

THE EFFECTS OF MIGRANT RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS ON ANTI-MIGRANT
POLITICAL ACTION BY MAJORITY NATIVES IN THE WELFARE STATE: THE CASE
OF SWEDEN EXAMINED AT THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL

by

JENNIFER JOELLE WHITE

(Under the Direction of Markus M L Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to elucidate the effects of migrant residential settlement patterns on the level of anti-migrant political action taken by ethnic natives within an advanced industrial democracy. I examine these effects via event data I collect at the sub-national (county) level from 1998-2014 within a comprehensive welfare state: Sweden. Although attitudes in Sweden towards migrants have been much more benign than in many other Western European countries over the past several years, the level of anti-migrant action within Sweden has nonetheless been on the increase, and to quite varying degrees within the country. Hence, despite the consistent positive attitudes towards migrants that Swedes report, ethnocentric political action has found room for expression. This gives rise to the research question: What explains the variation in the levels of anti-migrant political action within an advanced democracy?

The main theory driving this research draws on group contact and conflict theory – and specifically the “halo effect” of the latter, which posits that when groups of native residents live in close physical proximity to groups of migrants, anti-migrant political action by natives will be

higher. That is, greater segregation between migrant residents and native majority residents will result in greater levels of anti-migrant political action. Conversely, in areas where migrants are more evenly settled among majority native residents, anti-migrant political action will be less likely to occur – despite the absolute number of migrants living in the area. Residential settlement patterns of migrants therefore play a key role in driving native political action against perceived migrants.

Whether due to conflict or economic necessity, migration into advanced industrial democracies and concomitant levels of diversity will continue to grow. The implications of this research can be extrapolated to other advanced democracies, and indicate that the number of migrants coming into a country is not as important for their integration – and for social and political stability – as where it is that they settle. Furthermore, institutions can have a significant role in managing the challenges that increasing diversity poses, and these effects are best observed at the sub-national level where the policy implementations and manifestations occur.

INDEX WORDS: Immigration, migration, segregation, ethnicity, foreign-born, halo effect, group conflict, contact theory, far-right parties, Sweden, Sweden Democrats, hate crimes, advanced democracies, Western Europe, Malmö, Stockholm, sub-national study

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DEDICATION

To my parents and grandparents, whose support and love I have always had, in all that I have wished to pursue.

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Chapter 1

Introduction, Puzzle, and Research Question

1.1 Introduction

The aim of the present research is to elucidate the effects of migrant settlement patterns on the level of political action taken against migrants within advanced industrial democracies. I pursue this study by examining outcomes within one advanced democracy – Sweden. Although I concern myself in this study with the processes that occur within a single advanced democracy, I believe my findings can be readily extrapolated to the dynamics that affect these outcomes within other advanced democracies as well; hence, this study serves as a template for future analyses within other advanced democracies.

One value of this study in relation to the literature is that it employs a comparative approach implemented at the *sub-national* level over time; this level of analysis enables me to tease out causal mechanisms and the effects of localized contextual factors that may well vary within a given national context, but are nonetheless occluded in studies conducted at a higher level of analysis and for shorter periods of time. In addition, although I analyze an institutional outcome that has been given much attention in recent years – electoral outcomes of far-right political parties – I also examine an extra-institutional (i.e., illegal) outcome that is becoming of growing concern in Sweden and other advanced democracies: hate crimes committed against migrants. The

motivations, costs, and opportunities are quite different for these two expressions of anti-migrant political action, yet I find that my main causal variable – the level of migrant residential segregation – has a substantive effect on both outcomes. By examining these two different kinds of anti-migrant political action, I can draw a clearer understanding of the ways in which xenophobic sentiments can find political expression – even within countries that have long supported altruistic policies towards immigration.

In this study, I intend to show that, where migrants are more evenly settled across communities and are not segregated from the majority native population, anti-migrant political action will be less likely to occur. On the other hand, where migrants are indeed concentrated in specific areas and hence more highly residentially segregated from the majority native population, anti-migrant political action will be more likely to occur. Thus, settlement patterns of foreign-born or minority persons – and by potential extension, policies that may reinforce these settlement patterns – play a key role in how majority natives will act with respect to these newcomers.

Although my main concern is with levels of migrant residential segregation – that is, the degree to which migrants are segregated from majority native Swedes in residential areas – I also consider and test proposed hypotheses that have been advanced in the literature previously. Given my focus at the sub-national level over a longer time range than many earlier studies, I do not necessarily expect to negate the previous findings, but to develop more nuanced understandings of the outcomes observed.

1.2 The Puzzle and Research Question

Crepaz and Damron (2009) have shown that states with a more substantial social welfare system tend to have populations that report lower levels of ethnocentricity and welfare chauvinism, as defined by measures of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nonetheless, these negative sentiments are

high in some states and variable within certain kinds of states (i.e., liberal, conservative-corporate, social-democratic), and not all of these states see such sentiments translated proportionally into political action. For example, looking at the data on welfare decommodification (Scruggs, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and surveys that reveal chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron, 2009, 448), states such as Finland, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium score highly on indicators of welfare chauvinism (both absolutely and relative to other states that have similar systems). Likewise, as Crepaz and Damron have pointed out, surveys of populations in these countries tend towards agreement that members of minority groups abuse the state's welfare system. Yet, of these states, Finland and Canada have not experienced substantial anti-immigrant political action compared to other states (for example, when measured by anti-immigrant protests or attacks, Bloemraad, 2012).

States such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, however, score much lower on measures of anti-immigrant sentiment and welfare chauvinism, yet each of these countries has seen a rise in anti-immigrant activity, including initially – yet perhaps, superficially – shocking electoral successes of radical right populist parties since the early 1990s (Rantakeisu, Almgren, and Starrin, 2000). For comparison, I present the attitudes towards migrants in Finland and Sweden from 1999/2000 to 2012 (taken from results of the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey) is shown in Table 1.1. Attitudes in Sweden towards migrants are overwhelmingly positive compared to its Nordic neighbor. Furthermore, these attitudes persist across time with only slight

Table 1.1 Response Percentages on Questions of Immigrants' Impact on Respondent's Country

		1999/2000	2002	2004	2005/2006	2008	2010	2012
a. People from these minority groups abuse the system of social benefits. (Tend to agree.)	Finland	57						
	Sweden	47						
b. Taxes and Services: Immigrants take out more than they put in or less. (Favor "take out more.")	Finland		53.4					
	Sweden		40.2					
c. Immigration is bad for the economy. (Favor "bad for the economy.")	Finland		29.6	35.7	27.8	26.9	32.4	28.4
	Sweden		27.5	34.8	29.2	26.4	19.4	28.3
d. Immigrants make country a worse or better place to live. (Favor "worse place to live.")	Finland		24.8	24.7	21.5	21.1	25.8	21.9
	Sweden		16.2	19.4	17.4	16.2	12.6	15.3
e. Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe. ("Allow some/many")	Finland		39.9	34.4	34.1	37.5	28.5	37.3
	Sweden		84.6	80.8	84.6	87.1	87.4	84.1
f. Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	Finland		37.3	38.2	40.6	37.2	37.6	46.9
	Sweden		83	83.4	84.9	87.3	88.8	86.6
g. Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	Finland		58.2	58.2	60.9	64.7	55.8	66.2
	Sweden		88.7	88	88.9	91.1	92.9	89
h. Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs. (Favors "take jobs away.")	Finland		29.2					
	Sweden		11.8					
Sources: Row a, Eurobarometer (EB53), 2000. Rows b – j, European Social Survey (ESS1-2000, ed. 6.2; ESS2-2004, ed. 3.2; ESS3-2006, ed. 3.3; ESS4-2008, ed.4.0; ESS5-2010, ed. 1.0; ESS6-2012								

variation, as shown in Table 1.1. Yet in Sweden, the high preponderance of reported tolerance towards the non-native population nonetheless leaves room for the expression of ethnocentric behavior.

With regard to the policy environment (e.g., political participation, access to nationality, access to resident permits, family reunification, access to healthcare, and anti-discrimination) that migrants find when they arrive, the Nordic countries are quite similar in their scores, according to calculations by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Figure 1.1 shows the overall scores for the Nordic countries and a comparison to the EU 25 member states for 2010 and 2014, and




Figure 1.1 MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall (Excluding Access to Education) in Nordic Countries and EU 25 Member States for 2010 and 2014

Sweden ranks above the other countries.¹ Appendix A gives the results of the overall scores for 2007, 2010, and 2014 for Western European countries, of which Sweden consistently ranks first.

Previous studies have posited the effects of economic conditions (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers *et al*, 2003; Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010) and/or political alienation (Dalton, 2004; Koopmans et al, 2005; Oskarson, 2010) as the main explanations for higher levels of anti-migrant action, such as electoral support for populist radical right parties and physical confrontation with migrants. For the extensive welfare states listed above (i.e., Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany), the state steps in to help defray the hardships brought about by economic insecurity, and hence the effects of a sense of material threat should be attenuated in these cases and not the cause for particularly acute strife on the behalf of the population – majority native or migrant alike. Furthermore, looking at measures of “political alienation” (an index of “political disinterest” and “distrust,” including only European states; Oskarson, 2010), all of the above-mentioned European states have levels across the board that are very similar to one another (i.e., Germany, the UK, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands – see Table 1 in Oskarson, 2010, p. 16; data taken from ESS 2004). A measure of “political alienation” for Sweden has been fairly constant over time, but did in fact decrease in 2010 (hence, individuals in Sweden felt *less* alienated from the political process and its institutions in 2010 – see Appendix B).

Although there are differences *between* countries with regard to anti-migrant political action, there are also differences in outcomes *within* countries, too – sometimes yielding wide variation. As an example, Table 1.2 shows the level of support for the Sweden Democrats – a party with a strong anti-migrant platform – in the three largest cities of Sweden. The Sweden Democrats have achieved more than twice the level of electoral support in Malmö than in Stockholm, and about

¹ The MIPEX data for the EU 27 member states is not available for 2007, so I use the EU 25 member states for this comparison.

1.5 times the support than in Göteborg (both Malmö and Göteborg are cities in the western part of the country). In all cities, the party has continued to gain voteshare, finally amassing a sufficient percentage of votes in 2010 to overcome the four-percent electoral threshold of the Swedish Parliament and obtain seats. This small snapshot reveals that there is substantial variation in anti-migrant party support within Sweden, and also a growing trend of that support.

Table 1.2 Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Swedish Parliamentary Elections, 1998-2014

	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
Malmö	0.9	3.8	5.0	7.8	13.5
Stockholm	0.4	1.0	1.6	3.2	6.6
Göteborg	0.5	1.6	2.5	4.9	9.6
<i>Sweden</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>5.7</i>	<i>12.9</i>

Thus, even where the state provides so much (social protections, access to citizenship, access to political institutions) and where the levels of anti-migrant, welfare-chauvinistic attitudes among the population are low, some societies do experience instances of anti-migrant political action, and the level of such action varies from locale to locale within these societies. Why might this be the case? Negative sentiments towards migrants do not seem to be a sufficient explanation of the levels and variation of anti-migrant political action. Understanding outcome differences *within* countries may likely shed better light on why there are also differences in outcomes *between* countries: analysis at a lower level can yield richer contextual factors that offer a better explanatory picture than a national-level, birds'-eye view can provide. The research question is thus: What explains the variation in the levels of anti-migrant political action within advanced democracies?

1.3 The Argument in Brief

Drawing on the “halo effect” of group conflict theory (Wessel, 2009; Ruth and Rydgren, 2013), I posit that, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed across communities, anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives will be less likely to occur. Conversely, where migrants are more segregated from but in proximity to majority native residents, such action will be more likely. The residential concentration of migrants is therefore a key causal element in explaining levels of anti-migrant political action.

To be sure, other factors may affect the outcome of anti-migrant political action as well. Drawing from the literature on populist radical right voteshare and minority-majority conflict, I also consider the effects of a “material threat,” where members of the native majority feel a higher sense of resource competition in the face of the presence of migrants, and “cultural threat,” which results from the sheer presence (or increasing presence) of migrants, who are potentially of different races, and who also bring with them different cultures, norms, languages, or religions.

Past studies have found that some of these factors act in tandem with one another, so I shall also consider interaction effects where it may be theoretically plausible to do so. For example, it may be that a large presence of migrant residents combined with a material threat leads to greater levels of anti-migrant political action (Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010). Indeed, a combination effect may result from my main causal variable – the residential concentration of migrants in an area – and either an indicator of material threat or culture threat, or both. I shall consider these possibilities as I conceptualize and operationalize my research design.

Much literature has been devoted to the study of the effects of ethnic segregation on *economic* outcomes – particularly in the fields of Urban Studies and Social Geography. I extrapolate these studies to examine the degree to which ethnic segregation affects *political* outcomes – building on

the previous literature, but taking it in a new direction. I believe this is an important step, as political actors and institutions can make and implement decisions that have consequences not only for economic outcomes, but for residential outcomes as well. A focus on political factors, then, provides a more robust picture of the processes that have the potential to create either adverse or positive socio-economic situations; and with respect to the presence of migrant populations, political processes can effect either positive social integration, or reinforce and entrench segregation.

1.4 A Roadmap of the Research

In this study, I employ a mixed-methods approach to examine two outcomes of anti-migrant political behavior: voteshare for anti-migrant political parties and hate crimes committed against migrants by the majority native population. As my main causal variable hinges on the geographic proximity of groups of residents to one another, I pursue my research at the sub-national level for a single country: Sweden. The sub-national level of analysis not only allows me to obtain a more accurate assessment of the causal processes through which the hypothesized halo effect works, but it also enables me to tease out contextual variables that may be occluded in an analysis conducted only at the national level. In addition, at the sub-national level, I can control for national-level factors that would likely vary from one country to the next, yet may be difficult to operationalize (e.g., a scandal within a political party around the time of an election).

One note of clarification up front on the terminology: I use the term “migrant” to denote immigrants and refugees: people who were born in one country and come to a new home country, for whatever reason. Previous studies of voteshare phenomena had used “foreign-born persons” as the indicator for “migrant;” as I was building from this previous work, I followed this convention

for my anti-migrant party voteshare analysis as well. For the further analysis of hate crimes committed against migrants – and owing to the manner in which these statistics were categorized by the National Council for Crime Prevention – I extrapolate the definition of “migrant” to include also any members of a minority group. The consequences of this more nuanced definition for “migrants” for the hate crime data are that victims may have in fact been born in Sweden (and are hence native Swedes), but owing to their foreign background, they are *assumed* to be immigrants or refugees by those who perpetrate the crimes; the key is in the *perception* of the victim as a “migrant” – regardless of where that victim may have actually been born. The perpetrators in this data are “native majority” Swedes – those who have been born in Sweden and are members of the ethnic Swedish majority group.

I pursue quantitative analyses for the outcome of voteshare for anti-migrant political parties and anti-migrant hate crimes, and from these quantitative results, I select suitable candidates for case studies of these outcomes – identifying typical and deviant cases to explore further. I amassed the data for my quantitative studies from Statistics Sweden and the National Council for Crime Prevention (*Brottsförebyggande Rådet*, or *Brå*) in Sweden. The data for the case studies I collected myself through field research I conducted in my chosen cases in Sweden: Sollentuna municipality and Järfälla municipality (in Stockholm County, or *län*), and Malmö City (in Skåne County). For the field research, I employed the techniques of interviewing and participant observation. I chose my interview subjects from those of a wide range of perspectives in the given case locality (e.g., academic experts, journalists, members of community organizations, politicians, and residents), and many of my initial interviewees provided me further contacts, thus enabling me to snowball my cadre of contacts and to speak to more people with information relevant to my study. The participant observation aspect of my data-gathering followed a “soak-and-poke” format, wherein

I visited as much of my chosen case localities as possible, visiting businesses, organizations, and public facilities while observing how the local populations interacted. Although my research is confined to Sweden and its constituencies, the outcomes I observe and the explanations I explore are applicable to all advanced democracies: this is particularly true in the light of the recent historic influx of refugees to Western Europe and beyond. The dynamics that I find at the local levels in my case studies can be found in other countries and localities as well; as such, the present research is a first step in a broader comparative case study.

The dissertation proceeds as follows: In the next chapter, I review the literature pertinent to my studies and establish the theory that underlies my main causal assertion. In Chapter 3, I lay out my main hypothesis and provide two alternative hypotheses, drawn from previous results in the literature. I discuss my conceptualization and operationalization of the concepts of my analyses, which provides the overall framework for the quantitative and qualitative studies to follow. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the quantitative analysis of voteshare for Sweden's anti-migrant political party (the Sweden Democrats) and of anti-migrant hate crimes per capita committed by native majority Swedes, respectively. In Chapter 7, I provide the justifications for the individual cases I have selected and the framework for the qualitative analyses that follow. Chapters 8 and 9 present the qualitative case studies of the disparate voteshare outcomes for the Sweden Democrats in two neighboring municipalities in Stockholm County, Sollentuna and Järfälla. For the final qualitative case study in Chapter 10, I examine the level of xenophobic hate crimes perpetrated by native majority Swedes in the city of Malmö in Skåne County. Finally, in Chapter 11, I discuss the conclusions of my analyses, the theoretical and policy implications of my findings, and I offer potential steps for future research based on my findings.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Theory

2.1 Introduction

This project builds upon insights from previous research in the areas of social psychology of groups and identity politics; geography and urban studies; social movement and mobilization; institutions; and populist radical right parties. Previous findings are not necessarily challenged, but their explanatory leverage and causal mechanisms are put to the test, and additional explanations are shown to enhance our understanding of these previous findings.

2.2 Institutions and Multiculturalism

The importance of institutions to this study lies in their persistence; once policy decisions are made and are implemented, those policies and their effects tend to be slow changing, triggered by some exogenous shock, or evolving (often slowly) from within (Deeg, 2005). Even in the face of some exogenous shock, change does not necessarily occur, and may arise in many forms: via a gradual transformation, a shift, or by being replaced altogether, for example (Thelen, 2004). Furthermore, institutions do not exist in a vacuum; they are shaped and evolve over time within particular social, political, and economic contexts. It is crucial, however, to tease out the effects of these contexts on outcomes; process tracing of a particular case can help to reveal some of these important factors.

Of interest to this study are the institutions concerned with migrant incorporation into the receiving society. I use the term “migrant” to denote immigrants, but also refugees as well: people who come to a new home country, for whatever reason. Different regimes of migrant incorporation have been identified (assimilationist, multiculturalist, segregationist, universalist; Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Guiraudon, 2002; Koopmans, 2010). Much debate has centered on the desirability of multicultural policies (Banting, 2000; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Goodhart, 2013). Even within each of these ideal-types, however, variation exists: not only can there be variation in the content of particular policies, but also in the manner in which they are implemented. Koopmans (2010) focuses on one facet of these policies – the *integration* of migrants within the welfare state – finding that the more comprehensive the welfare state, the less likely migrants are to integrate into society (Koopmans argues that, supported by the generous benefits of the welfare state, there is little need for migrants to find employment and thereby integrating via one major facet of society: the workforce). Hence, findings on the efficacy of multicultural policies in fact allude to the possibility that even well-intentioned policies can in fact have the opposite of desired effects, such as increased segregation and instability (Soysal, 1994; Joppke and Lukes, 1999; Goodhart, 2007; Putnam, 2007 Koopmans *et al*, 2010); these studies have most often been implemented at the national level, and hence cannot account for sub-national effects that have possibly led to contradictory findings concerning multicultural policies for the country taken as a whole (Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Sides and Citrin, 2007). The debate over the virtues of multicultural policies – particularly within the welfare state – thus continues.

As mentioned, integration into society is one element of the multicultural policies that a given country may address. Integration can be tackled on many fronts: participation in the workforce; participation in education and training; incarceration rates; civil society participation;

and residential settlement, for example. A country may focus on some or all of these, and to varying extents. Some of these factors can be related to one another (for example, the decision may be made not to settle migrants in areas where jobs are scarce). In cases where no particular settlement policy has been set, one might expect that migrants will indeed settle where jobs are or where other migrants of the same or similar ethnicity (or kin) have previously settled. There are, however, cases where settlement policy becomes an unintended contributor to integration outcomes; many policy options arise, and a slight difference in one policy choice at an earlier point in time can evolve into quite an unintended outcome in the longer run as more migrants are welcomed to their new home. Settlement patterns thus reflect the effects of settlement policies, and can be path-dependent and difficult to change as time goes on.

2.3 Insights from Social Psychology

Settlement patterns can become problematic when one considers the insights from social psychology literature. Tajfel posits that individuals need to identify with a group or groups, and that there is a predominance of in-group bias (Tajfel, 1982). Hence, prior research has found that individuals tend to put themselves into opposing camps. With respect to the intergroup conflict, Cash posits two broad categories of identification: the corporate mode (an “us-vs.-them” view wherein the “other” is distinctly different in *every* respect from the subject, with that other being constituted and exhausted on the basis of one, defining characteristic, such as a native or migrant), and the liberal mode (the subject and other share common, general characteristics, but are nonetheless different at the core – the “other” is constituted beyond the level of a single trait, such as a migrant who happens to be European *or* a non-European; Cash 1996). Given this insight, the cross-cutting cleavages that Lijphart has suggested make sense: the more points of commonality

among different groups, the less conflict there will be among these groups, and the more stable society will be (Lijphart, 1977; 1985; 1996; Andeweg, 2000).

Prior studies have found that conflict can be triggered by competition over scarce resources – economic and/or political (Gurr, 1970; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992; Dancygier, 2010), or by identity threats (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Paxton and Mughan, 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Group conflict theory (hereafter, just “conflict theory”) draws on these findings and asserts “that socioeconomically vulnerable individuals are more likely to articulate negative attitudes toward immigration due to a perception of ethnic competition for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, economic benefits, and social services” (Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Under the conditions presented above, it would appear on the surface that diversity will eventually lead to conflict between groups (Alesina and Ferrarra, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008).

Despite the pessimistic conclusions drawn by these studies, other authors have identified situations where diversity may not necessarily lead to conflict. The (group) contact hypothesis states that diversity can lead to positive outcomes when individuals from different groups have *quality* contact with one another – that is, contact that is of a more personal, intimate nature, and under certain conditions (where individuals are of equal status, share an overarching goal, and there is wide institutional support for such contacts: Allport, 1953; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). These conditions, however, are not necessary to reduce negative attitudes towards other groups; other factors may provoke negative attitudes and conflict in the wake of these positive contact conditions.

Quality contact may not be possible to effect for each individual in each different group across a population. Interpretation of such quality contacts can be different as well, and indeed

may be quite challenging to measure across contexts and cases. In some countries, multicultural policies appear to concentrate on the contact hypothesis' condition of "equal status" of migrant groups, particularly in relation to the native group. There is clear institutional support for this condition, and the policy makers may assume that each group shares an overarching goal (to live well in society, for example). This concept of the contact hypothesis is thus implemented with regard to residential and political resources: the state provides migrants with housing and particular access to the political machinery of the state in an effort to achieve a quality of outcomes for the migrant groups (Soysal, 1994; Soinenen, 1999; Koopmans *et al*, 2005). By not providing such commodities equally to native groups, however, a sense of deprivation on behalf of natives towards migrants may arise (Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Dancygier, 2010). In fact, providing separate housing may reinforce the in-group/out-group cleavages, instead of mitigating them – particularly where migrant housing settlements are spatially separate from native residences.

This latter situation gives rise to the (negative) "halo effect." This is observed where the in-group (here, natives) may "overextend a narrow set of perceptual experiences and information" (Wessel, 2009) and hold more negative views of the out-group (migrants). This overextension occurs in spaces where migrants are more readily visible in the *vicinity* of natives – where migrants are situated in discrete areas of the population, near native residential tracts, for example (Wessel, p.13, 2009). The halo effect arises as a particular aspect of conflict theory: the natives who live closest to the migrant settlements will come to resent those migrant groups as the segregation between the two becomes physically evident (that is, there is contact, but not *quality* contact and interaction between the groups; McLaren, 2003), even in the absence of direct competition for resources (Pardos-Prado, 2011). The entrenchment of these native attitudes towards migrants may increase in the case where the state is seen to be supplying special considerations for migrants

(such as public housing or political access; Dancygier, 2010). Hence, the specifications of conflict and contact theory, including the proposition of the halo effect, indicate that negative attitudes can arise from non-quality contacts (such as different groups merely living near one another), but they can be further entrenched by other forms of segregation and perceived differential treatment by authorities.

In his examination of the effects of demographic conditions on levels of intergroup trust, Uslaner asserts that it is indeed *segregation* that drives mistrust and *not* diversity: greater diversity *per se* is not an inhibitor of building trust between groups, but rather how this diversity is distributed in a given population (e.g., neighborhood, municipality) that matters (Uslaner, 2012). Although Uslaner examines the outcomes of trust levels, one can extrapolate a mechanism by which a lack of trust serves the basis for the presence of negative action: that is, where trust between groups is low, the more likely it is that individuals from these groups will engage in behavior against members of the opposing group. Trust thus serves as the underlying basis for political action (someone from one group is less likely to attack someone from a different group if there a comparatively high level of trust exists between these groups).

Further expanding on the role of segregation with regard to anti-migrant political action, Rydgren and Ruth look at the effects of the halo effect at the level of the voting district in Sweden and assess the impact of segregation levels on the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats (an anti-migrant political party) for the 2010 parliamentary elections (Rydgren and Ruth, 2013). In this study, Rydgren and Ruth find that socio-economic marginalization, although unemployment rates and voteshare for the Sweden Democrats were found to be negatively correlated. In addition, their study also revealed that such voteshare was higher in areas of higher immigrant concentration, yet there was an unexpected negative correlation between the proportion of non-European immigrants

and levels of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. Generally, however, the proportion of migrants in a district was found to be not as important as socio-economic effects. The authors provide insights based on a rather fine-grained sub-national level (the electoral ward), but for only one election: without being able to compare results with other election years, it is a bit difficult to determine whether a unique event or series of events influenced these electoral outcomes or if the level of segregation did indeed have the powerful effect that the authors found.

2.4 Insights from Geography and Urban Studies

Studies from Geography and Urban Studies have also taken up the group contact theme, but with mixed or contradictory results: research on neighborhoods has shown that greater homogeneity may stimulate political and social interaction and support within a migrant community, yet can lead to marginalization of migrant groups overall – especially where resources are limited (Musterd and de Winter and, 1998; Murdie and Borgegård, 1998; Murie and Musterd; 2004; Musterd, *et al*, 2005). In addition, it has been found that spatial segregation is associated with social inequality and poor economic outcomes (Musterd, 2005; Andersson *et al*, 2007; Bevelander 2009). Such studies urge further research with regard to segregation of excluded groups to control for factors such as extent of the welfare state, economic indicators, and the presence of socialization networks (Musterd, 2005) – particularly at the more macro level (such as regions), as opposed to neighborhood level (Musterd and deWinter, 1998).

2.5 Social Movements and Social Action

Under which conditions will the configurations of contact lead individuals to mobilize? Is a sense of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) necessary to incite people to act, or must the level of

competition for resources be sufficiently high to lead to an all-out battle between groups (Dancygier, 2010)? Drawing on social mobilization literature, I consider the concept of “strategic action fields” (henceforth, SAFs; Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). SAFs can apply at the individual or collective level, they can be multiple and overlapping, and they essentially set the frame for defining and legitimizing one’s own group and the actions available to counter “others.” Hence, given the concept of SAFs, and following the logic of contact theory and its associated halo effect, I argue that as the boundaries between the two groups (here, natives and migrants) are drawn more clearly – as in the quite literal case of pronounced residential segregation and population concentration of migrants – the frame and action repertoire of the dominant group become more salient (as does the perceived threat from the challenger group), and action against the challenger group becomes more likely.

But, as Fligstein and McAdam argue, SAFs are in constant flux: meta-conditions (those that are more localized) can readily change, as in the steady or sudden growth of the challenger group or the challenger group’s claims to and receipt of resources. Under such conditions of change (sort of an exogenous shock to the SAF), dominant-group perceptions of threat may intensify and the “law of appropriateness” within the dominant group’s SAF may actually break down; dominant group actions can become more numerous or extreme against the challenger group.¹ Such a situation may be even more acute when the dominant group perceives the offending change to have been brought about by the authorities; the dominant group then finds itself squeezed between the (less powerful) challenger group and the (more powerful) elite (policy makers) that have imposed or allowed the change. This is a situation of dual social closure, and exacerbates

¹ Note that this change in behavior by the dominant group can have an effect on the less powerful group, and the less powerful group may change its action repertoire as well, becoming more extreme. I presently do not account for this behavior in my study, but I may need to do so. I may need to add a variable to indicate whether native mobilization is in direct response to migrant mobilization.

the dominant group's perception of insecurity (Parkin, 1974). Thus, I would expect that anti-migrant mobilization by natives will be more likely where greater residential segregation between the two groups exists, and that such mobilization will be more likely and more severe with the introduction of conditions that enhance natives' perceptions of insecurity – particularly when elite authorities are believed to have brought about these conditions.

2.6 The Rise of Radical/Extreme/Populist Right Parties in Western Europe

The facet of the Sweden Democrat Party that is of concern to me in this study is the consistent presence of anti-migrant rhetoric in the party's platform. Definitionally, however, the party belongs to a more general categorization of parties that may be best described as “far right,” as this designation captures the gamut of parties that may be single-issue, extreme, populist, radical – or indeed, some combination of these characteristics (if only with regard to certain issue areas, such as migration) (Jungar, 2016). To undertake a study of the levels of success of far-right radical parties, it is first necessary to define what constitutes right-wing radicalism (as least as it arises in [Western] Europe), and how/whether this ideology fits into the overall political fabric of a democracy. As pointed out by Mudde (2010, 1168), many studies of these parties use the terms “extreme,” “radical,” and “populist” seemingly interchangeably, without regard to the nuances of each label's meaning. Such confusion in terminology makes evaluation and comparison difficult, and further reduces each right-wing party to one of a homogenous group of political system anomalies that has sprung up here and there like some new infectious disease. Hence, there are some limitations in the extent to which comparisons can be made with regard to electoral outcomes of different parties that have been categorized as based on a different definition of the concept of “far-right.”

Some of these far-right parties may be viewed in some studies as “single-issue” parties (for example, as anti-migrant or anti-EU parties), yet their platforms and agendas often have different elements as well, and so a party that may have an “anti-migrant” platform may not have just that one issue as its rallying point: the dimensions of the party are important, too. These dimensions come from the “demand-side” view of the rise of right-wing parties: that is, what conditions exist in the body of the electorate to enable their development and success in country after country (see Betz, 1994; Lubbers et al, 2002)? Such conditions as insecurity or a fear of the future (in economic and cultural terms) and frustration (protest or anger votes) – sociological or psychological factors – are proffered to explain the attachment to such non-mainstream parties (Betz, 1993). These conditions are attributed to a postmodern anomie (Inglehart, 1997), and arise out of what Parkin termed “dual social closure” (Parkin, 1979). This dual closure arises when certain groups within society see their position (again, economic or cultural) threatened, and, unable to effect their preferences through political elites, turn their frustration and anger towards what they see an inferior group (closure towards an out-group, or downward closure). In postmodern societies, this group is often that of migrants – and in Western European societies, especially non-European migrants. Lacking power to sway political elites, these members of the electorate may turn to radical or even extreme parties that voice their views in a bid to challenge the established political elites indirectly (a form of usurpation, or upward closure exercised by the threatened group). The downward and upward forms of closure comprise the situation of “dual” closure, wherein the threatened group pits itself between elites and less powerful out-groups (Parkin, 1979). The radical parties are often led by “charismatic leaders” who orchestrate discourse and effectively play to the views of their supporters (Betz, 1993, 413-414; Husbands, 1998.), but these demand-side views are nonetheless subject to the institutional filters that comprise a country’s political system and

which set the landscape of political opportunity for radical or extreme parties – in other words, factors on the “supply side” of the question at hand.

Work on the “supply side” has considered institutional structures, party platforms, and policies on issues typically found on the right-wing agenda. Research by Jackman and Volpert seeks to identify which systemic institutional conditions (electoral and party-system factors) contribute to the success of “extreme right” ([neo]-fascist or anti-system) parties in Western Europe over time (from 1970 to 1990) (Jackman and Volpert, 1996). Higher electoral thresholds curb these parties’ chances of success when the number of parties competing is higher, but proportional representation also creates opportunities for smaller parties to make headway electorally, or at least to affect the traditional parties’ strategies.² These results would be true, however, for any new party – extreme right, extreme left, Green, or Very Silly Party – that entered into electoral competition, and the authors admit that there may be country-specific variables that have not been measured which may affect outcomes (Jackman and Volpert, 1996, 517). Jackman and Volpert also find that high unemployment provides fertile ground for extreme right parties, a result that injects a demand-side interaction into their study without being specifically linked to voters’ preferences or motivations. Furthermore, the authors view unemployment as a systemic variable that can be manipulated via policy choices by existing parties in an effort to drain the fuel of rising radical right-wing parties. An increasingly global economy, however, places increasing constraints on such policy choices, and the consequences of these choices are less certain. Finally, in an extensive welfare state, unemployment is less of a demand-side concern as opposed to levels of social expenditure (per capita) than in less generous welfare systems.

² One must note, however, that Golder disputes the validity of these results due to a lack of consideration of conditional standard errors in the authors’ interpretations. See Golder, 2003: 437.

Golder follows the lead of Jackman and Volpert and stays focused on the supply side with his models, yet he divides the far right parties into “older, neo-fascist” and “more recent populist parties on the extreme right” (Golder, 2003). Golder posits that the neo-fascist parties’ goal is expressive, while the newer populist far right parties have strategic and instrumental goals within their respective existing political system. Of course, this view precludes the possibility that each type of party may have instrumental *as well as* expressive components girding its existence and success, and there is also an assumption that each party is somewhat static over time with regard to its goals. So, again, definitional issues arise to cloud analysis, potentially. Nonetheless, Golder does execute a tighter statistical analysis than had been produced in past studies, and he identifies the same causal variables as Jackman and Volpert (electoral institutions, unemployment levels, and immigration levels), although he measures electoral chances in terms of district magnitudes and upper tier seats (regional seats available in parliament in addition to district seats). Golder includes countries for which no neo-fascist or populist right party has found voter support (such as Finland, although the Swedish New Democrats are included as a populist right party), so his choice of cases was not made on the dependent variable and hence this source of selection bias is not included in his models.

Although Golder’s results are mixed, he does find that the levels of unemployment and immigration do matter in the success of populist right wing parties (but not of neo-fascist parties). In addition, he finds that higher levels of unemployment tend to help populist right parties only when there are large numbers of immigrants in the country. He measures immigration as “the percentage of the national population composed of foreign citizens” (Golder, 2003, 445). Many immigrants have earned citizenship in their new homes or establish permanent residency (which is easier to do in the Nordic countries – see Soysal, 1994), or indeed have been welcomed in

without even being registered as foreign citizens (such as the many thousands of Ingrian Finns that repatriated from Russia in the early 1990s (Tanner, 2011), and, of course, those residing in a country illegally, which cannot be measured), so it is not clear how these populations are included in his study even though they qualify as immigrants. In addition, Golder does not consider the effect of the growth rate of immigration numbers nor the country of origin of immigrants in his models, so one must be tentative in accepting his results.

In an attempt to tie the demand and supply sides together, Lubbers *et al* describe three factors to consider in their study of voting for “extreme right-wing parties:” sociological (e.g., age, education, social class), economic (levels of unemployment), and political factors (position on levels of immigration restriction) (Lubbers et al, 2003). These factors link the individual level of analysis with that of the contextual or systemic level in 16 countries of Western Europe (Finland and Sweden included), and the authors examine via multilevel analysis how these levels interact to indicate levels of extreme right-wing party voting in these countries in the 1990s. As with Golder’s study, Lubber *et al* include cases where the percentage of votes cast for extreme right-wing parties was so small as to be effectively zero (as in Finland). In Sweden, the New Democrats and Sweden Democrats were coded as existing extreme right parties that had gained a non-negligible percentage of votes during the timeframe under study.

Of all of the variables that Lubbers *et al* propose in their models, “public opinion towards immigrants” and “the way democracy works” were shown to be the most compelling: negative public opinion towards the democratic system – but especially towards immigrants – in the respondent’s country were factors that tended to favor votes for extreme right-wing parties (Lubbers et al, 2003, 366). The unemployment rate was not significant in their findings. The

authors did note, however, that Sweden fit their models less well; explanation beyond their models is required.

Considering the above research, it is clear that there have been conceptual difficulties when it comes to defining and categorizing far-right parties, and that these difficulties have created potential problems in interpreting results. It is useful to return to Mudde's clarifications on these groups and how they relate to democratic systems, so that true comparison can be more effective. First, there is the distinction between "extreme" and "radical." Mudde³ considers parties to be "extreme" if they are anti-democratic, that is, rejecting the process of popular sovereignty and representation. "Radical" parties, on the other hand, do not accept constitutional (liberal) democracy and its pluralist underpinnings and checks and balances on majorities. In other words, the extreme parties tend to operate despite the political institutions of democracy, and radical parties operate within these institutions. This recalls Golder's view of neo-fascist parties as "expressive" parties, and the newer radical right parties as "instrumental." Mudde then further defines the ideological basis of populist radical right parties as a mix of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2010, 1173-1175). "Nativism" is often described as xenophobia or racism, and it holds that states should belong to and provide for the native population, and no external elements should be permitted (Mudde points out that these external elements may be persons or ideas) (Mudde, 2010, 1173). Secondly, "authoritarianism" is indicated by "the belief in a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are punished severely" ((Mudde, 2010, 1173). Of course, such strict "law and order" views exist in conservative thinking, and the "rule of law" is considered as an underlying principle of plural democracy.⁴ Finally, "populism" is described as an "us-vs-them" view in which the people of the (nation)-state see themselves pitted against the

³ These definitions are all taken from Mudde, 2010.

⁴ Polity IV Manual, 14.

political elite, who are corrupt and self-serving, and against institutions that distort the voice of the people.

Mudde points out that each of these elements is not foreign to contemporary democratic societies, and indeed has existed in these societies over the course of their histories and is represented in attitudinal surveys over the past two decades (Eurobarometer and European Social Surveys). This is an important assertion: each of these elements can be found, to a greater or lesser degree, in modern democratic societies and are represented in not small proportions in the attitudes of populations of these societies (Mudde, 2010, 1176). So, it is in terms of degree that these attitudes combine and are expressed by a far-right party which determines their radical character.

Finally, as Mudde prescribes, studies of populist radical right parties should focus on the *supply side*: that is, at least a marginal demand for these parties exists in most European democracies (for whatever reasons – a separate research question, but not unrelated to political institutions), and so we are left begging for an explanation as to *why* these parties become viable competitors in a given political system.

The preceding sets the theoretical framework and situates the present study within the relevant literature, and give rise to my main hypothesis and two alternative hypotheses, which I specify in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Hypotheses

3.1 Hypothesis One

In my main hypothesis, I posit that the residential settlement patterns of migrants lead to a social context that affects the probability of members of one group (the “in-group”) to take action against members of another group (the “out-group” or “target” group). Drawing on insights from conflict and contact theory, one would expect that in areas of higher migrant segregation – where migrants reside in more concentrated areas relative to members of the native majority than in areas of lower segregation – overall contacts between majority native and migrant populations will be lower. Hence, majority natives who live near an area where migrant settlement is concentrated may feel a sense of “ethnic threat” (which may be of a cultural or material/economic nature) that is not experienced by majority natives who do not live in such close quarters with a large, concentrated settlement of migrants. It is this concentration of the “out-group” – a defined target in a defined area – that increases the majority native resentment, and will set the context for the further entrenchment of negative attitudes and the possibility that the neighboring majority natives will “scapegoat” the out-group and act on negative attitudes. This follows from the “halo effect” within the body of conflict theory. The causal mechanism, then, is that the residential proximity of one clearly-identifiable “out-group” to a clearly-identifiable “in-group” raises the feeling of perceived

threat in members of the “in-group,” which then precipitates action against members of the “out-group” by members of the “in-group.” I depict this causal chain visually in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.




Figure 3.1 Causal Chain Underlying Residential Settlement of Groups to In-Group Action against Out-Groups




Figure 3.2 Spatial Relationship of Residential Settlement of Groups to In-Group Action against Out-Groups: Areas of High Segregation (I) and Low Segregation (II)

The mechanism of the “halo effect” could also be present and lead to outcomes in segregated areas where migrants may feel themselves threatened by the ring of natives residing around them as well. Indeed, members of different migrant groups may be in such a segregated

residential situation and action between two migrant groups may be possible. The “halo effect” does not indicate which group will take action, only that a clear concentration of different groups in close proximity to one another is more likely to lead to in-group/out-group behavior. In this study, however, I concentrate on the perpetration of anti-migrant action against migrants (members of minority groups), as it is the implications for integration of migrants and social stability that are of primary concern.¹

On the flip side of this scenario, where migrant settlement is more evenly dispersed in an area, much more of the majority native population is more likely to come into contact with a migrant and vice versa. While this contact may lead to negative attitudes on behalf of the majority native population against the migrants, the migrants are nonetheless not encapsulated in one area as a group, and hence their semblance as a threat – and their potential as a target – do not develop as fully as in the concentrated settlement case. Thus, migrants are seen not so much as an out-group (although individual migrant families may be treated as outcasts, depending upon circumstances). In this case of greater migrant dispersion, greater visibility of migrants may lead to overall more negative majority native attitudes (particularly early on during settlement), but the threat is diffused as well, and should any trigger conditions occur (again, such as bad or worsening economic conditions, or a marked increase in migrant settlement), majority native action against migrants is *less* likely, or will be less severe. This situation is presented graphically in Figure 3.3. The main hypothesis on political action against migrants thus states:

¹ It is possible that some action against a group by another group may be part of a retaliation – between the groups. I do not consider those motivations in this analysis, but it is something to bear in mind for perhaps a future expansion of the present study. Likewise, hate crimes committed by members of one minority group against members of a different minority group are possible as well, but are in quite small numbers compared to majority-against-minority crimes, and are not included in this study.

H1: The higher the level of migrant residential concentration, the higher the level of anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives. Conversely, the lower the level of migrant residential concentration, the lower the level of anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives.




Figure 3.3 Anticipated Level of Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Parties as a Function of Migrant Settlement Patterns

Concomitant with this hypothesis is the theoretical role of population density, driven by the halo effect and group contact theory: that is, in areas where there is high population density, the likelihood that residents will be in closer contact with each other is high as well (as can be seen in Figure 3.3: if the areas of residential segregation are not as close to one another, the perceived threat on behalf of the in-group is not as obvious, thereby reducing the motivation to act against the out-group). Where residential segregation exists in areas of high population density, one would expect that the halo effect would be exacerbated by the closer proximity of residents, thus leading to higher levels of anti-migrant political action. Where migrants are more evenly dispersed in a

high-population density area, however, migrants and natives alike may have greater opportunities for *quality* contacts – defined by contact that is of a more personal, intimate nature, and where individuals share an overarching goal and there is wide institutional support for such contacts (Allport, 1953; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). These quality contact opportunities would serve to defuse the impetus towards anti-migrant political action by majority natives, as migrants are considered by majority natives to be part of the whole, and a clear “us-vs-them” segregation does not exist to a great degree (Cash, 1996; Gross-Stein, 2001). I therefore include “population density” as a potentially important augmenting explanatory variable, and I add a lemma to my main hypothesis:

H1.1: The effect of migrant residential concentration is higher in areas of high population density.

Where migrant residential concentration is lower, high population density will have a dampening effect on the levels of anti-migrant political action, as the elements of group contact theory are more likely to affect outcomes. I therefore include an interaction of “migrant residential concentration” and “population density” in my analyses to follow.

One might question the possible presence of endogeneity in the relationship between residential segregation and anti-migrant political action posited above: could anti-migrant action taken by majority natives lead to greater levels of residential segregation between migrants and majority natives? While theoretically possible, in the present case of Sweden, the historical trajectory of migrant residential patterns has arisen over time due to the effects of Sweden’s housing and migrant policies, with migrant segregation resulting from quite unintended consequences. As I discuss more fully in the following chapter, Sweden embarked on an ambitious housing construction plan in the 1960s and 1970s in response to a marked shortage of residential

housing – particularly for the rising middle classes. Middle-class Swedes did not, however, flock to these housing projects, and when migration (labor and then refugee migration) to Sweden began to rise precipitously in the 1970s, the Swedish government dedicated this housing to the incoming migrants, as much of it was state-owned (and hence affordable), and available (Andersson, 2007: 62). The affordability and availability of this housing over time – combined with the established migrant communities that had settled here previously – served to reinforce this residential settlement pattern, thereby propagating conditions of segregation between migrants and majority natives over the ensuing decades. Hence, many observed patterns of housing segregation in Sweden were set over 40 years ago by virtue of policy and the necessity to house an inflow of migrants. It is after this pattern had been well established that the rise in anti-migrant activity became more common in Sweden.

