THEY DON'T MAKE CONCEPTS LIKE THEY USED TO: REREADING THE AFFECT THEORY-COGNITIVISM DEBATE AS POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

by

VINCENT LI

(Under the Direction of Piers Stephens)

ABSTRACT

Recent debates between affect theorists and cognitivists of emotion indicate a decided lack of common understanding of crucial terms and concepts. In this paper, I set out to partially remedy this problem by addressing the crucially post-Kantian philosophical background for debates over the conceptuality of experience. To this end, I evaluate Linda Zerilli's conceptualist reading of Arendt and argue that there are strong Arendtian grounds for requiring nonconceptual content. I conclude the paper with a speculative comparison of Arendt and Deleuze's reading of reflective judgment in order to indicate a basis for a nonconceptualist theory of political judgment.

INDEX WORDS: Arendt, Deleuze, Judgment, Zerilli, Conceptualism, Affect theory

THEY DON'T MAKE CONCEPTS LIKE THEY USED TO: REREADING THE AFFECT THEORY-COGNITIVISM DEBATE AS POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

by

VINCENT LI

B.A., The University of Georgia, 2017

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTERS OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2019

THEY DON'T MAKE CONCEPTS LIKE THEY USED TO: REREADING THE AFFECT THEORY-COGNITIVISM DEBATE AS POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

by

Vincent Li

Major Professor:	Piers Stephens
Committee:	Sarah Wright
	Chris Cuomo

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Interim Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER

CHAPTER 1

THE COGNITIVISM-AFFECT THEORY DEBATE

In her reply to a 2011 debate between William Connolly and Ruth Leys, Linda Zerilli offers a cognitivist critique of affect theory (Zerilli 2015). She presents what I take to be a historical argument in that she attempts to trace contemporary affect theory's influences in phenomenological accounts of non-intellectualist, embodied skilled coping (263). On Zerillli's view, the turn to theorizing the nonconceptual, embodied aspects of experience served as a useful corrective for strict intellectualist accounts of the political subject and decision-making. The danger, however, is that the nonconceptualist picture might now "hold us captive" to "the way things "*must be*" (264). Zerilli criticizes nonconceptualist phenomenology for taking nonconceptual, embodied coping as the foundation of experience (267). Affect theory radicalizes this "layer-cake" ontology by positing "pre-individual bodily forces" that entirely precede cognition and the subject (ibid). Because these forces precede cognition and the subject, they cannot be connected to critical judgment, which reduces politics to the practice of tactically manipulating other's feelings (268, 269). The alternative, it seems, is to insist on thinking the "radical entanglement of affect and conceptual rationality" in such a way as to avoid lapse into a caricatured opposition (282). Zerilli's names the problem of thinking this entanglement the "problem of critical judgment" (ibid).

Although I am sympathetic to Zerilli's concerns, I think that the cognitivist critique of affect theory largely misses its mark. Affect is a relational concept employed by a constructivist theory of the political subject. Affect is 'pre-individual' because the individual is constituted by

affective relations and does not itself precede those relations as an independent term. Similarly, affect is nonsignifying because affect theory posits that signification and conceptualization emerge from nonsignifying, nonconceptual *genetic* elements. To take these elements as psychological is to miss the peculiarly ontological and transcendental point that readers of Deleuze are usually attempting to make. Affect, in other words, is not a psychological primitive property but a relational ontological term according to which experience, concept, and the subject can be *engendered.*

Of course, the cognitivist is unlikely to find this brief summary persuasive. The complexity of Deleuze's ontology is such that one might be suspicious that Deleuze and affect theorists are obscuring an implicit appeal to psychological primitives. Furthermore, affect theorists and cognitivists also genuinely disagree with one another about the constitution of experience. The cognitivist is unlikely to be comfortable with any account that attempts to theorize the emergence of the conceptual out of the nonconceptual, whereas the affect theorist is unlikely to attribute the same constitutive role to concepts that the cognitivist attributes. Consequently, the cognitivist critique still warrants evaluation even if much of the debate concerns a conflation of an ontological concept with an empirical, psychological one. Furthermore, the precise nature of both misunderstandings and disagreements is likely to be partially clarified through a closer examination of what cognitivists mean by concepts.

In order to clarify the debate between affect theory and cognitivism, I attempt to clarify some of the presuppositions held by cognitivists and to adduce the crucially *post-Kantian* character of the discussion. Specifically, I summarize Zerilli's philosophical influences John McDowell and Hannah Arendt. In summarizing John McDowell's conceptualism, I cash out his view in terms of his notion of 'logical structure,' which is the determinate unity of intuition in

accordance with categories of the understanding and apperceptive spontaneity. I, then, address the incompatibility of his notion of logical structurte with Zerilli's requirements regarding reflective judgment. In order to clarify Zerilli's requirements regarding reflective judgment, I specifically develop Hannah Arendt's requirement that the content of reflective judgment have an *indeterminate* unity, which I cash out in Deleuzian terms as a free, indeterminate harmony of the faculties. In clarifying these respective views, I draw out a fundamental incompatibility between Arendt's view and McDowell's as concerning the independence of the faculty of imagination and the mental activity of judging. Arendt requires both the independence of imagination in the sensation of particularity and the independence of judging from knowing and thinking. Neither requirement is possible under the legislation of the understanding, which serves as the condition for the logical structure of experience. Thus, I argue that Arendtian judgment is crucially nonconceptual in two respects: 1) judgment is concerned with particulars which are synthesized in their *particularity* preconceptually and 2) the aesthetic common sense is distinct from the empirical common sense, that is, the legislated accord of the understanding over the other faculties performed on the sane object.

In arguing for this position, I take it for granted that the majority of everyday experiences might very well be informed by concepts. Nonetheless, experience includes a nonconceptual residuum of experience that is related to particularity. Furthermore, judging as a creative, synthetic activity is an *exceptional* activity, that is, one which exceeds or is not a part of everyday experience. As a further note on terminology, I will take concept throughout this paper in the Kantian sense of a mediate representation of multiple possible objects with reference to what is common to those objects. In short, concepts involve generalizations. Even when cognitivists assert that concepts can be singular, their interest in singular concepts is still an

interest in the thinker's capacity for the mediate representation of particulars. Finally, I do not intend to address affect theory's position directly in this paper. My concern, here, is simply evaluating the coherence of cognitivism's account, although I will raise certain characteristically Deleuzian concerns about the cognitivist and Arendtian accounts of judgment. In referencing affect theory in this introduction, I only mean to indicate the broader scope of my project, which consists in working towards a theory of normativity as creative synthetic activity. I gesture towards this project by providing comparing Deleuze and Arendt's readings of Kantian reflective judgment in the final section of this paper.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUALISM AND NONCONCEPTUALISM

Zerilli's argument in her critical reply can be summarized as having two prongs: 1) Affect theory can be shown as lacking obvious motivation on a nonintellectualist conceptualism and 2) Nonconceptualism struggles to provide an account of critical judgment and normativity. In this section, I develop the first argument by contextualizing it to the work of philosophical conceptualism of John McDowell. I specifically explain McDowell's 'fine-grained' and 'nonintellectual' conceptualism.

McDowell holds that experience is fundamentally conceptual in content. Content is what is given by a 'that clause' as in cases of the attribution of belief, e.g. 'Peter believes that it is raining' (McDowell 1994, 3). Content is understood to be representational in the modern sense, which I take to mean that content has semantic, truth-bearing properties (4). Content, finally, involves experiential intake, a thought which McDowell traces to Kant's contention that "thoughts without content are blind" (McDowell, 4; *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75, henceforth *CPR*). Thoughts without experiential intake are 'blind' in that they are not *of* anything and simply involve an interplay of concepts.

