SOLON SURROUNDED:

THREE IMAGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION IN SOLON'S POLITICAL POETRY

by

ALEXANDER KARSTEN

(Under the Direction of Charles Platter)

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I examine three fragments (West Fragments 5, 36, and 37) in which Solon describes himself using puzzling, evocative metaphors. I use the rhetorical theory of narrative as a framework for analyzing the authorship, audience, and text in these fragments. I find that these poems make careful use of ambiguity to operate on multiple levels with multiple different rhetorical targets and culminate in images which have multivalent meaning. This methodology allows me to identify the ways in which Solon uses these images to shape and reflect on his legacy.

INDEX WORDS: Solon, Political Poetry, Rhetorical Theory of Narrative, Athens, Elegy, Iambic, Archaic Greek Poetry, Implied Author

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DEDICATION

For John Iaquinta and Scott Cooper.

μηδέ μοι ἄκλαυτος θάνατος μόλοι, ἀλλὰ φίλοισι

καλλείποιμι θανὼν ἄλγεα καὶ στοναχάς.

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I examine three fragments (West Fragments 5, 36, and 37) in which Solon describes himself using puzzling, evocative metaphors. I use the rhetorical theory of narrative as a framework for analyzing the authorship, audience, and text in these fragments. I find that these poems make careful use of ambiguity to operate on multiple levels with multiple different rhetorical targets and culminate in images which have multivalent meaning. This methodology allows me to identify the ways in which Solon uses these images to shape and reflect on his legacy.

Solon: His Laws and His Poems

Solon of Athens was famously both a lawgiver and a poet. By all accounts, his poetic output preceded his position as archon and διαλλακτής ("mediator") and may have even been the motivation for his nomination as such.[1] We can confidently place Solon in the early 6th century: his archonship is usually dated as having taken place in 593/4 BCE, although there are some theories that date it in the 570s BCE.[2] There is some controversy over whether Solon's archonship and position as διαλλακτής were held simultaneously, and, if not, which office was held first.[3] If his reforms did indeed take place in 593/4 BCE, the upheaval that led to

[1] Aristotle explicitly says so (*Athenian Constitution* 5.2). It is worth noting that Solon's poems were not exclusively political. The fact that almost all of our extant fragments are political (with a few exceptions: 14, 23, 25, 27, 38, 39, 40) tells us more about his biographical tradition and the interests of the authors who preserved him in quotation than about his oeuvre itself (Lefkowitz 1981, 40, 46).

[2] For a thorough summary of the controversy until that point, see Markianos 1974, 18-20. For the most up-to-date references, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 6-8.

[3] For a thorough survey of these theories, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 7 n. 21.

Peisistratos' tyranny would have signaled their failure. Some accounts tell of Solon living to see that failure.[4] Solon was consistently listed as one of the "Seven Sages," and was thus the subject of tales that had him interacting with the other sages,[5] Aesop,[6] and Croesus.[7] It is difficult, if not impossible, to fit such various encounters within a single lifetime.[8] Solon's position as a historical figure on the borderline of the mythological tradition means that it is easier to observe later reception and rhetorical exploitation of his name than to know the reality of his historical actions.[9]

Solon was appointed as leader of Athens in a time of great crisis and instituted reforms. According to Aristotle, his reforms were twofold: constitutional and economic. Constitutionally, according to ancient accounts, Solon defined four classes that were based on wealth,[10] he allowed any citizen to introduce a trial to a popular court for injury (to themselves or another) and gave the right to appeal the decisions of the magistrate,[11] he instituted a system of selection for the archons which combined election and lot,[12] and he introduced a council of 400 (one hundred men selected from the four tribes that were extant at the time) that worked alongside the Areopagus.[13] There are also other laws attested that cannot be considered "constitutional" in

[4] Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 30f. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 14.
[5] Noussia-Fantuzzi gives a brief overview and bibliography of these interactions (2010, 11). For Solon as a sage see Martin 1993.
[6] For a discussion of Solon's interaction with Aesop, see Kurke 2011, 125-158.
[7] Herodotus 1.29-33.
[8] Aristotle himself comments that one such story—that Solon and Peisistratus were lovers—was chronologically impossible (*Athenian Constitution* 17.2). For a helpful overview of all matters of Solon's chronology, see Almeida 2003, 20-6.
[9] For the most recent examination of Solon's later reception, see the collection of essays in Noussia-Fantuzzi and Nagy 2015.
[10] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 7.1. Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 16.3, 18.
[11] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 9. Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 18.2-5.
[12] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 7.1.
[13] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 7. Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 19.

measure.[14] These laws, taken together, were transcribed onto *axones* or *kurbeis*, which Plutarch claims to have seen in fragmentary form.[15]

There is dispute over whether or not Solon's laws were more advantageous towards the elite or the people. This disagreement is evidenced in our ancient sources, and has continued in the most recent scholarship.[16] Solon's constitutional laws, particularly those concerning the courts, have been cited as one of the origin points from which the radical Athenian democracy emerged.[17] On the other hand, it has been emphasized that Solon's legacy as the founder of the democracy runs against the grain of his poetry, which emphasizes the need to check the δῆμος.[18] The classification of citizens, and accompanying restrictions of which classes are eligible for which offices, is by no means democratic. It is worth noting, however, that these classifications are based on wealth rather than birth.[19] It is quite possible, I would even venture to say *probable*, that the crisis in Athens involved more than two interests—possibly those of noble birth, wealthy who lacked status, and the poor on the edge of (or bound in) debt-slavery.[20] To understand this as the reality of the crisis, however, is to read against the grain of Solon's poems (especially West Fragment 5)[21] and their contextualization in Aristotle.[22]

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[14] An example that is relevant to this thesis is the law which he passed which paid a reward for those who killed wolves and wolf pups (Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 23.3). For a full list of Solon's laws, see Ruschenbusch 1966 and relevant critiques in Scafuro 2006. A new edition of Solon's laws has been published, but too recently for me to be able to review it (Leão and Rhodes 2015).

[15] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 7.1. Plutarch *Life of Solon*, 25.1. On the *axones* and *kurbeis*, see Stroud 1979, Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 20 n.6, and Rhodes 2006.

[16] Almeida notes there are diametrically opposed views about the political motivations for Solon's reforms: "Some scholars see Solon attempting as far as possible to maintain a status quo, while others see him as a progressive reformer responding to radical changes in the conditions of economic and social life" (2003, 53).

[17] Hignett 1952, 6-8. Starr 1990, 8.

[18] Carey 2015, 111. For an analysis of the way in which Solon's status as the founder of the Athenian democracy developed in the fourth century, see Mossé 2004.

[19] This is consistent with his poetic habit of not giving the "notables" a name, but rather describing them by their wealth and power (5.3-4; 37.3). For more discussion on this topic, see Chapter 1.

[20] Rhodes 1993, 88-9.

[21] All subsequent fragments numbers given will be using West's numeration in order to maintain consistency with the scholarship.

Economically, according to the ancients, Solon cancelled debts,[23] banned debt-slavery,[24] and reformed the coinage system.[25] These are all concessions to the poor. If anything, Solon's balancing act in favor of the wealthy was refusing redistribute land as the poor had hoped for.[26] Although Aristotle and Plutarch largely agree on these points, these facts were not undisputed in antiquity: Androtion, claimed that Solon reduced interest rather than forgiving all debt.[27] This controversy, and others concerning the true nature of Solon's economic reforms, has continued into modern times. Various scholars have brought contemporary historiographical and archaeological techniques to bear on the problem, but no *communis opinio* has formed concerning Solon's reforms.[28]

Since at least the time of Aristotle, Solon's poetry has been used as a source of information about his actions as a political figure.[29] It is worth noting that most of these inquiries have attempted to define terms (σεισάχθεια, ἑκτήμορος) that we do not see in the poetry itself, but rather in biographical account of Solon's reforms.[30] Fragment 36, in particular, has been read as Solon's direct description of his reforms, and has thus been mined as a potential source of information about them. Certainty in such endeavors is frustrated; the poetry comes tantalizingly close to giving enough historical detail to draw conclusions, and yet does not.[31] It is not the case,

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[22] I will, throughout this thesis, be referring to the author of the *Athenian Constitution* as simply Aristotle, rather than [Aristotle] or ps.-Aristotle. For more information on this question, see Rhodes, who admits the possibility of Aristotelian authorship while suspecting it was a student (1993, 61-3).
[23] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 6.1. Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 15-16.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 10. Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 15.4.
[26] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 11.2.
[27] Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 15.
[28] For a thorough review of such scholarship, see Almeida 2003, 1-69.
[29] Our earlier sources (Herodotus and Plato), who treat Solon much more briefly, do not quote from the poems (although Plato does mention Solon's poetry). Rhodes theorizes that Aristotle drew the quotes of poetry from his sources, rather than his memory, which might explain the lacunae in Fragment 37 (if the fragment had been broken up in that original work) (1993, 24, 124).
[30] For ἑκτήμορος: Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 2 and Plutarch, Life of Solon 13.2. For σεισάχθεια: Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 6.1 and Plutarch 15.3.
[31] The accomplishments of 36.3-8 have even been understood as entirely metaphorical. See Harris 1997, 104-5.

however, that the poems have no use as a potential source of information about Solon. These poems show the way in which he both shapes and reflects on his legacy.

The three poems that I am analyzing (Fragment 5, Fragment 36, and Fragment 37) have been viewed as primarily rhetorical.[32] While their aim is certainly at persuasion, these are not deliberative speeches versified so that they will be more memorable.[33] Solon is not trying to convince the *polis* to adopt his proposed measures, but rather trying to frame those measures as beneficial. Almost all of Solon's actions are given in the aorist tense: Solon is reflecting on, and trying to define, his legacy. Elizabeth Irwin writes, "[Solon] composed poetry that did, and probably was intended to, control his reception."[34] This reception can be interpreted as his legacy among his contemporaries, but it can also be extended out to later generations. Given the fact that Solon was writing laws to be displayed publicly and followed indefinitely into the future, I believe it is germane to suppose he might have intended his poetry to have an equally long temporal reach.[35] Solon was not only trying to solve a temporary crisis, he was trying to reshape Athens for the future. In the popular memory, he failed at the first task and succeeded in the second.

In keeping with the view of Solon's poems as inherently rhetorical, the performance context of Solon's poetry was—until quite recently—assumed to be in a public assembly. The most prominent proponent of this claim is Martin West, who includes "The Public Assembly" as the fifth out of his eight possible venues for the performance of elegy, entirely on the strength of

[32] This view is heavily implied in West's view of their performance in a public assembly (1974, 12).
[33] This possibility is also proposed by West (1974, 12).
[34] Irwin 2005, 149.
[35] This does not mean that I side with Linforth in saying that the poems were almost certainly written down at the time of Solon (1919, 9-10). It is clear that orality dominated archaic poetic culture (Thomas 1989), but orality is three-pronged: 1) composition 2) performance and 3) transmission (Gentili 1985 (trans. Cole 1988), 4). It does not necessarily follow that it was *impossible* that these poems be written down, especially given the momentous weight that they would have had immediately at the time of their performance.

Solon's elegies and the contextualization they are given in the biographical sources.[36] More recent scholarship, following Bowie, places Solon's performance in the symposium.[37]

The different performance circumstances assume different audiences, and have thus been understood to represent different rhetorical purposes for the poems. If the poems are thought to be set in the public assembly, Solon would be directly speaking to both audiences—which would explain the careful balancing of interests that I examine in these poems. If, on the other hand, the audience was sympotic, Solon would be speaking exclusively to the elite. This assumption of an elite audience, and hence elite targets of persuasion, has led scholars to look for imbalance in these poems towards the interests of the elite.[38] I do find such bias in the text, but for every reading in which Solon caters to the interests of the few, there is an accompanying interpretation in which he extends more benefits to the many. There are evidences of bias in both directions, and thus there is balance. This balance is reflected in the structure of poems like Fragment 5, and also in the more subtle nuances of interpretation of individual lines.[39] In fact, this flexibility would allow for Solon's poetry to be appropriate for both a purely aristocratic audience and a mixed, popular one: the aristocrats would hear what they wanted to hear, as would the people. Perhaps Solon really was performing for the public, perhaps he knew his private performances would eventually find the public's ear,[40] or perhaps he really was genuinely interested in balancing both sides as well as possible. The poetry itself does not present conclusive proof of political bias.

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[36] West 1974, 12. Lefkowitz points out the flaws in interpretation that have readers from Plutarch onward to set the performance of the Salamis Ode in the *agora* (1981, 40).
[37] Bowie, 1986. Irwin 2005. Lardinois 2006.
[38] E.g. Mülke 2002, 406.
[39] N.B. My examination of 36.18-20 in Chapter 2.
[40] "Even though one can attempt to situate…the performance of Solon's political poem within a specific assembly or symposiastic setting, it is also necessary to remember that most of these poems gained fame far beyond their original audiences and that their ability to communicate extended through much of the Greek world in general, although many nuances of meaning may have been left behind among the original audience members of the first performance" (Garner 2011, 5).

The Poems

I am examining three poems, one in elegiac and two in iambic meters.[41] The question of whether the poetic genres presents two different personae of Solon is still up for debate. In two of the most recent efforts to track Solon's persona, different conclusions were drawn: Stehle maintains that the corpus of Solon's poetry supports one narrative arc for one persona,[42] while Lardinois argues for a distinct personae between the genres.[43] While I do believe that Solon's poetry makes use of the generic traditions of iambic poetry in the two iambic fragments that I examine,[44] both speakers would have been understood by the ancients to be Solon himself. His tone may change, but in both cases he is Solon the lawmaker and mediator reflecting on his accomplishments and political situation. Therefore, I will not be treating the persona of the iambs as an inherently different character from the one presented in the elegiac Fragment 5.

I have chosen these three fragments because they share a few essential features. They each feature a heavily focalized first person speaker, concern themselves with Solon's legacy, and end with an evocative image. The images are all relatively straightforward on a cursory reading: holding a shield over both sides means Solon is protecting both factions, being a wolf surrounded by dogs means Solon is under attack, and being a ὅρος ("marker") between the spear-fighters means that Solon defines order. But upon further examination, the meaning of these images becomes less certain: a shield held over both sides would not protect either from the other, a wolf has connotations in Greek thought that we would imagine Solon would want to

[41] Solon finds himself well incorporated into various examinations of elegiac poetics (West 1974; Adkins 1985; Faraone 2008; Garner 2011), but his depiction as an author of iambic verse is more varied. West goes as far as to say that Solon's fragments should not be regarded as "true iambi" (West 1974, 32). More recent scholarship, however, places Solon's iambi squarely within the traditional parameters (Lardinois 2006 25f.; Kantzios 2005; Bowie 2001).
[42] Stehle 2006, 100-1.
[43] "In the iambics, we thus seems to come closer, both in content and in form, to the historical figure of Solon than in his elegies" (Lardinois 2006, 25).
[44] For instance, his use of the wolf in 36.27 plays into a long iambic tradition of wolves (Miralles and Pòrtulas 1983, 51-60).

avoid, and a ὅρος,[45] to the extent that we can identify it, no longer defines order when it is being fought over on a battlefield. A major aim of this thesis will be to examine the effect that these strange images have on our perception of Solon, and our understanding of his own self-perception.

These fragments all share in common another, external, feature: they all appear in their earliest and most complete form in section 12 of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*. This context is important. In the previous section, Aristotle lays out the context for Solon's departure. Solon began to be approached by frustrated citizens from each side of the conflict who wanted him to make changes to his new laws and reforms. Breaking the conflict up into two factions, Aristotle notes that Solon pleased neither: the δῆμος ("the people") was disappointed that his reforms were not more radical, while the γνώριμοι ("the notables") were upset that his reforms were too radical.[46] As a result of this pressure, Solon decided to leave Athens for a period of ten years on the conceit of a trading journey. Aristotle closes section 11 with the lofty note on Solon's selflessness: εἵλετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἀπεχθέσθαι, σώσας τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα νομοθετήσας ("he chose to be hated by both, saving the fatherland and instituting the best laws.")[47] He then quotes extensively from what seem to be five different poems of Solon.[48] The fragments vary in length: the longest is 27 lines (Fragment 36) and the shortest is four lines (Fragment 6). Aristotle gives a short statement of context for each, and each is related in someway to the events introduced in section 11, but the poetry dominates the section.[49] Section

[45] The identity of the ὅρος is an important topic of Chapter 3. For now, I will leave it in its Greek form and only translate it when necessary and as plainly as possible: "marker."
[46] Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 11.2 Note the similarity of this summary to 36.20-5 and 37.1-4.
[47] This translation is my own.
[48] Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 12. These are Fragments 5, 6, 34, 36, 37. What is now deemed to be Fragment 37 is quoted in two different piece by Aristotle.
[49] This heavy emphasis on Solon's poetry led early readers of the Berlin Papyrus, almost a fourth of which is made up of Section 12.3-4, to doubt its authenticity (Rhodes 1993, 2).

12 is thus a uniquely multivocal passage within this work:[50] Aristotle's presence is felt in the contextualization and (most importantly) the selection of poems or passages of poems, but Solon is also allowed to "speak for himself."[51] The treatment of Solon in the *Athenian Constitution* gives us a sense of Aristotle's reception of Solon's poetry, while at the same time coloring our later reception of that poetry. We are left with a Solonian Aristotle and an Aristotelian Solon.

There are other important sources for fragments of Solon: Demosthenes,[52] Diodorus Siculus,[53] Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius.[54] Of these other authors, I have given attention exclusively to Plutarch, whose *Life of Solon* expresses interest in Solon as a lawmaker and a poet and quotes from the fragments which I am examining (although, in the case of Fragment 36 and Fragment 37, just in parts). Regardless of whether Plutarch's poems represent a wholly different transmission tradition from that given in Aristotle, Plutarch's quotations do give some slightly different readings.[55] With these facts in mind, I have limited my examinations of Solon's audiences to Aristotle, Plutarch, and modern scholars.

