

ENTER STAGE RIGHT: REBEL LEADER TYPE & CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN
INTRA-STATE WAR

by

JOHN DEAN WILLINGHAM IV

(Under the Direction of K. Chad Clay)

ABSTRACT

What role do rebel leaders play in driving the dynamics of intra-state warfare? More specifically, does variation in rebel leader type have implications for the type, severity, and tenure of a leader's combat campaign? I theorize that a rebel leader's background is key to explaining the dynamics of their combat campaigns. By examining a leader's motivation for conflict—defined in terms of their pursuit of public versus private goods—in conjunction with the depth and quality of their military experience, I offer a novel conceptualization and theory of rebel leaders in warfare. I introduce four distinct types of rebel leaders: the Ideologue, Insurgent, Operator, and Warlord. Each type yields testable implications for violent outcomes in war. To test these implications, I introduce a new dataset, Rebel Leaders in Civil War (RLCW), 1989-2014 (Willingham & Doctor 2017), in which rebel leaders serve as the unit of analysis. Overall, I make four important contributions to the field: a theory, typology, dataset and results indicating that even in the presence of multiple conflict and group-level factors, rebel leaders exhibit independent effects on the type, severity and tenure of intra-state combat campaigns.

INDEX WORDS: Rebel leaders, Intra-state war, Civil war, Combat, Warfare, Conflict, Civil war

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DEDICATION

For my dearest Hayes, Ruby and Lucy.

For the memory of Charles and Estelle Shelton, the Reverend Charlie Penick, and Patrick Joseph Reen.

For the men and women who serve and sacrifice for our great county, and for those who perform the work of a nation.

Pro Aris et Focis.

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LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

AAH – Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Iraq)

ADF – Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)

ADP – Arab Democratic Party (Lebanon)

AFDL – Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (DRC)

AFRC – Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)

AIS – Armed Islamic Army

AJPSN – Youth Parties for National Survival (Ivory Coast)

ALiR – Liberation Army of Rwanda (Rwanda)

AMB – Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (Palestine)

AQ – Al-Qaeda

AQAP – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen, Saudi Arabia)

AQI – Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Iraq)

AQIM – Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania)

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines)

ATTF – All Tripura Tiger Force (India)

BLA – Balochistan Liberation Army (Pakistan, Afghanistan)

BLTF – Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (India)

CNDD – National Council for the Defense of Democracy (Burundi)

CNDD-FDD – National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Burundi)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

- CPJP – Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Central African Republic)
- CPJP-Fond. – Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace - Fundamental (Central African Republic)
- CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (Nepal)
- CPP-NPA – Communist Party of Nepal-New People’s Army (Nepal)
- CPSK – Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (Central African Republic)
- CSNPD – National Revival Committee for Peace and Democracy (Chad)
- DHD – Dima Halam Daogah (India)
- DHD-BW – Dima Halam Daogah-Black Widows (India)
- ELN – National Liberation Army (Colombia)
- FALA – Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
- FAPC – People’s Armed Forces of Congo (DRC)
- FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Colombia)
- FARF – Armed Forces for a Federal Republic (Chad)
- FDLR – Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Rwanda)
- FDPC – Democratic Front of the Central African People (Central African Republic)
- FIAA – Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (Mali)
- FIS – Islamic Salvation Front
- FNI – Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (DRC)
- FPR – Rwanda Patriotic Front (Rwanda)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

FRC – Forces Republicaines pour le Changement (Central Africa Republic)

FRCI – Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (Ivory Coast)

FRPI – Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (DRC)

FUC – United Front for Democratic Change (Chad)

GAM – Free Aceh Movement (Indonesia)

GIA – Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (Algeria)

GICM – Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Morocco)

GSPC – Salafist Group Preaching and Combat (Algeria)

HPC – Hmar Peoples Convention (India)

HuM – Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen (Kashmir)

IS – Islamic State

ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ICE – Islamic Caucasus Emirate – (Russian Federation)

INPFL – Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (Liberia)

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Iraq, Syria)

JEM – Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)

JJS – Jamaat Jund al-Sahaba (Iraq)

JSS/SB – Jana Samhati Samiti – Shanti Bahini (Bangladesh)

Kamajors-CDF – Kamajors Civil Defence Forces (Sierra Leone)

KNF-Presidential – Kuki National Front (India)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

- KRA – Kuki Revolutionary Army (India)
- LeI – Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)
- LeT – Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistan-Kashmir)
- LDF – Lofa Defense Force (Liberia)
- LeJ – Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Pakistan, Afghanistan)
- LPC – Liberia Peace Council (Liberia)
- LRA – Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda)
- LTTE – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
- LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (Liberia)
- M23 – March 23 Movement (DRC)
- Mayi Mayi-C – Mayi Mayi-Chinja Chinja
- Mayi Mayi-K – Mayi Mayi-Katanga
- MCC – Maoist Communist Center (India)
- MEND – Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Niger)
- MFDC – Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Senegal)
- MIA – Islamic Armed Movement
- MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)
- MLC – Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (DRC)
- MNLA – National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali)
- MPCI – Patriotic Movement of Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

- MPIGO – Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (Ivory Coast)
- NDC – Nduma Defence of Congo (DRC)
- NDFB – National Democratic Front of Bodoland (India)
- NDFB-RD – National Democratic Front of Bodoland-Ranjan Daimary (India)
- NLFA – National Liberation Front of Angola (Angola)
- NLFT – National Liberation Front of Tripura (India)
- NPFL – National Patriotic Front of Liberia (Liberia)
- NSCN-IM – National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (India)
- ONLF – Ogaden National Liberation Front (Somalia)
- Palipehutu-FNL – National Forces of Liberation (Burundi)
- PARECO – Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (DRC)
- PFT – Popular Front of Tajikistan (Tajikistan)
- PIJ – Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (Palestine)
- PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran)
- PLFI – The Peoples’ Liberation Front of India (India)
- PWG – People’s War Group (India)
- RaFD – Rally of Democratic Forces (Chad)
- RCD – Rally for Congolese Democracy (DRC)
- RRA – Rahanweyn Resistance Army (Somalia)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

- RUF – Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
- SLDF – Sabaot Land Defence Force (Kenya)
- SLM/A – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Sudan)
- SLM/A – MM – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army – Minni Minnawi (Sudan)
- SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Army (Sudan)
- SPM – Somali Patriotic Movement (Somalia)
- SPM – Harti – Somali Patriotic Movement-Harti (Somalia)
- SSDF – Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Somalia)
- TTP – Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistan)
- TTP-Islahi – Tehrik-i-Taliban-Islahi (Pakistan)
- UFDD – Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Chad)
- UFDR – Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (Central African Republic)
- UFR – Union of Republican Forces (Central African Republic)
- UFR-Fond. – Union of Republican Forces-Fundamental (Central African Republic)
- ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam (India)
- ULIMO – United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Liberia)
- ULIMO - J– United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson (Liberia)
- ULIMO - K– United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah (Liberia)
- UNITA – The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Angola)
- UPA – Uganda People’s Army (Uganda)

LIST OF GROUP ACRONYMS

UPC – Union of Congolese Patriots (DRC)

UPDS – United People’s Democratic Solidarity (India)

WNBF – West Nile Bank Front (Uganda)

“All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds, wake in the day to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act on their dreams with open eyes, to make them possible.”

- T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* 1922

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“OVERTURE”

“Let me have war, say I; it exceeds peace as far as day does night: it's spritely waking, audible, and full of vent. Peace is a very apoplexy, lethargy; mull'd, deaf, sleepy, insensible; a getter of more bastard children than war's a destroyer of men.”

- *Coriolanus*, Scene V¹

The Question

What are the critical mechanisms that help explain variation in the length, type and intensity of intra-state warfare campaigns? More specifically, what role do rebel leaders play in driving these dynamics? Intra-state wars, such as civil war and insurgency, are notoriously messy and difficult to analyze. They produce a variety of characters, especially in rebel leadership roles. In large-scale conflicts, rebel leaders act as lightning rods, capable of capturing the attention of participants and observers by achieving widespread notoriety through their words and deeds. Yet many opposition leaders operate under the radar in smaller-scale conflicts around the world. Moreover, multi-party conflicts in anarchic environments feature a variety of actors making it difficult for participants and observers to assess the impact of individual leaders. But regardless of the nature, size, and location of the conflict, I theorize that rebel leaders play an important role in shaping outcomes in war. Evidence suggests that leaders drive the bargaining process, manage groups, formulate strategies, design and implement

¹ The Pelican Shakespeare (1999)

tactics, manufacture violence, and ultimately, facilitate war. I argue that rebel leaders are an overlooked, but critical mechanism propelling the dynamics of war.

Policy-makers and journalists often focus on rebel leaders during intra-state war, but scholars systematically ignore the role they play in shaping the dynamics of intra-state war, preferring instead to focus on groups or states. When scholars do pay attention to leaders, it is usually in the context of inter-state war, whereas scholars of intra-state war focus almost exclusively on individuals in government leadership roles. Leadership is imperative to the conduct of intra-state warfare campaigns, such as guerrilla warfare and insurgency, as groups are often filled with inexperienced, unmotivated, or over-zealous rank-and-file who look to their commanders for direction, discipline, and overall guidance. Because of these issues in personnel, leaders serve as important strategic focal points in the chaos and confusion of combat campaigns.²

In this dissertation, I make the case that focusing on individual rebel leaders and their campaigns, rather than groups or states, offers tremendous insight into the dynamics of intra-state war. One of the main thrusts of this project is to determine to what extent, if any, does an individual's taste for greed, in conjunction with their level of military experience, propel the dynamics of warfare. As a result of this exercise, I am able to offer a novel theory of rebel leaders in war. This project aims to "bring the leader back in" to analyses of intra-state warfare.

The argument I present is straightforward: the military background of the leader, combined with their motivation for conflict, affects the type, severity, and tenure of armed intra-state combat campaigns. Through a unique conceptualization process in

² See Schelling (1960).

which I distinguish between varying types of rebel leaders—the Ideologue, Insurgent, Operator and Warlord—I am able to offer a typology of leaders that yields testable implications of whether or not varying leader types impact outcomes in intra-state war.³ To test my theory, I utilize the Rebel Leaders in Civil War (RLCW) dataset, a dataset developed with my colleague, Austin Doctor, at the University of Georgia (Willingham & Doctor 2017). The RLCW dataset features 206 rebel leaders at the helm of more than 150 groups operating in over 60 intra-state wars across the world between 1989 and 2014. To my knowledge, this is the first dataset of its kind.

Overall, this project makes four contributions to studies of intra-state warfare: first, it offers a novel theoretical framework for analyzing combat dynamics by focusing on the effects of individual leaders in armed combat; second, as an extension of this theory of rebel leaders in war, I am able to conceptualize a typology of rebel leader types; third, it introduces a new dataset in which rebel leader-years are the unit of analysis; and finally, it offers a test of these results with implications for future research.

The Puzzle

Understanding violent outcomes within intra-state warfare is inherently problematic. On the one hand, the factors thought to explain incidence are wide-ranging, and at times, conflicting (Dixon 2009). On the other hand, factors believed to shape termination are varied and often unpalatable to policy-makers and scholars (Walter 2002;

³ The conceptualization and theory of rebel leaders in intra-state war, as well as the resulting typology that I introduce in this dissertation, was initially developed on my own. However, future iterations and the development of the implications of the theory and typology benefited greatly from input and collaboration with my colleague at the University of Georgia, Austin Doctor, who now serves as a co-principal on a larger data project and research agenda that uses the typology to explore the effects of rebel leaders in war.

Toft 2010). The tendency is to approach the study of warfare in separate stages, such as the onset, duration, and termination of war. However, these stages are inextricably linked and often overlapping making it difficult to parse out a reliable and consistent explanation of violent outcomes. In short, mapping a story of violence in war is inherently problematic for scholars and policy-makers alike.

Since 1989, roughly 40 percent of intra-state wars ended in negotiated settlement, whereas more than half ended in decisive victory or are still ongoing (*The Economist*, November 2013). Statistics like these suggest that the factors driving the dynamics of warfare vary greatly across conflicts. While some civil wars last for years with no end in sight, others end just as quickly as they started (Cunningham 2011). With respect to the nature of warfare, a number of wars reach obscene levels of violent intensity, while others simmer at low levels of severity for decades (Weinstein 2007). With so many theories, explanations, variables, and data sets to consider, one wonders if scholars are missing a critical link to explaining the logic and testing the empirics of intra-state combat behavior. In short, why is there so much variation in the nature, severity, and length of intra-state wars? And, why is it so difficult for scholars to explain these dynamics?

For one, it is exceedingly difficult to observe, identify, and analyze stages, actors, and outcomes in intra-state war. Combat campaigns are inherently dangerous, and often conducted in lesser-known corners of the world, making observance and accurate data collection a challenge in difficult conflict and post-conflict environments. Moreover, these challenges present issues for scholars attempting to conceptualize and operationalize elements of warfare scenarios.

As such, many scholars have accepted these limits and attempted to explain combat duration relying on structural and group level variables that are relatively easy to quantify and measure. Others limit their focus to key players—often a single opposition group and the state—and their respective characteristics and grievances, ignoring the fact that intra-state wars often include multiple actors and a host of competing issue dimensions. Even more problematic, a number of scholars limit the scope of their analysis to cases in which battle deaths exceed a previously accepted, but largely arbitrary threshold of violence.

These types of decisions, although understandable given the limitations of data collection, often contribute to biased, myopic, and misleading forms of analysis. Furthermore, all of these approaches ignore a critical factor, namely, the roles played by key individuals. The scope of this project focuses on the roles that individual leaders play in combat, and the subsequent effects of their actions on outcomes of warfare. My goal is to highlight a previously ignored mechanism propelling the logic of intra-state combat. To reiterate, my logic and inquiry are straightforward: leaders are agents capable of shaping the scope and nature of warfare.

A leadership-focused analysis of warfare dynamics—defined here as the type, severity, and length of combat—can help scholars and policy-makers sift through the conceptual mire of intra-state war to focus on crucial identifiable propellants of warfare. Leaders play a central role in war due to their ability to make critical decisions that allow for the prosecution of successful combat campaigns. If people and politics drive warfare, then leaders are the engines of military and political decision-making. Their decisions shape variation in the nature and scope of the fighting.

Rather than focusing on broad explanations of overall outcomes in war, this project aims to uncover the factors that shift leaders and their rank-and-file away from the negotiating table and on to the battlefield. It also helps explain what they decide to do in a particular theater of combat, and more precisely, how they behave *on the battlefield*. The motivations of leaders, conditioned by their military and political skill-sets, are important mechanisms driving the conduct of warfare. Therefore, given the central role played by leaders in combat, I first ask a simple question: does variation in rebel leader type affect the tenure of a leader's combat campaign?

In subsequent chapters, I offer logic and evidence that a leadership-focused examination of combat tenure is crucial to understanding how and why conflicts persist and the many forms that conflict can take. By effectively disaggregating the multi-dimensional, multi-party nature that characterizes modern warfare, this project offers a systematic micro-level examination of individual leader's campaigns. This approach has the potential to yield important insights for explanations of war duration and termination. A leader's ability to stay in theater longer, particularly in the case of multi-party conflicts, has important implications for why intra-state wars persist for as long as they do. It also offers insight into the factors particular to individual leaders that drive bargaining and determine final settlement durability.

This initial question about the relationship between the type of leader and the tenure of their combat campaigns also led me to explore an overlooked dynamic: the nature of warfare employed. An important link exists between the tenure of an individual leader's campaign and the type of warfare observed, as well as the overall severity of the violence employed (Cunningham 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas & Balcells 2010).

However, these links are left largely unexamined in the study of intra-state war. Understanding the factors that propel violence in war is critical to untangling the causal complexity associated with how wars are conducted and sustained. Therefore, a story about campaign's duration is inextricably linked to its logic of violence. If one wants to examine the driving factors behind a war's length, one must first take a step back and address the issues associated with the type and intensity of the fighting. For example, why is it that some intra-state wars feature extreme levels of violence through conventional forms of combat, while other wars are characterized by low levels of simmering violence achieved through irregular modes of warfare? Few studies have adequately addressed the issue of linking leadership roles and the type, severity, and duration of combat.

A cursory glance at global conflicts since the end of the Cold War reveals a wide degree of variation in the length, type and intensity of a leader's combat campaign. Moreover, there is considerable disagreement over *which* factors drive the nature and length of warfare. Scholars routinely work across multiple levels of analysis to explicate a chain of logic with respect to violence dynamics in war. Not surprisingly, a number of inter-state war theories are often "taken down a level" and applied to incidences of intra-state war (Lake 2011).

Most of these studies, however, fail to clarify the relationship between the nature of the violence and the length of time spent on the battlefield. None of them consider which factors keep some leaders in combat longer than others, nor do they explain the roles leaders play in managing and facilitating combat. Therefore, I will first attempt to answer another puzzling, yet important question: how does the severity and type of war

impact the campaign tenures of different leader types? More importantly, can we disentangle leadership effects from the causal complexity surrounding intra-state war?

Furthermore, my research into these vexing questions led me to another important conclusion: individual entities operating within larger environmental structures of incentives and constraints are often systematically ignored in favor of singularly focused meso-level and macro-level explanations of conflict. Similar to a number of past approaches, I argue that disentangling the interplay of agents and structures is critical to understanding political change and conflict (Most & Starr 1989; Berejikian 1992; Mason 2004; Weinstein 2007). To date, only a handful of studies actually examine the role that leaders play in manufacturing violence thereby facilitating the duration of a leader's time in combat. In most cases, leaders are ignored as a potential barrier to peace in war, or they are perceived as epiphenomenal actors on the periphery, incapable of exerting independent effects on conflict dynamics and outcomes. This is the most puzzling lacuna in the intra-state conflict literature, especially given the fact that a number of inter-state war scholars find evidence of leaders playing a critical role in driving the dynamics of international interactions (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Chiozza & Goemans 2004, 2011; Weeks 2012; Horowitz et al 2015).

Fundamentally, I view rebel leaders as important agents of political violence operating within a larger structure of constraints and incentives. My theoretical approach is a significant departure from the current literature on intra-state war dynamics. So finally, I ask the following critical question: overall, what role do rebel leaders play in shaping violent outcomes in war? And, perhaps more critically, do the experiences they bring to bear on a combat scenario, in part, drive the type, severity, and duration of their

campaigns? In answering these questions, I attempt to bridge studies of leadership in war at the inter-state level with studies of war at the intra-state level.

It is people who propel armed conflict. Thus, it stands to reason why more scholars do not focus on leadership incentives, motivations, experiences, perceptions, and behavior, as plausible determinants of violent outcomes in intra-state war. This project aims to fill the void on rebel leadership roles in intra-state war, as I attempt to clarify the relationship between a rebel leader's background, motivations, and resulting outcomes of violence in war.

The Argument

I make the case that rebel leaders matter. But I start from a basic, but previously unexplored premise that different rebel leaders exist in scenarios of intra-state war. I will show that variation in the *type* of rebel leader emerging in scenarios of intra-state war induces variation in the nature or type of warfare, the severity of violence, and the overall duration of their combat campaigns. Ultimately, the factors that determine who a rebel leader *is*, will directly shape his or her decision-making with respect to combat strategies and battlefield tactics.

I advance a new argument about leaders in warfare, namely, that a leader's motivations for conflict, in conjunction with the depth and quality of their military experience, greatly influences their decision-making with respect to the bargaining process, strategic formulation, tactical selection, and the overall execution of successful combat campaigns. Extending this logic further, I expect different leader types to behave differently in response to changing battlefield conditions. Most of all, it is the leaders who bear primary responsibility for bargaining failures and defeats on the battlefield.

Echoing Most & Starr (1989), I contend that rebel leader types will recognize and operationalize varying opportunities differently. Thus, they will craft and select from varying menus of action.

Overall, I view rebel leaders as managers and facilitators of combat. The conflict environment levies unique constraints and conditions on decision-makers. Accordingly, I frame my analysis by situating rebel leaders as key entities operating within a larger structure of environmental constraints and opportunities (Berejikian 1992). I believe that a leader-centric approach is not only appropriate, but absolutely necessary, given that leaders exercise a great deal of control over the formation, management, and actions of agent and groups in combat. Leaders also accrue costs and benefits from manufacturing and facilitating campaigns of armed combat. The buck stops at the leadership level since it is individual leaders who make influential decisions regarding strategy and tactics.

The Mechanisms

If one assumes that leaders matter in the prosecution of war, it is important to understand how they emerge, and to what extent the factors that give rise to leaders initially, impact their ability to wage war. The emergence of variation in rebel leader type is predicated upon two dimensions: an individual's motivation and military experience. It is these two mechanisms that ultimately drive the relationship between variation in rebel leader type and variation in the type, severity and tenure of a leader's campaign. To be clear, I am not dismissing group-level or structural factors in this story. In fact, I accept that conflict environments levy unique constraints on a rebel leader's decision-making, but the thrust of my argument is that conflict environments provide the stage on which a leader's motivations and military experience interact to shape violent

outcomes in war. By establishing this nexus of military experience and motivation, I am able to draw out theoretical expectations about the behavior of individual leaders.

After all, it is the leaders who make decisions and set the course of action among followers in response to their concern for the distribution of private or public goods.

However, this decision-making process is heavily influenced by the quality and depth of a leader's prior military training and combat experience, as well as their motivation.

The Stage

In this section, I clarify the context of the conflict theater in which rebel leaders take center stage. Later on, I conceptualize rebel leaders focusing on why they matter with respect to the dynamics of violence and duration. As a result of this conceptualization processes, I am able to offer a typology of rebel leaders in intra-state war yielding testable implications for the nature, intensity, and duration of fighting.

In a vein similar to Kalyvas (2006), I define *intra-state war* as organized campaigns of armed combat between parties subject to a common regime wielding a monopoly on the use of force and policy-making prior to the onset of combat activity primarily within, but not limited to, the territorial delimited boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity. Seen from this perspective, intra-state war features a range of conventional and non-conventional conflict types ranging from civil war to insurgency to acts of covert violence and terror. It also allows me to analyze the factors that determine the formulation of strategies and design of tactics associated with a range of technologies of rebellion. Thus, conventional civil war is a sub-type within a broader category of intra-state forms of warfare. As a result, I can test for the relationship between leader and conflict types.

In addition, I extend my definition of intra-state war to instances of armed intra-state violence that spill across state boundaries and invite foreign intervention by foreign fighters (e.g. Syria), regional powers (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo), or in some cases great powers (e.g. Cold War). This allows me to capture the unique effects of rebel leadership on violence associated with a class of warfare such as organized trans-national terrorism, guerilla fighting, and global insurgency.⁴ I should be clear that armed intra-state warfare, as defined here, is not a situation of *inter*-state warfare, anarchist violence, criminal activity, street gang violence, organized civil protest, or isolated acts of homegrown terrorism. At its most basic level, intra-state war is the violent organized expression of domestic social, economic, and political conflict.

In order to identify and account for leaders in combat, I search for evidence of a leader attempting to carry out a systematic and organized combat campaign. This may include, but is not limited to military activity, combatant casualties, non-combatant targeting, mobilization, terror campaigns, political organization, or any type of action that armed oppositional groups engage in to remain viable in war or perceived periods of peace.⁵ Capturing severity is one of the most observable forms of evidence associated with group activity within a conflict. Therefore, a proper examination of violence in war, and the conflict environment where violence plays out, necessitates a discussion of violence affecting combatants and non-combatants.

⁴ See Kilcullen (2009) for a rich discussion of the various forms of war waged by non-state and intra-state actors.

⁵ See Shapiro (2013) for a detailed discussion of the manner and means by which armed intra-state groups stay viable in conflict.

Although to some extent I set an arbitrary threshold of combatant and non-combatant deaths when identifying and measuring conflict severity, I do this mainly for practical reasons. This allows me to take advantage of measures used by other publicly available datasets on armed intra-state conflict. However, I am also interested in capturing the full range of violence and duration of intra-state war. Therefore, I include both combatant and non-combatant measures of violence since civilian violence is a defining feature of intra-state war (Mitchell 2004). Battle related deaths or collateral damage are not always the best metric of campaign success or severity, particularly for those non-state groups that operate clandestinely. Although reprehensible, there is evidence of actors in war employing strategies and tactics aimed at maiming and terrorizing enemy combatants, rather than simply killing them (Coll 2004). My goal is to fully consider the link between the modes of warfare leaders employ and the resulting severity—measured in terms of overall casualties—stemming from their strategic and tactical decisions.

Moreover, this approach acknowledges the inherently political nature that characterizes most, if not all, scenarios of violent intra-state conflict. Violence within intra-state warfare, such as conventional pitched battles, and guerrilla warfare, can be intimate and brutal—combatants and civilians bear the brunt of the violence. It also tends to fester and linger, making settlement difficult. The perceived chaos of these situations, as I conceptualize it, makes the violence both selective and indiscriminate, but also political and economic, depending on the context of the environment and the strategies of the actors. Therefore, I try to avoid excluding scenarios of intra-state violence that do not meet certain casualty thresholds, civilian or otherwise, since this type

of violence takes place within the context of a larger process of political bargaining. With respect to non-combatant violence, I treat casualties as just one component of violence in scenarios of intra-state war. A more realistic portrayal of the violence accounts for incidences of rape, looting, mutilation, and other intentional forms of targeting that aim to brutalize the enemy, as well as civilian populations (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004; Kalyvas 2006; Wood et al 2012).

Case in point, the Congolese wars featured untold human suffering, as enemy combatants sought to maim and brutalize local populations as part of a broader coercive strategy of violence (Stearns 2011). This also proved to be a calculated and determined strategy among combatants—Afghan and Soviets alike—during the Afghan civil wars (Feifer 2009). An effective measure of severity should account for a wide range of both civilian and non-civilian casualties.

Effectively, this conceptualization of intra-state war strengthens my findings and mitigates the introduction of selection bias since hardened, more experienced and battle-tested rebel commanders are likely to sustain campaigns longer than inexperienced or novice rebel leaders. This also allows me to test empirically those campaigns that simmered just below the threshold of large-scale intra-state war featured commonly in data sets from the UCDP and the Correlates of War project, for example. My ultimate goal is to cast a theoretical net that captures a much wider swath of leaders and conflicts.

It is also important to remember that a lack of observed violence in a given year does not necessarily mean that a group or leader is not active militarily, especially given the constraints groups are under, not to mention the incentives leaders have to operate clandestinely in order to avoid security vulnerabilities (Shapiro 2013). Patience can be a

virtue for rebel leaders, and battlefield inactivity does not necessarily indicate an exit from combat. Rather, leaders are often faced with tough decisions about finding time to rebuild and strengthen their organizations. In setting the stage, I acknowledge the political, economic, and military realities that leaders face when conducting intra-state warfare, and through this recognition, I can offer a stronger (and more realistic) test of the effects of rebel leader type on variation in violent outcomes and the duration of intra-state warfare campaigns.

Road Map

The analysis for this dissertation proceeds through seven chapters. In the next chapter, I offer a theory of rebel leaders in intra-state war. I conceptualize leader type by focusing on their individual motivations and military background. As a result, I am able to offer a typology of rebel leaders in war. Chapter 3 presents this typology along with testable implications. In Chapter 4, I introduce an original dataset, the RLCW. This dataset is the first of its kind and allows me to test the independent effects of leader type against a backdrop of conflict and group level factors in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I test for the effects of leader type on three related outcomes: the type, severity, and tenure of combat campaigns. In Chapter 6, I offer four vignettes of rebel leaders in war, as a way of evaluating my results and predictions. I conclude by discussing these findings and offering further implications for the RLCW theory and dataset.

CHAPTER 2
A THEORY OF REBEL LEADERS IN WAR
“ENTER STAGE RIGHT”

“I started with a shotgun and three rifles and a few dozen men behind me.”

- Charles Taylor, Liberia, 1991⁶

The Story

Intra-state war represents a dramatic theater of violent domestic anarchy as parties to armed conflict vie for political *and military* control, or at least a share of that control, of the post-conflict governing framework. In some cases, the combatants are fighting for domestic control of the entire state or some portion of the state. In other cases, the goals of the combatants are not strictly relegated to the domestic realm. Rather, they extend beyond the border of the state, as is the case with globalized forms of insurgency (Kilcullen 2009). Ultimately, intra-state war is a tragic story of violent chaos and human suffering in which individuals at the helm of rebel groups take the stage in a leading role.

Fundamentally, operational environments, group capabilities, and actor goals, interact to shape violent outcomes in war. In general, these multi-level factors are often observable and measurable. In fact, the historical and empirical record suggests that important indicators and systematic patterns of action exist with respect to outcomes in intra-state war. There proves to be considerable variation in the nature and length of intra-state war, suggesting that cases of armed intra-state conflict share significant

⁶ Waugh (2011)

differences and similarities. As suggested in the introduction, past approaches yield tremendous insight into intra-state warfare dynamics, yet there remains a considerable amount of unexplained variation in outcomes of warfare. Current theories of intra-state war, although useful, are ultimately incomplete. Below, I introduce the rebel leader as an important agent of violent outcomes in war.

Explaining the Type, Severity and Tenure of Combat Campaigns

So what is missing from current explanations of the type, severity, and duration of intra-state war? More importantly, can we develop a more complete theory of intra-state war dynamics? I offer a novel theory of intra-state warfare dynamics that moves away from common explanations that focus on environmental factors or group-level characteristics, but instead focuses on the roles played by rebel leaders.

Broadly, the literature on intra-state warfare dynamics is divided into two main camps: exogenous and endogenous drivers of war. The former camp is comprised mainly of macro-level conditions that incite violence and drive war. Exogenous explanations stress structural conditions, such as natural resources or ideology that create and sustain armed insurgency as a precipitate of warfare (e.g. Gates 2002; Fearon & Laitin 2003; Ross 2004; Krain 2005; Peksen 2011, 2012). Exogenous factors are typically slow-moving variables that show little variation across time. Other examples include factors of identity, geographical terrain, and political systems.

The latter camp is comprised mainly of group or individual level factors that shape variation in warfare outcomes. These types of explanations emphasize factors related to combatant interaction, rebel capability, membership profile, rebel recruitment, and micro-level explanations for warfare dynamics (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004; Kalyvas

2006; Hultman 2007; Weinstein 2007; Cunningham et al 2009; Gates et al 2009; Wood 2010; Wood et al 2012; Wood 2013). Seen from this perspective, endogenous explanations highlight the ways in which warring groups interact strategically to drive war. Additionally, these approaches may also emphasize group and individual-level characteristics associated with armed conflict.

Regardless of group goals and capabilities, or the operational environment, the factors driving the prosecution of intra-state war are notoriously difficult to understand for a variety of reasons (Walter 2002; Fearon 2004; Cunningham 2011). Even when peace appears to be economically or politically profitable to all parties, it can remain elusively precarious, thereby inducing persistent forms of violence and obscene levels of severity. There are moments when the continuation of the conflict remains profitable or the terms of settlement are simply unacceptable to one or more sides. Although war is costly, peace may be perceived as being even costlier. Thus, staying on the battlefield is rational and recidivism is more likely when parties to a conflict are unable to find an acceptable bargaining range preventing the emergence of a durable settlement. As such, the combatants will compete for an advantage by formulating new strategies and employing a variety of tactics aimed at defeating their enemy and gaining leverage in the overall bargaining process.

Similar to previous approaches in the war literature, I contend that the onset, extension and recidivism of war are best viewed as bargaining failures (Blainey 1988; Fearon 1995; Walter 1997, 2002). Thus, war is just one part of a larger, more extensive and complex bargaining process. As General Clausewitz famously noted, war is simply the continuation of the political process by other means (1832).

This type of approach is true for both inter-state and intra-state outcomes of war. Pillar (1983) suggests that civil war duration and termination is best understood as a bargaining process. Moreover, Walter (1997) contends that bargaining failures are more pronounced in intra-state war than inter-state war since intra-state war combatants do not have the luxury of laying down their arms and retreating back to their home states. Instead, the combatants remain vulnerable to one another and laying down arms is tantamount to annihilation. It may also have implications for the nature of the violence observed as each side strives to inflict total defeat on their domestic rival (Fearon 2004; Walter 2009; Cunningham 2011).

As such, the literature points to three critical mechanisms that drive combat duration: incomplete information (with incentives to misrepresent), credible commitment problems, and indivisible issue stakes (Pillar 1983; Fearon 1995; Walter 1997; Reiter 2002; Cunningham 2011). These mechanisms function as critical barriers to settlement, and each one, separately or combined, serves as a potential bulwark to durable forms of peace (Reiter 2002; Cunningham 2011).

Additionally, I posit the nature or type of conflict as a critical mechanism driving duration. Although under-theorized and routinely ignored as a driver of conflict, there is also evidence to suggest that the nature and type of violence that emerges in intra-state war profoundly shapes the severity of violence, which has important implications for the length of the conflict and the likelihood of its eventual settlement (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Below, I consider each of these mechanisms and use them to lay a foundation for a theory of rebel leader in war.

The first mechanism deals with information asymmetries, in addition to the incentives that combatants have to misrepresent various forms of information acquired during war. The informational approach has gained considerable attention in recent years (Cunningham 2011). It posits that over-optimism or miscalculation on the part of the combatants leads to breakdowns in the bargaining process. In this particular framework, combatants form perceptions of their opponent's capabilities, battlefield performance, intentions, as well as past behavior at the negotiating table, to develop rational expectations that inform their cost-benefit calculations regarding the likelihood of succeeding in war.

As a result, combatants adjust the size of their demands, and ultimately narrow or widen their bargaining range, in response to the revelation of important information related to the capabilities, performance, regime type and behaviors of their opponents (Fearon 1995; Filson & Werner 2004). Information approaches identify the incentives that combatants have to misrepresent or bluff important forms of battle-related information, or to fight versus negotiate. The logic is simple: once enough (accurate) information is revealed, one or both sides should have an incentive to settle for peace rather than pay the continued costs of war, especially since this type of information should provide clear evidence of which side is likely to win.

However, there are numerous examples, throughout history, in which combatants continue to pay severe costs to continue fighting despite the fact that neither side is likely to achieve outright victory. For example, some parties may have incentives to pay the costs of war in order to hurt their opponent over a prolonged period time inducing stalemate, as is typically the case in guerrilla warfare or insurgency campaigns (Slantchev

2003; 2005). In other cases, as the Angola and Liberia examples suggest, combatants may find conflict to be a profitable venture making settlement unlikely in the near-term. Also, recognizing that multiple parties are often present on the battlefield and the negotiating table in civil war can distort the information picture and complicate the bargaining process (Cunningham 2011; Christian 2012). Therefore, focusing exclusively on information is unlikely to provide a complete explanation of why conflicts persist for as long as they do. Other factors need to be considered.

The second mechanism is the issue of credible commitment problems during war. Often considered to be the critical barrier to settlement, this approach focuses on the factors that shape each side's ability to uphold the terms of an agreement (Walter 1997; Cunningham 2011). This framework rests on the assumption that intra-state wars create environments of domestic anarchy, in which uncertainty and insecurity make it difficult for combatants to respect the terms of settlement. Therefore, states and rebels have little incentive to negotiate with each other in a fair, reliable manner (Cunningham 2011). Mutual mistrust and the shadow of the future weigh heavily on the minds of the actors.

Additionally, combatant expectations regarding relative changes in the balance of power prevent immediate settlement effectively prolonging the conflict as one or both sides pursue a more favorable bargaining position. As such, commitment and information problems are, in reality, two-sides of the same coin—resolving each of these problems may be necessary for settlement, but neither is sufficient (Reiter 2002). Overcoming commitment and information problems requires mutual trust and a reduction in uncertainty, which is highly unlikely given the complexity and context of intra-state war dynamics.

In this Hobbesian world, laying down one's arms is tantamount to total defeat or worse, total annihilation. Ultimately, peaceful resolution comes in the form of third-party enforcement mechanisms that allow for monitoring and sanctioning of defection by one or both sides (Walter 1997, 2002; Fortna 2003) or it can come through durable peace agreement that effectively institutionalize the peace through careful design, which includes a combination of information revelation, enforcement, legality, and power-sharing mechanisms (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003; Bell 2006; DeRouen Jr. et al 2009; Mattes & Savun 2010; Badran 2014). There is also evidence to suggest that certain types of conflicts are more prone to commitment problems than others (Fearon 2004; Kalyvas & Balcells 2010; Balcells & Kalyvas 2012; Christia 2012). The nature of the fighting, the severity of the violence and the issue stakes, taken together or individually, only exacerbate uncertainty and insecurity.

In addition, principal-agent problems can exacerbate commitment problems (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004; Weinstein 2007). Moral hazard and a lack of monitoring and enforcement can unleash potentially horrific scenarios of intra-state war and make it difficult to end the fighting. Also, multiple parties can create a host of commitment problems by shaping coalition dynamics and creating multiple veto players, thus winnowing the eventual size of the bargaining range (Cunningham 2011; Christia 2012). Not surprisingly, this hostile, complex, multi-faceted, multi-player conflict environment engenders seemingly rational myopia on the part of the combatants, as one or more sides tend to prefer more costly outcomes of warfare to uncertain, but potentially less costly terms of peace. It can also lead to the emergence of peace spoilers (Stedman 1997; Greenhill 2006).

The third mechanism is the problem of indivisible issue stakes. Despite the fact that some authors (e.g. Fearon 1995), at times place less emphasis on indivisible issues as a driver of bargaining failures, there are some scholars who argue that issue stakes are much more pronounced in determining settlement failures than previously thought (Hassner 2003; Goddard 2006; Toft 2010). In this mode of analysis, bargaining failures are attributed to irreconcilable differences over sacred objects, strategically vital territory, national borders, or other important issues that generate severe domestic audience costs (Vasquez 1993; Cunningham 2011). This approach also opens the door to explanations of war severity and duration that focus on the effects of leadership incentives for continuing war (Buono de Mesquita et al 2003; Prorok 2015), fears and expectations surrounding leadership tenure and exit (Uzonyi & Wells 2015), and finally, the manner in which warfare changes actor perceptions of the size of demands (Kalyvas 2006).

