REFUGEES AND HOST STATE REPRESSION

by

NAJI BSISU

(Under the Direction of Amanda Murdie)

ABSTRACT

What determines levels of repression targeting refugee populations? Do states hosting refugees specifically target these populations with increased repression? Why and when does this occur? There are vast discrepancies in the ways in which host states respond to refugees; however, as the number of refugees worldwide continually increases so does the amount of repression targeting them. Given that there is a direct and positive relationship between refugees and the use of repression, my aim is to discover the specific conditions that lead to the use of repression targeting refugee populations. In tackling the broader question relating to refugees and repression, I argue that the connection between refugees and repression can be determined by the following. First, factors inherent with the refugees themselves play a role in levels of host state repression targeting refugees. This pertains to refugee populations fleeing conflict, as well as refugee populations that can be tied to violent acts. Second, I argue that human rights organizations as well as institutionalized systems and norms within the state can mitigate host state repression targeting refugees. Finally, I explore the impact that state characteristics can have on its treatment of refugee populations, namely a state's political stability and levels of state capacity. Using a new dataset that captures state repression of refugee populations, I find ample support for my proposed covariates of host state repression targeting refugees.

INDEX WORDS: Human Rights, Human Security, Repression, Refugees, Forced Migration

REFUGEES AND HOST STATE REPRESSION

by

NAJI BSISU

BS, University of Dayton, 2004

MA, University of Chicago, 2013

MA, University of Missouri, 2016

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2020

REFUGEES AND HOST STATE REPRESSION

by

NAJI BSISU

Major Professor:	Amanda Murdie
Committee:	K. Chad Clay
	Daniel Hill Jr.
	Andrew Owsiak

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Interim Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to begin by thanking Amanda Murdie, without whom this would not have been possible. Amanda has been instrumental to my development as an academic and person beginning at my time at the University of Missouri and culminating as I head towards the end of my career at the University of Georgia. She has been a teacher, advisor, mentor, and friend throughout these years, and I could not imagine a better guide for my journey through graduate school.

I would also like to thank the rest of my dissertation committee: Chad Clay, Andy Owsiak, and Danny Hill. They have been tremendously helpful to me throughout this entire process. I am very appreciative of their help and look forward to working with them as I embark on my own career as an academic.

My family has been the foundation for my success. They have provided support, guidance, and encouragement whenever it was needed. My older brothers, Wasfi and Basil, have been islands of stability in a sometimes-chaotic time. I would like to especially thank my mother, May, who has been fundamental to my achievements. Her unconditional love and support have propelled me to reach for heights I once never thought possible. I truly could never repay her for what she has given to me. I would not be the man I am today without her.

My daughter, Margot has been a tremendous joy and much-needed distraction from the struggle and monotony of working on a dissertation. Her joy and youthful exuberance have energized me and provided a much-needed spark whenever I felt bogged down. She has been, and continues to be, my daily source of inspiration.

I would also be remiss not to mention Zoey, our smooth Collie. She is my faithful companion, always up for a walk around the neighborhood, or a rambunctious game of tug-of-war. She has a special sense about her to know when to nudge me away from my desk whenever I was overdue for a break. She truly is man's best friend.

Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful and amazing wife, Sarah. Her friendship, companionship, and love has been unsurpassed. My success is her success as none of this would have been possible without her. She has been by my side every step of the way and has gone out of her way to ensure that I had the time to put towards my dissertation. I couldn't even begin to thank her for all the time and effort she put forth reading drafts or looking up STATA and LaTeX code to help me get to this point. She is the best partner anyone could ever ask for and I am truly blessed that she agreed to go on this journey with me.

March 2020

Athens, GA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Conflict has always been one of the primary drivers of forced migration and the creation of refugee populations. The conflicts of World War I and World War II themselves created millions of displaced persons. These tragedies brought the international community together and led to the formalization of international agreements relating to the status and care of refugee populations. Although the process was formally started by the League of Nations in 1921, it was not until 1951, when a diplomatic conference in Geneva resulted in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This document provided a legal definition for a refugee and laid out the legal protections and rights to be afforded to them. While the 1951 Convention was largely geared towards refugees of European origin following World War II, the international community expanded these definitions to cover displacement globally in the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Per the United Nations (UN) 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol following it, refugees are defined as individuals who

> owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Unfortunately, while the 1951 Convention and the 1967 protocol have made huge strides in identifying refugees and establishing protections afforded to them, the plight of refugees worldwide remains dire. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Refugee Agency, there are close to 26 million refugees worldwide. This

includes over 20 million refugees under the UNHCR's mandate, and approximately 5.5 million Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).[1] Given the prospect of continued civil and international conflict throughout the world, along with the increasing potential for climate related natural disasters, the likelihood of increased refugee populations remains high. This has led to increased attention paid to refugees and their plight within the media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), policy makers, as well as the academic community. My own interactions and experiences with refugees and refugee camps has led me to develop a research program centered on the question of what determines the level of treatment of refugees by their respective host state. I specifically focus on the determinants of government, including government-sanctioned, violence targeting refugees.

Objectives

Forced migrations and the plight of refugees have unfortunately dominated much of the news-cycle recently. Throughout the world, refugees flow across borders traveling by land and sea. From the deadly Mediterranean Sea crossings, to the quality of camps in Southern Europe and the Manus Islands, to the plight of the Rohingya, among many others, there are countless stories everyday across all forms of media detailing the plight of these refugees. A cursory glance at the *New York Times*, *Washington Post,* or *The Guardian,* among others, would illustrate this phenomenon quite clearly.

Once refugees reach a host country, their suffering does not necessarily stop. Despite many similarities, Italy and Spain have adopted relatively different strategies and attitudes regarding migrants and refugees. While Italy used to be rather welcoming towards refugee populations, under new leadership they have begun to enact measures to prevent migrants and

[1] UNHCR Figures at a Glance: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [accessed Jan. 14, 2020]

refugees from entering their territory (Der Spiegel Staff 2018). Now, Spain has become the preferred destination of migrants and refugees coming from Africa and the Middle East as they have shown a willingness to address this humanitarian crisis (Sánchez 2018). Differences in attitudes and treatment of refugee populations is not just limited to European states. For example, refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon treat refugees quite differently, despite the fact that the refugees in question are of the same origin. Even with a renewed focus on refugees, the questions of why the treatment of refugees differs across states and how best to ensure the humane treatment of these populations by their respective host state remains understudied.

While there has been an abundant amount of research looking into multiple different aspects of refugees including where they go and the impact they can have on their host state, there remains a dearth of scholarship that focuses directly on the treatment of refugees once they arrive at their respective host state. The closest the academic community has come to addressing this issue is by looking at the overall human rights situations of states that end up hosting refugee populations as seen in the work of Wright and Moorthy (2018). In this study the authors look at the impact that hosting refugees has on state repression and found that increased numbers of refugees lead to increased use of state repression. Additionally, they find that this relationship is conditional on the host state's economic capacity (Wright and Moorthy 2018). While this study is one of the few that attempt to connect state repression and the presence of refugees, I believe there is a lacuna in the field as it relates to the treatment of refugees themselves at the hand of their host state.

There are vast discrepancies in the ways host states respond to refugees however, recent research has revealed a growing consensus that host state repression increases as the numbers of refugees within a host state increases (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Given that there is

a direct and positive relationship between refugees and the use of repression, my aim is to discover the specific conditions that lead to the use of government violence targeting refugee populations.

In tackling the broader question relating to refugees and repression, I will seek to focus on three related factors: (1) the impact on the repression of refugees due to factors inherent with the refugees themselves, (2) the impact on the repression of refugees by nongovernmental organizations working with or providing services to refugees, and finally (3) the impact on the repression of refugees based on characteristics of the host state and its governing body. We know that refugee populations are an already vulnerable population. However, I aim to dig deeper into whether there are characteristics inherent within these populations that increase the chances that they are targeted by repression by their host state. These factors include the initial cause of their forced migration, notably are refugees fleeing conflict more susceptible to violence. Additionally, I explore the potential impact of violence committed by refugee populations or even violent acts committed by ethnic or religious groups that can be tied to the refugee population and how that impacts state repression targeting refugees.

Beyond looking at the refugees themselves, I also explore the potential impact that NGOs have on levels of repression targeting refugees. For example, Human Rights Organizations (HROs) can mitigate the state's choice to use repression through multiple avenues. These include the ability for HROs to provide information and resources which can decrease the state's perceived need to use repression. Additionally, they can work with the refugees and local community directly to help mitigate any tension that may arise between the two communities ultimately lowering the level of threat posed by the refugee population. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, characteristics of the host state itself will ultimately contribute to the use of

repression targeting refugee populations within its borders. Notably, I focus on a state's political stability and state capacity as indicators of how well the state would be able to handle a sudden influx of refugees on political, economic, and social levels.

State of the Field

Scholarship on refugees has focused on multiple issues, including where refugees go, the impact refugees can have on their host state, the relationship between refugees and conflict, as well as the treatment of refugees in the international system. There has been considerable debate regarding the level of agency individual refugees have in where they end up once they have been forced to flee. Conventional wisdom would dictate that refugees fleeing conflict would undoubtedly seek a safe haven from violence, which is born out in the literature (Moore and Shellman 2007). Arguments have also been made that refugees would seek out states with secure democratic institutions and highly functioning civil societies (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya 2016), although studies have shown that those considerations often do not have much of an impact on refugees' choice of locations (Moore and Shellman 2007). Additionally, it is argued that refugees are attracted to states with strong economies and higher wages. While those may be desirable for refugee populations, those locations tend to be further away from refugee-producing situations and the costs of getting to those places are often too high for refugees (Moore and Shellman 2007). The strongest indicators for where refugees go are distance and trans-border ethnic linkages (Moore and Shellman 2007; Rüegger and Bohnet 2018). Approximately 90% of refugees end up settling in a neighboring state (Moore and Shellman 2007). Refugees tend to follow previous migratory and refugee flows often determined by presence of an ethnic kin population (Moore and Shellman 2007; Rüegger and Bohnet 2018).

Beyond looking at where refugees go, the majority of scholarship on refugees to date has focused on the impact that they have on their host state. This tends to focus on two aspects, the costs they impose on a society as well as any potential links refugees may have with violence that can impact the host state. Through no fault of their own, refugees often impose costs upon on their host state, at least in the short run (Loescher 1994; Salehyan 2008). These costs often place a strain on the economic health of a state, impact public health, and have the possibility of altering demographic balances (Salehyan 2008). Refugee populations are often placed in overcrowded and under resourced camps, often leading to public health issues which can impact the surrounding area. Dealing with these situations requires resources which may have been earmarked for other uses, potentially creating friction with local communities (Collier et al 2003; Rowland and Nosten 2001; Salehyan 2008; Toole and Waldman 1997). Furthermore, once refugees arrive, they have the propensity to end up competing with the local population for jobs and resources (Martin 2005; Salehyan 2008). International foreign aid given to states to help them with the costs of hosting refugees often does not offset the actual short-term costs (Salehyan 2008).

In addition to the fact that hosting refugees is often costly, numerous studies have shown a link between refugees and violence. Refugee populations have been linked to increasing possibilities of both international and civil conflict (Lebson 2013; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Other studies have explored the factors that could lead to militarization by the refugees themselves (Lebson 2013). As mentioned earlier, refugees can upset delicate demographic balances in their host state which can increase the chances for tension and conflict (Salehyan 2008; Weiner 1992). Finally, refugees have also been linked to increasing levels of domestic and international terrorism (Choi and Salehyan 2013).

Structure of the Dissertation

The first chapter provides a brief overview of the existing scholarship relating refugees in international relations and how there is a lacuna in the scholarship relating to the decision of states to use repression targeting refugee populations. I then discuss how I plan on addressing this lacuna with my work relating to why and when states use violence targeting refugees. Chapter two revolves around how certain characteristics inherent of the refugee population itself impact the host state's decision to use violence that targets refugees. Notably, I explore the impact that refugees fleeing conflict have on state repression targeting them. I also look at the impact that violent acts committed by, or at the very least can be attributed to, refugee populations can have on the decision by states to target those populations with violence. I find that refugees from conflict states do experience higher levels of targeted violence by their host state. Furthermore, refugee populations that commit violent acts, or can be associated with violent groups, are also more in line to be targeted by increased host state violence.

The third chapter switches the focus from the refugees themselves to the impact that HROs and institutionalized systems and norms within the state can have on the state's decision to use violence targeting refugee populations. I find that HROs and conditions that favor equal opportunity and access for refugees mitigate the aforementioned link between refugees and increased levels of repression. Chapter four then focuses on characteristics of the host state itself and how they impact the decision-making process to target refugee populations with violence. Specifically, I measure the impact that political stability and state capacity have on this process. I find that increased levels of political stability and state capacity can reduce levels of government violence targeting refugees. The final chapter summarizes my findings and discusses potential avenues for future research on this topic.

CHAPTER 2

THE DUALITY OF VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON REFUGEES[2]

[2] Bsisu, N. To be submitted to *Journal of Conflict Resolution*

Abstract

Does associating refugees with conflict or violence lead to increased state repression targeting those refugee populations? Are refugees fleeing conflict zones treated differently than those who flee for other reasons? Do violent acts committed by refugees in turn lead to increased government violence targeting them? Are levels of repression altered if refugee violence directly targets the government as opposed to civilians of the state? Despite the burgeoning growth relating to the scholarship on refugees and the impact they may have on their respective host state, there remains a lacuna in the field relating to the relationship that an association to violence can have on the treatment of refugees by their host state. I examine levels of government violence targeting refugee populations by focusing on refugees fleeing conflict, as well as violence committed by the refugees themselves. In doing so, I argue that refugees fleeing conflict zones will be more likely to be targeted by increased repression. Additionally, when refugees commit acts of terror or commit acts of violence aimed towards the state or its representatives, refugees will be targeted by increased levels of repression. Using a new dataset that captures state repression of refugee populations together with a zero-inflated probit model, I find much support for my hypotheses.

Introduction

The plight of refugees has been around for as long as conflict between organized groups has taken place. However, it has taken the great tragedies of the conflicts of World War I and World War II to bring the international community together to address the displacement of refugees on a global scale. These events brought the international community together, leading to the formalization of international agreements on the status and care of refugee populations.

Beginning with the League of Nations in 1921, the process finally culminated in an international agreement in 1951 when a diplomatic conference in Geneva resulted in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This document provided a legal definition for a refugee and laid out the legal protections and rights to be afforded to them. While the 1951 Convention was largely geared towards refugees of European origin following World War II, the international community expanded these definitions in the 1967 Protocol to cover across the globe.

While the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol following it have made huge strides in addressing the global refugee crisis, the quandary facing refugees and the states hosting them remain ever present. In fact, according to current estimates, there are more displaced persons across the world today than ever before.[3] Despite the seemingly never-ending stream of displacement following conflict and climate-related disasters, the international community seems poised to make renewed efforts to address the situation facing refugees. The UNHCR has championed a Global Compact on Refugees, which has been affirmed by the UN General Assembly in 2018. The four key objectives within the Global Compact on Refugees are as follows: (1) to ease pressures on host states, (2) to enhance refugee self-reliance, (3) expand access to third-country solutions, and finally (4) support conditions in countries of origin to facilitate safe returns for displaced populations.[4] In order to ease pressures on host states and ensure a positive environment that is conducive to fostering a safe harbor for refugee populations, additional work is needed to discover what goes into the decision making process of states that chose to use repression targeting refugees.

We know that one of the primary drivers of forced migration and ensuring creation of refugee populations is conflict (Betts and Loescher 2011). In fact, over half of all refugees in the

[3] UNHCR Figures at a Glance: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [accessed Jan. 17, 2020]
[4] https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html [accessed Jan. 17, 2020]

care of the UNHCR today come from three states: Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan.[5] Each of these states is currently experiencing some level of conflict. While the link between conflict and the creation of refugee populations is quite clear, less is known relative to the impact that fleeing from conflict has on the treatment of refugees once they reach their host state. In essence, what has yet to be determined is the role that conflict has in the treatment of refugees once they arrive at their host state.

