

TOURISTS, IMMIGRANTS, AND FAMILY UNITS: ANALYSIS OF TOURISM
DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION PATTERNS IN AND FROM THE BAYS OF
HUATULCO, MEXICO.

by

GREGORY STEPHEN GULLETTE

(Under the Direction of Benjamin G. Blount)

ABSTRACT

It has been argued that a promising opportunity to reduce Mexico's internal pressures influencing out-migration remains in targeted development initiatives. By focusing development within economically depressed regions, it is possible to equalize some relative differences between Mexico and the United States. Overtime this would reduce Mexico's domestic push-factors associated with Mexico-U.S. migration. For the past few decades the Mexican government explored tourism development as one means to strengthen locally depressed economies and meet regional development initiatives. This dissertation explores the outcome of one such development site in Huatulco, Oaxaca, Mexico. In this dissertation I explore how tourism development on the Oaxacan coast, implemented through the Mexican agency FONATUR, created, rather than eliminated, local conditions in the region that produced and sustained out-migration and undocumented migration into the U.S. Central to these local conditions affecting migration are the restrictions placed on local resource access, most notably the contentious issue of land.

This dissertation tests three related propositions. First, that local Huatulco residents perceive tourism as reducing the availability of local resources due to the redirection of capital and natural resources to the tourist infrastructure. Second, the redirection of resources towards tourism development and the growing tourist presence has changed the actual or the expected standard of living for local residents. Third, local residents that perceive their standards of living cannot be raised in the context of tourism development decide to out-migrate to the U.S.

After analyzing data collected through 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Mexico, and drawing on research conducted in economic, political, and cultural migration studies, I argue that the structural conditions emerging through tourism development created the social networks perpetuating out-migration. I determine that the manner in which the state directed the tourism project significantly altered the local communities' abilities to live in the region and influenced their decision-making process on whether or not to participate within undocumented migration. In the end, the success of the Huatulco tourism development project cannot be measured in pure economic or quantitative factors, but must include considerations on the qualitative restrictions that the Mexican government has created as practice in Huatulco.

INDEX WORDS: Oaxaca, Migration, Tourism Development, Political Ecology,
Huatulco, Development

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B.A., The University of Louisville 1999

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2004

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DEDICATION

To my mother, who for so long has helped me understand life's complexities.
And to those migrating from Huatulco, who, in just one year, helped me understand what
some are willing to risk in life for the ones they love.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Like most things in life, this dissertation is a product of numerous influences stretched out over several years. Some individuals have been by my side for years and others were somewhat momentary acquaintances, though still playing a significant role. This project would not have been possible without the assistance and support from a great number of individuals. I should perhaps begin by thanking those in Huatulco that allowed me the opportunity and pleasure to learn from them. Their honesty, sincerity, and kindness showed me things I had never fully thought of and they taught me through their actions what some individuals are willing to chance for their families. Crossing the border as an undocumented migrant can be dangerous. The fact that so many risk their lives for a better life for themselves and their families was astounding. Learning from them, seeing their obstacles, and knowing what day-to-day problems they dealt with, I believe made me a better person, and I hope in the end, a better advocate for their struggles, both in Mexico and in the United States.

I would also like to thank my committee members (past and present). Your help, assistance, and patience have been greatly appreciated throughout the stages of my graduate career. Without your thoughtfulness and motivation this dissertation certainly would not have been possible. The lessons I have learned through the process of producing this work will not easily be forgotten. I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to Ben Blount, my committee chair, who has over the past five years offered enormous support for my research, even if it diverged from his own interests at times. His willingness to help me has been a source of constancy, one that I frequently relied upon and greatly benefited from. I am also thankful for the opportunity to have worked with

Alex Brewis and Peter Brosius. Alex over the past several years, starting with my research in New Zealand on conservation and forestry, has proven to be one of the most helpful professors I have had the pleasure to know. Her suggestions on this work, past and future work, and general professionalism in the field of anthropology have been invaluable. Peter has also been a source of motivation and inspiration, not only in this dissertation but for future research, where his guidance in humanistic writing will undoubtedly be welcomed and accepted. I am also lucky to have worked with Kavita Pandit, who has offered wonderful suggestions and constructive feedback in the time I have known her, which I hope does not end with this dissertation.

Of course, this dissertation goes beyond my time collecting and analyzing data. My initial interests in anthropology, and particularly cultural anthropology, were in many ways influenced by my friendships with Julie Peteet, Lisa Markowitz, and Robert L. Kelly at the University of Louisville. Discussions with Julie and Lisa in particular sparked much of my interest in development and the issues in power and who gets what and why. Tim Wallace at North Carolina State University, who gave me my first opportunity to conduct ethnographic research in Latin America, initiated my interests in the theoretical foundations and practicalities of research in tourism. That first ethnographic experience, one I pleasantly recall, planted me in the field of cultural anthropology.

I would like to thank some of my closest friends, both at the University of Georgia and elsewhere, who have made my undergraduate and graduate studies in anthropology, not only possible, but enjoyable. I thank Kelly, Tiffany, Sarah, Yadi, April, Elizabeth, Carlos, Tiffanie, Jen, Ana, Beth Harvey, Beth O'Hara, and Vero for

some of my fondest memories and best times. You all helped in numerous ways with this process or simply kept me sane throughout it. The faculty in the department of anthropology, particularly Margie and Charlotte, has been tremendously helpful with all of the bureaucracy associated with finishing a graduate degree. Their friendships and support have made the process incredibly smooth and all graduate students should be so lucky to have such a department filled with incredibly talented and wonderful individuals. I would also like to thank Christian who has been a cherished friend in Xalapa... a delightful person with patience unseen. Much of the political and economic data contained in this dissertation would not be present were it not for her. Other sources of support in Huatulco were my field assistant Lupe, my adopted parents Flor and Miguel, and my friends throughout the various sectors of Huatulco.

I am, of course, indebted to my family for their love and encouragement throughout all of my educational and personal endeavors. It has certainly been a long journey but I am grateful to have you all with me. Marlene, Sam, Meliah, Virginia, and Larry, this would not have been possible without you.

At last, but not least, I have two important individuals to recognize. I most certainly have to thank Sayamon. I could write for days on how much support, kindness, and love she has given me over the past couple of years, but such isn't practical. It should simply be said that without her strength and patience, through both the year in Mexico and the past several months of writing this dissertation, I certainly would not have been able to make it through either process. She is my love, my beauty, and perhaps unfortunately for her at times, my personal psychiatrist.

I also need to thank “Christopher Barrett McClintock,” my best friend and the one of two people I tell everything to. Since middle school he has been by my side and is, in all seriousness, a treasured friend (going beyond our music trades and fascination with television). My life up to this point would not have been possible without his presence.

This study was funded through the generous support of the Wenner-Gren Foundation’s *Individual Research Grant* and the National Science Foundation’s *Dissertation Improvement Grant*. I am extremely grateful to both of these institutions for their financial support.

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“The president of the municipality could try to create more jobs here. They could finish these roads but they don’t. They could try to build more hotels that more people could afford but they don’t. They say they are concerned with tourism growth here but I don’t believe them. There hasn’t been anything new in 4 or 5 years. Nothing. And the money that comes into the area gets funneled into corruption. There is no reason that these streets should not be finished.”

A Respondent’s Initial Interview, 11 December 2002

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Mexican government created a series of tourism sites in southern Mexico and the Baja California Peninsula in the attempt to generate economic growth in some of the nation's poorer regions. The projects were undertaken primarily by the state agency *Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo* (FONATUR). Five key areas were selected for tourism development based on information contained in a 1969 *Banco de México* report. The sites, known as tourism poles, were Cancun, Ixtapa, Loreto, Los Cabos, and Huatulco. The *Banco de México* report focused on tourism development as one means to bolster the national economy and generate economic growth in some of these poorest areas of Mexico. The sites were also chosen based on their geography. That is, while they were to occur primarily in southern Mexico, they were all designated as beach resorts and these sites contained some of the most attractive beaches throughout the country. The creation of the tourism resorts was hypothesized to strengthen locally depressed economies, reduce economic pressures that frequently contributed to the large percentages of southern Mexico's population migrating to the United States, and meet regional development initiatives by integrating southern Mexico into the expanding northern Mexican economy.

This dissertation explores the outcome of one such tourism development site in the Bays of Huatulco, Oaxaca, Mexico. In the following pages I seek to explicate how tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco on the Oaxacan coast (see figures 1.1-1.2), implemented under state control in 1984, promoted, rather than eliminated, local

conditions in the region that influenced rates of out-migration and undocumented migration into the U.S.

When I first began conducting research in Mexico I was aware of the various histories, politics, and economic factors that shaped the formation of Huatulco and how these processes might affect the newly emerging international migration patterns. When construction began on Huatulco it was hoped that FONATUR could produce a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable tourism development project. The agency had by that point accumulated ten or eleven years of experience managing tourism development and witnessed the outcomes associated with tourism growth in sites such as Cancun and Los Cabos. Therefore, Huatulco was not divorced from the larger historical events that shaped other areas of Mexico. It was, in many ways, constituted from them and would be created and managed in part based on the successes and failures of the other tourism poles.

Informed by this historical context, I gathered from households that were participating in the international migrant stream *their* understanding of Huatulco and the reasons they were willing to risk their lives to cross into the U.S. Understanding why they attempted to enter the U.S. was interesting since the majority of migration was temporary. An overwhelming majority had already returned or planned to return to Huatulco. In this regard, migrants were not fleeing political or cultural persecutions. I wanted to understand the factors that appeared to motivate the patterns of Mexico-U.S. migration originating from Huatulco. I was interested in how the development project was reshaping the area, its people, and the options they perceived as viable to achieve a better life or to simply live at a basic level in the newly created tourism site.

Figure 1.1: The district of Pochutla in relation to the state of Oaxaca. The coast line that constitutes the Bays of Huatulco is boxed. The exploded view of the coastline is illustrated in figure 1.2 through satellite photography.





Figure 1.2: Expanded satellite image of the primary bays in Huatulco marked for or undergoing tourism development.



Propositions

The dissertation's central objective was to explore if and how tourism development and tourist presence within the government's development project affected the decision of local residents to out-migrate from Huatulco and attempt migration into the United States. Ultimately, the research was to explore whether any underlying decision making in Mexico-U.S. migration emerged as a result of tourism development and the associated alterations to the local economy, environment, and social systems.

This study was predicated on three broadly related propositions.¹ First, local Huatulco residents perceived tourism as reducing the availability of and access to local capital and natural resources. It was argued that local households perceived the state as redirecting local resources to the tourist infrastructure, which in turn complicated local households' ability to either access or utilize them. Second, the combination of redirecting resources towards tourism development and the growing tourist presence in Huatulco altered how local residents' perceived their actual standard of living and their expectations of an appropriate standard of living. There were, however, additional questions. For example, did the development project drive down the standards of living for people moving to the area or for those families that lived in the area prior to development? Or did the presence of increased levels of tourists, the majority of which were affluent based on the four- and five-star hotels dominating the region, conceptually alter how families thought they too *should* live? The third proposition was that as resource redirection continued and aggravated local residents' expectations on or their actual standards of living, those individuals who thought their standards of living could

¹ See chapter two for more detailed information on the specific hypotheses forming this study's foundation.

not be raised in the context of tourism development decided to out-migrate, temporarily or permanently, to a destination in the United States.

Importance of the Research

It was important to situate this research within some of the broader theoretical models in anthropology and migration, specifically those literatures attempting to find practical solutions to the problems that many Mexican households confront on a daily basis. In locating my interests within these literatures and attempting to answer the central thesis of this research, as a site of study Huatulco proved beneficial on several levels. To begin, Durand and Massey (1992: 12) stated that migration processes are “developmental and longitudinal,” with surveys unable to capture migration’s inherent dynamism. Examining out-migration from Huatulco was ideal since the region had undergone tourism development, social transformations, and resource reallocation since the mid-1980s. The relatively short history provided, in many ways, the ability to differentiate alternate migration drivers. Prior to 1984 there was little need for migration. According to respondents the social networks that migrants rely on to reduce the risk associated with undocumented migration into the U.S. were primarily created through tourism development because, prior to 1984, there was little need to leave the region. Huatulco was an appropriate site to examine how migration patterns might emerge from a given area, how daughter communities in the U.S. form, and how attempts by the government to improve the lives of Mexicans become problematical.

Additionally, it is argued by some migration specialists (e.g. Corona 1982; Durand and Massey 1992; Kauffmann 2002; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouacouci, and

Pellegrino 1994) that one of the more promising avenues to reduce Mexico's internal pressures forcing out-migration remains in targeted development initiatives, such as the development of tourism sites throughout southern Mexico and the Baja California Peninsula. By focusing on economic growth either within regions experiencing high levels of emigration or those that are economically depressed, it is possible to equalize some relative differences between Mexico and the United States (CNP 2001; Kauffmann 2002). As the differences in Mexico and U.S. economies and the nations' standards of living become more even, the domestic push-factors in Mexican migration would reduce. That is, since the domestic Mexican economy would be stronger, it would reduce the need to travel to the U.S. searching for alternate or temporary sources of employment.

However, Massey and Espinosa (1997: 968) stated that out-migration frequently occurs in communities undergoing development and economic growth, whereby economic transformations create international migrants as opposed to reducing their numbers. Due to state-sponsored tourism in Huatulco and the argumentation by other migration researchers that targeted development still remains one of the best methods to reduce undocumented migration pressures, Huatulco was presented as an ideal site to not only explore the hypotheses set forth in this study but also to examine these opposing standpoints. Did tourism development create structural conditions or alter the way people thought about their lives in the region, ultimately influencing the patterns of out-migration? Or did the targeted development initiative achieve its goal in creating economic growth, regional integration, and reducing the economic pressures that frequently contributed to emigration patterns emerging within southern Mexico?

To answer those questions about tourism, this dissertation required a historical contextualization within Mexican economic and political policies and an examination of Huatulco from not only an economic perspective but including qualitative improvements for those in the region. Development success is not strictly an economic measure; it encompasses a wide range of attributes such as community wellbeing, equitably distributed resources, or quality of life indexes. In the following chapters I examine these themes. While 1984 marked the opening of Huatulco to the national and international tourism market, the actual histories and events that precipitated its creation as a tourist destination stretch further back in history. In order to fully understand why migration might have originated in the area based on the creation of tourism as the regions primary source of economy, it was necessary to explore the larger political and economic dynamics performed at the state or international level. In this regard, this dissertation examines Huatulco and undocumented migration originating from the area from a distinctly multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995), or the embedded nature of Huatulco in larger political and economic histories.

Research Design and Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted over a period of 12 months in Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca, Mexico. Local households with residency status in Huatulco – not tourists or residents in the elite foreign dominated neighborhoods – constituted the sample population. Only households that sent migrants, were sending migrants, or attempting to send migrants to the United States were included. The total sample population was 89 households, which were identified through chained-referral sampling. Of the

participating households, the total number of migrants was 121. Five data collection methods and three key analysis methods were used. Data collection consisted of participant observation; semi-structured and unstructured interviewing; socioeconomic data collection; and archival research, including the collection of political and economic data on the nation, state, and region. Information was also collected on the social networks either between households (i.e. those that referred other households through the chained-referral sampling) or the use of social networks² when attempting to migrate to the U.S. These data were collected through the sampling procedure or during the interview sessions. Data analysis consisted of coding with NVivo 2.0; descriptive and inferential statistics; and socioeconomic frequency distribution. All data were contextualized within a political ecology/economy framework. More information on the use of these methods is presented below, and then expanded upon in chapter two.

Participant observation centered on the day-to-day life of Huatulco's residents. Observation occurred in the communities of U2, Infonovit, Chahue, Cocoa, and numerous sectors and bays in Huatulco. For the most part, residents in areas such as U2, Chahue, or some of the other sectors surrounding the main town center of Crucecita, were composed of a mixture of original residents from the area and those that had migrated into Huatulco in search of employment. Those migrating into the area for employment were the overwhelming majority, but there were households spread throughout the sectors or in the main town center that had lived in the various bays prior to tourism development. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of the households in these areas

² Social networks in migration studies center on any socioeconomic link between a prospective migrant and other previous migrants or individuals with knowledge that may reduce the risks associated with undocumented migration. The attempt is to gain access to bodies of knowledge that will decrease the dangers of illegal crossings and increase the ability to safely and productively work in the U.S. destination.

were composed of those working in the tourism industry (e.g. maids, cooks, tour guides). During my time in Huatulco, I observed a range of daily activities by locals: conducting tours for tourists, selling product and services on the beach or in town, working in restaurants or shops and interacting with tourists. I also observed where FONATUR focused most of its construction and cleanup efforts. Opportunistic observations were made during general activities such as social protests or Huatulco celebrations.

Throughout the participant observation, chained-referral sampling was used to identify the sample population. After each interview I asked respondents if they knew of other people or families with whom I could talk. Not only did this create a mutual contact between previous respondents and potential respondents, it also began to identify the relationships between households. This, in part, helped construct the social networks between households by highlighting whether the networks factored into decisions to migrate or whether one household received support from another household. For example, did a household receive a loan from another household to pay for a trip across the border, or did households share information on locating jobs in the U.S. More detailed information was also collected during interview sessions (see below). The detailed social network information centered on what types of social networks were used when attempting migration. These networks existed between families, friends, or acquaintances. The objective was to understand whether family assistance or family networks were more important in providing support when deciding to migrate than that of networks between friends or acquaintances (see for example Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2000).

With the study population identified and parts of the social networks uncovered, comprehensive socioeconomic data were collected from each of the participating households. These data helped constitute sample representativeness. Data were collected on the following: household size, gender and age compositions, ethnicity, marital status, religion, economic activities, levels of income, sources of income, migration rates, migration attempts, migrant demographics, and destination area. After socioeconomic data were collected, semi-structured interviewing techniques were used (unstructured interviewing was used during the first month of research to understand what some of the main issues were in the communities). The primary goal of the interviews was to see how individuals perceived tourism development in Huatulco and what their primary reasons were for out-migration. During the course of interviews, questions were asked on the following topics: 1) how respondents perceived the effects from tourism development in Huatulco; 2) how resource access or traditional economic systems were altered or unchanged due to tourism development; 3) whether perspectives on standards of living had changed from tourism development; 4) what factors influenced decision-making on out-migration; 5) what did the household or migrant consider once the decision to out-migrate was made; 6) how out-migration patterns from Huatulco were sustained or what social networks were used; and 7) what factors were considered when attempting to rally from tourism development pressures, if any. The specific questions for each of these main topics are provided in the following chapter in table 2.1.

Household history collection was embedded within the in-depth interviews or occasionally occurred at a later date. The objective in household history collection was to understand the changes within the household structure over time. Examined were

changing income patterns, economic activities, standards of living, household composition, and structural integrity throughout the phases of tourism development.

Lastly, archival research was used to collect political and economic data on Huatulco, the state of Oaxaca, and Mexico in general. Data were primarily located in the Mexican government statistical office, *Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática* or INEGI. Statistical data were collected starting from 1950, though for the most part, data on Huatulco were available beginning from the mid 1980s.

After the data collection was completed, data analysis began. Most of the taped interviews were transcribed in the field; eight interviews were transcribed upon my return to the United States. Interviews were coded using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis program. Codes identified the main themes and topics discussed by respondents. For example, some of the salient themes and keywords for respondents centered on or were the following: FONATUR, the use of the term *lento* (or slow) to describe tourism growth, land prices, the use of *grupos* when purchasing land, or crossing *mojado* (i.e. illegally). The use of NVivo 2.0 also enabled coding interviews to present the qualitative descriptions derived from interview sessions and to identify the most salient categories or topics discussed by respondents. For example, respondents consistently mentioned that tourism development increased the difficulty in purchasing land or that FONATUR limited the regions economic development by only focusing on affluent tourism growth. As stated above, NVivo was also used in the process of identifying the social networks that migrants used when crossing the border. These data were identified either in interview transcripts or in fieldnotes. While a large portion of coding was conducted in

Mexico, I completed further, more finely detailed coding and analysis of the interviews upon my return to U.S.

All statistical analyses were conducted in the U.S. The socioeconomic data were entered into SPSS for descriptive and inferential statistical analysis. Primarily, the data were ran through cross-tabulations, explore, and univariate summary statistics. The statistical results were used to determine if intra-community variations in economics and social networks influenced who strategically decided to out-migrate, who was more likely to migrate, who was more capable to migrate, or who was more capable of withstanding some of tourism development's harmful or limiting effects.

Research Findings

The results of this study indicated that the decisions of local residents to out-migrate from the region and attempt immigration into the U.S. included considerations of the social, political, and economic changes brought about by tourism development. Ultimately, the results of the data analyzed allowed acceptance of the central thesis of this research, which stated that the government's development project influenced the decision of local residents to out-migrate from Huatulco and attempt migration into the United States. Local Huatulco residents did perceive a significant reduction in the availability of and access to capital and natural resources as these were directed to the tourist infrastructure or, in the case of land, held in reserve where local residents were unable to purchase properties. Most respondents expressed serious concerns on either the direction of regional capital and natural resources to a specialized affluent tourism market or how land distribution and availability were controlled in Huatulco. As development

took hold in the region, most of the respondents felt marginalized or discriminated against in the process, especially in regards to their perception that FONATUR would not sell land to them but would sell land to foreigners or rich nationals. Based on the development work undertaken and some of the problems associated with it, this significantly influenced the decision-making process of those households out-migrating from the region. The combination of structural variables and how respondents conceptualized their placement in the region were influential for their decisions to emigrate. It is not a novel finding that certain households were migrating, but *why* they were migrating. Tourism development in Huatulco had created local economic and political situations that most respondents felt were the catalyst for their contemplation of out-migration as a viable option to better their lives. To fully understand this, however, more specific information is required.

Throughout the development project FONATUR focused most of its energies on creating Huatulco as a premier tourist destination for the upper segments of the tourist market. The outcome was a local economy that relied on a smaller segment of the total tourist market with the expectation that substantial economic growth would occur. This did not always happen and relative to the other tourism development sites managed by FONATUR, Huatulco experienced a lag in tourism expansion (though relative to the state of Oaxaca, workers in Huatulco were paid better and experienced lower unemployment rates). Yet, respondents felt that FONATUR needed to create a diverse tourism base and a wider range of hotels, instead of relying on the area's few upscale resorts. If FONATUR would do this, then more tourists would come to Huatulco, strengthening the local economy. However, respondents maintained that FONATUR – which was the main

agency in Huatulco responsible for managing and selling lands to either businesses or individuals – preferred to preserve their land holdings and only distribute land and construction rights to four- and five-star hotels, complicating the region's growth potentials.

Most respondents stated that FONATUR fixated on money. The agency's attempts to sell the smallest portion of land at the highest price to businesses eventually found its way into the private market. At the time of my research a majority of respondents were either seeking to purchase land so they could build a house or had gone through the arduous process of acquiring land from FONATUR. Respondents informed me that FONATUR prevented locals from purchasing land since the agency preferred to sell land to foreigners or nationals with larger sources of income. Essentially, the local economy created after tourism development began to favor non-residents who wanted to buy land in the region for summer or retirement homes. Locals on the other hand, required more money to buy land from the government since they were effectively discriminated against. FONATUR could, for the most part, establish land prices as they wished. Having created Huatulco as a destination for affluent tourists, the simultaneous result was the creation of a prospective pool of future land owners. Locals rarely possessed the economic resources to compete with the body of tourists that might build their summer or retirement homes along the Huatulco coast, a previous home for many families. One of the methods local households used to acquire land from FONATUR was a group, or a collection of households. With memberships for one group reaching upwards of 60 or 80 households, the attempt was to purchase land at a reduced rate – a one time down payment then monthly payments. However, even if households had the

money, FONATUR would not sell them land. Respondents informed me that the only way to get land was to go to the United States and save more money (about seven or eight times what one would need in a group) and purchase the land outright from FONATUR.

On the other hand, these factors did not negate the qualitative improvements made through tourism development. For a majority of the respondents, the standards of living were high and considerably higher than in other parts of Mexico or from their place of origin (e.g. Chiapas or Guerrero). Yet, even though respondents enjoyed Huatulco and its amenities, they perceived distinct differences between themselves and the tourists or the foreign-dominated retirement/summer home neighborhoods. Locals were peripheral to some areas, virtually excluded from building a home or purchasing land in other areas, and always limited in their ability to purchase land or build a home even in the ‘local’ areas of Huatulco. The problem for locals was to overcome the disparities between their standards of living and those of the tourists or those in the affluent neighborhoods.

The structural variables also affected how respondents conceptualized their placement in Huatulco and their level of importance in relation to tourists or the affluent neighborhoods. These were primary factors for households deciding to temporarily leave the region to go to the United States. Knowing the obstacles that they faced in Huatulco to simply obtain land to build a house and seeing the amounts of money that U.S. tourists spent on arrival, locals were increasingly motivated to out-migrate from the region to access new sources of capital so they could later access resources in Huatulco (e.g., land). Thus, the overwhelming majority of migration was temporary and migrants returned to Huatulco with the intent of obtaining land and/or starting a private business. Further, the majority of migrants leaving greatly relied on the use of social networks, which were

primarily family based networks. This overwhelming majority of migrants using social networks illustrate their importance in sustaining migration or serving as a source of information to reduce the risks and dangers associated with undocumented migration.

Migration might not have been as necessary in the region had there been more jobs through either industry or tourism diversification or had FONATUR not set the price of land prohibitively high for local residents. The simple fact that FONATUR made most families wait years to purchase land in a group substantially influenced a household's decision to migrate. Thus, a household's decision to participate in undocumented migration was primarily based on how they perceived the region's excessive land prices; the restrictions on resource access as greater importance was placed on tourism areas and the foreign dominated neighborhoods; and the arguably limited regional economy brought on by the lack of industry or tourism diversification.

The structural components associated with the tourism development and the presence of affluent tourists affected how local households perceived their options, the constraints they faced, and their standards of living relative to the more affluent. How families perceived these variables greatly affected why they might have participated in undocumented migration. For most of the respondents the increase in affluent tourists altered how they perceived their own lives (i.e., in comparison to tourists they were relatively deprived). Some respondents originally from the region or those who had moved there, cited the analogy that *campesinos* were often content with their lives and what they had in the countryside, but those living in (or moving to) Huatulco saw more and wanted more. As the views, ideas, and expectations on standards of living changed for those in the area, there was a simultaneous desire to reach them. Combined with most

of the families finding problems in land possession, building a house, and circumventing the loss of money in apartment rent, a majority felt that the most viable option was using migrant remittances to obtain a better life.³

Significance and Potential Applications

Through the process of coding with NVivo 2.0, utilizing descriptive and inferential statistics, and examining the political and economic data on the region and state, the data suggested that decisions to out-migration from the region included consideration of the variables created through tourism development. Yet, it is important to understand how the processes of qualitative and quantitative advancements made in Huatulco through the development project (e.g. low unemployment, higher salaries, improved living standards relative to other areas in Mexico) became problematized by the structural limitations FONATUR simultaneously created. Ultimately, the obstacles and unequal distributions of resources the agency established as practice prevented a truly successful development project. In this regard, the in-depth, ground level analysis clarified some of the main factors that households included in their consideration when determining out-migration from Huatulco. This project attended to what respondents perceived as limiting their ability to live comfortably in Huatulco and how this affected their decision to out-migrate. The above results should not be extrapolated to all of Mexico; rather, the lessons learned from local households illustrate some of the complications that may emerge when implementing a development project of this nature. These factors should be addressed, not only in Huatulco but in areas throughout Mexico.

³ The other primary methods for obtaining a better life were completing your education or saving what money one could working in Huatulco. These themes are further explored in chapter five under section two: “Standards of Living: Differences and Divisions.”

The focus on the local and how respondents viewed this particular set of political and economic circumstances did not deny linkages and intersections between multiple scales or the transnational nature of Huatulco; such personified the region and were seen in how state agencies, foreign investors, and international tourism operators had vested interests in resource allocation. Recognizing community level variables allowed a more accurate understanding of how development initiatives, which often attempted to contribute to regional economic expansion and job creation, might fail some of the original objectives. The outcome in Huatulco was increased migration flows to the United States. Respondent consensus regarding why migration occurred indicated the pervasiveness of some of the problems in Huatulco and the need to address them. The most notable difficulties that local households factored into their decision to migrate to the U.S. were: land availability and allocation; the expense of goods and products; the relative homogenous nature of the tourist body; and local households' economic and social positions relative to some of the more affluent neighborhoods and tourists (e.g., relative deprivation). In all, these factors created a local setting that respondents viewed as limiting their economic potentials and their ability to acquire land for a residence, which provided the predominant reasons *why* they were migrating.

*

While the structural obstacles created in Huatulco due to tourism development generated migration patterns, the best hope to reduce the need for international migration remains in targeted development initiatives. With successful development, equitable access to capital and natural resources, and an overall strengthening of the Mexican economy, it is arguable that many of the hardships associated with living and working in

Mexico will decrease, simultaneously reducing the dependency on migrant remittances as a source of family or community economy. However, Mexico-U.S. migration is unlikely to stop altogether. Even if successful development strategies were implemented throughout large sections of the country, areas or regions would exist with pronounced economic, political, or environmental hardships; migration would continue. It is arguable that while development and economic strengthening are perhaps the best methods to curb migration, some legal methods should be established for Mexico-U.S. crossings. Further border militarization is unlikely to stop the flow of undocumented workers.

Additionally, as migration is unlikely to cease, migrant remittances should not be used primarily for the acquisition of land. A more fruitful approach in utilizing migrant remittances would be their direction to productive enterprises or businesses. With money invested in the community, multiplier effects might emerge and migrant remittances would contribute to further economic growth through business proliferation as opposed to investment in land purchase (see for example Durand, et al. 1996, who argued that migrant remittances, in certain communities, were periodically allocated to productive activities over 50 percent of the time). To do so, however, the Mexican government should attempt to eliminate structural conditions that families might perceive as a main reason necessitating their participation in international migration (e.g. land restriction in southern Mexico, which has historically personified the region and its people). It is hoped that this research will combine with contemporaneous research in Mexican development and migration, as well as future research by myself and others, and explore some of these issues in Huatulco and throughout other development sites in Mexico.

Chapter Summaries

The remainder of this dissertation centers on exactly how tourism development and Mexico-U.S. migration interrelate and interact when set against the Mexican government's historically shifting policies on development and specifically how those interactions manifest themselves in Huatulco. Chapter two provides the theoretical and methodological foundations of the project and explicitly states each of the study's ten hypotheses. As political ecology and political economy are the underlying theoretical bases for the project, they are explored in this chapter as opposed to the literature review in chapter three. Within the exploratory framework of political ecology and economy, the theoretical importance of this study is possible: the interpretation of two forms of intersecting human population movements and how one (labor migration) is affected by the other (tourism) due to its consumption of natural and capital resources for its required infrastructure. The methods used during data collection and analysis are also provided, as well as an in-depth discussion on how each method was used, for what length of time, and why.

Chapter three synthesizes the most relevant bodies of literature on both tourism development and Mexico-U.S. migration. The chapter is divided into two main sections: tourism/development and international migration. The first half examines the rise of "development" in the post-World War II global economy and why many developing nations focused on tourism as a means to bolster their economies' export-sectors. Within this discussion there is an appreciation of the direct role the state has in the creation and maintenance of the tourism industry; such is important since the Mexican government had a direct role in creating Huatulco in the 1980s. To understand why the state

frequently plays a continued role in tourism, even after economic growth has been initiated, the tourism industry's inherent characteristics are examined and how these characteristics might necessitate direct state involvement.

The latter half of the chapter examines the expansive bodies of migration literature. I focus primarily on the relationship between Mexico and the United States, where the overwhelming majority of migration is labor migration (of which the majority is temporary migration with an intention to return to Mexico). Most of the literature on labor migration utilizes as heuristic devices the concepts of social networks and human capital formation. These concepts are defined and contextualized within larger theoretical frameworks that explain migration on a global/international scale (e.g., push-pull factors or Segmented Labor Market Theory). Lastly, U.S. policies on immigration are reviewed as they have a bearing on recommendations for future avenues to handle the complicated nature of Mexico-U.S. migration and potential applications of these research findings.

Chapter four traces the origin of Huatulco and gives its history in relation to the wider political and economic changes occurring throughout Mexico. History is provided from the beginning of Spanish Colonialization to the neoliberal reforms and free market activities implemented after the 1982 Debt Crisis. The neoliberalism of the 1980s is important as it served as the main political and economic milieu where the 'touristic Huatulco' was born, a history distinctly different from some of the other tourism sites in Mexico. Whereas chapter three examines development from a more general perspective, this chapter traces the specific historical processes that affected Mexico's attraction to and eventual adoption of tourism development in the 1960s and 1970s.

Chapter five reports the results of the data collection and analysis. Each of the hypotheses stated in chapter two are returned to and grouped into three main sections: 1) how local capital or natural resources were redirected to the tourism infrastructure; 2) perceptions of standards of living and an individual's ability to raise their standard of living *or* the differences, perceived or authentic, between that of tourists and local residents; and 3) why a decision to out-migrate was made or contemplated and what resources were available to the migrant at the time of the decision.

Finally, chapter six situates the results of the data analysis with the foundational material reviewed in chapters three and four. The goal of this chapter is to provide an explanation of how tourism, created by the state and implemented through FONATUR, affected Mexico-U.S. migration patterns emerging specifically from Huatulco. To do so this chapter addresses the intersection of political, economic, and social histories at multiples scales and among numerous actors. The significance of this research is identified and potential applications suggested to address: 1) some of the unsuccessful aspects of the development project; 2) how a more equitable development project may contribute to economically and environmentally sustainable development; and 3) possible recourses to either slow the rate of illegal/undocumented migration or to implement a legal means for labor migration between Mexico and the United States, in turn helping to stop the dangerous, and at times deadly, border crossings.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides the theoretical foundation used throughout the data collection and analysis. Political ecology and political economy were the main theoretical bases for this study, in addition to development post-structural frameworks discussed in chapter three. This chapter will also provide detailed information on this study's ten hypotheses and the methods used to collect the required data. How the data were analyzed is explained in the last section of this chapter.

Political Ecology/Economy

Contemporary political, economic, environmental, and ideological activity has created a variety of social divisions, yet at the same time has resulted in increased interaction between groups and levels, a seemingly problematic consequence. Few theoretical models or frameworks would sufficiently elucidate the relationships between various temporal and spatial scales when accounting for the globalization of nature, economy, politics, and social activity. Political ecology (and political economy) does that.

Political ecology finds much of its origins in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1972 Wolf examined how local rules of ownership and land inheritance were not simple norms of allocation for a bounded population but represented mechanisms emanating from the larger society and the exigencies of the local ecosystem. In the 1980s anthropologists began to adopt anti-colonial stances and explore dependency theory, situating their

ethnographies into wider frameworks of political economy and natural environments (Blaike and Brookfield 1987; Greenberg 1989; Mintz 1985; Taussig 1980; Wolf 1982). Also at this time greater interdisciplinary work began (for example, Geertz's 1963 *Agricultural Involution* was widely cited by agricultural economists).

This was the origin of political ecology: embedded within political economy (with its insistence on linking the distribution of power and productive activity) and ecological analysis (with its broader vision of bio-environmental relationships and anthropogenic landscapes). And it is here that political ecology finds itself poised to explore how cultural and political activity occur within ecosystems usually socially constructed or altered and how these ecosystem structures limit or advance political, economic, and cultural activities (Bryant 1992, 1998; Greenberg and Park 1994; Martinez-Alier 1991; Puelso 1992; Proctor and Pincetl 1996; Roseberry 1988; Sayre 1999; Shiva 1991).

One of the more appealing aspects of political ecology is that it achieves its mode of analysis not by offering theory, but by offering analytic devices and interpretations to explore how environmental and political forces interact to affect social and environmental changes through the actions of various actors at various scales. Similar to the work of Foucault, political ecology provides questions and problems, not necessarily distinct answers, and implies that most answers are ephemeral and local (Keeley 1990). It is unsurprising then that many contemporary researchers have utilized political ecology/economy as an attempt to understand how few places in the world (especially the local) remain unaffected by state powers, global flows, colonial projects, and capitalist expansion. The historical, political, and economic factors behind environmental change can be explained by political ecology, not through abstract premises or dogmas, but with

real world political and economic activities (Greenberg and Park 1994). And while a Marxist orientation often situates societies in relation to the larger arenas of state and global structures (Darier 1996), political ecology focuses on both micro and macro levels.

For example, Stonich (1998) examined unregulated tourism development in the Bay Islands, Honduras and the unequal distribution of adverse affects among various stakeholders. Created here was a political ecological analysis that consisted of explaining human-environment interactions linked through different scales from the national/global to the local. In slight contrast, Palmer (1993) argued that attention should primarily focus on the motivation of the locals – specifically Maine and Newfoundland lobster fishers who engaged in folk practices – and the local socio-economic context where it occurred. Even Hardin’s (1968) classic and heavily revisited *Tragedy of the Commons* would require a localized, on-the-ground approach to examine many of the institutional arrangements that evolved for regulating access and use of common pool resources (McCay and Jentoft 1998; Feeny et. al 1990). Therefore, political ecology may explain the human-environment interactions linked either through the international/global economy to the local region or vice-versa; illuminate disproportionate relations of power between various actors (Schroeder 1993); and center on how these power relations affect access to and management of the regions natural resources (Sayre 1999).

