

COMPETING CHRONOTOPES: THE TEMPORAL, SPATIAL, AND AFFECTIVE-
EMOTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RHETORIC

by

JESSICA CHAPLAIN

(Under the Direction of Belinda Stillion Southard)

ABSTRACT

Climate rhetorical scholars have worked to understand how climate rhetoric influences climate action, but their focus has been primarily on the apocalyptic imaginary of traditional climate rhetoric. In this thesis, I explore climate inaction through the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional complexity in newer climate activist groups. Expanding Mikhail Bakhtin's chronotope, I argue for the need to consider more fully the time, space, and affective-emotional relationships shaping our understanding and perceived ability to respond to climate change. Further, I add competing chronotopes and chronotopic intensities to the chronotopic framework and advocate for a more nuanced engagement with the concept in the rhetorical discipline.

INDEX WORDS: Climate Rhetoric, Chronotopes, Temporality, Spatiality, and Affects-
Emotions

COMPETING CHRONOTOPES: THE TEMPORAL, SPATIAL, AND AFFECTIVE-
EMOTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RHETORIC

by

JESSICA CHAPLAIN

B.A. and B.S. at Appalachian State University, 2018

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2021

© 2021

Jessica Chaplain

All Rights Reserved

COMPETING CHRONOTOPES: THE TEMPORAL, SPATIAL, AND AFFECTIVE-
EMOTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE RHETORIC

by

JESSICA CHAPLAIN

Major Professor: Belinda Stillion Southard
Committee: Barbara Biesecker
Roger Stahl

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2021

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first begin by thanking Dr. Stillion Southard for her continued support and guidance throughout this project. She has been an exceptional adviser, always helping me refine my writing and ideas. I could not have made it to this final draft without her. I also want to thank Dr. Biesecker and Dr. Stahl for their support not only throughout this process but in inspiring me with the ideas my first year in the program. I am tremendously grateful to both of these committee members for propelling me forward on this journey.

I would also like to thank all of my other professors for indulging my obsession with climate temporality in every class and always helping me think of new ways to approach climate rhetoric. You challenged me and provided me with an array of critical resources I will forever be thankful for. I also cannot overstate how grateful I am for all the graduate students for giving me ideas and talking me through obstacles that arose these past two years. You all are a joy to work with and provided me with so much insight and enthusiasm for this project. Finally, I would like to thank the two people who loved me enough to read this work so many times. You were there through every set back, and you never failed to encourage me to keep going. Thank you, Mom and Noah, for all your continued love and support. I really could not have done this without you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
Climate Apocalyptic Rhetoric.....	3
Research Questions.....	11
Chronotopes	12
Preview of Chapters	19
2 TOO LATE OR TOO SOON? TEMPORAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE RHETORIC OF FRIDAYS FOR FUTURE.....	24
Emergency of the Future.....	25
Emergency of the Present	38
Competing Chronotopes	48
3 RESILIENCE OR VULNERABILITY? ON THE FRONTLINE OF CLIMATE SOLUTIONS	52
Emergency of the Present	54
Slow Emergency	68
Competing Chronotopes	80
4 CLIMATE EMERGENCY OR CLIMATE TRAGEDY? CLASHING ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE RHETORIC OF EXTINCTION REBELLION.....	84

Emergency of the Present-Future.....	86
Climate Tragedy.....	96
Competing Chronotopes	110
5 CONCLUSION.....	114
Contributions.....	117
Future Research	124
Embracing Climate and Chronotopic Complexity.....	126
ENDNOTES	131

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

On March 28, 2019, United Nations General Assembly President María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés warned only 11 years remain to avert climate catastrophe. She said, “We are the last generation that can prevent irreparable damage to our planet.”¹ This warning is not new. Projections from a report in 2018 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change express the need to reduce emissions 45 percent by 2030 to keep warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius.² News articles accentuated the findings of this report, which declares that we have 12 years to save the planet.³ Similarly, the environmental activist group Extinction Rebellion declares on their website, “If we do not change course by 2020, we risk missing the point where we can avoid uncontrollable climate and ecological breakdown, with disastrous consequences for people and for all life on Earth.”⁴ These pronouncements point to an increased urgency for climate action; however, mobilizing the public remains a key concern. Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger note while public opinion about climate change has remained stable for the past two decades, the public does not currently worry about the issue a “great deal” and “only about one-third consider it a ‘serious personal threat.’”⁵ The Yale Climate Opinion Maps confirms this with only 43 percent of Americans believing that climate change will harm them personally.⁶ These findings have led rhetorical scholars to interrogate why increased knowledge does not lead to motivation for climate action.

A lot of climate rhetorical scholarship focuses on linear and homogenous apocalyptic narratives. These studies criticize climate apocalyptic rhetoric for producing a “depoliticized

imaginary”⁷ that impedes “political consensus and stymies preventive policy action.”⁸ Scholars claim apocalyptic rhetoric reduces possibilities for climate action. Others take this a step further and attribute climate inaction to spatial and temporal distance from the issue. Nordhaus and Shellenberger note, the threat of climate change “is distant in both time and space. It is difficult to visualize. And it is difficult to identify a clearly defined enemy.”⁹ These scholars point to spatial and temporal limitations of climate rhetoric but pay limited (if any) attention to the different spatial and temporal relationships within climate discourse. While some scholars recognize the temporality of climate rhetoric, space remains underexplored despite being deeply tied to conceptions of climate time.¹⁰ If, as Madeleine Fagan describes, climate change “presents us with spatial and temporal difficulties,”¹¹ then the ways in which speakers spatialize and temporalize climate change needs to be given more attention. Thus, in this thesis, I analyze how different conceptualizations of space and time relate within and among climate change rhetorics and reveal how these relationships influence the perceived possibilities for climate action.

Chronotopes offer a useful analytic for addressing these problems. The concept, originally theorized by Mikhail Bakhtin, helps rhetorical scholars examine “time-space arrangements” and how they “provide the ground of action for characters in a narrative.”¹² Chronotopic analysis “reveals implicit models of causality and agency embedded in narrative accounts.”¹³ While scholars have traditionally been interested in how a single chronotope operates within a text, I am interested in how competing chronotopes result in a fractured understanding of human causality and agency and the underlying tensions these competing chronotopes generate. By examining climate rhetoric through a chronotopic lens, I uncover the ways in which space-time relationships correspond with different affects-emotions that shape how people understand and relate to the issue of climate change. I hyphenate affects and

emotions to show the range of feelings and experiences that these chronotopes can illicit, either within our cognitive understandings (as emotions is often thought to be) or as those more visceral feelings (affects) or sensory experiences “that we do not quite have language for.”¹⁴ An examination of competing space-time-affects-emotions relationships in climate discourse enhances our understanding of the ongoing tensions and rhetorical obstacles in our conception of climate change and our efforts to motivate climate action.

In this first chapter, I detail how climate rhetorical scholars fixate on a linear, homogenous apocalyptic narrative and the limitations in that current focus. Second, I overview my research questions and discuss how chronotopes offer a better lens for examining the different time-space-affects-emotions relationships within climate change discourses. Finally, I end by previewing the thesis’s chapters, my specific case studies, and the different time-space-affects-emotions relationships configured within and amongst various climate discourses.

Climate Apocalyptic Rhetoric

The literature on climate rhetoric’s temporality and spatiality mostly focuses on apocalyptic narratives of impending catastrophe.¹⁵ Luke Winslow describes how “telic temporality positions individuals into catastrophic communities defined by a particular linear and determined understanding of time.”¹⁶ In such narratives, the apocalypse reveals a “cosmic system of order” and that system has an understanding of history as progressing towards this final catastrophic end.¹⁷ Delf Rothe explains how this telic understanding of time “brings with it questions of finitude, irreversibility and temporal ending. Anthropocene discourse thus paints the picture of a threat that is not only irreversible but also both spatially as well as temporally absolute.”¹⁸ In this sense, apocalyptic rhetoric in climate discourse privileges linearity and homogeneity as it points towards a global future threat. Linear time and global space are taken to

be the primary way of conceiving the apocalypse. Apocalyptic narratives frame this catastrophe as preventable which leads some scholars to view apocalyptic rhetoric as “the single most powerful master metaphor that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal.”¹⁹ Michael Salvador and Todd Norton add that apocalyptic rhetoric provides direction for action by showing the future consequences of not acting.²⁰ Yet, while this notion of time might fulfill “a desire to escape the flow of real and ordinary time, to fix the flow of history into a single moment of overwhelming importance,”²¹ it does not necessarily create the possibilities for action these scholars have suggested.

Apocalyptic narratives homogenize the spatial impacts of climate catastrophes and disregard the current climate impacts faced by certain communities. The idea that we all face this threat together overlooks social differences and “disregards that many people in the majority world have already lived through the ecological catastrophe brought about by European colonialism and its repercussions.”²² Madeleine Fagan describes this as a “cosmopolitan” view that frames the issue in “planetary terms” which erases political differences.²³ This connects to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s point: “To talk planet-talk by way of an unexamined environmentalism” refers to “an undivided ‘natural’ space rather than a differentiated political space.”²⁴ Climate change will impact communities differently, and many people have already faced similar destruction due to colonialism and capitalism. In apocalyptic narratives, everyone becomes “universal victims” which “silences ideological and other constitutive social differences and disavows conflicts of interests by distilling a common threat or challenge to both Nature and Humanity.”²⁵ In other words, apocalyptic narratives fail to account for the uneven spatial distribution of climate risk, address how some nations are more responsible than others for carbon emissions, and recognize how the capitalist system itself enables the “fulfillment” of

some lives at the cost of others. Fagan asks whether “The real problem posed by climate change, on at least one reading, is not the possibility of human extinction, but the prospect of ‘increased misery to the very poorest in society.’”²⁶ Roman Krznaric similarly argues that governments and companies currently ignore “distant strangers in developing countries” who are experiencing the impacts of climate change as a consequence of developed countries’ high emission levels.²⁷ Apocalyptic narratives erase these political differences by homogenizing spatial impacts.

Climate apocalyptic discourse often fails to consider climate justice and environmental racism. The question becomes: “Whose worlds are actually ending in the Anthropocene and whose worlds are extended at the costs of others[?]”²⁸ The problem is not will the world end, but rather whose worlds will end? Claire Colebrook adds that, to view apocalyptic narratives “as cautionary tales is to assume the position of the liberal blessed, those happy few for whom conditions of scarcity, violence, volatility and ‘existential threat’ are not part of day-to-day existence.”²⁹ By depicting climate change as a future threat, apocalyptic narratives disavow past and present catastrophes.³⁰ As such, the climate action it would encourage would not allow for a more systemic critique of the colonial, racist, and capitalist logics that led to the crisis in the first place. Instead, the depoliticizing effect of apocalyptic rhetoric makes the task ahead cutting carbon emissions at any cost without considering what future society such policies might give way to as a result.³¹

The apocalyptic universalizing narrative also runs the risk of diminishing human agency. Joshua Gunn and David Beard argue people respond to traditional apocalypticism because it restores a sense of agency.³² The climate change apocalypse, however, tends to do the reverse. Laura Johnson discusses how the use of apocalypticism engenders feelings of powerlessness through “discourses of the irreparable” which emphasize the precarity of nature to argue for why

it needs to be saved.³³ Irreparable discourses aim for calls to action that “depend on the notion that ‘that which is threatened need not be lost, [that] choice is possible.’”³⁴ However, if the irreparable is read as predictive, it diminishes possibilities for action by focusing too much on irreparability rather than repair. Salvador and Norton argue apocalyptic narratives must balance anxiety and efficacy.³⁵ If that balance is not properly maintained, nature becomes a deterministic or causal force. This takes on a form of “nature washing” wherein the “socially changed nature becomes a new super determinant of our social fate. It might well be society’s fault for changing nature, but it is the consequent power of that nature that brings on the apocalypse.”³⁶ In this imaginary, “only nature is left as the arbiter of proper human conduct.”³⁷ By depicting nature as a causal power that can “derail civilizations,”³⁸ apocalyptic narratives fetishize catastrophe in a way that inspires apathy, or at least a sense of powerlessness, by implying that such an end is unavoidable.³⁹ Balancing human agency and the power of nature becomes essential for apocalyptic rhetoric to inspire action. Not maintaining that balance inhibits productive action rather than enables it.

Apocalyptic rhetoric depends on the ability for its audiences to accept and fear the certainty of these catastrophic futures enough to take action. Winslow argues, however, “The human brain is not adapted to connect ecological crisis to pragmatic political action.”⁴⁰ As he further puts it, with climate change, “we do not have the cognitive capacity to muster the appropriate amount of concern.”⁴¹ This connects to what Aristotle said about fear when describing pathos appeals in the *Art of Rhetoric*: “We do not particularly fear things that are far off.”⁴² In Aristotle’s conception, fear only works when it is imminent. So, when climate apocalyptic narratives push climate catastrophe off into the future, they allow for a psychological distancing from that catastrophe, reducing one’s motivation to respond. Rosemary Randall

explains, “In narratives about the problem of climate change, loss features dramatically and terrifyingly but is located in the future or in places remote from Western audiences. In narratives about solutions, loss is completely excised.”⁴³ Randall describes this as a “defensive process of splitting and projection,” which protects the public from having to deal with the losses of climate change by producing “monstrous and terrifying images of the future accompanied by bland and ineffective proposals for change now.”⁴⁴ In Randall’s view, by distancing themselves from the unsafe future, the public feels less threatened by climate change in the present, which not only disavows current impacts but also diminishes the sense of urgency for action. In these ways, these narratives are premised on the ability for us to imagine something catastrophic and feel motivated to take action,⁴⁵ but future apocalyptic threats are often difficult to recognize as priority concerns.⁴⁶ Thus, apocalyptic narratives do more to inhibit climate action rather than promote it.

Apocalyptic rhetoric generates more skepticism and distancing in relation to the proposed catastrophe. In a recent study, Greg Garrard found “the most common complaint against climate scientists and environmentalists (two groups they typically conflate) is the bias they are thought to share toward catastrophism and worst-case scenarios.”⁴⁷ These findings suggest people do not respond to apocalyptic framing. Nordhaus and Shellenberger confirm this noting, “the louder and more alarmed climate advocates become in these efforts, the more they polarize the issue, driving away a conservative or moderate for every liberal they recruit to the cause.”⁴⁸ In this sense, apocalyptic narratives increase distance from climate change through skepticism.⁴⁹ Jean-Pierre Dupuy affirms, “Even when it is known that it is going to take place, a catastrophe is not credible: that is the principal obstacle.”⁵⁰ Thus, the use of apocalyptic rhetoric results in forms of skepticism and distancing that enable inaction rather than action. In increasing

skepticism and psychological distance, apocalyptic rhetoric does more harm than good within climate discourse.

Another important problem is the kind of solutions these narratives direct us towards. Stefan Skrimshire asks, “Alongside visions of an apocalyptic threat, what visions of the type of world we’d like to create in its place, are implied by direct action? Which paradigms of power are legitimized in the process?”⁵¹ Mark Levene argues often these narratives suggest technology provides adequate solutions to global and environmental problems, which fails to consider the problems inherent within technology itself.⁵² Levene further cautions, this “top down” approach submits to technical fixes “increasingly in alignment with the military-security apparatus of the hegemonic powers.”⁵³ This technological approach then becomes “a signal refusal to deal with the systemic causes of the carbon crisis, opting instead for a control paradigm which responds only to its violent symptoms and, in the process, perpetuates that state of violence.”⁵⁴ These proposals do not seek to challenge the existing order and the way technology has allowed for environmental degradation, but instead keep the existing order in check by holding technology as the savior of us all. Even if apocalyptic narratives were to work and direct us towards action, they do so by reproducing current power structures that position technology as the agent to prevent the impending catastrophe.

Beyond foreclosing possibilities for action, apocalyptic narratives are also fraught with affective-emotional complexities. Scholars often see climate inaction as the result of focusing too much on disaster and not enough on utopia. Sarah Amsler asks, “What practices or conditions, what experiences or sensibilities, might ‘tip’ moral and political consciousness from despair to hope?”⁵⁵ Amsler suggests apocalyptic narratives, in their attempt to provoke fear, can create despair as a byproduct by making the audience feel powerless against the impending disaster.⁵⁶

Aristotle explains, “There must, however, be some hope of deliverance from the event that is causing anxiety.”⁵⁷ In other words, without hope people feel powerless. Krznaric similarly insists climate change rhetoric needs more utopian visions of the future as a way of “inspiring a greater sense of hope.”⁵⁸ While these scholars acknowledge apocalyptic narratives stymie climate action, they seem to think this is because they are too hopeless; perhaps, however, the underlying problem is the idea that hope or fear (and as a byproduct despair) are our only resources for affectively-emotionally engaging with climate change. Neimanis and Walker argue the apocalyptic imaginary is “invested in the consumption of affect (transfixing news coverage of a ‘natural’ disaster; the rush of an apocalyptic movie) without intensity—without any mobilization of responsivity or sense that our bodies and our time are mutually implicated in environmental changes.”⁵⁹ The question becomes, what other ways might we affectively-emotionally engage with the climate issue, and might we consider other affective-emotional resources than utopia or doomsday? Furthermore, hope manifests in a variety of forms. Indeed, this project explores what types of hope are cultivated by climate rhetoric and how these differing hope appeals lead to differing understandings of the crisis.

For some scholars time and space remain unexplored facets of the apocalyptic imaginary, but others identify these problems as the result of spatial and temporal limitations. Fagan explains climate change is often thought of as “temporally and spatially distant.”⁶⁰ Krznaric sees climate inaction as the consequence of a lack of empathy with people distant through time and across space.⁶¹ In this perspective, climate change forces us to make sacrifices on behalf of future generations who are distant in time but also to empathize with those who are already feeling the devastating impacts of climate change but live “far away.”⁶² Krznaric describes how we find it difficult to empathize with those we do not know because “We cannot really imagine

who they are and what their lives are like, let alone how the impacts of our carbon emissions affect them.”⁶³ Climate change “presents us with spatial and temporal difficulties”⁶⁴ we must address in order to create better rhetorical possibilities for climate action. While scholars acknowledge spatial and temporal limitations, they have paid little attention to the different spatial and temporal relationships within climate discourse. Stephen Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul H. Thibodeau document how optimism for climate change arises with more time to address it.⁶⁵ The scholars also found that future events seen as approaching of their own accord increase anxiety and urgency.⁶⁶ In other words, different time-space relationships also influence the affective-emotional experiences of climate change and vice versa. Despite these moments in the literature, a more detailed understanding of these relationships is required.

Currently, the climate rhetoric literature fixates on what they perceive to be a coherent apocalyptic narrative within climate discourse. The problems with apocalyptic rhetoric have been well-documented, but apocalypticism is only one way of understanding climate time and space. A vast range of temporal and spatial understandings of the crisis are currently subsumed within one dominant understanding, as are a multitude of affective-emotional responses beyond fear, hope, and despair. Apocalyptic rhetoric may characterize much of the discourse on climate change; however, competing temporalities, spatialities, and affects-emotions within this discourse deserve further inspection. Examining how climate discourse depicts certain relationships between time, space, and affects-emotions enhances our understanding of climate inaction and provides more nuance in our understanding of climate rhetoric. It is to this task that I now turn.

Research Questions

The spatial and temporal relationships within climate change rhetoric pose several research questions my thesis considers and meditates upon:

1. Within and amongst climate change discourses, what are the different chronotopes at work and how are each animated by relationships between space, time, and affects-emotions?
2. To what extent does each chronotope resist a linear conception of time, a homogenous understanding of space, and fear-based affects-emotions? To what extent do they remain tied to apocalyptic temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional orientations?
3. Within each chronotope, which element works most intensely and in turn, organizes the functions of other elements?
4. How do certain chronotopes uphold certain power structures, and to what extent do they foreclose consideration of climate justice?
5. How do certain chronotopes interact to enable and constrain discourses of climate action and climate justice?

My interest here is in the way in which different spatial, temporal, and affective-emotional relationships may operate within the same rhetorical texts to produce or negate senses of how one should relate to and respond to the issue of climate change. These competing chronotopes reveal underlying tensions within climate discourse that point to ongoing struggles to motivate climate action. In this sense, I understand “apocalyptic as one diffuse facet of the ways in which our society as a whole talks about, and understands, the future.”⁶⁷ I am interested in the multifaceted ways in which activists describe temporal and spatial relationships within their discussions of climate change and what contradictions emerge through their efforts to overcome rhetorically the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional distance of the issue. Overall, I aim to expand our understanding of climate rhetoric by paying closer attention to how different temporalities, spatialities, and affects-emotions come up against each other in climate discourse. The best way to explore these relationships is through the chronotope.

Chronotopes

The concept of chronotopes originally examined the time and space relationships found in literature and in connection to genre.⁶⁸ As Bakhtin explains, “it is precisely the chronotope that defines genre and generic distinctions, for in literature the primary category in the chronotope is time.”⁶⁹ Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart further describe how chronotopes function: “(1) they have narrative, plot-generating significance; (2) they have representational significance; (3) they ‘provide the basis for distinguishing generic types’; and (4) they have semantic significance.”⁷⁰ In other words, Bakhtin’s understanding of chronotopes connects relationships of time and space to larger thematic understandings of time and space across texts.⁷¹

The rhetorical uptake of this concept similarly understands these time and space relationships as commonplaces across rhetorical situations. Jordyn Jack explains, “the term chronotope refers to the ways in which a text draws upon, constitutes, or appeals to particular notions of space and time.”⁷² In this understanding, chronotopes “direct readers’ attention toward particular spaces and times, influencing not only arguments but also material effects that emerge from policies, regulations, or the lack thereof.”⁷³ Through their temporal and spatial orientations, chronotopes influence decision making and possibilities for action.⁷⁴ Chelsea Redeker Milbourne and Sarah Hallenbeck theorize material-discursive chronotopes and their account of how “multiple material, spatial, temporal, and textual elements interact with and impact each other within an assemblage, facilitating particular spatial–temporal orientations that influence the rhetorical opportunities available.”⁷⁵ The scholars further explain, “like linguistic commonplaces, material chronotopes gain power through repetition and reflect culturally produced and sustained meanings that, within the context they inhabit, are more or less naturalized.”⁷⁶ Taking a similar

approach, I understand the chronotopes I explore in climate rhetoric to be material-discursive commonplaces within activist rhetoric that provide a particular understanding of climate change and climate action; however, I argue these chronotopes change shape in the different activist discourses they animate, as a certain element or elements of the chronotope operate with more intensity than others. In other words, while these activists share similar chronotopic commonplaces, these chronotopes are malleable and shift forms based on the organization and their particular appeal. How the chronotope transforms and what elements of the chronotope function with the greatest intensity organizes the functions of the other elements, shaping the possibilities for climate action. This enhanced understanding of chronotopes provides a more nuanced interpretation of the way chronotopes manifest across texts and rhetorical situations. In what follows, I break down the different elements of the chronotope and how I understand each in my analysis.

Time

Chronotopic orientations center two primary elements: time and space.⁷⁷ For my purposes, I agree with Mark Rifkin:

There is no singular unfolding of time, but, instead, varied temporal formations that have their own rhythms—patterns of consistency and transformation that emerge immanently out of the multifaceted and shifting sets of relationships that constitute those formations and out of the interactions among those formations.⁷⁸

Chronotopes offer a method for considering the various temporal formations that pervade our understandings of climate change and the ways in which problems of space and time are rhetorically mediated in climate discourse. Matthew Houdek and Kendall R. Phillips argue, “The temporal turn reflects an emerging cross-disciplinary conversation in the humanities that views temporality as a site of power and resistance.”⁷⁹ Attuning to temporality in climate discourse exposes the way the “construction of time via capital and colonial formations” works to alienate

“both humans from nature and humans from humans.”⁸⁰ Exposing taken for granted temporal formations attunes us to other forms of temporality that push up against and challenge these dominant understandings of time. Revealing clashing temporal perspectives provides pathways to new temporal orientations that could enhance our understanding and ability to respond to climate change.

Space

While more rhetorical scholars have turned toward time, space is a crucial part of the chronotope that deserves equal attention.⁸¹ Doreen Massy describes several problems with current understandings of space:

The imagination of space as a surface on which we are placed, the turning of space into time, the sharp separation of local place from the space out there; these are all ways of taming the challenge that the inherent spatiality of the world presents. Most often, they are unthought.⁸²

Joan McAllister similarly calls for analysis of the “rhetorical and material mediation through spaces.”⁸³ In my analyses, I aim to approach these shortcomings while simultaneously recognizing how these problems pervade the spatiality of climate rhetoric. Massey argues for space to be understood via these propositions: First, to understand space as the “product of interrelations; as constituted through interactions”; second, to view “multiplicity and space as co-constitutive.”; and, third, to “recognise space as always under construction.”⁸⁴ These propositions suggest “the very possibility of any serious recognition of multiplicity and heterogeneity itself depends on a recognition of spatiality.”⁸⁵ In other words, space is heterogenous, open, and malleable, and constantly shifting based on our relationships. I maintain this understanding of space throughout this project even as I point to ways in which activists foreclose this understanding. Even more, I raise questions about the way different spatialities are also tied to power formations that depend on closed, homogenous understandings of space to

uphold current socio-ecological relationships.⁸⁶ I agree with Gordon Walker's point, "environmental injustice arises not simply from unevenness in the spatial distribution of risk, from a politics of Cartesian geographical patterning, but from how this interacts with unevenness in socio-spatial distribution of vulnerability and wellbeing."⁸⁷ In paying more attention to space in climate discourse, I aim to expose the way certain spatialities conceal the uneven distribution of climate risk. The consideration of the spatiality of climate change in climate rhetoric is essential for fostering climate justice.

Briefly, it is important to note the relationship I understand between space and place. Massey challenges understandings of place as local and space as global. For her, "the global is just as concrete as is the local place."⁸⁸ Space often designates the abstract while place signifies the concrete. Massey argues, "If we really think space relationally, then it is the sum of all our connections, and in that sense utterly grounded, and those connections may go round the world."⁸⁹ Massey rejects this dualism and suggests, "If space is rather a simultaneity of stories-so-far, then places are collections of those stories, articulations within the wider power-geometries of space."⁹⁰ Thus, both space and place remain open, malleable, and constantly shifting based on relationships. Places are "integrations of space and time; as spatio-temporal events."⁹¹ In other words, spaces designate the simultaneity of different trajectories, whereas place designates "a particular constellation" within these wider trajectories.⁹² This understanding animates my analysis of spatiality in climate rhetoric.

Affects-Emotions

Chronotopes reveal how space-time relationships are always influenced by emotions and values.⁹³ These values reflect "societal assumptions about the place of human individuals in space and time and the type of action allowed within that space and time."⁹⁴ In this sense,

chronotopes correspond with certain affects-emotions that shape how a person relates to and understands a particular social problem. Paul Routledge describes how emotions “mediate social and political processes through which people’s subjectivities are reproduced and performed” and how they are “intimately bound up with power relations and also with relations of affinity, and are a means of initiating action.”⁹⁵ In this understanding, space-time relationships are tied to certain affects or emotions which influence how one understands and makes sense of social problems and perceive their ability to respond. Kara Keeling describes affect “as the embodied mental activity required to make sense of the world.”⁹⁶ Chronotopes not only provoke certain sensations, but they also provide a way of understanding the world that is affective-emotional just as much as it is temporal and spatial.⁹⁷ Deborah Gould distinguishes between emotion and affect, describing emotion as flowing “directly, expectedly, and coherently from cognitive processing” and affect as the “noncognitive, nonconscious, nonlinguistic, and nonrational qualities of emotion.”⁹⁸ For Gould, affect encompasses “the visceral qualities of feelings,”⁹⁹ whereas emotion is tied to “conscious, cognitive, rational assessments.”¹⁰⁰ Gould further explains that whereas “affect is unfixed, unstructured, and nonlinguistic, an emotion is one’s personal expression of what one is feeling in a given moment, an expression that is structured by social convention, by culture.”¹⁰¹ For my purposes, I will hyphenate affects-emotions to show the range of feelings and relationships (rational or nonrational, visceral or cognitive) that influence how one might respond to these space-time relationships. Thus, I add to the existing chronotopic framework to include affects-emotions as an important entailment to how chronotopes operate and influence the possibilities for action. Examining the different affects-emotions that correspond to different space-time relationships helps us consider alternative affective-emotional resources for motivating climate action.

Possibilities for Action

Chronotopes give rhetorical scholars a better understanding of how temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional dimensions of rhetorical texts are deeply tied to conceptions of agency.¹⁰² As Ilkka Tuomi details, “Each historical form of chronotope carries with it a unique model of causality and agency, enabling and limiting the types of meaningful stories that can be told in its context.”¹⁰³ Chronotopes as a method reveal how rhetorical texts make temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional sense of the phenomena and social problems they describe.¹⁰⁴ Examining the chronotopes within rhetorical discourse provides an understanding of how these space-time-affects-emotions relationships shape what “is achievable, accessible, and proximal from the point of an actor” and how “agency and future can be expressed.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, chronotopes “also typify material realities” in that they “refer to the rich social contexts in which individuals speak, write, read, think, work, and live.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, chronotopes unveil the way temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional orientations shape our understandings of the world and ability to respond to social problems. They expose “the workings of power, ideology, and knowledge in contemporary arguments,”¹⁰⁷ uncovering differing ethical frameworks that influence our possibilities and motivations for action.¹⁰⁸

Competing Chronotopes and Intensities

While the literature on chronotopes mostly focuses on how different chronotopes operate within different rhetorical texts, I am interested here in how competing chronotopes operate within the same rhetorical text and lead to a particular understanding of the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional limits to human action. Jack explains how “one chronotope may become rhetorically dominant in ways that shape the overall argument and its effects, while other chronotopes may lurk at the margins or compete for the center.”¹⁰⁹ Bakhtin similarly recognizes

the propensity for other “minor” chronotopes to operate within a text, creating complex interactions.¹¹⁰ Both of these perspectives, however, presume that one chronotope will dominate or envelop the others.¹¹¹ The question becomes: What happens when competing chronotopes undermine each other and the spatial-temporal-affective-emotional relationships each describes? If “chronotopes form the basic time-space organization that makes meaningful accounts of causality and agency possible, and they also define what kinds of stories can make sense,”¹¹² competing chronotopes result in a complex story by enabling and limiting coherent understandings of causality and agency.

Jack argues rhetorical situations engender different arguments with different ideological implications. I question, what happens when the same argument from the same activist group is also imbued with many different chronotopes that compete to shape how the argument is perceived?¹¹³ While Jack acknowledges how “chronotopes compete to shape rhetorical situations and arguments in powerful ways, often by supporting ideological interests,”¹¹⁴ I aim to explore how competing chronotopes within the same rhetorical texts reveal underlying tensions within the effort to motivate climate action. I agree with Jodie Nicotra and Judith Parrish’s that “At any given moment in public discourse, multiple chronotopes compete and jostle for dominance.”¹¹⁵ I view these competing chronotopes within a single activist group as evidence of these ongoing tensions within public discourse. Examining the clash of chronotopes points us to the rhetorical roadblocks and possibilities in climate rhetoric. Thus, I use the concept of chronotopes to explore the time-space-affects-emotions relationships within climate discourse, the ways in which different chronotopes compete against each other, and the tensions that emerge from these complex interactions.

In his original understanding of the chronotope, Bakhtin expressed the inseparability of space and time,¹¹⁶ viewing them as always working together. I add to his theorization by considering the way different elements of chronotopes gain more intensity in certain rhetorical moments, shaping and organizing the way the other elements of the chronotope operate. In some texts, time gains force, shaping the way space and affects-emotions are expressed. In other times, space gains intensity, shaping the understanding of the other entailments. In each of my chapters, I explore these intensities to better understand the complex relationships between these chronotopic elements. To summarize, my main contributions to the chronotopic literature are as follows: I add affects-emotions as an important entailment to how the chronotopes function within rhetorical texts and situations, I consider more fully how different chronotopes in the same text interact, creating complex understandings of climate change, and I explore the way different facets of the chronotope (time, space, affects-emotions) gain intensity in certain rhetorical moments. In all, I aim to complicate how we understand the relationship between these facets and the way chronotopes manifest across texts.

Preview of Chapters

To explore the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional relationships within climate rhetoric, I analyze the discourses of three main climate activist groups: Fridays for Future, Indigenous Peoples within the United Nations, and Extinction Rebellion. Each case study highlights two chronotopes, each with a different chronotopic intensity. All three case studies work to overcome the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional distance of climate change in various ways, and these efforts expose underlying tensions and complexities that I unpack at the end of each chapter and in the conclusion.

In my first case study, I examine the rhetoric of Fridays for Future and the two competing chronotopes *emergency of the future* and *emergency of the present*. Fridays for Future emanates from the “School Strikes for Climate” that Greta Thunberg initiated in Sweden in 2018 because, as the organization website details, “She was tired of society’s unwillingness to see the climate crisis for what it is: a crisis.”¹¹⁷ The movement currently has 13,000,000 people involved in 7,500 cities worldwide.¹¹⁸ I analyze speeches located on the group’s website from these youth activists: Thunberg, Theo Cullen-Mouze, Hilda Flavia Nakabuye, Kallan Benson, Luisa Neubauer, and David Wicker. In this chapter, I unpack the *emergency of the future* chronotope’s temporal intensity and how the combination of reproductive futuristic and apocalyptic time depicts climate change as a threat to children’s futures. In contrast, the *emergency of the present’s* temporal and spatial intensity dramatizes the present impacts of climate change to disrupt the future-oriented temporality of climate rhetoric. In my analysis, I argue both chronotopes work to overcome the perceived temporal distance of climate change and heighten the urgency for climate action. As time gains intensity in these artifacts, space vacillates between homogenous and heterogenous descriptions of climate impacts. “When” becomes more important than “where,” and climate inaction is perceived to be a problem of time. Fear, panic, anger, and a temporal hope are evoked to mobilize action. The *emergency of the present* urges us to panic and react (undermining democratic thinking), while the *emergency of the future* demands us to reduce carbon emissions by 2030 (oversimplifying climate solutions). I argue that these two competing chronotopes highlight a tension between increasing urgency to act and providing time for change to occur. What results is an oversimplification of climate time, space, and the possibilities for climate action.

My second case study explores the spatial intensity in Indigenous Peoples' Climate Rhetoric. Currently, there are "370 million indigenous people around the world" who have "their own distinct languages, cultures, and social and political institutions apart from mainstream society."¹¹⁹ These various communities come together within the United Nations Climate Change Conferences to advocate for their communities. On a United Nations website for the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, it states, "Indigenous peoples are among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change, due to their dependence upon, and close relationship, with the environment and its resources."¹²⁰ This page goes on to say, "indigenous peoples interpret and react to the impacts of climate change in creative ways, drawing on traditional knowledge and other technologies to find solutions which may help society at large to cope with impending changes."¹²¹ In this perspective, Indigenous Peoples are considered to be vulnerable on the "frontline" of climate change and have the knowledge to adapt to climate changes. This case study examines Indigenous Peoples' efforts across a multitude of texts (official statements, speeches, activist websites, etc.) to overcome the spatial distance of climate change by emphasizing the vulnerability and resilience of their communities.

In this second case study, I trace the tension between vulnerability and resilience in Indigenous Peoples' climate rhetoric through two chronotopes: *emergency of the present* and *slow emergency*. As space takes on the most intensity in these texts, time and affects-emotions becomes more relational and organized by their connection to space. Heterogenous impacts and spatial relationships are acknowledged, but homogenous understandings of time still pervade the *emergency of the present*. Anxiety, anger, and a collaborative and realistic hope are affects-emotions emanating from these texts. Both chronotopic frameworks highlight Indigenous Peoples and position them as equal stakeholders in climate negotiations; however, the production

of vulnerability through the *emergency of the present* conceals the underlying causes of the crisis, whereas the *slow emergency* cultivates resilience as a critique of colonial and capitalist exploitive practices. The two chronotopes reveal two underlying tensions. The first involves the simultaneous need for swift and thoughtful action. Thoughtful action often takes time that could result in further harm to Indigenous communities, but swift action often is made without proper consideration of climate justice. The second tension stems from how marginalized groups negotiate their participation within climate rhetoric by simultaneously invoking dominant chronotopic orientations and working to subvert them. This chapter explores these tensions and spatial considerations for climate justice.

My final case study examines the environmental activist group Extinction Rebellion. Founded in 2018 by Roger Hallam and Gail Bradbrook, Extinction Rebellion is defined by its founders as “a decentralised, international and politically non-partisan movement using non-violent direct action and civil disobedience to persuade governments to act justly on the Climate and Ecological Emergency.”¹²² While the website of the movement reflects a lot of similar rhetorical moves as Fridays for Future, the group promotes grief as a central part of their movement.¹²³ In a video on their website page entitled “The Truth,” Claire, a core member, notes, “grief is a perfectly acceptable part of what we are doing with Extinction Rebellion and, I think it’s an important difference between us and a lot of other movements and campaigns.”¹²⁴ Focusing on two of their grief events, “Funeral for Our Future” and “Grief March,” along with their website, blog posts, and videos about grief, I trace the tension between two chronotopes: *emergency of the present-future* and *climate tragedy*. The *emergency of the present-future*, as read through a disease metaphor, gains temporal intensity as climate change is cast as a disease threatening the global body. In contrast, the *climate tragedy* gains affective-emotional intensity as

climate change is imbued with innumerable losses that activists mourn as a means of transforming socio-ecological relationships. Both chronotopes aim to mobilize action, but their different time-space-affects-emotions orientations expose an underlying tension between two clashing ethical frameworks. This chapter ends with a discussion of this tension, the faulty assumptions made about climate inaction, and how such faulty assumptions lead to problematic ethical frameworks.

In the Conclusion, I explore the need for more temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional complexity in climate rhetoric. Each case study reveals ongoing rhetorical obstacles to climate rhetoric. I suggest that diving deeper into these tensions and complexities ensures more temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional variety in climate rhetoric. Climate change is a complex phenomenon not easily encapsulated by any single chronotopic imaginary. Engaging with its nonlinearity and complexity helps us better understand how to respond and relate. Competing chronotopes point us towards negotiations over meaning. These ongoing negotiations can be important starting points for moving forward with more reflexivity and insightfulness. Furthermore, developing climate policy is difficult and complex. Attending to this ongoing struggle over the meaning of climate change has important implications for how policy develops and what kind of limitations and possibilities will emerge. In challenging taken for granted assumptions about time, space, and affects-emotions, these case studies point to alternative orientations that move us out of the apocalyptic imaginary. In this final chapter, I detail how this project expands how we understand climate inaction and move us towards more engagement with the uncertainty, unpredictability, and complexity that the issue poses.

CHAPTER TWO:
 TOO LATE OR TOO SOON? TEMPORAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE RHETORIC OF
 FRIDAYS FOR FUTURE

In 2019, Greta Thunberg declared to the European Parliament: “I want you to panic. I want you to act as if your house was on fire.”¹²⁵ In this moment, Thunberg affirmed climate change as an immediate threat, disrupting the future-oriented apocalyptic temporality at the heart of climate rhetoric. In the past few years, Thunberg has become the face of the climate youth activist group Fridays for Future.¹²⁶ Working in tandem with other activists such as Theo Cullen-Mouze, Hilda Flavia Nakabuye, Kallan Benson, Luisa Neubauer, and David Wicker, Thunberg has used climate rhetoric’s fixation on future generations to create a subject position for youth activists within the international climate arena.¹²⁷ While children are traditionally afforded limited participation in public life,¹²⁸ these activists embody generations now at risk due to continued climate inaction. In this subject position and with their more urgent appeals, these activists work to diminish the perceived temporal distance of climate change.¹²⁹

In this chapter, I explore two chronotopes, the *emergency of the future* and the *emergency of the present*,¹³⁰ within Cullen-Mouze, Benson, Flavia, Neubauer, Wicker, and Thunberg’s speeches and videos. The *emergency of the future*’s temporal intensity combines reproductive futuristic temporality with apocalyptic time to reinforce the need for preventative action by 2030. In contrast, the *emergency of the present*’s temporal and spatial intensity dramatizes the immediate threat climate change poses locally and globally, creating a reactive temporal perspective. These two differing chronotopes and their disparate intensities result in a

disjointed sense of the possibilities for climate action and reveal the ongoing struggle to temporalize climate change in a way that balances time to act with increased urgency. Examining the way these activists work to overcome the temporal distance of climate change reveals how temporal assumptions animate efforts to increase climate action and limit our critical and democratic resources to respond.

In order to interrogate these competing chronotopes within Fridays for Future's rhetoric, this chapter unfolds as follows: First, I discuss the *emergency of the future* chronotope, its combination of reproductive futurism and apocalyptic temporalities, and the spatial and affective-emotional entailments emerging from its temporal intensity. Likewise, I turn to the temporal and spatial intensity of the *emergency of the present* chronotope to explore how climate change is depicted as a homogenous and heterogenous immediate threat requiring a reactive response. Finally, I consider how these competing chronotopes reveal an ongoing struggle to temporalize climate change and the problem with urgency in climate rhetoric.

Emergency of the Future

The chronotope I term *emergency of the future* depicts the climate crisis as ultimately a crisis of the future. Like a typical crisis, the *emergency of the future* “is an exceptional moment; a departure from the norm that calls forth a concomitant response.”¹³¹ The response, however, is directed towards the future rather than the present. The *emergency of the future* “assumes that the future will inevitably end in tragedy or in a state of emergency.”¹³² The present represents a decisive moment determining our trajectory towards the future. As Mario Kaiser explains, “Only if we drastically change the course of events, only if we do not wait too long, and only if we act right now are we able to bend the course of events into a shape that provides us with a surplus of a humane future.”¹³³ The *emergency of the future* chronotope has obvious apocalyptic tendencies

as it depicts our present trajectory leading to a future catastrophe¹³⁴ unless massive transformations occur.¹³⁵

This apocalypticism merges with reproductive futurism as the youth activists represent a future at risk to climate catastrophe. The chronotope perpetuates a “chrononormative,” family time¹³⁶ climate change interrupts by threatening the futures lives of children and grandchildren.¹³⁷ Lee Edelman describes reproductive futurism as the way in which the image of the child comes to embody “the social order and has been enshrined as the figure for whom that order must be held in perpetual trust.”¹³⁸ Edelman explains any politics, no matter how radical its actions, will remain “conservative insofar as it necessarily works to affirm a social order, defining various strategies aimed at actualizing social reality and transmitting it into the future it aims to bequeath to its inner child.”¹³⁹ Reproductive futurism positions children as a symbol of hope for all political projects.¹⁴⁰ Children simultaneously gain symbolic force and lack agency, as they are the moral reason for taking action.¹⁴¹ Edelman argues this fixation on children in all political projects reproduces heteronormative values into the future. In the *emergency of the future*, time takes on intensity through the combination of chronormative and apocalyptic temporality. Activists reappropriate reproductive futurism to blame adults for their failure to protect children. The chronotope abstracts and homogenizes space and elicits fear, anger, and a temporal hope aimed at justifying the need for action by 2030. The following analysis exposes how the combined temporalities organize space and affects-emotions to overcome the temporal distance of climate change.