Finally, the nature and mode of violence serves as an important driver of conflict outcomes, by linking conflict type and severity with duration. These approaches suggest that conflict outcomes are endogenous to the nature, type and intensity of the violence observed in intra-state war. Lake (2011) argues that domestic anarchy is a *result* of war suggesting that as domestic security vacuums emerge, new and potentially deadly forms of political bargaining can result. Likewise, Kalyvas (2006) maintains that the factors that explain the severity and duration of intra-state war are analytically distinct from the factors that shape onset. Sorely under-theorized, this framework highlights the various technologies of rebellion that combatants employ, their strategies of violence aimed at mitigating combat challenges, and their effects on conflict outcomes.

Kalyvas & Balcells (2010) contend that violence in war is partly determined by the mode of warfare utilized by the combatants. Furthermore, Balcells & Kalyvas (2012) offer a theoretical hook between mode of warfare, severity, and duration. For example, they find that irregular modes of warfare tend to last longer than more conventional forms of conflict. In heeding Kalyvas' (2006) call to analytically decouple the logic of civil war onset from the logic of violence within civil war, scholars are better positioned to explain why some wars last as long as they do, in addition to offering insight into why some wars feature differences in the nature of warfare observed.

Why Rebel Leaders Matter

Missing from the logic of intra-state war is the rebel group leader. Leadership roles are examined in studies of inter-state war, but to my knowledge, only a select few explore leadership effects on conflict outcomes at the level of intra-state war. Overwhelmingly, these studies focus on the roles of regime-side leaders. In contrast, rebel leaders are viewed as epiphenomenal actors operating on the periphery of intra-state conflict, but the majority of the time, they are simply ignored. To date, explanations of intra-state conflict outcomes are incomplete due to this important omission from the intra-state war literature.

Yet some studies suggest that rebel and insurgent leaders appear to matter a great deal to manner in which conflicts play out, even if leaders are not the main focus of the analysis (Clapham 1998; Marten 2007; Giustozzi 2012; Shapiro 2013; Jones 2017). It is rebel leaders who perform critical tasks that directly shape the dynamics and outcomes of intra-state war. It is also the leaders who determine the type and length of the combat by manufacturing political violence through the careful (and sometimes not-so-careful)

formulation of strategies and the selection of tactics. In conjunction with other macro and meso-level factors, this uniquely micro-level factor represents a critical mechanism propelling the logic of violence and duration in scenarios of intra-state war.

I theorize that rebel leaders are principals who play an important managerial role in mobilizing participation and manufacturing violence in war. From start to finish rebel leaders perform critical tasks in the face of severe disadvantages in a hostile operational environment. Leaders, as principals, are focal points for strategy, tactics, ideology, and managerial guidance.⁷ They impact conflict outcomes through four key mechanisms.

First, rebel leaders attempt to build organizations and then maintain organizational viability (Christia 2012; Staniland 2014; Driscoll 2015). As past approaches reveal, effective leadership is necessary condition for overcoming collective action problems since it is rebel leaders who formulate and implement strategies that help mitigate collective action problems and principal-agent failures (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004). In order to be successful, leaders must manage their organizations through careful delegation to trust sub-level commanders. Therefore, it is important for leaders to engage directly in the design and maintenance of their group's structure and command chains.

The leaders are tasked with setting organizational imperatives, enforcing organizational discipline among the rank-and-file, as well as their officer corps, and providing instructional and managerial guidance to their subordinates and lower-level operatives (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004; Shapiro 2013; Sinno 2015). Successful management also requires that rebel leaders formulate and develop managerial strategies aimed at mitigating issues of moral hazard and adverse selection (Weinstein 2007;

⁷ See Schelling (1960) for a discussion of the role of focal points in strategic interaction.

Shapiro 2013). Moreover, they are required to implement effective tactics in response to changing environmental demands. In some cases, rebel leaders effectively create and serve as a *de facto* head of government (Mampilly 2011; Driscoll 2015; Mukhopadhyay 2016). This requires a leader to move beyond focusing solely on limited organizational imperatives to adapt their organization and equip it with the capability to meet the needs of a much larger civilian population. Civilian populations are a source of invaluable streams of resources and recruits, but they also pose challenges to group viability.

Therefore, a leader's ability to spur and sustain group formation represents a crucial determinant of how a conflict campaign plays out. Different leader types will prefer varying sizes of winning coalitions, resulting in unique loyalty norms across rebel groups (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). These are reinforced (or undermined) by the payoff structures established by each leader. Given their individual preferences, group structure is largely determined by the leader, and in most cases, the group structure and strategies will reflect those preferences. In addition, a leader's competence for group maintenance has implications for coalitional dynamics in war, such as situations of alliance building, fractionalization, and splintering. Where leaders either fail to provide promised incentives—in the form of both public and private goods—or undergo consistent defeat on the battlefield, they will lose control of their forces. Leaders also have the ability to make and enforce credible forms of commitment, as well as monitor group behavior. All of these managerial tasks are necessary to group maintenance, survivability, and viability.

Second, rebel leaders offer political or ideological vision to their followers. Essentially, the leader serves as the symbolic and operational figurehead of a particular

movement or cause (Jordan 2009; Johnston 2012; Price 2012; Tiernay 2013). They become important focal points for a grievance or issue and followers look up to their leaders for motivation and direction (Clapham 1998). Moreover, they provide ideological guidance and match political goals with strategies and tactics (Shapiro 2013; Jones 2017). Without a leader to define and perpetuate a reason for war, a group will implode. Groups may also collapse under the weight of fractionalization in the absence of a lightning rod who is capable of offering a unifying group vision that resonates with a civilian population. To gain support, the message must come from a legitimate messenger. Furthermore, leaders directly and indirectly communicate information to their followers and enemies regarding their political intentions through face-to-face discussion, directives, and signaling. In some cases, rebel leaders serve as the physical embodiment of the cause.

Third, rebel leaders offer selective incentives for participation in armed conflict. Effective leaders are able to exploit individual grievances and amplify situations of relative deprivation among potential supporters (Gurr 1970), but actually inspiring and securing participation in violent conflict is problematic for organizers of armed conflict given the severe costs of participation (Lichbach 1995).

To be successful in these endeavors, they must recruit members and maintain group formation by doling out private and public goods (Olson 1965; Mitchell 2004; Mason 2004; Weinstein 2007; Mamphilly 2011; Shapiro 2013). This is a vital task, as it ensures access to recruitment streams, as well as tacit and overt support from local populations. Equally important, the ability to incentivize participation allows for agent retention and discipline among commanders and rank-and-file soldiers. Leaders also use

pay offs to mitigate delegatory inefficiencies within an organization (Shapiro 2013).

Through proper incentivization practices, such as wage matching, they are able to ensure that proper roles are being filled and that tasks are carried out effectively to bolster mission efficacy.

In some instances, the use of coercion and sanction to mobilize participation, and enforce their will. Similar to the CEO of a multinational corporation, or perhaps more accurately, like the owner of a small business, the leader plays an important role in financing the life of a conflict campaign and its participants. In short, leaders are tasked with the important responsibility of ensuring the welfare and management of their employees.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, leaders *lead* on the battlefield. It is the leader who sets the war agenda. They provide strategic direction and set tactical objectives (Mason 2004; Mitchell 2004; Staniland 2014; Tallmudge 2015). If successful, rebel leaders are able to develop winning strategies. One way to do this is by attempting to formulate rational optimal strategies paired with the selection of effective tactics. They pay close attention to changing battlefield conditions and adapt, if necessary. Their ability to build and maintain military capacity or take advantage of local geographical resources is crucial to their success (Gates et al 2009). The rebel leader makes decisions to mitigate battlefield failure and improve the likelihood of military success. Failure on the battlefield is the quickest way to ensure total defeat. Leaders who fail to do this will suffer significant agency loss or in some cases group implosion.

Military creatures by nature, rebel leaders possess varying levels of experience and ability. Regardless, an effective rebel leader adheres to the axiom of *know thyself*.

Therefore, he or she will delegate military responsibilities to a trusted commander who will ensure that strategic military objectives are married to overarching political goals. It is vital that leaders lead by example, and find ways to motivate their followers to action. They must inspire confidence among their sub-ordinates to pay the potentially grave moral, emotional and physical costs of participating in combat.

Relatedly, it is also crucial that rebel leaders take great pains to lead at the negotiating table. In an earlier discussion of the roles that leaders play in the intra-state bargaining model, it is important to remind that the buck stops with the leader. Arguably, it is the rebel leader who sets the price of peace and decides who will pay the costs of war. It is also important to consider that rebel leaders may have incentives to adjust the price of peace, as their individual price point may actually conflict with the collective price point of their own group or the people they claim to represent. A successful rebel leader will weigh the costs and benefits of continuing a campaign and ensuring that battlefield victories translate into political success.

Rebel leaders who fail in these areas only increase the chances of military and political defeat inviting group elimination. Each of these tasks offers a compelling theoretical mechanism that explains how and why leaders matter in influencing conflict outcomes. It also lays the foundation for my theory of rebel leaders in intra-state war, namely, that these leadership mechanisms allow leaders to drive the bargaining model of war. Although leaders are assumed to play a role in determining bargaining failures, they are not analyzed as independent actors in the process.

Moreover, I contend that rebel leaders, as managers of opposition groups (in some instances operating at a severe disadvantage against a stronger state opponent), possess a

unique advantage over their opponents when bargaining. They are able to wage a war of attrition and possess the power to hurt (Slantchev 2003, 2005). Not losing and remaining viable is often a legitimate form of victory for rebel leaders, and greatly improves their chances of securing long-term gains in peace negotiations.

The argument I present focuses on four main reasons why leaders are important principals in intra-state war. In combination, these factors lend support to rationalist explanations for intra-state war. The approach offered here suggests that leaders are focal points of decision-making who not only facilitate the exchange of information on and off the battlefield, but also determine *what type of information* is exchanged, the divisibility of stakes, in addition to determining how credible commitments are formed both within groups and between groups (Fearon 1995; Reiter 2002). In the end, leaders serve as important players in the bargaining model of war.

Rebel Leaders and Bargaining Failures

I argue that leaders are an essential feature of bargaining in war, and that rebel leaders in particular, play the most significant role. Their ability to wage an effective campaign of attrition, or rather their power to hurt, frequently gives them tremendous leverage against their state opponent when bargaining (Slantchev 2003, 2005). My theory rests on a simple idea: that the motivations and military experience of individual rebel leaders ultimately determines how each of three main mechanisms associated with bargaining failures are likely to play out in conflict.

The interplay of a rebel leader's incentives, experiences, motivations, and skill sets, within a much larger set of environmental constraints, has profound implications for their ability to carry out their aforementioned roles. Consequently, this interplay

influences the likelihood of breakdowns in the bargaining process. Fundamentally, rebel leaders are tasked with managing groups operating at a severe disadvantage in a hostile conflict theater, and are therefore, more prone to bargaining failures. A leader's ability to perceive and exchange information, driver hard bargains, form credible commitments, remain viable militarily, and frame issue stakes, is inextricably linked to their ability to serve as managers, figureheads, principals of compensation, and battlefield commanders.

First, leaders help determine the quality and quantity of information that is exchanged at the negotiating table and on the battlefield. They also directly facilitate the flow and exchange of information. Leaders make threats, communicate and articulate the power to hurt, formulate strategies of deterrence, designs strategies of compellence, and serve as diplomats of violence (Schelling 1966). This last point is important because rebel leaders have an informational advantage over their followers and opponents. In running covert organizations operating a severe disadvantage in a hostile environment, their ability to leverage information is key to their overall success and survivability. In essence, they act as important arbiters of information related to operations and negotiations. They decide the type of information that gets exchanged assuming, of course, that this information is not directly observable to their opponent. In line with the bargaining model, they also decide whether or not to misrepresent that information.

With respect to the battlefield, it is the leader who offers operational guidance. They formulate strategies and select tactics to match these strategies. Even if leaders decide not to signal their intentions on the battlefield directly to rival leaders, which is most often the case, the result of their combat decision-making signals important information regarding capability and resolve to their opponents. At the negotiating table,

leaders make important bargaining decisions that require the exchange of information regarding demands, capabilities, and resolve. They decide what types of information to reveal in order to gain leverage. They also signal important domestic costs they may incur if they fail to find an appropriate agreement. Fundamentally, leaders serve as critical agents of information. They use this information to set the terms of peace and craft final deals.

Second, leaders make and determine the credibility of commitments. They serve as adjudicators of agreements. It is the leader that helps craft sticky agreements. Effectively, they are the ones who negotiate the terms of an agreement and decide whether or not to make a credible commitment to uphold those terms. Therefore, information stemming from negotiations and combat is filtered through the leader (and trust subordinates), thus shaping their willingness to cooperate or defect. They assess their conflict environments, evaluate the potential for success or failure on the battlefield, and then use this information to determine if sticking with a deal is in the best interests of the group. Not surprisingly, leaders feel the shadow of the future most directly and make decisions about the utility of short versus long-term gains. In making final deals, followers look to their leaders for guidance over whether or not to lay down their arms, although this is admittedly contingent upon the extent to which principal-agent problems plague a particular group. Alternatively, deals are shaped by a leader's personal incentives to negotiate, which in some cases make credible commitment unlikely and peace elusive.

Lastly, leaders identify, frame, and sell or disparage the issue stakes. They play a critical role in the bargaining model since leader can potentially determine the size of the

demands. Given their informational advantages and motivation for reliably committing to settlement, this calculation is based off a mix of personal and group incentives.

I argue that leaders are out in front of their followers. This allows them to frame or in some instances manipulate, the issues at hand. Not only can they influence what their followers perceive as sacred or indivisible, but they can also amplify or downplay pre-existing grievances. Furthermore, they are able to distract followers and observers from their own personal incentives to wage war, particularly in cases where a leader's personal interests deviate from group interests. Through their ability to motivate and serve as symbols of resistance, rebel leaders can sell agreements back to their respective audiences. They are able to ramp up the rhetoric and mobilize their followers over important issues in order to maximize leverage at the bargaining table.

They may also structure their organizations and formulate strategies with sole purpose of achieving those demands, even at risk of group peril or abandoning the ostensible cause. In rare cases, the life, actions, and death of the leader can become an indivisible issue in itself, overshadowing other issue stakes. Personality cults emerge around rebel leaders presenting numerous, if not impossible, challenges to overcoming bargaining failures.

I make the case that rebel leaders play an important role in driving the bargaining process. Their unique position at the helm of rebel movements makes them important decision-making entities. Their decisions have profound implications for the likelihood of breakdowns in the bargaining process. Rebel leaders serve as important focal points for strategy and tactics in the midst of violent domestic anarchy. Once the fighting is underway, leaders are continually forced to assess their operational environment and

battlefield performance. Subsequently, they exchange, and in some cases misrepresent, important pieces of information, they cut deals, and then decide whether or not to stick to the terms of those deals over time, and finally, they define the size of demands.

The goal is to secure leverage over their opponent both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. In rare cases, there are rebel leaders who simply want to sow destruction and perpetuate suffering. For these leaders, war is not a means to a political end, but rather *it is the end*.

Follow the Leader: Entrepreneurs and Commanders

Theoretically, I distinguish between two important roles that rebel leaders play and offer a dynamic theoretical threshold of rebel leaders in war. I do this to separate the leadership factors that contribute to group formation from those that shape combat outcomes. This is one way to parse out the logic of violence in war from the logic of war onset. In this dissertation, I focus on the former logic, not the latter.

The first role represents the nascent role of rebel entrepreneur. In this role, leaders are primarily concerned with facilitating group formation. Therefore, much of the strategy formulation and operational decision-making is focused on mobilization efforts, recruitment, materials acquisition, and group maintenance in order to ensure the group gets off the ground and survives the long road ahead of them. This is critical since the life expectancy of most armed opposition groups is short and violent (Shapiro 2013). Rebel entrepreneurs attempt to develop strategies aimed at overcoming the initial obstacles to group formation.

In the second role, leaders focus primarily on successfully prosecuting a combat campaign. I refer to this role as that of rebel commander. After the group is up and

running, leaders can then turn their attention to the business of war. The bargaining process has begun and the goal is to ensure that group is primed for military success, and more importantly, that battlefield success leads to political success. Therefore, their strategy formulation and operational decision making shifts from group formation to group combat efficacy. For this project, I am mainly concerned with rebel commanders since it is in this stage that rebel leaders enter the bargaining process. Once the first shots are fired, rebel commanders attempt to formulate optimal strategies and select effective tactics that will increase their chances of winning the war, or at least settling on favorable terms. Rebel entrepreneur tasks associated with mobilization and maintenance, are still critical for rebel commanders, but ultimately, over-shadowed by combat campaign concerns.

This distinction is important because rebel leaders are likely to operate differently across these two stages. Rebel leaders are decision-making entities operating amidst a complex set of incentive structures; however, these structures change from one stage to the next. More specifically, rebel leaders face different constraints in each role.

Therefore, I delimit the scope of my project to the rebel commander stage where leaders serve as focal points of political and military strategy and offer tactical guidance amidst the violent chaos of intra-state war. I do this because I am concerned with the ways in which leaders impact the nature, severity and length of combat campaigns. This distinction is also important because it allows me to focus on two key drivers of rebel leader decision-making in wartime scenarios: motivation and military experience. These combinations of these two indicators determine the types of rebel commanders operating in intra-state war and their ability to shape the logic of violence *within war*.

To advance this framework, I borrow from the Most & Starr (1989) framework of opportunity and willingness to lay out my theory of rebel leaders in warfare. I conceptualize rebel leaders as different decision-makers facing varying environmental constraints (i.e. opportunity), which shapes their ability (i.e. willingness) to formulate strategies and select tactics. I find that decision-making is born primarily out of a leader's motivating purpose and military experience, and secondarily out of environmental constraints, as well as the dimensions of the actual rebel group that emerges from the rebel entrepreneurial or pre-conflict stage.

Leaders who lack operational combat effectiveness are likely to be eliminated quickly and decisively, thus ending their chances of changing the political status quo. Leaders can alter the nature of rebellion through a mix of effective strategies and tactics, and by facilitating the exchange of combat information related to capability and intent. But ultimately, their motivation for public versus private goods is going to influence their overall strategic and tactical decision-making once a combat campaign is up and running.

Motivations for Combat

Any analysis of the use of violence in intra-state war must consider a rebel leader's expected utility of initiating or entering a civil conflict.⁸ Collier & Hoeffler (2003) popularized the greed and grievance school of thought in studies of intra-state war

⁸ Various scholars have explored sources of motivation. Most notably, Collier & Hoeffler (2003) and Collier & Sambanis (2005) find that opportunity-based and motive-based explanations of civil war and insurgency offer a compelling rationale for why conflicts persist as long as they do. Similarly, Weinstein (2007) considers the unique behavior of opportunist and activist rebellions across the sequence of civil war. In the Collier & Hoeffler argument (2003), while motive or "grievance" matters to some extent, it is necessarily of secondary importance to a group's ability to survive or profit off the fighting.

and rebel conflict, in particular. Their framework advances the idea that conflicts are perpetuated by the pursuit of economic gains versus political grievances.

Here, I make the case that individual motivations of greed and grievance driving warfare partially shape leader type. However, I conceptualize “greed” based leaders as decision-making entities pursuing conflict for pecuniary gain above all else. These leader types typically find peace to be unprofitable, and are therefore concerned with the accrual and distribution of private goods as opposed to collective public goods.

In contrast, “grievance” based leaders pursue conflict for ideological, ethnic, political or religious reasons. As a result, their focus is less on private gains or good and more on the accrual and distribution of public goods.⁹ Whether or not the pursuit of public versus private goods drives a leader, will ultimately influence a leader’s decision-making calculus during war. As such, private goods driven leaders will be more politically exclusive and more self-centered in their aims when compared to public goods driven leaders.

I also contend that a leader’s concern for public or private goods influences patterns of group recruitment, formation, and behavior in armed intrastate conflict. Rebel group viability is largely determined by a leader’s ability to secure resources and provide current or future incentives to participation—this is true for both rebel entrepreneurs and rebel commanders.¹⁰ Effective leaders are able to balance the distribution of private and

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of leaders and their pursuit of public versus private goods see Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003).

¹⁰ It is reasonable to expect rebel commanders to encounter greater difficulties than their entrepreneur counterparts in sustaining participation among their subordinates, especially once these individuals have been exposed to enduring forms of warfare, in addition to the grave costs associated with continued fighting. Barring promotion and selective

public goods to secure membership loyalty and induce members to participate in fighting. My theory proposes that rebel leaders, according to their type, balance these differently.

Specifically, leaders who are primarily interested in filling their own coffers will create a group payoff structure centered on select, private incentives. Private goods based leaders will seek to recruit or rely upon opportunistic individuals (Weinstein 2007), mercenaries, or “accidental guerrillas” (Kilcullen 2009). Likewise, rebel leaders who are motivated by public goods will recruit and strategize in such a way as to maximize the probability of having those goals met. These types of leaders pursue highly committed individuals (Weinstein 2007). Leader type in the *ex post* conflict onset stage (i.e. rebel commander stage) depends in part on the type of motive and degree of opportunity that exists in a conflict environment. Case in point, Mitchell (2004) contends that leaders are motivated either by self-interest or ideology when making decisions to engage in violence. At a basic level, it is individual *leaders* who induce their followers to commit acts of violence on the basis of private or public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).

Leaders focused on public goods rely on ideological, sectarian, or political grievances as a source of power and organizational survival. They preside over activist rebellions in which participation is comprised of highly committed principals and agents (Weinstein 2007). Most often they come to power through their ability to offer a vision of political or ideological reform. These types of leaders will appeal to their followers and potential recruits on the basis of the perceived infeasibility of the status quo and future public goods to be gained (i.e. political empowerment, greater economic mobility,

incentives, the utility of sustained warfare with no hope of settlement likely diminishes over time for the rank-and-file (see Kilcullen 2009).

religious freedoms, etc.) To such leaders, peace is untenable until their political or ideological demands are met. Victory translates into achievement of political ends.

Not all public goods, however, are created equal. Some leader demands may be positioned in closer proximity to a regime's set of preferences (and are therefore more likely to be adopted).¹¹ While public good-based incentive structures can serve as a primary condition for group recruitment and strategy formation, there must also be present a stream of available private goods to sustain the conflict. Even freedom fighters have to pay the bills and stay viable. A focus on public goods emphasizes that, while some form of opportunity is required to sustain a conflict, many rebel leaders enter the conflict environment with a genuine grievance and are unconcerned with personal gain. Their personal metrics for success in warfare are judged primarily on their ability to secure political goals for their respective domestic audience.

In contrast, private good-based leaders emerge as a result of their predatory skills and pursuit of self-interested ends. Simply put, these types of leaders see conflict as a source of profits. At a basic level, greed-driven leaders preside over opportunistic rebellions, in which participation of agents is fuelled by the promise of short-term rewards (Weinstein 2007). These leader types will make appeals to their followers and potential recruits by promising them pecuniary gain as a result of their participation.

To be clear, the approach offered in this dissertation considers private goods as items of pure greed. Both private and public good-based leaders need opportunities for

¹¹ In some instances, public goods-based leaders can veer into extremism as they publicly emphasize a cosmic battle of ideals as a motivating force for continued conflict. I label these personalities "zealots" and expect that the intensity of violence in the conflict duration will be higher than more moderate ideologues. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (IS), Antar Zouabri (GIA), and Osama Bin Laden (AQ) fits into this category.

conflict to be present, but private goods-driven leaders leech these resources to generate personal profit streams and recruit followers only when it further increases their own coffers. They will induce participation in political violence by offering selective incentives, mainly in the form of current or future financial and material rewards. These types of leaders emphasize and capitalize on the profits of conflict to maintain the viability and sustainability of a conflict. Private goods-based leaders also must take great pains to balance the immediate distribution of select incentives with the promise of “more to come.” They tend to recruit consumers of conflicts, unlike the investors that characterize participation in public good or grievance based campaigns of insurgency (Weinstein 2007). To these types of leaders, peace is not only precarious, but it is potentially unprofitable, thus when leaders do well out of war, they are more likely to sustain the violence (Collier & Hoeffler 2003; Collier et al 2004).

Essentially, these are ideal-types that exist on a continuum. They are not always mutually exclusive, nor are they directly observable. For example, rebel leaders can shift their focus from public to private goods, whereas private good-driven leaders may operate on the pretense of political grievance, disguising themselves as political freedom fighters, all the while operating on the basis of profit. In some cases, leaders may vacillate between sources of mobilizing power. Over the course of a conflict, leaders may even shift from economic modes of organization to social and political modes of organization (Weinstein 2007). I do not preclude the possibility that motivations are in some cases endogenous to the fighting, and therefore likely to evolve over the course of a conflict. This is one of the main reasons I attempt to distinguish between public and private goods-based leaders, as well as entrepreneurs and commanders.

It is also important to link individual motivations to outcomes stemming from bargaining failures. Whether or not a leader is pursuing public versus private goods can potentially distort their expectations of victory through problems of information, the creation of incentives for bluffing, a weakening of actor commitments to uphold an agreement's terms, and embellishment of the issue stakes. Leaders may fetishize short-term gains at the expense of long-term goals, or they may be too cautious in pursuing long-term objectives, especially when short-term rewards may offer a critical lifeline to struggling groups.

These are just a few examples of the ways in which motivation shapes bargaining in war. The main point, however, should be clear: leadership incentives determine the size of the demands. In some cases, the personal motivations of leaders are likely to override group interests, which has implications for the nature or type of the fighting, the severity of violence, and the prospects for termination. In the end, a leader's sincere preference to profit the few or provide for the many has profound implications for the prosecution of combat.

Military Experience

Although conflict motivation is a crucial factor, it represents only one side of the story. The pursuit of public versus private goods is conditioned, in large part, by a leader's military experience. Earlier, I made the case that rebel leaders are military creatures. I theorize that leaders with military experience are different from leaders who lack sufficient military training or consolidate their power on the sole basis of an overarching political vision. Although political skills are a necessary component for successful leadership in armed intra-state conflict, it is not sufficient. Rather, leaders

with military skills are often able to sustain a conflict and control the nature of the violence without offering a compelling ideological message. They excel at providing such a message.

Past approaches suggest that a leader's military background has implications on their group's ability to wage war. Mitchell (2004) theorizes that leaders exert a great deal of control over the range and nature of political violence that is employed within a state, but this control is determined, in part, by who they are and what they represent. Mason (2004) observes that effective leaders are typically well educated and possess the skills and experiences associated with operating in formal organizations. In poverty-stricken conflict-ridden environments, individuals with these types of skills and experiences are rare. Those who do possess wartime entrepreneurial skills are vital to the organizational efforts of local dissidents. The past background and experiences of the principals themselves should have a direct bearing on how a conflict plays out among various agents. It should also have implications for the nature of warfare observed.

Leaders with military experience formulate and execute strategies usually considering the efficacy and efficiency of their actions; they are likely to create strong cohesive command structures to mitigate principal-agent problems. Concerns about military effectiveness are likely to weigh heavily on their minds. Leaders lacking military experience are more concerned with ideological or profit-seeking agendas at the expense of sound military strategy; they implement weak command structures and suffer from principal-agent problems as a result.

For Shapiro (2013), leaders of insurgent organizations are vital to group sustainability. In effect, leaders play a role similar to corporate executives in their

attempts to manage personnel, delegate tasks, and overall, seek to remove principal-agent problems within their organizations. Furthermore, Tallmadge (2015) argues that leaders play an important role in promoting military effectiveness through the implementation of promotion patterns, command structures, and training regimens. In addition, Sescher (2004) finds empirical evidence that a leader's prior military experience significantly affects their decision-making with respect to the use of force. Extending this type of approach to the level of intra-state conflict, I expect to see differences in the nature and duration of violence, driven in part by the observed differences between leaders' military experiences.

I also argue that a leader's military experience impacts the nature of the rebellion, which translates into variation in the type and intensity of the fighting, and finally, the prospects for settlement. Military skills are an endogenous source of alteration in the conflict environment, which impacts the technology of rebellion or the type of warfare employed by the combatants (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). The strategies and actions of effective combat leaders alter the strategic calculus of opponents thereby altering the type of tactics employed by either side. Effective military leaders are better able to recognize when one tactic is favorable to another. For example, when faced with an opponent who possesses overwhelming military capability, an effective leader may switch to more unconventional tactics. Shifts in tactics can alter the nature of conflict dynamics with implications for violence (Wood et al 2012).

A leader's lack of military experience makes it difficult for that individual to develop and select optimal strategies and tactics. They are less likely to be able to recognize threats and adapt to changes in the environment. Most importantly, they are

more likely to lose control to sub-commanders within organizations, and oversee unwieldy organizations that fail to reflect their preferences. In contrast, leaders with military experience are better able to selectively target enemies and civilians, while also possessing greater capability to increase or decrease levels of violence and intensity. Political vision is complementary to, but not a substitute for combat efficacy and effectiveness. An effective military leader will work hard to ensure that military means are married appropriately to political goals (Jones 2017).

Additionally, a solid military background helps a leader maintain control of the organization through continued success on the battlefield. Military leaders can implement cohesion, discipline, and selective forms of punishment and incentives. As a result, the military leader is better equipped to deal with principal-agent problems by more effectively monitoring agents and ensuring that orders are carried out. Stronger command structures serves to amplify a leader's agency within a conflict. Military leaders are better able to implement cohesive and effective mid-level command structures. This allows for better communication between battlefield units across a combat theater and encourages discipline among subordinates.


For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) I have identified a number of rebel leaders lacking military training whose groups suffered chronic principal-agent problems. In most cases, these groups featured weak command structures leading to the proliferation of splinter groups. As a result, I observe considerable variance in duration and levels of the intensity of violence through the conflict.

In contrast, evidence from the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) reveals a much more cohesive and centralized command structure. This ultimately led to less

fractionalization and, on the whole, fewer principal-agent problems. By ensuring a reliable chain of command, military leaders are better able to mitigate principal-agent problems, communicate across battlefield commands, and react more quickly to the changing demands of combat.

I argue that military actions speak louder than politics in anarchic situations of armed intra-state warfare. Thus, military prowess is a key determinant of rebel group survival and eventual victory in the rebel commander stage. The leaders who balance political and military success are most likely to achieve decisive victories over their opponents. Military experience, or lack thereof, also complicates the bargaining process, as leaders with varying levels of experience will perceive and assess battlefield information differently, while also showing variation in their level of commitment to a deal. They may also suffer from an inability to communicate deals to sub-commanders making it difficult to enforce the terms of a deal within their own organization. Military training, both in terms of quantity and quality, can make the difference in a leader's decision to pursue costly conflict in favor of peace. Not to mention, the presence of military experience may also influence the extent to which leaders prioritize important issues stakes versus combat objectives.

Figure 2.1. Mapping the Emergence of Rebel “Commanders”



My theory, then, proposes that a leader’s willingness to initiate severe violence, engage in a particular type of combat, and lengthen a combat campaign is primarily a function of leader type—shaped by motivation and military experience—and secondarily a function of the context of a given conflict. Variation along these dimensions of motivation and military experience yields four ideal types of rebel leaders and offers testable implications with respect to their ability to shape conflict outcomes in intra-state war. In the next chapter, I present the RLCW typology along with a number of hypotheses about the effects of rebel leaders on outcomes of technology of rebellion, combat severity, and a leader’s tenure.

CHAPTER 3
THE TYPOLOGY OF REBEL LEADERS
“THE PLAYERS”

“The first rule of guerrilla warfare is not to be caught in bed.”

- Jonas Savimbi, Angola 1979¹²

Introduction

The intersection of motivations for conflict and military experience yields four ideal types of rebel leaders: the Ideologue, the Insurgent, the Operator, and the Warlord. Each of these leader types produces testable implications for further study. The individual types also behave differently in the bargaining process by playing varying roles in negotiating and fighting. The rebel leader typology presented below is inspired by Weeks (2012) typology of autocratic systems, which yielded testable implications for international conflict behavior among varying types of authoritarian regimes. In this chapter, I provide the foundations of individual rebel leader types and offer a brief description of each type. I conclude this chapter by providing testable implications for each type with respect to my main outcomes of interest: combat type (i.e. technology of rebellion), severity (i.e. combat casualties), and tenure of combat (i.e. the length of a leader’s campaign).

¹² Bridgland (1986)

The Ideologue

The Ideologue is defined at the nexus of two dimensions: grievance and a lack of military experience. Driven solely by perceived political grievance, they aim to upend the current political environment. Ideologues, are therefore, public good oriented.¹³ As a result, they tend to place an emphasis on long-term political gains and operate on the basis of longer time horizons when analyzing costs and benefits.

The Ideologue is more likely than other leader types in the RLCW to be politically inclusive and build a leadership command structure that features a larger loyalty norm. Their lack of military experience, however, inhibits their ability to take direct control over military operations. In some cases, Ideologues will prefer to separate themselves from military operations, in effect creating a bifurcation between the political and military wings of a rebel organization. In other cases, the Ideologue's military command structure is often weak and decentralized making monitoring of lower-level commanders difficult. It may also be may be non-existent, leading to the creation of a large, unwieldy organization with little oversight and a high likelihood of splintering. The Ideologue is usually incapable of selecting appropriate modes of rebellion in response to their opponent and an evolving conflict environment. As a result, witnesses to a conflict are likely to observe a wide variety of combat modes during a campaign.

More often than not, their poor strategy and tactic selection translates into sub-optimal modes of rebellion and undesirable military outcomes. Thus, Ideologues tend to delegate to more experience commanders. For example, this may explain why leaders

¹³ Throughout this project, I borrow language from Selectorate Theory detailed in Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) to help explicate the logic of rebel leadership in intra-state war. For example, I conceptualize leader type in terms of public versus private goods, loyalty norms, and constituencies.

such as Gerry Adams (Irish Republican Army), Muqtada al-Sadr (Al-Mahdi Army) or Khaled Meshal (Hamas) focus primarily on political responsibilities and delegate military responsibilities to lower level commanders. Although principal-agent problems may arise as a consequence of this bifurcation and diffuse structure, the Ideologue's ability to offer vision, embody a cause, and serve as a symbolic figurehead to a cause, may help mitigate these issues in the short-term in order to sustain organizational viability in the long-term.

I expect Ideologues to be more amenable to compromise in the bargaining process. Their emphasis on political goals leads them to prefer the benefits of peace to the costs of war. However, this depends largely on the size of their demands, which are wide ranging for Ideologues. While some Ideologues have practical, tangible political goals, there are still others who act as ideological *zealots*.

For the former, an agreement that addresses important grievances and allows for agency and inclusion in a post-conflict political landscape is sufficient for a deal to emerge. For the latter, the bargaining space is narrow, and in some instances, it may be otherworldly effectively keeping a deal out of reach.¹⁴ This latter camp of leaders is comprised mainly of hard-core activists, such as Osama bin Laden (Al-Qaeda) or Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (Islamic State). Men of this caliber emphasize indivisible issue stakes and are unwilling to compromise on what they perceive to be sacred spaces or issues.

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion on this topic see Juergensmeyer (2003). He suggests that some individuals engage in a violent cosmic war of ideas. Their goals are often rooted in religious extremism and not likely achievable on earth. As such, violence itself often becomes the end goal since these types of individuals are unlikely to compromise on issues of faith and settle for tangible political outcomes on earth.

In either case, a lack of military experience may be a liability for three reasons. First, they will be unable to assess battlefield performance, which complicates the information game. Moreover, they may prioritize political issue stakes over military goals, thereby decreasing their leverage at the bargaining table. Lastly, their proneness to delegation of military responsibility creates commitment problems making it difficult for them to stick an agreement, as rogue commanders are left unchecked and splintering occurs over the final terms. They are also at increased risk of adverse selection and moral hazard, given their distance from military operations.

Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah represents such an ideal-type. Nasrallah is a spiritual leader who sits at the helm of the Lebanese religious and political group Hezbollah. This group is functionally bifurcated into political and paramilitary wings. Nasrallah offers political and spiritual guidance, governs primarily on the basis of public goods, and chooses to delegate military strategy to senior level commanders in the military wing of his organization. In Chapter 6, I profile the campaign of Antar Zouabri who fits the mold of a zealot Ideologue in the Algerian Civil War.

The Insurgent

The Insurgent is a leader who possesses substantial military experience and is motivated by grievance. Like the Ideologue, the Insurgent is oriented toward the allocation and provision of public goods. They act on the basis of longer time horizons in the pursuit of political, economic, or religious concessions. The Insurgent tends to be politically inclusive, and creates a structure of operations with a small loyalty norm.

However, the Insurgent's military background pushes them to focus on achieving military efficacy and efficiency. For the Insurgent, military experience is a means to

overturning the political status quo. Therefore, the Insurgent has a vested interest in assuming direct control over a group's day-to-day military operations in order to mitigate principal-agent problems, eradicate moral hazard, and avoid adverse selection problems in recruitment.

In cases where a particular technology of rebellion is not strategically optimal, the Insurgent will avoid it. Insurgents tend to employ violence selectively, while being cognizant of the perceptions of non-combatants. The Insurgent is also likely to employ population-centric modes of warfare. They exhibit more control over strategic and tactical decision-making, and as a result, they are more responsive and adaptive in their conflict environment than leader types who lack military experience. The Insurgent tends to be a student of warfare.

Case in point, the Afghan rebel leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was known just as much for his political savvy as his military acumen (Coll 2004). Massoud's Northern Alliance featured a more traditional, hierarchical military command structure (Williams 2013). As a result, Massoud was better able to mitigate principal-agent problems, and therefore, employ violence selectively and strategically. For Massoud, military success was inextricably linked to political success enabling him to secure a high-level position in the Afghan government. As I will show in Chapter 6, Sri Lankan rebel leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran is another example of how Insurgents are able to use their experience and skill-set to wage long-running political-military campaigns.

