THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

AS A RESPONSE TO RADICAL ISLAM IN POST-CASABLANCA SUICIDE BOMBINGS

OF MAY 16, 2003

by

MOUAD FAITOUR

(Under the Direction of Kenneth Lee Honerkamp)

ABSTRACT

The project conducted in this master's thesis treats the religious reforms initiated by the Moroccan government in its efforts to address the radicalization of a marginalized portion of Morocco's young people. This project has been initiated after the suicide bombings that the city of Casablanca witnessed in 2003. The reforms were launched in 2004 as a response to the radicalization of Islamic discourse in a nation—Morocco—that has an Islamic tradition going back over fourteen hundred years. The reforms include significant strategic steps, among which are the adopting and implementing in a regimented manner the principles of the Mālikī School of jurisprudence, the al-Ashʿarite doctrine of theology, both balanced by adherence to the path of Sūfism, according to the teachings of the well-known Sufi scholar, Al-Junayd al-Sālik. The thesis will discuss the effectiveness of implementing such reforms in defining "traditional Islam" within the context of Morocco as a modern democratic state.

INDEX WORDS: Moroccan Islam, Religious Radicalism, Religious Reforms, Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, the Moroccan Monarch (Amīr al-Muʾminīn), Jihad.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE AS A RESPONSE TO RADICAL ISLAM IN POST-CASABLANCA SUICIDE BOMBINGS OF MAY 16, 2003

by

MOUAD FAITOUR

B.A., University Hassan II at Casablanca, Morocco, 2014

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE AS A RESPONSE TO RADICAL ISLAM IN POST-CASABLANCA SUICIDE BOMBINGS OF MAY 16, 2003

by

MOUAD FAITOUR

Major Professor:	Kenneth Lee Honerkamp
Committee:	Alan Godlas
	Kevin M. Jones

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2019

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my profound gratitude to all the people that have contributed to the success of this thesis project and made it possible. This project wouldn't have been complete without the aid of several individuals whom I am grateful to have in my life. First, I sincerely would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Kenneth Lee Honerkamp, for his patience, guidance, orientation, and the correction of my thesis throughout this academic journey of this research. I am extremely fortunate to have worked under his supervision and direction. I really cannot thank him enough for all what he has done for me. I also awe a deep respect to Dr. Alan Godlas, who encouraged me to apply to the master's program at the University of Georgia and demonstrated an infinite support and encouragement. I would also like to seize this opportunity to thank Dr. Muṣṭafa al-Ṣamadi, professor of jurisprudence and economics at *Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines Ben M'sik,* Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco, who was so accommodating and generous to provide me with the necessary suggestions needed for this research project. I also wish to thank my parents and siblings who supported me emotionally and have always believed in me and my dreams. Finally, my sincere thanks go to my dear wife, Tugba Nur Dogan, for her love and spiritual support during this period of academic experience. Her patience and understanding were the source of energy behind the completion of my thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The thesis will comprise four chapters. The introduction and the conclusion will discuss the status of the *ʿulamāʾ*, the educated religious elite of traditional Islamic society and their social-political role in general – and this role in Morocco specifically - of assuring social stability and cultural continuity. It will present the function of the *ʿulamāʾ* as the ***bridge*** that has connected the ethical discourse, founded upon Islam's textual sources, the Qurʾān and the custom and usage of the Prophet, or *Sunna*, with the central thread of the social, political and intellectual heritage of the Muslim world for over fourteen centuries. Chapter two discusses the role of the *ʿulamāʾ* in social reform and their role in defining *Jihad* as a legal response to threats to the stability of Islamic society. An aspect of this duty is their responsibility to address any challenges that the Muslim community might face internally as well as externally. It is the *ʿulamāʾ's* task to stand firm against any ideology that may distort the authentic image of Islam, and among such ideologies is the radicalization of the concept of *jihad*. *Jihad* as a concept has always been of major importance for most of, if not all, the *ʿulamāʾ* throughout the more than fourteen centuries of Islamic history. In this chapter I will introduce how the *ʿulamāʾ* have treated this very sensitive term, particularly in the modern era. Chapter three will treat the religious reforms that have been undertaken by the Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, within the light of the role of the *ʿulamāʾ* as discussed in chapter two. This chapter will introduce the efforts of the Ministry to define 'Traditional Moroccan Islam' as an integral facet of Moroccan character and citizenship within the context of the *Madhab Mālikī*, theology of Hassan Ashʿari, and the Sufism of Junayd. The fourth

and final chapter will deal with specifics of these reforms, both nationally and internationally, and shed light on the cooperation between the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training and the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs in implementing and introducing the key concepts of these reforms within the public education curriculum for the future generations on the one hand, and in a wide spread campaign of general public education, on the other.

The research project adopts a social-historical approach in analyzing the above-stated religious reforms. The approach substantially supports our abilities to trace back early jihadist movements in Islamic history, starting with the Khāridjites (A.H. 37/ CE 657) through their social and political impacts on Islamic society until today. It helps situate the issue of jihad within a time/place context that more easily can be analyzed. It is essentially a comparative-analysis that is meant to provide the reader with an idea of the role of the *ʿulamāʾ* as a reference point, legally and spiritually, to the Muslim community, and how they address ideologies that threaten the stability and general wellbeing of the society, and the manner in which their task continues to be valid and effective with modern day Morocco. This social-historical approach is relevant to the present research project in the sense that it allows us to understand directly the role of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs within the Moroccan context in general, and at the same time to actually make us aware of a living discourse in Morocco's efforts to restore the traditional ideals and values of its people, founded upon the principles of tolerance and moderation of the Islamic faith, that have been hijacked by a minority of radical jihadists.

This research project is meant to provide insight into the fact that terrorism, as a global issue, is not only a menace to the West, but also to all Muslim Majority States without exception. Morocco's religious reforms, as stated earlier, are a clear indication on one nation's effort to address and minimize the threat of radicalized religious fervor to the wellbeing of its citizens. The

Moroccan example has been a positive response to this challenging issue and in future research I plan to follow up the programs initiated in Morocco with those other Muslim nations, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, that are taking the Moroccan model in an effort to implement the essential principles that have proved effective in Morocco. The current project presents the measures that the Moroccan government have been made to combat religious radicalism, in all its forms. The thesis also aims to add to the collective scholarly contributions that have been made to address the issues of terrorism and radicalization as an international threat.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROLE OF THE *ʿULAMĀʾ* IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITIONS

Let not the entire company of the believers go forth (to encounter the enemy);
If only a portion of each party go fourth (it would be better), that those who remain,
get instruction in the religion, that they may admonish their people when they return
in order that they take heed. Qur'an: 9:122

In 2003, the Moroccan city of Casablanca experienced a major suicide bombing. The present paper will deal with the religious reforms initiated by the Moroccan government to address the radicalization through Islamic fundamentalism of an increasingly marginalized portion of Morocco's youth. Crucial to these reforms, instigated by the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, is the status of the *ʿulamāʾ*, or the representatives of Islam's long scholarly tradtions and jurists (*fuqahāʾ*), and their role within Islamic society in general, and in Morocco specifically, of assuring social stability and cultural continuity. This paper will deal in particular with the function of the *ʿulamāʾ* of Islam as transmitters of the ethical discourse. Discourse that I will be focusing on in this paper that is central to the process in which the essential ideals and values of a community become integrated into the cloth of its social and communal identity. As discourse it is the shared heritage of all the participants of a given social matrix or community; some participants of course, taking a more active role in it than others. The *ʿulamāʾ* from this perspective, could be said to be the **bridge** that connects this ethical discourse, founded in Islam's textual sources, the Qurʾān and the custom and usage of the Prophet, or *Sunna* as narrated in the

body of hadith literature, with the central thread of the social, political and intellectual heritage of the Muslim world for over fourteen centuries. In short, as purveyors of Islam's textual tradition, the *ʿulamāʾ* have become both the representatives and interpreters of what constitutes normative Islamic society.

The *ʿulamāʾ* and the jurists, as stated above, function as the purveyors and translators of the 'text' to the 'populace' of their respective times. In this role they are the key factors to transforming and preserving their societies and provide as a positive guiding force for each individual to understand and decode for themselves the religious texts that both the Qur'an and Hadith represent. They are influential figures in their societies and their role is essential in the sense that they are the role models and the religious leaders of their communities. This paper will therefore address the ongoing attempts of the Moroccan government and its initiative to enliven religious discourse in the country that has long been part of the Islamic traditions through the promotion of an influential scholarly elite represented clearly in the persons of the *ʿulamāʾ*. These scholars, according to the Moroccan government, are believed to have always played an important religious role in the educational process of Moroccan society and helped maintain the national stability through their opposition to any religious ideology that threatens the integrity and stability of the Moroccan body politic. The term: *ʿulamāʾ* in the *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* is defined as follows:

> Inasmuch as *ʿilm* in the first instance was knowledge of traditions and of the resultant canon law and theology, the *ʿulamāʾ*, as peculiarly custodians of that tradition, were canonists and theologians. They, thus, as a general body, represented and voiced the Agreement of the Muslim people, and that Agreement was the foundation of Islām. In consequence the *ʿulamāʾ*, in whatever stated form they functioned, came to have, in a wide and vague fashion, the ultimate decision on all

questions of constitution, law and theology. Whatever the de facto government might be, they were a curb upon it, as surviving expression of the Agreement and of the right of the People of Muhammad to govern itself.[1]

According to the *Encyclopedia of Islam*:

> The *ʿulamāʾ* have long been a very distinct group, a regulated and structured body, expressing the popular voice, constituting the solid framework of permanent government behind these changing dynasties. In fact, during the first two centuries of Islam, they consisted of a relatively small number of people, engaged in the elaboration of *fiqh* and concentrated at Medina, in the south of ʿIrāq and in the caliphal capitals, and general lines of informal consensus were more easily established than was subsequently to be the case. This consensus (*iḏjmāʿ*) gave them weight but did not transform them into an institution comparable to a legislative body. However, they had a consciousness of their identity which marked them as a distinct group."[2]

Throughout Islamic history, the *ʿulamāʾ* have functioned as a bridge to the understanding of the Quran, seen as God's word, and the prophetic narratives. They are in high esteem and hold an eminent status among the generality of the Muslim population because their mission is prophet-like. In other words, since they are profoundly knowledgeable of the workings of the law (*sharī'a*), jurisprudence, and its textual sources, the Qu'ran and Hadith, as well as theology, and other scholarly viewpoints about religious issues, they are best suited to guide and direct people and

[1] *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam,* ed. Gibb H. A. R. and Kramers J. H. (Leiden: The Royal Netherlands Academy, 1953), 599.

[2] Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "*ʿUlamāʾ*," Accessed November 12, 2017, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ulama-COM_1278?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=.Ulama.

make them aware of the most essential facets of their religion. Traditionally speaking, the *ʿulamāʾ* and jurists have been highly respected in Islamic society. The importance for a group of people to be involved in teaching and providing good guidance within the Islamic social context is well portrayed in the following verse cited in Chapter *Tawba*, verse 122, which states:

> Let not the entire company of the believers go forth (to encounter the enemy); If only a portion of each party go fourth (it would be better), so that those who remain,
> are instructed in the religion, that they may admonish their people when they return in order that they take heed. (Qur'an: 9.122).

This verse demonstrates the important role of the *ʿulamāʾ* even under the most severe circumstances that Muslims may encounter, such as at times of war, when the community must take up arms to defend themselves. As stated above, it was the responsibility of the community to appoint a party of them to remain behind in order to study and teach people their religion and remind them of their multiple responsibilities upon the cessation of hostilities. In his book, *Asbāb al-nuzūl* (*Events Leading to Revelation*), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyyūtī (A.H. 849-911/CE 1445-1505) explains that this verse was revealed at a time when the community used to all go out to battle to defend the community leaving no one behind in Madina.[3] For this reason, the verse was revealed to explain to the Muslims that not going for *jihad* and staying with the prophet and the companions was considered as important as going to battle, or even more.

Imam Al-Qurtubī (d.671/CE1272), interprets this verse in his book, *Al-Jāmiʿ li aḥkām al-Qur'an*, according to him, it is not mandatory for all the Muslims to join in in the taking up of arms; if a group of them went on a campaign against an enemy for, others must stay in Medina

[3] Jalāl al-Dīn Al-Suyyūtī, *Asbāb al-nuzūl*, ed. Muhammad Muhammad Tāmr, (Cairo: Dār Ibn Al-Haytam, 2005), 114.

with the prophet to seek knowledge.[4] He adds that this verse promotes the virtue of knowledge, and it also demonstrates the role of the people who stayed with the prophet, which to become educated in the religion so they would be capable of transmitting these teachings to the rest of the community when they return from the campaign. Imam Al- Qurtubī states that seeking knowledge in this verse can be divided into two facets: *farḍ ʿayn* (individual obligation), meaning that learning is compulsory for every Muslim in the sense that they have to be able to serve God based on knowledge, especially when they are fulfilling their religious duties such as praying, fasting, and making pilgrimage. All this is considered as must-learn knowledge that every Muslim must seek. The second type of knowledge is *fard kifāya* (communal obligation), meaning that if a group of the community consecrates itself to learning and teaching the religion and jurisprudence, the rest of the community are free of the responsibility.

Ibn Kathīr's (d.774/CE1372) interpretation of this verse agrees with that of Al-Qurtubī said. In his commentary, *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿaẓim,* Ibn Kathīr argues that the verse was revealed during the Tabūk campaign to the North of the Arabian Peninsula. He writes, "It is not obligatory for all the Muslims to go out for the fight." He continues, "a group of people must stay with the prophet to learn about the religious teachings, especially during this time when revelation of the Qur'an was ongoing. Therefore, a group has to stay to learn about what is newly revealed so that they can inform their companions about it later when they come back from the battlefield.[5] Muhammad Sadr Al-Dīn Al-Baqlī (d.606/CE1209) explains in, *ʿArāʾis Al-Bayan fi tafsīr al-Quran*; a well-known Sufi commentary of the Qu'ran that, "those who remain with the prophet should comprise

[4] Abu 'Abdullāh Al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Aḥkām al Qur'an,* ed. Abū *Isḥāq Ibrāhim*, (Beirut: Dar Ihyā' a-Turat Al-ʿarabi, 1985), 293-297.
[5] Ibn Kathīr al-Quraishī, Abū Al-fidāʾ Ismāʿīl, *Tafsīr Al-Qur'an Al-ʿAẓīm,* ed. Shaykh Khalid Muhammad Maḥram, (Beirut: Al-Maktaba Al-ʿAssrīya, 2002), 364.

the elect of the community who are able to understand with insight the wisdom and knowledge being imparted by the Prophet and the essence of God's revelation and that which He wants them to know when it comes to serving Him."[6] According to Al-Baqalī, their learning of these religious teachings is a transformation that takes them from ignorance to knowledge, and from darkness to light.