McDowell's conceptual content is 'fine-grained.' Fine-grainedness means that the conceptual content of experience is supposed to have the same determinacy of detail that is supposed of nonconceptual content. Whatever is referred to within experience is produced by a capacity that is already integrated within spontaneity, that is, within one's capacity to think freely and rationally in accordance with evidence (58). McDowell develops this view in response to

Gareth Evans's argument for nonconceptual content from the determinacy of color experience. Evans argues that there are far more shades of color given in experience than a subject has color concepts (56). For Evans, color concepts are *coarse-grained* classes described by names such as 'red,' 'green,' or even 'burnt sienna.' Thus, a particular shade has a particularity not given by a general class. McDowell counters that the perception can, in fact, be conceptually specified with the demonstrative phrase "that shade," which "exploits the presence of the sample" (57). Although the physical presence of the shade is what initially enables reference, the subject retains the capacity for reference through the *persistence* of the perception in memory. Thus, the subject has the adequate *distance* from the perception for the perception to be subject to generalization, judgment, and linguistic expression. That one might never be presented with the particular shade again is irrelevant to the fact that one *could* reference the shade. The content of experience, then, consists in its *potential thinkability*. The perception itself serves as the content of experience, and the content is conceptual in its potential thinkability, that is, its integration within capacities for rational thought.

Fineness of grain bears on a parallel motivation of the emotional cognitivist against nonconceptualism. Emotions are often assumed to exceed discursive capacities and even be ineffable. Zerilli argues that the nonconceptualist rejects conceptualism out of a fear of losing or distorting particularity through particularity's being subsumed under coarse-grained concept classes (279). If, however, the conceptual content of experience is already fine-grained, no particularity is lost (280). Any variation not expressed by the general concept is still itself thinkable through sensation's integration within spontaneity.

Why is thinking's proper mode conceptuality? Here, I find McDowell's influential *Mind and World* to be obscure. The answer seems clearer in the more recent *Having the World in View*

(McDowell 2009). On the account of the later book, experience need not include *explicit* propositional content as experience has an *intuitive,* conceptual structure (2009, 94). McDowell develops this view with reference to the following quote from Kant:

> The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. Kant *CPR,* A79/BI04-5; ibid.

Intuitions, as "cases of sensory consciousness of objects," have the same logical structure as judgments (ibid). Judgments subsume objects beneath concepts and thereby make conceptually appraised objects available to the unified thinking subject, the apperceptive unity of the 'I think' (2009, 148). Intuitions have this same logical structure in that they involve the formal concept of an object in general and must be accompaniable by the thought 'I think.' On McDowell's updated view, my experience does not *itself* involve a proposition, but instead my experience has a unity that is *akin* to a propositional structure in that my experience is synthesized in accordance with linguistic, conceptual capacities (2009, 261). This structure is what accounts for my ability to attend to a particular aspect of a unified intuition and give that aspect linguistic determination, that is, this structure accounts for the potential thinkability of intuition.

The implicit logical structure of intuition provides for the *nonintellectual* character of experience. Conceptual content is nonintellectual because content does not require explicit propositional belief. If experience already has the structural unity of judgment, then conscious judgment is not required for experience's conceptuality. Here, cognitivists inspired by McDowell often make further reference to Wittgensteinian aspect-seeing to substantiate this point (Hutchinson, 102-3; Zerilli, 272). Wittgenstein's famous example, drawing on Gestalt (figure) psychology, is that of the duck-rabbit, an ambiguous picture that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. With the duck-rabbit, one need not consciously interpret the picture in order to see the

figure as a duck or rabbit. Instead, one attends to certain aspects of the figure and thereby comes to *see* a duck or a rabbit. The motivation of this view, as with fine-grainedness, is partially to demonstrate that the motivations of nonconceptualism can be satisfied without a nonconceptualist account. Cases that lack explicit propositional belief fail to falsify the conceptualist view. The bearing of nonintellectualism on emotional cognitivism should be obvious. The experience of being ‘at a loss for words’ in the grips of a strong emotion would seem to falsify emotional cognitivism. If conceptualism does not require explicit propositional attitudes, then the nonconceptualist intuition of experience’s apparent ineffability can be accommodated.

CHAPTER 3

NORMATIVITY AND JUSTIFICATION

In the section above, I clarified what I take to be the two most distinctive features and related them to objections often made by nonconceptualists. These arguments are largely negative. In this section, I develop McDowell's positive motivation of preserving the normativity of epistemic justification and his commitment to metaphysical quietism. I, then, argue that Zerilli's emotional cognitivist view seems to share McDowell's positive motivation in that both require conceptual mediation for justification. Zerilli's commitment to theorizing the conceptual **and** nonconceptual elements of judgment, however, is incompatible with McDowell's quietism. If nonconceptual content is required for thinking judgment, then McDowell's positive motivation must also be rethought.

McDowell motivates his influential account in Mind and World with reference to an apparent antinomy, which follows in part from the empiricist commitment to knowledge providing a relationship between mind and reality (xii). Specifically, the antinomy results if one takes this commitment as requiring that mind be related to something 'real' within experience itself, that is, something determined by material causes. If the relationship of mind to reality depends on something causally determined, then this relationship will consist in reference to material causes rather than to reasons or justifications. Justification requires reference to the conceptual content of experience, the possibility of which is developed in the section above. I do not believe that there is a dog before me because I am acquainted with a fuzzy blob that I interpret as a dog, but because I see a dog. This picture of knowledge as requiring something

causally extrinsic to conceptuality and reason is named, following Wilfrid Sellars, *the Myth of the Given.*

The view diametrically opposed to the Myth of the Given forms the other half of the antinomy. If one recoils from the Myth of the Given, one might be tempted to reject the empiricist commitment to mind's relationship to reality. In rejecting the empirical commitment, one lapse into what McDowell terms a "frictionless coherentism;" one rejects the need for a relationship to reality and insists that knowledge consists purely in relationships between concepts (18). For McDowell, experience is conceptually informed and nonetheless *of* objects within a *thinkable* world (33). Intuitions involve the *passive* deployment of the same conceptual capacities that are *actively* drawn upon in judgment (28-29). McDowell contends that the difference between passive intuition and active judgment provides adequate friction that knowledge can be taken to be more than a non-experiential, subjective projection. The subject must still reflect on the deliverances of experience, even if what is reflected upon is already conceptually informed.

