False Equivalence: Asymmetric Ideological Identity

by

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(Under the Direction of Alexa Bankert)

Abstract

Most political science literature tends to treat Democratic and Republican voters as mirror images of each other. This dissertation examines partisan asymmetries in the emphasis and impact of partisan and ideological identity between and within the two parties. Using nationally representative data, I present evidence that Republicans tend to emphasize ideology rather than partisanship. Using convenience samples, I also present evidence that young Democrats and young Republicans differ from their older counterparts: young Democrats are stronger ideological identifiers than Republicans, and young Republicans are stronger partisan identifiers than Democrats. Additionally, I demonstrate that Democratic voters—regardless of age— emphasize ideology as as a summary of issue preferences (instrumental) rather than as a social identity (expressive).

Index words: Ideology, Social identity, Partisanship, Political behavior

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Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

"I'm not a Republican. I'm a conservative. But I'll be damned if I vote for Hillary Clinton"

—Frank R. Day, Republican Voter

Pundits and scholars alike tend to treat Democratic and Republican partisans as mirror images of the other— some argue the parties hold starkly different policy preferences but behave in the same way. While Democrats and Republicans are equally loyal to their respective party, the role of ideology appears to differ among them– the epigraph includes examples of this asymmetry. Republicans are sorted around their ideological identity while Democrats are sorted around their "big tent" partisan label. Indeed, this is why Mr. Day emphasizes that he is a conservative *first*. This identity clearly matters to him more than his partisan identity. Most Republican elites are in agreement about almost all policy preferences, while Democratic politicians demonstrate much more diversity in the degree to which they agree on issues (e.g. it is reasonable to be a pro-choice and anti-gun control Democrat whereas a Republican with similar preferences would likely become a partisan pariah). This produces an asymmetry in the emphasis of ideology among the two electorates: Republican voters coalesce around their *ideological* label and emphasize ideological purity while Democrats coalesce around their *partisan* identity and emphasize issue advocacy and the importance of partisan unity. Indeed, this explains the results of the 2020 Democratic Primary— despite

the party's platform shifting to the left, the candidate who emphasized his connection to the party and highlighted that Bernie Sanders was emphatically *not* a Democrat is likely to emerge victorious; additionally, most of those who dropped out quickly coalesced around Biden and stressed that the party remain united. Meanwhile, Donald Trump repeatedly attempted to tie Joe Biden– an objectively moderate Senator– to the "Radical Left" during the 2020 general election. Most contemporary work on the two parties has focused on polarization, studying the alignment of partisanship and ideology. I, however, emphasize the importance of analyzing the differences between the parties in how much they value their ideological identity. In this dissertation, I detail these key differences in ideological emphasis between the Democratic and Republican electorates and examine their impact on partisans' political behavior.

Scholars debate whether or not partisanship attachments are primarily based on policy preferences (Key et al. 1966, Fiorina 1981, Fiorina 2006) or in social group membership akin to sports fandom (Greene 1999, Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2004, Greene 2004). Contemporary research suggests partisanship operates as the latter (i.e. partisanship is *expressive* rather than instrumental) (Huddy, Mason & Aarøe 2015). This means that partisans can be strong Democrats or Republicans without necessarily holding issue preferences aligned with their party; indeed, as Americans partisan and ideological identities have become increasingly aligned (i.e. Americans have become more *sorted*), citizens' partisan attachments have intensified without a corresponding increase in issue preference extremity. (Mason 2015, Mason 2016).[1] Individuals who are strong identifiers of *both* partisanship and ideology tend to be more extreme than those who are more poorly sorted or weak identifiers (Mason 2015). Most prior work has treated sorting as a process that is identical for Democrats and Republicans, while I argue that the identities (partisan and ideological) around which the electorates have sorted is asymmetric. Additionally, while there is an ever-growing wealth of literature on the importance of treating partisanship as a social identity,

[1]Mason also includes what she calls a "Mega Identity": the increasing alignment of other identities (e.g. religion, race, etc.) alongside partisanship and ideology.

very little work addresses treating *ideology* as an expressive social identity (see Mason 2016 for a notable exception). I argue that acknowledging ideology as a social identity explains key differences between Democrats' and Republicans' emphasis on ideology. Among Democrats, ideology operates mainly as an *instrumental* factor; among Republicans, ideology operates mainly as an *expressive* factor.

While members of both parties have grown increasingly attached to their party labels with not much change in issue preferences, I argue that Republicans are primarily driven by their *ideological* identity, while Democrats are primarily driven by their *partisan* identity. This suggests that appeals to these identities will affect members of the two electorates differently. In other words, appeals to ideology will be much more effective in getting out the vote and garnering support for Republicans while appeals to partisanship, various groups, and unity will be the best strategy for Democratic office-seekers. This dissertation will provide evidence for my argument in three main ways. First, I use observational data from the American National Election Study (ANES) to analyze the impact of partisanship and ideology on attitudes and voting behavior and how this differs between Democrats and Republicans. Next, because the ANES does not include identity-based measures of partisanship and ideology, I use original survey data to also examine differences in attitudes and voting behavior between the parties but include measures of partisan and ideological identities instead of self-placement. I also present results from an experiment that manipulates appeals to either ideology or partisanship and then examine differences in voting intention and attitudes between Democrats and Republicans.

1.1 Implications

Political theorists have long-stressed the importance of an informed citizenry being key to a well-functioning democracy. Factual knowledge about politics is a critical component of citizenship, one that is essential if citizens are to realize their true political interests and

vote for representatives who will serve those interests. My findings suggest that Republicans more so than Democrats are not always necessarily voting for a certain slate of policies but against their ideological opponents.

In addition to troubling normative implications, my findings help explain some elite behavior. In particular, the ideological asymmetry between Democrats and Republicans explains many interesting phenomenon that occurred during the 2020 presidential election, both during the primary and general election. For example, this partisan discrepancy explains why Joe Biden was so successful during the Democratic primary: he was the candidate who was arguably most strongly tied to the party's so-called "establishment." My findings also help explain President Trump's and many Republicans' efforts to tie Joe Biden— an objectively moderate former Senator— to the so-called "Radical Left." Beyond normative and political implications, my findings suggest political scientists should consider analyzing members of the two parties separately, as well as consider treating both partisanship and ideology as social identities.[2]

Political scientists have long-studied Democratic and Republican voters as mirror images of the other. As Americans have become increasingly polarized, Democrats have become increasingly liberal and Republicans have become increasingly conservative. Political scientists have treated this process as identical across the two partisan camps.I argue this produces a false equivalence and obscures key differences between the Democratic and Republican electorates. Political analysts should at the very least consider differences between the two electorates when theorizing and conducting analysis.

1.2 Place in the Literature

While partisanship has increasingly been examined as an expressive social identity, little work has addressed the function of *ideology* in such a manner (see Malka and Lelkes 2010 for a notable exception). I argue that it important to consider ideological identity when

[2]See Bankert 2020 for an excellent example of finding partisan asymmetries among voters.

examining the electorate. Additionally, few scholars address differences between Democratic and Republican voters. Democrats are much more ideologically and racially diverse than Republicans, while Republicans are remarkably cohesive and homogeneous (Grossmann & Hopkins 2016). Because a broad field of group interests comprise the Democratic party, this leads to attempts by politicians to unify under the party banner. Republicans, on the other hand, feature more overlapping identities.This leads to an asymmetric ideological emphasis. Put differently, Democrats care about being Democrats and less about being liberals while Republicans care about being conservatives first and foremost. Finally, I argue that there exists another key difference between Democrats and Republicans: the *operation* of ideology. Among Democrats, ideology operates mainly as a set of policy preferences while, among Republicans, ideology operates mainly as a social identity.

1.3 Hypotheses

Because of their focus on the betterment of a series of disparate social groups, Democrats unite under the partisan banner. Republicans, on the other hand, are more homogeneous and unite under the ideological banner. Because of this, I hypothesize the following:

- *H1*: Republican behavior is primarily driven by their electorate's *ideological* identity, while Democratic behavior is primarily driven by their electorate's *partisan* identity.

This difference in ideological emphasis suggests that appeals to each identity should produce differential effects among Democrats and Republicans; therefore, I hypothesize the following:

- *H2A*: Appeals to ideological identity will produce action-oriented emotions among Republicans more than among Democrats, while appeals to partisan identity will boost action-oriented emotions among Democrats more than among Republicans.

- *H2B*: In turn, these action-oriented emotions will increase the intention to turnout or become involved in politics more among Republicans when appeals to conservative identity are made and more among Democrats when appeals to partisan identity are made.

Because of the difference between Democrats' and Republicans' ideological emphasis, this produces an asymmetry in the operation of ideology among the electorate. Therefore, I hypothesize:

- *H3*: Ideology operates as an expressive social identity among Republicans more than among Democrats.

1.4 Preview

Chapter 2 includes a review on the literature regarding the nature and function of partisanship among the US electorate. While early political science work emphasizes the importance of social-psychological components of partisanship (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), a competing theory was provided by rational choice models of partisanship (e.g. Fiorina 1981) that suggest partisanship is mainly derived from voters' policy preferences. Contemporary scholarship, however, has revisited the study of partisanship as a social group membership (e.g. Huddy et al. 2015, Bankert et al 2017, Bankert 2020). This dissertation also stresses the importance of considering partisanship as an *expressive social identity.*

Chapter 3 contains an overview on the scholarly work on ideology among the American public. Social scientists have long struggled to settle on a comprehensive definition of ideology. Some argue that ideology is restricted solely to political content (Converse 1964), while others see ideology as an individual's broad views about how an ideal world should operate (Campbell 1960). Like work on partisanship, the field still debates the nature of ideology. Scholars disagree whether ideology is based in a set of sincerely held political beliefs (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) or– like partisanship– whether it operates mainly as an

expressive social identity (e.g. Malka and Lelkes 2010, Mason 2016). This distinction matters because a well-functioning democracy is dependent on an informed citizenry, a public ignorant of policy is normative displeasing. The US is a good case study for this since we have recently witnessed shifts in ideological self placement among American voters (Gallup 2009). Here, already, we see a starker shift to conservatism among Republicans than there is a shift to liberalism among Democrats.

Next, Chapter 4 features observational analysis from an original survey administered to students at the University of Georgia and College of William and Mary survey. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find that Democrats' value ideological identity more than partisan identity. Republicans, on the other hand were driven by partisan identity rather than ideological identity. Because this counterintuitive finding may be related to age, I analyze the impact of age on ideology in a nationally representative sample in Chapter 5. Contrary to Hypotheses 2A and 2B, I find that ideological identity drove Democrats' emotions and political activity rather than partisan identity. Among Republicans, I find that partisan identity drove emotions and political activity instead of ideological identity. In support of Hypothesis 3, I also find that ideology serves as an instrumental construct at a higher rate among Democrats than among Republicans.

Chapter 5 contains an analysis of a sample drawn from the American National Election Survey (ANES). I do find that young Democrats are much more liberal than older Democrats, while young Republicans are stronger partisan identifiers. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find no difference between Democratic and Republican voters operation of partisan identity in determining emotions and voting behavior. In support of Hypothesis 1, though, I find that ideological identity drives political behavior among Republican voters but has no effect among Democratic voters.

As the final substantive chapter, Chapter 6 includes unique experiment in which I manipulated threats to each political identity (i.e. liberal/conservative and Democrat/Republican) by showing respondents tweets I generated from a twitter account belonging to either GA

(Democrats/Republicans) or GA (Liberals/Conservatives), as well as a neutral control group about GA weather. Similarly to Chapter 4 and contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republican voters' ideological identity strength or partisan strength; however, I did find some support that the Democratic electorate uses ideology as an instrumental concept more so than Republican voters (Hypothesis 3). Across all conditions in the experiment, I find no differences within the two parties (e.g. there is no difference in Republicans' or Democrats' in-group enthusiasm across the control, partisan treatment, or ideological treatment), suggesting the treatments did not elicit action-oriented emotions. Between parties, I find no difference in in-group enthusiasm regardless of experimental condition. I do find that Democrats report higher rates of both anger towards Republicans and participation regardless of experimental condition. Disregarding the experimental conditions, I find that both Democratic and Republican voters' in-group enthusiasm was driven by their partisan identity; out-group anger, on the other hand, is driven by ideological identity among voters of both parties. I did find a partisan difference in the probability of voters voting for their party's candidate in the 2020 election: Democratic voters were motivated mainly by ideological identity, while Republicans were motivated by partisan strength and identity as well as ideological self-placement

Finally, Chapter 7 includes a conclusion and discussion. I find large differences in ideological emphasis between Democrats and Republicans. The two main findings are these:

1. Ideological identity is much more important to young Democratic voters than to young Republican voters. In the mass electorate, partisan identity operates similarly among both Democratic and Republican voters. Ideological identity, though, matters to Republicans but not Democrats.

2. Ideology operates as an expressive social identity at a higher rate among Republican voters than among Democratic voters. Conversely, ideology operates as an instrumental construct at a higher rate among Democratic voters than among Republican voters.

These findings suggest that Democrats and Republicans relate to ideology in quite different ways which impacts their response to and use of ideological labels. These findings also contribute to a wealth of evidence that Americans– Democratic and Republican alike– are deeply divided.

Chapter 2

Partisan Identity

This chapter outlines the literature on partisan identity. While most scholars stress the importance of partisanship, the field sees much debate about whether the nature of partisanship is instrumental (i.e. based in a sober, rational analysis of policy) or expressive (i.e. based in social identity and possibly even removed from ideology). Following Huddy (2015), this dissertation stresses the importance of considering partisanship a social identity but, it goes further by arguing that ideology is a crucial social identity as well, especially for Republicans. Despite the wealth of research on partisan identity, there is only scant research on treating ideology as as social identity. I will first review the literature on expressive and instrumental partisanship to illustrate their distinctive nature and origins. Next, I examine the impact of affective polarization and sorting. I will use this prior work as a template for my examination of ideology in Chapter 2.

2.1 Instrumental Partisanship

Early work on partisanship and political behavior was dominated by the Rational Choice paradigm. This model assumes the individual is a rational actor who weighs the costs and benefits of each political act. Voters choose a political party based on how well it represents their personal interests. Because a functioning democracy relies upon an informed

citizenry, many view this instrumental model of partisanship as more normatively pleasing than the expressive model— if the instrumental model is valid, then voters are making political decisions based in a reasonable analysis of policy.

Scholars who believe partisanship is instrumental in nature argue that Americans' partisan leanings are based mainly in their policy preferences (Key et al. 1966, Fiorina 1981, Fiorina 2006). Fiorina (1981) introduces a theory of "retrospective voting." He argues that voters make electoral decisions based in policy, but mainly in rear-looking economic effects of party officials in the government. In other words, voters tend to vote for whichever party or candidate benefit them the most financially and personally. MacKuen et al (1989) argue that economic factors play the largest role determining in what they call "Macropartisanship" (i.e. Americans aggregate partisan leanings). MacKuen and colleagues (1989) demonstrated substantial shifts in mass party identification that seemed to develop in parallel with other, more short-term, factors such as presidential approval and consumer sentiment. This observation provided the impetus for the development of the macropartisanship hypothesis (MacKuen et al. 1989), which started a line of research that focused exclusively on aggregate party identification levels rather than theorizing about individual-level mechanisms. This is a major weakness and should be mentioned here. In fact, MacKuen and colleagues concede that the shifts in mass partisanship are limited to a small segment of the entire electorate in the sense that "... most [citizens] are either fixed or changing in a noisy random-like fashion and a few are systematic, the signal is wholly the behavior of that few" (p.1129). From that perspective, macropartisanship does not necessarily provide evidence for the instrumental model of partisanship since the concept merely suggests that "a handful of exceptions" (p.1129) change party attachments in response to economic conditions and presidential approval.

