

HOW TO PERSUADE VOTERS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS  
USING POLITICAL ADVERTISING: MESSAGE VALENCE, DISCLOSURE, FREQUENCY,  
AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY

by

HANA KIM

(Under the Direction of Spencer F. Tinkham)

ABSTRACT

This paper provides insights into the effectiveness of “Stand by Your Ad” (SBYA) legislation that requires specific disclosure of sponsorship for all advertising employed in federal election campaigns. Since one of the policy’s intended goals is to lessen negativity, this study examines the effectiveness of positive and negative political advertisements with different disclosure timing (beginning vs. end vs. non-disclosure) in a candidate’s ad. While only one experimental treatment (message valence) exhibited a significant main effect on attitude toward the ads and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate, MANCOVA revealed significant two-way and three-way interactions. The mandated disclosure statement increases positive attitude toward ads and intensifies voting intention for the sponsor in positive ads. In contrast, SBYA language decreases the impact of negatively valenced ads on both attitudinal and behavioral responses. This analysis presents evidence that the inclusion of SBYA legislation is likely to serve its public policy purpose of discouraging the use of negative appeals in that SBYA language induces attitudinal backlash toward negative messages and actually diminishes voting intention in the

response to negative ads. This study also found that for behavioral responses, the impact of frequently seen positive ads is encouraged by their containing SBYA language at the beginning, whereas SBYA language at the beginning depresses the impact of frequently seen negative ads. This finding suggests that the current public policy should contain specific rules for timing SBYA identification at the beginning of the ad to serve the intended purpose of discouraging negativity. The findings also provide evidence that credibility plays the critical role of mediator predicting the relationships between SBYA language and attitude toward the opponent, between message valence and attitude toward the sponsor, and between message valence and attitude toward the opponent candidate.

INDEX WORDS: Political advertising, Negative political advertising, Credibility, “Stand by Your Ad” legislation, Public policy

HOW TO PERSUADE VOTERS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS  
USING POLITICAL ADVERTISING: MESSAGE VALENCE, DISCLOSURE, FREQUENCY,  
AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY

by

HANA KIM

B.A., Chongju University, Cheongju, Republic of Korea, 1997

M.A., The University of Georgia, 2005

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2009

© 2009

HANA KIM

All Rights Reserved

HOW TO PERSUADE VOTERS IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS  
USING POLITICAL ADVERTISING: MESSAGE VALENCE, DISCLOSURE, FREQUENCY,  
AND SOURCE CREDIBILITY

by

HANA KIM

Major Professor: Spencer F. Tinkham

Committee: Dean M. Krugman  
Ruthann W. Lariscy  
Mariko Morimoto  
Brenda Cude

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso  
Dean of the Graduate School  
The University of Georgia  
May 2009

## DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my dearly loved parents and sister  
who always love and encourage me.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My special thanks go to Dr. Spencer F. Tinkham for his thoughtful guidance and invaluable advice throughout my work on this dissertation. Without his insight, guidance, and encouragement, this work would not exist. I would also like to thank Dr. Dean Krugman, Dr. Ruthann Lariscy, Dr. Mariko Morimoto and Dr. Brenda Cude for their willingness to serve on my committee and for their ideas and suggestions to guide my work. I especially wish to thank my lovely friend, Sue, who gave me technological help to produce stimulus advertisements for my experiment.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	v
LIST OF TABLES .....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES .....	x
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Purpose of Study .....	2
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....	4
Political Advertising Literature .....	5
Effectiveness of Negative Advertising .....	8
“Stand by Your Ad” Legislation .....	10
Theoretical Framework .....	13
Need for Cognition .....	17
Political Involvement .....	19
Source Credibility .....	21
Source Identification .....	24
Message Repetition .....	27
Hypotheses & Research Questions .....	29

III. METHOD .....	33
Experimental Design.....	35
Questionnaire .....	35
Stimuli Development .....	36
Procedure and Measurement.....	39
IV. RESULTS .....	41
Profile of Participants .....	41
Reliability of Measures .....	43
Internal Valence Manipulation Check.....	44
Reliability of Source Credibility Measure .....	45
Dimension of Credibility as a Mediator.....	48
Dimension of Treatment Effectiveness: Controlling Credibility .....	49
Dimension of MANCOVA: Credibility as a Covariate .....	52
Considering Potential Covariates.....	56
Dimension of MANCOVA: Need for Cognition as a Covariate.....	56
Dimension of MANCOVA: Political Involvement as a Covariate .....	57
Testing H&RQ: MANCOVA: Political Involvement and Credibility as Covariates....	58
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION .....	64
Theoretical Implication: The Role of Credibility .....	64
The Impact of Need for Cognition & Political Involvement .....	66
The Impact of SBYA Language .....	67

The Impact of Message Valence .....	67
The Interaction Effect of SBYA Language & Message Valence.....	68
The Interaction Effect of SBYA Language & Message Repetition .....	70
The Interaction Effect of Message Valence & Message Repetition .....	70
The Interaction Effect of SBYA Language, Message Valence & Message Repetition.....	71
Practitioner Implication .....	74
Public Policy Implication.....	75
Limitations and Future Directions .....	76
REFERENCES.....	100
APPENDICES .....	114
A. Background Measurement Questionnaire.....	115
B. Main Questionnaire.....	118
C. Synopses of Test Advertisements.....	122
D. Advertisements (Still Cuts).....	123

## LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: Program Content and Test Ad(s) Order.....	38
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Chi-square Test: Each Treatment Proportion .....	41
Table 3: Participants Profiles: Gender .....	42
Table 4: Participants Profiles: Age.....	42
Table 5: Participants Profiles: Year in College .....	42
Table 6: Participants Profiles: Race .....	42
Table 7: Participants Profiles: Political Party Affiliation.....	42
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable .....	47
Table 9: Summary Statistics for Main and Interaction Effects .....	80
Table 10: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Credibility.....	82
Table 11: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Need for Cognition.....	84
Table 12: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement .....	86
Table 13: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement & Credibility.....	88
Table 14: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement & Credibility (Disclosure: Presence vs. Absence) .....	90
Table 15: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement & Credibility (Disclosure: Beginning vs. End) .....	92

## LISTS OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1: Mediation Model .....	48
Figure 2: The Path Diagram of a Mediation Model.....	55
Figure 3: Main Effect on Ad Evaluation & Voting Intention.....	94
Figure 4: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure x Message Valence .....	94
Figure 5: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure x Message Valence . ....	95
Figure 6: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure x Message Repetition .....	95
Figure 7: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Message Valence x Message Repetition.....	96
Figure 8: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Message Valence x Message Repetition.....	96
Figure 9: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure x Message Valence x Message Repetition .....	97
Figure 10: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure x Message Valence x Message Repetition .....	97
Figure 11: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure x Message Valence x Message Repetition.....	98
Figure 12: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure x Message Valence x Message Repetition .....	98
Figure 13: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure (Presence vs. Absence) x Message Valence x Message Repetition .....	99
Figure 14: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:	
Disclosure (Beginning vs. End) x Message Valence x Message Repetition.....	99

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Persuasion is ubiquitous in the political process; it is also the central aim of an election campaign, “the winning of the voter.” In order to achieve this primary goal and persuade voters, televised political advertising has been considered as the most advantageous means, and now the evidence of the behavioral effect of political advertising on voting can be seen in the impact of the negative attack, which comprised as much as 80 percent of the television ads in the mid-term campaigns of 2006, an increase of 60 percent since the 2004 election. Not only were the mid-term campaigns perhaps the most negative ever (NYT, 10/15/2006; CBS Evening News, 10/31/2006), the 2008 campaign ads are also being accused of containing the most deceptive content of any set of campaigns in recent history (ABC Lateline, 10/21/2008). This intensely negative, deceptive environment came at a time when legislation at least partly designed to promote positivism and honesty, such as the “Stand by Your Ad” legislation enacted through the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), was becoming an accepted part of the political landscape. As a result, this new public policy is designed to prevent attack ads and mudslinging, in the hope that candidates will be personally unwilling to attach their names to such negative messages.

Nevertheless, negative political advertising is still a staple of the American electoral process, yet remains highly controversial with regard to its impact on both individual candidates as well as on the election system as a whole. While voters consistently report that they dislike negative attack messages in general (Roberts, 1992; *Newsweek*, 9/23/96), specific negative ads

may be strongly liked (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1995). Whether negative ads are liked or disliked, political consultants and academic researchers have rather consistently found them to be an effective campaign technique (Perloff & Kinsey, 1992; Plaut, 1998; Lariscy & Tinkham, 1999).

In addition, a recent experimental study indicated that “Stand by Your Ad” legislation is not likely to serve its public policy purpose of discouraging the use of negatively valenced appeals (Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007). SBYA language induces resistance to attitudinal backlash toward negative messages at higher frequencies and actually enhances voting intention in response to negative ads at higher frequencies of exposure. Further, the absence of SBYA language is associated with enhanced effectiveness of positive appeals at higher frequencies. However, in this study, the negative ads were liked more than the positive ads. Even though this attitudinal difference across the valence treatments raises the possibility that the disclosure and frequency effects may be attributable to attitude toward the ad rather than message valence, there is a need to explore the impact of SBYA language to refine interpretation of this important public policy issue. In addition, the current public policy does not yet contain specific rules for the location of SBYA language in a candidate’s political ad (e.g., at the beginning or at the end of the ad) at the federal level and in some statewide election campaigns. This difference in disclosure timing may affect the persuasive impact of the ad.

### Purpose of the Study

This study is designed to provide additional insights that consider the impact of SBYA language in terms of examining how the position (the beginning vs. the end) of disclosure of sponsorship in political advertisements, also compared to non-disclosure of sponsorship, influences attitude toward the sponsoring candidate’s ads and impacts voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. In addition, since one of the SBYA policy’s intentions is to lessen

negativity, the relative message effectiveness of positive and negative political advertising claims are examined. Furthermore, this study explores the frequency of exposure to these positive and negative messages. This manuscript provides an interesting case study of a public policy where intention and outcome intersect in some predictable, and some not-so-predictable, ways.

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the past decades, political advertising has evolved into the dominant form of communication between candidates and voters in presidential elections and in most major statewide contests, since its first appearance in campaigns in the 1950s (Kaid, 1999; Kaid & Johnson, 2001). In a variety of forms and styles, political advertising has also become a staple of communication in democracies. Political advertising on TV has advantages in that it can be designed to target voters who support a particular candidate during the campaign. Candidates control both the substance and style of advertising. They are able to attain strategic positions in the form of advertising better than in other media venues. In this sense, candidates have strong reasons to rely on ads to get their messages across to voters. They try to “communicate some attention-getting and memorable images and some information about the candidates’ or opponents’ political orientation, experience, or views in a way that resonates with the target public” (Kern, 1989, p. 62).

As a result, the study of political advertising is largely about the role of political television advertising, and televised political advertising is now the dominant form of communication between candidates and voters in most elections. One measure of this trend is the large amount of campaign funds spent on political television advertising, and spending on TV ads has been dramatically increasing in last two decades. George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis together spent more than \$80 million on electronic advertising in 1988 (Devlin, 1989). In 1992, three candidates, Perot, Bush, and Clinton, spent more than \$120 million combined (Devlin, 1993),

and they spent more than \$200 million on advertising time in the 1996 campaign (Devlin, 1997). Al Gore, George W. Bush, and their parties spent more than \$240 million in reported advertising expenditures in the 2000 campaign (Devlin, 2001). Candidates, parties, and special interest groups spend millions more on state- and local-level races in presidential and off-year election cycles and on advocacy related to ballot issues, propositions, and public issues. In the 2006 campaign season, the spending on political and issue-advocacy TV advertising reached \$2.3 billion (CNN, 10/15/2007).

### Political Advertising Literature

The large body of academic research on political advertising falls into two basic categories: research about the content of political advertising and research that focuses on the effects of political advertising. Some researchers have described the content of political advertising through approaches that are primarily historical, critical, and interpretive, relying on subjective analysis (Diamond & Bates, 1992; Jamieson, 1996; Devlin, 2001). Joslyn (1980) was the first to apply a more systematic method, followed by many other content studies that have been dominated by key concerns about issue/image content; negative/positive content; and other content characteristics such as presence of partisan appeals, emotional tone, and use of fear appeals.

*Issue vs. Image.* Across more than five decades of research on political advertising, no topic has been more dominant than discussion of whether or not campaign commercials are dominated by image information or issue information (Kaid, 2004). Rooted in the classic democratic voting model that insists rational voting decisions should be made on the basis of policy issues (Berelson, 1966), one of the perennial criticisms of advertising in politics is that it trivializes political disclosures by concentrating more on candidate personalities and images than

on issues. However, this has proven to be an unfounded concern since research has shown that most political advertising, whatever the medium, concentrates more often on issues than on candidate image (Kaid, 2004).

The dominance of issues in televised political advertising has rarely been challenged by empirical data. Television political advertising concentrates more often on issues than on candidate image (Kaid, 2004). Patterson and McClure's (1976) classic study of the 1972 presidential campaign found that issue information overshadowed image content. Kern (1989) reinforced these findings in her studies of ad spots in the 1980s. In analyses of the 1996 primaries, researchers have also discovered that candidate messages (advertising and speeches) were giving substantial attention to issues and were definitely more issue substantive (Lichter & Noyes, 1996). Kaid and Johnston (2001) analyzed a comprehensive sample of presidential ads from 1952 through 1996 and concluded that 60 percent of all spots used in presidential general elections focused primarily on issues. Findings from four presidential campaigns – 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 – also substantiated that issues are more frequently stressed in ad spots than are images (Kaid 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002). In fact, the percentage of issue ads (78 percent) in the 2000 presidential campaign was one of the highest in history (Kaid, 2002).

Such findings are also common in lower-level races (Joslyn 1980; Elebash & Rosene, 1982). Vavreck (2001) analyzed the ads of 290 candidates in the 1998 elections and found that only 30 percent were predominately trait-based, whereas 52 percent were dominated by issues and more than 80 percent contained some mention of issues. Researchers also suggested a relationship between issue content of ads and electoral success. Candidates seem to be more successful when their issue advertising focuses on issues over which they can claim ownership (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994).

*Positive vs. Negative* Since the early 1980s the controversy over negative and positive ads has raged even more strongly than the issue/image debate. Generally, negative and positive ads are distinguished by their relative emphasis on the sponsoring candidate and his or her opponent. Negative ads focus on criticism of the opponent while positive ads center on the “good” characteristics, accomplishments, or issue positioning of the candidates’ ads (Kaid & Johnston, 1991). There was a real increase in the number of negative ads used in presidential campaigns in the past few election cycles. Whereas the percentage of negative ads in presidential campaigns from 1952 through 1996 was only about 38 percent, in the 1992 and 1996 campaigns negative ads made up more than half of the advertising content of both major party candidates. In both 1992 and 1996, Clinton reached all-time highs in the number of negative ads used in a presidential campaign, with 69 percent of his ads being negative in 1992 and 68 percent being negative in 1996 (Kaid, DeRosa & Tedesco, 2002). Al Gore’s presidential campaign used only slightly fewer negative ads; 62 percent of his ads were negative, compared to 37 percent of Bush’s ads (Kaid, 2002). In the mid-term campaigns of 2006, 80 percent of the television ads were negative attacks (NYT, 10/15/2006; CBS Evening News, 10/31/2006), and the 2008 campaigns were accused of containing the most deceptive content of any set of campaigns in recent history (ABC Lateline, 10/21/2008).

One of the clear findings about negative ads is that they tend to be more issue oriented than positive ads. Kaid and Johnston (1991) reached this conclusion from a study of more than 800 presidential ads aired between 1960 and 1988 and confirmed it in later analyses that included presidential ads from 1992, 1996, and 2000 (Kaid & Johnston, 2001; Johnston & Kaid, 2002). West (1993) reached similar conclusions in his content analysis of typical and prominent ads: “It is somewhat surprising to discover that the most substantive appeals actually came in

negative ads” (p. 51).

### Effectiveness of Negative Advertising

The growth of negative advertising has made scholars pay attention to numerous research studies, yet it remains highly controversial with regard to its impact on both individual candidates as well as on the election system as a whole. One important characteristic of negative political advertising helps to explain its effects on voters: negative political ads are more issue-oriented than positive ads. It is not surprising that exposure to negative ads results in higher levels of audience recall than exposure to positive ads (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1989; Basil et al., 1991; Kahn & Kenny, 2000). Voters who recall negative ads are more likely to have enhanced issue knowledge and use issues for evaluating candidates, particularly late in the campaign (Brians & Wattenberg, 1996).

Negative ads have very complicated effects on attitudes toward ads and the candidates who sponsor them and the opponents who are the target of them. While voters consistently report that they dislike negative attack messages in general (Roberts, 1992; Newsweek, 9/23/96), specific negative ads may be strongly liked (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1995; Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007). Research has shown that candidates who sponsor negative ads may be subject to negative responses themselves – i.e., the negative ads may backfire on them, leading to more negative views of the sponsoring candidate (Merritt, 1988; Sonner, 1998; Jasperson & Fan, 2002). Despite the potential for backlash, most research has concluded that the content and style of negative advertising is an important determinant of its success. Attacks that focus on the opposing candidate’s issue positions are more effective than those attacking the character or image of the opponent (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1989; Kahn & Geer, 1994; Kaid & Tedesco, 1999; Schenck-Hamlin et al., 2000). Experimental studies have documented the effectiveness of

negative advertising, particularly in giving negative attitudes toward the opponent/target (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1993). In fact, Jasperson and Fan (2002) found that the effect of negative information was four times greater than the effect of positive information when both were considered in favorability toward the candidates.

Many of the studies that have measured negative ad effects on recall and attitude toward the sponsoring candidate have also identified effects on voting behavior, leading to a clear conclusion that negative ads do affect voting preferences (Kaid & Boydston, 1987; Roddy & Garramone, 1988; Basil et al., 1991; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Lau and Pomper (2002) found that negative campaigning was effective for challengers. Their study showed that negative campaigns seem to work for challengers, whereas positive campaigning seems to be more effective for incumbent political candidates. The context in which negative ads are shown can also affect vote likelihood. For instance, negative ads are likely to affect vote decision when shown in a new environment (Kaid, Chanslor, & Hovind, 1992).

However, less substantial evidence exists on the impact negative political campaigning has on the electoral process. Some findings suggest that negative ads mobilize the electorate (Finkel & Geer, 1998; Wattenberg & Brians, 1999) and thus enhance turnout by stimulating interest in a campaign and by providing more complex information than positive advertisements (Lariscy & Tinkham, 1999; Kahn & Kenney, 1999). Conflicting evidence, however, supports the opposite effect. Several studies have found that mudslinging increases cynicism, alienation, and apathy about the process, evidenced by lower voter participation (Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Germond & Witcover, 1996).

Until recent campaigns (2006, 2008), attack ads were more frequently employed by challengers to current office holders (and by open-race candidates) than by incumbents who were

most often the targets of attack (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1993; 1995). For years, incumbents have both disliked negative political advertising and feared its effectiveness more than challengers or open-race contenders (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1991; Kaid & Johnston, 1991). Incumbents used to be least likely to resort to attacking their opponents, preferring to rely upon their records in office, their relationships with constituents, and other inherent advantages of incumbency. Some people argue that one motivation behind the “Stand By Your Ad” legislation was to protect incumbents; given their assessment that negative political advertising was unethical and surely disliked, it is not surprising that many incumbents favored the state and national legislative movement that would regulate, in part, the content of political advertising in a way that would inhibit the use of negative appeals (see Martin, 1985, for an insightful discussion of the interplay of ethical judgments and legislation in a free society).

#### “Stand by Your Ad” Legislation

An intensely negative, deceptive electoral environment came at a time when legislation at least partly designed to promote positivism and honesty was becoming an accepted part of the political landscape. “Stand by Your Ad” legislation stems from a recent requirement enacted through the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). BCRA requires “candidates, parties, and interest groups” to include both verbal and visual disclosure statements with radio and television ads, not online ads, thus taking accountability for the content of the ad. This provision is the so-called “Stand by Your Ad” disclosure (SBYA). For candidates, this disclosure must consist of an oral statement spoken by the candidate conveying approval of the advertisement, such as, “I am George Bush, and I approve this message” (Patterson, Gale, Hawkins, & Hawkins, 2004). This audio statement, aired at any time during the ad, must be accompanied by either a full-screen view of the candidate making the statement or a photograph

of the candidate occupying at least 80 percent of the vertical screen height. Finally, the advertisement must include a "clearly readable" written disclaimer (Patterson, Gale, Hawkins, & Hawkins, 2004). By including a written and verbal disclaimer with the message, viewers of political ads can readily identify the advertisement's sponsor, distinguishing whether the message originated from a candidate, party, or special interest group. Proper identification of advertisements reduces misattribution of information on the part of voters, thereby increasing their trust and confidence in the campaigns.

