ACCOUNTING FOR EMOTION:

EMOTION DISPLAYS AND COLLABORATIVE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT

by

TIFFANI EVERETT

(Under the Direction of Dawn T. Robinson)

ABSTRACT

In this research I examine how people respond to the *disclosure* of an anti-social behavior. Specifically, I study how the emotion display by a person confessing to a harmful behavior influences techniques used by observers to redefine the situation. Using vignette data, I find support for the notion that individuals engage in strategies to ensure smooth interaction. When the actor's emotion is consistent with emotion norms, observers redefine the situation, making accounts for the actor's behavior and/or emotion. However, when the actor displays a socially *inappropriate* emotion following admitting to a harmful behavior, observers make errors in recalling the details of the event. Though both accounts and recall errors are strategies for redefining a situation, accounts only are used to manage another's identity. These findings provide insight into the conditions under which people work to manage other's identities. Additionally, I demonstrate that emotions play an important role in recalling events.

INDEX WORDS: emotions, accounts, recall errors

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TIFFANI EVERETT

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TIFFANI EVERETT

Major Professor:	Dawn T. Robinson
Committee:	James W. Balkwell Jody Clay-Warner

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my friends and family who have continued to give me support. I am especially grateful for Nancy B. Miller who has been a source of inspiration in my life. If not for her encouragement, advice, and insight, I am not sure where I would be or what I would be doing. I also dedicate this thesis to my grandmothers who have been role models for me and are constant reminders of the ability to overcome adversity. I am indebted to my grandfather for passing on his perfectionist tendencies and other character traits that I have either learned or received from him; we are more alike than either one of us prefers to admit. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my mom and dad who have become more than parents to me over the past few years; they have also become two of my best friends. Thank you for all of your support.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Oftentimes in social interaction people are required to disclose information that may damage their identities. Whether it is admitting to cheating on an exam, confessing to being unfaithful to one's partner, stealing an item from one's workplace, or even something as minor as holding an unpopular opinion, these disclosures do occur in social interaction. With all of the interactions requiring some type of potentially stigmatizing disclosure, how is it possible to maintain positive identities? One way identities may be maintained is through the redefinition of the situation. Emotion display is an important component of interaction, and this research seeks to answer how emotion displays shape the ways we manage definitions of the situation.

Those engaged in social interaction and those observing interaction both utilize strategies of identity management and reshaping of events. Individuals are motivated to maintain predictable interaction, so they often respond to the disclosure of a harmful act with identity management techniques to mitigate the damage done to the discloser's identity. When a potentially damaging disclosure does occur, observers are compelled to "save face" and avoid social embarrassment (Goffman 1959). Symbolic interactionists argue that the reason for this is to maintain a stable definition of the situation and ensure that interaction continues predictably. Many sociologists have examined the ways in which individuals manage their own identities (For example, Goffman 1959; Burke 1991; Stets 2006), but have paid less attention to the ways an observer may manage *another's* identity (Cahill and Eggleston 1994; Francis 1994, 1997; Goffman 1955; Maynard 1996; Katovich and Hintz 1997; Thoits 1996).

This paper fills gaps in the identity management and the sociology of emotion literature by addressing *how* people manage the identities of others, *why* they choose to do this, and how the *emotion display* of the social transgressor affects the identity management technique used. I argue that another's emotion display serves as a signal about the nature of her identity, which guides our efforts to protect that person from a "spoiled" identity (Goffman 1963). An attempt to link identity management and emotion is not completely novel; prior research has examined the ways emotions are involved in the management of one's own identities (Hochschild 1979, 1983; Robinson, Smith-Lovin and Tsoudis 1994, Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1999; Thoits 2004). Less is known, however, about the role of emotion in the identity management of *others*.

Recently, Rogalin, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin (2007) found that emotions also play a key role in shaping our efforts to manage others' identities through deference behavior. In that study, male undergraduate students worked on a collective task with a partner that they thought was a mathematics graduate student. Before the task, the participant inadvertently saw his partner, actually an accomplice in the study, being insulted by another experimenter. The researchers experimentally manipulated whether the partner appeared sad or angry immediately following this insult. They found that students deferred more to partners who appeared sad after being insulted, compared to those who appeared angry after being insulted. The authors used Affect Control Theory to explain how emotion displays change the nature of the identity work to be done on someone else's behalf.

The present paper elaborates this theoretical explanation and links these findings to earlier work on emotion and identity by focusing on a classic form of identity

maintenance – account-making (Scott and Lyman 1968). I suggest that individuals respond to the disclosure of bad behavior by engaging in tactics of identity management for the social transgressor and by reshaping the definition of the situation. Unlike much of the previous research, my focus is on how one individual may help another individual maintain a positive identity and hence a stable definition of the situation. Individuals who witness a person disclosing a harmful behavior while displaying culturally appropriate emotions will (1) like those individuals more than those who confess to a harmful behavior but show no remorse and accordingly (2) will provide more identity work on the behalf of individuals who display culturally appropriate emotions.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

Definition of the Situation

The notion that actors strive to maintain a stable definition of the situation is a key feature of symbolic interactionism (Goffman 1959). During interaction, individuals reflexively create a definition of the situation, which in turn provides individuals with information about what to anticipate and how to act in a setting. Affect Control Theory's (Heise 1979, 2007; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988; MacKinnon 1994) underlying assumption is that individuals act to maintain congruence between fundamental sentiments and transient sentiments. Fundamental sentiments are enduring, affective meanings whereas transient sentiments are more momentary (Heise 2002). As Heise (1989:11) explains, when events occur that do not maintain the equilibrium between fundamental and transient impressions, an individual takes reparative actions to illustrate that the event itself was abnormal but the definition of the situation is stable. Alternatively, an individual can abandon that definition of the situation and accept a new one. One may do this through re-labeling components of the event.

Goffman's notion of face-work is a general method of maintaining a definition of the situation when a social transgression has occurred (1955). A definition of face-work first requires a definition of face. Face, as defined by Goffman (1959), is the positive social value a person claims for him or herself through social interaction. Face-work, then, is the "actions taken by a person to make whatever he is doing consistent with face" (1959:12). Individuals are motivated to maintain a mutual working definition of the situation to maintain face for themselves and save the face of others from potential

embarrassment. Goffman believed that individuals identify emotionally with others and their feelings which motivates them to "go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face of others" (1959:10). This is face work.

Strategies for restoring the definition of the situation are diverse and have many names including "vocabularies of motive" (Mills 1940), "techniques of neutralization" (Sykes and Matza 1957), "realigning actions" (Goffman 1959), "quasi-theories" (Hall and Hewitt 1970, Hewitt and Hall 1973), "remedial work" (Goffman 1971), and "aligning actions" (Stokes and Hewitt 1976). All of these techniques of identity management occur *after* the discrediting event.[1] In addition to these strategic means for redefining situations, social cognition research from the experimental psychology literature suggests that once a socially disruptive event is behind us our imperfect memories may serve to help us realign social meanings through systematic forgetfulness. Below I review research from each of these traditions and then develop predictions about how emotion displays after a social transgression might influence both the strategic process of account making and non-strategic process of social recall.