The Qur'an continues to praise the *ʿulamāʾ*, as those who possess knowledge, in a variety of verses. It explains that the distinctive feature between an ordinary Muslim and an *ʿālim* or knowledgeable one is the religious knowledge they possess; therefore, knowledge is seen as a measuring standard to compare the status of the two. Because the *ʿulamāʾ* are knowledgeable of the teachings of the Qur'an, seen as God's words, it is believed that they are the ones who fear God most. "It is only those who have knowledge among His servants that truly fear God," (Qur'an: 35.28). Al-Baqalī comments that God combines fear with knowledge. The knowledge the *ʿulamāʾ* have of God is what makes them aware of His essential nature, and therefore, they fear Him more than other people. He adds that fear is one of the characteristics of the *ʿulamāʾ*. Likewise, Al-Qurtubī (d.671/ CE1272) agrees that the *ʿulamāʾ* are the people who know God's ultimate power and His omnipotence. They fear Him because they know His boundaries and cannot transgress the limits He has decreed. In other words, they can distinguish between *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* (the permitted and the forbidden) and justice and tyranny (*ʿadl and ẓalam)*; as a result, they are mindful and discerning not to exceed the limits. Ibn Kathīr adds that the *ʿulamāʾ* are those who have the religious knowledge that God made compulsory to learn. This knowledge contains the teachings

[6]Abū Muhammad, Sadr Al-Dīn, Al-Baqlī, *ʿArāʾis Al Bayan fi Tafsīr al-Quran,* ed. Ahmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, (Beirut: Dar Al-Kutub Al-ʿIlmīya, 1971), 58.

of the Quran, Sunnah, and everything derived from the teachings of the Prophet's companions, and that which has been taught after them from the Imams of the Sunni Muslims."[7]

The Qur'an is not the only textual evidence that covers the position of the *ʿulamāʾ*, the narrative traditions of prophetic reports promote and elaborate on the matter as well. Muslims believe that countless of hadiths have been reported that deal with the classification and the status of the *ʿulamāʾ*, as well as their significance and their role in society. Abū Dāwūd states in his *Sunan* that Muhammad said, "The scholars (*ʿulamāʾ*) are the heirs of the prophets."[8] Commenting on this tradition, Imam Ghazālī said in the *Book of Knowledge*, which is the first and longest part of *The Revival of The Religious Sciences*, that, "It is well known that there is no degree above that of prophecy, nor nobility above the nobility of heirs of that degree."[9] This hadith makes it clear that the *ʿulamāʾs* role and function is the same that the prophets came with, which is to transform God's words into actions and teach people how to assimilate these actions and apply them to their lives. Like the prophets, the *ʿulamāʾ*, with their knowledge of the textual sources of Islam, the Qur'an and Sunnah, are the bridge between God and His servants. In another Hadith, the prophet said, "The scholar is superior to the one fastening, praying at night, or striving in God's cause. When a scholar dies, a fissure opens in Islam that only a successor [of his degree] can close."[10] Hassan ibn Ali, once said, "The ink of scholars will be weighed against the blood of the martyrs, wherein the ink of the scholars will prove weightier than the blood of the martyrs."[11]

---

[7] Ibn Kathīr, 516.
[8] Abū Dawūd, 3641; al-Tirmidhī, 2682; Ibn Maja, 223.
[9] Al-Ghazālī, *The Revival of The Religious Sciences,* trans. Kenneth Honerkamp and Hamza Yusuf Hanson, (Louisville, Library of Congress, 2015), 5.
[10] Abū Tālib al-Makkī, Qūt al-qulūb, 1:143; al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, al-Jāmiʿ lil akhlāq al-rāwī wa-ādāb al-samiʿ, 350.
[11] Reported by Abū Nuʿaym, Tārīkh Iṣbahān, 2;178 Ibn ʿAbdal-Barr, Jamiʿ bayan al-ʿilm wa fadlih, 153, from the hadīth of ʿAbdallāh b.' ʿAme and Abū l-Dardaʾ as attributed to the prophet. It is also by al-Shīrāzī, al-Alqāb, from the hadith of Anas as attributed to the prophet. Perhaps Hassan Heard it from Anas. Al-Zabīdī, Ithāf. 1:90.

The Role of the 'Ulamāʾ in 'Traditional Moroccan Islam' in Assuring Social Stability and Cultural Continuity

The *ʿulamāʾ* have influenced both the public and the private sectors of the Muslim community throughout history and played a dynamic role in all spheres of their human activity, and in Morocco they are no exception. For Aḥmad Taoufīq, the Moroccan Minister of the Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, the Moroccan *ʿulamāʾ,* as a scholarly elite, have contributed to the protection of the national identity and the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Moroccan people.[12] Their contribution goes back to the foundation of Moroccan statehood in the 8th century by *Idrīs ibn ʿAbdu Allah*, the founder of the Idrisid dynasty in the ninth century. It was the *ʿulamāʾ* who established the fundamental pillars of Moroccan statehood through building trust between the king and his people. They constituted an entourage of a solid body of advisors to the king based upon consultation and advising concerning the matters of the state and its people.

The role of the *ʿulamāʾ* in Morocco began with the introduction of the *Mālikī* School of Thought to the 'Farthest West' (al-Maghreb al-Aqṣā, in Arabic, meaning Morocco) by a prominent jurist named, *Darrās ibn Ismāʿīl al-Fāsī* (d.357/CE968). By introducing the *Mālikī* rite *Darrās* made the task easier for the *ʿulamāʾ* to unite under one school of jurisprudence, which had been a dire necessity among scholars back then to set the cornerstone of the religious and juristic identity of the Moroccan state. It was the Moroccan scholar, *Othman al-Salāji*, who first presented the Creed of Imām Ḥassan al-Ashʿrī whose tenets of faith are characterized by moderate views and spirit of open-mindedness.[13]

[12] Ahmad. Taoufīq, "The Role of the *ʿulamāʾ* in Protecting the National Identity (in Arabic)," last accessed January 12, 2019, goo.gl/YH25s4

[13] Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, *The Hassanian Lectures* (in Arabic), (Muḥammadia: Matbaʿt Fdala, 2009), 22-23.

Central to the establishment of the tenets of the Muslim faith, the *ʿulamāʾ* have always stood firm against any threatening factors that might shake the social stability of the Moroccan people. During the times of the French protectorate in 1912, for example, the *ʿulamāʾ* were instrumental in the resistance against the colonial French and Spanish power: They demanded numerous reforms in all spheres of life including the army. They demonstrated solidarity through writing statements denouncing the occupation of Algeria which was still under French control and they called for jihad against the colonial aggression and condemned those involved in high treason. The leaders among the *ʿulamāʾ* took up arms and organized against the colonizers. Their struggle led to the emergence of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement with four leading scholars, namely *ʿAllāl al- Fāsī, Muḥammad al-Makkī al-Nāṣirī, Muḥammad al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī,* and *ʿAbdu Allah Kanūn,* who later (in post-colonial Morocco) became the founding fathers of the League of Moroccan Scholars.[14]

With the rise of the modern radical Islamist movements, the burden of replying to the challenge of these modernist political ideologies fell upon the shoulders of the Moroccan *ʿulamāʾ*. Their responsibility was to retrieve the traditional teachings of moderate Moroccan Islam that was being hijacked by a small vocal group of well-organized dissidents. In a speech delivered before the Moroccan monarch, Muḥammad VI, Aḥmad Taoufīq points out that it is the responsibility of the *ʿulamāʾ* to impede anyone from corrupting Islam or spreading mischief through manipulation of the sacred texts. It is still the *ʿulamāʾ*s task to protect this religion from the extremist sects that have been working to distort it. Taoufīq adds, "it is the *ʿulamāʾ*s primary goal to treat and handle sensitive religious issues that concern any intellectual deviation, which might lead to internal

[14] Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, *The Hassanian Lectures*, 28.

conflicts or sectarian violence within Moroccan society."[15] In the same speech the minister, Taoufīq, criticizes the contemporary "radical Salafist movement" stating that, "this tiny group has gone astray and excommunicated itself from the entire Muslim community, which represents the majority, to opt for violence, implement fear and terrorize innocent people." Taoufīq adds, "Ironically, this group is the one that deviated from the mainstream Muslims and all the four schools of law of Sunni Islam and, therefore, it has to reconcile with the entire Muslim community again."[16]

[15] Ahmad. Taoufīq, "The Role of the *ʿulamāʾ* in Protecting the National Identity," last accessed January 12, 2019, goo.gl/YH25s4
[16] Ibid

CHAPTER THREE

THE ʿULAMĀʾ AND JIHAD: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The *ʿulamāʾ* (religious scholars), as discussed earlier, have played a tremendous role in the understanding of the Quran and the prophetic narratives. They have always been considered as the religious reference to the Muslim community, especially when people are encountered with extremely challenging issues of the everyday life, be it familial, social, cultural, economic, or political. The *ʿulamāʾ* have, in many cases, been referred to in such challenging times to help remove the ambiguity and illustrate matters for people. In other words, the *ʿulamāʾ* operate as a **bridge** to the teachings of Islamic principles and values that Muslims must act upon according to the will of God and His Messenger, Muhammad. The *ʿulamāʾ's* role, as spiritually religious leaders, has granted them a highly respected position among their communities. Their authority comes directly from the profound knowledge of the law (*sharī'a*) and the ability to decode complicated religious texts, which have to do with historical and socio-cultural contexts in which they had been revealed and reported.

An aspect of this duty is the responsibility to address any challenges that face the Muslim community. It is their task to stand firm against any ideology that may distort the authentic image of Islam, and among such ideologies is the term jihad. This concept is not a new manifestation in the Islamic discourse; it has always been of major importance for most of, if not all, the *ʿulamāʾ* throughout more than fourteen centuries of Islamic history. It has been the *ʿulama's* responsibility to clear the dust of confusion from the minds of Muslims and non-Muslims who have a limited

understanding of what jihad entails. Jihad is not a new phenomenon that has recently emerged in the twenty-first century. In fact, its historical roots date back to the emergence of Islam in the 7th century CE.

The term jihad within the context of Islamic discourse and as used by the *ʿulamāʾ* has little to do with violence or what is termed "holy war" in the media against the Jews or Christians, or any other religious groups or minorities whose belief systems differ from Islam. Jihad is a word that is misused and frequently mentioned in the media in a sense that is different from its authentic meaning. Contrary to what the Western Media propagates, jihad does not mean 'war', let alone a 'holy war'. In this paper, I will present a background information on jihad, and I will try to argue that jihad, from the dawn of Islam, has been viewed, by prominent Islamic scholars, as a defensive principle.

War as a defensive principle: the right of people to defend themselves from being persecuted, oppressed, or put in life-threatening situations. A defensive war is a response to an attack on peoples' territories, protecting their national rights, establishing social justice, to ultimately restore their honor and dignity. When it comes to religion, a defensive war is waged to promote religious freedom for all individuals in a society which holds different sets of belief systems. As for who has the official authority to give the consent for the declaration of war, it goes to the head of the Muslim state who has a legitimate stance, not any category (religious groups) of society.

Linguistically, the word jihad, as a noun, comes from Arabic which literally means effort and struggle in a positive sense or a commendable manner. As a verb (*jāhada*), it means to strive, to do effort, and to struggle for the best. In his book, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Rudolph Peters explains:

> The Arabic word jihad (verbal noun of the verb *jāhada*) means to strive and exert oneself. The word has a central connection of an effort towards a praiseworthy purpose. In a religious context it may express a struggle against one's evil inclinations or exertion for the sake of Islam and the *umma* (Muslim community).[17]

In Islam the word jihad may be used in a variety of contexts to refer to different situations: It may refer to the inner struggle (between good and evil forces) of a Muslim to act righteously according to the will of God. It can also mean the efforts to build a homogeneously perfect Muslim society that thrives for the wellbeing of the Muslim community. Finally, jihad can only mean 'warfare' in the case of oppression against Muslims. This will bring us again to the notion of defensive warfare, which has been covered by Rudolph Peters, in which he elucidates that on the strength of those Qur'anic verses that make fighting against the non-believers conditional upon their aggression or perfidy. The Middle Eastern Muslim reformers like Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashīd Ridā (1865-1935) argue that peaceful coexistence is the normal state between Islamic and non-Islamic territories, and that jihad is only allowed as a defensive warfare. Peters indicates that, "this left the way open to proclaim jihad against colonial oppression, as the colonial enterprise was clearly an attack on the territory of Islam."[18]

[17] Peters Rudolph, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, (Princeton: Library of Congress, 1996), 1.
[18] Peters Rudolph, 6.

It is of the utmost importance to consider the historical context of the environment where Islam emerged before making any pre-judgmental conclusion concerning the word jihad. According to Michael Bonner, in his book, *Jihad in Islamic History*: "Islam arose in an environment where warfare—or at any rate, armed violence with some degree of organization and planning—was a characteristic of everyday life."[19] Historically, when Islam came into existence in the Arabian Peninsula (a pagan society), it was not welcome in that unfriendly atmosphere. The Arabian Peninsula was a boiling spot of tribal conflicts and wars. Bloodshed and waging wars against the neighboring tribes was a common practice, and any tribe can unexpectedly attack its neighbors either for revenge, stealing others' properties, or for petty reasons such as a cow trespasses a field of a person of a certain tribe, then the entire tribe would wage a war on that basis. Unfortunately, and sadly, this widespread violence led to unhealthy practices among the Arab tribes back then, which was to kill (by burying alive) their baby girls because they thought that a tribe couldn't stand strong enough to defend itself if there were only baby girls born. For the Arabs, females were not reliable to fight in case a war was waged against them. However, they wouldn't kill their baby boys because, in their mindset, boys signify the future soldiers of the tribes.

