CHANGING THE BRAINS:

HOW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA SUCCESSFULLY ADAPTS TO CAPITALISM

by

WEIQI ZHANG

(Under the Direction of Han S. Park)

ABSTRACT

The "China paradox" refers to the successful coexistence of communism and capitalism in China. Much of the literature on authoritarian resilience tries to explain the paradox by focusing on institutions but lacks a mechanism of change. This dissertation provides the mechanism of change by looking at the roles of leaders and their worldviews. Borrowing from the human needs paradigm of political development and sociology of profession, leaders are divided into two types: those whose worldview is responsive to diverse social needs and those whose worldview is unresponsive. The quantitative and qualitative methods are used to analyze the leadership transitions and adaptation policy making at both central and provincial levels. The results show that the Chinese Communist Party has successfully maintained resilience because it has replaced unresponsive leaders with responsive ones when social needs diversify as a result of development. Consequently, the rise of responsive leaders facilitated the adoption and implementation of adaptation policies.

INDEX WORDS: China, Authoritarian Resilience, Leadership, Worldview

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To my wife, Juan Ling, my son, George Zhang, and my parents, Jingbao Zhang and Qiu
Chen, I am grateful to you for your love, support and confidence in me.

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THE "CHINA PARADOX"

China's rapid development in the past three decades amazes the world. Economically, according to the World Bank, China's real GDP has been growing at 9.92 percent on average annually since 1978 to the present (The World Bank 2014). Additionally, China has made significant progress in human development, which includes three basic dimensions: long and healthy life, knowledge, and decent standard of living (The United Nations Development Program 2013). According the UN's Human Development Index, which combines indicators of life expectancy, education and income and ranges from 0 to 1, China rose from 0.4 to 0.7 from 1980 to 2012. Such rapid growth challenges the notion that communism and capitalism cannot successfully coexist in a society.

However, the economic growth over the years brought about serious problems. One of the biggest problems is economic inequality. China's Gini coefficient rose from 0.29 in 1981 to 0.42 in 2009 and surpassed the United States in the early 2003 (The World Bank 2014). Such a dramatic change turns China from being one of the most equal countries in the world to being one of the most unequal one, which directly contradicts the socialist principle. China also suffers pervasive corruption (Manion 2004; Wedeman 2008) and environmental pollution (Smil 1984; Wang 2004), just to name a few. Facing these problems, China is expected by some to be unstable or even collapse. Chang (2001) believes that China would not be able to survive when encountering these issues at the same time. Park's (1984) "U-curve" theory of regime stability

suggests that revolutions take place when the gap between people's expectation and the reality exceeds a certain point. In other words, not only a revolution would happen when the social situation worsens, but also it can happen when a regime may collapse when it tries to fix these problems but fail to meet people's expectation. Bremmer (2007) claims that an authoritarian regime becomes unstable and prone to collapse when it transitions from a closed society to an open society. Others think that the authoritarian communist party in China is at best trapped in stagnation (Pei 2006; Li 2012a). However, the authoritarian regime in China has shown its high level of resilience.

Existing theories try to explain authoritarian resilience from two perspectives. One perspective is repression. It is argued that authoritarian regimes collapse simply because they are not authoritarian enough. The contagion theory points out that regimes collapse because of diffused revolutions from neighboring countries. Scholars assert that a regime's susceptibility of foreign diffused revolution and its capability of disrupting the diffusion are key to the resilience of the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2013). Studies of the former communist countries in East Europe show that countries that collapsed were unwilling to use force to repress domestic protests (Kramer 2013; Bernstein 2013). However, contagious revolutions, such as the ones triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, developed in different ways in different countries. Therefore, the contagion theory repression does not does not explain the mechanism of how a revolution would cause another revolution in other countries. More importantly, history shows that violent repression does not guarantee survival nor does non-repression necessarily leads to collapse (Dimitrov 2005).

The second stream of explanation focuses on institutions and structures. For instance, some literature stresses on the varied outcomes of economic reforms among authoritarian

regimes and posits that regimes collapse due to failed economic reforms (Dimitrov 2013a; Bernstein 2013). The failure can be caused by bad timing, unrealistic goal of the reform, and rigid organization (Lin 2011). However, the success of economic reform cannot explain China's, Vietnam's or North Korea's survival. The more and deeper China and Vietnam reform their economies, the more difficult it is to continue to grow rapidly and therefore the more likely for them to collapse. Nonetheless, these two economies seem to be relatively very stable. In the case of North Korea, the Workers' Party of Korea has maintained survival and arguably resilience without a successful economy. Therefore, economic reform alone cannot explain authoritarian resilience

In addition, authoritarian regimes survive because they adapt to the challenges via institutional adaptation. Adaptation is defined as the creation of a political system that is more responsive to the needs and concerns of different sectors of society (Dickson 1997). This school of argument looks for institutional changes that authoritarian regimes conduct in order to be more responsive to the society without losing control of it (Nathan 2003; Shambaugh 2008). For instance, the Communist Party of China (CCP) has changed its cadre management system to guide officials' behavior, even in the policy areas where the CCP does not have control (Edin 2003; Huang 1996; Whiting 2004). The top evaluation criteria changed from political loyalty to the capability of promoting economic growth and to the capability of maintaining social stability. These changes not only allow the CCP to strengthen its control over the government officials, but also enable it to respond to the society. Besides the evaluation system, the CCP also replaces incompetent leaders to pursue its policy goals (Walder 1995; Walder et al. 2000; Lee 1983; Zang 2006).

To be resilient, it is also pointed out that an authoritarian regime can selectively repress people's discontent. For example, China does not repress all negative internet criticism of the government and the leaders. Instead, it selectively censors the comments that have the potential to mobilize collective action (King et al. 2013). Furthermore, besides repression, the Chinese government also takes the advantage of the internet forum to strengthen its legitimacy by posing positive comments about the regime (Han 2013). Resilience can also be achieved by incorporating potential or real challengers (Gallagher and Hanson 2013; Dickson 2008; Haddad 2012; Falcoff 2003). For instance, business elites were forbidden from joining the CCP before 2000. But with the advent of the "Three Represents" ideology, the party tried to incorporate business elites into the party and even the leadership so as to maintain stability. The next approach is ideological adaptation. Many regimes survive because they managed to adjust their ideological foundation to serve new policy deviations (Dimitrov 2013a; Tismaneanu 2013; Coase and Wang 2012). For example, in order to change policy direction without undermining the ideological foundation of the regime, The CCP developed the theories of "the Primary Stage of Socialism," "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics," "Three Represents," "Harmonious Society," and "Scientific Development." Similarly, North Korea developed the *Juche* ideology and the *Songun* ideology to justify the legitimacy of the regime. The "adaptation explanations" show how institutional changes affect resilience. However, they fail to explain why adaptation succeeded in some countries but not others. The quintessential example of a failed adaptation is the *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the "adaptation" explanations do not explain how adaptations were started.

Other scholars look at China's informal institution, such as *guanxi*, for explanation. It is argued that *guanxi* is crucial to the Chinese way of life. When there is no rule of law and formal

institutions do not function, informal institutions can facilitate socioeconomic activities by lowering transaction costs (Boisot and Child 1996; McNally 2011, 2012). Nonetheless, this stream of explanations focuses so much on China that it fails to explain how unique China's *guanxi* is compared to other countries' informal institutions. Without this clarification, we cannot say the *guanxi* network is the cause of resilience.

Overall, the extant literature cannot explain why some authoritarian regimes succeed in their adaptations while others failed and does not indicate the mechanism of change in adaptation policy making. I argue that the literature has these weaknesses because it focuses too much on institution and does not pay enough attention to the role of the agency. In order to explain what drives successful adaptations, we should pay more attention to "agents", especially when the subject of interest is an authoritarian regime. Chinese political leaders play a significant role in making all the key decisions for the country. However, there has been little research to date that investigates what makes the CCP capable of adapting to the changing challenges. An institutional explanation would be that the leaders were able to adapt because the social, economic environment changes. I show that although external environment does have impact on leaders' awareness of adaptations, leaders still matter because different leaders have different policy preferences even when they face similar situations.

In this study, I extend the human needs paradigm of political development. The human needs paradigm suggests that social needs develop with the society. A society that is at lower development stages has relatively more uniform social needs; while one that is at higher development stages has relatively more diverse social needs. Uniform social needs can be best dealt with by policies that are unresponsive to diversity and diverse social needs by responsive policies. Focusing on leadership, I posit that a leader's worldview determines his or her policy

preferences and determines the success of adaptation. Therefore, I argue that, first, leaders with responsive worldview are more capable of adapting to diverse social needs than those who have unresponsive worldviews. Second, when social needs become more and more diverse, the CCP ensures the success of its adaptation by replacing the leaders whose worldviews were unresponsive to diverse social needs with those whose worldviews were more responsive.

As shown above, the existing literature on China's adaptation focuses on institutions such as cadre management, democracy in the party, and co-optation of challengers (Nathan 2003; Dickson 2008; Shambaugh 2008). My dissertation is expected to make the following contributions to the field. First, by examining the role of leadership in the CCP's adaptation, I refine the authoritarian resilience and depict a more complete picture of how the CCP has successfully adapted to the challenges that are produced by capitalist institutions. In terms of practical implication, this study suggests that a successful reform has to be accompanied by changes in the leadership. Leaders who are unresponsive to diverse social needs are not likely to successfully adapt to the challenges.

Second, I contribute to the field of China study by creating a comprehensive, user-friendly data set about Chinese political leaders' worldviews and biographical information. The existing data sources on the Chinese political leaders are limited in the following areas. First, most of the data sets on the Chinese political leaders' demographic characteristics are only available for the pre-2002 time period. Only the Chinese Political Elites Database that is prepared by Chien-Wen Kou covers the up-to-date information, but it is very difficult for researchers to extract information from the data set. Second, the existing data do not provide any information on Chinese political leaders' worldviews. I contribute to the field by creating a comprehensive, up-to-date, and user-friendly data set of Chinese leaders' biographical

backgrounds and worldviews. I hope my dissertation provides a foundation from which researchers embark upon future explorations of the role of political leadership in adapting to the changes and challenges of Chinese political and economic environments.

The issues that are discussed in this introduction will be engaged in detail in the following chapters. Chapter 2 comprises a review of the relevant literature about authoritarian resilience. I also review the literature of Chinese leadership study and discuss the difference between my study and the existing literature. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework of this study. I will discuss the relationship between the human needs paradigm of political development and worldview-based leadership capability. In this chapter, I also introduce the typology of worldview. In Chapter 4, I use evidence from central party leaders and provincial leaders to examine the relationship between leaders' worldviews and leadership transition. In this chapter, I show that, when social needs diversify, leaders that have responsive worldview are more likely to be recruited or promoted in the CCP than those whose worldview are unresponsive. Chapter 5 deals with the relationship between leaders' worldviews and their policy preferences. I find that leaders with different worldviews behave differently, even when they are subject to the same policy guidance from the same central government. Chapter 6 summarizes the theory and the findings of the study and discusses the limitation and the future improvement of the study. I also point out the future development of the study by covering more varied cases, such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea.

CHAPTER 2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing literature explains the resilience of authoritarian regimes from two perspectives: repression and institutional adaptation. The "repression" explanation suggests that authoritarian regimes collapse because they are not authoritarian enough. As for the institutional adaptation explanation, the stream of literature looks for institutional explanations in the following areas that help an authoritarian regime maintain stability: (1) the economic reforms, (2) ideological unification, (3) cadre management, (4) incorporation of potential challengers in the society, (5), selective repression, and (6) informal institutions. Below I will review each of these groups of literature and then focus on the leadership literature.

2.1 Repression

According to Linz (1975), an authoritarian regime features irresponsibility, repressive tactics against opponents and prohibition of anti-regime mass mobilization. In other words, when an authoritarian regime is threatened it can almost always use force to pursue survival. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the East European countries followed suit, but China, North Korea and Cuba did not. Facing the diffusion of the revolution, Kramer (2013) suggests that those who survived because they were willing to use force to disrupt the diffusion of revolution; while those who were unwilling or unable to use force collapsed in front of protesters. Similarly, Bernstein

(2013) claims that one of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed but China did not was because Gorbachev was unwilling to repress the protests. In comparison, Deng Xiaoping was willing to shed the blood of people to maintain stability. Heydemann and Leenders (2011) find that evidence in the Middle East. They note that once the leaders in the Arab world are accustomed to protesters' demand, the former would gain advantage and believe that repression is the best survival strategy.

However, as Dimitrov (2005) shows, repression does not guarantee resilience. Geddes (1999) claims that a single-party authoritarian regimes in a crisis are able to allow popular participation and influence on policy making without giving up their dominant role in the political system. Gandhi (2008) argues that not only is authoritarian regime able to survive without using force but also it should not use force. The reason is that ruling via pure coercion is costly and risky. Comparing with coercion, authoritarian leaders are better off adopting representative institutions to obtain public opinion and including societal groups in the decision making.

Structural factors also contribute to the repressive capability of the regime. Bunce and Wolchik (2013) suggest that the regimes who survived the collapse of the Soviet Union were geographically distant from, culturally different from, and economically and politically independent of the Soviet Union, which was the center of the "communist federalism". Nonetheless, Dimitrov (2005) shows that, first, among the ten regimes that collapsed due to contagion, they collapsed in five different ways. For instance, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria collapsed with leadership change and no street protests. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia collapsed with leadership change and non-violent street protests. Romania suffered leadership change and violent street protests. Albania, experienced street protests but without

leadership change. And last, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union collapsed with a withdrawal from the federal union. Second, Dimitrov shows that regimes with different status in the communist camp and relationship with the Soviet Union also collapsed. Thus, structure is not a major determinant of the resilience of an authoritarian regime.

2.2 Adaptation

Adaptation is defined as the creation of a political system that is more responsive to the needs and concerns of different sectors of society (Dickson 1997). The existing literature indicates five aspects of adaptations that are conducive to authoritarian resilience: economic adaptation or economic reform, cadre management reform, selective repression, incorporation and ideological adaptation.

2.2.1 Economic adaptation

Economic growth is one of the two pillars for regime resilience (Dimitrov 2005). Dimitrov (2013a) and Bernstein (2013) point out that the economic reforms in the economically backward communist countries such as China, Laos, and Vietnam were much simpler tasks than the economic reform in industrialized communist economies, such as the Soviet Union. In the backward economies, the poor industrial foundation resulted in relatively few consumer products that were under the central planning. When economic reform started in these economies, the reform started in the agricultural industry. In comparison, the governments of the industrialized economies had a more complex task of planning numerous industrialized products and their

prices. When these economies conducted economic reforms, the reforms started in the light and heavy industry and service, which was a more difficult task than agricultural reform.

Besides the economic structure that makes backward economies more likely to succeed, the goal and the scale of the reforms also matter. The Soviet Union collapsed partly due to its aim to conduct a fundamental, comprehensive economic and political liberalization (Bernstein 2013). In order to complete the reform in a timely manner, the Soviet Union adopted a "shock therapy". Ironically, despite the goal of liberalization, the political liberalization was taken advantage of by the conservatives in the party, military and bureaucracy to impede economic liberalization. For instance, on the one hand the Soviet Union tried to create a market economy; on the other hand, the government refused to give up its control over price. The institutional conflicts eventually resulted in the failure of the economic reform and eventually political instability.

In comparison, China's reform focused on the economic liberalization only. Moreover, the economic reform was conducted in a slow and sequenced manner. It has been more than three decades since China initiated its economic reform. But the reform is still ongoing today. The reform has gone through several stages under government plans and each stage features different goals, scales and scopes (Chan and Unger 2009; Lin 2009; Coase and Wang 2012; Zhang 2011). Unlike the economic reform, on political reform, the CCP maintained tight, suppressive control over the society and ideological diversity. The gradualist economic reform strategy plus the suppressive political control provided the CCP sufficient leeway to experiment and adapt to the expected and unexpected situations brought about by the reforms.