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[1] In contrast to these techniques, Hewitt and Stokes (1975) conceptualized a form of identity management that is used immediately *preceding* an event one believes will be discrediting. Hewitt and Stokes call this type of identity management disclaimers which are used "to define forthcoming conduct as not relevant to the kind of identity-challenge or re-typification for which it might ordinarily serve as the basis" (1975:3). In this paper I focus specifically on the *antecedent* technique of account-making conceptualized by Scott and Lyman (1968).

Accounts

Account-making is a classic way of restoring the definition of the situation. Generally, accounts are described as statements made following an unexpected act. The importance of accounts lies in their ability to bridge the gap between what is expected in a situation and what actually occurs in a situation (Scott and Lyman 1968:46). Accounts differ from explanations, according to Scott and Lyman, because the implications of explanations are not often of the magnitude of accounts (1968). Individuals may offer explanations for particular political preferences, for example, but accounts are reserved only for more consequential events.

There are two types of accounts: excuses and justifications. Each type of account may be used as a result of similar situations. This is to say that one type of account does not appear more likely depending on the nature of the behavior. Justifications occur when an individual accepts responsibility for an act but denies the offensive nature of the act. For example, an individual may admit stealing a small item from a store but dismiss the idea that it was "wrong" because he believes the company "steals" from him each time he buys its over-priced products. Excuses, however, occur when an individual admits that an act was inappropriate or bad, but does not accept responsibility for that action (1968:47). For instance, an individual may purposely trip a friend resulting in the friend falling. He may admit what he did was wrong, but deny that he meant any harm or injury to the friend. Specifically, "excuses are socially approved vocabularies for mitigating or relieving responsibility when conduct is questioned" (1968:47). Excuses and justifications both reduce the magnitude of social transgressions.

Individuals go to great lengths to maintain stable definitions of the situation (Goffman 1959), even if that means intervening to remedy another's damaged identity. Carter, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin (2007) note that there are a variety of restorative acts available to an observer at a particular time, but the decision process individuals use when choosing among alternatives remains unclear. One type of restorative act involves redefining an event. Generally, any part of the event can be redefined to create a stable definition of the situation.

Recent research by Nelson (2006) demonstrated that behaviors are reidentified more commonly than actors or objects. Nelson explained further that identities are viewed as more enduring and accurate than labels attached to behaviors (2006: 225). In his study, Nelson distributed one of six questionnaires to ninety-six undergraduates. Each questionnaire contained six somewhat unusual events. Participants were told that each of the events may be incorrect in a number of ways including exaggeration, mistakes in remembering, misconceptions, or biases. The participants were instructed to read each event and replace only *one* word to "correct" the event. Nelson used simulations guided by Affect Control Theory to classify how socially inappropriate (or, deflecting) each event was. Nelson found that behavior words were relabeled most frequently regardless of whether the event was considered to be high or low in overall deflection. A tendency to relabel a behavior over an actor is plausible since the actor seems a highly salient part of interaction and is unlikely to be relabeled or misremembered.

Cognition

Whereas account making is viewed as a typically conscious, motivated process, we may have less overt and intentional methods for altering events to achieve situational realignment. Social cognition research suggests that our systematic patterns of attention information storage and recall each serve to create more coherence in our mental representations of events and categories (Fiske and Taylor 1984; Higgins and Bargh 1987). Cognitive researchers use the term schema to refer to the knowledge structures in which we store organized sets of information about events (or people, or social categories, or other concepts). Numerous studies reveal that we are better able to recall information that is consistent with existing schemas than information that is either inconsistent, or has no schema as a referent (see review in Bransford 1979 . For example, we are more likely to recall an actor's social behaviors when they are consistent with our perception of his or social traits than when they are inconsistent with them (Rothbart, Evans, and Fulero 1979). Furthermore, inconsistent information and irrelevant information is remembered poorly, in comparison to consistent information (Cantor and Mischel 1977; Markus 1977; and Hamilton 1979). Finally, people often falsely recall information consistent with a schema, even if that information was never present (Tsujimoto 1978; Tsujimoto, Wilde, and Robertson 1978; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Taylor and Crocker 1981; Fiske and Taylor 1984; Markus and Zanjonc 1985; Stephan 1985; and Cantor and Mischel 1977).

Individuals rely on cognitive schemas to make sense of information and interactions. The use of schemas, while generally a useful, efficient strategy, can often lead to systematic errors (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). One example of this type of

error is an error in recalling previously experienced or accessed information. Recall errors are considered to be a type of “cold cognition” (Abelson 1963), that is an error in cognition due to cognitive load.

Research in the 1970s (Loftus 1975, 1977, 1979) demonstrated that individual’s memories can be altered if they are presented with inconsistent information following an event. It seems likely that a similar cognitive process may occur when individuals observe (or read about) an actor who admits to a bad action but does not display sadness about her action. In the time between viewing (or reading) the event and recalling the event, individuals are likely to misremember information. This misreporting of what they saw (or read) is a result of using schemas to categorize the memory. It is unlikely that an individual often witnesses the confession of a bad deed in conjunction with the absence of an emotional response, so it is likely that the individual will not remember the event in this manner. In essence, individuals may rely on past experiences and schemas when recalling the event, which results in misinformation about the current event.

Emotion Cultures and Defining Situations

Emotion and memory may be connected by emotion norms. Emotion norms are cultural scripts that indicate the appropriateness of particular emotions at a given time. According to Gordon (1989a, 1989b, 1990), emotion cultures are comprised of rules, or emotion norms, indicating what feelings and expressions are acceptable in a given culture, as well as beliefs regarding emotions. Emotion cultures are learned through socialization and become patterned over time. Hochschild (1983) similarly describes emotion cultures as containing feeling rules and expression rules indicating the

appropriateness of an emotion within a given culture. By extension, Thoits (1990) argues that continual failure to uphold the emotion culture standards results in emotional deviance and the labeling of that person as deviant. Emotion is evidently an important component of social interaction. Instability is likely to occur when norms aren't followed.

Heise and Calhan (1995) found that prescriptive norms of emotion do exist and that individuals agree about what emotions should be felt in response to particular events. These findings illustrate the imperative function of emotions in creating and maintaining a consistent definition of the situation. Through emotions' role in saving face, we can see how emotion norms are used to create a mutual definition of the situation. One way emotions may be used is through the strategic display of emotion (Francis 1994). Emotional displays indicate to observers the character of an individual in the situation of interest. Mutually accepted definitions of one's character are a key component of the definition of situation.

Emotions and Identity Management

Smith-Lovin (1990) suggested that emotional displays can serve as confirmation or disconfirmation of an identity. Displaying culturally *inappropriate* affect during interaction damages the shared definition of the situation and one's perception of the character of her interaction partner. Displaying culturally *appropriate* affect during interaction, however, can solidify the definition of the situation and enhance the character evaluation of an interaction partner.

