SATISFACTION AND STATE (MIS)BEHAVIOR: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

STATE BEHAVIORS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND STATUS

QUO EVALUATIONS

by

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(Under the Direction of DANIEL HILL)

ABSTRACT

Satisfaction is poorly conceptualized in international relations and as a result is poorly measured. Following an extensive review of IR literature, a new theory of the role satisfaction plays in IR is developed along with a new measurement of status quo evaluations centered on state interactions with International Organizations. The theory is tested using the new measure and primarily logistic and multinomial logistic regression statistical techniques to find the effects of satisfaction on conflict initiation, conflict settlement, and what happens when dissatisfied states attempt to alter the international system. Most hypotheses are found to be correct, that satisfaction matters to conflict initiation, how certain types of conflict are settled, and under what conditions new International Organizations will be promoted by dissatisfied states.

INDEX WORDS: International Relations, International Organizations, Conflict, Satisfaction

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DEDICATION

To Maggie and Quinn, my best supporters.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

What is satisfaction? What does it mean to be satisfied? For people, this may be a relatively easy thing to describe and think about. When discussing countries and government, it gets a little bit trickier. How can a country be satisfied, and what would that look like? Surprisingly, there is not a great definition of satisfaction for states, nor is there a great definition for what might be the opposite concept, revisionism, that is, changing the status quo to benefit oneself at the possible expense of others. If there are not clear concepts, then there will not be clear studies that use those concepts and we will lose valuable insight into ways the world works. I aim to correct some of that misplaced focus and come up with a strong working definition of satisfaction and related concepts, a closely related way to measure that concept, and explore the results of using these two things to examine global events.

The inspiration for this project came from realizing that there was a fundamental disconnect in the way that satisfaction is discussed, and the way satisfaction is measured in at least one major body of international relations theory. For the most part, this disconnect exists within the power transition literature, as it deals most directly with the concept of satisfaction, however it is found in realist literature as well. While satisfaction is intended to refer to the view of a state toward the international system and its position within that system, the way that satisfaction is usually conceptualized and measured relies on the interactions between two paired states and how they view the leader of the international system.

While the measures of satisfaction used in power transition literature and realism are useful and made use of readily available data, they do not necessarily align with the theories they are testing. That is, they are not directly measuring the concepts that the theories claim to be present in the international system. The disconnect results in some interesting implications for existing research. According to this kind of analysis and way of measuring satisfaction, it would be impossible for allies to engage in violent conflict with one another, but we know that alliances fall apart, and allies will engage in brief skirmishes on occasion. For example, Canada and Greenland have been engaged in a friendly little 'flag war' where they steal one another's flag off an uninhabited North Atlantic island and leave whiskey for the other nation to find as payment for all those flags that have been stolen. As a matter of fact, power transition literature and realism both do a terrible job of explaining the Austro-Prussian, or Seven Weeks, War in 1866.

Additionally, there is, by definition, no way for the system leader to be dissatisfied or desire revision of the system. Because it made the rules, it must always be happy with those rules. There are also questions as to what leads a state to be satisfied. Does a state automatically become satisfied by gaining hegemon status? By seeing the international system shaped in a way that is most beneficial to itself or a close ally? Is achieving security from rivals a driver of satisfaction, or is increasing economic development in terms of standard of living? Thinking about it from the revisionism side, what makes a state revisionist? Is there anything that inherently makes states dissatisfied? Is there a relationship between predominant regime types and levels of satisfaction? These are all the kinds of questions that could be addressed using a slightly different interpretation and measurement of satisfaction.

After engaging with a review of other theories of international relations based on the structure of the international system, there are a few research questions that each part of this dissertation is designed to answer. These questions include: can satisfaction predict conflict or its resolution? Does satisfaction function only at a system level, regional level, or some combination of the two? Can satisfaction indicate which types of issues states prioritize?

In order to answer these questions, I propose a new way of thinking about satisfaction that involves the rules of the international system. I envision the international system organized in such a way that there is one hegemon (system leader), possibly competing with one or more challengers for hegemony, that disseminates rules of the system that allow the hegemon and its allies to prosper, but do allow all states that accept the rules to improve their security and economic situations. This is not that dissimilar from the research program known as power transition theory (see Organski (1958) and Kugler (1980)), but where it does differ is that I argue that the rules of the system are disseminated through international organizations, which is the number one feature of the current iteration of the international system and that the hegemon is not inherently satisfied. This system is not reliant on states trying to balance their military capabilities and trying to pass the buck for preserving peace. Instead, by the design of the post-WWII IOs, the IOs disseminate rules and serve as a feedback mechanism that allows the hegemon to coopt any rising challengers, make concessions where necessary, and reform the system as necessary to keep itself in power.

In thinking about the international system this way, I hope to explain the declining incidence of interstate conflict, norms related to the phenomenon of the democratic peace, some of the increase in regional organizations, and the basis of state satisfaction as I expand my research program. This is an important contribution that builds off the work of many previous

scholars. There are the entirety of the power transition theory and realist traditions that I argue deal with satisfaction and revisionism in such a way that the concept is integral to both bodies of literature. There are additional structural theories of international relations that suggest that satisfaction, without directly mentioning the concept, and institutions in the form of IOs are integral to the functioning of international relations. Some scholars have already pointed out that revisionism is a concept that is highly used but does not have a standard accepted definition and their work is important in developing my definition of the concept and its relation to satisfaction.

In addition, my work here melds well with those scholars that have suggested an institutional factor to questions of satisfaction. The blending of scholarship on IOs and conflict, territory, and structure of the international system will allow me to develop a theory that genuinely predicts conflict without relying on conflict behavior as a predictor of additional conflict, further emphasize the role of IOs as actors that matter in the international system, and bring a new coherence to the conceptualization of the international system.

While I cannot answer every question related to satisfaction here, I do hope to bring it back into a larger discussion on international relations and move the conversation on the role of hegemons, satisfaction, and institutions forward. In addition, I want to contribute to the way events data can be used to inform trends in international relations and broad factors in why states will support or abandon international organizations.

This dissertation is divided into several chapters. This introduction comprises the first chapter. The second is the concepts and theory for the dissertation that focuses on previous conceptualizations of the international system, the roles of IOs, and some of the ways that territory is involved in conflict initiation. Chapter 3 outlines the data and methods that are used with an emphasis on why particular satisfaction measure is unique, aligned with structural

theory, and why that matters, while chapter 4 examines the relationship between my measures of satisfaction, previous measures, and conflict in the form of MID onset and outcomes. Chapter 5 breaks down conflict surrounding territory and the development of the New Development or BRIC Bank. Chapter 6 concludes the study by summarizing the evaluations of my hypotheses and providing directions for future research.

Overall, this project has brought in material from several different disciplines within international relations and has the potential to impact several others. There is still work to be done focusing specifically on regional organizations and some of the impacts of additional interactions between satisfaction and what are seen as control variables in other analyses of conflict onset.

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CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTS AND THEORY

Introduction

The introductory chapter presented here offers a brief overview of the power transition, realist, and hegemonic stability literature, as well as literature that covers the role of international organizations in conflict processes, to cover how satisfaction has developed as a concept and how it relates to the concept of revisionism. There are a few research questions that each part of this dissertation is designed to answer. These questions include: Is there currently a coherent definition of satisfaction? If not, can we define satisfaction in a coherent way? If satisfaction can be defined coherently, what is the most valid way of measuring it? The final question is whether satisfaction can be reliably used to predict conflict and various behaviors associated with conflict. From exploring these questions and some possible answers to them, the chapter moves into the concepts and literature that treat satisfaction as a primary concept, either explicitly or implicitly. After engaging with the theoretical literature I provide a brief definition of satisfaction that incorporates and expands on previous definitions, then provide a theory about satisfaction's role in the international system and conclude the chapter by demonstrating how satisfaction is related to the formation of the New Development, or BRIC, Bank.

In order to answer the previous questions, I propose a new way of thinking about satisfaction that involves the rules of the international system. I envision the international system organized in such a way that there is one hegemon, possibly competing with one or more challengers for hegemony, that disseminates rules of the system that allow the hegemon and its allied great powers to prosper, but also allow all states that accept the rules to improve their security and economic situations. This is not that dissimilar from power transition theory, but

where it does differ is that I argue that the rules of the system are disseminated through international organizations, which is the number one feature of the current iteration of the international system, that the hegemon is not inherently satisfied, and that dissatisfaction can be directed at the international system itself, not just other states.

The literature review shows that several bodies of literature, such as power transition theory and realism, use the closely related concepts of satisfaction and revisionism. I have reframed each concept to think of it as more of a continuum than has previously been articulated. A finding of the literature review is that satisfaction is not considered in terms of satisfaction with the system, but as satisfaction with one state or within a pair of states. This has implications for why and how certain results relating satisfaction to conflict are obtained and leads to some of the conclusion that satisfaction is an incoherent concept. I counter by formulating my own definition that treats satisfaction as involving the entire international system and a state's place within it. This definition opens the door to additional studies in the future that would try to determine the factors that make states satisfied, the types of policy implications this has for the immediate future, and what types of states should be considered most threatening to the international system and if they are also the most threatening to the hegemon.

This is an important contribution that builds off the work of many previous scholars. There are the entirety of the power transition theory and realist traditions, as well as other structural theories, that I argue deal with satisfaction and revisionism in such a way that the concept is integral to these bodies of literature. Some scholars have already pointed out that revisionism is a concept that is highly used but does not have a standard accepted definition and their work is important in developing my definition of the concept and its relation to satisfaction.

In addition, my work here melds well with those scholars that have suggested an institutional factor to questions of satisfaction, as seen below.

While I cannot answer every question related to satisfaction here, I do hope to bring it back into a larger discussion on international relations and move the conversation on the role of hegemons, satisfaction, and institutions forward. In addition, I want to contribute to the way events data can be used to inform trends in international relations and broad factors in why states will support or abandon international organizations. The largest contribution though will fill a gap in the literature related to what constitutes the structure of the international system and how satisfaction is related to the international system.

Concepts and Literature:

Satisfaction is a concept that appears frequently in international relations, even if that is not the term that is explicitly used. The terms used range from "satisfaction," meaning support for the status quo, as in Organski and Kugler where increasing power and low satisfaction lead to conflict (Hwang, 1998, Kim, 1992a, Kim, 2002, Kugler, 1980, Kugler, 2006a, Kugler and Lemke, 1996, Kugler, 2006b), to "revisionist states," or states wishing to revise the international system, as a means of explaining when states are likely to engage in behavior that will alter the system through conflict, as revisionist great powers are most likely to engage in interstate war (Schweller, 1998, Schweller, 2004), and finally to questions of "hierarchy," relationships and structures that enforce authority, why states support hierarchies, and how hierarchies become "legitimate" (Gilpin, 1988, Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010).

What most of these terms have in common is that they are used in discussions of conflict (DiCicco, 1999, Farber and Gowa, 1995, Genna, 2003, Gilpin, 1988, Kim, 1991, Kim, 1992a, Kim, 2002), refer primarily to willingness to engage in conflict rather than ability or capacity to

do so, encompass more than a response to a threat, refer to a type of relationship that extends past bilateralism, and open up multiple avenues to explore the structure of the international system. These terms also speak past one another, which has the implication that many researchers are effectively working on the same topic, but do not fully realize it and may not be as effective in building a cumulative body of knowledge as they otherwise might be. I believe that all of these different terms and concepts can be merged into the general concept of state satisfaction without losing parsimony and stretching the concept into meaninglessness (Sartori, 1970), because my conceptualization is based on behavior in relation to the international system, and is a step up the ladder of abstraction from other studies that focus on specific behaviors. Thus, I will be examining multiple behaviors of states and trying to determine whether they demonstrate state satisfaction or what impact state satisfaction has on those behaviors.

Satisfaction vs. Revisionism

It should be noted that while there is no single best definition of satisfaction, or conceptualization of it, there is also no single best definition of revisionism, even though one or both concepts can be found in a significant amount of the literature related to conflict and the international system. In fact, nearly every study focusing on revisionism uses a different conceptualization (Jaschob et al., 2014). While (Schweller, 1994) brings in a typography of revisionism that is based on power and the type of revisionism sought, it is still somewhat incomplete according to Jaschob et al. (2014). This is Schweller's jackal (opportunistic revisionist with lesser aims) vs. lion (great power) typology that tries to categorize states based on the amount of revisionism being sought and the power capabilities of the revisionist state. The more revisionist and the more powerful a given state is, the more likely it is to upend the international system (Schweller, 1994).

On the satisfaction side of the coin, the best descriptions of satisfaction are found in power transition theory literature (Kugler, 1980) and describe satisfaction as something more or less inherent in a state's interaction with the international system. The earliest definition of satisfaction belongs to Organski (1958). In his conceptualization satisfaction is made up of supporting the status quo of the international system, *and the state* that is currently at the top of the international system. Instead of a balance of power structure (states try to constrain one another by forming alliances and increasing power) or anarchy (every state for itself), as in neorealism, the structure is a hierarchy that exists in an ordered environment. One hegemonic state sets the rules and norms of the international system with the help of other great powers and there are an increasing number of states found at each lower level of power. Contrast that to the view of Mearsheimer (2001) that there can never truly be a hegemon, only the competition to be one. Not every state will support the hegemon and these states may wish to change some fundamental aspect of the system, and the number of such states increases as one travels down the hierarchy, even into regional sub-hierarchies (Lemke, 1993). These states further down the hierarchy that have not been involved in its establishment are said to be dissatisfied (Tammen, 2000, Genna, 2003, Kang, 2008, Kim, 1989, Kim, 1995, Kim, 1992b), because there could be rules not included in the structure of the system that these states would find more beneficial. Dissatisfaction is a necessary condition for great power conflict to start in power transition theory, but it would not be sufficient. The likelihood of a systemic or great power war breaking out is increased with the presence of a dissatisfied great power that has the capability of challenging the hegemon for control of the international system (Kugler, 1980).

Most relevant to my study is the paper by Johnston (2003) that asks whether China is a status quo power. This particular theory is very similar to mine in that states act within the

international order in support of or opposition to a hegemon and the way things work. Johnston (2003) even includes statements and actions that state leaders take to determine which states are revisionist. My structure, in contrast to Schweller (1994) and Jaschob et al. (2014), also anticipates a range of revisionism, rather than a typology that would require specific behaviors. In addition to not embracing a specific typology for whether states are one certain form of revisionist, I am considering revisionism in relation to the institutions of the international order, but not necessarily things like the distribution of material goods. This conforms to additional theorizing about the nature of revisionism and whether its better thought of as dissidence or opposition (Daase and Deitelhoff, 2019), that is playing by the rules to change the system or just wrecking it or some part of it to get a better deal.

The important thing about satisfaction and revisionism to remember is that they are two sides of the same coin. They are not speaking about fundamentally different concepts, rather they are the same concept in a positive light or a negative light. It is also worth noting that satisfaction is not a stable concept. That means that states can become dissatisfied even if they are satisfied at the start of an analysis, or they could initially be dissatisfied but become satisfied due to changes to the international system or actions by the great powers. However, at any given moment there are some states which are satisfied and others which are dissatisfied.

Status Quo Supporting States as Satisfied States

While satisfied states are "status quo supporting" in power transition theory, satisfaction is treated most often as a cause of conflict, but there has been some work to try and determine what might cause states to be satisfied. The general consensus among power transition scholars is that the *perception* of an unfavorable status quo leads to low satisfaction (Kugler, 1980, Lemke and Reed, 1996, Lemke and Reed, 1998, Lemke, 1996a, Lemke, 1996b, Organski, 1958).

In fact, the perception of an unfavorable status quo may be more important to the onset of great power war than an actually unfavorable status quo (Kim, 1992b). An unfavorable status quo can consist of unaddressed territorial issues related to a previous great power war, but may be as simple as the fact that a newly rising power may have not been consulted in the creation of the rules of the international system (Tammen, 2000). This is nearly identical to what Schweller (2004) has defined as revisionist sentiment in that not all great powers have had a hand in creating the system and some may have grievances, related to rules or territory, that need to be addressed. These definitions are nearly identical, yet the two theories do not consistently reference one another beyond discussing a state's support for the status quo.

In the realist body of theories focused on balancing, that is states attempt to equalize military power in order to hold off military aggression, satisfaction itself is not treated as an independent or dependent variable. Despite the lack of an explicit appearance of satisfaction, it is implicit in analyses of international relations, like those found in offensive realism, where the accumulation of power is the main end of aggressive action (Mearsheimer, 2001). In addition, the idea that states are revisionist, or desiring of changes to the international order that will benefit the state in question, as in Schweller (1996), means that satisfaction is not entirely absent from realist interpretations of the international system. Where there can be the desire to revise, due to dissatisfaction, then support for the status quo is logically based on satisfaction. The idea of revisionist tendencies being present in states opens up the possibility that satisfaction could be included as an independent variable in tests of realist theories, as in more recent tests of theories regarding conflict onset (Reed, 2000, Quackenbush, 2015).

Despite the focus on the negative effects of security dilemmas, spiraling escalations of military buildup, and insecurity in structural realism, there is a bias toward the status quo,

meaning that system shaking wars are rare and few states are actively balancing (Schweller, 1996). This perceived bias is somewhat intuitive, if the main goal of states is to survive and that is the reason that states increase power, what is the point of increasing power if it causes the loss of the status quo and security? Keeping power and alliances at the status quo may be just as effective as increasing power at keeping the state secure. If the status quo bias is true, as Schweller (1996) argues, then what would explain the impetus to upset the balance of power?

One possible explanation is that states are not more concerned with a defensive or status quo supporting stance, but want to accumulate as much power as possible in an effort to become the hegemon or one of the few states at the head of the international system (Mearsheimer, 2001). In this case, states are strictly offensive in nature and will form alliances, increase capabilities, and generally run the risk of entering security dilemmas in order to become powerful, but there is no way that any state can reach the status of hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). With the exception of never being able to achieve hegemony, Mearsheimer's argument is identical to that found in Organski's *World Politics* on dissatisfied state behavior (1958). Dissatisfied great powers seek to build military strength, form alliances, and run the risk of war while trying to become the hegemon, or at least a great power, to achieve the goal of reshaping the system to their benefit, this should mean that satisfied states are the ones that are reaping the benefits of the current system and defending it by coopting revisionists, limiting access to benefits, or aggressively defending the international system.

What Mearsheimer's argument also implicitly contains is an argument about international structure. He is arguing that there can never be an actual hegemon to set the rules and enforce them, but in making that clear, he has effectively argued that there is a perception of this ability. In Mearsheimer's and Organski's theories, there is a system or order that creates a distribution of

benefits to some, while leaving others without. Being left out or feeling left out when it comes to the benefits of the system, means that some states are dissatisfied, this is true regardless of whether the system is anarchic, hierarchic, or something in between.

Questions surrounding why security valuing states would upset the status quo of a stable security environment lead to the conclusion that states are not balancing against power, as Waltz argues, but are balancing against something else. Walt (1985) and Schweller (1998) argue that states are balancing against *threats* posed by other states. This fact, in their theories, would also explain why balancing behavior is also relatively rare compared to when it is predicted to occur. Walt (1985) argues that balancing, attempting to meet a threat by increasing one's own capabilities, and bandwagoning, more closely aligning with a state perceived as a threat, are most likely to be the results of fluctuations in aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions(Walt, 1985). In other words, states are balancing, or acting in a similar fashion, against a threat posed by other states, but not based on power along, an unexplored option is that they are actually balancing against threats to the system, rather than the increasingly rare threats to state survival. This would account for the rarity of balancing behavior, even when it would be predicted to occur. States

Schweller argues that balancing behavior is rare because only certain states pose threats, and only revisionist states need to be balanced against. Therefore, states will only engage in balancing behavior against powerful states that seek to revise the current status quo (Schweller, 2004). That is, only states that pose a threat to the system will be balanced against, not necessarily every state that shows it is increasing in power or revisionist tendencies. However, Morgan and Palmer (1997) suggest that any arguments which hinge on the concept of revisionism are technically incorrect. Their basic argument is that any given status quo is

evaluated by states along two dimensions, security and proaction. Security is the ability to remain secure and not be invaded or taken over by another state. Proaction is the ability to change those aspects of the status quo that a state desires to change. They hypothesize that both security and proaction increase as power increases, but the marginal increase in security as power increases actually becomes negative for the most powerful states (Morgan and Palmer, 1997). Powerful states like the Soviet Union only put a target on their backs by attempting to elevate themselves up to or past a superpower status. In other words, states act satisfied until security has been achieved, then may become more openly dissatisfied because now that these states have security, they want to change the system. Once they have achieved great power status, any dissatisfaction a state experienced along the way can now be dealt with through the means the state has acquired on its rise to great power status, that can be directly through military confrontation or through influence at IOs. Rising states in PTT, balancing states in realism, or proactive states may all initially act friendly, only to later act as the Brutus to a hegemonic Caesar.

For all these theories, satisfaction is the binding theme. It manifests as the desire and ability to achieve changes that are beneficial to the state in question, while at the same time preserving the status quo. The more a state has the desire and ability to change that status quo, the less satisfied the state is. The study of IR has a good grasp of what happens when states have the capacity for changing the status quo, I aim to explore new ways of determining when a state has the desire to do so.

One aspect of the international system that is left out of these discussions of great power behavior and whether states are status quo supporting are international organizations. This is surprising as IOs have been a major feature of the international system since the end of the last

major great power conflict. If any theories were suggesting that rules of the system matter and didn't mention IOs it would be leaving a major explanatory source for the decline of great power conflict and interstate war on the table. It is probable that states exerting influence through IOs has allowed additional alternatives to direct confrontation that states are willing to take in order to preserve the status quo or revise it to a more favorable outcome.

