State Willingness to Initiate and Manage Interstate River Claims

Why do states initiate and manage interstate river claims over some transboundary river basins but not others? Although recent research indicates that geographic and institutional factors render some transboundary river basins more prone to contention or cooperation, few scholars provide a causal mechanism linking transboundary rivers to these outcomes. This analysis addresses the present gap, linking scholarship of domestic institutions with transboundary river research. I argue that states are more willing to initiate interstate river disputes when substantial proportions of a domestic leader’s political support reside within a river basin. Additionally, I contend that interstate river disputes are most likely to be unmanaged or negotiated when one disputant is comparatively more willing to protect transboundary river access than the other, while disputes are most likely to result in militarization when both states maintain equal willingness. An empirical analysis of transboundary river dyads from 1900-2001 uncovers substantial support for this argument.