From Interests to Rights: Using CEDAW to Understand the Substantive Representation of Women

by

K. Anne Watson

(Under the Direction of Daniel W. Hill, Jr.)

Abstract

Although widely ratified international law guarantees women equal access to and enjoyment of the economy, women's enjoyment of their economic rights continues to show variation—even in developed, democratic countries. I argue that this variation is a result of differing degrees of support for specific women-friendly policies in these countries' legislatures. In one chapter, I create and test a measure of the women–friendliness of state policies. In the remainder of the book, I examine the process through which such policies are incorporated in domestic law, using case studies and a new database of more than 3 million speeches I collected from the parliamentary archives of three countries—the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland—to determine if trends hold true across time and space.

Index words: Women's rights, human rights, international law, text analysis, defamilialization

From Interests to Rights: Using CEDAW to Understand the Substantive Representation of Women

by

K. Anne Watson

B.A., University of Tennessee, 2013

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Athens, Georgia

2020

From Interests to Rights: Using CEDAW to Understand the Substantive Representation of Women

by

K. Anne Watson

Major Professor: Daniel W. Hill, Jr.

Committee: K. Chad Clay
Lihi Ben Shitrit

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Interim Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2020

Dedication

For Jo Sawyer, who taught me that there was a big, beautiful world to meet and to know.

For Dr. Bookie, who was the first person to show me it's about more than just the research.

And for my students, whose passion for creating a better world reignited my own.

Acknowledgments

One of the things I always tell incoming graduate students is that no one gets through a graduate program alone. It's certainly true in my case. I did not come to this program alone, I did not finish this program (or this dissertation) alone, and I do not move forward alone.

From my earliest years, my mother, Kathryn Watson, taught me a love of reading, of learning, of creativity, and even of math. She taught me that women are powerful and resilient and equal to men in every way. As I grew older, my father, Randy Watson, taught me that words have power—not just the specific words that we choose, but also how we speak them. My interest in discourse analysis finds its heart in those discussions. Mom and Dad, pieces of the lessons I have learned from both of you can be found throughout this project, and without your support, I would never have made it to or through graduate school.

Advisors are such an important determinant of how graduate programs (and dissertations in particular) go, and I have been blessed to have the best advisor out there in Danny Hill. Danny, you were the first professor to tell me that your door was always open to me if I needed to talk. That, your thorough and thoughtful feedback on every piece of work I have ever sent you, our understanding that everything would always take two weeks longer than we said it would, and your weekly mantra of "You're doing everything that you need to be doing," have defined my time at UGA in the best way possible. I have learned a new standard for when to panic (which is never, even when the frog's pot of water is starting to boil) in observing your equanimity, something I hope to pass to my students in the future. I am truly grateful to the person who assigned me to be your RA that first year and for your constant, steady support over the past six years.

Somehow, I have been lucky enough to have not just an amazing advisor but also a fantastic vice advisor (on everything but paper), Chad Clay. Chad, the genuine way that you interact with others showed me that having a tender heart in our line of work is a strength. And the enthusiasm that you bring to the table for such a wide variety of projects has been so infectious that it has

made me a better, happier, and more creative teacher and researcher (and also a slightly over-committed one, but that works for me, too).

The support of other members of the faculty and staff has also made an incredible impact on my experience as a graduate student. Lihi Ben Shitrit, your classes helped me think about the norms of political science—the way it asks and answers questions and who it considers "normal"—in new ways and fall in love with the discipline again. Colleen Kuusinen and Zoe Morris, you helped me build a passion for and find fulfillment in the second half of our job, without which I would not be able to carry out the research half. And Maryann Gallagher and Leah Carmichael, your incredibly kind encouragement and the many, many resources you provided to me made it possible for me to successfully teach all of my classes this year.

Finally, there are the many friends who have made this process not just possible but enjoyable. Aaron Rennow and Josh Jackson, dragging you through calculus and being dragged by you through R and linear regression, sharing notes and rides and dinners, was my first lesson that none of us do this alone. It was a great one, and it stuck. Matt Rains, Yesha Datas, and Meridith LaVelle, Shitty Movie Saturday is the best idea that any of us has ever had (and I am so thankful to have the kind of friends that would dedicate at least one of those Saturdays to coding bibliography entries for me). And Brianna Yoder, Pedro Monarrez, and Hannah Vincent, your cards, your memes, your photos, your snacks, your insight, your constant and unwavering support, and your general brilliance as human beings are a key reason that I have kept going and that this project can exist at all. It has been a pleasure to help and to be helped by and to celebrate, to rant, and to walk through this program with all of you.

Thank you!

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Introduction

On September 3, 1981, the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) entered into force. The treaty represents the global standard for women's rights, espousing non–discrimination and equal participation for women in every area of life. Although the treaty is widely acknowledged to have positive effects for women's rights in ratifying countries (Simmons 2009; Hill Jr. 2010; Cole 2012; Lupu 2013; Englehart and Miller 2014) and has now been close to globally ratified, women worldwide continue to lag behind men with regards to nearly every indicator—particularly with regards to participation in the political sphere.

At the beginning of 1997, the global average of parliamentary seats held by women was under 12 percent; at the beginning of 2012, their share had risen to 20 percent. By the beginning of 2017, women filled just over 23 percent of the seats (Inter–Parliamentary Union 2020). Practically speaking, this means that there are still more than three male legislators for every female legislator across the world, only two countries in the world (Rwanda and Bolivia) where the number of women is equal to or greater than that of men in the lower house of parliament, and only one country (Belgium) where the upper house of parliament is perfectly gender equal.

The male–skewed nature of political representation is detrimental to women's enjoyment of their rights in other spheres. A common understanding in the field is that increased women's descriptive representation in a legislature is associated with increased representation of women's interests in that country (See Phillips 1995; Wängnerud 2009). Embedded within this argument is the assumption that women are either better equipped or more likely than men to substantively represent women's interests, presumably on the basis of shared experiences or concerns. When women are kept from full political participation,

we expect that their enjoyment of rights in other spheres will also be limited, including the economic sphere.

This make it unsurprising that the World Economic Forum (2016, p.30) reports that "Globally, 54 percent of working–age women take part in the formal economy, on average, as compared to 81% of men." Additionally, the global average of women's earnings is approximately half that of men's earnings; there is no country in which executives perceive wages as being equal and only five in which the wage gap is less than 20 percent. They are also significantly less likely to own companies, hold senior positions in companies, or serve on boards.

In reality, we know that even once women overcome the obstacles to being elected, full participation in the legislative process is often still denied to them. And current research connecting women in legislative positions to improvements in respect for gender equality suffer from a few common weaknesses: They largely rely on single country cases for their analysis (Vega and Firestone 1995; Celis 2006) or focus on correlating women's share of seats with changes in societal outcomes for women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Schwindt–Bayer and Mishler 2005). This tells us little about the actions that individual women take to improve the situations of women living in their country.

Those studies that do analyze the actions of individual women examine ad hoc policies defined as "women's interests," which is a problematic term to conceptualize in a concrete, meaningful, and broadly applicable way. Attempts to do so assume that women represent a homogeneous group, ignoring key differences in perspectives coming from the intersectionality of different identities, such as religion, ideology, age, and race. Ignoring intersectionality privileges dominant groups at the expense of those who experience multiple forms of marginalization. And ignoring ideology overlooks the fact that while many women share similar concerns, they will often support dramatically different solutions for them.

In this project, I shift the direction of women's substantive representation analyses in two primary ways. First, I argue for a shift in the discourse from women's interests to women's rights. Second, I present a direct test of which members of national parliaments discuss and support women's rights (their economic rights, specifically), using a new dataset of parliamentary speeches I collected from the archives of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland.

In Chapter 2, I briefly discuss international conceptions of and norms around human rights and women's rights, reviewing the basic principles of CEDAW. Approaching my analyses through the lens of these international human rights norms allows me to avoid the pitfalls inherent to conceptualizing "women's interests." The norms are already established, with the support of the interna-

tional community behind them; this will keep me from arbitrarily choosing policies to analyze. Their universal nature makes them applicable in all circumstances. Additionally, with a focus on CEDAW's primary principles of non–discrimination and substantive equality, I avoid further conceptualization pitfalls (like defining "human dignity") inherent to discussions of human rights more broadly.

In Chapter 3, I discuss women's political participation, their political representation, the establishment of women–friendly policies, and the links among all of the above. Outright discrimination in policies and practices originally kept women from equal political participation and representation. Although legal discrimination has largely been abolished, there are still forces suppressing women's equal participation in the political sphere, including the "boys' club" atmosphere maintained in legislatures. This atmosphere, which remains dismissive of—and is often outright hostile to—women and their concerns continues to weaken the link between women in national legislatures and outcomes for women's rights (an atmosphere that I will put into greater context for each of the countries I analyze in later chapters).

In Chapter 4, I explore women's economic rights, both as a first step in answering concerns about "interests" and as the springboard for the statistical analyses in subsequent chapters. Economic rights in general receive less scholarly attention than other classes of rights, and women's economic rights receive less attention still. But the enjoyment of economic rights is key for the enjoyment of other rights, and when women's economic rights in particular are not respected, they often experience less power to make decisions that affect their own lives and guide the lives of their families, as well as being much more vulnerable to experiencing violence. This makes studying women's economic rights, particularly the degree to which countries support their right to financial independence, a pressing need.

In Chapter 5, I present the concept of defamilialization (the ability for women to be financially independent from their families), create a new measure of the degree to which it is supported by domestic policies, and test its effects on outcomes for women's rights. Where existing measures of defamilialization are limited with regards to the number of countries, time waves, and policies included, I employ a Bayesian latent variable model to create a measure that includes 21 countries and 14 policies over 20 years. Employing this measure in models of women's economic rights outcomes, I find that as defamilialization in a country increases, the labor force participation gap between men and women and the wage gap both decrease in that country. Importantly, the Bayesian latent variable model identifies four sets of policies—abortion, childcare, family

leave, and workweek policies—that are particularly important for improving respect for women's economic rights.

Finally, in Chapters 6 through 9, I turn to the process through which these policies are incorporated in domestic law, seeking to identify which members of legislatures are most likely to discuss and support these protections, particularly in a world where women are also dramatically underrepresented in the political sphere. Where existing research largely relies on correlations between the numbers of women holding seats in parliament and societal outcomes for women, which obscures the mechanism connecting the two, I provide a direct, cross–national test of the mechanism connecting the individual characteristics of legislators to the discourse around the incorporation of women's economic rights into domestic law. Furthermore, my analysis is conducted in a cross-national, comparable manner, using machine learning and a new database of more than 3 million speeches pulled from the parliamentary archives of three countries to determine if trends hold true across time and space.

The primary analysis of these chapters draws on the emotions (anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, or trust) on which members of legislatures call when they are discussing the four sets of policies related to women's economic rights that I identified in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I lay out my expectations for speeches regarding women's economic rights in parliaments and address why discourse analysis is so important for understanding the development of support for policies. First, I expect that women will make more speeches (proportionally) on these topics than men. Second, I expect that women will be more likely to deviate from the default emotion of parliamentary speeches, trust, in two ways. Drawing on their personal experiences of marginalization, they will be more more likely than men to call on negative emotions—anger, disgust, fear, and sadness—as they call for changes in policies related to women's economic rights. And they will be more likely to call on positive emotions—anticipation and joy—as they call for and celebrate positive advances in women's economic rights.

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 test this theory on speech data from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland, respectively. My analyses find different trends in each country, driving home the importance of applying cross–national analysis. However, two trends hold true across countries, both indicating that women legislators do substantively represent other women. First, after accounting for women's underrepresentation in these parliaments, they make more speeches than men on each of the topics related to women's economic rights. Second, women, compared to men, are more likely to make a speech coded as joy than they are to make a speech coded as trust, suggesting that women's support for

and celebration of progress for women's economic rights is both more prevalent than both men's support and celebration and more prevalent than their own negatively–coded calls for change (or opposition to change).

Chapter 2

Women's Rights Are Human Rights

States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;

(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination;

(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;

(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise;

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.

—CEDAW, Article 2

In 1941, Former President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a well–known State of the Union address, later to be known as his "Four Freedoms" speech. In this address, President Roosevelt spoke of four essential freedoms on which all else is (or should be) founded: the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear. He concluded, "Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. ...To that high concept, there can be no end save victory" (Bank 1941).

Since the time of President Roosevelt's speech, the world has seen the establishment of a battery of international human rights treaties, all widely ratified. These instruments represent both the authoritative definitions of human rights and the standards by which states' fulfillment of their human rights obligations are judged. The authority behind these instruments makes them a key jumping off point for analyses of human rights, particularly for state obligations and behaviors in this realm. These treaties cover every area of the human life, from infancy and childhood to education to participating in politics or the labor force to bearing and raising children. They contain a list of rights both broader and more specific than freedoms of speech and worship and from want and fear, but some of these are still intrinsic to our understandings of agency and human dignity. For the rest of the project, I will repeatedly return to women's experiences that are defined by want and by fear, as well as the steps governments can take to lift women out of each.

In the sections below, I first present a commonly accepted definition of human rights. Next, I discuss why we study women's rights in particular and present two of the key challenges. Finally, I briefly review the relevant international instruments and discuss why these matter for any analysis of human rights, as well as the difficulties created by using such an approach.

2.1 The Big Picture: Human Rights

Human rights are "the minimum set of goods, services, opportunities, and protections that are widely recognized today as essential prerequisites for a life of dignity," or "a life worthy of a human being" (Donnelly 2013, p.17, 15). They are inherent and universal—held equally by all humans. They are inalienable—unable to be given or taken away, only respected or not respected. And they are interdependent and indivisible—each right builds on all of the others. When an individual fully enjoys all of their rights, we can expect that their life is "richer and more fully human" (Donnelly 2013, p.15). When someone's rights are vio-

lated, however, they are instead separated from the heart of what it means to be human.

The substance of the rights held by each human has been laid out in a series of international declarations and covenants, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Other treaties have been directed at the needs of individuals who have historically faced greater obstacles to the full enjoyment of their rights, such as the Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and (my focus here) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The obligations laid out under international law place restraints on the execution of national sovereignty, because states are both the principal violators and essential protectors of human rights.

Conceptualizations of a government's very legitimacy are wrapped around its ability to respect, protect, and fulfill internationally recognized human rights in all spheres of life. By the UN's definitions, the obligation to *respect* requires that state actors not actively commit abuses. The obligation to *protect* requires state actors to defend individuals against abuses by others. The obligation to *fulfill* mandates that states take steps to provide the goods, services, opportunities, and protections discussed above (UN OHCHR 2020). These state obligations are for all humans within their borders. However, the countries of the world have historically been (and currently are) very bad at respecting the rights of half of their people—the female half.

2.2 Women's Rights

Women's rights are human rights. They are still inherent, inalienable, and indivisible. They are still held by women as individuals. But while abuses of their rights often appear in the same contexts as abuses suffered by men, women as a group have historically faced additional and systematic discrimination, marginalization, and abuse purely on the grounds that they are women. When "Significant numbers of the world's population are routinely subject to torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, mutilation, and even murder simply because they are female" (Bunch 1990, p. 486), a concentrated study of the enjoyment of their rights is necessary.

In 2014, 52 out of 195 (or 25 percent) of countries did not formally guarantee equality between men and women in their national constitutions (United Na-

tions). In the introduction, I discussed that less than one–quarter of the world's legislators are women. The UN also reports that husbands, by law, can prevent their wives from working in 18 countries. In 39 countries, inheritance rights are gender specific. Around the world, only 52 percent of women who are married or in a committed relationship feel able to make their own decisions regarding sexual relations, health care, and contraceptive use. Twenty percent of women and girls experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence each year—and 49 countries have no laws against domestic violence (United Nations). This is not random abuse or discrimination; it the longstanding, global oppression of women perpetuated by patriarchal traditions, institutions, and ideologies.

Above, I discussed the universality of human rights, as well as states' overarching obligations to human rights established by international treaties. These two characteristics of the international human rights regime are highly debated for all rights, but women's enjoyment of their rights have particularly suffered. Discussions of women's rights are often centered on whether international human rights norms can (or should) take primacy over cultures or traditions that include the marginalization of women. Relatedly, they incorporate concerns about the role of governments—whether they should take action in the areas of life identified as part of the "private sphere," or if they should have power only in the "public sphere." I will address each of these debates in turn.

2.2.1 Universalism and Cultural Relativism

One of the enduring debates in literature and practices regarding human rights are whether they are truly universal and applicable to everyone or if they are, instead, culturally relative and context specific. Arguments on this matter commonly fall along the spectrum ranging between the most radical forms of each. Donnelly (1984) writes, "Cultural relativity is an undeniable fact; moral rules and social institutions evidence an astonishing cultural and historical variability. Cultural relativism is a doctrine that holds that (at least some) such variations are exempt from legitimate criticism by outsiders, a doctrine that is strongly supported by notions of communal autonomy and self–determination" (p. 400). A radical cultural relativist approach would thus argue that the only source of legitimacy for a right can be found within cultural context, whereas a radical universalist approach would argue that culture is completely irrelevant to the conceptualization of rights or their enjoyment.

While the ratification of international human rights treaties (IHRTs) does place limits on state sovereignty in that they must respect, protect, and fulfill the *substance* of the rights addressed within each instrument, there is some room left for national variation in the exact interpretation and implementation of

rights in domestic policies (Donnelly 1984). For example, although states must respect, protect, and fulfill the right of citizens to an adequate standard of living (under Article 11.1 of the ICESCR), including food, clothing, and housing, one government could conceivably interpret this to mean that they must provide food, clothing and housing to every single citizen. Another government may interpret "adequate standard of living" to require a much broader range of provisions, such as health care and transportation. A third may interpret this to mean that they must only provide food, clothing, and housing at a reduced cost. Further variations may appear in the implementation stage—on the amount of food or clothing considered "adequate," for example, or on the amount to subsidize housing.

When applied to women's rights, however, culturally relative arguments allow for the maintenance of many institutionalized forms of discrimination against women. Arguments such as "culture determines what is moral" (DiMauro 1996, p. 337) allow countries to ratify international treaties with blanket reservations, limiting—and often negating—a treaty's impact in that state.[1] CEDAW had a record number of these reservations, many of which were entered by states with Islamic legal systems. Under Shariah, men and women have different rights with regards to marriage and family, so CEDAW, with its mandated equality between men and women in all areas (including the family), was seen in part as a cultural imposition by the West. They sought to limit its effects in their countries (Akstiniene 2013).

A possible solution to differences between universal and cultural interpretations of rights is the creation of national legislation that allows targeted individuals to opt out of traditional practices that are seen as harmful to them. In some cases, this might be enough. In others, the cultural and relativist stances are too incompatible for such a compromise to exist (Donnelly 1984, p. 419); this is particularly true for women's rights. In societies where the subordination of women is built into every sphere, where patriarchy and traditional gender roles are the norm, girls, women, and their families will face tremendous pressure to conform, even when they might prefer to opt out. For example, in the countries with high rates of female genital mutilation (FGM), the procedure is seen to procure or confirm the purity and femininity of the girls who undergo it. Those who do not undergo FGM are often harassed or even ostracized (Billet 2007; World Health Organization 2012). Parents who might otherwise elect to not submit their daughters to such a procedure often cave under social pressures and allow in secret what is domestically and internationally illegal (World Health Organization 2012).

[1] Blanket reservations such as these, intended to limit a treaty's impact, run counter to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), which mandates that states may place reservations unless "the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty" (United Nations 1969, Article 19.c).

A similar, albeit more sensitive, solution is found in Amartya Sen's (1999) *Development as Freedom*. Sen (1999, p.31) proposes that

> There is an inescapable valuational problem involved in deciding what to choose if and when it turns out that some parts of tradition cannot be maintained along with economic or social changes that may be needed. ...If a traditional way of life must be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or minuscule longevity, then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen.

While giving the people (in this case, the women) whose lives are impacted by potential policy changes a seat at the negotiation table is a firm step in the right direction, this approach still leaves the potential for the exclusion of some voices–including the very young, the elderly, women with disabilities, women from ethnic minorities, and women who experience other kinds of intersectional discrimination.

Cultural arguments and definitions of human rights are often used very selectively to control women's bodies, livelihoods, and autonomy: "All institutionalized behavior, including cannibalism and slavery, are cultural traditions. And surely no human rights advocate, or for that matter anyone else, would today dare to justify cannibalism or slavery...on cultural or traditional grounds" (Eisler 1987, p.296). Why, then, do we continue to allow these justifications to derail women's full enjoyment of their rights?

2.2.2 Public vs. Private Spheres

A second major debate with relation to human rights is when exactly states can (or must) intervene. In some cases, this has to do with the degree to which they must provide for those who cannot provide for themselves. In others, it refers to international interventions—actual violations of other states' sovereignty. In the case of women's rights, the debate often boils down to the ability (or the necessity) of states to intervene in public versus private spheres of life.

The private–public divide refers to the home, with its caregiving and childbearing responsibilities, as the private sphere of life, whereas the public sphere encompasses the workplace, politics, and the economy. Participation in the public sphere has historically been associated with citizenship, autonomy, and masculinity and afforded rights that women, relegated to the private sphere, could not enjoy. A continued reliance on this division reinforces the androcentrism of human rights and "de–politicizes women's experiences in the private"

(Parisi 2010). It allows for *de jure* gender equality to be endorsed in public by the state, apparently satisfying their obligations under international law, while traditional gender hierarchies are reinforced in the home (See discussion in Parisi 2010).

The public–private dichotomy is false, and arguments pushing back against government interventions in the private sphere are hollow. Such arguments tend to come from one of two stands of logic. The first is that the private nature of abuses committed against women in the home means that the extent to which it occurs is often hidden, making it more difficult for outside forces to intervene—difficult, but not impossible, as we see from an increasing number of laws against domestic violence and marital rape around the world (Richards and Haglund 2015).

The second strand of logic is perhaps more pernicious. "Family sphere" and "private sphere" are often used interchangeably, and interventions in these spheres are conflated with infringements on the right to privacy:

> The first thing that becomes apparent is that in this context, the distinction between private or internal and public or political actions is merely another way of saying that in the private sphere of his home the male "head of household" *should* be in control—or that here the human rights of women *should not* be protected (Eisler 1987, p.292).

In reality, governments promulgate laws regulating private lives—inheritances, divorce, marriage, etc.—all the time. The principle of government non–interference in the family sphere has been used inconsistently, "applied in a very selective manner designed to maintain a particular type of familial (and social) organization: a male headed, procreation–oriented patriarchal family in which women have few if any individual rights" (Eisler 1987, p. 293). Thus, the true matter at hand is not whether or not the state can intervene in the private sphere. Instead, it is which private activities call for (or allow for) state interventions.

Feminist scholars have drawn stark comparisons between kings' and governments' "divine right" to rule, treating their people as they will, and men's traditional, authoritative position as the head of the household (See Eisler 1987; Bunch 1990; Parisi 2010). Following from this comparison, just as there are increasingly strong international protections for citizens against their governments—and established pathways for intervention when states break these norms—there must also be clear protections for women against the systems of patriarchy that infringe on their rights, with parallel pathways for state interventions when these protections fail. These protections, as well as internationally supported definitions of women's universal rights, are laid out in CEDAW.

2.3 CEDAW

On September 3, 1981, the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) entered into force. The treaty represents the global standard for women's rights, espousing non–discrimination and equal participation for women in every area of life. It is also widely acknowledged to have positive effects for women's rights in ratifying countries (Simmons 2009; Hill Jr. 2010; Cole 2012; Lupu 2013; Englehart and Miller 2014) and has now been close to globally ratified.[2]

[2] Iran, Palau, Tonga, Somalia, Sudan, and the United States are the only countries who have not yet ratified CEDAW.

CEDAW includes rights broadly specified in three dimensions—political rights, social and cultural rights, and economic rights. Politically, women have rights to participation, representation, and citizenship that are equal to men's. This includes the rights to vote and run for elections to all public offices, to assist in the creation of public policies, and to participate in the work of non–governmental and international institutions (Articles 7 and 8). States must equally respect their rights to "acquire, change or retain their nationality," even upon getting married, and shall equally contribute a nationality to any children they have (Article 9). Furthermore, CEDAW guarantees women's equality before the law, with equal abilities to enter into contracts and hold property, equal treatment throughout court cases, and equal freedom of movement.

Socially, equal personhood extends to family relations. Men and women have the same rights to enter into and to dissolve marriages (as well as protections against child marriage), shared rights and responsibilities for any children (as well as planning their existence), equal control over property, and ability to choose family names and individual occupations (Article 16). They must be allowed equal access to family benefits, financial credit, and "all aspects of cultural life" (Article 13). CEDAW also makes multiple provisions for protections related to reproduction, including ensuring access to information and advice around family planning (Articles 10.h and 12.1), health and safety precautions in the workplace (Article 11.1f), and adequate health services and nutrition during pregnancy and breastfeeding (Article 12.2). Beyond home and family life (strictly speaking), states must ensure that women and men have equal access to all levels of education at the same level of quality, as well as to vocational guidance, training programs, scholarships, and sports (Article 10). It is noted that rural women face particular challenges on the path to full enjoyment of their rights, so the treaty clarifies that they must be able to "participate in and benefit from rural development," including development planning, health care services, social security, co–operatives, agricultural credit, technology, and ade-

quate living conditions (housing, sanitation, electricity, water, transportation, and communications) (Article 14).

Economically, states must guarantee women's right to work. They must have the same employment and promotion opportunities and evaluation standards, access to training and retraining, equal pay for equal work, and access to paid time off. In cases of sickness, unemployment, retirement, and old age, they have the same right to social security. Because of women's particular needs related to childbearing and caregiving pressures, states are obligated to protect women's jobs during pregnancy, regulate workplace hazards and provide necessary workplace protections during pregnancy, ensure maternity leave with pay (or similar benefits), and to develop a state–supported system of childcare facilities (Article 11).

These guarantees and obligations are meant to take multiple forms of implementation by state governments. In Article 2, CEDAW mandates the incorporation of gender equality and non–discrimination in the constitution or other national laws, which includes repealing any existing discriminatory measures, and the establishment of national tribunals or public institutions to combat gender–based discrimination. States must not only refrain from abuses of women's rights themselves but also take steps to eliminate abuses and discrimination by all actors, state or private, within their borders. This includes direct steps to intercede in and abolish "customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women" (Article 2.f).

2.4 Summarizing and Looking Forward

CEDAW's protections and provisions for women can be summarized with its third article:

> States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men (UN General Assembly 1979).

Ultimately, the fact that states have ratified this convention and all of its provisions means that they have committed to being held by the standards contained within it. In law and in practice, this means that state actors of ratifying countries (which means all but six countries in the world) must respect, protect, and fulfill CEDAW's principles of non–discrimination and substantive gender

equality, making arguments regarding cultural relativism and spheres of life moot. While the correct interpretation and implementation of these rights can continually be debated, the moment states ratify a treaty, they are obligated to respect the substance of the rights contained within. *Pacta sunt servanda*—their agreements must be kept, and they can and must be held accountable for any failures to do so.

Chapter 3

Women in Politics

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:

(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;

(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public function at all levels of government;

(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country.

—CEDAW, Article 7

I opened the book with the statistic that there are still more than three male legislators for every female legislator across the world. Additionally, at the beginning of 2017, women held 50 percent or more of ministerial positions in only six countries. In only 50 countries in the world did women hold 25 percent or more of these positions (Inter–Parliamentary Union and UN Women 2017). Of the 193 countries in the United Nations, only 15 currently have a female head of state—less than 10 percent. Forty percent of the countries represented in the United Nations have never had a female head of state (Geiger and Kent 2017). This means that in most countries around the world—countries which have, with few exceptions, ratified CEDAW—women lag behind men with regards to the enjoyment of every right of formal political participation.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly address why the participation rates for women in politics remain so low around the world. Next, I move on to a discussion of what low rates of female participation in government mean for citizens, particularly female citizens, in that country. Third, I address the

heart of the matter: What are women's interests, and how are they best represented in the political sphere? Finally, I summarize the common weaknesses of the existing literature and present my plan for addressing them.

3.1 Suppressed Participation

Why do the numbers of women in positions of political power remain so low? Originally, outright discrimination in policies, attitudes, and practices kept women from participating in politics. The first year women were allowed to vote in the national elections of any country in the world was 1893 (in New Zealand). Australia followed in 1902, Finland in 1906, and Norway in 1913 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2020). This means that in nearly every country in the world, women have been able to vote for less than 100 years. In some countries it has been significantly less than 100 years—Saudi Arabia became the last country other than Vatican City to grant women the right to vote in national elections in only 2015 (Zarya 2015). Voting rights also did not come hand–in–hand with the right to run for and hold public office in every country. The first female members of parliament were actually elected in Finland (an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire at the time) in 1907 (Korpela 2019).

After receiving the legal rights to vote and to run for election, women still struggled to find places in the eligibility pool of traditional political pipeline careers, such as business and law. Take the US as an example. Even today, although jobs and pay start out relatively equal for men and women entering business careers at the lowest levels, there are increasingly fewer women at each rung of the corporate ladder. Women are 18 percent less likely to receive a promotion to manager than their male coworkers, and by the time they reach the level of senior vice president, only 22 percent are female (Miller 2018). In 2017, only 6.4 percent of Fortune 500 companies had female CEOs—and only 22.2 percent of board members for those companies were women (Pew Research Center 2019). In 2018, this already low number of female CEOs decreased by 25 percent; 12 women left their positions, and they were all replaced by men (Miller 2018).

Trends for women in law in the United States echo those of women in business. In 2018, women made up just over 50 percent of law students at accredited institutions (Olson 2016). However, only 36 percent of attorneys are women. At the highest levels of law firms, only 24 percent of partners are women—and only 20 percent are equity partners, earning part of the profits produced by the firm (Marcus 2018). [3]

Based on the numbers of women filling the political pipeline occupations, we might therefore expect to see fewer women running for office (Welch 1978;

[3] As always, the number of women of color filling these positions is even lower.

Sanbonmatsu 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2001). Women who do choose to run for office have been handicapped by the incumbency advantage—where, as a reminder, most of the incumbents are men (Mayhew 1974; Lawless 2015, p. 351). In the United States, legislators are consistently reelected at over 90 percent (Fox and Lawless 2004, p. 264). These two factors combined mean that women's ability to break into the political scene is often limited.

However, the most recent research suggests that once women enter an electoral race, the campaign trail is no more hostile to them than it is toward men (Dolan 2014; Hayes, Lawless, and Baitinger 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2015).[4] Fox and Lawless (2004) find that there is no statistically significant difference in the chance that a man or a woman will win an election in the United States. This places the burden on the unequal representation of men and women in the government at earlier stages in the process—both in who *decides* to run and also in who is *encouraged* to run. An individual's decision to run for office is significantly related to the amount of encouragement they receive, and Fox and Lawless find that while 43 percent of men received such encouragement, only 32 percent of women in their sample received the same (p. 272). In addition, women were actually more likely than men to express an interest in national and local politics, but men were at least 50 percent more likely to take the beginning steps in starting a campaign (p. 268). The authors determine that women are less likely to consider themselves qualified to run for office and also more likely to take these self-perceived qualifications into consideration when deciding whether or not to run (p. 272). This means that when women do run for office, they are often more qualified than their male counterparts—and they appear to work harder once elected (Anzia and Berry 2011).

[4] Past research suggested that women candidates faced a significantly more complicated playing field, from only being able to run successfully in certain districts (Palmer and Simon 2008) to having to raise more campaign funds than their male counterparts to be successful (Fiber and Fox 2005) to facing gender stereotyping in the media (Kahn 1992, 1994, 1996; Braden 1996; Heldman, Carroll, and Olson 2005; Kittilson and Fridkin 2008; Dolan 2010; Lawless 2009).

3.2 Representation and Its Effects

Citizens' free participation in the public affairs of their county is one of the highest ideals of democracy, which rests on the ideas of popular control and political equality—governance "by the people, for the people" (See Dahl 1989; Phillips 1995, pp.27–30). It is also strongly encoded in international law; both the Universal Declaration of Human Right and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) endorse every citizen's ability to participate in their country's politics either "directly or through freely chosen representatives."[5] The ICCPR further declares that all citizens should have equal opportunities to vote and to be elected to public office.[6] However, voting (as important as it is) is different than filling a public office—and the populations who perform these actions are distinct, as well. Representatives are by definition a subset of

[5] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 21.1) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 25.a)

[6] Article 25.b

the population chosen to speak for other citizens, and the exact nature of this relationship, both as it is and as it should be, continues to be the subject of a number of debates.

Conversations about the nature of political representation commonly reference Hanna Pitkin's (1967) four conceptualizations of representation: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive.[7] Formalistic representation focuses on a nation's institutional arrangements regarding representation—the procedures through which representatives gain office and carry out their roles. Symbolic representation refers to the perception of representatives by their constituents, or their "power to evoke feelings or attitudes" (Pitkin 1967, p. 97). In practice, these feelings or attitudes tend to regard the legitimacy of the legislature, its members, and the voters who elected them (Kurebwa 2015). Descriptive representation concerns the degree to which representatives share specific characteristics with their constituents—sex, race, ethnicity, age, class, occupation, geographic location, etc. Finally, substantive representation regards the degree to which representatives serve the needs and interests of their constituents.[8]

Importantly, these four conceptualizations are simply dimensions of representation as a whole. Theoretically, improvement in each should result in improvements in all, either directly or indirectly: As political systems improve the freedom and fairness of their elections through formal representation, we should expect the descriptive representation of the entire population to improve, the policies crafted by the legislature to be more responsive to public desires (substantive representation), and the overall legitimacy of the institution to increase (symbolic representation). As a legislature improves with respect to its policy responsiveness or increasingly looks like the broader populace, we would expect it to also rise in the public's estimation, and so on (Schwindt–Bayer and Mishler 2005).

In practice, some dimensions of representation seem to be far more closely and directly linked than others. While there is no demonstrated link between formal representation and substantive representation (gender equality), the link between formal representation and descriptive representation appears to be quite clear. We as a field know quite a bit about institutional factors that increase women's share of seats in a country, although the recent trend toward gender quotas in legislatures makes this more complicated (Dahlerup 2006).[9] On average, parliamentary systems outperform presidential systems, and women gain the most seats in countries with proportional representation electoral systems with party lists and large district magnitudes (Rule 1987; Matland and Brown 1992; Norris 1996). There is also a diffusion of gender equality as a platform across parties—when one party begins to promote female candidates, others are

[7] Mansbridge (2003) presents four different categories of representation: promissory (upholding campaign promises), anticipatory (pleasing voters in order to be reelected), gyroscopic (improving legislative debate by adding views and focusing on legislators' own principles), and surrogate (where the composition of the legislature and how it represents views as a whole matters more than any single legislator).

[8] See also Kurebwa (2015) for a summary of more recent works discussing and testing Pitkin's conceptualizations of representation.

[9] See also discussion in Wängnerud (2009).

likely to follow (Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Kittilson 2006). Furthermore, women's descriptive representation tends to be greater in more gender equal, less corrupt societies (but the direction of the causal arrow is unclear) (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001; Sung 2003).

Interestingly, there do not seem to be gender–differentiated links between women's descriptive or substantive representation and symbolic representation (citizens' confidence in the legislature). Instead, women and men both have more confidence in their national legislature (assessing a higher level of symbolic representation) when it is more gender equal and shows a greater degree of policy responsiveness with regards to gender equality (Schwindt–Bayer and Mishler 2005). Citizens (male and female) in countries with more women in their lower houses of parliament are more likely to be satisfied with election results and the democratic process as a whole (Karp and Banducci 2008).[10] Female governors also lead to improved satisfaction in government from both female and male citizens (Atkeson and Carillo 2007).

[10] Although one study did find, to the contrary, that only female citizens perceive legislatures as being more responsive and representative when women hold a greater share of seats (Atkeson and Carillo 2007).

In a slightly different vein of symbolic representation, an increase in women in parliament seems to push women to believe more strongly in women's ability to govern. In return, this increased belief in ability leads more women to run for office, which increases the number of women in parliaments, a "virtuous cycle" (Alexander 2012). Importantly, the effect an increased belief in women's ability to govern has on the number of women who run for office is larger than that of an increased number of women on belief in women's ability to govern. This indicates that while the various forms of representation discussed here are deeply meaningful for women's experience in politics and as citizens, cultural pressures around traditional gender norms and expectations are still quite sticky and impactful, themselves.

The vast majority of research on the representation of women, however, focuses on the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Research on women's political representation often assumes or asserts that the two are intrinsically linked, that "The voice of women in the electorate is heard more loudly when a woman articulates the views on which women and men differ" (Ondercin and Bernstein 2007, p. 50). More directly, the general understanding in the field is that a greater number of women representatives will directly lead to the improved representation of women's interests in a country, that the representation of women's interests requires women holding public office, and that female representatives will consistently "stand for" the other women in their countries (See Phillips 1995). In practice, increased numbers of female representatives are associated with improved performance on a number of indicators: The Nordic countries, which are all ranked at 21 or above in the world

for women's share of parliamentary seats, also perform better than most other countries on gender equality indices such as the United Nations Development Programme's Gender Inequality Index, Gender Development Index, and Gender Empowerment Measure; the World Economic Forum's Gender Gap Index; Save the Children Alliances' Mothers' Index; and the Social Watch's Gender Equity Index (Wängnerud 2009, p. 64). Countries with greater descriptive representation also have, on average, longer maternity leave and a greater degree of legal marital equality (Schwindt–Bayer and Mishler 2005).

However, it is unclear if the reality is that women are more likely to push for gender-equal policies or if women's presence in parliament pushes all members of parliament to support these kinds of policies. Alternatively, societies that are more likely to support these kinds of policies may also be more likely to elect female parliamentarians. Answering these kinds of questions requires directly addressing issues of endogeneity and examining the mechanisms connecting descriptive to substantive representation. Ultimately, the primary question is if men and women are different—if they have different political needs, goals, and actions in office. Existing studies explore patterns in voting and policy preferences in order to answer this important question. The primary strands that emerge in this research are attempts to, first, define and draw explicit comparisons between the political views of elites and the general public, and second, to build arguments for the effects of token women versus a critical mass of women in legislatures. I will address each of these themes in turn.

3.2.1 Equivalences between Civilians' Interests and Politicians' Policies

The first trend in descriptive–substantive representation literature focuses on concrete differences and similarities between and among civilians and politicians. It compares the political leanings of male and female politicians and female politicians and citizens. It also explores differences between the content of bills passed when female legislators are present and analyzes the likelihood of male and female legislators voting for bills that cover issues related to women's interests. I briefly address each of these strands of research below.

First, do male and female politicians express different policy preferences? In the United States, female state legislators—particularly Republican women—have expressed more liberal views on various welfare policies than their male counterparts, even after controlling for ideology and constituent pressures (Poggione 2004). In the European Parliament, female candidates are significantly more likely to present themselves as very liberal, compared to their male coun-

terparts. This liberalism covers attitudes toward policies that include same–sex marriage, abortion, welfare policies, and women cutting down on paid work for the sake of their families (McEvoy 2016).

Second, do female politicians and citizens express the same political attitudes? Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski (2010) find that in Britain, they do. Women at both the mass and elite levels are "more hostile to traditional gender roles and more supportive of measures to improve the descriptive representation of women," (p. 193) although partisanship is a more important determinant of attitude at the elite level, and generational effects are more important for attitudes in the masses. For the European Union and the European Parliament, the gender gaps in attitudes for the masses and the elites differ somewhat. Women citizens are actually more likely to express extreme views in general—both liberal and conservative—than male citizens, while female candidates are more likely express extremely liberal attitudes. There is also a greater gender gap in attitudes among politicians than among voters, and again, partisanship is a stronger predictor of candidate views than of voters' attitudes (McEvoy 2016).

Finally, does the involvement of women parliamentarians intrinsically change the content of bills passed in legislatures? We know that female politicians encourage a different style of communication in parliamentary roles (Kathlene 1994, 1995),[11] and that women are more likely to view the representation of other women as part of their duty, making them more likely to contact cabinet ministers on their behalf (Esaiasson 2000), but does this lead to differences in the content of bills passed? There is some evidence from the United States, Sweden, and Belgium that female members of parliament prioritize issues that are also prioritized by female voters (Thomas 1994; Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 1998; Reingold 2000; Wängnerud 2000; Celis 2006).

[11] See also Tolleson-Rinehart (1991) and Weikart et al. (2007).

Wittmer and Bouché (2013) find that as the number of women in a US state legislature increases, so does the number of women's issues bills raised. As the number of women sponsoring a particular bill (in this case, human trafficking legislation) increases, so does the amount of money the state agrees to invest. However, if there are *only* women sponsoring a bill, the amount of money invested by the state decreases.[12] This suggests mixed results for the effect of women on the content of policies, particularly budgets.

[12] Interesting discourse note: Men who participated saw this as a human rights issue, not a women's rights issue.

Voting patterns on women's issues are similarly complex, the result of a complicated intersection of interests and identities. For example, Vega and Firestone (1995) analyze US Congressional voting records and find that female legislators are more likely to vote for legislation regarding women's issues, and Celis (2006) finds something similar by analyzing speeches about the budget from the Belgian lower house of parliament. But Bratton and Ray (2002) find that the effect

of women's share of seats in Norway on child–care coverage fluctuates over time and relies on other institutional factors, such as a female head of state, and suggest that descriptive representation matters most during the agenda–setting stage, rather than during votes. In the United States House of Representatives in the 103rd Congress, women were significantly more likely to vote for measures regarding women's health and reproductive rights, even after controlling for political party. In issues related to education and the family, though, legislator sex was nullified by the effects of partisanship, ideology, and constituent interests (Swers 1998). This finding has been echoed in more recent research, which finds that while women in state legislatures are more likely to vote for some policies identified as women's issues, such as access to abortion without parental consent, abortion without waiting periods, increased TANF benefits, and the extension of TANF benefits to children, they are actually less likely to vote for other issues posited to be of particular interest to women—mandated domestic violence training for the police, TANF time extensions, and transitional child care for TANF recipients. Public opinion is found to be a far more consistent predictor of policy outcomes (Cowell–Meyers and Langbein 2009).