Cyclical Theory

A third body of theoretical literature that uses similar concepts of satisfaction is the long-cycle literature. There are two main ways that the long cycle literature uses the concept of satisfaction. The first is found in Doran and Parsons (1980) in which the rise and decline of hegemonic states occurs in regular cycles. These cycles are defined in terms of both relative and absolute power capabilities. Which state occupies the position of hegemon is determined by the relative capabilities of each state, and the overall capacities of the system in absolute terms is used in part to determine the wax and wane of each cycle (Midlarsky, 2000). Doran and Parsons (1980) argue that major conflict is most likely to result when the roles of states do not match up to the power capabilities of states. A state with high capability may begin to play a more active role in the system, upsetting any current order in which the newly active state is not considered to be a major player. States that are in the high-power club do not need to question if they are members and are loath to recognize new members. A state that is not receiving the levels of prestige other states of similar power capabilities are may show signs of dissatisfaction and attempt to revise the system to achieve those levels of prestige. At the same time, the states with prestige will hold onto it at all costs, even if their military power does not guarantee a favorable outcome. Again, these concepts are almost identical to those found in both power transition theory and the theory of underbalancing (Organski, 1958, Schweller, 2004).

In addition to the ideas of role and capabilities that Doran and Parsons use in their long cycle of hegemonic powers, Gilpin also examines the nature of international politics following great power wars. In general, Gilpin (1988) argues that order is established after large wars by the victorious states. The victors distribute the spoils of war, including territory, and determine the conditions for peace that the vanquished must abide by. The losing states or those that do not design the international order would have a desire to change it in order to regain any losses demanded as payment by the victors. The victors would be satisfied with the new structure to the system as they have set the rules and created the way things will operate. The losers will almost certainly want to set things back to the way they were before such a disastrous outcome. These states would not be automatically supportive of the new status quo, they would likely seek to change it and could be called revisionist or dissatisfied the same way that Schweller and Organski would suggest.

Hegemonic Stability

Closely following off of the international order body of literature is the hegemonic stability body of literature (Midlarsky, 2000). In this body of literature, stability of the international system is based on the existence of a single hegemonic state that has the ability to set up rules which govern the international system in relation to a particular issue (Midlarsky, 2000, Gilpin, 1988). Again, states that have not been involved in forming the rules of behavior around this issue may seek to change them. In addition to explaining when great power conflicts break out, hegemonic stability theory also suggests that conflict can break out when no state takes charge of the system (Gilpin, 1988). If this happens, chaos reigns. Hegemonic stability theory is somewhat similar to power transition and long-cycle theory in that the international system is dominated by one powerful state at different periods of time (Snidal, 1985). According

to the most basic iteration of the theory, having a hegemon is supposed to make the world function smoothly with little conflict and large amounts of cooperation.

The hegemonic stability theory is most often applied to economic issue areas (Webb and Krasner, 1989). For example, it is suggested that free trade was the dominant structure for economic interactions during the mid-19th and 20th centuries because Great Britain and the United States could pay the costs of enforcing such a system and still profit (Snidal, 1985). This argument is not particularly novel, many theories state that a dominant state will enforce its will on the international system, but the second implication of the theory is rather novel. Because the dominant state provides the public good of a free trade system entirely on its own and still derives profit, the other states in the system reap the full benefits because they pay no costs at all (Snidal, 1985, Olson, 2009, Keohane, 2005).

All the previous literature, from some realist theories to hegemonic stability theory, discusses concepts similar to satisfaction, or satisfaction explicitly, in connection to how international systems are established and how some states are revisionist. Many theories hold that a dominant state, usually as a result of winning a major war, have the ability and power to set rules that most other states will choose to abide by (Doran and Parsons, 1980, Gilpin, 1988, Ikenberry, 2014, Kohout, 2003, Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010, Organski, 1958, Schweller, 2004). Most states will choose to abide by the various rules set by a dominant state in order to secure a benefit of some type, typically security in the form of protection by more powerful states (Morgan and Palmer, 1997). Support for a status quo that has been set by a hegemon usually is strongest among states that aided the hegemon gain victory in the previous war, but this is not always the case. Some states may have a differing vision for the way the world would look afterward, which would lead to them being called revisionist or dissatisfied (Kim, 1995, Kim, 1992b, Lemke and

Reed, 1996, Organski, 1958, Schweller, 1998, Morgan and Palmer, 1997). The most obvious

means for a hegemon to distribute benefits to supporters and at the same time gain buy-in from

potential rivals is through IOs. There are even theories of IO formation that suggest IOs that do

not have hegemonic support will not succeed, so why could it not also be the case that a great

power would not succeed in becoming a hegemon without gaining buy-in through the formation

of IOs? Direct alliances may not be effective in cementing favorable outcomes, but IOs and the

connections they foster would keep like-minded states on the same agenda. The previous

theories are based on a structure of hierarchy that every state is necessarily a member of, but the

theories below are based on slightly different forms of hierarchy that do not always involve a

systemic structure.

<u>Logic of Order</u>

There are two significant subsets of state interaction and conflict literature that deal

primarily with hierarchy and the evolution of a hierarchy. The first of the two branches is a

development of Robert Gilpin's (1988) international order that comes from Ikenberry. In his

extension of Gilpin's international order work, Ikenberry defines order as being settled

arrangements that define and guide relations between states (Ikenberry, 2014). Orders in this

fashion are likely to be initially based on customary behavior and enforced on a state-state

relational basis, like Lake's interpretation of relational hierarchy. Many of the concepts, such as

scale and issue area found in Ikenberry's theory, are key to treaty arrangements, international

organizations, and other hierarchical theories of international relations. For example, some

international organizations, like MERCOSUR, only function in certain geographic areas (South

America), have limited functional responsibilities (trade), and institutional decision

making/distribution of power (members vote).

In addition to the variation in key features, there are also a few forms of stable relations in the international order, such as a balance of power, command relationship, or consent relationship. For Ikenberry, the balance of power is like that in realism, blocs of states compete against one another in order to achieve dominance or at least not be dominated. In a command relationship, actions are dictated by a powerful state to the weaker states. This is held to occur on a global scale but is also found in regional interactions. For Ikenberry, consent relationships contain the idea that each state in a system has a say in how the system functions and in coordinating the actions of other states in the system. In each of these examples of a potential order the top state will create a new system after a major war and the system will evolve over time as states and the order itself interact with one another. Satisfaction with the order could serve as a way of determining which states will engage in actions that will dramatically change the international order, which is like the main idea in power transition theory.

Ikenberry's main contribution to discussions of order is that it occupies a place in between Lake's primarily patron-client conceptualization of a hierarchy and the global systems found in theories like PTT. One possible line of evolution that Ikenberry offers for consideration, but is not the only possibility, is that a triumphant dissatisfied challenger in PTT may first develop stable relations based on a command relationship in which it dictates actions to now weak states. As weak states gain strength, this system will eventually shift to being more consensual in nature.

In Ikenberry's theory of order everything is essentially pointing to attempts to foster satisfaction with the international system through developing standardized sets of relations and IOs. Attempts to subvert this system would result in states being classified as dissatisfied because they have broken the order. Whether the order has been broken by refusing to recognize

a customary international law or in some other fashion, a state has chosen to break the order and now it must be reformed or thrown out if enough states decide to scrap it.

<u>Relational Hierarchy</u>

The second branch of relational hierarchy was developed by David Lake and deals with the evolution of a hierarchy as it relates to the relationship between two states. This is not the same as a systemic hierarchy, like exists in power transition theory or other hierarchical theories, it is how a hierarchical relationship can exist between a dominant state and a subordinate state (Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010). In the more structural form of hierarchy, the primary goal of the dominant state is creating a political order. This "formal-legal authority" is derived from the existence of a legal structure that confers authority onto an agent of that structure (Lake, 2009), like a police officer has authority. The form of hierarchy that Lake is most convinced exists is the relational hierarchy. He derives this from social contract theory and suggests that State B is willing to give up some freedoms because State A provides a political order with benefits sufficient enough to offset B's costs of joining the order (Lake, 2009). Because B is *willingly* participating, the order is considered *legitimate* and State A can broadcast that legitimacy as a sort of soft power display toward other states. The dominant state should gain legitimacy from its actions if it provides the stability necessary for the subordinate state to develop economically (Lake, 2010). This is exactly the type of hierarchy that is expected to exist by power transition theory, a hegemon provides structure that is supported by states that are satisfied with the structure and benefit from it, those opposed to the structure benefit less. We can see this at work in the security and economic relationship between the United States and Japan following the Second World War. Japan chose to invest in rapid economic development, constitutionally limit

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its military capabilities, and has recently been more involved in logistical support for the military endeavors of the United States.

One proposition that Lake and Ikenberry both contain is that satisfaction can be thought of as an outcome that the dominant state desires for the subordinate states in a hierarchy (Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010). In both theories, the subordinate states award legitimacy to dominant states when they are satisfied. In order to be satisfied, subordinate states require stable international environments that allow them to have strong economic development and face few security threats (Lake, 2010). Both hypothesize that subordinate states that view the dominant as legitimate will be more likely to join in a wartime coalition with the dominant state (Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009), in other words, satisfied states should bandwagon with the hegemon in defense of the system, or support the status quo (Schweller, 1994). They use support for coalitions to test whether weak states have, in fact, granted legitimacy to more dominant states. Really though, there is not an especially easy way to collect empirical data on which state is viewed as legitimately exercising a hierarchical relationship over another, other than the fact that the relationship exists. Lake (2009) also suggests that states that receive more security and economic guarantees from a dominant state will display more economic openness and lower levels of defense effort. He does find data to support this assertion and primarily points to states that benefitted to a large extent from the Marshall Plan as examples of the process of weaker states acting as if the dominant state is legitimate.

Tying Lake and Ikenberry to other hierarchical theories is the idea of a relational network (Ikenberry, 2011, Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010, Lemke, 1993). The vision that both Lake and Ikenberry share is that the international system is defined by networks of domination and rules established by dominant states using various methods, and this is very similar to

Lemke's idea that within a global hierarchy in power transition theory, there will also be less extensive regional hierarchies where regional powers will attempt to impose rules and policies on other states that are not as powerful in the region (Lemke, 1993). Lake (2009) specifically mentions this type of hierarchy when discussing the relationship between the United States and the Dominican Republic, the US guarantees Dominican independence and economic stability in exchange for Dominican cooperation with US policies in the Caribbean. The relationship between the United States and Dominican Republic has involved fluctuations of the level of direct control, which follows Ikenberry's assertion that differing methods of control can be used to maintain a hierarchy (Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009). The US/Dominican example also follows from the Lemke multiple hierarchies model in that the US exercises regional dominance in the Caribbean as it is a particular region of interest for the US since the period of the Monroe Doctrine (Lemke, 1993). This is a single, relational hierarchy nested within a larger regional and global context that has had fluctuations in the level of control that is being exercised within the hierarchy.

Relational networks, rules, and order are concepts that have been present in many different areas of international relations but are not always recognized as the concept under examination. Long lasting trade partnerships, strategic rivalry, and trade diversion are all a part of satisfaction. Legitimacy, hierarchy, and attempts to revise the status quo can all be explained using the concept of satisfaction. Recognizing that distribution of benefits in relationships are integral to the functioning of the international system it will be possible to examine the behavior of states to gain a better understanding of the nature of satisfaction and determine what levels of satisfaction are required to maintain stable and prosperous conditions in the international system.

<u>Territory</u>

In much of international relations there is a focus on territory as a potential cause of conflict. There are frequently skirmishes over borders, disputes over mineral rights and fishing grounds, as well as other resources centered on territory. Some of this literature even focuses on how IOs insert themselves into territorial conflicts and attempt to maintain peace. Territory is an easily observable, politically relevant, and important issue for states to engage in conflict over and IOs often work on issues of territorial integrity, so it presents an ideal issue for testing my general theory.

There is a large of amount of literature that focuses on conflict and territory. This literature uses contiguity, distance, capabilities, and other factors to try and explain why some states become involved in conflict over territory and others do not. Sometimes these are fights over borders, a strategic territory, or are trying to preserve certain territorial ownership (Starr, 2005, Starr and Thomas, 2005, Hensel et al., 2009, Park and James, 2015). What is not often considered, outside of alliance factors or regime type, is whether states engaged in territorial conflict are satisfied or not.

Hensel et al. (2009) come the closest to addressing both the satisfaction aspect that I am addressing and the role that IOs play in disseminating the rules of the system as they test whether the norm of territorial integrity or the norm of no violent territorial acquisition is more prominent and how these two norms are codified in treaties. They find that while the norm of territorial integrity has strong support and third parties will intervene to maintain this norm, the norm of proscribing violent acquisition has increased attempts to violently acquire territory, thereby weakening the norm of territorial integrity. This is an interesting question and has some bearing on how I feel that territory and satisfaction are interrelated. Territory is an inherently relatable way for a national leader to rally support for a conflict from a population, while also being easy

to bring up as a grievance in international forums. This should mean that as satisfaction increases, the likelihood of conflict over territory should decrease.

Some work focuses on the role of IOs in territorial disputes, such as that of Shannon (2009) who investigates the role of IOs in resolving disputes over territory. She finds that interventions by IOs can help promote peaceful conflict resolution, but do not promote bilateral conflict negotiation when IOs are hands off. Shannon et al. (2010) find that joint IO membership and participation reduce the length of conflict duration. This follows my line of thinking that support for IOs builds up trust in them and makes it more likely that two states with high levels of satisfaction, as expressed by behavior toward IOs, would be more likely to settle a conflict than continue to escalate, especially when that conflict is over territory specifically.

There is considerable research relating to how territory interacts with other factors, such as strategic rivalry, to influence the likelihood of conflict onset. In addition, some of the same authors work to determine what types of processes are involved in settling territorial disputes (Owsiak, 2013, Owsiak and Mitchell, 2019, Rider and Owsiak, 2015, Wright and Diehl, 2016, Owsiak, 2014). Territory matters in these terms for my project because it presents a difficult case for satisfaction to matter in a conflict setting. Why should satisfaction outweigh a strategic rivalry in determining whether a conflict will occur? It almost certainly doesn't matter for initiation, but perhaps it does for determining which type of settlement strategy would be the most successful, or which types will build off one another to yield a successful outcome.

<u>International Organizations</u>

There is also significant literature relating to IOs and the onset of conflict. Beginning with Russett et al. (1998) and the work on similar memberships reducing the likelihood of conflict, these studies have drawn a strong link to the prevention of international conflict by IOs.

This does not mean that every IO reduces the chances of conflict, it is only the most structured and integrated group of IOs that can really have an effect on the likelihood of conflict occurring (Bearce et al., 2006, Boehmer et al., 2004, Haftel, 2007, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, Russett and Oneal, 2001). In addition to structure and integration, there could be a buildup effect that allows IOs to be successful in working with states, through imposition or mediation, to achieve a working conflict settlement (Owsiak, 2014). This adds significant strength to my theory of international structure, conflict onset, and how to measure satisfaction. What these studies in particular add to my theory is the mechanism that IOs use to intervene in conflicts.

In all the previous literature, the focus is on the structure of the international system, and yet there is not a major attempt to define what evidence would lend support to the idea of an overarching structure to the international system. In order to prove that there is a structure, we must be able to point to some type of evidence and say, 'that's the structure.' The single missing element here is the fact that since the end of the Second World War there has been an increasing amount of international law based on treaties and international organizations based on rules. These international organizations are relational networks that allow certain states to impose their goals and vision of the system or region onto other states, while allowing the other states the benefit of being in an organization that is geared toward helping all members benefit in some way (Russett et al., 1998). Benefits may include pooled security resources, lessened trade barriers, more political clout in negotiations, and support in implementing domestic reforms (Bearce et al., 2006, Bearce and Omori, 2005, Boehmer et al., 2004, Haftel, 2007, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, Russett and Oneal, 2001, Russett et al., 1998). International organizations fulfill all these roles in forming relationships and are integral in the discussion of the international system.

<u>Satisfaction Defined</u>

For my purposes in this research I am going to be using a definition of satisfaction that combines the relational and structural conceptualizations with the institutions mentioned in some of the revisionist literature. Satisfaction, therefore, is:

The perceived benefits of the international system that states accrue by actively supporting the system that has been developed by the leading powers/hegemon.

This means that satisfaction is made up of the perceived benefits that states reap from their position within the international system. They support the system and are likely to be benefitted, but if they work against the system itself are likely to be rewarded with threats, unflattering labels, and may even be shut out of certain benefits entirely, i.e. not permitted to join the WTO. This definition captures the full range of possible expressions of satisfaction or revisionism that states can engage in, assumes that there is a hegemon responsible for implementing rules and some way of enforcing those rules. It does not directly address what that structure or those rules may entail. This project does not really seek to explore all the different forms that the system could take but does suggest a way of capturing the interactions of states with the structure of the current system.

<u>A Theory on International Organizations and Satisfaction in International Relations:</u>

The international system is made up of more than just state actors. There are transnational groups, terrorist organizations, domestic polities, and international organizations that all play a role in international relations. IOs have an especially large role to play in international relations because they are the skeleton on which the international system is built. The push and pull of IOs and states to formulate policies and norms of behavior results in a system that allows for us to easily see which states are satisfied and which are dissatisfied based

on the way that they interact with IOs. These actions toward IOs are not the same as diplomacy between states, they are interactions between a given state and the system, and would be precursors to international conflict initiation, settlement of conflict, and even expansion of the ecosystem of IOs.

In a conflict sequence, these interactions with IOs take place before there is any sort of buildup to armed conflict. They could be refusals to follow IO rules, calls for IOs to intervene before a conflict escalates, or calls for inspections/blockades, but they would come before a conflict initiates. Once build up is occurring and actual fighting is taking place, then IOs would be called upon to intervene in some fashion, as well as other states. IOs would also be called on to help settle conflicts if two states are unable to do so themselves (Owsiak, 2014, Owsiak and Mitchell, 2019). IOs are generally credible, have more resources to draw from, and states will generally agree to follow most suggestions.

The international system at any given point in time, but especially the post-WWII era, is based on rules that are established by powerful states and that are likely to be disseminated and possibly even enforced by IOs established for that purpose (Gilpin, 1981). Some examples of rules are the idea of state sovereignty, peaceful resolution of differences, and established norms of maritime trade. The peaceful resolution of differences as the accepted norm of behavior/rule of the system is the only feature that has entirely relied on international organizations for enforcement, but the idea of state sovereignty and the norms of maritime trade have found their own ways into the ecosystem of IOs that populate the world and enforce the norms of behavior espoused by the dominant state. For example, the membership of IOs is limited to sovereign states and maritime traditions have been codified by states acting as members of the United Nations.

Additional examples of these kinds of rules include the norm established with the founding of the United Nations that disputes between states should be settled peacefully in a democratically run forum. The basic idea of peaceful resolutions of differences in a democratic setting is one that derives from Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and was adopted by Great Britain following WWI. Despite the British adopting the democratic values, the British Empire was in decline and lacked the legitimacy and power to enforce the new demands of self-determination, free markets, and liberal democracy. At the time, the United States withdrew from being the hegemonic state it had the potential to be and retreated into self-imposed isolation. The United States decided to also implement this approach to conflict resolution in cooperation with the other Allied Powers as part of the negotiations for a new system of institutions following WWII. This basic norm of conflict resolution has also taken root in most other major international organizations, such as the Organization of American States. The major exception was the Warsaw Pact, which saw most Eastern European states taking direction from the Soviet Union while not having the ability to offer much input. The Pact did also not preclude the Soviets from enforcing demands on member states through military means, which followed from the domestic implementation of Communist ideals in the Soviet republics.

The key point here is that most of the rules are based on a vision of the international system that is determined primarily by the interests of the most powerful state or small group of states (Lemke, 1993). These rules are implemented by international organizations designed and supported by powerful states in the international system. If the organization is regional, then it is the regional power's vision, if it is a global organization, it is the vision of a systemic hegemon or a group of great powers. The vision in question might include ideas on a type of ideal governmental system, for how conflicts should be resolved, or the terms on which trade will be

conducted. The rules may even extend to what might be considered moral implications of state policies, as when the British decided to enforce a ban on the maritime slave trade starting in the early 1800s. The regional organizations play a role in reinforcing the demands made by the global organizational structure.

Even though there are operationally democratic norms in most of the major international organizations, these organizations also serve to efficiently keep many states in line at one time. If the premise that IOs represent the vision of a dominant state for the international system is correct, as several scholars suggest, then it would mean that using IOs to spread rules and norms must be more efficient than establishing individual hierarchical relationships or even sub-hierarchies within a larger global hierarchy (Ikenberry, 2011, Ikenberry, 2014, Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010, Lemke, 1993, Organski, 1958, Bearce et al., 2006, Bearce and Omori, 2005, Boehmer et al., 2004, Haftel, 2007, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000, Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, Russett and Oneal, 2001, Russett et al., 1998). In some organizations, like the UNSC or IMF, the goal is to create a non-democratic decision-making process to more overtly enforce the vision of the great powers, but even these organizations have explicit grievance procedures and ways for the hegemon to be thwarted. These procedures may allow for the sense that the hegemon is not entirely dictatorial.

Effectively, creating a large international organization that promotes a single vision for the international system allows the hegemon to create an economy of scale that makes it possible for the hegemon to provide a public good, and only allow states that conform to the general outline of the vision to participate, which is in line with Gowa's argument about why states would agree to follow a hegemon and why a hegemon would not simply order other states around (Gowa, 1989). The hegemon is creating a reward distribution system for those states that

play by the hegemon's rules. The most obvious public good is collective security, it is what the UN and NATO were founded upon, but Gowa's argument is more explicit in that she expects to see transfers of wealth used to reward states that conform to the hegemon's vision of the international order. There is a delicate balance that revolves around the hegemon providing these goods to conforming states to keep them satisfied and the expectation that they will not demand unreasonable amounts of the good and will support the hegemon when it asks for support.