Applying such a framework to this research it is possible to see the interactions between the different spatial and temporal scales that act in a region. This is of course similar to the “multi-sited ethnography” that examines issues embedded within and intersecting dichotomies such as local and global or North and South (Marcus 1995; see also Marcus 1989). Arguably there is a connection between state-sponsored tourism

development in Huatulco and the distribution of land resources. Using political ecology and a multi-sited ethnography we may examine how the impacts from tourism development are dissipated and absorbed in the various communities in Huatulco (e.g. who are better able to manage or control any adverse effects from tourism growth and the distribution of such adverse effects) and we may explore how Huatulco is still embedded within Oaxaca and Mexican economic and political policies. Furthermore, adopting a political economic approach and its ability for contextualization, we can further consider how southern states have failed to enjoy the economic growth rates of northern states, which has led to some of the social and economic unrest experienced in southern Mexico and has in many ways determined the focus on tourism growth as a means to ‘develop’ southern states. Of course, it is here where friction may emerge between communities and governments based on differential conceptions of the environment and its resources and in turn, how these differences manifest themselves in economic policy and practice.

For instance, much of the Oaxacan coast was conceptualized by the state as a prime area for tourism development, along with establishing conservation estates. As explored more in chapter three, families were moved from the coast, land was bought by the state, and complete control over the region was granted to FONATUR. Yet, locals conceptualized the area differently. They had differing ideas on their place in the Huatulco geography and what land, resources, and amenities should be afforded to them. The result of these differential conceptualizations, how they were manifested in policy and then implemented, and how these policies affected various stakeholders and actors differently are seen through the use of political ecology and its framework for examining various temporal and spatial scales (see chapter five for data analysis). Ultimately,

political ecology/economy is situated well to offer critical analyses of local, national, and global relationships and the associated multiplicity of views and conceptualizations held within these scales. By acknowledging these differences in cognition and implementation more equitable studies are possible. This was the continual basis for this research, to be “more alert to issues of power and inequality, to the contingency of cultural and historical formations, to the significance of regimes of knowledge production, and to the importance of the acceleration of translocal processes” (Brosius 1999: 278). Adopting this approach incorporated multiple theoretical frameworks and pluralistic methodologies enabling a study of this size, scale, and intent to be possible.

The Hypotheses of this Study

From the outset this study sought to determine if relationships existed between the increased tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco (Oaxaca, Mexico) and the decisions of local residents to out-migrate from the region. As stated in the introduction chapter, this study tested three related propositions. First, that local Huatulco residents perceived tourism as reducing the availability of and access to local resources due to the redirection of capital and natural resources to the tourist infrastructure. Second, the redirection of resources towards tourism development and the growing tourist presence in the Bays of Huatulco resulted in what local residents perceived as either a change in the actual standard of living or what was an appropriate expected standard of living for local communities within the matrix of the tourist destination. Third, as resource redirection continued and aggravated local residents’ expectations on or actual standards of living, those that perceived their standards of living could not be raised in the context of tourism

development made the decision to out-migrate in search of a better resource base for improved standards of living. This led to an increase in both local out-migration and immigration attempts into the United States. The primary concern then was to determine the relationships between how tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco and the increasing numbers of European and United States tourists affected the decision-making behind out-migration patterns from Huatulco and current immigration attempts into the United States. The hypotheses of this study are the following:

H1: That the members of local communities of Huatulco perceive state sponsored tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco as causing the re-direction of a majority of regional and local capital and resources to the maintenance and development of the tourist infrastructure.

H2: That the local communities of Huatulco view the development and promotion of tourism in the Bays of Huatulco as having reduced their own access to local resources in the region.

H3: That the local communities and residents of Huatulco perceive tourists as enjoying a higher standard of living than they do.

H4: That the growing presence of international tourists in Huatulco has resulted in lowering actual standards of living while promoting the ideal of a higher standard of living for local communities.

H5: That processes of tourism development and resource redirection over time augment or aggravate expectancies of standards of living for local residents of Huatulco, intensify out-migration patterns, and alter household socioeconomic activities.

H6: That the local Huatulco residents who have no expectation that tourism development will raise their standard of living will be motivated to emigrate.

H7: That local residents of Huatulco immigrating or attempting immigration to the United States seek an improved living condition for their source family in Mexico, for themselves upon their return to Mexico, or in the U.S.

H8: That the patterns of out-migration from Huatulco are sustained by social capital formation for Huatulco residents.

H9: That there are intra-community variations in economics and social networks that result in some better able to withstand the associated costs from tourism development and who strategically decides to out-migrate.

H10: That there is high correlation between the variables associated with “Tourism Development” and the variable “Local Resident Out-migration from Huatulco to the United States.”

Methods

A host of qualitative and quantitative methods were used for data collection.

Based on the hypotheses and thesis of this study the following data were collected to confidently reject or accept the hypotheses (see table 2.1 for a detailed table indicating what questions were asked to collect the following data sources): local residents perceptions on tourism development, resource access, and standards of living tested H1 – H4; household history data were gathered for H5; motivations behind out-migration were collected for H6 – H7; social networks and migration patterns/migration frequency tested H8; and household socioeconomic data and factors that determine migration patterns were compiled for H9. H10 was rejected or accepted based on all the compiled data and its analysis.

Field research and data analysis were conducted over 12 months in Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca, Mexico. The primary methods of data collection were participant observation, semi-structured and unstructured interviewing, archival research, chained referral sampling, social network information, household history collection, and household socioeconomic surveying (Bernard 1995, Freeman, et al. 1989, Levy and Hollan 2000, Trotter 1999). The local residents in Huatulco constituted the sample population for this study (i.e. those households that had residency status in Huatulco and

were not tourists or residents of the affluent neighborhoods). Since this project centered on tourism development as an impetus for out-migration, only Huatulco households that sent migrants, were sending migrants, or attempting to send migrants to the U.S. constituted the sample population where $N=89$.⁴ Of the 89 households the total number of migrants sent or going to the U.S. was $N=121$.

Table 2.1: A general listing of the primary questions asked during interview sessions to elicit the data supporting or rejecting this study's hypotheses.

<p>Interviews covered the following issues (with freedom for further prodding and exploring some of the themes in greater detail through additional questions):</p>
<p>1) How respondents perceived the effects from tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco:</p> <p>Has your family structure changed due to the development of the Bays of Huatulco? Has your place of residence changed due to the development of the Bays of Huatulco? Has your community changed due to the development of the Bays of Huatulco, if so how? What do you think of developing Huatulco for tourism? What is your general opinion of this process?</p>
<p>2) How resource access or traditional economic systems were altered or unchanged due to tourist development:</p> <p>Has tourist development in the Bays of Huatulco affected your economic activities? If so, how? Have natural resources in the area become less available since tourist development initiated? Is the economic system in Huatulco different now than it was 15 years ago; 10 years ago; 5 years ago? For example, is it more expensive to live here now than it was previously? How do you overcome such a difficulty (if present)? How do you handle life in Huatulco?</p>
<p>3) Diachronic perspectives on standards of living:</p> <p>Do you view a difference between your standard of living and those of tourists? How? Have your expectations on standards of living recently changed due to tourist development and tourist presence? Is the standard of living here different than the rest of Mexico? If so, how and why do you think this is?</p>

⁴ Through the process of data analysis two interviews were discarded. It is assumed that the respondents were untruthful based on consistent incongruities in their stories of migration or the associated timeline.

<p>4) What factors influenced the decision-making for out-migration:</p> <p>Have you ever migrated to the United States? Have your immediate family members migrated to the U.S.? What was the length of time? Did they return to Mexico? Why did they return to Mexico? What were the reasons for the migration? Would you or someone in your household like to migrate to the United States? What do you think about when you migrate to the United States? What influenced your decision to migrate? Why?</p>
<p>5) How out-migration patterns from Huatulco were sustained and the importance of social networks:</p> <p>How did you get to the United States? What friends or family assisted in the migration? Was it necessary to have the help of your family and friends during that migration? How did you (or the migrant) locate the <i>pollero</i> to use in the crossing? How did you repay those that helped you or how will you repay them? Did they (the migrant) assist you while they were working in the United States? Did they remit money from the United States? Did they (the migrant) have the support of the household in the decision to migrate? Were there multiple trips to the United States? If so, why?</p>
<p>6) What factors were considered when attempting to out-migrate:</p> <p>Who initiated the discussion on possible immigration into the United States? Why? Did you have to save money for the trip? How was this done? How long did this process take? How much money was needed for the migration? Are job conditions or job availability in the United States a factor that affects your decision to migrate or send migrants? Do conditions here affect your decision to go to the United States? How?</p>
<p>7) What factors were considered when attempting to rally from tourism development pressures:</p> <p>Has tourism development in Huatulco been as you expected? How so? Is it difficult to find jobs in Huatulco? Do the jobs that are here pay well? Are there any shortcomings to the tourism development? How do you handle these difficulties? Are there any benefits derived from the development of tourism?</p>
<p>8) Demographic information not collected in the Socioeconomic Surveys:</p> <p>Where did you live before? What prompted your move? Did you attend school/secondary education? If so, where? You mentioned in your Socioeconomic Survey you worked in (INSERT), how long have you worked in this field? Do you subsidize this job with any other activities? What amount of time do you invest in economic activities? What prompted your move into this employment? What economic activity would you currently like to participate in? Out of everyone in the household, who provides the most important economic support? What is the most important economic activity in this household? Has this ever changed? Why?</p>

Two field assistants were hired during the course of this dissertation project. One hired field assistant based in Huatulco attended 73 percent of the interviews and initially provided language support. However, the primary, and most important activity of this field assistant, was assistance with establishing contacts throughout Huatulco. Due to the nature of this project and its focus on migration to the United States (98.9 percent of which was illegal) it was vital to use a local resident as both a means to help establish some of the initial contacts in Huatulco and ground myself in the area. This procedure overcame the hesitant nature of some participating households. For example, even after a household participated in the study they might have recommended a neighbor or relative who had family in the United States, yet they would decline due to apprehension, even after their friends or family explained the study and my intent. Outside of the N=89 sample there were N=39 households that either declined the study or agreed only later to avoid me, ask to reschedule multiple times, or simply not show up to an interview. By employing a local field assistant, along with participant observation in the areas such as U2 and Cocoa, I more efficiently and successfully entered the Huatulco community.

The participant observation that helped establish myself in the area primarily centered on the day-to-day life of Huatulco residents in the communities of U2, Cocoa, Infonovit, Chahue, the numerous sectors in Huatulco/Crucecita, and the various bays along the Huatulco coast line. This consisted of observing a range of daily activities, such as selling goods on the beach, conducting tours for tourists, working in restaurants or shops and interactions with tourists, general activities related to families and raising children, activities associated with high and low tourist seasons, and opportunistic observations on a variety of social events or protests. I also observed where FONATUR

directed most of its construction and cleanup efforts. Due to the length of the project, providing an exact account of how many hours were spent on participant observation proves difficult. Upon initial arrival in Huatulco a month was spent primarily observing the daily life of those working in Crucecita (the main town center) and on the beaches of Tangolunda and Santa Cruz. Afterwards, and once contacts were established in the various sectors of Huatulco, time was spent on an average of 8-10 hours per week watching local residents from a variety of locations (e.g., restaurants, an *estitica*, shops, and from peoples' homes). The time spent on the beach locations increased during the months of November, December, and part of January. During these months Huatulco experienced, what respondents considered, the most important high season. The Christmas season consisted of an increase in American tourists, where 'green' dollars were brought into the area. Due to the importance placed on this time for Huatulco residents I remained in Huatulco and viewed more of the interactions that took place on the beach and in the hotels.

Based on participant observation, my first field assistant, and establishing myself in the community I was able to more accurately understand what relationships existed between the various households in the study. Based on the migration literature, a large portion of migrant patterns are determined in part by the social networks that are available to a prospective migrant. This was an explicit concern throughout the study. That is, by utilizing a host of methods (e.g. observation, interviews, or history collection) I was able to determine the bases in the relationships between those households that sent migrants and whether they possibly shared information or supplied assistance in any form to other households (see also Trotter 1999). This was particularly important in

determining why some family members might not participate in migration even though the social networks were available to them. These networks might be anything from family groups and work groups to friendship networks (long-term friendships to short-term acquaintances). However, these networks were a beginning step. What was needed was to understand which networks were more or less important in decisions to migrate. That is, were family networks (or *strong ties*) or friend and acquaintances networks (or *weak ties*) more important as a source of support and knowledge sharing for those migrants leaving Huatulco (see for example Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2000).⁵

To understand these networks the initial method of data collection was to ask those willing to participate in the research if they could identify other households or individuals I should speak with because they had either helped them in migration or knew that the household had a migrant in the U.S. Because regional or local economic development has been shown to initiate the processes of undocumented out-migration only to be augmented later by social capital formation (Massey and Espinosa 1997), the collection of data on social networks was important. This was also how the primary study population was identified: chained-referral sampling. Bernard (1995: 97; see also Johnson 1990) stated that the use of chained-referral sampling is the most effective means “to find out who people know and how they know each other” and the social networks therein. However, the social networks established through simple referrals were later detailed or understood more through a combination of limited observation (e.g. households helping each other in work) and interviewing (both semi-structured and household history collection interviewing techniques). This combination of referral

⁵ Refer to chapter three, section “¿Tienes familia en el otro lado?” for more detailed information on the role of social networks and their importance in international, undocumented migration.

sampling and interviewing techniques provided the most effective means to understand the networks between households and whether these networks factored into decisions to migrate or whether family assistance and family networks were more important in the process of deciding to migrate (Trotter 1999; 41). Essentially, this is a juxtaposition of *weak ties* and *strong ties* as explained chapter three's discussion on social networks and social capital formation. Huatulco's networks are discussed in chapters five and six.

With the sample population identified, comprehensive socioeconomic data were collected from each of the households participating in this study. Arguably, since the sampling method was chained-referral, there could be issues with accurate representations of the Huatulco population. However, representativeness of the sample was enhanced through the collection of socioeconomic data, which allowed for the respondents/households to be stratified according to information on the household size, gender and age compositions, ethnicity, religion, marital status, economic activities, levels of income, sources of that income (e.g. is the money derived locally, regionally, or transnationally and who supplied it), migration rates, migration attempts, migrant characteristics (e.g. sex, age, income, occupation), and destination area. These data also enabled the identification of the: 1) factors influencing the frequency of and reasons for out-migration; 2) intra-community variations in income and economic activities; and 3) the manner in which variables interacted and whether significant results emerged when processed through descriptive and inferential statistical techniques (more below).

After the socioeconomic data were collected, in-depth interviews and household history collection were conducted (Bernard 1995; Levy and Hollan 2000). All the interviews, except for two, were conducted in Spanish. The locations for interviews were

variable and all interviews were conducted at the convenience of the interviewee, which essentially revolved around their work and family schedule and occurred in the preferred location of their home. The average length of the interviews were one hour, with a couple interviews being only 30-40 minutes and approximately 24 interviews running 90 to 110 minutes. During the in-depth interviews the head of the household and, when available, the migrant themselves were interviewed.

Interviews were semi-structured and tape-recorded to ensure accurate reproduction of word choice and descriptors. Since the interviews were semi-structured there were prepared questions used to generate discussion, with the further flexibility to explore topics as they emerged. Thus, the topics discussed during interview sessions were a result of questions I had composed based on the hypotheses of the study and topics that respondents would independently discuss throughout the research project. The primary goal of the interviews was to determine how individuals perceived tourism development in and around Huatulco and what were the primary reasons for the initial out-migration patterns. Interviews covered the following issues (refer to table 2.1 for a more detailed listing of questions used in the interviews): 1) how respondents perceived the effects from tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco; 2) how resource access or traditional economic systems were altered or unchanged due to tourist development; 3) whether perspectives on standards of living had changed from tourism development; 4) what factors influenced decision-making on out-migration; 5) how out-migration patterns from Huatulco were sustained or what social networks were used; 6) what factors were considered when attempting to out-migrate; and 7) what factors were considered when attempting to rally from tourism development pressures, if any were present.

The household history collection, which was a component of the in-depth interviews, was similar to individual life history analysis by enabling an understanding of changes within the household structure over time based on individualized accounts (refer to table 2.1, particularly topic numbers one, two, and eight). It was argued that out-migration was part of a response to larger social and economic structural conditions; therefore, the individual migrant was not acting alone and was embedded within household politics that determined the actions taken in response to tourism development. The household data enabled the identification of changing income patterns, economic activities, standards of living, household composition, and structural integrity throughout the phases of tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco.

Archival research was also conducted by myself and the second hired field assistant located through the *Universidad de Veracruzana*. To fully test this study's hypotheses it was necessary to determine if alternate local or regional developments other than tourism may have contributed to the patterns of Huatulco out-migration. To elucidate these alternate migration drivers a more basic ethnographic inquiry was employed. Specifically, a host of historical, political, and economic data were collected (primarily from the Mexican government statistical office INEGI or *Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática* located in both Oaxaca City and Xalapa – Huatulco lacked the necessary offices to collect archival data in situ). The field assistant collected most of her data from the INEGI offices in Xalapa. Any missing data sets or data that were not located by the field assistant were augmented through data collection conducted by myself. I collected a series of political and economic data from primarily from the INEGI offices located in Oaxaca City. This process occurred over a period of

approximately two months. Data collected began from the 1950s and extended until the most recent dates available. Our collections concentrated on economic growth rates; demographic characteristics in the area; growth rates among Huatulco industries; tourism development; local access to regional and national markets; infrastructural expansion such as telecommunications, roads, or water; and arable land and percentages in ownership. Migration rates in and out of Huatulco were collected; however, since most of Mexico-U.S. migration is arguably clandestine, regional data regarding population movement is accepted as imprecise. In this case, the *household history collection* complemented these data by tracing previous (if present) migration patterns and associated social networks. Essentially, these supplementary political and economic data sets provided historical contextualization and developed an informed understanding of the political economy within Huatulco, how Huatulco interacted with or was affected by regional and national politics, and provided a stronger basis for accepting or rejecting this study's hypotheses.

Data Analysis

Data analysis consisted of the following techniques: coding with NVivo 2.0, which also entailed coding for social networks (Bernard 1995; Freeman, et al. 1989; Richards 1999a, 1999b; Trotter 1999); descriptive and inferential statistics (Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero 2000; Madrigal 1998); and household socioeconomic stratification and frequency distribution (Madrigal 1998). Throughout the processes of data analysis and writing, all the data were contextualizing within a political ecology/economy framework (see above and, for example, Greenberg and Park 1994).

Prior to data analysis taped interviews were transcribed in the field primarily by hired transcriptionists. The first field assistant also transcribed interviews since she was fully bilingual. I keyed all interviews into the computer and I transcribed eight interviews on my return to the United States. I developed codes for all fieldnotes and interview sessions using NVivo 2.0. The most salient themes, categories, and keywords in interview sessions were identified, coded, and analyzed with NVivo. For instance, some of the salient themes and keywords for respondents were or centered on the following: FONATUR, land prices, the use of *grupos* or groups, crossing *mojado* or wet (i.e. illegally), job availability, the use of the term *carisimo* (or very expensive), or the use of the term *lento* (or slow) to describe tourism growth. Beyond certain key word or theme identification, the use of NVivo 2.0 enabled coding interviews to present the rich qualitative descriptions derived from tape-recorded interview sessions and simultaneously identify the most salient categories/topics discussed by the respondents. For example, respondents consistently mentioned that tourism development had made it more difficult to buy land or that FONATUR limited the regions economic development by only focusing on more affluent tourism growth; respondents would later provide more detailed examples. Through the process of coding I was able to essentially catalog parts of each interview into a particular topic, at which point I could later explore a topic (for example “Dangers Encountered when Crossing the Border”) and any interview where this topic was discussed would be pulled up.

In order to determine if there were intra-community variations in economics and social networks that affected who strategically decided to out-migrate, the comprehensive socioeconomic data were entered into SPSS and underwent analysis using frequency

distributions along with descriptive and inferential statistics (see for example Madrigal 1998). One of the main benefits of using frequency distributions is the ability to simplify large data sets and present the data in a “crunched” form such as cumulative frequencies or valid percents. Descriptive and inferential statistics offer the ability to 1) organize, describe, and run analysis between dependent and factor variables and 2) make predictions or inferences about a sample population and the larger population from observations of the quantitative data, in combination with qualitative data. For instance, it is possible to use SPSS to run a descriptive explorer or cross-tabulation to determine if there are differences in the amount of migrant remittances based on the gender of the migrant, the age of the migrant, his/her marital status, etc. While I originally anticipated conducting multivariate regression and chi-square analysis, these statistical analysis methods were excluded based on the size of the sample, the shape of the sample, what sampling method was used, and the types of data. After consideration and meetings with statistical consulting services at the University of Georgia and Dr. Ben Blount, it was determined that frequency distributions and descriptive/inferential statistics were best suited for this study.

Lastly, the social networks present and what types of support or service they offered to migrants (Trotter 1999) were identified and coded using NVivo 2.0. As discussed in chapter three, social networks can be a defining factor in the resources available to a migrant when making their decision to risk migration. Interviews were coded for some of the following main themes for the social networks available to or used by migrants: whether there were friends or family in the U.S. that would assist them upon arrival; the state they would reside in and why; how community members relied upon

each other if a migrant was gone; who a migrant might rely on during his/her attempt to cross; how the migrant's job was (or would be) located upon arrival; or whether there were multiple migrations for a migrant and why and how these multiple crossings occurred.

Before the results of the data analysis are presented in the analysis chapter, it is first necessary to supply some supplementary information regarding Huatulco tourism development. In the following chapter the main strains of thought regarding development (and specifically tourism development) and migration are presented. These themes are used in part to understand the history of Huatulco and how tourism was implemented by the state, which is explored in detail in chapter four. The foundational material covered in chapters three and four will illuminate the data in chapter five, which illustrates how tourism development influenced out-migration patterns from Huatulco.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter addresses the concerns of development, specifically tourism development, and the wide bodies of literature regarding Mexico-U.S. migration. (Concerning the exact history on Mexican economic policy and the nation's eventual adoption of tourism development in the 1970s, these data are provided in the following chapter.) The tourism industry within this chapter is viewed as a distinct subsection of development. With tourism embedded within development, it is possible to examine the role of the state in the direction and management of the industry as an export-oriented strategy. While tourism is often regarded as a creation solely of market forces, this chapter orients itself to both the state as an active participant in the promotion and direction of tourism development⁶ and of the push for tourism development by the World Bank or other international development organizations. Therefore, while chapter four highlights some of the specifics regarding Mexico's adoption of tourism starting primarily in the 1970s (which ultimately led to the creation of Huatulco in 1984), this chapter examines the structure of tourism, why it might require direct state involvement, and why it became an emerging priority for many developing nations after World War II. These discussions will frame why the Mexican government took an active role starting in the mid 1980s to create Huatulco as a premier tourist destination in the following chapter.

The last half of this chapter centers on the literature attempting to explain patterns in Mexico-U.S. migration. Primary foci for much of the migration literature, at least in terms of factors sustaining or enabling migration, are in the fields of social networks and

⁶ For a more detailed analysis specifically regarding Mexican tourism development see chapter three.

human capital formation. Much of this literature review is based in these literature bodies and in the explorations of labor migration. To understand the history behind social network construction and its influence on human capital formation, two key international policies or programs – the Bracero Program and the Green Revolution – are examined to understand the formation of migrant networks still active today and to provide examples of push-pull factors. By discussing these programs it will provide an example of how structural variables interrelate and create push-pull factors, ultimately facilitating migration network creation or influencing the impetus to out-migrate. These case examples will frame and help illuminate how tourism development in Huatulco has followed similar patterns in creating structural variables such as resource restriction, in turn influencing rates of regional out-migration.

Development to Quality of Life Indexes

The concept of development that emerged primarily in the 1950s and 1960s often represented the world as that of linear progression where the North was advanced, prosperous, and healthy, and the South was not. It was argued that through globally-concerted efforts, technological inputs, and/or structural adjustments the South would complete their transition to the Northern example (Gardner and Lewis 1996). Essentially such comprised the view of modernization theory, which in part recognized one path to economic development. In the post-World War II era development took hold and the “Global South” found themselves labeled as “undeveloped” or “underdeveloped,” thanks in no small part to President Truman’s Bold New Program. It was believed that through the cooperative work of national governments and the emerging international aid and

development institutions the alleviation of poverty and suffering could be achieved in developing countries, where ultimately a more equitable world would be created.

The very nature of the endeavor to eliminate poverty and suffering on a global scale required global connections between countries and the flow of substantial international aid. Unsurprisingly, vast bodies of literature that critique and attempt to understand the concept and practice have been spawned in the field of development theory. Within these bodies of literature several lines of contention for academics and practitioners have been drawn. For some development might be thought of as a state of being, it might be thought of as a process, or it might be a simultaneous interaction of a state and of practice. That is, most often when social and economic changes are being discussed, development is thought of as processual. Development may also refer to a condition or a state of being (e.g. Thailand may be classified as “undeveloped” or “developing” and Great Britain as “developed”).

According to Freidmann (1980) development might also contain a structure since it is always something that is developed. One might develop a region, a nation, a people, or an industry. This suggests that “development has a structure and the analyst has some idea of how this structure ought to be developed” (ibid: 14). Of course, such a view is often placed under the umbrella of economic growth. For example, if a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) is high, then that is a key indicator of developmental success. Others have drawn finer distinctions between economic growth and development, where the former is quantitative and the latter is qualitative. What this entails then is a move from purely economic variables to quality of life variables. Development begins to embody the general improvements in peoples’

lives: raising their standards of living, improving the social and material well-being of society as a whole, increasing the ability of future generations to care for themselves, equally distributing resources and benefits, and enabling accessible healthcare, education, and welfare facilities (Bernstein 1973; Mehmet 1978; O'Dowd 1967; Varma 1980). The measurement of GNP or other macroeconomic indicators simply cannot measure all of these achievements. For example, in the case of Mexico, following the 1982 Debt Crisis and the austerity programs imposed on the government by the IMF and the United States, the actual standard of living declined in many of the poorer southern states such as Oaxaca, Chiapas, or Guerrero (Gonzalez 1993; Murphy and Stepick 1999; Tamayo-Flores 2001). What this reflects is that, while a country may experience substantial economic growth in its GDP, this does not imply that such growth is equitably distributed; some may actually be more disadvantaged than before.

The difficulty for many development practitioners (current or historical) is the incongruity between what might appear on one hand as economic growth and capital expansion, yet in the other as increasing poverty and social and economic disparities (for earlier explorations of this discrepancy see for example Chenery and Syrquin 1973, 1989; Kuznets 1966, 1971). As early as 1957 Myrdal stressed the need to “transcend the then conventional segregation of economic and noneconomic factors in order to understand development in dynamic and relational terms, rather than as a static condition of backwardness” (cited in Sofield 2003: 31). Intellectuals within the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) to those in Development Studies at the University of Sussex (and again Myrdal in his 1970 *The Challenge of World Poverty*) produced stinging critiques of development for having failed its objectives, despite

leading impressive economic growth in certain countries. Development had unfortunately not alleviated poverty or suffering in many nations or regions.

There were certain bodies of literature most easily grouped under topics such as modernization theory, widening gap theory, take-off theory, and big-push theory that argued more time was required before the work in development would eliminate poverty (see for example, Mehmet 1978; Rostow 1960, 1971; Rosenstein-Rodan 1963).

Researchers within these theories argued it was unreasonable to assume economic growth and social transformations would occur within a few short years. However, other critics often cited that the above theories were at times ahistorical, supported a continuation of colonialism in a new package, and placed the developing nations as dependent on the developed world. Authors such as Amin (1976), Baran (1957), Emmanuel (1972), Frank (1966, 1967), Rodney (1972), Wallerstein (1974), and Wolf (1982) all produced some of the earliest critiques on the structure of development and its seeming inability to address the very real problems those in the global South faced.⁷ One of the more prominent problems that emerged early within development projects was the issue in unemployment. In countries such as Thailand, development was accompanied by rising unemployment as the mechanized technology imported or domestically produced through large capital investment programs proved increasingly efficient (Sofield 2003), which in turn squeezed more people from production jobs even though high population growth rates continued. What was needed was a means to create not only a capital intensive

⁷ While early critiques and structural evaluations of development were no doubt important, later researchers employed a postmodern and discursive deconstruction of the very nature of power within development (see for example Cooper and Packard 1997; Cooper 1996, 1997; Escobar 1988, 1995, 1999; Ferguson 1994, 1997; Foucault 1980; Keeley 1990; Sachs 1992; Said 1979). These authors and the works generated in this vein have argued that knowledge and the world are socially, historically, and politically constructed. Development uses a specific corpus of techniques and phraseologies to create the world in a particular manner, constructed for intervention, at which point the First World acts upon their creation with subordination, control, and extraction.

industry, but also a labor intensive one, where economic growth would couple with job creation for expanding workforces.

In the attempts to reconcile some of these deficiencies within development (as pointed out by authors or institutions such as Myrdal, Frank, Rodney, or the ECLA), tourism was increasingly viewed with optimism. There were certain structural variables within the tourism industry itself that made it attractive not only to developing countries, but also to the international community, who increasingly pushed for its development as one means to eliminate some of the problems associated with development through industrialization (e.g. higher levels of unemployment).

Tourism, Development, and the State

As the specific history of the Mexican government's focus on tourism development as a means to balance payments, meet trade deficits, and overcome some of the shortcomings of ISI are thoroughly discussed in the next chapter, this section will primarily discuss the general trends within tourism development and the various roles the state may play in its growth. The latter is quite important to Mexico. While tourism over the past twenty years has seen an increase in private investment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the industry has remained an important component for many developing nations to manage and control. The reasons for such involvement, when other economic indicators might point to a seemingly logical release of the tourism industry to private-sector investors, actually lie within the inherent characteristics of the tourism industry. As the following chapter traces out the historical antecedents of why tourism development was chosen by the Mexican government, this chapter highlights

some of the structures *of* tourism and why it might necessitate direct government involvement.

Much of the initial research in tourism studies centered on the pre- and post-World War II divisions. That is, the tourism industry was of a different nature in the early 1900s. Travel was primarily confined to a small economic elite, most of whom originated from Europe or the United States. Travel was fanciful and international travelers' journals were a mover when in print; it was one way to experience the exotic "otherness" of a people never before seen or known. Even domestic tourism was limited to those with the capital to finance cross-country excursions. However, in the post-World War II economic boom a host of factors changed that opened the door of international travel to mostly U.S. and European populations. Significant here was the accessibility of travel for the average person. Larger segments of the population experienced increased leisure time due to the economic growth in the post-World War economic climate. Combined with both the technological advances and efficiencies in transportation and the international lift on foreign exchange and international travel imposed during the World Wars, the opportunity for cheap travel increased dramatically. According to Honey (1999) as domestic tourism increased in Europe and the United States, those displeased by overcrowded and unpleasant conditions with already established national parks, such as Yosemite National Park or the Grand Canyon National Park, expanded outward seeking serenity and pristine beauty overseas.

One of the problems of course was creating the infrastructure to handle the increased arrival of international tourists. As will be shown in the case of Mexico (chapter four), the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) played

substantial roles in supplying the necessary capital for Third World governments to initiate a host of tourism development projects. Such was not unique to Mexico or even Latin America. In South East Asia, most notably Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore, planned tourism growth was made possible with substantial aid in western capital (Burns and Holden 1995). The goal was bolstering the overall economy and tourism was a component among many. If substantial growth occurred in one segment of the economy, it would ideally act as a catalyst to further economic development in others. Additionally, while jet engines, automotive production, and general industrialization characterized economic growth in the North, tourism was optimistically viewed as a ‘smokeless’ industry that the South might benefit from (Gunn 1993; Honey 1999; Mathieson and Wall 1996; McLaren 1998; Nicholson-Lord 1997). Governments in the South were encouraged to adopt tourism, supposedly a cleaner version of economic development and an economic development package that would circumvent the pollution problems associated with the North’s industrial revolutions. Encouragement for tourism occurred on the one hand from the substantial quantifiable growth experienced in the industry, and on the other hand, from the willingness of international lenders to supply the funds necessary to initiate the industry. These features, when set against a backdrop of frequently volatile commodity markets and declining terms of trade, supplied the push for tourism development in many developing countries (Sofield 2003).

Yet, with tourism’s outward expansion came the view of the industry as a form of neocolonialism or that tourism was created in the South based on the desires of dominant foreign interests (see Britton 1982, 1984, 1991; Lea 1988; Richter 1989, 1991). In many cases this was true. Even within Mexico, despite a strong governmental initiative to

create tourism as a source of GDP, there was a reliance on the capital supplied by international banks and foreign investors. However, this does not diminish the role state agencies in the South had in the development of tourism; they were not passive acceptors of Northern influence. There was a perceived benefit on their part and there was a perceived benefit for the North. The situation was never black and white; the economic possibilities within tourism's 10 percent or more annual growth rates proved attractive.

The difficulty for developing nations became to continue tourism growth. If tourism dropped and economic growth halted or declined, loans acquired from international development institutions still existed. The problem with increasing tourism revenues, or even maintaining them at a given level, is that tourism relies on a particular product often based on geographic diversity and the unending search for the new, other-worldly 'paradise' (Bosselman, Peterson, and McCarthy 1999). Combined with technological advances in transport and information systems, the competition between tourist destinations to capture a piece of world tourism revenue is high. Likewise, the "technologically advanced distribution channels permit [many] to receive the most up-to-date multimedia information on the best connections, and at the best prices, for the most attractive destinations in the world" (ibid: 6). The world market of tourism has become a buyer's market. Primarily based on the consumerism of the west (see table 3.1 for a breakdown of the top world tourist senders), tourism in the age of globalization has also increasingly been tied to name recognition, comfort, and convenience. What happens is a rise in the metatourism system, a standardization of many destinations as indistinguishable commodities, where the substitutability of one sun, sand, and sea destination is possible with another (see also Ascher 1985). The growth in

standardization has become problematic within tourism. However, it is in many ways built on the very structure of the industry and its ‘life stages.’

The stages of economic development proposed by Rostow (1960) to explain the development apparatus of the post-World War era, distinguished five stages of growth: the traditional society; the pre-conditions for take-off; take-off; the drive to maturity; and the period of high mass consumption. Such rigid views on development arguably are inadequate to manage the diversity found in international economic growth and expansion. “To maintain that every economy follows the same course of development with a common past and an identical future is to over schematise the complex forces of development and to give the sequences of stages a generality that is unwarranted” (Wahab and Cooper 2001: 8). The problems with overarching models that attempt to explain international development often fail to recognize the shared histories between nations. The picture is more complex. The same is true with tourism to some extent.

Table 3.1: Rank of the top ten tourist sending nations as of 2002.

Rank of Sending Nation	International Tourism Expenditures (US\$ Billion)
1) The United States	58
2) Germany	53.2
3) United Kingdom	40.4
4) Japan	26.7
5) France	19.5
6) Italy	16.9
7) China	15.4
8) Netherlands	12.9
9) Hong Kong (China)	12.4
10) Russian Federation	12
Source: World Tourism Organization 2003	

There have been a series of economic growth models attempting to explain the life stage of a tourist destination (e.g. the Banff Centre School of Management's 1970s self-destruct theory of tourism). Unlike Rostow's stages of economic growth or even Modernization theory, tourism life stages have been shown to, if nothing else, correctly suggest that destinations constantly change (Wahab and Cooper 2001). In most cases the life stages of a tourist destination move through the cycle starting at discovery/creation, then growth, followed by maturity, and culminate in regeneration, stagnation, or decline (see Butler 1980, 1993). Using these ideas as heuristic devices it is possible to see how these stages might apply to tourism development in the global South. In most cases tourism is based on the shared history of consumption, notably Western consumption as illustrated in the above table on the top three world tourist sending markets. As the industry is opened to larger segments of the population, many tourists have taken to prepackaged tours and are in general less affluent than many of the tourists in the early to mid twentieth century. They spend less on arrival and often demand most of the conveniences inherent in their native country; name recognition is increasingly important (e.g. Club Med, Best Western, Hilton, or Hertz).

Standardization of the tourist destination eventually occurs – much like airports throughout the world, where one essentially serves all the functions, and in much of the same structural setting, of another airport halfway around the world. There is a comfort associated with the common that many tourists desire and this “common” is frequently associated with large multinational or international corporations and their name recognition. The combination of multinational corporations and standardization does not negate the capital expenditures associated with the industry. In many cases, and in

virtually all the cases associated with tourism development via loans through the World Bank or the IDB, the tourism development schemes have been top-heavy and capital intensive, which creates a desire for governments or aid agencies to perpetuate the industry. However, unlike manufacturing industries where products are purchased and consumed repeatedly (e.g. computers, clothing, or cars), tourism “involves consumption *at and of* the site itself” (Clancy 2001a: 116). For most tourists going to Huatulco, Bangkok, or Jakarta, once is enough. When consumption takes place, the experience had, and the novelty spent, tourists look for the new location, the other “other.”

According to Bauman (1997) tourists may always find a new experience by breaking out onto the road at the moments notice when something has become dull, lackluster, or common. The point of the tourist life is to be on the move, to participate in spectacle and gaze. They choose where and with what parts of the world to interface with and when to switch off the interaction. In most cases the world is just too irresistibly attractive to go back to a site already experienced. Urry (1990) employs semiotics to discuss this tendency. “The fundamental motivation and activity of individual tourists is to collect and consume signs, attached to which are meaning. Once these signs are collected, however, there may be little reason to return to a given site” (as cited in Clancy 2001a: 116). An inherent problem within the tourism industry is the generation of repeat business. Given the life stages of tourism, it is entirely possible for a destination to be discovered, have its peak, and enter into stagnation or decline. This has been the general experience in Cancun and Acapulco, which have annually drawn a smaller percentage of foreign tourists arriving in Mexico since the mid to late 1990s (INEGI 2003). To maintain tourists levels growing or consistent, constant planning and

promotional efforts are required. Therefore, businesses within tourism are on a perpetual scramble due to the very characteristics of its industry.