*Background of the Policy.* "Stand by Your Ad" legislation, first enacted in North Carolina in 1999, was subsequently introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives by one of that state's Congressmen, U.S. Representative David Price (*The Daily Tar Heel Online* 1/12/1999; *Carolina Journal*, 9/1999; North Carolina General Assembly, Senate Bill 881). Shortly thereafter, several other states, including Virginia, adopted similar provisions (CFIF.ORG, 2002; Rein 2002). Then in February 2002, Congressman Price reintroduced his Federal "Stand by Your Ad" bill as part of the Shays-Meehan bill for campaign finance reform (Price, 2002). It amends the Federal Campaign Act of 1971 to require full-screen disclosures or voice-over disclosures with a "clearly identifiable" picture on the screen. Justifying its inclusion in a campaign finance reform bill, Price noted that campaign reform is not only about money, but "...also about encouraging truthfulness and a focus on the issues" (Price, 2002). In the Virginia debate, the "Stand by Your Ad" legislation was more clearly positioned as a way to motivate candidates "...to tone down negative advertisements if they are forced to appear in and take responsibility for them" (Rein, 2002).

Critics of the Virginia legislation noted that the North Carolina law had not eliminated attack ads during the 2000 election cycle. Yet, Price asserted that most observers believed the

1999 law passed in North Carolina “...had a positive effect on the 2000 gubernatorial election” (Price, 2002). Other states (Minnesota, for example) enacted laws that require less stringent compliance measures, though they still seek to accomplish the same objective of reducing the use of negative political advertising (Alliance for Better Campaigns, 2001). In either form, the legislation presumes that candidates do not want to be closely identified with their own negative ads and will avoid the use of attack messages if they are forced to be directly associated with them. Thus the name, “Stand by Your Ad,” is quite apt. The center of the debate among the various state versions lies in First Amendment protection versus compelled speech.

*Compelled Political Speech* Because it requires that any candidate must personally and prominently take part (whether in broadcast or print) in every ad for his or her candidacy (and for television ads, the candidate must appear on the full screen to state a disclosure), critics of “Stand by Your Ad” place it directly into the category of “compelled speech,” a major First Amendment issue most frequently debated in the context of required funding of advocacy ads by unions and agricultural associations (DeVore, 1997; McConnell, 2000; Elliott, 2002). To the extent that these rules are designed to prevent attack ads and mudslinging, in the hope that candidates will be unwilling personally to attach their names to such negative messages, the First Amendment implications for political speech are more direct. It of course may also be argued that infringement on time and space in broadcast and print political advertising, by default, directly limits other forms of speech that might have occupied the same time or space. Both arguments raise the issue of direct infringement on political speech. Regardless of the valence, positive or negative, of a political ad, it is still considered a form of protected speech.

A limited number of studies have been conducted on SBYA language, specifically on measuring its effectiveness. However, Gale et al. (2005) suggest that ads with a SBYA provision

increase respondents' likelihood to support the sponsoring candidate. Also, those ads with a disclosure make voters significantly more likely to vote for the candidate who sponsored the ad, both for the known and the unknown candidate. Furthermore, SBYA language slightly increases respondents' levels of confidence in election campaigns. Another study conducted by Patterson et al. (2004) also supports the idea that SBYA language is positively related with voting intention. Voters are more likely to vote for the sponsoring candidate regardless of known or unknown candidates after watching negative ads with a disclosure.

However, recent laboratory experimental research (Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007) indicated that SBYA legislation is not likely to serve its public policy purpose of discouraging the use of negatively valenced appeals, in that SBYA language induces resistance to attitudinal backlash toward negative messages at higher frequencies and actually enhances voting intention in response to negative ads at higher frequencies of exposure. Thus, particularly in the case of well-funded campaigns (that can achieve high average frequencies of message exposure) SBYA language within negative advertisements actually benefits the sponsoring candidate. In contrast, these findings should discourage the use of positive advertising appeals among well-funded candidates whose messages contain the mandated SBYA language. Under such conditions, attitudinal and behavioral responses toward the sponsoring candidate are depressed. Further, the absence of SBYA language is associated with enhanced effectiveness of positive appeals at higher frequencies.

### Theoretical Framework

How can we explain the effects of political advertising? How do individual voters process persuasive political messages? How can we translate an understanding of voter processing to strategies for advertising effects? In order to answer these questions, there is a need

to turn to a social psychological theory, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which offers the dominant and powerful theoretical perspectives on attitude change processes and effects in political persuasion. Furthermore, the ELM provides a more integrated analysis of persuasion variables, particularly those that bear on politics. The centerpiece of the ELM is process. It emphasizes that messages change attitudes by connecting with individuals' preferred strategies for processing communication in a given situation. Voters can be either thoughtful or mindless processors of political messages, depending on their motivation and ability to elaborate on political information. When they are motivated and able, individuals process information through a central route – sometimes with thought and objectivity, other times in a biased fashion, guided by values. Under low involvement or low ability conditions, voters take the peripheral route, opting for simple messages. Thus, the ELM's emphasis on fitting persuasive strategies to cognitive processing melds nicely with this study's focus on matching political messages to voters.

The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) proposes that there are two fundamentally different “routes” to changing a person's attitudes. One route – the central route – is taken when persuasion results from thinking about the issue or arguments under consideration. The other route – the peripheral one – results when persuasion results from non-issue-relevant concerns such as motivation, or the message source (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Cacioppo & Petty, 1989). Thus, when people process information through the central route they actively think about what they are receiving and weigh it against what they already know. When people process information through the peripheral route, they are much less critical.

The use of the central route increases when both motivation and the ability to think about the message are high. On the other hand, when motivation and/or the ability to think are low, chances of substantial thought decreases and persuasion will occur along the peripheral route (Cacioppo, Petty, & Stoltenberg, 1985). To determine which route will be taken, one has to first know the individual's level of motivation to process information. Motivation is mainly influenced by, and positively correlated to, perceived personal relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986a, 1986b, 1990; Cacioppo & Petty, 1989). In addition, one has to determine whether the receiver is capable of processing the message through the central route. This is a function of the message's nature (e.g., level of complexity, repetition), situational factors (e.g., environmental noise undercutting concentration), and personal variables (e.g., previous knowledge) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1983, 1984; Cacioppo & Petty, 1989).

These mechanisms are one's motivation to process information and one's ability to process the ad content. People who are high in involvement should be motivated and able to process negative political ads. Those with high involvement should have greater ability to process and evaluate these messages since they have probably developed more prior political knowledge. Faber et al. (1993) supports that political involvement (both enduring and situational) positively influences the degree of impact negative political ads exert. When voting intention is the dependent variable, people who are more involved and interested are most influenced by negative ads. Therefore, political involvement will be positively associated with the impact of negative ads on voters.

When processing information in the central route, people will carefully consider the arguments. Certainly the degree to which the message matches previous attitude would have an effect here. Messages that are more favorable to an individual's view would probably be

evaluated more positively than those that are not. On the other hand, the strength of the argument certainly plays a role because in central processing people are thinking critically. They identify good and bad arguments and tend to be influenced more by good ones.

In peripheral processing, individuals do not look closely at the strength of the argument. Instead, they make judgments quickly about whether to believe what they read or watch on the basis of simple cues. For instance, when source credibility is high, the message may be believed. The number of arguments can also be a cue in that people rely on the sheer number of arguments to determine whether to accept a message.

It is very important to note that the difference between the central and peripheral routes to attitude change is not that the former actually is rational and logical whereas the latter is not. The favorable thought and counterarguments that a person generates in response to a message need not be logical or rational at all. They only have to make sense to the person who generates them (i.e., they are psycho-logical or psycho-rational). Likewise, it may be perfectly logical and rational in some situations to like things that lead to rewards or to agree with someone simply because of that person's greater weight on an issue.

The difference between the two routes has to do with the extent to which the attitude change that results from a message is due to active thinking about either the issue or the object-relevant information provided by the message. According to the central view, thinking about issue-relevant information is the most direct determinant of the direction and amount of attitude change produced. On the other hand, according to the peripheral view, attitude change is the result of peripheral "*persuasion cues*." Persuasion cues are factors or motives inherent in the persuasion setting that are sufficient to produce an initial attitude change without any active thinking about the attributes of the issue or the object under consideration. These cues, such as a

very attractive source or the ability to obtain a reward, allow a person to evaluate a communication or decide what attitudinal position to adopt without engaging in any extensive cognitive work relevant to the issue under consideration.

### Need for Cognition

In ELM, two factors influence the degree of elaboration that a receiver will likely undertake in any given circumstance. One concerns the receiver's motivation to engage in elaboration; the other is the receiver's ability to engage in such elaboration. One of these factors that has received research attention as an influence on receivers' motivation to engage in issue-relevant thinking is the receiver's degree of need for cognition. Need for cognition (NFC) refers to "the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking" (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p.116). This tendency varies among people; some people are generally disposed to enjoy and engage in effortful cognitive undertakings, whereas others are not. Cacioppo and Petty considered NFC to be a primary motivation for people to carefully and critically consider message arguments and to process that information centrally. NFC is also considered a trait-related audience factor that has been most frequently studied in advertising and marketing and has been used in many studies that examine how issue-arguments that require a great deal of thought differ from more peripheral, often executional characteristics (like perceived attractiveness of message source) and how each can differently impact consumers' attitude. Information processing styles, such as NFC, are now largely thought to be relatively stable aspects of personality (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000).

Individuals high in need for cognition tend to engage in and to enjoy effortful thinking across situations and topics; thus, they are motivated to seek information and process it systematically. Because of their characteristic desire to think about information, individuals with

high NFC typically are persuaded by strong, detailed messages, not by subtle cues (Cacioppo et al., 1986). In contrast, individuals low in need for cognition are generally unwilling to expend much cognitive effort, unless forced to do so under situational pressure (Bohner & Wanke, 2002). Thus, individuals low in need for cognition are viewed as cognitive misers who dislike effortful cognitive actions and only use them when such actions are necessary for obtaining desired extrinsic rewards (Stayman & Kardes, 1992). Low NFC people are more likely to rely on the influence of others, or use mental shortcuts; they like to rely on expressive, sometimes peripheral cues or characteristics rather than anything complex. These people are not motivated to expend effort thinking about something, particularly if it is not highly interesting for them (Haugtved & Petty, 1992). Individuals with low NFC who are less apt to use effort for making decisions can be more persuaded by the presence of peripheral cues, such as source credibility. This suggests that the presence of SBYA legislation providing source information for delivered messages will be more likely to have persuasive impact on these low NFC people's evaluations of candidates' characteristics.

Beyond its advertising and marketing contexts, NFC is beginning to be applied to political contexts. One study found that citizens with a high need for cognition were more likely to be attentive to campaign news coverage, to be active in campaign work, and to react emotionally to candidates (Bizer et al., 2002). They conclude that NFC is a significant cognitive, affective, and behavioral disposition from psychology that has important uses for understanding political attitude phenomena. These results were not supported in a study where need for cognition was examined for its impact on voter choice (Fournier, Lyle, Cutler, & Soroka, 2004). They suggest, however, that using a reduced scale (rather than the full 36-item NFC scale) for the independent variable may be problematic. It is apparent that how need for cognition

influences citizens' evaluations of candidates and their characteristics is a construct that needs further examination.

### Political Involvement

The second factor influencing elaboration motivation for engaging in issue-relevant thinking is the personal relevance of the topic to the receiver. In ELM, variations in personal relevance have often been labeled as variations in the receiver's level of "involvement" with the message topic. For instance, in the high-relevance condition, receivers would be said to be "highly involved" with the topic. As a given issue becomes highly involved to a receiver, the receiver's motivation for engaging in thoughtful consideration of that issue presumably increases (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981).

Political involvement has been considered as a cognitive-based emotional variable representing a mental interest in political life, manifested through participation in passive and private behaviors such as gathering information on a political issue or watching the news or a debate. Political involvement has generally been regarded as an important mediator of the effects of political advertising (Rothschild, 1978; Atkin, 1980; Hollander, 2007). However, strong disagreements exist over what involvement is (Zaichkowsky, 1986; Roser, 1990), particularly the exact nature of the construct and its measurement, thereby resulting in research findings that sometimes are confusing or appear contradictory (Salmon, 1986). For instance, some research has indicated that less involved voters learn more from political advertising (Hofstetter & Buss, 1980). In contrast, other research has indicated that advertising recall is associated with a high level of interest (Faber & Storey, 1984) and information seeking (Garramone, 1984), both of which indicate high involvement.

To help clarify involvement, Zaichkowsky (1985, 1986) suggested that two different categories of involvement exist, including enduring involvement and situational involvement. Enduring involvement refers to a long-term, inherent interest in a product category or topic, while situational involvement reflects the temporary relevance of a specific object of concern with a short-term outcome. When discussing political elections, enduring involvement might refer to a voter's general interest in politics, while situational involvement would reflect concern about the outcome of a specific election.

In terms of voting intention, both situational and enduring involvement increase the influence of negative advertisements on individuals' voting decisions in that people who are engaged in politics may pay close attention to political advertising (Faber et al., 1993). Highly involved voters who are motivated to pay attention to campaign messages will process political advertising in relative depth, leaving themselves open to the influence of political advertising. Negative political advertising may be a particularly effective means of communicating with this group. A variety of research reported in the consumer behavior literature also indicates that consumers who are high in involvement may react to advertisements by dedicating their cognitive processing abilities to considering the contents of an advertising message carefully (Muehling et al., 1993; Yoon et al., 1999). Therefore, highly involved voters are motivated and able to process message arguments centrally as part of their decision-making process. On the other hand, low-involved voters are unmotivated and unable to process message arguments centrally, and thereby consider the peripheral aspects of message or communication environment, such as source credibility or attractiveness of a sponsoring candidate. Therefore, negative advertising will be more effective on highly involved voters, and SBYA legislation providing information of source will be more persuasive as a peripheral cue for low-involvement voters

than high-involvement voters.

### Source Credibility

The concept of source credibility should be postulated in that the mandated SBYA disclosure informs the sponsorship of the ad. The originator or source of a persuasive communication may be a person (e.g., the president of the United States), a group (e.g., your family), an institution (e.g., University of Georgia), and so forth. Identification of the source provides the audience with information above and beyond the arguments presented in the message. Thus, credibility has been considered as the judgments made by a message recipient concerning the believability of a communicator, not an inherent property of a communicator. A message source may be thought highly credible by one perceiver and not at all credible by another. However, the general notion of credibility has been given a specification in an investigation aimed at identifying the basic underlying dimensions of credibility (Stiff & Mongeau, 2003).

The concept of source credibility resulted from a landmark study by Hovland et al. (1953). They defined source credibility as the combination of a source's expertise and trustworthiness. Expertise was defined as "the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions," and trustworthiness was defined as "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid." Further, Hovland et al. hypothesized that an endorser associated with high trustworthiness provokes greater message acceptance than an endorser associated with moderate or low trustworthiness. However, several sets of research have found contradicting results: sometimes source credibility led to greater persuasion, sometimes source credibility led to less persuasion, and sometimes credibility did not influence persuasion at all. These confusing findings led to the introduction of

the Elaboration Likelihood Model.

According to the ELM, source credibility can affect persuasion through a variety of distinct mechanisms, depending on message recipients' level of elaboration. When elaboration is low, source credibility operates as a cue to persuasion, such that a high credibility source is more persuasive than is a low credibility source, regardless of the argument strength. In contrast, when elaboration is high, strong arguments are more influential than are weak ones, regardless of source credibility. When elaboration is moderate, a high credibility source is more influential than is a low-credibility-source, but only when arguments are strong.

Research on source credibility has mainly focused on its effect on persuasion and attitude change (Hovland & Weiss; 1951; Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979) and the impact of source credibility on consumer reactions to advertisements (Sternthal, Phillips & Dholakia, 1978; Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990; Lafferty & Goldsmith, 1999; Goldsmith, Lafferty & Newell, 2000). General outcomes of previous literature are pretty simple: As one's source credibility increases, so will one's effectiveness. Pornpitakpan (2004) performed a meta-analysis of five decades of research on source credibility, and the findings suggest that higher source credibility results in more persuasion in terms of both attitude and behavioral measure.

However, two clarifications need to be made concerning the research on the effects of source/communicator credibility. The first is that two primary dimensions of credibility (expertise and trustworthiness) are usually not separately manipulated. That is, research commonly compares a source that is relatively high in both expertise and trustworthiness (the high credibility source) with a source that is relatively low in both (the low credibility source).

Obviously, because expertise and trustworthiness are conceptually distinct aspects of credibility, it would be possible to manipulate these separately and so examine their separate

effects on persuasive outcomes. However, expertise and trustworthiness have not been independently manipulated in investigations of credibility's effects (O'Keefe, 2002). There have been only a few efforts at disentangling the effects of expertise and trustworthiness (e.g., McGinnis & Ward, 1980; Netemeyer & Burton, 1991), but to date no clear generalizations seem possible.

The second clarification concerns the nature of the low-credibility sources in literature. The low-credibility sources are not low in absolute terms but simply relatively low in credibility. The low-credibility communicators are probably accurately described as no better than moderate in credibility (Greenberg & Miller, 1966; Sternthal, Dholakia & Leavitt, 1978); thus, the comparison made in previous credibility literature is nearly always between a relatively higher-credibility communicator and a relatively lower one, not between two sources that are in absolute terms high and low in credibility.

In political advertising literature, source credibility has been defined as the positive characteristics of a communicator that influence receivers' acceptance of a message (Stiff & Mongeau, 2003). Therefore, the characteristics of political candidates themselves appearing on advertisements have been an important variable that affects the judgments voters make about the credibility of message sources. Persuasion experts and political consulting firms (Wayne, 2000) would unquestionably agree that the source of a message can significantly influence political attitudes.

In terms of voters' support for politicians, when low-credibility candidates use attack advertising, voters may be less likely to support them, perhaps believing that a candidate's use of such advertising results from his or her flawed personal disposition (Hill, 1989; Yoon, Pinkleton & Ko, 2005). Conversely, a high-credibility candidate who relies on negative political

advertising may continue to enjoy strong voter support.

In this vein, negative messages with a trusted source (SBYA language) at higher frequencies of exposure induce more positive attitudes toward ads than those without the SBYA language (the non-disclosure condition). Furthermore, negative ads with a trusted source (the presence of SBYA language) somewhat intensify voting intention for the sponsor at higher levels of frequency. But negative ads without the SBYA language (the non-disclosure condition) produce a lower mean voting intention for the sponsoring candidate at higher levels of frequency (Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007).

### Source Identification

The current public policy does not contain any specific rules for the location of SBYA language in a candidate's political ad at the federal level and in some statewide election campaigns. That means the issue to be decided is: Should the mandated disclosure statement be identified at the beginning or at the end of the message? By locating SBYA language at the outset of the message, the credibility of the message arguments might be increased so that they would attract more attention and encourage learning from them. In contrast, knowing the source might prevent the audience from focusing on the message, thereby reducing its impact. Which would be better for the sponsoring candidate to do?

When the source was perceived to be highly credible, introducing the source at the outset (Greenberg & Tannenbaum, 1961; Mills & Harvey, 1972) was more persuasive than was identifying it at the end. Ward and McGinnies (1974) found that a highly-credible source had a strong advantage over a low-credibility one when identification preceded the message and found no source effect when identification was delayed.

Sternthal, et al. (1978) employed participants who had favorable initial opinions toward the issue. They found the moderately-credible source was more persuasive in terms of attitudinal responses, intention, and behavior than was the highly-credible one when the source was introduced before the message. Besides, the highly-credible one induced a significantly more positive attitude toward the issue when the source was identified after rather than before the message, contradictory to findings of previous research (Greenberg & Tannenbaum, 1961; Mills & Harvey, 1972). Like Ward and McGinnies's study (1974), there was no source credibility effect when the identification was delayed until after the message.

There was another inconsistent result obtained by Dholakia (1986), who found that there was no difference in initial and one-day delayed behavioral compliance, even though both the high-credibility and the low-credibility sources were revealed at the beginning of the communication. When the source was low in credibility, deferred identification of the source led to greater persuasion than at the outset of the appeal (Husek, 1965; Greenberg & Miller, 1966) and significantly increased persuasiveness (Ward & McGinnies, 1974).

Forewarning literature on persuasive communication should be reviewed in that SBYA language located at the beginning provides preliminary information about what is to follow. According to conventional wisdom, "forewarned is forearmed;" that is, warning of an impending request allows people to prepare for it and ultimately to resist it. The idea that warnings generate resistance also is evident in reviews of persuasion research, which typically discuss forewarning effects along with other resistance techniques (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

The assumption that warnings yield resistance can also explain a common practice in psychology experiments on attitude change. McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) and Papageorgis (1967, 1968) suggested that forewarning an audience of an upcoming discrepant communication

on an involving topic produces resistance to persuasion by stimulating counterarguments in anticipation of the message. A number of studies have provided support for this view. One type of evidence comes from studies that varied the amount of time between the forewarning and the message. These studies indicate that a forewarning produces resistance to persuasion only when there is a reasonable time delay between the forewarning and the message, e.g., two minutes (Freedman & Sears, 1965; Hass & Grady, 1975). If the forewarning comes immediately prior to the message, then there is no time for anticipatory counterarguing to occur. A second type of evidence comes from studies in which a forewarning was made to measure subjects' anticipatory counterarguments. Petty and Cacioppo (1977) found that the warning was highly successful in inducing resistance to persuasion. Warned subjects showed more evidence of thinking about the topic than unwarned subjects. This suggests that a forewarning gets people to think about the expected message prior to receiving it. Also of interest is that unwarned subjects who were asked to write their thoughts about the issue before hearing the message showed resistance to persuasion equivalent to that of the warned groups. In other words, merely being instructed to think about the issue before being presented with a message was sufficient to induce anticipatory counterargumentation and subsequent resistance to persuasion. This suggests that it is not the forewarning itself that induces resistance but the anticipatory thinking about the topic. The forewarning apparently elicits thoughts consistent with the person's negative attitude about the issue.