That the opposition between the Myth of the Given and frictionless coherentism is framed as an antinomy indicates one last feature of McDowell's account. McDowell's view can be understood as metaphysically *quietist* in its rejection of "constructive philosophy" based upon false dualisms (1995, 93). The opposition presented above is understood to be only an apparent one because the opposition relies on the assumption that the original commitment (mind's relationship to reality) requires something extrinsically determined within experience. As soon as the assumption of this connection is demonstrated as being a false antinomy, the problem can simply be dissolved. Constructive philosophy around the terms which originally generated the false antinomy is no longer required (94). McDowell's quietism, then, can be understood as a

commitment to avoiding unnecessary metaphysical speculation around false dualisms. This requirement can be observed in McDowell's commitment to the "bare idea of Bildung," that is, to the assumption that experience is always, at least in part, influenced by enculturation and socialization (95). McDowell writes:

> The bare idea of Bildung ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhuman. . .This leaves no genuine questions about norms, apart from those that we address in reflective thinking about specific norms, an activity that is not particularly philosophical. There is no need for constructive philosophy, directed at the very idea of norms of reason, or the structure within which meaning comes into view, from the standpoint of the naturalism that threatens to disenchant nature. Page 95

Philosophy regarding the norms of reason is otiose. Norms of reason do not require theorization because they are not transcendently spooky; norms are presupposed by the activity of knowers in a society. Specific knowers will inevitably discuss specific norms, but the theorization of the armchair philosopher is not required for the success of these discussions. Thus, McDowell does not deny all theories of nonconceptual content but rejects any attempt to theorize the emergence of conceptuality from nonconconceptual processes (55). This position is, to my mind, an inevitable result of McDowell's quietism. A precise account of the relationship between the conceptual and the nonconceptual within experience retains the terms of the opposition. Experience is thoroughly conceptual and minimally informed by enculturation. Further theorization constitutes unnecessary metaphysical speculation.

Emotional cognitivism seems to share similar normative motivations. Leys argues that affect seems to determine thinking and acting. Because affect is encapsulated, the affect theoretical subject is incapable of making normative pronouncements, "so that preferring democracy to despotism is like preferring tea to coffee" (452). Zerilli emphasizes the separation of affective and rational systems: "The 'wild card' of affect has lost any connection to our power of judgment: affect and cognition are posited as being two different systems, entirely distinct"

(2015, 269). If affect is purely causal and nonconceptual, then affect could be understood as a peculiar kind of Given that undermines the normativity of **political** justification. Zerilli specifically invokes McDowell's requirement of distance with regard to the conceptuality of 'that shade' (280). Zerilli writes: ". . .when we speak of 'that shade' we have in mind something that is just as 'fine-grained' as our perception of the color sample; we attend to that shade as having the *general form* of a concept" (ibid). Although one's political concepts might lack the fine-grained particularity of the particular judgment, the persistence of that particular judgment in memory and its thinkability will provide the distance required for that judgment's being rightly understood as conceptual. One's sense of outrage at injustice might have the *indeterminate* content of one's being capable of expressing this feeling and expecting others to be similarly outraged.

Zerilli's reference to the 'general form of a concept' would seem to evoke McDowell's notion of the logical structure of intuition, but this connection is difficult to explicate. For McDowell, the conceptuality of intuition comes from intuitions having the same logical structure as *determining* judgments. Zerilli, however, is concerned with *reflective* judgments, which precisely lack the objective necessity and determinacy of determining judgments. Determining judgments subsume an object given in intuition underneath a category of the understanding. The *conceptuality* of McDowellian intuitions, consequently, consists in their having the same conceptual, determinate unity as determining judgments. Reflective judgments have an *indeterminate* content and the *intersubjective* necessity of the expectation of agreement. Zerilli cashes this view out in a Wittgensteianian manner by taking rules to emerge out of practice, approval and disapproval, and "forms of life" (275-6). The 'general form of the concept' seems to be cashed out in the thinkability of reflective judgments. Thinkability, however, is an

inadequate explanation because McDowell requires **both** thinkability and determinate conceptual unity. It would be question-begging to explain conceptuality in terms of thinkability, while also asserting that anything thinkable must be conceptual. McDowell's view is not question-begging because experience is thinkable **by virtue** of its determinate conceptual unity. Because indeterminate content lacks this unity, Zerilli must cash out her account in a different manner.

I cannot come up with a way to cash out indeterminate content in a manner consistent with McDowellian conceptualism. The indeterminacy of reflective judgments consists in their not being conceptually determined. Arguing that conceptual content can be fine-grained or nonintellectual does not demonstrate that conceptual content can be indeterminate. Furthermore, indeterminacy and determinacy would need to be explained by a feature of their conceptual content, rather than a lack of conceptual content. Zerilli seems to have something like this in mind, when she contends that conceptual content need not be intellectual and rule-following, but such an explanation might put the norms of reason into question in a way that would be unacceptable to the McDowellian. Even if not all conceptual content need be rule-following, asserting the distinction would conflict with McDowell's notion of a bare commitment to Bildung; although not all conceptual content need be rule-following, theorizing a distinction between determinate and indeterminate content still constitutes unnecessary philosophizing about the norms of reason. Zerilli, consequently, must reject McDowell's commitment to quietism in order to theorize indeterminate conceptual content.

This point allows me to formulate a final point regarding the incompatibility of McDowell and Zerilli's views regarding the role of philosophy. Zerilli is clearly interested in a philosophical account of judgment, but there is no obvious need for such a theory on

McDowellian grounds because the norms of judgment do not require philosophical theorization..

Zerilli explicitly calls for a description of the "radical entanglement" of concept and affect:

> Can we describe the radical entanglement of affect and conceptual rationality in a way that keeps their mutual imbrication from sliding into always already affectively primed responses, on the one hand, or always already conceptually determined responses on the other? This is the real problem—the problem of critical judgment—raised at once by and for affect theory. Page 282

While Zerilli obviously shares the McDowellian view of the inseparability of concept and nonconcept, her call for describing their entanglement seems no less than a call for the exact sort of constructive philosophy that the McDowellian rejects. The commitment to quietism serves, in part, to precisely block the demand made by the nonconceptualist that the McDowellian must provide an account of the synthesis of experience in terms of conceptual and nonconceptual content. Experience is simply irreducibly conceptual; any theorization beyond that would likely require appeal to the nonconceptual. If nonconceptual content is allowed back into the picture, then Zerilli must reply to McDowell's criticism of Givenness or establish her own standards for evaluating the dual dangers of material reductionism and intellectualism. Zerilli calls for a theory that includes nonconceptual content and, therefore, must revise the McDowellian criticism of Givenness and reject quietism. Even if Zerilli does not ultimately settle on a hybrid conceptual-nonconceptual view of experience, such a view cannot be ruled out from the outset of any inquiry into judgment.

CHAPTER 4

KNOWING, THINKING, AND JUDGING

In the previous section, I argued that Zerilli's call for thinking the problem of judgment as a problem of thinking the entanglement of affect and concept requires that she reject and revise McDowell's normative commitments. By revision, I meant that Zerilli's normative requirements must be treated as being independent of McDowell's requirements. As indicated by the quote, these requirements should be understood as avoiding materialist reductionism and avoiding intellectualism about experience. Nonconceptual content of some kind must be allowed back into the picture to think the entanglement of affect and concept and to ground the distinction between determinate and indeterminate content. In this section, I outline an additional argument for why nonconceptual content should be included in the theorization of judgment: nonconceptual content explains the phenomenology of particulars for Arendt, who provides the philosophical inspiration for Zerilli's interest in judgment. I also outline a transcendental idealist picture that allows for nonconceptual content to avoid materialist reductionism.