Gender equality does not represent a single voting issue; rather, it represents a broad range of issues, each of which can face different levels of conflict and support with party, ideology, and other identities or traits. Some issues related to gender equality can find support across partisan ideologies, such as violence against women; other issues are so controversial that there is no mandated party vote. In Brazil in 1999, female legislators showed stronger support for gender quotas and labor market legislation favoring women. However, leftist party membership, not legislator sex, was the strongest predictor for all of the liberal policies under examination—gender quotas, labor market regulations, abortion rights, and gay rights (Htun and Power 2006).

From previous research, we can see that there are some differences between men and women's political views, on average and all else equal. However, we can also see that political party is a significant determinant of political views and, among legislators, support for various policies. The complexity of the situation means that any conversation of representation rapidly devolves into discussions of party politics and constituent interests and social norms. Conclusions become highly qualified—female politicians differ from men under *certain* conditions; *sometimes* the gender of a politician is a determining factor in their support for bills that *might* qualify as being particularly in women's interests.

3.2.2 Token Women vs. Critical Mass

The second common thread in research on the representation of women attempts to tease apart the nuances of exactly when the number of women in legislatures makes a difference, focusing on the role of "token" women versus the force behind critical mass. Some researchers argue that tokens, or women in severely male-skewed legislatures, are more likely to promote themselves and establish distinct legislative agendas. Others, however, have argued that women will be most effective in more gender-diverse settings—and, in fact, *cannot* be truly effective until they fill a certain percentage of seats.

Tokens are members who differ from others in a group not in their ability to accomplish some task but only on the basis of some ascribed characteristic, such as race or gender. Tokens are, by definition, alone or nearly so; as such, they often end up representing all members of their ascribed category to the dominant members of the group (Kanter 1977, p. 968). Kanter (1977) found that when faced with token women, male workers in a Fortune 500 company responded in four general ways: displaying heightened or exaggerated aggressive behaviors, prefacing comments or actions with apologies or inquiries regarding appropriate behavior in such a way that women were pushed to affirm men's statements or actions, moving activities to private spheres where women were not welcome, and giving loyalty tests where they asked tokens to support the dominants against their own group (pgs. 975-978). In response to such behavior, token women tended to either accept their isolation and status as tokens (often overachieving) or attempt to become insiders, minimizing differences between themselves and the men (pg. 980).[13]

[13] Stereotyping and mistaken assumptions about the female identity often pushed token women into playing one of four roles: mother, seductress, pet, or iron maiden (Kanter, 1977, pgs. 980-981). This is something to keep in mind for future sections, where I will discuss the discourse surrounding women politicians in the media and in their houses of parliament.

The role of token women in legislatures has undergone some empirical exploration. In severely gender–skewed state legislatures in the United States, token women have sometimes been more successful at passing legislation in general but no more likely than men to pass women's bills (Bratton 2005). Token women were also more likely to sponsor women's bills in these legislatures, but this became less likely as the proportion of women increased (Bratton and Ray 2002; Bratton 2005).

This runs directly counter to expectations regarding the importance of critical mass. The term comes to us from nuclear physics, where a critical mass "refers to the quantity needed to start a chain reaction, an irreversible take–off into a new situation or process" (Dahlerup 1988, pgs. 275–276). Applying the term to the number of women in legislatures means that we would expect women to be able to make great strides forward in their legislatures only when there are enough of them present to fundamentally shift (or indicate a fundamental shift in) the overall culture of the institution. Following Dahlerup's

(1988) article on the subject, the threshold for critical mass is commonly set at 30 percent, where women are still clearly in the minority of a legislature but are expected to be able to join together and combine their voices in such a way that they can make a difference in the agenda, policies, or processes and outputs of their institutions.

Each of these viewpoints has received a fair bit of pushback. Women in severely male–skewed situations face "invisibility, marginality, harassment, the Queen Bee Syndrome, [and] exclusion from the informal network" (Dahlerup 1988, p. 275). They are caught between two mutually exclusive expectations, where they must simultaneously prove that they are "just as good as" or "just like" male politicians but also that they make a difference with their presence (Dahlerup 1988). Either expectation might carry more pressure during any given legislative session or debate. Alternatively, other institutional and contextual factors, such as the female head of state discussed above, might give more or less weight to one of these expectations. This makes it difficult to predict exactly how token women will respond in any given situation.

The argument for critical mass is also flawed. The field has been over–reliant on 30 percent as the "magical cure–all for ensuring the representation of women in national politics," even in the face of samples with few legislatures that actually display a percentage of women above the established threshold (Grey 2006, p. 494). Furthermore, we now have examples of severe backlash and a reversion to fundamentalism that prove that critical masses are not truly irreversible in this case (Dahlerup 2006). Responses have included recommendations for a shift in focus to critical acts (Dahlerup 1988; Lovenduski 2001) or safe spaces (Childs 2004), rather than critical masses, or to establish (and test) different levels of critical mass necessary for different outcomes—such as 15 percent for changing the agenda versus 40 percent for creating policies that reflect women's interests (Grey 2006, p.494).[14]

3.3 Have We Been Asking the Wrong Questions?

The argument that improved descriptive representation necessarily leads to better representation of women's interests raises two final, vitally important questions: Which women? And which interests? As the discussion above makes clear, gender is not the only (or even the best) predictor of votes for bills perceived to be in "women's interests." Arguments that assume that elected women will fight for the improvement of all women in their country ignore three important facts. First, in any given country, women have a number of identities and experiences that may prove to be as influential or more influential than their

[14] It should be noted, however, that even if the 30 percent critical mass cannot be systematically, empirically linked to improved outcomes for women in legislatures, it has been vital for advocates making a case for increased numbers of women in parliament, which is a worthy goal in and of itself. Thirty percent is also very often the threshold established for gender quotas, a decision that appears to be made with this argument in mind (Dahlerup 2006).

gender when it comes to policy preferences. Second, these arguments also have "a tendency to conflate women's interests with feminist ones" (Schreiber 2013, p. 475). Third, democratic institutions often act to maintain the status quo, distributing resources to certain groups to the detriment to others (like women of color).

Ultimately, however, I would argue that the questions being explored in many examples of existing literature have failed to incorporate one critical piece of insight. It is an empirical, undeniable fact that women are treated differently than men, as civilians and as members of government. This means that *women are different because they are treated differently*. All women, therefore, have at least one thing in common.

3.3.1 The Problem with "Interests"

Most of the literature I discussed above uses the word "interests" to discuss the substantive representation of women, followed by lists of policies determined by the authors to represent women's interests. These include childbearing, sexual harassment or violence, paid and unpaid labor, and exclusion from power (Phillips 1995); family policy, care for the elderly, and healthcare (Wängnerud 2009); and childcare (Bratton and Ray 2002). While these policy issue areas clearly fall under the umbrella of some—or even most—women's interests, issues of power and identity make this a more complicated matter than simply regressing votes on demographic characteristics.

First, women do not compose a single, homogeneous group; issues of race, ethnicity, religion, geography, occupation, education, family, and numerous other identities interact with and take precedence over those of gender. Even where women do share similar concerns—such as with childcare or healthcare—women from different political parties will support vastly different solutions to the same problems. Women of some social classes will be completely uninterested in the regulation of unpaid labor. Women in some occupations may have no need for the provision of public childcare—and may wholly opposed to their tax money being sent in that direction. Women of some ethnicities may be so concerned with levels of violence against them that no other policy matter falls on their radar.

Related to this point, not all women elected to parliaments run with feminist platforms—and the women who voted for them would not appreciate them supporting feminist ideas or bills (See Celis and Childs 2012; Schreiber 2013; Ben Shitrit 2016, p. 784). In such a context, female MPs would be most faithfully representing their female constituents' political interests by voting against bills with feminist ideals. This suggests that either the policies chosen

for analysis must be carefully chosen to avoid party politics and anything remotely considered feminist, an impossible task bound to come to uninteresting conclusions, or researchers must tread a dangerous, agency-stripping argumentative line in which they determine exactly what all women's interests should be and conclude that all votes by women against the included policies are votes against "their own" interests.

Finally, there is an inclusion problem in legislatures, where including some women comes at the expense of including others. Any argument that ignores intersectionality and patterns of privilege "naively assumes that the benefits and privileges of some women will translate into giving all women a voice" (Dovi 2007, p. 299). In reality, for all of the struggles faced by women in general, the situation faced by women of color, the hurdles they must jump to be heard, is exponentially harder.

By January 2019, 11,037 individual people had served in the United States Congress as a senator, a representative, or both (with persons serving in both roles only counted once) (History, Art Archives, U.S. House of Representatives 2020). Of these, only 325 were women. However, only 65 of *these* were women of color (Center for American Women and Politics 2020). Women have been severely marginalized in US politics, but assuming that an increase in numbers of any women will lead to improvements in the lives of all women ignores the realities of the winners and losers created by political institutions (Dovi 2007, p. 312). When seats and policies and resources are representative of zero-sum games, we must never forget "that attempts to increase descriptive representation of one group cannot be enacted without marginalizing further other vulnerable subgroups of women," which "occurs because one person cannot adequately capture the differences among the many" (Dovi 2007, p. 311).

Taken together, this all means that any attempt to operationalize women's interests runs the risk of excluding some women, excluding some interests, or relying on clear demarcations between men's and women's interests in areas where there are none (Baldez 2011). This makes it particularly tricky to measure the substantive representation of women by women. Which interests of which women matter the most? Should female MPs only be concerned with the women who voted for them, or should they actually attempt to represent all women in the country? Do all women, civilians and politicians alike, share a single set of concerns that binds them all together as a coherent, identifiable group? I will argue that they do, that the very experience of being identified as women by society and then discriminated against on the basis of that identity gives researchers a clear approach for addressing women's interests in the political sphere.

3.3.2 How Political Actors MAKE Women Different

I have already addressed some of the raw numbers, dates, and statistics that make clear the state of women's current and historical exclusion in the political sphere, but these numbers alone do not represent the full picture of women and politics. Suffrage and seats have simply not been enough to achieve gender equality, because in reality, we know that even once women overcome the obstacles to voting and being elected, full participation in the political process is often still denied to them. The "boys' club" atmosphere of legislatures is well documented, and it persists.

In 2011 in the Texas House of Representatives, a male Representative joked about a female Representative's breasts during a discussion regarding a state park (Barajas 2016). More than once, women legislators in the same House engaged in heated discussions have been meowed at by male counterparts—in the UK House of Commons, a male MP barked at a female colleague with whom he disagreed instead (Mason 2017). A male MP referred to Canada's female Environment Minister as "climate Barbie" in a Tweet (BBC 2017a). Male members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies refer to Laura Boldrini, the speaker of the lower house and the third highest politician in the country, "Signor Presidente" as a slur (Davies 2014). Julia Gillard, Australia's first female Prime Minister, was accused by a male senator of being "deliberately barren" and therefore unfit for leadership (Anderson 2016). In France in 2016, female MPs faced everything from lewd text messages to sexual assault from a male colleague (Chrisafis 2016). Every day, female MPs face roadblocks to carrying out their work—solely on the basis of their sex.

This disrespect carries over to the discourse surrounding issues that directly affect women. In 2017, two male senators (facetiously) suggested in the Missouri Senate that women seeking abortions go to the zoo instead of abortion clinics, because their regulations on euthanizing animals are stricter (Roberts 2017). In one session of the Nevada legislature discussing the removal of the tampon tax, a male lawmaker asked if he could also make tax-free purchases of jockstraps (Bronson 2017); in France in 2015, another male lawmaker tried to compare the tampon tax to the tax on shaving cream for men (BBC 2015). In 2017, a male Member of the European Parliament argued that "Of course women must earn less than men because they are weaker, they are smaller, they are less intelligent...," (Rankin 2017) and a male MP in the UK argued that a bill on domestic violence was sexist because it focused on the eradication of endemic violence against women rather than the eradication of *all* violence (Mason 2016).

Hostility towards female legislators extends beyond the walls of parliaments, reflecting the worst of the trends among the general populace. Rape, assault, and death threats are common occurrences for female MPs (Davies 2014); (BBC 2016a). United Kingdom MP Stella Creasy was labeled a witch and threatened with rape for her work advocating for putting Jane Austen on the 10-pound note (BBC 2014). It gets far worse: Jess Phillips, another UK MP, once received more than 600 rape threats on Twitter in a single night. Many of these tweets detailed the way individuals would *not* rape her, "as if raping is something they would do to someone they liked," she shared in an interview (Oppenheim 2016a); (Phillips 2016). And in June of 2016, Jo Cox, another MP from the UK, was stabbed and shot because of her political position; she died from her wounds. Men have since taken to threatening other female MPs in the country with being "Jo Coxed" (BBC 2016b).

Women represent a single group of political actors because the world continues to treat them as such. As long as we live in a world that categorizes people as women and where political actors respond to members of this socially–constructed group and issues related to their needs with mockery and disrespect, every single woman will share an interest in eliminating gender–based discrimination and establishing gender equality (See Baldez 2011). CEDAW points us toward an elegant solution for addressing shared interests in non–discrimination and equality in analyses of women's representation.

3.3.3 From Interests to Rights

CEDAW's three primary principles are non–discrimination, state obligation, and substantive equality. Article 1 defines discrimination against women as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field." This definition highlights the multiple forms discrimination can take, sometimes even appearing as "rights" or protections for women. With this conceptualization of discrimination, it is prohibited not only to prevent women (even indirectly) from working in certain fields or positions but also to consider women the only individuals capable of fulfilling certain roles or positions (such as caregiving) (Facio and Morgan 2009, p. 1142–1143).

The second principle, state obligation, is laid out in Article 2. CEDAW requires states parties to codify gender equality in their national constitutions or other domestic legislation, draft legislation outlawing discrimination on the

basis of gender by public officials or any organization, and abolish any current laws or practices that can be considered discriminatory on the basis of gender. Further provisions in CEDAW require the adoption of measures "to ensure the full development and advancement of women" (Article 3) and allow for the creation of "temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women" (Article 4.1).

The third principle, substantive equality, is measured by women's outcomes rather than by the laws and policies in place in a given country. This requires both equality of opportunity and equality of results—for example, women and men should have equal opportunities to vote and run for public offices *and* equal representation in their governments (Article 7). To achieve substantive equality at both levels, the differences (biological or social) between men and women must be mitigated through provisions in domestic law that even the playing field (Facio and Morgan 2009, p. 1147–1148).

CEDAW is established on the fundamental idea that if states create policies that eliminate gender–based discrimination in their countries, women will be able to participate equally in all spheres, and substantive equality will follow. It applies to all women, regardless of age, ethnicity, race, religion, or political party. Although "Women's rights opponents have criticized CEDAW as imposing a feminist political agenda upon them" (Baldez 2011, p. 422), it does not eliminate the possibility of women choosing to live under conservative principles. Instead, it privileges the ability for women to choose the principles they follow in their personal lives and to enjoy equal opportunities to men. All of this makes CEDAW a clear, internationally supported framework for discussing women's representation, which I will expound upon in following chapters.

3.4 Summarizing and Looking Forward

We see from the discussion of previous research above that there does often appear to be a positive relationship between women's increased presence in legislatures and improvements in women's standing in that country. However, there remain three issues with applying existing findings to broader contexts. First, many of the readings discussed above link women's share of seats to outcomes without directly examining the mechanism linking the two. This is problematic, because increases in descriptive representation do not necessarily lead directly to increases in women's rights. In many cases, men's hostile reactions to the addition of women to legislatures, working conditions and schedules that are incompatible with family responsibilities, and the deeply embedded culture of

masculinity in political institutions can severely hinder female legislators' abilities to be effective (Lovenduski 2005).

Second, the direct tests that have been performed largely rely on analyses for single countries. Single–country analyses are, by nature, limited with regards to external validity. This means that we are currently unable to tell if existing findings rely on specific situational factors for the countries used or if they are applicable to other countries (Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 1998; Celis 2006).

Third, the primary difficulty with answering any question about the substantive representation of women's interests is in precisely defining those interests. Women come from a variety of backgrounds and have a broad span of life experiences. Identifying a single set of policy interests without the use of a greater framework of understanding runs the risk of excluding certain women's interests from the analysis.

To address the first and second concerns, I propose a direct, cross–national test of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. Rather than examining the correlation between the number of women holding seats in parliament and societal outcomes for women, I propose directly examining which members of parliament most often discuss and support bills which improve women's situations. This will allow me to concretely identify gender-based differences in representation—or reject them in favor of explanations based on party differences. Furthermore, I propose doing so in a cross–national, comparable manner, using finely grained text analysis data for three countries—Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—to determine if trends hold true across time and space.

To tackle the third concern, that of defining interests, I propose a shift from ad hoc measures of women's interests to a focus on CEDAW and its principles of nondiscrimination and substantive equality. As Baldez points out, "all women do share an interest in not being discriminated against because of their gender," and "Freedom from discrimination allows us to pursue all other interests" (p. 422). CEDAW's position as the international standard on women's *rights* allows me to avoid the culturally relative or time–sensitive pitfalls suffered by discussions of women's *interests*. This is an issue of rights, and it must be treated as such.

Chapter 4

Women in the Economy

1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular:

(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;

(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment;

(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;

(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;

(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;

(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction.

—CEDAW, Article 11

International law and pithy Latin phrases (like *pacta sunt servanda*) aside, we know that women do not yet enjoy full equality with men. There are multiple stages of implementation between a treaty's creation and its production of effects for individuals on the ground: ratification, creation of legislation and institutions supporting the treaty's content, implementation and enforcement of said legislation and institutions, and acculturation into the treaty norms (both of state actors and private individuals). At each stage of the process, new barriers arise for the full implementation of the treaty's provisions; legislative repeals

and enactments are vetoed, faulty institutions are constructed, and communities push back against regulations they consider to be an infringement upon their ways of life.

My focus in this project is on the stage of the process where governments incorporate treaty provisions into domestic legislation. More specifically, I will focus on the domestic incorporation of policies related to women's equal right to work. This is a pressing concern. CEDAW expressly recognizes that women have the right to be employed (11.1a), to freely choose professions and to be promoted (11.1b), to receive equal pay for equal work (11.1c), to receive paid maternity leave (or similar benefits) (11.2b), and to access childcare (11.2c). Nevertheless, the World Economic Forum (2016, p. 30) reports that "Globally, 54 percent of working–age women take part in the formal economy, on average, as compared to 81% of men." They also report that the global average of women's earnings is approximately half that of men's earnings; there is no country in which executives perceive wages as being equal and only five in which the wage gap is less than 20 percent. Women are more likely to be unemployed, to be employed in part–time work (with fewer benefits), and to spend time in unpaid labor. They are also significantly less likely to own companies, hold senior positions in companies, or serve on boards (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; World Economic Forum 2016, p. 30).

Economic empowerment and equality are valuable, even vital, for all human beings. However, a study of how to improve women's enjoyment of their economic rights stands out as being particularly important. While economic rights have, in general, received much less attention than other classes of rights (which I will discuss in greater detail below), women's economic rights have received even less academic attention. What we do know is that systematically—*globally*— the female half of the world's population is not enjoying the same degree of economic rights as the male half. We also know that this has a dramatic, even violent, impact on their enjoyment of other classes of rights. Below, I explore concerns about economic inequality and its impacts on human dignity. I then address economic inequality's effects women's enjoyment of their other rights.

4.1 Economic Rights and Equality

Economic empowerment and equality have been part of the discussion of international human rights law for as long as there has been such a discussion. Each of the primary documents making up the International Bill of Rights—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—incorporates economic rights into its mandates. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), established in 1948 by the United Nations' General Assembly, proclaims the right to work for all. In addition, it states that every individual has the right to protection against unemployment, the right to equal pay for equal work, and the right to fair wages that (potentially with other forms of social protection) ensure for a worker and their family "an existence worthy of human dignity" (United Nations 1948, Article 23).

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) entered into force on January 3, 1976. It highlights the importance of ensuring men and women's equal rights to all of the rights laid out in the covenant (Article 3), which include the right to work, to access training programs, to receive fair and equal pay for equal work, to work in safe and healthy conditions, to receive paid time off, to form trade unions, to strike, and to have social security. It also mandates that everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living, with enough food, clothing, and housing (United Nations 1966, Articles 6-9 and 11).

Even the International Covenant on Civil and Politics Rights (ICCPR), which also entered into force in 1976, mentions the importance of economic rights. In its preamble, it echoes the language of the ICESCR: "the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights." It also identifies the inherent, non–derogable right to life—and how long do individuals live without access to food, clothing, water, housing, and income to provide all of the above?

Research on economic rights, however, has been performed much less frequently than research on other classes of rights, such as physical integrity rights[15] or civil and political rights. Three important terms—dignity, available resources, and progressive realization—make economic rights more difficult to address in analyses, both conceptually and methodologically. I address each of these terms below.

[15] Physical integrity rights are the rights to be free from disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killings, and arbitrary or political imprisonment (Cingranelli and Richards 1999).

4.1.1 A Life of Dignity

In Chapter 1, I presented a dignity–based definition of human rights, but scholars have thoroughly debated whether this is the best philosophical foundation for the concept, particularly when it comes to economic rights. Competing offerings have included such terms as "claims", "capabilities," "the minimal reasonable demands that everyone can place on the rest of humanity," "reasonable,

minimal demands required for self–respect," and things required for "purposeful human action" or required for the actualization of one's own worth. Other selections include the "necessary condition[s] for human autonomy" or for freedom (Hertel and Minkler 2007, pgs. 8–9). One particularly notable argument references Rousseau: "...as for wealth, no citizen be so very rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself" (Goodhart 2007, p. 101).[16]

[16] The reference is from Rousseau (1997), *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*.

"Dignity," however, appears in not only the UDHR, but also the ICCPR and the ICESCR, referring to the "inherent worth" of each person. It has not been universally accepted, with some scholars calling too vague—or even vacuous. But it has been widely accepted as a type of common ground for many scholars, theorists, and practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds (Hertel and Minkler 2007, p. 7–8).

The term has often been used without an accompanying definition, leaving observers to intuitively recognize crimes against human dignity on their own. This is clearly problematic for the sake of analysis, giving credence to critics above who called the term lacking in meaning. However, Donnelly (2013, p. 29) provides a solid working definition with which I will move forward from here: "Dignity indicates worth that demands respect. ...Human rights can thus be understood to specify certain forms of social respect—goods, services, opportunities, and protections owed to each person as a matter of rights—implied by this dignity."

4.1.2 Progressive Realization and Available Resources

The ICESCR is the international standard for economic rights. Most of the its language is very similar in scope and tone to the ICCPR. However, the ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR, includes one particular sentence that heightens the difficulty of addressing the rights defined within the covenant in empirical analyses: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps... to the *maximum of its available resources*, with a view to *achieving progressively* the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means..." (Article 2.1, emphasis added). The two phrases that should stand out there are "to the maximum of its available resources" and "achieving progressively the full realizations of the rights."

Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR explicitly acknowledges that a state's resources play a role in a government's ability to respect the rights in the treaty, particularly when looking at full realization. Moreover, rather than relying on a not respected/fully respected dichotomy, the progressive realization clause tasks governments to improve their respect for these rights over time. Although

they are meant to begin efforts to respect immediately, the treaty and its interpretations recognize that many of these rights require the establishment of institutional structures and those pesky resources that may take time to build and allocate effectively. Any attempt to measure economic rights (or to include them in analyses) must incorporate these two things (Chapman 2007, pgs. 143–144).

My focus on the domestic incorporation of CEDAW's economic provisions allows me to skirt these potential pitfalls of economic rights analyses. CEDAW mandates immediate compliance with equal opportunities and rights and non–discrimination in law and practice. By focusing on these principles as they appear in law, I avoid conceptualizing dignity, as well as concerns regarding resources and progressive realization—laws either exist, or they do not. Support for these laws is espoused, or it is not. Laws either incorporate gendered needs, or they are blind to them (or even discriminatory).

That doesn't mean that women's rights and their enjoyment are a simple or straightforward matter. As with all rights; women's rights are indivisible and interdependent, with respect or violations of rights having far–reaching consequences. I discuss this in greater detail in the following section.

4.2 Consequences of Economic Inequality

Restricted enjoyment of economic rights is not limited to consequences in the economic sphere. Just as scholars have long noted the mutually constitutive nature of broad economic, social, and cultural rights, physical integrity rights, and civil and political rights, women's enjoyment of their economic rights is intrinsically linked with their enjoyment of other classes of rights. When women's access to the labor force or to income is restricted, so too is their financial independence from their families. The reduced ability to achieve financial independence has grave consequences for women's ability to influence household decision making and control their reproductive capabilities and contributes to the increased occurrence of domestic violence.

4.2.1 The Division of Labor and Household Decisions

The traditional division of labor in a household with two adults (a man and a woman) took the form of the "male–breadwinner, female–homemaker model," in which the man's labor occurred entirely outside of the home, earning money, while the woman's labor occurred within the house, cooking, cleaning, and caregiving. In the 1960s and 1970s, the division of labor began to shift from a

"nearly complete specialization of economic roles" to the current pattern of "partial specialization" in which men continue to spend most of their time working for income outside of the house, while women split their time between earning an income and caring for the house and their family members (Gornick and Meyers 2003, p. 31). In numbers, this means that in 1930 in the United States, 55 percent of children lived in a two–parent family operating under the male–breadwinner model, but by 2000, 70 percent lived in families where either both parents or the sole parent of the house participated in the labor force (Gornick and Meyers 2003, p. 30). Although women, even married women, are entering the workforce in greater numbers and men have begun to contribute more to household labor over time, these shifts have not been equal; men in OECD countries put in approximately 34 percent of the time that women spend on unpaid labor, and when considering total time spent working per day (paid and unpaid), women work approximately 50 minutes a day more than men (World Economic Forum 2016, p.31).

The distribution of unpaid labor varies between households even after controlling for the hours each adult spends in paid labor and their income. One approach to understanding this variation is through bargaining models that look at "marriage as an incomplete contract that is potentially subject to termination" (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, p. 1). In other words, each partner in a marriage is seeking to make themselves as financially well–off as possible in case they divorce. Each seeks to maximize the amount of time they spend working for income and progressing in their jobs and minimize the amount of time they spend on domestic, unpaid labor, improving their exit options (Kleider 2015, p. 507). Because women's labor force options have tended to be more limited than men's (decreasing their bargaining power), they end up spending more time working at home (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, p. 3). Although education and income have clear effects on bargaining power, other factors are more systemic; to understand them, we must turn to national policies, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5.

The distribution of bargaining power determines the allocation of a household's resources. When men bring in most or all of a household's income, they also maintain greater control over how the family's resources are spent, which can lead to further inequalities between husband and wife and investments in the priorities of each. For example, existing studies have shown that women often prefer to have fewer children than men. When their bargaining power increases, fertility rates decrease; when their bargaining power is limited, however, they are less able "to influence their fertility outcomes" (Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler 2013, p. 253). Lower fertility rates are associated with decreases in

the maternal mortality rate, and as women have fewer children, they have more time to invest in their own education and training, raising the likelihood that they will be employed (World Bank 2011, p. 11).

When women's bargaining power increases, we also see better outcomes for their children's—particularly female children's—health and education (See, e.g. Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler 2013, p. 253). These investments in children's health and education have a lasting impact on their lives. An unhealthy child—one with a low birth weight or exposed to disease—will often struggle to match the educational achievements of their peers and is more likely to be unhealthy as an adult; each of these outcomes, in turn, makes it more likely that this individual will see lower lifetime earnings (World Bank 2011, p. 105). However, women's improved access to bargaining power leads to higher educational attainments for girls and women and lower child mortality rates (Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler 2013, p. 253). And when women are able to invest in their children's—particularly their daughters'—education, it makes *them* "more likely to work when they become older, have fewer children, and exercise more voice in their households—feeding the cycle of change" (World Bank 2011, p. 12).

4.2.2 Violence against Women

Gendered economic inequality is linked to even more problematic outcomes for women than the distribution of household resources and the fertility rate, however. Where women have limited access to economic resources, restricting their ability to achieve financial independence, we see increased rates of violence—physical, sexual, and economic. And when women face more obstacles to full participation in the economic sphere, it is less likely that these abuses will be reported and prosecuted.

Violence against women is a global pandemic. It occurs across all socioeconomic classes in all societies, and to fully understand its causes, we must explore the inequalities generated at household, societal, and international levels (True 2012). Violence against women is perhaps easiest to understand first as a family or household issue: "Scholars estimate that in any given country, 20–50 percent of women have experienced physical abuse at the hands of a partner or family member" (Richards and Haglund 2015, p. 15) Furthermore, approximately 30 percent of women who have been in a relationship have experienced physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence—this number is as high as 38 percent in some regions—and nearly 40 percent of women who are murdered are murdered by intimate partners (Garcia–Moreno and Pallitto 2013). While there are many factors that contribute to domestic violence, the same subordination of

women and their labor that grants men greater control over the allocation of household resources also leads to a wider acceptance of abuse (True 2012, p. 9).

"Violence" in this case is not limited to physical and sexual abuse; it also extends to economic violence or exploitation, where men keep their female partners or family members wholly dependent on them financially. Examples include male partners using their names to receive all forms of welfare benefits while arranging all debt in the women's names, male partners placing only their own names on house deeds, and male partners refusing to give their female partners access to finances, even to pay for food or bills. These kinds of tactics trap women in abusive relationships, making it even harder for them to gather the resources necessary to leave (True 2012, p. 106–107).

These are not solely household processes. Violence against women is also the result of broad systems of inequality embedded in social, political, and economic institutions that rely on and reinforce the idea that men and their labor are more valuable than women and women's labor. Internationally, economic globalization has both fed on and driven women's exploitation. Capitalist pressures for maintaining low labor costs, particularly in the service industry, have contributed to keeping women's wages relatively low and encouraging their migration to find jobs. The pressure for keeping their wages low is a structural factor that keeps women economically dependent on their families.

As female citizens of more developed nations begin to enter the workforce in increasing numbers, there is a rising demand for private nannies, nurses, maids, etc. to take care of the traditionally feminine household responsibilities—cooking, cleaning, and caring. These positions (and positions as sex workers) are often filled by migrant women with little access to better paid, more highly regulated jobs. "Crucially," True (2012) writes, "violence has become part of the employment relationship in these thriving service industries due to the highly unequal power relations at work based on inequalities of gender, class, migration status, and ethnicity" (p. 54). With few options for supporting themselves and no means of prosecuting abuses, these workers often become locked in violent or exploitative situations.

Nationally, women's greater enjoyment of their economic rights is associated with improved protections and access to reparations for abuse. Countries that score higher on measures of women's rights are also more likely to adopt legal measures against rape and marital rape. They are also *much* more likely to enforce the protections against violence against women that they have in place, meaning that where women have greater access to economic resources, police appear to more easily or more often investigate and prosecute violence against women (Richards and Haglund 2015, p. 111). However, while women's

full enjoyment of their economic and social rights is a necessary step towards eradicating systematic gender–based violence, it is important to understand that women's increased participation in the economic sphere and, relatedly, financial independence, is sometimes seen as a threat to masculinity or to "male dominance" (p. 18), leading to a possible *increase* in violence, at least at first.

4.3 Summarizing and Looking Forward

The World Bank (2011, p. 150) identifies all of the issues I have addressed in Chapters 3 and 4—control over resources and income, freedom to decide movements, decision making related to the family and its formation, freedom from violence, and the ability to make one's voice heard and to influence public policy—as related a broader concerns about women's capacity to exercise agency, "an individual's... ability to make effective choices and to transform those choices into desired outcomes." They note that agency, formed of all of these things, is vital for understanding how gendered inequalities emerge. Around the world, in every country, women are at a disadvantage in making choices and expressing agency in nearly every sphere of life, and so gendered inequities also continue in all of these spheres—or, to use the language of the human rights literature, their enjoyment of human dignity is reduced. States have a particular capability to address these gendered inequities through the creation of national legislation—and an obligation to do so under international law. In the next chapter, I create a measure of state support for one such set of policies relevant for improving women's opportunities and, in the long run, ability to express agency and enjoy a fuller extent of human dignity.

Chapter 5

Incorporating CEDAW into Domestic Legislation

2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:

(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;

(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances;

(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;

(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

—CEDAW, Article 11

In previous chapters, I discussed how the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, or CEDAW, has been widely ratified and is recognized to lead to marked improvements in the overall levels of women's rights respected by ratifying states. I also addressed that this has not yet led to gender equality, particularly in the economic sphere. While economic outcomes have improved for women over time, there remains significant

variation across countries—even in consolidated democracies with advanced industrial economies.

Recent studies have turned to explaining this variation with the degree to which a country's social welfare policies encourage *defamilialization*, or women's ability to enter the labor force and be financially independent from their families (Lister 1994). These studies, however, are limited with regards to the number of countries, time waves, and policies they have been able to include in their analyses. In response, I present here a Bayesian latent variable model approach to measuring defamilialization. Such an approach allows me to incorporate indicators for multiple policies—such as those related to parental leave, childcare, and working regulations—in 21 OECD countries over 20 years. It also estimates its own weights for the indicators, as well as the uncertainty around the resulting scores. Employing this measure in models of women's economic outcomes, I find that as a country's defamilialization score increases, the labor force participation rate gap between men and women decreases, as does the gender wage gap.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I discuss the broad trends of women's experiences in the labor force over the last few decades. In the next section, I turn to welfare state explanations of continued variation in women's workforce outcomes in highly developed countries. Third, I lay out my latent variable approach to measuring defamilialization. The fourth section presents models of women's labor force outcomes using my latent defamilialization variable as the predictor, and the final section summarizes and concludes.

5.1 Women in the Workforce

Starting with World War II, women's share of the labor force increased dramatically. Scholars have argued for the importance of several considerations in explaining this increase. First, the war itself drew women into the labor force. With many men drafted into the military and out of the country, women were pulled into the workforce to maintain services and production. Their experiences during this time broke some of the normative barriers against women in the workplace. Second, demand for labor increased, particularly in the 1960s. There was a proliferation of part-time jobs particularly suited to married women, and they flooded the labor force in great numbers (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Goldin 2006).

This increase in participation in the labor force was, to some degree, self–perpetuating. As women were more commonly accepted in the workforce, girls began to invest more strongly in their education, preparing for their future ca-

reers. The growing availability and reliability of birth control contributed to this preparation, and rising divorce rates cemented the importance of women's ability to be financially independent from their husbands. However, it wasn't until the 1980s and 1990s that wives became more than "secondary workers'," women's wages relative to men's began to rise, and they forayed into roles that had formerly been considered nontraditional avenues for women's work (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Goldin 2006).

The results of these forces have not been consistent across time or across countries. Women's share of the labor force—particularly mothers' share of the labor force—continues to show cross–national variation. In some states (such as Finland, France, and Sweden), women's participation rises and falls as a function of age, similar to men's patterns of participation in the labor force. In other states (Germany and the Netherlands), labor force participation peaks for women in their mid–twenties, falling with age from that point. In Australia and the United Kingdom, women's labor force participation rates have exhibited a third pattern—an "M" shape that rises, falls for women in their late–twenties, rises again, and then falls again with age (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997).

One explanation for trends in women's labor force participation rates is found in the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) literature. While liberal market economies (LMEs) focus on general skills, which exhibit slower rates of deterioration during workforce absences, coordinated market economies (CMEs) encourage specific skills, which are strongly impacted by labor force absences. This means that the careers of women who leave the workforce for childbirth—and particularly those who remain absent for months or years to raise their children—are more negatively impacted in CMEs than in LMEs (Soskice 2005; Estévez–Abe 2006; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006).

This approach, however, has been criticized for relying too strongly on the CME–LME distinction. Women's labor force participation rates are not neatly divided between countries classified as CMEs and those classified as LMEs. Instead, the strongest differences in women's labor force participation are found within the CME category of countries, where the Scandinavian countries stand out for their extremely high levels of labor force participation for women compared to the other CME states, which fall below LMEs with respect to women in the workforce (Mandel and Shalev 2009; Rubery 2009).

The primary explanation for the differences within the CME classification has been the generosity of social policies supported by the welfare state—or the gender relevance of these social policies (Kleider 2015, 508). Such policies range from extremely generous to nonexistent. While some countries provide for full wage replacement during maternity leave and assurance of continued em-

ployment, provisions for infant care, and public childcare, other states do not provide for any job protections for mothers or for public childcare (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997). In the former group of countries, women's participation in the labor force (on average) mirrors men's participation in the labor force by age group. In the latter, women are far more likely to drop out of the labor force during their childbearing years (or never enter it at all) (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1996). It is on these explanations that I will focus for the remainder of the paper.

5.2 Welfare States and Defamilialization

Studies of the effect of welfare state policies on women's experiences in the economy use indicators or proxies for defamilialization, or the degree to which women are able to enter the labor force and be financially independent from their families (Sainsbury 1996; Kleider 2015). In practice, this includes the presence of female labor force-promoting policies—such as public childcare (Hofferth and Collins 2000; Chevalier and Viitanen 2002) and maternity leave (Morgan and Zippel 2003; Ondrich et al. 2003; Mandel and Semyonov 2006)—and the absence of policies that discourage female labor force participation—high taxes on the second earner in a household (Gustafsson 1992; Sainsbury 1996; Blundell et al. 2000) and means–tested child benefits (Sainsbury 1996; Kreyenfeld and Hank 2000). Some authors have created defamilialization scales using several of these policies, working under the assumption that these policies are mutually reinforcing and build on each other (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997; Atchison 2015; Kleider 2015). I explore some of these policies in greater detail below.

5.2.1 Maternity and Parental Leave

Family leave policies have two primary elements: length of job protection (meaning that individuals will still have jobs waiting for them when they come back from leave) and financial support during periods of parental leave. Maternity leave generally consists of short–term leave with a high wage replacement rate taken in the days or weeks immediately surrounding childbirth. Parental leave is a longer period of leave with a (typically) lower wage replacement rate taken in the weeks or months following childbirth. It is assumed that mothers will take all of the leave they are entitled to, as well as any leave their husbands can transfer to them (See, i.e. Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2009).

In 1970, the average amount of paid leave available to mothers in OECD countries was 17 weeks. In 1990, that had increased to 39 weeks. By 2014, the average length was 52 weeks (Farré 2016). However, there is still stark variation among countries. For example, job assurance ranges from 14 weeks in Switzerland to nearly *three years* of protected (but not entirely paid) leave in Spain and France. While most highly developed countries provide monetary support for parents through at least part of their protected leave, this is not true of all countries. The average amount of paid leave ranges between three months and one year, but the United States offers no paid leave at all, and Sweden provides for 40 weeks of paid leave (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2009).

The degree to which countries should be generous with regards to length of leave is complicated. Although generous policies for mothers are clearly preferable to a complete lack of support for new mothers, extremely generous leave policies can be understood to have negative impacts on women's share of the labor force in the long run. Consider tenure–track jobs for women in academia in countries with extremely generous parental leave policies. Women in these countries may take off more time because it is supported, but this could have a negative impact on their ability to meet tenure requirements for publishing or to participate in career-improving networking. In comparison to their male counterparts, mothers will appear to lag behind with respect to goals generally accepted in the field and may struggle to receive promotions—or even, as in the academic example, struggle to keep their jobs.

Employers in countries with generous leave policies may also consider women to be too much of a risk to hire in some cases. If a female employee does get pregnant with extremely generous leave policies in place, her job must be performed in her absence; someone else will have to be chosen and trained to fill her place. When the first individual returns, she may require retraining, and the second individual will likely lose their own job after months or even years of employment. In this case, men seem to pose less risk as employees (Culpepper 2007).

This is supported by previous research, which has shown that the maternity leave exhibits a U–shaped relationship with female labor force participation. At extremely high and extremely low levels of generosity with regards to protected time, maternity leave shows a negative impact on female labor force participation. At middling levels of generosity, however, maternity leave has a positive impact on women's share of the labor force (Pettit and Hook 2005; Genre, Salvador, and Lamo 2010; Misra, Budig, and Boeckmann 2011; Akgunduz and Plantenga 2013). Notably, while leave can increase the female share of the labor force, the effects are not constant across all economic outcomes; extended leave

policies can also lower wages for women in highly skilled positions, increasing the gender wage gap (Akgunduz and Plantenga 2013).

Relatedly, Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 119) point out that the strongest deterrent to parents taking leave is little or no wage replacement. Unpaid leave is, in fact, approximately the same as having no leave at all for parents who rely on two incomes. The absence of paid leave in combination with traditional gender roles and women's lower pay (on average) is likely to weaken mothers' labor force attachment, pushing them to limit their time spent in working for pay and focus on caregiving responsibilities (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2009, pgs. 7-9).

5.2.2 Paternity Leave

Leave for fathers has been established among OECD countries much more recently that maternity leave, gaining the most ground since 2010. Like maternity leave, there continues to be significant variation in the generosity of leave policies for fathers. For example, while many countries, such as Canada, Australia, and the United States, guarantee no paid paternity leave, Iceland guarantees three months of leave to new fathers (Farré 2016).