Political news coverage is another context in which forewarnings have been used to induce resistance. Specifically, "adwatch" programs conducted by television news media provide critiques of political advertisements to help voters identify and resist misleading information (Jamieson, 1992; Jamieson & Cappella, 1997; McKinnon & Kaid, 1999). Adwatches, like

antismoking interventions, consist of warnings in conjunction with other components, such as the presentation of evidence supporting or refuting the arguments made in the ad. Warnings in adwatch coverage may take the form of spoken disclaimers alerting viewers that the information presented represents partisan advertisements and not actual news stories. Visual cues such as text overlays that label the ad's content as "misleading" or "false" also warn recipients to be wary of the arguments presented in campaign ads. In some empirical tests, adwatches increased viewer skepticism and reduced ad effectiveness (Cappella & Jamieson, 1994; Pfau & Lounden, 1994; Leshner, 2001).

Even though SBYA legislation does not contain any actual "warning" phrases, such as "misleading" or "false," SBYA language at the beginning possesses sufficient intention to persuade viewers by providing preliminary information on what is to follow and give them enough time to think about the expected message and to induce counterargument prior to receiving the persuasive message. Thus, ads with SBYA language at the beginning will be less effective than those with SBYA language at the end.

### Message Repetition

Besides motivation and ability, opportunity to see persuasive messages has also been considered as an instrumental influence on whether a voter will process a political communication message centrally or not (Shimp, 2003). Cacioppo and Petty (1979) also suggested that if a person were already motivated to think about a message, repeating the message several times would give people a greater opportunity to think about the implications of the message. If the message contained compelling arguments of some complexity, people might generate additional favorable implications of the arguments with each repetition. Mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) indicates that exposure is a critical factor in developing positive or negative

attitudes. A set of experiments in which the mere repeated exposure of ‘Chinese-like’ symbols was found to reliably predict their rated ‘goodness of meaning.’ Simply put, the more frequently particular symbols were presented to participants, the more positive participants believed the symbols’ meaning to be. This finding has been highly influential in the study of attitude formation and change. There have been more than 200 investigations of this mere exposure effect, and meta-analytic evidence (Bornstein, 1989) suggests that it is a highly persuasive and robust phenomenon (Stang & O’Connell, 1974; Harrison, 1977). The effect is not limited to visual stimuli as used in Zajonc’s original demonstration, but has also been observed with auditory (Heingartner & Hall, 1974) and even gustatory stimuli (Crandall, 1970). Besides laboratory studies, the effect has been demonstrated in field settings (Moreland & Zajonc, 1976) and with respect to varied domains ranging from advertising (Sawyer, 1981) to food preference (Pilner, 1982). Consequently, the more we have experienced something, the more we like it.

The mere exposure hypothesis and related models of exposure effects have been rarely applied to the analysis of political campaigns, but with quite interesting results. Typically, mass distribution of minimal political information during an electoral campaign favors the candidate or issue relying on the highest level of exposure. Some studies provide the evidence that merely exposing an unfamiliar candidate’s name enhances a candidate’s electoral chances (Grush et al., 1978; Grush 1980, Schaffner et al., 1981), liking of television and radio advertisements and liking of the sponsoring candidate (Atkin & Heald, 1976), and voting behavior (Schaffner & Wandersman; 1974).

Within the marketing communications literature, it has been proposed that the familiarity effect of mere exposure may decrease the perceived risk associated with a brand, leading to preference formation and brand choice (Baker, 1999). Empirically, studies have found that mere

exposure to marketing communications can influence attitudes toward both advertisements and brands (Bierley et al., 1985; Bornstein, 1989, Janiszewski, 1993), and affective response to subsequent exposures (Anand et al., 1988; Janiszewski, 1993). However, perhaps the most significant effects of mere exposure relate to brand choice itself. As Baker (1999) explains:

The approach tendencies created by mere exposure may be preattitudinal in the sense that they do not require the type of deliberate processing that is required to form brand attitudes (Krugman 1965; Ray et al., 1973; Nord & Peter 1980; Zajonc, 1980; Smith & Swinyard, 1983). These approach tendencies may significantly impact brand choice decisions when brands link to tangible criteria (e.g., prior evaluation, benefit possession, etc.), or when consumers do not have the motivation, ability or opportunity to search for more specific information at the time of brand choice.

Based on political and marketing communication literature on mere exposure effect, repetition of political advertising messages will provide the familiarity of the name of a sponsoring candidate, thus will enhance a candidate's electoral chances in terms of increasing a positive attitude toward the ad and the sponsoring candidate, and voting intention for the candidate who sponsors the ads.

### Hypotheses and Research Questions

Before specifying hypotheses and research questions there is a need to say that need for cognition, political involvement, and source credibility should be considered as covariates for further analysis. Over the years, numerous studies have demonstrated that these three variables are the most useful predictors of how advertising message are processed (Andrews, Durvasula, & Ahter, 1990). Therefore, while guided by principles set forth in the ELM, this study is not intended to be a test of the ELM. Rather, the focus of this study is on three variables and how

they can moderate how voters receive cues about the position of SBYA language, message valence, and message repetition, and how they will evaluate the ads and the sponsoring candidate of ads and will intend to vote for the sponsoring candidate.

Besides considering a covariate, source credibility needs to be more carefully considered to examine what the role of source credibility is in political persuasion because political ads with SBYA legislation might be perceived as more credible than those without SBYA in that they provide a source of sponsorship of the ad. In persuasion literature, if a source of a message is considered credible, the message exposed to viewers is judged as truthful or valid, thus leading to more persuasion. In other words, source credibility may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and attitudinal or behavioral change. Therefore the first research question considers what the role of source credibility is in political persuasion and what source credibility does to attitudinal or behavioral responses.

**RQ1.** What is the role of source credibility in political persuasion? Do the treatment variables (the position of SBYA language, Valence, and Frequency) affect a level of credibility? And how are the treatment variables on attitudinal or behavior responses mediated by source credibility?

Now, the main effects of the message treatments are considered. The first hypothesis considers impact of presence or absence of a disclosure (whether or not the political ad contains SBYA language). The literature reviewed suggests that higher source credibility results in more persuasion in terms of both attitude and behavioral measure (Pornpitakpan, 2002). Political ads with SBYA language might be perceived as more credible than those without SBYA language in that they provide a source of sponsorship of the ads. Thus, the presence of SBYA legislation will generate more positive attitudinal responses and stronger behavioral responses.

**H1:** Political ads containing SBYA language will be more effective in terms of generating more positive attitudinal responses and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than will political ads containing non-disclosure.

The second hypothesis considers impact of the position of SBYA language in the ad (beginning vs. end). Even though past studies on impact of source timing in the ads do not provide enough evidence to establish certain hypotheses due to contradicting results, forewarning literature on persuasive communication suggests that warning of an impending request allows people to prepare for it and ultimately to resist it (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). SBYA language at the beginning of ads may function as forewarning in that one at the beginning provides preliminary information about what is to follow, and viewers will be forearmed. Thus, SBYA language at the beginning of ads will generate resistance.

**H2:** Political ads containing SBYA language at the end will be more effective in terms of generating more positive attitudinal responses and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than will political ads containing SBYA language at the beginning.

The third hypothesis is motivated by the empirical evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of positive or negative political advertising appeals (message valence). Impact of negative advertising remains highly controversial; political consultants and academic researchers have rather consistently found negative advertising to be an effective campaign technique (Perloff & Kinsey 1992; Plaut 1998; Lariscy & Tinkham, 1999; Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007) in terms of increasing attitudinal responses (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1995; Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007) and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate (Kaid & Boydston, 1987; Roddy & Garramone, 1988; Basil et al., 1991; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Based on this research on the effectiveness of negative advertising, the following is hypothesized:

**H3:** Negative political ads will be more effective in terms of generating more positive attitudinal responses and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than will positive political ads.

The fourth hypothesis posits greater political message effectiveness for higher than for lower numbers of message repetition. Based on prior research on mere exposure effects, which suggests that the more we have experienced something, the more we like it (Zhang, 1968), the following is hypothesized:

**H4:** Within the frequency ranges tested in this study, repetition of a candidate's ads will generate more positive attitudinal responses and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate.

Also, the impact of the three treatment variables in combination, by asking if the presence or absence of a disclosure has differential effects across message valence (positive vs. negative) and/or across different levels of frequency, needs to be considered. Specifically,

**RQ2.** Do the treatment variables (the position of SBYA language, Valence, and Frequency) produce two-way and/or three-way interactive effects on attitudinal and behavior responses?

## CHAPTER III

### METHOD

#### Experimental Design

This study was conducted in the form of a randomized factorial experiment online, the design of which was described as a 3 (position of disclosure – beginning, end, and non-disclosure) x 2 (positive vs. negative) x 2 (the number of repetitions, lower – 1 & 2 vs. higher – 3 & 4). The three independent variables were position of disclosure, message valence, and the number of repetitions. In addition, need for cognition, political involvement, and source credibility were used as potential covariates. Message effectiveness was assessed in three ways: attitude toward ads, attitude toward the candidates, and voting intention for the candidates.

#### Questionnaire

*Attitudinal Measures.* Participants' post-exposure attitudes toward the ads were determined by asking viewers to rate the ads on four semantic differential scales (*extremely dislike-extremely like*, *not at all powerful-very powerful*, *not at all believable-very believable*, and *not at all persuasive-very persuasive*) to assess how much they liked the candidate's ads. Also, each set of three bipolar adjective scales was used to measure attitude toward the sponsoring candidate and the opponent candidate: *extremely dislike-extremely like*, *extremely bad-extremely good*, and *strongly oppose-strongly support*.

*Voting Intention.* The ultimate goal of political advertising is winning the election. Therefore, voting intention is one of the most important dependent variables to measure the effectiveness of political ads. Participants were separately asked to indicate the likelihood that

they would vote for the sponsoring candidate or for the opponent candidate on a 7-point scale, ranging from “*not at all likely to vote for the sponsoring candidate/the opponent candidate*” to “*definitely will vote for the sponsoring candidate/the opponent candidate*.”

*Source Credibility.* New mandated disclosure requires advertisements of “candidates, parties, and interest groups” to contain both verbal and visual disclosure statements that prominently identify the sponsor who takes responsibility for the content of the ad. A candidate is the form of object/idea (a product); SBYA language is the form of message source (an endorser); negative and positive political advertising is the form of message (a commercial); and voters are the form of audience (customers).

Even though political literature has emphasized a cognitive component of source credibility so far, this study conceptualizes credibility as a two-dimensional concept incorporating a cognitive component (expertise and trustworthiness) and an affective component (attractiveness) in that SBYA language includes the photograph and the voice of a candidate in addition to information about sponsorship. Therefore, credibility of SBYA language was assessed on each of these three dimensions measured by respondents' assessment of expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness (Ohanian, 1990). Five items measured trustworthiness on a 7-point semantic differential scale ranging from 1 to 7: *extremely undependable-extremely dependable, extremely dishonest-extremely honest, extremely unreliable-extremely reliable, extremely insincere-extremely sincere, and extremely untrustworthy-extremely trustworthy*. Expertise was measured by the following items: *not at all an expert-very much an expert, extremely inexperienced-extremely experienced, extremely unknowledgeable- extremely knowledgeable, extremely unqualified-extremely qualified, and extremely unskilled-extremely skilled*. Also, five items measured attractiveness in the same way with two factors: *extremely*

*unattractive- extremely attractive, not at all classy-extremely classy, extremely ugly-extremely beautiful, extremely plain-extremely elegant, and not at all sexy extremely sexy.*

*Need for Cognition (NFC).* The Need for Cognition Scale has been validated with a variety of techniques in several studies (Haugtvedt, Petty & Cacioppo, 1992). This variable is assessed by a self-report measure containing 18 items (the first 18 items in the questionnaire in Appendix A), although longer and shorter forms have been developed. Individuals high in Need for Cognition tend to engage in and to enjoy effortful thinking across situations and topics, whereas individuals low in Need for Cognition are generally unwilling to expend much cognitive effort, unless forced to do so under situational pressure (Bohner & Wanke, 2002). Thus, individuals low in Need for Cognition are viewed as cognitive misers who dislike effortful cognitive actions and only use them when such actions are necessary for obtaining desired extrinsic rewards (Stayman & Kardes, 1992). In this study, an 18-item short form (Bearden & Netemeyer, 1999) for assessing the need for cognition, proposed and validated by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984), was used, and it was scaled on 7-point scales, ranging from *extremely uncharacteristic* to *extremely characteristic*.

*Political Involvement.* To measure political involvement, five questions were asked. First, four questions were asked about how much participants generally pay attention to news about the candidate, to televised political advertisements, to televised debates, and to campaign literature, such as yard signs, brochures, and bumper stickers, during any election campaign on 7-point scales: *almost no attention* to *a lot of attention*. The last question asked about overall involvement – “how interested in politics are you” – on 7-point scale ranging from *almost no interest* to *a lot of interest*.

Participants were also asked to complete several demographic questions: gender, age, year in college, political party affiliation, and political ideology.

### Stimuli Development

*Program Selection.* For this study, one episode of “Friends,” a comedy on NBC, was selected for two reasons. First, the selected 30-minute episode did not contain any biased or controversial issue that can lead viewers to a specific political ideology or political party affiliation. Second, samples for this study were going to be undergraduate students around age 20; therefore, to capture their attention during this experiment, “Friends” was selected.

*Advertisements.* For the experiment, two 30-second televised political advertisements containing environmental appeals – one positive and one negative – were created as stimulus materials exposed to research participants. The environment has been considered an area that does not contain any biased viewpoint represented by the specific political ideology or political party affiliation.

Prior to producing stimulus materials, 20 political advertisements aired for the actual federal and statewide election campaigns were reviewed to catch environmental issue trends in positive and negative political advertisements in order to improve external and internal validity of the study. These 20 ads were rented from the Political Communication Center at the University of Oklahoma. After carefully reviewing 20 ads, one that supported a candidate who ran for Congress in Kansas was chosen as an appropriate ad to refer for this study in terms of ad content and production value. In this process, ads that generated unusual controversy or used unusual stark images or languages were avoided. The selected ad emphasized cleaning up the Kansas River, the most polluted river in the United States. Based on the issue and the fact provided by the selected ad, one positive and one negative ad were created to support a fictional

candidate, Bob Johnson, who was portrayed as running for senator in Kansas. Bob Johnson was depicted as a challenger who had been a congressman and tried to unseat a fictional incumbent, David Brown. To eliminate any influence from the background and experiences of the subjects due to the candidates' names, both names (Bob Johnson and David Brown) were selected from a list of the most popular names in the United States.

*Message Valence.* A positive test commercial supported Bob Johnson in that he voted for the Environment Protection Act to keep air and water safe and healthy in Kansas and to clean up the Kansas River. A negative test commercial attacked the targeted candidate, David Brown, in that he flip-flopped his position and finally voted against the Environmental Protection Act (see Appendix C for actual wording). Each positive and negative ad mentioned the consistent central theme of focusing on cleaning up the Kansas River and possessed a consistent degree of humor (actually, no humor) during equal amounts of time. The voice-overs of the two test ads were equivalent in recording quality, and were recorded by the same narrator who read the synopses of both the positive and negative ads.

*Position of SBYA.* The mandated SBYA disclosure was identified either at the beginning or at the end of a candidate's ad. In the Beginning-Disclosure condition, participants were informed of the sponsorship of the ad before watching an actual advertising message. In the End-Disclosure condition, participants did not know the sponsorship of the ad until the ad message had ended. In the case of the non-disclosure treatment, the picture and voice-over of the sponsoring candidate were eliminated and only the phrase "Vote for Bob Johnson" was left on the black screen. To eliminate potential bias, there was no political party affiliation of the sponsoring candidate on the screen for any of the three treatments.

*Message Repetition.* These fictional political advertisements were embedded in the

“Friends” series episode, depending on each treatment. The 30-minute program exposed to participants consisted of 23 minutes of program content and 7 minutes of commercials, which was composed of general televised commercials and political test ad(s). There were four commercial pods. For repetition 1, the test ad was inserted in the fourth commercial pod, and for repetition 2, the test ads were inserted in the third and the fourth commercial pod. Within each relevant commercial pod, the test ads would be given the first position to create a stronger manipulation effect for the test ads (Barta & Ray, 1986). Repetition 1 and 2 were categorized as lower levels of message repetition, and repetition 3 and 4 were categorized as higher levels of message repetition.

Table 1: Program Content and Test Ad(s) Order

Repetition 1

Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program
---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------

Repetition 2

Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program
---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------

Repetition 3

Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Program
---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------

Repetition 4

Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Test ad	Program	Commercials	Test ad
---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------	---------	-------------	---------

### Procedure and Measurement

*Pretest.* The pretest was accomplished using a convenience sample of 12 graduate students (four males and eight females) at a large southeastern university. They participated as volunteers, without any credit. First, they were told what positive and negative political ads are and what a disclosure is, and then they watched the “Friends” episode, with the inserted positive and negative political ads with three conditions of SBYA language. After watching the program, participants were asked to verify the valence and the position of SBYA disclosure.

*Participants.* A total of 559 undergraduate students enrolled in three different introductory courses at a large southeastern university participated in this study to obtain extra credit for their courses. Many researchers insist there is a great difference between college students and “real” people (Sear, 1986; Wells 1993). Therefore, student samples are not appropriate for research in social sciences because the background and experiences of the subjects would have impact; thus undergraduate students are very different from adults (James & Sonner, 2001). On the other hand, some scholars suggest that students are reasonably acceptable subjects, specifically, in studies designed to examine attitudinal responses, because the basic process would be the same for a more general populations (Burnett & Dunne, 1986). In this vein, it is quite acceptable to use student samples for this study because it intends to examine individual’ attitudinal responses.

To recruit samples, the researcher made an announcement about this study at the beginning of a regularly scheduled class and let students know the link of a website to participate

in an online experiment. All participants were told that this research was to examine recall and attitude toward the contents of a 30-minute TV program to avoid focusing on political advertisements during their participation. Also, the researcher requested professors to upload the link of a website to access this study on WebCT. In order to remind them to participate in this study, the researcher sent email to recruited samples twice, one week after the first announcement and a day before closing the experiment online.

*Experiment.* Participants were randomly assigned to each treatment condition via an online survey (using [www.surveymonkey.com](http://www.surveymonkey.com)). This survey tool has the ability to show a 30-minute program with inserted manipulated political ads to participants and implement a randomized experimental design. Upon accessing the website, participants were told that they would be watching a 30-minute program and answering questions about the contents of it. Following the IRB direction for web-based surveys, an informed consent form was obtained from all participants indicating that by completing the survey they were agreeing to participate in this study. Prior to watching the program, participants were asked questions to measure individual differences, such as political involvement and need for cognition. After watching the prepared TV program with inserted political ads online, participants received the main questionnaire containing global and diagnostic items for the measurement of source credibility, attitude toward ads, attitude toward the sponsor and the opponent, and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate and for the opponent candidate.

## CHAPTER IV

## RESULTS

Profile of Participants

The data set contained the self-report responses of all of the 559 participants, of which 121 were male and 438 were female. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the treatment conditions. All of the condition groups were exposed to a 30-minute program in which was inserted at least one political advertisement manipulated by the type of message (positive vs. negative), the position of the “Stand by Your Ads” language (the beginning vs. the end vs. non-disclosure), and the number of repetitions (lower vs. higher). The results of a chi-square test (Table 2) indicated that there is no proportion difference in each cell; thus, random assignment for each treatment was successful.

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Chi-square Test: Each Treatment Proportion

# of Repetition		Position of SBYA				
		Beginning	End	Non	Total	
Lower <sup>a</sup> (1 &2)	Message Valence	Positive	42	36	52	130
		Negative	48	36	38	122
		Total	90	72	90	252
Higher <sup>b</sup> (3 & 4)	Message Valence	Positive	42	46	48	136
		Negative	34	50	46	130
		Total	76	96	94	266

<sup>a</sup> The proportion difference is not significant at the level of .05 ( $p=.313$ ).

<sup>b</sup> The proportion difference is not significant at the level of .05 ( $p=.632$ ).

After the exposure of each treatment, participants responded to a set of questions, and 518 participants out of 559 (92.7%) answered that they had watched a political advertisement in the context of the exposed program. Therefore, the 518 responses (109 from males and 409 from females) created the usable sample analyzed in this study. Most were between 19 and 21 years old (86.5%), and a majority was sophomores (49.4%). Most participants were white (84.2%), and a majority was Republican (49.4%).

Table 3: Participants Profiles: Gender

Gender	Male	Female	Total
N	109	409	518
%	21.0	79.0	100.0

Table 4: Participants Profiles: Age

Age	18	19	20	21	22	23	25	Total
N	14	142	184	122	50	4	2	518
%	2.7	27.4	35.5	23.6	9.7	.8	.4	100.0

Table 5: Participants Profiles: Year in College

Year in College	Freshman	Sophomores	Junior	Senior	Other	Total
N	28	256	128	100	6	518
%	5.4	49.4	24.7	19.3	1.2	100.0

Table 6: Participants Profiles: Race

Race	American Indian or Alaska Native	Asian	Black or African American	Hispanic or Latino	White	Total
N	6	26	42	8	436	518
%	1.2	5.0	8.1	1.5	84.2	100.0

Table 7: Participants Profiles: Political Party Affiliation

Political Party Affiliation	Strong Republican	Lean toward Republican	Independent	Lean toward Democrat	Strong Democrat	Total
N	70	186	72	134	56	518
%	13.5	35.9	13.9	25.9	10.8	100.0

Before testing hypotheses and answering research questions, a series of analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) tests for all variables was performed to examine whether or not the gender difference would significantly affect attitudinal or behavior responses. The results in every analysis indicated that there was no statistical significance between attitudinal or behavior responses for males and females with regard to the position of SBYA language, message valence, and message repetition.