In terms of policy making, CCP's institutional innovation helped accommodate the conflict between communism and capitalism. Lin (2011) notes that the Chinese economy is a centrally managed capitalism. On the one hand, the party commands the national and local

economy by controlling personnel, organization, and capital in political and economic fields (Huang 1996; Whiting 2004; Edin 2003); on the other hand, it encourages competition among state owned enterprises. Under the centrally managed capitalism, the party-state secures both political control over the critical social resources and economic efficiency. One of the quintessential examples of the dualism is the dual track price system that was adopted in 1984. Under this system, in order to maintain the features of the planned economy and stimulate the economy, commodities produced within the command quota are traded at command prices; while the production that exceeds the requirement can be sold at higher market prices. Dualism also exists between urban and rural economies. Huang (2008) states that dualism is practiced in different sectors of the Chinese economy. In the rural economy, township and village enterprises were liberalized to form an entrepreneurial capitalism; while in the urban economy state performs a leading role in the economy.

Regarding the explanation of economic and political reform, if the economic backwardness and progressive market reform helped China grow the economy and maintain stability, then it is difficult to explain why Vietnam, which was also economically backward in the 80s, also conducted progressive market reform, failed to achieve economic development, and managed to maintain resilience. In this regard, North Korea's economic reforms failed, but it has maintained resilience. More tellingly, the Vietnamese economy later started to stabilize and took off after Nong Duc Manh took office in 2001 (Dimitrov 2005). Vietnam's and North Korea's experience suggests that the success of economic reform may not play a significant role in enhancing regime resilience. Second, if the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries collapsed due to their relatively advanced starting point, then we should expect China to move toward instability and collapse when the deepening of economic reform becomes more complex

and economic growth becomes more difficult. However, we have not seen any major sign of instability in China that is worse than the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, while China today is much more advanced economically than it was in 1989.

2.3 Political adaptations

Unlike conventional wisdom that believes that only democracies are responsive to the society, Nathan (2003) argues that communist regimes are not rigid. In fact, they are capable of improving governance by creating institutions of accountability. There are two types of institutions of accountability: horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability refers to the constraint that is posed by other government organs on the executive branch; in comparison, vertical accountability refers to the constraint that is posed by the people on the leaders. Abrami et al. (2013) point out that although China and Vietnam are still authoritarian, they have been progressively improving on horizontal accountability. For instance, in China, the CCP introduced "democracy in the party" to improve horizontal accountability. One result of the reform is the transition from single-candidate election to marginal election, in which multiple candidates compete for one position. In Vietnam, there is a checks-and-balance among the General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP), the President, and the Prime Minister. Moreover, even in the VCP leadership, the Central Committee of the VCP, which used to be considered the subordinate of the Politburo Standing Committee, has become more and more powerful in the decision making.

As for vertical accountability, Dimitrov (2013b) differentiates between direct vertical accountability and proxy accountability. Direct vertical accountability makes the central government be directly responsible to the people. Abrami et al. (2013) assert that both Vietnam

and China allow more representation of the people in the party and the National People's Congress by making election nominations easy. Proxy accountability allows people to appeal to the central government and request it to sanction lower levels of government. As a result, the central government can deflect people's discontent from itself to the local governments.

Nathan (2003) notes that the CCP established institutions such as the norm-bound leadership succession, meritocracy, and democracy in the party to promote the responsiveness of the party to the society. Shambaugh (2008) shows that the CCP has studied diligently the collapse of authoritarian regimes in history and made great effort to avoid the mistakes that led to the collapse. Tocqueville's *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* is allegedly the most popular book among the today's Chinese leaders. According to Shambaugh, the CCP becomes flexible in conducting institutional reforms to cope with the atrophies that were proven to have undermined other regimes, such as the lack of social security, social stratification, corruption, and growing protests.

2.3.1 Ideological adaptation

Economic development may enhance a regime's capability of resilience. But it may also trigger instability by creating uncertainty and hurting some social groups. So, ideology becomes another important source of resilience (Dimitrov 2005, 2013a). Communist ideology suffered a significant crisis in the 1980s when the living standard in the communist world fell much lower than that in the capitalist world. Tismaneanu (2013) claims that the communist regimes that survived were more capable of creating new ideological unification, such as nationalism, in the society than those that collapsed.

For instance, during the market reform era, encountering a dilemma between a poor economy and the communist ideology, it was argued that although China was a communist society, it could take the advantage of capitalism to better serve communist goals (Coase and Wang 2012). In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping developed the "theory of the primary stage of socialism (*shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan lilun).*" This theoretical innovation is different from the orthodox Marxism. Marxism asserts that capitalism is one stage of human development prior to socialism and communism. In comparison, the "primary stage of socialism" refers to a stage of development at which a society with a backward economic foundation skips capitalism and arrives at socialism. Due to the poor economy, the society had to keep the socialist superstructure and industrialize by adopting capitalist economy, or so called "socialist market economy". This proposal of socialist market economy initially encountered strong opposition from the conservatives in the party. Zhao Ziyang, the former Party Secretary, responded, "Some criticized me for pursuing a capitalist path. So what? It's the law of socialism" (Zong 2007).

Following the theory of the primary stage of socialism, Deng Xiaoping later developed "Socialism with Chinese characteristics", another theoretical innovation that features the combination of communist and capitalist institutions. These new ideologies provide theoretical explanation and justification for the capitalist economic institutions in the communist society. Shambaugh (2008) posits that the ideological adaptations continued during the post-Deng Xiaoping era. Guo (2003) analyzes the Chinese political culture and the Chinese cognitive map of legitimacy. He states that the CCP enhances its legitimacy by adapting to the changing cognitive map with different policies. For instance, Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" campaign required the party to represent the "advanced productivity," "advanced cultural development", and "the fundamental interests of the majority" (Jiang 2002). Hu Jingtao's "Scientific

Development" campaign and "Socialist Harmonious Society" campaign tried to correct the growth-oriented developmental strategy and stressed the sustainability and social stability in the development. The evolving ideological adaptation shows that it is not a feature of certain leaders, but a feature of the party leadership as a whole.

Similar to the CCP to some extent, the Workers' Party in North Korea developed the *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology and later the *Songun* (Military First) ideology to find legitimacy for the regime. These ideologies transfer the legitimacy of the regime from communist ideology to the Kim's family and the military (Park 2002). In addition, the Workers' Party also took the advantage of international hostility to enhance nationalism to unify the society under the party (Tismaneanu 2013). Comparing to their East Asian comrades where communist ideology was adjusted but largely maintained intact, the East European communist countries suffered a worse ideological crisis due to the more thorough de-Stalinization.

On ideological adaptation, there are two weaknesses of this stream of explanation. First, the change in ideology does not mean people really believe in the ideological transition nor does the change guarantee a smooth transition in reality. Despite the innovation such as the "primary stage of socialism", the transition from the primary stage to the advanced stage has proved to be challenging. Not only did the CCP itself experience cyclical economic and political downturns since the inception of the market reform, but also some communist regimes, such as the Soviet Union and Poland, collapsed during the transition. North Korea conducted ideological adaptation and survived but has paid the cost of stagnation (Manscourov 2006). Second, these explanations fail to explain why ideological adaptation was initiated. In China's case in particular, the ideological adaptations seem to correlate with the leadership transitions.   One explanation is that the adaptations were caused by the changes in the problems that the leaders faced. Another

explanation is that these adaptations were the results of different leaders. Later in this chapter, I argue that the nature of leaders may play a more significant role in adaptation.

2.3.2 Cadre management

A collection of literature edited by Brødsgaard and Zheng (2006) presents a comprehensive adaptation strategy. One of the major adaptation approaches is the cadre management. Lenin (1964) said at the Sixth Party Congress, "if the Central Committee is deprived of the right to direct the allocation of personnel, it will be unable to direct policy." To date, most of the literature on the cadre management in former communist countries examines the impact of the *nomenklatura* on the leadership during the post-communist era (Eyal and Townsley 1995; Hill and Lowenhardt 2007). The literature that examines how cadre management systems have been used to improve regime resilience focuses primarily on China (Walder 2006; Burns 2006; Brødsgaard 2012).

The background of the party structure in the CCP

The official leadership group of the CCP is the Central Committee of the CCP (CCCPC). The CCCPC is composed of all the important party members serving in the party, government and the military. Its members have voting rights on all the major decisions of the party, such as major policy changes and the election of a new General Secretary and Politburo members. The CCCPC is a hierarchical organization (Figure 2.1). It is ranked from high to low in the order of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the Politburo, the CCCPC full membership and the CCCPC alternate membership.

Figure 2.1 The Structure of the CCCPC

The CCCPC members are elected every five years by Party Congress delegates, who are elected from the local party branches. The candidates of the CCCPC members are carefully selected before the election by the PBSC members, among whom a new Secretary General will be elected. According Shih et al. (2012), although the delegates can vote freely, they are closely monitored and controlled by the incumbent Secretary General and the PBSC members. Thus, in practice, the incumbent PBSC members are the agents that manage the Chinese leadership composition.

However, although the PBSC members have control over the CCCPC membership, once the CCCPC members are elected, the PBSC members have to be elected by the CCCPC members. Moreover, in the following five years, the policy agendas of the PBSC members are subject to the approval of the CCCPC members and the CCCPC members will implement these policies. Shirk (1993) refers to this institution as "reciprocal accountability." Thus, when the PBSC members pick CCCPC members, political loyalty is not the only consideration. The candidates' capability also matters, especially when the regime faces challenges. The evaluation of one's capability is based on the cadre evaluation system.

Cadre evaluation system

Scholars have shown that an authoritarian regime does not have to have authority over everything to run the country. Instead, with a tight control of cadre management in hand, it can adjust cadre evaluation system to achieve policy goals even in the policy areas where authority is decentralized (Edin 2003). Huang (1996) finds that the CCP successfully managed inflation level by using cadre management to motivate local officials to voluntarily constrain their spending and investment. Kung and Chen (2011) state that the impact of the evaluation system on officials

were so strong that caused moral hazard during the Great Leap Famine from 1958 to 1962. Whiting (2004) notes that CCP selectively adjusts the performance based evaluation criteria to achieve major policy goals and maintain party unification, and that the party today also adjusts the measurement of evaluation to avoid moral hazard problems.

Leadership replacement is another part of the cadre management system. It is observed that different types of leaders are recruited by the CCP during different time periods. In the communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, the loyalty to the party and the faith in the communist ideology are considered the most important criteria leadership evaluation and recruitment. The importance of expertise or capability for leader's political career changed in history. During Mao Zedong's era, expertise was not important. Halpern (1987) showed that economists were involved in the industrial policy making in the 1960s, but they could only make policy suggestions and had to leave the decision up to their revolutionary bosses. The importance of skills during the post-Mao era was raised. Hu Yaobang, who succeeded Deng as the General Secretary of the party in 1982, said that all leaders must be trained specialists (Hu 1983). Thereafter, we observe the rise of expert leaders in the leadership group. Walder (1995) and Walder et al. (2000) point out that the communist ideologues and technicians pursue different political career paths, and that the rise of technocrats depends on the needs of the communist party. When the party needs to consolidate its control over the society, technicians are allowed to enter a professional career but are kept away from the positions with authority; while the ideologues are encouraged to the take the leadership positions. Lee (1991) shows that when the party aims to promote economic growth, technicians are preferred by the party to take leadership positions. Zang (2006) revises the model and argues that capable communist ideologues and technicians are both rewarded with leadership positions but in different branches of the

government. The ideologues tend to enjoy careers in the party and the technicians in the government.

The changes in the cadre evaluation system and cadre replacement would shed light on the strategy and intention of the CCP. One of the weaknesses of the leadership literature on authoritarian resilience is that it pays too much attention to the differences between experts and ideologues. Recent studies show that there is no clear distinction between being an ideologue leader and being an expert leader. Li and Walder (2001) and Huang (2013, 2009) argue that loyalty to the party is the *sine qua non* for leadership positions. In other words, all leaders are ideologue to some extent. Another weakness of authoritarian resilience literature is that too little attention is paid to the difference among experts. Studies in other areas show that leaders who have scientific expertise are more apolitical than those who have social science expertise (Seligman 1964; Putnam 1977; Huang and Wang 2009). On this account, knowing that there are leadership changes, the leadership literature does not explain what drives leadership changes or how leadership changes affect policy making.

2.3.3 Incorporation

An endangered regime can incorporate the losers in the society by fulfilling their material demands, or incorporate previously undesirable social groups into the party. Gallagher and Hanson (2013) show that the CCP tried to accommodate the losers of the market reform by increasing spending on social programs and focusing on social harmony. In recent years, village election is another area that the CCP has experimented to include people in the decision making on local issues (Dickson 2005). However, despite the improvement in people's "access to power", the village election has not improved their "exercise of power" (O'Brien and Han 2009).

Besides the losers in the society, the party is also interested in the winners. Huchet (2006), Tsai (2007) and Dickson (2008) claim that the incorporation of business elites into the party, who were not allowed to do so in the past, contributes to the resilience of the CCP. By incorporating business elites, the party not only maintains political stability but also has better management over economic growth. By the same token, the Syrian leaders have also managed to maintain resilience by incorporating the business sector (Haddad 2012). Cuba achieved resilience by incorporating religious worshippers into the party (Falcoff 2003).

2.3.4 Selective repression

An endangered authoritarian regime has repressive capability in the armed forces and in the media. Social problems and worsening economic performance do not cause revolutions if people do not perceive them as problems or people cannot coordinate to conduct collective action. Therefore, the regime can censor information to achieve resilience. Comparing with newspaper, radio and television that are traditionally under the control of the government, internet forum is a new area that allows people to efficiently have their voice heard in the society and exchange information. In the CCPs' adaptation to this development, King et al. (2013) find that the CCP does not censor all information that is negative about the government or the leaders. Instead, the CCP allows criticism of the government and uses them as channels of public opinion. However, some information and some of people's comments that could potentially mobilize the people are censored to maintain stability. Han (2013) shows that, besides the repressive effort, the CCP also tries to take the advantage of the technology to improve its legitimacy by mobilizing state-paid online commentators.

2.4 Informal institutions

China scholars explain the authoritarian resilience from the perspective of informal institution. For instance, the *guanxi* (interpersonal relationship) in the Chinese society is considered to lubricate the frictions between capitalism and communism. Boisot and Child (1996) suggest that, unlike the impersonal, transparent market economy in the West, the absence of rule of law in China results in a market system that features economic relationship based on the exclusive, informal interpersonal networks. These non-market features in China facilitated rapid economic growth by lowering the transaction costs in economic activities. In addition to economic relationship, *guanxi* also affect state-market relationship. In a heavily centralized regime, *guanxi* networks also enable business elites and the party-state to form an alliance even when the former was officially kept away from political power (McNally 2011, 2012).

Although *guanxi* is a crucial institution in the Chinese society (Gold et al. 2002), China is not the only society in which interpersonal relationship plays a key role. In a society where the rule of law is absent and formal institutions ignored, informal institutions usually play an important role in the social, economic relationship in the society. For instance, *Blat* in Russia, *Wasta* in the Middle Eastern societies, and *sociolismo* in Cuba are considered the equivalent of *guanxi*. In this sense, the weakness of the "*guanxi* explanation" is that it focuses too much on China. Without clearly distinguishing between *guanxi* and the informal institutions in other societies, it is hard to prove that *guanxi* is the cause of China's successful adaptation.