Paternity leave is designed to have two primary effects: give fathers more time with their children and redistribute household work more equally between parents. Design is of prime importance here. Fathers are significantly more likely to take non–transferable leave than they are to take optional leave, for example. They are also unlikely to take more than the minimum amount of leave. Furthermore, in countries where leave is optional, fathers who take leave face similar workforce penalties as mothers. However, in countries where fathers are *entitled* to leave, fathers who do not take up leave face the penalties, instead (See Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2009; Farré 2016).

Although maternity leave policies are important for allowing women time off for childbirth and recovery, it is not maternity leave alone that can mitigate the effects of having and raising children on labor force outcomes. In countries that only offer protected maternity leave, practicality (and expenses) keep fathers from taking time off from work around the birth of their children. This means that women continue to disproportionately bear the costs of procreation. The existence of protected paternity leave presents a normalizing effect for both parents taking time off for the birth of their children. When companies expect men and women to undergo similar patterns of employment and productivity (on average), childbearing should have fewer negative effects on career trajectories, and women's share of the labor force should increase (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt 2009; Dearing 2016). In states that provide

for parental leave and where men and women receive similar treatment with respect to support for birth and childrearing, we should expect female labor force participation to increase (and the gender wage gap to narrow).

Effects of paternity leave found by existing work are tentatively positive. On average and all else equal, paternity leave does seem to increase men's time spent on housework, although not necessarily their time spent on childcare. In Canada (Patnaik, Forthcoming) and Iceland (Anarson and Mitra 2010), men worked fewer hours and averaged lower earnings and women increased their hours and average earnings after the introduction of paternity leave, narrowing the gender wage gap.

5.2.3 Childcare and Child Benefits

Women have traditionally been expected and pressured to be the caregivers in their families, which means that they are socialized to protect their time dedicated to their children and expected to make up the costs of childcare from their wages if they stay in the workforce after giving birth. This means that there are two main theoretical linkages between the provision of public childcare and women's female labor force participation. First, the availability of quality child care is expected to "decrease mothers' preferences for time spent at home versus time spent in market work, *all else equal*" (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997, p. 47, original emphasis). Second, the cost of childcare is often weighed against a mother's potential income. Where childcare is more expensive, budgetary restrictions may limit the utility of mothers returning to work. As a country invests more in public childcare, improving both its quality and its affordability, women's labor force participation is expected to increase (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997, p. 48).[17]

As children age, social policies regarding their care continue to affect their mothers' labor force opportunities. National policies vary with regards to the age at which children enter primary school, for example, and not all countries mandate continuous school days. Where children begin their schooling at younger ages, it should enable their mothers to return to the labor force more quickly, functioning in a manner identical to that of daycare. However, where school days are not continuous—where children return home for lunch, for example, their mothers will struggle to acquire and maintain full–time positions (Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997; Atchison 2015). Furthermore, where there are no family leave policies in place to care for children past the age of three years old, mothers may be hesitant to take up a full–time position, as it may be difficult for them to both work and take care of their children in the case of illness (Atchison 2015).

[17] Research on individual decisions to return to the labor force stress the influence of education on this choice. As education increases, the income a woman sacrifices by staying at home with her children also increases, changing her utility calculation (See Farré 2016; England, Gornick, and Shafer 2012).

Some countries provide allowances to families to offset the costs of raising children. While availability of quality public childcare and other benefits in kind encourage women's participation in the labor force, cash benefits compensate mothers staying at home to care for their children rather than reentering the labor force. This is particularly true of means–tested benefits, which lessen as income increases, and where costs of childcare are high, decreasing the marginal utility of mothers staying at or returning to work (Kleider 2015, p. 510).

5.2.4 Work Regulations

Policies that impact women's economic outcomes extend beyond those directly related to children. States also have the ability to establish regulations on employment that make it either easier or more difficult for women to work. For example, Gornick and Meyers (2003, p. 156) identify four types of work regulations that might impact parents' (and particularly mothers') ability to "secure time away from the workplace without sacrificing economic security or career opportunities." These regulations include limits on the maximum number of hours worked in a week, protections for part–time employees, non–gendered regulations for non–standard working hours, and vacation policies. I focus on limits on regulations of the maximum number of hours and non–standard hours here.

Achieving a household balance of labor in which both parents equally split earning and caring responsibilities relies on paid work taking up less than forty hours per week. Where a forty–hour workweek (or more) is the norm, parents will have few options regarding the allocation of their time. This makes it more likely that they will default to traditional male breadwinner, female caregiver norms. Some countries have responded to this concern by capping maximum working hours (without overtime pay) at between thirty–five and thirty–nine hours per week (Gornick and Meyers 2003, pgs. 156–157).

Non–standard work hours pose greater complications for parents than for other workers. Although parents' ability to split shifts may make the distribution of household labor more equitable, such a system may strain family dynamics instead, making it more difficult for the parent working non–standard hours to assume caring responsibilities or even to interact with their children in a meaningful way. However, policies that limit parents' access to such positions without limiting employer demand for workers for these positions serve only to place limits on parents' employment opportunities. Furthermore, many such limitations are gendered, limiting only the access of pregnant women or mothers. Because these positions are often more highly paid, this has the effect of

limiting both mothers' overall opportunities for employment and their access to more highly paid jobs (Gornick and Meyers 2003, pgs. 172–173).

5.2.5 Abortion Policies

Finally, a state's restrictions on abortion have been explicitly linked to women's ability to participate in the formal economy. These restrictions come in a number of forms, including limits on abortions to save the mother's life, for reasons of physical or mental health, in cases of rape or incest, because of fetal impairment, or for economic or social reasons. In some cases, there are further restrictions based on length of the pregnancy or the father's consent (Bloom et al. 2009, p. 87).

Women's access to abortion can be considered a right of its own; Asal, Brown, and Figueroa (2008, p. 266) point out that "a person's control of his or her body, regardless of gender and application, is perhaps the sine qua non of rights generally." However, the restriction of access to abortion can also result in negative consequences for women's economic opportunities. High fertility rates increase women's caregiving responsibilities. At the national level, this means that increases in the fertility rate are associated with significant decreases in female labor force participation. As abortion policies become less restrictive, though, fertility rates decline (Bloom et al. 2009, pgs. 80–81). This means that as state policies allow for greater access to abortion, we should see a decrease in women's caregiving load and an increase in their ability to participate more equally in the formal economy.

5.3 A Latent Variable Approach to Measuring Defamilialization

Existing studies of defamilialization have some limitations. First, they can be limited with regards to the number of countries covered, often focusing on only a single country. Second, they are often limited with regards to temporal coverage. Most are limited to one or two waves of time. Third, while there have been separate studies regarding the effects of various potentially defamilializing policies, individual studies often focus on only one—or even a few—policies at a time. Finally, where researchers have constructed scales of defamilialization, they often rely on *ad hoc* or *a priori* weighting schemes with no related measure of uncertainty around their scores.

To address the issues highlighted above, I employ a Bayesian latent variable model to create a measure of defamilialization, or the extent to which a coun-

try's policies encourage women's equal participation in and enjoyment of the economy. This approach has a number of benefits. First, it neatly handles missing data in the observed indicators. Each observed indicator is assigned a prior distribution. When the estimation algorithm encounters a missing value, it draws a random value from the prior distribution for that variable. This allows for the estimation of the latent variable even for observations that are missing values for any of the indicators (See Jackman 2000). Second, where previous indexes of defamilialization have been constructed, they have often used *a priori* weighting schemes. This model estimates the weights for each of the observed indicators instead, producing weights very similar to the loadings produced by factor analysis. Finally, the model returns estimates of uncertainty around the scores it produces. Rather than producing a point estimate, the latent variable is estimated as a posterior distribution, which means that I am not claiming any degree of certainty that is not supported by the data themselves (See Fariss 2015; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014; Hill Jr. and Watson 2019).

5.3.1 Data for the Measurement Model

I include indicators for fifteen defamilializing policies in my measurement model. Broadly speaking, these indicators can be divided into four main categories: family leave policies, childcare policies, work regulations, and abortion regulations. Family leave policies include total maternity and parental leave in weeks (and its square term), paid leave as a proportion of total leave, and paternity leave in weeks (OECD SOCX); wage replacement rates during maternity and parental leave as a percentage of women's wages in manufacturing (Gauthier 2011); and a dichotomous indicator of the presence of policies promoting fathers' take–up of leave, including non–transferable leave and additional weeks of leave for families where both parents take leave (Atchison 2015). Childcare policies include average child benefits as a percentage of a family's monthly income (Gauthier 2011), a categorical indicator for availability of public childcare (where a 1 indicates that a state has guaranteed all–day public daycare for children ages 3–6 and a 2 indicates that such guaranteed care is available for all children from infancy to 6 years old), the legal age at which children begin elementary school, a categorical variable for continuous school days (where a 1 indicates "sometimes" and a 2 indicates "always"), a dichotomous indicator for the availability of childcare leave after a child reaches three years old; and a continuous indicator of monetary compensation received by parents (Atchison 2015). Work regulations include dichotomous indicators of the presence of policies regulating the maximum number of hours that can be worked in a week (where a 1 indicates that such policies are present) and policies restricting women's access

Table 5.1: Observed Indicators for Measurement Model

Concept	Indicator	Variable Type
Family Leave Policies	Total Maternity and Parental Leave (in weeks)	Continuous
	Total Maternity and Parental Leave Squared	Continuous
	Prop. Paid Maternity and Parental Leave	Continuous
	Maternity Leave Wage Replacement Rate	Continuous
	Parental Leave Wage Replacement Rate	Continuous
	Paternity Leave (in weeks)	Continuous
	Incentives for Fathers to Take Leave	Dichotomous
Childcare Policies	Availability of Public Childcare	Categorical
	Starting School Age	Continuous
	Continuous School Day	Categorical
	Family Leave Past 3 Years Old	Dichotomous
	Child Benefits	Continuous
Work Regulations	Regulation of Hours in Work Week	Dichotomous
	Gendered Reg. of Non–Standard Hours	Dichotomous
Abortion Regulations	Availability of Abortion by Request	Dichotomous

to non–standard working hours (where a 1 indicates that such policies are *not* present) (Atchison 2015). Finally, abortion regulations are represented by a dichotomous indicator where a 1 means that women have access to abortion on request, rather than only in cases of rape, incest, or concerns about the health of the mother (Bloom et al. 2009). The indicators cover 21 OECD countries for roughly the time period from 1990 to 2010. Each of the continuous indicators was standardized before model estimation.

5.3.2 Measurement Model

To estimate my measurement model, I chose distributions for each of my policy indicators. The continuous indicators all received normal distributions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&X_{it} \mathcal{N}(\mu_{it}, \sigma^2) \\
&\mu_{it} = \beta\theta_{it}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.1}
$$

In these distributions, X represents the observed indicator, θ is the latent defamilialization score, and β is the weight or loading of the indicator in the latent score. In order to best represent the U–shaped relationship supported by the literature and discussed above, total parental leave is additionally restricted so that extreme values are negatively related to the latent trait and middling values are positively related. The dichotomous indicators received Bernoulli distributions with a logit link function:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&X_{it} Bern(p_{it}) \\
&\text{logit}(p_{it}) = \beta\theta_{it}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.2}
$$

Finally, the categorical variables received categorical distributions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\Pr(X_{it} = 1|\theta_{it}) = \Phi(\tau_1 - \beta\theta_{it}) \\
&\Pr(X_{it} = j|\theta_{it}) = \Phi(\tau_j - \beta\theta_{it}) - \Phi(\tau_{j-1} - \beta\theta_{it}) \\
&\Pr(X_{it} = J|\theta_{it}) = 1 - \Phi(\tau_{J-1} - \beta\theta_{it}).
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.3}
$$

Here, Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. J is the number of categories (3 in this case), and τ represents the cut points between these categories.[18]

[18] Other restrictions I used purely to orient the measurement model included restricting public daycare, total leave, paid leave, wage replacement rates, and paternity leave to be positive.

I use a random–walk prior to account for temporal dependence in the latent trait. This means that for the first year for each country, the latent trait is specified to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of 1. In following years, the latent trait is specified to follow a normal distribution where the mean is the previous year's value of the latent trait and the variance is estimated by the data (See Martin and Quinn 2002; Hill Jr. and Watson 2019).

I ran two Markov chains for 100,000 iterations each with an additional 20,000 iterations of burn–in. The Geweke diagnostic (Geweke 1992), Gelman–Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin 1992), and plots of the posterior densities give no evidence of nonconvergence. The factor loadings are displayed in Figure 3.1, where indicators to the left of the dotted line at 0 load negatively onto the latent trait, indicators at 0 have no effect, and indicators to the right of the dotted line load positively. Indicators which do not show a significant relationship with the latent trait are colored grey for ease of viewing.

As the figure shows, the gendered regulation of non–standard working hours, continuous school days, and child benefits are centered on 0, demonstrating no relationship to the latent trait. Although restricted to be negative in the model specification, extreme values of maternity and parental leave also



Figure 5.1: Factor Loadings for Bayesian Latent Variable

tend toward 0, countering expectations from the literature. The availability of abortion by request does contain zero within its credible intervals; however, slightly more than 94 percent of the values are positive, indicating a positive weight. Each of the other indicators load positively. It is important to note that the loadings for the continuous, dichotomous, and categorical variables cannot be directly compared.

With this in mind, there are three particularly notable aspects of the factor loadings. First, although the availability of abortion by request, regulation of workweek hours, and family leave when children are older than three all load positively, incentives for fathers to take leave—such as the presence of leave that fathers cannot transfer to their spouses or extra leave available to couples where both members take leave around the birth of their child—loads more strongly than each of these. Second, against expectations, starting school age loads positively onto the latent trait. In most cases, the highest starting school age (7) is found in country–years where the state also guaranteed full–day public daycare to children under seven years old. This suggests that the indicator for starting school age is actually giving extra weight to the provision of public daycare.

This leads to the third, most notable aspect of the factor loadings: the estimate for public daycare is quite large. Again, although the loadings cannot be directly compared between different classes of observed indicators, this indicates that the guarantee of all–day public childcare for all children under the age of seven is of considerable importance when considering defamilializing policies. In the years covered by my data, only four countries have this guarantee: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.[19] These are also the countries with the highest overall values of the latent trait in 2010.

[19] These are also four of the five countries in which the starting school age is seven. The fifth such country is Switzerland, which receives a zero for policies guaranteeing all–day daycare.

The ropeladder plot in Figure 3.2 that orders countries by their values of the latent defamilialization trait confirms the validity of the model. The Nordic countries cluster at the top of the plot, while countries that generally score lower with regards to defamilialization, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland, fall at the bottom of the rankings.



Figure 5.2: Latent Trait, 1990 and 2010

Figure 3.3 presents the yearly average of the latent trait. This figure shows that the presence of defamilializing policies has seen a slow but steady increase for the two decades covered by my data, with the credible intervals showing no degree of overlap between the 1990s and the most recent year. Figure 3.2 also confirms this trend, with the average latent trait for most countries increasing between 1990 and 2010—most, but not all. Figure 3.2 shows that the latent trait has polarized, where the countries in the middle have all advanced a little, the

highest performers have gotten even better, and the lowest three performers have worsened over time.



Figure 5.3: Yearly Average of Latent Traits

In the next section, I briefly summarize the theoretical connections between my latent variable measure of defamilialization and three outcomes related to women's enjoyment of their economic rights, developed in greater detail above.

5.3.3 Theoretical Argument

We often focus on women's share of the labor force as a key indicator for their enjoyment of their economic rights. However, as we see in CEDAW, women's enjoyment of their economic rights includes other concepts—such as receiving equal pay for equal work and being particularly protected during pregnancies. This means that any test of respect for women's economic rights should examine effects for multiple economic outcomes. As a first cut at this analysis, I will move forward with three potential outcomes of policies that are defamilializing (or not) for women: women's share of the labor force (relative to men's), the gender wage gap, and the maternal employment rate.

Defamilialization, as defined above, represents women's ability to equally participate in the labor force and to be financially independent from their families. Countries can support defamilialization through a number of the policies, including through leave for mothers and fathers, childcare, and not restrict-

ing women's access to flexible and higher-paying jobs. If these policies work as designed, we should expect to see women entering the labor force in greater numbers, staying in the labor force for greater spans of time, and returning to the labor force more often after having children. This will increase the overall number of women in the labor force, which will decrease the labor force participation rate gap between men and women, leading to my first hypothesis. *Hypothesis 1*: As defamilialization increases, women's share of the labor force will increase.

Policies that increase women's ability to enter, stay in, and return to the labor force should have positive effects on women's career trajectories. When women are no longer penalized for having and raising children—when men also take time off for the birth of their children and societies have policy–based support systems for families in place—they should be able to more freely choose their employment, maintain productivity, and receive promotions. Men's and women's patterns of employment and productivity should begin to look more similar, and so should their wages. Thus, as defamilializing policies increase in strength, I expect that the gender wage gap will decrease, leading to my second hypothesis. *Hypothesis 2*: As defamilialization increases, the gender wage gap will decrease.

Finally, I expect mothers in particular to benefit from defamilializing policies. Although women as a whole gain by introducing the normative and societal aspects of defamilialization, it is mothers who are likely to most directly profit from the availability of maternity leave, for example, or public childcare. As defamilialization increases, then, I also expect to see an increase in maternal employment, leading to my third hypothesis. *Hypothesis 3*: As defamilialization increases, maternal employment will increase.

5.3.4 Models

Data for my dependent and control variables in the following models come from the OECD. For controls, I include each country's share of women who are employed in part–time employment, total unemployment rate, public expenditure, degree of employment protection, and the percentage of a country's lower house of legislature that are women. The availability of part–time employment, which tends to be more flexible than full–time employment, should increase women's overall share of the labor force and maternal employment while potentially inflating occupational segregation and, therefore, the gender wage gap. The unemployment rate captures "prevailing economic conditions" (Genre, Salvador, and Lamo 2010, p. 1503) that may drive certain hiring decisions.

Strong employment protections should limit employers' ability to fire workers; this suggests that it might also make them less willing to hire workers who have (or may have) extended workplace absences (Genre, Salvador, and Lamo 2010). Measures of employment protection have also been used as proxies for a country's level of skill specificity, in which a higher level of skill specificity is expected to lower women's share of the workforce. Public expenditure (measured as total government expenditure minus military expenditures as a percentage of GDP) represents government spending both on the provision of wages for public employees, who tend to fill jobs with more general skill requirements, and the overall size of the social services sector. This expenditure should be particularly important in creating general skills jobs in specific skills economies, leading to an interaction term for the two (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Kleider 2015).

Finally, I include the percentage of legislative seats filled by women in Models 2, 4, and 6. This is one way to proxy the general trend toward women's empowerment or equality in a given country-year. I expect that as women's share of the legislature increase, their share of the labor force will also increase, the gender wage gap will decrease, and the maternal employment rate will increase.

Because all of the outcome indicators are continuous, I estimate the relationship between them and my latent variable measure with mixed effects linear regression models, including random effects by country. In order to take advantage of the uncertainty estimates around my defamilialization variable, I draw 100 random values from the posterior distribution of the latent trait (defined by its mean and standard deviation) for each observation and then use each of these draws as the independent variable of the models. I pool the results using the `Amelia` package (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) in `R`, which uses Rubin (1987)'s rules for combining multiply imputed estimates. The results of these models are shown in Table 3.2 and discussed below.

5.3.5 Findings

The models provide mixed support for my hypotheses and for the arguments presented in the broader literature. In models of women's share of the labor force, the coefficient for my latent defamilialization variable is positive and significant. In models of the gender wage gap, the significance varies. Missing data inflate the standard errors for the model of the maternal employment rate and make its conclusions less reliable, but the defamilialization variable shows no statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. I discuss each of the models in further detail below.

Table 5.2: Women's Economic Rights Outcomes

	1 Share Labor Force	2 Share Labor Force	3 Wage Gap	4 Wage Gap	5 Mat. Emp.	6 Mat. Emp.
Coefficient Estimates						
Defamilialization	0.021*	0.011*	−0.663*	−0.364	−0.377	−0.444
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.306)	(0.289)	(0.330)	(0.276)
Part–Time Women	0.005*	0.004*	−0.007	0.002	0.548*	0.423*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.132)	(0.116)
Unemployment	−0.006*	−0.003*	0.272*	0.207*	−0.700*	−0.559*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.149)	(0.127)
Public Expenditure	0.407*	0.349*	−60.074*	−51.161*	−23.168	−10.733
	(0.132)	(0.099)	(9.786)	(8.995)	(14.857)	(12.722)
Employment Protect.	−0.035	0.002	−7.195*	−6.215*	−9.345*	−3.558
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(2.362)	(2.183)	(3.128)	(2.768)
P. Expend. x E. Protect.	−0.035	−0.092*	19.525*	17.251*	31.841*	15.819*
	(0.058)	(0.044)	(4.643)	(4.223)	(7.242)	(6.514)
Percent Women in Leg.	–	0.005*	–	−0.229*	–	0.372*
	–	(0.000)	–	(0.040)	–	(0.050)
(Intercept)	0.583*	0.479*	37.847*	40.157*	54.613*	45.570*
	(0.070)	(0.055)	(5.161)	(4.885)	(7.933)	(6.611)
Random Effects						
Country (Var)	0.010	0.008	31.483	34.462	97.282	76.362
N	298	298	201	201	151	151
RMSE	0.958	0.956	0.939	0.936	0.925	0.921

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.01

In Models 1 and 2, as defamilialization increases, women's share of the labor force relative to men's increases. This means that as welfare state policies become more generous and gender relevant, women do enter into, stay in, and return to the labor force in greater numbers, *ceteris paribus*. Women's share of the labor force is further increased as their participation in part–time work increases and as public provisions of services and employment increases but decreased as total levels of unemployment rise. Taken together, Model 1 supports welfare state explanations more strongly than explanations coming out of the varieties of capitalism literature. However, with the inclusion of women's share of the legislature (which is associated with an increase in women's share of the labor force) in Model 2, we also see that increased employment protections decrease the effect of public expenditure. These results are displayed in Figure 3.4.



Figure 5.4: Coefficient Plot, Labor Force Participation Rate

In Model 3, supporting my hypothesis, as defamilialization increases, the gender wage gap decreases, on average and all else equal. This follows from the expectation that men's and women's career trajectories will begin to look more similar as defamilialization increases. However, the varieties of capitalism literature also receives support from this model. In countries with higher levels of public expenditure, the gender wage gap is markedly decreased. Interestingly, the strength of employment protection also shows a significant, negative relationship with the gender wage gap; however, the significant and positive interaction term indicates that each of these relationships is moderated in the presence of the other. As employment protection, proxying skill specificity, increases (holding all else constant), public provisions of jobs and services displays

a decreased (although still marked) ability to close the gender wage gap. As in the model of labor force participation, the overall economic conditions also matter for hiring decisions—as the unemployment rate increases, so does the gender wage gap. The results for the gender wage gap hold in Model 4 (with the inclusion of women's share of the legislature), with the exception of the loss of statistical significance for the defamilialization variable. Again, women's participation in the national legislature is associated with an improvement in women's enjoyment of their economic rights through a decrease in the gender wage gap. These results are displayed in Figure 3.5.



Figure 5.5: Coefficient Plot, Gender Wage Gap

Finally, in Models 5 and 6 of maternal employment, the defamilialization score is insignificant. These models were particularly plagued by missingness in the dependent variable, leading to only one-third of the observations available for my defamilialization score being used in the model estimation and requiring a more cautious interpretation of its results. That being said, most of the control variables continue to perform as expected. The presence of women in part–time labor shows a strong positive relationship with the overall maternal employment rate (all else equal), confirming that the more flexible hours make it easier for mothers to juggle their caring and employment responsibilities. Increases in the total unemployment rate are associated with an (expected) decrease in maternal employment. Again, the negative effect of employment protection is moderated by large public expenditures, as is expected from the varieties of capitalism literature. With the inclusion of women's share of the lower house of legislature (which is associated with an increase in the maternal

employment rate), most of the results hold. These results are displayed in Figure 3.6.



Figure 5.6: Coefficient Plot, Maternal Employment

Taken together, these models present mixed support between the welfare state and varieties of capitalism literatures. Although defamilializing policies appear to be important for increasing women's overall share of the labor force, expectations from the varieties of capitalism show more explanatory power for the maternal employment rate. Furthermore, both bodies of literature contribute explanatory power toward modeling the gender wage gap. From this, we can conclude that gender–based improvements in each are necessary for women's complete enjoyment of their economic rights.

5.4 Summarizing and Moving Back to Representation

In summary, I have argued for the importance of measuring a broader conceptualization of defamilialization than we have traditionally seen in the literature in order to best understand women's experiences in the economy. Using such a measure here, I have contributed to the discussion between the welfare state and varieties of capitalism literature and found that while increases in defamilialization in a country are associated with decreases in the labor force participation gap between men and women and the gender wage gap, public expenditure on employment and services (moderated by skill specificity) also contributes to our

understanding of the gender wage gap and is perhaps more important in understanding maternal employment. This supports and drives home the current understanding in the literature that the generosity and gender relevance of welfare state policies are necessary for ensuring women's equal access to the labor market and to equal wages but tempers that understanding by acknowledging the existence and importance of other gendered institutional constraints.

The Bayesian latent variable approach to measuring defamilialization presents a number of possible avenues for expansion. Either data sources with greater coverage and decreased missingness or multiply imputed data could lead to improved model performance. The potential exists, as well, for an increased (even an exhaustive) list of welfare state policies related to defamilialization to be added to the Bayesian latent variable model for a more complete conceptualization of the latent trait.

Furthermore, women's experience of the labor force is more complex than simply their share of the labor force or even the wage gap. Women and men display different rates of part–time employment, different levels of unemployment, and different rates of employment in various occupations and at managerial levels of these occupations. The measure and approach I have presented here have the potential to give researchers a more nuanced understanding of gender–differentiated enjoyment of economic rights at all levels in future work.

This more nuanced understanding of the enjoyment of economic rights speaks to the broader literature on gender and politics, because financial independence is intrinsically linked to women's enjoyment of all of their other rights. We might expect that labor force policies that restrict women's access to employment are also linked to their decreased participation in political institutions, for example. Additionally, we know from previous work that women's restricted financial independence has serious consequences for their ability to influence household decisionmaking (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Kleider 2015) and control their reproductive capabilities (Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler 2013), as well as contributing to the increased occurrence of domestic violence (True 2012). Financial freedom is necessary for women to enjoy equality with men, and it is to this freedom that my measure of defamilialization speaks.

But how are these policies raised and passed in parliament? Who speaks in favor of them, and who speaks against them? What does the overall discourse related to these kinds of policies look like? In the following chapters, I set up and execute a text analysis of parliamentary speeches to answer these questions.

Chapter 6

Sentiment, Emotions, and Gender in National Legislatures

As I discussed in Chapter 3, there are three problems with research connecting women's descriptive and substantive representation. First, many of these studies link women's share of seats in national legislatures to outcomes for gender equality in those countries without directly examining the mechanism linking the two. Second, the direct tests that have been performed largely rely on analyses for single countries, which limits the external validity of their conclusions. And third, these studies rely on ad hoc conceptualizations of the women's interests being represented. I have addressed these problems by shifting the conversation from one of representing women's interests to one of representing rights, incorporating multiple countries into my analysis, and directly studying which members of parliaments discuss and voice support for advances in women's rights.

In Chapter 4, I explained the intrinsic connection that women's enjoyment of their economic rights have with their enjoyment of other rights. And in the previous chapter, following existing literature, we saw that women's representation in national legislatures is positively associated with respect for women's economic rights in those countries. In the chapters following this, I will analyze speech data from the lower houses of three national legislatures to more directly test the link between women filling seats in legislatures and the creation of policies that respect women's rights, more concretely connecting women's descriptive representation to women's substantive representation.

This structure of this chapter is as follows: I begin by discussing why personal emotions are relevant in analyses of parliamentary support for women's

rights. Next, I present my expectations for the emotions that will be identified in the speeches of different members of national parliaments. I close by briefly introducing the process (and complications) involved in performing a content analysis on parliamentary speech data.

6.1 The Personal Is Political

I open my Women and World Politics class by introducing a key idea, one to which we return again and again over the course of the semester: *The personal is political, and the political is personal.* It's an idea that became very popular during the second wave of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, gaining particular attention after an article published by Carol Hanisch in 1969 titled "The Personal is Political," in which she writes, "One of the first things we discover in these [consciousness–raising] groups is that personal problems are political problems. There are no personal solutions at this time. There is only collective action for a collective solution." In a 2006 follow-up to this article, Hanisch (speaking of those who criticized "women getting together in consciousness–raising groups to discuss their own oppression as 'naval-gazing' and 'personal therapy'—and certainly 'not political' ") added,

> They could sometimes admit that women were oppressed (but only by 'the system') and said that we should have equal pay for equal work, and some other 'rights.' But they belittled us no end for trying to bring our so–called 'personal problems' into the public arena—especially 'all those body issues' like sex, appearance, and abortion. Our demands that men share the housework and childcare were likewise deemed a personal problem between a woman and her individual man. The opposition claimed if women would just 'stand up for themselves' and take more responsibility for their own lives, they wouldn't need to have an independent movement for women's liberation. What personal initiative wouldn't solve, they said, 'the revolution' would take care of if we would just shut up and do our part. Heaven forbid that we should point out that men benefit from oppressing women (Hanisch 2009).

In class, we start with examples: A 17–year–old girl in El Salvador, Evelyn Beatríz Hernández Cruz, was charged with aggravated homicide after passing out from severe blood loss in the latrine where she had given birth. It is unclear if it was a stillbirth or if the infant drowned. Evelyn had been repeatedly raped, which she was too afraid to report to the police at the time, and did not know

she was pregnant. The judge sentenced her to 30 years in prison, 3 of which she served before finally being released for a re–trial (BBC 2019d).

In India, Poornima Javardhan must spend every day that she menstruates in a hut on the outskirts of her village (along with any other menstruating girls and women). Most menstruation huts are lacking in furniture, electricity, and even running water, and the girls and women staying in them are at risk of snakebites and harassment, as well as increased exposure to the elements. They may not attend school—or even cook to feed themselves, relying on family members to bring them food—during this time (Kaur 2015).

In Australia, Michaela Dunn, a 24–year–old college student and sex worker, was murdered by a client (McGowan 2019).

In the US, Allison Gamba worked for Goldman Sachs for nine years. She "generated a department record of $9.5 million from the low-performing stocks her boss assigned to her" and was a top performer in her department. In 2010, Bloomberg published a list of recent promotions at Goldman Sachs, which her name was not on. When she asked her manager if he had nominated her to be a managing director (a role she was already performing without the accompanying salary), he responded, "I would have been a laughingstock if I had nominated you." She watched multiple men whose performance records were not as good as hers be promoted past her (Campbell 2019).

Gender–based abuses extend to women in the public eye. Multiple high–profile women—including Sia, Bella Thorne, and Whitney Cummings—have released their own nude photos in order to end extortion efforts (BBC 2019f).

These are intensely personal stories. It is personal to be passed over for promotions that you have earned. It is personal to be forced to reveal your body to the world. It is personal to be forced out of your home and your school for the duration of a biological process. It is *personal* to be murdered for performing your job.

And it is so incredibly personal to be at a greater risk for any one of these experiences because you are female, because the events above did not happen in isolation or in a vacuum. They represent single cases of much broader trends—the 63 percent of men's wages that women earn around the world (Neate 2018), the 60 percent of illiterate individuals around the world who are female (UN Women 2015), the 45 to 75 percent of sex workers who will experience sexual or physical violence on the job (Deering et al. 2014), the 87,000 femicides in a year (UNODC 2018). These are the global issues of who has power, who does not have power, and how these power imbalances are expressed in daily life, which means that they are not only personal—they are also political, both in their nature and in their solutions.

Guidance for these solutions can be found in CEDAW, but CEDAW doesn't automatically change the politics in ratifying countries. A key step of the process in establishing respect for women's rights is incorporating CEDAW into domestic legislation. Previous work on the substantive representation of women, discussed in Chapter 3, has found that, on average, countries with parliaments that have a greater proportion of seats filled by women are likely to have policies that are more supportive of women. Additionally, women politicians are likely to express more liberal political views than their male counterparts. However, these conclusions are based primarily on votes cast and policies enacted.

Measuring policy opinions and sentiments toward political issues only with votes cast is likely to obscure variations in the actual political stances of the voting members (Lauderdale and Clark 2014). Analyzing only whether someone voted yea or nay on a bill misses the part of the process where the bill's contents were debated. It misses whether someone voted nay because they disagreed with the premise of the bill or because they disagreed with its practicalities. Analyzing other, richer, types of data, such as press releases (Justin 2010; Grimmer and King 2011; Justin and Stewart 2013) or debate transcripts (Lauderdale and Clark 2014) can capture dimensions of position–taking, signaling, and perspective overlooked by voting data.

Moreover, the way that politicians speak about issues drives the perception of those issues across the nation and makes it more or less likely that the general public will support the legal measures that are developed (Druckman 2001). Public opinion, in turn, shapes the final forms of bills that are passed into law (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). This means that the discourse around an issue is intrinsically tied to a country's policies and to the ability to change these policies over time (as the discourse evolves).

Thus, the way that countries talk about these issues—or don't talk about them—in many ways establishes or reaffirms the reality of them. When inequalities and abuses are overlooked, ignored, or justified, they continue. When bills are crafted or discussed from a perspective that excludes the viewpoint of the individuals who are most marginalized by them, that marginalization is perpetuated. We might expect, then, that the discourse changes when individuals from those marginalized groups participate. We can expect that they speak about respect for their rights in a different way, because it's personal. (More importantly, I can—and will—test it.)

So far, this has been a relatively abstract discussion of the possible effects that personal experience can have on a legislator's discourse on the floor regarding related bills. Let's take a look at how this plays out in practice. On June 6,

2018, the British parliament debated measures that would legalize abortion in Northern Ireland. During that debate, Conservative MP Heidi Allen took the floor with this speech:

> This is a hard and emotive topic. Northern Ireland is a devolved administration, so is it our business? I am a modern, progressive woman in this country, and I am proud that this country is my home. As a woman who believes passionately in equality, in choice, and in an individual's right to determine their own destiny, as a woman elected to be the Member of Parliament for South Cambridge in the 21st century, who stood yesterday to support the member for Walthamstow's request for this debate, because she is standing up for all the women in the UK, but mostly because I have been there, I am making it my business.
>
> The Irish referendum results spoke volumes about how the people in southern Ireland felt. They want to change, and they voted for it decisively. How can it be that Northern Ireland will soon be the only part of Great Britain and Ireland where terminations are to all intents and purposes outlawed?
>
> I was ill when I made the incredibly hard decision to have a termination. I was having seizures every day. I wasn't even able to control my own body, let alone care for a new life. So, Mr. Speaker, are you seriously telling me that in a civilized world, rape, incest, or a fetus that is so sadly deformed that it could never live are not sufficient grounds for a woman to have the power to decide for herself, that she shouldn't make that decision?
>
> No. Enough.
>
> Very suddenly and unexpectedly, we have a window of opportunity before us. Whether you feel that window has opened as a consequence of no functioning devolved administration in Northern Ireland or because a neighboring referendum was so close and so relevant as to be impossible to ignore, or simply because you feel the glaring light of equality and human rights illuminating the women of Northern Ireland, this has become their moment, and they will have my unequivocal support (Allen 2018).

Labour MP Jess Phillips followed her with this speech:

> Recently, I had to hire a car. It turned out that the cheapest and best option for me was to hire it from Birmingham Airport. When

I got in the car, I turned on the on–board sat–nav, and the last journey taken was to the Calthorpe Clinic in Edgbaston, the place I myself had been for an abortion a decade previously. I shuddered at the thought of the woman who had hired the car before me—not to go about her working life but to go and do something that I took completely for granted.

Myself and the member for South Cambridgeshire are not criminals.

Last week, I asked the women of Northern Ireland to get in touch and tell me their stories of traveling to England, Scotland, and Wales. Today, I am them, here with some of the extracts.

It was Christmas Eve. I was with friends at a party. I stepped outside for a breath of air, and I was raped. My mum had to book the flights, put me into a clinic. This all took money. I was from a working–class family; we had to borrow it. I had to travel on my own. I had never been alone anywhere after I'd been raped.

I was in a relationship with an abusive man. I knew if I carried on with this pregnancy, I would lose my job, my home, and the ability to look after the children I already had. My consultant told me that, following legal advice, medical staff were not allowed to provide any information to help me get an abortion. I cried on the phone when I rang Marie Stopes in Belfast. They told me how much it would cost to book a medical abortion. I considered taking too many antidepressants——not enough to kill myself, just to induce a miscarriage.

I was fifteen, standing in McDonald's carpark in a freezing December weather, staring at a boy much older than me, minutes after finding out I was pregnant. I was terrified that someone would see me standing in my school uniform. I went to Liverpool two months before I turned sixteen and eight weeks after having sex with a boy who no longer wanted to know my name. The shame I felt lingered long after I'd made the eight-hour boat journey back to Northern Ireland.

. . . The taxi driver who picked us up in Birmingham from the flight was kind. He drove right past the protesters outside the clinic and called them horrible people. He wouldn't accept Mum's money for the fare. I realized he saw many girls like me. I wasn't alone.

> I did not want to travel on my own, so I had to wait for my friend to get time off work. Leicester isn't exactly easy to get to, so we set off at 4 a.m. on our flight, an hour's journey into Leicester and another 45 minutes on another bus to get to the clinic. After the procedure, me and my friend had to go and catch a flight again. Again, another two bus journeys, took near three hours this time to get back to the airport, another flight, then we went back to the house—drained, exhausted, emotional, sore.
>
> The night before I was due to fly to London, I had some minor bleeding, and by the time I boarded the plane, I was in some discomfort. Immediately, the plane took off. I made the way to the toilet. I was bleeding heavily. When a female steward eventually knocked on the door, I told her I was unwell and suffered heavy periods. Of course, she knew, but she said nothing. I was first off the plane, and the young steward accompanied me to the public toilets in Heathrow Airport. She tried to persuade me to see a doctor or a nurse, but I was terrified. I went to the cubicle, and I passed everything into the toilet, and I flushed it. When I returned to Belfast, I did see my GP. He was horrified and told me that I could have died.
>
> The final story of my speech sums up what each and every woman who got in touch—and it was hundreds—[had to say]. So I will finish with this:
>
> Despite my mental health issues, despite an abusive partner, despite having no money and no real sense of where I was going, I was expected to have this baby. But I didn't want to be pregnant, and that's really why I went to England. Afterwards, I felt sore but mostly angry that I had been made to board a plane because the government that laid claim to my country, demanded it, legislates better for its English citizens than for its Northern Irish people. Because Westminster allows our women to be deprived of the basic human rights they give to their English citizens (Phillips 2018).

These are clearly intensely personal, intensely emotional speeches. Both MPs shared their personal experiences, and Phillips collected and shared other women's stories as if they were her own. It is apparent that they are speaking of legislation that is creating suffering for women, and their evidence begins with their own struggle. But abortion is, perhaps, too easy to sell for this argument.

It is a topic that brings up heated emotions from people with all perspectives. These perspectives are also markedly divided among political parties.

Let us consider a more general, potentially less controversial example. On April 23, 1991, Fine Gael TD Gay Mitchell (referencing CEDAW) proposed a constitutional amendment which would add the sentence, "Rights under the law shall not be limited or denied by the State by virtue of distinction of sex," to the Irish constitution. Fine Gael TD Monica Barnes responded,

> I want to thank my colleague, Deputy Gay Mitchell, for sharing his time with me on such an important Bill and to commend him on introducing what I consider to be one of the most positive and affirmative acts in regard to equality to be introduced in this legislature.
>
> ...One of the first tenets of the Treaty of Rome was that equal rights would be extended to women and the necessary legislation would have to be introduced not just at European level but at national level. Our history in that area has been lamentable and I would like to think we could draw a veil over it. There was derogation after derogation. The necessary legislation was brought in in a miserly way, left until the last moment, and, unfortunately, it very often backlashed on the very women to whom it was supposed to grant equality because successive Administrations did not plan for it and did not take it seriously. The legislation that was introduced was too little too late.
>
> Up to now we have not shown any political will to observe the spirit of the law because even when we have introduced legislation to grant equal rights to women the legislation was so contorted that the very law providing for equality has been used against women. I will give one instance because it is important. There was a huge difference between the income of waiters and waitresses in a certain industry, the men earning much more than the women. There was also an unequal division of work in so far as the women had the greatest burden and responsibility. This was deemed to be a case of inequality. It had to go through the slow and tortuous channels such cases have to go through—nobody concedes that there is inequality until the very last minute. The Labour Court came to the extraordinary conclusion that while there was inequality both in terms of income and division of work in this case it could not be decided as it was not an equal case any longer—the women did

much more work than the men. Equal was not equated with equal in this case. These women were denied equal pay on the basis of that contorted and totally negative attitude to equality law.

This Bill would cut across much of the legislation which would have to be brought into this House piece by piece, which, as we all know, can be a long and laborious task. The inclusion of an equality clause in the Constitution would cut across the need for much of this legislation and do away with the necessity of having to bring each case before the Labour Court. It would also indicate the importance we as politicians and legislators attach to equal rights for women. It would show our acceptance of the equality of women not just in the spirit of the law but also in the written law. It is important that such a clause is integrated into the Constitution as it would reverse what the Constitution has done to women down through the decades.

...If this House does not accept the clause which Deputy Mitchell has put forward or, if there are any legal difficulties with it, a comparable one, we will be marginalising, ignoring, undervaluing and undermining women all over again. However, the difference this time is that we will be doing this with 54 years of experience and wisdom behind us. We will be flying in the face of European Community ideals and directives which have ensured the introduction of most of our equality legislation. We will be ignoring the covenants and conventions of the United Nations who promoted a women's decade, from 1975–86, to ensure that all nations acknowledged in spirit as well as in word what has been denied to women for so long. The inclusion of this clause in the Constitution would remove the embarrassment and shame Irish women experience—I should like to think Irish men feel the same—at international fora when we are held up as a model where much still needs to be done in this area and where votes of sympathy are passed to the women of Ireland. We should remember that this is happening in the nineties.