Insurgents depend less on a cooperative group structure and more on a rigid system of command. They recruit highly committed rebels who empathize with their grievance. Therefore, where the Insurgent suffers agency loss it is rarely for lack of

proper enforcement mechanisms, but because the Insurgent fails to deliver upon promises of military success or lack of material resources to maintain operation costs. The Insurgent can mitigate agency loss by securing a stable stream of income to fund operations, winning military battles, and properly training recruits.

With respect to the bargaining model, I expect Insurgents to drive a harder bargain on the basis of strong military performance. Their training makes them more capable processors of combat information, which can then be used for leverage at the bargaining table. Moreover, their dual-focus on military and political gains makes them amenable to settlement, similar to less zealous Ideologues. Yet they may pursue lengthier campaigns when it seems strategically viable.

In some situations, the Insurgent may make large demands on their opponents and settle for nothing less in their pursuit of total military defeat of the enemy. Often, the Insurgent is effective at embodying a cause through their military exploits and rallying participation in the advancement of their cause.

The Operator

Next, I introduce the Operator. Like the Ideologue, the Operator has little or no experience with military command. Unlike the Ideologue, however, the Operator is motivated primarily by the pursuit of personal profits. As a result, this ideal type is oriented to profiteering through the allocation and distribution of *private* goods. This means the Operator is likely to be politically exclusive, resulting in a highly selective leadership network and small winning coalition of cronies. Operators tend to act in accordance with shorter time horizons since they are more likely to emphasize immediate pecuniary gain in contrast to future political rewards.

Generally speaking, Operators are likely to exhibit indirect control over combat operations, leading to a weak and decentralized military command structure. Like the Ideologue, their lack of military training makes them incapable of selecting, implementing and controlling appropriate modes of warfare. On the one hand, principal-agent problems abound in Operator-led groups, leading to the loss of control and the prominence of rogue sub-commanders who seek their own profit streams. On the other hand, Operators encourage pecuniary adventurism on the part of mid-level commanders to avoid being burdened with the responsibility of offering payments for their services. Operators make executive decisions on the basis of securing private rewards at the expense of sound military doctrine.

This type of single-faceted decision-making often weakens the rebel organization and decreases popular support for the Operator. The Operator's willingness to emphasize short-term pecuniary gains over long-term political goals is detrimental to the group's long-term sustainability and viability. This has the effect of insulating the leadership, splintering the organization, encouraging high-level military defections, and increasing indiscriminate violence. Through their failure to stem adverse selection and moral hazard problems, Operator-led organizations routinely implode or they devolve into criminal mafia-style organizations.

A classic example is found in the Liberian Civil War, in which the rebel leader Charles Taylor served at the helm of the notorious National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). As leader of the NPFL, Taylor ran a brutal campaign of violence directed at his enemies and civilians alike, in which exploitation, looting, and sexual violence proved to be commonplace (Waugh 2011). In his desire to secure private rewards, Taylor

negotiated business deals with multinational companies, trafficked arms, and engaged in the sale of precious stones (PBS 2014). In his zealous pursuit of revenue stream, Taylor sought to perpetrate armed conflict beyond Liberia's borders and into Sierra Leone. I delve deeper into the Taylor campaign later, in Chapter 6.

On average, I expect Operators to run wanton and reckless campaigns with a short lifespan featuring wide variation in the type of conflict and severity of violence. The Operator motivates others with material incentives. A sub-commander's loyalty is only as good as their last paycheck and the anticipation of the loot to come. Agency loss, however, is not as costly to the Operator as it is to other leader types. It frequently results in increased violent domestic anarchy, yet the Operator has a comparative advantage in capitalizing off of chaos. Thus, Operators do not always want to mitigate agency loss, but when they do, they can only do so by providing more wealth to their fighters.

Similar to the Ideologue, the Operator is prone to principal-agent problems making commitment difficult and settlement unlikely. For one, they are too focused on profits to settle quickly. But also, they are less likely to recognize military failures, and are therefore, more likely to make strategically sub-optimal decisions with respect to settling a conflict. Their exorbitant demands are unlikely to change in response to battlefield dynamics. Additionally, they are unable to control the rogue mid-level commanders they created making commitment an especially big problem. In reality, Operator-led campaigns are particularly violent and most likely to end in total defeat. They are unable to see defeat on the horizon, and often they are blinded by their pursuit of private goods to acknowledge setbacks on the battlefield. Similar to Hobbes's state of nature, Operator-run campaigns tend to be nasty, brutish, and short.

The Warlord

The Warlord lies at the nexus of personal gain and military experience. To date, the concept of the Warlord has been inflated to include a wide array of characteristics rendering it analytically meaningless. One goal of this project, however, is to reinvigorate the concept with a modicum of analytical precision.¹⁵ Analogous to the Operator, the Warlord sustains the rebellion through the allocation and provision of private goods to a small cadre of followers. Thus, the Warlord regime is politically exclusive and characterized by a small loyalty norm, like the Operator.

One of the defining features of Warlords is their dual focus on military *and* economic gains. In this vein, military operations are a means to maximizing immediate profits. The Warlord's military experience conditions them to favor the use of force, but their motivation for pecuniary game does not preclude them from engaging in brutal forms of warfare aimed at combatants and non-combatants alike. As a result, Warlords may capitalize on their military experience to capitalize off domestic anarchy and create fiefdoms for the sole purpose of developing, facilitating, and maintaining revenue streams.

Similar to the Insurgent, the Warlord takes ownership over military operations—including planning and strategy—and relies on a strong centralized military command structure. Therefore, they have more control over the technology of rebellion. They are poised to formulate sound strategies and select effective tactics in response to their conflict environment and opponents. Principal-agent problems are less likely to arise under the leadership of a Warlord since they are capable of monitoring agents more

¹⁵ For an interesting discussion of these challenges when conceptualizing “Warlords” see Marten (2007) and Giustozzi (2012).

closely due to their close relationship with field commanders and foot soldiers. Warlords are equipped to implement a strong mid-level command structure shaped by training, discipline, and the provision of selective incentives.

For example, “the Chairman” Laurent Nkunda, led various rebel factions in the Congolese conflict theater for more than two decades (Stearns 2011). Originally trained in the armed forces of the DRC, Nkunda created a cult of personality in his fight against his political enemies. Indicted for war crimes, Nkunda waged highly lethal campaigns of violence in his pursuit of political power and economic gain. Reportedly, Nkunda targeted precious minerals and natural resources, as aggressively as he targeted non-combatant populations in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Stearns 2011). For Nkunda, war was a means to a very profitable end. Although Nkunda is a classic RLCW Warlord, I highlight the campaign of Jonas Savimbi in Chapter 6. Although initially an Insurgent, over time Savimbi transitions to Warlord evidenced by his ruthless pursuit of personal power and profits by the end of the Angolan Civil War.

Warlords are the most capable of mitigating agency loss. Unlike the Operator, they do not suffer fools or rogue sub-commanders. Through regular military victories and consistent payouts of profits, the Warlord is able to prevent agents from attempting to defect at all. Warlords further mitigate agency loss and reduce problems of adverse selection and moral hazard by their ability to engender discipline and loyalty through the chain of command. Although Warlords place primary importance on using sound military doctrine to maximize personal profits, both selective and indiscriminate violence may be employed in strategic fashion, especially given their complex payoff system.

Of all leader types, Warlords are the most difficult to bargain with since they drive the hardest bargains due to their dual military and focus on revenue streams. Like the Operator, they are more prone to bargaining failures than Ideologues and Insurgents. They process information in a rational, capable manner, they can uphold an agreement when they finally decide to settle on the terms, and they are better able to adjust the size of their demands in response to changing conflict dynamics. However, they are effective and efficient manufacturers of political violence. Essentially, they drive the hardest bargains. In essence, Warlords are termites that eventually embed their organizations within the political foundation of a state: once they are embedded within that foundation they are difficult to exterminate. *Table 3.1.* presents an overview of the typology.

Table 3.1: RLCW Typology, 1989-2014¹⁶

| <i>Motivation</i> | <i>Military Experience</i> | |
|----------------------|---|---|
| | <i>Non-Military</i> | <i>Military</i> |
| <i>Public Goods</i> | <p>“The Ideologue” (528 leader-years)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public good orientated • Longer time horizons, emphasis on lasting shifts in political landscape • Politically inclusive, smaller loyalty norm • Primary focus on political arena • Less focus on effective military operations • Weak decentralized military command structure <p><u>Examples:</u> Osama Bin Laden; Leonard Nyangoma; Muqtada Al-Sadr; Abdullah Ocalan</p> | <p>“The Insurgent” (545 leader-years)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public good orientated • Longer time horizons, emphasis on lasting shifts in political landscape • Politically inclusive, smaller loyalty norm • Dual focus on political and military efficacy and efficiency • Focus on effective military operations • Strong centralized military command structure <p><u>Examples:</u> Ahmed Shah Massoud, Doku Umarov; John Garang; Velupillai Prabhakaran</p> |
| <i>Private Goods</i> | <p>“The Operator” (100 leader-years)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private good orientated • Shorter time horizons, emphasis on immediate pecuniary gain versus future political reward • Politically exclusive, higher loyalty norm • Primary focus on economic gains • Less focus on effective military operations • Weak decentralized military command structure <p><u>Examples:</u> Al-Zarqawi; Joseph Kony; Charles Taylor; Malik Ishaq</p> | <p>“The Warlord” (254 leader-years)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private good orientated • Shorter time horizons, emphasis on immediate pecuniary gain versus future political reward • Politically exclusive, higher loyalty norm • Dual focus on military and economic gains • Focus on effective military operations • Strong centralized military command structure <p><u>Examples:</u> Johnny Korama; Prince Johnson; Carlos Castano; Laurent Nkunda</p> |

¹⁶ N=1,427

Ultimately, rebel leaders make decisions in pursuit of personal gain or the amelioration of a horizontal grievance. Effective leaders are able to manipulate motivations for public and private goods to secure membership loyalty and induce members to participate in fighting. Extending beyond the motive-opportunity framework, I theorize that leader type in the rebel commander stage ultimately depends on their motivation for conflict and depth of their military experience.

In effect, public goods-based leaders rely on large loyalty norms, while leaders interested in private goods rely on small loyalty norms. However, it is the cross cutting effects of military experience that determine whether or not the leader is able to prosecute a conflict campaign, and employ the appropriate type and levels of violence, successfully. The interplay of these dimensions has ramifications for the emergence of bargaining failures, combat decisions, the nature of warfare, and the likelihood of a leader's exit from the conflict.

Hypotheses

The theoretical framework and typology suggests a number of empirical implications for rebel leaders and violent accounts in intra-state war. These implications can be tested quantitatively and evaluated qualitatively. In addition to offering a novel theory of rebel leaders in war, this dissertation examines three main outcomes of interest sequentially—the type, severity, and tenure of a leader's combat campaign.

I lay these out sequentially since I argue that rebel leaders shape an overall logic of violence, namely, that the choice of combat type is linked to severity, which in turn, shapes the duration of fighting. Although I do not necessarily test of the relationship between these three outcomes of interest directly, I do expect rebel leader type to be

directly related to each combat outcome. Given my discussion of each of the individual leader types, I expect a number of interesting expectations unique to leader type, all else being equal. Below, I put forth three main hypotheses about the effects of leader type on campaign strategy:

Hypothesis 1a: On average, Insurgents and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Operators to engage in symmetric conventional (i.e. traditional set piece) combat campaigns in a given year relative to situations of irregular warfare in which the state has the advantage.

Hypothesis 1b: On average, Insurgents and Warlords are also more likely than Ideologues and Operators to gain the upper hand against state militaries in a given year after starting at a disadvantage.

Hypothesis 1c: On average, Operators and Warlords are also more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to exploit non-conventional symmetric (i.e. primitive) warfare relative to irregular-state advantage (i.e. asymmetric combat in which the state has an advantage) warfare in a given year.

Insurgents and Warlord are defined, in part, by their extensive military experience. Therefore, I expect these leader types to be able to formulate strategies and implement tactics that characterize more traditional types of kinetic military campaigns, unlike Ideologues and Operators. When it is advantageous, leaders with military background will not shy away from conventional engagements, partly because they are able to employ these technologies of rebellion.

Likewise, an Operator's lack of interest in public goods will seek the lowest common denominator of combat type. It is costly and time-consuming to confront opponents in traditional set piece battles. Therefore, the Operator will tend to seek other modes of warfare that are cheap as a way to maximize profit margins. Combat, if necessary, is a means to a criminal end for the Operator. Although Ideologues are not entirely excluded from conventional warfare, especially in cases where they delegate to a

more experienced commander, she will seek the least violent form of military resistance to achieve their political goals. This means minimizing civilian violence and fighting wars cheaply in order to keep their campaigns viable. In some cases, the Ideologue will lay low and entirely refrain from military action.

Warlords, although driven by pecuniary gain and private goods, are effective battlefield managers. Thus, I also expect their leader years to feature irregular warfare in which they have an advantage over the state. As such, they are able to set up their own personal fiefdoms under the barrel of the gun. In doing so, the Warlord protects her investment ensuring a steady flow of revenue. Warlords will utilize their considerable military acumen to gain a comparative combat advantage—something Ideologues and Operators are simply unable to do. Although it seems reasonable to expect Insurgents to similarly gain an advantage militarily, I argue that once Insurgents have the advantage combat ends in either victory or a negotiated settlement that favors their side. In contrast, Warlords will create a *de facto* state and continue the conflict in order to maintain access to revenue streams that increase their ability to secure and distribute private goods.

Finally, I have one final expectation that leaders driven by private goods will be more likely to engage in primitive forms of non-conventional symmetric combat. I reason that a desire for private goods should push Operators and Warlords to exploit more primitive modes of warfare, given the low overhead costs associated with this type of warfare and their innate desire to maximize profits. Operators and Warlords are plagued by a number of recruitment issues and moral hazards given the chaotic and violent state of domestic anarchy in which they function. Moreover, these types of leaders may even prefer to set up their organizations in these types of difficult

environments. Therefore, I expect it to be a challenge for them to conduct organized campaigns of resistance, even in the presence of a Warlord's military skill. Moreover, they are likely to exploit situations of weak state capacity and will set up their operations in areas plagued by poverty, violence and a lack of institutions. This makes the environment ripe for syndicalist, primitive modes of warfare whether they desire it or not. In either case, their pursuit of pecuniary gain will lead them to capitalize and even encourage this type of combat.

Overall, the first two hypotheses (1a, 1b) attempt to parse out the strategic and tactical effects between those who possess military skills and those who do not, whereas the final hypothesis (1c) tries to identify whether or not meaningful differences exist between those who use combat strategies to seek private versus public goods.

Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, Operators and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to engage in higher levels of combat severity in a given year.

Given their ruthless pursuit of profits and lack of military training, I expect Operators to conduct wanton and reckless campaigns characterized by agency loss and extreme levels of violence, particularly toward civilian populations. Lacking a strong command structure and unable or unwilling to discipline the rank-and-file, Operators are unable to moderate levels of violence. In contrast to Ideologues, an Operator's desire for private gain at the expense of public goods means they are more likely to unleash extra-lethal forms of violence, both intentionally and unintentionally. Moreover, I expect they are unable to control that violence once it is unleashed. Operators are the most likely of all RLCW leader types to wield violence indiscriminately.

Unlike the Operator, the Warlord will use their military acumen to “up the ante” and engage in brutal tactics against combatants and non-combatants alike. Their skill on the battlefield allows them to impose huge costs on their opponents in terms of personnel and materials. Given their focus on private gains, they may also be willing to pay costs through combat personnel deemed expendable in a campaign. Whereas military training may act as a moderating factor for Insurgents, this will not be true for Warlords.

Based on the preceding theoretical discussion, I expect Ideologues and Insurgents to be the least likely leader-types to run campaigns featuring high levels of severity. For Ideologues, high severity combat is not desirable as they attempt to address grievances through the obtainment and distribution of public goods. Moreover, Ideologues lack the military acumen necessary to wage all out war. In cases of high severity, it is likely the Ideologue suffered agency loss, similar to my expectations about the Warlord. It is the Ideologue’s desire for political gains and a post-conflict political future that mitigate the likelihood of engaging in all out war.

Similarly, I expect Insurgent-run campaigns to be less severe. In these cases, military training and experience is a moderating factor. High severity is only likely when it is military advantageous to engage in tactics that lead to high severity or in response to overwhelming force perpetrated by the state. On average, Insurgents are able to rely on strong command structures, preparedness, and discipline among the rank-and-file to mitigate agency loss and control the speed, size, and intensity of combat. They are also concerned with matching political goals to sound military strategy. The destruction of war may serve as an obstacle in their path to a political victory, thus an Insurgent is likely to pay close attention to nature and severity of their combat campaigns.

Hypothesis 3: Overall, I expect Operators to preside over shorter combat campaigns, unlike Ideologues, Warlords, and Insurgents.

The preceding discussion suggests a link between combat severity, type and a leader's tenure in war. In the following chapters, I offer a test of these relationships. The individual types identified in the RLCW are driven by different goals, which are conditioned by their military experience and aptitude. It seems reasonable then to expect Ideologues, Insurgents, Operators and Warlords to differ systematically in their ability to manage, adapt and sustain combat campaigns. Their goals and skill sets may even change over the course of a campaign, suggesting that a leader's background and evolving experience in combat represent critical factors that are likely to shape the prospects for conflict termination. Given their lack of military training and zealous—if at times reckless—pursuit of private goods, I expect Operators to preside over short, and more often than not, violent combat campaigns. To reiterate, I focus on the campaigns of individual leaders as important mechanisms for driving overall combat duration. A leader's motivations and skill set shapes their incentives to stay in the fight or settle.

Despite their lack of military training, the Ideologue's devotion to public goods and inclusiveness improves their ability to attract committed followers and delegate to skillful mid-level commanders, while managing the political side of their organization. In effect, they are able to mitigate moral hazard, adapt to changing conditions, and are better positioned to sustain the viability of their campaign, all else being equal.

Alternatively, Insurgent and Warlords are also able to stay in theater longer than Operators given their expertise as effective and efficient battlefield managers. Military experienced leaders can drive a harder bargain and reveal more information about their

capability and resolve. Thus, I expect them to stay in theater longer than Operators who are more likely than the other types to conduct reckless tactically sub-optimal campaigns. Their military skills give them significant leverage in a combat situation, which keeps them in the fight longer and provides them with the ability to settle on more favorable terms or win an outright victory.

CHAPTER 4

THE DATA

“REBEL LEADERS IN CIVIL WAR DATASET”

“No military leader is endowed by heaven with an ability to seize the initiative. It is the intelligent leader who does so after careful study and estimate of the situation and arrangement of the military and political factors involved.”

- Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 1937

Introducing the RLCW

In order to test my theory, I rely on original data from the RLCW (Willingham & Doctor 2017). The RLCW dataset is a joint collection effort from 2014-2017 with my colleague at the University of Georgia, Austin Doctor.¹⁷ This dataset includes important indicators of rebel leader motivations, military experience, conflict type and severity, and combat duration, as well as a host of exogenous and endogenous controls identified in the literature as having a significant impact on intra-state conflict outcomes. The RLCW is also unique in that it provides a comprehensive list of rebel leaders operating in armed intra-state conflict since 1989. To my knowledge, this is the first dataset of its kind.

The unit of analysis in this data set is provided in actor-year format—that is, rebel leaders operating in a given conflict by year. This dataset builds off the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016 (Melander et al 2016). It contains conflict-year and dyad-year information on armed conflict between 1946 and

¹⁷ From 2015-2016, our collection effort benefited greatly from the assistance of a team of about 25 undergraduate students at the University of Georgia trained and managed by Mr. Doctor and myself.

2015. Most notably, the UCDP dataset identifies state and non-state actors in conflict, as well as data on battle-deaths and civilian killings. Unlike the UCDP data, RLCW is limited armed conflict information for leaders of non-state armed groups. Additionally, the RLCW data expands on the UCDP data by including civilian victimization data for actors and years not previously identified by UCDP. The RLCW dataset further expands on the UCDP dataset by introducing a number of new measures integrating macro, meso, and micro-level explanations for violence.

First, the RLCW dataset identifies a singular leader of a rebel group in combat, and then provides a measure of leader type. Second, the RLCW dataset accounts for the overall of severity of combatant and non-combatant violence intentionally perpetrated by a leader-led group in a given year. The measures of severity in civilian violence move beyond death counts, to broader measures of systematic civilian targeting in the form of rape, looting, exploitation, and mutilation. Third, the RLCW dataset offers a measure of the modal combat type observed in a given year of a leader's campaign (i.e. technologies of rebellion). Additionally, the new dataset identifies groups, conflicts, countries, and the nature of the grievances, sources of group funding, regime type, state sponsorship, and foreign intervention, among other variables.

Theoretical Variable of Interest

In measuring the main theoretical variable of interest, we identified a single leader for each rebel group-year. We only attempted to identify the leaders of non-state groups engaged in armed intra-state conflict against a state or regime authority, thus paramilitary groups, mercenaries, or regime-based militias are excluded from the present analysis.

Similar to Prorok (2015), our coding team reviewed a variety of source materials in order to identify a *rebel leader*—that is, the highest-ranked individual who ultimately sets (or delegates) political, economic, and military policy, within a group. Moreover, we look for documented evidence of whether or not a leader is in charge of formulating political and/or military strategy, selecting tactics, and providing overall guidance and direction for a group.

Our team also looked for evidence of the leader serving as a symbolic figurehead for a movement or cause. In cases of leadership by committee within a rebel group, as is the case for many leftist groups in South Asia, we examine processes of rebel leader election, if available, or we determine who is in charge of the committee.

Inter-coder reliability tests were performed for all cases and we also included a team of 25 undergraduates who assisted in the preparation, research, and writing of coding narratives for all leaders in the dataset. These narratives contain important information related to conflict characteristics, actors, drivers, timing, and leader backgrounds.

Qualitative Comparison Analysis for RLCW Construction

I also employed Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to help render a final coding decision on leader type. QCA is a useful tool as part of a model building and coding exercise to help determine necessary and sufficient conditions of leader type. It allowed me to uncover set-theoretic relationships between multiple indicators associated with leader types, in this case, in addition to conflict outcomes (e.g. Valeriano & Marin 2010). It is also uniquely suited to deal with the causal complexity of conflict environments out of which leaders emerge (Rihoux 2008; Rihoux & Marx 2013).

Utilizing QCA allows me to isolate and determine specific connections between indicators of experience and motivation and leader types. In fact, many of my variables lend themselves to QCA since they are already operationalized in discreet form.¹⁸ *Table 4.1.* is an example of a truth table demonstrating how QCA is used to code leader type. The RLCW data matrix is an extension of this truth table.

In measuring the confluence of leader and conflict type with military experience, our team relied on an earlier conceptualization process in which the motives, opportunities, and military experience of a leader determine the overall leader type. The coding system for leadership types is dichotomous: ‘1’ if the leader fits a particular type, ‘0’ if not. A number of indicators exist to help in differentiating across leader types. One of the limitations of this approach is that leader type evaluation and assessment relies heavily on archival and historical research. Eventually, these binary coding schemes for each type were aggregated into a single categorical variable of leader type for testing.

The first step in the coding process was being able to differentiate between motive and opportunity driven leaders. Ideally, Ideologues and Insurgents are characterized by their strong political or ideological grievance against the existing regime. In order to identify these two leader types, it is necessary to evaluate the statements, writings, and actions, of an individual leader in order to determine whether or not a leader sought to rebel on the basis of political, ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. If it is determined that the primary factor for rebellion is rooted in grievance, the leader type is considered to

¹⁸ Despite important limitations related to omitted variable bias, selection bias, and over emphasis on necessary and sufficient conditions, QCA is still a useful analytical tool that allows the scholar to develop an in-depth understanding of a small to intermediate range of cases (Rihoux 2008). The results from QCA proved to be invaluable to improvements in theory development and model specification.

be motive-based. The only coding difference between Ideologues and Insurgents is the presence of absence of a military background. Ideologues are, therefore, coded '1' if they espouse grievances and lack military experience, and '0' otherwise. If the leader is driven by ideological or grievance-based concerns and possesses significant military experience, then that person is coded '1' for "Insurgent" or '0' for anything else.

Second, we differentiated private gains-based leaders by their profit seeking behavior or their expressed desire for pecuniary gain as a result of conflict. It is important to note that in most cases, it will be inferred from archival research that a person is grievance or greed driven since leaders may espouse political or motive-based concerns, while simultaneously engaging in rent-seeking or predatory behavior during conflict. If this is the case, the individual is still considered to be an opportunity or greed-based leader type. The goal is to determine whether or not the leader was driven mainly by the pursuit of profit in prosecuting the conflict. To differentiate between the two types of opportunity-based leaders, I account for the leader's past military experience. If a leader is greed driven and possesses significant military experience, the individual is coded as a '1' for Warlord or '0' if not. Conversely, a leader is coded '1' for Operator or '0' otherwise, if the individual lacks military experience, but is driven mainly by greed or opportunity.

The example truth table, below, shows the final coding decisions regarding the presence of absence of key criteria thought to determine the emergence of a particular leader type in civil war. The entire process of criteria evaluation is theoretically informed. The goal is to review historical accounts, statements, primary sources, news media, and archival reports, to determine whether or not motive or opportunity factors

characterize a particular rebel leader, in addition to determining their prior military experiences. The coding narratives are very helpful in this endeavor.

In *Table 4.1*, conditions are coded ‘1’ if present, or ‘0’ if absent. Motive-based indicators are differentiated by the presence or absence of grievances along ethnic, religious, political, or economic lines. Opportunity-based indicators are delineated by the presence or absence of profit-seeking behavior or predatory actions during the course of the conflict. Furthermore, prior military experience indicators include past training, combat action, or service in a formal military organization. These conditions are coded as being present if my research indicates their existence through statements or observed behavior, or inferred indirectly through at least two expert accounts.

Table 4.1. Coding Indicators of Leader Type

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Leader</u> | <u>Motive</u> | | | | <u>Opportunity</u> | | <u>Military</u> | | | <u>Type</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|-------------|
| | | <i>Conflict</i> | <i>Ethnic</i> | <i>Rel.</i> | <i>Pol.</i> | <i>Econ.</i> | <i>Profit</i> | <i>Predation</i> | <i>Training</i> | <i>Combat</i> | |
| Iraq | al-Sadr | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Ideologue |
| Afghan | Massoud | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Insurgent |
| Liberia | Taylor | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | Operator |
| DRC | Nkunda | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Warlord |

I first establish a truth table. Then, I rely on Boolean algebra techniques to establish specific connections between necessary and/or sufficient conditions of leader

type.¹⁹ By analyzing set-theoretical combinations of binary conditions that are thought to influence leader type, I am able to identify multiple conditional pathways leading to the emergence of varying leader types. This exercise, although tedious, offered a systematic coding approach and helped facilitate the construction of the final RLCW dataset. But hardly just a coding exercise, the QCA method allowed me to uncover systematically meaningful categories of ideal leader types separate from my main outcomes of interest.

Table 4.2. is an example of minimization analysis. Characteristics in all capital letters are present in the truth table, while characteristics in lower-case letters are absent. The table shows that opportunity trumps motive in configurations five and six to produce Operators and Warlords. This aligns with the expectations of Collier et al (2004), that the pursuit of private gains drives war even in the presence of considerable grievance.

Table 4.2: Leader Type Content Families

| Configuration | Characteristics | Ideal Type |
|---------------|---------------------------------|------------|
| 1 | MOTIVE * opportunity * military | Ideologue |
| 2 | MOTIVE * opportunity * MILITARY | Insurgent |
| 3 | motive * OPPORTUNITY * military | Operator |
| 4 | motive * OPPORTUNITY * MILITARY | Warlord |
| 5 | MOTIVE * OPPORTUNITY *military | Operator |
| 6 | MOTIVE * OPPORTUNITY * MILITARY | Warlord |

¹⁹ Essentially, Boolean algebra is a minimization technique that establishes the existence of certain configurations of indicators to help determine whether or not a particular outcome is present or absent.

Although this table represents a rough first cut at identifying particular types of leaders, the overall goal is to identify set-theoretical configurations of conditions thought to influence leadership type. These results are invaluable to improving the validity and reliability of the coding process in the final data set. Future studies can build on these criteria to refine the conceptualization and model building process in iterative fashion. Coding narratives were designed to help facilitate the QCA process. Over time, these coding indicators are updated to capture a leader's ability to acquire combat skills and experience, or changes in their prioritization of public versus private goods. This process can be extended to connect leader types to conflict outcomes of interest, as well.

Identifying Leaders

In identifying and coding the leaders of each group, we relied on secondary and primary sources of information, such as international news reporting (e.g. BBC News, *The Economist*), local news reporting (e.g. IRIN news, *AllAfrica*), reporting from recognized governmental bodies (e.g. UK Border Agency, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights) and international organizations (e.g. Interpol, United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), officially recognized think tanks (e.g. Institute for the Study of War, the Center for Strategic and International Studies), as well as university institutes (e.g. University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, Stanford University's Mapping Militant Organizations). We also relied on reporting from Jane's *World Insurgency and Terrorism* database (2005). Additionally, the coding process relied on historical and scholarly accounts of past conflicts, leaders, and organizations. In some cases, we relied on documentation associated with International Criminal Court proceedings. Out of the

1,427 leader years in the data set, less than 1% of the cases are excluded from the analysis due to the lack of an identifiable leader. In the overwhelming majority of cases, rebel leaders proved to be truly unique individuals who like to be identified and tell their story.

In all, the dataset contains 1,427 leader-year observations, comprised of 206 unique rebel leaders of 157 total armed opposition groups operating across 65 intra-state wars. These conflicts are found in 5 major regions (i.e. Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America) in 42 countries worldwide. Of this total, Ideologues make up 528 (37%) leader years; Insurgents make up 545 (38%) years; Operators are featured in 100 (7%) leader years; and finally, Warlords make up 254 (18%) leader years in the final dataset.

Table 4.3. Distribution of Leader Type

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|-----------|--------------|---------|
| Ideologue | 528 | 37% |
| Insurgent | 545 | 38% |
| Operator | 100 | 7% |
| Warlord | 254 | 18% |

Figure 4.1. Overall Distribution of Leader Type by Region





Figure 4.2. Overall Distribution of Leader Type Over Time



In reviewing these sources, we looked for evidence of conflict motivation and military experience. Leaders with military experience (i.e. Insurgents or Warlords) generally possess formal military training, extensive and verifiable combat experience (3 or more years), or prior service in a military organization (e.g. state army, paramilitary group, or rebel organization). If any of these factors were present (0 – Absent; 1 – Present), the leader is coded as having military experience. We operationalize “formal” military training because in some cases, individual leaders were trained formally by non-state organizations. Although unofficial in nature given their non-state status, some groups, like Al-Qaeda for example, offer rigorous formalized training program to its recruits (Coll 2004). Therefore, we did not want to ignore this type of training experience from the coding scheme. Leaders lacking substantial military experience (i.e. Ideologues or Operators) showed little to no evidence of these experiences. In the entire sample to date, we observe 700 (49%) leader years featuring military experience and 727 (51%) leader years lacking military experience.

Table 4.4. Distribution of Military Experience

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|-------------|--------------|---------|
| Military | 628 | 44% |
| No Military | 799 | 56% |

In addition, the data set accounts for within unit variation, that is, some leaders start out lacking military experience, but develop it through training (e.g. Charles Taylor transitions from an Operator to a Warlord because of battlefield experience as well as the training he received from Libyan security forces in the early 1990's²⁰), or by leading on the battlefield and showing evidence of actual participation on the battlefield for more than 3 years (e.g. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi transitions from an Operator to a Warlord after 3 years of leading and participating in operations in the Iraq conflict theater²¹). We wanted to ensure that we distinguished from those who lead from behind versus those who lead from the front.

Table 4.5. Indicators of Military Background

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|----------|--------------|---------|
| Combat | 893 | 63% |
| Training | 709 | 50% |
| Service | 303 | 21% |

For the motivation dimension, our team reviewed multiple source materials looking for the presence or absence of private or public goods-based behavior. Fundamentally, private goods-driven leaders show evidence of patterns of *systematic* and sustained predatory action, exploitative practices, or profit-seeking behavior. In contrast, public goods-based leaders lack evidence of profit-seeking behavior and instead show evidence of political, ideological, ethnic or religious motive.

²⁰ See Waugh (2011).

²¹ See Warrick (2015).

Table 4.6. Distribution of Motivation

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|---------------|--------------|---------|
| Public Goods | 1,073 | 75% |
| Private Goods | 354 | 25% |

In cases where both types of behavior were present, we coded the leader as being concerned with private goods. In the RLCW dataset, leaders are innocent until proven guilty of private gain seeking behavior. When this type of behavior is revealed, it trumps all other grievance-based considerations.²² In all cases, coding for the presence or absence of these factors required a least two independently confirmed sources. Project principals—Mr. Doctor, and myself—resolved any inter-coder reliability differences between members of the coding team. Throughout the coding process, we attempt to distinguish between those leaders who exhibit private-gains seeking behavior as a way to maintain group viability and those who focus almost exclusively on profit seeking and predation.

Table 4.7. Distribution of Grievance

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|--------------|--------------|---------|
| Grievance | 1,325 | 93% |
| No Grievance | 102 | 7% |

²² For a more detailed discussion for this reasoning, see Collier & Hoeffler (2003).

Each variable was coded dichotomously by accounting for the presence or absence of a goods-based component or factor.²³ In total, 380 (26%) leader years are coded as “greed-driven” or *private goods-based* compared to 1,047 (73%) “grievance-driven” or *public goods-based* leader years. Similar to the procedure for military experience, I allow for within unit variation. In some cases, leaders transition from public to private goods. For example, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA transitions from an Insurgent to a Warlord during the later stages of the Angolan civil war.²⁴ It is important to note once again that, when a leader is found to prioritize private-gains over public goods, they are resigned to this coding designation for the remainder of their time in theater. Ultimately, we feel the historical record of rebel leaders in combat offers strong evidence and justification for this coding decision.

Table 4.8. Indicators of Greed

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|-------------|--------------|---------|
| Profit | 415 | 29% |
| Predation | 545 | 38% |
| Opportunity | 420 | 29% |

²³ Inter-coder reliability tests were performed routinely, and coding narratives were developed to record leadership and conflict characteristics, while also providing justifications for coding decisions.

²⁴ See Clapham (1998) and Cunningham (2006, 2011).

Conflict Outcomes of Interest

I am primarily interested in testing for the effects of rebel leader type on three main dependent variables: the type, severity, and tenure of a leader's combat campaign. To do this I will rely on RLCW designed measures of each. A description of my main outcomes variables is provided below.

Combat Type (i.e. Technologies of Rebellion)

I am also interested in determining the mode of warfare or technology of rebellion (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010; Balcells & Kalyvas 2012) typically employed by an individual leader in a given year of their combat campaign. Through this measure, I attempt to account for the type or nature of violence between combatants, highlighting the strategic choices made by leader and how these choices were implemented operationally on the battlefield.

To do this, I rely on a conceptual typology from Kalyvas & Balcells (2010). They identify four types of intra-state combat campaigns. I use these categories to help characterize and describe the nature of the fighting between combatants. Independent of the initial coding effort, I constructed a nominal level variable that accounts for each specific conflict type observed in a given year of a leader's combat tenure.²⁵ Also, I subject each conflict to a rigorous yearly review of battles, engagements, combat

²⁵ Given the fluidity and dynamism of conflict environments, it is possible that conflict type changes monthly, weekly or even daily. However, I make a coding decision to determine the modal or typical conflict type that characterizes the combat campaign in a leader's given year. Essentially, I am choosing what is likely to be the most consistent form of combat type observed in an individual leader year, as identified by scholars, journalists, historians, and participant records.

campaign reporting, and any other reporting related to armed conflict type for a given year.²⁶

The first category is referred to as *symmetric conventional warfare*. In this instance, there is considerable parity in military capability between each side or all sides. The fighting resembles more of a traditional kinetic military combat campaign (e.g. pitched battlefield campaigns). The combatants are usually well-organized, often uniformed armies, that are evenly matched at a high level of capability. These types of warfare scenarios typically feature heavy artillery, order-of-battle planning, and advanced weapons systems. This type of combat is more commonly found in engagements between states. However, a classic intra-state example of this type of combat is found in the Angola conflict where rebels fought pitched battles against regime forces backed by Cuban and Soviet military personnel.

The second category of this measure I refer to as *irregular warfare–state advantage*. In this particular case, there is a noticeable power asymmetry between state and rebel forces. More specifically, the state has a moderate to considerable power advantage over the opposition. At a basic level, rebel military technology lags behind their state opponent forcing rebel groups to prefer avoid direct frontal assaults on the state. These types of wars produce irregular forms of fighting on the part of the rebels, in addition to the increased use of terror tactics, guerrilla warfare, etc. as rebels attempt to overcome power imbalances vis-à-vis the state. I see terror as a tactic, thus I include it in

²⁶ Typical sources include but are not limited to: Jane's 2006 *World Insurgency and Terrorism* review, Osprey Men-at-Arms series, published histories, biographies, reporting from think tanks and non-governmental institutions, news media (e.g. the *Economist*), web reports, etc.

this category. This type of warfare is a common feature of groups operating in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict within the RLCW.

Conversely, when the rebel military capabilities outstrip their state opponent, I observed *irregular warfare–rebel advantage* modes of warfare. In these instances, one observes a noticeable increase in the amount of coups, feudalistic warfare, and violent terminal political breakdown and state failure etc. It can also be endogenous to state breakdown or failure. Observers might also see an increase in state use of pro-military regimes, paramilitary forces, and private military firms and mercenaries, in order to overcome power imbalances that benefit the rebels. Notable examples include the Sri Lankan and Sudanese civil wars.