Time

In their speeches, the F4F activists disrupt the subject-object relationship¹⁴² of reproductive futurism by embodying the figure of the child to appeal to society’s concern for the

well-being of future generations. Scholar Kyrre Kverndokk explains how in reproductive futurism, encompassed by the phrase “our children” in climate rhetoric, children do not have agency but function “as the object-actant.”¹⁴³ F4F turns the child trope from an object status into a subject position. Nakabuye says at the COP 24, “I made a decision to protect the only place I call home: Earth, and so I joined other young people all over the globe to protect our future. Through endless fights and sleepless nights, we hustle our way because this is our future.”¹⁴⁴ Here, “our children” shifts to “our future,” affording agency to these activists. Cullen-Mouze, a 17-year-old activist, at one point says, “Of course, I like being treated as an adult, but as a legal child, today I am speaking to you as a child.”¹⁴⁵ Cullen-Mouze leverages his childhood as a means for speaking and advocating for climate action. Both activists draw on reproductive futurism while reinscribing agency to “children.” Kverndokk describes family time as “based on how individual life experiences and lifespans are embedded into family cycles through formative life stages and events, such as childhoods, marriages, childbirths, parenthood, parents gradually getting old and dying, and so on.”¹⁴⁶ The temporal emphasis on childhood in these speeches emphasizes climate change as a threat to children and this family time. The activists symbolize all current and future generations who face a climate catastrophe should action not be taken.

F4F activists’ reappropriation of reproductive futurism aims to increase the urgency of taking action now through downscaling. Kverndokk defines downscaling as delimiting “the time span of the climate-changed future to one or two generations ahead.”¹⁴⁷ This works to move the climate catastrophe closer.¹⁴⁸ Benson evokes this downscaling when she says, “Earth will survive. It is our lives that are in jeopardy. Our lives, your children’s lives, and the lives of future generations.”¹⁴⁹ Here, Benson affirms climate change will impact the current generation, making the crisis feel more immediate than a few generations away. The *emergency of the future* ties the

present to the future through an ethical relationship to protect children. Kverndokk explains, children “do not represent the future as such, but rather a future related to the present.”¹⁵⁰ The phrases “our lives” and “your children’s lives” allocates responsibility to adults for protecting these youth. In this way, these youth simultaneously have agency and are calling on adults to act to protect them, reaffirming their symbolic force as a moral imperative to act. The *emergency of the future* situates adults in an ethical relationship to these youth and future generations, linking the present to the future through a reproductive futuristic concern for children.

The *emergency of the future* depicts concern for climate change as concern for children and future grandchildren, reproducing heteronormative values into the future.¹⁵¹ Activist Neubauer states: “Imagine what this world would look like, where children would grow up, knowing their future was this one great adventure to look forward to and nothing to be scared of.”¹⁵² Neubauer’s statement reinforces that we should care about climate change because it threatens children’s futures. This notion of environmental ethics rooted in familial concern¹⁵³ suggests any actions taken now only acquire weight and impetus once considered in relation to our children and future relatives. By drawing upon the idea that concern for the environment emerges most prominently from biological relationships,¹⁵⁴ this chronormative orientation undermines the variety of forms kinship can take beyond the dominant heteronormative family structure and reinscribes the future as a “hetero-reproductive”¹⁵⁵ future. The focus on threatened children’s futures limits concern for climate change to concern for the children, which vastly restricts the way futurity and climate ethics are expressed in climate politics.

In the *emergency of the future*, chronormative time merges with apocalyptic time to reinforce the need for action before it is too late for these youth.¹⁵⁶ These activists’ futures reflect the species’ future, and their survival equals the species’ survival.¹⁵⁷ Madeleine Fagan describes

apocalyptic time as “characterised by the idea that time is directed towards a certain event that the apocalyptic era will see a period of accelerating development towards this end, or ‘time compression.’”¹⁵⁸ In these apocalyptic warnings, time operates in two ways: chronistically (unfolding) and kairotically (as a moment of importance).¹⁵⁹ Chronistically, time moves linearly but accelerates towards the impending catastrophe; yet, the catastrophe is still preventable. Kairotically, now offers a moment within the flow of time to change the course of the future. The *emergency of the future* ties the present to the future through reproductive futurism by making present actions necessary for future survival.¹⁶⁰ As Thunberg describes, “Homo sapiens have not yet failed. Yes, we are failing but there is still time to turn everything around we can still fix this, we still have everything in our own hands.”¹⁶¹ In the *emergency of the future*, climate change represents a unique moment of interruption, a catastrophe awaiting in the future. Each day of missed action propels us closer and closer to catastrophe. In this chronotopic perspective, time speeds up, and we are left with limited to act.

The acceleration of time manifests through ticking clock and tipping point metaphors functioning as affirmation that now is the time for action. Thunberg details:

Around the year 2030, 10 years 259 days and 10 hours away from now, we will be in a position where we set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human control, that will most likely lead to the end of our civilization as we know it. That is unless in that time, permanent and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society have taken place.¹⁶²

Thunberg’s depiction of 2030 as our deadline increases urgency through the countdown¹⁶³; however, she contradicts this deadline by stating, “these are just calculations. Estimations. That means that these ‘points of no return’ may occur a bit sooner or later than 2030.”¹⁶⁴ Here, Thunberg aims to heighten the need to respond quickly through the unpredictability of these points of no return; however, that unpredictability weakens the force of 2030 as a deadline. The date appears as an “arbitrary conceptual”¹⁶⁵ deadline rather than a crucial turning point. In this

chronotope, the clock is ticking, but there is still a range of time for when action could take place. Scholars Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan describe climate change as a “long threat” in that “the threat is perceived to be so distant in time that people are unable to relate to/imagine such an event coming to pass.”¹⁶⁶ More immediate deadlines promote more urgency.¹⁶⁷ A deadline given too far into the future makes the threat feel less urgent and diminishes the immediacy of the ticking clock. While downscaling through reproductive futurism aims to increase urgency, the 2030 deadline temporally distances climate impacts from the present. These activists posit as long as we have made the necessary changes before the deadline, our children will survive. Such temporal distance disavows the experiences of those already facing climate impacts and weakens F4F’s call for action now.

Thus, the *emergency of the future* chronotope works to increase urgency by combining apocalyptic time with reproductive futurism. These activists embody the future threatened by climate catastrophe. The given time for action, however, creates too much temporal distance between the present and the supposed catastrophe awaiting in the future. Stefan Skrimshire argues one definitive turning point (such as 2030) leads “to two seemingly opposite, and erroneous, conclusions – that nothing will happen until we reach the ‘point’ and conversely, that once we’ve reached it, there will be nothing that can be done about it.”¹⁶⁸ The arbitrary deadline of 2030 suggests we will not face climate impacts until then and there is still plenty of time to change course. Such temporal distance diminishes the urgency of taking action now. Thus, while the chronotope overcomes some temporal distance, the future-oriented perspective still provides too much time between the present and a catastrophic future.

Space

In the *emergency of the future*, time reverberates out through global space. *When* things will happen takes on more force than *where* they will happen. Space is perceived as open, natural, homogenous, and foreboding. These activists do not distinguish a space—or particular place—that will face the brunt of the impacts. Wicker emphasizes, “The climate crisis will affect everyone. ‘We are all on the same boat.’”¹⁶⁹ Here, Wicker’s “global view”¹⁷⁰ homogenizes climate spatial impacts. Erik Swyngedouw describes how in global perspectives people “are not constituted as heterogeneous political subjects, but as universal victims, suffering from processes beyond their control.”¹⁷¹ Wicker’s boat metaphor conceals the uneven spatial distribution of climate risks by depicting everyone as equally impacted. Activists depict space as abstract and expansive, in one sense, as the climate crisis will affect everyone, but on the other hand, they restrict it to the condensed space of a boat. Furthermore, a boat metaphor points to rising sea levels as the primary climate impact. The environment becomes a surface, a background for action.¹⁷² As Thunberg details, setting off irreversible chain reactions “will most likely lead to the end of our civilization as we know it.”¹⁷³ Here, earth is a backdrop of the events unfolding, and it does not bear the brunt of the risk. Humans are the ones threatened.¹⁷⁴ In the *emergency of the future*, humans are ultimately at risk and the cause of the risk. Earth remains an undifferentiated global space where these events unfold.

Joan Faber McAllister criticizes how, in recent literature on time and space relationships, “space is rendered passive (being), a realm of the ‘essential and static’ while time is portrayed as active (becoming), both ‘fecund and creative.’”¹⁷⁵ In many ways, this is what happens in the *emergency of the future* chronotope. Time gains intensity, relegating space to the background of human action. The lack of timely action causes catastrophic effects reverberating globally and

impacting everyone. At times, the activists acknowledge some spatial differences, like Benson who states, “Many of us are still lucky. Our lives are relatively secure.”¹⁷⁶ While Benson hints at the uneven spatial distribution of climate precarity, the common theme underlying the *emergency of the future* chronotope is that climate change will affect everyone, most importantly everyone’s children. Children’s future in many ways are depicted as abstract, irreplaceable space. Without proper action now, their future, humanity, and civilization are lost. Thus, in the *emergency of the future* chronotope, space functions as a background for action, expanding to include all of humanity, and yet limited to a condensed space of a boat to represent the predicament of the global community. Time exerts its force through space more than space exerts its force with and against time.

Affects-Emotions

The *emergency of the future* chronotope’s apocalyptic and reproductive futuristic temporality elicits fear and anger. Fear of a future climate catastrophe, as seen in the apocalyptic rhetoric literature, aims to mobilize preventative action.¹⁷⁷ In this view, fear is “associated with the effects of climate change and the slowness or absence of action against climate change”¹⁷⁸; however, scholars Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren warn catastrophic futures are too abstract.¹⁷⁹ They view fear as a “trigger” for mobilization when combined with and mitigated by anger.¹⁸⁰ F4F’s rhetoric is imbued with this interrelation of fear and anger, as activists condemn adults for failing to take climate action:

We are striking because we are frightened. And we are striking because we are angry. Normally, adults mind their children. Normally, adults make sure their children don’t do anything stupid. Normally, adults help their children avoid putting their futures at risk. Unfortunately, the adults today are doing the exact opposite.¹⁸¹

Here, Cullen-Mouze blames adults for their failure to protect children and provide them with a future. These activists attribute responsibility for the current state of climate inaction to adults,¹⁸²

transforming “potentially demobilizing fear into mobilizing anger.”¹⁸³ Benson accuses, “You have known for decades that climate change would threaten human life. You know you sacrifice our future every day you fail to take real action.”¹⁸⁴ In this view, adults bear the brunt of the ethical responsibility for climate change. Through their false promises, adults interrupted the lives of children, forcing them to strike to demand climate action instead of prepare for their future. The *emergency of the future* chronotope channels fear by expressing anger in relation to the ways in which adults have failed to protect children’s futures.

Through the cultivation of anger and articulation of apocalyptic time, activists reject the image of young people as hopeful, disrupting the reproductive futuristic view of children as symbols of a hopeful tomorrow.¹⁸⁵ Neubauer explains, “in these kind of TED Talks, I would now say how it’s overly hopeful, how we young people are going to get this sorted [...] Usually. But this is not how this works. This is not how this crisis works.”¹⁸⁶ These activists reflect adults’ failures, transforming the symbolic force of children in reproductive futurism from hope to guilt. This reflects Kleres’s and Wettergren’s understanding: “Activism often requires a conscious reorientation from a dominant emotional regime through a collective emotion management process that fosters alternative feeling rules.”¹⁸⁷ In the *emergency of the future*, adults’ temporal-emotional regimes have failed, and these youth offer the combination of anger and fear as an alternative. The activists use their symbol as adults’ failures to guilt adults into action. As Thunberg describes, “you all come to us young people for hope! How dare you. You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words.”¹⁸⁸ Celeste Condit details angry rhetoric functions by rebuking the actions of those deemed responsible with the aim of restoring normative actions.¹⁸⁹ In the *emergency of the future* chronotope, anger manages fear and disrupts reproductive futurism while guiltning adults for failing to comply with reproductive futuristic

norms. This guilt aims to encourage adults to protect children, which reinforces reproductive futurism as it also disrupts it.

The *emergency of the future* chronotope generates a conflicting sense of affects-emotions. On the one hand, there is still hope in that, as Thunberg says, “there is still time to turn everything around we can still fix this, we still have everything in our own hands.”¹⁹⁰ Hope shifts from these youth to time and is cultivated through the time left to act.¹⁹¹ On the other hand, anger does the majority of the work as adults have failed children and put their futures in a precarious position. Thunberg criticizes, “You are failing us. But the young people are starting to understand your betrayal. The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you.”¹⁹² Here, adults must restore their sense of dignity in the eyes of young people by backing up their words with action. Condit argues shared anger “co-orient[s] peoples and tends to direct their actions and resources along particular paths.”¹⁹³ These activists use anger and guilt to orient adults towards climate action. Thus, the *emergency of the future* chronotope nurtures hope in our time to change course but gains force through its arousal of anger at adults for their failure to address the crisis. Undercutting all of this is the apocalyptic fear preventative action will not be taken, leading these children to an even more precarious and potentially nonexistent future.

Possibilities for Action

The intensity of time in the *emergency of the future* chronotope leads to limited and conflicting possibilities for climate action. The *emergency of the future* prescribes human agency to change course, as events are controlled by human action; but the varying forces contributing to the problem (such as developed countries’ carbon emissions) are erased as humans, and more specifically, adults are blamed for perpetuating the problem. Actions are

limited to two main choices: Change everything about society and survive or continue as is and lead to the destruction of humanity.¹⁹⁴ Thunberg declares, “The main solution however is so simple that even a small child can understand it. We have to stop the emissions of greenhouse gases. And either we do that or we don’t.”¹⁹⁵ This either-or scenario oversimplifies the range of possible actions and fails to consider international power imbalances. Neubauer expresses the need for a radical transformation of society:

The world would have to see changes which we have never experienced before. We’d have to fully decarbonize our economies by 2050 and transform the distribution of powers that is currently allowing those fossil fuel giants and political leaders to stay on top of the game. We are talking of nothing less than the greatest transformation since the Industrial Revolution.¹⁹⁶

Here, in Neubauer’s emphasis on transformation, climate solutions are focused on reducing carbon emissions and the way this transformation could happen is vaguely outlined. These activists present these solutions in such a straightforward way, oversimplifying the complexity of instituting climate policy. Possibilities for action are either vague, in the sense of transforming society, or overgeneralized in the sense of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. What remains to be investigated are the ways in which power structures inhibit a restructuring of society in the way Neubauer calls for.

F4F activists express the need for adults to reduce carbon emissions by listening to science and imagining a better world for their children.¹⁹⁷ The action lies in the hands of adults, and more specifically at times, the United Nations. Benson expresses, “You as the United Nations hold the power to save humanity from itself.”¹⁹⁸ Those in power must transform society by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and decarbonizing the economy; however, those without power must continue to exert pressure on those who do. Benson declares, “We will strike again and again increasing our numbers until you change the course of humanity.”¹⁹⁹ The field for

climate action under the *emergency of the future* chronotope is as follows: adults must decarbonize the economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions while children continue to exert pressure on those with the power to take action. While this gives youth activists a role within the fight for climate action, the agency for real change lies with those in power, meaning activists must continue to appeal to these persons to provoke change. In other words, these youth are still functioning as a moral imperative to act, even though they have more agency than traditionally afforded by reproductive futurism. Through its focus on protecting these youth, the chronotope erases the underlying causes of the crisis, unequal distribution of climate risk, and differences in countries' carbon emissions, limiting meaningful engagement with the problem.

These possibilities for climate action are further limited by one key underlying weakness of the *emergency of the future* chronotope similar to apocalyptic rhetoric more broadly. To make the crisis of the future a problem for the present, the future is cast as inevitable without action.

The problem goes as follows:

If one is to prevent a catastrophe, one needs to believe in its possibility before it occurs. If, on the other hand, one succeeds in preventing it, its non-realization maintains it in the realm of the impossible, and as a result, the prevention efforts will appear useless in retrospect.²⁰⁰

This perspective suggests we have to believe something will happen to act, but if we prevent it, the event will never happen undermining our efforts.²⁰¹ Climate activism often remains stuck on convincing people a future catastrophe is inevitable without climate action. Instead of going into detail about the actions required and what limits those actions, the onus is on increasing the urgency for action. In this perspective, more certainty about the future is equated with increased urgency to act.

For the *emergency of the future*, acting now requires an “anticipatory governance,”²⁰² where we make policy decisions to prevent a certain future.²⁰³ These activists cannot even maintain that mindset. Thunberg notes:

The year 2078 I will celebrate my 75th birthday. If I have children, maybe they will spend that day with me. Maybe they will ask me about you. Maybe they will ask why you didn't do anything while there still was time to act.²⁰⁴

Here, Thunberg discusses a future as if it will still happen regardless of climate action. This makes the climate change catastrophe feel less likely to cause the civilization collapse she claims it will. Climate catastrophe discourses assume we need to be certain about the future to act. Convincing people of its inevitability takes attention away from what actions are required and what transformational change would and should actually look like. Furthermore, while blaming adults helps activists refuse a heteronormative sense of time, it also leaves space for such a future to exist should adults take action, which reifies the reproductive regime altogether.

The *emergency of the future* chronotope becomes hard to maintain rhetorically and limits possibilities for action in three main ways: it provides too wide a range for action to take place, giving us until 2030 or even 2050 for when certain actions need to occur; it globalizes and homogenizes spaces of impact which erases important spatial considerations of climate effects; and it fixates on convincing us action is required rather than detailing what actions would be preferable. Furthermore, Edelman warns calls to save our children's futures appear apolitical by seeming to suggest there is only one side (who would be against saving our children?). Such appeals uphold a universal fantasy that “coercively shapes the structures within which the ‘political’ itself can be thought.”²⁰⁵ Our social reality depends upon such an image in order to reproduce the social into the future.²⁰⁶ Any kind of environmental ethics rooted in the notion of

familial obligation is founded on heteronormative assumptions and values and diminishes the transformational possibilities for climate action.

Emergency of the Present

Unlike the *emergency of the future* chronotope, the *emergency of the present* views the present moment as a moment of crisis. This chronotope confines “the temporal dimensions of a rhetorical situation to the present and immediate future, but expands the spatial dimensions to a global level.”²⁰⁷ The present is a “politics of crisis”²⁰⁸ leaving “no time for either analysis, forecasting, or prevention.”²⁰⁹ As time dwindles, acting becomes reacting. In this chronotope, the future disappears from view while the present represents a kairotic or critical moment requiring immediate attention.²¹⁰ The *emergency of the present* chronotope overlaps with the time-space compression chronotope, in which the future gives way to an ever extended present.²¹¹ Scholars Jodie Nicotra and Judith Totman Parrish describe how in “an age of social and technological acceleration, what the future holds becomes less and less certain.”²¹² This uncertainty leads to “the reduction of the present”²¹³ and “decisions that are made hastily and with little reflection.”²¹⁴ They argue the deployment of time-space compression undermines democracy through its emphasis on speed and acceleration.²¹⁵ While these insights are important, McAllister argues the time-space compression chronotope is based off of a “Newtonian model of physics” and “a binary modernist and masculinist logic” that renders “time and space as distinct and oppositional categories in ways that flatten, denigrate, and depoliticize the latter.”²¹⁶ McAllister abandons this for a more fluid understanding of the relationship between time and space.²¹⁷ Thus, I use the phrase *emergency of the present* to better encompass the way time and space work together to accelerate and expand climate impacts in F4F’s rhetoric. Time and space gain intensity, organizing affects-emotions through increased urgency. The chronotope’s

temporal and spatial intensity works to overcome the temporal and spatial distance of climate change by disrupting future-oriented understandings of the issue.²¹⁸

Time and Space

Time for the *emergency of the present* chronotope is immediate and accelerated. The present moment interrupts linear time. We see this when F4F activist, Wicker, says, “We are in a climate emergency. Despite countless alerts from the scientific community, institutions around the world are not recognizing this emergency and are not acting accordingly.”²¹⁹ Using the term emergency shifts the future tense of climate change to a present tense. Similarly, Thunberg declares, “Our house is on fire, I am here to say our house is on fire!”²²⁰ Here, the phrase “our house is on fire” is a spatial and temporal metaphor for the climate emergency happening now. In this view, we no longer have time to avert the catastrophe. As Nakabuye asks, “Why are we acting as if we still have time?”²²¹ The *emergency of the present* chronotope shifts the tense and spatiality of climate change to the present. Time is constricted to an immediate now, as the future disappears from view.

These activists emphasize extinction to heighten the urgency for taking action now, bringing the past into focus. Thunberg warns, “We are in the midst of the sixth mass extinction and the extinction rate is up to ten thousand times faster than what is considered normal, with up to 200 species becoming extinct every single day.”²²² Extinction represents this acceleration of the climate crisis because it is temporally and spatially irreversible.²²³ Prevention offers time. Extinction indicates no time. As Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker discuss, “The very force of extinction, thus, is its finality: we cannot go back in time to undo the loss of plant and animal populations.”²²⁴ In F4F, extinction ties the past to the present. The past marks the time for when action should have taken place. Greg Garrard explains how in Anthropocene

discourse, “The present is thus both tragically belated and perennially balanced on the cusp of disaster.”²²⁵ Climate change becomes “a predicament we must face rather than a problem we can solve.”²²⁶ In this perspective, action simultaneously should have already occurred and is desperately needed now. The immediacy of the present moment morphs action into reaction.

In this chronotope, climate change is already causing current suffering, shifting the moral imperative to act. As Nakabuye says, “I am lucky that I am still surviving. I will not take this for granted because people are dying every day.”²²⁷ Where the *emergency of the future* derives its moral force from children’s futures threatened by climate change, the *emergency of the present* fixates on current suffering as means to motivate action now. Delf Roethe explains how suffering in climate rhetoric “is taken as a sign that urgent intervention is required to save Planet Earth.”²²⁸ In all of these more urgent warnings, the *emergency of the present* chronotope overcomes the temporal distance of climate change (often thought to be a future problem) by emphasizing its present impacts. Through accelerating time via the language of irreparability and collective suffering, the chronotope increases the urgency for immediate action. As the future disappears from view, the past gains meaning as the time for when action should have taken place. The *emergency of the present* depicts the window for preventative policy action as already past, limiting our available resources to respond.

Space in the *emergency of the present* chronotope simultaneously contracts and expands as impacts felt in one region are globalized but condensed to a domestic setting.²²⁹ Thunberg’s metaphor of a house falling apart places us all under the same roof. What happens in the Amazon Rainforest or California has consequences for us all. Thunberg details:

If our house was falling apart our leaders wouldn’t go on like you do today. You would change almost every part of your behavior. As you do in an emergency [...] If the walls of our house truly came tumbling down, surely you would set your differences aside and

start cooperating. Well, our house is falling apart. And we are rapidly running out of time.²³⁰

By using this metaphor of the house on fire, Thunberg collapses the spatial distance between the Amazon Rainforest where forests burn and the rest of the world. This move erases spatial differences, specifically how some regions get to live in relative comfort while others face climate precarity. Earth appears as an enclosed domestic space threatened by flames. Forest fires are taken as the dominant sign of climate change, disregarding other impacts.

In this chronotope, space is irreplaceable. If earth, as our collective house, burns to the ground, we have nowhere else to go; yet, there is still a symbolic separation between us and our “house,” suggesting a false separation between us and the climate.²³¹ In other words, the climate appears as an external, threatening force. Swyngedouw argues, “A third characteristic of environmental apocalyptic thought is that it reinforces the nature–society dichotomy and the causal power of nature to derail civilizations.”²³² The house on fire metaphor makes it unclear what caused the flames. Climate change appears as a force of its own volition. While the phrase does work to create a sense of global urgency, it does so at the sake of causality and attention to the uneven spatial impacts of climate change. Nakabuye evokes a similar house metaphor when she says, “for those of you that didn’t stand up, your beds might be comfortable now but not for long. You will soon feel the same heat we feel every day.”²³³ This statement does imply spatial differences, but it also collapses global space into a domestic sphere where we all must band together to keep our house from burning to the ground. Moreover, it draws the proximity even closer from the house to one’s bed. Such proximity aims to overcome the spatial distance of climate change but only through homogenizing and constricting global space.

While the house metaphor homogenizes spatial impacts, activists also spotlight local places to dramatize climate change as a present threat. Nakabuye details:

After the massive effects of climate change in my home village — the heavy strong rains that washed away our crops and left the land bare, the constant dry spells that left the streams and wells dry — my parents had to sell off our land and livestock to sustain our lives. And when the money was over, it was a question of survival or death.²³⁴

Here, current climate impacts are centered to reaffirm the present nature of the crisis. Similarly, Cullen-Mouze describes, “Our offshore community of Care Island population 150 is already experiencing the effects of the climate catastrophe in a very real and frightening way. Winter storms are wilder, summer droughts are longer, extreme flooding is more and more frequent.”²³⁵ In these two speeches, space takes on localized meanings, as certain areas already face the brunt of the impacts. These localized spaces contrast with the homogenous globalized space and raise considerations of the uneven spatial distribution of climate risks. Nakabuye argues, “extreme weather events are killing people in my country. I’m very disturbed that western media is silent on the climate emergency happening in Uganda and the whole of East African region.”²³⁶ Nakabuye criticizes the way spatial differences are erased within climate discourse. Yet, while she and Cullen-Mouze acknowledge the particularities of space and how climate change impacts their communities, these acknowledgements are subsumed within a homogenous view of climate change as a universal threat.

Space also works rhetorically to mark how climate change has interrupted the lives of these activists. Where the *emergency of the future* draws on reproductive futurism to arouse concern for children’s futures, the *emergency of the present* spatializes climate disruptions to these youth’s educational pursuits to further dramatize the present impacts of climate change. Nakabuye states, “I am missing my classes right now, the same way I have missed them for the last six weeks to create climate awareness. It’s not the first-time climate change has kept me out of school.”²³⁷ Here, Nakabuye details how climate change has forced her out of school, a “safe” space. Similarly, Thunberg declares, “This is all wrong. I shouldn’t be up here. I should be back

in school on the other side of the ocean.”²³⁸ Thunberg uses a present perfect tense, which compares her current present with what her present should be. School represents a safe space that has been interrupted by the need for climate action. Kverndokk describes how life-scripts reflect “a naturalized and scripted expectation of a safe and happy childhood and a successful adolescence.”²³⁹ These activists invoke this life-script in describing the present they should have but are unable to because of climate change. Cullen-Mouze explains, “Alarmed by the increasing evidence all around me, I have become a climate activist and a school striker. Not because I want to, but because I have no option but to be one.”²⁴⁰ The climate crisis as a present threat has forced children into the streets, an “unsafe” place. In this way, the *emergency of the present* chronotope in F4F creates spatial proximity to climate impacts through the interruption of spatial norms for children. Children must navigate “unsafe” and globalized spaces (the streets) because climate change has disrupted the spaces to which they belong.²⁴¹ Time and space take different forms and perform different functions in the *emergency of the present* chronotope. Time operates through immediacy and acceleration, depicting the present as a moment of reaction. Global space is constricted to domestic space and further illustrates the urgency of the climate crisis through localized impacts and spatial disruptions. Together, the two invalidate the future-oriented temporality of the *emergency of the future* by signifying climate change as an immediate threat.

Affects-Emotions

The *emergency of the present* chronotope’s temporal and spatial intensity induces panic, anger, and guilt. Thunberg says:

I want you to panic, I want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to act, I want you to act as if you would in a crisis. I want you to act as if the house was on fire, because it is.²⁴²

Panic indicates a more immediate and reactive form of fear and “produces a paralyzing sense of imminent peril.”²⁴³ Byron Williston explains, “Panic involves a (usually) short-lived but often dramatic temporal constriction: our attention is riveted on the present in order to resolve a perceived crisis.”²⁴⁴ The *emergency of the present* chronotope cultivates panic as our house burns to the ground. Instead of depicting an abstract future at risk, the chronotope derives from what Kleres and Wettergren describe as “an experience of climate change as an already manifest reality with devastating consequences.”²⁴⁵ This chronotope counters apocalyptic framings with a post-apocalyptic affective-emotional orientation founded upon immediate fear; yet, while panic may provide urgency for action, acting in panic does not ensure the changes made will last and build a more ecologically sound society.²⁴⁶ The *emergency of the present* chronotope does not give us time to make those considerations. Thunberg insists, “Adults keep saying we owe it to the young people to give them hope. But I don’t want your hope, I don’t want you to be hopeful.”²⁴⁷ Using the language of panic, Thunberg rejects hope as now is a moment of survival. In this perspective, we must leave the house or try to stop it from burning to the ground, but we can no longer prevent the flames. If we cannot prevent the fire, then climate action becomes reaction, which vastly limits our ability to respond deliberatively to the crisis.

Accompanying this panic is also anger for the lack of climate action. Cullen-Mouze criticizes adults for wasting time negotiating. He espouses:

For thirty years, you and people like you have sat around tables and talked and talked and talked. You have promised much, and you have delivered very little. The adults sit around and debate what to do while the house burns.²⁴⁸

Here, the potentially paralyzing effect of panic is managed by the guilt ascribed to adults for their failure to act.²⁴⁹ If paternalism is “the belief that children are immature and incapable of the sort of rational deliberation and decision-making that democratic self-governance requires,”²⁵⁰

these activists flip this understanding, positioning adults as the ones incapable of making rational decisions and taking action. Nakabuye argues, “For how long will you keep negotiating. You’ve been negotiating for the last 25 years. Even before I was born. Do you want the whole Africa to first perish before you start acting?”²⁵¹ Here, climate inaction is the direct result of adults over negotiating and focusing too much on the economic outcome of action. Thunberg similarly criticizes, “We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!”²⁵² By failing to consider the magnitude of the problem and by continuing to act in the same mindset that caused the problem, the adults are blamed for limiting collective action. The ethical responsibility falls again on the adults who have made a precarious situation for children and those who are already losing their lives to the climate crisis. In this way, the *emergency of the present* chronotope generates panic, anger, and guilt to enhance the affective-emotional pull for adults to act immediately.

Possibilities for Action

Like the *emergency of the future* chronotope, the *emergency of the present* attributes the current crisis to human actions, but the immediacy of the crisis limits the range of possible solutions. Urgency gains more force than anything else. The actual actions required are uncertain. With the *emergency of the present* chronotope, the right time for action has already passed.²⁵³ The present is not so much a moment of decision but rather a moment of survival.²⁵⁴ If *kairos* represents “an opportune moment for interrupting an interruption,”²⁵⁵ then the opportune moment can be assumed to have been before the house caught fire. Unlike the *emergency of the future*’s deadline of 2030, the *emergency of the present* has no deadline because there is no time to wait. In this perspective, people are already dying, and so we must act now to save what we can.

The *emergency of the present* justifies extreme measures and undermines democracy by allowing for, what Roger Stahl articulates as “an emergency intervention by those with supposed expertise.”²⁵⁶ This construction of urgency, he continues, leads to “the destruction of the rule of law. Here, at the temporal zero point, there are no rights, only utility; no deliberation, only authority; and no time, only real time.”²⁵⁷ By emphasizing the need to panic, the *emergency of the present* allows for immediate solutions disengaged from the long-term. Peter Skilling contends accelerated time, “makes a preferred response appear urgently necessary, thus marginalizing dissent and debate.”²⁵⁸ In this chronotope, instead of trying to build a better world, one must merely react to save what one has left. This leaves little time for critiquing the structures that enabled the climate crisis in the first place and diminishes democratic deliberation and action.

If we truly are in a climate emergency and our house is burning, then what does that mean for humanity? Can we put out the flames by diminishing our carbon emissions? Are we too late? Jerome Bindé explains, “If tomorrow is always too late, then today is often already very late.”²⁵⁹ While this may be true, rhetorically the *emergency of the present* risks depicting the present moment as too late for action. Claire Colebrook adds the unpredictability of the present validates a quick response and, yet, “on the other hand, the complexity of the present (but by way of slightly different reasoning) seems to offer the opposite of an imperative for immediate action.”²⁶⁰ In her view, urgency can reduce our engagement with complexity. By vastly narrowing the range of action, the *emergency of the present* risks creating a sense of paralysis. Thunberg argues, “Everyone and everything has to change so why waste precious time arguing about what and who needs to change first? Everyone and everything have to change.”²⁶¹ What does this mean? Change how? If the climate crisis is already upon us, what can we do but merely

react now? To act requires knowing what possibilities one has to act.²⁶² When acting becomes reacting, however, the possibilities for action diminish, and there is no longer time to create the meaningful action that would lead to better socio-ecological relationships.

Nicotra and Parrish recognize the significance of any climate action given the years of climate inaction. They warn, however, these “dromocratic tactics” impact “not only the public reaction to the media’s framing of climate change, but also how the problem of global climate change is framed and studied.”²⁶³ The language of panic undergirding new pronouncements of the climate crisis diminishes long-term thinking in both public and scientific spheres. The scholars express further concern with how these pronouncements imply “serious cuts of greenhouse gas emissions and use of fossil fuels literally should have begun years before” further arousing “a sense of panic about the shortness of time and the urgent need to get something—anything—done now.”²⁶⁴ Thus, in its temporal and spatial intensity, the *emergency of the present* raises several concerns: First, it creates an affective-emotional sense of panic and perpetual anger at “negotiations,” viewing deliberation as an obstacle to action. This could have problematic implications for how climate policy is implemented. Second, it undermines the time available for action limiting the possibilities for action. Third, while it localizes impacts prompting some consideration of the uneven spatiality of climate effects, it also constricts space to a domestic setting reaffirming the global nature of the crisis. All of these facets of the chronotope limit our ability to meaningfully respond; however, the intensity of time and space disrupts apocalyptic temporal frameworks and do highlight present climate impacts currently erased by apocalyptic imaginaries. By shifting away from future-oriented temporal frameworks in climate rhetoric, the chronotope overcomes the temporal and spatial distance often found in climate discourse.

Competing Chronotopes

The *emergency of the present* and *emergency of the future* chronotopes create a fractured narrative within these speeches. These activists depict action taken now as simultaneously too late, as our house is already on fire, and potentially too soon, as we still have 12 years to act before facing impacts.²⁶⁵ In the *emergency of the future*, space functions homogenously, globalizing impacts. The *emergency of the present* draws attention to heterogenous local impacts and spatial disturbances but similarly reinforces a global view of the crisis. The chronotopes cultivate similar affects-emotions, with the temporality of each changing how these affects-emotions are expressed. For example, fear in the *emergency of the future* transforms into panic in the *emergency of the present*. Both chronotopes aim to heighten the urgency for action; however, their interaction within these texts results in contradictions. The temporal distance of the *emergency of the future* weakens the temporal and spatial urgency of the *emergency of the present*. Similarly, the *emergency of the present*'s acceleration and panic diminishes the hope of time left to act in the *emergency of the future*. Thunberg says, "Our house is on fire, I am here to say our house is on fire. According to the IPCC we are less than 12 years away from not being able to undo our mistakes."²⁶⁶ Here, we are simultaneously in the midst of a crisis and have 12 years left to make changes. This creates a fractured sense of space and time. Is climate change an immediate threat? Is it a distant threat? Do we have to act now? Do we have to act before 2030? When is the right time for action? Where is the right place for action? Wicker warns, "When I say 10 years, don't think that we can wait another 9 then start to see what to do. We must start now. In this very moment. Now. What are you waiting for?"²⁶⁷ The question becomes, why now? The *emergency of the present* chronotope answers because the crisis is already upon us,

whereas the *emergency of the future* indicates we must act before it is too late. These answers create a disjointed sense of when action is actually required and to what extent.

Together, these conflicting perspectives reveal the struggle to temporalize climate change in climate rhetoric. These activists are caught between a need for urgency and the need for time left to act. What results is a crisis simultaneously preventable and unavoidable.²⁶⁸ Sarah Amsler argues, we need not assume urgent problems should be framed in ways that limit their urgency, “nor must we conclude that their urgency means theorizing them cannot also be a kind of political action, or that people must experience them as a crisis in order to engage.”²⁶⁹ For Amsler, urgency does not have to mean a shutting down of deliberation and critique. In these chronotopes, however, the need for urgency and time to act combined create a conflicting temporal understanding of climate impacts and fetishize action over reflection and complexity. While both chronotopes aim to encourage action, they shut down the possibilities for action by impeding the “reflection, analysis and imagination that can emerge.”²⁷⁰ Climate change induces uncertainty about the present and future, but these chronotopes transform our uncertain present and possible futures into certain catastrophic impacts. Instead of the two temporal perspectives being knotted together through temporal complexity, the nuance of climate change temporally is erased in favor of contradictory temporal perspectives.

The question both chronotopes raise, is what and who are running out of time? Skrimshire raises the questions, “What are we actually trying to save? Our own lives? The life of our species; biota; habitat, our current population level and way of life?”²⁷¹ For the *emergency of the future*, children are losing their futures, whereas the *emergency of the present* depicts us all as running out of time due to our house burning to the ground. These differing perspectives create even more contradictions because the *emergency of the present* suggests we do not even have a

future left to save. In trying to overcome the temporal distance of climate change in two disparate ways, F4F activists lessen the force of both senses of time. The assumption animating these chronotopes is people need to feel urgency to act; yet, the intensity of time actually diminishes the force of the other entailments of the chronotope and our possibilities for action.

Amsler suggests “it is now an underestimation to say we are running out of time. For such crucial issues as climate change, deforestation and loss of biodiversity, we ran out of time quite a while ago.”²⁷² In giving us time to act, both temporal perspectives fail to consider whether for some the possibility for action has already passed. Marlia Banning says the question underlying climate change is “whether or not it constitutes a real threat and, if it does, what the exigency and nature of the threat are, in human time.”²⁷³ The temporal tension in F4F suggests an ongoing struggle to determine the temporality of climate change and how time should be construed to mobilize action. Nicotra and Parrish discuss the importance of recognizing how dominant chronotopes conceal others that would provide a different temporal and spatial perspective. They particularly are interested in “deep time” and the way such a perspective is foreclosed by focusing on more immediate temporal chronotopic frameworks.²⁷⁴ In their focus on when we should act, these chronotopes fixate around convincing people action is necessary rather than focusing on what actions are going to create lasting changes. The complexities of designing climate policy disappear as solutions are presented in an oversimplified, matter of fact way. As we continue to consider the force of climate change, we must pay more attention to the way the focus on urgency limits our ability to respond. Such confusing temporal perspectives shift us away from the critical resources needed to foster truly transformative action. Our struggle to temporalize climate change exposes our ongoing ties to urgency as a necessary

prerequisite to climate action. Such urgency needs to be fully interrogated for the way it can foreclose action rather than enable it.

CHAPTER THREE:

RESILIENCE OR VULNERABILITY? ON THE FRONTLINE OF CLIMATE SOLUTIONS

More recently, the United Nations has emphasized the impact climate change has on Indigenous communities. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs affirm climate change poses a direct threat “to indigenous peoples’ very existence” and that “combined with various legal and institutional barriers, which affect their ability to cope with and adapt to climate change, makes climate change an issue of human rights and inequality to indigenous peoples.”²⁷⁵ Despite this recognition and projects²⁷⁶ designed to increase their participation, Indigenous communities continue to be marginalized in international discussions about climate solutions.²⁷⁷ Climate change conferences and negotiations have become an important avenue for Indigenous Peoples to advocate for and assert the sovereignty of their communities.²⁷⁸ Dev Kumar Sunuwar explains, “an estimated 370 million Indigenous Peoples” live in the world and belong to “5,000 different groups, in the 90 countries worldwide.”²⁷⁹ Ben Powless clarifies, “Despite their considerable diversity, Indigenous Peoples share a history of oppression and dispossession that constitutes the basis for collective mobilization beyond the confines of traditional political systems or official state borders.”²⁸⁰ Representatives from these different communities come together in global summits, participate in yearly climate change conferences, and offer their traditional knowledge and climate mitigation strategies in exchange for continued recognition and further extension of Indigenous Peoples’²⁸¹ rights, especially in developing climate solutions. The UN has become the primary site for debating and negotiating climate action, and Indigenous Peoples have become an important part of the international advocacy for

climate justice.²⁸² Indigenous Peoples' struggle for respect and support from the UN provides insight on differing chronotopic orientations for climate justice and the clash between them.

In their participation with the UN, Indigenous activists draw attention to the vulnerability Indigenous Peoples presently face on the "frontline" of climate change and their ecological resilience and adaptation throughout colonial history. This chapter's analysis traces the tension between vulnerability and resilience through the *emergency of the present* and *slow emergency* chronotope. The frontline metaphor spatializes vulnerability in ways that reaffirm climate change as both a local and global threat, whereas the *slow emergency's* temporal and spatial intensity subvert progress narratives by asserting Indigenous adaptation as a vital resource for addressing the changing climate. Examining these two chronotopes and their contradictions reveals the tension in climate discourse between when action is needed and how that action is taken, an important consideration for the climate justice movement. The clash between these two chronotopes further reveals how Indigenous communities work with and against dominant understandings of climate change to enhance international recognition and support for their communities.

To better understand the tension between these chronotopes and how both increase and limit the possibilities for climate action, this chapter analyzes a variety of texts²⁸³ Indigenous Peoples have produced within the United Nations climate conversations. First, I trace the *emergency of the present* chronotope and how its frontline metaphor's spatial intensity configures time and affects-emotions through the lens of vulnerability. Then, I explore what I term the *slow emergency* chronotope and how it subverts dominant temporal frameworks through a temporal and spatial intensity grounded in Indigenous adaptation and resilience. Finally, I end

by discussing the tensions that emerge from the interaction between these two chronotopes and what those tensions reveal about our ongoing struggle to improve climate action.