A 1987 study by Lazowski examined how the expression of emotion may moderate listeners' reactions to negative self-disclosure. Lazowski distributed vignettes

with manipulated information about the emotion displayed by the main character. She found that displaying sadness after disclosing social harm led to a decrease in *unfavorable reactions* by listeners, but displaying sadness did not lead the listeners to decrease their perceptions of *blameworthiness*. Lazowski concluded that "Expressing negative emotion while disclosing undesirable behaviors is therefore likely to communicate to the perceivers that the speaker acknowledges the undesirability of the behavior and views it as discrepant from his or her self-image" (1987: 11). She suggested that to understand fully others' perceptions researchers must study the emotion displays speakers make while disclosing information. This work provides the basis for my paper.

Some research has explored the protective role emotions may serve when individuals behave in bad or unexpected ways. For example, Robinson et al. (1994:182) confirmed Affect Control Theory's prediction "that an actor's emotional response to his or her own malevolent behavior influences behavioral responses of others by prompting them to reassess the character of the guilty party." The authors collected experimental data and found support for the hypothesis that individuals who do bad acts but show remorse for those acts are rated higher in character than others with that identity are typically rated. Similarly, Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1999) found that displaying emotions affectively congruent with a behavior can reduce damage to an identity, even if the behavior is unfavorable and displaying incongruent emotions may damage an identity, even if the behavior is positive.

Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin (1998) extended the design used by Robinson et al. (1994) to the judicial setting, and they found that not only does the *perpetrator's* (actor's) emotional display matter in criminal sentencing, but the *victim's* (object's) emotional

display also matters. Victims who display positive emotions when discussing their victimization appear to be confirming the identity of victim and someone deserving of the transgression, while those who display negative emotion after the act disconfirm the negative identity.

As alluded to previously, individuals do not engage in identity management with only self-interest in mind. Carter et al. (2007) reported evidence for altruistic identity management. The authors found that when a participant observed an individual's identity being damaged, the observer tended to defer to the damaged individual on a cooperative task, despite the fact the observer reported viewing the individual as less powerful following the damage to his identity. This demonstrates that individuals do not only cognitively but also behaviorally manage the emotions of others. For example, Rogalin et al. (2007) found that research participants more frequently manage the compromised identity of insulted others who display normative emotions (in this case, sadness and distress) than those who display anger. In particular, research participants deferred to insulted others who were sad or distressed more often on an influence task than to those who were angry.

The present research explores whether the appropriateness of emotional displays shape our efforts to manage others' identities and redefine situations. I specifically examine how account-making and recall errors may respond to emotions that vary in their appropriateness.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Identity management, definition of the situation, emotion, accounts and recall errors all have sociological ties to symbolic interactionism. The symbolic interactionism tradition in sociology states that objects in social interaction develop meaning only through being defined symbolically (Mead 1964a). Once these objects have been defined symbolically, individuals behave in ways that support and reinforce the meaning. Not only is Mead known for his work on the symbolic use of symbols, but he also argued that individuals develop a sense of a "generalized other" that helps us determine what is appropriate in a situation. Once individuals develop a sense of a generalized other, they are able to evaluate themselves from an outsider's perspective (Mead 1934, 1964b). This ability enables individuals to maintain predictable interaction and stable definitions of the situation, much like a consistency motive (McHugh 1968).

Psychologists developed early theories exploring the consistency motive. This interest quickly spread to other disciplines where new theories developed. The most relevant of these theories are perception control theory (Powers 1973) and by extension Carver's (1979) cybernetic model of self-attention processes, self-consistency theory (Lecky 1945), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957, 1958), and balance theory (Heider 1958). Not only do all of these theories suggest that people attempt to maintain consistent beliefs and attitudes, but they also imply that inconsistency produces a general state of discomfort.

Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (1957, 1958) and Affect Control Theory are most closely related. The theory of cognitive dissonance states that cognitive

dissonance occurs when an individual holds two incompatible thoughts at the same time. When cognitive dissonance occurs, the individual is said to search for a new thought (or framing of the current thought) to reduce the conflict between cognitions. The intensity of dissonance felt by an individual is a result of how salient the cognitions are to the person.

Affect control theory relies on a related but somewhat different model of maintaining consistency. Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance suggests an internal motivation to respond cognitively and behaviorally in ways to reduce dissonance (Festinger 1957, 1958), while individuals are *socially* motivated to reduce dissonance under Affect Control Theory. Furthermore, the concept of deflection refers to inconsistent *affect* between two affective states (fundamental and transient), and deflection can result in either positive or negative emotion. Most distinctively, Affect Control Theory's treatment of deflection emphasizes feedback and control, which is noticeably absent in Festinger's theory and other similar theories (MacKinnon 1994).

Affect Control Theory

Affect Control Theory (Heise 1979; 2007, Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988, MacKinnon 1994) is a generative theory created to explain *and* predict social interaction. The strength of the theory lies in its ability to predict the ways individuals will react in particular situations (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006).Specifically, researchers are able to test how people interepret and create events in order to maintain fundamental meanings (Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988)

Scope conditions reflect the conditions which must be met for a theory's predictions to apply (Cohen 1989). First, Affect Control Theory applies only when a

social behavior occurs between an actor and an object-person. Second, an observer must be part of the identified language culture. Finally, the theory can only be applied to behaviors that are observed or interpreted (Robinson 2006). Robinson and Smith-Lovin (2006) provided useful examples. They explain that Affect Control Theory could not predict the response of a man whose fly was unzipped, though children were laughing at it, unless the man realized his fly was unzipped. Furthermore, they explain that unintended consequences of behavior, such as an electrostatic shock while kissing, are also outside the scope of the theory (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006).

Sentiments, impressions, and a mathematical control principle are the three main components of Affect Control Theory. The theory operates under the assumption that all concepts possess culturally relative meanings on dimensions of goodness, powerfulness, and liveliness that comprise the affective meaning or *sentiments* (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). Specifically, Affect Control Theory researchers measure the degrees of *evaluation, potency, and activity* for each concept using semantic differential measures. The universal dimensions were created by Charles Osgood and others (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957; Osgood, May, and Miron 1975). Respondents are asked to rate words on a scale of -4 to 4 on how bad-good (*evaluation)*, weak-powerful *(potency)*, and quiet-lively *(activity)* the word is. Ratings are recorded in a series of three-numbers profiles for each concept, and to date there are “dictionary entries” reporting the EPA values of hundreds of identities, actions, emotions, and settings in a variety of cultures and languages including the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, China, and Northern Ireland (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006).

Impressions, on the other hand, are more contextualized than sentiments. They are specified meanings created and conveyed through social interaction. Impressions, then, are more contextual than sentiments. Impression formation equations are used in Affect Control Theory to predict changes in evaluation, potency, and activity values that are caused by the social interaction (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). Since sentiments provide a reference level for cultural meaning, Affect Control Theory works to minimize the difference between the evaluation, potency, and activity of sentiments and the evaluation, potency, and activity of impressions, referred to as deflection. Simply stated, the mathematical control principle works to minimize differences between impressions and sentiments.