This final category is observed when both state forces and rebel groups are evenly matched, but both sides featured low levels of military capability. This type is known as *symmetric non-conventional warfare*. As Kalyvas & Balcells (2010) observe, this is likely the case “when states are unable (or, in a few cases, unwilling) to deploy an organized military against poorly equipped insurgents.” Mutual weakness creates a primitive, pre-modern style of fighting that devolves into syndicalistic violent low-technology warfare. Most often this style of fighting emerges in failed or collapsed states (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Liberia).

Table 4.9. Distribution of Combat Type

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------|
| Symmetric Conventional | 180 | 13% |
| Irregular Warfare–State Advantage | 596 | 42% |
| Irregular Warfare–Rebel Advantage | 355 | 25% |
| Symmetric Non-Conventional | 296 | 21% |

Combat Severity

In this project, I theorize that rebel leader type influences severity. In order to measure the overall severity of a leader’s combat campaign in a given leader-year, I rely on an independent measure of the overall severity of combatant and non-combatant violence observed in a given year of a leader’s tenure.

I reviewed a number of sources for indicators of the level and intensity of intentional forms of combatant and non-combatant violence. Based on this initial review of source and reporting, I distinguished between ordinal level categories of combatant and non-combatant violence ranging from low, medium, and high.

To start, I determine the number of combatant deaths on all sides for a given leader year using estimates provided from the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset. In multiple party conflicts, this is much more problematic. Therefore, I do make an attempt to determine whether or not the leader of interest was actively participating in battle for that year. I also rely on UCDP totals that are directly attributable to a particular leader’s group in a given year of a combat campaign. I then cross-reference UCDP totals with the

reporting sources to improve the accuracy of my attribution in coding. These combat casualty estimates form the baseline for coding severity—that is, leader-years featuring less than 25 total casualties must start at code ‘0’ indicating low level severity; leader-years with casualties ranging from 25 to 999 combat deaths cannot receive less than a ‘1’ for medium level severity; and those leader years featuring over a thousand deaths cannot receive a code less than ‘2’ for high level severity.

However, since combat casualty totals from UCDP are only a baseline coding measure, leader-years featuring low or medium severity are examined more closely to determine if the overall level of severity for a given year should be raised from low to medium to high. Code ‘2’ for high level severity is the ceiling and typically includes extremely high levels of combatant and non-combatant deaths coupled with reporting suggesting sustained high-intensity combat between actors. It may also include evidence of intentional forms of civilian targeting, in addition to more traditional forms of violence between combatants. I combine combatant and non-combatant violence to capture the overall conditions of violence in a given year of a leader’s campaign.

Table 4.10. Distribution of Combat Severity

| Type | Leader Years | Percent |
|--------|--------------|---------|
| Low | 626 | 43% |
| Medium | 570 | 40% |
| High | 231 | 17% |

I believe that a leader's behavior toward non-combatant populations is a key feature of intra-state warfare since civilians are often caught in the crossfire of combat operations. Thus, I wanted to be able to capture this in the data. In general, non-combatant violence can be either intentional or unintentional (e.g. collateral damage). To look for evidence of civilian violence, our coders first collected data from UCDP regarding intentional killings perpetrated by non-state groups in a given year. The RLCW team also relied heavily on U.S. and international news reports, U.S. Department of State Human Rights reporting, in addition to reporting from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. For each case, we sought at least two independently confirmed sources in making a coding decision.

Essentially, non-combatant deaths make up just one part of this measure of severity. Although the number of killings serves as an important base-line threshold of violence perpetrated by a leader, the data accounts for incidences of rape, maiming, torture, mutilation, looting, and pillaging to describe general conditions of non-combatant violence in a given year. Therefore, the RLCW considers whether or not civilian deaths were paired with other systematic forms of intentional violence aimed at civilians, such as rape or predation. If this type of behavior is present in a given leader year, we then make a determination as to whether or not to raise the level of severity by one or more categories. At its most basic level, the number of combatant and non-combatant (i.e. civilian) deaths serves as a baseline for entry into a more severe category; however, this baseline of deaths combined with the evidence of more systematic forms of civilian targeting ultimately determine the final code for a given year of a leader's tenure.

Toward this end, we also researched primary and secondary sources for indicators of wanton violence and gross atrocities as additional indicators of overall severity. In reviewing these sources, our coders looked for evidence of systematic campaigns of targeted anti-civilian violence, including, but not limited to instances of sexual violence, looting, mutilating or maiming, displacement, and mass destruction of civilian infrastructure.

In cases in which the number of civilian killings was unspecified we reviewed the reporting for language that references any form of “systematic targeting,” “mass atrocities,” “wanton violence,” and “mass rape.” In these instances, years initially coded “none” were coded as “low” or higher depending on the evidence and extent of brutalization. Just because a leader is unable to kill mass quantities of combatants and non-combatants in a given year does not mean that the overall severity is low.

Other types of behavior and observable outcomes need to be accounted for as well in the final measure of combat severity. For example, Afghan rebel groups were notorious for maiming and mutilating enemy combatants and non-combatants, to gain notoriety and weaken morale in their opponents, but also to ensure that their opponents were preoccupied with caring for their wounded (Coll 2004).

In another example, Laurent Nkunda served as leader of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009—a year in which no civilian killings were recorded in the data, despite evidence of mass civilian brutalization in the form of looting and sexual violence. Therefore, Nkunda received a code of “medium” instead of a “none” for that particular year.

Overall, the goal of the RLCW is to measure the *overall* conditions of combat severity perpetrated by a leader for each year in the dataset by extending my description of battlefield violence beyond death counts. Thus, deaths and casualties are just one component of the RLCW coding classification for severity. To capture the overall severity of combat, our team examined multiple sources in addition to the raw numbers.

Combat Duration

In order to measure a combat duration, I estimate the overall length of a combat campaign over which a given leader presided. Therefore, I am not necessarily interested in measuring the overall length of a conflict, irrespective of a leader, but rather, I want to measure how long a campaign lasted while a particular rebel leader was in charge.

I evaluate each case separately to determine start and end years for a leader's campaign. I then create a ratio-level variable that accounts for each year that a conflict persisted during a leader's combat tenure. In general, any evidence of military activity against a state opponent will signal onset or duration.²⁷ In total, combat campaign duration ranges from 1 to 26 years in the RLCW data set. Roughly 60 percent of the campaigns featured lasted 5 or less years; nearly a quarter lasted between 5 and 10 years.

Control Variables

Previous work on civil war, terror, and insurgency suggests a number of control variables at the conflict and group levels that could affect warfare dynamics and conflict outcomes. I include a list of these measures, below, distinguished by the level of their expected effects. Hardly irrelevant, I expect each of these measures to play a critical role

²⁷ At this stage, I am accounting for leader-years; however, in future research I hope to shift to leader-month level analysis, although this would have considerable implications for the final structure of the data since micro, meso, and macro level treatments are currently coded by year.

in shaping the relationship between leaders and levels of combat severity, type and campaign tenure. The RLCW is useful in that it contains a host of structural, conflict, group and leader level variables—that is, we are able to test for independent effects of leader type across multiple levels of analysis.

Conflict Level: Foreign Intervention

When foreign states intervene in intra-state conflict, the combat changes in its overall dimension and complexity (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). As argued by Regan (2002), Wood et al (2012), and DeMeritt (2013) how, where, and why the foreign intervener applies its resources has drastic implications on conflict outcomes. Unlike state sponsorship, foreign intervention is present when a neutral third party security guarantor intervenes with the expressed intention of stopping the fighting. I expect these types of interventions to have an impact on the combat space, on average. Therefore, I account for the absence or presence of foreign intervention in each leader year.

Conflict Level: Regime Type

As formally discussed by Hegre et al (2001), Regan & Bell (2010), and many others, regime type is inherently linked to the probability of civil war onset, *ceteris paribus*. While the factors that determine civil war onset are theoretically distinct from those factors that shape civil war outcomes, a state's form and stability of government should determine the likelihood of certain rebel leader types and their available tactics.

Conflict Level: Contagion

Conflicts, especially those defined by ethnicity or tribal affiliation, have the potential to spread across state borders into contiguous regimes. Further, I expect levels of violence to be particularly high and long lasting in states that have been on the

periphery of long-standing conflicts. Borders are believed to make a difference in warfare (Most & Starr 1989; Vasquez 1993; Gates et al 2009). Thus, in cases of contagion, conflict tension is often highest when it spreads, resulting in immediate and disproportionately high counts of civilian victimization. Accordingly, I account for the presence or absence of conflict spillover.

Conflict Level: Multiple Parties

Inter-rebel group coalition dynamics impact rebel leaders and their strategies. Past approaches by Clapham (1998), Weinstein (2007), Cunningham (2011), Christia (2012) and Staniland (2014), suggest that coalitional fracturing and multiple veto players within civil war exhibit independent effects on violence, bargaining, and settlement. Intergroup competition is well documented in the literature and I cannot ignore the empirical observation that this often results in longer, more violent wars. In order to understand the dynamics of violence in civil conflict, scholars need to better understand the practices of inter-group dynamics so I provide an indicator of the presence or absence of multiple parties in a conflict. Similar to Cunningham (2011) and Christia (2012), I argue that accounting for the factionalized nature of intra-state war is a more accurate and honest representation of modern intra-state combat.

Group Level: Resources

A rebel organizations access to natural resources and endowments is likely to play a significant role in determining a group's capability, thus shaping a leader's willingness to use violence (Ross 2004; Weinstein 2007). Where leaders depend on donations or support from civilians, leaders will certainly be less keen to target those populations. I also expect that where leaders are entirely self-sustaining the dynamics of warfare will be

impacted. Moreover, strategic formulation and tactical selection is largely a by-product of a leader's access to resources, particularly for leaders who prioritize private over public goods. All else being equal, I expect the presence of natural resources to be a critical factor in determining the quantity and quality of one's tactics and weaponry, as well as order-of-battle considerations.

Group Level: Terror

Groups officially labeled as terrorist organizations, and the people that lead them, are often sporadic yet strategic in their use of violence. The patterns of violence for such groups will vacillate in intensity. Therefore, I develop a simple control for terror campaigns to reduce unnecessary noise from the model. As mentioned earlier, I view terror as a tactic on a larger menu of options available to the leader.

Group Level: State Sponsorship

This project borrows from a re-conceptualization of technologies of rebellion (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Similar to Kalyvas & Balcells, I expect that groups benefitting from overt state support—either advisory or kinetic in nature—will implement varying strategies and tactics as result of this support. Further, I suppose that some leader types will be more inclined to pursue foreign support and even more adept at securing it. In effect, state support can help a group change its combat playbook. It can also prop up or breathe life into failing campaigns. All else equal, I expect direct state sponsorship of a group to be game changer in intra-state war with implications for the outcomes of interest. This differs from foreign intervention since I am accounting for the direction of the support, as opposed to just the presence or absence a third party intervention designed to stop the fighting.

Group Level: Ethnic Conflict

I expect that ethnic or ethno-nationalist groups who challenge the state will produce significant variation in conflict outcomes (Sambanis 2001; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug 2013) than non-ethnic conflict, thus I include a measure of the presence or absence of ethnic grievances in a leader's combat campaign.

Group Level: Religious Conflict

Accordingly, I also account for the presence or absence of religiously motivated grievances in each year of a leader's campaign. Conflicts motivated by faith have been some of the bloodiest in history (Mitchell 2004). Where splits in religion are thought to drive conflict, I expect violent outcomes to be significantly affected.

Group Level: Separatist Conflict

I also control for the presence or absence of groups driven by separatist goals in a given leader-year. Described by Fearon (2004) and Gates et al (2009), secessionist--especially "sons of the soil"—conflicts are prone to extended duration.²⁸ I expect that such conflicts will give rise particular leader types, mainly those motivated by public goods, and may increase those leaders' willingness to employ certain modes of warfare.

²⁸ Also, see Walter (2009) for an in-depth discussion of violence in separatist conflicts.

Table 4.11. Control Variables: Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Mean | Median | StDev. | Min | Max | N |
|--------------|------|--------|--------|-----|-----|------|
| Intervention | 0.34 | 0 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Regime | 0.21 | 2 | 0.88 | -1 | 1 | 1427 |
| Contagion | 0.56 | 1 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| MultiParty | 0.87 | 1 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Resources | 0.20 | 0 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Terror | 0.48 | 0 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| StateSponsor | 0.47 | 0 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Ethnic | 0.64 | 1 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Religious | 0.38 | 0 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |
| Separatist | 0.46 | 0 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 1427 |

Potential Sources of Bias

In this section, I briefly specify the approaches taken to avoid common issues in sampling and research design. Specifically, I look at issues of selection bias, endogeneity, and omitted variable bias. For example, it is possible that environmental and group level factors determine leader type or that the type of violence observed in a given year determines the selection of leader type. Additionally, I discuss the limitations of utilizing QCA as a model building exercise in this project.

First, I address the possibility that my data sample—and, therefore, the models I present—suffers from selection bias. To guard against this issue, the coding project took

a two-part approach in which we (1) expand “leader year” observations to cover the full duration of the respective leader’s presence in the civil conflict and (2) include cases on the full spectrum of armed intrastate conflict, rather than selecting only high profile, high-casualty intra-state wars. This process of conflict, rebel group, and leader coding involves a robust iteration of research and coding in which each observation is held accountable to multiple independent sources, and in some cases, peer-reviewed conflict narratives. In applying these practices, the data generation process attempts to avoid problems of selecting on the dependent and independent variables. Further, the overall set of intra-state wars is distributed more evenly across global regions.

In effect, the subject matter makes case selection more straightforward. Intra-state warfare is a highly visible event. The research environment—intra-state war—forces me into a relatively small population. Therefore, I am careful in my generalizations—I expect that my results are only relevant in this limited domain (Collier 1995). I then select my cases on the criteria of whether or not a rebel leader participated in a given intra-state war, not whether or not they employed a particular mode of warfare, led particularly long campaigns, or engaged in particularly brutal campaigns of violence.

Next, I evaluate the theoretical argument and model for an endogenous relationship. Is there something about the nature of warfare or its duration that influences the rise of one leader type over another? My first line of defense with respect to this dilemma is the dynamic threshold I establish to separate the pre-conflict environment from the theater of war. My experiment focuses on the effects that rebel leaders—having emerged from the rebel entrepreneurial stage—yield on combat outcomes. Importantly, the dataset contains a positive percentage of cases in which multiple types of rebel

leaders emerge from the same pre-conflict environment. For example, within the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), I observe the emergence of an Insurgent leader, Riaz Basra, who was succeeded by an Operator, Malik Ishaq. Further, I observe that different leaders and types emerge *within a single campaign or group*. This suggests that my categories of rebel leader type are not merely produced by a combination of pre-existing constraints and conditions, but that the personal characteristics of the rebel leader interact with structural conditions to yield unique outcomes on intra-state war outcomes. One of my main goals in Chapter 6 is to use the vignettes as a way to identify the direction of my argument using real-world examples. It is one thing to show a statistical correlation, it is quite another thing to evaluate those associations by revealing a definitive logic and providing an explanation to it.

One additional criticism is that the RLCW definitions of leader type contain within them an assessment of what individual leader types prioritize. While this is a challenge, myself, and Mr. Doctor, took great pains to measure leader type independently from major outcomes of interest. Although, this project started with some initial theoretical expectations about how an individual's motive and military background may impact their behavior in war, the QCA process offered a systematic way of helping us avoid conflating the independent variables with my dependent variables. Thus, leader type is determined and coded prior to the examination and evaluation of outcomes. Subsequent empirical tests and case studies allow me to reconcile those initial theoretical expectations with the empirical record.

The logic of this theory has a clear and definitive direction—rebel leaders are agents who shape outcomes in the conflict environment. Accordingly though, I plan to

subject my results to a variety of robustness checks to lend credence to the claim that leader type is hardly epiphenomenal with respect to violent outcomes in intra-state warfare. For example, I cluster my standard errors on individual leaders to account for within-cluster variation. I also utilize multilevel modeling to help avoid inefficiency, and to mitigate over-stating the precision of my estimations, while overall, providing a tougher test of the effects of my covariates.

Finally, I consider those variables that have a confounding effect on my final estimates. In attempt to avoid omitted variable bias, I surveyed the literature on intra-state warfare to compose a list of appropriate control variables.²⁹ My controls help insulate my models from inaccurate estimates. The creation of this list has been strictly informed by my own theoretical argument of agents in warfare and relevant literature. While there is a laundry list of potentially useful variables I would like to include in my final models, I believe the selected factors comprise an exhaustive compilation of the theoretically relevant variables exhibiting independent effects on conflict outcomes across multiple levels of analysis.

²⁹ These are: natural resources, terror, regime type, technology of rebellion, contagion, state intervention, multiple parties, and the ethnic, religious, and/or separatist nature of the rebellion. See the previous discussion on control variables.

CHAPTER 5

A TEST OF THE EFFECTS OF REBEL LEADERS IN WAR

“THE EMPIRICS”

“My men did not fight for communism. They fought for me and one another.”

- Abdul Rashid Dostum, Afghanistan 1979³⁰

Introduction

I expect variation in leader type to affect violent outcomes in scenarios of intra-state war. As a result, combat campaigns are likely to vary in terms of the type of technology of rebellion, the severity of the violence, and length of the leader’s tenure, depending on who is in charge. In this chapter, I test the implications yielded by the RLCW typology and report the results. I test these claims on the RLCW dataset, which features an unbalanced panel data structure where individual leader years are the unit of analysis. Robustness checks are included in the Appendices. In short, I find evidence that rebel leader type has a significantly meaningful impact on the type, severity, and tenure of combat campaigns employed in intra-state war.

Below, I sequentially test hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 2, and 3, laid out in Chapter 3. I begin by testing the effects of my covariates on four types of combat observed annually within an individual leader’s campaign (i.e. symmetric—conventional v. non-conventional and irregular warfare—state v. rebel advantage) followed by a test of severity that incorporates combat mode as an additional predictor variable. In the final

³⁰ Williams (2013).

test, I look for a discernible relationship between leader type and the probability of a leader's tenure coming to an end.³¹ I focus on combat tenure rather than overall duration.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I employ a multinomial logistic regression estimation model to test my predictions regarding the relationship between leader type and the likelihood of observing a particular combat type—measured in discrete categories, while controlling for other factors believed to shape conflict type. Second, I estimate a multinomial logistic regression model to test for the effects of leader type on ordered categories of conflict severity in the presence of other factors likely to violent outcomes in combat. Third, I explore the relationship between leader type and the likelihood of combat termination by employing a discrete-time event model. For each outcome of interest, I discuss the results of my empirical tests and their significance. Robustness checks and additional model specifications, namely multilevel models that account for random effects at the conflict level, are included in the Appendix.

Test 1: Exploring the Relationship between Leader Type and Conflict Type

First, I expect variation in leader type to effect change in the types of combat that are likely to be observed most frequently in a leader's campaign for a given year. I try to answer the following question: does variation in leader type increase the likelihood of observing a particular tactical form of rebellion in a given year of a leader's campaign? In Chapter 3, I laid out three related hypotheses exploring the link between leader type and variation in combat type.

³¹ To reiterate, for this final test I am not predicting that overall conflict duration will be longer or shorter under a particular leader type. Rather, I am testing to see if certain leaders are more likely to prosecute a combat campaign for longer periods of time than other leader types. By extension, a leader's ability to increase their tenure has important implications for overall conflict duration and termination.

First, I expect Insurgents and Warlords to be more likely than their militarily inept counterparts to run a symmetric conventional combat campaigns in a given year relative to situations of irregular warfare in which the state has the advantage, all else being equal (1a). Second, I expect that, on average, Insurgents and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Operators to gain the upper hand against state militaries in a given year after starting at a disadvantage (1b). Third, I expect that Operators and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to exploit non-conventional symmetric warfare relative to irregular-state advantage warfare in a given year, all else being equal (1c).

Fundamentally, I expect that leaders with military experience, given their training and tactical experience, are better positioned to exploit conventional modes of warfare relative to those who lack strategic combat skill sets. Moreover, I expect that militarily experienced leaders are more likely than their inexperienced counterparts to gain an advantage over their state opponents. I also reasoned that private goods should push Operators and Warlords to exploit more primitive modes of warfare, given the low overhead costs and their innate desire to maximize profits. Whereas the first two hypotheses (1a, 1b) attempt to parse out the strategic and tactical effects between those who possess military skills and those who do not, the final hypothesis (1c) tries to determine if meaningful differences exist between those who use combat strategies to increase their ability to obtain private over public goods.

In order to perform this test, I re-conceptualized Kalyvas and Balcells's (2006) technology of rebellion typology to delineate between symmetric conventional and non-conventional battlefield campaigns, as well as rebel and state advantages in irregular

combat. In coding this measure, I attempted to identify the modal or most typical form of conflict type utilized by a rebel leader in each given year of their campaign. This was performed by an extensive and careful review of yearly strategic and tactical developments in past conflicts. The exercise also benefitted from written conflict and leader narratives that profiled combat technologies across the duration of a leader's campaign.


In *Figure 5.1.*, the data indicates that the most frequent mode of combat among Ideologues is Irregular Warfare in which the state has a clear and distinct advantage over the rebel group. Among Insurgents, Irregular Warfare in which the rebel group has the advantage is the most frequent form of combat. However, Insurgents also appear more likely than any other type to engage in symmetrical conventional campaigns probably due in part to their military aptitude. Operators show a more bimodal distribution of combat type—a split between Irregular Warfare-State Advantage and Symmetric Non-conventional warfare, which is not surprising given their military ineptitude. Warlord-led campaigns tend to feature Symmetric Non-conventional combat and Irregular Warfare-Rebel Advantage. The former is likely a reflection of their willingness to exploit domestic anarchy to advance their goals of ruthless profiteering; the latter is likely a reflection of their unique military skill-set.

In short, leader types driven by greed and private gains appear more likely to exploit primitive forms of warfare more than their public goods-driven counterparts. Moreover, leader types lacking military experience—i.e. Ideologues and Operators—are more likely than those possessing military experience to rely on irregular warfare at a clear and distinct disadvantage to their state rival. Their lack of military training and

experience is likely to have deleterious effects on their overall strategic formulation and tactical implementation. *Figure 5.1* also reveals that militarily adept leaders appear to be more likely to lead Irregular Warfare campaigns that offer them a military advantage.

These initial descriptive statistics appear to align with my earlier theoretical expectations. These descriptive statistics offer preliminary evidence of a relationship between leader and combat type, but below, I subject these theoretical expectations to rigorous testing. In doing so, I find evidence that leader type meaningfully predicts variation in technologies of rebellion, all else being equal, in a given year.

Figure 5.1 Overall Distribution of Combat Type by Leader Type



I employ a multinomial logistic regression to estimate the effects of my covariates interests on outcomes of combat type. I assume that my outcome of interest is an unordered response variable comprised of four discrete categories. I assume non-perfect separation, as well as independence, across my discrete outcomes of combat mode.³²

³² To meet test whether this assumption holds, I employ a generalized Hausman specification test that adjusts for clustering in my standard errors by individual leaders. A classic Hausman test assumes, very restrictively, that one of the estimators is efficient; however, this assumption is violated if my data are clustered on a particular variable. Given that my data is clustered by leader, the findings from the test indicate a failure to reject the null of the equality of common coefficients across categories of combat mode,

I believe that a model of multinomial choice more accurately reflects the decision-making reality faced by leaders in combat, namely, the decision to follow a particular technology of rebellion in response to changing conditions in a given year. I reserve Irregular Warfare-State Advantage, as my base category, since I rebel groups often start a relative disadvantage.³³ Relative risk-ratios of probabilities are reported in *Table 5.1*. I reserve the Ideologue as my baseline category for comparison between leader-types.³⁴ In addition, I have reason to suspect that my errors are not independently and identically distributed within leader periods since observations from the same individual leader cluster are most likely correlated. To combat against biased estimates, I rely on robust standard errors clustered on Leader IDs.

thus my assumption of IIA is not violated. However, it also suggests that a multilevel random effects model may be more appropriate. As such, I estimate a generalized linear and latent multilevel mixed model (gllamm) in Appendix B to account for unit-level conflict effects.

³³ I chose the second category as my baseline category for comparison since I make the hearty assumption that most rebel leaders begin their campaigns at a disadvantage relative to the state. Building and maintaining an armed rebel group is a difficult task. If this is the case, then I argue that variation from this disadvantage is more compelling theoretically, but also from a policy-implications standpoint. I expect leaders with military acumen to be able to turn the tables on their opponent and 1) gain an advantage, or 2) build up enough capability and skill to challenge the state in a traditional mode of warfare. The approach I put forward suggests that military leaders are better able to adapt, formulate sound strategies and implement tactics in response to the state.

³⁴ I chose the Ideologue to serve as a baseline for comparing effects across leader types for two reasons. First, they make up a considerable portion of cases in the RLCW. Second, the Ideologue is driven by public goods and lacks military skill and one of the main thrusts of the RLCW project is to determine to what extent a taste for greed and/or considerable military experience changes the dynamics of warfare.

Table 5.1. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Factors Related to Combat Type³⁵

| Predictor | <u>Symmetric Con.</u> RRR | <u>Irregular Rebel Adv.</u> RRR | <u>Symmetric Non-Con.</u> RRR |
|--------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| LeaderType | | | |
| Insurgent | 4.89* (2.92) | 10.09* (4.40) | 0.16* (-2.80) |
| Operator | 0.63 (0.69) | 0.15 (-1.47) | 1.77 (0.60) |
| Warlord | 4.83* (1.60) | 9.89* (2.36) | 2.24 (0.88) |
| Intervention | 6.12 (2.61) | 2.63* (2.24) | 0.14* (-2.83) |
| Regime | 1.16 | 1.46 | 0.44 |
| Anocracy | 0.98 (0.67) | 1.04 (0.08) | 0.36 (-1.57) |
| Democracy | 1.32 (0.99) | 2.04 (1.26) | 0.19* (-2.44) |
| Contagion | 1.37 (0.61) | 1.06 (0.13) | 3.69* (2.26) |
| MultiParty | 0.15 (-2.78) | 0.96 (-0.06) | 1.31* (16.20) |
| Resources | 1.25 (0.25) | 1.86 (1.14) | 2.68 (1.44) |
| Terror | 0.47 (-1.36) | 0.80 (-0.38) | 0.07* (-2.90) |
| StateSponsor | 1.39 (0.56) | 1.22 (0.43) | 1.19 (0.32) |
| Ethnic | 1.40 (0.67) | 0.62 (-1.16) | 4.25* (2.09) |
| Religious | 0.74 (-0.51) | 0.39* (-1.93) | 0.34* (-1.64) |
| Separatist | 1.05 (0.10) | 0.42* (-2.21) | 0.70 (-0.64) |
| _Constant | 0.21 (-1.74) | 0.24* (-1.84) | 2.05* (-13.21) |

N=-1427

Log Likelihood= -1156.02; $X^2 = 846.64$ (p -value = 0.0002); Pseudo R2=0.376**

AIC=2402.05; BIC=2638.89; D(1399)=2312.05; $df=45$

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Irreg. State Advantage; z-scores in parentheses; Robust standard errors clustered on LeaderID)

³⁵ The restricted (or null) model, in which I test the non-linear effects of leader type on technology or rebellion without the addition of relevant controls, yields significant effects for all leader types relative to Ideologues. A Likelihood Ratio test comparing the null and full models yields a significant test statistic (883.93; $p=0.000$).

The results confirm my earlier hypotheses—1a and 1b—regarding combat type: Insurgents and Warlords, given their military aptitude, are more likely than types lacking this skill set to engage in conventional modes of combat. The results also suggest that the relative risk of engaging in symmetric conventional modes of combat versus being at a disadvantage against their state opponent is 4.89 times greater for Insurgents than Ideologues. Similarly, Warlords experience 4.83 times the relative risk of engaging in symmetric conventional versus irregular-state advantage combat compared to their Ideologue counterparts. In other words, the relative risk in probability of engaging in conventional modes of combat versus irregular warfare at a distinct disadvantage against the state—is higher for Insurgents and Warlords when compared to Ideologues. This is also true when comparing leaders with military experience to Operators and Ideologues. These results suggest that both types are less likely than their militarily adept counterparts at engaging in high skill forms of warfare and gaining the upper hand over their state opponents in a given year. In fact, there appears to be no statistically significant difference between Operators and Ideologues when analyzing combat type.

To summarize these findings, military aptitude among rebel leaders has important implications for more conventional forms of strategic and tactical behavior observed in a given year, all else being equal. Post-estimation Wald tests of joint significance of leader-type indicate that variation in type is a significant predictor.³⁶

In terms of my controls, foreign intervention appears to decrease the relative risk of observing non-conventional modes of symmetric combat compared to state advantage irregular warfare. This result offers additional support to past studies that suggest

³⁶A test of joint significance of leader type yields a test statistic of 45.44 (p-value=0.000).

interventions have game changing effects on the combat. Religious and terror campaigns also appear to decrease this risk, perhaps reflecting the fact that leaders of groups with a distinct religious agenda, and those who resort to terror tactics, are often in a disadvantageous position relative to state forces. Multi-party conflicts and ethnic campaigns actually increase the relative risk ratio of entering category 4 (i.e. non-conventional symmetric) versus the baseline category 2 (i.e. irregular-state advantage). This seems to map onto reality, as ethnic conflicts and multi-party fighting tend to characterize more primitive modes of low technology warfare in the third world. Also, combat campaigns featuring a democratic opponent decrease the relative risk of observing primitive modes of warfare versus Irregular Warfare-State Advantage perhaps reflecting a link between more inclusive polities featuring democratic institutions and the strength of its military institutions relative to rebel challengers.

Moreover, the results also provide strong evidence that leader types featuring military experience are more likely than their non-military counterparts to employ Irregular forms of warfare to gain the upper hand against state militaries in a given year. Once again, the relative risk ratio of engaging in Irregular Warfare-Rebel Advantage is 10.09 times greater for Insurgents compared to Ideologues. Likewise, the relative risk ratio of engaging in Irregular Warfare marked by a distinct rebel advantage versus Irregular Warfare in disadvantageous position against their state opponent is 9.89 times greater for Warlords than Ideologues. Operators and Ideologues continue to be statistically indistinguishable from one another, which is not surprising since gaining an advantage over a state opponent requires considerable military skill. In short, military experience offers a strategic advantage over those who lack it, all else being equal.

In looking at the controls included in the model for this category, foreign interventions generally increases the relative risk ratio of observing Irregular Warfare in which rebels gain the upper hand (compared to Irregular Warfare-State Advantage), unlike campaigns distinguished by their religious or separatist nature, which appear to decrease the odds of observing Irregular forms of warfare in which rebels gain an advantage over their regime rivals, on average. These findings suggest that the direction of an external intervention likely has an impact on whether or not rebels can overcome their disadvantage relative to the state. They also suggest that campaigns with a distinct religious or separatist agenda tend to face overwhelming challenges making it difficult for the leaders of the groups to gain a strategic advantage over the regimes they hope to defeat.

The results do not provide strong evidence to support my expectations outlined in hypothesis 1c, namely that Operators and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to engage or exploit more primitive modes of warfare (i.e. category 4). In fact, the data indicates that with respect to primitive modes of combat, Operator and Warlords are effectively indistinguishable from Ideologues.

Instead, Insurgents offer the only discernible effect within this category. I find that Insurgents are significantly less likely to engage in Symmetric Non-Conventional warfare relative to Irregular Warfare-State Advantage, than Ideologues. This lends some support to my initial hypothesis, that while Operators, Warlords and Ideologues show no meaningful differences with respect to this category, Insurgents will more often than not avoid engaging in primitive modes of warfare, probably due in part to their considerable military advantage and skill set.

Moreover, the predicted probabilities suggest that in-category comparisons within individual categories of combat type perhaps offer more substantively helpful meaning in assessing the relationship between leader type and combat mode. The predicted probabilities across technologies of rebellion for each leader type reveal that private goods-based leaders are more likely to be found in this final category of primitive warfare.

Additionally, the results in *Table 5.1.* suggest that campaigns characterized by contagion, multi-party, and ethnic conflict, increase the risk of observing Symmetric Non-conventional warfare relative to irregular warfare in which the state has the advantage. This is hardly surprising given that all of these controls are reflective of syndicalistic, chaotic forms of primitive fighting described by Kalyvas & Balcells (2010).

To test for model performance, I calculated the proportional reduction in error. Overall, the model predicts the technology of rebellion correctly 65% of the time. The proportion reduction in error is equal to 41% relative to the null model (i.e. picking the modal category—irregular warfare state advantage—every time).³⁷

Next, I calculate predicted probabilities of observing each combat type across individual leader-types. These findings are in *Table 5.2.* Predicted probabilities offer an intuitive and useful way to interpret substantive effects of leader type on combat mode. Overall, the results indicate that Insurgents are significantly more likely than Ideologues and Operators to engage in conventional warfare, in addition to Irregular warfare in which the rebels have an advantage. In a given year, Insurgent-led campaigns have a 0.17 probability of being observed in the symmetric conventional category and a 0.44

³⁷ For this calculation, irregular warfare – state advantage is the most frequently observed technology of rebellion.

probability of being observed in the Irregular warfare-rebel advantage category. Similarly, Warlord-led campaigns have a 0.14 probability of being observed in the symmetric conventional category and a 0.35 probability of being observed in the Irregular warfare-rebel advantage category. By contrast, lead types lacking these skill sets have the lowest probability of engaging in symmetric conventional warfare, probably due to the high costs and strategic aptitude that is required to plan and carry out this type of warfare.

Alternatively, Operators and Warlords do appear to be significantly more likely than their public goods-motivated counterparts to initiate and perpetrate non-conventional symmetric forms of warfare. Groups led by Operators have a 0.32 probability of being observed in the Symmetric Non-conventional category followed by Warlords who have a 0.25 probability of being observed in the same category.

This appears to be more in line with my initial expectations in hypothesis 1c since Ideologues have a 0.26 probability of resorting to Symmetric Non-conventional warfare compared to only 0.07 percent for Insurgents. This suggests that Insurgents are likely to avoid this type of combat due in part to their discipline, and combined focus on military and political goals, whereas Ideologues who lack military skill sets are more likely to find themselves in situations of anarchic primitive forms of warfare. In the end, the predicted probabilities suggest that Operators and Warlords, along with Ideologues, may in fact be more likely to exploit this form of warfare than Insurgents. In the end, it is Insurgents who are qualitatively different with respect to this final category.

Table 5.2. also reveals that Ideologues and Operators are significantly more likely to conduct war irregularly against a stronger state opponent. Ideologue-led groups have a 0.56 probability of being observed in the Irregular warfare-State Advantage category, and Operators have a 0.61 probability of being in the same category—more than any other type. These findings suggest that military skills sets significantly set Insurgents and Warlord apart from Ideologues and Operators on the battlefield.

Table 5.2. Predicted Probabilities by Leader Type: Combat Type

| Leader Type | Sym. Conv. | Irreg.-State Adv. | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Sym. Non-conv. |
|-------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Ideologue | 0.07 | 0.56 | 0.10 | 0.26 |
| Insurgent | 0.17 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.07 |
| Operator | 0.05 | 0.61 | 0.02 | 0.32 |
| Warlord | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 0.25 |

(Note: control values set at median values)

As a robustness check, I estimate a multilevel multinomial logistic regression model that allows for random effects at the country and conflict levels.³⁸ This model assumes that leaders are nested within conflicts and countries. Therefore, I include a random intercept at the conflict and country level to control for unit-specific factors that may drive model results. If left unaddressed, these unit level effects could lead to biased estimates, as well as inefficient standard errors, whereas a fixed effect approach is inappropriate because my main theoretical variable of interest is time-invariant for many of the rebel leaders (Monogan 2011).

³⁸ As mentioned previously, I rely on Stata’s “gllamm” command.

Test 2: Exploring the Relationship between Leader Type and Campaign Severity


Second, I expect variation in rebel leader types to determine the mode of combat, as well as varying levels of combat severity of intra-state war campaigns. Earlier, I hypothesized that the presence of Ideologues, Insurgents, Operators or Warlords will lead to different campaign outcomes, and therefore, varying levels of severity observed in a given year, all else being equal. More specifically, I expect that Operators and Warlords, given their taste for greed and ruthless methods, are the most likely leader types to engage in combat featuring high levels of severity.

Given their violent and relentless pursuit of profits combined with a lack of military training, I expect that, on average, Operators will conduct wanton and reckless campaigns characterized by agency loss and extreme levels of violence, particularly toward civilian populations. Moreover, Warlords are likely to use their military skill sets to design strategies and implement tactics that introduce obscene levels of violence as a way to destroy their rivals and maximize profits. Warlords have no compunction about hurting others to protect revenue streams.

Figure 5.2. shows the distribution of leader type across each of the three levels of combat severity. Ideologues—politically inclusive by nature—are most frequently observed in the low severity category followed by Insurgents. This supports my claim that public goods driven leaders are likely to avoid combat that is unnecessarily violent since the decision to ramp up the violence has the potential to undermine political goals. In contrast, Operators are observed most frequently at medium and high levels of severity, followed by Warlords. To reiterate, I expect private goods driven leaders to have no qualms about using whatever violence deemed necessary to achieve their own

selfish ends. For them, engaging in higher levels of violence may actually seem like a lucrative opportunity. Interestingly enough, small portions of Ideologues, appear to reach the highest level of severity. This may be explained by the presence of religious zealots who are not shy to use violence in this world to achieve other worldly goals. It may also be explained by principal-agent problems caused by a lack of military discipline among lower level commanders and the rank-and-file. Finally, the results indicate that Insurgents tend to cluster in low to medium levels of severity, which suggests that the combined effects of military experience and the pursuit of public goods or rectification of a political grievance probably has a moderating effect on severity.