Deputy Mitchell referred to the lack of protection for women. One of the reasons I expect all sides of the House to support this Bill is that for many decades women have been under the illusion that the Constitution protected them in some way.

...Women still believe that the Constitution protects them. I put it to the House that it has not protected them and that it must now

> protect them. It took the Succession Act of the sixties to ensure that women would not be disinherited after 50 or 60 years of marriage. I want to pay tribute to the Taoiseach for introducing that Act. It is appalling to think that women who had been married for so long could have been disinherited. It took until 1976 before women got a guarantee that their houses would not be sold over their heads, without their knowledge. We have yet to bring in a Bill which will give women joint ownership not just of the family home but of the entire property. Even though the Constitution pays some lip service to the work they do in the home women have still not got that protection.
>
> I want to refer to the level of domestic violence against women. This ranges from rape and wife battering to pornography. These issues have to be addressed seriously. The acceptance of the clause proposed by Deputy Mitchell would be one way of dealing with such problems.
>
> In relation to women at work, we have an equal pay Act, an employment equality Act and an Act dealing with maternity leave, yet the majority of women are still in part-time, contract, and under–paid work. Their income is not on the level of men's income. Opportunity for women, even in the public service, is lamentable. If we are serious about removing inequalities for women we must ensure that this clause is included in the Constitution. We must ensure that all legislation is screened so that not alone does it not contain inequalities but that it positively supports the removal of them.

This is another emotional speech, one that centers on the idea of shaming—shaming a government that derogated from its duties, shaming a court that would contort itself and the law to avoid guaranteeing equal pay, shaming an institution that does not explicitly protect women—and the personal experience of feeling shame for being part of a parliament that could continue "marginalising, ignoring, undervaluing and undermining women" (and being made an example for doing so on the international scene). Ultimately, it must be noted, it was determined that the amendment "would add absolutely nothing to the Constitution," (Fianna Fáil TD Vincent Brady), and the bill failed (Houses of the Oireachtas 1991).

One final speech will round out this discussion. On May 4, 2006, the Canadian House of Commons hotly debated a new childcare policy. While members

of other parties debated the exact shape of the bill, MPs from Quebec (which, as I will discuss in the chapter on Canada, already had a significantly more robust childcare system than the one that would be enacted by the bill) debated the federal government's ability to enact a national childcare scheme in Quebec at all. From Bloc Québécois MP Paule Brunelle:

> Mr. Speaker, I would like to speak today about respect and what is needed to provide equitable child care services for all families. Among other things, we must speak about respect: respect for how Quebec is different, for our jurisdictions and powers, for Quebec's financial needs for its day care system, and most importantly, respect for families. We also need to provide more support for families so that they can realize their desire to have children.
>
> Quebec has given a lot of thought to this issue; it has found its solutions and wants its differences to be respected.
>
> Family policy does not fall within the competence of the federal Parliament. Today's debate strikes us as surreal: the Liberals want to convince us that their family policy is the best, the Conservatives want to convince us that their family policy is better than the Liberals', and the New Democrats want to convince us that their family policy is better than that of the Liberals or the Conservatives. But what the three federalist parties need to understand is that family policy does not fall within the competence of this Parliament but rather of Quebec and the provinces. For us in the Bloc Québécois, the best family policy is the family policy that Quebeckers will decide upon on their own; in short, the policy that they themselves will choose.
>
> It is very important for us, therefore, to respect our areas of jurisdiction. We have a day care system that is really in the vanguard of all that is done in North America. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said the following, 'There are, however, positive developments that are important to underline: The extraordinary advance made by Quebec, which has launched one of the most ambitious and interesting early education and care policies in North America. ... none of these provinces showed the same clarity of vision as Quebec in addressing the needs of young children and families.'
>
> ...Quebeckers treasure their early childhood centres. As a woman and a mother, I had the privilege of knowing that my children were

> benefiting from quality services that were accessible at a reasonable price. I was able to witness, first hand, all the benefits for working mothers, who do not have to worry when they leave their children at a day care centre that provides quality services and opportunities for children to socialize and learn.
>
> For Quebeckers, the obstacle to the development of the network is financial and, until sovereignty is achieved, it hinges on resolving the fiscal imbalance. Obviously, we will revisit this issue. Based on the text of this motion, the development of the child care network would fall under a federal child care program.
>
> We understand that, for Canadians outside of Quebec, this may be logical and acceptable. For us, however, this is unacceptable. We already have such a network that works very well. We are at the forefront in this area. This whole child care issue once again illustrates the difference between Quebec and Canada.
>
> In conclusion, as long as Quebec is part of Canada, it will prevent Canada from developing the coherence desired by the rest of the Canadian public, and Canada will prevent Quebec from developing at its own pace. It would be better for us to be good neighbours than a bad couple. Our relations could only be better (Parliament of Canada 2006).

The key identity being defended above is not one of gender. However, Brunelle does draw on her experience as both as woman and a mother to defend Quebec's existing system. She makes a particular call to the worry (or fear) that working mothers may experience when trying (and potentially failing) to secure high–quality and affordable childcare.

One note and three clarifications remain. First, this small selection of speeches does indicate that, at least in some cases, women reference their personal experiences and emotions when building a case for or against legislation that is likely to most directly impact women's lives in the houses of their respective parliaments (with varying degrees of success). There is also some indication that the most relevant emotions to draw on when interested in change are negative—shame, fear, sadness, anger.

Second, identities aren't experienced in isolation, and gender isn't the only identity that matters on the floor of these parliaments. Race, religion, sub–region or constituency, and political party are all key elements of the decision–making calculus that drives the speeches that legislators make. Brunelle's Québécois membership came through clearly in her discussion of the childcare policy,

and much of the pushback for the amendment to the Irish constitution came down to complaints that Fine Gael as a party is too hasty in submitting constitutional amendments. I am not trying to make an argument that these identities are unimportant to parliamentary discourse—or that gender would be the key identity in discussions of other topics. However, there are clear ways in which women's experiences as women (and the emotions attached to them) contribute in meaningful ways to discussions of women's rights and related policies.

Third, others, of course, can be (and often are) supportive of marginalized groups. They can elevate members' voices and press for change in their favor. They can use a similar vocabulary. But their privilege is that they will never be them; they will never live those lives or have those experiences. This suggests that their discourse will be inherently different from members of that group, because we speak differently about things that don't (or that we feel don't) directly affect us. It can be important and still not be personal. It also allows the possibility for them to oppose policy changes that would benefit those groups.

Fourth, it is important to keep in mind that gender socialization is at work in the words that people use and their willingness to display emotions. It is a common gender stereotype that women are emotional, while men are rational. Men are regularly socialized out of showing emotions that could make them appear weak, such as fear. This could be another element driving differences in men's and women's discourse in parliament more generally and then reflected in speeches on this particular topic.

6.2 Hypotheses

My expectations for the discourse around women's economic rights in national parliaments follow directly from the discussion above and from the literature on women's substantive representation. Women legislators are more likely to view the representation of other women as a key aspect of their jobs, which makes them more likely to communicate with cabinet ministers on their constituents' behalf (Esaiasson 2000). It follows from this that the same initiative involved in reaching out to cabinet ministers will manifest itself in an increased willingness to discuss issues related to women's rights on the floors of legislatures. This leads to my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Women MPs are more likely than men to discuss issues related to women's economic rights in their parliamentary speeches.

Additionally, evidence from voting data does indicate that women legislators prioritize similar issues to those prioritized by female voters (Thomas 1994;

Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 1998; Reingold 2000; Wängnerud 2000; Celis 2006). If they prioritize these issues in their vote choices, I expect to also see them supporting these policies with their discourse (particularly through an increased rate of speeches coded as "anticipation" and "joy," which pick up on a number of words related to positive changes.) This leads to my second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: Women MPs are more likely than men to support and celebrate progress for women's rights in their parliamentary speeches.

Finally, women politicians are more likely than men to have a "view of the world as connected and interacting," which makes them more likely to identify the societal root causes (childhood experiences, educational access, adult employment opportunities, etc.) of more immediate concerns (crime rates) under discussion (and also more likely to propose "contextual, multifaceted, and long–term" solutions to these concerns) (Kathlene 1994, pg. 721). Between this perspective and the same shared identities that lead them to prioritize their female constituents with other political actions, I expect that women MPs are likely to demonstrate an increased willingness or ability to relay gendered experiences of suffering under economic inequalities that drive their policy preferences. This leads me to my third hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Women MPs are more likely than men to express negative sentiments—fear, disgust, sadness, and anger—when discussing women's rights in parliamentary speeches.

It is important to note that personal characteristics other than gender are likely to have an impact on the frequency or tone of MPs' speeches. Members of parties with more leftist ideologies will be more likely to speak in support of progress for women's rights (and more likely to use language coded in those negative emotions I discussed above), although party itself has become a weaker identifier of willingness to engage with women's rights over time (Erzeel and Celis 2016). Members with leadership positions (either in the government or in the shadow government) may be more likely to speak (or speak freely) than members of parliament with less status. (Bratton 2005). Length of parliamentary tenure may demonstrate a similar trend, where individuals who have spent longer as an MP are more likely to speak freely on issues that matter to them. Alternatively, freshmen parliamentarians may feel more beholden to their constituents and, thus, be more likely to speak up (Swers 1998).

Additionally, following previous literature, I expect that as women's share of seats increases (Celis 2006), discussions of and support for women–friendly

policies will also increase (as will negative sentiments related to discussions of the societal problems that these policies are designed to address). The presence of a women serving as the head of government is likely to be associated with similar trends. However, a conservative–majority parliament will be associated with the opposite trends (Bratton and Ray 2002).

6.3 Introduction to Automated Emotion Analyses

To gather the parliamentary speech data I analyze in the chapters that follow, I wrote web scrapers to retrieve every speech made in the the British, Canadian, and Irish lower houses of parliament from roughly 1988 to 2017. The full collection includes approximately 3 million unique speeches. Of these, less than 1 percent make some mention of the policies identified in Chapter 5. To identify these speeches, I used the dictionary of terms in Table 6.1, which cluster into topics by policy of interest. Applying this dictionary to my corpus of speeches creates a database of the speeches that use at least one of these terms.

Table 6.1: Topic Clusters of Dictionary Terms

Topic	**Dictionary Term**	
Abortion Regulations	abortion	fetus
Childcare Policies	childcare	daycare
Family Leave Policies	family leave	parental leave
	maternal leave	paternal leave
	maternity leave	paternity leave
Work Regulations	work day	work week

Practically speaking, setting up an analysis of these texts is tricky. The sheer number of speeches made over the course of three decades makes hand-coding speeches for topic and degree of support impractical, if not outright impossible. Most automated coding practices, however, rely on dictionaries of "positive" and "negative" words, where each word (or set of words) in a speech would be identified as conveying either a positive or negative sentiment and the speech itself would receive a score determined by its proportions of positive and negative words. Early attempts to apply this type of dictionary to the speech data demonstrated that this approach would be ineffective for this analysis. In a simple binary classification, positive versus negative, there end up being multiple

kinds of "positive" and "negative" speeches; speeches praising a policy approach and speeches declaring that women's rights are fully respected (indicating that no further efforts are needed) are both coded as positive, and speeches pointing out women's struggle for equality or disagreeing with a policy approach are both coded as negative based on the language that they share in common. A more fine-grained approach to the text analysis is required, one that picks up on the distinctions among these different sentiments.

Thus, I adopt an eight-emotion classification for the analysis: anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust. These sentiments come from the NRC lexicon (Mohammad and Turney 2013) from the `sentiments` dataset in the `tidytext` package in `R` (Silge and Robinson 2017). NRC is a crowd-sourced lexicon that associates words with common emotions. Through the sentiment analysis, each speech receives a set of scores based on the number of times it uses words that evoke one of the identified emotions. The speech's final classification is the emotion (or emotions) from which it draws the most words. A brief sample of the NRC lexicon is displayed in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Sample of NRC Lexicon

Emotion	**Sample Terms**		
Anger	abolish	effigy	meddle
	carnage	gibberish	recalcitrant
Anticipation	allure	endeavor	linger
	board	gradual	momentum
Disgust	abject	liar	tetanus
	carnage	measles	unclean
Fear	carnage	mistaken	omnipotence
	irrational	monster	paranoia
Joy	accomplish	diamond	luxury
	allure	flattery	resources
Sadness	carnage	mausoleum	resigned
	flaw	measles	worn
Surprise	allure	chance	pang
	break	gawk	undiscovered
Trust	clean	honor	neutrality
	guarantee	inclusion	resources

There are a three main things to note about the lexicon. First, it was not developed on the kinds of texts (parliamentary speeches) to which I will be applying it. NRC was crowdsourced, built by random Mechanical Turk workers responding to standalone words (compared to other lexicons, which have been built off of words in contexts such as movie reviews). The use of lexicons that were not created within the context in which they will be used can introduce some random error into the analysis. Second, not all words have associated emotions. This includes extremely common words, or "stop words," which are generally removed from text data before analysis. It also includes less common words that are identified as neutral, apply to all of the sentiments, or otherwise outside of the bounds of the emotions in this lexicon, such as "accent," "adopt," "army," "heart," "linear," and "rebound." Third, the emotion categories are not mutually exclusive, as you see with "allure," which appears in anticipation, joy, and surprise, and "carnage," which appears in anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise.

Here's how the lexicon works in practice. Take the following speech made by British Labour MP Alice Mahon on January 22, 1988:

> Does the Hon. Gentleman share my concern about what happened before the 1967 Act, when the foetus was stabbed by a knitting needle or a screwdriver? I had direct experience of that, as I was a nurse in the wards which received the victims of backstreet abortionists and women who had had self-induced abortions. It was horrific. At least now abortions take place in clean, clinically controlled environments. There was more suffering, pain and anguish for women then than there is now.

In this quote, Mahon expresses severe concerns about rolling back abortion protections. She conveys her personal, devastating experiences as a nurse from before the (partial) legalization of abortion, implies that rolling back protections will lead to more "suffering, pain, and anguish" for women, and indicates that the current system is an improvement over that time.

The emotions ascribed to this speech by the NRC lexicon are broken down in Table 6.3. We can see again that words (and speeches) can be classified as conveying more than one emotion. "Horrific," for example, falls under anger, disgust, fear, and sadness, and "suffering" is classified under disgust, fear, and sadness. "Gentleman," "share," "nurse," and "clean" fall under trust. The modal emotions for this speech are fear, sadness, and trust—all of which we would expect based on the speech itself.

Table 6.3: Applied Lexicon: Negative Emotions in the UK

Emotion	**Classified Terms**		
Anger	horrific	anguish	
Anticipation	share		
Disgust	horrific	suffering	
Fear	horrific	suffering	anguish
	pain		
Joy	share	clean	
Sadness	horrific	suffering	anguish
	pain		
Surprise			
Trust	gentleman	share	nurse
	clean		

In comparison, there is this speech, made by British Labour MP Stella Creasy on June 29, 2017:

> Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I am grateful to all the Members who have supported the rights of Northern Irish women to have equal access to abortion. I am delighted by today's announcement from the Government and satisfied by the commitments that I have had from the Minister responsible to work with the sector. On that basis, I am happy not to move the amendment today. Let us send a message to women everywhere that in this Parliament their voices will be heard and their rights upheld.

Here, Creasy expresses gratitude for and faith in her fellow MPs and the efforts they have made. She closes with a triumphant and proud announcement that Parliament respects women's rights and that the world will now know. Words such as "delighted," "satisfied," and "happy" contribute to this speech's modal emotions being anticipation, joy, and trust.

The full emotion breakdown of this speech appears in Table 6.4. This example demonstrates two challenges inherent to the NRC lexicon, particularly as it applies to this analysis. First, in this speech, we can see that "abortion" is coded, whereas in the previous speech, "abortions" was not. This is a weakness present in many automated text analysis algorithms. In this case, the package only picks up exact matches that it finds within the lexicon. There are two

Table 6.4: Applied Lexicon: Positive Emotions in the UK

Emotion	**Classified Terms**		
Anger			
Anticipation	delighted	announcement	happy
Disgust	abortion		
Fear	abortion	government	
Joy	delighted	satisfied	happy
Sadness	abortion		
Surprise	delighted		
Trust	responsible	happy	parliament

primary ways to address this challenge: stemming and lemmatization. Stemming chops off word endings (and sometimes beginnings) in an attempt to get all related words down to their most similar, basic form. Through stemming, "abortion," "abortions," "aborted" and "aborting" would all be stripped down to "abort." However, this strips some of the meaning from the original words used in the speeches ("aborted" may not refer to a fetus, for example, while "abortion" nearly always does). Also, stemming does not always result in complete words, which means that the final stems are unlikely to perfectly match the words in the NRC lexicon. Thus, lemmatization is a better solution for this analysis. Through lemmatization, words are replaced with their base words (their lemmas). After lemmatization, "abortion" and "abortions" would both be represented by "abortion," whereas "aborted" or "aborts" would be replaced with "abort."

Second, the lexicon has coded emotions for words that are going to be very common in parliamentary speeches—like "parliament" (trust) and "government" (fear)—as well as the words that I used to identify the speeches relevant to my analysis—like "abortion" (disgust, fear, and sadness). The concentration of these words in the speeches that I am analyzing could skew my results. To avoid this bias, I removed these and related words from the lexicon before the analysis.

Third, the trust emotion acts as a kind of neutral or baseline category for parliamentary speeches. Something about the common vocabulary used on the parliamentary floor makes this the most frequently identified emotion (by far).

It indicates a general faith in the processes and outputs of the legislative body by the MPs.

6.4 Moving Forward

With this understanding of my data in place, the next section focuses on my expectations for the relationships between speakers and the classifications of their words. In the three chapters that follow, I focus on three specific parliaments I will be analyzing: the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland. It begins with a description of Westminster parliaments and their gendered aspects, which are necessary for understanding the broader shared system under which the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland parliaments operate. Then, explore relevant aspects of each country's background and government—suffrage, women's share of seats in parliament, female heads of government, the contemporary parliamentary environment, and overall support for defamilializing policies. Finally, I perform and discuss the results of a sentiment analysis on a new corpus of parliamentary speeches I scraped from the archives of each country's lower house of parliament.

Chapter 7

The United Kingdom

7.1 Westminster Parliaments

Westminster systems of government, named after the British parliamentary seat (the Palace of Westminster), are bicameral parliamentary systems. Generally speaking, the head of state is a ceremonial position with little influence on day–to–day policy making. In some countries, like the United Kingdom and Canada, this is the spot filled by the monarch. In other countries, such as Ireland, the head of state is a popularly elected president with a fixed term. The head of government is the prime minister, the leader of the political party with the largest number of seats in the lower house (often known as the House of Commons). Upon gaining office, the prime minister appoints the members of the cabinet (known as ministers) from members of his party. The prime minister stays in office until a new party gains a majority or plurality of seats through an election or until the party fails a confidence vote in the assembly.

As the prime minister forms their cabinet, the leader of the party with the next highest number of seats in the lower house of parliament becomes the leader of the formal Opposition party in parliament. They choose members of their own party to fill out a "shadow government." Each of their chosen ministers is assigned to pay special attention to the minister assigned to the same task in the formal government, relevant current events and issues, and upcoming policies.

Parliamentary members are elected for fixed terms. During terms, members of parliament are called together by the initiation of a session (which can range from days to years) by the head of state. At the end of each term, the parliament is dissolved and all members run for reelection.

Daily schedules in parliaments are governed by the Standing Orders, which vary among countries. As a general rule, daily business consists of messages from

the head of state, reports by committees, petitions by members of parliament on behalf of private citizens, questions posed to the prime minister or their cabinet ministers, statements by members, motions for a decision on some matter, and debates. Debate is of particular importance here. In most cases, debates are initiated by a member raising a subject and then moving for debate. The Speaker of the House moderates these debates, attempting to give all sides to the issue equal opportunities to discuss it, as well as maintaining order (and the day's schedule). Following the debate, the Speaker will call for a vote; the outcomes of these votes become resolutions of the House. These debates are all recorded in the Hansard, or the parliamentary record. It should be noted, however, that members can move to remove statements from the official record; this is often the case when one member formally apologizes to another for a remark, for example.(Bognetti et al. 2020).

Collier and Raney (2018, pgs. 437–439) highlight three normative and institutional characteristics of Westminster parliaments that "work in tandem to arguably permit and perpetuate sexism and sexual harassment": the myth of neutrality, adversarial politics, and parliamentary privilege. The broadest, most nebulous threat to gender equality in parliaments is the assumption of gender neutrality. This goes back to the definitions of representation I discussed in Chapter 3. Legislatures are designed with the idea that legislators directly represent the interests of their constituents, regardless of their own demographic characteristics. Furthermore, they are assumed to do so within an institution that is equally representative of all. In reality,

> Men, operating within a hegemonic normative code, have been thought to possess the appropriate skills, knowledge, and temperament to design and maintain the institutions of the state, while most women—assumed to be irrational, fragile, and dependent—have tended to be relegated to supporting roles as low grade clerks, cleaners, tea ladies, and wives... (Chappell and Waylen 2013, pgs. 601–602).

This means that masculinity has been embedded in the deepest operating principles of these institutions, in even the most subtle norms for which behavior is considered acceptable or appropriate. Such operations are unlikely to change even with greater numbers of women filling seats; instead, they receive "censure, ridicule, and harassment" for failing to meet the established (even unwritten) norms of behavior (Chappell and Waylen 2013, p. 603).

One such operating principle is the practice of adversarial politics, whereby members of the governing party propose laws and must defend them against

questions posed by the opposition. Such a system places more value on masculine forms of debate, even yelling, heckling, or "bullying." To have their voices heard, women also participate in this system, further embedding it within the institutional norms of parliament (Collier and Raney 2018, p. 438).

Finally, parliamentary privilege, the guarantee for MPs to execute their freedom of speech without repercussions such as defamation or libel suits, prosecution, or criminal charges, codifies these gender–insensitive norms—and protects them. While this privilege has been lauded as necessary for the successful functioning of parliament, it can also create hurdles for combatting sexual harassment between MPs. In 2015, Canadian MPs who served on the Subcommittee on the Code of Conduct for Members raised the issue of sexual harassment in the House of Commons—and highlighted protections of free speech and parliamentary privilege as one of the primary barriers for combatting it (Collier and Raney 2018, pgs. 438–439).

These three characteristics, Collier and Raney (2018, p. 439) conclude, build an environment that hides the male privilige inherent to these institutions, "demonizes" more traditionally feminine modes of behavior, strips the authority from women MPs during standard parliamentary operations, and prevents victims of sexual assault or harassment from seeking reparations. Each of these elements of the Westminster systems will recur repeatedly in my detailed descriptions below of women and gender in my three cases. For each country (the United Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland), I first briefly present relevant historical information to place current issues related to women's rights into a broader context. I then addresss the process through which women gained suffrage, the presence of women in parliament and the executive, the overall parliamentary environment for women and women's rights, and the state of defamilialization in the country today, as well as presenting a snapshot into the speeches in each country that I will analyze in the formal text analysis at the end of each country's chapter.

7.2 Background

The United Kingdom (formally the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) actually consists of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (as well as a number of territories). In the tenth century, King Athelstan united several Anglo–Saxon kingdoms as the Kingdom of England. Conquest during the centuries that followed led to a rapid expansion of England's territory. The Acts of Union of 1536 and 1542 made Wales a formal part of the Union, followed by Scotland (ruled by England since the early 1600s)

in 1707, which created the Kingdom of Great Britain. Ireland (also under English control since the 1600s) formally joined the union in 1801. Though the Republic of Ireland gained its independence in 1922, six out of the nine counties of the Irish province of Ulster remained as part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Bruce et al. 2019; Josephson 2020).

It has not always been a peaceful union: "Relations between these constituent states and England have been marked by controversy and, at times, open rebellion and even warfare" (Josephson 2020). In the twentieth century, the response to these tensions primarily took the form of the devolution of power from Westminster to the constituent states. In 1998, as part of of the Belfast Agreement that ended the Troubles, the Northern Ireland Assembly was established (Landow and Sergie 2020). In 1999, the UK parliament reestablished the Scottish Parliament (shut down in 1707) and created Wales' National Assembly. The process of devolution continues today. While Scotland and Northern Ireland have established their own legal and justice systems, Wales continues to share England's legal system, and the Parliament of the United Kingdom remains the supreme legislative body for the entire United Kingdom (with the British House of Lords as the final court of appeals) (Bruce et al. 2019). Thus, where relevant, I will focus on the British Parliament's environment and actions in this chapter.

7.3 Suffrage

The Representation of the People Act 1832 formally barred women from voting in England and Wales. Before this time, women holding a sufficient degree of property (and paying the associated taxes) had been able to vote, although women fulfilling these requirements were rare. The 1832 Reform Act, however, simultaneously extended the kinds of property ownership that came with the franchise and defined voters as male. Although there had been some advocates for women's right to vote before this time, the enactment of this bill and the bills extending the male franchise even further (in 1867 and 1884) has been seen as one of the catalysts for the development of the women's suffrage movement.(UK Parliament)

The women's suffrage movement in Britain consisted of two distinct groups of activists: the suffragists and the suffragettes. The suffragists developed first, around the 1850s and 1860s. These were activists who campaigned through *peaceful* means, such as lobbying Members of Parliament and gathering signatures on petitions, for women's right to vote.(UK Parliament) This period did see some advances for women's rights: In 1870, the Married Women's Prop-

erty Act granted women the right to control their own property (a key element of the franchise).(British Library Learning 2018b) In 1880, the Isle of Man extended the franchise to unmarried and widowed property–holding women.(Isle of Man Government 2017) In 1894, the Local Government Act extended the right to vote in local elections to women who owned property.(British Library Learning 2018a)

In 1897, various suffragist groups from across the country joined together as the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), headed by Millicent Garrett Fawcett. The group primarily pushed for the vote for middle class women who owned their own property and relied on profile–raising activities like printing pamphlets and posters and holding public meetings to spread their message. The group grew quickly, reaching a membership of around 54,000 by 1914.(British Library Learning 2018b) However, they were criticized for focusing so exclusively on Parliament, missing opportunities for greater mobilization, and making what was seen as extremely slow progress.(UK Parliament)

These criticisms culminated in the development of the second group of activists for women's suffrage: the suffragettes. In 1903, women who believed that more direct action should be taken to pressure Parliament to grant women the right to vote in national elections on par with men formed the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), headed by Emmeline Pankhurst. Their motto was "Deeds not Words."

The women initially relied on high–profile "disruption and some civil disobedience," including an attempted "rush" on Parliament in 1908 by 60,000 people (that failed when a police cordon held against them) (UK Parliament). When this failed, they began to take more militant actions, where they "staged huge marches and outdoor demonstrations, interrupted political meetings, chained themselves to the railings outside Parliament, and battled with the police." Additionally, they pursued systematic, highly visible property destruction, "pouring acid in mailboxes, breaking windows, defacing artwork in the National Gallery, and tearing up golf courses" (Smith 2017).

On November 18, 1910, 300 suffragettes attempted to storm Parliament. A riot ensued, during which the women endured police brutality, physical assault, and sexual assault. Two women (Cecilia Haig and Henria Williams) died, and 115 were arrested. The date later became known as "Black Friday." Following this date, the suffragettes pursued a widespread campaign of arson and bombings, attacking "MPs' houses, churches, railway stations and post offices." (Myers 2013; Riddell 2018).

From 1908 to 1914, over 1,000 suffragettes were imprisoned for their actions (Smith 2017). Many of the women used hunger strikes to protest their impris-

onment. The government responded by force–feeding them–forcing their jaws open and pouring food into their stomachs through a tube. In 1913, the Prisoners (Temporary Discharge for Ill Health) Act (also known as the "Cat and Mouse Act") was introduced, which allowed for the discharge of suffragettes who had starved themselves to the point of nearly irreparable harm. They could then re-arrest them afterwards, when they had recuperated (Fenton 2005; Myers 2013).

It should be noted that distinctions between the suffragists and suffragettes were not always clear. The WSPU splintered in 1907, when some members (unhappy with their violent approaches) created a third group, called the Women's Freedom League (WFL). The WFL pursued "peaceful lawbreaking," such as demonstrating and refusing to pay taxes or contribute to the census. Furthermore, all three groups—the NUWSS, the WSPU, and the WFL worked together at times (British Library Learning 2018a).[20]

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 led most women's suffrage organizations and activists to shift their focus to supporting the war effort. It's estimated that 2 million women replaced men who were drafted out of the labor force and into the military between 1914 and 1918 (although they were still paid less for performing the same work). The demonstration of women's abilities to perform "men's work" significantly contributed to changing norms around women's role in society and furthered their original cause (UK Parliament).

In 1918, the Representation of the People Act extended men's suffrage to all men over the age of 21, abolished property requirements for men's right to vote, and granted the right to vote to women over 30 (as long as they were married to or were a member of the Local Government Register). This added 8.5 million women to the voting pool. In 1928, the Equal Franchise Act lowered the regulations on women's voting to match men's, bringing the number of women in the voting pool to 15 million (UK Parliament).

7.4 Female Members of Parliament

Legally, women were allowed to run for parliamentary office the same year that they (or some of them) got the vote, 1918. In 1918, Constance Markievicz was elected to the Commons. However, her membership from Sinn Féin kept her from taking her seat.[21] Therefore, the first woman to formally take a seat in the House of Commons was Vicountess Nancy Astor, in 1919. She was elected to fill the seat formerly filled by her husband, Viscount Astor, after he entered the peerage and left the Commons for the House of Lords and is known to have

[20] It should also be noted that there is very little evidence of women of color participating in the women's suffrage movement in Britain. A recent BBC article notes that this could be for one of two reasons. First, people of color (particularly women of color) represented an extremely small percentage of the population until after World War II. Second, it is possible that they did participate, and they have been " 'hidden from history.' " There is some evidence of participation by Indian women (Crawford 2018).

[21] Sinn Féin is a cross–border political party for Ireland and Northern Ireland with the goal of Irish unification. Its members run (and are elected) on an abstentionist policy, whereby they seek electoral legitimacy but never take up their seats in (or salaries from) Westminster as a protest against British power over Ireland (O'Loughlin 2019).

been a vocal supporter of the women's movement for the duration of her time in office (UK Parliament).



Figure 7.1: Women's Share of the UK House of Commons, 1988–2017

By 1988, women filled only 6 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. This had risen to 18.2 percent (and 7.5 percent of the seats in the House of Lords) by December 1997, leading the United Kingdom to rank 20th in the world for women's share of parliamentary seats (more of an indication of the dire situation of women's political power across the world than a particular achievement) (Inter–Parliamentary Union 2020). By December 2007, it had fallen to 60th in the world (tied with Cambodia), with women filling 19.5 percent of the seats in the House of Commons and 19.7 percent of seats in the House of Lords (Inter–Parliamentary Union 2020). As of December 2018, the UK ranks 39th in the world, with 32 percent of seats in the House of Commons filled by women and 25.7 percent in the House of Lords.(Inter–Parliamentary Union 2020). As in Canada, the 2017 elections were touted as the most diverse yet. In this parliament, 45 out of 650 MPs in the House of Commons identify as LGBT, 52 are members of ethnic minority groups, and 208 are women (up from 191 in the 2015 elections). This election also brought two MPs who have publicly acknowledged disabilities into office—Marsha de Cordova, who is blind, and Jared O'Mara, who has cerebral palsy hemiparesis (Wilson 2017). This diversity has not yet spread to the cabinet ministers, where currently only 4 out of 22 are women (Gov.UK).

7.5 Female Heads of State and Government

7.5.1 Queen Elizabeth II

While considered primarily a figurehead, Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom (and 15 other countries of the Commonwealth) is the longest-reigning queen regnant in world history, the longest-reigning British monarch, and the longest-reigning living monarch in the world (Addley 2016; The History Press). She acceded to the throne in 1952, at 25. In 2020, she will have ruled for 68 years (The Royal Household).

It is difficult to connect the queen with specific policies in the United Kingdom. Although she meets weekly with the Prime Minister, there are no records of these meetings, and she is legally bound to be politically neutral, a policy she deliberately and carefully maintains in public. In fact, some have dubbed her "Elizabeth the Silent" for her stark commitment to being apolitical (Oppenheim 2016b; Erlanger and Castle 2015).

7.5.2 Margaret Thatcher

Where the monarch of the United Kingdom is a symbolic head of state, the prime minister is the head of government, directing both the executive and legislative branches. Although this differed in earlier periods of history, today the prime minister always sits as a member of the House of Commons. To date, the United Kingdom has had two female prime ministers, who served a combined fifteen years in office: Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and Theresa May (2016-2019).

Margaret Thatcher, the UK's first female head of government, took office in 1979. Serving for 11 years, she was the country's longest-serving prime minister of the 20th century. Her time in office was marked by opposing forces with regards to women's rights—although her own experience demonstrates a significant step forward for the kinds of political roles women could (and would) fill, she did not use her time in office to support other women. In fact, she regularly and explicitly dismissed issues of gender equality (Lakhani 2013).

Reports and remembrances of Thatcher split primarily into two camps with regards to how they discuss her gender: those that characterize her as the Iron Lady (or, more generally, as a bitch) and those that characterize her as a flirt–in the words of French President Francois Mitterand, "She has the eyes of Caligula but the mouth of Marilyn Monroe" (Kenny 2009). Each standpoint is used to discuss both her strengths as a leader and her weaknesses. With regards to her strengths,

> She outfoxed the men in political strategy; she outlasted them in stamina and showed a steelier backbone than they did when she dispatched the Navy to recapture the Falkland Islands and told George Bush senior not to "go wobbly" over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
>
> At the same time, she managed to meet most of the men's expectations of women. She was married, with twins. She could look domestic or glamorous as required. She could flirt if she chose... Her feminine side was the ultimate weapon she could use to disarm adversaries. Venus or Mars, "soft power" or "hard power," Mrs. Thatcher could deploy either or both as required (The Independent 2005).

Her supporters laud her for "rescu[ing] the nation from a post-war Socialist decadence with a weak currency, feeble business spirit, ineffective incentives and an interventionist, consensus government" (Vallely 2013).

For her critics, though, Thatcher was one of the first (and is certainly one of the most well-known) women to carry the mantle of the Iron Lady, a moniker that referenced both her tough and no-nonsense style and also denoted her as uncompromising and occasionally heartless in her approach to politics (Simmons 2016). As the education secretary, she ended the practice of giving free milk to school children, which earned her another nickname: "Margaret Thatcher, Milk Snatcher." As prime minister, she privatized a number of previously nationalized industries, deregulated the financial sector, and curtailed union powers. The poll tax she advocated led to riots. Her critics highlight the damage that her "aggressive" policies (known as Thatcherism) inflicted on the manufacturing industry and the increased poverty gap, as well as her demonstrated "lack of compassion for those whose lives and careers were disrupted by her policies" (White 2013). Television satirists represented her as a man (Bowman 1989). [22]

Simultaneously, she was criticized for "playing with female stereotypes":

> She irritatingly played the feminine card whenever it suited her purposes. The Iron Lady could melt winningly and even shed a tear when needed. She compared the economy to running a household budget and was ever ready for a cosy chat in the No 10 kitchen with any undemanding magazine interviewer who would be content with a girlie giggle over the decor or a discussion about what she made Dennis for his dinner (Murray 2013).

This description of Thatcher overlaps with stories of how she related to male MPs. She was described as "'coquettish' in giving way to frequent inter-

[22] Thatcher also used racist rhetoric more than once. Leading into her election, she remarked that the UK was "swamped by people of a different culture." She also strongly opposed sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa, referring to the anti-apartheid African National Congress as "a typical terrorist organization" while claiming to be against apartheid herself (Borger 2013).

ruptions from Labour" and accused of flirting with some of the younger MPs. With a single exception, all of her cabinet members were men, and "With few exceptions the men are said to have been scared of her, if not wets then wimps" (White 2013). The least generous description of this phenomenon states that "she simply was the kind of woman who would surround herself with sycophantic and adoring male admirers who would dance to her tune" (White 2013).

Criticisms of Thatcher were also marked (and gendered) within Parliament. The Labour Party's Communications Director described her first televised speech from the Commons as "shrill and hectoring" (Bowman 1989). Male Labour MPs "chanted 'ditch the bitch' when she entered the Commons. They called her Attila the Hen and likened her voice to 'a perfumed fart"' (Vallely 2013). When she faced the resignation of her chancellor, Nigel Lawson, MP Austin Mitchell stated, "It's been a touching spectacle: the brave little woman getting on with the woman's work of trying to dominate the world" (Bowman 1989). In an interview, Tory MP Emma Nicholson said, "They will use anything to attack the Prime Minister and I think they are sacrificing their acceptance of women as equals to get at her" (Bowman 1989).

Thatcher's time as prime minister was an inescapable form of symbolic representation, a sign of what women were capable of in the political realm. While she experienced intense dislike from parts of parliament and the country, she also demonstrated that women politicians could be strong and powerful, effective and valid. There were few calls to avoid women in high political offices after she resigned (Hooper 2013).

That being said, Margaret Thatcher was not a feminist—was, in fact, regularly criticized for her lack of solidarity with other women and with feminists (Walter 2012). She supported "patriarchal ways of running the state" (Lakhani 2013), was accused of a "tendency to pull the ladder of equal opportunity up behind her," and publicly demonstrated her belief that "a woman must rise through merit," and that "There must be no discrimination," in the face of calls for positive action and concerns about the almost complete lack of women in her cabinet (Murray 2013). In her own words, she believed that "The battle for women's rights has been largely won" (Fetters 2013). Women must succeed on equal footing with men—with no attention to systemic inequalities or barriers. This was further reflected in her avoidance of discussing topics perceived as women's issues and her indifference (or hostility) to the needs of working women (Bowman 1989).

Thatcher seemingly did not *want* to be a symbol as a female prime minister, viewing her own sex as "an irrelevancy" (Fetters 2013). Thus,

> She was the Mummy, the Nanny, the Governess, the Wife, the Matron, the Flirt or Boudicca, depending on which role was required for any given moment, but woe betide the hapless hack who asked what it was like to be a woman PM. "I have no idea, dear," she would sneer, "as I have never experienced the alternative." "I didn't get here by being a strident female," she once intoned. "I don't like strident females" (Murray 2013).

That being said, Thatcher was not worse in most ways than the male politicians who have held that office, but she did face "especial hatred, base insults and grotesque mockery" in a dramatic display of "misogynist backlash against female leadership " (The Guardian 2012). When she resigned, people sang "Ding Dong! The Witch Is Dead" outside of Downing Street (Vallely 2013). When she died, there was a social media campaign to make the song a bestseller. It hit the number 10 spot on the charts and was on its way to reaching one of the top three spots in the week following her demise (O'Carroll 2013). Hundreds of revelers staged parties in the street in which the chanted "Maggie, Maggie, Maggie, Dead, Dead, Dead," and ate "Maggie death cake" (Hooper 2013).

7.5.3 Theresa May

Theresa May took office as Prime Minister in 2016 and served for three years. Her time in office was defined by navigating the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union ("Brexit") and characterized by regular comparisons with Margaret Thatcher. On a policy and personal level, May demonstrated a mixed record with regards to supporting women's rights.

One woman prime minister on the books did not guarantee an easier path for the second. In fact, research has determined that May experienced greater gendered news coverage than Thatcher had 40 years before. One study found that the *Daily Telegraph*, a mainstream newspaper, discussed May's gender at nearly double the rate of Thatcher's, and they were more likely to write about her appearance, too (Purtill 2020). Another study, which analyzed Twitter data, found that May also received triple the number of "derogatory comments related to her gender" as Jeremy Corbyn, the opposition leader (Hervey 2018).

Public comments about May split into two primary camps—those discussing her personality (as it related to her ability to lead) and those that were oddly obsessed with her shoes. Following the announcement that she would be the next prime minister, one newspaper ran the headline "Heel, Boys" with a closeup picture of her feet in heels. Another ran the headline "Theresa May: The vicar's daughter in kitten heels who will be our new Prime Minister." This particular

article also addressed her lack of children: "The 'headmistress in high heels' may not be a mother…but she is defined by being a daughter" (Retter 2016). A third article stated, "Yes, Mrs. May works a good shoe…but she doesn't flirt or use feminine wiles to get her way" (Thomas 2016). These are a few examples of a more common trend–one that centered on her shoes but neither stopped nor started there.

As home secretary, May was subjected to copious amounts of news coverage related to two instances in which her clothing showed a small amount of cleavage, leading to headlines referring to the "busty budget" and a "boob–boosting push–up bra" and articles referring to her as "May-dy in red" (Bates 2016; Culbertson 2017). As Prime Minister, May once gave an at-home interview regarding her background and Brexit. The key takeaway from the interview appeared to be neither topic; rather, the most widely debated aspect of the interview had to do with May's £995 leather pants, an incident that became known as "Trousergate." Critics highlighted the "flamboyant" style as well as the price, arguing that both suggested that May was out of touch with the average person—although pushback noted that the previous PM, David Cameron, regularly wore £3,500 suits and received no similar criticisms (Ferrier 2016; Elgot 2016; Moseley 2016; Wilford 2017). Additionally, another widely circulated (and widely debated) headline referring to a meeting between May and first minister Nicola Sturgeon read, "Never mind Brexit, who won Legs-it!" alongside a photo of both women, framed to place their legs front and center. The article discussed the women's legs, the way they were sitting, their choice of tights, and the "direct attempt at seduction" (BBC 2017b).