This chapter will examine the role that conflict plays in the reception and treatment of refugees by their host state. In doing so I focus on several key aspects of the proposed link between conflict and the treatment of refugees. These include: (1) refugees fleeing from conflict zones, (2) instances of refugee violence targeting the host state government and its agents, (3) acts of terror committed by the refugees within their new host state, (4) acts of refugee violence targeting citizens of their new host state, and finally (5) instances of refugee rioting. I argue that refugees fleeing conflict will be perceived to be more threatening relative to non-conflict refugees and thus will bear increased government violence. Additionally, refugee violence targeting the state or its representatives, as well as acts of terror carried out by refugees will also result in increased levels of government violence targeting the refugees. However, refugee violence targeting civilians or refugee riots, which often are contained to the refugee camps, will not be seen as threatening and will thus result in lower levels of government violence. To sum, an association with violence will negatively impact the treatment of refugees once they arrive at a host state. Once, refugees are present within a state, certain acts of violence will be seen as more threatening – those that directly challenge the state itself, and thus they will result in increased government violence. Other forms of violence, those that impact the refugees themselves or civilians of the state, will not result in increased government violence.

[5] UNHCR Figures at a Glance: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [accessed Jan. 17, 2020]

The remainder of this chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the relevant literature relating to state repression, conflict and refugees, and finally the treatment of refugees. This will be followed by my theoretical arguments relating to the impact that conflict and certain forms of violence have on levels of state violence targeting refugee populations. From there I discuss how I set up my empirical analysis, including the operationalization of key variables and type of statistical model used to evaluate my theoretical claims. I conclude with a discussion of my results, including discussion on how my results fit into the literature, as well as recommendations for potential future research.

Literature Review

As this study seeks to explain the role that conflict and violence play in the treatment of refugees by their respective host state, it makes sense to revisit the literature pertaining to state repression, links between refugees and conflict, and finally the treatment of refugees by their respective host state. All states have some measure of control over their citizens. Each government or ruling entity has different methods of obtaining and maintaining control. State repression is often considered to be one those tools available to most regimes (Poe 2004). There is an abundant amount of research that explores why and when states decide to use repression. One consensus that seems to have emerged is that states tend to use repression when they feel threatened (Poe 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). Essentially, those in power wish to remain so (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005a), and any challenge to that position may result in state sanctioned repression. Furthermore, state repression is more likely if the group or individuals challenging the state adopt violent tactics (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This has often been dubbed the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). In simplistic terms, states have multiple tools of

control at their disposal. Repression is one of those tools and states are most likely to use repression anytime they perceive a threat to their hold on power, especially when that threat itself is violent.

The notion that conflict generates refugees is widely adopted in the academic and policy communities. The fact that over half of the refugees under the care of the UNHCR originated from three countries (Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan) that have recently experienced conflict illustrates this point well.[6] Further research into the link between refugees and conflict has tended to focus on the impact that admitting refugees can lead to increasing levels of conflict in the host state. Multiple studies have found that hosting refugees can lead to increased chances of both domestic and international conflict (Lebson 2013; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Lebson (2013) focuses on refugee militarization and how that impacts the host state with respect to stability and conflict. Besides increased militarization, refugees have been shown to upset delicate ethnic or religious balances within the state, which in turn can lead to increased levels of tension and ultimately conflict within the state (Salehyan 2008; Weiner 1992). Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugee movements are one mechanism by which conflict spreads across regions. Finally, Salehyan (2008) shows that mass refugee flows can act as a source of international conflict and illustrates how they result in increased militarized interstate disputes. Beyond civil and international conflict, Choi and Salehyan (2013) have shown that a link exists between refugees and increasing levels of domestic and international terrorism.

While there exists a hefty amount of research examining the link between refugees and conflict, there remains limited scholarly work that focuses on the treatment of refugees in their host state on a global scale. The work that has been done examining the treatment of refugees has

[6] UNHCR Figures at a Glance: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [accessed Jan. 17, 2020]

focused on human rights scores within the host state more generally as in the case of Wright and Moorthy (2018), or on levels of one-sided violence (Fisk 2016). Overall, these studies found that as the number of refugees within a state increases, so too does the amount of repression and one-sided violence (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Wright and Moorthy (2018) argue that the link between refugees and repression plays a role in the development of armed conflict. Through their analysis they find that an increase in the number of refugees increases the amount of state repression, however, this relationship is conditional on the host state's economic capacity (Wright and Moorthy 2018). Fisk (2016) examines refugee-hosting areas in Africa in order to determine if refugee populations threaten the security of host states. She finds that hosting refugees is a significant predictor of one-sided violence, and this is especially true if the refugee population in the area is self-settled (Fisk 2016).

Connections and exposure to violence can also impact attitudes towards hosting refugees. For example, Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu (2019) find that historical exposure to violence and displacement does not impact an individual's attitude with regards to hosting refugees. In essence, personal or familial experience with violence and displacement does not make one more likely to support hosting refugee populations. They did find, however, that interactions with and exposure to refugee populations does lead to a willingness to host and employ refugees (Ghosn, Braithwaite, and Chu 2019). This goodwill, however, can be negated by acts of violence by groups that can be linked to refugee populations in the host state. Braithwaite et al. (2018) find that recent exposure to violent acts committed by Syrian militants does increase the perceived risk of hosting Syrian refugees.

Despite all the attention relating to refugees and conflict, there is a dearth of academic research that has explored whether an association with violence illustrated by a refugee

originating from a conflict zone results in additional levels of repression targeting the refugee in their new host state. Moreover, we lack any systemic study relating to how instances of refugee violence targeting the state or its agents as well as how acts of terror by refugees ultimately impact levels of government violence targeting refugees. Furthermore, the scholarly community has yet to produce a comprehensive analysis of how refugee clashes with civilians of their new host state, as well as refugee riots, ultimately impact government violence targeting refugee populations. I intend to develop a theoretical model which will illustrates the systemic link between violence and the treatment of refugees at the hands of their respective host state.

Theory

The decision to use repression, regardless of the target, is a conscious decision of a government entity or one of its representatives. In order to discover why and when governments or leaders decide to repress, in addition to who they target, it is useful to begin with the assumption that a government's primary preference is survival. That is, it will take whatever action necessary to ensure that it remains in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005a). A state often has multiple options available to it in order to achieve its goals. These options are often variations of accommodation, co-optation, or repression. Most and Starr (2015) would describe this as the "choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral option from a range of alternatives." The key here is to identify when a state decides that repression is the best or lowest cost option for achieving their objectives. In order to accomplish this task, it is useful to think back to Weber's (1965) definition of a state that describes it as a community that has a legitimate monopoly on the use of force within a set territory. At its most basic level, a state and the government in charge of the state whose primary desire is to remain in power, must at the very least maintain the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their

territory. Any challenges to this monopoly can be seen as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state itself. When a population, especially one as vulnerable as refugees, poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state through their connection to conflict or through direct acts of violence, the state can view this as a direct challenge to their own legitimacy and respond with violence of their own doing. Throughout this section, I will illustrate how the presence of conflict and acts of violence can alter the perception of threat posed by refugee populations. When this occurs, the state must decide which strategy available to them is the lowest cost option for ensuring their legitimacy and hold on power remains. In doing so, I will show the causal process of action and reaction by the refugees and state and ultimately illustrate which actions lead to government sanctioned repression targeting refugee populations.

As described earlier, the link between refugee populations and increased probability of conflict, militancy, and terrorism has been well established (Choi and Salehyan 2013; Fisk 2016; Lebson 2013; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gledistch 2006). As discussed in Lebson (2013), refugees who have been forced to flee conflict in their home state are more prone to militarize for two reasons. First, they have the prerequisite political motivation which makes militarization easier, and second, there will be an increased amount of "militancy entrepreneurs" who serve to militarize forcibly displaced refugee populations (Lebson 2013). With this in mind, it would be easy to make the assumption that refugees fleeing conflict may be viewed differently, in terms of their perceived risk to the host state, relative to non-conflict refugees.

I believe that conflict refugees will thus be seen as an increased threat of militancy, which in turn may lead to increased international and civil conflict, in addition to the potential for increased acts of terror originating from the host state. There are a number of factors why this perception would exist. First, refugees fleeing conflict may have already been militarized,

personally been involved in the fighting, or provided support to parties involved in the conflict. The potential that the incoming conflict refugees may have a demonstrated capacity for violence will almost assuredly increase the threat perception of the host state. Non-conflict refugees will not have demonstrated this capacity and thus will generate less of a threat. Furthermore, refugees fleeing violence can be expected to mandate a longer residency in a host state relative to non-conflict refugees. Depending on the nature of the violence (for example in the case of ethnic cleansing) or the outcome of the conflict, certain conflict refugees may never have the option to return to their home state. The increased time and resource commitment required of conflict refugees may make them more vulnerable to increased state repression. Refugees are also, by their very nature, more vulnerable to state repression due to their lack of electoral power (Savun and Gineste 2019). If their arrival can be seen as a security threat, they can become strategically attractive targets of repression (Savun and Gineste 2019). The security threat itself may not even need to be from the refugee population itself. McAlexander (2020) found that an increase in migration is positively correlated to an increase in domestic right-wing terrorism. Any terrorist attack, even those that occur in neighboring states, are more likely to result in violence targeting refugee populations (Jäckle and König 2018).

As noted earlier, states will have multiple options to ensure their legitimacy and control and they will seek the lowest cost option of maintaining that grip on power in the face of adversity. If conflict refugees constitute a greater cost relative to non-conflict refugees, the increase in cost may potentially justify the cost of using repression. In essence, the combination of the increased threat to state security posed by conflict refugees and the potential for a longer time horizon resulting in increased costs to the state, the host state may decide that the relative

cost of repressing this refugee population may in fact be less than those of not repressing them. This leads to my first testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Conflict refugees will be subject to higher levels of government violence relative to non-conflict refugees.*

While the previous hypothesis focused on acts prior to the arrival of the refugees and how that may ultimately impact levels of repression targeting them, I now turn my focus to acts of violence committed while the refugees are in their new host state. These acts, specifically looking at acts of refugee violence targeting the state or its agents, as well as acts of refugee terror, can be seen as directly challenging the state's legitimacy and its monopoly on the use of force. Not only that but any act of violence targeting the state will almost invariably result in a violent response from the state as described in the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007).

Acts of violence committed by refugees targeting the state or its agents, as well as acts of terror carried out by refugees undoubtedly raise the apparent threat level of hosting said refugee population. Evidence suggests that exposure to violence committed by refugees, or groups that can be linked to them, increases the perceived risk associated with hosting those refugees (Braithwaite et al. 2018). Similar to how violent acts directed towards the state and its agents will likely result in a violent response from the state, so too will any actions that increased the threat posed by a specific group. In the case of refugees, the increased threat of hosting a violent population will positively contribute to the willingness of the state to engage in repression as well as giving it justification for its own use of violence. As seen in Jäckle and König (2018), negative or anti-immigrant statements by elected officials relating to acts of terror by refugees, or

any group that can be publicly linked to them, is strongly linked to an increase in violence against refugees. This leads to my second and third testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: *Refugees that engage in violence that targets the state or its agents will be subject to increased levels of state repression.*

Hypothesis 3: *Refugees that engage in acts of terror will be subject to increased levels of state repression.*

Whereas the previous hypotheses looked at acts of violence committed by refugees that actively targeted the state, I do think it is important to also examine other types of violence committed by refugees and whether they have the same impact on triggering retribution in the form of government violence. For example, do acts of violence between refugee populations and civilians constitute a challenge to the state's legitimacy on the use of force? Would they be conceived of threatening to the regime's grip on power? I argue that violence between refugees and civilians will not be viewed in the same light as refugee violence targeting the state or its agents for a couple of reasons. First, refugee and civilian violence fails to meet the threshold of challenging the state's legitimacy or its hold on power. Second, it fails to trigger the "law of coercive responsiveness" since it does not entail a direct attack on the state. In addition to this, I argue that refugee riots, which often are limited to refugee camps themselves, will fail to elicit a repressive response from the state. These riots often occur due to ethnic or religious tensions within the camp or in response to overcrowding and poor living conditions.[7] Similar to the logic above regarding acts of violence between civilians and refugees, refugee riots do not directly target or challenge the state and thus will not prompt a repressive response from the state. For these reasons, I argue that acts of violence between refugees and civilians, in addition to refugee

[7] For examples, see: Faiola and Mekhennet 2015; Kitsantonis 2019

riots, will not incur an increase in government repression. This leads to my fourth and fifth testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4: *Acts of violence between refugees and civilians will not result in increased levels of state repression targeting refugee populations.*

Hypothesis 5: *Acts of refugee rioting will not result in increased levels of state repression targeting refugee populations.*

Research Design

In summary, I focus on the duality of violence as it relates to refugees and their treatment in their host state. In doing so, I explore whether refugees fleeing conflict will be seen as more threatening relative to non-conflict refugees, and thus face increased levels of targeted state repression. Furthermore, I look at types of violence enacted by the refugees themselves and how this impacts state violence targeting them in response. I argue that acts of violence tied to refugees that either directly target the state or its agents will result in a violence response from the state as described in the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). Additionally, acts of terror that can be tied to refugee populations will also result in a violent response from the state as acts of terror challenge the state and its legitimacy. Not all acts of violence are viewed the same, however. Acts of violence that do not meet these criteria, such as refugee on civilian violence or refugee rioting that is contained to refugee camps, will not incur the same violent response from the state.

Sample and Dependent Variable

I test my hypotheses using a time-series cross national dataset set at the country-year unit of analysis. My sample ranges from 1996-2015 based on data availability for key variables of interest. My dependent variable is a measure of government violence targeting refugee

populations from the POSVAR dataset (Gineste and Savun 2019). They define government violence against refugees as, "the intentional use of physical force against refugees by military personnel, police, other security officers, and any other individuals directly employed by the host government" (Gineste and Savun 2019). This variable is set as an ordinal scale and ranges from zero to three, with zero indicating no government violence targeting refugee populations and a three designating systematic violence (Gineste and Savun 2019). This is the preferred indicator of government violence as it directly captures the treatment of refugees, whereas other more commonly used measures only designate levels of repression facing the entire population.

Given that my dependent variable is heavily biased towards zero as indicated in Table 1, I have chosen to use a zero-inflated ordered probit model with robust standard errors. This allows me to account for the large number of zeros in the dependent variable by examining which cases are zero because repression was never a realistic option for the state, versus those cases where the measure is zero because the state actively chose a different strategy.[89]

Table 1: Dependent Variable – Government Violence Against Refugees

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	3,475	90.94	90.94
1	247	6.46	97.41
2	93	2.43	99.84
3	6	0.16	100.00
Total	3,821	100.00	

[8] More information on this model can be found here: https://www.stata.com/manuals/rzioprobit.pdf (accessed March 22, 2019).
[9] See Bagozzi et al. (2015) for an example of a zero-inflated ordered probit used in conflict research.

Independent Variables

My first explanatory variable is captures whether the refugee population in a host state originated due to a conflict. This data was compiled from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which is a joint project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016; Teorell et al. 2017). There are four separate measures of conflict in this dataset, which include extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and internationalized internal armed conflict. I collapsed these measures and created a single dichotomous conflict measure that indicated if the state of origin for a refugee population was incurring a current conflict at the time of their departure. The refugee data came from the UNHCR Population Statistics time-series data (UNHCR 2019). For each state in any given year, I identified the state of origin for the largest group of refugees currently being hosted in that state.

Data for my second explanatory variable comes from the POSVAR dataset (Gineste and Savun 2019). It captures acts of refugee violence against the government. It specifically measures, "the intentional use of physical force against military personnel, police, other security officers, and any other individuals directly employed by the host government by refugees" (Gineste and Savun 2019). Similarly, data for my third explanatory variable also comes from the POSVAR dataset. It captures threatened or actual acts of refugee terror. The primary source for this data in the POSVAR dataset originates from the Global Terrorism Database (GTB), which is part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism database. They define terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation (Miller, LaFree, and Dugan 2018). To create the POSVAR variable, they isolated

cases where the perpetrator was considered a refugee. Data for my fourth explanatory variable also comes from the POSVAR dataset. The refugee violence against civilians variable measures acts where intentional force was used by refugees against civilians of the host state. Finally, the fifth explanatory variable measured instances of refugee rioting. This is a dichotomous variable that captures if refugees are involved in rioting which can include instances of both physical and property damage (Gineste and Savun 2019). Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables can be seen below in Table 2.