3.2 Hypothesis Two

To explore the relative impacts of the mere number of migrants within a population – versus the residential distribution of migrants – I also consider the effects of the proportion of migrants living in an area of analysis. That is, I test whether there is an effect of just the *number* of migrants that live in a population on the outcomes of anti-migrant political action, instead of *where* migrants are settled residentially. This competing explanatory variable is one taken up in many previous studies (Lubbers *et al*, 2002; Golder, 2003; Van Der Brug *et al*, 2005; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Dancygier, 2010) as an indicator of the level of presence of migrants in a given area, and hence, of the potential level of material or cultural threat that members of the native majority may feel. So the assumption is that the sheer numbers of migrants leads to an outcome of anti-migrant action or attitudes. It is also noted that people in general tend to overestimate the number of migrants

that they believe live in a particular area if they do not have prior knowledge of migrant population numbers²; hence, a larger proportion of migrants in an area will tend to be overestimated as much larger than it is, leading to an even greater sense of “ethnic threat.”

The second hypothesis is intended to examine the effects of the number of migrants in an area on anti-migrant political action, and is as follows:

H2: The higher the proportion of migrants within a population, the higher the level of anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives. Conversely, the lower the proportion of migrants in the population, the lower the level of anti-migrant political action.

Using the same logic as in the first hypothesis, I also consider the combined effects of population density and the proportion of migrants: if the proportion of migrants in a given population has a significant effect on anti-migrant political action, then a higher population density may exacerbate the magnitude of this effect.

3.3 Hypothesis Three

In the presence of a trigger condition such as the effect of worsening economic conditions, any resentment majority natives may hold towards migrants may be more easily translated into action (for those who are strategic in their actions) against the threat perceived to be posed by migrants. The results from previous research, however, have often been mixed (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; but also Dancygier, 2010, Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Golder, 2003): it would appear that economics has a role in these outcomes, but it is not necessarily clear under which conditions this is the case – or indeed if these effects hold across or even within countries.

² The German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2014,” 38. Surveys in 2010 and 2014 yielded consistent results on this point for respondents in the United States and Europe.

Some research has identified a role for economic variables – but only via interactions with other factors – in explaining the outcomes of anti-migrant behavior (Dancygier, 2010; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Golder, 2003). The role of economics in anti-migrant action has been questioned by observers as well (Ramalingam, 2013). In a comprehensive welfare state, one would not necessarily expect social instability to stem solely from economic hardship; easing inter-class (read: inter-group) deprivation resulting from economic fluctuations was the *raison d'être* of the welfare state in the first place, and the welfare state has been viewed as having an integrative capacity as well (Marshall, 1950; Crepez and Damron, 2009, 440). Therefore, mixed results in past studies may not be so surprising, especially where the extent of the welfare state varies (Crepez and Damron, 2009) and this variable has not been taken into account.

According to the logic of theories of grievance and relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), one might expect a trigger mechanism such as bad or worsening economic conditions to provoke individuals to act; it may be that this triggering influence exacerbates the effects of migrant segregation. To explore the relative explanatory power of economic circumstances and migrant population sizes – and their interaction effects – I consider the following:

- H3:** The presence of poor economic conditions acts as a “trigger condition” and combines with the distribution of migrants in a region, leading to a higher level of anti-migrant political action.

In terms of “distribution of migrants,” I evaluate both the residential segregation of migrants from majority natives and the proportion of migrants within the population – drawing on my main causal variable and that offered in previous studies. Golder (2003), for example, considered the interaction of the *proportion* of migrants with levels of unemployment to be of primary causal import on the level of populist-radical right voteshare (anti-migrant political parties

here); following from previous findings and my main hypothesis, I shall also consider the interaction effects of poor economic conditions with the proportion of migrants and with the level of residential segregation on the level of anti-migrant political action. This will test the strength of the explanatory power of my main independent variable, the residential concentration of migrants, against the numbers of migrants in an area.

Golder's analysis, however, was at the national-level: by focusing on sub-national measurements, I should be able to tease out any localized variance that may be washed away at the national level of analysis, and also I shall look at changes (growth or decline) in the migrant population and concentration in each region over the time periods selected.

Note that this hypothesis identifies a *conditional* effect: that is, where another factor (here, economic conditions) combines with the level of migrant residential segregation or the level of the proportion of migrants in an area, the outcome is affected by the presence of this additional factor: bad economic conditions intensify the hypothesized effects of migrant residential segregation or the proportion of migrants, leading to a higher level of anti-migrant political action by majority natives. Essentially, if the economy is not doing well, this increases a sense of material threat the majority natives perceive from migrants (in the form of welfare chauvinism, for example), and this leads members of the native majority to take political action against migrants. The argument is not that poor economic conditions lead to greater migrant residential segregation or a higher proportion of migrants, but that these residential patterns are already in place, and the state of economic variables augments (or dampens) the effects of these residential patterns on the outcome of anti-migrant political action.

In consideration, then, of factors that may combine in a similar fashion to lead to higher levels of anti-migrant political action, I also examine the combined effects of migrant residential

concentration and the proportion of migrants: where there are more migrants within a population, the effects of segregation may be more prevalent (that is, there may be more opportunity for the residential conditions of the halo effect to occur). The number of migrants in a population may not have as much of an impact unless there is high segregation among the residents:

H3.1: A higher the level of migrant residential segregation in the presence of a high proportion of migrants in an area leads to a higher level of anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives.

Here, then, I can test the relative effects of my main explanatory variable (migrant residential concentration) against those of the alternative hypothesis (the proportion of migrants, which has been the measurement of migrant settlement used in much of the previous literature).

Finally, again I shall consider the effect of population density combined with that of economic conditions. It has been found that in urban areas (that is, areas of higher population density), where economic conditions are lower, economic prospects for *all* residents are lower (mostly among males), regardless of levels of education, residential tenure, or ethnicity (Andersson *et al*, 2007). Thus, majority natives are more likely to be worse off economically in urban areas where economic conditions are poor, and this may lead to an increased sense of material threat and welfare chauvinism against migrants (outside of the effects of segregation or the proportion of migrants). I therefore test these combined effects as well:

H3.2: The combined effects of poor economic conditions in areas of high population density will result in higher levels of anti-migrant political action by majority natives.

In the following chapter, I shall operationalize the concepts inherent in my hypotheses and lay out the context and research design of my quantitative and qualitative studies of my cases in Sweden.

Chapter 4

Operationalization: Conceptualization and Research Design

4.1 Introduction

In laying out the puzzle and hypotheses of this research, there are a number of concepts that need to be clearly defined, and then operationalized. As such, it is necessary to discuss the theoretical definition of the concepts in this study, but also the operational concepts that I posit will enable me to approximately translate the theory into a model with distinct variables and measurable quantities. I begin with the theoretical concept and definitions of the constituents of this concept.

4.2 Conceptualization: Dependent Variable

The outcome of interest in this study is political action of members of the native majority group in advanced democracies against migrants, in particular as motivated by the configuration of presence (or absence) of migrants in their localities. I define “political action” as acts taken by individuals for whom the intention is to express or effect a preference for a political decision or a direction of policy. By “native,” I mean persons who are not foreign-born and are of the ethnic majority group; actions taken against “migrants” by members of the ethnic majority group indicates that these actions are taken against those who are *perceived* to be migrants. Thus, actions may be taken against those who are native to the country but who are descended from those who were foreign-

born: although these individuals may come from different cultural backgrounds, they are nonetheless at least partly integrated into society by virtue of being born there and having citizenship there (Soysal, 1992; Dancygier, 2010). The measure of the numbers of “migrants” in this study is based on migrants – that is, foreign-born newcomers who are native to another country. It should be noted, however, that anti-migrant actions may indeed be motivated by the *perceived* number or presence of migrants: those taking actions against individual migrants or migrants as a group likely do not check to make sure that the individual or group of individuals has been born abroad – they likely act on what appears to be the case. Particularly in countries where immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon and where the native group is relatively ethnically homogenous, members of a minority group will likely be more obvious (for example, this situation will more likely be the case for Western European countries as opposed to the United States, the latter having a much longer history of immigration from different areas of the world).

The reason for making this distinction lies in the theoretical perceived cultural or material threat to natives that incoming populations may pose (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers et al, 2003; Golder, 2003; Koopmans and Muis, 2009), as opposed to the actual numbers of newcomers. It has been suggested, however, that those who are born in a given country – even when their ancestors arrived from a quite different culture – are understood as “natives” by other natives and are hence differentiated categorically from those born in other countries (perhaps queued by native linguistic or other cultural traits the later generations have acquired; Murdie and Borgegård, 1998; Nordin, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006). So, in a tangential way, this study references the concept of “integration,” and to what extent migrants and their descendants are able to achieve social and political acceptance in their new home.

The main explanatory factor is the level of spatial residential segregation that exists between natives and migrants. I consider *residential* segregation, as an individual will be at his/her residence most days and be aware of those who live nearby or in the vicinity (this is in opposition to considering the time spent at the workplace, for example, which is a less personal social environment – but see Pecoraro and Ruedin, 2014, for insights into how workplace integration can affect native attitudes towards migrants). Migrant residences might be segregated from those of natives, or more or less evenly interspersed among natives throughout a neighborhood, a community, a municipality, a province, or indeed, an entire country. Theoretically, the ideal level of analysis would involve examination of the level of migrant residential segregation from natives at the neighborhood level – this would allow for the most fine-grained analysis of the direct effects of spatial residential segregation on native political behavior; on the other end of the scale, the most coarse analysis would be at the country level, and this is the level of analysis that previous studies have examined with regard to anti-migrant political actions by natives, yet have led to insignificant or conflicting results (e.g., Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Lubbers *et al*, 2002; Koopmans *et al*, 2005). Thus, the closer the analysis can come to the neighborhood level, the better the test of the halo effect, as more direct interaction between groups can be more readily observed, measured, and analyzed, and the less ambiguous the results are likely to be. Of course, the level of analysis can be limited by the availability of data and methods, but again, a sub-national level of analysis will be superior to a national-level of analysis under the consideration of the theory proposed. I shall address these levels-of-analysis limitations with regard to the analyses I have conducted respectively.

4.3 Conceptualization of Theory

It is useful to think of the concept of the outcome of interest – political action – in the context of a ladder of abstraction (Sartori, in Collier and Gerring, 2009). Under the broad rubric of “political action,” there are indeed various kinds of such actions that individuals within a democratic society might take. Moving down one level from this umbrella term, I identify two categories of political actions: legal and illegal. “Legal” actions are those that fall within the institutional framework of an advanced democracy (my overall universe of cases). By contrast, “illegal” actions are those taken outside of such institutional bounds (one might describe these as “criminal,” “radical,” or even “anti-institutional” actions – I use the term “legal” to encompass actions that fall outside of the legal institutional framework of an advanced democracy). Within each of these subcategories, there are different types of actions as well: legally, citizens may express anti-migrant agency




Figure 4.1 Ladder of Abstraction for Anti-Migrant Political Behavior

by voting for anti-migrant parties; attending anti-migrant protests; or making anti-migrant statements with regard to policy. Illegal anti-migrant political action could entail open attacks by members of the native majority group against or conflict with migrants; civil disobedience or other law-breaking actions in efforts to express dissatisfaction with migrant policy; or hate speech intended to intimidate or invoke fear in its victims. I represent this categorization for my dependent variable in Figure 4.1.

4.4 Research Design: Methods and Units of Analysis

For this study, I employ a nested analysis approach, beginning with quantitative analyses and followed by qualitative case study analyses of specific areas that have been identified from the quantitative results. Although the selection of cases for my qualitative studies are driven by the quantitative results, note that the unit of analysis for the quantitative analyses is different from that of the qualitative analyses: my quantitative studies are done at the county level of analysis, while the case studies are conducted at the municipal (sub-county) level. Nonetheless, the case study selection is driven by the results of the quantitative analyses, and hence are nested within the framework of those latter results. The level of the quantitative studies was limited by available data; my qualitative studies – which resulted from field work in which I performed interviews and participant observation – were conducted at the municipal level, as I could not readily access entire counties with the time and funds I had available. The case examination at the municipal level yields some distinct theoretical benefits (as discussed below), while still being supported by the quantitative results gleaned from a higher level of analysis: in short, the qualitative studies allow me to drill down to observe causal mechanisms more clearly, and hence to tease out possible

additional explanatory variables. I discuss the case selection and units of analysis further in the following sections.

4.5 Research Design: Temporal Scope and Case Considerations

In an effort to craft a most-similar systems analysis and thus to control for some important macro-level variables – such as the decommodification level of the welfare state; the structure of the national electoral system (e.g., consensus versus majoritarian); citizenship regimes; immigration policies; and membership in the European Union – I have chosen for my main analyses cases within a single, comprehensive welfare state: Sweden. In Sweden, the macro-level control variables are set at the national level, as it is the national government that determines social welfare policy, citizenship criteria, immigration policy, and is responsible for carrying out EU-wide policy.

Sweden's policies on granting eligibility for citizenship and voting rights to migrants are relatively generous compared to other advanced democracies (Koopmans *et al*, 2005), and political participation for migrant associations has been institutionally established (MIPEX; Soysal, 1994). Furthermore, as a member of the EU, Sweden has acceded to the Dublin Convention/Regulation, an EU law that essentially determines the EU Member State responsible for an asylum claim.¹ Finally, Sweden has migrant settlement policies (for immigrants and refugees) that dictates the number of migrants that are to be settled in each county, so some control over the level of residential diversity within its borders rests at the national level. To be sure, *implementation* of these national-level policies rests to sometimes a large degree with local authorities, but the point

¹ The Dublin Convention was signed by Sweden on 1 October 1997, and by Finland on 1 January 1998. The Dublin Regulation was instituted on 18 February 2003 for all Member States. The Convention and then Regulation clarified the procedures for responsibility within the Member States for the processing and implementation of asylum seekers. In short, an asylum seeker may apply for asylum in one EU Member State, but may be transferred to another EU Member state per this law. <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu>>, accessed 1 June 2013.

is that the policies themselves are set at the national level, and hence are applicable for all sub-national units within the country.

The temporal scope of my quantitative analyses runs from 1998-2014. I chose this timeframe in accordance with particular aspects of my variables, and the availability of data with respect to certain variables (discussed in more detail below). For my case studies, I of course was limited with respect to my observations to the present moment, but was able to accumulate relevant historical data from most of my interview subjects. Thus, while my case studies can speak most strongly to the present state of outcomes in the localities I visited, I was also able to construct a longer-term view of outcomes in each area from those with whom I spoke.

4.6 Case Selection: Quantitative Analyses

The quantitative studies will examine the phenomena under consideration at the sub-national level, namely the county (*län*) level within Sweden. These regions coincide with the NUTS 3 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics), the smallest sub-regional unit identified by Eurostat,² and the next-lowest area division (above municipality) in each country. It would be ideal to implement the study at an even lower sub-national level – such as at the community or neighborhood level – but data enabling me to calculate my main independent variable (“migrant concentration,” as discussed below) are not readily available at these lower levels of analysis.

4.7 Case Selection: Qualitative Analyses

For the case studies, I performed field work in three municipalities (chosen based on results from the quantitative analyses, as discussed above) in addition to making observations in other

² See the European Commission, Eurostat:
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction>.

municipalities in Sweden. Hence, the level of analysis for the qualitative approach is the *municipality* in Sweden. I performed in-depth field work in three municipalities in October and November of 2105: Malmö (Skåne County), and Sollentuna and Järfälla (both in Stockholm County).³

4.8 Quantitative Dependent Variables

I operationally define the dependent variable, “anti-migrant political action,” in two ways, examining an institutional outcome (voteshare) and an extra-institutional outcome (hate crimes against migrants) in each county. “Voteshare” data refer to the proportion of votes in national parliamentary elections that an anti-migrant party receives out of all votes cast. “Hate crimes against migrants” is measured in terms of hate crimes committed against minorities (i.e., not members of the majority ethnic population). These outcomes can also be thought of as “indirect” (i.e., via institutional means) and “direct” (i.e., via direct action against migrants). This is an important distinction in some respects, as one may vote for an anti-migrant party for reasons other than being against migrants, or for more than just that one reason. Hate crimes against a minority, however, have been judged to be motivated by the fact that the victim is indeed a member of a minority group, so it seems a closer representation of anti-minority (read: anti-migrant) action and preferences. I elaborate on these points further below.

4.8.1 Quantitative Dependent Variable: Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Parties

I have chosen to examine parliamentary elections for this study (as opposed to municipal elections), given that migrant policy is set at the national level in each country (although these

³ Justifications for the selection of these particular municipalities will be made as part of the discussion of the results of the quantitative analyses in a later chapter.

policies may be implemented locally in some cases); thus, one might expect that any disenchantment that a voter may have with regard to migrants and migrant policy would be directed at national-level representatives who are in a position to change or influence policy on behalf of their constituents. In Sweden, it is the case that voteshare for parties at the county level mirrors that at the national level, although national parties are not allowed to work directly with their local counterparts.⁴ (It is interesting to note that in Sweden, voting for local and national elections occurs on the same date every four years.) Hence, voting patterns in national elections is a good indicator of voting behavior at the sub-national level as well. In addition, parliamentary electoral districts are isomorphic with the counties, so an analysis of voteshare at the county level is congruent with other county-level data. As with the level of migrant residential concentration, it may yet be useful to examine voteshare outcomes at the municipal level as well, as this would give a finer-grained picture of constituents' local political action. Data at the *valdistrikt* (voting district) level is indeed available in Sweden, but for this analysis, acquiring this data proved prohibitive due to cost and contact. This will, however, be a step in future research, as will be discussed in the last chapter.

I define “anti-migrant parties” as those parties that are associated – or are perceived to be associated – with anti-migrant statements, views, or policy preferences (as in their manifestos or platforms). I emphasize that the manner in which these parties are *perceived* by the electorate is important in this definition: from the outside, certain parties may seem to express anti-migrant views or support anti-migrant policies, but the context in which these expressions are made and how they are received by the electorate may reveal otherwise. For Sweden, I have identified one anti-migrant party: the Sweden Democrats (Hainsworth, 2008; Sainsbury, 2012; Oja and Mral,

⁴ Interview Subject 6 November 2015#2.

2013). Although my research indicates that New Democracy could be considered an anti-migrant party (Hainsworth, 2008; Sainsbury, 2012) and the party did field candidates in the 1998 parliamentary election, I have not been able to find a reliable source that reports their (apparently quite small) voteshare for this election at the sub-national level; I therefore do not consider New Democracy in this study.

There are, however, limitations to the use of “voteshare” as an indicator of anti-migrant action. First and foremost, parties with anti-migrant associations are not necessarily one-dimensional parties: they have other aspects to their platforms and agendas besides policies against migrants. Parties perceived to have anti-migrant views may also be Eurosceptic, for example (such as the Front National in France, or the British National Party in Great Britain; Hainsworth, 2008, 84-85). Hence, a vote for such a party cannot automatically be considered to be purely a vote against migrants. Still, voting for a party with anti-migrant views does indicate at least a tolerance for such views, even if in small degree. There is, nonetheless, some potential difference between the theoretical concept and the operational measurement of this variable, so due caution must be used in the statistical results.

The unit of analysis, therefore, will be the county-election-year, and the temporal scope is from 1998 to 2014 (with elections having occurred in 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014). I go back only to 1998, as those were the first elections after Sweden entered the European Union and became a member of the Schengen Area, which allows free movement of persons (e.g., migrants) from other EU member countries. In addition, this timeframe commences just after county reconfigurations occurred in Sweden, thus giving continuity to the unit of analysis over the entire timeframe. Lastly, I do not have voteshare data at the county level before 1998 for all the Sweden

Democrats. Thus, the temporal scope is constrained somewhat by theoretical considerations, and also by data limitations.

4.8.2 Quantitative Dependent Variable: Hate Crimes

For this second quantitative analysis, I examine the level of hate crimes committed in Swedish counties against perceived migrants (members of minority groups) by native majority Swedes from 1998-2014. As the populations of the different counties differ, I consider the number of hate crimes in each county per 100,000 residents.⁵ The unit of analysis is therefore hate crime per capita-county-year.

The hate crimes are defined by the National Council for Crime Prevention, Department of Statistical Surveys (*Brottsförebyggande Rådet*, or *Brå*) in Sweden.⁶ It should be noted that these hate crimes are defined by *Brå* – not the police – and then compiled according to these definitions by *Brå* from police reports from around the country. Hence, these data do not represent hate crimes as defined by police authorities, but by this agency that does, however, work in conjunction with police authorities. I make this point to draw attention to the fact that hate crimes can be defined differently at municipal levels; this data yield a consistent measure of hate crimes across all counties, however, and as such, are quite useful. It must be noted, of course, that these data only include *reported* hate crimes: there may be many hate crimes that go unreported, or may not be recorded by the local police unit. It is likely that these figures, then, are underreported and should be higher than what is indicated in the data. Nonetheless, these are the best data available on such crimes, so they shall be employed. Finally, these hate crimes do not include crimes against other

⁵ In addition, for the year 2000, the only data on hate crimes available were in terms of 100,000 residents, not actual numbers. For this reason, I opted to scale the hate crimes per 100,000 residents for all observations; note that in my analyses, my use of the phrase “hate crimes per capita” implies “hate crimes per 100,000 residents.”

⁶ A list of the crimes that have been identified as “hate crimes” by *Brå* has been included in Appendix H.

minority groups (such as homosexuals): the data refer only to racial minorities, making them more representative of true anti-migrant sentiment.⁷

Compared with voteshare for anti-migrant political parties, analysis of hate crimes yields insights to more direct, unambiguous action against migrants: as mentioned, people may vote for anti-migrant parties for a number of reasons, but direct action against migrants/minorities clearly has a xenophobic, anti-migrant motivation, as categorized by the *Brå* reports. Again, I shall stress that minority victims of hate crimes may in fact have been born in Sweden (e.g., one or both parents or grandparents may have been migrants, but the victim is a native Swede): it is the *perception* of the victim/target as a migrant that matters (and is usually derived by the perpetrator from the victim's/target's race, ethnicity, or perhaps clothing or speech) – to be sure, a hate crime perpetrator probably does not ask for a victim's birth certificate before committing a crime! On a serious theoretical note, however, these crimes are taken to be evidence of anti-migrant motivation, as it is the “otherness” (e.g., the non-ethnic-Swedishness) that provokes the perpetrator.

4.9 Qualitative Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for the qualitative case studies are theoretically the same as those for the quantitative studies. I examine explanatory effects for the difference in outcomes of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna and Järfälla, and the level of hate crimes against migrants in Malmö. As noted previously, one of the considerations of analyzing hate crimes at a more local (municipal) level is the fact that local police authorities define and investigate hate crimes in their own ways – that is, what is considered a hate crime by *Brå* may *not* be considered a hate crime by the Malmö police: the police may have a more- or less-encompassing view on what comprises a

⁷ My thanks to Interview Subject 17 November 2015 for drawing my attention to these aspects of the hate crime data.

hate crime. In addition, many sub-national police units did not begin categorizing or prioritizing hate crimes until quite recently (2012 in Malmö, for example); hence, comprehensive awareness of hate crimes among authorities may be different from the awareness that the population of the locality has, and may have led to a reluctance among victims to report such crimes (the underreporting problem mentioned above). It is possible, therefore, for authorities to have a different perspective on anti-migrant crimes than inhabitants.

4.10 Main Independent Variable

My main hypothesis posits that the level of residential concentration of migrants with respect to the native majority population is the primary variable that explains effects on anti-migrant political action (voteshare for the Sweden Democrats and hate crimes against migrants). A higher concentration of migrants in the midst of the native majority population indicates that migrants are more segregated residentially from natives. For the quantitative analyses, this variable is therefore defined as the level of segregation between migrant residency and majority native residency within a given county. To calculate this indicator, I take the proportion of migrants in the total population within each municipality of the county (data gathered from Statistics Sweden), and then find the standard deviation of the migrant proportion among all municipalities of the county. Hence, an even distribution of migrants from one municipality to the next in a county would have a migrant residential concentration score of “0;” the higher this score (standard deviation of the migrant population), the more unevenly distributed are the migrant populations among municipalities (or, the more concentrated the migrant populations are in one or more municipalities). In my analyses, I have data for 21 counties; this excludes Götland, which is a small county and has no separate

municipalities: I therefore cannot calculate migrant distribution for that county, as there is no way to find the standard deviation of migrant distribution from the data I have at the county level.

The same main independent variable is applicable in the qualitative case studies, although I assess the level of the concentration of migrants within a municipality through observation of the individual cases and my interviews. By actively exploring the localities and neighborhoods of my selected municipalities in person – and through talking with those who live in each municipality – I was able to attain a sense of the level of residential segregation in the area and what the potential effects of this segregation are.

4.11 Context: Migration to Sweden – Immigration and Housing

4.11.1 Immigration to Sweden

There have been a number of “waves” of external migration to Sweden since World War II, and each of these waves has been characterized by a change in the areas of the migrants’ home countries and motivations for migration. Roughly, three such waves can be identified, the first of which was contaminant with the war and consisted mostly of war refugees from other parts of Europe (i.e., Jews,⁸ children from Finland, and refugees from Norway and Denmark [Andersson, 2007]). The second wave followed closely behind in the 1950s and 1960s, when economic migrants from Finland,⁹ southern Europe, and Yugoslavia arrived with few if any restrictions. Finally, from the 1970s onwards up to the present, the third wave of migration to Sweden has been one of refugees fleeing conflict zones and family reunification from areas outside of Europe

⁸ It should be noted, however, that the immigration of Jews in the wake of WWII was limited, owing to the existence of anti-Semitic sentiment in the country <www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden-restrictive-immigration-policy-and-multiculturalism>; some researchers have drawn a parallel between the rise of extreme-right, Nazi groups in Sweden at this time and the development of the Neo-Nazi movement that has given rise to the Sweden Democrats in recent times (Interview 27 October 2015#2).

⁹ Immigration from Finland remained substantial until the 1990s. In 2000, ten percent of migrants were from Finland; by 2014, this figure dropped to 5.5%. Statistics Sweden, <www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se>.

(Andersson, 2007): the Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria); Africa (Ethiopia, Somalia); and Latin America (Chile). The total numbers of immigrants also grew steadily: according to Andersson (2007, 64), “Without immigration, the size of the Swedish population would have been the same today as 45 years ago. The country’s net-population increase of some 1.5 million people is entirely due to a surplus of first and second generation immigrants.”

The trend of these shifts in the numbers and of countries of origin since the 1950s has grown in magnitude in the past 20 years, as the largest growth in home country demographic of immigrants has been for those who arrive from non-European countries, as shown in Figure 7.4. As shown in the figure, while the numbers of migrants from Nordic countries has remained fairly steady (and was about even with the numbers from non-EU-28 countries and non-European




Figure 4.2 Trends in County-of-Origin of Recent Migrants to Sweden, 2000-2015
 (Source: Statistics Sweden, Statistical Database, www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se, consulted 3 March 2015)

countries in 2000), the rate of growth from non-EU countries has grown more quickly, with migration from non-European countries has growing at the fastest rate of all. In 1970, less than seven percent of the population in Sweden was foreign-born (Blind 2015, 160); in 2015, about 17% of Sweden's population was foreign-born, and nearly 29% of the population in 2014 was of foreign background, with one or both parents having been born in other countries (Statistics Sweden). Hence, Sweden has become a more ethnically diverse immigration country, with a rapid rise not only in the number of migrants arriving over the past 40 years, but also a dramatic shift from European to non-European countries of origin for these newcomers in this time. These numbers grew at an unprecedented rate in 2015 with the influx of over 160,000 refugees, mostly from Syria and Iraq (Moore, 2016). These numbers have not only placed a strain on the generous welfare state in Sweden, but have also challenged the cultural identity of the country (of which universality of welfare provisions and generosity and openness towards immigrants have been a part) (Demker, 2007).

4.11.2 Immigration Policies: Accepting Migrants

With regard to immigration policies, there are two strands: policies with regard to accepting migrants and granting citizenship, and policies with regard to the settlement of migrants within the country once they arrive. These policies have domestic as well as international dimensions, as some of them have been affected by Sweden's membership in the European Union (i.e., under the Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention) and other international agreements, and so, to a degree, Sweden has had limitations with regard to its decisions regarding migrant settlement into the country. Nonetheless, Sweden's stance on immigration has been an historically open one (to which the numbers above attest), and its citizenship regime is also among one of the most generous

in Western Europe –which some claim to be a factor in *increasing* anti-migrant sentiment and political action (Koopmans *et al*, 2004).

The war refugees who arrives in the first wave migration to Sweden were eventually welcomed into the country (despite some initial misgivings that accepting Jews may cause conflict with Germany during the war). Unlike other European countries such as Germany, the labor migrants who arrived during the second wave of immigration did not do so under any kind of “guest worker” scheme: these migrations were seen to be permanent by the State, yielding future citizens of the country (Westin, 2006). Bolstered by the main Swedish labor association, companies actively sought foreign labor, and in the 1960s, migrants began to arrive on their own to find work (yet the Swedish government at the time did not have a gauge on how much foreign labor was being recruited, as opposed to how much was arriving without being recruited) (Westin, 2006). Although Sweden officially halted labor migration in 1972 (Westin, 2006), these earlier positions with regard to refugee and labor migration set Sweden’s reputation as an “open” immigration country, and is the lens through which current refugee policies are discussed and debated.

Although the third wave of migration to Sweden – that of refugees seeking asylum – did not begin until the early 1970s, Sweden nonetheless had acceded to 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention) and the 1967 Protocol in the years in which each had been established. Before the onset of this wave, refugees in the 1950s and 1960s were treated as labor migrants, and settled by the National Labor Board (Westin, 2006). This policy changed, however, when labor migration ended, and refugees then sought settlement in Sweden via permanent resident status, and many began entering as part of chain migration, where established family members in Sweden would “pull in” family members from their former homelands. It is

also important to note that in the early phase of refugee settlement, asylum-seekers were accepted on “humanitarian grounds,” which meant that Sweden did not have to follow the UN Convention as strictly, but could instead have some discretion over whom it accepted (allowing more to enter than would have been dictated under the UN Convention). Again, this reinforced Sweden’s reputation of having a comparatively generous acceptance of refugees into the country (Westin, 2006).

With a precipitous rise in the number of refugees in the late 1980s, Sweden reversed its policy course somewhat by instead adhering strictly to the UN Geneva Convention; this shift limited the numbers of refugees that Sweden would accept, compared to its earlier policy. The timing of this change occurred just as the Soviet Union began to collapse, and had repercussions for the numbers of refugees that sought asylum from these former states, Somalia, and then the Balkans; nonetheless, refugees continued to arrive and be settled in Sweden in increasing numbers, further bolstered by wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and finally, Syria.

Migration to Sweden occurred via another route, as the country became a member of the European Union in 1995. In the following year, Sweden opted to be a party to the Schengen Agreement, which allows for free movement of peoples and goods throughout other Schengen Area EU Member States. While such migration is relatively small compared to the numbers of refugees arriving – and Swedes migrate to other EU Member States in somewhat higher numbers than those who migrate from other EU Member states – this free movement of EU citizens (which in Sweden, includes admission of citizens of the newly-admitted Eastern European Member States) has had a novel impact with regard to members of the Roma community. As EU citizens, Roma can freely enter Sweden and remain for up to three months; yet as the border has been opened under Schengen and many Roma have very low trust in authorities (due to persecution and

discrimination in their home countries), it is difficult to regulate how long Roma migrants stay, as they rather live “under the radar” officially, not registering with authorities or seeking employment once in the country. This unforeseen consequence has led to a situation heretofore unknown in Sweden’s generous welfare state: the sight of beggars in many of the cities and towns. Until the more recent historic influx of refugees from Iraq and Syria, the situation of the Roma had dominated domestic discourse on migrants, as the Roma occupy a sort of “middle-ground” between refugees and immigrants.¹⁰ Socially and politically, the issue is divisive, as it challenges Sweden’s long-held tradition of generosity towards migrants on humanitarian grounds in light of concerns over integration and State oversight (the challenges of low-trusting people coming to a high-trusting state). As many Roma establish their settlements *outside* of State facilities and other residential areas, I have not considered their impact in the case studies that follow with regard to the effects of migrant residential segregation on anti-migrant political action, but there is little doubt that the Roma community do have an effect on migrant discourse in Sweden (as well as on the discourse of EU membership). I shall take this point up a little further in my concluding chapter.

Another aspect of EU membership that influences Sweden’s policies on refugees is the country’s accession to the Dublin Convention¹¹ (recast in 2014 as the Dublin Regulation, amending some aspects of the Convention), which superseded the refugee provisions in the Schengen Agreement. The Dublin agreements provide a framework for Member States in the acceptance and processing of refugees, aiming to determine which Member State is responsible for granting asylum to an applicant and to ensure that an asylum-seeker does not have multiple

¹⁰ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1.

¹¹ Full title: “The Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States,” agreed in 1990 and ratified in 1997
<www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/assets/0001/5851/dublin_aug2002.pdf>.

applications active in more than one Member State at one time. This framework is implemented in conjunction with the refugee quotas that Sweden's Parliament agrees for each year and that is coordinated with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Honoré, 2003).

A set of criteria in the Dublin agreements establishes a hierarchy of criteria to guide Member States in deciding where asylum applications should be processed – a Member State is responsible for processing an asylum application for reasons of family reunification, for holders of residence permits/visas in the Member State, for illegal entries, and in the Member State where asylum application was first made (Refugee Council, 2002). The changes made in 2014 are relatively recent, and combined with the unprecedented influx of refugees to Europe in 2015, it is unclear to what extent these enhancements may have improved the asylum application process. In fact, the mechanisms of the Schengen Agreement¹² and that of the Dublin agreements were essentially suspended or modified in many Member States in 2015 – including Sweden – as a result of the phenomenal influx of refugees.

Sweden had open borders until November 2015 when border checks were instituted between the country and Denmark on the Øresund Bridge that connects the two; until November, refugees freely came into the country, some asking for or being offered asylum (in fact, after debarking from a train from Malmö, I was asked by a Swedish police officer in Stockholm Central train station if I wanted asylum), some on their way to Finland through Sweden. As not all refugees were possibly accounted for by authorities, it is difficult to say just how many entered the country during the year, and indeed, there have been many who have gone missing since arriving (especially minors¹³ – an incredibly disturbing development). In addition, Sweden changed its

¹²The Schengen Agreement does, however, allow for temporary border control in cases of threats to a Member State's "public policy or internal security." <www.thelocal.se/20151112/is-sweden-closing-its-borders-no-its-not>

¹³ <www.thelocal.se/20151015/one-thousand-refugee-kids-missing-from-sweden>; <www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35453589>.

policy on permanent residency for refugees in October 2015, to be enacted as of 2016: prior to this time, refugees granted asylum in Sweden were given automatic permanent residency; under the new, long-debated and controversial policy, such refugees will be granted temporary three-year visas.¹⁴ These more recent events do not have great bearing on the timeframe of my quantitative analysis (1998-2014) – as Sweden had been managing its asylum policies in accordance with the Dublin framework and Schengen Agreement until 2015 – but they were occurring at the time of my field research and have had some impact on the information I gathered in my case municipalities – a point I shall discuss in the case study analyses to come.

4.11.3 Immigration Policies: Migrant “Integration” and Citizenship

Sweden’s internal policies on immigration address what the national government sees as a priority of “integration” – particularly with regard to political integration, but more recently, the emphasis has been on economic integration (Holmqvist and Bergsten, 2009). Access to citizenship for migrants is based on *jus sanguinis*, and hence is not automatic for those born in Sweden to migrant parents. Eligibility for citizenship requires a migrant to have permanent residence status and to have lived in the country for at least five years (the time requirement is four years for refugees; three years for partners of citizens; two years for spouses of citizens [MIPEX] or for Nordic citizens [Westin, 2006]). Migrant children can claim their own right to citizenship after three years, if the parents notify authorities of the child and her/his claim. To receive citizenship, migrants must pay a nominal fee, have paid their taxes/debts, and have a clean police record (MIPEX). In 2001, Sweden allowed dual citizenship, making citizenship decisions somewhat easier for migrants.

¹⁴ <www.thelocal.se/20151023/swedish-parties-set-to-reveal-new-refugee-plans>.

As of 2011, more than 70% of non-EU migrants have become citizens, which is a relatively high figure for Western Europe (MIPEX). Adding the right of *jus soli* has been debated – and may increase citizenship numbers – but such a policy change has not taken place as yet. In political and media discourse, then, children of migrants are often referred to as “second-generation migrants or immigrants” (Westin, 2006) – even after they have become citizens themselves. Sweden has sought to avoid such exclusionary terms when referring to migrants, yet their popular usage persists, creating something of an identity conflict for those born in Sweden of migrant parents.¹⁵

The acquisition of citizenship is linked with higher employment levels among migrants, which is part of the reason for the more recent focus on labor integration of migrants. No language test is required, however, and language acquisition by migrants is viewed as one prerequisite for increased probability of their finding employment. Language classes and job training for migrants are made available by local governments and are supported by the national government, and non-EU migrants (non-refugees) have instant and equal access to the job market as citizens (Westin, 2006). Refugees are able to seek employment once they receive a resident permit; however, they have a lower employment rate than non-refugee migrants, who in turn have a lower employment rate than native majority Swedes (Bevelander, 2011). This lower rate of employment can be attributable to a number of factors, including the hurdle of language acquisition, but also the labor market conditions at the place of settlement, and the potential difficulty a migrant may have in becoming part of a social network through which labor market knowledge is shared (Bevelander, 2011, 30-31). Sweden has tried to overcome these difficulties with training opportunities, as

¹⁵ Interview subject 12 November 2015#1.

mentioned, but also through cooperation with a web of civil society associations – an approach it has also taken with regard to political integration.

In terms of political integration of migrants, Sweden had supported ethnic political associations with State funds as facet of its policies on multiculturalism, thereby giving access to political institutions and actors to different groups of migrants. These groups were, however, based on country-of-origin, and had to be have sufficient numbers in order to form an official, State-supported association – effectively a silo approach that isolated different ethnic groups from one another and left some groups out of the process altogether (Soysal, 1992). With the misgivings of “multiculturalism” over the past decade, these “official immigrant consultative bodies” have been abandoned in favor of direct consultation by political actors with various civil society groups (MIPEX).

According to MIPEX, this shift from officially-supported migrant associations to a more ad-hoc consultation with various non-governmental organizations has decreased opportunities for migrant participation in the political process (MIPEX), but it may have also *increased* participation in some areas where civil society is quite active and well supported by the community. Such an increase in political participation may be hypothesized to expand under the new approach, given that many civil society organizations are not representative of a sole ethnic group, but rather of a larger swath of a community (benefitting multiple ethnic groups, or indeed all migrants, for example). Nonetheless, the level of migrant participation – even under this new approach – is dependent upon politicians’ willingness to listen and work with migrant civil society groups, and this was reported as a stumbling block by a few of the members of such organizations whom I interviewed. Therefore, on *paper*, the level of participation of migrants in Sweden’s political process may look higher or more likely to be higher compared to that of other Western European

countries, but in reality, it is constrained by the priorities of established political actors (e.g., elected officials, political parties). This is part of the “two views of Sweden” that I discovered during my field research, and which I shall discuss further in the case studies.

One of the weak areas of integration efforts in Sweden that several interview subjects mentioned to me was the absence of any coherent, articulated plan of *social* integration. This is evident for example, in the lack of knowledge and presentation of traditions and experiences of members of the migrant community in publicly-supported institutions such as education and health care.¹⁶ It appears that policymakers in Sweden expect social integration to simply evolve as a by-product of workforce and political integration efforts. Most of those whom I interviewed, however, saw this approach as further isolating migrants from majority natives, and was emblematic of an assimilation into Sweden, as opposed to true integration. This is another theme that I shall take up in the course of my case studies.

4.11.4 Immigration Policies: Settlement and Housing

Action on changing and adapting settlement policies to the new inflows of refugees was promulgated in the 1980s. Many refugees at that time settled in a few areas of Stockholm County (e.g., Botkyrka and Södertälje), placing greater demands on these municipalities to provide settlement assistance (particularly jobs and housing) than in other municipalities.¹⁷ To address this growing situation of resource inequality with regard to receiving refugees, the national government invoked several new policies aimed not only to ease the burden on certain areas of high migrant populations, but also ostensibly to help integrate refugees into their new homes.

¹⁶ Interview subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview subject 12 November 2105#1; Interview subject 17 November 2015#1.

¹⁷ Interview Subject, 27 October 2015#1.

These goals were to be accomplished with a policy that would disperse refugees among the municipalities in Sweden and provide them housing (Imner, 2015, 30).¹⁸ This *compulsory* refugee settlement policy was instigated throughout the country over 1984/1985, and lasted until 1 July 1994.¹⁹ As part of this policy, the Immigration Board (now the Swedish Migration Agency) oversaw refugee settlement into the municipalities, ensuring accommodation was available.

As part of this housing policy, refugees can choose to live in accommodation of their own choosing (called EBO – “ *eget boende,*” or “independent living”) or in institutional accommodation offered by the Swedish Migration Agency through the municipality of settlement (ABO – “ *anlaeggningsboende,*” or “accommodation facility”).²⁰ Presently, about 60% of refugees opt for the EBO housing, while 40% choose ABO housing.²¹ Refugees in institutional housing, however, must go where that housing is available, so they may be moved to a different municipality from that in which they arrived, and refugees may be moved subsequently while their asylum application decision pends (Imner, 2015, 30). One important facet of the ABO scheme is ownership of the accommodation. In some instances, the State – through the Migration Agency – provides the funding for municipalities to purchase accommodation from private owners. In other cases, the State owns the housing, which is managed directly by the Migration Agency.²² In both schemes, it is the State – at the national level – that provides the housing, either directly or indirectly.

With the historic number of recent refugees arriving in Sweden, the share of ABO accommodation purchased from private companies (at market value) is likely to grow, and the scarcity of such housing will likely push the price for these housing properties upwards, raising

¹⁸ Also Interview Subject, 27 October 2015#1.

¹⁹ Interview Subject, 27 October 2015#1.

²⁰ Interview Subject, 27 October 2015#1

²¹ Interview Subject, 27 October 2015#1

²² Interview subject, 27 October 2015#1.

the cost to the State.²³ Such State-sponsored housing has created friction between refugee settlements and members of the native majority in the past (Nordin, 2005), and this same scenario may unfold yet again – but with conflict perhaps being more likely, as the numbers of refugees and refugee accommodations will be higher than in the past.

Contaminant with Sweden’s economic growth and the consequent increased labor migration (which then gave way to the increased refugee migration), Sweden experienced an “acute” housing shortage in the 1960s that prompted policy makers to take swift action (Zilliacus, 2013). To address this shortage of housing, Parliament instituted a wide-ranging housing construction program in 1965 called the “Miljonprogrammet,” or “Million Program.” The goal of this program was to (quickly) design and build a million rental spaces over ten years’ time²⁴ in planned community block developments, featuring high population densities, close proximity to transportation links (meant to be within 500 meters of a rail station), and open spaces and access to everyday necessities – all intended for the burgeoning middle class.²⁵ While many Million Program housing developments were established in the suburbs around Stockholm City, this was indeed a nationwide project, and construction took place from the mid-1960s (almost as soon as the Program had been approved) through the mid-1970s (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013, 1).

This program was funded by the Swedish government, and the housing units themselves were needed and constructed quickly, and as such, were not required to be held to the basic construction standards of other, private developments. As such, the Million Program developments were low-cost, low-quality constructions, focused more on serving the basic needs of the envisioned future residents, and less on aesthetics or quality (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013.

²³ Interview subject, 27 October 2015#1.

²⁴ <www.thelocal.se/20070209/6356>

²⁵ Ibid.

Not all were housing blocks – there were some single-family and terraced homes as well,²⁶ but this was housing of minimalist design and concrete construction – intended to be valued more for function than form, yet the design did not appeal to many potential residents, or the allure wore off as it became clear that such communities needed to provide more than just living space and a place to shop.²⁷

There were, then, unintended events, and hence consequences, that unfolded as a result of this Program. In some areas – particularly around Stockholm – the Program actually produced a *surplus* of housing, and some residents relocated from what they viewed as less-than-desirable living areas.²⁸ Also, with the shift in demographics in the 1970s from an influx of labor migration (which, as noted previously, officially ended in 1972) to a rapid increase in refugee migration, this housing – particularly the large blocks – became the residential destination for more and more migrants: the housing was available in the aftermath of the Program, and it was government-owned, making this an affordable and convenient way of accommodating the rising numbers of refugees.