Methodology

This thesis seeks to examine Solon's self-representation in three of his political poems. In order to conduct such an examination, I am applying the methodological framework of the rhetorical theory of narrative.[56] Introduced by Wayne Booth in *The Rhetoric of Fiction*,[57] and

[50] Aristotle otherwise only quotes from unattributed songs in the *Athenian Constitution*.
[51] Aristotle emphasizes this point in his introduction to the section: ταῦτα δ' ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔσχεν οἵ τ' ἄλλοι συμφωνοῦσι πάντες, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε ("These things happened this way, everyone else agrees, and he himself in his poetry recalls them in these words:") (12.1).
[52] Demosthenes, *On the Embassy*.
[53] Library of History, 1 & 9.
[54] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 1.45-67.
[55] N.B. κράτος in place of γέρας (5.1).
[56] For an overview of the rhetorical theory of narrative, see the entry entitled "Rhetorical Approaches to Narrative" in Herman, Jahn, and Ryan 2005.
[57] Booth 1961 (second edition: 1983).

benefiting from important contributions from Peter Rabinowitz and James Phelan,[58] the rhetorical theory defines narrative as "somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened."[59] While this definition may seem painfully obvious, its emphasis on the "somebody telling" and "for some purpose(s)"—that is, on authorship and rhetorical effect—is at variance with major trends in narratological thought.[60]

In keeping with this definition, the rhetorical theory views narrative as formed via a triangular relationship: the text, the author, and the audience. I have tried, as much as possible, to take each "point" of the "narrative triangle" into account as I conduct my analysis. These elements are inexorably tied together in a recursive relationship: it is impossible to talk about authorship in complete isolation from audience or the text, and *vice versa*.[61] As such, while I discuss various elements of the text, authorship, and audience of these poems, I do not separate these aspects into their own discrete, independent sections.

In order to discuss authorship and audience within these poems, I make use of the frameworks set forth by Booth and Rabinowitz, with subsequent revision by Phelan. Both authorship and audience are seen as operating at multiple different levels within each narrative. Within authorship, Booth observed three levels that are relevant to my investigation: 1) the flesh-and-blood author, who exists independent of the narrative; 2) the implied author, who makes the choices that manifest themselves in the details and norms of the text; 3) the narrator, who relates

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[58] Rabinowitz 1977. Phelan 1996.
[59] Phelan 2007.
[60] The structuralism that characterized much "classical" narratology is most strongly opposed to this rhetorical theory of narrative. For helpful overviews of the history of narratology, see Herman 2005 (which is drawn from and to some extent streamlined in Herman 2007), Fludernik 2005, and, arguing such a history is a largely fruitless exercise, McHale 2005.
[61] As Phelan writes, "Texts are designed by authors in order to affect readers in particular ways; those designs are conveyed through the words, techniques, structures, forms, and intertextual relations of texts; and reader responses are a function of and, thus, a guide to how authorial designs are created through textual phenomena." (1996, 209).

the narrative to the audience.[62] The idea of authorial levels is not new to Solonian scholarship: the common dichotomy between the "historical Solon" and the "persona" or the "speaker" is, in these terms, a distinction between the first and third categories of authorship. This system, however, allows for another, important distinction: the implied author.[63] When I speak of "Solon" in this thesis, I am, unless otherwise specified, referring to the implied author. Regardless of whether or not the flesh-and-blood author of these poems was indeed the historical Solon,[64] we can safely identify the implied author of these poems as the Solon that structured the reception of the poems.

The identification of the authorial presence with Solon is what gave these poems their power. The application of the theory of the implied author allows me to examine the representation of Solon without having to first settle the question of its authenticity. In addition to allowing me to attribute authorial choice to Solon, this theory also allows me to make distinctions between the "Solon" that is presented as a speaker and the "Solon" that is manifest as an authorial presence. I believe that the possibilities inherent in this distinction are crucial to understanding the strange metaphors in each of the three poems I am analyzing.

To describe Solon's audience, I will be using the system put forth by Peter Rabinowitz in his 1977 article, "Truth in Fiction."[65] In this article, Rabinowitz identifies four essential layers of audience: 1) the flesh-and-blood audience, who exists independently from the text; 2) the authorial audience, an ideal audience that possesses the knowledge and beliefs necessary to understand the narrative on its own terms; 3) the narrative audience, who, although not a

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[62] This is an abbreviated version of Booth's model (1983, 428-31). I have, moreover, used the term "speaker" in lieu of his term "The Teller of the Tale" to maintain consistency with common scholarly diction.
[63] Irene J.F. de Jong, in her important work *Narratology and Classics*, is skeptical of the implied author (De Jong 2014, 19). I hope that my work will prove the usefulness, and even the necessity, of this entity.
[64] Weighty arguments have been made that throw this identification into doubt. Lardinois 2006. Stehle 2006, 109-11.
[65] Rabinowitz 1977, 126-34.

participant, experiences the narrative on an entirely mimetic level; 4) the ideal narrative audience, who interprets the narrative exactly as the narrator intends.[66] James Phelan recognized the necessity of adding the concept of the narratee (an addressee who exists as a participant in the narrative) to this list.[67] Without making these distinctions within the audiences of Solon's poems, previous scholars have limited their efforts to speculation about the flesh-and-blood audience and—assuming that these poems are not fictional—thus also the narrative audience (see my discussion of performance context above). My examination of audience will focus primarily on the effort made by later, recorded audiences (Aristotle, Plutarch, and modern scholars) to try to inhabit the authorial audience by filling in the gaps of their own knowledge and applying their own beliefs to the poetry, and the ways in which those efforts are steered by the text and implied author.

In analyzing Solon's text, I have thus paid special attention to the power of ambiguity. Both Aristotle and Plutarch note that Solon made his laws intentionally ambiguous in order to leave them open for interpretation by the courts—thus giving the courts more power.[68] I believe that Solon uses the same device in his poetry. By allowing for multiple interpretations of certain crucial lines, Solon has left blanks for his audience to fill. These blanks force what Iser calls "acts of constitution": they force the audience to participate in the construction of the meaning of the narrative.[69] The fragmentary nature of our extant Solonian poetry creates additional blanks—sometimes explicitly, in the form of lacunae, but more often in more subtle ways.[70] It is a distinct

[66] The usefulness of the ideal narrative audience has been questioned (for a good discussion of this, see Phelan 1996, 140-1). This is an interesting problem, but since I will not be making use of the concept of the ideal narrative audience in this thesis, it is outside of the scope of this introduction.
[67] Phelan 1996, 140.
[68] Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 9.2. Plutarch *Life of Solon*, 18.3.
[69] Iser 1978, 180-231.
[70] For instance, the question of whether the inceptive δέ in 36.1 represents that we are missing previous lines or not (see Chapter 2). It is important to note that our terminology of "fragment" misleadingly lumps in two quite disparate categories. Fragments that were formed by physical accidents or accidentally preserved are distinctly different from

possibility that some of the blanks that I am analyzing are a result of these additional blanks, but it is just as possible that the incompleteness of our text has also allowed us to see possibilities of meanings that we would have otherwise passed over.

Within each chapter, I take approximately the same course: I begin with an examination of the poetic structure of the fragment, followed by a close reading of the final simile. Far from relying wholly on narratologically-minded sources, I have found that extant classical research has been of great assistance with each of the three points of the "narrative triangle." I have drawn from past philological research for my discussions of textual features. I have looked to examinations of the Solonian persona and Solon as a poet and historical figure for my discussions of authorial presence. Finally, I have looked to theories of performance and reception, as well as examining the reception in ancient and modern accounts of Solon's poetry, for my examination of audience. It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to this body of work.

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fragments, such as those of Solon, that were preserved via the indirect tradition of quoting in other authors. Although no meaning can be interpreted into the selection of what survives physical accidents and what does not, conclusions can be drawn about what we are given in quotation.

CHAPTER 1

THE SHIELD (FRAGMENT 5)

δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ,
τιμῆς οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος·
οἳ δ᾽εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν·
ἕστην δ᾽ ἀμφιβαλών κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
νικᾶν δ᾽οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.[71]

For to the people I gave as much privilege as sufficed them,
neither taking away honor nor holding out still more.
As for those who had power and were admired for wealth,
I took care that they too should have no unseemly share.
I stood holding my strong shield about both parties,
allowing neither to gain victory unjustly.[72]

Fragment 5 consists of a mere three elegiac couplets. It is unknown whether or not this fragment is part of a larger poem. The use of γάρ in line one could suggest that these three lines serve as an explanation of a statement made in a previous section that has since been lost, but both of the source texts for this fragment, Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* and Plutarch's *Life of Solon*, only quote these six lines. Following in Aristotle and Plutarch's footsteps, I will be treating this as an independent poetic unit.

Although it never explicitly says so, this fragment has been interpreted as discussing the reforms that Solon made as the "διαλλακτής" (mediator) of the Athenian constitutional crisis.[73]

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[71] For the text I have used Noussia 2010. I prefer her reading of ἀπαρκεῖ (from Aristotle) over West's ἐπαρκεῖν (from Plutarch). The best defense of this reading has been given by Rhodes, "ἀπαρκεῖ had already been conjectured, by Coraes, before the discovery of *A.P.* [Athenian Constitution]...the only other instance in LSJ of ἐπαρκεῖν without an object is Soph. *Ant.* 612, so *A.P.*'s verb is to be preferred" (1993, 172). In keeping with West, Gentili-Prato, and Noussia, I have also rendered the γέρας (found in Aristotle) rather than κράτος (found in Plutarch).

[72] This translation is from Miller (1996, 67). I have chosen to use his translation in order to avoid making my own definitive interpretive choices without the opportunity to explain them first. Elsewhere, all translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.

Operating under this assumption, most modern scholarship has focused on the ways in which the balanced structure of this poem reinforces the basic fairness and moderation of Solon's reforms. In this reading, the first four couplets explain Solon's beneficial action towards each group, and the final couplet summarizes those benefits with a dramatic metaphor. This interpretation is complicated, however, by the fact that the metaphor, which depicts Solon protecting two groups with one shield, is physically impossible. In order to understand how this potentially paradoxical image operates, I will examine the different ways that the first two couplets can be interpreted and how those interpretations affect our understanding of the final couplet.

While the basic structures of the fragment point to equal treatment of both sides, there are clear discrepancies in the poetic treatment of the two groups, which may complicate those claims of balance. Furthermore, there also remains the possibility that the elements of balance have been overread in the poem. Certain words, ἐπορεξάμενος (2) and ἀμφοτέροισι (5), are ambiguous, but have typically been disambiguated for the sake of maintaining the systems of parallelism and antithesis of the poem. In this chapter, I will be examining further the interpretive possibilities inherent in these ambiguous words.

Finally, my understanding of the final couplet, and thus the entire poem, is informed by the idea that the speaker and the implied author do not necessarily have to be in agreement. It has generally been assumed that there is no distance between the speaker and the implied author in this text. In other words, the characterization of the speaker matches exactly our characterization of the author. I believe, however, that it is fruitful, in grappling with the final image, to remember that the speaker is a fictionalized creation of the implied author, and thus does not

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[73] A key to understanding the interpretation of this fragment is the universal approval of Solon in Aristotle's description his selection as the "διαλλακτής" (mediator): εἵλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ (They, by consensus, chose Solon as mediator and archon, and turned the city over to him) (*Athenian Constitution* 5.2).

necessarily completely reflect the implied author. This potential separation allows for a previously unexamined rhetorical understanding of the final image.

This chapter will be broken up into two sections. In the first, I will examine the first four lines of the fragment, which establish the different possible interpretations of the way the fragment operates rhetorically. In the second section, I will examine the ways in which those interpretations inform possible readings of the final image.

Lines 1-4

δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ,
τιμῆς οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος·
οἵ δ᾽εἴχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί,
καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν·

The fundamental tension between structural balance and elements which complicate that balance is introduced in the first two couplets of fragment 5. The dominant structures of parallelism and antithesis give this poem its sense of balance: for every statement, there is a parallel counterstatement. A close examination of these couplets, however, reveals important discrepancies in the way the speaker names the groups, relates to the groups, and benefits the groups. The tension created by these discrepancies is as rhetorical as it is formal. Because the balanced structure of the fragment reinforces the claim that political balance has been struck,[74] factors that complicate the poetic balance would necessarily also complicate the political balance. In this section, I will lay out the elements of balance in these four lines and then identify features of these four lines that may complicate that balance.

The most obvious element of balance is the equal space within the poem that is given to each group: two separate parties are the objects of the speaker's action, and a couplet is devoted

[74] As has been noted by Irwin (2005, 235).

to each. Although describing separate groups, these couplets are connected by a unifying syntactical structure. The fragment consists of one overarching thought governed by μέν-δέ syntax, which offers what Denniston calls "coordinated antithesis" to the fragment on the most basic level.[75]

Within each couplet, the syntax is also basically parallel. The main thought of both couplets falls within a single line: for the first couplet, δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ ("To the people, on the one hand, I gave as much privilege as was appropriate") (1); in the second couplet, τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν ("I contrived [for them] that they have nothing unseemly") (4). Both of these main thoughts follow the same basic structure: first, a dative of the group benefitting from the speaker's action (δήμωι (1), τοῖς (4)); second, a first person aorist main verb with the speaker as the subject (ἔδωκα (1), ἐφρασάμην (4)); third, a clause as the object of the speaker's action (τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ (1), μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν (4)). This shared syntactical structure emphasizes the similarity of the actions taken toward each side.

This parallelism also extends, albeit less directly, into the antithetical structure of thought shared by both couplets. Each couplet qualifies its first line with a negation in the second. In the first couplet, the speaker gave (ἔδωκα) as much privilege as was appropriate, but *did not* take away honor or overreach (οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος).[76] In second couplet, the ἀγητοί are the ones who had power (οἵ δ᾽εἶχον δύναμιν) and were revered for their wealth (χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί), and the speaker makes sure they *don't* have anything unseemly (ἐφρασάμην μήδεν

[75] Denniston 1954, 369. The particles all take the secondary position in each couplet (lines 1, 3, 5, and 6). This positioning is consistent with the proper style, as observed by Denniston (1954, 371). But in early writing, especially verse, this "proper style" is often forgone for the sake of metrical convenience (1954, 371-2). This "proper" style could be fodder for those who believe that the poems of Solon may be later, perhaps even fourth century, inventions (i.e., Lardinois 2006, 16f.).

[76] See below for more discussion of the important participle ἐπορεξάμενος.

ἀεικές ἔχειν).[77] For every action there is a necessary counter-action. The positive effects on the δῆμος are checked before excess, and the negative effects that could have been visited on the rich and respected were curbed as well. This is the picture of moderation.

In this way the basic structure of the fragment is understood to be an important aspect of its rhetorical program. The parallelism of the syntax reinforces the idea that the speaker treats both parties fairly, and the antithetical structure shows he does so in a moderate way. But if this balance holds rhetorical weight, so too must the slight imbalances that create tension within the carefully crafted fragment.

The parallelism of the two groups mentioned in the fragment is not as strong as the structural elements make it appear. First, there is the issue of nomenclature. While the non-elite is simply called δῆμος in line one,[78] the elite group is not given a name. Instead, the group is identified by the pair of clauses that form the entire third line: they are οἵ δ᾽εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί ("those who held power and were revered for their goods") (3). This line, serving as the antecedent for the dative τοῖς, plays the same role for the second couplet that δήμωι plays by itself for the first couplet. The lack of any one name for the group identified in the second couplet defines them not by any title or heritage but by their δύναμις (power) and χρήματα (goods). They are not called by the aristocratic terms ἀγαθοί (good) or καλοί (noble), which would suggest an ethical superiority on the part of the upper-class.[79] The speaker's choice of address undercuts any claims to moral or hereditary superiority among the elite: a subtly revolutionary choice within a couplet that, on the surface level, promises the maintenance of the status quo.

[77] This is represented in the Greek with a positive verb and negative noun, but I have translated it with a negative verb and a positive noun here for the sake of English felicity.
[78] It is the first word of the fragment, no less.
[79] Cf. Fragment 15.

The name δῆμος also holds rhetorical significance. While δῆμος can be used to refer to the community as a whole,[80] the μέν-δέ structure that links the couplets together leaves no doubt that the couplets are referring to two different groups.[81] The order of their introduction further reinforces the effect of the contrast. The first use of δῆμος could possibly have been understood to be referring to the whole community until the second couplet enters in contrast of the first and takes those described by "οἳ δ'εἴχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί" out of the category of δῆμος. This is an instance in which the sources in which the fragment is preserved shape the audience's understanding of the poem. The dichotomization of the rich and the poor has already been made in the context of the fragment in both the *Athenian Constitution* and *Life of Solon*, so the impact of the second couplet's act of splitting the upper class out of the δῆμος is unsurprising for readers of these later works. In addition, both works frequently use the term δῆμος in reference to the lower class. Taking the poem out of those frame narratives, however, one can imagine a situation in which that distinction held important, and unexpected, weight for the audience.