Table 2: Chapter 2 Descriptive Statistics for DV and IVs

	Violence Against Refugees	Conflict	Ref. Against Gov.	Ref. Terror	Ref. Against Civ.	Ref. Riot
Mean	0.12	0.55	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
SD	0.40	0.50	0.09	0.30	0.14	0.15
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0
Max	3	1	2	17	3	1
N	3821	2580	3821	3821	3821	3821

Control Variables

Looking through the extant literature, there are a number of variables which need to be controlled for in the host state in order to isolate the effect of my explanatory variables on my dependent variable. I begin with a measure of all refugees present within a state as several studies have shown that repression is positively correlated with the number of refugees (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). The number of refugees within a state was calculated from the UNHCR Population Statistics time-series dataset (2019). Increased population size and decreased economic performance has also been linked to increased repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Data on population numbers is gathered from the Gleditsch data set, it captures the size of the population in 1000's (2002). Similarly, I used Gleditsch's data

on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measured in 2005 US Dollars (2002). I also include a measure of a state's human rights as one could see a correlation between a state's willingness to repress their own population with a willingness to repress a refugee population that they are hosting. I measure a state's respect for physical integrity rights from the CIRI dataset (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The CIRI physical integrity rights scores are an additive index that combines counts of disappearances, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, and torture (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Taking in refugees can be costly on the state, and states that are better equipped economically have been demonstrated to rely on less repression as seen in Wright and Moorthy (2018). In addition to a state's GDP, I also include a measure to foreign aid. This measure is created by combining all officially directed aid provided to the host state in any given year (AidData 2016). Finally, as democracies have been shown to repress less often relative to non-democracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005b; Hill and Jones 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), it seems natural to include a measure of regime type. I use Freedom House's Polity scores to measure regime type, specifically the 0-10 level of democracy scale based on the average scores of the Freedom House and Polity measures (Freedom House 2016; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2014). On this scale, a higher number indicates a greater degree of democratization. In my analysis, I use logged versions of refugee count, population count, GDP, and total aid. Descriptive statistics for my control variables can be seen in Table 3 on the following page. Additionally, a correlation matrix for the dependent variable, government violence targeting refugees, and the CIRI physical integrity rights measure is shown on Table 4 on the following page.

Table 3: Chapter 2 Descriptive Statistics for Controls

	Refugees	Population	GDP	Physical Integrity Rights	Total Aid	Polity
Mean	9.20	8.50	8.06	4.99	19.48	6.56
SD	3.29	2.21	1.62	2.27	2.19	3.15
Min	0	2.20	4.23	0	7.32	0
Max	15.89	14.10	11.97	8	24.87	10
N	3118	3034	3607	2797	2915	3798

Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Government Violence Against Refugees and CIRI Physical Integrity Rights

	Physical Integrity Rights	Violence Against Refugees
Physical Integrity Rights	1.00	
Violence Against Refugees	-0.23	1.00

Model

As discussed earlier, zero-inflated ordered probit models are most useful when the dependent variable is an ordered response with the data containing a high fraction of observations in the lowest category. When the model has a high concentration of zeros, it is commonly considered to be zero-inflated. As opposed to traditional ordered probit models, that treat all zero-valued outcomes as a homogenous group, zero-inflated ordered probit models assume that the zero observations could be part of two separate but unobservable groups. The first group, commonly called the nonparticipation group, is where no matter what else happens the observed outcome will always be zero. The second group, often called the participation group, is where the current observation is zero, but other factors could have influenced it to be another potential value.

In order to determine which observations fit into these two groups, the zero-inflated ordered probit model includes an "inflate" portion of the equation. This section of the equation is where you specify which variables in the model are the ones that determine which of the zeros are part of the nonparticipation group, and which of those are part of the participation group. In essence, it helps you to discover which observations are zero because they will always be zero, and which observations are zero, but could theoretically have been another value. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the model, I include all my control variables into the inflate portion of my equation. These include a count of refugees, population count, GDP per capita, CIRI physical integrity scores, total foreign aid, and polity scores.

Results

When does violence affect the treatment of refugees by their host state? Tables 5 and 6 show the results of my analyses. Overall, I find that conflict refugees are not met with increased host state violence, though I believe that this finding may be impacted by some preemptive screening by host states. I do find that instances where refugee acts of violence either directly target the state or its representatives or challenge the states legitimacy (as seen in hypotheses 2 and 3), result in increased host state violence targeting refugees. These results are depicted in Table 5. However, acts of refugee violence that target civilians and refugee rioting do not trigger the same response from the state as they do not target the state directly or challenge its legitimacy and thus do not result in increased host state violence targeting refugees. These results can be seen in Table 6.

Table 5: Results for H1, H2, and H3

DV: Violence Against Refugees	H1	H2	H3
Conflict	0.164		
	(0.107)		
Ref. Against Gov.		1.170**	
		(0.401)	
Ref. Terror			0.172***
			(0.0498)
Refugees	0.241***	-0.120	-0.0931
	(0.0339)	(0.0649)	(0.100)
Population	-0.0971	0.0345	-0.00494
	(0.0568)	(0.262)	(0.308)
GDP	0.110	-0.243*	-0.267*
	(0.0602)	(0.0985)	(0.121)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.0746	0.0141	0.0292
	(0.0389)	(0.106)	(0.147)
Total Aid	0.0644	0.122	0.136
	(0.0500)	(0.129)	(0.154)
Polity	0.00372	-0.0345	-0.0229
	(0.0225)	(0.0717)	(0.0987)
Inflate			
Conflict	-0.428		
	(0.566)		
Ref. Against Gov.		0.261	
		(0.499)	
Ref. Terror			0.815***
			(0.203)
Refugees	-0.824***	0.375*	0.347*
	(0.240)	(0.165)	(0.163)
GDP	-1.089***	0.192	0.176
	(0.277)	(0.227)	(0.257)
Population	0.673**	-0.0401	0.0347
	(0.261)	(0.362)	(0.388)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.0423	-0.137	-0.126
	(0.211)	(0.0866)	(0.115)
Total Aid	-0.130	-0.0854	-0.112
	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.175)
Polity	-0.0999	0.0469	0.0341
	(0.0978)	(0.0758)	(0.0958)
Constant	15.94**	-3.288	-3.100
	(4.866)	(3.674)	(4.344)
N	1705	1938	1938

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As you can see in the first column of Table 5, the relationship between conflict refugees and government violence targeting refugees is not statistically significant. This tells us that conflict refugees, that are admitted into the country, do not in fact face additional targeted state repression. I believe that rather than signaling that conflict refugees are less threatening to the state relative to non-conflict refugees, it illustrates that states are aware of the potential risks involved with allowing refugees that have been exposed to or participated in conflict. These states can then take measures to disallow high risk individuals or groups to enter the state, or if they are allowed to enter, they can be placed under increased scrutiny and/or held at the border, preventing their integration and interaction with the rest of the population.

The second column of Table 5 shows the results relating to the acts of refugee violence targeting the state or its representatives with government violence targeting refugee populations. As you can see, the relationship between these two variables is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Essentially, when refugees resort to violent acts directed towards the state, they are in turn met with state violence. This supports my argument that violence will be met with violence as deemed in the "law of coercive responsiveness." This is especially true when that violence specifically targets the state or its representatives. Similarly, the results in the third column, which shows the relationship between acts of refugee terror and state violence targeting refugees shows a similar relationship. The relationship between refugee terror and state violence targeting refugees is both statistically significant and in the expected direction. Acts of terror committed by refugees serve to challenge a state's legitimacy and its sole authority to use force. This goes along with my argument regarding when acts of violence committed by refugees will be met in kind by targeted state violence.

Table 6: Results for H4 and H5

DV: Violence Against Refugees	H4	H5
Ref. Against Civ.	0.423	
	(0.342)	
Ref. Riot		0.548
		(0.393)
Refugees	-0.0849	-0.112
	(0.0976)	(0.0941)
Population	-0.0708	-0.0407
	(0.256)	(0.299)
GDP	-0.221	-0.223
	(0.134)	(0.132)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.0270	0.00474
	(0.127)	(0.139)
Total Aid	0.174	0.146
	(0.160)	(0.181)
Polity	-0.0150	-0.0167
	(0.0811)	(0.0880)
Inflate		
Ref. Against Civ.	0.983*	
	(0.412)	
Ref. Riot		0.575
		(0.525)
Refugees	0.311*	0.330
	(0.149)	(0.197)
GDP	0.143	0.164
	(0.235)	(0.285)
Population	0.105	0.0396
	(0.284)	(0.344)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.126	-0.128
	(0.0982)	(0.0968)
Total Aid	-0.147	-0.107
	(0.136)	(0.161)
Polity	0.0236	0.0257
	(0.0774)	(0.0853)
Constant	-2.473	-2.980
	(3.586)	(4.438)
N	1938	1938

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The null results seen in Table 6 also support my argument. Unlike the previous acts of violence, clashes between refugees and civilians as well as cases of refugee rioting, will not serve to threaten the state. Since these acts of violence do not directly target the state or challenge its legitimacy, they will fail to elicit a violent response from the state. The results seen in Table 6 illustrate that there is no discernable statistically significant relationship between refugee on civilian violence or refugee riots, and state violence that targets refugees.

As with all discrete model choices, it is often more useful to look at marginal effects for interpretation purposes. Figure 1 below illustrates the marginal effects of refugee violence targeting the state and acts of terror committed by refugee populations.



Figure 1: Marginal Effects for Hypotheses 2 and 3

The top left quadrant of Figure 1 illustrated the marginal effect of refugee violence targeting refugees on the probability that the state will not target the refugees with violence. The top right quadrant shows the marginal effect of refugee violence targeting refugees on different levels of state sanctioned violence targeting refugee populations. As expected, increased levels of refugee violence targeting the state, or its agents decrease the likelihood that the state and its agents will refrain from using violence. Additionally, increasing levels of refugee violence targeting the state result in greater levels of state violence targeting refugees across all three metrics.

The bottom half of Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of acts of terror committed by refugee populations on the probability that the state will use violence to target the refugees in response. Beginning with the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1, we can see that increasing levels of refugee acts of terror decrease the probability that the state will refrain from using violence. Furthermore, increasing levels of refugee terror lead to increased probability that the state will engage in systemic violence. There seems to be an inverted-u relationship between acts of terror committed by refugees and isolated or prevalent levels of state violence targeting refugees.

To be thorough, I have also run my analysis using limited inflate zero inflated ordered probit models. As mentioned earlier, the inflate portion of the model is supposed to help the statistical model determine which zeroes are part of the nonparticipation group and which are part of the participation group. The nonparticipation group are those that will always be zero, whereas the participation group are those that are currently zero but could have been any of the possible alternatives. In my limited inflate models, as seen in Table 7, I rerun my five models, but this time I only include the number of refugees and a state's physical integrity rights scores

in the inflate portion of the model. As you can see, the results are largely similar. The only primary different relates to hypothesis 2, which looks at refugee violence targeting the state or its representatives. It just barely misses the standard test of significance (a p-value of less than 0.05) with a p-value of 0.052.

Table 7: Chapter 2 Results for Limited Inflate Models

DV: Violence Against Refugees	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5
Conflict	0.140				
	(0.331)				
Ref. Against Gov.		0.896			
		(0.462)			
Ref. Terror			0.143***		
			(0.0363)		
Ref. Against Civ.				0.356	
				(0.359)	
Ref. Riot					0.318
					(0.374)
Refugees	-0.122	-0.128*	-0.109	-0.112	-0.113
	(0.0671)	(0.0630)	(0.0634)	(0.0646)	(0.0744)
Population	-0.0682	-0.0526	-0.0300	-0.0480	-0.0818
	(0.0873)	(0.0836)	(0.0780)	(0.0842)	(0.109)
GDP	-0.123	-0.167*	-0.190**	-0.152*	-0.138
	(0.0850)	(0.0717)	(0.0694)	(0.0723)	(0.0850)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.0325	0.0331	0.0481	0.0374	0.0301
	(0.0764)	(0.0791)	(0.0858)	(0.0822)	(0.0806)
Total Aid	0.135	0.147*	0.142*	0.159*	0.167
	(0.0821)	(0.0701)	(0.0696)	(0.0750)	(0.0968)
Polity	-0.0245	-0.00994	-0.00945	-0.00911	-0.00853
	(0.0486)	(0.0403)	(0.0411)	(0.0408)	(0.0426)
Inflate					
Conflict	0.140				
	(0.183)				
Ref. Against Gov.		0.733			
		(0.375)			
Ref. Terror			0.501		
			(0.514)		
Ref. Against Civ.				0.881**	
				(0.326)	
Ref. Riot					0.770**
					(0.289)
Refugees	0.239***	0.253***	0.259***	0.246***	0.226***
	(0.0533)	(0.0477)	(0.0527)	(0.0498)	(0.0560)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.0868*	-0.0958*	-0.0946*	-0.0973*	-0.101**
	(0.0403)	(0.0400)	(0.0432)	(0.0398)	(0.0361)
Constant	-3.082***	-3.126***	-3.172***	-3.064***	-2.909***
	(0.439)	(0.480)	(0.541)	(0.493)	(0.495)
N	1705	1938	1938	1938	1938

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

When do acts of violence linked to refugee populations result in state violence targeting refugees? In this chapter, I find that when it comes to refugee populations, not all violence elicits the same response from the state. Conflict refugees do not seem to suffer from increased levels of state violence, though I suspect this may be a result of pre-emptive screening by the host state. When it comes to violence directly associated with refugee populations, I find that when refugees violence targets the state or is considered an act of terror, refugee populations face additional levels of state violence. This does not hold true for acts of violence targeting civilians or acts of rioting. I argue that this distinction is tied to the fact that the first two types of violence either challenge the state's legitimacy and its monopoly on the use of force. Furthermore, being that these acts target the state directly, they will almost always result in a violent response. Clashes between refugees and civilians and refugee rioting, that is most often constrained to refugee camps, does not prompt a violent response from the state due to the fact that these acts do not directly challenge the state or its legitimacy.

As conflicts across the globe continue seemingly unabated, combined with the increased potential for climate change to generate additional forced migrations, the plight of refugees will remain a pressing issue throughout the globe. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol following it were a huge step in the right direction as it relates to protections afforded to refugee populations. Despite this, refugees continue to face innumerable challenges in a continuously evolving international system. The Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed in 2018 by the UN General Assembly, was a much-needed boost to assist with updated and comprehensive strategies relating to the treatment of refugees. The ensuing Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework illustrates a clear global commitment to refugee populations and

the states who host them. Not only that, but the global community has agreed to organize and participate in a Global Refugee Forum, which is to take place every four years to ensure that refugees and host states continue to receive the support they need for the betterment of both parties.

My results suggest many potential avenues for future research. I believe that increased attention needs to be paid to the treatment of different types of refugees. While the results do not show a difference in treatment for conflict and non-conflict refugees, I wonder if there are cases of under or altogether unreported preemptive repression taking place that fails to show up in the data. Furthermore, I think there is potential room for growth as it relates to whether host states have any avenues for conflict management available to refugee populations, such as mediation, that would possibly prevent situations from devolving into a cycle of violence between the refugees and the state. I also think that the role of NGOs, and specifically human rights based NGOs, needs to be explored in the role that they can play to assist with refugee integration and a reduction in conflictual relations between refugees and the host state. Can a robust civil society assist with this as well? Finally, are there certain state characteristics that can influence the relationship between refugees and violence? We know that economic capacity can mitigate the relationship between repression and refugees (Wright and Moorthy 2018), but how about political factors such as political stability or even the ideological leanings of the ruling party? In essence, are some states better equipped to deal with an influx of refugees, and if so why? There remains a considerable amount that we as a research community do not know about how to best ensure a smooth and equitable process of accepting and taking care of refugee populations, but I hope that this work contributes to the overall puzzle.