Another strength of Affect Control Theory is its highly mathematical nature. Deflection can be measured mathematically as the squared distance between evaluation, potency, and activity of sentiments and evaluation, potency, and activity of impressions. Events that are highly deflecting are also predicted to be highly unlikely. Heise and MacKinnon elaborate "Event likelihoods arise in affect control theory because a key premise of the theory is that events are constructed so as to minimize deflection of transient feelings from fundamental sentiments, and a behavior that so minimizes deflections is the expected or intended behavior – the likely behavior – in the circumstances" (1987: 135). Heise and MacKinnon (1987) demonstrated that the impact of deflection is cumulative, and deflection is not a result of word choice or sentence structure as suggested by Gollob (1974). Finally, Heise and MacKinnon (1987) indicate that the relationship between deflection and event likelihood is enhanced when people act in roles that are standard and institutionalized. For example, when an actor's identity does

not fit clearly into an institution such as family, legal, sports, or therapeutic, the ability of deflection to predict likelihood is decreased.

Propositions

As noted, Affect Control Theory rests upon the assumption that individuals strive to maintain a stable, consistent definition of the situation. When definitions become unstable, individuals engage in behaviors like making accounts or misremembering information to restore consistency. This paper extends existing arguments in the literature about the relationship between emotion display and the management of others' identities to the more traditional symbolic interactionist domain of account making and aligning actions. I extend this literature by making use of classical symbolic interactionist ideas and arguments from Affect Control Theory to develop predictions about the circumstances under which we use accounts to manage the identities of people who are describing discrediting events. Heise and Thomas (1989) made predictions about the creation of social identities from combinations of emotion and identity meanings and found that that the main effects of emotion evaluations and identity evaluations affect identity-emotion combinations as does an interaction effect between emotion evaluation and identity evaluation. Below I briefly present my propositions and their theoretical justification.

First, I expect to show the pattern that individuals who display emotion appropriate to their actions, in this case, sadness following a bad behavior, will be evaluated more highly than those who display no emotion or anger following a similar behavior. This hypothesis comes directly from Affect Control Theory and

has been tested in earlier papers (Heise 1989; Heise and Thomas 1989; Lazowski 1987; Robinson et al.1994; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1999; Tsoudis 2000, 2002; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 2001).

Heise (1989) describes appropriate emotion as a "matching of emotion with the kinds of evaluative outcomes produced by events" (1989: 18). When a person behaves in a negative way and creates a negative impression of herself, a negative emotion display by that person is appropriate (and expected). People who display positive, appropriate affect are characterized positively while people who display inappropriate affect are stigmatized (Heise 1989:18). The implication, as Heise states, is that "an actor might exert quite a bit of control over the way in which he is characterized if he were to manipulate his emotional expressions" (1989: 18). As such, I predict:

> Proposition 1: When individuals behave badly and display appropriate emotions, they will be evaluated more highly than when they behave badly and display inappropriate emotion.

It seems logical for people to account for the behavior of those who display appropriate emotion. In fact, research by Rogalin et al. (2007) found that individuals who display appropriate emotion will have more restorative work done by others to remedy their identities. Specifically, the authors found that students made more efforts to manage the identity of an insulted task partner when that partner appeared sad or distressed after the insult. In this paper I attempt to extend this finding by showing how the classic strategy of restoring identities, account-making, is used to manage the identities of individuals we evaluate positively. This account-making can be viewed as a *hot* cognitive error

where individuals have a motivated interest in committing the error (Keren 1996: 176). Therefore:

> Proposition 2: When actors display appropriate emotions, observers will make more accounts for them.

Coming directly from Affect Control Theory and social cognition literature regarding schemas, the final proposition rests upon the assumption that highly deflecting events (e.g., displaying inappropriate emotion) indicate a low likelihood of occurrence in social life. Individuals store information about familiar encounters in cognitive schemas. When an unusual event occurs, individuals are not typically equipped with a schema to deal with the situation and are cognitively unable to sensibly remedy the inconsistency between behavior and emotion. Alternatively, the individuals may rely on non-applicable schemas. The result is an increase in errors as they recall information. This type of error is a *cold* cognitive error because it assumed to be an unmotivated, unconscious mistake (Keren 1996: 176).

Since high deflection indicates a low likelihood of an event, and events that are unlikely often do not have schemas attached to them, I predict the following:

> Proposition 3: When actors display inappropriate affect following a bad behavior, observers will recall the event with greater error than when actors display appropriate emotion.

CHAPTER 4

METHODS

Procedures

Forty-six females and fifty-five males in lower-division sociology classes volunteered to participate in a study about "Interpersonal Communication". Individuals in classrooms were given a packet including instructions, a transcript, and a set of questions. Experimental instructions explained that the passage was transcribed from a videotape recorded during a communications workshop. Instructions specifically asked participants to use the transcript to form a clear picture of the speaker. Upon reading the passage, participants completed a questionnaire of scale items and then recalled qualitatively information about the actor, her behavior, and her emotions. Actors in the transcripts were always female. Data were collected using a 2 (scenario) X 3 (emotion: sad, angry, neutral) factorial design with the intention of collapsing across scenario.

Vignette Transcripts

I used a paradigm developed by Lazowski (1987) in which nonverbal cues are embedded within the transcripts of videotapes. Transcripts depicted the disclosure of a harmful act and contained nonverbal cues suggesting an emotion display by the speaker. These cues used to manipulate the speakers' emotion are taken from Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action Coding System and convey emotion by using the speaker's eyes or mouth. Other cues embedded in the text suggest one's overall demeanor (e.g., shoulders slouched). There were six transcript conditions. Each transcript involved the disclosure of one of two negative acts: (Condition 1) Forgetting to keep a promise to a

friend or (Condition 2) Lying about a roommate. Within each transcript nonverbal cues were embedded indicating one of three emotions: (1) anger, (2) sadness, or (3) neutral or no emotion. Similar nonverbal cues and transcripts have been used by Lazowski (1987), Robinson et al. (1994), and Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1999). Below are examples of three of the transcripts[2]

> *Condition 1: Sad/Forgetting to keep a promise to a friend*
> (Sad/unhappy, sits with eyes downcast, frowning, has head leaning on hand, voice is low monotone) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private...but (softly) I think my friend might get fired. Um.... the other night I stopped by the store where she works and she asked me to drop off the bank deposit for the store because she had a date. As I was leaving I ran into this guy I've been seeing and we went out for a drink. Well, I didn't make the deposit and didn't even realize it until the next afternoon. By then the store manager had missed the receipts for the deposit (pause),.... and he was really upset (corners of the mouth pulled downward), now he's hassling her all the time, and (eyes downcast, head down) he says he's thinking of firing her.