### Reliability of Measures

The primary dependent variables in this study were attitudinal responses. These were measured by three different questions: global attitude toward the ads, attitude toward the sponsoring candidate, and attitude toward the opponent candidate. Four items measured global attitude toward the ads on a 7-point semantic differential scale ranging from 1 to 7: *extremely dislike-extremely like*, *not at all powerful-very powerful*, *not at all believable-very believable*, and *not at all persuasive-very persuasive*. Three items were used for measuring the attitude toward the sponsoring and the opponent candidate: *extremely dislike-extremely like*, *extremely bad-extremely good*, and *strongly oppose-strongly support*.

Across the four items, the mean global attitude toward the ads varied from a low of 3.45 to a high of 6.25, but those had a Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .88, which is above the acceptable level of alpha, .75. Thus, the global attitude toward the ads analyzed was an item whose mean was 3.01. Based on the same procedure, the attitude toward the sponsoring candidate had a mean score of 3.64 (Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .92) and the attitude toward the opponent candidate had a mean score of 2.65 (Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .95).

In examining the Chronbach's coefficient alpha, the alpha value for Need for Cognition was above the acceptable level, at .82, indicating solid subscale reliability. Its mean score was

4.62. Political involvement was measured by four items, and across them, the mean of each varied from a low of 2.20 to a high of 6.60, but those had a Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .78, above the threshold of .75. Thus, political involvement analyzed was an item whose mean was 3.75.

#### Internal Valence Manipulation Check

The past experiment (Kim, Tinkham, & Lariscy, 2007) showed the negative ads were liked more than the positive ads (though neither treatment received highly polarized attitudinal scores). However, this attitudinal difference across the valence treatments raises the possibility that the disclosure and repetition effects may be attributable to attitude toward the ad rather than message valence. Therefore, it is important to consider whether or not each of positive and negative advertisement in this study is equivalently evaluated.

Four items measured global attitude toward the ads on a 7-point semantic differential scale ranging from 1 to 7: *extremely dislike-extremrely like*, *not at all powerful-very powerful*, *not at all believable-very believable*, and *not at all persuasive-very persuasive*. T-test results revealed that the positive ad treatment ( $M=3.767$ ) was perceived as more believable than the negative ad treatment ( $M=3.455$ ) was ( $t=2.239$ ,  $df = 514$ ,  $p = .026$ ). However, there was no significant difference between positive and negative advertisements on ad likability ( $t = .862$ ,  $df = 516$ ,  $p = .389$ ), ad powerfulness ( $t = -.679$ ,  $df = 516$ ,  $p = .497$ ), and ad persuasiveness ( $t = .137$ ,  $df = 514$ ,  $p = .891$ ). Also, there was no significant difference between the positive and negative ads on global attitude toward the ad, the composite score (described earlier) based on all 4 items ( $t = .793$ ,  $df = 512$ ,  $p = .428$ ). Therefore, the positive and negative advertisements are equivalently evaluated in this study, thus, supporting discriminant validity of the message valence treatement.

### Reliability of Source Credibility Measure

Source credibility was measured by three factors: trustworthiness, expertise, and attractiveness. Five items measured trustworthiness on a 7-point semantic differential scale ranging from 1 to 7: *extremely undependable-extremely dependable*, *extremely dishonest-extremely honest*, *extremely unreliable-extremely reliable*, *extremely insincere-extremely sincere*, and *extremely untrustworthy-extremely trustworthy*. Trustworthiness had a mean score of 3.41 (Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .94). Expertise was measured by the following items: *not at all an expert-very much an expert*, *extremely inexperienced-extremely experienced*, *extremely unknowledgeable-extremely knowledgeable*, *extremely unqualified-extremely qualified*, and *extremely unskilled-extremely skilled*. Expertise had a mean score of 3.42 (Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .93). Also, five items measured attractiveness in the same way with two factors: *extremely unattractive-extremely attractive*, *not at all classy-extremely classy*, *extremely ugly-extremely beautiful*, *extremely plain-extremely elegant*, and *not at all sexy-extremely sexy*. Attractiveness had a mean score of 2.61 (Cronbach's coefficient alpha of .88).

In order to identify collinearity or multicollinearity between pairs of each factor, the Pearson correlations were examined. As a general rule of thumb, two variables correlated in the middle .7s or higher should probably not be used together in a regression or any other multivariate analysis. The results indicated that Trustworthiness and Expertise were correlated very strongly at .887 ( $p < .001$ ), and Trustworthiness and Attractiveness also were highly correlated at .745 ( $p < .001$ ). In addition, Expertise and Attractiveness were strongly correlated at .716 ( $p < .001$ ). That means a set of three factors cannot be used together in this study, because multicollinearity can distort the interpretation of multivariate analysis results. In other words, if two variables are highly correlated, then they are largely confounded with one another; that is,

they are essentially measuring the same characteristic, and it would be impossible to say which of the two was the more relevant.

In order to double-check multicollinearity, a factor analysis was employed. Prior to running the factor analysis, missing values and potential outliers were examined. As a result, 44 missing values were found. However, since there was no evidence of a systematic missing pattern, those missing values were deleted listwise. In addition, several outliers were detected. However, since there were no outliers that displayed consistently extreme scores across the variables under investigation and no justification existed for deleting them from the data, they were kept for the analysis. In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests were significant at the .01  $\alpha$  level, indicating a normality violation. Therefore, further investigation on this matter and a cautious interpretation were required. Meanwhile, an insignificant Levene statistic (.995) indicated the homogeneity of variance.

When applying the 10-to-1 variables-to-cases ratio, the sample size in the data ( $N = 518$ , excluding missing values) was large enough to continue the factor analysis. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .934 and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ( $P < .0001$ ), indicating sufficient correlation between the variables to proceed with the analysis.

When using the Kaiser-Guttman retention criterion of eigenvalues greater than 1.0, three factors were recommended. However, after running the factor rotation using varimax, only two factors extracted accounted for 74.6 percent of the total variance. Factor 1 had the eigenvalue of 9.49 and accounted for 63.3 percent of the variance with 13 items, including Trustworthiness, Expertise and a part of Attractiveness (i.e., trustworthy, honest, sincere, reliable, skilled, knowledgeable, classy, experienced, qualified, dependable, an expert, elegant, and attractive).

Factor 2 represented two items, including a part of Attractiveness (i.e., sexy and beautiful). It accounted for 11.4 percent of the variance with the eigenvalue of 1.71. Therefore, three components (i.e., Trustworthiness, Expertise, and Attractiveness) could not continue to be used for further multivariate analyses together. Instead, a set created from the three was used as one variable labeled “Credibility,” which had a Cronbach’s coefficient alpha of .90, indicating solid subscale reliability. In the treatment of the non-disclosure condition, there was no cue to measure Attractiveness due to having no picture of the sponsoring candidate on the screen in the test ads; thus, Attractiveness was only added on “Credibility” for further analysis within the presence of SBYA language treatment.

Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Each Variable

	Mean <sup>a</sup>	SD
Need for Cognition	4.623	.685
Political Involvement	3.769	1.130
Credibility	3.138	1.029
Ad Evaluation	2.979	1.300
Sponsor Attitude	3.394	1.173
Opponent Attitude	2.654	1.091
Sponsor Voting Intention	3.726	1.359
Opponent Voting Intention	2.691	1.169

<sup>a</sup> Based on itemized rating scales with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 7.

### Dimension of Credibility as a Mediator

Figure 1 exhibits a path diagram for clarifying the meaning of mediation and depicting a basic causal chain. There are two causal paths feeding into the outcome variable: the direct impact of the independent variable (Path c) and the impact of the mediator (Path b). There is also a path from the independent variable to the mediator (Path a). To investigate whether or not Credibility functions as a mediator, the following conditions were examined: (1) variations in levels of the independent variable significantly account for variations in the presumed mediator (i.e., Path a), (2) variations in the mediator significantly account for variations in the dependent variable (i.e., Path b), and (3) when Paths a and b are controlled, a previously significant relation between the independent and dependent variables is no longer significant.




Figure 1 Mediation Model

To test the first condition, an ANOVA (analysis of variance) was conducted to report the mean difference between groups of each independent variable, and whether or not each treatment affects degree of credibility. Test results revealed that Disclosure (the position of SBYA language) had a significant impact on credibility. Ads containing SBYA language were perceived as more

credible than those without SBYA legislation ( $M=3.211$  for the Disclosure-Beginning condition,  $M=3.227$  for the Disclosure-End condition, and  $M=2.981$ , for the Non-Disclosure condition, respectively,  $p = .036$ ). However, within the presence of SBYA language treatment, timing of SBYA identification did not exhibit significant main effects on credibility ( $t = .037$   $df = 320$ ,  $p = .971$ ). Ads containing SBYA language, regardless of the position of it, were perceived as equivalently credible. With respect to Message Valence, participants who were assigned to positive appeals perceived the ad sponsor to be less credible than did those who were assigned to negative appeals ( $M=3.437$  for positive ads vs.  $M= 2.981$  for negative ads, respectively,  $p < .001$ ). Repetition treatment did not show a significant main effect on credibility ( $p = .241$ ). There was no two-way or three-way interaction to predict credibility. Therefore, the Disclosure (the presence or absence of SBYA language) and Message Valence treatments met the first condition.

The third criterion was tested next prior to examining the second condition. To test the third criterion, a three-way MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) was conducted to report the main and interaction effects of the between-subjects treatments controlling for Credibility as a covariate.

#### Dimension of Treatment Effectiveness: Controlling Credibility

Table 9 reports that Disclosure (the position of SBYA language) did not exhibit significant main effects on Ad Evaluations, Sponsor Attitude or Voting Intention but on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Political ads without SBYA language ( $M = 2.503$ ) decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate compared to ads with SBYA language, regardless of the position of it ( $M = 2.634$  for ads with SBYA in the beginning, and  $M = 2.804$  for ads with SBYA in the end).

With respect to Message Valence (positive vs. negative appeals), Table 9 reports a significant impact on Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .05$ ) and Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ), but a non-significant relationship to Ad Evaluation, Sponsor and Opponent Voting Intention. For the Valence treatment, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the positive ads produced more positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate than the negative ads did ( $M = 3.664$  for positive ads vs.  $M = 3.134$  for negative ads, respectively), whereas the negative ads diminished a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate more than the positive ads did ( $M = 2.510$  for negative ads vs.  $M = 2.784$  for positive ads, respectively).

Message Repetition was not the main predictor for measuring Ad Evaluations, Sponsor Attitude or Voting Intention; however, repetition of ads had a significant impact on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Higher numbers of repetition to a candidate's political ads presented in a program context were more effective in terms of diminishing a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate than lower numbers of repetition.

Note in Table 9 that several two-way interactions between pairs of treatments were observed to be statistically significant. Disclosure and Message Valence acted in combination to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). In the case of positive advertising, the presence of SBYA language generated more positive attitudes toward ads ( $M = 3.241$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 2.667$  for ads without SBYA, respectively) and the voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M = 3.936$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 3.405$  for ads without SBYA, respectively). For negative advertising, the presence or absence of SBYA language generated almost the same positive level of attitudes toward ads ( $M = 2.923$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 3.029$  for ads without SBYA, respectively). With respect to Voting Intention, negative ads without SBYA generated higher voting intention for the

sponsoring candidate than negative ads with SBYA ( $M = 3.627$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 3.824$  for ads without SBYA, respectively). With respect to position of the disclosure, the Disclosure-End condition generated the lowest voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M=3.379$ ), and the Disclosure-Beginning condition induced the highest voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M=3.875$ ) in negatively valenced messages.

Message Valence and Message Repetition also acted in combination to produce a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Positive ads in higher numbers of repetition were more positively evaluated than those in lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 2.991$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.108$  for higher numbers of repetition), while negative ads in higher levels of exposure were more negatively evaluated than those in lower levels of exposure ( $M = 3.140$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.711$  for higher numbers of repetition). With respect to Opponent Attitude, repetition of positive ads slightly decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate ( $M = 2.842$  for lower frequency vs.  $M = 2.726$  for higher frequency), but negative ads in higher numbers of repetition diminished a positive attitude toward the targeted candidate substantially ( $M = 2.783$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.237$  for higher numbers of repetition). The interaction effect with Disclosure and Message Repetition was also found in terms of predicting Sponsor Attitude. The presence of SBYA language created more positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition, but the absence of SBYA legislation increased a positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in higher numbers of repetition. Furthermore, SBYA language located in the beginning of the ad created almost the same level of positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate regardless of numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.433$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.351$  for higher numbers of repetition), whereas SBYA

language located at the end of the ad generated a more positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.821$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.261$  for higher numbers of repetition). Note in Table 9 that no three-way interactions between the three treatments (Message Valence, Disclosure, and Message Repetition) were observed to be statistically significant.

According to MANOVA analysis results, there were several significant main effects and two-way interaction effects on dependent variables. These significant effects were compared to the results of the next analysis considering Credibility as a covariate. Turning to test the second condition, which meets variations in the mediator and significantly accounts for variations in the dependent variable, MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) was conducted.

#### Dimension of MANCOVA: Credibility as a Covariate

Table 10 summarizes the results of a three-way MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) in which Credibility was entered as a potential covariate. Credibility was significantly and positively related to all dependent variables: Ad Evaluation ( $p < .001$ ), Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .001$ ), Opponent Attitude ( $p < .001$ ), and Voting Intention ( $p < .001$ ). Participants who perceived that the source of the message had higher credibility tended to have more positive attitudes toward political ads, more positive attitudes toward both the sponsoring and the opponent candidates, and higher voting intention.

After controlling a potential covariate, the main effects on the message treatments should be considered. Note in Table 10 that Disclosure (the position of SBYA language) did not exhibit significant main effects on any dependent variable.

With respect to Message Valence (positive vs. negative appeals), Table 10 reports a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .001$ ), but a non-

significant relationship to Sponsor Attitude and Opponent Attitude. For the Valence treatment, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the negative ads were evaluated more positively than were the positive ads ( $M = 3.156$  for negative ads vs.  $M = 2.863$  for positive ads, respectively). Like the attitudinal responses, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the negative ads produced higher voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the positive ads did ( $M = 4.123$  for negative ads vs.  $M = 3.523$  for positive ads, respectively).

With respect to Message Repetition, repetition of ads had a significant impact on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .001$ ). Higher numbers of repetition of a candidate's political ads presented in a program context were more effective in terms of diminishing a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate than lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 2.778$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.457$  for higher numbers of repetition). Note in Table 10 that several two-way interactions between pairs of treatments were observed to be statistically significant. Message Valence and Disclosure acted in combination to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). In the case of positive advertising, the presence of SBYA language generated more positive attitudes toward the ads ( $M = 2.972$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 2.645$  for ads without SBYA, respectively) and the voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M = 3.667$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 3.336$  for ads without SBYA, respectively). For negative advertising, the absence of SBYA language generated more positive attitudes toward the ads ( $M = 3.099$  for ads with SBYA vs.  $M = 3.271$  for ads without SBYA, respectively). With respect to Voting Intention, the Disclosure-Beginning condition ( $M = 4.090$ ) and the Non-Disclosure condition ( $M = 4.075$ ) generated the highest voting intention for the sponsoring candidate, and the Disclosure-Beginning condition induced the lowest voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M = 3.665$ ) in the negatively-valenced

message.

Message Valence and Message Repetition also acted in combination to produce a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Positive ads in higher numbers of repetition were more positively evaluated than those in lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 2.772$  for lower frequency vs.  $M = 2.953$  for higher frequency, respectively), while negative ads in higher numbers of repetition were more negatively evaluated than those in lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.317$  for lower frequency vs.  $M = 2.996$  for higher frequency). With respect to Opponent Attitude, repetition of positive ads slightly decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate ( $M = 2.727$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.636$  for higher numbers of repetition), but negative ads in higher numbers of repetition caused a positive attitude toward the targeted candidate to diminish a lot ( $M = 2.829$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.279$  for higher numbers of repetition). The interaction effect with Disclosure and Message Repetition was also found in terms of predicting Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Overall, the presence of SBYA language created more positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.496$  for lower frequency vs.  $M = 3.315$  for higher frequency, respectively), but the absence of SBYA legislation increased a positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.229$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.531$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively). Furthermore, SBYA language located in the beginning of the ad created almost the same level of positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate regardless of numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.342$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.312$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively), whereas SBYA legislation located at the end of the ad generated a more positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.654$  for lower

numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.309$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively). Note in Table 10 that no three-way interactions between the three treatments (Message Valence, Disclosure, and Message Repetition) were observed to be statistically significant.

As a result of testing three criteria to answer **RQ1**, Credibility plays the critical role of mediator in three relationships: between Disclosure and Opponent Attitude, between Message Valence and Sponsor Attitude, and between Message Valence and Opponent Attitude.




Figure 2 Path Diagram of a Mediation Model

Figure 2 exhibits SBYA language's main effect on Opponent Attitude, but conceptually they are only coincidentally associated. What mediates this relationship is Credibility. For a variety of reasons, ads containing SBYA language decrease positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate. Presumably, the presence of SBYA language would affect whether or not positive attitudes toward the opponent decrease. Credibility, then, appears to mediate the relationship between the presence of SBYA language and attitude toward the opponent candidate.

Thus, the correlation between the positions of SBYA language would be weak, and the influence of Credibility is statistically accounted for. The same explanation would apply to the two other relationships between message valence and Sponsor Attitude, and message valence and Opponent Attitude.

### Considering Potential Covariates

Besides reporting the main and interaction effects of the between-subjects treatments considering Credibility, other potential variables that may confound the observation of relative effects should be considered: Need for Cognition and Political Involvement.

Prior to entering all of these variables as potential covariates for MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance), each variable needs to be entered as a covariate one after another in order to figure out which variable is the most powerful covariate. In order to check collinearity between pairs of potential covariates, the Pearson correlations were examined. As a general rule of thumb, two variables correlated in the middle .7s or higher should probably not be used together in a regression or any other multivariate analysis. The results indicated that each pair of variables did not correlate very strongly: Need for Cognition and Political Involvement correlated at .083, Need for Cognition and Credibility correlated at .093, and Political Involvement and Credibility correlated at .353. Therefore, each variable can be used as a separate covariate for statistical analyses.

### Dimension of MANCOVA: Need for Cognition as a Covariate

Table 11 summarizes the results of a three-way MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) in which Need for Cognition was entered as a potential covariate. Need for Cognition was not significantly related to any dependent variable. That is, Need for Cognition is not the main predictor to measure the attitude toward the candidate's ad, the sponsor, the

opponent candidate, and voting intention.

After controlling for the cognitive response, now we can consider the main effects on the message treatments. Disclosure (the position of SBYA language) exhibited significant main effects on Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .05$ ) and Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ) but not on Ad Evaluations or Voting Intention. With respect to Message Valence (positive vs. negative appeals), Table 11 reports a significant impact on Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .001$ ) and Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ), but a non-significant relationship to Ad Evaluation and Voting Intention. With respect to Message Repetition, repetition of ads has a significant impact on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ).

Note in Table 11 that several two-way interactions between pairs of treatments were observed to be statistically significant. Message Valence and Disclosure acted in combination to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). Message Valence and Message Repetition also acted in combination to produce a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ). The interaction effect with Disclosure and Message Repetition was also found in terms of predicting Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .05$ ).

Note that Table 11 reveals two significant three-way interactions for both Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ) and for Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). That is, the three treatments (Message Valence, Disclosure, and Message Repetition) acted in combination with each other to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to attitude toward the opponent candidate and with respect to relative voting intention for the sponsoring candidate, when controlling for Need for Cognition.

#### Dimension of MANCOVA: Political Involvement as a Covariate

Table 12 summarizes the results of a three-way MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) in which Political Involvement was entered as a potential covariate. Political

Involvement was significantly and positively related to all dependent variables: Ad Evaluation, Sponsor Attitude, Opponent Attitude, and Voting Intention. Therefore, people with higher political involvement tended to have more positive attitudes toward political ads, more positive attitudes toward both the sponsoring and the opponent candidates, and higher voting intention.

After controlling a potential covariate, the main effects on the message treatments should be considered. Disclosure (the position of SBYA language) exhibited significant main effects on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ), but not on Ad Evaluations, Sponsor Attitude or Voting Intention. With respect to Message Valence (positive vs. negative appeals), Table 12 reports a significant impact on Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .001$ ) and Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ), but a non-significant relationship to Ad Evaluation and Voting Intention. With respect to Message Repetition, repetition of ads had a significant impact on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ).

Note in Table 12 that several two-way interactions between pairs of treatments were observed to be statistically significant. Message Valence and Disclosure act in combination to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). Message Valence and Message Repetition also act in combination to produce a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ).

Note in Table 12 that the three-way interactions yielded statistically significant results for Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). That is, the three treatments (Message Valence, Disclosure, and Message Repetition) act in combination with each other to produce meaningful causal relationships with respect to voting intention for the sponsoring candidate.