The distinction between the two groups extends beyond their appellation. The power relationship between the speaker and the two groups is also quite different. In the first couplet, the speaker is the agent. The first line makes that power dynamic clear: δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ ("To the people, on the one hand, I gave as much privilege as was appropriate"). Although the δῆμος is given primary position, it is the speaker of this line who is doing the action. The δῆμος must be content to be the passive recipient. In the second couplet, on the other hand, the speaker takes a much less active role. While he remains the subject of the

[80] It has been argued that δῆμος could only mean "the people" in the sense of the poor and low class in the time of Solon (Larson 1973). There are other instances in this poetry, however, when Solon does seem to be using δῆμος to refer to the entire citizenry (36.22, see my discussion ad loc.).
[81] Denniston 1954, 369.

main clause of the couplet, it is a verb of the head (ἐφρασάμην) rather than an action verb (ἔδωκα). As such, where δήμωι had been an indirect object, τοῖς must be considered a dative of advantage. The focus of the second couplet is not on the speaker's action at all, but rather on the fact that the action has maintained the status quo enjoyed by the group, the description of which makes up the entire first line of the couplet.[82] This focus on the continuation of the long-enjoyed status quo is reinforced by the use of forms of ἔχω.[83] The speaker is still in control, but he is careful to portray that control in terms that, on the surface, are non-threatening to the current order of things. This distinction is clearly not *variatio* for its own sake, but rather a reflection of a choice made by the implied author concerning how to address the two groups. The elements of parallelism in the fragment are complicated by the speaker's rhetorical sense of how to best describe the benefits that he has accorded each group.

The fundamental difference in the way that the benefits to each group are described is further emphasized by an unusual use of language in the first couplet. The speaker uses marked language of honor to describe his actions toward the δῆμος: δήμωι μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον **γέρας** ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ, / **τιμῆς** οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος ("To the people, on the one hand, I gave as much **privilege** as was appropriate / neither taking away **honor** nor extending it"). These terms are never used in this way in earlier poetry: while the δῆμος is typically the dispenser of γέρας, it is never the recipient.[84] A deeper investigation of the use of this language in Homer and Hesiod will show that Solon's use of these terms in a popular context is not only unprecedented, it is close to revolutionary.

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[82] This line is, not coincidentally, the only one in which imperfect finite verbs appear. The continuity of this status quo is demonstrated by the aspect of the verbs.

[83] Mülke 2002, 181. And yet it is worth noting that, although two uses of ἔχω bookend the couplet, they are not as supportive of the status quo as they first appear. Solon states what these people had and that they did not have anything unseemly *added on* as a result of his policies, but nowhere does he promise that they still have everything they had.

[84] Irwin 2005, 231-2 and Anhalt 1993, 101.

The use of γέρας has distinct political significance. Although written in 1969, Émile Benveniste's *Indo-European Language and Society* remains the authority on the proper understanding of γέρας.[85] Benveniste defines γέρας as, "extra-ordinary presentations reserved as the right of the king, in particular a special portion of the booty, and certain material advantages bestowed by the people; a place of honor, allocation of the best pieces of meat, cups of wine."[86] Moreover, γέρας can even to describe kingly prerogative, the right of rule.[87] The δῆμος symbolically gives γέρας, but it is not typically the public itself deciding upon the specifics of distribution. In the *Iliad*, for example, "It is always Agamemnon who distributes to the *aristéessi* (ἀριστήεσσι) and the *basileûsi* (βασιλεῦσι), to the lords and their kings, their *géras*, their portions of honor."[88] With this social significance, the first line of the fragment takes on much more force. Solon casts himself in the role of an Agamemnon-like leader, not only dealing out the γέρας, but deciding how much is appropriate (τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ) (1). Moreover, this γέρας is not just respect or physical gifts, but in this situation is probably best understood as actual political prerogative.[89] Understood in purely Iliadic terms, in the sense of booty or spoils, the distribution of γέρας typically (although not exclusively) takes place after the sack of a city. An ungenerous audience could feasibly have used this implication to interpret a very immoderate view of the reforms: these reforms did not restore the city, but rather despoiled it. But the reading of γέρας need not be this extreme for the potential revolutionary character of the word to remain.

If we are to posit a similar social significance for γέρας in this poem as in the *Iliad*, we must also observe that in Book 1 of the *Iliad* γέρας is a zero-sum game. Agamemnon describes it

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[85] I will be citing from the English translation by Elizabeth Palmer (1973).
[86] Benveniste 1969 (trans. Palmer 1973), 336-7. Anhalt (1993) gives a complete list of the different forms that γέρας takes in the works of Homer (101).
[87] cf. Odyssey 11.174-6: "εἰπὲ δέ μοι πατρός τε καὶ υἱέος, ὃν κατέλειπον, / ἢ ἔτι πὰρ κείνοισιν ἐμὸν γέρας, ἦέ τις ἤδη / ἀνδρῶν ἄλλος ἔχει" (Tell me about my father and son, whom I left behind, do they still hold my γέρας among them, or does some other man now?).
[88] Benveniste 1969 (trans. Palmer 1973), 336.
[89] Noussia 2010, 286.

as such, when he demands that his lost γέρας be replaced by someone else's.[90] These lines resonate with the second couplet of Fragment 5, in which the speaker promises the elite that they have not suffered the fate Agamemnon feared: τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν ("for them I contrived that there not be anything unseemly") (4). Solon claims to have been able to give γέρας to a new group of people who had not previously had it, while nevertheless making sure others have been able to hold on to what they had. In other words, he claims to have solved the motivating conflict of the first book of the *Iliad*. If γέρας really is a zero-sum game, Solon's claims are too good to be true.

The Iliadic understanding of γέρας is not, however, the only interpretation of the term available at the time of Solon. The redistribution of γέρας takes a different form in another early major work of Greek poetry: Hesiod's *Theogony*. Zeus, trying to gain support in his fight against the Titans, makes the following promise:

> εἶπε δ', ὃς ἂν μετὰ εἷο θεῶν Τιτῆσι μάχοιτο,
> μή τιν' ἀπορραίσειν γεράων, τιμὴν δὲ ἕκαστον
> ἐξέμεν, ἣν τὸ πάρος γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
> τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
> τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἦ θέμις ἐστίν.
>
> And he said whoever of the gods would fight with him against the Titans,
> he would not deprive any of them of privileges (γεράων), but each
> will have the honor (τιμὴν) which he has at present among the immortal gods,
> and he said this, whoever was without honor (ἄτιμος) and without privilege (ἀγέραστος)
> under Kronos,
> he would indulge with honor (τιμῆς) and privileges (γεράων), as indeed is right.
> (392-396)

Zeus is trying to strike the same balance as Solon by giving γέρας[91] and τιμή to some who had never previously possessed it while maintaining the same levels for those who did. This passage

[90] The most relevant lines: "αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γέρας αὐτὶχ' ἑτοιμάσατ', ὄφρα μὴ οἷος / Ἀργεΐων ἀγέραστος ἔω, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικεν" (But immediately you must make ready an honor for me, lest I alone among the Argives be without an honor, since that is not fitting) (1.118-9).

[91] It is interesting that in this passage of Hesiod γέρας as a thing to be doled out only appears the plural.

opens the possibility that the distribution of γέρας, at least immediately after a victory, can potentially please all parties. Moreover, the similarity of this passage to fragment 5 implicitly compares Solon to Zeus, a bold rhetorical move by an implied author trying to establish the legitimacy of his rule.[92]

The second line of the fragment builds on the rhetoric of the first by using another marked word of honor, τιμή: τιμῆς οὔτ᾽ ἀφελών οὔτ᾽ ἐπορεξάμενος ("neither taking away honor nor extending it"). This use is remarkably consistent with the passage of the *Theogony* cited above, in which Zeus promises, "each will have the **honor** which he has at present among the immortal gods" (**τιμὴν** δὲ ἕκαστον / ἐξέμεν, ἣν τὸ πάρος γε μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν) (393). In the *Iliad*, τιμή is typically used to describe the status conferred by the possession of γέρας (and lost with the loss of γέρας).[93] On the other hand, τιμή is understood by some as a separate type of honor than γέρας, rather than a result of having γέρας. Gregory Nagy observes τιμή as being understood as: "the 'honor' received by a god or hero in a cult."[94] Benveniste believes that the distinction between τιμή and γέρας lies in the fact that γέρας is granted by humans, while τιμή is divinely ordained.[95] This understanding of τιμή as divinely ordained would further reinforce the implications of similarity between Solon and Zeus.

The two basic interpretations of τιμή lead to two different understandings of how the lines of the first two couplets relate to each other. If τιμή is understood to be the status conferred by the possession of γέρας, the second line of the fragment becomes a result of the first. In this

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[92] The comparison of Solon to Zeus was made before, but from a reading of Fragment 36, not Fragment 5 (Blaise 1996, 33). I make the distinction that this is the operation of the implied author and not the speaker because it is a comparison made on the level of intertext. The speaker's rhetorical choices are contained within the world of the poem itself, while the implied author can use such intertextual rhetoric by referencing works which the authorial audience would be expected to know.

[93] cf. Iliad 1.352-6.

[94] Nagy 1979, 118.

[95] Nagy 1979, (341). Contra Anhalt (1993), who cites Hesiod's different understanding of this concept: "For Hesiod, *geras* refers to divine privilege; it is never the possession of mortals (*Works and Days* 126; *Theogony* 393, 396, 427)" (100-101).

reading, the speaker gave the δῆμος an appropriate amount of γέρας and in doing so he gave them an appropriate amount of τιμή. The second reading, in which τιμή is understood as simply a different type of honor, breaks the immediate causal connection with line one in favor of a more important role for the participles, ἀφελών and ἐπορεξάμενος, which are separate actions that the speaker has taken rather than impersonal results of his first action. This distinction will have important implications in the discussion of the participle ἐπορεξάμενος below.

Regardless of how their relationship to each other is understood, the unusual use of these marked words of honor paints a rather extreme picture. Solon evokes Agamemnon, Zeus, or a cult hero; the δῆμος plays the role of an ἄριστος or βασιλεύς; the reforms are possibly compared to the sack of the city. But it is important to remember that these words are placed in the context of a system of antithetical checks. While it is certainly normal for an Agamemnon figure to decide how to apportion the γέρας, it undoubtedly undercuts a revolutionary reading for Solon to give out "only as much kingly prerogative as is appropriate" (τόσον γέρας ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ) (1). This is revolutionary language, but it is not demagoguery.[96]

Thus far I have shown the structural elements of the first two couplets that make implicit claims of balance and moderation, as well as the nuances that complicate those claims. These claims, and their complications, communicate different messages about the nature of the reforms. Those who believe that the distinctions do not overthrow the basic balance of these two couplets necessarily also believe that the reforms being described were basically fair. On the other hand, those who believe that the discrepancies hold important weight can point to the use of γέρας and τιμή as subtle hints that Solon is truly a democrat, or the fact that he assures that there are checks on the δῆμος (2) and emphasizes the lack of restraint of the upper class as signs that he really has

[96] Contra Irwin, who carefully examines language that could point to a more tyrannical Solon than popularly imagined (2005, 205f.).

the interests of the elite at heart. Both of those interpretations are essentially concerned with the ideological portrayal of the reforms. The final potentially disruptive element that I will treat, the participle ἐπορεξάμενος, would have a different rhetorical focus entirely: the speaker himself.

The exact meaning of ἐπορεξάμενος has been the subject of much scholarly consternation. Irwin discusses the problem, and the varying scholarly solutions, in great detail.[97] There are essentially two possibilities, which hinge on whether or not this use of the middle voice is understood as being reflexive. Either this participle is another instance of the antithetical balancing of positive and negative action within the poem, this time within the scope of a single line: "neither taking away honor nor extending it further,"[98] or it is a defense made by the speaker of his own actions, "neither taking away honor nor reaching for it myself."[99] If it takes the latter meaning, the balance emphasized in the former interpretation is thrown off. In this reading, elements that had previously been understood as elements of balance—ὅσσον ἀπαρκεῖ ("as much as was appropriate") (1) and μήδεν ἀεικές ἔχειν ("that they have nothing unseemly") (3)—become responses to critiques instead of demonstrations of moderation. The fact that the speaker is the subject of every main verb in the fragment is also cast into new light: the poem is not about the reforms themselves, but rather about the speaker's role in those reforms. The controversy surrounding ἐπορεξάμενος thus opens the door for two readings of the fragment that are mutually exclusive. The emphasis on balance in the fragment has led most scholars to assert that ἐπορεξάμενος does not have reflexive force. The nature of the language, however, does not allow for a definitive answer as to which is correct. Both possibilities will inform drastically different readings of the final couplet.

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[97] Irwin 2005, 230 n.71.
[98] This is the interpretation of Linforth 1919, 135; Gerber 1970, 134; West 1993, 75; Miller 1996, 67; Noussia 2001, 269; Mülke 2002, 187-8.
[99] This is the possibility put forth in Mülke 2002, 188; Noussia 2010, 287-8.

In sum, the first four lines firmly establish the central issue of the interpretation of this poem—how much significance to attribute to the balance of the poem as opposed to the elements within the poem that complicate that balance. How one decides to read the poem in turn has very real consequences for the characterization, not only of the speaker but also of the implied author, and so Solon himself. Irwin accuses Solon of using the balance of the poem as a "sagacious ploy of seeming to say something pleasing to everybody."[100] And yet, this sort of blandishment is the very inverse of how Aristotle describes Solon's behavior in his own contextualization of the poem: εἵλετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἀπεχθέσθαι σώσας τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τὰ βέ[λτι]στα νομοθετήσας ("he chose, in saving the city and establishing the best laws, to be an enemy of both sides") (11.2).[101] These different interpretations also give us entirely different pictures of Solon's position within his political career at the time of this poem's delivery. While both acknowledge that the fragment is fundamentally reflective, in Irwin's interpretation Solon is using that reflection on past achievement in an attempt to gain further political favor. In Aristotle's view, on the other hand, Solon has been put in a position such that he finds it necessary to defend his use of power in retrospect. For Irwin, this poem is an encomium; for Aristotle, an apology. This ambiguity will only be heightened by the addition of the last couplet.

The Shield Image

ἔστην δ᾽ ἀμφιβαλών κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
νικᾶν δ᾽οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.

In the last couplet, Solon describes an image that would seem to fit in a Homeric battle scene: ἔστην δ᾽ ἀμφιβαλών κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι, / νικᾶν δ᾽οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους

[100] Irwin 2005, 235.
[101] This stance is related to what would seem to be an inconsistency in the characterization of Solon in the *Athenian Constitution*: in one instance, Solon is reported as always blaming the crisis on the rich (Fragment 5.3); in another, he is quoted in a distinctly anti-democratic sentiments (Fragment. 6 in 12).

ἀδίκως ("And I stood up casting my great shield around both, / and I did not allow either to win unjustly").[102] This image follows the same basic structure as the previous two couplets: it is the final element of the overarching μέν-δέ syntax, it follows the same model of positive statement with negative qualification (ἔστην... οὐκ εἴασ'), and it involves the same basic grammatical roles for the actors (the speaker as the subject, the two groups in the dative). This dramatic image in the final couplet is the culmination of the poem, but whether it is a metaphor for the balance of Solon's reforms or for his defensive position depends on one's interpretation of the first four lines.

Most scholarly attention on this couplet has been directed toward line 5. The essential point of disagreement is concerning the nature of the dative ἀμφοτέροισι; namely, whether it is a dative of advantage or disadvantage. The disagreements over the interpretation of this dative go back as far as the first texts that contain the fragment, Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution* and Plutarch's *Life of Solon*. Aristotle signals quite clearly that he believes it is a dative of disadvantage by using the same type of dative with the same word in his description of the political situation that precedes his quotation of the fragment: ὁ δὲ Σόλων ἀμφοτέροις ἠναντιώθη ("Solon was opposed to both") (11.2). Plutarch, on the other hand, definitively interprets the image as a dative of advantage. The disagreement over the nature of ἀμφοτέροισι generally falls along the same lines as the controversy over ἐπορεξάμενος, with a dative of disadvantage signaling the poem's focus on Solon's defensiveness and a dative of advantage focusing on the nature of Solon's reforms.

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[102] This is another unusual use of epic diction. The word σάκος, which appears in line five, never otherwise appears outside of epic poetry (See Bershadsky 2010). On the other hand, the phrase in which σάκος appears in this poem (κρατερὸν σάκος) never appears in either epic, despite the fact that it is composed of two common epic words. Another conflict with Homeric usage can be found in the choice of the participle ἀμφιβαλών in line 5. This word, no matter how it is interpreted, seems to mimic the Homeric use of ἀμφικαλύπτω with σάκος: the sense of covering for the sake of protection (Il. 8.331, 13.420, 17.132, and 22.313). Ironically, the only uses of forms of βαλλώ in association with a σάκος in Homeric epic are when a σάκος is being struck by a spear. It is clear that this is an innovative passage.

The dative of disadvantage is less frequently posited.[103] It would be rendered, "And I stood up, casting my shield around [myself, in defense] against both parties." The use of this image to depict the need for defensiveness would be a further development of the theme introduced by the reading of ἐπορεξάμενος (2) as a middle-voiced assurance that the speaker did not extend himself τιμή inappropriately. While this reading avoids the paradox presented by the dative of advantage (discussed below), it is not without its own interpretive problems. First and foremost, there is the problem of how this reading relates to line six: νικᾶν δ'οὐκ εἴασ' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως ("and I did not allow either to win unjustly"). This line could be referring not to a conflict with each other, but with Solon. Alternatively, Solon could be reinforcing his lack of bias by using νικᾶν in a more figurative: "prevail over [me]." If Solon is seen to be taking a defensive posture, both of these readings would be continuous.