Emergency of the Present

As previously discussed with Fridays for Future, the *emergency of the present* chronotope views the present moment as a moment of crisis. This chronotope confines “the temporal dimensions of a rhetorical situation to the present and immediate future.”²⁸⁴ However, Indigenous activists’ climate rhetoric foregrounds space as the organizing force of time and affects-emotions. Specifically, their rhetoric evokes the frontline metaphor to highlight the vulnerability of Indigenous communities to climate change.²⁸⁵ Melanie Boyd and Ozouf Senamin Amedegnato describe, “Though its application has expanded over time, front line is a term unquestionably rooted in warfare—both historically and contemporarily.”²⁸⁶ The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the term as “an area where soldiers are fighting,” “an area of potential or actual conflict or struggle,” or “the most important and active position in a job or field of activity.”²⁸⁷ As a war metaphor, the frontline symbolizes the area closest to the enemy and, therefore, the area most vulnerable. Where there is vulnerability, there is also strength and courage. Thus, the frontline is a spatial metaphor for both vulnerability but it also signifies bravery. Indigenous Peoples use the frontline metaphor to position themselves as strong victims ready to fight the threat.

Michael Bravo discusses how crisis narratives often generalize an entire region or the world as being threatened by a phenomenon, which can obscure spatial differences.²⁸⁸ In Indigenous climate rhetoric, however, the *emergency of the present* chronotope amplifies vulnerability of location to “both personalize and personify climate change impacts.”²⁸⁹ This vulnerability highlights spatial differences while still upholding a view of climate change as a

universal threat. Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus contend vulnerability discourses motivate the international community to care about climate change while they also direct attention away from causes of the crisis²⁹⁰; however, Indigenous activists appropriate vulnerability discourses as “a strategy which captures the seriousness of climate risks, and draws attention to the need for international responses.”²⁹¹ In other words, Indigenous activists describe their vulnerability through the frontline metaphor as a means to advocate for their communities, while the international community uses it as motivation for global action.²⁹² In my analysis, I trace this tension through the ways the chronotope configures time and affects-emotions via the spatial metaphor of the frontline to dramatize Indigenous Peoples’ vulnerability to climate change.

Space

Indigenous activists define vulnerability with a spatial openness and fluidity, but typically their definitions have two primary components: a proximity to climate impacts and a culture dependent on natural resources and ecosystems.²⁹³ Métis activist Dawn Pritchard argues Indigenous Peoples feel the first effects of climate change, and “Water levels rising in the Pacific, ice melting in the Arctic, and forest fires and floods displacing people are but some examples.”²⁹⁴ The Pacific and the Arctic invoke concrete regional locations, whereas forest fires and floods are unspecific and broad. Many areas face these impacts. This ambiguity allows for the flexibility in understanding where these effects occur. The frontline designates any community deemed in close proximity to more severe climate impacts. It can be, as Indigenous activist Peter articulates, a proximity to the ocean,²⁹⁵ or it can represent areas of extreme heat like Indigenous activist Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim’s Lake Chad.²⁹⁶ Like soldiers, Indigenous Peoples’ spatial proximity to the enemy amplifies their vulnerability. Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, Civil Society

Representative from the Marshall Islands, describes her experience coming home from a day of teaching to see debris, coral, and rock littered everywhere:

The level of debris and how far they were from the shoreline demonstrated the power of the waves. There was a quiet, hushed energy in the air, as if each of us were holding our breaths – reminded once again, of just how vulnerable we were.²⁹⁷

As this example illustrates, the frontline metaphor designates spaces as vulnerable places through their proximity to more severe climate impacts. The fluidity and openness of these definitions allows for activists themselves to demarcate their communities' vulnerability. Annette Watson and Orville Huntington describe how Indigenous Peoples take on the role as a “canary in the coal mine,” providing a “human dimension to scientists' calculation of ‘impacts’ from climate change.”²⁹⁸ The frontline's emphasis on vulnerability becomes a warning to the rest of the world about the devastating impact climate change will have should it not be addressed.

Utilizing the *emergency of the present* chronotope, Indigenous activists also define vulnerability as cultures dependent on natural resources and ecosystems. Andrea Muehlebach argues all Indigenous politics are also a politics of land, as land “is infused with culture, and vice versa.”²⁹⁹ President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway highlights that connection in their description of how climate change threatens “The Sámi way of life”³⁰⁰:

Many aspects of indigenous people's cultures in the Arctic are dependent on snow and ice. If they disappear, we will find it extremely difficult to maintain our cultures. Climate change makes our areas more accessible for extractive industries and more vulnerable for pollution.³⁰¹

In this example, vulnerability to climate change manifests due to these communities' dependence on natural resources. Indigenous Peoples' proximity both to climate change impacts and their environment makes them more vulnerable to other external threats. Indigenous activist Ibrahim, in a speech at the United Nations Paris Agreement Signing, further explains, “For us, the nature is our supermarket, where we can collect our food, our water. It's our pharmacy where we can

collect our medicinal plants.”³⁰² Here, ecosystems are imbued with cultural formations, and those cultures perceived to be less dependent on their environments are deemed less vulnerable.

Vulnerability arises from living and working on the land.³⁰³ What disappears from this perspective, however, is the way vulnerability is “produced and reproduced for different people and communities.”³⁰⁴ Bravo similarly argues, “the notion of vulnerability being a relationship of dependence on a particular climate risk is a gross oversimplification, and may fail to speak to the world’s most pressing political questions of inequality.”³⁰⁵ Both Bravo and Walker raise concerns about positioning vulnerability in a way that conceals social inequalities. Chris Cuomo similarly insists that understanding vulnerability “only in terms of susceptibility to harms focuses attention on the supposed weaknesses or limitations of those who are in harm’s way, but says little about whether injustices or other harms have put them in such precarious positions.”³⁰⁶ Thus, in the *emergency of the present* chronotope, the frontline spatial metaphor conceals not only the bravery and fortitude of Indigenous Peoples, but also the uneven distribution of risk. In war, marginalized and poor communities are most often placed on the frontline while socially and economically advantaged individuals live at a safe distance from the threat. Instead of drawing attention to those unequal spatial arrangements, these communities define their vulnerability through their proximity to climate change and dependence on their ecosystems, oversimplifying how their vulnerability to climate change manifests.

Typically, when a war metaphor is evoked, the war front becomes separate from the home front³⁰⁷; however, in the *emergency of the present* chronotope, climate change is a war fought on all fronts. The home front becomes the war front, and Indigenous communities are the first line of a human defense. Indigenous activists highlight spatial differences while also reminding their audiences that climate change is impacting everyone. As civil society

representative Jetnil-Kijiner says, “Climate change affects not only us islanders. It threatens the entire world.”³⁰⁸ Indigenous youth activist Xiuhtezcatl Martinez, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, similarly states, climate change “isn’t solely affecting the ice caps in the poles or the sea-level rise in our oceans. It is affecting us right here and right now, and it will only continue to get worse.”³⁰⁹ The *emergency of the present* (as seen in Fridays for Future) juxtaposes the local with the global. Indigenous activists spotlight the impacts of their communities and zoom out to remind everyone that this is a universal threat. The President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway warns, “The Arctic is getting warmer as I speak. Climatic change is taking place more than twice as fast in the Arctic as elsewhere in the world.”³¹⁰ Here, climate change is worse on the frontline but is still impacting everywhere else, meaning there is no home front or safe space from the war. Ruth Kaviok’s statement from COP24 describes how Indigenous Peoples “are not alone in facing relocation, loss of life and our communities.”³¹¹ In the climate war, all spaces become war spaces, with some spaces marked by war more than others. Mitchell Reyes and Kundai Chirindo argue, “The Anthropocene marks our collective vulnerability to conditions that could end our existence.”³¹² The frontline metaphor accentuates this collective vulnerability by balancing spatial differences with the global nature of the impacts. Indigenous Peoples become a resource for unifying the global community in taking climate action because they provide a glimpse at what awaits all of humanity if the climate continues to advance.³¹³ In that unity, however, these communal spaces become war spaces, erasing the heterogeneity of these communities geographically, politically, and socially. Indigenous Peoples are cast as brave yet vulnerable soldiers in the war of humanity against the climate.

In the frontline metaphor, climate change represents a threatening causal agent, as the underlying causes of climate change disappear from view. Activist Ibrahim details how her people “cannot walk to Lake Chad because it is vanishing. Our pasture, our livestock, our food, our land are vanishing [...] Climate change is adding poverty to poverty every day.”³¹⁴ Here, climate change is a force seeming to occur on its own volition that will continue to result in direct harms to these communities. Jetnil-Kijiner similarly describes, “Sea level rise, however, is exacerbating both our King Tides seasons as well as our seasons of high tides.”³¹⁵ She adds that a recent warning of high tides resulted in “swells and huge waves that engulfed seawalls, flooding and damaging homes and roads.”³¹⁶ As these examples illustrate, climate change impacts are the threatening forces to these communities. Like an adversary, climate change is unpredictable and that unpredictability amplifies these communities’ vulnerability. The root causes of the crisis disappear. Hartmann-Mahmud argues war metaphors proceed “as if the enemy is completely separate and distinct from our society.”³¹⁷ This separation becomes challenging to maintain when an issue is “impossible to separate from the society in question,” “has no distinct beginning or end,” and is “immune to narrowly defined, uni-dimensional ‘attacks.’”³¹⁸ The separation of humans from their common enemy posits that climate change emerges on its own, without any connection to our ways of living, and obscures how we all are immersed in the changing climate.³¹⁹ This move also oversimplifies the cause of these impacts.³²⁰ Anupama Ranawana and James Trafford argue, “Climate crises have been manufactured through, and are the material embodiment of, disregard for black and brown people’s lives.”³²¹ Depicting climate change as the causal agent erases the ways in which developed countries’ carbon emissions contributed to the changing climate and how colonial and capitalist racist formations have made these

communities more vulnerable to these changes. In the *emergency of the present* chronotope, these ethical and political concerns disappear as all are united against the common enemy.³²²

While at times heterogenous and fluid in its description of vulnerability, the metaphor of the frontline is homogenous in encapsulating all of Indigenous communities' as sharing a spatial vulnerability to the threats of climate change. This spatial vulnerability is the result of Indigenous communities' proximity and relationship to their environments rather than the complex interrelation of capitalism, colonialism, and international policies.³²³ The frontline metaphor situates Indigenous communities as outside of and against the climate."³²⁴ Such a false separation makes it seem as though we can escape and distance ourselves from its impacts. Dipesh Chakrabarty cautions, "there is no corresponding 'humanity' that in its oneness can act as a political agent."³²⁵ In this view, we cannot overlook the way climate change interacts with the spatial distribution of risk exacerbated by social inequality.³²⁶ The *emergency of the present* erases these considerations as the local reinforces the global. These are concerns that should not be overlooked; and yet, highlighting climate vulnerability through this spatial intensity justifies Indigenous participation in climate negotiations.

Time

In the *emergency of the present*, time is relationally foregrounded by space. Indigenous activists understand their place in time through both relational and categorical terms. Sophie Pascoe, Wolfram Dressler, and Monica Minnegal contend that in relational time, "causality becomes fluid and contextual since relations are always in the making. Time is experienced through relationships and interactions with the world, rather than in reference to pre-existing categories."³²⁷ War time is relational time, as one must consistently track the enemy's movements and respond to changes in the landscape. Indigenous communities employ relational

time when describing local changes due to climate change. For example, Indigenous activist Kera Sherwood O'Regan introduces herself as:

A proudly disabled Kāi Tahu woman from Aotearoa, New Zealand. When I introduce myself in this way, I connect to my family, my ancestors, my river, and our chiefly ancestral mountain Aoraki who stands amongst his brothers as the tallest peak in the Southern Alps. He is currently melting due to your inaction.³²⁸

Here, Sherwood-O'Regan emphasizes her connections to her human and nonhuman ancestors, which provides a spatial frame for understanding the temporality of climate impacts. In these moments, spatial relationships shape temporal relationships. A relational understanding of time arises through a connection to and living on the frontline. In the *emergency of the present*, location becomes more important as soldiers understand their fight with the enemy through their proximity and observations of its movements. Instead of an abstraction of time, the frontline metaphor orients time through the relationship these communities have to the climate.

Through the frontline metaphor, climate changes observed through these communities provide insight on the enemy. Amy, one of the “Mother Earth Original Stewards” panelists, discusses how climate change threatens Redwood trees due to warming summers and dwindling fog.³²⁹ Amy observes, “this time of year there’s actually been a beautiful warm summer which we really enjoy, but it’s also scary because the fog isn’t coming in and the fog is the Redwood tree food.”³³⁰ Here, Amy discusses what her community observes through their relationship to their environments and how those changes reaffirm the threat climate change poses to both the human and nonhuman world. Pascoe, Dressler, and Minnegal explain how climate change is “disrupting relations with the environment, destabilizing time and making the world less predictable.”³³¹ Both Amy and Sherwood-O’ Regan ground their concerns for climate change in their own observations of living with their environments. In this perspective, climate change as a threatening causal agent disrupts normal temporality through its unpredictability. Time is

understood through climate impacts, simultaneously supplementing and overriding categorical time where the passage of time “is seen as an external, ‘real’ phenomenon structuring reality into linear and chronological units and scales.”³³² The changes are simultaneously categorical (in the sense of years) but also relational (in the sense of observations). In the *emergency of the present*, the frontline metaphor construes time through space, as climate observations orient Indigenous Peoples in the war setting.

When Indigenous activists describe their communities’ observations through relational time, they challenge “colonial time” where “native” being is depicted as emanating from the past.³³³ Rather than characterizing Indigenous communities as from a bygone era,³³⁴ these activists articulate Indigenous Peoples as “participants in current events, as stakeholders in decision making, and as political and more broadly social agents with whom non-natives must engage.”³³⁵ Indigenous Peoples occupy a shared present marked by war that threatens native and nonnative well-being. The It Takes Roots climate alliance brochure for COP24 details, “Indigenous Peoples, frontline communities and everyday people around the world, are already facing devastating impacts from wildfires, floods, drought, and food insecurity.”³³⁶ Here, the present progressive is used to characterize climate change as a present reality that will continue to get worse.³³⁷ Already as an adverb indicates this is happening before anticipated. Indigenous activist Martinez similarly states, “Frequency and severity of massive storms and massive floods and massive superstorms are increasing all over the planet because of our lack of action.”³³⁸ In these moments, the urgency of the present moment is marked by increased frequency in natural disasters that impact communities all around the globe. The frontline metaphor assembles temporally and spatially dispersed events into the unified war with climate change.³³⁹ Each disparate event symbolizes an attack from the enemy. As Ibrahim express, “The world is

losing. We lost already 60 percent of the species, and it's increasing every day."³⁴⁰ Indigenous activists highlight the urgency of the crisis through the present tense, present progressive, and the increasing nature of these crises. Assembling diverse events into a shared present marked by climate crisis enables Indigenous activists to articulate "native being in time" in coordination with and against colonial time, as all face the threat of looming climate disaster. A shared present moving towards a more catastrophic future, however, upholds dominant temporal frameworks that privilege linearity. Thus, both the relational and shared present temporal orientations work with and against colonial time, situating Indigenous Peoples as temporally and spatially vulnerable in the battle against climate change.

Affects-Emotions

In the *emergency of the present* chronotope, space is the organizing force, positioning affects-emotions in ways that reaffirm Indigenous Peoples' position on the frontline. Due to their proximity to the enemy, Indigenous communities feel heightened anxiety. Stephen J. Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul H. Thibodeau argue war metaphors "naturally bring on fear and anxiety because the stakes are high and there are tremendous risks, for instance, loss of lives, loss of resources, and feelings of despair."³⁴¹ While literature on climate change and anxiety is expansive and growing, there is a general consensus that climate anxiety manifests through feelings of uncertainty.³⁴² Susan Clayton similarly makes this connection, noting "no one can predict the exact [climate] impacts in a particular place and time."³⁴³ While more concrete threats tend to elicit fear, anxiety emerges through this uncertainty about climate change and the future.³⁴⁴ In other words, certain apocalyptic futures evoke fear, whereas uncertain futures evoke anxiety.

In its depiction of climate change as an unpredictable causal agent, the frontline metaphor cultivates a sense of anxiety communities feel amidst erratic changes to their environments. The President of the Sámi Parliament expresses this when he says, “For good reason, we fear that climatic change will hit us harder than others, and that we are in danger of losing our traditional way of life unless something is done very quickly.”³⁴⁵ Jetnil-Kijiner similarly notes, “We’ve seen waves crashing into our homes and our breadfruit trees wither from the salt and drought. We look at our children and wonder how they will know themselves or their culture should we lose our islands.”³⁴⁶ These communities express concern for the disruption these changes are and will bring about to their ways of life.³⁴⁷ The anticipation of change leads to even more anxiety.³⁴⁸ As the frontline, they do not know when or how the climate will strike next. The *emergency of the present*’s depiction of Indigenous Peoples as spatially vulnerable to and threatened by unpredictable climate changes cultivates a sense of anxiety aimed at justifying the need for urgent action.

Indigenous activists occasionally express disappointment when solutions fail to consider the current needs of their communities,³⁴⁹ but their messages are also hopeful that the crisis is solvable if we work together. Amy Chadwick argues, “Feeling that there is an opportunity to achieve a desired outcome causes hope.”³⁵⁰ In her view, the perception of a possible future must also be accompanied by a sense of now as an opportunity for change. Activist Martinez expresses this sense of hope noting, “we have this opportunity, this defining moment that belongs to each and every one of us. This is not my moment. This is our moment. And you have this opportunity now to choose how you will play your part.”³⁵¹ In this view, the climate crisis is an opportunity for all of us to come together and change the course on humanity. As activist

Peter says on the “Mother Earth's Original Stewards” panel, “We’re not here to go against people.”³⁵² Hope emerges through our collaboration. Martinez further adds:

Never before has there been such a unifying issue as climate change, and it is time now to set aside everything that divides us, everything that separates us, everything that makes us want to point a finger at someone else and throw the problem to them.³⁵³

In this perspective, climate change helps us overcome our differences by giving us a common goal. The war metaphor aims for unity against a common enemy, and hope emerges through this opportunity of unity. Thus, the frontline metaphor arouses anxiety Indigenous Peoples experience in their closer proximity to the threat and hope in the sense of unity the threat can engender. Both affects-emotions work together to enforce the need and open up the possibility of climate action.

Possibilities for Action

The *emergency of the present's* depiction of climate change as an unpredictable and threatening enemy prompts the need for more ambitious action. In this chronotope, climate action revolves around two main concerns: keeping emissions under 1.5 degrees Celsius and developing a collaborative mindset. Many Indigenous speakers express concern for the 2 degrees Celsius target because, as Ibrahim declares, “1.5 is not a negotiation. It’s an obligation to save my brother, my sister, and so we need to save the world.”³⁵⁴ Indigenous communities, much like Fridays for Future, suggest that reducing climate impacts through mitigating carbon emissions is the top priority,³⁵⁵ but the current agreed upon limit is not aggressive enough. Scholar Kyle Whyte characterizes 2 degrees Celsius as a tipping point threatening “alarming dangers—ones the reports show are concerning for indigenous peoples everywhere, including more severe droughts, sea-level rise, disruptive precipitation patterns, ocean acidification, and more intense extreme weather events.”³⁵⁶ Here, the current spatial and temporal vulnerability Indigenous

Peoples face on the frontline increases the need for more ambitious goals to protect those communities. As the Statement of the IIPFCC during the Opening session of Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice similarly details, staying under 1.5 degrees “is imperative for the continued survival and development of all, including those living in small island states and Indigenous Peoples.”³⁵⁷ The frontline metaphor puts the focus on a degree limit rather than making changes by a certain deadline because space and time are processed through the unpredictable impacts of the enemy.³⁵⁸ Fridays for Future gives a time for when the catastrophe will strike,³⁵⁹ but if climate change is an adversary operating on its own, than more aggressive and immediate action is required to fight the enemy back.³⁶⁰ Heightened anxiety and vulnerability increase the need for immediate action rather than timely action.

The *emergency of the present* casts the present moment as the time for action because the past and the future seemingly disappear within this chronotope. In doing so, it highlights cooperation at the expense of reflection on how climate change emerges from and how it is made worse by oppressive power structures. Ben Anderson, Kevin Grove, Lauren Rickards, and Matthew Kearnes explain how emergency claims operate by “opening up an ‘interval’ in which action can make a difference, even as the risk remains that present harms and damages will continue or even intensify.”³⁶¹ Now becomes the interval of when action should occur but acting now requires collaboration. As the President of the Sámi Parliament notes, “This is the time in history when we have no other prudent alternative but to continue to work together: States, Indigenous Peoples, NGOs and other sectors of civil society.”³⁶² In this perspective, since climate change threatens everyone, we must come together to address that threat. Indigenous activist Peter warns, “One of the dangers we have with things like climate change is that we can create sides [...] We can’t create division.”³⁶³ Drastic climate action requires cooperation, and

cooperation requires moving past differences in order to unite against a common cause. In war, however, some lives are deemed expendable at the sake of saving others. Instead of raising important concerns about current international relationships, especially in relation to developed countries' unabated carbon emissions, the frontline metaphor unites all humanity together in their fight against the climate. In these moments, Indigenous Peoples' vulnerability makes them uniquely positioned to offer insight on climate solutions in order to ensure those solutions meet the needs of their communities. While these moves give credence to Indigenous voices, the discussion of a shared degree limit conceals the important ways certain countries and corporations contribute to the problem at the expense of others.

The *emergency of the present* chronotope depicts climate change as the threat to Indigenous communities and humanity more broadly. In doing so, it can limit the possibilities for climate action by erasing important considerations of climate justice. These communities face vulnerability due to the excessive carbon consumption of others. In depicting vulnerability as the outcome of Indigenous Peoples' proximity to the threat, the primary drivers of the climate crisis disappear and those seemingly not on the frontline can feel distant and safe from the impacts. On the other hand, Indigenous vulnerability can heighten the need for more aggressive degree limits and provides Indigenous Peoples a voice within these negotiations. While climate action may still be made without deeper consideration of colonialism and capitalism, a 1.5-degree limit would prompt more consideration of Indigenous Peoples and their communities. Thus, as Hartmann-Mahmud argues while war metaphors call "attention to the issue," they simultaneously direct "attention away from the very debates and discussions that are necessary for making inroads in resolving the problem."³⁶⁴

Slow Emergency

The *slow emergency* chronotope encapsulates the ways in which current impacts of climate change emanate from ongoing colonial violence. Anderson et. al utilize the term to mark the intersection between two prominent literatures: The first are feminist, postcolonial and critical race theorizations on slow violence, which respond to the “breaking down of the geo-historical promise and hope that the everyday or ordinary can be separated from emergency/disaster”³⁶⁵; the second is literature on the biopolitical mobilization of emergency, which attends to “how individual and collective life in liberal societies is increasingly governed through a variety of techniques, strategies and rationalities of emergency.”³⁶⁶ I use *slow emergency* to mark the ways in which Indigenous activists tie current climate impacts to a colonial history with continued disregard for the rights of Indigenous communities. Anderson et. al explain the phrase “slow emergency” racializes emergency appeals to attend to the “racially uneven distribution of temporality” and “how racially and economically uneven processes of environment (in)justice fold harm, suffering, risk and premature death into the fabric of everyday life, particularly among poor and marginalized communities.”³⁶⁷ The scholars explicate further how necropolitics produces “death-spaces” that are “inhabited by colonized subjects whose lives carry no juridical or theological value” and are “exposed to the power of death-in-life.”³⁶⁸ The *slow emergency* chronotope offers a deeper understanding of the ways in which capitalist and colonial practices manifest the current climate crisis and produce vulnerability in Indigenous communities. It collapses the distance between past and present, allowing for a recognition of the repetitive practices Indigenous communities adopt to survive amidst colonial and capitalist threats.

In this chronotope, Indigenous Peoples emphasize their resilience in ways that center Indigenous survival and adaptation to environmental changes.³⁶⁹ Dominant temporal frameworks depict Indigenous Peoples as emanating from a “primordial past,” whereas whiteness symbolizes “a progressive present-future.”³⁷⁰ Mark Rifkin affirms in these colonial temporal formations, “native time is understood as stasis or as being out of another time and therefore a threat to contemporary American political life.”³⁷¹ In these contrasting temporalities, Indigenous Peoples represent stagnation and antiquity while the white liberal subject represents change and growth.³⁷² Dominant temporal frameworks either consign Indigenous Peoples to the past, restricted from being equal partners and stakeholders in current events, or bring them into the present on non-native terms.³⁷³ In drawing upon the *slow emergency* chronotope, Indigenous activists subvert progressive temporal formations by depicting Indigenous communities as constantly changing and adapting to environmental changes in their communities. Muehlebach explains how Indigenous Peoples often utilize a “double voiced rhetoric” where “tropes of a dominant language are engaged in order to subvert this same language.”³⁷⁴ I argue the *slow emergency* chronotope operates as a subversion to progress narratives. In this chronotope, true “progress” involves adapting to environmental changes brought about by colonialism in ecological ways rather than advancing through the exploitation of the natural world. Indigenous Peoples position themselves as agents of change throughout time and in connection to space, and their knowledge gleaned from their adaption and preservation of diverse ecosystems positions them as leaders for developing climate solutions. Thus, not only does the *slow emergency* chronotope reveal colonial injustices, its intensity of time and space grounded in Indigenous resilience and adaptation subverts dominant temporal understandings of progress and stagnation.

Time and Space

Time and space take on equal intensity in the *slow emergency* chronotope. Rifkin describes time as a “divergent processes of becoming.”³⁷⁵ Similarly, Doreen Massey depicts space as “the product of relations,” filled with “multiplicity” and “loose ends and missing links.”³⁷⁶ In these understandings, both time and space are not fixed but are constantly changing as relationships change. This more fluid understanding of time and space animates the *slow emergency* chronotope. The UNSG Climate Action Summit statement details, “Since time immemorial, Indigenous Peoples have been leaders in adaptation, mitigation, and living reciprocally with their lands, territories, and resources, including oceans and waters.”³⁷⁷ Time immemorial is defined as a “time so long past as to be indefinite in history or tradition.”³⁷⁸ This phrasing draws on the view of Indigenous Peoples as antiquated to subvert it through the emphasis on their constant change and adaption to their environments. Instead of stagnant agents, Indigenous Peoples depict themselves as agents of change.³⁷⁹ Frank Ettawageshik, in the IIPFCC’s Statement at COP21, indicates, “Indigenous Peoples are those who least contribute to climate change, having safeguarded our traditional lands, territories and resources for millennia.”³⁸⁰ In this view, Indigenous Peoples are best suited for developing climate solutions due to the constant role they have played throughout history in protecting their environments. The phrasing of time immemorial within the *slow emergency* chronotope ties Indigenous Peoples to an uncertain past before memory, but it does so to reinforce Indigenous Peoples as agents of change throughout history. This chronotope subverts colonial temporal formations by removing Indigenous Peoples from a fixed past and depicting instead their ability to adapt and preserve their ecosystems as a vital resource in the present. Both time and space are foregrounded by the adaptive relationship Indigenous Peoples have to their environments.

Indigenous Peoples' historical ability to change and "progress" in ecological ways gives them the ability to interpret environmental changes in the present. Indigenous activist Ibrahim discusses her grandmother's ability to "predict the next 12 months, if it's going to be a good rain season or not. She can tell you just by observing her environment, by observing the wind direction, the cloud position, the bird migration, the size of fruits, the plant flowers."³⁸¹ Ibrahim explains how Indigenous Peoples' unique knowledge gained from consistent adaptation to spatial changes provides them the skills needed to know their environments. Amy similarly expresses, "we have been on the land since the beginning of time, so we have you know hundreds, thousands of years of anecdotal information about how things worked here. So. if you really want to learn about climate change talk to us."³⁸² This knowledge of the environment enables Indigenous resilience, as communities learn to anticipate and prepare for these changes. Ibrahim further notes, "we use our Indigenous People's traditional knowledge to get better resilience to what we need to survive. Our knowledge is not only for our communities. It's to share with others who are living with us."³⁸³ Indigenous Peoples and their spatial relationship provides a resource on how to transition to more sustainable practices and adapt to the changes brought on by rising temperatures.³⁸⁴ Massey argues, "It is that liveliness, the complexity and openness of the configurational itself, the positive multiplicity, which is important for an appreciation of the spatial."³⁸⁵ Space in the *slow emergency* chronotope contains this complexity and openness as Indigenous activists depict their changing relationships to space. In other words, adaptation implies the constant flexibility and malleability of both Indigenous communities and their environments. The *slow emergency* chronotope through emphasizing Indigenous Peoples' spatial and temporal relationship to environmental changes reveals the insight Indigenous Peoples offer and positions them as having a unique ability to adapt others must learn from.³⁸⁶

Indigenous activists depict space as heterogenous, biodiversity rich places Indigenous Peoples have preserved throughout time. Space becomes more open and concrete. In the UNSG Climate Action Summit statement, it is stated:

Drawing on our knowledge systems, sustainable practices, and rights, we continue to preserve our diverse ecosystems (such as forests, savanna, lands, oceans, waters, and biodiversity). Through this, we steward 80% of the world's biodiversity, and at least 22% of forest carbon, despite comprising only 5% of the world's population.³⁸⁷

Here, this spatial knowledge and temporal experience throughout history positions Indigenous Peoples as vital for addressing the climate crisis.³⁸⁸ Ibrahim further argues, “Indigenous Peoples around the world are saving 80 percent of the world’s biodiversity. That’s the scientists who say that. [With] Indigenous Peoples in the Amazon, you can find the most diverse ecosystem, better than the national park.³⁸⁹ In this view, Indigenous Peoples not only have the knowledge, but they are the ones largely responsible for protecting biodiversity worldwide due to their spiritual and ecological relationship with their environments.³⁹⁰ Ranawana and Trafford affirm, “This is the spiritual, intellectual and emotional dimensions of land – the knowledge of co-existence with rivers, streams, air, wind.”³⁹¹ Muehlebach describes this as a new politics of morality grounded in the preservation of diverse ecosystems.³⁹² The *slow emergency* chronotope highlights Indigenous Peoples’ protection of biodiversity to affirm Indigenous Peoples’ unique ecological knowledge as necessary for developing climate solutions.

Through an interrelation of past and present, the *slow emergency* chronotope illuminates how the climate crisis emanates from colonialism. This understanding, however, is grounded in a spatial understanding of the relationship between humans and their environments. Indigenous activist Amy discusses the Yurok creation story where the creator told humans to live in balance with the nonhuman world and they would always have what they needed.³⁹³ Amy describes how

for thousands of years her people lived this way and never wanted for anything. Then, a shift happened in mindset. As Amy explains:

In the colonialists' world you know, many people adopted a Christian belief that this world is not heaven, that heaven is some other place, and that everything here is made for man and man can take. And what that core belief allowed was the exploitation of natural resources and using those resources for human benefit regardless of environmental consequence.³⁹⁴

The Yurok creation story emphasizes the importance of restoring the spiritual relationship between humans and nature. Environmental problems result from colonial mindsets that prioritize exploitation of the natural world.³⁹⁵ Muehlbach describes how the protection of humans and nature is often illustrated in Indigenous narratives “where a creator charged a people with looking after and taking up responsibility for a specific piece of land.”³⁹⁶ Space takes on spiritual meaning and reflects the clash between spiritual worldviews.³⁹⁷ Heather Davis and Zoe Todd argue, climate change can be understood “as a deliberate extension of colonial logic.”³⁹⁸ Indigenous Peoples affirm this connection between climate change and colonialism, but for them, colonialism emerges from a different, spiritual understanding of the relationship between humans and their environments. The move to center a spiritual and spatial understanding of environmental problems by understanding the present through the past becomes an important aspect of the *slow emergency* chronotope and its critique of colonialism.

Indigenous activists utilize the *slow emergency* chronotope to critique progress emerging from colonialism. Activist Sherwood O'Regan asserts, “Since the colonial project began, we have been overcoming an apocalypse on our lands. This has embedded patriarchy, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, white supremacy, and systemic oppressions within both national and international mechanisms.”³⁹⁹ Framing the current crisis in terms of a past apocalypse calls attention to what many nonindigenous people fear about the climate crisis: that they too will

experience an apocalypse, including “ecosystem collapse, species loss, economic crash, drastic relocation, and cultural disintegration.”⁴⁰⁰ The use of apocalyptic rhetoric in climate discourse conceals that colonial history by centering climate change as a common threat to all of humanity.⁴⁰¹ Indigenous activists expose the true legacy of progress because, as the letter to Minister Jonathan Wilkinson from the Youth Delegation of Indigenous Climate Action indicates, “this legacy looks like gendered violence that further exploits our lands.”⁴⁰² Progress through colonial and capitalist frameworks enables continued violence and destruction.⁴⁰³ Evoking the *slow emergency* chronotope, Indigenous activists critique the myth of progress by exposing colonialism’s legacy of apocalypticism and destruction for Indigenous communities.

In the *slow emergency* chronotope, Indigenous Peoples affirm adaptation as the true “progress” needed to address the climate crisis. The Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment statement at COP 23 details, “As indigenous peoples, our traditional knowledge and technological innovations, anchored in the natural world, have enabled our peoples to not merely survive, but to prosper, adapt, and thrive in an ever-changing world, without being at odds with Mother Earth.”⁴⁰⁴ This view subverts the understanding of progress as an inherently good thing and asserts adaptation as an ability to change in ecologically sound ways. Muehlebach argues the politics of morality Indigenous activists articulate at the UN juxtaposes “‘what is’ with ‘what should be,’ the gain of humans against the loss of nature.”⁴⁰⁵ While I agree with this point, what is equally important is the temporal juxtaposition: the way in which temporal resilience and adaptation assert Indigenous ability to “progress” for the better, whereas colonialism represents the “ongoing processes of control and commodification of the planet.”⁴⁰⁶ As Indigenous activist Peter says, “There’s been a huge disconnect from nature and from our Earth.”⁴⁰⁷ Indigenous Peoples not only depict themselves as agents of change, but they depict their ability to change in

ecological ways as superior to a change rooted in ongoing exploitation and destruction of nature. The *slow emergency* chronotope positions Indigenous Peoples as offering a “political corrective” on how to change by living reciprocally with one’s natural environments.⁴⁰⁸ By juxtaposing colonial oppression with Indigenous resilience, the *slow emergency* chronotope subverts dominant temporal orientations that view Indigenous Peoples as emanating from the past and makes them important agents of change for the past, present, and future. Through their changing relationships to their environments via adaptation, Indigenous Peoples are temporally and spatially positioned to be leaders in developing climate solutions.

Affects-Emotions

In the *slow emergency* chronotope, space and time orient affects-emotions, especially anger and subsequently hope. As Indigenous Peoples depict themselves as agents of change, anger emerges for those that impede their ability to adapt. Lisa Kretz argues anger holds others accountable by exposing injustice and the need for change.⁴⁰⁹ As she puts it, “Successfully expressed anger is communication about an unjust present, and insofar as uptake is secured, it can prompt change for a just future.”⁴¹⁰ Indigenous Peoples cultivate anger by blaming the United Nations for continuing to pursue climate solutions that harm Indigenous communities. Sherwood-O’Regan criticizes how the United Nations “treat negotiations like a zero-sum game, where you make deals behind closed doors, trading off our rights for the profits of those who caused this very problem in the first place.”⁴¹¹ This moment provides a brief glimpse at the anger Indigenous Peoples feel at constantly fighting for their recognition and inclusion. Sherwood-O’Regan continues:

We are experts on the climate, and the kaitiaki- stewards of nature. We know the legitimacy of our voice and it’s about time that you recognize it too. Hear our stories, learn our histories, stop taking up space with your false solutions and get out of our way.⁴¹²

In this moment, Sherwood-O'Regan views the United Nations as stagnant, an obstacle keeping real solutions from emerging due to their disregard for Indigenous Peoples' rights and expertise. Market-based solutions continue to exploit natural resources and cause harm to Indigenous communities and their diverse ecosystems.⁴¹³ Through subverting colonial temporal orientations by depicting themselves as agents of change, Indigenous Peoples cast the UN and market-based solutions as obstacles to adaptation. In this view, if the UN wants real change, they must get out of the way of Indigenous communities. Indigenous Peoples become the forces for change as the UN and dominant climate solutions become forces for stagnation and impediments to adaptation. This cultivated anger subverts dominant temporal formations by helping redefine what stagnation and progress look like in climate solutions.

From these moments of anger, hope emerges in these texts in the knowledge that change is possible because it has already occurred. C. R. Snyder states, "Hope is defined as the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired goals, and motivate oneself via agency thinking to use those pathways."⁴¹⁴ In this understanding, hope arises from our ability to perceive a way forward to our desired outcome. Indigenous Peoples cultivate this sense of hope by positioning themselves as evidence of a way forward. The Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment statement at COP 23 reasons, "as parties discuss how to combat the greatest challenge of our time, know that as custodians, indigenous peoples have shown that this CAN be done. For we have done it before."⁴¹⁵ As this perspective indicates, Indigenous Peoples provide us hope by showing us their ability to adapt to environmental changes and being open to sharing that knowledge with us. As Indigenous activist Peter indicates, "Our homes are open to you to come and see. Let us share that experience with you [...] We are here to help people learn, help people understand."⁴¹⁶ The *slow emergency* chronotope simultaneously cultivates anger Indigenous

Peoples feel toward the UN's obstruction of developing ecological solutions and hope that change is possible if we listen to and learn from Indigenous communities.

Possibilities for Action

As already hinted at in my discussion of the other sections, the *slow emergency* chronotope depicts climate action as listening to Indigenous Peoples and valuing their leadership in developing climate solutions. The Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment statement at COP 23 details, "In the face of climate change, the custodians of this planet will continue to do what we have always done. We will continue to listen to Mother Earth and uphold our traditional knowledge. Because this is where solutions lie."⁴¹⁷ In this perspective, climate solutions must be developed by those with the knowledge and experience of adaptation. Indigenous Peoples have worked for generations to protect their ecosystems, and in doing so, they know how to address a changing climate without further exploiting mother earth.⁴¹⁸ In the *slow emergency* chronotope, Indigenous resilience becomes a resource for the international community. As Michael Charles asserts in the IIPFCC closing statement from COP 21, "The resilience of my people has enabled my existence. Listen to indigenous peoples' voices and humbly accept our wisdom and knowledge as solutions moving forward, so it can also enable yours."⁴¹⁹ Thus, in the *slow emergency* chronotope, climate solutions arise from those who have the experience and the right mindset to adapt to the climate crisis. These solutions cost nothing but offer the international community the ability to learn how to change in an ecologically sound way.⁴²⁰

In positioning Indigenous Peoples as climate leaders, the *slow emergency* chronotope depicts their knowledge systems as a complement to Western science but only if their rights are protected. Indigenous activist Ibrahim states, "if we put together all the knowledge systems that we have –science, technology, traditional knowledge – we can give the best of us to protect our

peoples, to protect our planet, to restore the ecosystem that we are losing.”⁴²¹ Here, Ibrahim describes Indigenous knowledge as an equally valuable perspective for understanding and combating climate change. If it is an equal partner, however, then it must be protected. In the IPFCC’s COP21 statement, Ettawageshik expresses, “It is essential that the rights of indigenous peoples be recognized, protected and respected within a broad human rights framework.”⁴²² In this perspective, climate change is a human rights issue. Similarly, the IIPFCC proposal calls for the “recognition of our rights as peoples, a necessary prerequisite for the continued existence of Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous knowledge.”⁴²³ Here, Indigenous Peoples’ ability to provide necessary insight on climate adaptation depends on the protection of their rights and knowledge systems.⁴²⁴ In these requests, Indigenous Peoples tie climate solutions to the sovereignty of Indigenous communities. To be partners with the rest of the world requires the international community to uphold these communities’ rights to free and prior informed consent as well as self-determination.⁴²⁵ Indigenous Peoples can and will only provide these solutions if they are at “the table to make the decision.”⁴²⁶ Thus, the *slow emergency* chronotope offers an exchange: Indigenous Peoples will help the world adapt but only if their rights are upheld and their partnership valued. Muehlebach explains that such a move indicates “the loss of indigenous cultures results in the loss of the knowledge needed to sustainably live in and with particular natural surroundings.”⁴²⁷ In other words, protect Indigenous communities in order to protect yourselves.

While the *slow emergency* chronotope enables Indigenous Peoples to assert their temporal and spatial sovereignty and resilience, it can also enable the United Nations to further harm Indigenous communities. Delf Roethe warns Indigenous knowledges have become important to the United Nations but only “to reappropriate them for a global politics of resilience

that romanticises and normalises black and indigenous suffering.”⁴²⁸ Arun Agrawal further articulates how this move can cast Indigenous knowledges as “an object that can be essentialized, captured in archives, and transferred.”⁴²⁹ Oftentimes, these inclusionary frameworks force Indigenous Peoples to work within Western perspectives at the expense of their own ways of understanding the natural world.⁴³⁰ Furthermore, the constant emphasis on stewardship and biodiversity defines Indigeneity in a way that upholds certain Western assumptions about Indigenous communities. Sylvia Escárcega cautions, “those Indigenous Peoples who have been able to maintain a land or a strong sense of belonging to a territory seem to set the cultural tone for defining what indigeneity looks like.”⁴³¹ While Escárcega expresses concern about defining Indigeneity in any fixed way, she also understands these definitions can be empowering for Indigenous communities.⁴³² Nation-states often understand and emphasize their legitimacy through their history and traditions. By emphasizing their historical relationship to the land, Indigenous activists assert their rights, especially through evidence of “their adaptation to modernity, globalization, and transnational realities.”⁴³³ While one could certainly read this focus on the preservation of biodiversity as essentializing Indigeneity, the fluidity of spatial and temporal relationships and the subversion of progress through adaptation offers a corrective to colonial frameworks grounded in Indigenous Peoples as agents of change. The chronotope itself may be co-opted by the UN for alternative purposes, but it serves here as a challenge to the UN and its continued disregard for Indigenous Peoples’ rights.

Thus, the *slow emergency* chronotope provides a more nuanced temporal and spatial understanding of the relationship between Indigenous Peoples, climate change, and colonialism. In this chronotope, Indigenous activists subvert colonial time by reinscribing Indigenous Peoples as agents of change throughout history with a unique spatial knowledge and preservation of

diverse ecosystems. The *slow emergency* chronotope centers the importance of upholding Indigenous Peoples' rights and prioritizing their leadership in climate solutions. While this chronotope raises concerns about relying on Western assumptions that essentialize Indigenous communities, its subversion of the progress narrative focuses on Indigenous Peoples' ability to adapt and thrive in the midst of a changing climate without exploiting the environment. This knowledge positions them as vital to addressing climate change.