Figure 5.2. Overall Distribution of Leader Type by Severity



Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that leaders driven by public goods are more likely than those driven by private goods to engage in low to medium levels of severity. Operators, by contrast, are likely to concentrate at medium levels, perhaps a reflection of their military inability to oversee large-scale combat operations or their inability to inflict severe casualties on their opponents, instead favoring civilian targeting.

These results also reveal that Insurgents are more reluctant to engage in severe levels of combat, unless it is absolute necessary to the overall success of their campaigns.

Warlords show a relatively flat distribution across levels of severity. This may be explained by a couple of factors. First, Warlords tend to root out the competition and establish fiefdoms that are relatively unchallenged thus decreasing the risk of combat in a given year. Second, they are able to moderate levels of violence given their military aptitude—when it is advantageous they will resort to severe violence, when it is not, they will hold back. The number one goal of the Warlord is to use force to protect their personal revenue streams and increase their ability to earn by eliminating rivals.

To conduct a test of leader type and combat severity, I rely on a categorical response variable measuring changes in overall combat severity. Categories range from low, medium and high levels of combat severity. Upon first glance, it would seemingly make sense to employ an ordered logistic regression to estimate the effects of my covariates on these ordered outcomes. However, ordered logistic regression models are restricted by an important assumption, namely, that the relationship between each pair of outcome categories is the same.³⁹ In estimating an ordinal logistic regression model, I am assuming that the coefficients that describe the relationship between the lowest versus all higher categories of severity are the same as those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories. When this assumption does not hold, it is necessary to estimate the relationship between each pair of outcome groups.

Fox and Weisberg (2010) offer a simple test of the parallel regression assumption (also referred to as the proportional odds assumption) in which the difference between the

³⁹ Commonly referred to as the parallel regression or proportional odds assumption.

residual deviances of ordinal and multinomial logistic regression models is tested in a chi-squared test of independence. If the assumption is violated, I will need to estimate different models to illustrate the relationship between each pair of categories featured in my response variable. In essence, a significant test result indicates that I probably need to employ a multinomial logistic regression, rather than ordinal logistic regression.

In testing this assumption, the results indicate that models are statistically discernible at the $p < 0.0001$ -level yielding a chi-square statistic of 78.59 (12 *df*). Thus, the assumption holds suggesting that multinomial logistic regression is probably more appropriate. Multinomial models also suggest that, hypothetically, while Insurgents may be more likely to reach medium levels of severity than Ideologues, they are not necessarily more likely to reach High levels of severity than Ideologues. In fact, they may be less likely. Therefore, for the purposes of my analysis, I will treat my outcome variable as a discrete unordered measure of combat severity. The data used to construct this variable comes from the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset (Melander et al 2016).

The Ideologue serves as the baseline category of comparison in my model. Robust standard errors are clustered on Leader IDs and resulting z -scores are reported in parentheses in *Table 5.3*. Since I am employing multinomial regression, I do not make assumptions of normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity in errors. I also once again assume non-perfect separation, as well as independence across my outcomes of severity.⁴⁰ The results are easily interpreted across individual levels of severity and allow me to make comparisons of effects across leader-types for a given outcome category.

⁴⁰ In this test, I once again employ a generalized Hausman specification test that adjusts for clustering in my standard errors by individual leaders. Similar to the previous test, the findings indicate a failure to reject the null the equality of common coefficients across categories of severity, thus my assumption of IIA is not violated.

By clustering on individual leaders, I am allowing for intra-group correlation within the tenure of a given leader, while assuming that my observations are independent across clusters of Leader periods.⁴¹ In addition to standard controls, I incorporate my outcome measure of combat type on the right-hand side of my equation to determine if leadership effects hold in the presence of varying modes of technology of rebellion.

⁴¹ In doing so, this proved to be a “tougher” test for my main theoretical variables of interests, as resulting *z*-statistics were deflated when clustering robust standard errors on LeaderID.

Table 5.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression: Factors Related to Combat Severity⁴²

| Predictor | <u>Medium Severity</u> RRR | <u>High Severity</u> RRR |
|--------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| LeaderType | | |
| Insurgent | 1.87* (2.00) | 2.48* (2.57) |
| Operator | 4.04* (2.19) | 5.58* (2.71) |
| Warlord | 2.59* (2.56) | 6.41* (3.72) |
| TechReb | | |
| Irreg-State | 0.82 (-0.40) | 0.24* (-2.55) |
| Irreg-Rebel | 0.44* (-1.65) | 0.05* (-4.98) |
| Sym.NonCon | 0.67 (-0.75) | 0.15* (-2.66) |
| Intervention | 1.04 (0.15) | 2.84* (2.65) |
| Regime | 1.81* (3.62) | 1.22 (0.84) |
| Contagion | 1.00 (0.01) | 1.01 (0.03) |
| MultiParty | 0.58 (-1.33) | 0.33* (-2.06) |
| Resources | 0.98 (-0.04) | 0.68 (-0.92) |
| Terror | 0.71 (-0.91) | 0.70 (-0.68) |
| StateSponsor | 1.37 (1.25) | 1.74 (1.43) |
| Ethnic | 1.31 (0.95) | 1.01 (0.02) |
| Religious | 1.46 (1.13) | 1.79 (1.47) |
| Separatist | 0.46* (-2.77) | 0.21* (-3.97) |
| _Constant | 0.67 (-0.61) | 1.47 (0.46) |

N=1427

Log Likelihood= -1268.28; $X^2 = 124.68$ (p -value = 0.0000); Pseudo R2=0.1310; BIC=2783.52; $df=34$

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Low Severity; z-scores in parentheses; Robust standard errors clustered on LeaderID)

⁴² The restricted model, in which I test the non-linear effects of leader type on severity without the addition of relevant controls, yields significant effects for all leader types relative to Ideologues. A Likelihood Ratio test comparing the null and full models yields a significant test statistic (328.10; $p=0.000$).

Similar to the previous test, I offer robustness checks by testing the relationship between leader type and combat mode while accounting for multilevel random effects at the country and conflict level. The results from these additional models are consistent with those presented in *Table 5.3.* and confirm my earlier hypothesis (2). These models assume that leaders are nested within conflicts and countries, and therefore, I include a random intercept at the each level, accordingly, to control for any omitted unit-level specific factors that may drive the model results. Results of these additional models in which I estimate random effects are presented in Appendix C. In addition, I provide estimates of a model in which I treat outcomes of severity as an ordered response variable. Once again, the results hold up.

Overall, the results in *Table 5.3.* support my hypothesis (2) that, *ceteris paribus*, Operators and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to reach the highest level of combat severity in a given leader-year. The relative risk of achieving a high level of severity (versus lower categories) is 5.58 times greater for Operators, and 6.41 times greater Warlords relative to Ideologues. The results also indicate that odds of Insurgents engaging in High severity campaigns increase for Insurgents relative to Ideologues. Post-estimation Wald tests of joint significance of leader-type indicate that variation in leader type is once again a significant predictor within my model.⁴³

A few additional covariates exhibited effects on severity as well. Combat mode did not have a discernible effect on medium levels of severity, with the exception of Irregular Warfare-Rebel Advantage, but it did consistently appear to have an impact on

⁴³ A test of joint significance of leader type yields a test statistic of 16.35 (p value=0.0010).

the odds of reaching the highest level of severity. Relative to conventional campaigns, all other campaign types appear to decrease the risk of reaching the highest category of severity suggesting that large-scale conventional campaigns are capable of producing high levels of casualties compared to irregular or primitive modes of warfare.

Anocratic and democratic regimes appear to increase the risk of observing medium and high levels of severity probably due in part to the lack of constraints on autocrats combined with their willingness to resort to tactics designed to inflict maximum casualties. I also find that separatist campaigns appear to decrease the risk of reaching higher levels of severity—again, probably reflecting the peripheral, confined nature of these types of smaller scale conflicts. Multiparty conflicts also decrease the risk of observing the highest level of severity in a given year, all else being equal. It is possible that the fractured nature of the combat environment makes it difficult for a single group to focus on a single target, thus decreasing overall casualty levels. Finally, the presence of an external intervention in a year of a leader's campaign greatly increases the risk of entering the highest category of severity. Again, this probably reflects the game changing nature of outside support, which has the potential to increase the capabilities of local combatants, and at times, spawn retaliatory interventions on the part of other outside actors seeking leverage over a localized conflict.

To get a sense of model fit, I generate predicted probabilities for discrete levels of severity, and then test to see how well the overall model replicates the observed distribution of outcomes in severity. A null model (i.e. in which the modal category is observed) selects the lowest level of severity 44% of the time, whereas the estimated

model predicts 57% of outcomes correctly.⁴⁴ Thus, the proportion reduction in error between the null and estimated model is roughly 23%, in that it eliminates 23% of the errors remaining relative to the model in which the modal category is observed each time. Predicted probabilities are displayed in *Table 5.4*. These results strengthen my overall findings and expectations about the relationship between leader type and combat severity observed in a given year of a leader’s combat campaign.

Table 5.4. Predicted Probabilities by Leader Type: Severity Level

| Leader Type | Low Severity | Medium Severity | High Severity |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Ideologue | 0.60 | 0.32 | 0.08 |
| Insurgent | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.14 |
| Operator | 0.25 | 0.55 | 0.19 |
| Warlord | 0.30 | 0.43 | 0.27 |

(Note: control values set at median values⁴⁵)

As *Table 5.4* reveals, Operator-led campaigns have a 0.19 probability of being observed in the High severity category, and Warlords have a 0.27 probability of reaching the same category in a given year of a leader’s campaign. In contrast, Ideologues have a 0.60 probability of falling into the Low severity category, while Operators and Warlords have a 0.25 and 0.30 probability of being observed in the lowest level, respectively.

Insurgent-led campaigns have 0.42 and 0.43 probability of leading a Low or

⁴⁴ The estimated models picks 31% of low level, 21% of medium level, and 5% of high level severity outcomes correctly.

⁴⁵ Values set for covarities: TechReb=2; Intervention=1; Regime=1; Contagion=1; MultiParty=1; Resources=1; Terror=1; StateSponsor=1; Ethnic=1; Religious=1; Separatist=1

Medium level of severity campaign, respectively, but only a 0.14 probability of engaging in High severity warfare. These findings suggest that leaders driven by private goods are more likely than their public goods motivated peers to engage in High severity warfare.

Overall, these findings offer strong support for hypothesis 2 and indicate that rebel leaders are critical theoretical mechanisms propelling the logic of violence in intra-state war. Unexpectedly, the results suggest that Insurgents are willing and capable of engaging in High severity campaigns, relative to Ideologues. When it is necessary the Insurgent will use their military skill to ramp up the violence to achieve political goals. However, the predicted probabilities also suggest that Insurgents are less likely than their private goods driven counterparts to engage in high levels of violence. To reiterate, the Insurgent is constantly assessing the utility of military means to accomplish political ends.

On average, we observe leader types exhibiting independent effects on the severity of the fighting. First, Ideologues appear to be the least likely to reach the highest levels of combat severity, followed by Insurgents who experience high severity campaigns, but are not as likely to do so as Operators and Warlords. Second, military experience appears to act as a moderating factor on leader's decisions to engage in severe levels of violence for Insurgents, but this is not always the case for Warlords. In the end, the desire for private-gains appears to have a pronounced effect on a leader's decision to use violence. Case in point, Operators and Warlords are the most likely to lead campaigns featuring high levels of combat severity. The substantive impact of these findings is clear and ultimately robust to the presence of my controls.

Test 3: Exploring the Effects between Leader Type and Campaign Tenure

Finally, I offer a test of whether or not combat campaign tenures vary in length in across leader types. Does the presence of one leader type versus another lead to an increase in the likelihood of combat tenure termination in the first five years of a campaign? My expectation is that Operators—leader types lacking military skills and driven by greed—are the most likely to preside over shorter campaigns than Ideologues, but especially compared to Insurgents and Warlords. Sixty-six percent of campaigns end in the first five years. Given the difficulty of standing up and sustaining an armed campaign over time, and the relatively small percentage of conflicts that extend beyond five years, I restrict the domain of my dependent variable—campaign tenure to five years.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Furthermore, the probability of a campaign ending after five years grows exponentially for all leader types making it difficult to distinguish between leader types as campaigns extend past five years.

Table 5.5. Discrete-Time Hazard Model: Predicting the Probability of Tenure⁴⁷

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|---------------|----------|------|----------|---------|
| Tenure (Year) | | | | |
| 1 | -3.59 | 0.90 | -4.01 | 0.000* |
| 2 | -3.81 | 0.89 | -4.27 | 0.000* |
| 3 | -3.56 | 0.90 | -3.97 | 0.000* |
| 4 | -3.01 | 0.89 | -3.39 | 0.001* |
| 5 | -2.90 | 0.90 | -3.23 | 0.001* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | -0.53 | 0.23 | -2.30 | 0.021* |
| Operator | 0.81 | 0.24 | 3.30 | 0.001* |
| Warlord | 0.25 | 0.25 | 1.02 | 0.308 |
| Intervention | 0.77 | 0.19 | 3.91 | 0.000* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -0.61 | 0.27 | -2.23 | 0.026* |
| Irreg. Rebel | -0.53 | 0.26 | -2.00 | 0.045* |
| Symm. Non. | 0.08 | 0.34 | 0.24 | 0.813 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | -0.02 | 0.19 | -0.10 | 0.917 |
| High | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.785 |
| Regime | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.53 | 0.597 |
| Contagion | -0.26 | 0.18 | -1.49 | 0.137 |
| Multiparty | 0.29 | 0.25 | 1.17 | 0.244 |
| Resources | -0.28 | 0.22 | -1.26 | 0.206 |
| Terror | -0.06 | 0.22 | -0.28 | 0.780 |
| StateSponsor | -0.29 | 0.16 | -1.85 | 0.065* |
| Ethnic | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.53 | 0.598 |
| Religious | 0.26 | 0.24 | 1.10 | 0.271 |
| Separatist | -0.35 | 0.17 | -2.11 | 0.035* |

N=1427

Log Likelihood=-564.56; Intercept=1.63; BIC=1448.71; D=1129.13 Df=44

* $p < 0.01$ (Notes: 5 time periods (time dummies) reported; Base category = Ideologue; z-statistics reported; Standard errors clustered on Leader ID)

⁴⁷ The null model yields significant effects across all leader types relative to Ideologues. A Likelihood Ratio test comparing yields a significant test statistic (258.77; $p=0.000$).

To estimate the effects of leader type, combat type, and severity on leader tenure, I employ a discrete-time model for non-repeated events of a single kind (i.e. tenure end = exit from data set). Although fairly intuitive as a method, the RLCW data structure—leader-year format as time periods—is appropriate for this type of event-history analysis.⁴⁸ Time is not treated as continuous variable, but as discrete units of time (i.e. leader-year dummy variables). Tenures for individual leaders are right-censored as some campaigns extend beyond the domain of the RLCW. Generalizations are confined to 1989-2014.

My goal is to estimate a model in which the conditional probability of a leader's tenure ending in a single year is contingent upon relevant values of my time-varying covariates.⁴⁹ One of the building blocks of this model is the concept of the estimated hazard of tenure termination, which represents the set of leaders who are at risk of terminating their combat tenure each year.⁵⁰ In total, tenure ranges 1–26 years in the RLCW. As mentioned earlier, roughly 60 percent of leader campaigns last 1-5 years.

⁴⁸ Left censoring is accounted for when campaign tenure preceded 1989. I only generalize my findings in the post-Cold War security environment. In cases where significant greed, grievance or military experience is evident prior to 1989, I adjust the coding of leader type accordingly. The conflict narratives are helpful for this very purpose.

⁴⁹ Appendix D contains additional model specifications (e.g. conditional logit, random effects model, and Cox Regression models). Bottom line: the findings hold. Leader type remains a robust and significant predictor of tenure end with Operators being significantly more likely than their counterparts to drop out of the dataset in the first five years of their campaign.

⁵⁰ For the purposes of the model, I assume that the hazard rate varies by year, but is the same for all leaders in each year. This is a hearty assumption, but given my generalizable framework of leader type informed by motivation and military experience, I treat each type – Ideologue, Insurgent, Operator and Warlord – equally.

Figure 5.3. Predicted Probability of Leader Type Failure⁵¹




Table 5.6. Overall Hazard Rates Across Leader Type

| Leader Type | Hazard | SE | z-score | p-value |
|-------------|--------|------|---------|---------|
| Ideologue | 0.15 | 0.20 | 7.78 | 0.000 |
| Insurgent | 0.10 | 0.01 | 8.97 | 0.000 |
| Operator | 0.28 | 0.04 | 7.25 | 0.000 |
| Warlord | 0.20 | 0.03 | 6.47 | 0.000 |

(Note: control values set at median values⁵²)

⁵¹ To reiterate, I chose to limit the domain of probabilities to the first five years of a leader's tenure. These early years are a crucial test of a leader's ability to wage war and remain viable in a conflict theater. I expect this to be a very difficult period for Operators.

⁵² Values set for covariates: TechReb=2; Intervention=1; Regime=1; Contagion=1; MultiParty=1; Resources=1; Terror=1; StateSponsor=1; Ethnic=1; Religious=1; Separatist=1

The results in *Table 5.5* offer some support for my initial hypothesis, although these results are noisy and the effects are indistinguishable across leader types at specific points in time. However, these effects are more pronounced in the first five years of a leader's campaign as *Figure 5.3* suggests. This figure shows the change in hazard rate across the first five years of a leader's tenure. These results show that the odds of observing tenure termination in an Operator-run campaign increase significantly relative to the Ideologue. In fact, the hazard rate for Operators is roughly 30% and is significantly higher than Ideologues (15%), Insurgents (10%), and Warlords (19%).

Once again, military skill appears to lengthen the duration of a leader's campaign as Insurgents and Warlords, on average, feature the lowest hazard rates in the RLCW. But also, Operator-led campaigns are distinguished from Ideologue-led campaigns by their pursuit of private gains, which may also explain why Operators are the most likely to terminate their campaigns more quickly in the first five years versus all other leader types, according to *Figure 5.3*.

Among the remaining covariates, severity levels appear to have no discernible impact on a leader's campaign tenure; however, the mode of warfare does appear to significantly impact the hazard rate. Irregular forms of combat relative to symmetric conventional campaigns significantly decrease the odds in observing a leader's exit from a conflict, suggesting that if a leader has the means and skill set to embark on a conventional campaign their campaigns are more durable.

Other factors that have a discernible impact on the rate of tenure end include state sponsorship of a group and separatist conflicts, both of which decrease the odds of a leader's campaign tenure ending. This finding suggests that if you want to stay in the

game, it helps to have outside support. For the former, having the backing of a state may bolster some leader campaigns, while keeping others on life support thereby prolonging the conflict. For the latter, the confined, often peripheral, nature of secessionist conflicts indicates that leaders can keep these types of insurgencies simmering for longer periods of time.

Overall, these three tests provide interesting and compelling results suggesting that leader type is a critical link in explaining the type, severity and tenure of combat. Additional robustness checks show consistently that leader type has a discernible impact on combat tenure and that Operators tend to terminate their campaigns more quickly than others, especially those with military training. It may be the Ideologues ability to delegate to a trusted subordinate with military experience that keeps them in the game longer, coupled with the benefits of increased popular support brought on by more inclusive approaches associated with the distribution of public goods. In the next chapter, I offer a qualitative exploration of these effects demonstrating how the logic of rebel leaders in warfare plays out.

CHAPTER 6
AN EXPLANATION OF REBEL LEADERS IN WAR
“FOUR VIGNETTES”

“I must have been saved by the spirits, by some reason to do good for my people.”

- Vang Pao, Laos 2005⁵³

Introduction

In this chapter, I offer an explanation of the results from the preceding empirical chapter through a series of vignettes profiling rebel leaders in action. Overall, my initial expectations about the systematic effects of rebel leader type were confirmed in part through three separate empirical tests. However, establishing a significant relationship among variables is hardly a definitive explanation. Therefore, I use this chapter to help clarify and explain the relationship between leaders and my intra-state war outcomes of interest. For the sake of empirical clarity, I profile the campaigns of four rebel leaders and the behaviors of the groups they led in combat in a series of vignettes sampled from the RLCW data. My goal is not to provide the reader with a comprehensive military history of each leader and their campaign. By briefly analyzing four rebel leaders, I am able to evaluate my predictions and qualitatively explicate a chain of logic with respect to rebel leaders and observable outcomes in intra-state war. My goal is to use qualitative vignettes of rebel leaders in action to highlight the ways in which military experience and motivation are directly connected to changes in the nature and duration of a combat

⁵³ Kurlanitzick (2016)

campaign. Whereas quantitative analysis can show general associations between key variables of interests, qualitative analysis can help establish direct connections between variables of interest. It can also provide external validity to my results in the previous chapter.

The chapter proceeds in the following manner: I offer four brief descriptions of rebel leader types in action. In terms of case selection, I first examine the campaign of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the Angolan Civil War from his entry into the RLCW in 1989 until being killed in action by MPLA forces at Moxico in 2002. Next, I look at the campaign of Charles Taylor. The notorious Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in the Liberian Civil War from 1989 until 1997, when he exits the RLCW data and becomes President of Liberia. I then offer a case study of Armed Islamic Group (GIA) leader, Antar Zouabri, who had led the GIA in the Algerian Civil war from 1998 until 2002. Finally, I offer an evaluation of Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and featured in the RLCW from 1989 until his death in 2009. For each vignette, I provide a biographical sketch of the leader highlighting their military training, experience, and motivations for conflict. I then offer a short overview of the conflict, followed by an overall assessment of each leader's determination of type, paying close attention to the relationship between individual leader types and outcomes of combat type, severity and tenure.

These four cases are selected on the basis of 4 main criteria. First, I wanted to ensure that I had range of leaders operating groups in conflict across multiple regions. As such, I include cases from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, three regions that make up

the bulk of my observations. I chose two leaders from Africa since this region contains the most conflicts and leaders in my data set. My goal is to see if the theoretical expectations I laid forth in preceding chapters regarding leader type hold up across varying regional and cultural conflict environments.

Second, I also choose three examples of leaders who reveal variation in leader type over the course of their campaign. In particular, I attempt to reveal how public goods based campaigns can devolve into profiteering campaigns. I also try to emphasize how a rebel leader is able to gain military experience over time and change the nature and severity of their campaign, in addition to sustaining the life of their campaigns. Relatedly, I tried to ensure variation in combat campaign tenure across the four vignettes, ranging from shorter campaigns (Taylor and Zouabri) to longer campaigns (Savimbi and Prabhakaran). Essentially, I wanted to try to use historical evidence to try and determine how and why leader type is able affect variation in a leader's campaign tenure.

Accordingly, the Savimbi, Taylor, and Prabhakaran, vignettes reveal a transition from one type to another during each of their respective tenures at the helm of UNITA and the NPFL. Savimbi starts out as an Insurgent, but over the course of time, devolves into a Warlord due to his incessant focus on personal wealth and power. Taylor is the ideal Operator early on his campaign to seize power in Liberia, but as the conflict develops, he makes the shift from to a Warlord—due in part to significant battlefield experience and training he was able to accrue over time. Prabhakaran, an ideal Insurgent for most of his campaign against the Sri Lankan government, remained so until 2006, at which point his pursuit of a personal wealth combined with a cult of personality-like aura of power become readily apparent, pushing him into Warlord status. In contrast, Zouabri

functioned as an Ideologue for the entire duration of his short, but violent time at the helm of GIA. The Zouabri case is also worth highlighting for another reason since it shows the flexibility and intra-unit variation in terms of violence within the Ideologue category. His experience reveals how Ideologues can remain ideologically pure, but brutally zealous, in their pursuit of ideological based, if not other worldly goals.

Overall, the four vignettes offer insight into each leader type—e.g. Ideologue, Insurgent, Operator, Warlord—featured in the RLCW typology. This approach also suggests that leader type is not pre-determined or a strict function of the conflict environment, but rather something that evolves over time as leaders motives change in response to changing combat conditions, and as they gain military training and experience. In addition, three of the vignettes explore leaders who served as founders of their respective groups (i.e. Savimbi, Taylor, and Prabhakaran), and one of the leaders assumed the leadership position upon the death of his predecessor. The vignettes also show significant variation in tenure ranging from 6 years to nearly 20 years.

Third, I select my cases to ensure that I have sufficient information to evaluate the course and dynamics of their campaigns. All four leader-types are readily visible leaders of their groups in war and feature detailed information about their time at the helm of their respective organizations. In the end, it did not prove to be a difficult task to identify the leaders of the 200 groups featured in the RLCW data set, but the coding team did observe considerable variation in the quality and quantity of reporting of leaders' participation in combat.

Finally, I wanted to ensure that each rebel leader type is featured in my qualitative evaluation. I did this to determine if my theoretical foundation, indeed, offers support for

my causal argument, namely, that a rebel leader's background has significant impact on intra-state war outcomes. This will also help me to determine if changes in the type, severity and tenure of a campaign are, in fact, connected to changes in leader type across the course of a conflict. I confine my analysis to the 1989 through 2014 time frame.

Jonas Savimbi: "The Warlord," Angolan Civil War (1989-2002)

Conflict Overview

UNITA and its armed wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA), fought an intermittent combat campaign in Angola from 1966 until 2002. In the early stages, UNITA/FALA fought a war of liberation against Portugal, Angola's colonial occupier at the time. In the later stages, the group participated in a decades-long civil war against the post-colonial, independent Communist government in Angola. UNITA ostensibly fought under a nationalist, anti-Marxist banner throughout its existence (Jane's 2006).

Overall, the conflict can be divided into two phases: the war for independence and the post-independence civil war. The Angolan War of Independence officially began in 1961—although fighting began as early as 1956—and continued until the MPLA achieved victory over the Portuguese military in 1975.⁵⁴ By 1961, three groups emerged as the primary factions within a larger liberation movement: the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA. Of these, MPLA was the largest and eventually succeeded in defeating the Portuguese army.

⁵⁴ Prior to the revolution, the Angolans began campaigns of guerrilla warfare to combat what was perceived to be an oppressive colonial government. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) began its initial insurgency in 1956, but the conflict was not deemed official until 1961.

However, peace between these parties did not endure. Almost immediately after independence, vicious fighting broke out between the parties due to the MPLA's unilateral formation of government without the consent of UNITA and the FNLA. In November 1975, three different declarations of independence were proclaimed igniting the Angolan Civil War. The main conflict pitted UNITA against the MPLA, as the FNLA quickly collapsed, and eventually, it became absorbed by UNITA.

Often referred to as the "War for Africa," the Angolan Civil War served as a major front in the Cold War (Bridgland 2017). Cold War superpowers, along with regional powers, faced off against one another in a proxy war transforming the conflict from a small-scale regional conflict to a large-scale civil war with international dimensions and Cold War implications. The MPLA quickly gained Soviet and Cuban military support, while UNITA received military arms, advisement, and tactical support from South Africa, in addition to assistance from United States military advisors and weapons (Shubin et al 2014). The participation of outside actors revolutionized the various technologies of rebellion employed by the actors (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Bolstered by Soviet, Cuban, South African, and US military support, the combatants frequently engaged in conventional military campaigns featuring heavy weaponry and set piece battles (Polack 2013).

Throughout the 1980's the war intensified, as massive outside intervention escalated. In total, Cuba sent thousands of troops—coupled with military personnel from the Soviet military—giving MPLA a military advantage over UNITA. Cuban and Soviet assistance led to early MPLA victories in the capital of Luanda and along the western coast of Angola (Bridgland 2017). Fearing an MPLA victory, South Africa subsequently

sent 5,000 troops and mercenaries, along with air and artillery support to aid UNITA (Bridgland 2017). Despite considerable assistance from South African forces, which included air power and crack commando units, such as the infamous 32 Battalion, the MPLA were able to capture UNITA strongholds of Huambo and Cuito Cuanavale (Bridgland 2017). Additional conventional battlefield defeats ultimately forced UNITA to adapt and change strategy. Eventually, Savimbi shifted UNITA's strategy from conventional to guerrilla warfare as the primary mode of combat (Jane's 2006). During this phase of the fighting, UNITA fought at a distinct disadvantage to the MPLA.

Throughout the 1980s, UNITA continued receiving aid from the West in response to increasing Cuban and Soviet involvement (Polack 2013; Shubin et al 2014; Brigland 2017). Over time, the conflict effectively became a proxy war in the midst of the Cold War.⁵⁵ Kalyvas & Bacells (2010) profile the Angolan conflict as an example of the “game changing” effects that Cold War superpower interventions had on the technology of rebellion in localized intra-state war.

In 1988, South African backed UNITA forces fought Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA forces in one of the largest battles ever fought on the African continent—the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Both sides ultimately claimed victory in a battle that featured large-scale kinetic offensives, massive artillery, air support, and tank battles (Polack 2013). Following Cuito Cuanavale, the Soviet Union began to withdraw support from the MPLA in order to focus on its own domestic political and economic turmoil. Not long afterwards, Cuba and South Africa also withdrew their troops from the conflict

⁵⁵ Savimbi visited the United States in 1986 to discuss his movement with President Reagan and was praised by Reagan for his efforts in freeing Angola from the clutches of communism.

theater. The exit of international and regional forces had profound effects on the nature and intensity of the fighting (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). In fact, much of the fighting in the wake of these withdrawals was largely characterized by irregular warfare, where neither side possessed a distinct advantage.

In the nineties, Angola witnessed a brief peaceful interlude in the fighting paving the way for a presidential election. But facing electoral defeat, Savimbi declared that his enemies had rigged the election. As a result, the combatants returned to the battlefield until 1994, when both groups declared a unilateral cease-fire brokered by the UN. The peace did not last long, and in 1998, UNITA forces attacked UN peacekeeping troops sent to monitor the conflict.

Stretching into its fourth decade, the conflict continued intermittently at low intensity throughout the late nineties. During these twilight years of fighting, UNITA's forces dwindled, as the MPLA forced Savimbi and his forces into the country's eastern hinterlands. Facing a severe disadvantage in power and capability, low-intensity irregular warfare and civilian targeting characterized much of UNITA's strategy and tactics during these final years.

In 2002, Savimbi was killed in action and the conflict ended. Savimbi's death resulted in total defeat for UNITA and a decisive MPLA victory. The resulting demobilization of UNITA allowed for concessions to remaining fighters. Although severely weakened, UNITA remained politically viable as an activist group with a stake in the new Angolan government.

Leader Background

Dr. Jonas Savimbi formed and led UNITA, a nationalist anti-Marxist Angolan armed rebel group, from its founding in 1966, until his death in 2002. Born in 1934 in Munhango, Angola, Savimbi showed academic promise early on and proved to be a gifted and determined student (Bridgland 1986). In his early twenties, Savimbi received an academic scholarship to study medicine in Portugal, Angola's colonial occupier at the time. After arriving in Portugal, he reportedly developed new interests and became involved in politics (Bridgland 1986). Shortly thereafter, Savimbi abandoned his medical training and was awarded a scholarship to study Political Science in Switzerland. He eventually received a doctorate in Political Science from the University of Lausanne in 1965.

While a doctoral student, Savimbi came into contact with Holden Roberto, a founding member of the National Liberation Front of Angola (NLFA). Roberto had gained international prominence as a fierce advocate for Angola's independence from Portugal. Under Roberto's tutelage, Savimbi also became intimately involved in the cause of Angolan independence. It was during this time period that Savimbi had a political awakening to the cause of decolonization and became passionate about securing the liberation of Angola (Bridgland 1986).

No stranger to political resistance, Savimbi's grandfather, Sakaita Savimbi, led the Ovimbundu rebellion against the Portuguese in 1902. The younger Savimbi would later use his family's political lineage as a foundation for his own political legitimacy throughout his life (Bridgland 1986; Reno 2011). No stranger to political arguments either—Savimbi cut his teeth politically by engaging in impassioned arguments with his

father who also held considerable political standing as a clerk and teacher in their local community (Bridgland 1986).

Emboldened by his family's legacy and imbued with a strong sense of political identity, political grievance proved to be a powerful force in shaping Savimbi's youthful emergence as a rebel leader. Savimbi came of age politically during a tumultuous time in Angola, and more broadly, on the African continent, as many African states started to move violently toward independence. As a graduate student, Savimbi was harassed and detained frequently by Portugal's state security services. Lisbon was concerned about Savimbi's political activity and saw him as a potential threat back home. These experiences with Portugal's security apparatus had a profound impact on the young Savimbi (Bridgland 1986). Thus, Savimbi's trajectory as a grievance-based leader was, in part, shaped by these formative experiences as a young man.

Following his political studies, Savimbi pursued a leading position in the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) youth wing. However, he was denied membership, and subsequently, joined the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) in 1964. It was in 1964 that he began making plans for the creation of UNITA, but first he visited China.

Mao Tse-Tung is reported to have heavily influenced Savimbi's guerrilla warfare style, as Savimbi eventually enrolled and trained at the Nanking Military Academy in China (Bridgland 1986). To overcome obstacles to mobilization, Savimbi sought support from China, and subsequently, he received arms and military training. Savimbi excelled in his new role as a guerrilla fighter. His political experiences, combined with

his military training in China, made Savimbi into capable student and practitioner of guerrilla warfare (Bridgland 1986). Savimbi proved to be an eager student of insurgency.

Upon returning to Angola, he used his newfound political indoctrination and training in guerrilla warfare, combined with externally funded resources and materials, to make UNITA into an organizational and political reality. By 1966, Savimbi had established UNITA and began attacking Portuguese troops in rural parts of southern Angola (Jane's 2006). This continued throughout the early 1970s, until the liberation movement achieved independence from Lisbon. In 1975, UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA. Civil war ensued and continued until Savimbi's death in a small-skirmish in Moxico, Angola in 2002.

Assessment of Leader Type

Dr. Savimbi enters the RLCW dataset as an Insurgent in 1989, after being at the helm of UNITA/FALA for more than 20 years. Even prior to 1989, Savimbi functioned as an Insurgent, but by 1992, considerable evidence of profiteering and rampant civilian targeting prompt a change in Savimbi's coding status from Insurgent to Warlord.

Savimbi acquired formal military training in China, and later on, he garnered significant combat experience participating in revolutionary and post-revolutionary civil war in Angola. Initially motivated by political grievance against the post-independence Marxist government, he eventually transitions away from the pursuit of public goods to using military means as a way to achieve lucrative personal ends and increase his own political power.

Savimbi is generally recognized as the sole political and military leader of UNITA/FALA (hereafter referred to solely as "UNITA"). He led from its inception until

his death in 2002 (Jane's 2006). He founded UNITA, and its armed wing FALA, in the early 1960s. A proven and effective rebel entrepreneur, during these early years Savimbi oversaw the formation, structure, and recruitment of UNITA. He turned UNITA into a viable political and military force in the Angolan political landscape. As a rebel commander, he led UNITA for nearly four decades ensuring the group's viability in the face of multiple threats, offering a vision, providing selective incentives to his rank-and-file, and frequently, leading his troops directly on the battlefield. Savimbi was ultimately responsible for the formulation of strategy and implementation of tactics. He transformed UNITA from a fledgling guerrilla organization into a professional army with the capability to fight large-scale conventional battles.

In terms of his military background, Savimbi gained extensive, formal military training in China, followed by more than forty years of intense combat experience at the helm of UNITA. A "hand's on" commander and charismatic leader, Savimbi participated on the front lines throughout the war (Bridgland 1986, 2017; Jane's 2006). In terms of motivation, Savimbi's history reveals a transition over time from a public-goods based leader, propelled by an intense grievance against his colonial occupier, and later on, a desire to own a stake in Angola's post-independence political system. By the end of his tenure, Savimbi sought full control of Angola.

During the revolutionary phases, Savimbi led UNITA in an insurgency characterized by strong grievance-based anti-Colonial, anti-Marxist overtones (Bridgland 1986). UNITA put a large focus on public goods, such as self-governance and equality, as a way to undermine Portuguese colonial rule. Thus, early on in the conflict—up until 1992—Savimbi is classified as Insurgent due to significant military training and

experience, in conjunction with his expressed motivation to secure a UNITA-led political future for Angola. There is also considerable evidence of prioritization of public goods.

But from 1992 until his death in 2002, Savimbi can be more aptly categorized as a Warlord. This determination is made on the basis of historical evidence suggesting systematic attempts at profiteering, exploitation of natural resources, in particular diamonds, and a zealous pursuit of private goods and personal political power verging on a cult of personality (Jane's 2006; Cunningham 2011; Reno 2011; Bridgland 2017).

Although Savimbi faced severe constraints and obstacles on the path to mobilization, the skill set he derived from his time training in guerrilla warfare in China helped UNITA become a viable political *and military force* in the domestic chaos of post-colonial Angola (Bridgland 1986). Throughout the 1970's, UNITA seamless shifted between irregular and conventional modes of combat (Jane's 2006). In fact, Savimbi scored major conventional military victories throughout central and Northern Angola, including major routs of the FNLA and MPLA (Bridgland 2017). As a rebel leader, Savimbi not only proved to be an effective political mobilizer and recruiter, but he also proved to be adept at formulating strategies and implementing tactics in response to changing combat conditions on the ground (Bridgland 1986, 2017).

Between 1974 and 1991, UNITA received massive amounts of money and military support from foreign donors, most notably the United States and South Africa (Jane's 2006). Savimbi's success in securing foreign assistance greatly increased UNITA's military capability. In addition, he formed alliances and coordinated with foreign governments, as well as insurgency groups in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Jane's 2006). Prior to 1992, Savimbi capitalized off foreign aid and

his own military skill set to engage in large-scale conventional military offensives against MPLA forces. Savimbi organized UNITA along army lines, with heavy emphasis on improving and maintaining the organization's military capability and effectiveness (Jane's 2006). Eventually, he created an organization that, at its peak, saw an estimated 100,000 soldiers among its rank-and-file (Jane's 2002).