> *Condition 5: Angry/Lying about a roommate*
> (Angry/annoyed, sits with eyebrows pulled tightly together, fists clenched, lips tight) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private....but (forcefully) my roommate's friends don't trust her anymore. I know this because the other day, for example, we were all talking, um....some of my friends and me, and I told them she's stolen things from Izard's before and gotten away with it. The whole thing was a complete lie (pause)... but (jaws clenched), now they don't trust her at all, (crosses arms tightly, raises chin) sometimes even in fairly unimportant matters.

> *Condition 6: No affect/Lying about a roommate*
> (Relaxed facial expressions, sits with arms resting on chair arms, makes eye contact) And something else about

[2] All transcripts can be found in Appendix A.

myself....well, this is kind of private....but (concentrating) my roommate's friends don't trust her anymore. I know this because the other day, for example, we were all talking, um....some of my friends and me, and I told them she's stolen things from Izard's before and gotten away with it. The whole thing was a complete lie (pause)... but (tilting head to the left), now they don't trust her at all, (makes eye contact, rests arms on chair arms) sometimes even in fairly unimportant matters.

CHAPTER 5

MEASURES

Manipulation Checks

To ensure that the nonverbal cues embedded in the transcripts adequately conveyed the desired emotion, respondents answered the questions "In your opinion, how sad/unhappy was the speaker?" and "In your opinion, how angry/annoyed was the speaker?" Additionally, the respondent rated his or her impression of how happy-unhappy a speaker appeared. This item was a Likert scale ranging from -5 to 5, recoded throughout the analysis so that higher scores indicate a higher impression of the speaker's happiness.

As common with self-report data, some items in the scale had missing values. To maintain a constant sample size without deleting any cases, I chose to use item mean substitution to input data for the missing values. As opposed to person mean substitution where an individual's average response for the scale is imputed into the item with missing data, this method of mean substitution uses the average item score for all respondents as the new value. Researchers (Downey and King 1995; King, Fogg, and Downey 1998) have demonstrated that this is a more conservative approach than person mean substitution because it does not inflate reliability estimates. Nine total values were missing, distributed across five cases. This represents less than one-half of a percent of missing data.

Evaluation

Respondents further reported impressions of the speaker based on a fourteen-item trait scale composed of adjectives from Anderson's 555 (1968). This scale is adapted from Lazowski (1987) and Robinson and Smith-Lovin (1999) and includes eleven-point bi-polar scales that consistently loaded on a single principle factor representing "goodness" in previous studies. This scale is the operationalization of the evaluation component of evaluation, potency, and activity. For the scale, the trait anchors were fair-unfair, agreeable-disagreeable, open-minded-closed-minded, trusting-not trusting, humble-conceited, warm-cold, genuine-phony, open-closed, sensitive-insensitive, honest-dishonest, trustworthy-untrustworthy, friendly-unfriendly, adjusted-maladjusted, and kind-unkind. Again, missing data was imputed by item mean substitution, as suggested by Downey and King (1995) and King et al. (1998). The Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .918.

Accounts and Recall Errors

Respondents were also given several open-ended questions with their vignette. These questions include: (1) How would you describe what the person did to her friend? (2) How would you describe she felt about it? (3) What kind of person would you think she was, after hearing her tell about what happened? and (4) If you were with someone who told you this story (as described in the videotape), how would it make you feel? These questions are useful for assessing how well individuals remember the vignette information.

Two researchers coded accounts and recall errors from the open-ended responses. Recall errors included omissions, additions, or transformations of the information presented in the transcript. The two main types of recall errors recorded are (1) behavior recall errors and (2) emotion recall errors. Additionally, negative recall errors, errors that are not in favor of the actor, and residual recall errors, errors that were not categorized otherwise, were coded. Examples include:

> "I thought it was quite a shady thing to suddenly turn on someone for trivial shoplifting." (Condition 5: Angry/Lying about a roommate) (Behavior recall error: She lied about her roommate shoplifting; she didn't shoplift.)

Similarly, accounts were coded as present if the individual made an excuse or justification regarding the behavior or the emotion displayed in the transcript. Examples include:

> "She accidentally forgot to do something that may have lost her job. It was irresponsible, but then again her friend should have been making the deposit herself because, after all, it was her job." (Condition 2: Angry/Forgetting to keep a promise to a friend) (Behavior excuse: Negative value is placed on the behavior, but the actor is relieved of responsibility)

There were no justifications found in any of the responses to open-ended questions; however, this is not altogether surprising. Other researchers have noted a similar pattern. McLaughlin, Cody, and O'Hair (1983) found that following a social transgression, 175 of 278 subjects reported using excuses but only 60 reported using justifications. It seems that justifications are more "risky" to an actor because they involve acknowledging the bad nature of one's actions. Individuals may be unprepared to justify events that are so blatantly negative.

Computer simulations

INTERACT (Heise 2005) is a computer program used to simulate social interactions as characterized by Affect Control Theory (Heise 2007). Within the program, individuals define interactants, situations, and events, and analyze the events to simulate resulting behavior and affect. Using INTERACT, I am able to test the proposition that emotion display influences evaluation. I find support for the proposition.

To simulate these events, I defined the vignette scenarios in language already available in INTERACT. For condition 1, I defined the situation as "Friend neglects friend." For condition 2, I defined the event as "Roommate maligns roommate".

Simulations showed that displaying no emotion following the negative events of "Roommate maligns roommate" and "Friend neglects friend" produces more deflection than displaying sadness or anger. For the event "Friend neglects friend", anger and sadness displays produce nearly the same amount of deflection, however, displaying sadness is predicted to be more deflecting than anger in the event "Roommate maligns roommate". See Table 1 for specific deflection predictions comparing each event with two cultural dictionaries.

CHAPTER 6

HYPOTHESES

While propositions are general knowledge claims related to a particular theory, hypotheses are more specific, predictive observations that allow a researcher to empirically test theoretical statements (Cohen 1989). Propositions guide research, but hypotheses link the substantive issues to the empirical setting. Below I expand upon my propositions by including specific hypotheses.

Recall, proposition 1 stated: *When individuals behave badly and display appropriate emotions, they will be evaluated more highly than those who display inappropriate emotion.* From this proposition and earlier research, I have developed the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1a: Actors who display sadness following a bad behavior will be evaluated more highly than actors who display no emotion.

Hypothesis 1b: Actors who display sadness following a bad behavior will be evaluated more highly than actors who display anger.

Proposition 2 stated: *When actors display appropriate emotions, observers will make more accounts for them.* I predict the following.

Hypothesis 2a: Observers will make more accounts for actors who display sadness following a bad behavior than for actors who display no emotion following a bad behavior.

Hypothesis 2b: Observers will make more accounts for actors who display sadness following a bad behavior than for actors who display anger following a bad behavior.

Proposition 3 states that *when actors display inappropriate affect following a bad behavior, observers will recall the event with greater error.* More specifically:

Hypothesis 3a: When actors display no emotion, observers will recall the event with greater error than when actors display sadness.

