THE UTILITY OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: HOW GOALS AFFECT THREAT PERCEPTIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

What influences when a decision maker will view events in the international system as a threat? The findings from this study demonstrate that as events occur in the internationals system, decision makers are judging those events through the lens of their foreign policy goal structures. The conditions the event creates by altering the current state of affairs will generate a threat perception when the decision-makers believe their goals are being obstructed. This study also demonstrates that decision makers may develop a "problem" perception of the event rather than a "threat" perception, which leads to persistence in current policies and behavior despite changing circumstances. A Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework was developed to uncover the causal mechanisms at work in perception development. The theory was tested on nine events across three administrations. This contributes to the field of international relations and foreign policy, providing insight into how foreign policy goals affect decision-making.

INDEX WORDS: threat perceptions, decision-making, foreign policy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

LIST OF TABLES viii

LIST OF FIGURES ix

CHAPTER

1 Introduction 1

Literature Review 4

Theory 19

Method of Inquiry 24

Limitations 25

Conclusion 26

2 Theory & Framework 27

Introduction 27

Summary of Framework 27

Assumptions 30

Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework 36

Theory of Threat Perceptions 80

Methods – Testing the Theory 80

Foreign Policy Example – Carter Administration 90

Summary of Theory & Framework Chapter 113

3 The Reagan Administration 114

Reagan Administration Goals 115

4 Guatemala: Ríos Montt and the Coup, March 1982 128

Historical Background 128
Operative Goals Prior to the Event 132
Perception of Events 139
Judgment of Events 142
5 Grenada: Coup, October 1983 147
Historical Background 147
Operative Goals Prior to the Event 154
Perception of Events 162
Judgment of Events 167
6 Lebanon: Attacks on Embassy & Marines, April & Oct. 1983 175
Historical Background 176
Operative Goals Prior to the Event 181
Perception of Events – Beirut Embassy Bombing, April 1983 191
Judgment of Events – Beirut Embassy Bombing, April 1983 193
Perception of Events – Marine Barracks Bombing, October 1983 196
Judgment of Events – Marine Barracks Bombing, October 1983 200
7 The Clinton Administration 208
Clinton Administration Goals 208
8 Rwanda: Coup & Massacre, April 1994 231
Historical Background 232
Operative Goals Prior to the Event 237
Perception of Events 246
Judgment of Events 252
9 Terrorism: Khobar Towers, June 1996 & US African Embassy Bombings, August 1998 ... 260
Historical Background 261
Operative Goals Prior to the Event 269

Perception of Events – Khobar Towers Bombing, June 1996 278

Examining the Judgment of Events – Khobar Towers Bombing, June 1996 284

Perception of Events – US Embassy Bombings, August 1998 287

Judgment of Events – US Embassy Bombings, August 1998 292

7 Implications & Conclusion 299

Case Studies 300

Implications 307

Limitations 313

Future Studies 313

REFERENCES 315

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: Selected Cases 90

Table 2: Summary of Guatemala coup and massacre, March 1982 146

Table 3: Summary of Grenada coup, October 1983 174

Table 4: Summary of Lebanon April and October 1983 207

Table 5: Summary Rwanda Coup & Massacre, April 1994 259

Table 6: Summary Terrorist Bombings, June 1996 & August 1998 297

Table 7: Summary of all cases presented 307

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework 30

Figure 2: Foreign Policy Goals Hierarchy, (adopted from Deshon & Gillespie) 59

Figure 3: Carter Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure 93

Figure 4: Reagan Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure 116

Figure 5: Reagan Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Latin America & Caribbean 134

Figure 6: Reagan Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Latin America & Caribbean 155

Figure 7: Reagan Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Middle East 182

Figure 8: Clinton Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure 210

Figure 9: Clinton Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Africa 239

Figure 10: Clinton Administration Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Middle East 271

CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

How do elite decision makers identify threats to national security? Various incidents and actors appear on the international scene daily, yet they are not all perceived the same; states make a judgment between what is considered to be threatening and what is not. What explains how this discrimination is made? For the United States (US) specifically, it appears to have been inconsistent on its designation and timing of which events and issues are deemed threatening. Throughout the 1990s, spanning both the George H. W. Bush and Clinton Administration, several nations entered into bloody civil wars. During this time period, President Bush regarded the Somali Civil War a threat – having the possibility of causing trouble, damage, or ruin. Yet, in contrast, the US refrained from identifying the civil wars in Georgia, Yemen, Rwanda, and Chechnya as threats. When the World Trade Center was attacked in 1993, the event was characterized as a criminal act. It was not until three subsequent terrorist incidents occurred, culminating in the attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, that the Clinton administration professed these attacks were threats to national security.

Not only has the US fluctuated on what events are considered a threat to national security, but also which actors themselves would be regarded as threats. President Eisenhower condemned the Iraqi Revolution in 1958. Despite initial threats against the new Iraqi leadership, the US reversed course about its opinion of Iraq. It began to foster diplomatic relations and provide foreign aid even amid Iraq harassing Israel throughout this period. In the years that followed, Iraq was courting the Soviet Union and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972, solidifying an alliance. The US changed course again under Nixon and perceived the Iraqi regime as a threat. In turn, this led to the US actively supplying aid and arms to Kurdish rebels to fight against the regime. Yet, following the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the US retreated from seeing Iraq as a threat. It reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq and

removed Iraq from the State Department terror list. Despite being in the administration when this occurred, President George H. W. Bush returned to labeling Iraq as a threat when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The US relationship with Iran takes on a similar pattern of vacillations between friend and foe. In the late 1950's, under the Eisenhower administration, the US eagerly supported Iran's development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, even providing them with enriched uranium. After the US covertly assisted in an overthrow of Iran's democratically elected leader, it pledged strong diplomatic relations with its autocratic replacement. Ford's administration continued the friendly relationship orchestrating the purchase of a nuclear reactor for Iran. A warm handshake between the shah and President Carter solidified the alliance for the next administration. Even following the Iranian Revolution, Carter retained a positive impression of Iran. It was not until months after the hostage situation that the Carter administration's perception of Iran changed.

States are confronted with and must respond to a plethora of events and issues in the international system, yet actors perceive and respond to them differently. What leads to this variation? Present literature has not fully answered this question. This research paper intends to provide causal mechanisms based on a newly developed framework of foreign policy decision-making that illuminate how threats are identified. Unlike previous studies this paper considers threat perceptions as judgments. They are not identical to the policy outcome itself. A threat perception will affect what policy outcomes are selected.

Presently, there are two distinct approaches used to examine threat perceptions in the international system. Embedded in these approaches are assumptions that do not lead scholars to uncover the actual process of how threats are realized. The first approach assumes that threats are objectively established by material or structural conditions. It asserts that there is a reality, which is common for all actors, for what should and should not be considered a threat. If threat perceptions are examined within this frame, it is assumed that threats are solely an object, universally understood by all actors and scholars. If a threat is tangible and evident to everyone, scholars would focus on the errors made by decision makers to accurately perceive the proven threat. On the other hand, the other approach rests on the claim that threat perceptions are divorced from reality and purely a subjective creation of the

individual. Following this assertion scholars tend to focus on the effect of threat perceptions on society, believing that they are merely created for political ends. What remains to be illuminated, whether taking an objective or subjective approach, is the process through which threat perceptions emerge and what actually influences that judgment. This is the central effort of this study, to illuminate what factors lead to the formation of elite threat perceptions. As a result this analysis will uncover an answer to the question of how elites identify national security threats.

The theory proposed by this paper is that foreign policy elites identify threats to national security based on whether the outcome of an event, act, or actor is assessed to be obstructing the administration's foreign policy goals. Despite a call from various audiences (i.e., public, lobbies, etc.) that an event or actor impacts state security, elites will only identify it as a threat when the administration's goals are obstructed. If the goals are not obstructed, the event or actor may be viewed as friendly, acknowledged by the administration but not deemed harmful, or even plainly ignored. A framework of goal-based decision-making is presented to highlight the causal mechanisms at work during this process of judgment.

In an effort to answer this question it was necessary to construct a framework of foreign policy decision-making. This model assists in answering other foreign policy puzzles, however, the framework will be used specifically in this project to expose how a process of goal-based decision-making leads to variation in threat perceptions. For this reason, the framework in this project will be tested to explain three situations. These situations are: 1) what leads to shifts in threat perceptions from benign to threatening; 2) what leads to the elevation of non-traditional security based issues (i.e. disease, environmental, humanitarian, etc.) to the level of national security threats; and 3) what causes a lag in identifying threats to national security.

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and results of this study bring value to the fields of international relations and foreign policy. Judgment about the character of an actor or event is the first step before policy is developed and implemented. Routinely the literature has focused on explaining why a particular policy was pursued, without clearly understanding the motivation that led policy makers down that path. Introducing the role that goals play in decision-making opens up the door to gaining

greater insight into why certain behaviors and outcomes are observed. The results of this study demonstrate that state actions and behaviors are conditions by the goals of its leaders. An administration's goals set the direction and focus of the decision makers, affecting information processing and perceptions of the political context. By examining the process of threat perception formation, the results demonstrate how individual decision, by interacting with the given political and structural context, evaluate international events, develop their understanding, and pursue policies. A leader's goals lead to certain behaviors. The goals are pursued through the allocation of resources, both physical and mental, resulting perceptions that drive choices. Threat perceptions themselves are not synonymous with policies and specific actions, but they do influence and condition the types of policies selected and govern how resources will be managed and used. As this study shows, the behavior exhibited toward an event that is viewed as a threat versus one that is not depends on the goals the administration has committed to and therefore, demands inquiry.

Literature Review

Examining the process of threat perception formation is fundamental to answering how elite decision makers identify threats to national security. Very few studies have sought to examine this process and extract the mechanisms that contribute to the actual development of threat perceptions. The majority of research focuses on the effect threat perceptions have on outcomes and behavior. When, on the rare occasion, scholars have investigated the process of threat formation, it appears the actors involved and the mechanisms proposed are under theorized and/or insufficient beyond the specific cases. Overall there is lack of attention and progress in directly pursing theories for how threat perceptions form. As the literature review demonstrates, this has occurred for two reasons.

First, there are two separate ontologies of threats. Threats are viewed as objective; thus come into being by material and/or structural conditions. Or threats are believed to be a subjective construction of individuals and groups. The second reason for a lack of progress is due to the stovepipe nature of the subfields and approaches, which make different models, appear incompatible. This study will fill the gap by presenting a theory for how threat perceptions are created among US elite decision makers. It also

provides a decision-making framework that takes into account the decision maker's foreign policy goals. This effort brings together insights from the research conducted in securitization, framing, sociology, cognitive psychology, and motivation science. Evidence of the gaps in current scholarship is presented by surveying literature on grand theories, domestic politics, foreign policy analysis, and securitization. The literature review seeks to show how threat perceptions have been incorporated into the ontologies and traditions of each field versus being a focus of inquiry on its own.

Grand Theories

Realism. The grand theories of IR were not designed to uncover the process of threat perception formation, yet, embedded within these theories are assumptions how threats are identified. In all of the grand theories threats are assumed to be objective, based on certain structural elements of the international system. According to the neorealist research program, systemic characteristics of anarchy and self-help drive a state to pursue power, or a relative distribution of capabilities, which secures its survival (Morgenthau, 1952; Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981, Mearshiemer, 2001). German scholar, Hans J. Morgenthau, who asserted that security is what safeguards survival, made this line of thinking popular.[1] He went on to define security vaguely in terms of power, or "anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man."[2] Shifts in power relative to a state's current capabilities in the international system will in turn determine what entities will be considered a threat.

There is a degree of ambiguity as to what constitutes a state's power, but in the neorealist program power is primarily a function of material capabilities. A change in military or economic means creates power asymmetries that will pose a threat a state seeking to secure their slice of the pie. Despite the importance material capabilities have for operating in the international system, power distribution alone is not a sufficient explanation for how elites identify threats. Since the end of World War II there has been very little change in the distribution of power among states in the international system. Yet,

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, "What Is the National Interest of the United States?," ?,",*Annals of the American*
[2] Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and W. David Clinton, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Boston : McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006).

there has been significant variation in what states have designated as a threat to national security. This becomes evident in the fact that states identify not only strong but also weak states as threats (e.g. Nicaragua, Venezuela, Afghanistan, etc.).

Liberalism. Another place to look for insights into threat perception, which also falls within grand theory of IR, is at the broad liberalist tradition. Similar to neorealist theories, liberalist theories were not designed to expose a process of threat perception development, but the liberalism also has expectations about which actors and events will be perceived as threats. Resting on the assumption that the anarchical international system creates uncertainty the liberal tradition focuses on state intentions (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 2005). A state's intentions are projected through its domestic character and/or through interactions with one another. Therefore, a state can determine which actors would be considered threats based on the state's memberships, adherence to rules, and domestic political structure.

With regard to memberships, Robert Keohane suggested that actors outside of a regime or institutional construct would have uncertain intentions and therefore present a threat to those within the regime.[3] Being tied to the same institutional arrangements produces shared norms and expectations of behavior. This line of thinking is pervasive in explanations for the democratic peace that speaks to norm externalization (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993, Dixon, 1996). Raymond Cohen (1979) argued the norm violation was relative to international norms, after examining six case studies that spanned 1875 through 1946. He concluded that the breaking of international rules created a perception of unpredictable and unconstrained behavior, therefore producing a threat perception.[4] Barbara Farnham (2003) built off of this logic in her case on President Theodore Roosevelt's perception of Hitler. Through her case study she argued, "The influence of shared procedural norms on expectations about behavior can lead to inferences

[3] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, A Princeton classic edition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).
[4] Raymond Cohen, "Threat Perception in International Crisis.," *Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science)* 93, no. 1 (1978): 100–101.

about intent which, in turn, influence threat perception."[5] She found it was not just any norms, but the norms of accommodation and peaceful settlement that dictated Roosevelt's threat perception. Stephen Walt (1985) asserts that, "perceptions of intentions play an especially crucial role in alliance choices."[6] This leads to the conclusion that through the international structure, which consists of the grouping of states within the international system and its rules, threats will be distinguished. Those states within a certain conglomerate will perceive those outside of it as threatening. Those violating the rules of the game will be viewed as threats. With the rise in integration and interconnectedness in the international system, along with the multitude of international rules, threats cannot be solely determined by assimilation or adherence to the international structure. This is most evident in the fact that issues (e.g. HIV/AIDs) and non-state actors have also been identified as threats.

Constructivism. The literature guided by constructivism sees the structure of the international system as a function of the social structures: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices. In this social structure states have identities and interests, which through mutual constitution, organize and order the states. This research program does offer a theory on how threat perceptions are formed between states, but instead focuses on norm and identity generation (Wendt, 2001; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 2001; Risse-Kappen 1995; Ruggie, 1998) As an approach, constructivism has opened up the avenue for research on threat construction which will be addressed in a later section. The logic of mutual constitution produces the concept of roles and status as a result of social structures. Therefore, threats would arise from states or entities that reduced a state's status or damaged its identity (Wohlforth 2009; Wolf, 2011). Although this approach offers the broadest pool from which threats in the international system can surface, it does not offer a clear explanation about how a state's status and identity can or would be harmed. It does not explore the process by which decision makers are involved the state's perception of threats to status. For this reason this research program cannot offer justification for how threat perceptions

[5] Barbara Farnham, "The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (2003): 408.
[6] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 12.

shift, how issue-based threats form, or how single individuals are considered threats (e.g. Osama bin Laden).

Domestic Politics

Resting on rationalist explanations, scholars have opened up the black box of the state to uncover intervening variables that affect state interests. Many of these studies retain the underlying assumption that threats are objective. Within the Neoclassical Realism approach threats are perceived in the same manner as the neorealist logic suggests, through distribution of capabilities. The difference in this approach is incorporating the effect domestic politics and elite roles have on the specific material capabilities considered as salient and thereby, threatening (Lobell, 2009). Steven Lobell produced one of the few studies that aimed to identify how states perceive threats. He suggests that foreign policy elites will determine threats according to shifts in specific components of state power, relative to parochial interests. According to his framework, the degree of consensus between the foreign policy executive and domestic elite interests will determine how the state's threat perceptions are formulated.[7] This theoretical framework adds intervening variables to the process, but it suggests that the causal mechanism is an elite decision maker's role-derived interests. If this were the case, then changing personnel into and out of a role would have no effect on the threat perceptions since those individuals would adopt the same interests. By assuming an objective threat and objective interests, the framework fails to explain variation across and within administrations.

This same underlying assumption about the objective nature of threats and interests run through many of the other studies that link domestic politics to IR. Therefore, the process of threat formation is not the focus of these projects, but rather on identifying the variables that affect responses to threats (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). This field of research begins with the observation that the public applies audience costs and political pressure. The implication is that this pressure affects how threat

[7] Steven E. Lobell, "Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

perceptions are constructed (Fearon, 1994, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, 2002). The problem with this literature is that is does not provide a clear picture of the causal mechanisms; hence it is not evident how and when the public will affect decision makers. Research on media framing, in the field of communications studies, has been searching for which direction the causal arrow points and finds that the answer is context dependent (Glazier and Boydstun, 2012; Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Garrison, 2001; Scheufele, 1999). Studies show that at different times decision makers influence the media, the media influences decision makers, decision makers influence the public, the public influences decision makers, the public influences the media, and media influences the public. A focus on domestic political institutions and its role in threat construction also implies that the elite decision makers' interests are fixed according to the office they hold and any variation in perceptions is due to persuasive influence by external actors. Even if this is true there is still no theory on how those external actors gained a collective understanding of the threat.

Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a subfield that investigates "factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers."[8] When looking for bodies of inquiry to address the puzzle of how elites identify threats, it would appear that this line of research would present a collection of theories on threat perceptions.[9] Especially since many of the theories move away from the system- and state-level to look specifically at organizations and individuals within the state apparatus. Early foreign policy scholars such as Sprout and Sprout (1954) and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954) recognized the need to incorporate the decision makers into the study of perceptions.[10] Yet, despite shedding the black box of the state, scholars retained the underlying rationalist assumption that there is a "true" threat that

[8] Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 2005): 2.
[9] Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis : Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014).
[10] Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of National Power; Readings on World Politics and American Security* (New York, New York: Van Nostrand, 1954); Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics.* (Oxford, England: Princeton University Organizational, 1954).

can be objectively discerned. This assumption drove researchers to focus on factors leading to the elite decision makers' responses.

Rather than examining a process by which threat perceptions are formed, scholars build on the conclusion that there is a "proper" interpretation of events. They begin with the assumption that threat perceptions are expected to be a function of human error or bias. From this, the motivation is to understand what decision-making led to a particular policy and/or conflict. Since the focus of many of these studies is to explain policies that "should not" have resulted in conflict, the emphasis has been uncovering the misrepresentations and misperceptions of the actors involved. This line of thinking parallels the arguments found in rational explanations for war (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). The assumption is that the information is available to evaluate the situation, and should produce a certain result.[11] Two possible explanations emerge, one points to the role of the sender and one to the receiver.

Jervis (1976) propelled forward the research on the receiver. He provided cognitive explanations for decision makers' misperceptions, exposing various heuristic biases used to collect, analyze, and interpret information. Since then many studies have taken the range of cognitive features and inserted them into case studies (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; McDermott, 1998; Mintz, 2004; Duelfer and Dyson, 2011). Rarely do these studies investigate cognitive processes not related to misperceptions and bias when examining how the actors actually perceived the current context in which they were operating. As Stein (2013) points out, there has not been "commensurate attention to identifying patterns of perception when thereat assessment is stable and routine, or when threat assessment does not cumulate in violence."[12]

When assessing foreign policy decision-making, the bulk of the FPA literature tends to examine the factors connected to the receiver. In the foreign policy sphere this boils down to elites such as presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, etc. Grounded in the objective threat assumption along with the belief that deviations from those expectations exist because leaders failed to respond correctly to the

[11] James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379; Robert Powell, "War as a Commitment Problem," *International Organization* 60, no. 1 (2006): 169.
[12] Janice Gross Stein, "Threat Perception in International Relations," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (2nd Ed.).*, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12.

objective threat, scholars set out to investigate what could contribute to this difference. The individual personalities, characteristics, beliefs, and decision-making styles are presented as explanations for policy choices (George, 1969; Greenstein, 1967; Herman, 1970; 1978; Suedfeld an Tetlock, 1977; Tucker, 1977; Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Renshon, 2009). Although these studies offer insight into the micro-foundations of decision-making, they are narrowly focused on explaining policy outcomes and preferences in instances of conflict or war, not on the process of threat perception formation.

In focusing on the receiver, the field of FPA has also tackled the influence group dynamics have on policy preferences and outcomes. Incorporating the group has revealed aspects of the decision-making process that affects threat perceptions, but once again that has not been the focus of investigation. The groupthink model is based on the psychological biases that result in poor information searches (Janis, 1982). According to preconceptions and biases, dominant opinions will then coalesce into a group consensus. In an attempt to explain what drove the US to war with Iraq, groupthink was cited as the explanation for persistent perception of threat at the elite level (Badie, 2010). What was left unexplained was how that threat perception developed among the individuals themselves in the first place. This is also true of Marsh's (2014) assertion that the surge during the war in Afghanistan in 2009 was a result of key military actors and the Secretary of State's perception of the threat, which drove the foreign policy decision makers to accept the need for the surge.[13] Similar to the argument presented by Lobell, as well as, Allison and Zelikow (1999), scholars concluded that perceptions of threat are a function of parochial interests or pathologies based on organizational loyalty.

In an attempt to overcome some of the shortfalls in previous studies, Yarhi-Milo (2014) breaks the process into two elements. She marries the individual level cognitive biases with the bureaucratic politics model, presenting what she calls the "selective attention thesis". She argues perceptions come from variations in how two actors select information about an adversary's intentions. Decision makers look not for credible signals as indicators of intentions, but information that is vivid to the individual

[13] Kevin Marsh, "Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 3 (July 2014): 265–288.

decision maker and their own subjective theories about the adversary. The intelligence organization will seek signals according to their expertise, which typically involves seeking information about the opponent's military capability.[14] Once again, the field gains insights into what factors may be affecting decision-making, but this study has focused its cases on states that already have an adversarial relationship and perceive one another as a threat. It does not assist in explaining what led to identifying one another as a threat to begin with.

Underpinning the much of the research above is the notion that the actors or groups should not have perceived the other actors the way they did. Within many of these studies, scholars rely heavily on cases where the opposing actors are already assumed to be threats and thereby attempt to explain how the rigidity of cognitive biases or perceptions affected future outcomes. By attempting to explain the poor execution of policy or bad policy decisions without considering why the leaders or group even viewed the actor as a threat. This research also focuses primarily on the actors themselves and not the events and how the socio-political context is altered due to changing circumstances. For this reason, the authors have failed to provide an explanation for why certain actors and events are identified as threats when others are not.

Foreign Policy Crises. A study on foreign policy crises offers insight into which events might be evaluated as threats. Robinson (1968) and Hermann (1969a) provide a list of criteria for the types of situations that would be perceived as a crisis: 1) it threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, 2) it restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and 3) it surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurrence.[15] This has become the most widely used definition of crisis and has informed the subsequent authors' work. Brecher (1993) developed a framework based on Hermann's definition to predict how the crisis will be perceived and when violent policy choices are likely to occur. The promise of this research is that it focuses on the decision maker

[14] Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Knowing the Adversary : Leaders, Intelligence, and Assessment of Intentions in International Relations*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014).
[15] Charles F. Hermann, *Crises in Foreign Policy; a Simulation Analysis*, An Advanced study in political science (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 414.

and the high-priority goals. The main limitation is that the perception hinges on what the scholar determines are the high-priority goals of the state. In doing so foreign policy goals are reduced down to either core national interests or are a merely a function of the state's internal characteristics (i.e. democratic vs. authoritarian). As the framework is employed all the effort made to incorporate intervening variables, such as what decision makers value, is reduced to a constant and labeled core national interests. According to this approach threat perceptions should not shift within administrations or even across administrations since the high priority goals and values, derived from core national interests, should remain relatively stable. Variation in responses to comparable events indicate that the goals and values are either not as fixed as the crisis research would assume, or are used differently by decision makers.

Another promising approach to assessing threat perceptions was borrowed research from social psychology literature. The main theory incorporated into IR scholarship is the Social Identity Theory (SIT). SIT is a model used to describe intergroup behavior between individuals and asserts that individuals will be positively biased toward their in-group and respond differently to out-group members.[16] Based on this assertion several scholars have used SIT to support the existence of threat perceptions as a function of identity. Rousseau (2006) developed the Construction of Threat Model arguing that decision makers focus on common identities (in-group characteristics) and craft their perception of external actor's behavior based on this assessment.[17] Larson and Shevchenko (2010) argued SIT could explain how being placed in an out-group by key international actor fosters perceptions of threat by harming a state's status. Mislan (2012) also used SIT to construct his Rule-Based Identity hypothesis. He attempted to show that variation in the president's appraisal of threats was a function of

[16] Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in *Political Psychology: Key Readings*, ed. John T. Jost et al., Key readings in social psychology (New York, New York: Psychology Press, 2004), 276–293.
[17] David L. Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities : The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism.* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006).

how the president identified his in-group, whether via legal, exceptional, or enlightened.[18] The challenge with using SIT to explain threat perception formation is that is does not provide a clear delineation of what constitutes the in-group. It is not clear which characteristics or which memberships the actor is using to perceive the threat. It also does not offer explanations for changes that occur to the identities within the group and the membership. It is important to point out this conclusion emerges because the scholars start with observation that some states have hostile relationships while others have friendly relationships. This automatically simplifies the environment into two sets of groups. Therefore, the inquiry is already framed in terms of the fact that since there are two groups, there is an embedded assumption that it is the group that makes them similar or different. This furthers the belief that a positive bias toward the in-group must result in negative bias toward an out-group; not accounting for the possibility of neutral or benign perceptions may exist.

Securitization

The research that may have contributed the most thought toward the formation of threat perceptions is securitization. This is a framework of research that surfaced from the field of security studies. Born out of the constructivist approach, securitization is rooted in the basic idea that the existence and management of certain issues as security problems does not necessarily depend upon objective, or purely material conditions.[19] Given this subjective understanding, securitization studies analyze the "set of interrelated practices, and processes…that bring threats into being."[20] The comprehensive presentation of the securitization concept grounded their scholarship in speech act theory (Buzan, et al., 1998). In this research track, the articulation of an issue or actor as an existential threat was coined a securitizing speech

[18] David Bell Mislan, *Enemies of the American Way : Identity and Presidential Foreign Policymaking.* (New York, New York: Continuum, 2012).
[19] Thierry Balzacq and Stefano Guzzini, "Introduction: 'What Kind of Theory – If Any – Is Securitization?,'" *International Relations* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 98.
[20] Thierry Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory : How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, PRIO new security studies (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2011), 155.

act. With this foundational assumption there were three key components of securitization: the securitizing actor, referent object, and audience.[21]

Concentrating on how certain issues were accepted as security issues, much of securitization literature focuses on the referent objects and audiences. Motivated by the fact that the approach was in opposition to the notions of objective threats, scholars aimed to uncover the fact that issues such as disease, environment, and immigration were considered threats to security (Krause and Williams, 1996; Elbe, 2005; Sjostedt, 2006; Curley and Herington, 2011; Bourbeau, 2011; Baele and Sterck, 2015). Foundationally, the literature assumed security issues were a speech act. Therefore, in many of the case studies the authors would trace the presence of language that claimed the issue as a threat to security. The requirement for successful securitization was an acceptance of the language by the audience. This then led to the audience becoming a focus of attention, similar to the domestic politics literature.

The effort to show successful acts of securitization pushed the research in the direction of viewing the securitization of an issue or actor as an end state. Built on the assumption that securitizing an issue meant that it required urgent attention and exceptional policies, a securitized issue would be elevated above normal politics (Williams, 2003). Making this assertion conditioned scholars to see the act of securitizing as a deliberate decision by policymakers. This perspective along with a focus on the referent object and audience diverted scholars away from why securitization would be initiated in the first place. The motivation of the decision maker was assumed to be for political gain. Therefore, in this stage of the research program, the motivations of the securitizing actor, interactions between the actor and audience, and roles each participant fulfills at different junctions is under theorized.

In the second generation of securitization studies there has been an effort to see securitization as a process not an end state (Balazcq, 2005, 2011; Williams, 2003; McDonald, 2008; Salter, 2008). This approach has placed the act of securitization back into the political process. Two points of contention with previous work drove this pursuit. First, was that securitization could not be a result of a single speech act.

[21] Philippe Bourbeau, "Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 43, no. 1 (September 1, 2014): 190.

History and context contribute to how discourse develops creating an interacting effect with the audience itself (Balzacq, 2005). The second contention is that it is not clear who the audience is and when a security issue is collectively accepted (Salter, 2011). By emphasizing that securitization is an interactive process between actors and context, the new approach opened up opportunities to examine the motivation and the incentive of the securitizing actors, along with the role and qualities of the audience, political context, and structural features (Salter, 2008; Sjostedt, 2011). Even with this quest, there is still a lack of research, that focuses on what kicks off the securitization process, which issues will be selected, and how these threat perceptions are initially formed.

One scholar who has set out to accomplish this task, Roxanna Sjostedt (2008, 2011) conducted studies on the securitization of HIV/AIDs in Russia and the United States. She developed a framework for explaining how threats are constructed. The framework places the start of the process at the international level, where she contends that the diffusion of norms in that arena "form a necessary foundation to the securitization process."[22] She then points to the change in discourse domestically and the effect of framing the issue by societal actors as a security concern. Through this process of normalizing the issue as a threat domestically it is asserted that the society gained a new identity relative to the issue. For example, AIDs was no longer limited to one community, but could affect anyone. The final component to her framework is the internalization of the norms and identity by the political elites. This element of the framework is somewhat ambiguous. In previous cases she points to changes in elite discourse as a reflection of internalization of the security issue (2006, 2008). More recently in her case on the US she admits there is not a definitive claim the Clinton Administration was influenced by the international and domestic discursive settings. To draw a conclusion as to why it was eventually labeled as a security threat Sjostedt points to the "window of opportunity" that the other parallel discourses opened up (Kingdon, 2003).

[22] Roxanna Sjöstedt, "The Construction of HIV/AIDS as a US National Security Threat," in *Securitization Theory : How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, PRIO new security studies (Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2011), 166.

Sjostedt confronts the question of how certain issues are identified as threats, yet her explanation leaves many gaps about what factors are actually influencing the process. One of the faults lie in not properly addressing who the securitizing actors and audiences are at the various levels and what roles they actually played in adopting/perpetuating norms and identities. Without more clarity on why certain ideas about the disease would become salient in the different contexts, it is not clear what is motivating the change. Without understanding what is motivating the change, it is perplexing to claim that political elites are going to jump on an issue area just because the window of opportunity is open. Based on this framework it appears timing was more of a factor than norm internalization or a specific political opportunity.

Cavelty (2008) also constructed a framework in her quest to determine how cyber has been raised to a national security threat. In her framework of threat construction, which she labels as threat politics, she focuses mostly on the contestation between competing frames. In an effort to uncover the mechanisms of what happens when a "new" threat is placed on the agenda, her framework adopts insights from frame and agenda-setting research. She establishes a two-phase process. In the first phase, after the policy window opens, actors enter the political environment to compete for the acceptance of their frame. The second phase is the reframing of threats over time, demonstrating the change in threat frames. The actors who are competing for a dominant frame are called security professionals, which are individuals who are motivated by prior beliefs, values, and resources to present a threat frame. Throughout her review of cyber over the last 20 years she touched on the initial frame (phase 1) and then continued to expound on the change of the cyber threat frame (phase 2).

Calvety's study presents a way to think about threat construction as a political event that incorporates framing and competition into the process. Unfortunately, the mechanisms of why initial threat frames are created, by which actors, and under what conditions, are not offered. What stands out in her in-depth case study, but was not fully incorporated in the framework, are the structural and institutional features that affected the perception of the threat and contributed to the development of threat frames. In her specific case, the technological advances that occurred in cyber and the challenges this

presented to various organizational missions elevated the issue within different bureaucracies. With a focus on threat politics, the factors that led to the threat construction were under theorized.

Filling the Gap

The result of the literature review demonstrates that no matter the subfield or approach there is still a theoretical gap regarding how actors, events, and issues are perceived as threats. As evident by the majority of IR scholarship, a main reason this chasm exists is due to an underlying assumption that threats are objective. Theories that rely on the international structures or material factors for explanations do not devise specific theories on threat perceptions. From an objective view, threats are inferred by what states should deem threatening according to the scholars' logic of what is designated as valuable in the international system (i.e. power, rule, or identity/status). The core assumption that threats are objective is carried into much of the domestic politics and foreign policy research. Rather than examine what the state truly values, the focus of research has been on exposing misperceptions and bias that produced "wrong" policies given the assumption of what should constitute a threat.

At the other end of the spectrum are studies that have been built on the belief that threats are a subjectively constructed. This is most widely apparent in the securitization approach and in the field of FPA. Despite its limitations, work in these fields comes closest to producing theoretical fruit concerning threat perception formation. Yet, even in this research program there appears to be a lack of development in theories about how the actual actors' motivations and decision-making process form threat perceptions and how they emerge within a given socio-political context.

The goal of this study is twofold. First, it will offer a theory for how elite decision makers identify threats to national security and subsequently test the sufficiency and necessity of the proposed causal mechanisms. Second, in uncovering causal mechanisms it offers a Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework that best captures the mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making. Since, threat perceptions are a result of the judgments that exist within the decision-making process, it is necessary to have a model that accounts for these judgments. Most foreign policy decision-making models typically bypass the judgment phase and are not able to connect the role of the decision maker with the group

structure.[23] Exploring the process of threat perceptions offers an opportunity to provide a decision-making framework that exposes previously hidden mechanisms involved in foreign policy decision-making. By these two efforts, this study will therefore fill the existing gap of what factors actually contribute to the perception of threats in foreign policy decision-making.

Theory

This section presents the proposed theory and explains its origin. It will also provide a brief summary of the decision-making process that supplied the causal mechanisms. Lastly it will discuss the application of the theory to the US foreign policy environment. A complete description of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and threat perceptions theory will be provided in Chapter 2.

Events occur around the world on a daily basis, yet there appears to be a variation in what will be perceived as a threat by decision makers. Where does this variation in threat perceptions come from? Are they objectively known, subjectively created, or a combination of the two? This study suggests that it is a combination of the two. More importantly the study provides a theory for how the objective factors and subjective interpretations are integrated in producing a threat perception. The theory is that elite decision makers will develop a threat perception when the foreign policy goals they are committed to become obstructed by events that occur in the international system. The objective factors are the actual events that are happening and the dynamics of those events, such as a coup or civil war. The subjective factors are the goals the administration is pursuing. Through a Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, decision makers evaluate the objective factors (events and its dynamics) through the subjective factor (foreign

[23] Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss, eds., *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998). This edited volume, which was the result of a 5-year study, provides and example of one exception. The central theme of this work is to draw scholars' attention to the fact that how decision-makers represent their problems affects the decisions they will make. This work incorporated the many of the same concepts presented in above framework. Despite this presentation and the call for incorporating the factor of "problem representation" into foreign policy studies, much of the work coming out of it has focused more on how representations of the problem affects the outcome or behavior (Stern, 2004). What remains to be established is the process for how incidents are actually categorized as problems to begin with. Voss suggests that they emerge from stories that imbue meaning and offer causal relationships (1998). Stern contends that much of the empirical work has not been done to open up the black box of "problem representations".

policy goals). The focus of this study is to uncover and test the causal mechanisms that affect how international situations are processed. The theory presents two possible mechanisms that are at work, goal commitment, and the judgment of goal attainment. The aim is to understand when and how threat perceptions emerge amid the plethora of international events.

To note, Perceptions are "cognitive constructs" that represent an image of reality with the future in mind (Knorr, 1976). Said another way, perceptions are mental judgments or an evaluation of the external conditions. The reason that people make judgments is so they are able to then make a decision regarding their circumstances. For this reason, examining threat perceptions in light of actual decision-making process, and incorporating them within their situational context aids in understanding perceptions.

Identifying the causal mechanisms at work in perception formation led to examining the decision-making process. Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) supplied a general model of the decision-making process that was applied to this investigation (Powers, 1973, 2005; Carver and Scheier, 1981, 1983). The general structure of PCT was taken and modified to construct a Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suited for foreign policy. The theory presented above is derived from the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. This framework advocates that a leader's goals motivate and influence judgments as well as behavior. By virtue, a decision maker is purpose-driven and persistently pursuing foreign policy goals. In this effort leaders and their administration operate within the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. It is within this process the theory of threat perceptions materializes.

The theory posits that threats are identified relative to the effect they have on the pursuit of the desired goals the administration is committed to. When an event occurs in the international system that affects the administration's specified goals, the foreign policy team will categorize it or judge its character (i.e. harmful, helpful, etc.). If an event is perceived to create conditions that obstruct goal attainment, it will be designated as a threat. If the event and the conditions that emerge from it are not perceived to impede goal attainment, it may be simply acknowledged, found beneficial, or ignored. Decision makers do not entertain or divert their attention to every problem or issue that exists in the world. Even prior to making a judgment on an issue, there is a selection effect. The administration's foreign policy goals, as

established by the president, create a structure that helps to govern this selection effect. Not only do the goals fix the elite's attention but also they systematically affect information processing and condition the allocation of resources through a structure that organizes and directs its member's focus on key issues.

When Herbert Simon drew attention to the human reality of bounded rationality, it was accepted that individuals must filter incoming information and sensations before making a decision (Simon, 2000). Yet, many foreign policy decision-making models fail to fully articulate or incorporate the mechanisms that affect information processing (Sylvan et al., 1990) Cohen describes the observation of external events as a period where there is a "selection of cues for attention from a universe of contemporary events" but does not offer the means for selection (1978, 95). Information processing is presented in the framing literature as "frames in thought" or the "schemata of interpretation", relying on existing categories in memory, which describes how individuals "locate and perceive…occurrences within their life space and the world at large" (Goffman, 1974, 21; Benford and Snow, 2000, 614; Chong and Druckman, 2007). The problem here lies in linking an individual's memory to judgments, then further explaining how those individual interpretations are processed, and operate in a group setting.

The work by Billings and Scherer on sequential decision-making is close to providing the necessary framework to examine the source of threat perceptions (1998). The model they present is built off of a cybernetics approach grounded in the feedback loop. Unfortunately, in an effort to emphasize the need to view foreign policy decisions as sequential, their model is built on preexisting problems, not events that lack a past designation. In doing so, it is a closed system, preventing examination of how situations became problems to begin with. Viewing Billings and Scherer's work in light of the securitization literature, their model is aimed at explaining normal politics, not necessarily emerging security matters.

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, presented in full in the following chapter, seeks to overcome this weakness. It aims to demonstrate that the iterative process political leaders go through to determine actions and behavior is built off how events are perceived through the existing context. This decision-making process incorporates factors influencing judgments that may in turn result in action. The

Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework originates with the leader's goals. The outcomes are motivated by the judgments that emerge from an interaction between the present state and the decision maker's desired state of affairs. To clarify, the definition of a goal is, a cognitive representation of a future object and/or state that the individual is committed to approach or avoid. These goals reside at the both the individual and the group level.

The theory regarding threat perceptions is based on the proposed Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. There are two pillars on which the decision-making model rests. First, it is believed that the human decision-maker is a key intersection between the material and ideational determinants of state behavior (Hudson, 2005, p3). Therefore, decision-makers and are central to understanding threat perceptions. Goals are composed by individuals, and in turn adopted at the group level. An individual's goals contain their beliefs, values, personalities, attitudes, etc. Since goals are a cognitive construct that embodies the individual, they can be used to identify their preferences. For this reason, when goals are offered in a public forum, it is believed that they are not solely motivated by public approval. The discursive engagement is actually considered as a reflection of the speaker's beliefs and values relative to the current context. Elites in the US (and other democracies) must win public approval for elected office. Therefore, elites must communicate in the open about their vision of the future state of affairs. It also means they will be judged by and are held to their stated goals.

The second pillar is that judgments take into consideration an objective reality. While perceptions are subjective, they are not wholly individualistic, or there would be very little consensus. The subjective nature comes from the interpretation itself, but the object of interpretation has some objective reality associated with it. A glass may be perceived as half empty to some and half full to others, but the perception could not exist without a glass containing water. Threat perceptions adhere to the same standard. The perceptions of an event, act, or actor may vary but there exists an entity that initiated the perception. The ability to derive purely subjective threat perceptions is further constrained by the fact that something tangible must exist in order for any national security threat claim to be received by constituents as legitimate. Since, the designation of an actor, an issue, or event as a threat eventually conjures up the

need for some type of response and mobilization of resources requires collective support (whether large or small) the threat must be believable and accepted by more than one person.

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is well suited for examining foreign policy and threat perceptions, specifically for the US. When a decision maker seeks office, such as the president, they bring with them a vision for a future state of affairs and more specifically a vision for the state itself. Rarely, if ever, does an elite decision-maker enter into a political battle without a desired future in mind. Although there may be some goal overlap, incoming leaders do not set out to merely continue the policies and programs initiated by the previous leadership, despite political orientation. One reason is as time goes on; new leaders must face the changing situational context. The second reason is, human beings are future-oriented and purposeful, and by design they have a desire to establish goals and pursue a desired outcome. The foundational element of politics is incorporated into the proposed decision-making framework. As leaders interact in their socio-political context, goal pursuit influences their interpretation of the current conditions. This association underpins how threats are perceived.

The goals that motivate judgments and behavior are come from a decision maker's goal hierarchy. The US president develops political agendas and embedded in these agendas are goal hierarchies. There is a hierarchy of foreign policy goals and also a hierarchy of domestic policy goals. In order to succeed, these goals are tracked to assess progress and problems with goal attainment. This assessment intends to identify discrepancies between the current state of affairs and the desired state of affairs. For the US this process creates a feedback loop that is filtered through the Executive branch via the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The prioritization and structure of the information flow is aligned according to the president's established goals. During goal pursuit and over time, actions are executed by various administration functions to affect the apparent goal discrepancies. This is a continual process until the goal is completed or abandoned. When an event occurs in the international system, it will be evaluated relative to the administration's prioritized goals and current discrepancies. If the circumstances of the event or actors involved are judged to be the cause of inhibiting goal attainment it

will be designated as a threat. A change in behavior is expected in response to this perception, resulting in mental and physical resources directed at reducing the identified threat.

Just to reiterate the theory presented in this project contends that the goals the leader has committed to attain affect whether an event, act, or actor will be viewed as a threat. Therefore, the key factor affecting threat perceptions is the president's foreign policy goals. Yet, it is not merely that factor alone. The types of goals pursued also initiate and organize the process by which the president and his administration are structured. Therefore, this influences how the president and his administration as a collective attend to and assess international conditions. The judgment of information by the administration's foreign policy team contributes to the effect goals have on threat perceptions. The proposed theory will be tested through a structured focused comparison of historical case studies assessing the sufficiency and necessity of the suggested factors and process.

Method of Inquiry

Perceptions are difficult to assess because many believe that they reside exclusively internal to the individual. For a field that tests theories and bases explanations on empirical evidence this can seem like a formidable task. Fortunately, perceptions are verbally communicated to assist individual in attaching meaning, testing their validity, and engaging the social world. In the political arena, perceptions about events and actors must be communicated in order to pursue policy actions. Therefore, it is possible to observe what at the surface appears hidden in the mind of men.

The approach for this research project will be to conduct a qualitative analysis. The focus of the analysis is the foreign policy decision-making team known as the administration's National Security Council. The study centers on US foreign policy. There are two causal mechanisms that will be examined in this study. First, it is vital to identify consistent and operative goals. In order to claim that foreign policy goals affect decision makers' judgment goals must be present and pursued. The second causal mechanism is a judgment that the goals are being obstructed or impeded due to the events that took place. Process tracing through structured case study analysis seeks to identify these mechanisms. There are a total of nine "cases" examined. The cases will allow for a within case and across case analysis spanning

three presidential Administrations from 1979 through 1998. The "cases" under examination pull events from the pool of interwar conflict, coups, humanitarian rights, and terrorism events.

There were two main reasons why the US was selected as the focus of the study. First, the US has held unprecedented military and economic power, which should make it less susceptible to threats. As a leading superpower, many events in the system should not significantly impact the national interests of the US, yet the US remains heavily involved in every region of the world, identifying seemingly benign events and actors as threats. Therefore, it offers a litany of cases where it responded to events and designated threats when there was no objective explanation for the perception.

Secondly, the US executive holds considerable power in foreign policy. Despite the checks and balance of the US democratic system, the president reigns in foreign policy making allowing more generalizability across different regime types. It also helps to identify whether threats are purely subjective, the creation of the individual. If this were the case, there would be great variance across different administrations and little agreement within the NSC, as threats would be produced to serve an individual's distinct political needs. The NSC staff and the dialogue that is transmitted between the president and his NSC is the main level of analysis.

Limitations

There are a few limitations to this study. Anytime historical data is used there is caution in drawing hard conclusions. While the majority of data can be solicited from unclassified material, some archival meeting minutes still remain classified. Luckily, given the need to articulate goals and judgments to a wider audience, material related to the causal mechanisms is available. The limitation is whether the author obtained all the necessary data. A second limitation is the definition of what constitutes a threat perception. As the variable is being explained, it is important to ensure the sample of cases from which the case studies were selected accurately represented the object of interest. Since it is a subjective assessment, cases have been selected based on criteria that historically produced perceptions of a threat and have demonstrated the potential to harm one of the core national interests. Lastly, the framework is a process-based model. To some it is complex and does not satisfy the principle of parsimony. This

limitation is accepted in an effort to uncover casual mechanisms that may contribute to further theorizing that may shed some of the complexity.

Conclusion

The outcome of this research aims to uncover the mechanisms in the decision-making process that result in the perceptions of threats. It aspires to fill existing gaps in current research on how threat perceptions emerge and offer a theory for when shifts in and the identification of threat perceptions occur. By examining foreign policy goals, this study incorporates the actual socio-political context decision makers find themselves in. It also exposes how the interaction between the foreign policy makers and the environment affect the overall perception of the event. An underlying motivation is to identify how individuals and groups are involved in this process. Through these various motivations, the overall focus is to test the proposed theory and offer a framework that explains the causal mechanisms that lead to the emergence of threat perceptions. This effort is crucial because threat perceptions are a key link in the chain that leads to the use of national resources. Therefore, this framework should shed light on understanding when and why states pursue and authorize the use of force and significant national resources toward particular actors or events.

CHAPTER 2:

THEORY & FRAMEWORK

Introduction

This chapter explains the theory on how threat perceptions emerge and supplies the mechanics from the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework that underpins the theory. The aim is to uncover how elite decision makers perceive which events in the international system are believed to pose a threat to national security. The theory is based on a newly developed foreign policy decision-making model. Therefore, this chapter begins by providing a condensed summary of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. This is important because it highlights the causal mechanisms incorporated into the theory. Following that brief summary is a description of the assumptions and assertions that go into the framework and theory. Next there is a detailed explanation of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework that begins with examining the definition of goals and a description of how goals function. Once this foundation has been laid, it is possible to offer an explanation of the theory. The theory on how threat perceptions emerge in foreign policy is explained via the causal mechanisms identified in the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The theory states, **threat perceptions emerge when events in the international system are judged to <u>obstruct the pursuit of foreign policy goals</u> the administration has <u>committed to achieve</u>.** After the explanation of the theory in light of US foreign policy is the methods sections, which describes how the theory will be tested through case study analysis. Finally, a condensed case study on the Carter Administration is provided to demonstrate the proposed method.

Summary of the Framework

This section offers a summary of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. As mentioned, the framework supplies the causal mechanisms used in the theory: foreign policy goals and judgments of events. Decision-makers go through a goal-based decision-making process when assessing their socio-political environment. Threat perceptions develop within the goal-based decision-making process. The

Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is a descriptive model for human decision-making that seeks to expose how agents make decisions. Three key components make up the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework: foreign policy goals, comparisons between the desired end state and the current conditions, and a judgment of discrepancies that leads to an individual or group perception. This study applies the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework to elite decision-makers responsible for the US foreign policy. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework can accommodate decision-making for both individual and groups. This study applies the framework to an organization: the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Yet, building justification for the framework and its components begins by emphasizing individual decision-making and then subsequently shows how the framework applies to groups.

The first component of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is the goals. Goals are developed or adopted to motivate an individual's purpose and effort. In US foreign policy, the president, along with his foreign policy team formulate their foreign policy goals. The intent of these foreign policy goals is to secure a desired future state for the nation. The development or adoption of goals results in an organized goal structure. Goals are hierarchically structured, from abstract to concrete, and linked both vertically and horizontally. Although one or more people can craft goals, the foreign policy goals and goal structure is adopted by the NSC staff. Therefore, the goal structure operates at both the individual and the group level. According to the framework, the foreign policy goals the decision-makers are committed to, in turn, will guide decision maker's judgment and actions.

The second component of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is the comparison between the current state of affairs and the desired state of affairs. Inherently a goal is something that is not yet achieved and must be monitored to ensure accomplishment. Therefore, another way to say this is when decision makers evaluate the socio-political environment they recognize discrepancies in their goal attainment. In an effort to achieve a desired goal, the difference between the present state of affairs and the desired future state is routinely evaluated, and the prioritized goals are assessed. This assessment measures the degree of goal completion and necessary effort. A discrepancy remains until the goal is attained. It is important to note, the aim is not always to eliminate the discrepancy. For example, if the

goal were to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, the decision-makers would be looking for a widening discrepancy window. The greater the difference between the current state (x nuclear warheads) and the desires state (x-10 nuclear warheads) the closer they are to goal completion. The discrepancies that exist supply information about how, what, and where the decision makers should focus their attention and resources.

The third component of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is the judgment of the discrepancies themselves. This particular study is focusing on events in the international system that alters the discrepancy window. Figure 1 offers a depiction of the Goal-Based Decision-Making process. A judgment occurs in the Comparator Phase. When an event occurs or a disturbance is recognized it is judged as either benign, a problem, or a threat. This judgment orients the type of response the decision maker has to the discrepancy. If the discrepancy is judged to be a problem, the decision maker continues to pursue the determined goals consistent with proposed actions. If the discrepancy is judged to be a threat, the cause of the threat must be addressed directly prior to returning to the determined goal pursuit actions. In this study, the discrepancies are examined in light of international events. In the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, when an event happens it will be judged relative in the context of the socio-political environment with an view of past goal progress. When comparing the new present state of affairs with the desired state in light of the event, the decision makers will judge how that event and the change in the socio-political context affects goal pursuit. The judgment of the event can result in a "benign", a "problem", or a "threat" perception. This is where the one of the mechanisms for the proposed theory reside. Within this comparator phase, if the decision maker believes the event obstructs the attainment of the foreign policy goals they are committed to, he will adopt a threat perception.



Figure 1. Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework[24]

Assumptions

This section provides a discussion of the assumptions incorporated into both the framework and the theory. The proposed theory states: decision makers develop threat perceptions when events in the international system are judged to obstruct the pursuit of foreign policy goals the administration has

[24] Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier, "Control Theory: A Useful Conceptual Framework for Personality–social, Clinical, and Health Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin* 92, no. 1 (July 1982): 111–135. The threat perception framework is based on Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), which originates from the premise that human behavior is purposeful (Powers, 1973, 2005; Carver and Scheier, 1981, 1983). PCT is designed around the principles of complex systems that take into account the dynamic interaction of the simple parts. (Vancouver, 2008) When it comes to explaining behavior, PCT claims the cause of an individual's action is the process of control. Control carries a litany of negative connotations, yet what PCT intends to convey is that humans actively regulate their behaviors to control an outcome. Control theory has been used in a variety of disciplines to explain decision-making and behavior, to include mathematics, economics, psychology, organizational behavior, motivation studies, etc.

committed to achieve. There are six human decision-making assumptions built into the framework. These assumptions are: 1) perceptions come judgments; 2) human decision-making is purposeful; 3) decision-makers are affected by the situational context and other people in politics; 4) mental representations affect information processing; 5) humans have limited mental and physical resources; and 6) goals are transferable. There are three assertions built into the theory. The three theoretical assertions are: 1) the US president leads the creation of the goal structure; 2) the socio-political environment affects the content of the goals; and 3) the NSC is an organization and adopts the goal structure. Next will be a detailed explanation of these assumptions.

Human Decision-Making Assumptions

The first assumption is that perceptions come from judgments; therefore, threat perceptions are the result of judgments. Judgments are embedded in and act as a key component of the decision-making process. A judgment is an act of comparison.[25] When information is processed, decision-makers are comparing facts, arguments, ideas, etc.[26] A perception is an understanding or interpretation of something; it is the product of the comparison or judgment. Since perceptions come by making sense of comparing available information, it is context dependent. As events take place the context is altered and new information is presented requiring a judgment. This will then produce a perception of the current situation. For this reason, a threat perception comes about from judgments of changing conditions. Given all the information that can be used to judge an event, the question remains, what is being used in the foreign policy sphere. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework identifies which factors are actually being compared when making a judgment that can lead to threat perceptions.

As stated, since a judgment is an act of comparison it will produce a perception of the situation. A judgment does not always produce a threat perception. It could result in a benign perception, where the

[25] Noah Webster, *Noah Webster's 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language* (Chesapeake, Virginia: Foundation for American Christian Education, 2006).
[26] Robin M. Hogarth, *Judgment and Choice : The Psychology of Decision.* (New York, New York: J. Wiley, 1980); Amos Tversky, "Features of Similarity.," *Psychological Review* 84, no. 4 (July 1977): 327–352; Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, "Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment and Choice.," *Journal of Accounting Research* 19, no. 1 (1981): 1–31.

decision maker considered the event and new information and it does not alter previous understandings. It is also possible for the judgments to produce new perceptions of the situation and actors involved. When the decision-maker has judged that the object has the potential to inflict harm, damage, or ruin, the event will produce the perception of a threat. It is also possible for a decision-maker to assess the information and determine there are some concerns based on the situation. This would produce the perception of a problem.

It is important to point out the difference between the perception of a problem and the perception of a threat. A threat must be dealt with urgently. A problem suggests something needs to be dealt with, but it may persist for a period of time, especially if there are no resources available to overcome the problem. In politics anything that impedes goal attainment can be considered a problem. So it is right to say, all threats are problems. Yet, not all problems will be perceived to as threats. It is possible to distinguish between a threat perception and a merely a problem perception. Three specific criteria can do this. First, a threat perception occurs when there is imminent danger or loss; therefore threat perceptions will contain a sense of urgency to address the object of the perception. Second, a threat perception will be associated with intent to harm specific vulnerabilities; therefore, it will be associated to a known actor or object. Lastly, unlike a problem, a person must be directly confront a threat to eliminate the possibility of imminent harm or continued injury. For this reason, threat perceptions should be followed by concentrated effort toward the specified actor or object.

The second assumption guiding the theory is that human decision-making and behavior is purposeful. Despite the role instinct plays in certain contexts, humans have the capacity to choose their response to personal and situational cues.[27] Humans also have the ability to affect or create a situation rather than merely respond to one. Humans are intentional, aiming to produce an outcome. There is debate as to what propels a decision maker's desired outcome and subsequent behavior. Some suggest

[27] Edwin A. Locke et al., "Goal Setting and Task Performance: 1969–1980.," *Psychological Bulletin* 90, no. 1 (July 1981): 125–152; Anthony J Mento, Robert P Steel, and Ronald J Karren, "A Meta-Analytic Study of the Effects of Goal Setting on Task Performance: 1966-1984," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 39, no. 1 (1987): 52–83.

that it is an individual's interests, preferences, alternatives, emotions, and beliefs, etc. This study submits that goals motivate decision-making and behavior, fueling an individual's purpose.

The third assumption for the theory is that the environment and the people who operate alongside them affect individuals. This is especially true for politics, which is a complex system where there is dynamic interaction between the situational context and the individuals involved in the political process. The decision-makers cannot be divorced from their social and political context. A politician's entire career is made up of responding to and trying to change the social and political context. The facts, ideas, and arguments that make up the information being judged emerge from a context. The environment and people operating in it affects how the information is understood and processed.[28] Therefore, the decision-making process must take into consideration the decision maker's external environment. The proposed framework accomplishes this by using goals to incorporate the present state of affairs and updating over time.

The fourth assumption for the theory is that mental representations affect information processing and behavior. Goals are mental representations. One definition of goals has captured this, stating goals are "cognitive or internal representations of a future object or state that the person is committed to approach or avoid."[29] As a mental representation, goals operate just as other cognitive structures, such as schema, identity, and attitudes. Therefore, goals can originate from both internal (beliefs, dispositions, motivations, etc.) and external (social, cultural, organizational, etc.) sources.[30] Since goals are mental

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[28] Paul Slovic, "The Construction of Preference," *American Psychologist* 50, no. 5 (May 1995): 364–371; Kenji Matsumoto, Madoka Matsumoto, and Hiroshi Abe, "Goal-Based Action Selection and Utility-Based Action Bias.," *Neural Networks* 19, no. 8 (October 2006): 1315–1320; David H. Krantz and Howard C. Kunreuther, "Goals and Plans in Decision Making," *Judgment & Decision Making* 2, no. 3 (June 2007): 137–168; Bertram F. Scheufele, "Framing-Effect Approach: A Theoretical and Methodological Critique," *Communications* 29, no. 1 (December 2004): 401–428; Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4, The future of the field: Between fragmentation and cohesion (1993): 51–58.

[29] Andrew J. Elliot and James W. Fryer, "The Goal Construct in Psychology," in *Handbook of Motivation Science* (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 244.

[30] Stijn Osselaer et al., "Choice Based on Goals.," *Marketing Letters* 16, no. 3/4 (December 2005): 335–346.

representations, they will affect information processing and behavior. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests how goals affect information processing and behavior.

The fifth assumption is that humans have limited resources (time, energy, information, and material means) and must prioritize their goals in order to reach their desired ends. Many of the resources available to pursue a course of action require a tradeoff. Decision-making is impacted by the amount of time and/or cognitive space available.[31] Even if a decision maker had time and cognitive space, he or she may not necessarily have the physical or mental ability to conjure up all the knowledge or facts necessary for a decision.[32] Decisions are based on present and relevant information regarding the alternatives and future outcomes of that particular choice. If time allows, it is possible to seek more knowledge, but that information must be available and deemed relevant by the individual or person affecting the decision. Another consumable resource is the material means required for a decision to become reality.[33] If an individual uses his money or time to realize one action, that same commodity will not be available for another pursuit. The assumption that individuals are physically and mentally constrained means they will have to make tradeoffs. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests individuals overcome this constraint through the construction of the goal hierarchy. This goal hierarchy establishes cognitive rules, which are used to overcome limited resources.

The last assumption for the theory is that goals are transferable. This means that goals can be both shared or adopted between different individuals, as well as, from the individual to a group and back.[34] Building off the fact that goals are mental representations, goals must be constructed. Once a goal is formulated and it is made available, whether communicated directly or indirectly, the goal becomes

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[31] Angela M. Sabates, *Social Psychology in Christian Perspective: Exploring the Human Condition* (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2012).
[32] Herbert A Simon, "Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow," *Mind and Society: A Journal of Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 25–39.
[33] Henk Aarts and Andrew J. Elliot, eds., *Goal-Directed Behavior*, Frontiers of social psychology (New York, New York: Psychology Press, 2012).
[34] Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, Eli J. Finkel, and Michelle R. vanDellen, "Transactive Goal Dynamics.," *Psychological Review* 122, no. 4 (October 2015): 648–673; N. Pontus Leander and James Y. Shah, "For Whom the Goals Loom: Context-Driven Goal Contagion," *Social Cognition* 31, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 187–200.

accessible to others. For example, an organizational mission statement is an explicit goal that can be accepted by its employees. The implicit goal of staying in your lane on the highway to avoid a serious accident is routinely accepted by numerous people on a daily basis. Goal adoption is a vital feature of coordinated human behavior, organizationally and socially. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework allows for individual or group dynamics based on the transferability of goals.

Theoretical Assertions

These assumptions on human decision-making are incorporated into the proposed theory. They also help to inform the three theoretical assertions. The theory is that threat perceptions emerge when events in the international system are judged to obstruct the pursuit of foreign policy goals the administration has committed to achieve. The first theoretical assertion is that the US president is the primary influence in setting the foreign policy goals. He is given deference and authority in establishing the foreign policy agenda. He may elect to solicit certain advisors to craft the objectives or goals for his administration, but he will select these individuals and delegate authority to them. This assertion builds off of assumption five that claims with limited resources a person will prioritize or select certain goals. It is asserted that the president is the source of the goals and the agent who holds the power to validate the goals. Based on this assertion it is the president and his closest staff (i.e. National Security Advisor) that present the goals, which make up the goal structure.

The second theoretical assertion is the socio-political environment and the president's past experiences affect the content of the goals that make up the goal structure. Politics demands that the individuals entering into office take into account the objective political climate. Goals are formulated and articulated in relation to the social and political context that a leader faces. Presidential candidates enter into the battle for executive power with a vision or a desired future for the country. Prior to and during the early stages of political competition, leaders communicate their vision in order to demonstrate their position and acquire support, as well as lay out what issues in the current context they believe require attention. This exposes, either directly or indirectly, the various goals the president has determined to pursue in order to facilitate bringing about the desired future state of the nation. The goals will vary.

Some goals will be focused domestically, while others will be internationally oriented. Some goals will be broad while others will be specific. Needless to say, these goals are consciously determined and in turn structure how and where the leader will direct their attention and resources while in office. The desired future state is affected by whether the president is entering office in a Cold War context versus a post-Cold War context. The types of goals and the content of the foreign policy goals take into account the context and in doing so establish the baseline for what direction the incoming administration can go. Some examples of these goals for various administrations include stopping the spread of communism, securing a stable government in Lebanon, reducing the amount of terror attacks worldwide, seeking new partnerships in Asia, fighting global poverty, etc.

The last theoretical assertion is that the NSC, as an organization, adopts the goal structure of the president. The goal structure is the guiding light for the staff and the rod by which their efforts and successes are measured. The sixth assumption in human decision-making is that goals are transferable. For this reason, it is possible to assert that the president transfers his goal structure to the NSC and as an organization it adopts it.

Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework

This section presents a full description of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework by examining the component parts and how they function. The theory of threat perceptions is derived from this framework. Since goals are a key component of the framework, it is important to begin by looking at what goals are and how they operate. This next section is a detailed look at one component of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, the goal. Once this is done it is possible to zoom back out and return to a view of the entire Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, focusing on the other key component: the judgment. The entire framework will be examined according to the US foreign policy domain.

Goals

This section explains why goals were selected as the main motivator for the theory. It also demonstrates how goals play such a key role in decision-making. The following discussion answers the question, if there is uncertainty about which mental representations influences decision makers, why are

goals selected for this theory. As mentioned, the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is grounded in the principle that humans are purposeful. The foundation for the argument presented here is that an individual and a group's purpose come from their goals. Therefore, decisions and behavior are motivated by their goals. This occurs because the active pursuit of committed goals affects how information is processed and judged. Judgments and perceptions result in choices and actions. The conclusion is that goal pursuit produces certain perceptions and behavior.

Based on this premise, the central feature of this project is to demonstrate the impact foreign policy goals have on decision-making. In this paper the focus will test the effect goals have on the foreign policy team's judgment of international events. It conducts an examination to see whether foreign policy goals condition threat perceptions. To note, this endeavor does not seek to explain or uncover the origin of the decision-maker's goals, rather how goals are used. To accomplish this it is necessary to uncover the actual foreign policy goals. This can begin through observing behavior, which reflects an effort toward an individual's or state's goals or desired ends. Yet, goals are not merely identified by what a person or state does. Goals are also visible in what an individual or state communicates and reflected in the actual choices they make to select or ignore certain choices.

It may be assumed that goals are too fluid and variable to examine or rely on. It may also be supposed that goals are merely a reaction to the external conditions in that present moment in time. Yet, there is a way to define, organize, identify, and examine the foreign policy goal structure. This section aims to show that goals are constituted and therefore, can be studied systematically. Since the literature in the field of foreign policy transposes personality for goals the effort to show goals can be studied systematically begins by demonstrating the separation of an individual's goals from their personality. This is also vital because by separating these concepts, it is possible to examine goals in group decision-making. After this the section continues with a presentation of the key characteristics of goals found in its definition. The subsequent section gives a detailed description of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and how goals function for an individual and groups.

Goals versus personality. The fields of international relations and political science have not fully embraced or explored goal-based decision-making. The concept is prevalent in many other disciplines, spanning both quantitative and qualitative research, to include mathematics, economics, psychology, education, business, organizational motivation, and coaching.[35] One tendency in the political science field is to equate goals to personal beliefs and individual motivations. By the field doing so a decision maker's goals are subsumed into and are masked by an individual's personality.[36] Yet, there is a distinction between goals and personality. In an effort to shed some preconceptions, it is necessary to briefly discuss how goals act differently than personality in producing behavior.

Much of the research in foreign policy, which focuses on the individual decision maker, stresses the importance of how the leader's disposition, personality traits, and/or temperament affect behavior.[37] Within this research program, variation in outcomes is attributed to the differences in personality profiles or specific attributes of the individuals. One of the challenges with this approach is that while the descriptions of an individual's personality traits or cognitions are effective summaries of that person, they do not supply an actual mechanism for explaining why an individual behaved a certain way under certain

[35] Jeffrey B. Vancouver, "Applying Control Theory to Sequential Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association* (2008): 1–32; William T. Powers, "PCT and MOL: A Brief History of Perceptual Control Theory and the Method of Levels.," *Cognitive Behaviour Therapist* 2, no. 3 (September 2009): 118–122; Osselaer et al., "Choice Based on Goals."; Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, "New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 15, no. 5 (2006): 265–268; Jane Brodie Gregory, James W. Beck, and Alison E. Carr, "Goals, Feedback, and Self-Regulation: Control Theory as a Natural Framework for Executive Coaching.," *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research* 63, no. 1 (March 2011): 26–38. Amid the diverse fields using goal-based decision-making they will typically package it in control theory or cybernetic models. Control theory or perceptual control theory is the most common way to depict goal-based decision-making and it is based on the negative feedback loop.