Competing Chronotopes

The *emergency of the present* and the *slow emergency* chronotopes point to different causes of the climate crisis and, therefore, different responses. The *emergency of the present* chronotope aims for unity and urgency, hence a shared degree limit, whereas the *slow emergency* chronotope aims for respect and protection of the rights of Indigenous Peoples. Emphasizing how Indigenous Peoples have already experienced an apocalypse through colonialism weakens urgency claims that climate change is a single event without preemption. The *emergency of the present's* focus on Indigenous vulnerability construes climate change as the threat to Indigenous communities. The *slow emergency* chronotope shifts focus to Indigenous resilience by highlighting the ways in which climate change arose out of a colonial mindset. In the first chronotope, Indigenous Peoples' dependence on their environments exacerbates their vulnerability, and climate change becomes a threatening causal agent increasing anxiety about the future. In contrast, the *slow emergency* chronotope foregrounds Indigenous communities' adaptative and ecological relationship to their environment as a resource for climate solutions. In the second chronotope, a critique emerges of colonialism and the unsustainable mindset upon which it is founded. A decolonial perspective that emphasizes Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination is required in developing climate solutions. While both highlight a spatial intensity

and potential to disrupt colonial temporal formations, the frontline metaphor forecloses criticism as the *slow emergency* provokes it.

In their interaction, these chronotope reveal two underlying tensions: the first between how and when we take action, and the second with how Indigenous Peoples negotiate their participation in the UN. The first reveals a problem of needing to hasten decision-making while also making sure solutions uphold Indigenous communities' rights to sovereignty and self-determination. Whyte argues looking at climate change through a relational view suggests "it's likely to be too late to stop dangerous climate change and its relationship to injustices."⁴³⁴ For Whyte, the 1.5 degrees tipping point is just as important as a relational tipping point that he says was probably crossed years ago due to colonialism, capitalism, and industrialization.⁴³⁵ To ensure climate justice, we have to ensure that climate actions taken are founded on "consent, trust, accountability, and reciprocity";⁴³⁶ however, those qualities take time to develop.⁴³⁷ This leads to two scenarios: the international community takes the time to establish those relational qualities in order to ensure climate solutions are grounded in climate justice, but it misses the window of staying under 1.5 degrees Celsius which will cause continued harm to Indigenous communities;⁴³⁸ or the international community acts to stay under 1.5 degrees but such speediness results in the violation of consent and the continuation of environmental injustices, especially those that exploit Indigenous communities.⁴³⁹ As we move closer to surpassing 1.5 degrees Celsius, the need for urgent solutions becomes more and more pronounced; however, acting urgently can mean not acting reflexively, perpetuating the very systems that enabled the crisis in the first place. Reflecting on climate solutions means considering how much of what could be done might be too late for some communities. Exposing this tension forces a reflection

on what kind of appeals we make and what implications those have for our ability to address racial injustices.

Both of these chronotopes also reflect the tension within a strategic essentialism that works to create space for Indigenous Peoples by simultaneously asserting Indigenous sovereignty and perpetuating Indigenous stereotypes and exclusionary frameworks. Escárcega explains how strategic essentialism works to “legitimize claims for social justice and rights (especially the right to self-determination)” while allowing “indigenous intellectuals and activists simultaneously [to] use and challenge these images and discourses to include a variety of perspectives on indigeneity, protect the (re)production of their cultures, and foster their claims for peoplehood and self-determination.”⁴⁴⁰ Escárcega sees these two practices as both a containment and flexibility. Indigenous communities at the international level must essentialize their communities in order to establish a peoplehood, while they must also continuously negotiate and redraw those boundaries.⁴⁴¹ We can understand this containment and flexibility to stem from how native orientations persist “alongside settler imperatives, and are affected by them, while not being reducible to them.”⁴⁴² In both of these chronotopes, Indigenous Peoples define Indigenous resilience and vulnerability through a spatial relationship to land, which upholds the assumption Indigenous Peoples have an ecological relationship with their environments.⁴⁴³ These definitions can fix indigeneity and exclude Indigenous Peoples without this relationship to their land. Both chronotopes, however, reflect “a process by which Indigenous Peoples raise consciousness of themselves as peoples and the need to transform the system that denies them peoplehood.”⁴⁴⁴ The vulnerability and the resilience frameworks enable the emergence of an Indigenous “political identity”⁴⁴⁵ that carves out space within the United Nations for Indigenous participation,⁴⁴⁶ even if that participation continues to be marked by

power imbalances. The interaction between these two chronotopes exposes the ways in which these boundaries are negotiated and the kind of agency afforded to Indigenous communities based on how the activists define their communities.

The documents I examined in my analysis allow for an understanding of the clash between Western and Indigenous temporal and spatial orientations. Nick Couldry notes, “Spaces for voice are therefore inherently spaces of power.”⁴⁴⁷ This resonates with Powless’s argument that through their participation in the United Nations, Indigenous Peoples are “challenging and trying to deconstruct dominant meanings.”⁴⁴⁸ Indigenous Peoples must constantly negotiate their participation through an interweaving of both critique and affirmation of Western notions of climate change. These statements operate as a new form for expressing Indigenous knowledge.⁴⁴⁹ Examining these competing chronotopes then alerts us to the ways in which “the battle over climate change is a battle over meanings and who gets to make claims. Those who frame the issues define the terms of the debate and possible solutions.”⁴⁵⁰ Each chronotope shapes what meanings and solutions will emerge. While both chronotopes aim to center Indigenous Peoples in climate solutions, they do so in different ways and by drawing attention to very different concerns, which highlights the various meanings of climate change and the tensions between them. These tensions expose our current obstacles to ensuring climate justice in our climate solutions.

CHAPTER FOUR:

CLIMATE EMERGENCY OR CLIMATE TRAGEDY? CLASHING ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE RHETORIC OF EXTINCTION REBELLION

On November 24, 2018, Extinction Rebellion (XR) took to the streets of London for their protest event, the “Funeral for Our Future.” The “funeral” revolved around mourning the losses people have, are, and will experience due to climate change. Members of the group recited poems, performed songs, delivered eulogies, walked in a procession, and placed mementos on a black casket outside Buckingham Palace. Since then, the group has hosted similar events focused on grief and the way it shapes our understanding of climate change.⁴⁵¹ An XR activist elaborates: “Grief is a perfectly acceptable part of what we are doing with XR and, I think it’s an important difference between us and a lot of other movements and campaigns.”⁴⁵² What has been termed “climate grief” has become a prominent component of XR’s rhetoric. Upon closer reading, I find that its manifestations in climate discourse generate tension between grief as an alternative affective-emotional orientation and more traditional temporal and spatial understandings of the climate crisis.

In this chapter, I turn to XR’s protest events “Funeral for Our Future” (London, November 24, 2018) and “Grief March” (London, October 12, 2019), their website, and some of their videos and online blog discussions about grief to better understand how XR’s rhetoric invokes two chronotopes, *emergency of the present-future* and *climate tragedy*. As discussed in the first chapter, the *emergency of the present* creates a reactive temporal perspective, while the *emergency of the future* fixates on future generations and averting catastrophe before it is too

late. In XR's rhetoric, these two previously-discussed chronotopes merge into one chronotopic orientation. Understood through a disease metaphor, the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope is defined by its temporal intensity and situates climate change as a potentially deadly illness in need of immediate treatment. In contrast, the *climate tragedy* chronotope takes on affective-emotional intensity as climate change is recast as a tragedy experienced through climate grief. Mourning climate losses attunes activists to the way climate grief manifests and can be suppressed within public discourse. Mourning is, as Ashlee Cunsolo and Karen Landman put it, "both individualizing and unifying" in that we feel alone in our loss and connected to others who share in our grief.⁴⁵³ Mourning is political and ethical when it transforms us through our own grief and through the grief of others.⁴⁵⁴ The *climate tragedy* chronotope evokes grief as a means to challenge the human-nature separations that make us feel disconnected. It involves affirming our connections to each other through our shared vulnerability.⁴⁵⁵ The two chronotopes in their differing intensities (temporal and affective-emotional, respectively) point to different reasons for why we should care about climate change. Together, their interaction within XR's rhetoric reveals an underlying tension between two clashing ethical perspectives in the ongoing struggle to motivate climate action.

To better draw out the complex and conflicted relationship between these two chronotopes, I first discuss the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope and how aspects of the *emergency of the future* and *emergency of the present* combine through a disease metaphor to create more temporal complexity in XR's rhetoric. Then, I turn to the *climate tragedy* chronotope to explore the way grief offers a relational, temporal, and spatial orientation for climate activism grounded in mourning as ethical climate action. Finally, I will discuss how these two

chronotopes reveal an ongoing struggle over how to motivate climate action and what assumptions that struggle is founded upon.

Emergency of the Present-Future

On the surface, the *emergency of the present-future* appears identical to the *emergency of the future* chronotope in its focus on present actions that will intervene in the current trajectory towards a catastrophic future.⁴⁵⁶ Often, activists will depict their concern for the climate as concern for their grandchildren and future generations.⁴⁵⁷ Such moments remain tied to chronormative structures that uphold a compulsory heterotemporality, or “the idea of a singular, linear unfolding in which the present supersedes the past in ways tied to proper sexual sequencing.”⁴⁵⁸ Martabel Wasserman warns this reproductive futuristic concern “obscures histories and present climate violence, and limits how we can imagine the future.”⁴⁵⁹ In these moments, climate ethics remains tied to a heteronormative framework, which can limit the possibilities for climate action. While these appeals are present in the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope, they are immersed within more temporal complexity as past, present, and future interrelate in this chronotopic framework. Furthermore, the *emergency of the present-future* shifts ethical action away from future generations to a self-preservation framework. To demonstrate how XR’s *emergency of the present-future* chronotope works, I unpack how a disease metaphor structures the group’s understanding of this temporal complexity and how this complexity subsequently organizes space, affects-emotions, and the possibilities for climate action.

In a blog post “Does XR Propose Solutions,” activist Rob Renouf compares climate change to an illness to defend the group’s focus on motivating climate action. He indicates, “climate scientists are telling us that our planet is seriously unwell. However, the good news is

that most don't think it's terminal (at least not yet) and there are still plenty of things we can do about it."⁴⁶⁰ In this view, climate change is currently impacting the body (our global community), but it is not currently fatal. If humanity continues to not seek treatment, however, the illness will get worse and could prove detrimental to our collective existence. Renouf more specifically evokes cancer as the metaphor for the climate crisis. He explains, "there isn't a safe level, which is why we need to take immediate action before it gets even worse."⁴⁶¹ Here, the longer we delay, the less chance we have of a positive outcome and more extreme action will be required.⁴⁶² Susan Sontag argues, "Illnesses have always been used as metaphors to enliven charges that a society was corrupt or unjust."⁴⁶³ Disease metaphors reflect social problems and their threat to social order by drawing on a "universal experience of disease."⁴⁶⁴ In its temporal intensity, the disease imagery shifts focus to when we take action rather than what solutions are viable.⁴⁶⁵ In his comparison of climate change to cancer, Renouf argues for immediate action in order to avoid the consequences of a terminal diagnosis in the future. This disease metaphor provides insight into how the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope operates within the group's activism and the kind of ethical perspective it engenders.

Time

The disease metaphor creates a complex relationship between past, present, and future. Through the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope, activists evoke a present perfect tense to indicate how climate change began at an unknown time in the past. The "Declaration of Rebellion," a statement XR delivered at the "Funeral for Our Future" event, says, "The breakdown of our climate has begun. There will be more wildfires, unpredictable super storms, increasing famine and untold drought as food supplies and fresh water disappear."⁴⁶⁶ Here, past, present, and future combine. The chronotope posits that the crisis began in the past, is occurring

now, and will continue in the future. A disease metaphor obscures causality. In other words, we often do not know when we became sick with the illness, but we do know we are feeling ill now and that we will feel worse if we do not seek treatment. The present perfect phrase of “has begun” captures the ambiguity of when we became sick with climate change. Similarly, in one of XR’s videos entitled Grieve Play Love, Jem Bendell states, “We now know that many self-reinforcing feedbacks have begun to further warm our planet threatening to take the future out of our hands.”⁴⁶⁷ Like the first example, climate change began in the past at an undetermined date but is going to continue to threaten humanity’s future if we do not seek treatment. The structuring of climate change as a past event that animates the present and will continue to threaten the future upholds a linear notion of time or “time’s arrow” that depicts each moment as a distinct temporal position moving in a single direction.⁴⁶⁸ Like a disease, climate change emerges, we recognize and diagnose the problem, and then we treat the issue before it leads to an undesired future. The time for when the illness began and will get worse is intentionally vague. The underlying causes of the crisis disappear as the dwindling time for action takes focus. Humanity, not knowing how it happened or how quickly it will progress, must act immediately to stave off future consequences.

The *emergency of the present-future* immerses us within the climate crisis as humanity cannot escape its illness. For example, in a page on their website entitled “Why We Rebel,” the group explains, “We are in the midst of a climate and ecological breakdown. We are facing an uncertain future—our world is in crisis and life itself is under threat.”⁴⁶⁹ Unlike the frontline metaphor that positions Indigenous Peoples as against the climate, XR depicts humanity as immersed within the crisis in the present. Stephen Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul Thibodeau argue that a time-moving metaphor, which situates “the agent as stationary while events in time

move toward them” can heighten the urgency of climate change by depicting “the individual as fixed in place, unable to control the arrival of a negative future event.”⁴⁷⁰ The chronotope, through the disease metaphor, positions us as unable to escape the climate. This immersion enhances the urgency of taking action and works to overcome spatial and temporal distance. The present is marked by crisis, but the crisis is not presently detrimental to our survival. As Claire reads in the “Declaration of Rebellion,” “The science is clear: we are in the sixth mass extinction event and we will face catastrophe if we do not act swiftly and robustly.”⁴⁷¹ The statement posits climate change will continue to get worse unless we do something about it now. In XR, humanity is immersed within the climate crisis, but the crisis is not yet terminal. The disease metaphor justifies immediate action because we cannot wait for the illness to progress past the point of a cure.

While past and present are evoked in the *emergency of the present-future*, the crisis appears as a more pronounced threat to the future. Claire states in reading the “Declaration of Rebellion,” “This is our darkest hour. Humanity finds itself embroiled in an event unprecedented in its history. One which, unless immediately addressed, will catapult us further into the destruction of all we hold dear.”⁴⁷² Through this perspective, climate change does impact our present, as we are sick, but it is not currently killing us. On their webpage “Why We Rebel,” the group explains, “As rebels, we know that tomorrow’s reality is today’s concern. A world ravaged by climate change and biodiversity loss is one that will gravely affect us all.”⁴⁷³ What is at stake is not the present lives impacted by climate change but the future existence of humanity.⁴⁷⁴ The *emergency of the present-future*, like the *emergency of the future*, obscures important considerations about the present. John Foster indicates these future-oriented perspectives involve “concentrating on the future consequences of our actions, and on the obligations of justice to

future people that in preparing those consequences we are allegedly breaking.”⁴⁷⁵ This move conceals the current environmental injustices happening all around the world and inhabits a similar mindset of sustainable development “with its obsessive focus on inherently negotiable futures.”⁴⁷⁶ In this chronotopic view, we have control over the outcome, but what happens to those “parts of the body” that are facing the brunt of the risk? The *emergency of the present-future* disregards these considerations by depicting the future as the time for when climate change will become most detrimental. While the chronotope’s intensity lies in its temporal complexity, the chronotope obfuscates the underlying causes of the crisis and fixates on the future, directing attention away from current impacts.

Space

The disease metaphor homogenizes the global community into one body sick with climate change. Space becomes homogenous and constricted. Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker explain how time has become exteriorized which results in bodies “conceived as only ever in time, subject to forces that carry on beyond and outside of us.”⁴⁷⁷ They add that the environment often functions as mere background which can create a false separation between us and the climate.⁴⁷⁸ This kind of homogeneity was detailed in Chapter Two with the frontline metaphor. In XR, however, the disease metaphor places everyone as part of the body, and the body is subject to the temporality of the illness. For example, the group designates the crisis as knowing “no borders, race or ethnicity, and while wealth may offer some protection, it is all but temporary.”⁴⁷⁹ In this view, while some parts of the body may remain untouched, it is only a matter of time before all parts are affected. While this collapses the distance between more severely impacted and less impacted areas, homogenizing a range of worldwide communities into one unified whole conceals the uneven spatial distribution of climate impacts.

In the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope, heterogenous spatial impacts become symptoms of the illness. For example, in the recitation of the “Declaration of Rebellion,” Claire reads, “Biodiversity is being annihilated around the world. Our seas are poisoned, acidic and rising. Flooding and desertification will render vast tracts of land uninhabitable and lead to mass migration.”⁴⁸⁰ These natural phenomena alert us to our illness, but what is interesting is the way causality disappears in their description. Who or what is annihilating biodiversity? Who is poisoning the seas? The causes of these symptoms disappear, and the symptoms themselves become causal agents: Flooding and desertification will lead to migration. Disease metaphors amplify the ambiguity of causality. Sontag describes, “cancer is understood as mysterious, a disease with multiple causes, internal as well as external.”⁴⁸¹ The disease metaphor has important implications for considerations of climate justice. As one body, we cannot blame others for the illness, nor can we consider climate vulnerabilities as racially and colonially configured. If we did blame parts of our body for spreading cancer, we are begging the question of where the cancer came from in the first place. Instead, the heterogenous impacts of climate change operate as a wake-up call to the universalized global body. Renouf admits, “We know that many people are already suffering the consequences of the levels of global warming happening today. However, many still seek to delay action, even though the projected consequences of doing so are much worse.”⁴⁸² If some people are presently suffering, what does that mean for them? If the illness is not terminal, how do we understand their suffering? Through the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope, threats are understood in primarily temporal rather than spatial terms. Space becomes homogenous and, even as differing impacts are acknowledged, XR’s rhetoric claims that climate change is a universal threat to all of humanity.⁴⁸³ The *emergency of the*

present-future chronotope disregards the raced and geopolitical politics of climate justice in favor of a more homogenous, global understanding of the crisis.

Affects-Emotions

Similar to Fridays for Future and the *slow emergency* chronotope, the primary affect-emotion in the *emergency of the present-future* is anger at inaction. At the “Funeral for Our Future,” one activist verbalizes, “I stand here in rebellion today to say that I am angry. I stand here in rebellion to say, ‘wake up.’ Scientists all around the world are ringing the alarm bells.”⁴⁸⁴ In this moment, the activist expresses how humanity knows what is wrong but refuses to take action. Bendell similarly states, “if we don’t wake up from our delusions of what is really pragmatic and appropriate then shame on us.”⁴⁸⁵ Here, the consequences of not acting (a catastrophic future) will be all of our faults because we refuse to do what is necessary. Anger emerges because the problem is solvable. Climate inaction emanates from the failure to implement solutions rather than the failure to develop them. Anger arises when attempting to find someone or something responsible for not taking action.⁴⁸⁶ Haoran Chu and Janet Z. Yang found that anger typically involves seeing oneself as close to a situation that is modifiable with a quick response.⁴⁸⁷ Furthermore, they argue people tend to be “angrier when victims of an unfavorable policy were portrayed as in-group members (i.e., socially close) rather than out-group members (i.e., socially far).”⁴⁸⁸ In this chronotope, we are united in our sickness, and it is our irrationality that is to blame for our inaction. To XR, there is no rational reason to deny treatment of the illness. This juxtaposition of taking action versus delaying action positions irrationality as the target for the activists’ anger and provides an easy solution that makes action still possible.

In diagnosing humanity, there is still hope. Sontag explains how, in the use of disease metaphors, “The prognosis is always, in principle, optimistic. Society, by definition, never catches a fatal disease.”⁴⁸⁹ Depicting the illness as not yet terminal provides the international community time to right this wrong.⁴⁹⁰ On their website page “Why We Rebel,” the group emphasizes, “Nothing is impossible - we can still write the story we want and we will. We as individuals can make a difference, collectively. We will do this together - transform the world, create lasting change and build a better future for all.”⁴⁹¹ While anger typically involves being closer to the issue, hope emerges from psychological distance.⁴⁹² Giving people time to seek treatment before the illness spreads suggests climate catastrophe is not inevitable. Panu Pihkala warns, however, “Optimism sounds like a very different message when it is heard by those who suffer from environmental racism.”⁴⁹³ The *emergency of the present-future* suggests the whole body is not terminally sick, but what does that mean for those parts of the body that are marked with cancer? John Foster contends these optimistic appeals have continued to be evoked despite years of failing to meet goals and expectations, which he argues is a “A willed refusal to confront reality.”⁴⁹⁴ Foster adds that if we keep making the same appeals despite every missed attempt then the effectiveness of such appeals are largely diminished.⁴⁹⁵ Thus, while the *emergency of the present-future* chronotope provides a sense of hope that change can occur, it does so unreflectively, by failing to consider those who already suffer from climate change. This continued need to provide hope through the time we have left to avoid catastrophe disregards current climate impacts, which has problematic implications for climate action.

Possibilities for Action

If the world is sick with climate change, we must seek treatment. For XR, the treatment is quite straightforward: Stop Carbon Emissions.⁴⁹⁶ As one activist so aptly described on their

poster: “Fossil Fuel Era Over.”⁴⁹⁷ If the treatment is simple, then what is the problem? For XR, “The problem isn’t being unaware of the solutions, it’s the dangerous unwillingness to implement them.”⁴⁹⁸ In their view, we know the problem and we know the solution, but we consistently fail to act on that knowledge. If we continue to do so, however, everyone will be impacted as the illness spreads throughout the body.⁴⁹⁹ The organization’s job involves increasing “awareness and understanding of the crisis, while also directly addressing the immoral lack of urgency to act.”⁵⁰⁰ Dimitrinka Atanasova and Nelya Koteyko explain that illness metaphors in climate change work to “communicate the irrationality of inaction.”⁵⁰¹ Through the metaphor of disease, rationality is contrasted against irrationality⁵⁰² as failing to seek treatment is coded as irrational. Activist Renouf expresses this thought: “When a person is diagnosed with cancer, the aim is normally to treat it as quickly as possible. In most circumstances people don’t ask how long they can delay treatment or how far they could allow the illness to progress.”⁵⁰³ As this quote exemplifies, in XR, the problem results not from the lack of action possible but rather the impulse to delay action even though the consequences of doing so could be catastrophic. This view can limit meaningful action and debate by suggesting the problem is merely refusing to act rather than the complicated nature of developing and implementing climate policy.⁵⁰⁴

The disease metaphor becomes complicated when XR blames governments for choosing economic gains over societal interest.⁵⁰⁵ Governments are responsible for the lack of action because they choose to promote “time wasting” and “party politics” over protecting their citizens.⁵⁰⁶ A comparison could be made to governments as the brain of this body, and they willingly choose to ignore the signs of illness in favor of doing what they know will kill them. In this view, the human body is trying to warn itself of the problem to no avail. The only proper

recourse is rebellion. The “Declaration of Rebellion” details the right of citizens to rise up against their corrupt governments:

When Government and the law fail to provide any assurance of adequate protection, as well as security for its people’s well-being and the nation’s future, it becomes the right of its citizens to seek redress in order to restore dutiful democracy and to secure the solutions needed to avert catastrophe and protect the future. It becomes not only our right; it becomes our sacred duty to rebel.⁵⁰⁷

Climate action for XR involves putting pressure on governments until the right action is taken.⁵⁰⁸

Like the body refusing to operate normally while sick, these activists alarm their governments and disrupt normal processing until the government seeks treatment. Blaming the government gives activists another target for their anger.⁵⁰⁹ Chris Cuomo communicates that it has become necessary for citizens to more actively participate in putting pressure on governments for climate action due to the reliance of national governments to commit to actions at the international level.⁵¹⁰ In this formulation, governments are the only ones who can seek the treatment, but citizens can disrupt normal practices, heightening the pressure for governments to respond. Doing so alarms the government by reminding them that “now we’re nearly out of time.”⁵¹¹ Such pronouncements and tactics provide more urgency for climate action.

While the *emergency of the present-future* prompts important interruptions in order to heighten the possibilities for action, it also diminishes those possibilities by oversimplifying climate solutions and erasing important matters of climate justice. Like Fridays for Future, the group presents us (and more specifically governments) with a choice: We can “acknowledge the truth of what we are facing, or we can continue to kick the can down the road and allow the effects of a heating planet to have even more detrimental outcomes on all living beings.”⁵¹² Simplifying a range of policy options to two choices makes it seem that any action will suffice, which undermines the complexity of determining climate policy. Furthermore, depicting climate

change as an illness leads to ambiguity about what caused the illness. The focus shifts to reducing carbon emissions (which will stop climate change) rather than digging deeper into the ideologies that promote endless growth and capitalist expansion over more environmentally conscious mindsets.

Reading XR's *emergency of the present-future* chronotope through the disease metaphor provides important insight into how the group orients us to think about and understand climate change. By bringing in more temporal complexity, the disease metaphor situates action as immediately necessary. Its temporal intensity, however, condenses space to a global body, erasing the uneven spatial distribution of climate impacts. The force of time produces anger at the irrationality of not acting swiftly, oversimplifying climate action. Cuomo defines climate change as an urgent issue and argues, "this urgency should shape our ideas about what ought to be done about it, and by whom."⁵¹³ While climate action is desperately needed, the chronotope's oversimplification of climate inaction obscures the underlying ideological causes of the crisis, which would lead to actions made unreflectively, especially in consideration of those already facing impacts. In other words, the *emergency of the present-future* oversimplifies climate solutions and climate inaction in problematic ways. It creates more urgency and operates as a disruption to normal practices while simultaneously limiting our ability to meaningfully engage with and respond to the issue.

Climate Tragedy

In the *climate tragedy* chronotope,⁵¹⁴ climate change represents an ongoing process of change marked by irreversible loss.⁵¹⁵ Foster explains, "while problems can sometimes have solutions, tragedy involves terrible loss, unmitigated and uncompensated."⁵¹⁶ Recasting climate change as a tragedy attunes us to the ways in which climate change alters our relationships to

each other and our environments through rising temperatures and sea-levels, changing landscapes, and environmental catastrophes. Ashlee Cunsolo and Neville Ellis define ecological grief as “grief associated with physical ecological losses (land, ecosystems and species), grief associated with disruptions to environmental knowledge and loss of identity, and grief associated with anticipated future ecological losses.”⁵¹⁷ Addressing climate change requires identifying and mourning these non-human⁵¹⁸ losses and coming to terms with the failure to act on climate change before these losses occurred.⁵¹⁹ In this view, mourning is a resource for climate action in that mourning rituals provide “a temporal, spatial, and social framework upon which to begin reorienting what has become disoriented.”⁵²⁰⁵²¹ The *climate tragedy* chronotope works against the *emergency of the present-future* and *emergency of the future* chronotopes that depict climate change as a future threat by shifting focus to the vulnerability we all share amidst a changing climate. Cunsolo and Landman detail that climate losses “can leave us changed in ways we could not have imagined, and hold[s] the possibility of leaving us more open to other bodies, to grief, and to our transcorporeal connections with all bodies.”⁵²² The *climate tragedy* chronotope validates climate grief as an important affective-emotional response to climate change and creates new opportunities to reimagine our socio-ecological relationships.⁵²³ The affective-emotional intensity of grief is the driving force of this chronotope, organizing time and space around mourning as climate action.

Affects-Emotions

Grief is the defining affect-emotion cultivated in the *climate tragedy* chronotope and manifests itself as a variety of other affects-emotions, creating a complex way of relating to and understanding climate change.⁵²⁴ In XR, grief is channeled through heartbreak, anger and despair. Ashlee Cunsolo argues, “mourning not only highlights our collective vulnerability, it

also commands that one respond through grief and pain, rather than solely rage or anger.”⁵²⁵ One activist at the “Grief March” describes, “My heart is broken. And that’s why I’m standing here. Every day my heart breaks open a little bit more.”⁵²⁶ Here, heartbreak reflects the ongoing experience of climate grief and intensifies as each day we are reminded these losses will continue unless action is taken. Another activist at the event recites in their poem, “There’s a constant twist in the depth of my heart. Like I can’t just exist when I know where we are.”⁵²⁷ Heartbreak propels these activists to action because in knowing what has already been lost, they know and fear what they stand to lose.⁵²⁸ Once one recognizes the irreversible changes climate change has brought about, one feels more vulnerable and uncertain about the future. This uncertainty and vulnerability lead to anticipatory grief⁵²⁹ and stimulate anger and despair. As Bendell says in his video, “We may grieve the loss of life and feel despair and anger about how this happened.”⁵³⁰ Despair involves losing the sense of hope that climate catastrophe is still avoidable and can enable inaction.⁵³¹ Anger arises for what caused these losses as one confronts their irreversibility. As one activist says, “I am angry. I am sad. I am mournful of seeing animals washed up on the beach dead, of seeing animals in fields dead.”⁵³² Dealing with climate loss means accepting and confronting not only current losses but anticipated losses through heartbreak, anger, and despair. The *climate tragedy* chronotope channels these various expressions of grief into motivation for climate action.

While the *climate tragedy* chronotope arouses these more negative affective-emotional experiences, it also grounds these activists in their collective appreciation for the natural world. Cunsolo and Ellis argue, “collective experiences of ecological grief may coalesce into a strengthened sense of love and commitment to the places, ecosystems and species that inspire, nurture and sustain us.”⁵³³ In their view, mourning non-human life reminds us of our

interdependence to each other. In their description for the “Grief March,” XR emphasizes, “Grief is subversive. Grief is not a negotiation with Death; it is a Courageous Love letter to Life.”⁵³⁴ To XR, grief can be an “emotional cleansing.”⁵³⁵ It can be difficult but beautiful in that, “When you see the grief in others it touches a known place in you.”⁵³⁶ As they see it, we connect to others through our grief because loss is really about our relationships, both to what we lost and to those that share our loss. Bendell explains, “Before loss there was love. After loss, love.”⁵³⁷ Climate grief reminds XR activists of their love for what they have lost, and this love is their anchor in their feelings of uncertainty and vulnerability.⁵³⁸ Mourning reconnects them to the world around them and reminds them to appreciate and love their environments more fully. Thus, in the *climate tragedy* chronotope, grief transforms the activists’ relationships to each other and their environments by grounding them in their shared vulnerability and interdependence.⁵³⁹

Grief in the *climate tragedy* chronotope delicately balances hope and despair, and through that relationship, hope manifests in a more radical form. Foster details, “Only hope, not needing to base itself on pretending, can accept the tragic – and thus have any chance of seeing us through.”⁵⁴⁰ In this view, hope embraces grief, which helps us experience life and love more fully.⁵⁴¹ XR activists nurture radical hope not from their denial of the ongoing loss and inability to combat climate change but through their reconnection to the world around them. As Byron Williston puts it, to hope for something is to “be open to the possibility that events might render that hope groundless.”⁵⁴² For Foster, hope is an embracing of reality, whereas optimism is a denial of reality.⁵⁴³ In his view, “all turning away from the real is despair.”⁵⁴⁴ Being confronted with endings can be difficult, but also it changes how we view ourselves and each other. As Lisa Kretz details, “Hope can function as a bridge from mourning to action.”⁵⁴⁵ The paradoxical

tension between despair and hope helps us learn from the past and ignites our imagination about what is still possible in the future.⁵⁴⁶ In the uncomfortable space of embracing and mourning environmental losses, one finds a radical hope grounded in shared heartbreak, anger, despair, vulnerability, and love. The *climate tragedy* chronotope, in its affective-emotional intensity, helps us to feel climate change in a way that opens up new pathways to each other and the future.

Time

In the *climate tragedy* chronotope, climate change is relationally understood through the loss it has brought about rather than abstract and exterior time scales that structure the crisis in years or degree limits. To understand this relational time, I draw on queer theories of temporality and mourning and affirm, like Mark Rifkin, that queer frameworks “contest the inevitability of time’s singularity in ways that sketch possibilities for imagining and feeling otherwise.”⁵⁴⁷ Rifkin defines time as a “divergent process of becoming” where “one’s experiences, sensations, and possibilities for action are shaped by the existing inclinations, itineraries, and networks in which one is immersed, turning toward some things and away from others.”⁵⁴⁸ The *climate tragedy* chronotope offers a new temporal orientation for climate social movements grounded in shared grief rather than apocalyptic time scales that view climate crisis as primarily about time, more specially the future. Neimanis and Walker argue that dominant temporalities of climate change tend to revolve around the anticipatory question of “what should we do to stop climate change?”⁵⁴⁹ The *climate tragedy* disrupts these neoliberal, progress and sustainability logics⁵⁵⁰ by depicting climate losses as already present and irreversible. At the “Funeral for Our Future” event, one activist voices, “This is a funeral for all we’ve lost, all we are losing, all we will lose. We come together in that grief because we love this planet. We love each other.”⁵⁵¹ Describing climate change as an ongoing process of loss recognizes how climate change is already a fact of

life for many communities.⁵⁵² At the “Funeral for Our Future,” one activist affirms, “I think the images on these boards just really remind us that we talk about future generations our grandchildren our children. It’s not that. It’s people living and dying, and dying right now.”⁵⁵³ Similar to the *slow emergency* chronotope, the *climate tragedy* chronotope situates climate change within a past, present, and potential future of death and destruction. It disrupts preventative thinking that focuses on taking action before it is too late and suggests that now is already too late for many.⁵⁵⁴

In its anticipatory grief, the *climate tragedy* chronotope disrupts linear temporality and reconfigures our relationship to the future. Joshua Barnett explains how in a Freudian framework, “Mourning is usually figured as a response to loss, which, chronologically speaking, is said to precede the expression of grief.”⁵⁵⁵ In XR, mourning follows and precedes a loss, in that activists mourn what has been lost and what might be lost if action is not taken. Mourning past, present, and future disrupts a linear temporality that provides sequential stages for mourning (something is lost, one mourns, one moves forward). At the “Funeral for Our Future,” the black casket carried in the funeral procession had the words “our future” written in white letters on the side.⁵⁵⁶ At one point, an activist says, “I stand here in black today to mourn for our and my future.”⁵⁵⁷ These moments challenge hopeful visions of the future by viewing it as something already lost and changed by climate change. Mourning reimagines the future and promotes awareness, as one activist details, of “the suffering that we have collectively caused, the heartbreak and the grief that we are collectively responsible for.”⁵⁵⁸ The *climate tragedy* chronotope exposes how some have been protected from climate impacts while others faced precarity, vulnerability, and loss. Mourning the future attends to the ways in which the future was never a given for all.⁵⁵⁹ In doing so, it signifies the future as the loss of possibility.

The *climate tragedy* chronotope, in mourning the future, reveals the failure of dominant future imaginaries to reproduce themselves. Andrew Mark and Amanda Di Battista describe how industrialization, the invention of the atomic bomb, and climate change have led to an uncertainty in the future.⁵⁶⁰ Furthermore, neoliberalism and capitalist logics have undermined long-term thinking and led to corporate and government disregard for the future.⁵⁶¹ Briohny Walker discusses how the Anthropocene marks a new temporal orientation marked by “futurelessness and disorientation.”⁵⁶² In this loss of futures, more specifically capitalist futures,⁵⁶³ Walker sees political opportunity in “queer theories of grief and loss [that] may help guide processes of transition between differing future imaginaries.”⁵⁶⁴ Grieving the loss of these imagined futures, for Walker, reminds of our interdependence and offers alternative ways of relating to each other. In his video on grief, Bendell gets at this temporal disorientation with the loss of our collective futures:

After we accept the full tragedy of climate change, what do we have left? Most people I meet sense that life is meaningful. Belief in a future is one way we look for such meaning [...] What future can we believe in now? And if that isn't possible, where can we find meaning?⁵⁶⁵

Mourning the future encapsulates us in the disoriented feeling of losing our collective futures. Sylvan Goldberg argues, “what climate change does so well is to render unfamiliar the things we have been looking at all along, to distort the known into something both familiar and strange.”⁵⁶⁶ Mourning can make familiar futures unfamiliar and can give us a new way to relate to and understand futurity as the future becomes more and more unrecognizable. In doing so, mourning the future can, like Kara Keeling argues about queer temporality, “introduce risk and uncertainty into present speculations about futures, and urge those of us still here now to action without guarantees.”⁵⁶⁷ The *climate tragedy* chronotope exposes the inability for our collective imagined

futures to reproduce themselves, and in that uncertainty, our relationship to the future is transformed, as grief offers a new way of affectively-emotionally relating to it.

Mourning climate losses grounds us in a relational time that recognizes our connections simultaneously to those that came before, exist with us, and will come after.⁵⁶⁸ Through signs such as “RIP Life on Earth”⁵⁶⁹ and moments such as one activist saying “I am carrying this coffin to signify or symbolize all the deaths that have happened because of climate change and all the deaths that will happen if we do not act,”⁵⁷⁰ the past, present, and future become interrelated and shape each other. One of the activists named Abby, in her poem, recites, “We remember them, who hour by shinning hour, gave all they have to give, for someone else’s power. But yet the dead do live. We sing their songs so we might hear their voices still. They live in you and me.”⁵⁷¹ In this moment, Abby recognizes how loss does not mean something ceases to exist but rather it changes forms as those still alive create new ways of remembering and relating to it. In other words, mourning tethers us to the past, present, and future. Keeling elucidates how queer temporality reflects “the unpredictable and the unknowable in time that governs errant, eccentric, promiscuous, and unexpected organizations of social life.”⁵⁷² Thus, the *climate tragedy* chronotope, in its “queer times,” encapsulates the alternative ways of relating to the past, present, and future that disrupt linear time and are incommensurate with dominant future imaginaries. Mourning past, present, and future climate losses are queer practices and temporal frameworks that offer a new way of affectively-emotionally relating to time.

Space

Space in the *climate tragedy* chronotope takes form in two ways: by what we are grieving and by where activists grieve. In their grief events, XR activists highlight non-human spatial disruptions and losses that correspond with our loss of relationality and culture. Space becomes

irreplaceable. Leslie, one of the speakers at the “Funeral for Our Future” event, recites his poem “Paradise Lost” about a Northern Island of Hawaii that had recently been washed away by rising sea levels:

Meanwhile, half a mile of sand safe until now a stop of refuge for seals and turtles has melted into nothingness. Two. The storm took it leaving us behind [...] the full envelope of life now torn apart and scattered, dissolved into air leaving behind a space where in dreams we mouth the words from ball games and yards, can we have it back please.⁵⁷³

Leslie describes how the island’s disappearance leads to life scattered and displaced. He goes onto to recite, “Invisible now, with only the maps as proof. Lying low in a huge blue, you are all salt and under tow. Your story as stars deep sea drift on the Oceania ancestors going down with the sun. Memories of the gods.”⁵⁷⁴ The loss of place accompanies a loss of memory and culture. Another activist says, “The disappearance of our old songs go hand in hand with the disappearance of our biodiversity. They are all connected. The loss of habitat, of individuality, and the unique expressions of culture and unique expressions of our environment.”⁵⁷⁵ In these moments, space and memory are knotted together, as we are cultivated by the non-human world around us. Doreen Massey details, “Space does not exist prior to identities/entities and their relations.”⁵⁷⁶ Environmental losses correspond with our loss of relationality. Space shapes our sense of culture, and the loss of that space results in the loss of who we are. In the *climate tragedy* chronotope, space is not mere background but is deeply tied to our connections to each other. The centering of our shared connectivity through grief works to reinscribe that spatial connectivity even as it has been severed due to climate losses.

If space is co-constitutive of interrelations, as Massey describes, then it is always in the making.⁵⁷⁷ XR’s *climate tragedy* chronotope transforms public space by bringing people together through their shared grief. Cunsolo asserts that climate grief has been silenced in public discourse.⁵⁷⁸ In this silencing, there is an absence of spaces to meaningfully engage with climate

grief. One of the group's blog posts "Rebel Daily" gets at this silencing noting, "Many of those reading this will, in the past days and months, have fought, grafted and struggled to build spaces where human beings can come together, support one another in a shared sense of loving grief."⁵⁷⁹ XR activists challenge this absence by turning public spaces into spaces for mourning climate losses. In their invitation to the "Grief March" event, the group invites activists to "join the jazz-funeral band, black horses and globe, XR Skeletons Rebellion and Art Blockers flags in a short ceremony of grief, followed by a funeral procession through the streets of London."⁵⁸⁰ Participants are invited to express themselves through the mourning rituals of their culture.⁵⁸¹ Similarly, at the "Funeral for Our Future," protestors are asked to dress in "funeral-wear to honor the dead and to bring wreaths, black and white umbrellas, flowers and pictures of extinct animals to lay outside parliament."⁵⁸² This event took place in prominent locations in London such as Victoria, Earl's Court, Elephant and Castle, and Tower Bridge and shut down parts of the city.⁵⁸³ Massey describes London as a global city characterized by its connection to global financial markets, and yet, she argues it cannot completely suppress encounters with diversity due to the variety of people who enter the city.⁵⁸⁴ Public ceremonies of grief for the loss of humans, animals, and environments transform this global city and interrupt these financial spatial logics. Public spaces become space for climate grief, challenging its exclusion within the public sphere.

In drawing on rituals of mourning, the group further remakes these public spaces as funerals. On mourning the environment, Sebastian Braun says, "Mourning as an act to express participation and responsibility is a public performance, a public acknowledgement, a ritual practice."⁵⁸⁵ We see this public performance when an XR speaker states, "Dearly beloved, we are gathered here today to mark the passing of 200+ species each day."⁵⁸⁶ Here, public spaces are remade as activists inscribe mourning rituals onto public settings. In the funeral procession at the

“Funeral for Our Future,” the procession shut down parts of the street, forcing many onlookers to stop and take in what was happening.⁵⁸⁷ The funeral itself was hard to ignore, as it interrupted the flow of daily life by backing up traffic. In a grief “sit-in” on Downing Street, all of the protestors sat down and remained quiet for about seven minutes.⁵⁸⁸ In this moment, silence offered respect for those that had died and validity to those grieving, but it also transformed this public space into a space for grieving. During the moment of silence, a man became particularly loud. One of the protestors said, “Sir, don’t forget this is a funeral.” The man replied, “No it ain’t. No one’s died. It ain’t a funeral.”⁵⁸⁹ The protestor then countered, “60 Percent of biodiversity has died. That’s the truth. Just be respectful.”⁵⁹⁰ In these moments, public space is marked by the encounter between those working to transform public consciousness and those forced to watch these displays of mourning. Alternative understandings of climate change develop as new relationships within space are forged.