Zerilli's concern with reflective judgment takes inspiration from Arendt's treatment of judgment as Zerilli is an Arendt scholar (Zerilli 2005; 2009). Arendt explicitly connects reflective judgment with political judgment and distinguishes them from determining judgment:

> The links between [the] two parts [of The Critique of Judgment] . . . are closer connected with the political than with anything in the other Critiques. The most important of these links are first that in neither of the two parts Kant speaks of man as an intelligible or cognitive being. The word truth does not occur. Arendt *Life of the Mind,* page 256, henceforth *LM*

Determining judgment, that is the cognition of empirical objects, concerns truth. Reflective judgments concern something else. An additional distinction between thinking and judging is required. When thought deals with purely with categories of the understanding or with moral laws, thought is concerned with the universal and necessary. The paradox of judging for Arendt is that judgment is "'the faculty of thinking the particular'; but to think means to generalize, hence it is the faculty of mysteriously combining the particular and the general" (271). Judging, then, might have the same criteria as thinking, but the two will still be distinguished by their given; thinking concerns generalities and judging particulars. Determining judging (knowing) and reflective judging will be distinguished by their modus operandi or their own rules.

Thinking involves generalization because thinking is primarily concerned with the 'invisibles' of meaning. Thinking first requires the "de-sensing" of objects through the abstraction of particularity and materiality; the particular, material object is internalized and reproduced within memory by the imagination (87). Thinking and knowing, then, can be initially distinguished by their objects. The objects of thought are internal, general 'thought-objects,' abstracted from materiality and particularity; they are 'invisibles.' The objects of knowledge are sense-objects and have a "sheer thereness" that is not produced by reason but a sort of sixth sense, which provides a sense of realness to the other sensations (50-1). This inner sense of reality is crucially not produced by thinking as thinking is concerned with invisibles, that is, de-sensed mental objects (51). The sense of reality, instead, corresponds to a common sense and to the context of the appearance of objects and of knowers. Common sense entails that 1) the five senses have a *common* object, 2) the object is sensed in a shared epistemic context, and 3) other knowers agree on the identity of the object (50). Despite never being directly given in sensation, common sense remains impenetrable to thinking:

> Whatever thinking can reach and whatever it may achieve, it is precisely reality as given to common sense, in its sheer thereness, that remains forever beyond its grasp, indissoluble into thought-trains—the stumbling block that alerts them and on which they founder in affirmation or negation" (51-52).[1]

Common sense can be given in naturalistic, evolutionary terms, while thinking "transcends all biological data" (52). Thinking "subjects everything to doubt" and "has no such natural, matter-of-fact relation to reality" (ibid). Thinking, then, can be summarized as being concerned with mental-objects shorn of their particularity and materiality.

The sensorily given and the realness provided by common sense are both opposed to thought's concern with invisibles. Although Arendt does not explicitly declare sensation and common sense to be nonconceptual, Arendt does seem to locate Kantian concepts and schema on the side of the invisibles of thought (100-1). Arendt, at another point, describes a Stoic procedure for internalizing the sense-object as mental object (157). Through the reproduction of the object in memory, one internalizes what is 'essential' and even 'intentional' about the object by purging it of the 'existential' and inessential. (ibid). The existential remains an "alien" reality opposed to the thinking ego, and it is Hegel who completed this "bracketing of reality" by bringing "the whole world into consciousness as though it were essentially nothing but a mental phenomenon" (ibid). Arendt, then, describes the sense-object as 'particular,' 'existential,' 'sheer,' 'alien,' and as 'a stumbling block to thought.' Although Arendt never explicitly declares herself to have a hybrid conceptual-nonconceptual picture of experience, it is hard to cash out 'sheer thereness' as anything but nonconceptual.

The nonconceptuality of particulars, furthermore, plays an *explanatory* role with regard to distinguishing between thinking and judging. Thinking and judging are distinguished by their objects or givens; thinking concerns generalities and judging particulars. Although thinking and

[1] Here, I choose the word impenetrability because it seems closer to Arendt's choices of 'indissolubility' and 'stumbling block.' Contemporary phenomenology seems to use opacity to refer to the same quality.

determining judging seem to have different criterion, thinking and reflective judging both seem to be concerned with meaning (14; 96). The difference between thinking and reflective judging, then, seems to be accounted for by the particularity of reflective judging's object. Particularity, in turn, is partially cashed out in terms of its nonconceptual 'sheer thereness.' This view is obviously unacceptable to the McDowellian because the nonconceptual Givenness of particularity cannot account for a difference in kind in normative mental activities. Of course, experience has a characteristic fineness of grain and involves experiential intake for McDowell, but both of these features are integrated into conceptual capacities for McDowell, whereas Arendt's 'sheer thereness' is not.

An Arendtian account of judgment, then, would seem to require an account of particularity in terms of its nonconceptual sheer thereness. An Arendtian that also adopted Zerilli's requirement of avoiding materialist reductionism and intellectualism might find their solution in transcendental idealism. Although conceptualist readings of Kant obviously have their supporters, nonconceptualism is not an indefensible reading. Here, I find Gary Banham's survey of contemporary readings of Kantian synthesis to be informative (Banham 2005). Banham offers two arguments against McDowell's assimilation of intuition to demonstrative concepts. Firstly, intuitions are both *immediate* and *singular* for Kant (16). McDowell retains immediacy by holding that intuitions are *immediately* of objects. McDowell must dispense with singularity according to Banham because singularity requires an *existence* condition that cannot be met by concepts. Concepts cannot meet an existence condition because they cannot have existence as a property for Kant as indicated by his rejection of the ontological argument for the existence of. Banham offers the second objection that intuition seems to have its unity preconceptually for Kant (17-18). McDowell's view, however, cannot account for this

preconceptual unity as it is precisely what McDowell rules out. Banham's second objection can be partially fleshed out with reference to intensive magnitudes and the formal intuitions of space and time. I will first focus on the irreducibility of intuitions to concepts.

The argument from incongruent counterparts provides a straightforward example of why intuitions must be, at least in part, nonconceptual. Two symmetrical objects, say one's hands, can be held to be conceptually identical (214). Nonetheless, the hands will be spatially individuated as the left and right hand. This individuation is independent of the concept of 'hand.' This example is consistent with the view that intuitions have an existential character independent of their determination under a general category.

Intensive magnitudes serve as an additional way of characterizing the transcendental idealist picture of intuition. Sensation, firstly, can be characterized as the *matter* of intuition, whereas space and time are the *form* (216). One's awareness of an object, at its most general, concerns "consciousness of affection" (ibid). This consciousness of affection exerts a "degree of influence," and this degree of influence is corresponds to what is called the *intensive magnitude* of a sensation (Kant *CPR*, B208; Banham, 216-7). Banham quotes Kant:

> Every sensation . . . is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and gradually vanish. Between reality in the [field of] appearance and negation there is therefore a continuity of many possible intermediate sensations, the difference between any two of which is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero or complete negation. In other words, the real in the [field of] appearance has always a magnitude. But since its apprehension by means of mere sensation takes place in an instant and not through successive synthesis of different sensations, and therefore does not proceed from parts to the whole, the magnitude is to be met with only in the apprehension. Kant A168/B210; Banham, 218-219

Sensations always include an intensive magnitude, which is capable of being diminished to virtually zero (at zero, the sensation ceases) (219). Sensation can, in other words, be universally characterized in terms of its intensity; a pain can be sharp or dull, a sound can be loud or quiet.

Banham argues that intensive magnitudes gives sensation the universal *structural complexity* of *degree*. Intensive magnitudes imply a comparison or inbuilt measurement with regard to the virtual zero of extinction. Because sensation cannot be experienced at this zero point, one's relationship to sensation is likely to consist in the continuity of successive instants. Certainly, this continuity is required for the "complex object" to be received, that is, one requires the synthesis of successive instants through the form of space and time (ibid). Because intensive magnitudes or a degree of affection are required for the receipt of an object, intensive magnitudes serve as a condition of our cognition of objects; objects, in turn, are given as "before us and independently of us" (220). Intensive magnitudes, then, serve as a condition for the "reality" of objects that Banham cashes out as the degree of our being affected and as being an irreducible *quale* of experience (ibid).