[36] Jerrold M Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders : With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 22.

[37] Margaret G. Hermann et al., "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (July 1, 2001): 83–131; Jonathan Renshon and Stanley A. Renshon, "The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making.," *Political Psychology* 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 509–536; David G. Winter, "Personality and Political Behavior.," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology.*, ed. David O. Sears et al. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 110–145.

conditions.[38] Knowing that a person has an agreeable disposition or power motive may allow for general predictions of behavior, but the trait in and of itself, does not explain the decision made, the action taken, or behavior performed. McCrae and Costa define traits as "dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions."[39] By selecting the word *tendencies* in the definition of traits, McCrae and Costa are emphasizing the fact that these traits are not determinants of behavior, but rather a propensity toward a behavior. They go on to suggest, "a great number of other factors go into the choice of a particular action" and agree with Mischel's 1968 study that found personality traits only account for 5-10% of individual behavior differences.[40]

Dispositions, traits, and motives are the stable energizers and orientors of behavioral tendencies.[41] Although motives appear to be equivalent to goals, motives are an underlying tendency toward a positive or negative experience.[42] Motives are typically organized into three main categories: achievement, power, or affiliation. These underlying propensities will affect which goals an individual constructs. An achievement, power, or affiliation motive does not solely determine the individual's aim or actual behavior. An individual forms certain goals relative to or based on the situation or context. For this reason, goals serve as the force for action.[43] Goals are what give the dispositions and underlying motives a focus and direction and thereby "add a flexible and strategic element" to human behavior.[44]

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[38] Robert Hogan, "In Defense of Personality Measurement: New Wine for Old Whiners.," *Human Performance* 18, no. 4 (2005): 335.
[39] Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, *Personality in Adulthood: A Five-Factor Theory Perspective* (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 2003), 25.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Andrew J. Elliot and Todd M. Thrash, "Approach-Avoidance Motivation in Personality: Approach and Avoidance Temperaments and Goals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82, no. 5 (May 2002): 814.
[42] Andrew J. Elliot and Daniela Niesta, "Goals in the Context of the Hierarchical Model of Approach—Avoidance Motivation.," in *The Psychology of Goals.*, ed. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al. (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 2009), 56–76.
[43] Gordon B. Moskowitz and Heidi Grant Halvorson, *The Psychology of Goals* (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 2009), 63.
[44] Elliot and Thrash, "Approach-Avoidance Motivation in Personality: Approach and Avoidance Temperaments and Goals," 814.

As a cognitive structure, goals are interacting with personality traits and dispositions. The exact effect and role they play is still being examined, but it is becoming clearer that goals are mechanisms that connect individual dispositions to behavior. A recent study by McCabe and Fleeson showed that goals affected the particular traits that were enacted in various situations.[45] Elliot and Thrash found that goals not only focused certain predispositions but they also overrode stable predispositions in certain instances.[46] Pervin came to a similar conclusion. He showed that the individual's preferences in various situations are a joint function of the goals they view as relevant, the value of attaining those goals, and the perceived probability of attaining them.[47] An individual will not merely act based on their stable personality, it is their goals or an end result that is determined to be feasible and desirable, which influences outcomes. Once again, this does not deny that personalities matter. Traits, motives, and dispositions are believed to contribute to the formation of goals, but it is the *active pursuit of the goal* that directs the behavior not merely the underlying personality.

Humans observe social behavior in an effort to understand people's motives. Social behavior provides evidence that goals, and not personality traits, affect certain choices and behavior. When someone has observed another person in a social situation, they will use traits to describe the type of behavior exhibited. For example, someone might describe another person as kind or outgoing, which offer explanations for *how* he or she interacted with others. Yet, to determine *why* someone was behaving a certain way, it is common to identify what he or she was trying to accomplish, his or her goal. For example, a host may be acting kindly when introducing her guests to one another. The motivation was be kind in order that the guests would feel welcome because she was the host. People make these determinations about others all the time, because identifying another person's motivations allows for a

[45] Kira O. McCabe and William Fleeson, "Are Traits Useful? Explaining Trait Manifestations as Tools in the Pursuit of Goals," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 110, no. 2 (February 2016): 287–301.
[46] Elliot and Thrash, "Approach-Avoidance Motivation in Personality: Approach and Avoidance Temperaments and Goals."
[47] Lawrence A. Pervin, ed., "Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology," in *Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology.* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 1989), 1–17.

better understanding of their choices. This attribution is actually necessary for social interaction so that people can anticipate behavior and function with one another. Understanding goals is crucial for perceiving intentions.[48] By acknowledging that people credit an individual's behavior to both *how* and *why* they are directing their efforts further exposes that goals are distinct from personality and the role goals play in human behavior.

Characteristics of goals. Goals are influenced by, yet distinct from, personality. This is important to recognize especially when examining decisions that entail more than one person. In a group decision-making environment, it is not sufficient to place the burden of explanation on a single individual's personal propensities or disposition. Acknowledging that it is goals that motivate judgments and choices offers a bridge that links individual to group behavior. This is critical when examining foreign policy. This section will continue to look closely at what a goal is. The definition of a goal provides five characteristics. It is important to go through each of them to ensure that there is a clear understanding of what constitutes a goal. A goal is defined as *cognitive or internal representations of a future object or state that the person is committed to approach or avoid.*[49] The five components to the definition are: 1) cognitive representation; 2) the future; 3) an object/state; 4) something committed to; and 5) something that is approached or avoided. An explanation of the components of the definition provides insight a systematic study of goals and how they operate in the proposed theory, supplying foundation for how threat perceptions emerge. Exploring the characteristics of goals will further illuminate the unique nature of goals and begin to expose the elements of goals that affect a decision-maker's judgment of international events.

Cognitive representation. A cognitive representation is also known as a mental representation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines a mental representation as a "mental object with

[48] Giel Dik and Henk Aarts, "Behavioral Cues to Others' Motivation and Goal Pursuits: The Perception of Effort Facilitates Goal Inference and Contagion," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 43, no. 5 (September 2007): 727.
[49] Elliot and Fryer, "The Goal Construct in Psychology," 244.

semantic properties (content, reference, truth-conditions, truth-value, etc.)"[50] Cognition is the process that produces subsequent actions where information from the external environment is turned into something meaningful.[51] Humans are constantly receiving sensations and information from their external environments. Political leaders are bombarded with information, especially today. The act of receiving that information and attaching meaning to uses the process of mental representation.

Since it is a mental process, on its own mental representations are not directly observable. Scholars have theorized about various cognitive representations. Goals are one of the many suggested cognitive constructs used to translate the external world into meaning and ultimately behavior. Other cognitive constructs that have been theorized and presented are schemas, attitudes, categories, identity, and beliefs. Each mental construct or structure helps to acquire and organize knowledge, evaluations, and expectations about social objects in the world.[52] It is believed that some cognitive constructs overlap, empower, or impede the others. Despite the complexity and inability to visually assess the actual formation of a cognitive representation, this does not inhibit their examination. For example, gravity is not visible, yet the effects of gravity are. The effects of mental representations are evident in the ability for people to communicate or demonstrate what these cognitive constructs produce: identity, goals, attitudes, etc.

Claiming that goals are cognitive representations means the same principles that govern alternative cognitive structures (schemas, categories, etc.) can be applied to goals.[53] These mental templates "guide what we attend to and what we ignore, how we encode information and experience in memory, what we remember and what we infer, and how we feel and respond in specific situations and

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[50] Brian K. Kooy, ed., "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Http://Plato.stanford.edu/," *Reference Reviews* 29, no. 8 (October 30, 2015): 14–16.
[51] Welko Tomic and Johannes Kingma, "Three Theories of Cognitive Representation and Their Evaluation Standards of Training Effects," *Educational Practice and Theory* 18, no. 1 (January 1, 1996); Martha Augoustinos, Iain Walker, and Ngaire Donaghue, *Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction*, 3rd ed. (London, England: Sage Publications, 2014).
[52] Augoustinos, Walker, and Donaghue, *Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction*, 20.
[53] Moskowitz and Halvorson, *The Psychology of Goals*.

interactions."[54] The key is that mental representations affect information processing. Based on this it can be asserted that political decision makers will perceive and judge incoming information relative to the foreign policy goals.

Goals as cognitive representations are retained in and can be retrieved from memory.[55] For this reason, goals can be activated or primed by various stimuli.[56] This leads to the conclusion that decision makers must possess or be familiar with a goal in order for it so become operative when stimulated by their situation. Individuals maintain and pursue various goals at one time. When there is a litany of goals, an individual must prioritize them due to the fact that the cognitive constructs are constrained by attention resources. Linking goals can facilitate this prioritization. Links can be made from one goal to one another, as well as to other theorized representations (schema, attitudes, beliefs, etc.) since they are mental structures consisting of similar semantic information.[57] The more relations and similar semantic information is available to solidify the goal, the more likely that goal will be activated. As a note, since cognitive representations are not observable, and various types are theorized, there may be a question as to why this framework suggests goals are the mental representations that are affecting threat perceptions over schemata, identity, etc. The remaining features that define a goal will distinguish why goals are the mental representation selected for this framework.

The future. One of the key features of goals that other mental representations lack is the dominance of the future. Attentiveness to time highlights the fact that individuals are mindful of the past, present, and future. As the old adage goes, there are only two certainties in life: death and taxes. The fact that individuals are aware of their pending death draws attention to the mental faculty used to imagine a

[54] Augoustinos, Walker, and Donaghue, *Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction*, 21.
[55] Aarts and Elliot, *Goal-Directed Behavior*; John A Bargh, "What Have We Been Priming All These Years? On The Development, Mechanisms, And Ecology Of Nonconscious Social Behavior.," *European Journal Of Social Psychology* 36, no. 2 (2006): 147–168.
[56] Arie W. Kruglanski and Catalina Kopetz, "The Role of Goal Systems in Self-Regulation," in *Oxford Handbook of Human Action.*, ed. Ezequiel Morsella et al., Social cognition and social neuroscience (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 350–367.
[57] Elliot T. Berkman, Emily B. Falk, and Matthew D. Lieberman, "Interactive Effects of Three Core Goal Pursuit Processes on Brain Control Systems: Goal Maintenance, Performance Monitoring, and Response Inhibition," *PLoS ONE* 7, no. 6 (June 2012): 1–12.

future state. Studies have shown people simulate and mentally represent future events more often than past events.[58] There are several ways to think about the future and scholars have labeled some of them as future fantasies, prefactuals, and expectancies.[59] Unlike fantasies, prefactual and expectancy thinking applies conditional if-then, or action-outcome linkages for things that may or may not happen in the future. These constructs are part of goal cognition. With the use of these mental constructs, goals are able to link the past, present, and future.

The human attribute of employing cause and effect thinking is foundational to translating thought into action. "What-if" or "if-then" speculations take experiences or ideas from the past and presuppose what is needed to influence outcomes into the future.[60] This act is required, especially when anticipating outcomes that may or may have not been experienced. Individuals must be able to concoct a given result, or effect, forward in time, especially in the political realm where leaders are responsible for the future of their state. Future-oriented thinking in relation to goals focuses not only on a picture of what the future *may* look like, but also on the causal inference of personal action to achieve an outcome.[61] Part of the representation of a desired outcome is act of identifying the steps needed to bring the present into alignment with the future. This process of marrying the past and present with the future is what incites action. Goal-directed behavior is proactive, and pursues the steps needed to attain a desired object or state. It can be suggested that the entire purpose of a political leader is to secure a future state, which forces them into goal-directed behavior at all times.

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[58] Joanne Kane, Leaf Van Boven, and A. Peter McGraw, "Prototypical Prospection: Future Events Are More Prototypically Represented and Simulated than Past Events.," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 42, no. 3 (April 2012): 354–362.

[59] Kai Epstude, Annika Scholl, and Neal J. Roese, "Prefactual Thoughts: Mental Simulations about What Might Happen.," *Review of General Psychology* 20, no. 1, The Science of Prospection (March 2016): 48–56; Gabriele Oettingen, "Future Thought and Behaviour Change.," *European Review of Social Psychology* 23, no. 1 (March 2012): 1–63.

[60] Roy F. Baumeister, Kathleen D. Vohs, and Gabriele Oettingen, "Pragmatic Prospection: How and Why People Think about the Future.," *Review of General Psychology* 20, no. 1, The Science of Prospection (March 2016): 3.

[61] Elliot and Fryer, "The Goal Construct in Psychology," 245; Epstude, Scholl, and Roese, "Prefactual Thoughts: Mental Simulations about What Might Happen.," 49.

Object/State of the goal. When the word "goal" is mentioned it can unknowingly conjure up a lot of conventions. When term "foreign policy" is added to goals there is an immediate personal interpretation of what is being discussed. It is routinely assumed that a goal is merely the object of interest itself. For example, when a political leader claims to have a goal to decrease national spending, some will assume the goal itself is the dollar amount of the debt while others will assume the goal is the total amount of the annual budget. Each of these assumptions reduces the goal to its object. Yet, it is important to realize that a goal object or end state is not the goal itself; rather the goal encompasses the level of commitment and direction necessary to move toward or away from the object or state. Although the object or state of the goal is important, an actual goal encompasses the individual's efforts required to affect the object, capturing the full scope of the goal. In foreign policy it may appear that leaders all have the same goals because the objects are very similar. Yet, the variation lies in the perceived direction and the effort the individual believes they need to take to affect the object. It is this characteristic of a goal that produces the goal hierarchy.

A focal point of a goal, or the object, can cover a wide spectrum of things. This could include an entity, event, experience, characteristic, etc. A goal object may be observable or unobservable, abstract or concrete. In an example, a student may have the goal of "earning an A in a course". The goal object is the "A", but the goal itself is a commitment to "earning the A in the course". The earning component of the goal points to the actions or sub-goals the individual needs to accomplish in order to acquire the object, an A. Just a slight change in the student's goal, for example, "avoid failing their class", can alter the path taken. The goal object of the goal is to pass the class, whereas the goal itself is the commitment to "avoid failure," which may produce a different series of actions necessary to realize the goal object. In this example, it is possible to have different goals and yet arrive at the same endpoint. In this situation both students may in turn receive an A. Focusing on the object of the goal does not illustrate the full effect the goal is having on the decisions each student made to acquire the desired object or the path that was created enroute to goal attainment. In goal-directed behavior, the full scope of the goals, not merely the object of the goals, condition the actions needed to arrive at a desired state.

Another reason this component of the definition is important to understand is the effect the full scope of the goal has on analyzing success. It is important to note that success or failure of a goal does not solely depend on realizing the desired state or object. If the goal was to "earn and A", and the individual received a B, he or she will assess success based on the actions taken toward "earning the grade" as well as the grade itself. Reducing discrepancies according to an assessment of the present state compared to the desired state incorporate the object, the magnitude of discrepancy, and the amount of effort put toward achieving the goal. The time and effort to accomplish the goal, not just securing the object will be taken into consideration. Therefore, when looking at goal-directed behavior, the object or state is not the only feature of goal-based decision-making that affects action and perception of success or failure. This unique characteristic of goals contributes to how different perceptions can emerge for various people who may appear to be pursuing the same object (i.e. state security).

Commitment to object or state. As mentioned above the future object does not solely constitute what makes up a goal. In order for a cognitive representation to be considered a goal, an individual must make a conscious commitment to the object or state and take action toward achieving the goal.[62] The nature of commitment to bring about a change in the object distinguishes a goal from a mere idea or image of a desired object. The type of future thinking that leads to commitment enlarges the goal to encompass the individual and their relationship to the object. William James described ideas or images of the future as free thoughts. He argued that a free thought is one that does not require judgment or an association to being true or false.[63] As mentioned above, attaching conditional statements or causal inference to an outcome is placing a mental commitment toward that outcome. It is also identifying how the individual plays a part in the causal chain. Making a commitment to a future object requires him or her to appraise the factual information surrounding the object and the likelihood of achieving that desired end.

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[62] Elliot and Fryer, "The Goal Construct in Psychology," 245.
[63] William James, "The Principles of Psychology," in *The Principles of Psychology, Vol I.*, vol. 1 (New York, New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1890), 283.

The feature of commitment is based on two elements: an appraisal of both the desirability and feasibility of the goal.[64] This is where the mental representation of a goal has the capacity to link the present with the future. It is necessary to appraise the state of the goal object in the present in order to determine the desirability and feasibility of attaining it in the future. This evaluation creates expectancy judgments. Expectancy judgments include the person's ability to perform the behavior (self-efficacy) required to produce the desired result (outcome).[65] These expectancies can be informed by a person's previous performance or by counterfactuals, and as mentioned, bring forward past experiences and beliefs. This characteristic of a goal is how planning and feedback are incorporated into the process. Political leaders establish a structure to accomplish just this, as evident by their staffs that offer precise planning and feedback on changes relative to the organization or administration's goals. Through an appraisal of desirability and feasibility along with the assessment of time and place of action, a person has considered what is necessary in the present to bring about the future.

Variations in perception of desirability (salience) and feasibility (resources) affect the level of effort, persistence, and interest in goal pursuit. Not all goals are equal. Depending on the level of abstraction, there will be some goals that are higher order and some that are lower order. There will also be some goals that are more pressing due to time or depleting resources. Experience, role, external authority, and goal competition are other factors that can influence the level of commitment. When there is a commitment to a goal, the individual applies the energy and resources to bring it about. A commitment certifies that goal pursuit has become valuable to the individual or organization. This supplies another reason for the inclusion of goals into the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and theory on threat perceptions.

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[64] Peter M. Gollwitzer, Heinz Heckhausen, and Birgit Steller, "Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets: Cognitive Tuning toward Congruous Thoughts and Information," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59, no. 6 (December 1990): 1119–1127; Gabriele Oettingen et al., "Mental Contrasting and Goal Commitment: The Mediating Role of Energization," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 35, no. 5 (May 1, 2009): 608–622.

[65] Albert Bandura, *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control* (New York, New York: W H Freeman, 1997); Heinz Heckhausen, *Motivation and Action* (New York, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991).

Approach or avoid. As mentioned above, a goal itself is not merely the desired object or state. A goal serves to provide directionality relative to the object or state based it valence, or the individual's attraction or aversion toward it. There is an inherent tendency in human psychology to approach or avoid situations. This can be seen in the classic axiom of flight or fight. It is also present in the consistent propensity for people to label experiences or stimuli as either good or bad, applying a dichotomous evaluation.[66] For objects that are deemed to have positive valence (attractive) the individual will move toward it (approach).[67] On the contrary, objects that are viewed to have negative valence (averse), the individual will seek to move away from it (avoid). Goals will reflect this dynamic. Not all objects or end states are things that someone wishes to acquire. It is possible for the goal to be one in which they are avoiding, such as bankruptcy, preventing attack, or delaying exhausting key resources. In each of these examples the individual is seeking to avoid a particular outcome. This highlights once again that the object of the goal may be the same for different individuals while the actual goal is different. For example, the object of a goal could be marriage. For one person the actual goal may be to get married right out of college. For another person the actual goal may be to avoid marriage until they are secure in a profession. One seeks to approach the object while the other seeks to avoid it.

Summary of the definition of a goal. The five characteristics presented above uncover the unique nature of a goal. The purpose was to explain what goals are and demonstrate that goals could serve as an appropriate causal mechanism for this study. During the decision-making process individuals are making comparisons and coming to a conclusion or judgment about an idea, fact, event, etc. A goal is a cognitive representation distinct from, yet influenced by personality. Since they are cognitive representations, goals operate under the same principles as schemata, beliefs, etc. The principles of cognition hold that goals

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[66] Charles Egerton Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana, Illinois: Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1957); Bargh, "What Have We Been Priming All These Years? On The Development, Mechanisms, And Ecology Of Nonconscious Social Behavior."; Robert B. Zajonc, "Emotions," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vols. 1-2, 4th Ed.*, ed. Daniel T. Gilbert et al. (New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 591–632.

[67] Andrew J. Elliot and Martin V. Covington, "Approach and Avoidance Motivation," *Educational Psychology Review* 13, no. 2 (2001): 73–92.

reside in the memory and are accessible, they are activated by internal and external stimuli, and they are linked to other goals and representations. Unique to goals is that the focal object or state is something that an individual envisions in the future and commits to approach or avoid. This description of a goal and the inherent pursuit of it necessitates that the individual has an awareness of and has taken stock of their present condition. Thinking about the goal object as a target in the future produces casual inferences, steps, and effort required in respect to securing the desired future. The mental contrast between the present and future object/state launches the individual into a control or regulation process, where individuals seek to affect the environment in through behavior so that they can attain their goal. Now with a foundation for how goals operate it is possible to delve into the proposed theory for how threat perceptions emerge with the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework.

Goal-Based Decision-Making

Now that there was detailed section describing the characteristics of a goal, this section zoom backs out to look at the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework process. There are six components to the framework: foreign policy goal, comparator, judgment, policy/action, and perceived goal status. This section provides a summary of the components the role they have in the process. After describing the role the components have, an explanation is offered as to how they function in the decision-making process in foreign policy. Since the framework is a process, it is by nature continuous and occurs over time. It is also important to note that the boxes or components of the framework are not merely phases the decision maker passes through, but instead each box produces tangible results that emerge from the function and role of the different components. This study is centered on the US foreign policy and the framework is discussed with this in mind. Also the theory offered in this study emerges from the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The theory states that threat perceptions emerge when political leaders judge the events that occur in the international system as a hindrance to the attainment of the foreign policy goals they have committed to achieve.

Goal-based decision-making components. The framework depicts a process that is energized by goals, specifically for this study, the foreign policy goals that the president develops. The president and

his advisors have selected these goals on account that by attaining them they can bring about the desired future state for the nation. The establishment of these goals and a commitment to them by the key foreign policy decision makers sets the standard by which the incoming information measured. The processing of incoming information relative to the goals will then influence judgments and behavior. Once a goal has been established and committed to, it sets in motion the cycle of goal-based decision-making, leading to continual comparison between the current conditions and the desired outcome. Goals are certainly a function of the individuals' assessment of the socio-political environment within which they are created, but the decision-making process here captures what happens once that goal is set.

The comparator component of the framework is where information regarding the observed goal status and the desired future state are assessed. The administration's goals provide the necessary direction for action. Yet, in order to move toward accomplishing these goals, it is essential to ascertain the amount of effort, time, and distance to travel in order to reach the desired outcome. As mentioned the goal is formulated according to an initial assessment of the socio-political context. Then, over time, the administration must remain aware of, and in turn, continue to assess what actions need to be taken given the present conditions and goal status. The president can accomplish this by either establishing and/or using an existing political mechanism to monitor and compare the existing state of affairs to the desired state. In the US, the NSC is the primary organization used to track, assess, and pursue foreign policy goals.

The comparator component is designed to receive incoming information and identify discrepancies between the current conditions of the environment and the desired goal outcome. When it is recognized that there is a discrepancy between the current state and the goal, a judgment is made on the source and magnitude of the discrepancy. Some scholars would constitute this as the diagnostic or evaluative component of decision-making.[68] When making an evaluation, causal attribution is a key

[68] Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979); Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and André Théorêt, "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, no. 2 (1976): 246; Alex Mintz and

cognitive activity that allows individuals to assign a reason to what is being evaluated.[69] The type of judgment being made and the source of judgment will affect perceptions and subsequent behavior.

There are three primary perceptions that can emerge from the judgment. Two will be explained in detail here. One is a "problem" perception, and the other is a "threat" perception. A "problem" perception develops when the observed discrepancy is understood as an impediment to goal attainment, but is believed it to be a function of the goal-pursuing process. A "threat" perception emerges when the discrepancy is judged to actually impede or obstruct goal attainment and if not addressed quickly will eventually prevent the decision maker's ability to accomplish the goals. It is possible for discrepancies to arise from different sources. For this study the focus is on discrepancies that could be impacted by events that occur in the international system.

The major difference between a "problem" and a "threat" perception is the judgment that the source of the discrepancy is part of the goal-pursuit process. A "problem" perception is a result of judging the event as being a function of the socio-political environment and in a sense is understood to be embedded within the goal-based decision-making process itself. In a complex world full of interacting parts, achieving a foreign policy goal takes time and is rarely accomplished with one act. Typically there are even setbacks during the process of goal pursuit based on the fact that foreign policy goals involve many different decision makers and actors. Therefore, sub-goals and actions are submitted with the intention of correcting the discrepancy. It is expected that there are a series of acts necessary to move toward the goal.

The political leaders are aware that their proposed policies enter into the political environment where there are other forces at work. As policies are presented and/or implemented, there is an interaction

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Steven B. Redd, "Framing Effects in International Relations," *Synthese* 135, no. 2 (May 1, 2003): 193–213.

[69] Harold H. Kelley, "The Processes of Causal Attribution.," *American Psychologist* 28, no. 2 (February 1973): 107–128; Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, "Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making.," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51, no. 2 (August 1986): 242–258; Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, "Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making," *Cognition* 49, no. 1–2 (October 1993): 123–163; Philip N. Johnson-Laird and Eldar Shafir, "The Interaction between Reasoning and Decision Making: An Introduction," *Cognition* 49, no. 1–2 (October 1993): 1–9.

with various agents, organizations, and institutions in the political environment. These entities will be affected by and inherently shift in response to the administration's behavior. Therefore, the proposed goal initiatives, in conjunction with the responding political forces, produce an altered state of affairs – the socio-political context. This altered state, which yields a new context, presents a transformed context through which the perceptions of goal progress are observed. Therefore, a "problem" perception is attributing the goal discrepancy to the anticipated set backs or challenges the decision makers will face in the quest toward their goals (i.e. expected duration, response from opponents, resource limitations, etc.). These challenges, or problems, are consistent with everyday politics and the effort to produce policies generated by the administration. Examples of problem perceptions could be Congressional opposition to foreign military sales or an increase in violence when deployed to a war zone. Each of these examples constitutes challenges that would be inherent to certain goals and the environment.

When confronted with "problem" perceptions, it would be expected that the administration continue to pursue the goal via initiatives and strategies that were generated during goal origination. Although new sub-goals (policies) may be developed, they would be consistent with previous actions taken to achieve the goal. There is persistence in the efforts that have already been used to plow the socio-political environment and a belief that if the current path is followed the goal is achievable. As these plans and strategies are implemented the process of assessing goal progress continues and the goal remains the lens through which the context is viewed.

The perception of goal status involves an assessment, where information from the environment is extracted to gather details on the goal progress. This information is used in the comparator, but this time the comparison is in relation to the new goal status based on the altered environment that the previous actions and responses shaped. The cycle continues for the administration. In the US the NSC and staff is responsible for monitoring and making the comparison between "altered" environments and the existing goals. The NSC and staff are tasked to pursue initiatives and make appropriate adjustments to correct for the internal discrepancies. Political leaders anticipate this process, because in a sense, it is the world of normal politics, pursuing goals, and adjusting actions as the political environment shifts in response to

that quest. It is possible for internal discrepancies to impede the goals, but it is more likely that they will be perceived to delay goal attainment leading to doubling effort toward the goal itself.

When a discrepancy occurs due to an event, act, or actor that disrupts the environment, but is not necessarily in response to the goal-directed actions or initiatives by the administration, it is considered a disturbance. For example, if one of the administration's foreign policy goals were to defeat global poverty, a disturbance within the environment could be a hurricane that devastates Haiti. Another example of a disturbance could be the eruption of a civil war in Somalia. These two examples show that the events altered the socio-political environment, but the events did not necessarily emerge as a result or response to an action or initiative taken by the administration regarding the goal itself. These are usually independent international acts, events, or the appearance of actors that would not or could not be anticipated or expected along the path to the goal.

Leaders anticipate opportunities and threats in their environment and aim to account for them.[70] It is possible for a "problem" perception or a "threat" perception to arise from a disturbance or event that was assessed as part of changing the environment in response to the decision-maker's actions or as an event disrupting the environment distinct from the decision-maker's strategy or plans. The focus here will be on events that arise external to the environment. When a disturbance is judged to as an obstruction, not just a mere delay to goal pursuit, it will produce a threat perception. Given a commitment to the obstructed goal, this threat designation will manifest a shift in resources to remove the obstacle in order to return to goal pursuit. The key causal mechanisms of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework that contribute to the "threat" perception are: 1) commitment to a goal, 2) recognition of discrepancy, and the 3) judgment of the disturbance as the source of goal obstruction.

As this section illustrated, there are key components at work in the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. So far the emphasis of this discussion was on describing the comparator phase and the judgments that emerge from it. The discussion also touched on the socio-political environment, actions,

[70] Jane E. Dutton and Susan E. Jackson, "Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to Organizational Action.," *Academy of Management Review* 12, no. 1 (January 1987): 76–90.

and perception of goal status. The actions considered in this framework are any choices or behavior designed to achieve the goal. Since an action can be a choice, it does not need to be completed for the action to affect the context. For example, after assessing the current state of affairs relative to the goal, a decision maker could decide to move Marine forces to a new location in preparation for a training event. The decision itself will begin a series of events that will alter the environment by removing those forces from another location, elevating the media's attention, and moving Congress to consider budget implications. The socio-political context or environment is the domain in which the goals are operating. Since the focus is on foreign policy goals, in this study, the domain consists of both the international and domestic environments. Based on the change in environment by an action, disturbance, or discrepancy the decision makers update their understanding of the goal status. This perspective is fed back into the comparator to assess the "new discrepancy".

Next is a discussion on how the key components function during the decision-making process. The discussion will bring in the investigation of US foreign policy by focusing on who is involved, and what can be observed at that level for each of the different mechanisms. Up to this point the framework has just touched on the actors involved in this process. It has been stated that the president and his staff is the primary force behind the establishment of foreign policy goals. The NSC is the main actor responsible for making comparisons and updating the perspective on goal progress based on the changing environment. These are the two main players in this study that contribute to threat perceptions for US foreign policy and their roles will be explained more clearly below. Although the entire framework has been described, the empirical portion of this project focuses on two core features of the framework: the existence and impact of a leader's goals and the presence and effect of judgments of the goal discrepancies.

Function of goals in decision-making. Goals perform a very important function in the framework by conditioning what information is received and how the current context is judged. At this point, a few important questions may have arisen when applying the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. For example, how does an individual develop and organize their goals, and is it possible to

know which goals are operative during the decision-making process? It is expected that an individual would produce innumerable goals. This is evident by the definition of a goal offered earlier, which is a *cognitive or internal representations of a future object or state that the person is committed to approach or avoid*. By nature, humans are pursuing a wider spectrum of goals, even when not fully cognizant of the goal itself. Decision makers, especially in the foreign policy sphere, are constantly serving various goals. Without the ability to structure and organize the operative goals of the decision makers, then it would appear fruitless to claim that threat perceptions are a result of an obstruction to the decision maker's goals, since the mere number of goals affords so many opportunities for a goal to be impeded. If there were no system of goals, it would also mean that people would retain a high number of threat perceptions. The key is that decision-makers are committed to certain goals at certain times. As mentioned, in goal pursuit there is a degree of expected discrepancy, which guards against attaching a threat perception to every disruption. This is where a judgment of a discrepancy as a "problem" or "threat" perception plays a role. In an effort to supply an answer the two questions above it is important to explain the systematic nature of goals, and in turn offer a suggestion that foreign policy goals are organized and structured. There are three factors keeping the use of goals, and specifically foreign policy goals, from becoming tautological: accountability, hierarchy, and goal competition.

Goal accountability. First, US leaders are held accountable for meeting the foreign policy goals they promote. This factor demands that the goals themselves are relevant to the context, feasible based on national resources, and desirable to constituents. A foreign policy goal divorced from socio-political context removes the political leader's credibility. This could manifest itself in the reduced likelihood of being elected, as well as, garner opposition once the individual is in office thereby making it difficult for them to take initiatives toward reaching the stated goal. Accountability affects access to resources. National resources must be available to accomplish any prescribed foreign policy goal. Even far-reaching theoretical goals pull national resources, for example President John F. Kennedy's goal to land a man on the moon or President Ronald Reagan's proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These goals

siphoned the intellectual resources of the nation and ultimately the material resources, creating a sphere of accountability.

Foreign policy goals affect many actors, and are therefore communicated to various audiences. Although, not all foreign policy sub-goals are made fully explicit to the public and a broad audience they are communicated to the NSC, allies, and institutions (i.e. Congress, foreign militaries, United Nations, etc.) Accountability lies in within the actors and the other branches within the government that gain access to and information on foreign policy activities that provide opportunities for opposition to proposed goals. Having accountability to what is articulated as the goals the administration is pursuing places a level of commitment and dedication to those goals. It also has the potential to increase the priority of those goals if other actors activate their role to hold the decision makers accountable to their stated goals.

Goal hierarchy. The second factor that conditions what goals are active in the decision-making process is the fact that goals are linked both vertically and horizontally forming a hierarchical structure of interconnected goals. Vertically, goals are organized in a standard hierarchical manner, where sub-goals support the accomplishment of higher-order goals.[71] This arrangement allows for the ends of a lower-order goal to serve as the means for a higher order goal.[72] This is key, because, abstract goals require more concrete sub-goals in order for them to be achieved. A hierarchical structure organizes goals temporally, from long-term to short-term, and across levels-of-abstraction, from abstract to concrete.[73]

Within the goal-based decision-making literature, some scholars have attempted to classify the various hierarchical levels of goals. Powers, who introduced the notion of hierarchy in his control theory,

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[71] Arie W. Kruglanski et al., "A Theory of Goal Systems," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 34.*, ed. Mark P. Zanna and Mark P. Zanna (Ed) (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 2002), 331–378.

[72] Jeffrey B. Vancouver, Justin M. Weinhardt, and Aaron M. Schmidt, "A Formal, Computational Theory of Multiple-Goal Pursuit: Integrating Goal-Choice and Goal-Striving Processes.," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 95, no. 6 (November 2010): 985–1008.

[73] Charles S. Carver and Michael Scheier, "Principles of Self-Regulation: Action and Emotion.," in *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition: Foundations of Social Behavior, Vol. 2.*, ed. E. Tory Higgins et al. (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 1990), 3–52.

identified nine hierarchical levels.[74] He called the peak of the hierarchy the "system concept" or the idealized self and world. This level contained goals that captured what is considered the "to be" goals: be responsible, be a good student, peaceful, etcetera.[75] At this level an individual attempts to maintain "unity among moral, factual, and abstract principles."[76] This indicates that the "to be" goals are most likely to incorporate other mental representations like schema or attitude or disposition. This level is so abstract that these goals are toothless in and of themselves. Action can only occur with the addition of sub-goals. Powers called the lowest level of his nine levels the "intensity level". It was here that he captured the muscle movements needed to physically act. As evident by the large distance between the systems level and the intensity level, there are other goals and actions that need to take place in order to get from being a good student to moving the pencil on paper to record the correct answer.

Since Powell's articulation of the different goal levels other authors have sought to provide more efficient and effective categories. The common thread between the various taxonomies is the funneling from conceptual goals to executable goals. Higher-order goals will typically specify the significance or the "why" of an action, where as the lower-order goals will specify the means or the "how" for accomplishing the higher-order goals.[77] Newell reduced Powell's nine levels into four and categorized them as social, rational, cognitive, and biological levels.[78] Cropanzano, James, and Citera's model also

[74] Morgenthau, "What Is the National Interest of the United States?"
[75] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1979).
[76] Donald Edwin Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership : The Setting of Priorities*, Westview special studies on international relations and U.S. foreign policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978); J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, National Security Policy and Strategy (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Army War College, July 2010).
[77] Richard P. DeShon and Jennifer Z. Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 90, no. 6 (November 2005): 1107.
[78] Carver and Scheier, "Principles of Self-Regulation: Action and Emotion"; James T. Austin and Jeffrey B. Vancouver, "Goal Constructs in Psychology: Structure, Process, and Content," *Psychological Bulletin* 120, no. 3 (November 1996): 338–375; Powers, "PCT and MOL: A Brief History of Perceptual Control Theory and the Method of Levels."

uses four levels—values, self-identities, personal projects, and task goals.[79] Frese and Zapf also promote four levels in their action theory—heuristic, intellectual, flexible action patterns, and sensorimotor.[80]

A very useful model of goal hierarchy that can be adopted for the foreign policy domain comes from Richard DeShon and Jennifer Gillespie, who developed the Motivated Action Theory (MAT). It incorporates many of the same categories offered in previous classifications. One of the reasons that the goal hierarchy supplied in MAT was selected to inform this study was that it was designed to demonstrate the cohesive structure to goals and provided categories most common in achievement-oriented contexts (e.g. work place, sports, academics). Achievement contexts are defined by Heckhausen as those that include: 1) objectifiable results of action, 2) difficulty and effort required to succeed can be estimated; 3) actions result in success or failure; 4) levels of difficulty and effort are seen as standards of excellence; and 5) performance is mainly determined by the individual's behaviors.[81] Based on this criterion, politics can be assessed to occur in an achievement context. There are four levels introduced in the MAT hierarchy: self-goals, principle goals, achievement goals, and action plan goals. The goal hierarchy used in this study is reflected in figure 2. These levels were taken, modified, and renamed to support the foreign policy domain. The levels are: endurance goals, principle goals, direction goals, and policy goals. Below is a description of the different levels and how they are identified.

Endurance goals. The highest level in the goal hierarchy is endurance goals. This level adapts the MAT hierarchy self-goal level. Self goals are defined as "the fundamental outcomes that all individuals must achieve, to some extent, to lead normal, healthy, and fulfilling lives."[82] For an individual, self-goals

[79] Darlene Bay and Harold Daniel, "The Theory of Trying and Goal-Directed Behavior: The Effect of Moving Up the Hierarchy of Goals," *Psychology & Marketing* 20, no. 8 (August 2003): 669–684.
[80] Michael Frese and Dieter Zapf, "Action as the Core of Work Psychology: A German Approach," in *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 4, 2nd Ed.*, ed. Harry C. Triandis et al. (Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1994), 271–340.
[81] Christophe Gernigon et al., "Rethinking Approach and Avoidance in Achievement Contexts: The Perspective of Dynamical Systems.," *Review of General Psychology* 19, no. 4 (December 2015): 443–457.Russell E. Johnson, Chu-Hsiang Chang, and Robert G. Lord, "Moving from Cognition to Behavior: What the Research Says," *Psychological Bulletin* 132, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): 381–415.
[82] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation," 1105.

are designed to supply the means needed for "human survival": preservation a functioning body, securing basic material necessities, and retaining mental capacity.



Figure 2. Foreign Policy Goals Hierarchy, (adopted from Deshon & Gillespie)

The MAT hierarchy begins with self-goals because they are the first goals individuals consciously formulate in order to pursue common "survival needs". In the same way there are "survival needs" of a state. Endurance goals are defined similarly, but capture that "a secure, sovereign, and prosperous state" is the focus of the outcomes. Given the diversity of the actors and political make-up of states in the international system, there may be numerous "survival needs" of a state. Yet, it appears there is an agreement on the core needs of a state. These needs are typically labeled as the state's national interests. Most often the survival needs are transposed as the foreign policy goals of the state, but the actual goals are those created to secure these common needs.

The ultimate requirement for political leaders to preserve their state and therefore, all subsequent efforts are aimed at constantly working toward this purpose. The logic holds that without the state the leader would not have a role or meaning, therefore, a leader's primary concern is state survival. German scholar, Hans J. Morgenthau, asserted that security is what safeguards survival.[83] The logic emerged because there was not an entity in the international system designated to facilitate state survival. Two core elements necessary to obtain survival, and in turn security, was to protect the state's physical and political identity against other actors. Waltz proposed that to ensure security a state must assess the distribution of power in the international system and seek to acquire military power and wealth.[84]

Following the work of these two authors others have deduced the primary interests of the state. These are then routinely codified as the state's vital goals (national interests). Again, these core national interests are actually not the goals themselves, but the needs of the state to persist. The three primary needs for a state to survive are: 1) defense of the homeland (physical integrity), 2) economic well-being, and 3) political stability.[85] The goal hierarchy is devised to secure these three core needs. How a leader believes this can be accomplished is demonstrated in the principle, direction, and policy goals he establishes.

Residing under the core survival needs of physical integrity, economic well being, and political stability exist an array of endurance goals. At the endurance level, goals fall into three primary categories: agency, esteem, and affiliation. Although these three categories of goals are derived from nearly all the comprehensive research conducted on the individual, it applies to the state as well.[86] Agency goals refer to goals that are oriented toward affecting the level of control or influence a state has over their environment or others. Only though agency is it possible to bring about a change in the environment or

[83] Morgenthau, "What Is the National Interest of the United States?"Gernigon et al., "Rethinking Approach and Avoidance in Achievement Contexts: The Perspective of Dynamical Systems."
[84] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1979).
[85] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation"; Elliot and Thrash, "Achievement Goals and the Hierarchical Model of Achievement Motivation."
[86] Michael Frese and Dieter Zapf, "Action as The Core of Work Psychology: A German Approach," in *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 4, 2nd Ed.*, ed. Harry C. Triandis et al. (Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1994), 271–340.

behavior in others, therefore endurance goals are designed to affect agency.[87] Esteem goals motivate states to pursue outcomes relative to reputation, goals that lead to maintaining a positive reputation or retain credibility.[88] Affiliation goals are goals tied to the social nature of the international system. These goals are oriented toward developing and maintaining relationships or attachments to other actors in the international system.[89]

Endurance goals are the most abstract and long-term of the state's goals. They are seldom achieved in full during the leader's tenure yet, these fundamental goals offer the administration or foreign policy team a purpose for action and govern the nature of the remaining goals in the hierarchy. Looking for how the president and his foreign policy team pursue agency, affiliation, and esteem exposes the endurance goals. It is possible that endurance goals are common across states given that the currency in the international system is agency, affiliation, and esteem. For this reason, this study concentrates on the principle, direction, and policy level goals.

Principle goals. In an achievement context, like politics, the principle goal level captures the sub-dimensions of the behaviors or traits states seek to exhibit, which they believe can assist in achieving the intended endurance goals. Provided by the MAT model, principle goal categories, in an achievement context, are: growth, fairness, structure, and social value. Given the interconnectedness of the hierarchy it is possible for the principle goals to be tied to one another and for a principle goal to serve more than one of the endurance goals. Principle goal level is the starting point to uncover the foreign policy goals for this study. Principle goals are closely associated with the leader's purpose or vision and encompass the full state of affairs in the international system. These goals supply the means for the endurance goals.

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[87] Christophe Gernigon et al., "Rethinking Approach and Avoidance in Achievement Contexts: The Perspective of Dynamical Systems," *Review of General Psychology* 19, no. 4 (December 2015): 443–457.
[88] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation," 1105.
[89] E. Tory Higgins, "Knowledge Accessibility and Activation: Subjectivity and Suffering from Unconscious Sources," in *Unintended Thought.*, ed. James S. Uleman et al. (New York, New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 75–123; Abraham Tesser, "Responding to Attempts at Control: Autonomy, Instrumentality, and Action Identification.," in *Perspectives on Behavioral Self-Regulation: Advances in Social Cognition, Vol. XII.*, ed. Robert S. Jr. Wyer and Robert S. Jr. Wyer (Ed) (Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1999), 229–239.

The principle goal categories are growth, structure, fairness, and social value. These categories illuminate the types of goals located at this level. Growth goals are goals set with the intention of acquiring information about one's state and the current environment. Goals relative to growth are focused on acquiring certain skills for operating in the current context or insight. A growth type principle goal is typically designed to secure an outcome that produces insight or access to what is feasible for the socio-political environment. It may also be related to acquiring insight into the capability of another state.

Another category at the principle goal level is fairness. Principle goals designed to establish a persona of fairness may be goals that are oriented on just behavior. Goals within this goal category can influence whether an individual sets goals that favor short-term outcomes, such as cheating, versus long-term outcomes based on just practices. Experiments and research have shown that individuals have a strong desire for fairness and to operate in a just world.[90]

The third category of goals within the principle goal level is structure. A goal categorized as a structure goal is where a state seeks outcomes that are designed to construct or organize their environment and make it unambiguous, whether physical or social.[91] The pursuit of structure goals aims at a degree of predictability, no matter how chaotic it appears a person operates on the outside. Therefore, leaders pursue goals related to the structure of the international system in an effort to secure outcomes that clarify boundaries, rules, and adhere to norms.

The last category depicted at the principal level is social value. Goals in this category are oriented around the state's standing in a group, which can have an impact on all of the higher-order endurance goals. The aim of goals related to social value is to alter the balance of power in a group setting, with an eye towards how that increase in power assists in achieving the established endurance goals. Social value

[90] Hermann et al., "Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals"; Tajfel and Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior."
[91] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation.," 1106.

type goals can include those that affect access to resources, control over decisions or punishments, the status of relationships within the group, social standing, etc.[92]

Principle goals are broad in nature and are designed for a general domain. Identifying principle goals starts with looking for goals related to the objects of growth, fairness, structure, and social value. Then it is important to see whether those goals are directly suited to supply the means for agency, affiliation, and esteem. Typically a President will have between 8-12 principle goals. They are repeated often and may be associated with the vision of the administration. One thing to keep in mind when identifying principle goals is that they transcend regions.

Below are several examples of principle goals held by various US administrations. Goals related to altering or improving the military can fall into the category of growth. Several leaders acknowledge the role the military plays in understanding the feasibility of operating in the socio-political context. Principle goals related to the future of the military also serve the endurance goals related to the agency of a country. It is important to note that having the same object for the goal (military) does not mean the agency goal is the same. President Donald Trump has set out to rebuild the US military with the best equipment in the world. President Bill Clinton on the other hand pursued the goal of restructuring the US military, in material and personnel, according to the post-Cold War threat. President Ronald Reagan's goal was to strengthen nuclear and conventional capabilities. While President Jimmy Carter's goal was to maintain the existing defense posture. Each of these leaders established principle goals that where ultimately designed to affect the endurance goals. The actual goals themselves differed according to the administration.

Since principle goals seek to provide the means for endurance goals, such as affiliation, often the principle goals are oriented around the alliances or relationships the state has or seeks to enter into. These goals would fit into the social value category. These goals speak broadly about desired relationships or memberships. For example, President Clinton spoke regularly about increasing the community of

[92] Ibid., 1108.

democracies. President Trump speaks often of seeking friendships with other nations, even Russia and China. President Reagan wanted to roll back Soviet influence and prevent the increasing affiliation neutral states were beginning to have with the Soviets. These examples of principle goals show the desire to affect the dynamics of the social order in the international system that promotes means to serve the endurance goals and US agency, affiliation, and esteem.

Another example is the principle goals in the fairness category, which typically serves goals in the agency and esteem categories at the endurance level. Leaders often set a broad goal about the state's prestige, reputation, image, or model. Presidents have discussed being an example for other nations or setting a standard for what is just and admirable. This language typically precedes or follows the actual goal. It is not just that the leaders want to set an example, but there is a way in which they believe they can establish a just system. For instance, President Reagan expressed the oft-repeated quote of a modeling the "city on a hill" in reference to maintaining the qualities of a free political and economic system. President Clinton was set on promoting and developing the international institutions needed for a globalizing world economy. President Trump believes that fairness is built by serving the state interests first and honoring commitments tied to the US interests.

Direction Goals. Under the principal goal level is the direction goal level. The goals pursued at the direction goal level are designed to serve the principle goals; the ends of the direction goal feed the principle goals' means. Once again, the linked dynamic of goals facilitates higher-order goal achievement. In the MAT model this level describes the goals as achievement goals. According to various scholars, achievement goals are goals directed to a competence-related end state or result.[93] Here the

[93] Carolyn L. Hafer, "Investment in Long-Term Goals and Commitment to Just Means Drive the Need to Believe in a Just World.," *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin* 26, no. 9 (September 2000): 1059; N. Pontus Leander, James Y. Shah, and Tanya L. Chartrand, "The Object of My Protection: Shielding Fundamental Motives from the Implicit Motivational Influence of Others," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47, no. 6 (November 2011): 1078–1087; Leda Cosmides, "The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task," *Cognition* 31, no. 3 (April 1989): 187–276; Allan E. Lind, *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice* (New York, New York: Plenum Press, 1988); Christine Clavien and Rebekka A. Klein, "Eager for Fairness or for Revenge? Psychological Altruism Economics," *Economics and Philosophy* 26, no. 3

achievement goals "reflect the general action patterns individuals use to pursue principle goals."[94] Both of these descriptions indicate that achievement goals are directionally oriented, hence the renaming for the foreign policy goal hierarchy to direction goals.

Direction goals are initially grounded in an existing quantity based on the current context. The goal is set in order to either increase or decrease the object of interest that is currently present in the socio-political context. Direction goals can be similar to but are more specific and tangible than principle goals. When the direction goals are accomplished their ends supply means to the higher-order principle goals. There are not specific categories for direction goals. It is possible to identify the direction goals the administration sets according to the criteria of *where and how*. The distinction between a principle goal and a direction goal is that a direction goal specifies a tangible future outcome that seeks to serve the principle goal. A direction goal that will indicate where efforts need to be directed, this could be a geographic location and is most often a specific region or continent. It is also common for direction goals to be domain-specific.

A direction goal will be one where the outcome demonstrates how a principle goal can be pursued. Direction goals are designed to in such a way that the goal establishes a tangible movement towards or away from the object of the goal in the current context. Given that direction goals are more concrete, operating in a particular domain or geographical location, and require tangible resources it is possible to see goal conflicts arise frequently at this level. It is at the direction level that decision makers must begin to prioritize their goals. A few examples of direction goals in foreign policy include reducing the number of nuclear weapons, elevating women's rights in third world countries, and decreasing the number of terrorist incidents. Direction goals may also include increasing alliance support in Afghanistan, rebuilding ties with allies, and expanding US diplomatic presence.

(2010): 267–290; Golnaz Tabibnia, Ajay B. Satpute, and Matthew D. Lieberman, "The Sunny Side of Fairness: Preference for Fairness Activates Reward Circuitry (And Disregarding Unfairness Activates Self-Control Circuitry)," *Psychological Science* 19, no. 4 (2008): 339–347.

[94] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation," 1106.

Policy goals. The last level foreign policy goal hierarchy is the policy goal level. The policy goals are crafted to feed into the means of the direction goals and are the most varied. Despite the variety it is still possible to witness coherence in the policy goals.[95] Policy goals are those located the ground level and the outcome are associated with the *who* and *what*. The policy goals direct *who* need to be active in securing mean for the direction goals and can speak to specific groups, offices, or people. They are also goals designed to secure *what* or tangible assets necessary to facilitate direction goals. In the foreign policy arena, these goals are most closely aligned with what many people would consider specific policy goals or organizational objectives. As you move down the hierarchy toward these policy goals you see an increase in specificity and individual responsibility. Given the nature of policy goals outcomes being more tangible this leads to an increase in goal accountability, preventing different organizations from pursuing their different foreign policy goals without proper delegation. Despite the variety across administrations, the accountability on policy goals ultimately affects the persistence of the policy goals. It constrains how they are communicated, the manner in which they are related to higher-order goals, and when they are committed to.

Since it is a hierarchy and the goals are interconnected, the policy goals are linked with the higher-order goals and serve a particular purpose. The main point of relaying the MAT model and translating it to the foreign policy sphere is to recognize the interconnected nature of the goals and how higher-order, long-term goals require more specific short-term goals to direct behavior.

This detailed description of a model of the hierarchy of goals was crucial to demonstrate that there is a connection and systematic order between different foreign policy goals. It also provided a path for other to identify a decision-maker's goals at the different levels and replicate building a goal structure. The intent was not to explore the origin of the foreign policy goals themselves or to create a complete map of all available goals. Each level is a goal in itself, but higher-level goals also provide a reason for the sub-level goal. In turn, the lower-level goals supply the means to accomplish the higher-level goals as well as

[95] DeShon and Gillespie, "A Motivated Action Theory Account of Goal Orientation"; Elliot and Thrash, "Achievement Goals and the Hierarchical Model of Achievement Motivation."

the ways to evaluate progress toward the higher levels. At times the hierarchy is obscured because political leaders routinely speak about one particular goal level or they communicate a variety of goals simultaneously that actually reside at the different levels. The variations between state behavior within and across different contexts are apparent based on the variety of sub-goals that a leader may construct.

Most observable behavior can be attributed to the actions that attend to some lower-order goals, which are designed to affect the abstract, higher-order goal.[96] As states seek to secure their goals they begin at the lower-levels, but always with the higher-order goals in mind. Then when means are produced for higher-order goals, they can actively move up the hierarchy. If states face challenges to goal pursuit, it is possible they need other means. In this case they move down in the hierarchy of goals in an effort secure any further means necessary to achieve linked goals. If the present policy goals are still achievable in the current context, decision makers will rely on the roads they have already paved. This is likely to occur because the established lower level goals already provide a concrete path to a realized outcome and during the formulation of those goals the outcomes have already been assessed as supplying the necessary means for the higher-order goals. There is caution in merely assessing state leaders actions, they may all be pursuing similar principle goals, but the behaviors exhibited primarily reflect the lower-order goals.

Multiple goals – goal competition. State leaders are committed to a number of goals at one time, but it is not possible to pursue all the goals concurrently. As mentioned above, goals are linked vertically and therefore, lower-order goals are able to serve the higher-order goals that they are affiliated with. Goals are also linked horizontally, yet, not all goals are aligned and aiding in goal attainment. Goal competition and conflict can transpire as a result of horizontal association. Competition arises when the progress made by going after one goal impedes progress toward another goal.[97] This dynamic is prevalent within the foreign policy domain but also occurs at the individual level. At the individual level, a college

[96] Kerrie Unsworth, Gillian Yeo, and James Beck, "Multiple Goals: A Review and Derivation of General Principles," *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 35, no. 8 (November 2014): 1064–1078.
[97] Justin V. Cavallo and Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, "Goal Competition, Conflict, Coordination, and Completion: How Intergoal Dynamics Affect Self-Regulation.," in *Goal-Directed Behavior.*, ed. Henk Aarts et al., Frontiers of social psychology (New York, New York: Psychology Press, 2012), 267–299.

student may have the goal of earning an A in their courses and the goal of increasing their social engagement. At some point these two goals will collide and the individual will have to choose between studying and spending time with friends. In foreign policy, a state may be chasing the goal of strengthening relations with Israel, at the same time; success toward that particular goal may have a negative effect on the goal of securing a two-state solution.

Secondly, goals may not be directly detrimental to one another, however, the reality of limited resources creates a conflict regarding which goals can be pursued and when. There is a finite amount of time, energy, and material resources available for each goal. Since goals demand resources, both mental and physical, individuals cannot serve all their goals at the same time and must prioritize and commit to certain goals at certain times.[98] When confronted with goals that are either in competition or conflicting an individual must order their pursuits or make trade-offs. The goal's feasibility and desirability, which is derived from the decision maker and their environment, facilitate goal selection or commitment.

Context will activate certain goals, but within a given context there are also three primary factors that contribute to goal priorities: expectancy, affect, the instrumentality of conflicting goals.[99] Expectancies are the beliefs that the individual or group's effort will result in the desired outcome. Expectancies arise from the assessment and confidence that the goal initiatives will produce a given consequence.[100] Expectancies are tied to the appraisal of the feasibility or attainability of the goal. The

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[98] Kruglanski and Kopetz, "The Role of Goal Systems in Self-Regulation"; Cavallo and Fitzsimons, "Goal Competition, Conflict, Coordination, and Completion: How Intergoal Dynamics Affect Self-Regulation."

[99] Arie W. Kruglanski et al., "The Distinct Psychologies of 'Looking' and 'Leaping': Assessment and Locomotion as the Springs of Action.," *Social & Personality Psychology Compass* 7, no. 2 (February 2013): 79–92; Ruud Custers and Henk Aarts, "In Search of the Nonconscious Sources of Goal Pursuit: Accessibility and Positive Affective Valence of the Goal State," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 43, no. 2 (March 2007): 312–318; Vancouver, "Applying Control Theory to Sequential Foreign Policy Decision-Making"; Bandura, *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control*.

[100] Kruglanski et al., "The Distinct Psychologies of 'Looking' and 'Leaping': Assessment and Locomotion as the Springs of Action."; James Shah and E. Tory Higgins, "Expectancy × Value Effects: Regulatory Focus as Determinant of Magnitude and Direction.," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73, no. 3 (September 1997): 447–458; Edwin A. Locke and Gary P. Latham, *A Theory of Goal Setting & Taks Performance* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990).

higher the expectancy, where the individual perceives they are more likely to successfully reach the desired outcome, the more committed the individual will be to that goal.[101]

Expectancies are influenced by the prior experiences, emotions, and progress achieved toward the goal.[102] Unlike other uses of the term expectancies, which view it as static, when it comes to goals, expectancies are dynamic. Individuals take into consideration the past experiences with goal pursuit, as well as, the current context they are faced with. For this reason, the role of expectancies in goal-based decision-making allows for the incorporation of the element of time. When pursing a goal, an individual considers how long it will take for progress to occur from the time when goal action is initiated to when effects should emerge from the action. At each point of comparison, assessing current context to the desired state, the individual reassess how much longer goal achievement may continue to take. As the goal attainment approaches, and the time afforded to complete goal narrows or the deadline approaches, the individual's expectancies would be modified to reflect this change.[103]

In experiments and computer simulations, it was observed that as the deadline for the various goals approached expectancies became a prominent factor when selecting the dominant goal.[104] In a volatile environment, individuals were more likely to remain committed to or pursue goals that were nearing their deadline and had the least amount of discrepancy.[105] This indicates that when selecting between conflicting or competing goals, the perception of time combined with the likelihood of success influences the level of the commitment toward a particular goal. The foreign policy arena can be a volatile environment and there are inherent deadlines incorporated into the politics. Those deadlines maybe

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[101] Oettingen, "Future Thought and Behaviour Change."
[102] Maria J. Louro, Rik Pieters, and Marcel Zeelenberg, "Dynamics of Multiple-Goal Pursuit.," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93, no. 2 (August 2007): 174–193.
[103] Vancouver, Weinhardt, and Schmidt, "A Formal, Computational Theory of Multiple-Goal Pursuit: Integrating Goal-Choice and Goal-Striving Processes."
[104] Aaron M Schmidt and Richard P DeShon, "What to Do? The Effects of Discrepancies, Incentives, and Time on Dynamic Goal Prioritization.," *The Journal Of Applied Psychology* 92, no. 4 (July 2007): 928–941; Vancouver, Weinhardt, and Schmidt, "A Formal, Computational Theory of Multiple-Goal Pursuit: Integrating Goal-Choice and Goal-Striving Processes."
[105] Aaron M. Schmidt, Chad M. Dolis, and Adam P. Tolli, "A Matter of Time: Individual Differences, Contextual Dynamics, and Goal Progress Effects on Multiple-Goal Self-Regulation.," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 94, no. 3 (May 2009): 692–709.

indirect or direct. The most direct deadlines are elections and established dates of peace accords. It is possible the combination of ensuing deadlines and the perception of nearing goal completion (changes in goal discrepancy) solidify goal commitment despites events demonstrating the need to address competing goals.[106] It is possible for the prioritized goal to actually lead to shielding the non-prioritized goals and any goals associated with non-prioritized goals.[107] This may be why it appears people become rigid in their pursuit of one particular end.

The interconnected nature of goals, allows an individual to conceptually travel up and down the hierarchy as well as across, shifting their focus to priority goals. This is a wonderful attribute, especially since individuals are stimulated to serve multiple goals on a regular basis. Yet, when multiple goals arise and conflict occurs between goals an individual attempts to maximize success by assessing how many goals can be accomplished by pursuing one of the conflicting goals.[108] This appraisal takes into account both the means and actions necessary to effect a successful outcome (i.e. lower-order goals). If competing goals surface and they are not instrumental in accomplishing an existing goal they will be shielded from interference.[109] Once a goal has been selected there is a devaluation of the alternative goals, even to the point of inhibiting them.[110] This function serves to prevent numerous conflicting goals from robbing resources from what the individual has determined is the primary goal. Shielding is especially prevalent in social and group settings where situations can easily present numerous competing goals.

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[106] William J. Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-2" (The White House, January 20, 1993). In the Reagan administration, there was an intense focus on Libya as a key rival throughout the early years of his administration. Subsequently, Lebanon and the Israeli peace process dominated the administration from through the beginning of 1984.
[107] Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski, "Forgetting All Else: On the Antecedents and Consequences of Goal Shielding."
[108] Ibid.
[109] Leander, Shah, and Chartrand, "The Object of My Protection: Shielding Fundamental Motives from the Implicit Motivational Influence of Others"; Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski, "Forgetting All Else: On the Antecedents and Consequences of Goal Shielding."
[110] Stijn M. J. van Osselaer and Chris Janiszewski, "A Goal-Based Model of Product Evaluation and Choice," *Journal of Consumer Research* 39, no. 1 (August 2012): 260–292; C. Miguel Brendl, Arthur B. Markman, and Claude Messner, "The Devaluation Effect: Activating a Need Devalues Unrelated Objects," *Journal of Consumer Research* 29, no. 4 (2003): 463–473.

Function of goals in groups. The discussion up to this point has primarily focused on the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework in light of how it applies to the individual, touching briefly on its application to groups via the foreign policy domain. The theory presented in this study suggests that threat perceptions emerge when events in the international system are judged to disrupt the foreign policy goals the administration has committed to achieve. US foreign policy affecting the nation's security is developed, managed, and carried out by the NSC and its staff. Therefore, in order to examine the formation of threat perceptions in the US, the body under investigation in this study is an entity, the NSC. Referencing the NSC here refers to a collection of individuals who make up an organization that is designed to produce US policy aimed at affecting national security and foreign relations. It is important to recognize that although individuals who make up the NSC may be associated with other departments or organizations, they are also members of the NSC, thereby the collection of principals and staff that make up the NSC is viewed as an organization. By definition, an organization is a group of people that are both structured and managed with the intent of pursuing goals.

This study advances by asserting that the NSC is the organization within the administration that is essential in producing the judgments of an international event, act, or actor. It is for this reason that threat perceptions will be examined at the organizational-level of the NSC, rather than solely at the individual-level (e.g. president, principals, or individual members). The members of the NSC are involved in processing incoming information about the goal progress within the present environment. It is through the NSC staff and structure that the administration's foreign policy goals are monitored and compared to the current context. Finally, it is through the NSC organization that policy alternative and actions are crafted and approved. This series of responsibilities and actions demonstrate that it is via the NSC that foreign policy goals are committed to and pursued.[111]

[111] Karl Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, *Fateful Decisions : Inside the National Security Council.* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York, New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).

Given that the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is a by nature an individual cognitive process, how can it be applied to an organization like the NSC? Interestingly enough, the goal-based decision-making model can easily bridge the gap between the individual-level and the group-level. The link that spans both levels of analysis is the activity of team (organizational) cognition.[112] The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework can be expressed as a cognitive process that produces decision-making, situation assessment, planning, and communication.[113] Each of the components of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework are variations of cognitive activity: formation and pursuit of goals, making comparisons of the desired state to the current state, recognizing discrepancies, processing information regarding the environment, recognizing disturbances, interpreting information about goal progress, and choosing appropriate goal initiatives/policies. Just like individuals, an organization goes through cognitive processing.[114] An organization pursues goals, makes comparisons, recognizes discrepancies, processes information, interprets information about the discrepancies and goals, and selects actions. It is through the interaction of the individual members within the organization that produce these various cognitive activities. For this reason, the proposed framework is applied to a foreign policy team like the NSC.

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[112] Eduardo Salas and Stephen M. Fiore, *Team Cognition : Understanding the Factors That Drive Process and Performance.* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2004); Michael P. Letsky, *Macrocognition in Teams : Theories and Methodologies*, Human Factors in Defence (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2008); Eduardo Salas et al., "The Science of Training and Development in Organizations: What Matters in Practice.," *Psychological Science In The Public Interest: A Journal Of The American Psychological Society* 13, no. 2 (June 2012): 74–101; John R. Turner, "Team Cognition Conflict: A Conceptual Review Identifying Cognition Conflict as a New Team Conflict Construct," *Performance Improvement Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (July 1, 2016): 145–167; Stephen M. Fiore and Travis J. Wiltshire, "Technology as Teammate: Examining the Role of External Cognition in Support of Team Cognitive Processes.," *Frontiers in Psychology* 7 (October 7, 2016): 1–17.

[113] Nancy J. Cooke, "Team Cognition as Interaction," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 24, no. 6 (December 1, 2015): 415–419; Sarah Kaplan, "Research in Cognition and Strategy: Reflections on Two Decades of Progress and a Look to the Future.," *Journal of Management Studies* 48, no. 3 (May 2011): 665–695; Ali E. Akgün, Gary S. Lynn, and John C. Byrne, "Organizational Learning: A Socio-Cognitive Framework," *Human Relations* 56, no. 7 (July 1, 2003): 839–868.

[114] Cooke, "Team Cognition as Interaction," 416.