What these IOs are doing is providing the order to the international system that is so desired by states. Stability in international politics brings expanded opportunities for trade and the ability for governments to improve the livelihoods and quality of life for citizens. Order in the international system means reliability, prosperity, and means that individual governments are also more stable. What the order has been established to achieve is to try to limit instances of major conflict and has not been perfect but has had an effect.

The common presence of rules in IOs to respect human rights, settle disputes peacefully, work toward relatively open economies, and use of force only with organizational approval would seem to support the idea of efficient dissemination of rules (Bearce and Omori, 2005, Boehmer et al., 2004, Haftel, 2007, Russett and Oneal, 2001, Russett et al., 1998). At the same time the reforms that states make in order to be allowed to join the system as members in good standing supports the idea that they could somehow be excluded if they do not accept certain reforms. An example of the reform impact is China's efforts to join the WTO. President Clinton made China's accession contingent on the revision of some of the Chinese government's human rights policies. Once these reforms were at least agreed to, the US removed its opposition to

China joining the WTO. This is a clear example of withholding the private good, membership, until an unacceptable behavior has been replaced with an acceptable one.

More examples will help to further elaborate the argument that IO membership can be used to transmit norms of behavior. Specifically, the United Nations espouses the ideas and norms that the United States and its strongest allies sought to institute following the Second World War. It has a democratic forum where states can engage in regular diplomacy and air grievances, an executive of sorts to coordinate activities, a basic court to settle disputes when regular diplomacy does not, and finally it has the Security Council, which acts as an enforcer for other UN decisions. Various political questions have created divisions and competing visions in the UN, but it and the Bretton Woods organizations (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) were approved by the major WWII Allies and cemented a more or less liberal democratic vision for the international system, with the United States as the main guarantor of that system.

There are additional examples of the Bretton Woods organizations being used to enforce a certain vision of the world on behalf of the United States. The IMF is quite (in)famous for attaching conditions to and loans that they grant in order to keep foreign states on track to remove protectionist policies and liberalize their economies. However, there is evidence that IMF conditionality can be used to reward friends, by imposing fewer conditions, and that fewer conditions can also be used to curry favor with states a hegemon wishes to befriend (Dreher et al., 2009b). For example, (Dreher et al., 2009b) cite an example of Zimbabwe and its votes regarding resolutions facing Iraq during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Zimbabwe initially voted in opposition to the resolutions but had lucrative IMF support threatened unless its vote was

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changed. Zimbabwe determined that the IMF loans were worth the change in vote, and subsequently voted for further resolutions against Iraq.

A few studies also indicate that the World Bank is more forthcoming on loans for development projects if countries are friendlier to the United States and more likely to vote along with the United States on UN Security Council votes (Dreher et al., 2009a). Specifically, the World Bank admits that many loans for development projects were given out to countries allied to the Western democratic countries during the Cold War (Dreher et al., 2009a). While there had been issues with previous studies attempting to link politics to frequency of World Bank loans, Dreher et al. (2009a) link the two by examining the relationship between temporary members of the UN Security Council and the frequency with which they received World Bank loans. Their study revealed that foreign aid, in the form of WB loans, was being used to essentially buy votes in favor of the US and its allies. Dreher et al. (2009a) speculate that this may be to increase the apparent levels of legitimacy in the UNSC by guaranteeing that votes that pass the Security Council are nearly unanimous. An alternate explanation to that one is that the hegemon and its allies are making it worth weaker states' time to support the international system and essentially buying support for the system.

These examples are supportive of the idea that the hegemon can exert influence through different organizations to gain compliance on supporting the goals for the international system. There are several theories that suggest that IOs are, at the least, useful tools for international hegemons to use in exerting their influence in the international system. What the examples regarding the UNSC demonstrate is that all the IOs that a hegemon and its allies have an interest in can be used as a carrot and a stick in order to punish members of the system that are not willing to follow the rules. This all relates to satisfaction because the creation of an international

order relies on the acceptance of the order by those it is imposed upon. The hegemon can create whatever type of system it desires, but if it is not accepted by the weaker states and they have enough power to overthrow it, they will (Ikenberry, 2014). Therefore, the motivation behind IO establishment is important for satisfaction.

IOs can also act as a constraint on the hegemon and this is very true in the case of the United States. There are cases, such as the 2003 motion to invade Iraq, that are not approved by the UN and act as a constraint on the actions that the US would otherwise be taking. While the UNSC was unable to prevent the US from invading Iraq, it was still seen as a necessary step to present the American case for invasion to the UN. In the post-Cold War era when the US is supposed to be the most powerful state and the beacon of liberal democracy, it did not make sense to invade another country and overthrow its government without good cause. The request to the UN for permission to invade sent the message that even the US should not be acting with impunity on the global stage, and that it was detrimental to have done so. Further recent disengagements by the US have thrown strong supporters of the post-WWII system into near panic, the US has threatened NATO, pulled out of the UN Council on Human Rights, and is imposing tariffs on allied states after neutering the WTO's dispute resolution process, which all contrast the goals of the international system as it was developed and implemented since the 1948 founding of the UN. Hegemonic theory would predict that large-scale hegemonic withdrawal from the system it creates would cause the system to collapse (Gilpin, 1981). This suggests that there are areas to explore in relation to how a *hegemon's* satisfaction with the international system may play a role in the collapse or revision of a system. The hegemon itself may initiate a systemic collapse or the refusal of a hegemon to be bound by the same rules could

lead other states to see the rules as illegitimate and lead them to become dissatisfied, thus overturning the system.

Other examples of the UN taking actions that would be in line with the ideals of liberal democracy would be different human rights treaties, like the Convention of Rights of the Child or the Convention on Ending Discrimination Against Women. Neither of these treaties have been approved by the United States but are in force internationally and widely approved by states and the US does attempt to meet the standards of these treaties in domestic policy. Another example of the UN embracing principles of liberal democracy that are not necessarily accepted by the United States is the example of the International Criminal Court. This court seeks to hold state leaders accountable for their actions, has been approved by treaty, and has even held trials, but the United States, Russia, and China are not members of the Court. These examples show that even if the hegemon is not directly supportive of certain IO actions, there may be a certain critical mass of great power support that would keep an IO running.

In addition to providing a set of rules that can keep all member states in line, IOs also provide a baseline for reciprocal norms of behavior to spread throughout the international system. Reciprocity is one of the basic concepts found in the major theories of international relations and it is critical in setting up norms of behavior that states would follow (Keohane, 1986). There are of course exceptions, such as repeatedly refusing to recognize a duty to reciprocate for something like safe passage of shipping, but these typically result in states receiving less benefit from international interactions than they may otherwise receive. This is the basic principle behind the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its mission to negotiate lower tariffs on a reciprocal basis. Even though the GATT has been replaced by the World Trade

Organization, the basic principle of allowing reciprocal moves on tariffs is still integral to negotiating toward a free trade environment.

IOs also can improve the credibility of rules if all member states are held to the same standards. Obligations to several organizations, such as the UN, help to send credible signals by requiring substantial resource commitments on the part of member states. While these commitments may not require material commitments that would totally preclude military spending, they are substantial enough that all observing states understand that a conscious decision has been made to pursue goals that may not be entirely out of self-interest. For example, the United States' participation in the World Trade Organization sends a credible signal that the US is committed to lowering tariffs and increasing open trade. It has agreed to not use specific policy mechanisms, unless approved by the WTO, in order to promote a global trade system that in theory will benefit all states. The US is acting in accordance with the interpretation of hegemonic stability theory that Gowa (1989) espouses.

The previous arguments are what IOs have already been determined to accomplish at the international level. They matter for my argument because without performing these roles, there is no international system that has rules to follow or norms that are distributed except on a state-state reciprocal basis. That is, without the organizations representing a type of structure, there is only a dyadic-reciprocal system that functions very closely to the anarchy that is prevalent as an assumption in theories of international relations. Even with the IOs there is still a measure of anarchy, but it is not as pervasive because there are expected, acceptable patterns of behavior. In exchange for following these patterns of behavior, states are granted protection, access, and the knowledge that other states are constrained by the same rules which allows them to be satisfied with the system.

The concept of excludable goods is crucial to having a stable international system that can be manipulated to change levels of satisfaction and create a system of rules to be followed. One proposal is to seek out private, distributable goods that could be used to reward states for supporting the status quo (Gowa, 1989). Gowa (1989) would argue that none of the international organizations mentioned could function without some type of excludable good, and that would mean that Ikenberry (2014) has some issues with her conceptualization of system control as it is not predicated on having private goods that can be distributed, but rather a form of consent or coercion.

One of the best examples of using organization membership to influence the actions of others is the way that the United States held off approving Chinese membership in the WTO. The Chinese government desperately wanted membership in order to avoid accusations of unfair trade practices, protect itself from potentially unfair trade, and keep up its lucrative trade relationship with the United States, clearly major benefits that the Chinese government felt it was worth pursuing. The United States made the membership of China conditional on Chinese economic reforms including opening to more foreign investment, liberalizing the economy, and improving protections for intellectual property in addition to domestic political and legal reforms centered around improving respect for human rights. Even though China initially supported the creation of the WTO in the Morocco agreement, it was not admitted until 2001. The US effectively used its dominant position in the WTO to impede China's membership until China agreed to accept the vision of a free trade economic system and rules to international trade that it did not have a hand in making. This means that membership in the organization can itself be the excludable good upon which Gowa (1989) is predicating status quo support.

International organizations are more likely to represent the more indirect forms of control that Ikenberry discusses. They are more likely to represent an effort at collaboration than a strict state-state hierarchy, where a hegemon is issuing and enforcing orders, such as those that Lake (2009) discusses. Instead of determining individual state policies, an IO is more likely to set a goal for all member states to meet, and then each member is responsible for implementing policies that will bring that state into compliance.

The example of the GATT transforming to the WTO provides a good example of how a hegemon can maintain control of an IO while still placing commitments on itself to maintain a standard of behavior that members find acceptable. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations on reducing tariffs, the United States and others determined that the GATT was an inefficient means of reducing tariffs. The voting rules of the GATT were perceived to favor the many smaller states that were members by virtue of the majority needed to approve new tariff reductions. The Uruguay Round was started in 1986 and did not end until the motion to create the WTO was passed in 1994 and entered into force in 1995. The WTO was approved because of the perception that small states would hold onto their voting advantage over the US and other large economies, however, the dispute resolution mechanisms in place have mostly favored the US and other large economies and the voting rules do not really disadvantage the US.

One function of IOs that has not been extensively worked on, which is closely related to satisfaction, is that of a feedback mechanism. IOs do not only serve to coordinate action, send credible signals, or disseminate rules. Any stream of communication, such as an IO's assembly, has to flow both directions in order to be effective. For IOs and hegemons, this means that the hegemon should be using the IO to communicate its vision for the world to other states, but other states can offer input that would alter that vision or change how an IO would function to

implement that vision, especially in the type of consent based system espoused by the United States (Ikenberry, 2014). The transition between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization would be an example here. Numerous small states wanted to alter the rules of the GATT to gain more trade leverage and fairer terms of trade, but the more dominant states, specifically the US, altered the rules to seem more fair, but have the same outcome (Przeworski, 2000).

In showing acceptance of rules, small states should be primarily engaged in cooperative behavior with a given IO. That means that these states should be meeting financial obligations, showing general support for the process of decision making within the IO, and limiting actions that would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the organization. For some organizations, the financial obligations are scaled so that every state would contribute something or would contribute troops for peacekeeping. States that are supportive of the organization would be willing to meet these obligations without reservations, if they can do so. There may be some cases where states are willing to make contributions but are unable to for various reasons. The second type of general support is supporting the process of decision making within the IO itself. This could be supporting the voting process if one is used, complying with decisions made by the organization even if the state in question was initially opposed to the outcome, or even bringing cases for dispute settlement to the IO. The third type of support activity should be limiting actions that cast doubt on the legitimacy of the organization itself. Many states will have occasion to disagree with a particular outcome as a result of the actions of an IO, for example Israel often disagrees with UNGA resolutions regarding the status of the Palestinian Territories. Despite these disagreements, Israel has not threatened to leave the UN or called it an illegitimate organization. By remaining a part of the organization and not threatening to undermine the general principles

of it, Israel is showing support. This is, of course, a rather low bar to meet the definition of support. Effectively, showing positive support, i.e. financial contributions, and making use of the IO, bringing disputes for settlement, show that states are satisfied with the system. After all, why pay a cost for something if there is no benefit or if you actively disapprove of the organization?

A further example is the United States and the way that it interacts with the United Nations. While the US is supposed to be the leader of the system, it still is required to follow the same rules if it is to inspire consent among the other system members. The US does this by abiding by Security Council decisions, for the most part, and allowing leaders of various hostile nations to give speeches at the UN headquarters in New York City. There may be instances where the US does not agree with all Security Council decisions, like the disapproval of the invasion of Iraq, but it still must go through the motions to maintain the faith of other states in the system. Even if the US later does go against the wishes of the Security Council, the fact that it feels the need to seek approval means that the US government is abiding by its own vision of a consent based international system.

The next possible range of actions involves rejecting the rules of the international system to varying degrees. The first type of action revolves around simply ignoring rules that the dissatisfied state does not agree with, the second includes actively trying to revise rules of the system to benefit the state in question, and the third is the often studied option of engaging in great power war to completely take over the system and devise new rules and structure to order the international system.

In the first type of action that is available, ignoring the rules, the dissatisfied state is not actively trying to take over any part of the system, it is simply going to ignore rules that it does

not agree with. For example, China has ignored rules regarding how maritime territory is to be claimed and the circumstances under which it can be declared territorial waters. The most recent example is the dispute between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea. In this case, China has rejected the application of a treaty that is supported by a majority of states, including land-locked ones, and has carried on building islands and outfitting them for potential military use. This could be a sign that China is preparing for conflict on a larger scale, but the current level of engagement is limited to essentially ignoring any other state's claims to the territory.

Another example would be the Russian government ignoring, or possibly even helping, the Syrian government using chemical weapons on its own population. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Stockpiling, and use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction has been signed by Syria, and enough other countries to be considered to be in force, despite this the Russian government has taken no actions to curtail their ally's use of chemical weapons and even voted down recent resolutions to sanction the Assad regime for its continued use of chemical weapons against civilians. In both cases, states that have the potential to challenge the US for the status of hegemon are ignoring rules that are inconvenient now, which sets up potential future challenges.

The second type of action involves states taking revisionist actions, but not to the extent that the overall governing structure of the system or the hegemon are overthrown. These types of revisions may involve territorial exchanges or the reforming of trade agreements to benefit the dissatisfied state. The regular tariff negotiations over the course of the GATT's lifetime are examples of states dissatisfied with their access to a free market system actively attempting to gain greater access and fairer terms of trade. The actions of the non-aligned states during the Cold War also fall into this category, where the many non-aligned states attempted to exert

greater influence in the UN and other organizations, but were not interested in militarily challenging either of the two super powers for a dominant position in the international system. Some cases may even involve calls to not recognize a state or government as legitimate, such as with the PRC and ROC. The dispute between the two Chinese governmental bodies over Taiwan is both a question of territory and legitimacy. The UN has decided to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government but has not weighed in on whether Taiwan is a separate state.

The BRIC Bank, or New Development Bank, specifically markets itself as an alternative to the World Bank. On the website for the NDB, it tries to distinguish itself from the World Bank by suggesting that the conditionality that the WB tries to impose are unfair to developing states, as are the rules by which projects are given funding. What is more important here is the countries that make up the membership to the NDB; Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Two are often considered to be dissatisfied states, China and Russia, while India has been more middle of the road, and Brazil and South Africa seem to be more mercurial. Interestingly, in the details of the governance of the bank, Russia and China have fewer members of the governance board, at only one a piece (Bank, 2018).

The third course of action available to dissatisfied states is to, of course, go full revisionist and attempt to overthrow the hegemon and institute a new set of rules for the international system. This is probably the most studied potential course of action as it is directly reflective of conflict and it is easy to recognize the final effect. Much of the conflict literature, especially the power transition portion, focuses on satisfaction in the form of alliance structures and preferences, but does little to address the fact that conflicts escalate (Kim, 2002). Some conflict literature, such as Reed (2000), do attempt to address factors related to the escalation of conflict from MID to war, but not many.

The short summary of everything above is that in the international system, IOs serve as the mechanism that hegemons and great powers use to transmit their vision for the international system and establish order. Every other state can choose to participate in these IOs and gain benefits in exchange for supporting the visions of the powerful states. States that choose not to participate would be excluded from those benefits and are to be considered dissatisfied with the system because they are choosing not to engage with the system as it exists.

Conflict becomes a part of this theory in the way that states interact with IOs before a conflict starts. Much like Morgan and Palmer (1997) suggest, there should be some type of signal sent to indicate that states are considering a conflict. While this could be a buildup of military resources (Lemke, 1996b), a more likely move is to signal diplomatically in an effort to begin negotiations to forestall a conflict but still making changes that are beneficial to the state. While states might very well buildup military strength or send diplomatic signals, it is just as likely that they will signal toward an IO that represents the rules of the system by taking one of the actions above to cut off funds to an IO, challenge for IO leadership, set up a new IO, or even declare a war.

So, what are the implications of the theory above? First, I expect that there will be small movements indicating dissatisfaction before a conflict breaks out. As Morgan and Palmer (1997) suggest, states will lay low and not demand changes that would involve major security challenges before using diplomatic protests and protests inside international organizations. Second, if certain international organizations represent certain parts of the order of the system, then I would expect satisfaction to change in reference to certain organizations based on the type of revisions states want to see.

An extended example of China's rise in the international system matches closely with these two implications. First, the People's Republic of China was largely antagonistic toward the post-WWII order immediately following the war. This was partly due to the Republic of China being the officially recognized government for China in the new IOs. The PRC worked through back channels and various means to eventually gain the ROC's place on the United Nations Security Council. This major event meant that the PRC had finally made it to the big leagues of international power politics. There wasn't a major challenge to the system by the PRC until after it had gained access to the WTO, as mentioned previously. Since that time there have been subtle moves by China to exert its influence in the South Pacific by flaunting UN rules about claiming island territory, building aircraft carriers, and potentially violating its agreements in relation to Hong Kong and its handover from the United Kingdom.

More subtle is the example of the organizations that China has developed and joined as challenges to the US led order. The Shanghai Economic Cooperative is designed to exert Chinese influence in Central Asia along with the Belt and Road Initiative. The most subtle challenge is listed below in the form of the New Development Bank. All these examples of Chinese challenges are pushing back against the rules of the system but have not escalated to the level of regular MIDs or full conflict.

BRIC Countries

There is one very easy to select set of countries that should provide an easy test of the theory laid out above. These are the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and they have set up at least one international organization that all are members of that on the surface appears to be in opposition to the international system laid out by the United States after the end of the Second World War. The BRIC states have created their own investment bank, the

NDB, that is supposed to require less conditionality for the member states than the IMF or World Bank would. The five member states of the NDB should have lower or declining levels of satisfaction than other states in similar positions prior to the founding of the NDB. Afterwards, they should continue displaying lower levels of satisfaction with the Bretton Woods organizations than other states. According to the list of projects available directly from the NDB, the only current beneficiaries of the bank are the five members with project funding centered on transportation, infrastructure, and energy projects. The real test of my idea of using behavior toward IOs as a way of measuring satisfaction will hinge on the behavior of states toward the IMF, WB, and NDB prior to creating the NDB, and their behavior afterward, as compared to the rest of the states in the system and whether other states exhibit an inclination to join the NDB. Interestingly for the NDB, all UN members are eligible to join, but only the current five members are participating.

What these five members do have in common is that they are traditionally not friendly with the US and do not share every value espoused at the UN or the Bretton Woods organizations. For example, China's government resents the amount of pressure it receives from the US to reform its economy, respect human rights, and to not expand into the South China Sea. Russia's leadership still operates in a mentality that sees the Cold War as a great tragedy and wants to build Russia up into a stronger power than it currently is. Brazil is still reckoning with some of its history as an authoritarian state and has had difficulty adapting to the open global marketplace. India and South Africa both attempted to split the difference between the Cold War alliances and expand their regional power but have seen their efforts limited by the US and other Western allies at the UNSC. Russia and China are consistently the states that vote against US interests in the UN. Three of the five members are searching for alternatives to IMF

conditionality and two actively oppose the US at most opportunities. These are not countries that could be considered satisfied overall. What is somewhat surprising is that there are not more provisional members, such as North Korea, that would be willing to join the bank, although this could be logistical in nature as membership involves a certain upfront and ongoing contribution to the bank's funds.

In my data that I will use to examine the implications of the theory laid out above, I have data that suggests there are shows of support and disapproval for IOs that have varying levels of cost. Some interactions may include supportive speeches to rally support for an IO, while others may be speeches attacking the same. There may be state dinners offered for IO staff or actions baring IO staff from entering a country. These actions show that states regularly express support for or disapproval of IOs, and the collective trajectory of those actions makes up state satisfaction. With these observations it should be possible to create different measures of which states are satisfied, to what extent are they satisfied, and if these states do behave differently.

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CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS

<u>Introduction</u>

As with any other large-scale empirical undertaking, my research will only be as good as

my data. In order to alleviate major questions regarding my data and methods, I will present that

information here. Each section will contain a brief description of the data used, the methods

used to examine the data, and explore potential pitfalls with either dataset or how to correct

them. I will also provide some of the basic vital statistics on my data.