As UNITA entered the 1980's, Savimbi had transitioned away from running a rag-tag guerrilla army to training a more professionalized modern army (e.g. Bridgland 1986; Polack 2013). In addition to training recruits in the arts of guerrilla warfare, Savimbi initiated the training of artillery, parachute, and air groups (Bridgland 2017). As a result, UNITA's forces took a more conventional path to confronting enemy forces head-on with support from the South African military (Bridgland 1986, Polack 2013, 2017). Moreover, by 1980, Savimbi had corrected an earlier strategy of hit-destroy-and-run attacks on small towns, and instead, Savimbi began ordering his troops to clear and hold small towns (Bridgland 1986, 2017).

At its peak in the late eighties, UNITA engaged in intense pitched battles against MPLA, Soviet and Cuban forces. The severity of the overall violence reached extreme levels during this time, due in part to massive offensive military operations that featured high levels of combatant deaths (UCDP 2017). Moreover, the campaign featured low levels of non-combatant deaths, as the bulk of the casualties occurred as a result of traditional set-piece battles, such as Cuito Cuanavale (Polack 2013; UCDP 2017).

As the conflict progressed into the 1990's, UNITA's command structure began to reflect his desire to run and operate a professional modern military force (Bridgland 2017). Although UNITA had traditionally been organized and run as a political

organization, it started to reorganize militarily with heavy emphasis given to the FALA (Jane's 2006). The FALA assumed a position of dominance in the overall structure and organization of UNITA. Much like a traditional army, UNITA's military wing contained five organizational fronts, each commanded by a colonel or brigadier general (Jane's 2006). Throughout the war, UNITA demonstrated an ability to institute a firm chain of command between high level and mid level commanders, which allowed the organization to communicate effectively across commands and conduct operations with a high-level of discipline (Jane's 2006).

Politically, Savimbi continued to fight under a nationalist, anti-Marxist agenda during the 1980s and early 1990s. Large amounts of foreign assistance gave Savimbi operational flexibility, and it allowed him to extend operations throughout large swaths of territory in eastern and Southern Angola. Under Savimbi's firm command, UNITA fought an effective guerrilla warfare campaign against the MPLA and controlled a much greater area than it physically occupied (Jane's 2006). Savimbi also relentlessly targeted and controlled areas rich in oil and diamonds (Sarvun & Cauvin 2002). When appropriate, Savimbi leveraged these resources, along with South African military support, in order to fight conventional battles against the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA.

For much of the conflict, Savimbi transitioned between guerrilla and conventional warfare campaigns to meet changing battlefield conditions. He also showed a willingness to come to the negotiating table. Between 1988 and 1992, Savimbi took part in multiple peace negotiations with the government and participated in the 1992

presidential elections. Upon losing, however, he returned to the battlefield. Following his electoral defeat, Savimbi's campaigns took on a more predatory, profit-seeking tone.

By 1992, UNITA's foreign support had begun to dry up. Subsequently, the organization began to increase its reliance on illicit revenue streams, primarily diamond smuggling from areas under its control (Jane's 2006). From 1992 to 1999, Savimbi raised an estimated \$3-4 billion from diamond sales alone (Jane's 2006). Despite earlier setbacks, the MPLA began to rearm and regroup, and by 1992, the group had rebuilt its forces and initiated a campaign against Savimbi concentrating on the oil and diamond-producing areas under his control. This approach proved to be effective as MPLA gained a number of victories and Savimbi slowly began to lose control of parts of the country.

At this stage, Savimbi shifted to a more self-centered Warlord insurgency. Savimbi situated his military command on top of a natural diamond mine that could be exploited to fill his own coffers and ensure that UNITA remained a viable opponent to the MPLA. During the final years of the conflict, Savimbi's campaign seemingly focused less on using military means to rectify political grievances and more on using combat to pursue private pecuniary gains.

It was following the 1992 elections that Savimbi began to target civilians and revenue streams more aggressively. He also transitioned away from using military resistance as a means to secure public goods, in favor of private goods. Even though the MPLA made a number of concessions—which included an offer of the Vice Presidency to Savimbi—he continued his campaign. Evidence from this time period suggests that Savimbi shifted his focus to maintaining his revenue streams from the illicit trafficking of minerals, arms and other resources (*Economist* 2002). While all other parties to the

conflict proved to be willing to come to the bargaining table, Savimbi persisted in armed rebellion against the state. Although ostensibly Savimbi still espoused political goals, his actions suggested that he was prolonging the conflict in order maintain control over large diamond and ivory resources (Prendergast 1999).

By 1999 UNITA had been relegated to the central highlands and the Namibian border areas. MPLA government offensives, UN sanctions, disarmament and demobilization efforts, and a loss of supply lines had severely weakened the group. Although UNITA had participated in multiple peace processes throughout the 1990's, Savimbi continued to perpetuate conflict to profit off illicit diamond sales. Unable to fight conventionally, and vastly outgunned and outnumbered, UNITA began fighting a low-level insurgency. Facing a severe disadvantage, by 2002 he had been pushed into Angola's sparsely populated empty quarters of Moxico and Cuando Cubango. The fighting during this time featured low levels of severity; however, UNITA began to attack civilian populations more aggressively.

Savimbi was eventually killed in 2002 as a result of battlefield wounds he sustained in a skirmish in Moxico province. Six weeks after his death, UNITA was defeated and entered into a peace agreement with the MPLA. Although for years UNITA was known for its tight command structure and well disciplined rank-and-file, this changed by the mid-to-late 1990's as the group suffered rampant principal-agent problems. Evidence suggests that Savimbi became more focused on personal over political ends (Reno 2011). By the time of his death, UNITA had devolved from a political and military organization organized around grievances against the state, into a Warlord personality cult built around Savimbi and fueled by his zealous personal pursuit

of wealth and political power. In line with theoretical expectations, Savimbi's military acumen helped him transform UNITA into a professional, disciplined military organization, able to adapt quickly in response to changes in combat conditions. His background and military experience allowed him to stay viable for nearly two decades. Moreover, Savimbi attracted massive amounts of foreign aid and profited off illicit arms and diamond smuggling making settlement difficult and elusive.

He trained and implemented a tight command structure led by accomplished sub-commanders who possessed significant combat experience and professionalized training (Bridgland 2017). He also showed a remarkable ability to form linkages and alliances with other groups in the region in order to accomplish battlefield goals as a means to achieving political ends early on, and personal ends, in the latter stages of the war.

It was only during the last decade of the war, that UNITA began to resemble more of a militaristic personality cult seeking to maintain personal profits for Savimbi than an effective and efficient military organization chasing political ends. His military acumen also led to numerous bargaining failures since Savimbi was consistently able to drive a hard bargain and return to the battlefield, if necessary. Over time though, his pursuit of private goods at the expense of sound political judgment led UNITA to overplay its hand and resulted in its eventual weakening, and later on, military defeat.

A brilliant tactician, Savimbi's tenure features three distinct shifts in combat type. For the majority of his tenure, Savimbi engaged in conventional military operations, with the help of external assistance. But over time, this assistance began to dry up. As a result, Savimbi makes a tactical shift to irregular warfare, most notably in 1997, when actually attains an advantage over the MPLA, before shifting back to conventional

operations in 1998. In 2002, prior to his death, he shifts once again back to irregular warfare. However, this time he was at a relative disadvantage to the state.

Although these strategic and tactical shifts are, in part, explained by foreign assistance from the game changing effects of outside Cold War intervention, Savimbi's combat record suggests a willingness on his part to seek assistance in order to adapt to the rapidly evolving dynamics of combat in Angola (Jane's 2006; Polack 2013; Bridgland 2017). In fact, reports from South African advisors indicate that Savimbi and his commanders were adept at staying ahead of their MPLA opponents, and also showed a remarkable ability to develop innovative responses to tactical challenges laid forth by their Cuban-Soviet backed MPLA enemies (Bridgland 2017).⁵⁶

Appropriately timed shifts in strategies helped prolong Savimbi's campaign—despite being outside the domain of the RLCW, Savimbi carried on a combat campaign from 1966 until 2002. Strategic foresight and tactical flexibility led to variation in severity. Largely a conventional war for most of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, Savimbi's campaigns featured a large number of enemy fatalities at the hands of UNITA rank-and-file. In 7 of the 14 years he is in the RLCW as a Warlord, Savimbi reaches the highest level of severity. In his three years as an Insurgent, he reached the highest category twice.

Our team also observed a marked difference in the number of civilian casualties between his Warlord and Insurgent—during his entire time as Insurgent we only observed around 100 civilian casualties. However, one year before his death, UNITA is

⁵⁶ For example, Bridgland (2017) notes that UNITA commanders taught South African commanders valuable lessons in setting up defensive positions against artillery and mortar attacks.

responsible for more than a thousand civilian casualties (Melander et al 2016). Relying on wealth accrued from trafficking in illicit resources, Savimbi's later years show a willingness to exploit and punish civilian populations.



Source: *The Economist* (Reuters 2002)

Overall, Savimbi's military experience made him a deadly and formidable opponent to his rivals. Like Prabhakaran and Taylor, Savimbi's combat skills allowed him to drive a hard bargain against his opponents. It also allowed him to wage a combat campaign that spanned across four decades. His time in the RLCW dataset shows an ability to adapt to changing combat conditions, a willingness to shift strategies and tactics, as well as an ability to marry military means with political goals. However, this eventually changes as Savimbi devolved from a classic Insurgent to a notorious Warlord. Although Savimbi continued to function ostensibly under the banner of grievance, in reality he began using military means as a way to secure private ends. This change in motivation drove repeated bargaining failures—including a rejection of an offer to sit as Vice President—and continued a war, which many saw as heinous and unnecessary. It eventually led to his ignominious death at the hands of the Angolan government in 2002,

at which point UNITA had been weakened by defections and a loss of popular support.

Table 6.1. offers a coding overview of Savimbi's relationship between leader type and outcomes from 1989 through 2002.

Table 6.1. Coding Overview: Jonas Savimbi

| Year | Motive | Military | Combat Type | Severity | Type |
|------|---------|----------|-------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1989 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Insurgent |
| 1990 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Insurgent |
| 1991 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | Med | Insurgent |
| 1992 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1993 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1994 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1995 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | Med | Warlord |
| 1996 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Med | Warlord |
| 1997 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Med | Warlord |
| 1998 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1999 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2000 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2001 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2002 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-State Adv. | Med | Warlord |

Charles Taylor: "The Operator," Liberian Civil War (1989-1997)

Conflict Overview

The civil war in Liberia began on Christmas Eve in 1989 when 100 armed members of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by the smooth talking, American educated Charles Taylor, entered into Nimba County, Liberia, from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire. Taylor's NPFL proceeded to launch attacks against members of President Samuel Doe's Peoples Redemption Council and soldiers from the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) (Clapham 1998).

Samuel Doe had been in control of the Liberian government since carrying out a successful coup in 1980. In the wake of this publicly televised coup, Doe went on to become the official President of Liberia in 1985. For the next five years, Doe's presidency was plagued by allegations of widespread corruption and plundering of Liberia's state coffers (Clapham 1998). The stage was set and the conflict began.

It was during this time that Charles Taylor began planning his own attempt to take power. A rebel entrepreneur by nature, he started by building up an organization known as the NPFL. By the mid-eighties, Doe had alienated most of Liberia's civilian population so Taylor initially focused his recruiting efforts on individuals who suffered abuses by the Doe regime—particularly those members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups who escaped to Cote d'Ivoire. Taylor also took advantage of widespread public hatred and animosity toward the regime, especially given Doe's treatment of the population under his rule (Clapham 1998). With swelling ranks motivated by grievance, and steady access to arms, Taylor began preparing for an assault on the Doe regime from neighboring Cote D'Ivoire.

In late 1989, Taylor and his NPFL entered Liberia with the immediate goal of ousting President Doe and taking control of the government. President Doe responded to the NPFL advance by sending two battalions of his Krahn majority AFL to Nimba County. The insurgency had begun.

The AFL quickly launched a counterinsurgency that involved the mass killing of civilians in the region, focusing its operations on targeting members of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups (Waugh 2011). The campaign was brutal: the AFL razed villages and engaged in systematic campaigns of mass rape, pillaging, and looting (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011).

However, the NPFL quickly gained the upper hand and took control of key areas of Liberia. Despite defeating the AFL in key battles and gaining territory across multiple Liberian counties, Taylor's NPFL reportedly began indiscriminately targeting civilians who were members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups who supported the Doe government (Clapham 1998). Similar to the Algerian conflict, anti-civilian violence became a hallmark of the Liberian civil war.

Despite its gains, Taylor's NPFL lacked a cohesive command structure. Major divisions occurred within the ranks of the NPFL from its inception leading to the creation of splinter rebel groups also vying for control of Liberia's government, in addition to its reserves and natural resources (Waugh 2011). The fighting was often primitive and syndicalistic, as warring bands of fighters on all sides engaged in irregular, chaotic, but frequently brutal modes of combat (Kieh 2004; Jane's 2006).⁵⁷

⁵⁷ A commander in the NPFL named Prince Johnson broke from the group in early 1990 and founded the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL). In September of 1990, Prince Johnson and members of the INPFL were able to capture President Doe, and

In 1990, the Economic Community Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia in an attempt to end the severe violence with special emphasis placed on protecting the city of Monrovia (Clapham 1998). This peacekeeping deployment likely made it difficult for the NPFL to make any sort of substantial gains in Monrovia. Alternatively, Taylor sought control of resource-rich areas around the country, outside of ECOMOG jurisdiction (Clapham 1998; PBS 2004).

At this point, Taylor controlled most of the country and had set up his command headquarters in the city of Gbargna. ECOMOG was eventually able to implement a ceasefire and establish a governing body called the Interim Government of National Unity (IGN), but Taylor refused to recognize the IGN as a legitimate authoritative body and proclaimed himself president of “Greater Liberia” (Clapham 1998).

Taylor and the NPFL eventually lost interest in their pursuit to take Monrovia probably due in part to Taylor’s acquisition of areas containing some of Liberia’s most valuable resources—notably diamonds, timber, iron ore, and rubber. Taylor’s ambition for money and territory grew exponentially, and by 1991, he had expanded his campaign’s scope to neighboring Sierra Leone in order to increase revenue streams (Clapham 1998).

To succeed, Taylor helped prop up a new armed group aimed at securing access to capital in Sierra Leone (BBC 2003). Known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Taylor and the RUF entered into Sierra Leone and started a violent campaign to defeat the government and exploit lucrative diamond mining operations in the country. The RUF was receiving the majority of its funding, weapons, and supplies from Taylor, as he

subsequently, they tortured and murdered him. Fighting between the NPFL and INPFL carried on as both Taylor and Johnson battled for outright control of Monrovia.

created a lucrative business trafficking in black market diamonds (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011). Evidence from this time suggests that Taylor exploited social and economic endowments to maintain group viability, but also to ensure that he had easy access to revenue streams for his own personal gain. In addition to using the conflict to profit off the diamond trade, he also took to recruiting thousands of new fighters for both his operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but he did so unconventionally. Case in point, he forcibly recruited young boys, between the ages of 8 and 18, to take up arms and fight for him (Waugh 2011). Under heavy drug use, often forced on to them by senior commanders, Taylor's child soldiers engaged in heinous acts of violence and brutality against local civilian populations (PBS 2014).

In the late spring of 1991, a group known as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) was formed with the explicit aim to counter the RUF insurgency (Clapham 1998). The ULIMO was primarily comprised of ethnic Krahn and former members of Doe's paramilitary AFL. By September of 1991, the ULIMO had entered into Liberia and became the primary adversary of Taylor and the NPFL, but to counter this offensive Taylor launched Operation Octopus in the fall of 1992—a major offensive aimed at capturing Liberia's capital, Monrovia (Waugh 2011; BBC 2014). ULIMO, ECOMAG, and AFL forces, successfully battled against the NPFL, yet the fighting raged on violently for nearly two months. In many respects, Liberia had devolved into violent domestic anarchy (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011).

Throughout the early months of 1993, progress was seemingly being made as the NPFL, ULIMO, and the interim government signed a peace agreement. This agreement called for widespread disarmament and the creation of a power sharing transitional

government comprised of representatives of each faction. The UN finally became involved in the conflict as well with the creation of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) that would help support and monitor the agreement. However, the peace proved to be fleeting, as violence began to flare up again in late 1993 and early 1994. A noticeable increase fractionalization of rebel factions occurred throughout the country, as ideological differences and a strong desire to control natural resources fueled rebel aspirations (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011).

In late 1993, an AFL offshoot known as the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) took shape. The LPC fought against the NPFL in southeastern Liberia as they competed for control of the region's highly sought-after resources. In 1994, the ULIMO split into two separate factions, the ULIMO-J (mainly ethnic Krahn) and the ULIMO-K (mainly ethnic Mandingo). Other groups, such as the NPFL-CRC and Lofa Defense Force, formed and became involved in Liberia's increasingly turbulent political landscape. Extreme violence towards civilians continued, and Liberia faced terminal political breakdown, as syndicalistic warring factions vying for power and control of resources were slaughtering combatants and non-combatants alike (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011).

In 1995, another peace deal was signed that created the Council of State—a temporary governmental body made up of representatives from various rebel groups in the country. A timetable was set for disarmament and elections, but in 1996, fighting broke out again. As the violence began to wind down, another timetable was established for elections. Finally, on July 19, 1997, elections were held throughout Liberia and Charles Taylor was elected president winning over 75% of the vote.

The election was said to be fair by the UN and ECOWAS, but upon closer inspection this was simply not the case (Lyons 1998). In the late 1990s, Taylor controlled the majority of Liberia's resources used his newly acquired wealth to campaign on a level that no other opponent had the ability to do (Lyons 1998).⁵⁸ In addition to his savvy and carefully crafted media persona, Taylor also held a monopoly on broadcast media outlets throughout the country (Clapham 1998). Reports suggest that many Liberians were certain that he would resume fighting if he lost the election and as a result threw their support behind him (Clapham 1998). Taylor was sworn in on August 2, 1997, but the civil war continued until Taylor's resigned from office in 2003 under international pressure. He was eventually arrested and prosecuted for war crimes.

Leader Background

Charles Taylor was born on January 28, 1948, in Arthington, Liberia. He was raised in an upper class family. Educated in the United States, he attended school at Bentley College in Waltham, Massachusetts, where he received a degree in economics in 1977. Taylor returned to Liberia shortly after the coup overthrow initiated by Samuel Doe in 1980, and took a position within the new Liberian governing body. Taylor became the Director of the General Services Agency in Doe's government in the early years of the regime, but eventually fled to the United States in 1984 after accusations of embezzlement. Taylor was eventually arrested in the United States on a warrant for extradition to Liberia to face charges, but shortly after his arrest, he managed to escape from prison and flee to Libya.

⁵⁸ Taylor's campaign slogan featured "He killed my Ma. He killed my Pa. But I will vote for him."

After arriving in Libya, Taylor briefly took part in guerrilla training under the notorious Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (Waugh 2011). This is the only time Taylor received formal military training in his career. Over the next few years Taylor moved through Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Libya, in an effort to form the NPFL, with a primary focus on recruiting ethnic Gio and Mano minorities who had been estranged by the Doe regime and forced into exile (Clapham 1998). Taylor showed an innate understanding of how to effectively recruit forces very early on in his campaign as he took advantage of ethnic tensions that many Liberians fostered and used that passion as a motivating factor to convince individuals to take part in the initial insurgency against the Doe government (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011). In 1989, Taylor and his band of NPFL fighters entered the Liberian conflict.

Assessment of Leader Type

Taylor is an ideal type Operator from his entry into the civil war in 1989 until 1991. There is strong evidence that Taylor put heavy, if not exclusive, emphasis on the pursuit private goods aimed at increasing his personal wealth and that of his inner circle. By 1989, Liberia had descended into violent domestic anarchy. The civilian population had witnessed decades of rule under the barrel of brutal strongmen who only cared about plundering the country's wealth and alienating its people. Thus, it was easy for Taylor to exploit the country's social, economic and political ills for his own greedy ends.



Source: *Boston Globe* 2012 (Pascal Guyot/AFP/Getty Images)

Operating ostensibly on the basis of political grievance, Taylor recruited young men to join his fledgling NPFL. For years, the Doe regime had mistreated Liberia's citizens, focusing on repressing Gio and Mano minorities who were excluded, and at times targeted for human right abuses. Smooth talking and articulate, Taylor crafted a savvy political message to disguise a personal agenda aimed at plundering Liberia's wealth for his own venal ends. Exhausted by years of conflict and suffering, many Liberians were all too eager to believe Taylor. A small force of less than 200 recruits quickly swelled to 500 trained recruits combined with over a thousand volunteers armed with person weapons (Waugh 2011).

Even the international community saw hope in Taylor amidst the turbulence and bloodshed in Liberia—by the end of the 1980s, the international community became

aware of Liberia's deteriorating situation. Multinational corporations had been doing business in Liberia for decades and Western governments began to fear that their commercial interests were under threat (Clapham 1998; PBS 2014). Taylor—who possessed an Economics degree from Bentley College in Massachusetts—began to work with corporations to keep Liberia in business.

In addition, Taylor proved to be a master at public relations—he was frequently featured on news programming from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). As Clapham (1988) notes, Taylor used media effectively “to build a national and international profile which gave him a vital advantage over other leaders” in the conflict (159). Taylor quickly gained the upper hand over his rivals and began to pursue a ruthless campaign of profiteering. Proud of his media operation, Taylor formulated and controlled an impressive public relations campaign that helped him secure the presidency in later years (Lyons 1998).

Despite these initial commercial and political successes, Taylor's lack of military ability presented numerous challenges and threatened the survival of his organization. Prior to 1985, Taylor had received no official or formal military training, with the exception of a brief stint at a guerrilla training camp run by the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. By itself, this does not qualify Taylor's transition from Operator to Warlord. Over time, however, Taylor began to accrue actual combat experience leading the NPFL on the front lines of a chaotic and primitive campaign of violence.

In the early stages of the NPFL advancement in Liberia, Taylor led on the battlefield. He even called into the BBC from his temporary field command posts using a satellite phone to report news from the front (Waugh 2011). Under his command, Taylor

trained hundreds of recruits and launched his campaign. He quickly secured Libyan support as well. In fact, many of his fighters received training in Libya (Waugh 2011). By 1991, Taylor had scored major victories against the AFL and gained control of large swaths of territory and resources. As Waugh (2011) notes, Taylor became “the ambitious driving force at the head of NPFL’s advance through (the Liberian) countryside” (139).

However, the NPFL faced crippling organizational problems (Waugh 2011). Between 1989 and 1991, the NPFL suffered rampant principal-agent problems. Widespread reports of looting, pillaging, torture and rape, was attributed to Taylor’s group. Some observers argued that Taylor had little, if any, control over his fighters who were often under the influence of heavy drugs and seen donning wigs and dresses (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011). Media outlets reported numerous atrocities perpetrated by the NPFL against civilians.

Taylor also faced numerous battlefield setbacks as a result of his inability to control what was becoming a violent, unwieldy organization. Throughout these early years, the NPFL suffered multiple high level defections among senior commanders (Waugh 2011). In addition, Taylor was unable to monitor and enforce discipline on rogue commanders who began to loot, pillage and rape indiscriminately. Although this may have been part of Taylor’s plan—since Operators are likely to encourage this type of brutal profiteering as a way to compensate fighters—the lack of discipline observed between 1989 and 1991 threatened the very survival of the NPFL. Taylor was eventually able to save the group through the assistance of a trusted military advisor, former US Marine Elmer Johnson, and by using his increasing military experience and economic benefits to secure major victories against the Doe regime (Waugh 2011).

Taylor also stayed viable by exploiting Liberia's vast national resources (PBS 2014). By effectively controlling the commodity economy in Liberia, Taylor functioned like a rebel CEO. Estimates between 1989 and 1993 reveal that Taylor accrued over \$75 million annually from the sale of timber, diamonds, rubber, iron ore (Waugh 2011). He also profited personally off the sale of looted goods and civilian taxation (Clapham 1998). Taylor's education, combined with past experience as an economic administrator in the Liberian government, ultimately served him well.

Taylor transitions to a Warlord in 1993. By this time, he had gained more than three years of combat experience, in conjunction with training, and proved himself as an effective military commander scoring major victories against internal and external rivals. He also began to consolidate battlefield victories into meaningful territorial gains against the regime, and began to govern over local populations within these territories (Waugh 2011). Although the NPFL still suffered from crippling principal-agent problems, much of this appears to be by Taylor's design. In doing so, Taylor ensured some level of plausible deniability when faced with accusations of human rights abuses; later on as President of Liberia he even established a human rights commission (Lyons 1998). Regardless of his intent, he was able to secure the loyalty of a few trust, but experienced senior commanders and implement a chain of command. An exception to the rule, Taylor's vicious and determined pursuit of profits prompted him to become more adept militarily as a way to broaden and protect his revenue streams. His profiteering even carried him into neighboring states of Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, but it also brought him into conflict with UN, mercenaries, and Nigerian forces (Clapham 1998).

Between 1989 and 1997, most, if not all of the fighting, is coded as symmetric

non-conventional warfare in the RLCW. Neither side had a considerable advantage over the other, and the fighting was often primitive (Keih 2004). The fighting also took on a syndicalist tone (Clapham 1998). The rebels were plagued by constant in-fighting and splintering. Numerous rebel groups emerged to challenge Doe's forces, not to mention each other (Clapham 1998). The fighting was ultimately conducted by an out of control group of young men and boys roving the Liberian countryside targeting non-combatants for personal gains, as aggressively as combatants. Most often, pillaging and killing of civilians was done indiscriminately, but at times selectively (Clapham 1998; Waugh 2011). In the RLCW, Taylor's campaign reached high levels of severity twice, in 1995 and 1996, when combatant and non-combatant death totals attributed to the NPFL reached upwards of 2,500 (Melander et al 2016).

By 1997, Taylor effectively controlled most of the country and had begun a campaign to take Monrovia from rival Warlord Prince Johnson, who earlier had taken the capital and killed Doe in a televised event. Taylor's military prowess and ruthless pursuit of private goods had taken him from a smooth-talking rebel leader of just a few hundred men, to defeating most of his rivals and being voted in by a war weary public as the President of Liberia in 1997.

For Taylor, there was no maxim truer than "doing well out of war" (Collier 1999). This also made it difficult for Taylor's rival to bargain with him. He constantly misrepresented his interests and disguised his true nature. His pursuit of wealth meant that he was willing to bargain away the best interests of the public, in favor of gains that benefited him and his inner circle. In short, Taylor was able to drive a hard bargain due to his economic and military advantage over his rivals.

Taylor's combat journey as head of the NPFL aligns with the theoretical expectations I put forward in this project. His time as an Operator is marked by a loose and fast campaign of civilian targeting (Jane's 2006). Taylor operated at the head of organization often seen as being out of control (Waugh 2011). Using a massive PR campaign, Taylor was able to convince his supporters that he was acting on the basis of public goods, but in reality, he was using war as a way to drive forward his greedy ambitions. As an Operator he faced rampant principal-agent problems in running the NPFL and was unable to implement a cohesive, disciplined command structure. Instead, it was disparate and chains of command did not intersect likely making communication between commanders and followers problematic (Jane's 2006). Eventually though, Taylor transitions to a Warlord, as he gained significant battlefield experience in conjunction with training from Libyan advisors.

His change is important as it allowed him to gain an advantage over his opponents on the battlefield, and it allowed him to formulate strategies and implement appropriate tactics that would help him in his assault on areas containing key resources. In addition, he gained more control over his organization, thanks in part to his trusted inner-circle of commanders and handsome payoffs designed to ensure their loyalty. He also used selective incentives to ensure the loyalty of the rank-and-file. At times, he did this by inducing them—directly and indirectly—to engage reckless and violent behavior. Seizure of vast amounts of lucrative resources not only financed his lifestyle, but it also financed his combat campaign. In short, it kept him in the game and led to his ability to mount an offensive on Monrovia and ultimately secure the presidency.

Table 6.2. Coding Overview: Charles Taylor

| Year | Motive | Military | Combat Type | Severity | Type |
|------|---------|----------|-------------------|----------|----------|
| 1989 | Private | No | Sym. Non-conv. | Med | Operator |
| 1990 | Private | No | Sym. Non-conv. | Med | Operator |
| 1991 | Private | No | Sym. Non-conv. | Med | Operator |
| 1992 | Private | No | Sym. Non-conv. | Med | Operator |
| 1993 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv | Med | Warlord |
| 1994 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Med | Warlord |
| 1995 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | High | Warlord |
| 1996 | Private | Yes | Sym. Non-conv. | High | Warlord |

Antar Zouabri: "The Ideologue," Algerian Civil War (1997-2002)

Conflict Overview

Algeria has a long history of armed rebellion. From its violent emergence as a nation-state out of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), to the present day, where the autocratic Bouteflika government continues to battle Taureg and Islamist militants in its rugged periphery. But the most violent armed rebellion ever witnessed in the country came between 1991 and 2003, when the Algerian government, led by Mohamed Boudiaf, one of Algeria's founders of the National Liberation Front (FLN), fought a brutal insurgency against a disparate group of Islamist rebel groups.

Between 1962 and 1992, Algeria had suffered from decades of economic stagnation and poor social conditions leading to widespread frustration and disaffectedness among the population (Kepel 2002). Riots broke out in 1988, signaling the beginning of a brutal repression campaign by Algerian state security services. In the wake of economic crisis and signs of political breakdown, Algeria's Islamists offered an attractive alternative to the failures of the Algerian government. By 1991, the stage was set for a massive confrontation between the Algerian government and the country's swelling Islamist ranks.

The Algerian Civil War began in December 1991 on the heels of a coup that effectively nullified an electoral victory by the hugely popular Islamist political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a loose-knit group of Islamists who disagreed on many issues, but were bound by a common goal: the removal of Algeria's secular government (Kepel 2002). Despite electoral gains over its secular rivals in the first round of the 1991 national elections, a coup was launched, as it appeared the FIS would win an outright

victory and implement its Islamist agenda. The election was cancelled and the results were nullified. Subsequently, the Algerian military took control of the government. FIS members were banned from participation in politics and thousands of Islamists were arrested. In response, an Islamist-based insurgent movement began to form.

The movement had trouble taking off as government forces scored early counter-insurgency victories. In the wake of these victories, the Islamists began to break apart into smaller armed rebel groups comprised of two main factions: the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Eventually, the MIA merged with various other groups to form under the umbrella of the FIS and rebranded as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). The AIS based primarily in Algeria's urban areas, and advanced a more moderate agenda than its counterpart, the GIA. Based primarily in the country's rural interior, the GIA contained extremist elements and drove a hardline.

Throughout the 1990s, this loose-knit cabal of Islamist groups fought a brutal insurgency against Algerian security services. At times civilians bore the brunt of the fighting. In addition, the Islamist factions often fought one another leading to a series of massacres across the countries. Moreover, government forces targeted civilians as well in an effort to root out insurgents and punish perceived collaborators. By the late 1990s, the GIA had emerged as a brutal insurgent group that selectively and willingly targeted combatants and non-combatants alike (Jane's 2006). Its mistreatment of civilians led to a number of rifts within the group causing desertion and factionalization as members began to split off and form their own groups.

Much of the fighting in the Algerian Civil War can be categorized as Irregular Warfare, in which Algerian government forces were at a distinct advantage to its Islamist opposition. The GIA relied on extremist interpretation of religion to justify its brutal campaigns of anti-civilian violence (BBC 2002). Rebel targeting of government personnel and property was frequent and violent. By the midpoint of the conflict, the Islamists began carrying out a determined campaign of targeting public areas and civilian populations.

The strategy for groups like the GIA seemed to be straightforward and ruthlessly simple: target civilians to expose the government's inability (and what at times appeared to be an unwillingness) to protect its citizens (Kalyvas 1999). Throughout the early to mid-1990s this strategy worked as state security services proved unable to protect civilian populations, particularly those residing in rural areas. Notoriously, the GIA killed civilians, and even those who supporter their cause, as a way to punish those who had already defected and deter potential defectors (Kalyvas 1999, 2006). The conflict featured few, if any, conventional battles. Massacres of civilians by all sides occurred frequently throughout the conflict, but the GIA had a particularly bad reputation for its mistreatment and violent targeting of civilians (Jane's 2006).

Fighting continued into the early 2000s, but the country continued to hold elections despite the ongoing violence (Kepel 2002). In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika—Algeria's current President—was elected into office. Shortly thereafter, a new amnesty law was enacted causing many insurgents to surrender.

By 2000, the AIS had fully surrendered under special amnesty, and by 2002, the ranks of the GIA had thinned drastically. In the final years of the conflict, the fighting transitions to Irregular Warfare, in which the state had an overwhelming advantage. Zouabri's lack of military training likely contributed to this state held leverage.

The GIA was effectively destroyed by 2002 due in part to numerous defeats at the hands of government forces and the death of its firebrand leader, Antar Zouabri (Jane's 2006). After over a decade of waging an insurgency, the GIA had also alienated much of Algeria's civilian population because of its brutal tactics and extremist agenda; as such, it had lost access to recruits and material support had dried up (Jane's 2006). In the wake of its defeat, hard-core members of GIA formed a splinter group in 2003 called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which is still active today fighting under the banner of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM).


Leader Background

Antar Zouabri led GIA as its emir from 1997 until his death in 2002 (Jane's 2006). Born in the town of Boufarik, Algeria, in 1970, Antar Zouabri was exposed early to radical Islamist ideas (BBC 2002). In fact, Zouabri's brother, Ali, was a member of the FIS. Although not much is known of Zouabri's life, the young Zouabri left school at young age to join the ranks of Algeria's Islamist militants. As a witness to Algeria's poor economic and social conditions, and fueled by perceived mistreatment of Islamists coupled with early exposure to radical Islamic teachings, Zouabri's identity as a rebel leader is forged in profound grievance against the country's secular government. Zouabri spent periods of his young life in prison and became radicalized monitoring the behavior

of university students who refused to dress in accordance with Islamic principles (Jane's 2006). He considered anyone who did not join the GIA a "renegade" (BBC 2002).

Following the 1992 electoral disaster, Zouabri joined the fight against the secular state. A divisive personality, in a short time, he moved up the ranks of the GIA and secured a position as a local commander in his home region despite no reported military training or battlefield experience (Jane's 2006). Throughout the mid-1990s, the GIA suffered numerous defections as a result of tactical disagreements within its ranks, thus weakening the group and causing it to split into new factions.

In 1997, Zouabri took over as the group's leader and emir. Upon taking the helm, he became increasingly radicalized and was known for his ruthlessness and cruelty (Jane's 2006). As a result, the group committed increased acts of senseless and brutal violence against civilians thinly justified under Islamic doctrines (Kalyvas 1999; Jane's 2006). Throughout the existence of the GIA, it remained a loosely structured group, but it became increasingly so under Zouabri who advocated extreme violence and a radical Islamist agenda leaving little room for compromise with his enemies (Jane's 2006).



Source: *BBC News 2013*

By 1997, international Islamists began withdrawing their support of the GIA because of Zouabri's violent extremism. At this point, the movement had alienated most of its supporters and faced severe challenges in recruiting new fighters (Jane's 2006). The group suffered further problems when Hassan Hattab split off in 1998 to form a new faction, the GSPC. In 2002, on the verge of group defeat, Algerian security forces killed Zouabri at the age of 32 in his hometown of Boufarik.

Assessment of Leader Type

Zouabri is coded as an Ideologue throughout his tenure as emir of GIA from 1997 until his death at the hands of Algerian security forces in 2002. He enters the RLCW dataset in 1997 following the death of his predecessor, Djamal Zitouni. Motivated by profound political grievance, there is little, if any, evidence that Zouabri chased prioritized private goods over political or religious gains.

In fact, Zouabri might be aptly categorized as a *zealot*—a sub-sample of Ideologues who chase otherworldly, religious goals. Overall, Zouabri fought to achieve three goals: to rectify the nullification of the 1992, to destroy Algeria's secular government (perceived as corrupt and anti-Islamic), and finally, to establish an Islamic state ruled by Shari'a law.

However, there does appear to be evidence of predatory behavior on the part of GIA under his leadership. Zouabri was viewed as a ruthless, and brutal rebel leader, who willingly massacred civilians (BBC 2002; Jane's 2006). His followers raped, punished and pillaged towns across the southern frontier (Kalyvas 1999). They collected taxes from civilians, but this appears to be driven only by a need to stay viable (Jane's 2006). It is likely he encouraged anti-civilian profiteering as a selective incentive, especially

given GIA's difficulty in maintaining its ranks. Zouabri's primary goal was to make lasting shifts in the political landscape of Algeria by destroying the secular government and establishing a rigid and austere Islamic state. Primarily exclusive of perceived un-Islamic enemies, Zouabri sought to unify the country's Islamist ranks.

There is no evidence that Zouabri received any formal military training in his career (Jane's 2006). Although he joined the militant ranks at a young age, much of his participation in the conflict involved targeted assassinations, destruction of government property, and the targeting of civilian areas. In fact, his early life is marked by criminal behavior, not military training (Jane's 2006). There is not enough evidence of significant combat experience to justify coding him as an Insurgent.

In terms of combat tactics, the GIA under Zouabri focused largely on civilian targeting and small-scale attacks (Jane's 2006). Zouabri's intense focus on anti-civilian violence is most likely a political maneuver aimed at exposing government weakness (or unwillingness) to protect civilian populations. By the time Zouabri took over GIA, the group suffered from splintering and its ranks had thinned by rampant defection and desertion (Jane's 2006).

Civilian violence proved to be a hallmark of GIA's strategy under his leadership. From 1997 to 1999, Zouabri's campaign reached the highest level of severity possible in the RLCW dataset. During this time, GIA forces killed nearly 1,500 civilians (Melander et al 2016). However, in his final years (2000-2002), the violence declined likely as a result of GIA's weakening status in the political landscape coupled with its rapidly deteriorating capability. In these final years, civilian death totals reached roughly 700 reported casualties (Melander et al 2016). This volatility in severity aligns with

theoretical expectations, since Ideologues are likely to lose control over combat operations. These types of principal-agent problems also likely led to his violent exit from the RLCW dataset in 2002. His zealous pursuit of ideological goals also likely hindered his strategic formulation resulting in bargaining failures and tactical defeats.