CHAPTER 3

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES[10]

[10] Bsisu, N. To be submitted to *Journal of Global Security Studies*

Abstract

What determines levels of repression targeting refugee populations? Do states hosting refugees specifically target these populations with increased repression? Why and when does this occur? There are vast discrepancies in the ways in which host states respond to refugees; however, as the numbers of refugees worldwide continually increases so does the amount of repression targeting them. Focusing on government violence targeting refugee populations, I explore the ability of human rights organizations and institutionalized systems and norms within the state to condition the relationship between refugees and government violence. In doing so, I argue that this repressive relationship can be mitigated through proper accommodation and integration of the refugee populations in addition to institutionalized equal opportunities for education and employment. Using a new dataset that captures state violence targeting refugee populations together with a zero-inflated ordered probit model, I find much support for my hypotheses.

Introduction

The plight of refugees, beginning with the issues that lead to their forced migration, their perilous journey in search of a safe harbor, and their impact they have on their host state and vice versa, has been covered in media ad nauseum. NGOs and International Organizations such as the UNHCR, Amnesty International, and the International Rescue Committee also contribute to the growing awareness surrounding refugees and the struggles they face. The academic community has also shown itself attuned to research questions relating to refugees as seen by a recent special issue in the *Journal of Peace Research*. This recent attention has started to pay dividends as it relates to the well-being of refugee populations as the UN has come together to affirm the Global Compact on Refugees discussed earlier which seeks to ease pressure on host states while

boosting the care of refugees while also working to assist with their ability to return home when feasible. These efforts have also resulted in a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework which lays out concrete measures for accepting and incorporating refugee populations while also stressing how non-host states can assist with this process. Despite all these efforts, however, the predicaments facing refugee populations remain dire.

Scholarship on refugees has focused on multiple issues, including the initial causes of refugees, the treatment of refugees in the international system, the relationship between refugee flows and conflict, as well as solutions to the global epidemic of forced migrations. There are vast discrepancies in the ways in which host states respond to refugees; however, recent research has revealed a growing consensus that host state repression increases as the number of refugees within a host state increases (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Given that there is a direct and positive relationship between increased refugees and repression, my aim is to discover the specific conditions which determine why host states utilize repression when hosting refugees. I argue that the use of repression targeting refugees can be mitigated through proper integration of the refugee populations, a robust civil society sector, and institutionalized equal access to pursue education and employment opportunities. This question is important and timely, since ascertaining the root causes behind the relationship between repression and hosting refugees can help governments, as well as international and domestic organizations, to combat repressive behavior and potentially alleviate the suffering of refugees and host populations across the world. It should also be of interest to human rights scholars, who to date have largely focused on state repression targeting their own citizens rather than refuge populations.

The remainder of the paper will begin with a brief discussion of the relevant literature relating to refugees and repression, followed by my theoretical arguments and how they relate to

levels of repression and refugee populations. Following that, I discuss how I set up my empirical analysis, including the operationalization of key variables, and discussion of the empirical tests themselves. I conclude with a discussion of the results, including discussion on how my results fit into the literature, as well as recommendations for potential future research.

Literature Review

State repression against its own domestic population is often considered to be a tool of control available to most regimes (Poe 2004). Why states decide to use these tactics against their own population has rightfully garnered a lot of attention within the research and policy communities. States are theorized to use repression for a multitude of reasons, with the most basic being that states repress when they feel threatened (Poe 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). When a regime feels that the population is actively posing a threat to the regime itself, they have the ability to forcibly repress that segment of the population, and this is especially true when the internal challengers have adopted violent methods of their own (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This has even been deemed the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). In addition to factors impacting repression due to their impact on the threat perception of the regime, one can also look to factors which impact the regime's perception of their own strength and stability (Poe 2004). Poe (Poe 2004, 17) describes the relationship between perception of threat posed by others relative to a regime's perception of their own strength as the "strength/threat ratio." Beyond looking at factors influencing the "strength/threat ratio," one must also look at the factors that affect the availability of tools or strategic options obtainable by the regime itself. The final set of factors to consider when looking at the decision to use repressive tactics are the ones which impact the regime's willingness to use certain tactics (Poe 2004).

In addition to looking at why states repress their own populations, there has been considerable work on factors and events that reduce state repression. For example, situations where domestic populations have the ability to hold leaders accountable tend to have lower levels of repression. This has led to the belief that democracies are inherently less likely to repress their populations than non-democracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005b; Hill and Jones 2014; Poe and Tate 1994). Similarly, besides forms of governance, others have looked at the ability of a robust civil society and the actions of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), in reducing levels of state repression as they can also hold leadership accountable (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie 2014). This reduction in human rights violations can incur via numerous methods, with one of the most common being the "naming and shaming" mechanism through the actions of NGOs (Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012).

In addition to that, refugee populations have been linked with increasing levels of conflict, both domestic and international (Lebson 2013; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Notably, refugee population movements have been linked with increased chances of international conflict (Salehyan 2008). Furthermore, they have been linked with increased chances of civil conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Beyond refugee population movements as a source of conflict diffusion, work has been done looking at the militarization of refugee populations themselves (Lebson 2013). Refugee population movements can also sometimes upset delicate ethnic or religious population balances in the host state, potentially inflating tensions and leading to increased conflict (Salehyan 2008; Weiner 1992). Finally, refugee populations have been linked to increasing levels of both domestic and international terrorism (Choi and Salehyan 2013).

Recent research has also looked at the connections between repression and refugee populations. It has resulted in a growing consensus that host state repression increases as the amount of refugees within a host state increases (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Despite this apparent link, researchers still need to identify specific causal mechanisms linking the presence of refugees and increased host state repression that extend beyond the basic notion of refugee population size, focusing on economic capacity (Wright and Moorthy 2018) and integration within the local community (Fisk 2016).

Theory

The decision to repress refugees necessarily contains both the willingness to carry out this action, as well as the opportunity for that action to occur. Given that the opportunity for repression is always available and that the primary concern of any regime is to maintain its grip on power, the willingness to use repression relies on the belief that a certain refugee population challenges this grip on power. This occurs any time the presence of a refugee population negatively influences the current regime's perception of their own strength or increases the perception of threat facing the regime. In this case the regime will want to take some action. Repression, along with accommodation and co-optation, are often part of the options available to a host state. The remaining section will demonstrate how and why states decide that repression of refugee populations under their care is their best and lowest cost option for remaining in power.

This process can be seen in the unfortunate treatment of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar after enduring decades of violence and systemic repression. Rohingya villages within the Rakhine State in Myanmar have been destroyed to make room for government facilities such as police barracks in acts described as ethnic cleansing by the United Nations (Head 2019). Those that have been able to flee find themselves in squalid conditions in refugee camps across

Bangladesh. Bangladesh, an impoverished state in its own right, has struggled to accommodate the Rohingya refugees and has resorted to various forms of repression in response. “Citing ‘state security’ and ‘public safety,’ the Bangledeshi telecommunications minister ordered a halt this week to mobile phone service in camps crowded with Rohingya Muslims who fled ethnic cleansing in their native Myanmar” (Beech 2019). Beyond shutting down telecommunications, Bangladeshi authorities have increased the military presence around camps and restricted freedom of movement for refugees, leading to clashes between refugees and security forces resulting in multiple refugee deaths (Human Rights Watch 2019b). These actions are not just limited to Bangladeshi authorities acting in response to the arrival of Rohingya refugees, as recently Lebanese armed forces demolished approximately twenty Syrian refugee shelters. “This crackdown on housing code violations should be seen for what it is, which is illegitimate pressure on Syrian refugees to leave Lebanon” (Human Rights Watch 2019a).

Human rights focused INGOs (HROs) can influence the decision a host state makes in deciding whether or not to repress a refugee population. They can positively influence the interaction between refugees and the state in multiple ways. First, they can provide information and resources which can reinforce a state’s position. Second, they can reduce the level of localized conflict or strife between the refugees and the domestic population they come into contact with, ultimately lowering the level of threat posed by the refugees to the state.

The state can use HROs, including the aid and services they provide, as a form of appeasement to refugee and impacted populations. In essence, by granting HROs the ability to work with refugees and the domestic populations most impacted by the presence of refugees, the state can take credit for the services and goods provided by the HROs, often at no or limited costs to themselves. For example, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) is the largest

provider of healthcare to refugees located outside of refugee camps in Jordan.[11] They may even use these goods and services as bargaining chips when working to appease refugee populations. In instances where states resort to repression, it is often because appeasement is not feasible due to material or political constraints. Recently in Jakarta, Indonesia, more than 1,000 asylum seekers and refugees were forced to move out of temporary shelters because city officials said that they could no longer help provide aid for them (Jakarta Post 2019). This left the asylum seekers and refugees stranded with no ability to seek shelter or security. Working through an established NGO sector, the state can expand their opportunities for alternative options to repression. Furthermore, HROs are also valuable to the state relating to their ability to collect information on the refugee population. Information provided by HROs relating to where people are settling and the manner in which they do so, may help decrease a state's belief that a negative security situation is being created on the ground. For instance, an HRO sharing that they have assisted 500 families settle in a specific region and have provided them with shelter and sustenance can help assuage any security concerns a state may harbor towards the refugees.

Beyond looking at how HROs can help strengthen a state's position, we can now look at the ability of HROs to reduce localized conflict and ultimately overall levels of threat perception by the state. Once a refugee population has entered a new state, they inevitably interact with the local population in the area where they are received or settled. Studies have shown that self-settled refugees, those who have integrated themselves within the local population without any government assistance, are linked with greater levels of one-sided state violence relative to those refugees who are settled by the government into camps (Fisk 2016). Essentially refugee accommodation, and the manner that it takes place, impacts levels of violence. With proper HRO

[11] (https://www.rescue.org/country/jordan, accessed Sept. 10, 2019)

assistance in the settlement and integration of refugee populations, there should be lower levels of one-sided violence.

If refugee integration can take place without leading to greater instances of conflict and grievance formation with the local population, levels of violence between and amongst local and refugee populations should decrease. Less conflict and upheaval at the local level, will decrease the need for national governments to intervene with violence and repression ultimately decreasing levels of state repression overall. I argue that HROs can assist with the process of integration, in a manner that limits conflicts between the local and refugee populations. HROs can assist in this integration process via several mechanisms. First, they can provide information to both the local and refugee populations (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This can be done to combat rumors and fear mongering, as well as to illustrate the role that the HROs themselves will be playing in ensuring a smooth and seamless integration. HROs have also been known to provide mediation services, either between refugees and local populations or between differing refugee groups. For example, NGO activity in Slovenia and Croatia that actively worked towards facilitating positive interactions between locals and Roma populations was shown to reduce discrimination targeting the Roma (Bracic 2016). HROs can also help this process by providing tangible resources including financial aid, medical services, housing, jobs, and education training. Ensuring that refugees can work towards earning a living wage and become self-sustainable helps reduce pressure on the local community, the HROs working with them as well as the state hosting them. This can be done by providing short term cash assistance, which in of itself can help in the long run as the additional cash obviates the need for parents to pull their children out of school so that they can work. This type of preemptive action prevents the long-term dependency of refugee populations.

Additionally, HROs can provide advocacy support to the refugee populations by working on their behalf to guarantee state and local protection and services for the refugees in the form of leverage politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998). NGOs, such as the UNHCR and the IRC actively "work with local and national governments as well as non-state actors to make sure that policies and practices serve all people equally."[12] "Naming and shaming" is one common tool used by HROs as a form of leverage politics which has been shown to have a positive impact (Franklin 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012). Finally, HROs can also assist with the integration process by holding actors accountable to local and international actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Less conflict and friction at the local level decreases the threat perception of incorporating a new refugee population ultimately decreasing the willingness for the use of state repression.

Ultimately, the presence of HROs can impact the cost/benefit of different strategies, including repression, impacting the state's choice among alternatives in their menu of options. HROs can use their international networks to report on the activities of the state placing additional costs on the use of repression. This would increase the costs associated with repression and decrease the chances that it is seen as a viable tactic. This leads to my first testable hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The more HROs in a given state assisting refugee settlement and integration, the lower overall levels of government violence targeting refugees will be.*

Relatedly, equal opportunities for individuals, including refugees, to pursue an education and employment can perform similar functions. Whereas the previous hypothesis focused on a more top-down approach to reducing violence facing refugees, this focuses on the ability of refugees themselves to impact this relationship in a more bottom-up approach. Equal opportunity

[12] (https://www.rescue.org/page/our-goals-power, accessed Aug. 29, 2019); (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/advocacy.html, accessed Aug. 29, 2019)

can be seen in states where "women and members of ethnic or religious groups have equal access to education, public office and employment" (Teorell 2019; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). This includes a robust institutional and legal framework for the protection against discrimination. Having a society built on equal opportunity can empower and enable refugee populations and assist with their ability to seamlessly integrate within their new host state. The empowerment of refugees is seen as crucial for the success of refugees and their new communities and has become hallmark of HRO strategies in the IRC and UNHCR[13]. States that have enacted these protections for their domestic constituents are also more likely to offer similar opportunities for refugee populations. Relatedly, these values often become ingrained with the civil society of a state and they will be more likely to extend or be open to extending these same opportunities to refugee populations. Similar to the previous hypothesis, this process of constructive integration geared towards reducing tension and conflict, will ultimately lead to reduced levels of state repression. This leads to my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2a: *Increased equal opportunities will lower the amount of government violence facing refugee populations.*

Another way to look at equal opportunity is through equal access to public services. Following the same logic described above, when access to public services are not conditioned on either social group or socio-economic position, one can posit that those states are prime exhibitors of equal opportunity. Essentially, the ability for refugees, who often belong to different social groups or socio-economic positions, to access goods and services will decrease tensions with the local community. This occurs because the ability for refugees to be able to work within the system to access necessary deliverables negates the need for them to resort to

[13] https://www.rescue.org/page/our-goals-power, accessed Aug. 29, 2019); (https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/advocacy.html, accessed Aug. 29, 2019)

illegal or dangerous acts which can inflame tensions with local communities. It also decreases the burden placed upon the state as the sole provider of goods and services given that refugees would be more likely to be able to access them for themselves. Furthermore, equal access also means that security agents themselves are able to access the necessary goods and services for own families, regardless of their social group or socio-economic position, thus negating the need for them to feel like they need to take from material resources from refugees and refugee camps. These factors working in conjunction with one another decrease the chances that the state would feel compelled to carry out repressive acts against the refugee population. I include tests of both, equal access to public services distributed by social group and by socio-economic position in my analysis.

Hypothesis 2b: *Equal access to public services that are not conditioned by social group will lower the amount of government violence facing refugee populations.*

Hypothesis 2c: *Equal access to public services that are not conditioned by socio-economic position will lower the amount of government violence facing refugee populations.*

Research Design

In summary, I focus on HROs and a society built on equal opportunity working in conjunction with one another to reduce state repression targeting refugee populations. I argue that HROs work to prevent grievance formation and conflict between the local and refugee populations often seen during flawed or unregulated integration. HROs and equal opportunities can reduce the perception of threat posed by refugee populations, which often leads to decreased state repression. In addition to reducing the perceived threat posed by these populations, HROs, through their settlement assistance, reduce the financial cost of hosting and monitoring refugee populations. Equal opportunities for everyone can empower refugee populations and is indicative

of an inclusive society. This will reduce levels of friction between domestic and refugee populations leading to less conflict. Without this, increased tension and competition for resources may leave the state feeling like repression is their only option. Finally, the presence of HROs, whether explicitly stated in their mandate or not, often can provide a monitoring servicing through information sharing with other INGOs and foreign states, which may place a cost on state repression. Combined these factors reduce the amount of state repression targeting refugee populations.

Dependent Variable and Sample

The unit of analysis in this study is the country-year and my sample includes all available data from 1996-2015. My dependent variable is a measure of government violence against refugees from the POSVAR dataset (Gineste and Savun 2019). "Government violence against refugees refers to the intentional use of physical force against refugees by military personnel, police, other security officers, and any other individuals directly employed by the host government" (Gineste and Savun 2019). This is preferable to other more common measures of repression since it directly captures repression targeting refugees. The ordinal scale ranges from zero to three, with zero indicating no mention of violence and a three indicating systematic violence (Gineste and Savun 2019).