Individual and group cognitive activity revolves around the process of acquiring, compiling, and manifesting knowledge so that one may act.[115] In order for cognitive activity to occur at the organizational level, cognition must exist outside the mind, body, or brain of its individual members. Due to limited human capacity, an individual's cognitive activity routinely depends on things outside of itself. This occurs through the use of artifacts such as lists, the Internet, and other people to aid in information gathering and processing.[116] An individual who is trying to determine where to go to dinner will integrate not only internal information, such as past experiences experience, sensations, and beliefs, but also external information solicited from technology, the environment, and other people. Although, organizations themselves do not have a mind or body, they have been observed to be able to "think" and "act". Organizations process incoming information, turning that data into meaning and knowledge, and from that knowledge produce an action. Just as an individual interacts with information from various sources, the same is true about an organization. Cognition within an organization is observed through the interactions and knowledge transfer that transpires between individual members.[117]

Individual members of an organization are the agents responsible for acquiring, compiling, and manifesting the knowledge of the organization. They are the source of cognition, or the construction of meaning based on their environment.[118] Individual members possess similar information and knowledge, and at the same time distinct information and knowledge. For example, in the military pilots have specialized knowledge about flying aircraft and intelligence officers have specialized knowledge in various intelligence collection methods. It is possible for these two members to share knowledge of a

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[115] James A. Grand et al., "The Dynamics of Team Cognition: A Process-Oriented Theory of Knowledge Emergence in Teams.," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 101, no. 10 (October 2016): 1353–1385.
[116] Fiore and Wiltshire, "Technology as Teammate: Examining the Role of External Cognition in Support of Team Cognitive Processes."
[117] Karl E. Weick and Karlene W. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (September 1993): 357–381; Ramón Rico et al., "Team Implicit Coordination Processes: A Team Knowledge–Based Approach," *Academy of Management Review* 33, no. 1 (January 2008): 163–184; Nancy J. Cooke et al., "Interactive Team Cognition," *Cognitive Science* 37, no. 1 (2013): 255–285; Fiore and Wiltshire, "Technology as Teammate: Examining the Role of External Cognition in Support of Team Cognitive Processes."
[118] J. Bruner, *Acts of Meaning* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990).

particular troop movement or target location, but they also have very distinct knowledge. The organizational knowledge is not merely a sum of the two individual's distinct knowledge or even the amount of shared knowledge. In the example provided above, a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), submitted up the chain of command, is the result of the collaboration between the pilot and the intelligence officer. Organizational knowledge and cognition merges through the transaction of information between individual members. It is possible that the individuals within the organization do not internalize or hold to the organizational knowledge personally.[119] The interaction produced an explicit communication at the individual-level between the pilot and intelligence officer, and this assessment becomes part of the artifacts that inform organizational-level cognition and is ultimately incorporated into its "thinking". It can then contribute to organizational-level actions by the decision-makers, in this case further selection of targets or missions. The illustration provided here is to demonstrate that it is possible to analyze the "thinking" of the NSC, without identifying how each individual thinks.

The decision-makers themselves do play a role in making use of the knowledge produced by the organization. Decision-makers are not necessarily required to use the knowledge manifested by the organization. Similarly, an individual has various cognitive resources at their disposal, and at times makes a decision by relying some and not others. Within the NSC the president has decision authority and can choose to adopt the "thinking" provided by the organization. Given that the NSC is designed to provide advice and assist the president on foreign affairs and policy, efforts are made to avoid cognitive dissonance between the top level decision-makers and the organization. Therefore, the communication and transfer of explicit information that occurs between individuals via their interaction, produces corporate cognition from which the decision-makers acquire, compile, and manifest their understanding. It is this perception or understanding that the organization will use to make decisions and act. To reiterate, is not necessary to examine what the beliefs and understanding individual members such as the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, or any single NSC staff personally possesses

[119] Cooke et al., "Interactive Team Cognition."

about an event. By examining how the organization developed an understanding of the event via transmitted communication and the approval of decision-makers, which reified that knowledge, supplies evidence of the organization's perceptions.

Since organizational cognition emerges from a transmission and interaction between individual members, organizational structure can impact communication influences cognition.[120] The managerial literature suggests that the manner in which top managers structure the organization can situate its cognition.[121] Examples of structure include degrees of specialization, office locations, protocol for information sharing, meeting attendance, the number of sub-organization departments, the type of technology used to transmit communications, and more. The structural choices result in individual members developing specific channels of communication to contribute to the organization's cognition via acquisition and compilation of information and data. The aim of a top executive is to produce organizational outcomes. An organization, like an individual, can only act on what it knows. Therefore, in order to produce organizational behavior the executive will shape its organizational knowledge, creating a particular organizational cognition. For this reason, how the organization is structured and used by the leader reflects the values and goals he aims to realize.

Every organizational structure is embedded with different properties based on membership, identifiable boundaries, ranks of authority, communication, activation, hierarchy, jurisdiction, obligations, goals and more.[122] As mentioned before an organization is not the sum total of its individual members, but a distinct creation as a result of how these properties manifest the organizational cognition and subsequent

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[120] Joseph F. Porac and Raghu Garud, *Advances in Managerial Cognition and Organizational Information Processing: Cognition, Knowledge and Organizations, Vol. 6.*, ed. Joseph F. Porac and Raghu Garud (US: Elsevier Science/JAI Press, 1999), http://proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2000-07458-000&site=ehost-live.

[121] Andrew J. Hoffman and William Ocasio, "Not All Events Are Attended Equally: Toward a Middle-Range Theory of Industry Attention to External Events," *Organization Science* 12, no. 4 (Summer 2001): 414–434.

[122] Brian Epstein, *The Ant Trap : Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences.*, Oxford studies in philosophy of science (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Hall et al., "Achievement Goals and Emotions: The Mediational Roles of Perceived Progress, Control, and Value."

outcomes. This is evident in the fact that the organization itself can persist despite changes in the individual parts (members) and people can be members of more than one organization at a time. Yet, it is also true that the content of the properties can be modified by the individual people existing within the group at a particular time, which is why as group membership changes, so can the goals, communication, authority, etc.

The NSC is hierarchical with the president at the top of the structure. In complex environments top managers or leaders rely on the various resources within the organization to assist them in responding to their strategic environment. Each president is given freedom to construct the lower echelons in the manner he sees fit, as well as determine the power distribution between the various departments by assigning certain individuals to run the various meetings. The NSC structure and operations will vary depending on the president and individual members within the organization. The composition and daily activity of the NSC offers a glimpse into not only how the organization "thinks", but also where its attention is directed and how new information is received and distributed.

Within the last decade several scholars have observed that groups operate under a similar decision-making process as individuals when viewed in light of goals.[123] An executive or manager operating at the top of an organization sets the direction of its organization by providing collective goals. The establishment of goals is a way to narrow the effort of the organization and focus it on issues the executive has determined are important.[124] Group goals are defined the same as way individual goals – a cognitive representation of a future object and/or state that a group is committed to approach or avoid. A

[123] Frank Wieber, J. Lukas Thürmer, and Peter M. Gollwitzer, "Attenuating the Escalation of Commitment to a Faltering Project in Decision-Making Groups: An Implementation Intention Approach," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6, no. 5 (July 1, 2015): 587–595; Daan Scheepers, Naomi Ellemers, and Kai Sassenberg, "Power in Group Contexts: The Influence of Group Status on Promotion and Prevention Decision Making.," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 52, no. 2 (June 2013): 238–254; Kai Sassenberg and Karl-Andrew Woltin, "Group Based Self-Regulation: The Effects of Regulatory Focus.," *European Review of Social Psychology* 19, no. 1 (2008): 126–164.

[124] Sucheta Nadkarni and Pamela S. Barr, "Environmental Context, Managerial Cognition, and Strategic Action: An Integrated View," *Strategic Management Journal* 29, no. 1 (December 2008): 1395–1427; Donald C Hambrick and Phyllis A. Mason, "Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers.," *Academy of Management Review* 9, no. 2 (April 1984): 193–206.

collective goal is still a cognitive representation. It is something that is mentally formulated, initially by the organizational leadership and may occur through a collaborative process where it was discussed and modified. It is understood that goals can be shared and adopted, and therefore possible for more than one person to hold the same goal.[125] Yet, it is not expected or necessary for every member of an organization to all pursue the same goals.

Since the organization itself develops its own cognition through member interactions and the collection and transmission of knowledge, the organization will internalize and reflect the goals it is committed to achieving. The hierarchical nature of higher-order and lower-order goals will be represented in the specialization and distribution of authority and means within the organization. Lower-order or more concrete goals are distributed to sub-organizations based on relevance, experience, and specialization. Higher-order, abstract goals, which connect various lower-order goals, exist near the top of the organization. This segregation of responsibility and knowledge further enhances where the direction of attention is placed at the various levels of the organization. An organization, such as the military, provides an example of a group pursuing varied goals. Collectively the one of the military's higher-order goals is securing the nation. From this higher-order goal, the various departments can express in mission statements and visions sub-goals necessary to meet this goal. Within the overarching organization, various entities are pursuing multiple goals and different abstractions of goals at any given time within a hierarchical goal structure.

The nature of the theory suggests threat perceptions materialize as a result of how incoming information is interpreted or judged. The argument put forward here is that the main factor affecting this interpretation is when external events are judged as obstructive to goal attainment. As presented earlier organizations operate to serve its goals and are structured to accomplish this task. What this means is that the different departments will be seeking different types of information. In order to act on the goals they

[125] Stephen Slade, *Goal-Based Decision Making : An Interpersonal Model.* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: L. Erlbaum, 1994); Leander and Shah, "For Whom the Goals Loom: Context-Driven Goal Contagion"; Fitzsimons, Finkel, and vanDellen, "Transactive Goal Dynamics."

are pursuing, the individuals within the organization must process information that will produce usable knowledge that will contribute to effective outcomes. If certain departments are responsible or focused on certain goals than an event, which does not appear to hinder those goals, will either be discarded or assumed benign.[126] This phenomenon was observed even when individuals were presented with what one would expect to be threatening, but was unrelated to their goal of interest.[127] It has to be relevant to the goals the group members and organization are committed to in order for it to register. Many times it requires the event to be communicated in respect to the goals the organization is currently committed to in order for it to be understood. This is the role of individuals in the organization. Individuals interact with other members of the organization and transmit knowledge up through the organization based on the organization's goals. At this point the organization begins to develop understanding of the event, yet it is based on the selection and interpretation of information.[128]

As it reaches the higher echelons, this prepared understanding and judgment of the event will become part of the organizational cognition. An example of this process is the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), a document that is compiled by various intelligence agencies within the government and provided to principal members of the NSC. Agencies and departments made up of different individuals with different focus areas, collect, compile, and then present what is considered the knowledge of the intelligence community. The material selected for and offered on the PDB is supplied to serve the organization and is therefore influenced by its hierarchical structure and highly specialized departments. Applying the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework to an organization means the type of information that is being selected by the organization will be information relevant to the goals the organization is

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[126] Julia Vogt et al., "The Automatic Orienting of Attention to Goal-Relevant Stimuli," *Acta Psychologica* 134, no. 1 (May 2010): 61–69; Steven B. Most et al., "What You See Is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional Blindness and the Capture of Awareness," *Psychological Review* 112, no. 1 (2005): 217–242; Ruud Custers, Baruch Eitam, and John A. Bargh, "Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Goal Pursuit," in *Goal-Directed Behavior.*, ed. Henk Aarts et al., Frontiers of social psychology (New York, New York: Psychology Press, 2012), 231–266.

[127] Julia Vogt et al., "Competing for Attentional Priority: Temporary Goals versus Threats.," *Emotion* 13, no. 3 (June 2013): 587–598.

[128] Michelle R. vanDellen et al., "In Good Company: Managing Interpersonal Resources That Support Self-Regulation," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 41, no. 6 (June 1, 2015): 869–882.

actively pursuing and committed to. Goal-based decision-making focuses attention to perceive events, actors, or situations as either goal-relevant means (instrumental) or as obstacles.[129] This also means that if the executive wants to gain understanding about an event, and reaches into the organization to get it, it may be conditioned by the goals of that department or office is focused on pursuing.

In summary, the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework can be applied to groups, and therefore, threat perceptions can be examined at the organizational-level. Given that goals are central to the evaluation, the individual is not completely removed, but the focus is on the interaction between the relevant individuals, which produce judgments and perceptions. The takeaway then from the discussion on organizational cognition and goal-directed attention is that goals can become a major factor in focusing information selection and interpretation (judgment). It is the creation and pursuit of goals that connect the individuals to the organization. The president's foreign policy goals affect how the NSC is structured and what is considered valuable information within the organization. The prioritized foreign policy goals that the NSC is committed to also determine which departments are solicited for information and where decision-makers acquire their knowledge. The power and influence of the president remains prevalent in this argument, but the organizational function of goal pursuit incorporate the inertia produced by institutional dynamics.

Theory of Threat Perceptions

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework offers a foundation for the theory put forth in this study. This study asserts that the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is the operative decision-making process for the elite decision makers. The theory is put forth to answer how certain events in the international system are identified as threats. In response to this question, the framework supplies two key

[129] Edward Orehek and Amanda L. Forest, "When People Serve as Means to Goals: Implications of a Motivational Account of Close Relationships," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 25, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 79–84.

causal mechanisms in the formation of threat perceptions. The first causal mechanism is the presence of goals that the administration is committed to achieve. The second causal mechanism is the judgment of goal discrepancies. When there are goals the Administration is committed to and they are judged to be obstructed as a result of an event occurring in the international system, the elite decision makers will adopt a threat perception.

The previous section went into detail about the characteristic and function of goals at the individual and group level. The evidence that goals play an enormous role in motivating action, especially in achievement contexts, solidified the selection of this mechanism. The nature of politics forces the elite decision makers to express and commit to foreign policy goals, further supplying weight to the causal mechanism of goals. The second causal mechanism offered by the framework of a judgment of goal discrepancies was selected due to the desire for political entities to monitor and control goal progress. This is evident in the structure of the staffs and a constant request for feedback on discrepancies regarding certain goals. The theory relies on assertion that these causal mechanisms are present and can be effected by international events.

Methods - Testing the Theory

A framework used to explain reality is of no value unless it is suggested causal mechanisms are observed in reality. This section discusses the methods that will be used to conduct the evaluation of the theory. The main objective of this evaluation is to observe the proposed causal mechanisms and identify if they operate as expected per the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The first discussion below layouts the how the case studies will be structured in order to identify and test the causal mechanism. The next section will be a discussion on what cases were selected and the decision to perform case study analysis.

Structure for Cases

The empirical focus of this study is on how goals affect the judgment of threat perceptions. Two causal mechanisms are proposed to affect the emergence of threat perceptions: 1) the existence of administration's goals and 2) the administration's judgment of the event via goal discrepancies.

Consistent with the framework outlined above, identifying the source of threat perceptions requires several steps. Those steps include: 1) identifying the leader's goals; 2) identifying historical context; 3) identifying the Administration's perception of the event and categorizing as "benign", "problem", or "threat"; and 3) evaluating whether the judgment of the event was affected by goal discrepancy. The test begins with identifying the leaders goals.

Step 1 – identify goals. The first step in testing the theory is to identify the pre existing goals of the administration independently from the policies they chose in response to an event. Powers (1973a) and Runkel (1990a) offer a precise method for identifying goals.[130] It starts with establishing that the goals are present. As mentioned goals range from higher-order, long-term to lower-order, short term. Goals are individually constructed, but socially and organizationally adopted. Since many goals in the foreign policy arena require mutual industry and resources, they must be communicated in order for joint effort. Political leaders and designated elite political groups construct goals to direct state behavior, especially when conducting foreign policy. In the US the president has a high degree of authority and responsibility to establish the foreign policy goals. The president creates a foreign policy agenda that contains many of the initial goals he seeks to pursue throughout his tenure. Therefore, examining the goals articulated by the president in their various forms can produce a goal structure.

By definition, these goals are neither subjective fantasies derived from childhood or a purely objective assessment that any individual in his shoes would select. An individual's goals are a combination of past and present experiences that take into consideration the commitment necessary in light of the goals' desirability and feasibility. Goals incorporate the personalities, beliefs, and motivations of the executive. Goals also incorporate the current context in which they entering into and are operating within. The president's goals will range from higher-order to lower-order goals. Some scholars have tried to generalize some of the goals pursued by political leaders. Light contends that there are three goals that drive domestic politics: 1) sustain office and if available gain reelection; 2) leave a positive historical

[130] Austin and Vancouver, "Goal Constructs in Psychology: Structure, Process, and Content.," 361.

legacy; and 3) institute sound policy.[131] Although these goals may be present, they are not the only goals or even the most dominate goals motivating perceptions and actions. The goals supplied by Light are higher-order goals related to the president himself, but not necessarily the higher-order goals devoted to the nation. Policy scholars posit that US foreign affairs are governed by four overarching goals, or national interests: 1) defense of the homeland (physical integrity and population security); 2) economic well being; and 3) political stability; 4) international stability.[132] This collection of goals seem nearly universal for any state seeking survival, but again they are underpinned by more concrete principle, direction, and policy goals. It is important to actually uncover the hierarchical goal structure of the administration.

A description of the Administration's goal structure helps to demonstrate linked and prioritized goals. This structure will show how some goals are prioritized routinely, while commitment to others appears to fluctuate. It may seem to some that foreign policy goals are either rigid and unchanging or fluid and completely malleable to fit a particular context. Illustrating the Administration's foreign policy goal structure will help to show why both perceptions carry some truth.

It is not often that foreign policy objectives are categorized in a hierarchical manner. Typically when discussing foreign policy goals, some people tend to zero in on either the grand strategic goals while others will focus on goals that reside at the ground floor or policy level. Yet, a goal structure contains not only these two levels but also the goals that exist between them. As mentioned in the previous chapter the hierarchical structure used in this study is derived from the Motivated Action Theory (MAT). MAT was based on individual decision-making, therefore, the four levels consist of: self-goals, principle goals, achievement goals, and action plan goals. When applied to the foreign policy arena the four goal levels are referred to as: endurance goals (self), principle goals, direction goals (achievement), and policy goals (action plan).

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[131] Paul Charles Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
[132] Nuechterlein, *National Interests and Presidential Leadership : The Setting of Priorities.*; Bartholomees, *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*.

Direction goals are goals that when achieved create a path or vector that will produce the means necessary to achieve principle goals. It is here at this level that many of the goals will concretely focus on an effort of increasing or decreasing, or approaching or avoiding, the desired outcome. Since direction goals are designed to be more concrete than principle goals, they will be orchestrated around domain-specific, geographic areas, or particular states. It is at the direction goal level where the majority of the NSC's effort will reside, because these goals are tangible and progress can be more easily tracked. The more identifiable the direction goal outcomes, the more likely the principle goals can be rightly evaluated. It is also at this level where goal conflicts will occur. For this reason, it will be necessary for the Administration to prioritize these goals.

Once the goals are identified, Powers and Runkel claim it is necessary to assess if the actors are actually seeking to take actions that will actually serve that goal. In other words, do the leaders strive to reduce discrepancies between their stated goal and current state? An executive's goals are observable through their communication and the actions they take in organizing and allocating their time, energy, and resources. Two areas to look for this in the US is how the NSC is organized and what resources shifted through proposals in the National Security Directives, Executive Orders, and presented to Congress for a vote. The organization of the NSC can shed light on which goals the Administration have prioritized and committed to, especially when new offices are created.

In conjunction with identifying the presence of goals and a commitment to those goals, an effort to purposefully assess progress on the goal should be present, solidifying commitment. For the US, upon entering office the president will establish his NSC and organize the feedback system designed to inform him on goal progress. In order to ensure that a goal is actually being pursued, it is important to look at how the feedback to the NSC and president affect their commitment to a goal. A self-regulating system will confront variance. An individual demonstrates goal stability by pursuing action that confronts the variance created by the environment affecting that goal. Meaning that when facing interruptions to goal

progress, a commitment occurs as the individual pursues the goal consistently.[133] If there is no effort to either detect or anticipate a discrepancy and there is no selection of means (i.e., a set of sub-goals) that is capable of reducing the discrepancy, it should be concluded that there is a commitment to that goal.

Step 2 – historical summary. The second step in the structuring the case study is to provide a brief historical summary in relation to the case. Goals and actors are situated in the social-political context. Providing a brief summary helps illuminate the conditions the decision makers were in when the events occurred. It is also important because the focus is on perceptions of the event and perceptions are affected by context. Most often foreign policy case studies are based on one particular decision or the event resulting from a decision. The focus of the cases selected here is not concerned with the specific policy decision that was made, but the judgment of the event or international incident.

For this reason it is important to look at the historical nature of the events in which the administration. It will also provide context for the comparison between events when the Administration did adopt a threat perception and compare it to time when it did not adopt a threat perception. It takes into account the interaction with and response to the environment over time, where some events were viewed as threats and others were not.

Step 3 – operative goals for the event. The full goal structure has been identified. This demonstrates the full scope of goals that the administration is seeking to attain. As mentioned previously, not all goals can be pursued simultaneously for a variety of reason. Therefore, it is important to pinpoint the goals that are currently operative for the Administration prior to the events happening. This helps to limit the evaluation so that it is based on the actual prioritized and operative goals rather than the full litany of foreign policy goals. If the perceptions are a result of the specific operative goals, the theory is accurate in stating it is the goals the administration is committed to that will affect the identification of a threat.

[133] Austin and Vancouver, "Goal Constructs in Psychology: Structure, Process, and Content."

Step 4 – identify the perception of the event. A key feature of the empirical test is the presence or absence of a judgment of threat. It is safe to say that not all international events are perceived as a threat to national security. It is important to remember that the framework is not designed to explain what is a threat to national security. The framework intends to uncover how certain events are perceived to be threats when others are not. The intent is not to claim that the actors should or should not have made the judgment, but instead to expose what led them to that judgment. For this reason, the judgment of a threat rests on the statements and perceptions of those individuals under examination. This can be observed when a leader or administration spokesman gives an account for how the event affects the US interest or security. These statements can be taken from private communications between policy makers or in public speeches and talks. Although some may conclude that the public judgment of a threat is just to gain political support, the reality is the leader has further committed the administration to that judgment. The framework is aimed at showing how it is not merely public support, but goal attainment that motivates this judgment.

The motivation behind this study is to uncover the factors that lead elite decision makers to perceive events in the international system as threats to national security. Therefore, the perception of the event is the object of inquiry. Although there may be various perceptions, for the purpose of this study there are three categories of perception: “benign”, “problem”, “threat”. The criteria for a perception to be labeled as a “threat” is the decision makers indicate a belief that: 1) there is imminent danger, harm, or injury to the US or its interests resulting in a sense of urgency; 2) a culpable actor is identified along with certain US vulnerabilities that are in danger; and 3) there is a redirecting or acquiring national resources directed at the designated actor. The criteria for a perception to be labeled as a “problem” is when: 1) the event is considered detrimental to US interests; 2) US behaviors are identified for addressing the event, most often through current plans/policies; and 3) resources are allocated based on current allocation and availability. Finally for a perception to be labeled as “benign”, there is: 1) an absence of the event being viewed as harmful or detrimental to US; 2) not defining a specific actor or behavior as the target of

concern or correction; and 3) lack of shifting resources based on the event itself. These criteria will help to categorize the events under examination so that the causal mechanisms can be uncovered.

Step 5 – evaluate the NSC's judgment of the event. The final step in structuring the case study is where validity of the theory is exposed. This step looks to see if the judgments the Administration is making on the events are influenced by the goals they have committed to pursuing. This step does not seek to merely aim to observe a relationship between a stated goal and the judgment of threat. Rather the intent is to determine if the members of the Administration attribute the conditions of the event as blocking, inhibiting, or negatively affecting the pursuit of the president's goals. This will require observations of communication or dialogue that demonstrates that an understanding of the event is affected by the stated goals. This observation entails that the circumstances of the event were discussed among members of the NSC. Then it must be observed that the event is discussed in light of the goals. If an event does become attached to a stated goal, it is necessary to see if the event has negatively affected goal progress. If the event is believed to have affected goal progress, the last piece of evidence is to see how members of the NSC discuss the event and whether they attribute the event to preventing or obstructing goal attainment. This series of communication will be examined through documents, meeting minutes, interviews, news archives, and memorandum.

Case Study Selection and Method of Analysis

The investigation will be conducted through a detailed case study analysis. The effort will begin by observing the mechanisms with process tracing and within-case analysis. Using a within-case analysis, allows for testing the threat perception theoretical framework, as well as the intervening factors in the process. It is also possible to perform a cross-case analysis to secure inferences about the necessity and sufficiency of the mechanisms. The variety of process tracing that will be accomplished is converting the historical narrative into an analytical explanation and testing hypotheses about the causes of the threat

perception.[134] The cases selected for this study are not merely picked based on one specific event or policy decision; rather the case studies cover a particular period of time or administration to demonstrate how the various mechanisms are operating.

The empirical portion of the research project will focus specifically on the US. The effort of the empirics involves identifying the administration's foreign policy goals, the process of assessing whether an event that occurred in the international system was deemed a threat, and if the threat perception was based on the judgment that it inhibited goal attainment. The US was selected as a test case because it would present the most likely actor to operate under a Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The features of hegemonic status and wealth, the democratic structure, and the function of the NSC would increase the role goals play in judgments and behavior. A nation with an abundance of resources and a diverse population expands the number of desirable and feasible goals of its government. It would be expected that an actor with the potential for a wider number of available goals to pursue open up the potential for goal disturbances to occur. A plethora of goals suggests that many international events would affect the US. Therefore, comparing cases of US threat perceptions with cases of when threat perceptions are absent for the US provides insight into what mechanisms are at work. This would present a viable case to demonstrate how goals influence threat perceptions. Another feature of the US that strengthens testing the framework is the democratic nature of the state.

In the US, in order to win an election, the president must gain or retain constituent approval. Embedded in this process is a requirement for the candidates to demonstrate competence and be held accountable to achieve success. This process encourages goal-based decision-making in two ways. First, goals are a way to both communicate to the public where effort and resources will be directed. This would result in an personal commitment to the goals. Therefore, the leaders may have an unwillingness to abandon goals facing obstacles so that they could demonstrate successful goal attainment. Secondly, presidents and their foreign policy choices are measured by what they claimed they were going to

[134] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 137.

accomplish. They are held accountable to both the broad and narrow commitments they have made. When events in the international system overwhelm an administration, typically the broad goals become the rod by which their responses and efforts are is measured. Administrations are also held to the concrete goals they set, and these will quickly become stumbling blocks in the administration's credibility if they are not pursued or attained.

The NSC is a body within the US government that has been given a key role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. (Best, 2011) The inclusion of this key group fosters the existence of goal-based decision-making. In order to unify a group of distinct people, some of whom have loyalties to other agencies, the leadership will guide them. This occurs by establishing organizational goals that direct energy and resources. In the US the president has the authority to personally select key members of the NSC and reorganize the structure according to his preference. Members of the group can be given executive authority to carry out policies and enforce policy decisions. Despite the fact that many elites, constituents, and policymakers have distinct perceptions of threats to national security, policies result from the final judgment of the president supported by the NSC. It is through this group dynamic that presidential direction can be turned into national security judgments and actions. For this reason, the NSC would offer discernable evidence of goal-based decision-making, and in turn.

Since the question this project seeks to answer is how threats to national security are identified, it is necessary to identify the pool of cases that are considered among the wide range of international events. As mentioned earlier, this framework is targeting the events that fall within a grey area of the threat spectrum, where they would not be universally lead to the perception of a threat or benign. For this reason it is necessary to qualify which international events could constitute the pool of cases. It has been posited that there are specific types of events, which tend to disrupt peace and security. These events are: 1) interstate conflict; 2) intrastate conflict; 3) acquisition of a weapon system of military capability; 4) non-state actor violence; and 5) changes in political power that brings shifts in political affiliation. Each year there are events that fall within each category. In 1982 alone there were roughly 3 interstate conflicts; 26 intrastate conflicts; 8 acquisitions of a weapon system of military capability; 8 acts of non-state actor

violence; and 56 changes in political power that brings shifts in political affiliation. Grey area threats would be further reduced to events that did not entail a direct attack on the territory of the nation.

Despite this being a large pool of international events to choose from, case selection was further refined based on selecting similar types of events both within and across different administrations. The event types that were chosen were selected because they could be considered the most subjective threats. Intrastate conflict, non-state actor violence, and changes in political power that bring shifts in political affiliation are the types of international events that will be considered for this project. In an interstate conflict the issue is typically domestic. Therefore, it is not expected that the security of a third party actor will immediately be affected by the event, especially if they do not share a border or region. Based on geographical location, the US territory would not be directly affected by intrastate conflicts. Non-state actors are a difficult event to interpret based on the ambiguity and lack of attribution that comes with the events themselves. Lastly, political changes based on the switching of political affiliations, through force or collapse, could be understood by different decision-makers to have a positive or negative impact. There is room for interpretation on these events.

There are six events that have been selected across two Administrations. This will allow for both within case and across case comparison. The test will examine several events in two distinct administrations, which offers a comparison across leaders and NSCs who would have different foreign policy goals. As mentioned before the presidents come into office with a series of hierarchical goals. They may have some that overlap with previous administrations, but the context and the desires of the new president will produce different goals, mostly at the principle level and below. By comparing across administrations it will be possible to see if the Administrations driven by the type of event or the goals.

When selecting the events it was intentional to choose ones from different regions and with different alliance structures. Events that spanned across the level of intensity were also chosen. By selecting events that had high and low casualties, involved and excluded US citizens, and produced immediate versus long-term effects taking into consideration the magnitude of the event. Lastly, it was important to select events that were embedded within a series of events or crisis that have existed over

time. Below is a list of two cases, containing six events that could be examined to test the proposed theory and Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework.

Table 1. Selected Cases

Events	Type Event	Threat to US interests
1983 Guatemala – Montt coup	Intrastate conflict	No
1983 Grenada – Overthrow of Bishop	Intrastate conflict	Yes
1983 Lebanon – Embassy Bombing & Marine Barracks	Non-state Actor	No
1994 Rwanda – Coup & Massacre	Intrastate conflict	No
1996 Saudi Arabia – Khobar Bombing	Non-state Actor	No
1998 Kenya and Tanzania – Embassy Bombings	Non-state Actor	Yes

Foreign Policy Example – Carter Administration

Given the possibility that the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and the application of the theory appear complex, it is valuable to provide an example of how it can be tested via a condensed case study. The case presented here is President Carter and the NSC's perception of three different events: Iranian Revolution, Iranian Hostage Crisis, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although a condensed example cannot do justice to the dynamic events listed above, the intention is to demonstrate an application of testing the theory in an effort to clear up any theoretical confusion. Per the discussion above, the causal mechanisms being examined are the presence of goals the administration is committed to and a judgment on the source of the discrepancies. In this case the three events each resulted in a different perception. The Iranian Revolution produced a "benign" perception. The Iranian Hostage Crisis produced a "problem" perception. Finally, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a "threat" perception. The condensed case begins with step 1, identification, and description of the foreign policy goals that Carter and his NSC were committed to. Following that, step 2 is conducted by supplying a brief historical account of the conditions surrounding the event. Then step 3 is identifying the Carter Administration's threat perception of each event. Finally, by tracing the statements and dialogue of the NSC, step 4 can be accomplished, which is an examination of how the events were judged and whether

the Administration's foreign policy goals were used as a factor in judging the events. This leads to the ability to validate the theory that, if the Administration judged an event as obstructing a foreign policy goal it is expected that it would be deemed a threat.

Carter Administration's Goals

President Carter entered into office with the overarching vision of conducting foreign policy according to humane and moral concerns (Brzezinski, 1983, p49). Throughout the president's term, the ultimate prize of world peace and US security motivated the subsequent goals that President Carter and his NSC staff pursued. In light of these characteristics for state survival and the desire for morally guided policy, there were three endurance goals the administration pursued: 1) increase agency and influence with the ability to shape the international system; 2) gain a reputation of trust, morality, and justice; and 3) widen affiliation with other states, specifically focusing on association with democratic and human rights abiding nations.[135] During his inaugural address in 1977, President Carter believed, "…the trust our nation earns is essential to our strength…help shape a world that is truly humane…a lasting peace, based not on weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values." In order to achieve these endurance goals, the administration formed principle goals that served as guiding lights throughout the administration.[136]

Principle goals. Most people are familiar with Carter's aim to promote human rights. Alongside this aim was the determination to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons by restricting the level of global armaments. Another principle goal, aimed at shaping the international system and US reputation, was the desire to resolve the global energy crisis. One way to accomplish this was by changing the level of US dependence on oil imports. This was both a domestic and foreign policy goal, given that it was

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[135] Jimmy Carter, *Carter Inaugural Address* (New York, New York: Films Media Group, 1977), http://proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00002a&AN=gua4419243&site=eds-live.

[136] David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, "Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy.," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (January 2004): 113–143.

intended to urge other nations to consider revising their own energy policies. The administration was also set on limiting Soviet influence in various regions of the world, namely Africa and the Middle East. Based on the Figure 5 below, it is possible to see that there was a key series of principle goals intended to serve the endurance goals of the Administration. It seems there are some principle goals that can transcend administrations, while others remain unique to the Carter administration. Moving down in the hierarchy, variation begins to emerge when looking into the more concrete goals of the administration, the direction, and policy goals.

Direction goals. The Carter Administration was very concerned about the United State's relationship with various countries and believed that political and economic relations were key to reaching its higher-order goals. In order to secure a web of political and economic relations, deter Soviet influence, promote human rights, and fuel Middle East stability the administration identified specific countries and regions to focus on. A few specific areas of engagement included: People's Republic of China, Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and Indonesia. The normalization of relations between the US and China was seen as a central stabilizing element of the administration's foreign policy.[137] Along with that, Carter specifically sought to increase positive acts and avoid negative acts that would pose trouble for relations with Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, and a few Latin American countries. He wanted to increase consultation with, and thereby, open up dialogue with the aforementioned countries, as well as Western Europe, advanced democracies, and Japan.

Improving Soviet and US relations was included among the direction goals, in an effort to diminish the hostility between the two countries and ultimately work toward a mutual strategic weapons reduction.

[137] Zbigniew Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983); Cyrus R. Vance, *Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.* (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).



Figure 3. Carter Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure

The Carter administration was heavily committed to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) because it was believed to be a key feature in stabilizing relations with the Soviets and move from limitation to reduction.

More specifically administration's direction goals included increasing the number of treaties, increase specific integration efforts, and create avenues for international coordination. The direction goals were set to move the administration toward (approach) or away (avoid) from a particular outcome. Underlying these direction goals are the concrete policy goals that actually provide the means for the direction goals.

Policy goals. There were various policy goals that the Carter administration established and these goals served as key motivators from April 1977 though the end of the president's term.[138] The US interest in Iran was motivated by the view that a stable Iran would facilitate a stable Middle East, prevent Soviet incursion into the Middle East, offer an example of a nation pursuing human rights policies, and be an ally in the global energy crisis. Therefore, the administration sought to engage with Iran in such a manner as to maintain good relations.

This meant operating in such a way as that promotes cohesion and avoid actions that made it difficult to cooperate. This included supporting the Shah's liberalization policies and not pushing too hard for more rapid changes in human rights violations. Carter demonstrated his fondness for Iran in his remark that he "considered the Shah a strong ally" and "appreciated his ability to maintain good relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and his willingness to provide Israel with oil in spite of the Arab boycott."[139] There were also very specific policy goals regarding the administration's interaction with other entities such as NATO, Israel, and the Soviet Union. This is to be expected given the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1973. The interactions with Iran cannot be divorced from the other conditions

[138] Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*; Hamilton Jordan, *Crisis : The Last Year of the Carter Presidency.* (New York, New York: Putnam, 1982).
[139] Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville, Arkansas: University of Arkansas Press, 1982), 435.

occurring in the international community. For this reason, a committed to certain policy goals specific to one nation does not remove the affect pursuing them can have on other foreign policy goals.

From the beginning of the term, the Carter administration demonstrated a commitment to the goal of fostering US relations with Iran. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was sent to Tehran to speak with the Shah. This was the first time since the American Ambassador to Iran has left during Ford's administration. Carter honored Iran's previous arm sales, supplying 160 F-16s. He also demonstrated a strong commitment to the Shah by willingly battling Congress over the sale of 7 airborne warning aircraft (AWACs). A month after this sale, President Carter hosted the Shah in November 1977. According to Vance, the purpose of this meeting was to "convince the shah of the president's firm commitment to the U.S.-Iranian special relationship."[140] In December 1977, President Carter traveled to Iran to meet with the Shah. The handshake and toast during this visit exemplified the belief that progress was being made in reviving a relationship between the US and Iran. In conjunction with serving the goal of building relations with Iran, that relationship had enabled the Carter administration's higher-order goals of promoting human rights and controlling global armament sales. The Shah was still asking for weapon systems, but improved relations allowed for more direct channels of dialogue to open up so that requests could be managed more effectively.[141] There was also a continued commitment by the Shah to maintain his liberalizing policies, thereby promoting the democratic rights eagerly sought by the administration.

President Carter's State of the Union Speech in January 1978 reaffirmed the goals that were set upon entering office, demonstrating consistency with the Administration's goal structure. As evident by the previous section, the Carter Administration confirmed a commitment to the goals related to Iran. The assessment at the beginning of 1978 was that progress had been made and the discrepancy window for these goals was shrinking. This progress opened up the opportunity for the administration to focus their attention and prioritize other competing goals. The various foreign policy goals the Administration was

[140] Ibid., 321.
[141] Vance, *Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.*, 324.

pursuing included the signing the Panama Canal Treaty, SALT II, Camp David agreement, and the dialogue necessary to open the door to China.[142]

Historical Summary of Events

Below is a brief historical review for this condensed case of the events under examination: Iranian Revolution, Iranian Hostage Crisis, and Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution began in early 1978 with student protests and demonstrations occurred throughout the country. The grievances were primarily a due to a clash between portions of the population, who held strong religious views, with current political views. The opposition was upset over the liberalizing policies the Shah was instituting along with his growing relationship with and dependence on the US. Violence began escalating throughout the year reaching a tipping point in September 1978 when, following massive protests, the Shah declared martial law. Later that day after the morning declaration, a large march occurred in Jaleh Square. It became known as Black Friday or the Jaleh Massacre, when the Iranian army killed over 100 civilians.[143] Just prior to this incident, the US had supplied Iran with crowd-control equipment and tear gas.[144] On September 10, President Carter phoned the Shah and reaffirmed US support for him, which the Shah aired publically to his nation. Throughout the remainder of the year, the Shah's power weakened and he eventually he sought a new political configuration to appease the opposition. There were different views within the Carter administration as to which configuration would produce the most stability, but there was consensus that the military would play a key role. By mid-January 1979, it became evident that the only way to silence the masses was for the Shah to leave the country.

Two weeks after the Shah left Iran, on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the exiled religious leader, returned to claim leadership over the revolution. The Iranian military dissolved in relatively quick fashion when scores of soldiers transferred allegiance to Khomeini. This began to shake

[142] Vance, *Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.*
[143] Michael M. J. Fischer, *Iran : From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 199.
[144] Vance, *Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.*, 325.

the administration's belief in a stable transition. On top of this, Khomeini established a parallel governing body, naming Mehdi Bazargan as the Iranian Prime Minister despite the fact that Shapour Bakhtair held the position. With the military and political system in disarray, revolutionaries roamed the streets with weapons and strong anti-American sentiment. Then on February 11, 1979 clashes between the various military arms and increased disorder led to the resignation of Prime Minister Bakhtair. Shortly after, further animosity culminated when a Fedayeen band attacked the US Embassy on February 14, 1979, taking 102 Americans hostage. Unexpectedly, Khomeini worked with his established Iranian government and was able to secure release of the US personnel and restore order at the embassy. Shortly after the embassy attack, on February 26, 1979, 20 American Air Force personnel were held hostage at the Kabkan listening station. The individuals were held for three days before the Iranian government was able to negotiate for their release. Despite successful efforts in recovering US personnel, evidence was mounting that the Iranian government was falling apart leading to a possible humanitarian crisis and increased violence in the streets.

After the events of February 1979, there was actually little discussion within the NSC regarding Iran. When the Shah's health deteriorated, it catapulted Iran into the Administration's spotlight again, because it raised the issue of bringing him to the US. Reluctantly, President Carter approved for the Shah to come to the US for medical treatment in October 1979. During NSC meetings, it was clear the Administration anticipated that Iranians would have a negative reaction to this event. Therefore, the Administration began watching closely for a violent response. One specific concern was the safety and protection of the embassy. The acting Iranian government had promised to provide adequate security against any mass uprisings against US personnel.[145] The anticipated consequence of accepting the Shah into the US was manifested on November 4, 1979. Over 300 Iranian students attacked the US Embassy in Tehran and took roughly 90 people hostage, 66 of which were Americans. It is well known that 52 of the Americans were held for 444-days, there were 13 hostages that were released within a few weeks of the

[145] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary.* (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 364.

attack. Throughout this time period there were several attempts at negotiations, a failed rescue mission, and finally a third party mediator was introduced in an effort to resolve the incident.

Just over a month after the US Embassy was attacked and American diplomats were taken hostage, Soviet forces rolled across the border into Afghanistan under the pretext of upholding the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1978. The US had been monitoring an increase in Soviet involvement in Afghanistan throughout 1979. Signs of Soviet influence in Afghanistan were witnessed when combat troops had been dispatched to Bagram Air Base outside of Kabul in mid-1979. After the assignation of the Soviet friendly government leader, Taraki in October 1979, Soviet forces began to amass along the Afghan border. Islamic fighters increased their attacks and began to encroach on the government in Kabul. This chaos along with the belief that the current Afghan government was unstable, led to Soviet invasion on December 24, 1979. Following the invasion they executed Hafizullah Amin, the sitting head of state, and installed of Babrak Karmal.

Perceptions of Events

Iranian Revolution. Within a year, what initially started as small domestic skirmishes in Iran, turned into a full-blown revolution. Ultimately, the Shah who reigned for thirty-seven years was forced to leave the country. During the transition, hundreds of Iranian civilians were killed, American diplomatic and military installations were attacked and personnel were taken hostage, and existing Iranian military and political leaders were jailed and executed. Yet, throughout the revolution, the Carter administration did not formulate a perception that Iran or the revolution was a threat.

It was not as though the administration was ignorant of the events occurring in Iran. When news reports surfaced about the demonstrations and violent uprisings in Iran, Ambassador William Sullivan showed concern, but conveyed confidence that the Shah could weather the storm. The administration was pleased to know the Shah was not backing down on his liberalization policies, despite using oppressive measures to quiet the opposition. In his diary during the fall of 1978, Carter recorded that he was aware of the domestic problems in Iran, but believed that the Shah could control it. His primary concern rested on

whether the Shah would show "courage and forcefulness" in this trying time.[146] Just a few months earlier, in August of 1978, the CIA assessed that Iran "is not a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation."[147] As things began to look more precarious for the Shah in late December 1978, early January 1979, there was some worry about the stability of Iran. While still placing support in the Shah, Carter was also willing to shift US allegiance to the Shah's newly formed government. The Administration voiced this to the Shah communicating that the US would support the Shah "without reservation" and support any government he chose to establish.[148]

Given the Administration's commitment to building relations with the Shah, it is expected that his departure may strain US-Iranian relations. Despite the Shah's departure on January 16, 1979 a threat perception did not emerge in the Administration. The next day, President Carter expressed that even with the Shah's departure, "we would anticipate and would certainly hope that our good relationships with Iran will continue in the future."[149] In a news conference he reiterated support for Prime Minister Bahktair, and voiced that once the government was stable arms sales could continue. President Carter suggested the interruption in the oil supply was a good opportunity for the US to cut back on consumption until oil production came back up. There was no indication that the administration viewed the upheaval of 37-year sitting state leader as threatening.

If not the removal of the Shah, the events that took place in February 1979 provided ample justification for the Administration develop a threat perception based on the revolution. It was acknowledged by the Administration that the incoming authority, Khomeini, was a religious extremist that held anti-Western views and showed hostility toward the Shah.[150] In light of this, the Administration had thrown their support behind the existing Prime Minister Bakhtiar, but he resigned on February 11. With his resignation, Khomeini took advantage of the vacuum and promoted Bazargan as the new Prime

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[146] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 261.
[147] Ibid., 438.
[148] Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, 364–365.
[149] Carter, *White House Diary*.
[150] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 445.

Minister. Emboldened by the power of their new leader, Khomeini revolutionaries attacked the US Embassy and several intelligence stations across the country. Still, the administration claimed, "there were some favorable signals."[151] Surprisingly, the detainment of 20 Air Force personnel was not even mentioned in Carter's diary. During this time, Khomeini had pledged increasing friendship and cooperation with the US.[152] Carter stated, "Despite the turmoil within Iran, I was reasonably pleased with the attitude of the Iranian government under Bazargan."[153] The consensus was that despite some strain in the relationship, the future looked promising for a stable and cooperative union.[154] Discussions regarding Iran in the months to come were few and far between. Based on the evidence, the Carter Administration held a "benign" perception of Iran following the Iranian Revolution.

Iranian Hostage Crisis. Amazingly, the hostage crisis on November 4, 1979 was also not perceived as a threat. Rather the initial occurrence of the Iranian Hostage Crisis was judged as a "problem" leading to a "problem" perception. This is first seen when Hamilton Jordan predicted that the hostages would be released that same night. Brzezinski exclaimed that it was not until a few days later that the NSC realized the hostage issue might not be transient.[155] Carter himself believed that it was "inconceivable that militants would hold our embassy personnel for any length of time."[156] Rather than the actual event itself disturbing him, he was more concerned that Khomeini had offered support toward the act. In various settings, the Administration labeled the hostage event as: "predicament", "this thing", "volatile situation", "incident", "crisis", "abhorrent act", "international terrorism", "inhumane act", and "issue".

Despite the hostage crisis holding a place in the American mind and history, at that time the Administration did not assume a "threat" perception of the event until April 1980. Even then, it was almost a reluctant acceptance. Carter expressed this when he said, ""The Iranian hostage issue was to

[151] Ibid., 452.
[152] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 296.
[153] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 452.
[154] Vance, *Hard Choices : Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.*, 343.
[155] Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, 479.
[156] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 367.

cause me more personal anguish and concern, but the Soviet's occupation of Afghanistan was a threat to the security of the United States."[157] Prior to April, the 1980 State of the Union speech was the closest that Carter came to expressing that the hostage situation as a threat. Yet, the comment "threats to peace" was directed at the acts of international terrorism and military aggression more broadly. The only other potential evidence that suggests the Administration considered the hostage crisis a threat to security earlier, would be the language offered in the standard pronouncement of presidential action to block Iranian property. Since the verbiage is set based on a template, and not separately prepared by the Administration, it should not considered a valid reflection of the Administration's threat perception.[158] A skeptic may claim that the use of the template is an agreement with the verbiage. In order to account for this critique it is important to observe a pattern of perceptions and also identify what may trigger the Administration's perception of a threat. Carter made it clear early in his term that instituting an embargo would be an indication that he felt the nation's security was at risk.[159] During the crisis he expressed that physical harm to the hostages would provoke an escalation of the Administration's perception. From the initiation of the event through the spring of 1980, the Administration perceived the event to be a political problem. This is reflected in the terms of negotiation with Iran. As late as March 25, 1980 one of the

[157] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 388.
[158] Mark Schafer, "Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance: An Introduction to the Symposium," *Political Psychology* 21, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 511–527. The key here is that presidential action templates are standard for all administrations across time. An example of the text is: The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." The use of power is classified by assuming the administration perceived the event as threatening, but not that they actually did. This is not to say that all prepared documents are devoid of administrative perception. On the other hand statements or speeches prepared by the NSC and staff represent the cognition of the organization as derived from the current context. It doesn't have to reflect each individual's personal perception, but when presented it becomes the perception of the group and will be perpetrated and adopted to prevent cognitive dissonance.
[159] "854 Presidential Campaign Debate of October 6, 1976," October 6, 1976, Gerald R. Ford, 1976-1977, Federal Register Division. National Archives and Records Service, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States.

stipulations placed the negotiations with Iran entailed the US continuing normal relations with Iran and recognizing the results of the Revolution.[160]

The shift in perception came when the hostage negotiations fell apart in April 1980. Jordan had been coordinating with two intermediaries that were working with members of the Iranian government. Khomeini initially agreed on the terms and then last minute failed to support the transfer. It was at this point that Carter expressed, "we had now lost our last chance to set the Americans free."[161] The Administration developed a "threat" perception when it finally concluded "there is no government in Iran other than the fanatics."[162] In a message to Congress, President Carter for the first time exclaimed, "The United States has used every diplomatic and legal means available to it to end this extraordinary threat, but without avail."[163] It was at this point that Administration viewed the hostage crisis as a threat. This is validated by the Administration's decision to execute an embargo, which again a order issued by President Carter in reaction to events viewed as threats to the security of the nation.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the Administration made a rapid judgment that the event produced a "threat" to the US. Carter stated bluntly in his diary, "This is the most serious international development that's occurred since I've been president."[164] In notes he made looking back on the incident, he stated, "The Iranian hostage issue was to cause me more personal anguish and concern, but the Soviet's occupation of Afghanistan was a threat to the security of

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[160] Jordan, *Crisis : The Last Year of the Carter Presidency.*, 234.
[161] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 499.
[162] Ibid., 409.
[163] Jimmy Carter, *Economic Sanctions Against Iran Message to the Congress Reporting on the U.S. Actions.*, Section 204(b), International Emergency **Economic** Powers Act 50 *U.S.C. 1703*, April 7, 1980. Within the document Carter reaches back and pulls the template language forward when he states, "The extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the **United States**, which I determined existed on November 14, continues today." This may give reason to believe there was a perception of threat that began on November 14, 1979. Yet, this is the first time in any dialogue that Iran or the event was referred to as an "extraordinary threat" or even described as a threat to national security, foreign policy, or the economy. It is the combination of this statement being referenced and the acts that coincide with previous triggers for threat perceptions that occurred in April 1980 that demonstrate a shift in threat perception.
[164] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 387.

the United States.[165] The "threat" perception is also evident because the Administration's beliefs led to serious actions; it immediately resulted in President Carter issuing an embargo. Carter exclaimed, "I promised I would never embargo grains except in the case of national emergency. But this is an emergency and I am going to have to impose the embargo..."[166] There is little doubt the Soviet invasion was perceived as a "threat".

Judgment of Events.

Iranian Revolution. It may be difficult to understand the Administration having a lack of threat perception today, especially when the ramifications of the Iranian Revolution are in full view. The Administration did not judge the Iranian Revolution as a threat, but instead retained a "benign" perception. The reason is the Carter Administration was able to maintain cooperation with the governing officials in Iran, which aligned with its foreign policy goals. Even incidents emerging from the Revolution, such as the attack on the American Embassy and intelligence listening posts, were overlooked because the Administration believed the Iranian government proved capable of securing the safety of the Americans. In a news brief, Carter attributed the source of the revolution to the "product of Iranian social, political, economic, religious factors, all intertwined."[167] These factors created turmoil, but as long as there was a capable government, the belief was the US could continue to pursue its goals of fostering and maintaining relations with Iran.

According to the theory, when events are judged obstruct foreign policy goals the administration has committed to, the Administration will develop a "threat" perception. More specifically, when the events create conditions that inhibit goal pursuit a "threat" perception emerges. The Administration recognized the destabilizing effects of the revolution, but when new leadership emerged at various times, it was assumed that relations would be possible. In a press conference given the day after the Embassy

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[165] Ibid., 388.
[166] Jordan, *Crisis : The Last Year of the Carter Presidency.*, 100.
[167] Jimmy Carter, "Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session" (Loy Henderson Conference Room at the Department of State., February 22, 1979), Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31941.

was attacked in February 1979, Carter was asked about the US and its relationship to Iran. He responded saying,

> "Yes, I see continued hope for very productive and peaceful cooperation with the Government of Iran. This has been our posture in the past, and it will continue to be our posture in the future. In the last few hours, our Embassy has reported that the followers of designated Prime Minister Bazargan have been very helpful in ensuring the safety of Americans, and we have been consulting with them very closely. So, I believe that the people of Iran and their government will continue to be our friends and that the relationship will be helpful to us."[168]

Confirmation from the Iranian leadership reinforced the "benign" perception, delivering an opportune socio-political environment and continued goal progress.

Prior to the hostages being taken in November 1979, the administration was committed to fostering positive relations with Iran and recognizing the newly formed civilian government. This goal was a means to higher-order principles goals of building a web of political and economic relations, securing a comprehensive Middle East settlement, and preventing Soviet influence in the Middle East. As events unfolded over the course of the year leading to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the last comparison of goal progress regarding US-Iran relations came from the information the administration assessed in February 1979. For all intents and purposes, it appeared progress had been made, although a discrepancy still existed.

Another higher-order foreign policy goal was to promote human rights within various countries and operate internationally according to American values. When the Shah was in power, the Carter administration had gained influence in promoting human rights policies by means of fostering the relationship with Iran. Progress was slow, but the promises by the Shah and the liberalization policies gave the administration confidence things would get better. Underpinning the human rights principle

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[168] Jimmy Carter, "Remarks at a Special Convocation of the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia" (Alexander Memorial Coliseum, February 12, 1979), Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31937.

goals was the sub-goal of honoring the citizen's choice in governance without international influence. When the transition occurred in Iran, despite the revolutionary violence, the initiation of elections and pursuit of civilian government provided evidence to the Carter Administration of the nation's willingness to honor human rights. Once again, a comparison of the goal status and current context supplied positive changes in the discrepancy. The revolution did not register as a threat, and it did not even persist as a problem due to the assessment that the goals were not actually being impeded.

Iranian Hostage Crisis. Surprisingly, when the hostages were taken on November 4, 1979, the administration did not initially adopt a threat perception. Instead the disturbance created a "problem" perception. The decision to admit the Shah into the US on October 23, 1979 led to an anticipation of hostilities toward Americans in Iran.[169] There were reports of students demonstrating outside the Embassy for days leading up to the event, but no hostility was noted.[170] Three days before the attack, Brzezinski had a meeting with Prime Minister Bazargan and his Foreign and Defense Ministers on and walked away from the meeting with the impression that US and Iranian relations were good.[171] When the demonstrations turned violent on November 4, 1979 resulting in the hostage incident, the event was initially interpreted in light of the Embassy attack in February, where the Iranian government stepped in to secure release. Since the perpetrators were a mob of students, the Iranian government was not implicated at this time. Given the status of US-Iranian relations, the expectation was the Iranian government would once again secure the Americans release.

The first indication that this event presented the Administration with a problem was three days after the attack. An attitude within the Administration began to rise that maybe this event would persist longer than anticipated.[172] Subsequently, the failure of the Iranian government to move quickly to secure the release of the Embassy personnel led to the event being labeled as a violation of international law. It was further communicated that a criminal act was conducted by a mob of fanatics or terrorists, which

[169] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 364.
[170] Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, 457.
[171] Ibid., 476.
[172] Jordan, *Crisis : The Last Year of the Carter Presidency.*, 44.

necessitated the role of the Iranian government. Throughout the much of the hostage crisis, the judgment persisted that the incident was a criminal act. In a message sent to Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr the Administration reiterated its aim to build relations with Iran. [173] Within the same letter the Administration made the claim that the hostages were being held in violation of international law, which supplies an indication of how the event was being judged, in respect of the Administration's goal to uphold international law and human rights.

The individuals that were keeping the hostages were making political demands to send the Shah back to the US. In a statement made on November 13, 1979, Carter expressed that it was a "grave situation" and "we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and seizure and the holding of hostages to impose political demands."[174] This was further reiterated in a speech made two days later along with the suggestion that the administration was willing to "ride the crisis out calmly".[175] Based on the individuals who carried out the attack and the demands that were being made, the incident was initially judged through the lens of the Administration's policy and direction goals. The goal hierarchy shows that some of the operative goals for the Administration began with balancing the policy goals of avoiding negative acts with Iran and promoting positive acts with Iran. Achieving these would supply means for the direction goals of reducing international influence during its transition, avoiding a further radicalization in the Arab world, and establishing a more affirmative stand on global human rights. Through these goals, the principles goals of widening the web of US political and economic relations, ensuring Middle East stability, and deterring Soviet influence was possible. Some of the goals the Administration set out to achieve competed and/or conflicted with one another. Given this dynamic as well as the reality of a transitioning government, the Administration anticipated a delay the in securing some of the foreign policy goals.

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[173] Hamilton Jordan, "Message to Bani-Sadr," November 1979, Container 34b, Carter Presidential Library, Office of the Chief of Staff Files Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files Folder: Iran.
[174] "Transcript of Carter's Statement," *New York Times* (New York, New York, November 13, 1979).
[175] Terence Smith, "Carter, Denouncing Terror, Warns Iran on Hostage's Safety," *New York Times (1923-Current File)* (New York, New York, November 16, 1979).

The administration was motivated to maintain friendly relations with Iran. Specific policy goals contained within performing positive acts and avoiding negative acts with Iran included: publically recognize the newly formed government, maintain lines of communication, and avoid negative acts that would affect the relationship. Based on a commitment by the Administration to promote human rights by demonstrating America's values, President Carter authorized the Shah to enter the US. In doing so, it was apparent that this was in conflict with the sub-goal of avoiding negative acts with Iran. Yet, the Administration gained confidence in the decision after communicating its intentions to the Iranian government and asking for support to protect the American citizens in country. The hostage event was initially judged as a response to the Administration's actions. When observing the discrepancy between desired nature of US-Iranian relations and actual nature US-Iran relations, it was judged by the Administration that this event primarily delayed goal attainment, but did not obstruct it. This is even more apparent by the fact that the Administration directed its efforts on political negotiations and identified the mob of students as the culprits. There was no indication by the Administration that the goal of fostering US-Iranian relations was obstructed. Therefore, a perception of "threat" to national security did not develop.

Although US-Iranian relations were not inhibited, the relations were strained due to the hostage crisis. For this reason, the US took actions to pressure the Iranian government to take a more active role in releasing the hostages. In response to various actions by Iranian officials, the administration deported illegal Iranian students, blocked official Iranian assets, and executed economic sanctions. These decisions were labeled as "exercises of diplomacy", not necessarily a response to a "threat" perception. Approximately, three weeks after the Embassy attack, the Administration gave an indication of what might elevate the judgment to a "threat" perception.[176] Khomeini authorized the release of 13 hostages on November 17, 1979. Initially, this appeared to bring relief to Carter and his Administration. Yet, the next day Khomeini issued a statement claiming that the remaining hostages would be tried as spies with a

[176] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 463; Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, 485.

potential outcome being execution. The Iranian government's failure to ensure the physical safety of the hostages was established as a potential obstacle to the goals the Administration was committed to. This became a signal by which the Administration was guided by to elevate the severity of the situation. An act of harm against the hostages would be used to decide whether it was viable to pursue diplomatic relations with Iran, whether there was hope for Iran's adherence to human rights, and whether the US could resolve the conflict without violence. Any indication of physical harm to the hostages would lead to the event being judged as an obstruction to the Administrations goal.

The hostage situation reinforced and highlighted the Administration's goal of promoting human rights globally. Yet, this goal was not necessarily obstructed as a result of taking of the hostages. The holding the Americans hostage delayed and interrupted human rights goal attainment, but did not prevent it. There was a constant call by the Administration for the Iranian officials to adhere to international law, and fair treatment of American diplomats. By doing so the Administration was indicating a belief that this was possible. The Administration built the principle goal of human rights on the sub-goals of increasing the US observance of human rights and increasing American influence over domestic decisions of foreign governments regarding human rights. Therefore, the hostage crisis was as much an issue of humane treatment of American personnel; as well as an opportunity for the US to influence the newly appointed Iranian leadership to observe international law and human rights. Maintaining positive relations with Iran, especially during a government's turnover, was a necessary step in ensuring a foothold to influence long-term human rights practices. The administration's human rights goal was not founded on the goal to punish all countries found in violation of human rights. This would have gone against the human rights sub-goal of resolving conflict with non-violent means. Therefore, the goal to preserve relations and foster diplomacy between the two countries governed much of the administration's perception and thinking during the hostage crisis as long as the lives of the hostages were protected. If that condition was not met, it would indicate that the previously mentioned goals could not be achieved.

As quickly as they emerged, the threats from Khomeini to try the hostages died down, leading to a period of negotiation between the Carter Administration and Iranian officials. The Administration

continued its course of goal pursuit. At the conclusion of November it was even observed that the Administration fell into a routine of normal politics.[177] Although, Carter found it very difficult to find anyone in the Iranian government who would communicate directly with the Administration, they were making progress with using emissaries. The discrepancies that existed relative to the US and Iran's relationship, has increased, but it was believed that amicable relations were still possible.

The aim following the hostage release was to "preserve the possibility of restoring working relations with Iran as soon as possible".[178] This included US efforts to "lift the freeze of Iranian assets and to facilitate normal commercial relations between the two countries".[179] Restraint and the selection of diplomatic alternatives by the administration were assessed relative to the long-term goal of pursuing mutual relations. At the beginning of the New Year, President Carter assigned Hamilton Jordan the task of coordinating clandestinely with the Iranian government. He was able to secure contacts and it appeared that it offered the most promising solution to influencing the Iranian government to take ownership of the hostages. After months of coordination, in March 1980, Jordan and his two contacts were able to secure a commitment that the hostages would be transferred to the Iranian government. The Carter Administration was becoming more confident, and in turn Carter made a public announcement of the transfer on April 1, 1980.[180]

Despite the many assurances that this plan would succeed, the deal fell through. This event resulted in a serious blow to the Carter Administration. At this point, President Carter and the Administration lost complete faith in the Iranian Revolutionary Council, Iranian government officials,

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[177] Bernard Gwertzman, "No Action Imminent, U.S. Military Says," *New York Times (1923-Current File)* (New York, New York, November 25, 1979); Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*.

[178] Hamilton Jordan, "Memorandum from Hamilton Jordan to President Carter," January 22, 1980, Container 34b, Carter Presidential Library, Office of the Chief of Staff Files Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files Folder: Iran, 1/80.

[179] The White House, "Telegram to Swiss Ambassador Lang," February 1980, Container 34b, Carter Presidential Library, Office of the Chief of Staff Files Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files Folder: Iran, 2/80.

[180] Jimmy Carter, "Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO Remarks at the National Conference" (International Ballroom, Washington Hilton Hotel, April 1, 1980), Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33210.

and Khomeini. President Carter exclaimed, "We could not longer negotiate with the Iranian leaders" and "We could no longer afford to depend on diplomacy."[181] The US-Iranian relations were completely hindered. On top of this, just a few days later, April 10, 1980, the captors released a statement "making all kinds of crazy threats to kill the American hostages if they are invaded by Iraq - whom they identify as an American puppet government."[182] A judgment of the goal status showed that Administration's efforts of pursuing positive relations with Iran and influence over proper adherence to human rights for the hostages were now obstructed. At this point the "problem" perception transitioned to a "threat" perception.

Observation of a change in perception in the administration was captured in the speech given on April 7, 1980:

> "The events of the last few days have revealed ***a new and significant dimension*** in this matter. This lays bare the full responsibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council for the continued illegal and outrageous holding of the innocent hostages. The Iranian Government ***can no longer*** escape full responsibility by hiding behind the militants at the Embassy. The steps I have ordered today are those that are ***necessary now***."[183]

The flat rejection by the Iranian government to bear responsibility for the hostages was an event that was judged to obstruct further relations. The elevated threats by the captors compounded the Iranian leader's rejection and helped reinforce a "threat" perception, by adding obstruction to a second goal: preserving humanitarian treatment of the captives. The various operative goals were linked in the minds of the Administration based on the goal hierarchy. Key policy goals of the Administration were to protect the lives of the hostages and secure their release, which was linked to decisions of the captors and how they treated them. When the hostages were released and how the captors treated the hostages while in their care was linked to how the Iranian government admonished poor treatment, sought the humanitarian rights of the hostages, and followed international law in gaining authority over the captives. Whether the

[181] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 415; Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 506.
[182] Carter, *White House Diary.*, 416.
[183] Carter, *Economic Sanctions Against Iran Message to the Congress Reporting on the U.S. Actions.*, vol. U.S.C. 1703, p. .

Iranian government pursued these actions was linked to the relationship between Iranian leadership and the US Administration. Therefore, the combination of the principle goals, direction goals, and policy goals being thwarted, the Carter Administration judged the ensuring events as an obstruction to goals it was committed to and a "threat" perception emerged. This change in perception was further reflected in the call for breaking diplomatic relations and instituting an embargo, which was only to be used when there was a threat to national security.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian hostage crisis did not initially garner a threat perception from the Carter Administration. The Soviet invasion on the other hand sparked an immediate "threat" perception. In one fell swoop, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan obstructed numerous foreign policy goals the Carter Administration was committed to. This is observed in Carter's speech on January 4, 1980:

> "This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world. This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people."[184]

The Administration immediately used explicit verbiage to express its perception calling it a threat to peace.[185]

According to the timeline the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred prior to the shift in "threat" perception of the hostage crisis. The difference in sentiment can be observed in this comment from President Carter to Jordan, "This [Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan] is more serious, Hamilton. Capturing those Americans was an inhumane act committed by a bunch of radicals and condoned by a

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[184] Jimmy Carter, "Address to the Nation on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan" (Oval Office, January 4, 1980), Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33233.
[185] Brzesinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, 460; Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*.

crazy old man. It raises grave questions about Soviet intentions and destroys and chance of getting the SALT Treaty through the Senate."[186] Various foreign policy sub-goals the Carter Administration had committed to fed the principle goals of both deterring Soviet aggression and fostering Soviet relations. This event not only affected the direction and policy sub-goals, but also directly obstructed the principle goals. President Carter stated, "This will inevitably jeopardize the course of the United States-Soviet relations throughout the world."[187] A validation of this perception is seen in the immediate call for a grain embargo on the Soviet Union. An immediate recognition of goal obstruction and an attribution that the event prevented goal pursuit led to a rapid judgment that the event posed a threat to US national security.

Summary of Carter Administration Case

The case presented here was intended to offer an example for how the theory could be tested using case study analysis through process tracing. The theory suggests that threat perceptions emerge when the foreign policy goals that decision-makers are committed to are obstructed. This example illustrated that the Carter Administration exhibited three different perceptions following three events in this example, the Iranian Revolution did not alter the benign perception the Carter Administration previously held. There was no indication the Carter Administration could not continue to pursue its goals. Although there was the potential for an increase in the discrepancy window, the Carter Administration did not exhibit the belief that the goal attainment hindered throughout the Revolution. The Iranian hostage situation presented the Carter Administration with an event, looking back, appears to be an objective threat to the US. Interestingly, the Cater Administration anticipated a negative reaction to decision to let the Shah into the US, and was not surprised by the initial attack on the US Embassy. Although concern grew within the first few weeks, there was still confidence that the administration's goals could be pursued. During this time, the event was perceived as a "problem". It was not until further events transpired, giving the administration more discrepancy information to evaluate, that it was judged that there were impediments to goal attainment. From this, the Carter Administration developed a "threat" perception. In contrast to the

[186] Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, 99.
[187] Ibid., 417.