The more conventional view among modern scholars is that of a dative of advantage.[104] This would render a translation such as: "And I stood up, casting my giant shield [as protection] around both parties." The implication of this interpretation is that Solon is summing up the reforms stated earlier as a balanced and fair protection for both parties.[105]

It has generally been assumed, given the adversative structure of the previous two couplets, that ἀμφοτέροισι refers to the two groups mentioned in lines one through four.[106] Based on this assumption, most have concluded that the shield is meant to protect each group from the

[103] The only recent scholar to propose this reading is Rhodes (1993, 172-3).
[104] Linforth 1919, 180; Masaracchia 1958, 284f.; Campbell 1982, 245; 1983, 95; Fränkel 1975, 225; Gerber 1970, 134; Vox 1984, 63; Anhalt 1993, 124f.; West 1993, 76; Mülke 2002, 192; Irwin 2005, 235; Stehle 2006, 96-7; Noussia 2010, 288. This list has been derived from Mülke 2002, 191 with subsequent scholarship added.
[105] This is indeed how it has been read by many modern scholars (e.g. "The image very effectively reinforces Solon's unique impartiality, and in particular the idea he has harmed neither party" (Noussia 2010, 288)).
[106] The only serious attempt at a different reading is a suggestion by Wilamowitz that ἀμφοτέροισι necessitates a suppressed ὥμοις, in order to be more consistent with Homeric usage (1929, 44. cf. Il. 10.149, 11.527, 15.479). Besides being structurally jarring, this conjecture has been satisfactorily dismissed on Homeric lexical grounds by Mülke (2002, 192.).

other.[107] And yet, as has often been noted, the image of one large shield protecting both sides from each other is paradoxical: they would simply fight underneath. Some attempts to reconcile the problem have tended towards the (intentionally) humorous, as when Stehle proposes, "the shield turns into a Möbius strip."[108] Others, such as Will, have been uninterested in the problem: "Solon's image...is successful and clear, provided it is not pressed into its sensuous detail. Nor is such pressing required, because Solon's poetry is unusually non-sensuous, relying little, for example, on exact visual imagery."[109] None have satisfactorily resolved the paradox.

Plutarch's interpretation in the *Life of Solon*, on the other hand, does not follow the premise that the shield is necessarily protecting the two parties from each other. In his contextualization of the fragment, Plutarch describes how Solon's laws were intentionally ambiguous to allow the courts, made up of the people, to decide disputes:

> λέγεται δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀσαφέστερον γράψας καὶ πολλὰς ἀντιλήψεις ἔχοντας αὐξῆσαι τὴν τῶν δικαστηρίων ἰσχύν· μὴ δυναμένους γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων διαλυθῆναι περὶ ὧν διεφέροντο, συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ δεῖσθαι δικαστῶν καὶ πᾶν ἄγειν ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς ἐκείνους, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν νόμων κυρίους ὄντας. ἐπισημαίνεται δ᾽ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὴν ἀξίωσιν οὕτως...
>
> It is said he wrote the laws ambiguously and having many counterclaims to add to the strength of the jurors: for, not being able to come to a resolution by means of the law concerning the matters on which they differed, there would always be a need of the jurors and every dispute would go to them, thus they would be the guardians of the laws. He himself signaled the worthiness of this in this way... (18.4-5) [110]

This contextualization smoothly incorporates the sentiment of line six: "νικᾶν δ᾽οὐκ εἴασ᾽ οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως" (and I did not allow either to win unjustly), with ἀδίκως being interpreted as modifying νικᾶν.[111] Far from "forced,"[112] this reading is entirely consistent with the image of a

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[107] Noussia has the strongest words to this effect: "This underscores the 'embrace' with which Solon has defended both classes (from one another, of course)..." (2010, 285).
[108] Stehle 2006, 97.
[109] Will 1958, 306. See also, Anhalt 1993, 125.
[110] Aristotle mentions this theory in a different context, but dismisses it (9.2).
[111] This could even be carrying the sense of νικᾶν which is used to describe winning in court.
[112] Irwin 2005, 236.

shield-bearer protecting two sides from unfair outside intervention while still allowing, perhaps even encouraging, them to fight amongst each other. While internally consistent, this interpretation necessitates the presence of some outside force from which the two groups need protection. There is no evidence of this outside force in the fragment as we have it, and the difference of Aristotle's interpretation suggests that it is not missing in a section that has been withheld from us, either. While Plutarch's interpretation of line five is more consistent with the sixth line than the others, it is less consistent with the closed system presented in the previous four lines.

The basic distinction between Plutarch's reading of line 6 and the paradox of modern scholars is a disagreement over what the adverb ἀδίκως modifies. Plutarch assumes it modifies νικᾶν, a choice which implies one side can win, as long as it is not unjust. If, on the other hand, the adverb modifies οὐκ εἴασ', the implication would be that the speaker was protecting either side from being defeated at all because to allow such a thing would be unjust.

The only possible scenario in which the speaker could realistically protect both sides with the same shield is if they were standing together. This scenario is implied by Linforth's supposition: "This could only be protection against outsiders".[113] Linforth's interpretation would be in keeping with Mülke's urging that we not allow the scenarios of other fragments (such as Fragment 37, in which battle lines are clearly drawn) to color our view of this fragment.[114] But the fact of the matter remains that the speaker, in separating the two groups into their own couplets, has undercut this possibility by emphasizing their division rather than their unity.[115]

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[113] Linforth 1919, 180

[114] Mülke 2002, 191.

[115] Denniston writes, "The words standing immediately before μέν and δέ are usually corresponding elements in the contrasted thoughts, and, further, the most important elements in the contrast" (1954, 371). The words that stand immediately before μέν and δέ in these couplets are δήμωι and οἳ. The groups themselves are the strongest contrastive elements.

The sixth line, moreover, reinforces the fact that the two groups meant by "both" actively oppose each other and have not reconciled. In an instance of poetics mimicking politics, the failure of the possibility for the unification of the groups in the image also represents the failure of Solon's reforms to unify the factions.

The dative of advantage leaves us only a few feasible interpretations: either we agree with Plutarch that Solon was not protecting the groups from each other, but rather giving them a fair battlefield on which to fight; or we follow Will and others in believing that Solon is indeed protecting both sides from the harm intended by the other, while acknowledging that a close look at the image renders this metaphor paradoxical.

The paradoxical interpretation should not be dismissed, nor should interpretation of the paradox. Rather than reflecting a lack of interest in detail, I believe the paradox holds significance for the proper understanding of the way that authorship operates in this fragment. The paradox can be interpreted on two authorial levels. First, this paradox could be intended by the speaker, either to signal the necessity of a dative of disadvantage (and thus the Aristotelian, defensive reading of the poem), or to signal the necessity that the shield should be interpreted as protecting from outsiders. On a second level, the paradox could be an instance of distance between the implied author and the speaker. In this reading, the speaker proudly caps his accomplishments with an evocative image, one which most readers (with Will and Anhalt) have found to be a bit puzzling but not particularly problematic, but which the implied author knows does not literally work. In this reading, the implied author is distanced from the speaker and uses a paradox that communicates the impossibility, or at the very least eventual ineffectiveness, of the very accomplishments that speaker celebrates in the poem. Multiple possible readings operate within this line simultaneously.

In the end, the interpretive problem presented by the final couplet, and in particular its use of ἀμφοτέροισι, yields many possible conclusions, but none that are self-evidently the only correct understanding. The dative of disadvantage does not satisfactorily account for line 6, Plutarch's understanding of the dative of advantage does not satisfactorily account for lines 1-4, and the modern understanding of the dative of advantage turns line 5 into a seemingly insoluble paradox that itself opens multiple possibilities.

The ambiguity inherent in ἀμφοτέροισι, as with that of ἐπορεξάμενος, is crucial to determining the rhetorical program of the poem, but remains impossible to satisfactorily resolve. Rather than being a failing on the part of the implied author, however, I believe that it is a clever rhetorical device. These ambiguities allow the implied author to communicate multiple messages at once without subordinating any of them. Only through these ambiguities would the poet be able, all at once, to claim to have successfully balanced the opposing interests, to justify his past actions and protect himself from attacks from both sides, and to implicitly acknowledge that his two accomplishments (his revolutionary reapportionment of γέρας and his steady maintenance of the status quo) were contradictory from the start. All of these arguments are reinforced by the final image, and all serve different rhetorical purposes. It is not only unnecessary, it is not sound to chose one interpretation over the others. If this poem is saying multiple different things at the same time, so should our reading of it.

CHAPTER 2

THE WOLF (FRAGMENT 36)

ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον
δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;
συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἐν δίκηι χρόνου
μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων
ἄριστα, Γῆ μέλαινα, τῆς ἐγώ ποτε
ὅρους ἀνεῖλον πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας,
πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρα.
πολλοὺς δ᾽ Ἀθήνας πατρίδ᾽ ἐς θεόκτιτον,
ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,
ἄλλον δικαίως, τοὺς δ᾽ ἀναγκαίης, ὕπο
χρειοῦς φυγόντας, γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ᾽ Ἀττικὴν
ἱέντας, ὡς ἂν πολλαχῆι πλανωμένους,
τοὺς δ᾽ ἐνθάδ᾽ αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα
ἔχοντας, ἤθη δεσποτῶν τρομεομένους,
ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα. ταῦτα μὲν κράτει
ὁμοῦ βίαν τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας,
ἔρεξα καὶ διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην,
θεσμοὺς δ᾽ ὁμοίως τῶι κακῶι τε κἀγαθῶι,
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην,
ἔγραψα. κέντρον δ᾽ ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών,
κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήμων ἀνήρ,
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον· εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἤνδανεν τότε,
αὖτις δ᾽ ἃ τοῖσιν οὗτεροι φρασαίατο,
πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ᾽ ἐχηρώθη πόλις.
τῶν οὕνεκ᾽ ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόμενος
ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος.[116]

But as for me, which of the things for which I called
the people together did I not attain before I stopped?
In support of this before the court of Time
the supreme mother of the Olympian powers,
black Earth, can best bear witness. From her I once
took up the boundary stones that were fixed in many places,
so that she who was once in servitude is now free.
And to Athens, their god-founded homeland,
I brought back many men who had been sold off, some unjustly,

[116] This text is as found in Noussia 2010,

others justly, still others sent into exile by
the compulsive power of need, none of whom still spoke
the speech of Attika, wandering as they were in many places.
And as for those who here at home endured the shame
of servitude, in terror of their masters' ways,
I made them free. These things through power,
by fitting together force and justice,
I brought to pass, and so came through as I promised.
Laws too, however, alike for the base man and the noble,
fitting straightforward justice to each one's case,
I set down in writing. Another man who took up the goad as I did,
one who was ill-intentioned and greedy for possessions,
could not have restrained the people. For if I had been willing
to do what pleased their opponents at that time,
and then again what the other party had in mind for them,
this city would have been widowed of many men.
For these reasons, mounting a defense in every quarter,
I turned and twisted like a wolf among many hounds.[117]

At 27 lines, Fragment 36 is the longest iambic fragment in the Solonian corpus.[118] It is also the longest of the extant fragments in which Solon discusses his own political accomplishments.[119] Like Fragment 5, this fragment is generally understood to be reflection by Solon on his deeds as διαλλακτής (mediator). Both fragments depict the effects of Solon's reforms, but Fragment 36 also gives details about what reforms cause those effects. Prompted by these details and Aristotle's introduction,[120] scholars have looked to this fragment as a potential source for the historical realities of Solon's reforms. While there are some basic points of agreement (i.e., that the freeing of the earth (3-7) refers to some sort of land reform), controversy

[117] Miller 1996, 74-5. I chose to use Miller's translation in order to avoid committing to interpretations, and to show the general trend of interpretation. I have also used this translation when quoting from Fragment 36 unless otherwise noted.
[118] Hence it earns the nickname "großer Iambos" (Mülke 2002, 361f.).
[119] The other fragments which are longer (Fragment 4 and Fragment 13) do not specifically address his role as a lawmaker or political figure.
[120] πάλιν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τῶν δουλευόντων μὲν πρότερον, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν "And again, concerning the loosening of the debts and those who had previously been enslaved but then freed on account of the Shaking Off of Burdens…" (*Athenian Constitution* 12.4)

over issues as basic as the nature of the σεισάχθεια date back to as early as the fourth century.[121] Important questions, such as what specific reforms the ὅροι of line 6 communicated, remain unanswered.[122] A proper survey of the various stances taken on these and other related issues is outside of the scope of this chapter, and has already been done thoroughly by both Noussia-Fantuzzi and Almeida.[123] These controversies are a natural result of a fragment that is specific enough to inspire speculation, but vague enough to confound any certain conclusions.

This vagueness is especially frustrating because the act of defining—one might even say spinning—Solon's accomplishments is at the rhetorical heart of this fragment. This fragment is not an attempt to persuade its audience to adopt new measures, but rather an attempt to define measures that have already been put in place. In the context of this act of definition it is noteworthy that this poem, as we have it, contains no instances of second person verbs or pronouns. This absence shifts the focalization from the narratees onto the speaker, who is almost omnipresent in the poem.[124] In other words, these accomplishments are not framed as "what I did for you" but rather "what I did." The heavy first person focalization thus signals the fact that the accomplishments are inherently connected to the speaker. By seeking to define Solon's reforms, this poem seeks to define his legacy.[125]

As an implied author Solon's legacy is more properly understood as his reception. In order to understand Solon's efforts to define his own reception, we must necessarily understand

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[121] Was it a total elimination of debt (Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 6.1, 12.4; Plutarch 15-16), or was it simply a restructuring of it (Androtion, as reported in Plutarch *Life of Solon* 15.2)?

[122] Were these mortgage stones that recorded the debt or encumbrance (Rihll 1991, 117) or something else entirely (perhaps denoting some type of border which restricted movement (Ober 2006, 449-50))? This topic will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.

[123] Almeida 2003, 1-69. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 19-44.

[124] The first word of the poem is ἐγώ, eleven of the sixteen finite verbs have him as their subject, and the other five are related to him or his deeds.

[125] While it by no means proves that Solon anticipated his poem to survive for millennia, his statement that he will be vindicated ἐν δίκηι χρόνου ("in the court of Time") (3) shows that he was concerned with his legacy beyond the immediate moment.

the object of those efforts—Solon's audience. The contemporaneous audience of this poem has been the subject of much debate.[126] Would they have been the aristocratic participants of a symposium or the entire public gathered together in the *agora* or *ekklesia*? [127] With the exception of Campbell, such speculation is based on what one believes the archaic performance culture would have allowed rather than on any details specific to this poem. We do not have enough evidence to confidently assert who the original audience of this poem was. It is self-evident, however, that the audience of this poem has extended well beyond Solon's contemporaries into later antiquity and on to the present day. With this in mind, my examination of the ways in which this poem manipulates its own reception will pay special attention to the ways in which it positions itself for these later audiences, whether it is doing so intentionally or not.

As with the other two fragments being analyzed in my thesis, this seemingly straightforward fragment becomes more obscure the closer one examines it: a phenomenon which comes to a head in the fragment's strange final simile, ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος ("I turned and twisted like a wolf among many hounds"). This simile is a topic of much scholarly discussion. The noteworthiness of this simile is signaled by its deviation from a common Homeric paradigm.[128] Once examined further, it is clear that the use of the wolf jars with the common understanding of Solon's political program. Solon is famous for repudiating

[126] This argument has at its root the basic disagreement between West (1974, 12) and Bowie (1986, 18-21).
[127] Campbell proposes that the phrase ξυνήγαγον / δῆμον (1-2) refers to the gathering together of the assembly, and thus physically sets the delivery of this fragment in the assembly (Campbell 1982, 251). Anhalt wonders aloud, "Perhaps Poem 36 was Solon's farewell address upon leaving office" (1993, 138). Lefkowitz's warnings against extrapolating a performance context out of a poem must be taken into account (1981, 40). For the possibility of performance at a symposium, Noussia-Fantuzzi writes, "Unless the beginning δὲ is correlated to μέν of ἐγὼ μέν…, the quotation in Aristotle can be considered to be a whole poem only if we assume that it belonged to a 'sympotic chain' with Solon's verses taking up the remarks of a preceding symposiast, who might have performed the role of a critic of Solon's reforms" (2010, 460). Irwin is a proponent of setting Solon's poetry in the symposium (2005, 2006).
[128] The closest parallel is *Iliad* 12.41f, in which Hektor is described as a boar or lion that turns about while surrounded by dogs and hunters. For more examples of these types of similes, see discussion ad loc.

tyranny,[129] but the wolf, especially the lone wolf, shares characteristics with tyrants in archaic Greek thought—and comes to be directly associated with the tyrant in classical Greek thought. In order to understand this strange choice, we must look beyond the simple encomiastic program of the speaker towards the more complex motivations of the implied author.

Structure

Any discussion of the structure of this fragment must take into account that our knowledge of the poem is incomplete. Some of the major foci of this investigation may have been resolved by information given in a more complete version of the poem, but we cannot be sure. Certain arguments, especially those from absence, should be avoided. The entire pursuit of a structural logic to the poem must take into account that the presence of lines preceding or following the lines we are given would drastically change our idea of that structure. That being said, the fragment that we have was not preserved by an accident of nature or selected to show a grammatical curiosity; this fragment was preserved by Aristotle, who was interested in it for its own sake. Regardless of whether it is the entirety of the poem in which it was originally found, Fragment 36 is a sense unit, and thus some discussion of its internal structure is not only germane but necessary.

The first two lines of Fragment 36 (ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα ξυνήγαγον / δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην;) are as ambiguous as they are important. The rhetorical question that these two lines ask will be programmatic for the rest of the poem. But that question has been understood in two fundamentally different ways. Some see it as confident statement that Solon has achieved his goals: "which of the things for which I called / the people together did I not

[129] This repudiation is most clearly stated in Fragment 32, Fragment 33, and Fragment 34.

attain before I stopped?"[130] Others have understood it to be the first line of a self-defense: "But as to the ends for which I brought the people together (formed the popular party), why did I desist before I had attained those ends?"[131] These rhetorical questions seem to be directly contradictory: either Solon attained the things or he did not. Given Solon's strong statement in line 17—ἔρεξα καὶ διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην ("I brought [these things] to pass, and so came through as I promised")—the likelihood of the second option, in which Solon seems to acknowledge that he did not indeed come through as he promised, seems to be diminished.