Models of instrumental partisanship typically rely on self-placement or self-reporting. These measures usually ask respondents to which party they belong: Democratic, Republican or Independent, while more nuanced measures ask Independents to which party they "lean." This limited range does not allow for much variation in gauging the strength of iden-

tification with a political party. Additionally, these models fail to explain certain paradoxes in American political behavior. Why should a voter turn out for their party's candidate when there is a remarkably low probability that their vote will be the deciding factor? Other work examines the degree to which voters are aware of and responsive to changes in their party's ideological platform. Adams et al. (2011) find that voters are not aware of changes in their party's platfrom. Fernandez-Vazquez (2014), on the other hand, does find support that voters are somewhat aware of changes to their party's ideological platform, but notes that voters' perceptions of the changes do not match *actual* changes to the platform. Instrumental models of partisanship fail to explain such "irrational" political behavior. Contemporary work on partisanship has turned to social psychology work to explain Americans' attachment to political parties.

2.2 Expressive Partisanship

Adherents to the school of expressive partisanship argue that social-psychological factors primarily drive partisanship— not policy preferences (Greene 1999, Arceneaux & Vander Wielen 2014, Lupu 2013, Huddy, Mason & Aarøe 2015). Most of the work on expressive partisanship is founded in social identity theory. Social identity theory suggests that a large part of one's self-worth and sense of belonging is derived from membership of social groups (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Beyond this, group members— even when group membership is based solely on random assignment— demonstrate high levels of both in-group favoritism and out-group resentment (Tajfel & Turner 1979).This effect is known as the "minimal group paradigm." According to this paradigm, simply belonging to a group— even a group based on something trivial like Jane Elliott's eye color experiment or even random assignment— is the minimum requirement to produce bias. This suggests that if partisans existed in an issue-free vacuum, there would still exist partisan rancor based *solely* on the label "Democrat" or "Republican."

Emotions, like anger for example, are important in the world of politics because they are closely tied to action (Frijda et al. 1986). Anger and positive emotions, in particular, tend to drive action (Huddy, Feldman & Cassese 2007). Applied to partisan politics, anger tends to motivate citizens interest in politics and sparks protest activity, while more positive emotions (e.g. enthusiasm) drives political engagement (Groenendyk & Banks 2014, Valentino et al. 2011). Among partisans, electoral threats tend to generate anger, while reassurance tends to generate positive emotions. Threat and reassurance are conditions that may be likely to generate activity, particular for strong partisans. Indeed, strong partisan identifiers tend to feel angrier than weak identifiers in response to threat (Van Zomeren, Spears & Leach 2008). Strong identifiers are also more likely to express disdain for members of the outgroup (Huddy 2013). I argue, though, that the identities that matter vary between the parties— threats and reassurance targeted at *conservatives* may be more effective than similar messages to liberals. This asymmetry in emotional reactions has not been examined in prior scholarship.

These group dynamics transfer easily to political parties. Greene (1999) was one of the first political science scholars to tie social identity theory with partisanship. He finds that using a scale gauging a psychological sense of belonging to a group strongly predicts political behavior. Created by Mael and Tetrick (1992), this scale gauges the degree to which the respondent identifies with a given social group. It features questions such as "When someone criticizes (group), it feels like a personal insult." Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2004) eschew social identity theory but argue that partisanship operates similarly to religion or sports fandom. In other words, partisanship impacts policy preferences— the partisan label is what, in large part, dictates a person's policy preferences. This is the direct opposite of the instrumental model's causal relationship between party and preference. Huddy et al. (2015) refine the partisan identity measure used by Greene (1999). This measure is derived from a battery of questions that gauge the degree to which the respondent socially identifies with the party, and presents a much more fine-tuned measure than the instrumental self-placement measures. They find that this social-identity measure of partisanship— more

than self-placed partisan strength *and* issue preferences— is a powerful predictor of political behavior. Strong partisan identifiers are the most likely to volunteer for campaigns, turnout to vote for their party, and feel anger towards members of the opposite party. In other words, the expressive model is a stronger predictor of behavior than the instrumental model. This suggests that strong partisans are more politically active but do not necessarily hold strict or extreme policy preferences.

Expressive models of partisanship attempt to gauge the degree to which an individual feels connected to a party (see Figure 1 for scale items used by Huddy et al. 2015.) Because partisan identity is a latent variable, Bankert et al (2017) use Item Response Theory (IRT) to assess how well the scale gauges partisan identity, and they find that most of the items on the scale explain partisan identity better than the traditionally used self-placement measure. Also, the use of several items allows the measure to cover a range of partisan identification values and differentiate between them.

Partisan Identity Scale Items
When I speak about the (Democratic/Republican) party, I usually say "we" instead of "they".
I am interested in what other people think about the (Democratic/Republican) party.
When people criticize the (Democratic/Republican) party, it feels like a personal insult.
I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party.
If the (Democratic/Republican) party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined.
When I meet someone who supports the (Democratic/Republican) party, I feel connected with this person.
When I speak about the (Democratic/Republican) party, I refer to them as "my party".
When people praise the (Democratic/Republican) party, it makes me feel good.

Figure 2.1: Partisan Identity Scale Items

2.3 Asymmetric Politics

Relatively little work examines differences in political behavior between Democrats and Republicans. The parties hold vastly different social groups, ideologies, and levels of religiosity. However, most contemporary work treats the parties as mirror images of each other. I argue that the Democratic and Republican electorates differ in which identity drives their

behavior— Republicans are primarily driven by their ideological identity while Democrats are driven by their partisan identity.

Grossman and Hopkins (2016) book *Asymmetric Politics: Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats* highlights some key differences between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. Their main argument is this: Republicans are a party driven by their adherence to a crystallized conservative core, while Democrats are a coalition of disparate social groups. I argue that this feature of the Democratic party renders ideology less central to the party's core. While Grossman and Hopkins do include a chapter devoted to the parties in the electorate, the majority of their book focuses on differences in the parties in government.[3] They argue that Democrats are "a coalition of social groups that act as discrete voting blocs for candidates, constituencies for group leaders, and demanders of particular policy commitments." They describe the Republican Party, on the other hand, as "the vehicle of a conservative ideological movement that succeeded after the 1950s in fusing its various intellectual strands, marketing its broad critiques of government, building a supportive organizational network, and moving party doctrine toward the policy commitments of its right wing" (14). While the authors do note the importance of partisan social identity to the Democratic electorate, they do not treat ideological identity as a social identity. I argue that doing so is crucial to understanding the power of expressive ideology in driving Republicans' political behavior. Some may question, for example, why Donald Trump won the Republican primary in 2016 despite holding relatively moderate (and in some cases traditionally liberal) issue positions. For example, Trump ran on expanding free trade– a traditionally liberal policy. I argue this is because he appealed to conservative *identity*. Another important concept to address is identity complexity: the degree to which a series of group identities an individual belongs to mesh well together (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Among Republicans, their social identities tend to overlap well with each other (e.g. evangelical, white, conservative, etc). Regarding Democrats, the diversity in identities in the party

[3]While partisan asymmetries in government are certainly an interesting and ripe research area, they are beyond the scope of this document.

produces more cross-pressures and higher levels of identity complexity, ultimately producing a party that is not as sorted around ideology as the Republican Party. This reveals a large asymmetry in the composition of the two parties, and treating them as mirror images is not appropriate and produces a false equivalence.

Some other research also highlights the ideological asymmetry between the parties. Lelkes and Sniderman (2016) argue that Republicans are not only likely to be more conservative than Democrats are liberal but also are more aware of the "correct" issue positions. Republicans are also acutely aware that their party is the one of conservatism and are more likely than Democrats to use ideological considerations when describing why they like their party. I depart from Lelkes and Sniderman (2016) in my emphasis on ideological *identity*. They argue that Republicans make political decisions based in sincerely held ideological considerations. I argue that their results could be explained by conservatives' desire to make the "right" decision (i.e. the decision that aligns with their ideological identity). This distinction aligns with Ellis and Stimson's (2012) argument about symbolic ideology– I argue that, among Republicans in particular, ideology is symbolic (i.e. distinct from issue preferences).

While this admittedly narrow field of literature presents clear asymmetries between Democrats and Republicans, most of the literature consistently finds 1) differences in ideological cohesiveness between the parties and 2) the Republican Party's hosts an intense attachment to its conservative core. However, the literature has neglected possible differences in Democrats and Republicans' ideological identities as well as their impact on partisan behavior. While the Republican electorate is strongly attached to its ideological identity, the Democratic electorate is strongly attached to its partisan identity. This suggests that appeals to a given identity are much more effective depending on the electorate— Republicans campaigns should (and *do*, arguably) highlight their "conservative credentials" while Democratic campaigns should highlight their support of key issue groups and their support of their party. Another consequence of this asymmetry is that literature on affective polarization and sorting neglects to consider the importance of analyzing the electorates' divergent

identities.

2.4 Affective Polarization and Sorting

Because the concepts of affective polarization and sorting are founded upon the importance of partisanship and negative emotion and the alignment of partisanship and ideology, respectively, I next address literature about these two concepts. Affective polarization refers to the increasing antipathy that members of American political parties feel towards each other (Abramowitz 2008). Scholars disagree about the nature of this phenomenon– some claim that it is a function of policy preference distance, while others argue it is driven by social distance. Abramowitz and Sanders (2013) find that affective polarization increases political participation and engagement but argue it is based mainly in ideology, and Webster and Abramowitz (2017) find that affect towards the opposing party is strongly predicted by respondents' positions on social welfare policy. Rogowski and Sutherland (2016) find that hypothetical political candidates (without information about political party) who are ideologically distant from respondents produce greater affect than candidates who are ideologically proximate to respondents, though this effect is mitigated by additional biographical information about the candidates. If affective polarization is driven by ideology, we should expect a relatively moderate Democrat and a relatively moderate Republican to get along well socially; however, partisans dislike members of the out-party *regardless* of ideological distance (Mason 2015, Mason 2016, Mason 2018). Additionally, affective polarization is at least partially explained by partisan implicit bias, and operates to a greater degree than racial implicit bias (Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes 2012, Iyengar & Westwood 2015)[4] This suggests that affective polarization is mainly a *social* phenomenon. While most scholars agree that elite and affective polarization has increased over time, there is much debate about *why*.

Mason (2015) observes stronger party attachments without an equivalent increase in

[4]The authors note that this is most likely because, while there are mores against racism, no norms govern the extent to which partisans should dislike members of the opposite party.

political issue intensity, emphasizing the validity of expressive partisanship. Because we observe disdain for members of the out-party regardless of differences in issue preferences, examining partisanship and ideology as social identities sheds light on the identities that drive affective polarization; however, this characterization of these key political identities does not explain why polarization has increased over time and continues to increase while issue extremity has only increased mildly over time among the public. While changes in parliamentary rules in Congress and elite cues may partially explain somewhat increasingly divergent policy preferences among voters (Roberts & Smith 2003, Lee 2009), these factors do not explain increases in group bias, rates of activism, and anger at the presidential candidate of the opposite party among the electorate (Levendusky 2009, Mason 2013). One of the main causes of this increasing social rift between the parties is the increasingly aligned identities—i.e. the parties have become better sorted.

Why, then, does sorting generate increasing social polarization? Theoretically, the presence of conflicting or "cross-cutting" identities produces relatively moderate attitudes and behavior. Conversely, aligned identities then produce relative extremity. Applied to politics, the increasing alignment of ideological and partisan identities explains increasing vitriol towards members of the opposite party among the electorate. The examination of conflict between party and ideology is not new to political science research: early work by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and Campbell et al. (1960) introduce the concept of cross-pressure on voters. More early work argues that voters facing conflicting identities would be weaker partisans and more moderate, potentially mitigating conflict between partisans (Nordlinger 1972, Powell Jr 1976).

Indeed, contemporary research suggests that cross-pressures (i.e. the presence of considerations and identities that do not easily align) do reduce partisan strength and activism rates (Brader, Tucker & Therriault 2014). These studies do not, though, address the impact of holding conflicting *social* identities. Brewer and others (1999, 2005) have studied the impact of holding multiple social identities outside the realm of politics, and they find that

non-aligned identities produce more tolerance and less divisiveness. Other work suggests that those with strongly aligned identities do not process threats to their group well and experience greater negative emotion as a result of a threat (Branscombe et al. 1999). This a function of what is called social identity complexity— the presence of multiple identities that do not necessarily align (e.g. pro choice groups and civil rights groups) allows group members to shift the focus of their identity when confronting different issues, producing a higher level of identity complexity. Conversely, the presence of multiple identities that *do* align and overlap (e.g. race and religion) produces less identity complexity. The individual coalesces around a single ingroup identification (Roccas & Brewer 2002).

Applied to partisan politics, this suggests that those who are not well-sorted should hold less bias and negative emotion towards members of the opposite party. Because this effect is produced merely by an alignment of social identities, a partisan does not have to hold extreme policy preferences to hold vitriolic attitudes towards members of the other party. What happens, then, if Democrats and Republicans are not sorted around the same identity? I argue that the importance of *ideology* to Republicans and the importance of *partisanship* to Democrats produce asymmetric attitudes and behavior among these separate electorates. This allows both sides of the affective polarization debate to be correct, to some extent. Appeals to different identities effect members of the two electorates differently— appeals to ideological identity generate action-oriented emotions among Republicans, while this pattern will hold among Democrats when elites appeal to their partisan identity.

Chapter 3

The Nature of Ideology

This chapter offers a review of the Political Science literature on ideology and focuses mainly on conceptualization but also touches upon other aspects of ideology. Social scientists have long struggled to settle on a comprehensive definition of ideology. Some argue that ideology is narrow in scope and refers mainly to the political realm (Converse 1964), while others argue it is a broad, overarching view of how the world should ideally operate (Campbell 1960). Additionally, scholars disagree whether ideology is based in a set of sincerely held political beliefs (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2006) or whether it operates as an expressive social identity (e.g. Mason 2016). Because a healthy democracy depends on a well-informed citizenry, an electorate that either knows or cares little about actual policy is normatively upsetting. There are also certain personality traits associated with one's ideology (Jost et al. 2003, Gerber, Huber & Washington 2010), and recent years have witnessed shifts in ideological self placement among the electorate (Gallup 2009).

3.1 Conceptualization of Ideology

While ideology has been a subject of study for decades, ideology rapidly became the focus of many social scientists in the 1960's. Campbell et al. (1960) foundational work *The American Voter* focuses mainly on voting behavior but includes some analysis of ideology.

They argue that ideology is elaborate (contains several different elements of policy preferences), far-ranging, and is inherently political but does contain some elements outside the political realm (e.g. morality, views about social welfare, etc.); ideology also allows people to simply make sense of the world surrounding them by providing a framework through which to interpret events and others' behavior. Minar (1961) presents a more narrow typology of ideology and departs from Campbell et al. (1960) in his focus less on the policy knowledge of the electorate and more on trying to decide just what ideology *is* (i.e. Minar is less concerned with voter knowledge and more on exploring ideology as a concept); he addresses several definitions of ideology and notes the inherent ambiguity in defining ideology and how this makes analyzing political behavior difficult. Minar (1961) highlights three main components of ideology:

1. "Ideology as thought distinguished by content or structure." Ideology typically refers to a set of ideas that contain an orientation towards normative issues. Ideology is stable, and is more than just an attitude.

2. "Ideology as thought distinguished by its function." Ideology is a psychological function that people use to rationalize opinions or actions, and it can also be used as a set of ideas related to organizational function. Ideology can also be a set of ideas that is meant to persuade others.

3. "Ideology as thought distinguished by its locus." Ideology is a set of social ideas that is shared by several individuals.

Lane (1962), on the other hand, argues that ideology is a collective set of ideas that deals with deciding how to govern. It involves deciding who will govern, how they will be selected, and how they will govern. Ideology is designed to persuade, and it is prevalent in everyday life. It is normative and involves group interest. Lane (1962) departs from the aforementioned work in his conceptualization of ideology as practical governance rather than policy preference content.