In the *climate tragedy* chronotope, objects of mourning become ways of further remaking space. At the “Funeral for Our Future,” the black casket was placed outside the gates of Buckingham Palace and protestors were asked to lay flowers, wreaths, and other mementos around it.⁵⁹¹ Some of these items included: a wooden frame with the words “91% of UK Population Decline Since 1995” over an image of a Turtle Dove, pictures of people standing in water halfway up their legs,⁵⁹² a note with the words “in memoriam of our beautiful blue planet,”⁵⁹³ a stuffed animal polar bear, and a banana with the words “Save our Souls.”⁵⁹⁴ These objects and embodied elements connect with Joan Berzoff’s point that “for mourners, aspects of the person who has died come to reside in the self. Finally, the mourner becomes identified with the lost object.”⁵⁹⁵ Collective grief re-constitutes the natural world and animal lives as grievable, which opens up new ways of relating to the non-human world. Space in the *climate tragedy*

chronotope is marked by the interrelations between us and our environments. Remaking prominent London spaces as spaces for climate grief disrupts the spatial logics of the city and allows for new meanings and relationships to be cultivated.

Possibilities of Action

For the *climate tragedy* chronotope, climate action involves remembering and mourning climate losses as a way to forge new connections.⁵⁹⁶ The “Funeral for Our Future” event invites protestors to “remember and mourn all the life lost, all the lives we are losing at the moment – around 200 species per day and untold numbers of humans – and the life still to be lost.”⁵⁹⁷ Similarly, at the “Grief March,” activists are called to “Remember who gives you birth. Remember mother earth. I am the soil that harvests the seed. I am the crop the good soil yields.”⁵⁹⁸ These calls for remembrance draw our attention to the way the natural world provides life and sustains us.⁵⁹⁹ To remember is to relate. Barnett explains that in naming and remembering our losses, we honor them in “their singularity, and so also their mortality, their radical lose-ability.”⁶⁰⁰ In the *climate tragedy* chronotope, mourning is a deeply rhetorical climate action aimed at (re)establishing connections and relationships. Sarah Ahmed insists that maintaining relationships with those we have lost can enable new forms of attachment.⁶⁰¹ Ahmed continues, “keeping the past alive, even as that which has been lost, is ethical: the object is not severed from history, or encrypted, but can acquire new meanings and possibilities in the present.”⁶⁰² Mourning as climate action is ethical in its ability to create new meanings and transform socio-ecological relationships.⁶⁰³ It changes how we think about climate change by reminding us of our connections to each other and our environments. Thus, grief and mourning motivate climate action through bringing us into contact with the suffering and vulnerability of

others.⁶⁰⁴ For Judith Butler, to grieve is to identify with suffering.⁶⁰⁵ Through such an identification, we are reminded of why action is necessary.

The work of mourning evoked through the *climate tragedy* chronotope fosters criticism of the structures that enable environmental losses. Cunsolo and Landman describe “resistance mourning” as a form of ethical protest that leaves grief unresolved in order to garner a sense of responsibility for the loss and to critique the structures that enable some lives to be ungrievable.⁶⁰⁶ XR utilizes mourning as a critique of environmental injustices. At the “Grief March,” one speaker blamed the billionaires for exploiting the earth and polluting the planet.⁶⁰⁷ The speaker went on to say, “that money and that wealth they’ve accumulated is ours for all of us in the world.”⁶⁰⁸ Here, mourning exposes the economic structures that enable the prosperity of some at the expense and death of others.⁶⁰⁹ Another speaker named Cofey describes climate change as the result of “corporate greed” that has resulted in “a carnage of slaughter of all life forms.”⁶¹⁰ In these moments, the activists condemn the capitalist structures that enabled the crisis. Unresolved mourning becomes, as Clifton Spargo clarifies, “‘a dissenting act’ that pushes against the limits of what is grievable and how we grieve because ‘mourning,’ especially in its most extreme cases, brings our assumptions about reality into question.”⁶¹¹ Critiquing the structures that enable the death of some allows for reflection on what remains silenced and disavowed within public discourse.⁶¹² In other words, mourning brings our assumptions and values into focus, which opens up possibilities to rethink and restructure how we relate to each other and our environments.

Mourning practices, through a politicization of grief, reorient what bodies and entities are grievable and are a form of civil disobedience aimed at disrupting business as usual. During the “Funeral for Our Future,” protestors sought to dig a hole for a coffin that symbolizes our current

and future losses. The coffin itself had “OUR FUTURE” written in white letters on its sides. Butler affirms, “if a life is not grievable, it is not quite a life; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if not the unburiable.”⁶¹³ The act of symbolically burying the casket in a space not authorized for burials reconstitutes that life as something buriable and functions as a bold disruption to the spatial norms of the city. One of the protestors Jo says, “Those that think we should apologize for wanting to obstruct business as usual there is death all around us.”⁶¹⁴ Climate mourning becomes a new and bold wakeup call that heightens the pressure for change by disrupting the day to day. Not only is mourning a way of reconfiguring our relationships, it is also an act of civil disobedience that puts pressure on governments to respond and brings climate grief into public consciousness.⁶¹⁵

The *climate tragedy* chronotope’s affective-emotionally intensity disrupts linear temporality, highlights the irreplaceability of space, and fosters mourning as climate action. The chronotope creates material and discursive shifts by depicting natural life as mournable and worthy of our ethical and political action.⁶¹⁶ Such a move challenges chronotopes that view climate change as a future threat by using our collective vulnerability and uncertainty in the future as motivation for climate action. While the chronotope points us away from practical implementation of climate policy like the other chronotopes, it provides a deeper reflection on why action is necessary, reconfigures our relationship to past, present, and future, and offers a radical hope rooted in our collective vulnerability. It brings our values into focus, and in doing so, it can be an important tool for changing how we ethically relate to and understand climate change.⁶¹⁷

Competing Chronotopes

The two chronotopes and their affective-emotional intensities point to different reasons for why we should care about climate change. Read through the disease metaphor, the *emergency of the present-future* engages in “all or nothing thinking”⁶¹⁸ in its derision of inaction as irrational. The focus is not on what action is required, as that is assumed to be obvious, but the lack of will to act. This perspective is problematic because it suggests that our struggle with climate action is only our motivation to do it. In contrast, the *climate tragedy* chronotope puts climate action into context of working to minimize the damage of what has already been done. One XR speaker gets at this noting, “We are not here today to be happy, we are here today to find the courage to face what is, to try to stop it from getting horribly worse, and to try if we possibly can at the end of the day, and it’s going to be a very long day, to make it better.”⁶¹⁹ This is an important distinction. For the *climate tragedy* chronotope, climate action cannot stave off the tragic, as some have already experienced innumerable losses. This recognition forces us to be more reflective about what actions we take, as our actions will not just impact the future, and indicates that we should care about the issue because of the damage it is already doing. The *climate tragedy* chronotope can shift us to a notion of “every degree matters”⁶²⁰ because each additional degree causes more loss and grief. These two perspectives create a disjointed understanding of climate action. Either we need to get over our irrational impulses and seek treatment before it is too late, or we need to embrace our grief, mourning climate losses as a way to transform how we and others approach climate action.

Together, these two chronotopes expose an underlying tension emanating from the perceived temporal and spatial distance of climate change. This perception starts from the recognition that public engagement with climate change is low.⁶²¹ Scholars suggest this stems

from psychological distance from the issue.⁶²² As Neimanis and Walker argue, “Melting ice caps and rising sea levels are ‘perceived as spatially and temporally distant’ from our everyday lives.”⁶²³ In this psychological distance, climate change is an “uncertain event that might occur far in the future, impacting distant places and affecting people dissimilar to themselves.”⁶²⁴ In other words, climate change is not perceived as an immediate threat, and as such, climate change presents temporal and spatial difficulties that impede public engagement with the issue. To overcome these obstacles, scholars suggest we must “extend the sphere of moral concern though both space and time.”⁶²⁵ Both of these two chronotopes reflect ways in which moral concern is cultivated in light of these perceived temporal and spatial difficulties.

In the first chronotope, ethics arises from the assumption that to care about the climate we need to see addressing it as a matter of self-preservation. Madeleine Fagan describes this ethical subject as “the individualised, rational, active and self-interested subject of modernity”⁶²⁶ The self-preservation ethical perspective assumes people are only motivated by “extreme and proximal suffering, or by the need to protect material and corporeal self-interest.”⁶²⁷ In the *emergency of the present-future*, as read through the disease metaphor, the illness is not currently fatal, but we should take action to protect ourselves from a terminal diagnosis in the future. Climate action becomes an act of self-perseveration. The disease metaphor has several important ethical implications: First, it upholds a “neoclassical economic view of humans as rational agents who make choices to further their self-interest,”⁶²⁸ and it does so under the assumption that all of humanity is and can be motivated by that self-interest. This perspective leads to a homogenous view of the crisis and the need for global action, which erases important political questions and differences.⁶²⁹ Second, the global view blames humans for the crisis rather than particular people, nations, industries, and economic systems which “diverts attention from the real sources

of the problem and reproduces the narrow view that there is a universal greedy human nature that inevitably leads toward planetary destruction.”⁶³⁰ Third, the projection of a terminal diagnosis onto the future reflects the influence of a “strong futurism that has overrun our public authorities, our conceptions of how and when decisions have to be made, and even our innermost feelings.”⁶³¹ The obsession with the future keeps us continually focused on the temporal (future existence) rather than the uneven spatial distribution of climate impacts (Indigenous Peoples).⁶³² The future is always marked by a threat to our survival, whether literally or in the sense of our familial legacy. Self-interest ethics suggests we should care about climate change because we care about ourselves. It aims for unity but only by erasing our differences and relation to each other.

The *climate tragedy* chronotope starts from a different assumption. Fagan argues self-interest perspectives are based on the idea “that we start off as not in relation and not responsible—with or for one another, future generations, or the natural world—and that we need ethics in order to produce a sense of relation and so responsibility.”⁶³³ The *climate tragedy* chronotope assumes the opposite: that we are deeply connected and implicated in the world around us. Butler defines mourning as “a restorative spiritual practice that can rekindle an awareness of the bonds that connect all life-forms to one another and to the larger ecological whole.”⁶³⁴ In other words, mourning reaffirms our collective vulnerability, dependency and responsibility.⁶³⁵ The *climate tragedy* chronotope posits that climate change can be “felt, sensed, apprehended emotionally, passing noticed and unnoticed as part of the fabric of everyday life in which acceptance, denial, resignation and action co-exist as personal and social responses to the local manifestations of a global problem.”⁶³⁶ The *climate tragedy* chronotope resituates people in a web of responsibility to and for others and resists narratives and tropes that would bring grief

through to catharsis, thus provoking ethical questions about the social forces that have prevented the work of mourning from being accomplished.⁶³⁷ The chronotope recognizes the ways in which we are constituted by our human and non-human relationships.

The tension between these two ethical frameworks reveals our ongoing struggle to understand why people lack motivation for climate action. Instead of suggesting we only act in our own interest, the *climate tragedy* suggests that relational ethics can emerge through affective-emotional intensities that remind us of our connections to each other and our environments. Instead of seeing us as “either individuals distinct from nature and from future generations or part of a universal whole undifferentiated across time and space,”⁶³⁸ the *climate tragedy* chronotope grounds us in these relationships while upholding our differences. As we continue to address the lack of public engagement with climate change, we must ask if we are starting from the wrong assumptions. Perhaps, perceived psychological distance can be overcome without motivation grounded in our self-interest. Sarah Amsler suggests “that different deployments of crisis thinking have different ‘affect-effects’ and consequences for ethical and political practice.”⁶³⁹ As this chapter highlights, different chronotopes and their affective-emotional orientations have different implications for ethical and political responses. Both chronotopes provide different reasons for why we should care about climate change and why we should respond in certain ways. Exposing these clashing ethical frameworks attunes us to our ongoing struggles to understand climate inaction and, at times, the false assumptions we make in addressing it. Simultaneously, it points us to other ways of motivating action that move us out of the self-perseveration mindset. Such a perspective can enhance our ability to understand and relate to climate change.

CHAPTER FIVE:

CONCLUSION

I began Chapter One with the problem of climate inaction. Many scholars have found “a disparity between the gravity of climate change and the extent of global and individual responses.”⁶⁴⁰ These scholars suggest mainstream environmentalism has failed to mobilize and engage the world around the issue of climate change.⁶⁴¹ Each dire warning continues to go unheeded. As John Foster says, “If each successive missed deadline, breached threshold or authoritative warning is a wake-up call to the world, the global alarm clock must be set very firmly to ‘Snooze.’”⁶⁴² Instead of increased urgency, scholars argue climate change evokes “paralysis,”⁶⁴³ “denial,”⁶⁴⁴ and “psychic withdrawal.”⁶⁴⁵ Climate change is a complex existential threat, interrelated to many other social problems and entangled within many power structures.⁶⁴⁶ Addressing this complex problem requires a rethinking of climate rhetoric and the problem of climate inaction, a task this thesis has set out to accomplish. The focus on the apocalyptic imaginary has limited our understanding of climate rhetoric. To address this limitation, I set out to illuminate how time, space, and affects-emotions shape our understanding and perceived ability to respond to climate change.

In Chapter Two, I analyzed the rhetoric of Fridays for Future and the two chronotopes *emergency of the future* and *emergency of the present*. In this case study, I found a tendency to focus on urgency at the expense of the kind of climate action needed. Activists imbue climate time with chronormative, apocalyptic, and reactive temporal orientations aimed at heightening the urgency for action. Time works through space in the *emergency of the future*, while the

emergency of the present evokes local heterogenous impacts to simultaneously reinforce the immediacy and global nature of the crisis. Both chronotopes cultivate fear, anger, and guilt, blaming adults for their failure to take climate action. In their emphasize on time, the chronotopes limit the possibilities for climate action to rapidly cutting carbon emissions without consideration of larger national and international obstacles to coordinated action. Through these clashing temporal perspectives, the time for climate action becomes simultaneously before the present crisis and before 2030, leading to a conflicting sense of when action is actually required. Together, these temporal perspectives oversimplify climate time in their attempts to overcome the temporal distance of climate change. What results is a heavy focus on the future and present without consideration of the complex relationship between past, present, and future. The tension between these temporal perspectives reveals our ongoing struggle to temporalize climate change in a way that balances urgency with time to act. I argued for the need to interrogate the assumption that urgency prompts climate action and suggested a heavy focus on time forecloses rather than enhances the possibilities for action.

In Chapter Three, I unpacked the spatial intensities in Indigenous Peoples' climate rhetoric through the *emergency of the present* and *slow emergency*. The *emergency of the present* transforms through its spatial intensity, as Indigenous Peoples are positioned at the frontline of climate change. The frontline metaphor characterizes Indigenous communities spatially via vulnerability, whereas the *slow emergency* highlights spatiality and temporality to affirm Indigenous resilience and adaptation as resources for climate solutions. The spatial intensity of the war metaphor cultivates anxiety and a collaborative hope, whereas the temporal and spatial intensity of resilience provokes anger at the United Nations for blocking action and Indigenous Peoples as an evidential hope that change is possible. Both chronotopes aim to overcome the

spatial distance of climate change, but the *emergency of the present* reaffirms a homogenous view of humanity against the climate, concealing the underlying causes of the crisis. In its critique of progress, the *slow emergency* chronotope positions Indigenous Peoples as active agents throughout time and space and depicts them as sustainable leaders the rest of the world must learn from. In the first chronotope, climate action is more reflective of the needs of Indigenous communities; however, it is also limited by the homogenous spatial relationship of humanity and climate change. In contrast, the *slow emergency* grounds climate action in respect for and rights of Indigenous communities. Together, the clashing perspectives reveal the tension between needing urgent action and needing reflective action. As we continue to miss key deadlines and “turning points,” the need for immediate action becomes more and more pronounced; however, immediate action can often be unreflective action, perpetuating harm to these communities. How we take action matters, and this case study raises concerns that are vital to our consideration of climate justice. Furthermore, these competing chronotopes reveal marginalized communities’ ongoing struggle to challenge and subvert dominant understandings of climate change. Indigenous activists delicately balance reappropriating and critiquing dominant understandings of time, space, and affects-emotions. Analyzing these competing chronotopes allows for a fuller recognition of how Indigenous Peoples negotiate their participation and agency within these climate negotiations.⁶⁴⁷ Attending to this struggle affirms that “cultural values and practices of particular groups of people in particular places are important for understanding the meanings and consequences of climate change.”⁶⁴⁸

In Chapter Four, I turned to Extinction Rebellion and the temporal and affective-emotional intensities found in the chronotopes *emergency of the present-future* and *climate tragedy*. In the *emergency of the present-future*, time once again gains greatest intensity,

organizing space and affects-emotions around the temporality of the disease metaphor. Homogenous impacts obscure spatial differences as we all become one body sick with climate change. Anger at inaction and hope that a cure is possible animate this chronotope. Climate action is oversimplified to seeking treatment, and the current impacts of climate change are disregarded through the illness being curable and not terminal. In contrast, the *climate tragedy* chronotope understands time and space through grief. Affects-emotions take on intensity as grief manifests in a variety of affective-emotional experiences: fear, anger, despair, heartbreak, love, and radical hope. The chronotope offers mourning as climate action to transform our socio-ecological relationships and reconnect to each other. Together, the two chronotopes highlight the tension between clashing ethical frameworks: one grounded in a self-preservation mindset, and one grounded in our interdependence. The case study challenges our understanding of climate inaction and suggests it is founded on false assumptions about how people affectively-emotionally engage with the issue.

Contributions

All together, these case studies illustrate the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional complexity currently oversimplified in climate rhetorical scholarship. The apocalyptic imaginary pervades these texts, but time, space, and affects-emotions change forms and work with and against that imaginary. Attending to this chronotopic complexity reveals the ongoing struggles to make sense of climate change in public discourse. Chronotopes provide an insightful analytic for understanding time, space, and affects-emotions and the way they shape our understandings of climate change. Throughout these case studies, I offer several contributions to climate change rhetorical scholarship and the chronotopic literature that could deepen future engagement with these areas of study.

Affects-Emotions

First, I demonstrate through these case studies the important role affects-emotions play within chronotopic orientations. Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren argue, “emotion is the driver of action; that merely knowing something is not enough to achieve acting upon that knowledge. One needs to ‘feel’ the knowledge in order to be moved to act by it.”⁶⁴⁹ As I have shown, our affective-emotional understanding of climate change influences our perceived ability and motivation to respond. While Bakhtin recognizes how chronotopes connect to emotions and values, I consider more fully how affective-emotional relationships shape time and space relationships. In other words, time and space do not simply cultivate affects-emotions, but affects-emotions also organize and influence the way time and space manifest. This perspective provides a deeper understanding of how chronotopes operate within rhetorical texts and situations. Furthermore, attending to affects-emotions in climate rhetoric moves us out of the fear (despair) and hope dichotomy⁶⁵⁰ within the apocalyptic literature by bringing in the range of affects-emotions activists arouse in their climate rhetoric: anxiety, anger, panic, fear, hope (in all its forms), grief, heartbreak, despair, love, etc. While more attention has been given to affective-emotional experiences of climate change,⁶⁵¹ climate rhetorical scholars need to pay more attention to how these affects-emotions shape the possibilities and limitations for climate action. Mitchell Reyes and Kundai Chirindo describe how the exploitation of “bodies and planet are two sides of the same necropolitical coin, one oriented internally (to the group ‘Homo sapiens’) and one oriented externally (to the group ‘nonhuman’). Combined, they have brought us to the precarity of the Anthropocene.”⁶⁵² This precarity elicits more affective-emotional experiences than previously realized, and the way these experiences are directed for action will have important implications for climate policy. My addition of affects-emotions to the chronotopic

framework offers a more comprehensive approach for scholars interested in the way affects-emotions relate with time and space and how affects-emotions function within climate rhetoric.

In my attention to affects-emotions, I also aimed to enhance rhetorical scholars' understanding of hope and the variety of ways it is conjured in climate activism. In the *emergency of the future* and the *emergency of the present-future*, one finds a temporal hope grounded in the time left to act before facing detrimental consequences. In contrast, Indigenous Peoples' climate rhetoric provides two different hopes: one based on climate change's ability to unify and the other in the international communities' ability to respond based on Indigenous Peoples' historical resilience and adaptation. Finally, the *climate tragedy* chronotope cultivates a radical hope grounded in accepting the devastating impact climate change has already had while also holding onto the idea another world is possible. All case studies maintain a sense of hope, even as that hope shifts forms, suggesting hope is a key part of the affective-emotional way people engage with climate change. Different forms of hope provide different possibilities for climate action. My categorizing these different hope appeals gestures towards more complexity in the way hope operates in climate rhetoric. Sarah Amsler describes an ongoing crisis of hope emanating from "a concern that the totality of our prevailing social practices negates the human desire for both transcendence and connection."⁶⁵³ In Amsler's view the experience of powerlessness caused by "uncontrollable and often nebulous forces" such as climate change result in an experience of "disempowered 'drift.'"⁶⁵⁴ Hope remains an important part of our ability to conceive agency. Thus, it is even more imperative now that we consider what hope we can cultivate and how that hope influences the limitations and possibilities for climate action. As Christopher Groves puts it, "The goal is both to enable people to give voice to fears and offer them the opportunity to retrieve concrete hope in the face of uncertainty."⁶⁵⁵ Hope is a prominent

part of climate rhetoric and it is important to recognize the multitude of forms it takes and how that shapes our understanding of climate change.

Chronotopes and Power Structures

My second contribution is a deeper understanding of how time, space, and affects-emotions remain tied to power structures, enabling certain ways of viewing and responding to the crisis. Temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional orientations are always “figured in relation to society” and “these figurations orient political decisions, thereby rooting imagined futures in the material now.”⁶⁵⁶ In other words, chronotopic frameworks have socio-ecological and political implications. As these case studies exemplify, more homogenous chronotopic perspectives conceal important causes of the crisis. Chris Cuomo argues, “Particular people and particular cultures, nations, industries, and economic systems have caused and contributed to the pollution that created the industrial greenhouse effect, and we need not take those actors to be representative of the entire human species.”⁶⁵⁷ Climate change is the direct result of capitalism and colonialism⁶⁵⁸ and “was manufactured in a crucible of inequality.”⁶⁵⁹ Chronotopes, such as the *emergency of the present-future*, *emergency of the present*, and *emergency of the future*, conceal these underlying causes and limit our ability to fully address the issue. For example, the *emergency of the present* in Indigenous Peoples’ climate rhetoric suggests we are all at war with climate change, erasing the way the vulnerability of those on the frontline was enabled by the excessive carbon emissions of others. Chronotopic analysis provides an understanding of the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional power dynamics within climate rhetoric. The apocalyptic imaginary, and climate rhetoric more broadly, naturalizes certain time, space, and affects-emotions relationships. Finding and isolating these relationships denaturalizes them and opens up alternative temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional orientations.⁶⁶⁰ Thus, paying more

attention to these relationships not only draws attention to the power formations shaping our understandings of climate change, but it also affirms Kara Keeling's argument that "whatever escapes meaning and valuation, exists as an impossible possibility within our shared reality, however one theoretically describes that reality, and therefore threatens to unsettle, if not destroy, the common senses on which that reality relies for its coherence."⁶⁶¹ In other words, chronotopes denaturalize these relationships by uncovering orientations irreducible to dominant frameworks. Such orientations create new meanings and relationships, transforming how we think about climate change. I add to the chronotopic framework not only more attention to the relationship between chronotopes and power, but also the way that relationship opens up other ways of conceiving and feeling time, space, and affects-emotions.

Chronotopic Intensities

Third, my thesis also contributes chronotopic intensities to our understanding of how chronotopes operate within and across texts. Bakhtin describes the inseparability⁶⁶² of time and space, noting, "In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole."⁶⁶³ In his original theorizations, time and space operate together. I have shown, however, that different parts of the chronotope gain intensity within certain texts, organizing the other entailments in particular ways. Each chronotope I explored was driven by a temporal, spatial, or affective-emotional intensity, and the other entailments were configured to support the force of this primary entailment. The *emergency of the future* and the *emergency of the present-future* were driven by a temporal intensity, organizing space and affects-emotions around the need for urgent and timely action. In contrast, the *emergency of the present* in Indigenous Peoples' rhetoric shifted to a spatial intensity, organizing time and affects-emotions through the frontline metaphor. The affective-emotional

intensity of grief animated the *climate tragedy* chronotope, organizing time and space around mourning as climate action; whereas, the *emergency of the present* in F4F and *slow emergency* were driven by a temporal and spatial intensity, as affects-emotions were relegated to a supportive role. All case studies illuminate the force of these intensities and the way they determine how the other entailments function, a compelling insight for future exploration in the chronotopic literature.

If chronotopes are commonplaces across rhetorical texts and situations, it is important to also understand the way these chronotopes are malleable, highlighting certain entailments to fit the particular rhetorical context. Jack argues, “chronotopes are not independent or static, but interact across space and time.”⁶⁴ I build on this understanding by paying more attention to how they interact and transform within different climate activist groups. While I show how the entailments operate together, my attention to intensities offers a rich starting point for reanimating the concept in rhetorical scholarship and for better understanding how chronotopes function within climate rhetoric.

Competing Chronotopes

My final addition to the chronotopic literature is more attention to how different chronotopes work together in the same rhetorical text, creating complex and perhaps fractured understandings of how to respond and relate to social problems. In the beginning, I outlined the apocalyptic imaginary and the tendency for climate change to be “framed in planetary terms: a ‘global’ concern requiring ‘global’ action and knowledge and so subordinating accounts of the subject as politically differentiated.”⁶⁵ This homogenizing tendency animates many of these rhetorical artifacts and yet, each case study also displays a tendency towards heterogenous spatial understandings of climate impacts. I understand these competing chronotopes within each

chapter to emerge from the ongoing tensions between newer rhetorical appeals and more traditional apocalyptic warnings.

As the rhetorical situation changes, so does our rhetoric; and yet, our understanding of climate change is still deeply saturated with apocalyptic temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional understandings. Paying attention to these competing chronotopes provides a closer look at those tensions but also exposes the underlying reasons for them: the rhetorical obstacles inhibiting our ability to encapsulate climate change within any single chronotope. Analyzing interacting chronotopes “reveals the multiplicity of assumptions around climate change and challenges the idea of a unified narrative of climate change that works to legitimise particular responses.”⁶⁶⁶ Disrupting a unified narrative opens up ways of reconceptualizing the issue and reimagining our available responses. Thus, competing chronotopes point to the negotiations over meaning within rhetorical texts and situations. In exposing the failures to create a unified “story” about a social problem, they help us grasp more fully the complexity of the issue and our available responses.

To summarize, I build on chronotopic scholarship by adding affects-emotions to the chronotopic framework, considering more fully the relationship between chronotopes and power, illustrating the malleability of chronotopes across texts through varying intensities of elements, and providing a fuller understanding of competing chronotopes within texts, the way they interact, and what insights are gleaned from paying more attention to these interactions. Not only could these additions reanimate chronotopes in rhetorical scholarship, but they also provide a better way of analyzing time, space, and affects-emotions in climate rhetoric. I view chronotopes as a site for struggles over meaning. Analyzing chronotopes across different climate activist

groups reveals the ongoing struggle over how climate change should be understood and that site is an important starting point for rethinking how we approach climate rhetoric.

Future Research

Beyond my main contributions, there are three important insights from this project that could enhance future research. First, space and affects-emotions are just as important to our understanding to climate change as time.⁶⁶⁷ When I set out on this journey, I, like other scholars, was fascinated by how “Time informs global warming discourse in a variety of complex and overlapping ways.”⁶⁶⁸ While this project certainly meditates upon time in numerous ways, space and affects-emotions are always operating as well. Doreen Massey argues, “for time to be open, space must be in some sense open too. The non-recognition of the simultaneity of open-ended multiplicities that is the spatial can vitiate the project of opening up temporality.”⁶⁶⁹ In other words, to embrace the multiplicity of temporality requires for Massey an embracing of the multiplicity of spatiality, and I would add the multiplicity of affectivity-emotionality. Capital and colonial formations pervade the way we experience time, space, and affects-emotions, but these are not the only chronotopic orientations. They are “various configurations that— though sometimes difficult to see—are always open to transformation and reparation.”⁶⁷⁰ While temporality has played an important role in rhetorical scholarship,⁶⁷¹ this project suggests it is time to consider more fully space and affects-emotions in climate activism and rhetorical scholarship more broadly. Eric Zencey affirms, “To fix on any single image of time to the exclusion of others is to deny ourselves some part of the richness of human experience.”⁶⁷² I counter, however, that we need to not only embrace temporal diversity⁶⁷³ but also spatial and affective-emotional variety, enhancing our ability to respond to complex social phenomenon and creating a radical openness of the future.⁶⁷⁴ As Massey says, “Only if the future is open is there

any ground for a politics which can make a difference.”⁶⁷⁵ Embracing multiplicity in all aspects of the chronotope leads to more openness, flexibility, and diversity.

Second, developing climate policy is difficult and complex. Attending to this ongoing struggle over the meaning of climate change has important implications for how that policy develops and what kind of limitations and possibilities will emerge. Cuomo describes how with climate action, “It is those with incumbent power in the richest and most powerful nations who are most likely to dictate the trajectory of response.”⁶⁷⁶ Those power dynamics need to be interrogated, and one way of doing so is examining these struggles over how to describe the threat of climate change. Anupama Ranawana and James Trafford contend, “Transforming environmentalism requires us to consider the ways that knowledge produced within the politics of the Global South challenges the solutions being prescribed in the Global North.”⁶⁷⁷ In this perspective, we need to give focus to what solutions are proposed and by whom. Any attempt to oversimplify climate solutions by erasing the underlying causes of the crisis has problematic implications for climate justice. We need to reconsider climate inaction not only based on why people lack the motivation to act but also what action is being called for. Such a move will help us interrogate more fully the limitations and possibilities for climate action.

Third, as witnessed in Chapter Three, scholars sometimes assume climate inaction means people do not care about climate change.⁶⁷⁸ Perhaps, that is a false assumption and based on another false assumption that people will only ever be selfishly motivated to care for the environment. As we see with the *climate tragedy* chronotope, we do not have to start from that assumption to mobilize action. What appears as a lack of empathy⁶⁷⁹ or lack of concern⁶⁸⁰ beyond our immediate selves and relatives might actually be understood as alternative affective-emotional experiences of climate change. Is not extreme climate denial not also an intense form

of caring about climate change, even in a negative sense? Is denial and skepticism not still engagement with climate change? Groves argues, “In becoming an ethically capable subject, we come to discover the significance of our acts through our affective, imaginative and cognitive connections with other concrete individuals, including non-human ones: animals, landscapes, institutions and ideals.”⁶⁸¹ In other words, affects-emotions are tied to our ethical frameworks, and interrogating what type of ethics climate rhetoric perpetuates moves us out of these false assumptions and challenges the “disembodied rational subject” such assumptions perpetuate.⁶⁸² Perhaps, it is not that people do not care, but their care is being directed in particular ways. Disrupting this process makes way for alternative ethical frameworks grounded in our connections to each other and our environments. Empathy⁶⁸³ is one way to do this, but shared grief is another. Amsler describes climate change as a form of crisis that is “not individualized, material and lived, but inter-subjective, ethical and imagined. ‘Translating’ such structural phenomena into personal concerns becomes problematic.”⁶⁸⁴ As we are confronted with endings and environmental changes, we need ethical frameworks that ground us in our connections and reignite our sense of interdependence. In the disorientation of our current moment, we find new affective-emotional orientations that transform how we view climate ethics. Thus, to review, climate rhetorical scholars need to pay more attention to space and affects-emotions and their relationship with time, consider how climate rhetoric construes climate policy and action, and interrogate the assumptions that people lack concern for climate change and that apathy enables climate inaction.

Embracing Climate and Chronotopic Complexity

The question could be asked, what chronotope would be most beneficial to climate rhetoric? While the possibilities are endless, I have aimed to show in this thesis not that one

chronotope would be best suited to addressing the exigencies of climate change, but that some point us in more productive directions than others. For example, the *climate tragedy* chronotope offers an alternative affective-emotional experience of climate change that grounds us in more temporal and spatial complexity, but it does not point toward concrete policies, nor does it sustain as direct of a critique as the *slow emergency* chronotope. I do not want to suggest that the problems I have identified are the result of failing to find the “right” chronotope. Rather, I see these competing chronotopic orientations as evidence of our struggle to make sense of climate change, and this struggle is a generative starting point for reflecting on the complexities of the issue. Climate change is a multifaceted phenomenon and engaging with its nonlinearity, heterogeneity, unpredictability, and complexity, I believe, would enhance our available responses. Competing chronotopes point us towards negotiations over meaning, and exploring the tensions between chronotopes alerts us to the problems and difficulties we are still grappling with. Starting from these tensions and negotiations enables moving forward more reflexively and insightfully.

I see competing chronotopes as a form of crisis that, as Amsler describes, heightens “critical awareness by disrupting existential certainty, asserting an ‘ethics of ambiguity’ which assumes that the continuous production of uncertain futures is a fundamental part of the human condition.”⁶⁸⁵ Amsler articulates how traditionally, crisis rhetoric shuts down debate, disregarding complexity “for the sake of resolving problems in a timely and decisive way.”⁶⁸⁶ Amsler problematizes the tendency to make indeterminate, complex phenomenon into predictable and uniform events.⁶⁸⁷ In these forms of crisis, the nonlinearity and heterogeneity of climate impacts are erased in favor of universal, homogenous, and mostly future-oriented apocalyptic depictions. In contrast, Amsler proposes an alternative form of crisis thinking that

works “to define complex social situations as critical moments of possibility, and to articulate the necessity of alternatives within a normative critique of existing conditions.”⁶⁸⁸ For her, crisis is “a practice of framing experience in ways that enable us to more consciously reproduce, reject or transform the cultural practices that shape our world”⁶⁸⁹ and leads to “encounters with radically disruptive realities and imaginations that expose our own as partial and situated.”⁶⁹⁰ I position competing chronotopes as a form of crisis, not only challenging the dominant ways we understand climate change but also reinserting uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity into the way we think and talk about it.⁶⁹¹ While yes, we do need climate action, we also need the choices we make to open up the future rather than foreclose it. Viewing competing chronotopes as this form of crisis reconstructs chronotopic analysis as a method of critique aimed simultaneously at exposing our attachments to certain ways of thinking and providing pathways to alternatives.⁶⁹²

Embracing more fully the unpredictability, heterogeneity, and non-linearity of climate change would create more temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional multiplicity within climate discourse. Claire Colebrook argues, “Even the seemingly most certain and determined causal sequences and dire predictions – that there will be catastrophic climate change, that the banks precipitated the financial crisis – are the outcome of complex, multiple, emergent, distributed, overlapping and nonlinear systems.”⁶⁹³ For Colebrook, “linearity as an ideal is a direct consequence of nonlinearity at the level of reality.”⁶⁹⁴ In other words, trying to make linear sense of non-linear phenomenon oversimplifies the way climate change manifests temporally, spatially, and affectively-emotionally. Sylvan Goldberg adds, “the queering of history” is “one of climate change’s most compelling features, for it warps what we have for so long taken for granted. To talk about what was once the most mundane of topics—the weather—is now to invoke crisis.”⁶⁹⁵ Climate change disrupts the predictability of the future, and therefore, can

provide an opening within our dominant temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional frameworks to reimagine our relationships to these orientations.

While scholars express concern that unpredictability and complexity nurture “uncertainty, apathy and inaction,”⁶⁹⁶ I would counter deterministic apocalyptic narratives also lead to these results. Perhaps, it is not uncertainty that shuts down engagement but the tendency to force certainty onto uncertainty. Embracing climate change in all of its complexity situates us all in “the uncomfortable space of denying neither endings nor possibilities.”⁶⁹⁷ It forces us to engage more fully with the “psychological and cultural struggle within ourselves over what and how to confront endings, what kind of hope to sustain, and how to be and act in the face of these accumulating apocalyptic (i.e., revelatory) facts.”⁶⁹⁸ We do not need to deny climate change its complexity to create meaningful action. Instead, we need to embrace it as the ambiguous, complicated threat it is to begin sharpening our critical and affective-emotional resources to respond.

Instead of asking what chronotope works best, instead might we ask what chronotopes can we cultivate? What new meanings, relationships, and understandings can emerge from this struggle over how to respond?⁶⁹⁹ Reyes and Chirindo argue rhetoric’s power “emerges in and through the action of relating or alienating, connecting or dissociating, and weaving or individuating. That work can and often is normative, but it can just as readily be subversive and intentional.”⁷⁰⁰ Rhetoric can simultaneously reinforce and disrupt. Perhaps, what we need is not one chronotope but a multitude of chronotopes challenging these unified narratives and reintroducing uncertainty and complexity back into our understanding. Whether it is through grief or resilience, new meanings are possible. Chronotopes offer us a form of critique and point to sites for invention. Sophie Pascoe, Wolfram Dressler, and Monica Minnegal note,

“Challenging the ways we see and frame problems like climate change allows us to consider what other assumptions and solutions might be possible.”⁷⁰¹ Thus, I encourage climate rhetoricians to look, listen, and feel for these alternative orientations, to allow for the challenge climate change poses to reanimate our creativity, reflexivity, and affectivity.⁷⁰² Only then, can we begin embracing the temporal, spatial, and affective-emotional multiplicity, diversity, and heterogeneity of our relationships to each other, the climate, and our environments.

ENDNOTES:

CHAPTER ONE

¹ “Only 11 Years Left to Prevent Irreversible Damage from Climate Change, Speakers Warn during General Assembly High-Level Meeting | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” *United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. United Nations, March 28, 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12131.doc.htm>.

² “Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments.” *International Governmental Panel on Climate Change*, 2018. <https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-of-1-5c-approved-by-governments/>.

³ Examples include The Guardian: “We have 12 years to limit climate change catastrophe, warns UN”; The Washington Post: “We only have 12 years to save the planet”; and The Independent “We have 12 years to act on climate change before the world as we know it is lost. How much more urgent can it get?” Also, politicians such as Pete Buttigieg (CNN) and Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez (Bowden) have made similar pronouncements.

⁴ “The Emergency,” *Extinction Rebellion*, <https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/the-emergency/>.

⁵ Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger. “Apocalypse Fatigue: Losing the Public on Climate Change,” *YaleEnvironment360*, November 16, 2020. 2.

⁶ “Yale Climate Opinion Maps 2020.” *Yale Program on Climate Change Communication*, September 2, 2020. <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us/>.

⁷ Erik Swyngedouw. “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change.” *Theory Culture & Society* 27, no. 2–3: 213–32. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1177/0263276409358728. 219.

⁸ Emma Frances Bloomfield and Randall Lake. “Negotiating the End of the World in Climate Change Rhetoric: Climate Skepticism, Science, and Arguments.” Found at the *Twelfth Conference on Communication and Environment*, International Environmental Communication Association, 2013.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286918947_Negotiating_the_End_of_the_World_in_Climate_Change_Rhetoric_Climate_Skepticism_Science_and_Arguments/citations. 384.

⁹ Nordhaus and Shellenberger, “Apocalypse Fatigue,” 3.

¹⁰ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. “‘Weathering’: Climate Change and the ‘Thick Time’ of Transcorporeality.” *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558–75. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 560. The scholars argue “climate change as both phenomenon and discourse is thoroughly temporal.”

¹¹ Madeleine Fagan. “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse? Climate Change and the Production of the Ethical Subject.” *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 19, no. 2 (May 2017): 225–44. doi:10.1177/1369148116687534. 237.

¹² Jordynn Jack. “Chronotopes: Forms of Time in Rhetorical Argument.” *College English*, 69, no. 1 (2006): 52. doi:10.2307/25472188. 53.

¹³ Ilkka Tuomi. “Chronotopes of Foresight: Models of Time-space in Probabilistic, Possibilistic and Constructivist Futures.” *Futures & Foresight Science*, no. 2 (2019). <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ffo2.11.2>.

- ¹⁴ Deborah Gould. "On Affect and Protest," *Political Emotions*, New York: Routledge, 2010. 23, 26. Gould specifically uses affect to "indicate nonconscious and unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and intensity that arise in response to stimuli impinging on the body." Gould says that emotion is understood in cognitive or rational terms where "cognition precedes political feelings, and the latter become almost rational in the sense that they flow directly, expectedly, and coherently from cognitive processing: given the situation that one has now assessed, it is logical that one would feel afraid or indignant or proud." In my understanding, emotion is attributed to cognition while affect is associated with sensation.
- ¹⁵ Joshua Gunn and David E. Beard. "On the Apocalyptic Sublime." *Southern Communication Journal* 65, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 269. doi:10.1080/10417940009373176. 269.
- ¹⁶ Luke Winslow. *American Catastrophe: Fundamentalism, Climate Change, Gun Rights, and the Rhetoric of Donald J. Trump*, Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2020. 14-15.
- ¹⁷ Gunn and Beard, "On the Apocalyptic Sublime," 271.
- ¹⁸ Delf Rothe. "Governing the End Times? Planet Politics and the Secular Eschatology of the Anthropocene." *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1177/0305829819889138. 147-148.
- ¹⁹ Greg Garrard. "Never Too Soon, Always Too Late: Reflections on Climate Temporality." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1002/wcc.605. 2.
- ²⁰ Michael Salvador and Todd Norton. "The Flood Myth in the Age of Global Climate Change." *Environmental Communication*, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2010.544749>. 48
- ²¹ Eric Zencey. "Apocalypse and Ecology." *The North American Review* 273, no. 2 (1988): 54-57. Accessed April 19, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25124975. 57.
- ²² Rothe, "Governing the End Times?" 146. See also: Axelle Karera. "Blackness and the Pitfalls of Anthropocene Ethics." *Critical Philosophy of Race* 7, no. 1 (2019): 32-56. www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/critphilrace.7.1.0032. 33-34. Karera affirms, "apocalyptic sensibilities which have significantly monopolized Anthropocene discourses are powerful in disavowing and erasing racial antagonisms. They foreclose 'proper political framings' while, simultaneously, they continue to construct and maintain growing numbers of both new and old enemies along racial lines."
- ²³ Fagan, "Who's Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?" 237.
- ²⁴ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. *Death of a Discipline*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 72.
- ²⁵ Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?" 221.
- ²⁶ Fagan, "Who's Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?" 238.
- ²⁷ Roman Krznaric. "Empathy and Climate Change: Proposals for a Revolution of Human Relationships," *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 155.
- ²⁸ Rothe, "Governing the End Times?" 162.
- ²⁹ Claire Colebrook. "Anti-catastrophic time." *New Formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*. 92 (2018): 102-119. <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/689860>. 106.
- ³⁰ Fagan, "Who's Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?" 238.
- ³¹ Sarah Amsler. "Bringing 'Hope' to Crisis: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action, and Social Change," *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 135.
- ³² Gunn and Beard, "On the Apocalyptic Sublime," 274.