Iranian Hostage situation, the Soviet invasion provided a very blunt example of a "threat" perception. The invasion was immediately recognized as an obstruction to the Carter Administration's foreign policy goals, generating a concrete "threat" perception.

Summary of Theory & Framework Chapter

The proposed framework has been designed to uncover causal mechanisms for how elite decision-makers identify threats to their national security. The theory suggests that when the goals that the decision-makers are committed to are obstructed a threat perception will emerge. The framework that is proposed is based on principles of goal-based decision-making that seeks to show how perception and subsequent behavior is a result of individual and group goals. It is a comprehensive framework, but the empirical strategy aims to focus on the presence of goals and the judgment phase of the framework in order to test threat perceptions. The remaining chapters will explore the cases and events presented above. The case studies will begin with identifying the committed goals of the administration prior to the events. Then a brief description will be given of the event itself. After the event description is how the leaders perceived the event, whether it was a threat or not. Finally the event will be analyzed to see if the goals affected how the decision-makers made the judgment.

CHAPTER 3:

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The purpose of the case studies presented here is to investigate the causal mechanisms of the theory. The theory states that threat perceptions emerge when events in the international system are judged to obstruct the foreign policy goals the administration has committed to achieve. There are two causal mechanisms taken from the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework that drive the theory. The first is goals. Each administration is guided by the foreign goals they set and commit to attain. The second is the judgment of the event. The President and his NSC staff judges the goal discrepancies and makes an attribution of the disturbances/events that occur by continually comparing the committed goals to the current situation.

The events that tested for the Reagan Administration begin with the Guatemalan Coup in March 1983. Following this event, the American Embassy bombing in Lebanon in April 1983 and the Marine Barracks bombing in October 1983 are evaluated. Then there is an investigation of the Grenada Invasion in October 1983. The analysis begins by identifying the administration's goals. Each event series occurs in a subsequent chapter, following the steps laid out in the previous chapter, beginning with a brief description of the historical data leading up to that event, placing it in its historical context. Following the section on the history, the first causal mechanism will be explored, the operative goals the administration was committed to prior to the event. After the goals are identified, the next section will provide an observation of the decision maker's perception of the event. This is the dependent factor in this study. It is here that it is determined whether the perception of the event is classified as a benign, problem, or threat. Once the perception is determined, the chapter proceeds with an investigation of whether the second causal mechanism is present that is, if the decision makers judged the event as an obstruction to their committed goals.

Reagan Administration Goals

This section is a discussion of the goal structure developed by President Reagan and his foreign policy team. Figure 6 provides and illustration of the Reagan Administration's goal structure. The goals the Reagan Administration pursued were heavily influenced by the context of the Cold War. Although this study does not intend to analyze the origin of the goals, it is beneficial to understand that the political context shapes an individual's understanding of their world. When the Reagan Administration entered office, the United States had been battling the Soviet Union for just over 35 years. For the majority of this time, the United States was believed to hold the upper hand militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Approaching 1980, this no longer appeared to be the case. This view was exemplified in Reagan's acceptance speech on July 1, 1980, when he said, "Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a weakened defense and an energy policy based on sharing scarcity."[188] President Reagan crafted many of the endurance and principle goals he used throughout his presidency during his initial run for the Republican ticket in 1976. After losing in that race, he continued to evaluate the political environment and in the years leading up to his run for the presidency in 1980, he refined the concrete direction and policy goals needed to fill out his administration's goal structure.

The endurance, principle, and direction, goals are established early in the Administration's time in office and do not change over the course of his presidency, even amid several adjustments to his NSC staff. If it does appear that goals are changing it is more a function of the context, where different goals are being prioritized. As events unfold over the course of the Administration's time in office there are policy goals that emerge to the forefront and then retreat to the backdrop. It is this apparent ebb and flow driven by a particular event or region that may cause people to assume goals are solely context-driven.

[188] Stephen F. Knott and Jeffrey L. Chidester, *Presidential Profiles: The Reagan Years* (New York, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2005), 335.



Figure 4. Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure.

Yet, what becomes evident is that the Reagan Administration's goal structure remained consistent. At the lowest level, there are minor variations in the policy goals. These sub-goals are applied to the situation the Administration anticipates and when observing the motivation behind the policy goals it demonstrates a commitment to and persistence in achieving the higher-order goals.

Endurance Goals

When starting to examine the Reagan Administration's goal hierarchy it is important to note that the principle goals were firmly associated with the overarching endurance goals: agency, esteem, and affiliation. As mentioned, entering into 1980, many people, including President Reagan believed that the US had squandered its prestige and reputation both domestically and internationally. President Reagan believed there was power in a reputation. In 1975 he stated, "Power is not only sufficient military strength but a sound economy, a reliable energy supply, and credibility – the belief by any potential enemy that you will not choose to surrender as the way to maintain peace."[189] He understood that credibility or esteem helped to secure the needs of the state. He also plainly understood that diminished US agency or influence in the international system created a vacuum that the Soviet Union was more than willing to fill. He felt that a lack of US influence opened opportunities for Soviet exploits into areas that closed in on US territory and vital resources, presenting a real threat to the physical and economic security of the US.[190]

Maintaining a strong relationship with allies and friendly countries was believed to be key to securing US interests. This affiliation that the US had with these countries was being threatened by the Soviets and their proxy states in nearly every region of the world. The Soviets and Cubans had massively expanded their influence through arms sales, revolutionaries, and force.[191] In the 1981 Inauguration speech it is possible to observe these higher-order goals in President Reagan's words, "And as we renew

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[189] Ronald Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Graebner Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York, New York: Free Press, 2001).
[190] Ibid., 471–479.
[191] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)" (National Security Council, May 20, 1982), Box 8, Folder Lebanon (4 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.

ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world (agency). We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom (esteem). To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment (affiliation)."[192] President Reagan sought to restore the agency, esteem, and affiliation necessary to ward off hostile actors and acquire peace and security for the US."

Principle Goals

The Reagan Administration's principle goals were designed to cultivate agency, esteem, and affiliation. The principle goals consist of goals that when achieved would produce desired behaviors or character traits that supplied the means for the endurance goals. There were ten principle goals during the Reagan administration, many of which revolved around the Cold War relationship. President Reagan believed very strongly that the communist system was the root of the wrong in the world. He claimed that peace and cooperation would only be possible, "if the Soviet Union abandons its political system and joins the community of free states."[193] In May 1975, Reagan stated, "Communism is neither an economic or political system – it is a form of insanity – a temporary aberration…"[194] Since the logic of Communism led to an aggressive expansion of the Soviet Union and its client states, deplorable economic conditions, and human suffering, one of the Administration's principle goals was to hasten the end of Communism.

In conjunction with breaking down Communism and its ideology, there were particular behaviors and characteristics of the Soviet system that were targeted by the Administration. Communism was predicated on a flawed economic theory and the Reagan Administration felt that a principle goal would be to demonstrate this weakness.[195] It was also apparent in the recent years that the Soviets and its client states were able to take advantage of poor, destabilized countries. President Reagan points out that,

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[192] Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address of President Reagan, January 20, 1981.," *U.S. News & World Report* 90 (February 2, 1981): 70–72.
[193] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 24–25.
[194] Ibid., 23.
[195] Ibid., 471–479.

"Communism is good at guaranteeing life-time jobs to dictators, but it is terrible for economic development."[196] These countries would become hotspots for violence, subversion, and terrorism. Therefore, it was vital for the Administration to roll back Soviet and its client states' expansionism into various regions around the world.

The expansive presence of the Soviets and their client states was a grave concern for the Administration because of the increasing opportunity for conflict between the East and the West. When the President Reagan entered into office, the threat of a nuclear attack was still present and it was evident that a strategic nuclear deterrent was necessary. Yet, he also appeared to be equally concerned about a prolonged, global conventional war sparked by the Soviets or one of its clients. For this reason, the principle goal to deter a Soviet attack encompassed the present reality that it may be a nuclear or conventional attack and it may begin in any region of the world. The principle goal of deterring Soviet aggression and attack supplied the means necessary to increase US esteem, agency, and affiliation by protecting the

Similar to President Reagan's belief in the detriment of adopting a Marxist-Leninist ideology, he also saw increased violence as a result of the emergence of radical Islamic ideology coming out of Iran. Recent events in Iran were seen as forming the next agent of violence and conflict in the world.[197] For this reason another principle goal was to halt the spread of radical Islam. Depending on where these two radical ideologies infiltrated and were adopted, it was possible for violence to spring up and depending on fragile or contentious relationships between neighboring countries, proxy wars could ensue.

The remaining principle goals developed by President Reagan were designed to provide a counterweight to the previous ones. It was not enough to just halt the spread and influence of violent and detrimental ideologies and their effects in the world, President Reagan was determined to replace it or push it out with Western ideology and a democratic system. In light of this one of the principle goals was

[196] Ibid.
[197] Ronald Reagan, "Televised Address, October 19.1980," October 19, 1980, CFOA 615, Folder Promises Report (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Michael Baroody: Files.

to substantiate the superiority of a democratic, free-market system. President Reagan explicitly states, "We must take the lead in point out to 3rd world nations the superiority of our system."[198] This effort had to be combined with the principle goal of winning back the trust of allied nations while demonstrating a character of reliability to friendly nations.[199] Based on the belief that "U.S. foreign policy was fraught with ambiguity, uncertainty, and inconsistencies", President Reagan and his Administration sought to establish consistent leadership that other nations could rely on, which would prevent them from tilting toward Soviet or its client states for support.[200]

The agency, esteem, and affiliation the Reagan Administration sought to increase was also dependent on successfully turning the US economy around and pulling the nation out of the recession. Therefore, a vital principle goal was to rebuild the U.S. economy. In a letter from former President Nixon to Reagan after the election, he advised that the new Administration focus primarily on the domestic economy in the first year. He specifically stated, "Consequently I would suggest that for at least six months you not travel abroad and that you focus the attention of your appointees, the Congress and the people on your battle against inflation…U.S. foreign policy during the first six months could be carried out by experienced people in the State and Defense who reflect your views."[201] President Reagan did just this, and he was routinely criticized for not having a firm foreign policy strategy, especially during his first year. All ten of the principle goals are present from the start of the administration through the end of its 8 years, it is possible to see how certain principle goals were prioritized among themselves. It is also possible to see the horizontal linkage between the various principle goals, where a strong US economy influences the Administrations' ability to demonstrate the superiority of the Western free-market system. In turn this can help provide contrast to the failing Communist economic system and help to counter Communist ideology that was spreading through the third world.

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[198] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 471–479.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[201] Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 56.

The principle goals are aimed at producing behaviors or characteristics of the US or other states. The outcomes of these goals are believed to be the means necessary to gain agency or influence, esteem, and affiliation or alliances throughout the international system. It is possible for different administrations to have the same principle goals given that they are broad by nature. Yet, it is important to point out that the Reagan Administration was one of the first US Administrations set to bring Communism to an end, rather than coexist with it.[202] It is also unique to the Reagan Administration to identify their economy as a weak point in their system that must be exploited. In a meeting with the NSC, "Henry "Harry" Rowen said to place as much stress on the Soviet economy as possible. He predicted that within 10 years the burden of defense spending would outstrip the Soviet's ability to continue producing and to compete with the West."[203] These two principle goals were exclusive to this administration and led to the formulation of a series of sub-goals that distinguished the Administration from the previous ones. Figure 6 shows a snapshot of the Reagan Administration's goal structure. It is evident that these principle goals are broad and require more concrete goals to facilitate their achievement. Below the principle goals are the direction goals.

One of the ways the administration believed it could regain its reputation of reliability with the allies (principle goal) was through the direction goal of avoiding the similar series of clashes that the prior administration made when the US shifted its allegiances and/or reneged on some of its commitments. These incidents include the situation with Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the prior administration's plan of withdrawing troops from South Korea, a back and forth with Germany on nuclear weapons, and actions taken at the United Nations regarding Israel.[204] Along side this direction goal, there was a concerted effort to improve relations with several allied nations. Specifically the Reagan

[202] Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, *Special Trust* (New York, New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), 220.
[203] Ibid., 216.
[204] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 471–479.

Administration was committed to rebuilding relations with Taiwan, Japan, Canada, and Mexico.[205] President Reagan also directed his administration to foster friendships with states in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. The litmus test for whether a state should be considered for friendship with the US was primarily if it was opposed to communism, irrespective of regime type.[206]

President Reagan saw a power that comes in fostering relationships and personal correspondence with heads of state and other elites. Strong relationships were central to reaching nearly every principle goal that was set. Broadly speaking one direction goal was to establish personal connections with key members of the governments that the administration was courting. There were a few crucial relationships. It was key to have a strong and unified NATO alliance.[207] President Reagan was also believed that it was crucial for the US to assist Israel in maintaining its qualitative military advantage so that the principle goal of halting Soviet expansion in the Middle East would be met. Consistent with his goals, the Reagan Administration sought to foster relationships with moderate Arab states. Witnessing the peaceful exchange between Egypt and Israel over the Sinai, President Reagan sought to build up more Egypts by pursuing relationships with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.[208] In the past many of the countries that the Administration pursued would have been condemned. Yet, this series of goals was supported by the direction goal set by the Administration to reduce the public admonitions of states for their human rights violations. Instead the Administration aimed at quite diplomacy with regard to human rights, aiming to build relationships and trust first.[209]

Direction Goals

In order to achieve the desired principle goal of deterring Soviet attack on the US and its allies, it was necessary for the Administration to achieve direction goals related to US and allied defense posture.

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[205] Ronald Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life* (New York, New York: Threshold Editions, 1990), 240.
[206] John D. Lees and Michael Turner, eds., *Reagan's First Four Years: A New Beginning?* (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988), 126.
[207] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[208] National Security Council, "1981 Year End Report (4 of 7)," 1981, CFOA 614, Year End Report (4 of 7), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Michael Baroody: Files.
[209] Lees and Turner, *Reagan's First Four Years: A New Beginning?*, 127.

One imperative was to increase the US access to forward basing and the capability for the troops to maintain a forward presence.[210] President Reagan trusted that an upgrade to the US conventional capabilities would serve the principle goals of deterring the Soviet, demonstrating credibility for US allies, and create a burden on the Soviet economy as it tried to keep pace.[211] Along with US conventional capabilities it was crucial to improve NATO's conventional capabilities. As expected there was a parallel direction goal to improve US and NATO's nuclear and chemical capabilities. Given a focus on US economic conditions, a directional goal for the Administration was to increase the defense contributions of NATO countries and even the Japanese and Korean allies.

Pushing American presence worldwide required resources, but the Administration did not want to overburden the US military and send US troops into unstable locations. To overcome these conditions, a critical direction goal was set to increase the amount of security assistance that the US would provide certain countries. The NSC acknowledged in the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 32, that, "Security assistance is a critical instrument for achieving national security objectives such as a power projection, deterrence, and political influence."[212] Certain regions of the world were smoldering with conflict, which presented opportunities for the Administration to apply this direction goal. There was a concerted effort by the Administration to reverse Communist gains in Latin America. Parallel to providing security assistance in areas like Latin America, the Administration was committed to the direction goal of reducing the Soviet's use of Cuba and influence over the Caribbean Basin and South America. President Reagan made the point, "We had already lost Cuba to Communism, I was determined the Free World was not going to lose Central America or more of the Caribbean to Communists…"[213] Prevalent in the mind of the president was the amount of US commercial product that transited within the Caribbean Basin. A sub-goal that facilitated the growth of the US economy, built linkages between

[210] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[211] Ronald Reagan, "National Journal Interview, March 8, 1980," March 8, 1980, CFOA 615, Folder Promises Report (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Michael Baroody: Files; Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 13–14.
[212] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[213] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 239.

regional allies, and substantiated the superiority of the free-market required that the Administration ensured access to foreign resources and raw materials.

The direction goals provided a strong foundation on which the principle goals could be met. These direction goals were applied to each region, with a just a minor adjustment in the object of the goal. It is clear that the Administration was seeking to increase and build up in certain diplomatic, economic, and political areas when it came to the US and its allies. It is also clear they were attempting to reverse, reduce, or decrease in those same domains whenever the object of interest was the Soviets or their client states. Beneath these crucial goals is a litany of policy goals designed to facilitate the achievement of the direction goals. It is possible to catalog the number of policy goals that existed, but it is more beneficial to follow the hierarchy from a few policy goals up to the endurance goals to show the nature of the Administration's goal structure.

Policy Goals

The policy goals are developed to supply the means necessary to achieve the direction goals. This is where the Administration formulates concrete alternatives and policies that will secure an outcome in a specific situation. Policy goals are typically designed with a specific object or actor in mind, a specific agency that will execute the task, and an established timeframe for when the goal will be initiated and completed. Depending on the level of delegation, policy goals may be developed at a level below the principal cabinet members. They may appear to be simply plans, but embedded in them are the goals, which ultimately serve the higher-order goals and are a critical link in achieving goal progress.

Here are a few examples of the Reagan Administration's policy goals. In an effort to halt Soviet influence in Europe and to begin chipping away at the Soviet economy, the Reagan Administration set two policy goals related to the Soviet Siberian pipeline.[214] One of the goals was to convince several of the Western nations not to support or fund the construction of the pipeline. The other policy goal was to

[214] Paul Kengor and Patricia Clark Doerner, *The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand* (San Francisco, California: Ignatius Press, 2007).

prevent any American technology from being used in its construction.[215] Secretary of State George Shultz acknowledged that these concrete goals aimed to serve the larger strategic goals of the Administration.[216]

Another example of the Reagan Administration's policy goals was the goal to sell Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The attainment of this goal was aimed at the direction goals of securing relationships with moderate Arab States and increasing the US military presence in the Middle East through the increased interactions such a sale would produce. In his diary, President Reagan captured the link between the sale of the AWACs and the higher-order goals. He said, "Met with Sen. Baker re the AWAC's sale to Saudi Arabia…We are striving to bring stability to the Middle East (direction goal) and reduce the threat of a Soviet move in that direction (principle goal). The basis for such stability must be peace between Israel & the Arab nations (direction goal). The Saudi's are key to this. If they can follow the counsel of Egypt the rest might fall into place."[217] Securing the sale of the AWACS was an outcome that the Administration believed would assist in achieving the higher-level goals.

Many times it was necessary to pursue multiple policy goals in an effort to facilitate progress on the direction goals. One of the Administration's direction goals was to defeat the terrorist, subversive activities of Libya. Terrorism was increasing in many parts of the world at this time, Europe, Central and South America, and the Middle East. President Reagan and his staff were provided intelligence that the head of the Libyan Government, Muammar al-Qaddafi had visions of spreading an Islamic fundamentalist state with Iran and assisted by Soviet arms.[218] Several policy goals were developed to prevent Qaddafi's vision and the effects of this violent ideology from spreading. One of those policy goals was to strengthen the moderate Arab states surrounding Libya, such as supplying military items to Sudan. President Reagan also pursued the policy goal of limiting American interactions with Libya by placing a ban on US travel

[215] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 305–306.
[216] George P. Shultz, "Ronald Reagan Oral History Project," interview by Stephen Knott, Marc Selverstone, and James Sterling Young, Miller Center at University of Virginia, December 18, 2002.
[217] Douglas Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries: Ronald Reagan* (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2007), 14.
[218] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 280–281, 290.

to Libya, asking US business men to send the American workers home, and closing the Libyan Embassy in Washington D.C.[219] In conjunction a policy goal was set to perform military exercises in the Gulf of Sidra.[220] This goal was aimed not only at deterring Libyan efforts to terrorize boats and aircraft traveling in international areas, but to demonstrate to Qaddafi the US would not recognize his attempt at reaching for territory outside of his state boundaries.

In the minds of the Administration, Libya was the African version of Cuba. It was a state with aims to export violence and an ideology, disrupting various regions of the world. Just like Cuba, the Soviets were sponsoring Libya's terrorist agenda.[221] For this reason, the policy goals are linked all the way to the principle goals. Through an effort to initiate policy goals that placed limitations on Libya's ability to acquire and supply terror, the direction goal of defeat the terrorist, subversive activities of Libya would be more attainable. As the direction goal of defeating the terrorist, subversive activities of Libya was further pursued, then the principle goal of preventing the spread of radical Islamic ideology could be closed in on.

This evaluation demonstrates that a hierarchical, interconnected structure existed for the Reagan Administration. Concrete policy goals were aimed at providing means to the direction goals, which were then used to provide means for the principle goals. Ultimately structure was designed to secure agency, esteem, and affiliation goals that were believed to lead to a secure and healthy state. The Reagan Administration followed this pattern of developing a goal structure that would take the state down the path to their desired future. Now that it is apparent the foreign policy decision makers had a goal structure to pursue actions in the international system, the next step is determine whether or not the operative goals in this goal structure affected the Reagan Administration's perception of the different events that sprang

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[219] National Security Council, "1981 Year End Report (4 of 7)"; National Security Council, "1981 Year End Report (2 of 7)" (National Security Council, 1981), CFOA 614, Year End Report (2 of 7), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Michael Baroody: Files.;
[220] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 281, 289.
[221] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (6 of 8)," May 20, 1982, Box 8, Folder Lebanon (6 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.

up in the international system. As the cases below unfold, the aim is to observe whether the decision makers judged the events in light of their operative goals.

CHAPTER 4:

GUATEMALA: RÍOS MONTT AND THE COUP, MARCH 1982

The key event that is under examination in this chapter is the military coup that overthrew the newly elected president of Guatemala on March 23, 1982. Based on the criteria for an objective threat, the nature of this event should have easily sparked a threat perception for US decision makers. The coup itself was a direct attack on an elected official. The act of delegitimizing a democratic government, by not honoring the elected official and instead implementing a coup, not only destabilizes a nation, but also increases opportunity for subversive ideologies. Subsequent to that event were follow-on actions taken by the new government. The Junta inaugurated a counterinsurgency plan that indiscriminately attacked any and all apparent insurgent sympathizers, violating a democratic principle of justice and the citizens' basic human rights. Lastly, as time goes on, the self-appointed government declared a state of siege, reinforcing the fact that democratic principles and values were not foremost in the government official's minds.

These actions indicate a failure to uphold basic democratic rights of its nation's citizens, opening the door to an abuse of power. When this happens, a nation is unable to grow economically, technologically, and socially. The actions of the government help foster violent uprisings, immigration issues, and human rights violations. Therefore, objectively these events should be seen as a threat to national security, especially of a neighboring country. Given the nature of the events as well as the proximate location of Guatemala to the United States, the events would be considered harmful to the national security of the United States. Yet, as will be demonstrated in the examination of the event, the Reagan Administration did not develop a threat perception of the events. It did not even register as a problem perception.

Historical Background

The intent here is to provide a succinct account of Guatemala's history that provides historical insight into the context of the events listed above. Guatemala has had one of the longest running, and

bloodiest, civil wars in Latin America, dated from the coup attempt in 1960 through 1996.[222] On November 13, 1960, a group of young army officers who supported the leftist government, which had been overthrown by a CIA-sponsored coup in 1954, was angered by the news that the current executive, President-General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes was allowing US-sponsored Cuban exiles to train in Guatemala for the upcoming Bay of Pigs.[223] This clandestine effort had been going on since March 1960.[224] Despite the fact that the 1960 coup was unsuccessful, the event laid the groundwork for several major guerrilla movements to emerge that were all motivated "to bring Cuban-style socialism to Guatemala". [225] In response to the coup and guerrilla activity, President Ydigoras Fuentes immediately began to take advantage of the political circumstances, broadening his executive power. Although President Ydigoras Fuentes was eventually overthrown on March 30, 1963 by another coup, his replacement Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia extended the increasing executive power by suspending Guatemala's 1955 constitution. It would not be until 1986 that a civilian government would return to power in Guatemala and return to the constraint of a constitution.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the US had provided military assistance, both funding and training for the Guatemalan Government to fight leftist insurgencies. The foundation of this assistance was the Doctrine of National Security (DNS) that solidified and legitimized Guatemala's internal struggle in terms of the international war on communism.[226] It is at this time that the Guatemalan army begins to become more active in the rural areas of the country. The memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Missions (DCM) Viron P. Vaky of the Policy Planning Council to the Assistant Secretary of State for

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[222] Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit : Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982-1983*, Religion and global politics series (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010), 26.
[223] Ibid., 27.
[224] Richard Gott, *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America*, The Penguin Latin American library (London, England: Penguin Books, 1973), 43–44.
[225] Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit : Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt, 1982-1983*, 26. President-General Ydigoras Fuentes temporarily suspended the national constitution as well as suspending the civil rights following the 1960 coup attempt. He also created the first Guatemalan elite counterinsurgency military force and set out on a counterinsurgency campaign.
[226] Ibid., 28.

Inter-American Affairs, put voice to the concerns that the Guatemalan Government was abusing their counter-terror tactics. He pointed to the fact that the counter-terror techniques that were being conducted were indiscriminate, brutal, and retarded the nation's modernization and institution building.[227]

As Guatemala entered into the late 1970s, the acts of repression by the government were not diminishing the insurgent activity; rather it appeared the guerrillas were being vitalized by the government's severe retribution. For this reason, the government under President-General Kjell Laugerud's, from 1977-78, moved from selective repression to more an even more indiscriminate repression.[228] Just prior to his transition out of office, May 29, 1978, there was a massacre in Panzos, killing over 150 civilians.[229] It was during this time, nearing the end of his regime, that US President Carter began instituting partial cutoffs of military aid to Guatemala.[230] On July 1, 1978 President-General Romeo Lucas Garcia came to power and held office until 1982. Within the first year in office, President Lucas Garcia escalated the tactics instituted by his predecessor, making use of death squads, both in the cities and in the rural areas in an effort to suppress insurgents.[231] As the Minister of Defense under President Laugerud, President Lucas Garcia believed his predecessor was too soft and they needed to take

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[227] Viron P. Vaky, "Guatemala and Counter-Terror [Includes Attachment]" (Department of State Policy Planning Council, March 29, 1968), 1679094595; GU00367, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679094595?accountid=4332.

[228] Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project : A Violence Called Democracy*, Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 37.

[229] United States Embassy Guatemala, "Cable to Secretary of State, Re: More on Campesino/Military Clash in Panzos," June 1, 1978, 1679093916; GU00520, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679093916?accountid=4332; Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project : A Violence Called Democracy*, 40.

[230] Beth. Benton et al., *On the Road to Democracy? : A Chronology on Human Rights and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations, January 1978-April 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Central American Historical Institute, 1985).

[231] Paul R. Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs, eds., *Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document Collection, Volume 1 Armenian Genocide, Bosnian Genocide, and Cambodian Genocide* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC., 2015), 937–938.

an even firmer stance against the guerrillas.[232] This strategy did not intimidate people from joining the insurgent cause, but continued to help to strengthen their numbers.

The guerrilla movements in Guatemala were also emboldened by the success of the Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua in July 1979 and subsequent insurgent activities in El Salvador. In response to this surge in guerrilla support, President Lucas Garcia targeted San Carlos University Community, labor leaders, left-leaning journalists, opposition politicians, and the sympathetic Indian population.[233] Watching the growing concern of human rights violations, President Carter sent an envoy, in August 1980, to dissuade President Lucas Garcia from using his repressive tactics in exchange for US economic and military aid.[234] He rejected the offer, refusing to relinquish his violent counterinsurgency strategy claiming, "He understood what our [USG] position was on the human rights issue but strongly disagreed with our belief that He could successfully combat the extreme left with other than radical measures."[235] A US Military Intelligence Report from September 1981 documents, "The [Guatemalan] Government's actions have polarized the nation's society and have galvanized opposition forces against the Lucas regime. Antigovernment terrorist activities, both urban and rural have increased significantly."[236] It was within this context that President Reagan entered into office.

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[232] Ibid., 937.
[233] United States. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII--Latin America," December 1980, 1, 1679121614; GU00682, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679121614?accountid=4332.
[234] Digital National Security Archive Collection, "Chronology: Death Squads, Guerrilla War, Covert Operations, and Genocide: Guatemala and the United States, 1954-1999.," June 16, 2015, 1679094482, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679094482?accountid=4332.
[235] Ambassador Frederic L. Chapin, "US Embassy Guatemala Cable, Re: Emissaries to President Lucas" (United States Embassy. Guatemala, August 18, 1980), 1679121155; GU00670, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679121155?accountid=4332.
[236] United States. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII--Latin America," September 1981, 1679120873; GU00725, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679120873?accountid=4332.

President Reagan and the Administration sought to reverse the deteriorating relationship between the US and Guatemala. During a NSC meeting on February 27, 1981 the team was discussing security assistance means for El Salvador. In light of this conversation, President Reagan asked about how the US could assist in Guatemala. National Security Advisor Allen responded that there were "diplomatic overtures" that were being formulated. Secretary Haig made a comment about the Administration's change in approach to Guatemala, responding to rumors that the Administration was indicating they were pro-Guatemalan, he stated, "in a sense we were".[237] Throughout the first year, despite the fact that the Administration was focusing much of their efforts on El Salvador, the NSC and State Department were taking steps to reinvigorate a mutually beneficial relationship with Guatemala. Given the context of the region, it will be evident what goals were operative leading up to the events.

Operative Goals Prior to Event

Even from the beginning, the Reagan Administration viewed the Western Hemisphere as a crucial battleground between the East and the West. There were several operative goals the Administration had committed to in this region. In his diary President Reagan admitted, "Central America is really the next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp supplied by Cuba and threatening a Communist takeover of all of Central America."[238] During a NCS Meeting, Secretary Haig when speaking of Central America made the statement, "This area is our third border."[239] As National Security Advisor Bill "Judge" Clark claimed, "It is our front yard," remarking, "The greater Caribbean is to us what the Mediterranean is to Europe."[240] It was clear to members of the NSC and the President that Latin America would be a critical region for the Administration, and it would play a large part in the United States security and ability to gain agency,

[237] Richard V. Allen, "National Security Council Summary of Conclusions; Subject: El Salvador and Saudi Arabia F-15s" (National Security Council, February 27, 1981), 5, Box 91282, Folder: NSC 0004 (02/27/81) (3 of 4), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Meeting Files.
[238] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 44.
[239] Richard V. Allen, "National Security Council Meeting Memorandum for President Reagan, Subject: Meeting Minutes on Caribbean Basin and Poland" (National Security Council, February 6, 1981), 2, Box 91282, Folder: NSC 0001 (02/06/81) (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Meeting Files.
[240] Jason Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Kentucky: Seabec Books, 2014), 146–147.

esteem, and affiliation in the international system. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones in the same meeting later made the point, "American influence has declined…The Soviets have more military advisors in Peru than we have in all of Latin America."[241]

President Reagan himself provided a clear perspective of how the Administration viewed the challenges of befriending the countries of Central and South America. Given the goals the Administration had, he established the priorities of the region. He stated,

> "…we are way behind, perhaps decades, in establishing good relations with the two Americas. We must change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we do not bring down governments in the name of human rights. None of them is as guilty of human rights violations as are Cuba and the USSR. We do not through out our friends just because they cannot pass the saliva test on human rights. I want to see that stopped."[242]

Clark said that the Administration believed it "could be more effective by privately reprimanding human-rights violators rather than publically shaming them."[243] From these comments it is possible to observe a prioritization of goals within the Administration's goal structure when it comes to Latin America. There was a belief that it was vital to secure a functioning, anticommunist, government that had a mutual relationship to the US before the US could persuade a country's government officials to reduce human rights violations.[244]

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[241] Allen, "National Security Council Meeting Memorandum for President Reagan, Subject: Meeting Minutes on Caribbean Basin and Poland," 5.
[242] Ibid., 4.
[243] Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 133.
[244] Allen, "National Security Council Meeting Memorandum for President Reagan, Subject: Meeting Minutes on Caribbean Basin and Poland," 5. There is a very interesting discussion in this meeting about the upcoming visit by the newly elected President of Jamaica. The NSC was well aware that one of the most lucrative exports from Jamaica to the US was marijuana. Although this was a problem and drugs were actually labeled as a national security threat by President Reagan, it was agreed that Jamaica's economic and political health were a bigger priority than the drug problem at this time. Secretary Haig said, "While this [drugs] is a problem, we must keep our policies in tandem. We don't want to create a revolutionary situation. We kept this item off the agenda for [President] Seaga's visit. We will do something about this problem after we have done something positive for Jamaica." Reagan then states, "This drug problem has been on my mind…Drugs are a threat to our people. Once we have made



Figure 5. Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Latin America & Caribbean.

progress in improving the Jamaican economy, we should make termination of the drug trade as our quid pro quo." (p3)

One of the directional goals that the Administration was committed to was to improve relationships with key regional countries.[245] Geographically, Guatemala was a key regional country. It was the next country after Mexico that provided a buffer between the US and the increasingly unstable, Communist-seeking, countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In an early NSC meeting, it was made clear that Soviet and Cuban intentions were to "target all of Central America for a Communist takeover".[246] El Salvador and Nicaragua were a down payment. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica were next, and then would come Mexico."[247] It was also evident that Guatemala was a key country politically. Despite nearly 20 years of military run politics, the government was consistently anti-communist and anti-Cuban. In April 1981, the NSC and State Depart were coordinating on various steps that were being taken to improve relations with the Guatemalan Government.[248] There were some legal and Congressional limitations to what they could achieve, but there was an obvious dedication to moving forward on this goal.

The administration was committed to building a relationship with the Guatemalan government in order to stem the Communist tide, while eventually seeking an opportunity to initiate quiet diplomacy on human rights. This effort was made explicit in a cable that was sent from the State Department to the American Embassy in Guatemala on April 8, 1981.[249] The summary of the cable provides a detailed look at the commitment the Administration had toward the Guatemalan Government.

> "The Department is initiating a series of confidence building measures with respect to Guatemala as a prelude to an attempt to engage the GOG [Government of Guatemala] in a productive

[245] Reagan, "Inaugural Address of President Reagan, January 20, 1981."
[246] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 238–239.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Robert Schweitzer and Roger Fontaine, "National Security Council Memorandum for Richard V. Allen; Subject: Guatemala Update" (National Security Council, April 9, 1981), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(3 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[249] Department of State, "Cable - From Secretary of State to American Embassy in Guatemala; Subject: Initiative on Guatemala, April 8, 1981" (Department of State, April 8, 1981), 1–2, Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(1 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.

dialogue on matters of mutual concern. These measure have been carefully selected to underscore our desire to restore a close, cooperative relationships with Guatemala, but at the same time to avoid and potential conflict with the human rights legislation. Thus no FMS [foreign military sales] will be included in our opening gambit. In late April, the Secretary will send General Vernon Walters as his personal emissary to Guatemala to review with President Lucas and other senior GOG officials our bilateral relationship. General Walters will inform the Guatemalans that the high level of political violence in which the GOG is involved causes us internal political and legal problems, which impede our ability to maintain the level of military cooperation we would wish. If the Guatemalans are prepared to give IS assurances that the will take measure to bring such violence under control, we will respond immediately by approving some FMS sales, starting with helicopter spares."

In the remarks it is evident that the Administration was pursuing a reversal in the US relationship with Guatemala. It is also clear that although there were domestic hurdles, the Administration was motivated to do all they could to reestablish a positive, working relationship with Guatemalan government officials. This effort is also made clear with the assignment of General Vernon Walters as a special emissary. Lastly, the administration recognized that the Guatemalan government was guilty of violence, but the prioritized goal was to establish good relations and then use quite diplomacy to encourage reformed behavior. Ultimately, the only check on whether the Guatemalan government was enacting changes in their repressive policies was a verbal commitment by the officials assuring the US that they were making changes. In June 1981, the Administration offered the Guatemalan Government a three-stage plan for resuming relations and President Lucas welcomed the plan.[250] The goal priorities were unmistakable.

[250] Department of State, "Cable - Secretary of State to American Embassy in Guatemala; Subject: Next Steps on Guatemala, June 11, 1981" (Department of State, June 11, 1981), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(1 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985; Roger Fontaine, "National Security Council Memorandum for Allen; Subject: Senator Stone on Guatemala, June 11, 1981" (Department of State, June 11, 1981), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(1 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.

In line with the Administration's goals, a pressing concern for the Administration early in 1981 was to stop the export and proliferation of Soviet- and Cuban-supplied weapons into the hands of insurgent groups throughout Central American and South America.[251] CIA Director Casey, supplied intelligence that Cuba was a key source for training the Guatemalan insurgents and inciting anti-government sentiment among the Indian population.[252] The Administration was strongly committed to this goal. In a Washington Post article, written on March 9, 1981, Bill Clark as the Deputy Secretary of State was quoted as saying; "the administrations 'most urgent objective' was to stop the flow of weapons from going to Salvadoran guerrillas by going to the source [Nicaragua]."[253] It was the perception that the violence and the insurgent activities in Central America were fueled by Soviet and Cuban efforts. Reagan exclaimed, "…I decided we had to send as powerful a message as we could to the Russians that we weren't going to stand by anymore while they armed and financed terrorists and subverted democratic governments."[254] This statement demonstrates that based on the goal of halting the assistance to insurgents, the Administration had established certain indicators, the presence or increase in insurgents and their activity, as a way to evaluate goal status. President Reagan sent a personal letter to President Lucas Garcia on October 21, 1981. In the letter he stated, "Clearly a central objective of our bilateral relationship is a shared desire to exclude Marxist-Leninist influence from this hemisphere."[255] When speaking of the gravity of the situation in a February 11, 1981 NSC meeting, President Reagan stated, "…if the Junta falls in El Salvador it will be seen as an American defeat…we must not let Central America become another Cuba on the mainland. It cannot happen."[256] Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador Honduras, and other Latin American countries were all given the same diagnosis and ultimately nearly the

[251] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 2.
[252] Allen, "National Security Council Meeting Memorandum for President Reagan, Subject: Meeting Minutes on Caribbean Basin and Poland," 5.
[253] Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 122.
[254] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 266–267.
[255] Department of State, "Cable - Secretary of State to American Embassy in Guatemala ; Subject: Presidential Letter, October 21, 1981" (Department of State, October 21, 1981), 2, Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(1 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[256] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 7.

same prescription, a strategy built off the goal hierarchy. For the Administration then, when they witnessed insurgent and guerrilla violence, it was assessed in light of the understanding that they were motivated to overthrow that country's democratic pursuits and seek to become a proxy state, like Cuba.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which was launched in early 1982, solidified the commitment and concentration the Administration had placed on serving their goals in the Latin America region. This policy package reinforced, and provided a summary, of the goals within the Administration's goal hierarchy that it was committed to during this time. The policy goals included supplying specific security assistance through economic and military means to various nations, including Guatemala. In line with the direction goals, the CBI was developed in order to establish a stronger relationship between anti-communist, US-friendly, countries in the region, subvert Soviet/Cuban support of insurgencies, and decrease the opportunity for Soviets or their proxy states to control vital maritime lines of communication.

Ultimately, the CBI package was pointing to the principle goals of rolling back Communist expansionism and ideology, building linkages between US allies, and providing tangible evidence of the superiority of a free-market, democratic system. The motivation to pursue these goals was strong and pursuing them took priority over nearly everything in the region, since failure to do so was detrimental to US interests. President Reagan made it clear, "Yes, it is true there are extreme right-wing outlaw elements…who were guilty of flagrant and grave human rights abuses…But the brutal pro-Marxist rebels who were slaughtering innocent peasants…was infinitely more barbaric."[257] He went on to say, "…the seriousness of the problems in Central America was so obvious that we had no choice: Based simply on the difference between right and wrong, it was clear that we should help the people of the region fight the bloodthirsty guerrillas bent on robbing them of their freedom."[258] The Administration demonstrated a strong dedication to the various goals they set out to achieve in the region. On February 28, 1982 the Reagan Administration showed their dedication to Guatemala by appropriating funds out of a request for

[257] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 479.
[258] Ibid.

$8.7 billion in military and security aid. With Congressional permission this would be the first allocation of US funding since it was cut off in 1977.[259]

Perception of Events

The main purpose of this study is to uncover the factors that lead elite decision makers to perceive events in the international system as threats to national security. Therefore, the perception of the event is the object of inquiry. Although there may be various perceptions, for the purpose of this study the perception will be categorized as: "benign", "problem", or "threat". As stated previously, the criteria for a perception to be labeled as a "threat" is when the decision makers indicate a belief that: 1) there is imminent danger, harm, or injury to the US or its interests resulting in a sense of urgency; 2) a culpable actor is identified along with certain US vulnerabilities that are in danger; and 3) there is a redirecting or acquiring national resources directed at the designated actor. The criteria for a perception to be labeled as a "problem" is when: 1) the event is considered detrimental to US interests; 2) US behaviors are identified for addressing the event, most often through current plans/policies; and 3) resources are allocated based on current allocation and availability. Finally for a perception to be labeled as "benign", there is: 1) an absence of the event being viewed as harmful or detrimental to US; 2) not defining a specific actor or behavior as the target of concern or correction; and 3) lack of shifting resources based on the event itself.

The Reagan Administration's perception of the 1982 Guatemalan coup is categorized as "benign". It was not perceived as a problem or as a threat. Instead it meets the criteria for a perception categorized as "benign". At no time was the coup or the subsequent actions the General Rios Montt took perceived as detrimental or harmful to the US. If anything the self-appointed leader was viewed as an opportunity. Despite all the overtures that had been made to President Lucas Garcia in 1981, he refused to back away from his repressive counterinsurgency strategy, making it difficult for the Administration to gain Congressional and public support for their goals and desire to reverse relations; allowing them to

[259] "U.S. Seeking to Restore Aid to 3 Latin Nations," *New York Times* (New York, New York, March 1, 1982), sec. A6.

provide security assistance to Guatemala.[260] A change in leadership was no worse than President Lucas Garcia, and based on Ambassador Chapin's interactions with General Rios Montt it appeared he was willing to reform some of the government's violent practices. In his meeting on March 29, 1982, Ambassador Chapin recorded in his cable, "The closing exchanges between President Rios Montt and me were over the close relationship which President Rios Montt hoped to see established between the GOG and the USG. He stated that there was a congruence of geopolitical situations and interests between our two countries and that we should work closely together."[261] A NSC memorandum, written the day after the coup, captured the Administration's sentiment regarding the coup. The closing remarks were, "However, we may have a real opportunity as well. A transition of military government which sets up a scheduled return to civilian government that at the same time cleans up the security forces would give us the chance to assist them in beating back the insurgents."[262] There was no evidence that the Administration held any concern that the coup was detrimental to the U.S. A week after the coup, the US government officially recognized the Rios Montt government.[263]

The second criteria that must be met for a perception to be labeled as "benign" is for there to be no delegation of an actor or US behavior that must be confronted as a the source of concern. As long as there was a perception of improvement in human rights, there was no reason to question the motives and actions of the Rios Montt government. The Administration was aware of the two rules he operated by: 1) "protect and respect the rights of the average citizen who lived in secure areas (mostly cities) and had nothing to do with the subversion" and 2) "where subversion was prevalent, in these areas ('war

[260] Department of State, "Cable - From Secretary of State to American Embassy in Guatemala; Subject: Initiative on Guatemala, April 8, 1981."
[261] Ambassador Frederic L. Chapin, "Cable - Coup Developments and Relationship with Guatemala, US Embassy Guatemala, March 29, 1982" (United States Embassy, Guatemala, March 29, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[262] Alexander M. Fontaine, Roger, "National Security Council Memorandum for Clark, Subject: Guatemala Coup, March 24, 1982" (National Security Council, March 24, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[263] Michael McClintock, *The American Connection, Volume Two: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1985), 228.

zones') the rule so unconventional warfare would apply, guerrillas would be destroyed by fire and their infrastructure eradicated by social welfare programs."[264] Yet, throughout the coup and the events following, the only objects of concern were the insurgents and Soviet/Cuban influence. On April 3, 1982, a State Department intelligence update documented the preparations and support Moscow was willing to send into Guatemala to take advantage of the political upheaval.[265]

The last criteria to confirm a "benign" perception is that resources were not allocated or directed at what could be considered the identified troublesome actor related to the event. Since there was no designation, there was no shifting of resources. Rather, the plans and programs that had been in place with the meetings prior to the coup were reiterated. What was proposed to President Lucas Garcia was proposed to President Guevara during his very short time in office, and then offered to General Rios Montt.[266] In May 1982, Ambassador Enders commented, "We believe that the USG should now move to strengthen the moderate elements in Guatemala and begin to construct a closer relationship with the GOG… Over the long term we need to develop the type of relationship with Guatemala, which our own critical interests there require."[267] The Administration did not skip a beat when the coup happened, but rather continued with their goals as if it had been a normal transition to a new government. Just over two and a half months after the coup, Montt dissolved the Guatemalan Congress, disbanded the three-person Junta, and declared himself president.[268] In response to this the Administration sent a cable to the American Embassy in Guatemala praising Montt's actions and encouraging him to extend the efforts he

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[264] United States. Defense Intelligence Agency, "Views of Coup Leader" (Cable, April 7, 1982), 1679120058; GU00794, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679120058?accountid=4332.
[265] Department of State, "Memorandum for Clark, Soviet Role in Guatemala, April 3, 1982" (Central American Intelligence, April 3, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[266] Alan Riding, "U.S. Is Said to Plan Aid to Guatemala to Battle Leftists," *New York Times* (New York, N.Y., April 25, 1982).
[267] Thomas O. Enders, "US Support for Junta and Its Reforms, May 22, 1982" (United States Embassy, Guatemala, May 22, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[268] McClintock, *The American Connection, Volume Two: State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala*, 234.

had already been taking. There is a strong sentiment throughout the cable to suggest a movement toward democratic rule, but there is no overt pressure.[269] The Administration continued to pursue the Guatemalan Government despite numerous reports of violence and non-democratic measures being taken against the rural populations.[270]

Judgment of Events

From an objective viewpoint, the Guatemalan coup of 1982 should have sparked at least a problem perception, and even a threat perception. An elected official was overthrown by a military coup, made up of primarily young officer. It was documented that, "junior officer revolts are fairly rare in Latin America — successful ones are very rare. They do, however, indicate serious change will take place — in short, 23 March will not be business as usual."[271] Yet, the Administration appeared numb to the event, rarely giving notice to it. Throughout the many NSC Meetings held during that time, the coup itself was not discussed. The few times the event was addressed in correspondence, it was routinely set as an opportunity to pursue the goals the Administration had been seeking over the last year. According to the theory, the event was not perceived as a threat because it did not obstruct the goals the Administration was committed to achieve. Examining the dialogue among the Administration will demonstrate this dynamic.

A week before the Guatemalan elections were scheduled, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research put out a Current Analysis Series. The Bureau anticipated a difficult election due to guerrilla violence and that General Angel Anibal Guevara would more likely gain the presidency. There was no mention or warning of the possibility of a coup in this intelligence report. Yet, shortly after the election the political landscape in Guatemala became unsteady. In a message from Chapin to Washington, he relayed the

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[269] Department of State, "President Rios Montt/MLN Coup, June 30, 1982" (Cable, June 30, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[270] By The Associated Press, "Report on Guatemala Killings," *New York Times* (New York, New York, October 12, 1982), sec. A3.
[271] Fontaine, Roger, "National Security Council Memorandum for Clark, Subject: Guatemala Coup, March 24, 1982."

conversation he had with some of the individuals in the inner circle. There was significant speculation of election fraud and even mention of a potential coup.[272]

Putting the newly elected president and the US government at ease, the Guatemalan Congress ratified the election, and Guevara officially became president on March 15, 1982. Had the Guatemalan Congress not confirmed Guevara's win, it is possible that the Administration would have reason for concern. Secretary Haig wrote in a memo to President Reagan, "…a fraudulent election would pay into the hands of the Marxist insurgent and make it very difficult to obtain USG congressional support for security assistance."[273] The Administration was already assessing the situation in light of their direction goal of supplying security assistance to a key regional actor, Guatemala, and hindering the insurgency progress in Central America. Only four days after being officially sanctioned by the Guatemalan Congress, US Ambassador Chapin sat down and had a meeting with President Guevara. He gave him a letter President Reagan had written recognizing the new Guatemalan government and looking for improvements between Guatemala and the US, continuing the goal of building relations.

On March 29, 1982 nearly a week after the coup, Ambassador Chapin relayed the psychological state of General Rios Montt. Chapin claimed, the other members of the Junta and private sector representatives were "concerned about his psychological state, he was on a persistent emotional high…"[274] He went on to say that Montt was operating as a one-man-show and he was totally evasive when private sector representatives asks about elections. Chapin stated, "[Montt] shows every indication in public that he loves power."[275] Yet these comments did not raise any red flags or dissuade the

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[272] Ambassador Frederic L. Chapin, "Cable - Guatemalan Post Election Issues" (United States Embassy, Guatemala, March 11, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[273] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "Memorandum for President Reagan on Guatemalan Elections" (Secretary of State, March 13, 1982), Box 30, Folder: Guatemala (01/20/1981-07/31/1984)(2 of 5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[274] United States Embassy. Guatemala, "Cable - Coup Developments and Relations with Guatemala" (Cable, March 29, 1982), 1679120373; GU00790, Digital National Security Archive, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679120373?accountid=4332.
[275] Ibid.

Administration. The only suggestion by the Administration was not to pressure the new Junta for elections too soon and to allow time for them to "clean up the mess both with respect to corruption and malfeasance in the security forces."[276]

The driving motivation that provided the filter through which the Administration viewed the event was their goals in the region. The Guatemalan government was labeled a conservative military government.[277] It was accepted that the conflict going on in Guatemala was a war, where the government was on the right, and the guerrillas were on the left. Although the Administration preferred to see a decrease in violence and a restoration of civil liberties, their ultimate incentive was so that the Guatemalan Government's reputation would improve allowing US security assistance to flow freely.[278] Rios Montt made several overtures to the US Ambassador that he desired to rid the country of political violence. Yet, he was not shy about the amount of violence and killing that would be brought on the guerrillas and their sympathizers.

Over the next several months, the character of the Rios Montt government would emerge. Although the removal of the Guatemalan Congress and other Junta members along with the declaration of a "State of Siege" were not the most pleasing, they did not restrain the Administration's movement toward pursuing security assistance and relations with Guatemala. In December 1982, nine months after the coup, President Reagan made a trip to Latin America. He gave a press conference following his meeting with President Rios Montt. During his remarks, he stated,

> "Well, ladies and gentlemen, President Rios Montt and I have just had a useful exchange of ideas on the problems of the region and on our bilateral relations. Our conversation today has done much to improve the climate of relations between our two governments. I know that President Rios Montt is a man of great personal integrity and commitment. His country is confronting a

[276] Ibid., 2.
[277] Richard V. Fontaine, Roger, "National Security Council Meeting Memorandum for Allen , Subject: Paper for the NSC Meeting on El Salvador W/ Interagency Options Paper" (National Security Council, February 24, 1981), Box 91282, Folder: NSC 0004 (02/27/1981) (2 of 4), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Meeting Files.
[278] United States Embassy. Guatemala, "Cable - Coup Developments and Relations with Guatemala."

> brutal challenge from guerrillas armed and supported by others outside Guatemala. I have assured the President that the United States is committed to support his efforts to restore democracy and to address the root causes of this violent insurgency. I know he wants to improve the quality of life for all Guatemalans and to promote social justice. My administration will do all it can to support his progressive efforts."[279]

In the question and answer session following his statement, illuminates their perception he held about the coup and the Guatemalan President. He said, "I frankly think that they've been getting a bad deal. You know, he was elected President in 1974 and was never allowed to take office. So, when this particular coup came, the officers who conducted the coup came to him and put him into the office he had been elected to. But he is totally dedicated to democracy in Guatemala."[280] The Administration was able to continue to pursue the goals they had established, through the new Guatemalan Government. Therefore, a threat perception did not emerge from the coup event.

[279] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, Following a Meeting With President Jose Efrain Rios Montt of Guatemala," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, December 4, 1982, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42069.
[280] Ronald Reagan, "Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the President's Trip to Latin America," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, December 4, 1982, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42070.

Table 2. Summary of Guatemala coup and massacre, March 1982

Country		Guatemala
Time Period		March 1982 to July 1982
Event(s)		- March 1982 Coup
Operative Goals	**Principle**	- Stop the spread of Communist ideology - Roll back Soviet expansionism - Build linkages between allies and regional friends - Demonstrate the superiority of the democratic, free-market system
	Direction	- Halt the spread of violence and terrorism - Decrease export of Soviet arms - Decrease Soviet financial and military support to insurgencies - Establish personal relationships with anticommunist government officials - Increase security assistance to friendly regional actors - Reverse Communist gains in Latin America - Decrease Soviet and proxy state access to sea lanes of communication
	Policy	- Provide economic and military assistance to El Salvador - Halt the flow of weapons from Nicaragua and Cuba to El Salvador and neighboring countries. - Promote and execute the Caribbean Basin Initiative - Supply and support the Contras and anticommunist fighters in Nicaragua
Perception of Event (I.e. benign, problem, threat)		**BENIGN**
Judgment of Events		There was no goal interruption, no interference of the Administration's goals by the coup that occurred in 1982. According to the reports circulating the NSC, the GOG was reducing violence and squashing insurgencies due to their new President, improving relations with the US, and security assistance provided by the US.

CHAPTER 5:

GRENADA: COUP, OCTOBER 1983

The key event that is under examination in this section is the military coup that overthrew the President of Grenada, Maurice Bishop on October 19, 1983. Objectively, a coup should stir up concern and spark a threat perception. Coups create havoc and discord among the population. The possibility exists for the incoming leadership to take advantage of their newly acquired power and oppress the people, avoid the rule of law, and seek new alliances. Yet, the previous event in Guatemala demonstrated that a coup might not necessarily be seen as a threat. Judging by the Reagan Administration's reaction to the Guatemalan coup, it is possible that they would treat this event in the same manner. Surprisingly, less than 18 months after the Guatemalan coup, the Reagan Administration responded completely opposite to how they responded to the Guatemalan coup. When rumors swirled that the US was on the verge of sending Marines to El Salvador, President Reagan stated that he would not even entertain the thought.[281] Still, in response to the Grenadian coup, the Reagan Administration sent 1900 Marines to the tiny island. There was a clear articulation from the decision-makers that this event was seen as a threat to national security. As the case unfolds it will become clear that the Administration believed its operative goals were being obstructed as a result of the coup and the actors who participated in the event.

Historical Background

The intent here is to provide a historical account of the occurrences leading up to the violent coup that removed Prime Minister Maurice Bishop from office in October 1983. The small island nation gained its independence from the British in 1974. Prior to independence the British had allowed Grenada to operate under a type of representative government. In 1951, Eric Matthew Gairy gained support as a result of his trade union policies and his party was voted into the Legislative Council. He helped found

[281] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 39.

what was eventually called the Grenada People's Labor Party (GULP).[282] From October 1951 till February 1974, Gairy and his party dominated the political scene in Grenada. Despite his consistent support from the middle class, Gairy was an authoritarian ruler who sustained office through favors and corruption. In 1970, he formed a secret police called the Mongoose Gang, who targeted political opposition.[283] Political turmoil was mounting, while a political opposition group, the New Jewel Movement (NJM) helped organize resistance to Gairy and his policies. When independence came in 1974, Gairy was voted in as Grenada's first Prime Minister.

In March 1973, prior to Grenada's independence, the NJM emerged as a dominant counter to the current regime. The NJM did not spring from Marxist ideology, but was rooted in a socialism that countered the tyranny of the reigning leadership. As the group began to mature it moved closer to Marxist ideology, primarily through the influence of members such as Bernard Coard.[284] A statement by the group demonstrates their view of their coming independence and prevailing leadership. The group claimed, "On February 7th, 1974, we are supposed to become independent. If we do, that will be independence in name only. Gairy believes that independence means pulling down one flag and putting up another, composing a new anthem, creating a new motto, calling the Governor 'Governor-General' and the Premier 'Prime Minister'…"[285] Hostility between the NJM and the sitting leadership began from political inequality and lack of true representation. Yet, the antagonism also turned personal. Gairy's Mongoose Gang killed Bishop's father, Rupert Bishop, while he was defending a group of women and children that were being attacked by the gang.[286] Just months prior to this bloody event, Maurice Bishop and other members of the

[282] Oliver Benoit, "'Ressentiment' and the Gairy Social Revolution," *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 95.
[283] Brian Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory : An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada.*, Warwick University Caribbean studies (London, England: Macmillan Caribbean, 1993), 142.
[284] Tony Thorndike, *Grenada : Politics, Economics, and Society.* (Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers, 1985), 49–50.
[285] Phil Miller, "The Secret Story of Grenada's Independence," *Race & Class* 57, no. 2 (October 1, 2015): 102.
[286] John E. Jessup, *An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996.* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), 75.

NJM, were severely beaten and thrown in jail without medical care while holding political demonstrations.[287] Despite the oppression, the NJM initiated anti-government riots leading up to the transition to independence. After the declaration of an independent Grenada, the NJM continued to engage in the political system and even attempted to challenge Gairy in the 1976 elections.

After nearly five years of corrupt and ineffectual governance, on March 13, 1979, Maurice Bishop led a bloodless coup under the political banner of the NJM, establishing the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG).[288] In an effort to succeed in overthrowing a regime that retained a degree of power over the people for nearly three decades, the NJM called on the people to assist their capture. The call went out at around 5 A.M. and by midday close to 3000 people was aiding the insurgency.[289] All the NJM's tactics, expertise, and economic assistance had come from Cuba and other Marxist countries. Despite the support the group had from communist countries, the new government ushered in a position of nonalignment. Unfortunately, the intentions by Bishop to claim autonomy from Cuba and the Soviets did not assure neighboring countries of their proclaimed neutrality. Grenada's UN voting record under Bishop's rule, indicated that Grenada's political ideology more closely resembled Cuban and Moscow politics, reinforced this judgment of the post-coup Grenada.[290]

On the day of the 1979 coup, Bishop reached out to the US Ambassador Frank Ortiz in an effort to quell any concerns. He assured the safety of Americans on the island, claimed a nonalignment stance, and promised elections would be held promptly.[291] Several of the Caribbean states that were members of

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[287] Ibid.
[288] W. Marvin Will, "From Authoritarianism to Political Democracy in Grenada: Questions for U.S. Policy.," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 26, no. 3 (1991): 33; *U.S. Relations With Grenada*, Country Report (Superintendent of Documents, November 10, 2015), International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, accessed December 1, 2016, http://proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=112230637&site=eds-live.
[289] Meeks, *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory : An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada.*, 156.
[290] Elizabeth Wilder, *Grenada Voice Shutdown 1981: The Grenada Chronicles, April Thru June 1981* (St George's, Grenada: The Grenada National Museum Press, 2016), 262.
[291] Gary Williams, *US-Grenada Relations : Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard.* (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 34.

the West Indies Associated States (WIAS) responded negatively to the coup and actually established a Regional Security Force that would seek to prevent future armed revolution.[292] Although there was a split in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the response to the coup, Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados recognized the Grenadian government on March 20, 1979. Two days later, the United States, Britain, and Canada officially recognized Grenada under the government of the PRG.[293] Optimism within the US began to wane a few days later when on March 25th Bishop suspended the constitution and set up the People's Law. Between the 1979 coup and the end of President Carter's term, there were several engagements between the Carter Administration and the PRG. The US even offered to provide financial assistance to the small island nation early in the relationship.[294] This hand of generosity was soon retracted when the US delayed aid to farmers after a severe flood in 1980, and further banned all disaster relief to Grenada.[295] Unfortunately, the failure of Bishop to satisfy the Carter Administration's push toward "free and fair elections, improved human rights, a reduction in anti-US rhetoric, and a true nonaligned policy," left a high level of distrust between the US and Grenada.[296] Agreements between various communist countries reinforced US concerns, including the arms agreement with Cuba in 1979 and 1981, Soviet Union in October 1980 and July 1982, and North Korea in April 1983. Bishop also invited forty-one foreign delegations from socialist states in November 1981 claiming solidarity with their governments.[297]

One of the most visible displays of Grenada alliance with Cuba and Soviet-influenced nations was the building of the Point Salines International Airport. In 1955, the British took a serious look at building an airport at Port Salines. Then five years later the West Indies Federation recommended the location for an airport. Canada produced a report by the Tripartite Economic Commission, which was

[292] Ibid., 36.
[293] Ibid., 37.
[294] Ibid., 50.
[295] Thorndike, *Grenada : Politics, Economics, and Society.*, 121.
[296] Williams, *US-Grenada Relations : Revolution and Intervention in the Backyard.*, 51.
[297] Thorndike, *Grenada : Politics, Economics, and Society.*, 199–120.

publicized in 1967, verified the economic evidence for building an airport at Port Salines.[298] The Commission was established by the US, Britain, and Canada. After Grenada gained its independence the World Bank put forth another examination of the feasibility for the airport. Prior to this, the NJM had voiced opposition to the construction, judging the Gairy government would corrupt the project.[299] Coard, Bishop's second in command, helped reorient the NJM thinking once in power suggesting the airport was vital to the Grenadian economy. It was an expensive project and one of the top contributors was Cuba, but other investors included a company from Florida, a Canadian company, European Community (EC), Iraq, and Libya.

The coup in Grenada was not the only coup to occur in the Western Hemisphere in 1979. Just four months after Bishop took power in Grenada, the Sandinista government succeeded in overthrowing the 40-plus year rule of the Somoza family in Nicaragua. Three Nicaraguans founded Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1961: Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomas Borge.[300] From 1961 through 1974 the FSLN did not have any significant military or political influence. The group was eventually determined to disrupt the regime. On December 27, 1974 several FLSN guerrillas invaded a supporter of the Somoza government and demanded money and release of prisoners for the hostage. In response the Somoza government instituted a state of siege, restricting political rights and repressing opposition for a 33-month period of time. The response of the Somoza government inflamed popular resentment. This abuse of power was piled on top of an incident that occurred in 1972 when the Somoza government kept a significant portion of the international aid money that came to Nicaragua in December 1972 following a deadly earthquake. Then on January 10, 1978, a well-known newspaper owner and journalist, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, was murdered sparking the start of the insurrection against the Somoza government. After 18 months of fighting, the FSLN defeated the Somoza government mid-July

[298] Ibid., 125.
[299] Ibid., 126.
[300] Roger Peace, *A Call to Conscience : The Anti-Contra War Campaign*, Culture, Politics, and the Cold War (Amherst, Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 13, \.

1979, taking over Nicaragua. The Sandinista's were socialists, but held to a democratic socialism. Yet, associations with the Soviets and Cuba blurred the distinctions between their political systems.

The context of the Grenada coup is augmented by another detour to the country of Suriname, a country with a very similar path. In November 1975, Suriname became a democratic nation upon receiving full independence from the Dutch following 20 years of colonial rule. Entering the last year of the Carter Administration, a military coup, violently overthrew the sitting Suriname government on February 25, 1980.[301] One of the lead instigators in this coup was Desi Bouterse. Under his leadership he initiated left wing, oppressive policies. .[302] Bouterse had sought out Grenada's recently appointed Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, for guidance and mentorship. Bouterse's communist behavior culminated in a public massacre of roughly fifteen, socially respected, political opponents in late December 1982.[303] In response to this event, the Reagan Administration along with the Netherlands cut off all economic assistance to Suriname.[304] During this time the Administration obtained intelligence that Bouterse was actively courting Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, and Moscow.[305] This intelligence was further solidified when emerged that the Soviets were looking to build an embassy in Surname.[306] By April 1983, the Reagan Administration sought to dissuade Suriname from leaning toward Cuban and Soviet assistance. It facilitated a plan with Brazil to provide economic assistance to Suriname.[307] The initiative was successful in disrupting ties between Suriname and Cuba. Yet, the rise of Communist influence, visible by the successful leftist governments of Suriname and Grenada, was leading to the hypothesis of a Latin America littered with future Cubas becoming a reality.

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[301] Bert Wilkinson, "Suriname Observes 30th Anniversary of Military Coup.," *New York Amsterdam News* 101, no. 10 (March 4, 2010): 14–14.
[302] Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 205–206; William Clark, "Ronald Reagan Oral History Project," interview by Stephen Knott, Miller Center at University of Virginia, August 17, 2003, accessed December 1, 2016, http://millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/william-clark.
[303] Scott B. MacDonald, "Insurrection and Redemocratization in Suriname?: The Ascendancy of the 'Third Path,'" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30, no. 1 (1988): 108–109.
[304] Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 205.
[305] Pico Iyer and William McWhirter, "A Country of Mutes," *Time* 121, no. 22 (May 30, 1983): 41.
[306] Clark, "Ronald Reagan Oral History Project."
[307] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 142–143.

Grenada Prime Minister Bishop appeared to alter course in late May 1983, seeking to normalize Grenada's relations with the US. He traveled to the US in an effort to set up a meeting with the President Reagan and discuss economic and security issues. The Administration did not welcome his initiative with open arms, but National Security Advisor Judge Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam met with Prime Minister Bishop on June 7. The Administration listed a number of issues that must be reconciled prior to US-Grenadian relations improving. These issues included concerns over: "…government has taken steps to abolish basic personal rights in Grenada… Grenada has consistently parroted the Cuban/Soviet line… growing presence of Cuban and Soviet personnel in Grenada, and the involvement, directly or indirectly in military or security related projects holds serious implications for the area's security."[308] During the meeting, Clark and Dam, included that cessation of anti-US rhetoric would be a first step in demonstrating a true intent to form positive relations.[309] Two days after the meeting, Prime Minister Bishop during a press conference in New York, admonished the US for a conspiracy to overthrow him via a CIA-orchestrated coup. The Administration expressed displeasure over his remarks and reiterated in a NSC memorandum entitled, "Next Steps in Grenada", the concerns it had regarding the small island-nation. The document records, "The presence in Grenada of an increasing number of Soviets and a large number of Cuban personnel — some with military responsibilities - create the impression that Grenada is become and outpost for interests alien to the security of this hemisphere. Consistent with a truly non-aligned foreign policy, we would like to see a reduction of these personnel eventually to a level of no more than the requirements of a normal diplomatic mission."[310] The

[308] William P. Clark, "Talking Points for Meeting between William Clark and Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, June 4, 1983" (National Security Council, June 4, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983) (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[309] Kenneth Dam, "Meeting Minutes between William Clark, Kenneth Dam and Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, June 7, 1983" (National Security Council, June 7, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983) (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[310] Alfonso Sapia-Bosch, "National Security Council Memorandum: Next Steps in Grenada, June 23, 1983" (National Security Council, June 23, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983) (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.

relationship with Grenada at this point was not friendly, but there was a potential for improved relations if the Administration was able to see behavior that aligned with its goals.