Overall, Zouabri offered a zealous, if flawed, ideological vision, but failed to lead on the battlefield resulting in a quick exit from the conflict. He also failed to ensure the group's viability through proper management, organizational structuring, and the provision of selective incentives, resulting in GIA's weakening and ultimate defeat. More importantly, he violated a cardinal rule of the Ideologue: he failed to be political inclusive. He also failed to marry political and military goals properly to ensure popular support and secure combat success.

Lacking military experience and combat acumen, Zouabri led a short, five year campaign characterized by Irregular warfare in which the state gained a strong advantage over the GIA. During this time, he showed an inability to monitor subordinates, combined with an overly zealous, Islamic extremist agenda. This approach led to obscene levels of violence primarily targeted at civilians in the Algerian countryside (Kalyvas 1999). His inability to lead on the battlefield likely led to GIA's downfall and the end of the fighting.

Unable to maintain a disciplined command structure and enforce discipline among the rank-and-file, the GIA suffered rampant factionalization during his tenure (Jane's 2006). The group eventually imploded under his leadership. This may be due in part to his inability to delegate military operations to an experienced battlefield commander. Zouabri's decision to escalate civilian violence in the late 1990s further weakened the

group and alienated potential supporters. In short, he lacked the military foresight to use violence selectively to advance his political goals. As a result, Zouabri's GIA remained at a relative disadvantage for the entire duration of his campaign, at times losing control over the violence and his ability to craft a coherent, effective military strategy.

Table 6.3. Coding Overview: Antar Zouabri

| Year | Motive | Military | Combat Type | Severity | Type |
|------|--------|----------|-------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1997 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | High | Ideologue |
| 1998 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | High | Ideologue |
| 1999 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | High | Ideologue |
| 2000 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | Med | Ideologue |
| 2001 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | Med | Ideologue |
| 2002 | Public | No | Irreg.-State Adv. | Med | Ideologue |

Velupillai Prabhakaran: "The Insurgent," Sri Lankan Civil War (1989-2009)

Conflict Overview

In 1976, Velupillai Prabhakaran founded the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. One of the group's main goals was to create an autonomous state for the Tamil minority ethnic group. The Tamil minority espoused a vision of autonomous government independent of the Sinhalese ruling majority. The Sri Lankan civil war proved to be brutal protracted insurgency that featured conventional warfare, targeted assassination, guerrilla warfare, and campaigns of terrorism (Jane's 2006).

The Sri Lankan Civil War officially began on July 23, 1983, when the LTTE ambushed and killed 13 soldiers from a Sri Lankan Army (SLA) patrol. The attack caused large-scale rioting in Sri Lanka's capital of Colombo resulting in the deaths of 3,000 Tamils. The riots mobilized support in favor of the LTTE, which allowed the group to embark in a decades long insurgency. The initial phase of the Sri Lankan civil war is known as the Eelam War I (Hashim 2013).

In 1984, The LTTE began receiving support from the Indian government in the form of sanctuary, training, and military resources. Throughout this phase of the conflict, India trained up to 20,000 fighters. However, the SLA launched a successful military campaign in May 1987, and by June, the SLA was bearing down on the LTTE stronghold in the city of Jaffna. Yet despite these advances, the Indian government intervened in support of the LTTE and brokered a tentative peace deal in July 1987. The agreement led to the withdrawal of the SLA in the Northern Province, and India deployed an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF). This marked the end of the Eelam War I (Hashim 2013)

Prabhakaran did not support Indian intervention in the conflict. He recognized India's involvement in the conflict as a means to control Sri Lanka and not as a means to support Tamil independence (Bae 2015). The LTTE turned on the IPKF, and between 1987 and 1990, the IPKF lost 1,200 soldiers at the hands of the LTTE (Bae 2015). India called off the peacekeeping mission in early 1990, and the LTTE refocused its efforts towards fighting the government of Sri Lanka.

The Eelam War II officially began in June 1990, when the LTTE launched an attack against police stations across Sri Lanka. The second war featured the widespread use of suicide bombing by the LTTE (Jane's 2006). These attacks targeted political leaders such as the assassination of the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and the assassination of the Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. The second campaign also featured large-scale conventional battles between the LTTE and SLA (Hashim 2013).

In 1994, the newly elected Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga sought for a peace deal with the LTTE. Kumaratunga wanted a political end to the conflict, and subsequently, he ordered a cessation of military operations against the LTTE. This marked the end of the Eelam War II, but eventually, negotiations with the LTTE broke down, and by early 1995, the LTTE had broken the deal. Outraged, the Sri Lankan government launched Operation Leap Forward with the goal of eliminating the LTTE from Jaffna. This July operation marked the start of Eelam War III (Hashim 2013).

Fighting for Jaffna continued until December 1995 when government forces successfully captured the city and its surrounding areas. The LTTE relocated its base of operations from the city to deep within the jungles of the Northern Province. Although

the SLA was able to successfully take control of the Jaffna Peninsula, it began to face serious challenges to its fighting capability as it lacked sufficient manpower due to casualties and desertions. The SLA was also unable to adequately supply units during operations either due to a lack of supplies or the inability to transport supplies. Due to the SLA's limited capability, the LTTE was able to successfully outmaneuver army advances and launch devastating counterattacks. Between 1996 and 1999, the LTTE successfully recaptured lost territory in conventional military confrontations. During this time, the LTTE also continued a campaign of suicide terrorism in major cities including an unsuccessful attack to kill president Kumaratunga (Hashim 2013).

In 2000, the SLA suffered its worst defeat. The LTTE was able to overrun the an SLA command at Elephant Pass. The SLA's defeat marked the end of the Eelam War III; however, the LTTE continued small-scale irregular warfare until December 2001. In February 2002, both sides signed a permanent ceasefire agreement, but citing a lack of progress, the LTTE suspended negotiations in August 2003. In October, they proposed a plan that would establish an interim government controlled by the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The far right in the Sri Lankan government ultimately opposed the plan and worked to block a peaceful resolution to the conflict (Hashim 2013).

During the mid-2000s, the LTTE had continued to face further challenges primarily due to internal rifts within the group. In March, Colonel Karuna, a senior commander in charge of the Eastern Province, defected from the LTTE along with 3,500 of his fighters. Col. Karuna stated that Prabhakaran had lost his grip on the realities of the war. Furthermore, Prabhakaran relied on recruitment of Tamils from the Eastern Province alienating eastern Tamils who felt that the LTTE was only acting in the interest

of Northern Province Tamils. The defection resulted in direct conflict between Prabhakaran's forces and forces loyal to Col. Karuna. In the ensuing conflict, the LTTE further alienated eastern Tamils by resorting to anti-civilian violence against Tamils backing Karuna. Karuna managed to survive the conflict largely because of support he received from the Sri Lankan government. The government capitalized on his defection by appointing him as Sri Lanka's minister of national integration (Bae 2015). This action reduced the credibility of the LTTE's cause against the government (Hashim 2013).

The tenuous ceasefire remained in effect, but both sides committed violations. From 2002 to 2005, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission recorded 3,000 violations of the ceasefire by the LTTE and 300 by the SLA. The 2005 presidential election resulted in the victory of Mahinda Rajapaska. In response, the LTTE reignited a terror campaign of assassinations and bombings, ultimately causing the collapse of a tentative ceasefire (Hashim 2013).

The fourth Elam War began in July 2006 when the SLA launched Operation Watershed in response to an LTTE dam closure in the Eastern Province. By May 2009, the SLA encircled the last remaining members of the LTTE. Prabhakaran was killed in action at the hands of SLA forces on May 18, 2009. Shortly thereafter, the LTTE surrendered to the SLA, effectively ending the conflict (Hashim 2013).

Leader Background

Velupillai Prabhakaran was born on November 26, 1954, in the village of Valvedditrai. He was the son of a middle-class fisherman, but little else is known of his early childhood (Thottam 2009). He grew up with little education and was considered to be a low-caste Tamil (Jane's 2006). Prabhakaran's early life was shaped profoundly by

political grievance. He spoke of the impact the 1958 anti-Tamil race riots had on him as a child, and he indicated that this event was a driving force in his pursuit of armed rebellion against the Sri Lankan government (Hashim 2013). As he grew older, Prabhakaran saw armed conflict as the only means to fight back against perceived repression and ultimately guarantee the survival of the Tamil people (Hashim 2013). His career as a militant began in 1975, when he assassinated the mayor of Jaffna and went into hiding. This established Prabhakaran as the face of the greater Tamil struggle, and with this momentum, he formed the LTTE in 1976 (Bae 2015).



Source: *BBC News* (2013)

Prabhakaran was organized at the center of the LTTE and was responsible for both the political and military doctrine of the LTTE (Jane's 2006). He controlled the LTTE in a wheel and spoke system. Each division of the LTTE was a spoke of the greater wheel, and Prabhakaran was at the center of that wheel. All commanders reported directly to him. He possessed no formal military background when he began, despite controlling the group's military strategy and tactics. Despite a lack of official training, Prabhakaran had accrued significant combat experience and had even began a program of LTTE-run formal training in guerrilla warfare by 1989.

The Insurgent leader ruled over all aspects of daily life and organizational culture. His complete control of the organization eventually transformed the LTTE into his own cult of personality. Members swore allegiance to him rather than the LTTE, and no one dared question his authority. Prabhakaran used his power to shape the LTTE into an organization whose identity was based around values of selflessness and martyrdom (Bae 2015). Over time he saw significant combat action and accrued training and skills that helped LTTE remain viable in theater.

Prabhakaran also oversaw the elite suicide unit known as the Black Tigers. He was responsible for organizing the use of widespread suicide terror in the guerrilla campaign. However, Prabhakaran main grievance remained political: he sought to create a legitimate independent state ruled by the Tamil people. According to him, for the LTTE to truly be considered a state, it should behave like states do. This meant engaging in conventional large-scale battles alongside the use of terrorism. Towards the end of the conflict, Prabhakaran continued to command the LTTE to engage in conventional battles even in the face of mounting losses. He saw other strategies of guerrilla warfare as a step backwards from achieving true statehood. He was killed on May 18, 2009 by the SLA, and without its leader, the LTTE quickly collapsed (Bae 2015).

Assessment of Leader Type

Between 1989 and 2006, Prabhakaran is considered an Insurgent's "Insurgent." A hardened battlefield commander, he enters the RLCW dataset in 1989 as an Insurgent and stays under this classification until 2006, when he transitions to a Warlord. Although Prabhakaran's life and campaign align neatly with the theoretical expectations of an Insurgent, he also proves to be a difficult test case given his inability to secure a peace

deal and his eventual switch from the pursuit of public goods to private gains by the end of the conflict. Regardless, Prabhakaran's campaign was motivated by a relentless quest to rectify political grievances against the Sri Lankan government. He also proved to be an adept military commander with strategic vision and tactical flexibility.

Prabhakaran received little, if any, education and no military training as a youth. The son of a poor, but educated fisherman, the young Prabhakaran quickly became involved in political activity against the Sri Lankan government (Jane's 2006). As a teenager he participated in local riots and acts of resistance against the state. Angered by the Sri Lankan government's perceived discrimination and oppression against his people, political grievance proved to be a powerful and motivating force in his life. By the 1970s, the young Prabhakaran established himself as a prominent political activist. By 1976, he had established the LTTE and became a lightning rod within the Tamil movement.

Under Prabhakaran's leadership, the LTTE organized heavily along military lines and was structured geographically with seven main commands across the country (Jane's 2006). Special district commanders reported directly to Prabhakaran. Typical of an Insurgent, each command was sub-divided into political and military wings. The LTTE also contained a naval warfare command called the Sea Tigers, and an air corps—although mainly inoperative—called the Sky Tigers. Promotions were based on seniority and merit.

As a result, Prabhakaran was able to monitor and communicate with his rank-and-file effectively and enforce discipline, while ensuring a clear and efficient chain of command. This helped mitigate principal-agent problems. Prabhakaran also established

linkages with business and diaspora communities bringing in funding and support globally. The LTTE quickly established itself as a viable and resilient military organization. It was also considered to be one of the most organizationally effective militant groups with business and political networks across the world (Jane's 2006).

Observers point to LTTE as a highly adept and innovative military force with a demonstrated capacity to adapt quickly and employ multiple modes of combat in response to changing battlefield conditions (Jane's 2006). Prabhakaran established an LTTE training center to train battle-hardened soldiers, in addition to new recruits, in the arts of mobile, guerrilla, and conventional warfare. The LTTE invested heavily in training programs that were highly structured featuring an array of topics including political indoctrination, artillery, psychological warfare, and reviews of past LTTE battlefield failures and successes (Jane's 2006).

As a result of this highly developed training program, the LTTE exhibited a range of technologies of rebellion during the decades long conflict. Depending on the strategic mission, LTTE combat units were often deployed in conventional combat campaigns with the aim of engaging directly with SLA units, particularly heavily fortified units. LTTE cadres featured heavy weaponry, such as surface-to-air artillery in many of its campaigns.

The LTTE also showed amazing tactical flexibility in being able to shift quickly between conventional force capabilities to irregular modes of warfare. It was able to fund its operations and procurement of heavy weaponry through worldwide fund-raising and support from China and Russia (Jane's 2006). Hardly a small-time operation, Prabhakaran built the LTTE into a formidable conventional military force by the 2000s

and was reportedly running a “state within a state” (Jane’s 2006, 432). Across the course of Prabhakaran’s career in the RLCW dataset, his campaign features multiple shifts in combat type between symmetric conventional combat (1989-2001) to irregular warfare – rebel advantage (2002-2005), and finally, back to a conventional kinetic campaign in the final years conflict (2006-2009). Combat severity levels vary widely as well. From 1990 until 2001, Prabhakaran’s conventional combat campaigns achieved the highest level of severity each year. Combatant casualties attributed to the LTTE during this time are estimated at nearly 70,000, while civilian casualties totaled around 1,700 (Melander et al 2016).

The LTTE was responsible for a number of terrorist attacks over the course of the conflict; however, civilian casualties were largely limited relative to combatant casualties (Melander et al 2016). Much of the LTTE focus was on targeting state security forces, not civilian populations, which is in line with theoretical expectations associated with public goods-based leaders. Insurgents will not typically shy away from targeting civilians, but will avoid unnecessary forms of anti-civilian violence, unless it has a combined military-political purpose.

In 2006, Prabhakaran shifts to Warlord status. By this time, our coders began to see evidence in Prabhakaran’s approach—the LTTE began to shift from a political-military organization to a cult of personality aimed at securing personal wealth and political power for Prabhakaran (Jane’s 2006). Much of his pursuit of private wealth came as a result of undetected smuggling operations, extortion, kidnappings, and a transnational business empire (Jane’s 2006).

Over time, disagreements emerged between Prabhakaran and top-level commanders leading to defections and a split within the organization (Jane's 2006). In the early to mid 2000s, the LTTE was severely weakened by a dwindling in its ranks and resources. Moreover, Prabhakaran had achieved an almost cult-like status among his remaining supporters with no clear line of succession upon his death (Thottam 2009).

During his time as a Warlord, we also observe a noticeable shift in tactics and severity as he transitions from irregular warfare back to conventional tactics. Between 2002 and 2006, the LTTE relied primarily on irregular warfare, suggesting that organizational problems were clearly taking a toll on the LTTE structure and *modus operandi*. After years of conventional campaigns and operational success, the LTTE began to suffer numerous strategic and tactical setbacks and likely switched to guerrilla warfare to lower overhead costs and rebuild. It was during this time, that a fragile peace deal was brokered.

It was also during this time that we see an increase in terror attacks and targeted assassinations. Perhaps believing he was now at a disadvantage, Prabhakaran likely entered into a tentative peace agreement to lay low and rebuild, but he did not completely cease operations. It seems clear that Prabhakaran was unable to sustain a conventional campaign during this time of organizational turbulence—combatant casualties attributed to his group dropped significantly until 2006, when his Warlord-induced shift back to conventional warfare leads to a massive increase in SLA fatalities. During these final years of Operation Watershed, LTTE attributed deaths against the SLA skyrocketed, totaling nearly 25,000 in four years (Melander et al 2016).

Overall, Prabhakaran is the model battle-hardened Insurgent from 1989 to 2005. Despite no formal military training prior to the war, over time he developed a deadly military skill set. As an Insurgent and Warlord, Prabhakaran ran an enduring and effective military and political campaign. However, in later years, he used his campaign to chase private over public ends. Throughout the course of the campaign, he built a powerful and resilient military command and showed a remarkable ability to shift between the most operationally effective strategies and tactics. A rebel ruler, as well as leader, he ran a state within a state and was able to use military means to achieve political ends. He drove a hard bargain and was able to use his military might to advance his cause at the negotiating table.

However, his shift of focus from public ends to private ends likely resulted in his demise and the ultimate organizational failure of the LTTE. By 2006, a small group of LTTE fighters primarily relied on extortion and private-goods based military campaign to continue fighting against the Sri Lankan state. It also likely that his inability to settle and maintain the peace in 2005 was fueled, in part, by personal incentives to acquire more wealth and increased power relative to his rivals, both within the Tamil movement and the Sri Lankan government.

Table 6.4. Coding Overview: Velupillai Prabhakaran

| Year | Motive | Military | Combat Type | Severity | Type |
|------|---------|----------|-------------------|----------|-----------|
| 1989 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | Med | Insurgent |
| 1990 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Insurgent |
| 1991 | Public | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Insurgent |
| 1992 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1993 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1994 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | Med | Warlord |
| 1995 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1996 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1997 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1998 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 1999 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2000 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2001 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2002 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Low | Warlord |
| 2003 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Med | Warlord |
| 2004 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Low | Warlord |
| 2005 | Private | Yes | Irreg.-Rebel Adv. | Med | Warlord |
| 2006 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2007 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2008 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |
| 2009 | Private | Yes | Sym. Conv. | High | Warlord |

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
“THE FINAL ACT”

“We, less orthodox, knew exactly what they would meet us with. This was our balance.”

- T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* 1922

“My fighting gospel is T.E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. I am never without it.”

- Vo Nguyen Giap, French Indochina 1946⁵⁹

The preceding theory and analysis confirms my initial expectations about rebel leaders in warfare. In this project, I explored the relationship between leader-type and individual outcomes of combat type, severity, and tenure. I also conceptualize both the conflict environment and the various leadership types, and modes of combat that are likely to arise during intra-state war.

As a result of this conceptualization process, I presented a typology of leaders in combat in which a leader’s motivations conditioned by the level of military experience they have accrued ultimately determine the types of leaders that emerge in war. I also introduced a new dataset—the RLCW (Willingham & Doctor 2017)—that attempts to account for measures of rebel leader characteristics in conjunction with environmental and group level factors. Finally, I offered a useful heuristic tool for scholars to make sense of violent events amidst the chaos and complexity of conflict environments.

⁵⁹ Schneider (2011)

Combined, this dissertation provides a compelling explanation for the ways in which varying leader types impact outcomes within intra-state war.

Overall, I argue that a leader-centric approach is appropriate since leaders exercise a great deal of control over the perceptions and actions of the combatants. Leaders offer vision, communicate messages and frames, structure and organize groups, make key decisions over strategies and tactics, and ultimately, negotiate the peace. The buck stops at the leadership level since it is the leaders who make important decisions regarding war and peace. Leaders also accrue costs and benefits from continued conflict.

Rationalist explanations for civil war focus on the *ex post* costs of conflict between groups due to problems of information, commitment, and the divisibility of stakes. Leaders are often ignored as capable agents in these models. In the preceding chapters, I put forward a theoretical argument that identifies rebel leaders as drivers of the bargaining process. Thus, the decisions and behaviors of leaders can potentially help shape conflict outcomes. Leadership-level explanations for war suggest additional mechanisms, whereby domestic security environment conditions interact with leaders to affect the likelihood and nature of continued conflict. From an academic and policy perspective, this type of approach is useful since it provides a clearer understanding of how leader type conditions the prospects for continued conflict or durable peace in a particular threat environment.

I offered a number of initial expectations regarding the relationship between leader type and conflict outcomes. First, I expressed initial expectations that leaders driven by private goods – that is, Operators and Warlords – are typically more violent than other leader types. Their zealous pursuit of pecuniary gain makes them lethal.

These types are willing to employ severe, and often brutal, modes of violence to continue campaigns of profiteering. They are not afraid to use force to do well out of war.

However, the quality and quantity of a leader's military experience is likely to determine whether or not individual leader types are able to sustain long term combat campaigns, as well as the technologies of rebellion they are likely to employ. Unlike the Warlord, the Operator is likely to suffer short yet violent combat campaigns, since they are more likely to formulate sub-optimal strategies and select ineffective tactics. They have no training or reservoir of experience to draw from and they most often do not surround themselves by capable military minds. Their inner circle is kept together on the basis of greed, cronyism, and the distribution of profits. Additionally, their proneness to principal-agent problems, combined with a tendency to create organizations plagued by delegatory inefficiencies, ultimately leads them to run ineffective combat campaigns. In some instances, it can even lead to short, but unsustainable bursts of extra-lethal violence. Although neither is likely to find peace profitable – forcing them to drive harder bargains – it is the Operator who is more likely than any of the other types to face total defeat in short amount of time.

This framework does not suggest that environments do not matter with respect to observed levels of violence or types of combat. Rather, it puts forward that leaders are a critical mechanism within these environments that propels the logic of violence forward in intra-state war. Leaders will behave differently in a particular environment, but more importantly, given their motivations and backgrounds.

It is worth noting that I expected each of these leader types to have a profound influence on group command structure and management. However, I did not test this

directly. For example, a lack of military training suggests that Warlords, unlike Operators, are likely to create cohesive, tight command structures, mitigating the likelihood of principal-agent issues. Whereas Warlords command control over their subordinates, Operators are unable to reign in lower level commanders and soldiers. This eliminates their informational advantage over their followers and exacerbates credible commitment problems, as their agents garner more autonomy than is ideally necessary making it more difficult for Operators to monitor and sanction their mid-level commanders and ground-level soldiers. Future research should continue to explore the manner and logic by which variation in rebel leader type affects organizational structure, recruitment, and resource allocation.

I also expected that public goods based leaders—i.e. Ideologues and Insurgents—tend to be less violent than their greed-based counterparts. These leaders feature longer time horizons, and are therefore more likely to favor long term political gains over short-term profits. Whereas peace is precarious and unprofitable for greed-based leaders, this is not necessarily the case for grievance-based leaders who strive to make meaningful and lasting changes in the post-conflict environment. These leader types are typically trying to create a post-conflict governing framework—one in which they play a leading role. To do this, they need popular support. As such, public goods-based leaders are much more attuned to their domestic audiences. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that these types of motivations will have a meaningful impact on decisions related to the use of force, as well as decisions revolving around organizational imperatives.

Military experience also matters a great deal. Ideologues, like Operators, are likely to suffer delegation breakdowns making them prone to a loss of managerial control

of their subordinates. Their lack of military training also makes it difficult for them to assess military performance. As noted earlier, this exacerbates information and commitment problems leading to bargaining failures and prolonging unnecessary violent conflict.

Conversely, Insurgents are professional soldiers. They are better able to assess and evaluate their opponents and the operational environment. Their focus on military efficiency and effectiveness means that, on average, their military background is a potentially moderating factor with respect to combat decisions. Both Ideologues and Insurgents may be more amenable to settlement than Operators and Warlords; however, Insurgents are particularly effective at using their military aptitude and skill to drive a harder bargain, reduce commitment problems, and to better assess and more clearly exchange battle-related information. The results suggest that, in some instances, Insurgents are willing to use violence and adapt their campaigns to achieve their political goals. They recognize how vital military success is to their political agenda in war. The Savimbi and Prabhakaran vignettes illustrate this point to some extent. When it was necessary, each of them as Insurgents appeared willing and capable of inflicting high levels of casualties against their enemies. Both of them also appeared willing to target civilians when they deemed it necessary to sustaining the life of their campaigns.

On the whole, I expected leaders with military training to exhibit significant effects on the modes of warfare observed. Their ability to assess and respond to a particular conflict environment and the actions of their opponents makes them better able to determine the most appropriate technology of rebellion. This is hardly the case for leaders who lack these types of skills, making it difficult, or even impossible for them to

implement appropriate modes of warfare in response to changing combat conditions. Those who lack this experience are less adaptive, less responsive, and therefore, less capable on the battlefield. They are also more likely to lose control of their organizations as the Zouabri and Taylor vignettes suggest.

The results of my empirical tests mostly confirmed these initial expectations. First, I found that, on average, Insurgents and Warlords are more likely than Ideologues and Operators to engage in symmetric conventional combat campaigns in a given year relative to situations of irregular warfare in which the state has the advantage. Second, Insurgents and Warlords do appear to be significantly more likely than Ideologues and Operators to gain the upper hand against state militaries in a given year after starting at a disadvantage. Thus, military aptitude seems to give them an advantage.

In addition, I find some evidence that Operators and Warlords are also more likely than Insurgents, but not necessarily Ideologues, to exploit non-conventional symmetric warfare relative to irregular-state advantage warfare in a given year. This last finding was somewhat surprising, but is not necessarily outside the scope of my theory. Case in point. Ideologues, lacking military training, are likely to find themselves in reckless, if not primitive campaigns of warfare against opponents who are similarly lacking in capability.

The results also confirm my expectations about leader type and combat severity. The findings indicate that, all else being equal, Operators and Warlords are significantly more likely than Ideologues and Insurgents to engage in higher levels of combat severity in a given year. This is where “greed” tends to exacerbate violence in conflict, while a desire for public goods and political inclusiveness is likely to have a moderating effect.

Moreover, the Insurgent emerges as a model of guerrilla warfare—their ability to marry military means with political ends makes them more attune to ensuring that appropriate levels of force are employed to achieve strategic ends.

Finally, I expected leader type to have discernible effects on the likelihood of campaign termination. I find evidence that that Operators are, on average, more likely than their counterparts to preside over shorter combat campaigns. Their inability to adapt and implement effective and efficient strategies will push them out of the conflict more quickly than other types. They are also more likely to be blinded by profits at the expense of doctrine, patience, and sound strategy.

The implications of these results are two-fold: first, I expected Insurgents and Warlords to be more capable in combat given their skill sets. And, the results do suggest that these types are more able to adapt and implement combat strategies and tactics in response to changing conditions. I also hypothesized that Insurgents and Warlords, unlike their counterparts who lack military skill sets, are more likely to either engage in symmetric conventional combat types or gain the upper hand over the state adversaries. These modes of rebellion are difficult to plan for and employ. They require tactical and strategic sophistication on the part of the decision-maker to when and where to employ. In contrast, I expected Operators and Warlords to exploit symmetric non-conventional modes of warfare characterized by more primitive, syndicalist forms of combat. These technologies of rebellion require lower overhead cost and less sophisticated approaches to modern warfare to implement at a tactical level. Moreover, it seems reasonable to expect a leader lacking military training to be at a tactical and strategic disadvantage to the state.

These results suggest the need for increased quantitative and qualitative analysis that explores the relationship leaders of armed rebel groups and how their motivations and experiences shape the decisions they make throughout a campaign. Perhaps more importantly, the results suggest that further work needs to be done required to expand the universe of cases in the RLCW data. As it stands, the RLCW is missing more recent actors between 2014 and 2017. In particular recent actors in the Syrian civil war are not included. The further development of this agenda is also essential to understanding the ways and means by which rebel leaders form, structure, and maintain their groups in war and peace. This project could also benefit from extensive field research. Most of the conflict narratives are compiled by reviewing primary and secondary source materials. However, future projects should attempt to discuss decision-making with participants and leaders themselves, if available.

Perhaps most importantly, these results lend support to research that focuses on the roles that individual leaders play within intrastate warfare. By focusing on the leader, scholars may be able to explain and even forecast conflict dynamics and outcomes associated with civilian targeting, conflict duration, settlement, and the durability of peace. It may also shed insight into how rebel leaders emerge from intra-state war and into positions of government. Thus, this approach may offer insights that extend beyond the battlefield and into the post-conflict social and political landscape.

In the end, intra-state war represents a tragic but complicated tale of violent domestic anarchy. Environmental, group, and individual-level factors are all thought to shape outcomes in civil war. But leaders are an important performer at the center of this complicated, often convoluted story of greed, grievance, and violence. By “following the

leader,” scholars and policy-makers can uncover additional mechanisms that impact violent outcomes during intra-state war. Rebel leaders are an exciting and under-theorized driver of intra-state war dynamics.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF LEADERS

Table A.1. Leaders in the RLCW, 1989-2014

| Tenure | Leader | Type | Group | Conflict |
|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 1989-2006 | HASAN DI TIRO | INSURGENT | GAM | Aceh Insurgency |
| 1992-1995 | ABDUL AL-MAZARI | IDEOLOGUE | Hizb-i-Wahdat | Afghan Civil War |
| 1992-1996 | ABDUL RASHID DOSTUM | INSURGENT | Junbish-i-Milli | Afghan Civil War |
| 1992-2001 | AHMAD SHAH MASSOUD | INSURGENT | Jamiat-i-Islami | Afghan Civil War |
| 1992-1995 | GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR | INSURGENT | Hizb-i-Islami | Afghan Civil War |
| 1994-1998 | MULLAH OMAR | IDEOLOGUE | Taleban | Afghan Civil War |
| 1993 | ABDELHAK LAYADA | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 2004-2014 | ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | INSURGENT | GSPC-AQIM | Algerian Civil War |
| 1997-2002 | ANTAR ZOUABRI | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 1994 | DJAFAR AL-AFGHANI | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 1996 | DJAMEL ZITOUNI | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 1998-2002 | HASSAN HATTAB | INSURGENT | GSPC | Algerian Civil War |
| 1992 | MANSOUR MELIANI | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 2003 | NABIL SAHRAOUI | INSURGENT | GSPC | Algerian Civil War |
| 2003-2004 | RACHID ABOU TOURAB | IDEOLOGUE | GIA | Algerian Civil War |
| 1989-1991 | JONAS SAVIMBI | INSURGENT | UNITA | Angola Civil War |
| 1992-2002 | JONAS SAVIMBI | WARLORD | UNITA | Angola Civil War |
| 2000-2005 | ARABINDA RAJIKHOWA | IDEOLOGUE | ULFA | Assam Conflict |
| 1997-2002 | HAGRAMA MOHILARY | IDEOLOGUE | BLTF | Assam Conflict |
| 1992-2014 | IK SONGBIJIT | INSURGENT | NDFB | Assam Conflict |
| 1993-2003 | JEWEL GARLOSSA | WARLORD | DHD | Assam Conflict |
| 2004-2009 | JEWEL GARLOSSA | WARLORD | DHD - BW | Assam Conflict |
| 1999 | KIRI RONGPHAR | IDEOLOGUE | UPDS | Assam Conflict |
| 2000-2002 | LONG KUMAR | IDEOLOGUE | UPDS | Assam Conflict |
| 2004-2014 | PRANAB NUNISA | INSURGENT | DHD | Assam Conflict |
| 1996 | PREM SINGH BRAHMA | IDEOLOGUE | BLTF | Assam Conflict |
| 2005-2012 | RANJAN DAIMARY | INSURGENT | NDFB - RD | Assam Conflict |
| 2000-2007 | BALACH MARRI | IDEOLOGUE | BLA | Balochistan Conflict |
| 2008-2014 | HYRBYAIR MARRI | IDEOLOGUE | BLA | Balochistan Conflict |
| 2010-2011 | ABDOLHAMID RIGI | IDEOLOGUE | Jondullah | Baluchi Insurgency |
| 2002-2009 | ABDOMALEK RIGI | IDEOLOGUE | Jondullah | Baluchi Insurgency |
| 1994-1995 | KRESIMIR ZUBAK | IDEOLOGUE | Bosnia | Bosnian Civil War |
| 1991-1993 | MATE BOBAN | IDEOLOGUE | Bosnia | Bosnian Civil War |
| 1992-1995 | SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC | OPERATOR | Serbia | Bosnian Civil War |
| 2001-2004 | AGATHON RWASA | OPERATOR | Palipehutu-FNL | Burundian Civil War |
| 1993-2000 | COSSAN KABURA | INSURGENT | Palipehutu-FNL | Burundian Civil War |
| 1995-2000 | GERVAIS NYANGOMA | OPERATOR | Hutu rebels | Burundian Civil War |
| 2001 | J.B NDAYIKENGURUKIYE | IDEOLOGUE | CNDD-FDD | Burundian Civil War |
| 2005-2006 | JEAN-BOSCO SINADAYIGAYA | IDEOLOGUE | Palipehutu-FNL | Burundian Civil War |
| 1993-2005 | LEONARD NYANGOMA | IDEOLOGUE | CNDD | Burundian Civil War |
| 2002-2005 | PIERRE NKURUNZIZA | IDEOLOGUE | CNDD-FDD | Burundian Civil War |
| 2008 | ABDOULAYE ISSENE | IDEOLOGUE | CPJP | CAR Bush War |
| 2009-2011 | ABDOULAYE ISSENE | OPERATOR | CPJP | CAR Bush War |
| 2004-2009 | ABDOULAYE MISKINE | INSURGENT | FDPC | CAR Bush War |
| 2010-2013 | ABDOULAYE MISKINE | WARLORD | FDPC | CAR Bush War |
| 2010-2014 | ASKIN N. LANDA | IDEOLOGUE | UFR-Fond. | CAR Bush War |
| 2008-2013 | BABA LADDE | INSURGENT | FPR | CAR Bush War |
| 2004-2014 | FLORIAN NDJADDER | INSURGENT | UFR | CAR Bush War |
| 2004-2008 | GENERAL DAMANE ZAKARIA | IDEOLOGUE | UFDR | CAR Bush War |
| 2009-2013 | MICHEL DJOTODIA | IDEOLOGUE | UFDR | CAR Bush War |
| 2014 | ALI DARASSA | WARLORD | FRC | CAR Civil War |

| Tenure | Leader | Type | Group | Conflict |
|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2014 | JOSEPH ZOUNDEIKO | WARLORD | ex-Seleka | CAR Civil War |
| 2014 | MICHEL DJOTODIA | IDEOLOGUE | Seleka | CAR Civil War |
| 2012-2014 | MOHAMMED M.DHAFFANE | INSURGENT | CPSK | CAR Civil War |
| 2012-2014 | NOUREDDINE ADAM | INSURGENT | CPJP-Fond. | CAR Civil War |
| 2013-2014 | PATRICE EDOUARD NGAISSONA | OPERATOR | anti-Balaka | CAR Civil War |
| 1989-2007 | FR AUGUSTINE D.SENGHOR | IDEOLOGUE | MFDC | Casamance Conflict |
| 1994-1996 | LAOKEIN BARDE | IDEOLOGUE | FARF | Chadian Civil War I |
| 1997-1998 | LAOKEIN BARDE | OPERATOR | FARF | Chadian Civil War I |
| 2006-2010 | MAHMAT NOURI | INSURGENT | UFDD | Chadian Civil War I |
| 2005-2006 | MHAMAT ABDELKERIM | IDEOLOGUE | FUC | Chadian Civil War I |
| 1991-1994 | MOISE KETTE | INSURGENT | CSNPD | Chadian Civil War I |
| 2006-2014 | TIMANE ERDIMI | IDEOLOGUE | RaFD | Chadian Civil War I |
| 1990-1997 | SHANTU LARMA | INSURGENT | JSS/SB | Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict |
| 2009-2011 | ALFONSO CANO | IDEOLOGUE | FARC | Colombian Conflict |
| 1989-1993 | MANUEL MARULANDA | INSURGENT | FARC | Colombian Conflict |
| 1994-2008 | MANUEL MARULANDA | WARLORD | FARC | Colombian Conflict |
| 1989-1997 | MANUEL PEREZ MARTINEZ | IDEOLOGUE | ELN | Colombian Conflict |
| 1998-2014 | NICOLAS R.BAUTISTA | WARLORD | ELN | Colombian Conflict |
| 2012-2014 | TIMOSHENKO | INSURGENT | FARC | Colombian Conflict |
| 2004 | ARTHUR NGOMA | IDEOLOGUE | RCD - CP | Eastern Congo War |
| 2013 | COL KOTALA DEDIEU | WARLORD | Nyatura | Eastern Congo War |
| 2008 | GENERAL LAFONTAINE | WARLORD | PARECO | Eastern Congo War |
| 2005-2012 | JEAN MUSUMBA | WARLORD | Raia Mutomboki | Eastern Congo War |
| 2004-2009 | LAURENT NKUNDA | WARLORD | RCD - LN | Eastern Congo War |
| 2010-2014 | NTABO NTABERI SHEKA | IDEOLOGUE | NDC | Eastern Congo War |
| 2010-2013 | SHEKA NTABERI | WARLORD | NDC | Eastern Congo War |
| 2012-2014 | SULTANI MAKENGA | WARLORD | M23 | Eastern Congo War |
| 2007-2009 | BAITULLAH MEHSUD | INSURGENT | TTP | FATA Insurgency |
| 2011-2014 | FAZAL SAEED HAQQANI | INSURGENT | TTP-Islahi | FATA Insurgency |
| 2008-2013 | HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD | INSURGENT | Fedayeen al-Islam | FATA Insurgency |
| 2002-2009 | MALIK ISHAQ | IDEOLOGUE | LeJ | FATA Insurgency |
| 2010-2014 | MALIK ISHAQ | OPERATOR | LeJ | FATA Insurgency |
| 2006-2014 | MANGAL BAGH AFRIDI | INSURGENT | Lashkar-e-Islam | FATA Insurgency |
| 2004-2005 | MUNIR SHAKIR | INSURGENT | Lashkar-e-Islam | FATA Insurgency |
| 1996-2001 | RIAZ BASRA | INSURGENT | LeJ | FATA Insurgency |
| 1990-1995 | DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV | INSURGENT | Chechen- Ichkeria | First Chechen War |
| 1996 | ZELIMKHAN YANDARBIYEV | IDEOLOGUE | Chechen- Ichkeria | First Chechen War |
| 1996-1997 | LAURENT KABILA | OPERATOR | AFDL | First Congo War |
| 1996-2000 | PAUL RWARAKABIDJE | WARLORD | ALiR | First Congo War |
| 1997-2003 | THARCISSE RENZAHO | WARLORD | Interahamwe | First Congo War |
| 2003 | FELIX DOH | WARLORD | MPIGO | First Ivorian Civil War |
| 2002-2003 | GUILLAUME SORO | OPERATOR | MPCI | First Ivorian Civil War |
| 1994-1996 | ALHAJI KROMAH | OPERATOR | ULIMO - K | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1989-1992 | CHARLES TAYLOR | OPERATOR | NPFL | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1993-1996 | CHARLES TAYLOR | WARLORD | NPFL | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1989-1996 | FRANCOIS MASSAQUOI | IDEOLOGUE | LDF | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1993-1997 | GEORGE BOLEY | OPERATOR | LPC | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1990-1992 | PRINCE JOHNSON | WARLORD | INPFL | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1991-1993 | RALEIGH SEEKIE | IDEOLOGUE | ULIMO | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1994-1995 | ROOSEVELT JOHNSON | IDEOLOGUE | ULIMO - J | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1996 | ROOSEVELT JOHNSON | OPERATOR | ULIMO - J | First Liberian Civil War |
| 1993 | VLADISLAV ARDZINBA | IDEOLOGUE | Abkhazian Sep. | Georgian Civil War |
| 1998-1999 | ANSUMANE MANE | INSURGENT | Guinea-Bissau | Guinea-Bissau Civil War |
| 2005-2014 | ABDUL MALIK B. AL HOUTH | INSURGENT | Houthis | Houthi Rebellion |
| 2004 | HUSSEIN B. AL HOUTH | IDEOLOGUE | Houthis | Houthi Rebellion |
| 2005-2006 | ABU ABBAS AL OMARI | IDEOLOGUE | JJS | Iraq Civil War |
| 2003-2010 | ABU ABDULLAH AL SHAFI'I | INSURGENT | Ansar al-Islam | Iraq Civil War |
| 2011-2014 | ABU HASIM AL IBRAHIM | IDEOLOGUE | Ansar al-Islam | Iraq Civil War |
| 2007-2010 | AL MASRI | IDEOLOGUE | AQI | Iraq Civil War |
| 2003 | AL ZARQAWI | OPERATOR | AQI | Iraq Civil War |
| 2004-2006 | AL ZARQAWI | WARLORD | AQI | Iraq Civil War |
| 2004-2014 | AI-BAGHDADI | IDEOLOGUE | ISIS | Iraq Civil War |
| 2007-2010 | AL-KABI | INSURGENT | AAH | Iraq Civil War |
| 2006-2014 | AL-KHAZALI | INSURGENT | AAH | Iraq Civil War |