The Muslims of Mecca had endured more than ten years of persecution and repression before God's permission was given to them to defend themselves as a form of jihad. The newly converted Muslims of Mecca were persecuted simply because they said, as cited in the Qur'an, *Our Lord is God* [*Al-Hajj:* 40] in a dominant pagan society. The social injustice the Muslims were exposed to forced them to leave all their families and properties behind and migrate, first, to Abyssinia, then to Medina as refugees. Migration was not a pleasant move for the Muslims back then since life in Medina was completely different from what they were accustomed to. In other words, Mecca was

[19] Michael Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, (Princeton University Press: Library of Congress, 2006), 7.

a trade center and most Meccans were merchants; whereas, Medina was an agricultural oasis, where farming was the primary source of economy. This was a challenge for the Meccan refugees who migrated to Medina. According to David Cook in his book, *Understanding Jihād*, in which the author states, "the persecutions of the pagan Quraysh forced the Muslims to emigrate to Medina. During the course of this migration, many of the Muslims lost most or all of their worldly goods and were unable to adjust to life in the agricultural oasis of Medina as Mecca lacked any agriculture [see 14:37]."[20] This religious oppression arose an urge among Muslims to fight back as an act of resistance against their oppressors, and was one of the leading factors for Muslims to wage jihad. Jihad in this context was not to kill the pagans because they were so; however, it was more about restoring dignity and establishing justice.

Jihad Within the Framework of Quranic Teachings

The above situates jihad within the historic-economic context of Medina immediately after the *Hijra* (migration). The Qur'anic revelation elucidates this context, making it clear that Muslims waged warfare as a defensive principle:

> The believers against whom war is waged are given permission to fight in response, for they have been wronged. Surely, God has full power to help them to victory. Those who have been driven from their homeland against all right, for no other reason than that they say, "Our Lord is God." Were it not for God's repelling some people by means of others, monasteries and churches and synagogues and mosques, where God is regularly worshipped, and His name is much mentioned, would surely have been pulled down (with

[20] David Cook, Understanding Jihad, (University of California Press: Library of Congress, 2005), 7.

the result that God is no longer worshipped, and the earth becomes uninhabitable). God most certainly helps whoever helps His cause. Surely, God is All-Strong, All-Glorious with irresistible might. (Qur'an: 22. 39-40).

These are the first verses of fighting revealed to the Muslims in Medina, emphasizing the essential component of justice. The verses clearly state that the main cause is not to compel others to convert to Islam. On the contrary, it is about their natural rights as humans to defend themselves. This permission was fueled by the motive that the Muslims were unjustly obliged to abandon and leave all their properties and homes behind without justification. Muslims submitted to God's will by remaining patient till the leave to fight was given to them. Whenever they asked the prophet to permit them to fight back, "I have not been commended to wage a war yet," the Prophet Muhammad used to respond. Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/ CE 1372), a well-known commentator on the Qur'an, explains that these verses were the first verses that commended Muslims to wage jihad. The verses were revealed when the prophet Muhammad (may God peace and blessings be upon him) and his companions were forced to migrate to Medina due to the suffering they were exposed to for several years under the most severe kinds of punishment, oppression in their religious freedom, and persecution for the sake of the creed they chose.[21] Similarly, Al-Qurtubī (d. 671/CE 1272), stresses on the fact that waging jihad came as a result of the tyranny that Muslims went through, that which is well-represented in their expulsion to Abyssinia, first, and Medina later as refugees. Therefore, jihad was permitted by a divine command, and it is a legitimate prerogative for the Muslims to fight back their enemy.[22]

[21] Ibn Kathīr al-Quraishī, Abū Al-fidāʾ Ismāʿīl, *Tafsīr Al-Qur'an Al-ʿAẓīm,* ed. Shaykh Khalid Muhammad Maḥram, (Beirut: Al-Maktaba Al-ʿAssrīya, 2002), 212.
[22] Abu 'Abdullāh Al-Qurtubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Aḥkām al Qur'an,* ed. Abū *Isḥāq Ibrāhim*, vol 12, (Beirut: Dar Ihyā' a-Turat Al-ʿarabi, 1985), 68-69.

Some of the verses that justify the fighting of non-believers as a form of jihad are mentioned in the second *surah* of the Qur'an, *Al-Baqarah*, verses 190-192, in which God urges Muslims to engage in a warfare against those who repressed them, but this time it was not a permission, it was rather a command:

> Fight in God's cause (to exalt His Name) against those who fight against you, but do not exceed the bounds (set by God), for surely God loves not those who exceed the bounds. (While at war) kill them wherever you come upon them and expel them from where they expelled you; persecution is grievous than slaying. But fight them not by the Holy Mosque until they should fight you there; then, if they fight you, slay them—such is the recompense of unbelievers—but if they desist (from fighting), surely God is All-Forgiving, All-Compassionate. (Qur'an: 2.190-192)**.**

These verses don't only commend the Muslims to fight the non-believers, but they clearly elucidate the purpose of the fight as well. Muslims were ordered to fight those who fought against them and expel those who expelled them. However, and simultaneously, Muslims were ordered not to exceed the limits set by God. By transgressing the bounds, Muslims are prohibited to turn the warfare into their favor or take advantage of it by fighting non-combatants, or those who are not involved in the war at all, or killing women, children, rabbis, priests, monks, cutting trees, or even killing animals (be they the animals of their enemy or wild life in general). In other words, civilians must be left in peace as long as they leave Muslims in peace. The verses forbid Muslims to initiate aggression and fight and ban them from fighting in the sacred places during sacred times till they (Muslims) are fought against.

The verses also point out to a very crucial issue in human history, *fitnah*, (referred to as persecution in Arabic) in which the Qur'an considers to be worse than slaying or causing

bloodshed. The Qur'an views that preventing people to freely practice their religious beliefs, expelling them from their homelands, or threatening their lives, is considered *fitnah*. Therefore, all Muslims must stand against this form of social injustice. Regarding the term *fitnah* in this context, Peters (1996) points out that expelling people from their homes, frightening them while they are safe and preventing them from living peacefully without fear for their lives or possessions is persecution worse than persecution by means of murder and bloodshed. Therefore, those who practice or provoke such things must be fought just like those who fight.[23]

The following verses are going to present the legitimacy that was given to Muslims to fight unbelievers with whom a peace treaty was signed, but the other party broke their pledges with the Muslims. In this case Muslims had to take a serious action via engaging in a warfare with the oath-breakers. *Surat At-Tawbah* (verses: 12-13) plainly explains this situation:

> But if they break their pledges after their treaty (with you) and assail your religion, then fight those leaders of unbelief—surely, they have no trustworthy pledges—so they may desist (from aggression). Will you not fight against the people who have broken their pledges and have done all they could to expel the messenger and initiated hostilities against you? Do you fear them? But God has greater right that you should fear Him, if you are sincere believers. (Qur'an: 9. 12-13).

Having a rational look at these two verses helps the readers understand the context in which Muslims had to wage jihad against non-Muslims and clears the doubts of prejudice against Muslims as being aliens who crave the blood of those who don't want to convert to Islam. In the beginning of the verse, it states that breaking the pledges is the first cause behind the fight (not

[23] Peters Rudolph, 74.

compelling people to convert). Second is that the unbelievers defame the religion of Muslims. Third, they were the ones who initiated aggression against Muslims.

What can be deduced from all the above stated verses, according to Maḥmūd Shaltūt, in his book, *Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Qitāl*, is that there is no single verse in the Qur'an that urges Muslims to fight for the sake of converting people to Islam. In contrast, Shaltūt explains that there are only three reasons for jihad to be launched: to restore dignity and stop aggression, to establish religious freedom for all, and to protect the mission of Islam.[24] These verses are a self-sufficient response to the unfair claims made against Islam as being a divine mission to spread Islam worldwide with compulsion and violence.

The Qur'an itself states that Muslims must not attack, as a fulfillment of religious duty, people of different faiths and philosophies where peace is prevailing. On the contrary, Muslims are asked, as cited in the Qur'an, that kindness, gentleness, and courtesy should humbly be displayed when treating or interacting with people of different religious backgrounds and philosophies. Such verses can be found in *surat Al-Mumtahinah,* verses 8-9:

> God does not forbid you, as regards to those who don't make war against you on account of your religion, nor drive you away from your homes, to be kindly to them, and act towards them with equity. God surely loves the scrupulously equitable. God only forbids you, as regards to those who make war against you on account of your religion and drive you away from your homes, or support others to drive you away, to take them as guardians. Whoever takes them for guardians or in charge of their affairs, those are wrongdoers. (Qur'an: 60.8-9)**.**

[24] Mahmoud Shalūt, Al-Qur'an Wa Al-Qitāl, (Cairo: Matbaʿat Al-Kitāb Al-ʿArabi, 1951), 35-36.

The disbelievers whom the Muslims are ordained not to fight against in these verses are a category of Meccans (idolaters), who denied the message of the Prophet Muhammad, but they didn't show hostility or wage a warfare against Muslims. In other words, since this category of pagans didn't initiate aggression, and as long as they are kind to Muslims, Muslims must be kind to them as well. Thus, Muslims had to leave them in peace simply because they had showed peace. These verses can be considered as an Islamic covenant of peace concerning the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. They are a distinct evidence of peace as the policy of Islam towards nonbelievers.

Reading *surat Al-Maʾdah*, verse 5, the Qur'an doesn't stop at the peaceable co-existence with people of different faiths, particularly the Jews and the Christians, seen as The People of Book, however, it transcends this to a more of an interfaith level:

> This day [all] good foods have been made lawful, and the food of those who were given the Scripture is lawful for you and your food is lawful for them. And [lawful in marriage are] chaste women from among the believers and chaste women from among those who were given the Scripture before you, when you have given them their due compensation, desiring chastity, not unlawful sexual intercourse or taking [secret] lovers. And whoever denies the faith - his work has become worthless, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers. (Qur'an: 5.5).

Reading this verse, one can obviously perceive the lofty spirit of Islamic peaceful co-existence with people of different religious ideologies. Islam does not forbid Muslims from engaging in intercultural interactions which are represented clearly in food and interfaith marriages. Islam, on the contrary, encourages such healthy social practices to prevail and makes them legitimate.

Jihad Within the Context of Prophetic Narratives

The prophetic narratives are regarded also as a rich source of incidents of the peaceful co-existence and the compassionate spirit towards people of different faiths, or even towards his enemies. An example of the Prophet Muhammad's merciful magnanimity is well expressed in the following passage when he (the Prophet) came with an army of ten thousand soldiers as a conqueror (*fātiḥ* in Arabic) towards Mecca, his birthplace from which he unwillingly was driven away. It was reported by Ibn Isḥāq that the Prophet Muhammed manifested an ideal example of mercy and forgiveness towards the people of Mecca, who persecuted and oppressed the early Muslim community for more than ten years. The Quraysh of Mecca already knew that there is no chance of evading the Prophet's massive army:

> "the Prophet Muhammad called upon the Quraysh of Mecca, guaranteeing peace stating, whoever enters the house of Abī Sufyān is safe, whoever enters his/her own house is safe, and whoever enters a mosque is safe."[25]

The Prophet, as cited in this passage, was not driven by vengeance or a spirit of retaliation towards his oppressors who persecuted them for more than ten years. He could have gone to that path if he had willed, but he wished to teach the Muslim community that mercy prevails over wrath, which is seen as one of God's attributes in the Muslim faith. "God's mercy prevails over His anger."[26] This compassionate noble conduct of the Prophet Muhammad towards the people of Quraysh of Mecca was to teach Muslims and non-Muslims, with no exception, that Islam's mission

[25] Abi Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Malik, Ibn Hishām al-Maʿārifī, *Al-Sīra al-Nabawiya*, V III, ed. Al-Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Quṭb and al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Dālī Balṭa, (Beirut: Al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriya, 2003), 40.
[26] Muslim 2751

is not primarily concerned with waging warfare or shedding bloods; however, it came to fight aggression and establish religious freedom for everyone.

In a hadith reported by Abū Dāwūd in his book, *Kitāb Al-Malāḥim* (the Book of Battles), in which the Prophet Muhammad states: Leave the Turks in peace as long as they leave you peace and leave the Ethiopians in peace as long as they leave you in peace.[27] The hadith addresses an important issue of mutual peace. It teaches Muslims that peace is the normal situation of co-existence between Islamic and non-Islamic states as in the case of the Turks who were pagans back then, and the Abyssinians were believed to be the People of the Book (Christians). If it was a mission for compelling people to convert to Islam, the prophet could have commanded the Muslims to wage war against the two above-mentioned countries, which they completely held different belief systems. What can be deduced from the prophetic narrative is that jihad is meant to be against the aggressors and oppressors alone.

In another hadith reported by Bukhari in which the prophet does not only emphasize on the peaceful interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims under the rule of the Islamic state, but he also stresses on the notion of no aggression must be committed by a Muslim against non-Muslim. In other words, no jihad must be held against non-Muslim innocents who live under the protection of the Islamic state or has a covenant of peace with Muslims. The prophet Muhammad states: "Whoever kills a person of the People of Covenant (such as Jews and Christian or people of other creeds or philosophy) with whom there is a covenant between them and Muslims, he or she will not enter Paradise."[28] The hadith is a self-explanatory of how Islam denounces violence or the killing of innocent people.

[27] Sunan Abi Dawūd 4302
[28] Bukhari, 3166.

Lesser vs. Greater Jihad

While still on the journey of discovering the authentic meaning of jihad, it is important to draw the readers' attention to the understanding of two crucial forms of jihad and help them distinguish between the two, the lesser *jihad* and the greater jihad. The lesser jihad is an external form of jihad. It may refer to a military struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims in case a warfare breaks out. It is between the Muslims and their oppressive enemy. Whereas, the greater jihad is an internal spiritual struggle between the Muslim and himself (jihad *al-Nafs* in Arabic). In other words, it is about waging a spiritual warfare to live according to the teachings of Islam and try to apply these teachings in the everyday life in a manner that can please God.