Philip Converse's 1964 book *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics* offers arguably the most influential analysis of ideology in the field of political science, and it explores less what ideology *is* as earlier work does and more the ideological composition of the American electorate and the extent to which voters use ideology to make decisions. Converse argues that most Americans neither adhere to a full, complete set of beliefs which produces a clear ideology nor do they have a clear grasp of what ideology *is*. Converse measures this by a lack of coherence in responses to open-ended questions, and he argues that citizens do not mirror the ideology of elites. Converse analyzes open-ended interview questions to measure levels of conceptualization of ideology. He concludes that the liberal-conservative continuum is a high level abstraction not typically used by the regular American because of response instability and lack of connections made between answers. Put more simply, ideology is complex, and most Americans do not typically take the time to think about their own policy preferences on a wide set of issues.There is no underlying belief structure for most people, just a set of random opinions. Even on highly controversial, well-publicized issues, large portions of the electorate simply do not have coherent opinions. Indeed, Converse argues many simply answer survey questions as though they are flipping a coin.

Converse (1964) argues that though some political sophisticates do structure Americans' opinions in a larger ideological framework, such structure is rare. This level of political sophistication (one's "level of conceptualization") is correlated positively with the respondent's level of education, degree of political involvement, and amount of political information. These levels are:

1. Ideologues: These respondents relied on "a relatively abstract and far reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting political significance over time were evaluated."

2. Near Ideologues: These respondents mentioned the liberal-conservative dimension, but did not appear to place much emphasis on it, or used it in a way that led the researchers to question their understanding of the issues.

3. Group Interest: This group did not demonstrate an understanding of the ideological spectrum, but made choices based on which groups they saw the parties representing (e.g. Democrats supporting blacks, Republicans supporting big business or the rich). These people tended to not understand issues that did not clearly benefit the groups they referred to.

4. Nature of the Times: The members of this group exhibited no understanding of the ideological differences between parties, but made their decisions on the "nature of the times." Thus, they did not like Republicans because of the Great Depression, or they didn't like the Democrats because of the Korean war.

5. No Issue Content: This group included the respondents whose evaluation of the political scene had "no shred of policy significance whatever." These people included respondents who identified a party affiliation, but had no idea what the party stood for, as well as people who based their decisions on personal qualities of candidates.

Field and Anderson (1969) examine 1) whether the electorate thinks in ideological terms varies by election year (i.e. if proximity to a presidential election influences voters' ideological thinking) and 2) in particular if the 1964 election was perceived by voters in terms of ideology. They find that proximity to a presidential election may shift ideological thinking among the electorate and that elites can influence the degree to which the public considers politics in ideological terms. This helps explain the lack of consistency observed by Converse.

Smith (1980) argues that the measures used by Converse don't reflect how people evaluate politics at all, but they only reflect the changing words Americans use to explain their policy evaluations. Theoretically, any survey respondent should have a stable level of conceptualization over time; however, Smith uses panel data from 1956 and 1960 to show that the same respondents have very different levels of conceptualization in the two different years. He concludes that these measurement schemes are not reliable. They are not measuring people's enduring level of sophistication (which Smith does believe exists, he simply thinks

it is not properly measured); they are only measuring how Americans talk about evaluations.

Conover and Feldman (1981) also explore the ideological composition of the electorate, but they argue that ideology is not necessarily a single liberal-conservative spectrum (i.e. liberals and conservatives do not necessarily share the same perceptual framework and do not simply differ in their views of that framework). Liberals and conservatives have fundamentally different ideological perspectives rather than bipolar views. Conover and Feldman focus on the components of ideological labels, arguing that some components may be cognitive in nature (i.e. the traditional instrumental ideological model) but ideological labels are mainly comprised of associations. Individuals support an ideological label because they associate certain groups or issue areas favorably with that ideological label.

John Zaller offers another highly influential work on ideology in 1992's *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* that helps explain the lack of ideological consistency among voters noted by Converse (1964). Zaller argues that elite-driven communications do impact public opinion, but that it is mediated by political awareness which determines the consistency and salience of considerations. Zaller challenges the idea that voters only have one true preference; instead he presents a model where individuals have conflicting views on specific issues and the "winning" view at any given time is determined by what considerations are at the "top of the head." Zaller uses the "Receive-Accept-Sample" model: stated opinions reflect considerations that the individual received (heard or read about), accepted (if they are consistent with prior beliefs), and sampled from (based on what's salient at the time). This can be understood with a bucket analogy: considerations go into one's head as if it were a bucket. When someone expresses an opinion, they reach into the bucket for a sample of considerations; those near the top are more likely to be picked. They then take the average of these considerations, and this average is their opinion at a given point in time. Zaller's argument explains the inconsistency found by Converse. It is not that Americans are inherently inconsistent: they are not necessarily ignorant but are instead aware of several competing views on issues and express their opinion as a running tally sampled from the

"top of the head."

While there is variation in the literature in the conceptualization of ideology, most scholars focus on ideology as a political instrument. They argue that ideology is mainly associated with voters' thoughts and preferences on *policy* or group interest; however, scholars find mixed results on the extent to which voters hold consistent policy preferences or attitudes. Indeed, much of the literature finds that political sophisticates are quite rare. This suggests that ideology as a coherent set of beliefs simply cannot be commonly found. I argue this is for one key reason: most scholars have not considered ideology to operate as an expressive *social identity*.

3.2 Instrumental vs. Expressive Ideology

Early work examines the nature of ideology, but contemporary literature generally refers to a voter's set of policy preferences; scholars disagree, though, if ideology is based in a set of sincerely held issue preferences or operates as an expressive social identity.

3.2.1 Instrumental Ideology

Ideology is an interconnected set of beliefs or worldviews about the role of government in society. In the contemporary United States, ideology is typically described as a left-right, liberal-conservative spectrum. While the specific policies associated with liberalism and conservatism can shift occasionally (Ellis & Stimson 2012), they are generally rather stable (Alford, Funk & Hibbing 2005). Substantively, conservatives tend to favor the status quo while liberals tend to favor societal change (Jost et al. 2003). While partisanship is increasingly treated as a social identity, ideology remains mainly studied as an instrumental variable and is typically measured by respondent self-placement. It is typically assumed that how one identifies on the liberal-conservative spectrum reflects one's core system of policy preferences and not a social identity. Indeed, ideological self-placement is reliably correlated

with issue preferences in many areas, including social welfare spending, military size and strength, etc. (Abramowitz & Saunders 2006). Notably, however, this assumes that ideology is grounded in actual understanding of the terms "liberal" and "conservative", despite the evidence, discussed above, that the majority of voters are quite unfamiliar with them.

Because of the somewhat consistent relationship between ideological self-placement, issue preferences, and electoral behavior, ideological identity and issue-preferences are often treated interchangeably. Yet, the self-placement measure is unable to distinguish between expressive and instrumental ideology. Indeed, why do we see an American public that overwhelmingly labels itself as "conservative" while supporting broad policies like redistribution, economic intervention, and government action to correct societal injustice (Ellis & Stimson 2009). Ellis and Stimson (2009) argue this is because liberalism has, over time, become associated with such policies while conservatism has become more symbolic (i.e. associated with non-policy qualities, such as morality, self-control, or lifestyle choices) and contains less policy content. This explains why, among liberals, ideology may act more instrumentally; among conservatives, however, ideology may operate more expressively. Using different measures of ideology helps address the ongoing confusion about the lack of instrumental factors in shaping people's ideological self-placement, and it allows us to investigate differences between the parties in terms of the role of their separate partisan and ideological identities.

3.2.2 Expressive Ideology

While the label "conservative" or "liberal" certainly conveys a large degree of policy preference, it also reflects more information, including how an ideologue sees himself or herself (Conover & Feldman 1981). Much like partisanship, ideology can be considered a social group identity. According to Social Identity Theory (see Tajfel and Turner 1979), a large part of a person's sense of belonging is derived from their social group memberships (Tajfel & Turner 1979). Members of social groups also demonstrate high levels of both in-

group favoritism and out-group resentment, even if group membership is randomly assigned (Tajfel & Turner 1979). According to the minimal group paradigm, group membership is the minimum requirement to produce bias towards non-group members. Liberals and conservatives identify as such because they derive a sense of self-concept from doing so, and express disdain for members of the opposite side of the aisle without holding divergent policy preferences (Mason 2018). If one party values ideological identity over the other (i.e. Republicans), we should see rancor directed at the opposite ideological label (i.e. liberal) at a higher degree and *not* the opposite partisan label (i.e. Democrat). These identities also generate at a rather early age (Converse 1964). From an early period in their life, children of Democrats are conditioned to be good Democrats and children of Republicans are conditioned to be good *conservatives*— all long before they could develop policy preferences.

Ideological identifiers also seek to remain consistent with their identity— regardless of their individual policy preferences, liberals and conservatives tend to endorse policy that is endorsed by their ideological camp (Malka & Lelkes 2010). Indeed, Malka and Lelkes (2010) show that ideology and issue preferences can be orthogonal to each other. They conduct an experiment that includes a description of aid to farmers (arguably a traditionally conservative issue area) and manipulate whether the aid is favored by conservatives, liberals, or "various groups;" they find that respondents mainly responded to these ideological cues (i.e. conservatives generally opposed the policy if it was advocated by liberals). Additionally, ideological identity is empirically distinct from ideological self placement and the two are not even particularly highly correlated (they are correlated at 0.283) (Devine 2015). Strong ideological identifiers also demonstrate much more bias towards members of the opposite ideological camp regardless of issue position extremity (Mason 2018). If ideology is indeed mainly an expressive social identity, then voters are making decisions not based in their true policy preferences, if such preferences even exist. Such a decision-making model is normatively upsetting to those who value a healthy democracy.

The scale items used by Mason (2016) to gauge ideology as a social identity are similar

to but slightly different from the items used by Huddy (2015) and Huddy et al. (2017) (See Figure 2). Instead of an IRT model, Mason simply uses an additive scale. The ideological identity scale is quite reliable ($\alpha = .81$ for conservatives and $\alpha = .80$ for liberals).

Ideological Identity Scale Items	Response Options
How important is being Liberal/Conservative to you?	Extremely important, Very important, Not very important, Not important at all
How well does the term Liberal/Conservative describe you?	Extremely well, Very well, Not very well, Not at all
When talking about Liberals/Conservatives, how often do you use "we" instead of "they"?	All of the time, Most of the time, Some of the time, Rarely, Never
To what extent do you think of yourself as being a Liberal/Conservative?	A great deal, Somewhat, Very Little, Not at all

Figure 3.1: Ideological Identity Scale Items

While these prior works and I argue a model of ideology based in social identity, I argue that this identity might be more important to Republicans than to Democrats (i.e. ideology operates as an expressive identity more so among Republicans). Democrats, on the other hand, tend to be stronger partisan identifiers with less emphasis on their liberal identity, and whatever focus on ideology among Democrats is typically based in policy preferences.

3.3 Psychological Bases of Ideology

Beyond policy content and social elements, liberalism and conservatism is associated with very different psychological traits. Political conservatism, in particular, has been studied for its associations with authoritarianism, intolerance of ambiguity, and rationalization (Adorno et al 1950). Conservatism is also associated with a particular set of personality traits not shared with liberalism (e.g. fear of death, system stability, etc.) (Jost et al. 2003, Hibbing, Smith & Alford 2014). More broadly, liberals and conservatives differ in their "Big Five" personality traits: conscientiousness, openness to new experiences, agreeableness, emotional stability, and extroversion.

Jost et al. (2003) conduct a meta-analysis and analyze political conservatism as motivated social cognition (i.e. one's identity as a conservative is at least partially based in

psychological need). They find that several personality features reliably predict an individuals conservatism. Conservatives tend to score higher in death anxiety than liberals (i.e. conservatives are more afraid to die). Conservatives are higher in their need for system stability, and they are higher in dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity— they are more rigid in their beliefs and prefer concepts to be very clear. Relative to liberals, conservatives are less open to new experiences and hold less tolerance for uncertainty. They tend to hold a higher psychological need for order structure, and closure and a lower need for integrative complexity (i.e. they are cognitively less likely to consider many dimensions when making decisions). Conservatives also score higher on their fear of loss or threat and demonstrate lower levels of self-esteem. The authors do note, however, that is not clear which way the causal arrow flows (i.e. it is not evident whether these personality traits *cause* individuals to favor conservatism or the other way around).

While previous work examines the impact of relatively minor psychological traits on ideology, more broad cognitive traits reliably predict ideology. Gerber et al (2010) analyze the impact of the "Big Five" personality traits and their impact on ideology and find that these traits play a large role in determining ideology, sometimes as much as factors like income or education. They divide ideology into economic and social dimensions. Those who score highly on conscientiousness tend to be more conservative in both economic and social spheres (i.e. they favor both hard work and organization and, socially, adhere to norms and rules). Alternatively, those who score higher in openness to new experiences tend to be more liberal both in the economic and social dimensions. They are more willing to try new economic programs and favor government intervention in the economy, and they value tolerance for novelty in the social realm. Individuals who score higher in agreeableness lean to the left economically (they are altruistic and desire to help the disadvantaged) but to the right socially (they desire to maintain social harmony and traditional communal relationships). An opposite pattern exists for those high in emotional stability: high scorers lean right economically and are comfortable with economic risks (e.g. investing in the stock

market); however, high scorers lean left socially, and they are comfortable with risky changes in the social status quo (e.g. accepting same-sex marriage). Finally, Gerber et al. (2010) find that there are no differences between liberals and conservatives in terms of extroversion but do note that individuals higher in extroversion tend to be more politically active. Once again, the authors note that the causal relationship between personality and ideology is not explicitly clear.

These psychological differences suggest that ideology is more than just policy preference—there exist quantifiable differences between the personalities of liberals and conservatives (though, once again, it is difficult to determine the causal direction between personality and ideology). It is important to note that psychological differences between ideologues provides more evidence that ideology is not strictly instrumental.

3.4 Ideological Movements

While this dissertation focuses mainly on the *function* of ideology among the mass public, it is also important to acknowledge recent ideological trends in the electorate. The Republican Party has shifted significantly to the ideological right, while the Democratic Party has remained firmly center-left; however, there has been a slight leftward shift in recent years (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Beyond simply being borne out in the data, these movements have generated labels and cultural icons.



Figure 3.2: Republican Electorate Ideology: 1994-2019

Note: Figure retrieved from Gallup



Figure 3.3: Democratic Electorate Ideology: 1994-2019

Note: Figure retrieved from Gallup

Following the 2008 election of Barack Obama and the defeat of Republican nominee John McCain, the GOP witnessed an insurgency. Claiming they had been "taxed enough already," members of the Tea Party mounted an attack not necessarily against their Democratic rivals but instead on members of their *own* party they deemed too "mainstream" or moderate. While initially there was some debate about the origin of the Tea Party movement, it is

now clear that the insurgency was primarily driven by wealthy Republican activists and groups like Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity (Waldman 2010). That said, the electorate was certainly ripe for such a movement. Despite the stark conservative bent to the movement, it rose mainly as a response to the election of Obama as the first non-white president; indeed, racial resentment is a significant predictor of belonging to the Tea Party (Abramowitz 2011).

While the Republican electorate has shifted substantially to the right, the Democratic electorate has become slightly more extreme (Poole & Rosenthal 2011). Most notably, we have seen the rise of the so-called "Squad": very liberal members of the House of Representatives including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Rashida Tlaib, and Ayanna Pressley (Sullivan 2019). Bernie Sanders presidential bids in both 2016 and 2020 have also arguably shifted the Democratic electorate to the left in terms of policy. Sanders campaigns have also created a very rabid following, particularly among younger voters, who have been pejoratively labeled as "Bernie Bros."

These ideological movements reflect the differences in ideological emphasis among the electorate. The Tea Party and the Freedom Caucus in the Republican Party focus mainly on preventing liberal policies from being implemented rather than implementing more conservative policies. Democrats in government, on the other hand, are focused on shifting public policy to the left. They do not typically make appeals to fighting against conservative culture but instead are focused on *policy*.