Hypothesis 3b: When actors display anger, observers will recall the event with greater error than when actors display sadness.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

Logistic Regression

I used binary logistic regression to test my hypotheses that emotion displays predict the occurrence of recall errors and accounts. In recent years, logistic regression has been the analysis of choice when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Pampel 2000, DeMaris 1995; Walsh 1987). As Michael S. Lewis-Beck explains in the Foreword of the *Logistic Regression: A Primer* by Fred C. Pampel, "Logistic regression has pretty much come to replace ordinary least squares regression as the data analytic tool of choice when the equation to be estimated has a dichotomous dependent variable" (2000:v). Ordinary Least Squares regression is not appropriate for analysis with a dichotomous dependent variable because variables of this nature violate the assumption of normality, the assumption of homoscedasticity, and the error term violates the assumption of homoscedasticity (Pampel 2000). With binary logistic regression, I am able to estimate the occurrence of account-making or recall errors and interpret the findings in terms of either probabilities or odds. Demaris elaborated, "Predicted probabilities are perhaps most useful when the purpose of analysis is to forecast the probability of an event, given a set of respondent characteristics. If, as is more often the case, one is merely interested in the impact of the independent variables, controlling for other effects in the model, the odds ratio is the preferred measure" (DeMaris 1995: 962).

One drawback of logistic regression is the lack of consensus surrounding the r-square statistic. In logistic regression, the r-square does not indicate the amount of variance explained by an independent variable, as is the case in Ordinary Least Squares

regression, but instead indicates the predictive efficacy of the model. Additionally, there are numerous measurements of this predictive efficacy, but the most common are Cox and Snell's R-square (Cox and Snell 1989), Nagerkerke R-square (Nagerkerke 1991), and McFadden R-square (McFadden 1974).

As suggested by Menard (2000, 2002), I report the McFadden R-square for the logistic regressions. The McFadden R-square has a number of advantages over other measures. First, this measure of association most closely reflects the proportional reduction in measurement similar to the r-square in Ordinary Least Squares regression. Second, this measure is not dependent upon the proportion of cases with the attribute being studied. Finally, McFadden's R-square is useful not only for dichotomous dependent variables but also for ordinal and nominal dependent variables (Menard 2002: 27). Furthermore, logistic regression allows for assessing the significance of model fit against a constant only model or when entering additional independent variables. This is often referred to as the chi-square improvement test (Pampel 2000: 46).

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Because my measure of emotion is categorical and my measure of evaluation is continuous, I use of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to explore the relationship. ANOVA is a widely used statistical test for experimental. Analysis of variance explores the variation of means within groups and between groups. Though ANOVA is related to regression, ANOVA differs because it determines whether an independent variable can have an effect on a dependent variable that is beyond what could be attributed to chance

(Iversen and Norpoth 1976). Regression, on the other hand, measures the fit between variables.

Pairwise comparison tests can be used to make comparisons within ANOVA. In my paper, I use the multiple, pairwise comparison known as Tukey HSD. Tukey HSD is the most conservative pair-wise test because the likelihood of Type I errors is low (Klockars and Sax 1986). A modified Tukey HSD test (Tukey 1953; Games and Howell 1976) is the recommended technique for pairwise comparison of means. This test is conservative against Type I errors and maintains control even with unequal sample sizes and unequal pairs (Klockars and Sax 1986; Kesselman and Rogan 1978). Further, the test is applicable even when variances are unequal (Kesselman, Games, and Rogan 1979).

CHAPTER 8

RESULTS

Manipulation checks

See Tables 2-4 for statistical comparisons. Manipulation checks indicated that the in-text cues to emotion were sufficient. Emotion condition influenced how happy, F (5,101) = 4.095, $p < .010$[3], how sad/unhappy, F (5,101) = 13.039, $p < .001$, and how angry/annoyed, F (5,101) = 35.528, $p < .001$, a speaker appeared. Speakers seemed more happy in the neutral condition than the sad condition ($p < .05$) and more happy in the neutral condition than in the angry condition ($p < .05$). Additionally, speakers seemed more unhappy in sad condition than the neutral condition ($p < .001$) and more unhappy in the angry condition than the neutral condition ($p < .001$). Furthermore, speakers in the angry condition seemed angrier than those in the sad condition ($p < .001$) and than those in the neutral condition ($p < .001$). Taken together, these findings suggest that parenthetical statements about an actor's emotion were understandable and clearly recognizable by respondents.

Collapsing across gender and scenario

Adequate cell size is an important consideration when using small samples. Having the ability collapse cells for analyses greatly increases one's statistical power. Chi-square tests of significance suggest that there were no gender differences in the amount of accounts or recall errors made by participants. The lack of a statistical interaction between gender and my variables of interest suggests the ability to collapse

[3] All predictions, unless otherwise noted, were directed hypotheses. As such, all hypothesis tests are one-tailed unless otherwise noted.

conditions across gender, increasing cell size and the power of the analysis. Additionally, ANOVA analyses and logistic regressions demonstrate that while there is a main effect for scenario in predicting goodness, recall errors, and accounts, there is not a significant interaction effect for scenario and the actor's emotion. This suggests that, though the scenarios may be marginally different, it is acceptable to collapse them. Thus, final analyses are collapsed across scenario.

Evaluation

I find support for hypothesis 1. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) results show that the emotion display of an actor significantly predicts how highly a participant evaluated the actor, F (5,101) = 8.029, p < . 001, (one-tailed). As Affect Control Theory predicts and Tukey HSD pair-wise tests (Tukey 1953; Games and Howell 1976) confirms, sad actors are evaluated significantly more positively than neutral actors (p < .01, one-tailed), however there is no evaluative difference between neutral and angry actors, again a prediction from Affect Control Theory. Appropriately then, sad actors are evaluated more positively than angry actors (p < .01, one-tailed).

Accounts

Table 7 presents the results of logistic regression of the dependent variable accounts. Emotion display is used to predict the occurrence of account-making. Actors who display sadness are over two times more likely to have an account made for them than actors who display no emotion (p < .05). Additionally, actors who display anger (p < .01) and no emotion (p < .05) instead of sadness are significantly less likely to have an

account made for them following the disclosure of a bad act. The chi-square model test indicates that including emotion display into the model significantly improves the fit ($\chi^2 = 8.361$, $p < .01$) of the model. In other words, emotion display appears a viable way to predict account-making.

Table 7 includes the evaluative variable *goodness*. Including goodness in the model increases predictive efficacy of the model as indicated by the r-square statistic. Adding emotion display and goodness improves the fit of the model over the constant-only model ($\chi^2 = 17.994$, $p < .01$), and adding goodness to a model significantly improves the predictive power of a model with only emotion display as predictors (block $\chi^2 = 9.632$, $p < .01$). Actors who display anger instead of no emotion are less likely to have accounts made for them ($p < .10$). Predictably, then, displaying anger instead of sadness also leads to a decreased rate of accounts ($p < .05$). Finally, a one-unit increase in positive evaluation of an actor increases the log-odds of making an account for that actor by 1.034. All of this evidence indicates support for hypothesis 2. Actors who display emotions appropriate to the situation have more accounts made for them by observers, presumably because the observers believe the actor feels badly about his action.