Media coverage of May's personality refers to her as awkward, disengaged, and robotic (or as the "Maybot" (Crace 2019);"inflexible, introverted, and surly"; "grumpy and entitles"; and "not particularly pleasant" to be around (Busby 2019). Most commonly, however, it refers to her as weak, as beginning to "crumble" during the general election campaign (Busby 2019), and as being cautious bordering on indecisive ("Theresa Maybe" (The Economist 2017)). Headlines included, "Weak Theresa May is destined to fail–but it may not be Brexit that brings her down" (Rentoul 2018); "Theresa May's 'Profoundly Weak, Surprisingly Stable' Leadership" (Serhan 2017); and "Theresa May 'Literally Too Weak to Resign,' Schick Says" (Schick 2019).

Members of Parliament also criticized the prime minister in gendered ways. Leading up to her selection as PM, MP Ken Clarke described May as a "bloody difficult women" as part of a series of criticisms of all of the candidates–a phrase that became a popular expression of pride on Twitter (Mason and Asthana 2016). In an interview on International Women's Day in 2017, Lord Michael Heseltine

(previously an advisor to the Government) suggested that May had a "man-sized job to do and [was] very busy" (Stone 2017). Following a difficult Brexit meeting, one MP said, "She looked like Alice in Wonderland when she drank that potion, shrinking in her chair" (Stewart and Elgot 2019). Most notably, during Prime Minister's Questions in 2018, Jeremy Corbyn called May a "stupid woman" under his breath—an event which he denied (claiming instead that he muttered, "stupid people"); he was not required by Speaker John Bercow to apologize (The Belfast Telegraph 2018).

It was clear from the beginning of her term that May would face regular comparisons to Thatcher. The same newspaper with the "Heel, Boys" headline also ran a "Maggie May in at No. 10" headline the day it was announced that May would be the next prime minister. (Margaret Thatcher was commonly called Maggie during her time in office) (Britton 2016). However, the two women had markedly different approaches to women's rights. As home secretary, May guaranteed "actions not words" with regards to violence against women and gender equality. In 2015, she introduced a law that criminalized emotional and financial abuse (and followed it with a national inquiry into police handling of abuse allegations). Under her leadership, the government pushed through mandatory sex and relationships education in schools, covering topics such as consent, respect, contraception, and reproductive rights (Norris 2017). As an MP, she voted for legislation removing the tampon tax and requiring gender pay gap reporting and lobbied for more highly paid and more flexible maternity leave (Saul 2017; Gill 2019; Levin 2019). She also founded the "Women2win" initiative geared at getting more Conservative women elected to Parliament in 2005–and appointed a woman, Amber Rudd, as home secretary during her term as Prime Minister (Freeman 2016). And in 2017, during Prime Minister's Questions, she affirmed that all sexual abuse allegations within Parliament should be taken directly to the police for investigation, not handled in house, as they sometimes were (BBC 2017c).

But not all of May's policies–or rhetoric–can be counted as a win for gender equality. As an MP, she repeatedly voted for (or abstained from voting on) legislation adding restrictions to abortion. She also voted for capping welfare spending and against excluding child benefits from benefit caps (two policies that will have twice the negative impact on women that they have on men) (Saul 2017; Osborne 2016; Norris 2017).

As PM, she did nothing to address "'the state–sanctioned abuse of women' at Yarl's Wood detention centre," where foreign nationals are held before being deported. Her government continued (and increased) nation–wide austerity measures with a 30 percent budget reduction in funding to local govern-

ments, which provide services on which women (particularly women of color and women with disabilities) disproportionately rely. Women are estimated to bear 85 percent of the financial burden of these budget reductions–including one–third of domestic violence victims being turned away from shelters after the vast majority had their budgets slashed (Levin 2019). The Tories also reinstated two of their members suspended after allegations of sexual misconduct so that they could participate in (and potentially save) May's no–confidence vote (Kentish 2018). Although she pledged to create a new Office for Tackling Injustices (OfTI) to address "disparities over race, gender, deprivation, sexuality and disability" (Savage 2020), this office never materialized.

Ultimately, May herself fell victim to the anti-female phenomenon known as the "glass cliff," where "Women are more likely to be appointed to leadership roles during a decline or chaotic moment" (Rohrich 2019) and then blamed for negative outcomes (Ryan and Haslam 2005). She became PM soon after the UK voted for Brexit, after which her predecessor resigned. While May herself campaigned against Brexit, after becoming PM, she complied with the vote to leave. Her subsequent struggles to gain support for her Brexit deal (along with a series of policies and responses to crises that made her look unsympathetic to the general population (McGee 2019) led for calls for her resignation. May, like many women, do not have the luxury of turning down potentially precarious leadership opportunities in favor of waiting for something better to come along—and she, as others have before her, paid the price by stepping down.(Rohrich 2019; Stern 2019).

Ironically, the final Brexit deal looked shockingly similar to the deal May negotiated (BBC 2020).

7.6 The Contemporary Parliamentary Environment

7.6.1 Myth of Neutrality

The British parliament demonstrates each of the gendered weaknesses of Westminster parliaments that I summarized above: the myth of neutrality, adversarial politics, and parliamentary privilege. The effects of the myth of neutrality are subtle. They are found in all examples of women MPs engaging (or attempting to engage) in standard parliamentary processes and receiving pushback for not being men. They are found in references to Theresa May needing to perform "a man-sized job" (and all references to women MPs' clothes and bodies, made because they look different from the expected, male MP). They are found in

the lack of proxy voting for new parents when new mothers are likely to face significantly more challenges in returning to the chamber to vote around the birth of their children (Buchan 2019). They are found in members from opposition parties breaking pairing arrangements with MPs on parental leave (in which a party agrees to keep one of their own MPs from voting when an MP from the opposing party must miss a vote for a compelling reason) (Sabbagh and Elgot 2018) and when new parents on parental leave receive unfair criticism for missing votes (Buchan 2019). They are found in Conservative MP Andrew Robothan assuming that Labour MP Stella Creasy was someone's assistant or a researcher and telling her not to use an MP elevator (McSmith 2013) and in Labour MP Dawn Butler, a black woman, being told she should use the cleaner's elevator (Butler 2018).

Although adversarial politics (discussed in more detail below) are an expected part of parliamentary proceedings, women who participate in them are often treated very differently than their male colleagues. In 2011, Labour MP Angela Eagle heckled PM David Cameron during Prime Minister's Questions as he discussed the government's NHS reforms. Cameron responded by telling her repeatedly to "calm down, dear." Calling women MPs "dear" is a patronizing attempt to discredit their voices in the chamber, and this wasn't a standalone event—in the aftermath, Labour MP Caroline Flint recounted being told to "just get behind the programme then, dear" by Conservative MP Eric Pickles the previous December (Wintour 2011).

7.6.2 Adversarial Politics

Women are also the focus of adversarial politics in very different ways than their male colleagues. In 2017, newly elected Liberal Democrat MP Layla Moran stood to ask her first question during Prime Minister's Questions–a question about the provision of what had been advertised as free childcare for her constituents (but what had, in reality, fallen far short of the promises). However, she had barely begun to speak when MPs sitting on the opposite benches erupted into laughter and jeering. Speaker John Bercow's response was to call for order and for the crowd to let the "highly articulate lady" speak, rather than to address the broader problem of bullying in parliament, particularly the bullying of women MPs (Revesz 2017).

Also in 2017, a Conservative MP woofed at Scottish National Party MP Tasmina Ahmed–Sheikh. He termed the act a "friendly canine salute" because he felt she had "snapped" at Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson during a speech she made. He did later "apologise to the Honourable Lady if she was offended" (BBC 2017d).

These are actually more subtle examples of gendered heckling in the chamber. In 2013, Labour MP Sarah Champion reported that male Conservative MPs regularly "[pretend] to juggle imaginary breasts and [jeer] 'melons' as women made Commons speeches." A 2004 study found that male MPs of all parties commonly engaged in this behavior (BBC 2013).

7.6.3 Parliamentary Privilege

Parliamentary privilege has resulted in a general air of lack of accountability. In 2009, Conservative MP Sir Nicholas Winterton slapped Labour MP Natascha Engel's bottom while the two were in line for refreshments in the Commons tea room. She did not make a formal complaint, noting that she would prefer not to have her bottom slapped but that he was just a "silly old man." No further actions were taken (The Telegraph 2009).

However, there have also been numerous complaints that male MPs have abused House of Commons staff, with women reporting that they had been "pushed against walls, forcibly kissed, groped and slapped by MPs." None of the complaints have progressed to being addressed through formal channels such as mediation (Cook and Day 2018). And as I discussed above, two Conservative MPs (Andrew Griffiths and Charlie Elphicke) who had been accused of sexual misconduct and suspended, had the whip restored to them in order to let them participate in the vote of no confidence in the (Conservative) prime minister (Syal 2018). Although women MPs have not been identified as being directly affected in these allegations, the disregard for due process in investigating the allegations further contributes to the air of male MPs being able to do or say anything to the women around them and get away with it.

This privilege for male MPs to speak and act without fear of reprisal leads directly to further abuse against women MPs—and fewer women MPs. In 2019, Labour MP Paula Sherriff, Labour MP Tracy Brabin, and Liberal Democrat MP Jo Swinson asked PM Boris Johnson to moderate his language when discussing the Brexit deal. Johnson regularly used words marked as pejorative to describe legislation designed to block a no-deal Brexit, including "Surrender Act," "betrayal," and "traitor." The three women expressed concerns that similar language was being used against them in threats they received against themselves and their loved ones and asked for the change in language so that they might feel safe going about their jobs. Johnson's only response was, "I have to say, Mr. Speaker, I've never heard such humbug in all my life" (BBC 2019c) Women MPs who leave politics regularly report that abuse and threats such as these are a key factor in their decision to go (Scott 2019).

7.7 Defamilialization

The way the British parliament treats its women is reflected in its low support for policies that are respectful of women's economic rights. As I identified in the ropeladder plot in Chapter 5, the United Kingdom falls third from the bottom on the list of OECD countries with regards to its defamilialization score, and the improvements it made from 1990 to 2010 are minimal. This in comparison with the most highly developed (and most gender equal) countries in the world, however; it certainly doesn't mean that the UK does not have any women–friendly economic policies in place. Thus, in this section, I will present the UK approach to key policy areas identified as significant by my measurement model–family leave, childcare, workweek regulations and abortion regulations. In the following section, I perform and present the results of an analysis of the discourse around these policies in the British parliament.

7.7.1 Family Leave Policies

The UK updated its family leave policies in 2015. As of 2020, two weeks of maternity leave are compulsory after giving birth (four weeks if the mother works in a factory). Mothers (who qualify) can take up to 52 weeks of this leave, with the first 26 weeks labeled "ordinary maternity leave" and the remaining 26 weeks labeled "additional maternity leave." This leave is only paid for 39 weeks. The first 6 weeks of leave are paid at 90 percent of their average weekly earnings before taxes, and the remaining time is paid at either the same rate or at £151.20 per week (whichever is lower). Qualifications include earning at least £120 per week, giving correct notice to employers, and having worked continuously for an employer for at least 26 weeks.

Those who do not qualify (including individuals who are self-employed, those who are recently unemployed, or those who have not worked long enough for their employer) for this policy (Statutory Maternity Leave) may qualify for a Maternity Allowance, instead. This approach sometimes pays the same as the Statutory Maternity Leave policy above and sometimes pays as little as £27 a week for 39 weeks or £27 per week for 14 weeks.

Employers are required to give pregnant employees paid time off to go to medical appointments and parenting classes. Partners also benefit here; employers are obligated to give them paid time off to attend at least two of these appointments (which includes adoption appointments). Additionally, there are a variety of benefits and tax credits (including a £500 first child grant) for new parents.

Employees taking time off for their partner having a baby or who are adopting a baby are eligible for 1 to 2 weeks of leave (deemed "paternity leave," regardless of the gender of the partner), paid at the same rate as maternity leave. Eligibility for this leave is the same as for maternity leave. However, taking advantage of the paid time off to attend adoption appointments negates the possibility of paternity leave or pay.

There is also the possibility of partners sharing the maternity leave after the compulsory two weeks—up to 50 weeks and up to 37 weeks paid between the two partners. This leave can be taken either all at once or in blocks of time and either together or separately. However, critics have noted that to be eligible, both partners must fulfill continuous employment requirements leading up to the birth or adoption; the Trades Union Congress has pointed out that this means that two out of five fathers will not be eligible for shared parental leave (Peachey 2015).

Parents can take up to 18 weeks of unpaid leave per child (until that child turns 18). Reasons for taking this leave include partners taking time off around the birth or adoption of their child, looking for new schools or childcare arrangements, and spending more time with their children. However, there is a limit of 4 weeks of unpaid parental leave per child per year, and the parent must have worked for the company for more than a year (and not be self-employed, a contract worker, or a foster parent). There are also (unpaid) allowances for short–term emergencies, as well as the possibility of using annual leave or the parental leave for longer–term caregiving situations (Gov.UK).

7.7.2 Provision of Public Daycare

The compulsory age for starting school in the UK is 5, although many children start the September after they turn 4. While EnglandNote that there are different policies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. has not provided for free daycare for all children under 5, they have instituted free daycare for children aged 3 and 4 (and some 2–year–olds) with approved providers. This is usually set at 570 free hours, generally taken as 15 hours per week for 38 weeks. However, some parents qualify for an additional 570 hours (or 30 hours of childcare per week. This primarily applies to partners who both work full–time (Gov.UK).

7.7.3 Workweek Regulations

Workweek hours are capped at 48, averaged over 17 weeks. However, there are numerous exceptions to this rule, including members of the military and police, domestic workers, and people working in places where 24–hour staffing is

required. Moreover, employees can voluntarily opt out of this policy and work more hours per week, either temporarily or indefinitely, as long as they do so in writing. The policy states that while employers may request that employees opt out, they cannot be required to do so (including being fired or otherwise mistreated for refusing). There are exceptions to this exception, though, primarily for safety reasons—airline personnel, delivery drivers of heavy loads, etc. (Gov.UK).

7.7.4 Abortion Regulations

Before the 1967 Abortion Act, abortions were completely illegal in the United Kingdom. The 1967 Act allowed them up to 28 weeks of pregnancy; this was reduced to 24 weeks in 1990. Abortions after 24 weeks are allowed only to save the life of the mother, in the case of severe fetal abnormalities, and "risk of grave physical and mental injury" to the mother. Abortions are generally free under the national health insurance, although individuals may opt into paying for them. However, there are still significant barriers in place: the procedure must be approved by two doctors, who must both agree that "having the baby would pose a greater risk to the physical or mental health of the woman than a termination" (BBC 2019e). Pregnant minors do not need parental approval (UK National Health Service 2020).

While this is the case for England, Scotland, and Wales, Northern Ireland is another case entirely. Until 2019, abortions were almost entirely prohibited there, allowed only to save the mother's life (and not in cases of rape, incest, or even fatal fetal abnormalities) (BBC 2019e). In the fall of 2019, Westminster pushed through legislation decriminalizing abortion (under a bill proposed by Labour MP Stella Creasy) while the Northern Irish parliament was not operating as normal (McDonald 2020). Under this new legislation, neither women who have an abortion nor health providers who help them can face criminal charges. Additionally, women can travel to England, Scotland, or Wales to have an abortion under those policies and have both their travel and accommodation paid for. Abortions before 12 weeks, in circumstances of severe fetal abnormalities, and to save the life of the mother can now legally be performed in hospitals in Northern Ireland (BBC 2019e). The actual provision of services, though, is lagging behind what has been promised (Oppenheim 2020).

7.8 Text Analysis



Figure 7.2: UK House of Commons Speeches by Topic, 1988–2017

My web scrapers retrieved every speech made in the United Kingdom's House of Commons from 1988 to 2017, creating a collection of over 935,000 unique speeches. Of these, fewer than 7,000 (or less than 1 percent) use the language related to women's economic rights identified in Table 6.1. For a summary of how references to these topics have shifted over time, refer to Figure 7.2. Here, we see that while work day and week regulations have remained largely unaddressed, childcare and (to a smaller degree) family leave and abortion have experienced a series of spikes in usage over the years covered by my data—in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the late 1990s, and the mid– to late–2000s. Childcare, already discussed at much higher rates than all of the other policies, continues to spike off and on in subsequent years, although it demonstrates a rapid decline in mentions beginning in 2015.



Figure 7.3: UK Abortion Speeches by MP Gender, 1988–2017



Figure 7.4: UK Childcare Speeches by MP Gender, 1988–2017

Of the relevant speeches, 3,733 were made by women, and 4,389 were made by men. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 display a single topic—abortion and childcare, respectively—broken down by the gender of the speaker[23]. On the left in each figure, you can see the raw counts for each topic. However, these raw counts are misleading because of the severe underrepresentation of women in the House of Commons. Although in raw counts, women and men appear to be discussing the topics of interest at similar rates, in reality, the group of women making these speeches is much smaller than the group of men.

[23] Speeches about family leave and the workweek occur at too low of a rate for charts like this to be meaningful.

Thus, to the right are the same figures constructed with weighted counts, where the number of speeches by both men and women are weighted as though they each represented 50 percent of the House of Commons. With each chart on the same scale, we can see that the counts of men's speeches have been slightly suppressed. Women's (weighted) speeches, though, see a *dramatic* increase. Proportionally, women speak significantly more frequently on issues of abortion and childcare in the House of Commons (although not family leave or workday and workweek policies, which are not shown).

Other expected trends appear when I disaggregate speeches by political party, shown in Figures 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7. These figures show the parties that currently have more than ten members in the House of Commons—Conservative Party (center–right), Labour Party (center–left), Liberal Democratic Party (center to center–left), and Scottish National Party (center left)—with all other MPs aggregated under "Other Party." The parties holding the largest shares of seats by far are the Conservative and Labour Parties with 365 and 202 out of 650 seats, respectively. This is demonstrated by their consistently higher counts of speeches than those of the other parties, particularly with regards to childcare

and family leave. The Labour Party's leftist ideology is particularly visible in these charts. Although the party has held a majority of seats in the House of Commons in less than half of the years of my sample, they have made significantly more speeches on these topics per year than the other parties (with a few exceptions).



Figure 7.5: UK Abortion Speeches by MP Party, 1988–2017



Figure 7.6: UK Childcare Speeches by MP Party, 1988–2017



Figure 7.7: UK Family Leave Speeches by MP Party, 1988–2017

One final set of charts is going to be particularly illustrative of the trends we can expect from the formal analysis. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 displays a series of chord diagrams that show how speeches for abortion, childcare, and family leave have been classified over time, by gender of the speaker. The axes of these diagrams are counts of speeches in each decade and classified as each emotion; they vary with the total number of counts, so it is best to consider the proportions of the colored chords when interpreting these graphs. Thus, by tracing the yellow chords from the base of these chord diagrams upwards, we can see the proportions of speeches classified into each emotion for the 1980s for men and for women.

In the charts for all three topics, we can see (as expected) that trust is by far the most common emotional classification across all time periods and for men and women alike, although men have more speeches classified as trust across all three topics. Anticipation is the second largest category for all categories (and for both women and men). Additionally, we can see that there are very few speeches classified as either disgust or surprise. This means that the use of negatively coded emotions is quite rare, overall. Of the speeches that are coded as anger, anticipation, fear, and sadness, more (proportionally) are made by women. As in Figure 7.2, speeches on each of the topics by both men and women spiked in the 1990s and 2010s, and only abortion appears to be a topic of recurring interest in the 1980s.

There are a few points of interest to address regarding the abortion charts. Men and women made a similar number of speeches on abortion in most periods (still acknowledging the different proportions of seats that they hold), except women made noticeably more speeches in the 2010s. Speeches have also been increasingly likely to be classified in the trust category in the 2010s (and, to some degree, in the 2000s). There were more speeches coded as anger, anticipation, fear, and sadness in earlier decades.

Speeches on childcare and family leave have been almost universally coded as trust over time, with a small number being coded as anticipation. Negative emotions on this topic have been quite rare across all time periods and by both men and women. Those that are present have come primarily from the 2010s.

In speeches on the work week (not displayed as a chord diagram because the much lower number of speeches on this topic distorts the chart), those negative emotions are proportionally higher (which remaining very low numerically). Men made several speeches coded as fear for this topic, particularly in the 2000s and 2010s. And women made a (proportionally) high number of speeches coded as sadness in the 2010s.

These patterns in topic usage and in emotional classification reflect some of my findings on defamilialization in Chapter 5, as well as greater political truths. First, abortion has been a heated and highly partisan political issue in many countries. It seems intuitive that of the topics I'm examining, this one would see the most emotional speeches. Second, my latent variable measure of defamilialization found that childcare is a very important issue when it comes to helping women be financially independent from their families. The UK appears to be discussing it at a (much higher) rate that reflects this truth, which is promising. However, the relatively low rate of occurrence of speeches related to women's economic rights also reflects the UK's low defamilialization score—third from the bottom for the countries analyzed in Chapter 5.



7.8.1 Analysis and Results

Control data for MP characteristics in the following models come from the United Kingdom parliamentary archives (Houses of Parliament 2020). My dependent variable is a speech's emotional classification. My primary independent variable is the speaker's gender, and I control for the speaker's age, number of years of service, political party, and position in the government and shadow government. At the parliament level, I also control for the percent of parliamentary seats filled by women (Clark 2020b; World Bank 2020) and whether or not the Conservative Party has a controlling share of parliament. And at the national level, I control for the presence of a female head of government.[24] Because my dependent variable is an unordered category, I test the relationship between it and the input variables with a series of multinomial logit models. Table 7.1

[24] As a note, while female heads of government in general are expected to have a positive relationship with speeches supporting women's rights in parliaments, Thatcher (as expressed in the discussion earlier in the chapter) may be an exception to the rule, nullifying the impact for the UK.



Figure 7.8: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, UK



Figure 7.9: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, UK

presents a quick recap of the expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables for reference.

Table 7.1: Expected Relationships with Anger, Anticipation, Disgust, Fear, Joy, and Sadness in Speeches

Variable	Relationship
MP Gender (F=1)	+
MP Party (Base Category = Conservative)	+
MP Age	−
MP Years of Service	+
MP Government Position	+
MP Shadow Government Position	+
Women's Share of Leg. Seats	+
Conservative Control of Leg.	−
Female Head of Government	+

As a first look a the relationship between MP gender and the classification of their speeches, I ran a bivariate model. The results from this model are displayed in Table 7.2. In a model with no controls, few of the expected relationships between gender and classified emotions appears. Women MPs, when compared to male MPs, are (on average) significantly more likely to make speeches coded as anticipation, joy, and sadness, as expected. However, gender does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with the other emotions.

Table 7.2: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by MP Gender (UK House of Commons, 1988–2017)

	Anger	Antic.	Disgust	Fear	Joy	Sad.	Surprise
Gender (F=1)	0.23	0.27*	−0.43	0.15	0.37*	0.23*	0.33
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.29)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.26)
(Intercept)	−3.20	−1.96	−4.51	−2.90	−2.98	−2.64	−4.70
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Speeches Classified	260	914	53	335	348	455	61
N	8109						
AIC	17901.02						

Note: 5,696 speeches classified as trust, and 60 speeches not classified with an emotion. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05

The next model, the results of which are displayed in Table 7.3, adds the political party of the MPs as a control. In this model, gender continues to exhibit

a positive and statistically significant effect with anticipation and joy; anger and sadness are both positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Political party is largely statistically insignificant. However, when compared to members of the Conservative Party, members of the Liberal Democrat party are significantly more likely to make speeches coded as sad, and members of the Labour Party are significantly less likely to make speeches coded as joy (on average and all else equal).

Table 7.3: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by MP Gender and Party (UK House of Commons, 1988–2017)

	Anger	**Antic.**	**Disgust**	**Fear**	**Joy**	**Sad.**	**Surprise**
Gender (F=1)	0.25	0.30*	−0.40	0.19	0.43*	0.20	0.34
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.30)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.27)
Liberal Democrat	−0.16	0.15	0.18	0.02	−0.16	0.77*	0.50
	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.50)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.52)
Scottish National	−1.31	0.46	−8.68	−0.44	−0.61	0.70	1.11
	(1.01)	(0.27)	(90.88)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.37)	(0.76)
Labour	−0.19	−0.12	−0.22	−0.21	−0.36*	0.31	0.14
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.31)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.31)
Other Party	−0.27	−0.01	−0.63	−0.04	−0.27	−0.28	0.21
	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.62)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.52)
(Intercept)	−3.07	−1.93	−4.37	−2.81	−2.78	−2.85	−4.85
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Speeches Classified	260	914	53	335	348	455	61
N	8109						
AIC	17901.30						

Note: 5,696 speeches classified as trust, and 60 speeches not classified with an emotion. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05

The results of the fully specified model are displayed in Table 7.4. In this model, the results for political party are largely uninteresting; members of the Liberal Democrat party are more likely to use words indicating sadness, all else equal, than members of the Conservative Party, and members of the Scottish National Party are significantly less likely to use words indicating disgust. Older MPs are less likely to use words indicating joy, and members who have served longer are more likely to use words indicating anger. Holding a government position makes members significantly less likely, all else equal, to use words indicating anger, disgust, fear, and surprise, while holding a position in the shadow government makes MPs less likely to use words indicating joy and more likely to use words indicating sadness. At the parliamentary level, an increased share of seats held by women MPs is associated with an increased likelihood of using words indicating joy and surprise, but Conservative Party control does not reach a standard level of statistical significance for any of the emotional categories. And at the country level, a female head of government is associated with an increased likelihood of using words that indicate fear and sadness.

Most interestingly, after including all of the control variables, gender demonstrates most of the relationships with the emotion classifications predicted by my hypotheses. Women are significantly more likely to make speeches that indicate negative emotions—anger, fear, and sadness (at the 90 percent confidence level), although not disgust. After converting the model output to odds ratios, these are substantively important differences, as well—women are 41 percent more likely to make speeches classified as anger, 32 percent more likely to make speeches classified as fear, and 20 percent more likely to make speeches classified as sadness than men (on average and all else equal). They are also 37 percent more likely to make speeches classified as anticipation and 49 percent more likely to make speeches classified as joy.

The related (in–sample) predicted probabilities are displayed in Figure 7.10. Note that all of the charts are on the same axis except for the one for trust. Here, we see (as expected) that both men and women are most likely to make speeches classified as trust; however, women are slightly less likely than men to make these speeches. The next most common emotional classification (for men and women) is anticipation; women are more likely than men to make these speeches. Interestingly, while differences between men and women regarding the probability of giving a speech classified as anger, disgust, and surprise (if any) are very small, women are more likely than men to give speeches classified as joy and sadness, on average and all else equal.

Table 7.4: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights, Full Model (UK House of Commons, 1988–2017)

	Anger	Antic.	Disgust	Fear	Joy	Sad.	Surprise
Gender (F=1)	0.35*	0.31*	−0.31	0.28*	0.40*	0.19	0.37
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.31)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.28)
Liberal Democrat	−0.09	0.16	0.38	0.14	−0.17	0.72*	0.59
	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.52)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.53)
Scottish National	−1.28	0.43	−6.34*	−0.58	−0.48	0.40	0.69
	(1.02)	(0.28)	(0.00)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(0.38)	(0.81)
Labour	−0.23	−0.10	−0.16	−0.26	−0.15	0.23	0.04
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.33)
Other Party	−0.20	0.00	−0.39	0.05	−0.16	−0.32	0.14
	(0.27)	(0.14)	(0.63)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.53)
Age	−0.01	−0.00	−0.02	0.00	−0.01*	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Service	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	−0.00	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Govt. Position (Y=1)	−0.37*	0.00	−0.88*	−0.72*	0.12	−0.26	−0.97*
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.43)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.43)
Opp. Position (Y=1)	−0.02	−0.01	−0.42	−0.02	−0.54*	0.32*	0.00
	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.38)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.31)
Women's Seats	−0.01	0.01	−0.03	−0.01	0.03*	−0.01	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Conserv. Control (Y=1)	0.06	−0.01	0.19	0.01	0.02	−0.12	0.23
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.32)
Fem. Head (Y=1)	0.13	0.16	0.39	0.59*	0.23	0.40*	0.35
	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.35)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.32)
(Intercept)	−2.70	−2.04	−3.11	−3.84	−2.70	−2.73	−6.17
	(0.42)	(0.24)	(0.88)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.87)
Speeches Classified	260	914	53	335	348	455	61
N	8109						
AIC	17843.69						

Note: 5,696 speeches classified as trust, and 60 speeches not classified with an emotion. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05



Figure 7.10: Emotions in the UK House of Commons, Predicted Probabilities by Gender

7.9 Conclusion

My analysis of the United Kingdom speech data has contributed evidence to support my three hypotheses. Women MPs in the British parliament are more likely to make speeches referencing issues related to women's economic rights. They are also more likely to make speeches coded as anticipation and joy (indicating support for progress in areas related to women's economic rights) and more likely to call on negative emotions, such as anger, fear, and sadness, when discussing these issues in parliament. However, without applying this analysis to other countries' legislatures, it is difficult to know how broadly these conclusions can be applied. Thus, I replicate this analysis for Canada and Ireland in the next two chapters.

Chapter 8

Canada

8.1 Background

In 1497, John Cabot claimed Canada's Atlantic shore (the "New Founde Land") for England, which they began to settle in 1610. Between 1534 and 1542, Jacques Cartier began to claim land for France, which they began to settle in 1604. This included land in present–day Nova Scotia and land around what is today Québec City. Cartier named the area for the Iroquoian word for village, "kanata"—thus, Canada was born.

The English colonies—today New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—grew more quickly in resources and number of settlers than the French colonies. In the 1700s, the two countries began to grapple for control in the region, and in 1759, the British won, renaming the former French colony the Province of Quebec. In 1774, the *Quebec Act* passed in the British Parliament. This act granted religious freedom to Catholics in the province and allowed them to hold public office (which they were not allowed to do in Britain at the time). Furthermore, it allowed for the simultaneous presence of French civil law and British common law—a move that had significant repercussions for governance, unity, and the enjoyment of rights by all marginalized communities across Canada's history.

With the *Constitutional Act* of 1791, Britain divided the Province of Quebec into Upper Canada (present–day Ontario) and Lower Canada (present–day Quebec). Upper Canada was primarily English–speaking and Protestant, while Lower Canada was primarily French–speaking and Catholic. Together with the Atlantic colonies, they were referred to as British North America.

Nova Scotia elected the first representative assembly in the colonies in 1758. Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick followed in 1773 and 1785, respectively. Upper and Lower Canada were able to do the same after the *Constitu-*

tional Act in 1791; their first elected assembly formed in 1793. Between 1864 and 1867, representatives from New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and the Province of Canada (the then–combined provinces of Upper and Lower Canada), negotiated the creation of a new country.

On July 1, 1867, the self–governing Dominion of Canada, formed of the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Quebec, was officially established by the British Parliament. The Dominion gained Manitoba and the Northwest Territories in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873, Yukon in 1898, Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, Newfoundland and Labrador (a territory) in 1949, and Nunavut (also a territory) in 1999. Today, Canada consists of these ten provinces and three territories. At the federal level, the government is responsible for defense, foreign policy, regulating trade and communications among the provinces, currency, navigation, criminal law, and citizenship. The provincial governments oversee education, health, natural resources, property rights, civil rights, and highways. Both levels of government share responsibility for agriculture and immigration (Government of Canada 2020b).

8.2 Suffrage

Colonialism and the federal nature of the Canadian government, discussed above, are necessary for understanding the process related to Canadian women's enjoyment of the right to vote. Before 1851, it was not explicitly against the law for women to vote; it was simply assumed that they would not. Few women controlled property, the sole requirement to vote at the time, and those who did were generally married by the legal voting age—and therefore not people before the law. However, there are still numerous recorded instances of women voting between 1793 and 1851 in the various provinces that later merged to form Canada, including in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Upper Canada (Ontario), and Lower Canada (Quebec). It was particularly common in French–speaking provinces, because it was easier for women to own property under French civil law than under British common law. By 1851, however, there were laws against women voting in every province (Jennings 2015, p. 30).

Arguments against women's right to vote were many, varying by interest group and by time period. Arguments regarding women's mental capacity for political issues were quickly discarded, but this only made room for arguments that claimed that women did not deserve a seat at policy tables because they did not serve in the armed forces, arguments that they "were organically too weak to participate in the broils and excitement of elections," and biblical arguments

for women's submission to men. Additionally, formal participation in politics was thought to lead to women's degradation and "unsexing," as well as creating conflict between husbands and wives and decreasing the birth rate. The most commonly used (and longest lasting) argument succinctly stated that women (other than a few "cranks") did not actually want the right to vote and would not use it if they had it (Cleverdon 1974, pgs.5-7).

Suffragists responded to these arguments with with petitions, lectures, public meetings, and mock parliaments (Jennings 2015, p. 32). They leaned heavily on studies from countries with women's suffrage that directly contradicted concerns about lowered birth rates and women not using the vote if it was granted to them, as well as statistics showing the small turnout of qualified male voters in Canada at the time–voters who would, of course, not have their ability to vote stripped from them for failing to turn out. Additionally, the cry of "No taxation without representation!" was borrowed from the United States; women were required to pay taxes and obey the laws of the nation, suffragists pointed out, so they should be allowed to assist in their creation (Cleverdon 1974, p. 7). Notably, the Canadian women's suffrage movement was not marked by violence. Instead, it was characterized by a slow swell of support from women's organizations across the nation, farming groups, labor unions, members of the Protestant clergy, and portions of the press (particularly Liberal news sources from English–speaking provinces), as well as from United States activists such as Dr. Anna Howard Shaw and Susan B. Anthony and British activists both moderate and militant (Cleverdon 1974, pgs. 10–17).

Extensions of the right to vote came slowly over century following the enactment of the legislation making it illegal. By 1900, women—primarily unmarried women—were allowed to vote in many municipal elections. Through two separate laws enacted in 1917 (for most of the country) and 1918 (for five Western provinces) (Cleverdon 1974, p. 5), "all female British subjects over 21" possessing the same qualifications that would allow a man to vote were granted the right to vote in federal elections (Jennings 2015, p. 33). In 1920, suffrage was made universal for all British citizens over the age of 21 (who had resided in their district for at least two months before the election). The same act permanently granted women the right to run for election to the House of Commons Eberts (2009, p. 391).

However, women still had to win the right to vote in provincial elections through separate laws passed by each province (Cleverdon 1974, p. 5). The first of these came in Manitoba in 1916, passed unanimously by the provincial legislature (with one abstention). Saskatchewan and Alberta passed their own legislation granting women's suffrage shortly after, and by 1922, women could

vote in most provinces—but not all. Newfoundland held out until 1925, Quebec until 1940, and the Northwest Territories until 1951 (Jennings 2015, p. 33).

It is necessary to note that these voting rights were not extended equally to all women. In reality, the dates above refer to the years when *white* women could vote. Various provinces denied municipal and provincial voting to anyone Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, a member of the First Nations, or a member of "other Asiatic" groups until the mid– to late–1940s. The Inuit were denied the right to vote in federal elections between 1938 and 1951. All women in Canada did not receive the right to vote in federal elections until all registered members of First Nations tribes were granted voting rights (without giving up their Indian registration) in 1960 (Eberts 2009, p. 391–393).

8.3 Female Members of Parliament

Participation in legislatures, provincial and federal, followed shortly after suffrage. In 1917, Louise McKinney of Alberta became the first female provincial legislator. In 1921, Agnes Macphail became the first female member of the national parliament. Finally, in 1929, the "Famous Five" (Nellie McClung, Louise McKinney, Emily Murphy, Henrietta Miur Edwards, and Irene Parlby) won what came to be known as the "Persons Case," the court case which determined that women qualified as legal "persons" who could hold Senate seats (See Eberts 2009; Jennings 2015, p. 33). The first woman to be appointed to the Canadian Senate was Cairine Reay Wilson, in 1930 (Gwiazda 2008). [25]

[25] She later also became the first Canadian woman to serve as a delegate to the UN General Assembly (in 1949) (Heroines.CA 2008).



Figure 8.1: Women's Share of the Canadian House of Commons, 1994–2017

In December 1997, Canada ranked 17th in the world[26] for women's share of its parliamentary seats, with women filling 20.6 percent of seats in the House of Commons and 23.1 percent in the Senate. By December 2007, it had lagged

[26] Note: These rankings are based on the percentage of women in the lower house of parliament.

behind other top performers in this area, with women filling 21.3 percent of House of Commons seats and 34.4 of Senate seats. As of December 2018, Canadian ranks 59th in the world, with Canadian women holding 90 out of 334 seats in the House of Commons (26.9 percent) and 49 out of 105 seats in the Senate (46.7 percent) (Inter–Parliamentary Union 2020). This parliament has been lauded as the most diverse in the country's history, with greater numbers of female, Muslim, and First Nations members than ever before (although members of these populations represent very small fractions of the whole) (Woolf 2015).

This diversity has extended toward cabinet ministers. Currently, there are 18 male cabinet ministers and 17 female cabinet ministers.(House of Commons 2019) The current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, announced his intentions to appoint a gender–balanced cabinet as soon as he took office. Famously, when asked why he was so determined to make his cabinet gender–balanced, he responded, "Because it's 2015" (House of Commons 2019).

8.4 Female Head of Government

To date, Canada has had a single female prime minister: Avril Phaedra "Kim" Campbell, who served as Canada's head of government from June 25 to November 4, 1993. Although her term was short, lasting just over four months, it is neither the shortest nor the second shortest term of a Canadian Prime Minister (Smith 2016). Campbell was also the nation's first female Minister of Justice and Minister of National Defence—in fact, the first woman to serve as Minister of Defence for any NATO member state (Office of the Prime Minister 2016).

During her time in office, Campbell supported bills on abortion, rights for gay people, and other human rights issues (Windsor 1993). She was lauded (by some) for her "frank honesty" regarding issues of the economy and social reforms (CBC 2018). However, she also pushed for pulling the government out of low–income housing projects (Britten 2016), a move that can only be seen as harmful to women and to other marginalized groups in society.

In the weeks leading up to and during her time in office, Campbell faced the full range of sexist pushback to female politicians. She was termed "too feisty" to successfully lead her party through a general election (UPI 1993), as well as unstable and hysterical. The media paid a great deal of attention to her two divorces and lack of children, as well as regularly remarking on her body and her sexual allure, calling her a blonde bombshell (Ross 2017). She was called "everything from Canada's Madonna to its Margaret Thatcher" (Windsor 1993).

Campbell has staunchly advocated for more women in politics and for improving their treatment, regularly discussing the difficulties women face in

politics in Canada and around the world, as well as her own struggles in office. In one interview, she pointed out the sexism inherent in criticisms around Hillary Clinton's bid for office of the United States—and in allowing Donald Trump to not only run for the same office but win it, when "no woman like that would be taken seriously" (Smith 2016). In another, she addressed politicians' "likeability"–and noted how this word is used against women in politics in a way that men do not experience. "I think the idea is that men are the default category," she is quoted as saying. "Their entitlement to be there is unquestioned. So women have to leap over certain hurdlers. They have to be feminine. They have to do as Ginger Rogers did—everything backwards in high heels" (Smith 2018b). She further remarked that even when she served in high political offices, her accomplishments were credited to others (to men). Regardless of her short tenure as prime minister and other losses by female politicians, however, Campbell continues to argue that all participation by women normalizes the idea of women holding public offices: "Every time a woman takes on a role that has not been held by women before, she may be a human sacrifice. In other words, it may be hard to hang on, but you gradually redefine who gets to do that job" (Smith 2018b).

8.5 The Contemporary Parliamentary Environment

8.5.1 Myth of Neutrality

As the discussion of PM Kim Campbell's experience displays, the Canadian parliament has long demonstrated each of the gendered weaknesses of Westminster parliaments: the myth of neutrality, adversarial politics, and parliamentary privilege. The myth of neutrality is exhibited in the boys' club atmosphere that has been very slow to change, which was originally embedded even in the concrete facilities that cabinet ministers used. The second woman to be appointed to a cabinet minister position in Canada, Judy LaMarsh, reported later that the establishment was completely unprepared for the addition of women; in 1963, there was not even a women's washroom nearby for her use (Zuschlag 2017).

In 1982, nearly 20 years after LaMarsh was appointed to the cabinet, other MPs laughed at Margaret Mitchell for citing statistics that 1 in 10 men regularly beat their wives in the chamber—in fact, they laughed and heckled her so loudly that she could not continue. She wrote later that one of the men remarked to another, "I don't beat my wife. Do you, George?" Mitchell also noted that the Prime Minister at the time, Pierre Trudeau, insisted upon calling her "Hon-

ourable Lady," rather than using "Honourable Member," as he did for the men; she considered this an attempt to diminish her authority in the House. Notably, Mitchell's speech in the House has been directly connected to the establishment of women's shelters in the country and the creation of programs to train judges in addressing domestic violence (Stoffman 2017). In this case, both the woman MP and the issue facing discrimination prevailed, but this has not always been the case.

The targeted disrespect is based in the idea that women simply being women places them outside the norm of a male MP. In 2003, Progressive Conservative MP Elsie Wayne asked Liberal Defense Minister John McCallum about identification markings for military vehicles. In reference to the sparkly sweater she was wearing, he responded, "It has been suggested that if our soldiers were to wear the dress of the honourable member, that they would be very well identified" (Staff 2011). In 2004, Conservative Belinda Stronach vied for leadership of her party. Media coverage focused on her looks and supposed deficiencies in intellect, presenting her as a "puppet for the backroom boys" (Ross 2017).