Once this is applied to the state level it is evident that government and state actors have a vested interest in encouraging renewal. Even if a tourist goes to San Cristobal and does not return, it is still a goal to have the old tourist visit other areas in Mexico and to have new tourists visit San Cristobal for their first time. Loans from the World Bank and the IDB still must be paid, and tourism is a massive component of many Third World nations. In fact, according to the WTO, in 2003 tourism receipts generated over 8 billion dollars for Mexico. The money involved in the industry is nothing short of awe-inspiring. Staying current with the tourist market – creating new resort areas and rejuvenating old ones – in many ways necessitates direct government involvement in the industry. Attempts to “recreate” old tourist destinations to “re-appeal” to previous tourists require promotion, planning, and at times infrastructure construction. Unfortunately, renewal projects in tourism are inherently speculative. They involve new risks and private investors are hesitant to devote capital to what is frequently labeled a precarious industry. Part of the problem in generating enough private investment to ‘create’ new forms of tourism is due to tourism’s placement in the global system.

“What happens in one country, be it receiving or generating, has repercussions on other countries. The economic fortunes of countries that rely on tourism are inexorably linked to the social trends and wellbeing of the countries that generate the tourists” (Burns and Holden 1995: 81). Since the 1990s there have been several broad trends within the global South that have and undoubtedly will continue to profoundly impact foreign tourist arrivals: questions of political stability; rising crime and issues of tourist

safety; cultural receptiveness; adequate infrastructure to handle the tourist body; and the most recent alterations to international travel prompted by the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. International connections in tourist travel such as these understandably create hesitation for the private tourism sector. As such, many developing nations (Mexico is no exception) find themselves playing their previous role of financier and entrepreneur that they possibly adopted in the 1970s.⁸ During that time state involvement was logical not only to supplement private tourism investment, but the 1960s and 1970s experienced a host of features that made tourism development a logical choice: the global tourism boom, the increase in tourists originating from the largest sending markets, and the push by multilateral aid institutions for the development of tourism (see chapter four for greater detail in the Mexican case example).

To return to Mexico, even though tourism is big business in the nation, governmental involvement is required. Currently, government actions are based in tourism diversification and will likely continue throughout this decade. While FONATUR is completing construction on Huatulco, its involvement in megaprojects such as Cancun or Ixtapa has primarily ceded to all but the largest investment groups, where the state's role ranges from promoter, to financier, to provider of infrastructure. However, during the 1990s the state initiated three diversification projects designed to continue Mexico's place as one of the premier tourist destinations in the world and to compete in an increasingly segmented tourist market (Clancy 2001a). "Colonial Cities"

⁸ Chapter four outlines the chronological development of the tourism industry in Mexico starting in the late 1960s. Particularly focused on is the creation of five tourism "poles" due in large part from a 1969 report released by *Banco de Mexico*, which focused on the positive effects that would likely accrue from Mexico's participation in the emerging international tourism economy. At the time loans were secured from the World Bank and the IDB to initiate tourism development projects in some of the poorest and lowest populated areas in Mexico since private investment (and interest) was lacking.

attempts to capture the tourist market interested in historical attractions in quaint, mid-sized cities located primarily in the interior. “Mundo Maya,” funded in part by the European Union and a joint venture with four other Central American countries⁹, promotes attractions to ancient ruins in southern Mexico. The focus here is regrettably *only* on history. Contemporary Mayan communities and their cultures are explicitly underplayed in the program (see also Martens 1999; Pi-Sunyer and Thomas 1997). The last program is a hybridization of the ongoing megaprojects, i.e. the five poles. During the Presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), FONATUR and SECTUR cooperatively announced plans for the continuation of the megaproject, albeit smaller in scope and more exclusive than the 1970s five poles. The new megaprojects centered on creating a series of self-contained mini-resorts complete with lodging, transportation, and recreational services. In general, the resorts are directed towards higher-end, affluent tourists in the hopes of capturing some of the elite tourism primarily associated with Europe. Many of the megaprojects are gated enclaves, cutoff from surrounding communities, and feature amenities such as yachts, golf courses, and luxury condominiums and hotels. One of the most recent, Puerto Cancún, calls for a series of canals modeled after residential Venice. The slated overall cost is \$1.5 billion US. Hotels that charge less than \$300 a night are excluded from constructing in the area.

Concluding Tourism and Development

There has been substantial economic growth in the tourism industry. Many economists might argue that increased privatization measures, free trade, and private investment would stimulate further growth in the industry (e.g. NAFTA). Their

⁹ The four Central American countries are Belize, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

argument is that the invisible hand of the market allocates resources optimally. When governments and outside agencies attempt to intervene they introduce distortions that cripple and wreak havoc on the economy. The validity of this statement is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, what has been argued is that tourism is unlike other manufacturing industries. Consumption of the tourist site, its experiences, and its “signs and meanings,” usually occurs once. Generating repeat business is challenging. The need for constant rejuvenation of the tourist site is high if countries are to appeal to tourists that have already visited sun, sand, and sea destinations or archaeological ruins. Renewing, diversifying, and staying current in a competitive world tourism market requires promoting, planning, and investing in new forms of tourism. This invariably involves speculative capital in new, non-established tourism industries; the attraction may be low for private investors. Ultimately, the inherent characteristics of tourism development necessitate government involvement.

For Mexico specifically, the macroeconomic successes of tourism have been unquestionably excellent by fulfilling two of the primary goals set out in the 1960s and 1970s: bolster the economy’s export sector and create jobs to assist with the rapidly expanding national workforce.¹⁰ There have been problems, however. Most notably on a microeconomic scale most of the industry’s economic gains have been garnered and controlled by small political and economic elites within Mexico. In Mexico the jobs in tourism are quite similar to jobs in other industries, which are unfortunately low-paying. Additionally, Mexican tourism has shared many of the same problems associated with tourism on a global scale. While originally billed as a smokeless industry – one that

¹⁰ During the 1960s and 1970s Mexico experienced similar problems with the connections between production efficiencies and unemployment that Thailand also experienced during the same decades. See above for more information or Sofield (2003).

would also assist in local development, raise standards of living, heighten cultural awareness, revitalize local culture traditions, and in certain segments of the tourism industry, contribute to conservation and scientific research while instilling a social and environmental consciousness among the growing tourist body – tourism around the world has shown to hold a body of negative consequences (see for example Blount 1998; Campbell 1999; Honey 1999; Gullette 2001; Mathieson and Wall 1996; McLaren 1998; Wall 1997; Young 1999). Primarily, researchers have argued that tourism furthered the penetration of the capitalist market into both people and nature. The results have ranged from commodifying people and nature as a product to be bought and sold; perverting the host culture; increasing drugs, prostitutions, crime¹¹, or violence in the host area; generating new forms of environmental degradation; marginalizing local communities from land or productive activities; and decreasing equitable levels of income, employment, and standards of living for local populations. According to Nicholson-Lord (1997: 14):

“Worldwide, tourism is a low-wage industry. For poor people, low wages may be better than no wages at all – but it’s a moot point. It depends, for example, on what alternatives they have, and sometimes people have no alternative because the government, in pursuit of a national tourism strategy, has moved them off their land or destroyed it to make way for beach resorts or holiday complexes or even golf courses.”

Some of these problems were present in Huatulco at the time of the study. In some respects, such problems influenced the patterns of out-migration from the region and immigration attempts to the US. Before we discuss how these factors interrelate with migration in the results and conclusion chapters, it is necessary to provide an overview of

¹¹ See Pizam 1982 for a converse argument on the associations between increasing tourism and crime.

the bodies of literature attempting to understand and explain international migration. Not all aspects of international migration will be explored below; rather, those topics most relevant to this dissertation and its data are discussed.

“Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States”:

Migration and Northern Shadows

Early in Mexico-U.S. history migration between the two countries went relatively unnoticed. In part this was due to the fact that Mexico and the United States both had frontiers instead of definable borders. There was consistent conflict between Mexico and the U.S. on exactly where the Mexico-U.S. border was placed. Yet, up until the mid 19th century movement in and out of the present day southwestern United States and northern Mexico occurred relatively freely as neither country cemented where one nation ended and the other began.¹² Even after the establishment of a definable Mexico-U.S. border – initiated in 1848 under the Treaty of Guadalupe and later under the Gadsden Purchase – Mexican migration to the United States went relatively unnoticed and those that crossed worried little with border checkpoints (Sánchez 1993). As certain Mexican families that had previously lived in Mexico found their national identity shift to that of a U.S. citizen, they still maintained family relationships with those residing in what is present-day Mexico. These family connections also began some of the social connections Mexican families in the U.S. and those remaining in Mexico. Essentially, these ‘social networks’ provided a means for some families to migrate, temporarily or permanently, to the U.S., where a strong attraction existed for those laborers attracted to southwestern U.S. wages.

¹² The problem was more problematical for Mexico as their northern frontier regions were dominated not so much by the central government in Mexico City, but by the emerging local elites and *caudillos* (Chasteen 1995, 93; Krauze 1997, 87-89; Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 1997).

For the most part, these early migration patterns were of little consequence to either country (Cardoso 1980). It was not until the early to mid twentieth century that Mexican immigration to the United States became a volatile topic. This does not deny restrictionist immigration laws throughout U.S. history. In fact, immigration laws sought to deny entry for immigrants from various countries into the U.S. as early as 1875.¹³ However, throughout most of the history between Mexico and the United States, international migration patterns were predominately economically-driven and excluded from some of the more racist and Anglo-Saxon racial superiorities targeted at Asian and Eastern European populations (see for example De Leon 1983). Further, as much of the early migration patterns between Mexico and the United States centered on economic labor, it was assumed that Mexican laborers would return to their country after working in the U.S. and saving what money they needed to live in Mexico. There was a greater threat of permanent residence for those migrating from Asia or Eastern Europe, or even those portions of migrants coming from countries such as Colombia, Guatemala, or Nicaragua, who most often engaged in international migration due to their countries' political instability and the associated fears of repression, murder, imprisonment, or persecution. For Mexico, however, most of the migrants entered the migrant stream based on economic incentives (Chavez, et al. 1990; Donato 1999; Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001; Jones 2001). This is not to deny alternate motivations for Mexico-U.S. migration (e.g., family connections, spousal abuse, or running from the Mexican

¹³ For the most part, restrictionist policies were based on prominent beliefs that immigrants inherently contained negative effects for the destination country. In the late nineteenth century this was primarily traced to 1) a substantial increase in the volume of immigration from southern and eastern Europe, 2) the economic recession in the U.S., 3) and the emerging popularity of a new ideology on the Anglo-Saxon racial superiority (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). The World Wars were most clearly accompanied by increased anti-immigration sentiment. The ideal was that immigrants were not "loyal" to the U.S. and could weaken the United States' presence in the war effort.

authorities). A blanket statement cannot address all of the intricacies within international migration. It is simply to state that for the most part migration has been economic in nature. The difficulty for researchers in Mexico-U.S. migration is to capture the dynamics of the phenomena, without the body of literature surrounding it to appear fragmented or haphazard. For the sake of clarity I have compartmentalized the research literature into somewhat distinct fields, while still recognizing interconnections between the literature bodies.

Economic Movements

Perhaps it is only logical that a majority of research on Mexico-U.S. migration contain economic components, especially when considering that most of the migration between the two countries is labor migration and U.S. policies seeking to control migration center on *Neoclassical Economic* analyses or the ideas of cost/benefit ratios.¹⁴ In this regard most of the labor migration has historically been viewed through “push-pull” factors. Yet, these push-pull factors are not always inherently economic in nature. For example, pull factors provide a motivation to migrate based on conditions in the destination country. These factors might range from employment and wages in the U.S., friends and family on the other side, access to food, or the availability of social services such as healthcare. Conversely, push factors are domestic conditions in the origin country that provide reasons why one might migrate. Push factors (not always economic nature) may cover issues such as crime, political persecution, spousal abuse, pollution, or qualities of life. Two of the most profound economic policies or projects that affected the

¹⁴ There are of course ideological components associated with Mexico-U.S. migration and those are discussed in the analysis and concluding chapters with regards to this study’s standards of living hypotheses. Further, Neoclassical Economic Theory is discussed in greater detail below.

flow and intensity of Mexico-U.S. migration were the Bracero Program and the Green Revolution, discussed here because each provides an example of a pull and push factor, respectively.¹⁵ Further, discussing these programs provides an example of how some structural variables interrelate and create push-pull factors, ultimately creating migration networks or the impetus to out-migrate. These two case examples will help illuminate how tourism development in Huatulco has followed similar patterns in creating structural variables such as resource restriction, ultimately influencing rates of out-migration. (The issue of social networks, some of which were born from migrant streams created during the Bracero and Green Revolution periods, is addressed in its own section below.)

Early in the twentieth century economic growth in the U.S. proved attractive to Mexicans: the booming production in coal and copper mines in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona; the growth of agricultural fields in California; and the large-scale urban construction in cities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Denver (Chavez 1998, see also Romo 1983). Likewise, for U.S. businesses Mexicans became a preferred source of alternative labor for several reasons: relative to Asian cultures, Mexican culture was more closely aligned to American culture (Chavez 1998); Mexicans were already established in the southwest; and Mexicans were commonly characterized as indolent and noncompetitive, two features that did not characterize how Asians were perceived (see

¹⁵ Other push-pull factors exist in Mexico-U.S. migration. For example, Durand and Massey (1992) stated that the *Reparto Agrario* – the ambitious program of land reform and redistribution implemented under President Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s – provided a push factor for Mexicans to migrate to the United States. The program attempted to curb the exodus of migration to the U.S. brought on by the Mexican Revolution by distributing land to the poor. The program broke down millions of hectares of land formerly held by wealthy landowners. These lands were then distributed as smaller plots to the campesinos who had traditionally worked them. It was thought that the *Reparto Agrario* would discourage migration since would-be migrants were faced with the prospect of acquiring land. The rules of the *Reparto* required that land remain in production, which forced campesinos to stay and tend their received land. However, Durand and Massey argued that the *Reparto Agrario* actually provided an incentive to migrate rather than the reverse. In certain communities campesinos were given land but not the capital or credit needed to acquire tools, seeds, fertilizers and other productive inputs. A pragmatic solution for many families was U.S. migration, a traditional source of ready cash.

for example Takaki 1989). As Mexican laborers possessed several attractive features for U.S. employers, the U.S. government initiated the Bracero program in 1942 (Donato 1994, González 2002, Massey and Espinosa 1997). Despite eschewing and repatriating Mexican laborers and their families during the Great Depression (Cardoso 1980; Chavez 1998; Hoffman 1974), during the 1940s the U.S. entered World War II, creating a new need for labor in the U.S. as many men and a small percentage of women moved into the military service. While some women began industrial work in factories, a labor shortage existed in both industry and agriculture. The U.S. turned to Mexico for a supply of unskilled and semiskilled workers. The Bracero Program allowed U.S. businesses (mostly agricultural) to recruit seasonal workers from Mexico for terms of employment in the U.S. that usually lasted less than eight months (García y Griego 1996). According to González (2002: 21):

“The Mexican government was initially reluctant [to participate in the program] fearing that the loss of workers would hurt Mexico’s economy. To the contrary, however, emigration out of Mexico helped reduce the effects of unemployment, low wages, and poverty there. As all braceros worked under seasonal contracts and intended to return to Mexico, the majority saved a large portion of their income and sent remittances (money orders, wire transfers) to their families.”

Both the money remitted to families remaining in Mexico and the money brought back to Mexico upon the braceros’ return injected capital into the Mexican economy, buoying it and certain Mexican communities (Taylor 1992).¹⁶ In fact, in 2004 Mexico’s central

¹⁶ See also Durand, Kandel, Parrado, and Massey (1996) who argued that the economic aspects of international migration and remittances are more dynamic than conventional models illustrate. It has been argued that international migration produces a cycle of dependency and stunts development in sending communities by raising material expectations without providing the means of satisfying them other than through additional migration. The authors argued, however, that two key aspects have not been appreciated. First, on an aggregate scale, even if migradollars are spent on consumptive goods rather than on community infrastructural development, those migradollars have multiplier effects. Migradollars relax family income expenditures, where more goods are purchased and a demand for domestic goods and

bank stated that migrant remittances or “migradollars” reached nearly \$13.226 billion US in 2003, surging 35.1 percent from the 2002 total of \$9.814 billion.¹⁷

Initiated as a temporary work program during World War II, the Bracero Program ran until 1964 when it was unilaterally cancelled by the United States. The Bracero Program’s expansion in the postwar era was due to the fact that it benefited both sides and proved irresistible to U.S. businesses who had grown accustomed to cheap sources of labor during the war. Products were produced at cheaper rates, Mexican laborers earned money for their families in Mexico, and the Mexican government found a system to reduce domestic pressures caused by unemployment and poverty (Chavez 1998; Donato 1994; González 2002). Yet, mounting pressures within Mexico and the United States among certain segments of the population who criticized the program, forced its cessation after twenty two years. The program’s criticisms centered on dismal working and housing conditions for the braceros, concerns of racism and discrimination activities, and the U.S. government ignoring undocumented workers who worked for lower wages and in poorer working conditions than the standards set by the Bracero Program (González 2002). In the U.S. it was a concern that U.S. businesses would employ migrant workers over domestically available labor forces, which was in direct conflict with the Bracero legislation. Political pressures from lobbying groups resulted in the program’s cessation on 31 December 1964.¹⁸ The long lasting effect of course was that the Bracero Program established many of the migration networks that contemporary migrants utilize for social

services are produced. Second, community studies have shown that communities are highly heterogeneous and diverse in their investment and allocation of migradollars. In some communities studied (e.g., Durand and Massey 1992), migradollars allocated to productive resources at times measured over 50 percent.

¹⁷ With the substantial growth, migrant remittances have become the nation’s second largest source of income, below oil exports and above tourism revenues.

¹⁸ While political pressures existed within Mexico to end the Bracero Program, the benefits of the program (e.g. remittances, reduced unemployment pressures) kept the program alive within the Mexican government. The program was cancelled by the U.S. Congress.

or financial support. Communities that actively participated in the Bracero Program currently utilize the social networks and human capital acquired during the program's twenty-two year span to actively participate in current migration to the U.S.

While the Bracero Program had substantial long-term effects on Mexico-U.S. migration, other U.S. involvement within Mexico produced economic and political conditions influencing Mexico-U.S. migration. Wilson (2000) traced the origins of some contemporary Mexico-U.S. migration patterns to the rise and perpetuation of the Green Revolution, which started in 1944 primarily through the Rockefeller Foundation and sought to increase the agricultural output of Mexican farming. The adoption of Green Revolution technologies propelled a differentiation of the peasantry in the Mexican countryside. The new and improved agricultural practices essentially represented an expensive alternative to traditional intercropping with indigenous plant varieties and techniques. Therefore, better-off peasants, who could afford the new equipment, took advantage of the technology and became capitalist farmers, producing for the market and hiring laborers. Poorer peasants, eventually forced to sell their lands, became landless wage-laborers or subsistence farmers. While many of the poorest migrated to burgeoning Mexican cities, it was young unmarried males and male heads of household with some capital to risk who pioneered the initial migration streams to the U.S. Those initial migrant streams, like those created through the Bracero Program, are still used today.

What the Bracero Program and the Green Revolution did was create a distinct subsection of the Mexican population which was gathering detailed knowledge of life and work in the U.S. Those initial migrant streams from communities throughout Mexico developed an extensive knowledge of how to enter the U.S. either legally or illegally,

along with information on employment opportunities, housing, safety, and cultural receptiveness (see Chavez 1998; Durand and Massey 1994; Kandal and Massey 2002; Monto 1994; Phillips and Massey 2000; Roberts and Frank 1999). The social networks and human capital created from either participating in the migrant stream or having access to those who have completed the process are what, in many ways, sustain and perpetuate Mexico-U.S. migration up to the present day. The difficulty for the U.S. government is to attempt to curb or control illegal crossings over the border when other factors (e.g. unemployment, poverty, standards of living inequities, or social networks) seemingly push for migration. Before we address the various legislations and acts created by the U.S. congress to deter illegal or undocumented migration, the issue of social networks and human capital formation should be discussed, as these have been heavily studied in Mexico-U.S. migration and proved vital for those migrants leaving Huatulco. A brief explanation will also be provided for the theoretical frameworks attempting to explain Mexico-U.S. migration at an international level.

¿Tienes familia en el otro lado?

Before discussing human capital formation and migrant social networks (referred to as either migrant networks or social networks), some of the theoretical paradigms that attempt to explain international migration should first be discussed. The migration paradigms that follow (while distinct from one another in certain ways) share various attributes, two of the most important being human capital and social networks. These two ideas are autonomous enough to stand alone; however, their importance in migration research has effectively found their incorporation into the various theoretical frameworks.

Perhaps it is best to view the following paradigms – *Neoclassical Economics*, the *New Economics of Migration*, *Segmented Labor Market Theory*, and *World Systems Theory* – as blanket theories (analogous to Modernization or Dependency Theory) that attempt to explain migration on a macro-scale. Human capital and social networks are then included within these frameworks, acting as micro-indicators and motivators of migration. For example, social networks may be stripped down to the interpersonal relationships between a possible migrant and a previous migrant, yet still remain aware of the larger structural conditions influencing migration.

Historically U.S. policies attempted to control migration based on the understandings supplied through *Neoclassical Economics* (Massey and Espinosa 1997), which assume that migrants make a cost-benefit calculation in their decision to migrate. In the case of Mexico, it is hypothesized that migrants determine what the difference is between what they earn or might earn in Mexico as opposed to the wage possibilities in the U.S. If U.S. policies are capable of raising the costs of crossing illegally by increasing border patrol and decreasing the possibilities of finding work through imposed employer sanctions, then it is assumed that U.S. policies will stop migration. Additionally, denying services such as healthcare or education to illegal migrants is assumed to cut any additional inducement for undocumented entry (see for example California Proposition 187). Frequently, however, the binational wage gap (i.e. what one earns in Mexico and what they expect to earn in the U.S.) are often divergent enough that the costs rarely outweigh the benefits (see Harris and Todaro 1970; Todaro 1969, 1976). Additionally, as shown below, human capital and social networks often function to lower the risks or costs associated with migration.

To compensate for some of these shortcomings, the *New Economics of Migration* was developed to counter Neoclassical Economics' narrow focus on labor markets and wages (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Taylor 1991; Stark 1991; Taylor 1986). This framework was based in "risk assessment" and on the understanding that markets fluctuate on a global scale. That is, given the volatility of markets and their possible failure, "which are common in developing countries such as Mexico, people migrate not only to reap a higher stream of lifetime earnings but also to manage risk and gain access to capital that will enable them to finance consumer purchases and production activities" in the future (Massey and Espinosa 1997: 953; see also Katz and Stark 1986; Lewis 1954). For example, acquiring wages based in the U.S. dollar would help insulate an individual or a family from Mexican price inflation and currency devaluation, a problem that has posed considerable difficulty for the Mexican government. Migration in this regard is not short-term or based on vagaries at a given point in one particular market; rather, it is based on larger understandings of historical instability and what one might do to protect themselves.

The last two – *Segmented Labor Market Theory* and *World Systems Theory* – attempt a more interrelated global understanding of migration. *Segmented Labor Market Theory* posits that based on the structure of postindustrial, globalized economic life, immigration is inherent within the system (ibid; see also Piore 1979). *Segmented Labor Market Theory* holds similarities to Dependency Theory of the 1960s, which argued industrialization in the North was only possible as underdevelopment occurred in the South. *Segmented Labor Market Theory* argues that Mexico-US migration is not caused by the binational wage gap, the formation of human capital, the establishment of migrant

networks, or collapses within Mexican financial markets; rather, it is caused by the intrinsic characteristics of the developed world and their requirement for a readily available supply of cheap immigrant labor (e.g., the implementation of the Bracero Program). Lastly, *World Systems Theory*, while originally developed by Wallerstein (1974) to examine the effects of the burgeoning global capitalist market in the sixteenth century, has in this case been applied to migration studies. World Systems Theory supplies a foundation to understand how the capitalist market penetrates into “peripheral societies such as Mexico, [creating] a mobile population that is prone to migrate, especially since capitalist development is seen as bringing about social and economic transformations that displace people from traditional livelihoods and force them onto transnational labor markets” (Massey and Espinosa 1997: 955). With this understanding a World Systems model may be applied to community level studies – the scale most often used to understand human capital formation and social networks. Once at the community level, for example in Huatulco, the World Systems model is applicable to areas undergoing economic development and ones connected with regional, national, and international markets. It is in these contexts that migrant social networks and human capital are established. The remainder of this section will focus on these two aspects.

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The most direct impacts of a *migrant/social network* or *human capital* are that they often function to provide services and reduce the costs and risks associated with undocumented crossings into the United States (Coleman 1988; Lattes, Santibañez, and Castillo 1998; Phillips and Massey 2000; Reyes and Mameesh 2002; Zahniser 1999).¹⁹ A

¹⁹ Social Networks and Human Capital Formation may be collapsed into one entity under *Social Capital Theory*. However, I view these two particular components of migration as distinct enough to warrant

social network may best be defined as “any socioeconomic linkage that facilitates migration between the origin and contemplated destination of a prospective migrant” (Zahniser 1999: 3). Since a social network may be based on any socioeconomic linkage, the examples are numerous: families that have historically participated in migration; the formation of daughter communities in the U.S.; migrants assisting other migrants based on shared experiences or shared origins; weaker networks (i.e. community networks), where information regarding crossing are shared between acquaintances or coworkers; previous migrants subsidizing other prospective migrants’ crossings; or the location and utilization of *polleros* or *coyotes* (individuals who receive payment to sneak migrants across the border).²⁰ Many of these network examples were uncovered within the data collected in Huatulco. The importance of course is that the presence of these networks usually presents migration as a more attractive economic alternative to employment within Mexico. These networks usually reduce the risk of crossing and the location of employment in the U.S. However, networks are not always beneficial. ‘Bad’ migrant networks exist, with examples ranging from abuse by family members in the United States when a new migrant arrives to migrants in the U.S. dispersing poor information regarding where a new migrant might locate a job to rejecting migrants upon their arrival into the U.S. The presence of good or bad networks indicates that knowing someone in

separate discussion. Under the *Social Capital Theory*, both human capital and migrant networks are combined into “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Massey and Espinosa 1997). That is, connections with current or former U.S. migrants establish valuable social assets as these connections are used to acquire information that reduce the costs and risks of entering the U.S. However, these connections, and the transfer of knowledge and information, are lumped with human capital or social capital because, over time, each act of migration creates additional social capital (i.e., the knowledge of migration gathered through networks), which promotes more migration and in turn creates more social capital formation. The two essentially become the same under *Social Capital Theory* and leave little room for the examination of human capital formation for those individuals without a durable support network (Coleman 1988).

²⁰ In southern Mexico, especially in Huatulco, the more common term was *pollero* to describe these individuals. The rough translation of a *pollero* is a chicken herder/farmer.

the U.S. does not open the door to migration; rather, the networks “reflect the state of interpersonal relationships between migrants and potential migrants” (ibid: 17).

Human capital, in the context of migration studies, refers to the knowledge, skills, and techniques an individual acquires through directly or indirectly participating in a migration network.²¹ These skills and knowledge are applied to the destination country and the location of employment. If for example, a migrant has made repeated crossings into the U.S., then they have gathered information on where to go, who to talk to, and where to find work. In comparison, a migrant that has never crossed nor has any family or friends in the U.S., is faced with a more complicated transition to life and work in the U.S. Therefore, it is the goal of migrants entering the U.S. for the first time to tap into this reservoir of knowledge generated from previous migrants and their experiences. The combination of human capital and migrant social networks presents a host of positives: reducing the risk associated with locating a *pollero*, lowering the probability of being deported, increasing personal safety, locating employment, decreasing the costs of migration, etc.

Based on the availability or presence of human capital and social networks it is argued that they essentially perpetuate the migrant stream. This is what Massey, et al. (1994) referred to as *Cumulative Causation in Migration*. Likewise, if networks encourage or facilitate participation in migration, then they might also shorten the length of time a migrant remains in Mexico before going to the U.S., either as new or repeat

²¹ Most of the U.S. research examines migration strictly from an international perspective – migration from Mexico to the United States. Research examining migration within Mexico has received much less attention in recent years (Zahniser 1999; see also Corona Vázquez 1982). It is argued that the novelty of such research has worn off or that the continual economic problems within Mexico have precluded migrating from, for example, Huatulco to Veracruz. During my study I encountered numerous individuals that had migrated to Huatulco, had left Huatulco for another location and returned, or had plans to leave Huatulco for another location within Mexico. However, as my research was constructed around international migration, internal migration was excluded as an area of primary focus.

migrant. Whether social networks affect the duration of stays in the U.S. has yet to be determined; however, qualitative examples were collected during my research indicating migrants without access to other human capital or social networks usually had shorter durations in the U.S., often because it was difficult to locate employment.

While social network studies are important to migration research and have relevance to this study, they have drawbacks. Researchers may fail to examine social networks on a temporal scale, where the networks themselves are acted upon and change. The work of Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2000) examined this problem. The authors argued that family networks, or the “strong ties” between close friends and kin, initially provided information on the costs and benefits, dangers and safeties, restrictions and possibilities of international migration. However, strong tie networks were replaced in importance overtime by community networks, or the “weak ties” between acquaintances. Once weak networks are established in a community and act as source for information on migration, there is a decreased need to have immediate family in the U.S. as sources of information on crossing or locating employment. Ultimately, either networks – family or community – may provide information and assistance on migration and thus, strongly mitigate a household’s decision to send an individual to the U.S. This is similar to the “prevalence ratio” proposed by Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994). The prevalence ratio states that if a given community has a higher than average percentage of emigration, then certain families lacking direct migration experience or friends and family who migrated may still benefit from the migration networks present in the community. The knowledge would be present, either through weak or strong ties.

An additional problem with social network studies is the applicability of a micro-level study to a macro-level (Winters, et al. 2000). Durand and Massey (1992) argued that while researchers attempt to make valid empirical generalization on migration and networks, they often do so without acknowledging how the local structural conditions (economic, political, cultural, or ecological) shape and determine the migrant flow. The results are inconsistent and contradictory results and generalizations when applied to a national level phenomenon. It was argued that a more fruitful approach to developing general statements about Mexico-US migration is to focus on how community variables interact with individual and household processes to produce actions of migration. Individual community studies would be aggregated to a whole.

By adopting a local approach researchers would be capable to determine how the processes of migration are shaped and differentiated by structural variables at the community level. These variables might range from: 1) the age of the migration stream (e.g., how long migration has been established in the community and how overtime migration becomes less class specific and gender specific as more women take an active role in U.S. labor markets); 2) the degree to which resources are equitably distributed in the community and how this might initiate migrant streams; 3) the niche in the U.S. labor market where a community's migrants first become established; and 4) the geographic, political, and economic position of the community within Mexico (e.g., how Southern states developed associations with migration due to their marginalization from central and northern Mexico's economic development, as exemplified by NAFTA and the *maquiladoras*).

Liberalization and Restriction:

U.S. Policies Handling International Migration

While the presence of push-pull factors in migration influence whether an individual participates in migration (for example in this study the processes of changing views on standards of living, the restrictions to land access, the elimination of communal lands, the inflation of goods in Huatulco, the perceived job opportunities in the U.S., etc.), they are not ultimate determining factors. Decisions to migrate are weighed against the factors of finding ways to cross the border, minimizing the risk of assault, robbery, rape, or death, factoring the distance from friends and family in Mexico, and handling possible exploitation and extortion by Mexican *polleros*, U.S. vigilante groups, or dishonest employers. Most U.S. policies that attempt to curb undocumented migration to the U.S. know these factors and attempt to make the costs and risks of migration high enough that they overshadow any benefit possibly gained by the migrant. Many of these themes discussed below are returned to in the conclusion chapter when discussing possible avenues for addressing the illegal aspects of Mexico-U.S. labor migration. As such, their discussion here is required in brief as they have a bearing on recommendations made in the concluding remarks of the final chapter.

Historically U.S. immigration policies vacillated from seemingly one side to another. For instance, while the 1920s saw the first quantitative restriction on U.S. immigration through imposing quotas on the basis of national origin and on the national composition of the U.S.²², the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 ushered in a significant change over the 1924 policy by making the dominant qualifying criteria for migrant entry work skills and family connections (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). As

²² See the National Origins Quota Act of 1924.

programs such as the Bracero Program, Green Revolution, or *Reparto Agrario* influenced the location of substantial portions of Mexican communities in the U.S., many of those same individuals became citizens through U.S. nationalization measures (most of which occurred during the 1950s). Their contribution to the legal immigrant composition within the United States was substantial. Continued economic problems within Mexico and growing economic opportunities in the U.S., combined with the family reunification provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act, boosted the Mexican population within the United States. Essentially, previous migrants that settled in the U.S. would later sponsor other family members to come.

This growth of foreign born populations, coupled with economic recessions and budgetary problems for local and state governments during the late 1970s and early 1980s, helped introduce a wave of “neo-restrictionist” sentiment (Chavez 1998; Dunn 1996; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Immigrants became scapegoats for explaining why the U.S. experienced economic problems. A primary argument of the time was that immigrants drained social services.²³ There were also concerns over immigrants’ undesirable cultural traits. Increasing illegal or undocumented immigration could bring a variety of social ills. Migrants would perpetuate their ‘private culture’ thereby threatening mainstream U.S. culture and the country’s national sovereignty (Chavez 1998). A series of bills introduced in Congress in the 1980s culminated in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 (see also García y Griego 1988).

One of the more significant changes under the IRCA was imposing employer sanctions against those hiring undocumented migrants. It was argued that by requiring employers to verify the legal status of the migrant, the U.S. could regulate the labor

²³ See for example Proposition 187 in California.

market, control the flow of migrants by reducing the pull-factors, and raise the costs of migration since false documents had to be purchased. However, Kossoudji (1992) found that there have been no extraordinary shifts in the patterns of migration based on the implementation of the IRCA. It was shown that 32 percent of apprehended migrants attempted reentry within a few days. In fact, the data collected in Huatulco illustrate that the few migrants who had to make multiple attempts to enter the U.S. usually did so within a few days from their previous attempt.

Continued public concern over immigration into the U.S. resulted in two revised Immigration Acts – the Immigration Act of 1990 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 (see Huspek, Martinez, and Jimenez 1998). Throughout the 1990s immigrants were increasingly viewed as a burden in the United States. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) argued that if an individual assessed illegal migration as a possible danger to their economic, political, or cultural position, then they frequently carry anti-immigrant sentiments, regardless if evidence points to the contrary.²⁴ Wilson (2000; see also Heyman 1998) further argued that the increase in anti-immigrant sentiment was derived from the fact that greater numbers of Mexican migrants were not only temporarily working in the U.S., they also began to reside in the U.S. and were viewed as an economic burden through their use of health care or social services.

Based on the general public's increasing anti-immigrant sentiment, the Immigration Act of 1990 and the IIRIRA of 1996 attempted to halt migration by imposing a series of strict measures (see for example Bacon 1999; Fragomen 1997; Quiroz-Martinez 2001). Most notable during this time was the steady increase in Border

²⁴ See for example Espenshade (1995), which stated that there is little evidence that undocumented migrants have negative labor market consequences on a national scale, despite general public sentiments.

Patrol at an annual rate of 127 percent from 1993 to 2000 (Meisnner 2000; as cited in González 2002). Possibly the most severe wave of immigration policies came after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Immediately following the terrorist attacks:

“The United States government took the extraordinary step of sealing U.S. borders to traffic and trade by grounding all aircraft flying into or out of the country and imposing a lock-down on the networks of transportation and commerce ... Given the uncertainty over what might happen next, these emergency procedures were a necessary and appropriate short-term response to the attacks. In the long run, however, a siege mentality and the construction of a fortress America are ineffective and unrealistic responses” (Stock and Johnson 2003: 3).

What was arguably created in the post-September 11th era was a United States more paranoid than before, where xenophobia seemed logical and where gaps in U.S. intelligence gathering and sharing were confidently eliminated with the establishment of the Department of Justice and Homeland Security (Akram and Johnson 2002). As all the terrorists were foreigners, much of the blame eventually fell on lax immigration policies and outdated methods.²⁵ Rather than implementing a full analysis on the management and resource deficiencies within and information sharing among the bureaucracies that administer U.S. borders, immigrants and immigration law were combined into one problem that could confidently be eliminated through laws and the reduction of temporary and permanent immigration (Camarota 2002, Krikorian and Camarota 2001).²⁶

²⁵ See also the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (2003): Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress.

²⁶ This was a similar recourse as the original provisions established in the IIRAIRA of 1996, which sought to enhance national security by improving the United States' ability to exclude and deport foreigners suspected of terrorism. However, instead of efficiently producing results and streamlining procedures, a bloated, obfuscated bureaucracy was created within the Immigration and Naturalization Service. While the IIRAIRA of 1996 was billed at the time as an effective tool to fight possible terrorism (following the

The U.S. Government then enacted a series of harsh immigration laws – contributing to the very bureaucratic entanglements that caused the September 11th information gaps – under the misguided assumption that such would protect the U.S. (see Brown 2002).

The most recent change to U.S. immigration policy has yet to fully occur. As of January 2004 President Bush introduced a comprehensive immigration reform proposal (King 2004). Similar to the Bracero Program implemented in 1942, Bush's new reform would allow the some 8 million illegal immigrants – 70 percent of which are Mexican – the opportunity to come forward and enroll in a temporary worker program where visas are allocated for a period of three years, during which workers may register for permanent residency or Green Cards; they may also register for an additional term on their work visa. According to the White House the reform is an attempt to understand and deal with what has been viewed by many as an inefficient program to control U.S. borders. By implementing a legal means for Mexicans to come into the U.S. it is hoped that dangerous, illegal crossings will stop and a more efficient monitoring of the borders may emerge. One obvious benefit for migrant workers is the establishment of a system to help guarantee their wage and employment rights. I spoke with several migrants in Huatulco that experienced abusive or exploitative relationships with their employers, which usually consisted of not receiving pay or pay that was less than originally agreed. While the reform program is a step in the right direction, some immigration think-tanks worry that, like the Bracero Program, this program may become abused, with few rights actually extended to migrants. Others within Congress have voiced staunch opposition to the program, which they view as rewarding individuals that have broken U.S. law.