The blocks of the Million Program thus became essentially “migrant ghettos,” where residents were of lower socio-economic status, and the upkeep of the dwellings was not pursued by the government due to costs (the sub-standard construction and materials meant proved to be cheaper in the short-run, but resulted in higher longer-term costs, as more maintenance and repair were required) (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013, 1). The original planners and architects had intended these housing units to *foster* integration amongst its residents and within the communities where they were located, but ultimately, this housing served to *segregate* its residents from native

²⁶ <www.thelocal.se/20070209/6356>

²⁷ <www.thelocal.se/20070209/6356>.

²⁸ Ibid.

majority Swedes and those of a higher economic class.²⁹ As this housing was concentrated in suburban areas which were becoming more population-dense as more native majority Swedes moved to the area from rural locations and more migrants arrived to take the available housing, the disparity and separation between native majority resident and minority (i.e., migrant) resident became exacerbated and physically obvious: for most native majority or middle-to-upper-class Swedes saw the Million Program housing as no-go zones.

While efforts were made in the 1990s to address the dilapidated conditions of the Million Program housing units and the socio-economic distress associated with them in hopes of increasing social integration, funding for housing repairs, education, and employment opportunities was made available through programs such as the Metropolitan Development Initiative (1998).³⁰ But yet again, another unintended consequence unfolded: those who did benefit from such initiatives and raised their socio-economic standing subsequently moved *out* of the Million Program housing to better housing; in their wake, a new wave of migrants moved in. Thus, the overall socio-economic conditions – and the disparity between the Million Program housing and other surrounding residential areas – remained steady.

Efforts to improve the conditions of the Million Program housing continues – supported by local and national funds³¹ – with planning and architectural modifications being made to make the areas more aesthetically pleasing, and new services and facilities being constructed in the vicinity of the housing. Nonetheless, the legacy of the Million Program housing remains, as in some of these areas, migrants represent over 90% of the residents, and unemployment is markedly lower than in surrounding areas (Andersson, 2010). The stigma of these housing areas – combined

²⁹ <www.thelocal.se/20070209/6356>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

with continued discrimination against migrants with regard to housing and employment – has kept these units segregated from their larger communities in many cases, and stuck in a cycle of deprivation. Unfortunately, these circumstances are often exaggerated and propagated by the media, further isolating these areas and entrenching their stigma.³² Husby, Rinkeby, and Tensta in Stockholm City (neighboring both Sollentuna and Järfälla municipalities) and Rosengård in Skåne County (Malmö) are all sites of Million Program housing blocks, and have been the location of riots by migrant residents in recent years – situations that express some of the frustration of the residents with the *status quo*, but are also used by the media to further entrench the notion of these areas as “no-go zones” to the rest of Sweden and beyond.³³ Hence, the legacy of the Million Program housing is still evident today – and I witnessed some of its effects in the areas I visited during my field research, but found much of the negativity promulgated about these areas to be unfounded.

4.12 Context: Anti-Migrant Political Parties in Sweden

Although post-Cold-War Sweden has long been associated with policies of inclusion and altruism when it comes to migrants (particularly refugees – see the World Values Survey results in Chapter 1 regarding Swedish attitudes towards migrants; see also Demker, 2007), political space for anti-migrant political parties at the national level has nonetheless been established in the country – first arising in the early 1990s when the New Democrats – a far-right party that espoused much more restrictive immigration policies – gained 6.7% of the national vote, thereby surpassing the four-percent voteshare threshold required to secure seats in parliament, the Riksdag (Sainsbury, 2012).

³² Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

³³ The Local, Sweden, <www.thelocal.se/20130527/48150>, <www.thelocal.se/20081220/16488>, accessed 14 December, 2015.

While the thrust of the New Democrats fizzled in the elections of 1994, the far-right, anti-migrant Sweden Democrats were just beginning to pick up steam. The Sweden Democrats did in fact win seats (two) in local government in 1991, and their national electoral success began in earnest with the 1998 election; the party finally reached the electoral threshold in 2010, securing 20 seats in the Riksdag (see Table 4.1). The strategy of the Sweden Democrats has been to cultivate support at the local level, gaining local funding which in turn is used to candidates at the national level (Sainsbury, 2012; Erlingsson *et al*, 2012).

Table 4.1 Voteshare and Seats Earned by Anti-Migrant Parties in Swedish Parliamentary Elections, 1991-2014

1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
New Democracy 25 seats 6.73%	New Democracy 0 seats 1.2%	Sweden Democrats 0 seats 0.4%	Sweden Democrats 0 seats 1.44%	Sweden Democrats 0 seats 2.93%	Sweden Democrats 20 seats 5.70%	Sweden Democrats 49 seats 12.86%
<i>Source: Statistics Sweden</i>						

Unlike the New Democracy party, the roots of the Sweden Democrats stem from a “xenophobic and racist organization,” known as *Bevara Sverige svenskt* (BSS) – or “Keep Sweden Swedish” (Sainsbury, 2012: 226). With its electoral successes, however, the party has made efforts to distance itself from its far-right past.³⁴ It has maintained its tough stance against migrants, however, calling for a 90% decrease in immigration rates to Sweden.³⁵ The party’s most recent gains in parliament have afforded it policy leverage, as the party nearly brought down the government over its opposition to the government’s proposed budget, shortly after the 2014

³⁴ “Swedish Neo-Nazis: Moves to Deradicalise amid Far-Right Rise, BBC, <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30528918>>, accessed 19 December, 2014.

³⁵ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

elections; the Sweden Democrats eventually put their support behind a budget proposed by the opposition, warding off snap elections yet also depriving the government of enacting its budget.³⁶ The Sweden Democrats, then, have accrued enough political leverage to affect some government outcomes, and their popularity reached an all-time high (polled at 19.9%) in December 2015 as a result of the large influx of refugees (mostly from Syria and Afghanistan) to Sweden in 2015.³⁷ The main focus of the party's policy agenda, however, has been limiting immigration, stressing its policy preference of assisting would-be refugees in their own countries (although the extent and practical steps of this proposed policy have not been made clear).³⁸

As with other far-right parties in Europe – such as the National Front in France, with which the Sweden Democrats identify and have had long-term association³⁹ – the Sweden Democrats have worked to bring their image more into line with the mainstream, moving from mere token opposition to viable political force. Sweden's more generous refugee policies compared to those in other parts of Europe have provided the Sweden Democrats with a strong rhetorical counterpoint to other mainstream parties in the country. Although the phenomenon of a rising far-right party has taken longer in Sweden to take hold than in other parts of Europe (Demker, 2007), its gains have been precipitous: Sweden is no longer the exception to the anti-migrant political influence that other European countries have experienced for some years now. As such, the analysis of anti-migrant party voteshare in Sweden can be readily generalized to other Western European countries (and indeed to advanced democracies writ large: the rise of Donald Trump in the United States

³⁶ Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, <<http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/sweden-opposition-budget-passed-government-announces-extraordinary-election/>>, accessed 26 April, 2016.

³⁷ "Swedish Nationalists Cheer Record Poll Support," The Local, Sweden, <<http://www.thelocal.se/20151201/sweden-democrats-surge-in-new-opinion-poll>>, accessed 12 December 2015.

³⁸ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

³⁹ BBC, "Profile: Far-right Sweden Democrats," <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29202793>>, accessed 26 April, 2016.

and the UK Independence Party [UKIP] in Great Britain⁴⁰ indicates that the growing popularity of far-right parties and ideologies is not limited to one continent or one type of political system).

4.13 Context: Hate Crimes in Sweden

The recognition of “hate” as a motivation for and perpetration of a crime in Sweden is a relatively new development in Swedish law. The first case in which perpetrators were convicted and given stricter sentences based on the motivation of hatred against another on the basis of an identifiable group characteristic was in the wake of the 1995 killing of an asylum-seeking from the Ivory Coast, who was stabbed to death by two native majority Swedes when he came to visit the town of Klippan (a rural town of about 16,000 inhabitants in Skåne County, 90.6 kilometers north-east of Malmö) (Wigerfelt, 2014, 49). The perpetrators had uttered racist comments before the attack, and one wore a swastika armband. This test case, then, set the precedent for what has developed into Sweden’s hate crime laws.

According to Swedish law, then, a “hate crime” is a crime against a person or persons that meets the following criteria:

- the motive has to do with color of skin, national or ethnic origin, religious belonging or other faith, sexual orientation ”or other similar circumstance” (as described in the “Rule of Sharpening,” discussed below)
- is subject to unlawful discrimination
- or when somebody has spread threats or disdain directed to a group of people⁴¹

The “Rule of Sharpening” is used in sentencing when a motive of out-group hatred is detected in the case. Hence, the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 29, §, p 7, states that:

⁴⁰ BBC, “UKIP: The Story of the UK Independence Party's Rise,” <<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21614073>>.

⁴¹ Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1, who works for a national anti-racist organization.

“As an aggravating circumstance when judging on the sentence shall, besides what is prescribed for every specific type of crime, specifically be taken into consideration... if a motive to the crime was to offend a person, ethnic or other such group of individuals due to race, color of skin, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation *or other similar circumstance*.”⁴²

Note that the Rule of Sharpening applies not only to victims who many belong to a different ethnic group than native majority Swedes, but also to those of different faiths, sexual orientations, or those with other group-identifying characteristics. As such, the application of the Rule of Sharpening in a hate crime can be fairly broad, including victims against whom a crime is perpetrated because of their identification as a member of any possible out-group (including a crime against a native majority Swede or Christian by a member of another ethnic or religious group). Such a proviso also implies that it is incumbent on police authorities to try to identify such out-group hatred as a motivation for a crime, and to record it accordingly. Also note that the hate crime itself includes instances of discrimination – a crime that is much harder to detect and penalize, and as such, is often very much underreported.⁴³

Hate crimes occur most commonly in public spaces (mostly streets and squares). The next most common location of a hate crime is close to the victim’s home, followed by crimes that occur on the Internet (EXPO, “Stängda Dörrar,” [“Closed Doors”], 2015, 15). Usually, the perpetrator is unknown to the victim. Afrosvedes/Black Swedes have been the predominant victims of violent hate crimes. Much hate speech crime has been anti-Semitic or Islamophobic. Members of the Roma community have often been the victims of discrimination hate crime (EXPO, 2015). Afrosvede females – particularly Muslims – have become a growing target for hate crimes.⁴⁴ The

⁴² Penal Code of Sweden, translated by Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

⁴³ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2, the Director of a local community organization; Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

⁴⁴ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1, who is on the board of a local community organization; Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

most common hate crimes are those of insult, assault, illegal threats, and violation of the Internet.⁴⁵

A trend that has recently evolved in public discourse (via social media for example) is for specific groups to be held accountable for actions of those who are in some way similar to that group. As one of my interview subjects put it, in more and more public discussions:

“The Muslim community [is] accountable for IS terrorist attacks, the Jewish group is left to the black for the troubles between Israel and Palestine, and the Roma group will be singled out and insulted because [they are] beggars who have become a new element in the Swedish city.”⁴⁶

This tendency to overextend a negative stereotype is exactly how the halo effect works when it is present, and there is seemingly a sizable proportion of the (native majority) Swedish population who feel legitimized in making these statements, and some feel legitimized in taking action on them – this latter condition being part of the “strategic action field” theory in which individuals or groups are mobilized against members of out-groups (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). Sweden has long embraced a “color-blind” approach to ethnicity, but in doing so, many native majority Swedes have convinced themselves that racism and xenophobia do not really exist in the country: “color-blindness in Sweden means not accepting the *roots* of racism or otherness.”⁴⁷ As Wigerfelt *et al* state: “This denial can lead to hate crime and other forms of racial harassment being neglected by the authorities” (Wigerfelt *et al*, 2013, 1). Without such a recognition, then, the problem becomes more difficult to tackle in the broader society.

This resultant inability of (particularly) native majority Swedes to acknowledge the existence or extent of anti-group behavior in their midst has been one reason why hate crimes go unreported, further entrenching the notion that hate crime is not as prevalent as it really is. The

⁴⁵ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1, who has worked with hate crimes in Malmö in different capacities over the years.

⁴⁶ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1

⁴⁷ Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

problem in Sweden of underreporting is not limited to discrimination cases, but includes *all* hate crimes, as many victims of hate crime have low trust in authorities (particularly those in the Roma community, or for any migrants who have fled homelands where persecution was rife),⁴⁸ convinced that nothing will be done about the crime. Police and political authorities have either shared racist or xenophobic sentiments,⁴⁹ or have themselves been unaware of the extent of their existence (outside of the higher-profile violent crimes that garner great attention in the national press) (Wigerfelt, 2014, 49-50). Another reason why hate crimes are not reported is out of fear of retribution – either by the perpetrator or someone close to the perpetrator: even if police authorities recognize and take appropriate action when a hate crime is committed, the victim may be taking a great risk in reporting the crime, should that fact become known (and with social media, such knowledge can spread very quickly, which can partially explain why hate crimes on the Internet rank as the third-most common location of hate crime) (Wigerfelt, Wigerfelt, Kiiskinen, 2013, 15-17.). It is therefore important to keep in mind that police statistics on hate crimes in Sweden are for those crimes which are *reported* (and hence, do not represent the true number of hate crimes committed); surveys have been conducted (by Brå, for example) that give a clearer picture of the number of hate crimes in Sweden, but again, this is survey data that is extracted from personal experiences that may vary from person to person.

In the following chapters, I present the specific operationalization and results for the quantitative analyses, as well as a discussion of the implications of these results for the two dependent variables, voteshare for the Sweden Democrats and the level of hate crimes against migrants. After the presentation of the quantitative analyses, I then present the individual case

⁴⁸ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁴⁹ “Swedes Investigate Police Racism,” BBC, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7877702.stm>. Accessed 11 March 2016.

studies, examining voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in two municipalities in Stockholm County (Sollentuna and Järfälla), followed by an analysis of levels of hate crimes against migrants in a municipality in Skåne County (Malmö).

Chapter 5

Quantitative Analysis: Voteshare for Anti-Migrant Party

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I undertake the quantitative analysis of the outcome of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in national parliamentary elections from 1998-2014 and the effects of my main independent variable (migrant residential concentration), as well as other explanatory variables that have been posited in previous research. The dependent variable and main independent variable were discussed in the previous chapter, so I shall further elaborate on the competing independent variables here and present the summary statistics, my models, and results. A discussion of the implication of the results closes the chapter.

5.2 Variables

Drawing from my hypotheses, I have posited a number of additional independent variables that may offer additional or competing explanatory leverage to my model. Specifically, for each county, I consider economic conditions, the proportion of migrants, the changes in both proportion of migrants and the concentration of migrants from year to year, and the population density. I elaborate on each one in turn below.

To evaluate economic conditions, I use unemployment levels for each county as an indicator (data from Statistics Sweden). Sweden defines “unemployed” as those in the workforce (as opposed to those who are not, such as full-time students, stay-at-home parents, or early retirees) from ages 16-64 who have not worked at least one hour in the week of the survey. Those who may be on short- or long-term leave are included as being employed. I include the proportion of migrants as well, as previous studies have used this indicator and found it to be significant (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003). I consider the change in the proportion of migrants from the previous time point as a measure of the potential sense of threat by increasing migrant numbers (or, conversely, the easing of that threat due to decreasing migrant numbers). Population density was identified by a number of my interview subjects as a potentially important explanatory variable, and this may have important theoretical relevance with respect to my main explanatory variable: in areas where population density is high, inhabitants are more likely to live in closer proximity to one another, making any impact from the halo effect much more likely. In sparsely populated counties, native majority residents may not be aware of areas of high migrant residential concentration, or these areas with many migrants might be sufficiently far away so as to not elicit a feeling of either a cultural or material threat in members of the native majority.

I also consider a few theoretically important interaction terms. Drawing from hypothesis three (and results from Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010), interacting unemployment with levels of migrants may lead to a magnification of any material threat sensed by members of the native majority group; I therefore wish to examine these effects at the sub-national level and with respect to my main explanatory variable. As just mentioned, population density may well interact with the residential concentration of migrants or the proportion of migrants in a county, yielding higher anti-migrant action outcomes in areas of higher population density and higher segregation of

migrants or proportion of migrants. I therefore include an interaction of population density with these variables. I also include an interaction between unemployment levels and population density: it may be that where unemployment is high, the sense of material threat is greater in areas where fewer jobs might be found (such as in rural counties where population density is much lower than in counties with large cities).

Finally, I also include the control variables of year and county. Voteshare for a party in particular may be significantly influenced by electoral results in the previous election, or where a party has enjoyed stronger electoral support over time. Over the timeframe I consider (five elections), I do not expect large swings in electoral support for the Sweden Democrats, and to be sure, the party has only gained in voteshare in each of the successive elections in the timeframe studied. Thus, the fact that previous levels of voteshare in one time period have an effect on levels of voteshare in the subsequent time period is important, but not particularly theoretically relevant in this study. Likewise, a county in which the party does well is likely to continue doing well in that county in the subsequent election, given that the party's voteshare increases with each election. So, again, the level of support in a given county is important, but not part of the theoretical framework I have established. I do include "year" and "county" as control variables, however, in order to account for these variables' effects.

I had also wanted considered including social spending levels in each county, but I was unable to obtain consistent data for this measure over the timeframe; I believe that information has been collected, but for the data I have been able to access, the measurement of social spending was changed after 2013 and has not been adjusted for historical data, making the data for 2014 non-comparable to the previous years. As Sweden is a very highly decommodified welfare state, however, I would not expect social spending to be highly variable from county to county, but there

may be some variability which could possibly have some effect on my model – particularly *how* the social funds are spent (e.g., on infrastructure vs on education). Although not in my quantitative analyses, I shall consider the allotment of social spending as a factor in my qualitative analysis of voteshare outcomes. How social spending is distributed among various sectors in each county will

Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of Independent and Dependent Variables, Voteshare Analysis

Variable	Number of Observations	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Year	105	1998	2006	2014	-
County	105	-	-	-	-
Unemployment (Percentage)	105	2.4747	5.9974	10.2751	1.6539
Concentration of Migrants	101*	0.8045	3.4834	9.7656	1.9962
Change in Migrant Concentration	80**	-0.5081	0.2318	1.1059	0.3172
Proportion of Migrants (Percentage)	105	3.7871	10.4015	22.9995	4.1277
Change in Proportion of Migrants	84**	0.1513	1.1751	2.7367	0.6002
Population Density (Inhabitants per Square Kilometer)	105	2.5000	44.6391	336.9000	62.8561
Voteshare of Sweden Democrats in Parliament (Percentage of Votes Cast)	105	0.0600	5.0939	21.3212	5.6263
<p><i>*The concentration of migrants for the county of Götland is not calculable as there are no municipalities in this county. Hence, there are only 101 observations for this variable (less the five observations for Götland).</i></p> <p><i>**The change in migrant concentration is not included in this data for 1998, as I did not have data at the time of computation for the migrant proportions for each municipality. This lowers the number of observations of this variable to 80. As I have data for the proportion of migrants in Götland, I do include these numbers, which results in four more observations for this variable as opposed to the change in migrant concentration (again, for which values for Götland are not calculable).</i></p>					

be an interesting inclusion in future research, once I can obtain comparable data for all counties over the entire temporal scope. A list of the variables in this analysis and their summary statistics are presented in Table 5.1.

5.3 Models

I first consider a rather spare model of the effects on voteshare of the Sweden Democrats – without any interaction terms. I start with this model as a baseline and build to include interaction effects, as earlier studies did not include these interactions, and I can gauge how well the model with interaction effects performs against a simpler model. The first model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Eq 5.1)} \quad [\text{Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare}] = & \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{County}] + \beta_2[\text{Unemployment}] \\ & + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] \\ & + \beta_4[\text{Change in Migrant Concentration}] \\ & + \beta_5[\text{Migrant Proportion}] + \beta_6[\text{Change in Migrant Proportion}] \\ & + \beta_7[\text{Population Density}] + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

I find that the variance in the model provided by the variable “year” overshadows the other variables (and rendering problematic adjusted r^2 values from 0.94 to 0.97 in my models; see these results in Appendix C). I therefore remove the “year” variable and introduce a time effect by including the variables “change in migrant concentration” and “change in migrant proportion,” which represent the amount of increase or decrease in each variable from the previous election year.

I have chosen to use ordinary least squares for my model, and although an initial examination of the data reveals the presence of heteroscedasticity in my dependent variable, a

transformation does not improve the linearity of the model to a great degree.¹ As discussed, I will test interaction effects in the analysis, and the transformation makes interpretation of these effects much less intuitive. Given this difficulty and the fact that the transformation did not render a large effect on the level of linearity of the data, I opted to leave the dependent variable untransformed.

Figure 5.1 shows a scatter plot of the original data.




Figure 5.1 Scatter Plot of Voteshare of Sweden Democrats vs Concentration of Migrants, 1998-2014

¹ As a transformation intended to reduce this heteroscedasticity, I added “1” to the voteshare value, then I took the natural log of this sum: $\ln(x + 1)$. As stated, this transformation improved the level of heteroscedasticity and made the data more linear, but only slightly so (see Appendix D for scatter plot of the transformed data).

I build the model from the initial simple model presented above, taking into account the hypothesized interaction terms. The best model fit that incorporates the anticipated effects of the proposed hypotheses arises from the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{(Eq 5.2) Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{County}] + \beta_2[\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_4[\text{Change in Migrant Concentration}] \\
 &+ \beta_5[\text{Migrant Proportion}] + \beta_6[\text{Change in Migrant Proportion}] \\
 &+ \beta_7[\text{Population Density}] + \beta_8[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_9[\text{Migrant Proportion}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_{10}[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Population Density}] \\
 &+ \beta_{11}[\text{Migrant Proportion}] * [\text{Population Density}] \\
 &+ \beta_{12}[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Migrant Proportion}] \\
 &+ \beta_{13}[\text{Unemployment}] * [\text{Population Density}] + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}$$

5.4 Results

The results of the models I have constructed are in Table 5.2; Model 5 is the best-fit model as presented in Equation 5.2 above, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.8687 – the model appears to explain a good deal of the variation in the outcome.² Adding the changes in migration concentration and proportion of migrants did increase the adjusted r^2 value (from 0.7620), but these variables did allow me to account for the effects of time over the range of my data, and hence I opted to keep these variables in my models (I show the results without the changes in migrant residential concentration and proportion of migrants in Appendix E.)

In my main model – Model 5 – the residential concentration of migrants and the change in the residential concentration of migrants in a county are statistically significant while the proportion of migrants and change in the proportion of migrants are not; this draws attention to previous studies which posited that the proportion of migrants is the best measure of the effects of migrant populations on the level of voteshare for anti-migrant parties (Jackman and Volpert, 1996;

² The “residual versus fit” plot for the main model (Model 5) is given in Appendix F.

Table 5.2 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Voteshare of Anti-Migrant Party (Sweden Democrats), Parliamentary Elections in Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
County	-0.2521*** (0.0525)	-0.2571*** (0.0538)	-0.2414*** (0.0520)	-0.2179*** (0.0531)	-0.1788*** (0.0478)
Unemployment	2.3274*** (0.2230)	2.3693*** (0.2793)	0.4439 (0.7723)	2.5979*** (0.2893)	-0.2550 (0.7222)
Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.3918* (0.1700)	-0.7453 (0.6456)	-1.8104 (1.0231)	-1.7362* (0.7364)	-3.7818*** (1.0160)
Change in Migrant Residential Concentration	2.3148* (0.9877)	2.3690* (1.0031)	2.6338** (0.9696)	2.2173* (0.9654)	2.4066** (0.8551)
Proportion of Migrants	0.8357*** (0.1540)	0.7636** (0.2119)	0.1866 (0.4956)	0.8035* (0.3260)	0.5937 (0.4638)
Change in Proportion of Migrants	-0.2410 (0.7904)	-0.3239 (0.8163)	0.4972 (0.8382)	-0.6551 (0.8770)	-0.2200 (0.7814)
Population Density	-0.0289*** (0.0076)	-0.0255 (0.0167)	0.0263 (0.0248)	0.0465 (0.0362)	0.1135** (0.0353)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-	0.2650 (0.1626)	-	0.5073** (0.1540)
Proportion Migrants * Unemployment	-	-	0.1058 (0.0698)	-	0.1479* (0.0640)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	-	0.0273* (0.0125)	0.0555*** (0.0127)
Proportion Migrants * Population Density	-	-	-	-0.0126** (0.0045)	-0.0202*** (0.0043)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	0.0392 (0.0697)	-0.0295 (0.0720)	0.1261 (0.0821)	-0.0265 (0.0802)
Unemployment * Population Density	-	-0.0021 (0.0038)	-0.0087 (0.0045)	-0.0066 (0.0043)	-0.0222*** (0.0052)
Constant	-11.1264*** (1.2167)	-10.4709*** (2.1640)	-1.1318 (4.2456)	-11.7943*** (2.5918)	-0.6453 (3.7351)
r^2 (Adjusted)	0.8203	0.8162	0.8302	0.8321	0.8687
n	80	80	80	80	80

Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** p< 0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
(Standard Errors in parentheses)

Golder, 2003; Koopmans *et al*, 2005; Dancygier, 2010). Population density is indeed statistically significant. It is interesting, however, that the proportion of migrants when interacted with population density is significant, as is the concentration of migrants interacted with population density. In addition, unemployment levels only become significant when interacted: this is true for each of the interactions of unemployment with migrant residential concentration, the proportion of migrants, and population density. These results rather point to the strong influence of population density with regard to the outcome of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in a county. The concentration of migrants interacted with the proportion of migrants is not statistically significant.

To get a better sense of the marginal effects of the coefficients of Model 5, the graph in Figure 5.2 indicates that the residential concentration of migrants and change in migrant residential




Figure 5.2 Marginal Effects of Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals, Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, 1998-2014

concentration are clearly significantly different from zero, and exhibit the greatest effects on the model. The county – as well as the interactions between migrant residential concentration and unemployment and between the proportion of migrants and unemployment are also statistically significant from zero, yet the confidence intervals are much smaller. The effect of the migrant residential concentration variable appears to have a negative effect on anti-migrant party voteshare outcomes, yet one must remember that this does not take into account the interactions that this variable has with other terms, as specified in the model. These combined effects on voteshare are evaluated properly later in the chapter.




Figure 5.3 Predicted Values of Voteshare for Sweden Democrats vs Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014

The predicted fit of the base model (Model 1) is featured in Figure 5.3 (this presents the effect of the main independent variable – the residential concentration of migrants – on the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, without the combined effects of other variables). From this graph, it can be seen that the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats increases as the residential concentration of migrants increases. That is, in counties where migrants are more segregated from native majority Swedes, the greater the percentage of votes the Sweden Democrats receive. Thus, for voteshare, my main hypothesis is indeed confirmed. Although the increase is somewhat modest, it should be noted that a party needs only 4% of the national vote in order to secure seats in the *Riksdag*, and voteshare for the Sweden Democrats is predicted to be around 5%, given a mean level of migrant concentration (3.48).

Stockholm County lies fairly well below the predicted value line for all elections except that in 2014; this is true for Norrbotten as well. Norrbotten is in fact quite an outlier, with the highest migrant residential concentration of all counties, yet a much lower-than-expected voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in all elections, save the one in 2014. Stockholm is an outlier in terms of population density, which is much higher in this county than in any other county. I tested the effects of these outliers by excluding them in turn from my analysis, but neither of these cases proved to change the results to any great effect in terms of significance levels or coefficient values; for this reason, I kept them in my observations. The outlier status of Stockholm is indeed a substantively significant outcome, as the migrant residential concentration is rather high in this county, yet the population density is also high as well. This could be one indicator that the halo effect is dampened when migrants have a higher chance of being in closer contact with majority natives, simply because there are so many more people living in this area: there may be quite a bit of segregation of migrants from natives, but there are also a lot of people living in very close

quarters, with a higher chance of coming into daily contact with one another. I explore this result in greater detail as part of the case study analysis in a later chapter.

Norrbotten is the most obvious outlier and would seemingly be a good candidate to investigate as a deviant case, but when one considers Norrbotten's demographics and history, the outcomes may not be so surprising. Norrbotten is Sweden's northern-most county, and it shares a border with Finland. For generations – particularly during and after World War II – Finns have come across the border to work and marry Swedes, so the high proportion of migrants in Norrbotten are in fact Finns for the most part, and they reside in or near the border towns with Finland (Hannikainen, 1996, 31). So, in fact, the migrants in Norrbotten are racially not different from the native majority Swedes (although attitudes towards migrant Finns in the years after World War II were not necessarily very positive [Runblom, 1994, 628]). Hence, Norrbotten's current migrant population is much different demographically than the migrant populations in other areas of Sweden, where many migrants over the past 25 years have come to settle from Asian and African countries (e.g., Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan). This makes Norrbotten a less surprising as a deviant case, compared to Stockholm, where the racial diversity of migrants is much greater.

On the other end of the outlier scale is Skåne, where voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been greater than expected, given its residential concentration of migrants. From interviews I conducted, however, Skåne was identified as a strong-hold for the Sweden Democrats due to a strong and long-standing presence of local leadership, and the influence of migration discourse that occurs in Denmark³ (which is just a short bridge-ride away, with many Swedes and Danes commuting to the other country for work or commerce). Again, as with Norrbotten, the geographic location of Skåne serves to provide some contextual explanations for the outcomes observed,

³ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

making the case less of a surprising outlier with regard to voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. Blekinge County is the next-door-neighbor of Skåne, and the same kinds of contagion effects from Denmark and Skåne itself may well explain the high level of support for the Sweden Democrats in these southern-most counties in Sweden.

A better view of the interaction effects rendered in this model and the conditions under which these effects are statistically as well as substantively significant can be gained through graphical presentation. Figure 5.4 shows the effects of population density conditional upon migrant residential concentration. Note here that at lower levels of segregation (migrant residential




Figure 5.4 Effects of Population Density on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014

concentration of values less than about 3.5), the conditional effects on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats are negative – that is, voteshare tends to decrease in this range of migrant residential concentration when combined with the effects of population density. Once migrant residential concentration crosses the threshold of about 5.5, the effect on Sweden Democrat voteshare is positive: therefore, higher levels of migrant segregation do indeed lead to higher voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, when combined with the effects of population density. It should also be noted, however, that these effects are quite *substantively* small in the ranges that are statistically significant (from about -0.23% to about 0.3%). Thus, the marginal effect does not produce a sizable impact on the outcome.




Figure 5.5 Effects of Unemployment on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014




Figure 5.6 Effects of Unemployment on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2014

In consideration of the effects of unemployment combined with those of the residential concentration of migrants and the proportion of migrants in a county, the outcomes are indeed much more substantively significant, as Figures 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate.

For both combined effects, the outcomes at the smallest end of each range are not statistically significant, yet as both the concentration and proportion of migrants increases, these effects also yield a higher level of predicted voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, and to a substantively significant degree. At the higher end of each range, the predicted increase in voteshare is over 4% -- the electoral threshold that secures seats in Parliament for a political party. The outcome for the effects of unemployment combined with migrant residential concentration

are greater than those combined with the proportion of migrants (note the larger slope of the former): migrant segregation thus has a larger effect on voteshare than the proportion of migrants, when the effects of unemployment are taken into account.

Looking at the effects of different levels of unemployment conditioned on the level of migrant residential concentration (Figure 5.7), it becomes clear that high levels of unemployment combined with high migrant residential segregation lead to quite a large increase in predicted voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. For low levels of unemployment, the effect is only



Figure 5.7 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Segregation, 1998-2014




Figure 5.8 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2014

statistically significant just below the mean values of migrant residential concentration (around 3.0 to 6.0), yet not very substantively significant. In comparison with the effects of different levels of unemployment and the proportion of migrants (Figure 5.8), the overall patterns are the same, yet the outcomes are much lower. Therefore, there is evidence that the combined effect of the proportion of migrants and levels of unemployment lead to higher levels of anti-migrant party voteshare, but there is a greater effect when unemployment is combined with the effects of the levels of migrant segregation.

What is particularly intriguing are the effects of population density and unemployment on the level of anti-migrant party voteshare. Figure 5.9 shows these results for different levels of unemployment.




Figure 5.9 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Population Density, 1998-2014

At lower levels of population density (e.g., rural areas), high unemployment leads to quite an increase in Sweden Democrat voteshare while low levels of unemployment have only a small effect. This effect *decreases* as population density increases – that is, in areas that are more urban, the effect on voteshare is not as great, and becomes statistically insignificant over 100 persons per

square kilometer (this is quite near the population density of Skåne County, in which Malmö is located). As unemployment rises, then, the sense of material threat is felt more keenly in rural areas. In urban areas, the large proportion of those who are unemployed tend to be migrants or minorities as opposed to the situation in rural areas; for majority natives in urban areas, unemployment is likely seen as a “migrant problem,” and does not provoke the kind of material threat that is felt in rural areas.

Finally, a look at the effects of population density combined with migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion also reveals some interesting results (Figures 5.10 and 5.11).




Figure 5.10 Effects of Different Levels of Population Density on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014




Figure 5.11 Effects of Different Levels of Population Density on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2014

As migrant segregation increases, voteshare for the Sweden Democrats tends to increase as well in urban areas, yet voteshare *decreases* in rural areas that are highly segregated. From a spatial perspective, this makes sense: in areas where people live closely together and are highly segregated, the identification of migrants as an “out-group” may be much easier and more obvious than in rural areas. The halo effect, then, has the greatest chance to have an effect in areas where people live in distinct groups yet these groups also live in quite close proximity to one another. For the proportion of migrants, the opposite effect occurs: where there are many migrants in a

rural area, the effect on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats is quite high. In more urban areas, this effect is still positive, but decreases as the proportion of migrants increases.

Looking at the conditional effects of the proportion of migrants on migrant residential concentration (Figure 5.12), it can be seen that segregation does indeed matter: once the level of segregation rises above the mean (about 3.0), the effect on voteshare becomes statistically significant and rises as segregation rises (and is highest where there are more migrants, although the number of migrants in a population does not increase the predicted outcome by a large degree).




Figure 5.12 Effects of Different Levels of Migrant Proportion on Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014

More than just the proportion of migrants matters in an area with regard to anti-migrant voteshare outcomes: the spatial distribution of migrant residences matters, too, and to a larger degree.

5.5 Conclusions

Previous results from the literature that investigate outcomes of voteshare for parties with an anti-migrant platform have been somewhat contradicted – and in some respects, enhanced – by inclusion of the effects of migrant residential concentration with respect to native majority residences *and* population density, as revealed in the model I have advanced here. In fact, population density is a substantively and statistically significant explanatory driver of this outcome on its own and when interacted with migrant residential concentration, the proportion of migrants and unemployment. Migrant residential concentration is also statistically significant on its own. The inclusion of population density lends a greater explanatory power to the model, and undercuts the importance that previous work has placed on the proportion of migrants alone. As population density is a factor of *where* people live in a locality (i.e., either quite close to one another or far apart), the theory I advance with regard to the posited effects of migrant residential concentration would appear to be very much supported, as the theory is predicated upon the spatial arrangement of residences. Therefore, the effect of migrant residential concentration would appear to be of significant explanatory importance with regard to explaining the level of voteshare that the Sweden Democrats have achieved over the past five parliamentary elections. In short, where people live – particularly where identifiable *groups* of people live – with respect to one another matters to the level of *legal* (institutional) anti-migrant political action taken by majority natives.

In the next chapter, I examine the effects of migrant residential concentration on a more direct form of anti-migrant political behavior: hate crimes committed against migrants by native majority Swedes.

Chapter 6

Quantitative Analysis: Hate Crimes against Migrants

6.1 Introduction

Following the encouraging results from the effects of migrant residential concentration on anti-migrant voteshare from the last chapter, I now examine these effects on an extra-institutional outcome: hate crimes committed against migrants by native majority Swedes. As hate crimes are direct and criminal acts, different theoretical motivations underlie these actions (one does not risk going to jail when voting in an advanced democracy, for example). The perpetration of hate crimes is therefore a more extreme anti-migrant response, and one that may be committed by an individual or by a group. Recalling Fligstein and McAdam's (2011) theory of strategic action fields, however, even individuals can feel that they are acting as part of a group, if they feel that those whom they consider to be in their "in-group" would condone or participate in such actions themselves. Hence, it is the sense of being part of an in-group that can drive such behavior, making it seem legitimate to the perpetrator even though it is illegal.

I posit that such an in-group can be formed on the basis of residence: that is, where a group of like-minded native majority Swedes live near one another, the likelihood that they will coalesce and form such a strategic action field among themselves becomes higher. When such a like-minded group resides in the vicinity of a targeted out-group – such as migrants – the mechanisms

of the halo effect come into play, and a sense of cultural or material threat may lead the native in-group to act against a migrant out-group, as the perpetrators would define the situation. Hence, even in cases of extreme, extra-institutional actions, the concentration of migrants may very well affect the level of such actions: to restate the main hypothesis, the greater the presence of the conditions of the halo effect (migrant out-groups living in close proximity to native majority in-groups), the greater the level of anti-migrant political actions – even when such actions are illegal. I reiterate these theoretical considerations here so as to draw a comparison with the previous findings on voteshare for anti-migrant parties, thereby linking the two outcomes theoretically.

Although I have hate crime data for all counties for my entire temporal scope (1998-2014), the National Council for Crime Prevention, Department of Statistical Surveys (*Brottsförebyggande Rådet*, or *Brå*) expanded their definition of what constitutes a hate crime in 2008; consequently, far more hate crimes were recorded from the period of 2008-2014, making the data from 1998-2007 incomparable to the latter time period. As the very nature of the data is different for the outcome of interest, I could not justify including all of the data in one, comprehensive model: I therefore execute two analyses for this data, one for the 1998-2007 period, and a second for the 2008-2014 period. Curiously, the data distributions are very similar, following the same patterns for each county in both timeframes (see the scatter plots for the data below); the scale is of course quite different, and the kinds of crimes included are different as well.¹ Again, for these latter reasons, I felt compelled to carry out two separate analyses.

¹ See Appendix H for a list of the *principal* crimes categorized as “hate crimes,” per *Brottsförebyggande Rådet* (*Brå*)/National Council for Crime Prevention (Sweden), Department of Statistical Surveys.

6.2 Variables

An analysis of hate crimes as an outcome of anti-migrant political behavior shares the same theoretical underpinning with regard to my hypothesized main independent variable as that of the analysis of voteshare for anti-migrant parties, and I therefore follow the logic in constructing the models for these analyses as employed in the previous voteshare analysis. To that end, I consider the same variables here, seeking to identify the model that best explains the phenomenon observed given the data I have. Hence, the residential concentration of migrants in a county is my main independent variable, and I include the proportion of migrants as well as the changes in migrant residential concentration and proportion; unemployment; population density; and control variables of “year” and “county.” I also explore several interaction terms: unemployment as interacted with migrant concentration, proportion of migrants, and population density; population density as interacted with migrant concentration and proportion of migrants; and migrant concentration with proportion of migrants. (I also looked at interactions with the changes in migrant concentration and proportion with unemployment and population density, but these proved to have a worse fit than any model I present below, and I therefore did not include these interactions in the presentation of my results.) I present the models and results for each time period (1998-2007 and 2008-2014) in turn below.

6.3 Hate Crimes Analysis: 1998-2007

A summary of the descriptive statistics for the 1998-2007 time period is presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables and Dependent Variable (Hate Crimes per Capita), 1998-2007

Variable	Number of Observations	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Year	210	1998	2002	2007	-
County	210	-	-	-	-
Unemployment (Percentage)	210	2.4747	5.6137	10.3000	1.5877
Concentration of Migrants	200*	0.7788	3.2372	9.9283	1.9629
Change in Migrant Concentration	180**	-0.4049	0.0338	0.2821	0.0924
Proportion of Migrants (Percentage)	210	3.7682	9.1814	19.7493	3.5959
Change in Proportion of Migrants	189**	-0.0677	0.2145	0.8650	0.1496
Population Density (Inhabitants per Square Kilometer)	210	2.6000	43.1852	299.0000	59.2190
Hate Crimes per Capita	209***	3.4836	20.4309	43.9340	7.9034

**The concentration of migrants for the county of Götland is not calculable as there are no municipalities in this county. Also, for 1998, hate crime data were not available for Dalarna County. Hence, there are only 200 observations for the Concentration of Migrants instead of 210 (the ten unattainable values for Götland and missing observation for Dalarna), and 209 observations for Hate Crimes per Capita (less the missing observation for Dalarna).*

***The changes in migrant concentration and migrant proportion are not included in this data for 1998, as I did not have data at the time of computation for the migrant proportions for each municipality. This lowers the number of observations for the change in migrant concentration to 180, and the change in migrant proportion to 189 (as these values can be calculated for Götland).*

**** There is one missing observation for Dalarna County (1998) in this time period.*

6.3.1 Models

As in the analysis of anti-migrant voteshare, I begin building my model by including only the main variables, without any interactions. As stated in the previous chapter, earlier studies did not include these effects, so I start here as a baseline. The first model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Eq 6.1)} \quad [\text{Hate Crimes against Migrants}] = & \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Unemployment}] \\ & + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_4[\text{Migrant Proportion}] \\ & + \beta_5[\text{Population Density}] + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$




Figure 6.1 Scatter Plot of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Concentration of Migrants, 1998-2007 (Untransformed Values of Hate Crimes per Capita)

I have again chosen to use ordinary least squares for my model, but just as with the voteshare analysis, an initial examination of the data reveals an issue with the original data. For the dependent variable in this dataset, heteroscedasticity is also present (although skewness and kurtosis are absent). There is also some skewness and kurtosis in the “migrant concentration” variable, but these issues are slight for the latter variable. Figure 6.1 shows a scatter plot of the original data, in which the issue with linearity can be observed; note that the data have a distribution not wholly unlike that for the (untransformed) voteshare distribution versus migrant residential concentration. Again, however, transforming the data does not render a great enough gain in linearity among the data to warrant its use, as the interpretations of interaction effects are much more accessible without the transformation.² In addition, I find significant intra-class correlation within the “county” variable, and I therefore cluster the standard errors around the “county” variable.

Building upon the initial model and incorporating the interactions proffered in the hypotheses, I find that the following yields the best fit (Eq. 6.2):

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{(Eq 6.2) Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] \\
 &+ \beta_4[\text{Migrant Proportion}] + \beta_5[\text{Population Density}] \\
 &+ \beta_6[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_7[\text{Migrant Proportion}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_8[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_9[\text{Migrant Proportion}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 &+ \beta_{10}[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Migrant Proportion}] \\
 &+ \beta_{11}[\text{Unemployment}] * [\text{Population Density}] + \varepsilon
 \end{aligned}$$

Unlike the analysis of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, I find that the changes in both migrant residential concentration and the proportion of migrants do not add robustness to the

² I show the scatter plot of the transformed data in Appendix G.

model;³ I have hence excluded them from the models I test. Unlike the case in the voteshare analysis, I retain the “year” variable, as it does not cause any intra-class correlation and provides a control over the timespan of the data. This yields a slightly more parsimonious model than that which I utilized for the voteshare analysis, but as will be shown below, my best model does not explain as much of the variation of the phenomena as I had found in the voteshare analysis.

6.3.2 Results

The results of the models I test are in Table 6.2; Model 5 is the best-fit model as presented in Equation 6.2 above, with an adjusted r^2 of 0.4644.⁴ It is interesting that my best-fit model for examining hate crimes per capita is well under that which I found for voteshare (r^2 of 0.8687), but the addition of population density increased the model fit from 0.263⁵ to 0.4464. Therefore, as with the voteshare analysis, population density does play an important explanatory role in my main model.

³ See Appendix I for a presentation of the results that include these variables.

⁴ The “residual vs fit” plot is given in Appendix J.

⁵ See Appendix K for the results of the regression analysis without the “population density” variable.