2.6 Critique

To summarize, adaptation is defined as the effort to make a political system more responsive to the society (Dickson 1997). The fact that some regimes collapsed does not mean they did not try to adapt. The Soviet Union's *perestroika* and *glasnost* were arguably adaptations. For instance, China started its economic reform in the agricultural sector, in which households were given more control over the management of land. In the Soviet Union, agricultural reform such as "normless links" was also conducted to allow contractual farming and let households be responsible for the production. The reforms succeeded in both countries. But in China, the reform was adopted nationwide; whereas in the Soviet Union, it was crippled by price control and geographically limited. The aforementioned literature from institutional and structural perspectives explains how institutional adaptations succeeded in some countries. However, the literature does not explain why the same institutional adaptations succeeded in some countries but failed in others.

The second weakness of the literature is that it lacks a mechanism of change is missing. In other words, we know that adaptations help maintain regime survival, but what drives adaptations? Particularly, what drives successful adaptations? As a general critique, institutionalism and structuralism have difficulty in explaining changes because institutions and structures are considered to constrain and shape actors' perception, preferences and options of action. Despite the difficulty, historical institutionalists argue that institutions change when the social context changes (Hall and Taylor 1996; Hall and Taylor 1998). Following their argument, it can be argued that adaptation policies are driven by the changing environment. However, it may not explain the drastic change between the Mao Zedong's era and Deng Xiaoping's era. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping are two of the most senior leaders of the CCP fought together

during the revolution, worked together at the top of the CCP and were constrained by the same institutions. They were supposed to behave in the same way. However, after Mao died, the power was taken by Hua Guofeng, who announced to "support whatever policy the Chairman Mao made, and follow whatever the Chairman Mao said." In policy making, Hua continued Mao's radical revolutionary way of governing. However, after four years in power, the economic stagnation and political campaigns continued. Deng Xiaoping criticized Hua's "leftist mistake" and took over the power. Once acquired power, Deng defied Mao's radical communist economic policies and adopted economic reforms. This difference implies that leaders' visions do matter to their policy making. Moreover, not only are leaders different, but also their visions hardly change. In their study of the Open Government Information regulation reform in China, which requires government agencies to be transparent and release information to the public, Florini et al. (2012) interviewed government officials and find that even when institutions are changed leaders may not change their behavior because they couldn't change their mindsets.

2.7 Leadership and adaptation

As I have argued, the lack of a mechanism of change is a weakness in the literature on authoritarian resilience. Hay and Wincott (1998) suggest, "if institutionalism is to develop to its full potential, it must consider the relationship between structure and agency." Regarding the role of leadership in authoritarian resilience, leadership matters to adaptation and policy change, especially during the time of change. In his study of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Bresaluer (2002) focused on the role of agency instead of structure or institution because the two leaders are considered "transformative leaders," who beat the institutional constraints and successfully pulled off changes. Even for less transformative leaders, leaders of authoritarian or Leninist

regimes by definition have significant influence in the policy making (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). The influence on policy making is also enjoyed by leaders in democracies too. Moon (1995) analyzes the case of Thatcher and concludes that leaders are capable of conducting policy changes despite institutional constraints. Goldfinch and Hart (2003) illustrate the point with Australian leaders' role in macroeconomic policy making.

2.7.1 Why do authoritarian leaders adapt?

Authoritarian leaders who usually have sufficient coercive capability do not have to adapt to the people. Even if they see the benefit of adaptation, they may still be hesitant to do so because adaptation is risky. The initiation of adaptation would make people hope for more adaptation and put more pressure on the regime may lose control (Park 1984; Spalding 1990). One explanation for adaptation is that the adaptive policies may be just the byproducts of leaders' pursuit their own personal interests.

Selectorate theory states that leaders in authoritarian regimes are more likely to pursue political survival by taking care of the needs of the small winning coalition than the needs of the public (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). Therefore, authoritarian leaders usually are expected to provide private goods to the winning coalition members. However, the CCP has invested heavily in the public goods such as education and infrastructure. Moreover, Rosen (1989, 1991) demonstrates that the CCP actively conducts public opinion polls to guide economic reform. Ma (2012) shows that the growing citizen participation in societal organizations plays a significant role in making the Chinese government responsive to social needs. Additionally, seletorate theory expects authoritarian leaders to maintain a loyal winning coalition. In practice, the turnover rate of the CCCPC on average has been higher than 60% (Li and White 2003; Li 2012b).

One of the major reasons behind the high turnover rate is the informal age limitation on leaders. However, the age limitation is not a result of path dependency or leaders' willingness to retire. Rather, it was relatively a new institution that was started in 1985 by Deng Xiaoping to force the old generation leaders to leave the leadership. The age limit was enforced by Jiang Zemin in the 90s to prevent political opponents from joining in the leadership. Therefore, the establishment of age limit is based on political concerns and the "disloyal" CCCPC members are deliberately created to ensure that no one individual leader or political faction would be able to accumulate political power over the long run.

On China's resilience, even the scholars of the selectorate theory changed their mind and agree that authoritarian leaders not only need to but also are willing to care about those who cannot directly influence the decision making. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005) show that, in order to politically survive, authoritarian leaders selectively provide some public goods that are good for economic growth but restrict the public goods that facilitate mobilization. Besides adapting for political survival (Geddes 1999; Gandhi 2008), responding to social needs would also help leaders gain legitimacy (Tang 2005) and acquire advantage in policy debates with rival political factions (Zhang 2001). In order to develop appropriate and doable policies, there must be some form of communication to let leaders be aware of the needs and preferences of the target population (Salmen 1987).

If authoritarian leaders do sometimes care about social needs, what kind of needs do they care? Leaders may care about the social needs in the past, at the present time or in the future. Among them, the present social needs are the ones leaders are the most concerned about. The reasons are that, first, politicians with tenure limits tend to discount the utility of long term benefit and focus on the short term utility of their behavior. Second, more importantly, being too

concerned about future social needs without taking care of the contemporary ones may jeopardize regime stability. For instance, Huntington (1965) points out that the pursuit of industrialization before domestic unification is reached would fail; and liberalizing political mobilization before modernization is complete would result in political decay.

CHAPTER 3.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of this study is founded on the Han Park's human needs paradigm of social development (Park 1984) and the sociology of professions. In summary, first, I extend Park's social development paradigm by focusing on the relationship between developmental stages and the diversity of social needs. I posit that the social needs in a less developed society are more homogeneous than those in a more developed society. These needs are best taken care of by authoritative or even repressive ways. When the society enters higher stages of development, social needs diversify. Diverse social needs are better dealt with by responsive approaches. Second, I borrow from the sociology of professions to illustrate that leaders with different occupational backgrounds differ in their worldviews and policy preferences. Some leaders prefer repressive approaches to deal with challenges while others like to solve challenges by fulfilling the needs of the society. I posit that, in order to ensure right policies are made and implemented effectively, worldview-based leadership transitions are carried out by the CCP leaders to correspond to the changing pattern of social needs. As suggested in the previous chapters, adaptation is not guaranteed to succeed. Therefore, the difference between a resilient authoritarian regime and a collapsed one is not just whether it adapts or not. Rather, the difference is who implement adaptation and how it is implemented.

3.1 Social needs and stages of development

What is social development and what drives social development? Enloe (1986) defines development as a purposive social change from some condition to another, more desirable condition. Spalding (1990) defines political development as a movement toward more flexibility in the political system and increasing ability to handle the stresses with which it is faced. He says, "A state is considered to be more developed if it is capable of developing an agenda based on the needs and resources of the society and programs which address the perceived social problems and is able to implement those programs with some degree of effectiveness." But how do we know what is the desirable condition for the society? What kind of needs do people have? The aforementioned definition implies that development is an interaction between people and the political system and that the pattern of the interaction changes. Why and how does it change?

Park (1984) develops a paradigm of political development that assimilate human development. Building on Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of human development, Park claims that human needs have four stages: survival, belongings, leisure, and control. These four needs are hierarchical and sequential. The higher stages of needs become important to people only when the lower stages of needs are fulfilled. On the contrary, if one is deprived of the satisfaction of the lower levels needs, then the higher level needs become no longer important. This proposition is supported by other literature. Deutsch (1961) suggests that as people's living condition changes, especially because of modernization, they are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities and from their old habits and traditions. As a result, their needs would also be drastically changed. Inglehart (1997) documents that when people's basic needs such as survival are met, their satisfaction from the fulfillment of these needs diminishes and they shift their focus from material benefits to postmaterial gains. As a

result, social development changes from the pursuit of modernization to the pursuit of post-modernization, which features the emphasis on well-being, participatory politics, environmental protection, and so on. Comparing people with different socioeconomic and generational background, Inglehart found that young middle-class individuals whose physical needs and social needs are better fulfilled than working class individuals are also more concerned about their higher needs, such as political issues and environmental protection. Grafstein (2002) analyzes the impact of the US public insurance policy on voters partisanship and show that voters are less concerned about material benefit when their material interests are ensured.

In non-democratic societies, Knutson (1972) find that when people's basic needs are not met they do not care about higher level needs such as political freedom. Davies (1969) compared people's view on liberal democratic value in the United States and Brazil and found that the poor people in both countries were less likely than the rich to support liberal democratic values in both countries because the poor was primarily busy pursuing the basic needs while the latter higher level needs.

3.2 The Fulfillment of Social Needs

There are three assumptions in the human needs paradigm. First, individuals always try to maximize their satisfaction of needs. Second, the dominant needs of individuals in a society are social needs that determine the tasks of development. Lastly, a political regime needs at least some legitimacy to maintain survival. Leaders and their regimes that are the most capable of serving social needs would have legitimacy in the society. When the regime fails to fulfill social needs, people offer their support to someone else who can fulfill their needs (Rostow 1990; Macdonald 1995).

In the Chinese political context, the Confucius political ideology stresses that it is the state's responsibility to fulfill people's needs and that the legitimacy of a regime relies on its service to the people. If the state is unwilling or unable to fulfill social needs, then the people have the rights to topple the government or institution and support another one. Although different regimes have different ways to survive, as the discussion on selectorate theory shows, when revolution looms an authoritarian regime would fulfill the social needs to maintain survival. Ng (1979) points out that when the Chinese peasants' survival was threatened, they were flexible and pragmatic enough to give up the traditional agricultural practice and join in the agricultural communes that were proposed by Mao Zedong so as to fulfill their needs of survival. Outside China, Pion-Berlin (1987) show that when the military regime in Argentina failed to maintain economic stability, it lost the support from every sector in the society.

3.2.1 Capacity of fulfilling social needs

State capacity includes the ability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and use those resources in intended ways and states vary in their capabilities of policy implementation and social needs fulfillment (Skocpol 1985). Institution is one of the sources of state capacity. For developing countries, not only how resources are used by the government matters (Migdal 1988), but also centralized governmental intervention may be necessary (Gerschenkron 1962). A capable state in this sense is able to channel resources through centralized state organizations to achieve policy goals, especially providing public goods. Wittfogel (1957) studied societies that have had centralized states and posits that the reliance on large scale public infrastructures such as irrigation works creates a centralized authoritarian

regime because only a strong, centralized state is able to mobilize social resources to accomplish these tasks.

Other scholars look at the capacity of leaders for the source of state capacity. Skocpol (1985) claims that leaders are engaged in diagnosing societal problems and framing policy solutions, but they are not all devoted and their level of success varies. Many theorists consider leaders' skills or expertise to be the foundation of their capacity. For instance, Plato's idea of philosopher-king is based on the notion that philosophers' wisdom and rationality make them more qualified than others to govern the society. Later, Saint Simon (1821) believed that industrialists or businessmen should be given the authority to solve social problems because their familiarity with numbers makes them more capable of finding efficient solutions to fulfill social needs. Disagreeing with Saint Simon and considering businessman's speculative nature to be dangerous to social, economic stability, Veblen (1904) and Meynaud (1964) believe that engineers are more capable of strengthening state capacity in fulfilling social needs because the engineers emphasize precision and smoothness in the system operation.

3.2.2 Han Park's human needs – political development paradigm

Different from the above static views of leadership capacity, more recent scholars assert that the relationship between leader's capacity and state capacity in fulfilling social needs is contextual. Under the paradigm of political development developed by Park (1984), the society at the stage of regime formation suffers backward economy and people are most concerned about physical survival. Based on the hierarchy of human needs, when the need of survival cannot be met, people do not care about other needs. Since the needs for survival can be objectively defined as the provision of food, shelter, and security, political legitimacy at this stage is

evaluated based on how effective the government can provide these goods. For instance, the Communist Party under Mao's leadership conducted land reforms to gain support from the starving masses. Instead of negotiating with the landlords on a fairer benefit distribution, the CCP simply forcefully took the land from them and redistribute it to the landless peasants. The people who were desperate for food at that time supported this policy.

For the government, in order to fulfill the need of survival, decisions should be made and implemented quickly and therefore the diversity of debates over ideology is not allowed. The strict chain of command and coercive capability that the military possesses enables it to be better equipped than others to fulfill the needs for survival. Also, in a poor society, the military usually has the greatest mobilization capability and is often involved in the economic development projects such as infrastructure construction and skill training make the military the most capable of fulfilling social needs for survival and win legitimacy.

Once survival is ensured, people start pursuing the need for belonging and the society enters the stage of political integration. The source of legitimacy for the government changes from providing food to creating ideological homogeneity. According to Park, the military is incapable of fulfilling social needs for belonging because the process of ideological unification brings about diverse ideology in the society. Although diversity can strengthen social stability in developed societies, it tends to undermine social stability in societies that do not go through industrialization (Huntington 1965). In order to fulfill the social need of a common identity without jeopardizing stability, the government has to constrain the diversity of ideology and indoctrinate the population under one political ideology. Therefore, intellectuals, cultural elites, and charismatic leaders are more capable than military leaders of accomplishing political

integration because the former has the skill of discerning the indigenous social, cultural contexts and design a political ideology that fits the context and help the government integrate the society.

After people ensure their survival and social identity, they feel less satisfied with more provision of necessities but more satisfied with the provision of diverse products for leisure. For instance, people want to spend less time working and more time enjoying life. Instead of mere survival, people want diversity, excitement, and well-being. The needs for leisure therefore require the government to pursue economic growth and the source of legitimacy changes from ideology to economic performance. This transition is particularly important for a communist regime because the legitimacy and the justification of the communist system rely on its ideological and economic superiority over alternative political systems. The military and intellectual leaders who dominated the first two stages of development no longer have advantages at the stage of resource expansion because food and ideology are no longer people's priorities. Instead, industrial elites and technical specialists become the most popular social group in the society and have significant influence in the political realm because of their expertise in technological development and economic management.

At the stage of resource expansion, the society becomes stratified and social problems exacerbate. The reason is that not everyone in the society benefits from economic growth. Government at this stage of development emphasizes growth not distribution. Income inequality is allowed to take place along the line of winners and losers. Particularly, those who have technical skills benefit the most from economic growth and can enjoy leisure; whereas the losers are composed of primarily those who do not have technical skills. However, the government can justify income inequality as an inevitable short term cost for growth and promise people a better future.

Table 3.1. Han Park's Stages of Political Change

	Regime formation	Political integration	Resource expansion	Conflict management
Human needs	Survival	Belonging	Leisure	Control
Means	Food Security	Group "Friends"	Toys Convenience	Power Prestige
Leadership type	Military (coercive)	Intellectual (philosophical)	Technocratic	Actor
Policy preferences	Law and order Production of necessities	Politicization Power consolidation	Economic growth	"Just" distribution (Who gets what, and how?)
Symptoms	Stubbornness and rigidity Uniformity	Politics of Fear Purges	Environmental Decay Morality confusion	Mutual distrust Legality replacing morality

This table is excerpted from Park (1984), pages 86-87

For those whose needs for leisure are satisfied, they start to pursue social status, prestige, power, and control over others. In other words, the human needs after the stage of resource expansion change from "living better than yesterday" to "living better than others." For Park, this change makes the stage of conflict qualitatively different from the previous three stages. At the previous stages, one's gain in survival, social identity, or leisure does not necessarily undermine others' gain. Using a terminology of game theory, people before the stage of conflict management engage in positive-sum games; therefore there is no conflict within the society. However, when people try to gain more than others, they engage in a zero-sum game and conflict becomes inevitable. For government at the stage of conflict management, since economic industrialization is completed at the stage of resource expansion, there is little room for the losers of economic growth to move up the social ladder. So, the government encounters a challenging task, that is, it has to fulfill some people's needs for control without losing the support of the losers and jeopardizing social stability. Thus, it is imperative for the government to mediate and mitigate the social conflict by facilitating a just distribution system, through which the unjust income gap among people can be narrowed. Failing to establish a just distribution system would result in the collapse of the regime.