The below cited prophetic narrative is among the well-known hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad expresses a clear distinction between the two forms of jihad:

> "A number of fighters came to the Messenger of God, and he said: "You have done well in coming from the 'lesser jihad' to the 'greater jihad.'" They said: "What is the 'greater jihad'? He said: "For the servant [of God] to fight his passions."[29]

In the eyes of the ʿulamāʾ the lesser jihad (military warfare against the enemy) is less challenging than the greater jihad (the spiritual warfare). To illustrate more, the lesser jihad is a temporary war between the Muslims and external forces (an enemy or an oppressor). In this situation Muslims are involved in a battle, and upon their death their mission is complete. Whereas, the greater jihad is more of an internal conflict. It is a permanent and everlasting fight; it starts on the Muslim's day of birth and continues throughout their lifetime.

[29] David Cook. *Understanding Jihad*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2005), 35.

For scholars, fighting one's passions and whims is the highest form of greater jihad. In this regard, the great theologian and Sufi scholar Imam al-Ghazalī (d. 504/CE 1111) presents, in his distinguished literary work, *Ihyaʾ ʿulum al-dīn* (*Revival of the Religious Knowledge*), the lusts and passions of the soul as an invading army trying to conquer the body and keep it from following the path of mysticism. Al-Ghazalī has made it clear that the real army for Muslims to fight against are their desires. Imam al-Ghazalī uses the word 'army' intentionally to describe the constant spiritual battle Muslims live in and engage into throughout their entire lives.[30] Resisting their passions is what is the greater jihad from a mystic stance.

Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī (d.1021), a prominent mystic scholar, considers the soul (*nafs*) as the primary enemy of Muslims. Therefore, *jihād* must be waged against it:

> It is not your enemy who kills you so that God can cause you to enter paradise—[though] if you kill him it will be a light for you—but the worst of enemies is your soul that is between the two sides [of your body].[31]

The soul being described as the primary enemies are used figuratively by Imam al-Sulamī to explain that any forces that may distract a believer from being closely attached to the spiritual path, which is vigorously connected to the remembrance of God, is an enemy. Since the remembrance of God is the cornerstone of the Sufi traditions, which profoundly marked the mystic life of Sufi Muslims throughout history, anything that deviates a Muslim from this path is considered an enemy.

[30] David Cook. *Understanding Jihad*, 37.

[31] Ibid, 36.

Al-Sulamī's viewpoint on the greater jihad is similar to that of Imam al-Ghazalī in the sense that both centralize their arguments on the soul as being the major enemy to human beings. They both view that the real enemy is the one that comes from within, and it is the one that should be taken seriously. For Imam al-Sulamī and al-Ghazalī, the soul is an internally threatening opponent, and therefore, fighting it must be a priority. However, both scholars don't deny or exclude the militant jihad (lesser jihad), or they even attempt to substitute it for the spiritual jihad, they just perceive it as a primordial point of concern when the issue of jihad is brought up to discussion.

One variation from the Sufi jihad is the political one. For politicians, jihad denotes all the social actions and the political reforms that Muslim societies need to establish in order to achieve Islam's social and political agenda. Political jihad is to improve the laws and constitutions in accordance with the expectations of the public. Jihad in this context is to build a democratic state where every individual bears equal rights to vote without being discriminated. Political jihad is the warfare that must be waged against the wide-spread unhealthy corruption in the Muslim societies, which cause them to collapse from within. Political jihad is a long-lasting battle towards the establishment of justice and prosperity in all spheres of society.

In this spirit of political jihad, Richard Bonney in his book, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, illustrates it from a political stance as follows:

> President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia used the term jihad to describe the struggle for economic development in Tunisia, much as Lyndon Jonson spoke of a 'War on Poverty'. In this context, jihad no more implies violence than the terms 'war' or 'crusade' on poverty in today's English. Bourguiba clearly did not advocate violence to improve education and development in Tunisia. The Muslims in India proclaim on their website: 'we have kept

our religion within our mosques and houses, and we are fighting a jihad against ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and disease and not against the state'.[32]

This short passage introduces various facets of political jihad. In fact, it doesn't stick to the classically strict way of interpreting it as a "holy war" or violence against non-Muslims to convert them to Islam. However, the word jihad is a flexible term that is free of any restrictions. As shown above, it can denote a struggle to build a vigorously developed economy, a war against poverty, or combatting any form of political or economic deficits that may hinder or slow down the development of the Muslim societies.

In a nutshell, jihad, as has been discussed previously in this paper, is used by the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions as a defensive principle. Both the Qur'anic teachings and the Prophetic narratives advocate this cause. Muslims had to endure more than ten years of persecution before the divine permission of launching a war was given to them in order to protect the community and establish freedom of religion for everyone living under the Muslim state. It is also important to put in mind that the word jihad is a rich concept in meaning, broad in content, and it can't be imprisoned in the narrow cell of war and violence. Limiting it to "waging warfare against nations to kill innocents, loot their properties, or colonize their homelands in the name of religion" means violating one of the main pillars upon which Islam was founded, which is peace. Peace has always been Islam's priority to prevail; even at times of war, it is mandatory for Muslims to cease fighting and set truce of peace if the enemy demonstrates a complete willingness to do so.

Jihad might come sometimes as a harsh response to oppression and injustice; however, it is not the only form that it can take. Jihad is an umbrella term that starts with loving God and His

[32] Richard Bonney, *Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden*, forwarded by. Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 12.

Messenger and moves forward into acting according to Islamic teachings which first and foremost entails treating humankind with justice. Jihad is a constant battle to steadfastly stay on the straight path of ethical behavior. It entails the removal as well of treacherous politicians from power and liberating the general population from tyranny. It is a fight to build a developed society. Jihad in Islam is to strive in the path of God by the pen (seeking knowledge and excelling in it), the tongue (to speak the truth when no one else is able to), and the hand (defending the oppressed and standing up for their rights). Jihad is to be able to greet someone with a broad smile no matter how difficult one's day is.

Jihad Between Modern and Pre-Modern Era

At the present time, however, Muslims radicals, implementing a modern agenda, deny and turn a blind eye on these, above discussed, nuanced interpretations of jihad and adhere to extremist readings and interpretations of the Quran and Sunna in order to spread "their own version" of Islam. Such radical groups reject the use of reason and intellect, which most schools of Islamic thought were founded upon, they opt for violence and armed struggle as a primary means to instill terror in both Muslim civilians and established Muslim governments. One of the techniques they rely upon to justify taking up arms against the citizens, governments, and rulers is the use of *takfīr* (anathematizing). The term *takfīr* refers to the act of declaring someone to be a non-Muslim (*kāfir)* and no longer under the protection of the Sharia. The danger inherent within this concept doesn't stop at simply labelling Muslims as heretics or non-believers, it leads to the issue of justified violence against other Muslims. An example of this is the assassination of President Anwar Sadāt (by a *jihadist* group) in Egypt in 1981, or more recently the killing of at least 305 Sufi Muslims last year (2017) in what officials are calling the worst terrorist attack in Egypt's modern history.

The tragedy of this most recent incident in Egypt is that all the victims were peaceful Muslims, who just had prayed the Friday congregational prayer at a large Sufi shrine in the Sinai Peninsula, their only crime in the eyes of the fundamentalists, was that they had prayed in a mosque in which a Sufi Saint was buried. Jihadists today target this form of Islamic practice and its followers (Sufis) not only because of their tolerant views of Islam or their path to approaching God as they see it, they were attacked as well due to their relative passivity in the face of the policies of the government. In fact, some experts say that the amicable ties between Sufis and the Egyptian government might be the real factor behind their being targeted, this gives the attack a political dimension. Alexander Knysh elaborates on the political aspect of the jihadists in an article, pointing out that from the point of view of the jihadists, "If Sufis continue to support the government policies, we will be against them."[33] Professor Alexander D. Knysh, suggests that they think that society is moving in the wrong direction and Sufis are aiding and abetting the authorities on this corrupt path.

For the above reasons the ideology of *takfir* applies to any Muslim who does not actively oppose the government whose policies the jihadists consider non-Islamic, making violence against them a legitimate option. The origins of *takfīr* can be traced back to the fundamentalist sect of Khārijites in the early centuries of Islam and has recently been enlivened by radical Islamist groups such as Muslim Brotherhood and *Jamāʿat al-Takfīr wa-l-Hijra* (Association of *al-Takfīr* and migration). The doctrines of the Khāridjites opened the door to intra-religious conflict and would mark the political spectrum within the then spreading Islamic World, until today, as a recent author has affirmed.

[33] Megan Specia, "Who Are Sufi Muslims and Why Do Some Extremists Hate Them?," last accessed August 31, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/middleeast/sufi-muslim-explainer.html

The Khāridjites are believed to be the earliest sect of Islamic rebels to involve in a religio-political controversy over the caliphate. The word Khāridjites in Arabic means those who exit the community. The origins of this movement go back to ʿAlī's and Muʿāwiya's first political conflict over the caliphate in the Islamic history, known as the first *fitna* of Islam. The members of this Islamic sect were supporters of the fourth caliphate of Islam, ʿAlī (January 661), as they strongly believed in his legitimacy as the ruler of the Muslim community; however, they separated themselves from him, proclaiming the nullity of his role as a caliph after accepting the reconciliation presented by his rival, Muʿāwiya. The proposal presented to ʿAlī by Muʿāwiya during the battle of Ṣiffīn (Ṣafar 37/July 657) to settle the differences arising out of the murder of ʿUthmān, which had provoked the war, by referring it to two referees who would pronounce judgment "according to the Ḳurʾān". While the majority of ʿAlī's army readily adopted this proposal, either because they were tired of war or because the "Ḳurʾān-readers" (*ḳurrāʾ*) hoped there would emerge from this Ḳurʾānic judgment the justification of the furious campaign they had conducted against ʿUthmān which had ended in the latter's assassination, one group of warriors, mainly of the tribe of Tamīm, vigorously protested against the setting up of a human tribunal above the divine word. Loudly protesting that "judgment belongs to God alone" (*lā ḥuḳma illā li-llāhi*) they left the army and withdraw to the village of Ḥarūrāʾ[34].

Khāridjites were renowned for their opposition to their rulers and governments and their terrorist acts toward innocent Muslims who disagree with their views and positions. This sect

[34] Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "Khāridjites," accessed September 30, 2018, https://referenceworks-brillonline-com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/kharidjites-COM_0497?s.num=5&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=al-Khawaridj

manifested itself in a variety of extremist actions; they went beyond the norms of the mainstream Muslims and began to brand as an infidel and outside the protection of the law who did not accept their views and disown ʿAlī as well as ʿUthmān, they started massacring people, sparing no one.[35]

The Khāridjite crisis appeared during the first century of Islam and perished; however, their ideology has been an everlasting one, it can be rejuvenated anytime and anywhere. Their ideology can take different shapes and forms according to the different political and social context and the way different jihadist groups manipulate it. However, the ideology itself remains the same ideology adapted by the Khāridjites in the pre-modern era.

The same issuw of *takfīr* was arose again with the coming of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328),[36] who was regarded as a prominent theologian and a legal philosopher, he lived between the13th and the 14th centurie Egypt. Ibn Taymiyya, as a scholar of his time, had gained a broad knowledge and understanding of Islamic disciplines including the Qur'an, the Prophetic narratives, theology, and jurisprudence. He was forcibly taken as a refugee to Damascus during the Mongol conquest of Iraq in the 13th century.[37] Ibn Taymiyya, is considered one of the most literal interpreters of traditional Islam, and he wrote prolifically on Sunni Islam. Above all, Ibn Taymiyya has been criticized in modern times as a reactionary, and someone who has given a "voice" to radical Islam activists, who are seeking to regain the alleged purity and uniformity of the early followers of the

[35] Ibid
[36] There are some debates whether Ibn Taymiya held the ideology of *takfīr* or not, but according Rudolph Peters in his book, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Ibn Taymiyya issued two fatwas regarding the legitimacy of the Mongol rule in the Middle East. For Ibn Taymiyya, the fact that the Mongol applied their own law instead of *Sharīʿa*, was a sufficient cause to regard them as non-belivers, (Princeton: Library of Congress, 1996), 8.
[37] Yahya Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya Against Extremisms*, forwarded by Bruce Lawrence, (Beirut: Dar Albouraq,2012), XIV.

Prophet, as well as justification for the degree of intolerance among contemporary radical Islamists toward other Muslims and any expressions of the faith that are different from their own.[38]

An understanding of this medieval scholar is important for anyone trying to grasp from where the contemporary radical jihadists are coming from. The ideology of *takfīr* was arose again with the Mongol conquest of the Middle East and establishment of their own legal system instead of the Sharīʿa oriented morality before the conquest, this applied even after their conversion to Islam. Ibn Taymiyya felt that the Mongols were still outside the faith as long as they applied their own laws of governance instead of God's divine law. Even though the Mongol pronounced the testimony of faith [There is no god but God and Muhammad is His Messenger] and officially embraced Islam, it was not enough for Ibn Taymiyya until they applied Sharīʿa law in the courts. According to Ibn Taymiyya, any Muslim leader who fails to enforce Sharīʿa law in all aspects of life, including the conduct of *jihād*, forfeits his right to rule; thus, the justification by some jihadists of their own ideology of *takfir* is based on Ibn Taymiyya's thought.

With the coming of modernity and colonialism jihadist groups emerged as a resisting force against colonial western powers or after independence against the postcolonial nationalist elite that grew out of the struggle for independence. Paramount behind this postcolonial struggle was the failure of the Muslim governments to establish liberal democratic societies, these groups would later adapt the *takfīr* ideology as their counterparts (Khāridjites) has done against their own co-religionists, other Muslims. Among these were the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), in 1929, *Jamāʿāt Islāmiyya* (Islamic Groups) founded around

[38] Bonney Richard, "*Jihad from Qur'an to bin Laden,"* forwarded by. Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 120.

1972, *al-Daʿwa* (The Call) in 1976, the Association of Muslims (*Jamāʿāt al-Muslimīn*) in 1977, who became better known as *Jamāʿāt al-Takfīr wa-l-Hijra* (The Association of al-*Takfīr* and Migration), and the Jihad Organization (*Tanẓīm al-Jihād*).[39]

As pointed out earlier in this thesis, the absence of democracy with the post-colonial period within the Muslim majority world led to the emergence on the one hand of Modernist Islam as a new perspective, that accepted the Euro-American imposed "modern state" as a vehicle for Islamic reform; while on the other the need establish justice in society led to radical Islamic movements that espoused violence as a means of reform. Both elements complimented one another, all the while never admitting to their secular/modernist roots. The relatively "new" interpretations of Islamic law and practice were always couched in the terms of Traditional Islam, which led to the dilemma of defining what the "tradition" actually meant.