³³ Laura Johnson. "(Environmental) Rhetorics of Tempered Apocalypticism in An Inconvenient Truth." *Rhetoric Review* 28, no. 1 (2009): 29. doi:10.1080/07350190802540708. 30.

³⁴ Johnson, "(Environmental) Rhetorics," 32.

³⁵ Salvador and Norton, "The Flood Myth," 48.

³⁶ Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?" 222.

³⁷ Salvador and Norton, "The Flood Myth," 47-48.

³⁸ Swyngedouw, "Apocalypse Forever?" 222.

³⁹ Johnson, "(Environmental) Rhetorics," 34.

⁴⁰ Winslow, "American Catastrophe," 84.

⁴¹ Winslow, "American Catastrophe," 84.

⁴² Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric* in *Aristotle The Art of Rhetoric: A new translation by Robin Waterfield*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 71.

⁴³ Rosemary Randall. "Loss and Climate Change: The Cost of Parallel Narratives." *Ecopsychology* 1, no. 3 (September 2009): 118–29. doi:10.1089/eco.2009.0034. 118.

⁴⁴ Randall, "Loss and Climate Change," 118.

⁴⁵ Amsler, "Bringing 'Hope' to Crisis," 135.

⁴⁶ Nordhaus and Shellenberger, "Apocalypse Fatigue," 3.

⁴⁷ Garrard, "Never Too Soon," 2-3. There could be several reasons for this finding. First, Garrard contends "dystopian depictions not only indulge 'the fallacy of worst-case thinking,' they also understate the contingency and reflexivity of the future." In positing a determined future, apocalyptic rhetoric does not allow for the unpredictability of the climate. Second, Johnson details how the "impassioned defense of the severity of environmental problems implies that their reality is in doubt, that it must be argued and re-argued, and that it is never accepted as given." See: Johnson, "(Environmental) Rhetorics," 34. In this perspective, rather than moving on to what ought to be done, climate rhetoric remains fixated on convincing audiences that action should be taken. Third, Johnson argues "the contestability or inaccuracy of one scientific 'fact' presented in a text is often used as an argument to dismiss the entire text, undermining the significance of ecological problems and casting environmental rhetors as misguided or even duplicitous." In other words, by undermining the credibility of the evidence or ethos of those giving these apocalyptic predictions, one can increase skepticism. Finally, Bloomfield and Lake add, "Some faithful skeptics believe that the end of the world is under God's control, so addressing climate change can be conceived as diverting or opposing God's plan." Bloomfield and Lake. "Negotiating the End of the World," 385. All of these scholars point to how apocalyptic rhetoric may undercut the complexity of climate change by simplifying its temporality to a linear, causal narrative that can result in increased skepticism and efforts to discount these predictions.

⁴⁸ Nordhaus and Shellenberger, "Apocalypse Fatigue," 3.

⁴⁹ Nordhaus and Shellenberger, "Apocalypse Fatigue," 4.

⁵⁰ Jean-Pierre Dupuy. "The Precautionary Principle and Enlightened Doomsaying: Rational Choice before the Apocalypse." *Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities* 1, no. 1 (October 15, 2009), <http://occasion.stanford.edu/node/28>. 8.

⁵¹ Stefan Skrimshire. "Introduction: How should we think about the future?" *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 8.

⁵² Mark Levene. "The Apocalyptic as Contemporary Dialectic: From Thanatos (Violence) to Eros (Transformation)," *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 60.

- ⁵³ Levene, “The Apocalyptic as Contemporary Dialectic,” 61.
- ⁵⁴ Levene, “The Apocalyptic as Contemporary Dialectic,” 69.
- ⁵⁵ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 135.
- ⁵⁶ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 135.
- ⁵⁷ Aristotle, *The Art of Rhetoric*, 73.
- ⁵⁸ Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 163.
- ⁵⁹ Neimanis and Walker, “Weathering,” 559.
- ⁶⁰ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 226.
- ⁶¹ Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 159.
- ⁶² Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 164.
- ⁶³ Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 165.
- ⁶⁴ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 230.
- ⁶⁵ Stephen Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul H. Thibodeau. “Thinking about the future: The role of spatial metaphors for time.” In *CogSci*. 2017. http://www.stephenflusberg.com/uploads/2/6/9/4/26942597/flusbergmatlockthibodeau_cogsci2017.pdf. 5.
- ⁶⁶ Flusberg, Matlock, and Thibodeau, “Thinking about the future,” 5.
- ⁶⁷ Skrimshire, “Introduction,” 4.
- ⁶⁸ Mikhail Bakhtin and Michael Holquist. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. University of Texas Press Slavic Series: No. 1. University of Texas Press, 1981. 85.
- ⁶⁹ Bakhtin and Holquist, “The Dialogic Imagination,” 85.
- ⁷⁰ Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart. “Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives,” *Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives*. Academia Press, 2010. 6.
- ⁷¹ Bakhtin and Holquist, “The Dialogic Imagination,” 84. Bakhtin specifically details, “Isolated aspects of time and space, however—those available in a given historical stage of development—have been assimilated, and corresponding generic techniques have been devised for reflecting and artistically processing such appropriated aspects of reality.”
- ⁷² Jack, “Chronotopes,” 54.
- ⁷³ Chelsea Redeker Milbourne and Sarah Hallenbeck. “Gender, Material Chronotopes, and the Emergence of the Eighteenth-Century Microscope.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 43, no. 5 (2013): 401-24. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24753576>. 404.
- ⁷⁴ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 52-53, 69. Jack explains, “The concept of chronotope offers rhetoricians one way to understand not only how such arguments depend on specific configurations of space and time, but also the implications of those space-time configurations for argument and decision making.” She adds, “it is useful to explore how alternative chronotopes offer different opportunities for rhetorical action.”
- ⁷⁵ Milbourne and Hallenbeck, “Gender, Material Chronotopes,” 403.
- ⁷⁶ Milbourne and Hallenbeck, “Gender, Material Chronotopes,” 405.
- ⁷⁷ Joan Faber McAlister. “Domesticating Citizenship: The Kairotics of America’s Post-9/11 Home Makeover.” *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 27, no. 1 (March 2010): 84–104. doi:10.1080/15295030903554391. 86, 90-91. McAllister expresses concern with the privileging of time over space and suggests the concept of the “kairotope” to better address “the temporal and spatial dimensions of texts.” She suggests “chronotope carries a very general and quantitative conception of time that fails to address the specific qualitative ways in which timely and well-placed action operates. Of the classical conceptions of time (chronos and kairos) and

space (chora and topos), a pairing of chronos-chora tends to be most general and abstract, while kairos-topos is the most specific in that it invokes particular moments and inhabited places.”

While I appreciate these concerns, I use chronotope specifically because it can carry this more abstract and broad meaning of time and space that is common in climate rhetoric.

⁷⁸ Mark Rifkin. *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017. 2.

⁷⁹ Matthew Houdek and Kendall R. Phillips. “Rhetoric and the Temporal Turn: Race, Gender, Temporalities.” *Women’s Studies in Communication*, no. 4 (2020): 369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2020.1824501>. 377.

⁸⁰ Mitchell G. Reyes and Kundai Chirindo. “Theorizing Race and Gender in the Anthropocene.” *Women’s Studies in Communication* 43, no. 4 (November 2020): 429–42. doi:10.1080/07491409.2020.1824519. 438.

⁸¹ McAlister, “Domesticating Citizenship,” 85. McAlister states, “despite the significance of both topos and kairos to the discipline of rhetoric, and although space is as significant a medium as time, communication scholars have often viewed space as a set of topical themes or a setting for the production and reception of texts. In other words, when it comes to rhetorics of citizenship and media makeovers, time seems to be getting most of the action, while space is merely being acted upon.”

⁸² Doreen B. Massey. *For Space*. SAGE, 2005.7.

⁸³ McAlister, “Domesticating Citizenship,” 87.

⁸⁴ Massey, “For Space,” 9.

⁸⁵ Massey, “For Space,” 11.

⁸⁶ Massey, “For Space,” 9. Massey states that the spatial is political and “thinking the spatial in a particular way can shake up the manner in which certain political questions are formulated, can contribute to political arguments already under way, and -most deeply -can be an essential element in the imaginative structure which enables in the first place an opening up to the very sphere of the political.”

⁸⁷ Gordon Walker. “Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental Justice.” *Antipode* 41, no. 4 (September 2009): 614–36. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00691.x. 620.

⁸⁸ Massey, “For Space,” 184.

⁸⁹ Massey, “For Space,” 185.

⁹⁰ Massey, “For Space,” 130. Massey argues, “Their character will be a product of these intersections within that wider setting, and of what is made of them. And, too, of the non-meetings-up, the disconnections and the relations not established, the exclusions. All this contributes to the specificity of place.”

⁹¹ Massey, “For Space,” 130.

⁹² Massey, “For Space,” 131.

⁹³ Bakhtin and Holoquist, “The Dialogic Imagination,” 243.

⁹⁴ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 66.

⁹⁵ Paul Routledge. “Sensuous Solidarities: Emotion, Politics and Performance in the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army.” *Antipode* 44, no. 2 (March 2012): 428–52. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2010.00862.x. 430.

⁹⁶ Kara Keeling, *Queer Times, Black Futures* (New York: New York University Press, 2019). 82.

⁹⁷ Bart Keunen. “The Chronotopic Imagination in Literature and Film Bakhtin, Bergson, and Deleuze on Forms of Time,” *Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections*,

Applications, Perspectives. Academia Press, 2010. 35. Keunen explains, “A chronotope only becomes a chronotope when it shows something, when it brings to mind an image that can be observed by the mind’s eye. It would be fair to say that, in Bakhtin’s view, a chronotope is the elementary unit of literary imagination.” This affirms affects-emotions as a key component of how chronotopes function.

⁹⁸ Gould, “On Affect and Protest,” 24

⁹⁹ Gould, “On Affect and Protest,” 24.

¹⁰⁰ Gould, “On Affect and Protest,” 23.

¹⁰¹ Gould, “On Affect and Protest,” 27.

¹⁰² Jack, “Chronotopes,” 67.

¹⁰³ Tuomi, “Chronotopes of Foresight,” 2.

¹⁰⁴ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 53.

¹⁰⁵ Tuomi, “Chronotopes of Foresight,” 3.

¹⁰⁶ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 53.

¹⁰⁷ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 55, 69. Jack further argues, “these chronotopes may be linked tendentially to particular ideologies, but they also represent more general spatiotemporal configurations that can be linked to a range of ideological or rhetorical concerns over time.”

¹⁰⁸ Nele Bemong, Pieter Borghart, Michel De Dobbeleer, Kristoffel Demoen, Koen De Temmerman & Bart Keunen, “Preface,” *Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives*. Academia Press, 2010. III. The scholars specifically detail, “Although Bakhtin’s theory is on this point rather underdeveloped and even premature, there are sufficient impulses in his writings to allow us to say that it serves as an analytical tool aimed at understanding how literature meditates on human action in a profoundly ethical fashion. Indeed, enquiry into the connections between chronotopes and action is probably one of the most promising lines of future research.” Jack similarly argues, “chronotopes can also help to describe the material, ‘sociohistorical matrix’ in which human action occurs.” For Jack, some chronotopes open up the possibilities for action as others limit available action. See: Jack, “Chronotopes,” 54.

¹⁰⁹ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 54.

¹¹⁰ Bakhtin and Holoquist, “The Dialogic Imagination,” 252. Bakhtin specifically argues, “Within the limits of a single work and within the total literary output of a single author we may notice a number of different chronotopes and complex interactions among them, specific to the given work or author; it is common moreover for one of these chronotopes to envelope or dominate the others (such, primarily, are those we have analyzed in this essay).”

¹¹¹ Bemong and Borghart, “Bakhtin’s Theory of the Literary Chronotope,” 7. Bemong discusses how, “The interaction between the concrete chronotopic units of a narrative eventually leaves the reader with an overarching impression, which we call major or dominant chronotopes. This central, ‘transsubjective’ chronotope thus serves as a unifying ground for the competing local chronotopes in one and the same narrative text.”

¹¹² Tuomi, “Chronotopes of Foresight,” 2.

¹¹³ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 65. Jack describes how the four chronotopes she analyzes compete “to shape the rhetorical situation and appropriate arguments in a different way.”

¹¹⁴ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 67.

¹¹⁵ Jodie Nicotra and Judith Totman Parrish. “Rushing the Cure: Temporal Rhetorics in Global Warming Discourse.” *JAC* 30, no. 1/2 (2010): 215-37. Accessed February 6, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20866943>. 229.

¹¹⁶ Bakhtin and Holoquist, “The Dialogic Imagination,” 84. Bakhtin states, “What counts for us is the fact that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space.”

¹¹⁷ “Who We Are.” *Fridays For Future*, 2020. <https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/who-we-are/>.

¹¹⁸ “Who We Are.”

¹¹⁹ “About the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change,” *International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change*, accessed May 4, 2020, <http://www.iipfcc.org/who-are-we>.

¹²⁰ “Climate Change.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Indigenous Peoples. *United Nations*. Accessed October 13, 2020. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/climate-change.html>.

¹²¹ “Climate Change.” *United Nations*.

¹²² “What Is XR.” *Extinction Rebellion*. Accessed October 13, 2020. <https://rebellion.global/about-us/>.

¹²³ Extinction Rebellion. “Heading for extinction and what to do about it.” YouTube, 18 September 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2Vkc4SnwY0>. 35:04. Gail Bradbrook emphasized the centrality of grief to the movement noting, “At some point soon, maybe it’s already happened to us ... we can’t reverse problems... I think it’s a big thing to decide to face the grief of this and not turn away from it. It’s a courageous thing to do in itself. This is a big shift in our consciousness.”

¹²⁴ Extinction Rebellion. “The Truth.” YouTube, 30 March 2029, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMzTWwTw_kQ&feature=emb_title. 1:40.

CHAPTER TWO:

¹²⁵ Greta Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” Fridays for Future, April 2019, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJAcuQEVxTY>. 0:08.

¹²⁶ While I bring in multiple activist speeches, I rely more heavily at times on Thunberg because of her more prominent position within the climate movement. In 2019, she was TIME Magazine’s person of the year. She received significant media attention for the school strikes for climate and has spoken at the European Parliament, World Economic Forum, United Nation Climate Change Conferences, and the United Nations Action Summit to name a few. These prominent locations as well as the more extensive archive of her speeches on the movement’s website indicate how she has become the main spokesperson for these climate activists.

¹²⁷ Kyrre Kverndokk. “Talking about your Generation: “Our Children” as a Trope in Climate Change Discourse,” *Ethnologia Europaea* 50 (1), 2020. doi: <https://doi.org/10.16995/ee.974>. 155. Kverndokk affirms, “Thunberg and the Fridays for Future movement draw heavily on the established “child” trope and the future-dimension embedded in it, and have rhetorically succeeded in turning the object into a subject.”

¹²⁸ Elizabeth F. Cohen. “Neither Seen Nor Heard: Children's Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies,” *Citizenship Studies* 9, no. 2, (2005): 221-240, DOI: 10.1080/13621020500069687. 222. Cohen specifically says, “without any real citizenship of their own children’s lives are almost exclusively directed from, and lived within, the private sphere. With diminished civil and political rights, they have neither a claim on, nor access to, public life.”

¹²⁹ Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger. “Apocalypse Fatigue: Losing the Public on Climate Change,” *YaleEnvironment360*, November 16, 2020. 3. Nordhaus and Shellenberger note, the threat of climate change “is distant in both time and space. It is difficult to visualize. And it is difficult to identify a clearly defined enemy.”

¹³⁰ The *emergency of the future* chronotope is built from the work of Jordynn Jack and Jérôme Bindé. Jack explains how “The ‘emergency of the future’ draws on the chronotope of time-space compression, but shifts its urgency toward the future, rather than the present.” Bindé describes this as “emergency of the long term.” While both of these scholars give some detail, I expand and particularize the *emergency of the future* chronotope to the temporal and spatial characteristics in the Fridays for Future movement. Similarly, the *emergency of the present* chronotope builds from what Jack and Bindé describe as a disregard for long term thinking. Jack calls this perspective time-space compression, whereas Bindé warns of the tyranny of emergency. I call this instead *emergency of the present* to again better encapsulate the particularities I am drawing out in Fridays for Future. See: Jordynn Jack. “Chronotopes: Forms of Time in Rhetorical Argument.” *College English*, 69, no. 1(2006): 52. doi:10.2307/25472188. 69; Jérôme Bindé. “Toward an Ethics of the Future.” *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 51-72. <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/26177>. 51. 56. Mario Kaiser. “Reactions to the Future: The Chronopolitics of Prevention and Preemption.” *NanoEthics* 9, no. 2 (August 1, 2015): 165–77. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-015-0231-4>.

¹³¹ Peter Skilling. “Everyday Emergency: Crisis, Unease and Strategy in Contemporary Political Discourse,” *Critical Policy Studies*, no. 1 (2014): 61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2013.86250>. 63.

¹³² Mario Kaiser. “Reactions to the Future: The Chronopolitics of Prevention and Preemption.” *NanoEthics* 9, no. 2 (August 1, 2015): 165–77. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-015-0231-4>. 171.

¹³³ Kaiser, “Reactions to the Future,” 171.

¹³⁴ Kaiser, “Reactions to the Future,” 175.

¹³⁵ Kaiser, “Reactions to the Future,” 174.

¹³⁶ Mark Rifkin. *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination*. Duke University Press, 2017. 67. Rifkin defines chrononormative as “a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts” and in which “historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power” appear as “seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines.” Rifkin is referring to the nuclear family, but a heteronormative ethics rooted in depicting climate change as a threat to children functions similarly.

¹³⁷ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 148.

¹³⁸ Lee Edelman, “The Future is Kid Stuff: Queer Theory, Disidentification, and the Death Drive,” in *The Routledge Queer Studies Reader*, ed. Donald E. Hall and Annamarie Jagose. (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 290.

¹³⁹ Edelman, “The Future is Kid Stuff,” 288.

¹⁴⁰ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 152. Kverndokk says, “My analysis is only concerned with the two key actants in Greimas’ model: the subject – the one reaching for a goal – and the object – which is defined as what the subject is aiming for.” They add, in climate rhetoric “‘Our children’ are not ascribed any agency – they just happen to grow up. They are not reaching for a goal – they simply have a ‘fate’ [...] It is ‘we’ that are given agency, working as the active subject-actant. This subject-actant/object actant relationship between ‘we’ and ‘our children’ is a symbolic parent–child one.”

¹⁴¹ Rebekah Sheldon. *The Child to Come: Life after the Human Catastrophe*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2016. doi:10.5749/minnesota/9780816689873.001.0001. 20.

¹⁴² Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 145. Kverndokk describes how the child trope “implies a ‘we’ working as the active subject in the texts, while ‘our children’ simply represents a future to be saved.”

¹⁴³ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 152.

¹⁴⁴ Hilda Flavia Nakabuye. “Watch This Powerful Speech From A Young Ugandan Climate Activist,” *TIME*, Oct. 11, 2019. YouTube video, 3:59. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjsDxcWS1zU>.

¹⁴⁵ Theo Cullen-Mouze. “‘We Dare’ Event,” Madrid, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fsKiYJV-BJ4>. 0:15.

¹⁴⁶ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 149.

¹⁴⁷ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 155.

¹⁴⁸ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 155.

¹⁴⁹ Kallan Benson. “UN Champions of the Earth,” United Nations New York City. Sept. 27, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaoAjfa9hcM>. 0:30.

¹⁵⁰ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 147.

¹⁵¹ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 37.

¹⁵² Luisa Neubauer. “Why you should be a climate activist,” TEDxYouth@München, Aug. 1, 2019, 17:36.

https://www.ted.com/talks/luisa_neubauer_why_you_should_be_a_climate_activist. 16:15.

¹⁵³ See for example: “We tend to care most for the people closest to us, especially those to whom we are biologically related. We worry about the welfare of our children and grandchildren. But the bonds start becoming weaker with respect to our great-grandchildren, and become almost completely absent when we consider the prospects for people a century from now to whom we are not related.” Roman Krznaric. “Empathy and Climate Change: Proposals for a Revolution of Human Relationships,” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 160; and “As in the words of David Brower, ‘we do not inherit the planet from our ancestors, we merely borrow it from our children.’ We are our children’s insolvent debtors, taking advantage, either deliberately or not, of temporal distance to escape from our creditors.” Jérôme Bindé. “Toward an Ethics of the Future.” *Public Culture* 12, no. 1 (2000): 51-72.

<https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/26177>. 51. 56.

¹⁵⁴ Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 160.

¹⁵⁵ Briohny Walker. “Precarious Time: Queer Anthropocene Futures,” *Parrhesia* 30, 2019: 137-155. http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia30/parrhesia30_walker.pdf. 145; and Nicole Seymour. *Strange Natures. [Electronic Resource]: Futurity, Empathy, and the Queer Ecological Imagination*. University of Illinois Press, 2013. 145.

¹⁵⁶ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 149. Kverndokk explains, “family time is, in this sense, a notion of experienceable time between the individual lifespan and historical time.”

¹⁵⁷ Sheldon, “The Child to Come,” vii. Sheldon states, “From the vantage of eco- catastrophe, in other words, the child stands in the place of the species and coordinates its transit into the future.”

¹⁵⁸ Madeleine Fagan. “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse? Climate Change and the Production of the Ethical Subject.” *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 19, no. 2 (May 2017): 225–44. doi:10.1177/1369148116687534. 231. Fagan suggests, “the claims in ecological disaster narratives, that ‘time is running out’, that we are approaching a ‘tipping point’

and that we must ‘act now’, invoke precisely this sense of acceleration, time compression and urgency.”

¹⁵⁹ Kverndokk describes how “Literary scholar Frank Kermode has remarked that there is a double temporal relationship between the present and the ending in apocalyptic narratives. With reference to theological literature, he uses the Greek terms *chronos*, meaning passing time until the end, and *kairos*, defined as ‘a point of time filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end.’ The *kairos* structure underscores how the apocalypse is as much about the significance of the present as it is about the future.” Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 151.

¹⁶⁰ Sheldon, “The Child to Come,” 4. Sheldon connects children to species survival noting, “Through the combined influence of physiology and psychoanalysis, the child as cipher for the future of the adult and the child as cipher for the future of the species intertwined and engendered the vulnerable, innocent child whose rescue from harm appears tantamount to the future safety of us all— a future that is in any case already irremediably harmed.”

¹⁶¹ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 1:24. Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan reveals the problem of ambiguity within these dates: “Do they represent an end point (after which nothing is known, or knowable, or predictable)? Do they represent the start of something (if we do not act now, climate change will ‘start’ in 2050)? Do they represent only one stopping-off point in a journey towards an altered state of climate and human existence (no turning back after 2050)? Does their precision mask their uncertainty, and elide climate variability (how much will temperature rise, how much rain will fall, and where)?” Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan. “Human Geographies of Climate Change: Landscape, Temporality, and Lay Knowledges.” *Progress in Human Geography* 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 284. doi:10.1177/0309132510376259. 291.

¹⁶² Greta Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” Fridays for Future, April 2019, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJAcuQEVxTY>. 1:38. This chrononormative familial time centers around “family-timed life cycles. While both climate modeling and climate agreements use more or less arbitrary dates for anticipating and calculating the future, such as 2030, 2050 and 2100, family time does not date the future. The future appears instead as the expectations of continuing lifespans and upcoming life experiences. In that way, family time makes the future seemingly tellable and imaginable.” Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 155.

¹⁶³ Roger Stahl. “A Clockwork War: Rhetorics of Time in a Time of Terror.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 94 (1): 73–99. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630701790826>. 81-82. Stahl describes how “The deadline is an authoritarian discourse that preempts its own questionability. The countdown is a rhetoric of submission to the authority of the deadline. The two combine symbiotically to perform the primary ritual of chronopolitical participation, whose main theme is inevitability.” The countdown and ticking clock undermine democracy. Stahl states, “The ticking clock infuses public life with a nearness (in both time and space),” making a future disaster feel more immediate, but also submitting “to the inevitability of authoritarian time.” Kaiser adds increased temporal urgency undermines “democratic procedures and processes, because democratic governance requires time—and time is a scarce resource.” Mario Kaiser. “Reactions to the Future: The Chronopolitics of Prevention and Preemption.” *NanoEthics* 9, no. 2 (August 1, 2015): 165–77. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-015-0231-4>. 176.

¹⁶⁴ Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” 3:10.

¹⁶⁵ Susanne Moser. “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late’ (to Prevent Dangerous Climate Change).” *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*, October 23, 2019. doi:10.1002/wcc.606. 6.

¹⁶⁶ Brace and Geoghegan, “Human Geographies of Climate Change,” 290.

¹⁶⁷ Stephen O’Leary. “Apocalyptic Argument and the Anticipation of Catastrophe: The Prediction of Risk and the Risks of Prediction.” *Argumentation*, 1997. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007704101604>. 298.

¹⁶⁸ Stefan Skrimshire. “Introduction: How should we think about the future?” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 3.

¹⁶⁹ David Wicker. “29th November (English Subtitles),” April 23, 2020. YouTube video, 6:03. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fB-6bX6cwUQ>. 4:10.

¹⁷⁰ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. “‘Weathering’: Climate Change and the ‘Thick Time’ of Transcorporeality.” *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558-75.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 567. Neimanis and Walker detail, “Just as a climate change imaginary supported by neoliberalism enforces a ‘global view’—the distanced perspective from the everywhere-and-nowhere of globalism—Colebrook also notes that neoliberalism’s time is that of a subject ‘for whom time is the passage towards complete actualization’—an expression of human exceptionalism as it braves on against the chaos of nature. The abstraction of climate change from the felt immediacy of our bodies is echoed in the temporality of this abstraction: something we stand outside of, or pass through, or control.”

¹⁷¹ Erik Swyngedouw. “Apocalypse Forever? Post-Political Populism and the Spectre of Climate Change.” *Theory Culture & Society* 27, no. 2–3: 213–32. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1177/0263276409358728. 221.

¹⁷² Doreen B. Massey. *For Space*. SAGE, 2005. 4. Massey argues, “conceiving of space as in the voyages of discovery, as something to be crossed and maybe conquered, has particular ramifications. Implicitly, it equates space with the land and sea, with the earth which stretches out around us. It also makes space seem like a surface; continuous and given. It differentiates: Heman, active, a maker of history, journeys across this surface and finds Tenochtitlan upon it. It is an unthought cosmology, in the gentlest sense of that term, but it carries with it social and political effects. So easily this way of imagining space can lead us to conceive of other places, peoples, cultures simply as phenomena ‘on’ this surface.”

¹⁷³ Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” 1:38.

¹⁷⁴ Neubauer, “Why you should be a climate activist,” 0:59. Neubauer describes, “we are in a point of history that the most destructive force on the planet is humanity itself [...] We are in a point of history that humanity is creating an environment that’s not safe.”

¹⁷⁵ Joan Faber McAlister. “Domesticating Citizenship: The Kairotics of America’s Post-9/11 Home Makeover.” *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 27, no. 1 (March 2010): 84–104. doi:10.1080/15295030903554391. 88.

¹⁷⁶ Benson, “UN Champions of the Earth,” 1:50.

¹⁷⁷ Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren. “Fear, Hope, Anger, and Guilt in Climate Activism.” *Social Movement Studies* 16, no. 5 (September 2017): 507–19. doi:10.1080/14742837.2017.1344546. 509.

¹⁷⁸ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 510.

¹⁷⁹ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 513.

¹⁸⁰ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 510.

¹⁸¹ Cullen-Mouze, “‘We Dare’ Event,” 3:20. We see this also when Wicker says “Simply put, I skip school on Fridays. Why would I ever do that? Just to skip school hours? Unfortunately, no. Absolutely not. I do it because I am afraid. I am afraid of the future I’ll have to live in.” Wicker, “29th November,” 0:10.

- ¹⁸² Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 509.
- ¹⁸³ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 509.
- ¹⁸⁴ Benson, “UN Champions of the Earth,” 0:50.
- ¹⁸⁵ The hope underlying political projects that revolves around the future of children in many ways is what Edelman rejects. Edelman argues that “we do not intend a new politics, a better society, a brighter future, since all of these fantasies reproduce the past, through displacement, in the form of the future by construing futurity itself as merely a form of reproduction.” Edelman, “The Future is Kid Stuff,” 297.
- ¹⁸⁶ Neubauer, “Why you should be a climate activist,” 8:27.
- ¹⁸⁷ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 508.
- ¹⁸⁸ Greta Thunberg. “How Dare You,” Fridays for Future, April 2020, YouTube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b_8XwcX9q_c. 0:23.
- ¹⁸⁹ Celeste Michelle Condit. *Angry Public Rhetorics: Global Relations and Emotion in the Wake of 9/11*. University of Michigan Press, 2018. 4.
- ¹⁹⁰ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 1:30.
- ¹⁹¹ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 517.
- ¹⁹² Greta Thunberg, “How Dare You,” 3:46.
- ¹⁹³ Condit, “Angry Public Rhetorics,” 2.
- ¹⁹⁴ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 2:56. Thunberg argues, “There are no gray areas when it comes to survival. Now we all have a choice. We can create transformational action that will safeguard the future living conditions for humankind, or we can continue with our business as usual and fail. That is up to you and me.”
- ¹⁹⁵ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 2:17.
- ¹⁹⁶ Neubauer, “Why you should be a climate activist,” 9:31.
- ¹⁹⁷ Cullen-Mouze, “‘We Dare’ Event,” 5:03. Cullen-Mouze argues, “You cannot solve a problem with the same mindset that created it [...] So please, I ask you again. Listen to us. Listen to the science. Imagine a better world, and start to act like the grownups in the room.”
- ¹⁹⁸ Benson, “UN Champions of the Earth,” 3:40.
- ¹⁹⁹ Benson, “UN Champions of the Earth,” 4:15.
- ²⁰⁰ Jean-Pierre Dupuy. “The Precautionary Principle and Enlightened Doomsaying: Rational Choice before the Apocalypse.” *Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities 1*, no. 1 (October 15, 2009), <http://occasion.stanford.edu/node/28>. 9.
- ²⁰¹ Dupuy, “The Precautionary Principle,” 11.
- ²⁰² Kaiser, “Reactions to the Future,” 175.
- ²⁰³ Swyngedouw, “Apocalypse Forever?” 219. Swyngedouw describes climate change as an “apocalypse that few really believe will realize itself (if we were to believe that the earth is really in the dismal state we are told it is in, we would not be sitting around writing and reading arcane academic journal articles).”
- ²⁰⁴ Greta Thunberg. “Speech at UN Climate Change COP24 Conference,” Katowice, December 15, 2018. 01:49.
- ²⁰⁵ Edelman, “The Future is Kid Stuff,” 288.
- ²⁰⁶ Edelman, “The Future is Kid Stuff,” 288.
- ²⁰⁷ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 67.
- ²⁰⁸ George Wallis. “Chronopolitics: The Impact of Time Perspectives on the Dynamics of Change.” *Social Forces* 49, no. 1 (1970): 102. doi:10.2307/2575743. 105.
- ²⁰⁹ Bindé, “Toward an Ethics of the Future,” 51.

- ²¹⁰ Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart. "Bakhtin's Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives," *Bakhtin's Theory of the Literary Chronotope: Reflections, Applications, Perspectives*. Academia Press, 2010. 7-8.
- ²¹¹ Jodie Nicotra and Judith Totman Parrish. "Rushing the Cure: Temporal Rhetorics in Global Warming Discourse." *JAC* 30, no. 1/2 (2010): 215-37. Accessed February 6, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20866943>. 224.
- ²¹² Nicotra and Parrish, "Rushing the Cure," 222.
- ²¹³ Nicotra and Parrish, "Rushing the Cure," 222.
- ²¹⁴ Nicotra and Parrish, "Rushing the Cure," 222.
- ²¹⁵ Nicotra and Parrish, "Rushing the Cure," 222. The scholars argue, "Where the deliberative process at the heart of democracy, being slow by nature, requires a great deal of time, democracy relies on the use of temporal tropes like 'the ticking clock' and 'the deadline/countdown' to more efficiently ram through actions that the government wants with less resistance from the people."²¹⁵
- ²¹⁶ McAlister, "Domesticating Citizenship," 88.
- ²¹⁷ McAlister, "Domesticating Citizenship," 88.
- ²¹⁸ While the chronotope does work to overcome spatial distance, spatiality is mostly used as a disruption to the future-oriented temporality of the *emergency of the future* chronotope. Here, I focus more on the chronotope's temporal intensity, whereas in the next chapter, I focus more on the chronotope's spatial intensity.
- ²¹⁹ Wicker, "29th November," 0:30.
- ²²⁰ Thunberg, "Our House is on Fire," 00:01.
- ²²¹ Hilda Flavia Nakabuye. "COP25 Speech," Madrid, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgpYF9iV0tg>. 3:15.
- ²²² Thunberg, "Speech at EU Parliament," 4:00.
- ²²³ Delf Rothe. "Governing the End Times? Planet Politics and the Secular Eschatology of the Anthropocene." *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1177/0305829819889138. 148. Matthew Brigham also notes that "the irreparable (rooted in a linear chrono-logic) constructs the past as forever lost and the future as always impending and risking loss." See Matthew P. Brigham. "Chrono-Controversy: The Makah's Campaign to Resume the Whale Hunt." *Western Journal of Communication*, no. 2 (2017): 243- 261. DOI:10.1080/10570314.2016.1242023. 250.
- ²²⁴ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. "'Weathering': Climate Change and the 'Thick Time' of Transcorporeality." *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558-75. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 568.
- ²²⁵ Greg Garrard. "Never Too Soon, Always Too Late: Reflections on Climate Temporality." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*. Accessed April 18, 2020. doi:10.1002/wcc.605. 4.
- ²²⁶ Garrard, "Never Too Soon," 4.
- ²²⁷ Nakabuye, "Watch This Powerful Speech," 1:07. See also "People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!" Thunberg, "How Dare You," 0:40.
- ²²⁸ Rothe, "Governing the End Times?" 158.
- ²²⁹ In some ways, the *emergency of the present* overlaps with the time-space compression. Jack explains how "At the same time, time-space compression expands spatial concerns outward to

encompass the entire global market. For this reason, time space compression serves to support neoliberal ideologies, which one might associate with free-market capitalism, globalization, and unhindered technological progress.” In a similar but different way, the *emergency of the present* constricts global space. The whole world comes to be represented by “house.” Jack, “Chronotopes,” 53.

²³⁰ “Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” 5:49.

²³¹ Neimanis and Walker, ““Weathering,”” 567. Neimanis and Walker affirm, “There is no escaping climate change, for our bodies are both the products and the vehicles of its iteration.

²³² Swyngedouw, “Apocalypse Forever?” 222.

²³³ Nakabuye, “Watch This Powerful Speech,” 3:25.

²³⁴ Nakabuye, “Watch This Powerful Speech,” 0:43.

²³⁵ Cullen-Mouze, ““We Dare’ Event,”” 0:30.

²³⁶ Nakabuye, “COP25 Speech,” 1:00.

²³⁷ Nakabuye, “Watch This Powerful Speech,” 0:10.

²³⁸ Thunberg, “How Dare You,” 0:12.

²³⁹ Kverndokk, “Talking about your Generation,” 149.

²⁴⁰ Cullen-Mouze, ““We Dare’ Event,”” 0:50.

²⁴¹ Neubauer, “Why you should be a climate activist,” 11:57. Neubauer argues, “since the climate crisis is affecting every single part of our social, of our political and of our private life, we need climate activists everywhere on every corner, not only in every room, but also in every city and country and state and continent.”

²⁴² Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 05:28.

²⁴³ Sarah Amsler. “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action, and Social Change,” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 134.

²⁴⁴ Byon Williston. “Climate Change and Radical Hope.” *Ethics and the Environment* 17, no. 2 (2012): 165-86. Accessed April 14, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.17.2.165. 177.

²⁴⁵ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 516.

²⁴⁶ Williston, “Climate Change,” 177.

²⁴⁷ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 5:19.

²⁴⁸ Cullen-Mouze, ““We Dare’ Event,”” 3:45.

²⁴⁹ Kleres and Wettergren, “Fear, Hope, Anger,” 510. The scholars discuss how paralysis “is averted by ascribing guilt (responsibility) for the danger to someone else, resulting in anger assuming that the other has power to do something.”

²⁵⁰ Cohen, “Neither Seen Nor Heard,” 222.

²⁵¹ Nakabuye, “COP25 Speech,” 3:22.

²⁵² Thunberg, “How Dare You,” 0:40.

²⁵³ John E. Smith. “Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’; ‘Chronos’ and ‘Kairos.’” *The Monist* 53, no. 1 (1969): 1. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27902109>. 6. Smith details that “kairos means a time of tension or conflict, a time of ‘crisis’ implying that the course of events poses a problem which calls for a decision at that time.” It also “means a time when an opportunity for accomplishing some purpose has opened up as a result of the problem that led to the crisis. Thus, kairos means the time when something should happen or be done, the ‘right’ or ‘best’ time.” So, while your house is on fire does imply a time of crisis, it does not imply that now is the best time for action. The best time would be before your house caught fire because now you are merely reacting rather than deciding on how best to deal with the crisis.

²⁵⁴ Jack, “Chronotopes,” 57. Jack explains, “time-space compression condenses the range of temporal concerns that seem appropriate to a rhetorical situation, limiting those concerns to the present and immediate future.”

²⁵⁵ Brian Amsden. “Dimensions of Temporality in President Obama’s Tucson Memorial Address.” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2014): 455. doi:10.14321/rhetpublaffa.17.3.0455. 462.

²⁵⁶ Claire Colebrook. “Anti-catastrophic time.” *New Formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*. 92 (2018): 102-119. <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/689860>. 109.

²⁵⁷ Stahl, “A Clockwork War,” 90.

²⁵⁸ Skilling, “Everyday Emergency,” 62.

²⁵⁹ Bindé, “Toward an Ethics of the Future,” 56.

²⁶⁰ Colebrook, “Anti-Catastrophic Time,” 114.

²⁶¹ Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” 8:34.

²⁶² Smith, “Times, Time, and the ‘Right Time,’” 11.

²⁶³ Nicotra and Parrish, “Rushing the Cure,” 225.

²⁶⁴ Nicotra and Parrish, “Rushing the Cure,” 225.

²⁶⁵ Smith explains that “Implicit in all three senses of kairos is the concept of an individual time having a critical, ordinal position. Such a time is one marked off from its predecessors and successors by the fact that it is a critical or ‘turning’ point in an historical process. Before this critical time is ‘too soon; for the event, and after this critical time is ‘too late.’” I read climate change as having these problems. On the one hand, the turning point is 2030. On the other, it has already happening since our house is on fire. In that way, any action taken can be read as too soon or too late. Smith, “Times, Time, and the ‘Right Time,’” 6-7.

²⁶⁶ Thunberg, “Our House is on Fire,” 00:01.

²⁶⁷ Wicker, “29th November,” 4:35.

²⁶⁸ Stefan Skrimshire. “Introduction: How should we think about the future?” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 4. Skrimshire explains, “climate crisis is represented as a reality both to be avoided and, in other senses, unavoidable (as well as a crisis that we’re mostly all complicit in bringing on ourselves). It invites the discourse of tipping points that have already been passed, and those approaching that must be resisted at all costs.”

²⁶⁹ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 146.

²⁷⁰ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 140.

²⁷¹ Skrimshire, “Introduction,” 3.

²⁷² Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 131.

²⁷³ Marlia Banning. “Exigency in Dispute: Global Warming and Uncertainty in Contemporary Rhetorical Criticism.” *JAC* 31, no. 3/4 (2011): 638-60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41709664>. 653, 643. More specifically, Banning asks, “are lower-lying regions and nations, like coasts and islands, more at risk? Will changes be felt differentially across populations on socioeconomic axes of difference, so that the poorer around the world will bear a greater burden of risk and threat? Because humans are uncertain about how events will unfold, we must rely on probable knowledge in our deliberations about the future. Uncertainty is not only the unstated grounds of probable knowledge; it is the terrain of rhetoric across every day, scientific, and public policy deliberations.” Furthermore, she asks, “Does global warming constitute a threat to human populations across the world and the earth’s fragile ecosystems? If so, what is the scope and nature of that threat - is it immediate (let’s say, as in ‘already occurring’), midrange (sometime

later, but still in this century), or long-term (well beyond the 21st century), and will it influence some places and populations disproportionately more than others?”

²⁷⁴ Nicotra and Parrish, “Rushing the Cure,” 217.

CHAPTER THREE:

²⁷⁵ “Climate Change For Indigenous Peoples.” *United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Indigenous Peoples*. United Nations. Accessed March 20, 2021. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/climate-change.html>.

²⁷⁶ See for example: “Climate Frontlines: A global forum for indigenous peoples, small islands and vulnerable communities,” *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*. 2017. Accessed May 21, 2021. <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/priority-areas/links/climate-change/projects/climate-frontlines/>.

²⁷⁷ “Climate Frontlines.” The page specifically details, “Despite broad recognition that small island, Arctic, high altitude and other vulnerable communities are on the frontlines of climate change, their voices have remained largely on the sidelines of climate change debates. Indeed, this exclusion has generated discord and protests by indigenous peoples and community representatives at recent international conferences and meetings on climate change.”

²⁷⁸ Ben Powless. “An Indigenous Movement to Confront Climate Change.” *Globalizations* 9, no. 3 (June 2012): 411–24. doi:10.1080/14747731.2012.680736. 414, 415. Ben Powless provides a deeper history of the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and the UN. As he puts it, “Indigenous Peoples were effectively able to become a force in the international arena and to use their collective power in challenging the rights, sovereignty, and accountability of states. These efforts can be seen as part of a broader movement to limit state sovereignty that began with the creation of the first human rights instruments after World War II, countering the ultranationalist and statist ideologies that preyed on, discriminated against, or marginalized many groups, including Indigenous Peoples.” Powless adds, “a transnational Indigenous movement can be said to really have emerged during the 1970s largely in response to these closed doors at the national level and seemingly more open ones at the level of the UN. Here, Indigenous Peoples began to appreciate that the UN was uniquely endowed with considerable legal and moral, or soft power, to set norms, and more importantly, define peoplehood and the rights associated with it.”