Oklahoma City bombings by U.S. citizen Timothy McVeigh in April 1995), the IIRAIRA proved ineffective to stop the September 11th terrorist attacks (Stock and Johnson 2003).

Concluding Migration

The bodies of literature attempting to explain international migration are wide and expansive. Certain topics were excluded from discussion as their direct relevance was in many ways peripheral to illustrating how migration patterns between Mexico and the United States may be created or to the immediate hypotheses of this study.²⁷ Based on the structure of this literature review it is important to remember that not all of Mexico-U.S. migration is economic in nature, or at least the initial motivations for migration. Historically, however, the predominant patterns between Mexico and the U.S. were economic and based on labor migration. Unlike other countries where a substantial investment in time and money to migrate to the U.S. is required, the close proximity of Mexico allows for easier crossings and returns. Settlement in the U.S. is not a requisite of participating in migration as it frequently is for other nationalities. This is perhaps one reason – combined with the issues of a relatively stable political climate and the lack of widespread human rights abuses – that migration from Mexico has taken this form.

This is not to deny that settlement in the U.S. does not occur nor is it to imply that migration from Mexico is not a substantial challenge for U.S. immigration policy. With approximately 8 million illegal aliens in the U.S. (70 percent of which are Mexican), the political debates surrounding Mexican migrants living and working in the U.S. have proven substantial. Based on the perpetuating mechanisms of human capital formation and migrant/social networks, the migrant stream does not show signs of lessening.

²⁷ For more information on some of the migration topics not discussed herein see the following: Migration and human rights (American Friends Service Committee 1998; Americas Watch 1992; Eschback et al. 1999; Huspek, Martinez, Jimenez 1998); Migration, transnationalism, and the environment (Alegría 2000; Herzog 2000; Michel 2000; Sklair 2000); Transnational migration and changing ethnicity (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Gonzalez and McCommon 1989; Kearney 1995, 1996; Lattes, Santibañez, and Castillo 1998; Nagengast and Kearney 1989; Rouse 1991); and Anti-immigration sentiment and conflict (Heyman 1995; Perea 1997; Simon and Alexander 1993).

Despite the United States' dim construction of a 14 mile fence along a 2,000 mile border and an increase in security personnel, the INS and Border Patrol have effectively lost control over much of the border when pinned against black market smuggling organizations created to move individuals across that border.

There are possible recourses to address these shortcomings. Most recently President Bush's immigration reform plan illustrates, if nothing else, that a system needs to be created and implemented to make visas and legal working status more widely available. While Bush's plan fails to address issues in expanding permanent residency or Green Card allocations,²⁸ it does open the door for improved treatment of Mexican immigrants by legalizing their presence within the U.S. and providing them legal avenues and options when aggrieved or mistreated by employers. Legalizing their presence within the U.S. also presents a greater opportunity to address how current immigrants living and working in the U.S. could be incorporated into American society. By dissolving the illegal aspects of their residency and their need to remain in shadow, it might be possible, with time, to eliminate discussion on programs that attempt to deny education, social, or healthcare services to migrants. Implementing some legal means to control the flow of migrants from Mexico to the U.S. might also enable the formation of bi-national task forces that cooperatively crack down on criminal smuggling organizations. On a macro-economic scale, migradollars are too large and too important for buoying the Mexican economy. Without a legal means to continue Mexico-U.S.

²⁸ Currently the Reform Plan only states that those immigrants on the temporary work visa program will be eligible to apply for permanent residency or Green Cards. There has not been an increase of either possible nationalization measures within the program. Furthermore, migrants on the work visa program are not given priority or preference over individuals in Mexico or any other country. As such, there is a distinct possibility that the migrant workers, while legal within the U.S., will only be used for labor in industry or agriculture and once their visa expires, they will be returned to their country after expending their labor.

migration, there exists little incentive for the Mexican government to stop *coyotes* or *polleros*. Hopefully, a legal means of labor migration will enable this and stop the dangerous, and at times deadly, border crossings.

Synthesizing Tourism and Migration in Huatulco

To return to some of the issues of tourism development or development in general and their relationship with migration, it has become possible to view how economic growth or development projects might affect migration. For example, based on the understanding supplied by the push-pull factors of international migration, an argument could be made for understanding certain waves of undocumented migrants originating from Huatulco as a result of the economic, social, and political alterations brought about through the development of tourism in 1984. That is, as stated in chapter one, local Huatulco residents perceived a reduced availability of capital and natural resources due to their direction to the tourist infrastructure. Respondents then felt marginalized or discriminated against in the process, especially in regards to their perception that FONATUR refused to sell them land. With such an understanding held by respondents, those households that were migrating maintained that the structural obstacles created through tourism development significantly influenced their decision to out-migrate. Such a push-factor is similar to the transformations generated through the Green Revolution; the structural conditions created through altered agricultural production provided an impetus to generate out-migration patterns. In the case of Huatulco, development created local economic and political situations that most respondents felt motivated their decision-making for out-migration as a viable option to better their lives. The question

that remains is in what ways might anthropologists, policy makers, or development practitioners attempt to better the lives of prospective migrants so they do not need to illegally cross a border and cut intimate contact with their families for years on end.

In general, the most humane way has been the focus for many immigration think-tanks or researchers to push for targeted development initiatives within Mexican regions that have historically experienced high rates of emigration or are economically depressed. I say humane because some of the more historically contemporary attempts by the U.S. government to reduce Mexico-U.S. migration have centered on increased border militarization or denying social services, healthcare, or education to migrants and their children (see the above discussion). Unless the situation prompting or influencing the decision to out-migrate from Mexico is addressed *in* Mexico, continued crossings are unlikely to slow. With development it is argued that a strengthened Mexican economy would reduce migration pressures. This chapter has examined tourism as one means of development that Mexico and developing nations have adopted into their national economic plan.

Built as an export-oriented economy, one that is both macro-economically successful and labor and capital intensive, tourism development has shown potential to the Mexican government since the 1970s.²⁹ Yet, there are researchers (e.g., Massey and Espinosa 1997) that believe development in general is a problem within migration. Their argument essentially stated that economic growth within a region produces alterations to traditional socio-economic patterns, resulting in greater emigration as labor systems are

²⁹ This is not to imply that tourism does not have its drawbacks. As mentioned above, problems with the industry may range from decreases in equitable levels of income, employment, and standards of living to increases in drugs, prostitution, crime, or violence in the host area, all of which may influence local out-migration. However, in the case of Huatulco, many of these problems were not present.

disturbed. For example, the social, economic, and political transformations created through tourism development in Huatulco have contributed to a household's decision to out-migrate. Therefore, Huatulco was presented as an ideal site to examine this opposing standpoint between certain migration specialists. On the one hand there were structural variables complicating a household's ability to live in the region. On the other hand, there were quantitative and qualitative improvements made for many of the households that affected their desire to live in the region, even if temporary migration was viewed as one of the ways to do so.

This study goes further by examining development as an impetus for migration through the views of tourism. By creating Huatulco as a site for affluent tourists, this affected how local households perceived their social and economic positions in Huatulco. They were 'relatively deprived' when compared to the tourists or the affluent neighborhoods. So while they may have been living better in Huatulco than they were previously in areas such as Chiapas or Veracruz, local households conceptualized their standards of living relative to the tourists and felt marginalized as FONATUR seemingly placed greater importance on the more affluent. In the process locals felt discriminated against. While tourism development was heavily promoted following WWII as a means to facilitate intercultural contact and global understanding, it is also presented those in the South with an opportunity to view how 'others' lived. Tourism development in the South offers a possibility to introduce a new ideology on higher standards of living, but those playing host in the tourist area (e.g. in the case of Huatulco the local residents) may be faced with structural conditions preventing the obtainment of these standards. The fact that respondents mentioned how their views and desires on life had changed from living

in the tourist area, especially when compared to the *campesino* who was content with his life, illustrated that (at least in their minds) their views, ideas, and expectations on standards of living had changed from living in Huatulco. This altered conceptualization and the structural obstacles affected the overall success of tourism development in Huatulco, requiring the closer examination of similar variables in future projects in Mexico and elsewhere.

By examining the development outcomes in Huatulco as a combination of qualitative and quantitative improvements or restrictions, it was possible to view some of the more intricate connections between development success and its influence on the perceived need to out-migrate from the region. The connections established between tourism development and out-migration have, for the most part, been under examined in Mexico-U.S. migration, and certainly unexplored in the context of Huatulco's development initiative. The more detailed relationship of tourism development and out-migration are explored in chapter five, as well as attention to each of the study's hypotheses that were provided in chapter two. However, prior to those, it is first necessary to give a history of Mexican state-led development in tourism, as this was the direct cause for the 'creation' of Huatulco in 1984.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORIES, ECONOMICS, AND TOURISM:

THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF MEXICO

This analysis of Mexican history indicates the more salient economic and political histories that directly affected the origin and developmental directions of Huatulco. A concise historical chronology of Mexico, adapted primarily from Krauze (1997) and Bates (2002), is presented in Appendix A. By avoiding a lengthy discussion on Mexican history it is possible to contextualize Huatulco within 1) the wider political environment of Mexico (and the country's interaction with the international community, specifically international development agencies and the United States) and 2) the geographic and/or economic divisions that are characteristic of the country. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the general trends and patterns in the country's economic development, its own regional divisions, and the neoliberal reforms and privatization measures cautiously implemented prior to and greatly expanded upon after the 1982 Debt Crisis; these, more than any other factors, gave rise to Huatulco as it was known during this study.

Protecting the Domestic

Mexico's economic growth has been closely linked to concurrent changes in the country's imports and exports, and more specifically the highly complementary processes of industrialization and trade expansion (Beatty 2000). Early after Mexico's disputes with the United States regarding the placement of the Mexico-U.S. border were settled in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase, economic gravity in Mexico

tilted towards the north, where the border provided a distinct zone binding Mexico to the U.S. and vice versa (Mora-Torres 2001, see also Lustig 1998; Lorey 1999; Meyers, Sherman, and Deeds 1999; Otero 1996; Schmitt 1974; Weber 1982). Initiated primarily during the Porfirian regime, the processes of political centralization and capitalist modernization would create northern Mexico as the contact zone between Mexico and the United States. Within a few short years Mexico began their primary role as that of a raw materials exporter. The United States received nearly 80 percent of Mexico's exported products. Two problems soon emerged for the Mexican government. On the one hand they experienced significant problems in declining terms of trade (Frank 1967; Wallerstein 1974). Simply put, the amount Mexico received for their exported goods did not cover the cost for those goods they imported from the United States or other countries. On the other hand, Mexico soon discovered the danger from failing to diversify either their export-oriented economy or those purchasing the exported products. During the Great Depression, Mexico was particularly hurt as the U.S., their main consumer of raw materials, closed their markets and stopped buying Mexican products (Beatty 2000). For Mexico this process was repeated once again when global markets were affected by the World Wars, particularly WWII.

Such historical incorporations into the world economy made Mexico vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations. In the attempts to understand their placement in the global market, by the 1950s most countries throughout Latin America embraced Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) as the model of economic development that both explained their declining terms of trade and sought to shield their nations from the vagaries of the world market. To understand this unequal relationship, either from within

the global economy or Latin America's dependence on the capitalist world market, a host of leftist and critical intellectuals began to explore the interacting histories between various nations (and eventually, within individual nations). One of the most important bodies to explore the world capitalist market critically was the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The ECLA primarily explained the world market through ISI, which focused on two key concepts for understanding Latin American underdevelopment: the concept of core/periphery (and the periphery's associated exploitation) and the fact that developing countries exported primary, unfinished products but needed to purchase finished products from the core, ultimately generating a pattern of national deficit and declining terms of trade (Frank 1967, Wallerstein 1974).

According to Warnock (1995) the intention of adopting ISI in Mexico was to 1) provide protection for domestic industry; 2) spur industrial development; and 3) create jobs for those in rural areas by shielding Mexican businesses from foreign competition through prohibiting the importation of many luxury goods, decreasing the reliance on foreign economies for imported goods (and thus the vagaries of the global economic market), enacting high tariffs, and establishing a licensing and quota system for placement on all imports. Between 1950 and 1973 Mexico became the economic miracle of Latin America, averaging a real growth rate³⁰ of 6.4 percent per year with an inflation rate of only 3.1 percent. Unfortunately, ISI soon ran into problems for the Mexican government. Specifically, the Mexican government's ability to finance the capital and technological inputs needed to sustain development and growth weakened; an increasing portion of finance was in the form of Foreign Direct Investment or FDI (Krauze 1997). The increased reliance on foreign investment to sustain ISI produced a host of problems

³⁰ Real growth rates are those that have already been discounted for inflation.

for the Mexican government, affecting their economic stability and development trajectory.

The North, South, and Trickle-down Economics

Throughout the 1960s and by 1970 Mexico's ISI-oriented strategy had achieved some remarkable results. While in the early 20th century Mexico on average imported approximately 48 percent of its manufactured goods, by 1970 imports decreased to 21 percent (Clancy 2001a). Mexico's dependence on trade, and thus the international market, also diminished. Despite the impressive growth there were several emerging problems by the 1960s. While frequently peddled as the ISI success story for Latin American, Mexico suffered from chronic problems with its balance of payments (Barkin 1990; Clancy 2001a). Responding to the crises the peso underwent a series of devaluations, which not only provoked declines in public opinion on the government's control of the economy, but also the transfer of billions out of Mexico (this would later factor into the 1982 Debt Crisis). The devaluations did stabilize the economy and prompted new foreign investment from companies such as General Motors, Ford, Goodyear, and Coca-Cola. However, the economic prosperity following a devaluation was short-term. From the 1950s on there were consistent trade and account deficits as the growth rate in exports lagged behind the rate of imports (see Velasco Arregui 1993).³¹

Part of the problem was that ISI in the Mexican context essentially followed "trickle-down" economics, which argues any macroeconomic growth (regardless of origin or location in the domestic economy) will eventually find its way to the bottom

³¹ Despite neoliberal reforms imposed after the 1982 Debt Crisis, the peso's relation to the dollar continued to slide. By 1987 the peso was at 2,300 to the dollar.

tiers of the economy. Essentially it argues that capital and economic growth move from upper classes down to lower classes. In Mexico the results proved unsuccessful. It is argued that trickle-down economic theory is incapable of working in Mexican society, which is dominated by a small, wealthy upper class and political elite (Hellman 1988; Suchlicki 2001; Velasco Arregui 1993). As noted by Warnock (1995: 41),

“The gap between the rich and the poor greatly increased... in 1958 the income of the richest 5 percent of Mexicans was twenty-two times that of the poorest 10 percent. By 1980, the income of the top 5 percent was fifty times greater than that of the 10 percent at the bottom. Taxation policy greatly benefited the rich and corporations. Taxes on the rich were the lowest in Latin America and among the lowest in the world. The unwillingness of the government to tax the rich revealed who had power in Mexico.”

Consequently, the lower classes shouldered most of the burden of industrialization and it was exhibited in the unequal distribution of income and taxes (Hansen 1971). ISI and trickle-down economics in the context of Mexican political systems were clearly showing signs of failing to close the economic gaps between classes. Once promoted as policies pursuant to benefit peasants, workers, and the popular sector, ISI was increasingly shown to favor a small, but powerful, ruling political and economic elite (Krauze 1997; Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 1999; Suchlicki 2001).

The problem of trickle-down economics could also be seen geographically and continues to this day through regional disparities manifested in NAFTA trade patterns (see for example Murphy and Stepick 1999; Oppenheimer 1998; Tamayo-Flores 2001). Southern states (e.g. Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Guerrero) did not share in Mexico's impressive export-growth and attraction of FDI. In the case of Mexico, disparities between northern and southern states were strongly shaped by the spatial configurations

of the national transportation network, which initially strengthened the connection between northern Mexico's leading industries, their capital, and their associated domestic and external markets (i.e. the United States as explored in chapter three). It has been argued that through greater integration with the U.S. and Canada, the interregional economic disparities will continue and perhaps heighten (Beatty 2000; Warnock 1995).³²

By the 1960s Mexico also faced the difficulty of supplying employment opportunities to a burgeoning population (Clancy 2001; Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 1999). Both high birth rates and a young population placed additional strains on the workforce structure in Mexico. Unfortunately, as the processes of ISI development became more capital intensive and agricultural labor was squeezed from an increasingly mechanized system of agricultural production, unemployment coupled with demographic changes as people began moving from the rural sectors to the cities (Warnock 1995). Overcrowding problems soon followed. The problems of creating jobs were also exacerbated as the United States unilaterally cancelled the *Bracero Program* in 1964, a previous source of employment for unemployed Mexicans (Storrs 2002). To overcome such problems regional development schemes were enhanced and closely examined.

In summary, starting with the problems in balance of payments in the 1950s, the Mexican government's expenditures began exceeding their revenues, which resulted in an escalating budget deficit. By 1976 Mexican imports sustaining ISI outstripped exports

³² On the other hand, recognition of the growing interconnections between nations' economic policies can lead to the converse argument. For example, the increasing outsourcing of jobs in the U.S. to foreign markets creates a situation where there is a continual search for the lowest expenditure of capital to complete the labor. While *maquilas* serve a purpose for many companies in the U.S., they have experienced competition from labor sources in China, India, or Southeast Asia, where the labor is a fraction of what is needed to pay *maquila* workers. As such, there has been an increase in *maquila*-type industries moving further south in Mexico in the attempt to find labor at cheaper rates than that in the border region. Obviously not a positive system of labor growth, it does show that labor and international markets, while originally confined primarily to border regions in Mexico, may perversely move further south in Mexico.

by nearly \$3.5 billion US (Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 1999). The deficit also coupled with a growing problem in trade. Mexico relied upon trade taxes for approximately one-quarter of its federal revenues. With the ratio of trade falling to GDP, Mexico faced growing twin deficits. According to Clancy (2001a) the problems were serious enough that by the 1960s the Mexican government began seeking alternative development strategies to ease these dual pressures. Mexican exports had by that time become uncompetitive on the world market, the growing deficit was creating severe budget restraints and draining reserves, and more equitable regional development plans had not been pursued. It was possible that ISI could have been abandoned. However, the main political party *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) did not perceive the economic problems at crisis levels. Of course, by that point the PRI had become entrenched in economic activities and if ISI were dissolved, many within the state apparatus would have lost substantially (ibid). Therefore, ISI continued with additional support through export promotion (i.e. tourism) and regional development.

Neoliberal Expansion, Tourism, and the “Passport to Peace”

Much of the interest in export-led growth strategies in international development occurred due to the macroeconomic successes of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, or what are frequently referred to as the “four tigers” of East Asia (see Clancy 2001a, 2001b; Franko 1979; Garnaut, Grilli, and Riedel 1995; Gereffi and Wyman 1989; Kim 1998). Primarily during the 1960s, export-led strategies were adopted throughout East Asia as frameworks for national development. Forgoing discussions on whether the distribution of economic resources and growth were equitable, these countries helped

establish much of the attraction for export-led growth strategies in developing countries. International organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF took notice (Garnaut, Grilli, and Riedel 1995). For instance, from 1970 to 1990 the average annual growth rates in GDP growth were 8.2 percent for East Asia, with Latin America averaging 2.83 percent (Hay and Schrader 1998; Stallings 1995; World Bank 1995).³³

Mexico did not completely abandon ISI in the 1960s or 1970s. What occurred was a gradual shift in economic policy. The country – careful not to lose the ideological components of ISI and what they contributed to a definable sense of national sovereignty and pride in domestic industrial production – began to open itself more to the international markets than had been practiced following the World Wars and the Great Depression. The combined effects of substantial macroeconomic growth in East Asia and a post-WWII recovering and economically booming United States provided much of the justification for establishing export-push and oriented strategies (see for example Corbo, Krueger, Ossa 1995; Franko 1979; Garnaut, Grilli, and Riedel 1995; Kim 1998). In its simplest, if a country that was previously marked by ISI-protectionism sought a higher degree of integration with the world economy, then the active elimination of artificial barriers to the flow of goods and capital would occur (Corbo, Krueger, Ossa 1995). This occurred in Mexico, with the additional creation of policy to promote, in the case of tourism exports,³⁴ greater forms of FDI to supplement governmental development

³³ Recently, the Latin American export-orientation has shown some improvement in comparison to East Asia. While East Asia experienced growth 4 times that of Latin America during the 1980s, by 1997 East Asia experienced 1.39 times the rate of growth in Latin America. See also: <http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/sector/employ/index.htm>

³⁴ See Bhagwati (1987) for more information on the neglected appreciation of services in development studies. Bhagwati stated that a “haircut” view of services mistakenly argues that since a person may not acquire a haircut long distance, then services are not tradable. Clearly this is not the case. There are numerous examples of services exported for use by persons or industries in other countries: transportation, banking and finance, passenger fares, consultation, various forms of tourism (e.g. ecotourism, sports

initiatives within their emerging tourism poles and among other already established tourist destinations (e.g., Cabo San Lucas, Oaxaca City, or Guadalajara).

Obvious benefits existed for the Mexican government to openly pursue tourism as a means for national development. Clearly tourism is one of the largest industries in the world and it is the largest service industry in the world when accounting for the international trade in services and associated economic activities. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO 2003) world receipts in tourism and services accounted for \$264.1 billion in 1990 and \$475 billion US in 2002. Figures provided by the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC 2003a) recognized secondary and tertiary effects of the tourism industry. As such, for 2002 approximately \$3.53 trillion US was generated by tourism travel and indirect economic activities. Attempting to capture some of the industry's growth and promise of future growth, Mexico decreased its protectionist ISI policies and integrated more tightly with the international markets. This explicit focus on tourism by Mexico indicates a distinct shift in earlier protectionist development policies.

Once Mexico directed energies towards tourism as a form of economic development, the results were successful by most accounts (Jud 1974; Salinas 1995; Sanchez 1986).³⁵ WTO data indicated that in 2002 Mexico attracted nearly 3 percent of the world's share of international tourists and was ranked eighth in world popularity.

fishing, archaeology and culture travel), and most recently e-commerce and digital technology exports. In the U.S. the term "services" includes all economic activity outside of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. A few examples of service industries that provide export income to the United States specifically are architecture, construction and engineering services, environmental development, technical training, agricultural development, franchising, telecommunications, healthcare, and accounting, financial, banking, legal, and tax advisory services.

³⁵ It should be noted, however, that the role of the government did not preclude the role of private investors or permanent institutions in Mexico and the political and economic elites that staffed them. In this regard the growth in Mexican tourism can be thought of as the government acting as a regulator, motivator, banker, and entrepreneur when private investment was lacking in a given region. Therefore, with the government's (or state's) active role in tourism promotion, better than average growth was achieved than most likely would have been had total reliance been placed on the capitalist venture market.

Mexico's growth was also substantial. In 1970 foreign exchange earnings were \$415 million. Preliminary estimates by the WTO stated that up to \$8.85 billion in total international receipts were collected in 2002; this figure excludes domestic tourism. However, this does not address why tourism was chosen as a way to overcome the growing deficits and social problems in the country (e.g. unemployment rates).

Prior to the mid 1960s there was little state involvement in promoting tourism development; rather, regional tourism growth which occurred was due primarily to independent market forces and for southern states consisted of explorer tourists (Clancy 2001a; Gibbons and Fish 1984; Long 1990). By the late 1960s and especially the 1970s this changed substantially for the Third World and in large part affected why Mexico chose to exploit tourism development. Largely a phenomenon born in the 20th century, tourism growth and expansion truly started in the post-World War II economic boom (see for example table 4.1, which indicates the steady and substantial growth the tourism industry experienced after 1950). Not only did economic prosperity in First World countries lead to higher living standards and additional leisure time, such processes made travel more likely for larger segments of the population (Matheison and Wall 1996). Coupled with technological advances and efficiencies in transportation (especially in air travel³⁶), the opportunity for cheap travel to previously distant lands increased dramatically. For instance, between 1950 and 1980 tourist arrivals grew at an average annual rate of 10.97 percent,³⁷ with receipts outpacing tourist arrivals by an additional

³⁶ Air travel was also advanced through the surplus of air planes after World War II, many of which were later transformed for private or commercial flights.

³⁷ With the 1960s and 1970s experiencing the highest levels of tourist growth, this in large part affected why the Mexican government looked favorably upon tourism as a means of macroeconomic growth. Other figures were located on the exact annual rate of increase in tourism, most notably Jud (1974). The author stated that from 1950 to 1972 the annual rate of increase averaged 12 percent. To err on the side of conservatism, figures above were compiled from Ritchie and Hawkins (1993) and Waters (1991).

growth of 3.23 percent (Ritchie and Hawkins 1993; Waters 1991: see also Goeldner, Ritchie, and McIntosh 2000; Jud 1974; WTO 2003; WTTC 2003b).

Tourism also became the embodiment of freedom, leisure, and prosperity (Clancy 2001a; Nicholson-Lord 1997; see also Bandy 1996, Jiménez Martínez 1990). The political rationale for promoting tourism development, at least from a First World perspective, was that the movement of peoples throughout the globe, most of whom originated from the United States and Europe, would increase intercultural contact and promote understanding and peace between what may have been hostile countries. Once this political and social rationale was coupled with the promise shown by industry growth over the past 10-20 years, tourism development was actively promoted by governments, international organizations, and development agencies (e.g. the 1963 United Nations Conference on Tourism and International Travel). With international support Third World nations began to explore tourism exports as a means to balance payments and deficits and to supply jobs to a growing workforce. The stage was set and international banks were there to support developing countries in their role as a tourist host.

Mexico: Sun, Sand, Sea, and Oil

As Mexico initiated many of its tourist plans in the early 1970s, the focus on international tourism was accompanied by an industry that would get a substantial push in just a few short years and maintain its dominance over tourism services in the export economy up to the present day. Though the importance of oil to the Mexican economy went further in that it precipitated one of the worst financial crises in history and in many

ways helped establish the neoliberal political and economic environment where Huatulco was created as a tourist destination.

Table 4.1: World tourism growth from 1950 to 2002

Year	International Tourist Arrivals¹ (thousands)	International Tourist Receipts² (millions U.S. \$)
1950	25,282	2,100
1960	69,296	6,867
1961	75,281	7,284
1962	81,329	8,029
1963	89,999	8,887
1964	104,506	10,073
1965	112,729	11,604
1966	119,797	13,340
1967	129,529	14,458
1968	130,899	14,990
1969	143,140	16,800
1970	159,690	17,900
1971	172,239	20,850
1972	181,851	24,621
1973	190,622	31,054
1974	197,117	33,822
1975	214,357	40,702
1976	220,719	44,436
1977	239,122	55,631
1978	257,366	68,837
1979	273,999	83,332
1980	284,841	102,363
1981	288,848	104,296
1982	286,780	98,616
1983	284,433	98,475
1984	316,357	112,707
1985	327,188	118,084
1986	338,854	143,475
1987	363,766	176,795
1988	394,810	204,290
1989	426,461	221,263
1990	458,229	268,928
1991	463,951	277,568
1992	503,356	315,103

1993	519,045	324,090
1994	550,471	353,998
1995	565,495	405,110
1996	596,524	435,594
1997	610,763	435,981
1998	635,134	439,393
1999*	661,100	452,200
2000*	687,300	473,400
2001*	684,100	459,500
2002*	702,600	474,600
¹ Same-day visitors excluded ² International transport receipts excluded * Rounded Figures Source: World Tourism Organization 2003 Waters 1991 Waters 1998		

In 1972 Petróleos de México (PEMEX) discovered several large oil fields in Villahermosa, Tabasco, offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, and in Chiapas (Meyer, Sherman, and Deeds 1999). Fear of United States involvement (and domination in the industry) President Echeverría underplayed the considerable size of the reserve and continued to increase other exports, tourism being one. President Echeverría's policies of both preventing total dependence on oil as an export and limiting dependence on the United States in terms of exports took a sharp turn in 1976 when President José López Portillo took office (Krauze 1997). President Portillo, unwilling to tax corporations, borrowed heavily from abroad to subsidize his Industrial Development Plan, which sought to decentralize development, foster exports, and diversify industry (Warnock 1995). In order to establish the needed infrastructure for the oil industry, PEMEX imported machinery, equipment, and technology, primarily from the United States. By 1982 the debt reached \$22 billion for PEMEX alone. The situation was worse for the government,

whose debt had topped \$82 billion, approximately 60 percent of its GDP. Warnock (1995: 47) stated:

“By the spring of 1981, the world recession had resulted in a glut of oil on the international market. PEMEX announced new prices for oil which undercut the floor set by OPEC. Prices continued to fall. Oil revenues dropped. The Mexican government continued to borrow abroad to cover the shortfall, which was \$6 billion in 1981. In 1982, they agreed to a sale to the U.S. Strategic Reserve that had prices as low as \$25 a barrel, down from \$38 in 1981. In August 1982, the Mexican government announced that it could not make its debt payments and declared a moratorium.”

While panic ensued from Washington to London, it was clear to most what had caused the Debt Crisis: Mexico's primary foreign export took a nosedive in price, interest rates rapidly climbed, and the PRI's ties to powerful economic elites gave forewarning on what was about to happen, precipitating the transfer of billions of dollars out of the country (Skidmore and Smith 1997; see also Oppenheimer 1998, Wertman 2002). What followed were a series of neoliberal reforms and austerity measures imposed by the IMF and international lending institutions to balance out Mexico's macroeconomic situation (Bates 2002; Gates 1996; Lustig 1998; Otero 1996). Officials were instructed to cut government spending, open the country to foreign investment, implement a series of privatization measures of state-owned enterprises, implement wage controls, and cut social programs from the annual budget (e.g. basic food subsidies under national anti-poverty programs). The impact on the Mexican people was hard as macroeconomic restructuring fell to microeconomic levels: standards of living fell, poverty increased, and disparities and inequalities between classes widened (see for example Collier 1999). 1982 marked the end of ISI in Mexico and the beginnings of a neoliberal environment.

The era of free trade and private investment in development characterized the beginnings of tourism in Huatulco, which started just two years after the Debt Crisis.

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Petroleum may have been a capital-intensive industry, but it was not necessarily a labor-intensive one. Prior to the Debt Crisis, Mexico in the late 1960s and 1970s faced increasing unemployment rates and the continuing problem of trade deficits. Expansion of petroleum production, at best, could absorb around 150,000 jobs each year but by the late 1970s there were on average 800,000 Mexicans entering the job market annually (Meyers, Deeds, and Sherman 1999). Tourism was a possible means to meet deficit problems (Truett and Truett 1982), enhance regional development, and create jobs for the rapidly expanding workforce. That is, while production efficiencies in petroleum may have squeezed workers from the market, tourism relied on a large body of employees to sustain the industry and it too, like oil production, was capital intensive.

In 1971 NAFINSA, the national development bank in Mexico, secured a loan of \$21.5 million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for initial construction in Cancun (Clancy 2001a). The same year Mexico acquired the first \$22 million credit from the World Bank for development of Ixtapa. In 1973 the government purchased and expanded the hotel chain *Nacional Hotelera* to initiate investment and tourist growth in the new tourist zones as private investors were unwilling to risk the capital. By 1981 the IDB alone had granted over \$300 million in loan packages designated for tourism development. The state also allocated increasingly significant portions of the national budget to developing tourism. While in 1957 the government allocated 1.2 million pesos

to tourism, by 1978 nearly 3.1 billion pesos were distributed annually for tourism development through one government agency alone (Truett and Truett 1982).

The substantial investment in tourism during the 1970s was based on the industry's average annual growth rate throughout the 1960s (Goeldner, Ritchie, and McIntosh 2000; Jud 1974; Ritchie and Hawkins 1993; Truett and Truett 1982). The United States, which had continually led the world tourism market as the biggest sender of tourists (and spenders upon arrival), had a marked affect on Mexico (see Gibbons and Fish 1984). While early 20th century tourism in Mexico was primarily from the U.S. and located either in Mexico City or the northern Border States that had the required infrastructure of roads and airports, after World War II Mexican tourism grew rapidly due to a host of factors: the close proximity to the world's leader in tourist sending; the construction of roads, airports, and infrastructure linking the interior and southern states; and the state's direct involvement as investor and entrepreneur (Jud 1974).

Yet, it was a concern during the 1960s that most of Mexican tourism was confined to border areas where the length of stays were short, money spent in the country was low, and leakage of funds was high (Clancy 2001a). *Banco de México* released a report in 1969 that identified several key benefits derived from Mexico's participation in international tourism – not least of which was the growth potential and meeting the twin deficits of ISI. The report also identified where development should occur to maximize the tourist dollar intake. Based on the report, in the 1970s Mexico began creating or conceptual planning for five new resort areas, or what were commonly referred to as poles, and refurbishing existing tourist areas (see also Clancy 2001b; Truett and Truett 1982). These poles – Cancun on the Yucatan Peninsula coast, Los Cabos and Loreto on

the Baja California peninsula, Ixtapa in the state of Guerrero, and Huatulco on the coast of Oaxaca – had several key benefits as identified by state and government actors. First development was to occur in some of the poorest and lowest populated areas in Mexico. This was to meet regional development plans and aid in the balance of payments and deficit (see also Hiernaux-Nicolas 1999a). Second, the state, with its strong directive role in the emerging market, could act as an entrepreneur when private interest was lacking (see also Casado 1997). Finally, since the resorts would occur in low populated areas and have no previous infrastructure to contend with, they could be planned and constructed from the bottom up. It was assumed that the state could circumvent the problems often associated with unregulated tourism growth (see Simon 1997).

The poles also carried the anticipated effects of alleviating social instability (Clancy 2001a). Due to the proximate location of southern states to the at times politically volatile Central America, it was believed that development would create a complacent populace. However, what occurred in virtually all of the poles was the agitation of local communities (specific examples in Huatulco are discussed below). The National Fund for Tourism Development (FONATUR)³⁸ increasingly took on broad powers (Sofield 2003). Lands were expropriated from local communities (at times by force); communal lands or *ejidos* were also expropriated, which caused significant upheaval as the Mexican Constitution (prior to the reforms of the 1990s) held *ejidos* in perpetuity as established through the Mexican Revolution; lagoons were dredged; forests

³⁸ In 1974 a federal law passed that sought to develop tourism to its fullest potential by merging the state funding agencies of FOGATUR (Tourism Guarantee and Promotion Fund) and INFRATUR (National Trust Fund for Tourist Infrastructure) into one agency: FONATUR. Its mandates were to carry out land expropriations, resettle local residents, construct infrastructure, market and promote to private investors through foreign and domestic investment incentives, grant loans to private investors, and plan urban and residential areas (Sofield 2003).

were cleared; and the social and environmental impacts that millions of tourists would have on these peoples and areas were frequently given, at best, peripheral concern³⁹ (see also Nicholson-Lord 1997). Luckily for FONATUR and the government any opposition to state development plans were contained within and among small, politically weak and geographically dispersed groups. The top heavy tourism development projects went as scheduled and showed substantial growth (see table 4.2).⁴⁰ By the 1990s the poles accounted for nearly one-fourth of all international tourists arriving in Mexico (Clancy 2001).

While initial planning for the poles began in the early 1970s, actual construction did not begin on Huatulco until 1984. Construction on the other four poles occurred in the 1970s. As such, Huatulco was born out of distinctly different political, economic, and social histories. Following the Debt Crisis, Mexico was forced to open its development sector to private industries, implement wage controls while cutting social programs from the national budget such as food subsidies, and completely abandon the ISI model of economic development. While these factors were generally negative, particularly for southern states, it was possible that Huatulco might benefit from the years of experience FONATUR accumulated with its direct management over the previous tourism poles.

³⁹ It was not until 1980 that opposition to the tourism industry and recognition of its downsides began to crystallize. “A conference in Manila convened by religious leaders in developing countries worried about the impact of tourism on local cultures [generated] the surprisingly categorical statement that ‘tourism does more harm than good to people and to societies of the Third World’” (Nicholson-Lord 1997; 12). This became known as the Manila Statement. The same year the Ecumenical Coalition on Third World Tourism was founded, which is one of the most outspoken advocates for peoples’ rights in tourism development areas.

⁴⁰ The focus on large, capital-intensive projects did not end with the poles and has been seen in more recent tourism development plans laid out by the government. What has been termed “Megaprojects” was laid out during the Carlos Salinas administration (best known for its implementation of NAFTA). The projects were meant to diversify Mexican tourism while adhering to the preference for planned resorts. The state would still have a strong hand in development and allocation; however, based on the neoliberal reforms and privatization measures throughout the country, the private sector will have more opportunities for investment and business ownership, as will transnational corporations.

Table 4.2: A comparison table indicating growth among each of the poles in Mexico, 1975-2002.


Year		1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
		All Figures Provided in Thousands					
<i>Cancun</i>	Total Tourists	99.5	460.0	729.9	1,575.7	2154.6	3,043.8
	International Tourists	27.3	241.6	503.0	1,180.5	1,665.8	2,254.6
	Domestic Tourists	72.2	218.4	226.9	395.2	488.8	789.2
<i>Ixtapa</i>	Total Tourists	33.6	207.2	311.5	300.8	352.1	384.0
	International Tourists	12.5	51.8	114.7	109.3	121.7	137.3
	Domestic Tourists	21.1	155.4	196.8	191.5	230.4	246.7
<i>Los Cabos*</i>	Total Tourists	34.4	70.3	134.8	255.7	448.9	546.2
	International Tourists	19.6	39.2	105.5	228.0	390.5	464.2
	Domestic Tourists	14.8	31.1	29.3	27.7	58.4	82.0
<i>Loreto*</i>	Total Tourists	12.3	24.0	45.0	38.1	36.0	58.5
	International Tourists	12.0	10.6	28.4	26.1	23.6	42.5
	Domestic Tourists	12.3	13.4	16.6	12.0	12.4	16.0
<i>Bahias de Huatulco*</i>	Total Tourists	No Data	No Data	11.2	119.0	153.4	186.8
	International Tourists	No Data	No Data	0.5	41.7	37.5	40.1
	Domestic Tourists	No Data	No Data	10.7	77.3	115.9	146.8
<p>* Data on Loreto and Los Cabos for 1975 were taken from the earliest data locatable, 1976. Likewise, data on Huatulco for 1985 were taken from the earliest locatable data, 1987.</p> <p>Source: FONATUR – http://www.fonatur.gob.mx</p>							

Santa María de Guatulco, Town Founded at the Edge of the Sea

Originally used in the Colonial period as a region for Spanish galleon ports, foreign corsairs simultaneously swept the Oaxacan coast searching for vessels carrying trade goods between the Orient, Spain, and the New World (Kresh 2000). The initial trade patterns among various indigenous groups interspersed along the Oaxaca coast established Huatulco as a port of trade prior to Spanish Conquest. Yet, Huatulco's more prominent role in the region and in international trade came with Spanish arrival.