I will discuss as the conclusion to this chapter and in order to contextualize the issue of Islamic discourse in Morocco the history of the development of the attempts to arrive at a working definition of "tradition" and their applications within modern Islamic. This is essential in our understanding the institutionalization of traditional discourse by the Moroccan government as a response to the terrorist attacks of 2003 in Casablanca, Morocco and as a means to reclaiming the "tradition" within the specifically Moroccan context of the Mālikī legal school, the theology of Hassan Ashʿari, and the Sufism of Junayd.

Our story begins in Egypt as a British colony, and with one of the founders of modern Islamic thought, Hassan al-Banna (1906/1949). He was a professor of the traditional Islamic sciences, and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. He never supported British rule over Egypt and advocated

[39] Rudolph Peter, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam,* (Princeton: Library of Congress, 1996), 154.

for the cessation of the British domination of Egyptian society. He campaigned calling the Egyptian people back to the "true" principles of Islam and its traditional foundations. His call would lead some years later in 1953 Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) a well known journalist and thinker to join the Muslim Brotherhood. He is remembered, after Hassan al-Banna as the most influential Islamist figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, his book *Milestones*, may be the most influential work on political thought composed in the twentieth century. He was a teacher, an author, poet, and a thinker whose view points and ideas led to his eventual imprisonment for anti-government activities until in 1966, he was executed by the Egyptian government led by Gamal Abd al-Nasr. The Muslim Brotherhood, under the repression of British colonial power at the time of Hassan al-Banna and the torment undergone by Sayyid Qutb in prison under Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime were the leading factors that shaped the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood which was later radicalized in a variety of forms and movements in Egypt and elsewhere after the Sayyid Qutb.[40]

Islamic radical groups in post-colonial Egypt believed that Western values had polluted the morals of the Muslim society and postcolonial nationalist elite who became dictators supported by Western governments had established as immoral state in their homeland.[41] Under circumstances such as these Muslim political activism, distanced itself from the tradition of the earlier generations, who in their eyes has allowed this state of affairs to occur, and became radicalized in the form of jihadists who espoused violence as a means of fighting against the implementation of Western values within Muslim society. Such groups sought to realize the ideal of an Islamic state through the implementation of *sharīʿa* law, founded upon a literalist interpretation of the Quran and Sunna sources. This eventually led the members of radical Islamic organizations to divide the

[40] Tommy Larsson, "The Islamist Ideology of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb: A Comparative Analysis," last accessed September 29, 2018, https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/60197/Tommy-Larsson-MA-Thesis.pdf?sequence=1
[41] Ibid

Muslim community into two camps, those who opposed the government and those who did not, this led to the doctrine of *takfīr*; anyone who disagreed with their claims, they saw as non-Muslims and outsiders and whoever did not implement their views was declared a non-believer.

The assault and aggression of such extremist jihadist groups didn't only affect the citizens of their societies, but they also touched the political figures and the Muslim leaders as well. Some of these jihadists consider, and continue to do so, the Muslim leaders as the enemies of Islam and non-believers, and therefore, they must be deposed. Their justification is the literal interpretation of the following verse: '*Whoever judges not according to what God has sent down they are the non-believers'* (Qur'an, Al-Māāʾda: 44). This resulted in the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt by Jihad Organization (*Tanẓīm al-Jihād*).[42] Also *Jamāʿāt al-Takfīr wa-l-Hijra* was held responsible for the kidnapping and assassinating the Egyptian minister of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dahabī in July 1977.

[42] Ibid, 155.

CHAPTER FOUR

CASABLANCA SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RELIGIOUS NARRATIVE

The above discussed combination of the Khāridjite doctrine, Ibn Taymiyya's thought, the Muslim Brotherhood and other jihadist organization's activism within post-colonial Morocco that came to a head in 2003 and culminated in five terrorist attacks on Moroccan soil. The attacks were perpetrated by a local jihadist group from a poor neighborhood of Casablanca, the most populated and modern city in the nation. The attacks in Casablanca on May 16, 2003, resulted in the death of 33 civilians including 12 suicide bombers and with 100 people injured.[43] The suicide bombings targeted five different sites in Casablanca. Cites that were frequented by Moroccan Jews, Muslims, and foreign tourists: two restaurants, a five-star hotel, the Belgian Consulate, and a Jewish cemetery.

The suicide bombers belonged to a poor underdeveloped neighborhood in Casablanca, known as *Sidi Moumen*, where poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and the crime rate are all extremely high. This neglected area of Casablanca is referred to as the Pit, *al-Ḥufra* in Arabic. It is located on the outskirts of Casablanca where daily life for many of its inhabitants is a struggle for survival. The region is known for its slums which are situated around vast pit; the whole neighborhood is referred to by those who live there as the caverns. A short walk through the unclean narrow

[43] Human Rights Watch, "MOROCCO: Human Rights at a Crossroads," Accessed September 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/morocco1004/morocco1004.pdf

passageways of *al-Ḥufra* shanty town of *Sidi Moumen* makes one acutely aware of the poverty and marginalized state of its residents. This isolated area suffers from poor infrastructure and social fragility in which both lower class people and even stray animals seek refuge. *Sidi Moumen* is among the most poorly kept, isolated, and marginalized regions of Casablanca and includes to this day the largest slum in Casablanca, where poverty and the unemployment rate are always high. As the Moroccan journalist, ʿAbd Al-Illāh Shible, put it: "If anyone happens to visit *Sidi Moumen*, they will be terrified by the number of drugs being sold and consumed, theft and armed robbery, and alcoholism. The region of *Sidi Moumen* must be given the utmost importance because it is impoverished and marginalized and lacks sports centers, green spaces, and youth houses." [44]

The atrocities of the suicide bombings not only shocked the Moroccan government and the intelligence services, but it also came as a shock to Moroccan society as whole. They (the attacks) challenged the commonly held belief that Morocco had always been a safe country, secure from radical jihadists.[45] Moroccans continued to believe that their country was an exception to the news so often coming from the Middle East, immune from the fanatical deviation of Islam, until May 16, 2003.[46] This tragedy marked the beginning of a new era in Morocco's religious, social, and political life.

These attacks made the Moroccan government acutely aware of the radical Islamic threat within its own borders and among its own citizens. Towards addressing this threat to the depository of Morocco's patrimony (its Islamic tradition), the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic

[44] ʿAbd Al-Illāh Shible, "Iʿlān Yuqārin ḥayāt al-faqr fī 'Sidi Moumen' birafāhiyat Copenhagen," last accessed October 28, 2018, https://www.hespress.com/regions/349739.html
[45] Mohammed El-Katiri, "The institutionalization of religious affairs: Religious reform in Morocco," last accessed September 19, 2018, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=5382e61b-4fbd-41be-a4e2-3bd8634352f0%40sessionmgr4008.
[46] Marvine Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 124.

Affairs was recruited to rejuvenate and define 'Traditional Moroccan Islam' in terms that responded to the threat of the modernist radicalization of it population. The Moroccan monarch himself, Mohammad VI was the first to affirm this need and mandate this Ministry, one of the most influential of the state's ministries with the implementing of a far reaching program that would define Moroccan Islam and its meaning for the individual citizens of the nation. The ministry was prepared for the task since it had already undertaken, since the reign of Hassan II, who died in 1999, a broad program of implementing a series of practical steps that affirmed the values and ethical principles that constituted "Moroccan Islam" as the shared heritage of the resident citizens of Morocco from the earliest of times. The reforms of 2004 represented a broader implementation of this earlier role.

Religion has always been a fundamental element of the lives and cultural heritage of the Moroccan people. It has always played a significant role in Morocco's spiritual, social, and political life. From the arrival of Moulay Idris I in the eighth century, Morocco as a territorial entity under a central governing agency was established. From the earliest times Islam in Morocco has been characterized by its adherence to the Mālikī school of jurisprudence, which has influenced the greater part of its legal and legislative systems for hundreds of years. Millions of Moroccans with all their cultural and ethnic diversity are united by this school of Sunni Islamic law which has long constituted an essential element of the Moroccan identity and heritage.[47] Within the context of theology and doctrine Moroccan scholars assimilated the theological school of Hasan al-Ashʿari (d. 935). As a balancing principle between these two facets of law and dogma, Moroccan Islam has been characterized as the cradle of the spiritual heritage of Sufism as exemplified in the the

[47] Kenneth Honerkamp, "Moroccan Islam: A Unique and Welcome Spirit of Moderation and Tolerance," last accessed September 27, 2018, http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Center-for-Contemporary-Arab-Studies-Moroccan-Islam-Oct-2013.pdf

teachings and person of Muhammad Junayd (was born around 210 A.H./825), he is known even today as the "Leader of the folk of the Path." These three elements became the integral factors in the government efforts to rejuvenate and define anew Islam within the modern Moroccan context. In other words, the Ministry of Pious Endowment and Islamic Affairs took on the task of institutionalizing Islam into a recognizable entity representative of the aspirations of the Moroccan people. To this end the Moroccan government launched a series of reforms that resulted in the restructuring of the entire religious environment in the country.

The Moroccan monarch, Muhammad VI, as the head of state personifies all the most powerful Moroccan institutions (religious, political, and military). His public and immediate denunciation of these acts of terrorist aggression done in the name of Islam went far in framing public discourse and initiating the government response. The Moroccan monarch is constitutionally, the highest representative of Islam in the country. As a descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, and as head of state, he is officially recognized in the constitution by the title the Commander of the Faithful (*Amīr al-Muʾminīn*). In a speech published by the official website of the Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Muhammed VI made it clear that his duty as the Commander of the Faithful was, first and foremost, to preserve the spiritual integrity and security of Morocco and the unity of the Mālikī legal school of jurisprudence.[48]

In the same speech, Muhammed VI vigorously condemned the Casablanca terrorist acts, declaring them to be acts that completely contradicted Islam's doctrine of tolerance. He stated categorically that those who conspired and committed these acts were the villains and enemies of Morocco and the teachings of Islam, which, he stressed that, as stated in the Noble Qur'an, "The

[48] King Muhammad VI, "Royal speech on the restructuring of the religious field in Morocco," last accessed November 3, 2018 http://www.habous.gov.ma/fr/Islam-au-maroc/29-Activit%C3%A9s-d-Amir-Al-mouminine/574-Discours-royal-relatif-%C3%A0-la-restructuration-du-champ-religieux-au-Maroc.html

murder of an innocent person is like the slaying of the entirety of humanity." [Sura: 5.32].[49] During the national holiday commemorating the close ties of the monarch with the Moroccan people, known as, *The Revolution of the King and the People*, Muhammed VI denounced the terrorist aggression in Morocco, Africa, and all over the world, stating that,

> Those who call for murder and aggression, those who deny the faith of other Muslims (*takfīr*) without a legitimate cause, those who interpret the Qur'an and the Sunnah to suit their own purposes are in fact lying to God and His Messenger. Those who engage in terrorism, in the name of Islam, are not Muslims. Their only link to Islam is the pretexts they use to justify their crimes and their recklessness. They have strayed from the right path, and their fate is to dwell forever in hell.[50]

At the request of the monarch, the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs took the initiative to more closely regulate and oversee the religious sphere of activities in Moroccan society. Constitutionally, the ministry is the highest religious authority in Morocco after the monarch, similar to the other constitutional institutions of the state, be they political, economic or dealing with social services. The Moroccan Official Bulletin (*al-Jarīda al-Rasmiya*) N 6448, on March 17, 2016, published the Royal Decree (*Ẓāhir Malakī*), making it the function of the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Religious affairs, first and foremost; to strengthen the awareness of the citizens of Morocco of their Islamic heritage, and the role of Islam as a promoter of the general mutual wellbeing of its citizenry based upon its well-established values of religious tolerance. Secondly, the Ministry was mandated the responsibility of upholding the ethical and moral values

[49] Ibid
[50] Morocco World News, "Text of King Mohammed VI's Speech on King and People's Revolution Day" (20-08-2016), last accessed October 7, 2018 https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2016/08/194754/text-king-mohammed-vis-speech-king-peoples-revolution-day/

of Islam as embodied in the authentic tradition of the Mālikī school of jurisprudence. To this end the Ministry focused anew its oversight of all mosques of the kingdom, the prayer leaders (*imām*), those who delivered the Friday sermons (*khaṭīb*), and those who gave public lectures (*wāʿīẓ*) reinforcing within the mosques of the nation, where the five daily prayers take place, an atmosphere of tranquility, calm, tolerance, and brotherhood. Thirdly, the Ministry was mandated to broaden its efforts towards a renewed sense of the vibrance of Islam's traditional cultural, intellectual, and spiritual heritage throughout the country and its citizens. Finally, the Ministry was charged with the building, restoring, and enlarging the mosques of the nation and providing them with the latest in modern conveniences, including sound systems, clean facilities, office space and libraries.[51] It also initiated wide gamut of educational programs, teaching traditional lessons in the mosques, women's circles, and new schools for training those involved in out-reach in rural and poor parts of Morocco.

The reforms undertaken by the Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Religious Affairs in 2004 represented a new focus in the management of the religious affairs. It included very significant strategic steps, among which were the adapting and enforcing of the principles of the Māliki school of jurisprudence and the al-Ashʿarite doctrine of theology, balanced by adherence to the path of Sūfism, according to the teachings of the well-known Sufi scholar, Al-Junayd al-Sālik (al-Junayd the Traveler on the Sufi Path). This included the vetting and training of a *imams* for the mosques of the nation, whether in the cities or the more rural areas, as well as new cadre of religious personnel that were trained as guidance counselors in the faith, young men and women, known as *Murshidīn* and *Murshidāt*. The Ministry also established in each city and region of the

[51] The Ministry of The Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, "Ikhtiṣāṣāt wa tanẓīm wizārat al-awqāf wa al-shuʾūn al-Islamia ḥasaba al-ẓahīr al-ṣādir fī 26 fabrāyer 2016 fī al-jarīda al-rasmiya ʿadad 6448," last accessed November 10, 2018 goo.gl/U6L7Yg

country, an entity known as the *Majlis al-ʿIlmī* or Council of Knowledgeable Scholars, who were authorized regarding the issuance of fatwās, or official legal opinions pertaining to religious matters and responses to questions. These councils provided legal opinions recognized as authentically derived from the three traditional sources cited above. The Ministry also initiated a media campaign on both radio and television, among these was the TV channel 6, founded by the monarch to provide programing on Morocco's rich history of spiritual music, Quran recitation, Quranic commentary and mystical thought.