²⁷⁹ Dev Kumar Sunuwar. “What Do the SDGs Mean for the World’s Indigenous Peoples?” *Media Development* 65, no. 2 (April 2019): 24, 27. <http://www.waccglobal.org/articles/what-do-the-sdgs-mean-for-the-world-s-indigenous-peoples>. Kyle Whyte, Chris Caldwell, and Marie Schaefer explain, “‘Indigenous peoples’ refer to the nearly 400 million people across the world whose communities, polities, and nations exercised self-determination according to their own social, cultural, and ecological systems— that is, governance systems— prior to periods in which other human groups dominated them through various combinations of imperial invasion, colonial exploitation and occupation, and settlement of their territories.” See: Kyle Whyte, Chris Caldwell, and Marie Schaefer. “Indigenous Lessons about Sustainability Are Not Just for ‘All Humanity,’” *Sustainability: Approaches to Environmental Justice and Social Power*, University Press Scholarship Online 2019. DOI:10.18574/nyu/9781479894567.003.0007. 154.

²⁸⁰ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 413.

²⁸¹ I use the terminology “Indigenous Peoples” more frequently within this paper because that is often the terminology used by the texts I survey and because it provides a more inclusive term for the wide range of Indigenous communities around the world being represented within these texts.

²⁸² David Schlosberg and Lisette B. Collins. “From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice.” *WIREs: Climate Change* 5, no. 3 (May 2014): 359–74. doi:10.1002/wcc.275. 361. The scholars argue, “The relationship between cultural practices, sovereignty rights, and lives immersed in diverse and threatened ecosystems has been at the heart of indigenous environmental justice organizing—and indigenous movements have been central to the environmental justice movement.”

²⁸³ These texts include statements made by Indigenous activists representing the Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change, speeches made by Indigenous activists, and texts produced by Indigenous climate activists’ groups. I tried to use a variety of texts to show how these patterns emerge throughout these different groups and activists.

²⁸⁴ Jordynn Jack. “Chronotopes: Forms of Time in Rhetorical Argument.” *College English*, 69, no. 1 (2006): 52. doi:10.2307/25472188. 67.

²⁸⁵ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 411. Indigenous scholar Ben Powless explains, “Indigenous Peoples are among the least powerful and most vulnerable to climate change, and indeed are already being impacted as so-called frontline communities.”

²⁸⁶ Melanie Boyd and Ozouf Senamin Amedegnato. “On the Front Line? Metaphors of War and Violence in Academic Libraries.” *Canadian Journal of Academic Librarianship* 5 (2019): 1–20. <http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/cjal-rcbu.v5.32163>. 12.

²⁸⁷ *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, s.v. “frontline,” accessed April 20, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/frontline>.

²⁸⁸ Michael T. Bravo. “Voices from the Sea Ice: The Reception of Climate Impact Narratives.” *Journal of Historical Geography* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2009): 256–78. doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2008.09.007. 262.

²⁸⁹ Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus. “The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu.” *Global Environmental Change Part A: Human & Policy Dimensions* 22, no. 2 (May 2012): 382–90. 385.

²⁹⁰ Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, “The First Climate Refugees,” 387.

²⁹¹ Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, “The First Climate Refugees,” 387.

²⁹² Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, “The First Climate Refugees,” 385.

²⁹³ “Climate Frontlines.” The website details, “Many small island, rural and indigenous peoples are already facing the first impacts of climate change. Their high vulnerability relates to their reliance upon resource-based livelihoods and the locations and configurations of their lands and territories. These communities however, are also key sources of knowledge and understanding on climate change impacts, responses and adaptation. Climate Frontlines works to promote inclusion of indigenous knowledge of climate change in relevant policy and action.”

²⁹⁴ Dawn Pritchard. “At COP23, Moving toward Greater Engagement with Indigenous Peoples,” *Centre for International Governance Innovation* (2017). <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/cop23-moving-toward-greater-engagement-indigenous-peoples>.

²⁹⁵ ““Mother Earth’s Original Stewards’ [Social Good Summit 2019],” YouTube video, 23:34, Mashable Brand X, Sept. 27, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IroFM8v_EcY. 2:00. Peter specifically expresses, “We are at the frontline of climate change. We are, you know our country is not very high up from the water line. We see everything that happens as soon as it happens.”

²⁹⁶ UN NGLS. “Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, AFPAT, Chad, speaks at United Nations Paris Agreement Signing, 22 April 2016,” *YouTube video*, 5:08, Apr. 28, 2016,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n1b7ZskKukE>. 1:16. Ibrahim specifically says, “When I left Chad last week my people were facing more than 48 degrees Celsius which is 118-degrees Fahrenheit, killing hundreds of them on silence. We fight for survival.”

²⁹⁷ Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner. “Three Weeks After the UN Climate Summit or Coming Home to a Climate Reality.” *Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner*, November 02, 2014. Accessed May 21, 2021.

<https://www.kathyjetnilkijiner.com/three-weeks-after-the-un-climate-summit-or-coming-home-to-a-climate-reality/>.

²⁹⁸ Annette Watson and Orville Huntington. “Transgressions of the Man on the Moon: Climate Change, Indigenous Expertise, and the Posthumanist Ethics of Place and Space.” *GeoJournal* 79, no. 6 (2014): 721-36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24432688>. 725.

²⁹⁹ Andrea Muehlebach. “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations: Indigenous Cultural Politics at the U. N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations.” *Cultural Anthropology* 16, no. 3 (2001): 415-48. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/656683>. 425. Muehlebach specifically details, “Place, then, is infused with culture, and vice versa, so that all indigenous cultural politics are always also a politics of land, and a politics of rights to land. By implication, all struggles for and about land are always also struggles about identity and culture.”

³⁰⁰ “Statement by the President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway - COP 21,” found in “Resources,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change.

<http://www.iipfcc.org/resources>. Specifically, the President states, “The Sámi way of life and our traditional livelihood, especially in relation to reindeer husbandry, fresh and seawater fishing, small scale farming, hunting and gathering is seriously threatened by climate change. Since reindeer husbandry is a cornerstone of Sámi culture, such a loss would have fatal consequences for Sámi languages, culture and community life.”

³⁰¹ “Statement by the President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway - COP 21.”

³⁰² UN NGLS, “Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, 2:40.

³⁰³ Pritchard, “At COP23.” Pritchard expresses, “Métis people and other Indigenous peoples live and work on the land and feel the first effects of climate change.” See also Ibrahim’s statement: “They are pastoralists. They are fishermen. And they are farmers. They do not depend on the end of the month’s salary. They depend on the rainfall. They depend on the crops that are growing or the pasture for their cattle. The shrinking resources, you have many communities that are fighting to get access. The first come is the first served. The second have to fight unto death.” See: Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim. “Indigenous knowledge meets science to take on climate change,” TEDWomen December 2019, TED video, 12:52.

https://www.ted.com/talks/hindou_oumarou_ibrahim_indigenous_knowledge_meets_science_to_take_on_climate_change?language=en. 2:19.

³⁰⁴ Gordon Walker. “Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental Justice.” *Antipode* 41, no. 4 (September 2009): 614–36. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00691.x. 620.

³⁰⁵ Bravo, “Voices from the Sea Ice,” 263.

³⁰⁶ Chis J. Cuomo. “Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility.” *Hypatia* 26, no. 4 (2011): 690-714. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41328876>. 695.

³⁰⁷ Benjamin R. Bates. “The (In)Appropriateness of the WAR Metaphor in Response to SARS-CoV-2: A Rapid Analysis of Donald J. Trump’s Rhetoric.” *Frontiers in Communication* 5 (June 1, 2020). doi:10.3389/fcomm.2020.00050. 8. Bates talks about the separation between the home front and the frontline in connection with the use of war metaphors in President Trump’s covid rhetoric: “As much as turning healthcare workers, first responders, delivery workers, and food

and grocery workers performing work within the United States into SOLDIERS confuses the FRONTLINE with the HOMEFRONT, Trump's invocation of the Second World War requires that there be a HOMEFRONT distinct from the area of military operations. Trump realizes that this entailment requires him to call for US citizens to engage in acts of self-sacrifice to support efforts on the FRONTLINE."

³⁰⁸ "Statement and poem by Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, Climate Summit 2014 - Opening Ceremony," YouTube video, 6:50, United Nations, Sept. 23, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mc_IgE7TBSY. 2:30.

³⁰⁹ "Xiuhtezcatl, Indigenous Climate Activist at the High-level event on Climate Change," YouTube video, 9: 31, United Nations, June 25, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27gtZ1oV4kw>. 2:45.

³¹⁰ "Statement by the President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway - COP 21."

³¹¹ Ruth Kaviok. "International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change Opening Plenary Statement 24th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 24)," *International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change*, Dec. 4, 2018. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/201812041201---Indigenous_IIPFCC_Opening_Statment_2_Dec_2018.pdf.

³¹² Mitchell G. Reyes and Kundai Chirindo. "Theorizing Race and Gender in the Anthropocene." *Women's Studies in Communication* 43, no. 4 (November 2020): 429–42. doi:10.1080/07491409.2020.1824519. 436.

³¹³ Farbotko and Lazrus, "The First Climate Refugees," 385.

³¹⁴ UN NGLS, "Hindou Oumarou Ibrahim, 1:16.

³¹⁵ Jetnil-Kijiner, "Three Weeks After."

³¹⁶ Jetnil-Kijiner, "Three Weeks After."

³¹⁷ Lori Hartmann-Mahmud. "War as Metaphor," *Peace Review* 14, no. 4 (2002), 427-432, DOI: 10.1080/1040265022000039213. 428.

³¹⁸ Hartmann-Mahmud, "War," 429.

³¹⁹ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. "'Weathering'": Climate Change and the 'Thick Time' of Transcorporeality." *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558-75. Accessed March 16, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 567. Neimanis and Walker affirm, "There is no escaping climate change, for our bodies are both the products and the vehicles of its iteration."

³²⁰ Bates, "The (In)Appropriateness of the WAR Metaphor," 7.

³²¹ Anupama Ranawana and James Trafford. "Imperialist Environmentalism and Decolonial Struggle." *Discover Society* (Aug. 2017): <https://discoversociety.org/about-us/>. 2.

³²² Hartmann-Mahmud, "War," 430. Hartmann-Mahmud argues, "It is the philosophical, ethical, and political critique that is not permitted to emerge in a time of war" and war imagery "cuts through the competing versions of why and how the enemy has emerged and sharply focuses on attacking and defeating the enemy."

³²³ Kyle Whyte argues, "While Indigenous peoples, as any society, have long histories of adapting to change, colonialism caused changes at such a rapid pace that many Indigenous peoples became vulnerable to harms, from health problems related to new diets to erosion of their cultures to the destruction of Indigenous diplomacy, to which they were not as susceptible prior to colonization. Indigenous peoples often understand their vulnerability to climate change as an intensification of colonially-induced environmental changes." Kyle Whyte. "Indigenous Climate Change Studies: Indigenizing Futures, Decolonizing the Anthropocene," *English Language Notes* 55, no. 1 (2018): 153. <https://kylewhyte.marcom.cal.msu.edu/wp>. 154.

In the *emergency of the present* chronotope, this historical connection is lost as Indigenous ways of relating to the natural world make them more susceptible to climate impacts.

³²⁴ Neimanis and Walker, “Weathering,” 567. See also: Eric Magrane. “Healing, Belonging, Resistance, and Mutual Care’: Reading Indigenous Eco-poetics and Climate Narratives,” *Literary Geographies* 4, no. 2, (2018): 156-170.

<https://www.literarygeographies.net/index.php/LitGeogs/article/view/92>. 166.

³²⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty. *The Crises of Civilization: Exploring Global and Planetary Histories*. First edition. Oxford University Press, 2018. 14.

³²⁶ Walker, “Beyond Distribution and Proximity,” 621. Walker argues, “inequality is not only a matter of the spatial distribution of risk— who lives on the floodplain and how they get to live there—but also of how each of these contributory dimensions to vulnerability also play out across space and time.”

³²⁷ Sophie Pascoe, Wolfram Dressler, and Monica Minnegal. “Storytelling climate change – Causality and temporality in the REDD+ regime in Papua New Guinea,” *Geoforum*, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.09.014>. 5. The scholars provide the example of Indigenous activists describing climate change as the outcome of poor relationships between people and their environment.

³²⁸ Kera Sherwood-O’Regan. “Closing Statement Transcript,” found in “Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus Expresses their Disappointment with Failed COP 25 Negotiations,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (Dec. 2019): 1.

<http://www.iipfcc.org/blog/2019/12/31/press-release-indigenous-peoples-caucus-express-their-disappointment-with-failed-cop25-negotiations>.

³²⁹ “Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,” 5:45.

³³⁰ “Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,” 5:04.

³³¹ Pascoe, Dressler, and Minnegal, “Storytelling climate change,” 7.

³³² Pascoe, Dressler, and Minnegal, “Storytelling climate change,” 3.

³³³ Mark Rifkin. *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination*. Duke University Press, 2017. 5.

³³⁴ Rifkin explains how often Indigenous Peoples are either “consigned to the past, or they are inserted into a present defined on non-native terms. From this perspective, Native people(s) do not so much exist within the flow of time as erupt from it as an anomaly, one usually understood as emanating from a bygone era.” Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” vii.

³³⁵ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 5.

³³⁶ Some examples include: It Takes Roots Delegation, “COP24.”; “Our Futures Will Not Be Traded” ITR Delegation to Poland 2018,” found in “United Nations - Climate Change Conference of the Parties,” Indigenous Environmental Network, <https://www.ienearth.org/unfccc/>; “Statement and poem,” 2:30. Jetñil-Kijiner states, “Those of us from Oceania are already experiencing it firsthand.”; Pritchard, “At COP23.” Pritchard similarly notes, “Métis people and other Indigenous peoples live and work on the land and feel the first effects of climate change. Water levels rising in the Pacific, ice melting in the Arctic, and forest fires and floods displacing people are but some examples.”

³³⁷ “Xiuhtezcatl, Indigenous Climate Activist,” 2:45.

³³⁸ “Xiuhtezcatl, Indigenous Climate Activist,” 3:45.

³³⁹ Ben Anderson, Kevin Grove, Lauren Rickards, and Matthew Kearnes. “Slow Emergencies: Temporality and the Racialized Biopolitics of Emergency Governance.” *Progress in Human Geography* 44, no. 4 (August 2020): 621–39. doi:10.1177/0309132519849263. 633-634.

³⁴⁰ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 6:50.

³⁴¹ Stephen J. Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul H. Thibodeau. “War metaphors in public discourse,” *Metaphor and Symbol* 33, no.1 (2018), 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/10926488.2018.1407992. 4.

³⁴² Panu Pihkala. “Anxiety and the Ecological Crisis: An Analysis of Eco-Anxiety and Climate Anxiety,” *Sustainability* 12, no. 19 (2020): 7836. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12197836>. 2. Pihkala explains, the climate crisis “causes difficult feelings of uncertainty, unpredictability, and uncontrollability, all of which are classic ingredients in anxiety.”

³⁴³ Susan Clayton. “Climate Anxiety: Psychological Responses to Climate Change.” *Journal of Anxiety Disorders* 74 (August 1, 2020). doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2020.102263.2.

³⁴⁴ Pihkala, “Anxiety and the Ecological Crisis,” 2. Pihkala states, “Among general scholars of anxiety, a basic and shared view of anxiety is that it is future-oriented and related to a threat about which there is significant uncertainty.”

³⁴⁵ “Statement by the President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway - COP 21.” “The Arctic is getting warmer as I speak. Climatic change is taking place more than twice as fast in the Arctic as elsewhere in the world. In our area, we are not talking about 1.5 or 2 degrees of warming, but perhaps of 4 to 6 degrees already by 2050.”

³⁴⁶ “Statement and poem,” 2:30.

³⁴⁷ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 8:18. Ibrahim specifically describes, “90 percent of the water just evaporated because there is no activity around it [...] the consequences for us are huge. We have environmental consequences and then social. For environmental we have the loss of biodiversity. So, then all the resources are shrinking. The animals who used to be there that I know personally myself disappear and that disappear forever.”

³⁴⁸ Ashlee Cunsolo Willox. “Climate Change as the Work of Mourning.” *Ethics and the Environment* 17, no. 2 (2012): 137-64. Accessed May 21, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.17.2.139-140. Willox argues, “Since Inuit lives and livelihoods are intimately intertwined with and reliant on the land, even subtle changes in climate and weather can cause significant environmental impacts—impacts which not only impact daily activities, but also cause strong emotional and mental responses.” She adds, “Based on the rapidity of the changes in the region and the realization that these changes will not only continue, but will most likely worsen in severity and impact, Inuit with whom I worked indicated they were already imagining future losses, already experiencing levels of pain over what may come.”

³⁴⁹ The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change statement from COP21 expresses this in its call for “A temperature goal of no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. We are disappointed this was not adopted as the Structured Expert Dialog stated that our traditional livelihoods will be severely affected at two degrees.” Ettawageshik, “International Indigenous Peoples Forum.”

³⁵⁰ Amy E. Chadwick “Toward a Theory of Persuasive Hope: Effects of Cognitive Appraisals, Hope Appeals, and Hope in the Context of Climate Change.” *Health Communication* 30, no. 6 (June 2015): 598–611. doi:10.1080/10410236.2014.916777. 600.

³⁵¹ “‘Urgency of climate crisis encompasses everything else we care about’ - Indigenous Climate Activist,” YouTube video, 5:01, United Nations, Sept. 20, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fj7vOlChHPc>. 4:43.

³⁵² “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 12:15.

³⁵³ “Xiuhtezcatl, Indigenous Climate Activist,” 9:05.

³⁵⁴ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 23:19.

³⁵⁵ It Takes Roots Delegation, “COP24.”

³⁵⁶ Kyle Whyte. “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice: Ecological and Relational Tipping Points.” *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*, October 23, 2019. doi:10.1002/wcc.603. 2.

³⁵⁷ “Statement of the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change during the Opening session of SBSTA,” found in “Resources,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1_itrcvT7uqSNbJOMuCRvZkDTJx71Z6IQ1xoAfJE8FXE/edit.

³⁵⁸ It Takes Roots Delegation, “COP24.” Specifically, the digital pamphlet reads: “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C warns that to stay below 1.5°C, ‘rapid and far-reaching’ transitions in land-use, energy, industrial development, buildings, air, ground, ocean transport, and cities, the world must take immediate action to transition away from fossil fuels. The IPCC report concludes that a world with 2°C of global warming will lead to more heat-related deaths, smaller crop yields, more intense extreme weather events, slower economic growth, more people in poverty, and an increase in the population facing water stress by up to 50%, compared to a 1.5°C world. These impacts will get progressively worse if temperatures warm beyond the 2°C limit. Indigenous Peoples, frontline communities and everyday people around the world, are already facing devastating impacts from wildfires, floods, drought, and food insecurity.”

³⁵⁹ Greta Thunberg, “Speech at EU Parliament,” Fridays for Future, April 2019, YouTube video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJAcuQEVxTY>. 1:38. Thunberg warns, “Around the year 2030, 10 years 259 days and 10 hours away from now, we will be in a position where we set off an irreversible chain reaction beyond human control, that will most likely lead to the end of our civilization as we know it. That is unless in that time, permanent and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society have taken place.”

³⁶⁰ “Statement of the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change during the Opening session of SBSTA.” The statement reads: “The cumulative temperature rise within the current commitments will not suffice to reduce temperature rise to way below the 2 degrees Celsius envisioned by the Paris Agreement. The demonstration of greater ambition is critical for mitigating the adverse impacts of climate change and achieving our desired temperature rise of 1.5 degrees Celsius or below that is imperative for the continued survival and development of all, including those living in small islands states and Indigenous Peoples. It is imperative that NDCs are not diluted or minimized by carbon offsets.”

³⁶¹ Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 633.

³⁶² “Statement by the President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway - COP 21.”

³⁶³ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 12:25.

³⁶⁴ Hartmann-Mahmud, “War,” 428.

³⁶⁵ Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 622.

³⁶⁶ Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 622.

³⁶⁷ Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 623, 625.

³⁶⁸ Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 627.

³⁶⁹ Whyte, Caldwell, and Schaefer, “Indigenous Lessons about Sustainability,” 153.

³⁷⁰ Reyes and Chirindo, “Theorizing Race,” 432.

³⁷¹ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 5.

³⁷² Anderson, Grove, Rickards, and Kearnes, “Slow Emergencies,” 623. The scholars explain, “The (white) liberal subject that anticipates a future of growth, change, development and becoming emerges through techniques of racialization that also produce (black and Indigenous) subjects suspended in a durative temporality of decline, stagnation, decay, and a repetitive temporality of recurring plantation violence.”

³⁷³ Reyes and Chirindo, “Theorizing Race,” 432. The scholars describe, “The time of blackness was an annulled time—or a primitive cyclical time that stood in stark contrast to the linear, progressive notion of time that hallmarked Western European ideas of civilization. This is how, as Helen Ngo recently noted, ‘racism and colonialism affix the racialized and colonized body to that of the past,’ frozen at the moment of contact, and thus defined not as a human living in a world but as a beast stuck in nature. Of course, the implicit and sometimes explicit result was the dissociation of blackness from whiteness—one a sign of a primordial past, the other a symbol of a progressive present-future.” Rifkin adds, “either they are consigned to the past, or they are inserted into a present defined on non-native terms. From this perspective, Native people(s) do not so much exist within the flow of time as erupt from it as an anomaly, one usually understood as emanating from a bygone era.” Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” vii.

³⁷⁴ Muehlebach. “‘Making Place,’” 418-419.

³⁷⁵ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 2.

³⁷⁶ Doreen B. Massey. *For Space*. SAGE, 2005.11-12.

³⁷⁷ “World Indigenous Peoples Initiative to the UNSG Climate Action Summit,” *Climate Action Summit* (23 Sept. 2019): 1-3. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bxD_Ge8nxDsLrwpUd5KZ-_ul_swOFn5q/view. 4.

³⁷⁸ *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, s.v. “time immemorial,” accessed March 21, 2021, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/time%20immemorial>.

³⁷⁹ “Freda Huson Of The Unist’ot’en Addressing The UNPFIII,” Indigenous Climate Action, April 24, 2019. <https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/entries/freda-huson-of-the-unistoten-addressing-the-unpfiii>. Freda Huson details, “Since time immemorial, Indigenous Peoples have been resilient and have fought the negative impacts of environmental changes through our traditional knowledge and livelihoods.”

³⁸⁰ Ettawageshik, “International Indigenous Peoples Forum.”

³⁸¹ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 0:46.

³⁸² “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 16:50.

³⁸³ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 5:49.

³⁸⁴ Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 418. Muehlebach argues, “In an age of ecological disaster and emerging models of sustainable development, the concepts of biological and cultural diversity, hinging on notions of (the value of) local indigenous knowledge, have powerfully come to the fore.”

³⁸⁵ Massey, “For Space,” 13.

³⁸⁶ Kyle P. Whyte, “Indigenous Science (Fiction) for the Anthropocene: Ancestral Dystopias and Fantasies of Climate Change Crises.” *Environment & Planning E: Nature & Space* 1, no. 1/2 (March 2018): 224–42. doi:10.1177/2514848618777621. 234. Whyte specifically details, “Indigenous peoples are the ‘stewards’ of ‘biodiverse ecosystems’ and are ‘lethally threatened by climate change and biodiversity destruction, which are symptoms of how far the Earth’s operating systems are tipping out of balance.’ As many Indigenous peoples have an ‘effective whole-of-Earth system of governance and values that have sustained and protected safe operating spaces on Earth for millennia. It is now time to learn from Indigenous peoples.’

For Havemann, the role of Indigenous peoples extends beyond imparting Holocene wisdom, as they also ‘alert us over and over again to the current loss of biodiversity and the “strange effects of climate change on ecosystems and their lives.”’

³⁸⁷ “World Indigenous Peoples Initiative,” 1.

³⁸⁸ “World Indigenous Peoples Initiative,” 1

³⁸⁹ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 5:49.

³⁹⁰ Takaiya Blaney, Nigel Henri-Robinson, Kalilah Rampanen, and Portia Morin. *Youth Delegation Indigenous Climate Action to Minister Jonathan Wilkinson*, December 5, 2019. Letter. From Indigenous Climate Action.

<https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/entries/letter-to-minister-wilkinson-reject-the-teck-frontier-tar-sands-mine-project-proposal> (accessed May 21, 2021). In a letter to Minister Jonathan Wilkinson Minister of Environment and Climate Government of Canada, representatives from the Youth Delegation of Indigenous Climate Action affirm that the rich ecosystems on Indigenous lands “is not happenstance, but is the result of millennia of stewardship founded in deep, spiritual connections with our lands and territories and not predicated on modern economic systems.”

³⁹¹ Ranawana and Trafford, “Imperialist Environmentalism,” 3.

³⁹² Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 418, 438. Muehlebach warns that “careful indigenous custodianship of the land—manifest in the fact that many areas rich in biodiversity are areas that have been inhabited by indigenous peoples for centuries—ironically often results in the encroachment of these diversity-rich territories and in the destruction of indigenous ways of life.”

³⁹³ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 16:25.

³⁹⁴ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 16:25.

³⁹⁵ Reyes and Chirindo, “Theorizing Race,” 437. The scholars note, “Within the context of colonialism and capitalism, then, time both enables and justifies the racialization of bodies and the asymmetrical distribution of death along racialized lines. In fact, the alienation processes of colonialism, capitalism, and sexism, as well as those that enable the plunder of earth’s “resources,” all depend on the asymmetrical distribution of social and material death. Such asymmetries—which often ride on commodification and dehumanization—ultimately conceal (through quarantine) the full and especially long-term cost of necropolitical action.”

³⁹⁶ Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 429.

³⁹⁷ Pascoe, Dressler, and Minnegal, “Storytelling climate change,” 5.

³⁹⁸ Heather Davis and Zoe Todd. “On the Importance of a Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene.” *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 16, no. 4 (December 2017): 761. <https://www.acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1539>. 771.

³⁹⁹ Sherwood-O’Regan. “Closing Statement Transcript,” 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Whyte, “Indigenous Science (Fiction) for the Anthropocene,” 226.

⁴⁰¹ Whyte, “Indigenous Science (Fiction) for the Anthropocene,” 234.

⁴⁰² Blaney, Henri-Robinson, Rampanen, and Morin, “Youth Delegation.”

⁴⁰³ “World Indigenous Peoples Initiative,” 1. The statement reads, “the continued degradation of Indigenous Peoples’ lands, territories, resources, and biocultural diversity resulting from imposed development, causes and compounds the impacts of climate change while reducing our adaptive capacity and creating a false dependency on fossil fuel extraction.”

- ⁴⁰⁴ Kia Ora. “Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment statement at COP 23,” found in “Resources,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change. <http://www.iipfcc.org/resources>.
- ⁴⁰⁵ Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 417.
- ⁴⁰⁶ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 419.
- ⁴⁰⁷ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 2:37.
- ⁴⁰⁸ Davis and Todd. “On the Importance of a Date,” 763. Davis and Todd explain, this connection of climate change to colonialism positions “Indigenous philosophies and processes of Indigenous self-governance as a necessary political corrective.”
- ⁴⁰⁹ Lisa Kretz. “Emotional Solidarity: Ecological Emotional Outlaws Mourning Environment Loss and Empowering Positive Change,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 276.
- ⁴¹⁰ Kretz, “Emotional Solidarity,” 276.
- ⁴¹¹ Sherwood-O’Regan. “Closing Statement Transcript,” 1.
- ⁴¹² Sherwood-O’Regan. “Closing Statement Transcript,” 1.
- ⁴¹³ Blaney, Henri-Robinson, Rampanen, and Morin, “Youth Delegation.” The letter reads: “At the same time, the implementation of REDD+ and similar forest-based carbon credit and payment for ecological services schemes have been documented in many instances to have failed to recognize the principles of Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), and have resulted in land grabs, human rights violations and the loss of livelihood for forest-dependent communities.”
- ⁴¹⁴ C. R. Snyder. “Hope Theory: Rainbows in the Mind.” *Psychological Inquiry* 13, no. 4 (2002): 249-75. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1448867>. 249.
- ⁴¹⁵ Ora, “Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment.”
- ⁴¹⁶ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 12:15.
- ⁴¹⁷ Ora, “Indigenous Peoples High Level Segment.”
- ⁴¹⁸ “‘Urgency of climate crisis,’” 4:18. Real solutions emerge from, as activist Martiniez describes, “learning from the Indigenous peoples of these lands that have been doing this work for generations and centuries to protect our land, our water, our generation, and those to follow.”
- ⁴¹⁹ Michael Charles. “Indigenous Peoples Closing Plenary Statement 2018,” found in “Resources,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change. <http://www.iipfcc.org/resources>.
- ⁴²⁰ “‘Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,’” 19:12. See also: “Our indigenous ways of knowing, rooted in the experiences of our ancestors, is the medicine that this sick world needs right now. Our prayers, ceremonies, and stories provide wisdom, balance, and connection between our spirit and all our relations - those that are two-legged and those that aren’t.” Charles, “Indigenous Peoples Closing.”
- ⁴²¹ Ibrahim, “Indigenous knowledge meets science,” 8:54.
- ⁴²² Ettawageshik, “International Indigenous Peoples Forum.”
- ⁴²³ “International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IPFCC) Recommendations on the Indigenous Peoples knowledge-sharing platform,” found in “Resources,” International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change. <http://www.iipfcc.org/resources>.
- ⁴²⁴ *International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change to Ministers*, 2015. Letter. From International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change. <http://www.iipfcc.org/resources-3>. (Accessed May 21, 2021). The letter reads: “the respect and protection of our rights, especially to our lands, territories and resources is a critical element in order to further the maximum potential of indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, innovations and sustainable livelihoods.”

⁴²⁵ “World Indigenous Peoples Initiative,” 1. Specifically, the statement outlines Indigenous Peoples commitment to “1) Lead the implementation of holistic plans to protect biocultural diversity, ensuring the inclusion of our most marginalized; 2) Develop actions to secure indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources, self-determination and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC); 3) Access the development of renewable energies in accordance with our self-determination and FPIC.”

⁴²⁶ ““Mother Earth’s Original Stewards,”” 19:12.

⁴²⁷ Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 433.

⁴²⁸ Rothe, “Governing the End Times?” 162.

⁴²⁹ Arun Agrawal. “Dismantling the Divide between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge.”

Development and Change 26, no. 3 (July 1995): 413–39.

doi:[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy-](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-7660/issues)

[remote.galib.uga.edu/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-7660/issues](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-7660/issues).

⁴³⁰ Casey Schmitt. “Invoking the Ecological Indian: Rhetoric, Culture, and the Environment,” in *Voice and Environmental Communication* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 73.

⁴³¹ Sylvia Escárcega. “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms: The Politics of Indigenousness at the United Nations.” *Cultural Dynamics* 22, no. 1 (March 2010): 3–28.

doi:10.1177/0921374010366780. 17.

⁴³² Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms,” 17.

⁴³³ Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms,” 17.

⁴³⁴ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 5.

⁴³⁵ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 5.

⁴³⁶ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 2.

⁴³⁷ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 2.

⁴³⁸ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 2. Whyte explains how “The second scenario is that nations and other privileged parties and influencers seek to first establish and repair the qualities of consent, trust, accountability, and reciprocity. Yet the time it takes to do so unfolds slowly, meaning that curbing emissions takes longer because key projects take more time to get off the ground. While in this scenario indigenous peoples eventually have relationships with other societal institutions that are conducive to justice-oriented coordination, there is nonetheless a 2C rise, leading to risky environmental disturbances, whether to indigenous peoples or others. In this scenario, it’s too late to avoid dangerous climate change. Yet the relational qualities for urgent, justice-oriented coordination will be established for the future beyond this scenario.”

⁴³⁹ Whyte, “Too Late for Indigenous Climate Justice,” 2. Whyte discusses specifically how “The first scenario involves sweeping global action to lower greenhouse emissions, led by nations and other privileged parties and influencers. Yet, without respecting the relational qualities of consent, trust, accountability, and reciprocity, the implementation of the solutions harms indigenous peoples widely, whether through displacement, land dispossession, unfair payment schemes and employment practices, exclusion from markets, or denial of indigenous agency in planning and leadership. Here, the intensity of ecological events (measured in isolation) lessens globally and a 2C rise is averted. However, environmental injustices remain business as usual. It’s too late, then, to stop climate injustices tied to the implementation of adaptation or mitigation solutions.”

⁴⁴⁰ Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms,” 4.

⁴⁴¹ Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms,” 4. “The (re)construction of peoplehood involves creating and negotiating at both local and international levels a sense that history, memory, experience, and culture are shared among the members of a group in an essential way; at the same time, it involves a continuous conscious redrawing of cultural boundaries according to the context in which such boundaries are questioned or enacted

⁴⁴² Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 38.

⁴⁴³ Schmitt, “Invoking the Ecological Indian,” 73. Schmitt argues, “From this perspective, endowing Native American peoples with the Ecological Indian persona can, indeed, enact a kind of environmental racism, marginalizing their role in socio-political discourse to mere affirmation of Western ideas of environmental conservation. When breaking from Western conceptions of conservation and ecology, Indian representatives have been condemned, attacked for being non-Indian, and held to ecological standards rarely expected of any White individual.”

⁴⁴⁴ Escárcega, “Authenticating Strategic Essentialisms,” 22.

⁴⁴⁵ Amity A. Doolittle. “The Politics of Indigeneity: Indigenous Strategies for Inclusion in Climate Change Negotiations.” *Conservation and Society* 8, no. 4 (2010): 286, 290.

<http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=0972-4923;year=2010;volume=8;issue=4;spage=286;epage=291;aulast=Doolittle>. 287.

⁴⁴⁶ Muehlebach, “‘Making Place’ at the United Nations,” 440.

⁴⁴⁷ Nick Couldry. *Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism* (London: SAGE, 2010). 130.

⁴⁴⁸ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 416.

⁴⁴⁹ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 418.

⁴⁵⁰ Powless, “An Indigenous Movement,” 420.

CHAPTER FOUR:

⁴⁵¹ See for example the Grief March (October 14, 2019) and the Funeral for Extinction (September 23, 2019) they hosted during fashion week. The group also hosts grief workshops and grief circles.

⁴⁵² Extinction Rebellion. “The Truth.” YouTube Video, March 30, 2029, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMzTWwTw_kQ&feature=emb_title. 01:40.

⁴⁵³ Ashlee Cunsolo, and Karen Landman. “Introduction,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 13.

⁴⁵⁴ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 14.

⁴⁵⁵ Joshua Trey Barnett. “Naming, Mourning, and the Work of Earthly Coexistence.” *Environmental Communication* 13, no. 3 (May 2019): 287–99. doi:10.1080/17524032.2018.1561485. 297.

⁴⁵⁶ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. “‘Weathering’: Climate Change and the ‘Thick Time’ of Transcorporeality.” *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558-75. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 567.

⁴⁵⁷ Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two | London | 24 Nov 2018 | Extinction Rebellion UK,” YouTube video, Dec. 14, 2018. 3:36, 3:23, 2:11. Some examples include: an activist who wore a blanket at the Rebellion Day Two event that read “I am here for my grandson,” the main chant for the day of “People going to rise like water to shut this system down. In the voice of my great granddaughter, climate justice now,” and the poster “No jobs on a dead planet. For our children’s sake, REBEL!”

⁴⁵⁸ Mark Rifkin. *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-Determination*. Duke University Press, 2017. 37-39.

⁴⁵⁹ Martabel Wasserman. "Past / Present / Future / Tense: ACT UP and Extinction Rebellion," *Art Practical* 11, no. 1 (December 2019). <https://www.artpractical.com/feature/past-present-future-tense-act-up-and-extinction-rebellion/>. 2. Wasserman further criticizes the movement for displaying public concern for the futures of children and grandchildren while simultaneously diminishing the voices of youth participation, specifically those with anti-capitalist sentiments. Wasserman explains, "The coalition collectively struggled with the question of whether we were a youth-led movement. One openly anti-capitalist high schooler was consistently ignored and overshadowed by adults speaking on behalf of an imagined youth. 'Kids don't have bank accounts,' someone said, when we were discussing why we should strike in front of Wells Fargo. In the climate coalition, 'the youth' were evoked by adults in an attempt to stop us from confronting one of the largest investors in fossil fuel and pipeline expansion."

⁴⁶⁰ Rob Renouf, "Does Extinction Rebellion Offer Any Solutions," *Extinction Rebellion*, March 12, 2021, <https://rebellion.global/blog/2021/03/12/xr-any-solutions/>.

⁴⁶¹ Renouf, "Does Extinction Rebellion."

⁴⁶² Renouf, "Does Extinction Rebellion." Renouf specifically states, "We need to think about climate change in the same way we think about cancer - there isn't a safe level, which is why we need to take immediate action before it gets even worse. Another sobering parallel is that we can't say with certainty at what point a cure will no longer be possible. There are incredibly complex inter-relationships in the natural world and potential for climate feedback loops to become established. This complexity means that it's impossible to predict with any confidence when tipping points might occur that could leave us powerless to prevent further climate change. What we do know is that delay reduces the chances of a positive outcome and that it will mean that more extreme action is required."

⁴⁶³ Susan Sontag. *Illness as Metaphor*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978. 72.

⁴⁶⁴ Dimitrinka Atanasova and Nelya Koteyko. "Metaphors in Online Editorials and Op-Eds about Climate Change, 2006-2013: A Study of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States." *The Role of Language in the Climate Change Debate*, ed. Kjersti Fløttum, (New York: Routledge, 2017), 82. Atanasova and Koteyko specifically detail that illness metaphors "prompt action by appealing to universal human experiences of illness." Sontag similarly states, "Disease imagery is used to express concern for social order, and health is something everyone is presumed to know about." Sontag, "Illness," 72.

⁴⁶⁵ Sontag, "Illness," 77. Sontag details, "Given proper foresight, the course of a disease is not irreversible; the same for disturbances in the body politic." Illness for Sontag "is a metaphor about foresight, and a call to foresight."

⁴⁶⁶ "FS7Leigh0281," *XR Media Archive*, Extinction Rebellion 2018.

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1uFqrvyX8LnICblUbceNYp-557Qe3KsLz>. 02:32.

⁴⁶⁷ Extinction Rebellion. "Grieve Play Love - Jem Bendell," YouTube video, 9:12, March 25, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ksUKEDWFIQ&t=1s>. 5:20.

⁴⁶⁸ Chris Russill. "Temporal Metaphor in Abrupt Climate Change Communication: An Initial Effort at Clarification," *The Economic, Social and Political Elements of Climate Change*, ed. Walter Leal Filho, (Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 121. Russill explains, "there is the metaphor of 'time's arrow', which construes history as 'an irreversible sequence of unrepeatable events', and where, '[e]ach moment occupies its own distinct position in a temporal

series, and all moments, considered in proper sequence, tell a story of linked events moving in a direction.”

⁴⁶⁹ “Why We Rebel.” *Extinction Rebellion*. Accessed March 27, 2021.

[https://rebellion.global/why-](https://rebellion.global/why-rebel/#:~:text=Extinction%20Rebellion%20is%20made%20up,want%20to%20change%20the%20future.&text=This%20is%20why%20we%20as,come%20together%20to%20take%20action)

[rebel/#:~:text=Extinction%20Rebellion%20is%20made%20up,want%20to%20change%20the%20future.&text=This%20is%20why%20we%20as,come%20together%20to%20take%20action](https://rebellion.global/why-rebel/#:~:text=Extinction%20Rebellion%20is%20made%20up,want%20to%20change%20the%20future.&text=This%20is%20why%20we%20as,come%20together%20to%20take%20action). See also: “We’re currently in the midst of our planet’s sixth mass extinction event and once again the primary driver for this is human activity.” Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.”

⁴⁷⁰ Stephen Flusberg, Teenie Matlock, and Paul H. Thibodeau. “Thinking about the future: The role of spatial metaphors for time.” In *CogSci*. 2017.

http://www.stephenflusberg.com/uploads/2/6/9/4/26942597/flusbergmatlockthibodeau_cogsci2017.pdf. 1-2.

⁴⁷¹ “FS7Leigh0281,” 01:53.

⁴⁷² “FS7Leigh0281,” 01:27.

⁴⁷³ “Why We Rebel.”

⁴⁷⁴ See for example: A part of the “Declaration of Rebellion” states, “We refuse to bequeath a dying planet to future generations by failing to act now.” “FS7Leigh0281,” 04:57. Furthermore, one of the chants from the “Funeral for Our Future” event involves activists asking “Who’s future? Our future.” Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two,” 2:40.

⁴⁷⁵ John Foster. *After Sustainability: Denial, Hope*, Routledge, 2015. 14.

⁴⁷⁶ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 12.

⁴⁷⁷ Neimanis and Walker, “Weathering,” 568.

⁴⁷⁸ Neimanis and Walker, “Weathering,” 568.

⁴⁷⁹ “Why We Rebel.”

⁴⁸⁰ “FS7Leigh0281,” 02:05.

⁴⁸¹ Sontag, “Illness,” 86.

⁴⁸² Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.”

⁴⁸³ Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” *Facebook*, November 24, 2018.

<https://www.facebook.com/ExtinctionRebellion/videos/2226930890963779>. 06:00. (1)

⁴⁸⁴ Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” *Facebook*, November 24, 2018.

<https://www.facebook.com/ExtinctionRebellion/videos/204639557116429>. 1:08:14. (2)

⁴⁸⁵ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 05:05.

⁴⁸⁶ Haoran Chu and Janet Z. Yang. “Emotion and the Psychological Distance of Climate Change.” *Science Communication* 41, no. 6 (December 2019): 761–

89. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547019889637>. 768. Chu and Yang specifically detail, “an anger-inducing experience often involves a certain and identifiable perpetrator.”

⁴⁸⁷ Chu and Yang, “Emotion,” 768.

⁴⁸⁸ Chu and Yang, “Emotion,” 768.

⁴⁸⁹ Sontag, “Illness,” 77.

⁴⁹⁰ Flusberg, Matlock, and Thibodeau, “Thinking about the future,” 5. Flusberg, Matlock, and Thibodeau describe how “People appeared to be more optimistic about solutions for climate change with a more distant time horizon (implying there would be more time to address it).”

⁴⁹¹ “Why We Rebel.”

⁴⁹² Chu and Yang, “Emotion,” 781. Chu and Yang clarify, “participants reported stronger anger, fear, sadness, and guilt when they perceived climate change as socially close. In contrast, they

reported more hope, a more abstract emotion, when they perceived climate change as a socially distant issue.”