Some of the earliest written documentation indicating “discovery” of Huatulco by the Spanish was dated to 1539 (though actual domination of Huatulco by the Spanish occurred in 1523 – see below). Painted on leaves, the words were a backdrop to an illustration of three caciques, or native leaders, dressed in Spanish attire, kneeling before the Virgin (see photo 4.1). The words interspersed between the caciques were: “Town of the Immaculate and Clean Conception of Huatulco, Don Juan de Simón, Hernán Cortés, Don Domingo Pérez, and Don Pedro García, founders of this Holy Conception” (Cited from González 2002: 19). The region where Cortés’ arrived was referred to as Guatulco (also referenced as Aguatulco or Aguatusco). In 1539 the region and possession of the land were released to the caciques so that Guatulco could continue its role as a port of export established after its 1523 conquest (e.g. exporting sugar and dyed cloth) and so that salt could be retrieved from regional marshes and lagoons (González 2002). After the Spanish Conquest and cacique possession, the region became Santa María Guatulco or Santa María of the Clean, Pure, and Immaculate Conception.

Photo 4.1: Excerpt from one of the original books first referencing Guatulco. The book dated at 1539 is painted on leaves and illustrates three caciques kneeling before the Virgin (González 2002).



To understand more of the Native peoples, the Spanish undertook a series of interviews based around 50 specific questions regarding politics, origin, and economy. According to interview and narrative transcripts, the ancient name for the village was Coatulco, or “the Place of the Snake” (González 2002; see also Hiernaux-Nicolas 1999b)

and the villagers, descended from the Chichimecas, venerated the snake at Coatepetl, or hill of the snake. However, current day explanations on the origin of Huatulco center on wood and worship. When the indigenous peoples first entered the area they named it Guahtolco, which means “*lugar donde se adora el madero*” or “place where the wood is worshipped.” Eventually Guahtolco became Huatulco. How wood became associated with legend occurred in the *Bahia Santa Cruz*. When the Spanish arrived on the Huatulco coast a miraculous wooden cross was encountered. The indigenous people informed the conquistadors, specifically chronicler Father Ignacio Burgoa, that a white bearded-man arrived from the sea (some estimates go as much as 1,500 years prior to Spanish arrival) and directed the people to build a cross and worship it. In 1587 when the English pirate Cavendish arrived he instructed the natives to destroy the cross believing it to be the work of the devil. Regardless of method or means they were unable to remove it. The cross was later removed by Bishop Don Juan de Cervantes and taken to Oaxaca City in 1612. Four smaller crosses were constructed out of it – one of which is in the Santa Maria de Huatulco Church.

Whether Huatulco was derived from names given by the Spanish, descendants of the Chichimecas, or those subscribing to the story of the cross, Huatulco had been an active participant in early Mexican history. Based on archaeological data (see Dávila and Serafín 1988; cited from González 2002) Guatulco – here after referred to as Huatulco – was in the late 15th century conquered by Moctezuma. After domination, Huatulco was incorporated into the Nahua⁴¹ stronghold, which extended to Pochutla (González 2002). Huatulco, blessed with a strategic position, became an active trading port with other

⁴¹ Indigenous Nahua languages are still spoken in the area. I was presented an opportunity by a respondent to view a Nahua speaking, in his home, on the Day of the Dead in Huatulco.

communities along the coast. It was this position, or area of convergence, that created an intertwining history. Huatulco offered numerous benefits, not least of which were bays with calm waters and a host of mountain ranges that provided wind protection. Prior to Spanish conquest, competition existed between the Zapotecs, Mixtecs, and others. It is believed that Huatulco was originally a Chontal stronghold, later invaded by the Zapotecs, Mixtecs, and the Nahuas. Huatulco's location on the coast also facilitated the creation of a series of trade patterns. Prior to Spanish arrival coastal waters provided currents for trade along the coast; inland travel proved difficult from mountainous terrain. Sea shells were traded as adornments, salt was traded to facilitate the process of extracting and refining silver, and cacao was used as a source of money throughout Mesoamerica. While Huatulco's strategic position initiated a convergence of three distinct pre-colonial groups (the Zapotecs, Mixtecs, and Nahuas), this position also brought about their domination under Spanish control in 1523.

Passing through the area after a recent victory over the Mixtec leader of the Tututepec *señorio* (a state to which Huatulco paid tribute), Pedro de Alvarado claimed the area for Hernán Cortés, though Cortés himself did not visit the area until 1539 (González 2002). It was believed the area would serve a strategic location both for Spanish attempts to claim the country and for the establishment of a trans-Pacific network of trade and commerce. Resistance to Spanish control was not uncommon throughout the region. However, introduced diseases and natives' lack of immunity crippled their defenses. The people of Huatulco, and those communities under its jurisdiction, began paying tribute to the Spanish Crown by the 16th century. Huatulco experienced its role as one of the more important shipping ports in the Pacific during the

1500s.⁴² Items of tribute and items designated for trade included sugar, salt, and cloth that was dyed with cochineal. Cochineal, a red dye derived from crushing mites that live on cacti, became a substantial business once the Spaniards learned of the dye process. By the early 19th century, cochineal exports followed behind the two largest exports of gold and silver. Though most cochineal products, while created in the state of Oaxaca, were exported through the Veracruz ports (González 2002). By the late 1500s most of the Pacific trade moved further up the coast to the port of Acapulco. Huatulco was still used for maritime activity, though for the most part, Spanish trade occurred through ports closer to Mexico City and Huatulco proved too distant for easy inland travel.

Beyond direct Spanish involvement, trade originating from the Oaxacan coast and Huatulco also occurred between the New World, the Orient, and South America. Trade patterns between Oaxaca and the Orient expanded enough to catch the attention of English pirates. The most notable pirates were Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish, who raided the area of Huatulco in 1578 and 1587, respectively (Kresh 2000). The pirate raids, brutal in nature, forced the Huatulco populations to move further inland to escape the events, which consisted of looting and pillaging, destroying documents on land and economy, and leveling the area through fire (González 2002).

With documents destroyed indicating the original land boundaries and delineations, land disputes increasingly became problematic in Huatulco as they were throughout much of southern Mexico. Increasing population levels throughout the 17th and 18th centuries resulted from runaway slaves, Spaniards, and Chinese or more likely

⁴² During the mid to late 16th century, Huatulco was used as a shipping port for sugar exported by Cortés. Sugar was not only exported to the New World by Cortés, but was also exported to different parts of Mexico for use in *pan dulce*, or sweet bread. Both sugar and wheat became major trade items and sources of substantial wealth for Cortés during the 16th century. Huatulco was used as his primary port of export and area of production.

Filipinos (González 2002). With increased populations came increased concerns over land and who had access to what and where. Conflicts became heated and people were incarcerated, tied, and lashed for supposedly infringing upon another's property either through direct settlement, planting or harvesting, or cattle grazing (see for example Greenberg 1989 for a discussion on the relationships between land conflict and violence). The issues of land would become more pressing with future changes in the economy.

Throughout the 1700s Huatulco continued its status as a shipping port, though its prominence on the Pacific coast was reduced due to the emergence of Acapulco as the port of favor for Spanish traders. However, the economic importance of Huatulco would change significantly during the 19th century. After the War of Independence in 1810 and the establishment of Mexico as a sovereign nation in 1824, economic priorities changed for the nation. Attempting to rebuild itself and find some semblance of national unity, most of the country's economic policies gravitated further away from southern Mexico and more towards central and northern Mexico (particularly once the Mexico-U.S. border was established in 1848). With economic and political foci focusing more on the north, the southern state of Oaxaca saw its economic importance decline, along with that of Huatulco.⁴³ Acapulco was a more accessible shipping port for the Pacific Ocean and Veracruz was more accessible to the Atlantic Ocean via the Gulf of Mexico. Once the availability of alternate shipping ports combined with the mountainous terrain of southern

⁴³ Despite the regions ebbing economic importance as a port of trade, Huatulco did play host to one particularly salient piece of Mexican history. During the early to mid 19th century the political struggle over the presidency between President Guerrero and Vice-President Bustamante (or the general schism between liberals and conservatives) resulted in President Guerrero being ousted from office. During his attempt to leave central Mexico, he was captured aboard the *Columbo*. The ship's captain, Picaluga, a Genoese citizen, handed Guerrero over to the Mexican government on the coast of Huatulco. Guerrero was one of the original leaders in the Wars of Independence – along with Miguel Hidalgo, José María Morelos, Agustín de Iturbide, and Guadalupe Victoria. Bustamante charged Guerrero with treason and sentenced him to death by firing squad on 14 January 1831.

Mexico, there existed little incentive for the newly emerging government to invest substantial economic and political resources into the region. Southern Mexico was gradually excised from the nation's plans on development.

Attempts to reintegrate southern Mexico into the nation's development strategy occurred in the mid to late 19th century. The Oaxaca-born Benito Juarez, during his tenure of three presidencies, attempted to improve the lot of his fellow *Oaxaqueños* by developing ports along the Pacific Coast. The ports were designated as locations for shipping lumber and coffee harvested in the Sierra Madre del Sur. By 1870, primarily based on the success of Puerto Angel, Huatulco had once again become part of Oaxaca's ports of shipping. However, Juarez's early death two years later was accompanied by new presidential priorities and economic foci, which – along with the geographic isolation from the rest of Mexico – saw the Pacific coast, and Huatulco in particular, lapse into economic marginalization from central Mexico. Nominal trade continued between communities along the coast and further inland (see Dávila and Serafin 1988).

As the border regions increased their domination over the nation's economy and as central Mexico continued its role of political governance, southern Mexico was removed as a region of economic possibility. States like Oaxaca and Chiapas were far from the central government and were much too far from the U.S. to achieve any substantial levels of trade and export. While southern states were marginalized, the internal structures of Oaxaca also affected Huatulco. The distance and time required to navigate the Sierra Madre to reach the coast limited most possibilities for Huatulco development. State resources, stretched as they were in Oaxaca, would likely be best spent on regions surrounding the capital. The interrelationships of these factors and

histories created a Huatulco that proved too distant for development or economic integration, either at the state or national level. With little to no economic contact with central and northern Mexico, most of the communities in Huatulco, particularly those along the various bays marked for tourism development, consisted of small populations composed primarily of Mixtec and Zapotec heritage. These communities maintained their living through subsistence fishing and farming. Much of this changed when in 1969 FONATUR started conceptualizing their plans for developing Huatulco for tourism.

As discussed above, tourism growth in the post-WWII economic boom proved attractive to many developing nations. Mexico's close proximity to the world's leading tourist sender motivated the government to explore plans for creating tourism exportation as a substantial component of the nation's overall economy. Attempting to locate a prime area to serve as a basis for creating a tourism development project, the *Banco de México* identified the nine bays of Huatulco. While the report established Huatulco as a location for development and enabled conceptual planning for the project to begin, the development plans were not finalized until the early 1980s; initial construction began in 1984 (Kresh 2000). Essentially FONATUR and the Mexican government sought to increase tourism not only in the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero but also within Oaxaca they hoped to draw tourists away from what had been the most visited areas of Oaxaca City and the nearby Monte Alban archaeological site. With the increase in tourism along the coast a main objective of the development plan was to bring increased economic opportunities to the area and improve the standard of living for local populations (Ramos 1992). While previous obstacles precluded economic development

projects from occurring in the region, the increase in air transportation and international tourists effectively eliminated concerns that developers in the state may have expressed.⁴⁴

The Bays of Huatulco offered many attributes that proved attractive to FONATUR. While the key attributes discussed above were applicable, Huatulco also offered beaches filled with white coral sand and a backdrop of hardwood forests stretched to the Sierra Madre (see photos 4.2-4.4). The added benefit of course, by FONATUR standards, was that Huatulco was now linked to Oaxaca City via Coastal Highway 200 and could complement the cultural and historical attractions of the region: indigenous Zapotec communities, the colonial history of Oaxaca City, or the immense archaeological history and sites spread throughout the Oaxacan valleys. Huatulco was secured a tourist market either through a segment of the existing Oaxaca City tourist market or expanding to include those tourists desiring the sun, sand, and sea that Huatulco offered. As development was nearing implementation stages, two problems seemed to exist. One was the existing population that resided in the area and the other was the perceived environmental impacts resulting from a development plan of this scale.

Before tourism development plans could be implemented local residents that had established themselves on the beach front had to be removed. According to FONATUR this entailed a simple process of expropriating the lands surrounding the nine bays and back towards the Sierra. Any households living on the land, which was often in communal fashion, were compensated with money and/or land plots further inland; this

⁴⁴ Tourism development was also intimately connected with road construction. While airline travel certainly assisted with the mass transportation of international tourists, national tourists often relied upon bus to travel to and from different regions. It is unsurprising then that tourism development started two years after the construction of Coastal Highway 200. This highway, while linking Huatulco with various regions throughout the state and those states stretched throughout the nation, also provided the ability to transport infrastructure used in the construction of Huatulco.

area was usually in the town center of Crucecita or the municipality Santa María Huatulco (personal communication, FONATUR). However, according to nine interviews with respondents originally from Huatulco the story of land appropriation was different. During one interview session a respondent stated:

Interviewer: So what happened when FONATUR began their plans for the development of Huatulco for tourism?

Respondent: A lot of people left from the beaches because of FONATUR and then a lot of people came here. But the people that made money were the people that sold their land to other people with money later on. There were a lot of people that came here from other parts, from Chiapas, from the United States, from Mexico, and they bought land for their houses or to try to open a business. So you have people living here that have everything and you have people living that have nothing. And FONATUR bought the land originally for such a low price and they are making money because they sell the land to foreigners who want to build houses and retirement homes here because of the weather and the beaches. So now you have Americans buying the land and building.

Interviewer: So what did your family think about FONATUR starting the development of tourism here?

Respondent: Well, when FONATUR first came here we had a leader of the community. FONATUR offered him a lot of money, or at least he thought it was a lot of money. But in return for the money the leader had to convince the rest of the community that it was a good decision to sell their land and be relocated where FONATUR or the government wanted us to go. So that was bad because he made a lot of money but the rest of the community didn't get much and still lost their land.

Interviewer: How sad. So what happened to that man?

Respondent: He is still here in Huatulco and lives a very nice life. But the community doesn't really talk to him and a lot of people don't like him for nothing. So after him the community got a new leader, one that cared for the community and our problems... and FONATUR had that person killed.

Interviewer: What happened?

Respondent: They hired a man to kill him. The man cut his lights and then went into the house and shot him. They never found the man of course. It was a terrible situation and a lot of people don't like FONATUR because of it.

Interviewer: I would imagine.

Respondent: Yes, FONATUR is the worse of the government branches here in Huatulco. They basically stole the land from the people that lived here and then they sell it at very, very high prices. And if you want to buy the land you have to have so many documents. They want to know everything about you. Do you have a job? What does your family do? How much do you have in your checking account? How long have you had your job? They are the worse part of the government in Huatulco.

For many originally from the area this was the general sentiment. This was true even during cursory interviews with individuals that did not have immediate family members in the United States and were excluded from the study. Attempts were made to locate news stories on this particular event in the various libraries in Oaxaca City. However, news on Huatulco was sparse (field assistants were also unable to locate any news of these events). Whatever the means of population removal or the exact history on land appropriation, FONATUR was set to begin constructing Huatulco for tourists.

At the time of initial development and area scouting, environmentalists were worried, and with good cause, that Huatulco was to be another Cancun or Ixtapa, both of which were also master-planned and developed by FONATUR and both of which had serious social, economic, and ecological problems associated with them (Simon 1997: 180-204).

Seeming to learn from the lessons of Cancun and Ixtapa, at least in environmental respects, FONATUR's master plan called for relatively few, though all upscale, hotels to occupy the coast line and the various bays. Out of the total project area, 69 percent of

Photo 4.2: View from Chahue, looking back towards Crucecita with the Sierra backdrop.



Photo 4.3: An early morning runner enjoying the soft sands among one of the many bays in Huatulco.



Photo 4.4: Families enjoying the beaches of Tangolunda prior to the Christmas rush of foreign tourists.



the area was allocated for ecological conservation, which essentially encompassed the areas behind the bays or the green foothills of the Sierra. Another 10 percent of the project was allocated to an urban zone that was primarily meant for those working in the tourist areas and hotels. Tourists, however, could of course use this area. Earlier conceptions of the tourism project had designed a support city for employees that would be outside of a single huge resort area located primarily among a couple key bays (e.g., Tangolunda or Santa Cruz). This was abandoned in favor of what FONATUR labeled an “Integrated Tourist City,” where various tourist centers were located along the long stretch of coast in one of the nine bays and linked by new roadways.⁴⁵ The new Master Plan, which spanned from 1984 to 2018, established a series of goals to bring Huatulco

⁴⁵ Source: FONATUR website (<http://www.fonatur.gob.mx>) and Ramos 1992.

up to standards for receiving tourists. Much of the infrastructural development was completed by 1986, including roads linking several of the bays to Coastal Highway 200 and the sewage treatment center located just outside of Crucecita by the Los Mangos and Infonovit apartment complexes. By 1990 over \$189 million US had been invested into the region for the construction of streets, plazas, hotels, and hospitals (Waters 1991).

For initial development FONATUR selected three of the nine bays: Tangolunda, Chahue, and Santa Cruz. In an attempt to reduce partial governmental control over the area, parcels of land were divided and appraised based on location, land use, and potential for economic growth and sold to private investors (e.g. Club Med, *Hotel Barcelo*, *Hotel Zaashila Resort*, and the *Hotel Camino Real*). All other lands not sold were placed under the management of FONATUR, where they remain. Most of the initial focus for upscale resorts occurred in Tangolunda, which featured a golf course, numerous restaurants and shops, and several hotels and resorts (though most recently Club Med was sold and has since reopened under the management of *Las Brisas*). Santa Cruz also underwent initial development plans though experienced slower growth than Tangolunda. The area featured a few hotels and a series of strip-mall type stores and restaurants along the beach. Most recently, however, Santa Cruz began construction on a new pier in the hopes of increasing commerce, cruise ship tourism, and fishing industries. According to several respondents construction should be complete by mid 2004. The last bay marked for initial development was Chahue, which has become the area of recent focus for FONATUR.⁴⁶ Due to its proximity to Crucecita and serving as a middle point

⁴⁶ The growth possibilities of Chahue are questionable since its beach and coastlines experience some of the strongest tides and undertows. On average each year several tourists drown in the area not recognizing the dangers. Based on personal experience in the area, the tides are *very* strong and may limit the area's growth potential (see also González 2002).

to most of the bays, development in Chahue is hoped to increase tourism in the area. Several renovations included a new wharf, the beginning constructions on several new hotels and clubs, a new Honda dealership, and the beginnings of a new site for condominiums (see photos 4.5-4.6). In the meantime most of life in Chahue centers on the small town of Crucecita and the surrounding sectors, where most of the people that work in the hotels and restaurants live. Similar to traditional towns throughout southern Mexico, life in Crucecita revolves around the *zócalo* or the central plaza and the market between *Calle Guamachil* and *Calle Guanacastle*. Construction and expansion on Crucecita was continuing at the time of this study (see photo 4.7). Although most respondents indicated that growth has been slow in Huatulco, the multi-decade development program has still required significant expansion in the area and in Santa María Huatulco – the interior town and main administrative headquarters of the Huatulco municipality. If Master Plan projections are on target, then the municipality can expect to have a permanent population of 300,000 by 2018, where 100,000 will work in tourism or related industries. A population of that size will produce tremendous challenges for the government to provide needed infrastructural growth such as telecommunications, water, and electricity; education; health care; and acceptable housing conditions.

According to Barkin and Pailles (1999), Camacho (1996), Ishida (1999), and Long (1990) a host of problems were associated with the development in Huatulco. While FONATUR asserted tourism development would close disparities between workers and raise the standards of living to those enjoyed in other parts of Mexico, it has been argued by these authors that tourism development actually exacerbated the differences between classes and ethnicities in the region and drew a distinct difference

Photo 4.5: The recently constructed wharf in Chahue.



Photo 4.6: A sign indicating the future site for a host of condominiums. The starting price is \$115,000 USD.



Photo 4.7: Woman passing a continuing construction site in the afternoon sun outside the main town center of Crucecita. Sign indicates, “Here we are constructing... a space inspired in legend. Plaza of the Wood.”



between types of workers (e.g., nonunion workers are afforded better treatment).

Additionally, the development project has been argued as 1) displacing many of the small fishing villages in the region; 2) disrupting practices in the small subsistence communities on the coast since migration into the area quickly increased from those seeking employment opportunities; 3) increasing social and spatial polarization within the communities and their relationship with the coast (which is now owned by the state or private large-scale tourism industries, forcing residents into smaller makeshift establishments surrounding the development area); and 4) impoverishing the indigenous populations, which may have raised tensions throughout the region and perhaps contributed to feelings of xenophobia and dislike towards mass tourists.

Conclusion

This chapter has traced out the importance of ISI, export-orientation, and neoliberal reforms in regards to the growth of tourism as a development paradigm in Mexico. While there are histories outside of and beyond what I discussed here, I have attended to what I maintain are the most salient economic and political histories that resulted in what was previously a small fishing village being transformed into one of the larger tourism locations in Mexico. These histories, more than any other, affected the initial implementation of the tourism development plans. Much of the growth in Huatulco is not complete and projections by FONATUR have Huatulco reaching full tourist capacity somewhere in the next 15 years. It is difficult to foresee what may happen in Huatulco over the coming years. However, the neoliberal reforms and privatization measures cautiously implemented prior to and greatly expanded upon after the 1982 Debt Crisis were the political and economic milieu that Huatulco was created within. This political and economic climate is also where Huatulco has experienced much of its growth. Openness to international markets and foreign investment has been the trend. How these factors affect or will likely affect the thesis of this study are returned to in the conclusion chapter.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents data collected during the year in Mexico. The data analysis is in relation to the thesis and hypotheses established in the introduction and methods chapters, respectively. The bulk of data are derived from collected socioeconomic information, in-depth interview sessions, and social networks. Alternate data sets are used primarily for contextualization purposes or to provide examples of economic growth in the region or the history of tourism in Huatulco. In the concluding chapter the data established here will be revisited within the context of Huatulco out-migration and their possible contributions to the field of Mexico-U.S. migration and tourism development.

The Structure of Analysis and Presentation

As stated in the introduction and methodology chapters, the overarching goal of this research was to determine if and how tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco, as well as the increasing numbers of U.S. tourists, affected out-migration patterns from Huatulco and current immigration attempts into the United States. This study was predicated on ten hypotheses, some of which were autonomous of each other and some of which formed conceptual interrelationships. For example, the first hypothesis, which stated that the locals in Huatulco perceived the state-sponsored tourism development as redirecting a majority of regional capital and natural resources to the maintenance and development of the tourist infrastructure, may be linked via the concept of ‘reduction in resources’ to hypothesis two, which stated that the locals viewed the development of

tourism in Huatulco as reducing their own access to local resources. Due to the complexity of the hypotheses and the numerous variables that may affect a decision as multifaceted as international migration, I have grouped the hypotheses into three main topics for discussion. Rather than addressing each of the ten hypotheses individually, and arguably in a piecemeal fashion, it is possible to subdivide the hypotheses into the following broad topics that ultimately supply the foundations for the project:

- 1) Issues in the redirection of local capital or natural resources to the tourism infrastructure;
- 2) Issues embedded within the ideas on standards of living or an individuals ability to raise their standard of living and the differences, perceived or authentic, between that of tourists and local residents; and
- 3) Why a decision to out-migrate was made or contemplated and what resources (e.g., social networks, finances, human capital) were available to the migrant at the time of the decision.

Each of these topics then contains a group of hypotheses. To avoid any ambiguity hypotheses one and two are encompassed within topic one; hypotheses three to five are encompassed within topic two; and hypotheses six to nine are encompassed within topic three. As these topics are discussed, each of the hypotheses will be revisited where appropriate. Specifically, the data discussed in these sections will illustrate why each of the hypotheses are supported or rejected. As stated in the methods chapter, hypothesis ten will be accepted or rejected based on the entire sets of data and their analysis.

Findings and Hypotheses:

A) Capital and Natural Resources – Issues in Access

In regards to the availability of natural resources, most of the respondents primarily focused on land. There were peripheral comments regarding the availability of

fish, corn, tomatoes, or other food stocks; however, a full 100 percent of all respondents mentioned land availability in one form or another. Concerns for land revolved around discussions on FONATUR⁴⁷, the price of land, or who FONATUR preferred to sell land to. The perceived redirection of capital resources to the tourist infrastructure was more varied than that of natural resources. Certain issues discussed by respondents were composed of seemingly clear-cut topics. For example, 76 percent of respondents discussed the inflation of goods bought and sold in Huatulco based on tourist presence. Furthermore, when this combined with how locals perceived the importance placed on tourists via the government and FONATUR, there were distinct feelings expressed by local residents of being slighted by the government in favor of tourists and the income they generated. Increasingly it was seen that Huatulco did not exist for the locals; rather, it was created, maintained, and expanded upon based on the desire of tourists. Exactly how Huatulco was created and expanded upon was often equated with where labor was directed and where capital would be invested in the area or in what communities. To provide a more detailed account on some of these topics I will first address the issues within redirecting capital resources to the tourist infrastructure; some of these capital and economic topics will relate to the availability of land for local residents.

*

Much of the data on the redirection of capital resources to the tourist infrastructure were embedded within or associated with respondents' discussions on the

⁴⁷ In 1974 a federal law passed that sought to develop tourism to its fullest potential by merging the state funding agencies of FOGATUR (Tourism Guarantee and Promotion Fund) and INFRATUR (National Trust Fund for Tourist Infrastructure) into one agency: FONATUR (or the National Fund for Tourism Development). Its mandates were to carry out land expropriations, resettle local residents, construct infrastructure, market and promote to private investors through foreign and domestic investment incentives, grant loans to private investors, and plan urban and residential areas (Sofield 2003).

importance placed on tourists. Certainly in the minds of respondents the priority tourists received created a distinct alteration to the practices of FONATUR and other businesses in the area, which ultimately determined where labor would be directed, how prices were set, and what types of jobs were created and distributed.

Before we delve directly into the direction of labor and capital in Huatulco, it is necessary to supply some of the region's economic history and respondents' perceptions on Huatulco and tourism; these factors related to how they viewed FONATUR, capital expenditures, and later, land availability. Of the 89 households included in the analysis⁴⁸, a full 97 percent (rounded figure) of respondents recognized divisions within Huatulco, particularly between the areas where tourists congregated or foreigners lived and the areas where locals lived. In most cases it was a matter of degree as to how they viewed the divisions. However, there was an arguable cultural consensus as 90 percent of these households viewed a distinct difference between the areas. The remaining 7 percent recognized differences between the areas yet did not view them as dramatic, believing that the standard of living they enjoyed was still considerably higher than in other parts of Mexico and Oaxaca in particular.⁴⁹ The 7 percent were right, at least by INEGI standards and data. According to censuses done in 1990 and 2000, Santa María Huatulco had enjoyed, relative to the state of Oaxaca, a considerably higher rate of pay and lower unemployment rate. The percentage of workers that received no pay or received at the minimum wage was always lower in comparison to the state. Likewise, while the

⁴⁸ As stated in the methodology, two households were dropped from the sample due to incongruities in their stories and timelines for migration.

⁴⁹ Actually, most of the 86 percent respondents recognized a difference between the quality of life in Huatulco and other areas of Mexico, which served as one of their primary enjoyments in the region (discussed further below). However, this majority still recognized a substantial difference between themselves and the tourists. For the 7 percent alone, the difference was not that important.

percentage of the state's population that received 2 to 5 times (or more) than the minimum salary hovered around 9 or 3 percent, the percentage for Huatulco's population was roughly between 16 or 8 percent, in some cases doubling, nearly tripling, the percentage experienced in the state (see table 5.1 and figures 5.1-5.2).⁵⁰

Still, respondents consistently argued that either there were not enough jobs in Huatulco or those jobs that existed paid insufficiently. There were respondents that felt plenty of jobs existed in Huatulco and those jobs paid well. These respondents, however, were a small minority, representing roughly 8 percent of the surveyed population. In most cases these individuals came to Huatulco from outside areas (e.g., Puerto Escondido, Chiapas, or Pochutla) where the rate of pay at their origin was considerably lower than that experienced in Huatulco. For individuals moving from poorer sections of Oaxaca or some of the other historically poorest states in the country (e.g., Chiapas, Guerrero, or Veracruz), the rate of pay common throughout Huatulco might seem ample relative to their origin. Yet, these views were in contrast to the general consensus (approximately 91 percent) that viewed jobs as limited in availability and/or low-paying. All respondents did maintain that there were plenty of jobs during the high tourist season and at these times substantial amounts of money could be earned working in Huatulco.⁵¹ Outside of these times, however, the majority's views on job availability were more pessimistic. One respondent stated, "There's a lot of competition and it makes it harder to get a job. There aren't enough jobs here... They don't pay well but everybody wants them because there aren't a lot of them."

⁵⁰ Data for the Municipio Santa María Huatulco is absent for 1980, four years prior to the tourism development initiative.

⁵¹ High season was associated with the months of November, December, January, April (*Semana Santa*), and August (approximately 48 percent of the time July was included as an extension of August's tourist flow).

Table 5.1: Employment status for the populations in Oaxaca and the *Municipio* Santa María Huatulco, 1980 – 1990.

Year	Total Economically Active Population	Employed Population	Unemployed Population	Economically Inactive Population	Did Not Specify
1980					
State	1,525,124	855,240	3,043	666,841	No Data
Men	753,103	601,238	2,060	149,805	No Data
Women	772,021	254,002	983	517,036	No Data
Municipio	3,996	2,196	No Data	1,800	No Data
Men	2,084	No Data	No Data	304	No Data
Women	1,912	No Data	No Data	1,496	No Data
1990					
State	1,977,098	754,305	21,539	1,181,359	19,895
Men	951,013	630,826	18,534	291,886	9,767
Women	1,026,085	123,479	3,005	889,473	10,128
Municipio	8,284	3,969	90	4,153	72
Men	4,268	3,209	65	964	30
Women	4,016	760	25	3,189	42
2000					
State	2,383,233	1,066,558	10,271	1,297,849	8,555
Men	1,124,557	751,448	8,462	360,011	4,636
Women	1,258,676	315,110	1,809	937,838	3,919
Municipio	18,782	10,110	60	8,436	176
Men	9,096	6,845	44	2,111	96
Women	9,686	3,265	16	6,325	80
<p>Source: INEGI. 2001. <i>Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca</i>. INEGI. 1997. <i>Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca</i>. INEGI. 1990. <i>Oaxaca, XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000; Tabulados Básicos</i>. INEGI. 2000. <i>Oaxaca, XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2000; Tabulados Básicos</i>.</p>					

Figure 5.1: Salary distribution below, at, and above the minimum salary in Oaxaca and Santa María Huatulco, Municipio – 2000 (Source: INEGI 2001).





Figure 5.2: Salary distribution below, at, and above the minimum salary in Oaxaca and Santa María Huatulco, Municipio – 1990 (Source: INEGI 1997).



One possible explanation for the view of jobs as limited and thus more competitive were the rates of growth experienced in Huatulco throughout the 1980s and 1990s⁵² (see table 5.2, total population increases for the Municipio from 1980-2000). Starting in the 1980s at the time of the development initiative, the population level was 6,670. By 1990 the population essentially doubled to 12,645. Within an additional five short years the population doubled again to 25,242. By 2000 Santa María Huatulco had a population of 28,327. While population growth rates over this twenty year period were 2.5 and 1.3 percent for the state, Huatulco's growth rates were an amazing 6.6 and 8.5 percent, respective to the state (see figure 5.3). Even with the extremes in growth and immigration as a result of FONATUR initiating their development plans in the mid 1980s, unemployment rates for the region were consistently lower than those experienced by the state as a whole and were considerably lower than the national average, even in 1995 when the Mexican economy crashed under the peso crisis and the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas. As seen in table 5.3 below, the average rate of national unemployment from 1990 to 2000 was 3.51 percent, whereas as shown in table 5.1 above, Huatulco experienced unemployment at 1.4 percent. In this context, the disheartenment experienced by a majority of the respondents in relation to the job market likely stemmed from their perceptions on job competition, despite their low paying status, and two additional factors: the type of jobs that were available and the price of goods in the area.

While data from INEGI and *Banco de Mexico* indicated that in comparison to the rest of Oaxaca residents in Huatulco enjoyed greater employment rates and higher levels

⁵² Data on population growth rates for 2000 and beyond were unavailable at the time of this study. It is assumed that these data have been or will be released in the 2003 or 2004 version of *Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca* and at the time of the next ten year census in the publication *Oaxaca, XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda, 2010; Tabulados Básicos*

of pay, approximately 91 percent of respondents felt their salary was inadequate for the prices set in Huatulco. During the course of the research project to the writing of this chapter I was unable to locate data or a general index on the price of goods bought and sold in Huatulco in comparison to the rest of the state. However, based on my experiences traveling along the coast and in Oaxaca City and respondent interviews, in general the products purchased in Huatulco were more expensive than those in other

Table 5.2: Population growth in Oaxaca and *Municipio* Santa María Huatulco from 1950 to 2000.

Year	Total	Men	Percent	Women	Percent
1950					
State	1,421,313	699,604	49.2	721,709	50.8
Municipio	2,371	1,166	49.2	1,205	50.8
1960					
State	1,727,266	859,189	49.7	868,077	50.3
Municipio	3,680	1,917	52.1	1,763	47.9
1970					
State	2,015,424	998,042	49.5	1,017,382	50.5
Municipio	5,675	2,943	51.9	2,732	48.1
1980					
State	2,369,076	1,176,733	49.7	1,192,343	50.3
Municipio	6,670	3,493	51.7	3,267	48.3
1990					
State	3,019,560	1,477,438	48.9	1,542,122	51.1
Municipio	12,645	6,448	51	6,197	49
1995					
State	3,228,895	1,582,410	49	1,646,485	51
Municipio	25,242	12,591	49.9	12,651	50.1
2000					
State	3,438,765	1,657,407	48.2	1,781,359	51.8
Municipio	28,327	13,941	49.2	14,386	50.8
Source: INEGI. 2001. <i>Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca.</i>					

Figure 5.3: Population growth rates in Oaxaca and the *Municipio* Santa María Huatulco from 1950 to 2000. Note the growth from 1980 to 2000 (Source: INEGI 2001).




Table 5.3: National open unemployment rate, by sex, 1990-2000.*

Period	Total	Male	Female
1990	2.8	2.6	3.1
1991	2.6	2.5	2.9
1992	2.8	2.7	3.2
1993	3.4	3.2	3.9
1994	3.7	3.6	3.9
1995	6.2	6.1	6.4
1996	5.5	5.3	6
1997	3.7	3.5	4.2
1998	3.2	2.9	3.6
1999	2.5	2.4	2.7
2000	2.2	2.1	2.4

*Note: Figures represent arithmetic average of quarterly data.

Source: INEGI (2001). Dirección General de Estadística. Dirección de Estadísticas de Corto Plazo. *Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano*.

areas. Certain goods were considerably more expensive: two to three times the expense of elsewhere. These consisted primarily of electronic equipment such as televisions, radios, CD players, and fans. Perhaps more important for respondents, however, were the concerns expressed that centered on affording the daily necessities of food, clothing, and in many cases, education for their children (discussions on the expense of education were independent of tourist influence, yet were related to the industry and acquiring stable jobs – more below). An excerpt from one interview illustrates the point.

Interviewer: So things are high here in Huatulco, you know, prices?

Respondent: Yes. It is very expensive to live here... *carisimo*.

Interviewer: Are these prices high because this is Oaxaca, a southern state in Mexico... or... what?

Respondent: Because it's a tourist zone here. If you go from here about 40 kilometers away things are much cheaper. For example, Puerto Escondido, while it has tourism, it wasn't created by FONATUR and things there are much cheaper than here. Or in Pochutla, things are less expensive there. About a year and a half ago I used to go to Pochutla, about an hour away from here, to buy my groceries. I would save a lot of money that way.

Interviewer: So Puerto Escondido is cheaper than Huatulco because it was not created by FONATUR?

Respondent: Yes.

Interviewer: But it is also an area for foreign tourists no?

Respondent: Yes, but Puerto Escondido was not planned by FONATUR. Puerto Escondido started growing because of the surfing. Puerto Escondido is more for the national tourists.

Interviewer: Mexican tourists?

Respondent: Yes, and also for the foreigners. But it is different because it caters to a different level of foreign tourists and it is famous because of the surfing. Zicatela is full of foreigners and the cost of living is

more economical there. In Huatulco the tourist is going to have to spend more because everything is more expensive. But for them it is usually alright. They have the money; Huatulco was built for them.