<u>Data Sources</u>

There are two main sources that I am using for my data in this project. The first is the

International Crisis Early Warning System developed by the Defense Advanced Research Project

Agency. The other sources of data come from standard datasets found in international relations,

like the Correlates of War or POLITY, or from organizations, like the World Bank, for economic

data.

For this project I have used the International Crisis Early Warning System events data as

my main source of information. I have chosen this dataset in order to compile a new measure of

state satisfaction based on a set of publicly available actions that states have taken toward

International Organizations (Boschee et al., 2017). This dataset contains publicly made

statements as reported by major news sources from around the world. News sources such as the

New York Times or *The Guardian* appear frequently. The events were recorded in the data set

based on criteria developed by DARPA and record the day, publisher, geographic coordinates,

what sector of society the statement sender and target are a part of, the geographic location of

target and sender by city, province and which country they are located in, the type of statement

or action made, and a Goldstein scale score for the intensity of the action. As a breakdown of each category, the date is the date on which the action in question took place. Each event is given an identification number, which is effectively the row number of the larger dataset. The source name is the party performing the action in question, while the target name is the object of that action. The sectors refer to different ways that the actors can be thought of. For example, a dissident, an elite, a government, an executive, etc. There are often multiple sectors attached to each actor so that there are multiple ways to view the event, depending on an analyst's interests. Source and target country refer to the originating country and the country where the target is located. The Event Text refers to the actual content of the event while the CAMEO code refers to a specific coding of events based on type of event dialogue. The Intensity is based on a Goldstein scale of event positivity. This is the primary column of the data that I am interested in. Story ID, sentence, and publisher are used to determine bibliographic information for each row of information in the dataset. The city, district, province, country, and coordinate information refer to the location that the event was reported from. The sample tables below show the first six rows of data from the 1995 ICEWS data file.

Event ID	Event Date	Source Name	Source Sectors	Source Country
926685	1/1/1995	Extremist (Russia)	Radicals / Extremists / Fundamentalists, Dissident	Russian Federation
926687	1/1/1995	Government (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Government	Bosnia and Herzegovina
926686	1/1/1995	Citizen (Serbia)	General Population / Civilian / Social, Social	Serbia

926688	1/1/1995	Canada			Canada
926689	1/1/1995	Lawyer/Attorney (Canada)	Legal, Social		Canada

Event Text	CAMEO Code	Intensity	Target Name	Target Sectors
Praise or endorse	51	3.4	Boris Yeltsin	Elite, Executive, Executive Office, Government
Express intent to cooperate	30	4	Citizen (Serbia)	General Population / Civilian / Social, Social
Express intent to cooperate	30	4	Government (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	Government
Praise or endorse	51	3.4	City Mayor (Canada)	Government, Local, Municipal
Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action	173	-5	Police (Canada)	Government, Police

Target Country	Story ID	Sentence Number	Publisher	City	District
Russian Federation	28235806	5	The Toronto Star	Moscow	
Serbia	28235807	1	The Toronto Star		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	28235807	1	The Toronto Star		
Canada	28235809	3	The Toronto Star		

Canada	28235964	1	The Toronto Star	Montreal	Montreal

Province	Country	Latitude	Longitude
Moskva	Russian Federation	55.7522	37.6156
Bosnia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	44	18
Bosnia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	44	18
Ontario	Canada	49.2501	-84.4998
Quebec	Canada	45.5088	-73.5878

An example of the type of event being examined should help to illustrate how this dataset is useful for the analysis of my theory. On January 1st, 2003, several events take place and are recorded in various newspapers around the world. The example I have chosen is event number 5643050. This event consists of the Iraqi government appealing to the UN in order to forestall and American invasion that would later take place in March. While the specific appeal is not recorded in the ICEWS data, it is recorded that the Iraqi Government made a diplomatic appeal to the United Nations and that such an action is recorded as having an Intensity score of 3.5. This event is considered a positive interaction in the data, and the CAMEO code is a generic 050, which is coded as engaging in unspecified diplomatic cooperation (Gerner et al., 2009).

My interest in the data is the Source Sector and Country, the Target Name and Sector, and the Intensity. I am not as interested in the Target Country because the targets that I do wish to examine are international organizations. As previously mentioned in my theory chapter, I believe that state behavior toward IOs could be a viable measure of state satisfaction with the international system. To that end, the Target Country is not as important as the Target Name and

Target Sector. The Source Sector and Country are both needed as a way to determine that each data point included in the final project is an action taken by a representative of a national government and was undertaken as part of that representative's official duties. I would not want to, for example, include campaign rhetoric that advocated disbanding the North American Free Trade Agreement, but would want to include any motions in that direction by active government officials and representatives.

The Goldstein scale of Intensity found in the ICEWS data is my primary measure to judge the positivity of an action or the negativity of an action. First of all, it has already been coded to indicate which actions are cooperative or conflictual, and to what extent that is the case (Goldstein, 1992). Goldstein (1992) originally developed this scale as a means of putting the World Events Interaction Survey data onto a continuous scale to facilitate event analysis. Previously, the Conflict and Peace Databank held events data after the level of conflict or cooperation had been agreed upon by a set of judges consisting of leading international relations scholars. This dataset ended collecting in 1978, while the WEIS continued into the 1980s. Goldstein tried to put the WEIS data into a continuous measure of conflict and cooperation even though the WEIS data was initially set up to not be a continuous scale. Goldstein used a panel of professors from the University of California to sort different actions into two scales, one of conflict and one of cooperation. In this way he took WEIS data, applied the COPDAB method to it, and came up with a way to extend the application of the COPDAB scale into the present (Goldstein, 1992).

Goldstein's goal of creating a scale of conflict versus cooperation makes this a valid measure to use for my concept of satisfaction and using actions toward IOs to measure it. Effectively, the scale is measuring whether a given state is taking conflictual or cooperative

actions with the entities that embody the rules of the international system. States always take a mixture of actions during any given period of time, but the beauty of the ICEWS data is that it records daily events from a variety of sources. For my purposes, the Goldstein scale is also nice because it uses a score of 10 to indicate when two actors have engaged in an alliance, and a score of -10 when two actors have declared war, meaning that there is an intuitive rating applied to each event. These pre-codings for alliance and war are unlikely to be used, because IOs are not often in possession of armies, but they are still useful to gauge how hostile or friendly the actions that states take toward IOs are.

The scale Goldstein developed has been tested in at least one study and was found to be at least as good as previous methods of coding events data, when compared to fresh coding of new events (Schrodt and Gerner, 1994). This means that the measurement of events data itself is consistent and has a good amount of reliability. The ICEWS data itself takes advantage of developments in machine reading that King and Lowe (2003) were a part of at Harvard. They found that it was possible to teach a computer to read and code new articles with at least as much reliability as undergraduates over a short term period and drew the conclusion that it would possible to code large amounts of data in a short period of time. The developments by Goldstein and King and Lowe were built upon by O'brien (2010) as he started working with DARPA to develop the ICEWS data. At this time, the ICEWS data and Global Data on Events, Location and Tone dataset are competing to see which set of data will be more valuable in helping to predict crises (Arva et al., 2013). ICEWS is currently being run by Lockheed Martin and consists of the data, which is what I am working with, and a couple of analysis programs based on statistical and social analysis of the data (Arva et al., 2013). There are a couple of things to keep in mind that Lockheed suggests in interpreting some of the data. The first is that events are

coded from a neutral perspective, which is good for my project. It means that the data is not inherently biased toward the perspective of the United States, i.e. the current hegemon (Lautenschlager et al., 2015). Second, there is not sense of magnitude in a Goldstein scale. That means that an event is cooperative or conflictual, there is not an indication that one border skirmish is worse than another because more people were killed, they would both be coded the same (Lautenschlager et al., 2015).

The data in the ICEWS dataset runs from 1995 to 2015, however, not all of this time series will be utilized. Due to some of the temporal restrictions in other variables, I will not use the full term of the data in all analyses. The full time period will be used after the effectiveness of my developed satisfaction variable has been shown in relation to using Tau-b and S for measuring satisfaction.

While the ICEWS data is an extremely large dataset, the information contained in it is more compact than I had initially presumed. This made it fairly easy to separate the original dataset into smaller sets focused on global organizations, regional organizations, and all international organizations that I am examining. The challenge with merging the ICEWS data and other standard international relations datasets was significantly reduced by using the NewGene data management software. This software is an update to the Eugene data management software and contains the most commonly used datasets, like the COW data, preloaded to make merging datasets and selecting certain variables much easier than manually merging entire datasets.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, the relevant targets for this study are major international organizations that function at the global and regional level. They can be economic or security related, but all must have some type of governance function or hierarchical

relationship between members. I chose to use the World Trade Organization, International

Monetary Fund, United Nations, and the World Bank to represent the global scale organizations.

These four organizations represent the major international structure implemented by the allies

following the Second World War. Each requires commitments by member states to abide by

certain restrictions in exchange for particular rewards. This directly relates back to the idea that

a hierarchy of relationships exists to keep all states in line with the hegemon's vision of the

international order. These organizations are also interacted with by nearly every recognized state

in the international system, which means that I have interactions between every state and the

organizations that are the embodiment of the rules of the system.

A number of regional organizations were also selected, keeping in mind that some

regional organizations are more active than others and that some regions are more tightly

integrated than others. I attempted to include regional organizations from major geographic

areas, but there are data limitations in the fact that coverage of these organizations must be found

in the newspapers that ICEWS uses as its primary sources. These organizations are the European

Union, the Organization of American States, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, NATO, the African Union,

and the Arab League. After paring down the data in this form, the extra variables that are not

relevant for this study are removed. Mostly, these are location information, but event text and

general information about the news article itself are removed while the names and sectors of

sources and targets are retained. There are additional mentions of each organization in each

subsequent year of the ICEWS dataset.

A general face validity check is run using North Korea as an example. If there is one

country that should be dissatisfied with the current institutional set up of the international

system, it should be North Korea. There are a variety of sanctions placed on the country and it is

considered to be a rogue state in the fact that it does not often comply United Nations rulings against it and works to undermine several norms of the international system related to the testing and production of nuclear weapons, abduction of foreign nationals, and taking of foreign nationals as hostages for negotiating purposes. The summary statistics on the general data of North Korea shows that the average yearly intensity of interactions between North Korea and international organizations has a minimum value of -4.3836 and a maximum of 3.392, with monthly averages being the same. The yearly sums of intensity range from -21392 to 7289 with monthly ranges between -4011 and 1495, which indicates far more conflictual than cooperative actions. There are 1208 total observations of North Korea's interactions with IOs, mostly directed at the United Nations.

I have also been made aware of some potential issues with ICEWS as a dataset based on feedback from conference presentations. First, because of the source news organizations, there are many events that are missed in data collection. For example, Brazil, a main founder of MERCOSUR does not appear to have any interaction with that organization for the entire range of data. This seems like a major issue. Second, there could be issues with offsetting events. For example, if the *New York Times* and *Moscow Times* record the same event, is the reporting the same, or is the reporting done in such a way that the same story from two sources have counteracting Goldstein scores?

For the first issue, there is not much of a way to address this except to hope that data collection improves approaching the present day. Another data set like GDELT may provide additional data that can be used to repeat some of my experiments in the future. For the second issue, this seems to be not as much of an issue because of the neutral nature of the scoring. While the individual news sources can report on an event in a way that would make it appear that

one country or another is directly benefitting, the Goldstein scores are designed to be opinion neutral.

<u>Status Quo Evaluations</u>

The status quo evaluations are the Tau-b, S, and Satisfaction scores. Tau-b is based on similarity of alliance portfolios (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975). The range of possible scores goes from -1 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect similarity. The individual scores of states in a dyad are compared to the United States, as global leader, added together and then the dyad score is used. The S-scores are based on alliances and policy similarities of states, and are again based on the dyad score (Signorino, 1999). A similar process to Tau-b is used for the S-scores, where the US is again used as the system leader. In addition to the alliance portfolios, a range of policy positions are used to determine when states are satisfied with the hegemon.

In order to begin the empirical analysis of the theory relating satisfaction to state behavior in IOs and its relation to conflict, I have to define an empirical measurement for satisfaction and begin measurement. For all of the empirical analyses I am using a satisfaction variable that I have developed using the International Crisis Early Warning System data (Boschee et al., 2017). My interest in the dataset is in the Intensity, Target, Source Country, Source Sector, and Date information included. I use the information in the dataset to create measures of satisfaction based on the interactions between states and IOs. Each line of data in my trimmed ICEWS data records which country has taken an action toward an IO, what the content of that action was, the intensity of the action, and the date of the action. For example, on January 3, 1995 the Russian Federation engaged in negotiations with the European Union as reported by the BBC for an intensity rating of 4 (Boschee et al., 2017).

I have grouped intensity scores of each statement by which state issued a statement, the date issued, and the target organization, then added them together and divided that score by the number of actions that occurred in a given time frame to create averages based on month, year, whether the organization is international or regional, and a general satisfaction score for each state over the years available. So, there is a yearly average, monthly average, yearly sum of satisfaction, monthly sum, and international and regional sums and averages. All these varying methods of aggregation have been created to provide differing levels of variation in the satisfaction score and can be used to answer different hypotheses. For initial analysis of data, I have used the scores related to the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. There are a number of regional organizations that will also be examined in the future, such as MERCOSUR, the Arab League, ASEAN, and NATO.

I have graphed the basic correlations between my satisfaction score and some other factors that are often used as control variables in analyses of conflict onset (Quackenbush, 2015, Reed, 2000) for the year 2000. The red line in each plot is the plot of a basic linear model, while the blue line is a lowess of the available data. There are some slight positive effects of GDP Change on satisfaction levels, such that as the three-year average of GDP Change grows, satisfaction increases slightly. What is more interesting is that there is nearly no relationship between satisfaction and the level of capabilities a state has, at least from what is shown in the chart, a more detailed regression is performed later. There are also slight negative relationships between GDP per capita and Polity IV score, but again, these are very slight negative influences that will be further examined in a regression analysis. Also, of interest is the way that there appear to be different clusters of states in each graph. Such as the cluster holding nearly none of

the capabilities in a dyad, the cluster of states below $10,000 per capita GDP, and the cluster

with between 3 and 5% positive GDP change on average.

Figure 1

The satisfaction variable as defined above is better than previous definitions of

satisfaction for a few reasons. First, it is directly based on state actions toward the organizations

that have been created to implement a certain vision of the international system, which means

that it is more theoretically appropriate. Second, the amount of short-term variation in the

variable is higher than that contained in Tau-b or S scores. Because the data is recorded daily,

there is significant day-to-day changes in Satisfaction scores that reflect changing political

situations. Another criticism, specifically of Tau-b, is that it is a measure of association and not

necessarily of similarity (Signorino, 1999).

I have chosen to use the following countries to graphically illustrate some of the issues: The United States, Russia, China, North Korea, the United Kingdom, and India. The United States is the hegemon, and it forms the baseline against which other states have their satisfaction measured using both Tau-b and S, its score does not change. Russia and China are adversarial to the United States and are two founding members of the New Development Bank, which was founded to challenge US hegemony in financial organizations. India was chosen because it has a history of non-alignment between the US and Russia, is the second most populous country, and is also a founder of the NDB. The United Kingdom is included because it has a close alliance with the United States in the form of NATO and was also a founder of the post-WWII order. North Korea is also included as a test of the measurements because it is extremely isolated, frequently makes provocative statements, and challenges the US militarily on a regular basis.

As an example of the first issue with Tau-b and S scores, I present the following illustrative graphs of satisfaction measures. The primary reason that I am so interested in using a different measure of satisfaction is that the Tau score for the major state, in this case the US, never changes. By design, there is no way for the US Tau-b or S-score to change, it will always be 1, meaning that current events like the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the UNHRC would not be captured, unless it caused other states to drop formal alliances with the US. Using the Tau-b scores for Russia, China, the United Kingdom, North Korea, and India as compared to the United States, we can see that there is only one value included in the data. For the UK, the alliance profile closely matches that of the United States, and so it has a value of .5 for all years. There is a similar occurrence with the North Korean, Chinese and Indian Tau-b measurements of satisfaction. The North Korean rating is about -0.5. This means that it has nearly nothing in common with the United States in terms of alliances. The measures for China

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and India both hover near 0, indicating that they are neutral, according to Tau-b measures of

satisfaction. What these charts have in common is that there is no movement in satisfaction for

these states. The UK is somewhat satisfied, and North Korea is not, that is all we can tell from

the graphical interpretation of the data for these states. If the hegemon could be dissatisfied with

the sysytem, or other states support for it, that would allow for more realistic predictions of

hegemonic behavior, without overly complicating any models. The largest variation out of the

sample countries satisfaction is that of Russia. Before 1990, Russia has the consistently lowest

satisfaction score out of the six countries chosen for the sample, at -0.25. Then, in 1990 there is

a major geopolitical event that causes Russia to reform its alliance portfolio, the Soviet Union

collapses and suddenly Russian Tau-b scores indicate a level of satisfaction that is nearly as high

as the United Kingdom. It seems odd to me that such a rapid shift in satisfaction would

accompany the collapse of a regime and economic system, especially considering that by 1995

the Tau-b score indicates a return to neutrality of satisfaction.

Figure 2

In addition to the small movements found in Tau-b scores, the S-scores also have a small overall range. It is also interesting to note the ways in which the S-scores move. The United States has zero variation, it is the system leader, and nothing changes, and all scores are compared to its. The Russian S-scores do show some interesting movement. It has especially low S-scores prior to 1990, reaches a peak in 1991, and starts to decline in 1995, but at no point does

the score cross a .5 threshold. Interestingly, North Korea appears to have a higher level of

satisfaction than Russia after 1995, which does match my Satisfaction score in general

movements, if not values.

The graphical interpretation of S-scores over the same time period as Tau-b, 1980 to

2000, tells approximately the same story. The range of possible scores is still the same, -1 to 1,

but because S-scores also examine policy closeness, the levels of satisfaction tend to be higher than indicated by Tau-b, especially in India, China, and North Korea, but overall the story is the same. The United States is the system leader and has no changes in its S-score. Russia experiences a bump in 1990, then returns to approximate neutrality by 1995.

What happens when we use a different variable to measure satisfaction? Using the general average of all state actions toward a selection of major international organizations included in ICEWS for the years between 1995 and 2015, we can again graph general satisfaction. These graphs are substantially different than those provided using Tau-b.

What we can see from these charts is that there is a significant level of variation in the levels of satisfaction between the six countries. The United States appears to have the most consistent levels of satisfaction, between 0 and 5 and it seems to be increasing over time, indicating that even the hegemon can have variations in how it is viewing the status quo of the international system. Russian satisfaction, much like in the graphs for Tau and S, starts off high in 1995, then declines toward a more neutral 0 by 1998, meaning that there was a positive bump at the end of the Cold War that ends before the start of the 21st century. North Korea has a significant dip in satisfaction around 2003, possibly related to the invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power and the debate concerning the invasion in the UN. China's satisfaction scores start out relatively high, then begin a decline to a low point in 1998, which is likely related to the impasse of China desiring WTO membership and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. As with North Korea, there are dips in the satisfaction levels of China and India during 2003.

Figure 4

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The most interesting things to note in the graphs of various countries satisfaction is that the US does not have the highest level. At different points, the other states have higher values. This should not be interpreted as invalidating my attempt to measure satisfaction, to note an example North Korea has a total of 1,610 interaction with the organizations listed below. Of those interactions the average score is -0.641, the median is 0, the minimum is -10 (equivalent to a declaration of war) and the max is 9 (nearly equivalent to signing an alliance), clearly the North Korean government is not consistent in its interactions with the international system, and that is reflected in the wild swings in satisfaction that appear in the graph above. The specific list of organizations that these states are interacting with is the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization so that all states have interactions with the foundational IOs of the international system for this analysis.

For my Satisfaction score, the mean intensity scores and summed intensity scores of each state are aggregated for each year in the range of the data available. There are two potential ways to use the data. The first is to simply dichotomize the level of satisfaction based on the total combined Satisfaction score for the dyad. If the total score is positive, the dyad is satisfied but if it is negative the dyad is dissatisfied. The alternative method is to leave each state's satisfaction score as a continuous variable. In addition, there are times when the Satisfaction score for only one state is used for a regression. These cases are specified when discussing the results of individual models.

BRIC Country Analysis

The BRIC countries are the five newly developing countries that are considered to be somewhere between middle powers and great powers. At least one of these countries was a great power and has slid to a slightly lower ranking, one is a major challenger to US hegemony in the

near to mid-future, and the other three have the potential to be regional if not global powers in the near to mid-future. These states are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, hence the acronym BRICS. There is some question as to whether all of these countries would be status quo supporting and for at least two of them the answer is almost certainly 'no.' Brazil, India, and South Africa have a very interesting history during the Cold War as they were generally part of the non-aligned movement. Analyzing the levels of satisfaction of these five states should demonstrate how states can be simultaneously supportive of the very general rules of the system and undermine it.

The most general rules of the system can be followed by using the same general organizational format for an organization, that is, a nominally separate executive body or secretarial branch, or using majoritarian decision-making processes. At the same time, the goals of a particular organization could be undermining the current international structure by trying to duplicate or replace a current organization's functions and drawing membership away from established organizations. Because a new organization could have the support of a hegemon or majority of great/regional powers or the support of none/minority choosing the appropriate organization had to be done carefully.

The New Development Bank (BRIC Bank) is a great organization to use for this type of analysis. It has as founding members states that are seen as a challenge to the current international system, it replicates the functions of at least one current IO that is seen as foundational to the current international system, and it has membership open to all UN members able to meet a minimum contribution, meaning that it would undercut membership of other IOs. China and Russia being founding members present a challenge to Western, and especially US, power in the current financial organizations of the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and

International Monetary Fund. These three organizations form the bedrock of the post-WWII

international trading and economic system and the BRIC Bank is attempting to undercut them by

poaching members and removing the political or economic conditionalities of receiving loans

from the IMF and WB or joining the WTO.