Operative Goals Prior to Event

An island of just over 100,000 people had garnered the attention of President Reagan a year prior to his arrival to the Oval office. In a speech he gave to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations on March 17, 1980, he spoke openly about his opinion of Grenada. He stated,

> "Totalitarian Marxists are in control of the Caribbean island of Grenada where Cuban advisors are out training guerrillas for subversive action against other countries, such as Trinidad-Tobago, Grenada's democratic neighbor…Must we let Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador all become additional 'Cubas', eventual outposts for Soviet combat brigades? Will the next push of the Moscow-Havana axis be northward to Guatemala and thence to Mexico, and South to Puerto Rico and Panama?"[311]

Upon entering office, the Reagan administration assessed that Grenada was aligned with leftist Marxist-Leninist ideology, the foundation of communism. The dominoes were falling and affected a neighbor in the Western Hemisphere. Grenada had forfeited its Westminster parliamentary system for the Soviet system. Reagan conveyed his concern over the events in another speech he compiled on August 18, 1980, where he warned, "Much closer to home is the Soviet inspired trouble in the Caribbean. Subversion & Cuban-trained guerrilla bands are targeted on Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, & Guatemala. Leftist regimes have already taken over in Nicaragua & Grenada."[312] Figure 8 illustrates the goals.

[311] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 471–479.
[312] Ibid., 480–486.



Figure 5. Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure: Latin America & Caribbean.

The international environment that the Reagan Administration entered into included a Grenada that had been transformed into a Soviet and Cuban proxy. Therefore the operative goals the Administration was committed to had taken this condition into account

During 1981, the President Reagan was primarily focused on shoring up the economy, but he did provide direction across various foreign policy issues. The development of the National Security Strategy, NSSD-32, codified this direction and provided a clear picture of the Reagan Administration's perspective of the international environment and the goals they were devoted to pursuing. Although it was signed in May 1982, there substance of what was contained in the document was consistent with the goals the Administration had been going after since they entered office. The NSDD-32 provided an even more transparent roadmap of many of the Administration's principle, direction, and policy goals. The Administration did not categorize its aims in this manner; rather, it segregated goals by region and domain. The regional categorization does not suggest that each region was treated differently. There was a high degree of continuity across regions, which demonstrate deep commitment to certain principle and direction goals. When looking at the interconnected nature of the Administration's goal structure it is possible to see the direction and policy goals at work in each region and how they were connected to the principle goals.

A principle goal that was very dominant in the Administration was Soviet expansionism. President Reagan's deep concern was expressed in his diary when in June 26, 1983 he wrote, "If the Soviet win in Central Am. We lose in Geneva & every place else."[313] This goal was a high priority, especially entering into 1983, due to the recent success of leftist insurgencies in many Caribbean countries like Nicaragua, Grenada, El Salvador, and Suriname. The tangible nature of Soviet-Cuban expansionism was visible in the region and the NSDD-32 document confirms this experience,

> "Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/military/economic strategy combining selective use of their own proxy

[313] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 163.

> military and security forces, arms sales and grants, economic incentives and disincentives, manipulation and terrorist and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally and to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to strategic resources and land and sea routes; second, by isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies, friends and neutrals, and this, by undermining political will in the west."[314]

As evident by this comment, the Administration was loosing ground in the Western Hemisphere in areas vital to US survival: agency, affiliation, and esteem. Therefore, it would be expected that the Administration would direct goals and attention to this area in an effort to recover or increase these means of survival. When surveying the international environment, the Administration concluded that Soviets and Cubans the root of the regional problems. This understanding of the source of concern conditioned the Administration's regional perspective and influenced the goals developed for the Latin America and the Caribbean Basin.

It was believed that the primary method the Soviets and Cubans used for gaining influence in the Western Hemisphere was through supporting left-leaning insurgencies or political opponents. They accomplished this by exporting their ideology, arms, and military expertise to train others for revolution. For this reason, the Reagan Administration set out, "to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America."[315] Two direction goals were contained in this statement, to blunt military power and to contain the projection of influence. The Administration was committed to fulfilling these goals and provided specific policy goals to facilitate their achievement in the region. Underpinning these direction goals were five policy goals: 1) reduce Soviet influence in Cuba (if possible eliminate it); 2) discourage USSR from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic threat to the security of the hemisphere (i.e. an attack; destabilize weak governments;

[314] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[315] Ibid.

incite violence, etc.); 3) strengthen U.S. political and military relationships with key countries (i.e. regional actors such as Mexico and Canada); 4) promote sustained economic progress in the Caribbean Basin area (i.e. CBI); and 5) assist friendly governments in combatting Marxist-Leninist insurgencies (i.e. El Salvador).[316]

The Reagan Administration's dedication to assisting friendly governments is witnessed in its response to the insurgency occurring in El Salvador. In February 1983, President Reagan wrote in his diary, "The N.S.P.G meeting was something. It was on El Salvador & Central Am. We have been so restricted by Congr. in our help to the El. S. govt. that they are losing to the Rebels. I finally told the Council to come up with how we could be of more help, not whether we should."[317] A few days later he commented, "We have an entire plan for bolstering the government forces. This is one we must win."[318] A dedication to this policy goal in Latin America would eventually lead to the Iran-Contra Affair. The NSDD-32 made explicit the Administration's view on this goal, "Security assistance is a critical instrument for achieving national security objectives such as power projection, deterrence and political influence."[319] Along with assisting friendly governments, such as El Salvador, with security assistance in an effort to push back current insurgencies, the Reagan Administration aimed to inhibit opportunities for future insurgencies through economic incentives. This goal was captured in the CBI.

The Reagan Administration was dedicated to partnering and cooperating with other Caribbean nations who presented allegiance to democratic principles. The dual focus of this initiative was to supply economic support to the struggling nations while building a web of nations friendly to US interests. When describing the initiative publicly, the Administration was speaking directly at Soviet-Cuban proxy nations such as Grenada. This sentiment was captured in a New York Times article, "The economic initiative in the Caribbean is viewed by the Administration as part of a new regional policy aimed at overcoming the appeal of Cuba. It is intended to demonstrate to new island nations like Grenada, which is now considered

[316] Ibid.
[317] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 132.
[318] Ibid., 134.
[319] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."

to be in the Cuban camp, and St. Lucia, where there has been publicly expressed admiration of the Grenadian example, that private enterprise can be a partner in the building of new economies."[320] When announcing the initiative in February 1982, President Reagan discussed it in connection to staving off Cuba's ability to export violence while improving the social and economic well being of its participants. The policy goal of the CBI helped the Administration demonstrate the criteria it used to judge friendly nations. CBI was linked to the direction goals of assisting allies, improving relations with key regional countries, and avoiding shifting alliances, which in turn, leads to trusting relationships. As mentioned in the Guatemalan case, the dedication to the CBI reaffirmed the Administration's commitment to the policy, direction, and principle goals embedded in its foreign policy goal structure.[321]

Several policy decisions demonstrate that the Reagan Administration was committed to solidifying relations to the nations of the Caribbean Basin. In a radio address, President Reagan expressed the interdependent nature of the US and Caribbean states saying, "The interests of Caribbean Basin countries are our interests; their security is our security."[322] He went further in a speech given on October 5, 1983 when expressed, "Peace and security in the Caribbean Basin are in our vital interest. When our neighbors are in trouble, their troubles inevitably become ours."[323] The Reagan Administration was dedicated to protecting friends and allies of the US and providing them an assurance that the US would assist in time of need. It was not just economic or military support that the Administration wanted to supply, but also a reassurance that the US is trustworthy and can respond if there is a need. The Reagan Administration sought to foster an interdependency among Caribbean states that facilitated access to

[320] Barbara Crossette, "Caribbean Aid Plan Advances But Faces Hurdles," *New York Times* (New York, New York, January 15, 1982), sec. A3, accessed December 1, 2016, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/424282534?accountid=4332.
[321] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on the Caribbean Basin Initiative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, February 24, 1982, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42202.
[322] Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Caribbean Basin Initiative," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, December 4, 1982, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42064.
[323] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a White House Ceremony Marking the Implementation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, October 5, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40593.

resources via basing, reinforcement of free-trade principles and open markets, and built an impenetrable wall in which Communist ideology and terrorist practices could not penetrate, and if it did would be met with an effective defense. Security relationships began as early as December 1981 with the creation of the United Forces Caribbean Command.[324] Security commitments were further defined in the October 4, 1983 NSDD-105, Eastern Caribbean Security Policy, where the Administration vowed that the US would protect certain Caribbean states militarily if need be.

The Cuban Missile Crisis solidified why a Soviet-friendly island like Cuba was such a danger to the US and its Western Hemisphere allies. The risk of Soviet military capabilities being exported only 90 miles off the US coast significantly altered the nation's ability to respond in a timely fashion to Soviet aggression or attack via sea and air routes. [325] Not only would Soviet military presence in the region affect US military access, but it would also have the ability to disrupt the US economy. President Reagan clearly expressed the vital necessity to have free transit of the Caribbean when he claimed, "that 50% of US trade passes through the Caribbean."[326] The policy goal of preventing the Soviets from using Cuba as a location to threaten the hemisphere spoke directly to the possibility of US economic and military interests being in danger. The reference to "future Cubas", pointed to the prospect of multiplying Soviet military enclaves that would expand this opportunity. In a speech given at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers on March 10, 1983, President Reagan was explicit about how a leftist regime in Grenada affected the socio-political environment. He stated plainly, "Grenada, that tiny little island…is building now, or having built for it, on its soil and shores, a naval base, a superior air base, storage bases and facilities for the storage of munitions, barracks, and training grounds for the military."[327] He ties the

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[324] Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Security: Retrospect and Prospect," *Latin American Research Review* 30, no. 2 (1995): 5.
[325] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (5 of 8)," May 20, 1982, Box 8, Folder Lebanon (5 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.
[326] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on Central America and El Salvador at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 10, 1983, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41034.
[327] Ibid.

build up on Grenada to the Soviet's overall intentions of weakening the US not just in the Western Hemisphere but worldwide. President Reagan avows,

> "…to destroy our capacity to resupply Western Europe in case of an emergency. They want to tie down our attention and forces on our own southern border and so limit our capacity to act in more distant places, such as Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Japan. Those Soviet theorists noticed what we failed to notice: that the Caribbean Sea and Central America constitute this nation's fourth border. If we must defend ourselves against large, hostile military presence on our border, our freedom to act elsewhere to help others and to protect strategically vital sea-lanes and resources has been drastically diminished."[328]

Despite its size and lack of international influence, Grenada had the potential to disrupt the path the Administration had laid for the region, which was littered with the goals it determined would secure US interests and desired future. As mentioned, October 4, just nine days prior to the Grenadian coup, President Reagan signed the NSDD-105 reaffirming the goals set for the Eastern Caribbean. In this security policy, Grenada was highlighted as a concern because of "increasingly closer ties to Cuba" and its "growing military potential and possible use of the island as a base for subversion and Cuban/Soviet strategic outreach."[329] There were two policy goals that were emphasized in this document. First, the document solidified a commitment to the goal to support regional allies and friends. It was noted, "…the United States should assist members of the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System – currently existing of Barbados, Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica – in responding to emergencies on other islands."[330] The second policy goal was to supply security assistance, economic and military assistance, to "Eastern Caribbean security forces, to enable them "more adequately to address internal or

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[328] Ibid.
[329] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 105: Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Policy, (NSDD-105)" (Executive Secretary, October 4, 1983), accessed December 1, 2016, https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDs/NSDD105.pdf.
[330] Ibid., 2.

external threats to their stability and security."[331] Again, embedded in this goal was an understanding and markers of which states where friendly to the US and which states were detrimental to US interests. These policy goals were a reflection of the commitment by the Administration to higher order goal, the direction, and principle goals, which sought "independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence."[332]

Perception of Events

President Reagan and the NSC had adopted a threat perception of the 1983 Grenadian coup. There are three categories of perception identified in this study, "benign", "problem", or "threat", and this event was viewed as a threat. The statements and discussion of the NSC during the period following the initial rebellion, on October 12, 1983, meets the criteria used to identify a threat perception. This criteria necessary for a perception to be labeled "threat" is when there is evidence following the event that: 1) it posed imminent danger, harm, or injury to the US or its interests resulting in a sense of urgency; 2) a culpable actor is identified along with certain US vulnerabilities that are in danger; and 3) there is a redirecting or acquiring national resources directed at the designated actor. A threat perception is distinct from just viewing an event as a problem. The criteria for a perception to be labeled as a "problem" is when: 1) the event is considered detrimental to US interests; 2) US behaviors are identified for addressing the event, most often through current plans/policies; and 3) resources are allocated based on current allocation and availability. It is also distinct from the response the Administration had to the Guatemalan case where the perception was "benign": 1) an absence of the event being viewed as harmful or detrimental to US; 2) not defining a specific actor or behavior as the target of concern or correction; and 3) lack of shifting resources based on the event itself. Grenada was a problem for the US prior to the

[331] Ibid.
[332] Ibid., 1.

coup. [333]The coup changed the Administration's behavior because the president and his NSC adopted a threat perception of the event.

When examining this event it is important to acknowledge that the Reagan Administration had already identified Grenada as an accomplice to Cuban and Soviet expansionism. Therefore, it is possible to jump to the conclusion that the coup was perceived as threatening because Grenada itself was an enemy of the US. Although this identity plays a role in the Administration's orientation toward the small nation, does it explain why the particular event of the coup shifted the Administration to respond aggressively toward Grenada? Before moving on, it is important to highlight that the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests that the judgment of the goal status in the environment affects perception, which in turn informs subsequent behavior. It is a judgment of the goal progress in the environment that has an influence on whether the decision makers shift or alter behavior. Prior to the coup, the Administration was committed to goals directly and indirectly associated with the assumed Marxist nature of Grenada. These goals were designed to confront nefarious actors in the international environment as a result of their perceived disposition. At the time leading up to the event, the perception of goal progress takes into consideration the current context of the actors involved. When goal discrepancies are observed and attributed to events or disturbances in which Grenada is associated, regardless of its identity, the Administration will make a judgment about whether that event is benign, a problem, or poses a threat. It is possible for an actor to be viewed as an adversary, but the event can be judged in such a way as to result in the categorization of "benign". An actor can also be an ally but when an event occurs the subsequent judgment can result in it being perceived as a "problem" or a "threat". The group identity contributes to the perception, but does not necessarily determine it. This study seeks to uncover the mechanisms that shape the perception of the event, thereby affecting behavior. The theory presented here suggests that when the Reagan Administration's goals were obstructed, the event of a coup

[333] William J. Clinton, "Statement on the Deaths of Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 7, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49922.

on Grenada was interpreted as a threat, not merely because the country was viewed as an opponent. This section demonstrates that the event itself, Grenadian coup, satisfies the criteria of a threat perception.

President Reagan and his NSC expressed that there was a need to respond quickly to the crisis that unfolded on Grenada. When presenting the situation it was repeatedly mentioned that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) had made an urgent request for help. Yet, even before the official request came through, and while on vacation, President Reagan "OK'd an outright invasion" of Grenada in concert with the six Caribbean nations.[334] When Ambassador Motley sent a cable on October 17, 1983, he commented, "…now would seem to be the time to act…The next ten day provide a window of opportunity."[335] This suggestion came through even before violence picked up on Grenada and Prime Minister Bishop along with 16 supporters were killed on October 19, 1983.

After the political violence that occurred on the 19 October, the Administration's urgency to respond to the event increased. The NSSD-110, Grenada: Contingency Planning suggests earnestness within the Administration. The NSC presents in the document, "…U.S. Naval air and Marine amphibious forces will move immediately to reduce the response time of the conduct of non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) on Grenada."[336] It was also captured in the document for the Secretary of State, Defense, and Director of the CIA to speak with regional governments, to identify "willingness to participate in a multi-lateral force to restore order on Grenada."[337] Rather than being prompted by other nations, this decision paralleled the reactions of some neighboring Caribbean countries. Various countries were crafting plans as a result of the coup. On October 21, just over a week after the initial coup, Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga sent word to the US and recommended a blockade along with the

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[334] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 189.
[335] Langhorne "Tony" Motley, "Message from Langhorne 'Tony' Motley to Mr. Bud McFarlane, Subject: Situation on Grenada October 17, 1983" (Secretary of State, Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 17, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983) (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[336] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 110, Grenada: Contingency Planning (NSDD-110), October 21, 1983" (National Security Council, October 21, 1983), RAC Box 3, NSC Background Book, Binder I (4), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.
[337] Ibid.

establishment of the a regional peace keeping force in which Jamaica could take the lead. During a hearing that was conducted following the invasion, it was divulged, "President Reagan concluded to wait passively would entail great risk."[338] The Administration met the first criteria of a threat perception, there was a sense of urgency to confront the danger or harm that was possible against the US citizens residing on Grenada as well as and its interests in the region.

There is no doubt that the Administration was concerned for the nearly 1000 American citizens residing on the island. In every public statement, whether it was an address to the nation, a Congressional hearing, or letters to heads of state, the Administration stated one of its primary objectives was to secure the lives of the American citizens.[339] There were concerns that the Americans could be taken as hostages, kicking off another Iranian hostage situation.[340] When analyzing the Administration's perceptions, it is not necessary to judge the object of concern and determine whether it is valid or not. The reality is the Administration identified the American citizens as vulnerable to injury. It was not merely because US citizens were in Grenada, Americans were scattered around the world. The combination of seeing the vulnerability as well as identifying an actor who could perpetrate harm or cause destruction to the assessed vulnerability, supplies the second criteria of a threat perception.

The Administration quickly identified the hardline Marxist leadership of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) and the nearly 600 Cuban personnel on the island as the culpable actors who were able to harm US personnel and interests. It appeared that the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) dominated the coup, even though Prime Minister Bishop's deputy Bernard Coard was complicit in the overthrow. It was the head of the PRA, Commander Hudson Austin, and his team that formed the RMC.

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[338] Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Foreign Relations, 1983).
[339] Ibid.; Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 110, Grenada: Contingency Planning (NSDD-110), October 21, 1983"; William P. Clark, "Meeting with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership: Grenada, October 25, 1983" (National Security Council, October 25, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983) (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[340] Morton Blackwell, "White House Talking Points Re: Grenada, October 26, 1983" (National Security Council, October 26, 1983), Box 54, Folder: Central America III (4 of 4), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Blackwell, Morton Files Series V.

The Revolutionary Military Council was identified as the sole group capable of holding power on the island. The Administration quickly calculated that it was possible for the RMC to harm US citizens on Grenada. The RMC could restrict access to the students and increase the influx of Cuban military personnel and equipment. They were also capable, through previous contacts, of fostering stronger relations with Soviets and Cubans.[341] Given the agency of the RMC, the perceived vulnerabilities began to mount. The Administration identified that the RMC could take American lives, restrict access to strategic sea and air routes, and improve their alliance with hostile actors, thereby thwarting democratic influence in the region. US interests were not only vulnerable, but the event created the means for them to be exploited.

Lastly, this event is labeled as a threat perception because the Administration believed it necessary to redirect Naval assets destined for Lebanon toward Grenada. This meets the third criterion of what constitutes a threat perception. On October 21, 1983 it was decided that 1900 Marines destined for Lebanon and ten naval ships would divert course and head toward Grenada. These assets had to be taken from a strategic mission in the Middle East to serve this crisis. This decision persisted even when a private company, Nation-wide World-wide Emergency Return (NEAR), offered to provide evacuation of the students and any other individuals who wanted to leave the island.[342] Mr. Joseph Travis' company's mission was to provide immediate transport, primarily for medical evacuation to students around the world. The day prior to that the RMC broadcast that the foreign nationals on the island were safe, specifically the American students and that the council desired improved relations with the US.[343] Even

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[341] Ronald Reagan, "Department of State Situation Report No. 6, October 23, 1983" (National Security Council, October 23, 1983), Box 8, Folder: Grenada I (7), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.

[342] American Embassy in Bridgetown, "Cable -American Embassy in Bridgetown to Secretary of State: Offer of Private Evacuation of Medical Students and Other Americans in Grenada, October 23, 1983" (Secretary of State, October 23, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Grenada Invasion, October 1983 (2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File.

[343] Richard P. Cronin, *Grenada: Issues Concerning the Use of U.S. Forces*, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 27, 1983); Central Intelligence Agency, "Central Intelligence Agency Situation Report 1700, October 22, 1983,"

with signals and opportunities to use existing resources or diplomatic channels to eliminate anxiety over identified vulnerabilities, the Administration saw a threat and diverted prized military resources in its direction.

Judgment of Events

As seen in the previous section, the Reagan Administration perceived the 1983 coup on Grenada as a threat. The question remains, what led to this perception? According to the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, the President and his NSC staff judged the event in light of their foreign policy goals. In the year prior to the Grenadian coup, the Administration celebrated the coup in Guatemala. From an objective standpoint, it is possible to see a coup as a threat irrespective of any other context, merely based on the political upheaval and regional instability that could ensue. Evidence from the previous case suggests that the Reagan Administration did not view a coup as an objective threat. Therefore, in this situation it would be insufficient to conclude that the coup was by nature viewed as a threat. Based on prior behavior in the Guatemalan case, it is possible to expect the Reagan Administration would also celebrate a Grenadian coup. The conditions surrounding the coup reinforce this possible explanation. Relations between Prime Minister Bishop and the US were antagonistic, especially with rumors the CIA was attempting to overthrow the regime. Grenada was already viewed as a regional agitator to many of the Caribbean and Western nations. Surprisingly, the Grenadian coup resulted in unpredictable behavior and was judged differently than anticipated.

The Reagan Administration's threat perception was driven by the judgment that the individuals who executed the coup created a situation where the new government of Grenada introduced an obstruction to the Administration's goals. It was clear one of the most pressing goals for the Administration was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence. This principal goal was further committed to by establishing a direction goal of rolling back and preventing influence specifically in the Caribbean and Latin America. It was not just the policy or direction goals that were affected by this coup, but the

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October 22, 1983, FOIA Collection Document #0000401538, CIA Electronic Reading Room, accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000679134.pdf.

entire goal structure including key principle goals. American citizens were at risk, but it was the possibility of the Administration's goals being obstructed that shaped the decision-makers perception. Bud McFarlane summarized it in this manner, ""...Reagan laid out his view of the stakes in Grenada and our plan for invasion, and asked the congressmen's and senators' endorsement. American citizens were at risk, he said, and a military operation was necessary to rescue them. But in addition, failure to act now, he stressed, would mean the prospect of a permanent, Soviet-sponsored Cuban presence on the island, a presence that could expand and threaten our interests in South America and, ultimately, in any larger conflict, given Grenada's location along the sea lanes through the Panama Canal and the Atlantic."[344]

In the initial reports regarding the coup that occurred on October 12, 1983, it was communicated that Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard was a primary actor in the overthrow. Coard was perceived as more left leaning than Bishop was. He was even critical of Bishop's failure to expedite Marxist-Leninist policies.[345] Coard had made several visits to Moscow over the last few years brokering deals with the Soviets.[346] When Ambassador Tony Motley submitted his assessment of the situation in Grenada on October 17, 1983, he stated, "The situation on Grenada remains a bit uncertain, but it now looks as though hard-line, Marxist-Leninist Bernard Coard has already or shortly will take over."[347] In all the correspondence that was transmitted by NSC staff, the coup government was consistently described as a hardline, Marxist-Leninist government. It was judged that the new government would not be more aligned with US and Western ideals, but rather it was moving further away from them. Any effort made by Bishop to reconcile relations and to provide assurance that Grenada was an independent, non-aligned nation, seeking to establish a friendly foothold in the Western Hemisphere dissipated with the emergence

[344] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, 264.
[345] Dam, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean*, 9.
[346] Central Intelligence Agency, "Chronology of Soviet Statements and Actions in Grenada," October 30, 1983, FOIA Collection Document #0000679141, CIA Electronic Reading Room, accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000679141.pdf.
[347] Motley, "Message from Langhorne 'Tony' Motley to Mr. Bud McFarlane, Subject: Situation on Grenada October 17, 1983."

of Coard and the incoming RMC. Under this new Grenadian leadership the Administration would not be able to withstand the increase in Soviet and Cuban influence headed toward Grenada.

The Administration believed that not only was the goal of checking Soviet/Cuban influence obstructed, but also the Administration's goal to ensure US access to vital sea and air routes. These routes were critical for the US to obtain national resources and to transport military supplies for worldwide deployments. Up to this point there was concern, but Bishop routinely defended that the use of Soviet and Cuban finances and manpower for the Port Salines Airport was motivated by commercial needs and tourism. Early in his career, Bishop did not support the construction of the airport. It was not until Coard convinced him of its necessity for Grenada's domestic economy, that Bishop changed his mind.[348] Coard was the one who primarily sought Soviet and Cuban resources to fund the project. Given the distance to Venezuela (90 miles) and the range to other Caribbean nations, military forces on Grenada had the ability to disrupt forty percent of all US oil imports and fifty five percent of NATO's military reinforcements that must travel Caribbean passages around Grenada.[349] President Reagan wanted the highest level of secret over the invasion out of concern that Cuban forces would be deployed to reinforce the RMC. He even kept the news from one of his most trusted allies, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.[350] The coup opened up the opportunity for more Cuban involvement and greater military presence on the island, giving both the Soviets and Cubans a stronger strategic foothold over vital US resources. The coup and its anticipated actions would be able to obstruct the Administration's direction goals of decreasing Soviet/Cuban support of insurgent operations, decreasing export of Soviet arms, decreasing Soviet/Cuban control of sea lanes, and maintaining access to resources.

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[348] Peter Shearman, "The Soviet Union and Grenada under the New Jewel Movement," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 61, no. 4 (1985): 662.
[349] Jonathan T. Howe, "Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Secretary of State: The Strategic Importance of Cuban Activities on Grenada, October 29, 1983" (Secretary of State, October 29, 1983), Box 30, Folder: Folder: Grenada (6/17/1983-10/25/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Country File.
[350] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 190.

If the initial events of the coup sparked concern over the obstruction of these goals, the killing of Bishop and several supporters on October 19, justified any judgments that were beginning to form. In a hearing given after the invasion, on November 3, 1983, an Administration official noted, "The disintegration of political authority in Grenada has caused a dynamic that made further violence likely and that spread uncertainty and fear. To wait would have meant that those who **o**n October 19 murdered much of the Government of Grenada…would have either driven the island into further chaos or turned it into an armed fortress."[351] In the opening statements of the NSDD-110, the comments reflect the Administration's judgment of the deteriorating situation following the political violence. It was stated, "…the murders of former government leaders and the apparent breakdown of control have created a situation which could lead to further radicalization of Grenadian society and increased Cuban/Soviet presence and activities on the island."[352] The murder of Bishop and several of his supporters elevated unease within the Administration by reinforcing the need for urgency, the vulnerabilities, and source of danger, and the requirement for assets. Deputy Secretary of State Dam cited, "What became of our overriding concern, however - as events unfolded - was not Grenada's political system. Rather, it was the safety of U.S. citizens in the midst of growing anarchy that the countries of the Caribbean also saw as a direct threat to their democratic institutions. As each day passed following the coup, the Administration was faced with the possibility that several of its policy, direction, and principle goals were becoming obstructed.

Given the timing of events it is possible to suggest the US was just responding to a call for help from its Caribbean neighbors. This does not appear to be the case, given that the US had already developed a plan to redirect Naval assets prior to being contacted, and that the staff was directed to seek support for US action from the Eastern Caribbean states. In early October prior to the coup the Administration crafted NSDD-105 that stated, "The principal objective of the United States in the Eastern

[351] Dam, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean*, 10.
[352] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 110, Grenada: Contingency Planning (NSDD-110), October 21, 1983."

Caribbean is to promote economically viable, independent democratic governments friendly to the United States and free of Cuban and Soviet influence."[353] The very next paragraph highlighted Grenada and its growing concern over its strategic use. Prophetically the writers of NSDD-105 assert, "Should the small states of the region fall under the control of radical groups with anti-U.S. orientation, the U.S. would face a significant threat to our economic and security interests."[354] Kenneth Dam confirmed this perspective in a hearing stating, "the United States had been concerned - well before the series of unique events which brought about the Caribbean Peace Force collective action - that Grenada could be used as a staging area for subversion of nearby countries, for interdiction of shipping lanes, and for transit of troops and supplies from Cuba to Africa and from Eastern Europe and Libya to Central America."[355] The US viewed the events in the region according to the goal structure the Administration had established, which provided the lens the events were filtered through.

President Reagan gave a speech to the American public regarding the policy decisions taken in response to the coup. In this address it is possible to see how the goal structure permeated the judgments and understanding the Administration developed regarding the Grenadian coup. He offers a very passionate remark about the distinct nature of the coup. In his address he stated, "Let there be no misunderstanding, this collective action has been forced on us by events that have no precedent in the eastern Caribbean and no place in any civilized society."[356] The reality is coup attempts and political insurrections were happening often in Latin America, and the Caribbean. According to the Cline Center for Democracy Coup d'état Project Data, there were 24 coup attempts worldwide in 1983. Six of those coup attempts occurred in Latin America. .[357] Just two months prior to the Grenadian coup, Guatemalan

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[353] Reagan, "NSDD-105."
[354] Ibid.
[355] Dam, *U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean*, 12.
[356] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, October 25, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40681.
[357] Cline Center for Democracy, *Coup D'etat Project (CDP) Data* (Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois, n.d.), accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/speed/coupdata/.

President Rios Montt's 18-month tenure came to an end when he was overthrown in a coup. It was not the event itself that was unprecedented, but what the event did to the socio-political context and how the event was interpreted by the Administration.

President Reagan continued in his speech to provide evidence of why this particular coup was singled out. He was explicit in the description of the actors responsible for this unprecedented act by classifying them as a, "brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power".[358] The depiction of the coup attributes certain motives and expected future behaviors of its members. Whether this is an accurate portrayal or not, it is the sentiment behind these comments that points to a judgment. If the coup had not been executed by leftist thugs" then the Administration would not expect subsequent behavior to negatively impact its aims in the region. The evaluation of the political affiliations of the coup members infer that its actions would be in conflict with the Administration's interests and therefore inhibit its pursuit of the foreign policy goals it set for the region.

The weight of these few words can be best observed in the talking points that were provided to NSC staff when asked about the event. The talking points highlighted three main consequences that were anticipated from the coup. These were: 1) the completion of a new airfield with a 9,000 foot runway where the Soviet Union might land nuclear capable bombers; 2) Soviet access to the port of St. George, which is capable of accommodating Soviet nuclear ballistic submarines; and 3) a hardline, Marxist-Leninist group that produced an even worse government for the people of Grenada.[359] It was not just the leftist disposition of the coup, but it was the judgment that the RMC and members of the coup had the ability to disrupt a series of goals the Administration believed were necessary to be secure in the region and even globally. This judgment persisted; even when the RMC attempted to provide the US assurance that the American citizens were safe and that they desired to form positive relations with the US.

[358] Reagan, "Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada."
[359] Clark, "Meeting with the Bipartisan Congressional Leadership: Grenada, October 25, 1983."

When military forces are used and lives are at stake, scholars seek to draw conclusions in an effort to explain certain behaviors or decisions. This examination is aiming to emphasize what factors affected the decision-makers perceptions. It does not fully explain why a particular policy is chosen, but rather that the judgment resulted in viewing the coup as a threat to national interests. In the case of Grenada, the Reagan Administration offered various objectives for the invasion itself, but these objectives are not the same as why the US invaded. It is suggested here that the policy choices were a result of seeing the event as a threat. The event was perceived as a threat because the coup created a situation where the Administration believed they goals they were committed to were obstructed. On the morning of the invasion, in a meeting with the Congressional leadership, the motivation for the actions of six Caribbean nations alongside the US was summarized. President Reagan stated, "All of the democracies participating in this operation have done so for one principal reason: protection of vital national interests. We agreed that we simply could not permit the Soviet Union and Cuba to impose their will further in this hemisphere."[360] This principle goal and the sub-goals associated with it were foundational to the Administration's foreign policy strategy. The Administration had been working diligently on this goal, not just in the Caribbean but also on the mainland in El Salvador and Nicaragua. There were both success and there were failures. Despite some of the set backs, earlier in the year, the Administration along with Brazil had success in severing the ties between Suriname and Cuba. The US was making progress in building key relations with Caribbean and Latin American nations. Yet, a coup on an island only twice the size of the District of Columbia presented a possibility for the next Cuba. The goal structure from the policy goals to the principle goals was built on preventing this outcome, and one coup on a small island-nation presented an obstruction to a future free of new Cubas.

[360] Ibid.

Table 3. Summary of Grenada coup, October 1983

Country		Grenada
Time Period		October 16-25, 1983
Event(s)		- Grenada Coup - Death of President Bishop
Operative Goals	**Principle**	- Stop the spread of Communist ideology - Roll back Soviet expansionism - Build linkages between allies and regional friends - Demonstrate the superiority of the democratic, free-market system
	Direction	- Decrease export of Soviet arms - Decrease Soviet financial and military support to insurgencies - Establish personal relationships with anticommunist government officials - Increase security assistance to friendly regional actors - Reverse Communist gains in Latin America - Decrease Soviet and proxy state access to sea lanes of communication
	Policy	- Promote and execute the Caribbean Basin Initiative - Establish security relationships with Eastern Caribbean nations
Perception of Event (i.e. benign, problem, threat)		**THREAT**
Judgment of Events		The administration has an immediate response to the coup based on the judgment that the Cubans and Soviets were gaining more ground in Grenada. They perceived the change in leadership to be moving more left than Bishop was and furthering communist expansion, increasing active efforts to buildup military arms and facilities on the island, and export revolution to neighboring nations.

CHAPTER 6:

LEBANON: ATTACKS ON EMBASSY & MARINES, APRIL & OCTOBER 1983

The previous two events were intrastate struggles that resulted in military coups. The perception and response to each event was different for the Reagan Administration, despite the events themselves being the same type. This section examines a different type of event; terrorist attacks on American citizens in a foreign nation. Within this section there are two key events that will be analyzed, the American Embassy bombing on April 18, 1983 and the Marine Barracks bombing on October 23, 1983, which both occurred in Beirut, Lebanon. When viewing the events objectively, it would be expected that they would register a threat perception among the decision-makers. One of the main functions of a government is to protect the lives of its citizens. Although an American Embassy is not American territory, an attack on an embassy could be interpreted as hostility toward America. Ultimately, the inability to protect its own citizens is objectively a threat to a nation's security.

A brief look at previous remarks would suggest that the Reagan Administration considered terrorist attacks on American citizens as a threat to the nation. He spoke boldly about terrorism and referred to the attack on the American Embassy in Iran as a national security issue. In laying out his "Strategy for Peace" in October 1980, he declared, "Terrorists seek to undermine, paralyze and, finally, destroy democratic governments."[361] Judge Clark, speaking on behalf of the NSC, expressed that the purpose of the Administration's national security strategy was to "preserve the institutions of freedom and democracy, to protect our citizens, to promote their economic well-being, and to foster an international

[361] Ronald Reagan, "Televised Address by Governor Ronald Reagan "A Strategy for Peace in the '80s"," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, October 19, 1980, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85200.

order supportive of these institutions and principles."[362] The fact that terrorist activities can target each of these components points to the threat they pose to a nation. The Reagan Administration openly expressed its desired response to terrorist attacks, retaliation; also suggesting these types of events would be considered a threat. In the speech he gave after the hostages were returned, President Reagan avowed, "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."[363]

Even though a threat perception would be expected, the Reagan Administration did not adopt a "threat" perception of the two events that occurred in Beirut in 1983. Instead, the decision-makers adopted a "problem" perception of the events. Although there was talk of threats in Beirut and the devastation that was caused by the attacks, the Administration's problem perception resulted in a continuation of the goal-directed behaviors they adopted prior to the event. Evaluating the events through the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework shows that it is the administration's operative goals that condition when an event will be identified as a threat. This case illustrates that despite objective criteria, certain events that should register as a threat, are judged merely as a problem because the prioritized goals are not obstructed.

Historical Background

The history presented here is a snapshot of what happened in Lebanon that led to the bombings in April and October 1983. Lebanon's history is a complex tale that cannot be fully expressed here, but the aim is to provide a sufficient account to offer context surrounding the attacks. Prior to the breakout of civil war in April 1975, Lebanon was coined "Switzerland of the Middle East".[364] In the years following Lebanon's independence, in 1943, the welcomed diversity that was once a hallmark of the nation became

[362] William P. Clark, "Address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 'National Security Strategy,'" George Washington University, May 21, 1982, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%205-1/Clark.pdf.
[363] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed American Hostages," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 27, 1981, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43879.
[364] Philip Moore, *Lebanon: A New Era* (London, England: Euromoney Publications, 1997), 3.

a stumbling block. As economic hardship during the 1960s and 1970s increased the existing social and political divisions, several political factions emerged looking for greater constitutional representation and a closer alignment to its Arab neighbors. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Lebanon was initially sympathetic to Egypt and was willing to support military activity against Israel.[365] Internal debate within Lebanon led to a more neutral stance, balancing relationships between the West and the Arab nations. One of the results of toeing this fine line was the removal of British and US ambassadors from Beirut in June 1967, but without breaking diplomatic relations.[366] A few months later following the Khartoum summit, Lebanon mirrored the example of Egypt and took steps to restore relations with the US, eventually being one of the only Arab nations that supported Egypt's efforts to reconcile with Israel. Although the Six Day War did not reach the interior of Lebanon, the hostilities took a toll on surrounding Arab nations and would soon begin to affect Lebanon.

Along with decreasing economic opportunities during this time, there was an increase in population growth. Between the end of the war and entering into the 1970s, more than 400,000 Palestinians came to settle in Lebanon.[367] With the influx of Palestinians came an increase in refugee camps, diverse political opinions, and tensions. Palestinians were forming clandestine commando groups that were set on targeting Israeli settlements.[368] Internally, the Christian Lebanese leaders wanted to restrain the commandos because it was leading to Israeli retaliation, damaging Lebanese communities in Southern Lebanon. Many of the Muslim Lebanese disagreed and wanted to work with the Palestinian commandos in defense against the perceived Israeli desire for control of Lebanese territory in the south.[369] These tensions produced violent clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian commandos, which resulted in the first breakdown in the Lebanese government in mid-1969. In an effort to restore order, members of the Lebanese government sought the help of Egypt to resolve the internal dispute. On

[365] Karol R Sorby, "Lebanon and the 1969 Cairo Agreement*," *Oriental Archive* 80, no. 1 (2012): 65–66.
[366] Ibid., 67.
[367] Brendan Sozer, "Development of Proxy Relationships: A Case Study of the Lebanese Civil War," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 4 (July 3, 2016): 637.
[368] Sorby, "Lebanon and the 1969 Cairo Agreement*," 70–71.
[369] Ibid., 71.

November 3, 1969, the Cairo Agreement was signed. The intention of the agreement was to cease internal disputes. One of the outcomes of the agreement was that Lebanon had legitimized the Palestinians right to have armed forces and autonomy within Lebanon.[370] As a result the Palestinians "gained control over large portions of southern Lebanon by the mid-1970's", producing a threat to Israel right on its border.[371] Shortly after the agreement went into affect clashes between Israel and Palestinian commandos increased, offering opportunities for sympathetic groups to join sides. When the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was forced out of Jordan in 1970, the prime location for their operations was the Palestinian territory in southern Lebanon.[372] Following suit in 1971, the neighboring Arab states, including Syria, had forced the Palestinian residents out of their countries.[373] Lebanon's Palestinian population began to blossom under the conditions of the Cairo Agreement.

Despite the authority granted to the Palestinian population by the Lebanese government, the Lebanese Army continued to clash with the commandos and PLO. Throughout 1973, the two sides openly attacked one another. In one instance the Lebanese Air Force shelled a refugee camp in near the Beirut Airport.[374] The country was beginning to fracture as various groups aligned themselves with the perceived victims. Demonstrators took to the streets and soon found themselves subject to clashes with security forces. The country broke out into civil war on April 13, 1975 when tit-for-tat attacks occurred. First there was a drive by shooting of a church killing 4 Christians and then subsequently in retaliation there was a drive by shooting of a bus killing 30 Palestinians.[375] In 1976, external actors entered into the conflict. Syria began sending troops into Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese government to assist the officials

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[370] Rami Siklawi, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Political Endurance in Lebanon," *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 4 (2010): 601.
[371] Gail E. S. Yoshitani, *Reagan on War : A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980-1984.*, Foreign relations and the presidency: no. 10 (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2012), 66, http://proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00002a&AN=gua3965918&site=eds-live.
[372] Samir A. Makdisi, *The Lessons of Lebanon* (New York, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 29.
[373] Moore, *Lebanon: A New Era*, 5.
[374] Siklawi, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Political Endurance in Lebanon," 607.
[375] Marwan George Rowayheb, "Political Change and the Outbreak of Civil War: The Case of Lebanon.," *Civil Wars* 13, no. 4 (December 2011): 417.

in maintaining order and oppose the PLO.[376] As violence escalated, the neighboring nations held a summit in October 1976 and called for a ceasefire offering to supply an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to enforce it. Although the ADF was made up of troops from Syria, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen over 27,000 of the 30,000 men were Syrian soldiers.[377] Just over a year after the ceasefire was initiated shots rang out again, this time between the Lebanese and Syrian army. Syrian alliance shifted to the PLO. Throughout the initial phases of the conflict the various groups would have a surge of hostility and strong allegiance with similar groups followed by a drop in support and loyalty.

Nearing the end of the 1970's the Lebanese civil war saw a greater involvement of third party actors. In March 1978, Israel deployed 25,000 troops across the border to create a six-mile deep security zone.[378] The UN sent an interim force (UNIFIL) in to provide a buffer between Israeli and Palestinian forces and allow the Lebanese government to regain control of the border.[379] This did little to inhibit the attacks from both sides. Even though Israel returned the land, they handed it over to Christian militia groups. Soon the Israelis were becoming bold in conducting air strikes against Palestinian and Syrian forces as far north as downtown Beirut.

The Reagan Administration entered office in 1981, and within the first few months the Lebanese conflict was addressed during NSC meetings. Philip Habib was assigned as a special envoy between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[380] Efforts were made to secure another ceasefire between the three actors, and for a period of about a year there were but a few skirmishes. The Saudis, US, Lebanese, PLO, and Israel were making progress on a peace initiative. Yet, decisions by Israel in June of 1982 altered the course of the negotiations. The Israeli Ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov was attacked in the streets of London

[376] Siklawi, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Political Endurance in Lebanon," 609; Makdisi, *The Lessons of Lebanon*, 31.
[377] Makdisi, *The Lessons of Lebanon*, 31.
[378] Yoshitani, *Reagan on War : A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980-1984.*, 67.
[379] Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations in Lebanon 1978-1982," *International Journal* 38, no. 4 (1983): 618–619.
[380] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 17.

on June 3, 1982.[381] In response Israel made the bold move to invade Lebanon with a mass of tanks, artillery, air strikes, and sea landings three days later.

One of the key requirements by the Israelis was the removal of all PLO personnel from Lebanon. In the months that followed, efforts were made to achieve this condition. Following the Israeli invasion, the US, France, and Italy agreed to supply forces for a Multinational Force (MNF). Once the PLO agreed to depart Lebanon, the Lebanese government made a formal request for assistance and the MNF was assigned the role of facilitating that removal. The rapid number of events that unfolded during the months of August and September set the stage for the conditions the US would find itself in the following year.

Within five days during the week of August 21, the French MNF arrived, Lebanon elected a new president, Bashir Gemayel, and US MNF forces arrived in Lebanon, with roughly 800 Marines. The following week by September 1, 1982 all 8,500 PLO forces had departed Lebanon.[382] A week later, with the designated mission complete, the MNF departed the mainland and returned to their ships leaving the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Beirut. Then as optimism was running high on the progress toward Middle East peace, Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in a hotel bombing. Israel moved further north to occupy Beirut in response to the assassination. In retaliation to the death of their new president, Lebanese militias entered into two Palestinian refugee camps located in Beirut, Shatila and Sabra, massacring the inhabitants.[383] Just ten days later the US MNF contingent returned to Beirut, this time with 1200 Marines. The "new" MNF was to be an "interposition force" to assist in the removal of foreign forces, such as Israel and Syria, in order that Lebanese Government could regain sovereign control over its country.[384] Entering into the new year, the MNF continued to serve this purpose while diplomatic negotiators attempted to find a deal that the Israelis, Syrians, Palestinians, Lebanese Government, and Lebanese Arabs could agree to.

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[381] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 43.
[382] Ibid., 82.
[383] Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds., *U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force* (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 1996), 93.
[384] Ibid., 93–95.

Operative Goals Prior to Event

When President Reagan and his administration entered office, the Lebanese civil war had been going on for nearly six years. Lebanon was incorporated into the Reagan Administration's goal structure. In a speech President Reagan gave to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations on March 17, 1980 prior to being elected, he spoke directly about the situation in Lebanon. He stated, "We must continue efforts to win the friendship and trust of other nations of the Middle East but we must not attempt to impose our solution to the problems there. This can be said to the trouble in Lebanon where we should offer our help but without dictating terms."[385] The Middle East was a crucial region of the world to the Administration. Similar to other regions of the world, President Reagan evaluated the Middle East through a Cold War lens, and erected his foreign policy goal structure according to this context. Figure 8 illustrates the goal structure for the Middle East.

The goal structure rests on an appraisal of the current context. One of the assessments he made about the international systems was that the Soviets were looking to exploit any area of conflict in an effort to gain a strategic foothold. President Reagan believed the strife in the Middle East provided this opportunity for the Soviets. He reflected in his memoirs, "The rainbow of ancient antagonisms in the Middle East produced an instability that the Soviet Union spent decades and billions of dollars seeking to exploit."[386] Soviet presence and the export of arms to Syria led to the conclusion that "the goal of the Soviet to in the Middle East and become part of any solution" in Lebanon.[387] This perspective led President Reagan to associate Soviet allies, such as Syria and the PLO, as the Soviet's agents of

[385] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 471–79.
[386] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 409–410.
[387] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 38.



Figure 7. The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Goals Structure - Middle East

disorder.[388] President Reagan asserted, "Under President Hafez el-Assad, Syria had come virtually a Soviet satellite in the Middle East, its army supplied and trained by the Soviets."[389] This perspective reinforced the interconnected nature of the Administration's goal structure, which would address Lebanon and the Middle East via the context of the international system in the 1980s.

The Administration's principle goals were consistent across regions and across time. From the start of the first term through to the events of 1983, the Administration was dedicated to rolling back Soviet influence as well as preventing further its expansion. In the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a clear indication that they sought influence in the Gulf Region. The belief in the domino effect was not merely reserved for Central America, but was a possibility in the Middle East as well. Despite it being thousands of miles away, Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf threatened US security interests. The presence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East activated other principle goals.

Another principle goal that was directly affected by Soviet presence and the existing demographics in the Middle East was the aim to build relationships and secure alliances with friendly states. It was concluded that Soviet influence globally could "weaken the United States…by isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies, friends and neutrals, and this, by undermining political will in the west."[390] By building on existing conflicts and/or inciting discord among various actors, alliance relationships would deteriorate. The current Arab-Israeli conflict along with the Iran-Iraq war presented a boiling pot of tensions apt for Soviet meddling. There were explicit conditions the Administration believed could be exploited, "Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient unproductive economies, rising expectations, rapid social change, the persistence of traditional conflicts and the prevalence of violence…"[391] In the first years of the Administration, Lebanon fit all of these conditions. Not to mention one of the few true allies in the region, Israel, could suffer at the hands of Soviet exploitation. The NSDD-32 captured this sentiment, "…that friendly states may be attacked by other local

[388] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 409–410.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[391] Ibid.

states…and that friendly governments might be toppled by internal insurrections possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets."[392] Given this perspective on the conditions of the international system, Lebanon and the Middle East solidified the Administration's dedication to the principle goals of building trust between leaders and building linkages that would strengthen alliances and friendships.

In conjunction with the previous principle goals, the Administration was determined to prove the superiority of the free market system, while at the same time expose the inferiority of communist system through economic pressure.[393] Access to the oil and natural resources were seen as vital to the western economic system. If the Soviets had control over it, they would have "a strangle hold over the West and enormously ease the Soviet economic difficulties."[394] Witnessing the countries the Soviets had taken over in the late 1970s, reinforced the notion that they had their sights set on the natural resources of the region. In his 1980 speech, President Reagan highlighted this when he said, "Then there is the Soviet takeover in Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and now Afghanistan. This last moves them 500 miles closer to the oil rich Arabian Gulf."[395] Not only would the resources reinforce the Soviet economy, but also it would weaken the US and its Western allies. It was assumed that if the Soviets gained control of the territory wither directly or through proxy states, they would attempt to diminish the US economic and military strength, "first by blocking access to strategic resources and land and sea routes."[396] Administration was set on preventing Soviet expansionism which could lead to Soviet control over resources that enabled the communist system to persist.

The significance of the region and its potential effect on US security, in turn, reinforced a commitment to the direction goals that underpinned the Administration's principle goals. One of the direction goals the Administration was committed to in relation to the Lebanese conflict was to garner support from moderate Arab nations. The Administration witnessed the success the Carter Administration

[392] Ibid.
[393] Clark, "Ronald Reagan Oral History Project," 34.
[394] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[395] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 480–486.
[396] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."

had when bringing an end to the hostilities between Egypt and Israel. The Reagan Administration set course to mirror this action by working diligently to secure friendly relations with other moderate Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

In talking about the pursuit of this direction goal, President Reagan commented, "I thought that strengthening ties to moderate Arab nations might help us in the long run to resolve some of the great problems of the Middle East. If we were ever going to be able to bring the warring parties together and negotiate a peace, we had to convince the Arabs that we could be fair."[397] Policy goals were created in relation to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to serve this direction goal. This effort was voiced specifically after a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin. He wrote in his diary, ""I think we are off to a good start in the difficult business of peace in the Middle East. My own feeling is that it should come through bilateral agreements just as it did with Egypt. That's why we want to start with Saudi Arabia."[398] In an effort to build relations with Saudi Arabia, despite clashing with Israel, the Administration set the policy goal of acquiring funding to provide the AWACS for it new friend. A similar situation developed with Jordan. The Administration was courting Jordan and was electing to sell arms to them, even amid adamant opposition by Prime Minister Begin. Reagan tried to alleviate the concerns of a US ally by claiming, "we are trying to create more 'Egypts' who will make peace with Israel."[399]

Closely connected to forming new relations, the Reagan Administration was also dedicated to reinforcing long time alliances. In the Middle East this meant shoring up the relationship between Israel and the US by honoring its commitments. In September 1980, President Reagan cited the commitment his Administration would have toward Israel. He stated, ""An ally of the United States Israel must have the means to remain strong and secure. Over the years, the United States has provided economic and defense

[397] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 411.
[398] Ibid., 415.
[399] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 89–90.

assistant and a Reagan Administration will maintain this traditional commitment."[400] He asserted that Reagan Administration was committed to ensure the survival and security of Israel.

A policy goal that served this end was to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage.[401] During the Lebanese conflict this commitment would be tested repeatedly. Yet, in his memoirs he reaffirmed this by saying, "I've believed many things in my life, but no conviction I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel. My dedication to the preservation of Israel was as strong when I left the White House as when I arrives there, even though this tiny ally, with whom we share democracy and many other values, was a source of great concern for me while I was president."[402] The allegiance the Administration had toward keeping its commitments to Israel persisted throughout the events of 1983, at times conflicting with other sympathies.

Equally important to the Reagan Administration was promoting the sovereignty of other friendly or neutral nations. This was especially true for countries in the midst of turmoil and violent upheaval. A dedication to the direction goal of resolving conflict in order that the governments could regain control of its nation is most evident in the Administration's efforts in El Salvador. This same devotion was carried over into the Middle East and is what propelled the Reagan Administration toward entering into the Lebanese conflict. President Reagan believed that the Administration "must continue efforts to win the friendship & trust of other nations of the Middle East."[403] He understood that a stable nation, motivated toward democracy, was less likely to fall into the Soviet sphere.[404] The conflict in Lebanon demonstrated what diminished sovereignty could do in an area rife with tensions. Routinely the Administration emphasized the dominant objective of restoring Lebanon's central government and authority. The NSC

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[400] Ronald Reagan, "B'nai B'rith Forum, Washington D.C.," September 3, 1980, CFOA 615, Folder Promises Report (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Michael Baroody: Files.
[401] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."
[402] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 409–410.
[403] Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan the Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, 471–479.
[404] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (6 of 8)."

declared this goal in June 1982 and in nearly every public comment about Lebanon from the Administration emphasized this as a crucial objective.[405]

In light of the principle and direction goals for the Middle East, the Administration developed three policy goals related specifically to Lebanon.[406] Those three goals included: 1) creating a strong, independent Lebanese government; 2) removing all foreign forces from Lebanese territory; and 3) ensure Israel's security, especially along its northern border. The Reagan Administration was desired to see reconciliation of the dispute between the Israelis, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians. It was believed that to accomplish this there must be a strong central Lebanese government that could secure its sovereignty. As early as his first meeting with Lebanese President Sarkis in November 1981, President Reagan confirmed "the American commitment to the territorial integrity of Lebanon and to the expansion of the central government's authority throughout Lebanon."[407] In the NSDD-64, Next Steps in Lebanon, signed at the end of October 1982, it was spelled out the Administration "must strengthen the ability of the Government of Lebanon to control, administer, and defend its sovereign territory."[408] It was expressed that a commitment to this goal was directly tied "…strengthening our credibility…".[409] This association to the endurance goal of esteem, helped solidify the Administration's obligation to this goal ensuring it would persist throughout the Administration's engagement in Lebanon.

Associated with reconciliation and securing Lebanese sovereignty, was the reality that all foreign forces, especially Syria must vacate Lebanon. It was believed that the presence of foreign forces in Lebanon was a major source to the country's troubles. The Syrian forces were asked to come in in 1975 in

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[405] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 184; Helen Thomas, "Reagan Vows U.S. Will Stay in Lebanon," *UPIs 20th Century Top Stories* (Washington, October 27, 1983), http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/454599813?accountid=4332.
[406] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 184.
[407] Richard V. Allen, "Meeting with Lebanese President Sarkis, November 1981" (National Security Council, November 11, 1981), Box 42, Folder: Lebanon (9/04/81-11/10/81), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[408] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 64, Next Steps in Lebanon (NSDD-64), October 28, 1982" (National Security Council, October 28, 1982), Box 8, Folder Lebanon (4 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.
[409] Ibid.

support of the Lebanese government. Yet, in just a few years they had switched sides to support the PLO. Syria was also aligned with the Soviets and was seen as controlling some of the different political parties. Given Syria's association with the Soviets in combination with its support of the PLO suggested Syria was in Lebanon in order to foment terrorism and disorder, while at the same time control political outcomes in its favor. It was perceived that this was part of their overall strategy in Lebanon. President Reagan remarked, "We saw the Brezhnev Doctrine in practice around the globe on a daily basis. In El Salvador, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and elsewhere, the Soviets and their surrogates, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and Syria, were seeking to undermine and destroy non-Communist governments through violent campaigns of subversion and terrorism."[410] He went on to say, "As the foundation to my foreign policy, I decided we had to send as powerful a message as we could to the Russians that we weren't going to stand by anymore while they armed and financed terrorists and subverted democratic governments."[411] Removing the various foreign forces from Lebanon was a policy goal aimed at serving the higher order direction and principle goals the Administration was faithful to.

Dedication to eradicating foreign forces was solidified by the deployment of the MNF, which was designed to facilitate the removal of the PLO forces. The Reagan Administration understood the interconnected nature of the policy goals they had. Removing the foreign forces included the Israelis. As events unfolded and the IDF moved into Beirut, followed shortly by the brutal attacks on the refugee camps, increased the Administration's dedication to this goal. In the NSDD-64, written shortly after the MNF returned to Lebanon, it was determined, "the United States must now take bold and timely initiatives to obtain the early withdrawal of all foreign military forces not later than by the end of this year. Such actions are essential if Lebanon is to become one more a sovereign, independent country and if the broader objective contained in the U.S. peace initiative are to succeed."[412] There was a commitment to

[410] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 266–267.
[411] Ibid.
[412] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 64, Next Steps in Lebanon (NSDD-64), October 28, 1982" (National Security Council, October 28, 1982), Box 8, Folder Lebanon (4 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records. The NSDD-64

the Administration's goal structure, which included the departure of friendly (Israeli) and inimical (Syrian and Palestinian) foreign forces.

It is important to note that the deployment of the MNF was not the policy goal itself but it was the behavior that was executed based on a sub-goal. The MNF was initially designed to facilitate the removal of the PLO. Once this goal was achieved the MNF returned to the ships off shore. Then the MNF returned with a modified mission of providing security and building Lebanese Armed Force capacity so that the Israelis and Syrians would leave the country.[413] The goal was not to have the US military operating in Lebanon, but rather, it was a means serve the policy goal of creating an environment where the US could convince Syria and Israel to leave.

President Reagan during an interview illustrated when answering a question about increasing US forces in Lebanon on February 16, 1983. He said, "there has been talk of this with regard to the difficulty in getting the present forces of the PLO, the Syrians, and the Israelis our of Lebanon while they establish themselves and their government – we have said that if in consultation with our allies, the multinational forces, if an increase and redeployment of those forces could aid and speedup this getting of the other forces out of there, I would be willing to go along with that."[414] He was aware of the risk that came with putting forces on the ground in an unstable environment, but it was intended to serve the goals the Administration was committed to achieving in the region.[415] In March 1983, the Administration agreed that expanding the MNF may be the only "immediate available alternative" to provide security until all the foreign forces were out. Eventually, the hostilities would lead to Congress agreeing to the War Powers Resolution.

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highlighted two policy objectives: removal of Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian forces and strengthening the Government of Lebanon to control, administer, and defend its sovereign territory.

[413] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 64, Next Steps in Lebanon (NSDD-64), October 28, 1982."

[414] Ronald Reagan, "The President's News Conference," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, February 16, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40940.

[415] National Security Council, "Expanding US Involvement in Lebanon" (National Security Council, March 14, 1983), Box 90584, Folder: Lebanon March 1983-April 1983 (03/05/1983-03/17/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate Files, NSC.

Another influential policy goal for the Administration was its interest in ensuring Israeli security. It may appear that the US could have been more aggressive toward Israel during the peace negotiations over Lebanon, especially in light of their repeated breaches of the various cease-fire agreements. Yet, Israel was an ally and friend and the Reagan Administration was determined not to diminish Israel's security and military advantage in the region. During an NSC meeting Clark commented that Ambassador Habib could propose to the Israelis that US forces could be used to in the security zone. He expressed, "This would be in keeping with your public statements that we will do what is required to protect Israel's northern border."[416] In this same meeting President Reagan then asserted, "I know there are objections to the use of U.S. forces in the South, but what is at stake here is our overall Middle East policy. We must get the Israelis out of Lebanon, yet, we must ensure their security needs have been met."[417] The direction goal of building "other Egypts" among the neighboring Arab nations was directed at ensuring Israel's security. President Reagan made this explicit in a Question and Answer session in Los Angeles on March 31, 1983. He stated, "Very simply, what the whole goal of our plan is – and it's being delayed until we can get this clearing of Lebanon – the goal is to create more Egypts. Egypt and Israel were once at war, and they came together with a peace treaty and became friends in the Middle East."[418] As evident by this comment, it was clear that many of the Administration's goals for the region were interconnected, and it was also apparent they could conflict with other goals

From the early days of the administration, there was a persistence to accomplish the policy goals of reconciliation, strengthening Lebanese political and military autonomy, and removal of foreign forces.[419] The challenge with the Lebanon conflict was that several of the policy and direction goals were

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[416] National Security Council, "NSC Memorandum, Security Arrangements Following Isreali Withdrawal from Lebanon" (National Security Council, March 16, 1983), Box 90584, Folder: Lebanon March 1983-April 1983 (03/05/1983-03/17/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate Files, NSC.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council Luncheon in California," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 31, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41123.
[419] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, 244.

at times divergent. The goal to assure Israel of the US commitment to its security conflicted with the goal to remove all the foreign forces from Lebanon. According to Israel, their security was at risk if the Israeli troops left before the PLO. The US was committed to assisting the Lebanese government regains its autonomy and security, yet the Lebanese president, Sarkis, wanted the Israelis to stay in the country until the PLO forces were evacuated.[420] The Administration was determined to build lasting alliances with moderate Arab nations, which at times competed with the goal of removing the foreign forces because the effort to build Arab support meant the Administration relied on Arab nation's commitments and negotiations. The US pledged to punish global terrorism and acts of aggression, but they were also committed to not dictating terms in the Arab-Israeli conflict in an effort to mediate for a lasting peaceful solution. President Reagan addressed the conflict that existed between some of the Administration's goals in October 1982. He stated,

> "I recognize the there are substantial risks in these undertakings which will confront our forces [Marines in the MNF] and those of our friends. However, mindful of the recent tragic history of this traditionally friendly country and the opportunity, which now exists to further the cause of peace between Israel and all its neighbors, we cannot let this historic moment pass. Clearly our initiatives and our commitment to Lebanon's independence will further strengthen our credibility and demonstrate our determination to continue the progress we have already made."

There was the potential for certain low-order goals to conflict, but a dedication to the higher-order goals that were at work in the region, helped prioritize the Administration's direction goals and policy aims in Lebanon.

Perception of Events – Beirut Embassy Bombing, April 1983

Given the current history of the US, with the memorable attacks in Benghazi, it may be difficult to believe that an attack on the US Embassy in Lebanon on April 18, 1983 was not seen as a threat. Based on the response of the Administration, it meets the criteria to be categorized as a "benign", or no threat

[420] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 423.

perception. A perception that is identified as "benign" results in: 1) an absence of the event being viewed as harmful or detrimental to the US; 2) no defined actor or behavior the becomes a target of concern or correction; and 3) a lack of shifting resources based on the event itself. The US Embassy bombing in Lebanon killed 63 people, but the loss of life and the objective traits of the event are not the same as the decision-maker's perception of the event. Although it can be called devastating, this does not confirm that they believed the event to be a threat to US security or its interest. According to an evaluation based on the criteria for a threat perception, this attack did not register as a threat to the Reagan Administration.

In statements or conversations about the Embassy bombing there was no mention of the event causing the US harm or having a detrimental effect on the nation. The sentiment was oriented around the act itself and the loss of life. President Reagan, in his statement to the American people, described the event as "a vicious terrorist bombing…cowardly act…criminal attack on a diplomatic establishment."[421] Secretary Haig expressed similar feelings in his statement when he said, "I learned this morning of a terrible bombing tragedy at out Embassy in Beirut today with the greatest shock and horror. Words alone cannot adequately express my total revulsion against our very dedicated and courageous staff."[422] The day of the attack President Reagan in a phone conversation with Lebanese President Gemayel made the statement, "…I of course feel very badly about that myself and what has happened, but I realize that that's the climate we're trying to solve."[423] The Beirut Embassy bombing was not associated with harm or danger to the US; it was viewed as an unfortunate tragedy. On April 20, 1983 the order by the President

[421] Ronald Reagan, "Statement on the Bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 18, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41202.
[422] National Security Council, "Cable - Statement by Secretary Shultz on Embassy Explosion" (National Security Council, April 18, 1983), Box 90584, Folder: Lebanon March 1983-April 1983 (04/18/1983-04/26/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate Files, NSC.
[423] National Security Council, "Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and President Gemayel" (National Security Council, April 18, 1983), Box 42, Folder: Lebanon (04/09/1983) (casefiles 8390505, 8302659, 8302665), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.

was given for the flag to be flown at half-mast in honor of those who lost their lives. The order presented the deaths as a result of the "performance of their duty".

The decision maker's perception meets the second criterion for the categorization of "benign". The Administration does not seek to alter or identify a particular actor or behavior. Although Iranian Shiites took credit for the bombing, specific groups or culprits were not pursued.[424] The Administration labeled the attack as a terrorist attack, yet despite the movement of the surviving diplomats to another location no effort was made to address the car bomb or vehicle borne attack. When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Kelley was giving his testimony on the bombing incidents in Beirut, he implied the Embassy bombing did not register any higher concern than the forces were facing in Beirut at the time.[425] Different security measures were not taken in response to this event.

Lastly, the third criterion for categorized as "benign" of the decision maker's perception of the Embassy bombings was met. The Administration did not direct additional resources in response to the attack. There were not even any resources supplied to prevent future car bomb or terrorist attacks. It was almost as if the Administration considered the event as part of the violence that was ongoing in Lebanon. Therefore based on satisfying the criteria, the Embassy bombing did not elicit a threat perception in the minds of the decision-makers.

Judgment of Events – Beirut Embassy Bombing, April 1983

The bombing of the American Embassy in Beirut did not solicit a threat perception from the foreign policy decision makers. The judgment the Reagan Administration made was based on the goals they were unwavering on and had been pursuing diligently for over a year. The bombing was evaluated in relation to the desired end state each of the goals they were committed to in Lebanon and the Middle East would produce. As mentioned in the section on the Administration's operative goals, the US was dedicated to rebuilding the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese Government, facilitating the

[424] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 145.
[425] Casper W. Weinberger and Paul X. Kelley, *Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives: The Situation in Lebanon and Grenada* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 1983).

removal of the foreign forces, and ensuring Israeli security. In the speech following the attacks, President Reagan stated explicitly that, "The criminal attack on a diplomatic establishment will not deter us from our goals of peace in the region."[426] He went on to point out specifically the Administration and its staff, "will continue to press in negotiations for the earliest possible, total withdrawal of all external forces. We also remain committed to the recovery by the Lebanese Government of full sovereignty, throughout all its territory…And to this noble end, I rededicate the efforts of the United States."[427]

Not long after the bombing President Reagan called US Ambassador to Lebanon Robert Dillon. The talking points prepared for President Reagan expressed how little impact the event had on the mission his Administration was dedicated to achieving in Lebanon. The talking points suggested, "We were stunned and shocked…This tragedy however awful must no distract us from our search for peace in Lebanon and elsewhere…I am determined, now more than ever, to insure that we do whatever is necessary to make Lebanon a free and safe country again."[428] The bombing was not to distract from the real purpose and pursuit in Lebanon. Here it is observed that the Administration was considering the priorities and the event would distract them from moving forward. Rather than see the bombing as a roadblock, and they judged it as an incident. It did not was not a viewed as a threat that must be confronted.