Table 6.2 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Hate Crimes per 100,000 Inhabitants against Minorities in Swedish Counties (1998 – 2007)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 4	Model 3	Model 5
Year	0.5138* (0.2034)	0.4736* (0.2009)	0.5430* (0.2348)	0.5054* (0.2292)	0.4592 (0.2298)
Unemployment	0.8631* (0.3614)	-0.3916 (0.8670)	0.8809* (0.3632)	-0.4885 (0.8529)	-1.911 (1.0440)
Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.3698 (0.2720)	0.7667 (0.9546)	-0.3822 (0.2929)	1.069 (0.8385)	4.0508 (2.3453)
Proportion of Migrants	1.415** (0.4109)	0.2108 (0.6779)	1.3967** (0.4676)	-0.0512 (0.7547)	-0.0849 (1.1963)
Population Density	0.0018 (0.0166)	0.0065 (0.0180)	0.0439 (0.0946)	0.0415 (0.0996)	0.0071 (0.1170)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-0.1535 (0.1161)	-	-1.1767 (0.1043)	-0.2159 (0.1099)
Proportion of Migrants * Unemployment	-	0.1941 (0.0979)	-	0.2136* (0.0959)	0.4611** (0.1477)
Proportion of Migrants * Population Density	-	-	-0.0033 (0.0061)	0.0025 (0.0073)	0.0033 (0.0071)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	0.0032 (0.0258)	-0.0129 (0.0295)	0.0101 (0.0321)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	-	-	-	-0.4031 (0.3234)
Population Density * Unemployment	-	-	-	-	-0.0149 (0.0096)
Constant	-1025.313 (405.4107)	-937.5856 (400.2599)	-1084.261 (468.5584)	-1000.444*** (456.4893)	-907.5241 (456.8398)
r^2	0.4276	0.4417	0.4299	0.4434	0.4644
n	199	199	199	199	199

Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$
(Standard Errors in parentheses; clustered by county)

In the main model (Model 5), the coefficient for migrant residential concentration is not statistically significant, nor is that for the proportion of migrants. In fact, the only statistically significant result is the interaction between the proportion of migrants and unemployment. In contrast to the outcome of voteshare for the anti-migrant party, “year” is *not* statistically significant: there is much greater variance in hate crime outcomes from year to year. And while there was high intra-class correlation within “county” for the hate crimes outcomes, this was not the case for outcomes of voteshare: this may not be such a surprising result, as voteshare (particularly for smaller parties) can be generated in specific area “strongholds” of that party, meaning that higher-level outcomes in certain counties than others where party organization is not as well established (resulting in greater variation in outcomes from county to county), or there is no local, charismatic leader to draw electoral support.⁶ One important consideration of this is that anti-migrant *voting* behavior is different from direct forms of anti-migrant behavior: that is, where voteshare for an anti-migrant party is high in an area, it does not necessarily follow that hate crimes against migrants will also be high. I shall explore these outcomes in greater detail in the subsequent presentation of the regression results, and in the case studies in later chapters.

Of all of the interaction terms in the model, only the interaction between the proportion of migrants and unemployment is significant; this is in line with previous results in the literature (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003 and Dancygier, 2010). This term will be compared with the 2008-2014 hate crimes per capita regression results and discussed further. Again, unlike in the voteshare regression results, population density is *not* a significant term when interacted with other variables. This result is at odds with the results of the voteshare analysis, where population density proved to be a rather important piece of the explanatory picture in the overall

⁶ Reasons indicated by my interview subject, 18 November 2015.

results. This is consequently also at odds with what the theory maintains: where population density is high, one would expect to find higher levels of hate crimes, given that people do reside in much closer proximity with one another. The mechanism of the halo effect would then dictate that in areas where migrant segregation is high *and* population density is high as well, members of the majority native population may live in close proximity to groups of migrants, and hence a higher level of anti-migrant action on the part of the former group would be expected. Yet in this model, migrant concentration as a function of population density does not contribute to the robustness of the model, and hence the effect is not even viable for consideration. This result makes for an interesting comparison with the regression results for the analysis for the subsequent




Figure 6.2 Marginal Effects of Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals, Anti-Migrant Hate Crimes per Capita, 1998-2007

time period (2008-2014), and I shall discuss this comparison in greater detail and its implications in the section on those results later in the chapter.

To visualize the relative marginal effects of the coefficients, Figure 6.2 shows marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals for each of the terms in Model 5. The only terms that are statistically significant are the year, and the interactions between migrant residential concentration and unemployment, and between the proportion of migrants and unemployment. The other terms have confidence intervals that include “0,” and so not much can be said of their significance from this plot. A closer examination of the interaction terms is presented below, wherein the combined effects and their statistical and substantive significance can be properly understood.

A better sense of what the coefficients in the statistical results mean in real terms is by viewing them graphically. In Figure 6.3, the effect of migrant residential concentration on the level of hate crimes per capita for 1998-2007 is depicted for the base model (without interactions). The slope increases as the level of migrant residential segregation increases, by approximately 10 hate crimes per capita in a given year, running from the lowest level of migrant concentration to the highest – a rather substantial number.

This graph also reveals another interesting finding with respect to the outliers in the sample. As with the voteshare results, Norrbotten remains an outlier at the high-end of migrant residential concentration: most of the outcome observations in Norrbotten fall well below the regression line, with the exception of the outcome in 2008, as noted on the graph. Stockholm County, however,




Figure 6.3 Predicted Values of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2007

is now a deviant case *above* the regression line; recall that in the voteshare results, Stockholm County was an outlier case but *below* the regression line. Conversely, Skåne County now is more of a typical case, with its outcomes centered round the regression line. In the voteshare analysis, Skåne was an outlier above the regression line. This is an intriguing result, as these cases exhibit opposing outcomes with regard to voteshare in comparison to hate crimes per capita. If this study were executed at the national level, such nuances would be occluded, as the effects of each county would counteract each other for each of these measures of anti-migrant political action, and one would not ascertain the sense that different causal variables may be at play with differing explanatory power, as appears to be the case when we look at the data at the sub-national level.

That is, something (or things) is affecting outcomes differently in Stockholm and Skåne with respect to anti-migrant voteshare and hate crimes. I shall comment more on this in the course of the results from the 2008-2014 timeframe, and these observations and results will help define the case selection for the qualitative case studies, which I begin to explore in the next chapter.

The conditional effects of migrant residential concentration and unemployment on the outcome of hate crimes per 100,000 inhabitants are statistically significant for values of migrant residential concentration that are near and below the mean value, but are yet not very substantively significant (less than two hate crimes per capita at the lowest levels of migrant segregation, Figure




Figure 6.4 Effects of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2007 (All other variables held at their mean values)

6.4). Although positive, the trend is for the number of hate crimes to decrease as segregation increases when combined with the effects of unemployment. This is in contrast to the combined effects of unemployment and migrant proportion (Figure 6.5).




Figure 6.5 Effects of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2007 (All other variables held at their mean values)

For the range in which the combined effects of unemployment and the proportion of migrants are statistically significant (for a population in which the proportion of migrants is greater than about 9%), they are also more substantively significant, leading to *larger* numbers of hate crimes per capita as the proportion of migrants increases.

Looking at the differential effects of unemployment conditioned by the proportion of migrants, we see that the number of predicted hate crimes per capita makes a rapid increase as the proportion of migrants increases in areas of high unemployment (Figure 6.6).⁷ These results point to the presence of a material threat to native majority group members posed by increasing numbers of migrants in an area, which is in line with previous studies that have examined anti-migrant outcomes, and thus with my third hypothesis. These results do differ in the subsequent




Figure 6.6 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2007

⁷ Note that in all conditional analyses, the values of the variables not under direct examination are held at their mean values.




Figure 6.7 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2007

analysis for 2008-2014, so there may be something about the time periods themselves that render differing expected outcomes. I shall take up this point after presenting the analysis of the 2008-2014 hate crime data.

The *opposite* occurs for the level of migrant residential concentration (Figure 6.7), which is an interesting outcome, as it is different from the same effects on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. For hate crimes, high unemployment and high migrant segregation lead to a *decrease* in the number of hate crimes per capita; this may be so, given that in areas of greater segregation, there may be less opportunity to commit hate crimes in the presence of higher unemployment –

this underscores the importance of population density on the opportunity structure to commit such crimes (discussed below).

The effects of population density combined with migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion are not statistically significant (see Figures 6.8 and 6.9). For hate crimes in this time period, then, the proximity of residents to one another does not seem to increase the number of hate crimes per capita that are committed – regardless of the level of segregation and number of migrants living among the population.




Figure 6.8 Effects of Population Density on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2007




Figure 6.9 Effects of Population Density on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 1998-2007

The combined effects of unemployment and population density, however, do have statistical significance for lower levels of population density, as was the case with voteshare outcomes for the Sweden Democrats (Figure 6.10). Again, in rural areas and smaller urban areas, the effects of unemployment are much greater than in large urban areas, where higher unemployment tends to affect migrants or minorities more so than majority native Swedes.




Figure 6.10 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Population Density, 1998-2007

These results do differ in the subsequent analysis for 2008-2014, so there may be something about the time periods themselves that render differing expected outcomes. I shall take up this point after presenting the analysis of the 2008-2014 hate crime data.

6.3.3 Summary

The results from this analysis of the level of hate crimes per capita in Swedish counties for the years 1998-2007 differed in some intriguing ways from the results of the anti-migrant voteshare analysis. One such difference was that only the combined effects of the proportion of migrants and unemployment were found to be statistically significant in the full model (Model 5): such a

finding underscores the suggestion of a material threat that migrants may pose to native majority group members, and is in accordance with earlier studies that investigated this combined effect on anti-migrant political action (see Golder, 2003; Dancygier, 2010).

An examination of the marginal effects of unemployment conditioned on levels of migrant residential concentration *lowered* the number of predicted hate crimes per capita as migrant residential segregation *increased* (but only statistically significant for migrant residential concentration levels at and below the average). For the voteshare outcome, the predicted result was just the opposite: voteshare for anti-migrant parties *increased* as migrant residential concentration increased (although this outcome was indeed negative when residential concentration levels were at and below the average). Although the outlier case of Norrbotten County may be thought to be a prime culprit driving these latter results, dropping Norrbotten from the dataset does not alter the significance or direction of the slope of this interaction term, and does not explain the difference with the outcome in the voteshare analysis. This outcome may be explained by the fact that greater segregation depresses the opportunity for majority natives to target migrant victims despite any cultural or material threat that is perceived by majority natives, while voting for anti-migrant parties is only limited by the opportunity of an election, and voters can more easily express anti-migrant political behavior in this manner – and at much less cost.

In addition, a closer look at the level of unemployment combined with the proportion of migrants in the county revealed a dampening effect on the number of hate crimes per capita when the proportion of migrants was low (less than about 5%); voteshare for anti-migrant parties was not statistically significant for a proportion of migrants below 5%, however. Furthermore, at such a low level of migrant proportion, *low* unemployment levels tended to result in much higher hate crimes per capita (about 18 more crimes per capita) than areas with higher levels of unemployment;

voteshare for anti-migrant parties was not statistically significant for low levels of migrant proportion and unemployment. This result may arise from the fact that unemployment tends to be higher among migrants than majority natives: unemployment, then, is likely not seen as much of a material threat, as it disproportionately affects migrants as opposed to natives.

Also in contrast with the results from the voteshare analysis was the lack of statistical significance of a combined effect of population density and other variables (recall that population density was indeed statistically significant with regard to the level of anti-migrant party voteshare, but with somewhat unexpected substantive results). The exception to this outcome was the combined effect with unemployment: at mean levels of population density and below, the effect of unemployment on the level of hate crimes per capita was indeed statistically significant, but hardly varied from 20 hate crimes per capita as the level of population density grew (still a substantive outcome, yet unemployment did not significantly change this outcome).

One important consideration with respect to these hate crime outcomes is that the model employed only explains about 46% of the variation found in the data – less than half. The model for the voteshare data, on the other hand, explained about 87% of the variation observed in the data – almost twice that of the hate crime model. Hence, the development of a more robust model may help to explain the level of hate crimes per capita observed during this time period, and one other possible explanation may be the level of overall crime in an area (not just hate crime): where more crimes tend to be committed per capita, this may be true for *all* types of crime (particularly violent crime). This is a consideration for future research.

Another factor that may be having a significant impact on the outcome of hate crimes per capita observed from 1998-2007 is the categorization of hate crimes. As discussed previously, the National Council for Crime Prevention (*Brå*) made changes to the definition of “hate crime” after

2007, expanding this category drastically. This can be seen in the sheer difference in the number of hate crimes recorded from 2007 to 2008 (as will be evidenced in the scale of hate crimes in the ensuing analysis of this phenomenon in the 2008-2014 timeframe). For 1998-2007, it may be that the category of “hate crime against minorities” is simply too restrictive, and has therefore led to somewhat skewed results. Without having any way to standardize the observations of hate crimes against migrants in the two time periods, however, these analyses will have to do in the evaluation of the expected explanatory effects. This makes the results of the 2008-2014 intriguing indeed – not merely because more hate crimes were categorized as such, but this time period also coincides with the origins of hate crime units in many local (e.g., municipal) police units.⁸ Given these considerations, I now turn to that analysis, and present its results in the following section.

⁸ Interview subject, 15 January 2016#1.

6.4 Hate Crimes Analysis: 2008-2014

In this analysis, I employ the same variables and build my models in a similar way as to that which was done for the analysis of the 1998-2007 data. The summary statistics for the 2008-2014 hate crimes per capita data are shown in Table 6.3

Table 6.3 Summary Statistics of Independent Variables and Dependent Variable (Hate Crimes per Capita), 2008-2014

Variable	Number of Observations	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Standard Deviation
Year	147	2008	2011	2014	-
County	147	-	-	-	-
Unemployment (Percentage)	147	4.6000	7.6068	10.6000	1.3982
Concentration of Migrants	140**	0.8474	3.7152	9.5898	2.0119
Change in Migrant Concentration	146	-6.4167	0.0001	7.9105	3.1590
Proportion of Migrants (Percentage)	147	4.4400	11.8462	22.9995	4.0870
Change in Proportion of Migrants	146	-8.2374	0.0437	9.1029	4.6800
Population Density (Inhabitants per Square Kilometer)	147	2.5000	46.3626	336.9000	66.6397
Hate Crimes per Capita	146*	20.7718	37.0367	69.7535	10.6611

**The concentration of migrants for the county of Götland is not calculable as there are no municipalities in this county. Also, for 2013, hate crime data were not available for Götland, either. Hence, there are only 140 observations for the Concentration of Migrants instead of 147 (the seven unattainable values for Götland), and 146 observations for Hate Crimes per Capita (less that missing observation for Götland).*

As mentioned at the end of the previous section, the number of hate crimes per capita has increased markedly for this time period, running from a minimum of about 21 hate crimes per capita to a maximum of about 70 (compared to about 3.5 hate crimes per capita to about 44 for the 1998-2007 timeframe). Hence, the outcomes are on a much higher scale than in the previous time period. But note also that the level of unemployment has higher values in the 2008-2014 timeframe as well, with a mean value of 7.61% (as opposed to a mean of 5.61% from 1998-2007); this latter time period coincides with the onset of the global economic crisis, and it would appear that Sweden was not immune from its effects. Both the levels of the residential concentration of migrants and proportion of migrants are higher for this latter time period as well, but what is striking is the much higher values for the *change* in migrant residential concentration for 2008-2014, and a concomitant increase in the variance of these values (much higher standard deviation: 0.0924 for 1998-2007 versus 3.1590 for 2008-2014). The change in the proportion of migrants is also much greater for the latter time period, with a much higher standard deviation compared to the earlier dataset (0.1496 for 1998-2007 versus 4.6800 for 2008-2014). Hence, more migrants were settling in Sweden from 2008-2014 compared to the numbers from 1998-2007, and these populations tended to be more residentially segregated from the native majority Swedes.

Population density also increased in the latter time period, but the mean value was rather near that of the previous timeframe (43.1852 for 1998-2007 and 46.3626 for 2008-2014). More than just the level of anti-migrant hate crimes per capita increased in the time from 2008-2014, and these factors will be considerations as I review the regression results below and in the case study analyses that follow in the next chapters.

6.4.1 Models

I begin building the model for the analysis of the 208-2014 dataset in the same way as for the 1998-2007 dataset, with the following base model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(Eq 6.3)} \quad [\text{Hate Crimes against Migrants}] = & \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{Unemployment}] \\ & + \beta_3[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_4[\text{Migrant Proportion}] \\ & + \beta_5[\text{Population Density}] + \epsilon \end{aligned}$$

I also employ ordinary least squares for the analysis as before.




Figure 6.11 Scatter Plot of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Concentration of Migrants, 2008-2014

The data again exhibit slight skewness and kurtosis, but as with the previous analyses, the value of a transformation is overshadowed by the utility in interpreting the interaction effect of the full model, and hence I do not proceed with a transformation. The data are displayed in the Figure 6.11; an inspection of the figure reveals that there is not much improvement in the linearity of the data compared with the transformed data (a graphical presentation of the transformed model is given in Appendix L). Note that the data have a pattern very similar to that for the hate crime data from 1998-2007, only at a higher scale.

From the initial model, I find that the following yields the best fit:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{(Eq 6.4) Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Year}] + \beta_2[\text{County}] + \beta_3[\text{Unemployment}] \\
 & + \beta_4[\text{Migrant Concentration}] + \beta_5[\text{Change in Migrant Concentration}] \\
 & + \beta_6[\text{Migrant Proportion}] + \beta_7[\text{Change in Migrant Proportion}] \\
 & + \beta_8[\text{Population Density}] + \beta_9[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 & + \beta_{10}[\text{Migrant Proportion}] * [\text{Unemployment}] \\
 & + \beta_{11}[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Population Density}] \\
 & + \beta_{12}[\text{Migrant Concentration}] * [\text{Migrant Proportion}] \\
 & + \beta_{13}[\text{Unemployment}] * [\text{Population Density}] + \epsilon
 \end{aligned}$$

Note that in this model (Model 5 in the Table 6.4 below), the changes in both migrant residential concentration and the proportion of migrants in a county were *not* included, as these added an unnecessary time element, given that I could control for “year” (i.e., there was no intraclass correlation within “year” for these data.⁹

6.4.2 Results

The best model (Model 5) has an adjusted r^2 of 0.6474 – a superior fit to that of the model for the 1998-2007 data (0.4644). The model thus explains well over half of the variance observed among the data (yet is still not as robust as the model based on the anti-migrant voteshare data, which has

⁹ See Appendix M for the results of models that did include changes in migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion.

Table 6.4 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Hate Crimes per 100,000 Inhabitants against Minorities in Swedish Counties (2008 – 2014)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Year	-1.5329** (0.4097)	-1.5632** (0.4057)	-2.1067*** (0.4893)	-2.1701*** (0.4587)	-2.2155*** (0.4522)
Unemployment	1.0465 (0.6169)	2.9898 (1.5802)	1.1247* (0.4822)	2.4503 (1.3225)	-1.8167 (1.5482)
Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.2200 (0.2677)	3.0704 (4.6932)	-0.6219 (0.6351)	4.4402 (5.5717)	-0.4398 (5.1836)
Proportion of Migrants	1.5258* (0.5974)	1.8933 (1.7496)	2.3518* (1.0104)	1.9343 (2.1531)	-0.9564 (1.9006)
Population Density	0.0342 (0.0291)	0.0222 (0.0292)	-0.3946* (0.1448)	-0.4146** (0.1343)	-0.0329 (0.1914)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-0.4262 (0.6081)	-	-0.5999 (0.6735)	-0.1939 (0.4698)
Proportion Migrants * Unemployment	-	-0.0343 (0.2257)	-	0.0675 (0.2369)	0.4842* (0.1732)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	0.0306 (0.0571)	0.0311 (0.0560)	0.0585 (0.0468)
Proportion Migrants * Population Density	-	-	0.0077 (0.0178)	0.0079 (0.0175)	-0.0038 (0.152)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	-	-	-	0.1131 (0.3717)
Unemployment * Population Density	-	-	-	-	-0.0540** (0.0174)
Constant	3092.409** (818.7926)	3137.862** (812.7232)	4244.084*** (980.0506)	4360.861*** (918.5637)	4483.751*** (905.2428)
r^2	0.5139	0.5219	0.5999	0.6102	0.6474
n	140	140	140	140	140
Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** p< .001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 (Standard Errors in parentheses)					

an adjusted r^2 of 0.8687). There are fewer observations in the 2008-2014 dataset compared with the earlier time period (140 versus 199), but the number of observations is sufficient, given the number of explanatory variables. The results are presented in Table 6.4.¹⁰

In Model 5, note that the only non-interacted term that is statistically significant in the full model is the year; the main independent variables of interest – migrant residential concentration and the proportion of migrants – are not statistically significant. It is interesting that the only other statistically significant terms are the interaction between the proportion of migrants and unemployment, and that between population density and unemployment. This might lead one to conclude that the effect of unemployment (and hence, a material threat) is greater with regard to hate crimes – at least in this latter time period. These results will now be examined more closely via graphical presentation.

An investigation of the marginal effects of the coefficients (Figure 6.12) indicates that, as was the case for the 1998-2007 time period, the year variable is statistically different from zero, with a clear decreasing effect on the level of hate crimes per capita as each year passes (and indeed, the level of hate crimes per capita has fallen in Sweden overall from 2008-2014 [Cabero *et al*, 2015]). The only other term that is statistically different from zero is the interaction of the proportion of migrants and unemployment; unlike the results for the 1998-2007 time period, the interaction of migrant residential concentration and unemployment does not appear to be statistically significant. The interaction of population density and unemployment is, however, statistically significant, but only just barely. As with the other analyses, a more accurate picture of the combined effects of the explanatory variables and their statistical and substantive significances will be presented in further detail below.

¹⁰ The “residuals versus fit” plot for this model is presented in Appendix N.




Figure 6.12 Marginal Effects of Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals, Anti-Migrant Hate Crimes per Capita, 2008-2014

The predicted values of hate crimes per capita per the level of migrant residential concentration for the base model are depicted graphically in Figure 6.13. Here, a rise in the level of migrant residential concentration leads to greater levels of hate crimes per capita against migrants, ranging from about 32 hate crimes per capita a year at the lower end of migrant residential concentration to about 47 at the highest end of migrant concentration. Keep in mind that these are hate crimes per capita (per 100,000 residents), and therefore the actual numbers of

hate crimes would be much higher, as multiplied by the number of residents in the county in orders of 100,000.¹¹




Figure 6.13 Predicted Values of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Migrant Residential Concentration, 2008-2014 (Untransformed Values)

The other intriguing finding from this result is the grouping of observed data points for each county: one can clearly see the data for the counties of Skåne, Stockholm, and Norrbotten, and the level of hate crimes per capita do not vary outside of these groupings (that is, there are no

¹¹ The only county in the dataset with less than 100,000 inhabitants is Götland, and that county has been excluded from the observations as it has no municipalities and hence, there is no way to calculate its migrant residential concentration.

data anomalies for any of the counties, as were found among some of the counties in the 1998-2007 data). Furthermore, Stockholm County is yet again a deviant case well above the regression line, while Norrbotten is a deviant case well below the regression line. Skåne County is centered fairly well right round the regression line, making it a good typical case for hate crimes per capita outcomes.

Recall that the results for Stockholm and Skåne were in fact the exact opposite with regard to anti-migrant party voteshare: for voteshare, the outcomes for Stockholm County were right around the regression line, while those for Skåne County were mostly well above the regression line. As mentioned in the analysis of the 1998-2007 data, if these outcomes were evaluated only at the *national* level, these variations in data would be occluded, as it would not be clear that one county was a considerable outlier with respect to one outcome, while another county altogether was a strong outlier with respect to the other outcome. This not only provides the cue that different factors are likely driving outcomes in different sub-national localities, but it also indicates where these differences are occurring.

As with both previous analyses, Norrbotten County remains a deviant case, yielding outcomes that are well below that which would be expected – yet the case does not appear to unduly influence the outcomes. One might think that the hate crimes outcomes in Stockholm County merely offset the outcomes in Norrbotten County, but I did test the models without Stockholm County, then without Norrbotten County, and then without both – and there was little effect on the coefficients, and no effect on significance nor sign of the coefficients. For these reasons, I kept these cases in my dataset.

Perhaps the most striking result for this time period is the effect of different levels of unemployment conditioned on population density (Figure 6.14).¹² As was the case with the effects on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, the outcome of hate crimes per capita *decreases* as population density increases, and is statistically significant from the lowest levels of population density to just over 100 inhabitants per square kilometer (again, this is about the population density of Skåne County). At the higher level of unemployment, the outcome becomes statistically significant again near the higher end of the level of population density, where the level of hate




Figure 6.14 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Population Density, 2008-2014

¹² As with the conditional analyses for the 1998-2007 time period, the variables that are not under direct examination are held at their mean values.

crimes decreases. As with the logic in the voteshare analysis, high unemployment in urban areas is potentially viewed as a “migrant problem,” and hence majority natives do not feel a material threat in the way that residents of rural areas may; in rural areas, unemployment affects more majority natives, and hence provides greater impetus to take action against migrants, who may be perceived as taking jobs away from majority native Swedes.

The effects of differing levels of unemployment combined with migrant residential segregation is also similar to the outcomes observed with regard to voteshare (Figure 6.15), yet there is less of a difference among the various levels of unemployment, and the effect is highly




Figure 6.15 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 2008-2014

substantive (and statistically significant for all but the lowest values of migrant residential concentration). The effect of migrant segregation combined with unemployment is clearly visible, as is the combination effect of unemployment with the proportion of migrants (Figure 6.16). These effects are more substantial than that of unemployment and migrant residential concentration, which is a different outcome than that for the voteshare levels for the Sweden Democrats. Of course, the greater the number of migrants in a population, the greater the opportunity to commit an anti-migrant hate crime; as such, these results may not be so surprising in comparison with the voteshare outcomes.




Figure 6.16 Effects of Different Levels of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Proportion, 2008-2014

The overall conditional effects of unemployment on migrant residential concentration is statistically significant for only a narrow range of values of segregation (Figure 6.17). The outcome decreases as segregation rises in this narrow range (just below the average value for migrant residential concentration), yet is not very substantively significant (values of less than one hate crime per capita).




Figure 6.17 Effects of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 2008-2014

When the conditional effects of unemployment with the proportion of migrants is examined, however, a greater range of statistical significance is observed, and the outcomes are much more substantively significant as well (Figure 6.18). Most importantly, when the proportion

of migrants is quite low (less than about two percent), there is a *negative* effect on the number of hate crimes per capita committed. The level of hate crimes nonetheless rises as the proportion of migrants rises, and when the proportion of migrants is above four percent, there is an *increase* in the number of hate crimes committed per capita. When the proportion of migrants approaches its maximum value, the number of hate crimes per capita is six or greater – a very similar outcome to what was observed in the earlier time period (1998-2007). And again, this




Figure 6.18 Effects of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on the Proportion of Migrants, 2008-2014

outcome may not be so surprising, as the more migrants there are in a population, the greater the opportunity there is to perpetrate a crime against a migrant.

In consideration of the combined effects of population density and migrant residential concentration and the proportion of migrants, somewhat surprising results are obtained. Figure 6.19 shows the former conditional relationship. For the range that is statistically significant (migrant residential concentration levels from about 1 to 6 – below and just above the mean value by a standard deviation), the effect on hate crimes is negative (from about -4 to -2.5 hate crimes per capita). Increased segregation does dampen this effect, but it appears that moderate segregation does not increase hate crime levels combined with population density. A similar trend is seen for the combined effects of population density and the proportion of migrants (Figure 6.20).




Figure 6.19 Effects of Population Density on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Migrant Residential Concentration, 2008-2014




Figure 6.20 Effects of Population Density on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on the Proportion of Migrants, 2008-2014

One might think that greater population density in areas where there are more migrants in the population would provide greater opportunity to commit a hate crime against a migrant, if one were motivated to do so. This finding underscores the important effect of other factors such as the level of unemployment in the outcome. If, then, we look at the effect of unemployment, conditional on population density, the most substantively significant effect is observed (Figure 6.21).




Figure 6.21 Effects of Unemployment on Hate Crimes per Capita, Conditioned on Population Density, 2008-2014

From this graph, it can be seen that population density has quite a substantively significant dampening effect on hate crimes per capita combined with unemployment levels, and is statistically significant for most values of population density (for all values except those just around the mean). Note, however, that the effect is *positive* for very low levels of population density: in highly rural areas, unemployment has a positive effect on hate crimes (of around three hate crimes per capita). In areas that are increasingly urban, the number of hate crimes decreases swiftly as population density rises: in the larger urban areas in Sweden, this decrease is by about 10 hate crimes per capita – quite a substantively significant outcome. This outcome reinforces the notion that in urban areas, the preponderance of unemployment is among migrants, and hence

majority natives do not feel a sense of material threat, and hence, no urge to act on such a threat. In very rural areas, the level of unemployment is more evenly spread among natives and migrants alike, allowing for the possibility of a material threat to take hold in the perceptions of majority natives (who may be more likely to be compelled, then, to act in response to this threat). Again, looking at just the effects of population density and the segregation and number of migrants only yields part of the causal picture: the hypothesis is somewhat undermined by the demographic structure of those who are unemployed for urban areas.

6.5 Summary and Comparison with Previous Results

The analysis of the level of hate crimes against migrants for the 2008-2014 time period not only differed from the results obtained for the anti-migrant party voteshare in some respects, but also from the results of the hate crime analysis for the 1998-2007 time period. The effects of unemployment conditioned on migrant residential concentration did not bear statistically significant predicted results in the latter timeframe, while these results were indeed statistically (although not very substantively) significant for levels of migrant residential concentration at and below the mean for the 1998-2007 timeframe. For the voteshare outcomes, these combined effects were indeed statistically (and quite substantively) significant for migrant residential concentration levels around the mean and higher. Segregation, it would appear, is a larger driver of anti-migrant voteshare than hate crimes when the level of unemployment (again, an indicator of material threat) is taken into account.

Interestingly, the predicted hate crimes per capita from the effects of unemployment on the proportion of migrants were nearly identical for the two time periods (negative when the proportion of migrants was at and below about 5%, and positive over about 7%); these results were

fairly substantively significant, too, reaching an increase of about five hate crimes per capita as the proportion of migrants rose to about 15%. The results for anti-migrant party voteshare mirror these results: hence, the proportion of migrants matters to the level of anti-migrant political action, but most substantively so when the proportion climbs to about 15% and higher.

The combined effects of population density and migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion on the level of hate crimes per capita were statistically significant around mean levels of the latter two variables for the 2008-2014 time period. These effects were not statistically significant at all for the 1998-2007 time period – a curious finding. Potentially, this difference in results could be driven by a more precipitous rise in segregation and migrant proportion: I did not control for the changes in these two variables from one time unit to the next (as I controlled for “year” already), but the rate of growth of each of these variables may well be a factor to consider.¹³ For the voteshare data, the conditional effect of population density on migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion was only narrowly significant around mean levels of the former variables. To be sure the number of migrants and the level of segregation increased markedly in the 2008-2014 time period; it may be that these factors simply did not exist at high enough levels to elicit an anti-migrant response from members of the native majority group before 2008, and hence their effects were counteracted in the dataset for anti-migrant voteshare, which includes data from this earlier time. It would be interesting if comparable xenophobic hate crime data could be obtained across the entire 1998-2014 temporal scope to see if a similar offsetting effect would operate for these outcomes as well. Given that such data do not as yet exist, there are some limitations to the conclusions that can be made not only with respect to the results from the

¹³ Although I had included the changes in migrant residential concentration and migrant proportion in the voteshare analysis, I did so due to intra-class correlation within the variable “year.” As I did not have such an intra-class correlation problem with the hate crime data for either time period, I opted to keep the “year” variable, thus controlling for time and establishing a more parsimonious model.

two time periods for the xenophobic hate crimes data, but also when comparing the level of hate crimes to the level of anti-migrant party voteshare.

For the 2008-2014 data, the main hypothesis on the effects of residential migrant concentration on anti-migrant action was not directly supported, but the combination of this variable with population density did lend support to its effects, and in particular to the theoretical mechanisms of contact theory and the halo effect. The effects of the proportion of migrants in a county in the latter time period were found to be significant when combined with the effects of unemployment, thereby providing no support for the second hypothesis but offering support for the third. It should be noted that, for 1998-2007, the proportion of migrants combined with the unemployment *was* found to be significant, but not when combined with population density: thus, the effect proposed in hypothesis three did receive support given this data. It can therefore be concluded that *both* the residential concentration of migrants *and* the proportion of migrants in a county had an important explanatory effect on the level of anti-migrant hate crimes. Thus, the proposition that the mere presence of migrants poses a sense of cultural threat against the native majority is not well supported at all – particularly in densely-populated areas. With regard to hate crimes, the effects of migrant residential concentration were found to be more substantively significant than those of migrant proportion, when each was conditioned by levels of unemployment and population density. Again, this may not be so surprising, as higher segregation may lead to less opportunity for a majority native to commit a hate crime against a migrant, but has no bearing on a majority native Swede's act of voting.

This difference between the effects of migrant residential concentration on outcomes of anti-migrant party voteshare and anti-migrant hate crime levels may be the result of the underlying differences of the level of action between these two outcomes: a vote is cast anonymously and in

isolation, whereas an attack is perpetrated *personally*, involving at least one other person: a vote is a more abstract form of action. In addition, there are few costs for casting a vote (other than making the effort to go to the polling station, and perhaps to inform oneself of the competing parties' platforms); there is, however, a rather high cost for committing a hate crime: the possibility of being caught by the police and serving a prison sentence. One might wonder if, in a comprehensive welfare state, the stakes of giving up one's freedom to express an anti-migrant preference may prohibit the perpetration of such a crime. Given that the material threat hypothesis is not well supported by my data, this could well be a valid conclusion.

6.6 Conclusions

Taking a broad view of these analyses, I can offer a few conclusions and lay the groundwork for my ensuing case studies. First, I did find appreciable support for the positive effects of the level of migrant residential concentration on the outcomes of anti-migrant political action with regard to anti-migrant party voteshare, as posited in my first hypothesis (this variable on its own was statistically significant and in the expected direction). For the xenophobic hate crimes analysis over 1998-2007 and 2008-2014, although the single term itself was not found to be statistically significant, it did combine with unemployment to render a significant effect on the outcome and in the expected direction, although the results were much more substantive for the 2008-2014 time period than for 1998-2007. Population density had a significant combined effect with migrant residential concentration only for the latter time period – an effect possibly rendered by the fact that segregation grew at a greater rate than in the former time period. Thus, the effect of migrant residential concentration proved to be a statistically and substantively significant predictor on the levels of anti-migrant political action, as hypothesized.

The effects of the proportion of migrants in an area, however, were mixed. In no analysis was this variable found to exert a statistically significant effect on the outcomes. The proportion of migrants was statistically significant when interacted with some other terms, but not consistently so across the three analyses. For anti-migrant party voteshare, the combined effect of the proportion of migrants and population density was statistically and substantively significant. Hence, the inclusion of population density as an explanatory variable has served to improve the robustness of the causal model and reveals a piece of the causal picture that lay hidden in previous studies. For the anti-migrant hate crimes analyses, the proportion of migrant was only significant when combined with unemployment and population density. The second hypothesis offered therefore did not receive sufficient statistical or substantive support, as its effects only mattered when combined with the effects other statistically significant factors. Support for a purely cultural threat motivation for anti-migrant political action was simply not identifiable.

In Hypothesis Three, I tested one such combination of effects: that of residential migrant concentration and unemployment. This hypothesis tested the “material threat” that had been proposed in previous studies, with the nuance that such a threat offered a “trigger condition” for native majority group members to act against migrants. These results were mixed as well across the three analyses. The level of unemployment was not significant on its own in any model (hence, there was an absence of simple “material threat” in the results), but it was statistically significant when interacted with the population density of an area for the voteshare analysis and hate crimes per capita analysis for 2007-2014 – but with a negative effect. Looking at the differential effects of unemployment combined with population density, then, revealed that in urban areas, high unemployment did *not* result in higher anti-migrant party voteshare, or higher levels of hate crimes in 2008-2014: as unemployment in urban areas is particularly high among migrants, the presence

of a material threat to majority natives would seem to be diminished. Therefore, a consideration of a material threat indicator such as unemployment was found to be quite a rough indicator: the nuanced effects of unemployment would not be appreciated if population density and the demographic character of those who are unemployed are not taken into consideration. Such a finding points to the limitations of using the mere measure of “unemployment levels” as a blunt indicator of material threat.

It is necessary to note the limitations of the individual models and any comparison that is made among them. The anti-migrant party voteshare model has a rather satisfying adjusted r^2 of 0.86870 – this model would appear to explain a very high amount of the variation taking place with regard to the outcome. The xenophobic hate crimes models offered much lower r^2 values (0.4644 for the 1998-2007 data and 0.6474 for the 2008-2014 data – which are not terrible measures of fit, and are yet improvements over previous iterations of these analyses that I have conducted, as shown in Appendix K). It is interesting that the voteshare and hate crimes analysis for 2008-2014 are the two models with the higher r^2 values. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that the results of the 2008-2014 hate crimes analysis are more reliable than those of the 1998-2007 analysis *for the variables examined*. As time goes on, the effects of migrant residential concentration and population density seem to play a larger explanatory role than in the earlier part of the overall data. This is an important supposition to make, as my case studies were of course conducted in 2015, just after the last year of observations for the hate crimes analysis for the latter time period (and for the year of the last observations voteshare analysis as well). Thus, these analyses that run to 2014 may point to effects that are more pertinent to the observations I made during my field research trip, and hence will give me better cues as to what I should look for, and what I should expect to find.

It would seem, however, that with regard to hate crimes, there are some missing factors that I have not captured in my models. For this case study in particular, I was mindful to be vigilant to spot possible competing explanatory factors and to compare them with the factors that my models reveal. I of course took the same precautionary approach with the anti-migrant voteshare case study data, despite the fact that the model I crafted explained nearly all of the variation found in the outcome.

Beyond the effects that the explanatory variables had on the outcomes observed in my models, there were also intriguing patterns in the data that helped me to identify potential candidates for the ensuing case studies, and also revealed the value of examining the data at the sub-national level, as opposed to merely the national level. Rather intriguing outcomes were revealed for Stockholm County and Skåne County: as discussed above, the anti-migrant voteshare outcomes in Stockholm County were about average (around the regression line), while those for Skåne County were quite high indeed (increasingly dramatically over time). Conversely, for the hate crimes analyses, Skåne County presented itself as a typical case, while Stockholm County was an extreme deviant case – this was true for *both* time periods. (Indeed, the dispersion of data in each time period in the hate crimes analyses were similar – albeit on different scales of the y-axis, owing to the higher level of hate crimes per capita in the second timeframe.) Therefore, Stockholm and Skåne counties maintained their outcome patterns across the entire timeframe under analysis: 1998-2014. In fact, for most observations, the patterns within each county were similar from year to year: they exhibited around the same level of hate crimes per capita from year to year, and those counties in which voteshare for the Sweden Democrats was higher in earlier elections also had a higher growth in voteshare over the subsequent elections – there was consistency to the pattern of the increase in voteshare, which is likely why the “county” variable

was found to be so statistically significant for this analysis. These patterns allowed me more easily to identify prospective cases for my qualitative analyses, and to be more confident that they would render useful observations during my field research.

Now, Norrbotten County also presented itself as an extreme deviant case for all of my analyses, but as discussed above, the complicating factor in this county was that most of the migrants are from Finland – that is, most migrants in this county have not been of a different race from the native majority Swedes (although Finns in Sweden do have an officially recognized status as a minority group [Cabero *et al.*, 2015]). Given that the xenophobic hate crimes data are based on an *apparent* minority status (i.e., *race*) and that the discourse of the Sweden Democrats has been against immigrants, but in particular against *refugee immigrants* (who have mostly come from Asia and Africa over the past 20 years), the situation in Norrbotten did not seem justifiable as an appropriate case study of anti-migrant political action. The difference in these factors for this one county in the very northernmost part of Sweden undercut its viability for further in-depth study, and I therefore discarded it as a possibility. Therefore, the counties of Stockholm and Skåne appear to offer the best choices for field study – Stockholm as a deviant case for the level of anti-migrant party voteshare (where voteshare has been lower than predicted), and Skåne as a typical case for the level of anti-migrant hate crimes. In the next chapter, I craft the framework for these case studies by reviewing the context of immigration and housing policies in Sweden and establishing the approach I take in analyzing each of these cases qualitatively.

Chapter 7

Qualitative Analyses: Case Studies Operationalization

7.1 Introduction

In the quantitative analyses, I constructed models to test the three hypotheses I posited to explain the level of two kinds of anti-migrant political acts: voteshare for anti-migrant parties and hate crimes committed against migrants by members of the native majority. These results yielded support for my main hypothesis – the level of migrant residential concentration – and also some interesting patterns with regard to the counties where these different anti-migrant actions were taking place since the beginning of my timeframe of study, 1998. While these results are intriguing from a statistical point of view, they do not contribute much in the way of explaining the causal mechanisms that underlie the observed outcomes: it became clear that field research would be necessary to tease out these elements, and to investigate possible competing explanations that were not included in my statistical models. To that end, I visited Sweden for six weeks in October and November of 2015 to conduct this field work.

The purpose of my case studies, then, is to evaluate my main and alternative hypotheses and the mechanisms that underlie them, and also generate possible competing hypotheses that may complement the explanations I have posited, and which I will take up in future research. While I did in fact find support for my main hypothesis – and for the influence of population density

combined with the level of migrant residential concentration – I also found some additional explanatory factors that I believe need to be considered as part of the overall causal picture with regard to anti-migrant political actions in Sweden and will be tested as part of future research; this is especially true for the outcome of hate crimes against migrants, the quantitative analyses for which indicated a less-robust model than the analysis of anti-migrant voteshare. Even though the quantitative model for voteshare outcomes appeared well-specified, I nonetheless also found additional explanatory factors for this outcome that help complete the general causal picture.

To situate my observations within the context of my own personal frame, let me provide some information on my own background. I was born, raised, and educated in the United States, so I come from a traditional “immigration country,” where issues of race and discrimination have long been prevalent in society, even unto this day. Having lived in the megalopolis of the Eastern Seaboard (near Washington, D.C.) and in the Deep South in Georgia, I have observed different levels of racial and land-of-origin segregation and discrimination (with segregation and discrimination being more prevalent in the latter location, in my experience).

Furthermore, in the United States, there is not a strong positive association with the concept of “social welfare,” and the idea of a “welfare state” is often seen as anathema to American ideals (as evidenced by the current comments on the presidential candidate, Bernie Sanders, who claims to be a “democratic socialist”¹ and has thereby been likened more to a “communist” or “national socialist,”² but who may be more properly termed a “social democrat”³ – with ideas for government

¹ Time, “Here’s How Bernie Sanders Explained Democratic Socialism,” <<http://time.com/4121126/bernie-sanders-democratic-socialism/>>.

² Politico, “Why Democrats Should Beware Sanders’ Socialism,” <<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/bernie-sanders-2016-socialism-213667>>.

³ The Atlantic, “Bernie is Not a Socialist and America is Not Capitalist,” <<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/bernie-sanders-democratic-socialism/471630/>>; The Fiscal Times, <<http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2016/01/26/Bernie-Sanders-Says-He-s-Democratic-Socialist-Here-s-What-Means>>.

institutions that are closer to those of the Swedish system than currently exist in the United States⁴). Nonetheless, views on social welfare vary in different areas of the country, and part of the ongoing national debate is over who is entitled to particular welfare benefits and what the extent of those benefits should be. A current example of this divide that concerns immigrants is the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act, which was intended to grant undocumented immigrants conditional residency so that they could apply and attend institutions of higher education.⁵ The legislation was introduced in the US Congress in 2010, but failed to pass at the national level; several states have since enacted their own versions of this provision in the wake of this failure at the national level, while other states have passed legislation specifically to prohibit undocumented aliens from obtaining access to higher education (as is the case in the state of Georgia⁶). Hence, the government institutions and provisions that exist in my country of origin are different from those in Sweden (and other countries in Europe), and the debate has often been of a more exclusive nature than in Sweden – particularly with regard to migrants.

I have, however, lived in Europe (Ireland), and have travelled in various European countries (Iceland, the United Kingdom, France, Finland): I have therefore had the opportunity to view and experience different varieties of democracy (liberal democracy and social democracy), and learn something of the debates in these countries over immigration and welfare provisions. I speak French fluently, and have familiarity with German and Spanish, and some Swedish. Although I have a limited grasp of Swedish, I was able to communicate readily with my interview subjects – most of whom spoke very good English. My lack of command of Swedish, however,

⁴ PRI, “Bernie Sanders Wants Us to Be More Equitable Like Sweden. Could It Work?”

<<http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-02-09/bernie-sanders-wants-us-be-more-equitable-sweden-could-it-work>>.

⁵ USA Today College, <<http://college.usatoday.com/2015/02/26/5-facts-you-need-to-know-about-the-dream-act/>>.

⁶ PBS, “Some States Bypass Congress, Create Their Own Versions of the DREAM Act,”

<<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/some-states-bypass-congress-create-their-own-versions-of-the-dream-act/>>.

gave me something of the perspective of a newly-arrived migrant who also would likely not have facility in the language. As such, my time in Sweden gave me a view of what life for newcomers who are adjusting to the language and customs of Sweden must be like, while my status as an academic afforded me the opportunity to readily speak to a range of interview subjects who were eager to assist me in my research.