3.4.1 Hypotheses

Because of their focus on the betterment of a series of disparate social groups, Democrats unite under the partisan banner. Republicans, on the other hand, are more homogeneous and unite under the ideological banner. This dissertation will test the extent of these key differences and their implications. I examine three main hypotheses:

- *H1*: Republican behavior is primarily driven by their electorate's *ideological* identity,

while Democratic behavior is primarily driven by their electorate's *partisan* identity.

- *H2A*: Appeals to ideological identity will produce action-oriented emotions among Republicans more than among Democrats, while appeals to partisan identity will boost action-oriented emotions among Democrats more than among Republicans.

- *H2B*: In turn, these action-oriented emotions will increase the intention to turnout or become involved in politics more among Republicans when appeals to conservative identity are made and more among Democrats when appeals to partisan identity are made.

- *H3*: Ideology operates as an expressive social identity among Republicans more than among Democrats.

Chapter 4

Political Identities, Emotions, and Voting Behavior

This chapter includes a test of Hypothesis 1, which states that Republicans value their ideological identity more than Democrats, Hypothesis 2 which states that appeals to ideological identity will produce action-oriented emotions among Republicans more than among Democrats, while appeals to partisan identity will boost action-oriented emotions among Democrats more than among Republicans. and Hypothesis 3 which states that ideology operates as an instrumental construct at a higher rate among Democrats than Republicans. Data are drawn from the 2020 University of Georgia/College of William and Mary omnibus survey. This survey was administered in two waves during the Fall 2020 semester and data collection was finalized in November of 2020 prior to the 2020 general election. This sample contains respondents that are much whiter and much younger than the general population. Because there are stark differences between young and old voters as well as black and white voters, this imbalance may skew my results and be generalizable mainly to young voters. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republican voters' ideological identity strength or partisan strength; however, I do find some support that suggests that the Democratic electorate uses ideology as an instrumental concept more so than Republican

voters (Hypothesis 3). I also find a pattern counter to Hypothesis 2: Democrats positive in-group emotions and negative out-group emotions, voting behavior, and political activity are driven mainly by their ideological identity strength rather than partisan strength, while Republicans positive in-group and negative out-group emotions and voting behavior are driven mainly by partisan strength rather than ideological identity strength.

Next, I describe the main independent variables and control variables included in the study. I also include summary statistics for each variable by political party. I then list the main dependent variables and their distributions as well. Next, I analyze Democrats' in-group and out-group emotions, turnout and voting intentions followed by the same for Republicans. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings for American politics.

4.1 Main Independent Variables

Partisan self-placement is a scale ranging from 0 (true independent) to 1(strong partisan). It is derived from the standard ANES branching partisanship self-placement question.

Ideological identity strength is a variable ranging from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong ideological identifier). This measure is similar to the partisan identity strength variable and is used by Mason (2016). This measure gauges the degree to which a respondent socially identifies with an ideology and is derived from a battery that asks respondents to express the degree to which they agree with statements such as "When someone criticizes the (liberals/conservatives), it feels like a personal insult. This variable serves as a expressive measure of ideology.

Ideological self-placement is a variable scaled to range from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong ideologue). It is derived from the standard ANES ideological self-placement measure. This is correlated with the ideological identity strength at 0.48, suggesting it is a distinct construct. This variable serves as a measure of instrumental ideology, as this is the measure typically used in most political science research. That said, this variable

contains both instrumental and expressive elements, so this measure is not a pure measure of instrumental ideology.

4.2 Control Variables

Because they could also theoretically predict each of the dependent variables, I also include a series of control variables. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. They are as follows:

Political interest gauges the degree to which the respondent reports being interested in politics and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Democrats (M = 0.511, SD = 0.29) and Republicans (M = 0.437, SD = 0.211) (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). This difference is statistically significant from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$), suggesting Democratic students are slightly more interested in politics than Republican students.

Race is a factor variable that indicates the race of the respondent, and it is coded 0 to indicate white and 1 to indicate nonwhite. Overall, the sample is 72% white, while Democratic students are slightly more diverse with 66% white respondents (see Table 4.1). Republican students, on the other hand, are about 89% white. This is reported in Table 4.2. This difference is statistically significant from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

Age indicates the age of the respondent, in years. The overall mean age is 19.37, and this does not vary much by party identification. Because the sample contains only an age group that comprises only around 20% of the United States population, my findings may not be generalized to the general population.

Religiosity gauges how frequently the respondent attends religious services and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Among Democrats, the mean value is 0.567 (SD = 0.29) and

among Republicans the mean value is 0.459 (SD = 0.226) (see Table 4.1 and 4.2). This difference is significantly discernible from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$).[5]

Gender is a factor variable that indicates the reported gender of the respondent and is coded 0 for male and 1 for female or other. The overall sample is 64.7% non-male, while Democratic respondents are 76.1% non-male and Republican respondents are 60.5% non-male (reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2).

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Democrats)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Strength	459	0.734	0.248	0.333	0.667	1.000	1.000
Ideological Identity	310	0.541	0.205	0.000	0.400	0.700	1.000
Ideological Self-placement	438	0.493	0.290	0.000	0.333	0.667	1.000
Political Interest	441	0.511	0.190	0.000	0.500	0.750	1.000
Percent Non-white	441	0.444	0.497	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Age	441	19.415	2.038	18.000	18.000	20.000	46.000
Religiosity	444	0.567	0.219	0.000	0.400	0.800	1.000
Gender	441	0.761	0.428	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Note: Data drawn from the 2020 UGA/College of William and Mary Omnibus Survey

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (Republicans)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Strength	413	0.725	0.231	0	0.7	1	1
Ideological Identity	123	0.494	0.224	0.000	0.286	0.643	1.000
Ideological Self-placement	402	0.393	0.267	0.000	0.333	0.667	1.000
Political Interest	404	0.437	0.211	0.000	0.250	0.500	1.000
Percent Non-white	403	0.107	0.309	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Age	405	19.289	1.129	18.000	18.000	20.000	24.000
Religiosity	405	0.459	0.226	0.000	0.200	0.600	1.000
Gender	405	0.605	0.489	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000

Note: Data drawn from the 2020 UGA/College of William and Mary Omnibus Survey

[5] I argue the finding that Democrats are higher in religiosity than Republicans may be a function of the importance of religious service attendance among Black voters, who identify as Democrats at a higher rate than White voters (Laird and White 2020).

4.3 Dependent Variables

Anger is a feeling thermometer scale gauging the degree to which the respondent feels anger towards both the partisan in-group and out-group (i.e. Democrats and Republicans report anger towards both their own group and the other group) *and* the ideological in-group and out-group (i.e. liberals and conservatives report anger towards both their own group and the other group). It ranges from 0 to 100.

Enthusiasm is a feeling thermometer scale gauging the degree to which the respondent feels enthusiasm towards both the partisan in-group and out-group (i.e. Democrats and Republicans report enthusiasm towards both their own group and the other group) *and* the ideological in-group and out-group (i.e. liberals and conservatives report enthusiasm towards both their own group and the other group). It ranges from 0 to 100.

Turnout is a factor variable gauging whether or not the respondent planned to vote in the 2020 Presidential election. This variable is coded such that no intent to turnout = 0 and intended turnout = 1. Overall, 89.7% of the respondents indicated that they intended to vote for president. There is no statistically significant difference between Democratic and Republican students.

In-party vote is a factor variable measuring whether the respondent voted for their party's presidential nominee. It is coded as 1 if the respondent intended to vote for their party's chosen nominee (i.e., if Democrats intended to vote for Joe Biden and Republicans



Figure 4.1 Mean Partisan Strength by Party
Note: variable scaled to range from 0 to 1

intended to vote for Donald Trump) and 0 if otherwise. Among Democrats, 93.4% reported planning to vote for Biden while only 67.98% of Republicans reported plans to vote for Trump. This difference is statistically discernable from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$).

Political activity is a measure of how many activities related to politics the respondent took part in. It is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Democrats report being more



Figure 4.2: Ideological Identity vs. Ideological Self-placement by Party
Note: all variables scaled to range from 0 to 1.

politically active (M = 0.34, SD = 0.18) than Republicans (M = 0.24, SD = 0.16). This difference is statistically significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

4.4 Results

First, I analyze data drawn from the University of Georgia/College of William and Mary Omnibus Survey (Omnibus Survey). This sample includes responses from 995 undergraduate students at the respective universities. The sample is made up of 46% Democratic students and 42% Republican students. Also contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find no difference in partisan strength between Democratic (M = 0.73, SD = 0.25) and

Republican (M = 0.72, SD = 0.23) respondents. In support of Hypothesis 3, I do find that Democrats are higher in ideological self-placement with a mean of 0.49 (SD = 0.29) than Republicans (M = 0.39, SD = 0.27). Results are presented in Figure 4.1. This difference is also statistically discernable from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$). These results can be found in Figure 4.2.

4.5 Democrats' In-group Emotions

Next, I analyze the impact of partisan strength and ideological identity on in-group enthusiasm and anger towards both Democrats and liberals among Democratic voters as a test of Hypothesis 2: the argument that appeals to ideological identity will produce action-oriented emotions among Republicans more than among Democrats, while appeals to partisan identity will boost action-oriented emotions among Democrats more than among Republicans. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for each model (controlling for political interest, race, and age) are reported in Table 4.3. I find that partisan strength is a stronger predictor of enthusiasm for Democrats than ideological identity. This is likely because strong partisans identify more strongly with the party. A one-unit change in partisan strength yields a 33.82 increase in enthusiasm, ceteris paribus, while a one-unit change in partisan strength yields a 16.138 increase in enthusiasm all else equal. Understandably, I find that ideological identity is a much stronger predictor of increased enthusiasm for liberals than partisan strength. A one-unit increase in ideological identity predicts a 46.91 increase in enthusiasm for liberals all else equal; a one-unit increase in partisan strength only yields a 19.20 increase in enthusiasm for liberals, ceteris paribus. Finally, I find that ideological identity predicts a 16.71 decrease in anger towards liberals among Democrats, while partisan strength has no effect.

Table 4.3: In-group Emotions (Democratic Voters)

	Dependent variable:			
	Enthusiasm (Democrats)	Anger (Democrats)	Enthusiasm (Liberals)	Anger (Liberals)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisan Strength	33.820***	-11.976**	19.209***	-7.298
	(6.791)	(5.706)	(6.184)	(4.869)
Ideological Identity Strength	16.138**	-5.488	46.914***	-16.716***
	(8.014)	(6.861)	(7.330)	(6.049)
Political Interest	-6.138	15.423**	7.991	10.767
	(8.722)	(7.559)	(7.918)	(6.626)
Race	-4.295	2.420	-2.832	1.502
	(2.919)	(2.496)	(2.658)	(2.207)
Age	-1.787**	1.501**	-0.242	1.327**
	(0.843)	(0.685)	(0.767)	(0.595)
Religion	0.723	2.822	6.497	-2.734
	(6.735)	(5.983)	(6.144)	5.412
Gender	7.104**	4.385	10.918***	-1.953
	(3.550)	(2.951)	(3.247)	2.602
Constant	56.860***	-6.056	10.272	3.085
	(18.214)	(14.799)	(16.579)	(12.333)
Observations	296	234	295	224
R^2	0.185	0.058	0.311	0.079
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.029	0.295	0.058
Residual Std. Error	24.376 (df = 288)	18.533 (df = 226)	22.159 (df = 287)	16.041 (df = 218)
F Statistic	9.334*** (df = 7; 288)	1.989* (df = 7; 226)	18.543*** (df = 7; 287)	3.747*** (df = 5; 218)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.6 Democrats' Out-group Emotions

I then examine the relationship between ideological identity and partisan strength and *out-group* emotions among Democratic voters. OLS regression results can be found in Table 4.4. Somewhat surprisingly, I find no effect of partisan strength on anger towards Republicans among Democratic voters, while a one-unit change in ideological identity predicts an 18.16 increase in anger towards members of the GOP, ceteris paribus. Next, I find that a one-unit increase in ideological identity yields a 12.533 decrease in enthusiasm towards conservatives among Democratic voters while there is no effect for partisan strength. Finally, I find that a one-unit shift in ideological identity predicts an 18.01 increase in anger towards conservatives among Democrats while there is no effect of partisan strength among Democratic students.

Table 4.4: Out-group Emotions (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:			
	Enthusiasm (GOP)	Anger (GOP)	Enthusiasm (Conservatives)	Anger (Conservatives)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisan Strength	-8.002	3.894	-8.044	5.675
	(4.863)	(7.399)	(5.153)	(7.668)
Ideological Identity Strength	-7.299	18.156**	-12.533*	18.013**
	(6.058)	(8.648)	(6.547)	(9.118)
Political Interest	-10.988*	20.390**	-11.654	26.146***
	(6.514)	(9.684)	(7.294)	(10.043)
Race	-5.036**	2.799	-0.654	5.044
	(2.250)	(3.144)	(2.489)	(3.272)
Age	-0.213	1.196	0.685	-0.112
	(0.591)	(0.909)	(0.619)	(0.934)
Religiosity	-10.333*	3.055	0.468	7.502
	(5.252)	(7.214)	(5.713)	(7.536)
Gender	-1.223	10.177***	-5.213*	13.262***
	(2.607)	(3.872)	(2.721)	(4.003)

Constant	44.345*** (12.646)	0.210 (19.646)	24.385* (13.307)	21.742 (20.213)
Observations	202	295	176	291
R^2	0.107	0.092	0.132	0.126
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.069	0.095	0.104
Residual Std. Error	15.244 (df = 194)	26.269 (df = 287)	15.273 (df = 168)	27.057 (df = 283)
F Statistic	3.320*** (df = 7; 194)	4.130*** (df = 7; 287)	3.635*** (df = 7; 168)	5.810*** (df = 7; 283)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.7 Democrats' Voting Behavior

I then analyze Democratic respondents' planned turnout and whether the respondent intended to vote for the Democrat candidate for president in 2020. Results from logit analysis are presented in Table 4.5. I find no relationship between partisan strength and neither the respondent's intent to vote in the 2020 general election nor their decision to vote for their party's chosen nominee, though this is likely due to little variation in both dependent variables. I do find that ideological identity predicts an increased probability of voting for Joe Biden among Democrats, though even at an ideological identity value of 0, the predicted probability of a Democratic respondent voting for Biden is 0.84, holding all other variables at their mean value (for continuous variables) or mode (for dichotomous variables).[6]

[6] While predicted probability graphs would normally be appropriate inclusions here, these models produce predicted probabilities that at most values are over 1, which is nonsensical.

Table 4.5: Democratic Voting Intentions

	Dependent variable:	
	In-Party Vote	Intent to Turnout
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	1.282	0.645
	(1.355)	(1.113)
Ideological Identity Strength	3.752**	0.699
	(1.667)	(1.384)
Political Interest	1.266	1.866
	(1.609)	(1.436)
Race	-0.465	-1.369**
	(0.595)	(0.548)
Age	0.031	0.059
	(0.179)	(0.141)
Religiosity	1.293	-2.725**
	(1.418)	(1.314)
Gender	0.580	1.086**
	(0.637)	(0.511)
Constant	-1.527	1.475
	(3.849)	(3.042)
Observations	310	310
Log Likelihood	-46.557	-64.522
Akaike Inf. Crit.	109.115	145.044
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.8 Democrats' Political Activity

Finally, I analyze the rate at which Democrats participate in politics based on their partisan strength and ideological identity strength. OLS results are reported in Table 4.6. I find that a one-unit change in ideological identity strength predicts a 0.138 increase in political activity while partisan strength has no effect. This suggests that, at least among young Democrats, ideological identity is quite valuable to voters.