Recall Errors

The analysis of recall errors differs some from my analysis of accounts because recall errors were broken down in to four types of recall errors. Some types of recall errors are better predicted by emotion display than others, so I conduct multiple analyses to explore this issue. First, I examine behavior recall errors alone. Then I examine all recall errors together. Finally, I examine negative and emotion recall errors separately.

In table 8 I examine the effect of emotion on all recall errors. Though the model itself is not significant, I still find a significant main effect by emotion. Specifically, individuals who display no emotion (neutral) are 2.3 times ($p < .05$) more likely to have some recall error made than individuals who display sadness, the appropriate emotion (one-tailed test). The strength of association, however, remains quite low (McFadden r-square = .021). Overall, this still indicates support for hypothesis three.

Exploratory analyses. Motivated by Nelson's (2006) findings that individuals more frequently re-identify behaviors than other components of interaction, in Table 9 I explore the possibility of emotion influencing one's ability to remember the *behavior* of an individual. Logistic regression reveals no differences by emotion. The strength of association between emotion display and behavior recall errors is quite weak (McFadden r-square = .033). Further, the chi-square model significance test is not significant, indicating that emotion does not adequately predict the occurrence of behavior recall error. This is in opposition to emotion's ability to predict accounts

Table 10 includes negative recall errors – that is, errors that are not in favor of the actor. In other words, these types of recall errors can be seen as a way to punish the actor for an abnormal social interaction. Though the model is not significant nor is emotion display, individuals who display the unexpected emotions of anger and neutrality are over two times more likely to have negative recall errors made for them than a person who displays sadness.

Finally, I examine emotion recall errors in table 11. The chi-square model test is statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level ($\chi = 9.278$, two-tailed). Furthermore, people who display no emotion are significantly more likely to have emotion recall errors made for them than for those who display sadness. In fact, if one displays no emotion she is almost six times (5.921) more likely to have an emotion recall error made for her if she had displayed sadness.

Figure 2. Type of Recall Errors by Emotion



CHAPTER 9

DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The analysis presented here illustrates the importance of emotion display for managing identities and maintaining a definition of the situation. I find support for the notion that emotion displays determine not only *if* measures are taken to manage an identity but also *what* measures are taken to manage an identity. More specifically, whether an account or recall error is used depends on what emotion is displayed by an actor following a behavior. When the definition of a situation is unstable and an interaction partner displays a culturally appropriate emotion, people use accounts to manage her identity and consequently redefine the situation. If the definition of the situation is unstable and the interaction partner displays inappropriate affect, however, people make errors in recounting the event. In this case, recall errors are one strategy to restore the definition of the situation and may or may not benefit the actor. I reason that accounts are used in this situation because we like individuals who display appropriate emotions (even when their behavior is bad), and this high evaluation leads us to put more effort into managing the actor's damaged identity. Therefore, individuals generally make excuses and justifications in this situation.

In line with Affect Control Theory, it seems that displaying sadness following a negative disclosure disconfirms the identity of the actor as someone who would commit such an act, leading observers to evaluate her more positively. Similarly, as Lazowski (1987) speculated, displaying no emotion following the disclosure of a social harm communicates that the person is unaffected by the action and that she is, indeed, the type of person who would do such an act.

The person disclosing an anti-social behavior, not just his emotion, may influence the way others respond and how the situation is redefined. As Hollander suggested (1958; Hollander and Julian 1969), individuals with higher status or perceived higher status may be given more social leeway and may be forgiven more than lower status others who commit the same anti-social behaviors. If this is true, then, not only does emotion display effect way observers respond, but *who* is displaying the emotion also influences responses. This suggests that high status individuals may be able to display culturally inappropriate affect and suffer less identity damage than their low-status counterparts.

Limitations and Future Directions

While this research illustrates the importance of studying emotional display as it relates to the definition of the situation and identity management, it is important to note the limitations of the data. All of the behaviors in the scenario are bad behaviors. Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1999 demonstrate the effects of emotion display on identity inferences using positive behaviors, but future studies should address whether recall errors and account-making widely differ by situation. Currently, Affect Control Theory does not currently make any predictions about the directed nature of emotions. I suspect that the direction of emotions, for example, anger directed at self or other, is related to one's perception of accepting blame or not. These questions remain to be addressed. Furthermore, it would be useful to know whether excuses and justifications are made for one's behavior or one's emotion. Research mentioned earlier by Nelson (2006) suggests that behavior is more frequently reidentified than actor or object. Finally, future studies should replicate this research with a larger, more generalizable sample.

Implications

Empirically, this paper is important because it can be extended to include specific settings where emotion display can be strategically used to mitigate identity damage such as in a courtroom or during eye-witness testimony. This topic, though already studied (Robinson et al. 1994; Tsoudis 2000, 2002; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998), may be underdeveloped. Emotions are not only important in criminal justice settings; emotion display may affect how one reacts toward medical personal following news of a serious illness or how a teacher treats a student who repeatedly violates emotion norms. It is within these institutions that I find the study of emotions most interesting.

Furthermore, this paper offers theoretical insight in to specific ways individuals manage others' identities. This paper adds to social cognition literature by implying that emotion display, net of all other factors, may inhibit one's ability to recall a situation. Most importantly it bridges social psychological thought on emotion and accounts with social cognition literature on recall to provide a complete picture of the role of emotions in redefining situations.

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Table 1. INTERACT simulations of deflection by year of data collection

Event	Deflection Resulting from Events by year of	
	1978	2003
Roommate maligns roommate	6	10
Angry roommate maligns roommate	1	3
Sad roommate maligns roommate	3	3
Calm roommate maligns roommate	6	10
No emotion roommate maligns roommate	4	5
Friend neglects friend	30	44
Angry friend neglects friend	12	17
Sad friend neglects friend	11	15
Calm friend neglects friend	22	40
No emotion friend neglects friend	16	24

Accessed April 4, 2007. Java Interact 2. copyright 2001, 2005. David Heise. http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/interact/JavaInteract.html

Table 2. Means (standard deviations) by Emotion Display for Study Variables

Measure	Emotion Display				Range
	Sad	Angry	Neutral	Total	
Goodness	81.512 (20.891)	67.029 (19.246)	67.123 (23.940)	71.935 (22.286)	18-125
Recall errors					
Behavior recall errors	.147 (.360)	.059 (.239)	.061 (.242)	.089 (.286)	0-1
Emotion recall errors	.118 (.327)	.441 (.504)	.273 (.452)	.277 (.450)	0-1
Negative recall errors	.088 (.288)	.206 (.410)	.182 (.392)	.158 (.367)	0-1
All recall errors	.384 (.493)	.588 (.500)	.485 (.508)	.485 (.502)	0-1
Accounts	.618 (.493)	.412 (.500)	.273 (.452)	.436 (.498)	0-1

Table 3. Means (standard deviations) by Emotion Display for Manipulation Check Variables