⁴⁹³ Panu Pihkala. “Eco-Anxiety, Tragedy, and Hope: Psychological and Spiritual Dimensions of Climate Change.” *Zygon*, vol. 53, no. 2, June 2018, pp. 545–569.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12407>. 554.

⁴⁹⁴ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 8.

⁴⁹⁵ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 7. Foster specifically notes, “if the last-chance saloon turns out in practice to be the last-chance saloon-car, always capable of being shunted on a few miles further down the track without ever encountering any buffers, then its effectiveness as a venue for concentrating the mind is hugely diminished.”

⁴⁹⁶ Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.” Renouf says, “We know that climate change is being driven by emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, and that these are increasing as a result of human activity. In order to prevent further global warming, we need to reduce these emissions.”

⁴⁹⁷ Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two,” 2:50.

⁴⁹⁸ Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.”

⁴⁹⁹ “Why We Rebel.” The group details, “The clock is ticking, and if we don’t succeed in uniting to protect our planet, everyone will be impacted - you, your family, everyone and everything you hold dear. . . . and yet every crisis contains the possibility of transformation.”

⁵⁰⁰ Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.”

⁵⁰¹ Atanasova and Koteyko, “Metaphors in Online Editorials,” 76.

⁵⁰² Atanasova and Koteyko, “Metaphors in Online Editorials,” 77. Atanasova and Koteyko clarify, “The judgmental tone of this statement is consistent with the affordances of Illness metaphors—their bipolar structure (good versus bad) allows for the vivid construction of what is rational and good versus what is not.” Similarly, Sontag indicates, “To perish from internal disorder— analogized to a disease—is suicide, something quite preventable; an act of will, or rather a failure of will (that is, of reason).” For Sontag, “The disease metaphor was used in political philosophy to reinforce the call for a rational response.” Sontag, “Illness,” 78.

⁵⁰³ Renouf, “Does Extinction Rebellion.”

⁵⁰⁴ Atanasova and Koteyko, “Metaphors in Online Editorials,” 82. The scholars warn, “environmental communication research also suggests that by anchoring climate change in the fear of disease, metaphors of Illness might, in fact, demotivate action.”

⁵⁰⁵ “FS7Leigh0281,” 03:43. In the “Declaration of Rebellion,” Claire reads out, “The willful complicity displayed by our government has shattered meaningful democracy and cast aside the common interest in favour of short-term gain and private profits.”

⁵⁰⁶ Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two,” 00:41. One of the groups’ chants goes “Parliament, parliament, what have you done? Can’t you hear the sound of the drum? Your time wasting and party politics is leading us all to climate crisis.”

⁵⁰⁷ “FS7Leigh0281,” 03:53.

⁵⁰⁸ Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two,” 00:59. One of the signs from Rebellion Day Two includes “For my children, STOP climate chaos. For all life on earth, WAKE UP! Government Action Now.”

⁵⁰⁹ Chu and Yang, “Emotion,” 766.

⁵¹⁰ Chris J. Cuomo. “Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility.” *Hypatia* 26, no. 4 (2011): 690-714. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41328876>. 708.

⁵¹¹ Senara ON THE BEACH. “FUNERAL FOR THE EXTINCT - Extinction Rebellion, Truro, Cornwall,” YouTube video, 2:39, March 3, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Rkf0oyADs3w&list=PLW0DhduKgrOzh0w7EoTjx0hb0UOSSvzld&index=6&t=0s.00:49>.

⁵¹² “Why We Rebel.”

⁵¹³ Cuomo, “Climate Change,” 692.

⁵¹⁴ I use the term tragedy to mark the connection between the chronotope’s centering of climate losses and tragic plays. Pihkala draws out this connection, noting that “Extinction is a prime example of this kind of loss. In classic tragic plays, irreversible loss is a key element. Part of their power and appeal comes from the way in which they enact on the stage such total losses (Shakespeare’s *King Lear*, for example). At the same time, there is a strange relief in the process of admitting and encountering such losses together. Tragic plays can function as therapeutic processes and as kinds of vaccinations which try to prevent further evil by ‘injecting’ parts of it into the audience. A key aim is to generate compassion for those who suffer.” Pihkala, “Eco-Anxiety, Tragedy, and Hope,” 555.

⁵¹⁵ Pihkala, “Eco-Anxiety, Tragedy, and Hope,” 555.

⁵¹⁶ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 13.

⁵¹⁷ Ashlee Cunsolo and Neville Ellis. “Ecological grief as a mental health response to climate change-related loss,” *Nature Climate Change* 8, 275–281 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0092-2>. 276.

⁵¹⁸ I use non-human to signify natural losses, such as environmental changes and animals. I prefer this broad term because it encompasses a variety of entities in the natural world mourned at these events.

⁵¹⁹ Verlie, “Bearing Worlds,” 759. Susanne Moser. “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late’ (to Prevent Dangerous Climate Change).” *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*, October 23, 2019. doi:10.1002/wcc.606. 6.

⁵¹⁹ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 14.

⁵²⁰ Nancy Menning. “Environmental Mourning and the Religious Imagination,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 43.

⁵²¹ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 6.

⁵²² Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 10.

⁵²³ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 22.

⁵²⁴ Verlie, “Bearing Worlds,” 756. “Grief and sadness are thus characteristic responses to encountering climate change, whether that is through experiencing the direct ecological impacts or through more existential modes of engagement.” See also: Cunsolo and Ellis, “Ecological Grief as a Mental Health Response,” 275. Cunsolo and Ellis explain, “Climate-related weather events and environmental changes, for example, have been linked to a wide variety of acute and chronic mental health experiences, including: strong emotional responses, such as sadness, distress, despair, anger, fear, helplessness, hopelessness and stress.”

⁵²⁵ Ashlee Cunsolo. “Climate Change as the Work of Mourning,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 175.

⁵²⁶ Extinction Rebellion. “LIVE from London: XR Grief March,” *Facebook*, October 12, 2019. <https://www.facebook.com/401847960644025/videos/962830924071209>. 36:42.

⁵²⁷ Extinction Rebellion, “LIVE from London,” 18:30.

- ⁵²⁸ Extinction Rebellion, “Rebellion Day Two | Funeral for the Future,” 01:08. See also “I grieve for my lost years, lost compromise. I grieve the lost of my identity. I grieved how I may not grow old. I grieve for those closest to me and the fear and pain they may feel as things breakdown, and I grieve for all humanity, and especially the young.” Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 01:37.
- ⁵²⁹ Cunsolo, “Climate Change,” 175.
- ⁵³⁰ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 07:18.
- ⁵³¹ Byron Williston. “Climate Change and Radical Hope.” *Ethics and the Environment* 17, no. 2 (2012): 165-86. Accessed March 22, 2021. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.17.2.165. 171. See also: Lisa Kretz. “Emotional Solidarity: Ecological Emotional Outlaws Mourning Environment Loss and Empowering Positive Change,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 277.
- ⁵³² Senara ON THE BEACH. “FUNERAL,” 00:30.
- ⁵³³ Ashlee Cunsolo and Neville Ellis. “Hope and Mourning in the Anthropocene: Understanding Ecological Grief.” *The Conversation U.S.*, April 4, 2018: <https://theconversation.com/hope-and-mourning-in-the-anthropocene-understanding-ecological-grief-88630>.
- ⁵³⁴ Extinction Rebellion, “London Rebellion.”
- ⁵³⁵ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 06:05.
- ⁵³⁶ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 06:27.
- ⁵³⁷ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 07:35.
- ⁵³⁸ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 03:16.
- ⁵³⁹ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 13. Specifically, Cunsolo and Landman argue, “From this perspective, mourning not only exposes our connections to others—human, animal, vegetal, or mineral—and provides an opportunity to connect to ourselves and others through loss and shared vulnerability, it also provides political and ethical opportunities to expand discursive spaces to include bodies that are not mourned in dominant discourse, and to encourage individual and collective action, recognition, and responsibility in environmental matters.”
- ⁵⁴⁰ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 12.
- ⁵⁴¹ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 07:18. Bendell explains how “There is no way to escape despair, but there is a way through despair. It is to love *love* more than we fear death.”
- ⁵⁴² Williston, “Climate Change,” 171.
- ⁵⁴³ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 17.
- ⁵⁴⁴ Foster, “After Sustainability,” 17.
- ⁵⁴⁵ Kretz, “Emotional Solidarity,” 277.
- ⁵⁴⁶ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 6. Moser argues this paradoxical tension “creates the possibility for reconciliation and atonement, learning profound lessons from the past, practicing our imagination of what is still—and maybe especially now—possible; finding or continually re-making meaning, and nourishing not false, but ‘radical’ hope
- ⁵⁴⁷ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 47.
- ⁵⁴⁸ Rifkin, “Beyond Settler Time,” 2.
- ⁵⁴⁹ Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker. “‘Weathering’: Climate Change and the ‘Thick Time’ of Transcorporeality.” *Hypatia* 29, no. 3 (2014): 558-75. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24542017>. 561. Neimanis and Walker explain, “This project shifts away from the dominant temporality of climate change discourse, where progress and sustainability narratives meld in the anticipatory mode of “what should we do to stop climate change?” and instead asks “how is climate change me?”

⁵⁵⁰ Neimanis and Walker, “‘Weathering,’” 568. Neimanis and Walker add “Climate time, when assumed to be something we are ‘in,’ or as part of a neoliberal progress narrative that we will either push forward or stave off, thus disables ways of thinking and doing ecology that stretch around and through our imbrications with climate.”

⁵⁵¹ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 20:30. (1).

⁵⁵² “Rebel Daily 3: They gave their lives,” Extinction Rebellion, October 10, 2019. <https://extinctionrebellion.uk/2019/10/10/rebel-daily-3-they-gave-their-lives/>.

⁵⁵³ Extinction Rebellion. “Mourning for the planet - events and actions during Rebellion Day 2,” Facebook, Dec. 3, 2018. <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=786755818337834>.

⁵⁵⁴ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 6. Moser explains how if the question of “is it too late to prevent dangerous climate change?” was really a question of whether it is too late to prevent human suffering, the answer is a clear ‘yes’ and for all too many people it has begun a long time ago.”

⁵⁵⁵ Barnett, “Naming,” 290.

⁵⁵⁶ Extinction Rebellion. “Rebellion Day Two | Funeral for the Future,” 00:40.

⁵⁵⁷ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 1:08:11. (2).

⁵⁵⁸ Extinction Rebellion, “LIVE from London,” 19:41.

⁵⁵⁹ Kara Keeling, *Queer Times, Black Futures* (New York: New York University Press, 2019). vii. Keeling challenges Lee Edelman’s call for no future and suggests that such a call “might inform a (non)politics only for those for whom the future is given, even if undesirably so.” Edelman, according to Keeling, fails to consider the vast amount of people precluded from futurity.

⁵⁶⁰ Andrew Mark and Amanda Di Battista. “Making Loss the Centre: Podcasting Our Environmental Grief.” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 241. Specifically, Mark and Battista explain, “The invention of the atomic bomb and the realization that human industrialization is causing rapid climate change threaten our ability to have concrete faith in the future. In our impulse to improve, we have acted on ideas and desires whose consequences will each for generations, such as mega dams and the introduction of invasive species. These failed dreams cannot capture the original utopian aims and represent a melancholic state in their making and conception. Our technologies are outdated in the moment of their creation, and they linger with toxic consequences, refusing to leave us, reminding us of our hubris, and channeling our anger back at ourselves. These ruined projects, broken and fragmented metaphors for a better future, give rise to a unique form of melancholic detachment. The existence of these dangerous projects as birth rights to new generations now represent a kind of given melancholic inheritance.”

⁵⁶¹ Nicole Seymour. *Strange Natures. [Electronic Resource]: Futurity, Empathy, and the Queer Ecological Imagination*. University of Illinois Press, 2013. 7. Seymour argues, “it is corporate and governmental disregard for the future that enables the (paradoxical) reproduction of capital, and, more specifically, environmental degradation and destruction in the name of capital accumulation.”

⁵⁶² Briohny Walker. “Precarious Time: Queer Anthropocene Futures,” *Parrhesia* 30, 2019: 137-155. http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia30/parrhesia30_walker.pdf. 145.

⁵⁶³ Walker, “Precarious Time,” 145. Specifically, Walker details, “the loss of capitalist futures does not have to mean the loss of all futures; the rejection of these particular imaginaries does not require the refusal of futurity itself. Rather, it may clear the way for the arrival of alternative ways of thinking and living through time.”

⁵⁶⁴ Walker, “Precarious Time,” 145. The current material disruptions caused by climate change can, according to Walker, disrupt linear time. In the Anthropocene, “Heightened economic and environmental precarity are symptomatic of shifts and changes that reveal the failing of some dominant narratives of futurity to correlate with material possibility.” There is a new failure of these hetero-capitalist imaginaries to continue to reproduce themselves. As Walker details, “imagined capitalist futures that hinge on the plausibility of endless growth appear more and more impossible.” In this disorientation and futurelessness, Walker locates possibility for grief and loss to transform our relationship to futurity. As she describes, “Political opportunity exists within the very experience of precarity and futurelessness, as it reflects increasingly pressing evidence that current dominant systems of production, reproduction and organisation, long unjust and undesirable, are in their most fundamental logics unable to continue indefinitely to participate in the ongoing recreation of the future.”

⁵⁶⁵ Extinction Rebellion, “Grieve Play Love,” 00:58.

⁵⁶⁶ Sylvan Goldberg. “The Queerness of Straight Time in an Era of Climate Change,” *Arcade*, 2020. <https://arcade.stanford.edu/content/queerness-straight-time-era-climate-change>. 3.

⁵⁶⁷ Keeling, “Queer Times,” 85.

⁵⁶⁸ Deborah Bird Rose. “Multispecies Knots of Ethical Time.” *Environmental Philosophy* 9, no. 1 (2012): 127-40. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26169399>. 129-131. Rose explains, “My focus is on one particular intersection: where generational time intersects with synchronous encounter. Both patterns of time are given substantive presence in the world through flows of material being, energy, and information. Generational time involves flows from one generation to the next. Synchrony intersects with sequential time, and involves flows among individuals, often members of different species, as they seek to sustain their individual lives. The intersection is a temporal site of embodied interface, using the term ‘interface’ in its everyday sense of a common boundary where two systems interact.”

⁵⁶⁹ Extinction Rebellion. “Rebellion Day Two | Funeral for the Future,” 01:09.

⁵⁷⁰ Mukesh Madhaparia. “London Savanah,” *XR Media Archive*, Extinction Rebellion 2018 https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/11-_rJmPwR6xZJFHdXldXTO-uRBa56tzM. 0:03.

⁵⁷¹ Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 10:42. (2).

⁵⁷² Keeling, “Queer Times,” 19. Keeling views queer as a productive force that “fluidly anchors and defines the normative” and “carves out our relations temporally and spatially and proliferates connections within difference.” In this formulation, queer can be a generative force that can invest in creative social relations that may not be fully recognized by dominant frameworks.

⁵⁷³ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 104:018. (2).

⁵⁷⁴ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 105:55. (2).

⁵⁷⁵ “FS7Leigh0281,” 08:08.

⁵⁷⁶ Doreen B. Massey. *For Space*. SAGE, 2005.10. Massey adds, “More generally I would argue that identities/entities, the relations ‘between’ them, and the spatiality which is part of them, are all co constitutive.”

⁵⁷⁷ Massey, “For Space,” 95. Massey states, “If space is the sphere of multiplicity, the product of social relations, and those relations are real material practices, and always ongoing, then space can never be closed, there will always be loose ends, always relations with the beyond, always potential elements of chance.”

⁵⁷⁸ Cunsolo, “Climate Change,” 172. Cunsolo specifically says, “Despite these intense feelings and experiences, the grief and mourning experienced by individuals and communities globally to anthropogenic climate change seems strangely silenced in public climate change discourse.”

- 579 “Rebel Daily 3.”
- 580 Extinction Rebellion. “London Rebellion.”
- 581 Extinction Rebellion. “London Rebellion.”
- 582 “Extinction Rebellion Day 2, London to be gridlocked for third day running,” *Extinction Rebellion*, Nov. 23, 2018, <https://extinctionrebellion.uk/2018/11/23/extinction-rebellion-day-2-london-to-be-gridlocked-for-third-day-running/>.
- 583 “Extinction Rebellion Day 2.”
- 584 Massey, “For Space,” 190.
- 585 Sebastian Braun. “Mourning Ourselves and/as Our Relatives: Environment as Kinship,” *Mourning Nature: Hope at the Heart of Ecological Loss and Grief*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017. 74.
- 586 Senara ON THE BEACH. “FUNERAL,” 00:15.
- 587 Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” *Facebook*, November 24, 2018. <https://www.facebook.com/239675493315233/videos/363888840845749>. 29:10. (3).
- 588 Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 41:11. (3).
- 589 Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 44:36. (3).
- 590 Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 44:36. (3).
- 591 Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 21:02. (1).
- 592 “***Best of Rebellion Day Two (24:11:18),” *XR Media Archive*, Extinction Rebellion 2018. <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1In8z3emsXY1jqGNf1Fhu5VHYQM5m4jCF>.
- 593 “***Best of Rebellion Day Two.”
- 594 “***Best of Rebellion Day Two.”
- 595 Joan Berzoff. “The Transformative Nature of Grief and Bereavement.” *Clinical Social Work Journal* 39, no. 3 (September 2011): 262–69. doi:10.1007/s10615-011-0317-6. 265.
- 596 Berzoff, “The Transformative Nature,” 268. Berzoff sees mourning as “a means of acknowledging our shared losses and continuing to relate to them.”
- 597 “Extinction Rebellion Day 2.”
- 598 Extinction Rebellion, “LIVE from London,” 51:27.
- 599 Barnett, “Naming,” 289. Barnett explains how remembrance brings our collective loss into our consciousness to be mourned.
- 600 Barnett, “Naming,” 292.
- 601 Sarah Ahmed, “Queer Feelings,” in *The Routledge Queer Studies Reader*, ed. Donald E. Hall and Annamarie Jagose. (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013). 433. Ahmed explains how the “desire to maintain attachments with the lost other is enabling, rather than blocking new forms of attachment.”
- 602 Ahmed, “Queer Feelings,” 433.
- 603 Braun, “Mourning Ourselves,” 74. Braun specifically notes, “To mourn is always an expression and fulfillment of kinship. The capacity to mourn for relatives stands at the centre of relationship making because it retroactively validates kinship relations.”
- 604 Cunsolo, “Climate Change,” 175.
- 605 Butler, “Precarious Life,” 30.
- 606 Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 15.
- 607 Extinction Rebellion, “LIVE from London,” 26:04. The activist further criticizes, “They are in charge of all the substances that pollute our planet and pollute us with exploitation and with digging in the earth for things that should remain in the earth.”
- 608 Extinction Rebellion, “LIVE from London,” 26:04.

- ⁶⁰⁹ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 14.
- ⁶¹⁰ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 51:00. (2).
- ⁶¹¹ Clifton Spargo. *The Ethics of Mourning*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2004. 21.
- ⁶¹² Judith Butler. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. Verso, 2004. 46.
- ⁶¹³ Butler, “Precarious Life,” 34.
- ⁶¹⁴ Extinction Rebellion. “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” *Facebook*, November 24, 2018. <https://www.facebook.com/239675493315233/videos/363888840845749>. 16:00. (3)
- ⁶¹⁵ Butler, “Precarious Life,” 182. Butler details how “non-violence is not a peaceful state, but a social and political struggle to make rage articulate and effective—the carefully crafted ‘fuck you.’”
- ⁶¹⁶ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 13.
- ⁶¹⁷ Cunsolo and Ellis, “Ecological Grief as a Mental Health Response,” 276. Cunsolo and Ellis explain, “experiences of grief and mourning illuminate our relational ties and fundamental dependency upon complex ecological communities and, in turn, our ethical and political responsibilities to these systems. For Butler, and others, grief and mourning have ‘we-creating’ capacities, exposing our known, unknown and unacknowledged connections to others, and allowing for opportunities to reach across differences to connect with others. In this light, grief and mourning can also question fundamental assumptions about what we choose to value — and what we choose to grieve and mourn — including climate change induced ecological loss and degradation.”
- ⁶¹⁸ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 5.
- ⁶¹⁹ Extinction Rebellion, “Extinction Rebellion’s Video,” 14:56. (2)
- ⁶²⁰ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 5.
- ⁶²¹ Charlotte Jones, Donald W. Hine, and Anthony D. G. Marks. “The Future is Now: Reducing Psychological Distance to Increase Public Engagement with Climate Change,” *Risk Analysis* 37, no. 2 (2017): 331-341. <https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.12601>. 331. The scholars specifically note, “Public engagement with the issue of climate change is low and too few people are adopting mitigating actions.”
- ⁶²² Jones, Hine, and Marks. “The Future is Now,” 332-333.
- ⁶²³ Neimanis and Walker, “‘Weathering,’” 559.
- ⁶²⁴ Jones, Hine, and Marks. “The Future is Now,” 331.
- ⁶²⁵ Madeleine Fagan. “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse? Climate Change and the Production of the Ethical Subject.” *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 19, no. 2 (May 2017): 225–44. doi:10.1177/1369148116687534. 230.
- ⁶²⁶ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 233.
- ⁶²⁷ Sarah Amsler. “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action, and Social Change,” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 136.
- ⁶²⁸ Janet Fiskio. “Apocalypse and Ecotopia: Narratives in Global Climate Change Discourse.” *Race, Gender & Class* 19, no. 1/2 (2012): 12-36. Accessed May 23, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43496858>.
- ⁶²⁹ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 234.
- ⁶³⁰ Cuomo, “Climate Change,” 697.
- ⁶³¹ Mario Kaiser. “Reactions to the Future: The Chronopolitics of Prevention and Preemption.” *NanoEthics* 9, no. 2 (August 1, 2015): 165–77. DOI:10.1007/s11569-015-0231-4.167.

⁶³² Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 231. Fagan expresses, “Even in work which does not start from the assumption that generations are separate and self-interested, ethical motivation and the development of a moral reason to be concerned with future generations remains a central concern.”

⁶³³ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 233.

⁶³⁴ Butler, “Precarious Life,” 30.

⁶³⁵ Butler, “Precarious Life,” 22. Butler specifically states, grief “furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by bringing to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility.”

⁶³⁶ Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan. “Human Geographies of Climate Change: Landscape, Temporality, and Lay Knowledges.” *Progress in Human Geography* 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 284–302. doi:10.1177/0309132510376259. 296.

⁶³⁷ Cunsolo and Landman, “Introduction,” 14-15.

⁶³⁸ Fagan, “Who’s Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse?” 237.

⁶³⁹ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 130.

CHAPTER FIVE:

⁶⁴⁰ Stefan Skrimshire. “Introduction: How should we think about the future?” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 5.

⁶⁴¹ John Foster. *After Sustainability: Denial, Hope*, Routledge, 2015. 2. Foster specifically states, “At the same time it is more and more apparent that, mainstreamed as sustainability or sustainable development, environmentalism has failed to reduce, even remotely adequately, the impact of humans on the biosphere. At this level it has not just failed to change the world, it has failed even to engage the world in the genuine pursuit of serious change. In particular, the futility of our collective efforts to do anything about human-induced global warming, with massively disruptive and dangerous climate change coming in its train, is there for all to see who will look at what is happening. The world talks the talk, but walks only as much of the walk as will enable it to go on talking.”

⁶⁴² Foster, “After Sustainability,” 7.

⁶⁴³ Aaron M. McCright. “Dealing with Climate Change Contrarians.” In *Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change*, edited by Susanne C. Moser and Lisa Dilling, 200-212. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511535871.015. 209. McCright notes, “Climate change knowledge easily can provoke pessimism and anxiety, and this just points to the necessity for framing present and future options in ways that encourage action and not paralysis.”

⁶⁴⁴ Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger. “Apocalypse Fatigue: Losing the Public on Climate Change,” *YaleEnvironment360*, November 16, 2020. 4. Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue, “Rather than galvanizing public demand for difficult and far-reaching action, apocalyptic visions of global warming disaster have led many Americans to question the science. Having been told that climate science demands that we fundamentally change our way of life, many Americans have, not surprisingly, concluded that the problem is not with their lifestyles but with what they’ve been told about the science. And in this they are not entirely wrong, insofar as some prominent climate advocates, in their zeal to promote action, have made representations about the state of climate science that go well beyond any established scientific consensus on the subject, hyping the most dire scenarios and most extreme recent studies, which are often at odds with the consensus of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.”

- ⁶⁴⁵ Ashley Dawson. "Biohazard: The Catastrophic Temporality of Green Capitalism." *Social Text* 31, no. 1 [114] (2013): 63–81. doi:10.1215/01642472-1958899. 64.
- ⁶⁴⁶ Luke Winslow. *American Catastrophe: Fundamentalism, Climate Change, Gun Rights, and the Rhetoric of Donald J. Trump*, Columbus: The Ohio State University, 2020. 63. Winslow says, "Climate change is the quintessential issue of our historical moment. It engages the entire human condition. And it combines narrative elements of big business, global economies, religion, politics, science, and media—all with the possible fate of civilization itself on the line."
- ⁶⁴⁷ Michael T. Bravo. "Voices from the Sea Ice: The Reception of Climate Impact Narratives." *Journal of Historical Geography* 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2009): 256–78. doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2008.09.007. 258. Bravo states, "This global science – or earth systems science – is constructing a new Arctic regional identity in which citizens, particularly indigenous groups, simultaneously portrayed as being an 'at-risk community', a victimised community lacking the agency to fight back, and the keepers of valuable traditional knowledge."
- ⁶⁴⁸ Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus. "The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu." *Global Environmental Change Part A: Human & Policy Dimensions* 22, no. 2 (May 2012): 382–90. 382.
- ⁶⁴⁹ Jochen Kleres and Åsa Wettergren. "Fear, Hope, Anger, and Guilt in Climate Activism." *Social Movement Studies* 16, no. 5 (September 2017): 507–19. doi:10.1080/14742837.2017.1344546. 508.
- ⁶⁵⁰ Sarah Amsler. "Bringing 'Hope' to Crisis: Crisis Thinking, Ethical Action, and Social Change," *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 138. Amsler expresses, "More recently, it has been argued that 'the success of right-wing governments and sentiments lies in reworking hope in a negative form', or in other words, in their capacity to articulate narratives of crisis which evoke fear. This is possible because crisis is affectively double-edged: radical rupture may be both liberating and terrifying at the same time. Crisis narratives can be specifically formulated to exploit the desire for certainty that emerges from experiences of ambiguity and insecurity, reducing the experience of crisis to a rhetorical catalyst for social reaction by posing what Henry Giroux has called the 'false choice between being safe or being free.'"
- ⁶⁵¹ Panu Pihkala. "Eco-Anxiety, Tragedy, and Hope: Psychological and Spiritual Dimensions of Climate Change." *Zygon*, vol. 53, no. 2, June 2018, pp. 545–569. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/zygo.12407?saml_referrer. 550. Pihkala discusses solastalgia: "a combination of solace and nostalgia (and hints at desolation as well). Places and place connections which used to give solace are being destroyed. Examples include the loss of local area to a construction of a mine or a dam, or loss of familiar places because of extreme weather resulting from global warming. This is not yet nostalgia, because home still exists, but is in the process of being damaged. When the effects of climate change become worse in various areas of the world, there will be more solastalgia, and there is a need for a growing understanding of the phenomenon."
- ⁶⁵² Mitchell G. Reyes and Kundai Chirindo. "Theorizing Race and Gender in the Anthropocene." *Women's Studies in Communication* 43, no. 4 (November 2020): 429–42. doi:10.1080/07491409.2020.1824519. 430.
- ⁶⁵³ Amsler, "Bringing 'Hope' to Crisis," 132.
- ⁶⁵⁴ Amsler, "Bringing 'Hope' to Crisis," 132.

⁶⁵⁵ Christopher Groves. "Living in Uncertainty: Anthropogenic Global Warming and the Limits of 'Risk Thinking,'" *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 123.

⁶⁵⁶ Anita Girvan. "Cultivating Longitudinal Knowledge: Alternate Stories for an Alternative Chronopolitics of Climate Change," *Alberta Environmental Themes for the Anthropocene*. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2014. Project Muse muse.jhu.edu/book/36089. 347. While Girvan is referring to time, I add space and affects-emotions to her point.

⁶⁵⁷ Chris J. Cuomo. "Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility." *Hypatia* 26, no. 4 (2011): 690-714. Accessed March 27, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41328876>. 697.

⁶⁵⁸ Heather Davis and Zoe Todd. "On the Importance of a Date, or Decolonizing the Anthropocene." *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 16, no. 4 (December 2017): 761. <https://www.acme-journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1539>. 761. The scholars affirm "the Anthropocene is not a new event, but is rather the continuation of practices of dispossession and genocide, coupled with a literal transformation of the environment, that have been at work for the last five hundred years."

⁶⁵⁹ Cuomo, "Climate Change," 693. Cuomo adds, climate change "is a product of the industrial and the fossil-fuel eras, historical forces powered by exploitation, colonialism, and nearly limitless instrumental use of 'nature.' The world's wealthiest nations, and the privileged elite and industry-owning sectors of nearly all nations, have built fortunes and long-term economic stability on decades of unchecked development and energy consumption. By dumping harmful waste into the common atmosphere, we have endangered everyone, including those who have contributed little or nothing at all to the industrial greenhouse effect: the 'least developed' nations, the natural world, and future generations."

⁶⁶⁰ Girvan, "Cultivating Longitudinal Knowledge," 348. Girvan says, "If the dynamics of transition are largely dictated by dominant cultural narratives of the past, present, and future that are 'naturalized,' both culturally and materially, then the work of de-naturalizing given perspectives on time emerges as a significant intervention in the cultural politics of climate change."

⁶⁶¹ Kara Keeling, *Queer Times, Black Futures* (New York: New York University Press, 2019). 83.

⁶⁶² Mikhail Bakhtin and Michael Holquist. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. University of Texas Press Slavic Series: No. 1. University of Texas Press, 1981. 84. Bakhtin argues, "What counts for us is the fact that it expresses the inseparability of space and time (time as the fourth dimension of space.)"

⁶⁶³ Bakhtin and Holquist, "The Dialogic Imagination," 84.

⁶⁶⁴ Jordynn Jack. "Chronotopes: Forms of Time in Rhetorical Argument." *College English*, 69, no. 1 (2006): 52. doi:10.2307/25472188. 54.

⁶⁶⁵ Madeleine Fagan. "Who's Afraid of the Ecological Apocalypse? Climate Change and the Production of the Ethical Subject." *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 19, no. 2 (May 2017): 225-44. doi:10.1177/1369148116687534. 234.

⁶⁶⁶ Sophie Pascoe, Wolfram Dressler, and Monica Minnegal. "Storytelling climate change – Causality and temporality in the REDD+ regime in Papua New Guinea," *Geoforum*, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.09.014>. 2.

⁶⁶⁷ Mark Levene. "The Apocalyptic as Contemporary Dialectic: From Thanatos (Violence) to Eros (Transformation)," *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 77. For example, Levene draws attention to the "Doomsday Clock" and says,

“At a major event hosted by the Royal Society in January 2007, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, who 60 years earlier, in the first full flush of the nuclear arms race had created a symbolic ‘Doomsday Clock’ – but after the end of the Cold War had pushed their minute hand back – now symbolically moved it forward once again to five minutes to midnight. The new message from the scientists was stark indeed. If the threat to our collective existence began with nuclear weapons, the inexorable countdown to ‘the end’ was now coming from two directions: nuclear weapons and from the impact of carbon emissions on the biosphere.” This is but one example of the heavy focus on time.

⁶⁶⁸ Jodie Nicotra and Judith Totman Parrish. “Rushing the Cure: Temporal Rhetorics in Global Warming Discourse.” *JAC* 30, no. 1/2 (2010): 215-37. Accessed February 6, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20866943>. 217.

⁶⁶⁹ Doreen B. Massey. *For Space*. SAGE, 2005. 48.

⁶⁷⁰ Reyes and Chirindo, “Theorizing Race,” 438.

⁶⁷¹ Nicotra and Parrish, “Rushing the Cure,” 216. Nicotra describes, “Time beyond the abstract measurements of the clock and the calendar has always been a vital concern for both the production and analysis of rhetoric. The rhetorical concern for time most often arises as discussions of *kairos*, typically understood (and taught) as communicative timeliness, the art of saying the right thing at the right time. Rhetorical scholarship has done much to broaden this somewhat limited understanding of *kairos*. It has also consequently opened the door for scholarship on other, non-*kairotic* understandings of time in rhetoric. A recent article by Roger Stahl, for example, delineates four main ways in which rhetoric has been concerned with time: in addition to *kairos*, Stahl identifies performed time (in rhetorical criticism and hermeneutics), narrative time (in rhetorical scholarship on public memory, for example), and public time which, like the more familiar ‘public space,’ ‘might be said to function as a kind of operating system for public deliberation, circumscribing boundaries and openings for discursive action.’ Specifically, the article demonstrates how appeals to time like ‘the ticking clock’ and ‘the deadline/countdown’ have been effectively mobilized by dominant powers in this case, the George W. Bush administration to push through an agenda of war despite widespread entreaties for a delay of aggression.”

⁶⁷² Eric Zencey. “Apocalypse and Ecology.” *The North American Review* 273, no. 2 (1988): 54-57. www.jstor.org/stable/25124975. 57.

⁶⁷³ Lucy Rowland. “Indigenous Temporality and Climate Change in Alexis Wright’s *Carpentaria* (2006).” *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 55, no. 4 (2019): 541-54.

doi:10.1080/17449855.2019.1598472. 551. Rowland details, “Accommodating temporal diversity is therefore critical, and retaining space for the discussion and celebration of non-western conceptualizations of time can strengthen psychological resilience in the face of the multiple (and multiplying) threats against survival in our climate-changing world.”

⁶⁷⁴ Massey, “For Space,” 11. Massey argues, “Third, imagining space as always in process, as never a closed system, resonates with an increasingly vocal insistence within political discourses on the genuine openness of the future. It is an insistence founded in an attempt to escape the inexorability which so frequently characterises the grand narratives related by modernity. The frameworks of Progress, of Development and of Modernisation, and the succession of modes of production elaborated within Marxism, all propose scenarios in which the general directions of history, including the future, are known. However, much it may be necessary to fight to bring them about, to engage in struggles for their achievement, there was always none the less a background conviction about the direction in which history was moving. Many today reject such

a formulation and argue instead for a radical openness of the future, whether they argue it through radical democracy, through notions of active experimentation or through certain approaches within queer theory. Indeed, as Laclau in particular would most strongly argue, only if we conceive of the future as open can we seriously accept or engage in any genuine notion of politics. Only if the future is open is there any ground for a politics which can make a difference.”

⁶⁷⁵ Massey, “For Space,” 11.

⁶⁷⁶ Winslow, “American Catastrophe,” 64. Winslow suggests, “Redressing climate change would engage complex issues of national sovereignty and challenges of global governance in an interconnected world. Internationally, redressing climate change would require an altruistic, sacrificial, and collective governing philosophy under which powerful countries such as the US and China would surrender some economic development so that poor countries such as Kiribati, Nauru, and the lowest Solomon Islands don’t flood. Closer to home, climate change mitigation would have to be politically mandated and enforced within a social, economic, and political climate increasingly oriented toward market supremacy. More precisely, redressing climate change would pit human collectivity against the profitability of an energy industry that created millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in commerce all over the world. Nonetheless, many took comfort in the simplicity of the objective: either burn less or fry the planet.”

⁶⁷⁷ Anupama Ranawana and James Trafford. “Imperialist Environmentalism and Decolonial Struggle.” *Discover Society* (Aug. 2017): <https://discoversociety.org/about-us/>. 3.

⁶⁷⁸ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 131. Amsler describes this as “a sort of anthropological pessimism that human beings lack the will or capacity to prevent it.”

⁶⁷⁹ Roman Krznaric. “Empathy and Climate Change: Proposals for a Revolution of Human Relationships,” *Future Ethics: Climate Change and Apocalyptic Imagination*. London: Continuum, 2010. 155. Krznaric describes, “Individuals, governments and companies are currently displaying an extraordinary lack of empathy on the issue of climate change, in two different ways. First, we are ignoring the plight of those whose livelihoods are being destroyed today by the consequences of our high emission levels, particularly distant strangers in developing countries who are affected by floods, droughts and other weather events. That is, there is an absence of empathy across space. Second, we are failing to take the perspective of future generations who will have to live with the detrimental effects of our continuing addiction to lifestyles that result in emissions beyond sustainable levels. Thus, there is a lack of empathy through time.”

⁶⁸⁰ Groves, “Living in Uncertainty,” 124. Groves says, “A previous generation of green activists enjoined us to ‘think global, act local’; an ethics of global and intergenerational care requires us to extend our circle of concern and connection out from our space and our time, to encompass those who we will never meet but whose fates are already inextricably bound up with our own.” Once again, there is a presumption that we need to cultivate care across space and time.

⁶⁸¹ Groves, “Living in Uncertainty,” 121.

⁶⁸² Rowland, “Indigenous Temporality,” 550. Rowland notes how “much contemporary discourse on the Anthropocene” has “the potential to ‘reinstall rather familiar versions of man’ as the ‘disembodied, rational subject’ that material feminisms have long critiqued.”

⁶⁸³ Skrimshire. “Introduction,” 7. Skrimshire argues, “This generates a fascinating and practical task to activists and campaigners: how do we create the means to empathize with people we may never meet, in a future we may never inhabit? Though certainly not mutually exclusive, such a proposal can be distinguished from a contemporary trend in direct activism that focuses on the

now of action.” Krznaric similarly argues, “generating empathy both across space and through time is one of the most powerful ways we have of closing the gap between knowledge and action, and for tackling the climate crisis.” See: Krznaric, “Empathy and Climate Change,” 155.

⁶⁸⁴ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 139.

⁶⁸⁵ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 130.

⁶⁸⁶ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 130-131.

⁶⁸⁷ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 136. Amsler states, “But for those who seek to create a critical consciousness of crisis – we might even say to cultivate a habit of attuning oneself to latent tendencies of crisis in everyday life – this exploitation of crisis to motivate unreflective action is precisely the problem. It is an unlikely road to political hope, for instead of exposing the indeterminacy of futures this approach recommends a sort of materialist fatalism in which catastrophic phenomena are regarded as naturally occurring, with predictable and uniform effects on an undifferentiated mass of subjects. There is no room here for a theory of political time, of a temporality which assumes the openness of the future, reconstruction of the past or power of human and nonhuman intervention to shape the world.” Nicotra and Parrish similarly state, “The reason we cannot forecast weather very reliably more than two or three weeks in advance is that the small errors in our predictions accumulate as we look further into the future. Thus, we must rely on that underlying structure in the chaos that is the atmosphere.” In other words, prediction can be unreliable. See: Nicotra and Parrish, “Rushing the Cure,” 227.

⁶⁸⁸ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 141.

⁶⁸⁹ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 145.

⁶⁹⁰ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 142-143.

⁶⁹¹ Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 147. Amsler notes, “The value of this kind of crisis thinking lies in the fact that it requires both a radical openness to ambiguity and a critical affection for messiness, awkwardness and contradiction in everyday life. However, it is precisely this quality that brings climate change and critical philosophy into crisis with one another. Can ‘untimely critique’ be justified even in the face of environmental catastrophe; is it ethically responsible to experience climate change as that sort of crisis? In a world that seems to celebrate both Marcuse’s nightmare of a ‘society without opposition’ and the populist politics of fear, should we be cultivating a kind of crisis thinking that privileges critical reflection as much as rapid response? I argue that we should.”

⁶⁹² Amsler, “Bringing ‘Hope’ to Crisis,” 148. Amsler describes, “The political hope of crisis thinking need not lie only in the power of crisis experience to mobilize transformative action; indeed, this is to hope for too much and too little all at once. The hope of crisis thinking may rather lie in the more humble possibility that it disrupts the flow of historical time and consciousness enough to make space for criticism, encounter and alternative imaginaries. These imaginaries, of course, cannot be ours to determine. They may be fearful or hopeful, enervating or energizing. The critical pedagogy of crisis, therefore, cannot simply be a matter of learning to recognize crises in everyday life or to extrapolate them in more abstract terms. Rather, it is a matter of creating environments where we can cultivate an ethics of ambiguity that will enable us to engage with experiences of crisis in more critical ways.”

⁶⁹³ Claire Colebrook. “Anti-catastrophic time.” *New Formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*. 92 (2018): 102-119. <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/689860>. 108.

⁶⁹⁴ Colebrook, “Anti-catastrophic time,” 114.

⁶⁹⁵ Sylvan Goldberg. “The Queerness of Straight Time in an Era of Climate Change,” *Arcade*, 2020. <https://arcade.stanford.edu/content/queerness-straight-time-era-climate-change>. 3.

⁶⁹⁶ Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan. “Human Geographies of Climate Change: Landscape, Temporality, and Lay Knowledges.” *Progress in Human Geography* 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 284. doi:10.1177/0309132510376259. 292.

⁶⁹⁷ Susanne Moser. “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late’ (to Prevent Dangerous Climate Change).” *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews-Climate Change*, October 23, 2019. doi:10.1002/wcc.606. 1.

⁶⁹⁸ Moser, “The Work after ‘It’s Too Late,’” 1.

⁶⁹⁹ Alexandra Lakind and Chessa Adsit-Morris, “Future Child: Pedagogy and the Post-Anthropocene,” *Journal of Childhood Studies* 43 no. 1 (2018): 30-43. DOI: 10.18357/jcs.v43i1.18263. 38. Lakind and Adsit-Morris specifically state, “For, to make a livable world, a backward glance at human impact on earth and a hopeful glance toward future generations is not enough. We need new imaginaries and new collective practices.”

⁷⁰⁰ Matthew Houdek and Kendall R. Phillips. “Rhetoric and the Temporal Turn: Race, Gender, Temporalities.” *Women’s Studies in Communication*, no. 4 (2020): 369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07491409.2020.1824501>. 378. Houdek and Phillips note, “The focus on how time and temporality structure and are structured by bodies, institutions, performances, speech, protest, popular culture, legal frameworks, technologies, memory, colonial narratives, and national imaginaries are centrally questions of context and invention—key concepts that position rhetoric as a compelling site to contribute to these emergent dialogues.”

⁷⁰¹ Pascoe, Wolfram Dressler, and Monica Minnegal, “Storytelling climate change,” 9.

⁷⁰² Keeling, “Queer Times,” ix. Keeling says, “This book takes seriously the generative proposition another world is possible, the insistence that such a world already is here now and it listens, with others, for the poetry, the refrains, the rhythms, and the noise such a world is making.”