There are, however, a few ways in which this reading might be consistent. First, Solon might be making a distinction between the reforms and the aims that the reforms were meant to achieve: Jebb's translation of τῶν μὲν οὕνεκα as "the ends for which" clearly points to this idea.[132] Solon can claim to have successfully installed his reforms without claiming that those reforms achieved the goals that he had hoped for. In this reading, the last image evokes the resistance that Solon faced that may have prevented the reforms from achieving their desired ends. The other possibility is that this rhetorical question reflects one posed by the members of the δῆμος who thought that Solon was going to go further with his reforms—perhaps confiscating land and redistributing wealth.[133] In this reading, when he asserts διῆλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην ("[I] came through as I promised")(17), he is pointedly replying to the claims that he had misled the people by asserting that he did everything that he had promised to do. Given the possibilities for consistency between Jebb's understanding of the rhetorical question in the first two lines and the confident assertion in line 17, it is safe to say it is a plausible alternative to the more common understanding of opening rhetorical question.

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[130] Miller 1996, 74.
[131] Jebb 1897, 98.
[132] Jebb 1897, 103.
[133] Aristotle *Athenian Constitution* 11.2; Plutarch 14.1.

These two possible rhetorical questions thus chart different courses through the fragment: either the fragment is a celebration of the deeds which Solon accomplished or a defense that he did indeed hold up his end of the bargain. If the poem is understood to be celebratory, the final simile comes as a twist. Solon gives an account of all the things that he had done only to show that, despite all of that he accomplished, he was still attacked. If the poem is understood to be defensive, on the other hand, the final simile is not a new development, but rather a figurative reflection of the circumstances that necessitated the poem: a poem of defense ends with an image of Solon under attack.

Solon begins the description of his accomplishments with a bold claim, συμμαρτυροίη ταῦτ᾽ ἄν ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου / μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων/ ἄριστα Γῆ μέλαινα ("In support of this before the court of Time / the supreme mother of the Olympian powers, / black Earth, can best bear witness") (3-5). If we understand the rhetorical question as celebratory, the use of the demonstrative pronoun ταῦτα provides a smooth transition to the list of the accomplishments represented by the demonstrative pronoun τούτων in line 2: the Earth is testifying to the things that Solon has attained. If, however, we understand the rhetorical question as defensive, this transition is a little more abrupt. It is unlikely that the two demonstrative pronouns can be referring to the same things; the Earth is clearly not testifying to the things that Solon stopped before attaining. There is a possibility, however, that the use of ταῦτα in line 3 refers not to what precedes it, but what follows.[134] In this reading, Solon is reporting the question that is asked of him—"why did I desist before I had attained those ends?"—and countering it with a swift response: the Earth will testify to the following things that he did attain.

[134] Smyth 839a. Smyth notes that a use of οὗτος that refers to the following tends to come in the neuter, which fits with this use.

Solon specifies the actions that the earth would testify to: he removed the marker stones (ὅρους ἀνεῖλον) (6),[135] which had been "stuck in her everywhere" (τῆς…πολλαχῆι πεπηγότας) (5-6). What was perhaps the most crucial aspect of Solon's reforms is thus described in terms that are entirely devoid of people.[136] We do not learn who benefitted (or, in turn, whom these measures hurt), but are rather told that this was a benefit to the earth itself. The detail of the "marker stones" (ὅρους) (6) is specific enough to root this statement in some actual deed, but is not specific enough for an audience unfamiliar with what these markers signified to know what the deed was.[137] This language either presumes knowledge of what Solon did when he removed the markers or deems such specific knowledge unnecessary. By not giving a more literal description of the reform, Solon does not give those who lack other knowledge enough details to judge it on its own merits. Furthermore, by describing his actions in terms of their benefit to μήτηρ μεγίστη δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων/ ἄριστα Γῆ μέλαινα ("the supreme mother of the Olympian powers, / black Earth") (4-5), [138] Solon uses an *a fortiori* argument to assure the later audience that those details are not necessary: who would dare disagree with a deity described in such grand terms? In this sense, Solon really is using Earth as his witness in the court of time.

Solon takes what many understand to be his most significant economic reform and reframes it as a mythological action. While this grand rhetoric certainly could have been convincing to some of his contemporaries, it is even more effective for posterity. If the reforms were as drastic as has been supposed, the citizens of Athens would probably have known whether Solon had benefited them or hurt them. But the lack of detail allows Solon to spin his

[135] I translate ὅρος as "marker stone" rather than Miller's "boundary stone" in order to stay neutral about what exactly these stones signified. For more on the meaning of ὅρος, see Chapter 3.
[136] This is, in fact, the very passage which Plutarch cites as Solon's description of the σεισάχθεια, of which Plutarch says οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι πάντων ὁμοῦ φασι τῶν συμβολαίων ἀναίρεσιν γενέσθαι τὴν σεισάχθειαν ("Almost everyone agrees that the "Shaking Off of Burdens" was a removal of debt.") (15.5).
[137] This is a point of serious controversy. See note 7 above.
[138] These terms to describe the earth are notably strange. Noussia-Fantuzzi notes that the phrase δαιμόνων Ὀλυμπίων appears in no other extant work. (2010, 464).

accomplishments as soon as those specific details have been lost. If it seems objectionable for Solon to recognize the impermanence of the memory of his own achievements, one must keep in mind that the annulment of the marker stones was an action meant to erase their significance for later generations.[139] This was not a positive act, like the codification of laws, but rather a negative act, which would need some external documentation to preserve its memory. Solon takes this absence as an opportunity to document his actions as favorably as possible.

The next act Solon describes—bringing Athenians home from abroad and freeing enslaved Athenians—is the most literal and specific of the entire fragment, but even this literalism has its limits. We are not told how Solon was able to recover Athenians from these far off places, or how he was able to free those who were enslaved. We are only told that it worked. Here again, Solon's selectivity with detail allows him to strategically frame the issue in order make it as uncontroversial as possible. No matter what the audience's perspective on slavery was, this particular slavery is ἀεικέα ("unseemly") (13)—almost certainly because it is specifically πολλοὺς…Ἀθήνας ("many Athenians") (8) who are being enslaved.[140]

Most importantly, Solon does not implicate any Athenians as the perpetrators of this "unseemly" condition. We know that these enslaved Athenians were forced into slavery,[141] but we are not told by whom. While Solon is hardly hesitant in his other fragments to cast blame on the greedy and point out the negative effects of that greed on the πόλις,[142] he notably abstains from implicating anyone for this situation. He even goes so far as to claim that some of the men

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[139] "Modern historians do not know what a pre-Solonian *horos* looked like precisely because Solon's act was so successful," Ober 2006, 454.
[140] The use of ἀεικέα here is, as Noussia-Fantuzzi notes, a specialized term for slavery dating back to at least Hesiod (2010, 473).
[141] Plutarch, in his citation of this passage, specifies that these were citizens who were sold into slavery πρὸς ἀργύριον ("on account of debt") (15.5).
[142] The most famous formulation to this effect is found in Fragment 6 (also found in Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 12): τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται / ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ ("surfeit bears hybris, whenever much fortune attends men for whom the mind is not suitable).

whom he freed were enslaved δικαίως ("justly") (10).[143] By shifting focus away from the masters and onto the enslaved, Solon is able to state his accomplishment in more universally agreeable terms.

The description of these reforms is followed by lines that describe the process by which he was able to achieve his ends as κράτει / ὁμοῦ βίαν τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας ("fitting together justice and force by means of power") (15-6).[144] These lines also subtly introduce the presence of contemporary resistance to Solon's reforms.[145] Words alone have not sufficed. Resistance to Solon's reforms is clearly implied by the need for βία ("force"). The combination of δίκη and βία is clearly associated with tyrannical language.[146] In describing the process necessary to achieve his desired results, Solon introduces a possible association with tyranny. Other tyrannical language will reappear prominently later in the fragment (lines 20 and 27). For a poem so concerned with Solon's legacy, such an association is striking.

Solon dedicates the next few lines (18-20) to a description of his efforts at codification: θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κἀγαθῷ, / εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἁρμόσας δίκην, / ἔγραψα ("Laws, too, however, alike for the base man and the noble, / fitting straightforward justice to each one's case, /I set down in writing"). Perhaps more than anywhere else, Solon here uses ambiguous language to cast his reforms in terms that are favorable to both a popular and an elite audience. The use of ὁμοίως, which is translated by Miller as "alike", does not necessarily mean that the laws are "the same." In other words, Solon has not necessarily introduced ἰσονομία. The use of ὁμοίως can mean that, but it can also mean that they are respectively appropriate. It is clear that

[143] Lewis, in general (2006, 118-9), supports the idea that the force needed to impose slavery could have had legal protection, but here supports a non-legal understanding of the δική words being used (Lewis 2006, 53).
[144] There was for a time some controversy over whether the proper reading of the first word in line 16 is ὁμοῦ or νομοῦ. I have chosen ὁμοῦ along with all of the most modern editions (Noussia-Fantuzzi, Gentili-Prato, and West).
[145] Lines 3-5 hint at resistance, since the Earth is being called as a witness of Solon's achievement. That testimony, however, is not against contemporary resistance; the use of the optative shows that the Earth is either defending Solon against hypothetical opposition, or against the potential of Solon's actions being forgotten.
[146] Irwin 2005, 228. Blaise 1996, 28-9.

the laws are mutually beneficial, but that does not have to entail raising the κακοί to an equal level of the κἀγαθοι in the eyes of the law.[147] This potential separation could be subtly implied by the fact that he is εὐθεῖαν εἰς **ἕκαστον** ἁρμόσας δίκην ("fitting straight justice to **each**") (19), in the sense that each group needs a different type of justice;[148] however, that statement can also simply mean that he is making sure everyone has "straight justice." Depending on one's perspective, Solon has either made everyone equal in the eyes of the law, or he has made laws that are appropriate for everyone depending on their status.[149] By using such ambiguous language, Solon has created the potential for universal appeal.[150]

In the first 20 lines, Solon details his accomplishments. Moreover, he manages to describe his solutions to a factional conflict in terms that aim for cross-factional appeal. If Solon had finished the poem here, or if Aristotle had cut the fragment short in the middle of the line (at ἔγραψα (20)),[151] it would be fair to read this poem as a relatively straightforward account of what Solon had done. But the poem does not stop here. Instead, the speaker turns to the defensive. The sources of resistance that were suggested in earlier lines are made more obvious. Rather than simply reflecting on his accomplishments, Solon declares why those accomplishments had to be his.

The speaker's argument for his own necessity takes the form of a hypothetical situation in which he is presumably absent: κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβών, / κακοφραδής τε καὶ

[147] I am assuming that these terms are social, rather than moral (Campbell 1982, 252).
[148] It was after all, the groups, and not individuals, that had just been mentioned in line 18.
[149] A use of ambiguity with identical effect is described in Plutarch 14.2-3, concerning why both parties supported Solon's appointment: λέγεται δὲ καὶ φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερομένη πρότερον, εἰπόντος ὡς τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῖς κτηματικοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ τοῖς ἀκτήμοσι, τῶν μὲν ἀξίᾳ καὶ ἀρετῇ, τῶν δὲ μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον ἕξειν προσδοκώντων ("And it is said also some saying of circulated beforehand, saying that equality does not make war, and this was pleasing both to those who had wealth and those who did not: the former expecting to have equality as per worth and virtue, and the later in quantity and number.")
[150] Cf. Irwin: "The complex strategy of playing both sides (ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόμενος, 'composing strength from all sides'), of being and not being—a strategy of displacement—resembles the displacement or obfuscation inherent in tyrannical rhetoric, and yet Solon takes the strategy one step further: he so effectively displaces the label of tyrant that tradition unanimously records him as not a tyrant (unlike the fate of Pittacus)." (2005, 261)
[151] Fragment 37, for example, seems to have been cut off mid-line.

φιλοκτήμων ἀνήρ, / οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον ("Another man who took up the goad as I did, / one who was ill-intentioned and greedy for possessions, / could not have restrained the people"). Even though it is conspicuously not about him, this hypothetical clearly reinforces his importance. The hypothetical subject is not just ἄλλος ("another") but ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ ("another man, as I did") (20).[152] This hypothetical other is never described as being a leader, a mediator, or even a tyrant, but rather as κέντρον…λαβών ("taking up the goad") (20).[153] The governing image of a goad being taken up to check the people has been noted to be paradoxical: a goad spurs, a bridle checks.[154] While it is possible that a bridle is implied, it is more likely left out in an attempt to show Solon's unique skill set: Solon, unlike anyone else, was able to take the goad and make it a tool of restraint. The use of this paradoxical image reinforces the message that Solon was the only appropriate διαλλακτής (mediator).

Having established that he alone could check the δῆμος, Solon next defines what checking the δῆμος entails: not allowing either side to do what it wanted to the other (22-5). It is clear from this definition that the δῆμος being checked is not the popular party alone, but rather the entire population of Athens.[155] Here Solon gives himself a potential source of opposition—by not allowing either side to have their way, he has clearly angered both. His opposition is not one or the other, but both. It is this sort of opposition that the κακοφραδής τε καὶ φιλοκτήμων ἀνήρ ("one who was ill-intentioned and greedy for possessions") (21) would either be unwilling or unable to withstand. It is this opposition that Solon shows himself surrounded by in the final two lines.

[152] As has been noted by Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 456.
[153] The κέντρον as a physical manifestation of power would, in later imagery, be connected to tyranny, or power used incorrectly. Cf. Theognis 847f. and Pindar *Pythian* 2.95.
[154] Anhalt 1993, 123.
[155] Contra Larson 1973.

From the ambiguity of its introduction to the strange simile of its conclusion, Fragment 36 serves two rhetorical purposes: encomium and apology. Modern scholars, looking to the fragment as a potential historical resource, have tended to focus on the fragment's encomiastic elements. This reading is organic to the poem: it is proof of the success of Solon's effort to define his legacy in positive terms. If I have emphasized the points where opposition to Solon, and thus apology, shines through, it is not because I find those elements primary within the poem, but rather because I find them to be underrepresented in the scholarship.

Aristotle seems to pick up on this double purpose in his *Athenian Constitution*, the first extant record of an audience's reaction to Fragment 36. In his direct contextualization of the quote, Aristotle describes the poem as being about Solon's reforms: καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν καὶ τῶν δουλευόντων μὲν πρότερον, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ διὰ τὴν σεισάχθειαν ("And about the loosening of the debts and about those who had been enslaved being free on account of the Shaking off of Burdens…"). But this poem is quoted within the context of a broader discussion of the backlash to Solon's reforms, which is the universal theme of the fragments quoted in section 12 of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution.*[156] For Aristotle's audience, therefore, Fragment 36 is not just a reflection on Solon's triumph but also an explanation of the circumstances of his departure.

Fragment 36, perhaps more so than any other fragment in Solon's corpus, is directly concerned with the reception of Solon and his actions. In my discussion of the structure of the fragment, I hope to have shown the dual appropriateness of concluding with a simile that describes Solon's embattled position. But understanding the position of this simile within the fragment does not give us a full picture of its significance. In order to understand the simile

[156] The introduction to this section makes that theme clear: αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖσδε ("he himself recalls these things [the backlash] in his poetry with these words") (12.1).

completely, I must answer a deceptively difficult interpretive question: why does Solon portray himself as a wolf?

The Wolf

ὡς ἐν κυσὶν πολλαῖσιν ἐστράφην λύκος

The use of a wolf in the final simile is striking for two important reasons.[157] First, this simile seems to be formed off of a Homeric model, but it deviates from that model. This deviation draws the audience's attention, forcing us to consider why Solon would make such a choice. Second, the wolf was associated with a consistent set of symbolic connotations in Greek thought, connotations which were notably political. These connotations, however, seem to be ones that the implied author would have wanted to avoid bringing into the mind of his audience: cleverness, conspiratorial cooperation, and—most surprisingly—tyranny. Why would Solon associate himself with such imagery?

The wolf simile is a clear instance of intertext with, and deviation from, a Homeric paradigm. There are over a dozen similes in the *Iliad* which use the imagery of predatory animals under attack.[158] Similarly to the simile in Fragment 36, these beasts are never opposed to individual heroic humans, as depicted in mythical stories of the great hunts, but rather against a nameless mass of men and dogs. In many of the situations given by Homer, hunger or even an excess of pride has pushed these heroic animals to hunt the herds of men. There are only a few instances in which the men are actively seeking out the animal in a hunt. In some, the heroic

[157] The choice is also ironic: Solon, as a lawmaker, was an enemy to wolves. He reportedly wrote a law rewarding five drachmas to anyone who killed an adult wolf and one drachma to anyone who killed a wolf pup (Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 23.3).

[158] Iliad 3.23-6, 5.136-42, 5.476 (N.B.), 5.554-8, 8.338-40, 11.292-3, 11.414-8, 11.547-55, 12.41-8 (N.B.) 12.299-306, 17.61-7, 17.133-6, 17.282-3, 17.657-64, 18.161-2, 18.573-86 (this is from the ekprhasis of the shield, but contains imagery almost identical to these types of similes), 20.164-73.

animal clearly has the upper hand; in others, it is engaging in a fatal feat of strength. Most often, the lion or boar is attacked by herdsmen after a successful hunt of their flock, a hunt which has already been described in all its grisly detail. Such a common paradigm would have been an obvious point of allusion for a poet hoping to glorify a speaker that has been put on the defensive. The image of a powerful individual who is attempting to glut itself on slaughter is, however, a strange choice for a poet whose rhetorical aim is seemingly to convince a mass of people that his actions as an individual have been beneficial to them.

It therefore makes sense that Solon departs from this paradigm: his use of a wolf in this simile is distinctly unhomeric. This type of simile never features a wolf in the Homeric corpus. Furthermore, Solon's wolf is distinctly individual, while wolves are universally found in packs in Homer's epics. Irwin, seeing these differences, claims, "from a Homeric perspective Solon's besieged wolf is an impossibility."[159] This impossibility would have certainly caught the attention of an ancient audience, and demanded further investigation.