Banham's account of intensive magnitudes serves to provide a neat transcendental idealist solution to Arendt's 'sheer thereness.' Arendt clarifies, as noted above, that realness is impenetrable to thinking and is guaranteed by a social epistemic context. Common sense does not clarify the impenetrability of the object because common sense is also similarly impenetrable to thought. Presumably, impenetrability precedes the common recognition by others, and common recognition is required precisely because thought cannot provide any of its own guarantees. Banham's discussion, of degree of affect offers an easy way of cashing the impenetrability of reality. I am affected to a certain degree, and my affection characterizes the 'reality' of the object. When I confirm the identity of this real object with others, I confirm another aspect of its reality. When one generalizes about the object, one abstracts from the particular elements of intensive magnitude, as well as spatial and temporal position. Thus, I abstract from what individuates the object *in its particularity,* that is, its matter and form. When I

abstract from the individuating particularity of the object, I am presented with its essence, my intentional object, or an invisible generality. The difference between sense-objects and mental-objects consists in the individuating particularity of sense-objects. This particularity is nonconceptual because it is synthesized independent from the understanding. This nonconceptual content is not ontologically simple because it involves the structural complexity of degree and continuity.

Ontological complexity avoids materialist reductionism understood as ontological simplicity. The rejection of naïve empiricism by McDowell is arguably the most compelling motivation for his account. It is difficult to see how complex properties can be given by bare sensibles, which I understand as ontologically simple sense data. Furthermore, reference to bare sensibles seems inappropriate for epistemic justification. Transcendental idealism, as Banham shows, provides a far more sophisticated picture by which some complex properties could be nonconceptual. The viability of reference to nonconceptual content, furthermore, still comes through the subsumption of the intuition underneath a category of judgment. Of course, this response is unlikely to be satisfying to the McDowellian, but I have already argued that the full force of McDowell's requirements must be rejected in order to fulfill Zerilli's requirements. Transcendental idealism, then, seems well suited to address Zerilli's motivation of positive theorization of judgment without running afoul of her motivation of preserving its normativity.

McDowell, in turn, seems to sense the danger posed by transcendental idealism. In his 2009 work, McDowell criticizes transcendental idealism for lapsing into subjectivism (2009, 80). This criticism locates transcendental idealism on the opposite side of the antinomy from naïve empiricism and consequently invokes, to my mind, the weaker motivation. On McDowell's reading of Kant, the success of the Kantian picture consists in its securing the objectivity of

knowledge by securing the objectivity of the conditions of experience (78). One must, then, be able to know that the conditions are genuine conditions. The problem with the formal intuitions of space and time is that these conditions seem to be synthesized by the imagination independent of the understanding. Consequently, the formal intuitions must be synthesized as *mere* reflections of a nonrational aspect of our subjectivity:

> What spoils things is that when we widen the picture to take in transcendental idealism, it turns out that the "objects" that we have contrived to see empirical intuitions as immediately of, thanks to the fact that the intuitions have a kind of unity that must be understood in terms of apperceptive spontaneity, are after all, in respect of their spatiality and temporality, mere reflections of another aspect of our subjectivity, one that is independent of apperceptive spontaneity. Page 81

Only if the formal intuitions are brought within the purview of apperceptive spontaneity, can one genuinely know the intuitions of space and time as conditions of experience. Space and time cease to be simply a “fact about us” and become genuine conditions (78). I do not find this motivation remotely compelling or plausible. The formal intuitions of space and time do not correspond to empirical objects and consequently cannot be revised in accordance with evidence. Consequently, I do not see what including the intuition of the unity of space or the unity of time in apperceptive spontaneity is meant to accomplish. This motivation seems far more concerned with preserving McDowell’s explicitly Hegelian reading of Kant, than with anything that might be of concern to a theorist primarily interested in the problem of judgment (81).

CHAPTER 5

THINKING

In the previous section, I argued that an Arendtian account of judgment requires nonconceptual content to explain the difference between particulars and generalities. Cashing this nonconceptual content out in terms of transcendental idealism avoids McDowell's more trenchant criticism of naïve empiricism. Finally, this discussion allowed me to elicit an implicit McDowellian commitment to the *unity* of subjectivity, that is, to knowledge and its conditions being synthesized entirely in accordance with apperceptive spontaneity. In this section, I develop Arendt's requirement of *internal difference* within the thinking subject and suggest that this requirement indicates a more fundamental incompatibility between conceptualism and Arendt's philosophy.

McDowell's requirement that intuition be integrated within and subject to apperceptive spontaneity can be characterized as being concerned with the *unity* of the thinking subject. The objection made by McDowell against transcendental idealism is that the form of intuition cannot belong to an aspect of our subjectivity that lies outside of spontaneity (81). What is encountered in intuition, in other words, must be the same rational capacities that are also used to actively think about the objects given in intuition. The source of intuition must be identical to the source of active thinking, that is, the unified thinking subject.

This requirement of McDowell's most clearly runs counter to Arendt's requirements because Arendt's subject is *non-self-identical.* Arendt's notion of the activity of thinking provides the clearest example. Arendt's conception of thinking revolves around the experience of

the thinking ego, which she derives from a Socratic maxim concerning the maintenance of harmony with oneself (181). She argues straightforwardly that nothing which is truly identical can be in or out of harmony with itself; "you always need at least two tones to produce a harmonious sound" (183). She articulates *consciousness* as "'literally, as we have seen, 'to know with myself'" and "the curious fact that in a sense I also am for myself" (ibid). She concludes that the Oneness of self includes an internal difference and takes this internal difference as generative of a duality within thinking, a dialogue of myself with myself: "I am both the one who asks and the one who answers" (185). The non-identical thinking subject, furthermore, evidences an ontological condition of difference: ". . . difference and otherness, which are such outstanding characteristics of the world of appearances. . . are the very conditions for the existence of man's mental ego. . ." and "[thinking's] inherent duality points to the *infinite plurality* which is the law of the earth" (187). Not only is difference internal to the thinking subject, but this difference is required by a metaphysical principle of difference.

Internal difference is also not exclusive to thinking. The Arendtian subject is also *plural* in that the mental activities are independent of one another. Arendt criticizes much of the Western philosophical canon:

> What is so remarkable in all these theories and doctrines is their implicit monism, the claim that behind the obvious multiplicity of the world's appearances and, even more pertinently for our context, behind the obvious plurality of man's faculties and abilities, there must exist a oneness—the old hen pan, "the all is one"-either a single source or a single ruler. 70.