Figure 5

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For the analysis of the BRIC countries, I have created a satisfaction score for the five

members based on the actions of these states toward the World Trade Organization, World Bank,

and International Monetary Fund. The New Development Bank itself is meant to be a type of

infrastructure development bank, similar to the World Bank but one which does not impose the

various types of conditionality that the World Bank does. I would anticipate that the levels of

satisfaction with these three organizations of the BRIC states would be at its lowest just prior to

the 2012 conference that established the New Development Bank. In order to test this

hypothesis, I have simply graphed the levels of satisfaction of all five states, and for comparison

the satisfaction levels of the other states with high vote share in the World Bank. For reference,

a neutral value is 0 and the more positive the numbers the higher the amount of satisfaction. The

global average satisfaction with the World Bank is charted by the black line and it shows that the

average level of satisfaction with the World Bank is consistently about 1.5 to 2, which is good

for an organization that has global membership.

What the graph shows is that there was generally declining economic satisfaction amoung

these states, but that South Africa in particular had a significant uptick in economic satisfaction

in 2012. South Africa hosted the conference and its delegates actually proposed the creation of a

development bank. What is telling is that the average economic satisfaction for these five states

is at or below the average of the entire global population for most of the period between 2012

and 2015. The satisfaction of all five states only exceeds the global average in 2015, three years

after the BRIC Bank was founded and had started disbursing funds to the members. On its own

this finidng does not tell us much, but, when paired with the declining economic satisfaction

from 2008 for all members but South Africa, there is some support for the idea that it was the

low levels of economic satisfaction that moved these states toward creating a new organization that could help to improve these states' economic satisfaction.

There is a fairly strong band of those major World Bank voting states that from 2005 forward stays consistently between scores of 0 and 5. There are major swings among all charted states before 2005, but it appears that only the BRICS states continue to have such wild swings after 2005. All states do have negative scores at some juncture, even the US. This could mean that these states were outvoted on certain issues or denied World Bank funds for certain projects, but the events data recorded in ICEWS can provide some insight. This is an important observation to make because it supports the idea in my theory that it is not necessary for the hegemon or great powers to be completely satisfied with the international system at all times for the system to function.

Interestingly, Russia does not interact with the World Bank at all during this period. There are simply no observations to be able to tell whether Russia is satisfied or not with the World Bank. Based on the fact that Russia is a member and has no interactions with the World Bank that are recorded for observations, it may be infered that, at best, Russia is a neutral member of the World Bank. According to the World Bank's information, Russia does hold a 2.82% vote share, so it would make sense for Russia to have some type of interaction with the IO, but there are simply no observations in the ICEWS data (Secretariat, 2020).

Conclusion

The data sources listed above are the best currently available sources that I can use for this type of project. All the variables are easily reproduceable with current statistical software and are available for free. The comparative graphs of Tau-b, S, and my Satisfaction variable created from the ICEWS data provides strong face validity that the previous measures are clearly

leaving out some type of interaction with the international system. As I argued in the previous chapter, this something is the system itself. The following chapters will show in more detail why this is the case. The following two chapters will use variables drawn from the data above and other standard data sets to examine a series of hypotheses developed from the theory outlined in Chapter Two.

While the overall average of economic satisfaction for every state in the international system is not particularly high, charting the economic satisfaction of the BRICS against it leads to the observation that the BRICS did have a dramatic drop in economic satisfaction immediately before forming the New Development Bank. There is one potentially confounding event that may mean something else drove the formation of the BRIC Bank, and that is the Great Recession of 2008. Despite this potential confounding factor, only Brazil and India record economic satisfaction levels above the global average between the Great Recession and the bank's founding in 2012.

Coupling the findings of the BRICS with more current events, it is easy to see why it was that the United Kingdom did, despite all predictions, actually leave the European Union. There have been numerous Eurosceptic statements made by both Members of Parliament and UK Members of the European Parliament. Add in the results of the referendum and it is not that surprising that the UK has formally left the EU and the other EU members were not disinclined to let it. As an aside, one of the drivers of lower than expected UK satisfaction scores as charted was UK statements and actions toward the EU, and just in the period between 1995 and 2003.

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CHAPTER 4

PREDICTING CONFLICT

<u>Introduction</u>

This chapter is primarily focused around general predictions of conflict onset, settlement,

escalation, and the relationship between satisfaction and territory. Several theories predict that

the international system is biased toward the status quo, see Schweller (1996), but others predict

action taken in defense of the status quo will result in conflict, see Kugler (1980). Which is

correct? It is entirely possible that neither is correct, but by examining the full range of cases

available in my data, I will show how satisfaction is related to the onset of MIDS and their

settlement or escalation. Using the COW data on causes of conflict, I hope to show a linkage

between certain issues and when satisfaction plays a role in either de-escalation or escalation.

Territory stands out as a specific issue that is closely related to conflict and that should

also be closely related to satisfaction. Previous studies have shown that unsettled territorial

issues often lead to recurring conflict, but once those issues are settled the conflict cycle is

reduced (Rider and Owsiak, 2015). I propose that satisfaction is a part of the commitment

problem that Rider and Owsiak (2015) examine. In this version of the commitment problem, the

difficulty is not necessarily because the two states have a commitment problem with one another,

but that they find the process for settling the issue to not be credible. If either state considers a

mediated or arbitrated settlement to be illegitimate, then fighting will be the likely outcome.

However, if the two states agree that a mediation process is legitimate and can be committed to,

then conflict is not likely. Whether the mediation process is legitimate will depend heavily on

whether each state is satisfied. Because satisfied states are supportive of the international

system, which means that they will be supportive of conflict settlement mechanisms that are

enshrined in international organizations. For example, taking cases before the International Court of Justice has become a much more common method of settling border disputes. This suggests a growing sense of satisfaction among states.

It is also entirely possible that satisfied states do not desire more territory. Rider and Owsiak (2015) suggest that as territorial conflicts are settled, states become more satisfied. The causal arrow could be as Rider and Owsiak (2015) suggest, but it could also be that as states become satisfied, begin to support the status quo and benefit from that status quo, that states start to desire territory less. The idea is that states will need fewer resources from their own territory as the economy develops and trade provides more essential resources. Resource poor states that are unable to connect to the global economy due to political interference from other states would be less supportive of a status quo that is keeping them from participating. Therefore, these states would be less willing to abide by rules associated with settling territorial disputes.

Great power conflict is also highly related to conceptualizations of satisfaction with the international system. Many theories of IR, power transition theory, hegemonic stability theory, and even offensive realism, are deeply concerned with satisfaction as a variable. It explains why state leaders might risk conflict when war can be so destructive. What many theories that are hierarchical in nature suggest is that it is a dominant state with high levels of satisfaction that might be the most detrimental to the system that it is satisfied with. To preserve the system and its preeminent position, a dominant state attacks all states it perceives as threatening and any encroachment on the power of the dominant state is a threat. This would mean that any rising state, even an ally, could be a threat to the dominant state. Which leads to the conclusion that the dominant state is the most likely initiator of any conflict in the international system.

Satisfaction may also play a role in the outcome of a conflict. There are several possibilities for how a given conflict could end. There could be a stalemate, one side can prevail over the other, there can be a negotiated settlement of some type, or it can escalate into a full-blown war. Satisfaction plays a role in determining which of these outcomes is most likely. As states signal their satisfaction with the international system by making statements and taking actions towards international organizations, they are essentially telling other states how legitimate they hold the international system to be. This means that more positive actions and statements are seen as legitimizing the system, while negative statements have the opposite effect. The real magic is that this changes the bargaining range of states before a conflict is entered into and gives states a way to avoid drastic costs of conflict. States can put the burden of negotiation onto another party or organization, if the other state views the process as legitimate. This means that as satisfaction increases, the likelihood of negotiated settlement also increases, if both states are satisfied. If one state is not satisfied, then the chance of a negotiated settlement does not rise.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses below are derived from both previous studies of conflict in relation to satisfaction and from previous studies of conflict in general. They are meant to test my theory that behavior toward IOs is a way to test modern state satisfaction as well as confirm my operationalization of the concept as a valid measure. I have developed some additional hypotheses related to satisfaction and specific aspects of conflict that also follow the logic of commitment problems, conflict processes, and specific conflict issues.

The first hypothesis is related to the onset of conflict. States that are not satisfied are not likely to follow the rules of the international system, which have been trending away from

violent conflict and focusing on nonviolent resolution of disputes (Organski, 1958, Thompson, 2015). This is because the states that do not see the rules of the system as legitimate are less likely to follow them (Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010). States that continuously protest against rules do not see that particular rule as legitimate and challenge the necessity of the existence of the rule (Lake, 2009, Lake, 2010). One rule that the US and UN have tried to make states follow is to have the UN settle disputes. The acceptance of rules regarding the peaceful resolution of conflicts also functions as a part of the bargaining model of war (Fearon, 1994, Fearon, 1995). If each state knows that the other has accepted the rules of the system, then it follows that a portion of the opponent's win set is known. The system rules stipulate that certain escalations are off the table, so the bargaining range has been altered before the negotiations have even started (Fearon, 1995). This even extends to allowing UN peace keeping forces into a country. There has always been the caveat that both parties to a dispute must accept UN sponsored forces and that that they will leave if either side wishes it, but there is mounting pressure for states to accept UN forces.

Building off of the original PTT and other studies of conflict initiation, the most likely course of events is that a dissatisfied state is the most likely type of state to initiate a conflict (Organski, 1958, Quackenbush, 2015, Reed, 2000). This is not that surprising of a hypothesis, but it is one of the most critical for both PTT and the idea that events data can be used in order to predict the onset of conflict. A dissatisfied challenger is the most likely to hold high revisionist experience. Controlling for capabilities, the higher dissatisfaction should mean a state is more likely to initiate a conflict, especially if both states in the dyad have satisfaction levels such that the dyad itself can be considered dissatisfied with the international system. As both state levels of dissatisfaction increase the chances of conflict should increase even more and this leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: If the dyad is unsatisfied, it will be more likely to initiate a MID to settle a disagreement, or as satisfaction increases, the likelihood of MID initiation decreases.

While much of the research around satisfaction relies on a dissatisfied challenger initiating a conflict with a status quo hegemon, what if it is the hegemon that is more likely to initiate conflict? Some of the power transition theory literature suggests that it may be the hegemon, rather than a challenger that would be more likely to initiate a conflict (Tammen, 2000). A status quo supporting power may interpret statements that express dissatisfaction as a threat to the status quo. If the perceived threat is great enough, then the supporters of the status quo will initiate a conflict in order to preserve the status quo (Kugler, 1980). The supporters of the status quo presumably have been benefitting more from the way things currently are and would have more military and economic power if that is the case. This means that they should have more to lose in the event that any state tries to revise the system (Kugler, 1980, Kugler and Lemke, 1996, Lemke, 1993, Organski, 1958), which leads to hypothesis 2:

H2: Satisfied dyads are more likely to initiate a conflict than dissatisfied dyads.
While there has not been a measure of satisfaction that works in the fashion that my measure does, previous studies may be able to inform a couple of hypotheses on the interaction between satisfaction and capabilities. There is reason to believe that the distance between two states satisfaction levels is an important factor in whether MIDs will be initiated or not. As one state is more supportive of the status quo and the other becomes less supportive over time, then they will have one fewer thing in common and one further reason to disagree with one another, thus leading to higher chances of engaging in a MID rather than simply a diplomatic spat. This would mean, that in a dyad, as the difference in satisfaction grows, then conflict is more likely to break out, all other things being equal. The difference in satisfaction is especially important because it

is showing exactly how different each state is in its evaluation of the international status quo. Two satisfied states would have similar general evaluations of the status quo, but a large difference between them would show that the states view the status quo in starkly different terms. Such a difference would mean less common ground on which to form compromises, negotiate for a settlement, and fewer ways in general to avoid conflict.

H3: As the difference in satisfaction increases, the likelihood of MID initiation increases. Aside from the difference in satisfaction playing a role in conflict initiation, there could be a role for the interaction of satisfaction and capabilities. There are several papers in Power Transition Theory that point to an interaction, generally multiplicative, between satisfaction and capabilities that predicts conflict initiation, i.e. $S * RP^2$ as a regression term (Efird et al., 2003, Kang, 2008). This builds from the idea that there is a window for capabilities and satisfaction both that allows dyads to become especially dangerous. Where these dyads are using satisfaction between the two states in the dyad, I will test that prospect using satisfaction with the system.

H4: An increase in satisfaction conditioned on parity will lead to an increase in the likelihood of conflict initiation.
If a conflict does initiate, then conflicts between two satisfied states are not likely to escalate to war (Reed, 2000). The two states will be able to credibly commit to a process for settling the conflict before it reaches the stage of war or a high hostility level and avoid the costs of fighting. The difference here is that there is not a specific issue area that is under examination, and the action under examination is escalation to war, rather than MID initiation.

H5: Conflicts that do occur in a satisfied dyad are less likely to escalate to war.
All the above hypotheses relate to the full conflict processes of MIDs, from initiation to escalation. While these are not particularly novel hypotheses, they do offer a full analysis of

conflict onset and escalation using my new measure of satisfaction to do so. I hope to show that my measures of satisfaction not only match the performance of Tau-b and S but exceed them in explanatory capabilities. Such a finding would show that satisfaction and its determinants are based in readily available observations and that there is an easy way to determine which states are supportive of the status quo and which are likely to cause crises and potentially conflict.

Variables from Data

There are several control variables that are derived from the COW data and have become standard in evaluations of conflict onset. In addition to these variables, I have used the ICEWS data to construct my satisfaction variable, as mentioned above. Many of these variables are different combinations of column data from the two datasets and analyzed with each row being one data point.

For data on militarized interstate disputes, I am using the updated MID 4.01 dataset (Palmer, 2015). This dataset is divided into multiple formats based on number of actors or grouped around particular incidents. The POLITY IV (Marshall et al., 2002) data is the final major dataset that I am using for this project. It has been updated to include a number of new code values for a variety of regimes transitioning between autocracy and democracy, and vice versa. The data in POLITY IV has also been updated to include regime information up to 2013, which may make for interesting analyses related to state satisfaction and regime type in the future.

Power Parity

The first variable in all the statistical models that I will run is power parity. This has been a standard variable in predictions of conflict for most of the history of statistical analysis of conflict. The most common predictions are that conflict is less likely, or more likely, when both

states in a dyad are approximately equal in power. I have chosen to use an older construction of this variable and use the Composite Capabilities Index score of the stronger state divided by that of the weaker state, rather than a strict ratio of capabilities (Reed, 2000).

Joint Democracy

For a measure of joint democracy, I use the Polity IV scores contained within the NewGene data management program of each states. These scores are combined in the dyad and if the dyad score is above 12, 6 for each state, then the dyad is jointly democratic. In the new Polity IV data, there are some new codes for states that are not democratic and not autocratic. There are three new codes for Interruptions (-66), Interregnum periods (-77), and Transition periods (-88) which may alter the results of regressions using polity scores. In order to combat any issues, I have converted the new codes to NA and dropped them from the data.

Alliance

The alliance variable is coded as 1 if the two states in the dyad are in a defensive alliance with one another or have an alliance with the United States. Reed (2000) points out that status quo evaluations and alliances are highly correlated. This remains true for my data. The Alliance variable is highly correlated with both Tau-b and S.

Economic Interdependence

For economic interdependence, I have followed the initial strategy used by Oneal and Russett (1997). The total imports and exports for each state is divided by that state's GDP per capita and the lower number for the dyad is used. Total trade for each state comes from the updated Correlates of War trade data while the GDP information comes from the World Bank economic dataset, and both are contained in the NEWGene software.

Economic Development

The economic development variable is the rolling three-year average change of GDP. This is the same way that Oneal and Russett (1997) determine economic development. The raw numbers are from the World Bank GDP data set. To create this variable, I combined each state's percent change of GDP for every three-year set and divided by three. The rolling average indicates that as a more recent year is added, an older year is dropped from the average.

MID Outcome

This variable comes directly from the COW MID dataset. It contains a range of options from settlement to escalation to war, with each option having its own code. The outcome variable is used as a dependent variable in some analyses.

Revisionism Type

The MID 4 dataset contains a variable that codes what type of revisionist policies a given state has espoused in relation to a MID. Some MIDs are related to changes in territory, while others are related to regime type or some other grievance. Using these revisionist types allows for an easy analysis to determine what type of relationship, if any, satisfaction as related to international organizations has to conflict.

Hypothesis Evaluations

The following tables present the results of logistic regressions meant to test the first two hypotheses outlined above. The first table contains four models, the first is a logistic regression of my satisfaction variable against the onset of conflict while the second introduces control variables. The third and fourth models are meant to provide a comparison between the fully specified satisfaction model and fully specified models using Tau-b and S scores. Logistic regression is the favored method as the dependent variable is dichotomous, either there is the onset of conflict, or there is not. As all the analyses presented use some form of logistic

regression it is important to discuss how they should be understood. The coefficients in the table

are not easily understood on their own, they must be turned into either a probability or an odds

ratio to gain some sense of what is happening as the value of an individual variable changes.

One way to go about this is using the following transformation to establish the probability of one

of the outcomes occurring: first, establish the parameters of the scenario by setting certain values

for each variable and multiplying them by the appropriate coefficients. Second, add the total of

values multiplied by coefficients together, and add the intercept, or constant, value to that. Now

insert that value into the equation $Probability = 1/(1 + \exp(x))$. A slightly easier way to

understand logistic regression results is to simply exponentiate any of the coefficients into a

simplified odds ratio. What a logistic regression is describing is the estimated effect of any of

our known variable values on the likelihood that a certain dependent variable will be achieved.

In the case of the first few regressions that I am undertaking it is the likelihood that a MID will

occur between two states.

The general models used for Table 4.1 are as follows: $Y_{MID\ Initiator} = \alpha +$

$\beta Satisfaction + \beta Capabilities + \beta GDP\ Growth_{Low} + \beta Democracy +$

$\beta Interdependence + \beta Alliance + \epsilon$. In this equation, as in the previous chapter *Satisfaction*

refers to Tau-b, S, and my satisfaction score, as specified in the table. The first table is designed

to test the first hypothesis that if the dyad is dissatisfied, then MIDs will be more likely to occur.

The aggressor here is defined as State A in the dyad. The dependent variable here is the

likelihood that State A initiates a MID and each dyad drops out as it initiates a MID. In all

models except Model 2 I use an additive satisfaction score, so that each dyad's satisfaction is

found by $Satisfaction_A + Satisfaction_B$ regardless of the particular satisfaction format being

used. Model 2 uses the difference in satisfaction for the dyad, where it is $Satisfaction_B -$

$Satisfaction_A$, so that we are subtracting the satisfaction of the aggressor from the defender. With this set up of satisfaction difference we should see a growing score for this variable lead to more conflict onset, as the anticipated satisfaction scores for dissatisfied states are negative and we are therefore subtracting a negative number from a positive. The unit of analysis is all directed dyads of states between 1995 and 2008, when the NewGene data ends for most variables. Ending the analysis in 2008 does drop a total of 14 unresolved MIDs that begin between 2008 and 2010, but 14 dropped MID initiations should have a minimal effect on the findings. There is a total of 126,653 directed dyads in the full table, and only a total of 271 new MID onsets over the period 1995 to 2008.

	Table 4.1	Model 1 Satisfaction (additive)	Model 2 Satisfaction (Difference)	Model 3 Satisfaction (additive) + Controls	Model 4 Tau B	Model 5 S-score
Likelihood of MID Initiation						
Intercept		-6.896 (0.171)***	-6.72 (0.147)***	-6.299 (0.194)***	-6.845 (0.157)***	-7.213 (0.211)***
Satisfaction		-0.125 (0.042)**	0.016 (0.046)	-0.119 (0.042)**	2.762 (0.430)***	1.210 (0.303)***
Parity			-0.226 (0.067)***	-0.227 (0.066)***	-0.022 (0.067)***	-0.240 (0.069)***
GDP Growth, Low			-0.063 (0.024)**	-0.059 (0.024)*	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.041 (0.025)
POLITY			-0.044 (0.010)***	-0.045 (0.010)***	-0.034 (0.011)**	-0.035 (0.011)**
Interdependence			0.435 (0.085)***	0.439 (0.085)***	0.426 (0.086)***	0.463 (0.085)***
Defensive Pact			2.093 (0.296)***	2.073 (0.297)***	-0.507 (0.491)	1.351 (0.339)***
		N=126653 AIC=1378.9	N=126653 AIC=1292.7	N=126653 AIC=1287.7	N=126653 AIC=1268.5	N=126653 AIC=1279.8

The models using added satisfaction show that satisfaction has a significant effect on the onset of MIDs, in a direction consistent with the first hypothesis that satisfied states are less likely to initiate conflict, rather than the second hypothesis that satisfied states initiate conflict. The effect seems small in the first model that uses only satisfaction where MID initiation has an odds ratio of 0.88 as satisfaction increases, but holds in Model 3 after the controls have been added and where each increase in satisfaction raises the chances of a MID by the same odds of

0.88. Compared to models using Tau-b and S-scores, the effects of my satisfaction measurement achieve significance, if not the same magnitude. Please note that an increase in Tau-b would raise the odds of a MID by almost 15 times and an increase in S raises it slightly more than three times, which tracks with previous power transition studies that found increases in chances of conflict as satisfaction increases. The generally negative relationship between my measure of satisfaction and the potential for conflict onset would seem to add support to the idea that it is status quo supporting states that are less likely to initiate a MID, at least in the time period under examination in this study and for all the potential measures of satisfaction. Subsequent analyses will use a difference of satisfaction to make this case.