Being that my dependent variable is heavily biased towards zero, I have chosen to use a zero-inflated ordered probit model with robust standard errors. This allows me account for the large numbers of zeros in the dependent variable by examining which cases are zero because repression was never a realistic option for the state, versus those cases where the measure is zero because the state actively chose a different strategy.

Independent Variables

My first explanatory variable is a measure of HROs within a state. This variable is a count of human rights focused INGOs, based on available data from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, working in the host state (Smith and Wiest 2005). It ranges from one to 139 in my sample. Data for my second hypothesis comes from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018; Teorell 2019). It is an ordinal measure of equal opportunity within states that ranges from one to ten, with a score of ten indicating higher equal opportunity. Because this data was only available in alternative years, I used *ipolate*[14] in STATA v15.1 which uses linear interpolation to fill in the missing data. I have run the same model with both versions of equal opportunity with similar results. The full results of the non-linear interpolated version of equal opportunity is available in the appendix. I also have two measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019), which capture the same effect that equal opportunity has on the process of empowering refugees and being indicative of a plural society that would not be conducive to government violence against refugee populations. These measures explore access to public services and whether they are impacted by either social group or socio-economic standing. Both of these measures are ordinal[15] from zero to four with a zero indicating extreme levels of unequal distribution based on social group or socio-economic position respectively, whereas a four indicates equal access to public services irrespective of social group or socio-economic position (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019). Table 8 depicts the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables below.

[14] More information on *ipolate* can be found here: https://www.stata.com/manuals/dipolate.pdf (accessed Aug. 8, 2019)
[15] Each measure has been converted to interval by the measurement model (Coppedge et al. 2019; Pemstein et al. 2019)

Table 8: Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

	Violence Against Refugees	HROs	Equal Opportunity
Mean	0.12	37.56	5.00
SD	0.40	23.95	1.99
Min	0	1	1
Max	3	139	10
N	3821	1296	1349

Controls

Looking through the existing literature, there are a number of variables, which need to be controlled for in the host state in order to isolate the effect of my independent variables on the dependent variable. Several studies have shown that repression within a state increases as the number of refugees increases (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). The number of refugees within a state was calculated from the World Bank's World Development Indicators dataset (2016). Population size and economic performance have also been linked to increased repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Data on population numbers is gathered from the Gleditsch data set, it captures the size of the population in 1000's (2002). Similarly, I used Gleditsch's data on GDP per capita measured in 2005 US Dollars (2002). It seems reasonable to think that states that have demonstrated their willingness to repress their own populations will also see repression as a viable tool to be used towards refugee populations within their borders. Respect for physical integrity rights comes from CIRI (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). CIRI physical integrity rights scores are an additive index that combines counts of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonments, and disappearances (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Given that taking in refugees impose costs upon a state, those that receive foreign

aid may be better equipped to handle the integration and accommodation of refugee populations, potentially decreasing the chances the state decides to use repression. Total aid is captured by adding all officially directed aid provided to the host state in that year (AidData 2016). Finally, as democracies have been posited to repress less than non-democracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005b; Hill and Jones 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), it seemed natural to include a measure of regime type. My measure of regime type is based on an average of Freedom House's and Polity scores. I use the 0-10 level of democracy scale which is based on the average scores of the Freedom House and Polity measures (Freedom House 2016; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2014). On this scale, a higher number indicates that the state is more democratic.

As stated earlier, zero-inflated ordered probit models are most useful when "the outcome of interest in an ordered response variable and the data exhibit a high fraction of observations in the lowest category."[16] The concentration of zeros in the model is commonly referred to as zero inflation. Unlike traditional ordered probit models, which treat all zero-valued outcomes as a homogenous group, zero-inflated ordered probit models assume that the zero observations could be part of two distinct, but unobservable groups. The first group is considered the always zero group, those observations that will always be zero. This is often called the nonparticipation group. The second group represents those observations that are currently zero, but actually have the ability to be any of the other potential values. This group is often called the participation group.[17]

In order to determine which observations fit into these two groups, the zero-inflated ordered probit model includes an "inflate" portion of the equation. This is where you specify the

[16] https://www.stata.com/manuals/rzioprobit.pdf (accessed March 22, 2019)
[17] https://www.stata.com/manuals/rzioprobit.pdf (accessed March 22, 2019)

variables in the equation that determine which of the zeros are part of the nonparticipation group, and which of those are part of the participation group. In my analysis, I have run two separate models for each of my independent variables. The first model for each of my independent variables contains a full inflate, where I include the respective independent variable alongside all the control variables in the inflate portion of the statistical model. In the second version of each model, I use a limited inflate consisting of the respective independent variable, the number of refugees, population size, CIRI physical integrity rights scores, and the polity score.

Results

In order to test my hypotheses, I run four zero-inflated ordered probit models with robust standard errors. The first model isolates HROs on the dependent variable measuring government repression against refugees, and all the control variables. The second model isolates my second independent variable, a measure of equal opportunity on the dependent variable and the control variables. The third and fourth models use the equal access to public services measures from V-Dem to further reinforce the theoretical logic and argument of my second explanatory variable and how it relates to decreasing government violence targeting refugees. Full results of these models can be seen below in Table 9.

Table 9: Results for HROs and Equal Opportunity

DV: Violence Against Refugees	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
HROs	-0.0258**			
	(0.00843)			
Equal Opportunity		-0.183**		
		(0.0618)		
Access by Social Group			-0.330***	
			(0.0941)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				-0.263**
				(0.0826)
Refugees	0.216***	0.311***	-0.0607	-0.0911
	(0.0398)	(0.0360)	(0.101)	(0.0780)
Population	0.0738	0.241***	0.0904	0.0957
	(0.107)	(0.0700)	(0.0790)	(0.0780)
GDP	0.151*	0.0410	-0.191*	-0.160
	(0.0661)	(0.0887)	(0.0757)	(0.0879)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.0543	0.160**	0.0169	-0.00968
	(0.0463)	(0.0583)	(0.0691)	(0.0779)
Total Aid	0.116	-0.186**	0.0904	0.102
	(0.0739)	(0.0611)	(0.0614)	(0.0727)
Polity	0.0564	-0.0131	0.00670	-0.00533
	(0.0320)	(0.0331)	(0.0450)	(0.0457)
Inflate				
HROs	0.240***			
	(0.0702)			
Equal Opportunity		3.207***		
		(0.0539)		
Access by Social Group			0.153	
			(0.292)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				0.213
				(0.234)
Refugees	-1.159	-355.3***	0.443***	0.444***
	(0.742)	(5.801)	(0.115)	(0.125)
GDP	-1.315	-258.1***	0.374	0.269
	(0.836)	(4.058)	(0.227)	(0.185)
Population	0.0548	66.77***	-0.0713	-0.0772
	(0.401)	(1.038)	(0.164)	(0.172)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.218	-351.7***	-0.126	-0.112
	(0.397)	(5.813)	(0.0813)	(0.0892)
Total Aid	-1.277	145.4***	-0.114	-0.109
	(0.742)	(2.434)	(0.160)	(0.137)
Polity	-0.0187	136.3***	0.00775	0.0187
	(0.297)	(2.249)	(0.0813)	(0.0652)
Constant	43.89	3593.6***	-3.865	-3.302
	(26.27)	(57.26)	(3.007)	(3.145)
N	878	733	1829	1828

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Model 1, the relationship between the number of HROs within the state and government repression is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Essentially, the presence of HROs within a state is shown to reduce government repression targeting refugee populations holding everything else constant. This supports my argument that HROs can provide valuable services and assistance to refugee populations ultimately reducing their perceived level of threat to the host state, which in turn reduces the likelihood that states will choose to use repressive tactics against them. Similarly, in Model 2a, I find a statistically significant relationship between equal opportunity and a reduction in state repression in the expected direction. Societies with institutionalized avenues for the pursuit of employment and educational opportunities, that are protected by law, can empower refugees to seek these for themselves. As the results show, increased equal opportunity is linked to lower levels of government repression targeting refugees. Furthermore, Models 2b and 2c, which include the V-Dem measures of equal access to public services are also statistically significant in the expected direction. Essentially, as societies have increased equal access to public services that are not determined by either social group or socio-economic position, they are more likely to also foster equal access for refugee populations. This ultimately decreases local competition and friction between residents and newly arriving refugee populations, which in turn decreases the perceived need for government violence towards refugees.

The second set of coefficients in each model, which represent the inflate portion of the equation, relate to the factors which determine which cases are zero because they will always be zero, and those which are zero due to a decision by the state not to use repression. As you can see in Table 9, the coefficients for HROs and equal opportunity are in the opposite direction of those

in the first equation. This is actually not uncommon for the sign of the coefficients to be flipped from the first to second equation.

I have also run these models with a limited inflate and the results are quite similar to the full inflate models. These results can be seen in Table 10. While the above models have been run on a sample of states that host refugees, I have also run the analysis on a sample of all states with available data and the results remain largely similar as you can see in Table 11.

Table 10: Limited Inflate Results for HROs and Equal Opportunity

DV: Violence Against Refugees	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
HROs	-0.0277***			
	(0.00832)			
Equal Opportunity		-0.115*		
		(0.0586)		
Access by Social Group			-0.160	
			(0.199)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				-0.308***
				(0.0867)
Refugees	0.182***	0.281***	-0.114	-0.102
	(0.0432)	(0.0329)	(0.0771)	(0.119)
Population	0.115	0.159*	0.0243	0.141
	(0.0802)	(0.0651)	(0.212)	(0.0745)
GDP	0.0881	-0.0453	-0.0816	-0.0474
	(0.0540)	(0.0822)	(0.0808)	(0.0770)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.102	0.126*	0.0971	0.0200
	(0.0603)	(0.0559)	(0.0825)	(0.110)
Total Aid	0.0491	-0.0715	0.159	0.108
	(0.0536)	(0.0470)	(0.0938)	(0.0561)
Polity	0.0829*	-0.0355	-0.0512	-0.0248
	(0.0352)	(0.0345)	(0.0485)	(0.0528)
Inflate				
HROs	0.301*			
	(0.138)			
Equal Opportunity		-43.91***		
		(0.906)		
Access by Social Group			-0.126	
			(0.138)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				0.260
				(0.389)
Refugees	-0.427	-76.35***	0.252**	0.384*
	(0.472)	(1.592)	(0.0892)	(0.159)
Population	-1.121*	31.30***	-0.0213	-0.195
	(0.455)	(0.762)	(0.140)	(0.246)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.326	-104.3***	-0.116	-0.156*
	(0.764)	(2.141)	(0.0829)	(0.0621)
Polity	-0.549	79.71***	0.0409	0.0441
	(0.367)	(1.651)	(0.0404)	(0.0428)
Constant	10.69	984.6***	-2.935**	-1.999
	(5.801)	(20.11)	(0.953)	(1.873)
N	878	733	1829	1828

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: Results for All States

DV: Violence Against Refugees	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
HROs	-0.0224***			
	(0.00633)			
Equal Opportunity		-0.184**		
		(0.0618)		
Access by Social Group			-0.305**	
			(0.0972)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				-0.224***
				(0.0672)
Refugees	0.158***	0.311***	0.0488	0.0602
	(0.0260)	(0.0361)	(0.0429)	(0.0324)
Population	0.0256	0.248***	0.0555	0.0359
	(0.0686)	(0.0703)	(0.0623)	(0.0592)
GDP	0.0211	0.0409	-0.0606	-0.0172
	(0.0549)	(0.0889)	(0.0855)	(0.0521)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.131**	0.162**	-0.0190	-0.0519
	(0.0409)	(0.0584)	(0.0450)	(0.0386)
Total Aid	0.0374	-0.199**	0.105**	0.107**
	(0.0509)	(0.0643)	(0.0404)	(0.0390)
Polity	0.110**	-0.00861	0.0209	0.0103
	(0.0335)	(0.0329)	(0.0262)	(0.0253)
Inflate				
HROs	26.48***			
	(1.030)			
Equal Opportunity		18.41***		
		(1.232)		
Access by Social Group			0.421*	
			(0.178)	
Access by Socio-Economic Position				0.854**
				(0.326)
Refugees	18.00***	-257.9***	0.396***	0.463***
	(0.713)	(7.970)	(0.114)	(0.0894)
Population	-67.39***	43.87***	-0.0177	0.00984
	(2.568)	(1.220)	(0.302)	(0.332)
GDP	58.34***	-207.5***	0.434**	0.300
	(2.332)	(8.488)	(0.155)	(0.179)
Physical Integrity Rights	68.67***	-252.7***	-0.178	-0.164
	(2.721)	(7.673)	(0.128)	(0.157)
Total Aid		116.2***	-0.564	-0.809
		(4.150)	(0.444)	(0.432)
Polity	-85.42***	81.01***	-0.119	-0.110
	(3.274)	(2.665)	(0.0944)	(0.147)
Constant	-295.8***	2597.5***	6.763	12.54
	(12.90)	(81.33)	(9.778)	(8.382)
N	966	767	2024	2023

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As with all discrete choice models, it is often more useful to look at marginal effects for interpretation purposes. Figure 2 below illustrates the marginal effect of HROs and equal opportunity on government violence towards refugees.



Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Model 1 and Model 2a

The top left quadrant of Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of HROs on the probability of no violence targeting refugee populations, whereas the top right quadrant shows the marginal effect of HROs on the probability of different levels of violence targeting refugee populations. As expected, increasing numbers of HROs seems to increase the probability that there will be no targeted government violence facing refugee populations. Similarly, as the count

of HROs increases, the propensity for violence also seems to decrease. However, it is interesting to note that in both cases, there seems to be a slight threshold effect, where the positive impact of HROs can only be definitively seen at a minimum of twenty HROs. Any less than that number, and there is just too much variation to conclude one way or another just how much of an impact HROs can have on this relationship.

The bottom half of Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of increasing equal opportunity on either the probability of no violence or violence. The bottom left quadrant illustrates the marginal effect of equal opportunity on no violence targeting refugees and as you can see increasing levels of equal opportunity tend to lead to increased probability of no government violence. Furthermore, on the bottom right, it is quite clear that increasing equal opportunity is also linked to decreased probability of government violence targeting refugee populations. [18] The marginal effects of Models 2b and 2c are illustrated below in Figure 3.

[18] Whereas in Model 1, we had instances of systemic violence, we did not observe any of these in Model 2a. This is not altogether surprising giving how many few instances of this were in the complete sample to begin with.



Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Model 2b and 2c

As you can see on the left side of Figure 3, equal access to public services within both the social group and socio-economic position measures are positively related to the probability of no violence targeting refugee populations. Increasing levels of equal access are indeed linked to an increasing marginal effect relating to the probability that a state will not use violence to target their refugee populations. Additionally, on the right-hand side of Figure 3, both measures also decrease the chances that government violence targeting refugee populations will occur. This results largely mirror those in Model 2a, which represents the marginal effects of equal opportunity, further strengthening the belief that equal opportunity and access can contribute to decreasing and/or preventing state violence towards refugee populations. These models

collectively capture the process by which HROs and a society built on equal opportunity and access, can reduce situations where states may decide that repression of refugees is in their best interest.

Conclusion

Research on the relationship between refugees and state repression is still a nascent literature, which has barely begun to scratch the surface of a thoroughly complex and important field. I have argued that repression in refugee-hosting states can be mitigated by HROs and a society built upon equal opportunity. Refugee populations enact costs on their host populations and states. If the integration of these refugee populations is done in the absence of HROs and a strong civil society, which can assist in handling an influx of refugees without exacerbating any local cleavages, then the chances of conflict and grievance formation between the local and refugee populations increases. In this case, the chances the state responds with repression also increases. HROs can alleviate some of the pressures and costs refugee populations enact on a state, and they can also provide necessary information and resources to assist with this integration process. Similarly, I argued that a state that has legal protections for an institutionalized system of equal opportunity allows refugees to pursue educational and employment opportunities on their own. With these opportunities available to them, the refugees will ultimately require less assistance from the state and will be less likely to rely on acquiring basic necessities from outside the system. This reduces the strain and potential for grievance formation. These factors, whether simultaneously or independently, can both reduce the willingness for states to engage in repressive behavior, as well as offer other options in the menu of available tools for states when faced with an influx of refugees. I have found ample support for this argument in my empirical results.