Arendt connects, once again, the multiplicity of the world to the plurality of the faculties and activities, suggesting that plurality of the mental activities further reduplicates a metaphysical principle of difference. Each activity, in fact, actualizes its own internal difference as each activity is "an experiment of the self with the self" (74). All of the activities, in fact, must

transcend what they are given in such a way as to be genuinely unconditioned (73-74; 70). Notably, Arendt does not include knowing in her list of unconditioned mental activities. Arendt writes that "Men. . . can mentally transcend all these conditions, but only mentally, never in reality or *in cognition and knowledge*, by virtue of which they are able to explore the world's realness and their own" (70-71). Arendt's point would seem to be that despite the invisible nature of concepts, knowing is bound to determining the object in accordance with its sheer thereness and the identity accorded by common sense. Only thinking, knowing, and willing go beyond their objects as mental activities precisely through their actualization of internal difference. Knowing in accordance with categories of the understanding, at best, reduplicates the objects of the world and thereby actualizes a negligible difference between the common object and one's representation thereof. It is only when a mental activity is no longer bound by the constraint of truth and certainty that the mind is able to transcend what it is given. Arendt, in fact, criticizes Hegel and German idealism precisely for mistaking knowing for thinking and taking truth to be the criteria of philosophy (15-16). A failure to distinguish between reason and intellect (the understanding), then, poses the greatest obstacle to philosophical thinking for Arendt (15). This obstacle and the freedom consist in the fact that *meaning* must transcend the empirically determinable; meaning is literally unknowable because meaning cannot be known (41). Thinking and the other mental activities must withdraw from the sensible and knowable objects in order to be actualizations of something **different** from the sensible, hence their **invisibility**.

CHAPTER 6

JUDGING

In the previous section, I elaborated the strongest motivation for rejecting conceptualism on Arendtian grounds. McDowellian conceptualism requires that knowledge, experience and the thinking subject be unified, a requirement that Arendt directly opposes. This unity was cashed out as a unity of conceptuality, which was also clearly rejected as threatening the plurality and independent of the mental activities from conditions of sensibility and knowability. What I did not explain is what accounts for the unconditioned nature of the mental activities, although I suggested that part of the opposition can be found in knowing's reduplication of sense-objects in its reality and in the identity of common sense. Prior to spelling out this suggestion, I will develop Arendt's account of judging in order to take judging as an unconditioned mental activity. In order to develop Arendt's account of judging, I will briefly summarize her account and query whether Arendt successfully demonstrates the independence of the activity.

Arendt raises several problems for thinking judgment in her one lecture course on Kant's judging. The general problem is that of thinking the particular as combining the general and the particular. This problem is partially addressed through Arendt's discussion of taste, which serves as the primary metaphor by which aesthetic judgment is discussed by Kant. The problem is how the *immediate* discrimination of taste is transcended and becomes discrimination with the *distance* required for aesthetic judgment (*Lectures on Kant*, 68, henceforth *LK).* Distance from the sensible is produced in two ways 1) the imagination reproduces what is experienced as an evaluable mental object and 2) one *reflects* on and approves or disapproves of one's immediate

feeling of pleasure or displeasure (69). The reproduction of imagination was discussed in the section on knowing, thinking, and judging. When one reflects on one's feelings, one chooses approval or disapproval in part through the criterion of the feeling's communicability (one might be embarrassed to share a particular feeling or detail) (70). The communicability of the feeling, in turn, depends on a standard of *sensus communis* or sense of community. Pleasure and displeasure, which initially seemed private are rooted in community sense and open to communication once pleasure has been "transformed by reflection, which takes all others and their feelings into account" (72). Sensus communis, then, provides the basis for the communicability of pleasure or displeasure because it is the "*effect* of a reflection" (71, emphasis my own).

Arendt addresses the general problem of thinking the particular through a discussion of the distinction between knowing and judging. While the combination of the general and the particular is straightforward, when the general is already given as a law or principle (determining judgments), it is more difficult when the law is not already given (reflective judgments). Determining judgments proceed from general category to the subsumption of a particular underneath said general category. Reflective judgments proceed from particulars to general principles (*LK*, 76). Reflective judgments can result in generalizations through abstraction; one sees many tables and derives the general concept of a table. Reflective judgments might also find a particular instance *exemplary* of a general principle or quality and take that particular as *example* to which other instances might be compared; "courage is like Achilles" (*LK*). Reflective judgment, then, is distinguished from determining judgment by the direction of reflective judgment's procedure, its resultant validity (exemplary validity, and its givens (its lack of already given generality).

Reflective judgment is also distinguished from thinking by its given (particularity.) Thinking as philosophical thinking is exemplified by Hegel's philosophy of history (77). The condition of political judgment is that that the actor as a participant "never sees the *meaning* of the *whole*" (ibid, italics my own). If the political act requires reference to a Historical totality or to an Infinite Progress, then the meaning of the act will never be given outside of the "backward glance of the historian" (ibid). Reflective judgments do not require reference to such an external position because reflective judgments concern beautiful things and exemplary acts *in themselves*. The meaning of the beautiful thing or exemplary act is self-contained. If one is concerned with History or Progress, one is thinking of a general philosophical *species being.* If one is concerned with exemplary acts, then one is concerned with the dignity of individuals as they appear to one another. Both thinking and reflective judging can be understood as being concerned with meaning, but reflective judging is concerned with the meaning of the particular and the example, hence Arendt's formulation of the problem of judgment as the problem of *thinking the particular.*

The connection of judging and thinking in terms of their interest in meaning can be substantiated with reference to Arendt's contention that judging requires the preparation of thinking (*LM,* 192-3). The disposition to stop and asks questions has of thinking liberates the subject to judge without dogma or unexamined opinion (192). Asking questions in the silent dialogue of the thinking ego with myself has conscience as its byproduct, which judging makes "manifest in the world of appearances" (193). Judging, then, is described as the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, and it is thought of the perspective of others in *sensus communis* that enlarges one's capacity to judge. Arendt writes:

> Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection. Hence, critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off

> from "all others." *To be sure, it still goes on in isolation, but by the force of imagination it makes the others present* and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kant's world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's imagination to go visiting. *LK*, page 43, italics my own

Thinking and imagination seem required in equal measure in reflective judging. The imagination is what makes the perspective of others present to myself in the withdrawal of judging, but it seems to be *reflection* and the thought of other perspectives that does the training.

The faculties each have their own givens and laws (*LK*, 70; 74). The standard of sensus communis poses a problem to the independence of reflective judging because sensus communis is effected by reflection on the idea of the perspective of others. Judging's law would seem to belong to the faculty of reason. Arendt seems to acknowledge as much and suggests that an independent modus can be given to judging and/or thinking:

> In Kant, it is reason with its 'regulative ideas' that comes to the help of judgment, but if the faculty is separate from other faculties of the mind, then we shall have to ascribe to it its own modus operandi, its own way of proceeding. *LM*, 216

If sensus communis is not the modus operandi of judging, then the modus is presumably the proceeding from particular to general resulting in the example. This contention might, then, strengthen my argument that nonconceptuality is essential to explaining judgment because particularity must be explained. At the same time, Arendt also states that the imagination is legislative in reflective judgment (LK, 83). Consequently, one might take Arendt to have sufficiently distinguished thinking and judging by virtue of the procedure of going from the particular to the general, but one might also be concerned that the independence of reflective judging should also require that the reflective judging have its own principle. Sensus communis is clearly the principle or standard of judging, but it is difficult to determine whether this principle genuinely belongs to judging. At the least, Arendt's account of the faculties is unclear

and perhaps unsatisfying as the volume of contemporary debate regarding Arendt's judging would seem to indicate.