8.5.2 Adversarial Politics

The differential treatment of women has extended into a starkly gendered execution of adversarial politics. In 1982, MP Gordon Taylor informed the House of Commons that "I admit that [Cabinet Minister Judy Erola] has a nice body but it's too bad it's connected to her mouth" (Collier and Raney 2018). Fast forward 9 years to 1991, and MP Barbara Greene reported being threatened by another MP and ordered to "shut up," and MP Bill Kempling ordered MP Sheila Copps to "go back to the sewer" and called her a slut after she requested an apology (Webb 1991). In a weekly column written in 2014, Copps also spoke of being told to "just quiet down, baby," by former Conservative minister John Crosbie in 1985, and being informed, "You are one bitch," by Reform MP Ian McClelland in 19997 (Robertson 2014). Also in 1997, Liberal minister Doug Young referred to Reform MP Deborah Grey as "more than a slab of bacon" talking while she held the floor in the House of Commons (Stewart 2006). And, of course, it was as recently as 2011 that Conservative MP Gerry Ritz referred to Environment Minister Catherine McKenna as "Climate Barbie" in a tweet (BBC 2017a).

8.5.3 Parliamentary Privilege

The environment is not simply disrespectful to women; it is hostile, and it is dangerous. In 2008, on her first day on Parliament Hill, another MP informed

MP Megan Leslie that she had a "fine body." She further reported the general "locker room mentality" and noted that other women had been patted and their looks complimented by male colleagues, as well as sharing a story of a female cabinet minister who, after standing a number of times to respond to questions in the Commons, remarked that she had been "up and down a lot" that day. Male colleagues responded with audible "crude backtalk" (Leslie 2013). In 2016, Liberal MP Dianne Watts' phone rang in a meeting, and Conservative MP Nicola Di Iorio asked her, "Where's your pole to slide down on?" He was assumed to be referencing a stripper pole (Zimonjic 2017).

In 2018, the Canadian Press surveyed the women of the parliament in order to determine the extent of sexual assault and harassment and other kinds of misconduct while in office. Almost 58 percent responded that they had experienced at least one of these forms of misconduct, "including inappropriate or unwanted remarks, gestures or text messages of a sexual nature." Four (of 38) respondents said they had experienced sexual harassment. Three reported that they had been victims of sexual assault. Of the 58 percent, 15 respondents answered that the misconduct was perpetrated by another MP. Eight identified other individuals they interacted with as a matter of their position in parliament. One MP shared that "she has heard her male colleagues share many jokes and remarks of a sexual nature about female MPs and employees" (Smith 2018a). In the same year, two provincial party leaders and a federal cabinet minister stepped down from their leadership roles but retained their place in politics following allegations of sexual misconduct: Patrick Brown as Ontario's leader of the Progressive Conservative party, Jamie Baillie as the leader of Nova Scotia's Progressive Conservative party, and Liberal Kent Hehr from his cabinet position (Hall 2018).

Prime Minister Trudeau has been quoted as saying, "Parliament Hill is a workplace like many others and therefore has the same kinds of challenges others have. But we also have a responsibility to lead and be a model for solving the challenges that exist elsewhere" (Curry and Stone 2017). It is an admirable mindset, one that has a chance to change the situation faced by the women of the Canadian parliament. As we see by Trudeau's own alleged groping (Kassam 2018) of a reporter and his elbowing of a female MP in the House (Kassam 2016), however, that time has not yet come.

8.6 Defamilialization

Women's organizations and the overall women's movement in Canada were "severely eroded" in the 1990s and 2000s "by cutbacks in spending on social pro-

grams and in core funding to civil society organizations" (Eberts 2009, p. 400). Between the 2006 elections and 2009, this erosion gained momentum. The Status of Women Canada removed "equality" from its mandate, and spending cuts led to 12 of its 16 regional offices closing their doors. The National Association of Women and the Law similarly suffered and closed its doors in 2007. Furthermore, Stephen Harper's government eliminated the national child care program established by the previous regime, introduced a resolution against abortion in the lower house, and ceased consideration of reforming the federal pay equity law (Eberts 2009, pgs. 400–401). These setbacks are represented in Canada's relatively low (sixth from the bottom) placement and lack of progress in the ropeladder plot in Chapter 5.

However, they have made significant strides in creating policies and passing legislation protecting women's rights in more recent years. In 2014, parliament removed the tax on menstrual products (King 2015). The 2017 budget included "gender recognition" in tax programs and policies (News 2017). And in 2018, they established parental leave for members of parliament for the first time (Aiello 2018). The current government is also well–known for its focus on gender equality and its feminist international assistance policy (Government of Canada 2020a). I explore their most recent domestic policies and progress on family leave, public daycare, the workweek, and abortion in greater detail below.

8.6.1 Family Leave Policies

Canada (except for Quebec, which has its own program) has an Employment Insurance (EI) program that includes maternity, parental, and caregiving benefits and leave. There are 15 weeks of maternity leave available for biological mothers (including surrogates), starting as early as 12 weeks before giving birth and lasting as long as 17 weeks after taking an infant home from the hospital. Standard parental leave benefits are offered for up to 35 weeks within one year after a child is born or adopted and can be shared between the parents. Both maternity leave and standard parental leave benefits are paid at 55 percent (with an insurable income cap at $54,200—or $573 per week). Extended parental benefits (also shared) can be paid for as long as 61 weeks at a 33 percent wage replacement rate, as long as they are taken within 18 months of the birth or adoption. All parents seeking to take up these benefits are required to have worked at least 600 hours of "insurable employment" in the qualifying time period (Government of Canada 2020e).

There are also three types of caregiving benefits: First, there are up to 35 weeks of leave available to care for a critically ill or injured person under 18 years

old. Second, there are up to 15 weeks available to care for a critically injured or ill person over 18 years old. Third, there are up to 26 weeks to provide end–of–life care to someone of any age. This leave can be taken all at once or in pieces and can be shared by eligible caregivers. These kinds of leave also pay at a wage replacement rate of 55 percent (up to $573). Interestingly, "As a caregiver, you don't have to be related to or live with the person you care for or support, but they must consider you to be like family." However, this only applies to individuals suffering from chronic illnesses if "the person's health changes significantly because of a new and acute life–threatening event" (Government of Canada 2020d).

Quebec established its own system, the Quebec Parental Insurance Plan (QPIP) in 20016. It was built with the goal of improving gender equality. Under this program, the wage replacement rate is 70 to 75 percent of the new parents' incomes, paid for a maximum of 52 weeks. Partners who do not give birth are entitled to five weeks of "use–it–or–lose–it" leave that cannot be transferred. This system works, too—over 80 percent of fathers in Quebec take paternity leave, compared to the 15 percent who take parental benefits in the rest of Canada (Silcoff 2018).

8.6.2 Provision of Public Daycare

Canada has one of the most expensive childcare systems in the world.(Kappler 2019) While the federal government of Canada "is investing in early learning and child care to help Canadian children get the best start in life and have a fair chance to succeed" (Government of Canada 2020c), there is no provision of public daycare at the national level. Instead, provinces and territories set their own policies. The cost (and quality) of daycare varies widely among them.

The best (and most widely touted) system is again found in Quebec, where daycare is universal and highly subsidized. Fees for childcare in the province are on an income–based sliding scale that ranges between $146 and $400 per month. (Compare this to median rates of $1675 in Toronto, Ontario.) There are some drawbacks to the system—the official childcare centers do not have enough seats to meet demand, so the program has been extended to private centers, and the quality of programs exhibits marked variation. However, it has reportedly been so successful that Quebec now has the highest labor force participation rate for women aged 26 to 44 in the world (at 85 percent), and the the increase in income tax has more than paid for the program (Kappler 2019; Herrera 2019; Williams 2018; Weikle 2019).

8.6.3 Workweek Regulations

For most "federally regulated industries" in Canada, standard workweek hours are capped at 40 (8 hours per day), and overtime hours are capped at 48 (with 1.5–time pay). Workweek hours are reduced by 8 in weeks with federal holidays, and federally regulated employees are entitled to a full day of rest per week (usually Sunday). However, there are a number of occupations exempted from overtime: managers, doctors, lawyers, dentists, architects and engineers included, as well as unionized workers (who have negotiated different systems for overtime and pay). Additionally, there are exemptions to maximum hours: emergency work, averaging plans, modified work schedules, and permits (Government of Canada 2020g). Notably, these regulations apply to approximately 6 percent of all employees in Canada (Government of Canada 2020f). Most employment laws fall under provincial and territorial jurisdictions, although most have not added additional caps on working hours. The two primary exceptions are Alberta, which has set a daily limit at 12 hours, and Quebec, which allows employees to refuse to work more than 4 hours more than their usual (12 hours per day or 60 hours per week) (TSheets 2020).

8.6.4 Abortion Regulations

Abortion (under certain circumstances) was legalized in Canada in 1969. However, it had to be approved by "therapeutic abortion committees" that were difficult for women to access. In 1988, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down this law, decriminalizing abortions entirely at the federal level; the only federal laws regulating abortions are those regulating medical procedures more generally (Abedi 2019). This places Canada in a very small minority of countries—there are only four in the world that have decriminalized abortion in this way (Shaw and Norman 2020).

While parliament has, at times, attempted to create policies reflective of the Supreme Court decision, it has never been able to come to a consensus on what those policies should be. During Stephen Harper's tenure as prime minister (from 2006 to 2015), he declared, "As long as I am prime minister we are not opening the abortion debate. ...The government will not bring forward any such legislation, and any such legislation that is brought forward will be defeated as long as I am prime minister" (CBC 2012). This is part of a greater Conservative Party policy to not legislate on abortion.

However, this has not kept MPs from debating abortion under the most recent government. It has also not made access to abortion universal—or easy. A lack of federal laws has left provinces to pass their own. While they cannot

criminalize abortion because of the federal ruling, they can (and do) take steps such as limiting funding for the procedure, limiting the number of clinics that can provide abortions (or excluding clinics entirely), or setting gestational limits. Facilities that do offer the procedure are often rare, particularly outside of cities, and have long waiting lists, which means that by the time some women can make an appointment, they have passed beyond the legal limits in that province (Gollom 2019).

In the following section, I perform and present the results of an analysis of the discourse around these policies in the Canadian parliament.

8.7 Text Analysis



Figure 8.2: Canada House of Commons Speeches by Topic, 1994–2017

My web scrapers retrieved every speech made in Canada's House of Commons from 1994 to 2017, with the full set of speeches including over 700,000 individual speeches. Of these, approximately 8,200 use the language related to women's economic rights identified in Table 6.1–family leave, childcare, the workweek, and abortion. Figure 8.2 displays how a summary of how these topics have been used over time. Here, we see that childcare speeches dominate even more dramatically than in the United Kingdom, with a major spike in the mid–2000s and a smaller spike in the mid–2010s. Of the other topics, abortion saw two much smaller spikes in the late 2000s and early 2010s, family leave arises at a low but relatively regular rate, and the workweek (as in the United Kingdom) barely comes up at all.

Of the relevant speeches, 40 percent were made by women, and 60 percent were made by men. Figures 8.3 through 8.5 display a single topic—abortion and

[27] Speeches about family leave and the workweek occur at too low of a rate for charts like this to be meaningful.

childcare, respectively—broken down by the gender of the speaker.[27] On the left in each figure, you can see the raw counts for each topic. On the right, you can see the same figures constructed with weighted counts, where the number of speeches by both men and women are weighted as though they each represented 50 percent of the House of Commons.



Figure 8.3: Canada Abortion Speeches by MP Gender, 1994–2017



Figure 8.4: Canada Childcare Speeches by MP Gender, 1994–2017



Figure 8.5: Canada Family Leave Speeches by MP Gender, 1994–2017

In the charts displaying raw counts, we can see that men and women had a similar number of speeches on abortion, childcare, and family leave. (Workweek discussions were too rare to have meaningful charts.) After accounting for women's underrepresentation in the House, though, we can see that women speak slightly more about family leave in most years, significantly more about abortion in some years (the later 2000s and early 2010s), and *significantly* more about childcare than their male counterparts.

Other expected trends appear when I disaggregate speeches by political party, shown in Figures 8.6 through 8.9. These figures show the parties that currently have more than ten members in the House of Commons—Liberal Party (center to center–left), Conservative Party (center–right), Block Québécois (center–left), and the New Democratic Party (center–left to left)—with all other MPs aggregated under "Other Party." The parties holding the largest shares of seats by far are the Liberal and Conservative Parties with 157 and 121 out of 338 seats, respectively. However, their numerical control of the House of Commons does not appear to mean that they overwhelmingly dominate the discourse on topics related to women's economic rights.

The parties have spoken similar numbers of times about abortion and family leave, with parties trading off on who takes the lead by decade. Liberal MPs led the discussion on childcare slightly through the 1990s and 2000s (understandable, given their numerical share of the House during those years), but the Conservative MPs followed closely behind starting in the early to mid–2000s and took over with a large spike of speeches in the 2010s (with the New Democratic MPs not far behind, especially given their much lower numbers). Interestingly, the Bloc Québécois has demonstrated a much higher interest in workweek policies than the other parties, particularly in the early 2000s.



Figure 8.6: Canada Abortion Speeches by MP Party, 1994–2017



Figure 8.7: Canada Childcare Speeches by MP Party, 1994–2017



Figure 8.8: Canada Family Leave Speeches by MP Party, 1994–2017



Figure 8.9: Canada Workweek Speeches by MP Party, 1994–2017

Finally, Figures 8.10 and 8.11 display a series of chord diagrams that show how speeches for all four topics have been classified into emotions over time, by gender of the speaker. In most cases, trust is (again) the most common emotion by far, although it dominates slightly less in abortion discussions. While men, proportionally, do have more speeches classified as trust for family leave, workweek, and (to a smaller degree) childcare policies, men and women appear to have a similar proportion of abortion speeches classified as trust. The second largest category across topics and genders is anticipation, which means that the Canadian House of Commons also has relatively few speeches coded with negative emotions. However, there are some notable negative emotion spikes: fear for both genders with abortion (and anger for men), sadness on childcare, and (to a smaller degree) sadness for family leave and fear for the workweek (and sadness for women).



Figure 8.10: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, Canada (Abortion and Childcare)



Figure 8.11: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, Canada (Family Leave and Workweek)

8.7.1 Analysis and Results

Table 8.1: Expected Relationships with Anger, Anticipation, Disgust, Fear, Joy, and Sadness in Speeches

Variable	Relationship
MP Gender (F=1)	+
MP Party (Base Category = Conservative)	+
MP Age	−
MP Years of Service	+
MP Government Position	+
MP Shadow Government Position	+
Women's Share of Leg. Seats	+
Conservative Control of Leg.	−

Control data for MP characteristics in the following models come from the Canadian parliamentary archives.(Parliament of Canada 2020) As a quick review, my dependent variable is a speech's emotional classification. My primary independent variable is the speaker's gender, and I control for the speaker's age, number of years of service, political party, and position in the government and shadow government. At the parliament level, I also control for the percent of parliamentary seats filled by women;(Clark 2020a) (World Bank 2020) and whether or not the Conservative Party has a controlling share of parliament.No speeches from Kim Campbell's brief tenure as prime minister are included in this data. Because my dependent variable is an unordered category, I test the relationship between it and the input variables with a series of multinomial logit models. Table 8.1 presents a quick recap of the expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables for reference.

The results from a bivariate model for Canada are displayed in Table 8.2. In a model with no controls, the expected relationships between gender and classified emotions do not appear. Women MPs, when compared to male MPs, are (on average) significantly more likely to make speeches coded as anticipation and joy than they are to make speeches coded as trust. But none of the other results reach standard levels of statistical significance.

Table 8.2: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by MP Gender (Canada House of Commons, 1994–2017)

	Anger	**Antic.**	**Disgust**	**Fear**	**Joy**	**Sad.**	**Surprise**
Gender (F=1)	−0.10	0.12*	−0.17	0.04	0.43*	−0.12	0.22
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.20)
(Intercept)	−2.45	−1.40	−4.03	−2.42	−2.65	−1.97	−4.17
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.13)
Speeches Classified	493	1534	98	535	508	785	100
N	9932						
AIC	27407.59						

Note: 5,879 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

The next model, the results of which are displayed in Table 8.3, adds the political party of the MPs as a control. In this model, gender continues to exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect with anticipation and joy; the other results remain statistically insignificant. Compared to the results from the United Kingdom, however, political party displays a number of interesting connections with speeches' emotional classifications. The omitted party category is the Conservative Party. Compared to members of the Conservative Party (and compared to speeches classified as trust), on average and all else equal, members of the Liberal Party are less likely to make speeches classified as anger, disgust, joy, and sadness. Members of the Bloc Québécois are more likely to make speeches classified as joy and less likely to make speeches classified as joy and sadness. Members of the New Democratic Party are less likely to make speeches classified as disgust and sadness. And other party members are more likely to make speeches classified as anticipation, fear, and surprise and less likely to make speeches classified as sadness.

Table 8.3: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by MP Gender and Party (Canada House of Commons, 1994–2017)

	Anger	**Antic.**	**Disgust**	**Fear**	**Joy**	**Sad.**	**Surprise**
Gender (F=1)	−0.11	0.13*	−0.05	0.03	0.45*	−0.01	0.24
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.21)
Liberal	−0.60*	−0.03	−1.06*	−0.11	−0.47*	−0.94*	−0.15
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.28)
Bloc Québécois	−0.01	−0.10	−0.22	0.32*	−0.97*	−1.29*	−0.32
	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.41)
New Democratic	−0.12	0.08	−0.66*	0.18	−0.14	−0.63*	0.25
	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.28)
Other Party	0.36	0.38*	0.57	0.81*	−0.34	−0.36*	0.90*
	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.38)
(Intercept)	−2.28	−1.42	−3.69	−2.51	−2.39	−1.49	−4.24
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.21)
Speeches Classified	493	1534	98	535	508	785	100
N	9932						
AIC	27205.54						

Note: 5,879 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

The results of the fully specified model are displayed in Table 8.4. In this model, the results for gender remain consistent. Women have a 55 percent increase in the odds of making speeches classified as joy (compared to trust) and a 13 percent increase in the odds of making a speech classified as anticipation (at the 90 percent confidence level) over men, ceteris paribus. Political parties remain important in this model. Compared to Conservatives, Liberals have a 42 percent decrease and other party members have a 96 percent increase in the odds of making a speech classified as anger; other party members have a 53 percent increase in the odds of making a speech classified as anticipation; Liberals have a 72 percent decrease in the odds of making a speech classified as disgust.

Table 8.4: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights, Full Model (Canada House of Commons, 1994–2017)

	Anger	Antic.	Disgust	Fear	Joy	Sad.	Surprise
Gender (F=1)	−0.11	0.12	−0.04	0.03	0.44*	−0.02	0.23
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.22)
Liberal	−0.54*	−0.05	−1.24*	−0.04	−0.43*	−0.64*	−0.28
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.32)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.30)
Bloc Québécois	0.03	−0.12	−0.27	0.49*	−0.74*	−0.96*	−0.61
	(0.19)	(0.13)	0.41)	(0.19)	(0.23)	0.20)	0.46)
New Democratic	−0.20	0.08	−0.57	0.31*	0.09	−0.68*	0.11
	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.33)
Other Party	0.67*	0.43*	0.60	1.03*	−0.02	0.32	0.54
	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.43)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.45)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Years of Service	0.01	0.01	0.06*	0.02	0.00	−0.01	−0.04
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Govt. Position (Y=1)	−0.26	0.26*	0.24	−0.15	0.78*	0.40*	−0.26
	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.41)
Opp. Position (Y=1)	0.10	0.09	0.00	−0.14	−0.03	0.21*	0.07
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.26)
Women's Seats	0.02	0.01	−0.05	0.02	0.01	0.14*	−0.06
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Conserv. Control (Y=1)	0.29*	−0.08	−0.11	0.21	0.01	0.39*	−0.31
	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.23)
(Intercept)	−3.23	−1.59	−3.29	−3.44	−3.00	−5.27	−3.14
	(0.65)	(0.39)	(1.43)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.51)	(1.37)
Speeches Classified	493	1534	98	535	508	785	100
N	9932						
AIC	26517.92						

Note: 5,879 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

Additionally, Bloc Québécois members have a 63 percent increase, New Democrats have a 36 percent increase, and other party members have a *179 percent increase* in the odds of making a speech classified as fear; Liberals have a 36 percent decrease and Bloc Québécois members have a 52 percent decrease in the odds of making a speech classified as joy; and Liberals, Bloc Québécois members, and New Democrats have 48, 62, and 49 percent decreases in the odds of making a speech classified as sadness, respectively.

Interestingly, the Conservative Party holding a controlling share of seats is associated with a 34 percent increase in the odds of giving a speech classified as anger and a 47 percent increase in giving speeches classified as sadness (compared to trust). Finally, while being a woman is not significantly associated with the odds of giving a speech classified as sadness, an increase in the number of women in the House is. As women's share of seats increases by 1 percent, the odds of a speech being classified as sadness increases by 15 percent, on average and all else equal.



Figure 8.12: Emotions in the Canadian House of Commons, Predicted Probabilities by Gender

Figure 8.12 displays the in–sample predicted probabilities from this model. Trust is, of course, the classification with the highest probability for both men and women (keeping in mind that the scale of that chart differs from the scale

of the others for readability); they are equally likely to give a speech classified as trust. MPs (with women being slightly more likely than men) have the second–highest probability of giving a speech classified as anticipation, with women being more likely to do so. Women also have a higher probability of giving a speech classified as joy, on average and all else equal.

8.8 Conclusion

My analysis of the Canadian speech data has contributed mixed evidence with regards to my three hypotheses. While women do make more speeches related to women's economic rights and are more likely to give speeches classified as anticipation and joy, suggesting support of policies to bring about positive changes in respect for women's economic rights, they do not appear to be more (or less) likely than men to give speeches classified as any of the negative emotions. In Canada, political party and positions in the government or shadow government are more important individual–level predictors of whether an MP is likely to make a negatively classified speech, and conservative control and women's share of seats predict anger and sadness speeches at the parliament level. This suggests that we might see that trends with regard to speech classification might differ by country context; my analysis of Ireland in the following chapter will either give evidence for this supposition or indicate that there are different pressures to consider in Canada (or in the United Kingdom), setting one country apart from the others.

Chapter 9

Ireland

9.1 Background

As discussed in Chapter 6, Britain took control of Ireland in the 1600s. They formally joined as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. There were long waves of nationalist sentiment in Ireland, particularly from the Catholic majority.

In 1885, the UK Prime Minister suggested establishing Home Rule in Ireland. This would allow Ireland to establish its own laws while formally remaining a part of the UK. Home Rule had mixed support and was opposed both by those who demanded an independent Irish state (many of whom would later band together to form Sinn Féin) and Protestants concentrated in the northern province of Ulster who worried about losing rights as a minority in a Catholic Ireland.

Home Rule, which was supposed to begin in 1914, was suspended with the start of World War I. This sparked a rebellion in 1916, which later became known as the Easter Rising. The rebellion was quickly suppressed by the British, who arrested its leaders and executed some of them. This sparked a new wave of support for independence (and, politically, Sinn Féin). In the UK parliamentary election in December 1918, Sinn Féin won a clear majority of seats over the previously more popular party that had supported Home Rule. However, on January 21, 1919, instead of taking up their seats in Westminster, Sinn Féin declared that they would be setting up a new Irish government in Dublin, instead.

This and other events sparked the Anglo–Irish War, which officially ended in 1922, when members of Sinn Féin and the British government signed the Anglo–Irish Treaty. This treaty established the Irish Free State, which had the authority to make its own laws but remained a part of the British Commonwealth, and the province of Northern Ireland, which was separate from the Free

State and allowed to opt into remaining a part of the United Kingdom (which it did). The treaty provisions sparked another war—this time an intrastate war between those who supported the treaty and those who opposed it. The Irish Free State won (with help from Britain) in 1923. A new constitution in 1937 renamed the state Éire (or Ireland, in English), and in 1949, Ireland formally exited the British Commonwealth, becoming its own republic (BBC 2019b).

9.2 Suffrage

The timing of Irish independence means that much of the push for women's suffrage in Ireland was deeply connected to the movements in Britain. Isabella Tod organized the first suffrage society in Ireland in 1871: the North of Ireland Women's Suffrage Committee. Anna Haslam and her husband, Thomas, followed by establishing the Dublin Women's Suffrage Association (which later became the Irish Women's Suffrage and Local Government Association) in 1876. The actions of these two groups echoed those of the peaceful suffragists in Britain: networking with parliament, passing petitions, fundraising, holding meetings, etc. Women in Ireland, of course, also benefited from the UK Parliament passing a series of legislation improving women's situation during this time (largely as a result of the actions of the suffragists)—recognizing women's legal existence separate from their husbands, allowing them to petition for custody, giving them the ability to seek protection orders against violent spouses, and giving them the ability to vote and run for office in local elections.

As in England, a more militant group also developed to press for parliamentary suffrage for women. In 1908, Hannah Sheehy–Skeffington founded the Irish Women's Franchise League (IWFL), modeled after Pankhurst's British Women's Social and Political Union. The IWFL similarly engaged in property destruction and hunger strikes when arrested. In the north, their destructive activities expanded to include cutting telegraph wires, bombings, arson, and more.

Although the major Irish political parties were either hostile or divided on the issue of women's suffrage, the British parliament's Representation of the People Act of 1918 extended the vote to women in Ireland under the same qualifications as in the rest of the UK—women over 30 who were college graduates, owned a house or were married to a house owner. Following this act, two women stood for election in Ireland in 1918, and one was elected: Constance Markievicz of Sinn Féin. Instead of taking her seat in Westminster, she joined the other members of Sinn Féin in establishing the first Irish parliament. Although women in Britain would have to wait until 1928 for full suffrage to be

extended to them, the 1922 constitution of the Free Irish State included full parliamentary suffrage for women (Crowe 2018).

9.3 Female Members of Parliament

The parliament of Ireland, or the Oireachtas, is formed of two houses. The Dáil Éireann is the lower house; the Seanad Éireann is the upper house. A member of the Dáil Éireann is known as a Teachta Dála (TD); there are 160 TDs who are directly elected by the general public. The Seanad Éireann, whose powers are much weaker than the Dáil Éireann, consists of 60 senators, who achieve office through various means—appointed by the prime minister (the Taoiseach), elected by graduates of specific Irish universities, or elected by the TDs, outgoing senators, and city and county councils (who generally select individuals who ran for seats in the Dáil Éireann but did not get elected).[28]

[28] `https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/members/`

Although women in Ireland received full parliamentary suffrage before the United Kingdom and Canada, this did not lead to high (or even higher) rates of women's descriptive representation in the Oireachtas. There were two primary factors that suppressed women's political representation during the early years of the Dáil. First, more women opposed the Anglo–Irish Treaty than supported it, and they expressed their displeasure by abstaining from the Dáil (even when elected), much like Sinn Féin's abstentionism from Westminster. Second, many suffragists exited politics after the fight for suffrage was over. And many of those who remained politically active preferred to work through civil society organizations rather than seek political office.



Figure 9.1: Women's Share of the Irish DE, 1990–2017

Along with the more general societal pressures keeping women from politics, this means that in the first hundred years following women's full suffrage, only 114 women were elected to the Dáil. In the 30 elections held between 1918

and 2018, women filled only 274 out of 4,575 total possible seats (or 6 percent). The number of women in the Dáil only reached double digits in 1981 (with 11 seats). In 2011, this had only grown to 25 women TDs (less than 16 percent), and by 2016, the number of women sat at 35 (or 22 percent), even with gender quotas for parties enacted in the meantime. And while Constance Markievicz served as a minister in the first Dáil, there was not a second woman minister until 1979, and there were not two women ministers at the same time until 1992 (Galligan and Coleman 2018).

The current Dáil, elected in 2020, has the most women in Ireland's history, at 36. The most recent election also made history as the first time that there was a woman on the ballot for every constituency. However, a number of high–profile women TDs also lost their seats in the election (O'Halloran 2020).

The Dáil is notable for its lack of diversity in other areas, too. For example, while ethnic minority groups make up approximately 20 percent of the population, there is only a single member of the Dáil identifies as a member of an ethnic minority group—Leo Varadkar—which works out to 0.6 percent of TDs (Farrell 2010). And while explicit counts of members of the LGBTQ+ community are not available, the first openly gay TDs were only elected in 2011 and the first openly lesbian TD and government minister in 2016 (although Ireland's first openly gay prime minister—Leo Varadkar again—did take office in 2017) (Dwyer 2017; Holland 2016).

9.4 Female Heads of State and Government

In Ireland, the role of the head of state is filled by the president, who is popularly elected but has traditionally had a largely ceremonial role. There have been two female presidents thus far: Mary Robinson (December 1990 to September 1997) and Mary McAleese (November 1997 to November 2011). The role of head of government is filled by the prime minister, or Taoiseach, who is nominated by the Dáil Éireann and confirmed by the president. To date, there have been no female prime ministers of Ireland, althougn there have been several deputy prime ministers (a largely honorific position known as the Tánaiste and nominated by the Taoiseach who stands in for the Taoiseach during temporary absences): Mary Harney (June 1997–September 2006), Mary Coughlan (May 2008–March 2011), Joan Burton (July 2014–May 2016), and Frances Fitzgerald (May 2016–November 2017).

9.4.1 Mary Robinson

Mary Robinson played a much more visible and political role than her predecessors. While she could not, as president, formulate laws, she did advocate for them—particularly laws that would improve respect for women's rights in Ireland. The tone for Robinson's presidency was set in her inaugural speech, in which she declared:

> The stage is set for a new common European home based on respect for human rights, pluralism, tolerance and openness to new ideas.
>
> ...If it is time, as Joyce's Stephen Dedalus remarked, that the Irish began to forge in the smithy of our souls 'the uncreated conscience of our race'—might we not also take on the still 'uncreated conscience' of the wider international community? Is it not time that the small started believing again that it is beautiful, that the periphery can rise up and speak out on equal terms with the centre, that the most outlying island community of the European Community really has something 'strange and precious' to contribute to the sea-change presently sweeping through the entire continent of Europe?
>
> ...I want this Presidency to promote the telling of stories—stories of celebration through the arts and stories of conscience and of social justice. As a woman, I want women who have felt themselves outside history to be written back into history, in the words of Eavan Boland, 'finding a voice where they found a vision (Robinson 1990).

As a lawyer and as a senator, Robinson lead the calls advocating for respecting women's right to sit on juries, getting rid of the requirement that married women leave civil service, ensuring access to family planning and divorce, and guaranteeing equal economic rights. She took the Irish government to the European Court of Human Rights, where its laws on homosexuality were overturned (O'Toole 1996). As president, she was also able to sign the bills legalizing contraception and decriminalizing homosexuality into law (Marsh 2020). During her term, Ireland voted in a referendum to legalize abortion (BBC 2019a). And throughout her time in office (and after), she spoke of using her position to bear witness to suffering and give a voice to the marginalized, particularly women (WBUR 2013).

Her progressive approach to politics did receive some negative responses. When she published her first contraception bill, in the 1960s, her letterbox was filled with used condoms. Leading up to the presidential election, Fianna Fail TD John Browne insinuated that if she was elected, there would be abortion referral clinics in the offical presidential residence—and one Catholic priest dubbed her a "Marxist, lesbian bitch." Multiple voters informed her that she should be taking care of her children at home, rather than campaigning (Fitzgerald 2018). Once she was in office, Taoiseach Charles Haughy even kept her from giving the BBC's prestigious Dimbleby Lecture in 1991. However, even in the midst of extremely controversial actions (like meeting with the Queen of England—the first Irish head of state to do so—and shaking the hand of Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams before the IRA declared its ceasefire in 1994, she regularly received approval ratings of over 90 percent (The Irish Times 1997; New World Encyclopedia 2008b; O'Toole 1996).

It is regularly noted that during her time in office, Robinson achieved a unique position as a moral leader for Ireland. In an interview, she noted, "The constraints [of the presidential office] bring a kind of moral authority, because when people vote they know that you're not going to govern. ...In this office you can be a unifying force, a president for all the people, in touch with different views" (Lewis 1993). This position, as well as her use of it to further women's rights, continued beyond her presidency. Just before she stepped down as president, she accepted the position as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, where she expanded the office's mandate to explore global human rights issues—including food and water security, healthcare, and shelter—in a feminist way (Friel 2013) and encouraged the UN to adopt a third principle (in addition to national sovereignty and international security—human security (O'Toole 1996). Afterwards, she founded the non–governmental organization Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative (2002–10), which addressed concerns related to "equitable international trade, access to health care, migration, women's leadership, and corporate responsibility," served as a founding member of the Council of Women World Leaders, and established the Mary Robinson Foundation—Climate Justice (2010–2019), which addressed climate change through a feminist lens (Marsh 2020).

9.4.2 Mary McAleese

Mary McAleese followed Mary Robinson into presidency in 1997, becoming the first woman in the world to succeed another woman as head of state, as well as the first person born in Northern Ireland to become the president of Ireland. Her record with regards to gender equality is mixed (although it has

demonstrated a positive trend over time), at least in part because it was not one of the primary focuses of her time in office.

In 1975, like Mary Robinson before her, McAleese was appointed Trinity College's Reid Professor of Criminal Law, Criminology and Penology. Around this time, she also helped found and served as a legal advisor for the Campaign for Homosexual Law Reform; this fight for legal and substantive equality for members of the LGBTQ community is a theme that would carry through her presidency and beyond. However, this is also the period of time in which she served as legal counsel for the movement working against legalizing divorce (New World Encyclopedia 2008b), and in 1983 she voted for the Eighth Amendment (which gave women and fetuses equal rights under the law, banning abortion) in the referendum vote (Coyne 2018).

In 1997, McAleese campaigned for the presidency with the slogan "Building Bridges," with themes of social inclusion, equality, and reconciliation. As president, these themes were primarily expressed in efforts to repair the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and in advocating for the LGBTQ community (which culminated in being able to sign the 2010 Civil Partnership Act into law, establishing legal recognition for same–sex partnerships) (Taylor 2010). However, McAleese also very publicly took on a key source for gender inequality in Ireland: the Catholic Church.

McAleese, who is Catholic herself, long professed support for women in the priesthood and publicly considered leaving the church over their lack of support for women's and LGBTQ rights. In 2018, she was invited to speak at the Voices of Faith conference on International Women's Day, an annual event held within the Vatican. However, the Vatican did not approve of the list of speakers—or Mary McAleese[29]—so the conference organizers shifted the location to the headquarters of the Jesuit religious order across the street to allow her (and others) to speak. In her speech, she summarized many of the same concerns that she had expressed more subtly during her presidency, stating that the Catholic church had long been "a primary global carrier of the toxic virus of misogyny" (and "an empire of misogyny" and "one of the last great bastions of misogyny") and noted that "Its leadership has never sought a cure for that virus, although the cure is freely available. Its name is equality" (Mulraney 2018). Although not beloved by the Catholic church for her stance, McAleese experienced very high approval ratings in office, leading her to run unopposed (with no party affiliation) for a second term (New World Encyclopedia 2008a).

Following her time in office, McAleese strongly advocated for yes votes in the marriage equality referendum of 2015. She also proudly voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment in the 2018 referendum, remarking in an interview: "Times

[29] When McAleese and Pope John Paul II met in 1999, the pope ignored McAleese to greet her husband instead, "joking," "Would you not prefer to be the President of Ireland instead of your wife?" (Fitzgerald 2018; Ryan 2018).

have changed. And one of the things that have changed is our understanding of our human rights. Among those human rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, freedom to change religion" (Clancy 2018). Both referendums passed, notably making Ireland the first country in the world to guarantee marriage equality by a public referendum (McAleese 2020).

9.5 The Contemporary Parliamentary Environment

In a country that apparently welcomed its female heads of state with open arms and high approval ratings, we might expect that women in the Dáil Éirann might also have had an easier time of things than their British and Canadian counterparts. This expectation would be wrong; while it appears to be less outwardly hostile than the other parliaments, the Dáil exhibits the same gendered weaknesses of all Westminster parliaments in its myth of neutrality, adversarial politics, and parliamentary privilege (if perhaps being less forthcoming about specific details than their British and Canadian counterparts).

9.5.1 Myth of Neutrality

In 2017, as a wave of sexual misconduct allegations were pouring in from Westminster, reporters asked Fine Gael TD Mary Mitchell O'Connor if similar allegations could be expected to arise from the Dáil. She responded that she would be very surprised to hear of those kinds of allegations; however, she did unequivocally assert that there is rampant sexism and bullying in the Dáil—including women's voices being put down or ignored in meetings—and that the "macho" behavior displayed in front of the public often left her feeling ashamed of being a public representative (O'Brien 2017).

A number of other female TDs agreed. Sinn Féin TD Mary Lou McDonald stated, "I don't feel it is very toxic in the Oireachtas in the same way that it is playing out in Westminster. That is not my sense of it." But, she continued, "It is a boys' club. Sure how could it not be when you look at the numbers?" Labour TD Joan Burton agreed that the Oireachtas is the "archetypal male club," adding that "There is a culture problem— whereby men feel powerful and women do not feel empowered." Additionally, she "said there are still a lot of 'traditional' men in Leinster House, as she put it, who might think it is okay to 'pat women on the head.'" Others have noted that infantilizing com-

ments, "man–splaining," and remarks on women TDs' intelligence or looks are commonplace (Finn 2017).

9.5.2 Adversarial Politics

As with the British and Canadian parliaments, the language of adversarial politics has played out in the Dáil Éirann in distinctly gendered ways. In 1992, Fine Gael TD Nora Owen engaged in (standard) heckling of Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, who responded, "That's women for you." In 2011, Independent TD Mick Wallace was recorded *in the Dáil* referring to Fine Gael TD Mary Mitchell O'Connor as "Miss Piggy" (McGing 2018). And Independent Senator David Norris both accused Fine Gael TD Regina Doherty of "talking through her fanny" and engaging in the "Regina Monologues" (riffing off of *The Vagina Monologues*) in remarks she made about abolishing the Seanad: "He objected to the fact that people who were over 20 years in the Seanad 'should have to listen to The Regina Monologues for somebody who is not a wet weekend in this house talking through her fanny, I object in the strongest possible way" (Kelly 2013).

9.5.3 Parliamentary Privilege

Parliamentary privilege is inherent in Taoiseach Varadkar's response to Mitchell O'Connor's remarks above. He was criticized for attempting to shift the blame for "macho" behavior and bullying to members of political parties on the left, particularly Sinn Féin. Asserting that the Oireachtas is a safe place for women to work, he remarked, "That is not to say there isn't macho behaviour on occasion, in the Oireachtas, there certainly is, but I have spoken myself in the past about how very often when you're trying to conduct normal business in the Dáil you're interrupted and shouted down constantly. ...But that is largely perpetrated by men and women of the left rather than men specifically" (Ryan 2017). Sinn Féin TD noted, "These are very serious issues and it is disgraceful that the Taoiseach would view such matters through the prism of political advantage. ...This is not the first time that the Taoiseach has sought to play to his gallery when matters of significance are raised with him. It happens daily. Women inside and outside the Dáil deserve more from the head of government." Sinn Féin TD Louise O'Reilly echoed her, noting that such a response was a "slap in the face" to any woman TD who raised issues of sexual harassment (Finn 2017).

While sexual misconduct may be rare, it hasn't been nonexistent. In 2013, during a break in a debate on abortion legislation, Fine Gael TD Tom Barry

grabbed his colleague Áine Collins and pulled her onto his lap (Finn 2017). And in an earlier but undated incident, former Taoiseach Charlie Haughey pulled on Fine Gael senator Gemma Hussey's bra strap to get her attention while she was watching the debate on an anti–rape bill she had sponsored in the Dáil (Ryan 2018). There have also been uninvestigated reports of aggression: Labour TD Niamh Breathnach has recounted the time an unidentified drunk male TD shoved her, making her hit her head against the wall, as well as the colleague who advised her to just forget about it. In 2017, she also reported, "Two men walking down for the vote at night... two TDs elbowed me, or shouldered me, down a corridor." The response she received to raising the issue was, "'Ah listen, if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen "' (McGing 2018; BreakingNews 2017).

9.6 Defamilialization

Ireland today is a mix of conflicting principles and policies. It also still has an article of its constitution reading "...the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home" (Article 41.2). But of the three countries I have presented, it scored the highest on the defamilialization measurement from Chapter 5. An exploration of four major sets of defamilializing policies explains why.

9.6.1 Family Leave Policies

The Maternity Protections Acts of 1994 and 2004 establish Ireland's maternity leave policies, which state that all women have the right to take off up to 26 weeks of unpaid maternity leave, regardless of where they are employed, how long they have been working there, and how many hours per week that they work. With enough social insurance contributions, they are also entitled to Maternity Benefit, which is £245 per week for the first 26 weeks and qualifies beneficiaries to take an additional 16 unpaid weeks of leave. Everyone who gives birth is required to take at least two weeks of leave before giving birth and at least four weeks afterwards. It also includes paid time off for an unlimited number of medical visits while pregnant and up to 14 weeks afterwards (Citizens Information 2020c).

The Paternity Leave and Benefit Act of 2016 created two weeks of unpaid leave that the parent not giving birth can take any time in the six months following a birth or adoption. It can be paid with the same requirements for Maternity Benefit above. Notably, individuals whose spouses die without taking their leave can transfer and take advantage of the leave to which that partner was entitled (Citizens Information 2020g).