In the following sections, I shall identify and present justifications for the specific municipality cases I chose; summarize the alternative explanations I discovered; provide an overview of the methods I employed; and then offer some historical and policy context for the study of the phenomena under consideration.

7.2 Research Design: Case Selection

From my quantitative results, I had already identified two ideal cases for further research – a typical case (xenophobic hate crimes in Skåne County) and a deviant case (anti-migrant party voteshare in Stockholm County). A “typical case” is one that exhibits the expected relationship (Gerring, 2008, 649), and a “deviant case” differs from expectations (Gerring, 655). Within each of these two sets of cases, I shall select cases with diverse values on the independent variables to allow me to examine a “range of variation” and how such differences affect the dependent variable (Gerring, 647; 650). This approach to the analysis also conforms to Bennett and George’s prescription of a “structured, focused case study” in that the structure is determined from the definition of the case population in the quantitative analysis and the focus of the case study selection is guided by the theory underpinning the research (Bennett and George, 2005). The typology of the universe of possible cases is represented in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Case Selection per the Outcomes of the Quantitative Analysis, according to Values of the Main Independent Variable (“Migrant Population Segregation Level”) and Dependent Variable (“Native Anti-Migrant Action Level”)

Level of Migrant Residential Segregation	Level of Anti-Migrant Political Action by Native Majority	
	Low	High
Low	Typical1	Deviant1
High	<i>Deviant2 (Stockholm - Voteshare)</i>	<i>Typical2 (Skåne – Hate Crimes)</i>

Although there have been different paradigms advanced that motivate mixed-method research designs (e.g., to improve data quality, to avoid biases, to aid in sampling), the main purpose for my use of the nested mixed-method approach lies in the substantiation of the initial findings of my quantitative analysis and the illumination of the causal connections between my main independent variable and the dependent variable by bringing other data sources (from field interviews and observations) to bear from the qualitative analysis (Denscombe, 2008; Bryman, 2006; Harrits, 2011). Thus, the quantitative analysis serves as a guide to let me know if my main hypothesis seems to hold for the population of cases I have selected; it is the case study analysis that will be doing the job of explaining why the connection I posit exists (or does not exist, if this turns out to be so).

Given time and budget constraints, I could only select to pursue field research in one deviant and one typical case (the last row in Table 7.1), yet I did so at a lower level of analysis. I opted to select specific municipalities within my case counties, which also had the effect of bringing the analysis to a more localized level. A lower level of analysis is an improvement over the level I was able to employ for the quantitative analyses (limited due to data availability), as my main hypothesis is predicated on the spatial distribution of migrants vis-à-vis majority natives, and

hence observing phenomena more locally enables me to investigate what is actually happening “on the ground,” in specific residential areas.

My first task in performing the field research was to find evidence concerning my main hypothesis: that is, I needed to consider levels of migrant residential concentration and the effects this variable has on the level of anti-migrant political action. Also, as population density appeared to be such an important co-variable, I decided to focus on cases where there was high population density compared to the average level across the country. From the theory of the halo effect, I would expect that where clusters of an identifiable “out-group” are observed residing in close proximity to identifiable “in-groups,” the level of anti-migrant political action will be much higher, as the differences between these two groups are evident, and such close proximity makes it more probable that in-group members will *act* towards out-group members. In areas of higher population density, the likelihood of such groups living in quite close proximity to one another is higher than in more sparsely-populated areas; hence, I would potentially have a better opportunity to observe the halo effect in densely-population areas. This was the first consideration in my individual case selections.

In addition to the effects of my main explanatory variable, I also needed to consider the possible effects of hypothesized alternative explanations. In the second hypothesis, an effect of the level of the proportion of migrants on anti-migrant political action was posited: the expectation was that the higher the proportion of migrants in an area, the higher the level of anti-migrant political action. Higher proportions of migrants in an area can represent a “cultural” threat to members of the native majority, as they may feel themselves culturally or ethnically overwhelmed by the mere number of migrants living around them. This sense of being outnumbered by the “other” provokes majority natives to act, and causes a higher level of anti-migrant political actions

when the proportion of migrants is high. The quantitative results of this variable were somewhat mixed, as the proportion of migrants only became significant statistically when combined with other factors. Observations at the local level may help me better determine the extent of the effect that migrant proportions have on anti-migrant political action.

In the third hypothesis, the presence of an economic indicator combined with the level of migrants (I examined both the migrant residential concentration and proportion of migrants in the quantitative models) was expected to produce a “trigger” effect, leading to higher outcomes of anti-migrant political action when the economic conditions were sufficiently bad. The causal mechanism in this explanation is the sense of a “material threat” from migrants that majority natives may feel, as the competition for available jobs breeds nativist resentment and chauvinism when there are many migrants also vying for employment in an area. This threat hence propels majority natives to act when that threat is sufficiently high (such as in times or areas of high unemployment). The combined effect of migrant segregation and high unemployment is then expected to yield high levels of anti-migrant political action, as it is this “trigger” condition which augments the impetus for majority natives to act against migrants. As with the quantitative analyses, I chose the level of unemployment as the economic indicator on which to focus for the selection of my municipality cases. I found in the quantitative study, however, that this “trigger” actually acted in a manner opposite to that which was expected, as high levels of unemployment tended to coincide with lower levels of anti-migrant political action (when combined with the proportion of migrants in the county or the population density⁷). As with the effects of the proportion of migrants, taking a closer look at the local level may help me to resolve this somewhat puzzling outcome and gain a richer explanation of the effects of a proposed “material threat.”

⁷ The combined effects of migrant concentration were not found to be significant.

I used the above criteria to choose my cases, but I also sought to identify potentially competing or augmenting explanatory factors. In the course of my field work, the common factors that I found in my chosen cases which may have explanatory leverage include the level of ethnic diversity *within* a migrant population; the time of the incoming “waves” of migrants to Sweden, and their origins; and the levels of public spending on cultural and recreational facilities and services. I shall elaborate further and explain the causal pathways of each of these factors in the presentation of the individual case studies in the ensuing chapters.

7.2.1 Research Design: Justification of Cases Selected

As stated above, the quantitative results indicated that Stockholm County was a good candidate county for a deviant case in which to investigate the level of anti-migrant party voteshare. In this county, voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been much lower over the past five parliamentary elections than my model predicts. In addition, Stockholm County also has a high proportion of migrants, high population density, and a level of unemployment quite close to average over the timeframe (1998-2014): *higher* anti-migrant party voteshare was predicated in my model around average levels of unemployment, yet again, voteshare is lower-than-expected in Stockholm County. To investigate these outcomes more closely, I chose two municipalities in Stockholm County that are similar with regard to the main independent variables, yet differ in their outcomes of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats.

Considering all of the criteria outlined above, I chose to investigate Sollentuna and Järfälla in an effort to explain the unexpectedly low level of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Stockholm County. These two municipalities have had around the same proportion of migrants,

Table 7.2 Available Demographic Statistics for Stockholm County and Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities, 1998-2014

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Proportion of Migrants*																	
Stockholm County	-	-	-	17.89	18.12	18.32	18.48	18.72	19.22	19.75	20.22	20.77	21.20	21.74	22.19	22.58	23.00
Sollentuna	-	-	-	16.19	16.35	16.56	16.81	16.84	17.26	17.70	18.06	18.85	19.53	20.20	20.78	21.26	22.12
Järfälla	-	-	-	18.52	18.77	19.01	19.22	19.54	20.18	20.88	21.68	22.41	23.17	23.91	24.52	25.15	26.08
Population Density**																	
Stockholm county	274.8	276.6	279.7	282.1	283.8	285.4	287.3	289.9	294.2	299	303.9	309.7	315.1	320.5	325.9	331.4	336.9
Sollentuna	1075.1	1081.7	1089.9	1094	1098.7	1105.6	1105.8	1114.4	1143.3	1159.6	1173	1196.6	1220.8	1251.7	1270.1	1294.6	1317.5
Järfälla	1116.8	1113.6	1118.8	1131	1134	1137.3	1139	1142.3	1153.4	1173.5	1190.7	1208	1225	1251.1	1267.6	1285.4	1314.4
Percent not Employed[†]																	
Stockholm County	-	-	-	-	-	-	18.5	18.9	18.3	17.6	17.5	18.9	17.9	17.4	16.9	16.6	16.3
Sollentuna	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.1	16.2	15.9	15.1	15.1	16.6	15.9	15.7	15.1	14.9	15.1
Järfälla	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.3	17.6	17.5	16.7	16.9	18.3	17.4	17.1	16.8	16.2	16.1
<p><i>*Percent of those residents who are foreign-born (does not include those born in Sweden of one or two foreign-born parents).</i></p> <p><i>**Indicates inhabitants per 100-square kilometers.</i></p> <p><i>[†]These numbers include those who are not actively seeking employment (such as students), and are thus not the official measurement of "unemployment."</i></p>																	

unemployment, and population density over my quantitative timeframe (1998-2014 – see Table 7.2), yet have differed with regard to the level of voteshare that the Sweden Democrats have secured over the past five parliamentary elections. Sweden Democrat voteshare in Sollentuna has been consistently lower than that in Järfälla – in fact, the voteshare in Järfälla has been right around or above the expected values of voteshare for the concentration density of Stockholm County, while Sollentuna has had lower-than-expected voteshare results (see Table 7.3). I therefore do evaluate a typical and a deviant case within the framework of this lower-level analysis.

Table 7.3 Voteshare for Sweden Democrats in National Parliamentary and Local (Municipal) Elections in Sollentuna and Järfälla, Stockholm County, 2006-2014

		2006	2010	2014
National				
Sollentuna		1.41	3.16	7.13
Järfälla		2.37	4.82	10.23
Local				
Sollentuna		-	2.22	4.28
Järfälla		-	4.42	7.42



Figure 7.1 Map of Stockholm County, featuring Stockholm City, Sollentuna, and Järfälla (Source: Wikipedia, via Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se)




Figure 7.2 Detailed map of the Municipalities of Sollentuna and Järfälla, Suburbs of Stockholm City (Source: www.val.se)

These two municipalities also neighbor one another, as northern suburbs of Stockholm City, as can be seen from the maps in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Note that Sollentuna and Järfälla are adjacent to three areas of Stockholm City – Husby, Rinkeby, and Tensta – that have high migrant populations and have received attention in recent years due to rioting in migrant residential areas. As both municipalities sit adjacent to these three areas in which recent unrest has occurred, one might expect proximity to such problem areas may affect support for the Sweden Democrats similarly in both. Yet this is an exogenous effect, and endogenous factors within Sollentuna and

Järfälla appear to have greater explanatory power on voteshare outcomes, as support for the Sweden Democrats is indeed different in the two municipalities. This is one reason for choosing to pursue a most-similar systems design for these case studies: with only one case municipality, the voteshare outcome could possibly be attributed to an exogenous factor, such as the rioting in neighboring suburbs. Thus, in considering these two municipalities, I hope to evaluate the explanatory leverage of the level of migrant residential concentration – as well as that of the hypothesized alternative explanatory variables, and identify any other factors that I may observe during my field work for future hypothesis testing.

Skåne County was the typical case for the level of xenophobic hate crimes predicted, and I opted to explore the city of Malmö for my field analysis. Malmö has a high population density and proportion of migrants (higher than other areas in the County), and a high unemployment level as well. As the quantitative results suggest, high unemployment and high population density should have a *dampening* effect on anti-migrant hate crimes, yet the proportion of migrants should not be a significant factor. The combined effects of unemployment and population density go against the third, alternative hypothesis. Given the proportion of migrants in the city, it would also be easier to spot areas of migrant segregation from the native majority population, and hence to evaluate the possible effects of the level of segregation on hate crimes outcomes. In addition, Malmö is the first stop for many migrants (particularly refugees, as I witnesses first-hand during my field visit to the city): its connection to the rest of Europe via the Øresund Bridge means that Malmö is the first stopping place – and often settling place – for new migrants into Sweden. For all of these reasons, Malmö seemed a good choice for a “typical” case selection within Skåne County to explore the effects of migrant residential concentration on the level of anti-migrant hate crimes.

Given Malmö's size and population density, however, I was physically only able to explore this one local case as a typical outcome. In addition, as the proportion of migrants and population density of this area were so much higher than in other areas of Skåne County, I could not really construct a most-similar cases design for Skåne as I had done with the municipalities in Stockholm County. Although this case limitation may lower the explanatory impact of my field findings, I




Figure 7.3 Detailed map of Malmö City (with Neighborhood Voting Districts)
(Source: www.val.se)

believe such a limitation will be overcome by the fact that I was able to more fully explore and observe most areas of the city. Hence, I sacrificed breadth for depth in this case analysis, and I was able to compare different areas within Malmö City with regard to my variables of interest. In effect, then, I was able to lower the level of analysis below that of the municipality, and to the neighborhood in Malmö. A map of Malmö and its various districts is shown in Figure 7.3.

7.2.2 Research Design: Methods Employed

In conducting my field research in all cases, I employed the methods of expert interviewing and participant observation. To obtain as complete a picture as possible of the effects of the factors on the outcomes of interest, I selected a pool of experts to interview that consisted of academics and researchers, directors and members of community groups (non-governmental organizations), journalists, politicians, and residents of the areas I visited. The various perspectives of these different sources allowed me to triangulate the information that I received from them, thereby focusing me on as accurate an understanding of the causal mechanisms as possible.

I had established some contacts before my visit, but while in the country, I was able to take advantage of a “snow-balling” effect, as those whom I interviewed put me in contact with more subjects; most of my subjects were quite useful in this regard (and I seem to have been the beneficiary of the high social trust and social capital that exists in Sweden). In this manner, I was able to gather information from many sources with particular views of the phenomena I was researching.

I developed a set of questions for each of the outcomes I investigated. Hence, I posed a set of questions to the subjects whom I interviewed concerning the voteshare of the Sweden Democrats, and another set of questions to my interviewees concerning xenophobic hate crimes.

(A list of these questions is in Appendix P.) My interviews, however, were semi-structured and open-ended, so I did allow my subjects to expand and contribute on certain issues and comments as they saw fit. This was an invaluable way to capture the unique perspectives and context of each of my subjects, and allowed me to identify potential competing or auxiliary explanations for the respective anti-migrant political action outcomes. Although open-ended, I did try to focus in on my subjects' views on the causal elements that led to the outcomes of interest: many of my subjects had been long-time residents or experts, and so they could afford me a broader view of the phenomena I was examining.

I conducted the participant observation aspect of my field research through a “soak and poke” approach (Fenno, 1986): I physically visited different areas of the municipalities, observing and interacting with residents. This exploration – combined with information gathered from my interviews – helped me to identify specific areas where I was likely to find evidence of my explanatory variables in action and to trace their causal mechanisms. I thus used the two methods in tandem, and was able to explore a number of important areas over iterations of interviews and field visits. I therefore feel confident that I was indeed able to gather sufficient evidence to evaluate the effects of my identified explanatory variables on the outcomes of interest.

To provide some context with regard to the immigration and housing landscape in Sweden, I present a brief overview of the history and policies of immigration and housing in the country. This background will set the stage for the case study analyses that then follow in the next chapters.

7.3 Causal Processes

As discussed in the chapter on my hypotheses, I expected to find that the presence of migrant residential segregation from majority natives creates barriers to consistent, quality contacts

between the two groups, thereby increasing perceptions of threat (cultural and/or material) held by members of the native majority. The sense of threat reinforces the segregation, and if the level of segregation is high enough, that threat is likely to spill over into anti-migrant action. Thus, it is the entrenchment of an “us-vs-them” mentality that high residential segregation fosters, and without mitigating factors that can provide avenues of close, quality contact, higher segregation is more likely to lead to higher levels of anti-migrant political action. These outcomes are further conditioned by other factors, such as that of a material threat (e.g., bad economic conditions): the combination of such an adverse factor with high residential segregation exacerbates the effects of segregation (in the absence of mitigating factors), and therefore leads to even higher levels of anti-migrant political actions by majority natives. The case studies, then, should allow me to evaluate the level of residential segregation on levels of anti-migrant political action, and to identify factors that may attenuate the level of threat posed by the structure of residential segregation: that is, how is the separateness of residential segregation possibly overcome between migrants and majority natives such that close, consistent, quality contact can take place between the groups? These are the identifiers of the causal chain that I looked for, as posited by the halo effects and also group contact theory.

7.4 Summary

The migrant residential situation in Sweden has been the product of over a half century of internal and external shocks that have prompted both local and national Swedish governments to respond – sometimes quite rapidly – to meet the demands of these unexpected factors. To be sure, not all of the policies and projects have had their intended effects, and both immigration and housing policies are still hotly debated in the country today, made even more salient and

controversial by the quite recent historic influx of refugees. Given the selection of field research cases I have made and the historical trajectories I have outlined above, I now move on to analyze my individual cases in the following chapters.

Chapter 8

Qualitative Case Study: Examining Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna

“The Sweden Democrats use immigration policy to build up support, but their main task is to [make] a policy of *culture*.” - Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

“We [the Sweden Democrats] value values.” - Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

“There is *no* integration plan whatever... People [of foreign-born descent] – especially young people – have to have the strength to have two identities.” - Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

8.1 Introduction

As outlined in the preceding chapter, I chose Sollentuna as one of my municipality cases for field research based on the factors that I found to be relevant to the outcome of interested – voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. I therefore sought a municipality with near-mean levels of migrant residential proportion and unemployment, but with a higher level of population density (to give me the best possible opportunity to spot evidence of the halo effect). I shall proceed by presenting the voteshare results for the Sweden Democrats, then I shall give a brief overview of the geography and demographic make-up of Sollentuna. In the subsequent sections, I shall offer evidence of the effects of the identified causal factors on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats. I shall then propose some possible alternative explanations for this outcome that I discovered during the process of executing field work in the municipality – these alternatives will serve as the basis for additional

hypotheses in future research on the outcomes of anti-migrant political action. I shall close with a summary and some thoughts on the causal explanations I observed and their potential policy relevance.

8.2 Sollentuna: Sweden Democrat Voteshare

The voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna and Järfälla is given in Table 8.1, for both the national and municipal elections from 1998 to 2014. Over the past three elections, the

Table 8.1 Voteshare for Sweden Democrats in National Parliamentary and Local (Municipal) Elections, Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities 1998-2014

		1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
National						
Sollentuna		0.5	1.0	1.34	3.16	7.13
Järfälla		0.6	1.3	2.37	4.82	10.23
Stockholm County		0.5	1.0	1.9	4.2	9.7
Sweden		0.4	1.4	2.9	5.7	12.9
Local						
Sollentuna		-	0.0	1.4	2.22	4.28
Järfälla		-	0.0	2.4	4.42	7.42

voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been below the national average in Stockholm County, and voteshare in Sollentuna has been below the County average, while that in neighboring Järfälla has been above the County average. Note that these trends in the two municipalities have been true at both the national (parliamentary elections) and local (municipal elections) levels, and that the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been roughly the same at both levels, respectively (excepting a rather larger jump at the national level than municipal level in the 2014 elections). These statistics reinforce the notion that local election results tend to mirror those in national

elections (and in Sweden, each of these elections are held at the same time, so voters are choosing local as well as national leadership when they go to the polls every election).

It is also interesting to note that when the Sweden Democrats first became noticeable on the national electoral scene (the elections of 1998 and 2002), electoral results in Sollentuna and Järfälla were nearly exactly the same (and similar to the County and county-wide voteshare results). Although the party improved its voteshare dramatically in the two municipalities in 2014, in each case the outcomes were below the national average for the parliamentary elections, and below what was expected in the results of my earlier quantitative analysis. With these results in mind, I now turn to a discussion of Sollentuna and the possible explanatory factors I observed in my field research.

8.3 Sollentuna: An Overview


The municipality of Sollentuna is a suburb of Stockholm City – just north of the city limits – on the main rail line between the city and Uppsala (with Arlanda airport just north on the line). It takes about 15 minutes to get to the heart of Stockholm City by rail from Sollentuna, and the main rail station is in Tureberg, the municipal seat (see the map in Figure 8.1). The neighborhood of Husby in Stockholm municipality – site of several days of rioting in May 2013 – is just adjacent to Sollentuna, separated by a motorway (Uppsalavägen).

Sollentuna is one of the more affluent municipalities in Sweden (one of the top three or four richest),¹ and is less densely populated and more affluent in the areas around Edsviken (an inlet of the Baltic Sea) and in more northern parts of the municipality, where there are also many parks, athletic facilities, and trails for public use. The heart of Sollentuna, however, is centered

¹ Interview Subject 6 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

round Tureberg, location of the main rail station in the municipality and the Sollentuna Centrum – a large, central shopping and entertainment complex adjacent to the rail station. The area of Malmvägen – one of the Million Program housing block sites – is just across the tracks of the rail station, on the opposite side of Sollentuna Centrum.



Figure 8.1 Detailed map of the Municipality of Sollentuna, Indicating the Municipal Seat, Tureberg (Source: www.val.se)  → Sollentuna Rail Station

8.4 Migration and Housing in Sollentuna: The Effects of the Distribution of Migrants and Population Density on Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats

Sollentuna has had a substantially long history as a residential destination for migrants, owing to its proximity and access to the capital and also the availability of affordable housing in the

Malmvägen area. Sollentuna has received migrants from each of the waves of immigration to the country, and while there is indeed a concentration of migrants living in the Malmvägen area, migrants of various nationalities are residentially dispersed around the municipality, typically in villas, small blocks of flats, or single-family homes. Thus, as has been the pattern in other Million Program areas, those migrants who do improve their economic standing have tended to move out of the Malmvägen area to live elsewhere in the municipality. Available housing at present – as in many other areas of Sweden – is at a premium, and young people and those of a lower economic status have great difficulty affording housing outside of the Malmvägen area, prompting many to leave Sollentuna for more affordable housing elsewhere.² Many housing units that had been low-rent have been converted to private, high-rent housing.³ In addition, abundant new housing is evident in Tureberg and other areas of the municipality, but again, the demand is high and the costs are reported to be prohibitive for those who are not very well economically established.

8.4.1 Housing: Malmvägen

Malmvägen was constructed between 1969 and 1972, and consists of several blocks of tower apartment housing, on the ground floor of which are businesses and organizations. In the first half of its existence, Malmvägen suffered the typical Million Program segregation and ghettoization: the buildings became dilapidated, there was high unemployment, and high crime. From the late 1990s through the present, Malmvägen has undergone a renaissance of sorts, with local funds being dedicated to improving the buildings, making green spaces more attractive and accessible, and supporting local organizations active in the community.⁴ Today, Malmvägen offers something

² Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

³ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

⁴ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

of a second Centrum,⁵ as many ethnic stores and restaurants also bring migrant and majority native residents to the area to shop and eat, somewhat dampening the segregation effects that have been



Figure 8.2 Malmvägen, Sollentuna municipality, 2015.
(Source: Arena Satelliten, www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNAG9r-7C-0>)



Figure 8.3 Malmvägen, Sollentuna Municipality.
(Source: Av Johannes Scherman - This is my own photo, CC BY 2.5,
<<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1024068>>)

⁵ Interview Subject 9 November 2015#1.

seen elsewhere in Million Program housing areas (its location across the tracks from the rail station makes the area easily accessible on foot). Despite the revitalization efforts and the sense of ownership that its residents have developed, however, for some residents “on this side of the tracks” (that is, opposite from Malmvägen), the negative perception of Malmvägen sticks, and they still will not venture across the tracks to this part of the municipality.⁶ Therefore, the stigma of the Million Program housing legacy does remain, at least for some residents of Sollentuna. A view of Malmvägen is shown in Figures 8.2 and 8.3.

Approximately 3500 people reside in Malmvägen, representing 96 nationalities.⁷ Quite a diverse ethnic and national mix exists among Malmvägen’s residents: in some cases, migrants from conflict zones have become close neighbors with those with whom they would have been enemies in their home countries – one of my interview subjects pointed out that these residents have learned to live and work with one another in their new homes despite past animosities, and that there was hope that the same efforts could be undertaken between migrants and majority natives in Sollentuna.⁸ Thus, a significant concentration of migrants does indeed live in this one area of Sollentuna, and despite recent efforts to rejuvenate and make the area safer, more accessible, and more attractive, some residents of Sollentuna – particularly members of the native majority – will dare not venture into this area, dissuaded by their persistent (yet presently unfounded) views of Malmvägen as it was in its more troubled past.

⁶ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

⁷ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

⁸ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

8.4.2 Business and Social Factors

Revitalization efforts have not only been implemented in Malmvägen, but in other areas of Sollentuna as well. The Sollentuna Centrum is a fairly new facility, opened in 2010, and serves as the commerce and social focal point of the municipality⁹ (see Figure 8.4). Again, with its proximity to the main rail station and population center of the municipality, it is well placed to attract many residents. It is also just across the rail tracks from Malmvägen, so many migrant residents from that area frequent the Centrum as well. I found that many residents of a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds visited Sollentuna Centrum on a daily basis, in addition to many majority



Figure 8.4 Exterior of Sollentuna Centrum.
(Source: By Einarspetz - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=22790605>>).

⁹ Sollentuna Centrum, <www.sollentunacentrum.se/om-centret/>.

native residents. I did note, however, that many of the larger chain stores in the Centrum were staffed only by majority natives; the smaller or locally-owned stores were the only businesses that appeared to be more likely to have minority staff. Also, although there was great diversity among all those who patronized the Centrum, I did notice that in almost all of the instances I observed in which patrons were together in groups, members of minority groups did not mix with members of the native majority. The minority groups of patrons themselves, however, usually had a broad mix of ethnicities among them (see Figure 8.5). Despite the mixing of minority and native majority residents in the Centrum itself, the two groups did not seem to mix more personally.




Figure 8.5 Inside Sollentuna Centrum, November 2015. (Source: Own work.)

8.4.3 Summary: Levels of Concentration of Migrants and Segregation in Sollentuna

As in other areas of Million Program housing, Sollentuna had segregation built right into its community in the establishment of Malmvägen. One would expect that the situation in

Malmvägen in particular would be a prime motivator of the halo effect, prompting higher anti-migrant political action by the native majority (and hence, higher voteshare for the Sweden Democrats), as this segregated area is located very near other neighborhoods in which more majority natives live. The presence of the rail station and Sollentuna Centrum, however, offer an excellent, everyday opportunity for migrants and majority natives to come into contact with one another as members of the same community. Although I did note that members of minority groups and of the native majority did not mix personally often (e.g., did not shop or eat together in the Centrum), ethnic diversity was indeed ubiquitous and quite commonplace. Furthermore, many migrants who began living in Malmvägen eventually improved their economic status over the years, and subsequently moved into their own homes in other, more affluent areas of Sollentuna; this relocation led to greater diversity even within the areas of lower population density and typically higher proportions of majority natives (e.g., Edsberg, Helenelund, Töjnan).¹⁰ Therefore, despite the misgivings that some majority natives still maintain about Malmvägen, the opportunities to interact and the large diversity throughout the municipality seem to undercut any impetus for anti-migrant political action, and hence a lower level of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been consistently observed in Sollentuna than would be expected.

8.5 Effects of the Proportion of Migrants in Sollentuna

To be sure, the proportion of migrants residing in Sollentuna municipality is relatively high (22.95% in 2015) – above the Swedish average, but just below the average for Stockholm County (23.43%). The statistics from 2001 indicate that the proportion of migrants has grown steadily in Sollentuna from about 16% to almost 23%, with the largest rate of growth occurring from 2008 to

¹⁰ Interview Subject 9 November 2015 #2 and personal visits.

2015, with nearly a 5% rise over that time (see Figure 8.6). The largest jump in migrant proportion was from 2013 to 2014: a 0.86%-rise (but the growth from 2014 to 2015 was 0.83% – nearly as large as the previous year).

As noted in the previous section, the presence of minorities (migrants and those of migrant descent) is ubiquitous in the Sollentuna Centrum and main rail station, yet migrants have settled throughout the municipality, despite a concentration of migrant residences in Malmvägen. And again, many migrants have resided in Sollentuna for some time from earlier influxes of labor or refugee migration (e.g., Iranian refugees from the 1980s). Given that Sollentuna has been a




Figure 8.6 Proportion of Foreign-Born Residents in Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities, Stockholm and Skåne Counties, and Sweden: 2001-2015

settlement destination for migrants for some time and that the numbers have continued to rise through 2015, any effects that the proportion of migrants may be thought to have on voteshare outcomes for the Sweden Democrats would be occurring at the time of observation – a time not only when the proportion of migrants is highest, but also when the *rise* in migrant proportion has been at its highest level as well.

The voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, however, is below average for the county and country, and local support is also small (as well as being below that of neighboring municipality, Järfälla, as noted above – see Table 8.1). The proportion of migrants and a continuing rise in their numbers do not seem to be having a substantial effect on the voteshare numbers for the Sweden Democrats – the trend has been for growing support for the party, but only moderately, compared to the rest of the country and other, individual counties: the proportion of migrants in Skåne County, for example, is measurably lower than that in Stockholm County, yet support for the Sweden Democrats in Skåne has been much higher than in Stockholm, as discussed in the voteshare quantitative analysis earlier (yet all areas have higher migrant proportions than the country as a whole). The rate of migrant proportion growth has been similar to that in the two municipalities and the two counties. Thus, more than just the proportion of migrants – and the growth in this number – must account for the lower share of votes for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna, and counter importance that previous literature has placed on these numbers with regard to anti-migrant party voteshare (Golder, 2003; Ruth and Rydgren, 2013).

8.6 Effects of Economic Factors in Sollentuna

In my quantitative analysis, I considered the official rate of unemployment at the county level as an indicator of the effect of economic conditions (and an evaluation of the “material threat” thesis

proposed in earlier literature). At the municipal level, the available data unemployment data is computed for those persons who are not “gainfully employed” (which includes students, retirees, and others in the 16-64-year age range who are not working). This measurement of unemployment may be considered more robust than the official numbers, which exclude those not actively seeking employment: those not “gainfully employed” are more likely to remain in the municipality, and may have more free time than those who are actively employed – those not gainfully employed




Figure 8.7 Percent of Residents not Gainfully Employed in Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities, Stockholm and Skåne Counties, and Sweden: 2004-2014

may be more likely to feel the “material threat” effects of migrants that have been previously posited, and which, in combination with other variables, I have found to have some impact on voteshare for the Sweden Democrats.

In Figure 8.7, I show the figures for those who are not gainfully employed in Sollentuna and Järfälla, Stockholm and Skåne Counties, and Sweden as a whole. Sollentuna is very much near the national average (and has been over the timeframe featured), while the rates for both Sollentuna and Järfälla have been below the average for the County (and note that the proportion of residents not gainfully employed in Skåne County is well above the other areas and the average for the country as a whole).

From the quantitative analysis, I expect a dampening effect on anti-migrant party voteshare in conditions of average unemployment but *high population density*. Table X in the previous chapter gave the figures for Sollentuna’s population density from 1998 to 2014, and it is clear that this value is quite high – higher than the average for the county – and has continued to grow each year. Since 2009, unemployment levels have stayed fairly steady, decreasing slightly, but staying in step with the average for the county. Therefore, unemployment has not varied substantively since before the 2010 elections, yet population density has grown rather briskly in this time (from 1197 persons per square kilometer to 1318 persons). The effects of unemployment, then are not clearly visible, yet the impact of growing population density – which puts residents in closer quarters to one another in the places where they live, shop, and recreate – seem to provide a key component of the explanatory picture in determining the relatively low voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in the Sollentuna.

8.7 Potential Explanations Observed: Proposed Alternative Hypotheses

In addition to identifying and evaluating the variables I had proposed in my hypotheses, I noted several competing or intensifying factors that may help to explain the relatively low level of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna. Part of the purpose of my field work was to generate these potential alternative hypotheses, which will inform future research directions on the outcome of anti-migrant political action. These explanations are a combination of structural, economic, and political factors, and I present and discuss their potential relevance in the following sections.

8.7.1 Diversity within the Migrant Population

As mentioned above in the section discussing the distribution of migrants, 96 nationalities are presently represented among the population of Malmvägen. This is an extraordinary mix of backgrounds, cultures, languages, races, and beliefs concentrated in a rather small area of the municipality. But such diversity within the migrant population in Sollentuna is not a new phenomenon: evidence of earlier waves of immigration, such as labor migrants (e.g., from Turkey in the 1970s) and the early years of refugee migration (e.g., from Iran in the 1980s) to Sweden can be found among the residential areas in the municipality. Many of these earlier migrants have indeed moved into more established, more affluent neighborhoods in Sollentuna after having become financially able to do so.¹¹ Thus, while Malmvägen has remained something of a “starting point” for newly arrived migrants, those who have lived in Sweden for longer periods of time have relocated throughout the municipality. As such, these longer-term migrants have become parts of their neighborhoods, and at least in some instances, are seen more as “Swedish” than “migrant” –

¹¹ Such was the case for my Interview Subject 10 November 2015#1 and #2.

in other words, they are not seen strictly as “other” – or as any kind of threat – by the majority natives as they acclimate to the presence of their migrant neighbors (Nordin 2005, 33). These earlier waves of migration, then, have possibly served as something like a buffer between the native majority population and those who arrive from different countries.

Given that the earlier periods of migration were also somewhat diverse (Turkey, Iran, and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s; Somalia, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe in the 1990s; Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria in the 2000s), there is already a rather wide cultural base into which the later migrants can situate themselves and to which they can connect socially. For example, Iranian associations may also be active in assisting the migrants who have been arriving most recently from Afghanistan and Syria. Also, in Sollentuna, there are many businesses owned by migrants or their descendants, such as Turkish, Yugoslavian, or Hispanic stores and restaurants. These businesses are patronized mostly by migrants (but not exclusively), providing points of integration and acclimation for the migrants themselves. Therefore, the timing and broad diversity of the on-going migration in Sollentuna may help explain why anti-migrant sentiment has not easily translated into anti-migrant action: the majority natives have slowly become accustomed to the diversity of their new neighbors, and so the subsequent migrants are not seen as so different from those who came before them.

8.7.2 Other Economic Indicators: Taxes, Areas of Public Expenditure, and Affluence

Sollentuna was described to me as one of the most affluent municipalities in Sweden,¹² yet I was also informed that the taxes in Sollentuna are lower than those in neighboring Järfälla. Looking at the municipal and total tax rates for the two municipalities (Table 8.2), this difference in municipal

¹² Interview Subjects 6 November 2105 #1; 10 November 2015#1 and #2, 11 November 2015 #1; and 12 November #1.

Table 8.2 Municipal and Total Tax Rates in Sollentuna and Järfälla, 2002-2015

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Municipal Taxes														
Sollentuna	17.93	18.68	18.68	18.68	18.58	18.33	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.10	18.10	18.10
Järfälla	18.63	19.13	19.13	19.13	19.13	18.98	18.80	18.63	18.63	18.63	18.63	18.98	18.98	18.98
Difference: Järfälla - Sollentuna	0.70	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.60	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.88	0.88	0.88
Total Taxes														
Sollentuna	28.25	30.30	30.95	30.95	30.85	30.60	30.30	30.30	30.30	30.30	30.30	30.20	30.20	30.20
Järfälla	28.95	30.75	31.40	31.40	31.40	31.25	30.90	30.73	30.73	30.73	30.73	31.08	31.08	31.08

tax rate is apparent over time, although the difference between the two has fluctuated over the past several years (yet was quite higher in 2015 than in the years immediately preceding). It is interesting that in the years after the 2008 global financial crisis, local taxes in Sollentuna were held steady or *decreased*, while in Järfälla, the municipal tax rate went up in 2013. Therefore, residents of Sollentuna have felt a smaller and decreasing tax burden from the municipality over the past decade, while this burden is higher and has increased in Järfälla. Although the decrease in municipal taxed in Sollentuna is not huge, it could nonetheless be considered an easing of an economic burden, and hence of a potential material threat from the rising migrant population.

In addition to the smaller tax rate in Sollentuna, the targets of public expenditure themselves may contribute to the causal picture of diffusing support for the Sweden Democrats in the municipality. After 2008, Sollentuna increased its spending on culture and recreation activities significantly, and after 2010, it began outspending Järfälla in these areas per capita (although Sollentuna did decrease spending in these areas in 2013; see Table 8.3). Thus, at least part of Sollentuna's higher taxes have been spent on more facilities, services, and activities that bring the

community together and foster social integration:¹³ for example, one organization that works with migrant/minority youth began operation in 2012, and their physical location is supported by the municipality.¹⁴ Many opportunities in Sollentuna such as this organization strive to attract

Table 8.3 Net Public Spending per Capita on Culture and Recreation in Sollentuna and Järfälla, 2000-2013

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Municipal Taxes														
Sollentuna	1112	1285	1252	1251	1268	1301	1350	1369	1336	1604	1762	1992	1963	1846
Järfälla	1427	1448	1374	1510	1520	1516	1559	1572	1753	1762	1866	1853	1854	1822
Difference: Järfälla - Sollentuna	-315	-163	-122	-259	-252	-215	-209	-203	-417	-158	-104	139	109	24

residents from all ethnicities – again in an effort to promote social integration.¹⁵ Therefore, any material threat that higher taxes in Sollentuna may provoke is potentially offset by the municipality’s expenditure on places and opportunities of social contact, where daily mixing of the residents can occur quite easily. In bringing residents together in close social contact on a regular basis, any potential halo effect that some of the residential segregation in Sollentuna may have otherwise given rise to can be dispelled, and the level of anti-migrant political action – such as support for the Sweden Democrats – is muted.

¹³ See Sollentuna Municipality, <www.sollentuna.se/sv/nyheter--press/nyhet-uppleva--gora/nystart-for-fritidsverksamheten-i-tureberg/>.

¹⁴ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

¹⁵ The municipality recently held an “integration lunch” and evening forum, to which it invited residents and organizations – including the one mentioned – to present views and information on integration within the Sollentuna community, <www.sollentuna.se/sv/nyheter--press/nyhet-kommun--politik/stort-intresse-for-kommunens-integrationslunch/>

Finally, I mentioned previously that Sollentuna is one of the most affluent municipalities in Sweden. It has been posited that residents of a higher socio-economic status do not typically show support for far right parties (in Western Europe), yet other scholarship has found that a sense of economic threat is not as salient for voters as that of a *cultural* threat (especially for those with a higher socio-cultural awareness [Lucassen and Lubbers, 2011]; Ivarsflaten, 2008; the lack of significance with regard to the economic indicator I use – the level of unemployment – on the outcome of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats *and* the level of anti-migrant hate crimes further underscores the absence of salience of a material threat). Furthermore, studies have also shown that issue saliency is what drives votes for far right parties (Van Der Burg, *et al*, 2005; Meguid, 2005). In Sollentuna, there is ample opportunity for a cultural threat to majority natives to arise, given the cultural and economic segregation of the Malmvägen area from the rest of the municipality – even though the presence of a material (economic) threat is absent. Clearly for some residents in Sollentuna, this threat remains, despite the improvements that have occurred in Malmvägen (which have been supported institutionally by the municipality council and through many civil society organizations). The overall point is that material threat does not matter as much as cultural threat in determining support for an anti-migrant party, and hence, the affluence of an area's residents is not a valid determinant of support for far right parties. To be sure, there is reason to believe that at least a sense of cultural threat is still felt among *some* residents of Sollentuna – but not to a large degree. Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) found that the effect of social class and education is moderated by *attitudes* towards migrants – attitudes that perhaps persist despite the present-day reality. I would argue, then, that the demand-side indicator of the relative affluence of Sollentuna's residents has not been the prime causal mechanism that has dampened support for the Sweden Democrats, but rather it has been the integration efforts made by political

and civil institutions have overcome the conditions of the halo effect by lowering the overall perception of cultural threat among majority native voters.¹⁶

8.7.3 Political Factors

Clearly, the decision on where to spend municipal funds is a political one, and may be an important explanatory factor not only in the municipality's support for measures of social integration, but also with regard to limiting political space for the Sweden Democrats to gain a foothold. The Moderates have held control of the municipal council for almost 40 years, and by some accounts, very little influence on policy comes from outside of the party.¹⁷ While some may see this as a measure of local political corruption, given there has not been a change in power over such a long period of time,¹⁸ others see the benefits that have come from a consistency of governance and decision-making: as one of my subjects succinctly put it: "The Moderates have done a good job. We have the lowest unemployment rate among youth [in the county] and there are no criminal gangs. I am a member of another party, but I cannot fault the Moderates for what they have done in the municipality."¹⁹

Thus, the Moderate Party's combination of tangible results in the municipality and a long tenure in power may leave little room for the Sweden Democrats to gain inroads – particularly in matters related to migrants and migration: residents are simply not receptive to the Sweden Democrats because they do not seem to offer any better alternatives (and none seem necessary).

¹⁶ Although the level of a voter's education has also been found to be significant in determining support for an anti-migrant party (Werts *et al*, 2012), again, Lubbers and Scheepers discount this finding when moderated by attitudes towards migrants. I was, however, indicated to me that the level of education throughout Sollentuna is variable, and indeed it has one of the best and worst secondary schools in Sweden (Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1). I nonetheless do not test education levels or anti-migrant attitudes as explanatory variables – a course for future research.

¹⁷ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

¹⁸ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

¹⁹ Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

Likewise, the Sweden Democrats do not have a strong local leader and the party is not as organized in Sollentuna as they are in other areas of Sweden – in the last two elections (2010 and 2014), some members of the Sweden Democrats tried canvassing for votes outside of Sollentuna Centrum, but were met mostly with indifference from residents.²⁰ According to a Member of Parliament for the Sweden Democrats:

Support [for the Sweden Democrats] has always be strongest in south of Sweden, as it is closer to Denmark, where the debate is different than it is in Sweden. There is more support in smaller areas, too, where immigration has created a greater strain – the backside of immigration has been seen in these areas. Also, in smaller areas, a charismatic leader stands out more and attracts attention.²¹

Explanation for the low level of support for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna, then, may be somewhat endogenous, as the municipality's size, proportion of migrants, and long migration history – and the abundant points of social contact – mean that the Sweden Democrats find Sollentuna a less-than-attractive area in which to try to tap into anti-migrant sentiment and orchestrate such sentiment into political action, especially given the strong hold of the Moderates in the municipality.

8.8 Conclusions

In consideration of the proposed and observed factors I observed during my field study, I can offer a few conclusions that I believe help explain why voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been lower in Sollentuna than expected, and particularly lower than in other areas of Stockholm County. First, although Sollentuna does indeed have one of the Million Program housing projects – and this area is inhabited overwhelmingly by migrants – throughout the rest of the municipality,

²⁰ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

²¹ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

migrants (particularly those from earlier waves of immigration) are well dispersed throughout other residential areas. Also, there are significant opportunities for daily, personal contact between minority/migrant residents and majority natives, and the municipality actively supports facilities and activities to increase such social contacts, including services offered by local community organizations. At the heart of the causal picture, then, is this mix of migrant/minority residents and native majority residents: the group contact theory in action.

In consideration of the alternative hypotheses, the actual *proportion* of migrants in the overall population of Sollentuna did not seem to have a substantive effect: although voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has risen for the local and national elections over the past four election cycles in Sollentuna, that rise has not been nearly as precipitous as in other areas of the county (such as in neighboring Järfälla), or indeed in other areas of the country. The wide residential distribution of migrants within the densely populated municipality appears to have overcome the effects of the mere rise in the numbers of migrants coming to the municipality year after year.

The level of unemployment did not appear to have any kind of effect on voteshare outcomes, per the alternative hypothesis: as unemployment levels have not varied significantly over the past six years, this factor could not be said to be having an effect on the Sweden Democrat voteshare levels. As expected from the quantitative results, however, a mean level of unemployment combined with a high population density has led to an increase in the party's voteshare – but only a very moderate rise. Again, the dampening effect of such a high population density – which puts residents in close contact with one another – appears to play a key causal role.

Of course, other factors possibly augment the mechanisms of group contact and help to offset the halo effect that one might expect to arise from the Malmvägen area. As mentioned, the

local politicians support social integration activities in name and funding, and have been able to achieve a favorable track record in this pursuit by virtue of their long tenure in power. The Moderates have taxed their residents *less* heavily than in neighboring municipalities, but again, *how* these funds are spent in the communities of the municipality may offset any ill social effects that might be more important than *how much* residents are taxed. In this way, the affluence of Sollentuna may aid in social integration, instead of allowing for the spectre of a cultural threat to develop: the level of affluence alone would not be cause enough to explain the low voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in the municipality, but the ways in which that affluence is directed through local tax spending undercuts the ripening of group conflict between migrants and majority natives.

The Moderates, then, seem to expect social integration to follow from social contact opportunities, and to an observable degree, this has indeed occurred – but it was mentioned to me that the government – at the local and national levels – has “no integration plan whatever.”²² It is possible, then, that social integration could be improved if the policy makers were to articulate a clear, comprehensive plan of integration – not only to migrants and their descendants, but to majority natives as well:²³ the difference between “integration” and “assimilation” is very small in the minds of many Swedes (native and migrant), and often, “integration” is seen as the responsibility of the migrant – not of the majority natives or government.²⁴ In Sollentuna, however, the seeds for increased social integration seem to have been well sown through patterns of residence, population density, and political priority and spending, and these factors have served to attenuate the electoral success of the Sweden Democrats.

²² Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1.

²³ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

²⁴ Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

Chapter 9

Qualitative Case Study: Examining Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla

9.1 Introduction

I chose to investigate the level of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla – a municipality within Stockholm County that neighbors Sollentuna – as it shares many similar characteristics with Sollentuna on several of the explanatory variables I have identified in my hypotheses (e.g., proportion of migrants, population density, unemployment levels). The Sweden Democrats have, however, garnered higher electoral support in Järfälla – at both the national and local levels – despite its similarities with Sollentuna. Using Järfälla as a comparative municipality case has enabled me to better assess my hypotheses, as well as to generate some possible alternative explanations, some of which I also put forth in the preceding case study of Sollentuna. Most importantly, I find that Järfälla does not have the kind of traditional “migrant ghetto” area that Malmvägen has been in Sollentuna – as it was not a location of a Million Program housing block – but neither does Järfälla afford the kinds of opportunities for its residents to come into close social contact as those I found in Sollentuna. The local political landscape, however, does seem to play a causal role, as local elections have been fought primarily between the Moderates and Social Democrats over the past several election cycles: the implications here are that, with the revolving door of policy-making power from one election to the next, consistent policy is difficult

to maintain, and residents may become frustrated with the status quo back-and-forth between these two mainstream parties – a situation that creates an opportunity for another, smaller party such as the Sweden Democrats to step in and claim some political space, and hence, electoral support.

As a reminder, I shall present the Sweden Democrat’s voteshare results for both municipalities, at the local and national levels. I shall then give a brief overview of Järfälla’s geography and population demographics, followed by an assessment of the main causal variables I identified in my hypotheses. Next, I shall consider some of the same alternative explanations that I observed in Sollentuna – as these were present in Järfälla as well, but appeared to operate causally in different ways than in Sollentuna, thereby leading to different outcomes. I shall conclude with a summary of the case of Järfälla, and an overall comparison with Sollentuna and an assessment of the additional leverage I have gained through this comparison.

9.2 Järfälla: Sweden Democrat Voteshare

To anchor the analysis of the present case study, I repeat the voteshare outcomes for the Sweden Democrats for both Järfälla and Sollentuna over the past several elections in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Voteshare for Sweden Democrats in National Parliamentary and Local (Municipal) Elections, Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities 1998-2014

		1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
National						
Sollentuna		0.5	1.0	1.41	3.16	7.13
Järfälla		0.6	1.3	2.37	4.82	10.23
Stockholm County		0.5	1.0	1.9	4.2	9.7
Sweden		0.4	1.4	2.9	5.7	12.9
Local						
Sollentuna		-	0.0	1.4	2.22	4.28
Järfälla		-	0.0	2.4	4.42	7.42

As mentioned in the Sollentuna case study, Järfälla has had a consistently higher voteshare outcome for the Sweden Democrats at both the local and national levels since the 1998 elections (the year that the Sweden Democrats became recognizable as a viable party at the national level). Initially, the electoral support for the party in the two municipalities was almost the same, but beginning with the 2006 elections, the Sweden Democrats began to reap a more rapidly-increasing level of support in Järfälla than in Sollentuna; the Sweden Democrats also gained a higher-than-average voteshare in Järfälla over this timeframe than in Stockholm County as a whole. The level of support for the party in Järfälla has nevertheless been lower than the national average for parliamentary elections, and lower than its that of its municipal elections as well. Still, the rate of




Figure 9.1 Graph of Voteshare Results for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla (Parliamentary and Municipal Elections), and Stockholm County and Sweden (Parliamentary Elections): 1998-2014

growth of support for the party for the parliamentary elections has been in lock-step with the party's level of support across the County, but not rising quite as precipitously as over the country as a whole (see Figure 9.1).

Hence, support for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla is higher than in surrounding areas in Stockholm County, but not as high as would be expected. Compared to other areas of Stockholm County, such as Sollentuna, there are factors that have enabled greater support, but also factors that have kept the party from doing as well as across the rest of the country. Teasing out the factors that are different in Järfälla compared to Sollentuna and the ways in which these differences manifest into different outcomes will be the task of the remainder of the chapter.

9.3 Järfälla: An Overview

As a neighbor of Sollentuna, Järfälla has some of the same characteristics: it is a northern suburb of Stockholm City, also connected to the city via a rail line (which has stations in Jakobsberg – the municipal seat – and Barkarby and Kallhäll) – see Figure 9.2. Located on a different line from that of Sollentuna (e.g., Järfälla's line does not serve Arlanda airport), it takes about 20 minutes to get to the heart of Stockholm. Sollentuna can be reached via bus service (a trip which takes over an hour!). The neighborhood of Husby (in which much unrest took place in 2013) is adjacent to Järfälla – closer to Barkarby (a district that is growing rapidly at present) than to Jakobsberg. In addition to being the municipal seat, the main rail station and Centrum are located in Jakobsberg, and are much larger than those in the other districts (Barkarby and Kallhäll; and the Centrum in Viksjö). The other districts do not radiate from Jakobsberg in the way that they do from Tureberg in Sollentuna – these districts are not closely situated to Jakobsberg. In addition, housing does not seem to be as dense around Jakobsberg as is the case in Tureberg.

Although the population densities are very similar indeed in Järfälla and Sollentuna – being ever-so-slightly higher in Järfälla (see Table 7.2 in Chapter 7) – there seems to be more rural area in Järfälla than in Sollentuna (I saw a large moose in a field near the road in Järfälla one day).



Figure 9.2 Detailed map of the Municipality of Järfälla, Indicating the Municipal Seat, Jakobsberg (*Source: www.val.se*) 🚆 → Jakobsberg Rail Station

Total population figures are similar to population density, with Järfälla being just slightly larger in population than Sollentuna (see Figure 9.3). The two populations have grown at nearly the same rate, with growth in Sollentuna rising a little faster since around 2004. In 2015, the land area of

Järfälla was 53.79 square kilometers, and in Sollentuna, it was 52.62 square kilometers (Statistics Sweden). Hence, the two municipalities are roughly the same size, with nearly the same numbers of inhabitants and population density. To me, however, it seemed that the population of Järfälla




Figure 9.3 Total population in Järfälla and Sollentuna Municipalities, 1998-2015. (Source: Statistics Sweden)

was more dispersed throughout the land area, whereas in Sollentuna, population was concentrated more around Tureberg. Thus, despite having about the same overall population density, to me it seemed that Järfälla's population was more dispersed throughout the municipality and its neighborhoods were less compact than was the case in Sollentuna.

Also of note was the ubiquitous presence of construction at the time of my visit: all three of the rail stations were undergoing what seemed to be quite sizable renovations and additions, and the Centrum areas of Barkarby and Kallhäll were also under construction. In Barkarby, many new housing complexes had apparently just been built (not all were yet occupied), and many more were under construction in the vicinity. Järfälla, then, seems to be preparing for more population influx to the municipality,¹ but it is interesting to note that most new housing construction is concentrated around the district centers and rail lines – similar to the development pattern that has evolved in Sollentuna. Despite the money being spent on such construction and renovations, Järfälla appears to have more of a working-class population than Sollentuna, as I noticed several factories in the areas outside of the district centers (Saab, for example, still has a major production facility just outside of Jakobsberg). There are, then, some differences between the two municipalities that may help complete the causal picture of voteshare support for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla.

9.4 Migration and Housing in Järfälla: The Effects of the Distribution of Migrants and Population Density on Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats

From my observations, I could ascertain evidence of migrants from different waves of migration to Sweden, but the demographics seemed different than those in Sollentuna. Järfälla seemed to be home to more migrants from Eastern Europe and East Asia, but there appeared to be fewer migrants from African countries. As in Sollentuna, I did see many migrants ostensibly from the Middle East throughout the municipality. Perhaps crucially, Järfälla was *not* a site of a Million

¹ According to Statistics Sweden, immigrations to Järfälla in 2015 were *much* higher (1026 persons) than those to Sollentuna (846 persons) – and higher than in previous years. The numbers of immigrants coming to Sollentuna for the preceding 16 years (data examined back to 1998), however, had on average been higher. <www.scb.se>.

Program housing block, as I mentioned previously, and hence no pre-fabricated “migrant ghetto” evolved here as a result. Hence, Järfälla’s population is ethnically diverse, but it did not seem to be nearly as ethnically diverse as that in Sollentuna.

9.4.1 Housing and Residential Distribution

The neighborhoods I visited – particularly those around Jakobsberg – were not as densely built or populated as those around Tureberg in Sollentuna, and the houses seemed to be built at an earlier time (constructed mostly in the 1970s,² concomitant with the influx of labor migration). Within the neighborhoods themselves, there was a substantial mix of ethnicities: minorities/migrants were living interspersed among the residences of majority natives. This neighborhood diversity seemed to be greater in Jakobsberg and Barkarby (the latter of which also seemed to be home to many young people who were new residents in the recently-constructed housing), than it was in Kallhäll.

In Järfälla, then, there was no identifiable “migrant block” of residents in which a clear concentration of potential “out-group” members lived in close proximity to “in-group” majority natives, and so one would not expect the halo effect to be particularly present in the municipality. Residential density, however, seemed much lower throughout Järfälla than in Sollentuna, so residents may not have as great an opportunity to come into close, personal contact with one another, outside of their specific neighborhoods. These two factors concerning the residential population would be expected to counteract one another: the lower probability of a halo effect would tend to lead to lower levels of anti-migrant behavior, while residential areas with lower density might not allow residents to mix more closely – or such lower density might dampen any kind of halo effect that might be present in specific areas (e.g., where a concentrated group of

² The house in which I stayed in Jakobsberg was built in the 1970s – very large, with a sizable back yard.

migrants live in relatively close proximity to a group of majority natives). Residential concentration and population density do not seem to comprise the complete causal picture in Järfälla with respect to its voteshare results for the Sweden Democrats, which are higher than those in Sollentuna: there appears to be more going on causally in Järfälla.

9.4.2 Business and Social Factors

As I noted above, I observed fewer areas in which community members can interact in Järfälla as opposed to Sollentuna (e.g., fewer community organizations, clubs, recreational facilities), and those that do exist were smaller than in Sollentuna: culture and recreation do not seem to be supported with public funds in Järfälla to the same extent as in Sollentuna. In Järfälla's more rural-like areas, there are plenty of outdoor spaces, parks, trails, a lake, and even a ski slope – but these areas are mostly well away from residential spaces. There is also a large golf course and yacht club in Viksjö – an area that appears to be more affluent than the other districts, with a newer but small Centrum and many newly-constructed housing units – in the western part of the municipality, near the lake.

I noticed in the shops, however, that there seemed to be more minorities/migrants working in larger, chain stores (and not just in minority-owned businesses) than was the case in Sollentuna – this was especially true in the Jakobsberg Centrum. Yet there also appeared to be fewer businesses throughout Järfälla that served specific ethnic interests (I found far fewer ethnic grocery stores and restaurants, for example). The clientele of the shops, however, seemed much less diverse than in Sollentuna: I did observe minority/migrant shoppers and restaurant-goers in Järfälla, but in far fewer numbers than in Sollentuna (where minority group members outnumbered majority natives). A view of the interior of the Jakobsberg Centrum is in Figure 9.4, illustrating

what I found to be the typical clientele: some minority Swedes, but as many or more native majority Swedes (note, however, that minority and majority Swedes are interacting in this space and are not separate from one another, as I found in Sollentuna's shops).



Figure 9.4 Inside Jakobsberg Centrum, November 2015. (Source: Own work.)

The Centrum in Jakobsberg was sizable (larger than those in other districts), but was not as big as that in Sollentuna, and people did not seem to gather there in the same numbers: there were fewer restaurants and cafes, and the opening hours were shorter. In Barkarby, there is not one, contained centrum *per se*, but rather a conglomerate of stand-alone stores and small strip centers – most of which appear to be very new indeed.³ The smaller shops in particular do not seem to be getting as much patronage as the big-box stores, but that may change as more residents

³ Ikea opened here a few years ago, followed by other big-box stores.

move into the new housing constructions. In Kallhäll, the Centrum was very small and had rather limited opening hours – I was there on a Saturday afternoon, and not many people were around at all. Compared to Sollentuna, then, the residents of Järfälla seem to do more of their shopping/socializing/recreating elsewhere (in Stockholm City, likely), and hence, the municipality has more of a “commuter” feel to it. As an example, I stayed in a house in Järfälla owned by a person whose parents were migrants, and while he did operate part of his business in his home in Jakobsberg, he also had an apartment in Stockholm City and conducted his business at that location for part of the week – his time was thus split between the two locations. Such a commuter lifestyle leads to a situation where residents do not interact with one another as easily, and there are fewer facilities that encourage community mixing. Hence, the opportunities for minority residents and native majority residents to come into personal contact regularly appears more limited in Järfälla compared to Sollentuna, although there do seem to be more minorities/migrants who work in the businesses of Järfälla.

9.5 Effects of the Proportion of Migrants in Järfälla

The proportion of migrants (foreign-born residents) is high in Järfälla (over 27% in 2015) – above the Swedish average (17% in 2015), but slightly above the average for Stockholm County (23.5% in 2015); these figures are repeated in Figure 9.5 from Chapter 8. As in Sollentuna over the past 12 years, the proportion of migrants has grown in Järfälla from about 19% to 27.5%, with the largest rate of growth from 2006 onwards (almost a 7% rise). This growing trend began earlier and has risen more sharply than in Sollentuna. The largest jump in the migrant proportion was from 2014 to 2015, when this number went up by 1.42% (the next-largest jump was from 2013 to 2014, when the increase was 0.93%). Thus, migrants are becoming a larger part of Järfälla’s

population, and presently the proportion is 4% more than in neighboring Sollentuna. These numbers are due more




Figure 9.5 Proportion of Foreign-Born Residents in Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities, Stockholm and Skåne Counties, and Sweden: 2001-2015

to an *influx* of migrants, as opposed to an out-migration of native majority Swedes: from 1998 to 2005, more migrants had been settling in Sollentuna, but since 2005, more and more migrants have been heading to Järfälla to live (see Figure 9.6).

Therefore, the proportion of migrants and the number of migrants arriving to live in Järfälla has been higher than in neighboring Sollentuna – perhaps one of the triggering factors for the wide-

spread housing construction I witnessed.⁴ To be sure, with the inordinate influx of refugees that arrived in the country in 2015, and the mandate for all municipalities to house more refugees,⁵ this




Figure 9.6 Number of Immigrants Settling in Järfälla and Sollentuna Municipalities: 1998-2015

growth in the number and proportion of migrants settling in Järfälla is likely to grow in the immediate future, even if refugee inflows level off or drop. But this increase in migrant numbers is on a par with that in Sollentuna, where voteshare for the Sweden Democrats has been much lower. The proportion and influx of migrants alone cannot explain this difference in anti-migrant political action between the two municipalities – although combined with lower population density in Järfälla, it may contribute to the explanation.

⁴ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1; see also The Local, <www.thelocal.se/20151021/sweden-is-approaching-the-limit-of-its-capacity>.

⁵ Interview Subject 27 October 2015#1.

9.6 Effects of Economic Factors in Järfälla

As in the Sollentuna case, I evaluate the effects of economic factors by considering the “not gainfully employed” population in Järfälla. This rate is above that in Sollentuna, yet a little below the average for Stockholm County (Figure 9.7 shows these figures again). As a reminder, the




Figure 9.7 Percent of Residents not Gainfully Employed in Sollentuna and Järfälla Municipalities, Stockholm and Skåne Counties, and Sweden: 2004-2014

earlier quantitative results predicted that a dampening effect on anti-migrant party voteshare would occur in areas of high population density and mean unemployment levels, yet there would still be an increase in voteshare as unemployment rose. The sharpest rise in unemployment occurred in

2009, and may have had some impact on the 2010 Sweden Democrat voteshare, but this level was still below the county average – things were not egregiously worse in Järfälla than in other municipalities (although the employment picture was rather better in Sollentuna at this time, as it has been for the past decade). Since 2009, unemployment levels have in fact *decreased* in Järfälla – reaching the lowest level since 2004 in 2014 – and have remained virtually in step with the county levels since 2004 (and very near the county averages since 2009). Similar to Sollentuna, then, variation in unemployment levels since before the 2010 election cannot fully explain the increase in voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla for the 2010 and 2014 elections, or indeed for the 2006 elections (a time in which Järfälla’s unemployment was even further below the county average). This factor could possibly contribute to the explanation of the outcome for the 2010 election, but not the large jump in support in 2014. As an indicator of economic stress – or of a potential “material threat” from migrants – levels of unemployment cannot provide an adequate enough explanation as to why the Sweden Democrats have done comparatively well in Järfälla in the past three elections.

9.7 Summary: Effects of the Identified Variables on the Outcome of Sweden Democrat Voteshare in Järfälla

In the case study analysis of Järfälla, I found some differences from the case of Sollentuna with regard to my main explanatory variable: residential concentration of migrants. Although Järfälla has virtually the same population density as Sollentuna, I found residential areas to be not as compact within Järfälla’s districts as those in Sollentuna: neighborhoods were more spacious and less near the area centrums, although I did note a number of high-rise apartment buildings (but again, not very near the centrums, and not near one another, either). In addition, the centrums

themselves did not offer as many shops and services as those in Sollentuna, and the main centrum in Jakobsberg was not patronized by as many residents. Minorities and migrants, however, *were* residentially dispersed throughout the neighborhoods I observed: there was apparently an even mixture of minority and majority native Swedes. And indeed, Järfälla did not have a Million Program housing block area like Malmvägen in Sollentuna. Thus, while there did not seem to be the same level of residential segregation in Järfälla as in Sollentuna, there were also fewer opportunities for residents to mix socially in their communities – or, residents took less advantage of the available facilities compared to Sollentuna. I would expect, then, that the widespread residential distribution of migrants would serve to dampen electoral support for the Sweden Democrats, given that a clear halo effect area was not present. The lack of community facilities, however, has perhaps kept residents from more freely associating with one another on an everyday basis: it seems that many residents commute to other areas of Stockholm – Järfälla is just a place to live, not to socialize.

There are, however, many industrial businesses in Järfälla, so at least some residents may choose to live *and* work in the municipality (although some may commute from other municipalities – a task that I found to be difficult and time-consuming via public transportation). Järfälla, then, seemed to be more working-class than Sollentuna, although Viksjö appeared to be a more affluent district than the others. One might expect that working-class areas would have been hard hit by the global financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis, yet unemployment over the past several years has in fact *decreased* in Järfälla, and the levels of those not gainfully employed have been below the county average since 2004 – two years before the Sweden Democrats began to achieve greater electoral successes (at the local and national levels) in the municipality, at a higher rate than in Sollentuna or the rest of the county. This measure of material threat does differ

between the two municipalities, but the gap has been narrowing since 2008, before the large jumps in support for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla in the 2010 and 2014 elections.

Although unemployment may not be as great a hardship to residents of a comprehensive welfare state as in states with more liberal economies, the increase in migrants may cause worry among native majority residents who fear that more of their taxes will be diverted to support refugees instead of providing a safety net for citizens – this is a kind of material threat through a back door, through a sense of welfare chauvinism. As population density and the proportion of migrants in the two municipalities have been nearly equal for more than decade, such fears that rising migrant numbers pose would be expected to play out in *both* municipalities in the form of anti-migrant political action, but this is not the case. The combined effects of rising migrant population numbers and unemployment have not had the anticipated outcomes, either: unemployment has gone down in both municipalities, while migrant population numbers have been the same. Such a material threat as unemployment, then – even when combined with the numbers of migrants – would not seem to be a main driver of the quickly rising levels of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla: other factors must be contributing to the outcomes observed.

9.8 Potential Explanations Observed: Proposed Alternative Hypotheses

During my field visits, I noticed a few possible alternative explanations in Järfälla that may further explain why the Sweden Democrats have done comparatively well here – and have continued to increase their successes – compared to Sollentuna. So again, my field work generated some possible additional hypotheses that I will leave for further research to evaluate more methodically. Interestingly, I observed some of these same factors in both municipalities, but their causal

mechanisms operated differently. I present these alternatives in the following sections and the ways in which they may combine to effect greater voteshare outcomes for the Sweden Democrats.

9.8.1 Other Economic Factors

As I described above, Järfälla appears to be a more “blue-collar” municipality overall than Sollentuna: whereas I observed many factories/production facilities throughout Järfälla, in Sollentuna, the businesses I saw were mostly concerned with services and sales. Järfälla was described to me as not being as affluent as Sollentuna, and I was told that its municipal tax rates are higher than those of Sollentuna⁶ – and have been over the past decade (particularly since 2013: see Table 9.2, excerpted from Table 8.2 from the last chapter). Therefore, the residents in Järfälla, on average, may be earning less than those in neighboring Sollentuna, yet are being taxed at a consistently higher rate. Such a combination of income factors may translate into a sense of welfare chauvinism as described in the previous section, as residents may become frustrated with continuously rising taxes and a continued rise in the number of migrants locating in the municipality.

Table 9.2 Municipal Tax Rates in Sollentuna and Järfälla, 2002-2015

Municipal Taxes	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Sollentuna	17.93	18.68	18.68	18.68	18.58	18.33	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.20	18.10	18.10	18.10
Järfälla	18.63	19.13	19.13	19.13	19.13	18.98	18.80	18.63	18.63	18.63	18.63	18.98	18.98	18.98
Difference: Järfälla - Sollentuna	0.70	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.60	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.88	0.88	0.88

⁶ Interview Subject 10 November 2015#1.

Yet there may be more to the tax picture than just this straightforward sense of welfare chauvinism beginning to creep out: of the taxes collected by the municipality, fewer funds have been spent on cultural and recreational services and facilities per capita in Järfälla than in Sollentuna over the past few years – yet Järfälla has tended to outspend Sollentuna in this area before that time (going back to 1998 – see Table 8.3). I did not see as much evidence of the target of these funds in Järfälla as I observed in Sollentuna, but it may be that most of Sollentuna’s spending on cultural and recreational purposes is relatively recent and on different kinds of purposes. Thus, something of a disjoint exists between the amount of funds being spent on services and facilities that could bring community residents together, and the ultimate targets of this spending. As mentioned previously, I did notice a great deal of construction on the rail stations and around city centres – these improvements may be categorized by the municipality as “culture and recreation” – a detail to explore further.

9.8.2 Political Factors: Political Space at the Local Level

As Järfälla does appear more working-class than Sollentuna, one would expect the Social Democrats to do rather well here. Yet the winning outcomes of the past three municipal elections have gone back and forth between the Social Democrats and the Moderates (a trend that is roughly mirrored in the national election outcomes) – a time in which the Sweden Democrats began to make successively larger voteshare results (see Table 9.3). Since 2002, support for the Social Democrats has dropped off noticeably, while support for the Moderates increased but then abated in 2014. Still, the voteshare that the Sweden Democrats have obtained since 2002 would be enough to swing the election from one party to the other: the presence of the Sweden Democrats has

become an important factor in municipal and national elections, and the party appears to be taking its biggest bite out of support for the Social Democrats.

Table 9.3 Voteshare for Social Democrats, Moderates, Sweden Democrats, and Greens in National Parliamentary and Local (Municipal) Elections in Järfälla, 1998-2014

	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
Parliamentary Elections					
Social Democrats	33.8	37.2	30.1	25.7	28.6
Moderates	30.3	18.6	34.1	36.4	29.0
Sweden Democrats	0.6	1.3	2.2	4.8	10.2
Greens	4.5	4.7	5.5	7.8	7.7
Municipal Elections					
Social Democrats	36.6	39.8	34.8	29.9	31.5
Moderates	29.9	21.7	31.9	34.4	28.8
Sweden Democrats	-	0.0	2.4	4.4	7.4
Greens	4.4	3.5	4.8	7.5	8.6

As discussed in the last chapter, the Moderates have had a stranglehold on power at the municipal level in Sollentuna for the past 40 years, while the Social Democrats had had a firm grip on power before the 2010 elections, but have been closely challenged by the Moderates since 1998 (except the outlier elections of 2002, when the Moderates performed particularly badly at the municipal and national levels). The recent back-and-forth struggle between the Social Democrats and Moderates at the municipal level may result in an inconsistency in policy, as one administration is just beginning to get projects off the ground when a new election brings the opposing party into power. The fluctuation between the Social Democrats and Moderates may

also indicate a frustration on the part of the electorate, who are looking for fresh or alternative ideas, yet are not finding them with the usual mainstream parties: it may be that the Social Democrats and Moderates have been locked in their battle with each other for so long that each party is not distinguishable from the other in the minds of voters. Hence, political space has opened up for a third party, and the Sweden Democrats have stepped in to claim some of that space.⁷

With respect to the particular loss of support that the Social Democrats have suffered, Oskarson and Demker (2015, 8) have found that a higher-than-expected level of support for the “...Sweden Democrats in the working class points to a dealignment between the working class and the Social Democratic Party, and authoritarian leanings within the working class together with a low degree of political trust as significant parts of the explanation.” The decrease in political trust has arisen from the fact that, since the 1998 elections, the differences in the positions of the Social Democrats and the Moderates have narrowed (Oskarson and Demker, 2015, 13) – again, reinforcing the idea that the distinction between the two parties and their platforms has become increasingly blurred over time. Crucially, anti-immigrant sentiments have not been the foundation for the growing support for the Sweden Democrats among working-class voters (Oskarson and Demker, 2015, 11), nor has the salience of economic issues been found to mobilize the working class in favor of radical right parties (Oesch, 2013, 49). These findings explain why I found no significant support for a material threat explanation for the Sweden Democrat’s higher electoral support in Järfälla, and they also reflect what I observed: the two mainstream parties in Järfälla have clearly alienated voters in the municipality – a predominately working-class area, particularly compared to Sollentuna – providing the “Sweden Democrats with a ‘window of opportunity’ to

⁷ Note, too, that the Greens have done rather well as a niche challenging party in Järfälla over this timeframe as well, outperforming the Sweden Democrats at the municipal level. This is another indicator that voters are looking for alternatives, and are turning to smaller parties more and more with each election.

mobilize significant parts of the Swedish working class” (Oskarson and Demker, 2015, 18). Clearly, in Järfälla, support for the Sweden Democrats has grown as support for the Social Democrats has waned – an excellent case in point. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to talk with working-class residents of Järfälla during my field research: this would be one avenue to pursue further in future research.

9.8.3 Waves of Migration: The Level of Diversity within the Migrant Population

As noted previously, I observed less diversity among the migrant/minority population in Järfälla than in neighboring Sollentuna: most migrants or descendants of migrants whom I observed appeared to be of Eastern European, East Asian, or Middle Eastern in origin – I observed very few whom I expected were from Africa. Those from Middle Eastern areas appeared to be part of the latest wave of migration from these areas (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria), as they were younger than the Middle Eastern migrants I met and observed in Sollentuna. Thus, the level of diversity among migrants in Järfälla has increased only within the past 20 years or so, whereas migrants have been settling in Sollentuna for a longer period of time.

That Sollentuna was an earlier destination for migrants may be down to the level of available housing: after the 1970s, Malmvägen in Sollentuna – like most of the other Million Program housing – was attractive to migrants as it was available and affordable. As no such housing projects were constructed in Järfälla, the municipality has been faced with a housing shortage in the wake of the increasing number of migrants who have come to work and live there (again, note in Table 9.6 the precipitous rise in the number of migrants coming to live in Järfälla compared to Sollentuna since 2005). Järfälla now seems to be trying to catch up, by constructing *many* new residential buildings throughout the municipality. New shopping areas are being

constructed as well (or older areas are being renovated and expanded). It may be that, once these new residences are occupied and the new business areas are completed, a greater amount of mixing among minority and majority native residents will result. An increase in cultural and recreational spending may also be put towards more facilities and services that will enable residents to come into social contact with one another more often, although I could not find any clear evidence of such projects. Järfälla may be following in Sollentuna's footsteps, to a degree, trying to effect social integration via new construction and conveniences.

9.9 Conclusions

In my field work in Järfälla, I found that migrants seem to be fairly well dispersed in residential areas throughout the municipality, but the opportunities for daily, personal contact between migrant/minority residents and native majority residents are seemingly much lower than in Sollentuna, despite a similar proportion of migrants and population density in the two municipalities. The difference in these opportunities for social mixing stems from the fact that housing is not as concentrated in areas of Järfälla as it is in Sollentuna, and cultural and recreational facilities and services are not as evidently plentiful in Järfälla, potentially limiting the acclimating effects of group contact theory between native majority residents and minorities/migrants. Järfälla is, however, presently undergoing a time of widespread housing and business construction – which may eventually lead to greater contact among residents on a daily basis. An even dispersal of migrants throughout residential areas – and a concomitant absence of an observable halo effect – may serve to dampen support for the Sweden Democrats among some residents, but clearly there are other factors driving residents to vote for the party, as its electoral support has grown much faster in Järfälla than in Sollentuna over the past three elections.

Although economic factors were not found to have particular explanatory weight, the residential demographics of Järfälla and the political landscape at the municipal level may fill in the causal picture as to why the Sweden Democrats have done comparatively well here. As a mostly working-class municipality, Järfälla had long been a stronghold for the Social Democrats, with the Moderates a strong second party. In recent elections, however, voters have clearly vacillated in their support of the two mainstream parties, and this lack of firm party support and identification has opened the door for the Sweden Democrats to step in to offer a potentially viable alternative to the mainstream status quo – a trend that has occurred among working-class voters throughout Sweden (Oskarson and Demker, 2015). Despite the Sweden Democrat’s strong anti-migrant platform, their support in Järfälla may be attributed more to this political dynamic (which has been very similar at the parliamentary level) than any anti-migrant sentiment that residents in Järfälla may have: it is the frustration and mistrust of the mainstream parties that have mobilized voters into the Sweden Democrat camp, rather than an impetus to take anti-migrant political action. As Järfälla continues to grow, its demographics may change, which in turn may change this particular political dynamic; at present, however, it appears that fewer opportunities for residents to mix socially combined with a disenchantment with the two mainstream parties (and, in particular, with the Social Democrats) have combined to give the Sweden Democrats a larger level of support than would be expected, and a level of support that has grown faster over the past three elections than in its neighboring municipality, Sollentuna.

9.10 Summary: Comparison of the Analyses of Sollentuna and Järfälla

It is interesting that some of the same causal factors come into play to explain the outcomes of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats in Sollentuna and Järfälla, yet different dynamics and patterns

have indeed led to different outcomes. Although Sollentuna has greater migrant residential concentration – due mostly if not entirely to the presence of Malmvägen – it has found ways to overcome the potential negative effects towards migrant residents through investment in community services and facilities. The hold on power that the Moderates have enjoyed in the municipal council ensures continuity of policies and the likelihood of having those policies executed: the municipality has kept taxes in check, has produced tangible outcomes, and has developed ways to spur social integration – a combination that bolsters trust in the party and diffuses social conflict.

In comparison, Järfälla appears to have less migrant residential concentration throughout the municipality, yet there is a great sense of transience among its residents: many seem to shop and/or socialize elsewhere, which limits the opportunities for different groups to interact. Politically, the Social Democrats have long had the upper-hand among the mostly working-class voters here, yet that support has fallen over the past 10 years as the Moderates have successfully challenged the party for power in this time. Thus, voter frustration and disenchantment seems evident (also indicated by the rising level of support for the Green Party over the past three elections), and the Sweden Democrats have taken advantage of these sentiments and built growing electoral support. While migrants have been settling in Järfälla in increasing numbers over the past decade, and it may be true that some residents in Järfälla have voted for the Sweden Democrats based on the party's anti-migrant position, merely the number of migrants does not seem to be adequate in explaining the higher level of support for the Sweden Democrats in Järfälla compared to Sollentuna (where the influx of migrants has grown at nearly the same rate). The local political dynamic presents itself as a viable additional causal explanation of the higher electoral support for the Sweden Democrats, yet the residential dispersion of migrants throughout the municipality may

at least partially explain why the Sweden Democrats have not garnered yet even greater support in Järfälla.

Chapter 10

Qualitative Case Study: Examining Hate Crimes against Migrants in Malmö



Utility box in Rosengård, Malmö City (November 2015, Own Work).¹

“There are two Swedens: one [seen] on the inside, and one [seen] from the outside.”
– Interview Subject, 4 November 2015#3

“The anti-racist movement is strong in Malmö.”
– Interview Subject, 17 November 2015#1

¹ Note the sticker on the box – a bit of a play on the “Million Program” housing, of which one development is located in Rosengård, Malmö: “Million Vibes Sound is based in Malmö (Malmö) Sweden, and has been active since 2002. We play all kinds of Jamaican music from Ska & Rocksteady to the latest Dancehall & Reggae.” <<https://soundcloud.com/millionvibes>>.

10.1 Introduction

In Chapter 7, I laid the foundation for my qualitative case studies, including my choice of Malmö in Skåne County as a typical case in which to study the outcome of hate crimes against migrants committed by majority native Swedes. Recall that it was requisite that I break my quantitative analysis of this outcome into two time periods, as the provider of my data – the National Council for Crime Prevention (*Brå*) – broadened its definition of “hate crime” in 2008. I found slightly different results between the 1998-2007 and 2008-2014 analyses: for the latter time period, not only were the recorded hate crimes much higher, but they also showed a downward trend. In addition, the Sweden Democrats also broke the electoral threshold in the *Riksdag*, gaining seats in the Swedish Parliament for the first time in the 2010 elections. Finally, the number of migrants coming to Sweden has steadily risen since 2008, with migrants making up ever greater proportions of many local populations. For these reasons, I expect the results from the 2008-2014 xenophobic hate crimes quantitative analysis to be most relevant with regard to identifying the significant factors that may affect outcomes I observe in the field.

For the quantitative analysis of the latter time period, my main explanatory variable – migrant residential concentration – was indeed found to be statistically and substantively significant, with the number of hate crimes per capita rising as the population of migrants in counties became more segregated (see Figure 6.10, Chapter 6). Given that anti-migrant hate crimes per capita is very close to the level predicted for Malmö, I expect that the effects of migrant residential segregation to be offset by mitigating factors – those that bring migrants and majority natives in close, consistent contact with one another, thereby diffusing feelings of threat that majority natives may feel from migrants.

Additionally, the level of population density played a strong explanatory role as well – but only when combined with levels of migrant residential concentration and unemployment (see Figures 6.12 and 6.14, Chapter 6). Contrary to the third, alternative hypothesis, the level of hate crimes was overall lower and tended to *decrease* as unemployment rates rose when population density was near its maximum value; around mean values of population density, the level of hate crimes fell ever-so slightly (Figure 6.14). With regard to migrant residential concentration, the levels of hate crimes were still lowest near the maximum level of population density, but hate crimes were shown to rise as the migrant residential concentration increased (Figure 6.12). The proportion of migrants in the county was not found to be statistically significant, nor to contribute to the model – an outcome that makes Malmö a good case to investigate further, as the proportion of migrants is the highest in Sweden (higher than either Stockholm City or Göteborg) (Statistics Sweden): the second, alternative hypothesis (drawn from previous literature) posited that the proportion of migrants would indeed lead to higher levels of anti-migrant political action. Hence, while the proportion of migrants was not a significant factor in my quantitative analysis, it is the causal variable in my second hypothesis, and hence is important to investigate qualitatively.

My analysis shall proceed in a fashion similar to that of the previous case studies. In the following section, I shall discuss the presence of xenophobic hate crimes in Malmö, and the ways that addressing these crimes has been addressed over the past several years. I shall then give an overview of the geography of Malmö, followed by a discussion of and the history and composition of its migrant population, leading to an analysis of the possible effects of the level of migrant concentration within the city on the number of xenophobic hate crimes reported. I shall then consider the effects of population density and economic factors. Next, I shall present the viable alternative explanations that I uncovered during my field visit and discuss their merits as potential

hypotheses for future research on anti-migrant hate crimes. I shall then offer some concluding thoughts, followed by a summary conclusion for all three qualitative case study analyses.

10.2 Xenophobic Hate Crimes: Malmö

According to one of my interview subjects who has had experience working with hate crimes for the Malmöstad Police and other city authorities, the Police began examining the presence of hate crimes in the city in 2008 – until that time, there had been no formal training or policy on the handling of hate crimes: “...it was a social problem that [was] not prioritized. The Police had no comprehensive knowledge, and worked in silos..”² The Hate Crime Group within the Malmö Police was subsequently instituted in 2012. This group has a multi-faceted approach to addressing hate crimes in the city: it aims to “gather expertise and to enact preventive measures; to raise the quality of investigative work; to establish contacts with groups that are subjected to hate crimes; and to inform and educate” (e.g., courses are taught a few times a year at the police academy in which police students are taught to identify and investigate hate crimes).³ The Police in Malmö have therefore not had hate crimes on their radar for very long, but have made great strides in implementing a comprehensive approach to the problem in a short time. As the Police had considered hate crimes more of a “societal” problem, the reports of these crimes were not given a very high priority until the Hate Crime Group came into being – this lack of priority up until quite recently underscores the impression that many in vulnerable groups may still harbor that the police will not take their complaint seriously, or will not act at all – thus making reporting the crime not worthwhile. Thus, part of the Hate Crime Group’s efforts is also directed at building trust within the vulnerable communities, and partnering with various civil society

² Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

³ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

groups to encourage victims to report these crimes and to let them know that these reports are indeed now being taken seriously.⁴

Building trust takes time, however – especially in a climate of fear and mistrust – and the Malmö Police had expected more noticeable results in a shorter period of time. While the work of the nascent Hate Crime Group was very much appreciated from the start by associations, parishes, politicians, and even the media, the Police themselves were less convinced of the Group’s usefulness. There were also potential conflicts of interest that the Group faced, as it had to balance its investigative and outreach roles very carefully. In time, however, the bottom-line results did show, and after a re-organization of the Malmö Police, hate crimes are prioritized, and more resources have been devoted to the Hate Crime Group.⁵

The City of Malmö also has a Safety and Security Unit, and part of its duties entails ensuring a safe environment for citizens so that they do not become victims of hate crimes, or become involved in hate crimes themselves – monitoring potential social problems and providing education are therefore two of its important tasks. As with the Hate Crime Group in the Police, this unit works to build trust with vulnerable communities and its ties with civil society in the city. The Police, the Safety and Security Unit, and civil society are now working to find ways to cooperate with one another in order to address hate crimes from as many angles and at as many levels as possible, but as with building trust, building such broad-based cooperation takes time, so it is early days yet. Those who have been affected by hate crimes, however, do indeed appreciate that efforts of all of these groups to address their grievances: within the vulnerable communities, Malmö’s new approach to handling hate crimes has been welcomed.⁶

⁴ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁵ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁶ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

It may take longer for the broader community to realize the impact of what these groups are presently doing: as with the Police, residents themselves expect quick results. The task is made even more difficult when hate crime numbers go up – or there is a particularly violent crime that captures widespread media attention: as was mentioned to me by a few of my interview subjects, Malmö is often portrayed unfavorably in the media (local and national – and sometimes international).⁷ But this is a bit of a catch-22 situation: as victims become more confident in the authorities and therefore feel more comfortable *reporting* crimes against them, the numbers of crimes appear to rise. Therefore, in a way, a rising level of hate crimes reported over the past few years is actually an indicator of these organizations’ *successes*, as they are now reaching vulnerable groups and making it easier for victims to trust that proper action will be taken.⁸ The short time horizon of these efforts has to be taken into consideration when evaluating the success of these efforts, but often the public and the media have different expectations. To that end, many of these organizations plan to include wider outreach and education activities, so that not only the vulnerable groups benefit from their work, but the Malmö community as a whole can appreciate what is being done.⁹ It is interesting, then, that in Malmö, the numbers of hate crimes per capita reported in 2013 and 2014 have risen (see Figure 10.1 below) – the years just after Malmö Police’s Hate Crime Group was instituted: these numbers can be somewhat misleading, then, as the rise in hate crime reports may be due (at least partly) to the Group’s efforts in reaching vulnerable communities and gaining their trust, and not necessarily to a real increase in anti-group behavior. With that caveat in mind, I present the xenophobic hate crime numbers for Malmö from 2009 to 2014 below, in comparison with the other two large cities in Sweden, Stockholm and Göteborg.

⁷ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2; Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁸ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁹ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

10.2.1 Xenophobic Hate Crimes: Trends

As discussed in the quantitative analyses of hate crimes against migrants, the numbers of these crimes per capita have mostly trended downwards nationwide since 2008 (with a bit of an increase in 2014). For the major cities (Malmö, Stockholm, and Göteborg), the number of anti-minority hate crimes has remained fairly steady until 2013, when the number increased in Malmö, yet decrease in Stockholm and Göteborg; for the latter two cities, the numbers made a precipitous jump in 2014, with a slight rise occurring in Malmö, as shown in Figure 10.1.




Figure 10.1 Hate Crimes of a Xenophobic, Racist, or Anti-Religious Motivate, per Capita in Malmö, Stockholm, and Göteborg, 2009-2014.
(Source: Brå, <www.bra.se/bra/brott-och-statistik/statistik/hatbrott.html>)

In the quantitative analyses, Stockholm County was identified as quite the deviant case, with the number of hate crimes per capita being above what would be expected. Skåne County (in which Malmö is located) has lower hate crimes per capita numbers (except for the jump in 2013),

while Göteborg has the lowest numbers. Note, however, that the numbers for Stockholm and Göteborg follow the same trend as one another, although the jump in 2014 was not quite as big in Göteborg as in Stockholm.¹⁰

From 2009 to 2013, the National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) noted in these statistics whether or not the hate crime reported had an association with “the White Power Movement, Extremism, or National Socialism.”¹¹ Although only a small percentage of hate crimes reported in this time had such connections (no more than 11% in Malmö, 15% in Stockholm, and 13% in Göteborg) (National Council for Crime Prevention), the trends of these numbers are




Figure 10.2 Number of Racist/Xenophobic Hate Crimes Committed by Those with Ties to the “White Power Movement, Extremism, or National Socialism” in Malmö, Göteborg, and Stockholm: 2009-2013.
(Source: Brå, <www.bra.se/bra/brott-och-statistik/statistik/hatbrott.html>)

¹⁰ And note that these numbers are *per capita*: the total numbers of xenophobic hate crimes in Stockholm City are *more than treble* the numbers in Malmö or Göteborg from 2008-2014.

¹¹ As described by the National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå), <www.bra.se/bra/brott-och-statistik/statistik/hatbrott.html>.

intriguing, as shown in Figure 10.2. For each year in this timeframe, Malmö clearly has the lowest numbers of xenophobic hate crimes committed by perpetrators connected to these extremist groups, while Stockholm has had far and away the highest number (and the numbers have continuously increased in Stockholm over time, while they have fluctuated in the other two cities). Therefore, not only does Malmö have a lower number of xenophobic hate crimes per capita than one might expect, but also the lowest number of such crimes committed by extremists, of the three major cities in Sweden. This contrasts with media reports (both from domestic and international sources) that often describe Malmö as a hotbed of racist hate crime – which is often attributed to a backlash to the existence of reputedly crime-ridden lower-income areas in the city where the residents are almost entirely migrants or of migrant descent.¹² Residents of Malmö itself often hold these same views of their city (again, likely fed by the media’s portrayal). There is something of a disconnect, then, between the numbers and these media reports: Malmö stands more favorably in terms of hate crime statistics compared with the other two major cities in Sweden. My visit to Malmö gave me the opportunity to see what was at the heart of these numbers, and gave me a much different picture than that which the media usually promotes of the city with respect to its migrant population and its level of crime.

10.3 Geography of Malmö

Malmö is the third largest city in Sweden (behind Stockholm and Göteborg), located in the southwestern tip of the country (see Figure 10.3). The municipality of Malmö is located on the western shore of the county, and the Øresund bridge connects the city with Denmark across the Øresund Strait. I present the detailed map from Chapter 7 (Figure 7.3) again here, in Figure 10.4.

¹² Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.



Figure 10.3 Map of Sweden with County (Län) Borders, Featuring Skåne County and Malmö Municipality (*Source: www.val.se*)



Figure 10.4 Detailed map of Malmö City (with Neighborhood Voting Districts)
 (Source: www.val.se)

The Øresund Bridge (opened in 2000) connects Sweden directly to the rest of Europe, making the Malmö-Zealand area in effect a single economic region of 3.7 million inhabitants.¹³

¹³ See The Øresund Region, <www.oresundsregionen.org/en/about-the-oeresund-region>.