CHAPTER 7

JUDGING AS SYNTHESIS

In the previous section, I raised a problem for Arendt's account of judgment. Reflective judgment proceeds through the giving of *examples*. Examples are generalizable historical particulars, that is, they are particulars that exemplify something meaningfully applicable to other particulars. Judging might be distinguished by its result (examples,) given (particulars,) procedure (reflection and movement from particular to example,) and standard (sensus communis.) The problem posed was that if reflective judgment requires the intercession of reason (reflection and critical thinking) and an Idea of reason as principle (thought of other possible perspectives,) then it would seem that reason is legislative in judgment, which would threaten the independence of judging from thinking. At the least, imagination does not seem to be legislative in the way in which Arendt takes it to be. Arendt, then, requires an explanation as to why the reflective judgment remains independent despite requiring the intercession of reason. The requirement of particulars might be adequate for **distinguishing** reflective judgment, but it is not adequate for demonstrating its independence. In this section, I turn to Deleuze to provide such an account. I argue that Deleuze fulfills Arendts requirements of plurality and provides a way of cashing out Arendtian examples as the synthetic products of an indeterminate harmony of the faculties.

Deleuze develops his reading of Kant's reflective judgment in an article entitled *The Problem of Genesis*, which followed the publication of his early monograph on Kant. In the essay, Deleuze addresses 'the problem of genesis' raised by the post-Kantian philosophers

Maimon, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (*The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics* 62, henceforth *IG*). In his indispensable *Essays on Deleuze*, Daniel Smith explains that Deleuze's interest was in tracing his own 'minor' post-Kantian tradition (2012, 68). According to Smith, Maimon inaugurated the post-Kantian tradition by arguing that Kant needed to *engender* the categories from *real* experience, rather than simply demonstrating their applicability to possible experience (67). Maimon posited a principle of difference which could serve as the genetic element of real thought, while Fichte and Hegel turned to principles of identity in different ways. For Fichte, difference is the not-self, while for Hegel difference and identity are resolved dialectically. For Smith, Deleuze turns to Maimon in order to retrieve the notion of difference as a genetic principle of real experience in order to find an alternative to the solutions provided by much of German idealism (68).

Deleuze, then, can be understood to be situating his article strategically in addressing the philosophical problems of the post-Kantian tradition and offering an alternative solution that returns to Maimon's principle of difference. He articulates the criticism raised by the post-Kantians as being two-fold: 1) Kant relied upon facts for which he only sought conditions and 2) Kant invoked ready-made faculties which were mysteriously already in proportional, legislative relationships with one another (*IG*, 62). Deleuze, here, makes a striking claim: the conditions already have their source in the faculties, and the accord of the faculties was, in fact, engendered in the third Critique. This claim, then, promises a solution to the major criticism of the post-Kantian tradition and finds that solution in a reading of Kant's aesthetic. Deleuze's reading, unsurprisingly, is a subversive one, but I do not see any incompatibility with Arendt's equally reconstructive account.

Deleuze claims that the Critique of Judgment grounds the first two Critiques by demonstrating an original, free, indeterminate accord of the faculties. In the first two Critiques, faculties either legislate or operate under the legislation of another faculty (60). The imagination only schematizes at the direction of the understanding. In the speculative interest, the understanding induces reason to find a middle term between concepts and objects. In the practical interest, reason legislates to the deduction of moral laws. Deleuze asserts that it is only if the faculties are originally *free* that the faculties could induce one another to assume the various permutations of the first two Critiques. Consequently, the determinate, legislated accords of the faculties in the two Critiques presuppose an original free, indeterminate harmony in the third Critique. Consequently, no faculty is legislative in the judgment. Rather, judgment "legislates over itself" (ibid).

Deleuze , then, raises a question regarding the objects of reflective judgment. No object is *necessarily* subjected to the free, indeterminate harmony of reflective judgment. Deleuze notes that Kant requires an aesthetic common sense commensurate to empirical common sense and to the free, indeterminate harmony of the faculties (61). The problem, however, is that aesthetic common sense cannot be affirmed categorically without falling under the speculative interest and the legislation of the understanding. Aesthetic common sense can also not be postulated for subsequent verification without falling under the practical interest and the legislation of thinking. Consequently, it would seem that aesthetic common sense can only be presumed. This problem is the one that I raise for Arendt's account in that Arendt's sensus communis also does not have a clear source.

Given the problems that beset aesthetic common sense, Deleuze begins with the experience of the sublime in order to attempt to derive a model by which the indeterminate harmony of the faculties might be engendered. He explains that in experience of the sublime the imagination is *elevated* to a transcendent operation through an encounter with its limitation (63). Imagination in sensibility operates through the apprehension of successive parts and comprehension as a whole. When presented with vast objects such as mountains and oceans, apprehension moves towards the infinite, and comprehension fails to reproduce the experience as a whole object. Imagination, then, is forced to confront its own limit, which is a painful experience. The sublime is, however, only apparently or projectively related to the sensible because the imagination actually confronts infinity as an Idea of reason. In being confronted with an Idea of reason, the imagination is confronted with its own weakness before the force of the rational Idea. At the same time, the imagination is elevated in that it is through the imagination that Idea can be *indirectly* presented. The sublime, then, is an indeterminate, harmony of the imagination and reason. Deleuze: "Reason puts the imagination in the presence of its limit in the sensible; but conversely, the imagination awakens reason as the faculty capable of thinking a suprasensible substrate for the infinity of this sensible world" (63). The imagination has its *own* limit as its *object*. Thus the imagination is confronted with its exclusive given and power of operation in a "transcendent exercise" that finds its destination in the supersensible, that is, that which is beyond sensation.

From the judgment of the sublime, Deleuze draws a model of the reciprocal fertilization of the faculties and their mutual destination in the supersensible. From this model, Deleuze proceeds to articulate a similar accord for the experience of the beautiful in nature and in art. Experience of the beautiful in nature involves a free accord of the imagination and the

understanding felt as pleasure (64). This pleasure is *disinterested* in that it is not concerned with the existence of the object (61). In reflective judgment, no concept can be given without disturbing the disinterestedness of the beautiful. Deleuze invokes Kant that "imagination schematizes without concept" (ibid). Deleuze immediately points out, however, that schematization is terminologically inappropriate because schematization requires a concept. Consequently, Deleuze suggests that imagination *reflects* the aesthetic form of the object by abstracting from the *matter* of sensation. The accord becomes genetic through the intercession of reason. Reason becomes *interested* in the aptitude of nature for producing beautiful things (65). Consequently, reason develops a 'meta-aesthetic interest' expressed by the thought "'this beauty is produced by nature'" (ibid). Whereas pleasure in the aesthetic judgment of beauty is concerned with the object's form, reason is interested in the matter of sensation, specifically in the matter's capacity for presenting Ideas. One relates the white lily to concepts of 'white' and 'flower,' but the white lily also comes to *symbolize* an Idea of 'pure innocence' (ibid). Ideas of pure innocence find their intuitive object through *analogy* to the concept. Innocence is given in the white lily by analogy. Thus, the imagination is freed from the empirical determinations of the understanding; the imagination is free to reflect its own objects. The understanding is enlarged virtually to infinity through the receipt of new objects not determined in accordance with empirical categories. The experience of the beautiful in nature provides an indirect, positive presentation of the supersensible, whereas the experience of the sublime provided a direct, negative presentation (66)

Deleuze contends that the experience of the beautiful in the work of art or genius is the most profound genesis and involves the thought of a being produced by "*another nature*" (ibid). Genius is a direct, positive mode of presentation of Ideas and defines an additional meta-

aesthetic interest. Deleuze draws a contrast between aesthetic and rational ideas and suggest that the opposition is only apparent in the work of art. Aesthetic ideas are intuitions without concepts, whereas rational Ideas are concepts without intuition. The principle of genius unifies rational and aesthetic Ideas by "producing an intuition of another nature than the one that is given to us" (ibid). With genius, the aesthetic idea and rational idea are unified: "The rational Idea contains some-thing inexpressible; but the aesthetic Idea expresses the inexpressible, through the creation of another nature" (ibid). The nature which is produced is one by which phenomena are "events of the mind, and the events of the mind, phenomena of nature" (ibid). Deleuze gives the example that invisible beings, heaven, and hell all presuppose a body, while love and death have own spiritual dimensions. The aesthetic Idea, then, presents rational Ideas in a way that is similar but distinct from the presentation of rational Ideas in symbols. In the experience of art, the imagination provides the understanding with "'food for thought'" and thereby enlarges the understanding infinitely. Genius, in turn, unifies aesthetic and rational ideas, that is, it unifies the aesthetic and rational Ideas. Genius, however, still requires its reciprocal disciplining in taste; taste is still required for the stimulation of genius to be universal (67). Genius is *exemplary* in that the work is to be followed by other potential geniuses. Genius stimulates the free, indeterminate harmony in others, while taste, in turn, allows for the articulation of *expectation* between these exemplary individuals.