It has been noted that other, more Homerically appropriate animals (most notably λέων ("lion") (as in 12.42)) would have also fit within the scansion.[160] I agree with the conclusion that this observation is meant to support—the wolf has been chosen as a departure from Homeric imagery—but find that it betrays a lack of confidence in Solon's poetic skill. An argument along these lines implicitly allows the alternative that Solon might have made this choice only for the sake of meter. Solon surely had the poetic capability to re-engineer the line to fit what he was trying to say. Solon made a purposeful choice to deviate from the usual Homeric paradigm.

The deviation from the Homeric paradigm makes it clear that Solon chose the wolf very purposefully. It is difficult to understand this choice, however, because the wolf was associated

[159] Irwin 2005, 245-6.
[160] Mülke 2002, 395.

with traits that one can hardly imagine Solon choosing for himself. Wolves, according to Buxton, were known in the Greek world for their cooperation, but also for their devious cunning.[161] Like the lions of Homeric similes, wolves were known to attack herds; unlike the lions, they did so (at least in the Greek imagination) using tricks and organized tactics.[162] Solon is distinctively individual and gives credit to himself alone for the reforms. Moreover, throughout Fragment 36, Solon has showed himself as a liberator, not an attacker. The comparison to cooperative, predatory wolves is strange indeed.

The cooperation that characterizes wolves makes the presence of a single wolf separated from the pack particularly striking. Already in antiquity the concept of the lone wolf had been integrated into the mythic framework, "developed so that the wolf becomes a powerful image for the man apart from other men."[163] It is possible that this direct connection is being made in literature already by Alkaios, who may call himself a *lykaimiais*, [164] in an explicitly political poem. Buxton says of this passage: "for an association with exile, wildness and solitariness a compound of lykos, 'wolf', is highly appropriate."[165] Perhaps Solon is merging together the epic and lyric poetic traditions to describe his unique place as a denigrated and yet heroic figure.

Alkaios is clearly a scapegoat figure, fitting into the long tradition of poetic scapegoats that is thoroughly examined in Todd Compton's *Victim of the Muses*.[166] Solon, in describing himself as a conspicuously singular wolf, could be placing himself in this same tradition. Anhalt in particular sees this simile as Solon engaging with the concept of the scapegoat for his own

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[161] Buxton 1986, 62. Solon was not averse to the use of cunning trick himself. He famously feigned the madness that allowed him to address the agora with the Salamis ode. (Plutarch, Life of Solon 8)
[162] Perry 153 (Perry 1952, 380).
[163] Buxton 1986, 63.
[164] Archilochus 130. It is unclear whether Alkaios calls himself "a wolf-thicket man" or is "settled in the wolf-thickets." (Campbell 1982, 297).
[165] Buxton 1986, 63.
[166] Compton 2006. For Alkaios specifically, see 106-113. There is no chapter about Solon, presumably because his departure from Athens was thought to be on good terms.

purposes.[167] Aristotle's description of the tension in Athens preceding, perhaps even causing, Solon's departure suggests that Solon was treated much in the manner of the scapegoat. The idea that Solon's decision to leave was premeditated smooths over the tense, volatile situation that threatened those laws, and Solon himself.

An alternative to the idea of Solon as a scapegoat is the tradition of departure after the implementation of the laws by ancient Greek lawgivers, as observed by Szgedy-Maszak.[168] Perhaps these two traditions are not actually in competition. The themes of the scapegoat tradition that the scapegoat be "the best among them" and that the act of scapegoating be propelled by some sort of "communal disaster"[169] would fit neatly within the conditions that necessitate the intervention of a sage lawgiver. Additionally, the supposed logical basis for the lawgiver's subsequent expulsion could be a later rationalization of an action more properly understood as ritual. Or, at the very least, the two traditions could have often intersected: lawgivers making radical changes would have often angered the community, as seems to be the case with Solon, and the reaction to this anger might have borrowed from the ritual of scapegoating. Solon may not have been a *lykaimais* in the tradition of Alkaios. It is clear, however, at least in Aristotle's telling, that leaving Athens was not part of Solon's original plan, but rather a reaction to the tensions created, or not alleviated, by his reforms.[170] The simile at the conclusion of Fragment 36 communicates that tension in figurative language.

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[167] Anhalt 1993, 115.
[168] Szegedy-Maszak 1978, 205-7.
[169] Compton 2006, 14 and 15 respectively.
[170] Herodotus' characterization of Solon's departure, while surely demonstrating planning on Solon's part, does not necessitate that this planning took place before tensions arose (*Histories* 1.29).

Beyond epic and lyric, another source of characterization of the wolf in Greek thought is found in the fable tradition, which was contemporary with Solon.[171] The lone wolf is a popular figure in Aesop's fables, although not always with the same connotations of exile and separation from the community. Wolf fables are often political in nature, and fables featuring lone wolves are no exception.[172] These lone wolves often demonstrate the traits of tyrants. In one fable, a wolf is tricked by the size of his shadow at sunset into thinking he is bigger than he really is, and his first reaction is to aspire to a tyranny: πλέθρου δ' ἔχων τὸ μῆκος οὐ θηρῶν ἁπλῶς / πάντων δυνάστης ἀθρόων γενήσομαι; ("Having a length of a hundred feet, shouldn't I become the ruler of the whole crowd of the beasts?").[173] In another fable, a wolf attempts to justify to a lamb why the lamb deserves to be eaten, but the lamb refutes all of his arguments.[174] The wolf decides to eat him anyway. The message, as eloquently summed up by Townsend: "The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny."[175]

No fable has such unmistakable relevance to tyranny, however, as Perry 348.[176] In this fable, one wolf implements a new law, in which all of the prey that has been killed must be put in the middle so that every wolf can have an equal share (μερίδα ἴσην). The other wolves agree to the plan until a donkey comes by, shakes his mane,[177] and says, ἐκ φρενὸς λύκου καλὴ γνώμη· ἀλλὰ πῶς σὺ τὴν χθεσινὴν ἄγραν τῇ κοῖτῇ ἐναπέθου; ἄγε ταύτην εἰς μέσον ἀπομερίσας. ("A

[171] There are multiple accounts of Aesop interacting with Solon. Whether these accounts are mythologized or true, he certainly inhabits the same archaic milieu. For a thorough treatment of Aesop's relationship with Solon and other sages, see Kurke 2011, 125-58.
[172] Irwin 2005, 252.
[173] Perry 260 (Perry 1952, 422). The wolf is summarily cut down to size, if you will excuse my pun, by a lion. All translations of the fables are my own.
[174] Perry 155 (Perry 1952, 381).
[175] Townsend 1871, 4.
[176] Perry 1952, 464. N.B. the discussions of Irwin (2005, 255-6) and Kurke (2011, 153).
[177] The fact that the donkey is described as τὴν χαίτην σείσας has puzzled scholars. Irwin proposes it is a leftover from an earlier version, in which the donkey had been a horse (2005, 161). Solon and Aesop are described as contemporaries, and even competitors, in the mythic tradition. Moreover, the tales of the Life of Aesop recount many fables given on specific occasions. Is it possible that this strange phrase is a sly reference to Solon's σεισάχθεια?

noble thought from the mind of a wolf. But how come you have put yesterday's game in your den? Come on and divide this up in the middle.") The wolf subsequently dissolves the laws. Leslie Kurke believes that Solon had this fable (or one like it) in mind while composing Fragment 36, arguing: "We might say that in the final image, Solon opts for the role of the outcast—the lone wolf—so as not to become the pleonectic lupine lawgiver in the fable."[178] I do not see, however, where to draw the distinction in the poem between the ignoble individual wolf in the fable, and the upstanding lone wolf of Kurke. All of the tyrannical wolves that we have seen, it must be mentioned, are lone wolves. The fable tradition clearly demonstrates the way in which the traditional traits of wolves can come to be associated with the traditional traits of tyrants. Whether or not an archaic audience would have explicitly connected a wolf to a tyrant, they would have associated a wolf with actions that befit one.

The association between wolves and tyrants is then solidified in the classical period. The tyrant in Euripides' *Helen* is named Lykus, which Irwin claims is a Euripidean innovation.[179] Irwin points out that Herodotus' story of Maeandrius (3.142-3), which closely mirrors Perry 348, is concluded with a note that Maeandrius' brother was named Lycaretus. [180] There is another echo of Perry 348 in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Socrates is teaching Strepsiades about the plasticity of the clouds, which form to mirror the character of whomever they see. Strepsiades asks, τί γὰρ ἢν ἅρπαγα τῶν δημοσίων κατίδωσι Σίμωνα, τί δρῶσιν; ("What about when they see that thief of the public goods Simon, what do they do?"). Socrates replies, ἀποφαίνουσαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ λύκοι ἐξαίφνης ἐγένοντο. ("Showing the nature of that one, they immediately become wolves") (350-1). Perhaps the most famous example of tyrannical wolves in classical literature is found in Plato's *Republic* (565e-566a):

[178] Kurke 2011, 153.
[179] Irwin 2005, 257 n. 164.
[180] Irwin 2005, 257.

> "Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος φόνου συγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτεινύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἆρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἴμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;"
> "Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη."
>
> "Isn't it also the same for the leader of a people who, taking over a particularly obedient mob, does not hold back from shedding the blood of his tribe but unjustly brings charges against a man—which is exactly what they usually do—and, bringing him before the court, murders him, and, doing away with a man's life, tastes of kindred blood with unholy tongue and mouth, and banishes, and kills, and hints at cancellations of debts and redistribution of land; isn't it also necessarily fated, I say, that after this such a man either be slain by his enemies or be tyrant and turn from a human being into a wolf?"
> "Quite necessarily," he said.[181]

Most of this description does not fit Solon, with the notable exception of ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν ("hints at cancellation of debts and redistribution of land"), which seems to allude to the impetus behind one of the possible rhetorical questions of the first two lines: that Solon promised such things only to not complete them.[182] Even if this passage is not an indirect accusation of Solon, it clearly demonstrates that the association between wolves and tyrants became crystallized in Greek thought.

Modern scholarship has grappled with how to account for these tyrannical connotations. Some chose to downplay these connotations, looking instead to other forms of symbolic significance held by the animal. Mainoldi, for instance, believes Solon simply chooses a wolf to contrast himself with the aristocratic lion as a form of solidarity with the common people.[183] I believe this motivation is too partisan for the implied author of this poem, who otherwise carefully balances his own ideological leanings—his enemies, after all, come from all sides

[181] The ritual surrounding the temple of Zeus Lykaion is described in Burkert (1983, 84f.). This translation is by Harold Bloom (1968, 244-5).
[182] Plutarch 14.1
[183] Mainoldi 1984, 101f., as reported in Irwin 2005, 247-9.

because of that impartiality. Miralles and Pòrtulas demonstrate the importance of the wolf as a symbol in iambic poetry, but do not mention Solon's use in Fragment 36.[184] It is very possible that Solon was playing with this symbolism in his own iambic poetry. But given the political significance of this poetry, that play would have implications Solon would have to take into account. The generic resonance is important, but cannot solely account for the use of the wolf here.

Given the connotations of this word, there is a possibility (assuming either the sympotic chain or the trial theory is correct)[185] that Solon is using the wolf as reappropriation of a term that had been used against him.[186] In this situation, Solon's opposition would have called him a wolf—taking advantage of all of the tyrannical connotations therein—to which Solon replied by reframing that image in a way that focalizes his own struggles, "a wolf, yes, but one surrounded by dogs." Whether or not this would be effective rhetoric, it would leave Solon open to later misinterpretation. This understanding of the simile ties the meaning of the poem inexorably to its original performance. The original performance would thus take primacy over later instances (such as its quotation in Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*).

Each of the theories catalogued thus far have rested on the basic assumption that Fragment 36 is an encomium, and that it was meant to give a good impression of Solon to an audience of his contemporaries. This assumption ignores the tension at the heart of the poem, in which Solon finds the need to ask a defiant rhetorical question in line 2, claims the Earth as his witness in the court of time in line 3, and devotes a whole line (21) to ridiculing a hypothetical

[184] Miralles and Pòrtulas 1983, 53-60.
[185] See notes 12 and 28.
[186] This would be in keeping with the interpretation of the rhetorical question of the first two lines as a reflection of the complaint of the δῆμος. In both instances, Solon would repeating the words of his opponents in his own reply.

man who had not checked the people.[187] Depending on how one interprets the penultimate line, it is the very people whom he has saved that are now forcing him to be on the defensive. It is no wonder that these enemies are being described in such loaded language.[188] Mülke, along these lines, writes: "the text gives a threat more so than a self-defense."[189] While it is certainly possible that Solon's heroic wolf was meant to have an element of menace, the idea of a threat puts too much emphasis on Solon's contemporaries as the audience of his poem. Solon is not trying to coerce Athenians into accepting his measures: those measures are all referred to in the past tense and have all been accomplished. Threats are meant to incite action; this poem is working to change perception. As the course of scholarly history has proven, this poem is a masterstroke of controlling one's own reception.[190]

That control of his own reception is part of what makes the use of the wolf so very strange. If the poem was only targeted at his contemporaries,[191] the use of a wolf would not be so risky. If he has really made the reforms he has claimed to, most of the audience has almost certainly made up their mind about whether or not he is a tyrant. Irwin, in her analysis, sees this simile as an instance of the sort of ambiguity that I find throughout the poem: "he creates for himself an unheroic stance that is simultaneously…*exceptionally* heroic."[192] But unlike Irwin, who posits that the tyrannical connotations allow Solon to claim the tyranny without having to claim it directly,[193] I do not believe that Solon intends to claim the tyranny subtly. If we take his poetry as a unified corpus and at its word, Solon had the chance to claim the tyranny outright and

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[187] Solon uses insults that evoke Homer (Iliad 23.483, 1.122).
[188] On the significance of dogs, especially female dogs, in Greek culture, see Franco (trans. Fox) 2014.
[189] Mülke 2002, 387.
[190] Our idea of Solon's accomplishments is, in large part, formed based on his own depiction of them. This point remains valid even if, as some suppose, Solon did not indeed compose these fragments. The implied author of these poems *is* Solon, whether or not the flesh-and-blood author is. In that sense, Solon has controlled his own reception.
[191] This would be a narratological situation in which the implied audience is the same as the narrative audience.
[192] Irwin 2005, 247. The emphasis is hers.
[193] Ibid, 259.

rejected it.[194] To the contrary, Solon might be showing the extent to which he has been misperceived. From the outset, the poem is an effort to set the record straight about what he accomplished. But running parallel to this narrative of success is an alternative narrative, one of resistance, a narrative of means achieved but ends failed. Perhaps, if Aristotle and Plutarch's narratives are correct, he even lived to see his once-successful measures fail.[195] With the wolf simile, the tension between the two rhetorical programs of the fragment reaches a tipping point, and the alternative narrative of opposition breaks out explicitly into the poem. Perhaps the significance of the wolf is that just as the success story has been narratologically superseded at the end of the poem, so too has the careful program of image crafting.[196]

The wolf does not symbolize that Solon is a tyrant, but instead that he has been perceived as one. The necessity of checking the δῆμος has not prevented the δῆμος from perceiving that action as tyrannical. And why should they? It *is* what tyrants do. The great irony of this reading is that a fragment which has done so much to solidify the positive nature of Solon's later reception subtly shows the struggles he had with the reception of his peers. He could not convince the people that he was benefitting them by restraining them, and he could not convince them that he was not a tyrant. So, like the wolf, he is hunted.

[194] N.B. Fragments 33 and 34.
[195] Plutarch 30f. Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 14.
[196] Right after Plutarch quotes from this fragment, he mentions perhaps the biggest stain on Solon's legacy—the rumor that Solon had enriched his friends by alerting them ahead of the σεισάχθεια (15).

CHAPTER THREE

THE ὍΡΟΣ (FRAGMENT 37)

δήμωι μὲν εἰ χρὴ διαφάδην ὀνειδίσαι,
ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὔποτ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἄν
εὖδοντες εἶδον…
ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες,
αἰνοῖεν ἄν με καὶ φίλον ποιοίατο.
…
οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ᾽ ἐπαύσατο,
πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα.
ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίωι
ὅρος κατέστην.

As for the people, if, on the one hand, it is necessary to scold them openly,
they now have things they would not have seen
before their eyes while sleeping…
those, on the other hand, who are greater and stronger in force,
should praise me and make me a friend.
…
he would not have checked the people, nor stopped
before stirring up the milk he seized the cream.
But I, as if between two armies,
established myself as a marker stone.[197]

Throughout this thesis, I have examined strange metaphors that Solon uses to describe himself and his circumstances. In previous chapters, I have maintained a consistent approach. First, I attempted to explore the argumentative schema of the fragments in which the images that I am examining appear. Second, I did close readings of the images in order to determine what they reveal about how the implied author views the speaker of the poems (what we might call Solon's poetic self-perception), and how the authorial audience is supposed to interpret those images.

[197] Text is from Noussia-Fantuzzi's edition (2010, 117). All translations, including from German, are my own unless otherwise noted.

Fragment 37 presents distinct challenges to this methodology. It is the most discontinuous of the three fragments that I am examining in this thesis. It is also the richest in figurative imagery—imagery that scholars have found quite perplexing. As a result of its discontinuity and its use of unusual imagery, Fragment 37 is the least well-understood fragment of those that I am dealing with. Sources, such as Anhalt and Irwin, that thoroughly cover Fragments 5 and 36 have fewer comments on 37. [198] In some anthologies that collect Solon's poetry, such as Campbell and Gerber, it is not included at all.[199] Those scholars, such as Mülke and Noussia-Fantuzzi, who thoroughly analyze the fragment often admit their uncertainty about various aspects of the nine-line fragment.[200]

With these limitations in mind, I am modifying my approach for this chapter. Instead of analyzing the structure of this fragment step-by-step, I demonstrate the ways in which the discontinuous nature of the poem as we have it presents interpretive problems. Next, I examine the use of figurative language throughout the fragment, and the obscuring effects that this language has. Finally, as in the previous chapters, this examination culminates in a close reading of the final image: ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐν μεταιχμίωι / ὅρος κατέστην ("But I, as if between two armies, / established myself as a marker stone.").