In terms of leadership type, at the stage of conflict resolution, the new generation of leaders has to be able to attract people with conflicting interests. On this account, the leaders of the previous developmental stages are incapable of dealing with the social needs at the stage of conflict management. Military leaders rely on coercive power; charismatic leaders focus on ideological uniformity; and technocrats emphasize efficiency. None of them is capable of taking care of diverse social needs. Only what Park called "actor like politicians" are able to achieve the task.

To sum up, Park's paradigm of human-needs-based political development suggests that, first, political development is an organic process that is based on the interaction between the development of human needs and leader's response. Second, social needs ultimately determine leadership transition. The paradigm emphasizes the leader's capability, not intention, to fulfill social needs as the foundation of their political success. The distinction between capability and intention is important. Every leader likes to have a prosperous and stable society. But leaders differ in their capability to achieve their goals. Those who are capable of fulfilling certain human needs would have the legitimacy of authority.

3.3 The Worldview-Based Capabilities

I extend two points from Park's paradigm. First, although not explicitly pointed out by Park, it is implied that the four stages of development also differ in the diversity of social needs. Higher stages of development feature more diverse social needs and tasks for the government. The social needs at the stage of regime formation and the stage of political integration are relatively homogeneous because people pursue the same goal, namely food and a common ideology. The needs at the stage of resource expansion are mildly homogeneous or mildly diverse due to the division between the achievers and the non-achievers. I think the diversity of social needs is mildly diverse because the hope of the non-achievers to catch up with the achievers in the future keeps social conflict dormant. As Park indicates that some people at the stage of resource expansion can enjoy economic growth and leisure, others still struggle for survival. At the stage of conflict management, conflict derives from people's intention to gain more than others, particularly between the winners and the losers in the society. The winners would try to control the political system to pursue their own interests at the cost of the losers. In addition,

postmodernism will grow among the winners and motivate them to pursue postmodern values such as environmental protection. In comparison, the losers of the society are still concerned about growth, therefore the postmodern values would be deemed by the losers as a tool to prevent them from catching up the winners. Conflict presupposes diversity of human needs. The diversity level at this stage is high because social conflict is pervasive and acute.

The second point implied by Park's paradigm is that leaders' capabilities of fulfilling human needs do not derive solely from their expertise or technical skills. In his analysis of leadership type, two types of capabilities are taken into consideration. One is the capability that is based on expertise or technical skills, and the other is the capability that is based on the more fundamental nature of the leadership, or their worldview. For instance, when he explains the advantages of the military at the stage of regime formation, he includes the coercive capability the military and the egalitarian and hierarchical views of the military. Additionally, the advantages of businessmen and technocrats at the stage of resource expansion are based on not only their wealth but also the "managerial and technocratic" mode of operation.

Differentiating the two types of capabilities is important because they differ in significance. I argue that technical expertise is not the major source of leader's capability or legitimacy. Political leaders and government bureaucrats are different in that governing a society requires more than technical expertise. Although technical expertise helps one understand some aspects of the society, no one specialized expertise can solve everything. Water engineers do not understand industrial engineering, biologist may have only limited knowledge about electricity, and economists won't be able to understand oil and steel production. Furthermore, many traditional leaders in history did not have technical expertise but still managed to create economically successful and socially stable empires.

I argue that one leader's capability of fulfilling social needs depends more on his or her worldview. Technical expertise is a means to an end. How skills are applied is determined by the worldview. Worldview defines actors' interests (Weber 1946; Vanberg and Buchanan 1989), constrains their range of choices (Solow 1989; Campbell 1998, 2002), presupposes other belief systems and is hard to be changed (Mäki 2001). In other words, leaders' technical capability is mediated by their worldviews. For instance, Allgood et al. (2004) compared the views of students who took an introductory economic class but studied different majors. They found that even when all students have the basic understanding of economics, students who majored in economics are more likely than social science students to oppose trade barriers, trade balance, and price control over oil price when the oil cartel restricts supply. In terms of the capability of fulfilling social needs, since higher stages of development come with more diverse social needs, leaders whose worldviews are responsive to diversity are more likely to react to and fulfill diverse social needs; in comparison, those whose worldviews are unresponsive to diversity tend to ignore and suppress these needs.

3.4 The Worldviews of Professions

We are what we learn. Education forms our worldview (Ringer 2001; Danesh 2006; Fisman et al. 2007). Different professions feature their own worldviews (Ridley 1966; Ziegler 1997) and those who are trained in one discipline share the worldview of that discipline (Buchanan 1991; Haas 1992; Sciulli 2009). In political science, the theory of epistemic community points out that the control over knowledge is a great source of power and that the diffusion of certain idea and information directs policy making (Haas 1992). According to Haas, epistemic communities differ from other groups in that the members of epistemic communities

share the same causal beliefs, principled beliefs, interests and knowledge bases. The shared belief systems and cognitive map shape the solutions to the problems, contribute to policy coordination, and serve as the foundation for coalition formation. In this sense, the concept of epistemic community is very much like the profession-based worldview. At the domestic level, specialists with similar skills and mindsets form epistemic coalitions to compete for the influence in policy making (Macdonald 1995). The competitiveness of the epistemic coalition depends on their capability of fulfilling social needs and therefore maintaining their legitimacy in the society.

Facing even the same facts, leaders with different worldviews perceive and react to them differently and consequently produce different outcomes. Moreover, since education shapes worldview, one's worldview can also be changed by new education (Giacalone and Thompson 2006; Fisman et al. 2007). I am not suggesting that education is the only source of worldview or that uneducated leaders do not have worldviews. Living experience and religion, for instance, also influence one's viewpoint. But studies show that education has greater impact on one's worldview than other sources. For instance, Danesh (2006) shows that the peace education in Bosnia and Herzegovia altered the worldviews of students, and their parents and teachers.

Worldview encompasses a wide range of aspects. This study focuses on how the training of a discipline and its corresponding worldview would affect one's perception of and reaction to diverse social needs. Some scholars have already pointed out that leaders with different educational backgrounds behave differently. For example, Seligman (1964), Putnam (1977), and Huang and Wang (2009) find that leaders with scientific backgrounds are more apolitical than those with social science backgrounds in their decision making. Therefore, at the stages of regime formation and political integration where the needs for survival and political unification constitute relative uniform social needs, the leaders with scientific education or authoritative

worldviews are more likely to succeed and thus makes it more likely for them to stay in the leadership positions (Guo 2003). In comparison, when the society enters the stage of conflict management and social needs become diversified, social scientists' and their responsive worldviews make them more qualified than scientists for leadership positions.

The literature on the profession-worldview relationship is based primarily on observations not analysis. They do not tell us why these disciplines have certain worldview. Below, I will go beyond this literature by examining humanities, social sciences, natural science, and military science in China and their respective worldviews. In my typology of worldview, I divided worldview into two categories for the sake of parsimony: responsive worldview and unresponsive worldview. Table 3.2 summarizes my typology of profession-based worldview. The professions that feature responsive worldview are humanities and social sciences, and those that feature unresponsive worldview are legal studies, natural science, military and the old generation, usually uneducated, revolutionary ideologues. In the rest of the chapter, I will first analyze the worldview of natural science and social science because most of the existing literature on the worldviews of professions focuses on the comparison between the two professions. Then, I will analyze legal studies, the military and revolutionary ideologues.

3.4.1 The Worldview of science

Natural science is established on ontological universalism, meaning that scientists believe there are basic rules to be discovered, and everything everywhere follows the same rules (Rutherford and Ahlgren 1991). Putnam (1977) posits that the science education implant the ''technocratic mentality'' in the mind of science students. Comparing with the social science mentality that is open and accommodating to diversity, the technocratic mentality features skeptical attitude to

Table 3.2. Worldviews of Disciplines

Responsiveness	Worldview type	Disciplines
High	Responsive worldview	Social science & Humanities Traditional economics Modern economics
Low	Unresponsive worldview	Legal studies Natural science Military Communist ideologues

political institutions, unsympathetic view on openness and equality of political democracy. Leaders with science background also are more likely to believe in the notions that social conflict is misguided and contrived, and that policy debates should be based on practical and technical terms instead of on ideological and moralistic criteria. Rossides (1997) also found that technocrats tend to apply technologies to solve practical problems and look at the world through a problem-solution lens.

Scientists in general are goal oriented. The goal oriented vision results in a hierarchical and functional view of the society and social needs. Putnam's research on the leaders of the Western industrialized societies supports this statement. In China's case, the feature of scientific worldview can be well illustrated by one story of Zhao Ziyang, the former General Secretary of the CCP in the late 80s. During his visit to Europe in 1978, Zhao noticed that the European farmers planted drought-resistant crops in the arid area. And this simple phenomenon shocked him. He later wrote in his diary that had the Chinese leaders, who were mostly scientists at that time, managed the land, they would have built irrigation systems to change the natural environment and plant the crops they wanted (Zhao 2010). For natural scientists, society is conceived to be a system, which has a system function that is different from the function of parts. Moreover, the goals of the parts are subordinate to the system goal. Hence, when the system goal is in danger, it should be preserved at the cost of the subordinate goals. Regarding goal orientation, engineers also emphasize efficiency, but in a different way from modern economists. Engineers focus on the efficiency of reaching the goal. In other words, they ask questions such as "what is the easiest, quickest, and cheapest way to achieve the goal." By comparison, economists focus on the efficiency of resource usage in reaching the goal. The question they ask is "which way has the lowest opportunity cost."

In order to ensure that their technological solutions can achieve goals effectively, scientists need full and centralized control over the system so that they can compare the actual outcomes and the expected outcomes and make adjustments. Wittfogel (1957) posits that the reliance on large scale public infrastructures such as irrigation works would create a centralized authoritarian regime. In China, it is reported that China has built more than 22,000 dams that are more than 15 meters tall, which accounts for half of the world's total (Lewis 2013). Thus, besides the economic reason, by building dams the Chinese scientist leaders also created a political environment for them to centralize authorities in their hands. In conclusion, the worldview of natural science is unresponsive to diverse social needs.

3.4.2 The worldviews of social sciences

In general, students of humanities and social sciences are encouraged to be open to and accept diversity in culture and social values. Thus, social scientists and humanists are more likely to be influenced by diverse values and perspectives. Liu and Tsai (2008) compare science students' epistemological belief of scientific knowledge with that of non-science students. They found that social science students are more likely than natural science students to agree that scientific knowledge is embedded in and affected by culture and social norms. The difference between social science and natural science in general shouldn't be surprising. Below, I will focus on the analysis of economics. Economics is treated differently from other social sciences because it approaches the subjects of social science with the method of natural science.

The development of economics education in China can be divided into two phases: Marxist political economy and modern economics. Marxist political economy dominated the Chinese economics during the pre-reform era. It started declining during the late 1980s, lost its hegemony in 1995 and was replaced by the modern economics (Chow and Liu 2007; Fan 1995). The distinction between the two economics is important because they are different in the subject of interests and sources of worldviews.

The Chinese economics education was dominated by Marxist political economy before 1995. Like other traditional studies of political economy, the then Chinese economics students focused on how people with different interests and goals can cooperate to solve problems and pursue mutual gains, and how social relationship and resource exchange affect each other (Song 2012). In terms of ontology, the Marxist economists held a holistic view of the society and believed that social stability could only be achieved when social and economic groups in the society are satisfied. Following the Marxist dialectic materialism, economists not only were concerned about social equality and stability but also tried to achieve these goals via government control over the means of production. So, in the then economics department, there was another major called "planning economics", which was specialized in how to best plan the economy to achieve socialist goals. In conclusion, the worldview of Marxist economists in responsive, but its approach is authoritative.

It was not until the late 80s when the then State Education Commission introduced to universities modern microeconomics courses from the US, which became dominant since the 1990s. Unlike traditional economics that focused on social relationship, modern economics deals with human behavior in human-material relationship under the condition of scarcity, or

efficiency in the economics terminology (Robbins 1932; Song 2012). The focus on efficiency makes the new generation of Chinese modern economists less concerned about equality than their Marxist predecessors. Additionally, modern economists hold an individualist view of the society and they believe that the whole economic system can be explained by the individual's behavior (Rosenberg 2001; Hoover 2001) rather than the relationship among social groups. In this regard, the losers in the economy and their suffering are considered as the cost of efficiency and they, not the state, should be responsible for their failure.

Despite the emphasis on efficiency, the worldview of modern economists overall is responsive to diversity. This is because modern economists in general believe in the market. It is not a secret that modern economists debate on whether the market can reach efficiency on its own. For example, the neoclassical economists believe that the market can reach efficiency on its own and that external intervention only creates externalities and inefficiency. Keynesianism, on the other hand, upholds that there are circumstances under which market cannot reach efficiency and government intervention is needed to help the market reach efficiency. But, overall, modern economists believe to some extent that the market can reach efficiency. The difference between economists is not whether the market can reach efficiency, but if the market can always reach efficiency.

The general belief in the market results in market-based solutions to problems. The economic concept of efficiency is measured with opportunity cost and marginal utility of behavior (Rhoads 1985) therefore is independent of social cohesion and equality. But if we look at behavior, then economists are responsive to diverse social needs, but for a different reason. For modern economists, ignoring diverse social needs, like ignoring market signals, results in high opportunity cost and inefficiency. So, modern economists usually believe that it is efficient to

fulfill diverse social needs, but only partially. For instance, Fisman et al. (2007) show in their behavioral experiment that adults with exposure to modern economics education are more likely to focus on efficiency than on equality when they make decisions on tax policies and social security. In China, some prominent Chinese economists claim that combatting corruption is economically inefficient and that keeping corruption at a moderate level is good for the economic growth (Fan 1996; Zhang 1997a; Zhang 1997b).

To sum up, the worldviews of Chinese traditional economists and modern economists are both responsive to diverse social needs, but for different reasons. The traditional economists care about social needs for the sake of social stability; while modern economists fulfill social needs for economic efficiency.

3.4.3 The worldview of legal studies

Similar to economics, the development of legal studies in China also experienced several phases. The education and the practice of law in China was disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. The profession resumed in the late 70s. However, according the *Interim Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers* that was adopted in 1980, all legal professionals were government employees. In other words, judges and lawyers were educated and required to serve the interests of the government in trials. In this regard, the then legal worldview was unresponsive to the society at all. In 1996, the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers* was passed. This allowed lawyers to practice independently of the government and to represent the interests of their clients instead of those of the government. So the new generation lawyers are more responsive to social needs than their predecessors. In practice, however, the development of the Chinese legal system still follows the principle of "rule by law" instead of

"rule of law." Lawyers are trained to abide by the letter of the law instead of the spirit of the law. Hence, although the new generation lawyers seem to be more responsive to social needs, their worldview is still unresponsive because they are concerned about what the law says instead of what the laws intend to achieve. For instance, one of the social problems in China is the worsening situation of the social disadvantaged groups (*shehui ruoshi qunti)*. Despite the growing social appeal for legal protection of these groups, many legal scholars, including some prominent ones, claim that they are "on the side of law." For them, the social disadvantage group is a flexible, relative identity that is not confined to the lower class only (Yu 2009); therefore everyone can be disadvantaged under some circumstance. Moreover, they argue that the fact that one being in a disadvantaged position in the society does not grant him or her privilege before the law (Qian and Wang 2004; Jiang 2007).