As for the controls, they behave in a manner that is consistent with previous studies. A defensive pact works to increase the likelihood of conflict in all models, except the Tau-b model. While surprising in the context of this study, it has been found to be the case in studies like Reed (2000). Specifically, the odds ratio on a Defensive Pact increases the likelihood of MID initiation by anywhere between .6 times, in the Tau model, and 8 times, in the Difference and Fully specified satisfaction models. Democracy and GDP growth work to decrease the likelihood of conflict, as one would expect, but GDP growth does not have any statistically significant effect in the Tau and S models. The results of democracy confirm the findings related to the democratic peace theory as the odds decrease to about .95 in all models, while the GDP variable shows that increasing growth discourages conflict by changing the odds to about .94. As the GDP growth of the slower growing state increases, the likelihood of conflict also drops which supports ideas that as incomes rise the states are less likely to fight.

Parity also seems to decrease the likelihood of conflict initiation as the ratio of power grows. Recall that my parity variable is set up to be the stronger state's capabilities divided by

the weaker state's, which means that as the value is increasing it is recording a power preponderance. The odds range from .97 in the Tau model to .786 in the S model. In my satisfaction model the odds are .796, meaning that the odds of a satisfied dyad initiating a MID decrease faster than the odds of a satisfied dyad using Tau as the ratio of power grows.

The effects of Interdependence in the three additive models is rather consistent across all three. The odds are about 1.55 that State A will initiate a MID as Interdependence increases. This is an interesting result as interdependence is supposed to reduce the chances of conflict between states, this is a founding principal behind the current setup of the international system. It is also worth noting that with the large negative values of the intercept for each model there are very low odds, about .001, of a State A initiating a MID in general. This reflects the fact that there are fewer than 300 MIDs recorded in the COW data between 1995 and 2008.

Model 2 in Table 4.1uses the difference of satisfaction between State A and State B, specifically the equation is $Y = \alpha + \beta(Satisfaction_B - Satisfaction_A) + \beta Parity + \beta GDP\ Growth, low + \beta Interdependence + \beta POLITY + \beta Alliance + \epsilon$, in the dyad to try to determine what happens as states experience greater differences in satisfaction. Instead of using the absolute values for the individual state satisfaction or the difference, I am simply using the difference. This is because I am only interested in what happens as the term increases or decreases, not necessarily what happens if it is forced to be negative or forced to be positive. I am also not looking for some type of ideal point as may be the case in analyses of voting behavior, so absolute value terms are not necessary here and I do not anticipate any dramatic impacts on the results if I were to use absolute values. As the dyad moves further apart in terms of satisfaction an unexpected result occurs, satisfaction becomes statistically insignificant. For Satisfaction, the difference results in the chances of a MID initiating decreasing to an odds ratio

of 1.016 as the difference gets larger. As one state becomes more dissatisfied and the other

retains its level, then it will be slightly more likely that the dyad does engage in conflict. In

Model 2, the controls do not experience a change in statistical significance from the additive

satisfaction model and keep similar coefficients as well.

What these models in Table 4.1 also show is that the predictive power and parsimony of

all three initial measures are similar. This lends credence to the idea that using events data is at

least as good as using other forms of data to measure satisfaction. The results of the three

models have very similar results which I find to be very encouraging for having an *N* of just over

125,000 dyads that can be analyzed. The fact that increases in satisfaction leads to decreases in

the chances of State A initiating a MID in both of my models using continuous satisfaction

means that there is strong support for *Hypothesis 1* but not for *Hypothesis 2*.

Hypothesis 1 is supported because increasing satisfaction reduces the odds ratio of State

A initiating a MID. These results are straightforward. *Hypothesis 2* is also straightforward to

interpret. The results of the models are not consistent with the hypothesis that increasing

satisfaction would increase the likelihood of conflict. As the odds ratio of Model 1 and Model 3

are below 1, this means that the odds of State A initiating a MID are decreasing for each increase

of satisfaction, and so *Hypothesis 1* is supported, but *Hypothesis 2* is not. *Hypothesis 3* is also

not supported. It would be expected that the satisfaction term in Model 2 would increase as State

A's satisfaction level decreases. This is because there would be a double negative term in

$Satisfaction_B - Satisfaction_A$ as $Satisfaction_A$ decreases and becomes negative. The

increase, if *H3* were supported, would make it more likely that State A would initiate a MID, and

it does increase the odds ratio to 1.016, but this is in no way statistically significant.

In order to gauge the overall effects of a change in satisfaction, I have run the predicted probabilities for conflict onset over the range of values for my satisfaction variable, as if it were in Model 1 of Table 4.1 and Model 3 of Table 4.1 with the remaining variables held at their medians. The condensed results appear in Table 4.2 and show that the overall marginal effect as satisfaction increases is to decrease the likelihood of conflict from a .0123% chance to a .000081% chance when going from minimum satisfaction to maximum satisfaction. This would mean that a state in the dyad with the lowest level of satisfaction would be 151 times more likely to initiate a MID in terms of raw probability than the state in a dyad with the highest level of satisfaction, if there were no other forces acting on the state. This seems like an enormous change in probability, but the highest probability of conflict is only about 1%. The Probability 2 results show how probability of conflict changes with changes in satisfaction for the model including control variables held at their medians. In this example the likelihood of conflict ranges from a .0096% to a .00008% chance, and the score at neutral satisfaction is .0008%. As the other controls are added to the model, satisfaction reduces the probability of MID onset more rapidly than satisfaction alone. Again, the probability of State A initiating a MID goes from about 1% to .00008%.

TABLE 4.2	PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT OVER RANGE OF SATISFACTION				
SATISFACTION	-20	-10	0	10	20
PROBABILITY 1	0.0123	0.0035	0.00101	0.0002	0.000081
PROBABILITY 2	0.0096	0.0029	0.00088	0.00026	0.000080

Table 4.3 reports the results of models similar to those in Table 4.1, but with two different interaction effects between Satisfaction and Parity. There are several studies that predict there is an interaction between the capabilities of states and satisfaction that leads to the

idea that as the interaction term between the two rises, then a MID would be more likely to initiate. Specifically, Kang (2008) and Efird et al. (2003) suggest that increases in the interaction term results in greater potential for conflict. Model 1 of Table 4.3 uses the additive satisfaction, while Model 2 uses the difference of satisfaction interacted with Parity. There are several different ways that have been suggested to interact Satisfaction and Parity, Genna (2003) uses

Interaction Effect between Satisfaction and Parity on MID Initiation		
Table 4.3	Model 1 Sat. Additive	Model 2 Sat. Difference
Intercept	-6.341 (.205)***	-6.703 (.147)***
Satisfaction	-0.104 (.047)*	-0.005 (.047)
Parity	-0.19 (0.076)*	-0.241 (0.070)***
Sat. * Parity	-0.014 (0.019)	0.020 (0.009)*
GDP Growth, Low	-0.059 (0.024)*	-0.062 (0.024)*
POLITY	-0.045 (0.010)***	-0.044 (0.010)***
Interdependence	0.437 (0.085)***	0.437 (0.085)***
Defensive Pact	2.07 (0.296)***	2.091 (0.296)***
	N=126653 AIC=1289.3	N=126653 AIC=1294.7

satisfaction multiplied by cubed relative power subtracted from satisfaction in their equation that describes a conflict-integration score and Kang (2008) simply multiplies parity by foreign policy similarities as the interaction. For simplicity sake, I will use the Kang (2008) method to see what type of results are obtained for an initial test.

The results in Table 4.3 show that in this instance, there is not a significant interaction effect between additive dyadic satisfaction and parity. There is the expected significance of the interaction term in Model 2, and it does support the general proposition of *Hypothesis 4*, that as the interaction term increases it also increases the odds of State A initiating a MID. Satisfaction is significant in the additive model alone, and, in both models, it has a reducing effect on the likelihood of MID onset. An increase in the satisfaction score of the dyad reduces the odds of State A initiating a MID by about 10%, and as the State2-State1 satisfaction term grows in Model 1 it also reduces the odds of State 1 initiating a conflict by 2%. We do see a slight increase, although not significant, in probability of conflict onset in the interaction term in Model 2. The Model 2 interaction term increases conflict onset odds by 1.02. Interdependence and Defensive Pacts both have strong positive effects on the probability that State 1 initiates a MID in both models. Interdependence has the same coefficient in both models at 0.437 and once it is exponentiated to put it into an odds ratio, it increases that ratio to 1.54. The presence of a Defensive Pact increases the odds ratio in both models to 7.92 in favor of State A initiating a MID. POLITY decreases the odds ratio to about .63 in both models when considered on its own, and the GDP Change variable changes that ratio to about .55 in both models. It is possible that a different interaction term would have different results, but the consistency between the models in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 does not offer clues as to what type of interaction effect would be most worth testing or what results would be obtained.

From these simple tests of my theory using the new satisfaction measurement, there is some support for the idea that status quo supporting states are less likely to initiate a conflict, as opposed to non-status quo supporting states. This preliminary finding also supports the hypotheses and findings in some of the power transition and hegemonic stability literature that

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suggests it is the rising states that cause the most instability in the international system (Kugler, 1980, Tammen, 2000) and use force to attempt to change the system. Because we also know that not every rising power is seen as a threat by the status quo states, this analysis also adds a possible explanation as to why. It could be that only a few revisionist states couple the more subtle types of revising the rules of the system with military conflict, and those that are not considered a threat may not be seen as such because they have limited revisionist aspirations or limited ability to change the system.

Table 4.4 reports the results of a multinomial regression that is designed to test hypothesis *H5: Conflicts between two satisfied states are less likely to escalate*. The multinomial uses the Dyad Hostility variable found in the Correlates of War data as the dependent variable and all the outcome values are compared to the possibility that there is no militarized action. The potential hostility levels here are No Militarized Action, Threat to use force, Display of force, Use of force, and War. It is important to note that the Dyad Hostiltiy variable measures the *highest* level of hostility the dyad experiences. The multinomial equation that I am using is $Y_{HostLevel} = \alpha + \beta Satisfaction + \beta Parity + \beta POLITY + \beta Interdependence + \beta Alliance + GDP\ Change, low + \epsilon$. This equation uses the variables from the two states in the dyad to see how likely a given hostility level is to occur when compared to a baseline of No Militarized Action.

From Table 4.4 we can see that Satisfaction has a consistently negative effect on all hostility levels above the threat to use force. Since there is only one instance of threat of force, there is little chance that Satisfaction would be able to explain its lack of occurrence relative to other outcomes. In fact, Satisfaction drops the odds of hostility compared to none by 16% for

Display of Force, 12% for Use of Force, and a little over 23% for the possibility that the MID

escalates to a War. These results are in line with the hypothesis that satisfied dyads are less

Effects of Satisfaction on Dyad Hostility Levels

Table 4.4	Inter.	Satisfac.	Parity	POLITY	Interdep.	GDP	Def. Pact
Threat	-14.196	0.183	0.001	0.032	-2.107	-0.112	5.25
(1)	(3.134)***	(0.387)	(0.0005)	(0.108)	(0.052)***	(0.271)	(2.553)*
Display	-6.698	-0.171	-0.017	-0.030	0.551	-0.056	2.236
(83)	(0.188)***	(0.041)***	(0.012)	(0.011)**	(0.069)***	(0.027)*	(0.294)***
Use	-6.143	-0.126	-0.007	-0.049	0.357	-0.016	2.239
(145)	(0.141)***	(0.03)***	(0.005)	(0.007)***	(0.103)**	(0.021)	(0.214)***
War	-6.363	-0.265	-0.421	-0.127	0.217	0.011	-2.352
(42)	(0.228)***	(0.049)***	(0.141)**	(0.017)***	(0.329)	(0.037)	(2.666)
N=126653	*p<.05*	**p<.01*	***p<.001*				

likely to escalate to War than other dyads.

As one would expect, the presence of a defensive pact increases the probability of all

hostility levels in the dyad, to 190.5 for Threat, 9.35 for Display, the same for Threat, but

reduces the odds of War to 0.095, but interestingly Interdependence plays a significant role in

raising the probability of Display (1.73) and Use of force (1.42) and of War (1.24). This could

mean that neighbors are more likely to posture against one another but do stop short of escalating

all the way to War. The joint POLITY term plays the expected role in reducing the probability

of all hostility greater than a Threat to use force, which means that the controls are behaving as

predicted in other studies of conflict.

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Effects of Difference of Satisfaction on Dyad Hostility Levels							
Table 4.5	Inter.	Satisfac.	Parity	POLITY	Interdep.	GDP	Def. Pact
Threat **(1)**	-13.417 (2.61)***	0.125 (0.308)	0.001 (0.0006)	-0.029 (0.07)	0.417 (.65)	-0.057 (0.267)	5.843 (2.730)*
Display **(83)**	-7.17 (0.147)***	0.046 (0.047)	-0.022 (0.013)	-0.031 (0.01)***	0.540 (0.067)***	-0.049 (0.027)	2.190 (0.290)***
Use **(145)**	-6.686 (0.111)***	0.008 (0.034)	-0.0078 (0.005)	-0.051 (0.007)***	0.434 (0.079)***	-0.026 (0.022)	2.615 (0.197)***
War **(42)**	-7.13 (0.196)***	-0.046 (0.064)	-0.321 (0.115)*	-0.116 (0.016)***	0.363 (0.180)*	-0.034 (0.032)	-4.35 (0.00007)
N=126653	**p<.05*	***p<.01*	****p<.001*				

Table 4.5 repeats that analysis of Table 4.4 but using the difference of satisfaction used in previous tables. In this case, the difference of satisfaction does have a negative effect on the potential to escalate to War but has no statistical significance for any particular outcome. It could be interpreted that having a larger difference of satisfaction leads to more potential use of force but does not lead to more likely onset of war. The odds of for the Threat of force are 1.13, nearly 1.04 for the Display of force, and 1.008 for use of Force, while the odds for going to War become 0.95.

The controls generally perform consistently with those in Table 4.4. Defensive pacts still increase the chances of all hostility levels short of war, POLITY scores still reduce the probability of reaching all hostility levels, and interdependence is still increasing the probability of displaying or using force, but slightly increases the odds of going to War to 1.37. Parity has

no significant effect on the level of hostility except that the increasing ratio of force changes the odds of going to War to 0.725. The results here in Table 4.5 are also remarkably consistent with those earlier in the chapter that compared other models using additive satisfaction and difference of satisfaction.

Conclusions

For all the models above, there is support for the main hypothesis that as satisfaction increases, the chances of conflict, in the form of State A initiating a MID, decreases. Specifically, for *H1:* there is support for the idea that increasing satisfaction decreases the likelihood that State A will initiate a MID, while there is little support for the hypothesis that jointly status quo supporting dyads will be more likely to initiate a MID. In evaluating *H3* and *H4*, the difference in satisfaction between the dyad pair does not have a positive effect on MID initiation and the interaction between satisfaction and parity does slightly increase MID onset. For *Hypothesis 5* there is support for the hypothesis that growing satisfaction does reduce the chances for a dispute to escalate to War, and there is evidence that even increasing difference of satisfaction reduces the odds of escalation to War.

What does this mean for my theory? This means that satisfaction does have the anticipated relationship to MID onset that I thought. The results here also add strength to the theories that IOs play a significant role in ending MIDs, and that satisfaction has more impact than just MID onset. I have not theorized any particular mechanisms as to how satisfaction reduces the likelihood of MID onset or escalation to war that are being tested in this paper, but the findings here do mesh nicely with the work of Shannon et al. (2010), Hensel et al. (2009), and others, that find that intervention by IOs can lead to certain kinds of outcomes more frequently, such as imposed settlements, that strongly integrated IOs have the strongest effects,

and that norms of behavior around violent acquisition of territory are frequently violated, but that

with each violation comes pushback to keep the established norm in place.

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CHAPTER 5

TERRITORY, OUTCOMES, AND SETTLEMENTS

Introduction

Territory is one of the major causes of unrest and conflict in the international system.

Because territory is linked to exploitable resources and definite populations and is one of the

primary features of a state, it has a long history of being fought over and claimed by any entity

that wishes to exercise authority over a population. With territory being so overwhelmingly

linked to conflict, it is essential to discover any potential links between territory, satisfaction, and

the outcomes or settlements of MIDs. This chapter analyzes potential territory hypotheses and

draws together previous literature on the ways territory and IOs are related to MID resolution.

The previous chapter suggested the expected relationship between satisfaction and conflict and

the initiation of MIDs was correct. This chapter will take some of those findings and dig into

them a little deeper to see what types issues satisfaction is related to when states are seeking to

revise the international system, how satisfaction affects the outcomes of MIDs, and how territory

is related to MID initiation and settlement.

Territory and Satisfaction

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is some literature relating to the settlement of territorial

MIDs and IOs (Shannon, 2009, Shannon et al., 2010). Shannon succinctly lays out the argument

for how IOs intervene in territorial conflicts, what types of IOs are more likely to do this, and

whether states are willing to abide by the decision of IOs in these situations. Typically, IOs that

focus on structured and enforceable negotiations can intervene in MIDs over territory to try and

impose a settlement. This supports the idea that actually taking territory by force is a violation of

norms against doing so, and the states that would support that norm should also be supportive of

IOs that are trying to enforce and spread it. My theory and hypotheses add to the findings in these two papers and others by arguing that IOs don't simply intervene in territorial disputes, the states involved need to have a reason to involve IOs and that reason is satisfaction, or support for the international system and its rules. The more satisfied states are, again as measured by interactions with IOs, they will be more likely to find a negotiated settlement to end a territorial conflict.

As states interact with one another and the international system, it is not likely that they will jump from no actions directly into MIDs. First, they will send some type of signal, whether it is a diplomatic notification or official statement, and then proceed into gearing up for a longer course of hostile interactions. The behavior toward IOs is one of the types of signals that will be sent before militarized behavior and the idea that states would allow IOs that have already been positively interacted with a chance to mediate a conflict is not a huge leap of logic. As both states express satisfaction with the international system it becomes even more likely that MIDs will be settled through negotiation or compromise than other possible outcomes.

Hypotheses

The previous studies by Shannon (2009) and Haftel (2007) lend credence to the idea that IOs involve themselves in ongoing conflicts in an effort to get states to settle MIDs before they can escalate, especially when the issue causing a dispute is territory. IOs generally also have a strong tendency to support negotiation and compromise over direct conflict, therefore, it would make sense that even expressing satisfaction through actions toward IOs would increase the likelihood that states would settle an ongoing MID by compromising. If the satisfaction of the dyad is increasing, then the level of support for the international system is increasing and

stronger support for the rules should correlate with stronger chances of following those same

rules and norms. Which leads to the following hypothesis:

H6: As dyad satisfaction increases, then an ongoing MID is more likely to be settled by
compromise.

When territory is the primary issue that is leading to conflict, two satisfied states will

work to settle the issue and could even be encouraged to do so by an IO that both states are

active participants in (Shannon, 2009, Shannon et al., 2010). Being satisfied means accepting

the way that the international system works and not risking the costs of conflict when there are

less costly options available, and that includes the settlement of issues through non-violent

means. Because there are established ways to settle territorial disputes through courts and

negotiations that are less costly than a MID or open conflict, and status quo evaluations are based

on actions toward international organizations, then we should see dyads with a high level of

satisfaction using more negotiated means to settle conflicts or MIDs. I expect satisfied states to

make use of the courts and other arbitration techniques associated with IOs to try and end a

conflict, which leads to hypothesis four:

H7: When the specific dispute is over territory, two satisfied states will be more likely to
have a Compromise outcome to a MID.

Two satisfied states will be more likely to find a peaceful solution to any dispute over territory

because they can commit to trusting the process and that process is likely to be overseen by some

of the IOs that states consider to be enforcers of rules of the system (Fearon, 1995, Shannon,

2009, Shannon et al., 2010). If the two states are not satisfied then the dispute will most likely

result in conflict, because commitment issues cannot be overcome, IOs cannot always enforce

agreements, and territory is something that states find to be worth fighting over (Hensel et al.,

2009). This should mean that satisfied dyads will be more likely to negotiate a settlement than settle a MID through one side yielding or having an imposed settlement, even if the dyad begins negotiations because an IO has intervened in the MID in order to make the two states begin negotiations.

H8: When a territorial MID is settled, satisfied dyads will be more likely to negotiate a settlement than other settlement types.

Before analyzing the different hypotheses, there are some words about the possible outcomes that are found in the data. There are some outcomes that do not, at first glance, make themselves clear. Specifically, there is the Released outcome to a MID. This particular outcome is referring to a seizure of territory and the subsequent release of that territory at the conclusion of a MID. It should also be noted that while some MIDs did escalate to the level of War, there are no cases where a MID escalated to the point where it melded with a war that was already in progress. Current events in Syria would tell us that this is likely to change in future iterations of the Correlates of War, but for now there are no observed outcomes where a MID merged with a war already in progress.

The following multinomial regression is used to explore the effects of satisfaction on the possible outcomes of a given MID. $Y_{Outcome} = \alpha + \beta Satisfaction + \beta Parity + \beta POLITY + \beta Interdependence + \beta GDP\ Change_{Low} + \beta Defensive\ Pact + \epsilon$. The equation is meant to test the influence of each variable on the possible range of outcomes of a MID. Each outcome is compared to the possibility that Side A wins the MID outright.