Fragmentary Challenges

Unlike Fragments 5 and 36, which both may or may not be complete, it is clear that we do not have Fragment 37 in its entirety. There are incomplete lines at 3 and 9, as well as a lacuna between lines 5 and 6. The discontinuous nature of this poem makes an analysis of its rhetorical

[198] Irwin includes it only as a point of comparison for various other passages and points (2006, 87, 133, 236, 224, 245). Anhalt has a brief discussion (1993, 121-2).
[199] Campbell 1982. Gerber 1970.
[200] Mülke 2002. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010. Mülke's lament, "The interpretation of this image, in terms of its content, is difficult," is typical (2002, 406).

structure extremely difficult. Like Fragment 5, it is clear that Fragment 37 has elements of antithesis.[201] The opening two thoughts are related with a μέν… δέ syntax, in which the δῆμος is put in opposition to a group that is described with a pronominal phrase rather than being named.[202] It is clear, moreover, that we are missing some text in line 3, which is not a full iambic line. The first three lines, which are made up of the protasis of a conditional and a relative clause, seem to form an incomplete thought. As a result, there is a certain amount of filling in the blanks that must take place in order to make sense of these lines. My translation (see above) makes the following assumptions in its translation of lines 1 and 2: the speaker is scolding the δῆμος [because they have complained] when in reality [he made sure] that they now have things they would not have seen in their dreams.[203] This type of filling in the blanks is different from that which is spurred on by complete lines that are left ambiguous (such as 36.1-2), and thus must have puzzled even the original authorial audience.[204]

With this text missing, it is impossible to judge the calibration of the ideological balance. Unlike Fragment 5, this fragment is essentially negative in tone, perhaps in keeping with the demands of the iambic genre. Aristotle portrays this poem as essentially balanced in his introduction (ὀνειδίζων πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον αὐτῶν μεμψιμοιρίας ἀμφοτέρων "reproaching both for their later complaints" (12.4)). In the poem as we have it, the δῆμος is scolded, while the powerful are urged to praise Solon more than they have been doing. We do not have enough of the poem, however, to determine whether or not those two complaints are equivalent in scope: perhaps the missing parts of the poem would have softened the tone toward the δῆμος, or

[201] Irwin mentions the impartial stance of Fragment 37 as basis for balanced reading of Fragment 5 (2005, 236).
[202] Here the phrase is: ὅσοι δὲ μείζους καὶ βίαν ἀμείνονες ("those who are greater and stronger in force"). Solon uses this same effect in Fragment 5, line 3: οἳ δ᾽εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγητοί ("those who had power and were admired for their wealth") (for discussion of this line see Chapter 1).
[203] See below for a discussion of the rendering of this Greek phrase as an English idiom.
[204] Iser 1978, 182-203.

introduced other elements that would change our picture of the poem. Whether or not these lines signal an aristocratic "target audience"[205] or the openness (διαφάδην) with the δῆμος signals a pro-democratic "egalitarianism and straightforwardness"[206] is up for debate. As a modern audience (or even the ancient audience of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*), the problems inherent in the transmission of the text, rather than the text itself, prevent us from being able to fully inhabit the authorial audience in its original form.

These problems of transmission reappear even more evidently in the lacuna between lines 5 and 6. In Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*, the text from which we can gather the largest representation of this fragment, the lacuna is spanned with an interjection—εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλος, φησί, ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς ἔτυχεν… ("For if someone else, he says, had won this position…") (12.4-5)[207]—which seems to be a paraphrase of the part of the poem that has been left out. We cannot tell, however, just how much poetry we are missing. [208] It is even possible that the second section is from a separate poem that is similar in tone and meter, but this would be a departure from Aristotle's otherwise consistent use of πάλιν to introduce new poems.[209] Why Aristotle would cut this poem short after quoting 27 lines of Fragment 36 is one of many questions about this fragment that remains unanswered. Perhaps the lacuna was already present for Aristotle, and he was making his own best effort at supposing what would have filled it.[210] All we can say for certain is that we are missing some text here.

The final, and perhaps most pernicious, fragmentary aspect of this text is the shortened line 9. Like the other two poems that I am analyzing, Fragment 37 ends on an evocative image

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[205] Mülke 2002, 399.
[206] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 490.
[207] There have been attempts to versify this line, based on the assumption that it is simply a close prose paraphrase of the original. These efforts are hampered by the use of τιμή to mean an "office" or "position," which is anachronistic to Solon (Mülke 2002, 403).
[208] "The extent of the lacuna is hardly determinable." (Mülke 2002, 401).
[209] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 487.
[210] Rhodes 1993, 24.

that reinforces Solon's defensiveness: is it possible that this is a purposeful result of Aristotelian editing?[211] Despite the fact that the fragment ends on an incomplete iambic line, I have not been able to find any comment on that fact, let alone speculation about how a completed line (and perhaps even subsequent lines) might affect our understanding of the poem. This silence is particular striking, given the common focus on the strangeness of this image.[212] The discontinuity of Fragment 37 allows us to make only provisional interpretations.

Strange Figurative Language

In addition to the exceptionally fragmentary nature of this poem, the heavy use of figurative language makes this poem difficult for modern audiences to interpret. These difficulties spring from the inability of modern audiences to inhabit the authorial audience of the poem. More so than literal language, symbolic images hold different meanings and weight across cultures and time. The use of such imagery demands that an audience that is culturally or temporally distant identify those differences and account for them in their understanding of the poem. It is this very demand that creates the need for scholarship in the first place: if audiences naturally had the necessary knowledge to be able to read and fully understand a work such as this, scholarly productions such as commentaries and theses would be unnecessary.

Luckily for scholars, these interpretive problems are present to varying degrees in the three images of Fragment 37. The first image—the δῆμος sleeping in lines 2-3—seems relatively straightforward, but that straightforwardness may be deceptive. The second image—the milk and the fat in line 7—has been the subject of much scholarly speculation because it seems to run counter to our modern understanding of the behavior of dairy products. The culminating final

[211] While it is true that the other two fragments that Aristotle quotes in the section do not end in evocative images, they also do not (as we have them) contain images on which the fragment could have ended.
[212] For more on the significance of the strangeness of this image, see below.

image—Solon comparing himself to a ὅρος[213] in line 9—is strange both on its own and in comparison to Solon's actions in Fragment 36.

The image of lines 2-3 (ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν οὔποτ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἄν / εὖδοντες εἶδον "they now have things they would not have seen/ before their eyes while sleeping") has generally been thought of as describing a dream. This language fits within a larger Greek literary motif of describing dreams as appearing before one's eyes.[214] The use here of a dream as a point of comparison is very close to the English idiom "not in your wildest dreams," meaning almost impossibly good, and has generally been interpreted as sharing this meaning.[215] It seems that Solon is saying that what he has afforded the δῆμος is better than what they could have hoped for, but this rests on two assumptions. First, we are assuming, as outlined above, that Solon is describing what he has done for the δῆμος; second, we are assuming that, in keeping with that context, the sense of the Greek idiom aligns with the English. The fact that this benevolent picture of Solon fits with the one he paints in Fragment 5 and, in turn, with our idea of him as a historical figure encourages the adaptation of this interpretation.

There is also the possibility, however, that the participle εὖδοντες is causal rather than temporal. This would yield a translation: "they now have things they never would have seen with their eyes / because they are sleeping," which avoids the messy possibility of an English idiom intruding into Greek. That having been said, the meaning of this new phrase is not especially lucid. Is Solon, as Noussia-Fantuzzi proposes, highlighting the shortsightedness of the δῆμος?[216] Is he equating sleeping with ignorance, and thus arguing that he gave them benefits that they did

[213] Because the unclear nature of the ὅρος is an essential element of this chapter, I will be leaving the term ὅρος untranslated throughout in order to avoid committing to any one interpretation of its significance.
[214] See Dodds 1951, 102-134.
[215] E.g. de Ste. Croix translates it "although they now had 'more than they could have dreamt of.'" (2004, 126).
[216] Noussia-Fantuzzi's explanation for the appearance of ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, "since the eyes are closed during sleep, Solon's stress on them may imply some sort of caricature of the shortsightedness of the *demos*" is unnecessary in light of this trope (2010, 491).

not even know to ask for? Or is he saying that they cannot see the benefits that he has indeed given them? We are left to choose between a meaning that may be too convenient and a meaning that is unclear at best. Even this, the least controversial image of the fragment, presents a serious interpretive dilemma.

The second image of the poem, which completes the thought paraphrased in the lacuna, is much more perplexing.[217] Syntactically, this image is not straightforward: to take the word order as given, with ἀνταράξας taking πῖαρ as its object and ἐξεῖλεν taking γάλα, renders what seems to be nonsense: "stirring the fat, he took away the milk." The counterintuitive pairing of the verbs and nouns forces the audience to consciously decide on how they want to construe the thought.

There are three major proposals for how this line is best arranged. First, Allinson proposes to take πῖαρ as an adjective modifying γάλα and both as the object of ἐξεῖλεν: "stirring, he took away the fatty milk."[218] This leaves ἀνταράξας with only an implied object (probably the δῆμος, mentioned in the previous line).[219] This interpretation is possible, but πῖαρ is very rarely, if ever, used as an adjective.[220] The unlikelihood of such a use of πῖαρ, along with the dangling ἀνταράξας, means that this reading creates as many problems as it solves. Second, Linforth, West, and Miller read ἐξεῖλεν as governing πῖαρ and γάλα (both as nouns) in a double accusative: "stirring, he took the fat from the milk."[221] This double accusative construction is otherwise only used with a middle form of ἐξαιρέω or with a person and a noun of life or the

[217] Mülke wrote in 2002 that no *opinio communis* had formed (2002, 404). The intervening years have not provided us with one.
[218] Allinson 1880, 458.
[219] This would result in two different levels of imagery: one mixed metaphor—stirring the δῆμος—and an unmixed metaphor working within the same set of imagery—he took away the fatty milk.
[220] Allinson's article is, in fact, an effort to prove that πῖαρ can be an adjective at all (Allinson 1880).
[221] Linforth 1919, 193. West 1974, 182. Miller 1996, 75.

soul such as θυμός, ψυχή, or φρήν.[222] In addition, the use of ἀνταράξας is still mostly unaccounted for. Finally, Mülke and Noussia-Fantuzzi, along with the unattributed translation in the appendix of Blok and Lardinois, take πῖαρ as the object of ἀνταράξας and γάλα as the object of ἐξεῖλεν: "stirring the milk, he took away the fat." Suffice it to say, the syntax of this line is controversial.

Our understanding of what Solon is trying to communicate with this metaphor is further hampered by our basic ignorance of what Noussia-Fantuzzi delightfully calls "the lactic realities" of dairy production and use in archaic Greece. [223] The translation of the participle ἀνταράξας thus is a point of controversy. This image is almost certainly not evoking the churning needed in the process of butter production,[224] since, as Mülke observes, butter was either unknown to archaic Greeks or thought of as barbaric.[225] Noussia-Fantuzzi (along with Blok and Lardinois) takes this verb to mean "stirring."[226] Mülke claims that κυκάω was the proper verb for "to stir."[227] He thus dismisses the common translation of ἀνταράξας as stirring, which he believes is derived from the anachronistic idea of an "agitator."[228] In his translation, he uses the German "wühlend" which can have the sense of "stirring up" but here takes more of the sense of "ransacking."[229] In defense of her translation, Noussia-Fantuzzi points to Hippocrates' later use of the verb ταράσσειν to describe the stirring necessary in the cheese-making process as a possible parallel

[222] Mülke 2002, 404. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 493.
[223] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 494.
[224] Linforth 1919, 193. To Linforth's credit, he does discuss the absence of any mention of Greek production of butter. He settles on butter by stating that Solon is either making an obscure, learned metaphor, or that butter production took place in Attica but was never mentioned in the literature. Ober also mistakenly translates πῖαρ as butter (1995, 104).
[225] Mülke 2002, 405.
[226] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 493-4.
[227] Mülke 2002, 406.
[228] Mülke 2002, 406.
[229] Mülke 2002, 71.

to this use of ἀνταράξας.[230] Establishing that the Greeks believed such stirring actually led to separation of milk's components,[231] Noussia suggests that Solon would stir the milk until the richest part was separated to be taken away.[232]

Contemporary audiences may have faced this same confusion. The difficulty of keeping milk from spoiling before refrigeration would have meant that any Greeks without their own dairy-producing livestock would have rarely encountered the drink, if ever. Milk would not have been a drink of the symposium. Cheese-making is mentioned as early as the *Odyssey*, being made by the antinomian Cyclops.[233] This is a decidedly rustic metaphor, a fact that would have been especially striking if the poem was delivered, as Noussia-Fantuzzi supposes, to a sympotic audience.[234]

Both the syntax and sense in the vehicle of this metaphor leave the modern reader in a state of ἀπορία. Any attempt to determine the tenor is thus necessarily preliminary. Fat is commonly associated with wealth in Greek literature, from as early as the *Iliad*.[235] This image has thus been associated with Solon's economic reforms, specifically with regards to the way that he has treated wealth or the wealthy. Even within this understanding, scholars have formed opinions at polar opposites. Mülke, reading "the wealthy" as the tenor for πῖαρ, sees this as catering to a purely aristocratic audience. In this reading, the image of the milk as an argument for why he should be the object of aristocratic praise seems to be a parallel to the use of the "dream" image to explain why the δῆμος should be scolded.[236] Noussia-Fantuzzi, on the other hand, reading "wealth" as the tenor, sees this as a strongly democratic statement: Solon

[230] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 493-4. She admits, however, that this is not a particularly vigorous stirring. She does not comment on Mülke's discussion of this point.
[231] Allinson 1880, 458.
[232] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 494.
[233] Odyssey 9.219f.
[234] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 489. Irwin 2005.
[235] N.B. The formula πίονι δήμῳ (16.437, 16.514, 16.673, 16.683, 20.385).
[236] Mülke 2002, 406.

prevented wealth from being taken from the people (who would otherwise be "like low-fat milk").[237] This is the only line from Fragment 37 quoted in Plutarch, who brings it up in the context of a comparison to the wide-sweeping reforms of Lycurgus, noting that unlike Lycurgus Solon did not effect the redistribution of wealth or the disruption of the class system.[238] We thus have an image which can be seen as ideologically aristocratic, democratic, or resolutely in the middle. At best, we can say that agitation and seizure are looked upon negatively in this poem. The rest is speculation.

The ὅρος

The final image of Fragment 37 presents a two-fold problem. First, within the context of the individual fragment, the choice of the term ὅρος is difficult to grasp. In fact, it is strange enough to have been the target of multiple attempts at emendation.[239] Second, on the level of Solon's oeuvre and of the relationship between the historical figure of Solon to the implied author of this poem, the speaker of this fragment is comparing himself to the very object which was the target of his reforms in Fragment 36. Rhodes' statement on the final image, although written over 20 years ago, still rings true: "I am not sure that the explanation of this sentence has yet been found."[240]

Setting aside the historical significance of the ὅροι for the time being, their significance within Solon's oeuvre is its own puzzle. In Fragment 36, he frames his reforms in terms of annulling, uprooting, or destroying the ὅροι (depending on how one wants to translate ἀνεῖλον)

[237] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 494.
[238] Plutarch *Life of Solon*, 16.
[239] The suggestion of δορός has been roundly dismissed (Anhalt 1993, 121), as has Stinton's suggestion of οὖρος (1976, 161f).
[240] Rhodes 1993, 179.

(36.6). In Fragment 37, the speaker takes the exactly antithetical action: he establishes himself as a ὅρος.[241] It is unclear what relationship these two images have, if any at all.

We do not, and cannot, know the chronological relationship between these two poems.[242] Lacking this knowledge, we can nevertheless speculate about the effects that each of the three possibilities of chronological relationship (Fragment 37 was presented after Fragment 36, Fragment 37 was presented before Fragment 36, the two poems were presented simultaneously)[243] would have on our understanding of what the implied author was hoping to achieve with the image of the ὅρος. Because an implicit goal of Solonian scholarship is connecting the claims of implied author of the poems to the actions of the historical lawgiver, studies have frequently been concerned with just this sort of speculation.

The issue of relative chronology is essentially one of intertextuality. The possibility that Fragment 37 preceded Fragment 36 has, as far as I can tell, not been examined. It would be strange indeed for Solon to first establish himself as a ὅρος only to later brag about nullifying the ὅροι. This juxtaposition would seem to indicate that these two poems were not meant to allude to each other. Solon's poetic productions, in this understanding, are to be taken as wholly individual.

The most consistently proposed relationship between these two poems is that Fragment 36 preceded Fragment 37 in separate poems. This relationship is commonly understood as one of replacement: Solon has nullified the previously extant ὅροι in Fragment 36 and then replaced them with himself (or, metonymically, his own laws)[244] in Fragment 37.[245] Stehle even goes so

[241] Depending on how one understands the syntax, he could be establishing himself "like a ὅρος."
[242] Mülke 2002, 398.
[243] A final option, that one of the poem is genuine to Solon and one is not (or that neither are), is of course *possible* but, in this case, a speculative dead end.
[244] Mülke 2002, 409.
[245] Lewis makes this argument most explicitly: "he tore up the stones only to become one himself" (2006, 113).

far as to argue that in replacing the ὅροι, he has inversely shown his own irreplaceability: "Solon's image therefore denies the finality of his action and acknowledges that, while he may vigilantly act as a boundary-stone, no boundary-stone can replace him."[246] The possibility that Fragment 36 and Fragment 37 are both part of the same poem has also been considered.[247]As was the idea that Fragment 37 was an "alternate ending" to Fragment 36.[248] If these two fragments do come from the same poem, the relationship between the two images would be a stronger version of the same relationship that they would have if Fragment 36 was a separate, earlier poem. Solon would be making that replacement over the span of one poem.