3.4.4 The Worldviews of military

The military is considered to be a discipline, even though not all military leaders receive formal higher education or go to the military academy. The military worldview is unresponsive to diversity. As Park explains in his paradigm, although military treats everyone equally, the operation of military activities requires uniformity, obedience without debate or question, clearly defined hierarchy, strict chains of command, and goal orientation. Furthermore, Slater and Wong (2013) point out that military leaders and political leaders differ in their job security. For political leaders, leadership positions are their last resort, therefore they are willing to concede authority to remain in the office, especially when the party has sufficient strength and resources to manage the challenge from the opposition. In comparison, military leaders have barracks to retreat to,

even when the regime collapses. Hence their higher job security renders them more indifferent and unresponsive to social opposition and requests.

3.4.5 The worldview of the uneducated communist ideologues

The worldview of the uneducated revolutionaries and communist ideologues derives from their communist belief. In the Chinese communist ideological education, communism has been taught as a faith and a worldview. In the communist worldview, communism claims a monopoly on truth. This monopoly renders plurality intolerable to the party and requires a one-party state. Consequently, the rule of the party is based on ideological legitimacy not on the popular consent (Saxonberg 2001, 2013). In sum, the worldview of communist ideologues is unresponsive to diverse social needs. The fact the many post-reform uneducated leaders stressed economic development instead of revolution did not contradict with their worldview. The communist doctrine suggests that the communist state-run economy is superior to the capitalist. Therefore, a strong economy is the second pillar of the regime legitimacy. On this account, the pursuit of economic development should be understood more as a way to strengthen the legitimacy of the communist ideology and monopoly than to fulfill social needs.

To summarize my typology of worldviews, social sciences including traditional political economy and humanities have highly responsive worldviews toward diverse social needs; modern economics has a low level of responsive worldview. Military and natural science share highly unresponsive worldviews toward diverse social needs; and legal studies has a mildly unresponsive worldview.

3.5 The changes in the worldviews of leadership

Leaders with the unresponsive worldview are less capable of fulfilling diverse social needs than those with the responsive worldview. Therefore, when a society develops from a low developmental stage to a higher developmental stage, social needs diversify and the worldview composition of the leadership group would change from unresponsive worldview to responsive worldview. Take social stability as an example. Leaders can achieve social stability in different ways. Leaders with responsive worldview would listen to the needs and achieve stability by fulfilling these needs. On the contrary, leaders with unresponsive worldview could also achieve stability by suppressing these needs. However, comparing these two approaches, the responsive approach solves social problems at source, whereas the unresponsive approach would exacerbate the situation in the long run. Thus, eventually, responsive leaders would perform better than unresponsive leaders on adapting to diverse social needs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Chinese leadership transition is in the control of the PBSC members. The top party leaders can ensure the success of adaptation by replacing unresponsive leaders with responsive ones.

Some may criticize that leadership change in my theory becomes the cause and the result of successful adaptations. My rebuttal can be summarized by Figure 3.1. I argue that leadership change is not the cause and the result of the same adaptation. Certain types of social needs and social problems can be best fulfilled and solved by one type of worldview. Appropriate leadership composition must be created to deal with the social needs. Once the needs are fulfilled and problems solved, people would have new, more diverse needs, which leads to more new problems. These require new leadership to conduct new adaptations to be dealt with. Therefore, leadership change in my theoretical construct is the drive behind changes and progress, instead of a point in a circle.

Figure 3.1. Leadership Change and Adaptation

3.6 Hypothesis

To reiterate my theoretical framework, I postulate that, first, when a society develops its social needs become more and more diverse, and different needs require different approaches to be dealt with. Second, leaders care about social needs, especially present social needs. Third, leaders' worldviews, which are closely linked to education, endow them different capabilities in fulfilling social needs and surviving at different developmental stages. Applying the theoretical framework to the puzzle of the varied outcomes of adaptations, I argue that what kind of leaders adapt determines how they adapt and consequentially the outcome of adaptation and regime resilience. More specifically, I hypothesize that *the CCP successfully adapts to diverse social needs by replacing the leaders whose worldviews are unresponsive to social needs with those whose worldviews are more responsive.* This hypothesis may sound tautological. But it is not. The reason is that, considering the effectiveness of the CCP's cadre management system in guiding officials' behavior, we should expect no difference in behavior between responsive and unresponsive leaders under the central policy guidelines.

To test my hypothesis, two important logic chains have to be tested and I will test them separately. First, I need to show that unresponsive leaders have been replaced by responsive leaders when social needs diversify and that leaders' worldview is one of the major factors in leadership transition. Second, I have to prove that leaders with unresponsive worldview are more repressive than the ones with responsive worldview.

My study does not suggest that a successful adaptation must follow an inexorable pattern of leadership transition from military officials and scientists to economists, social scientists and humanists. As Fourcade (2009) suggests, disciplines are taught and practiced differently across societies. Accordingly, one discipline might feature a responsive worldview in one society but an

unresponsive one in another society. What I argue is that, although responsive and unresponsive worldviews may consist of different disciplines in different societies, the transition from leaders with the unresponsive worldview to those with the responsive one would contribute to a successful adaptation.

CHAPTER 4.

WORLDVIEWS AND LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between leaders' worldviews and leadership transition at the central level and the provincial level. The first part of the chapter focuses on the research methods. I will describe the measurements of the dependent variable, leadership transition, the independent variables, leaders' worldview, and other control variables. I adopt quantitative and qualitative research methods to test the hypothesis on the worldview-leadership transition. I examine if worldview is a factor in leadership transitions. In the quantitative analysis, I test how a leader's worldview would affect his or her political career. In my qualitative analysis, I examine the decision making behind leadership transition. If my reasoning is correct, then we should expect leaders with the responsive worldview are more likely to rise in power than those with unresponsive worldviews when social needs diversify.

4.1 Research methods for central level analysis

4.1.1 Defining leadership

Party leadership is defined by the CCP as the members of the Central Committee of the CCP (CCCPC) and the members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CCP. In this study, I focus on the CCCPC members because only the CCCPC members are involved in decision making. Although the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) of the CCP runs the

country on a daily basis and has significant influence on the CCCPC members, all the top leaders have to be elected by the CCCPC and all major policy decisions made by the PSC must be approved by the CCCPC. So, under the institution of "reciprocal accountability" (Shirk 1993), the CCCPC members are not simply the puppets of the PSC members. Rather, the CCCPC could have an independent influence on the party decision making and therefore can be considered an appropriate choice for leadership for this study. For instance, when Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform, he as the most senior and the most powerful political figure in the party could not rally enough support from the CCCPC, which was primarily composed of central government leaders. In order to push the reform forward, Deng replaced the bureaucrats in the CCCPC with provincial leaders who were in favor of his reform agenda (Naughton). This example is not meant to cause any confusion. Rather, it shows that there is more than one aspect of leadership transition that had been adopted to facilitate reforms.

Moreover, the CCCPC as the central organ of the CCP consists of all the important officials and leaders of the party, the central and provincial governments, and the military. In other words, the CCCPC members not only play an important role in decision making but also are in charge of policy implementation. Another reason for focusing on the CCCPC instead of the PBSC is based on methodological concern. Not only are there more members in the CCCPC than in the PSC but also there is more variation in the CCCPC membership than the PBSC membership. The CCCPC provides more observations and variation to analyze.

In terms of time frame, I focus on the leaders who served between the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 and the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012. I choose this time period because it is the era of reform and adaptation. I could have covered the Mao Zedong era. However, nearly all leaders during that time period were either uneducated or military officers. Thus, there is little

variation in their profession nor is there sufficient biographical information about them for me to speculate on their worldviews. Regarding the leadership transition, the CCCPC membership changes at the CCP Congresses, which convene every five years. I use the data to construct a time-series cross-sectional data set. For instance, if a leader was a CCCPC member for three times, then he or she has three observations. In summary, the data set covers 1,369 different leaders from 1982 to 2012, which creates 3,450 observations.

4.1.2 The identification of worldview

The worldview of an educated leader is determined by the discipline of education. I focus on leaders' higher education experience. I focus on higher education because, first, students receive specialized, professional training at universities. Therefore, higher education experience fit well with my theoretical analysis of one's worldview. Second, although education may not be the perfect measurement for worldview, existing literature suggest that different professions do feature different worldviews. Additionally, given that it is nearly impossible to conduct surveys with Chinese leaders and that it is difficult to analyze one's worldview based on his or her living experience, education is arguably one of the best available and feasible measurements.

The coding scheme of one's worldview is based on my typology of worldview that is discussed in Chapter 3. I first collect data on leaders' educational background and then convert the information into the corresponding worldviews. Responsive worldview is coded as 1, and unresponsive worldview is coded as 0. The data on leaders' education backgrounds are collected from the *Chinese Political Elites Database* that is prepared by Kou (2014). I also cross-checked

the data with other sources such as Shih et al. (2010) and Shih et al. (2012)[1]. When information

is not available in none of the above sources, I use internet sources such as Wikipedia and Baidu

Search. For most leaders who studied only one discipline, their worldview is determined by their

disciplines. For some leaders who have multiple degrees in different disciplines, their

worldviews are determined by their last educational experience because worldview can be

changed by new educational experience.

4.1.3 Measuring the transition of leadership/worldview

The transition of leadership and their worldviews is one of the key variables in this study.

I measure this variable from institutional and behavioral aspects. From the institutional

perspective, I examine the changes in the cadre management principles. Institutional changes are

precursors of any comprehensive, large scale changes. Additionally, these changes imply the

intention of the CCP. From the behavioral perspective, a second measurement is the change in

the percentage of the responsive and the unresponsive worldviews in the CCCPC. This aggregate

measurement shows a big picture of the composition of worldviews in the leadership.

Nonetheless, the big picture may not tell us how important each of the worldviews is in the

leadership. A full CCCPC membership and a membership in the PBSC are counted the same in

the big picture approach but in reality they differ significantly. Thus, a rise in the percentage of

the responsive worldview in the CCCPC does not necessarily mean that this worldview becomes

more important in the party. It is possible that despite the increase in the number of leaders with

responsive worldviews, they may all fall down the hierarchies. Moreover, the aggregate data do

not have many observations. If each CCCPC has one observation, then there are only eight

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[1] The data in Shih et al. (2012) are incorrect in the way that leaders' names do not match the values in other
variables. I contacted the authors regarding this error. As for today, the error has not been corrected.

CCCPCs from 1982 to date. Therefore, these two measurements will be used in the qualitative test of the hypothesis

Following the coding schemes, Figure 4.1 shows the leadership composition by profession in the CCCPC since 1982. In this figure, I take into account a leader's entire higher education record. For instance, if a leader has a bachelor degree in engineering and a Masters degree in economics, then the leader is counted as both an engineer and an economist. Figure 4.2 shows the same data, but only the leader's last higher education experience is recorded. Comparing the two figures, we see a similar trend. The share of natural scientists in the CCCPC rose rapidly in the 80s and the 90s and was surpassed by that of economists. The share of military officials was the highest before the reform and has declined steadily during the reform era. Despite the similarity, the share of natural scientists in 1992 was 80% in the Figure 4.1 while in Figure 4.2 the share was 40%. This difference indicates that many scientist leaders pursued a different profession at that time. And these leaders' behavior implies that another profession other than natural science became more and more attractive to leaders.

To facilitate analysis, I convert the single-counting data that are presented in Figure 4.2 into the leadership composition by worldview (Figure 4.3). Figure 4.3 shows that unresponsive leaders used to dominate the CCCPC in the 80s, but its share has been declining steadily. In comparison, the share of responsive leaders was very low in the 80s but has been rising steadily.

In my third measurement, to better measure the status of leaders and their worldview in the party and to expand the number of observations, I focus on the vertical mobility of leaders in the CCCPC. At each leadership transition, a leader is either promoted to a higher hierarchy or not (promotion is coded as 1, non-promotion as 0). If responsive leaders are considered to be more important or simply perform better than unresponsive leaders under the cadre evaluation system,

then we should see more leaders with responsive worldview to be promoted in the leadership. In this coding scheme, an incumbent leader is considered being promoted if his or her status ascends in the hierarchy; besides, all new CCCPC members are considered being promoted because their status changes from normal party members to party leaders. This measurement enables me to expand observation size and apply quantitative analysis to test the hypothesis.

4.1.4 Measuring social needs diversity

The CCP's perception of social needs is a state secret therefore unavailable to outsiders. To measure the changes in the diversity of social needs, I look at three variables as proxies. The first variable is public opinion conducted by a third party institution. Survey data are collected from the World Values Survey (2014). The surveys cover the years of 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2012. I am particularly interested in the survey questions V60, V61, V62 and V63. The question V60 asks respondents what they think is the most important thing for the country. The options include "stronger defense", "economic growth", "giving people more say", and "protect the environment." "Stronger defense" can be translated into the need for security and identity unification; "economic growth" suggests the need for economic development; and "giving people more say" and "protecting the environment" implies people's need for political control. The question V61 follows V60 and asks respondents what they think is the second most important thing for the country. Questions V62 and V63 ask what people think are the most and the second most important thing for themselves. The options include "maintaining order in the nation," giving people more say in important government decision," "fighting rising price," and "protecting freedom of speech."

Figure 4.1. Leadership Composition by Profession (multiple counting)

Figure 4.2 Leadership Composition by Profession (single counting)

Figure 4.3. Worldview Composition in the CCCPC

The World Values Survey measures individual needs. To measure the diversity of social needs, I used the data of the World Value Survey to calculate a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which is widely used in economics to measure the level of diversity and competition in an industry. The HHI is calculated with the following formula:

$$\text{HHI} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} S_i^2,$$

where N is the number of options of needs available. S_i is the percentage of respondents who choose the *i*th option. The index ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the index is, the higher the concentration level is, or the lower the level of diversification. Table 4.1 reports the summary of the four survey questions and the HHI of each survey result. The results suggest that the top two needs for the country and for the respondents have become more and more diverse over time. The only exception is the need for respondents in 1995.

There are several observations based on Table 4.1. First, comparing the HHIs of each response across time, the survey results suggest that social needs have been diversifying since 1990. The jump in the HHI for the "aim for respondents" questions in 1995 is caused by the decrease of number of options, which mathematically pushes up the HHI value. The second observation is that people's individual needs differ quite significantly from their view of the country's needs. For instance, for each question response, I color the most popular option blue and the second most popular option red. The results show that most people believed that economic growth is the priority for the country, while maintaining order is the priority of them. The second most popular answer for the "most important thing" question is the defense of the country and economic growth for the people. Looking at the responses to the "second most important thing" questions, people's top expectation for the country changed between

environment protection and economic growth over the years but people always wanted to enjoy economic growth for themselves.

One weakness of this measurement and the World Value Survey is that they assume that people's needs must be one of the four provided options. Another weakness is that the survey may not represent how the CCP perceives social needs. However, without alternative data sets that directly measure social needs in China over time, it is one of the best measurements available. Besides, although the survey cannot represent the real social needs in China, it should be able to catch the trend of change in the diversity of social needs.