Bringing the manner in which the Mālikī school of thought was interpreted and implemented up to date the standards of contemporary society has been a fundamental part of the Moroccan government's religious reform program. The Ministry has focused its reform project on this school of legal thought, for a number of reasons. Among them is it's being the earliest legal school to appear in Morocco and the most deeply rooted in Moroccan's moral-ethical culture. The school is characterized by its embodiment of Islam's moderation and flexibility as practiced within a context of social and religious diversity. Legally the school provides a wide gamut of principles by which the scholars of the school are able to base their opinions from the canonical sources such as the practice of *Ijtihad* (derived opinion), and *al-masālih al-mursala*, which both provide answers to contemporary issues that may not have not been dealt with directly in the fundamental texts of the Qura'an and Sunnah making the school the most liberal and flexible of the schools of law.[52]

The Māliki school or *madhhab* of jurisprudence has always been viewed as the uniting spirit of the Moroccan cultural identity. According to Mohammed El-Katiri, a Senior Research Analyst at United Kingdom's (UK) Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), within the Moroccan context,

[52] In a presentation of Mohammed Al-ʿAbādī, secretary general of al-Rābita Mohammadia of ʿulamā, describing the distinguishing qualities of Māliki School, which are moderation, realism, and flexibility (Al-Abadi 2008).

the Māliki *madhhab* has played an important strategic role in uniting the Moroccan nation through history and separated them from the caliphate of the Middle East and Turkey.[53] Muhammad Raissoni (2003), a renowned Moroccan religious scholar elucidates this point stating,

> that the case of a diversified nation like Morocco has required rational thinking that could accommodate differences, which the Māliki *madhhab* clearly offers through reliance on customs (*ʿurf*) and public interests (*al-masālih al-mursala*). It has accommodated local traditions and reconciled them with the teachings of fundamental texts." Raisounis continues, "the Māliki *madhab* in Morocco united the scholars among themselves, princes and kings, and united both the public and private lives of the general population and individuals and accomodated their different sects and affiliations. The Māliki school made it easy for various groups, within the Moroccan context, to peacefully co-exist. It combined between the Ḥadith narrators and theologians, people of Ashʿarite doctrine and Salafis, and it understood Sūfis in all their ways and methods. It assimilated the opponents of Ashʿarism and mysticism as well. All the above-mentioned groups, throughout the history of Morocco, differed, competed, and intellectually disputed with one another, however, they were all united under the Māliki school of thought.[54]

[53] Mohammed El-Katiri, "The institutionalization of religious affairs: Religious reform in Morocco," last accessed November 10, 2018, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=5382e61b-4fbd-41be-a4e2-3bd8634352f0%40sessionmgr4008.

[54] Raissouni, "The Mālikī Madhab in Morocco Between Neglect and Exploitation (in Arabic)," last accessed November 11, 2018, https://www.maghress.com/attajdid/10521

Morocco's commitment to tolerance is well represented in adapting the Māliki *madhhab* as the uniting rite for the Moroccan people. Unlike other Sunni schools of thought, the Māliki *madhhab* is more flexible and lenient. According to Dr. Muhammad Tawīl:

> The Māliki Madhhab is characterized by the abundance of its legal sources represented in the Qur'an, the custom of Muhammad (*Sunna*), consensus of the scholars (*ijmāʿ*), legal analogy (*qiyās*), unspecified interests (*al-masālih al-mursala*), and others. The diversity of these legal sources and their broad applicability has assured that Moroccan scholars of the law continue to respond to issues as they arise with scholarly review and legal extrapolation. Dr. Tawīl, the Mālikī madhhab is characterized by the absence of strictures that lend it an openness that permits it to evolve and renew itself in an atmosphere of resilience, liberality, and facility, with moderation and temperance, and within a logical and rational nature. The Mālikī *madhhab* also categorically rejects ascribing unbelief (*takfīr*) to a Muslim because of a sin committed or because of heresy. Dr. Tawīl asserts from the Mālikī perspective that there is no obligation to enjoin the good and forbid evil in matters in which there is disagreement. It also guards against factional and sectarian strife. This, according to Dr. Tawil, is an important source of what makes the Moroccan faith a tolerant and open community that allows for opposition from those who hold opposing views. This openness is enshrined in Morocco's Constitution.[55]

Dr. Tawīl regards the Māliki *madhab* as a school of jurisprudence apart from the other three widely recognized schools of legal thought in the Muslim world today for its flexible and inclusive nature. The Māliki *madhhab*'s inclusive vision in dealing with various legal matters is what

[55] Kenneth Honerkamp, "Moroccan Islam: A Unique and Welcome Spirit of Moderation and Tolerance," last accessed November 11, 2018, http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Center-for-Contemporary-Arab-Studies-Moroccan-Islam-Oct-2013.pdf

appealed to the Moroccan people most and made them adopt it centuries ago. The Māliki *madhhab* proved, through its highly respected textual tradition and sincere views on major issues in the Islamic creed, that it is not only a school of jurisprudence, it also belongs to the mainstream Sunni Muslim Community (*Ahlu- al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿa*) as a founding school Islamic Sharīʿa thought. For the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs the Māliki *madhhab* has always protected the spiritual life of the Moroccan society, and it always stands firm against any ideologies that threaten the wellbeing of the populous or suspicious matters (*shubuḥāt*) that cause division. This legal school is characterized by its resistance to and the ability to respond to intellectual threats that may attempt to impose themselves from as an alternative to the well-established norms of Sunni orientation.[56]

Morocco's adherence to the *Māliki* school wouldn't have been complete without the adoption of the Creed of Imām Ḥassan al-Ashʿrī whose tenets of faith are characterized by moderation and tolerance. The Ashʿrī creed has been practiced for centuries in Morocco, due to its flexibility and open-mindedness it established itself next to the flexibility of the *Māliki* school. This creed is categorized by the absence of restrictions which stand as a hurdle in front of religious openness, liberty, and facility. The al-Ashʿrī creed opposes the literal interpretation of the sacred texts or blind textualism. Like the *Māliki* school, the Ashʿrī creed completely refutes the concept of *takfīr* which has been key to the modern radical jihadist movements today.[57] Indeed, the Ashʿrī creed has protected Moroccan Islam to a large degree against the inroads Wahhabī literalism which have

[56] Publications of the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, *The Guide of Imām, Preacher, and Sermonizer*, (Casablanca: Matbaʿat al-Najāḥ al-Jadīdah, 2006), 19-20.
[57] Kenneth Honerkamp, "Moroccan Islam: A Unique and Welcome Spirit of Moderation and Tolerance," last accessed November 28, 2018, http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Center-for-Contemporary-Arab-Studies-Moroccan-Islam-Oct-2013.pdf

invaded the Muslim world today and led to sectarian strife, religious clashes and bloodshed and violence.

Along with the legal and theological schools of the Mālikī school and the creed of Imām al-Ashʿrī Morocco upholds rich heritage founded upon the traditional teachings of the Sufi orders and those who exemplify its well-established principles of solidarity, selflessness and generosity for centuries. Sufism is founded upon the teachings of correct conduct (*adab*) and ethical behavior (*akhlāq*). The Moroccan Minister of Islamic Affairs, Aḥmad Taoufīq defines Sufism as, "a path of upbringing towards love; that has effectively contributed in shaping the religious moral-ethical conscience of the Moroccan Muslim and his social and national commitment." He adds, "this is a well-established historical fact that can't be changed."[58] The impact of Sūfism, as elucidated by the masters of Moroccan Islam, has been and remains to be the spiritual bond between the cultural, social, and tribal components of the Moroccan society under the theme of compassion. The latter is considered as an objective towards spiritual upbringing and training in Sūfi ethical behavior and self-purification. The process of purification is represented in following the footsteps of the renowned pioneer and the master of the Sūfi path, Imām al-Junayd al-Baghdādī, known as al-Junayd al-Sālik (the traveler). For al-Junayd, Sūfism is to discipline the self to reach the spiritual goal of ethical conduct between all members of society so that they can attain a spiritual harmony among themselves that reinforces values of solidarity, collaboration, generosity, and tolerance.

To maintain and preserve the values of tolerance and moderation in Sūfi Islam, the Moroccan monarch, Muḥammad VI, appointed Aḥmad Taoufīq, a Sūfi intellectual, university professor, and former head of the Moroccan National Manuscript Archives, in 2002 as Minister of the Pious

[58] Publications of the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, *The Guide of Imām, Preacher, and Sermonizer*, 29.

Endowments and Islamic Affairs. This appointment came as a replacement of the former Minister, ʿAbdu al-Kabīr al-ʿAlawī M'dāghrī, who had occupied the position for 18 years during the reign of Hassan II.[59] Taoufīq is well known in Morocco for demanding more state control of Islamic affairs, unlike ʿAbd al-Kabīr al-ʿAlawī who accommodated the Wahhabī movement of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Moroccan religious affairs.[60] M'dāghrī even facilitated Saudi trained *imāms* to preach in different areas across the country and open Quranic schools in Moroccan towns and cities. It had been under the leadership of Taoufīq that the Ministry has been reorganized through the addition of new departments such as the department of Mosques and the department of traditional education, as well as the establishment of libraries and teaching centers.[61]

The current Ministry of Islamic Affairs has been dynamically involved in a variety of educational training programs for male and female religious scholars from both inside and outside Morocco in both Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. The young religious scholars are referred to as *Murshidīn* and *Murshidāt* (spiritual guidance counselors). In 2015 the Moroccan monarch officially inaugurated the opening of an elite new school in Rabat called *L'Institut Mohammed VI Pour La Formation Des Imams, Murshidīn, et Murshidāt*. The objective of the institute is to implement an integrated strategy that aims at spreading the values of moderate Islam among younger generations of Imāms and spiritual guidance counselors in order to address the threat to Morocco from radical extremism which has spread throughout Muslim society. The institute, along

[59] Saad Guerraoui, "Sūfism in Morocco 'a powerful weapon' against extremism," last accessed November 28, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/sufism-morocco-powerful-weapon-against-extremism
[60] Mohammed El-Katiri, "The institutionalization of religious affairs: Religious reform in Morocco," last accessed November 28, 2018, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=5382e61b-4fbd-41be-a4e2-3bd8634352f0%40sessionmgr4008.
[61] Dahīr No. 1-03-193, published on the Official Bulletin on 4 December 2003.

with other institutions, also aims to preserve the identity of Moroccan Islam which is characterized by openness, moderation and tolerance.[62]

The institute is transforming young generations of Moroccan scholars into spiritual leaders whose mission is to provide people with the knowledge necessary to help them better understand the multiple facets of their religion and offer them the intellectual tools needed in today's world of conflicting definitions of "tradition" that will protect them and their brothers and sisters from the radical threat that contradicts the peaceful message of Islam's teachings. The role of these scholars is also to hinder desperate young Moroccans from joining radical Islamic movements like the ISIS or launch terrorist attacks on Moroccan soil as occurred in Casablanca on May 16, 2003.

The reforms of the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs have today taken a different broader role of consolidating religious discourse. This time the focus will be upon the specifics of these reforms, both nationally and internationally, and shed light on the complimentary role that cooperation between the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training and the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs in shaping and implementing these reforms within the public education curriculum for the future generations on the one hand, and in a wide spread campaign of general public education, on the other.

[62] The official website of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, "Establishing Muhammad VI Institute for Training Imāms, Murshidīn, and *Murshidāt,*" last accessed December 1, 2018, goo.gl/wm5VBZ

CHAPTER FIVE

REGENERATING THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE CURRICULUM OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION

"The objective of reconsidering the curriculum of Islamic education is to eliminate that which may instigate hatred and prevent the promotion of openness and tolerance," Fouad Chafiqi, Curriculum Director at Ministry of National Education.[63]

The suicide bombings of 2003 brought both domestic and global attention to the existence of radical Islamic activism and terrorism in modern Morocco and renewed discuss of the role of Islamic education in averting violence. As Islamic studies of a core curriculum within the standard national program of education it was seen as necessary to re-evaluate Islamic studies, as taught in the public schools and the texts that were standardized as well. The Moroccan Monarch's call for the reform of Islamic education became a prevalent issue of discussion among scholars and educators and resulted in the emergence of divergent views towards these reforms. Some, of a more secular liberal leaning, argued that the manner in which the curriculum was designed, and the number of hours spent in Islamic education classes for secondary and high school students could have radicalize students. The Ministry of Education did not agree and claimed that reducing the number of credit hours for Islamic education might only lead to radicalization due a lack of breadth in the students exposure to Islamic thought. For these educators, providing students with

[63] Fouad Chafiqi, "Books of Islamic Education Contains no Disgrace (in Arabic)," last accessed January 31, 2019, https://www.medias24.com/ar/NATION/14426.html

enough credits to learn about their faith would, indeed, assist them to develop an immunity system against radicalization. Aside from discussing the new religious reforms that affected the national curriculum and its reactions among the Moroccan intellectual elite, this chapter will, treat Morocco's international role in the matter of the response to the challenges of religious extremism beyond it own borders. It will also discuss some of the reforms the Moroccan Ministry of Educaton has adopted.

It was a dire necessity for the Moroccan government to shift the reforms of Islamic education to both the public and private sectors to reach Morocco's younger generations and aid them in understand Islam in the contemporary world, especially, after the domestic bombing attacks of May 2003, and then other terrorist attacks carried out by Moroccan national in Europe and, finally, the increasing number of Morocco's young people who has joined ISIS. And traveled to Syria and Iraq. According to Martin Chulov, up to 1,600 Moroccans are believed to have traveled to Iraq and Syria, making them, per capita, one of the largest national groups in the fast-shrinking caliphate.[64] This high number, along with the above-stated overlapping events, put Morocco in the spotlight of scrutiny on a global scale.