Effects of Satisfaction on MID Outcome

Table 5.1	Intercept	Satisfaction	Parity	Polity	Interdependence	GDP Change, low	Def. Pact
A Yields 1	-4.592 (8.965)	-2.177 (2.153)	-0.759 (1.119)	0.714 (0.822)	34.021 (35.030)	-0.063 (0.048)	-41.273 NaN
B Yields 4	2.178 (1.438)	-0.400 (0.345)	-.948 (0.894)	0.116 (0.090)	28.317 (32.952)	0.035 (0.181)	-35.046 (.0000000003) ***
Stalemate 218	4.783 (1.076)***	-0.212 (0.192)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.042)	37.706 (31.557)	0.165 (0.095)	-3.287 (0.964)***
Compromise 16	2.038 (1.168)	-0.267 (0.220)	-0.078 (0.083)	-0.022 (0.048)	38.077 (31.558)	0.145 (0.121)	-1.872 (1.091)
Released 10	-0.174 (1.421)	0.057 (0.248)	-0.032 (0.042)	0.115 (0.068)	38.283 (31.559)	0.050 (0.117)	-4.585 (1.695)**
Unclear 14	1.427 (1.201)	-0.153 (0.225)	-0.0014 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.048)	37.656 (31.562)	0.160 (0.125)	-1.800 (1.088)
Model 2 – Defensive Pact Dropped							
A Yields 1	-1.693 (2.727)	-0.785 (0.513)	-0.202 (0.373)	0.203 (0.195)	13.254 (17.823)	-0.048 (0.357)	
B Yields 4	1.168 (1.249)	-0.421 (0.310)	-1.177 (0.996)	0.125 (0.084)	4.756 (18.794)	-0.045 (0.177)	
Stalemate 218	3.736 (0.834)	-0.259 (0.179)	-0.020 (0.023)	0.006 (0.044)	15.007 (15.762)	0.102 (0.079)	
Compromise 16	1.242 (0.944)	-0.307 (0.215)	-0.067 (0.074)	0.011 (0.051)	15.376 (15.764)	0.097 (0.108)	
Released 10	-1.208 (1.227)	0.032 (0.232)	-0.032 (0.040)	0.122 (0.065)	15.458 (15.764)	-0.025 (0.103)	
Unclear 14	0.694 (0.984)	-0.169 (0.220)	-0.002 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.052)	14.779 (15.773)	0.110 (0.112)	
Number below outcome is number of occurrences	*N=271 MIDs*	*p<.05*	**p<.01*	***p<.001*			

From the multinomial regression we can see how satisfaction is related to a few different potential outcomes to a conflict. First, each possible outcome is compared to the likelihood that Side A wins. It turns out that for any potential conflict, satisfaction plays no significant role in whether that outcome is obtained. This is not exactly what I had predicted would be the case. Recall that I had predicted that something like a compromise would be the most likely outcome as satisfaction increases, and this prediction is not supported. The most likely cause for such results here is the fact that each outcome has such a small *n* that there is not quite a large enough sample size for each outcome, with the exception of Stalemate. Generally, it is best if there is a sample size of at least 30 for any given input observations, but I suspicion that it may be the case that the sample size for each output may actually be too small for this analysis.

Working through the detail results of Table 5.1, the intercept has some strong effects on the odds of each individual result. Beginning with A Yielding, the odds ratio decreases to .01, but with each further outcome the odds grow quite high. For B Yielding the odds ratio increases to 8.82, the odds of a Stalemate increase to 119.4 which is statistically significant, and the odds of a Compromise are 7.67. The odds ratios of a Released result are 0.298 and an Unknown outcome is 2.001. These are quite in favor of each particular outcome and make the other variables pull more weight over the course of obtaining the various outcomes in relation to A being victorious in a MID.

The effects of satisfaction on the outcomes of the MIDs do not have statistical significance at any level, which dramatically calls into question *Hypothesis 6*. A final blow for *H6* is that the odds of a Compromise outcome are below 1, as satisfaction increases the odds of a compromise outcome compared to State A winning change to .765. For the other outcomes, A Yielding is .113 which makes sense as A is the aggressor, B Yielding is also below 1 at .67,

Stalemate actually has lower odds than A winning at .80, the Released outcome has somewhat good odds at 1.05, and the odds of an unknown outcome are .85. These results imply that something other than satisfaction must be driving the individual outcomes, or that there may not be enough data to properly determine what the relationship between satisfaction and the outcomes might be.

For the Parity variable, it does not achieve statistical significance and reduces the odds of all outcomes in relation to Side A Victory. The result that A yields has an odds ratio of .468, that B Yields has a ratio of .387 and Stalemate has a ratio of .98. Compromise has a slightly lower odds ratio than Stalemate at .92, while Released has a pretty good ratio at .96, and the unknown outcome is nearly a coin flip at a ratio of .99. The POLITY variable is not significant in any possible outcome and the odds ratios range between .96 and 2.04. This means that these other outcomes are just slightly better than a coin toss when compared to Side A winning. Interdependence is statistically significant for no outcomes. As the coefficients for Interdependence are all quite large and the odds ratios range between $1.44e^{12}$ and $3.18e^{16}$. With such large odds ratios it appears that Interdependence is the main driver of these outcomes in relation to Side A winning, but there are no statistically significant coefficients here.

The Low GDP Change variable references how the outcome is affected by the slower growing state in the dyad. As each result is not statistically significant it is important to note that each outcome slightly increases to just above 1, except for A Yields, which drops to just below a ratio of 1 at .93. For B yielding drops to 1.03, and Stalemate drops to 1.17. The odds ratio for a Compromise falls to 1.12, while Released is 1.05 and the Unclear outcome rises to 1.17. The final variable is the Defensive Pact and, except for A yielding, Compromise, and Unclear, all the outcomes are significant. For all the other variables the odds ratios are below .05. There is no

standard error for A Yielding as the model had some sort of data error where it failed to converge or some similar issue.

As will be the case in the following Tables, I have made a second model that drops the defensive pact variable as it seems to draw all the weight in Model 1 and is the only significant variable. The results for Model 2 in Table 5.1 are not at all statistically significant and pretty generally have the same effects as Model 1. This adds further trouble for Hypothesis 7, which is disappointing for me.

As a result of this unexpected conclusion and because some of the coefficients seemed to go against what I thought were the appropriate outcomes, I decided to undertake some accuracy analysis. For the data available, the frequency of predicted outcomes out of the 271 possible MID involved dyads, there are 8 where Side A wins, 1 where A yields, 4 where B yields, 218 end in a stalemate, 16 have a compromised settlement, 10 are classified as released , 14 have an unclear outcome. The MIDs overwhelmingly end in stalemates, this could be reflective of changing international norms toward non-intervention or other factors, like threats of the hegemon to become involved. There are no instances in the available data between 1995 and 2010, the most recent overlapping years of the ICEWs and MID data, where Side B wins or where the sides join an ongoing war. Based on this full accounting, with the non-MID dyads incorporated, the model has a predictive accuracy of 99.97%, however, after dropping the non-MID dyads, it becomes only 3.69% due to the vast reduction in sample size, the over prediction of A yielding, compromise, and stalemate, and the underpredictions of B yielding, release of territory, and unclear outcomes. This is also not out of line with the results obtained using Tau or S as the measure of satisfaction, using Tau the model has an accuracy of 4.06% and using S it

is 3.69%. My measure has the same level of accuracy as using S scores and the way the model is specified the dyadic Tau score is slightly more accurate.

Clearly the most important variables for any sort of settlement of a MID are Interdependence, Defensive Pact, and the lower value of GDP Change. These have the largest coefficients and are doing the heavy lifting in this analysis. It is possible, that rather than having compromise coded as a negotiated settlement, the MID data codes a negotiated settlement in such a way that it could be counted as one side yielding or a compromise. What is clear though, is that satisfaction is not significant to any outcome. This is inconsistent with my hypothesis of conflict outcomes. Visually, this leads to the following box plot that has a few outliers as we get to stalemate. There are outliers that include both high and low levels of satisfaction.

Distribution of Outcomes

Figure 6

There is also a slight skew toward positive interaction found in this interpretation of satisfaction. This is seen in the fact that the highest positive value is well above positive 5, while the lowest negative value only makes it to -5. Because these numbers are based on yearly averages, this means that there are a far larger number of positive interactions with international organizations rather than a highly negative interaction. This tracks with the idea that the

majority of states are supportive of the international system and derive some benefit from it. It is especially interesting that the median satisfaction for the Compromise outcome is right at 2.5 and it has a large range of values. This could indicate that the other variables, like growth or capabilities have the stronger effect on the Compromise outcome, which is borne out by Table 5.1.

The boxplot that demonstrates the distribution of settlements also makes sense and contains results that back up the general theory. The three possible settlements of negotiated, unclear, and none all have similar ranges of satisfaction, means, and medians. Where the results add to the strength of the theory and distinguishes itself is the imposed settlement. This settlement has a median satisfaction of about 4.5, which is higher than other settlements, but the two middle quartiles range from 3 to just over 5. This does not quite align with what I would predict to be the case. It makes more sense for the imposed settlement type to have lower satisfaction scores, as an outside group is imposing a settlement. However, when factoring in Shannon's work on IO intervention into conflict, the imposed settlement type having the highest satisfaction values makes sense. It would be IOs imposing some type of settlement on a dyad engaged in a MID and it would only do so after being asked by a state or a group of states. The negotiated settlement seems to have the second highest median satisfaction score and the second greatest range, but overall seems to be lower than expected.

Figure 7

Distribution of Outcomes relative to Tau-b

Figure 8

In contrast to my satisfaction scores, the Tau-b scores have medians of practically 0 and

means between -0.125 and .7. Tau seems to drastically underpredict the Stalemate outcome, as it

is full of supposed outliers and the mean lies above the fourth quartile box. The means are

similar, the medians are nearly 0 in all cases, and the ranges across all outcomes except the

possibility of A yielding and the Stalemate outcome are very similar. The Stalemate outcome

continues to exhibit most outliers being at the higher ranges of cooperation that Tau-b indicates.

One possible explanation for the different results obtained here is that the compressed range of

Tau means that any deviance simply looks larger than it actually is.

For the settlement varieties there is a similar story to that in the outcomes charted by

using Tau-b. There is a much larger range of values that predict Imposed, Negotiated, and None

settlement types than Unclear. This would seem to indicate that Negotiated would be predicted

by Tau-b values. It seems that Tau does very well at predicting the individual settlement types of

Negotiated, Imposed, and None, but does poorly at predicting any Unclear outcomes. Perhaps

the Tau measure is doing poorly at predicting this outcome because it is predicted that these will

fall into other categories should the MIDs come to some type of settlement.

Figure 10

The scale of the y-axis for the S scores should be the immediate thing to note in the boxplots of both the Outcomes and Settlements. The scores here should be only ranging between 0 and 1. What is slightly tricky about this type of range is that there are very few outliers that would indicate any sort of statistical anomaly. That being said, it is telling that A winning and A yielding seem to have little range or deviance, just a single outlier for A winning and a single point/line for A yielding. In addition to the tightness of the y-axis, it should also be noted that the S scores are subject to the same time limitations that the Tau-b scores are. There are not S scores calculated for the period after 2008.

Distribution of Settlements Relative to S

Figure 11

The distribution of Settlements in relation to S scores is also rather bunched together.

Again, a high percentage of Settlement types, three out of four, are predicted over the full range

of recorded S-scores. It is also important to remember that neither S nor Tau-b scores vary

wildly over time. One of the key features of these two measures is that they are relatively stable.

S scores do vary more than Tau-b scores over time, but only when there are new policy prescriptions and programs that are available for states to sign on to.

Unclear and None have the largest ranges of possible S scores, followed by the Negotiated settlement. Imposed has its range concentrated near the upper bound of S scores. This means that Imposed settlements only occur at high levels of satisfaction, as opposed to the other types of settlement which occur over larger ranges of satisfaction.

In order to begin testing on Hypothesis 7 and the relation between territory and satisfaction, I start by sorting my MID data by revision type, selecting for those cases where the revisionist aspects of a MID are related to territory, as opposed to Not Applicable, Regime/government Type, Policy, or Other. I then use logistic regressions to analyze the type of MID outcome when territory is the primary cause of the MID as opposed to other types. There are some selection effects issues with this method, as I am assuming that conflict is underway. When formulating the second revision multinomial to compare to the first, I do drop the dyads where MIDs do not occur. Dropping the non-MID dyads does make some of the results a little bit problematic, but also means that my results are not overpredicted. As Hypothesis 7 says, the chance of conflict should decrease when there is a jointly satisfied dyad and the issue at stake is territory primarily because this is the issue that IOs like the UN are designed to tackle.

Testing what effects territorial revisionism has on the chances of a given MID Outcome is the hard test for a theory of satisfaction as territory is an issue all states should fight over. I have used my general model developed in the previous chapters to run a multinomial logistic regression on a dataset that only includes the kinds of MIDs that contain territorial revision as a key cause. All other MIDs are skipped over and included in a second use of the model. The results are reported in Table 5.2 and are in relation to Side A outright winning a MID. As in

previous multinomial logistic models of MID outcome, the dependent variable here is which

outcome out of the nine possible is obtained. Due to the small *n* of the pared down directed dyad

data there are three results that have no observations between 1995 and 2008. These are Side B

winning, Side A yielding, and a release of territory. The fact that there are no observed releases

of territory when these MIDs are based on territorial revision presents a very difficult case for

my measure of satisfaction.

Effect of Territorial Revisionism Type and Satisfaction on MID Outcome

Table 5.2

Outcome	Intercept	Satisfaction (Additive)	Parity	GDP Change Low	Interdependence	Polity	Def. Pact
B Yields 1	9.784 (9.48)	0.016 (1.143)	-2.073 (2.974)	-3.864 (2.025)	-15.77 (9.763)	0.276 (0.545)	-38.297 (.000000006)***
Stalemate 78	12.594 (7.834)	1.492 (1.032)	3.457 (2.048)	-2.881 (1.65)	95.984 (53.505)	-1.113 (0.613)	0.925 (2.387)
Compromise 5	7.186 (8.022)	1.93 (1.066)	3.412 (2.054)	-2.953 (1.652)	97.154 (53.508)	-1.119 (0.615)	1.963 (2.761)
Unclear 4	8.088 (8.042)	1.961 (1.064)	3.453 (2.049)	-2.845 (1.654)	31.269 (91.77)	-1.167 (0.617)	1.918 (2.779)
Model 2 – Dropped Defensive Pact							
B Yields	9.128 (12.079)	-2.439 (5.259)	-0.297 (6.238)	-5.258 (3.396)	48.170 (21.959)*	0.128 (1.438)	
Stalemate	15.969 (10.549)	2.030 (1.373)	5.035 (3.076)	-3.809 (2.239)	133.676 (75.682)	-1.507 (0.877)	
Compromise	10.858 (10.666)	2.466 (1.396)	5.004 (3.078)	-3.873 (2.240)	134.731 (75.683)	-1.514 (0.880)	
Unclear	11.490 (10.690)	2.450 (1.395)	5.031 (3.076)	-3.747 (2.244)	125.730 (77.125)	-1.587 (0.879)	
p<.05	**p<.01*	***p<.001*	N=1419				

For this analysis, the Revision Type variable from the MIDB v4.0 dataset is used as it

includes territory, among other items, as a source of revisionist sentiment for national

governments (Palmer et al., 2015). Firstly, when analyzing these findings, it should be noted that Defensive Pact seems to be the most significant driving force in the entire table. That alone is somewhat surprising as I was aware that Interdependence and Alliances are often thought to be drivers of the more peaceful outcomes of MIDs, so it would make sense that they would also be significant to a Compromise outcome, however, they are not significant to Compromise at all. The closest that satisfaction comes to being statistically significant are the compromise and unclear outcomes. When satisfaction alone is considered in relation to the compromise and unclear outcomes it is increasing the odds ratios of those outcomes to 6.88 and 7.1, respectively. This result means that Satisfaction is increasing those odds in the expected direction, but it is also not a statistically significant move.

The only outcome that has any variable with significance is B Yielding and the variable is presence of a Defensive Pact. When the states in the dyad have a defensive pact the likelihood of B yielding increases to nearly 100%. This was a hard test for my measure of satisfaction and unfortunately for my theory in general, there is not strong support for Hypothesis 7, that *When the specific dispute is over territory, two satisfied states will be more likely to have a Compromise outcome to a MID.*

Model 2, with dropped defensive pacts, has slightly different results. Satisfaction still does not have any level of statistical significance, and the sign of its effect on B Yielding has changed, but with the standard error being larger than the coefficient, this should not be relied on. The sign for the effect of Interdependence on B Yielding has changed to a positive effect and is the only statistically significant effect in Model 2, and its impact is to raise the odds ratio to $8.13e^{20}$. All other variables have the same general effects on the possible outcomes as in Model 1.

What is most interesting to me about these results is that satisfaction plays almost no role in any of the outcomes. This is immensely surprising because it seems like satisfaction should be a main driver of whether IOs or third parties in general would be involved in settling a MID, especially over territorial issues given the research of Shannon and others. What is somewhat comforting is that very similar results without any statistical significance, though not reported here, are obtained when using Tau and S scores to determine the outcome of a territory based MID using my model. This could mean that I have poor model construction, or that there is not a large enough sample size for the outcomes to draw any conclusions. I lean toward the latter explanation because there are three total outcomes that are not observed at all over the timeframe for which all of my variables are available. Perhaps if there were events data similar to the ICEWs set that covered more of the 20th century than the last decade there would be results to

Effect of Non-Territorial Revisionism and Satisfaction on MID Outcome							
Table 5.3							
Outcome	Intercept	Satisfaction (Additive)	Parity	GDP Change Low	Interdependence	Polity	Defensive Pact
A Yields 1	-46.124 (52.893)	-5.623 (5.088)	2.636 (4.433)	-3.174 (4.447)	-17.822 (24.827)	4.459 (4.357)	-54.02 (.0000002)***
B Yields 3	4.091 (4.573)	-0.329 (0.684)	-4.746 (5.332)	0.66 (0.556)	-30.722 (81.573)	0.149 (0.198)	-45.542 (NaN)
Stalemate 100	7.402 (3.976)	-0.454 (0.583)	-0.754 (0.641)	0.339 (0.271)	17.185 (69.203)	0.067 (0.117)	-4.805 (1.949)*
Compromise 8	4.641 (4.041)	-0.69 (0.600)	-0.758 (0.683)	0.413 (0.301)	12.922 (69.484)	0.009 (0.117)	-1.497 (2.048)
Released 1	-61.168 (22.726)**	-4.296 (10.424)	-4.897 (81.740)	5.342 (26.557)	3.436 (105.552)	4.508 (8.282)	-51.788 (.00000001)***
Unclear 7	4.935 (4.041)	-0.623 (0.610)	-0.859 (0.704)	0.361 (0.310)	17.239 (69.208)	0.128 (0.128)	-4.099 (2.301)
Model 2 – Dropped Defensive Pact							
A Yields	-3.449 (8.427)	-1.247 (0.663)	0.142 (0.418)	-0.688 (1.199)	-3.274 (52.833)	0.797 (0.727)	
B Yields	3.955 (3.526)	-0.585 (0.569)	-5.393 (4.679)	0.699 (0.487)	-17.866 (57.990)	0.157 (0.174)	
Stalemate	7.014 (2.902)*	-0.676 (0.429)	-0.711 (0.451)	0.327 (0.209)	8.610 (45.690)	0.102 (0.099)	
Compromise	5.063 (2.977)	-0.987 (0.462)*	-0.815 (0.504)	0.408 (0.250)	4.201 (46.483)	0.084 (0.112)	
Released	-9.227 (20.515)	-1.442 (1.486)	-6.816 (10.729)	1.526 (1.763)	5.616 (45.849)	1.098 (1.504)	
Unclear	4.580 (2.990)	-0.847 (0.467)	-0.828 (0.536)	0.356 (0.261)	8.629 (45.694)	0.172 (0.110)	
p<.05	**p<.01**	***p<.001**					

support Hypothesis 7.

In the interest of thoroughness, Table 5.3 presents the results of the same multinomial logistic regression as run for Table 5.2 but using all other revision types that are not included in Table 5.2. It could be that Satisfaction simply doesn't play a definite role in whether there is a Compromise outcome independent of whether a MID is over territory.

This table shows that even when the revisionism type is not related to territory, the results of the regressions in Table 5.2 do generally hold. There are clearly more obtained outcomes than

when territory is the main feature of revisionist sentiment in the initiating state. The main similarity is that the Defensive Pact is the primary driver of the results in this table again. Satisfaction scores do not seem to work in the expected way to increase the likelihood of the different outcomes, all possible outcomes become less likely when compared to Side A winning when not considering territory.

Model 2 again drops the defensive pact variable. As a result, only two coefficients obtain statistical significance. First, the Intercept for the Stalemate outcome, which raises the odds ratio of a Stalemate in relation to Side A Victory to 1112. Secondly, in a bit of a surprise, an increase in Satisfaction will reduce the odds ratio of a Compromise in relation to Side A Victory to .372. All other variables behave the same as in Model 1, but to different degrees. For example, Satisfaction reduces the odds ratios of all outcomes in both models just to different degrees.

Hypothesis 7 does not stand, but there is support for the idea that compromise is made more likely, in general, when the dyad as a whole is satisfied with the international system and territory is the issue states are contesting. The fact that all Satisfaction coefficients here are negative means that the odds ratios will all be below 1. There are a range of possibilities for why this is the case. Perhaps IOs are not generally involved in the types of MIDs that would be caused by issues other than territory. These are slightly messier disputes to work out than where a border has been placed, but perhaps my findings are more generally associated with the time under examination. There is some more depth to explore here but the results are not consistent with other studies that suggest status quo supporting states would be more likely to follow the norms of the system.

Table 5.4 tests the hypothesis that satisfied dyads will be more likely to negotiate a settlement to a MID based on territory than other possible settlement types. After separating

MIDs based on territory from other types, I have used a multinomial logistic regression to test how satisfaction and other variables affect the likelihoods of different MID settlements. In the table below, the odds of each settlement occurring is in relation to a Negotiated settlement, so any decrease in an odds ratio means that the reported outcome is less likely in relation to a Negotiated outcome.