#### Testing Hypotheses and RQ: MANCOVA with Involvement and Credibility as Covariates

Table 13 summarizes the results of a three-way MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) in which two variables were entered as potential covariates: Political Involvement

and Credibility. Need for Cognition was excluded as a potential covariate in this analysis because it was not significantly related to any dependent variable in the previous MANCOVA.

The results of this analysis indicated that Credibility was still significantly and positively related to all dependent variables: Ad Evaluation ( $p < .001$ ), Sponsor Attitude ( $p < .001$ ), Opponent Attitude ( $p < .001$ ), and Voting Intention ( $p < .001$ ). In contrast, the impact of Political Involvement on Sponsor Attitude and Opponent Attitude disappeared. Political Involvement was significantly and positively related to Ad Evaluation and Voting Intention. That is, Credibility might mediate the impact of Political Involvement on attitudinal responses; thus, Credibility is the most powerful covariate that transmits the causal influence for the independent variable to all dependent variables in this study.

After controlling for two potential variables, we now consider the main effects of the message treatments to test hypotheses. Note that Disclosure (Beginning vs. End vs. Non-disclosure) in Table 13, in Table 14 (the presence or absence of SBYA language), and in Table 15 (Beginning vs. End) did not exhibit significant main effects on any dependent variable. Thus, **H1** and **H2** are not supported because we cannot reach a generalizable conclusion about the impact of the presence or absence of SBYA or the position of it on attitude toward the candidate's ads, the sponsor and the opponent candidate, or intention to vote for the sponsoring candidate. With respect to Message Valence (positive vs. negative appeals), Table 13 reports a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .001$ ), but a non-significant relationship to Sponsor Attitude and Opponent Attitude. Negative ads were evaluated more positively than were positive ads ( $M = 3.158$  for negative ads vs.  $M = 2.877$  for positive ads, respectively). Like the attitudinal responses, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the negative ads produced higher voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the

positive ads did ( $M = 4.125$  for negative ads vs.  $M=3.536$  for positive ads, respectively). Thus, **H3** can be partially accepted.

With respect to Message Repetition, repetition of ads had a significant impact on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Higher numbers of repetition to a candidate's political ads presented in a program context are more effective in terms of diminishing a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate than lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 2.735$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.486$  for higher numbers of repetition). Thus, **H4** can be partially accepted.

**RQ2** suggests an examination of two-way and three-way interaction effects, in order to determine whether varying effects of the treatments in the context of other treatments may confound the observation of significant main effects. Such an analysis might help to delimit the domain of treatment effects, or to specify the extent to which those effects can be generalized. Note in Table 13 that several two-way interactions between pairs of treatments were observed to be statistically significant. Disclosure and Message Valence acted in combination to produce meaningful causal relationships both with respect to Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and Voting Intention ( $p < .05$ ). In the case of positive advertising, the presence of SBYA language, regardless of disclosure timing in the ads ( $M=3.097$  for Disclosure-Beginning,  $M=2.934$  for Disclosure-End, respectively), generated more positive attitudes toward the ads than the absence of SBYA language did ( $M=2.585$ ). Like the attitudinal responses, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the mandated statement disclosure ( $M=3.632$  for Disclosure-Beginning,  $M=3.611$  for Disclosure-End, respectively) produced higher voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the non-disclosure ads did ( $M=3.300$ ).

However, for negative advertising, the absence of a disclosure ( $M= 3.276$ ) generated more positive attitudes toward the ads than the presence of SBYA language did ( $M=3.053$  for the

Disclosure-Beginning condition, and  $M=3.168$  for the Disclosure-End condition, respectively).

With respect to Voting Intention for the sponsoring candidate, the Disclosure-End condition induced the lowest voting intention for the sponsoring candidate ( $M=3.652$ ), but the Disclosure-Beginning condition ( $M=4.078$ ) and the Non-Disclosure condition ( $M=4.045$ ) generated the same level of voting intention for the sponsoring candidate in negatively-valenced ads.

The interaction effect with Disclosure and Message Repetition was also found in terms of predicting Sponsor Attitude ( $p<.05$ ). Overall, the presence of SBYA language, regardless of disclosure timing ( $M = 3.340$  for Disclosure-Beginning, and  $M = 3.670$  for Disclosure-End, respectively), created more positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.336$  for Disclosure-Beginning, and  $M = 3.278$  for Disclosure-End, respectively), but the absence of SBYA language increased a positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.210$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.529$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively). Furthermore, SBYA language located at the beginning of the ad created almost the same level of positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate regardless of numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.340$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.336$  for higher numbers of repetition), whereas SBYA language located at the end of the ad generated a more positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.670$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.278$  for higher numbers of repetition).

Message Valence and Message Repetition also acted in combination to produce a significant impact on Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and on Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). Positive ads in higher numbers of repetition were more positively evaluated than those in lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 2.747$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 3.006$  for higher numbers of

repetition, respectively), while negative ads in higher numbers of repetition were more negatively evaluated than those in lower numbers of repetition ( $M = 3.322$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.993$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively). With respect to Opponent Attitude, repetition of positive ads slightly decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate ( $M = 2.696$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.677$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively), but negative ads in higher numbers of repetition caused a positive attitude toward the targeted candidate to diminish a lot ( $M = 2.774$  for lower numbers of repetition vs.  $M = 2.295$  for higher numbers of repetition, respectively).

Note in Table 13 that the three-way interactions yielded statistically significant results for Ad Evaluation ( $p < .05$ ) and for Opponent Attitude ( $p < .05$ ). That is, the three treatments (Message Valence, Disclosure, and Message Repetition) act in combination with each other to produce meaningful causal relationships with respect to attitude toward the sponsoring candidate's ad and the opponent candidate. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the form of a significant three-way interaction for Ad Evaluation and Figures 11 and 12 for Opponent Attitude.

Considering Ad Evaluation first, note in Figure 9 that for positively-valenced ads, attitude toward the ads exhibits a positively sloped relationship to numbers of repetition for all positive ads regardless of whether they contain SBYA language or not. However, positive ads that contain SBYA language were evaluated more positively than those without SBYA under both the lower and higher numbers of repetition conditions. The Disclosure-Beginning condition generated the highest level of attitude toward the sponsor's ad followed by the Disclosure-End condition and the Non-Disclosure condition. Turning to the Ad Evaluation response for negatively-valenced ads, note in Figure 10 that higher numbers of repetition were associated with a relatively stable attitude toward the sponsor's ads both in the Disclosure-Beginning condition and the Non-

Disclosure condition even though the direction of attitudinal response is reversed. The negative ads containing SBYA at the end showed a marked decline in Ad Evaluations in the higher numbers of repetition condition. Clearly, at lower numbers of repetition the End-Disclosure condition produced the most positive attitudes toward the negative ads while at higher numbers of repetition the End-Disclosure condition produced the least positive (actually, markedly negative) mean attitudes.

Note in Figure 11 that attitude toward the opponent candidate exhibits a positively sloped relationship to numbers of repetition only for those positive ads that contain SBYA language at the beginning. In contrast, positive ads containing the mandated disclosure statement at the end and those without SBYA generated less positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate under the higher than the lower numbers of repetition condition. The Disclosure-End condition produced the highest positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate under both of the lower and higher numbers of repetition conditions. At lower numbers of repetition, the Disclosure-Beginning condition produced the most positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate while the Non-Disclosure condition produced the least positive mean attitudes toward the opponent candidate at higher numbers of repetition.

Turning to the Opponent Attitude response for negatively-valenced ads, note in Figure 12 that higher levels of frequency exhibited a negatively sloped (actually, markedly negative) relationship to numbers of repetition for those negative ads that contain SBYA language. However, higher numbers of repetition were associated with a relatively stable attitude toward the opponent candidate in the Non-Disclosure condition. At lower numbers of repetition, the Non-Disclosure condition produced the least positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate, while the Disclosure-End condition generated the most positive attitudes toward the opponent

candidate, which was almost the same attitudinal mean that the Disclosure-Beginning condition produced. At higher numbers of repetition, the Non-Disclosure condition produced the most positive attitudes toward the opponent candidate, while the Disclosure-Beginning and Disclosure-End conditions generated the least positive mean attitudes.

With respect to the three treatments of disclosure timing (i.e., at the beginning vs. at the end vs. non-disclosure), or with respect to the presence or absence of SBYA language, there was no three-way interaction effect on voting intention for the sponsoring candidate; however, within the presence of SBYA language (i.e., at the beginning vs. at the end), the three-way interaction effect on voting intention provides an interesting pattern.

Figure 13 notes voting intention elicited by positively-valenced ads in the Disclosure-End condition was depressed at higher numbers of repetition compared to lower numbers of repetition, while higher numbers of repetition enhanced voting intention for positive ads in the Disclosure-Beginning condition. Figure 14 notes that negative ads in the Disclosure-End condition somewhat increased voting intention for the sponsor at higher numbers of repetition. But negative ads in the Disclosure-Beginning condition produced a lower mean voting intention for the sponsoring candidate at higher numbers of repetition.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

#### Theoretical Implications: The Role of Credibility

The environment of this experiment was portrayed as a Congressional Election in Kansas, not in Georgia where the participants live. Test commercials for the experiment also supported a fictional candidate who was running for Congress from Kansas. This scenario may have resulted in participants having low situational involvement. Thus, participants did not have very much prior information about the issue or the candidates and may not have perceived the issues to have very much personal relevance, suggesting that peripheral processing would probably have some success in this study. Thus, credibility was explicitly used as the critical “persuasion cue” and played a main role in predicting attitudes toward the ads, attitudes toward the sponsor and the opponent candidate, and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. Higher credibility induced more persuasion in terms of gaining more positive attitudinal responses and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. Also, credibility plays the critical role of mediator predicting the relationship between SBYA language and attitude toward the opponent, between message valence and attitude toward the sponsor, and between message valence and attitude toward the opponent candidate.

Although credibility successfully worked as a “persuasion cue” in this study, all of these results will not be very permanent. Furthermore, this technique is not likely to be very successful in changing voters’ attitudes when they have a lot of prior information about the issue or if the issue is very involving to them. When voters have a lot of prior information about an issue and

the issue has personal relevance, they will be motivated to process the issue-relevant information presented, and peripheral aspects, such as credibility, and the persuasion situation may be less important.

Therefore, the success will be short-lived, so it will be necessary for the candidate who is trying to persuade voters to constantly remind them of the persuasion cue (reward, attractive source, contextual stimuli). These constant reminders may be sufficient to get them to vote for the sponsoring candidate. Ironically, once voters have made a decision to vote for a candidate in the real world, they may become motivated to think about the candidate and generate bolstering cognitions that then produce a more permanent change in attitude. Also, because voters may feel responsible for electing the candidate they will vote for, they may be motivated to centrally process any subsequent information that they receive about the candidate. This can lead to permanent attitude changes. What begins, then, as a temporary attitude change via the peripheral route may end up being a more permanent change via the central route.

However, there is one aspect of source credibility that may be unique to political advertising. This is the issue of the conceptual closeness of source credibility and the candidate as an object of judgment. In this study, there are no explicit source credibility cues except SBYA language that may result in the sponsoring candidate (who says “I am Bob Johnson and I approved this message.”) being considered as the source of the political message. When participants think of source credibility, they might use the cognition about the sponsoring candidate and evaluate him centrally, not peripherally. Therefore, this political advertising study possess a greater difficulty than brand goods advertising in making a simple distinction between central and peripheral processing even though it found that source credibility played a mediator role in predicting attitudinal and behavioral responses.

### The Impact of Covariates: Need for Cognition & Political Involvement

Need for cognition was not significantly related to any attitudinal or behavioral responses. That is, need for cognition is not a predictor or an antecedent to measure the attitude toward the candidate's ad, the sponsor, the opponent candidate, and voting intention. This is not consistent with findings of previous studies showed that need for cognition is a significant cognitive, affective and behavioral disposition from psychology that has important uses for understanding political attitude phenomena. However, this finding is compelling with literature on voting intention in that there is no impact of need for cognition on voting choice (Fournier, Lyle, Cutler, & Soroka, 2004). No need for cognition effect might occur in this study due to college student samples that are homogenous in relatively high need for cognition. Participants in this study had relatively high average scores of need for cognition (the mean score was over the midpoint of 4 on the 7-unit itemized rating scales employed in this study) and less than 1 standard deviation, which indicates data distributed very close to mean score. Thus, because of homogeneity of sample characteristic in need for cognition, the significant difference on attitudinal or behavioral responses might not be discovered in this study.

Political involvement was significantly and positively related to attitude toward the ads and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. People with high involvement in politics were more likely to evaluate both positive and negative advertising positively and more likely to vote for a sponsoring candidate. This finding is consistent with previous involvement literature that indicated that people with high involvement in politics tend to have more positive attitudes toward political ads and tend to have stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate (Yoon et. al, 1999).

### The Impact of SBYA Language

When the impact of treatments are filtered through the covariates of credibility and political involvement, the results of this study do not show any main effect from the presence or absence of SBYA language or the position of it (the beginning vs. the end) on attitudinal and behavioral responses, even though a previous study suggested that the ads with a SBYA provision increase a positive attitude toward the candidate and viewers are significantly more likely to vote for the candidate who sponsored the ad, both for the known and the unknown candidate (Gale et al. (2005). However, interesting two-way and three-way interaction effects provide insights into those specific conditions under which the position of SBYA language may enhance or depress positive attitudinal and behavioral responses toward the sponsoring candidate.

### The Impact of Message Valence

Prior to discussing interaction effects due to mandated disclosure statements, the main effect of message valence should be mentioned. When the impact of treatments are filtered through the covariates of credibility and political involvement, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the negative ads were evaluated more positively than were the positive ads. This result may seem inconsistent with voters' reported general dislike of negative political advertising (Roberts, 1992; Newsweek, 9/23/96). However, it is not inconsistent with findings that individual negative advertisements may be positively evaluated (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1995; Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007). Like the attitudinal responses, the direction of the significant difference reveals that the negative ads produced higher voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the positive ads did. This finding supports the notion that negative ads do affect voting preferences (Kaid & Boydston, 1987; Roddy & Garramone, 1988; Basil et al., 1991; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Furthermore, negative ads used in this study were manipulated

to support the challenger, and participants did not have very much prior information about the issue or the candidates. Therefore, this study leads to a clear conclusion that negative advertising is effective for challengers (Lau & Pomper, 2002), and that negative ads are likely to affect vote decision when shown in a new environment (Kaid, Chanslor, & Hovind, 1992). Consequently, this finding supports the idea that negative message strategy is an effective campaign technique for the sponsoring candidate in the electoral process (Perloff & Kinsey, 1992; Plaut, 1998; Lariscy & Tinkham, 1999; Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007).

#### The Interaction Effect of SBYA Language & Message Valence

Turning to the two-way interaction effect with SBYA language and message valence, in the case of positive advertising, the presence of SBYA language, regardless of disclosure timing in the ads, generated more positive attitudes toward the ads and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the absence of SBYA language did. However, for negative advertising, the absence of a disclosure generated more positive attitudes toward the ads and stronger voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the presence of SBYA language did. The mandated disclosure statement increases positive attitudes toward ads and somewhat intensifies voting intention for the sponsoring candidate in positively-valenced ads. In contrast, SBYA language decreases the impact of negatively-valenced ads on both attitudinal and behavioral responses.

This result in the impact of SBYA language is inconsistent with a previous experimental study (Kim, Tinkham & Lariscy, 2007) that suggested that SBYA language at high levels of repetition restores some credibility to negative campaign ads, but is annoying for relatively innocuous positive ads when the ads are repeated. The big difference between the two studies is content of test ads. In the past experiment, each positive and negative ad mentioned different issues and possessed different degrees of humor even though all ads had similar production

values as they were produced by the same consultant. In addition, only the negative advertisements possessed humor whereas there was no degree of humor in positively valenced ads, thus, the negative ads were liked more than the positive ads (though neither treatment received highly polarized attitudinal scores). This attitudinal difference across the valence treatments raises the possibility that the disclosure and repetition effects may be attributable to attitude toward the ad rather than message valence. In contrast, in this study, each positive and negative ad mentioned the consistent central theme of environmental issues and possessed a consistent degree of humor (actually, no humor). The current study better controlled message variation and increased internal validity. Therefore, different degrees of humor used in negative ads might produce conflicting results in that the humorous message resulted in more favorable evaluations, and more positive attitudes toward the commercial and advertiser (Zhang & Zinkhan, 2006). In addition, the combination of humorous and credible messages (with SBYA legislation) might create a synergy effect on ad evaluation and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. Also, past study showed two different positive and negative ads and rotated position of the disclosure (beginning or end) within treatment. Variety of political ads and position of disclosure might minimize “satiation” and lessen the wearout.

Despite inconsistent findings of a past experiment, this study provides evidence that SBYA language in positive ads works as a credible source that strengthens value and believability of positive messages, then enhances attitudinal and behavioral responses. On the other hand, since the presence of SBYA language in negative ads does not provide the responsible source of negative and likely biased information, recipients might hesitate to accept the persuasive messages. This study presents evidence that SBYA legislation is likely to serve its public policy purpose of discouraging the use of negatively-valenced appeals in that SBYA

language induces attitudinal backlash toward negative messages and actually diminishes voting intention in response to negative ads. Also, SBYA legislation achieves its intended purpose of encouraging the use of positive appeals that focus on meaningful issue positions, thus creating a climate of political discourse that encourages voter participation. However, there is no significant difference between the Disclosure-Beginning condition and the Disclosure-End condition to predict attitudinal and behavioral responses to the valence treatment.

#### The Interaction Effect of SBYA Language & Message Repetition

The presence of SBYA language, regardless of disclosure timing, created more positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate in lower than in higher numbers of repetition, but the absence of SBYA legislation increased positive attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate in higher numbers of repetition. This result shows the perspective of irritation, the concept of declining positive effects in greater advertising repetition. In other words, repetition of SBYA language decreases a positive attitude toward the sponsoring candidate regardless of message valence. This pattern of irritation is markedly exhibited in the Disclosure-End condition. SBYA language at the beginning of the ads created virtually equivalent mean responses on attitudes toward the sponsoring candidate regardless of numbers of repetition. In contrast, attitudes toward the sponsor under the condition of SBYA language at the end of the ads markedly declined with higher numbers of repetition. Thus, in the case of well funded campaigns that can achieve high average frequencies of message exposure, the use of political ads with SBYA language at the end does not benefit the sponsoring candidate.

#### The Interaction Effect of Message Valence & Message Repetition

Repeatedly seen positive ads were positively evaluated, yet repeatedly seen negative ads were negatively evaluated. This is consistent with the idea that negative information weights more

heavily than positive information in the initial formation of impressions processing (Richey, McClelland, & Shimkunas, 1967; Cusumano & Richey, 1970; Kellermann, 1984), but the more often negative political ads are repeated, the more likely it is that some voters will evaluate negatively to the ads (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991). Repetition of positive ads slightly decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidates, but negative ads in higher numbers of repetition resulted in a substantial decline in attitudes toward the targeted candidate. Thus, negative ads are negatively evaluated with higher numbers of repetition conditions, but they may still work for the sponsoring candidate by depressing a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate.

#### The Interaction Effect with SBYA Language, Message Valence, & Message Repetition

The three-way interactions provide interesting results. With respect to attitude toward ads, positive ads that contain SBYA language were evaluated more positively than those without SBYA in both lower and higher numbers of repetition conditions. This result not only supports previous findings that as source credibility of message increases, consumers more positively evaluate to the message (Sternthal, Phillips & Dholakia, 1978; Goldberg & Hartwick, 1990; Lafferty & Goldsmith, 1999; Goldsmith, Lafferty & Newell, 2000) but also provides evidence that a highly credible source increases effectiveness regardless of how many times message is repeated.

Particularly, the Disclosure-Beginning condition is most effective for positive ads in both lower and higher numbers of repetition conditions. This pattern also applies to the result of attitude toward the opponent. Due to no mention of the opponent in positive appeals, each disclosure treatment created virtually equivalent mean responses even though there is a statistically significant difference between treatments. However, the Disclosure-End condition

induced more positive attitudes toward the opponent than the Disclosure-Beginning condition and Non-disclosure condition did. Therefore, in the case of the positive ad, the Disclosure-Beginning condition most benefits the sponsoring candidate in terms of suppressing a positive attitude toward the opponent candidate regardless of message repetition.

Turning to attitudes toward negative ads, this study found that as a message repeated, negative ads with SBYA language were more negatively evaluated, but those without SBYA were more positively evaluated. However, as negative appeals with SBYA language were repeatedly exposed to voters, their attitudes toward the targeted candidate decreased. This means that voters may consider SBYA language as a trusted source of negative information against the opponent candidate and that repetition of negative advertising with SBYA language, perhaps by building voter confidence, diminishes attitude toward the opponent candidate. Therefore, negative appeals with SBYA language are negatively evaluated in higher numbers of repetition conditions, but they may work for the sponsoring candidate by decreasing a positive attitude toward the opponent. This finding supports the effectiveness of negative advertising, particularly in producing negative attitudes toward the opponent/target (Tinkham & Lariscy, 1993).

With respect to three treatments of disclosure timing (i.e., at the beginning vs. at the end vs. non-disclosure), or with respect to the presence or absence of SBYA language, there was no three-way interaction effect on voting intention for the sponsoring candidate; however, within the presence of SBYA language (i.e., at the beginning vs. at the end), the three-way interaction effect on voting intention provides interesting results.