Ireland also offers two weeks of (paid with appropriate amounts of social insurance contributions) parent's leave during the first year following birth or adoption (Citizens Information 2020e) and up to 22 unpaid weeks of leave per child under 12 and per parent (although it requires that the qualifying individual has worked for their employer for at least a year to get the full amount—and six weeks' notice). This will increase to 26 weeks in September 2020 (Citizens Information 2020f). There is also up to 24 paid weeks and 16 unpaid weeks of adoptive leave for adoptive mothers or "men alone" who are adopting (Citizens Information 2020a) and unpaid "carer's leave" (with the possibility of a Carer's Benefit) for a minimum of 13 weeks and a maximum of 104 weeks in order to care for someone who needs full–time attention (Citizens Information 2020a).

9.6.2 Provision of Public Daycare

Children in Ireland must start school by the age of six, but may start as early as four years old (Citizens Information 2020h). There are a variety of options for childcare before this time. For children older than 6 months but younger than 2 years and 8 months, there is a universal childcare subsidy for providers registered with the Child and Family Agency (Tulsa). This subsidy, established in 2017, is based on hours of childcare needed, not income (Citizens Information 2020i) Between the ages of 2 years and 8 months and 5 years and 6 months, the Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) Scheme provides free daycare for 3 hours a day, 5 days a week over the course of a normal school year (for up to two years). Parents are charged for additional time (Citizens Information 2020b).

Most recently, Ireland has created the National Childcare Scheme (NCS), which will replace all other childcare programs (except for the ECCE) by 2021. It consists of a universal (not income–based) subsidy for children under 3 and and an income–based subsidy for children under 15. The universal subsidy pays 50 cents per hour for up to £20 per week (£1,040 per year) for parents who qualify for the maximum 40 hours per week of childcare. The rates for the income–based subsidy vary, and it cuts off entirely for families with an annual income of £60,000 (Citizens Information 2020d).

The subsidy policies barely make a dent in the costs of childcare, which range from an average of £4.82 an hour for a daycare center and £6.13 an hour

for a childminder in the home (Burke-Kennedy 2018). This is even higher in Dublin and the surrounding areas, where parents pay an average of £200 per week compared to £184 in the rest of the country, costs that are dramatically higher than other countries in the OECD (Taft 2020). This means that parents with a single child who is three years old pay approximately 12 percent of their disposable income on childcare—16 percent for single parents, 20 percent for parents in low–income households, and higher for parents with more than one child. These costs have a direct impact on women's ability to work outside of the home; one study found that as childcare costs raised by 10 percent, the hours mothers worked per week decreased by 30 minutes per week, and childcare that was 50 percent higher was associated with 2.5 fewer hours of paid work for mothers per week (Burke-Kennedy 2018). In addition to this affordability crisis, 60 percent of childcare workers earn salaries that fall beneath the Living Wage, and the turnover rate at full-time care centers is above 40 percent, affecting the quality of care provided and hinting at a forthcoming staffing crisis (Taft 2020).

9.6.3 Workweek Regulations

Working hour regulations were laid out in the Organisation of Working Act 1997. It mandates that most workers must not exceed 48 working hours per week, averaged over 4 months (in most cases). There is no legal obligation with regards to overtime pay for employers. There are also no regulations keeping women (including pregnant women) from working non–standard hours, although if a doctor certifies that the hours will harm a pregnant woman or her baby, she may be exempted from working those hours, even by receiving health and safety leave. This applies for up to 14 weeks after she gives birth (Citizens Information 2019).

9.6.4 Abortion Regulations

Abortion has been a key women's rights issue in Ireland and has been at the center of heated debates throughout the country's independence. The original criminalization of abortion came from the UK's Offences Against the Person Act (1861), which Ireland retained after its independence. In the 1980s, after watching the loosening of abortion laws in other countries, Ireland (by public referendum) added the Eighth Amendment to its constitution, which recognizes "the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right." Another referendum in 1992 led to the Thirteenth Amendment, which made it legal for women to travel to other

countries to receive abortions, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which made it legal to access information related to legal (abortion) services in other states.

In 2013, the new Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act opened the door for abortions to save the life of a mother (either from threats related to the pregnancy itself or if there was a medical consensus that she would take her own life if not allowed the abortion). At this time, the maximum penalty for an illegal abortion was 14 years in prison. Finally, in 2018, there was a final referendum, in which the citizens of Ireland overwhelmingly voted in favor of repealing the Eighth Amendment (BBC 2018). Legislation regulating abortions went into effect in 2019. Under this legislation, women can access free and legal abortions inside the country up until 12 weeks of pregnancy, with extensions in the case of fatal fetal abnormalities and threats to the mother's life.

While the new law is a dramatic improvement, it does not mean that abortions are freely (or equally) accessible. Women must wait for three days in between a doctor certifying that they are eligible for the procedure and having the procedure itself, which adds a barrier to abortion, particularly for women living in rural areas or vulnerable circumstances. Additionally, there have been numerous reports of providers lying to pregnant women—asserting that they are further along than the are or telling them they have miscarried and then not revealing the truth until after the 12-week mark—and "putting pregnant people through traumatic and coercive experiences, including unnecessarily invasive physical exams, being made to watch graphic videos and being threatened with unproven claims that a termination would cause cancer, death and the breakdown of mental health and relationships" (Hogan 2019).

9.7 Text Analysis



Figure 9.2: Ireland DE Speeches by Topic, 1990–2017

My web scrapers retrieved every speech made in Ireland's Dáil Éireann from 1990 to 2017, with the full corpus including over 800,000 individual speeches. Of these, a little over 6,000 use the language related to women's economic rights identified in Table 6.1–family leave, childcare, the workweek, and abortion. Figure 9.2 displays how a summary of how these topics have been used over time. Here, we see that while childcare has often been the most common topic raised in the Dáil (and has, as a general trend, been increasing in usage since the 1990s), it has been surpassed at times by abortion. Workweek discussions are, again, very rare.



Figure 9.3: Ireland Abortion Speeches by TD Gender, 1990–2017



Figure 9.4: Ireland Childcare Speeches by TD Gender, 1990–2017



Figure 9.5: Ireland Family Leave Speeches by TD Gender, 1990–2017

Of the relevant speeches, 1,549 (or 25 percent) were made by women, and 4,564 (75 percent) were made by men. Figures 9.3 through 9.5 display a single topic—abortion and childcare, respectively—broken down by the gender of the speaker.[30] On the left in each figure, you can see the raw counts for each topic. On the right, you can see the same figures constructed with weighted counts, where the number of speeches by both men and women are weighted as though they each represented 50 percent of the House of Commons. As in the United Kingdom and Canada, men made more speeches on each topic by raw count. However, after accounting for the dramatically different proportions of men and women in the Dáil, we can see that women were slightly more likely to make speeches on abortion and family leave and significantly more likely to make speeches on childcare than men.

[30] Speeches about the work-week occur at too low of a rate for charts like this to be meaningful.

Figures 9.6 through 9.8 display speech topics disaggregated by political party. These figures show the parties that currently have more than ten members in the House of Commons—Fianna Fáil (center to center–right, Fine Gael (center–right), Sinn Féin (center–left to left), and the Green Party (center–left)—with all other TDs aggregated under "Other Party." The parties that in 2020 hold the largest shares of seats are Sinn Féin (37 seats), Fianna Fáil (37 seats), and Fine Gael (35 seats). This is a decrease in seats for Fine Gail, a marked decrease in seats for Fianna Fáil, and a dramatic increase in seats for Sinn Féin compared to past decades. These charts show a variety of voices being raised for each of the topics. In most years, speeches by "other" party members are prominent, if not dominant, on the charts, with speeches by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael following close behind and occasionally taking the lead.



Figure 9.6: Ireland Abortion Speeches by TD Party, 1990–2017



Figure 9.7: Ireland Childcare Speeches by TD Party, 1990–2017



Figure 9.8: Ireland Family Leave Speeches by TD Party, 1990–2017

Finally, Figures 9.9 and 9.10 display the chord diagrams demonstrating the call to different emotions by topic and gender of the speaker over time. Emotions other than trust (and, to a much lesser degree, anticipation) are particularly rare in the Dáil, although there are small spikes of speeches classified as fear (abortion for men and women and the workweek for men) and sadness (family leave for men).



Figure 9.9: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, Ireland (Abortion and Childcare)



Figure 9.10: Emotions by Topic and Gender of Speaker, Ireland (Family Leave and Workweek)

9.7.1 Analysis and Results

Table 9.1: Expected Relationships with Anger, Anticipation, Disgust, Fear, Joy, and Sadness in Speeches

Variable	Relationship
TD Gender (F=1)	+
TD Party (Base Category = Conservative)	+
TD Age	−
TD Years of Service	+
TD Government Position	+
Women's Share of Leg. Seats	+
Conservative Control of Leg.	−
Female Head of State	+

Control data for TD characteristics in the following models come from the Irish parliamentary archives.[31] My dependent variable is a speech's emotional classification. My primary independent variable is the speaker's gender, and I control for the speaker's age, number of years of service, political party, and position in the government[32]. At the parliament level, I also control for the percent of parliamentary seats filled by women (Bank 2020) and whether or not the Conservative Party has a controlling share of parliament. And at the national level, given the lack of female heads of government and the deeply involved nature of Mary Robinson and Mary McAleese, I control for the presence of a female head of state. Because my dependent variable is an unordered category, I test the relationship between it and the input variables with a series of multinomial logit models. Table 9.1 presents a quick recap of the expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables for reference.

[31] `https://api.oireachtas.ie/`

[32] Ireland does not record and promote positions in a shadow government to the same degree as the United Kingdom and Canada.

Table 9.2 displays the results of the bivariate model. In a model with no controls, there are no statistically significant relationships between TD gender and a speech's emotional classification at the 95 percent confidence level. Women TDs, when compared to male TDs are (on average) less likely to make speeches coded as surprise than trust at the 90 percent confidence level.

The next model, the results of which are displayed in Table 9.3, adds the political party of the TDs as a control. In this model, gender continues to exhibit no statistically significant results at the 95 percent confidence level, although

Table 9.2: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by TD Gender (Ireland Dáil Éireann, 1990–2017)

	Anger	**Antic.**	**Disgust**	**Fear**	**Joy**	**Sad.**	**Surprise**
Gender (F=1)	−0.02	0.12	0.14	−0.05	0.39	−0.15	−1.03
	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.45)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.16)	(0.61)
(Intercept)	−3.69	−2.07	−5.37	−2.95	−4.35	−3.11	−5.04
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Speeches Classified	128	670	25	268	75	222	28
N	6579						
AIC	11066.77						

Note: 5,163 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

women are more likely than men to give a speech coded as joy (over trust) at the 90 percent confidence level. Political party is also largely statistically insignificant. However, when compared to members of Fine Gael, members of Fianna Fáil are less likely to make speeches coded as anger and fear than they are to make speeches coded as trust, and "other" party members are less likely to make speeches coded as anticipation.

The results of the fully specified model are displayed in Table 9.4. In this model, the gender of the speaker continues to show no relationship with the emotional classification of a speech (at the 95 percent confidence level; women TDs are more likely than men to make speeches classified as joy at the 90 percent confidence level). The results for political party are largely consistent from the previous model. TDs from Fianna Fáil have a 45 percent decrease in the odds of making a speech coded as anger and a 36 percent decrease in the odds of making a speech coded as fear compared to TDs from Fine Gael and making a speech coded as trust, on average and all else equal. And members of the Green Party have an almost 100 percent decrease in the odds of giving a speech coded as disgust or surprise.

Table 9.3: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights by TD Gender and Party (Ireland Dáil Éireann, 1990–2017)

	Anger	**Antic.**	**Disgust**	**Fear**	**Joy**	**Sad.**	**Surprise**
Gender (F=1)	−0.14	0.15	0.03	−0.21	0.44	−0.25	−1.03
	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.62)
Fianna Fáil	−0.62*	−0.17	−0.58	−0.58*	0.38	−0.34	−0.70
	(0.26)	(0.11)	(0.57)	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.20)	(0.45)
Sinn Féin	−0.43	0.13	−0.08	0.06	0.59	0.41	−1.34
	(0.42)	(0.16)	(0.79)	(0.26)	(0.46)	(0.25)	(1.04)
Green Party	0.28	−0.05	−7.28	0.23	0.65	−0.81	−8.27
	(0.54)	(0.30)	(49.18)	(0.41)	(0.76)	(0.73)	(59.27)
Other Party	0.06	−0.24*	−0.06	0.29	0.28	0.23	−0.96
	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.48)	(0.15)	(0.32)	(0.17)	(0.50)
(Intercept)	−3.52	−1.96	−5.14	−2.90	−4.64	−3.11	−4.47
	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.38)	(0.13)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.29)
Speeches Classified	128	670	25	268	75	222	28
N	6579						
AIC	11054.21						

Note: 5,163 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

With regards to the control variables, TDs who have served longer are less likely to make speeches coded as anger and more likely to make speeches coded as joy. TDs holding government positions are more likely to make speeches coded as disgust but less likely to make speeches coded as fear. Fine Gael control of the Dáil is associated with an increase in the odds of giving a speech coded as fear and a decrease in the odds of giving a speech coded as joy. Interestingly, although gender of individual TDs does not show a statistically significant relationship with speech classifications, at the aggregate level and at higher levels of office, they do. As women's share of seats increases by one percent, the odd of giving a speech classified as fear decrease by 13 percent and the odds of giving a speech classified as joy increase by 20 percent (compared to trust), on average and all else equal. When we consider the increase in women's share of seats from 8 percent to 22 percent over the span of years covered by my data, this represents substantively meaningful changes in the discourse. Additionally, when a woman is the head of state, the odds of making a speech classified as anticipation decrease by 34 percent, ceteris paribus.

Table 9.4: Emotions in Speeches Regarding Women's Economic Rights, Full Model (Ireland Dáil Éireann, 1990–2017)

	Anger	Antic.	Disgust	Fear	Joy	Sad.	Surprise
Gender (F=1)	−0.14	0.16	0.05	−0.20	0.46	−0.23	−0.97
	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.46)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.62)
Fianna Fáil	−0.59*	−0.12	−0.98	−0.44*	0.18	−0.32	−0.96
	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.63)	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.49)
Sinn Féin	−0.41	0.18	0.03	0.04	0.66	0.44	−1.27
	(0.42)	(0.16)	(0.81)	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.26)	(1.05)
Green Party	0.23	−0.08	−13.42*	0.49	0.38	−0.63	−9.69*
	(0.54)	(0.30)	(0.00)	(0.42)	(0.77)	(0.73)	(0.00)
Other Party	0.10	−0.20	0.04	0.23	0.29	0.21	−0.94
	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.49)	(0.16)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.50)
Age	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Years of Service	−0.03*	−0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.03*	0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Govt. Position (Y=1)	0.15	−0.18	1.09*	−0.52*	0.09	0.10	0.57
	(0.29)	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.51)
Women's Seats	−0.03	−0.04	0.13	−0.13*	0.18*	−0.05	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.10)
Conserv. Control (Y=1)	−0.43	−0.35	−1.70	0.51*	−1.49	0.15	−0.49
	(0.41)	(0.18)	(1.33)	(0.23)	(0.81)	(0.30)	(0.95)
Fem. Head State	−0.50	−0.41*	−0.59	−0.44	0.15	−0.54	0.75
	(0.40)	(0.18)	(1.24)	(0.23)	(0.86)	(0.29)	(1.09)
(Intercept)	−2.27	−0.89	−5.32	−1.19	−6.99	−2.49	−7.07
	(0.66)	(0.31)	(1.57)	(0.46)	(0.99)	(0.52)	(1.59)
Speeches Classified	128	670	25	268	75	222	28
N	6579						
AIC	11044.2						

Note: 5,163 speeches classified as trust. Standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.05

Figure 9.11 displays the in–sample predicted probabilities for this model. The probability of making a speech in Ireland rises back to a similar level to the United Kingdom for both men and women TDs. Women TDs are slightly more likely than men to make speeches classified as anticipation and joy. Otherwise, however, the probabilities of receiving any given speech classification are very similar for women and men TDs in the Dáil.



Figure 9.11: Emotions in the Irish Dáil Éireann, Predicted Probabilities by Gender

9.8 Conclusion

As in the previous parliaments, women TDs in Ireland are more likely to speak up on issues related to women's rights. However, as individuals, they are not more or less likely to make a call to any particular emotion in their speeches. And unlike the Canadian House of Commons, party is also not a big determinant of a speech's emotional classification. The different results from each country suggest that country context has much to do with the emotional discourse in national legislatures.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Mainstream political scientists often claim (or imply) neutrality in their research; normativity is held in opposition to objectivity and empirical truth (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). It follows from this logic that to be objective, we must be emotionless. But the ultimate goal of political science is the endeavor to improve the human condition. When we study democracy, we seek to understand how to best spread political participation and improve representation. When we study development, we seek to understand how best to improve populations' access to food, water, and housing. When we study war, we seek to understand how best to protect individuals' lives and bodies. Political science is inherently normative in this way. Particularly when we research abuses against humanity, when we research suffering and pain, it is illogical (or even immoral) to pretend that there are no emotions involved or, worse, that we have no investment in the outcome.

Emotions are built into humanity, into individuals and into societies. They can also be tools of society, even liberal societies. In *Political Emotions*, Nussbaum (2013, pgs. 1–2) writes,

> All societies are full of emotions. Liberal democracies are no exception. The story of any day or week in the life of even a relatively stable democracy would include a host of emotions—anger, fear, sympathy, disgust, envy, guilt, grief, many forms of love. Some of these episodes of emotions have little to do with political principles or the public culture, but others are different: they take as their object the nation, the nation's goals, its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one's fellow citizens seen as fellow inhabitants of a common public space. Often... emotions directed at the geographical features of a nation are ways of channeling emotions

> toward it key commitments—to inclusiveness, equality, the relief of misery, the end of slavery.
>
> ...Such public emotions, frequently intense, have large–scale consequences for the nation's progress toward its goals. They can give the pursuit of those goals new vigor and depth, but they can also derail that pursuit, introducing or reinforcing division, hierarchies, and forms of neglect or obtuseness.

In this way, emotions are a political phenomenon that can and should be studied, which is a task to which I have contributed with this project. With a better understanding of the emotions to which legislators call in their speeches, we can develop a better understanding of which emotions spread and how they spread through the general public; we can better identify which emotional framings are most effective in bringing about progress. The first steps in this bigger goal, the steps I have introduced here, are, first, to identify the policies that bring about progress, second, to identify the emotions used in discussions of these policies, and third, to establish if there are trends in how members of legislators make calls to these emotions and otherwise speak about these policies.

With regards to promoting respect for women's economic rights, my latent variable determined that progressive abortion, childcare, family leave, and workweek policies are important for ensuring that women can equally participate in and benefit from the economy. The method itself is key here. When we allow the data to speak for themselves in ascertaining the importance of specific policies for women's economic independence, the effects of some regularly discussed policies (like child benefits or gendered regulation of non–standard work hours) wash out, while the effects of other, similarly discussed policies (like the public provision of daycare) indicate that they have received the credit they are due. Furthermore, a policy like free access to abortions, which is more often treated as a physical integrity right rather than an economic right, can introduce itself as a contending defamilializing policy.

My three country analyses determined that female members of parliaments are—in all countries and for nearly all topics—more likely than male members to make speeches related to these policies. Speeches such as these act as a key vehicle for the creation and communication of frameworks for discussing policy issues, frameworks that are likely to be transmitted to the general public and reflected in the policies that are adopted. This acts as an important linkage between women's descriptive representation in national parliaments and policy outcomes that further respect for women's rights in those countries.

With regards to the actual emotional frameworks being used, there is a significant amount of variation by country, driving home the importance of con-

ducting multi–country analyses. In the United Kingdom, women MPs are more likely than men to express anger, fear, anticipation, and joy than they are to express trust. This suggests that they are both more likely to refer to experiences of suffering and pain in reference to the need for change and more likely to support and celebrate positive change that occurs. However, it is not just individual women or MPs who have an impact on the discourse around women's economic rights. As women's share of seats increases in the UK House of Commons, speeches classified as joy and surprise become more likely (relative to speeches coded as trust). And the presence of a female prime minister in office makes speeches coded as fear and sadness significantly and substantially more likely. What this could indicate is that in the United Kingdom, the presence of a female prime minister encourages individual MPs to speak out about abuses and experiences of suffering, whereas women's increased share of seats makes it more likely that policies respecting women's economic rights are more likely to pass, leading to an increased rate of celebratory speeches.

In Canada, party politics become much more important for predicting the emotions into which speeches become classified, with membership in any party besides the Conservative Party being associated with significant changes in the odds of having a speech classified as multiple emotions besides trust. However, women MPs are still significantly more likely to make speeches classified as joy. Contrasting the UK, women's increased share of seats is associated with an increase in the odds of a speech being classified as sadness.

In Ireland, neither party membership nor TD gender appears to have much impact on a speech's classification, although women are still more likely than men to make a speech classified as joy over trust (at the 90 percent confidence level). This could reflect the lower levels of hostility to women that female TDs have identified in the Dáil Éireann compared to legislatures like Westminster. It's possible that this perception suppresses trends in emotional speeches, instead allowing them to fluctuate based on adversarial politics and the policies being discussed. Increases in women's share of seats are associated with decreased odds in making speeches classified as fear and increased odds in making a speech classified as joy. Interestingly, the presence of a female head of state is associated with a decrease in the odds of making a speech classified as anticipation (compared to trust), all else equal. This is a result that is difficult to explain, but it may suggest that Mary Robinson's staunch support for women's rights was negated by Mary McAleese's concentration on other issues of equality.

Ultimately, this means that while there are notable examples of women politicians making calls to negative emotions in speeches promoting change, these examples wash out in the statistical analyses (possibly because of the shared

negative language used in adversarial politics by all members of parliaments). Moreover, it stresses the importance of country context with regards to political discourse, even in relatively similar countries with shared political histories. However, across all three country contexts, the one trend that holds true is that women are more likely to make calls to joy in their speeches, indicating that women are more likely than men to speak in strong, positive terms about advances in women's economic rights.

Taken all together, this represents a key piece of the puzzle in connecting the descriptive and substantive representation of women. It allows us to move beyond disconnected linkages between percentages of women in legislatures and policy outcomes in those countries and beyond vote choices that obscure deeper logics and political preferences. With this analysis, I have provided evidence regarding which members of parliaments most often discuss, support, and celebrate advances in women's economic rights—and they are women.

The analyses and findings I have presented open the doors to a number of exciting possibilities for future research. The data I have already collected with my web scrapers for each of these parliaments can be applied to issues beyond women's economic rights. Remaining in the framework of CEDAW, policies could also be identified to match each of the articles related to women's political and economic rights in order to determine if trends differ among different subcategories of women's rights. The analyses could also be extended to include any topic—not just women's rights but also human rights broadly, international interventions and assistance, trade, taxes, and all other topics regularly addressed on the floor of these national legislatures.

Future work is also needed to address the bias toward trust speeches in the corpus of parliamentary speeches for each of these countries. Recoding the speeches in terms of positive and negative language and cross–checking the results with the speeches originally coded as trust determines that approximately half would more accurately be coded "mistrust." While this does not meaningfully change the results of this analysis, it, along with the sheer number of speeches classified as trust to begin with, indicates the need for a greater level of nuance in the emotional coding. This nuance would best be provided by a team of coders scoring a training set of speeches based on an established set of criteria and then training an algorithm to replicate these criteria, resulting in (hopefully) greater variation in speech classifications.

Finally, determining which emotional framings resonate with the greater public and result in change requires two further steps. The first step is gathering data from the public to parallel speech data in parliaments—news stories or Twitter data, for example. This kind of data would allow us to establish if the

general public exhibits trends similar to politicians in their emotional discourse around these topics. It would also allow us to directly explore which speeches most resonate with the public through tweets, reshares, quotes, and shared language. The second step is connecting this spread of emotional discourse with concrete changes in policy, determining where emotions in the general public make their way into parliamentary speeches, closing the loop, and the policies produced by national legislatures.

Emotions are a powerful source of human motivation, even—or especially—political motivation. Better understanding them will allow us to understand the spread of policy frameworks and, ultimately, the shape of policies themselves, particularly when we are discussing policies guided at addressing historical, institutionally embedded inequalities between men and women. Such inherently emotional, personal experiences require equally personal, emotional analyses. After all, the political is personal.

Bibliography

Abedi, Maham. 2019. "How abortion rights work in Canada — and whether they could be put at risk". *Global News*. https://globalnews.ca/news/5310984/abortion-rules-canada/.

Addley, Esther. 2016. "Queen Elizabeth II is longest-reigning living monarch after Thai king's death". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/13/queen-elizabeth-ii-is-longest-reigning-living-monarch-after-thai-kings-death.

Aiello, Rachel. 2018. "Parental leave for MPs a first, to be seen how it addresses reality of political life". *CTV News*. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/parental-leave-for-mps-a-first-to-be-seen-how-it-addresses-reality-of-political-life-1.3829766.

Akgunduz, Yusuf Emre, and Janneke Plantenga. 2013. "Labour Market Effects of Parental Leave in Europe". *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 37 (4): 845–862.

Akstiniene, Aiste. 2013. "Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Problematic Aspects Related to Gender Issues". *JURISPRUDENCE* 20 (2): 451–468.

Alexander, Amy C. 2012. "Change in Women's Descriptive Representation and the Belief in Women's Ability to Govern: A Virtuous Cycle". *Politcs & Gender* 8:437–464.

Allen, Heidi. 2018. "MP Heidi Allen talks about her abortion in powerful Commons speech—video". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/society/video/2018/jun/06/mp-heidi-allen-talks-about-her-abortion-in-powerful-commons-speech-video.

Anarson, Bjorn Thor, and Aparna Mitra. 2010. "The Paternity Leave Act in Iceland and implications for gender equality in the labour market". *Applied Economic Letters* 17:677–680.

Anderson, Stephanie. 2016. "Julia Gillard says women going into politics should expect rape threats". *ABC News Australia*. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-12/expect-rape-threats,-gillard-warns-female-politicians/7925906.

Anzia, SF, and CR Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson effect: Why do congresswomen outperform congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 478–493.

Asal, Victor, Mitchell Brown, and Renee Gibson Figueroa. 2008. "Structure, Empowerment and the Liberalization of Cross–National Abortion Rights". *Politics & Gender* 4:265–284.

Atchison, Amy. 2015. "The Impact of Female Cabinet Ministers on a Female–Friendly Labor Environment". *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 36 (4): 388–414.

Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Nancy Carillo. 2007. "More is better: the influence of collective female descriptive representation on external efficacy". *Politics & Gender* 3 (1): 79–101.

Baldez, Lisa. 2011. "The UN Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW): A New Way to Measure Women's Interests". *Politics & Gender* 7 (3): 419–423.

Bank, The World. 1941. "STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 'THE FOUR FREEDOMS'". *Voices of Democracy*. https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/fdr-the-four-freedoms-speech-text/.

Bank, World. 2020. "Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) - United Kingdom)". *The World Bank*. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=GB.

Barajas, Michael. 2016. "5 Moments of Misogyny at the Texas Legislature". *Houston Press*. https://www.houstonpress.com/news/hidalgo-raises-harris-county-covid-19-threat-level-to-the-max-11479171.

Bates, Laura. 2016. "So Theresa May has breasts – who knew?" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/17/theresa-may-breasts-home-secretary-cleavage-budget-sexism-westminster?CMP=share%5C_btn%5C_fb.

BBC. 2013. "Women MPs 'face sexist gestures' in the Commons". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-25266177.

— . 2014. "Peter Nunn jailed for Twitter abuse of MP Stella Creasy". *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-29411031.

— . 2015. “France rejects ’tampon tax’ change”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34538672.

— . 2016a. “Labour MP Yvette Cooper contacts police after Twitter death threat”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-leeds-36594086.

— . 2016b. “MP Anna Soubry contacts police over ’Jo Cox’ tweet”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-38180748.

— . 2017a. “Canada MP sorry for Catherine McKenna ’climate Barbie’ remark”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41343006.

— . 2017b. “Daily Mail’s ’Who won Legs-it!’ headline draws scorn”. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-39416554.

— . 2017c. “Theresa May: Take sex abuse claims to police”. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-41831268.

— . 2017d. “Tory MP Soames sorry for ’woofing’ at Tasmina Ahmed–Sheikh”. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38801422.

— . 2018. “Ireland abortion referendum: What is the law?)” *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43961988.

— . 2019a. “Divorce referendum: Ireland votes to liberalise laws”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48410903.

— . 2019b. “Ireland independence: Why Jan 1919 is an important date”. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/46480953.

— . 2019c. “MPs’ fury at Boris Johnson’s ’dangerous language’”. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49833804.

— . 2019d. “Salvadorean woman jailed over baby’s death is freed”. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47263743.

— . 2019e. “What are the UK’s laws on abortion?” *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/health-19856314.

— . 2019f. “Whitney Cummings, US comedian, tweets nipple photo to stop extortion”. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49329140.

— . 2020. “Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU”. *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.

Ben Shitrit, Lihi. 2016. "Authenticating Representation: Women's Quotas and Islamist Parties". *Politics & Gender* 12:781–806.

Billet, Bret L. 2007. *Cultural Relativism in the Face of the West: The Plight of Women and Female Children*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Bloom, David E., et al. 2009. "Fertility, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend". *Journal of Economic Growth* 14 (2): 79–101.

Blundell, Richard, et al. 2000. "The Labour Market Impact of the Worlding Families' Tax Credit". *Fiscal Studies* 21 (1): 75–104.

Bognetti, Giovanni, et al. 2020. "Constitutional Law". *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitutional-law.

Borger, Julian. 2013. "The Conservative party's uncomfortable relationship with Nelson Mandela". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/06/conservative-party-uncomfortable-nelson-mandela.

Bowman, Marion. 1989. "The Iron Lady made flesh and blood". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/1989/nov/30/gender.uk.

Braden, Maria. 1996. *Women Politicians and the Media*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Branisa, Boris, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler. 2013. "Gender Inequality in Social Institutions and Gendered Development Outcomes". *World Development* 45:252–268.

Bratton, Kathleen A. 2005. "Critical mass theory revisited: the behavior and success of token women in state legislatures". *Politics & Gender* 1 (1): 97–125.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Leonard P. Ray. 2002. "Descriptive representation, policy outcomes, and municipal day–care coverage in Norway". *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2): 428–437.

BreakingNews. 2017. "I was bullied by two male TDs, says former Minister". *BreakingNews.ie*. https://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/i-was-bullied-by-two-male-tds-says-former-minister-812804.html.

British Library Learning. 2018a. "What is the difference between the suffragists and suffragettes?" *British Library*. https://www.bl.uk/votes-for-women/articles/suffragists-and-suffragettes.

— . 2018b. "Women's suffrage timeline". *British Library*. https://www.bl.uk/votes-for-women/articles/womens-suffrage-timeline.

Britten, Liam. 2016. "A look back at first female PM of Canada". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/kim-campbell-archive-1.3835924.

Britton, Bianca. 2016. "People care way too much about Theresa May's shoes". *CNN World*. https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/europe/theresa-may-sexism-prime-minister/index.html.

Bronson, Brittany. 2017. "What Happens When Women Legislates". *The Guardian*. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/opinion/what-happens-when-women-legislate.html.

Bruce, Erika, et al. 2019. "United Kingdom". *Salem Press Encyclopedia*.

Buchan, Lizzy. 2019. "MPs to challenge John Bercow over '18th century' rules against proxy voting for new parents". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/pregnant-mps-proxy-voting-new-parents-john-bercow-speaker-commons-rules-sexism-a8707551.html.

Bunch, Charlotte. 1990. "Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re–Vision of Human Rights". *Human Rights Quarterly* 12 (4): 486–498.

Burke-Kennedy, Eoin. 2018. "High childcare costs keeping women out of workplace - study". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/high-childcare-costs-keeping-women-out-of-workplace-study-1.3617000.

Busby, Mattha. 2019. "Theresa May inflexible, introverted and surly, biography claims". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/26/theresa-may-inflexible-introverted-and-surly-biography-claims.

Butler, Dawn. 2018. "As a female MP who was once told to use 'the cleaner's lift' in Westminster, I know sexism is still rife". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/women-vote-100-suffrage-sexism-mp-commons-westminster-gender-pay-gap-a8196666.html.

Campbell, Alexia Fernández. 2019. "They did everything right—and still hit the glass ceiling. Now, these women are suing America's top companies for equal pay". *The Guardian*. https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/12/3/20948425/equal-pay-lawsuits-pay-gap-glass-ceiling.

Campbell, Rosie, Sarah Childs, and Joni Lovenduski. 2010. "Do Women Need Women Representatives?" *British Journal of Political Science* 40 (1): 171–194.

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. "Out of Step, out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting". *The American Political Science Review* 96 (1): 127–140.

CBC. 2012. "How the abortion debate has reared its head in Parliament". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/how-the-abortion-debate/-has-reared-its-head-in/-parliament-1.1200237.

— . 2018. "Kim Campbell: The politician who wouldn't promise jobs". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/kim-campbell-the-politician/-who-wouldn-t-promise-jobs-1.4813213.

Celis, Karen. 2006. "Substantive representation of women: the representation of women's interests and the impact of descriptive representation in the Belgian parliament (1900–1979)". *Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy* 28 (2): 85–114.

Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2012. "The Substantive Representation of Women: What to Do with Conservative Claims?" *Political Studies* 60 (1): 213–225.

Center for American Women and Politics. 2020. "Women in Congress 2018". *Rutgers Eagleton Institute of Politics*. https://cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2018.

Chapman, Audrey R. 2007. "The Status of Efforts to Monitor Economic Rights". In *Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues*, ed. by Shareen Hertel and Lanse Minkler. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chappell, Louise, and Georgina Waylen. 2013. "Gender and the Hidden Life of Institutions". *Public Administration* 91 (3): 599–615.

Chevalier, Arnaud., and Tarja K. Viitanen. 2002. "The Causality between Female Labor Force Participation and the Availability of Childcare". *Applied Economics Letters* 9 (14): 915–918.

Childs, Sarah. 2004. "A Feminised Style of Politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons". *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 6 (1): 3–19.

Chrisafis, Angelique. 2016. "'We can no longer stay silent': fury erupts over sexism in French politics". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/13/we-can-no-longer-stay-silent-fury-erupts-over-sexism-in-french-politics.

Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights". *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 407–417.

Citizens Information. 2019. "Night Work)". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/hours_of_work/night_work.html.

— . 2020a. "Carer's Leave". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/carers_leave_from_employment.html.

— . 2020b. "Early Childhood Care and Education Scheme". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/education/pre_school_education_and_childcare/early_childhood_care_and_education_scheme.html.

— . 2020c. "Maternity Leave". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/maternity_leave.html.

— . 2020d. "National Childcare Scheme (NCS)". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/education/pre_school_education_and_childcare/national_childcare_scheme.html.

— . 2020e. "Parent's Leave". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/parents_leave.html.

— . 2020f. "Parental Leave". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/parental_leave.html.

— . 2020g. "Paternity Leave". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/employment/employment_rights_and_conditions/leave_and_holidays/paternity_leave.html.

— . 2020h. "Starting School". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/education/primary_and_post_primary_education/going_to_primary_school/primary_education_life_event.html.

— . 2020i. "Universal childcare subsidy". *Citizen Information*. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/education/pre_school_education_and_childcare/universal_childcare_subsidy.html.

Clancy, Paddy. 2018. "Mary McAleese will not apologize to Catholic church following abortion vote". *Irish Central*. https://www.irishcentral.com/news/irishvoice/mary-mcaleese-catholic-abortion.

Clark, Daniel. 2020a. "Proportion of Female Members of Parliament in the UK (UK) from 1979 to 2019". *Statista*. https://www.statista.com/statistics/871195/proportion-of-women-mps-in-uk-parliament/.

— . 2020b. "Proportion of Female Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom (UK) from 1979 to 2019". *Statista*. https://www.statista.com/statistics/871195/proportion-of-women-mps-in-uk-parliament/.

Cleverdon, Catherine L. 1974. *The Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada*. 2nd. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Cole, Wade M. 2012. "Human Rights as Myth and Ceremony? Reevaluating the Effectiveness of Human Rights Treaties, 1981–2007". *American Journal of Sociology* 117 (4): 1131–1171.

Collier, Cheryl N., and Tracey Raney. 2018. "Understanding Sexism and Sexual Harassment in Politics: A Comparison of Westminster Parliaments in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 25 (3): 432–455.

Cook, Chris, and Lucinda Day. 2018. "House of Commons Speaker John Bercow named in bullying claims". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-43339116.

Cowell–Meyers, Kimberly, and Laura Langbein. 2009. "Linking Women's Descriptive and Substantive Representation in the United States". *Politics & Gender* 5:491–518.

Coyne, Ellen. 2018. "I backed repeal of the Eighth and it was not a sin, insists Mary McAleese". *The Sunday Times*. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/i-backed-repeal-of-the-eighth-and-it-was-not-a-sin-insists-mcaleese-m2dh6lt6f.

Crace, John. 2019. "Farewell Maybot: John Crace on the changing of the Tory guard". *Today In Focus*. https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2019/jun/07/farewell-maybot-john-crace-on-the-changing-of-the-tory-guard.

Crawford, Elizabeth. 2018. "The black and Asian women who fought for a vote". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/in-pictures-42837451.

Crowe, Catriona. 2018. "How Irish women won the right to vote in 1918". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/how-irish-women-won-the-right-to-vote-in-1918-1.3697389.

Culbertson, Alix. 2017. "Boom bust budget! The day Theresa May's boob-boosting bra sparked Twitter meltdown". *The Express*. https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/653043/theresa-may-recycles-cleavage-outfit-Budget-Day.

Culpepper, Pepper. 2007. "Small States and Skill Specificity". *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (6): 611–637.

Curry, Bill, and Laura Stone. 2017. "Trudeau urges Canadians to speak up about sexual harassment". *The Globe and Mail*. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/trudeau-urges-canadians-to-speak-up-about-sexual-harassment/article37108076/.

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahlerup, Drude. 1988. "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics". *Scandinavan Political Studies* 11 (4): 275–298.

— . 2006. "The story of the theory of critical mass". *Politics & Gender* 2 (4): 511–522.

Davies, Lizzy. 2014. "Laura Boldrini: the Italian politician rising above the rape threats". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/feb/09/laura-boldrini-italian-politician-rape-threats.

Dearing, Helene. 2016. "Gender equality in the division of work: How to assess European leave policies regarding their compliance with an ideal leave model". *Journal of European Social Policy* 26 (3): 234–247.

Deering, K. N., et al. 2014. "A systematic review of the correlates of violence against sex workers". *American Journal of Public Health* 104 (5): 42–54. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24625169/.

DiMauro, Julie. 1996. "Toward a More Effective Guaranteee of Women's Human Rights: A Multicultural Dialogue in International Law". *Women's Rights Law Reporter* 17 (3): 333–344.

Dolan, Kathleen. 2010. "The impact of gender stereotyped evaluations on support for women candidates." *Political Behavior* 32 (1): 69–88.

— . 2014. "Gender stereotypes, candidate evaluations, and voting for women candidates: What really matters?" *Political Research Quarterly* 67 (1): 96–107.

Dollar, David, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti. 2001. "Are women really the 'fairer' sex? Corruption and women in government". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organizations* 46 (4): 423–429.

Donnelly, Jack. 1984. "Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights". *Human Rights Quarterly* 6 (4): 400–419.

— . 2013. *Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Dovi, Suzanne. 2007. "Theorizing Women's Representation in the United States". *Politics & Gender* 3:297–319.

Druckman, James N. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *The Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1041. ISSN: 00223816.

Dwyer, Colin. 2017. "Ireland's First Openly Gay Prime Minister Formally Takes Office". *NPR*. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/14/532916075/irelands-first-openly-gay-prime-minister-formally-takes-office.

Eberts, Mary. 2009. "Women as Full Citizens: Addressing the Barriers of Gender and Race in Canadian Constitutional Development". In *Suffrage, Gender and Citizenship : International Perspectives on Parliamentary Reforms*, ed. by Pirjo Markkola, Seija-Leena Nevala-Nurmi, and Irma Sulkunen. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Eisler, Riane. 1987. "Human Rights: Toward an Integrated Theory for Action". *Human Rights Quarterly* 9 (3): 287–308.

Elgot, Jessica. 2016. "Theresa May sidesteps question about £995 leather trousers". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/06/theresa-may-sidesteps-question-about-995-pound-leather-trousers.

Encyclopedia Britannica. 2020. "Women's suffrage". *The Guardian*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/woman-suffrage.

England, Paula, Janet Gornick, and Emily Fitzgibbons Shafer. 2012. "Women's employment, education, and the gender gap in 17 countries". *Monthly Labor Review* April:20–26.

Englehart, Neil A., and Melissa K. Miller. 2014. "The CEDAW Effect: International Law's Impact on Women's Rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 13 (1): 22.

Erlanger, Steven, and Stephen Castle. 2015. "Queen Elizabeth II Becomes Britain's Longest-Reigning Monarch". *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/world/europe/queen-elizabeth-ii-britain-longest-serving-monarch.html.

Erzeel, Silvia, and Karen Celis. 2016. "Political parties, ideology and the substantive representation of women." *PARTY POLITICS* 22 (5): 576–586.

Esaiasson, Peter. 2000. "Focus of representation". In *Beyond Westminster and Congress. The Nordic Experience*, ed. by Peter Esaiasson and Knut Heidar, 51–82. Columbus.

Estévez–Abe, Margarita. 2006. "Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism: A Study of Occupational Segregation by Sex in Advanced Industrial Societies". *World Politics* 59 (1): 142–175.

Facio, Alda, and Martha I. Morgan. 2009. "Equity or Equality for Women? Understanding CEDAW's Equality Principles". *Alabama Law Review* 60 (5): 1133–1170.