The second measurement of social needs diversity is the level of development. The higher the development level, the more diverse social needs are. To rid of the effect of inflation, I use the index of GDP per capita at constant 1978 price of Chinese yuan to measure the level of development. The data are collected from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008 (Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics 2009) and the website of the Chinese Department of Statistics. Inglehart (1997) in his classical work *Modernization and Postmodernization* points out that, when modernization brings material satisfaction, urbanization, and mass education, social needs shifts from survival values to well-being values, from achievement motivation to post-materialist motivation, and from bureaucratic authority to participatory management. Hence, the higher the GDP per capita is, the more diverse social needs are. I use the mean GDP per capita of the five years prior to a CCCPC to catch the big picture of the level of development before leadership transition and avoid any accidental changes in one particular year. To examine how the changes in the social needs affect leadership transition, I am particularly interested in the average GDP per capita during the time period between two CCCPCs. The assumption is that when the CCCPC members make decisions on

Table 4.1. Social Needs Diversity – World Values Survey

	2007		2001		1995		1990	
Aim for the country	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
Defense	19.3	20.8	34.9	28.1	24.7	32.3	18.7	35.7
Economic growth	35.5	22.8	35.4	25.3	57.3	23.5	65.8	15.6
More say	7.0	13.0	4.6	10.5	5.4	13.6	2.4	9.2
Environment	20.9	25.4	13.7	24.0	8.1	24.2	12.3	37.6
HHI	2118.55	1766.64	2680.02	2115.95	3988.15	2366.14	4836.38	3016.25
Aim for respondent	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd	1st	2nd
Order	38.4	22.2	49.7	21.2	69.2	20.9	66.2	17.5
Rising price	26.4	26	23.1	32.5	22	50.7	16.7	43.3
More say	12.4	20.6	10.1	21.4	5.9	23.7	14	22.3
Freedom of speech	4.2	11.3	4.4	11			2.6	15.4
HHI	2342.92	1720.89	3125.07	2084.65	5307.45	3568.99	4864.09	2915.59

new leadership they evaluate how the incumbent CCCPC does during his or her tenure and make adjustment based on the evaluation.

In my quantitative analysis, since I expect the effect of an increase in the social needs diversity to have different effects on the career of responsive and unresponsive leaders, this variable also has an interaction effect with leaders' worldview.

4.1.5 Control variables

Since the quantitative model adopts an individual level analysis, some individual level variable that affect one's career is controlled. First, age is controlled. Age is an important factor in the Chinese leadership recruitment. There are informal but strictly imposed age limit on CCCPC members. For example, the Politburo members have to retire after 68 years old and no one older than 63 years old should join in the CCCPC. Controlling the factor of age would allow me to avoid the fact that many leaders left the leadership simply because they retired not because of incompetency. Second, party age is controlled. Aforementioned literature suggests that one of the most important cadre evaluation criteria is loyalty. In practice, since everybody has to be evaluated for loyalty before they can become official party members. Therefore, those who join in the party at a young age are considered by the party to be more loyal than those who join in the party at an old age. Also, Under the constraint of age limitation, the longer one serves in the party, the more advantage of seniority one accumulates, and the more possible one would be able to promoted to top leadership. Third, gender is controlled because the fact that the CCCPC, especially the Politburo and the Standing Committee, is dominated by males suggests that gender can be a glass ceiling over female leader's career. Despite the constraint on promotion, female

leaders tend to stay longer in the leadership than male leaders. Fourth, leader's ethnic background is also controlled. Similar to gender, the CCCPC is dominated by Han nationalities and minority leaders' career in the leadership is limited. But, once they join in the leadership, they tend to stay longer in the CCCPC than Han leaders.

Another major group of variables is political faction. In spite of the lack of information, Li (2001, 2013) identifies informal networks as foundations of political factions. These networks include family background, the provinces where one once lived or worked, career paths, and educational experience. In my model, I do not include working experience and career path because working together does not necessarily create faction. On the contrary, office politics may create a competitive or even hostile relationship between two leaders. Some scholars point out that alumni network is also a foundation for political faction. For instance, many leaders who graduated from Qinghua University are considered "the Qinghua gang". Nonetheless, according to my data collection, the majority of the CCCPC members graduated from the central party school. Unlike regular university, where graduates share a common identity, the central party school does not emphasize identity building. Therefore, to avoid mistakenly making the central party school the biggest political faction in the CCCPC, regular educational experience is not used to measure political faction.

What I include in the model are birth province, family background, working experience as prominent leaders' secretary (*mishu)*, and study abroad experience. Having the same hometown (*tongxiang)* can be valuable to leaders because of the common dialect and culture. For leaders who have to stay in Beijing, the commonality becomes even more valuable for better living experience and career future. Regarding family background, being the child of party leaders, or the so called princeling, gives a leader great advantage in his or her career prospects.

For example, the princelings usually start their political career at a young age, are more likely to be promoted and more likely to be assigned to positions that are easy to perform well, and enjoy the privilege of switching between political career and business career. The working experience as a secretary of a leader gives one advantage in career development. Being a secretary usually creates a faction because the secretary and the leader usually work very closely and share the same political views. Therefore, it would be leaders' interests to help their secretaries join in the leadership. Lastly, the experience of study abroad creates a division among leaders: those who studied abroad and those who did not. Moreover, the location of the experience matters. Here, I specifically focus on whether a leader studied in the West or not. The West includes the US, Western European countries and Japan. The most popular location of study abroad before 1978 was the Soviet Union; whereas the West was the top choice during the post-reform era. Additionally, being sent by the party to study in the West implies some qualities of these leaders. First, they usually are considered to be more loyal to the party than others. Second, they are also more intelligent and capable than others. Third, they were sent abroad because the party planned to nurture them and promote them in the future. Therefore, study abroad experience gave one advantage in career promotion.

4.1.6 Quantitative test

The hypothesis that is tested in this chapter is that responsive worldviews are more likely to be promoted and replace unresponsive leaders. In the quantitative test, the dependent variable is whether a leader is promoted in the party or not in a CCCPC (promotion=1 and non-promotion=0). Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable and I am interested in the likelihood of one being promoted, logit regression is appropriate for the hypothesis test.

Additionally, I am also interested in two other time-related questions. One is that, if a leader changes his or her worldview, does the change affect his or her career when social needs diversify? Another interesting question is that, comparing among leaders, does diverse social needs make some leaders more likely to be promoted than others? If my theory is correct, then I should expect the leadership transition mechanism to work both for same-person comparison and cross-person comparison. Given the nature of the dependent variable and my research question, I choose time-series cross-sectional logit model to answer these questions.

Table 4.2 presents the results of two models. The fixed effects model examines the effect of worldview on leaders' promotion probability when we compare individual leaders with themselves. The random effects model tests the impact of worldview on leaders' promotion probability by comparing between leaders. At a glance, the results show that, comparing individual leaders with themselves, when social needs become diversified, leaders who change their worldview from the unresponsive one to the responsive one would be more likely to be promoted in the party than those who do not make the change. Also, comparing leaders with each other, those with the responsive worldview would be more likely to be promoted than those whose worldview is unresponsive.

The results of other variables also provide some interesting findings. In the fixed effects model, the results suggest that one's age or party age does not affect his or her promotion probability. In other words, getting older or stay longer in the party does not help one get promotion. However, when we compare between leaders, age and party age have negative effects on one's promotion probability because old leaders are more likely to retire. Besides, having the opportunity to serve senior leaders as their secretary and to build political connections with them help one's political career. Male leaders are more likely than their female comrades to be

Table 4.2 Quantitative Test at the Central Level

	Fixed Effects	Random Effects
Worldview* Log(GDPpc)	1.491*** (0.432)	0.440*** (0.112)
Log(GDPpc)	-10.34*** (0.756)	-1.177*** (0.0711)
Worldview	-9.323*** (2.811)	-2.270** (0.703)
Age	2.216 (151.8)	-0.0656*** (0.0102)
Party age	-1.725 (151.8)	-0.0345*** (0.00725)
Birth province		-0.00294 (0.00564)
Princeling		0.0271 (0.211)
Mishu		1.568*** (0.122)
Study abroad		0.152 (0.196)
Minority		-0.556*** (0.136)
Gender		0.482** (0.151)
_cons		11.21*** (0.612)
lnsig2u _cons		-13.68 (15.84)
N	3103	3317

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

promoted. Those who are ethnic minority are less likely to be promoted. I also tested the model by using the HHI of social needs diversity instead of GDP per capita. The results are not statistically significant. One explanation for the insignificance is that the survey questions of the World Values Survey do not capture all the major social needs in the society hence do not measure social needs diversity well enough.

To illustrate the effect more vividly, Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probability of promotion. Several points need to be made about the figure. First, the figure shows that when the social needs are not diverse, unresponsive leaders are more likely to be promoted than responsive leaders. But when social needs diversify thanks to development, responsive leaders are more likely to be promoted in the party. Second, the figure shows that both types of leaders become less likely to be promoted in general when social needs diversify. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the Chinese leadership transition went through a technocratization process. Therefore, when there were not many expert leaders in the leadership, every expert leader was highly likely to be promoted because they were competing with uneducated leaders. As more and more expert leaders join in the leadership, expert leaders compete among themselves. Hence, it is statistically less likely for each expert leader to be promoted.

4.1.7 Qualitative test at the central level

Since the inception of reform, the CCP has been adjusting its cadre management policies based on social needs. I will examine how the party tried to adapt to diverse social needs by replacing the unresponsive worldviews with the responsive ones.

Figure 4.4. Predicted Probability of Promotion

The Chinese society during the pre-reform era was inundated with mass political campaigns. The economy suffered economic stagnation. The growth of real GDP per capita (Figure 4.5) before 1978 was volatile. The economic failure undermined the legitimacy of communism as a superior socioeconomic system among the public. Although there were no survey data on the then social needs, based on the fact that more than 60% of the people considered economic growth as the most important task for the country (Table 4.1), it would be safe to presume that more people in the early 80s would vote for economic growth, which means that the social needs in the 80s were more uniform than the 90s and there was no need for responsive worldviews.

For the CCP, it was realized that the existing recruitment principle of the Mao's era that focused on political loyalty and capability of mass mobilization would not help the party access qualified personnel to improve the economy. In 1978, the CCCPC issued the *Opinion of the Department of Organization of the CCP on Cadre Evaluation* (The Department of Organization of the CCCPC 1979), which established four criteria for cadre evaluation: political loyalty, expertise and education, diligence, and performance. The requirements for expertise, diligence, and performance were set up to replace the uneducated revolutionaries. However, as this time was a transitional stage, not all revolutionaries could be replaced or were willing to be replaced without a fight. To compromise the dilemma, the *Opinion* suggested that specialist leaders should be evaluated based on performance and other party leaders on political loyalty.

Shortly after the *Opinion,* in 1980, Deng Xiaoping said that party leaders should study hard and try to become "red" and "specialist" (Deng 1980b). Later in the same year, the Politburo approved and issued a Deng Xiaoping's speech, *The Institutional Reform of the Party and State Leadership* (Deng 1980a). This new leadership recruitment principle changed from the

Figure 4.5. Real GDP per capita Growth Rate

previous dualistic division between the "red" leaders and specialist leaders to a single requirement of "red specialists". This regulation initially applied to new recruitments only. But within two years, Hu Yaobang, the then General Secretary of the CCP, pushed the technocratization further by requiring all incumbent leaders to be specialists (Hu 1983). Among all types of specialists, natural scientists were most favored by the CCCPC to take up the leadership positions because the goal of the reform was economic revival not political liberalization. Scientists are a good choice because they have technical expertise but they are not as political as other professionals.

As my analysis of the World Value Survey shows, the social needs during the 1990s still centered on economic growth and were not diverse. In 1995, the CCCPC institutionalized the leadership recruitment via the *Interim Regulation on the Recruitment of Party Cadre and State Leadership* (The Department of Organization of the CCCPC 1995). Under the leadership that was dominated by unresponsive worldview, "party manages cadre and government leaders" was listed as the top principle. This principle implies that leaders are responsible to the party only, not the public. Under the pressure of economic growth, "performance" and meritocracy were listed as the second top criteria for cadre evaluation.

Table 4.3 reports the number of promotions at each CCCPC by profession. As we can see, when social needs were uniform in the 80s, among the promoted leaders, the number of the unresponsive leaders such as the military officials and natural scientists more than tripled that of responsive leaders. Moreover, military officials were the most promoted. As social needs become more and more diverse in the 90s, the gap between the responsive and unresponsive leaders in promotion narrowed more and more leaders with responsive worldviews were promoted. Among unresponsive leaders, the share of scientists grew rapidly in the 90s while the share of promoted

Table 4.3. Promotion in the CCCPC

Profession \ Year	1982	1985	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007	2012
Military	93	8	37	31	41	35	42	46
Science	75	33	68	83	111	100	74	80
Economics	7	8	11	29	31	73	98	104
Humanities	22	4	9	28	26	46	52	62
Social sciences	11	5	3	11	17	40	43	44
Law	1	0	0	2	6	14	23	27

military officials remained stable. In 2002, more responsive leaders were promoted than unresponsive leaders. Besides the absolute total number of leadership composition, the data on leadership promotion also show that diverse social needs have a positive impact on the rise of responsive leaders.

If it is still unclear about why leaders are recruited, then the special leadership transition during the Tiananmen Square incident is a telling example. The late 80s was the time period of intense political struggle between the reformists and the conservatives in the party. In 1987, Hu Yaobang, the then party secretary and a reformist, was abruptly forced to step down. In the following two years, economic liberalizations were rolled back and political reforms were suspended. Protests broke out when Hu passed away in 1989. Encountering the large scale protests, the struggle between the unresponsive worldview and responsive worldview further intensified. The unresponsive leaders believed that protests took place because the reformists were too tolerant of diversity and the reform progressed too fast to control. In comparison, the responsive leaders believed that the protests were opportunities for deepening economic and political reforms therefore should not be suppressed. In the debate, the responsive worldview was in a disadvantaged position. First of all, party leadership in the 80s was still dominated by unresponsive leaders. Even though Deng Xiaoping as the most powerful and senior leader supported economic reform, he was more of a pragmatist than a responsive leader. Zhao Ziyang said in his diary that Deng could have solved the issue easily if he could just say "the protest is not a big deal" to the conservatives in the party. But Deng did not say the words because "he has always been a hardliner on issues like this and it is really, really difficult to change him" (Zhao 2010). Second, comparing between the solution that was proposed by the unresponsive leaders and that by the responsive leaders, the former seemed more certain and effective to the party

leaders. The unresponsive leaders proposed to use force to suppress protests and leaders were confident that repression would at least end the protest. In comparison, the responsive leaders proposed to negotiate with the protesters and solve the issue peacefully but failed to propose concrete and politically feasible solutions (Zhao 2010).

Eventually, the responsive worldview totally lost ground in the policy debate and in the party leadership. Zhao Ziyang was forced to resign from the General Secretary and was replaced by Jiang Zemin, an unresponsive leader in Shanghai. Jiang attracted the attention of the top leadership for his hard line on social movements. Before the breakout of the Tiananmen Square Incident, Jiang as the party secretary of Shanghai suspended one of the most influential newspapers in China because the newspaper published an article that implicitly criticized the government and the leadership. Because of his decisive repressive approach toward protests, he won the favor of Deng Xiaoping and was promoted from a CCCPC full member to the very top of the party leadership. The rise of Jiang Zemin resulted in a total domination of the scientific technocrat leaders and the slowdown in the rise of the responsive leaders.

4.3 Empirical test at provincial level

At the provincial level, I examine the relationship between leaders' worldviews and their career by looking at how the diversity of social needs in one province affects the leadership type in the province. The unit of analysis is the position of provincial leadership position. If my theory is correct, then we should expect the provinces that have diverse social needs to be governed by leaders with responsive worldviews, vice versa. We should also expect the leaders whose worldviews are unresponsive to be replaced by those whose worldviews are responsive when the social needs in a given province become diverse. One advantage of the provincial analysis is that

I do not have to take into account many biographic factors such as political faction because I only focus on which worldview would take the provincial leadership positions, not who will take these positions.

Measuring leadership and worldviews

Provincial leadership is defined as the provincial party secretary and governor because these two positions are responsible for policy making and governing. I focus on this group of leaders because they are also party leaders. Since the market reform, provincial leaders have composed the majority in the CCCPC. Additionally, one advantage of the provincial level analysis is that provincial leaders have the same duties therefore their behavior can be compared with each other. In comparison, in the central level analysis, it is difficult to compare provincial leaders and bureaucrats in the governmental agencies because they have different duties and functions.