The number of refugees worldwide is ever increasing and the problem of forced migrations and refugees shows no signs of abating. It is imperative to continue the study of refugees, as this is not an isolated issue and has ramifications for states and populations all over the world. Figuring out why refugee-hosting states use repression will go a long way to alleviate the suffering of an already victimized population. Additional research is needed to pursue both short and long-term solutions for refugee populations and their respective host states.

CHAPTER 4

HOST STATE CHARACTERISTICS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES[19]

[19] Bsisu, N. To be submitted to *Journal of Peace Research*

Abstract

What role do individual state characteristics have on their treatment of refugee populations? Are certain states more likely to target refugees with violence? While there has been an increase in the literature regarding the impact refugees have on their host state, the link between refugees and violence, the link between refugees and overall human rights conditions, there has been limited analysis on how certain state characteristics can impact state violence targeting refugee populations. I argue that certain state characteristics can positively impact the level of violence a state may decide is necessary when dealing with a refugee population within its borders. Building off established links between refugees and violence, I show that political stability and state capacity impact levels of state violence targeting refugees. Specifically, increased levels of political stability and state capacity reduce levels of state violence targeting refugees. Using a new dataset that captures state repression of refugee populations together with a zero-inflated probit model, I find much support for my hypotheses.

Introduction

"Before, I thought that Greece would be one of the best places to live…Now I feel it would have been better to drown while crossing the sea." - Patrick Kingsley, New York Times 2018.

Sadly, this sentiment captures the feelings of despair and despondency felt by many migrants and refugees throughout their journey. This is especially true when they finally reach a place they think will be able to afford them a better and safer life. On the Greek Island of Lesbos migrants and refugees suffer in dire conditions in Camp Moria, one of Europe's largest refugee camps. A lack of resources and extreme levels of overcrowding have resulted in a powder keg

situation where violence and protests lead to clashes with local police and security forces. For example, there are over 42,000 migrants and refugees held in Greek Islands that were designed to hold no more than 5,400 (Smith 2020). In what is becoming an altogether too familiar scene, Greek police and security forces routinely clash with refugees and migrants who feel they have no choice but to protest the untenable living conditions provided for them (Da Silva 2020; Maltezou 2020).

This situation in Greece is not an outlier as similar events have occurred all over refugee receiving areas. As the number of refugees worldwide continues to grow, one can foresee how this problem will not only persist, but also likely get worse, as the issues with overcrowding and a lack of resources begin to compound. Are certain states better equipped to handle an influx of refugees without the situation devolving into violent clashes and the use of repression? If so, are their specific state characteristics that indicate when and where state repression of refugee populations will occur? While there has been a tremendous growth relating to the research on refugee populations and their global impact, there remains a void that examines the relationship between state characteristics and their treatment of refugee populations.

This chapter will examine the role that certain state characteristics have on the state's decision-making process that ultimately decides if they end up using repression targeting refugee populations within their borders. In doing so, I focus on two main criteria: state capacity and political stability. I begin with examining how state capacity impacts levels of state sanctioned violence targeting refugee populations. A state's resources have been shown to impact levels of state repression (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filipov 2014; Englehart 2009; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Fundamentally, the more resources a state possesses, both economically and politically, the greater their respect for human rights (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and

Filippov 2014; Englehart 2009; Wright and Moorthy 2018). Without the capability to accommodate refugee populations, the propensity for conflict between refugees and state security and police forces, as well as between refugees and civilians, increases. Increased levels of state capacity should help moderate the relationship between refugees and repression and decrease the threat posed by hosting refugees as it would decrease the number of clashes brought upon by a lack of resources and overcrowding. Second, I look at political stability and the role that it plays in a regime's choice to use repression that targets refugees. The more secure a governing entity, the less likely it will be to feel threatened by the influx of large populations of refugees. This is key as threat, or the perception of threat, has been shown to be related to increased repression (Regan and Henderson 2002). Politically stable regimes will feel less vulnerable to any potential changes in balance of power within the state through the introduction of refugee populations. They will also feel more secure in their ability to navigate the challenges posed by accepting refugee populations, ultimately reducing the perceived need to target refugee populations with violence.

The remainder of this chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the relevant literature relating to state repression, state capacity, political stability, and the treatment of refugee populations. This will be followed by my theoretical arguments relating to the impact that state capacity and political stability have on levels of state sanctioned violence targeting refugees. I will then transition to a discussion on how I organize my empirical analysis, including the operationalization of key variables and type of statistical model used to evaluate my theoretical claims. I then conclude with a discussion of my results, including discussion on how my results fit into the literature, as well as recommendations for future research.

State Repression

State repression continues to be a prominent topic within the scholarly research communities. Through extensive study, there seem to be a few commonly asserted and accepted notions relating to state repression and its utilization. First, repression as a tactic is always available to the state. It is commonly considered to be a tool available to all regimes as a form of ensuring and maintaining control over their domestic population (Poe 2004). The most pressing issue relating to state repression, however, is knowing when states will decide to use repression. For this, the consensus that seems to have emerged is that states will repress when they feel threatened (Poe 2004; Regan and Henderson 2002). Furthermore, state governments will be more likely to use repression as a tactic whenever an internal challenger has also adopted violent tactics of their own (Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Kang 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This is often dubbed the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). In essence, states will meet violence with violence. Poe (2004) conceptualizes state decisions to use repression by focusing on what he calls a state's strength to threat ratio. This ratio looks at a state's perception of their strength relative to the perceived level of threat posed by any other group or situation. When a group or event negatively impact a state's perception of their own strength, the state will be more likely to decide to use repression. Additionally, when a group or event pose an elevated sense of threat, the state will also be more likely to use repression (Poe 2004).

Beyond looking at when states use repression, there has also been considerable work that explores potential factors that may mitigate the use of state repression. The most prominent link relating to state repression is a state's form of government. The consensus that has formed to date indicates that democracies will be less likely to use repression on domestic populations (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005b; Hill and Jones 2014; Poe and

Tate 1994). In looking at the impact that democracy has on human rights violations Davenport and Armstrong (2004) argue that democracies will be more constrained in their use of repression due to inherent constraints that democratic systems place upon those in authority. For example, citizens have the capability to vote and can work to remove leaders who violate their human rights. In conjunction with institutional checks and balances on the state's ability to take coercive action, democracies should end up with lower levels of human rights abuses. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) do argue, however, that there exists some level of threshold in relation to democracies and human rights abuses with the mitigating power of democracies coming through at higher ends of the democratic spectrum. In an in-depth analysis of democracies and their human rights practices, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005b) find that certain characteristics of democracies have a higher impact than others. First, they find that political participation and multi-party competition to be one of the strongest indicators that a democracy will respect their citizens' human rights. Furthermore, and similar to Davenport and Armstrong (2004), they also find that full developed democracies are more likely to respect human rights within their states. They argue that this is due to the high levels of accountability present in fully functioning democratic states (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005b).

While the above studies focus on the ability of democratic institutions to limit human rights abuses and state repression, they focus on the human rights of citizens of the state. Refugees are not afforded the same protections as citizens and they lack the ability to respond to state violence through institutionalized and legislative means, which provides the basis for the argument linking strong democracies with improved respect for human rights. While the improved human rights practices within democracies will likely also result in reduced levels of

state violence targeting refugee populations, there are likely other state characteristics that can provide for a more comprehensive causal story.

Refugees and State Violence

The growing consensus in the refugee literature is that refugees and host state repression are linked (Fisk 2016: Wright and Moorthy 2018). In studying refugee populations in Africa, Fisk (2016) finds refugee accommodation to be a significant predictor of one-sided violence. The findings are especially strong with self-settled refugee populations. Wright and Moorthy (2018) also find a link between larger numbers of refugees and overall levels of repression, but they find that this relationship can be mitigated by a state's economic capacity. The links between refugees and violence directly targeting them are less developed. One particular study (Jäckle and König 2018) addresses this question by exploring a potential link between threatening events and anti-refugee violence. They find that terrorist attacks in neighboring states, especially when those attacks are highly publicized, result in increased levels of violence that targets refugee populations. Similarly, Savun and Gineste (2019) find that repression of refugee populations is more likely following terrorist attacks in the host state.

Links between refugees and conflict exist. This is in addition to the aforementioned links between refugees and repression. Refugees alter the status quo and can decrease perceptions of a state's strength or increase perceptions of threat facing the regime (Poe 2004). Admitting refugees can also lead to increased political and economic pressure on the state (Wright and Moorthy 2018). There are also established links between refugee populations and international and civil conflict (Fisk 2016; Lebson 2013; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). All of these factors can indicate an increased chance for repression. However, not all refugee hosting

states decide to target their refugee populations with repression. Are there certain state characteristics that can help indicate why and when a state would decide to target refugees within their borders with violence? I argue that both state capacity and political stability can help explain why and when state sanctioned violence is used targeting refugee populations under their care.

The argument detailing how a host state's state capacity and political stability impact their treatment of refugee populations begins with the premise that a leadership's primary desire is to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005a). An influx of refugees, which can be seen as the introduction of a previously foreign population, has the potential to challenge the current leadership's grip on power by altering the status quo and also has the potential to upset the coalition that helps the leadership stay in power. This challenge is largely based on established links between refugees and conflict as well as refugees and repression detailed above. Refugees, through no fault of their own, place pressure on their host state. Due to the elevated risks associated with hosting refugees, as compared to migrant or any other type of foreign population, influxes of refugee populations garner a close watch by the state's leadership. It is incumbent upon the leadership to handle this situation well as they are ultimately responsible for the accommodation and/or integration of refugee populations within their state. The inability to do so places pressure upon the police and security forces of the state, which can lead to clashes and situations of repression targeting both the refugees and broader population in more generally. The inability to handle the accommodation and/or integration of refugee populations can also lead to domestic unrest as competition between refugees and local citizens may arise. This competition may be economic in nature as state resources become more difficult to access as additional resources are required to handle the influx of refugees. The competition may also be

social or political in nature if the arrival of refugees upsets delicate demographic balances within the state. In any of these situations, the inability to handle the accommodation and/or integration of refugees can lead to conflict and repression.

An influx of foreign aid or cash assistance from international organizations may not be enough. This can be seen in the Greek Asylum efforts, especially within the conditions evident in the Moria Camp. To assist Greece with the inflow of asylum seekers, the European Union (EU) committed 1.62 billion euros, the equivalent of approximately $1.9 billion dollars. Of that 1.1 billion euros have already been paid to the Greek authorities (Kingsley 2018). Despite this massive amount of financial support, the conditions that Greek asylum seekers find themselves in remain dire. Due to a combination of extreme overcrowding and a lack of resources, representatives of the International Rescue Committee estimate that just under one-third of all camp residents have attempted suicide (Kingsley 2018). According the head of the Doctors without Borders mission in Greece, who admits that they have seen some "horrendous camps and situations," the Camp in Moria represents "the camp in which I've seen the highest level of suffering" (Kingsley 2018). Despite tremendous financial support from the EU and the tireless work of numerous NGOs, asylum seekers in Greece in addition to the communities that host them, are struggling. The issue is more than just a lack of resources, it also requires an effective governing structure and high levels of state capacity.

The quality of governance and government performance are instrumental in ensuring that refugee inflows can be handled in a humane and effective manner. This will increase the chances that refugees are afforded the resources they need while decreasing the chances that conflict will arise between refugees and security forces as well as between refuges and local populations. Increased levels of state capacity will ensure that both state and foreign funding allocated to

assist with the accommodation of refugee populations actually gets to the facilities and individuals that need them and will not be commandeered or lost due to corruption. Furthermore, effective state capacity will assist with the maintenance of law order by being able to provide effective training to police and security forces to help in their ability to handle the inflow of refugee populations. It will also assist in preventing clashes between refugees and locals by ensuring that government resources are going where they are supposed to go and doing what they are directed to do. Overall bureaucratic quality and state capacity will increase chances that refugees and their hosts are taken care of and decrease the need for state police and security forces to get involved which ultimately decreases the chances that government violence targeting refugee populations will be needed. This leads to my first testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: *Increased levels of state capacity and government performance will lead decrease levels of government violence targeting refugee populations.*

Beyond state capacity, I also argue that political stability is a key determinant for if and when states decide to target refugee populations with violence. To build this argument I begin with the same theoretical foundation that those in power wish to remain so and will do whatever is necessary to do so (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005a). Any challenges to the status quo have the potential to disrupt the leadership's coalition and threaten their grip on power. The arrival of a previously foreign population in the form of refugees has the potential to alter the status quo and potentially negatively impact the coalition that the leadership currently relies upon. The fact that refugees have also been linked to elevated chances of conflict, terrorism, and repression further complicate matters (Choi and Salehyan 2013; Fisk 2016; Lebson 2013; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Wright and Moorthy 2018).

As mentioned earlier, repression is a tool available to all regimes (Poe 2004). However, the utilization of state repression comes with its own set of risks to the leadership of the state. Repression can lead to a cycle of tit-for-tat violence seen in the dynamic relationship between protest and repression (Carey 2006). This can ultimately lead to an erosion of support for the ruling regime. Furthermore, the use of repression can also bring about both international and domestic condemnation, potentially resulting in naming and shaming campaigns, sanctions, international interventions, loss of foreign direct investment and trade, among other things. In essence, the decision to use repression is not without its risks. It does, however, remain an effective tool at the state's disposal when the potential benefits outweigh the costs of using it. Politically stable regimes, with strong winning coalitions, should have the demonstrated capacity and ability to weather the short-term costs of hosting refugees. However, less stable regimes may view the arrival of a foreign population as too much of threat to their precarious hold on power and may be willing to risk the potential international and domestic blowback that comes with using repression. In this case, the costs of using repression will be lower than the costs of losing power. This leads to my second testable hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: *Less politically stable regimes will be more likely to use violence targeting refugee populations.*

Research Design

In summary, I argue that certain state characteristics can help explain when repression that targets refugees would be used. I believe that state capacity and political stability are key indicators of if and when a state would use violence targeting refugee populations. The influx of a previously foreign population, as indicated by refugees, necessarily constitutes an alteration to the status quo with the potential to upset the coalition responsible for helping the present

leadership remain in power. A leader's primary desire is to remain in power, and they will ultimately be held responsible for the accommodation of refugee populations within their borders. A state that has been demonstrated to possess effective levels of state capacity will be more likely to be able to handle the integration of refugees into their population without the need to resort of the use of violence. This is based on the fact that they will be more likely to be able to marshal the resources available to them and then effectively distribute those resources to assist with provision and care of refugee populations without negatively impacting the local population and especially the coalition that helps keep them in power. Beyond that, I argue that political stability is another key factor. Less politically stable regimes will be more likely to risk the international and domestic blowback from using repression that targets refugees in order to maintain power as they will be less likely to be able to withstand the short-term costs and potential consequences of hosting refugees.

Sample and Dependent Variable

I use a time-series cross national dataset set at the country-year unit of analysis to test my hypotheses. Within this dataset, my sample ranges from 1996-2015 based on data availability for key variables of interest. My dependent variable is a measure of government violence targeting refugee populations from the POSVAR dataset (Gineste and Savun 2019). They use an ordinal scale to measure levels of government violence that explicitly targets refugees and the scale rnges from zero to three, with a zero indicating no government violence targeting refugee populations with a three designating systemic violence at the hands of the state (Gineste and Savun 2019). Within the context of their dataset, they define government violence that targets refugees as, "the intentional use of physical force against refugees by military personnel, police, other security officers, and any other individuals directly employed by the host government"

(Gineste and Savun 2019). The POSVAR dataset is the preferred data for this type of analysis, as compared to other more commonly used measures of repression as it explicitly counts abuse targeting refugee populations by the state, whereas others focus on repression or human rights violations that impact the entire population.

As depicted earlier in Table 1, my dependent variable is heavily biased with regards to the count of zero observations. Given the high number of zeros, I have chosen to use a zero-inflated ordered probit model with robust standard errors. This type of model accounts for large numbers of zeros in the dependent variable by examining which cases are zero because repression was never a realistic option for the state, relative to those cases where the measure is zero because state leadership actively decided against using repression.