On April 22, 1983, our days after the bombing, the NSC was meeting to discuss Lebanon. In the dialogue, one would never suspect that an attack on an American embassy took place or that American lives were lost. The conversation mirrored those that had been occurring the month prior to the attack, focusing strictly on the Administration's goals, negotiation status, and the agreements they had been pursuing, and Secretary Shultz's upcoming Middle East trip. The administration was driven to become

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[426] Reagan, "Statement on the Bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon."
[427] Ibid.
[428] National Security Council, "Talking Points from President Reagan's Phone Call to US Ambassador to Lebanon Robert Dillon" (National Security Council, April 19, 1983), Box 90584, Folder: Lebanon March 1983-April 1983 (04/18/1983-04/26/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Near East and South Asian Affairs Directorate Files, NSC.

more active in their efforts to try to accelerate the withdrawal process with Israel and Syria.[429] That afternoon President Reagan was conducting a question and answer session with the press. In his opening remarks he asserts that the Embassy bombing was not an impediment to the goals in the region, but it actually motivated the Administration toward the goals. He stated, "The tragic and brutal attack on our embassy in Beirut has shocked us all and filled us with grief. Yet, because of this latest crime, we're more resolved that ever to achieve the urgent and total withdrawal of all [foreign forces] from Lebanon."[430] The following day he made a similar statement, "They [the terrorists] mistakenly believe that if they're cruel enough and violent enough, they will weaken American resolve and deter us from our effort to help build a lasting and secure peace in the Middle East."[431] He ended the speech voicing the Administration's commitment to the removal of foreign forces and the sovereignty of Lebanon.

President Reagan and the Administration did classify the bombing as an act of terrorism, yet this particular act was not judged to be a threat. Acts of terror had happened previously in Lebanon and would continue to happen during the Administration. When perceived to be an expected part of the socio-political environment they were operating in, the event did not trigger a threat perception. When changes in the context did not enlarge the goal discrepancy, the event did not trigger a threat perception. Despite the fact that the Reagan Administration had expressed goals to combat terrorism, in this environment the prioritized goals in Lebanon inhibited that goal from being actively pursued. Therefore, when evaluating and understanding the event that took place on April 18, 1983 the act of terrorism did not produce a threat perception consistent with the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The event was not perceived to obstruct the Administration's operative goals.

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[429] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 243.
[430] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 11, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41041.
[431] Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Death of Federal Diplomatic and Military Personnel in Beirut, Lebanon," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Public Paper, April 23, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/42383a.htm.

Perception of Events – Marine Barracks Bombing, October 1983

It may be even more surprising that the bombing of the Marine Barracks on October 23, 1983, also did not elicit a threat perception from the Reagan Administration. The belief the Administration came to following the Marine Barracks bombing meets the criteria for a "problem" perception. The criteria for a perception to be labeled as a "problem" is: 1) the event is considered detrimental to US interests; 2) US behaviors are identified for addressing the event, most often through current plans/policies; and 3) resources are directed based on current allocation and availability. As the evidence of the Administration's perception is presented it will become clear that the event was viewed as a problem rather than a threat. The Reagan Administration's evaluation of the Marine Barracks bombing is elevated to the category of a threat perception because there was no sense of urgency due to the belief that more danger or harm was imminent demanding that the Administration take active measures, actors were not specifically identified as adversaries or opponents that must be stopped quickly, and there was no effort made to direct alternative resources to do so. The Marine Barracks bombing, like the Embassy bombing, did not obstruct the goals the Administration was committed to and therefore, the decision-makers did not identify the event as a threat.

In order for a decision-makers opinion of an event to be considered a problem, it must have some effect on the decision-maker's interests. The perception of the Administration to the bombing of the Marine Barrack on October 23, 1983, was considered disadvantageous to US interests. Yet, the Administration did not demonstrate the need to urgently direct attention to the bombing. Therefore, it meets the first criteria for a "problem" perception rather than a "threat" perception. When describing the Marine Barracks bombing it was called a "criminal act" and "act of violence", indicating that the attack was harmful.[432] President Reagan described the danger these attacks posed when he said, "…but I think

[432] Press Secretary, "Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President" (White House, October 23, 1983), Box 5, Folder: Lebanon Bombing - October 1983 [10/23/1983 speech to Regional Broadcasters Convention], Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Dur, Philip A. File; Secretary of State, "Cable - Letter from the President on Beirut Bombings to Other MNF Countries" (White House, October

we should all recognize that these deeds make so evident the bestial nature of those who would assume power, if they could have their way and drive us out of that area, that we must be more determined than ever that they cannot take over that vial and strategic area of the Earth or, for that matter, any other area of the Earth."[433] It was clear that the scale of the terrorist attacks displayed on October 23, 1983 led the decision-makers to see the event as detrimental to the national interests. The bombing was an example of the violence that plagued Lebanon for the last eight years and the violence that was affecting so many other nations at the time. Terrorism was a problem globally.

Although terrorism was threatening many around the world, not all attacks were alike, since they were deliberately targeting different interests. For example, some terrorist attacks were intended for indiscriminate killing, some were acts of political rebellion, and some were designed to cripple armed forces. In order for an event to be considered a problem, it must attack a nation's vulnerabilities or interests. The interest that the Administration associated with the bombing was to weaken the US willpower to stay in Lebanon. This assessment was most likely derived from an anticipated problem addressed in the National Security Strategy. The NSC warned of the Soviet's intentions, ""The near-term objectives of their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally and to weaken the United States…by undermining political will in the west."[434] The comments by the Administration following the attacks referenced this view by making assertions that the acts of terror would not drive the US out of Lebanon and the US would not be intimidated by the bombing. In a letter to the other MNF nations, President Reagan expressed, "There is no doubt that the perpetrators of the latest bombings in Beirut have attempted once more to undermine our collective will…[435] Attacking this interest was harmful to the US,

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24, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon - Marine Explosion 10/23/1983-11/03/1983 (2 of 9), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.

[433] Secretary of State, "President's Statement on of Marine Barracks Bombing in Lebanon" (White House, October 24, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon - Marine Explosion 10/23/1983-11/03/1983 (2 of 9), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.

[434] Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 32: U.S. National Security Strategy (4 of 8)."

[435] Secretary of State, "Cable - Letter from the President on Beirut Bombings to Other MNF Countries."

but not to the extent that the Administration believed an urgent response was required to overcome the architects of violence.

The second criterion needed, for an event to be classified as a "problem" perception, is that the decision-makers will direct their attention toward the actions and behaviors the Administration itself must alter to address the discrepancies the event created. A problem perception will focus the decision-maker's energy internally on its own activities. In a statement by the Press Secretary, he conveyed, "The President has directed that General P. X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, depart for Beirut to undertake a complete review of the ways to provide better protection for the Marine contingent in Lebanon."[436] The focus was on examining the Marines situation and the behavior that they could do to defend against future attacks. The draft statement had expounded on this view, commenting, "We will spare no effort to reduce the vulnerability of our troops…The president, to prevent future acts of terrorism and reduce our vulnerability, has directed that an immediate review be undertaken of ways to provide better protection for the Marine contingents…"[437] The Reagan Administration was not shy about pointing to the fact that terrorists were the culprits of the attacks, but follow-on actions were directed toward the security of the Marines and altering the procedures that were present at the time of the attack at the Beirut International Airport. Again, it was not that there was not an actor who committed the attack, but the attention was directed at US behaviors, because ultimately the Administration desired to return to pursing its goals. In an effort to acknowledge that an actor was responsible for the act the Administration stated, "We also intend to respond to this criminal act when the perpetrators are identified." [438]

Concurrently with focusing on US behaviors, the Administration classified the actors in a way that shifted efforts to identify them outside of the NSC staff. Based on various references to the bombing being a criminal act, the event was evaluated from a judicial standpoint. This inhibits the event from

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[436] Press Secretary, "Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President."
[437] National Security Council, "Draft Statement from Press on Marine Barracks Bombing, October 23, 1983" (National Security Council, October 23, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon Chronology (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat: NSC: Country Files: Records 1981-1985.
[438] Ibid.

being associated as national security concern to a Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) departmental concern. The CIA and DOD were sent off to find evidence of a perpetrator, and instructed to look closely at Syrian or Iranian involvement. In an attempt to search for evidence, the Administration was put in a wait and see period. During this time all options were presented as to how to deal with the perpetrators once all the evidence was in, including overt military retaliation.[439] Despite having statements from certain terrorist groups, the Administration was not quick to accept this confession and punish any one of them without complete confidence of their involvement. In a note to Bud McFarlane by NSC staff, Howard Teicher, he expressed concern that the NSC had not made a greater effort to attack terrorist infrastructure following the attack. He claimed the newly crafted NSDD-111 did not adequately deal with terrorism. [440] Ultimately the wait and see did not produce solid evidence and the Administration did not persist in going after the nebulous enemy. There were no acts of retaliation by the US or indications that a particular actor was identified. The French, on the other hand, targeted Syrian military positions in response to the bombing of their MNF facility, which occurred minutes after the barracks bombing on October 23, 1983.

There is a difference between the notion of terrorism as a menace to Western interests and American lives versus the actual terrorist act stimulating the perception that the threat is tangible and must be addressed. This distinction of a theoretical opponent versus a concrete threat is evident in comments made by President Reagan. The day after the attack President Reagan remarked, "Yesterday's acts of terrorism in Beirut which killed so many young American and French servicemen were a horrifying reminder of the type of enemy we face in many critical areas of the world today: vicious, cowardly, and

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[439] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 109, Responding to the Lebanon Crisis (NSDD-109), October 24, 1983" (National Security Council, October 214AD), 109, Box 8, Folder: Lebanon (4 of 8), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC: Records.
[440] Press Secretary, "National Security Strategy Memorandum from Howard R. Teicher to Bud McFarlane, Draft NSDD on Lebanon and Middle East" (White House, October 26, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon Chronology (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.

ruthless."[441] In the press statement that was released on the day of the bombing the event and the "enemy" is spoken again in broad terms, "These acts…those who sponsor these outrages…international terrorism…"[442] The Administration did not persist in finding out who was at the bottom of this event because it was not judged as an obstacle or a threat to the goals it set out to achieve.

The last criterion that points to the Administration having a "problem" perception of the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut is the absence of the NSC directing material resources at the terrorists who conducted the attack. This again ties into the previous section. In line with failing to designate an adversary associated with the attack, the Administration did not have anyone or anything to direct its resources at. The only allocation of resources was to shore up the security of the Marines and to resupply the contingent with the Marines that were already associated with the MNF, located off shore. Just days prior to the bombing, other naval assets destined for Lebanon had been diverted to Grenada, but after the invasion took place these assets were not expedited to Lebanon. They only resumed course at the end of October once the Grenada operation was complete. As strange as it may seem today, the bombing of the Marine Barracks that killed 241 Americans did not produce a threat perception. Instead it was viewed as a problem that at some point must be reduced. The bombing, ultimately, was not perceived to pose imminent danger to the US and its interests, thereby requiring the shifting of resources or the targeting of a particular actor. The Administration focused on bolstering the Marines and pressing on with the mission at hand. The Reagan Administration was determined to persist, in spite of the tragedy.

Judgment of Event – Marine Barracks Bombing, October 1983

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests that when the decision-makers are evaluating an event in the international system, they will judge it through the lens of the goals they have committed to achieve. Actions were taken by the Administration between the April Embassy Bombing and the Marine Barracks bombing that helped to reinforce the Administration's devotion to the goals it set

[441] Press Secretary, "Presidential Remarks: Regional Broadcasters Luncheon" (White House, October 24, 1983), Box 5, Folder: Lebanon Bombing - October 1983 [10/23/1983 speech to Regional Broadcasters Convention], Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Dur, Philip A. File.
[442] Press Secretary, "Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President."

for Lebanon. The MNF was part of this goal structure, but it was a means to achieve the policy goals. It is important to point out that ten days prior to the bombing, President Reagan signed the "Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution". In his statement regarding the resolution, President Reagan made a comment in regard to any attacks that may be conducted against the MNF. He stated, "I would not the initiation of isolated or infrequent acts of violence against United States armed forces foes not necessarily constitute actual or imminent involvement in hostilities, even if casualties to those forces result."[443] There were already discussions circulating the NSC staff about the future of the MNF, and the effectiveness of this means.

The Administration's judgment of the Marine Barracks attack is best understood with a quick summary of the agreements made between the Embassy bombing and barracks bombing. It demonstrates the Administration's active pursuit of its goals and how the MNF contributed to this effort. A month after the American Embassy was bombed, Israel and Lebanon signed the May 17 Agreement. It was a commitment by Israel to remove all of its forces. This was a glimmer of hope that the Administration's goal of removing all foreign forces may be accomplished. Syria quickly opposed the agreement and refused to cooperate.[444] The Administration attributed Syria's stubbornness to the Soviet's role and influence over Syria. Bill Clark stated, "Behind all this activity in the region, the Soviets continue to inveigh against the agreement and our role in negotiating it."[445] Despite the Syrian's resistance to leave Lebanon, in July 1983, Israel decided to it would withdraw some of its forces south. The problem with a partial and potentially one-sided withdrawal was Israel was performing a crucial security function in the northern Beirut area. A withdrawal without a reciprocal response from Syrian forces and its allies, could destabilize Beirut. On July 20, 1983, President Reagan, during a NSC meeting, suggested "…expanding

[443] White House, "Statement by Reagan on Resolution," *New York Times* (New York, New York, October 12, 1983).
[444] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Members Banquet of the National Rifle Association in Phoenix, Arizona," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Public Paper, April 23, 1983, accessed December 1, 2016, https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1983/42383a.htm.
[445] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*, 249.

and redeploying the MNF…" to offset the loss of Israeli security.[446] The Administration was committed to the policy goals in Lebanon and was willing to increase the means necessary to achieve them.

By August 1983, violence had escalated and the civil war appeared to become more fractured. Two Marines were killed on August 24, two more were killed two weeks later, and five were killed mind-October.[447] Upon learning about the death of the Marines who died on September 6th, President Reagan wrote in his diary, "The Civil War is running wild & could result in collapse of the Gemayel govt. & the stuff would hit the fan."[448] In September 1983, the MNF had come under increased hostilities and were taking fire from a ridgeline believed to be under Syrian and Druze control.

During this time the NSC began to discuss the proper use of the MNF and had circulated two options, increase the MNF contingent or redeploy them to the ships and use them when necessary.[449] On September 29, 1983 Congress approved invoking the War Powers Act and extended the Marines for another 18 month in Lebanon. In a statement regarding the legislation, President Reagan pointed to the fact that Congress made this decision in support of the Administration's goals. He said, "I am especially happy that this proposed resolution supports our policies in Lebanon and that we may now be able to advance Unites States peacekeeping interest…"[450] Two days prior to the attack on the Marine Barracks, a NSC memorandum reiterated the loyalty to goals the Administration sought, while acknowledging that the "fragility of the current situation in Lebanon may not, for the near-term, permit significant change to status to the MNF, but we should keep the options open for alternative employment of the MNF open

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[446] Ibid., 251–252.
[447] Bill Clark, "National Security Council Memorandum from Bill Clark to President Reagan, Killing of Marines in Beirut" (National Security Council, October 16, 1983), Box 43, Folder: Lebanon (10/11/1983-10/17/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.
[448] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 177.
[449] Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files: Inside the National Security Council*; Bill Clark, "National Security Council Paper for Meeting, Our Strategy in Lebanon and the Middle East: Operational Issues" (National Security Council, October 17, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon Chronology (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.
[450] Ronald Reagan, "President Reagan's Statement on Congressional Approval of MNF Continued Presence" (National Security Council, September 29, 1983), Box 43, Folder: Lebanon (09/21/1983-10/08/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.

because of the changing situation in Lebanon."[451] Despite the increase in violence and the upheaval in Lebanon, the Administration was pursuing its goals and beginning to see support for the MNF, which is the means it chose to do so.

The judgment of the Marine Barracks bombing was made through the context the Administration's socio-political context. At the news of the bombing the President and some of his staff were in Augusta, Georgia on vacation. The day prior, Bud McFarlane had awakened President Reagan in the middle of the night to inform him of the events taking place on Grenada. The next day, at 2 a.m. on October 23, 1983 Bud McFarlane again woke President Reagan to give him news of the bombing in Lebanon. Rather than obstruct the Administration's effort, this event emboldened it to pursue its goals. Secretary Shultz recounts the events of that morning but quickly focuses on the evaluation of the event. He wrote, "We were shocked and grieved but the President was determined not to be driven out of Lebanon by this terrorist attack. We replaced our marine contingent and continued our effort to help the Lebanese our of their civil war and into a process of national reconciliation…"[452] McFarlane reflected back on that day and claimed, "…the barracks bombing seemed to strengthen his resolve to stay."[453]

The bombing did not prevent the Administration from furthering the goals they set for Lebanon; even the loss of US forces did not obstruct this effort. The objectives the MNF were directly associated with was providing security in an effort to facilitate the withdrawal of all foreign forces and support the growing autonomy of the Lebanese government. In the draft press statement written following the attack, it was stated,

> "The President has communicated with our MNF partners and the Government of Lebanon. He has stressed that we remain determined to pursue our stated objectives in Lebanon which are to ensure that Lebanon can be restored as an independent and sovereign nation free of all foreign

[451] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Council Memorandum, US Policy in Lebanon and the Middle East" (National Security Council, October 21, 1983), Box 41, Folder: Lebanon Chronology (2 of 2), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.
[452] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, 227–228.
[453] McFarlane and Smardz, *Special Trust*, 268.

forces and free to reconstitute a national consensus…The world should understand that we will not be deterred from our pursuit of these goals by today's brutality."[454]

In the message sent to the MNF countries, the President claimed, "…the United States remains firmly committed to our joint search for peace and stability in Lebanon. The United States will not be dissuaded by acts of violence committed by those who are seeking to prevent Lebanese political reconciliation and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over territory at present controlled by foreign forces. **Our common goals are still attainable**; we believe we can achieve them…"[455] Clearly stated, the goals were not perceived to be obstructed by the bombing.

The week following the attack, General Paul X. Kelley presented his report on the Marine Barracks bombing, solidifying the Administration's judgment that this event did not affect its goals. He concluded that this type of attack was a "new ballgame in Beirut, and our Marines are being targeted for terrorism," but he went on to say, "in all likelihood there can and will be further attacks against our Marines."[456] The attacks the Marines suffered were incorporated as part of the environment, which allowed the Administration to be convinced that the tragic event was not disruptive of its objectives. The NSDD-111, which had been crafted prior to the bombing, was signed on October 28, 1983. The language demonstrates what is being evaluated and how the Marine Barracks bombing registered in the minds of the NSC. The document offers, "The progress made in arranging a cease-fire and the beginning of intra-Lebanese take on national reconciliation give cause for hope that our policy to see an independent, sovereign Lebanon, free of all foreign forces is an achievable goal."[457] The document then presented the

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[454] National Security Council, "Draft Statement from Press on Marine Barracks Bombing, October 23, 1983."

[455] Secretary of State, "Cable - Letter from the President on Beirut Bombings to Other MNF Countries." (emphasis added)

[456] General Paul X. Kelley, "Cable - Report on General Kelley's Assessment of the Marine Barracks Bombing" (National Security Council, October 27, 1983), Box 44, Folder: Lebanon (10/08/1983-12/31/1983), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Secretariat Country File, NSC.

[457] Ronald Reagan, "National Security Decision Directive 111, Next Steps Toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East, (NSDD-111)" (National Security Council, October 28, 1983), 111, Box 8, Folder: [National Security Decision Directive] NSDD-109/111 Lebanon and Middle East, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Dur, Philip A. File.

decision to modify the Rules of Engagement for the U.S. forces (ground, air, and sea) against the high ground surrounding Beirut.

The event of the barracks bombing was not judged as a threat, but instead it was considered one of the many problems the Administration had to resolve on the path to goal achievement. In a letter written to the Congress a week after the attack, President Reagan asserted, "The U.S. Marines are in Lebanon to help bring stability to that country. Their mission is to support the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces by their presence…to help strengthen the Lebanese armed forces and to give the central government an opportunity to establish its authority…But at this time there is no substitute for the political and practical support provided by the MNF…"[458] The Marine contingent was a means to the goals the Administration set, and even when an attack took out 241 on them, the Reagan Administration was not deterred from accomplishing its goals. This is further reflected in the reinforcement of the MNF and the persistence of their presence after the attack. The Marines serving in the MNF were kept in place for another five months after the bombing before the Administration, by the suggestion of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, to position them offshore. Options emerged, including deploying an Army unit to replace the Marines and have them work more closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces.[459] In the end the Marines were redeployed to the ships and American forces left Lebanon at the end of February 1983.

It is commonly assumed that we left Lebanon because of the Marine Barracks attack, and thereby it is assumed that the Administration considered it a threat to national security. Yet, a look at the events and the response by the Administration does not demonstrate that. As suggested by the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework, the Administration did not identify the Marine Barracks bombing as a threat to national security because it did not disrupt or obstruct its goals.

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[458] Ronald Reagan, "Letter to Committee in Congress Following the Marine Barracks Bombing" (National Security Council, October 30, 1983), Box 8, Folder: [National Security Decision Directive] NSDD-109/111 Lebanon and Middle East, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Dur, Philip A. File.
[459] Brinkley, *The Reagan Diaries*, 214.

The choice to redeploy the Marines took into consideration the attack but it also took into consideration the entire context of the Lebanese conflict. Reflecting back on that decision, President Reagan asserted, "As 1984 began it was becoming clearer that the Lebanese Army was either unwilling or unable to end the civil war…It was clear that the war was likely to go on for an extended period of time…Our policy wasn't working. We could not stay and run the risk of another suicide attack on the marines. No one wanted to commit our troops to full scale war in the Middle East."[460] It is beyond the scope of this project, but it is possible the Administration reprioritized its goals, it developed other means it felt could best serve its goals in the Middle East, or competing goals inhibited the pursuit of its course. Regardless, this event was judged as a problem in light of the goals the Administration was committed to prior to the event.

[460] Reagan, *Ronald Reagan: An American Life*, 465.

Table 4. Summary of Lebanon April and October 1983

Country		Lebanon	
Time Period		March 1983 to October 1983	
Event(s)		- April 1983 American Embassy Bombing	- October 1983 Marine Barracks Bombing
Operative Goals	**Principle**	- Stop the spread of radical ideology (Communist, Islam) - Roll back Soviet expansionism - Build linkages between allies and regional friends - Demonstrate the superiority of the democratic, free-market system - Halt the spread of violence and terrorism	
	Direction	- Avoid breaking alliance commitments - Halt the spread of terrorism - Improve relations between key regional countries - Avoid shifting allegiances, restore trust - Maintain access to foreign resources and raw materials - Increase support to moderate Arab nations - Improve and demonstrate ability to deploy forces - Reduce conflict without dictating terms	
	Policy	- Remove the foreign forces from Lebanon - Build relations with Saudi Arabia to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict - Build relations with Jordan to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict - Demonstrate US support through multinational military efforts in Lebanon	
Perception of Event (i.e. benign, problem, threat)		**BENIGN**	**PROBLEM**
Judgment of Events		The US Embassy bombing was an emotional event, but did not in any way alter the perception or actions of the Administration.	The Marine Barracks bombing was judged as a "problem". The attack did not derail the Administration's present efforts or introduce a new the allocation of resources. There was no retaliation or identification of a source of imminent danger. The nature of the MNF mission was to provide a deterrent against hostile actions in Beirut and supply means to the Administration's goals. Despite the discrepancy with these goals, the Administration believed any discrepancies could be overcome with internal changes, such as tighter security.

CHAPTER 7:

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

The case studies presented here continue to test the causal mechanisms offered in the framework. The mechanisms under investigation are the presence of foreign policy goals and the administration's commitment to those goals. The second mechanism that is being examined is the administration's judgment of the events and the presence of the goals being used as a instrument in the evaluation of the event. The cases for the Clinton Administration begin with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre that took place during the Bosnian conflict. The next event is the 1994 Rwanda massacre. The final two events include the 1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia known as the Khobar Towers and the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. As seen in the previous chapter the examination will begin with a look at the goals the Clinton Administration's goal structure.

Clinton Administration Goals

The international context that was present when President Clinton entered office was vastly different than when President Reagan began his first term. Yet, despite a difference in the character of the international system, President Clinton and his administration had a very clear view of the dynamics of the international system. For this reason, the Clinton Administration had a very stable and consistent goal structure that existed from the time President Clinton entered office until he departed eight years later. The Clinton Administration's goal structure was orchestrated around the new features of the post-Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the context of the international system, but there were other changes taking place in conjunction with this event. President Clinton believed the world was changing dramatically and an entire new world was emerging.[461] President

[461] William J. Clinton, "Inaugural Address," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 20, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366.

Clinton reflected that, "It was clear to me that if my vision of twenty-first century America was to become a reality, we had to break out of yesterday's thinking and embark on a new and bold course for the future…"[462]

Having an understanding of the way the Clinton Administration understood the international system illuminates the foundation of the Administration's goal structure. There were four overarching assumptions about the world that President Clinton held. He presented these assumptions in a speech he gave in December 1991, titled A New Covenant.[463] Within this speech President Clinton provided a clear picture of how he viewed the international environment. This perspective remained throughout his presidency and he would even resurrect the new covenant terminology for his 1995 State of the Union Speech. The assumptions began with the declaration that although there was a collapse of communism, the world was even less stable and there was a new set of threats and dangers. Secondly, the world was becoming interconnected in such a way that a nation's economy was intimately tied to the health of other nation's economies. Third, the rapid pace of technology and information had elevated the power of ideas to such a point that information was regarded as a legitimate currency. Lastly, President Clinton believed that because of the interdependent nature of the global system, the division between domestic and foreign policy was blurred. Figure 9 illustrates the goal structure for the Clinton Administration.

Endurance Goals

At the top of the goal structure are the endurance goals. President Clinton was very vocal about his pursuit of agency, affiliation, and esteem. For President Clinton affiliation was crucial to bind nations together and solidify the relationships and responses states had when events occurred in the international system. He stated frequently "democracies rarely go to war with each other…traffic in terrorism…[democracies] make more reliable partners in trade and diplomacy…expand individual

[462] Bill Clinton, *Between Hope and History : Meeting America's Challenges for the 21st Century.* (New York, New York: Random House, 1996), 3.
[463] William J. Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University," December 12, 1991, Box 7, 2011-0516-S, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Foreign Policy - General #4.



Figure 8. Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure.

opportunity and social tolerance."[464] Affiliation with other democracies was viewed as central and necessary to the health and security of the US. He stated, "Global democracy means nations at peace with one another."[465] President Clinton also believed that US agency in the international system was vital for peace and stability. He declared, "our goal is constant: to make sure the United States remains the greatest force for peace and prosperity on Earth."[466] Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the US had succeeded all other states as the world's remaining superpower. President Clinton's perspective was that America had to retain its position of global leadership.[467] President Clinton did not speak directly to the US reputation in the same manner that President Reagan did, but he was just as dedicated to upholding the status of the US in the global community. This is evident in the manner in which he spoke of the US and other state's membership in international institutions. The reputation of a state to keep its commitments and to follow international norms and rules was central to strengthening the "global village" and orchestrating conflict resolution. The US was believed to provide a model for this by its own reputation and status among the other states. Whether it was explicitly understood, the Clinton Administration set out to ensure the US maintained or increased its agency, affiliation, and esteem.

Principle Goals

The desire to satisfy these endurance goals within the context of the international system led to the various principle goals that President Clinton derived. Coming out of the Cold War, President Clinton assessed that the US had been able to sustain its agency, esteem, and affiliation. Yet, as the twenty-first century approached he believed that the continued decline of the economic health of the US would begin to seriously degrade the agency, esteem, and affiliation that had been gained by virtue of being the last remaining superpower. This tied to the underlying assumption that the US economy was intimately

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[464] Governor William J. Clinton, "A Strategy for Foreign Policy: Assistance to Russia," *Vital Speeches of the Day* 58, no. 14 (May 1, 1992): 421–425.
[465] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."
[466] Clinton, *Between Hope and History : Meeting America's Challenges for the 21st Century.*, 147–148.
[467] William J. Clinton, "Forward to the Public Papers of the President of the United States, William J. Clinton" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.

connected to the world economy, led to the principle goal of strengthening the global economy. In a news conference prior to his inauguration, President-elect Clinton stated, "I am doing what I can to strengthen global economic growth...promote global growth... a commitment to global growth and economic regeneration."[468] Six month later in a speech, President Clinton stated, "We'll have to find ways to preserve the global environment and still make it possible for the economies of our world to grow."[469] The idea of a global economy captured the notion that all transactions were now done or affected globally. President Clinton expressed this when he said, "Capital clearly has become global...Products have clearly become more global….Services have become global...Most important of all, information has become global and has become king of the global economy."[470] Strengthening the global economy was so vital to President Clinton that he linked the future of the world to the health of the global economy. He exclaimed, "…for this new fabric of commerce will also shape global prosperity or the lack of it, and with it, the prospects of people around the world for democracy, freedom, and peace."[471]

Alongside the principle goal to strengthen the global economy, President Clinton sought to promote democracy. This connected well with the global economy because it was believed that democracies were more likely to adopt market-based economies, which would feed the global economy. President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, stated "The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization abroad."[472] President Clinton saw the fall of the Soviet Union as an indication that the world was on the path toward democracy. He believed the US was

[468] William J. Clinton, "Excerpts of the President-Elect's News Conference in Little Rock," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, November 12, 1992, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85225.
[469] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the New Hampshire Technical College Commencement Ceremony in Stratham, New Hampshire" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, May 22, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[470] William J. Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, February 22, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[471] Ibid.
[472] Anthony Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement," John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, September 21, 1993.

the world's hope in fostering this movement. He said, "One of the cornerstones of our foreign policy is to support the global march toward democracy and to stand by the world's new democracies."[473] He routinely pointed to the fact that democracies do no fight one another, they respect the rules of the international system, and they are more likely to settle conflicts through diplomacy.[474] The Clinton Administration was dedicated to building and expanding the community of democracies. President Clinton expressed this goal during his remarks at the UN General Assembly, "For our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression, in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace."[475] Lake made it clear when he stated, "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement -- enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."[476] President Clinton expressed this sentiment as well when he stated, "If we could make a garden of democracy and prosperity and free enterprise in every part of this globe, the world would be a safer and a better and a more prosperous place for the United States and for all of you to raise your children in."[477] A community of democracies would directly affect the endurance goals of affiliation, agency, and esteem.

Another principle goal the Clinton Administration set out to achieve was restructure or reinvent the democratic and international institutions of the international system. President Clinton voiced this to his audience in Silicon Valley, saying, "And we must look anew at institutions we use to chart our way in the global economy and ask whether they are serving our interest in this new world or whether we need to

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[473] William J. Clinton, "Statement on Sanctions Against Haiti," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 4, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46658.
[474] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, Maryland" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, April 1, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg241.pdf.
[475] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 27, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119.
[476] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[477] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."

modify them or create others."[478] Strengthening the economy and spreading democracy was seen to coincide with the establishment of institutions that would organize this new international dynamic. President Clinton envisioned that the international context reflected a very similar dynamic to what President Harry Truman faced.[479] He agreed with the principles and efforts President Truman made and praised the work to bind nations together through institutions such as NATO and GATT. With significant changes on the horizon, President Clinton believed that it was vital for the US to use this change as an opportunity to make the institutions serve US interests.[480] The two primary institutions that the Clinton Administration wanted to affect were the economic and collective security institutions.[481]

Despite the absence of a peer threat, the post-Cold War world was not void of dangers or concerns, therefore the Clinton Administration had principle goals designed to increase agency, affiliation, and esteem amid the dangers that existed. One of these principle goals was to restructure the US military in such a manner that it could effectively respond to the anticipated threats. President Clinton was asked specifically, who is the enemy, by a reporter at a news conference in June 1993. He responded, "Well, there will be different enemies. The enemy will be anybody that threatens the security and the peace of the member nations, the values that we hold important."[482] Although this is a broad statement, President Clinton and members of his administration pointed to specific dangers in the interdependent international system. In 1992 at the World Affairs Council, President Clinton stated, "One of the most dangerous new threats is the spread of military technology, especially weapons of mass destruction."[483] He expanded the list of dangers in that speech claiming,

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[478] Ibid.
[479] Ibid.
[480] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, February 26, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46220.
[481] William J. Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council," August 13, 1992, Box 7, 2011-0516-S, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Foreign Policy - General #4.
[482] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 17, 1993," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 17, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46708.
[483] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."

> "We must start with a fresh assessment of the dangers that could threaten our interests and potentially require the use of force. These include: the risk of new threats from the former Soviet republics, should democracy fail; the spread of weapons of mass destruction; historic tensions in various regions, especially the Korean peninsula and the Middle East, and the related risks of terrorist attacks; and the growing intensity of ethnic, fundamentalist and separatist violence, as in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, that can spill across borders."[484]

In his 1991 speech, President Clinton associated the need for a new military that can address the new dangers on the era.[485] In his news conference shortly after the election, President-elect Clinton stated, "…pillars of our national security and foreign policy ought to be a different but still very strong defense."[486]

In conjunction with the principle goal to restructure the military, President Clinton believed the US had to isolate states that were opposed to the global economy, liberalization, and adherence to international norms.[487] Rather than feel burdened to include all nations into the community of democracies, the Clinton Administration understood there would be some "backlash" states.[488] President Clinton expressed the discrimination when he said, "...not to mean we should deal only with democracies, or that we should try to remake the world in our image. But recent experience from Panama to Iran to Iraq shows the dangers of forging strategic relationships with despotic regimes."[489] It was these states that were the producers of all the dangers in the international system. Lake expressed this when he said,

> "When such leaders sit atop regional powers, such as Iran and Iraq, they may engage in violence and lawlessness that threatens the United States and other democracies. Such reactionary, 'backlash' states are more likely to sponsor terrorism and traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies. They are more likely to suppress their own people, foment

[484] Ibid.
[485] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."
[486] Clinton, "Excerpts of the President-Elect's News Conference in Little Rock,."
[487] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[488] Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, Maryland."
[489] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."

ethnic rivalries and threaten their neighbors...Our policy toward such states, so long as they act as they do, must seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, and technologically."[490]

In a Foreign Policy article written in the Spring 1997, Douglas Brinkley labeled the Clinton Administration's vision of democratic enlargement as "econocentric" and summarized this term by stating, Only countries with free-spending middle classes, it was believed, could become democratic and adopt the Western values of embracing ethnic diversity, protecting citizens' rights, and cooperating with the world community to stop terrorism."[491] The principle goals of enlarging the community of democracies while isolating those who inhibited the effects democracy should have on the global community went hand in hand.

In order for the new international system to thrive and for the global economy to prosper it was vital that nations did not divert their markets or attention to weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton Administration saw the existence and proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons as a major impediment to global security and prosperity. Therefore, it was imperative for the Administration to eliminate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the devices used to deliver them. President Clinton exclaimed, "I believe the United States has an obligation to try to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to slow the proliferations of weapons generally throughout the world."[492] When speaking at the UN General Assembly, President Clinton stated, "I have made nonproliferation one of our Nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationships with the world's nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for nonproliferation but increasingly open trade and technology for those states that live by

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[490] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[491] Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 106 (Spring 1997): 110–127.
[492] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With President Francois Mitterrand of France," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 9, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46314.

accepted international rules."[493] In and of itself this principle goal of pushing nonproliferation was vital to global security. Yet, it was also a way of identifying what states were willing to enter into the community of democracies and which states were on the outside, potentially causing problems. When speaking with Dan Rather during an interview, President Clinton expressed this when he said, "…the North Koreans have now given us notice that they are going to withdraw, which means they're going to put themselves outside the family of nations seeking to contain nuclear weapons. That would be a great mistake, and I hope they do not do it… The North Koreans still have a couple of months to change their mind, and I hope and pray that they will change their mind and return to the family of nations committed to restraining nuclear proliferations."[494] He made a similar comment about Iran, saying, I am more concerned about the Iranian government maintaining its militancy, perhaps supporting, in general, terrorists organizations or engaging in unsafe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for its own use or for the benefit of others. I wish Iran would come into the family of nations."[495]

President Clinton pursued principle goals that could develop a family of nations, incorporating ones that were expanding and developing economically. The Clinton Administration anticipated the growing of the global economy as being effected by as well as affecting the environment. For this reason the Clinton Administration set out to preserve the global environment. President Clinton bluntly stated, "On the environment and other global issues, our very survival depends upon the United States taking the lead."[496] Given the interdependent nature of the international system, Clinton acknowledged in his inaugural address, "The world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race: they affect us all."[497] He identified a link between the environment and the global economy. The Administration had the Office of Environmental Policy, which President Clinton created in February

[493] Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City."
[494] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 24, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46370.
[495] Ibid.
[496] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."
[497] Clinton, "Inaugural Address."

1993. In his remarks during the announcement of the new office, President Clinton stated, "This Office represents our commitment to the environment and to a new, more efficient and effective way to craft policies that work, policies that recognize that protecting the environment, strengthening the economy, promoting the global environment, and dealing with global environmental problems have all too often been relegated to the bottom of the agenda."[498]

It was understood that the principle goals of protecting the environment, spreading democracy, eliminating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and isolating "backlash states" would require the dedication of nations beyond the US. President Clinton recognized the need to strengthen the US relationship with its allies because it could positively affect other principle goals and ultimately serve the endurance goals. Therefore, the last principle goal pursued by the Clinton Administration was to strengthen alliances. Under this context, allies were not restricted narrowly, but rather encompassed any states who held to democracy and free-market ideas. President Clinton vowed in his Inaugural Address, "Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change, lest it engulf us…Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause."[499] The belief in global dangers and a global village were major motivations for strengthen alliances. This is evident in President Clinton's statement "…we must work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad."[500]

Direction Goals

The Clinton Administration remained dedicated to the eight principle goals established at the beginning of its first term. For the President Clinton and his administration, there were only a few broad objectives that were needed to secure the agency, affiliation, and esteem of the US in the existing

[498] William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the Creation of the White House Office on Environmental Policy" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, February 8, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1993-book1/pdf/PPP-1993-book1-doc-pg62-2.pdf.
[499] Clinton, "Inaugural Address."
[500] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."

international context.[501] Yet, these principle goals were broad and required direction goals in order for them to be achieved. In order to strengthen the global economy, the Clinton Administration set direction goals to serve this particular principle goal. One way to accomplish this was the Clinton Administration sought to create a new Pacific community through economic and security relationships. President Clinton understood that he could not build an Asian version of NATO. There were tensions between Japan and the US over trade. There were tensions between China and the US over human rights and weapons sales. Other states in the region were still under autocratic or authoritarian rule, such as North Korea. This complex dynamic in the region, which affected the Administration's principle goals, drove the direction goal of creating a Pacific Community. This new Pacific Community would be built on policy goals of overlapping security and economic arrangements. President Clinton described the difference between the Pacific Community versus an Asian NATO, "The challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade, instead, is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements can function like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns."[502]

It was not just security arrangements in Asia that were incorporated in the Pacific Community. Rather, it also encompassed economic arrangements. President Clinton saw that the economies of Asia had a major influence over the future of the global economy. He stated, "The emerging economic powerhouses of the Pacific are changing the financial order forever."[503] In the news conference alongside Prime Minister Kiishi Miyazawa of Japan, President Clinton mentioned the point that the US and Japan's economies combined made up 40 percent of the world's GDP.[504] Promoting a community environment in

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[501] Bill Clinton et al., *The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader : Presidential Speeches with Commentary.* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 4.
[502] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, July 10, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[503] Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, Maryland."
[504] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Kiishi Miyazawa of Japan" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, April 16, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.

the Pacific would assist in protecting the global economy and ease economic tensions that permeated the region.

President Clinton pursued a very similar concept in Europe by setting out to integrate Soviet Bloc states into the European Community. The fall of the Soviet Union helped to unleash many European states that could now participate in the global economy. It was also believed that in their transition, these nations would be strengthened by the collective security offered. This led to two direction goals. First, the Administration wanted to incorporate these European nations into the European Community in an effort to promote their inclusion into the economy and prevent them from becoming "backlash" states or to suffer from internal strife. President Clinton stimulated this goal by saying, "We are right to encourage the European Community to open its doors to those societies, perhaps by creating an affiliate status that carries some but not all of the privileges of membership." The President exclaimed his support for Europe's efforts to integrate new members.[505] He went on to say, "We believe a strong and united European Community as a key partner in the pressing problems around the world is very much in the interests of the United States."[506] This direction goal set out to serve several of the principle goals.

The direction goal associated with these Central and Eastern European states was the desire to envelope them into Europe's collective security arrangements. Alongside the growth of the European Community was the enlargement of NATO. President Clinton voiced the dedication he had to Europe and its security when he said, "We believe that American and European securities remain indivisible, and that the common threads of the post-cold-war era require common action."[507] NATO was a crucial element of European security. President Clinton stated, "The clearest example I know to give you that NATO is not dead was provided by the leaders of all the Eastern European countries that used to be Communist that

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[505] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference with European Community Leaders," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, May 7, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46534.
[506] Ibid.
[507] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 26, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46377.

aren't anymore. When they came here a few weeks ago for the Holocaust dedication, every one of those Presidents said that their number one priority was to get into NATO."[508] The direction goal of enlarging NATO aimed at solidifying the stability of Europe. It is important to note that although this was a direction goal the Administration had since the beginning it, was not prioritized until the second term. The direction goal of building the European community and facilitating new economic relationship had to come first. It was also essential to delay the expansion because it was in direct competition with another direction goal, Russia's transition and ensuring President Boris Yeltsin's liberalization policies took hold..

Even prior to taking office President Clinton vowed to support Russia's reforms and transition to democracy. On April 1, 1992 Governor Clinton gave a speech outlining his goals for assisting Russia. He pointed to the principle goal of spreading democracy and the direction goal of assisting Russia's transition at the opening of the speech. He said, "Today I want to discuss what America must do to secure democracy's triumph around the world, and most of all, in the former Soviet Empire."[509] He went on to explicitly state that it was imperative to assist Russia and "no security issue was more urgent".[510] A democratization of Russia was viewed to be a major combatant against the dangers of the new era. In his speech Governor Clinton painted the picture by asking, "What does a democratic Russia mean to Americans?"[511] He answered saying, "Lower defense spending. A reduced nuclear threat. A diminished risk of environmental disasters. Fewer arms exports and less proliferation. Access to Russia's vast resources through peaceful commerce. And the creation of a major new market for American goods and services."[512] A month after being in office, President Clinton reiterated the direction goal and highlighted the implications if it was not followed. He exclaimed,

> "The perils facing Russia and other former Soviet republics are especially acute and especially important to our future…If the economic reforms begun by President Yeltsin are abandoned, if

[508] Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 17, 1993."
[509] Clinton, "A Strategy for Foreign Policy: Assistance to Russia."
[510] Ibid.
[511] Ibid.
[512] Ibid.

> hyperinflation cannot be stemmed, the world will suffer. Consider the implications for Europe if millions of Russian citizens decide they have no alternative but to flee to the West where wage are 50 times higher. Consider the implication for the global environment if all the Chernobyl-style nuclear plants are forced to start operating there without spare parts, when we should be in a phased stage of building them down, closing them up, cleaning them up. If we are willing to spend trillions of dollars to ensure communism's defeat in the cold war, surely we should be willing to invest a tiny fraction of that to support democracy's success where communism failed."

It was not merely Russia that Clinton Administration sought to lift out of communism and into the community of nation. He also applied the same reasoning and direction goal to the Central and Eastern European Soviet Bloc nations.[513]

Russia and the post-Soviet Bloc nations were not the only nations the Clinton Administration believed it could pursue in it effort to spread democracy and free market economies. China was another country the Administration sought to draw into the international community. Due to the fact that China was not pursuing democratic institutions in the same manner as Russia, the direction goal was slightly different. Rather than assist China in a transition to democracy (i.e. an approach goal), the Administration sought to prevent isolating China (i.e. avoidance goal). Lake expressed the balance that was required to see that China was incorporated, but that its illiberal policies were not rewarded. He stated, "We cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalization, but we may be able to help steer some of them down that path while providing penalties that raise the costs of repression and aggressive behavior. These efforts have special meaning for our relations with China. That relationship is one of the most important in the world, for China will increasingly be a major world power, and along with our ties to Japan and Korea, our relationship with China will strongly shape both our security and economic interests in Asia."[514]

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[513] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."
[514] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."

Closely linked to the direction goals of assisting Russia, China, and post-Soviet Bloc states in pursuing liberalized policies, the Clinton Administration developed direction goals to address the possession and distribution of weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton set a direction goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Russia and the four Soviet republics that had them. He stated, "…we're going to have to work to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We've got to keep going until all those nuclear weapons in Russia are gone and the other Republics."[515] He understood the risk that existed with nuclear-armed countries that were on the edge of unstable domestic politics. He expressed this concern early on, "We must start with a fresh assessment of the dangers that could threaten our interests and potentially require the use of force. These include: the risk of new threats from the former Soviet republics, should democracy fail; the spread of weapons of mass destruction…"[516] A reporter asked President Clinton what his top priorities would be in office. President Clinton responded citing the direction goal of reducing nuclear weapons with Russia and other nuclear powers.[517]

The Clinton Administration aimed their non-proliferation efforts toward other states beyond just Russia and European nations. Another direction goal was to increase the number of nations that would support nonproliferation agreements. This included North Korea, China, and India. Reflecting back in his memoirs, President Clinton remarked on the dedication he had toward this direction goal. He exclaimed, "I was determined to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal, even at the risk of war."[518] Parallel to this was another direction goal aimed at reducing the ability for states to sell and transfer nuclear technology. President Clinton understood the impact that the transfer of nuclear technology could have, especially in unstable environments. He predicted and warned, "One of the most dangerous new threats is the spread of military technology, especially weapons of mass destruction. We can't afford to

[515] William J. Clinton, "Presidential Debate at the University of Richmond," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 20, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46366.
[516] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."
[517] Clinton, "Excerpts of the President-Elect's News Conference in Little Rock,."
[518] Bill Clinton, *My Life.* (New York, New York: Knopf, 2004), 591.

wait until a host of Third World nations acquire fill arsenals of First World weapons."[519] The spread of nuclear technology was the precursor to the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; so establishing a direction goal to inhibit this distribution of technology served the principle goal of halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The one domain that the Clinton Administration did want to see proliferation was in the area of trade and the export of US products. In an effort to strengthen the global economy, the Clinton Administration set three direction goals. One of the direction goals was to specifically increase the number of countries open to US markets.[520] In conjunction with this pursuit of opening markets, the Administration sought to expand trade to areas of the world that were previously isolated. Describing the connection between these direction goals and the principle goal of strengthening the global economy, President Clinton stated, "Standing as we are on the edge of a new century, we know that economic growth depends as never before on opening up new markets overseas and expanding the volume of world trade. And so, we will insist on fair trade rules in international markets as a part of a national economic strategy to expand trade…"[521] The focus on exports and international markets sprung from the increase in the US domestic economy becoming more reliant on imports and exports. In a speech given to the Silicon Graphics employees, President Clinton relayed that, "Imports and exports, which accounted for about $1 in $10 when I was growing up, now represent $1 in every $5. Nearly three-quarters of the things that we make in America are subject to competition at home or abroad from foreign producers and foreign providers of services."[522] The Clinton Administration viewed exports and international markets as key elements to the US domestic economy and the overall global economy.

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[519] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."
[520] Ibid.
[521] William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, Miller Center," Miller Center at University of Virginia, February 17, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3435.
[522] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."

The Clinton Administration viewed the global economy the center around which the international system rotated, and the US as the "world's strongest engine of growth and progress…world's largest producer and its largest and most open market."[523] Therefore, it was seen as imperative to establish the direction goal of breaking down existing trade barriers, in order that the effects of the US economy and other strong economies could penetrate developing nations. Although the goals of expanding trade and decreasing trade barriers could be seen as synonymous, they are distinct. The difference is in the target or object of the goal. Expanding trade is aimed at nations that have not had trade relations with the US or other Western nations before, specifically developing nations. Decreasing trade barriers is aimed at countries that have had trade relations with the US, but have over time placed restrictions or constraints on US goods or services creating a trade deficit. The Clinton Administration was pursuing both direction goals, which were closely tied to strengthening the global economy as well as to the principle goal of spreading democracy.

President Clinton also set the direction goal of advancing peace in the Middle East, which supported both the principle goals of strengthening the global economy and spreading democracy, as well as eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, isolating countries who opposed the promotion of democracy and free market economies. The Clinton Administration, like previous administrations, understood the economic, military, and political implications of ignoring the boiling tensions of the Middle East. In his December 1991 speech, President Clinton expressed, "We need a broader policy toward the Middle East that seeks to limit the flow of arms into the region, as well as the materials needed to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction; promotes democracy and human rights; and preserves our strategic relationship with the one democracy in the region: Israel."[524] The Clinton Administration sought to keep the pace process between Israel and the Palestinians on track, and similar to President Reagan, aimed to expand the number of Arab countries willing to align with Israel,

[523] Ibid.
[524] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."

such as Jordan.[525] In February 1993, President Clinton demonstrated his dedication to his direction goal by sending Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the Middle East for his first trip. President Clinton stated, "In accord with my pledge to maintain continuity in the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, I have decided to dispatch Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East. His purpose will be to convey to all the parties my commitment to advance the peace negotiations… It is an indication of the priority my administration attaches to peacemaking in the Middle East."[526] A direction goal of advancing peace in the Middle East inherently focused on the peace talks, therefore, it led the Administration to continue the path laid previously by earlier Administrations.

Two other direction goals set by the Clinton Administration included promoting growth in the developing world and preventing the overspill of refugees. With the increase in ethnic strife and regional tensions, the Clinton Administration anticipated an increase in refugees. It was important for the administration to limit or inhibit this outcome because refugee flows negatively impacted a nation's economy, both established economies and developing economies. This view was expressed in the Presidential Review Directive 36, "…ethnic conflict, chaos, war or massive flows of refugees anywhere can threaten stability everywhere, including in the most advanced Western European democracies."[527] When highlighting the dangers the world faced in this new era, President Clinton would include the "flow of refugees" in the list of security concerns.[528] In speaking about the benefits of being a democracy, President Clinton stated, "They do not wage war on each other, practice terrorism, *generate refugees,* or traffic in drugs and outlaw weapons."[529] When describing where the US will focus its interests, Lake commented, "Thus, we must target our effort to assist states that affect our strategic interests, such as

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[525] Clinton, "Excerpts of the President-Elect's News Conference in Little Rock,."
[526] William J. Clinton, "Statement on Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher's Trip to the Middle East" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, February 4, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[527] Anthony Lake, "Presidential Review Directive/NSC-36 U.S Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe," May 27, 1993, 2010-0190-M, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Anthony Lake.
[528] Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul."
[529] Ibid. (emphasis mine)

those with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies."[530] He was identifying the criteria based on regions or states that produced refugee issues.

Policy Goals

The direction goals set by President Clinton and pursued by his administration supplied means to achieve the principle goals. Although the direction goals were more concrete, their achievement was facilitated by even specific sub-goals, or policy goals. It is not necessary to list all the policy goals generated, but some will be presented in order to demonstrate the hierarchical structure of President Clinton's foreign policy goals and their interconnected nature. President Clinton set the policy goals of getting North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) passed. These specific policy goals fed the direction goals of opening markets to US goods, decreasing trade barriers, and expanding trade. President Clinton made this clear regarding GATT when he relayed to the Silicon Graphics employees, "Certainly we need to seek to open other nations' markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade. That is why I'm committed to a prompt and successful completion of the Uruguay round of the GATT talks."[531] He reiterated this sentiment in a news conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl from Germany saying, "we conferred on trade and economics. We agreed that we must work hard to conclude the Uruguay GATT round this year, and we committed to work closely together in this endeavor."[532] Concerning NAFTA, he stated, "And these agreements, once concluded, can act as a magnet including other countries to drop barriers and to open their trading systems. The North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example."[533] In conjunction with the GATT talks and NAFTA, President Clinton also pursued the policy goal of hosting state leaders at the Asia Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in an effort to liberalize

[530] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[531] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."
[532] Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany."
[533] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."

trade in the Pacific.[534] Lake pointed out why focusing on institutional structures was a emphasis of the Clinton Administration's policy goals. He stated,

> "And it is why enactment of NAFTA is one of the President's top priorities...Unless the major market democracies act together -- updating international economic institutions, coordinating macroeconomic policies and striking hard but fair bargains on the ground rules of open trade -- the fierce competition of the new global economy, coupled with the end of our common purpose from the Cold War, could drive us into prolonged stagnation or even economic disaster."[535]

President Clinton and his administration set their policy goals to create a lasting economic structure that would open trade, increase US access to markets, and ultimately serve the principle goal of strengthening the global economy.

When it came to spreading democracy and democratic ideas, President Clinton had developed another set of policy goals. Even prior to entering office, President Clinton had set the goals to create a Democratic Corps. The idea was born out of mirroring the Peace Corp, but the intention was to supply developing nations a population of people who could help them cultivate democratic institutions.[536] He also set a policy goal to create a new Radio Free Asia to "deploy accurate news and information against Asia's closed societies."[537] He also pursued the policy goals of restoring democracy to Haiti and recognizing Ukraine's independence. The Clinton Administration set policy goals aimed at supporting or facilitating nations that demonstrated a commitment toward democracy or a liberalized movement.

Spreading democracy through Russia and the Soviet Bloc nations was a dominant direction goal of the Clinton Administration. In order to accomplish this President Clinton set various policy goals. He sought to increase the food aid to Russia, assist in privatizing their businesses, and assist in running their

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[534] Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul"; Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany."
[535] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[536] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."
[537] Ibid.; Clinton, "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul"; Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."

energy businesses more efficiently.[538] Tied closely to the economic context, which supported building Russia's free market, was an effort to control the military context. The direction goal of the reducing the weapons of mass destruction in Russia was interconnected with fostering economic stability. In order to accomplish this President Clinton set various policy goals related to Russia's access to weapons. These goals included demilitarizing Russia and Soviet Bloc societies and supporting political and economic institutional changes.[539] Along side this was the policy goal to deactivate nuclear weapons scheduled for elimination under the START I Treaty.[540] He also set out to accelerate the dismantling of nuclear weapons on Russia's and neighboring state's territory.

President Clinton and his administration felt they were entering office at the start of a new era in international politics. It was believed that the previous administration's new world order vision did not fully capture the changing dynamics of the global economy, technology, intrastate versus interstate conflict, and transnational dangers. President Clinton set his sights on ushering America into this new era through the principle, direction, and policy goals he devised. According to the Clinton Administration, the US was at the heart of the future, leading the global economy and the march toward democracy. He built his goals to address the international environment the administration faced and anticipated facing. The Clinton Administration's goal structure was consistent with its perception of the international system and an understanding of the economic, political, and military mechanics needed to ensure American agency, affiliation, and esteem. This goals structure also persisted throughout the Clinton Administration's eight years. It will become evident in the case studies that the elements of this goal structure, which reflects the administration's vision and interests, would affect which events would be perceived to threaten US national security.

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[538] Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News."
[539] Clinton, "A Strategy for Foreign Policy: Assistance to Russia."
[540] William J. Clinton, "Statement on Advancing U.S. Relations With Russia and the Other New Independent States" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, April 23, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.

The events included within Clinton Administration case study are the Rwandan Massacre that occurred in April 1994, the massacre that occurred in July 1995 during the Bosnian conflict in the village of Srebrenica, and the terrorist bombings of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. These events will be examined to uncover the causal mechanisms presented in the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework. The first mechanism to identify is the presence of operative goals the Clinton Administration was committed to prior to the event. The second mechanism to identify is whether the Administration used the operative goals when judging the event. Just as the events in the Reagan Administration were discussed, a historical context will be presented. This will be followed by an observation of the operative goals the Administration demonstrated a commitment to prior to the event. Next the type of perception will be identified to determine which category it would be: "none", "problem", or "threat" perception. Finally, there will be an assessment as to whether the Administration used the operative goals to construct their understanding or perception of the event. This pattern of examination will be conducted for each event. The result will determine whether the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework helps to explain whether foreign policy goals affect elite decision-makers' perception of international events and condition when they will be considered threats to national security.

CHAPTER 8:

RWANDA: COUP & MASSACRE, APRIL 1994

Over the course of three months, beginning in April 1994, nearly one million were killed in Rwanda. Despite the short time period, the shear efficiency of the killing occurred at a rate five times greater than that of the Nazis.[541] The United Nations General Assembly decried the crime of genocide in December 1948. The Contracting Parties of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide confirmed, "…whether in time of peace or in time of war, [genocide] is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."[542] The United States is a Contracting Party to this UN Convention. For this reason alone it would be expected that the events that occurred in Rwanda would objectively sparked a threat perception for the Clinton Administration. Although it was a intrastate conflict in the land-locked state of Rwanda, the effects of indiscriminate killing on a population impacts the lives of a nation's citizens in a manner that is detrimental to the political and economic stability of the nation and ultimately the region. The Clinton Administration emphasized the dangerous effects of civil conflict. President Clinton voices this by highlighting, "Ethnic hatreds, religious strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the violation of human rights flagrantly in altogether too many places around the world still call on us to have a sense of national security…"[543] He expressed bluntly that, "Resurgent ethnic conflict is challenging the very meaning of the nation-state."[544] IN the Presidential Decision Directive-25 President Clinton stated, "…armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which spill across international borders), an the total collapse of governmental authority in some states

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[541] Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London, England: Zed Books, 2006), 4.
[542] Christina Dendy, "War Crimes and Tribunals: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide..," *Defining Documents: Post War* (July 2015): 16.
[543] Clinton, "Remarks and a Question-and Answer Session with Silicon Graphics Employees in Mountain View, California."
[544] Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, Maryland."

are now among the threats to world peace."[545] With this level of impact that the President Clinton attributed to ethnic strife, it would be expected that the Clinton Administration would have perceived the violence and devastation in Rwanda as a threat. Yet, the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, followed by the vicious acts of aggression on a single people group, did not garner a threat perception. It did not even spark a problem perception from the Clinton Administration.

Historical Background

This section will provide a brief history of the Hutu and Tutsi relationship and the international communities involvement in the country leading up to the events. It has been documented that the first Europeans to visit Rwanda were Germans in 1894, 100 years prior to the explosion of violence.[546] After World War II, a League of Nations mandate gave Rwanda and Burundi to the Belgians to administer. That mandate categorized Rwanda and Burundi. According to the League of Nations, the Rwanda and Burundi fell into the category that declared self-determination was not feasible; therefore, the Belgians would be solely responsible for the selection of the governing party and laws.[547] The people of Rwanda were broken into three groups, the Hutu (84%), Tutsi (15%), or Twa (1%). These demographics were not divided along ethnic lines for they all spoke the same language, shared the same religion, and lived in the same villages.[548] Rather the distinction was based on the type of profession they held; the Twa were nomads, the Hutu were farmers, and the Tutsi were cattle-herders.[549] Influenced by Darwinian philosophy, the Europeans believed that the Tutsi were superior and more capable to govern than the Hutus because their origin. This was determined by their physical features (i.e. lighter skin tone, angular features, taller, etc.), which provided indication they may have come from European decent.[550] In 1926, the Belgian administrators established laws that excluded the Hutu from certain government positions and

[545] William J. Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-25, U.S. Policy on Reformin Multilateral Peace Operations" (White House, May 3, 1994), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html, Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
[546] Dean White, "An African Holocaust," *History Today* 64, no. 6 (June 2014): 40.
[547] Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 9.
[548] White, "An African Holocaust," 40.
[549] Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 8.
[550] Ibid., 11.

restricted their education. In 1933, a census was taken and "Every Rwandan was counted and measured: the height, the length of their noses, the shape of their eyes. Everyone was classified: the Tutsi were taller, the Hutu were shorter and broader…Every Rwandan was classified and given an identity card."[551]

After World War II, the UN continued the League of Nations mandate for Rwanda and Burundi and would send missions down to monitor the Belgian administrators. Although the UN missions criticized the Belgians for using the Hutus as a labor force and for the evident harsh treatment of the Hutus, nothing changed. In the late 1950s, the tide was turning and it appeared Rwandan independence would soon be granted. In light of this the Hutus began to become more politically active and formed political parties in hopes of gaining representation in government. The reigning Rwandan king was killed in 1959 and the Hutus were quick to blame Tutsi youth.[552] Belgium established a military rule under Belgian Colonel Guy Logiest. He anticipated the changing political winds and with a majority of the country being Hutus, believed they must be incorporated into government to prevent political upheaval. Upon taking power, he rapidly began replacing the ruling Tutsi chiefs for Hutus.[553] This reversal remained while the nation gained its independence on July 1, 1962. From this time through the events of April 1994, the Hutus had control of the Rwandan government. Rwanda's first elected president, Gregoire Kayibanda, was coined the father of Hutu nationalism. As a result of strong Hutu nationalism and dominant Hutu political presence, in short order, Tutsis began to be persecuted causing thousands to flee to the neighboring countries of Burundi and Uganda.[554]

When Rwanda secured its independence, Belgium pulled its administrators and personnel out of the country, but still continued diplomatic and economic relations. France found an opportunity to step in to offer military assistance building a strong French-Rwandan alliance. In December 1963, over a year after Hutus gained political dominance in the newly independent Rwanda, Tutsis that had been exiled

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[551] Ibid., 10–11.
[552] White, "An African Holocaust," 42.
[553] Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*, 17.
[554] White, "An African Holocaust," 42.

incited a rebellion against the Hutu government.[555] This effort was met by a severe response from the Rwandan Government, and over 10,000 Tutsis were killed. This event would lay the groundwork for the militias and perpetrators of the genocide thirty years later.

In 1973, Rwanda Defense Minister Juvenal Habyarimana over threw President Kayibanda in a coup and became the new president. He was welcomed by Rwandans because of his Hutu nationalism and remained in office for twenty-one years until his assassination. Shortly after taking office, in 1975, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing signed a military cooperation and training agreement in Paris with President Habyarimana.[556] This agreement allowed the French to supply and train the Rwandan national police and militia forces, which were dominated by Hutu. In 1988, the exiled Tutsi's in Uganda had created its own political and military arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was created in an effort to secure the return of the 500,000-plus Tutsi refugees displaced in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.[557] The RPF pursued diplomatic efforts with President Habyarimana to negotiate for their return. Rwanda was one of the most densely populated African nations with over 7 million people occupying a country the size of Wales, so President Habyarimana cited population and economic reasons behind his unwillingness to allow their return.

Negotiations failed and on October 1, 1990, the RPF resorted to force, invading Rwanda and threatening the government. All of the RPF successes were short lived due to the military support President Habyarimana received from France, Belgium, Egypt, and South Africa.[558] During this time, the French also responded with Operation Noroît, providing personnel, training, and military equipment to

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[555] Ibid.
[556] Hazel Cameron, "The French Connection: Complicity in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.," *African Security* 8, no. 2 (April 2015): 100.
[557] Department of State, "Rwanda Refugee Fact Sheet," March 15, 1994, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB464/docs/Document%2013.pdf, National Security Archive, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
[558] Central Intelligence Agency, "Central Intelligence Memorandum for National Security Council, Re: Rwanda: Background to the Crisis," April 9, 1994, 2, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [10] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).

the Habyarimana government in an effort to repel the RPF invasion.[559] They were assisted by Belgium and Zaire.[560] It is important to note that in the two years just prior to the genocide, Rwanda was the third largest arms importer in the world despite being one of the smallest African nations.[561]

On January 9, 1991, three months after the fighting broke out, the United States took notice and began to provide economic assistance to Rwandan refugees fleeing the civil war. President Bush authorized "$600,000 for emergency assistance programs in Central Africa for new Chadian and Rwandan refugees and those uprooted by the current conflict in Rwanda."[562] After being repelled but then gaining some ground in the north, the RPF voiced a willingness to negotiate a peace agreement. In July 1992, the President George H. W. Bush sent Assistant Secretary of State for African Herman Cohen to support the efforts started by OAU and further encourage the peace negotiations between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF.[563] A ceasefire was established to allow for the negotiations to occur. Despite the existence of a ceasefire, massacres were perpetrated by the Habyarimana government in December 1993 and January 1994, one of which resulted in the death of 300 people.[564] On February 8, the RPF launched an attack in retaliation for these massacres. By March 1993, hostilities calmed and peace talks resumed, yet, accusations were being levied that Uganda was supporting the RPF and supplying arms. Given the inability of the parties to establish the truth, in May 1993, there was agreement that resolution would only

[559] Cameron, "The French Connection: Complicity in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.," 101.
[560] Clifford Krauss, "3-Nation Force Helps Rwanda Meet Tutsi Invaders," *New York Times* (New York, New York, October 6, 1990).
[561] Cameron, "The French Connection: Complicity in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.," 103.
[562] George H. W. Bush, "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on United States Assistance for Liberia and Other Refugee Relief Efforts," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 9, 1991, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19203.
[563] Joyce E. Leader, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Joyce Leader, Deputy Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali," PBS Frontline, April 1, 2004, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/leader.html.
[564] National Security Council African Affairs, "Press Guidance on Rwanda," February 23, 1993, OA/ID 502, Folder: Rwanda, 1993, [2] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs); Leader, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Joyce Leader, Deputy Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali."

come through a border monitoring force. Therefore, the parties requested a force from the UN that would help discern the source of arms coming into Rwanda from the border between Uganda and Rwanda.[565]

The UN approved the UN Observer Mission – Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR) on June 22, 1993, which would be a multinational force funded by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) states and located on the Ugandan side of the border.[566] Prior to this resolution coming through, on June 11, the Government of Rwanda and RPF also requested a neutral international peacekeeping force (NIF) be provided by the UN to facilitate the execution of the peace accord, primarily demobilization of arms and formation of the new government. Given the support the French, Belgium, and Zaire government had in arming President Habyarimana police and military forces during the 1990 invasion, they were asked to be excluded from the NIF. Interestingly, it was the French that put forth a resolution to the UN Security Council regarding the establishment of a NIF. During the proposal, the France was seeking US support on the matter, hoping that a NIF in Rwanda would allow them to withdraw the 400 troops that were currently stationed in country. While delayed negotiations were being conducted within the UN Security Council regarding the NIF, the RPF and President Habyarimana signed the Ashura Peace Accord on August 4, 1993. At the time the peace agreement was signed, there was the UNOMUR force in Uganda and the UN expanded its Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) from 50 to 130 personnel. The Government of Rwanda and the RPF delayed initiating the peace accord conditions until the NIF was approved.