Effects of Satisfaction on Territorial MID Settlement							
Table 5.4	Intercept	Satisfaction	Parity	GDP Change, Low	Interdependence	POLITY	Defensive Pact
Imposed 1	-38.683 (70.895)	-5.878 (13.837)	-0.189 (1.327)	8.689 (15.407)	-34.64 (39.467)	1.391 (2.933)	-32.005 (84.78)
No Settlement 78	2.44 (0.845)***	-0.058 (0.181)	0.113 (0.237)	0.041 (0.069)	-0.532 (0.376)	-0.006 (0.039)	-0.224 (0.952)
Unclear 2	-0.524 (1.88)	-0.007 (0.355)	0.097 (0.244)	0.166 (0.252)	-18.011 (29.492)	-0.04 (0.124)	-20.689 (.0000004)***
Model 2 – Dropped Defensive Pact							
Imposed	-9.035 (10.293)	-1.306 (1.471)	-1.943 (2.882)	2.398 (2.136)	-180.992 (180.856)	0.872 (0.850)	
No Settlement	2.396 (0.808)**	-0.059 (0.181)	0.110 (0.229)	0.037 (0.069)	-0.512 (0.359)	-0.007 (0.040)	
Unclear	-0.312 (1.882)	-0.038 (0.372)	0.084 (0.235)	0.095 (0.205)	-85.114 (107.562)	0.003 (0.091)	
*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<.001	N=90				

Table 5.4 shows that, in relation to a Negotiated settlement, the other types of settlement are not as likely, if Satisfaction is the only variable. While Satisfaction takes on importance for each of the possible settlements, it is not reinforcing for the settlements. Each of the other possible settlement types decreases in terms of odds as satisfaction of the dyad with the system increases. This means that the other settlements are less likely than negotiation as Satisfaction increases. Similar to the other analyses that have been run so far, Satisfaction is an additive that

grows larger as each state of the dyad becomes more satisfied. This should mean that there is strong support for Hypothesis 8, that negotiated settlements would be most likely as satisfaction increases. In terms of actual results, the breakdown is that there are 9 Negotiated settlements, 1 Imposed settlement, 78 MIDs where there was no settlement during the time under examination, and 2 Unclear settlements for the total of 90 MIDs where territory was the main revision type for State A.

Interdependence, POLITY, and a defensive pact all slightly decrease the odds that there will not be a settlement at all, and that follows from other studies of MIDs and MID settlements that suggest interdependence, similar regimes, and alliances make it easier to come to some sort of agreement, even if it is not the ideal one.

Model 2 shows what happens when dropping defensive pact, and in this case the Satisfaction variable remains in the expected direction for all outcomes, even if the coefficients are not statistically significant. The only coefficient that shows statistical significance in Model 2 is that for the Intercept in relation to No Settlement, which raises the odds ratio to 10.97. Otherwise, the variables generally behave the same way as Model 1, just to different degrees. The findings here slightly support Hypothesis 8, but because the coefficients are not statistically significant, the support is not to be declared strong, let alone absolute.

Table 5.5 repeats the regressions using the other revision types the same way that Table 5.3 does. After the results of the repeated analysis in Table 5.4, I anticipate similar results in Table 5.5. Satisfaction should have a strong effect on whether there is a negotiated settlement, meaning that it would decrease the likelihood of the other possible settlement types as Negotiated is the reference category.

Clearly for the Settlement of non-territory related MIDs POLITY and Alliances matter the most to obtaining an unclear settlement. The Unclear settlement results could be the consequence of asking allies to join a MID, be related to what types of states are involved in MIDs over revision of policies or regimes or are just ongoing. Satisfaction is again not statistically significant for any outcome. Even though Satisfaction is not significant for predicting the outcomes here, it does increase the odds very slightly in favor of an Imposed settlement or No settlement in relation to a negotiated one. However, the odds for an unclear

Effects of Satisfaction on MID Settlement (Non-territory)							
Table 5.5	Intercept	Satisfaction	Parity	GDP Change, Low	Interdependence	POLITY	Defensive Pact
Imposed 5	-3.019 (2.008)	0.581 (0.361)	0.180 (0.271)	-0.396 (0.275)	5.865 (12.022)	0.067 (0.097)	0.676 (1.691)
No Settlement 103	2.731 (0.862)**	0.258 (0.172)	-0.010 (0.232)	-0.100 (0.156)	5.966 (11.770)	0.036 (0.052)	-2.779 (1.047)**
Unclear 9	0.488 (1.198)	-0.423 (0.297)	-0.055 (0.342)	-0.077 (0.245)	3.368 (12.031)	0.297 (0.098)**	-16.650 (0.0004)***
Model 2 – Dropped Defensive Pact							
Imposed	-3.222 (1.592)*	0.767 (0.338)*	0.299 (0.267)	-0.352 (0.249)	4.608 (9.297)	0.057 (0.101)	
No Settlement	1.930 (0.717)**	0.359 (0.181)*	0.058 (0.229)	-0.085 (0.145)	4.792 (9.134)	0.004 (0.055)	
Unclear	-0.351 (1.013)	-0.095 (0.235)	0.090 (0.292)	-0.095 (0.219)	2.352 (9.474)	0.188 (0.080)*	
*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<.001	N=125				

settlement are slightly reduced as satisfaction grows in this sample.

For Model 2, the coefficients for the intercept are statistically significant for Imposed and No Settlement outcomes and Imposed has its odds ratio reduced to .039 and No Settlement is

raised to 6.88. Those are very different directions to take in comparison to a Negotiated settlement. Satisfaction raises the odds ration of both Imposed and No Settlement in relation to a Negotiated settlement and to a statistically significant level. The odds ratios rise to 2.15 and 1.43 respectively, while the odds ratio for an Unclear settlement is reduced to .9. The only other statistically significant variable is POLITY, which slightly raises the odds of an Unclear outcome to 1.2. Parity and Interdependence generally raises the odds ratios of all outcomes in relation to a Negotiated settlement, while GDP Change generally lowers the odds.

Effects of Satisfaction on MID Settlement (All MIDs)							
Table 5.6	Intercept	Satisfaction	Parity	GDP Change, Low	Interdependence	POLITY	Defensive Pact
Imposed 9	-4.079 (1.341)*	0.525 (0.225)	0.07 (0.046)	-0.14 (0.096)	0.36 (0.313)	-0.022 (0.042)	1.831 (0.965)
No Settlement 216	2.257 (0.421)***	0.08 (0.105)	0.032 (0.039)	0.035 (0.064)	-0.311 (0.271)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.885 (0.515)
Unclear 24	0.624 (0.575)	-0.334 (0.164)*	-0.009 (0.045)	0.023 (0.101)	-2.831 (1.866)	0.154 (0.043)***	-12.449 (60.56)
Model 2 – Drop Defensive Pact							
Imposed	-3.042 (1.034)**	0.520 (0.208)*	0.061 (0.041)	-0.091 (0.087)	0.386 (0.299)	-0.037 (0.046)	
No Settlement	2.041 (0.394)***	0.088 (0.109)	0.028 (0.035)	0.026 (0.063)	-0.207 (0.243)	-0.025 (0.024)	
Unclear	0.216 (0.530)	-0.177 (0.143)	-0.003 (0.042)	-0.028 (0.094)	-1.932 (1.527)	0.084 (0.035)*	
*p<.05	**p<.01	***p<.001	N=125				

Table 5.6 presents the Settlement multinomial using all MIDs in the same model. Instead of separating the MIDs based on type of revisionism coded in the COW data, this model uses all MIDs and the results show that combining all the MIDs yields different results than either of the two previous models. While Satisfaction is only statistically significant in the unclear outcome, it does have strong effects on imposed settlements and no settlements in relation to negotiated

settlements. As satisfaction increases the odds of an imposed settlement in relation to a negotiated settlement is 1.69 and for no settlement it rises to 1.08. The odds ratio of the unclear settlement type changes by 0.71 for each increase in satisfaction.

Other effects include the intercepts determining that Imposed and Unclear settlements are less likely than a negotiated settlement, while no settlement is much more likely. Interestingly, as POLITY of the dyad increases, the odds ratio increases to 1.16. The results overall indicate that there is not a major statistical difference between any of the given settlement outcomes when all MIDs are taken together.

While Model 1 tested the fully specified multinomial, Model 2 tests the same multinomial while dropping the defensive pact as in the previous tables. After dropping the defensive pact from the analysis, there are only a few variables that achieve statistic significance. Compared to the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, the intercepts for the Imposed and No Settlement outcomes are very significant. Imposed has its odds ratio drop to .04 and No Settlement rises to 7.69 based on the coefficients. Interestingly for Satisfaction, the only significance it achieves is to help the odds ratio of an Imposed settlement rise to 1.68. The odds ratio for No Settlement is just above 1, and the ratio for an Unclear settlement falls to .83. However, the No and Unclear settlements are not statistically significant. The only other variable that achieves statistical significance is POLITY for the Unclear settlement and it is has an odds ratio of only slightly above 1 at 1.087, while it reduces the odds of an Imposed settlement or No Settlement, but not to a significant degree.

The remaining variables generally reduce the likelihood of an Unclear outcome in relation to a negotiated settlement. As a reminder, for the purposes of MID Outcome and MID Settlement, I am choosing to interpret the Unclear category as the MID is still ongoing or

settlement attempts are in progress. Parity seems to move the odds ratios for Imposed and No

Settlements to slightly above 1, but again are not significant. The GDP Change variable slightly

reduces the odds ratio of an Imposed settlement, but slightly increases the odds of No Settlement,

while the Interdependence variable has the opposite effects. The findings in Table 5.6 further

support *Hypothesis 8*, that territorial MIDs are settled differently than non-territorial MIDs.

Analysis

What the regressions show is that satisfaction is not significant for predicting the outcomes or

settlements of MIDs. Even though I was expecting results to build on Hensel et al. (2009) and

Shannon et al. (2010) in relation to structured IOs being important to negotiating settlement to

MIDs, I found no evidence that satisfaction plays a significant role in what the outcome of a

MID will be or what a settlement might look like. I am limited in temporal range by the fact that

the ICEWS data does not record events earlier than 1995. This means that the Cold War has

already ended, and the world system is hegemonic by the time data is being collected, which

could be having an effect in terms of limiting available data and types of outcomes or

settlements. This means that there are potentially other interactions that could alter the outcomes

of these regressions had the data included more time or actions from more states.

Satisfaction does frequently move the potential outcome and settlement types into a

direction that I had hypothesized, but the lack of statistical significance means that I cannot claim

to have found strong support for any hypothesis in this chapter. What is heartening is that Tau

and S behave in similar manners, which could mean that my lack of support for the hypotheses is

down to problems other than incorrect hypotheses. I am also heartened by the fact that the

behavior of other variables in my models matches the expectations of other writing in the

literature.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Introduction

At the start of this dissertation my goal was to initially develop a new measure of

satisfaction for studying power transitions and state interactions. What I have done is refocus

discussions around what the "rules of the system" entails and come up with a solid measure for

the concept that is closely related to theory. Along the way I have shown how satisfaction and

revisionism are two different ways of approaching the same concept and reframed these terms

along a continuum of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. I have shown that actions taken by certain

states follow not only my theory as outlined in Chapter 2, but the theories of Organski, Morgan

and Palmer, and Schweller without violating any of their assumptions or pitting the theories

against one another, but by seeing how they had initially talked past one another and reframed

their concepts.

Additions to Theory

The main theoretical contributions of this study demonstrate that satisfaction and

revisionism are two highly linked, if not identical, theoretical concepts. These concepts are so

closely related that they are often used to refer to the same phenomena, even if that was not the

intention of the authors using the terms. Power Transition Theory is one of the few bodies of

theory that explicitly refers to satisfaction as a core concept. The other bodies of theory tend to

use terms like revisionism or revisionist to refer to states that are not satisfied or status quo

supporting for states that are. Realism in particular tends to focus on revisionist states without

acknowledging that is what is happening. The correct way of thinking of the concept of whether

a state supports the status quo or not is one of scale and direction rather than an entirely different

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concept. Simply reframing the issue this way lets us think of new ways to determine if states are satisfied or not, and what that might mean for the international system as a whole and not just individual states.

While Schweller has concisely articulated criticisms of the logic of rising states as spoilers, I have found support for the idea that it is the level of system satisfaction within a given dyad that determines when a MID is likely to occur. This supports previous findings by other scholars in power transition theory and elsewhere that point to the challenging states as being the ones that are most likely to start a MID in order to change the rules of the system or their position in the system. This finding is also consistent with Morgan and Palmer (1997) in that a state attempting to increase its power and position through subtle means would be more likely to use diplomatic means to better its position before resorting to open conflict with other states, which means that it should be possible to circumvent such an occurrence.

Aside from clarifying certain theoretical concepts, this study has also demonstrated a more theoretically aligned measurement for satisfaction. The measurement of satisfaction based on state behaviors towards international organizations allows for measuring satisfaction based on a state's view of the entirety of the international system and the rules that govern it. This is more theoretically aligned with PTT, but also means that there are more ways to use satisfaction in relation to other theories of international politics. Many theories of international relations point out that states interact with various institutions, but do not say exactly what those institutions are or how they can be observed. Realism does not even acknowledge that international organizations are even full participants in the international system and still want to use revisionism as a core concept in predicting conflict.

Additionally, rather than simply making an arbitrary division between satisfied and not satisfied, my measure allows a determination to be made of *how* satisfied a state is. That is, I can rank states in terms of satisfaction based on my measure, even how satisfied the hegemon is and not just the weaker states. Because satisfaction can vary over short and long periods of time, not just decades, we can now see how certain changes to the international system are perceived in the short run, and, because we can track events at a narrow level, what resulting policy responses look like.

There is also now a bridge between structural theories and the IO literature that involves conflict resolution. Within my project is the link that shows where state-IO interactions fit when determining a timeline of conflict onset and resolution. As states interact with IOs they are creating a trail of evidence that leads to them being categorized as highly satisfied or highly dissatisfied or somewhere in between and that should allow for predictions of what types of future behavior the states are likely to engage in. The prediction of future interactions means that policies can be adjusted accordingly and both states and IOs can promote more peaceful interactions.

The chance to reflect on policy responses is especially useful in the context of a dissatisfied hegemon or oddly behaving great power. While I haven't rejected the assumption that the hegemon and its supporting great powers are satisfied states, the data indicates that the United States is not the most satisfied state in the system. That finding does challenge the satisfied hegemon assumption and raises a few questions for future exploration. First, if the hegemon is not the most satisfied state, what kinds of states are the most satisfied? Second, what happens when the hegemon is dissatisfied and why was it assumed to be satisfied in the first place? Is the hegemon assumed to be satisfied because it gets to make the rules? The

assumption seems to go against most theories that suggest a preponderance of power would make a state a target for a coalition of states seeking to reduce that preponderance.

The current political climate shows what happens when a hegemon behaves in an unpredicted manner. Despite the actions of President Trump, the other status quo great powers are attempting to carry on supporting the international system. In fact, recent news reports from Africa are demonstrating that IOs are aiding in further economic expansion and integration along the free market lines begun by the Bretton Woods organizations and the EU. The expansion of free trade regimes in Africa shows promise for the continuation of the established international order, but the continued challenges posed by the BRIC bank and other international agreements show that there are still challenges to the dominance of the United States in the international system.

The BRIC bank itself shows the resilience of the Bretton Woods agreements and the challenges that rising states face in reshaping a sticky international order. While the BRIC bank is established, is operating according to its mission, and has set itself up as a competitor to the World Bank, it has not managed to garner support outside of the original five members. Membership is ostensibly open to any UN member that is able to contribute a minimum of funds, but there have not been any additional members join after nearly a decade in existence.

In addition to widely varying measures of satisfaction, I have also changed an assumption about hegemons that allows for further exploration of hegemonic behavior within the system. Previously, the hegemon was assumed to be satisfied. I did not make this assumption and measured hegemonic satisfaction through behavior toward IOs the same as with any other state. This contributes to conflict onset literature and PTT by demonstrating under what conditions a hegemon will be the aggressor in a conflict. Hegemons do take action to defend the international

system from perceived challengers and in PTT could be more likely to initiate a conflict to defend the system and its place within that system. Aside from establishing under what circumstances a hegemon would be willing to engage in a MID to defend the system, treating the hegemon like every other state also can tell us under what circumstances a hegemon is willing to accommodate calls for revision of the system. Clearly, not every challenge is worth fighting, so what makes some challenges worth fighting and others not? Is it only when there is a fundamental challenge to the structure and operation of the system or the hegemon itself? Further research can assess these questions.

In addition, there was a large amount of disagreement on the term 'revisionism.' This has been pointed out by such writing as Jaschob et al. (2014) that attempt to develop a new way of determining the extent and type of revisionism displayed by various states. This could be a fruitful area for future research building from Jaschob et al's efforts so far.

<u>New Measurements</u>

My new measurement of satisfaction is not only more theoretically aligned with the research questions surrounding satisfaction it also has some key benefits over previous measures based on the type of data being used. The new measurements of satisfaction based on state behavior are events based. This means that as time passes, it is not necessary to wait for new alliances or even policy adjustments to take place, just changes in national opinion that are reported in internationally circulated newspapers. While there are certainly missing data points given the fact that not every national newspaper in the world is used as a source of events, the main events that would achieve world significance are covered here.

What this study has also accomplished is to determine that events data can be used to determine the relationship between satisfaction and conflict onset in a way that is at least as good

as Tau-b or S scores. I was very pleased to see that my predictions of conflict onset and the outcomes of conflicts were nearly the same as Tau and S scores. While this may not seem like a major accomplishment, it offers new directions for research on conflict initiation and settlement. This means that new datasets will always be available, and it should be possible to have especially efficient data. Additionally, because the actual satisfaction scores vary over time, they can offer more description of current events leading up to the initiation of a conflict, the resolution of a conflict, or in the case of the BRIC Bank, the establishment of a new international organization that challenges an established organization.

In addition, I have tried not to rely too strongly on a set score of satisfaction to determine whether a state is satisfied or not, but the trend in whether it is rising or falling to determine if a state is generally doing better or worse under the current global structure of international organizations since the Second World War.

<u>Future Research Directions</u>

As a result of presenting some of the preliminary findings of this project, I intend to revisit this project using a differing events data set. While the ICEWs data is intended, as a part of the initial public-private partnership that created the data, to predict crises and it does so in my analysis, it is also missing some key components. There is a lack of consistent information from newspapers other than a few major selections, such as *The New York Times*. A portion of the project related to trade diversion among South American countries in MERCOSUR had to be postponed due to a lack of data concerning Brazil, even though it was a founding member of the organization, although this could be because there was no MERCOSUR for Brazil to interact with before 1995.

The result of the shortcomings with the ICEWs data means that another dataset will need to be considered, both to verify the results obtained here and to further test the applications of satisfaction as it relates to conflict. Further considerations to test are whether differences in regional or global organizations matter for how conflict initiates or concludes, which types of organization have a greater bearing on satisfaction, and what effect satisfaction has on other types of state interactions, such as trade. There may be connections between satisfaction and all these factors, and I intend to explore them into the future.

I plan to continue this project using the ICEWS data and other datasets to examine which types of organization matter the most for predicting future conflicts. There is some question as to whether regional or global interactions matter more for the onset of conflict. The points toward regional mattering more are that it is easier to interact with neighbors than it is to interact with other states that are continents or oceans apart. Are there any regional organizations that operate in the same area or overlap in mission that matter more for conflict onset, and why might that be the case? At the global level there are questions about whether security or economics matter more for state satisfaction. I plan on exploring the determinants of state satisfaction further by seeing if things like GDP growth, improving standards of living, or a lack of MIDs make states more satisfied. Recall that in Chapter 3 I did explore some basic relationships between GDP and satisfaction by graphing one against the other and did not see any clear relationship between them, but I have reason to believe that there may be some kind of interaction that leads to states being satisfied with the international system.

One possible way that states could be satisfied is with their role in the system. For example, a state that is well to do and doesn't face many external threats, like Denmark, could be more satisfied than other states because the role it plays in the system matches the expectations

for the state. I would start this project by trying to determine which states are the most satisfied and ranking all states that are present in the data.

As mentioned above, there is also further effort to be put into determining what revisionism means and the different forms that it could take. One thing that I noticed, and that others before me have noticed, is that most of the judgment around what is revisionist sentiment is often *post hoc* in nature. I have tried to not fall into this line of thinking and looked for levels of satisfaction to change in the form of statements and actions toward international organizations that lead to further confrontation in the form of MIDs.

Policy Implications

In addition to the future research questions, there are some policy implications that could be found from this project. One is that there are indeed some ways to accommodate a rising challenger. This would include buy-in on any type of organization created in the future, or something as simple as urging the creation of organizations to continue the international system as it is currently formatted. This has major implications for the ongoing challenges that China presents to the hegemony of the United States. A second implication is that hegemons are not always satisfied, this means that a major assumption of global politics for the twentieth century may need to be reconsidered. That is, the United States, and other states that may become the hegemon in the future, will seek to impose their own revisions on the international system. That means that for other states in the system, there needs to be a major consideration of whether any foreign policy is likely to result in backlash from the hegemon. This sounds intuitive, but this is another confirmation of that fact from a new source of data.

I am satisfied that this project has made a contribution to political science in general and international relations in particular by reframing the discussion around revisionism and

satisfaction, bringing international organizations into the conflict process in way that precedes

the outbreak of a conflict, and added a measure of satisfaction that is very closely aligned with

the theory of satisfaction and conflict that I have developed here.

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