Table 4.6: Democrats' Political Activity

	Dependent variable:
	Political Activity
Partisan Strength	0.022
	(0.042)
Ideological Identity Strength	0.138***
	(0.050)
Political Interest	0.396***
	(0.054)
Race	-0.012
	(0.018)
Age	0.009*
	(0.005)
Religiosity	0.034
	(0.041)
Gender	0.062***
	(0.022)
Constant	-0.173
	(0.113)
Observations	309
R^2	0.280
Adjusted R^2	0.263
Residual Std. Error	0.153 (df = 301)
F Statistic	16.702*** (df = 7; 301)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.9 Republicans' In-group Emotions

Next, I examine the impact of partisan strength and ideological identity on Republicans' emotions towards Republicans and conservatives (i.e., their in-group emotions). OLS results are reported in Table 4.7. I find that a one-unit change in partisan strength predicts a 54.93 increase in enthusiasm towards the GOP among Republican voters while there is no statistically significant effect of ideological identity. This suggests that young Republican voters care very deeply about their party and less about their

ideological identity, counter to my hypotheses. Next, I find no relationship between neither partisan strength nor ideological identity and anger towards the GOP among Republican students. I also find that increasing partisan strength by one predicts a 50.44 increase in enthusiasm felt towards conservatives among Republicans while ideological identity has no effect. Finally, I find that a unit change in ideological identity yields 19.53 decrease in anger towards conservatives among Republican voters and find no relationship between ideological identity and anger towards conservatives.

Table 4.7: In-group Emotions (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:			
	Enthusiasm (GOP) (1)	Anger (GOP) (2)	Enthusiasm (Conservatives) (3)	Anger (Conservatives) (4)
Partisan Strength	54.925***	-14.772	50.439***	-19.526*
	(11.390)	(10.095)	(11.987)	(9.907)
Ideological Identity Strength	3.580	-5.269	14.338	-2.510
	(12.241)	(10.527)	(12.586)	(10.317)
Political Interest	36.536***	8.914	30.400**	-5.968
	(13.123)	(11.812)	(12.819)	(11.539)
Race	-2.576	-13.381	-10.102	-2.633
	(10.310)	(9.290)	(11.259)	(8.655)
Age	-1.564	2.390	0.257	0.404
	(2.210)	(1.946)	(2.245)	(1.864)
Religiosity	2.946	4.474	-0.846	5.206
	(11.144)	(9.978)	(11.274)	(10.005)
Gender	2.876	-0.984	1.624	0.921
	(4.946)	(4.313)	(5.065)	(4.328)
Constant	17.828	-17.341	-14.600	27.422
	(45.886)	(39.963)	(46.590)	(38.918)
Observations	106	86	103	88
R^2	0.316	0.087	0.304	0.071
Adjusted R^2	0.268	0.005	0.253	-0.010
Residual Std. Error	23.827 (df = 98)	19.106 (df = 78)	23.883 (df = 95)	19.190 (df = 80)
F Statistic	6.480*** (df = 7; 98)	1.066 (df = 7; 78)	5.927*** (df = 7; 95)	0.877 (df = 7; 80)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.10 Republicans' Out-group Emotions

Somewhat surprisingly I find no significant relationship between partisan strength and ideological identity in predicting Republicans' emotions towards Democrats and liberals other than the finding that a one-unit change in partisan strength yields a 36.78 increase in anger felt towards liberals. This suggest that my hypotheses may be conditioned on the tone of emotions (i.e., Republicans may just feel very negatively towards liberals and not Democrats while not necessarily holding their own ideological identity as important as their partisan identity). OLS results are reported in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Out-group Emotions (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:			
	Enthusiasm (Democrats) (1)	Anger (Democrats) (2)	Enthusiasm (Liberals) (3)	Anger (Liberals) (4)
Partisan Strength	6.879	18.438	3.251	36.751***
	(10.474)	(12.276)	(10.579)	(13.227)
Ideological Identity Strength	-8.659	-7.260	-7.007	1.811
	(11.755)	(12.457)	(11.689)	(13.412)
Political Interest	24.707**	38.192***	13.922	20.123
	(11.201)	(13.626)	(11.660)	(14.558)
Race	-0.541	-12.990	-0.587	-11.205
	(8.840)	(11.882)	(8.707)	(11.837)
Age	0.646	6.008**	-0.643	5.360**
	(1.886)	(2.340)	(1.834)	(2.519)
Religiosity	9.909	17.121	10.280	16.304
	(10.171)	(11.943)	(10.398)	(12.821)
Gender	3.307	-5.207	-0.756	-6.120
	(4.382)	(5.196)	(4.511)	(5.592)
Constant	-10.958	-108.996**	18.956	-96.056*
	(38.605)	(48.231)	(38.556)	(51.691)
Observations	83	98	77	100
R^2	0.082	0.177	0.039	0.169

Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.113	-0.058	0.105
Residual Std. Error	18.524 (df = 75)	24.588 (df = 90)	17.976 (df = 69)	26.634 (df = 92)
F Statistic	0.962 (df = 7; 75)	2.760** (df = 7; 90)	0.401 (df = 7; 69)	2.665** (df = 7; 92)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.11 Republicans' Voting Behavior

Next, I analyze Republican respondents' voting intentions in the 2020 general elections. Logit results are presented in Table 4.8. I find that partisan strength predicts an increased probability of voting for Trump among Republicans, while both partisan strength and ideological identity predict an increased probability of voting for Trump holding all other variables at their mean value (for continuous variables) or mode (for dichotomous variables). Similar to Democrats, there is very little variation in Republicans' intent to turnout and baseline predicted probabilities are quite high for both partisan strength and ideological identity (0.84 and 0.86, respectively). The finding that partisan strength is a stronger predictor of voting for Trump among Republicans suggests my hypothesized asymmetry in ideological emphasis is correct; however, it is Democrats and not Republicans who are stronger ideological identifiers. That said, this pattern may only hold for younger voters. This is in line with some research by Jacobson (2016), which suggests that young Republicans are much more moderate than their older counterparts.

Table 4.9: Republican Voting Intentions

	Dependent variable:	
	In-party Vote Intent	Turnout
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	6.256***	3.312**
	(1.388)	(1.592)
Ideological Identity Strength	1.386	2.664*
	(1.137)	(1.547)
Political Interest	-2.067	-1.325
	(1.315)	(1.740)
Race	-2.357**	-2.226**
	(0.987)	(0.911)
Age	0.171	-0.407
	(0.222)	(0.278)
Religiosity	-0.167	-1.463
	(1.187)	(1.559)
Gender	-0.147	-0.090
	(0.494)	(0.714)
Constant	-6.576	8.347
	(4.745)	(5.784)
Observations	119	119
Log Likelihood	-56.596	-32.907
Akaike Inf. Crit.	129.192	81.815
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

4.12 Republicans' Political Activity

Finally, I analyze Republicans' rate of political activity. OLS results are reported in Table 4.10. I find no effect for neither partisan strength nor ideological identity strength. This suggest that young Republicans may not value ideology as much as young Democrats. I only find an effect for political interest: a one-unit change in political interest predicts a 0.138 increase in the rate of political activity among Republicans.

Table 4.10: Republicans' Political Activity

	Dependent variable:
	Political Activity
Partisan Strength	0.089
	(0.058)
Ideological Identity Strength	-0.055
	(0.061)
Political Interest	0.138**
	(0.067)
Race	-0.001
	(0.048)
Age	-0.002
	(0.011)
Religiosity	-0.010
	(0.058)
Gender	0.028
	(0.026)
Constant	0.163
	(0.238)
Observations	117
R^2	0.084
Adjusted R^2	0.025
Residual Std. Error	0.132 (df = 109)
F Statistic	1.426 (df = 7; 109)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

4.13 Discussion

Interestingly, I find that young Democrats tend to value ideological identity strength over partisan strength, while young Republicans do value their party. The findings counter to my hypotheses that Republicans emphasize ideological identity while Democrats emphasize partisanship can be explained by recent trends among young voters. While undergraduate samples are generally representative (Hanel and Vione 2016), this particular sample does not vary much on two variables central to my argument: age and race. The mean age of the sample was around 19, and 70% white.

According to Pew, young Americans are much more liberal than older Americans (see Figure 4.3), and black Democrats are more conservative than white Democrats while remaining overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party (Figure 4.4). Figure 4.3 displays findings from a Pew study that finds that Millennials skew much more liberal than older Americans regardless of party, and a 2019 update to this study finds that Generation Z is even more liberal than Millennials. Figure 4.4 displays the findings of a Pew study containing ideological self-placement of Americans and shows that Black Americans report identifying as liberal at a much lower rate than White Americans; however, they tend to remain overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic party despite their more moderate ideology (White and Laird 2020). I argue that a nationally representative sample would yield different results. If the sample were more diverse in terms of age and race, I argue I would find that Democrats value their partisan identity more than their ideological identity while Republicans value the opposite: their ideological identity more than their partisan identity. That said, I did lose many Republican respondents due to a Qualtrics user error. It is possible this error systematically affected my results.

These findings do contribute, though, to a wealth of evidence that young voters skew more liberal and more Democratic than older Americans and young Republicans may be relatively moderate. This aligns with Jacobson's (2016) findings that young Republicans tend to be much more moderate than their older counterparts while young Democrats are more liberal. Somewhat interestingly, my hypothesized pattern may be flipped among young Americans. This suggests that the parties may change substantially in coming years.



Figure 4.3: Ideology by Generation

Note: figure retrieved from Pew Research Center. Accessed Feb 1, 2021.



Figure 4.4: Black Democrats' Ideological Self-placement

Note: data from Pew Research Center. Accessed Feb 1, 2021.

Chapter 5

The Impact of Ideology and Partisanship on Political Behavior: Partisan Differences

This chapter contains another test of Hypothesis 1 which argues that Republicans primarily value their *ideological* identity while Democrats primarily value their *partisan* identity. This chapter analyzes a nationally representative sample instead of a sample of mainly young Americans. I also analyze the impact of age on partisan strength and ideological self-placement because of the interesting findings in Chapter 4 using the sample of young voters that suggest young Democrats are strong ideological identifiers while young Republicans are strong partisans. Data are drawn from the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) pre-election survey. This survey was conducted in August 2020 until November 3, 2020 and includes 8280 responses; interviews were administered in 3 ways: 1) internet only, 2) internet and phone, and 3) internet, phone, and video. No in-person interviews were conducted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find that partisan strength operates very similarly between Democrats and Republicans; however, there is a slight difference in the operation of ideological self-placement (i.e. instrumental ideology) in support of Hypothesis 1 (i.e.

Republicans value ideology more than Democrats). I also find that age is indeed a key factor in the operation of both partisan strength and ideology as speculated in the previous chapter. Older Americans among both Democrats and Republicans are much stronger partisans than their younger counterparts. This is consistent with the political science literature on crystallization, which suggests that Americans become more entrenched in their partisan leanings as they age (Converse 1964). I find that relationship between ideology and age, on the other hand, does differ between Democrats and Republicans. Young Democrats are ideologically more extreme than their older counterparts. Among Republicans, I find the opposite pattern: young Republicans are more moderate than old Republicans. Finally, I find that ideological self-placement predicts Republicans' in-party vote but has no effect among Democrats, suggesting that Republicans do value ideology more than Democrats.

Next, I describe the main independent variables and control variables included in the study. I also include summary statistics for each variable by political party. I then list the main dependent variables and their distributions as well. Next, I analyze how Democrats' and Republicans' partisan strength and ideological self-placement relate to age. I then examine the impact of partisan strength and ideological self-placement on voters' voting behavior, specifically their intent to turn out in the 2020 presidential election and if they plan on voting for their party's candidate.[7] I then analyze the impact of these two constructs on respondents' emotions and political Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings for American politics.

5.1 Main Independent Variables

Partisan self-placement is a scale ranging from 0 (true independent) to 1(strong partisan). The mean value among Republicans was 0.73 (SD = 0.28) and 0.76 (SD =

[7] Because the post-election ANES data was not available at the time of my writing this dissertation, I only use the respondents' intention to turn out and their intended presidential vote choice. In the 2016 ANES, the pre-election and post-election figures for these variables were correlated at about .94 and .97, respectively.

0.27) among Democrats (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). While this difference is statistically distinct from 0 at the 0.0001 level, it is substantively quite a small difference.

Ideological self-placement is a scale ranging from 0 (moderate) to 1 (extreme ideologue). The mean value among Republicans was 0.51 (SD = 0.37) and 0.47 (SD = 0.39) among Democrats (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). This difference is significantly different from 0 at the 0.0001 level, and this is substantively a slightly larger than the difference in partisan self-placement, suggesting that Republicans are indeed ideologically more extreme than Democrats.

5.2 Control Variables

Because they could also theoretically predict each of the dependent variables, I also include a series of control variables. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. They are as follows:

Gender is a factor variable denoting the reported biological sex of the respondent. It is coded 0 for male and 1 for non-male. The sample is 54% non-male. Among Republicans, 50% are non-male; among Democrats, 58% are non-male. This difference is significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$). This suggests the Republican Party is more male dominated than the Democratic Party.

Political Interest gauges the degree to which the respondent reports being interested in politics and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Republicans are slightly less interested in politics (M = 0.68) than Democrats (M = 0.7). This difference is statistically discernible from 0 ($p = 0.002$).

Race is a factor variable denoting the race of the respondent. It is coded as 0 for white and 1 for non-white. Overall, the sample contains 28% non-white respondents. Among Republicans, the sample is about 18% nonwhite, while Democrats are 34% nonwhite. This difference is significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

Age is the age of the respondent in years. The sample's median age is 52, and the sample has a much greater range than the student sample in the previous chapter: 18 to 80. There is statistically no difference between Republicans and Democrats.

Religion denotes the degree to which the respondent values their religion and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The mean value of the overall sample is 0.55. Mean religiosity among Republicans is 0.61 and is 0.51 among Democrats. This difference is statistically different from 0 ($p < 0.001$). This suggests that Republicans are more religious than Democrats.

Education gauges the overall education level of the respondent, and it is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Overall, the mean education level of the sample is 0.59. Among Democrats, the mean value is 0.61 and among Republicans it is 0.58. While this difference is substantively small, it is significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$). This suggests Democrats are more educated than Republicans.

5.3 Dependent Variables

General election turnout is a factor variable gauging whether the respondent planned to vote in the 2020 presidential election and is coded as 0 for "no" and 1 for "yes." Only 12% of the sample reported that they did not plan to vote in the general election.

In-party vote is a factor variable indicating whether the respondent planned to vote for their party's presidential variable and is coded 0 for "no" and 1 for "yes". In other words, it is coded 1 if a Republican planned to vote for Trump and 0 if otherwise. Then coded 1 if a Democrat planned to vote for Biden and 0 if otherwise.

Participation is a variable that gauges the degree to which the respondent engages in a series of political activities, (e.g. talking to someone about the election, attending a political rally or meeting, wear a campaign button or sticker, etc). The sum is then rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Among Republicans, the mean value is 0.28; among Democrats, the mean value is 0.30. While substantively rather small, this difference is

statistically distinct from 0 ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that Democrats are slightly more politically active than Republicans.

Happiness is a variable gauging the degree to which the respondent is happy with how things are going in the country at the time the pre-election study was administered (August to November 3, 2020) and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Among Republicans, the mean value is 0.32 while among Democratic voters the mean value is 0.16. This difference is statistically different from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

Anger is a variable gauging the degree to which the is angry with how things are going in the country at the time the study was administered (August to November 3, 2020) and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. The mean value among Republicans is 0.59 and 0.72 among Democrats. This difference is statistically discernible from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

Table 5.1: Summary Statistics (Democrats)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Self-placement	3,743	0.763	0.274	0.333	0.667	1.000	1.000
Ideological Self-placement	3,743	0.478	0.395	0	0	0.7	1
Political Interest	3,743	0.695	0.253	0.000	0.500	1.000	1.000
Race	3,743	0.341	0.474	0	0	1	1
Age	3,625	51.738	17.109	18.000	37.000	66.000	80.000
Religiosity	3,737	0.505	0.375	0.000	0.250	0.750	1.000
Education	3,738	0.618	0.290	0.000	0.500	0.750	1.000

Note: data drawn from the 2020 ANES pre-election study.