The steps the Moroccan government initiated were effective enough among its own citizens that Morocco began to be seen as a pioneer country within the Muslim world in training and producing Imams and religious leaders with a communal role. Other countries in Africa, that has since their Islamization had had their roots in Moroccan Islam, namely Nigeria, Mali, Gabon, Senegal, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Tunisia began to send students and senior scholars for

[64] Martin Chulov, "Moroccan ISIS Terrorists 'Pose a Threat on Europe's doorstep: Hundreds of Islamic State Fighters have sneaked back into North Africa – and could use it as a base for further attacks," last accessed February 7, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/spain-terror-attacks-isis-morocco

consultation with their counterparts in Morocco.[65] The Moroccan monarch established the Muhammad VI Foundation for African Scholars—as stated in a royal decree No 1.15.75—in 2015. This Initiative stems from the king's sincere desire to preserve the unity of the Islamic faith and combat the intellectual and doctrinal streams of radical fundamentalist thought, as well as to protect the spiritual unity of the African peoples from all the ideologies that were impacting the security and balancee of Islam's ethical-moral content and its ideals. The foundation aims, **first**, to unify and coordinate the efforts of Muslim scholars, both in Morocco and in other African countries, to introduce, disseminate and consolidate the values of tolerant Islam. **Second**, to foster intellectual, scientific and cultural movement in the field of Islamic studies and discourse. **Third**, to strengthen the historical relations that unite Morocco with the rest of Africa. **Last but foremost**, to strengthen the ties between nations and solidify cooperative relations with associations and institutions of common interest.[66]

As a fundamental element of its counterterrorism policy the Moroccan government established The Moroccan Scientific Council for Europe as a strategic management to combat radicalism, particularly after the involvement of some young Moroccan Europeans, or those who reside temporary in Europe, in terrorist attacks in France, Finland, Belgium. and Spain (Madrid Bombing, 2004). The Moroccan Monarch himself has emphasized the importance of formulating such a Scientific Council of *ʿUlamā* in Europe to facilitate the religious training process for youth who find themselves, at times, caught between cultures. He realizes that without outreach and education these young people are easy prey for recruiting jihadist organizations, which are acutely aware of

[65] Ann Marie Wainscott, "Defending Islamic education: War on Terror discourse and religious education in twenty-first-century Morocco," last accessed February 7, 2019, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=6158d49c-4fea-44bb-8c31-de3573d2c0fe%40sessionmgr4006

[66] The Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, "Muhammad VI Foundation for African Scholars," last accessed February 7, 2019, goo.gl/1XHCKD

the lack of religious background of their targets in Europe. Therefore, to prevent the sowing of the seeds of anger and isolation within the minds of these young people, the Moroccan Scientific Council for Europe was established, by a royal decree, in 2008 to promote interfaith dialogue as well as intra-faith dialog between Muslims themselves. Among the council's main objectives are, **first**, aiding the Moroccan Muslim community, especially young people, to enable them to understand the ethical-moral facets of traditional Islam and its purposes and principles. This also means that bridges must be built between the Muslim youth and their elders, on the one hand, and the textual sources of their faith and cultural heritage, on the other. All this within a framework of coexistence and harmony between the values of authenticity and modernity. **Second**, the contribution to any open dialogue between all the faiths in order to emphasize the moral values shared by the three monotheistic religions, and by renouncing all forms of denigration of the other, and discrimination and re-consideration of the moral role of religions. **Third**, deepening the awareness of the Moroccan Muslim community in Europe with the optimum values of Islam which are based on tolerance, moderation, cooperation on righteousness and piety, while refuting aggression. This can work by issuing fatwas based on well-interpreted teachings of the Quran and Sunnah along with respecting the unity of the Mālikī school. **Finally**, dealing effectively with concept of citizenship and the principles of progress related to it will help the Moroccan community in Europe to integrate in the new societies so that they can all contribute to the well-being of the entire community of Europe.[67]

Going back to the story of regenerating the Islamic education in the national curricula, the issue began when the Moroccan king, Muhammad VI publicly criticized the content of some textbooks

[67] The Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, "The Moroccan Scientific Council for Europe," last accessed February 10, 2019 goo.gl/zHrkT8

and the way they are taught in particular the portrayal of faith traditions other than Islam. He targeted, in his speech the competent authorities and advised them to re-examine the entire national curricula. In an article published by *France 24*, the electronic newspaper in February 7, 2016, the monarch addressed both the Ministers of National Education and of the Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs stating, "it has become a dire need to review the curricula and programs of teaching religious education, whether in public or private schools, or in the institutions of traditional education."[68] The king's instructions were a response to a number of calls that had pointed out the danger of the teaching methods that had escaped the general reforms to education after independence. These methods it was felt led to a lack of acceptance of other faith traditions and may lead to radicalization or encourage terrorism in a country where more than 1500 young men had reportedly joined ISIS.

The king's suggestions received immediate attention from the Ministry of National Education which implemented these suggestions and took action. By 2016 the Ministry of National Education had omitted the verses of dealing with jihad from the textbooks of the junior and high school levels which once used to introduce the term to students. The ministry argues that students are too young to assimilate the concept of jihad and the historical context in which it the Quranic verses were revealed. The Moroccan Ministry of National Education deleted these verses dealing with jihad as armed struggle and warfare and replaced them with others that promoted reconciliation and tolerance. In an article published by Hespress, a Moroccan newspaper in July 10, 2016, in which the Journalist *Ḥassan Ashraf* discusses the details of this change in one textbook, he writes: "The Ministry of National Education omitted *Sûrat Al-fatḥ* (the victory)[69] from the curricula of Islamic

[68] France 24, "The Moroccan Monarch orders a Review of Islamic Education in Schools to Promote Values of Tolerance," last accessed February 10, 2019, goo.gl/qnJjv3
[69] Chapter 48 of the Qur'an

education in the junior school level and replaced it by *Sūrat Al-ḥashr* (the gathering).[70]The change, according to the people specialized in the field, is necessary because *Sûrat Al-fatḥ* contains verses of al-jihad whereas *Surat Al-ḥashr* includes a considerable number of verses that foster *tazkiya*, self-purification and ethical-moral principles. Fouad Chafiqi, a curriculum director imn charge of redesigning the new curriculum, affirmed that Islamic studies falls within the context of a scholarly pursuit and is not the domain of the preacher or imam, whose place has traditionally been the mosque. He believes that there is something in religious education that is beyond the scope of school children and that they must wait. He believe that many nuanced issues encountered in the study of Islam require knowledge of historical and social context, that young people may not have acquired and that may out of context be misunderstood. So, we must work on a pedagogic scheme to teach the child what they need at a given time and age.[71]

The Minister of Education, Rashīd Bel-Mukhtār, states that this change will respect the mental and the psychological development of the learner and the social context, which will help them acquire the fundamental principles of the value of *At-tawḥid* (oneness of God) which will lead to self-purification, justice, and wisdom."[72] The Moroccan thinker and researcher of Islamic Movements, Said Lekḥal comments: "These modifications of the curricula in religious education are positively necessary steps for two reasons: First, this alteration complies with what the constitution of the Moroccan state confirms regarding the protection and the rights of all citizens to practice their religious rituals in a multicultural environment; and second it enforces interfaith

[70] Chapter 59 of the Qur'an
[71] "Morocco Reforms Religious Education to Fight Extremism," France 24 video, 9:25, posted by "France 24 news," December 13, 2016, https://www.france24.com/en/20161213-focus-morocco-school-reform-religious-education-islam-fight-extremism
[72] *Ḥassan Ashraf*, "The Ministry of Education Omits *Sûrat Al- jihad* From the Educational Textbooks in Morocco," accessed November 11, 2017, https://www.hespress.com/societe/312398.html.

pluralism in Morocco. Said affirms to the online newspaper, *Hespress*, that one of the advantages of this change in the religious education curricula is that it makes students more open to the other faith traditions, and students will realize that Islam is not the only religion in Morocco. Said adds that this modification is important simply because it omits the word jihad and any idea that promotes it, which elevates the students' consciousness to respect the beliefs of others, which stems from the religion itself and human rights, and drives students away from the culture of anger and contempt for other faiths."[73] The Moroccan poet, Ṣalāḥ Būsrīf, criticizes the way Islamic education is presented to students; he stresses that the methodology used fills students with fear and menace instead of making them reach the pure essence of religion by themselves through a well-studied curricula written by scholars and specialists in comparative religion, philosophy, Islamic thought, heritage, sociology, and education.[74]

The Ministry of National Education claims that in order to develop independent, open, and balanced students, four sets of values must be implemented: 'Islamic values,' 'values of modern identity,' 'nationalist values,' and 'human rights values.'[75] All these four tenets can be achieved under the umbrella of citizenship. Both junior and high school students are supposed to grasp an inclusive comprehension of what citizenship means and its significant role in human development. The subjects introduced to both categories of students treat acceptance of others, humility, moderation, and tolerance. These teaching qualities enforce compromise, respect, and wisdom among students and help them understand that religious differences, as a rich element of Morocco's long history, are uniting forces to the social and spiritual sustainability not threats.

[73] Ibid
[74] Ṣalāḥ Būsrīf, "Subjects of Islamic Education fills Students with Fear and Menace (in Arabic)," last accessed February 16, 2019, https://www.hespress.com/orbites/94279.html
[75] This section builds on a study completed by a Moroccan think tank affiliated with the Islamist party, PJD: Al-Markaz al-Maghribī li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Abh. āth al-Muʿāsira (2009, 266–267).

Contrary to what has been stated above, a great number of Moroccan educators and critics came out against the above mentioned reforms in Islamic education. The public dispute over the nature of Islamic education created social tension between scholars which resulted in the emergence of those who supported the reforms and those who defended the earlier program of Islamic education in secondary schools. The latter claimed that Islamic education functions as a vaccination to Moroccan students against Islamic fundamentalism. They added that dedicating two hours a week for students to profoundly understand Islamic teachings is not enough. The defenders of the prior system accused the Ministry of Education of contemplating a reduction in the number of hours of Islamic education from two hours to one hour weekly.[76] According to ʿAbd al-Karīm Lahouaychri, who was later elected to parliament as a member of the PJD (Party of Justice and Development) and an Islamic party, asserts that Islamic education does not contribute to extremism, but rather protects children from such beliefs. Lahouaychri acknowledged that teachers of Islamic education face challenges, but rather than reducing the number of hours given to the subject as had been done in the 1990s, he called for the use of better-qualified teachers. This comment likely refers to the practice of using Arabic language instructors to teach Islamic education instead of teachers of Islamic studies.[77] We can be understand from Lahouaychri's criticism that the issue doesn't not lie in Islamic education per se; however, it is the lack of qualified teachers on the subject. Appointing Arabic instructors to teach Islamic education remains one of the biggest challenges facing Moroccan educational system.

[76] Ann Marie Wainscott, "Defending Islamic education: War on Terror discourse and religious education in twenty-first-century Morocco," last accessed February 16, 2019, http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=6158d49c-4fea-44bb-8c31-de3573d2c0fe%40sessionmgr4006

[77] A complaint mentioned by an Islamic education teacher in an interview in Fez in July 2011.

Khalid al-Ṣamadi, President of the Moroccan Center for Research and Studies on Islamic Education, refuses to accept that Islamic education promotes violence and encourages extremist views. The blame can't be put on this school subject as a threatening danger to the Moroccan citizens. On the contrary, Islamic education is meant to protect Moroccan students from falling prey to radicalism which prospers in the fertile land in religious illiteracy.[78] Like Khalid al-Ṣamadi, Aḥmad al-Hilālī, president of the Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research, rejects the accusations of Islamic education institutions as being responsible for producing religious extremism, calling the necessity of strengthening the role of these institutions in renouncing the manifestations of extremism and terrorism.[79]

[78] Ann Marie Wainscott, "Defending Islamic education: War on Terror discourse and religious education in twenty-first-century Morocco," p. 643.
[79] Moroccan Center for Contemporary Studies and Research, "The Moroccan Center Discusses Issues of Religious Education at a National Seminar," last accessed February 16, 2019, http://cmerc.ma/index.php/activites/2016-07-18-07-45-02/316.html

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF THE GUIDELINE (A BOOK COMPILED BY THE MOROCCAN MINISTRY OF PIOUS ENDOWMENTS AND ISLAMIC AFFAIRS)

Finally, towards clarifying the foundational vision of the Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs and presenting an actual fruit of their implementation of the above-cited reforms within the domain of defining "traditional Moroccan Islam," as well as an indication of the direction education may take in the future, I will present a summary of the Ministry Guideline "*al-Dalīl*" to be followed by all Imāms, *Khaṭīb* (one who gives Friday sermons), and Public counselors (Wuʿāz) throughout the kingdom, in cities and the countryside.

Al-Dalīl, as a Ministry Guideline, has been composed by the Muslim scholarly elite to in order to establish a standardized conduct on the part of the *ʿulamāʾ*, Imāms of the mosques and *khutabāʾ*(who give Friday sermons), *muftī* (who gives legal opinions), *mustafti* (who seeks legal opinions), judges, governors, and *ahl-Alḥl al-ḥisba* (people in charge of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong). The book is meant to guide, restrict, and illustrate the fundamentals of the public religious discourse, vis-à-vis the revelation, Prophetic guidance, and wisdom of wise men and women of the tradition. It was compiled to make the audience aware of the great ethical-moral benefits that can be gained from these sources if they are implemented correctly.

The *Dalīl* comprises elements that constitute the normative conduct expected of the Imām, *Khaṭīb*, and *Wāʿiz* within the mosques of the Moroccan Kingdom. It also reminds these same people and states in a minimalist manner the essential principles that have been profoundly rooted

in the age old spiritual tradition of Morocco that they represent. It states that these principles are the result of the efforts of the Moroccan virtuous forefathers who fulfilled their duty towards religion (Islam) and community in being representatives of the ethical-moral ideals of their brothers and sisters in terms of addressing its objectives and interests in an environment that contributed to the rich history of the Muslim community.

It is a dire necessity in this era to transform these inherited ethics of good conduct from a dimension of proposed guidance into a form of contractual legalization. This will indeed strengthen the role of the Imām, *Khaṭīb,* and *Wāʿiz* and protect the mosques from the disruptions which contradicts the tranquility that most people seek therein. The Imām, *Khaṭīb,* and *Wāʿiz* possess trustworthiness and serenity in the Moroccan nation, thank God for this. They are among the selective elite who educate the unity of broadening thought, brotherhood spirit, political sense which stems from the ethical constants of religion in both their teaching and their conduct.