In 2015, over seven million vehicles crossed the Bridge.¹⁴ The Bridge has also been a conduit for criminal transport (e.g., criminal gang members, guns) into Malmö as well.¹⁵ Crucially, the Bridge has been a link between Sweden and the rest of Europe not only for commerce and commuters, but also for migrants: in 2015, Malmö was the main point of entry for refugees pouring into the country, who mostly arrived by train or bus over the Øresund Bridge (as I observed first-hand). Due to this unprecedented influx, the *Riksdag* voted to temporarily suspend its participation in the Schengen Agreement and instituted border checks in January 2016 for those arriving into the country over the bridge or by boat (a move that is allowed under the Schengen Agreement in cases of security concerns or public order, for up to six months;¹⁶ the border checks are set to expire on 4 July 2016, after which a two week “grace period” will elapse before any further border checks can be implemented¹⁷). Malmö has therefore been a key arrival point into the country for many migrants to the country, and many who have arrived have chosen to settle here.

10.4 Migration and Housing History in Malmö: The Effects of the Distribution of Migrants and Population Density in Malmö

10.4.1 Waves of Immigration

Malmö is a diverse city where more than 170 nationalities reside and over 150 languages are spoken.¹⁸ As the port city closest to the rest of mainland Europe, Malmö has received migrants from all waves in Sweden’s migration history: Jewish refugees during World War II, labor migrants from Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, and groups of refugees from the conflicts that drove

¹⁴ The Øresund Bridge, < www.oresundsbron.com/en/traffic-stats>.

¹⁵ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

¹⁶ Border checks, <www.thelocal.se/20151209/sweden-border-checks-to-start-after-new-years>; <<http://www.thelocal.se/20151217/swedish-parliament-votes-on-id-checks-on-trains>>.

¹⁷ The Local, Border Checks <www.thelocal.se/20160311/sweden-will-open-borders-for-two-weeks-in-the-summer>.

¹⁸ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

people from their homes from the 1980s through the present (e.g., those from Latin America, Iran, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria). Malmö’s proportion of foreign-born people is well above the Swedish average, and above that of Stockholm County as well (Figure 10.5).




Figure 10.5 Proportion of Foreign-Born Persons in Malmö, Skåne County, Stockholm County, and in Sweden, 2001-2015. (Source: Statistics Sweden)

indicates that most of the migrants who live in Skåne County are in fact residents of Malmö – over 32% of the total population of the city in 2015. Note that these figures comprise only those residents who were born abroad – it does not account for their offspring: since 2013, the proportion of those for whom one or both parents had been born abroad was over 50% (and again, this does not account for those who are third generation or beyond) (Statistics Sweden). As discussed in the previous section, there is also a Roma community in Malmö, but I did not notice the presence of

Roma to the same extent as I saw in the cities of Göteborg or Stockholm.¹⁹ Thus, the ethnic diversity of Malmö is rich – not unlike that of Sollentuna – but migrants make up far more of the population than in other areas of Sweden.

10.4.2 Housing: The Million Program Housing Area in the Herrgård Neighborhood in Rosengård

As was also the case in Sollentuna, Malmö was the location of one of the Million Program housing estates, built in the 1970s. This housing is located in the district of Rosengård, with a concentration of migrant residences in the neighborhood of Herrgård (part of the Rosengård district in the city – see Figure 10.4). The story of Rosengård is the same as that for many other of the Million Program homes: it did not attract the burgeoning middle classes as anticipated, and subsequently became the residence of choice for the many migrants who began to arrive in the mid-1970s – it was available housing at an affordable price. This trend continued, and over time, the housing became dilapidated, further lowering its value (and, hence, the rental cost). As migrants continued to come into Malmö, the choice to live in Rosengård was natural: it was affordable, and it was the home to others who had migrated from the same homelands. This latter point offered something of a safety net via a migrant social network for those who were new to the country – an important connection for finding employment in Sweden, as “job recruitment practices are based on informal channels and social networks to quite a high extent” (Andersson, 2007, 63 and 71).

In Herrgård, the percentage of foreign-born living in the estate went from 75 percent in 1990 to 95 percent in 1995, and those residents (aged 20 to 64) who were employed went from 48

¹⁹ It would be interesting, then, to examine the number of hate crimes perpetrated against members of the Roma community in future research. This is a more focused issue than what I study here, and would be somewhat complicated by the fact that relatively few Roma trust authorities enough to report crimes, as noted earlier.

percent to 8 percent (Andersson, 2007, 71). These numbers represent the trend in Herrgården that has continued to the present: Herrgården currently has the lowest employment level and highest poverty rates in Sweden.²⁰ In addition, there were dramatic increases in crime from 2005 to 2009, although some progress has been made since that time by virtue of renovation projects that have been completed in the neighborhood by privately-owned companies (about 22 percent of the housing in Herrgården) (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013, 70). In the areas of Herrgården where these renovations were completed, unemployment and crime both fell, in contrast to the other areas of the neighborhood (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013, 71).

For much of Herrgården and Rosengård writ large, however, the number of migrants moving in continues to grow while unemployment and crime continue to rise. Part of this problem has to do with the cycle of housing mentioned previously: as migrants find jobs and improve their economic status, they move out of Rosengård, making room for newer residents of a lesser economic status to move in.²¹ The socio-economic condition of Rosengård thus remains relatively constant – improved only in areas where investments in renovation and revitalization have been made.

Part of the problem in securing potentially socially-positive renovations lies with the way in which private companies view “value:” some assess the value of a project purely by its profitability, while others include the improved social conditions (which in turn promise a rise in rents, and hence, a greater profitability, but only in the longer-term) (Ulrich and Pscheidl, 2013). Finding a company that will value more than the bottom line and that will also involve residents as stakeholders to the project has been one stumbling block to making the kinds of renovations

²⁰ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1, an academic who pursues research on ethnic issues and who is a resident of Malmö.

²¹ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

that will matter in areas like Rosengård. Nonetheless, progress has been made in Herrgården with such projects that offer a private-public partnership (one such project was completed in 2009), so the picture is not as dismal as it had been in at least a part of Rosengård.

The area of Herrgården – where well over 90 percent of the residents are migrants – is situated adjacent to the district of Almgården, an area that is comprised of predominately working-class majority native Swedes.²² The housing in Almgården was built in the 1960s to house labor immigrants who came primarily from Finland and Yugoslavia.²³ Almgården followed the same dynamic as most migrant settlement areas and continued to receive kinship migrants; as such, the area has remained rather racially homogenous over time. A highway separates Herrgården from Almgården, but the clear racial segregation has produced intriguing election results: support for the Sweden Democrats in Almgården is one of the highest in Malmö, while it is one of the lowest in Herrgården (a point I discuss further as part of the alternative explanatory factors in a later section).

An important factor to consider – and one that is much different in Stockholm and Göteborg – is that Malmö does not really have suburban areas: the population resides within the city limits, although there are different districts and neighborhoods within the city. Many of Stockholm’s “problem areas” have been in identifiable suburbs (e.g., Husby, Rinkeby, Kista), where high concentrations of migrants settled in the Million Program housing and the phenomenon of “white flight” (i.e., majority natives moving out of the area as more migrants moved in) consequently occurred.²⁴ The case in Sollentuna is similar, although it is not a part of Stockholm City; it is, however, adjacent to Stockholm’s city limits, and it neighbors the areas of Husby and Rinkeby (as

²² Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1.

²³ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

²⁴ Interview Subject 27 October 2015#1.

discussed in the chapter on Sollentuna). Unlike Sollentuna, however, the areas of Husby, Rinkeby, Tensta, and Kista are saddled with high unemployment and low economic opportunity: such a situation has been described a “segregation trap,” as the low prospect of improving one’s economic status is passed from one generation to the next (or, as in many Million Program housing areas, people simply relocate if they do improve their economic situation) (Andersson, 2010).

The same economic dynamic operates in areas of Malmö, but the areas in Malmö that have a high number of migrants are an integral part of the city, and are not “banished” to tracts that lie a sizeable distance outside of the city’s main commerce and transport areas. Thus, even though there is a high level of migrant residential segregation in certain neighborhoods of Malmö, these neighborhoods are nonetheless quite close to and easily accessible from areas that are not as migrant-rich. Such proximity, however, could lead one to conclude that the halo effect would operate rather strongly in Malmö in certain areas (in the vicinity of Herrgården, or Rosengård and Södra Sofielund, for example).

With respect to anti-migrant hate crimes, though, any such effect has not been inordinately translated into significant action. But as one of my interview subjects in Malmö pointed out, there are no “ethnic enclaves” in the city: that is, one does not find blocs of residents from one ethnicity/nationality living together in large numbers²⁵ (which is the opposite situation from that in Stockholm city, where many districts are occupied by one ethnic group or another, such as Turks or Poles [Andersson, 2007, 73]). It may be that the diverse ethnic mix *throughout* all of Malmö attenuates any potential feelings of threat that majority natives may feel from the areas of high migrant residential concentration – an effect that is bolstered by the relatively close proximity that all neighborhoods have with one another within the city’s limits.

²⁵ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1.

Despite areas of residential segregation in Malmö, the population density is quite high indeed – over 1.5 times as high in Sollentuna or Järfälla – and it has increased steadily since 1998 (see Figure 10.6).²⁶ Transportation throughout the city is quite good, with bus lines running regularly through most neighborhoods, including the migrant-rich areas of Södra Sofielund, Rosengård, and Möllevången. There are also many large city parks and recreation facilities throughout the city, and these appeared to be frequented equally by minority and majority Swedes alike. Although these parks can separate one neighborhood from another, they also serve as a place for social gathering and mixing, facilitated by their convenient locations right in the middle of the more residential areas of the city.




Figure 10.6 Population Density in Malmö, Järfälla, and Sollentuna, 1998-2014.

²⁶ Note also that the population density of Malmö has also consistently been about 1.6 times that of Göteborg, while Stockholm city has had the greatest population density – about 2.3 times that of Malmö.

High population density puts people in close contact with one another – which could be a factor that might *amplify* the halo effect and lead to greater conflict – yet the widespread transportation networks and ample parks and recreational facilities provide public places where minority and majority residents mix with one another on an everyday basis. Malmö does seem to be a city of movement, and the level and kind of contact possible in the city may do more to draw people together than entrenching them in separate, “us-vs-them” camps.

10.4.3 Business and Social Factors

As mentioned, Malmö has a high number of ethnicities and nationalities living throughout the city, concentrated in areas around Rosengård, such as Södra Sofielund, Persborg, and Hindby. Möllevängen, a neighborhood south of the Old Town and north-west of Rosengård, is also ethnically- and socially-diverse, with many ethnic and pan-ethnic businesses (shops, restaurants, social venues). I visited a grocery store in Södra Sofielund that specializes in Asian and African products: there were people (both employees and patrons) from many different ethnicities in the store, but the *lingua franca* was English (if patrons spoke in Swedish, the employees would answer in English). I also visited a large Turkish grocery store – also in Södra Sofielund, but close to Rosengård – that was staffed by mostly Middle Asian employees, yet the patrons seemed to be an even mix of migrants/minorities and native majority Swedes (the common language was Swedish here). I also visited a Turkish restaurant in Södra Sofielund in which the employees were all recently arrived from Turkey (and who also spoke English quite well); again, the patrons were an even mix of minority and majority Swedes.

In Ribersborg, I ate at two Italian restaurants, one staffed by recent migrants from Italy, the other owned and operated by an Italian migrant who had been in Sweden for some time – all of

whom also spoke English and Swedish. Ribersborg is one of the more affluent districts in Malmö (near the water on the north side of the city), and I noticed mostly native majority Swedes living in this area: the patrons at these two restaurants were all native majority Swedes at the times I visited. Nonetheless, there were many ethnic restaurants in the area (a kabob stand was just across the street from one of the restaurants, and was operated by a minority Swede). Thus, as in Sollentuna, there are many businesses owned by migrants that cater to their various preferences (e.g., restaurants, grocery stores, beauty salons, auto garages), yet who also serve members of the native majority. I was surprised to find that so many migrant workers spoke rather fluent English as well as Swedish: possessing English may be an important factor businesses consider when hiring an employee (and is something to consider with regard to the integration of the most recent influx of refugees to Malmö, who appeared to be fairly affluent, and many of whom also spoke English).

10.4.4 Levels of Concentration of Migrants and Population Dynamics in Malmö

Malmö has a long history of migration and migrant settlement, and does indeed possess a diverse ethnic mix. Yet migrants and minorities are highly segregated residentially from the native majority population in some areas of the city, such as Rosengård, where the legacy of the Million Program housing remains. Other areas of Malmö – such as Möllevången – are more ethnically integrated with native majority residents. The lack of suburbs and a high population density – combined with a good public transportation network, abundant public space, and the prevalence of minority-owned businesses – enables migrant and majority native residents to be in close contact with one another on a daily basis. This kind of contact among different groups of residents

may serve to lessen the potential for negative outcomes – particularly those of a direct nature – that are posited to result from the mechanisms of the halo effect.

The level of diversity within the areas of high migrant residential concentration means that Malmö has no “ethnic enclaves,” as there are in Stockholm: the areas of high migrant residential concentration are occupied by people from all over the world in quite a diverse mix of ethnicities, nationalities, and ages. In this way, Malmö is similar to Sollentuna, and the level of diversity within migrant residential areas may be an important factor with regard to native majority actions towards migrants; I shall discuss this in more detail below as one potentially viable alternative explanation for the lower level of xenophobic hate crimes observed in Malmö.

10.5 Effects of Economic Factors in Malmö

Part of the legacy of the Million Program housing estates is the low economic status of and opportunity for its residents. It is well known in Malmö and beyond that areas of high migrant concentration such as Rosengård possess an unemployment rate that is quite higher – higher than that of native majority residences.²⁷ The proportion of residents in Malmö that is not gainfully employed is quite above that of Stockholm or Göteborg (see Figure 10.7), and is driven primarily by minority/migrant unemployment.

The quantitative results for the 2008-2014 time period indicated that at very high levels of population density, higher levels of unemployment actually produced *lower* levels of hate crimes against migrants per capita: part of the reason for this may be the unequal distribution of unemployment between migrant residents and native majority residents. As unemployment does

²⁷ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

not affect the native majority to nearly the same degree as minority residents in Malmö, any sense of a “material threat” that natives may feel is offset – unemployment is seen as a “minority”




Figure 10.7 Percent of Residents not Gainfully Employed in Malmö, Göteborg, Stockholm, and Sweden: 2004-2014. (Source: Statistics Sweden)

problem, and not one that is shared by the majority residents. In Skåne County, for example, those born in Sweden are employed at 1.5 times the rate as those who are foreign-born.²⁸ Although this number is for the county as a whole, Malmö is the driver of these numbers, as it not only has the largest population in the county, but also the largest number of foreign-born residents.

Part of this unemployment problem stems from the reportedly prolific amount of discrimination against migrants and minorities on the job market in Malmö, with regard to hiring,

²⁸ For those aged 20-64 years. Statistics Sweden, <www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se>.

firing, and access to job training opportunities.²⁹ This, too, is a crime, as according to the Swedish Penal Code, “unlawful discrimination” occurs:

“...when a registered trader [”näringsidkare”] – discriminates [against] somebody due to their race, color of skin, national or ethnic origin, confession of faith or sexual orientation. This also applies to those employed by the registered trader or those acting on orders by the registered trader.”³⁰

Such crimes, however, are difficult to prosecute, and (as had been the case with hate crimes before 2008), there does not seem to be much interest among authorities in pursuing instances of discrimination against minorities.³¹ I did not pursue “discrimination” as a form of hate crime in the present analysis, but this indicator would possibly reveal a much different trend than the direct forms of reported hate crime that my data feature.

Discrimination, however, may be part of the “unemployment trap” in which migrants find themselves, and as it does not as readily apply to native majority Swedes, is not grounds for them to take direct action against migrants. Hence, it is not only the *level* of unemployment in an area that is important as an economic indicator as part of the explanation of anti-migrant political action, but also the distribution of unemployment among the minority and majority groups.

10.6 Summary: Effects of the Identified Variables on the Outcome of Anti-Migrant Hate Crimes in Malmö

Although I did identify an area of high migrant residential concentration (Herrgården in Rosengård) in close proximity to an area of high native majority residential concentration (Almgården) in Malmö, minority and native majority residents mix rather readily in many areas

²⁹ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

³⁰ Cabero *et al.*, “Stangda Dörrar,” 15, translated by Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

³¹ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

of the city, either within certain neighborhoods (such as Möllevången), or by virtue of public spaces and minority-owned and -staffed businesses that are found in most neighborhoods. Migrants have been settling in Rosengård throughout Malmö's recent migration history, and despite the level of economic depression in areas of high migrant residential concentration, those who are able to improve their economic status do relocate to other areas of the city.³² In addition, the migrant-rich residential areas are within Malmö itself – they are not shut off from the rest of the city in suburbs, a factor that increases the population density of the city. Transportation within Malmö also makes it very easy to get from area to another. Therefore, native majority residents have for some time lived among migrants and minority Swedes: not all migrants are trapped in specific neighborhoods, although those neighborhoods that have a very high number of migrants tend to be the home of more newly arrived migrants.

A clue to the effects of the economic indicator chosen for the quantitative studies presents itself quite clearly in the case of Malmö: the rate of unemployment is quite high in Malmö, yet is significantly higher for migrant Swedes as opposed to those born in Sweden. The proposition that unemployment poses a material threat to native Swedes and compels them to act against migrants as a result is not as tenable in this light. This disparity in unemployment rates may also explain why – at maximum levels of unemployment – the level of hate crimes against migrants was seen to *decrease* in the quantitative analysis. By looking at a finer-grained level of analysis, such trends become quite obvious, and help to illustrate why an indicator such as unemployment may yield different results for different cases, and among different studies.

³² Interview 4 November 2015#1.

10.7 Potential Explanations Observed: Proposed Alternative Hypotheses

I have alluded to a number of potential alternative or supplementary causal explanations in the course of my above discussion. I shall focus more on those that I found most compelling, setting up their evaluation as hypotheses in future research and describing how they may affect the outcome of anti-migrant hate crimes, or combine with other previously-identified factor to enrich the causal picture.

10.7.1 Diversity within the Migrant Population

As in the case of Sollentuna, I noted in Malmö the rich diversity of ethnicities and nationalities among the migrant residents. Rosengård, Södra Sofielund, and Möllevången not only had residents from many different ethnicities, but also of different ages. I noticed while exploring these areas that earlier waves of migrants (e.g., Turkish labor migrants, refugees from Iran) have settled and established businesses and services in the communities – particularly around the edges of the more migrant-concentrated area of Rosengård. As these earlier migrants have been in Malmö for some time, they seem to have become part of the “accepted minority” by their native majority neighbors (Nordin 2005, 33). These longer-term inhabitants then work to facilitate the settlement of newer migrants through employment (such as the waiters I met at the Turkish restaurant), in cooperation with the various non-governmental organizations active in the city that serve the migrant community. It is possible that these “old guard” migrants act as a sort of buffer between the native majority and the newer arrivals, many of whom come from different home countries yet who share a cultural (e.g., religious) connection with those from the earlier waves of migration. Therefore, the *timing* and diversity of migration to Sweden may be an important aspect of integration – in Malmö, if not in the rest of Sweden – as this process represents a gradual

acclimation of the *native majority* to more recent influxes of migrants who happen to share similar characteristics with the earlier migrants, and who are able to integrate (economically, socially) to a greater degree than might be the case otherwise, thanks to the assistance of these earlier migrants. Note that the spatial location of the “old guard” migrants is potentially important, too, as they either live or work in areas that are on the periphery of the residences of primarily newly-arrived migrants, thus serving as a kind of buffer zone with the rest of the city and easing possible tensions that may arise between native majority Swedes and newer migrants (who may be seen as more of a burden and threat to Swedish society by the native majority due to welfare chauvinism or a perceived crime risk).

10.7.2 The Strength of Widespread Weak Ties: Civil Society

Several of my interview subjects in Malmö mentioned what they perceived to be a lack of true political leadership and cooperation with respect to migrant communities.³³ Given that the city of Malmö did not even take hate crimes against minority residents seriously and make it a priority until 2008 (and then, not establishing an actual Hate Crime Group until 2012) supports the view that authorities in Malmö are not always serving all of their residents as needed. In the wake of this vacuum, community organizations have taken up the responsibilities of looking after migrant interests and promoting social integration by offering education, legal, job training, language, and socialization services.³⁴ There is therefore a strong presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work with and assist migrants – stepping in where the authorities have not or cannot.

³³ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2014#2; Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

³⁴ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2014#2; Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

From my interviews, I gathered that Malmö has a robust civil society *network*, with an overarching umbrella association that links most NGOs with one another within the city and also with other local and national NGOs across the country.³⁵ Most of these NGOs either work directly with those who reside in the community in which the organization is located (providing education and advocacy to those who live in Rosengård, for example), or with specific ethnic groups (such as Iranian or Muslim migrants, or women).

These NGOs in Malmö receive financial support from the city government, but often there is a lack of communication between the government and the various organizations, resulting in duplication of effort in some areas and unmet needs in others.³⁶ The umbrella organization is presently working to improve communication and cooperation between the city's Department of Activities, Sport, and Lifestyle and the individual NGOs, but some organizations seem to be favored over others in terms of financial support, which makes cooperation more difficult for some organizations who lack adequate funding.³⁷ Nonetheless, it is the power of civil society organizations – as individual groups and as a consortium – in Malmö that meets many needs of individual migrants and the greater migrant community in the city. Also, as in Sollentuna, these organizations work to bring the native majority community together with the migrant community in steps towards social integration, yet this seems to be a secondary goal: the priority appears to be that of meeting the immediate needs of migrant and minority groups.

Thus, migrants who may have fallen through the official cracks or who may not otherwise know how to attain support, education, and services can turn to these NGOs, which are highly visible in their communities. Such a strong, widespread network pulls residents from across the

³⁵ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

³⁶ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

³⁷ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

city together. In addition, the anti-racist movement is strong in Malmö, with frequent demonstrations and strong solidarity.³⁸ Interestingly, students in Malmö have been found to be more tolerant of other ethnicities/cultures than students in other areas of Sweden.³⁹ The social integration effects of the vast network of NGOs in Malmö seemed unique in Sweden to me, and may help to explain why residents of Malmö do not take openly direct action against to nearly the same degree as in other areas, such as Stockholm.

10.7.3 The Power of the Press

Even before arriving in Malmö, I had heard reports of high levels of crime and violence in the city, essentially describing certain areas as “no-go” zones.⁴⁰ Such reports are taken as accurate by some residents of Malmö and beyond, as it is the consistent picture that is presented of Malmö – and in particular, of Rosengård – by those who likely have never visited the area.⁴¹ Malmö has also been cited as an area notorious for anti-Semitism, yet these reports are exaggerated as well (although such sentiments do exist in the community – just not to the degree that is reported).⁴² And, as mentioned above, the media have played up the levels of hate crime in Malmö – especially when the crime is of a particularly violent nature.⁴³

³⁸ Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1. In fact, while I was in Malmö, Roma residents of a “shanty” area had been ordered by authorities to move, due to what was assessed by the city as unsafe conditions. Residents of Malmö – both minority and native majority – came out to protest at the site for several days before police forcibly removed the Roma inhabitants. The protest then continued on the steps of the City Hall for over a month, until the last Roma resident of the former shanty town voluntarily left the protest.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ For example, the riots that ensued after the closing of a mosque in Rosengård in December 2008 (the owner of the property had decided not to renew the lease). The unrest continued for several days. <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7791553.stm> and <www.thelocal.se/20081218/16420>.

⁴¹ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

⁴² Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

⁴³ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

On the one hand, the attention that violent hate crimes receive may serve to legitimize them even further in the eyes of those who would support such actions, yet fortunately, these instances are rare – even in Malmö.⁴⁴ The stigma, however, that the press assigns to the areas of high migrant concentration is so strong and consistent, that such reports may well deter anyone with anti-migrant sentiments from entering these areas to take action – or from taking action against a migrant in other areas, as it is so easy to get around the city: any trouble started could easily follow the perpetrator home. Further to this point, most targets of hate crimes appear to be women – particularly African Muslims.⁴⁵ When hate crimes are committed or attempted, the victims are usually those who are less likely to be able to fight back.

I found Rosengård to be a rather ordinary area, and I did not feel unsafe at all: those who live here are often confronted with a negative view of migrant-rich areas by others in Malmö who have not ever visited. As an example, one of my interview subjects said that she had once mentioned to one of her professors that she biked to school from her home in Rosengård and back again every day. Her professor reacted in shock that she would dare travel alone by herself in such a manner in Rosengård! She could not convince her professor – who had never been to Rosengård – that she was perfectly safe to do so.⁴⁶ Thus, the press may have a pivotal role in potentially legitimizing anti-migrant action while at the same time segregating communities within Malmö, which may make hate crimes more likely than they would be without this influence.

⁴⁴ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1

⁴⁵ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

⁴⁶ Interview Subject November 4 2015#1.

10.7.4 Political Action against Migrants as a Substitute for Criminal Action

In Section 10.4.2 above, I mentioned the interesting comparison of election results in Herrgården and neighboring Almgården. Recall that the residents of Herrgården are almost entirely migrants of mixed ethnicity (from more recent waves of refugee immigration) while Almgården's residents are also migrants, but are mostly white – descended from Finnish and Yugoslav workers who began arriving in the 1960s and 1970s. The two areas are separated only by a highway, so they are in quite close proximity to one another (see Figure XX), and there are clear racial, cultural, and economic differences between the two. (although both would be considered working-class areas).

Table 10.1 gives the election results at the parliamentary and municipal level for these two districts for the 2006, 2010, and 2014 elections.

Table 10.1 Voteshare for Sweden Democrats and Social Democrats in National Parliamentary and Municipal Elections in Herrgården and Almgården, Malmö, 2006-2014: Evidence of the Halo Effect for Voting Outcomes
(Source: Swedish Election Authority, www.val.se/)

	2006	2010	2014
<u>National Elections</u>			
<i>Sweden Democrats</i>			
Almgården	18.11	30.02	35.57
Herrgården	0.41	0.89	1.09
<i>Social Democrats</i>			
Almgården	51.17	38.84	41.93
Herrgården	82.30	87.52	78.67
<u>Municipal Elections</u>			
<i>Sweden Democrats</i>			
Almgården	22.99	34.67	37.27
Herrgården	0.73	0.80	1.30
<i>Social Democrats</i>			
Almgården	44.48	39.67	39.58
Herrgården	80.63	89.84	76.22

The Sweden Democrats have clearly won a very high level of support in Almgården (higher than the national average), while the party has not elicited much support at all in Herrgården. (And the little support the party *has* received in Herrgården can at least partly be attributed to some confusion that migrants may have faced on the ballot: “Sweden Democrat” [“*Sverigedemokraterna*”] is very close in name to “Social Democrat” [“*Socialdemokraterna*”]⁴⁷: there were reports in Rosengård that, because of this confusion, some residents voted for Sweden Democrats when they in fact intended to vote for the Social Democrats.⁴⁸) As these are working-class areas, the Social Democrats have done rather well in both districts. Yet in Almgården, support for the Social Democrats has fallen from the level of 2006 (more so at the national level than at the municipal level): this trend reflects that observed in Järfälla, where the Sweden Democrats appear to be taking working-class support from the Social Democrats (Oskarson and Demker, 2015). Voteshare for the Social Democrats in Herrgården dropped off in 2014 (an explanation for which is beyond the scope of the current study), yet the party still maintains overwhelming support in this district. The patterns of electoral support are very similar at the national and municipal levels, as is usually the case in Sweden.⁴⁹

Although I am not investigating the deviantly high level of voteshare support for the Sweden Democrats in Malmö, I mention these results for a couple of reasons, relevant to the overall study and to the outcome of anti-migrant hate crimes which is the focus of this chapter. First, given the residential segregation conditions of Almgården and Herrgården (based on ethnicity and perhaps time of arrival to the country), one would expect that a prime example of the halo effect would occur here. The stark disparity of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats between

⁴⁷ I would conjecture that this potential confusion may be one reason why the Sweden Democrats chose this as the name for their party.

⁴⁸ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

⁴⁹ Interview Subject 6 November 2015#2.

Almgården and Herrgården bears out this expectation. Second, while I do not have any statistics on hate crimes committed by residents of Almgården against residents of Herrgården (or *vice versa*), I have not found any reports of egregious hate crimes happening between these two areas (e.g., no “neighborhood wars”). Institutional action, then, may be a substitute for direct, extra-institutional action when the halo effect exists between areas that are in *such close proximity*. The halo effect – with regard to hate crimes – may operate at a slightly higher level of analysis (that is, residents from Almgården may commit hate crimes against migrants, but do so against anonymous targets away from their home area – and again, the converse scenario may happen as well). As Dancygier (2010, 128) found, for some forms of anti-migrant action taken by the native majority, indirect, legal action may only be weakly or indirectly linked to direct, illegal action; it is possible that the former action is a substitute for the latter – at least in the locations where inter-group tensions are caused by such clear group differences in closer quarters. Such a consideration would be a good avenue for future research.

10.8 Conclusions

In the course of my field research on anti-migrant hate crimes committed by majority native Swedes in Malmö, I found a number of effects that potentially offset each other, keeping the level of hate crimes observed within the range of what would be expected for the size of Malmö’s population.⁵⁰ Despite certain areas of Malmö in which migrant residential segregation appears to exist quite clearly, high population density, a lack of suburban areas, ethnically-mixed neighborhoods (including migrants who have arrived earlier in Malmö’s migrant history), good

⁵⁰ And I will reiterate here that my data are only for those hate crimes that have been *reported*: the true number is most likely quite higher indeed, but the same dynamic of underreporting exists in all other areas of Sweden, and this is the best data available by which to gauge this phenomenon.

transportation throughout the city, and easily-accessible public spaces and facilities seem to provide a dampening effect on direct anti-migrant political action, thereby providing support for the hypothesized effects of group contact theory.

The level of unemployment did not have the hypothesized effect, yet followed the results of my quantitative results: higher unemployment was associated with a *decrease* in hate crimes. Of the three major cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö), Malmö has the highest level of unemployment (shown in Figure 10.7 above), yet the level of hate crimes has remained somewhat steady from 2009 to 2013 (with an increase in 2014, but not nearly to the same degree as in Stockholm and Göteborg). In all cities, unemployment has dropped since 2009. Therefore, the connection between unemployment and the level of anti-migrant hate crimes is tenuous. This may be because – at least in Malmö – the majority of those unemployed are migrants or minority Swedes: as such, native majority Swedes do not feel materially threatened by minorities, and hence feel no compulsion to take direct action against this group. Another, more sinister problem may underlie this trend, however: from my interviews, I found that discrimination is rife in Malmö (particularly with regard to employment and job training opportunities).⁵¹ Discrimination based on race or ethnicity is illegal in Sweden, and is also considered a hate crime; yet, instances of discrimination are difficult to identify and prove, making them hard to prosecute – it is easier, then, for native majority Swedes to practice discrimination, as the potential costs are low.⁵² A study of discrimination as a hate crime would be another interesting area for future research.

Prime conditions for the halo effect do exist in Malmö, however (as seen between the districts of the almost-exclusively migrant-minority Herrgården and the migrant-majority Almgården), yet the anti-migrant political action observed in this case is indirect and institutional,

⁵¹ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

⁵² Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

in the form of the high support for the Sweden Democrats in Almgården – not illegal and criminal, as in the outcome of a hate crime. The common perception of Rosengård (and Herrgård, in particular) as an “unsafe, no-go zone” that has been propagated by the media may deter majority Swedes from entering the area to commit any crimes against residents. Also, as most hate crimes tend to be perpetrated against victims who are unknown to the assailant, hate crime is not usually an act that is carried out close to home.

There have also been factors in Malmö, however, that have potentially encouraged and possibly legitimized the commission of hate crimes against migrants. The authorities in Malmö did not even taken hate crimes as a serious police issue until 2008, finally making it a priority in 2012 with the institution of a Hate Crime Group. Reports of racial prejudice within the Malmö Police have underscored the problems the police have had in addressing hate crimes in the city.⁵³ In addition, the constant media portrayal of Rosengård, for example, as a dangerous and derelict area has fueled fears and prejudices against the areas inhabited predominantly by migrants or minority Swedes and the residents of these areas. By constantly calling negative attention to such parts of Malmö, the media reinforce segregation through misperception, which those who know the areas cite as being very unfair.

In the wake of such institutional failures vis-à-vis migrants and their neighborhoods, a rich civil society network has arisen in Malmö to address the needs of migrants and minority Swedes. These organizations not only attract members of their immediate communities, but also support from native majority residents in other areas of Malmö. The level of connection of these organizations in Malmö (and with NGOs in other areas of Sweden) is impressive, and these groups have begun to work more closely with authorities in Malmö to address issues of migrant/minority

⁵³ BBC, “Swedes Investigate Police Racism,” <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7877702.stm>.

concern (such as crime, discrimination, and access to housing) more closely. This cooperation is rather incipient, however, and it will take more time for authorities to build greater trust with the NGO network and the vulnerable groups in Malmö. It will consequently take more time for the native majority residents of Malmö to see the fruits of these initiatives, yet the returns are beginning to show in the rising number of reported hate crimes over the past couple of years: victims are becoming more comfortable in reporting such crimes, as the authorities have begun making efforts to take these grievances seriously. On the surface, however, a rise in hate crimes seems like a bad result, and the media have (again) been eager in drawing attention to this seemingly negative outcome. Nonetheless, the seeds of cooperation and progress on anti-migrant action have been sown in Malmö, and the strong civil society ties will likely ensure further progress.

My investigation of Malmö, then, revealed several countervailing factors which appear to limit the outcome of at least some forms of anti-migrant hate crimes. To be sure, there are many instances of hate crimes against migrants and minority Swedes that go unreported, so the true extent of the problem cannot be fully gauged by the reports alone. This was part of the reason for the field research: the problem of discrimination against migrants, for example, is much larger than is generally known, and represents a kind of “quiet” hate crime that is usually unreported. The media usually draws attention to the egregious instances of hate crime, so such subtle forms of the crime appear to be non-existent to the native majority, who do not suffer from discrimination in nearly the same measure. The prevalence of discrimination against migrants and minority Swedes goes against the common perception – even within Sweden itself—that the nation is quite tolerant towards migrants. As one of my interview subjects said: “There are two Swedens: one

[seen] on the inside, and one [seen] from the outside.”⁵⁴ The egalitarian “color-blindness” that most Swedes accept as the norm, however, clouds the issue of political action against migrants for many in the native majority: even within Sweden itself, there do seem to be two societies, and a conflict between “integration” and “assimilation” continues to unfold.

Finally, I would like to say that I liked Malmö. I liked its people and its spaces, and its feeling of being a true community despite its size. I liked that it was not at all as I had heard and read: I did not find its more economically-deprived areas to be as rough, run-down, and crime-ridden as I had been led to believe – a sentiment shared by those who live and work in these areas. But mostly, I liked its people: those whom I interviewed, those whom I met in passing, those who worked in the businesses I visited – everyone was open, helpful, and optimistic. I’m sure that this is not true of every resident of Malmö, but I visited quite a few areas, and I encountered an openness and a hospitality that I did not expect to find in such abundance.



One of the many “Refugees Welcome” signs posted around Malmö; this one was located in Rosengård (November 2015; Own Work)

⁵⁴ Interview Subject, 4 November 2015#3, a volunteer with a community-based NGO in Malmö.

Chapter 11

Conclusions and Implications

11.1 Findings: Main Hypotheses

From the results of my quantitative and qualitative studies, I can conclude that the level of migrant residential concentration from the majority native population *does* matter with respect to the level of anti-migrant political action. In areas where such residential segregation was high and a clear boundary existed between blocs of migrant minority residents and native majority residents, the hypothesized halo effect appeared to drive outcomes in some particular instances I observed (e.g., the high level of hate crimes in Stockholm, where segregation is high, and the higher voteshare in Almgården in Malmö, a mostly-majority district that abuts a mostly-migrant district).

In my specific field research, however, I found the causal picture to be much more nuanced overall. Population density seemed to play a key role in terms of residential proximity: for example, the voteshare for the Sweden Democrats was higher in Järfälla than in Sollentuna: residential areas in Järfälla are not grouped as closely together as they are in Sollentuna, despite having a mix of minority and majority residents. In Sollentuna, then, the more compact areas of residence throughout the municipality ensured that people were in closer, everyday contact with one another, and a lower voteshare for the Sweden Democrats was observed. Likewise, in Malmö, the compact area of the city – without any suburbs – means that most residents live close to one

another and mix readily; the level of hate crimes against migrants per capita is lower in Malmö than in Stockholm.

The proportion of migrants has been a “cultural threat” indicator long used in the literature as an important explanatory variable with regard to the level of populist radical right party voteshare (and I include the Sweden Democrats as a PRR party, although for my purposes here, I focus on the anti-migrant aspect of their platform as a qualifier). The use of this indicator has produced mixed results, however, and has in some studies been found to be significant only in combination with other variables, such as the level of unemployment. I did not find the proportion of migrants as a single factor to be significant in my quantitative or qualitative studies: to be sure, if there are more migrants in a population, the opportunities to commit a hate crime against a migrant are greater. Yet I did not find a *causal* link between the mere proportion of migrant residents and the level of anti-migrant political action as I had operationalized it. There is certainly more to the causal picture, as I have found with my evaluation of the effects of residential concentration.

As in previous studies, I did find that levels of unemployment were significant *in combination* with other variables (e.g., migrant residential concentration and population density), but not on its own. For a comprehensive welfare state, this may not be so surprising: any material threat that unemployment may pose is expected to be offset by generous social welfare provisions. A better indicator of material threat may be tax rates, as this may relate more directly to a sense of welfare chauvinism that could exist among native majority residents: as the migrant population grows, tax-payers may become resentful that their rising taxes are going to support these “others” (particularly those who are newly arrived) instead of being spent on those who have been born in

Sweden. This may be part of the explanation of the voteshare outcomes in Järfälla, where municipal taxes have been higher than in neighboring Sollentuna.

Unemployment as a monolithic explanatory variable is likely flawed, too, as the question of *who* is unemployed may be more important than *how many* are unemployed. Malmö, for example, has a very high unemployment rate, yet a majority of that unemployment is among the foreign-born population: as I noted, a resident who is born in Sweden is 1.5 times more likely to be employed than one who is foreign-born (Statistics Sweden). Given this structure of the unemployment demographic, one of two outcomes of anti-migrant political action by majority natives can be possible: on the one hand, native majority residents may feel a sense of material threat (via welfare chauvinism), and be prompted to act against migrants (either through voting for an anti-migrant party, or taking direct action against a migrant); on the other hand, unemployment may be seen as strictly a “migrant problem” by native majority residents, and hence they do not concern themselves with the issue. As with the proportion of migrants, unemployment as a *driving* explanation of anti-migrant political action is not sufficient, a point I take up in more detail below.

Although I found potential alternative explanations in the course of my field work in addition to evidence for the hypotheses I proposed in this study, these competing explanations appear to add to the overall causal picture, instead of negating the hypotheses I set out to explore: the sense of conflict induced by the halo effect in areas of residential segregation between migrants and majority native Swedes does appear to lead to higher levels of anti-migrant political action, *unless* these conditions of segregation are supplanted by ways in which migrant and majority natives can interact closely and consistently in quality contact (e.g., in common areas, or venues which are supported by the State) – as group contact theory dictates (Allport, 1953; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).

11.2 Findings: The Generation of Alternative Hypotheses for Future Research Directions

One of the purposes of performing field research was to uncover possible competing or augmenting explanations for the outcomes of anti-migrant political action. While I did not specifically test these alternatives in this study, I was able to explore them to a degree in my cases and discuss the ways in which they may affect the observed outcomes. These alternatives may well add to the overall causal picture, while not detracting from the importance of residential segregation. In fact, these alternative factors appear to have combined with residential concentration to enhance or dampen the levels of anti-migrant political action observed.

I found the different waves of migration to Sweden appear to have attenuating effects on anti-migrant political action, and I found evidence for this both in terms of voteshare for the Sweden Democrats and anti-migrant hate crimes. This factor operates in two ways: first, in each wave of migration in Sweden's history (i.e., Jewish and Finnish refugees during World War II; the labor migration from Turkey, Poland, and Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s; and finally the various groups of refugees that have arrived since the 1980s to the present), people from different nationalities, ethnicities, and cultures have come to settle in Sweden. This has given many areas of high migrant proportion quite a rich diversity within the migrant population itself: therefore, there is no *one single* group of migrants that can be identified in many areas of Sweden (with the exception of Stockholm, where migrant enclaves of a particular national or ethnic group are still found). This makes the scapegoating of *all* migrants more difficult, except for those who are easily identifiable in contrast to members of the native majority group (Afro-Swedish Muslim women, for example, who may be identified by their skin color and form of dress; in Malmö, for example,

Afro-Swedish women do tend to be the victims of hate crimes or harassment more than other members of other migrant groups)¹.

Second, as the earlier waves of migrants have settled and acclimated to their new homeland, they have formed social networks, businesses, and organizations that serve the migrant community. Not only do such services help new migrants establish themselves more easily after arrival (particularly in the job and housing markets), but the earlier waves of migrants may help to acclimate *native majority* residents to the newcomers as well: in some instances, earlier migrants lived and worked in areas around the districts where mostly new migrants had settled. Hence, as the earlier migrants have lived in Sweden for some time, majority native residents become accustomed to the presence of migrants overall, and the earlier migrants also provide something of a buffer between majority natives and the new migrants who have yet to acclimate to Swedish society. I observed this dynamic most acutely in Malmö, but also in Sollentuna.

The legacy of the Million Program housing initiative has meant that many areas in Sweden have had migrant ghettos in their midst. As discussed previously, the Million Program was a formula for high segregation between migrant and native majority Swedes, although entirely unintended. In some cases, however, the outcomes of the halo effect that one would expect from such a residential segregation have not materialized to a significant degree. Some municipalities have found ways to bring residents – minority and majority alike – into closer daily contact with one another, through public facilities, services, and development of areas that combine business, residential, and social opportunities. Sollentuna, for example, has developed the Centrum area (near the main rail station, and also near Malmvägen, one of the Million Program housing sites) in the past few years, and has also dedicated more spending to recreational and cultural facilities and

¹ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1.

services in that time as well. While Järfälla seems to be playing catch-up to Sollentuna in some respects (via numerous housing construction projects and upgrades of rail and shopping facilities), a primary focal point for residents such as the Centrum in Sollentuna does not really exist. The municipal government in Sollentuna, then, seems to have done more to bring its diverse residents together, while this has not been yet accomplished in Järfälla.

In addition to government-sponsored initiatives (and in some cases, *in lieu* of any government support), civil society has stepped in to offer services and provide assistance to the migrant community, and has also played a role in social integration between minority/migrant Swedes and native majority Swedes. I observed a number of organizations in Sollentuna that pursued these kinds of activities (e.g., for specific groups of migrants, such as Iranians, Turks, or Eritreans; or for minority youth), and in Malmö, I found the presence of such organizations to be ubiquitous and far-reaching. Thus, the activities and activism of civil society in parts of Sweden has resulted in a bottom-up approach to social integration, and has been a factor in stemming anti-migrant political activity. While some members of these organizations have acted out of a perceived necessity (i.e., in cases where the authorities have been absent or indifferent), once begun, the involvement of civil society takes on its own momentum, drawing more and more support from the community, which also eventually can lead to better engagement with authorities. This can be a somewhat slow process, but from my observations in Malmö and Sollentuna, civil society actors have achieved some successes in their efforts. And yet again, it seems that in areas where residents live closely together (as in Malmö and Sollentuna), civil society organizations are more prevalent and active (where they appear to be less so in Järfälla).

I also found that certain political institutional dynamics offered important explanatory factors with regard to the anti-migrant political actions I examined. The mainstream parties have

been somewhat caught off guard by the ascent of the Sweden Democrats, and the Social Democrats in particular have had trouble connecting with their traditional base of support – the working class. This party identity crisis is something Social Democrat parties in other parts of Europe have experienced, and part of this crisis arises from the fact that the platforms of the mainstream parties are continuously moving towards each other in the middle of the left-right divide. While some issues do not necessarily sit well within this traditional divide, an anti-migrant platform is clearly identifiable as a far right position. Hence, with no clear differentiation among the mainstream parties – and with a lack of strong leadership on issues concerning migration – some working-class voters have switched their support from the Social Democrats to the Sweden Democrats (although other niche parties, such as the Greens, have also gained votes, too). I found this to be the outcome in working-class areas where migrant residential concentration was quite high and the conditions of the halo effect existed (such as in the Almgården district in Malmö), but also in areas where residents did not live in very close proximity to each other, although migrants/minorities were dispersed fairly well throughout the area (such as in Järfälla).