Table 5.2: Summary Statistics (Republicans)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Self-placement	3,539	0.738	0.283	0	0.3	1	1
Ideological Self-placement	3,539	0.513	0.372	0.000	0.000	0.667	1.000
Political Interest	3,539	0.677	0.252	0.000	0.500	0.750	1.000
Race	3,539	0.183	0.387	0	0	0	1
Age	3,394	52.369	17.142	18.000	38.000	66.000	80.000
Religiosity	3,533	0.611	0.362	0.000	0.250	1.000	1.000
Education	3,531	0.581	0.274	0.000	0.500	0.750	1.000

Note: data drawn from the 2020 ANES pre-election study.

5.4 The Role of Age

Next, I analyze partisan differences on the effect of age on both partisan and ideological self-placement. The results in the former chapter suggest that young Republicans are ideologically somewhat moderate, while young Democrats are ideologically more extreme (both in terms of self-placement and ideological identity). This pattern also holds in a nationally representative sample. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the relationship between age and partisan self-placement and ideological self-placement by political party. I find that partisan self-placement operates quite similarly between the parties: as voters age, both Democrats and Republicans become stronger partisans. Once again, this is consistent with the political science literature on crystallization (Converse 1964). Ideological self-placement, on the other hand, operates slightly differently between Democrats and Republicans based on their age. Consistent with the previous chapter's findings, young Democrats are ideologically more extreme than older Democrats while young Republicans are more moderate than older Republicans.



Figure 5.1: Impact of Age on Partisan Strength by Party

Note: Data drawn from the 2020 ANES. Dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1. Models are OLS with 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 5.2: Impact of Age on Ideological Self-placement by Party

Note: Data drawn from the 2020 ANES. Dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1. Models are OLS with 95% confidence intervals.

These findings help explain why the previous chapter's results were not consistent with my hypotheses. Student samples are typically generalizable (Hanel and Vione 2016); however, the UGA-College of William and Mary poll did not vary much on age, which I have demonstrated to be key to the function of ideology among voters. I next analyze nationally representative data to examine differences in the function of ideological and partisan self-placement between Democratic and Republican voters.

5.5 Voting Behavior

Next, I analyze the impact of partisan and ideological self-placement on respondents' intent to vote in the 2020 presidential election, as well as their intended vote choice.[8] Data are drawn from the 2020 ANES pre-election survey. I used the R package "anesrake" to determine which variables required weighting to align them with the mass

[8] These are instrumental measures of partisanship and ideology– a limitation of this analysis.

public. Race, age, and gender are all weighted to be more representative of the US electorate.

5.5.1 Republicans

I find that among Republicans, partisan self-placement has no effect on the probability of a respondent turning out to vote. This is likely because there is very little variation in the turnout variable (0.08). Ideological self-placement does, however, predict and increased probability in turning out, though the effect is modest. As ideological self-placement moves from 0 to 1, the probability of turnout increases from 0.88 to 0.927. Logit results are presented in Table 5.3.

Next, I find that partisan self-placement has a stronger effect than ideological self-placement in predicting a Republican respondent's probability of voting for Donald Trump. Logit results are presented in Table 5.3. This finding is contrary to Hypothesis 1 and suggests that partisan self-placement is more important than ideology in determining Republican's voting behavior.

Table 5.3: Voting Behavior Logit Results (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:	
	General Election Turnout	In-party Vote
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Self-placement	0.381	11.96^{***}
	(0.241)	(0.441)
Ideological Self-placement	0.374^{**}	0.688^{***}
	(0.164)	(0.211)
Gender	0.136	0.037
	(0.134)	(0.152)
Political Interest	2.160^{***}	-1.495^{***}
	(0.253)	(0.349)
Race	-0.298^{*}	-0.927^{***}
	(0.127)	(0.174)
Age	0.009	-0.009

	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religiosity	0.369**	0.857***
	(0.183)	(0.221)
Education	1.237***	-1.145***
	(0.223)	(0.289)
Constant	-0.068	-6.211***
	(0.271)	(0.398)
Observations	3,387	2,977
Log Likelihood	-987.626	-619.914
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,991.249	1,263.629
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

5.5.2 Democrats

Next, I analyze the impact of ideological and partisan self-placement on Democratic voters' voting activity. I find that, like Republicans, partisan self-placement has no impact on the respondent's probability of turning out. Again, this is likely because there is very little variation in the general election turnout variable (0.09). I do find that more ideologically extreme Democratic voters were more likely to turnout, though, like among Republican voters, the effect is modest. As ideological self-placement moves from 0 to 1, the probability of turnout increases from 0.88 to 0.91. Logit results are presented in Table 5.4.

I do find that partisan self-placement in Democratic voters' probability of voting for Joe Biden over someone else. I find that ideological self-placement does not predict and increasing probability of voting for Joe Biden among Democrats, suggesting partisanship was Democrats' main driver in the 2020 election.

Table 5.4: Voting Behavior Logit Results (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:	
	General Election Turnout	In-party Vote
	(1)	(2)

Partisan Self-placement	0.009	10.001***
	(0.223)	(0.378)
Ideological Self-placement	0.332**	0.256
	(0.150)	(0.163)
Gender	0.357**	0.152
	(0.101)	(0.149)
Political Interest	1.057***	-0.025
	(0.201)	(0.311)
Race	-0.360**	0.563***
	(0.134)	(0.113)
Age	0.004	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.007)
Religiosity	0.141	-1.212***
	(0.144)	(0.107)
Education	1.099***	2.029***
	(0.051)	(0.345)
Constant	0.462*	-5.500***
	(0.271)	(0.406)
Observations	3,616	3,135
Log Likelihood	-1,161.250	-667.662
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,340.500	1,353.324
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

5.6 Political Participation

Next, I analyze the impact of partisan strength and ideological self-placement on voters' rates of participation other than voting. Included in the variable are the following possible activities:

- Whether the respondent talked to someone about politics.
- Whether the respondent attended online political meetings, rallies, speeches, or fundraisers.
- Whether the respondent went to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, or dinners.
- Whether the respondent displayed a campaign button or sticker.

- Whether the respondent did any work for a party or campaign.
- Whether the respondent contributed money to an individual candidate running for political office.
- Whether the respondent contributed money to a political party during the election year.
- Whether the respondent contributed money to any other group that supported or opposed candidates.
- Whether the respondent discussed politics with family or friends.
- Whether the respondent had gotten into a political argument in the past 12 months.
- Whether the respondent had joined a protest march, rally, or demonstration in the past 12 months.
- Whether the respondent had signed an internet or paper petition in the past 12 months.
- Whether the respondent had posted comment online about a political issue in the past 12 months.

Here I find the most support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that (especially for more costly political activities) ideology drives Republicans more than partisanship, while the opposite pattern holds among Democrats: partisanship is a stronger driver than ideology. Among Republicans, there is no effect of partisan strength on engaging in more costly political activities; however, as ideological self-placement increases by one-unit, the rate of political participation increases by 0.086 (see Table 5.5 for OLS results). Among Democrats, there is a very similar effect regarding ideology: as ideological self-placement increases by one unit, the rate of political participation increases by 0.085, on average and all else equal. Notably, though, a one-unit increase in partisan strength predicts a 0.110 increase in the rate of participation. This suggests that partisan strength is indeed a better predictor of political participation among Democrats, and it has no effect among Republicans.

Table 5.5: Political Participation OLS Results

	Dependent variable:	
	Political Participation	
	(Republicans)	(Democrats)
Partisan Strength	0.009	0.220***
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Ideological Self-placement	0.096***	0.087***
	(0.004)	(0.010)
Gender	0.019**	0.032**
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Political Interest	0.261***	0.275***
	(0.011)	(0.019)
Race	0.005	-0.033***
	(0.009)	(0.008)
Age	-0.0004*	-0.002***
	(0.0001)	(0.0004)
Religiosity	-0.027**	-0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.007)
Education	0.032**	0.076***
	(0.002)	(0.018)
Constant	0.099***	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.019)
Observations	3,053	3,259
R^2	0.142	0.289
Adjusted R^2	0.138	0.247
Residual Std. Error	0.171 (df = 3044)	0.178 (df = 3250)
F Statistic	61.882*** (df = 8; 3044)	134.698*** (df = 8; 3250)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The differential effect of ideological self-placement and partisan strength provides the strongest support for Hypothesis 1 and suggests that ideology drives Republicans to participate in more costly forms of political participation while Democrats are indeed driven more strongly by partisan strength.



Figure 5.3: Impact of Partisan Strength on Political Participation by Party

Note: Data drawn from the 2020 ANES. Dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1. Models are OLS with 95% confidence intervals.

5.7 Emotions

Finally, I analyze the impact of these two key political constructs– ideological self-placement and partisanship– on emotions. Particularly, I examine how ideology and partisanship impact Democratic and Republican voters' anger and happiness about how things were going in the country at the time the survey was issued (Fall 2020). I find mixed results.

5.7.1 Republicans

First, I analyze the impact of ideology and partisanship on Republican voters' anger and happiness with the state of the nation in Fall of 2020. I find that stronger partisans felt less anger. As partisan strength increases by one unit, we see a decrease of

about 0.278, *ceteris paribus* (OLS Results are reported in Table 5.6). This finding is not particularly surprising. On the other hand, more conservative Republicans felt *more* anger towards the state of the country. A one-unit change in ideological self-placement predicts a 0.079 increase in anger, *ceteris paribus*. While this effect is substantively rather small, it is somewhat surprising. I find it likely this is due to President Trump's policies being seen as not purely conservative by those on the political right, as well as his appeals to partisanship and a cultural conservative identity that is not necessarily paired with conservative policy principles.[9]

In terms of happiness, I find that stronger partisans felt happier with the state of the country. A one-unit shift in partisan strength yields a 0.427 increase in happiness, all else equal (OLS results are presented in Table 5.6). Surprisingly, I find that ideological self-placement has no statistically significant effect on Republican voters' happiness with the way things were going in the country in Fall 2020. This is contrary to Hypothesis 1, which posits that ideology should be the main driver of emotions for Republicans.

Table 5.6: Emotion OLS Results (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:	
	Anger	Happiness
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	-0.278***	0.427***
	(0.022)	(0.019)
Ideological Self-placement	0.079***	-0.002
	(0.021)	(0.013)
Gender	0.046***	-0.029***
	(0.011)	(0.015)
Political Interest	0.234***	-0.034
	(0.024)	(0.012)
Race	0.017	-0.017
	(0.021)	(0.014)
Age	0.002*	-0.002*

[9] Ideological identity is explored more in-depth in Chapters 4 and 6.

	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Religiosity	0.021**	0.057***
	(0.002)	(0.011)
Education	-0.001	-0.007
	(0.017)	(0.012)
Constant	0.581***	0.048*
	(0.025)	(0.022)
Observations	3,386	3,382
R^2	0.101	0.219
Adjusted R^2	0.097	0.207
Residual Std. Error	0.285 (df = 3377)	0.247 (df = 3373)
F Statistic	46.513*** (df = 8; 3377)	111.171*** (df = 8; 3373)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

5.7.2 Democrats

Next, I examine the impact of ideology and partisanship on Democratic voters' anger with the state of the US in Fall 2020. I find that, while both partisan strength and ideological self-placement affect Democrats' anger, the effect of partisan strength is much larger. A one-unit increase in ideological self-placement yields only a 0.359 increase in anger (*ceteris paribus)*, while a one-unit increase in partisan strength yields a 0.351 increase in anger towards the state of the country, all else equal (OLS results are presented in Table 5.7). This is in support of Hypothesis 1, suggesting that Democrats emphasize their partisanship more than liberal ideology.

Finally, I analyze the impact of ideological self-placement and partisan strength on Democratic voters' happiness towards the state of affairs in the US during the Fall 2020 election season. I find that a one-unit increase in partisan strength predicts a 0.318 decrease in Democrats' happiness, all else equal. I find no effect on happiness for ideological self-placement. This is in support of Hypothesis 1 and suggests that partisanship, not ideology, was the main driver of Democratic voters' emotions during the 2020 election season.

Table 5.7: Emotion OLS Results (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:	
	Anger	Happiness
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	0.359***	-0.318***
	(0.018)	(0.014)
Ideological Self-placement	0.047***	-0.016
	(0.014)	(0.009)
Gender	0.042***	-0.029***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Political Interest	0.221***	-0.042***
	(0.017)	(0.012)
Race	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.020)	(0.007)
Age	-0.001***	0.0002**
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
Religiosity	-0.033***	0.031***
	(0.0112)	(0.010)
Education	-0.003	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.012)
Constant	0.327***	0.411***
	(0.032)	(0.028)
Observations	3,611	3,614
R^2	0.199	0.175
Adjusted R^2	0.197	0.169
Residual Std. Error	0.253 (df = 3602)	0.205 (df = 3605)
F Statistic	112.158*** (df = 8; 3602)	95.573*** (df = 8; 3605)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

5.8 Conclusion

Results from analyzing the 2020 ANES provides moderate support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that Republicans value ideology more than Democrats and that Democrats care more about partisanship than ideology, though this varies somewhat by age.[10] While

[10] See Chapter 4 for an analysis of a sample of young voters.

partisan strength seems to be the main driver for both Democrats' and Republicans' willingness to vote for their party's nominee, it is notable that ideology has no effect among Democratic voters. This suggests that, indeed, ideology matters less to Democrats than it does to Republicans.

Next, I analyze the impact of partisan strength and ideological self-placement on voters' political participation beyond voting. I find that, among Republicans, partisan strength has no effect on political participation while more ideologically extreme Republican voters participated in politics at a higher rate. Among Democrats, I find that higher levels of both partisan strength and ideological self-placement predict higher rates of participation beyond voting; however, the effect size of partisan strength is larger. This provides the most support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that Democrats value partisanship more than ideology, while the opposite pattern exists among Republicans: Republican voters value ideology more than partisanship.

Finally, I find that stronger Republican partisans feel less angry about the state of the country during the 2020 election season; more conservative Republicans, however, felt *angrier*. Stronger Republicans also felt happier about the nation's condition in Fall 2020, while there was no effect for ideology among Republican voters. Among Democrats, both partisan strength and ideological self-placement predict an increase in anger towards the situation in the country in Fall 2020. That said, the effect size of partisan strength is *much* higher. This provides some support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that Democrats value partisanship more than ideology. I also find that among Democratic voters, higher levels of partisan strength predict a marked decrease in happiness felt about the state of the nation, while there is no effect for ideological self-placement. Again, this suggests Democrats value their partisanship more than ideology.

These findings suggest that appeals to different political identities will have different effects based on a voter's political party. Appeals to ideology and conservative identity will likely have a greater effect among Republican voters than Democrats, and appeals to party unity will likely have a greater effect among Democratic voters than

Republicans (though, somewhat contrary to my hypotheses, it does seem that Republican voters *do* value their partisanship– just not as much as Democrats do).

This analysis is somewhat limited, though, in the sense that I am limited to the use of only instrumental measures of partisanship and ideology. Though the literature on partisan identity has grown substantially in recent years, it is not used widely in large surveys like the ANES. Ideological identity is used even less frequently than partisan identity. I argue that treating ideology and partisanship mainly as social identities rather than instrumental constructs will yield more robust results. Additionally, I argue that ideology operates mainly as an identity among Republicans and as an instrumental concept among Republicans. These arguments are addressed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6

Experimental Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter includes another test of Hypothesis 1, which states that Republicans value their ideological identity more than Democrats, Hypothesis 2 which states that appeals to ideological identity will produce action-oriented emotions among Republicans more than among Democrats, while appeals to partisan identity will boost action-oriented emotions among Democrats more than among Republicans as well as Hypothesis 3 which states that ideology operates as an instrumental construct to a larger extent among Democrats than Republicans. To test these three inter-related hypotheses, I designed and implemented a unique experiment in which I manipulate threats to respondents' partisan and ideological identity (i.e., conservatives/liberals and Democrats/Republicans). I subsequently measure several dependent variables such as in-group enthusiasm and out-group anger, as well as voting habits and political participation beyond voting. Data are drawn from the 2021 University of Georgia (UGA) omnibus survey. This survey was administered in May 2021 to undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory class on American government; it received 1231 responses.