Independent Variables

My first independent variable is supposed to capture state capacity and quality of governance. To accomplish this, I use data from the International Country Risk Guide (IRCG), which is compiled by the PRS Group (PRS Group et al. 2019; Teorell et al. 2019). Specifically, I use the ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government measure. This measure of the quality of government, which is placed on a 0-1 scale, is created by taking the mean value of three separate ICRG variables, each of which captures levels of corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality. Measuring corruption is an integral part of the quality of governance in a state as high levels of corruption can negatively impact the quality of life for refugees and create conditions where the state may be more likely to target them with violence. For example, high levels of corruption can distort the economic environment within a state, making it difficult to conduct business to provide aid. Corruption also leads to a reduction in the efficiency of governance by allowing patronage rather than meritocracy to flourish. Finally, it brings about inherent

instability into the political process. All of these factors can negatively impact state capacity and quality of governance. Beyond corruption, this variable also includes a measure of law and order. The law and order measurement captures both an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as an assessment of popular observance of the law. Essentially, how well does the judicial system function and do the citizens actually follow the law. Finally, bureaucracy quality measures whether an existing state bureaucracy has the strength and capacity to govern without drastic changes in their policies or suffer from interruptions in state services (PRS Group et al. 2019; Teorell et al. 2019). This is essential as a large influx of refugees has the capacity to act as an exogenous shock and having strong institutions and a quality bureaucracy have the ability to act as shock absorbers and maintain effective government. Combined, these three elements provide for an effective measure of the quality of governance within a state.

I also include two robustness checks for my first hypothesis. Both of these variables come from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index provided by Bertelsmann Stiftung (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018; Teorell et al. 2019). The first variable measures the extent that basic administrative structures exist within the state. It ranges on an ordinal scale that goes from 1 to 10 with a score of 1 indicating that the territorial scope of administrative structures is extremely limited, and their administrative abilities are limited to maintaining peace as well as basic law and order. At the other end of the spectrum, a score of 10 indicates that the state as differentiated administrative structures that operate throughout the country and provide all basic public services to their citizens. The second variable used as a robustness check is also from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and it measures governance performance. This variable also measures on an ordinal scale that ranges from 1 to 10, which a score of 1 indicating limited steering

capabilities, resource efficiency, consensus building and international cooperation. A 10 score would indicate high levels of the aforementioned metrics.

Regarding my second independent variable, I use a measure from from the Center of Systemic Peace and their State Fragility Index variable (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017; Teorell et al. 2019). The State Fragility Index measures a state's fragility by examining its capacity to "manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintain system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and sustaining progressive development" (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017; Teorell et al. 2019). A higher score indicates a more fragile state. As a robustness check I use a measure from the Boix-Miller-Rosato dataset (Boix et al. 2014; Teorell et al. 2019). It measures the number of consecutive years of the current regime type, which would indicate that there is political stability in the state. Table 12, located below, depicts the descriptive statistics for my dependent and independent variables.

Table 12: Chapter Four Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

	Violence Against Refugees	Quality of Government	Basic Administration	Governance Performance	State Fragility	Years of Current Regime
Mean	0.12	0.55	6.60	5.52	9.21	38.59
SD	0.40	0.21	2.19	1.83	6.51	42.90
Min	0	0.08	1	1.05	0	1
Max	3	1	10	9.40	25	211
N	3821	2713	737	736	3238	2828

Control Variables

In order to isolate the effect of my explanatory variables on my dependent variable, there are a number of variables that need to be accounted for. Looking through the literature, I have identified six such variables. The first is a measure of all refugees present within the state as multiple studies have shown that repression can be positively correlated with the number of

refugees (Fisk 2016; Wright and Moorthy 2018). The number of refugees in the state is calculated from the UNHCR Population Statistics time-series dataset (2019). Decreased economic performance and increased population size has also been linked to increased repression and thus must be accounted for (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). I use Gleditsch's data on GDP per capita measured in 2005 US Dollars (2002). Similarly, Data on a state's population comes from the Gleditsch data set (2002). It measures population size in terms of 1,000s. I also include a measure of a state's human rights practices as one there likely exists some form of correlation between a state's willingness to use repression targeting their own population with their willingness to use repression targeting refugee populations within their borders. I measure a state's respect for physical integrity rights from the CIRI data set (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The CIRI physical integrity rights scores are an additive index that combines counts of political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Taking in refugees can impose tremendous financial costs on the state, and states that are better equipped economically have been demonstrated to use less repression (Wright and Moorthy 2018). I have also included a measure of foreign aid. This measure is a combination of all officially directed foreign aid given to the host state in any given year (Aid Data 2016). Finally, as democracies have been shown to repress less often relative to non-democracies (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005b; Hill and Jones 2014; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999), it seems natural to include a measure of regime type. I use Freedom House's Polity scores to measure regime type, specifically the 0-10 level of democracy scale based on the average scores of the Freedom House and Polity measures (Freedom House 2016; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2014). On this scale, a

higher number indicates a greater degree of democratization. In my analysis, I use logged versions of refugee count, population count, GDP, and foreign aid.

Model

As stated earlier, zero-inflated ordered probit models are most useful when "the outcome of interest in an ordered response variable and the data exhibit a high fraction of observations in the lowest category."[20] The concentration of zeros in the model is commonly referred to as zero inflation. Unlike traditional ordered probit models, which treat all zero-valued outcomes as a homogenous group, zero-inflated ordered probit models assume that the zero observations could be part of two distinct, but unobservable groups. The first group is considered the always zero group, those observations that will always be zero. This is often called the nonparticipation group. The second group represents those observations that are currently zero, but actually have the ability to be any of the other potential values. This group is often called the participation group.[21] In order to determine which observations fit into these two groups, the zero-inflated ordered probit model includes an "inflate" portion of the equation. This is where you specify the variables in the equation that determine which of the zeros are part of the nonparticipation group, and which of those are part of the participation group. For this analysis, I include the dependent variable, a count of the number of refugees within the state, the state's population size, as well as a state's CIRI physical integrity rights score.

Results

Can state capacity and political stability mitigate government violence targeting refugees? Overall, I find support for both my hypothesized relationships that argue that both state capacity and political stability reduce levels of government violence targeting refugee

[20] https://www.stata.com/manuals/rzioprobit.pdf (accessed March 22, 2019)
[21] https://www.stata.com/manuals/rzioprobit.pdf (accessed March 22, 2019)

populations. Table 13 displays the results for my first hypothesis relating to state capacity as well as two of my robustness checks for that variable. As you can see below, I find strong empirical support for my theory.

Table 13: Results for State Capacity

DV: Violence Against Refugees	Model 1	R.C. 1	R.C. 2
Quality of Government	-2.040*		
	(1.037)		
Basic Administration		-0.387*	
		(0.178)	
Governance Performance			-0.494*
			(0.235)
Refugees	-0.223***	-0.201	-0.250
	(0.0580)	(0.122)	(0.136)
Population	0.107	0.449*	0.526*
	(0.113)	(0.225)	(0.260)
GDP	-0.163	-0.205	-0.597**
	(0.0975)	(0.271)	(0.213)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.0637	0.232	0.357
	(0.0825)	(0.197)	(0.206)
Total Aid	0.104	-0.229	-0.431
	(0.0585)	(0.318)	(0.292)
Polity	-0.0190	0.131	0.263*
	(0.0470)	(0.0751)	(0.127)
Inflate			
Quality of Government	1.135		
	(0.729)		
Basic Administration		0.0379	
		(0.177)	
Governance Performance			0.0516
			(0.0754)
Refugees	0.329***	0.326*	0.293***
	(0.0649)	(0.134)	(0.0535)
Population	-0.132	0.138	0.157
	(0.0913)	(0.248)	(0.121)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.121*	-0.102	-0.0856
	(0.0506)	(0.143)	(0.0797)
Constant	-2.942***	-5.475***	-5.592***
	(0.803)	(1.587)	(1.317)
N	1,563	418	417

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results indicated by Model 1 in Table 13 indicate that the hypothesized relationship between state capacity and government violence targeting refugees is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Essentially, as state capacity increases, government violence targeting refugees is decreased. This supports my argument that state capacity is instrumental in properly handling the arrival of a previously foreign population, where the state is able to provide basic goods and services to provide for the refugees reducing chances of conflict between the state and refugee populations. Additionally, they are able to accomplish this without upsetting the status quo within the state that would have the propensity to lead to conflict and ultimately repression. My two robustness checks for state capacity are also statistically significant and in the expected direction. These variables, which measure basic government administrative capacity and governance performance, reinforce the finding evident in my first hypothesis, namely that state capacity can reduce levels of state violence targeting refugees.

Table 14 displays the results of my empirical analysis assessing the impact that political stability can have on state violence targeting refugee populations. These results can be seen below. As you can see in Model 1 of Table 2, the relationship between state fragility and government violence targeting refugee populations is statistically significant and in the expected direction. Increased levels of state fragility lead to increased state sanctioned government violence targeting refugees. This reinforces my theoretical argument that those in power in more fragile states are more willing to risk the international condemnation and potential domestic blowback of targeting refugees with violence in order to maintain control in the face of an exogenous shock represented by the arrival of refugee populations.

Table 14: Results for Political Stability

DV: Violence Against Refugees	Model 1	R.C.
State Fragility	0.0837**	
	(0.0259)	
Years of Current Regime		-0.00402*
		(0.00166)
Refugees	-0.0996	-0.0626
	(0.0693)	(0.0768)
Population	0.130	-0.110
	(0.0934)	(0.0932)
GDP	0.0343	-0.116
	(0.0826)	(0.0663)
Physical Integrity Rights	0.0570	-0.0197
	(0.0647)	(0.0682)
Total Aid	0.101*	0.109*
	(0.0410)	(0.0471)
Polity	0.0325	0.00111
	(0.0247)	(0.0308)
Inflate		
State Fragility	-0.0442	
	(0.0410)	
Years of Current Regime		0.00666
		(0.00405)
Refugees	0.358***	0.273***
	(0.0852)	(0.0571)
Population	-0.192	0.0842
	(0.185)	(0.0754)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.168*	-0.0800
	(0.0722)	(0.0541)
Constant	-1.022	-4.176***
	(2.103)	(0.797)
N	1,892	1,801

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

As with all discrete model choices, it is often more useful to look at marginal effects for interpretation purposes. Figure 4 below illustrates the marginal effect of state capacity and political stability on government violence targeting refugees. The top left quadrant of Figure 4 illustrated the marginal effect of state capacity on the probability that the state will not target the refugees with violence. The top right quadrant shows the marginal effect of state capacity on different levels of state sanctioned violence targeting refugee populations. State capacity's impact on the likelihood that a state will refrain from targeting refugees with violence appears to be highest at the lowest and highest levels of state capacity. Whereas high levels of state capacity correspond to lower probability for systemic and prevalent levels of state violence targeting refugees, probabilities of isolated violence increase with state capacity until the top levels whereby the probability of isolated violence then decreases.

The bottom half of Figure 4 illustrates the marginal effect of acts of political stability on the probability that the state will use violence to target the refugees in response. Beginning with the bottom left quadrant of Figure 4, we can see that the relationship between political stability and the probably that the state will refrain from violence resembles a "U". That is, the probability that the state will refrain from targeting refugees with violence occurs at the lowest and highest levels of political stability. Political stability seems to decrease the probability of isolated and prevalent government violence targeting refugees beyond a certain threshold, although it may actually increase some levels of violence at lower levels. Finally, systemic violence seems to decrease as levels of political stability increase.



Figure 4: Marginal Effects for Hypotheses 1 and 2

Conclusion

Research relating to refugees has largely focused on events that create refugees, where refugees go, and the impact that refugees have on their host states. Partially due to limited data, there has been limited research that examines the treatment of refugee populations at the hands of their respective host states. I hope that this work has in some way worked towards filling this lacuna in the literature. Throughout this piece, I have made the argument that certain state characteristics can explain variation in the treatment of refugee populations. I specifically focus on state capacity and political stability. I argue and then empirical test the assertion that increased levels of state capacity will ultimately decrease levels of state violence targeting

refugees. As refugees enter a state, they act as an introduction of a previously foreign population. Their arrival will almost inevitably create both economic pressure and security concerns. It is the regime's responsibility to manage the absorption of this new population without upsetting the status quo and alienating their winning coalition. The inability to do so will lead to changes within the status quo, ultimately threatening the regime and stability within the state. This in turn increases the chances that the state would consider using violence targeting refugees. I argue that political stability is another indicator of the likelihood that a state will resort to violence when dealing with refugees within their borders. More stable regimes will be less threatened by the arrival of a foreign population and thus be less likely to risk the international condemnation and potential domestic blowback of using repression targeting a vulnerable population. Less stable regimes, however, may feel like repression, as a tool of coercion, is one of their only options. Using a new dataset that explicitly captures state violence targeting refugee populations, I find support for these arguments in my empirical results.

While a state's characteristics are not the only part of the puzzle when it comes to host state and refugee relations, they nonetheless play a major role in the outcomes relating to the treatment of refugee populations. Opportunities for further research into other considerations abound. Beyond focusing on refugees, I believe that it would be interesting to study mixed-flows, instances where you have dual migrant and refugee inflows into the host state. There seems like there could be a natural convergence within the migration and refugee scholarly communities. Furthermore, I believe that a deeper examination of domestic politics and the domestic political climate could lead to interesting results. For example, would the results be consistent depending on different political parties and their ideological leanings? Would the presence of xenophobic attacks, such as the recent attack in Germany that left nine dead, signal

that the government would be more willing to use targeted violence against refugees (Oltermann 2020)? Unfortunately, the factors across the globe that lead to the creation of refugees do not seem to be slowing down. This makes it imperative to continue to study why and when states sign off on government sanctioned violence towards refugee populations. Only when we begin to understand the decision making process can we begin to work towards reducing and eradicating targeted violence aimed at refugee populations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Summary of the Main Findings

This dissertation has explored different factors and how they impact the treatment of refugee populations by their host state. In doing so, I am addressing a lacuna in the field relating to the treatment of refugee populations their treatment at the hands of their respective host state. I focus on factors that can help explain why and when host states target refugee populations with violence. In tackling the broader question relating to refugees and state repression, I concentrated my efforts in examining the impact of three related factors. I began with an examination of factors inherent with the refugees themselves and how that can impact levels of state sanctioned violence targeting refugees. Next, I examined the impact that HROs and civil society can have on the treatment of refugees by the host state. Finally, I looked at certain characteristics of the host state, namely state capacity and political stability in relation to their treatment of refugee populations within their borders. In each case, I find much empirical support for my hypothesis.

Chapter two of the dissertation looks at the refugees themselves and sees how a refugee's connection to violence and violent acts can impact their treatment by their host state. I begin the examination by looking at conflict refugees with the expectation that conflict refugees will incur increased levels of state violence relative to non-conflict refugees. I expected that this would incur due to the increased threat posed to state security by conflict refugees, as well as the increased time horizon for a conflict refugee's displacement. My empirical analysis did not find this to be the case. I suspect that states more than likely have the same expectations regarding

conflict refugees and engage in preemptive screenings or repression to prevent their entry in the first place. This would then artificially decrease cases of host state violence targeting refugees within their borders, potentially resulting in a null finding. My second and third hypotheses examine instances of violence committed by refugee populations. Hypothesis two measures instances where refugees commit acts of violence targeting the state or its agents, whereas, hypothesis three examines acts of refugee terror. In both of these cases refugees acts of violence challenge the state's legitimacy and its monopoly on the use of force. When this occurs, it will almost invariably result in the state responding with violence in kind, as described in the "law of coercive responsiveness" (Davenport 2007). My empirical results bear this out as I find strong evidence of a positive relationship between refugee acts of violence and state violence targeting refugee populations. To distinguish between types of violence and to illustrate that no all violence is seen in the same light, I also included two measures of violence that capture refugee on civilian violence and finally instances of refugee rioting. The expectation is that these types of violence, given that they are not directly targeting the state or its agents, will not result in a violent response from the state. My empirical results support this believe as I do not find any support that these events are connected.