On the flip side of this “wavering support” mechanism is that of continued support: in Sollentuna, for example, the Moderates have been in power for decades, and have been able to craft and implement their policies to serve the municipality without the threat of being seriously challenged by another party. The pattern of support for parties at the local level roughly mirrors that at the national level in Sweden – and I found this to be true in all of my cases – but it may be that support at the national level starts with the political landscape at the local level: from my observations, I found that the Sweden Democrats were not able to wrest as many votes away from the mainstream parties in areas where the Sweden Democrats did not have strong leadership, or where one party has been dominant for some time.

The local political scene has a bearing on hate crime outcomes, too: in Malmö, the Social Democrats have had a hold on power similar to what the Moderates have enjoyed in Sollentuna. Skåne County, however, has been a strong base for the Sweden Democrats (due to the level of local leadership of the party in the county, but also due to its proximity to Denmark, where the discourse on migration is different than it is in Sweden).² To counteract the strength of the Sweden Democrats locally, the Social Democrats have recently revamped much of the way they have handled migrant issues: the police force has been reorganized, and hate crimes against vulnerable groups have become a priority of the Malmö Police and also for Malmö City.³ In the vacuum that the national parties – particularly the Social Democrats – have left on issues of migration, local parties have stepped up to enact direct measures in efforts to encourage social integration. As a result, hate crimes in Malmö have not risen as precipitously as in the other major cities of Sweden, and victims have begun to have greater trust in the local authorities and are reporting more instances of such crimes. So, yes, it does seem to be true in Sweden: “all politics is local.”⁴

11.3 Comparison of the Outcomes of Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare and Anti-Migrant Hate Crimes

The dynamics that undergird the motivations individuals may have to vote for an anti-migrant party and to commit a crime against a person because she/he appears to be from another country and culture are different, yet connected. The presence of White Supremacist groups in Sweden is not new, and one such group is the foundation for the Sweden Democrat party of today (although the party has taken some care to blur that connection and moderate its rhetoric). During World

² Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1, a Minister of Parliament for the Sweden Democrats.

³ Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

⁴ Tip O’Neill, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.

War II, Nazi groups developed in Sweden, and there is current research ongoing that traces the trajectories of that movement and finds intriguing parallels with the ascent of the present movement behind the success of the Sweden Democrats.⁵

To be sure, some of the present rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats serves to legitimize more direct action against migrants: while I was in Sweden, a wave of arson attacks on refugee housing centers was continuing. A Sweden Democrat in the municipal council in Lund published on a Web page the locations of such housing in and around Lund, after the Swedish Migration Agency had decided not to reveal these locations in order to protect the residents and the property.⁶ Ironically, the leader of the Sweden Democrats, Jimmy Åkesson condemned the publishing of these locations by a fellow member of his party, and drew criticism for being a hypocrite as a result.⁷ A Social Democrat MP was rather blunt in her criticism of the decision to reveal the refugee accommodations: “I find it hard to see that this is anything other than an incitement to commit hate crimes.”⁸

The act of voting has no direct personal cost, and as such, people may be more inclined to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo or a particular policy area with ballots instead of through criminal acts. In my time in Sweden – when the influx of refugees was at its highest rate – the government appeared not to react as this “crisis” was unfolding: I saw no Member of Parliament visiting Malmö to witness the huge influx of refugees pouring into the city, nor to assess the Roma camp that had become such a controversial issue there. While Malmö is the main point of entry for refugees, many who arrived would disperse (or be settled) in other areas of

⁵ Interview Subject 27 October 2015#2, a researcher on housing and urban economics in Sweden.

⁶ Daily Telegraph, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11960921/Sweden-conceals-refugee-centre-addresses-after-attacks.html>.

⁷ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1.

⁸ Daily Telegraph, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/sweden/11960921/Sweden-conceals-refugee-centre-addresses-after-attacks.html>.

Sweden, and the scramble for appropriate housing for the number of refugees arriving was a nationwide concern. So, the challenges that Malmö was facing immediately would (and will) also ripple out to affect other municipalities as well over time.

Yet while the national government did make comments about the crisis from time to time, little action was taken, until, in December, the government decided to institute border checks into the country and disallow through-transit to other countries for refugees (beginning in January 2016), in an effort to stem the inward flow (and that flow has indeed decreased – “between 500 and 600 asylum applications per week are currently being registered [early March 2016], compared with 10,000 in late October [2015 – when I was in the country]”⁹). This move went against the promises of the government to keep Sweden’s borders open in an altruistic spirit, but the government was caught in a trap of its own rhetoric, and eventually had to relent. Despite these moves with regard to border controls, the government seemed to be doing little to help individual localities deal with the influx: as I described the situation in Malmö, ordinary citizens were stepping up to do what they could to help the newly-arrived refugees, who were often overwhelmed and just happy to have arrived at their destination.

Therefore, not only have the Social Democrats apparently run out of palpable ideas and effective actions in the eyes of much of their working-class base (Blyth, 2001; Forestiere and Allen, 2011), but the mainstream parties in general seem to have been caught in this trap – especially with regard to migration policy. Although the indicator of the number of hate crimes is fraught with measurement issues, I wonder how much of a coincidence it is that in 2014 – when the Sweden Democrats secured a dramatic (some described it as “shocking”) increase in electoral support – the number of hate crimes in Stockholm and Göteborg (and to a smaller extent, Malmö)

⁹ The Local, <www.thelocal.se/20160303/swedens-border-checks-set-to-remain-in-force-this-spring>.

increased dramatically as well (of course I note in the previous chapter other reasons why the number of hate crimes might possibly have increased in the past couple of years in Malmö). The success of the Sweden Democrats may be a substantial legitimizer of anti-migrant action – even extreme anti-migrant action: this follows from the logic of strategic action fields, in which even extreme actions by in-group members against out-group members can occur if the feeling of threat is legitimized within the group; the anti-migrant rhetoric of the Sweden Democrats may well serve as that legitimizing force (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). This will be a trend to observe with some interest over the coming years and elections.

11.4 Limitations of the Study

I do have to note a number of limitations that I encountered in the course of this study – some of which have to do with data availability and accessibility, and others were limitations of time, funds, and language facility. The first such limitation concerns the levels of analysis: as my main explanatory variable – migrant residential concentration – is inherently predicated on physical location and proximity to other residents, my analysis would be best performed at an even lower level than the county or municipality. This was part of the reason for pursuing the field research: I needed an idea of how the causal mechanisms of group contact and the halo effect may play out in specific localities. For the quantitative analyses, however, I could only access data for all of my main variables at the county level; the data *do* exist at a district level (and Ruth and Rydgren [2013] and Andersson [2010] were able to access this data for their respective projects), but Statistics Sweden charges for the use of these data (for primarily local business marketing purposes), and is quite guarded as to whom they allow access to the data (as it contains information that could potentially identify specific individuals in some cases) (Statistics Sweden). Access to

and permission to use this data would be one task for future research, yet my initial study at the county-level at least brings a finer-grained analysis than other studies have executed, and combined with the qualitative case studies, I was able to trace causal links that I would not have observed at only the county level.

Limitations with regard to conceptualization and measurement exist, too. I have operationalized my studies in terms of “actions against migrants,” yet one crucial assumption I have made is that those who take such actions assume that a “minority” is indeed an indicator of “migrant.” In my research, I have essentially used these terms interchangeably for this reason: for example, in the perpetration of a hate crime, the victim is presumed to be chosen because she/he is “different” from the assailant – usually in terms of race, language, or appearance (e.g., manner of dress). For this kind of anonymous attack, this differences stem from the fact that the victim is (or is descended from) a migrant, and so I consider this an “anti-migrant” act. To be sure, however, many minority Swedes were born in Sweden, but their predecessors came to Sweden from elsewhere. This forms part of the identity trap in which the offspring of migrants find themselves: they are born Swedish, but in society, they are still treated as “migrants” (often the term “second-generation” is used by the media and authorities to describe Swedish-born minorities – a term that has a not-so-subtle implication that these individuals are not “truly” Swedish¹⁰). Setting aside the issue of identity for a moment, the point is that *operationally*, minority Swedes and migrants to Sweden are often treated as the *same group* (by social institutions, but also by individuals who would take action against these individuals). As such, I felt comfortable in using the concepts of “minority Swede” and “migrant” to mean the same group *with respect to the outcomes I examined*.

¹⁰ Interview Subject 4 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 12 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

Now, the measurement of “hate crimes against migrants” is not problematic, given this conceptualization, but the operationalization of “migrant population” and “migrant unemployment” is less precise, as the data available via Statistics Sweden records these numbers for those who are “foreign-born.” There are also data for those who are born in Sweden but whose parents (one or both) are born outside of Sweden, but these data were not available at the county and municipal levels of analysis.¹¹ Hence, the measurements of the level of hate crimes against migrants and the other measurements of migrant data are not quite the same. The foreign-born population figures, however, do give a rough guide to the overall minority picture in each locality (and are also the numbers that other studies have used, making this study more comparable to those results), so I considered this disjoint between the two measurements of “migrant” rather negligible.

The specific measurement of hate crimes against migrants also has some inherent issues, as I mentioned in the case study of Malmö: these data represent what Brå have gathered from individual police reports from around the country, and so the data are dependent upon *how* the local authorities record these crimes and whether or not such crimes are reported in the first place. In Malmö, for example, the Police seemed quite ill-equipped and unwilling to identify a crime as a “hate crime” until two officers were put in charge of assessing hate crimes in the city in 2008, and a Hate Crime Group was finally established in 2012.¹² This laxity in pursuing hate crimes had two effects: before 2012, hate crimes were not prioritized, and hence were likely not identified and recorded properly, and victims were less likely to report these crimes, as they had no faith that their grievances would be properly handled. While I did not look at the manners in which other police authorities in the country address hate crime, it is clear that local variation in the reporting

¹¹ Such data likely do exist in the Statistics Sweden labyrinth of data, but I was not able to find them, nor to find a contact who could provide them to me.

¹² Interview Subject 3 February 2016#1.

and recording of these events may well exist, and so comparability is drawn into question. The data I received from Brå, however, represent the best national data available, and hence I was compelled to use it, but with these limitations in mind.

One other issue exists over the implications that can be drawn from examining levels of “unemployment” with regard to hate crimes. It is important to note that discrimination in the job market is prevalent (in Malmö, if not in other areas of Sweden), and landing employment is often accomplished through established social networks. These factors shape the unemployment landscape for migrants, and one of these factors – discrimination based on ethnicity or minority status – is categorized as a hate crime. Discrimination, however, is extremely difficult to measure, as it often goes unreported and is not a great priority in the eyes of the authorities. Still, a connection can be made between unemployment levels and being denied employment: if better data existed on instances of discrimination, “unemployment” as an explanatory variable may be in fact endogenous: that is, migrant status leads to employment discrimination, which in turn leads to higher migrant unemployment rates, which increases native majority antipathy towards migrants, which leads to greater employment discrimination against migrants, etc. The use of “unemployment” as a measure of material threat is problematic not just because it occludes the demographics of those who are more likely to be unemployed, but also because it can be a *result* of the anti-migrant action in the first place. This could also be part of the reason that this variable has not yielded consistent results among earlier studies, but also why my quantitative results were somewhat surprising factor and why it did not have as much explanatory power as other variables I considered.

With regard to case selection, there are some issues that I would like to overcome in future research as well. First, I did not perform field research in a rural area due to time and funding

limitations, but a rural/urban dimension with regard to political actions against migrants likely exists: as one Sweden Democrat MP told me, “There is more support in smaller areas where immigration has created a greater strain -- the backside of immigration has been seen in these areas. Also, in smaller areas, a charismatic leader stands out more and attracts attention.”¹³ These are all factors to consider – not only with respect to voteshare for the Sweden Democrats, but also the level of hate crimes against migrants.

In addition, I was not able to visit all areas of Malmö (e.g., I did not go into Almgården), or to interview people in other areas that were similarly homogenous. It took me some time to get a “lay of the land” when I arrived in Malmö, so I was not sure where these more homogenous areas until I was about to leave. As I noted a number of times, the media have tended to focus on the problems in the migrant-rich areas of town, so those were easy to identify before I even arrived in Malmö. I was also not able to interview many people in Järfälla: contrary to my experience in Sollentuna and Malmö, my attempts to make contact and schedule interviews went unanswered (e.g., among community organizations, journalists, members of the municipal council). This is an observation as well, as overall, I found the people in Järfälla to be less open than people in the other two municipalities. I relied mostly on field observations for my results for this case, but it would have been ideal to have had at least a few more interviews from residents in Järfälla with different perspectives.

And finally, My Swedish is very rudimentary! I can read the language rather well, but I found it difficult to follow conversations. The range of my observations, then, was curtailed by my inability to understand much of the discussions going on around me – those conversations may have been quite telling. I am working to improve my grasp of Swedish, but this was a considerable

¹³ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1.

hindrance to my participant observation, during which time I had to rely often on the dynamics I observed and not the words. Fortunately, in addition to my ability to read some Swedish, *The Local* – an English-language paper that reports on Swedish News – was available, and seemed to echo the main Swedish newspapers (and I was informed that it was a reliable source of Swedish news). Access to this news source saved me a lot of time, and helped me to keep on top of the unfolding refugee crisis while I was in the country (and since).

11.5 Other Considerations

One dimension of the migrant community on which I did not focus but has implications for how migrants are perceived and treated was the presence of Roma, as my analysis focused on migrants as a group, and not on the actions taken against specific migrant groups. Eastern European EU Member States were granted Schengen Area rights a few years ago in Sweden, and as such, many members of Roma groups began to arrive. Until the recent mammoth influx of refugees to Sweden, the issue of the Roma in Sweden was the highest-profile migrant issue: as a long-standing, comprehensive welfare state, Swedes are not accustomed to seeing beggars.¹⁴ Roma can stay for up to three months in Sweden without employment, but then are required to leave if unemployed by that time. Most Roma have a long history of mistrust of the authorities, however, and so many live “under the radar” of the State, and hence do not report themselves as living in Sweden, and do not seek official employment. This leaves begging as a main source of income for many Roma, although their presence is different from municipality to municipality: I saw quite a few Roma in Göteborg, yet fewer in Stockholm and Malmö; there were a couple in Sollentuna, but I saw none in Järfälla. The presence of Roma – and the conditions under which

¹⁴ Interview Subject 29 October 2015#1.

they live in the country – may further entrench feelings of resentment among majority natives, but also make majority natives insensitive to issues that affect minorities: while in the Central Göteborg rail station, many Roma would continuously approach majority Swedes to ask for money, and most Swedes would simply ignore the Roma's entreaties. Such a dynamic may threaten the level of social trust and social capital that still exists in Sweden, to the detriment of all minority groups – not just the Roma. The status of the Roma is, in effect, somewhere between that of a permanent resident and a refugee; as such, a study on just this one migrant group and how its presence in Sweden may affect attitudes and actions towards other migrants would be of interest.

Another factor that may well have a future bearing on the outcomes I have studied is the historic influx of refugees to the country in October and November of 2015. I have mentioned this phenomenon a number of times in this study – mostly because it was occurring at its peak right when I was in the country (and Malmö was particularly affected – as it is a first point of landing for the majority of refugees). This crisis situation was not the main focus of my study, however, and as it was unfolding while I was there observing, it is difficult for me to draw many conclusions about its effects on Swedish society in general, and on anti-migrant political action in particular. Nonetheless, I believe that the way Sweden has approached immigration in the past (both its successes and failures) will impinge greatly upon how well it will be able to manage the challenges of this crisis. I believe policy-makers will do well especially to note some of the points of this study: segregation matters, and social integration policies should be clearly defined and communicated to all of Swedish society, and it should not be left only to individual municipalities in some kind of piecemeal approach.

11.6 Theoretical Implications

I do see a value in this study compared to previous literature in that I have implemented a lower level of analysis, which enabled me to discern causal patterns that would have otherwise been occluded at strictly a national level of analysis. Likewise, greater value would be yet attained (especially for the quantitative analyses) from being able to pursue similar study at an even more local level (e.g., district, neighborhood) – a path for future research. In addition, as I contained my analysis to sub-national units within a single country, I was able to hold constant variance that may well occur at the national level: I did not have to account for differences in migration, citizenship, social welfare policy, or even the particular factors of national political institutions and actors. For a larger, quantitative study, these factors could be incorporated into a multi-level analysis, but as I felt qualitative study was necessary to establish causal mechanisms and linkages, I would not have been able to pursue several case studies in different countries with the time and funding I had available.

Much research has been devoted in Sweden (and elsewhere) on the *economic* implications of residential segregation, and to some extent, the social implications as well. This research comes from the Urban Studies literature, and much of it is inspired by racial segregation studies that have been conducted in the United States. In my study, I have gone beyond socio-economic outcomes to elucidate *political* outcomes, which in turn can affect socio-economic outcomes quite significantly and substantively (as illustrated especially in my case studies of Sollentuna and Järfälla). By adding this political dimension to the inquiry of the effects of residential segregation – and by tracing the causal mechanisms and combinations of factors that are significant – I broaden the understanding of what negative effects can arise from this kind of segregation, and potential

ways that those negative effects can be effectively addressed and attenuated, yielding greater social integration.

Finally, my research gives rise to the question of the impact of new populations on the level of social trust (Uslaner, 2012; Crepaz, 2008): many refugees come from areas where the actions of authorities contributed to the reason for their migration (e.g., Syrian refugees fleeing civil war, Roma migrants who were persecuted in their homelands). Can social trust between the authorities and migrants be built in order to achieve a cohesive society? Will these differences erode the level of social trust that has existed in a high-trusting country such as Sweden? How are integration and social trust related? These are important research questions to undertake in future research, and ones that may become much more salient in the wake of the recent mass migrations of refugees from the Middle East to Europe and beyond.

11.7 Policy Implications

For Sweden, some of the policy implications of this study have become quite clear: Sweden has been experiencing a housing shortage in recent years – a situation made all that more acute, given the numbers of refugees who have arrived over the past eight months. The State is already providing housing for refugees – some of it temporary – but there may be no choice but to enact a kind of housing construction initiative like the Million Program from the 1960s and 1970s. Although there were substantial unintended consequences of that program, it is not clear if Sweden will be able to provide adequate accommodation for its population within instilling the kind of ghettoization that followed in the wake of the Million Program. Part of the issue has to do with the larger share of housing that is owned by private companies, and leased out to the State, which in turn provides this accommodation to refugees. How and where private companies manage these

housing holdings will determine the conditions and the *location* of much refugee accommodation in future. Frankly, the Swedish government has seemed overwhelmed with the numbers of refugees, and has reacted in a manner something like a deer caught in headlights. The major policy question will be, then: will the Swedish government be able to enact policy that deters migrant residential segregation? Also, to what degree will the Sweden Democrats be able to influence this policy, and in which direction? Not only has the Swedish government been unable to articulate clear policy directions on these matters, but the Sweden Democrats have not offered substantive alternatives, either (outside of their desire to cut migration by 90% and to deport more migrants).¹⁵ As I observed, some municipalities are doing what they can to cope with not only the legacy of the Million Program, but the steadily increasing rise of migrant residents. Without leadership at the national level, however, the strain of meeting housing and social integration challenges may be too great for many municipalities.

Part of the lack of leadership at the national level is down to a very unclear understanding of what “integration” means and entails. For many Swedes, “integration” is only a one-way process: it is the responsibility of a migrant to “fit” into her/his new home and to try to “become Swedish.” For many native majority Swedes, then, “integration” is understood to be *assimilation* with the native majority.¹⁶ Society is not static, however, and Swedish society *has* changed over the years, and not just due to the most recent influx of migrants. To become a more socially integrated and hence *stable* society, integration needs to be accepted as a two-way process that involves members of the native majority. As such, institutional changes need to be made, in terms of how diversity in Sweden is taught in schools, how it is handled by local authorities, and how and where the negative impacts of racism exist throughout Swedish society (e.g., job and housing

¹⁵ Interview Subject 11 November 2015#1.

¹⁶ Interview Subject 18 November 2015#1; Interview Subject 4 November 2015#2.

discrimination).¹⁷ A better-integrated partnership between authorities at the local and national levels and the growing, robust civil society networks that address migrant issues would represent a giant step towards making positive changes. The cases of Malmö and Sollentuna offer good examples of how these partnerships can be established, and the ways in which their successes can counter a negative factor like the halo effect, which stems from residential segregation.

11.8 Moving Forward

Although I have limited the scope of the present study to constituents of one comprehensive welfare state, I believe that the processes of residential segregation – and the potential negative political outcomes that can arise from such segregation – are highly applicable to other advanced democracies as well. The comparisons I made with regard to anti-migrant attitudes and outcomes in the Introduction indicate that these issues play out in different ways in various countries, but I believe that many of the factors I have identified likely have a causal role in other countries as well. Extrapolating this research to other countries (such as Finland, Germany, Denmark) would be a directly for future research, as these issues will only become more salient over time – particularly given the mass migration of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan to many European Union countries in the latter part of 2015. Migration policy and social integration policy are two connected policy challenges that have implications for social and political stability: the rise of radical right populist parties throughout Europe in the wake of rising immigration has meant that action on migration and integration policies needs to happen now – and preparing citizens for changes to their societies will be a requisite part of such policies. The conflicts over race relations in the United States (and the present ascent of Donald Trump, based on his anti-group rhetoric)

¹⁷ Interview Subject 17 November 2015#1.

indicates that the politics of groups and segregation still hold great power over politics even in a traditional immigration country. It may be just tremendous fortuity that I have chosen the issue of migrant residential segregation as my area of research precisely at a time when the number of migrants arriving in advanced democracies has been an historic event. I do believe that there are lessons from Sweden's past and present policies on migration, housing, and social engineering that can be applied to the situation which will continue to unfold in these countries: one hopes that there is enough political will and vision to craft and implement policies wisely: in an inclusive – and not exclusive – manner, and to avoid recreating the patterns of residential segregation that have incited feelings of threat within the majority native population and induced them to act against their migrant neighbors.

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
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
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APPENDICES


Appendix A MIPEX Scores on Migrant Policies Overall, Including Access to Education for 2007, 2010, and 2014



MIPEX Results: 2010



MIPEX Results: 2014



Appendix B Measures of Political Alienation

Political alienation (PA) is derived from data of the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), in a similar formulation to that of Oskarson, 2010. “Political Trust” (PT) is an average of trust in parties, parliament, and politicians. (I use “Trust in Parties,” as opposed to Oskarson’s measure of “Trust in the European Parliament,” as a more accurate measure of *domestic* political trust.) “Political Interest” (PI) data is taken directly from the surveys, and normalized to a 10-point scale. “Political Alienation” is on a 10-point scale, where “0” is “not alienated,” and “10” is “alienated:” Following Oskarson’s formula:

$$PA = 10 - (PI/2 + PT/2)$$

Table B1 Political Alienation in Finland and Sweden

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
Finland					
PI	4.743	4.663	4.767	4.857	4.743
Trust Parties	--	5.004	5.004	4.969	4.540
Trust Parliament	5.795	6.000	5.989	5.982	5.385
Trust Politicians	4.779	4.889	4.946	4.871	4.436
PT	5.445	5.298	5.313	5.274	4.787
Political Proclivity	5.094	4.980	5.040	5.066	4.765
PA	4.906	5.020	4.960	4.935	5.235
Sweden					
PI	5.350	5.340	5.610	5.443	5.587
Trust Parties	--	4.400	4.618	4.771	5.107
Trust Parliament	5.924	5.352	5.622	5.733	6.276
Trust Politicians	4.714	4.196	4.460	4.623	5.040
PT	4.774	4.649	4.900	5.042	5.474
Political Proclivity	5.062	4.995	5.255	5.243	5.531
PA	4.938	5.005	4.745	4.757	4.469

Data Weighting

For data from the European Social Survey (ESS Rounds 1-5), there is a design weight of 1. No country weight is used, as the country data are not combined and hence country weights are not necessary.

Appendix C Regression Results: Voteshare for Sweden Democrats, Including the Independent Variable “Year”

Table C.1 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Voteshare of Anti-Migrant Party (Sweden Democrats), Parliamentary Elections in Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014): Including the Independent Variable “Year”

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Year	0.1392*** (0.0057)	0.1444*** (0.0051)	0.1428*** (0.0053)	0.1418*** (0.0046)	0.1400*** (0.0047)
County	-0.0170*** (0.0043)	-0.0162*** (0.0038)	-0.0162*** (0.0038)	-0.0145*** (0.0034)	-0.0140*** (0.0033)
Unemployment	0.0426** (0.0156)	0.0039 (0.0267)	-0.0365 (0.0391)	0.0458*** (0.0118)	0.0133 (0.0344)
Proportion of Migrants	0.0487** (0.0141)	0.0809*** (0.0142)	0.0257 (0.0386)	0.0804*** (0.0221)	0.0426 (0.0354)
Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.0366** (0.0133)	0.1017** (0.0289)	0.1083 (0.0558)	-0.1272** (0.0407)	-0.2034** (0.0684)
Population Density	-0.0071 (0.0140)	-0.0107 (0.0248)	0.0409 (0.0413)	0.1626*** (0.0319)	0.2434*** (0.0505)
Proportion Migrants * Unemployment	-	-	0.0087 (0.0057)	-	0.0076 (0.0048)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-	-0.0009 (0.0072)	-	0.0070 (0.0063)
Proportion Migrants * Population Density	-	-	-	-0.0151*** (0.0026)	-0.0176*** (0.0030)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	-	0.0099 (0.0075)	0.0152 (0.0077)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	-0.0148*** (0.0029)	-0.0149*** (0.0029)	0.0097 (0.0052)	0.0112 (0.0059)
Unemployment * Population Density	-	0.0081* (0.0040)	-0.0003 (0.0067)	-	-0.0126* (0.0060)
Constant	-278.1964*** (11.3015)	-288.8695*** (10.2693)	-285.5085*** (10.6184)	-283.9805*** (9.2595)	-280.3236*** (9.4718)
r^2 (Adjusted)	0.9385	0.9515	0.9518	0.9649	0.9660
n	101	101	101	101	101

Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** p< .001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 (Standard Errors in parentheses)

Appendix D Scatter Plot of Voteshare of Sweden Democrats vs Concentration of Migrants, Transformed Values (1998-2014)




Figure D.1 Scatter Plot of Voteshare of Sweden Democrats vs Concentration of Migrants, 1998-2014 (Transformed Values of Voteshare)

To counteract the effects of heteroscedasticity observed and smooth the data into a more linear approximation, I transformed the dependent variable by adding “1” and taking the natural log (to offset any theoretical values of zero in the data for “voteshare”): $\ln(x + 1)$. A scatter plot of the (more linear) transformed dependent variable is presented in Figure D.1.

Appendix E Alternative Models: Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare

Table E.1 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Voteshare of Anti-Migrant Party (Sweden Democrats), Parliamentary Elections in Sweden (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014): Without the Changes in Migrant Proportion and Concentration from Previous Year

Variable	Model 5A	Model 5B	Model 5C	Model 5D	Model 5E
County	-.2923*** (0.0614)	-0.2982*** (0.0604)	-0.2854*** (0.0554)	-0.2624*** (0.0634)	-.2305** (0.0562)
Unemployment	1.4665*** (0.2218)	1.4861*** (0.2685)	-0.9253 (0.6753)	1.6174*** (0.2794)	-1.432* (0.6662)
Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.3358 (0.1995)	-1.6406** (0.5956)	-0.5266 (0.9216)	-1.680* (0.8128)	-0.5901 (1.1063)
Proportion of Migrants	1.2986*** (0.1382)	0.8935*** (0.2197)	-1.123* (0.4921)	1.1548** (0.3253)	-0.8710 (0.4825)
Population Density	-0.0457*** (0.0083)	-0.0483* (0.0207)	0.0392 (0.0285)	-0.0337 (0.0461)	0.0547 (0.0460)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-	-0.1070 (0.1072)	-	-0.0330 (0.1080)
Proportion Migrants * Unemployment	-	-	0.3144*** (0.0700)	-	0.3685*** (0.0695)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	-	0.0223 (0.0126)	0.0363** (0.0119)
Proportion Migrants * Population Density	-	-	-	-0.0074 (0.0049)	-0.0130* (0.0046)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	0.1535* (0.0659)	0.1193 (0.0608)	0.1326 (0.0949)	0.0252 (0.0861)
Unemployment * Population Density	-	-0.0041 (0.0043)	-0.0173** (0.0051)	-0.0074 (0.0047)	-0.0255*** (0.0056)
Constant	-10.8860*** (1.5767)	-7.1016** (2.3990)	7.6257 (4.4208)	-9.6384** (2.9106)	6.9978 (4.2539)
r^2 (Adjusted)	0.6376	0.6506	0.7077	0.6548	0.7326
n	101 [†]	101 [†]	101 [†]	101 [†]	101 [†]

Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$
(Standard Errors in parentheses)

[†]There were more observations for these models, as I did not have to drop the observations for “change in migrant concentration” and “change in migrant proportion” for 1998; I did not have values for the migrant concentration and migrant proportion for the previous election year (1994), and hence could not compute the changes in these values for the observations in 1998 for models in my analyses that included these change variables.

Appendix F Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5): Voteshare versus Migrant Residential Concentration




Figure F.1 Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5) of Anti-Migrant Party Voteshare Versus Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2014

There do appear to be a few outliers (and speaks to the heteroscedasticity found in the data), but overall, an even distribution around the y-axis at zero is present, lending evidence to the fact that the assumption of independent, identically distributed errors can be reasonably made for the model.

Appendix G Scatter Plot of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Concentration of Migrants, Transformed Values (1998-2007)




Figure G.1 Scatter Plot of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Concentration of Migrants, 1998-2007 (Transformed Values of Hate Crimes per Capita)

This scatter plot shows the effects of the transformation on the dependent variable (hate crimes per capita) in which “1” was added to the value of the variable and the natural log was then taken of this sum: $\ln(x + 1)$. (It can be observed from the untransformed scatter plot in Figure 6.3 that the effect is not substantial.)

Appendix H: Description of *Principal* Hate Crime Categories (Majority Native Swedes against Minorities) Reported to Swedish Police

Olaga hot	<i>Unlawful threat</i>
Misshandel	<i>(Physical) Assault</i>
Ofredande	<i>Non-sexual molestation</i>
Förtal-förolämpning	<i>Defamation/slander-insult</i>
Hets mot folkgrupp	<i>Agitation against a population group</i>
Olaga diskriminering	<i>Unlawful discrimination</i>
Skadegörelse	<i>Vandalism</i>
Klotter	<i>Graffiti</i>
Grov misshandel	<i>Aggravated assault</i>
Rån	<i>Mugging</i>
Rån utan skjutvapen	<i>Mugging without firearm</i>
Brottskod saknas	<i>Crime code missing</i>
Hot mot tjänsteman	<i>Threat against a public servant</i>
Våld mot tjänsteman	<i>Violence against a public servant</i>
Stöld	<i>Theft</i>
Tjänstefel m.m.	<i>(Official) misconduct etc.</i>
Brott mot knivlagen ¹	<i>Offences against the Knives Act</i>
Övriga brott mot 4 kap.	<i>Other crimes according to chapter 4²</i>
Olaga intrång	<i>Unlawful entry</i>
Övriga brott mot 17 kap.	<i>Other crimes according to chapter 17³</i>
Mordbrand	<i>Arson</i>
Bötesbrott eller annat förfarande	<i>Various offences resulting in a fine</i>
Övriga brott mot 8 kap.	<i>Other crimes according to chapter 8⁴</i>
Övriga brott mot 15 kap.	<i>Other crimes according to chapter 15⁵</i>
Våldsamt motstånd	<i>Violent resistance</i>
Försök till mord eller dråp	<i>Attempted murder or manslaughter</i>
Falskt larm	<i>False alarm</i>
Framkallande av fara för annan	<i>Creating danger to another person</i>
Allmänfarlig vårdslöshet	<i>Carelessness endangering the public</i>
Övriga brott enl. spec.lagstiftning	<i>Other criminal legislation⁶</i>
Övriga brott mot 16 kap.	<i>Other crimes according to chapter 16⁷</i>
Brott mot vapenlagen	<i>Crimes against the Weapons Act</i>
Oredligt förfarande	<i>Dishonest conduct</i>
Vållande till kroppsskada	<i>Causing bodily harm</i>
Dråp	<i>Manslaughter</i>
Lagen om besöksförbud	<i>Restraining Order Act</i>
Övrigt	<i>Other</i>

Source: Brottsförebyggande Rådet (*Brå*)/National Council for Crime Prevention (Sweden), Department of Statistical Surveys. Note: Not all of these crimes are included in both time periods (1998-2007 and 2008-2014).

¹ Also: Lagen om förbud beträffande knivar.

² The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against liberty and peace.

³ The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against public activity.

⁴ The Swedish Penal Code: Theft, robbery and other crimes of stealing.

⁵ The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes of perjury, false prosecution and other untrue statement.

⁶ Outside of the Swedish Penal Code.

⁷ The Swedish Penal Code: Crimes against public order.

Appendix I Alternative Models: Hate Crimes against Migrants (1998-2007): Inclusive of Changes in Migrant Proportion and Migrant Concentration

Table I.1 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Hate Crimes per 100,000 Inhabitants against Minorities in Swedish Counties, with Changes in Migrant Proportion and Concentration (1998 – 2007)

	Model 5A	Model 5B
Year	0.0314** (0.0115)	0.0345*** (0.0092)
County	0.0075 (0.0043)	0.0072 (0.0042)
Unemployment	-0.0397 (0.0590)	-0.0396 (0.0588)
Proportion of Migrants	0.0064 (0.0457)	0.0089 (0.0453)
Change in Proportion of Migrants	0.0923 (0.2069)	-
Migrant Residential Concentration	0.1432* (0.0701)	-0.1403* (0.0696)
Change in Migrant Residential Concentration	-0.0760 (0.2442)	-0.0572 (0.2400)
Population Density	0.0038 (0.0023)	-0.0036 (0.0023)
Proportion of Migrants X Unemployment	0.0132 (0.0078)	0.0130 (0.0077)
Migrant Concentration X Unemployment	-0.0082 (0.0071)	-0.0082 (0.0071)
Proportion of Migrants X Population Density	-	-
Migrant Concentration X Population Density	-	-
Proportion Migrants X Migrant Concentration	-0.0120 (0.0063)	-0.0117 (0.0062)
Population Density X Unemployment	-0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0004)
Constant	-60.5441 (23.1062)	-66.7038*** (18.4844)
r^2 (Adjusted)	0.4034	0.4063
n	180	180

Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$
(Standard Errors in parentheses)

Appendix J Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5): Hate Crimes per Capita versus Migrant Residential Concentration (1998-2007)




Figure J.1 Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5) of Hate Crimes per Capita Versus Migrant Residential Concentration, 1998-2007

As in the residual-vs-fitted values plot for anti-migrant voteshare and migrant residential concentration, a few outliers are noted; overall, however, an even distribution around the y-axis at zero is present, lending evidence to the fact that the assumption of independent, identically distributed errors can be reasonably made for the model.

Appendix K Alternative Model of Hate Crimes per Capita Analysis: Exclusive of “Population Density” Variable (1998-2007 and 2008-2014)

Table K.1 Regression Results for Models of Migrant Population and Unemployment on Anti-Migrant Political Action (Hate Crimes), 1998-2007 and 2008-2014 (without “Population Density”)

Variables	Model	Model
	1998-2007	2008-2014
Year	0.049*	-0.027*
County	0.013*	0.013*
Unemployment	0.111*	0.156*
Migrant Residential Concentration	0.573*	0.750*
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-0.059*	-0.077*
Year*County	-	-
Constant	-95.383*	55.772*
R^2	0.263 (adjusted)	0.241
n	159	140
* indicates $p < 0.05$		

Appendix L Transformed Values of Hate Crimes per Capita versus Migrant Residential Concentration (2008-2014)




Figure L.1 Scatter Plot of Hate Crimes per Capita vs Concentration of Migrants, 2008-2014 (Transformed Values of Hate Crimes per Capita)

For this transformation, I added “1” to the dependent variable value and then took the natural log of the sum: $\ln(x + 1)$. Note that in comparison with Figure 6.X, there is not a great difference in the distribution of data.

Appendix M Alternative Model of Hate Crimes per Capita Analysis: 2008-2014

Table M.1 Regression Results for Models of Effects on Hate Crimes per 100,000 Inhabitants against Minorities (2008 – 2014), with Changes in Migrant Proportion and Concentration over Time

	Model 1A	Model 2A	Model 3A	Model 4A	Model 5A
Year	-1.4731** (0.4311)	-1.5039** (0.4375)	-2.0760*** (0.4749)	-2.2370*** (0.4702)	-2.2469*** (0.4706)
Unemployment	0.8445 (0.5784)	2.8626* (1.2706)	0.9959** (0.3336)	-2.3011 (1.7434)	-1.9128 (1.7089)
Migrant Residential Concentration	1.3835 (0.7911)	4.5726 (4.8802)	0.6106 (3.1178)	2.0756 (4.5803)	-0.1224 (5.4414)
Change in Migrant Residential Concentration	-1.1375* (0.4567)	-1.1379* (0.4712)	-0.8738* (0.3795)	-0.6880* (0.2854)	-0.7051* (0.2819)
Proportion of Migrants	1.1022 (0.7461)	1.5559 (1.6539)	2.3375 (1.6300)	-1.0274 (1.7095)	-1.1713 (1.7365)
Change in Proportion of Migrants	0.3485 (0.3614)	0.3391 (0.3725)	0.1958 (0.2414)	0.0090 (0.2353)	-0.0135 (0.2419)
Population Density	0.0343 (0.0292)	0.0222 (0.0286)	-0.3679* (0.1726)	-0.0474 (0.1296)	-0.0040 (0.1919)
Migrant Concentration * Unemployment	-	-0.4135 (0.6372)	-	-0.2777 (0.5409)	-0.2257 (0.1978)
Proportion Migrants * Unemployment	-	-0.0443 (0.2293)	-	0.5356* (0.2149)	0.4915* (0.1978)
Migrant Concentration * Population Density	-	-	0.04884 (0.3782)	0.0710 (0.0495)	0.0670 (0.0482)
Proportion Migrants * Population Density	-	-	-0.0173 (0.3782)	-0.0072 (0.0172)	-0.0098 (0.0185)
Proportion Migrants * Migrant Concentration	-	-	-	-	0.1921 (0.3723)
Unemployment * Population Density	-	-	-	-	-0.0098 (0.0185)
Constant	2973.158** (860.9789)	3018.645** (877.0903)	4180.303*** (948.8351)	4525.120*** (943.1244)	4546.381*** (944.0925)
r^2	0.5446	0.5526	0.6178	0.6627	0.6651
n	139 [†]	139 [†]	139 [†]	139 [†]	139 [†]
Data: Statistics Sweden. Significance levels: *** p< .001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 (Standard Errors in parentheses)					
[†] There is one missing observation for the change in migrant residential concentration in Blekinge County for 2008.					

Appendix N Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5): Hate Crimes per Capita versus Migrant Residential Concentration (2008-2014)




Figure N.1 Residual versus Fit Plot for Main Model (Model 5) of Hate Crimes per Capita Versus Migrant Residential Concentration, 2008-2014

For the 2008-2014 timeframe, the residual-vs-fitted values plot for hate crimes per capita and migrant residential concentration is distributed around the zero x -axis, but not as compactly as the data for the 1998-2007 timeframe. There do appear to be a few more sizable outliers in this plot for 2008-2014, yet an even distribution around the y -axis at zero is observed, lending evidence to the fact that the assumption of independent, identically distributed errors can be reasonably made for the model.

Appendix O Field Interview Questions

Interview Questions – Voteshare for the Sweden Democrats*

1. Tell me a little bit about your background. Are you active on political issues in the municipality? Are you active on migration issues in the municipality? What, in your view, are the most important political issues in the municipality? Most important social issues?
2. Are residents in the municipality interested or active in political issues? Which issues? How interested/active? Why might that be?
3. How would you describe the municipality? Affluent? Working class? Level of overall education? Multicultural? Segregated? Are there many young people? Level of unemployment? Level of crime/violence?
4. Are there any specific problems/concerns in the municipality? For how long has/have this been an issue(s)?
5. How would you describe the Sweden Democrats?
6. The Sweden Democrats' support has been (lower/higher) in this municipality than in other municipalities in the county. Why do you think that is?
7. Which factors do you think have (helped/hurt) the Sweden Democrats' support in this municipality?
8. The current influx of refugees is unprecedented in Swedish history. How are people in the municipality reacting to the number of refugees arriving? How many come to this municipality?
9. Will the arrival of so many refugees change people's views on immigration in the municipality, do you think? Will the increasing number of refugees lead to increased support for the Sweden Democrats in the municipality, in your opinion?

10. Is there anyone else whom you think could offer me more information on these issues in the municipality?

11. Is there anything you would like to add?

12. Do you have any questions to ask me?

* Note that my questions were asked in the context of an open-ended interview of subjects in different roles, and hence not all parts of all questions were asked of every participant, and some follow-up questions were asked in conjunction with the information I was offered.

Interview Questions – Hate Crimes*

1. Tell me about your organization and what it does. How long has the organization been in existence? What are your organization's goals? How many people are involved in your organization? How is your organization perceived by the community?
2. Which members of the community does your organization serve (e.g., children/youth, males/females/ elderly, families, youth-at-risk)? Do many members of the community come to your organization? Why might that be?
3. How do people outside of the community view your organization? Do you have many contacts with those outside of the community you serve?
4. How would you describe the area of the physical location of your organization? Is unemployment a problem? Is violence a problem? Or is the area fairly safe and peaceful? Are there any other problems in the community about which you or your organization is concerned?
5. How would you describe relations between members of the community you serve and people outside of that community? Has it always been this way? Have there been any changes?
6. How does your organization view the current influx of refugees (particularly from Syria)? Is your organization involved in any refugee relief efforts?
7. Are there any other organizations or people whom you think could offer me further information?
8. Is there anything else you would like to add? Do you have any questions to ask me?

* Note that my questions were asked in the context of an open-ended interview of subjects in different roles, and hence not all parts of all questions were asked of every participant, and some follow-up questions were asked in conjunction with the information I was offered.

Expert Interview Questionnaire: Hate Crimes in Malmö

(Conducted via e-mail)

Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my research project. I would very much appreciate your insights regarding the questions below. I would also appreciate any additional information that you believe may be relevant to my research on hate crimes in Malmö. You may disregard any question that you do not wish to answer. Again, my thanks to you for your time and participation.

1. Please tell me a little about your background and the kind of work you have done with hate crimes, and the work you do now in the Safety and Security unit for Malmö Stad.
2. What prompted the creation of the Hate Crime group in the Police in Malmö? How many people work for the Police's Hate Crime group? How is this group perceived by the people of Malmö?
3. How many people work for the Safety and Security unit in Malmö Stad where you work now? What are the priorities of this unit? How is the Safety and Security group perceived by those who live in Malmö?
4. Which vulnerable groups does the Safety and Security unit work with? How is the unit perceived by members of these vulnerable groups? Do you find that members of vulnerable groups have high trust in the Safety and Security unit? Why do you think this is so? Do these groups have trust in the Police in Malmö? Again, why do you think this is so? Does the Safety and Security unit seek out vulnerable groups with whom to work, or are these groups referred to your unit? If referred, by whom?

5. What kinds of hate crimes have occurred in Malmö? Is there any particular group or groups that are targeted? How would you describe the perpetrators of these crimes – that is, are there any common traits that these perpetrators share (e.g., age, ethnicity, gender, where the perpetrators live)?
6. How would you describe the trend of hate crimes in Malmö over the past 20 years? My data suggest that there are fewer hate crimes in Malmö than in other cities (such as Stockholm) – would you agree with this? If so, why do you think there are fewer hate crimes in Malmö than in other cities in Sweden? If you believe there are just as many or more hate crimes in Malmö as other Swedish cities, why might that be?
7. What do you believe are the causes of hate crimes in Malmö? In your view, are these causes different than in other cities in Sweden?
8. It is my understanding that the media portray some areas of Malmö (such as Rosengård) as very unsafe in terms of the level of crime. Do you agree with the media's description of certain areas of Malmö as very unsafe? Why or why not? Do hate crimes tend to occur only in certain areas of Malmö? If yes, in which areas, and why do you think this is so?
9. How does the Hate Crime group of the Malmö Police address hate crime? How does the Safety and Security group in Malmö Stad address hate crime? Do these two groups share resources (e.g., information, personnel)?
10. Which other groups in Malmö does the Safety and Security unit work with to address hate crimes? What kinds of cooperation does the Safety and Security unit have with these groups?

11. How do you think the current influx of refugees to Malmö has affected the level of hate crimes in the city? Do you think there will be more hate crimes with so many more refugees arriving? Why or why not?

12. Is there anything else about hate crimes in Malmö that you would like to add?