Similarly to Chapter 4 and contrary to Hypothesis 1, I find no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republican voters' ideological identity

strength or partisan strength; however, I do find some support that the Democratic electorate uses ideology as an instrumental concept more so than Republican voters (hypothesis 3). I compare the effects of partisan and ideological identity both within and between parties in the experimental analysis. Across all conditions in the experiment, I find no differences within the two parties (e.g. there is no difference in Republicans' or Democrats' in-group enthusiasm across the control, partisan treatment, or ideological treatment), suggesting the treatments did not elicit action-oriented emotions. Between parties, I find no difference in in-group enthusiasm regardless of experimental condition. I do find that Democrats report higher rates of both anger towards Republicans and participation regardless of experimental condition.

Disregarding the experimental conditions, I find that both Democratic and Republican voters' in-group enthusiasm is driven by their partisan identity; out-group anger, on the other hand, is driven by *ideological* identity among voters of both parties. I do find a partisan difference in the probability of voters voting for their party's candidate in the 2020 election: Democratic voters were motivated mainly by ideological identity, while Republicans were motivated by partisan strength and identity as well as ideological *self-placement.*

In the next section, I describe the experimental design and then analyze experimental results. Since the experiment yields null results, I then analyze the experiment as observational data, and conclude with a discussion of the implications for American politics.

6.2 Experimental Setup

Next, I analyze data from a unique experiment in which I manipulate which political identity is threatened (i.e. either partisan or ideological identity). Social psychology literature suggests that threats to a social in-group generate action-oriented emotions e.g. anger and enthusiasm (Tajfel and Turner 1979). I also include a neutral

control condition related to the weather (see Figure 6.1). I presented respondents with fabricated tweets from one of three accounts: "Georgia Democrats/Republicans" (see Figure 3), "Georgia Liberals/Conservatives" (see Figure 6.2), or "Georgia Weather" (see Figure 6.1). Democrats saw either a threat to Democrats or liberals (or the control condition), and Republicans saw either a threat to Republicans or conservatives (or the control condition). Each tweet is from a "verified" account and date, time, retweets, quote tweets, and likes were randomized. Examples are shown in Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.

Figure 6.1: Control Condition

Figure 6.2: Ideological Condition for a Republican Respondent

Figure 6.3: Partisan Treatment for a Democratic Respondent

I then collected a series of dependent variables: respondents' enthusiasm for their own party, anger towards members of the opposite party, and their willingness to participate in a series of political activities.[11] In the next section, describe the main independent and dependent variables. I then analyze the results from the experiment.

6.2.1 Main Independent Variables

Partisan strength is a scale ranging from 0 (true independent) to 1(strong partisan). It is derived from the standard ANES branching partisanship self-placement question. The mean value among Democratic voters was 0.698 and 0.694 among Republicans. These values are not statistically distinct from each other ($p = 0.78$).

[11] I used willingness to participate rather than likelihood of participation due to any trepidation about participating because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Partisan identity strength is a variable ranging from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong partisan identifier). It is identical to the measure used by Huddy et al. (2015) and is derived from a battery that asks respondents to express the degree to which they agree with statements such as "When someone criticizes the (Democrats/Republicans), it feels like a personal insult. Among Democrats, the mean value was 0.48. Among Republicans, the mean value was 0.51. These values are indeed statistically distinct from one another, suggesting young Republicans are slightly stronger partisan identifiers than young Democrats.

Ideological identity strength is a variable ranging from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong ideological identifier). This measure is similar to the partisan identity strength variable and is used by Mason (2016). This measure gauges the degree to which a respondent socially identifies with an ideology and is derived from a battery that asks respondents to express the degree to which they agree with statements such as "When someone criticizes the (liberals/conservatives), it feels like a personal insult. Among Democrats, the mean value was 0.54; among Republicans, it was 0.52. These values are not statistically distinct from each other ($p = 0.22$).

Ideological self-placement is a variable scaled to range from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong ideologue). It is derived from the standard ANES ideological self-placement measure. This is correlated with the ideological identity strength at 0.42, suggesting it is a distinct construct. The mean value among Democrats was 0.41, and the mean value among Republicans was 0.32. These values are statistically distinct from each other (p ¡ 0.001). This suggests that Democrats are stronger instrumental ideological identifiers than Republicans, in support of Hypothesis 3.

Policy preferences is a variable scaled to range from 0 (moderate) to 1 (strong ideologue). It is derived from a series of questions gauging respondents' policy preferences regarding same-sex marriage, immigration, environmental regulations, regulation of firearms, raising the minimum wage, expansion of healthcare, equal pay, free trade, and tax cuts. This variable serves as a more fine-tuned measure of instrumental ideology. The mean value among Democrats was 0.69, and among Republicans the mean value was 0.47.

These values are statistically distinct from one another (p ¡ 0.001), suggesting that, at least among young voters, Democrats hold more extreme policy preferences than Republicans.

6.2.2 Dependent Variables

Anger is a feeling thermometer scale gauging the degree to which the respondent feels anger towards the partisan out-group. It ranges from 0 to 1.

Enthusiasm is a feeling thermometer scale gauging the degree to which the respondent feels enthusiasm towards the partisan in-group. It ranges from 0 to 1.

In-party vote is a factor variable measuring whether the respondent voted for their party's presidential nominee. It is coded as 1 if the respondent voted for their party's chosen nominee (i.e., if Democrats voted for Joe Biden and Republicans voted for Donald Trump) and 0 if otherwise. Among Democrats, 93.4% reported voting for Biden while 67.98% of Republicans voted for Trump. This difference is statistically discernable from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$).

Political participation is a measure of how many activities related to politics the respondent took part in beyond voting. It is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Democrats report being more politically active ($M = 0.28$, $SD = 0.18$) than Republicans ($M = 0.18$, $SD = 0.16$). This difference is statistically significantly different from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

6.3 Experimental Results

I start by analyzing differences across experimental conditions among both Democratic and Republican respondents (i.e. differences between treatment conditions *within* the two parties' electorates). Overall, I find no significant differences across the control and treatment groups among both Democratic and Republican voters, suggesting neither the ideological nor partisan treatments were effective in stimulating action-oriented emotions (i.e. in-group enthusiasm and out-group resentment) . I also find no

differences across experimental conditions for participation beyond voting among both Democrats and Republicans. I next analyze differences *between* Democratic and Republican voters' in-group enthusiasm, out-group anger, and participation beyond voting. I find no difference across treatment conditions between Democrats' and Republicans' in-group enthusiasm; however, I do find that Democratic voters report feeling much more anger towards Republicans than Republicans feel towards Democrats across all conditions. I also find that Democrats report higher rates of political participation than Republicans, regardless of experimental condition.

6.3.1 In-group Enthusiasm

Among Democratic voters, the mean enthusiasm towards the Democratic Party in the control condition was 0.47. In the ideological treatment condition, enthusiasm towards Democrats was 0.44. These values are not statistically distinct from one another ($p = 0.29$). In the partisan condition, the mean in-group enthusiasm value was 0.44 as well, and this is not statistically distinct from the mean in the control condition ($p = 0.38$).

Among Republican voters, the mean enthusiasm towards their own party in the control condition was 0.43, and in the ideological condition the mean value was 0.46. These values are also not statistically distinct from each other ($p = 0.40$). In the partisan condition, the mean in-group enthusiasm value was 0.47; this value is also not significantly distinct from the mean value in the control condition.

Next, I analyze differences *between* Democratic and Republican voters' in-group enthusiasm. In the control group, Democrats' mean enthusiasm for their own party was 0.47; Republican voters' mean enthusiasm for their party was 0.43
. These values are not statistically distinct from one another ($p = 0.20$). In the partisan condition, Democratic voters' mean in-group enthusiasm was 0.44 while Republican voters' mean in-group enthusiasm was 0.47. These values are also not statistically distinct from each other ($p = 0.53$). In the ideological condition, the mean value of Democrats' in-

group enthusiasm was 0.44. For Republicans, the mean in-group enthusiasm was 0.46. These values are also not discernably distinct from one another ($p = 0.54$).

6.3.2 Out-group Anger

Among Democratic respondents, the average anger towards the Republican Party in the control condition was 0.56. In the ideological condition, average anger towards Republicans was 0.63. These values are not statistically distinct from one another ($p = 0.07$). That said, the p-value is quite close to traditional measures of statistical significance, suggesting that it is possible that threating ideological identity among young Democrats may trigger anger towards Republicans– more data collection would be needed to substantiate this effect. In the partisan condition, the mean anger towards Republicans was 0.56. This is also not distinct from the mean out-group anger among Democrats in the control condition ($p = 0.84$).

Among Republican voters, the mean anger towards Democrats in the control condition was 0.36. In the ideological condition, the mean value was 0.37. These values are not statistically different from each other ($p = 0.79$). Finally, in the partisan condition, the average anger towards the Democratic Party was 0.36. This is also not distinct from the mean anger towards Democrats in the control condition ($p = 0.90$).

Next, I compare anger towards the opposite party *between* Democrats and Republicans. In the control group, I find that Democrats report anger towards Republicans at a rate of 0.56. Republican voters, on the other hand, report anger towards Democrats at a rate of 0.36. This difference is distinct from 0 ($p < 0.001$). In the partisan condition, Democrats report anger towards Republicans at a rate of 0.56, while Republicans report a rate of feeling anger towards Democrats of 0.36. This difference from the control group is also statistically distinct from 0 from the control group ($p < 0.001$). In the ideological condition, I find that Democratic voters report a rate of feeling anger towards Republicans of 0.63, while Republican voters report a rate of feeling anger towards Democrats of 0.37. This difference is also significantly distinct from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

These results suggest that, regardless of experimental condition, Democrats feel more anger towards Republicans than Republicans feel anger towards Democrats.

6.3.3 Political Participation

Among Democrats, I find the mean value of the rate of political participation beyond voting (e.g. attending a Young Democrats/Republicans meeting, wearing a campaign button/sticker, canvassing, etc.) in the control group was 0.28. In the ideological condition, the mean participation value was 0.29. These values are not statistically different from one another ($p = 0.77$). In the partisan condition, the average participation value was 0.27. This value is also not distinct from the mean value in the control group ($p = 0.77$).

Among Republicans, I find the mean value of participation beyond voting in the control group was 0.17. In the ideological condition, the mean participation value was 0.19. These values are not statistically different from one another ($p = 0.60$). In the partisan condition, the average participation value was 0.18. This value is also not distinct from the value in the control condition ($p = 0.69$).

Next, I analyze differences in political participation across experimental conditions *between* Democrats and Republicans. In the control condition, I find that Democrats report a rate of participation of 0.28 while Republicans report a rate of 0.17. While both values are understandably low, Democrats are slightly more politically active ($p < 0.001$). In the partisan condition, Democrats report a mean value of participation of 0.27 while Republicans report a rate of 0.18; these values are distinct from one another ($p = 0.002$). Finally, the average value of Democrats' participation rate in the ideological condition was 0.29, and the average value of Republicans' participation rate was 0.19. This difference is also significantly distinct from 0 ($p < 0.001$). These results suggest that, across conditions, Democrats are more willing to participate in politics beyond voting more than Republicans.

6.4 Observational Analysis

To supplement the experimental analysis, I also include observational analysis that is also drawn from the 2021 UGA omnibus survey.[12] Here, I use the same dependent variables but disregard the experimental conditions. This is not ideal but since the experimental conditions failed to generate emotions, the observational analyses can be used to provide additional evidence for the differential effects of partisan and ideological identities on Democrats' and Republicans' political behavior. First, I analyze in-group enthusiasm among Democrats and Republicans, and I find that partisan identity seems to be the main driver for both Democrats' and Republicans' enthusiasm for their own political party. Next, I examine the impact of both instrumental and expressive partisanship and ideology on out-group anger. I find that ideological identity to be the main factor in determining anger towards members of the opposite party among both Democrats and Republicans, though the effect is slightly larger among Republicans. Finally, I analyze the impact of instrumental/expressive partisanship/ideology on the probability of the respondent voting for their party's respective nominee in the 2020 presidential election. I find that both partisan identity and ideological identity influence the probability of Republican voters voting for Donald Trump. Among Democratic voters, only ideological identity influences their probability of voting for Joe Biden.

6.4.1 Control Variables

Because they could also theoretically predict each of the dependent variables, I also include a series of control variables. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. They are as follows:

Political interest gauges the degree to which the respondent reports being interested in politics and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Democrats (M = 0.56, SD = 0.26) and Republicans (M = 0.48, SD = 0.3) (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). This difference is

[12] These analysis and results are similar to the observational analysis in Chapter 4.

statistically significant from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$) suggesting Democratic students are slightly more interested in politics than Republican students.

Race is a factor variable that indicates the race of the respondent, and it is coded 0 to indicate white and 1 to indicate nonwhite. Overall, the sample is 63% white, while Democratic students are much more diverse with only 47% white respondents (see Table 6.1). Republican students, on the other hand, are about 77% white. This is reported in Table 6.2. This difference is statistically significant from 0 ($p < 0.001$).

Age indicates the age of the respondent, in years. The median age is 20, and this does not vary much by party identification. Because the sample contains only an age group that comprises only around 20% of the United States population, my findings may not be generalized to the general population.

Religiosity gauges how frequently the respondent attends religious services and is scaled to range from 0 to 1. Among Democrats, the mean value is 0.40 (SD = 0.29) and among Republicans the mean value is 0.58 (SD = 0.226) (see Table 6.1 and 6.2). This difference is significantly discernible from 0 at the 0.05 level ($p < 0.001$).

Gender is a factor variable that indicates the reported gender of the respondent and is coded 0 for male and 1 for female or other. The overall sample is 57.47% non-male, while Democratic respondents are 63.37% non-male and Republican respondents are 53.25% non-male (reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2).

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics (Democrats)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Strength	566	0.698	0.260	0	0.3	1	1
Partisan Identity	566	0.475	0.198	0.000	0.308	0.615	1.000
Ideological Identity	566	0.539	0.255	0.000	0.385	0.692	1.000
Ideological Self-placement	464	0.406	0.357	0.000	0.000	0.500	1.000
Political Interest	551	0.558	0.311	0.000	0.333	0.667	1.000

Age	551	24.646	14.112	18.000	19.000	21.000	85.000
Religiosity	551	0.404	0.330	0.000	0.200	0.600	1.000

Note: Data are drawn from the UGA 2021 omnibus survey. All variables (except age) are rescaled to range from 0 (min) to 1 (max).

Table 6.2: Summary Statistics (Republicans)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Partisan Strength	522	0.694	0.249	0.333	0.667	1.000	1.000
Partisan Identity	522	0.513	0.234	0.000	0.385	0.692	1.000
Ideological Identity	522	0.522	0.214	0.000	0.385	0.692	1.000
Ideological Self-placement	413	0.322	0.331	0.000	0.000	0.500	1.000
Political Interest	509	0.480	0.301	0.000	0.333	0.667	1.000
Age	507	24.142	13.440	18.000	19.000	21.000	85.000
Religiosity	509	0.583	0.314	0.000	0.400	0.800	1.000

Note: Data are drawn from the UGA 2021 omnibus survey. All variables (except age) are rescaled to range from 0 (min) to 1 (max).

6.4.2 In-group Enthusiasm

Using ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, I examine the impact of these distinct partisan and ideological constructs on Democratic and Republican voters' enthusiasm for their own party. OLS results are presented in Table 6.3. Among Democrats, I find that only partisan identity predicts an increase in in-group enthusiasm. As partisan identity increases by one unit, the model predicts a 0.788 increase in enthusiasm for the party among Democrats, *ceteris paribus.* I find no impact of neither ideological self-placement nor ideological identity on in-group enthusiasm.

Among Republicans, I find that both partisan strength and partisan identity predict an increase in enthusiasm towards the Republican Party, though the effect of partisan identity is larger. OLS results can be found in Table 6.3. A one unit increase in partisan strength predicts a 0.198 increase in in-group enthusiasm, while a one unit increase in partisan identity predicts a 0.691 increase in enthusiasm, *ceteris paribus*. These results suggest that partisan identity is the main driver of enthusiasm for voters'

enthusiasm for their own party. This is not surprising, though it is somewhat surprising that neither ideological self-placement nor ideological identity has no impact.