The respondent (and others like him) was correct in his assertion. Huatulco was created with the intent purpose of serving as a high scale, national and international resort area, one that would avoid the Cancun-like saturation of the coast line with hotels.⁵³ As seen in table 5.4 the number of five-star hotels was consistently higher than two- to four-star hotels (one-star hotels never existed in Huatulco). With the type of tourism associated with Huatulco it was argued by approximately 87 percent of the respondents that the prices were high as a result of the type of tourists in Huatulco. For respondents this was traced to a couple of key factors: the type of tourism in Huatulco and how capital was allocated by FONATUR and the government.

First, the 87 percent of respondents saw the price of goods as high and they predominately traced the cause back to tourism. With the predominance of high class, four- and five-star hotels, the type of tourists coming to Huatulco were obviously different than the surfer crowd up the coast in Puerto Escondido. Prices were set higher at the hotels and since the markets and restaurants catered to these tourists their prices were set accordingly. Managers and owners of businesses bought and sold their goods in Huatulco with the direct understanding of how much they could charge the tourists.⁵⁴

⁵³ It was in fact Huatulco where upcoming President Zedillo was celebrating New Year's Eve at the *Camino Real* right before the Zapatistas made their mark on 1 January 1994.

⁵⁴ Several respondents (52 percent) mentioned that Huatulco was primarily constructed for foreign and international tourists. Their opinions were that the prices were high and the hotels expensive so that it prevented most Mexicans from coming to Huatulco. Their perception was that the average Mexican could not afford it. Simultaneously, however, other respondents (27 percent) mentioned that Huatulco was more popular with national tourists since most internationals set their destination to Ixtapa, Cancun, or Acapulco. Approximately 21 percent maintained that it depended on the time of year whether the majority of tourists were national or international tourists.

Table 5.4: Historic growth in types of hotels and numbers of rooms from 1990-2000 for the state of Oaxaca and the Municipio Santa María Huatulco.

Hotel Category	Establishment		Rooms	
	State	Municipio	State	Municipio
1990				
Total	197	13	6,349	1,369
5 Stars	4	3	1,239	1,148
4 Stars	10	2	1,023	130
3 Stars	15	0	744	0
2 Stars	39	1	1,078	20
1 Star	36	0	907	0
Other	93	7	1,403	71
1994				
Total	449	21	12,384	1,905
5 Stars	8	6	1,683	1,443
4 Stars	15	4	1,343	276
3 Stars	38	2	1,553	21
2 Stars	75	3	2,099	48
1 Star	66	0	1,411	0
Other	247	6	4,295	114
1996				
Total	476	31	13,410	2,278
5 Stars	10	8	1,752	1,511
4 Stars	19	6	1,465	320
3 Stars	47	6	1,938	282
2 Stars	81	0	2,465	0
1 Star	53	0	1,227	0
Other	266	11	4,563	165
2000				
Total	612	42	15,368	2,334
5 Stars	13	8	1,749	1,484
4 Stars	44	8	2,411	490
3 Stars	76	12	2,353	204
2 Stars	81	1	2,215	12
1 Star	48	0	1,285	0
Other	350	13	5,355	144
<p>Source: INEGI. 2001. <i>Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca.</i> INEGI. 1997. <i>Cuaderno Estadístico Municipal Santa María Huatulco, Oaxaca</i> .</p>				

Unfortunately for locals there were not separate prices set for them and for tourists. What the tourists paid, the locals did too. Even if the tourists might not necessarily buy food from the *zócalo* market, restaurant and hotel managers did and market vendors passed the same prices onto the locals. Since FONATUR was directly responsible for determining who would build what and where in Huatulco, respondents grew resentful of their actions to primarily maintain Huatulco as an upscale resort area, which for most seemingly retarded the area's growth possibilities. If other hotel types existed, then other tourist types would arrive, diversifying the economy, shortening low seasons, and by extension, creating more employment and opportunities. This may be occurring. As seen in table 5.4 from 1996 to 2000 there was a double in the number of three-star hotels. It is unclear what future construction will bring, but currently the 87 percent of respondents view the development as homogenous and/or the job availability as limited.

Second, to overcome these obstacles in purchasing power, access to inexpensive goods, and prevalence in low-paying jobs, nearly 53 percent respondents maintained that alternate employment opportunities were needed in Huatulco; (36 percent of respondents maintained that greater levels of tourism were needed. 4 percent of respondents discussed both of these issues as an 'and/or' situation. 7 percent felt there were sufficient jobs in Huatulco.). While primarily catering to upscale tourists was a problem in Huatulco, for these respondents a more pressing problem was the lack of industry diversification in Huatulco (not just tourist diversification). The problem with Huatulco's development was the focus propagated by FONATUR and the government. Essentially, respondents stated the government was too focused on the development of tourism in Huatulco at the expense of other industry possibilities. By addressing one type of

economic development and failing to direct regional and state capital to creating alternate industry in the area, respondents perceived the government and FONATUR as limiting their options. If only tourism existed in Huatulco, then only tourist jobs would be present. If only tourist jobs were present, then tourists would be the lifeblood of the area. If tourists were the lifeblood of the area, then tourists would be the most important component for the regions development, and by extension, placing the region and the people dependent on their arrival. For respondents this created a situation of dependency and recurrent cyclical fluctuations in the local economy.⁵⁵ While jobs were prevalent in the high seasons and money was to be made, during the low seasons a cycle of economic depression and job layoffs returned. If more industry existed in the region there would be more possibilities. One respondent noted:

Respondent: My family was born here and I have family that has lived here most of their lives and they have children in school in Oaxaca. They spend a lot of money for that and a lot of time. They then come back and they can't find a job here in Huatulco. They might say, "I'm a lawyer and I can't find a job here." We might be able to make more lawyer jobs but they end up driving a taxi. The problem in Huatulco is that it's so small. It's so small. And you can't find a job easily. Here in Huatulco the only type of business is tourism. We don't have business with agriculture. We don't have business with manufacturing. We don't have business with nothing else. Nothing. You can study in the University of MAR and I think the only thing you can study is tourism... and for example, what do you do in other situations? If you're an architect or an engineer you might have a job here at the moment but once that job is over you can't really do much else. If the government would create some other type of business or infrastructure, to make some other type of business, we would have more work for the whole year and we wouldn't have to wait only for the high season.

⁵⁵ There were three outlying cases where respondents discussed the fact that they wished Huatulco would not grow and expand more than it already has (one wished it smaller). These individuals, coming from Mexico City, worried that if alternate industries were created in the area then the possibility existed of becoming overcrowded, polluted, and overdeveloped. Two of the respondents stated that they did not want it to become another Mexico City or hyper-urban center. I would argue that this sentiment was shared by the third respondent based on the same origin; however, since I did not ask in the interview, it would be presumptuous to apply it.

Interviewer: Are there no other types of jobs here in Huatulco?

Respondent: I don't think so. It's all tourism. For example, if you go to Salina Cruz it is different. They have different types of business. But in Huatulco we only have nice places and it's for tourism. That's one reason why Huatulco isn't growing up as it should be. If we had another type of business I think it would be better for all of us.

Despite local protests over jobs only existing in the tourism industry, the status quo in relation to these employment opportunities continued. When I had considered a job independent of the tourist industry, several local respondents (n=15) pointed out my misunderstanding. Even if an individual was employed in, for example, a local carpentry shop or an iron and welding business, for them it was still connected to tourism. When there was growth in the industry or the construction of more hotels, restaurants, or shopping centers, there was more work for them. Businesses would need iron for protection or construction and hotels and restaurants would need furniture or tables and chairs. If there was more tourism, other people would earn more money. Families would have money to buy new furniture or put iron bars on their windows. The few jobs that I considered independent of the tourist industry proved wrong. Tourism was the lifeblood of the area and for respondents everything was connected to it and depended on it.

As outlined in chapters one and four, the primacy of tourism in the area constructed a state that was directly concerned with its growth and continuation. The interesting component, however, was while respondents felt that only promoting tourism development in the area diminished the possibility of creating alternative industry, they simultaneously resented FONATUR for doing this *and* for seemingly doing an inadequate job at it. That is, if tourism was to be the only industry that existed in the

area, then certainly FONATUR could do better at promoting the area and increasing tourism. The other five tourism poles⁵⁶ had achieved somewhat remarkable results, yet Huatulco lagged. It was somewhat perplexing. For respondents there seemed to be an effort to create the area into a tourist destination, perhaps just not increase the tourists coming into the area. What was worse for locals was that while tourism lagged, they continually felt slighted by FONATUR. It was obvious to a majority of respondents that the government agency purposefully decided where they would direct labor such as mosquito spraying, lawn care, road construction, clean up, or police enforcement. These activities were not in local areas.⁵⁷ Perhaps had tourism been growing as respondents expected the slight would have seemed justified or worth it. In this case, they were doubly wronged. In a fieldnote (11 November 2002) I observed the following:

“I have noticed several things indicating that the high tourist season is coming up. FONATUR and BMO (*Baja Mantenimiento*) are stepping up their cleaning rituals and are taking much more care to trim the shrubbery and watering the lawns. In fact, they water so much grass here [see photo 5.1 below]. I mean, it doesn’t rain in Huatulco during this season. Since I have been here it has maybe rained four or five times. And those were in a row when a big tropical storm was resting off the coast. Plus, the soils here are sandy, where the water just drains right through them. They have to water all the time to keep the scenery green and the plants alive. It is truly a constructed environment [see photos 5.2-5.4 below]. It is manipulated and adjusted to arguably appeal to ... the tourist senses. Outside the main town and away from the beaches it is shit. They don’t water anything or even bother with paving roads. Only where the tourists go or are concentrated do they place efforts to maintain its appearance. The locals know it too... this is tourist country.”

⁵⁶ Refer to chapter four for a detailed account of the tourism poles initiated in the 1960s and 1970s.

⁵⁷ While there was a perceived and obvious difference between the areas in Huatulco established for tourists and those for locals, all of the respondents loved Huatulco. There were occasional complaints regarding the heat or the rainy season, but for the most part Huatulco was viewed favorably and most respondents recognized some of the good work done by FONATUR in the area’s construction. This will be discussed more below, yet I felt it necessary to state at this point that not everything in Huatulco was negative. Huatulco was cherished and this was consistently attributed to its small size, the cleanliness, the sense of community, and the area’s low crime (outside of petty thefts there were no problems such as tourist or local beach knifings, which existed in Puerto Escondido). One respondent stated, “The quality of life here is good. It’s expensive but it’s good. It’s very clean. Huatulco is very clean. There is not a lot of garbage on the streets and there is not a lot crime. It’s very tranquil... relaxed here.”

Photo 5.1: Daily (and lengthy) watering practices of FONATUR and BMO.



Photo 5.2: Constructed hedgerow along the road *Bahias Guelaguetza*.



Photo 5.3: The INFONOVIT apartment complexes across the street, complete with overgrown shrubbery and graffiti.



Photo 5.4: Halted construction in the tourist section of Chahue. The unfinished building is covered with a “forest” tarp.



One respondent, who originally grew up in the area and resided in Huatulco prior to the development plans in 1984, stated:

“The one thing that FONATUR is interested in is the development of tourism here in Huatulco. They’re part of the government and the government is interested in money and growth so that is what FONATUR is interested in. They want to ... put money in their hands. And the only time they worry about parts of Huatulco, for example, out towards Cocoa or even here in Tangolunda, is when they are having visitors from the government. They will clean and make sure everything looks nice when Vicente Fox comes to Huatulco. They want to have everything clean and no garbage anywhere, nothing anywhere. They will fix the streets or clean the buildings. Or they will paint things with new, bright colors to make it look nicer, but it’s not for the people here. The next week after they are gone everything is different and FONATUR doesn’t fix anything....

... Tourists can go someplace else for cheaper and the same type of beaches. And we don’t have a strong agency here to lower the prices. FONATUR controls most of the tourism and they won’t lower the prices. And we don’t have enough publicity for the events here. For example, the concert series is coming up and they are not trying to bring people here for the music, the food, the dancing, everything. That’s on the 20th or so of this month. But FONATUR isn’t making a big deal out of it.”

In the following section of an interview a respondent stated:

Interviewer: Yeah, other people have told me that Huatulco is more or less only for people with money.

Respondent: Yes, yes. It’s true. The tourists that come here they don’t see these areas. Tourists stay on the beaches and in Santa Cruz or Tongalunda. The municipal workers and FONATUR don’t want them to see how we live. They don’t bring them out here.

Interviewer: Is this why the streets here are not finished?

Respondent: Yes, for the same reason. There’s more attention for the tourists and where they want tourists to go and stay.

Interviewer: Yeah, I always see BMO working and cleaning the streets in Santa Cruz or in Tongalunda.

Respondent: Yes, yes. And this street here... The only reason it is completed is because the people that live on this block did the work themselves. We tried to get FONATUR to do the street but they don't care about us. They don't care about the people that live here.

A few days after this interview I was walking around in U2 attempting to locate a respondent's house for a possible interview, at the time still baffled by the street and house numbering system in U2. It was close to five o'clock in the evening and many of the houses that set up tables in their front yard to sell tacos, clayudas, or empanadas had begun the process. This was, however, the first time that I had seen a house spraying the street with water immediately in front of the tables. I asked the lady, after ordering three tacos to-go, why she was doing this. She told me that since the roads were unpaved it was necessary to wet the street to keep the dust from going into peoples' food when cars drove by. "We shouldn't have to do things like this," she said.

*

Locals felt slighted by FONATUR. There were differences between the areas of U2, Cocoa, or Infonovit and those in Tangolunda, Santa Cruz, or some of the foreign dominated neighborhoods. While approximately 93 percent of respondents enjoyed the quality of life in Huatulco – the tranquility, and what was considered a nice location relative to some other parts of Mexico – there was an obvious incongruity between themselves and the tourists (this is discussed further below). Labor was directed by FONATUR in very specific ways and to specific areas. In local opinions tourism and tourists took primacy, which did not extend only to capital and labor orientations and was increasingly not contained only to tourists. The redirection of the area's natural resources

to the tourist infrastructure was most apparent when all the respondents (including cursory interviews with individuals not included in the study) discussed land availability.

While all of the respondents discussed land availability issues, there were differences within the responses. These differences were based primarily on the respondent's length of time in Huatulco, that is, whether an individual/family migrated to the area or was an original from the area prior to tourism development in 1984.⁵⁸ For the former the issues came down to views of FONATUR as hoarding land, raising prices, and needlessly complicating the process for locals to buy land; for the latter the issues were the same with the additional components of historical interactions and being forced off their land, most of whom were located in the Santa Cruz Bay (see also Long 1991). For those originally from Huatulco their opinions of FONATUR were more acerbic. While other individuals moving to Huatulco from poorer regions or states appreciated some of the amenities afforded to residents, originals were more contemptuous of FONATUR. Their opinions were tempered from longstanding interactions with the agency that, according to respondents, cheated them out of their land, forced them to move inland, marginalized them by failing to install water or electrical lines in certain neighborhoods, or ignored their concerns and needs prior to and after relocation. For example, those that peacefully moved off their land when tourism development started were given plots of land further inland. However, after one (at times two) generation, families were limited in their land and their ability to provide new plots to their children or their children's children. Respondents felt that generational land entitlement was implied in their 1984

⁵⁸ Out of the 89 households included in this study, 65 families had moved to the area after tourism development had been initiated. 24 families were originally from the area. For those families moving to the area, the distance was often not that substantial; several families had moved from areas surrounding Huatulco (e.g. Puerto Escondido, Puerto Angel, Rio Bravo).

agreements with FONATUR (as they certainly would have been able to supply land to their children had FONATUR not initiated tourism development and changed land ownership patterns). Families that attempted to gain access to new lands found this not to be the case.

The problematic access to lands was not confined only to original families. Their perceptions of FONATUR were simply, at times, more hardened than the average respondent moving to the area as a result of tourism development. Those moving to Huatulco usually saw some of the benefits of having FONATUR in the area. These respondents recognized that while FONATUR had its negative aspects, much of the work they did had transformed Huatulco for the better. Comments centered on constructing roads, using canals to divert water and control flooding,⁵⁹ creating hotels (and by extension jobs), establishing a water treatment plant, and providing electricity in most areas. Yet, even for these individuals FONATUR had “two faces” and their comments, like those of all the other respondents, consistently gravitated to land. The issues of land allocation were at times intimately connected with how respondents viewed the allocations and directions of labor and capital resources. Since tourism was seemingly going to be the only industry and source of jobs in the area, it was argued that by allowing a more diverse hotel base to establish itself in the area that more diverse tourists would come into the area. Huatulco would no longer be only for affluent tourists. It was thought that with diversification tourism would increase, prices would decrease, and low seasons would shorten. Since FONATUR controlled all aspects of tourism development, land allocation, and decisions on who would build what and where, they were viewed as

⁵⁹ Flooding was still a problem during my time in Huatulco. At several points a heavy rain would sweep into the area flooding the streets with water 6-10 inches high. Locals stated that the drainage systems would become obstructed with garbage, leaving the water few ways to make it into the canals.

the source of economic stagnation. If they would loosen their hold on lands and allow (or entice) more businesses to build and more competition to come into the area, then the benefits would be numerous. Unfortunately, for virtually all respondents (save the roughly 7 percent that viewed development as on target and job availability as good) this was not the case and FONATUR adopted the persona of a land-hungry, land-stingy entity that only sold land plots and development/construction rights to some of the most elite hotel operations (e.g., Club Med, *Las Brisas*, *Camino Real*).

But why be land-hungry? Why be land-stingy? If FONATUR, as was argued by 72 percent of the respondents, was primarily interested in money, then why not sell the land plots to other businesses that might build in the area.⁶⁰ For respondents these issues were distinctly interrelated. That is, by strictly controlling the allocations of land, FONATUR ensured that they could direct development of the region to a few upscale hotels with ready (and extensive) sources of capital. Controlling who bought the land was a source of power that FONATUR would unlikely yield by marketing its entire reserve. Respondents argued it was better for FONATUR to carefully allocate land plots to certain businesses, which usually were those that could afford the minimum qualifications to build in the area (e.g. such is analogous to the megaprojects cooperatively undertaken by FONATUR and SECTUR to capture higher-end, affluent tourists [see chapter three]). Yet, the practices of holding land were not confined only to businesses. FONATUR was seen as attempting to control every parcel of land and this meant increasingly to control the allocations and sales of lots to private owners.

⁶⁰ Remaining percentage justifications for FONATUR holding reserves of land consisted of the agency not caring for local needs and concerns, wanting to maintain the area as an elite tourism destination, or wanting to decrease their amount of work through limiting land sales.

In the earlier phases of tourism development, there was an alternate means for a private owner to obtain land for house construction. Created in the early 1980s, *Instituto de Vivienda del Estado de Oaxaca* (IVO) was established to provide lots and housing to those families living in poverty or when other avenues of land acquisition/house construction had been exhausted. For many within Huatulco IVO provided a way to make small monthly payments on both a house and lot.⁶¹ However, according to respondents (n=13) during the mid 1990s IVO expended the last of their lots. At that point FONATUR became the sole provider of land in Huatulco. IVO may still provide housing to poor families (much like Infonovit or CIPRO – two other housing/apartment construction agencies); however, all land must be obtained through FONATUR. Essentially, FONATUR represented a monopoly of power. One respondent stated, “I like Pochutla better in some ways than Huatulco. In Pochutla there is a good president. There is a strong president and he tries to help the area. But here – here we have FONATUR and they worry about FONATUR.” Worrying about FONATUR for most meant squeezing the peso. FONATUR attempted to get the most money they could for the plots of land that served as bargaining chips. If the agency controlled all of the area’s land, then they could determine the prices, which were free from outside competition that may have driven prices down. For respondents, obtaining the highest rate possible for land sales meant the agency selected what private party they sold to; respondents recognized an obvious preference for foreigners.⁶² For example, most of the areas out in

⁶¹ Of the 89 households only 11 had obtained their lot from IVO. All other respondents had acquired land through FONATUR or were renting.

⁶² Even those respondents who viewed FONATUR and their land holding practices outside of or in addition to an economic context (e.g. not caring about local needs and concerns or wanting to limit the agency’s workload) still shared the sentiment that FONATUR was holding land from locals who wanted to buy it and selective as to who they sold land to.

Tangolunda or Conejos were owned by foreigners, sometimes previous tourists who fell in love with the area and sometimes retirees from various countries (most notably the United States); rich nationals from different parts of Mexico also invested in the area. Foreigners or rich nationals represented a capital pool that was usually readily available to pay prices the agency established. An original resident from the area stated:

“Here in Huatulco – FONATUR, who sells for the tourism infrastructure – they sell property to the tourists and all that. So we are, instead of paying rent, working and trying to... see if we could get some land to build us a small house. We want them to give it to us with a down payment and then allow us to make monthly payments on it. But also we want it to be ours. We want what they have [residents in Tangolunda]. It is really difficult because FONATUR tells us that a certain lot costs about 1 million and some pesos or 2 million and some pesos and the down payment is 20,000 or 15,000 pesos. Our husbands only earn minimum wage so we can’t come up with the down payment. Everything closes up for us, and that affects us a lot. They say that this is “Tourist Zone” and that is why the lots are very expensive, but we are also persons in need and this place shouldn’t only be for tourism, but for people also... And that on the other hand, in a certain form, affects us. It is not so much because of tourism, but because the tourists come, like it here, invest, and buy the lands... It is just not convenient for us to obtain a lot out here and have a modest small house. Just so that we won’t have to pay rent anymore. But FONATUR keeps coming up with excuses trying to keep us from being able to do just this. It’s frustrating.”

Another respondent noted:

“They [FONATUR] might sell the land to somebody and then they have a better price that comes along, say from an American or somebody with more money, so FONATUR says that they have to build the house in a certain manner or with certain materials. And if the person can’t afford it, then they take back the land, give the person their money back, and then sell the land to the higher bidder.”

With the preference for foreign dollars or those from rich nationals, local respondents were faced with the difficult situation of competing in a land market where they frequently lacked the resources to be just that: competitive. There were two primary

methods by which a local household might obtain land for a house: saving migrant remittances or forming a *grupo* or group. The issue in migrant remittances will be discussed below as it directly relates to a household's decision to participate in a migrant stream. Addressed here will be the use of a group, which represents the locals' bargaining chip when attempting to obtain land from FONATUR.

According to the respondents who specifically discussed the usage of groups to obtain land (n=45), there were several benefits to the process. First, an explanation of a group is necessary. In its simplest form a *grupo* is a collective of local residents, living in various places – though most often renting in one form or another – that decide to pool their economic resources together and take their case for purchasing land to FONATUR. Once a group is formed a leader is elected, or a leader may actively create his or her own group; they serve as the mediator between themselves and FONATUR. Their task is to obtain the land for the cheapest price possible and to speed the process of land possession. Instead of buying individual lots, a group uses their strength in numbers and purchases one or more *manzanas* or blocks and divides that section into individual land allotments. By pooling their resources locals are able to obtain the land for a cheaper price than if they purchased it individually. In a normal situation most respondents or locals did not have the necessary funds to purchase land outright from FONATUR.⁶³ A local wanting to buy land when they wanted and where they wanted needed the money upfront. Payments were not possible. By utilizing a group they made it worth FONATUR's effort to sell the land to them. With one group FONATUR could sell 40 or more lots at one time. Group members would pay a deposit, usually around 15,000

⁶³ According to respondents prices for land if bought on an individual bases ranged from 80,000 to 90,000 pesos at the time of purchase.

pesos, and enter into a monthly payment schedule of a few hundred pesos. The drawback was that locals had to wait for FONATUR to sell them the land. That is, while they had the attention of FONATUR, or at least a better chance of capturing it, the agency seemingly was in no hurry to parcel out the land.

For groups wanting land there was an extensive wait time. The general time from when a group sought and received their land was 1 ½ years to 2 years. Some groups had been on a waiting list for 3 or 4 years at the time of my research. One reason FONATUR hesitated in selling land to all the groups was that slowly parsing out the land to locals extended the time FONATUR might receive a higher bid from another buyer. And just because an individual was in a group there was no guarantee that they would receive land if the group did. Oftentimes group membership reached 50, 60, or 80 individuals. When FONATUR would release certain *manzanas* to be bought, there was at times insufficient land for each group member. Those joining the group later were placed at the beginning of a new group and their wait resumed. Another drawback to groups was that the buyers had little or no say in the location of their prospective lots. Once FONATUR offered a lot for sale a group had to accept it or another group would receive it. There was no picking a prime spot; at most a group might state that they would like a lot in a given sector or neighborhood (e.g., Sector T, Cocoa, or U2).

According to several respondents (n=11) there were cases of individuals waiting years to purchase land from FONATUR. Becoming frustrated with the process, they took the land. Squatters were usually forced off by police and told to move into areas outside of Huatulco, beyond the jurisdiction of FONATUR. Most would, but some would fight for land. One respondent that was in a group had waited for 2 years. After

the attempts to capture the attention of FONATUR failed, the leader of the group suggested that they camp out in front of FONATUR's main offices on *Bulevar Tangolunda* in Chahue. The group was there for 20 days and slept on the sidewalks in cardboard boxes before FONATUR finally ceded to their demands. During their two year wait they lived in sections outside of town that lacked drainage and electricity; water was limited.

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypotheses One and Two

The allocations of capital and natural resources to the tourist infrastructure were obvious to virtually every respondent, in one form or another. There were cultural consensus between respondents as they identified most of the same themes and issues in the region's resource direction and allocation. Some respondents did not agree on each issue or the exact mode of how resources were allocated (or should be allocated as seen in the example of further capital investment by FONATUR and the state in alternate industry or tourism diversification), yet they all recognized that resource redirections occurred. For example, a consensus existed among respondents that there were distinct differences in the areas where locals lived and the areas where tourists visited, and by extension, where FONATUR would direct most of their labor for cleanup, road construction, etc. Furthermore, the occurrence of resource direction to the tourism infrastructure altered the local peoples' ability to access the regions resources, capital or natural. As such, hypotheses one and two were fully supported by the data.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Hypothesis one stated that the members of local communities of Huatulco perceive state sponsored tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco as causing the re-direction of a majority of regional and local capital and resources to the maintenance and development of the tourist infrastructure. Hypothesis two

For the respondents, tourists were the leveling factor for the economy, land distribution, and capital and natural resource distribution. Local residents consistently argued that Huatulco was increasingly an international land, specifically for U.S. tourists or retirees who purchased land for their summer/retirement homes, which in turn increased the difficulty for locals to purchase land from FONATUR (see photo 5.5); the agency preferred to sell the land at higher prices to foreigners or rich nationals. Additionally, the type of tourism propagated by FONATUR was argued to be one of the main reasons that prices were high in the region. Further up the coast or just an hour outside of Huatulco in the town of Pochutla, there were better deals to be found: cheaper groceries and food stocks, inexpensive land, more affordable medicines, etc. In this case, resource availability was less in Huatulco not due necessarily to steady depletion but from increased inflation brought on by the type of tourism FONATUR had created, which was arguably anything but diverse. The feeling of most respondents might be summed up from one respondent's statement of, "If you have money here you are important. If you don't, then you're not. That's the way it is."

B) Standards of Living: Differences and Divisions

The hypotheses that centered on standards of living were in many ways an extension of the resource allocation and access hypotheses above and a component of the decisions to out-migrate (below). That is, much of the economic data and respondents' perceptions on access to capital and natural resources affected their views on their own standards of living. Additionally, these views on standards of living were often closely

stated that the local communities of Huatulco view the development and promotion of tourism in the Bays of Huatulco as having reduced their own access to local resources in the region.

Photo 5.5: The graffiti left by recent protestors at the main government buildings located in Chahue. The sign states, “We demand solutions, not repression” (sic). Protests centered on access to land and housing. Graffiti was also sprayed on the street, which stated, “*No queremos promesas*” or “We don’t want promises.”



related to an individual’s decision to emigrate. As such, some of the themes discussed in this section will be returned to in the following section to provide a foundational understanding of why an individual might immigrate to the United States. The data collected on standards of living concentrated on five main issues: 1) the differences between respondents/locals and the tourists; 2) the differences between Huatulco and other areas in Oaxaca or Mexico; 3) the differences within Huatulco or its own socio-spatial divisions; 4) the changing or historically shifting perspectives on standards of living; and 5) how a family might raise their standard of living to a desired goal (this was often directly related to the decision to out-migrate and will be discussed further below).

When asked if there were differences between respondents' standard of living and that of tourists, most would slightly laugh, give a wry smile, and motion their arms to all that surrounded them. Then ask me something like, "Have you seen Tangolunda?" It was obvious and I hated asking. For nearly 93 percent of respondents it was a difference between night and day, where tourists had everything and anything and the locals were forced to make what they could through work, taking out a little for rent, a little for food, and a little to save. Tourists obviously had money. They came to Huatulco and stayed in the four- and five-star hotels lining the beaches of Santa Cruz or Tangolunda. Locals were scraping money together to make a down payment on a plot of land, to pay delinquent bills, to buy food and clothing, or to send their children to school so they might get an education and find a good job when they were older. Yet, tourists were not a homogenous unit. While virtually all respondents felt that there were dramatic differences between themselves and the tourists⁶⁵, a larger differential in standards of living existed between themselves and tourists from the U.S. Many of their opinions were based on how tourists spent money upon arrival, where they stayed, and what tips they left. European tourists were considered stingy or miserly. National tourists were also considered a little cheap, leaving very little or no tip at all. However, nationals were pardoned. It was argued that Mexican tourists saved their pay for long periods of time to take their vacation; they were required to be more cautious with money. United States tourists, on the other hand, were the most sought after tourist. They spent a lot, gave generous tips, and were usually considered some of the most polite tourists.⁶⁶ There were

⁶⁵ Out of the 89 households there were 3 respondents that felt the comparison between themselves and tourists was unreasonable and declined to answer the question.

⁶⁶ I asked several friends I had established in Huatulco or Oaxaca City if U.S. tourists were nicer (in general) than some other nationalities. I worried that respondents were being nice in their response to U.S.

examples indicating the opposite. A few respondents (n=14) stated that Canadian tourists were also very tight with their money since it was weaker to the dollar. A few other respondents (n=3) mentioned that at times older U.S. tourists were demanding and rude. However, the general sentiment was that U.S. tourists were the best tourists to have simply on an economical level. An excerpt from one interview went as follows:

Interviewer: Who are the majority of your clients?

Respondent: Mexicans. They fish more. We get Americans too. They really like to fish.

Interviewer: Do you get a lot of Americans?

Respondent: Next month and this month we hope there are more. We hope.

Interviewer: Why?

Respondent: Because they bring the green bills.

Interviewer: The green bills! [Laughs]

Respondent: [Laughs] The American dream here only exists in dollars, not pesos. It's the dream of the dollar. It's worth more.

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypotheses Three and Four

This view of the U.S. tourist will be returned in the section below on out-migration as it did affect, in some cases, the decision of an individual or household to immigrate to the United States. Table 5.5, for example, illustrates the differences between the flow of tourists from the United States going to Mexico and those from other countries going to Mexico. Clearly U.S. tourists will have more of an effect in the

tourists based on my nationality. Thinking that my friends would be as unlikely to lead me astray, they agreed with the respondents. They stated that, much like the respondents, Mexican tourists often attempted to get the most out of their vacation and as such were at times short with hotel or restaurant staff. They argued U.S. tourists were more relaxed since they had more money and could afford a little more here or there.

Mexican international tourism market, if for no other reason than their sheer numerical presence. For the purposes here, however, it can be seen that the data supported hypothesis three.⁶⁷ While these standards of living differentials were across the board and applied to all tourists, there was a particular notice to the differences between the locals and U.S. tourists. Virtually every household in this study recognized an obvious difference between themselves and the tourists. With the high degree of cultural consensus regarding local differences with respect to tourists, hypothesis three was accepted.

In regards to hypothesis four of the study⁶⁸, the collected data did not fully support the hypothesis. Perhaps the hypothesis would have been better constructed as two hypotheses, but this was not done. As a result hypothesis four should be rejected. It is important to explore the hypothesis at this point in relation to topics two and three established in the introduction of this section. Essentially this hypothesis was based on the bodies of literature that examine decreasing standards of living for host communities in heavily developed tourist areas (e.g. the Manila Statement as described in chapter four, footnote 39). As the argument goes, overdevelopment of a tourist area may lead to a saturation of the market with both businesses and laborers, many of whom immigrated to the region seeking job opportunities. The uncontrolled growth leads to higher rates of unemployment, shanty town constructions on the tourism zone periphery, and hyper-inflation of goods bought and sold in the area. The result is a lowering of the standard of living many households previously enjoyed (see for example Jud 1975; Mathieson and

⁶⁷ Hypothesis three stated that the local communities and residents of Huatulco perceived tourists as enjoying a higher standard of living than they did.

⁶⁸ Hypothesis four stated that the growing presence of international tourists in Huatulco had resulted in lowering actual standards of living while promoting the ideal of a higher standard of living for local communities.

Wall 1996; Pizam 1978; Sinclair and Sinclair 1997; Theobald 1998). However, as illustrated in the above section on capital access and allocations, Huatulco, relative to the state of Oaxaca, enjoyed higher rates of employment and substantially higher rates of pay. Furthermore, respondents consistently mentioned the beauty of Huatulco: the cleanliness, the low crime, and the services they enjoyed (e.g. electricity, an up-to-date water treatment facility, and roads connecting the bays, all of which were unavailable or limited prior to tourism development). These were features and components that entered into respondents' discussions on standards of living. Therefore, decreasing standards of living did not necessarily occur. However, there were problems and most of them were traced to land availability and the socio-spatial divisions of Huatulco.

For the latter it was actually how locals perceived the difference in the standards of living enjoyed by tourists or the residents in Tangolunda, Conejos, or the other foreign dominated neighborhoods. It was obvious to respondents that there was money in these areas. The coastline was dotted with a few, but primarily all up-scale, four- or five-star hotels. If tourists could afford the prices of a couple thousand pesos or more for a nights stay, then surely they were doing better than the respondents. In the residential neighborhoods, foreigners or nationals could capture the attention of FONATUR and purchase land when they wanted and usually where they wanted. FONATUR was more attentive in cleaning activities and repairing roads in these areas, not just tourist areas but the residential ones too. There were differences and virtually everyone knew it.⁶⁹ Yet, in this case their standard of living was lower *relative* to that enjoyed by foreigners or wealthy nationals. It did not necessarily reflect the macro-socioeconomic condition of

⁶⁹ This is based on the percentages of respondents that viewed dramatic differences between themselves and tourists (93 percent) and those that viewed dramatic divisions within Huatulco (90 percent).

Oaxaca, but was important nonetheless and frequently factored into the decision-making process when deciding whether or not to out-migrate. This is discussed further below.

If anything were to drive down the standard of living enjoyed by respondents it would have been the higher prices in the area and the restriction to land (and thus their inability to build their own house). The respondents that were included in the study and on waiting lists to acquire land for a house (n=22) maintained one of their main reasons for doing so was to escape the high prices of rent in the area. A majority of their pay went to rent, which on average began at around 1,000 pesos per month and went up to the average high mark of around 2,500 or 3,000 pesos (depending of course on location, apartment size, and amenities such as air conditioning, which most did not have). By not selling land to those that wanted it, FONATUR limited a family's ability to manage their finances as they wished and to escape the monthly cycle of losing money in rent. Respondents that had already acquired their land, again, primarily stated that the circumvention of rent was one of their main priorities. Once the cycle of rent combined with the high prices of goods and products bought and sold in the region, there was a significant constraint placed on a family's budget that should not be downplayed. Yet, this in and of itself did not seem sufficient to support the hypothesis.

While respondents may have viewed the prices of goods as considerably higher in Huatulco than in other areas such as Pochutla or Oaxaca City, they also consistently mentioned the quality of life enjoyed in Huatulco. Therefore, even if the prices of goods were high and did complicate their ability to purchase products or land, most felt that their standard of living was high (though expensive). Essentially, there were contradictory views: the simultaneous acknowledgment of the amenities created by

Table 5.5: Inbound tourists, by origin and destination, 1990-1999 (thousands of persons, figures rounded off).

Period	Inbound tourists					
	Total	United States of America	Canada	Europe	Latin America	Others
1990	6,393	5,598	294	189	277	36
1991	6,372	5,346	260	328	398	40
1992	6,352	5,320	276	362	363	33
1993	6,625	5,470	237	473	409	37
1994	7,135	6,025	213	412	439	46
1995	7,784	6,764	197	339	445	40
1996	8,982	7,891	269	341	437	44
1997	9,794	8,637	369	347	379	64
1998	9,775	8,118	519	477	297	365
1999	10,214	8,634	502	563	218	297
Source: SECTUR (2000) <i>Compendio Estadístico del Turismo en México, 2000</i> .						

FONATUR that most respondents enjoyed and the higher costs associated with living in the area. The result was a complication of hypothesis four. Based on respondents consistent return to the standard of living they enjoyed relative to other parts of Oaxaca or Mexico – in combination with the political and economic data obtained from INEGI on employment and salary – the overall data prevented the full acceptance of hypothesis four.

*

The last two topics within this section are historically shifting perspectives on standards of living and raising standards of living to a desired level. For most of the respondents the challenge was to understand the seemingly incongruent lifestyles the different groups enjoyed (i.e. between themselves and tourists/foreigners). With the influx of tourists, approximately 81 percent of respondents mentioned that their ideas on

what type of standard of living they *should* enjoy had changed, accommodating the higher lifestyle exhibited by tourists. Much like the section above, which explored the actual or perceived differences between the tourists and their enjoyed standards of living, those respondents that mentioned a change in their ideas on standards of living consistently mentioned U.S. tourists as one of the primary influences. Clearly most tourists enjoyed some pleasures and niceties that respondents lacked. Yet, U.S. tourists were perceived as those that enjoyed the highest lifestyle or standard of living. For some respondents it was only logical to want what tourists had (e.g. different shoes or clothing, economics, cameras, and portable electronics). Parents said that these new desires were most often identifiable in their children, who were said to be easily influenced. Children might have mentioned new things that they wanted or something they saw in town or at the beach. When asked whether these changes in desires were a result of something they saw on television or on the internet (i.e. through globalization), respondents said it was possible. However, they said that based on their experiences a lot of the changes were induced through tourist presence since they frequently served as the basis of comparison. According to one respondent:

“The children have changed a lot. They come to the city or they live here or go to school here and they change. I’m more different than my parents. We’ve changed in how we talk or who we talk to, what we buy, what we want. And that is how it is here in Huatulco, especially with tourists because we get people from all over the world and we see different things. So the children change faster. When you have more people coming from other areas it is going to change things.”