Fariss, Christopher J. 2015. "Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability". *American Political Science Review* 108 (2): 297–318.

Farré, Lídia. 2016. "Parental Leave Policies and Gender Equality: A Survey of the Literature". *Studies in Economic Applications* 34 (1): 46–60.

Farrell, David. 2010. "Is the Dail 'too busy' for by-elections?" *Irish Politics Forum*. https://politicalreform.ie/2010/06/25/the-dail-is-too-busy-for-by-elections/.

Fenton, Ben. 2005. "Pankhurst: my force-feeding ordeal in jail". *The Telegraph*. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1496513/Pankhurst-my-force-feeding-ordeal-in-jail.html.

Ferrier, Morwenna. 2016. "Theresa May's leather trousers: you need a tough hide to wear them". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2016/dec/07/theresa-mays-leather-trousers-you-need-a-tough-hide-to-wear-them.

Fetters, Ashley. 2013. "Margaret Thatcher's Tart Words About Women in Power". *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/04/margaret-thatchers-tart-words-about-women-in-power/274785/.

Fiber, Pamela, and Richard L. Fox. 2005. "A tougher road for women: assessing the role of gender in congressional elections". In *Gender and American Politics*, ed. by Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson, 64–79. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Finn, Christina. 2017. "'The Dáil is no Westminster - but it certainly is a boys' club'". *the journal.ie*. https://www.thejournal.ie/sexism-leinster-house/-3682496-Nov2017/.

Fitzgerald, Martina. 2018. "Irish women in politics: 'Now, now, girlie. There's no place for women here'". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/irish-women-in-politics-now-now-girlie-there-s-no-place-for-women-here-1.3658442.

Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2004. "Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office". *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 264–280.

Freeman, Hadley. 2016. "Theresa May, Margaret Thatcher: spot the difference – and the sexism". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/commentisfree/2016/jul/23/theresa-may-margaret-thatcher-spot-the-difference-uk-politics-hadley-freeman.

Friel, Elly. 2013. "Mary Robinson President human rights activist". *Women's Museum of Ireland*. https://womensmuseumofireland.ie/articles/mary-robinson.

Galligan, Yvonne, and Marie Coleman. 2018. "Why have there been so few women elected in Ireland since 1918?" *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/why-have-there-been-so-few-women-elected-in-ireland-since-1918-1.3697428.

Garcia–Moreno, Claudia, and Christina Pallitto. 2013. *Global and Regional Estimates of Violence against Women: Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner and Non–Partner Sexual Violence*. Geneva: Department of Reproductive and Health Research, World Health Organization.

Gauthier, Anne H. 2011. *Comparative Family Policy Database, Version 3 [computer file]*. Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (distributors). www.demogr.mpg.de.

Geiger, A.W., and Lauren Kent. 2017. "Number of women leaders around the world has grown, but they're still a small group". *Pew Research Center*. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/08/women-leaders-around-the-world/.

Gelman, Andrew, and Donald B. Rubin. 1992. "Inference from Iterative Simulation Using Multiple Sequences". *Statistical Science* 7 (4): 457–472.

Genre, Véronique, Ramón Gómez Salvador, and Ana Lamo. 2010. "European Women: Why Do(n't) They Work?" *Applied Economics* 42 (12): 1499–1514.

Geweke, John. 1992. "Evaluating the Accuracy of Sampling-Based Approaches to the Calculation of Posterior Moments". In *IN BAYESIAN STATISTICS*, 169–193. University Press.

Gill, Martha. 2019. "Theresa May's positive legacy? She's a feminist champion". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/15/theresa-may-legacy-feminist-champion-women.

Goldin, Claudia. 2006. "The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family". *American Economic Review* 96:1–21.

Gollom, Mark. 2019. "Abortion barriers in Canada are back in spotlight following passage of abortion bans in U.S." *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/abortion-access-canada-us-bans-1.5140345.

Goodhart, Michael. 2007. "'None So Poor That He Is Compelled to Sell Himself': Democracy, Subsistence, and Basic Income". In *Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues*, ed. by Shareen Hertel and Lanse Minkler. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gornick, Janet C., and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. *Families that Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.

Gornick, Janet C., Marcia K. Meyers, and Katherine E. Ross. 1997. "Supporting the Employment of Mothers: Policy Variation across Fourteen Welfare States". *Journal of European Social Policy* 7 (1): 45–70.

Gov.UK. "15 hours free childcare for 3 and 4–year–olds". https://www.gov.uk/help-with-childcare-costs/free-childcare-and-education-for-2-to-4-year-olds.

— . "Holidays, time off, sick leave, maternity and paternity leave". https://www.gov.uk/browse/working/time-off.

— . "Maximum weekly working hours". https://www.gov.uk/maximum-weekly-working-hours#:~:text=You%5C%20can't%5C%20work%5C%20more,or%5C%2040%5C%20hours%5C%20a%5C%20week.

— . "Ministers". https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers.

Government of Canada. 2020a. "Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy". https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.

— . 2020b. "Discover Canada—Canada's History". https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/discover-canada/read-online/canadas-history.html.

— . 2020c. "Early Learning and Child Care". https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/early-learning-child-care.html.

— . 2020d. "EI Caregiving benefits and leave: What caregiving benefits offer". https://www.canada.ca/en/services/benefits/ei/caregiving.html.

— . 2020e. "Employment Insurance maternity and parental benefits". https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/ei/ei-list/reports/maternity-parental.html.

— . 2020f. "Federal labour standards that apply to you". https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/workplace/federally-regulated-industries/federal-labour-standards.html.

— . 2020g. "Hours of Work". https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/employment-standards/work-hours.html.

Grey, Sandra. 2006. "Numbers and beyond. The relevance of critical mass in gender researchNumbers and beyond. The relevance of critical mass in gender research". *Politics & Gender* 2 (4): 429–502.

Grimmer, Justin, and Gary King. 2011. "General purpose computer-assisted clustering and conceptualization". *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 108 (7): 2643–2650.

Gustafsson, Siv. 1992. "Separate Taxation and Married Women's Labor Supply". *Journal of Population Economics* 5 (1): 61–85.

Gwiazda, Emily. 2008. "Cairine Wilson". *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/cairine-reay-wilson.

Hall, Chris. 2018. "Stamping out sexual harassment in politics can't be a partisan issue". *CBC News*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/harassment-politics-sexual/-misconduct-1.4506610.

Hanisch, Carol. 2009. "The Personal Is Political: The Women's Liberation Movement classic with new explanatory introduction". http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html.

Hayes, Danny, and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2015. "A non-gendered lens? Media, Voters, and Female Candidates in Contemporary Congressional Elections". *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (1): 95–118.

Hayes, Danny, Jennifer L. Lawless, and Gail Baitinger. 2014. "Who cares what they wear? Media, gender, and the influence of candidate appearance". *Social Science Quarterly* 95 (5): 1194–1212.

Heldman, Caroline, Susan J. Carroll, and Stephanie Olson. 2005. "'She brought only a skirt': print media coverage of Elizabeth Dole's bid for the Republican presidential nomination". *Political Communication* 22 (3): 315–335.

Heroines.CA. 2008. "Cairine Wilson". *Biographies*. http://www.heroines.ca/people/wilson.html.

Herrera, Allison. 2019. "What we can learn from Canada's universal child care model". *The World*. https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-02-05/what-we-can-learn-canada-s-universal-child-care-model.

Hertel, Shareen, and Lanse Minkler. 2007. "Economic Rights: The Terrain". In *Economic Rights: Conceptual, Measurement, and Policy Issues*, ed. by Shareen Hertel and Lanse Minkler. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hervey, Ginger. 2018. "Theresa May faces more gender-based abuse than Jeremy Corbyn: report". *Politico*. https://www.politico.eu/article/theresa-may-faces-more-gender-based-abuse-than-jeremy-corbyn-report/.

Hill Jr., Daniel W. 2010. "Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior". *The Journal of Politics* 72 (4): 1161–1174.

Hill Jr., Daniel W., and K. Anne Watson. 2019. "Democracy and Compliance with Human Rights Treaties: The Conditional Effectiveness of CEDAW". *International Studies Quarterly*.

History, Art Archives, U.S. House of Representatives. 2020. "Total Members of the House State Representation". *History, Art Archives, U.S. House of Representatives*. https://history.house.gov/Institution/Total-Members/Total-Members/.

Hofferth, Sandra, and Nancy Collins. 2000. "Child care and Employment Turnover". *Population Research and Policy Review* 19 (4): 357–395.

Hogan, Caelainn. 2019. "Why Ireland's battle over abortion is far from over". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/oct/03/why-irelands-battle-over-abortion-is-far-from-over-anti-abortionists.

Holland, Kitty. 2016. "Profile: Katherine Zappone (Ind)". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/oireachtas/profile-katherine-zappone-ind-1.2552766.

Honaker, James, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell. 2011. "Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data". *Journal of Statistical Software* 45 (7): 1–47. http://www.jstatsoft.org/v45/i07/.

Hooper, Simon. 2013. "Margaret Thatcher: The good, bad and the ugly". *Al–Jazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/04/2013498151678432.html.

House of Commons. 2019. "Ministry Cabinet as of November 20, 2019". *Parliament of Canada*. https://www.ourcommons.ca/Members/en/ministries?page%5C%2f=3.

Houses of Parliament. 2020. "data.parliament.uk". http://explore.data.parliament.uk/index.html?endpoint=members#download-list.

Houses of the Oireachtas. 1991. "Dáil Éireann díospóireacht—Dé Máirt, 23 Aib 1991". https://www.oireachtas.ie/ga/debates/debate/dail/1991-04-23/27/.

Htun, Mala, and Timothy J. Power. 2006. "Gender, Parties, and Support for Equal Rights in the Brazilian Congress". *Latin American Politics and Society* 48 (4): 83–104.

Inter–Parliamentary Union. 2020. "Women in Parliaments: World and Region Averages". http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm.

Inter–Parliamentary Union and UN Women. 2017. "Women in Politics: 2017". *Imprimerie Courand et associes*.

Isle of Man Government. 2017. "Votes For Women!" https://www.gov.im/news/2017/dec/05/votes-for-women/.

Iversen, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. "The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross–National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap". *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (1): 1–19.

Jackman, Simon. 2000. "Estimation and Inference Are Missing Data Problems: Unifying Social Science Statistics via Bayesian Simulation". *Political Analysis* 8 (4): 307–332.

Jennings, Cec. 2015. "Winning Back the Vote". *Canada's History* 95 (5): 28.

Josephson, Paul R. 2020. "United Kingdom". *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/place/United-Kingdom#accordion-article-contributors.

Justin, Grimmer. 2010. "A Bayesian Hierarchical Topic Model for Political Texts: Measuring Expressed Agendas in Senate Press Releases." *Political Analysis* 18 (1): 1. ISSN: 10471987.

Justin, Grimmer, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21 (3): 267.

Kahn, Kim Fridkin. 1992. "Does being male help: an investigation of gender and media effects in U.S. Senate races". *Journal of Politics* 54 (2): 497–517.

— . 1994. "The distorted mirror: press coverage of women candidates for statewide office". *Journal of Politics* 56 (1): 154–173.

— . 1996. *The Political Consequences of Being a Woman*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token Women". *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5): 965–990.

Kappler, Maija. 2019. "Why Is The Cost Of Daycare In Canada So High?" *Huffpost*. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/daycare-cost-expensive_ca_5dc2fe3de4b005513881976f.

Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. 2008. "When politics is not just a man's game: Women's representation and political engagement". *Electoral Studies* 27:105–115.

Kassam, Ashifa. 2016. "MP elbowed by Justin Trudeau fends off personal attacks: 'It was very painful'". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/justin-trudeau-elbow-ruth-ellen-brosseau-cananda-parliament.

— . 2018. "Justin Trudeau 'does not remember' groping reporter at festival". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/02/justin-trudeau-denies-groping-reporter-music-festival-2000-british-columbia.

Kathlene, Lyn. 1994. "Power and influence in state legislatures; the interaction of gender and position in committee hearing debates". *American Political Science Review* 88 (3): 560–576.

— . 1995. "Alternative views of crime: legislative policymaking in gendered terms". *Journal of Politics* 57 (3): 696–723.

Kaur, Gagandeep. 2015. "Banished for menstruating: the Indian women isolated while they bleed". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/22/india-menstruation-periods-gaokor-women-isolated.

Kelly, Fiach. 2013. "Norris says TD is "talking through her fanny" on Seanad abolition". *The Irish Independent*. https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/norris-says-td-is-talking-through-her-fanny-on-seanad-abolition-29421169.html.

Kenny, Mary. 2009. "No wonder Mitterand said that Margaret Thatcher had 'the eyes of Caligula (and the mouth of Marilyn Monroe)'". *The Irish Independent*. https://www.independent.ie/woman/no-wonder-mitterand-said-that-margaret-thatcher-had-the-eyes-of-caligula-and-the-mouth-of-marilyn-monroe-26525167.html.

Kentish, Benjamin. 2018. "Tories restore whip to MPs suspended over claims of sexual misconduct so they can take part in Theresa May no-confidence vote". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/andrew-griffiths-tory-mp-theresa-may-no-confidence-vote-whip-suspended-sex-text-conservatives-a8680081.html.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press.

King, Robin. 2015. "The unsung history of the fight to end the tax on tampons". *The Star*. https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/05/12/the-unsung-history-of-the-fight-to-end-the-tax-on-tampons.html.

Kittilson, MC. 2006. *Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments.Women and Elected Office in ContemporaryWestern Europe*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Kittilson, Miki Caul, and Kim Fridkin. 2008. "Gender, candidate portrayals and election campaigns: a comparative perspective". *Politics & Gender* 4 (3): 371–392.

Kleider, Hanna. 2015. "Paid and unpaid work: The impact of social policies on the gender division of labour". *Journal of European Social Policy* 25 (5): 505–520.

Korpela, Salla. 2019. "Finland's Parliament: Pioneer of Gender Equality". *Finland Promotion Board*. https://finland.fi/life-society/finlands-parliament-pioneer-of-gender-equality/.

Kreyenfeld, Michaela, and Karsten Hank. 2000. "Does the Availability of Child Care Influence the Employment of Mothers? Findings of Western Germany". *Population Research and Policy Review* 19 (4): 317–337.

Kurebwa, Jeffrey. 2015. "A Review of Hanna Pitkin's (1967) Conception of Women's Political Representation". *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications* 5 (11): 50–60.

Lakhani, Nina. 2013. "Margaret Thatcher: How much did The Iron Lady do for the UK's women?" *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/margaret-thatcher-how-much-did-the-iron-lady-do-for-the-uks-women-8564631.html.

Landow, Charles, and Mohammed Aly Sergie. 2020. "The Northern Irleand Peace Process". *Council on Foreign Relations*. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/northern-ireland-peace-process.

Lauderdale, Benjamin E., and Tom S. Clark. 2014. "Scaling Politically Meaningful Dimensions Using Texts and Votes". *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (3): 754–771.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2009. "Sexism and gender bias in election 2008: a more complex path for women in politics". *Politics & Gender* 5 (1): 70–80.

— . 2015. "Female Candidates and Legislators". *Annual Review of Political Science* 18:349–366.

Leslie, Megan. 2013. "My First Day on Parliament Hill". *Blacklock's Reporter*. https://www.blacklocks.ca/guest_commentary/my-first-day-on-parliament-hill/.

Levin, Sophie. 2019. "Now that she's going, it's time to set the record straight on Theresa May's 'feminist' legacy". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-resign-leave-tory-leader-feminist-brexit-female-prime-minister-a8947086.html.

Lewis, Anthony. 1993. "At Home Abroad; A Different President". *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/15/opinion/at-home-abroad-a-different-president.html.

Lewis, Jane. 1992. "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes". *Journal of European Social Policy* 2 (3): 159–173.

Lister, Ruth. 1994. ""'She Has Other Duties'—Women, Citizenship, and Social Security"". In *Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model*, ed. by Sally Baldwin and Jane Falkingham. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Lovenduski, Joni. 2001. "Women and Politics: Minority Representation or Critical Mass?" *Parliamentary Affairs* 54 (4): 743–758.

Lovenduski, Joni, and Pippa Norris. 2003. "Westminster women: the politics of presence". *Political Studies* 51 (1): 84–102.

Lupu, Yonatan. 2013. "The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects". *American Journal of Political Science*.

Mandel, Hadas, and Moshe Semyonov. 2006. "A Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and Women's Employment Opportunities in 22 Countries". *American Journal of Sociology* 111 (6): 1910–1949.

Mandel, Hadas, and Michael Shalev. 2009. "Gender, Class, and Varieties of Capitalism". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society* 16 (2): 161–181.

Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation". *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–528.

Marcus, Bonnie. 2018. "Forget The Glass Ceiling. Female Attorneys Now Face A Concrete Wall". *Forbes*. https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2018/06/15/forget-the-glass-ceiling-female-attorneys-now-face-a-concrete-wall/#744e8ace38f3.

Marsh, Michael. 2020. "Mary Robinson". *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mary-Robinson.

Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. "Dynamic ideal point estimation via Markov chain Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999". *Political Analysis* 10 (2): 134.

Mason, Rowena. 2016. "Conservative MP tries to derail bill protecting women against violence". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/16/philip-davies-anti-feminist-tory-mp-filibuster-women-violence-bill.

— . 2017. "Harriet Harman says sexist habits still rife in parliament". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/31/harriet-harman-sexist-habits-parliament-women-mps.

Mason, Rowena, and Anushka Asthana. 2016. "Ken Clarke caught on camera ridiculing Conservative leadership candidates". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/05/ken-clarke-caught-camera-ridiculing-tory-leadership-candidates-theresa-may-michael-gove.

Matland, Richard E., and Deborah Dwight Brown. 1992. "District magnitude's effect on female representation in the U.S. state legislatures". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17 (4): 469–492.

Mayhew, David R. 1974. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals". *Polity* 6 (3): 295–317.

McAleese, Mary. 2020. "Mary McAleese: Marriage equality did not end rampant homophobia". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/mary-mcaleese-marriage-equality-did-not-end-rampant-homophobia-1.4259225.

McDonald, Henry. 2020. "Northern Ireland confirms abortions can now be carried out". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/09/northern-ireland-confirms-abortions-can-now-be-carried-out.

McEvoy, Caroline. 2016. "Does the Descriptive Representation of Women Matter? A Comparison of Gendered Differences in Political Attitudes between Voters and Representatives in the European Parliament". *Politics & Gender* 12:754–780.

McGee, Luke. 2019. "A legacy of failure: Theresa May was a disaster as Prime Minister". *CNN World*. https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/uk/theresa-may-legacy-of-failure-analysis-intl-gbr/index.html.

McGing, Claire. 2018. "Dealing with everyday sexism in Leinster House". *RTE*. https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2018/1120/1012074-leinster-house/.

McGowan, Michael. 2019. "Michaela Dunn identified as woman who died in Sydney stabbing attack". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/14/michaela-dunn-identified-as-victim-who-died-in-sydney-stabbing-attack.

McSmith, Andy. 2013. "Stella Creasy - the Labour MP who has taken on the internet trolls and payday lenders". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/stella-creasy-the-labour-mp-who-has-taken-on-the-internet-trolls-and-payday-lenders-8754945.html.

Miller, Clara Cain. 2018. "The Number of Female Chief Executives Is Falling". *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/23/upshot/why-the-number-of-female-chief-executives-is-falling.html.

Misra, Joya, Michelle Budig, and Irene Boeckmann. 2011. "Work-Family Policies and the Effects of Children on Women's Employment Hours and Wages". *Community, Work & Family* 14 (2): 139–157.

Mohammad, Saif M., and Peter D. Turney. 2013. "Crowdsourcing a Word-Emotion Association Lexicon". *Computational Intelligence* 29 (3): 436–465.

Morgan, Kimberly J., and Katherin Zippel. 2003. "Paid to Care: The Origins and Effects of Care Leave Policies in Western Europe". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society* 10 (1): 49–85.

Moseley, Tom. 2016. "Theresa May's leather trousers prompt political row". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38287637.

Mulraney, Francis. 2018. "Former Irish president Mary McAleese brands Catholic Church "empire of misogyny"". *Irish Central*. https://www.irishcentral.com/news/politics/mary-mcaleese-catholic-church-misogyny-sexism.

Murray, Jenni. 2013. "What did Margaret Thatcher do for women?" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/09/margaret-thatcher-women.

Myers, Rebecca. 2013. "General History of Women's Suffrage in Britain". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/general-history-of-women-s-suffrage-in-britain-8631733.html.

Neate, Rupert. 2018. "Global pay gap will take 202 years to close, says World Economic Forum". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/18/global-gender-pay-gap-will-take-202-years-to-close-says-world-economic-forum.

New World Encyclopedia. 2008a. "Mary McAleese". *New World Encyclopedia*. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Mary_McAleese.

— . 2008b. "Mary Robinson". *New World Encyclopedia*. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Mary_Robinson.

News, Global. 2017. "Gender equality in Canada: Where do we stand today?" *Global News*. https://globalnews.ca/news/3574060/gender-equality-in-canada-where-do-we-stand-today/.

Norris, Pippa. 1996. "Legislative recruitment". In *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, ed. by L LeDuc, RG Niemi, and Pippa Norris, 184–215. London: Sage.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2001. "Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation". *Journal of Democracy* 12 (3): 126–140.

Norris, Sian. 2017. "A vote for Theresa May is not a vote for women". *politics.co.uk*. https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2017/04/27/a-vote-for-theresa-may-is-not-a-vote-for-women.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2013. *Political Emotions*. Harvard University Press.

O'Brien, Carl. 2017. "Mary Mitchell O'Connor hits out at 'sexism' among male TDs". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/education/mary-mitchell-o-connor-hits-out-at-sexism-among-male-tds-1.3280813.

O'Carroll, Lisa. 2013. "Thatcher's death prompts chart success for Ding Dong! The Witch Is Dead". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/apr/10/thatcher-death-ding-dong-witch.

O'Halloran, Marie. 2020. "Election 2020: A 'missed opportunity' for gender equality – Women's Council". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/election-2020-a-missed-opportunity-for-gender-equality-women-s-council-1.4169015.

O'Loughlin, Ed. 2019. "Sinn Fein Refuses to Vote in British Parliament, Even Against Brexit". *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/world/europe/sinn-fein-mps-brexit.html.

O'Toole, Fintan. 1996. "Profile: Mary Robinson: Mary, quite contrary". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/profile-mary-robinson-mary-quite-contrary-1336211.html.

Office of the Prime Minister. 2016. "The Right Honourable Kim Campbell". *Prime Minister's Office*. https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2016/08/02/right-honourable-kim-campbell.

Olson, Elizabeth. 2016. "Women Make Up Majority of U.S. Law Students for First Time". *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/dealbook/women-majority-of-us-law-students-first-time.html.

Ondercin, Heather A., and Jeffrey A. Bernstein. 2007. "Context Matters: The Influence of State and Campaign Factors on the Gender Gap in Senate Elections, 1988–2000". *Politics & Gender* 30 (1): 33–53.

Ondrich, Jan, et al. 2003. "The Liberalization of Maternity Leave Policy and the Return to Work after Childbirth in Germany". *Review of Economics of the Household* 1 (12): 77–110.

Oppenheim, Mary. 2020. "Why hundreds of women are still coming from Northern Ireland and the Republic for abortions despite change in law". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/abortion-northern-ireland-republic-journey-england-a9563361.html.

Oppenheim, Maya. 2016a. "Labour MP Jess Phillips receives '600 rape threats in one night'". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/labour-mp-jess-phillips-receives-600-rape-threats-in-one-night-a7058041.html.

— . 2016b. "Queen's birthday: Five times Elizabeth II dropped the veil of neutrality and revealed her political opinions". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/queens-birthday-five-times-elizabeth-ii-dropped-her-veil-of-neutrality-and-revealed-her-political-a6992781.html.

Osborne, Samuel. 2016. "Women will bear brunt of tax cuts and benefits changes, research finds". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/women-bear-brunt-government-tax-cuts-benefits-changes-a7428606.html.

Palmer, Barbara, and Dennis Simon. 2008. *Breaking the Political Glass Ceiling: Women and Congressional Elections*. 2nd. New York: Routledge.

Parisi, Laura. 2010. "Feminist Perspectives on Human Rights". In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. by Robert A. Denemark. International Studies Compendium Project.

Parliament of Canada. 2006. "39TH PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESSION". https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-1/house/sitting-16/hansard.

— . 2020. "Parlinfo". *Parlinfo*. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/ParlInfo/default/en_CA/People/parliamentarians.

Patnaik, Ankita. Forthcoming. "Reserving Time for Daddy: The Consequences of Fathers' Quotas". *Journal of Labor Economics*.

Peachey, Kevin. 2015. "How the UK's new rules on parental leave work". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-32130481.

Pettit, Becky, and Jennifer Hook. 2005. "The Structure of Women's Employment in Comparative Perspective". *Social Forces* 84 (2): 779–801.

Pew Research Center. 2019. "The Data on Women Leaders". http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/fact-sheet/the-data-on-women-leaders/.

Phillips, Anne. 1995. *Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Phillips, Jess. 2016. "By ignoring the thousands of rape threats sent to me, Twitter is colluding with my abusers". *The Telegraph*. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/by-ignoring-the-thousands-of-rape-threats-sent-to-me-twitter-is/.

— . 2018. *TheJournal.ie*.

Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Poggione, Sarah. 2004. "Exploring Gender Differences in State Legislators' Policy Preferences". *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (2): 305–314.

Purtill, James. 2020. "Media's gendered stereotyping was worse for Gillard than Thatcher 30 years earlier, research shows". *ABC Triple J*. https://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/media-gender-stereotypes-worse-for-gillard-than-for-thatcher/11996326.

Rankin, Jennifer. 2017. "Polish MEP punished for saying women are less intelligent than men". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/polish-mep-janusz-korwin-mikke-punished-saying-women-less-intelligent-men.

Ray, Rebecca, Janet C. Gornick, and John Schmitt. 2009. *Parental Leave Policies in 21 Countries: Assessing Generosity and Gender Equality*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Reingold, Beth. 2000. *Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in Arizona and California*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Rentoul, John. 2018. "Weak Theresa May is destined to fail – but it may not be Brexit that brings her down". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/theresa-may-brexit-andrew-gimson-prime-ministers-a8261016.html.

Retter, Emily. 2016. "Theresa May: The vicar's daughter in kitten heels who will be our new Prime Minister". *The Mirror*. https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/theresa-may-vicars-daughter-kitten-8399895/.

Revesz, Rachael. 2017. "At PMQs today, the treatment of a new female MP showed the Tories' true colors". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/pmqs-layla-moran-sexism-heckled-john-bercow-theresa-may-parliament-a7932726.html.

Richards, David L., and Jilliene Haglund. 2015. *Violence against Women and the Law*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Riddell, Fern. 2018. "The 1910s: 'We have sanitised our history of the suffragettes'". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/feb/06/1910s-suffragettes-suffragists-fern-riddell.

Roberts, Rachel. 2017. "Republican male senators suggest women 'go to the zoo' to get an abortion'". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/republican-senators-bob-onder-wayne-wallingford-suggest-women-go-to-the-zoo-to-have-an-abortion-st-a7680996.html.

Robertson, Dylan. 2014. "I was sexually assaulted, former Liberal minister Sheila Copps says". *Ottawa Citizen*. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/i-was-sexually-assaulted-former-liberal-minister-sheila-copps-says.

Robinson, Mary. 1990. "Inaugural Address". *President of Ireland*. https://president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/address-by-the-president-mary-robinson-on-the-occasion-of-her-inauguration.

Rohrich, Zoe. 2019. "How Brexit became a 'glass cliff' for Theresa May". *PBS News Hour*. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/how-brexit-became-a-glass-cliff-for-theresa-may.

Ross, Andrea. 2017. "Sexist media scrutiny of women in politics spans decades, study says". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/media-representation-women/-politics-1.4453407.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997. *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rubery, Jill. 2009. "How Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism Requires a Wider Lens". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 16 (2): 192–203.

Rubin, Donald B. 1987. *Multiple Imputation for Nonresponse in Surveys*. New York: Wiley.

Rule, Wilma. 1987. "Electoral systems, contextual factors and women's opportunity for election to parliament in twenty–three democracies". *Western Political Quarterly* 40 (3): 477–498.

Ryan, Michelle K., and S. Alexander Haslam. 2005. "The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women are Over–Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions". *British Journal of Management* 16 (2).

Ryan, Nicky. 2017. "Mary Mitchell O'Connor: 'There is sexism and bullying in the Dáil'". *the journal.ie*. https://www.thejournal.ie/sexism-dail-gender-equality-third-level-3682182-Nov2017/.

Ryan, Phillip. 2018. "'Charles Haughey pulled my bra strap during rape debate' - former Fine Gael minister". *The Irish Independent*. https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/charles-haughey-pulled-my-bra-strap-during-rape-debate-former-fine-gael-minister-37415929.html.

Sabbagh, Dan, and Jessica Elgot. 2018. "Jo Swinson pairing row: Conservatives admit chief whip asked MPs to break arrangements". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/19/tory-whip-julian-smith-urged-to-explain-pairing-breach-that-caused-serious-damage.

Sainsbury, Diane. 1996. *Gender, Equality, and Welfare States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Women to State Legislatures". *Journal of Politics* 64 (3): 791–809.

Saul, Heather. 2017. "How Tim Farron, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn voted on women's issues". *iNews*. https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/tim-farron-theresa-may-jeremy-corbyn-voted-womens-issues-60785.

Savage, Michael. 2020. "'Theresa May's social injustice office 'doesn't exist – and never will'". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/mar/21/theresa-may-social-injustice-office-doesnt-exist.

Schick, Nina. 2019. "'Theresa May 'Literally Too Weak to Resign,' Schick Says". *Bloomberg Surveillance*. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-04-02/theresa-may-literally-too-weak-to-resign-rasmussen-s-schick-says-video.

Schnakenberg, Keith E, and Christopher J Fariss. 2014. "Dynamic patterns of human rights practices". *Political Science Research and Methods* 2 (01): 1–31.

Schreiber, Ronnee. 2013. "How Studying Ideological Diversity among Women Transforms Political Knowledge". *Politics & Gender* 9 (4): 474–479.

Schwindt–Bayer, Leslie A., and William Mishler. 2005. "An Integrated Model of Women's Representation". *Journal of Politics* 67 (2): 407–428.

Scott, Jennifer. 2019. "Women MPs say abuse forcing them from politics". *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019-50246969.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books.

Serhan, Yasmeen. 2017. "Theresa May's 'Profoundly Weak, Surprisingly Stable' Leadership". *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/theresa-may-profoundly-weak-and-surprisingly-stable/545426/.

Shaw, Dorothy, and Wendy V. Norman. 2020. "When there are no abortion laws: A case study of Canada". Abortion: Global Perspectives and Country Experiences, *Best Practice Research Clinical Obstetrics Gynaecology* 62:49–62. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bpobgyn.2019.05.010. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1521693419300550.

Silcoff, Mireille. 2018. "'The Daddy quota': how Quebec got men to take parental leave". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/the-daddy-quota-how-quebec-got-men-to-take-parental-leave.

Silge, Julia, and David Robinson. 2017. *Text Mining With R: A Tidy Approach*. O'Reilly Media.

Simmons, Ann M. 2016. "Clinton is set to make history, but female leaders are nothing new in other parts of the world". *Los Angeles Times*. https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-women-leaders-0607-snap-story.html.

Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Joanna. 2016. "'I think it matters': Kim Campbell on being first and only female PM in Canada". *CTV News*. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/i-think-it-matters-kim-campbell-on-being-first-and-only-female-pm-in-canada-1.2970411.

— . 2018a. "MPs reveal experiences with sexual misconduct on Parliament Hill in survey". *The Globe And Mail*. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mps-reveal-experiences-with-sexual-misconduct-on-parliament-hill-in-survey/article37472308/.

— . 2018b. "Politics and MeToo: voices from a survey of staffers on Parliament Hill". *CityNews*. https://toronto.citynews.ca/2018/03/19/politics-and-metoo-voices-from-a-survey-of-staffers-on-parliament-hill/.

Smith, Karen Manners. 2017. "Women's Social and Political Union". *Encyclopedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Womens-Social-and-Political-Union.

Soskice, David W. 2005. "Varieties of Capitalism and Cross-National Gender Differences". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 12 (2): 170–179.

Staff, CTV. 2011. "MIs profanity in Parliament a longstanding tradition?" *CTV News*. https://www.ctvnews.ca/is-profanity-in-parliament-a-longstanding-tradition-1.740640.

Stern, Stefan. 2019. "Like many women before her, Theresa May was set up to fail". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/25/women-theresa-may-set-up-to-fail.

Stewart, Heather, and Jessica Elgot. 2019. "Theresa May: don't blame me for Brexit crisis, blame MPs". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/20/acting-like-trump-theresa-may-sparks-mps-brexit-fury.

Stewart, J.D.M. 2006. "Mr. MacKay's remarks have a long, unfortunate pedigree". *The Globe and Mail*. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/mr-mackays-remarks-have-a-long-unfortunate-pedigree/article1108009/.

Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation". *The American Political Science Review* 89 (3): 543–565.

Stoffman, Judy. 2017. "MP Margaret Mitchell famously called wife abuse 'no laughing matter'". *The Globe and Mail*. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/mp-margaret-mitchell-famously-called-wife-abuse-no-laughing-matter/article34392492/.

Stone, Jon. 2017. "Michael Heseltine criticised for saying Theresa May has a 'man-sized job' on International Women's Day". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/international-womens-day-michael-heseltine-man-sized-job-theresa-may-a7617751.html.

Sung, Hung-En. 2003. "Fairer sex or fairer system? Gender and corruption revisited". *Social Forces* 82 (2): 703–723.

Swers, Michelle L. 1998. "Are women more likely to vote for women's issue bills than their male colleagues?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23 (3): 435–448.

Syal, Rajeev. 2018. "Tories attacked for restoring whip to MPs accused of sexual misconduct". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/13/tories-attacked-for-restoring-whip-to-mps-accused-of-sexual-misconduct.

Taft, Michael. 2020. "The Irish childcare model is broken". *The Irish Times*. https://www.overleaf.com/project/5ef7bd0b10b90a0001fd9c78.

Taylor, Charlie. 2010. "Civil Partnership Bill signed into law". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/civil-partnership-bill-signed-into-law-1.861242.

The Belfast Telegraph. 2018. "Sexism row as Corbyn is accused of calling Theresa May a 'stupid woman' at PMQs". *The Belfast Telegraph*. https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/uk/sexism-row-as-corbyn-is-accused-of-calling-theresa-may-a-stupid-woman-at-pmqs-37641764.html.

The Economist. 2017. "Theresa Maybe, Britain's indecisive premier". *The Economist*. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/01/07/theresa-maybe-britains-indecisive-premier.

The Guardian. 2012. "Margaret Thatcher: a feminist icon?" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/the-womens-blog-with-jane-martinson/2012/jan/05/margaret-thatcher-feminist-icon.

The History Press. "The top ten longest-reigning British monarchs". https://www.thehistorypress.co.uk/articles/the-top-ten-longest-reigning-british-monarchs/.

The Independent. 2005. "The world's most powerful women". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/the-worlds-most-powerful-women-321465.html.

The Irish Times. 1997. "No politician in the history of the State has commanded such respect and popularity". *The Irish Times*. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/no-politician-in-the-history-of-the-state-has-commanded-such-respect-and-popularity-1.51651.

The Royal Household. "Her Majesty the Queen". https://www.royal.uk/her-majesty-the-queen.

The Telegraph. 2009. "Sir Nicholas Winterton accused of slapping female MP's bottom". *The Telegraph*. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/6511633/Sir-Nicholas-Winterton-accused-of-slapping-female-MPs-bottom.html.

Thomas, Sue. 1994. *How Women Legislate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Thomas, Zoe. 2016. "Are female leaders disadvantaged by media bias?" *BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-36917511.

Tolleson-Rinehart, Sue. 1991. "Do women leaders make a difference? Substance, style, and perceptions". In *Gender and Policymaking: Studies of Women in Office*, ed. by Debra Dodson, 93–102. New Brunswick, NJ.

True, Jacqui. 2012. *The Political Economy of Violence Against Women*. New York: Oxford University Press.

TSheets. 2020. "A complete guide to Canadian labour and employment laws". https://www.tsheets.com/ca/canadian-labour-law-guide#:~:text=The%5C%20average%5C%20workweek%5C%20in%5C%20Canada,the%5C%20employer%5C%20and%5C%20the%5C%20employee.

UK National Health Service. 2020. "Abortion". https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/abortion/.

UK Parliament. "Early suffragist campaigning". https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/earlysuffragist/.

— . "Start of the suffragette movement". https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/startsuffragette-/.

— . "Suffrage in Wartime". https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/suffragetteswartime/.

— . "Suffrage in wartime". *Living Heritage*. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/suffragetteswartime/.

— . "The Reform Act 1832". https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/.

— . "Women get the vote". *Living Heritage*. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/thevote/.

— . "Women in the House of Commons". *Living Heritage*. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/overview/womenincommons/.

UN General Assembly. 1979. *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm.

UN OHCHR. 2020. "International Human Rights Law". *United Nations*. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx.

UN Women. 2015. "Infographic: Human rights of women". *United Nations*. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/multimedia/2015/12/infographic-human-rights-women.

United Nations. 1948. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

— . 1966. *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. United Nations. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx.

— . 1969. *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*. United Nations. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%5C%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf.

— . "Gender Equality: Why It Matters". https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Goal-5.pdf.

— . "Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls". https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/.

UNODC. 2018. "Global Study on Homicide: Gender–related killing of women and girls". *United Nations*. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/GSH2018/GSH18_Gender-related_killing_of_women_and_girls.pdf.

UPI. 1993. "Canada's Campbell to become prime minister June 25". *UPI Archives*. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/14/Canadas-Campbell-to-become-prime-minister-June-25/1739740030400/?ur3=1.

Vallely, Paul. 2013. "How Margaret Thatcher built the myth of The Iron Lady". *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/how-margaret-thatcher-built-the-myth-of-the-iron-lady-8565103.html.

Vega, A, and JM Firestone. 1995. "The effects of gender on congressional behavior and the substantive representation of women". *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20 (2): 213–222.

Walter, Natasha. 2012. "Margaret Thatcher: a feminist icon?" *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/the-womens-blog-with-jane-martinson/2012/jan/05/margaret-thatcher-feminist-icon.

Wängnerud, Lena. 2000. "Testing the politics of presence. Women's representation in the Swedish riksdag". *Scandinavian Political Studies* 23 (1): 67–91.

— . 2009. "Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation". *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:51–69.

WBUR. 2013. "Mary Robinson: Bearing Witness And Giving Voice". *WBUR*. https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2013/03/14/mary-robinson-ireland.

Webb, Karen. 1991. "Sexism in the House of Commons". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/sexism-in-the-house-of-commons.

Weikart, LA, et al. 2007. "The Democratic sex: gender differences and the exercise of power". *Journal of Women, Politics, and Policy* 28 (1): 119–140.

Weikle, Brandie. 2019. "Child-care costs 'astronomical' in most of Canada, despite progress in some provinces". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/childcare-costs-canada-1.5008106.

Welch, Susan. 1978. "Recruitment of Women to Public Office: A Discriminant Analysis". *Western Political Quarterly* 31 (3): 372–380.

White, Michael. 2013. "Margaret Thatcher: looking back on the life of the Iron Lady". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/iron-lady-margaret-thatcher.

Wilford, Greg. 2017. "Theresa May didn't want to wear £995 leather trousers but was forced into it by aide, report claims". *Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/theresa-may-prime-minister-trousergate-995-leather-trousers-amanda-wakeley-fiona-hill-nick-timothy-a7842481.html.

Williams, Conor. 2018. "When 'Universal' Child Care Isn't Universally High-Quality". *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/05/quebec-child-care-family-leave/559310/.

Wilson, Cherry. 2017. "Election results 2017: The most diverse Parliament yet". *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40232272.

Windsor, Hugh. 1993. "Canadians carried away by minister's bare shoulders: A provocative picture may help Kim Campbell become leader of her country." *The Independent*. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/canadians-carried-away-by-ministers-bare-shoulders-a-provocative-picture-may-help-kim-campbell-1453125.html.

Wintour, Patrick. 2011. "Labour fury as David Cameron tells Angela Eagle: 'Calm down, dear". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/apr/27/david-cameron-calm-down-dear.

Wittmer, Dana E., and Vanessa Bouché. 2013. "The Limits of Gendered Leadership: Policy Implications of Female Leadership on 'Women's Issues". *Politics & Gender* 9:245–275.

Woolf, Nicky. 2015. "Canada's new parliament is most diverse ever". *The Guardian*. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/canada-new-parliament-most-diverse-ever.

World Bank. 2011. *World development report 2012: Gender equality and development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

— . 2020. "Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)". https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS.

World Economic Forum. 2016. *The Global Gender Gap Report*. Switzerland: World Economic Forum.

World Health Organization. 2012. "Female genital mutilation". *Understanding and addressing violence against women*. http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/%2077428/1/WHO%5C_RHR%5C_12.41%5C_eng.pdf?ua=1.

Zarya, Valentina. 2015. "There Is Now Only One Country Left in the World Where Women Can't Vote". *Fortune*. https://fortune.com/2015/12/11/one-country-women-vote/.

Zimonjic, Peter. 2017. "Opposition MPs want Justin Trudeau to sanction Liberal MP accused of sexist remark". *CBC*. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/stripper-pole-sexist-remark-1.4038699.

Zuschlag, Anna. 2017. "Judy LaMarsh". *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/judy-lamarsh.