The dialogue between UN Security Council members over the French-initiated resolution to supply a NIF to Rwanda to secure the Ashura Peace Accords was concluded in October 1993. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was comprised of roughly 2500 personnel and was deployed at the end of October. By December, the Government of Rwanda and the RPF agreed on the transitional government and the Transitional National Assembly, but there was some conflict in placing people in position within the government. Hutu nationalists opposed the peace accords and the new government

[565] United Nations, "Interim Report to the Secretary General of UN on Rwanda Re: UNOMR," May 20, 1993, OA/ID 502, Folder: Rwanda, 1993, [2] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).
[566] Ibid.

structure primarily because of the power sharing and inclusion of Tutsi officials.[567] The American Embassy in Kigali sent word to Washington that witnesses saw young men in Hutu refugee camps were being trained for military action.[568] Radio programs sponsored by Hutu nationalist and the Rwandan government that had been airing since October fueled this distrust and animosity. The radio broadcasts claimed the Tutsis were seeking power and revenge after years in exile.[569] This helped feed political tensions and spark demonstrations and political activities that led to violent outbursts in the beginning months of 1994.[570] During this time the UNAMIR was still assisting in the conditions of the Ashura Peace Accords. The UNAMIR was initially scheduled to be in Rwanda for six months, but on April 5, 1994 the mandate was extended through the end of the summer. Despite the positive impressions at the UN regarding the movement toward political stability, political turmoil exploded when the plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down as it approached the airport in Kigali, Rwanda, on April 6, 1994. Violence erupted and for the next 100 days, over 8,000 people were killed per day.

Operative Goals Prior to Event

The operative goals for the Clinton Administration from the time the president entered office throughout the 15-month period leading up to the April 1994 event were crafted in light of the ongoing civil war in Rwanda. Yet, Rwanda was not the only nation that was in turmoil when the Clinton Administration entered the White House, it also faced conflicts in Bosnia, . An effort to minimize and ultimately eliminate the danger of internal conflict and ethnic rivalries were already incorporated into President Clinton's goal structure. Three of the principle goals were aimed directly at this rising trend in

[567] Leader, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Joyce Leader, Deputy Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali."
[568] American Embassy in Kigali, "Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to Secretary of State, Re: Potential Regional Tensions," December 1, 1993, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB464/docs/Document%207.pdf, National Security Archive, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
[569] White, "An African Holocaust," 43.
[570] "New Government Is Delayed As Violence Rocks Rwanda," *New York Times* (New York, New York, February 24, 1994); "U.S. Issues Warning On Travel in Rwanda," *New York Times* (New York, New York, March 13, 1994).

violent political and social disagreements: spreading democracy, strengthening the global economy, and restructuring military forces to address these new dangers. All of these principle goals were operative and applied to Africa and its developing nations. Figure 10 below illustrates the operative goals for the Clinton Administration in Africa.

As a direction goal, President Clinton was committed to increasing the community of democracies through developing nations, even on the forgotten continent of Africa. The first speech given by President Clinton's National Security Advisor was at the Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon on May 3, 1993. In this speech Lake pointed out that although there is continuing conflict across the African continent, there was a "new wave of democratic reform…a new movement toward market economies and integration with the global economy; promising new efforts at conflict resolution and peacekeeping…"[571] He would go on to say, "I believe the most important change for Africa's long-term prospects is the Continent's new progress toward democracy."[572]

The administration was clear as to why it sought to promote democracy in Africa, Lake states, "The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism. They are more trustworthy in diplomacy and do a better job of respecting the human rights of their people. These dynamics lay at the heart of Woodrow Wilson's most profound insights; although his moralism sometimes weakened his argument, he understood that our own security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes."[573] This principle goal of spreading democracy was not naively pursed, especially in difficult regions of the world. President Clinton and his foreign policy team understood the difficulties that came with growing stable democratic institutions. Therefore, policy goals

[571] Anthony Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake at Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon," May 3, 1993, Box 420, Folder: [Anthony] Lake - Brookings Africa Speech - 5/3/1993; Box#20; 2006-0460-F, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Speechwriting - Boorstin, Robert.
[572] Ibid., 2.
[573] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."



Figure 9. Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure - Africa

were designed to account for these challenges while serving the higher order goals.

One of the policy goals the Clinton Administration pursued, in an effort to encourage change in Africa, was to reward countries that made movements toward democratic institutions and market economies. This goal was articulated in President Clinton's 1991, New Covenant Speech. Evidence of his commitment to this goal is observed when President Clinton lifted the sanctions against South Africa. In his statement, President Clinton justified the lifting of sanctions, stating, "Yesterday's action by the South African Parliament to create a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and today's announcement by the ANC are watershed events in the history of South Africa and its movement toward a nonracial democracy…We must now respect the judgment of the leaders of South Africa and move to lift our remaining economic sanctions. We will be taking steps necessary to permit lending to South Africa from the International Monetary Fund."[574] There were also punishments for nations who failed to persist in the movement toward democracy. An example of this was, just two days after rewarding South Africa; President Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting transactions with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) the second-largest political party in Angola.[575] For the Clinton Administration this policy goal was linked to supporting developing countries transition to democracy, and therefore the higher-order goal of spreading democracy. Commitment to the specific policy goal of supplying economic rewards or punishments focused the decision-makers attention on certain democratic institutions and markers of reform.

A key policy goal the Clinton Administration was committed to, which was aimed at building up specific democratic institutions, by fostering a civil society within these various countries. This was one of the goals the administration sought in Somalia. President Clinton praised the efforts of US military

[574] William J. Clinton, "Statement on Lifting Economic Sanctions Against South Africa," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 24, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47109.
[575] William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 12865—Prohibiting Certain Transactions Involving UNITA," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 26, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=61559.

personnel specifically citing the work done to rebuild a civil society.[576] He emphasized the importance of this effort, saying, "Although there is still much to be done if enduring peace is to prevail, one can now envision a day when Somalia will be reconstructed as a functioning civil society."[577] In September 1993, Lake reiterated the commitment to "strengthening the pillars of civil society" within the African nations.[578] Joyce Leader was Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Rwanda beginning in August 1991. She was tasked with helping strengthen civil society, receiving funding from USAID for a 5-year, $5 million democracy project target the nation's civil society.[579]

The effort to spread democracy, especially in economically, politically, and militarily unstable areas, was sought through the Administration's direction goal of increasing multilateral cooperation. President Clinton pursued this direction goal through thee different policy goals. One of these policy goals was to establish a robust peacekeeping operation through the UN. President Clinton was deeply committed to the mission of the UN and believed strongly in its ability to prevent conflicts. He claimed, "U.N. peacekeeping holds the promise to resolve many of this era's conflicts."[580] Yet, in order to accomplish this given the material resources available, the UN had to reform its current peacekeeping operation. This goal was explicitly laid out in President Clinton's address to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly. It was acknowledged that peacekeeping operations were increasing in the post-Cold War era, affecting the nations supplying the bulk of support.

For President Clinton, a reform of UN peacekeeping operations consisted of logistical changes as well as operational changes. In an effort to reform the UN peacekeeping operation, President Clinton sought to influence the types of conflicts the UN and ultimately the US would contribute troops to. The direction of Presidential Review Directive/NSC-13 and development of Presidential Decision

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[576] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Operation Restore Hope," Miller Center at University of Virginia, May 5, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-4564.
[577] Ibid.
[578] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[579] Joyce E. Leader, "Genocide in Rwanda and the Kigali Diplomatic Corps," *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association* (August 24, 2005): 6.
[580] Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City."

Directive/NSC-25 were the products of the Administration's commitment to this goal. During the unveiling of PDD/NSC-25 in May 1994, Lake commented, "the essence of the policy is what we have been following since approximately I say last fall, late last summer…"[581] President Clinton was using the key elements of the PDD/NSC-25 when assessing conflicts as early as June 1993.[582] President Clinton was not interested as he said, "remaking the world in our image," but he was interested in aiding countries on the path to liberalization.[583] It was vital to US interests to ensure the UN was not using global resources to resolve the conflicts in every corner of the world. Rather, the Clinton Administration aimed to drive the UN toward applying peacekeepers to areas where final reconciliation and democratic transition were viable. The UN mission in Somalia was a textbook example of the type of UN peacekeeping mission the Clinton Administration was encouraging the UN to pursue. Lake commented that Somalia offered an example of the principle the US desired the UN to follow.[584]

The second policy goal aimed at increasing multilateralism was to bolster the regional involvement, specifically in Africa and Asia. These two regions lacked robust formal security or economic. In Africa, the OAU was established, but it was viewed to lack the logistical and operational means to support the number of regional conflicts. President Clinton was dedicated to bolstering the regional institutions. Lake explained, "…the Organization of African Unity, have shown promise in recent years, and we need to help build their capacity to engage early and effectively."[585] The African Affairs office within the State Department specifically cited strengthening the OAU in an effort to relieve the UN of being overburdened.[586]

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[581] Anthony Lake and Wesley Clark, "Press Briefing By National Security Advisor Tony Lake And Director For Strategic Plans And Policy General Wesley Clark," White House Press Secretary, May 5, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25_brief.htm.
[582] Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 17, 1993."
[583] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."
[584] Lake and Clark, "Press Briefing By National Security Advisor Tony Lake And Director For Strategic Plans And Policy General Wesley Clark."
[585] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake at Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon."
[586] Edward Brynn, "Memorandum from Edward Brynn to Douglas Bennett, Re: Rwanda: UN/OAU Peacekeeping Initiatives," May 27, 1993, OA/ID 502, Folder: Rwanda, 1993, [2] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).

The Clinton Administration was committed to a third policy goal that supported an increase in multilateralism. The policy goal was providing humanitarian relief to conflict areas. Supplying humanitarian aid by nature promoted multilateral cooperation. If one country supplied the food another country could support its delivery. One country could fund the supplies and resources while another country provided personnel to ensure its distribution. This policy goal not only supported the direction goal of increasing multilateralism, but it also was able to facilitate the direction goals of increasing the credibility of the UN and increasing the public's trust in global engagement. In a press conference with the Prime Minister of Japan, President Clinton expressed his commitment to this effort. He said, "If we do not strengthen the capacity to resolve conflict among and within nations, those conflicts will smother the birth of free institutions, threaten the development of entire regions, and continue to take innocent lives."[587] IN another news conference, President Clinton also praised the cooperative efforts Egypt was making in addressing regional conflicts in Africa.[588]

The Clinton Administration fought a rising voice throughout the country and in Congress to limit America's engagement in the world. Yet, President Clinton's goals required US influence and action around the world. Therefore, it was vital to secure public support of the institutions the Clinton Administration aimed to use in this endeavor, as well as, enlist public support for US leadership. This pursuit is visible in President Clinton's decisions in Somalia. In a press conference President Clinton stated, "Our objectives were clear: The U.N. sought to preserve the credibility of peacekeeping in Somalia and around the world, to get the food moving again, and to restore security." The connection is also demonstrated with Lake's statements on the Administration's humanitarian strategy, "Our humanitarian actions nurture the American public's support for our engagement abroad. Our humanitarian efforts also can stimulate democratic and market development in many areas of the world. Ultimately, the world

[587] Clinton, "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Kiishi Miyazawa of Japan."
[588] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 6, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46404.

trusts our leadership in that broader effort in part because it witnesses our humanitarian deeds…"[589] When violence erupted in Somalia in October 1993 killing 18 Americans, President Clinton actually increased US involvement to complete the humanitarian mission. He stated the Administration's commitment plainly, "Our own credibility with friends and allies would be severely damaged. Our leadership in world affairs would be undermined at the very time when people are looking to America to help promote peace and freedom in the post-cold-war world."[590] He went further, stamping the devotion to the policy goal, "And make no mistake about it, if we were to leave Somalia tomorrow, other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The relief effort would stop, and starvation soon would return. That knowledge has led us to continue our mission."[591]

Rwanda was another example of the Clinton Administration's dedication to the policy goal to provide humanitarian support. Continuing the effort initiated by the previous administration, President Clinton approved supplying humanitarian aid to the hundreds of thousands of refugees displaced by the three-year long civil war. After speaking with a predominant human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya, President Clinton approved $4.5 million in relief for the refugees fleeing from Burundi into Rwanda.[592] During the time prior to the renewed fighting in Rwanda there were an estimated 900,000 refugees. In October 1993, a coup occurred in Burundi sparking another movement of refugees.

Also embedded within the Clinton Administration's goal structure, aimed at promoting democracy, was the direction goal of increasing the global commitment to peaceful resolutions. The policy goals that underpinned this direction goal were centered on supporting initiatives to advance the peace process. A commitment to this was visible in the assignment of US personnel to observe the Ashura Peace Talks that were being conducted in Tanzania between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF.

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[589] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."
[590] William J. Clinton, "Address on Somalia," Miller Center at University of Virginia, October 7, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-4566.
[591] Ibid.
[592] Eric P. Schwartz, "National Security Council Memorandum from Eric P. Schwartz to Nancy Soderberg, Re: Human Rights Monitors," December 8, 1993, OA/Box 570000, Folder: [07/12/1993-05/03/1994], William J. Clinton Presidential Library, NSC Emails, A1-Non-Record (Jan 93 - Sept 94) ([Rwanda & Ward]).

The US had State Department officials monitoring the accords since the initiation in July 1992.[593] Leader commented that it was a priority for the US to "promote resolution of GOR-RPF conflict and prevent its escalation."[594] This same commitment was demonstrated in the support for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in Bosnia and the Middle East Peace Talks. It is important to note that the goal was not designed to determine the peace arrangements, but merely provide US leadership by encouraging and supporting the efforts by the disputing parties. President Clinton speaks of "working together" and "getting peace talks back on track".[595] The peace process itself was the focus of the goal. President Clinton states, " But my view is that we ought to try to get the Vance-Owen peace process working. If the parties will good-faith agree to a peace process, then I would be willing to have the United States participate with other nations in trying to keep the peace in Bosnia."[596] He talks about remaining committed to continuing the peace process in the Middle East and warns those who would try to disrupt the process, relating the peace process to the movement toward reconciliation.[597]

Another policy goal directed at increasing global commitment to peace negotiations was to encourage cease-fire agreements. A commitment to this goal was seen in the Clinton Administration's support of the UN resolutions that provided the UNOMUR, border force in Uganda. The intention of the force was to monitor and report the weapons coming into Rwanda. Another example of the Administration's commitment of encouraging a cease-fire was its support of the UNAMIR, a neutral international peacekeeping force aimed at demobilizing the two parties in Rwanda and establishing the conditions for the Ashura Peace Accord to be implemented. Encouraging a cease-fire was a key component of the goal structure, since it was seen as the most blatant evidence that peace and in turn political stability was possible. When speaking about Bosnia, President Clinton voiced that his sanctions

[593] Leader, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Joyce Leader, Deputy Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali."
[594] Leader, "Genocide in Rwanda and the Kigali Diplomatic Corps."
[595] Clinton, "The President's News Conference With President Francois Mitterrand of France."
[596] Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News."
[597] Clinton, "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Kiishi Miyazawa of Japan."

were an effort to achieve the goal of a cease-fire.[598] President Clinton remarked, "Do we have the capacity to impose a settlement on people who want to continue fighting? We could not do that in Northern Ireland. We could not do that in the Middle East. And I would submit, if you look at the population and the geography and the history of Bosnia, we cannot do that there."[599] This dedication to the goal of securing a cease-fire operated in the same manner for the conflicts in Africa as well.

The operative goals for the Clinton Administration were not limited to the ones listed above, but when dealing with intrastate conflicts and the regional issues in Africa, these were the goals the Administration pursued. The priority in Africa was to spread democracy. Closely tied to this principle goal was a commitment to build market economies, yet, given the condition of the political environment in many of the nations it was necessary to resolve political conflicts first. This goal hierarchy was structured with policy goals that aided in stabilizing the current conditions through humanitarian aid, promotion of peace accords, encouraging cease-fires, supporting viable UN peacekeeping operations, etc. These policy goals supplied the means necessary to accomplish the direction goals, such as, reforming UN peacekeeping operations, increasing multilateralism, increasing public trust in global engagement, increasing the credibility of the UN, and promoting global commitment to peaceful resolutions. Over time the policy goals would help secure direction goals that would provide the means to preempt conflict and promote democracy. Prior to the April 1994 these were the operative goals that affected the Clinton Administration's judgment of the events.

Perception of Events

The political violence that began with the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 7, 1994 did not generate a threat perception for the Clinton Administration. The Clinton

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[598] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 15, 1993," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 15, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46689.

[599] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Larry King," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 5, 1995, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51450; Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 17, 1993."

Administration held a "benign" perception of the events over the first three months of the violence. A perception is categorized as "benign" when it meets the following criteria: 1) an absence of the event being viewed as harmful or detrimental to US; 2) not defining a specific actor or behavior as the target of concern or correction; and 3) lack of shifting resources based on the event itself. The Clinton Administration's response to the events meets the criteria for having "benign" perception.

News broke through the State Department that the Rwandan and Burundi presidents were killed in a plane crash. In this message there was a note that there reports the plane was shot down, although it was unconfirmed.[600] Yet, further in the message the recommendation was to "appeal for calm in both countries" because "if, as it appears, both Presidents have been killed, there is a strong likelihood that widespread violence could break out…"[601] The message went on to cite that the State Department was in close contact with the French and Belgians who were operating in the country at the time. Then the message indicates the NSC was aware of the incident because it was mentioned that the, "White has requested we prepare a presidential statement expressing condolences and urging calm."[602] This indicates that the Administration knew the heads of state were killed, most likely assassinated, and made a concerted effort to minimize its impact. This is the first sign that the deaths of the two leaders was not perceived to be a threat or detrimental to the US.

Evidence that the first criteria for a "benign" perception has met are found in the statements made regarding the event. In line with the White House request, the first comments President Clinton made about the incident was intended to show sympathy for the loss rather than concern for security. He stated, "I was shocked and deeply saddened to learn of the tragic deaths of President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Cyprien Nyaryamira of Burundi last night in a plane crash outside Kigali, Rwanda." By the time the President gave his statement the Prime Minister of Rwanda had also been

[600] Prudence Bushnell, "Memorandum to the Secretary of State from African Affairs Prudence Bushnell, Re; Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali," April 6, 1994, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [10] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).
[601] Ibid.
[602] Ibid.

assassinated along with eleven Belgian UN forces. Yet, in his statement he continued to focus on expressing sympathy, "I am equally horrified that elements of the Rwandan security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan officials, including the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend my condolences to the families of the deceased Presidents and the Prime Minister as well as to the peoples of the two nations."[603] The final two statements by President Clinton highlight the perception that was forming. Although it was tragic and he "strongly condemn these actions", he merely asked "all parties to cease any such actions immediately" and suggested the "tragedies must not derail Rwanda and Burundi from pursuing national reconciliation and democracy."[604]

The next day, April 8, 1994, President Clinton was in an exchange with reporters in Minneapolis and made comments related to the events in Rwanda. His statements were unprompted by reporters and followed the announcement of Prime Minister Hosokawa of Japan's resignation. In his remarks President Clinton demonstrated that the events were being discussed at the highest levels in the Administration by stating that he had called the Secretary of State, Defense, and National Security Advisor and "had extended conversations with all three of them about the *situation* in Rwanda."[605] He went on to label the events in Rwanda as a "situation" two more times, stating, "we are doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation" and "it is a difficult situation".[606] The President did not elevate the description of Rwanda above it just being a "situation". It was not that the events in Rwanda were not precarious, for there was concern for the roughly 280 Americans who were in Rwanda.

Waves of violence in the region were routine. In light of the events that took place in Burundi and Somalia in October 1993, the Administration was prepared to evacuate the US citizens if violence erupted in the region. This decision was further motivated by France and Belgium's decision to evacuate their

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[603] Clinton, "Statement on the Deaths of Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi."
[604] Ibid.
[605] William J. Clinton, "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters in Minneapolis," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 8, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49933. (emphasis mine)
[606] Ibid.

military forces from Rwanda.[607] What it indicates is that the Administration was aware of the resumed fighting and the increase in violence within the country. The focus for the Administration was on the evacuation of American citizens rather than the events on the ground itself. The level of involvement that President Clinton had was directed at encouraging the personnel working on the evacuation. In a memorandum to the Anthony Lake, it was recommended that President Clinton put in a call to Ambassador David Rawson who was stationed in Kigali to "really buck up the spirits of the entire community out there" describing the conditions in Rwanda as "a very harrowing time."[608] One of his only two visits to the Rwandan Task Force was to thank the individuals working to get the Americans safely evacuated.[609] The actual fighting and trouble in Rwanda was not seen as detrimental to the US.

On April 10, 1994 commenting on the success of getting the Americans out of Rwanda, President Clinton described Rwanda as a "very difficult situation."[610] Only five days after the assassinations and political violence kicked off President Clinton sent a letter to the Speaker of the House describing the decision to evacuate the Americans. In his letter he clearly laid out the events that had taken place highlighting that the Rwandan military was responsible for killing political opposition leaders and civilians.[611] He made remarks about the success of the evacuation and the fact that no hostilities were

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[607] Madeleine Albright, "Cable from USUN US Mission New York to Secretary of State, Procedures Established for Security Council Action on Evacuating Foreign Nationals and UNAMIR From Rwanda," April 9, 1994, Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda; Folder: Susan Rice; 2011-0263-M; https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/49406, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Susan Rice, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs.

[608] Donald K. Steinberg, "National Security Council Memorandum from Donald Steinberg, Update on Kigali: Update 4 (7:20 Am, 4/7)," April 8, 1994, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [10] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).

[609] Executive Secretariat, "Operations Center Situation Report No. 31," April 11, 1994, Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda; Folder: Susan Rice; 2011-0263-M; https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/49406, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Susan Rice, Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs.

[610] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 10, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49939.

[611] William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Evacuation of United States Citizens From Rwanda and Burundi," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 12, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49961.

encountered. The events in Rwanda are minimized as President Clinton compares it to previous incidents of violence. When speaking to journalists on South Africa he states, "And we're terribly troubled by Rwanda now, but it wasn't so many months ago that in a period of months it's estimated that as many as a quarter of a million or more people died in Burundi."[612] The turmoil that is erupting in Rwanda is viewed as routine and there is no indication that he is concerned for the effect it may have on the nation of Rwanda, the region, the US, or the international community.

Rather than perceive the events as problematic or threatening, the administration saw it as an opportunity. It was an opening to pull the UNAMIR forces out of the country. When the initial resolution was introduced to place the NIF into Rwanda, the US was hesitant seeking to delay the vote until the UN Secretariat released the report on its viability.[613] The US did support the UNAMIR, but when its mandate was coming due, the US wanted to increase pressure on the Government of Rwanda and RPF to follow through on the Ashura Peace Accords and link the extension of the UNAMIR to visible progress.[614] On April 4, 1994, a cable relayed from Washington that, "the US position is to keep Rwanda on a 'short leash'…"[615] After the events developed on April 7, 1994 both the Government of Rwanda officials and the RPF to asked to retain the UNAMIR. The UNAMIR commander even requested an increase to the

[612] William J. Clinton, "Interview With Journalists on South Africa," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 20, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50020.
[613] Donald Steinberg, "Memorandum from African Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Moose on Neutral International Peacekeeping Force (NIF) in Rwanda," September 22, 1993, OA/ID 502, Folder: Rwanda, 1993, [2] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).
[614] Madeleine Albright, "Cable from USUN US Mission in New York to Security Council Members, Re: Rwanda," April 6, 1994, Inside the UN Security Council: April–July 1994; http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 472.
[615] National Security Council, "Cable from Washington to Wellington, Re: UN Security Council; New Zealand Presidency; Rwanda," April 4, 1994, Inside the UN Security Council: April–July 1994; http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 472.

2500 personnel in country. Yet, the US was the first Security Council member to push for UNAMIR to depart Rwanda given peace talks broke down.[616]

According to the first criteria, the Clinton Administration adopted a "benign" perception. Reflecting back on the incident in an interview, Anthony Lake commented, "I wish I could say it had even become an abstraction. I think the problem here for me, for the president, for most of us at senior levels, was that it never became a serious issue."[617] The initial response of the Clinton Administration also meets the second criteria; no particular actor or behavior became the target of concern. No one was implicated as the source of the assassinations or the perpetrators of the violence. The Clinton Administration called on the remaining Government of Rwanda officials and the RPF to cease hostilities, but there was not a specific designation of an object of concern. Reports were coming in to the NSC from the American Embassy in Kigali and from the Rwandan Task Force indicating that there was a more complex picture on the ground.[618] There were two-dimensions to the violence. One was the civil war between the RPF and the Government and its political supporters. The second aspect was the indiscriminate killing by the Rwandan military and its supporting militias. President Clinton and the NSC did not pursue information on the actual dynamics with the conflict. There was no effort to identify who was responsible for the deaths of the Belgian peacekeepers. The extent of investigative inquires came in May when the Administration sought for information on the refugees situation.[619] It is important to note

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[616] Richard A. Clarke, "National Security Council Memorandum to Donald Steinberg, Et. Al.; Re: Rwanda: Next Steps, for Sunday and Beyond," April 9, 1994, Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278; http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 472; Madeleine Albright, "Cable from USUN US Mission New York to Secretary of State, Re: TFRWOL: Future UNAMIR and French Roles in Rwanda," April 12, 1994, Clinton Library MDR Case no. 2014-0278; http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/, Digital National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 472.
[617] Anthony Lake, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Anthony Lake," PBS Frontline, April 1, 2004, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html.
[618] Steinberg, "National Security Council Memorandum from Donald Steinberg, Update on Kigali: Update 4 (7:20 Am, 4/7)."
[619] William J. Clinton, "Interview on CNN's "Global Forum With President Clinton," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, May 3, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50095.

that the refugee problem that developed came from the conditions within Rwanda. Yet, as this refugee problem grew, the Administration turned its attention on the symptoms rather than the disease.

As the refugee numbers soared to the hundreds of thousands pushing their way into Burundi the Administration met the concern. President Clinton authorized $5 million dollars from the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund on May 3, 1994.[620] This may appear that the Administration is shifting resources to address the events, but it actually is not addressing the political violence and turmoil within Rwanda. A message from Ambassador Moose solidifies the perception that the Administration held regarding the events. Ambassador Moose testified, "In the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community in an internal conflict of this type is limited, but we will use what influence we have in an effort to achieve our goals."[621] The violence is not seen as detrimental to the US. Although it is acknowledged that the warring parties are involved, there is no further identification of particular group or actor that determined to be at the source. US resources are not shifted or directed at an identified perpetrator because they are not specifically recognized. Rather than assess the event according to the objective facts presented, the goals of the Administration established the lens through which the event was judged.

Judgment of Events

According to the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework presented in this study, elite decision maker's judgment of an event will be conditioned by the goals they are committed to. If those goals are obstructed then the decision makers will adopt a threat perception from the events. This section will show that in the case of Rwanda, the Clinton Administration's goals did influence how the events were

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[620] William J. Clinton, "Memorandum on the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, May 3, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50096.

[621] Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, "Cable from Secretary of State Re: Ambassador Moose's Testimony on the Crisis in Rwanda," May 4, 1994, OA/ID 4016, Folder: Rwanda II, 1994, [1] 2006-0646-F Box #3 of 9, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Eric Schwartz (Multilateral And Humanitarian Affairs).

interpreted. During this period of time, the Clinton Administration did not indicate that theirs goals were being obstructed. This case supplied evidence of the causal mechanism suggested in the framework and support for the theory.

At the first indication that the President of Rwanda and Burundi were shot down, the Administration immediately began to focus on the peace process and the transition to new governance. It was relayed that Ambassador Rawson was scheduled to meet with the Rwandan military and Western diplomats first thing the following morning "to discuss the transition."[622] The Ashura Peace Accords provided the rule of engagement for this type of event, but unfortunately the National Assembly had not been stood up so the President of the National Assembly could not assume the presidency. Without this individual named, the interim would be the Prime Minister. She was assassinated the next day. Two days later the President gave his weekly radio address. In that address he offered his concern following the murders, but he also indicated where the Administration's focus was. He asked for Americans to join together in prayer for the safe return of the Americans and "a return to peace in Rwanda."[623] The events were considered an expected interruption given the tensions between parties and the focus was on resuming the peace process.

The goal structure of the Clinton Administration was very interconnected and nearly all of the events were filtered through this structure in an effort to identify accomplishments. On April 13 1994, President Clinton met with freshmen members of Congress. Lake supplied his talking points, emphasizing that in a period of resource constraint US leadership on the world stage and the role of peacekeeping in foreign policy was crucial. Rwanda is mentioned in those talking points as a demonstration of US success

[622] Bushnell, "Memorandum to the Secretary of State from African Affairs Prudence Bushnell, Re; Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali."
[623] William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address, April 9, 1994," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, April 9, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49938.

in providing leadership through a safe evacuation of American citizens.[624] Turning to peacekeeping, Lake supplied points that will demonstrate how peacekeeping is an effective tool to serve the national interests. His bullets suggest peacekeeping can: promote democracy, limit conflicts, monitor human rights, and relive suffering.[625] None of these bullets mention Rwanda, but it demonstrates the rubric behind which events were assessed. That same day in a question-and-answer session with reporters President Clinton is discussion foreign policy and relays numerous elements of his goals structure. Although Rwanda is not mentioned, he does discuss the need to contain a flood of refugees in Bosnia and claims, "harnessing NATO's power and the service of diplomacy…will help prevent a wider war."[626]

The effort of the Administration was not on gaining a better understanding of the conflict because it was judged in light of the current context. Prior to the events, Rwanda was in post-civil war cease-fire attempting to execute the conditions of its negotiations. During an interview with Taylor Branch, who documented Clinton's presidency, Clinton voiced that the evacuation of the American citizens, "was all that could be done in the midst of chaotic tribal warfare."[627] Taylor documented on April 20, 1994 that "The president thought more Rwandans had been killed since the April 6 uprising than in either of the protracted wars in Somalia and Angola."[628] Two days later it the press secretary relayed the National Security Advisors comments on Rwanda. "We call on the Rwandan Army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front to agree on an immediate ceasefire and return to negotiations called for and facilitated by the Government of Tanzania."[629] It was not the violence that dominated the principles judgment of the events, but the goals that were being pursued. When supporting a peace process the Administration prioritized

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[624] Anthony Lake, "Memorandum from Anthony Lake to President Clinton on Breakfast Meeting with Members of Congress," April 13, 1994, OA/Box 3102, Folder: United Nations (1), William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Philip J. (PJ) Crowley.
[625] Ibid.
[626] Clinton, "Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, Maryland."
[627] Taylor Branch, *The Clinton Tapes: Conversations with a President 1993-2001* (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 133.
[628] Ibid.
[629] Press Secretary, "Press Secretary Statement about Anthony Lake's Remarks on Rwanda," National Security Archive, George Washington University, April 22, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw042294.pdf.

establishing a ceasefire so that talks could continue. The cease-fire was a show of faith and in return UN forces could be offered as a reward for the warring parties making concerted effort toward negotiations. As mentioned these policy goals fed the direction goals of the Administration.

The Administration did want to see the killings stop; they were not immune to the facts that violence was occurring. This was one of the objectives of the Rwandan working group.[630] Yet, when it came to judging the nature of the event, the perceptions of its impact were guided by what the Administration's goals were. The talking points provided to Clinton for his discussion with the UN Undersecretary of Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, highlight this effect. In May, the UN Secretary General began soliciting states to contribute to another UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda. Given the Administration's commitment to reforming UN peacekeeping practices President Clinton's talking points emphasized questioning this action and warned about setting a "bad precedent" for the UN to fund non-UN missions.[631] In this same discussion the President voiced his commitment to make "$15 million dollars to support the refugee and emergency relief effort" and the dispatch of two US diplomats to "reinvigorate the peace process."[632] The goals were driving the Administration's judgment. The same day as President Clinton's telecom, he gave a speech at the CNN Forum demonstrating the guiding nature of his goals. In this speech he remarked,

> "Security, prosperity, democracy: These are the pillars of our strategy in the new world. These building blocks do not answer every question we confront. In particular, this era has seen an epidemic of humanitarian catastrophes, many caused by ethnic conflicts or the collapse of governments. Some, such as Bosnia, clearly affect our interests. Others, such as Rwanda, less

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[630] Richard A. Clarke, "National Security Council Memorandum and Discussion Paper Deputies Committee Meeting Re: Rwanda," April 28, 1994, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda"; 2011-0267-M; https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36618, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Deputy National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger.
[631] Susan E. Rice, "Talking Points for President Clinton's Meeting With UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan," May 3, 1994, "Declassified Documents Concerning Rwanda"; 2011-0267-M; https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36618, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Deputy National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger.
[632] Ibid.

directly affect our own security interests but still warrant our concern and our assistance. America cannot solve every problem and must not become the world's policeman. But we do have an obligation to join with others to do what we can to relieve suffering and to restore peace."

In this comment President Clinton demonstrates an assessment of the Rwandan conflict based on the perspective of what the Administration is committed to, such as joining others (multilateralism) to relieve suffering (humanitarian aid) and to restore peace (supply diplomatic levers and encourage cease-fires).

As the violence escalated the French offered to send in forces, which elevated a discussion over whether or not to send a UN force back into Rwanda. The US eventually supported UNAMIR II. President Clinton's message to Congress regarding the matter highlights that it was in line with the Administration's goals. He wrote, "I share your belief that the U.N. assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) still has an important role to play in brokering a cease-fire, assisting humanitarian relief, and ensuring protection of Rwandans under their protection."[633] The actions taken, even before offering support for UNAMIR, by the Administration point to its focus on the goals. In response to criticism that the Administration is not responding a memo is crafted emphasizing the call for regional nations to pressure the warring parties to establish a cease-fire and return to the Ashura process.[634] The actions by the Administration to verbally condemn the killings was intended to "stop the killing, get the parties to agree to a cease-fire, resume negotiations under the Ashura accord, and move toward national reconciliation."[635] The pursuit of these goals reinforces that the event could only be viewed through these markers. In a message given on April 30, 1994 the President showed the connection between the goals

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[633] Anthony Lake, "National Security Memorandum for President with Reply to Congressional Letter on Rwanda," May 25, 1994, OA/ID 4016, Folder: Rwanda II, 1994, [2] 2006-0646-F Box #3 of 9, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Eric Schwartz (Multilateral And Humanitarian Affairs).

[634] Donald K. Steinberg, "National Security Council Memorandum; Re: USG Actions on Rwanda," April 25, 1994, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [9] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).

[635] Donald K. Steinberg, "National Security Council Memorandum for Anthony Lake; Re: Efforts to Facilitate Peace in Rwanda," April 28, 1994, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [9] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).

and his judgment of the events. He stated, "…I call on the Rwandan army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front to agree to an immediate cease-fire and return to negotiations aimed at a lasting peace in their country."[636]

The death of the Rwandan president did not obstruct the Administration's sub-goals designed to spread democracy. The Administration built goals that focused on the process of democracy, which is why supporting peace agreements and encouraging cease-fires were policy goals. President Clinton understood that the US could not force nations to accomplish these things, but US leadership and support may be able to influence them. He expressed in his remarks at the US Naval Academy on May 25, 1994. He stated, "Now the entire global terrain is bloody with such conflicts, from Rwanda to Georgia. We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces. We cannot turn away from them, but our interests are not sufficiently at stake in so many of them to justify a commitment of our folks. Nonetheless, as the world's greatest power, we have an obligation to lead…"[637] President Clinton expressed to the Italian media that he believed the US was on the right track with Rwanda, stating, "we try to advance the cause of prosperity, democracy, and human rights, and where we try to limit chaos and misery, doing what we can in a cooperative way as we did in Somalia or as we work together to try to help the African countries deal with the tragedy of Rwanda and Burundi, and et cetera, et cetera."[638] In the National Security Strategy that was released in July 1994, the Administration admitted that peacekeeping provides "breathing room for fledgling democracies" and "…permits America to influence events that concern us…" and "provide a measure of confidence to warring factions…". The events in Rwanda did not obstruct the Administration's ability to pursue these

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[636] William J. Clinton, "Transcript of Radio Message by President Clinton on the Situation in Rwanda," April 30, 1994, OA/ID 633, Folder: Rwanda, Jan.-July 1994, [9] 2006-0218-F Box #1 of 8, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Donald Steinberg (African Affairs).
[637] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to Midshipman at the United States Naval Academy In Annapolis, Maryland" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, April 1, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[638] William J. Clinton, "Interview With the Italian Media," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, May 27, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50251.

goals, rather the conflict actually provided another opportunity for the US to seek a international leadership role in promoting democracy and peacekeeping. Rwanda was not judged by the actual conditions on the ground, but whether or not the Administration's goals could be obtained. Ten years after the events, Lake comments,

> "We were focusing on the edges of the problem. We were focusing on what we could do, for example, in putting on the radio the names of some of those who were responsible for the killings in an effort to diminish it. We were concentrating on getting a peace process going, which became, in my view, a diversion from dealing with the underlying problems. We were focusing on and made a proposal on how to deal with some of the refugees and those most at risk…. So it is wrong to say nobody had any idea hell was breaking loose in Rwanda. Of course they did. But at the same time, there was very little attention to what the problem was…"[639]

Nancy Soderberg, who served as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also reflected back on the events. She stated, "After the Rwanda genocide started, everyone was focusing on getting the peace process back in place. They'd get a little progress, and thing, Okay, now it's going to stop…But everything was getting the peace process back on track."[640] The event was judged by the Administration's goals.

[639] Lake, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Anthony Lake."
[640] Nancy Soderberg, "PBS Frontline: Interview with Nancy Soderberg," PBS Frontline, May 10, 2007, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html.

Table 5. Summary Rwanda Coup & Massacre, April 1994

Country		Rwanda
Time Period		April 7, 1994 – July 1994
Event(s)		- Assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi - Tutsi genocide campaign
Operative Goals	**Principle**	- Promote democracy abroad - Restructure US military to meet new dangers - Reinvent democratic and market institutions in the international system - Strengthen the global economy - Counter those in opposition to liberalization or democracy - Eliminate opportunity for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - Strengthen alliances
	Direction	- Advance regional security institutions - Increase global commitment to peaceful resolutions - Promote growth in the developing world - Increase public trust in global engagement - Increase global trust in UN and US leadership - Increase multilateralism
	Policy	- Institutionalize UN ability to mobilize internationally - Reform UN peacekeeping logistics and operational decisions - Support UN mission to Somalia - Encourage OAU to have a robust security role in Africa - Strengthen civil society in Rwanda and Somalia - Promote transition to Transnational Government in Rwanda - Support and observe Ashura Peace Accord and peace process - Secure humanitarian aid to Somalia - Secure humanitarian aid to Rwanda and Burundi refugees
Perception of Event (i.e. benign, problem, threat)		**BENIGN**
Judgment of Events		The Clinton Administration viewed the events as a tragedy and was deeply concerned over the loss of life. Yet, they believed that by encouraging a cease-fire and return to the peace process the violence would be resolved. It saw the events as an opportunity to continue to pursue the goals it had established.

CHAPTER 9:

TERRORISM: KHOBAR TOWERS, JUNE 1996 & US EMBASSY BOMBINGS, AUGUST 1998

This chapter examines two separate events of the same character; terrorist attacks on US personnel on foreign territory. The first event is the bombing at the US Air Force housing facility in Saudi Arabia commonly known as the Khobar Towers. The bombing took place on June 26, 1996 killing nineteen Americans and injuring 500 people. It was the most deadly attack on US military personnel since the Marine Barracks bombing in 1983. The second event under examination is the simultaneous attacks of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The destruction of these two facilities culminated in the death of 224 people, twelve of who were US citizens, and injuring over 5,000. Both of these events were indiscriminate terror attacks on US installations in foreign countries. Both attacks killed American citizens. Yet the Clinton Administration developed distinct perceptions of the two events.

Objectively, terror attacks on a nation's citizens would constitute a threat and produce a threat to the nation's leaders. Terrorism causes death and destruction to a state's most valuable resources, its people and ability to operate globally. For this reason it would be anticipated that the decision-makers would adopt a threat perception of these two events. On top of the objective nature of the events, President Clinton decried terrorism from the early days of his time in office, despite suggestions otherwise. Prior to his inauguration, President Clinton associated terrorist attacks with the new wave of threats surfacing in the post-Cold War era.[641] He explicitly stated, "…the gravest threats we are most likely to face in the years ahead include… the attendant risks of terrorist attacks on Americans traveling or working overseas."[642] When discussing with the Foreign Policy Association in April 1992 where

[641] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."
[642] Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security, by Governor Bill Clinton, Georgetown University."

threats may arise he adds, "From terrorist attacks on Americans abroad."[643] Lake reiterated this sentiment and called terrorism a "serious threat" in his engagement speech.[644] The Administration understood how terror attacks could threaten a nation.

Yet, rather than perceive both of these events as threats, the Clinton Administration adopted a distinct perception of each event. The Khobar Tower bombing generated a "problem" perception for the Clinton Administration. The attack was seen as detrimental to the US leading the Administration to direct its attention to it, but it never rose above a problem. The embassy bombings on the other hand produced a "threat" perception very quickly. This chapter will examine whether the goals the Administration was committed to affected the difference in perception. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests that the Administration's goals will affect how the events are judged. If it is assessed that its goals are obstructed then the decision-makers will adopt a threat perception of the event and respond according to that perception. This chapter will demonstrate that an event that appears objectively threatening may not register as a threat to the decision-makers. It will show in cases of similar events that the intervening factor of goal obstruction affects the Administration's eventual perception.

Historical Background

This section of the chapter will provide a brief history of the Clinton Administration's relationship to terrorism, both state-sponsored and non-state sponsored. This is not a comprehensive history, but is aimed at providing context for the events that took place in 1996 and 1998. This historical summary will apply to both events; therefore, it will cover the period from 1993 though the summer of 1998. Terrorism was not a new phenomenon for the Clinton Administration and there is a political history with certain states such as Iran, Libya, Syria, etc. The intent is not to ignore US history with terrorism, rather to focus on the Clinton Administration's interaction with terrorism.

Within a month of entering office, just after noon on February 26, 1993, the Clinton Administration faced a harrowing incident. A truck was parked in the basement of the World Trade

[643] Clinton, "A Strategy for Foreign Policy: Assistance to Russia."
[644] Lake, "Remarks of Anthony Lake: From Containment to Enlargement."

Center in New York City and exploded killing six individuals and injuring 1,042.[645] President Clinton was scheduled to give his Saturday Radio Address the following morning and planned on discussing the Administration's economic policy. Using this opportunity to address the public on the recent incident, he expressed that he was "deeply affected by the tragedy that struck Manhattan…"[646] He went on to praise the work of law enforcement and voiced that the FBI, Treasury Department, and New York City police and fire departments were working together to find out why this happened and who was involved.[647] It would take several months before any of the perpetrators were caught. A year after the attack, the main architect of the bombing Ramzi Yousef, was arrested in while in Pakistan.[648]

The Clinton Administration's next encounter with terrorism would be only a few months later. In April 1993, while visiting Kuwait to commemorate the success of Desert Storm, former President George H. W. Bush became the target of an assassination plot.[649] Luckily the attack never occurred. The Kuwaitis had detained 17 people suspected of being involved in the attempted murder. Richard Clarke, a NSC staff member, came across a news report of the events and ran it up the NSC chain.[650] After a series of interrogations, the Kuwaiti authorities claimed they had confessions that the individuals were operating on behalf of the Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS). President Clinton dispatched the FBI to conduct an independent series of interviews to confirm the confessions. After reviewing the comments by two of the detainees and analysis of the trigger device of the car bomb, the Administration assessed that the Iraqi

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[645] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 202; *World Trade Center Bombing: Terror Hits Home* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993).
[646] William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address, February 27, 1993," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, February 27, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46253.
[647] "The President's Radio Address, Re: 1993 World Trade Center Bombing," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, February 27, 1993, accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46253.
[648] Laurie Mylroie, "The World Trade Center Bomb: Who Is Ramzi Yousef? And Why It Matters," *The National Interest*, no. 42 (1995): 5.
[649] Michael R. Bromwich, *The FBI Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, April 1997), 198.
[650] Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies : Inside America's War on Terror.* (New York, New York: Free Press, 2004), 96.

involvement was credible and assigned blame to the Iraqi intelligence for the operation. On June 26, 1993, President Clinton authorized a strike on an IIS command and control facility using Tomahawk missiles.[651] In his remarks to the nation, President Clinton stated, "Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly that he will resort to terrorism or aggression if left unchecked…The world has repeatedly made clear what Iraq must do to return to the community of nations. And Iraq has repeatedly refused."[652]

Along with Iraq, the Clinton Administration would also find itself at odds with another country refusing to align with the community of nations, Sudan. In 1989, Sudan's democratically elected government was overthrown by a military coup.[653] The replacement government, National Islamic Front (NIF) party, quickly became a source of contention for the US. In August of 1993, Sudan was added to the State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. In 1994, while acting as the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, Madeline Albright, and highlighted concerns that the NIF was forging "an international movement that would champion radical causes using methods that included terrorism."[654] This effort by the NIF went against many of the foreign policy initiatives the Clinton Administration pursued in its determination to expand democracy and free markets. One of the contentions the US had with Sudan was its open border policy. It welcomed any Muslim, particularly fundamentalists, into the country without the requirement of having a visa.[655] This led many in the US government to view Sudan as a breeding ground for terrorism. Madeleine Albright referred to Sudan as a "viper's nest of terrorism."[656]

In 1996, the Clinton Administration condemned Sudan for harboring the perpetrators of an

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[651] Louis J. Freeh and Howard B. Means, *My FBI : Bringing down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror.* (New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005).
[652] William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, June 26, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[653] Ted Dagne, *Sudan: Civil War, Terrorism, and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, April 3, 1997), 2.
[654] Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement of Madeline K. Albright, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States" (9/11 Commission, March 23, 2004), 13, accessed May 8, 2015, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/hearings/hearing8.htm.
[655] Dagne, *Sudan: Civil War, Terrorism, and U.S. Relations*.
[656] Ibid., 10.

assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on June 25, 1995 in Ethiopia.[657] The OAU states had called for Sudan to hand the accused over, yet the government of Sudan refused. In January 1996, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1044 against Sudan.[658] Once the UN resolution passed, the US evacuated it embassy in Sudan sending the employees to Kenya.[659] By November 1996 Sudan had still not complied with the UN Resolution, leading the Clinton Administration to apply travel restrictions against Sudan.[660] Sudan claimed they were not housing terrorists and had even willingly given up a known terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, to France. The Sudanese government also revoked the open border policy and stopped allowing Arabs to enter the country without visas.[661] These actions did not alter the view foreign policy officials had of Sudan. A year later, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13067 restricting economic relations with Sudan.[662] The US government was insistent that the Sudanese government changes their ways, denounce terrorism, and expel the individuals' accused of attempting to assassinate President Mubarak from Sudan. The failure of Sudan to meet this expectation meant that Sudan would remain in the US crosshairs in the same vain that Iraq and Iran were, categorized along with theses community of states that opposed global peace.

Nations like Iraq and Sudan were not the only nations that presented challenges for the Clinton Administration. Entering office, President Clinton adopted the Somalia mission that began under President Bush. On May 3, 1993, when the major humanitarian crisis in Somalia appeared to be

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[657] Albright, "Statement of Madeline K. Albright, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," 13.
[658] United Nations Security Council, "United Nations Resolution 1044" (United Nations, January 31, 1996), United Nations Treasury, accessed March 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/1044.pdf.
[659] Tim Weiner and James Risen, "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise.," *New York Times* 148, no. 51287 (September 21, 1998): A1.
[660] William J. Clinton, "Proclamation 6958—Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Are Members or Officials of the Sudanese Government or Armed Forces," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, November 22, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52271.
[661] Weiner and Risen, "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise."
[662] William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 13067—Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, November 3, 1997, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53505.

neutralized the U.S.-led Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF was transferred to the operational control of the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), leaving roughly 4,100 Americans in country to support effort. The following month, on June 5, 1993, Somalia warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid and supporting troops killed 25 Pakistani military personnel.[663] Prior to this, Somalia was beginning to look like a global peacekeeping success, but the progress on the humanitarian front did not prevent the terrorist attacks by the militant factions. Then near the end of 1993, tragedy struck when eighteen US service members were brutally killed following an attempt at targeting the rebel leader Aidid. The Battle of Mogadishu was a blow to earlier success, but the Clinton Administration remained dedicated to completing the mission and increased support for it by supplying more 1,700 troops, stationing another 3,600 Marines offshore, and extending the commitment of US forces for another six months.[664] It was not known at the time of the incident, but the individuals involved in the attack in Somalia were trained in terrorist training camps established by Osama bin Laden, which had set up when he moved to Sudan just a few years before.[665]

Despite the trouble on the international scene, a major event in 1993 offered hope to the Clinton Administration. For years the US had been mediating talks between Israel, Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab nations. On March 6, 1991, President Bush outlined a framework for peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of "land for peace."[666] President Clinton continued support this effort, adopting it as a priority for his Administration. On September 13, 1993 there appeared to be a major breakthrough in the peace process, which was reflected in the handshake between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yassar

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[663] William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia" (Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration, June 4, 1993), U.S. Government Printing Office, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys.
[664] William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Somalia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, October 7, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47180.
[665] *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden* (United States District Court of Southern District of New York 1998).
[666] Carol Migdalovitz, "Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service: Report*, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (January 29, 2010): 5.

Arafat.[667] The signing of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accord) between Israel and the PLO gave Congress the ability to authority to waive legislation that had previously restricted economic relations with the PLO.[668]

The peace agreement was followed by a period of calm. Then five months later, on February 25, 1994 a Jewish settler killed over 40 people, targeting Muslims during a time of worship.[669] This would kick off a round of car bombings within Israel. By July the violence against Jewish targets had spilled into other regions of the world. On July 18, 1994 a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, Argentina was bombed killing 96 people.[670] Within a week of this attack, a car bomb exploded outside the Israeli Embassy in London. The attack in London occurred the day after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan vowed to end war between the two countries. The two men drafted a peace treaty on October 17, 1994 and two days later a bomb exploded on a bus in Tel Aviv killing 20 people and wounding 48 more civilians.[671] Despite the persistent terror attacks, they would eventually sign a peace treaty on October 26, 1994.[672]

Hope was on the horizon again for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Confidence was wounded when at the start of 1995 two more bombings occurred in Israel.[673] These incidents led to President Clinton signing Executive Order 12947 that prohibited transactions with, twelve foreign

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[667] Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 121.
[668] Clyde Mark, "Palestinians and Middle East Peace: Issues for the United States," *Congressional Research Service: Report*, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (April 26, 2005): 1–19.
[669] Clyde Haberman, "New Clashes Likely: Massacre Sets Off Riots Causing More Deaths in the Territories West Bank," *New York Times* (New York, New York, February 26, 1994).
[670] Tim Weiner, "Iran and Allies Are Suspected In Bomb Wave," *New York Times* (New York, New York, July 29, 1994).
[671] Clyde Haberman, "On the No. 5 Bus Line, A Thud, Then Silence: THE SCENE," *New York Times* (New York, New York, October 20, 1994).
[672] "Israel and Jordan Sign a Peace Treaty..," in *Great Events*, vol. 13 (US: Salem Press, 1999), 1724, accessed January 13, 1999, http://proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=khh&AN=6353302&site=ehost-live.
[673] Clyde Haberman, "61 Suffer Wounds: Islamic Holy War Says It Attacked Bus Stop, Packed by Soldiers Bombs Kill 19 in Israel, Imperiling Peace Talks," *New York Times* (New York, New York, January 23, 1995).

terrorist organizations listed in the annex as well as eighteen individuals that have been identified as leaders of these organizations who disrupt the Middle East peace process.[674] Shortly after this order, in February 1995, the Administration proposed its new legislation to combat terrorism. Not long after this, on April 19, 1995, the US experienced its own tragedy on US soil when the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed, killing 168 people. Nearing the end of the year, two more tragic events occurred. On November 13, 1995 terrorists attacked an American facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia killing 7. Two weeks later, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated, on November 22, 1995. [675] His death was a heavy loss for the Administration, but luckily, President Clinton and Israel's new Prime Minister were able to continue the coordinated effort to secure peace in the Middle East.

The following year there attacks continued. Another surge of terrorist attacks took place in late February and early March 1996 prompting President Clinton to voice the United States' pledge to stand with the Israelis and the Palestinians that are seeking peace. At the end of April, President Clinton and Prime Minister Shimon Peres signed the Israel-United States Counterterrorism Cooperation Accord. Also in April 1996, the Clinton Administration had gained support for the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act strengthening Federal law enforcement agencies' ability to confront and punish terrorism at home and abroad. Over the next year and a half the list of foreign terrorist organizations would expand to 30 groups and by August 1998 the Clinton Administration incorporated individuals in an executive order that restricted US transactions.

The concern that terrorism was going to be a persistent condition of the post-Cold War was solidified by the events that occurred form 1993 through 1996. As strides were being made in the Middle East peace talks and relations with Israel and its Arab neighbors were improving, but there were still

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[674] William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 12947—Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 23, 1995, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51612.

[675] The Historical Section, "The War in Israel," *New York Times* (New York, New York, March 5, 1996); William J. Clinton, "Statement on the Terrorist Attack in Israel," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 3, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52487.

states that were active or complicit in disrupting the peace process. In an effort to decrease their influence, the Clinton Administration had applied economic and diplomatic pressures to the hostile states like Iraq, Iran, and Sudan. Sudan highlighted itself in in June 1995 by harboring the terrorists suspected of attempting to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt. The US began increasing its pressure on Sudan, and it was beginning to suffer under the US sanctions. Although it refused to relinquish the accused terrorists, in an effort to forestall further degradation, the Sudanese kicked known terrorist financier Osama bin Laden out of the country.[676]

Entering into 1996 the Administration was beginning to recognize that individual terrorists, not directly backed by states, were having an increased presence in the international environment. Shortly after departing Sudan, bin Laden had established himself in Afghanistan. During this time he issued a fatwa against US forces occupying the Arabian Peninsula.[677] This was not necessarily the first "Declaration of Jihad" that bin Laden had issued. Yet, two days after the statement, on June 26, 1996 the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia were bombed. There were nineteen American Airmen that were killed in that attack and nearly 500 injured. It was the second terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia within nine months. The response to the incident will be examined in detail below. It is important to point out that the following month, trouble began brewing in Iraq. President Clinton, took action, and authorized another round of Tomahawk missile strikes on Iraq. This time the strike was in response to Saddam's assault on the Kurdish city of Irbil.[678] Saddam had recently rejected the UN weapons inspectors and began targeting the Kurds. President Clinton relayed that the use of military force was to send a message to states that refused to denounce supporting terror as a tactic, "When you abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors, you must pay a price."[679]

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[676] Kenneth Katzman, *Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1998*, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Congress Research Service, August 27, 1998), 13.
[677] *United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden*.
[678] William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing a Missile Strike on Iraq and an Exchange With Reporters," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 3, 1996, accessed May 8, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53278.
[679] Ibid.

The various terror incidents, which are too numerous to be covered in depth, continually presented the President and his administration with the reality that there were actors that were willing to disrupt the US effort toward global peace and prosperity. It was becoming apparent that those actors were not only states and state-sponsored groups, but also individuals with wealth and resources at their disposal.[680] The events of 1996 prompted a more wide spread examination of the rising voice of extremism, bin Laden. Individuals who had been caught and were being prosecuted for terror activities cited bin Laden as the financier and ideological foundation for their actions.[681] An assessment was published and passed to the media near the end of the year describing bin Laden's role in financing and supporting terror training. At the beginning of 1998 bin Laden made the jump from merely a financier to the full-fledged face of terrorism. The declarations he made to his followers in February and then May called for attacks on Americans, civilian or military, wherever they are located.[682] Bin Laden's rhetoric, combined with emerging evidence of his support for previous terrorist attacks in Yemen, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia, propelled him into the status of "Special Designated Terrorist".[683] Lake commented in an interview that he was the only individual to receive and acronym (UBL), which demonstrates how seriously the Administration took his actions.[684]

Operative Goals Prior to Event

Over time the Clinton Administration gained better clarity on the nature of the terrorist threat was and who operated behind the veil of anonymity. This progressive view of who the threat was did not mean that the Administration was blind to what terrorism was. The goal structure and operative goals that span across the period of time from 1993 through 1996 and beyond demonstrate that the Administration

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[680] Thomas Kean and Philip Zelikow, *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 108, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
[681] Katzman, *Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 1998*, 13.
[682] Ibid., 14.
[683] Clinton, "Executive Order 12947—Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process."
[684] Anthony Lake, "Interview with Tony Lake," interview by Chris Bury, Television, September 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/lake.html.

was cognizant of the impact that terror had on the international system. Considered the first post-Cold War administration, President Clinton envisioned a new era that could usher in the promise of peace and the further spread of democracy.[685]

Terrorism was incorporated into this goal structure, in figure 10, because it was seen as a danger to peace in the new era. President Clinton designed his principle goals based on the context he operated in and constructed them in order to secure the nation's survival through agency, esteem, and affiliation. President Clinton frequently spoke of three key principle goals, which were highlighted in the National Security Strategy (NSS): 1) to credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight, 2) to bolster America's economic revitalization, and 3) to promote democracy abroad.[686] These were not the only principle goals of the Administration. There were two more principle goals designed to ensure the US had the agency, affiliation, and esteem necessary for survival and prosperity, and in doing so confronted the injurious effects of terrorism.

One of these principle goals was to counter those in opposition to liberalization and democracy. President Clinton believed that it was in everyone's interest to embrace the increasing globalized world and join the community of nations pursuing freedom and democracy. As the title of the NSS indicates, the Administration's principle goals were a shift from a containment philosophy to one of enlargement. Via the US world leadership the strategy would enlarge the world's free community of market democracies. Yet, President Clinton was aware that universal acceptance of this mentality was not likely and that certain states would resist the US. Therefore, tied closely to this vision of enlargement was a policy of dual containment, which targeted the actors who refused to accept US leadership and vision.

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[685] Madeleine Albright, "Interview with Madeleine Albright," interview by Chris Bury, Television, November 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/albright.html.
[686] William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (White House, July 1, 1994), accessed December 2, 2016, http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/.



Figure 10. The Clinton Administration's Foreign Policy Goal Structure - Middle East

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sub-goals were designed to serve both promotion of democracy and peace and the prevention of antagonism toward that effort. The Clinton Administration saw a dichotomy between peace-loving nations and those who were opposed to peace. When asked who the enemy to NATO was, President Clinton responded, "The enemy will be anybody that threatens the security and the peace of the member nations, the values that we hold important."[687] When addressing the nation about responding to the intelligence that Iraqi Intelligence facilitated a plot to assassinate former President Bush, President Clinton expressed a distinction according to states that operate according the rules of peace and cooperation. He remarked the US took action against Iraq, "to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations" and "Iraq's violence and terrorism demonstrates that Iraq poses a continuing threat to United States nationals and shows utter disregard for the will of the international community."[688]

The next principle goal also confronted terrorism and antagonistic nations. The principle goal was to eliminate the opportunity for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As Lake mentioned, President Clinton believed there was a nexus between the threats in a globalized world.[689] Terrorism was the effect, drug trafficking enabled the means, and weapons of mass destruction increased its effectiveness. He also had a clear view of the source of terrorism. President Clinton remarked on several occasions that, "Democracies rarely go to war with each other or traffic in terrorism."[690] It was these states that were apparently seeking the weapons of mass destruction, leading to the conclusion that it was to bolster the nefarious acts of terrorism. This perspective was expressed during President Clinton's commencement address at the US Military Academy in May 1993. He stated, "A particularly troubling new element in the world you face, however, is the proliferation around the globe of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Today, ambitious and violent regimes seek to acquire

[687] Clinton, "The President's News Conference - June 17, 1993."
[688] Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters."
[689] Russell Riley, "Interview with Anthony Lake," Transcript, May 21, 2002; Clinton, *Between Hope and History : Meeting America's Challenges for the 21st Century.*, 157.
[690] Clinton, "Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at World Affairs Council."

arsenals of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare."[691] He went on to articulate his principle goal by claiming, "And meeting these new threats will require a new approach and a new determination shared by all peace-loving nations to oppose the spread of these dread weapons."[692] In his address to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, President Clinton emphasized the importance of this principle goal. He expressed, "One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical, or biological, and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away…I have made nonproliferation one of our Nation's highest priorities."[693]

The Clinton Administration was dedicated to the two principle goals of eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and containing states that opposed the movement toward peace. The direction and policy goals constructed by President Clinton demonstrate a commitment to this the two-pronged effort of pursuing the path of peace. One of these direction goals was to isolate the so-called "backlash states". Upholding and instituting travel restrictions and sanctions on Sudan, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were policy goals aimed at isolating them from the global market. A policy goal was constructed against terrorist organizations as well. In a statement regarding the Administration's terrorism policy the press secretary stated, "Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions."[694] He demonstrated commitment to this goal hierarchy when during a speech at George Washington University he stated, "[The Iran-Libya sanctions act] builds on what we've already done to isolate those regimes by imposing tough penalties on foreign companies that go forward with new investments in key sectors. The act will help to deny them the money they need to finance international terrorism or to

[691] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, May 28, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46638.
[692] Ibid.
[693] Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City."
[694] Robert Boorstin, "Statement by the Press Secretary: US Counter-Terrorism Policy," August 3, 1995, OA/ID 415, Folder: Counter-terrorism - 8/3/95; 2006-0460-F, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Speechwriting, Robert Boorstin.

acquire weapons of mass destruction."[695] It was seen as necessary to isolate those who would use terror to disrupt peace. In 1996, at the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly, President Clinton claimed, "Real zero tolerance requires us to isolate states that refuse to play by the rules we have all accepted for civilized behavior."[696]

In conjunction with its dedication to isolating those who supported violence and terrorism, the Clinton Administration sought the direction goal of deceasing the effects of terror attacks. This goal was pursued through different policy goals, one of which was to capture and prosecute terrorists. Part of the impact of terror was that it was conducted outside the international rules and norms. President Clinton aimed to bring the perpetrators of violence under the constraints of law and demonstrate that rules are binding. A commitment to the treating terrorism judicially is witnessed in the response to the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. The morning after the attack, President Clinton began his radio address by labeling the incident as an "explosion" and thanked the investigating forces for their dedication to bring the criminals to justice.[697] Those who operated outside the legal bounds were not considered in the family of peace-loving nations. He believed the Administration should treat terrorists as criminals and encouraging other states to do In an interview with Dan Rather nearly a month after the attack President Clinton demonstrated a commitment to this policy goal. He was asked what the US would do if Iran was found to be responsible for the World Trade Center Bombing. President Clinton responded,

> "First, let's note that even as we speak, we were just given notice that another major arrest was made and someone brought to the United States from Egypt where the apprehension was made. That is very good news. I do not want to speculate about who was behind it until I know. That would be a very dangerous thing to do. Let me say that I am more concerned about the Iranian

[695] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on International Security Issues at George Washington University," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 5, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53161.
[696] William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the 51st Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 24, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51976.
[697] "The President's Radio Address, Re: 1993 World Trade Center Bombing."

> government maintaining its militance, perhaps supporting, in general, terrorist organizations or engaging in unsafe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for its own use or for the benefit of others. I wish Iran would come into the family of nations."[698]

Despite the unprecedented attack on US soil, President Clinton sought to treat terrorists and their actions as a crime and aimed to bring them to justice. He assigned the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead agency. This was further codified the Presidential Directive/NSC-62. The first success that was highlighted was an "increased rate of renditions, apprehensions, and convictions of terrorists."[699] The statements made and initiatives taken by the Clinton Administration demonstrate a dedication to this policy goal. President Clinton would continue to express his Administration's dedication even up till the second attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.

Another policy goal aimed at serving the direction goal of isolating states and the bad actors was to encourage nations to adopt and follow a no-sanctuary policy. Closely associated with the no-sanctuary policy goal was to encourage states to condemn terror attacks. The Clinton Administration gave public statements denouncing terror attacks and in those would call on other nations to do the same.[700] In a news conference with the Prime Minister of Israel and King Hussein of Jordan, President Clinton stated, "I have continued to press with our friends and neighbors, our allies, the importance of standing up against nations which support terrorism."[701] This was also a condition that Sudan and Iraq had to meet in order to be in right standing with the US. Achievement of both of these policy goals would facilitate isolating those actors who opposed international law and peaceful cooperation by building up a coalition like-minded states.