Chapter three of the dissertation looks at whether HROs and institutionalized systems and norms and how they may reduce levels of state violence targeting refugee populations. I begin by examining the role that HROs can play in this process and illustrate how they are able to mitigate a potential repressive relationship between a host state and refugees within its borders. I argue that HROs can assist with the accommodation and integration of refugee populations, which studies have shown can lead to a reduction in one-sided violence (Fisk 2016). HROs can assist the state by providing information to the state about the refugee populations, as well as take

pressure off the state by directly providing necessary resources and services to refugee populations. Furthermore, HROs can also reduce levels of localized strife between refugee populations and the local population, decreasing the need for police and state security agents to get involved, ultimately reducing instances of state violence. In addition to the impact of HROs, I also examine the impact that institutionalized equal opportunities and access have on the reduction of state violence targeting refugees. Allowing refugees access to employment and education empowers them and assists in their ability to integrate into society and ultimately become self-sufficient. Institutionalized and legal protections against discrimination also serve to reduce repression targeting refugees. Moreover, equal access to these opportunities that are not restricted by social group or socio-economic standing further reinforce refugee's abilities to thrive without incurring increased host state violence. An empirical analysis of the impact of HROs and equal opportunity and access shows strong support for my hypotheses.

Chapter four of the dissertation looks at the impact that certain host state characteristics can have on state violence targeting refugee populations. I focus on both state capacity and political stability. State capacity, which takes into account levels of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality, impacts the ability of the state to handle an influx of a previously foreign population without upsetting the status quo, which if impacted, could lead to dissent, conflict, and ultimately repression. Political stability is also an important indicator as less politically stable regimes may be more willing to use repression relative to more politically stable regimes. Less politically stable regimes would be more willing to incur the potential domestic and international backlash from the use of repression as their hold on power is weaker and may feel like repression is one of the only options available to them. In an empirical analysis of both state capacity and political stability I find empirical support for my hypotheses.

Implications for Protecting Refugees

Based on the analysis, what are some strategies that can be adopted to ensure that refugees are afforded a welcoming and safe haven throughout their journey. For starters, given that one of the strongest indicators of state violence targeting refugees are acts of refugee violence, it makes sense to target the underlying causes leading to refugee violence. First, it would help if the state and others working with refugees within the state, such as international organizations and HROs, adopted some techniques used in conflict management to help prevent grievances that refugees may have with the state or vice versa from devolving into a tit-for-tat cycle of violence. For example, mediation efforts between refugee populations and state representatives could help prevent an onset of violence. Furthermore, having institutionalized and accepted means for refugee populations to petition the state or representatives in public offices could also help prevent an escalation of violence between the two parties. Having an opportunity to work within the system should reduce the likelihood that refugees would feel the need to resort to extralegal strategies such as taking up arms against the state or it's representatives. Institutionalized access to employment and education opportunities can also assist with the integration process of refugees as well as bring them closer to self-sufficiency which further reduces the potential for negative interactions with the state.

Beyond that, further support for HROs working with refugees, whether it comes from the state or the international community more broadly, can be of great assistance to reducing the chances that the state would feel the need to use repression targeting refugee populations within their borders. HROs can assist with the accommodation an integration of refugee populations. This would be of tremendous help to states without the resources to take care of refugee populations. HROs can also be a source of information for both the state and the refugees

themselves, further decreasing the chances that misperceptions or miscommunications could lead to further violence. Additionally, as the analysis has shown that state's with high state capacity are less likely to target refugee populations with violence, it makes sense to assist low capacity states with the administration and accommodation of refugee populations. International organizations such as the UNHCR or HROs can provide this function. Furthermore, the international community can encourage high capacity states to increase the number of refugees they choose to accept. Relatedly, states with high levels of political stability also prove to use less violence when dealing with refugee populations and the international community can also encourage those states to accept more refugees.

Suggestions for Future Research

While I hope that this dissertation has made a contribution to the study of refugees and their treatment by their respective host state, there remain copious avenues for more in depth analysis. Although the POSVAR dataset provides a much-needed look at state violence targeting refugees, more data is always helpful, especially when addressing these issues on a cross-national basis. Beyond the need for more data, it is imperative to discover some ways to account for the preemptive repression that occurs prior to refugees crossing a state's border. This is important since preemptive forms of repression and that strategy's ability to prevent refugees from crossing a state's borders are more than likely impacting the levels of repression targeting refugees found in available data. Next, I would be interested in exploring the success or failures of various conflict management techniques used by states and NGOs and how they can impact relations between refugees, their host state, as well as the local population. Perhaps there would be some merit in combining the disparate literature of conflict management and peace and the scholarship on refugees. There has also been recent debate about the impact that push-pull

factors have on the creation of refugees, their flight patterns, and where they ultimately end up. I would be curious to ascertain whether these push-pull factors also impact their treatment at the hands of their host state. There has also been recent discussion on mixed flows, which are population movements that contain both migrants and refugees. While the literature concerning refugees and migrants has been largely separate, I believe that it would be interesting to gauge whether the presence of one impacts the other. Finally, I also believe that the length of time that a refugee has been within a state impacts their treatment at the hands of their host state. I think it would be interesting to study whether longer term refugees are treated differently than recently arrived refugees.

REFERENCES

AidData. 2016. In *AidDataCore_ResearchRelease_Level1_V3.0 Research Releases dataset*. Williamsburg, VA: Accessed on: http://aiddata.org/aiddata-research-datasets.

Bagozzi, Benjamin E, Daniel W Hill Jr, Will H Moore, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2015. "Modeling Two Types of Peace: The Zero-inflated Ordered Probit (ZiOP) Model in Conflict Research." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (4):728-752.

Beech, Hannah. 2019. "A Million Refugees May Soon Lose Their Line in the Outside World." *The New York Times,* September 5, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/world/asia/rohingya-phone-ban.html

Bell, Sam R, K Chad Clay, and Amanda Murdie. 2012. "Neighborhood Watch: Spatial Effects of Human Rights INGOs." *The Journal of Politics* 74 (2):354-368.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2018. Bertelsmann Transformation Index. https://www.bti-project.org/en/home/.

Betts, Alexander, and Gil Loescher. 2011. "Refugees in International Relations." In *Refugees in International Relations*, edited by Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, 1-28. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Boix, Carles, Michael K. Miller and Sebastian Rosato. 2014. "Boix-Miller-Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy, 1800-2010." *Harvard Dataverse.*

Bracic, Ana. 2016. "Reaching the Individual: EU Accession, NGOs, and Human Rights." *The American Political Science Review* 110 (3):530.

Braithwaite, Alex, Tiffany S. Chu, Justin Curtis, and Faten Ghosn. 2018. "Violence and the Perception of Risk Associated with Hosting Refugees." *Public Choice*: 1-20.

Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, James D. Morrow, and Randolph M. Siverson. 2005a. *The Logic of Political Survival.* MIT Press.

Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, Feryal Marie Cherif, George W Downs, and Alastair Smith. 2005b. "Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (3):439-458.

Carey, Sabine C. 2006. "The Dynamic Relationship Between Protest and Repression." *Political Research Quarterly*, 59(1): 1-11.

Chenoweth, Erica, Evan Perkoski, and Sooyeon Kang. 2017. "State Repression and Nonviolent Resistance." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (9): 1950-1969.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Columbia University Press.

Choi, Seung-Whan, and Idean Salehyan. 2013. "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30 (1): 53-75.

Cingranelli, David, Paola Fajardo-Heyward, and Mikhail Filippov. 2014. "Principals, Agents and Human Rights." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (3): 605-630.

Cingranelli, David L, David L Richards, and K Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset." *CIRI Human Rights Data Project* 6.

Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Sven-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. In *V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Da Silva, Chantal. 2020. "Children Allegedly Teargassed as Greek Government Cracks Down on Asylum Seekers Protesting 'Dire' Living Conditions." *Newsweek,* February 3, 2020. https://www.newsweek.com/children-teargassed-asylum-seekers-lesvos-greece-1485393

Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State Repression and Political Order." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 1-23.

Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3):538-554.

Der Spiegel Staff. 2018. "Spain Becomes New Target for Migrants." *Spiegel International*, March 8, 2018. https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/refugees-now-aim-for-spain-in-their-migration-route-a-1221537.html.

Englehart, Neil A. 2009. "State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (2):163-180.

Faiola, Anthony and Souad Mekhennet. 2015. “A Refugee Riot puts a German Town on Edge.” *The Washington Post,* October 1, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-refugee-riot-puts-a-german-town-on-edge/2015/10/01/fa9075bc-65f5-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html

Fisk, Kerstin. 2016. "One-sided Violence in Refugee-hosting Areas." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (3): 1-28.

Franklin, James C. 2008. "Shame on You: the Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America." *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (1):187-211.

Freedom House. 2016. "Freedom in the World 2016." https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.

Ghosn, Faten, Alex Braithwaite, and Tiffany S. Chu. 2019. "Violence, displacement, contact, and attitudes toward hosting refugees." *Journal of peace research* 56 (1): 118-133.

Gineste, Christian, and Burcu Savun. 2019. "Introducing POSVAR: A Dataset on Refugee-Related Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (1):134-145.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5):712-724.

Gleditsch, N.P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.” *Journal of Peace Research.* 39(5): 615-637.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2008. "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem." *International Organization* 62 (4):689-716.

Head, Jonathan. 2019. “Rohingya Crisis: Villages Destroyed for Government Facilities.” *BBC News,* September 10, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49596113?utm_source=NEWS&utm_medium=email&utm_content=1st+section+2nd+story+bbc&utm_campaign=HQ_EN_therefugeebrief_external_20190910

Hill, Daniel W, and Zachary M Jones. 2014. "An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression." *American Political Science Review* 108 (03):661-687.

Human Rights Watch. 2019a. “Lebanon: Syrian Refugee Shelters Demolished.” July 5, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/05/lebanon-syrian-refugee-shelters-demolished#

Human Rights Watch. 2019b. “Bangladesh: Clampdown on Rohingya Refugees.” September 7, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/07/bangladesh-clampdown-rohingya-refugees#

Jäckle, Sebastian, and Pascal D. König. 2018. "Threatening events and anti-refugee violence: An empirical analysis in the wake of the refugee crisis during the years 2015 and 2016 in

Germany." *European Sociological Review* 34(6): 728-743.

Jakarta Post. 2019. "Jakarta Ends Aid as UNHCR Finds Solution for Asylum Seekers." *The Jakarta Post,* September 2, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/02/jakarta-ends-aid-unhcr-finds-solution-asylum-seekers.html?utm_source=NEWS&utm_medium=email&utm_content=2nd+section+1st+story+jakarta+post&utm_campaign=HQ_EN_therefugeebrief_external_20190902

Keck, Margaret E, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics." *International Social Science Journal* 51 (159):89-101.

Kingsley, Patrick. 2018. "Better to Drown: A Greek Refugee Camp's Epidemic of Misery." *The New York Times,* October 2, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/world/europe/greece-lesbos-moria-refugees.html

Kitsantonia, Niki. 2019. "Riots Erupt at Greek Migrant Camp in Lesbos after Deadly Fire." *The New York Times*, September 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/world/europe/greece-fire-riot-lesbos.html

Lebson, Mike. 2013. "Why Refugees Rebel: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Refugee Militarization." *International Migration* 51 (5):133-148.

Loescher, Gil. 1994. "The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?" *Journal of International Affairs* 47 (2): 351-377.

Maltezou, Renee. 2020. "Greek Police Fire Teargas at Protesting Migrants, Refugees on Lesbos." *Reuters,* February 3, 2020. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-greece-lesbos/greek-police-fire-teargas-at-protesting-migrants-refugees-on-lesbos-idUKKBN1ZX1S0

Manjoo, Farhad. 2017. "Snap Makes a Bet on the Cultural Supremacy of the Camera." *New York Times*, March 8, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/technology/snap-makes-a-bet-on-the-cultural-supremacy-of-the-camera.html.

Marshall, Monty G. and Gabrielle Elzinga-Marshall. 2017. "Global Report 2017: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility." *Center for Systemic Peace.*

Marshall, Monty G, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. 2014. "Polity IV Project: Dataset." *Available from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html*.

Martin, Adrian. 2005. "Environmental Conflict Between Refugee and Host Communities." *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (3):329-346.

McAlexander, Richard J. 2020. "How Are Immigration and Terrorism Related? An Analysis of Right-and Left-Wing Terrorism in Western Europe, 1980–2004." *Journal of Global Security Studies*.

McAuliffe, Marie, and Dinuk Jayasuriya. 2016. "Do asylum seekers and refugees choose destination countries? Evidence from large-scale surveys in Australia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka." *International Migration* 54 (4): 44-59.

Melander, Erik, Therése Pettersson, and Lotta Themnér. 2016. "Organized Violence, 1989-2015." *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(3): 727-742.

Miller, Erin, Gary LaFree, and Laura Dugan. 2018. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/global-terrorism-database-gtd

Moore, Will H, and Stephen M. Shellman. 2007. "Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees' Destinations, 1965-1995." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (4): 811-834.

Most, Benjamin A, and Harvey Starr. 2015. *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Murdie, Amanda. 2014. "The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations." *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (1):1-27.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R Davis. 2012. "Looking in the Mirror: Comparing INGO Networks across Issue Areas." *The Review of International Organizations* 7 (2):177-202.

Oltermann, Philip & Kate Connolly. 2020. "Germany Shooting: Far-Right Gunman Kills 10 in Hanau." *The Guardian*, February 20, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/19/shooting-germany-hanau-dead-several-people-shisha-near-frankfurt

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2019. In *The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data*. V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 4th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

Poe, Steven C. 2004. "The Decision to Repress." In *Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies*, edited by Sabine C Carey and Steven C Poe, 16-42. Ashgate.

Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88 (4):853-872.

Poe, Steven C, C Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993." *International studies quarterly* 43 (2):291-313.

PRS Group. 2019. International Country Risk Guide. Political Risk Services.

Regan, Patrick M., and Errol A. Henderson. 2002. "Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?" *Third World Quarterly* 23 (1): 119-136.

Rescue. 2019. "Jordan." https://www.rescue.org/country/jordan

Rescue. 2019. "Our Goals for Power." https://www.rescue.org/page/our-goals-power

Rowland, Mark, and François Nosten. 2001. "Malaria Epidemiology and Control in Refugee Camps and Complex Emergencies." *Annals of Tropical Medicine & Parasitology* 95 (8): 741-754.

Rüegger, Seraina, and Heidrun Bohnet. 2018. "The Ethnicity of Refugees (ER): A New Dataset for Understanding Flight Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35 (1): 65-88.

Salehyan, Idean. 2008. "The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4):787-801.

Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Gleditsch. 2006. "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War." *International Organization* 60 (2): 335-366.

Sánchez, Álvaro. 2018. "Spain is the Most Welcoming EU Country for Refugees, Survey Finds." *El País*, 2018. https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/09/21/inenglish/1537530658_492695.html.

Savun, Burcu, and Christian Gineste. 2019. "From Protection to Persecution: Threat Environment and Refugee Scapegoating." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (1):88-102.

Smith, Helena. 2020. "Greece Sends More Riot Police to Lesbos after Migrant Clashes." *The Guardian,* February 4, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/04/greece-sends-more-riot-police-to-lesbos-after-migrant-clashes

Smith, Jackie, and Dawn Wiest. 2005. "The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association." *Social Forces* 84 (2):621-652.

Stephan, Maria J, and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International security* 33 (1): 7-44.

Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko & Richard Svensson. 2017. The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se

Teorell, Jan, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko & Richard Svensson. 2019. "The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan19." *University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute*.

Toole, Michael J, and Ronald J Waldman. 1997. "The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations." *Annual Review of Public Health* 18 (1): 283-312.

UN General Assembly, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 14 January 2020]

UN General Assembly, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html [accessed 14 January 2020]

UNHCR. 2019. "Advocacy." https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/advocacy.html

UNHCR Population Statistics. 2019. UNHCR Time-Series data. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series

Weber, Max. 1965. *Politics as a Vocation.* Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Weiner, Myron. 1992. "Security, Stability, and International Migration." *International Security* 17 (3): 91-126.

WorldBank. 2016. World Bank Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Wright, Thorin M., and Shweta Moorthy. 2018. "Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression." *International Interactions* 44 (1):132-155.