Another respondent stated:

“In general I think people are the same; however, I think that they want more and that’s why they go to the other side [The United States], to bring back things and

bring back the money. More money! The people that live out in the ranch are, more or less, content with their lives and what they have, but the people here see more and want more. That affects them.”

With these changes in views, ideas, and expectations on standards of living there was the simultaneous desire to reach them. Somewhat limited in their options, respondents mentioned a few key ways to do so: completing your education, saving what money you can, and using migrant remittances. The issue of out-migration will be discussed below. For most respondents the prospect of acquiring land, a house, a child’s education, and other amenities seemed daunting when only working in Huatulco. While about 28 percent of the families claimed that it was not at all possible, the majority stated that it was possible given enough time, patience, and certitude. They stated that this process in Huatulco was of course *much* slower than saving money in the United States. In general, most thought that it would take about 6 to 10 years working in Huatulco to save the money for a house and land. This was in contrast to the year or two spent working in the United States. Out-migration was a tempting prospect.

The other option was the completion of an education to obtain a higher paying job in Huatulco, facilitating a person’s ability to save through increased wages. Yet, this view seemed to be determined, at least in part, by whether the respondent had an education up to or beyond *secundaria* or the equivalent of U.S. high school. Of the respondents that lacked these educations, numerous respondents (n=31) mentioned the benefits an education presented for acquiring a well-paying job. A brief interview excerpt illustrates the point.

Interviewer: So it’s easier to find work when you have an education?

Respondent: Yes, because here, see what happened, is that there are more people coming from outside of Huatulco, from the city, and they have an education and they can work for the hotels or work in nicer restaurants and earn the good salaries. So for the people living here it's better to have an education. Otherwise, you'll lose the job to people coming from other parts of Mexico. Of course, in the high season there are a lot of people working and it's not hard for anybody. The high season is in April, July and August, and December and January. During these times you can find work but when it's the low season it helps to have an education. So when there are people, when there is tourism, you can find work here in Huatulco.

Yet, there were respondents (n=11) that had a substantial education; they argued an education did not necessarily help one obtain a good job. According to one respondent:

“They can't create enough jobs for the students. And also I think that the students quit from school and they say, “Oh, I saw my brother who is a lawyer working as a taxi driver and I don't want to waste my time. I'll just stop now and save my time.” So they quit school and work as a taxi driver or sell insurance and that's one reason we don't finish school... because it's really hard to find a job. I think people that are in school can't always start their own business.”

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypothesis Five

Based on the discussions regarding resource access in section one of this chapter and the issues surrounding hypotheses three and five, it is possible to accept hypothesis five as valid. While hypothesis five might be read as strictly related to changing perspectives on standards of living, I believe that the hypothesis is more soundly informed with data that are also relevant to hypotheses one through four. That is, the data contained in this section on the historically changing views on standards of living supports the hypothesis in and of itself. However, the hypothesis is further reinforced with the understanding supplied on 1) how respondents viewed the direction and allocation of the area's natural and capital resources; 2) the differences in the standards of

living between locals and the tourists; and 3) the differences in the quality of life within the various neighborhoods and sections of Huatulco. How all of these factors interrelate to possibly affect an individual's decision to migrate is still unknown. This is explored in the next section.

C) Emigration and the Green Dollar

A family's decision to participate in the migrant stream may be read in relation to an amalgamation of the data presented thus far. Obviously how a respondent viewed regional job opportunities or how their understandings on standards of living changed may have influenced their decision to try to enter the U.S. Yet, their decisions were based on various data sets. The combinations of these data presented below offer an understanding on the complexities of deciding to leave their homes, families, and friends and attempt, what most would consider, a dangerous border crossing into the U.S.

Similar to the sections above, I have divided the remaining hypotheses into two somewhat distinct topics to be discussed here. The first topic (addressing hypotheses six and seven) will focus on how alterations to Huatulco and the local residents, brought on by tourism development, affected the decisions of out-migration and what the migrants hoped to achieve by entering the U.S. The second topic (addressing hypotheses eight and nine) examines the issues in how intra-community variations in economics and migrant networks might have played a factor in an individual's decision to emigrate and what strategies they employed in the process. Hypothesis ten will be addressed in the concluding section of this chapter.

Based on the predominant view of jobs as either limited in availability or low paying in status, most respondents (n=83) maintained that acquiring land or raising their standard of living working only in Huatulco was difficult or close to impossible. The importance is that it was not impossible. Improbable might be more accurate. Most viewed the process as taking eight to ten times longer in Huatulco than if one was working and saving money in the United States. It was argued that most of the jobs in Huatulco provided only enough money, if that much, to pay bills, buy food, send children to school, and purchase other necessities such as clothing, medicine, or healthcare. The economics of the situation rarely left room for a family to place large sums of money into savings. The situation for most was further complicated by their educational status. Of the 89 households included in this study, a total of 121 migrants had left to go to the United States. The overwhelming majority of these migrants had attended either no school (n=6) or only *primaria* (n=74), of which they may not have finished *primaria*. Their economic situation was usually worse than those with an education up to *secundaria* (n=27) or at a university (n=14). Thus, the majority of migrant respondents had little or no education, with an additional portion having all or part of an education at a high school level (i.e. *secundaria*).

After running descriptive statistical analysis with the factor variable as migrant education level and the dependent variable as migrant pay prior to migration, there were distinct differences between the rates of pay enjoyed by those with a higher education when compared with those only attending *primaria* or *secundaria* (see table 5.6; figures provided were computed at a 95 percent confidence interval for the mean, upper bound). For those migrants leaving Mexico with little or no education, their mean rate of pay was

Table 5.6: Increasing education correlated with increasing pay levels in Mexico, prior to migration (in pesos per month).

Level of Education for Migrant at the Time of Migration			Statistic
<i>Primaria</i>	Mean		\$2,177.1111
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$1,886.3056
		Upper Bound	\$2,467.9166
	5% Trimmed Mean		\$2,104.5679
	Minimum		\$600.00
	Maximum		\$6,000.00
	Range		\$5,400.00
<i>Secundaria</i>	Mean		\$2,421.1765
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$1,714.0300
		Upper Bound	\$3,128.3229
	5% Trimmed Mean		\$2,329.0850
	Minimum		\$500.00
	Maximum		\$6,000.00
	Range		\$5,500.00
<i>Universidad</i>	Mean		\$2,927.3846
	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$2,137.2566
		Upper Bound	\$3,717.5127
	5% Trimmed Mean		\$2,874.8718
	Minimum		\$800.00
	Maximum		\$6,000.00
	Range		\$5,200.00

2,467 pesos. For those with an education up to *secundaria* it jumped about 700 pesos to 3,128 and then to 3,717 pesos with a university education. Respondents who lacked substantial education often felt that the jobs available in Huatulco preferred those with an education; and if they had an education they would make more money and their job would be more stable or less susceptible to seasonal layoffs. On the other hand, those with higher education levels frequently maintained that the jobs in Huatulco were of one

type: tourism. With the lack of industry diversification there were few opportunities to capitalize on one's education. They believed that they received, more or less, equal to what everybody else got paid. The somewhat pessimistic views by the respondents when discussing the job market provided one motivation for out-migration. If it was believed that better jobs with higher salaries were not to be had in Huatulco, then migration to the other side seemed more logical than scraping together savings for ten years to make a down payment on a piece of land.

Of course, had land been cheaper as it was in Pochutla, Puerto Escondido, or even in Santa María Huatulco, there might not have been as drastic a need for migrant remittances. Based on factors such as these, there were distinct feelings by respondents that tourism development was inhibiting some of their goals. FONATUR had by that point clearly established affluent, four- or five-stars hotels as the main focus for the regions growth. While there were signs that less expensive hotels were coming into the region (refer to table 5.4), high class hotels and resorts remained the area's main source of economic support.

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypothesis Six

By limiting their development strategy, FONATUR had simultaneously created a situation that respondents viewed as the source of area inflation. There was little variation in the overall tourist. While there was variation in how tourists spent money or what tips they left at a restaurant or in a hotel, they could still afford the area. What was created, as explained above, was a situation where vendors could set their prices according to what types of tourists came into the area. The same prices were passed on to

the locals. Even though a couple of respondents mentioned that prices were high in Huatulco as a result of being a southern state in Mexico (i.e. the additional cost of transporting goods long distances and through the mountainous regions), this did not fully explain why a television was at times 1,000 pesos (or more) cheaper just an hour outside Huatulco in the town of Pochutla. For respondents it was a result of tourism, the type of tourist, and the emerging affluent communities in the areas of Tangolunda and Santa Cruz. With these factors seeming to work against some of Huatulco's residents, an obvious option was to out-migrate from the region. The failures of FONATUR and the Mexican government to appropriately allocate capital to alternate industries in the region or to diversify the tourism market in Huatulco resulted in locals feeling that their options were limited. The ways in which all of the data presented thus far interrelate provide substantial support for the acceptance of hypothesis six.⁷⁰

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Conceptually, hypothesis seven was directly related to hypothesis six. Surely if a person was motivated to emigrate from a region and their out-migration was not the result of political persecution, danger, or family abuses, then one of their likely reasons for doing so would have been to raise their standard of living. This of course coincides with the predominant pattern of Mexico-U.S. migration as labor migration (refer to chapter three). The close proximity of Mexico to the U.S., the historically interrelated cultures (especially along the border regions), and the United States' vacillating need for cheap sources of labor that presumably posed little threat to the U.S. economy and mainstream culture, helped create segments of laborers in Mexico that actively participated in

⁷⁰ Hypothesis six stated that the local Huatulco residents who had no expectation that tourism development would raise their standard of living would be motivated to emigrate from the region/area.

migrating to the U.S. for temporary work. While not all Mexico-U.S. migration is labor migration or labor-oriented (or even all the migrant cases in this study [n=9]), the overwhelming majority of migrants (n=112) in this study participated for economic reasons or the ideological components that were associated with economics, that is, as views on standards of living changed for some a key component to raise them was access to more lucrative sources of capital.

Had the overwhelming majority of respondents migrated for reasons alternate to economics (e.g., spousal abuse, pollution, crime), it might be logical that they not return to Mexico or, at the least, to Huatulco. Yet, the overall return rate to Huatulco was high. Migrants that had already returned or would return were 79 percent and those possibly returning were 8 percent. There were 12 percent of migrants that at the time did not have plans to return to Mexico.⁷¹ With the majority of respondents returning or possibly returning to Mexico, their migration supported the literature that viewed most of Mexico-U.S. migration as economic. There were cases where people left to escape an abusive marriage/relationship or to reunite with their family that had already established ‘residency’ in the U.S.; however, these constituted 6 cases out of 121 migrants.⁷² It was

⁷¹ Figures provided were rounded. There were two cases of respondents that had attempted to cross but were apprehended by U.S. Border Control Agents. They had plans to try again and were saving money for the *pollero*. Yet in general, the apprehension rate was low for this sample. 81 percent of migrants crossed on their first attempt, 8 percent crossed on their second attempt, and 6 percent crossed on their third attempt. Remaining migrants, at the time of study, were preparing to leave. Data was unavailable on their success rate.

⁷² According to some of the early literature on Mexico-U.S. migration, the role of women as active participants in the migrant stream was underplayed. Most women were viewed as passive actors, only going to the United States for reunification with their spouse. While all of the cases in this study that had the motive to migrate as “family reunification” were female (n=6), there was a grand total of n=32 females, where the majority of responses for migration were economic in nature and centered on improving or augmenting family/individual economies. In this case women were not passive actors in what events would shape their lives. The gender differentials embodied in the early literature likely reflect either gender biases in the researchers as most of them at the time were male or that women at the time in Mexico were dominated in large parts by what was arguably a patriarchal society (see also Dore and Molyneux 2000; Friedmann, Autler, and Abers 1996; Kanaiaupuni 2000; and Tiano 1994).

clearly a minority. As most of the migration was economic, the ideological underpinnings or motivations were primarily to improve their lot in life or that of their family and children. People were faced with the option of working for years in Huatulco to try to save money for land and a house. One respondent stated:

“You can work over there for a couple of years and send back the money. Then you can buy the land. It’s faster. It’s much faster. My brother bought his land only working here but he worked at *Los Portales* and restaurants for 13 years and saved his money and saved his tips to buy this land.”

Emigrating from the area proved feasible and possibly worthwhile. If they could find a job elsewhere, save money, or send remittances, then they could catch up to their goals and their somewhat newly emerging views on how people should live and what amenities should be afforded to them.

Rather than eking out a small living in Huatulco, the rates of pay in the U.S. were tempting. They could remit large portions of their U.S. wages for savings in Mexico (see tables 5.7 to 5.8 for a presentation on how migrant remittances changed based on gender or marital status, where males and married migrants remitted substantially larger sums on average than unmarried migrants. See also figure 5.4 for an illustration on the normal curve of migrant remittances; note within the distribution the overwhelming majority of remittances that fell between 2,000 and 4,000 pesos a month). Not only was the dollar stronger than the peso, employment in the U.S. was based on hourly wages. Unlike all of Mexico where salaries were based on day or weekly work, employment in the U.S. was more favorable to migrants who could work 10 hours a day and get paid for 10 hours of work.


Table 5.7: Differences in migrant remittances based on gender.

Migrant Gender				Statistic
Remittances from Migrant Income per Month (in pesos)	Male	Mean		\$3,337.2881
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$2,499.2471
			Upper Bound	\$4,175.3292
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$3,058.3804
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$15000.00
		Range		\$15000.00
	Female	Mean		\$1,965.9091
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$821.9908
			Upper Bound	\$3,109.8274
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$1,699.4949
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$9,000.00
		Range		\$9,000.00

Table 5.8: Differences in migrant remittances based on marital status.

Migrant Marital Status				Statistic
Remittances from Migrant Income per Month (in pesos)	Single	Mean		\$1,206.8966
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$635.1571
			Upper Bound	\$1,778.6360
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$1,042.1456
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$6,000.00
		Range		\$6,000.00
	Married	Mean		\$4,168.1818
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$3,156.4142
			Upper Bound	\$5,179.9495
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$3,949.4949
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$15000.00
		Range		\$15000.00

Figure 5.4: Stratified distribution of migrant remittances based on amount of remittance (X-axis) and the frequency of each amount (Y-axis).*



* Mean equaled 3,231.50.

Regarding her reasons of going to the United States, one respondent stated that they were:

“One, curiosity. Tourists come here and they look different and they have different clothes or shoes. And people that go over and come back they have bigger houses. I was curious what it was like over there. I wanted to know it. I wanted to see how people lived over there and how life was different. It’s different over there. There are more things, bigger stores, different foods. The second, is that you can earn more on the other side. I could make more money and save it faster than I could working here.”

While respondents recognized there were differences between themselves and tourists, it did not suspend the reality of Mexico-U.S. migration. One respondent stated:

“It’s not as though you could go over and do exactly as the tourists do. This is a fun area for them. You couldn’t go to the United States and hang out in Las Vegas with the women and expect to make money. You have to work and if you

work then you can have the nice things that they do. So they [migrants] can go and get these things and bring them back when they return.”

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypothesis Seven

Migration to the U.S. in most cases seemed a logical response to the situation in Huatulco. That is, by that point a specific political economy was created in Huatulco. For respondents the area offered a life they very much wanted, which was unfortunately complicated by FONATUR. The agency had raised land prices, restricted resource access on a variety of fronts, and arguably limited the region’s economic growth with the lack of either industry diversification or heavy promotion of tourism growth. If respondents were to remain in the area (and arguably most wanted to), then they would have to find ways of doing so, which often meant temporary migration to the U.S. to access new sources of capital for themselves and/or their families. With these data it is possible to accept hypothesis seven as valid.⁷³

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With the foundations established for why individuals might migrate or why families might send a family member to the United States, it is necessary to now explore how intra-community variations in economics and migrant networks might have played a factor in an individual’s or family’s decision to emigrate and what strategies they employed in the process. A majority of the initial research on international migration and particularly in Mexico-U.S. migration centered on the formation of social capital, which broadly defined usually encompassed social networks and human capital formation (refer

⁷³ Hypothesis seven stated that local residents of Huatulco immigrating or attempting immigration to the United States seek an improved living condition for their source family in Mexico, for themselves upon their return to Mexico, or in the U.S.

to chapter three). This study maintained an explicit focus on how social networks and human capital might have affected out-migrations patterns.

For the most part, social networks were a dominant factor in the resources that an individual used in their migration to the United States. Nearly 88 percent of the migrants used social networks in one form or another. These networks ranged in function from providing housing upon arrival in the U.S., assistance with the location of employment, social support in the transition to U.S. life and cultures, and/or monetary support for the expenses related to travel to the border and the procurement of a *pollero*. While social networks may have provided the monetary support to obtain a *pollero*, they also provided the ability to mine experienced migrants for information on what *pollero* a possible migrant should use. Crossing the border is a dangerous route (see for example Conover 1987); using people that have already crossed as sources of information for locating a reputable *pollero* was a valuable component of the social networks in this study. According to one respondent, her husband had crossed with a *pollero* who robbed them in the desert. Another respondent stated that, while not common, there were cases of *polleros* taking half the money upfront then leaving town before providing the border crossing service to the migrants.

Yet, the most frequently cited benefit of the social networks was the location of employment in the U.S. Without this assistance the location of employment for a newly arrived migrant proved, to say the least, difficult. For example, one respondent stated:

Interviewer: Is it easy to find jobs in the United States?

Respondent: No. No. It's not easy.

Interviewer: No?

Respondent: For a person that goes over there before anybody else and they don't know anybody, it would be very hard to find a job. Who would help them find a job? They don't know anybody over there.

Another respondent who had just returned from his residency on the other side stated:

Migrants returning don't want to [talk about these problems]. They want their families to think that they had a good time over there and their friends to think that they made a lot of money. They don't want to talk about how hard it is or how much they suffered and couldn't find work. But that's the truth. It's pride. And they stay there and suffer and they won't return in 6 months because then people want to know why they came back so fast. They don't want to talk about that... Yes, it happens. And to talk about it is hard on the heart.

Social networks, however, extended beyond their roles as sources of information for a possible migrant to utilize. They also acted as determinants for where a migrant would reside upon their arrival in the U.S. (see table 5.9 and the frequency of settlement in the states of New Jersey, California, and Georgia). As one of the primary benefits of social networks was the assistance with job location, it is logical that a migrant would reside and work in the area where their contacts and sources of information live. The close proximity to one's source of support and information was also particularly important since most of the migrants in this study (n=106) did not make multiple trips to the U.S. Without the continual exposure to multiple crossings, most migrants were unable to acquire significant human capital on the understandings of the U.S. labor and job market. They certainly acquired human capital during their residency in the U.S., yet this did not give them a base of knowledge to use when they first arrived or during their attempts to cross. Social networks were vital to this process, which is reflected in the 107 respondents that received help from either friends or family.

Table 5.9: Migrant destination in the United States

State	Frequency
Arizona	4
California	27
Florida	3
Georgia	14
Illinois	8
Kansas	2
Minnesota	1
Nevada	1
New Jersey	36
New York	5
North Carolina	9
Oregon	1
Tennessee	3
Texas	3
Virginia	1
Unknown	3

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypothesis Eight

It was stated by González (2002: 17) that “those who have crossed the border are lost among the thousands upon thousands of migrants living in the United States, working as laborers in fields, hothouses, and vineyards, as gardeners, and as servants, until they can return home.” While González maintained that some of those leaving Huatulco never made it to the U.S. and worked in the towns and fields of Baja California, a majority that did make it across found their residency in states such as New Jersey and California. This statement was confirmed through my data. As shown in table 5.9, a clear preference existed for those leaving Huatulco to try to find work in either California or New Jersey. The prevalence of migrants leaving Huatulco for these two states illustrates the

importance of social networks. Not only do social networks provide information on how to cross, how to find work, or how to live on the other side, they also lay the foundations for where an emerging migrant stream will focus upon, leading to possible daughter communities (see also Wilson 1994). During discussions with either participating households or friends in Huatulco, it was stated that the simple reason many current migrants attempt to find work in these states was because migrants before them had done just that. The power of history in social networks was strong. While it is somewhat variable whether an individual will participate in a migrant stream (more information below on what variables might affect a migrant's decision), predominant factors in sustaining or providing support for migrants seeking to cross into the U.S. were the social networks present. As such, hypothesis eight was supported by the collected data.⁷⁴

*

This section will explore the data sets that illustrated distinct differences within the community and who might be more likely to emigrate and/or remain in Huatulco. For the most part these data sets focused on household and migrant economics, with control or factor variables of gender, family size, multiple migrations, and/or education. Some of these variables have been discussed above, for example, the relationship between education level and pay in Huatulco. All figures provided below are given at the 95 percent Confidence Interval for the Mean unless otherwise indicated.

Clearly one of the more important variables affecting whether a prospective migrant would emigrate was the access to migrant social networks discussed above. The low frequency of migrants (n=13 of 121) that did not receive help during their migration

⁷⁴ Hypothesis eight stated that the patterns of out-migration from Huatulco are sustained by social capital formation for Huatulco residents.

indicated the importance of these networks for information and support. Outside of the importance of social networks most of the intra-community variations that may have affected possible migration or remaining in Huatulco centered on differences in economy and why such differences existed.

To begin, there were distinct differences in respondents' pay scales, which certainly affected an individual's or family's ability to live comfortably in Huatulco or gather the capital necessary for the expensive crossing into the U.S.⁷⁵ Using gender as a factor variable to rates of pay, obvious differences were illustrated in the pay enjoyed by males and females, which affected one's ability to finance their migration. While much of the literature, as stated above, downplayed or underestimated the role women have in Mexico-U.S. migration, one possible reason for their under-representation in the migrant streams is the substantial differential in pay they experience in relation to men in Mexico (see table 5.10; table 5.11 illustrates the reduction in gender pay differentials when factoring U.S. employment pay rates).⁷⁶ Female migrants attempting to enter the U.S. had the mean rate of pay in Mexico of 1,398 pesos, whereas men were paid 2,479 pesos per month.⁷⁷ If women were to pay their way across without help from a

⁷⁵ At the time of study the average price for the respondents that had crossed into the U.S., depending of course on the mode of travel (i.e. by foot, by car, or a combination of the two), was approximately 17,000 pesos or \$1,700 US. After September 11, 2001 the increased Border Patrol resulted in a price rise. The average respondent that it was approximately 20,000 pesos for a *pollero* assisted crossing.

⁷⁶ In table 12 (as well as table 13 further below) the U.S. salary of one respondent was excluded from this statistical analysis. According to the respondent his employment in the United States consisted of selling heroine, cocaine, and/or marijuana. Due to his engagement in drug trafficking he claimed to have made on average about \$20,000 a month. The validity of his story is irrelevant. Even if true this one particular case was such an extreme value that it would essentially skew the distribution and unacceptably alter the mean experienced by most male migrants. His U.S. pay was left void so that SPSS would label it as a "Missing Value/Case" and exclude it during the analysis.

⁷⁷ Women experienced a more equitable pay scale relative to male migrants upon their arrival in the United States than they had with men in Mexico. While women experienced in Mexico roughly a 1,000 pesos a month difference in pay relative to men, women migrants in the United States earned on average \$1,342 per month with men earning on average \$1,664 for their labor in the U.S. With such conditions being more

husband/boyfriend or friends and family, their obstacles were much higher than that of men. Men were ahead of the game with a little over a thousand pesos a month. Thus, even if women were to decide to risk a border crossing, their ability to finance the journey was lower than men. Yet, these differentials in ability were also manifested in males.

Whether a male was married also factored into what economic resources were available to them in their decisions to migrate. While the majority of men in this study were married and experienced higher levels of pay prior to migration relative to single men, after factoring in the additional expenses of children and a wife, their average rate of pay dropped significantly. For males that were married at the time of migration the average rate of pay was 2,564 pesos per month; single men averaged 1,877. Yet, the average number of children for a married man was two children. After factoring in the additional expenses of these dependents, single males were presented with a greater chance to self-finance their border crossings.

The ability to finance a border crossing was also read across the board, regardless of gender or marital status. The majority of migrants experienced pay in the range of 1,500 pesos to 3,000 pesos (see figure 5.5). The figures are significant. Those individuals possibly wanting to out-migrate from Huatulco that received less than 1,500 pesos per month likely lacked the resources to subsidize the trip and its expenses on their own. Using the variable “received help” as a factor variable and the migrant’s rate of pay in Mexico at the time of migration, it was possible to see a distinct difference between those migrants that received no help or some help. For those migrants that received help

favorable to female labor in the United States than what they might earn in Mexico relative to men, it is possible that increased female migration to the United States will increase in the future.


Table 5.10: Pay differences in Mexico based on gender.

Migrant Gender				Statistic
Levels of Income for the Migrant Prior to Migration (in Pesos, per month)	Male	Mean		\$2,479.1803
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$2,156.5711
			Upper Bound	\$2,801.7896
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$2,407.2769
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$6,000.00
		Range		\$6,000.00
	Female	Mean		\$1,398.1667
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$968.6854
			Upper Bound	\$1,827.6479
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$1,386.8519
		Minimum		\$0.00
		Maximum		\$3,000.00
		Range		\$3,000.00

Table 5.11: Pay differences in the United States based on gender.

Migrant Gender				Statistic
Migrant Pay Scale in the United States (in dollars per month)	Male	Mean		\$1,664.8431
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$1,506.7472
			Upper Bound	\$1,822.9391
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$1,637.3638
		Minimum		\$650.00
		Maximum		\$3,575.00
		Range		\$2,925.00
	Female	Mean		\$1,342.5000
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound	\$995.3899
			Upper Bound	\$1,689.6101
		5% Trimmed Mean		\$1,288.8889
		Minimum		\$900.00
		Maximum		\$2,750.00
		Range		\$1,850.00

Figure 5.5: A Histogram presentation on the distribution of pay in Mexico prior to Migration. The majority of respondents that migrated experienced pay between 1,500 to 3,000 pesos per month.*



*Mean equaled 2,229.70 pesos per month.

from their friends and family, the average rate of pay per month prior to migration was 1,640, whereas for those migrating without help averaged 2,320 pesos per month. Differences similar to these figures were also seen in whether a migrant made multiple trips between Mexico and the United States. The general pattern was that those migrating multiple times averaged higher rates of pay both in Mexico (prior to migration) and during their time in the U.S. (see tables 5.12 to 5.13).⁷⁸

There are bodies of literature that examine not only the economic resources available to an individual but also the seemingly contradictory effects of economic levels in regards to an individual's decision to migrate (see for example, Cohen 2002; Dinerman 1982). For instance, an individual might earn 2,500 pesos a month with an increased

⁷⁸ Table 13 has excluded the same case that was excluded from table 12 above (footnote 24).

ability to immigrate to the United States than that of a person who earns 700 pesos a month. Likewise a person that earns 10,000 pesos a month would have greater economic resources to finance their trip than that of the individual earning 2,500 pesos. Yet, while economic levels and pay scales continue to rise for certain individuals residing in Mexico, the benefits of migrating decrease even though their ability to finance the trip increases. If an individual receives a good or sufficient salary in Mexico, especially in relation to the average wages received, then the benefits they might see by migrating to the U.S. are lower since they would at that point likely earn the same U.S. wages as all other migrants. Thus, ability to finance one's own trip does not always determine who would migrate. It simply illustrates who might be more likely to migrate. Other factors must be taken into account such as access to social networks, human capital formation, macro- and micro-economic structures, and/or individual migrant characteristics. For instance, while individuals that earned less than 1,500 would be harder pressed to pay a *pollero* or their travel expenses to the border, this does not necessarily take into account what help they might receive from a friend or family member. Factoring in alternate sources of support it is possible to see that migrants with little pay in Mexico often show a higher probability of accruing greater benefits from migrating to the U.S., whereas those that are paid substantially in Mexico may lose money if they migrate (especially after taking into account the costs associated with the pollero, travel, relocation, and the lag time before obtaining employment). These associations between higher rates of pay in Mexico and decreased likeliness of migration or accruing substantial benefits were also seen in education. As discussed above, as education levels for respondents rose, so did their rates of pay. Yet, once a migrant enters the U.S. the rate of pay experienced did not

Table 5.12: Correlations between whether a migrant made multiple trips to the United States and their rates of pay in the United States.

Whether Migrant made Multiple Trips to the U.S.			Statistic
Migrant Pay Scale in the United States (in dollars per month)	Yes	Mean	\$2,098.5000
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound
			\$1,508.5581
		Upper Bound	\$2,688.4419
		5% Trimmed Mean	\$2,088.6111
		Minimum	\$800.00
		Maximum	\$3,575.00
		Range	\$2,775.00
	No	Mean	\$1,510.0377
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound
			\$1,382.9385
		Upper Bound	\$1,637.1370
		5% Trimmed Mean	\$1,502.6205
		Minimum	\$650.00
		Maximum	\$2,750.00
		Range	\$2,100.00

Table 5.13: Correlations between whether a migrant made multiple trips to the United States and their rates of pay in Mexico prior to migration.

Whether Migrant made Multiple Trips to the U.S.			Statistic
Migrant Pay Scale in Mexico prior to Migration (in pesos per month)	Yes	Mean	\$2,612.0000
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound
			\$1,790.8703
		Upper Bound	\$3,433.1297
		5% Trimmed Mean	\$2,568.8889
		Minimum	\$0.00
		Maximum	\$6,000.00
		Range	\$6,000.00
	No	Mean	\$2,094.8611
		95% Confidence Interval for Mean	Lower Bound
			\$1,797.0721
		Upper Bound	\$2,392.6501
		5% Trimmed Mean	\$2,035.9568
		Minimum	\$0.00
		Maximum	\$6,000.00
		Range	\$6,000.00

change significantly based on education. Those with an education of *primaria* earned \$1,300 US a month; those with higher education only increased their pay a few hundred dollars to \$1,657.00 US.

In this study, after a migrant's rate of pay prior to migration exceeded 3,000 pesos a month, their frequency of migration dropped significantly. This could also be seen when using education as a factor variable (refer to table 5.6). It has been argued that U.S. migration policies have actually lowered the level of education that a migrant has upon entering the U.S. As risks and prices associated with migration increase as a result of heightened border enforcement, those with higher levels of education are often at an advantage by remaining in Mexico (see González 2002; Orrenius and Zavodny 2001). As migrants with higher education levels often earned more per month than those with little or no education, they represent a greater ability to remain in Huatulco and withstand some of the associated costs of tourism development. Likewise, their possible net benefit of migrating, relative to migrants with little or no education, was lower.

Acceptance/Rejection: Hypothesis Nine

Migration and its internal structures of selectivity in general operated against Mexicans with higher levels of education and/or who earned more than the average wage in Huatulco. Thus, there were differences within the economic, political, and social structures of Huatulco that affected who might be more willing to undertake a migration to the United States, and by extension who might be more capable of absorbing or mediating the effects induced through tourism development. For instance, there were established differences between migrants based on their level of education and more so

based on their gender. With males earning almost twice as much as females in Huatulco, the ability for women to finance their own trip was drastically reduced. There are other factors that likely influence whether women participate in migration to the U.S. These factors can range from the dangers of crossing to the presence of children and the usual requirement of remaining at home to take care of them. The latter is arguably enhanced where patriarchy might influence a woman's role in the house. Yet, even if a woman was single and without children, their finances were in general lower than men. Their access to social networks was then more important in enabling their migration to the U.S.⁷⁹ However, as illustrated above access to social networks was also important regardless of gender, where the determinant was level of pay. That is, as level of pay went down the reliance on social networks increased. Those migrants that subsidized the trip on their own and received no help on average earned approximately 700 pesos more a month. With these data and their relation to who might migrate or have the capacity to migrate, as well as handle the effects of tourism development, hypothesis nine can be accepted.⁸⁰

Conclusion

Many of my original assumptions and hypotheses regarding the development project were supported by the data collected. A majority of the respondents did view tourism development in the region as complicated, or perhaps more appropriately as complicating their lives. While respondents enjoyed the area and the amenities afforded to them by living in Huatulco, they also perceived distinct differences between the locals

⁷⁹ Of the migrants that received no help in their migration to the United States, all were male.

⁸⁰ Hypothesis nine stated that there were intra-community variations in economics and social networks that resulted in some better able to withstand the associated costs from tourism development and who strategically decided to out-migrate.

and the tourists or within Huatulco itself. FONATUR had focused much of its attention on creating Huatulco as a premier destination for upper class tourists, which concurrently affected how most respondents viewed what amenities and qualities of life should be afforded to them, the area's socio-spatial divisions, and their access to resources – natural or capital. Since FONATUR was to focus most of its energies on bringing in large sums of money through a smaller portion of the total tourist market (i.e. through fewer, but more affluent tourists), then tourism diversification would unlikely occur. By adopting this approach the economic precariousness of Huatulco was also increased. Respondents argued that directing regional resources to primarily one type of tourism complicated the region's ability to grow. Either industry diversification or tourism diversification was needed to supply adequate, stable employment to a growing work force who increasingly (children especially) desired the lifestyles exhibited by tourists. Yet, beyond the associations between the type of tourism in Huatulco and regional economic growth, tourism development as promoted by FONATUR had other effects.

For respondents FONATUR essentially controlled Huatulco. They determined where businesses would build and what types of businesses would come into the region. By focusing on affluent four- or five-star hotels, FONATUR was perceived by most respondents as being primarily concerned with money. The agency's practices of limiting inexpensive hotels from building in the region proved analogous to how respondents viewed the increasing, though unfortunate, practice of denying land sales to local families. For the respondents tourists were the leveling factor in the economy, land distribution, and capital and natural resource distribution. Respondents consistently stated that FONATUR much preferred to sell land to foreigners or nationals with

significant sums of capital. Why would an agency sell the land to locals (who struggled to acquire the deposit for the land and then required monthly payments) when they could hold the land and sell it to individuals that could pay what FONATUR wanted? As FONATUR had created an affluent tourist market, they also had created an affluent body of foreigners and nationals coming into the area that served as a prospective pool of land buyers. Of course, the types of tourists coming into the region also had the effect of raising the prices for goods bought and sold in Huatulco as discussed above.

What was created in Huatulco was a specific combination of events, histories, and structural conditions that significantly influenced the decision-making process of those households out-migrating from the region. The combination of structural variables and how respondents conceptualized their placement in the region were influential for their decisions to out-migrate. As stated in chapter one, it is not a novel finding that certain households were migrating, but *why* they were migrating and what factors they were considering when deciding whether they should emigrate; these variables were primarily the structural constraints resulting from the development of tourism.

As stated above, the agency had raised land prices, restricted resource access on a variety of fronts, and arguably limited the region's economic growth with the lack of either industry diversification or significant tourism expansion. For respondents to remain in the area, send their children to school, or purchase land for constructing a house, they required additional ways of doing so. Unfortunately, the local economy created after tourism development began to favor non-residents wanting to buy land in the region for their summer or retirement homes. As locals were essentially discriminated against in the process (FONATUR could for the most part set the price of

land where they wished), locals rarely possessed the economic resources to compete with the body of tourists or affluent foreigners or nationals coming into the area. One of the few options locals had was reliance on a group membership to purchase land, but even in this regard there was no guarantee that FONATUR would sell them land. To ensure the opportunity to buy land, a household would have to abandon a group membership and purchase the land outright from FONATUR, which meant on average paying around six or seven times the amount you would pay in a group. Knowing these obstacles, locals were increasingly motivated to out-migrate from the region to access new sources of capital in the United States. The primary objective was to return from the U.S., having saved money on the other side, to then access resources such as land in Huatulco. Thus, a household's decision to participate in undocumented migration was primarily based on how they perceived the resultant features of tourism development.

After collecting and analyzing all the data and finding support for most of the hypotheses (ranging from topics such as natural and capital resource to historically changing views on standards of living) it is possible to accept hypothesis ten as valid. Exactly what this means for future migrants or future development projects in Mexico is explored in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 6

WELCOME TO AMEXICA

The central aim of this dissertation was to understand how two forms of human population movement – migration and tourism – interacted when situated in the context of Mexican-led tourism development. The objective was to explore how tourism development in the Bays of Huatulco, which started in 1984, affected the decision of local residents to out-migrate from Huatulco and attempt migration into the United States. Through the processes of data collection and analysis I wanted to understand whether any underlying decision-making in Mexico-U.S. migration for households in the region emerged as a result of tourism development and the associated alterations to the local economic, political, and social systems. The results indicated that the Mexican government's tourism development initiative did in fact alter the region and produce many of the structural obstacles that households factored into their decision when out-migrating from Huatulco. The structural variables such as land restriction or perceived job availability, combined with respondents' conceptualization on their lower status in the region when compared to affluent tourists or neighborhoods, were influential in their decisions to out-migrate. While there were differences between households that were in the area prior to tourism development and those that moved into the region (e.g., certain households being forced off their properties and losing access to communal lands), at the time of research most households experienced the complications and structural obstacles resulting from the development of tourism. Tourism development in Huatulco became the leveling factor for the average Mexican households attempting to reside in the area.