In terms of the coding scheme, the leaders' worldviews are determined by their last higher education experience, the same as that in the central level analysis. Each of the two leadership positions has an observation for each year. Provincial leaders change more frequently and more irregularly than CCCPC members. According to the constitution, provincial leadership transitions take place every five years. In practice, most of them have been replaced before they completed their tenure. When there is a leadership transition in the middle of the year, the one who governs the longest time during the year is considered to be the leader of that year because he or she is more responsible for the policy making.

Measuring the diversity of social needs

Since there are no survey data of social needs at the provincial level, I use the Engel coefficient as a proxy for the diversity of social needs. The Engel coefficient measures the percentage of income a household spends on food and it is calculated with the following formula:

$$Engel\ Coefficient = (Spending\ on\ food)/(Aggregate\ spending) \times 100.$$

The Engel Coefficient ranges from 0 to 100. The higher the coefficient, the lower the living standard or economic development. I use the Engel coefficient rather than other measurements of economic development, such as GDP per capita and annual disposable income per household for several reasons. Frist, GDP per capita measures the aggregate economic development of an economy and does not accurately reflect people's living standard. At the provincial level, provinces differ in economic structures. Some provinces rely on natural resources and they would have high GDP per capita but low per capita income. Second, there are data on nominal disposable income and relative disposable income level comparing to that of 1978. Both measurements have weaknesses. The nominal disposable income value does not take into account inflation. And relative income level takes into account inflation, but it cannot be used to compare between provinces. In comparison, the Engel coefficient not only takes into account inflation but also can be used to compare the living standards across provinces. The data are collected from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2008 (Department of Comprehensive Statistics of National Bureau of Statistics 2009).

Control variables

To test the relationship between social needs and leadership type, I control the effect of the nature of provinces, such as whether the province is an ethnic minority autonomous district and whether the province is included in the campaign of "Development of Western Regions". The nature of a province is included in the model because it is reasonable to assume that ethnic minority autonomous districts are different from other provinces whose majority population is Han nationality. One of the big differences is the unification of identity. People in the minority districts do not share as much identity of being Chinese as other provinces. For instance, minority languages are pervasive in minority districts which separate the minority nationalities and Han nationalities in the society. In comparison, in other provinces Mandarin is spoken. On this account, minority districts are less developed on political integration than other provinces and I expect leaders with unresponsive worldview to be more likely to govern minority districts than those with responsive worldview because the social needs in the minority districts are more uniform than those in other provinces. Besides ethnicity, there are also regional differences among provinces. The western region in China in general is less developed than the eastern region. With lower living standard, I expect that the people in the western provinces are more focused on economic growth than their eastern fellows and that the leaders with unresponsive worldview are more likely to serve in the western provinces than in the eastern province. Additionally, I control the type of leadership in the previous year. It is controlled because it is possible that there could be institutional factors, such as path dependency, that affect leadership transition.

Overall, the data set covers all Chinese provincial leaders for the time period from 1978 to 2012. For each year, every province has one observation for the party secretary and the

governor. In total, there are 1,069 observations for party secretary and 1054 observations for governor.

5.2 Evidence at provincial level

I use time-series cross-sectional logit model to test the relationship between social needs diversity and leadership type. The reason is that the dependent variable, the worldview of provincial leaders, is a dummy variable. Moreover, time-series cross-sectional model allows me to examine the causal mechanisms both within a province over time and between provinces over time.

Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 4.4 present the results of fixed effects models that examine how diversifying social needs within a province would affect which type of leaders to serve as party secretary and governor respectively. The results show that when the social needs in a province diversify (when Engel coefficient declines), both the governorship and the secretary position will be more likely to be served by leaders with responsive worldview. At the same time, it is also found that the leadership type also has statistically significant impact on the future leadership type in one province. However, the coefficients are not standardized, therefore we cannot compare the degree of impact of the two variables, which have different units, on the dependent variable.

The results are illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the predicted probability of the provincial leaders to have responsive worldview. The general trend of the figure shows that as provinces that have diverse social needs, especially when the Engel coefficient is lower than 50, the probability of the provincial leaders to have the responsive worldview rises significantly. The figure also shows that under the same condition governors in general are more likely than

secretaries to have the responsive worldview. However, my models cannot explain why secretaries are more likely than governors to have responsive worldview when the Engel coefficient is approximately 40. Additionally, my models cannot explain why the probabilities fluctuate. These weaknesses imply that I may have missed some factors that affect provincial leadership transition.

Model 3 and Model 4 present the results for the random effects models that examine the relationship between social needs and leadership by comparing different provinces over time. The results show that the provinces that have more diverse social needs tend to have more responsive governors but not party secretaries. One possible explanation is that the governors are mainly in charge of administration and governance thus governors are most affected by social needs; while secretaries are most concerned about party affairs so they are less affected. This explanation can also be supported by the results. Comparing the coefficients of the Engel coefficients between Model 1 and Model 2, and between Model 3 and Model 4, the coefficients for governor are greater than those for secretary, which suggests greater impact. Similar to the fixed effects models, the leadership type also has a positive effect on the future leadership type. The nature of province produces mixed effects. Being part of the Great Western Development campaign would make a province to be more likely to have responsive leaders than another province that is not included in the campaign. Minority Autonomous Districts do not have a statistically significant impact on leadership type.

Table 4.4 The Impact of Social Needs Diversity on Provincial Leadership Type

	(1) Fixed effects governor	(2) Fixed effects secretary	(3) Random effects Secretary	(4) Random effects governor
Engel coefficient	-0.154*** (0.0408)	-0.134** (0.0411)	-0.0439 (0.0253)	-0.0755** (0.0242)
Previous governor	3.209*** (0.395)			4.001*** (0.368)
Previous secretary		3.647*** (0.486)	4.917*** (0.420)	
Minority			-0.752 (0.623)	-0.900 (0.580)
Western			1.120* (0.533)	0.906* (0.445)
_cons			-0.364 (1.162)	1.479 (1.113)
lnsig2u				
_cons			-11.34 (585.3)	-13.82 (33.30)
N	322	288	372	370

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4.6. Predicted Probability of Provincial Leaders to Have Responsive Worldview

CHAPTER 5.

LEADERSHIP TRANSITION AND ADAPTATION

The previous chapter shows that diverse social needs have a positive impact on the rise of the leaders with responsive worldviews. This chapter examines the consequence of the leadership transition from unresponsive leaders to responsive ones. I will test whether responsive leaders tend to make responsive adaptations. Therefore, the dependent variable in this chapter is the responsiveness of government policies. The independent variable is the leadership transition, which is the dependent variable in Chapter 4. The organization of this chapter assimilates that of Chapter 4. I will first describe the research method. Like Chapter 4, I will examine the hypothesis with evidence from policy making at central and provincial levels.

5.1 Research methods

The dependent variable is the responsiveness of government policy. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, adaptation is defined as the capability to respond to the diverse social needs. In the past three decades, China has suffered many serious problems. For the sake of feasibility and data availability, I examine some major policy adaptations. The first issue is the cadre management system. Many scholars have pointed out that cadre management system is one of the most important adaptations that the CCP has conducted. Thus, I will examine how leadership transition affects cadre evaluation system.

The second policy area is the government attitude in dealing with societal organizations. Societal organizations represent diverse social interests and serve the social needs that are ignored or not fully met by the state (Saich 2000). Citizen's participation in societal organizations plays a significant role in making government responsive to social needs, even in China (Ma 2012). However, it should be stressed that the CCP has the authority over registering societal organizations. Therefore, the number of societal organizations also indicates how tight the government controls societal organization and how tolerant the government is toward diverse social needs. The data on the registered societal organization are collected from the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs website. The time data cover the time period from 1988 to 2013.

The third policy area is income inequality. Income inequality has exacerbated in China since the market reform and is one of the drives behind inequality (Dickson 1997; Pei 2006; CASC 2009). The adaptation to income inequality is measured by the fiscal spending on social security as a percentage of the total provincial expenditure.

5.2 Evidences at the central level

5.2.1 Consequences under Unresponsive Leaders

The generation of scientist leaders brought about successful economic growth; however, it also brought problems. At the beginning of the reform, Deng Xiaoping openly proposed to "let some people become rich first" and let the rest catch up in the long run. When the agenda was implemented by the goal oriented scientists, the interests of some social groups and regions were promoted and protected whereas the interests of the rest of the society were sacrificed and their needs were suppressed. Over time, the richer people and the coastal regions become, the more

important they are in the national economy and the more likely they remain on the top of the priority list. Decades after development, the poor did not catch up and China slipped from being one of the most equal countries to being one of the most unequal ones.

Worse for the poor, the decentralization and privatization of the state sector resulted in rising unemployment rate and the strong economic growth caused high inflation. Seeing their economic benefit being jeopardized, people across the nation protested to express their discontent. According to the official media, the number of strikes, marches, and collective petitions rose from only 86 in the entire1980, to 120 in 1985 for 18 provinces, to 553 and 871 in only half year in 1989 and 1990 (Figure 5.1) (Zhang 2009). The growing grievance reached the peak in June 1989.

Since the party was dominated by the unresponsive worldview in the 80s and the 90s, the protests were perceived as threats to the primary goal of economic growth. Instead of taking the opportunities to respond to these needs, the unresponsive leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Li Peng were promoted to repress protests. In the meantime, the unresponsive leaders further consolidated their position in the party by ousting leaders with responsive worldviews.

Being alerted by the protests in 1989, the unresponsive leadership decided to pursue regime stability at the cost of economic performance. At the Celebration of the Seventieth Anniversary of the CCP in 1991, Jiang Zemin, the then CCP General Secretary, stressed that the party could not do anything that contradicts socialist principles. On the economy, he said that privatization should be stopped. As a result, many economic reforms were rolled back or suspended. On political reform, he said that the state must not adopt the Western democracy or allow plural parties. On ideology, he asserted that the guiding ideology of the society must not be diverse. These changes implied that political stability would be pursued at any cost, including

Figure 5.1. Number of Strikes, Marches, and Collective Petitions (1980-90)

economic growth. On top of the existing economic issues in the late 80s, the leaders' focus on stability and their unwillingness to revive the economy at the risk of political instability dragged down the economy. Under Jiang's leadership, the GDP growth slowed down from an average of nine percent during the 80s to seven percent in 1991.

Since the legitimacy of the CCP is built on both ideological legitimacy and economic success, Deng Xiaoping, who jumpstarted the economic reform, became seriously concerned about China's economic future. In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping travelled to the southern China and made the famous "South Tour Speech," in which he criticized the leadership for rolling back the "reform and opening up" policy and threatened to replace whoever opposed the "opening up policy". Asserting that the difference between socialism and capitalism is not the difference between market economy and command economy, Deng asked the leadership to resume reform, pursue modernization and mitigate income inequality by hinting that the leadership might be replaced if they did not do so. However, Deng's insist on market reform cannot be misconstrued as a responsive adaptation. What Deng asked for was economic growth only. The concerns over inflation, income inequality and unemployment were not even mentioned in his speech. The difference between Deng and Jiang was that Deng focused on economic growth while Jiang emphasized ideological unification.

Under the pressure of Deng, the leadership shifted policy priority from stability to economic growth. However, this shift did not improve the situation. The unresponsive worldview upheld by the leadership determined that they were incapable of caring about other social needs other than economic growth. During the second wave of the growth, inflation reached the highest point (Figure 5.2) during the post-reform era. Knowing of the worsening economic and social problems, the solution proposed by the unresponsive leadership was not to fulfill these diverse

The data on CPI are collected from the Department of Statistics website.

Figure 5.2. CPI and Worldview

social needs. Jiang Zemin's solution was to "use growth to solve the problems that are brought about by development." In the meantime, Jiang tightened his control over the society. Figure 5.3 shows the total number of registered societal organization in China. The data indicate that right after the Tiananmen Square Incident, the government relaxed the control over the society by allowing more societal organizations to be registered. However, after Jiang Zemin and his unresponsive followers consolidated their power in the party, the number of organizations dropped.

The unresponsiveness of Jiang's leadership group can also be seen in the implementation of the "Three Represents" ideology. Although the ideology requires the party to represent the fundamental interests of the people, based on the official data on governmental spending on social security and social insurance, the total governmental spending on social security and social insurance from 1989 to 2002 dropped from 1.99% of the total governmental expenditure to merely 1.34% (Figure 5.4). The level of social security spending did not rise even during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis.

5.2.2 The transition to responsive worldview

Unresponsive leaders' repressive and growth-oriented approaches toward social problems didn't solve the sources of the problems. In order to solve social problems, it became imperative for the party to "change the brains" of the party by recruiting leaders with a new worldview. In 2002, right before retirement, Jiang revised and formalized the *Interim Regulation on the Recruitment of Party Cadre and State Leaders* that was issued in 1995. In the revised regulation, a leader's capability for the first time was listed before party loyalty (The Department of Organization of the CCCPC 2002). In the Chinese political context, the change in the order implies that expertise

The data on the societal organization are collected from the Ministry of Civil Affairs website.

Figure 5.3. The Societal Organizations

* Data collected from the National Bureau of Statistics website

Figure 5.4. National Social Security Spending (% of total government spending)

was considered more important than party loyalty. This behavior can be understood as the last push from the unresponsive leadership to use economic growth to solve diverse social issues. Since economic performance was still the top evaluation criteria, economic growth accelerated after the issuance of the *Regulation*. However, the unresponsive way of governing that was composed of a focus on economic growth and repression did not solve problems. A more rapid economic growth puts great pressure on social needs diversification. As shown in the Figure 5.5, the number of mass incidents has risen exponentially since the early 1990s.

The unresponsive leaders' failure to improve the situation results in their disadvantaged position in policy debate. At the 16th CCCPC in 2004, the CCCPC prepared to replace the unresponsive leaders with responsive ones by issuing the *Opinion on Further Developing Philosophy and Social Sciences* (The CCCPC 2004). The *Opinion* proposed to recruit more leaders with educational backgrounds in social sciences and humanities, and prioritize the education of these disciplines as a strategic goal of development. Three years later in the 17th CCCPC, the leaders with responsive worldview for the first time in history became the majority in the party.

Shambaugh (2008) points out that many new adaptations were initiated under Hu Jingtao's administration. One of the new adaptation policies since 2004 is that the government fiscal spending becomes more transparent and data are listed in more detail. Before 2004, for instance, the expenditure on public security was not disclosed. The expenditure on education, healthcare and cultural activities was combined therefore did not allow people to compare individually. After the reform, for the first time in China's history, people knew that China spent more on public security than on national defense. Besides more detailed breakdown, new spending items were also created. For example, the central government started spending on

*Data collected from Keidel (2006).

Figure 5.5. Number of mass incidents

environmental protection since 2007 and on affordable housing in 2009. Regarding environment protection, before 2007, local governments were responsible for environmental protection and the total government spending reached a maximum of 161 million yuan in 2006. After the central government started sharing the responsibility of environmental protection with the local governments, the total governmental spending on environment protection jumped to 995.82 million yuan and has been growing rapidly since then. In 2012, total government spending on environmental protection reached 2963 million yuan. This change in the "open government" policy is arguably an effort to improve the responsiveness and accountability of the government.

Under the responsive leadership, in 2009 the party issues the *Opinion on the Scientific Development of Cadre Establishment and Cadre Evaluation* (The General Office of the CCCPC 2009). This *Opinion* announced that economic growth would no longer be the key factor in cadre evaluation. Rather, social development, sustainable development and effectiveness of governance became more important in the evaluation. More importantly, different from previous evaluation regulations in which officials were evaluated by their bosses and coworkers, the new *Opinion* stressed that officials should also be evaluated based on public opinion.

In regard to the fiscal spending on social security, Figure 5.4 illustrates a drastic difference between two eras. During the era of the unresponsive leadership in the 80s and the 90s, the social security spending accounted for at most 2% of the total spending; in comparison, under the responsive leadership, the lowest share of social spending was 7% of the total spending.