| Tenure | Leader | Type | Group | Conflict |
|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------------------|
| 2006-2007 | MUQTADA AL-SADR | IDEOLOGUE | Al-Mahdi Army | Iraq Civil War |
| 1994-2004 | AHMED YASSIN | IDEOLOGUE | Hamas | Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |
| 1989-1995 | FATHI SHAQAQI | IDEOLOGUE | PIJ | Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |
| 2000-2014 | MARWAN BARGHOUTI | IDEOLOGUE | AMB | Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |
| 1996-2014 | RAMADAN SHALAH | IDEOLOGUE | PIJ | Israeli-Palestinian Conflict |
| 2005-2006 | BAUDOUIN ADIRODO | OPERATOR | FRPI | Ituri Conflict |
| 2002-2005 | FLORIBERT NDJABU | OPERATOR | FNI | Ituri Conflict |
| 1999-2004 | GERMAIN KATANGA | WARLORD | FRPI | Ituri Conflict |
| 2000-2009 | IGNACE MURWANASHYAKA | IDEOLOGUE | FDLR | Ituri Conflict |
| 2003-2005 | JEROME KAKWAVU | WARLORD | FAPC | Ituri Conflict |
| 2006-2009 | PETER KARIM UDAGA | WARLORD | FNI | Ituri Conflict |
| 2001-2005 | THOMAS LUBANGA | WARLORD | UPC | Ituri Conflict |
| 2001-2009 | FAROOQ KASHMIRI | INSURGENT | HuM | Kashmir Conflict |
| 2003 | HAFIZ MUHAMMED SAEED | IDEOLOGUE | Lashkar-e-Taiba | Kashmir Conflict |
| 2007-2008 | HAFIZ MUHAMMED SAEED | IDEOLOGUE | Lashkar-e-Taiba | Kashmir Conflict |
| 1989-2000 | MAULANA FAZLUR KHALIL | INSURGENT | HuM | Kashmir Conflict |
| 1997 | RANCO THANGBOI KUKI | IDEOLOGUE | KNF-Presidential | Kuki Insurgency |
| 1999-2007 | THANGKENG HANGSHING | IDEOLOGUE | KRA | Kuki Insurgency |
| 1989-1990 | SUBHI AL TUFAYLI | IDEOLOGUE | Hezbollah | Lebanese Civil War |
| 2004 | ABDELKARIM EL MAJJATI | INSURGENT | GICM | Mahgreb Insurgency |
| 2012-2014 | BILAL AG ACHERIF | IDEOLOGUE | MNLA | Mali Civil War |
| 1991-1998 | ABDURAHJAK JANJALANI | INSURGENT | ASG | Moro Conflict |
| 2003-2014 | AL HAQ MURAD EBRAHIM | INSURGENT | MILF | Moro Conflict |
| 1989-2002 | HASHIM SALAMAT | INSURGENT | MILF | Moro Conflict |
| 1999-2006 | KHADAFFY JANJALANI | WARLORD | ASG | Moro Conflict |
| 2007-2014 | RADULLAN SAHIRON | WARLORD | ASG | Moro Conflict |
| 1989-1994 | AFONSO DHLAKAMA | WARLORD | Renamo | Mozambique Civil War |
| 2005-2006 | W.MATAKWEI KIRUI KOMON | IDEOLOGUE | SLDF | Mt. Elgon Insurgency |
| 2007-2008 | W. MATAKWEI KIRUI KOMON | OPERATOR | SLDF | Mt. Elgon Insurgency |
| 1989-2014 | ISAK CHISI SWU | IDEOLOGUE | NSCN-IM | Nagaland Conflict |
| 1989-2003 | LALRUPUI | IDEOLOGUE | HPC | Nagaland Conflict |
| 1999-2006 | PUSHPA KAMAL DAHAL | IDEOLOGUE | CPN-M | Nepalese Civil War |
| 2003-2014 | GOVERNMENT TOMPOLO | IDEOLOGUE | MEND | Niger Delta Insurgency |
| 2013 | ALIASKHAB KEBEKOV | IDEOLOGUE | ICE | North Caucasus Insurgency |
| 2012 | DOKU UMAROV | INSURGENT | ICE | North Caucasus Insurgency |
| 2010-2014 | ABUBAKAR SHEAKAU | OPERATOR | Boko Haram | Northern Nigeria Insurgency |
| 2002-2009 | MOHAMMED YUSUF | IDEOLOGUE | Boko Haram | Northern Nigeria Insurgency |
| 1989-2014 | BENITO TIAMZON | INSURGENT | CPP - NPA | NPA People's War |
| 2007-2014 | MOHAMMED OMAR OSMAN | INSURGENT | ONLF | Ogaden Conflict |
| 2004-2013 | MASAE USENG | INSURGENT | Bersatu (Patani) | Patani Insurgency |
| 2007-2013 | DINESH GOPE | OPERATOR | PLFI | People's War Insurgency |
| 1999-2004 | DIPANKAR BHATACHARYA | IDEOLOGUE | MCC | People's War Insurgency |
| 1989-2014 | MUPPALA LAKSHMANA RAO | IDEOLOGUE | PWG | People's War Insurgency |
| 1989-1998 | VINOD MISHRA | IDEOLOGUE | MCC | People's War Insurgency |
| 1989-1992 | ABIMAEEL GUZMAN | INSURGENT | Sendero Luminoso | Peruvian Civil War |
| 1993-1999 | OSCAR RAMIREZ | WARLORD | Sendero Luminoso | Peruvian Civil War |
| 2000-2014 | VICTOR QUISPE PALOMINO | IDEOLOGUE | Sendero Luminoso | Peruvian Civil War |
| 1993-1998 | BERNARD KOLELAS | IDEOLOGUE | Ninjas | Republic of Congo Civil War |
| 1993-1999 | DENIS SASSOU NGUESSO | INSURGENT | Cobras | Republic of Congo Civil War |
| 1992-1997 | PASCAL LISSOUBA | IDEOLOGUE | Cocoyes | Republic of Congo Civil War |
| 1998-2008 | PASTOR NTUMI | IDEOLOGUE | Nsiloulous | Republic of Congo Civil War |
| 1994-1996 | AUGUSTIN BIZIMUNGU | WARLORD | Interahamwe | Rwandan Civil War |
| 1989 | FRED RWIGYEMA | INSURGENT | FPR | Rwandan Civil War |
| 1990-1994 | PAUL KAGAME | INSURGENT | FPR | Rwandan Civil War |
| 1997-2005 | ASLAN MASKHADOV | INSURGENT | Chechen-Ichkeria | Second Chechen War |
| 2007-2011 | DOKU UMAROV | INSURGENT | Chechen-Ichkeria | Second Chechen War |
| 2006 | SHEIKH ABDUL SADULAYEV | IDEOLOGUE | Chechen-Ichkeria | Second Chechen War |
| 2001 | ANTIPAS MBUSA | IDEOLOGUE | RCD - ML | Second Congo War |
| 2000-2003 | EMILE ILUNGA | OPERATOR | RCD | Second Congo War |
| 1998-1999 | ERNEST WAMBA DIA WAMBA | OPERATOR | RCD | Second Congo War |
| 1999-2013 | GEDEON KYUNGU MUTANGA | IDEOLOGUE | Mayi Mayi | Second Congo War |
| 2014 | GEDEON KYUNGU MUTANGA | OPERATOR | Mayi Mayi - K | Second Congo War |
| 2004-2005 | MBAYO BUTOT | WARLORD | Mayi Mayi - C | Second Congo War |
| 2002-2003 | ROGER LUMBALA | WARLORD | MLC | Second Congo War |

| Tenure | Leader | Type | Group | Conflict |
|-----------|--------------------------|-----------|--------------|---------------------------|
| 2010-2014 | SYLVESTER MUDACUMURA | INSURGENT | FDLR | Second Congo War |
| 2010-2012 | ALASSANE OUATTARA | IDEOLOGUE | FRCI | Second Ivorian Civil War |
| 2010-2013 | CHARLES BLÉ GOUDÉ | OPERATOR | AJPSN | Second Ivorian Civil War |
| 2007-2008 | ALI EID | IDEOLOGUE | ADP | Second Lebanon Conflict |
| 2009-2014 | RIFAAT EID | IDEOLOGUE | ADP | Second Lebanon Conflict |
| 1999-2000 | SEKOU CONNEH | IDEOLOGUE | LURD | Second Liberian Civil War |
| 2001-2003 | SEKOU CONNEH | OPERATOR | LURD | Second Liberian Civil War |
| 2002-2014 | ABDEL WAHID AI NUR | IDEOLOGUE | SLM/A | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 2012-2014 | GIBRIL IBRAHIM | IDEOLOGUE | JEM | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 1989-2004 | JOHN GARANG | INSURGENT | SPLM/A | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 2000-2002 | KHALIL IBRAHIM | IDEOLOGUE | JEM | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 2003-2011 | KHALIL IBRAHIM | INSURGENT | JEM | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 1997-2005 | PAULINO MATIP NHIAL | WARLORD | SSDF | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 1989-1996 | RIEK MACHAR | INSURGENT | SSDF | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 2006-2011 | SULIMAN ARCUA MINNAWI | IDEOLOGUE | SLM/A - MM | Second Sudanese Civil War |
| 1991-1996 | FODAY SANKOH | WARLORD | RUF | Sierra Leone Civil War |
| 1997-2003 | JOHNNY PAUL KORAMA | WARLORD | AFRC | Sierra Leone Civil War |
| 1997-2000 | SAM BOCKARIE | WARLORD | RUF | Sierra Leone Civil War |
| 1991-1995 | SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN | INSURGENT | Kamajors-CDF | Sierra Leone Civil War |
| 1996-2002 | SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN | WARLORD | Kamajors-CDF | Sierra Leone Civil War |
| 1993-2003 | A.A. NUR GABYOW | INSURGENT | SPM - Harti | Somalian Civil War |
| 1989-2004 | AHMED OMAR JESS | WARLORD | SPM | Somalian Civil War |
| 1991-2014 | H.M. NUR SHATIGADUD | INSURGENT | RRA | Somalian Civil War |
| 2006-2014 | MOKTAR ALI ZUBEYR GODANE | INSURGENT | Al-Shabaab | Somalian Civil War |
| 1991-1992 | ABBAS AL MUSAWI | IDEOLOGUE | Hezbollah | South Lebanon Conflict |
| 1993-2014 | HASSAN NASRALLAH | IDEOLOGUE | Hezbollah | South Lebanon Conflict |
| 1989-2005 | VELUPILLAI PRABHAKARAN | INSURGENT | LTTE | Sri Lankan Civil War |
| 2006-2009 | VELUPILLAI PRABHAKARAN | WARLORD | LTTE | Sri Lankan Civil War |
| 1992-1997 | SAFARALI KENJAEV | IDEOLOGUE | PFT | Tajikistani Civil War |
| 1991-1995 | AHMED OULD SIDI MOHAMED | IDEOLOGUE | FIAA | Taureg Rebellion |
| 2001-2014 | BISWAMOHAN DEBBARMA | IDEOLOGUE | NLFT | Tripura Rebellion |
| 1989-1993 | DHANANJOY REANG | OPERATOR | NLFT | Tripura Rebellion |
| 1994-2000 | NAYANBASI JAMATIYA | IDEOLOGUE | NLFT | Tripura Rebellion |
| 1990-2014 | RANJIT DEBBARMA | IDEOLOGUE | ATTF | Tripura Rebellion |
| 1989-1999 | ABDULLAH OCALAN | INSURGENT | PKK | Turkish-PKK War |
| 2000-2014 | MURAT KARAYILAN | INSURGENT | PKK | Turkish-PKK War |
| 1995-2014 | JAMIL MUKULU | IDEOLOGUE | ADF | Ugandan Bush War |
| 1989-1991 | JOSEPH KONY | OPERATOR | LRA | Ugandan Bush War |
| 1992-2014 | JOSEPH KONY | WARLORD | LRA | Ugandan Bush War |
| 1995 | JUMA ORIS | INSURGENT | WNBF | Ugandan Bush War |
| 1996-1997 | JUMA ORIS | WARLORD | WNBF | Ugandan Bush War |
| 1989-1992 | PETER OTAI | WARLORD | UPA | Ugandan Bush War |
| 2002-2014 | NASIR AL WUHAYSHI | INSURGENT | AQAP | Yemeni Al Qaeda Campaign |
| 1998-2001 | Q.S. SINAN AL HARETHI | IDEOLOGUE | AQAP | Yemeni Al Qaeda Campaign |
| 1993-1994 | AL SALIM AL BAYD | IDEOLOGUE | South Yemen | Yemeni Civil War |
| 1993-1994 | ALI ABDULLAH SALEH | INSURGENT | North Yemen | Yemeni Civil War |

APPENDIX B

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR TEST 1: COMBAT TYPE

Table B.1. Descriptive Statistics For Multilevel Generalized Model

| Group Variable | Number of Groups | <u>Observations per Group</u> | | |
|----------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | | Minimum | Average | Maximum |
| CountryID | 42 | 1 | 34 | 250 |
| Conflict ID | 65 | 1 | 22 | 76 |

(Note: Leaders are nested within Conflict and Country clusters)

Table B.2. Multilevel GLLAMM: Factors Related to Combat Type (Conflict Level)

| Predictor | <u>Sym. Conv.</u> | <u>Irreg.-Rebel Adv.</u> | <u>Sym. Non-Conv.</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| LeaderType | | | |
| Insurgent | 2.10* (5.96) | 3.27* (10.37) | -1.26* (-3.14) |
| Operator | -0.86 (-1.35) | -2.27* (-2.81) | 0.29 (0.62) |
| Warlord | 2.10* (4.75) | 3.35* (9.46) | 1.28* (3.17) |
| Intervention | -0.05 (-0.14) | -0.68* (-2.27) | -3.80* (-9.49) |
| Regime | 0.65* (2.96) | 1.12* (5.98) | -0.23 (-1.09) |
| Contagion | -0.03 (-0.11) | -0.26 (-1.03) | 1.34* (3.83) |
| MultiParty | -0.97* (-2.47) | 0.94* (2.51) | 7586.44* (26.58) |
| Resources | 1.56* (3.58) | 1.85* (5.09) | 2.32* (6.50) |
| Terror | -0.42 (-1.09) | -0.12 (-0.38) | -1.81* (-3.58) |
| StateSponsor | 0.96* (3.36) | 0.80* (3.15) | 1.24* (4.01) |
| Ethnic | -0.26 (-0.90) | -1.09* (-4.59) | 0.71* (1.98) |
| Religious | -2.11* (-6.32) | -2.58* (-8.61) | -3.03* (-8.29) |
| Separatist | -1.54* (-5.07) | -2.47* (-9.22) | -1.53* (-4.93) |
| _Constant | -0.69 (-1.24) | -1.54* (-3.03) | 7585.74* (-26.58) |

N=1427; Log Likelihood= -982.32; BIC=2276.96; df=43

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Irreg. State Advantage; z-scores in parentheses; Level 2 ConflictID 5.11(0.74))

Table B.3. Multilevel GLLAMM: Factors Related to Combat Type (Country Level)

| Predictor | <u>Sym. Conv.</u> | <u>Irreg.-Rebel Adv.</u> | <u>Sym. Non-Conv.</u> |
|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| LeaderType | | | |
| Insurgent | 2.12* (6.32) | 3.22* (10.77) | -1.24* (-3.14) |
| Operator | -0.89 (-1.41) | -2.21* (-2.75) | 0.92 (0.19) |
| Warlord | 2.32* (5.37) | 3.51* (10.27) | 1.40* (3.55) |
| Intervention | -0.05 (-0.14) | -0.39* (-1.39) | -3.42* (-9.13) |
| Regime | 0.60* (2.87) | 1.04* (5.82) | -0.21 (-1.08) |
| Contagion | -0.51* (-1.93) | -0.73* (-3.27) | 0.84* (2.60) |
| MultiParty | -0.82* (-2.18) | 1.06* (2.97) | 13.24* (0.29) |
| Resources | 1.50* (3.46) | 1.81* (5.10) | 2.23* (6.44) |
| Terror | -0.78* (-2.19) | -0.43 (-1.38) | -2.43* (-5.30) |
| StateSponsor | 0.96* (3.45) | 0.77* (3.10) | 1.07* (3.65) |
| Ethnic | -0.15 (-0.52) | -1.01* (-4.34) | 0.72* (2.00) |
| Religious | -1.84* (-5.81) | -2.27* (-8.20) | -2.68* (-7.54) |
| Separatist | -1.66* (-5.59) | -2.57* (-9.87) | -1.70* (-5.47) |
| _Constant | -0.87 (-1.64) | -1.60* (-3.34) | 12.35* (-0.27) |

N=1427; Log Likelihood= -987.46; BIC=2287.26; df=43

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Irreg. State Advantage; z-scores in parentheses; Level 2 Ctry_ID 4.40 (0.66))

APPENDIX C

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR TEST 2: CAMPAIGN SEVERITY

Table C.1. Descriptive Statistics For Multilevel Generalized Model

| Group Variable | Number of Groups | <u>Observations per Group</u> | | |
|----------------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | | Minimum | Average | Maximum |
| CountryID | 42 | 1 | 34 | 250 |
| Conflict ID | 65 | 1 | 22 | 76 |

(Note: Leaders are nested within Conflict and Country clusters)

Table C.2. Multilevel GLLAMM: Factors Related to Combat Severity (Conflict Level)

| Predictor | Medium Severity | High Severity |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| LeaderType | | |
| Insurgent | 0.33* (1.75) | 0.56* (2.15) |
| Operator | 1.74* (5.10) | 2.06* (4.75) |
| Warlord | 0.82* (3.28) | 1.75* (5.30) |
| TechReb | | |
| Irreg-State | -0.66* (-1.73) | -2.06* (5.38) |
| Irreg-Rebel | -1.45* (-3.72) | -3.70* (-8.97) |
| Sym.NonCon | -0.96 (-2.19) | -2.70 (-5.61) |
| Intervention | 0.35* (1.68) | 1.32* (5.13) |
| Regime | 0.44* (3.86) | 0.02 (0.14) |
| Contagion | -0.09 (-0.49) | 0.01 (0.05) |
| MultiParty | 0.08 (0.30) | -0.50 (-1.35) |
| Resources | -0.39 (-1.64) | -0.84* (-2.64) |
| Terror | 0.38 (1.55) | 0.27 (0.87) |
| StateSponsor | 0.21 (1.32) | 0.53* (2.44) |
| Ethnic | 0.64* (3.47) | 0.35 (1.46) |
| Religious | 0.95* (4.96) | 1.25* (4.86) |
| Separatist | -0.61 (-3.70) | -1.54* (-6.46) |
| _Constant | -1.12* (-2.37) | -0.11 (-0.21) |

N=1427; Log Likelihood= -1177.4; BIC=2609.08; $df=35$

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Low Severity z-scores in parentheses; Level 2 ConflictID 3.05(0.62))

Table C.3. Multilevel GLLAMM: Factors Related to Combat Severity (Country Level)

| Predictor | Medium Severity | High Severity |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| LeaderType | | |
| Insurgent | 0.17 (0.88) | 0.40* (1.55) |
| Operator | 1.62* (5.07) | 1.95* (4.75) |
| Warlord | 0.74* (3.24) | 1.70* (5.39) |
| TechReb | | |
| Irreg-State | -0.13 (0.42) | -1.23* (-3.80) |
| Irreg-Rebel | -0.52* (-1.64) | -2.73* (-7.79) |
| Sym.NonCon | -0.13 (-0.35) | -1.83* (-4.39) |
| Intervention | 0.55* (2.53) | 1.52* (5.83) |
| Regime | 0.40* (3.13) | 0.01 (0.03) |
| Contagion | 0.24 (1.40) | 0.31 (1.36) |
| MultiParty | -0.36 (-1.55) | -0.90 (-2.66) |
| Resources | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.52 (-1.61) |
| Terror | 0.32 (1.37) | 0.18 (0.60) |
| StateSponsor | 0.13 (0.82) | 0.41* (1.93) |
| Ethnic | 0.37* (2.08) | 0.11 (0.47) |
| Religious | 0.21 (1.14) | 0.48* (1.96) |
| Separatist | -1.04 (-6.38) | -1.92* (-8.16) |
| _Constant | -0.29* (-0.73) | 0.62 (1.28) |

N=1427; Log Likelihood= -1185.91; BIC=2626.04; df=35

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Low Severity; z-scores in parentheses; Level 2 Ctry_ID 2.05(0.37))

Table C.4. Ordered Logistic Regression: Factors Related to Combat Severity⁶⁰

| Predictor | OR | SE | z | p-value |
|--------------|-------|------|-------|---------|
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | 1.89 | 0.53 | 2.31 | 0.021* |
| Operator | 3.40 | 1.40 | 2.98 | 0.003* |
| Warlord | 3.71 | 1.18 | 4.11 | 0.000* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg-State | 0.30 | 0.14 | -2.57 | 0.010* |
| Irreg-Rebel | 0.12 | 0.05 | -4.50 | 0.000* |
| Sym.NonCon | 0.20 | 0.10 | -2.96 | 0.003* |
| Intervention | 1.63 | 0.47 | 1.72 | 0.086 |
| Regime | | | | |
| Anocracy | 1.37 | 0.41 | 0.86 | 0.387 |
| Democracy | 1.88 | 0.58 | 2.04 | 0.041* |
| Contagion | 0.94 | 0.26 | -0.21 | 0.832 |
| MultiParty | 0.63 | 0.20 | -1.42 | 0.157 |
| Resources | 0.81 | 0.22 | -0.75 | 0.452 |
| Terror | 0.77 | 0.25 | -0.80 | 0.426 |
| StateSponsor | 1.44 | 0.35 | 1.51 | 0.132 |
| Ethnic | 1.05 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.843 |
| Religious | 1.36 | 0.37 | 1.15 | 0.248 |
| Separatist | 0.38 | 0.10 | -3.77 | 0.000* |
| /cut 1 | -1.33 | 0.67 | | |
| /cut 2 | 0.91 | 0.66 | | |

N=1427; Log Likelihood= -1306.47; $\chi^2= 83.17$ (p -value = 0.0002); pseudo $R^2 = 0.10$; BIC = 2750.94

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Robust z-scores in parentheses; standard errors clustered on LeaderID)

⁶⁰ The null model (i.e. restricted model), in which I test the non-linear effects of leader type on levels of severity without the addition of relevant controls yields significant effects across all leader types relative to Ideologues. A Likelihood Ratio test comparing the null and full models yields a significant test statistic (258.77; $p=0.000$) suggesting that my controls significantly improve the fit of my model.

Table C.5. Generalized Estimating Equation Model: Factors Affecting Combat Severity

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|---|----------|------|----------|---------|
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | 0.24 | 0.20 | 1.22 | 0.224* |
| Operator | 1.34 | 0.27 | 5.00 | 0.000* |
| Warlord | 0.94 | 0.22 | 4.17 | 0.000* |
| Intervention | 0.96 | 0.22 | 4.42 | 0.000* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -1.54 | 0.34 | -4.48 | 0.000* |
| Irreg. Rebel | -2.57 | 0.34 | -7.46 | 0.000* |
| Symm. Non. | -1.99 | 0.39 | -5.08 | 0.000 |
| Regime | 0.18 | 0.12 | 1.53 | 0.125 |
| Contagion | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.76 | 0.446 |
| Multiparty | -0.45 | 0.31 | -1.47 | 0.143 |
| Resources | -0.14 | 0.23 | -0.61 | 0.539 |
| Terror | 0.57 | 0.35 | 1.63 | 0.103 |
| StateSponsor | -0.07 | 0.18 | -0.42 | 0.667 |
| Ethnic | -0.01 | 0.19 | -0.06 | 0.955 |
| Religious | 0.82 | 0.24 | 3.36 | 0.001* |
| Separatist | -1.21 | 0.20 | -6.10 | 0.000* |
| cut1 | -1.57 | 0.52 | -3.01 | |
| cut2 | 1.04 | 0.52 | 2.00 | |
| Ctry_ID | 1.49 | 0.56 | | |
| Ctry_ID > ConflictID | 0.57 | 0.33 | | |
| LRTest v. ologit: $X^2(2) = 169.20$ ($p < 0.000$) | | | | |
| N=1427; Log Likelihood=-1221.92; BIC=2589.09; <i>df</i> =20 | | | | |

* $p < 0.01$ (Notes: Base category = Ideologue; LeaderID nested within ConflictID, nested within CountryID)

APPENDIX D

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR TEST 3: CAMPAIGN TENURE

Table D.1. Conditional Logit: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure (Leader ID)

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|--------------|----------|------|----------|---------|
| Tenure | 2.10 | 0.38 | 5.48 | 0.000* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | 24.00 | 4.31 | 5.56 | 0.000* |
| Operator | 22.49 | 1.54 | 14.62 | 0.000* |
| Warlord | 36.87 | 2.25 | 16.37 | 0.000* |
| Intervention | -0.58 | 0.67 | -0.87 | -1.893 |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -1.29 | 1.89 | -0.68 | 0.497 |
| Irreg. Rebel | 0.46 | 1.51 | -0.31 | 0.760 |
| Symm. Non. | 1.57 | 1.75 | 0.89 | 0.371 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.33 | 0.30 | 1.08 | 0.280 |
| High | 0.35 | 0.38 | 0.93 | 0.350 |
| Regime | 1.72 | 0.79 | 2.16 | 0.031* |
| Contagion | -3.28 | 2.01 | -1.64 | 0.102 |
| Multiparty | -6.59 | 1.69 | -3.90 | 0.000* |
| Resources | 3.21 | 1.76 | 1.82 | 0.068* |
| Terror | 26.39 | 1.09 | 24.14 | 0.000* |
| StateSponsor | 4.02 | 3.34 | 1.20 | 0.229 |
| Ethnic | 16.10 | 2.86 | 5.63 | 0.000* |
| Religious | -4.92 | 2.92 | -1.68 | 0.092 |
| Separatist | -1.23 | 2.03 | -0.61 | 0.544 |

N=1427; Log pseudo-likelihood=-79.15; BIC=295.95; *df*=19

* *p*<0.1 (Notes: Grouping by LeaderID; Base category = Ideologue)

Table D.2. Conditional Logit: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure (Year)

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|--------------|----------|------|----------|---------|
| Tenure | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.25 | 0.000* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | -0.71 | 0.26 | -2.77 | 0.000* |
| Operator | 0.77 | 0.32 | 2.43 | 0.006* |
| Warlord | 0.29 | 0.26 | 1.11 | 0.267 |
| Intervention | 0.61 | 0.23 | 2.64 | 0.008* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -0.95 | 0.30 | -3.14 | 0.002* |
| Irreg. Rebel | -0.82 | 0.32 | -2.56 | 0.011* |
| Symm. Non. | -0.47 | 0.38 | -1.24 | 0.214 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.32 | 0.21 | 1.55 | 0.121 |
| High | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.91 | 0.363 |
| Regime | -0.14 | 0.14 | -1.00 | 0.317 |
| Contagion | -0.17 | 0.21 | -0.80 | 0.426 |
| Multiparty | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.90 | 0.366 |
| Resources | -0.55 | 0.27 | -2.07 | 0.038* |
| Terror | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.45 | 0.653 |
| StateSponsor | -0.27 | 0.19 | -1.40 | 0.161 |
| Ethnic | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.14 | 0.887 |
| Religious | -0.15 | 0.22 | -0.67 | 0.504 |
| Separatist | -0.42 | 0.20 | -2.13 | 0.033* |

N=1427; Log pseudo-likelihood = -414.506; BIC=965.79; *df*= 19

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Grouping by YEAR; Base category = Ideologue)

Table D.3. Conditional Logit: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure (Country)

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|--------------|----------|------|----------|---------|
| Tenure | 0.13 | 0.03 | 4.95 | 0.000* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | -0.99 | 0.27 | -3.65 | 0.000* |
| Operator | 0.50 | 0.27 | 1.88 | 0.060* |
| Warlord | 0.40 | 0.29 | 1.42 | 0.155 |
| Intervention | 0.72 | 0.24 | 3.02 | 0.003* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -0.55 | 0.43 | -1.27 | 0.202 |
| Irreg. Rebel | -0.16 | 0.42 | -0.38 | 0.705 |
| Symm. Non. | -0.37 | 0.46 | -0.82 | 0.414 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.78 | 0.435 |
| High | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.95 | 0.342 |
| Regime | 0.30 | 0.17 | 1.75 | 0.080 |
| Contagion | -0.19 | 0.22 | -0.87 | 0.384 |
| Multiparty | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0.67 | 0.506 |
| Resources | -0.52 | 0.26 | -2.01 | 0.044* |
| Terror | 0.35 | 0.84 | 0.42 | 0.673 |
| StateSponsor | -0.00 | 0.36 | -0.00 | 0.997 |
| Ethnic | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.49 | 0.626 |
| Religious | -0.09 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.783 |
| Separatist | -0.18 | 0.20 | -0.92 | 0.359 |

N=1427; Log pseudo-likelihood=-472.61; BIC=1083.21; *df*= 19

**p*<0.1 (Notes: Grouping by Country level; Base category = Ideologue)

Table D.4. Conditional Logit: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure (Conflict)

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|--------------|----------|-------|----------|---------|
| Tenure | 0.19 | 0.02 | 7.94 | 0.000* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | -1.19 | 0.37 | -3.20 | 0.001* |
| Operator | 0.38 | 0.33 | 1.15 | 0.249 |
| Warlord | -0.02 | 0.43 | -0.03 | 0.972 |
| Intervention | 0.78 | 0.34 | 2.33 | 0.020* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -0.09 | -0.18 | 0.86 | 0.858 |
| Irreg. Rebel | 0.31 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.549 |
| Symm. Non. | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.85 | 0.850 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.12 | 0.25 | 0.48 | 0.635 |
| High | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.72 | 0.472 |
| Regime | 0.23 | 0.17 | 1.36 | 0.174 |
| Contagion | -0.22 | 0.29 | -0.77 | 0.441 |
| Multiparty | -0.78 | 1.12 | -0.70 | 0.483 |
| Resources | -0.22 | 0.32 | -0.71 | 0.477 |
| Terror | 1.47 | 0.78 | 1.88 | 0.060 |
| StateSponsor | -0.16 | 0.32 | -0.51 | 0.608 |
| Ethnic | -0.29 | 0.29 | -0.99 | 0.324 |
| Religious | -0.36 | 0.56 | -0.66 | 0.507 |
| Separatist | -0.49 | 0.26 | -1.89 | 0.059* |

N=1427; Log pseudo-likelihood=-422.92; BIC=983.82; *df*= 19

**p*<0.1 (Notes: Grouping by Country level; Base category = Ideologue)

Table D.5. Random Effects Model: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure

| Predictor | <i>b</i> | SE | <i>z</i> | p-value |
|---------------|----------|------|----------|---------|
| Tenure (year) | | | | |
| 1 | -4.84 | 1.61 | -3.02 | 0.003* |
| 2 | -4.99 | 1.57 | -3.17 | 0.002* |
| 3 | -4.68 | 1.54 | -3.05 | 0.002* |
| 4 | -4.05 | 1.49 | -2.72 | 0.007* |
| 5 | -3.89 | 1.47 | -2.65 | 0.008* |
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | -0.72 | 0.31 | -2.40 | 0.017* |
| Operator | 0.81 | 0.33 | 2.46 | 0.014* |
| Warlord | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.332 |
| Intervention | 0.89 | 0.26 | 3.38 | 0.001* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | -0.73 | 0.33 | -2.22 | 0.026* |
| Irreg. Rebel | -0.58 | 0.34 | -1.75 | 0.080* |
| Symm. Non. | -0.07 | 0.39 | -0.19 | 0.850 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.05 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.817 |
| High | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.658 |
| Regime | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.48 | 0.628 |
| Contagion | -0.29 | 0.22 | -1.33 | 0.185 |
| Multiparty | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.95 | 0.342 |
| Resources | -0.26 | 0.29 | -0.91 | 0.361 |
| Terror | -0.02 | 0.27 | -0.06 | 0.948 |
| StateSponsor | -0.29 | 0.20 | -1.44 | 0.151 |
| Ethnic | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.68 | 0.498 |
| Religious | 0.39 | 0.24 | 1.60 | 0.110 |
| Separatist | -0.46 | 0.21 | -1.99 | 0.046* |
| _cons | 2.59 | 1.56 | 1.66 | 0.097* |

pr(chibar2) = 0.087 (1.85)

N=1427; Log likelihood=-563.63; BIC=1454.13; df= 45

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Grouping by LeaderID; Base category = Ideologue)

Table D.6. Cox Regression with Discrete-Time Varying Covariates: Effects of Leader Type on Campaign Tenure

| Predictor | Hazard Ratio | SE | z | p-value |
|--------------|--------------|------|-------|---------|
| LeaderType | | | | |
| Insurgent | 0.60 | 0.13 | -2.40 | 0.016* |
| Operator | 1.68 | 0.43 | 2.00 | 0.045* |
| Warlord | 1.28 | 0.31 | 1.04 | 0.299 |
| Intervention | 2.07 | 0.42 | 3.62 | 0.000* |
| TechReb | | | | |
| Irreg. State | 0.74 | 0.19 | 2.35 | 0.235 |
| Irreg. Rebel | 0.69 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.179 |
| Symm. Non. | 1.15 | 0.37 | 0.67 | 0.670 |
| Severity | | | | |
| Medium | 0.99 | 0.17 | 0.99 | 0.993 |
| High | 1.14 | 0.25 | 0.54 | 0.541 |
| Regime | 1.04 | 0.13 | 0.70 | 0.701 |
| Contagion | 0.84 | 0.15 | 0.31 | 0.313 |
| Multiparty | 1.27 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.407 |
| Resources | 0.71 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.126 |
| Terror | 0.95 | 0.21 | 0.82 | 0.821 |
| StateSponsor | 0.73 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.044* |
| Ethnic | 1.10 | 0.20 | 0.58 | 0.575 |
| Religious | 1.16 | 0.21 | 0.38 | 0.384 |
| Separatist | 0.77 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.136 |

N=1427; Log likelihood=-833.615; BIC=1794.90; df= 18

* $p < 0.1$ (Notes: Base category = Ideologue; shared frailty by LeaderID)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John D. Willingham received his Bachelor's degree, with honors, in Political Science from North Carolina State University in 2006, along with a minor in Middle East Studies and Arabic. In 2009, he received his Master's degree in International Studies from North Carolina State with a focus on Middle East and Islamic studies, where he studied Middle East politics, violent extremism, insurgency, and counter-insurgency extensively. As a doctoral student at the University of Georgia's School of Public and International Affairs, his major field is in International Relations with a focus on intra-state war and the role of leaders in warfare. His minor field is in Quantitative Methodology. Born in Albany, Georgia, he now divides his time between Northern Virginia, Georgia, and Eastern North Carolina. He serves as an officer and analyst in the United States Government.