Voting intention elicited by positively-valenced ads in the Disclosure-End condition is depressed at a higher number of repetitions compared to a lower number of repetitions, while a higher number of repetitions enhance voting intention for positive ads in the Disclosure-

Beginning condition. In this study, ads with SBYA legislation regardless of disclosure timing were perceived to be more highly credible than those without SBYA legislation. Thus, this finding supports the idea that introducing the source at the outset is more persuasive than is identifying it at the end when the source is perceived to be highly credible (Greenberg & Tannenbaum, 1961; Mills & Harvey, 1972; Ward and McGinnies 1974) at a higher number of repetitions. By identifying the source before delivering the message, the credibility of the message might be increased and attract more attention and encourage learning. On the other hand, identifying the source right after a message that presents the sponsor in a positive light might lead the audience to take the ad with skepticism or to consider the sponsor a bragger.

In contrast, negative ads in the Disclosure-End condition somewhat increase voting intention for the sponsor at a higher number of repetitions. But negative ads in the Disclosure-Beginning condition produce a lower mean voting intention for the sponsoring candidate at higher repetitions. This finding supports evidence that SBYA language at the beginning in negative ads works as forewarning of an impending request allows people to prepare for it and ultimately to resist it – less likely to vote for the sponsoring candidate – when a negative message is frequently repeated. Even though SBYA legislation did not contain any actual “warning” phrases, SBYA language at the beginning by announcing an intention to persuade viewers thus providing preliminary information on what is to follow and letting people anticipate a persuasive message prior to receiving it. In other words, before being presented with a message was sufficient to induce counterargument and subsequent resistance to persuasion. In this study, SBYA language at the beginning in negative ads functioned as forewarning, which yields resistance to persuasive messages.

Consequently, for voting intention, the impact of repeatedly seen positive ads is depressed by their containing SBYA language at the beginning, whereas SBYA language at the beginning depresses the impact of repeatedly seen negative ads. In contrast, SBYA language at the end increases the impact of repeatedly seen negative ads and decreases the impact of positive ads.

### Practitioner Implications

This study provides several implications to campaign managers and practitioners. First of all, negative advertising is an effective campaign technique in terms of increasing positive attitudes toward the ad and voting intention for the sponsoring candidate. Particularly, negative message strategy is an effective campaign technique for challengers. Also, another strategy for effective negative attacks based on intertwining attacks focusing on an issue and the opponent candidate's fickle character is important.

In the case of well-funded campaigns that can achieve high average frequencies of message exposure, negative ads are more effective than positive ads because repetition of negative ads resulted in a substantial decline in attitudes toward the targeted candidate, while repetition of positive ads only slightly decreased a positive attitude toward the opponent candidates. Under the current SBYA legislation, the Disclosure-Beginning condition benefits the well-funded sponsoring candidate more than the Disclosure-End condition does when using positive advertising. In contrast, the Disclosure-End condition profits the well-funded sponsoring candidate more than the Disclosure-Beginning condition does when using negative advertising.

In the case of under-funded campaigns that need to achieve impact of political advertising at the initial exposure, the Disclosure-End condition is more effective than the Disclosure-Beginning condition for positive ads, while the Disclosure-Beginning condition generates greater

impact on voting intention for the sponsoring candidate than the Disclosure-End condition for negative ads.

### Public Policy Implications

This study was motivated by the goal of assessing the impact of SBYA (“Stand by Your Ad”) language (a mandated disclosure requirement) in political advertisements at the federal level and in some statewide election campaigns. Evidence, from legislative hearings and debates as well as statements by SBYA sponsors and political pundits, has established that this type of regulation of the content of political speech is thought to serve the public welfare by: (1) enhancing the ability of potential voters to identify sponsorship, (2) discouraging the use of negative political attacks against opponents (frequently reported in surveys to be a strongly disliked type of political advertising), (3) encouraging the use of positive appeals that focus on meaningful issue positions, (4) causing candidates to avoid using deceptive and misleading claims, and (5) creating a climate of political discourse that encourages voter participation. Some have suggested that such legislation may serve the purpose of protecting incumbent office holders from serious attacks by challengers, whose often negative persuasive messages must justify the removal of incumbents from office. After all, it is the incumbents who pass such laws! However, in a brief review of the legislative history of the federal SBYA provision, Gale et al. (2005, p. 773) argue convincingly that the designers of the legislation wrote it “...with the intention of decreasing overall negativity in ads by increasing the level of responsibility that candidates and others must take for their advertising.” Their field experiment suggests that the SBYA language may produce unexpected and counter-intuitive results, and may actually work *for* the sponsoring candidate who uses negative advertising by building voter confidence in making a choice, thus mitigating the negative impact of negative appeals.

This study tested whether or not such legislation serves its intended purpose of suppressing negativity and to what extent the position of SBYA language within the ad facilitates the intended purpose of the legislation by making negative ads less effective for the sponsoring candidates. These issues of SBYA language and message valence were also studied in the context of low and high exposure levels. Findings of this study suggest evidence that the inclusion of SBYA language is likely to serve one of its primary public policy purposes, in that the disclosure actually diminishes the effectiveness of negative appeals, whereas positive appeals containing the mandated disclosure enhance their effectiveness.

Furthermore, the implications of this study support an idea that the location of SBYA language at the beginning rather than at the end of political ads better serves the intended public policy goals of discouraging the use of negative political attacks against opponents and encouraging the use of positive appeals that focus on meaningful issue positions. Under such conditions, voting intention for the sponsoring candidate is encouraged in positively-valenced ads at higher levels of frequency, whereas behavioral responses for the sponsoring candidate in negatively-valenced ads are depressed at higher exposure.

#### Limitations and Future Directions

The present study has several limitations that should be noted with respect to method and the measures employed. First, since this study was conducted with college student samples, the results cannot be generalized to the voter population as a whole. According to Brown and Stayman (1992), student samples tend to be more homogenous and to yield higher correlations than do non-student samples. Thus, the use of student subjects appears to have an upward-biasing effect on the strength of some relationships. This effect is a limiting condition on the generalizability of results generated from student samples. For instance, participants in this study

had a relatively high average score on need for cognition (mean score was over the midpoint of 4 on the 7-unit itemized rating scales employed in this study) and less than 1 standard deviation which indicates data distributed very close to mean score. Because of high mean and high homogeneity of sample characteristics in the need for cognition, the significant differences on attitudinal or behavioral responses that would have been predicted for a more general population, might not have been discovered in this study. Yet, these predicted effects were, nevertheless, largely observed. Further, the sample characteristics would increase the likelihood of central processing, thus lessening role of source credibility as a mediator, yet a strong mediating role of source credibility was observed.

Second, the online experiment conducted for this study offered an opportunity to provide an environment where participants were in a frame of mind to be receptive to advertising messages unlike in a field study. Online experiments usually have less artificial circumstances of controlled forced exposure than laboratory experiments have. Participants in this study had a chance to miss test ads by clicking a forward button on the survey tool if they wanted to avoid watching test ads. However, participants might give their full attention to the messages unlike in a real situation, because they were told that they must watch tests ads to continue to participate in this study. Therefore, captive and receptive audiences might have made a stronger impact of the advertising message than a field study would have.

Third, test ads dealt with environmental issues. The environment has been considered an area that does not contain any biased viewpoint represented by the specific political ideology or political party affiliation; however, sometimes it is considered to be a more liberal than conservative issue. In this study, political ideology or political party affiliation was not considered as a potential covariate that can affect attitudinal and behavioral responses to political

messages. Thus, tests ads might have a different impact on participants who are liberal than those who are conservative.

Fourth, the negative test commercial attacked the targeted candidate, David Brown, by arguing that he flip-flopped his side and finally voted against the Environmental Protection Act. Thus, a negative test ad in this study attacked issue positioning of the opponent candidate and his personal character by the change that he is inconsistent or does not know whose side he is on. A combination of these two components might induce a stronger impact of negative ads because voters are more influenced by character attacks when they have a strong justification based on issues (Homer & Bartra, 1994; Budesheim et al., 1996).

Fifth, this study was conducted in a relatively low situational involvement situation, which may differentiate it from a real electoral world. Future research should analyze the impact of position and other SBYA issues, valence, and repetitions in high-situational involvement situations, such as the presidential election or in a field study. Also, this study examined the effectiveness of political ads supporting an unknown candidate. Future researchers should concentrate on the impact of SBYA language sponsored by a known candidate versus an unknown candidate and explicitly vary candidate status (e.g. incumbent, challenger, open-race).

Finally, findings of this study, particularly on the impact of SBYA language, are somewhat inconsistent with previous results, calling for further replicated research employing different research methods and recruiting different samples should be conducted to generalize the result of the impact of SBYA language in message valence, and repetition. Although limitations are obvious, this study provides important theoretical and managerial implications for one of the newest issues in politics and in the field of political advertising research.

TABLES

Table 9: Summary Statistics for Main and Interaction Effects (N=518)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b><u>MAIN EFFECTS</u></b>					
Disclosure	Ad Evaluation	5.139	2	1.577	.208
	Sponsor Attitude	6.441	2	2.490	.084
	Opponent Attitude	7.635	2	3.380	<b>.035</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	5.519	2	1.543	.215
	Opponent Voting Intention	2.987	2	1.111	.330
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	1.908	1	1.171	.280
	Sponsor Attitude	35.069	1	27.107	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	9.335	1	8.264	<b>.004</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.553	1	.309	.578
	Opponent Voting Intention	.070	1	.052	.820
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	3.045	1	1.868	.172
	Sponsor Attitude	2.212	1	1.710	.192
	Opponent Attitude	13.652	1	12.086	<b>.001</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.085	1	.048	.827
	Opponent Voting Intention	.662	1	.493	.483
<b><u>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</u></b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	15.929	2	4.887	<b>.008</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	5.762	2	2.227	.109
	Opponent Attitude	1.902	2	.842	.432
	Sponsor Voting Intention	23.592	2	6.597	<b>.001</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.441	2	1.652	.193
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	6.946	2	2.131	.120
	Sponsor Attitude	13.566	2	5.243	<b>.006</b>
	Opponent Attitude	4.564	2	2.020	.134
	Sponsor Voting Intention	7.658	2	2.141	.119
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.096	2	1.523	.219
Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	9.318	1	5.718	<b>.017</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.102	1	.079	.779
	Opponent Attitude	5.762	1	5.101	<b>.024</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	1.122	1	.627	.429
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.213	1	.902	.343

**THREE-WAY INTERACTION**

Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	3.937	2	1.208	.300
	Sponsor Attitude	3.903	2	1.509	.222
	Opponent Attitude	4.850	2	2.147	.118
	Sponsor Voting Intention	10.240	2	2.863	.058
	Opponent Voting Intention	6.692	2	2.489	.084
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	46.353 <sup>a</sup>	11	2.586	.003
	Sponsor Attitude	62.786 <sup>b</sup>	11	4.412	.000
	Opponent Attitude	44.163 <sup>c</sup>	11	3.554	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	50.569 <sup>a</sup>	11	2.571	.004
	Opponent Voting Intention	21.728 <sup>d</sup>	11	1.469	.139

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations and Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .054 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .033)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .089 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .069)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .073 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .052)

<sup>d</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .031 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .010)

Table 10: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Credibility (N=518)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Credibility	Ad Evaluation	221.674	1	185.486	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	301.972	1	443.324	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	41.378	1	42.697	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	325.232	1	295.868	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	.001	1	.001	.974
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure	Ad Evaluation	.728	2	.305	.738
	Sponsor Attitude	1.810	2	1.329	.266
	Opponent Attitude	2.599	2	1.341	.263
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.810	2	1.278	.280
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.848	2	.721	.491
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	9.514	1	7.961	<b>.005</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.394	1	.579	.447
	Opponent Attitude	1.797	1	1.855	.174
	Sponsor Voting Intention	19.497	1	17.731	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	.373	1	.287	.592
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	.582	1	.487	.486
	Sponsor Attitude	.055	1	.080	.777
	Opponent Attitude	12.419	1	12.815	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.490	1	.446	.505
	Opponent Voting Intention	.594	1	.457	.499
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	8.850	2	3.703	<b>.025</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	1.809	2	1.328	.266
	Opponent Attitude	2.300	2	1.187	.306
	Sponsor Voting Intention	10.815	2	4.919	<b>.008</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.557	2	1.754	.174
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	4.166	2	1.743	.176
	Sponsor Attitude	8.522	2	6.256	<b>.002</b>
	Opponent Attitude	4.150	2	2.141	.119
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.193	2	.998	.370
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.926	2	1.512	.222
Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	7.585	1	6.347	<b>.012</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.704	1	1.034	.310
	Opponent Attitude	6.343	1	6.545	<b>.011</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.163	1	.148	.700
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.559	1	1.201	.274

<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	6.755	2	2.826	.060
	Sponsor Attitude	.816	2	.599	.550
	Opponent Attitude	5.658	2	2.919	.055
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.940	2	1.337	.263
	Opponent Voting Intention	7.602	2	2.927	.055
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	267.447 <sup>a</sup>	12	18.649	.000
	Sponsor Attitude	363.964 <sup>b</sup>	12	44.528	.000
	Opponent Attitude	89.896 <sup>c</sup>	12	7.730	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	375.586 <sup>d</sup>	12	28.473	.000
	Opponent Voting Intention	22.201 <sup>e</sup>	12	1.425	.151

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .318 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .300)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .526 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .514)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .162 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .141)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .415 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .401)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .034 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .010)

Table 11: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Need for Cognition (N=518)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	Df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Need for Cognition	Ad Evaluation	2.880	1	1.779	.183
	Sponsor Attitude	.003	1	.003	.959
	Opponent Attitude	.050	1	.044	.833
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.837	1	.470	.493
	Opponent Voting Intention	.163	1	.122	.727
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure	Ad Evaluation	8.758	2	2.705	.068
	Sponsor Attitude	9.874	2	3.853	<b>.022</b>
	Opponent Attitude	7.607	2	3.387	<b>.035</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	8.476	2	2.380	.094
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.537	2	1.327	.266
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	1.075	1	.664	.415
	Sponsor Attitude	34.980	1	27.301	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	9.692	1	8.631	<b>.003</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.074	1	.042	.838
	Opponent Voting Intention	.327	1	.246	.620
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	2.492	1	1.539	.215
	Sponsor Attitude	1.455	1	1.135	.287
	Opponent Attitude	11.331	1	10.091	<b>.002</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.029	1	.016	.899
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.551	1	1.164	.281
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	16.451	2	5.081	<b>.007</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	6.409	2	2.501	.083
	Opponent Attitude	4.210	2	1.875	.155
	Sponsor Voting Intention	19.267	2	5.410	<b>.005</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	5.000	2	1.877	.154
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	8.084	2	2.497	.083
	Sponsor Attitude	11.846	2	4.623	<b>.010</b>
	Opponent Attitude	3.589	2	1.598	.203
	Sponsor Voting Intention	8.390	2	2.356	.096
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.030	2	1.512	.221
Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	7.619	1	4.706	<b>.031</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.144	1	.113	.737
	Opponent Attitude	2.823	1	2.514	.113
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.699	1	.393	.531
	Opponent Voting Intention	.331	1	.249	.618

<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	3.114	2	.962	.383
	Sponsor Attitude	4.369	2	1.705	.183
	Opponent Attitude	6.824	2	3.039	<b>.049</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	14.065	2	3.949	<b>.020</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	7.800	2	2.928	.540
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	48.424 <sup>a</sup>	12	2.493	.004
	Sponsor Attitude	63.332 <sup>b</sup>	12	4.119	.000
	Opponent Attitude	42.652 <sup>c</sup>	12	3.165	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	54.021 <sup>d</sup>	12	2.528	.003
	Opponent Voting Intention	24.082 <sup>e</sup>	12	1.506	.118

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .059 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .035)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .094 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .071)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .074 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .051)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .060 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .036)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .037 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .012)

Table 12: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement (N=518)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Political Involvement	Ad Evaluation	100.620	1	69.400	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	51.312	1	42.272	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	8.724	1	8.609	<b>.004</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	76.446	1	46.663	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	9.220	1	7.313	<b>.007</b>
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure	Ad Evaluation	4.013	2	2.705	.252
	Sponsor Attitude	4.848	2	3.853	<b>.137</b>
	Opponent Attitude	6.146	2	3.387	<b>.049</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	5.315	2	2.380	.119
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.811	2	.905	.488
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	.126	1	.664	.768
	Sponsor Attitude	25.930	1	27.301	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	10.897	1	8.631	<b>.001</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.002	1	.001	.972
	Opponent Voting Intention	.072	1	.057	.811
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	1.408	1	1.539	.325
	Sponsor Attitude	2.165	1	1.135	.182
	Opponent Attitude	10.225	1	10.091	<b>.002</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.120	1	.016	.787
	Opponent Voting Intention	.526	1	.417	.519
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	18.525	2	5.081	<b>.002</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	5.367	2	2.501	.111
	Opponent Attitude	1.251	2	1.875	.540
	Sponsor Voting Intention	21.549	2	5.410	<b>.002</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.221	2	1.227	.280
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	7.932	2	2.497	.066
	Sponsor Attitude	15.113	2	4.623	<b>.002</b>
	Opponent Attitude	5.846	2	1.598	.057
	Sponsor Voting Intention	8.191	2	2.356	.083
	Opponent Voting Intention	2.987	2	1.185	.307
Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	13.684	1	4.706	<b>.002</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.006	1	.113	.942
	Opponent Attitude	8.407	1	2.514	<b>.004</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	3.155	1	.393	.166
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.949	1	1.546	.214

<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	3.179	2	.962	.335
	Sponsor Attitude	4.031	2	1.705	.191
	Opponent Attitude	4.143	2	3.039	.131
	Sponsor Voting Intention	10.427	2	3.949	<b>.042</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.179	2	2.090	.192
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	142.380 <sup>a</sup>	12	8.184	.000
	Sponsor Attitude	109.696 <sup>b</sup>	12	7.531	.000
	Opponent Attitude	54.584 <sup>c</sup>	12	4.489	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	127.435 <sup>d</sup>	12	6.482	.000
	Opponent Voting Intention	26.242 <sup>e</sup>	12	1.735	.057

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .170 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .149)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .159 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .138)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .101 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .079)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .140 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .118)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .042 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .018)

Table 13: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement &amp; Credibility (N=518)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Political Involvement	Ad Evaluation	16.311	1	14.137	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.078	1	.115	.735
	Opponent Attitude	.354	1	.371	.543
	Sponsor Voting Intention	5.272	1	4.789	<b>.029</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	10.470	1	8.162	<b>.004</b>
Source Credibility	Ad Evaluation	142.603	1	122.331	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	246.510	1	354.080	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	31.765	1	33.304	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	248.848	1	226.045	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.393	1	1.086	.298
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure	Ad Evaluation	1.036	2	.444	.407
	Sponsor Attitude	1.512	2	1.086	.152
	Opponent Attitude	3.732	2	1.956	.276
	Sponsor Voting Intention	3.497	2	1.588	.205
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.533	2	.598	.551
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	8.448	1	7.247	<b>.007</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.468	1	.672	.413
	Opponent Attitude	2.477	1	2.598	.108
	Sponsor Voting Intention	16.174	1	14.692	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	.400	1	.312	.577
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	.142	1	.122	.727
	Sponsor Attitude	.078	1	.112	.738
	Opponent Attitude	7.179	1	7.526	<b>.006</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.236	1	.214	.644
	Opponent Voting Intention	.179	1	.140	.709
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	10.191	2	4.371	<b>.013</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	1.600	2	1.149	.318
	Opponent Attitude	2.200	2	1.153	.317
	Sponsor Voting Intention	10.095	2	4.585	<b>.011</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	2.620	2	1.021	.361
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	5.409	2	2.320	.099
	Sponsor Attitude	9.941	2	7.140	<b>.001</b>
	Opponent Attitude	3.986	2	2.090	.125
	Sponsor Voting Intention	3.139	2	1.426	.241
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.808	2	1.484	.228

Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	9.957	1	8.541	<b>.004</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.815	1	1.171	.280
	Opponent Attitude	6.076	1	6.371	<b>.012</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.575	1	.523	.470
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.715	1	1.337	.248
<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	7.113	2	3.051	<b>.048</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.853	2	.613	.542
	Opponent Attitude	5.904	2	3.095	<b>.046</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	4.853	2	2.204	.111
	Opponent Voting Intention	5.040	2	1.965	.141
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	288.055 <sup>a</sup>	13	22.158	.000
	Sponsor Attitude	358.580 <sup>b</sup>	13	27.583	.000
	Opponent Attitude	84.690 <sup>c</sup>	13	6.515	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	379.352 <sup>d</sup>	13	26.507	.000
	Opponent Voting Intention	27.985 <sup>e</sup>	13	1.678	.062

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .347 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .329)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .526 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .513)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .161 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .137)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .426 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .410)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .426 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .410)