The policy behavior and outcomes between the era of responsive leadership and the era of unresponsive one are drastically different. First, facing the rising unemployment, responsive leaders spend at least 7% of the fiscal spending on social security; in comparison, unresponsive leaders spent at most 2%. Responsive leaders made government more transparent and did not

restrict societal organizations; while unresponsive leaders kept government spending secret and kept societal organizations at bay. To make all these changes possible, the responsive leaders reformed the cadre evaluation system to promote responsive worldview in the party.

To summarize, the CCP has been trying to adapt to the developing social needs. Successful adaptation is not simply a reaction of the leadership toward diversifying social needs. Leaders' worldviews matter. Looking at the history of the post-reform Chinese development, we see that the social, economic problems have been there since the market reform. Therefore, the adaptation is arguably not a result of changes in issues but a result of changes in the leadership and its worldview. Leaders with unresponsive worldviews were hostile toward these social needs because they were incapable of working with multiple goals at the same time. The failure of the unresponsive leaders in dealing with diversity results in the CCP replacing them with responsive leaders. With a new leadership that was dominated by responsive worldview, the needs for a stable economy, more equal distribution, better social security were viewed as opportunities to strengthen regime legitimacy instead of threats. As a result, the new worldview made possible most of the adaptations.

5.3 Evidence at the provincial level

One advantage of examining the provincial level leadership behavior is that the results of the analysis are more robust than the results of central leadership analysis. It is because all provincial leaders are under the pressure of the overarching central government policy principles and guidelines. As many scholars have already pointed out, the cadre evaluation system works so effectively that the central government can control local officials' behavior (Huang 1996; Edin 2003; Whiting 2004). If we find that the leaders' worldviews influence their policy preferences

even under the pressure of the cadre evaluation system, then it means worldview is important to adaptation.

In this section, I examine the impact of provincial leaders' worldviews on their policy responsiveness. The dependent variable is the policy responsiveness. Although there are multiple policy areas that are related to adaptation, I look at the government spending for evidence of adaptation. Government spending, comparing with policy rhetoric and policy outcomes, is more representative of a leader's policy preference. In terms of policy area, I focus on income inequality. Cadre management and the policy on the mass incidents at local level are not analyzed due to the lack of information.

5.3.1 Income inequality

The data on provincial government spending became available since 1995. Among all the spending area, the spending on social programs is one of the best in terms of data availability. My analysis of the spending on social programs covers the data of all provinces from 1995 to 2012. The dependent variable for this analysis is the provincial spending on social programs as a percentage of the total fiscal spending. The social programs that are included in the analysis are education, public health, social welfare, and social security. Although the provincial fiscal accounting system also went through a reform that was similar to the central government, the major change in reform was to break aggregate category such as "culture, education, and public health" into three categories. So, the reform does not affect my analysis because I intend to look at the aggregate spending level.

The independent variable is leaders' worldview. Same as the previous chapter, leadership is defined as party secretary and governor. Both positions are included in the model because both

of them are involved in the decision making process. Worldview is measured based on a leader's last higher educational experience. As for control variables, I control the percentage of "*dibao*" residents, those whose income is lower than the minimum wage in a province. This variable is controlled because the more people need help the more government tend to spend on social welfare. By the same token, unemployment rate is controlled. The correlation between unemployment rate and the share of *dibao* residents is 0.38 because the unemployed and the poor are technically not the same group of people. I also control the provincial inflation level. Inflation is controlled because the data I use are nominal values of spending. High inflation may result in a high level of spending on social programs. Whether a province is an ethnic minority autonomous district and whether it is covered in the Western Development program are taken into consideration. Minority districts are coded as 1, otherwise 0. Being part of the Western Development program is coded as 1, otherwise 0. The data are collected from the Yearbook of Statistics from 1995 to 2012. The dataset contains 494 observations for all provinces from 1995 to 2012.

To test my hypothesis, I use time-series cross-sectional regression because I am interested in the causal mechanisms within a province and among provinces. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.1. The results of the fixed effects model show that the worldviews of party secretaries and governors have statistically significant impact on the share of spending on social programs when the worldviews of the leadership change in the province. The results of the random effects model suggest that, comparing among provinces, leaders who have responsive worldview tend to spend more on social programs. Comparing the degree of impact between governor and secretary, both models indicate that governors have greater impact on fiscal

spending than party secretaries. It is so because governors are more responsible for fiscal policies.

Regarding the impact of the *dibao* population, the fixed effect model shows that an increase in the *dibao* population in a province does not affect the spending on social programs. This finding is important because it shows that leaders do not necessarily change their policy to adapt to the changing economic and social environment. The random effects model suggests that the provinces that have higher percentage of *dibao* population tend to spend more on social spending. This seemingly puzzle can be explained by the fact that provincial leaders are still subject to the guidelines of the central government. The results here do not refute the findings of the cadre management literature. They imply that when the central leadership asks local officials to adapt, overall all leaders would be more responsive to some extent because of the pressure, but those who have responsive worldview would be more responsive than those who have unresponsive worldview because of intention. Besides *dibao* population, inflation rate does affect spending. Minority districts tend to spend less on social programs than other provinces.

Table 5.1. The Effect of Leadership/Worldview on Spending on Social Programs.

	Fixed effects	Random effects
Sectary worldview	0.0197***	0.0179**
	(0.00577)	(0.00549)
Governor worldview	0.0316***	0.0295***
	(0.00510)	(0.00497)
Dibao population	0.309	0.351*
	(0.176)	(0.150)
Unemployment rate	-0.0111	-0.00775
	(0.00567)	(0.00486)
CPI	0.00741***	0.00749***
	(0.000966)	(0.000959)
Minority district		-0.0421*
		(0.0175)
Western		-0.00509
		(0.0137)
_cons	-0.409***	-0.421***
	(0.1000)	(0.0991)
N	387	387

Standard errors in parentheses
$^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

CONCLUSION

After three decades of rapid growth, China has made a significant progress in social, economic development. Today, it is the second largest economy in the world and it is world's most populous country. Therefore, China's stability is an important topic for the world. So far, there are theoretical and factual reasons for conventional wisdom to be pessimistic about China's stability. The literature on development and social stability suggests that a developing country becomes unstable when it pulls off successful development (Park 1984; Bremmer 2007). The theoretical expectations have received more and more support from the emerging signs of instability, such as widening income inequality, worsening environmental degradation, and growing mass incidents. However, facing all these challenges, China has successfully maintained a stable authoritarian political system and continuous rapid growth.

Existing literature explains the authoritarian resilience by examining the level of repression and institutions. For instance, Kramer (2013), Bernstein (2013) and Heydemann and Leenders (2011) suggest that authoritarian regimes collapse because they were not repressive enough. King et al. (2013) and Han (2013) show that repression can be conducted skillfully so as to not only let people express their discontent but also maintain stability. Other scholars point out that the authoritarian resilience is achieved via institutional adaptations. On economic adaptations, the studies on the economic reforms in the Soviet Union and China indicate that the differences in the economic structures and in reform approaches resulted in the opposite outcomes of reforms (Dimitrov 2013a; Bernstein 2013; Chan and Unger 2009; Coase and Wang

2012; Zhang 2011). Additionally, China's *guanxi* network is believed to contribute to economic growth when rule of law and private property are lacking (McNally 2011, 2012).

On political adaptations, Nathan (2003), Shambaugh (2008) and Abrami et al. (2013) point out that successful authoritarian resilience is achieved via improving political accountability without sacrificing the control over the society. Some of the adaptations include reforms in the cadre evaluation system and incorporation of social groups. In terms of ideological institution, it is argued that resilient authoritarian regimes are capable of creating new ideologies such as the "primary stage of socialism" in China to justify their reform and legitimacy (Tismaneanu 2013).

The existing literature does a good job of explaining why the resilient regimes are resilient. However, it has two weaknesses. The first weakness is that the literature falls short of explaining the mechanism of change from a rigid authoritarian regime to an adaptive one. The lack of a mechanism of change leads to the second weakness of the literature. Adaptation does not guarantee success. The literature does not explain what drives adaptations, especially the successful ones. In other words, the literature does not explain why some authoritarian regimes' adaptation succeeded while others' failed. The literature has the weaknesses due to its focus on institutions. Institutionalism in general has difficulty in explaining changes because institutions tend to constrain actors' behavior instead of motivating them to change. With that said, I acknowledge that actors' behavior change when institutions change. In China's case, the cadre evaluation system has been carefully managed by the CCP to guide government officials' behavior. For instance, facing the most mass incidents in the country, Guangdong province announced in 2013 that the number of mass incidents would be included in the cadre evaluation system. In this sense, the change in the situation results in a change in the institution and

expectedly would impact local officials' behavior. However, although policy goals may change with the situation, it does not mean that the government becomes more responsive. Social stability measured with a low frequency of mass incident can be achieved via responsive and repressive approaches. Similarly, income inequality can be dealt with by redistribution through social programs or by "solving the issue with development." In Chapter 5, the analysis of the provincial leaders' behavior on income inequality shows that leaders do not spend more on social programs to correct the inequality when the poor population in the province grows even when inequality is included in the cadre evaluation system. In other words, leaders do not necessarily become more responsive when situation and institutions change.

This dissertation as a supplement to the authoritarian resilience literature identifies a mechanism of change by taking into consideration the role of leaders in authoritarian resilience. Authoritarian leaders care about social needs for their own political interests, but they react to the needs differently. Drawing from the human needs paradigm of political development and the sociology of professions, I argue that leaders' worldviews is an important factor in successful adaptations. The focus of social needs evolves through four stages: survival, ideological unification, economic growth and political control. Not only do the content of needs change but also the needs become diverse as the society develops. In order to maintain legitimacy, leaders at each of developmental stages have to fulfill the social needs; otherwise, they would be replaced by others who are able to do so.

Leaders differ in their capabilities of fulfilling social needs and their capability derives from their worldviews. Leaders who have responsive worldview of social needs tend to be accommodating to diverse social needs; in comparison, those who have unresponsive worldview are indifferent to diverse social needs. Drawing from the literature on the sociology of

professions suggest, I examine leaders' professional backgrounds for their worldviews. In my typology of profession-based worldview, military officials, natural scientists, lawyers, and uneducated communist ideologues are tend to have unresponsive worldview. The feature of this group of leader is their intolerance of diversity. They perceive diversity as a source of chaos. Therefore, they in general are incapable of pursuing diverse interests of different social groups; however, they are very effective in achieving their goals. In comparison, social scientists and humanists tend to have responsive worldview. They are more open and tolerant toward diversity and they perceive diversity as potentials for improvement.

Hence, I posit that successful adaptations are driven by leadership change. When a society is at a low developmental stage, officials who have unresponsive worldview are likely to become leaders because their unresponsiveness toward diversity enable them to fulfill homogenous social needs such as survival, ideological unification and economic growth to some extent. When social needs diversify, the unresponsive leaders become less and less effective in fulfilling social needs and maintaining legitimacy. In order for a regime to survive, it replaces the leaders with unresponsive worldview with those who have responsive worldview. And it is those responsive leaders who achieve authoritarian resilience via adaptations. Without the leadership transition from unresponsive leaders to responsive leaders, adaptation cannot succeed. Consequently, the regime would either collapse or be trapped in stagnation.

Applying the theoretical framework to the China paradox, I analyze the leadership transition at the national and provincial levels during the post-reform era and the changes in the behavior of leaders. At the national level and provincial level, I find that there has been a clear worldview-based leadership transition over time. At the beginning of the reform, the top leadership was dominated by leaders whose worldview was unresponsive. As the reform deepens

and the society develops, social needs diversify and social problems emerge. Encountering the diversifying social needs and the worsening social problems, the unresponsive leadership adopted repressive approaches and a hard-line attitude toward them. As a result, these problems continued to exacerbate and posed greater threats to the regime stability. In order to achieve resilience, the CCP has progressively replaced its unresponsive leadership with a responsive one. Institutions such as the cadre evaluation system were adjusted to favor responsive leaders in leadership recruitment.

The transition from an unresponsive leadership to a responsive one has made a difference in adaptation. The new generation of responsive leaders has redirected cadre evaluation system from economic growth to effective governance, improved the transparency of governmental operation, significantly increased the spending on social programs to alleviate income inequality, and started initiatives at the national level to combat environmental degradation. At the provincial level, I find that responsive leaders tend to solve problems in a more responsive way than unresponsive leaders. On the issue of income inequality, while unresponsive leaders prefer to solve the problems with more development, responsive leaders try to alleviate the problem by redistributing social wealth and spending more heavily on social programs. As mentioned before, the difference between the leaders is robust because my analysis shows that leaders do not spend more simply because income inequality worsens in their provinces.

Implications

Theoretically, this dissertation supplements the authoritarian resilience school of thought by providing a mechanism of change of adaptation. Practically, the findings of this dissertation suggest that leadership is an important factor of reform and adaptation. Although all rational

leaders do react to the changing environment, what matters more in terms of authoritarian resilience is how leaders react. At a high development stage, unresponsive and repressive approaches to the social problems that are rooted in diverse social needs are unsustainable. Moreover, repression may even backfire and result in regime collapse. Successful adaptations require not only changes in policy goals and reforms of institutions but also a new "brain" for the regime. By replacing an unresponsive leadership with a responsive one, the regime becomes more capable of adapting to the diverse social needs and continues to maintain control over the society.

Using the conceptual framework of this dissertation to speculate on the future development of China, the fact that the Xi Jinping administration has the most responsive leadership group that China has had so far implies that the CCP would continue to maintain the capability of adaptation. Nevertheless, the trend of the leadership composition also shows that the growth of the responsive leaders and the decline of the unresponsive leaders in the party leadership have been slowing down. The slowdown implies an intensifying struggle between the responsive worldview and unresponsive worldview in the party. If the responsive worldview continues to grow in the next Party Congress in 2017, then the CCP would be expected to be more capable of adaptation and more likely to maintain authoritarian resilience. If, however, the unresponsive worldview is reinstated in the next Party Congress, then the CCP may lose its capability in adaptation and is more likely to suffer regime instability. Since 2012, the current CCCPC has continued to maintain a responsive approach toward social problems. In addition to the continuous effort in improving people's living standards and environment protection, the Xi administration has made bold action and significant progresses in anti-corruption campaigns. However, in 2013 the CCCPC established the Central National Security Committee, which was

designed to maintain with domestic political security. This policy is arguably an unresponsive approach toward social discontent. The combination of responsive and unresponsive policies constructs a mixed prospect of China's future.

Future research

This study focuses primarily on China and conducts within-country comparison. This does not mean that China is the only case of successful authoritarian resilience. Further studies may take a "between-country comparison" approach. Vietnam and Cuba as two communist countries that have enjoyed stability and rapid development are also important cases to examine and see if their success was contributed by leadership transitions. Besides the comparison among successful cases, the study would also benefit from studies that compare the successful cases with failed cases, such as the Soviet Union, and stagnated cases, such as North Korea. Additionally, this study is limited on the coverage of adaptation policy areas due to data availability. As the government becomes more and more transparent, future studies would have more data available to look into a wider range of adaptation policies. Also, since unresponsive leaders dominated most of the time period so far and the responsive leaders' takeover just happened, more time and more data would make the differences between unresponsive and responsive leaders clearer. Lastly, although this study discusses the role of leaders' worldviews in authoritarian resilience, the idea that leaders matter to the success of reforms does not need to be limited to the literature on authoritarian regimes. The theoretical framework can also be applied to study reforms in democracies.

In conclusion, this dissertation brings agency into the research of authoritarian resilience and hopes to depict a more complete picture of why and how authoritarian regimes can achieve

resilience. As has been stated, leadership is not the only reason for successful adaptations. The relationship between leadership and institution is dynamic. Both factors mush be compatible to each other to produce positive outcomes.

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