Deleuze's reading of Kant allows me to provide a reconstruction of some of Arendt's key points. The most obvious bearing of Deleuze's reading of Kant on my discussion is that it satisfies my question regarding the independence of the faculties. Not only are the faculties independent of one another in reflective judgment, but their independence must itself engendered in a way that engages what can only be done by each faculty. Reason must liberate the

imagination from the understanding. The understanding is enlarged through the food provided by the imagination, and the imagination must be freed to reflect the aesthetic forms that make rational and aesthetic Ideas sensible. In the case of the beautiful in art, rational and aesthetic Ideas are unified in the principle of genius, which stimulates the free indeterminate harmony in others. With the beautiful in art, the meaning of the work is in the work itself, which serves to present phenomena of nature that are also events of mind. The experience of the beautiful in art, then, has a complex set of geneses in that it both provides food for thought directly and liberates the imaginations in others. Drawing the parallel account for Arendt's political judgment allows one to say that political actions are, themselves, both sensible and meaning-laden. Political acts induce the thought 'of another perspective' and therefore serve to provide both food for thought in the form of examples and to liberate others to think and judge freely about the political event. Taste understood as aesthetic and political common sense is required for political action and spectatorship because one must be free to think, will, and judge independent of dogma and unexamined opinion.

Genius's unification of the inexpressible and its expression serves as an interesting point of reference for the example because it allows me to suggest that the example, themselves might be the products of synthetic activity. An action or spectacle is required to make political Ideas such as freedom, fairness, or justice visible, that is, to present a political Idea. In judging about the act, furthermore, one exerts one's freedom to synthesize one's own examples, that is, to find meaning freely in political acts and spectacles or to *exemplify*. Reflection as thought of another perspective frees one the imagination to come up with its own examples, which provide food for thought for oneself and for others. Injustice, freedom, and political heroism are non-empirical in the crucial sense that they are not directly given by empirical objects. Instead, such notions are

given by transcendental *examples*, which must themselves be synthesized by a spectator in a communicable fashion. In other words, one is never excused from the responsibility of judging and making normative value pronouncements in one's choice and synthesis of examples. There is, if one will pardon the cliché, an *art* to judging.

Finally, the genius should not be mistaken as the lone individual artist. The genius is, for Deleuze, a transcendental force or principle. The genius is a description or structure of encounter by which the free, indeterminate harmony of aesthetic common sense is engendered. Concretely for Arendt, encounter with the principle comes about through an encounter with another's perspective. One might be shocked by an act of terrorism or by a particularly brutal example given in support of an economic position. One might be struck by one's own ability to make sense of things or to come up with counter-examples. One might also be inspired by a particularly poignant moment of political resistance and thereby be stimulated to begin thinking, willing, and judging freely. The encounter is partially perspectival, but the encounter also evinces the instability of the perceiving subject. In other words, one's perception of the event induces the becoming of one's activities, such that one might have one's mind changed or even become a different sort of political subject. Certainly, the life and activity of a political activist is very different from that of a passive consumer of cable news. In this regard, the principle of genius does not describe actual geniuses but simply describes forces that are temporarily stabilized as the actor and spectator and, then, destabilized in the indeterminate harmony of reflective judgment. This discussion allows me to draw the most important connection to Arendt. For thinking to be an actualization of difference and judging the realization of conscience, the mental, political subject must itself be unstable, that is, the political subject must be a becoming.

CONCLUSION

In the section above, I attempted to sketch the picture of political judging that I have drawn from my reading of Arendt and Deleuze. In this sketch, I provided a brief summary of the ways in which my notion of political judging requires nonconceptual content and processes. Due to the brevity of my discussion I cannot hope that my picture is persuasive, although providing it was no doubt necessary for completing my reading. I take the argumentative force of my paper to simply involve indicating the necessity of a nonconceptual reading of Arendt. Fleshing that nonconceptual reading out served to demonstrate its putative plausibility and further indicate the incompatibility of Arendt's philosophy with conceptualism.

Consequently, I will simply summarize my argument. At the beginning of the paper, I summarized features and motivations of McDowellian conceptualism and Zerilli's emotional cognitivist view. I challenged the compatibility of Zerilli's requirement of positive theorization of judgment with McDowellian quietism in order to demonstrate that at least some of the motivations of conceptualism needed to be rejected. I, then, indicated several indications that Arendt requires nonconceptual content: 1) judgment is concerned with particulars, which are characterized by nonconceptual sheer thereness, 2) the mental activities must, themselves, be independent of conceptuality and the understanding, and 3) this independence follows from the internal difference within the thinking subject, which itself must precede conceptuality. In the final section, I outlined a genetic account of reflective judging that takes reflective judging as a free, indeterminate harmony of the faculties. I concluded that section with a sketch of examples as the product of the liberated synthesis of the imagination.

REFERENCES

Arendt, Hannah. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Life of the Mind*. Harcourt, Inc, 1978.

Banham, Gary. Kant's Transcendental Imagination. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2005, pp. 57-70.

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton, The Athlone Press Limited, 1994.

Deleuze, Gilles, and Smith, Daniel W. (translator), "The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics." *Angelaki*, vol. 5, no. 3, Dec. 2000, pp. 57–70. *EBSCO*host, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mzh&AN=2001440263&site=eds-live.

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman K. Smith, Second ed., PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2007.

Leys, Ruth. "Affect and Intention: A Reply to William E. Connolly." *CRITICAL INQUIRY*, no. 4, 2011, p. 799. *EBSCO*host, proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url= http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbl&AN=RN298107830&site=eds-live.

Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke University Press, 2002, pp. 39, 40, 41, 26

McDowell, John Henry. *Mind and World*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1994., 1994.

McDowell, John. *Having the World in View : Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars.* Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2009.

Thrift, Nigel. "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect*." Geografiska Annaler,* no. 86, 2004, p. 58

Zerilli, Linda M. G. "'We Feel Our Freedom': Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah Arendt." *Political Theory*, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, p. 158. *EBSCO*host, doi:10.1177/0090591704272958.

Zerilli, Linda M. G. “Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment.” *Signs*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2009, p. 295. *EBSCO*host, doi:10.1086/591090.

Zerilli, Linda M. G. “The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgment.” *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation*, vol. 46, no. 2, 2015, pp. 261–286. *EBSCOhost*, proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mzh&AN=2015395542&site=eds-live.