Table 14: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement & Credibility (N=518)  
(Disclosure-Presence vs. Absence)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Political Involvement	Ad Evaluation	22.319	1	19.040	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.817	1	1.164	.281
	Opponent Attitude	.555	1	.585	.445
	Sponsor Voting Intention	5.169	1	4.623	<b>.032</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	11.073	1	8.650	<b>.003</b>
Source Credibility	Ad Evaluation	144.120	1	122.947	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	252.861	1	360.263	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	32.356	1	34.112	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	261.298	1	233.695	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.126	1	.877	.349
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure (Presence vs. Absence)	Ad Evaluation	.694	1	.592	.442
	Sponsor Attitude	.057	1	.082	.775
	Opponent Attitude	2.852	1	3.007	.084
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.356	1	.319	.573
	Opponent Voting Intention	.696	1	.543	.461
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	12.826	1	10.941	<b>.001</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.266	1	.379	.539
	Opponent Attitude	3.898	1	4.109	<b>.043</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	24.327	1	21.757	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	.748	1	.584	.445
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	.014	1	.012	.914
	Sponsor Attitude	.467	1	.666	.415
	Opponent Attitude	3.533	1	3.725	.054
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.558	1	.499	.480
	Opponent Voting Intention	.991	1	.774	.379
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	9.112	1	7.774	<b>.006</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.281	1	.400	.527
	Opponent Attitude	1.794	1	1.892	.170
	Sponsor Voting Intention	5.668	1	5.087	<b>.025</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.480	1	1.156	.283
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	1.861	1	1.588	.208
	Sponsor Attitude	6.922	1	9.862	<b>.002</b>
	Opponent Attitude	3.655	1	3.853	<b>.050</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.298	1	2.055	.152
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.790	1	2.961	.086

Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	4.830	1	4.121	<b>.043</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	.265	1	.377	.539
	Opponent Attitude	2.525	1	2.662	.103
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.500	1	.447	.504
	Opponent Voting Intention	.493	1	.385	.535
<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	4.410	1	3.762	.053
	Sponsor Attitude	.738	1	1.052	.306
	Opponent Attitude	6.057	1	6.385	<b>.012</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.668	1	.597	.440
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.728	1	2.913	.089
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	280.352 <sup>a</sup>	9	31.150	.000
	Sponsor Attitude	353.137 <sup>b</sup>	9	39.237	.000
	Opponent Attitude	83.332 <sup>c</sup>	9	9.259	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	366.880 <sup>d</sup>	9	40.764	.000
	Opponent Voting Intention	24.106 <sup>e</sup>	9	2.678	.029

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .338 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .325)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .518 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .509)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .158 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .142)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .412 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .401)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .039 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .020)

Table 15: Summary Statistics for MANCOVA: Political Involvement & Credibility (N=518)  
(Disclosure- Beginning vs. End)

Source	Dependent Measure	Type III Sum of squares	df	F	Sig.
<b>COVARIATES</b>					
Political Involvement	Ad Evaluation	16.479	1	13.918	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	1.975	1	2.606	.107
	Opponent Attitude	.796	1	.756	.385
	Sponsor Voting Intention	1.021	1	.876	.350
	Opponent Voting Intention	3.811	1	2.882	.091
Source Credibility	Ad Evaluation	106.135	1	89.641	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	161.291	1	212.817	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Attitude	15.189	1	14.437	<b>.000</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	164.470	1	141.195	<b>.000</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	.005	1	.003	.953
<b>MAIN EFFECTS</b>					
Disclosure (Beginning vs. End)	Ad Evaluation	.049	1	.041	.839
	Sponsor Attitude	1.304	1	1.721	.191
	Opponent Attitude	.761	1	.724	.396
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.930	1	2.516	.114
	Opponent Voting Intention	.911	1	.689	.407
Message Valence	Ad Evaluation	.813	1	.687	.408
	Sponsor Attitude	.866	1	1.142	.286
	Opponent Attitude	.637	1	.605	.437
	Sponsor Voting Intention	2.872	1	2.466	.117
	Opponent Voting Intention	.185	1	.140	.708
Message Repetition	Ad Evaluation	1.110	1	.937	.334
	Sponsor Attitude	3.655	1	3.853	.051
	Opponent Attitude	10.761	1	10.228	<b>.002</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.137	1	.118	.732
	Opponent Voting Intention	.600	1	.454	.501
<b>TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS</b>					
Disclosure x Valence	Ad Evaluation	2.115	1	1.786	.182
	Sponsor Attitude	1.291	1	1.704	.193
	Opponent Attitude	.339	1	.379	.539
	Sponsor Voting Intention	3.966	1	3.405	.066
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.356	1	1.025	.312
Disclosure x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	3.519	1	2.972	.086
	Sponsor Attitude	3.049	1	4.023	<b>.046</b>
	Opponent Attitude	.234	1	.222	.638
	Sponsor Voting Intention	1.277	1	1.096	.296
	Opponent Voting Intention	.116	1	.088	.767

Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	14.171	1	11.968	<b>.001</b>
	Sponsor Attitude	1.372	1	1.810	.179
	Opponent Attitude	11.368	1	10.805	<b>.001</b>
	Sponsor Voting Intention	.791	1	.679	.411
	Opponent Voting Intention	4.087	1	3.091	.080
<b>THREE-WAY INTERACTION</b>					
Disclosure x Valence x Repetition	Ad Evaluation	2.560	1	2.162	.143
	Sponsor Attitude	.009	1	.012	.914
	Opponent Attitude	.011	1	.010	.920
	Sponsor Voting Intention	4.978	1	4.274	<b>.040</b>
	Opponent Voting Intention	1.322	1	1.007	.316
<b>CORRECTED MODEL</b>					
	Ad Evaluation	205.077 <sup>a</sup>	9	19.245	.000
	Sponsor Attitude	250.606 <sup>b</sup>	9	36.741	.000
	Opponent Attitude	52.525 <sup>c</sup>	9	5.547	.000
	Sponsor Voting Intention	238.212 <sup>d</sup>	9	22.722	.000
	Opponent Voting Intention	13.969 <sup>e</sup>	9	1.174	.311

<sup>a</sup> For Ad Evaluations, R Squared = .369 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .350)

<sup>b</sup> For Sponsor Attitude, R Squared = .528 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .513)

<sup>c</sup> For Opponent Attitude, R Squared = .144 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .118)

<sup>d</sup> For Sponsor Voting Intention, R Squared = .409 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .391)

<sup>e</sup> For Opponent Voting Intention, R Squared = .034 (Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .005)

## FIGURES

Results from MANCOVA: Political Involvement and Credibility as Covariates




Figure 3: Main Effect on Ad Evaluation & Voting Intention




Figure 4: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure X Message Valence




Figure 5: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure X Message Valence




Figure 6: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Disclosure X Repetition




Figure 7: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 8: Form of Two-Way Interaction Result: Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 9: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:  
Disclosure X Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 10: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:  
Disclosure X Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 11: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:  
Disclosure X Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 12: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result:  
Disclosure X Message Valence X Repetition




Figure 13: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result  
(within the presence of SBYA disclosure)




Figure 14: Form of Three-Way Interaction Result  
(within the presence of SBYA disclosure)

## REFERENCES

- ABC Lateline*, (Oct. 21<sup>th</sup>, 2008), "US Election Attack Ads Backfire," (retrieved 2/12/2009), [available at [www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2008/s2397339.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2008/s2397339.htm)].
- Alliance for Better Campaigns (1998), "Issue Brief: Stand by Your Ad," [available at <http://www.bettercampaigns.org/accountability.htm>].
- Anand, P., Holbrook, M. B., and Stephens, D. (1988), "The Formation of Affective Judgments: The Cognitive-Affective Model Versus the Independence Hypothesis," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 15(3), 386-391.
- Ansolahehere, S., and Iyengar, S. (1994), "Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaign," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58(3), 335-357.
- Ansolahehere, S., and Iyengar, S. (1995), *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate*, New York, NY: The Free Press.
- Ansolahehere, S., and Iyengar, S. (1996), "Can the Press Monitor Campaign Advertising? An Experimental Study," *Press/Politics*, 1, 72-86
- Ansolahehere, S., Iyengar, S., Simon, A., and Valentino, N. (1994), "Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?" *American Political Science Review* 88(4), 829-838.
- Atkin, C. K. (1980), "Political Campaigns: Mass Communication and Persuasion," in M. E. Roloff and G. G. Miller (Eds.), *Persuasion: New Direction in Theory and Research*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Atkin, C. K., and Heald, G. (1976), "Effect of Political Advertising," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 40(2), 216-228.
- Baker, W. E. (1999), "When Can Affective Conditioning and Mere Exposure Directly Influence Brand Choice?" *Journal of Advertising*, 28(4), 31-46.
- Basil, M., Schooler, C., Reeves, B. (1991), "Positive and Negative Political Advertising: Effectiveness of Ads and Perceptions of Candidates," in F. Biocca (Eds.), *Television and Political Advertising, Vol. 1*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associate.
- Batra, R., Myers, J. G., and Aaker, D. A. (1996), *Advertising Management* 5<sup>th</sup> Edition, 467.

- Batra, R., and Ray, M. L. (1986), "Situational Effects of Advertising Repetition: The Moderating Influence of Motivation, Ability, and Opportunity to Respond," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 12, 432-445.
- Bearden, W. O., and Netemeyer, R. G. (1999), *Handbook of Marketing Scales: Multi-Item Measure of Marketing and Consumer Behavior Research*, Thousand Oaks: CA, Sage Publication.
- Berelson, B. (1966), "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*, New York: Free Press, 489-504
- Bierley, C., McSweeney, F. K., and Vannieuwkerk, R. (1985), "Classical Conditioning of Preferences for Stimuli," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 12(3), 316-323.
- Birnbaum, M. H., and Stengner, S. E. (1979), "Source Credibility in Social Judgment: Bias, and the Judge's Point of View," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 48-74.
- Bizer, G., Krosnick, J., Holbrook, A., Petty, R., Rucker, D., and Wheeler, C. (2002), "The Impact of Personality on Political Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior: Need for Cognition and Need to Evaluate," Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Bohner, G., and Wanke, M. (2002), *Attitudes and Attitude Change*, NY: Psychology Press.
- Bornstein, R. F. (1989), "Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research 1968-1987," *Psychological Bulletin*, 106 (September), 265-288.
- Brians, C. L., and Wattenberg, M. P. (1996), "Campaign Issue Knowledge and Salience: Comparing reception from TV Commercials," *TV News, and Newspapers, American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 172-193.
- Brown, S. P., and Stayman, D. M. (1992), "Antecedents and Consequences of Attitude toward the Ad: A Meta-analysis," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19, 34-51
- Budesheim, T. L., Houston, D. A., and DePaola, S. J. (1996), "Persuasiveness of In-group and Out-group Political Message: The Case of Negative Political Campaigning," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70, 523-534.
- Burnett, J. J., and Dunne, P. M. (1986), "An Appraisal of the Use of Student Subjects in Marketing Research," *Journal of Business Research*, 14(4), 329-343.
- Cacioppo, J. T., and Petty, R. E. (1979), "Effects of Message Repetition and Position on Cognition Response, Recall, and Persuasion," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37, 97-109.

- Cacioppo, J. T., and Petty, R. E. (1982), "The Need for Cognition," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 42(1), 116-131.
- Cacioppo, J. T., and Petty, R. E. (1989), "The Elaboration Likelihood Model: The Role of Affect and Affect-Laden Information Processing in Persuasion," In *Cognitive and Affective Response to Advertising*, P. Cafferata and A. M. Tybout (Eds.), Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., and Kao, C. F. (1984), "The Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition," *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 48, 306-307.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Kao, C. F., and Rodriguez, R. (1986), "Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion: An Individual Difference Perspective," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51, 1032-1043.
- Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., and Stoltenberg, C. D. (1985), "Processes of Social Influence: The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion." in *Advances in Cognitive-Behavioral Research and Therapy*, P. C. Kendall (Eds.), San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Calder, B. J., and Sternthal, B. (1980), "Television Commercial Wearout: An Information Processing View," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 17, 173-186.
- Cappella, J. N., and Jamieson, K. H. (1994), "Broadcast Adwatch Effects: A Field Experiment," *Communication Research*, 21, 342-365.
- Caroline Journal Notebook* (August-September 1999), "Cleaning Up," 9(1), [available at [www.johnlocke.org/carolina\\_journal/99//Aug-Sep/notebook.html](http://www.johnlocke.org/carolina_journal/99//Aug-Sep/notebook.html)].
- CBS Evening News*, (Oct. 31<sup>th</sup>, 2006), "Nasty Campaign Ad Spending Beats Nice, 10:1; 2006 Ratio Radically Higher Than 2004 When Positive, Negative Ad Dollars Nearly Equal," (retrieved 11/12/2006), [available at [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/31](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/31)].
- CFIF.ORG (2002), "Stand by Your Ad...Back from the Dead," *CFIF.ORG.State Issues*.
- CNN News (Oct. 15<sup>th</sup>, 2007), "Political Television Advertising to Reach \$3 billion," (retrieved 2/18/2009), [available at [www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/15/ad.spending/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/15/ad.spending/index.html)]
- Cusumano, D., and Richey, M. (1970), "Negative Salience in Impression of Character: Effects of Extremeness of Salient Information," *Psychonomic Science*, 20, 81-83.
- Devlin, L. P., (1989), "Contrasts in Presidential Campaign Commercials of 1988," *American Behavioral Scientist* 32, 389-414.
- Devlin, L. P., (1993), "Contrasts in Presidential Campaign Commercials of 1992," *American Behavioral Scientists*, 37, 272-290.

- Devlin, L. P., (1997), "Contrasts in Presidential Campaign Commercials of 1996," *American Behavioral Scientists*, 40, 1058-1084.
- Devlin, L. P., (2001), "Contrasts in Presidential Campaign Commercials of 2000," *American Behavioral Scientists*, 44, 2338-2369.
- DeVore, P. C., (1997), "Fruit Growers' Generic Advertising Program Not Compelled Speech, Supreme Court Rules," *Commercial Speech Digest*, [available at [http:// www.mediainst.org/digest/97summer/devore.html](http://www.mediainst.org/digest/97summer/devore.html)].
- Dholakia, R. R. (1986), "Source Credibility Effects: A Test of Behavioral Persistence," in M. Wallendorf and P. Anderson (Eds.), *Advances in Consumer Research*, 14, Provo, UT: Association of Consumer Research, 426-430.
- Diamond, E., and Bates, S. (1992), *The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Eagly, A. H., and Chaiken, S. (1993), *The Psychology of Attitudes*, Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Elebash, C., and Rosene, J. (1982), "Issue in Political Advertising in a Deep South Gubernatorial Race," *Journalism Quarterly*, 59, 420-423
- Elliott, S. (2000), "Advertising: Promoting Food without the Farmer's Money" *The New York Times*, [available at <http://college3.nytimes.com/guests/articles/2001/06/27/853941.xml>].
- Faber, R. J., and Storey, M .C. (1984), "Recall of Information from Political Advertising," *Journal of Advertising*, 13(3), 39-44.
- Faber, R. J., Tims, A. R., and Shumitt, K. G. (1993), "Negative Political Advertising and Voting Intent: The Role of Involvement and Alternative Information Source," *Journal of Advertising*, 22 (4), 67-76.
- Factcheck.org, (Nov. 4<sup>th</sup>, 2006), "The Whoppers of 2006: We Review the Worst Deceptions from House and Senate Campaigns," Annenberg Political Fact Check, Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania, (retrieved 2/8/2009), [available at [www.factcheck.org/article467.html](http://www.factcheck.org/article467.html)].
- Feldman, S. (1966), "Motivational Aspects of Attitudinal Elements and their Place in Cognitive Interaction," *Cognitive Consistency: Motivational Antecedents and Behavioral Consequences*, New York: Academic.
- Finkel, S. E., and Geer, J. (1998), "A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising," *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(April), 573-595.

- Fournier, P., Lyle, G., Gutler, F., and Soroka, S. (2004), "Need for Cognition, Need to Evaluate, and Electoral Attitude Change," Paper Presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Phoenix, AZ.
- Freedman, J. L., and Sears, D. O. (1965), "Warning, Distraction, and Resistance to Influence," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1, 262-266.
- Gale, K., Hawkins, B. G., Hawkins, R., Magleby, D. B., Monson, J. Q., and Patterson, K. D. (2005), "Election: Effects of the Stand by Your Ad Provision on Attitudes About Candidates and Campaigns," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 35(4), 771-783.
- Garramone, G. M. (1984), "Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads," *Journalism Quarterly*, 61(2), 250-259.
- Germond, J. W., and Witcover, J. (1996), "Why Americans Don't Go to the Polls," *National Journal*, 28(47), 2562-2564.
- Goldberg, M. E., and Hartwick, J. (1990), "The Effects of Advertiser Reputation and Extremely of Advertising Claim on Advertising Effectiveness," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 17, 172-179.
- Goldsmith, R. E., Lafferty, B. A., and Newell, S. J. (2000), "The Impact of Corporate Credibility and Celebrity Credibility on Consumer Reaction to Advertisements and Brands," *Journal of Advertising*, 29(3), 43-54.
- Gorn, G. J., and Goldberg, M. E. (1980), "Children's Responses to Repetitive TV Commercials," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 6, 421-425.
- Grass, R. C., and Wallace, W. H. (1969), "Satiation Effects of T.V. Commercials," *Journal of Advertising Research*, 19, 47-57.
- Greenberg, B., and Miller, G. (1966), "The Effect of Low-Credible Sources on Message Acceptance," *Speech Monographs*, 33, 127-136.
- Greenberg, B., and Tannenbaum, P. (1961), "The Effects of Bylines on Attitude Change," *Journalism Quarterly*, 38, 535-537.
- Grush, J. E. (1980), "Impact of Candidate Expenditures, Rationality, and Prior Outcomes on the 1976 Democratic Presidential Primaries," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38(2), 337-347.
- Grush, J. E., McKeough, L. K., and Ahlering, R. F. (1978), "Extrapolating Laboratory Exposure Research to Actual Political Elections," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36(2), 257-270.

- Hass, R. G., and Grady, K. (1975), "Temporal Delay, Type of forewarning and Resistance to Influence," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 11, 459-469.
- Haugtvedt, C. P., and Petty, R. E. (1992), "Personality and Persuasion: Need for Cognition Moderates the Persistence and Resistance of Attitude Change," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63(August), 308-319.
- Haugtvedt, C. P., Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1992), "Need for Cognition and Advertising: Understanding the Role of Personality Variables in Consumer Behavior," *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 1, 239-260.
- Hill, R. P. (1989), "An Exploration of Voter Responses to Political Advertisements," *Journal of Advertising*, 18(4), 14-22.
- Hofstetter, C. R., and Buss, T. F. (1980), "Politics and Last-Minute Political Television," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 33, 24-37.
- Hollander, B. (2007), "Media Use and Political Involvement," in R. W. Preiss, B. Gayle, N. Burrell, M. Allen, and J. Bryant (Eds.), *Mass Media Effects Research, Advances Through Meta-Analysis*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
- Homer, P. M., and Batra, R. (1994), "Attitudinal Effects of Character-Based Versus Competence-Based Negative Political Communication," *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 3, 163-185.
- Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., and Kelley, J. J. (1953), *Communication and Persuasion*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hovland, C. I., and Weiss, W. (1951), "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15, 635-650.
- Husek, T. R. (1965), "Persuasive Impacts on Early, Late, or No Mention of a Negative Source," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 2, 125-128.
- James, W. L., and Sonner, B. S. (2001), "Just Say No to Traditional Student Samples," *Journal of Advertising Research*, 21 (Sep/Oct), 63-71
- Jamieson, K. H. (1984), "The Evolution of Political Advertising in America," *New Perspectives on Political Advertising*, Southern Illinois University Press, 1-20.
- Jamieson, K. H. (1992), *Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction, and Democracy*, New York: Oxford Press.
- Jamieson, K. H. (1996), *Packaging the Presidency* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.), New York: Oxford University Press.

- Jamieson, K. H., and Cappella, J. N. (1997), "Setting the Record Straight: Do Adwatches Help or Hurt?" *Press/Politics*, 2, 13-22.
- Janiszewski, C. (1993), "Preattentive Mere Exposure Effects," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 20(3), 376-392.
- Jasperson, A. E., and Fan, D. P. (2002), "An Aggregate Examination of the Backlash Effect in Political Advertising: The Case of the 1996 U.S. Senate Race in Minnesota," *Journal of Advertising*, 31(1), 1-12.
- Johnson-Cartee, K. S., and Copeland, G. (1989), "Southern Voters' Reaction to Negative Political Ads in 1986 Election," *Journalism Quarterly*, 6, 888-893, 986.
- Johnson-Cartee, K. S., and Copeland, G. A. (1991), *Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Johnston, A., and L. L. Kaid (2002), "Image Ads and Issue Ads in Presidential Advertising: Using Videostyle to Explore Stylistic Differences in Televised Political Ads from 1952 to 2000," *Journal of Communication*, 52, 281-300
- Joslyn, R. A. (1980), "The Content of Political Spot Ads," *Journalism Quarterly* 57, 92-98.
- Joslyn, R. A. (1984), *Mass Media and Election*, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Kahn, K. F., and Geer, J. G. (1984), "Creating Impression: An Experimental Investigation of Political Advertising on Television," *Political Behavior*, 16, 93-116.
- Kahn, K. F., and Kenney, P. J. (1999), "Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation," *American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 877-889.
- Kahn, K. F., and Kenney, P. J. (2000), "How Negative Campaigning Enhances Knowledge of Senate Elections," in J. A. Thurbeck, C. J. Nelson, and D. A. Dullo (Eds.), *Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Election*, Washington, DC: Brooking Institution.
- Kaid, L. L. (1981), "Political Advertising," in D.D. Nimmo and K.R. Sanders (Eds.), *Handbook of Political Communication*, 249-271, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Kaid, L. L. (1991), "The Effects of Television Broadcasts on Perception of Political Candidates in the United States and France," in L. L. Kaid, J. Gerstle, and K. Sanders (Eds.), *Mediated Politics in Two Cultures: Presidential Campaign in the United States and France*, 247-260, New York: Praeger.
- Kaid, L. L. (1994), "Political Advertising in the 1992 Campaign," in R.E. Denton Jr. (Eds.), *The 1992 Presidential Campaign*, 111-127, Westport, CT: Praeger.

