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Abstract
The prevailing theory in US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine establishes civil affairs, including economic aid and development, to be one of the foundational pillars of an effective COIN strategy. This doctrine currently states that it is essential to provide a population with opportunities for economic prosperity and growth in order to eliminate the allure of being recruited to a terrorist or insurgent group. Without disregarding the importance of civil affairs in COIN, the provision of economic aid may be counterintuitive. If economic status is not a major driving factor in insurgent recruitment and is disbursed without ensuring the security of the populace, then economic aid may simply enhance the ability of an insurgent group to finance its operations by boosting the carrying capacity of a population. This paper seeks to establish the positive relationship between economic aid and insurgent effectiveness conditional on state control by using data from the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project on the US occupation of Iraq.