May this *Dalīl* be of countless benefits and its reminders living proof of the centrality of the Imām, *Khaṭīb,* and *Wāʿiz,* while they strive in fulfilling their noble mission as representatives of Moroccan Islam.

The book comprises six significant units each of which contains subcategories: **First**, the integral nature theory of religious affairs. **Second**, public counseling and guiding from an indvidual spiritual development to a national development. **Third**, managing religious affairs while respecting the international environment. **Fourth**, implementing correctly the rites of worship and judgements. **Fifth**, models of the religious rituals that have been practiced: establishing the origin and exegesis. **Sixth**, Friday sermon and the role of *Khaṭīb*.

The First Focus Point of *al-Dalīl:* the integration theory of the religious affair—affirms that the Imām is the vicegerent of Amīr al-Muʾminīn, the Moroccan monarch, and it is his duty to

preserve the spiritual security and stability of the nation and respects its choices. The Imām is supposed to act on behalf of Amīr al-Mūminīn and must represent the excellent pattern (*al-ʾuswa al-ḥasana*) since he is destined to lead the nation, while the nation is meant to follow its Imāms and scholars. Obedience of those in authority, the necessity of bonding to the group, and discarding division is a legitimate duty that no one has disputed but those who followed their personal caprices. Dispute in religion is a wicked act of those who follow their vain desires. It is the source of trial and tribulation (*fitna*) and division; thus, the Imām has to adhere to the unity of the *umma* (community). Sunnī Sūfīsm is the genuine path of detachment from the lower self and self-purification, that has been the path of our ancestors over centuries. Thus, preserving our cultural heritage means protecting the components of the spiritual stability and security of the nation. Respecting the Mālikī rite as a school of thought that is founded upon moderation and balanced judgements is an integral aspect of this point of view.

The Second Focus Point: public counseling and guiding from a spiritual development to a national development sums up the matter as follows: employing a heartfelt sincere discourse during the process of delivering public counseling or guidance in a loving and an approachable manner to develop the spiritual aspects and ethical-moral meanings for the human self, which are founded on an inclusive sense of belonging to the integral territory of the state. Deepening the national integration through encouraging the feeling of unity within the great national family. Affirming the essence of believing in the homeland (citizenship) through passion and service. Promoting positive productivity by encouraging self-reliance, and not being dependent on others. And making a psychological assimilation through educating people to respect the opinions of others.

Focus Point Three: managing religious affairs while respecting the international environment—sheds lights on Islam within the context of international relations. It illustrates that God ordained Muslims to fulfill their oaths and covenants because that is part of their faith. It adds that Islam prospers and flourishes in an atmosphere of dialogue and peaceable co-habitation, which can't be achieved in an environment of strife and civil conflict. It is of the highest importance to adopt the middle path that of moderation and reject the phenomenon of religious extremism, a point always repudiated by traditional Islam. This Focus Point addresses the obligation of protecting human rights as they have been established by the Sharīʿa Law and the international charters. It is a must to respect and defend the prerogatives of non-Muslims living in Muslim countries because the Sharīʿa itself guarantees these rights and necessitates equal duties and obligations for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Focus Points Four: honoring the rite of worship and points of view revolves around holding fast to the Mālikī school of thought in all its inclusive nature. It defines the Mālikī school as a reference to the juristic statements of Imām Mālik ibn Anas, May God bless his soul, and all his students which are vividly recorded in the jurisprudence books of al-Mālikī school of thought. The Mālikī rite in Morocco was well-founded in the late second century of Islam (13th century ago). The Moroccan people chose this rite of Imām Mālik because he was the accomplished scholar of Medina (the city of the Prophet). He accumulated scholarship from all the distinguished scholars, particularly, the seven scholars among them (Prominent Jurists of Medina).

Focus Point Five: models of the religious rituals that have been practiced: establishing the origin and exegesis aims to clarify various religious practices that have long been part of "Moroccan Islam," but were deemed as being invented in Islam. Opponents of these forms of spirituality believe that neither the Prophet of Islam nor his companions or the virtuous ancestors

practiced such rites. The Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs refute such accusations finding them groundless without foundation. Among such claims are reciting the Qur'an collectively after the sunrise and sunset prayers, the way the *Ādān* (Call of Prayer) is performed, ending the prayer with only one *taslīma* (an expression used to conclude one's prayer), performing *Ādān* three times during Friday's afternoon prayer, and making invocations and remembrance of God post every prayer. Therefore, the Ministry states that the juristic sayings are founded upon evidence and built on it. It is not recommended to form a judgement on juristic statements, which have not been studied yet, and claim that they are invented while there is no evidence provided to support theF argument.

The Final Focus Point: the Friday sermon and the role of *Khaṭīb* concludes the social functions of the Imām, at the practical level, in the following steps: connecting the spiritual relations and strengthening the social ties of the community who perform the prayers. This can happen through being aware of them individually and collectively and their conditions, asking about those who are absent, visiting their sick and assisting the needy among them, easing their discomfort, sharing their concerns, and praying for them. The Imām is supposed to take the effective initiative to reconcile between people who are in a dispute and disagreement such as married couples, people of the wombs (blood-related family members), and those who are repulsed among friends. The Imām might want to formulate a group of virtuous and righteous people of either the neighborhood or the tribe where he resides so that they can help him in his mission of reconciling between people and bringing them together.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To sum up, as stated earlier in this thesis, Morocco's religious reforms came as a well-structured strategy against a global issue that threatens national and international security and general stability. Through taking serious steps to restore religious discourse across a multi-faceted socio-political landscape, Morocco has demonstrated its sincere willingness to combat what is termed today religious fundamentalism. Morocco's national and international efforts in counterterrorism management are meant to minimize the menace of the escalating religious radicalism, both in Morocco and in the internationally. The Casablanca suicide bombings of May 16, 2003 were an awakening shock that had made the Moroccan government acutely aware of the danger and the seriousness of religious fanaticism that affected a country whose Islam has long been characterized by moderation and tolerance. The attacks were an eye-opening event for the Moroccan government that reacted rapidly in a prudent way with a strategically long-term vision that aims to prevent such terrorist attacks from occurring again.

The research conducted in this project traced the roots of radical Islamic movements from early Islam and their emergence fourteen centuries ago. The project intended to bring the readers to the conclusion that Islamic fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon of the 21st century, its origins go back to first century of Islamic history. Researching into the Islamic history revealed the challenges Muslims of the pre-modern era encountered with the radicalization of Islamic discourse. Employing a social-historical approach in analyzing the issue facilitated the understanding of how modern jihadist movements have developed and functioned and their trends

in interpretation of the source material found in the Quran and Sunna. The theoretical foundation of this project is of the utmost importance in the sense that it permits us to comprehend jihad as a social phenomenon and aids in illuminating the logic behind the principle measures the Moroccan government took in order to treat the issue and bring the religious narrative back to its traditional roots.

This analysis of the issues discussed attempted to present the audience with a vison of the ongoing attempts being made by the Moroccan government and its initiatives to regenerate religious discourse in the country that has long been the home of the Islamic scholarly and mystical traditions through the promotion of an influential scholarly elite represented clearly in the persons of the *ʿulamāʾ*. These scholars, according to the Moroccan government, are believed to have always played an important religious role in the educational process of Moroccan society and helped maintain the national security through their resistance to any religious dogma that menaces the integrity and stability of the Moroccan body politic.

The *ʿulamāʾ*, as a scholarly elite have played an important role in preserving the spiritual aspect of the Moroccan society. They are referred to as the guardians who help maintain the national stability through their opposition to any religious ideology that threatens the integrity and stability of the Moroccan body politic. The *ʿulamāʾ* have, in many cases, been referred to in such challenging times to help remove the ambiguity and illustrate matters for people. In other words, the *ʿulamāʾ* operate as a **bridge** to the teachings of Islamic principles and values that Muslims must act upon according to the will of God and His Messenger, Muhammad. The *ʿulamāʾ's* role, as spiritually religious leaders, has granted them a highly respected position among their communities.

REFERENCES

Ünal, Ali. *The Qur'ān*. New Jersey: The Light, 2006.

Al-Alawani, Shaykh Taha Jabir. *Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought*. London and Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005.

Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥamid. *The Revival of The Religious Sciences*. Trans. Kenneth Honerkamp and Hamza Yusuf Hanson. Louisville: Library of Congress, 2015.

Al-Khūlī, Amīne. *Al-Imam Mālik*. Casablanca: Al-nnajāḥ Al-jadīda, 2006.

Abou Al Fadl, Khaled M. *And God Knows the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse*. Lanham, New York, Oxford: University Press of America, 2001.

ʿAbd Al-Malik, Ibn Muḥammad, Ibn Hishām. *Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiya*. Ed. Muḥammad ʿAli al-Qutb and Muḥammad al-Dālī Balṭa. Beirut: Al-Maktaba Al-ʿAṣriya Li- Al-Ṭibaʿa wa al-Nashr, 2003.

Aboullouz, Abdelhakim. *Salafism in Morocco: religious radicalism and political conformism*. London & New York: Routledge, 2012.

Al-Maʿāfirī, Ibn Hishām Abi Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Malik. Al-Sīra al-Nabawiya. V III. ed. Al-Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Quṭb and al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Dālī Balṭa. Beirut: Al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriya, 2003.

Al-Mutairi, Abdul Rahmaan ibn Mualla al-Luwaihiq. *Religious Extremism in the lives of Contemporary Muslims*. Trans. Jamaal al-Din M. Zarabozo. Denver: Al-Basheer Company for Publications and Translations, 2001.

Al-Qurtubī, Abū 'Abdullāh. *Al-Jāmi' Li Aḥkām al Qur'an*. ed. Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhim. Beirut: Dar Ihyā' a-Turat Al-ʿarabi, 1985.

Al-Quraishī, Ibn Kathīr. Abū Al-fidāʾ Ismāʿīl. *Tafsīr Al-Qur'an Al-ʿAẓīm*. ed. Shaykh Khalid Muhammad Maḥram. Beirut: Al-Maktaba Al-ʿAssrīya, 2002.

Al-Raysuni, Ahmad. *Imam Al-Shatibi's Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law*. Trans. Nancy Roberts. London and Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005.

Al-Suyyūtī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Asbāb al-nuzūl*. ed. Muhammad Muhammad Tāmr. Cairo: Dār Ibn Al-Haytam, 2005.

Bonner, Michael. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrine and Practice. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Bonney, Richard. *Jihād: From Qur'ān to bin Laden*. Forwarded. Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Bruce B. Lawrence. *Shattering Islam Beyond Violence: The Myth.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Charrad, M. *States and Women's Rights: The making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco*. Berkeley: University of Calefornia Press, 2001.

Chouki, El Hamel. *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Clifford, Geertz. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971.

C.R. Pennell. *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2003.

Daniel Crecelius. *The ʿUlamā and the State in Modern Egypt*. unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1967.

David, Cook. *Understanding Jihad*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005.

David S. Woolman. *Rebels in the Rif: Abd Krim and the Rif Rebellion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Duclos, L. J. The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan Nationalism. London: Duckworth, 1973. Douglas, Porch. *The Conquest of Morocco*. New York: ALFRED A. KNOPF, 1983.

Drouin, E. *Almohades et Hafsides*. Frankfurt: Institute for History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang University, 2003.

Dutton, Yasin. *Original Islam: Mālik and the Madhhab of Madina*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

Emilio, Spadola. *The Calls of Islam: Sufis, Islamists, and Mass Mediation in Urban Morocco*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014.

Evrard, Amy Young. *The Moroccan Women's Rights Movement*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014.

François-Marie Arouet, Voltaire. *Aqāwl fī Al-ttasāmuḥ*. Trans. Saʿīd Benkarrād. Casablanca: Almarkaz Al-Thaqāfī Al-ʿArabī, 2015.

Gilliot. CL. "ʿulamāʾ." The Encyclopaedia of Islam. Published online, 2012.

Gibb H. A. R. *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*. J. H. Leiden: The Royal Netherlands Academy, 1953.

Howe, Marvine. *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Jamil M. Abun-Nasr. *A Hsitory of the Maghrib*. Cambridge: University Press, 1971.

Jasser, Auda. *Maqasid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach*. London and Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in The Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001.

Julien, Charles André. *History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, from Arab Conquest to 1830*. Trans. John Petrie. Ed. Stewart. Revi. R. Le Tourneau. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970.

Lasker, Michael Menachem. Bashan, Eliezer. *Morocco*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

Melchert, Christopher. *Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal*. Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2006.

Michot, Yahya. Ibn Taymiyya Against Extremisms. Forwarded. Bruce B. Lawrence. Beirut: Dar Albouraq, 2010.

Munson, H. *The Political role of Islam in Morocco (1970-90).* London: Routledge. 1993.

Nickerson, Jane Soames. *A short History of North Africa, from pre-Roman times to the present: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco*. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1961.

Publications of Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. *The Hassanian Lectures* (in Arabic). Rabat: Matbaʿt Top Press, 2004.

Publications of Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. *The Guide of Imām, Preacher, and Sermonizer*. Casablanca: Matbaʿat al-Najāḥ al-Jadīdah, 2006.

Publications of Moroccan Ministry of Pious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. *The Hassanian Lectures* (in Arabic). Muḥammadiya: Matbaʿt Fedalah, 2009.

Rudolph, Peters. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996.

Sayyid, Qutb. *Milestone*. Beirut and Cairo: Dār Al-Shurūq, 1979.

Segalla, Spencer D. *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.

Shaltūt, Maḥmūd. *The Qur'an and the Fight* (in Arabic). Cairo: Matbaʿat Al-Kitāb Al-ʿArabi, 1951.

Shana Cohen and Larabi Jaidi. *Morocco: Globalization and Its Consequences*. New York: Routledge Tylor & Francis Group, 2006.

Susan Gilson, Miller. *A History of Modern Morocco*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Wael B. Hallaq. *The Origin and Evolution of the Islamic Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Western Muslim Scholars. *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition*. Ed. Joseph E. B. Lumbard. Forward. Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2004.

White, Gregory W. Tessler, Mark A. Entelis, John P. *Kingdom of Morocco.* Boulder: Westview, 2003.

William C. Chittick. *Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Texts*. New York: State University of New York Press,1992.

Wyrtzen, Jonathan. *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Zebiri, Kate. *Maḥmūd Shaltūt and Islamic Modernism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.