- Kaid, L. L. (1998), "Videostyle and the Effects of the 1996 Presidential Campaign Advertising," in R.E. Denton, Jr. (Eds.), *The 1996 Presidential Campaign: A Communication Perspective*, 143-159, Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kaid, L. L. (1999), "Political Advertising: A Summary of Research Findings," in B. Newman (Eds.), *The Handbook of Political Marketing*, 423-438, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kaid, L. L. (2002), "Political Advertising and Information Seeking: Comparing the Exposure via Traditional and Internet Media Channels," *Journal of Advertising*, 31, 27-35.
- Kaid, L. L. (2004), "Political Advertising," *Handbook of Political Communication Research*, New Jersey: LEA.
- Kaid, L. L., and Boydston, J. (1987), "An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Negative Political Advertisements," *Communication Quarterly*, 35, 193-201.
- Kaid, L. L., Chanslor, M., and Hovind, M. (1992), "The Influence of Program and Commercial Type on Political Advertising Effectiveness," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 36, 303-320.
- Kaid, L. L., DeRosa, K. L., and Tedesco, J. C. (2002), "An Analysis of George Bush's 1998 and 1992 Campaign Advertising: Revisiting the Definition of a Presidential Candidate," *Honor and Loyalty: Inside the Politics of the George H. W. Bush White House*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Kaid, L. L., and Holtz-Bacha, C. (1995), *Political Advertising in Western Democracies*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kaid, L. L., and Johnston, A. (1991), "Negative Versus Positive Television Advertising in Presidential Campaign, 1960-1988," *Journal of Communication*, 41, 53-66.
- Kaid, L. L., and Johnston, A. (2001), *Video Style in Presidential Campaigns*, Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood
- Kaid, L. L., and Tedesco, J. C. (1999), "Tracking Voter Reactions to Television Advertising," in L. L. Kaid, D.G. Bystrom (Eds.), *The Electronic Election: Perspectives on the 1996 Campaign Communication*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum.
- Kellermann, K. (1984), "The Negative Effect and its Implications for Initial Interaction," *Communication Monographs*, 51, 37-55.
- Kern, M. (1989), *30-second Politics: Political Advertising in the Eighties*, New York: Praeger.
- Kihlstrom, J. F., and Cantor, N. (2000), "Social intelligence," in R. J. Sternberg (Eds.) *Handbook of intelligence*. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press.

- Kim, H., Tinkham, S. F., and Lariscy, R. W. (2007), "Public Policies and Political Advertising: What Do Source Disclosure, Message Valence and Repetition Achieve?" Presentation at Marketing and Public Policy Conference, Washington D.C. June 10-13.
- Krugman, H. E. (1968), "Process Underlying Exposure to Advertising," *American Psychologist*, 23, 245-253.
- Lafferty, B., and Goldsmith, R. E. (1999), "Corporate Credibility's Role in Consumer Attitudes and Purchase Intentions When a High Versus a Low Credibility Endorser is Used in the Ad," *Journal of Business Research*, 44(February), 109-116.
- Lang, G. E., and Lang, K. (1984), *Politics and Television Re-viewed*, Beverly Hills and London: Sage.
- Lariscy, R. W., and S. F. Tinkham (1999), "The Sleeper Effect and Negative Political Advertising," *The Journal of Advertising*, 28(4), 18-30.
- Lasswell, H. D. (1948), "The Structure and Function of Communication" in L. Bryson (Eds.) *The Communication of Ideas*, 37-52, New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Lau, R. R., and Pomper, G. M. (2002), "Effectiveness of Negative Campaigning in U. S. Senate Elections, *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(1), 47-66.
- Leshner, G. (2001), Critiquing the Image: "Testing Image Adwatches as Journalistic Reform," *Communication Research*, 28, 181-207
- Lichter, S. R., and R. Noyes (1996), *Campaign '96: The Media and the Candidates*, First Report to the Markle Foundation, Washington, DC: Center for Media and Public Affairs.
- Martin, T. R. (1985), "Ethics in Marketing: Problems and Prospects," in Laczniaak, Gene R. and Patrick E. Murphy (Eds.), *Marketing Ethics: Guidelines for Managers*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Book, 1-8.
- McConnell, M. (2000), "Opening Statement--Hearings on Compelled Political Speech," Committee on Rules and Administration: United States Senate, [available at <http://rulte.senate.gov/hearings/2000/041200hrh.htm>].
- McGinnies, E., and Ward, C. (1980), "Better Liked than Right: Trustworthiness and as Factors in Credibility," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 6, 467-472.
- McGuire, W. J., and Papageorgis, D. (1962), "Effectiveness of Forewarning in Developing Resistance to Persuasion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42, 71-80.

- McKinnon, L. M., and Kaid, L. L. (1999), "Exposing Negative Campaign or Enhancing Advertising Effects: An Experimental Study of Adwatch Effects on Voters' Evaluations of Candidates and Their Ads," *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 27, 217-236.
- Merritt, S. (1984), "Negative Political Advertising," *Journal of Advertising*, 13, 27-38.
- Mills, J., and Harvey, J. (1972), "Opinion Change as a Function of When Information about the Communicator is Received and Whether He Is Attractive or Expert," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 21, 52-55.
- Muehling, D. D., Laczniak, R. N. and Andrew, J. C. (1993), "Defining Operationalizing, and Using Involvement in Advertising Research," *Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising*, 15(1), 21-57.
- Netemeyer, R. G., and Burton, S. (1990), "Examining the Relationship between Voting Behavior, Intention, Perceived Behavioral Control, and Expectation," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 20, 661-680.
- Newsweek*, (1996), "The Limits of Negativity," September 23, 42.
- New York Times* (Oct. 15<sup>th</sup>, 2006), "Midterm Meanness: Negative Ads Rule the 2006 Elections," *New York Times*, (retrieved 02/12/2009), [available at [www.nytimes.com/cq/10/15/](http://www.nytimes.com/cq/10/15/)].
- North Carolina General Assembly, Session Law 1999-453, Senate Bill #881, "An Act To Establish the Campaign Reform Act of 1999," [available at <http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/html1999>].
- Ohanian, R. (1990), "Construction and Validation of a Scale to Measure Celebrity Endorsers' Perceived Expertise, Trustworthiness, and Attractiveness," *Journal of Advertising*, 19, 39-52.
- O'Keefe, D. J. (2002), "Source Factors," *Persuasion Theory and Research*, Thousand Oaks: CA, Sage Publication, 181-213.
- Papageorgis, D. (1967), "Anticipation of Exposure to Persuasive Messages and Belief Change," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5, 490-496
- Papageorgis, D. (1968), "Warning and Persuasion," *Psychological Bulletin*, 70, 271-282.
- Patterson, K., Gale, K., Hawkins, B. G., and Hawkins, R. (2004), "I Approved this Message," *Campaigns & Elections*, 26(4), 39-40.
- Patterson, T. E., and McClure, R. D. (1976), *The Unseeing Eye: Myth of Television Power in Politics*, New York: Putnam.

- Perloff, R. M., and Kinsey, D. (1992), "Political Advertising as Seen by Consultants and Journalists," *Journal of Advertising Research*, 32(May/June), 53-60.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1977), "Forewarning, Cognitive Responding, and Resistance to Persuasion," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 645-655.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1979), "Issue Involvement Can Increase or Decrease Persuasion by Enhancing Message Relevant Cognitive Response," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37 (10), 1915-26.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1981), *Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches*. Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1983), "Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion: Application to Advertising," in Advertising and Consumer Psychology, L. Percy and A. Woodside (Eds.), Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1984), "The Effects of Involvement on Responses to Argument Quantity and Quality: Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46, (1), 69-81.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1986a), *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1986b), "The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion," In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, L. Berkowitz (Eds.), New York: Academic Press.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1990), "Involvement and Persuasion: Tradition Versus Integration," *Psychological Bulletin*, 107 (3), 367-74.
- Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., and Schumann, D. (1983), "Central and Peripheral Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 10 (2), 135-46.
- Pfau, M., and Loudon, A. (1994), "Effectiveness of Adwatch Formats in Defecting Political Attack Ads," *Communication Research*, 21, 325-341
- Plaut, J. (1998), "The Political Professional: Age of Incrementalism," *Campaigns & Elections*, 19(1), 63.
- Pornpitakpan, C. (2004), "The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A Critical Review of Five Decades' Evidence," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 34(2), 243-281.
- Price, D. (2002), "Shays-Meehan Bill Contains Price's Stand by Your Ad" Proposal," [available at [http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nc04\\_price/020213CRG.html](http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nc04_price/020213CRG.html)].

- Ray, M. L., and Sawyer, A. G. (1971), "Repetition in Media Models: A Laboratory Technique," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 8, 20-29.
- Ray, M. L., Sawyer, A. G., and Strong, E. C. (1971), "Frequency Effects Revisited," *Journal of Advertising Research*, 11, 14-20.
- Rein, L. (2002), "Stand by Your Ad" Bill Advances in VA: Measure Expected to Go to Warner," *The Washington Post*. March 6, Final Edition, Metro p. B01.
- Richey, M., McClelland, L., and Shimkunas, A. (1967), "Relative Influence of Positive and Negative Information in Impression Formation and Persistence," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 3, 322-327.
- Roberts, M. (1992), "The Fluidity of Attitudes toward Political Advertising." In Leonard N. Reid (Ed.), *Proceedings of the American Academy of Advertising*, Athens, GA: Grady College of Journalism & Mass Communication, The University of Georgia, 134-143.
- Roddy, B. L., and Garramone, G. M. (1988), "Appeals and Strategies of Negative Political Advertising," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 32, 415-427.
- Roser, C. (1990), "Involvement, Attention, and Perception of Message Relevance in the Response to Persuasive Appeals," *Communication Research*, 17, 571-600.
- Rothschild, M. L. (1978), "Political Advertising: A Neglected Policy Issue in Marketing," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 15, 58-71.
- Salmon, C. T. (1986), "Perspectives on Involvement in Consumer and Communication Research," in B. Dervin, and M. J. Voigt (Eds.), *Progress in Communication Sciences*, Vol. VII, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing.
- Schaffner, P. E., and Wandersman, A. (1974), "Familiarity Breeds Success: A Field Study of Exposure and Voting Behavior," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1, 81-83.
- Schaffner, P. E., Wandersman, A., and Stang, D. (1981), "Candidate Name Exposure and Voting: Two Field Studies," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 2(3), 195-203.
- Schenck-Hamlin, W. J., Procter, D. E., and Rumsey, D. J. (2000), "The Influence of Negative Advertising Frames on Political and Politician Accountability," *Human Communication Research*, 26(1), 53-74.
- Sears, D. O. (1986), "College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social Psychology's View of Human Nature," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51(3), 515-530.

- Shimp, T. A. (2003), "Persuasion in Marketing Communications," in *Advertising Promotion and Supplemental Aspects of Integrated Marketing Communications*, OH: Thomson South-Western, 114-147.
- Sonner, B. S. (1998), "The Effectiveness of Negative Political Advertising: A Case Study," *Journal of Advertising Research*, 38, 37-42.
- Stayman, D. M., and Kardes, F. R. (1992), "Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising Effectiveness," *Journal of Consumer Psychology*, 1(2), 125-142.
- Sternthal, B., Dholakia, R. R., and Leavitt, C. (1978a), "The Persuasive Effect of Source Credibility: Tests of Cognitive Response," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 4, 252-260.
- Sternthal, B., Phillips, L., and Dholakia, R. R. (1978b), "The Persuasive Effect of Source Credibility: A Situational Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42, 285-314.
- Stiff, J. B., and Mongeau, P. A. (2003), "Components of Persuasive Transactions," *Persuasive Communications*, New York: NY, The Guilford Press, 101-126.
- The Daily Tar Heel* (January 12, 1999), "Stand by Your Ad Proposal," [available at [www.unc.edu/dth/archives/1999/01/011299/edt.html](http://www.unc.edu/dth/archives/1999/01/011299/edt.html)].
- Tinkham, S. F., and Lariscy, R. W. (1991), "Advertising Message Strategy in US Congressional Campaigns: Its Impact on Election Outcome," *Current Issues & Research in Advertising*, 13(1-2), 207-226.
- Tinkham, S. F., and Lariscy, R. W. (1993), "A Diagnostic Approach to Assessing the Impact of Negative Political Television Commercials," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 37, 377-399.
- Tinkham, S. F., and Lariscy, R. W. (1995), "Ethical Judgments of Political Television Commercials as Predictors of Attitude toward the Ad," *Journal of Advertising*, 23(3), 43-57.
- Vavreck, L. (2001), "The Reasoning Voter Meets the Strategic Candidate: Signals and Specificity in Campaign Advertising," *American Politics Research*, 29, 507-529.
- Ward, C., and McGinnies, E. (1974), "Persuasive Effects of Early and Late Mention of Credible and Noncredible Source," *The Journal of Psychology*, 86, 17-23.
- Wattenberg, M. P., and Brians, C. L. (1999), "Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer?" *American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 891-899.
- Wayne, L. (September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2000), "One Consulting Firm Finds Voter Profiles a Hot Property," *The New York Times*, A1, A10.

- Wells, W. D. (1993), "Discovery-oriented Consumer Research," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 19(4), 489-504.
- West, D. M. (1993), *Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaign 1952-1992*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
- Winter, F. W. (1973), "A Laboratory Experiment of Individual Attitude Response to Advertising Exposure," *Journal of Marketing Research*, 10, 130-140.
- Yoon, K. Bolls, P., and Muehling, D. (1999), "The Effect of Involvement, arousal, and Pace on Claim and Non-Claim Components of Attitude toward the Ad," *Media Psychology*, 1(4), 331-352.
- Yoon, K., Pinkleton, B. E., and Ko, W. (2005), "Effects of Negative Political Advertising on Voting Intention: An Exploration of the Roles of Involvement and Source Credibility in the Development of Voter Cynicism," *Journal of Marketing Communication*, 11(2), 95-112.
- Zaichkowsky, J. L. (1985), "Measuring the Involvement Construct," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 12, 341-352.
- Zaichkowsky, J. L. (1986), "Conceptualizing Involvement," *Journal of Advertising*, 15(2), 4-14, 34.
- Zajonc, R. B. (1968), "Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 9(2), 1-28.
- Zhang, Y., and Zinkhan, G. M. (2006), "Responses to Humorous Ads," *Journal of Advertising*, 35(4), 113-127.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND MEASUREMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Please write the **ONLY ONE SCORE** between 1 to 7 in the space that best describes as yourself.  
The scale of each score 1 to 7 is as follows.

- 1 : Strong disagreement
- 2 : Moderate disagreement
- 3 : Slight disagreement
- 4 : Neither agreement nor disagreement
- 5 : Slight agreement
- 6 : Moderate agreement
- 7 : Strong agreement

1. \_\_\_\_\_ I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with solution to problems.
2. \_\_\_\_\_ I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
3. \_\_\_\_\_ Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.
4. \_\_\_\_\_ I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
5. \_\_\_\_\_ The idea of relying on thought to get my way to the top does not appeal to me.
6. \_\_\_\_\_ The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.
7. \_\_\_\_\_ I only think as hard as I have to.
8. \_\_\_\_\_ I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.

- 1 : Strong disagreement
- 2 : Moderate disagreement
- 3 : Slight disagreement
- 4 : Neither agreement nor disagreement
- 5 : Slight agreement
- 6 : Moderate agreement
- 7 : Strong agreement

9. \_\_\_\_\_ I prefer to think about, small daily projects to long-term ones.
10. \_\_\_\_\_ I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.
11. \_\_\_\_\_ I find little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
12. \_\_\_\_\_ I don't like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
13. \_\_\_\_\_ I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.
14. \_\_\_\_\_ Thinking is not my idea of fun.
15. \_\_\_\_\_ I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I'll have to think in depth about something.
16. \_\_\_\_\_ I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
17. \_\_\_\_\_ I would prefer complex to simple problems.
18. \_\_\_\_\_ It is enough for me that something gets the job done, I don't care how or why it works.

**Please circle the number that best describes your feeling.**

19. Overall, during any election campaign, how much attention do you generally pay to NEWS about the candidates?

Almost no attention   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   A lot of attention

20. Overall, during any election campaign, how much attention do you generally pay to TELEVISED POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS?

Almost no attention   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   A lot of attention

21. Overall, how interested are you in politics?

Almost no attention   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   A lot of attention

22. Overall, during any election campaign, how much attention do you generally pay to TELEVISED DEBATES?

Almost no attention   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   A lot of attention

23. Overall, during any election campaign, how much attention do you generally pay to campaign literature, such as yard signs, brochures, and bumper stickers?

Almost no attention   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   A lot of attention

## APPENDIX B: MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

1. While watching the program did you see any political advertising for a Senate election?

1) Yes

2) No

2. Overall, how would you evaluate the political advertisement(s) you saw and its effects on you?  
(Please circle the number that best describes your feeling with higher numbers representing more positive feelings.)

Extremely Dislike	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Like
Not at all Powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Powerful
Not at all Believable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Believable
Not at all Persuasive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very Persuasive

3. Overall, how would you evaluate the sponsoring candidate who ran the ad?

Extremely Dislike	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Like
Extremely Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Good
Strongly Oppose	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Strongly Support

4. Overall, how would you evaluate the opponent of the sponsoring candidate?

Extremely Dislike	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Like
Extremely Bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Good
Strongly Oppose	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Strongly Support

5. Overall, how would you evaluate the source of political advertisement you saw?

Extremely Undependable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely dependable
Extremely Dishonest	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Honest
Extremely Unreliable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Reliable
Extremely Insincere	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Sincere
Extremely Untrustworthy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Trustworthy
Extremely Unattractive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Attractive
Not at all classy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely classy
Extremely Ugly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely beautiful

6. Overall, how would you evaluate the source of political advertisement you saw?

Extremely Plain	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely elegant
Not at all sexy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely sexy
Not at all an Expert	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Very an Expert
Extremely Inexperienced	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Experienced
Extremely Unknowledgeable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Knowledgeable
Extremely Unqualified	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Qualified
Extremely Unskilled	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Extremely Skilled

7. Assuming you live in Kansas, after seeing this advertisement, **how likely are you to vote for the sponsoring candidate?**

Not at all likely to vote for the Sponsoring Candidate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely will vote for the Sponsoring Candidate
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

8. Assuming you live in Kansas, after seeing this advertisement, **how likely are you to vote for the opponent of the sponsoring candidate?**

Not at all likely to vote for the Opponent Candidate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Definitely will vote for the Opponent Candidate
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	--

Please fill in the personal data below. All of your responses throughout this questionnaire are completely confidential. Please place a check mark in the space that best describes as yourself.

1. Gender

\_\_\_\_\_ Male  
\_\_\_\_\_ Female

2. \_\_\_\_\_ Age (years)

3. Race

\_\_\_\_\_ American Indian or Alaska Native  
\_\_\_\_\_ Asian  
\_\_\_\_\_ Black or African American  
\_\_\_\_\_ Hispanic or Latino  
\_\_\_\_\_ Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander  
\_\_\_\_\_ White

4. Year in College

\_\_\_\_\_ 1<sup>st</sup> in Undergraduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ 2<sup>nd</sup> in Undergraduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ 3<sup>rd</sup> in Undergraduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ 4<sup>th</sup> in Undergraduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ 5<sup>th</sup> in Undergraduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ Graduate  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## 5. Political Party Affiliation

- \_\_\_\_\_ Strong Republican  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lean toward Republican  
\_\_\_\_\_ Independent (No party affiliation)  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lean toward Democrat  
\_\_\_\_\_ Strong Democrat  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## 6. Political Ideology

Conservative 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Liberal

### APPENDIX C: SYNOPSIS OF TEST ADVERTISEMENTS

Sponsoring Candidate: Bob Johnson

Opponent Candidate: Dave Brown

#### 1. Positive ad


Every Kansas parent worries about environmental pollution and wants to clean up the polluted Kansas River. Fortunately we can count on Bob Johnson to protect our families and communities. In Congress he voted for the Environmental Protection Act to keep our air and water safe and healthy. And hold corporations responsible for cleaning up pollution they create. We need Bob Johnson as a senator who will keep working to protect Kansas's air, water, and its most important river. For our families and for our future. Vote for Bob Johnson as your senator.

#### 2. Negative ad


Every Kansas parent worries about environmental pollution. When Dave Brown first ran for the Congress, he promised to keep the air and drinking water safe and healthy and clean up the polluted Kansas River, a state's most important. But then, Brown's party leaders got after him and he ran to the other side. He voted against the Environmental Protection Act that would have held corporations responsible for cleaning up pollution they create. Dave Brown doesn't know whose side he is on. We need a senator we can count on. For our families and for our future. Vote for Bob Johnson as your senator.

APPENDIX D: ADVERTISEMENTS (STILL CUTS)

The Disclosure-Beginning Condition



## The Disclosure-End Condition



# Non-Disclosure Condition



Vote  
for  
BOB JOHNSON