The Clinton Administration was also dedicated to another direction goal, which was to advance

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[698] Clinton, "Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News."
[699] William J. Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas" (White House, May 22, 1998), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-62.pdf, Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
[700] Clinton, "Statement on the Terrorist Attack in Israel."
[701] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, July 26, 1994, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50546.

the peace in the Middle East. Many of the policy goals presented above were aimed at supporting this direction goal as well since many of the backlash states and actors came from the Middle East. Yet, there were other policy goals aimed at advancing the Middle East peace process and meet the policy goal of strengthening alliances. One of those was to extend friendship to Arab states and Islamist groups that abided in peace and tolerance. The Clinton Administration's actions toward Syria reflect this commitment. President Clinton expressed the Administration's goal of calling on Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians to join negotiations with Israel.[702] Given the fact that Syria was on the US list of state-sponsors of terrorism, this could be seen as conflicting, yet President Asad demonstrated a willingness to join peace talks.[703] When announcing Secretary of State Warren Christopher's first trip to the Middle East, President Clinton made this goal explicit. He said, "We cannot impose a solution on the Middle East. Only the leaders of the region can make peace…Those who oppose the process, who seek to subvert it through violence and intimidation, will find no tolerance here for their methods. But those who are willing to make peace will find in me and my administration a full partner."[704] In a news conference President Clinton spoke boldly saying, "Everybody in Israel has got to know in the end there can't be a total peace in the Middle East unless there is some peace with Syria."[705] For this reason, President Clinton was willing to incorporate Syria into negotiations.

The success of Middle East peace was believed to be the most comprehensive deterrent against terrorism as well as serve the principle goal of strengthening the global economy. President Clinton voiced this when he said, "Peace in the Middle East…can help to unleash that region's great economic potential and calm a perpetual source of tension in global affairs."[706] It was President Clinton's belief that

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[702] William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, March 15, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46339.
[703] William J. Clinton, "Interview With the Arab News Media on the Middle East Peace Process," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, September 13, 1993, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47064.
[704] Clinton, "Statement on Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher's Trip to the Middle East."
[705] Clinton, "The President's News Conference With President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt."
[706] Clinton, "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City."

"if we could succeed in bringing a comprehensive peace to the Middle East and then we could bring the benefits of that peace to all the people who live there, I believe that that would help us to defeat terrorism in all continents in the next century."[707] Yet, in order to advance peace in the Middle East, the Clinton Administration committed to the policy goals that were believed to secure means for this peace. This included the policy goals mentioned such as supporting talks between the Arab nations and Israel and extend friendship, arrest terrorists and bring them to justice, encourage other states to condemn terrorism, and punish states and/or actors who refuse to come along with the peace process.

The Clinton Administration had a goal structure that was designed to serve the policy goals of promoting free markets, democracy, and a strong alliance of a community of nations. While at the same time the goals were aimed at preventing the deleterious effects caused by states that sought to counter this effort either directly through acts of terror or indirectly through financing and supplying aggression. The NSS represented this sentiment in this fashion, "Our strategy is harnessed to the unique characteristics of the region and our vital interests there, as we work to extend the range of pace and stability, while implementing a strategy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to U.S. interests, to other stats in the region, and to their own citizens."[708] The direction and policy goals that underpinned this effort directed the perceptions and actions of the Administration. Only a few months into the presidency, the administration's' dedication to this goal structure was tested. The assassination plot of President Bush was being crafted in April 1993 and was discovered a few months later in June. President Clinton explicitly stated, "We should not be surprised by such deeds, coming as they do from a regime like Saddam Hussein's, which is ruled by atrocity, slaughtered its own people, invaded two neighbors, attacked others, and engaged in chemical and environmental warfare. Saddam has repeatedly violated the will and conscience of the international community."[709] There was "compelling evidence"[710]

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[707] Clinton, "Interview With Larry King."
[708] Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement."
[709] Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters."
[710] David Von Drehle and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Strikes Iraq for Plot to Kill Bush," *Washington Post* (Washington, D.C., June 27, 1993), sec. A01. Seymour Hersh wrote a scathing report in The New Yorker

and the response was meant to send a message.[711] Just as a commitment to the goals conditioned how the Administration viewed the event in the case of the attempted assassination, the events examined below will be judged through the goal structure.

Perception of Events – Khobar Towers, June 1996

On the night of June 25, 1996 a car bomb exploded outside an Air Force facility that housed US Airmen stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia supporting Operation Southern Watch. The attack killed nineteen US Airmen and injured more than 350 service members and civilians. Objectively it is expected that this event would issue a threat perception. American servicemen and women were targeted while supporting a military operation on foreign soil. Unarmed civilians including US citizens were killed and injured and property was damaged in a direct, hostile attack. Although the deaths do not reach the same numbers, this was the largest loss of American lives since the Marine Barracks bombing thirteen years earlier. On the other hand, subjectively, it would be anticipated that the Clinton Administration would develop a threat perception from the attack. Prior to June 1996, President Clinton had increased his dedication to his counterterrorism policy. He had proposed his counterterrorism legislation in February 1995, which was approved by Congress in June that year. The Administration proposed and signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 the following spring. Then on April 30, 1996, President Clinton announced the signing of the Counterterrorism Accord between the Israel and the US. At the announcement President Clinton reaffirmed the US commitment to its goals, stating, "We will not do what the enemies of peace want. We will not let our anger turn us away from the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. Maintaining our resolve for peace does not mean, however, turning the other cheek. We must do everything in our power to stop the killing and bring the terrorists to justice."[712]

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on August 31, 1993, on the so-called forensic evidence calling into question the legitimacy of the conclusions. He also contended that Kuwait had a reputation for enhanced interrogations and there were clear signs of torture on the detainees.

[711] Clinton, "Address to the Nation on the Strike on Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters."

[712] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Signing the Israel-United States Counterterrorism Cooperation Accord and an Exchange With Reporters," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American

Based purely on objective factors the event should generate a threat perception. Based purely on the subjective perspective of the president the event should have produced a threat perception. Yet, the actual perception the Clinton Administration adopted following the bombing was a "problem" perception. Distinct from a threat perception, the criteria for a perception to be labeled as a "problem" is when: 1) the event is considered detrimental to US interests; 2) US behaviors are the central focus for addressing the event, most often through current plans/policies; and 3) resources are allocated based on current allocation and availability. The response of the Clinton Administration satisfy these three criteria and in many ways mirror the response the Reagan Administration had with the Marine Barracks bombing in Lebanon.

The Clinton Administration did understand the bombing to be harmful to the US. The US lost nineteen highly qualified military personnel and several were severely wounded. It is important to note that the harm and loss assumed by the US was detrimental, but according to President Clinton, it was a loss that was anticipated. Just after the attack, President Clinton was scheduled to depart for Lyons, France to host an annual summit focusing specifically on terrorism. While at the summit he provided his weekly radio address. In that address President Clinton briefly commented on the "cowardly, brutal attack."[713] He then moved on to discussing terrorism more broadly emphasizing that, "New technologies and the rapid movement of information, money, and people across borders bring us closer together and enrich our lives. But they also make us all more vulnerable to rogue states, crime, drugs, and terrorism."[714] This demonstrates that although the loss was harmful to the US, it is expected because of the nature of the international system. President Clinton made similar remarks at the memorial service honoring the Airmen who died saying, "…we are not free from peril. While the modern world brings to all of us many new opportunities, it also leaves us more open to the forces of intolerance and destruction

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Presidency Project, April 30, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52743.

[713] William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address from Lyons, France June 29, 1996," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 29, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53010.

[714] Ibid.

and especially to terrorism."[715] In the statement given in response to the attack, President Clinton focused his comments on the plain facts. His focus then turned to what the US should concentrate on. He commented that all Americans should "rededicate ourselves to the fight against terrorism."[716] The response letters sent by President Clinton to heads of state offering condolences reaffirms the mindset of the Administration. He writes, "[it is] a cruel reminder that we are all vulnerable to the scourge of terrorism. However, we must not be intimidated. Together we must deal firmly with terrorism and stay the course for peace…"[717] The perspective was that the US suffered a tragedy and the attack was detrimental to the US, but the Administration assumed the loss and set out to continue on course.

The dedication or rededication to the fight against terrorism demonstrates the second criterion for a "problem" perception. When an event is perceived to be a problem the decision-makers will focus inward on their own actions or behaviors in an effort to continue pursuing their goals. President Clinton demonstrates this focus in the same radio address given from Lyons, France when he says,

> "All these steps against terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are part of a campaign America has been leading for 3 years now. Without our leadership, the job will not get done. The good news is, the United States at this G-7 summit is in the best position we've been in for years to protect the physical security of our people, in part because of our strong leadership toward a more stable and prosperous economic future for ourselves and our allies."[718]

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[715] William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the Memorial Service at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for American Servicemen Killed in Saudi Arabia," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 30, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53016.
[716] William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Saudi Arabia and an Exchange With Reporters," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 26, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52993.
[717] Warren Christopher, "Cable from Secretary of State Christopher to American Embassy in Islamabad Re: Reply from President Clinton to Prime Minister Bhutto," July 8, 1996, OA/ID 510000, Folder: [07/29/1996-08/09/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #4 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1995-Dec 1996 [Khobar].
[718] Clinton, "The President's Radio Address from Lyons, France June 29, 1996."

The Clinton Administration was focusing on the US actions within the current environment. The event did not alter the path or impede it, rather, in a sense, it focused the Administration efforts toward what they were already pursuing. The event presented the Administration with an opportunity to identify areas where the US could make adjustments toward accomplishing its goals. Evidence of this is most clearly seen in Administration officials focusing its attention on the actions of the Department of Defense and the conclusions of the Downing report. The Downing Report determined that it was the senior military commanders who were to blame due to ineffective security. In a briefing given to the House of Representatives, the Administration concentrated their talking points on "force security" and the "issue of the fence line."[719] The summary of the meeting concluded, "All also agreed that the threat was underestimated and that terrorist activity is likely to occur again."[720] Secretary of Defense William J. Perry openly took the blame by claiming that any failure of leadership that my have resulted in the terrorist attack was his fault.[721] The Administration directed subsequent actions on improving installation security.

President Clinton and his administration focused their attention on US behaviors that continued the path to goal attainment was the message to all audiences. In the talking points provided to President Clinton the emphasis was on US actions in response to the attack. He was given guidance to express, "…in the face of these tragedies that have happened to Americans home and abroad, our responsibility is to do everything we can to prevent terrorist attacks and to bring to justice those who commit them…We will continue to push for better tools to fight terrorism at home…Abroad we must work closely with out

[719] Katherine M. Veit, "Email Message to Anthony Lake and NSC Staff, Re: Legislative Update on Saudi Brief to House," July 10, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [07/10/1996-07/19/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #4 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, MSMail-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) [Khobar].
[720] Ibid.
[721] Philip Shenon, "Perry Accepts The Blame In Saudi Blast, But Not All," *New York Times* (New York, New York, September 19, 1996).

allies…"[722] This focus even resulted in a concerted effort by the NSC to avoid assigning blame for the attack.

Reports began to surface accusing Iran of supporting and even instigating the attack. The Clinton Administration was quick to contend with these reports, which were directing attention toward Iran as a possible culprit for the attack. News agencies, USA Today and Time, were claiming to have intelligence that the terrorists behind the attack were Iranian-sponsored. In email traffic between NSC staff members regarding the Time article it was suggested that efforts could be made to "kill Waller's story by starvation."[723] In discussions about whether to reinforce the intelligence the USA Today article was going to publish about Iran's involvement, it was advised for the Clinton Administration to "…stick with our current guidance that this is an ongoing criminal investigation…"[724] Talking points were prepared for Lake's discussion with USA Today. The suggestion was to avoid a "substantive discussion about what Iran is or is not up to" and several points were offered indicating the paper had poor information.[725] Also in those talking points a question was presented asking the journalist, "And why are you trying to provoke an Iranian action?"[726] The Administration did not want to unleash the implications of Iranian-sponsorship. Instead a criminal investigation allowed the Administration to stay in line with focusing on the US actions necessary to bring the terrorists to justice.

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[722] Natalie S. Wozniak, "Email Message to Sandy Berger and NSC Staff, Re: For Guidance, Presidential Talking Points for next Weeks Interviews," August 15, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/15/1996-08/19/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) [Khobar].

[723] Rand R. Beers, "Email Message to Sandy Berger and NSC Staff, Re: Khobar Bombing - USA Today," August 20, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/20/1996-08/22/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, MSMail-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) [Khobar].

[724] Ibid.

[725] Mark R. Parris, "Email Message to Anthony Lake and NSC Staff, Re: TPs for TL [Tony Lake] on USA Today," August 8, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/06/1996-08/14/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, MSMail-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) [Khobar].

[726] Katherine M. Veit, "Email Message to Anthony Lake and NSC Staff, Re: TPs Change - For Phone Conversation with USA Today Editor," August 8, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/06/1996-08/14/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, MSMail-Record (Sept 94 - Sept 97) [Khobar].

The third criterion to assess the type of perception adopted by the Clinton Administration is assessing the resources used in response to an event. For a "problem" perception, consistent with the understanding that the event was harmful, it would be expected that the Administration would direct some resources. At the same time, the resources used would be based on what is readily available and remains coherent with the goals in the goal structure. This is what happens in the Khobar bombing case. President Clinton quickly responded to the incident by dispatching the FBI to work with the Saudis. According to the PDD/NSC-39 the June 1995 Counterterrorism directive, when a terrorism event occurs US agencies will be sent to work in close coordination with friendly governments.[727] The State Department was given jurisdiction according to the PDD/NSC-39 to ensure the safety and security of Americans in foreign locations by reducing vulnerabilities. A cable was sent by the Secretary of State to American citizens residing in Qatar and despite the universal nature of terrorism, it was conveyed that "there are no, repeat, no indications that this bombing represents other than an internal Saudi security issue."[728] The Administration aimed its resources and response toward strengthening security measures for its American citizens abroad, but specifically those stationed at Dhahran. Per the Downing report the Department of Defense was following the same path changing personnel deployments to Saudi Arabia to unaccompanied tours and moving current forces to a new facility.[729] These actions demonstrate the third criterion for a "problem" perception was met. The Clinton Administration did not view this event as a threat; rather it was a problem that emerged in the environment that could be overcome through continuing US efforts toward goal pursuit.

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[727] William J. Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism" (White House, June 21, 1995), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-39.pdf, Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

[728] Warren Christopher, "Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Doha Re: Warden Message Proposal: Al-Khobar," June 30, 1996, OA/ID 510000, Folder: [06/20/1996-06/30/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #3 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1995-Dec 1996 [Khobar].

[729] Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Report to the President on Actions in Response to Khobar Bombing," September 15, 1996, OA/ID 2240, Folder: Khobar Towers [Saudi Arabia] [2] 2006-0648-F Box #2 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, TNT- Simon.

Judgment of Events – Khobar Towers, June 1996

The Clinton Administration developed a "problem" perception of the Khobar bombing. The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework suggests that perceptions are influenced by the operative goals the administration has committed to. The Clinton Administration was committed to the direction and policy goals within the goal structure directed at the Middle East. The theory presented here claims, if the decision-makers judge that the event is obstructing its goals it will consider it a threat. Embedded in this judgment is the act of attributing a source of the threat, which would lead to identifying an actor or object that must be addressed. As indicated, the Khobar Towers bombing was not judged to obstruct these goals. For this reason, although there was loss of American life and resources, the event was not perceived to be a threat. The Administration believed that they could continue the mission and ultimately it was behaviors within the Department of Defense that needed to be modified to ensure greater protection of its forces. This section will examine the Administrations response to the event to see if the judgments were based on the goals.

The Administration defended the fact that the military personnel that were attacked in Saudi Arabia were directly facilitating the Administration's goals. In a response to a foreign minister, Secretary Christopher stated, "This cowardly act was a direct and deliberate assault on the United States, its friends, allies, and our mission of peace. However, we must not be deterred."[730] In this comment Secretary Christopher claims the US must not be deterred, indicating that the event has not obstructed the mission or objectives of the forces. An email message among the NSC staff supplied talking points regarding the Khobar bombing. These talking points were in response to claims that US troops in Saudi Arabia were serving no purpose and the Administration failed to protect them. The email provided states clearly, "We are there [Saudi Arabia] because it is a base from which we can prevent further aggression by Saddam Hussein in the area, first. And, second, it is a base which enables us to cooperate with those who agree

[730] Warren Christopher, "Cable from Secretary of State Christopher to American Embassy in Seoul," July 8, 1996, OA/ID 510000, Folder: [07/08/1996-07/10/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #4 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1995-Dec 1996 [Khobar].

with us in the Middle East, including many Arab countries, in fighting terrorism."[731] A defense of the mission not only highlights the goals that were being pursued, but also that they were still viable and not inhibited by the attack.

The mission or the goals of the Administration were in full view, guiding its judgment of the event. The Clinton Administration was assessing the bombing through the lens of the Middle East peace process context. President Clinton expressed the Administration's continued persistence of the goals in his own words by saying, "And I think it would be a mistake for the United States to basically change its mission because of this…But I believe the United States mission in the Middle East is important, and it is supportive of countries that support the peace process, and I believe that we should continue on that mission. "[732] A cable was sent documenting the effect of the Khobar bombing on the Middle East peace process. The information that is relayed demonstrates that the Administration was assessing the event through its goals. In cable it was documented that during the conference held July 9-10, 1996, "the recent al-Khobar bombing played second fiddle to the peace process…"[733] It was a relief that the attendees were more focused the business at hand, such as on the Israeli agreements and negotiations that had been previously established. The status of the effect the event had on goal progress was a concern.

Comprehensive Middle East peace and the efforts taken in this process were viewed as the strongest defense against terrorism. For the Administration being able to advance this cause by achieving the Administrations goals equated to fighting terrorism. Therefore, a persistent call to continue the fight following the attack was an indication that the Administration was judging the Khobar Towers bombing in light of its goals. President Clinton explicitly states, "America must not, and America will not be

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[731] Steven J. Naplan, "Email Message to Anthony Blinken and NSC Staff, Re: Saudi C&R," August 22, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/20/1996-08/22/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) [Khobar].
[732] Clinton, "Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Saudi Arabia and an Exchange With Reporters."
[733] Warren Christopher, "Cable from American Embassy in Riyadh to Secretary of State, Re: Saudi and Syrian FonMins Emphasize Adherence to Previous Agreements," July 10, 1996, OA/ID 510000, Folder: [07/08/1996-07/10/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #4 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1995-Dec 1996 [Khobar].

driven from the fight against terrorism."[734] In a statement given to reporters on the bombing, President Clinton pointed directly to what influenced his understanding of the attack. He declared, "This attack underscores the struggle of all those who share tolerance and freedom and security. Our struggle at the end of the cold war is to deal with these new perils..."[735] The bombing was judged in light of what it was the Administration was trying to accomplish, freedom, and security. The attack did not obstruct this but was judged as an event reinforcing his efforts. He states, "Now as I head to Lyons, my first order of business will be to focus the strength and the energy of the G-7 on the continuing fight against terrorism…"[736] The day prior to this comment, in a press briefing, Mike McCurry was asked about the bombing and whether it would be a topic at the G-7 summit in Lyons. His response also indicates that the goals were influenced the evaluation of the bombing. He states,

> "Well, remember that over the course of the past several years the subject of terrorism itself has been elevated on the agenda of the G-7 as the industrialized nations begin to work together. One of the points the President has consistently made… is that we must develop global approaches to combating terrorism, which can lead to greater information exchange, greater cooperation among industrialized nations. That subject was already on the agenda for the G-7; this incident will certainly elevate the importance of that discussion."[737]

The event was assessed through the lens of the Administrations' operative goals.

A dedication to certain policy goals designed to fight terrorism also uncovers the Administration's use of its goals to judge the event. The perpetrators of the act were designated as criminals. This is a judgment on the character of the act. A sub-goal to advancing Middle East peace was to arrest and prosecute terrorists. Previous actions demonstrated that the Administration was dedicated to

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[734] Clinton, "Remarks at the Memorial Service at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, for American Servicemen Killed in Saudi Arabia."
[735] Clinton, "Remarks on the Terrorist Attack in Saudi Arabia and an Exchange With Reporters."
[736] Ibid.
[737] Mike McCurry, "Press Briefing by Mike McCurry," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, June 25, 1996, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59381.

pursuing judicial action on the suspected terrorists. The goals informed the Administration about how they should characterize the terrorists and proceed. Director of the FBI Louis Freeh faced many challenges in working with the Saudi government to question the accused; he even suggested that the Administration pursue other potential actors. Yet, the Administration held fast to pursuing this track and praised the fact that the FBI was working "closely with the Saudis."[738] The Administration even offered a reward of up to $2 million to anyone with information on the suspects.[739] Guidance consistently solidifying this commitment, suggesting, "[We] believe that we should stick with our current guidance that this is an ongoing criminal investigation about which no conclusions have been reached…"[740] The Clinton Administration viewed the terrorists as criminals and remained committed to the FBI investigation three years later. As mentioned earlier, even amid allegations that the Iranian sponsored terrorist group Hezbollah may have been responsible, the Administration pursued an FBI investigation.[741]

Perception of Events – Embassy Bombings, August 1998

On August 7, 1998 within the span of 9 minutes two US embassies were attacked in two separate countries. The embassy in Nairobi, Kenya sustained the worst damage and casualties, over 290 people were killed (12 Americans), and over 5,000 were wounded. Subsequently, in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 10 people were killed and over 70 people were injured. An attack on a nation's embassy, especially at those magnitudes, would be considered a threat. Then add to context that two attacks were carried out simultaneously. There is little question that these events would produce a threat perception objectively. As indicated in the previous section, it would be expected that subjectively President Clinton and his

[738] Natalie S. Wozniak, "Email Message to Sandy Berger and NSC Staff, Re: POTUS Guidance," August 15, 1996, OA/ID 590000, Folder: [08/15/1996-08/19/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #9 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) [Khobar].
[739] Warren Christopher, "Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy in Riyadh Re: June 25, 1996, Bombing of the Khobar Towers Facility, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia," June 27, 1996, OA/ID 510000, Folder: [06/27/1996]; 2006-0648-F Box #3 of 16, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1995-Dec 1996 [Khobar].
[740] Parris, "Email Message to Anthony Lake and NSC Staff, Re: TPs for TL [Tony Lake] on USA Today."
[741] Richard Miniter, *Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Regency Publishing Inc., 2003), 5.

administration would develop a threat perception. In the case of the embassy bombings did result in in a threat perception for the Clinton Administration. This declaration is not merely based on the Administration's use of force but the perception that led to a military response. The evidence points to a "threat" perception according to the following criteria that: 1) it posed imminent danger, harm, or injury to the US or its interests resulting in a sense of urgency; 2) a culpable actor is identified along with certain US vulnerabilities that are in danger; and 3) there is a redirecting or acquiring national resources directed at the designated actor.

There is little doubt that the event generated a sense of urgency in the due to the possibility of an imminent threat. The attacks sent shocks through the international community. President Clinton sent an initial message from Martha's Vineyard presenting the imminent threat on the horizon. He stated, "we have compelling information that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable collateral casualties we saw so tragically in Africa; and fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons."[742] [743]When he returned to the Oval Office he was blunt about the Administration's perception, stating, "Today I ordered our Armed Forces to strike at **terror**ist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security." The sense of urgency was definitely present as well. Immediately, President Clinton ordered Sandy Berger his National Security Advisor to identify military options.[744] The embassy attacks occurred on August 7 and two weeks later the Administration fired the missiles. Previous responses by the Administration were to avoid jumping to conclusions about the motive and to delay so

[742] William J. Clinton, "Remarks in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 20, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54798.
[743] William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 20, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54799.
[744] Michael Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence," *Nonproliferation Review (After Jan. 1, 2005)* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 116.

that the proper agencies could pursue judicial evidence to confirm responsibility. In this case the threat of similar future attacks elevated the concern and urgency.

The second criterion for a threat perception is that a particular actor or object is identified as having the capability to exploit US vulnerabilities. The pursuit of military action implies something or someone is the target. Berger's talking points records, "From the first day, our intelligence community began to receive a substantial amount of credible evidence from many sources and many methods indicating that the Usama bin Laden terrorist organization was responsible for these terrible acts."[745] The small group of trusted foreign policy advisors quickly developed a target list with their military counterparts. On August 11, General Zinni the Commander of the Central Command received orders to "prepare detailed plans for strikes against targets in Afghanistan."[746] The following day, President Clinton was briefed on the various military options. General Shelton provided a plan to go in with Special Forces or the Tomahawk missile strike targeting two facilities in Sudan and seven targets in Afghanistan.[747] There was discussion about the form of attack, but there was near consensus that the risk of losing US forces was too high, therefore the missile strike was selected. On August 14, two days later President Clinton approved the attack plan.[748] The strike would occur on 20 August based on intelligence reports the CIA had obtained that there would be a large meeting of terrorist leaders to include bin Laden that evening.

The decisions were made very quickly and reflect how quickly the event generated a "threat" perception. The NSC team had already determined that bin Laden was the face and name of the terrorist movement. He was designated as a target well before the bombs exploded in Kenya and Tanzania. The

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[745] Samuel Berger, "Sandy Berger Assistant to the President for National Security, Talking Points for Briefing on Militray Strikes," August 20, 1998, OA/ID 3784, Folder: For NSC [Air Strikes in Afghanistan & Sudan][2]; 2007-1596-F Box #4 of 11, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Transnational Threats, Richard Clarke.
[746] Kean and Zelikow, *9/11 Commission Report*, 116.
[747] Russell Watson et al., "`Our Target Was Terror'. U.S. Strikes Against Afghanistan and Sudan," *Newsweek* 132, no. 9 (August 31, 1998): 24.
[748] Tim Weiner and James Risen, "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise.," *New York Times* 148, no. 51287 (September 21, 1998): A1.

decision-makers threat view of bin Laden began to change from being a financier of terrorism to an orchestrator of the terrorist movement. As a mere financier he would have been no different than the various terrorist the FBI captured and tried. Yet, the accumulation of resources and followers magnified his projected influence. This change was recognized when he moved to Afghanistan and became more dedicated to establishing training camps and recruiting followers. The level of his willingness to pursue violence by training an army of followers increased. There was also intelligence from his phone conversations that demonstrated he had cells in nearly 60 countries and was continuing to grow.[749] The scale of the embassy attacks made the realization that he was increasing his capability even more clear. By designating bin Laden as the architect of all terrorist actions, based on his rhetoric and accumulation of resources, allowed the Clinton Administration was able to identify a tangible, targetable actor. In response questions about the strikes, NSC officials repeatedly claimed that bin Laden was not the target, but instead they were targeting his network and ability to conduct future attacks. Yet, in interviews of Albright and Berger conducted later suggest bin Laden was the target and the date was selected specifically based on intelligence that he may be at the training camp.[750]

Along with identifying the US vulnerability to future large-scale attacks, the Administration anticipated a potential chemical attack. The Administration had not only identified a potential an actor, but also a means that could be used to exploit the US weaknesses. The Sudanese pharmaceutical plant was selected based on reports that the plant was making the products used in chemical weapons. The justification presented to the public and international community was said to come from "convincing intelligence".[751] The main justification came from soil samples and human intelligence gathered years prior to the strikes.[752] Despite a significant amount of information that has come out since the strikes to

[749] Russell Riley, Stephen F. Knott, and Robert Strong, "Interview with Madeleine K. Albright," Transcript, August 30, 2006.
[750] Madeleine Albright, "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," interview by Thomas Kean, Transcript, 2004.
[751] Samuel Berger, "Interview with Sandy Berger," interview by Chris Bury, Television, November 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/clinton/interviews/berger.html.
[752] Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence."

cast severe doubt on the validity of the intelligence and the evidence the decision-makers used, the fact is that the Administration selected specific the targets based on US vulnerabilities. There were two US vulnerabilities that were identified. One was the threat of future attacks on embassies and American personnel by bin Laden and his network. Berger's talking points indicate this, "As preparations began…we also saw clear signs that one or more additional attacks against us were being planned."[753] The second was the threat of chemical weapons landing in the hands of terrorists. The training camp target addressed the first vulnerability by removing bin Laden and the command structure. There was a loose association between bin Laden and the plant itself, it was believed the plant was funded by bin Laden.[754] More importantly bin Laden had made public statements about wanting to acquire chemical weapons and the Administration linked the financial holdings he had in Sudan to the plant, which was thought to be making chemical weapons. There were actually two factories on the hit list and the just prior to the strike the Joint Chiefs were allowed to review the target list. They unanimously called into question the leather factory for collateral damage considerations and it was removed from the strike.[755] Given the nature of the threat and the perceived vulnerabilities, no other parties were privy to the planning process besides the small group of six. Several members stated with pride the enormous amount of secrecy surrounding the planning process and claimed it as one of the most successful events in preventing leaks.[756]

The third criterion used to assess the type of perception developed by the Clinton Administration in response to the embassy bombings is the evidence of directing resources at the identified actor. This is most clearly demonstrated in the fact that Tomahawk missiles were aimed at bin Laden and his network of commanders, his training camp, and his financial assets. Along with the strike, President Clinton

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[753] Berger, "Sandy Berger Assistant to the President for National Security, Talking Points for Briefing on Militray Strikes."
[754] Watson et al., "`Our Target Was Terror'. U.S. Strikes Against Afghanistan and Sudan."
[755] Department of Defense, *Military Staff Statement No. 6 to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 9/11 Commissions, 2004).
[756] Berger, "Interview with Sandy Berger"; William S. Cohen, "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," interview by Thomas Kean, Transcript, 2004.

signed an executive order adding bin Laden and his organizations to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995 regarding "Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process."[757] The question and answer guidance illustrates that bin Laden was the object of the resources, "The actions taken were intended to prevent and deter an immediate and continuing threat from UBL and his related organizations…"[758] Based on this evidence and the previous criteria examined, it is verified that the Clinton Administration adopted a threat perception.

Judgment of Events – Embassy Bombings, August 1998

It may not seem too much of a stretch to claim that the Clinton Administration developed a threat perception of the Embassy bombings. Again both objectively and subjectively this is expected. The key to this study is whether the judgment of the event was influenced by the Administration's commitment to its foreign policy goals. Some of Clinton Administration's aim through its various policy and direction goals was to eliminate opportunities for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promote freedom and democracy, and counter those who oppose liberalization and the community of nations pursuing peace. The below will examine if the Administration's goals are taken into account when decision-makers are evaluating the attack.

Given that part of the theory is based on a commitment to the goals it is important to note that the individuals that made up the NSC were not new to the Administration. Due to the nature of the response, much of the coordination regarding the embassy bombings was constrained to a small group of well-seasoned foreign policy makers. Entering into the second term in 1995, the Clinton Administration filled certain NSC positions with new names. Although the names that filled the seats were new the faces were familiar. Many of the individuals in were present in the NCS staff or worked intimately with them in the

[757] William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 13099—Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 20, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54808.

[758] Secretary of State, "Cable Re: Guidance on Questions and Answers Related to the Embassy Bombings and Bin Laden," August 21, 1998, OA/ID 520000, Folder: [08/21/1996]; 2007-1597-F Box #6 of 11, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Jan 1997 -Dec 1998 [Kenya, Tanzania...].

year's prior, making them very familiar with the Administration's goals and priorities. This includes six of the individuals specifically involved in the decision to strike Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998.[759] As mentioned, several of these individuals held positions directly within the administration's foreign policy network starting in 1993 and were abreast of the events and circumstances leading up to the decision. Samuel "Sandy" Berger was the Deputy National Security Advisor for Anthony Lake from 1993 through 1997 before taking over as NSA. He was intimately involved with the various crises that emerged throughout the period leading up to the missile strikes and was a key actor in coordinating meetings. The "ABC" meetings, named after Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and William Cohen, were his creation in the second term; routinely focusing on terrorism concerns.[760] Madeleine Albright was the US Ambassador to the UN in the president's first term. She was one of the new additions to the NSC after the reorganization. She was also included in the small group meetings reserved for special topics. During the second term she became the Secretary of State and a key figure in the decision-making circle.

The other key members of the 1998 decision-making team held positions that afforded them close access to the issues that arose prior to August, familiarizing them and conditioning them with the Clinton Administration's goal structure. William Cohen was immersed in the nation's foreign policy decisions, but primarily as an observer during the first term. He resided on the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, which afforded him insight into the intelligence community and covert actions, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 1997 he moved over to be the Secretary of Defense and shifted from observer status to decision-maker. George Tenet was appointed by President Clinton as Director for Intelligence Programs in the NSC from 1993 to 1995. Then in 1995 he moved over to become the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). After the former NSA Lake's nomination was blocked, Tenet entered into the position of the Director of CIA. His career in the intelligence profession and legitimacy as DCI gave weight to his recommendations and opinions. The final member of the small contingent that helped formulate the response in August 1998 was the CJCS General Henry "Hugh" Shelton. Prior to

[759] Weiner and Risen, "Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on Surmise."
[760] Albright, "9/11 Commission Report."

taking this position General Shelton ran the Joint Task Force in Haiti and then commanded Special Operations Command (SOCOM). While at SOCOM General Shelton established a cell dedicated to tracking Osama bin Laden and brought that awareness to the NSC when he joined the principals in 1997.

The actions of bin Laden were beginning to show up on the Administration's radar even before the embassy attacks. Plans were being generated to kill or capture bin Laden as early as February 13, 1998. The Counterterrorism Center planners had begun to develop a plan where tribal leaders in Afghanistan would participate in the seizure.[761] The CIA had set up a cell in 1996 to track the movement of bin Laden and it had become apparent he was more than just a financier. There was mounting evidence of his involvement in terror attacks and an indictment through the New York courts could finally be used to charge him if he was brought to the States. From February through May of 1998 plans were developed, rehearsed, and modified. As the time neared for the CIA to get approval to execute the covert action, Tenet feared there likelihood of success was low and pulled the plan from the agenda.[762] He searched for other options that minimized the potential loss of life and called on the CJCS to draft some alternatives. In June, General Shelton went to General Zinni and requested alternatives to sending troops in, which resulted in the Tomahawk strike option.[763] On August 5 two days prior to the embassy bombings there was a working group meeting discussing the options available to get bin Laden.

When the embassy attack occurred the Clinton Administration witnessed the scale and scope of what the bin Laden network could do. Talking points for the Administration state, "[Bin Laden's organization's] ability to organize the bombings in East Africa shows how capable their operations are."[764] In the talking points a comment states that the attacks are not responsible for the stalemate in the Middle East peace process, but in the same paragraph it indicates "The aim of the network's recent

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[761] Kean and Zelikow, *9/11 Commission Report*, 112–114.
[762] Ibid., 115.
[763] Ibid., 116.
[764] National Security Council, "Talking Points on the Afghanistan and Sudan Strikes," August 20, 1998, OA/ID 3784, Folder: For NSC [Air Strikes in Afghanistan & Sudan][2]; 2007-1596-F Box #4 of 11, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Transnational Threats, Richard Clarke.

attacks – including the embassy bombings – have clearly been to force America to retreat from its global leadership. Today's actions demonstrate that this effort cannot and will not succeed."[765] This majority of goals operating at this time were a function of the Administration leading by example. The day of the attack an email was sent to Berger, the National Security Advisor with goals the President has communicated at the Naval Academy's commencement speech. The goals highlighted key policy goals in President Clinton's comprehensive strategy to fight terrorism. Those goals were: "capture terrorists, no matter where they hide; work with other nations to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries, and respond rapidly and effectively to protect Americans from terrorism at home and abroad."[766] This transaction of information acknowledges that the Administration was evaluating the event very early on through the goals it had committed to. Then in a press briefing, Berger pointed directly to the Annapolis speech as a guide for what the Administration was committed to pursuing in counterterrorism.[767] Given bin Laden's proven capability, it would become recognized that all three of these goals were obstructed.

Not only did the Administration developed their perception of the attacks through these particular goals, but also from day one, the Administration sought to eliminate the acquisition of chemical weapons. It was documented in a cable after the attacks, "our intelligence over the past few months that the bin Laden network has been actively seeking to acquire chemical weapons for use against United States interests."[768] The cable went on to say, "We have been concerned with the activities of Usama Bin Laden and his network of terrorist groups for some time bet we have never had such conclusive evidence of their terrorist activities as we have recently."[769] In a press conference Berger commented, "Let me be very

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[765] Ibid.
[766] David E. Halperin, "Email Message to Sandy Berger and NSC Staff, Re: Naval Academy Commencement Speech Exerts," August 7, 1998, OA/ID 1275, Folder: Embassy Bombings/Counterterrorism Aug 98 (Binder); 2007-1596-F Box #5 of 11, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Transnational Threats, Mark Fung.
[767] Samuel Berger and Mike McCurry, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Mike McCurry," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 21, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48360.
[768] Secretary of State, "Cable Re: Guidance on Questions and Answers Related to the Embassy Bombings and Bin Laden."
[769] Ibid.

clear about this. There is no question in my mind that the Sudanese factory was producing chemicals that are used, can be used, in VX gas. This was a plant that was producing chemical warfare related weapons and we have physical evidence of that fact."[770] The following day President Clinton made it clear the goal to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons played a large role in the Administration's perception of the events. He stated, "And we know he [bin Laden] wants to acquire chemical weapons. With that information and evidence, we simply could not stand idly by."[771] This reinforces the statement made after the Congress ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty at the beginning of 1998. President Clinton vowed that his Administration was determined to deny the capacity for the use of chemical weapons.[772] This is best summed up by a comment Berger made in a press brief, "We know that bin Laden and his people have sought to obtain chemical weapons. We know that he has had a particularly close relationship with the government of Sudan. And, therefore, when you put those things together…"[773] The embassy attacks were judged in light of this information.

[770] Berger and McCurry, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Mike McCurry."
[771] William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address, August 22, 1998," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 22, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54811.
[772] William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, January 27, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56280.
[773] Samuel Berger and Madeleine Albright, "Press Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger," Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, August 20, 1998, accessed January 27, 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=48285.

Table 6. Summary Terrorist Bombings, June 1996 & August 1998

Country		Saudi Arabia	Kenya & Tanzania
Time Period		June 1996 to August 1998	
Event(s)		- June 26, 1996 Bombing of Khobar Towers	- August 7, 1998 Simultaneous bombing of US Embassy Kenya and Tanzania
Operative Goals	**Principle**	- Promote democracy abroad - Restructure US military to meet new dangers - Reinvent democratic and market institutions in the international system - Strengthen the global economy - Counter those in opposition to liberalization or democracy - Eliminate opportunity for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - Strengthen alliances	
	Direction	- Advance regional security institutions - Increase global commitment to peaceful resolutions - Promote growth in the developing world - Increase public trust in global engagement - Increase global trust in UN and US leadership - Increase multilateralism - Increase number of countries who support nonproliferation agreements - Advance the peace process in the Middle East - Reduce "backlash" countries ability to sell nuclear technology - Reduce state-sponsored terrorism - Reduce available funding for terror (i.e. drug-trafficking) - Decrease effects of terror attacks on regional stability	
	Policy	- Keep continuity with Israel-Palestinian peace process - Reward Syria for efforts toward peace - Support Jordan- Israel peace talks - Support Syria-Israel peace talks - Arrest terrorists and bring them to justice - Counter Iran's opposition to Middle East peace (i.e. sanctions) - Pressure Iraq to follow UN resolutions - Encourage states to condemn terror attacks - Limit the spread of weapons to the Middle East	
Perception of Event (i.e. benign, problem, threat)		**PROBLEM**	**THREAT**

Judgment of Events	The bombing of Khobar Towers was a tragedy and emotional event, but it was viewed as a problem. The attack did not derail the Administration's present efforts or introduce a new the allocation of resources. There was no retaliation or identification of a source of immanent danger. The US mission in Saudi continued and the Administration's campaign against terrorism continued as it had before. Despite the existence of a discrepancy with these goals, the Administration believed any discrepancies could be overcome with internal changes, such as tighter security.	The simultaneous bombing of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania generated a threat perception. The demonstration of capabilities by bin Laden and his network led the Clinton Administration to judge that its international leadership, ability to capture and bring terrorists to justice, encourage states to hold a no-sanctuary policy, and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons was obstructed.

CHAPTER 10:

IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to expose how elite decision makers identify threats to national security. Proposing a theory on threat perception formation and testing it through detailed case study analysis accomplished this endeavor. The focus of the test was to broadly answer the question of how elite decision makers identify threats to nationals security, but more specifically it sought to examine specific situations: 1) what leads to shifts in perceptions from benign to threatening; 2) what leads to the elevation of non-traditional security issues (i.e. disease, environmental, humanitarian, etc.) to the level of national security threats; and 3) what causes a lag in identifying threats to national security. Through the process of theory development, the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework emerged. The theory posited that elite decision makers develop threat perceptions when it is judged that international events obstruct the decision maker's foreign policy goals.

This theory was tested for the US through multiple case studies across different administrations. Several findings emerged from this study. First, it became clear that US administrations have clear hierarchical goal structures that remain consistent across time and personnel changes within the administration. Second, the foreign policy goals developed for the Administration remained consistent and apparent "changes" in the decision maker's goals was actually a change in prioritization of the different goals. Third, it was concluded that decision makers use the foreign policy goal structures to evaluate events in the international system. The presence of all three of the proposed perceptions – benign, problem, and threat – were observed. Lastly, it was observed that when these events established conditions that were judged to obstruct the decision maker's foreign policy goals, it produced a threat perception for the administration. In turn, this threat perception affected the Administration's behavior. This chapter provides a summary of the case studies and the implications of the findings. It ends with a discussion of the limitations of the study and future research projects.

Case Studies

Below is a brief summary of the cases and events that were examined in this study. The investigation shows that the Administrations goals affected how they perceived the events. In the both Grenada and the African Embassy bombings the Administrations adopted a threat perception. In both cases the events presented the Administrations with a situation where their goals were obstructed by the context that emerged from the event. According to this examination the theory is accurate in claiming that threat perceptions emerge when decision makers perceive the goals they have committed to be obstructed.

Summary of Reagan Administration

Guatemala Coup and Massacre, March 1982. Objectively a military coup followed by political assassinations and indiscriminate killing would generate a threat perception**.** President Reagan expressed a deep commitment to democracy and democratic values. He believed it was the highest form of government. Subjectively, the event of a military takeover and the suppression of citizens' rights should have elicited a threat perception. Following the events of the coup subsequent political oppression in Guatemala the Reagan Administration maintained a "benign" perception. The evaluation of this case reveals that in light of the Administration's foreign policy goals, the events did not cause goal interruption. The events of the coup that occurred in 1982 were actually judged as a positive. The Reagan Administration set out early in his first term to improve relations with the Guatemalan Government. The limitation was the previous president of Guatemala's delay in instituting human rights reforms, which were needed to secure Congressional support for military sales. When the coup occurred and General Montt showed a willingness to meet the Administration's conditions, it offered the Reagan Administration an ability to pursue its goals.

The conditions of Soviet and Cuban influence in Nicaragua and El Salvador heightened the Administration's commitment to pursuit their goals in Latin America. General Montt took over by coup, but he professed to be strongly anti-communist and this testimony helped facilitate the goals the Administration had set for the region. According to the reports circulating the NSC, the new Guatemalan Government was reducing its political violence and squashing insurgencies thanks to the new President.

Along with verbal agreements to improve human rights, the Administration could use Guatemala to push back Cuban and Soviet influence. This served many of the Administration's goals in Latin America and the Caribbean. The indication that the Administration's goals would be achievable due to the regime change, and it was judged to reduce the current discrepancies, facilitated the Reagan Administration's "benign" perception.

Grenada, October 1983. The Reagan Administration adopted a "threat" perception very quickly after the Grenadian coup and the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop. It was just over two weeks between the initial events of the coup and the US Marine invasion of Grenada. In this case the Reagan Administration's goals were clearly obstructed. For the Reagan Administration, the Caribbean was a strategic region due to current Soviet influence, economic trade, and proximity to the US. Many of the goals within the foreign policy goal structure relative to Grenada were linked both vertically and horizontally. When a radical, pro-Communist leader took over the country of Grenada, a number of the Administration's goals were affected.

Early in his run for office, President Reagan had been warning that Grenada was a crucial piece to rolling back Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean. The belief that Grenada could be the next Cuba elevated the small the country to a place of prominence in the Administration. The nature and character of the coup indicated to President Reagan and his NSC that they could not achieve their goals until the regime was replaced. Plainly, policy, direction, and principle goals were obstructed. For this reason, the Reagan Administration developed a threat perception as a result of the coup.

Lebanon – Embassy and Marine Barracks Bombing 1983. It is difficult to accept that two attacks on US citizens in the span of one year in the same country would not generate a threat perception. Yet, that is the case for the bombings in Lebanon, the US Embassy bombing in April 1983, and the Marine Barracks Bombing in October 1983. Surprisingly, the Reagan Administration retained a "benign" perception following the US Embassy bombing, while adopting a "problem" perception following the Marine Barracks bombing. This case illustrated how operative goals and the anticipation of a response to actions can have a large influence on how discrepancies are assessed and the Administration's judgment.

The events are unique because they exist within an ongoing conflict. From the beginning, the Reagan Administration was dedicated to Israel's security and peace in the Middle East. Lebanon was a crucial link to these foreign policy goals. It was President Reagan's belief that solving the existing problems in Lebanon would create the conditions necessary to secure Israel and ease tensions within the region. The resolution of the Lebanon conflict was also believe to limit the influence the Soviets, specifically their influence via Syria, both politically and militarily .

In light of the operative goals, the Reagan Administration accepted the risks of placing US forces in Lebanon as part of the Multinational Force. The US troops were a means to the policy and direction goals established by the Administration. Since goal achievement, which took into account risk, was the focus and the guiding force for the Administration, when the two bombings occurred, they were assumed as part of the present context. The Reagan Administration anticipated violence and possible casualties since they were operating in a conflict region.

The reason the US Embassy bombing did not elevate the perception, but remained at benign is due to the circumstances surround the Administration's goals that were happening at the time. As mentioned in the theory chapter, if there are competing goals it is expected that the goal, which is closest to the deadline and has the smallest discrepancy, will inhibit other goals. In the case of Lebanon, the Reagan Administration was close to securing what would end up being called the May 17 Agreement when the US Embassy bombing occurred. The Administration remain committed to the operative direction and policy goals, looking at the events purely through the lens of securing an agreement and getting foreign forces out of Lebanon, which the May 17 Agreement was aimed to accomplish.

The Marine Barracks raised the Administration's perception from benign to problem primarily because over the course of the next 4 months, it became evident that Syria would not support the May 17 Agreement and Israel was unwilling to continue to maintain their security presence in Beirut. This changing political context highlighted that the US forces were in a vulnerable position in Beirut. When the bombing occurred, security was further reduced for the US forces by the use of the car bomb tactic. The Reagan Administration anticipated the US forces would become more of a target when Israel pulled

back from their positions in Beirut. Since the conditions of the event were already embedded in the socio-political environment, by the anticipation of violence, the nature of the attack was registered a "problem" perception. Following the attack it was judged to have occurred because the forces did not have adequate security measures in place. A common misperception is that the bombing of the Marine Barracks led to the Reagan Administration pulling out of Lebanon. In reality, the attack happened in late October and it was not until February that the Administration made the decision to redeploy the Marines offshore to the ship. Even after the redeployment there were efforts being made to keep US ground forces in Lebanon.

Summary of Clinton Administration

Rwanda Massacre, April 1994. Objectively the simultaneous assassination of two heads of state followed by the assassination of the Prime Minister and Belgium UN forces would garner a threat perception. Not to mention these deaths came on the heels of peace negotiations and political changes that were moving toward a new transitional government. Surprisingly, the Clinton Administration's perception of the assassinations and subsequent political violence did not generate a threat perception. The Clinton Administration voiced the importance of Africa and attempted to break the "Cold-War prism" of viewing the countries according to an anti-communist lens.[774] Yet, the surge of ethnic conflicts in Africa was almost predictable prior to the events of April 1994. Defending the Administration's policy theme of engagement, Lake is explicit that certain judgments must be made about the various conflicts. The list of criteria he offers reflects the operative goals of the administration and the expected cues that would condition the judgment of the events. He states,

> "But we must bring other considerations to bear as well: cost; feasibility; the permanence of the improvement our assistance will bring; the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their part; and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the people and the region in question. While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem bloodshed and

[774] William J. Clinton, "Remarks by President Clinton to the White House Conference on Africa," June 27, 1994, Folder: Africa - General; Box 1, 2011-0516-S; https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/48409, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, National Security Council, Philip J. (PJ) Crowley.

> suffering in ethnic conflicts, and while we will always bring our diplomacy to bear, these criteria suggest there will be relatively few intra-national ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention."

Certain conflicts were already painted in light of the socio-political context and markers for how to judge and assess their nature were embedded in what goals were being pursued.

President Clinton dogmatically held to the conviction that democracies do not go to war with one another, they do not produce refugees, and they do not support terrorism. He assumed democratic nations lived under a principle of cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution. From the outside, Rwanda was in transition toward becoming a democratic nation. According to the Clinton Administration, Rwanda was believed to have a poor economy and was bubbling with the ethnic tensions that had been released at the end of the Cold War. It was assessed that the lack of a stable democratic government had led to Rwanda suffering from political instability and civil strife. The goal structure established by President Clinton and carried out by his administration reinforced this perspective and embedded this perception into the environment.

Observing the context through the current environment conditions the decision makers to attribute a cause and effect to the situation based on what is judged relative to the operative goals. The Clinton Administration did not see Rwanda through any other lens than unstable yet actively transitioning government. The success achieved during its diplomatic conflict resolution led the Administration to continue to insist on the Ashura Accord and peace talks. The violence, which was viewed as African ethnic conflict, was believed to be a result of political opposition. The refugee spill over was judged as a subsequent result of the "random" violence perpetrated by the civil strife. These characteristics were already incorporated into the socio-political context for Africa and the goals the administration sought were aimed at addressing these issues, therefore, it was expected that there would be some challenges. The goal structure and the effect it has on conditioning perceptions inhibited the administrations ability to seek information and evidence about what was actually causing the refugee flows or what the political or civil grievances were over.

Khobar Bombing, June 1996 and Embassy Bombings, August 1998. According to goal-based decision-making, a commitment to goals affects information processing. When it is judged that events are affecting goal attainment yet the path of goal pursuit is viable, a "problem" perception develops. This is what happened following the Khobar Towers bombing. When it is judged that the event creates the condition where the goals are now obstructed, a "threat" perception emerges. In this case goal pursuit is not longer possible until the source of the "threat" perception is a confronted. For this reason, the Clinton Administration developed a "threat" perception following the African Embassy bombings. In both of the cases the Administration's judgment of the events were influenced by the foreign policy goals it had committed to.

The Khobar Bombings event is another example of how the operative goals condition the administration's view of the socio-political environment where certain events are anticipated. The Clinton Administration was familiar with terrorist attacks, it was witnessed an increase in the use of terrorism around the world. President Clinton understood that with the lifting of the Cold War lid, the caldron of ethnic and political grievances would be exposed. Based on this the Clinton Administration identified terrorism as a primary tactic that states and extremists would use to disrupt efforts toward peace and stability. The repetition of terror incidents in the Middle East was believed to be a reaction to the movement of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria's efforts toward peaceful relations. The Clinton Administration anticipated acts of violence in response to these efforts. Therefore, when the Khobar Towers were bombed, the event did not present an obstruction to the operative goals. Instead it merely reinforced the need for the Administration to be better prepared for future attacks, by shoring up security at deployed bases. It is based on this judgment that a "problem" perception developed.

Unlike Khobar, the Embassy Bombings quickly led to the adoption of a "threat" perception for the Clinton Administration. It was not purely the fact that a terrorist attack occurred, or even that there was massive damage or a higher loss of life. The Embassy bombings provided a demonstration of a capability that had previously been theoretical, that could obstruct the Administration's goals. A working group within the Clinton Administration had been tracking Osama bin Laden and was aware of his

increasing presence in the terrorist community. He was considered a problem and there were efforts made to draft plans for his arrest. As mentioned, prior to the Embassy bombings, the Clinton Administration had recognized the danger of terrorism. The principle goals the Administration was pursuing to deal with this danger was linked heavily to the confidence that President Clinton was achieving the Administration's policy goals. The scale, scope, and source of the Embassy bombings indicated that these policy goals were now obstructed.

The breadth of bin Laden's organization indicated that it would take an enormous amount of time to arrest and try the members. The scope of the attack demonstrated the ability for bin Laden and his organization to acquire significant resources. This combined with the intelligence they were seeking chemical weapons obstructed the Administration's goal to restrict the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. This case demonstrated how one event, viewed in light of the Administration's goals, could be perceived to create a major threat to US security in such a way that President Clinton and his staff sough to respond rapidly to eliminate the threat.

Interestingly, these cases illuminate that there is a difference between the classifying something as a threat and actually perceiving an event to be threatening. Throughout his time in office President Clinton emphasized that terrorism was a threat to peace. He reiterated in his speech regarding the Embassy attacks, "This will be a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism."[775] As a threat, the US was in a fight against terrorism. Yet, when terrorist attacks occur they are not all treated the same. The Khobar Towers attack was considered more as a force security concern, than a national security concern. The frame of reference used in making this distinction appeared to be whether the operative goals of the Administration were judged as inhibited or whether they remained unhindered.

[775] Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan."

Admin	Region	Country	Time Period	Event	Operative Goals			Perception of Event (i.e. Benign, Problem, Threat)
					Principle	Direction	Policy	
Carter	Middle East	Iran	1979	Iranian Revolution	N	N	N	BENIGN
Carter	Middle East	Iran	1979	Iranian Hostage Crisis	N/Y	N/Y	Y/Y	PROBLEM/ THREAT
Carter	Middle East	Afghanistan	1980	Soviet Invasion	Y	Y	Y	THREAT
Reagan	Latin America	Guatemala	1982	Coup & massacres	N	N	N	BENIGN
Reagan	Caribbean	Grenada	1983	Coup & political violence	Y	Y	Y	THREAT
Reagan	Middle East	Lebanon	1983	Bombing US Embassy	N	N	N	BENIGN
Reagan	Middle East	Lebanon	1983	Bombing US Marine Barracks	N	N	Y	PROBLEM
Clinton	Africa	Rwanda	1994	Coup & massacres	N	N	N	BENIGN
Clinton	Middle East	Saudi Arabia	1996	Bombing US Khobar Towers	N	N	Y	PROBLEM
Clinton	Africa	Kenya & Tanzania	1998	Bombing US Embassies	Y	Y	N	THREAT

Table 7. Summary of all the cases presented. The Y/N in the operative goals window indicates whether the Administration judged those goals as obstructed as a result of the event.

Implications

When surveying current scholarship on grand theories, domestic politics, foreign policy analysis, and securitization, there appeared to be gaps in the field's understanding of when threat perceptions would emerge. Through the literature review it was assessed that threat perceptions have been routinely incorporated into the ontologies and traditions of each distinct field versus being a focus of inquiry on its own. As posited by some, threat perceptions are a combination of objective and subjective factors, yet the

factors contributing to this assertion remained unexplored. This study sought to illuminate the actual causal mechanism behind threat perceptions.

One of the implications that came out of this study is that it is important to distinguish between designating an object as a threat versus the formation of a threat perception. It is possible to label something as a threat, yet not consider it threatening at all times. It is also possible for something that is not labeled as a threat to present itself as threatening under certain conditions. To identify a country or a head of state as a threat asserts that there are indeed objective characteristics that are commonly agreed that would pose danger to another. When President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union as a threat, he is making the claim that there is something inherent in the country that poses harm to the US. When President Clinton labels terrorism a threat, he is asserting that act and effects of terrorism are harmful to the US because of what it does the people and the state. As this study indicated, even objective threats or identified threats do not necessarily elicit threat perceptions on their own.

This study helps to rectify this by providing an alternate explanation for the formation of threat perceptions. Decision makers are making an assessment of the international system through their foreign policy goals. This act conditions whether the events are judged as creating a threatening situation, despite the whether it was previously labeled as a threat. The subjective nature of threat perceptions is that decision makers personally create goal structures, which incorporate the present socio-political environment, and from here judgments are sourced. Goal hierarchies take into consideration the labeled threats, so decision makers are sensitive to actors or issues that have been identified as threats because their goals are typically designed to address them. Yet for actors or issues that have been labeled as threats, certain events are anticipated. This becomes part of the existing environment, and therefore creates a certain cushion where those entities designated as a threat can operate before an actual event generates a threat perception. It is in this space that problem perceptions emerge. The development of a problem perception may lead decision makers to be more sensitive to the actions to those actors that have been labeled at threats, but since the problem perception is a result of anticipated behavior and assumed into the socio-political context, it will not appear threatening. Being designated as a threat actually

incorporates it into the Goal-Based Decision-Making process. For this reason, a designated threat may operate without generating a threat perception as long as they are not obstructing the decision makers' operative foreign policy goals.

Foreign Policy Goals

Since goals have not been throughout examined, the nature, structure, and function of goals can easily be assumed without much active thought. In agreement on the literature from other fields, this study has demonstrated that foreign policy goals are actually persistent, hierarchical, and interconnected. The model used to create the foreign policy goal hierarchy was taken from the Motivated Action Theory. Slight modifications to the designation of the levels assisted in bringing the hierarchy into the foreign policy sphere. Across all the case studies, each US administration examined (Carter, Reagan, and Clinton) demonstrated the presence of a structured set of foreign policy goals that remained consistent from the beginning of the president's time in office until the end, even during 8-year terms. The goal hierarchies developed also demonstrated that the administrations had goals at every level and the lower-order goals served the higher-order goals. Not only did the hierarchy govern the president's, but it served to orient the NSC as well.

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework was applied to an organization within the US government responsible for foreign policy, the NSC. Through the case studies, it became clear that the prescribed goals crafted by the president and his close advisors were adopted and executed by the NSC staff. Regularly the Administration's goals were present throughout the staff's communications, talking points, questions asked during meetings, and memories about previous experiences that were relayed in interviews. Rarely was the dialogue between NSC principals and staff, as well as, among the staff members themselves void of the Administration's goals. This demonstrated a persistent commitment to the operative principle, direction, and policy goals at the various levels of the NSC. It appeared the NSC functioned as an organization, effectively working for the purpose of goal achievement. When new personnel were introduced into the Reagan and Clinton Administrations, they did not bring new goals to the Administration. Rather, they quickly adopted the organizational goals, which were the

Administration's goals, solidifying the influence they had on the individuals within the organization.

It was not that all NSC personnel always adopted the Administration's goal structure. Alexander Haig, President Reagan's first Secretary of State, demonstrated the consequence of an individual failing to adopt and commit to the organization's goal structure. He aligned with the principle goals of the Administration, but not the direction and policy goals. This created a large amount of conflict and confusion during the first year of Reagan's presidency. This ultimately led to him being encouraged to step down from his position.

It was exposed, by conducting case studies across different administrations, that despite the fact that the presidents were very different men and had different administrations, they responded to international events according to their goal structures. For this reason, manner in which they developed their perceptions conducted subsequent actions were very similar. In a similar fashion, President Reagan and President Clinton were highly criticized early in their presidencies for not having a solid foreign policy. This was definitely not the case. Both men had a well developed a foreign policy goal structure even prior to their inaugurations. By choice, both presidents made it a point to prioritize the domestic economy during their first year. Although it appeared they did not have a robust foreign policy, this attention was not a result lacking a foreign policy; rather it was the prioritization of their goals.

Both President Reagan and President Clinton's foreign policy goals were based on their understanding of the existing conditions of the international system. Many times it was necessary for them to communicate this perspective to their respective publics, and especially critics. Principle goals are most closely tied to addressing the context of the international system. For example, President Reagan's principle goal of preventing the spread of communism was linked to the fact that the Soviet Union had nearly doubled their presence in the world. President Clinton's belief that globalization was directly affecting the global economy influenced his principle goal of strengthening the global marketplace. Since the context is ever present, many times the President will reiterate and harp on their principle goals. This continual presentation of broad objectives will affect the perspective the society and foreign policy elites

have on the overall foreign policy. These goals primarily explain the vision the Administration is following. Yet, because they are so broad they leave a lot to be desired by the audience.

It is also possible for the audience to activate certain goals within the Administration's goal structure and elevate it to a priority. This was not the focus of the study and there is still a lot to be examined regarding the interaction of the domestic or political audience and the Administration's goals. What was evident when looking at the archival research was in order for the audience to gain the Administration's attention, the audience's concern had to exist with in and be related to goals present in the goal structure. Both Administrations made concerted effort to have the American people understand and support the goals they were pursuing.

President Reagan and President Clinton both had direction goals, although they may not have developed a hierarchy or it may not have been visible to them. In seemed that in each administration, the direction goals were typically communicated in conjunction with principle goals. A clear distinction was that direction goals were most often regionally focused, such as Africa or Middle East, or domain-specific, such as economic or military. Each administration had direction goals for the different regions of the world. What became clear was the Administration's priorities were reflected in how closely the direction goals were tied to the principle goals, the more closely linked, the higher the likelihood they were the priority goals. In the Reagan Administration the direct association of rolling back Soviet influence (principle goal) with removing Soviet and Cuban presence from the Caribbean and Central America demonstrated a strong commitment to those goals. President Clinton set the principle goal of spreading democracy to foster the international community of democratic states. His direction goal of supporting Russia and post-Soviet Bloc states deepened his goal commitments. With a deepened goal commitment it is evident that the Administration's time and attention would be directed to those regions.

Perceptions

Through the investigation of threat perceptions evidence did show that there was a distinction between "problem" perceptions and "threat" perceptions. I admit the categorization of "problem" is not the best. What is important to see is that there is a perception that is developed that resides between a

"benign" and a "threat" perception. The Reagan and Clinton Administration both adopted a "problem" perception of the hostile attacks on US military installations in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Further research would uncover that the Administrations suffered other attacks in Kuwait (Reagan) and Somalia (Clinton) and had the same "problem" perception. The implication is that scholarship tends to lump the two perceptions together and call it a crisis. By not distinguishing between the two it is possible to attribute behavior to the wrong cause and accept historical inaccuracies. In the Reagan Administration it is commonly stated that the bombing of the Marine Barracks led to the departure of the US from Lebanon. Although it contributed, following the attack the President strengthened the US commitment to Lebanon. Prior to the bombing discussion papers were already circulating to present options to the President from going in with an all out force to withdrawing all the troops. The decision to withdraw was not solely determined by the Marine Barracks bombing and understanding the nature of the perception can help distinguish was factors actually affected the outcome.

Behavior

A significant portion of the foreign policy research focuses on outcomes. This study purposely restricted itself to the perceptions. Even so, certain patterns of behavior are revealed. What was uncovered in this study was that both Administrations had a limited set of behaviors available to them. When forces were threatened overseas the Administration could increase security. When governments were unresponsive to the will of the US, sanctions could be administered. Each of these behaviors represent a response to a perception of both the actors involved and the events taking place. The implication uncovered in this study is that many times the behavior was directed at a specific foreign actor. There is a personal relationship between heads of state and the decisions of the Reagan and Clinton Administration to apply certain policy options reflect the type of relationship they have or seek to have with the individual. Alliances and the relationships that the two Administrations were trying to build or preserve was as important as the target of the policy option.

Limitations

There were two primary limitations to this study. First, the time and resources available limited the number of case studies conducted. If there were more time, I would have completed a case study on Libya, the Berlin Discotheque bombing in 1986 for the Reagan Administration and a case study on the Srebrenica Massacres in Bosnia in 1995 for the Clinton Administration. Second, the declassified material for the Clinton Administration was limited because of the current national security events going on today. Although the 9/11 commission and inquiries have opened up a lot of declassified material on Osama bin Laden, material for some of the other terrorist attacks is limited. I attempted to overcome this limitation by using all available declassified data and triangulating the material.

Future Studies

It is important to note that the findings from this study suggest that goals are part of the human decision making process of and apply to all political leaders. For this reason, the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework and theory is generalizable to states, institutions, and organizations outside of the US. Accomplishing this requires three key efforts. First it would be important to identify the nucleus that makes up the foreign policy team. Second, the researcher would need to determine the person or group who creates the collective goals that govern the efforts of the foreign policy team. In the US it was determined that this is the president. In another country it may be a council, a military leader, or its designated head of state. Lastly, the researcher would need to build the goal structure for the state or organization that is being examined. During the course of the research for this study, several archival documents, memos, speeches, and communications were examined. This was intended to ensure that the goals that were spoken in public were reiterated within the NSC. The deeper the investigation, the more confirmation was given that the goals the leaders committed to in a public forum were consistent with the goals they pursued as an organization. The coherence in speech and action suggests that governments with closed internal archives can still be examined based on public records. One suggestion would still be to make an effort to acquire closed-door communications to provide further confidence in the research.

The Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework offers several avenues of future research in other areas of decision-making. The first avenue is to look at the origin of foreign policy goals. This is where research on personalities and dispositions can be further incorporated into the decision-making process. It opens up the possibility to examine the relationship between dispositions and the goals that are selected. There may be a pattern to the domain or type of goal selected, which can help scholars and policy analysts anticipate a decision maker's behavior when entering the political arena. This would apply to candidates both domestically as well as world leaders.

Another avenue is to focus future research on would be exploring the different groups that are assigned to provide feedback on goals or the ones who actual conduct the comparisons. Exploring this area may illuminate the effect a lack of commitment to a goal has on the type of information presented to the principals. It may uncover more causal mechanisms embedded in the poliheuristic theory presented by Mintz or the group dynamics theory offered by Allison and Zelikow. Due to the nature of goal adoption the framework presents a model that assists in the movement between the individual and group level. Digging into the transfer of goals could better facilitate scholarly efforts in bridging this gap.

Finally, the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework could supply the mechanisms needed to craft a theory of framing for prospect theory. Incorporated in the framework is the practice of decision makers approaching and avoiding certain outcomes. Also incorporated in the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework is an account for risk. The goals decision makers craft have take into account risk as a function of the desirability and feasibility of the endeavor. If the discrepancy of a goal is improving then a decision-maker may be in the gains frame. Whereas, if the discrepancy of a goal is deteriorating it may indicate they are in a loss frame. Using the mechanics of the Goal-Based Decision-Making Framework may be beneficial here.

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