In both of these relationships, there is an implicit presumption that the audience of Solon's poems would not only be familiar with the political realities of Solon's world but also to the thematic imagery of his poetry. This interpretation of the two images emphasizes the importance of intertextuality within the corpus of Solon's poetry to understanding what he is communicating in his images. If this is the case, any number of similar revelations are being withheld from us by the fragmentary nature of the Solonian corpus.

Throughout this thesis, I have been attempting to identify and describe the authorial audience of these poems, the hypothetical audience which has the necessary knowledge, beliefs, and cultural understanding to read the poem as the implied author intended.[249] In fact, these chapters are ordered such that our ability to inhabit the authorial audience of the poems decreases from each fragment to the next. In the first chapter, I examined Fragment 5, which concludes with the couplet ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι, / νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἴασ' οὐδετέρους ("I stood holding my strong shield about both parties, / allowing neither to gain

[246] Stehle 2006, 98.
[247] Linforth 1919, 192.
[248] Stehle 2006, 97.
[249] Note that this does not necessarily entail that the authorial audience is omniscient.

victory unjustly").[250] We do not need to have specific knowledge about the archaic Greek conception of the shield in order to understand (or, perhaps, see the paradox in) Solon's image: the shield signifies protection from foes and from harm, just as all shields do wherever there are shields.[251] In the second chapter, I looked at Fragment 36, which concludes with the image of Solon as a wolf surrounded by dogs. This is a much more culturally weighted image than that of Fragment 5: the wolf carries distinct connotations in Greek thought, which do not precisely align with our modern conception of the wolf. In order to understand the significance of the use of the wolf, I was thus forced to attempt to grasp that different symbolic weight—to make an effort to inhabit an authorial audience with more distance from my own personal knowledge, beliefs, and cultural understanding. It was, however, an effort that was possible to make. However distinct the Greek conception of wolves may be from my own, there is evidence of that conception in other texts, and—what is important, but perhaps too obvious to even state—I know what a wolf is.

Our basic lack of knowledge of what Solon is referring to with the image of the ὅρος in the final line of Fragment 37 puts the effort to inhabit the authorial audience of the poem into serious trouble. Unlike the images focused on in my previous chapters, the ὅρος is a culturally, even temporally, specific object. The basic identity of the ὅρος (in both Fragment 36 and Fragment 37) is the subject of much scholarly debate. We have no archaeological record of a ὅρος from Solon's time. We know that some ὅροι served as boundary markers,[252] while some served as mortgage markers.[253] Aristotle clearly thought that the ὅροι of Solon's time were

[250] Miller 1996, 67.
[251] This is not to say that all shields are created equal. Solon's use of the term σάκος has its own epic, cultural connotations, which enhance (but don't fundamentally alter) our modern reading (for a convincing argument that the difference between a σάκος and a ἀσπίς in Homeric poetry is that a σάκος is impenetrable when used by a Greek, see Bershadsky 2010).
[252] Harris 1997. Traill 1986.
[253] Finley 1952. Fine 1951. Millett 1991.

mortgage markers, or at least markers that demonstrated indebtedness of some sort.[254] More recently, scholars have proposed that the ὅροι Solon refers to in Fragment 36 may have marked off sacred territory,[255] or perhaps established Herodotus' famous distinction of the people of the plains, coasts, and hills.[256] Lacking any corroborating evidence, either literary or chronological, we simply cannot claim with confidence to know precisely what Solon means when he uses the word ὅρος in line 9 of Fragment 37, nor what associations he might have expected his audience to make.

As a modern flesh-and-blood audience attempting to inhabit the authorial audience, the image of the ὅρος thus puts us in a state of ἀπορία. But this ἀπορία is not complete. While we do not know the specifics of what a ὅρος was, we do know that it was a marker of some sort. It thus had an effect in the world outside of the text in a way that is more purely symbolic than shields and wolves. In the flesh-and-blood world, a shield does not simply symbolize protection, it actually protects its carrier from harm. Much in the same sense, a wolf does not primarily exist as a symbol of (in the case of the ancient Greeks) cunning, cooperation, and tyranny, but rather as an animal which, through a complex process of observation and attribution,[257] is given those symbolic attributes. Shields and wolves can exist in a pre-linguistic world; not only would they exist, they would (and at some point probably *did*) serve the same function (or, in the case of the wolf, take the same actions). This is not the case, however, for ὅροι. A ὅρος—whether it be a

[254] The phrase τῆς ἀποκοπῆς τῶν χρεῶν (the removal of debts) in the contextualization of Fragment 36 (*Athenian Constitution* 12.4) can only be applied to Solon's claim ὅρους ἀνεῖλον (36.6). de Ste. Croix agrees, but with certain caveats (2004, 115, 121).
[255] Lewis 2006, 113.
[256] Ober 2006, 453-4.
[257] See Buxton 1968.

boundary marker, a mortgage marker, or a marker of any other sort—is no longer a ὅρος without language.[258]

Unlike a wall, a ὅρος does not physically hinder an action from being taken. Instead, a ὅρος thus takes the function of a performative speech act: by making a statement (its identity), it is performing an action (marking a space).[259] A ὅρος can thus only successfully stakes its claim when it meets the standards of a successful performative speech act: 1) if there is a conventional procedure in place in which a performative statement can be made, 2) if the speaker is appropriate, and 3) if the convention is followed correctly by the speaker.[260] In terms of ὅροι, these standards demand that the meaning of the ὅροι be 1) known and respected, 2) established in an appropriate place, and 3) marked correctly. Ober makes a similar observation that ὅροι are making truth claims and thus must have both "accuracy" and "coherence."[261] The accuracy of the truth claims made by ὅροι is, as Ober observes, affected by whether or not a ὅρος is moved around in space. If the ὅρος created to signify the border of the *agora* is moved to some other location, [262] it is no longer making a valid claim and thus no longer serving its purpose as a marker. That is unless, of course, the border of the *agora* was meant to be moved. The coherence of the truth claim depends, moreover, on the maintained knowledge of what the *agora* was. If the meaning of the *agora* is forgotten or ignored, the ὅρος created to signify its border is no longer making a true statement.

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[258] This is not to say that literacy is necessary for a ὅρος to function. Even if the ὅρος itself did not bear the markings of language, language is still needed to communicate its function—a ὅρος established by an individual without the ability to communicate to other individuals what it had signified would be an ineffective device.
[259] Austin 1965, 6. This "marking" holds even for mortgage ὅροι: rather than marking the boundaries of a space, they are marking a space as under a mortgage.
[260] This is an abbreviated version of Austin's standards for a performative speech act (1965, 14-5).
[261] Ober 1995, 92.
[262] Ober uses this as his example (1995, 93). It is a particularly fitting example because such a stone has been discovered in Athens, and placed limits of access that we know from references in Athenian oratory.

Taking this idea a step further, even if the knowledge of what the ὅρος marks is not lost, a ὅρος can still lose its coherence. Ober notes that the social distinctions made by a ὅρος are "contingent on a knowledge of changing and historically specific social codes."[263] The ὅρος marking the *agora*, even if it is in its original position and we know what the *agora* is, no longer maintains the prohibitive power it once held. As millennia have passed and the culture has changed, we no longer feel bound to comply with the rules concerning who was permitted or not permitted to enter that space. In that same sense, time or human acts can nullify the border marker of a *deme* that no longer exists or nullify mortgage marker for a mortgage that no longer holds, even if the ὅρος is unmoved and the previous status is still held in memory.

As Fragment 36 demonstrates, Solon understood, at some point in his poetic career, that ὅροι were vulnerable to this sort of negation and took advantage of it for his own purposes. In a later article, Ober claims, "Modern historians do not know what a pre-Solonian *horos* looked like precisely because Solon's act was successful."[264] If Solon was composing this poem for a contemporary audience, that act of negation would not have been nearly so complete.[265] Even if pulled out of the earth, the ὅροι would not have been pulled from the audience's memory. Solon's comparison of himself to a ὅρος would have thus been evocative in ways that we cannot hope to understand. We can understand, however, that this is clearly a rhetorical power play that attempts to reassign truth claims to the speaker of the poems.

Many scholars, assuming that the image is referring to a boundary stone, have remarked on the strangeness of this choice. Ober calls establishing a ὅρος between two armies

[263] Ober 1995, 96.
[264] Ober 2006, 545.
[265] Even if Fragment 37 chronologically preceded Fragment 36, it did not precede the reforms. A contemporary audience, lacking intertextual reference, would have still had the extratextual reference of the actions taken toward the ὅροι in the reforms themselves.

"nonsensical."[266] Martin observes that it is strange to put a marker in what he translates as "no man's land," since that is inherently supposed to be the middle.[267] Linforth says bluntly, "there was no such thing as a barrier set up between two armies to prevent them from joining conflict."[268] In fact, the placement of such a stone ἐν μεταιχμίωι ("in the space between the spearmen" or "in no-man's land") is so strange that scholars consider its strangeness must have its own significance. Anhalt and Mülke believe the unusual position of the ὅρος is meant as a reflection of Solon's unusual political position.[269] But a ὅρος between two armies would not just be unusual, it would be ineffective. The truth claim of a ὅρος between the spearfighters is almost certainly about to be ignored, boundaries are, after all, what armies tend to fight over.[270] In the situation being described, it is not the ὅρος that will ultimately determine where the boundary is, but the armies.

It is worth noting that where the other images I have examined have been linked to Solon's actions (5.5-6) or his circumstances (36.27), this image is a direct metaphor for the speaker himself.[271] As with all of the fragments I am examining in this thesis, Aristotle includes this poem among the list in which Solon defensively testifies for himself in his own words.[272] Perhaps Solon's replacement of the ὅροι is not a reflection of his absorption of their power, but rather that he himself has replaced them as the point of conflict within the city.

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[266] Ober 1995, 105. The fact that a ὅρος might become the point of conflict between two armies is not nonsensical—borders are often the sources of disputes. What is nonsensical is the placement of a ὅρος between two armies when the armies are already there, which seems to be what Solon is doing.
[267] Martin 2006, 167.
[268] Linforth 1919, 194.
[269] Anhalt 1993, 121. Mülke 2002, 408.
[270] Stehle 2006, 97.
[271] There is a certain level of syntactic ambiguity in the last two lines, specifically concerning the reach of ὥσπερ. It is possible that ὥσπερ governs both ἐν μεταιχμίωι and ὅρος, which, in its meaning "like a marker in the space between the spearmen" would signal that such a marker is a common phenomenon. The other reading, in which ὅρος is a proleptic appositive, would introduce two separate comparisons into the line (a metaphor comparing Solon to a ὅρος, and a simile comparing his position to "the space between the spearmen"). Current scholarship prefers the proleptic predicate (Mülke 2002, 409; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 495). Given the word order, I am inclined to agree.
[272] Aristotle *Athenian Constitution*, 12.

By calling himself a ὅρος, Solon has become something whose significance is not only totally human-driven, but which has been determined by Solon himself. And yet, paradoxically, that determination was purely negative: if we can take Fragment 36 as a guide, it was an act of nullification. If Solon is replacing the pulled up ὅροι with himself, and in doing so placing the power that they used to hold in himself,[273] thus making himself irreplaceable,[274] there is the unignorable irony that Solon himself had already shown just how easy to nullify the ὅροι are, just how little power they had, and just how replaceable they were.

If we understand the ὅρος in 37 as a boundary stone, we cannot understand it as an effective one. The idea that this image might compare the speaker to something ineffective goes against the idea implicit in most scholarship that this poem is an essentially rhetorical effort made by a historical politician. If we assume that Solon himself is one-hundred percent identifiable with the speaker, this type of argumentation makes little sense: Solon would not compare himself to something ineffective. But if we look at this poem as a poem rather than a rhetorical address, the implied author can be afforded a bit of separation from the speaker. If we allow the implied author to step back from the proud speaker, we can imagine that he might be reflecting on the ephemerality of his own accomplishments.

[273] Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, 489.
[274] Stehle 2006, 98.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have applied the framework of the rhetorical theory of narrative to examine Solon's self-representation in three fragments of his political poetry. I have given special attention to the images on which these fragments conclude. In keeping with the rhetorical theory's idea of the narrative triangle, I have incorporated analysis of the authorship, audience, and text of this poetry. Throughout this examination, I have done my best to account for and identify a wide variety of possible interpretations. Rather than being discouraged by this multiplicity, I have embraced it as evidence of the richness of these poems.

On the level of authorship, the possibility of separation between the implied author and the speaker yields rich multivalent meaning for these images. Within these images, the speaker is engaged in shaping his legacy, while the implied author is reflecting on it. When Solon holds a great shield over both sides in Fragment 5, he casts himself as a protector of both sides, describes his defensive posture against the beneficiaries that have become his enemies, and shows the basic paradox of his position. When he calls himself a wolf surrounded by dogs in Fragment 36, we see both an embittered depiction of himself as an embattled lone figure and a reflection of the ways in which that figure has come to be misunderstood. Finally, when he calls himself a ὅρος among the spear fighters in Fragment 37, he both creates a symbol for his role as a replacement of the old order with the new and acknowledges the impermanence of just that sort of action. Within each image, Solon is not trying to convince his audience to take specific action but rather to both characterize the action that he has taken and reflect on it.

Throughout this thesis I have used the name Solon in substitution of what might more properly be called the implied author. I made this choice because whether or not Solon was the flesh-and-blood author, it is clear that Solon was intended to be thought of as the author of this text. This clarification is not meant to imply that Solon wasn't the flesh-and-blood author, but rather that we do not need to have a confident answer to that question in order to be able to evaluate this poetry as Solon's. In addition, my assertion that this poetry may be critical of Solon, or at least not a pure celebration of his accomplishments, need not be taken as casting doubts on the idea that the poetry could have been written by the historical Solon. There is no reason to believe that Solon was not capable of the sort of reflection that my readings elucidate. This sort of clear-eyed contemplation of one's own life would have been appropriate for a man who is reported to have said, γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος ("I grow old, always learning many things.").[275]

On the point of audience, the identity of Solon's contemporary audience has been the topic of much speculation. The idea that in order to understand the rhetorical program of these poems we must understand the audience they were trying to convince is a sound one, but this audience need not be limited to Solon's direct contemporaries. These fragments are not artifacts; they are living documents. The rhetorical goal of the poems remains the same whether it is addressed to Athenians in the 6th century BCE or an Athenian of the 21st century CE: to define Solon's legacy. What does change, however, is the ability of those flesh-and-blood audience members to inhabit the authorial audience. As such, my examination of audience has attempted to identify the places in which the presentation of information (or withholding thereof) in these fragments would and has affected later audiences. I have also, at times, identified instances in which we, as a later audience, do not have enough information to be able to inhabit the authorial

[275] Fragment 18

audience. This is not me simply throwing up my hands in *aporia*. Rather, it is my hope that by identifying gaps in our understanding and developing a vocabulary for why they exist, we can come nearer to the Socratic wisdom of knowing what we do not know.

Alongside of the diachronic split of authorial audiences, there is also a synchronic split. Solon seems to be addressing an elite authorial audience at the same time as he addresses a democratic one. Throughout this thesis I have shown instances in which Solon's words could be understood favorably by the elite and the democratic, sometimes in ways that are entirely contradictory. Perhaps this is, as Irwin argues, tyrannical speech—deceitful at its core.[276] There is also the possibility, however, that this delicate balancing act is a necessary aspect of creating poetry that allows a genuinely unaffiliated figure to maintain appeal across various factions and times.

It is no coincidence, however, that in each of the fragments that I examine, Solon ends with an image of himself surrounded by foes. As Solon seems to have found out, there is danger in this type of ambiguity. Poetry that can be understood by opposing ideologies as saying what they want to hear can also be understood by both as saying the opposite. Solon utilizes this same ambiguity to describe how his rhetorical efforts were unsuccessful: these fragments use ambiguity to be encomiastic and apologetic simultaneously. It is ironic that these poems, which shape Solon's reputation in future reception, also show the ways in which Solon lost control of his reputation among his peers.

Because Solon's poetry has not survived to us within its own direct tradition, Solon's act of controlling his own reception has been mediated by those authors in which we find his poetry preserved. Solon's poetry shaped the accounts in which it appeared, but those accounts also determined what poetry we have access to and in what context we understand it. These sources

[276] Irwin 2005, 205-61.

are thus vital in any attempt understanding the complex relationship of Solon's poetry has with its own reception. In this sense, my use of Aristotle and Plutarch should not be considered to be as sources of historical fact. Instead, I have looked to these works as sources of how thoughtful audiences of Solon's poetry have reacted to it and, in turn, shaped it.

Solon did not solely appear in sources in which he was directly quoted; he was widely portrayed as one of the seven sages and as one of the founders of the Athenian democracy. If I was to extend this project in the future, a logical next step would be to track the reception and recharacterization of Solon in the wider classical tradition and how that characterization matched and departed from the one given in these poems. I would dive further into the characterization of Solon in Plutarch, along with those in Diodorus Siculus, Diogenes Laeritus, Herodotus, Plato, Aristophanes, and the Athenian orators. Each of those instances of portrayal both reflected and shaped Solon's reception as a character.

Even now, the modern scholarship that seeks to understand Solon and interpret his poetry plays this same role. Because of scholarly effort, our idea of Solon as a lawgiver and a poet is much different than the one held even a century ago. This thesis is thus engaged, in however small a way, in the same basic act as the poetry that it examines: reflecting and shaping our view of this great man.

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