Measure	Emotion Display				Range
	Sad	Angry	Neutral	Total	
Angry	3.677	7.849	3.618	5.020	1-11
	(2.128)	(2.612)	(2.462)	(3.098)	
Sad	8.265	7.061	5.261	6.860	1-11
	(1.797)	(2.783)	(2.606)	(2.709)	

Table 4. ANOVA for How Sad was the Actor

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Corrected Model	163.901	5	32.780	5.462***
Intercept	4757.331	1	4757.331	792.695***
Scenario	0.088	1	0.088	0.015
Actor Emotion	156.507	2	78.253	13.039***
Scenario * Emotion	8.434	2	4.217	0.703
Error	570.139	95	6.001	
Total	5487.060	101		
Corrected Total	734.040	100		

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 5. ANOVA for How Angry was the Actor

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Corrected Model	427.949	5	85.590	15.284***
Intercept	2569.870	1	2569.870	458.896***
Scenario	0.483	1	0.483	0.086
Actor Emotion	397.924	2	198.962	35.528***
Scenario * Emotion	35.099	2	17.549	3.134*
Error	532.011	95	5.600	
Total	3505.000	101		
Corrected Total	959.960	100		

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 6. ANOVA of the Effect of Emotion on Perceived Goodness

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Corrected Model	20365.054	5	4073.011	13.206***
Intercept	526041.484	1	526041.484	1705.582***
Scenario	15442.240	2	15442.240	50.068***
Actor Emotion	4952.426	1	2476.213	8.029***
Scenario * Emotion	251.247	2	125.624	0.407
Error	29300.231	95	308.423	
Total	572309.388	101		
Corrected Total	49665.285	100		

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 7. Logistic Regressions on Accounts with Perceived Goodness

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio
Independent Variables						
Angry	-1.460**	.527	.232	-1.150*	.558	.317
Neutral	-.836*	.496	.433	-.416	.537	.660
Perceived Goodness				.033**	.011	1.034
Constant	.480	.353	1.615	-2.183	.988	.113
R-square	McFadden .060			McFadden .130		
Chi-square model test	8.361**			17.994**		
n = 101						

reference category is sad

all tests are one-tailed

$^{\dagger}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 8. Logistic Regressions on All Recall Errors

	All Recall Errors		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio
Independent Variables			
Angry	.419	.496	1.520
Neutral	.836*	.496	2.308
Constant	-.480	.353	.619
R-square	McFadden .021		
Chi-square model test	2.906		
n = 101			

reference category is sad
all tests are one-tailed
$^{\dagger}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 9. Logistic Regressions on Behavior Recall Errors

	Behavior Recall Errors		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio
Independent Variables			
Angry	-.983	.876	.374
Neutral	-1.015	.875	.363
Constant	-1.758	.484	.172
R-square	McFadden .033		
Chi-square model test	1.988		
n = 101			

reference category is sad
all tests are two-tailed
$^{\dagger}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 10. Logistic Regressions on Negative Recall Errors

	Negative Recall Errors		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio
Independent Variables			
Angry	.831	.755	2.296
Neutral	.985	.739	2.679
Constant	-2.015	.532	.133
R-square	McFadden .024		
Chi-square model test	2.119		
n = 101			

reference category is sad
all tests are two-tailed
$^{\dagger}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 11. Logistic Regressions on Emotion Recall Errors

	Emotion Recall Errors		
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio
Independent Variables			
Angry	1.034	.660	2.812
Neutral	1.779**	.635	5.921
Constant	-2.015	.532	.133
R-square	McFadden .078		
Chi-square model test	9.278**		
n = 101			

reference category is sad
all tests are two-tailed
$^{\dagger}p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

APPENDIX A

VIGNETTES

Condition 1: Sad/Forgetting to keep a promise to a friend

(Sad/unhappy, sits with eyes downcast, frowning, has head leaning on hand, voice is low monotone) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private...but (softly) I think my friend might get fired. Um.... the other night I stopped by the store where she works and she asked me to drop off the bank deposit for the store because she had a date. As I was leaving I ran into this guy I've been seeing and we went out for a drink. Well, I didn't make the deposit and didn't even realize it until the next afternoon. By then the store manager had missed the receipts for the deposit (pause),.... and he was really upset (corners of the mouth pulled downward), now he's hassling her all the time, and (eyes downcast, head down) he says he's thinking of firing her.

Condition 2: Angry/Forgetting to keep a promise to a friend

(Angry/annoyed, sits with eyebrows pulled tightly together, fists clenched, lips tight) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private...but (forcefully) I think my friend might get fired. Um.... the other night I stopped by the store where she works and she asked me to drop off the bank deposit for the store because she had a date. As I was leaving I ran into this guy I've been seeing and we went out for a drink. Well, I didn't make the deposit and didn't even realize it until the next afternoon. By then the store manager had missed the receipts for the deposit (pause),.... and he was really upset (jaw clenched), now he's hassling her all the time, and (crosses arms tightly, raises chin) he says he's thinking of firing her.

Condition 3: No affect/Forgetting to keep a promise to a friend

(Relaxed facial expressions, sits with arms resting on chair arms, makes eye contact) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private...but (concentrating) I think my friend might get fired. Um.... the other night I stopped by the store where she works and she asked me to drop off the bank deposit for the store because she had a date. As I was leaving I ran into this guy I've been seeing and we went out for a drink. Well, I didn't make the deposit and didn't even realize it until the next afternoon. By then the store manager had missed the receipts for the deposit (pause),.... and he was really upset (tilting head to the left), now he's hassling her all the time, and (makes eye contact, rests arms on chair arms) he says he's thinking of firing her.

Condition 4: Sad/Lying about a roommate

(Sad/unhappy, sits with eyes downcast, frowning, has head leaning on hand, voice is low monotone) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private....but (softly) my roommate's friends don't trust her anymore. I know this because the other day, for example, we were all talking, um....some of my friends and me, and I told them she's stolen things from Izard's before and gotten away with it. The whole thing was a complete lie (pause)... but (corners of the mouth pulled downward), now they don't trust her at all, (eyes downcast, head down) sometimes even in fairly unimportant matters.

Condition 5: Angry/Lying about a roommate

(Angry/annoyed, sits with eyebrows pulled tightly together, fists clenched, lips tight) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private....but (forcefully) my

roommate's friends don't trust her anymore. I know this because the other day, for example, we were all talking, um....some of my friends and me, and I told them she's stolen things from Izard's before and gotten away with it. The whole thing was a complete lie (pause)... but (jaws clenched), now they don't trust her at all, (crosses arms tightly, raises chin) sometimes even in fairly unimportant matters.

Condition 6: No affect/Lying about a roommate

(Relaxed facial expressions, sits with arms resting on chair arms, makes eye contact) And something else about myself....well, this is kind of private....but (concentrating) my roommate's friends don't trust her anymore. I know this because the other day, for example, we were all talking, um....some of my friends and me, and I told them she's stolen things from Izard's before and gotten away with it. The whole thing was a complete lie (pause)... but (tilting head to the left), now they don't trust her at all, (makes eye contact, rests arms on chair arms) sometimes even in fairly unimportant matters.