There were of course differences between households: those that could most easily withstand some of the more detrimental effects from tourism development, those that could afford land outright as opposed to reliance on group memberships, or those that could more easily finance a migrant's undocumented crossing into the U.S. Further, stating that tourism development had become a leveling factor is not to downplay the historical interactions that some families had with the government when their lands were appropriated for development. People were forced to relocate, there were protests, and in two cases community leaders attempting to fight the government's land appropriations were murdered. At the time of study, however, those average Mexican households were then faced with the regional obstacles created through tourism development. The development project in Huatulco created local economic, political, and social conditions that most respondents felt led to contemplation of out-migration as a viable option to better their lives. Ultimately, the project and the region proved an interesting combination of quantitative advancements in terms of economic growth and qualitative standards of living improvements that were complicated by the manner in which the development project was handled by the state. That is, how certain key resources and benefits were distributed and/or restricted in terms of access, and how migrating households perceived their standards of living relative to the affluent tourists and neighborhoods. The result was the 'creation' of a region with a complex layering of histories, individuals, and interactions.

The local conditions manifested through tourism development were influential in forming locals' decisions to out-migrate and attempt to find work in the U.S. The local economy created after tourism development increasingly favored non-residents wanting

to buy land in the region for their summer or retirement homes. Locals on the other hand, required more money to buy land from the government since they were effectively discriminated against. Locals were increasingly motivated to out-migrate or contemplate out-migration as a means to purchase land for the security it afforded and the ability to circumvent apartment rental rates. For most this meant purchasing land outright from FONATUR as opposed to relying on group memberships, which did not guarantee a land purchase as many groups waited four or more years for the agency to sell them land. However, to purchase land outright from FONATUR (and at a higher price than in a group membership) locals argued that this required migration to the U.S. to access new sources of capital so the migrants could later access resources such as land in Huatulco.

I will return to these points (as well as suggested avenues to address some of the development project's complications) in the concluding remarks within this chapter. However, before I finish with some final recommendations, I will summarize the main findings and further explore the creation of the structural constraints and context in which decisions to out-migrate were made. These discussions will inform and supplement the closing pages of this dissertation.

The Making of Huatulco

Though plans for tourism development on the Oaxacan coast were initiated in the 1969 *Banco de Mexico* report, implementation did not occur until 1984. Huatulco was created by the state in a distinctly different era than that of Cancun, Ixtapa, Los Cabos, or Loreto. While these tourist destinations were marked for export-orientation in the 1970s, they still enjoyed strong state-led development initiatives such as the establishment and

expansion of the then-national hotel chain *Nacional Hotelera*, as well as periods of economic confluence between northern, central, and southern Mexico. The injection of foreign capital, carefully controlled and allocated under state direction, proved vital to the initial growth periods of the four poles. The state was the primary entrepreneur when private investors were unwilling to risk their capital in newly emerging tourism sites.

As explored in chapter three, some characteristics of the tourism industry necessitate this direct government involvement. Unlike other manufacturing industries where consumption or purchase of a product occurs repeatedly, consumption of a tourist site, its experiences, and its signs and meanings, usually occurs only once. Repeat tourism does occur (e.g. the tomato festival and running of the bulls in Spain). For the most part, however, one visit to Morocco, Queensland, or Ixtapa is enough. Generating repeat business is challenging. While some economists, particularly in a neoliberal Mexico, might argue that increased privatization measures, free trade, and private investment will further Mexican economic growth, the tourism industry serves a special case within this analysis. For Mexico, the need for constant rejuvenation of the tourism site is high if they are to appeal to tourists that have already visited the country or a particular site within the country. Renewing, diversifying, and staying current in a competitive world tourism market requires promoting, planning, and investing in new forms of tourism. The difficulty becomes obtaining repeat business and doing so often requires speculative capital; the attraction may be low for private investors. Therefore, while the other four poles were created in a state-dominated economic climate, Huatulco was initiated after 1982, a year that marked the overt rise in neoliberal economic policies based on the 1982 Debt Crisis and the subsequent economic austerity measures.

Growth in Huatulco has been characterized by private investment in hotels (e.g., Club Med, *Las Brisas*, *Camino Real*, or Best Western) and individual investment in retirement or vacation home construction. However, trade liberalization and openness to foreign investment has not, at least in Huatulco, created the rapid regional economic expansion one might imagine or most of the respondents had hoped for. The reasons were several. FONATUR continued to play a significant role in the region on a variety of fronts. While the state itself no longer acted as owner and operator of hotel chains or restaurants, it did establish the needed infrastructure in Huatulco so that tourism might start (e.g., roads, electricity, water lines, and an airport). The government, via FONATUR, also determined what type of businesses would build in Huatulco and where.

In the other four poles initial investment came primarily from the state, most notably in hotel and restaurant construction. This effectively laid a more concrete foundation for future businesses to come into the regions. Had there been nothing in, say for example, Cancun, the first hotel built had the definite advantage to claim the incoming tourists. However, they also had the definite disadvantage to lose substantially if no tourists came. The risks associated would have been high in the newly created four tourism poles. This, in part, is what occurred in Huatulco and hotel and/or restaurant construction has been characteristically slow. The question remains though, “Why has growth been sluggish and investment limited?” Such events confound the general expectancies in a liberal, open-market economy.

Starting in the mid 1980s, significant macroeconomic growth occurred in Mexico. On the one hand, the IMF structured bailout package after the 1982 Debt Crisis instilled a renewed sense of investor security for those abroad. It was assumed, somewhat

paternalistically, that after internal economic mismanagement, Mexico, under the guidance of international development agencies and the United States, would incorporate themselves into the international market with strong fiscal responsibility. On the other hand, with the demise of ISI and the elimination of restrictive regulations on FDI and high tariffs on imported goods, the gate was opened and capital flowed into a 'new' Mexico. Significant increases occurred on the GDP front, though according to Pastor and Wise (1997) and Tamayo-Flores (2001), most of the GDP increases after 1982, and after the 1994 implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were located among northern states or in Mexico City. As stated in chapter four, while a country may experience substantial economic growth and provide a picture of national recovery, this does not imply that the growth is equitably distributed; some states may be more disadvantaged than before (see also Murphy and Stepick 1991). From the mid 1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s, some of the poorest states had pronounced negative growth rates in a neoliberal environment (e.g. Chiapas, Tlaxcala, Oaxaca).⁸¹ Thus, unlike the initial growth rates experienced by the other tourist poles, Huatulco lagged. The largest increase in arriving tourists occurred from the opening date to 1990. Huatulco then saw an increase of about 6,000 tourists per year (see table 3.3).

As many of the respondents in this study stated, the problem in large part was the type of tourism promoted by FONATUR. Relying on a few (primarily upscale) resorts and hotels prevented the area from expanding to include a more diverse tourist base. For a majority of respondents, FONATUR was at fault for the region's slow growth (second

⁸¹ Some hesitations by private investors in southern Mexico have stemmed from the region's perceived political and economic instability, based on factors such as the high concentration of indigenous communities or the proximity to the politically volatile Central America. The 1994 Zapatista uprising in Chiapas did little to suppress the fears of southern Mexico's rebelliousness.

only to Loreto, which is regionally challenged by a stretch of tourism sites along the Baja California coast, including Cabo San Lucas). As FONATUR prevented tourism diversification or the creation of alternate regional industries, the area was dependent on those tourists that could afford the four- and five-star hotels that dotted the Tangolunda and Santa Cruz bays. With a more highly specialized niche market than that of Cancun, which contains a range of hotels available to suit various types of tourists, Huatulco was dominated by upper-class hotels. In turn, possibilities for growth were limited as the segment of tourists capable of visiting Huatulco was lower than in Cancun, which contained a wider variety of hotels and resorts.

The focus on four- and five-star hotels and resorts also contributed to the majority of respondents' views on the limited availability of jobs. It was argued that if there were varied types of hotels and tourists, then logically there would be more jobs. Yet, as shown in table 5.1 the unemployment rate reduced from 1990 to 2000, despite increasing population levels. The unemployment rate was also always lower than that of Oaxaca and workers in Huatulco enjoyed substantially higher salaries than workers throughout the state. These data in some ways complicate traditional views on curbing Mexico-U.S. migration. It was stated in chapter three that some view development in and of itself as a major initiator of migrant streams. The argument, based on World Systems theory, essentially states that economic growth within a region produces alterations to traditional socio-economic patterns. Such alterations may be accompanied by decreases in equitable levels of income, employment, and standards of living, or increases in drugs, prostitution, or crime. The net result is greater emigration as labor and social systems are disturbed.

Essentially, such examples would constitute the push-factor in international migration (e.g. the Green Revolution as discussed in chapter three).⁸²

Yet, this is possibly a short-term view. While early periods of development may be characterized by new or significant levels of out-migration, it has been argued that over time these will equalize as the local economy expands and those in the area have become accustomed to any changes that occurred (see for example Acevedo and Espenshade 1992). Thus, one possible avenue to curb migration is to target development initiatives to regions in Mexico that have historically experienced high rates of out-migration brought on by poverty, relative to the nation. For example, under the original proposals for NAFTA, the United States, Mexico, and Canada affirmed their belief in free trade. The nations argued that given time the net effects of continental trade would be positive and employment and living standards would even between the countries. If the Mexican economy and living standards improved relative to the U.S., then the derived benefit from migrating to the U.S. would decline. Ultimately, regional development needs time to curb migration. This unfortunately has not appeared to be the case in Huatulco. Despite economic growth and rising employment, out-migration continued.

Intersecting the Global-Local

There were several interacting variables that contributed to the pattern of out-migration when both macro- and micro-economic indicators might suggest otherwise. To begin, a brief exploration of the applicability of a *World Systems Theory* is needed. It is

⁸² Other push-factors in Mexico and southern Mexico include the economic crises resulting from the 1982 Debt Crisis and the 1994 peso devaluation resulting from NAFTA and the associated Zapatista uprising in Chiapas. If the economic situation deteriorates below its previous level, a viable option is to immigrate to areas where the economic conditions are perceived better than the current situation.

arguable that the initiation of tourism development in 1984 produced profound changes for many of the communities residing along the various bays on the coast. This in part would support a World Systems perspective. Alterations occurred to the economy, the political environment, and how resources were allocated. Further, World Systems would be heavily supported if the population residing in the area was solely original inhabitants of the region prior to 1984. This of course was not the case. Significant in-migration occurred as a result of the development project. A majority of the respondents and the current population in Huatulco were from either outside areas or in communities peripherally located around Santa María Huatulco. This suggests that the local experience had been both radically transformed as social, political, and economic systems were altered and not radically transformed from, say, an introduction of a cash-based economy (see for example Mintz 1985 and Taussig 1980). Certain patterns of employment and engagements with the regional, national, and global economy have certainly shifted. However, most engaged with the industry or those that moved to Huatulco to work were aware of their actions. Thus, while the initiation of tourism development produced profound alterations to those fishing and farming communities residing in the bays prior to 1984, for the majority of Huatulco and for the majority of the respondents, a previous engagement with a national capitalist system was present on some level. According to a few respondents originally from the area, some out-migration did occur when the development project began and the government began the earlier processes of removing families from the coastal areas. However, these individuals were not included in this study; according to respondents they moved to other parts of Mexico.

What most notably transpired in Huatulco was the establishment of a strong government agency in the region, which dominated control over most of the activities that occurred. This included what businesses would build in the region, how resources were allocated, and how land was purchased and by whom. Thus, on the one hand, profound alterations existed for some as social, political, and economic systems were uprooted (most notably for the originals inhabitants). On the other hand, alterations did not so much occur for those migrating to the area seeking employment. Rather, those in-migrants lacked part of the historical interaction that originals had with FONATUR. Upon arrival in-migrants were faced with a government agency that was already established and served as an obstacle in their efforts to achieve a better life (a better life originally promised in the development plans initiated by FONATUR; see chapter four). Some aspects of a better life and improved living standards could be found in Huatulco (more below); yet, the region experienced contradictions in these improvements.

As examined in chapter five, the region underwent economic growth, decreasing unemployment levels, and higher rates of pay relative to the state. Yet, as explored in chapter three, quantitative improvements do not necessarily account for qualitative aspects or the contextual factors within Huatulco that confound the general expectancies on the relationship between development's economic growth and its presumed function to lower out-migration. Development, in quantitative and qualitative regards, is more complex than simple macro indicators of GDP, or in the case of Huatulco, rising salaries and employment rates (see Myrdal 1957). While households did enjoy certain features of living in Huatulco (e.g. low crime, cleanliness), there were problems associated with the development project that influenced the decision-making process for those out-migrating.

Meadowlands

The pattern for a significant portion of the respondents in this study consisted of in-migration and settlement in Huatulco, later followed by out-migration to the United States. Originals from the area also participated in the migrant stream. The reasons for this were varied, though most centered on either standards of living or resource access, regardless of whether a migrant was originally from the area or from, for example, Chiapas or Mexico City. Thus, original Huatulco inhabitants and in-migrants were in the end faced with some of the same complications resulting from the development project.

The most prominent concerns for the migrating households in this study were the issues of land or resource access. There were two intersecting variables when respondents discussed land availability. First, as discussed in chapter five, there were concerns that FONATUR was primarily interested in its own finances and generating the most money possible for the land in their estate. In general, FONATUR was thought of as a land-hungry, land-stingy entity. It was argued that by strictly controlling the allocations of land, the agency could ensure their control over the region's development, selling land to a few upscale hotels that could pay what the agency wanted. This ensured the highest return on sold land. Local residents also argued that unfortunately this practice was carried over to individual land sales. Huatulco was increasingly "international country," a prime location for tourists, retirees, or nationals to purchase land for their summer or retirement homes. As FONATUR essentially represented a monopoly in the region, the agency controlled all the area's land, which in turn enabled them to determine the prices or who bought it. Respondents felt land was reserved for larger hotels and high-levels of private investment. Even with a *grupo* or group, locals

were still marginalized when attempting to acquire land in the region. They were essentially told to wait and many groups, though they had the money for a down-payment, were denied the opportunity to purchase land from FONATUR.

The reliance on a few upscale hotels and a few wealthy neighborhoods also created a situation where other resources were directed in specific ways. A majority of the respondents maintained that FONATUR had created Huatulco to serve as a high scale, national and international resort area (which they had). FONATUR attempted to avoid the Cancun hotel-saturated beach fronts; Huatulco would function from and revolve around a few primary up-scale resorts and hotels. The limited number of hotels and thus the limited number of incoming tourists simultaneously created a situation where the capital injected into the economy from the few affluent sections proved vital. The importance of the few key hotels or key neighborhoods, which in many ways buoyed the local economy, determined where FONATUR would direct their labor and capital, or specifically, what areas would receive attention such as road construction, cleanup, mosquito spraying, or police enforcement. These activities did not occur in local areas, or they did so limitedly. As it was, the trajectory and orientation of the local tourism economy produced a state more attentive to tourists than the majority of its residents.

In relation to standards of living, much of the focus was placed on the perceived differences between local residents and either the tourists or the more affluent communities in Tangelunda or Santa Cruz. What occurred on one hand was the creation of an idealized tourist lifestyle in the four- and five-star hotels throughout Huatulco, and on the other hand, a process analogous to gentrification within key residential areas.⁸³ As

⁸³ Gentrification may be best described as a massive flow of capital and resources into an area to either displace lower-income residents from the region or to renovate rundown neighborhoods or slums into an

illustrated in chapter five, the focus for FONATUR on both the more affluent tourism market and on those wanting to build their retirement or summer homes in Huatulco, created social and spatial divisions within the area. Locals were peripheral to some areas, virtually excluded from building a home or purchasing land in affluent areas, and always limited in their ability to purchase land or build a home even in the ‘local’ areas of Huatulco. Locals were aware of the disparities in how they lived and the life of the tourists or those in the affluent neighborhoods. While economic data and respondent interviews explored in chapter five illustrated that, relative to the state, Huatulco residents experienced an overall improved standard of living, the situation was complex.

First, there were the relative differences between locals and the tourists or the residents of affluent neighborhoods. There were historically changing views on the standards of living that should be afforded to local residents. The changing views were frequently traced to the presence of tourists and foreign residents. While these standards of living differentials were across the board and applied to all tourists, there was a particular notice to the differences between the locals and U.S. tourists. Second, FONATUR exhibited a distinct preference for selling lands to foreigners or rich nationals. As locals were unable to purchase land when they wanted, FONATUR limited a family’s ability to manage their finances as they wished and escape the monthly cycle of losing money in rent. Respondents that had already acquired land stated that the circumvention of rent was a main priority. One way to cope with the situation was immigrating to the United States to locations such as New Jersey, California, or Georgia.

area complete with condominiums, high-class restaurants, and specialty shops. The influx of higher incomes displaces many of the original residents and/or their businesses. As a result rents rise or land prices increases as sellers can attract wealthy, prosperous individuals. The area is cleansed of its working class residents (see for example Blomley 2004, Muñiz 1998, Nyden and Wiewel 1991).

Creating the Transnational

Provided with an understanding on some of the resource restrictions that occurred in Huatulco, it is possible to view immigration to the U.S. as one way to cope with the government created difficulties. While Huatulco experienced quantitative growth in the form of decreasing unemployment rates and increasing salaries, the qualitative restrictions created through FONATUR's resource allocations and focus on one type of tourism development limited the area's full growth and economic potential and the ability for households to reside in the area. Yet simultaneously, the qualitative advances made in the region – most notably the area's cleanliness, low crime, or extensive water and electric availability – created a populace that sought to remain in the region. This is seen in the data explored in chapter five, where 79 percent of migrants had returned and a further 8 percent had definite plans to return. Huatulco embodied a life that most respondents enjoyed and wanted to continue. As such, migration to the U.S. seemed a logical response to the political/economic situation in Huatulco. FONATUR had by that point raised land prices, restricted resource access, and arguably limited the region's economic growth by preventing industry diversification or the heavy promotion of tourism. Temporary migration to the U.S. gained access to new sources of capital for migrants and/or their families, ultimately overcoming some of these complications. However, completing a border crossing into the United States is both complicated and dangerous. Since 1998 yearly averages of over three hundred migrants have died in their attempts to cross illegally. Two of the most important factors that assisted migrants' crossings were human capital formation and social networks, where their main functions were to provide support and reduce the costs and risks associated with illegal migration.

As explained in chapter three, social networks are best described as any socioeconomic linkage between a prospective migrant and another individual. This linkage serves to facilitate migration to the contemplated destination for the prospective migrant. Human capital, on the other hand, are those resources (knowledge, techniques, skills) that an individual accrues through experience, most often through personal migration or multiple crossings. However, human capital may be formed through indirect experience with migration networks. Being raised in a family that has extensively participated in Mexico-U.S. migration is one form of indirect experience. In combination, social networks and human capital are vital to sustaining or facilitating current migration patterns. Their net result reduces the risk associated with locating a *pollero*, lowers the probability of apprehension in the U.S., increases personal safety, assists in the location of employment, and provides knowledge vital to a healthy and successful crossing. In the case of Huatulco, social networks proved integral to current out-migration patterns.

The overwhelming majority of migrants in this study (88 percent) used social networks in their attempts to cross. While the services provided through the networks ranged from supplying temporary or permanent housing upon arrival in the U.S. to monetary support for the associated costs of securing a *pollero*, the most frequently cited benefit from accessing a network was the assistance with locating employment in the U.S. The important role social networks had in providing employment information and assistance unsurprisingly determined where a prospective migrant would reside upon their arrival. If a family member or friend was living in the New Jersey Meadowlands, then the migrant would likely go there. The social networks explored in chapter five

were particularly important to the population of Huatulco migrants as 106 migrants (out of 121) did not make multiple trips to the U.S. Essentially these migrants lacked direct, firsthand experience and thus the direct formation of human capital in relation to understanding either border crossings or the U.S. labor and job market.

It was also shown that the importance of social networks increased relative to a migrant's pay in Mexico. That is, individuals that earned more in Mexico were better able to finance a border crossing through personal finances. As rates of pay decreased, reliance on social networks increased. Patterns similar to these data were also manifested in who might be more willing to undertake migration or more capable of handling the outcomes associated with tourism development (see chapter five, hypothesis nine). For example, the net benefits derived from migration in general operated against Mexicans with higher levels of education and/or who earned more than the average wage in Huatulco. By extension, those with higher than average wages or with higher than average educations (which also equated to higher pay) were more capable of affording the expense of goods and products bought and sold in Huatulco. In the end the internal selectivity of migration, the availability of migrant networks or human capital, the individuals' views on the development project, and the prevailing political economy and ecology of Huatulco influenced who would likely make the exodus to the United States.

Concluding Remarks:

The Future Other, the Future Resident

This dissertation explored the changes that occurred within Huatulco due to state-sponsored tourism development and their relationship to a household's decision to out-

migrate from the region. After contextualizing the development project within the region's political economy and ecology, it was shown that the quantitative advances did not overcome the qualitative/quantitative restrictions created by FONATUR and their allocations of natural and capital resources. One way to cope with the situation was migrating to the U.S., in locations such as the New Jersey Meadowlands, southern California, or Atlanta, Georgia and regional farms. Thus, while in part the development project was successful, in other areas it failed to meet some of the original objectives. If local residents, the average Mexican, could not access resources, then development would not necessarily be sustainable, regardless of economic growth levels. Ultimately, what is vital is distribution, whether they are natural resources or state capital.

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that there is a greater need in equity within the development of Huatulco. Land should not only be distributed to those with extensive sources of capital. Even when local residents had the necessary funds to place a down payment on a plot of land, FONATUR stretched the purchasing process out several years, making some groups wait three, four, and in one case, six years. Ideally all development projects would be thoroughly equitable. However, such is not an ideal world. There are structural variables, inter-personal relationships, intersecting political and economic interests, and issues in power for who gets what. As such, in a realistic sense, it is unlikely that Huatulco would turn itself upside-down over night. There are possibilities in the region and the establishment of a more varied hotel base is one indication that tourism diversification may be beginning. Further, some respondents felt optimistic with the election of President Vicente Fox in 2000, ending a seventy-one-year stronghold on the presidency by the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or PRI. It is

hoped that the new presidential party, *Partido de Acción Nacional* or PAN, will dissolve much of the special interests and corruption established and entrenched within the long running PRI regime.⁸⁴ Work is needed to accomplish these ends.

The contentious relationships over land in southern Mexico, especially in relation to the manner that FONATUR handled its allocation and sales under tourism development, was a significant factor when families were deciding to out-migrate from a region that previously experienced little to no emigration. Prior to development there was little need to access significant sources of capital to purchase a small plot of land. Tourism development did produce significant alterations to the local political and economic systems, forcing some original families to completely abandon the area and others to participate in temporary migration to the U.S. to access new sources of capital. Land was no longer communal, and for most, land was no longer available, especially for children's inheritance. For those moving into the area seeking employment opportunities with the expanding tourism base, there were similar structural obstacles. The process FONATUR established for purchasing land was, to say the least, problematic. The government agency dominated control over most of the economic and political activities, including what businesses were allowed into Huatulco, how capital and natural resources were allocated, and how land was purchased and by whom. The relationship between people and property took on larger aspects as tourism development introduced state agencies, international companies, and foreign populations, all of whom had a stake in how land and resources were apportioned. The combination of these variables supplied a motivation for families to make a decision to migrate to the United States.

⁸⁴ According to several poles conducted in the mid 1990s, 87 percent of Mexicans stated they had little to no trust in their government (Oppenheimer 1998). In fact, the government achieved one spot higher on the list than used car salesmen. Used car salesmen were at the bottom.

Yet, it is arguable that the best hope to curb migration remains in targeted development initiatives within certain communities. The goal is to reduce the domestic pressures necessitating dangerous border crossings into the U.S. The perpetuating mechanisms of social networks and human capital formation present a migration pattern between Mexico and the United States that is unlikely to stop by increased militarization of the U.S. southern border. The networks created through undocumented migration reduce the risks and costs associated with migration. Further, the communities that have established migrant networks may over time become dependent on the levels of remittances and their effect of buoying the local economy. As such, U.S. policies that operate from Neoclassical Economic theories of border enforcement are likely to continue their failure. The best hope is to create equitable, just, and beneficial development projects within certain areas or communities in Mexico. The strengthened Mexican economy will expectantly reduce the need for additional migration or the push-factors in Mexico.

Pragmatically, however, this will take time, and as in the case of Huatulco, it is not going to happen instantaneously. Recognizing that the migrant networks present a viable economic option for many families throughout Mexico, Huatulco being no exception, it is unrealistic to expect that they stop altogether with increased border enforcement. This also fails to account for the U.S. role in historically creating many of the networks that are utilized by contemporary migrants (e.g. the Bracero Program and the Green Revolution). The 2004 discussions on implementing a guest worker program present some avenues for Mexican laborers to legally enter the U.S. There are benefits. On an individual level, migrants no longer need to attempt a dangerous and at times

deadly border crossing, nor would they have the expenses associated with black market smuggling organizations. Migrants would also be presented legal recourses within the U.S., reducing worker abuse or mistreatment. On a national level, a legal means of crossing would present order to what by most accounts is considered a disorganized, inefficient, and broken system of border enforcement. Illegal crossings would likely continue, though on a substantially reduced level. As Mexican migrant remittances on a macroeconomic scale jumped to over \$13 billion US in 2003, there exists little incentive for Mexico to actively crack down on criminal smuggling organizations and stop illegal migration. A legal means of crossing benefits both countries. In the end it is hoped that bi-national task forces that cooperatively eliminate criminal smuggling organizations and further advances towards equitable and just development projects throughout Mexico will reduce the dangers and need for crossing into a country to find work, separated from families and friends by thousands of miles.

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APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY OF MEXICO

* indicates direct citation from Krauze (1997).

** indicates direct citation from Bates (2002).

Period or Year	Description and Events
** ca. 10,000 B.C	First hunters and gathers reach area of present-day Mexico.
** ca. 1500 B.C.	Villages appear and inhabitants begin to produce clay products.
** ca. 200 B.C.- A.D. 100	Monte Albán civilization in southern Mexico begins and runs its primary dominance in the region.
** c.a. A.D. 1-650	Teotihuacán civilization is located in central Mexico.
** c.a. A.D. 600- 900	Classic Mayan civilization in the Yucatan peninsula starts.
* 1325	Founding of the city of Mexico-Tenochtitlan by the Mexicas, later known as the Aztecs.
* 1440-1487	The Aztecs greatly expand their power and empire under Emperor Moctezuma I.
1502	Moctezuma II becomes emperor of Tenochtitlan and maintains power for 20 years.
* 1519	Hernán Cortés lands his forces on the shores of Mexico.
* 1520	Death of Moctezuma II. He is replaced by Cuitláhuac, who reigns for only eighty days and dies of smallpox (a disease brought by the Spaniards). Cuauhtémoc, the last Aztec emperor, continues to resist the Spaniards.
1521	After Hernán Cortés and about 700 men landed in Mexico, Tenochtitlan falls to the Spaniards and their Indian allies.
1524	Indian conversion to Christianity begins its long and tumultuous history.
* 1528	Arrival of the first bishop of Mexico, Fray Juan de Zumárraga.
* 1533	Inspired by the <i>Utopia</i> of Thomas More, Vasco de Quiroga founds the first hospital town in Michoacán.
* 1535	Antonio de Mendoza is named the first viceroy of New Spain.
1542	The Spanish Crown issues <i>Las Nuevas Leyes</i> (the New Laws) to protect the Indians.
* 1551	The University of Mexico is founded.
1571	In Mexico City the Inquisition is established as a means of social suppression and domination.
* 1700	Philip V becomes king of Spain, and the Bourbon Dynasty replaces the dynasty of the Hapsburgs.
* 1767	Expulsion of the Jesuits.
* 1803	The traveler and scientist Alexander von Humboldt visits Mexico.
** 1808-1813	French occupation of Spain throws Spanish colonies into political turmoil.
1810	The priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla begins the War of Independence with the <i>Grito de Dolores</i> (Cry of Dolores). The War is directed against Spain and their control.
1811	Miguel Hidalgo is defeated by Spanish forces and executed. José María Morelos y Pavón commands the insurrection and leads to the Independence

	movement.
* 1813	Morelos convokes the first Mexican Congress, which formally declares Mexican Independence.
1814	The Mexican Congress issues the first (of many) Constitution of Mexico.
* 1815	Morelos is defeated and executed.
1821	Agustín de Iturbide unites fractionated forces and gains the Independence of Mexico through the Treaty of Córdoba, which proclaimed Mexican independence and was signed by both Iturbide and the Spanish envoy. The treaty, however, was not honored by the Spanish government.
1822	The Army of the Three Guarantees operates under Iturbide's command and occupies Mexico City. Iturbide is proclaimed emperor.
1823	A rebellion led by Antonio López de Santa Anna successfully abdicates Iturbide from his position of power. Mexico establishes its first Mexican President: Guadalupe Victoria.
* 1824	The first Constitution of independent Mexico formally establishes a federal republic.
1828	Vicente Guerrero becomes president. In the attempts to discourage United States southerners to Texas, Guerrero abolishes slavery.
1831	Vice president Bustamante overthrows President Guerrero. Removed from power, Guerrero makes his way to Acapulco where he is captured aboard the <i>Columbo</i> and delivered to government authorities on the coast of Huatulco. Guerrero is charged with treason and executed.
1833	Santa Anna becomes President of Mexico. His reign of power will last for eleven times.
1836	The State of Texas attempts to establish its independence from Mexico. A war begins between Texas and the central Mexican government. Santa Anna is defeated by the Texans. Spain and the Vatican recognize the Mexican Republic as an sovereign entity.
* 1838	French forces attempt to occupy Veracruz and are defeated by Santa Anna.
* 1845	Texas becomes part of the United States of America.
1846-1848	The Mexican-American War (or War of the American Invasion) begins between Mexico and the United States. The war ends with the defeat of Mexico and the peace Treaty Guadalupe Hidalgo, which eventually cedes more than half of Mexico's territory to the United States.
1853-1855	Santa Anna's final presidency begins in 1853. Under the Gadsden Purchase Santa Anna sells additional territory to the United States in the hopes of buoying the national economy with additional capital injection.
* 1855	Forces under the leadership of Juan Álvarez and Ignacio Comonfort overthrow Santa Anna. The call is issued for a Constitutional Convention to create a new Constitution.
* 1857	A new and liberal Constitution is approved, preceded by a series of laws directly opposing the interests of the Church and Mexican conservatives.
1858-1861	The War of the Reform between Liberals and Conservatives, where Reform Laws nationalize ecclesiastical properties without compensation and suppress religious orders.
1861	Conservatives are defeated in the War of the Reforms. Liberal ideologies proliferate. President Benito Juárez initiates a moratorium on foreign debts and suspends payments for two years. France, England, and Spain sign a Tripartite agreement intended to force Mexican payment of debt.
1862	The French Army, supported by Mexican Conservatives and backed by

	Napoleon, invades Mexico and begins the War of the French Intervention. Maximilian Hapsburg is placed as the Monarch of Mexico.
** 1863	The French Army enter Puebla, then Mexico City where Juárez is forced to abandon the city.
* 1864	The French Army and Mexican Conservatives establish the Second Mexican Empire, crowning the Austrian archduke Maximilian von Hapsburg emperor of Mexico.
* 1867	The Liberal armies defeat the Empire. Maximilian is executed. Juárez reestablishes the Republic.
* 1872	Death of Juárez. Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada becomes president of Mexico.
* 1876	Porfirio Díaz overthrows Lerdo de Tejada and becomes President. He will reelect himself seven times, and his dictatorship, the “Porfiriato,” will last thirty-four years.
1888	Díaz is allowed to succeed himself through Constitutional amendments.
1904	Six year presidential terms are made possible through Constitutional amendments.
1910-1911	The beginning of Mexico’s 100 years of independence celebrated in 1910. Francisco I. Madero leads a revolution to overthrow the Díaz regime. While beginning primarily in the north of Mexico (and Puebla), the revolution quickly spreads throughout Mexico.
* 1913	A military coup led by Victoriano Huerta overthrows Madero, who is later murdered. Venustiano Carranza leads a rebellion against Huerta. After the victory, the Revolutionaries fight among themselves. The forces led by Carranza defeat Francisco (Pancho) Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Carranza becomes President and convokes a new Constitutional Convention.
** 1917	Constitution of 1917 promulgated. Carranza elected President.
* 1920	Carranza is overthrown and dies in an ambush. New elections lead to the presidency of Álvaro Obregón.
** 1924	Plutarco Elías Calles elected President.
* 1926-1929	Conflicts between the government and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church lead to the Cristiada, a widespread revolt in central and western Mexico.
* 1928	Obregón is elected President again and assassinated a few months later. Emilio Portes Gil becomes provisional President.
* 1929	Plutarco Elías Calles forms the <i>Partido Nacional Revolucionario</i> (National Revolution Party, or PNR).
1934	Lázaro Cárdenas is elected President of Mexico.
1934-1940	Cárdenas begins socialist policies. Agrarian reform establishes <i>ejidos</i> (or communal lands).
1938	Cárdenas furthers socialist policies with nationalization of the oil industry. The PNR officially changes its name to the <i>Partido de la Revolución Mexicana</i> (PRM).
1942	Mexico, hesitantly, participates in the U.S. created <i>Bracero Program</i> , a temporary worker program legalizing the passage of Mexican Laborers to the U.S. during the Second World War. The program would last for 22 years.
1940-1946	The six year presidential term of Manuel Ávila Camacho begins in 1940. Mexico joins with the Allies and declares war on the Axis powers.
1946-1952	The six year presidential term of Miguel Alemán Valdés begins.
* 1946	The PRM is restructured for the last time and renamed the <i>Partido</i>

	<i>Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).</i>
1952-1958	The six year presidential term of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines begins. Women's suffrage finds itself extended to the national level.
* 1956-1958	Labor unrest with a new teacher's union at the forefront. The movement is defeated by government repression.
** 1958-1964	Presidency of Adolfo López Mateos. Increased foreign investments in Mexico and control of economy by foreign (mainly United States) interests.
* 1958-1959	Labor unrest by the Railroad Workers Union. The movement is repressed and its leaders jailed.
1964	The United States unilaterally cancels the <i>Bracero Program</i> , which prevents Mexican workers' legal passage into the U.S.
1964-1970	The six year presidential term of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz begins. Tourism as a form of export promotion and a source of economic growth within Mexico is heavily examined, especially in Southern Mexico.
* 1968	A large and important Student Movement ends with police and army firing on students at the Plaza of Tlatelolco.
1970-1976	The six year presidential term of Luis Echeverría begins. Export orientations continues with tourism as an important priority for the state. Some of the first international loan packages for tourism are created in Mexico.
* 1976-1982	Presidency of José López Portillo. His administration bases the national economy on large, newly discovered oil reserves. A drop in the international prices of oil precipitates one of Mexico's worst economic crises [the 1982 Debt Crisis].
1982-1988	The six year presidential term of Miguel de la Madrid begins.
* 1988-1994	Through elections widely regarded as fraudulent, Carlos Salinas de Gortari becomes President. He initiates important economic changes, privatizes many state enterprises, and signs the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. An economic recovery begins.
1994	The economic recovery stops. On New Year's Eve of 1993 a rebellion breaks out in the southern state of Chiapas. The rebellion is led by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and commanded by the charismatic leader Subcomandante Marcos, whose true identity is later revealed as Rafael Santiago Guillén Vicente, a former philosophy student from UNAM in Mexico City. Luis Donaldo Colosio, the official presidential candidate of the PRI is assassinated during his campaign in Tijuana. Ernesto Zedillo replaces him and is elected president. Attempting to control the national economy, he drastically reduces the peso. The flight of foreign investment and capital is tremendous, provoking the worst economic and financial crisis in modern Mexican history.
1995	Zedillo arrests former President Salina's brother in the murder of Colosio. The former assistant attorney general and brother of Colosio is arrested in the United States when it was discovered he laundered millions of dollars from Mexico and may have covered up his own brother's murder.
1995-2000	Industrialization and modernization advance significantly, particularly in the northern states of Guadalajara and Monterrey. 41 million Mexicans do not obtain adequate nutrition, where 17 million live in extreme poverty and suffer malnutrition. The majority of these populations are located in the southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Guerrero, and Puebla.

1997	The PRI loses its majority in congress for the first time since its establishment. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the <i>Partido de la Revolucion Democrática</i> (PRD) becomes the elected mayor of the Federal District.
2000	For the first time in the history of the PRI the presidential election is lost to the <i>Partido de Acción Nacional</i> (PAN) candidate Vicente Fox.
2001	Fox emphasizes that he wishes to increase loans to small and medium-sized businesses and calls for a smaller role of the state and privatizes parts of the state-run oil company PEMEX. Fox attempts to improve the lot of the poor and create a free-flow of workers across the U.S.-Mexico border by engaging conversations with US President Bush. Conversations between Mexico and the U.S. stop abruptly. U.S. Border Control is greatly enhanced and further militarized after the September 11 th terrorist attacks.
2002	The first Freedom of Information Initiative is signed into legislation by President Fox in the attempt to overturn social perceptions on the government long cemented by PRI political domination. Fox hopes to create government transparency and accountability, reversing what is perceived by most in Mexico as a closed and corrupt government.
2003	The Zapatistas broke two-years of self-imposed silence, marching on the streets of San Cristobal, Chiapas as the new year began, protesting the Mexican government's continuation of poverty and repression. President Fox falters on creating jobs in Mexico. The fourth year of employment decline continues unabated, having lost 1.2 million jobs since 2000. Migrant remittances reach a staggering \$13.23 billion annually. President Fox reestablishes talks with U.S. President Bush regarding the establishment of a temporary worker program for Mexican laborers to legally enter the U.S. Claims that the Mexican economy is on the mend are based on reduced government debt and controlled inflation at 3.8 percent. Globalization and <i>maquila</i> industries move further south in Mexico to the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas under the <i>Plan Puebla de Panama</i> .
2004 (As of February)	President Bush submits to Congress a new Temporary Worker Program to legalize the crossing of Mexican migrants into the United States. It is unenthusiastically applauded and strongly protested on both sides of the border. Presidents Fox and Bush continue meetings to discuss the implementation of the Temporary Worker Program.