Table 6.3: In-group Enthusiasm (OLS Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	Enthusiasm towards Democrats (Among Democrats)	Enthusiasm towards Republicans (Among Republicans)
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	0.096	0.198***
	(0.060)	(0.072)
Partisan Identity	0.788***	0.691***
	(0.089)	(0.084)
Ideological Identity	-0.007	0.140
	(0.063)	(0.096)
Ideological Self-placement	-0.120	-0.143
	(0.134)	(0.105)
Political Interest	0.082*	0.101**
	(0.045)	(0.049)
Age	0.002	-0.025**
	(0.007)	(0.010)
Race	0.020	-0.018
	(0.025)	(0.036)
Gender	0.018	0.003
	(0.027)	(0.029)
Religiosity	-0.039	-0.007
	(0.038)	(0.044)
Constant	-0.054	0.399*
	(0.157)	(0.206)
Observations	458	428
R^2	0.363	0.446
Adjusted R^2	0.351	0.434
Residual Std. Error	0.247 (df = 448)	0.252 (df = 418)
F Statistic	28.418*** (df = 9; 448)	37.393*** (df = 9; 418)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Next, I analyze the impact of a more fine-tuned measure of instrumental ideology on in-group enthusiasm (see Table 6.4). I find that partisan identity remains the main driver of in-group enthusiasm among both Democrats and Republicans, and that policy preferences do not have an impact.

Table 6.4: In-group Enthusiasm with Policy Preferences (OLS Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	Enthusiasm towards Democrats (Among Democrats) (1)	Enthusiasm towards Republicans (Among Republicans) (2)
Partisan Strength	0.101^{*}	0.176^{**}
	(0.060)	(0.070)
Partisan Identity	0.792^{***}	0.698^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.085)
Ideological Identity	0.006	0.107
	(0.062)	(0.094)
Policy Preferences	0.002	-0.036
	(0.073)	(0.067)
Political Interest	0.088^{*}	0.096^{*}
	(0.046)	(0.050)
Age	0.002	-0.025^{**}
	(0.007)	(0.010)
Race	0.019	-0.018
	(0.025)	(0.036)
Gender	0.024	0.016
	(0.026)	(0.027)
Religiosity	-0.045	-0.017
	(0.038)	(0.043)
Constant	-0.097	0.365^{*}
	(0.156)	(0.206)
Observations	458	428
R^2	0.362	0.444
Adjusted R^2	0.349	0.432
Residual Std. Error	0.248 (df = 448)	0.252 (df = 418)
F Statistic	28.279^{***} (df = 9; 448)	37.081^{***} (df = 9; 418)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.4.3 Out-group Anger

Next, I analyze the impact of partisan strength/identity and ideological self-placement/identity on respondents' anger towards members of the opposite party. OLS results are found in Table 6.5. Among Democrats, I find that neither partisan strength nor partisan identity impact their anger towards Republicans. I do find that a one-unit shift in ideological identity predicts a 0.196 increase in anger towards Republicans, all else equal. Somewhat curiously, I find that more liberal Democrats report *less* anger towards Republicans: a one-unit change in ideological self-placement predicts a 0.739 *decrease* in anger towards Republicans.

Among Republican voters, like Democrats, neither partisan strength nor partisan identity influences anger towards members of the opposite party. I also find that a one-unit increase in ideological identity predicts a 0.248 increase in anger towards Democrats, *ceteris paribus.* I find no impact of ideological self-placement. These results suggest that among both Democrats and Republicans, ideological identity drives anger towards members of the opposite party.

Table 6.5: Out-group Anger (OLS Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	Anger Towards Republicans (Among Democrats) (1)	Anger Towards Democrats (Among Republicans) (2)
Partisan Strength	0.045	-0.016
	(0.083)	(0.092)
Partisan Identity	0.059	0.017
	(0.124)	(0.108)
Ideological Identity	0.196**	0.248**
	(0.088)	(0.123)
Ideological Self-placement	-0.739***	0.129
	(0.188)	(0.135)
Political Interest	0.109*	0.152**
	(0.063)	(0.064)
Age	0.010	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.013)

Race	-0.010	-0.122***
	(0.034)	(0.047)
Gender	-0.075**	0.012
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Religiosity	-0.078	-0.081
	(0.053)	(0.056)
Constant	0.378*	0.412
	(0.219)	(0.265)
Observations	458	429
R^2	0.153	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.073
Residual Std. Error	0.346 (df = 448)	0.323 (df = 419)
F Statistic	9.005*** (df = 9; 448)	4.728*** (df = 9; 419)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Next, I analyze the impact of political identities as well as policy preferences on respondents' anger towards members of the opposite party. I find that among both Democrats and Republicans, neither partisan strength nor partisan identity predict any significant increase in anger towards members of the opposite party. I do find that both ideological identity and policy preferences predict an increase in anger among respondents of both parties. Among Democrats, a one-unit increase in ideological identity predicts a 0.221 increase in anger towards Republicans, *ceteris paribus*. Among Republicans, a one-unit shift in ideological identity predicts a 0.302 increase in anger towards Democrats, all else equal. Next, I analyze the impact of policy preferences on out-group anger. I find that, among Democrats, a one unit increase in policy preferences predicts a 0.415 increase in anger towards Republicans, all else equal. Among Republicans, I find that a one-unit shift in policy preferences yields a 0.302 increase in anger towards Democrats, *ceteris paribus.* These results suggest that out-group anger is driven mainly by *expressive* ideology among Republicans but *instrumental* ideology among Democrats. This supports Hypothesis 3.

Table 6.6: Out-group Anger with Policy Preferences (OLS Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	Anger towards Republicans (Among Democrats)	Anger towards Democrats (Among Republicans)
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	0.039	-0.006
	(0.083)	(0.089)
Partisan Identity	0.075	-0.009
	(0.124)	(0.108)
Ideological Identity	0.221**	0.302**
	(0.086)	(0.120)
Policy Preferences	0.415***	0.245***
	(0.102)	(0.086)
Political Interest	0.102	0.131**
	(0.064)	(0.063)
Age	0.013	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.013)
Race	-0.022	-0.123***
	(0.034)	(0.046)
Gender	-0.065*	0.003
	(0.036)	(0.034)
Religiosity	-0.074	-0.063
	(0.053)	(0.055)
Constant	-0.133	0.345
	(0.218)	(0.261)
Observations	458	429
R^2	0.155	0.108
Adjusted R^2	0.138	0.088
Residual Std. Error	0.345 (df = 448)	0.321 (df = 419)
F Statistic	9.145*** (df = 9; 448)	5.615*** (df = 9; 419)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.4.4 In-party Vote

Finally, I examine the impact of partisan strength/identity and ideological self-placement/identity on the probability of voters' voting for their party's presidential candidate in the 2020 election (i.e. a Democrat's vote for Joe Biden and a Republican's vote for Donald Trump). Logit results are presented in Table 6.7. Among Democrats, I

find that neither partisan strength nor partisan identity impact the probability of voting for Joe Biden. I do find that ideological identity predicts an increase in the probability of voting for Biden. This suggests that, at least among young Democrats, ideological identity is the main driver of in-party voting behavior.

Among Republicans, on the other hand, I find that partisan identity, ideological identity, and ideological self-placement all predict an increase in the probability of voting for Donald Trump, though the effect of ideological self-placement is the largest. Logit results are presented in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: In-Party Vote (Logit Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	In-party Vote	
	Democrats	Republicans
Partisan Strength	3.846	-0.547
	(3.677)	(1.466)
Partisan Identity	-2.695	3.159*
	(4.667)	(1.889)
Ideological Identity	10.465**	3.481*
	(4.709)	(1.968)
Ideological Self-placement	-0.906	10.025***
	(6.444)	(2.628)
Political Interest	-0.855	0.577
	(2.505)	(0.946)
Age	0.055	-0.073
	(0.692)	(0.176)
Race	17.232	-0.511
	(3,118.951)	(0.634)
Gender	-2.358	0.349
	(1.619)	(0.589)
Religiosity	0.634	0.034
	(2.348)	(0.827)
Constant	0.750	-2.985
	(14.319)	(3.804)
Observations	413	365
Log Likelihood	-11.689	-54.106
Akaike Inf. Crit.	43.377	128.212
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Next, I analyze the impact of policy preferences instead of ideological self-placement on the probability of the respondent voting for their party's presidential nominee in the 2020 election. I find that, again, among Democrats neither partisan strength nor partisan identity predict an increase in the probability of the respondent voting for Joe Biden. Among Republicans, I find that partisan identity and ideological identity predict an increase in the probability of respondents voting for Donald Trump, while more conservative voters– in terms of policy preferences – were less likely to vote for Trump.

Table 6.8: In-party Vote with Policy Preferences (Logit Results)

	Dependent variable:	
	In-party Vote	
	Democrats	Republicans
	(1)	(2)
Partisan Strength	4.323	0.009
	(3.758)	(0.069)
Partisan Identity	-4.146	0.165*
	(5.503)	(0.085)
Ideological Identity	11.442**	0.186**
	(5.207)	(0.093)
Policy Preferences	4.062	-0.172**
	(4.327)	(0.069)
Political Interest	-2.068	0.052
	(2.858)	(0.051)
Age	0.033	-0.004
	(0.618)	(0.010)
Race	17.398	-0.034
	(2,961.053)	(0.037)
Gender	-1.907	-0.030
	(1.582)	(0.027)
Religiosity	0.291	0.012
	(2.330)	(0.044)
Constant	-0.989	0.889***
	(12.221)	(0.207)

Observations	413	365
Log Likelihood	-11.214	21.876
Akaike Inf. Crit.	42.428	-23.752
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6.5 Discussion

Overall, I find no real differences between conditions among both Democratic and Republican respondents. This suggests that both the partisan and ideological treatments (i.e. the threats to each political identity) were not strong enough to elicit in-group enthusiasm and out-group anger as well as willingness to become more politically active.[13] Future research could include stronger primes to activate action-oriented emotions (i.e. in-group enthusiasm and out-group anger). Simple tweets may not be strong enough, or respondents may have not viewed the tweets as authentic. That said, I do find that the rates of political participation are higher among Democratic voters across all conditions. This suggests that young Democratic voters are more willing to participate in politics than their Republican counterparts. I also find that Democrats, regardless of condition, feel more anger towards Republicans than Republicans feel towards Democrats.

Observational results suggest that partisan in-group enthusiasm is driven by partisan identity among both Democrats and Republicans, while out-group anger is driven mainly by ideological identity among both Democrats and Republicans. There do exist partisan differences in the main drivers of in-party voting behavior: Democratic voters were mainly driven by ideological identity, while Republican voters were driven mostly by *instrumental* ideology.

Like the results from Chapter 4, these findings suggest two things: 1) that young Democrats and young Republicans are driven by different political identities and 2) young Democrats and young Republicans do not mirror their older counterparts (see Chapter 5). Indeed, millennial Democrats are also much more liberal than previous generations

[13] OLS and Logit results with interactive models comparing results by experimental condition are presented in the Appendix.

(Halpin and Agne 2009). This chapter contributes to a growing body of research on so-called "Generation Z" voters, and suggests that the Democratic and Republican parties will likely change in the future. The focus of young Democrats in particular on ideology is evident in members of Congress like Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, or Senator Bernie Sanders.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

"*I'm a Christian, a Conservative, and a Republican – in that order!*"

–Vice President Mike Pence

Observers of American politics– scientists and politicos alike– often portray both Democratic and Republican voters as two sides of a coin. They may hold starkly different policy preferences, but their partisan identities are mirror images of one another. I, on the other hand, offer an alternative: I demonstrate that Democrats are driven mainly by their partisan identity while Republicans are driven mainly by both their partisan and ideological identity. Indeed, the above quote from former Vice President Mike Pence illustrates the emphasis that Republicans place on ideology. For Democrats, voters selected the candidate to run for president who emphasized his partisan credentials and de-emphasized any inkling of ideological extremity. I also demonstrate that among Democratic voters, ideology operates mainly as an instrumental concept (i.e. liberals hold leftist policy preferences). Among Republican voters, I demonstrate that ideology operates as an expressive construct– conservatives care about an ideological identity without necessarily holding right-wing policy preferences. Next, I highlight the findings from each chapter of the dissertation. I then highlight my contributions to political science

literature. I conclude with some limitations of my research, avenues of future research, and implications of my research for American politics.

7.1 Summary of Findings

Next, I describe what is contained in the remainder of this conclusion. I proceed with a brief summary of my findings from each substantive chapter. I then conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this dissertation, as well as the implications of my results for American politics.

In Chapter 4, I examined data from the 2020 University of Georgia/College of William and Mary omnibus survey. The sample lacked the racial and ethnic diversity; because there are stark differences between young and old voters as well as black and white voters, this imbalance may have skewed my results and may not be generalizable mainly to young voters. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I found no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republican voters' ideological identity strength or partisan strength; however, I did find some support that suggests that the Democratic electorate uses ideology as an instrumental concept more so than Republican voters (hypothesis 3). I also find a pattern counter to hypothesis 2: Democrats positive in-group emotions and negative out-group emotions, voting behavior, and political activity were driven mainly by their ideological identity strength rather than partisan strength, while Republicans positive in-group and negative out-group emotions and voting behavior were driven mainly by partisan strength rather than ideological identity strength. This counterintuitive finding was likely due to two factors: 1) young voters are quite different from older voters and 2) the College of William and Mary students were overwhelming Democratic and strong ideological identifier. Because of this finding, I placed an emphasis on analyzing the impact of age on ideological and partisan identity with a nationally representative sample in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 5, I analyzed data drawn from the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) pre-election survey. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, I found that partisan

strength operates very similarly between Democrats and Republicans; however, there is a slight difference in the operation of ideological self-placement (i.e. instrumental ideology) in support of Hypothesis 1 (i.e. Republicans value ideology more than Democrats). I also found that age is indeed a key factor in the operation of both partisan strength and ideology as speculated in Chapter 4. Older Americans among both Democrats and Republicans were much stronger partisans than their younger counterparts. I found that relationship between ideology and age, on the other hand, does differ between Democrats and Republicans. Young Democrats were ideologically more extreme than their older counterparts. Among Republicans, I found the opposite pattern: young Republicans were more moderate than old Republicans. Finally, I found that ideological self-placement predicts Republicans' in-party vote but has no effect among Democrats, suggesting that Republicans do value ideology more than Democrats.

In Chapter 6, I analyzed data Data are drawn from the 2021 University of Georgia (UGA) omnibus survey. This survey was administered in May 2021 to undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory class on American government; it received 1231 responses. This survey included a unique experiment in which I manipulated threats to each political identity (i.e. liberal/conservative and Democrat/Republican) by showing respondents tweets I generated from a twitter account belonging to either GA (Democrats/Republicans) or GA (Liberals/Conservatives), as well as a neutral control group about GA weather. Similarly to Chapter 4 and contrary to Hypothesis 1, I found no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republican voters' ideological identity strength or partisan strength; however, I did find some support that the Democratic electorate uses ideology as an instrumental concept more so than Republican voters (hypothesis 3). Across all conditions in the experiment, I found no differences within the two parties (e.g. there is no difference in Republicans' or Democrats' in-group enthusiasm across the control, partisan treatment, or ideological treatment), suggesting the treatments did not elicit action-oriented emotions. Between parties, I found no difference in in-group enthusiasm regardless of experimental condition. I did find that Democrats report higher rates of both anger towards Republicans and participation

regardless of experimental condition. Disregarding the experimental conditions, I found that both Democratic and Republican voters' in-group enthusiasm was driven by their partisan identity; out-group anger, on the other hand, was driven by ideological identity among voters of both parties. I did find a partisan difference in the probability of voters voting for their party's candidate in the 2020 election: Democratic voters were motivated mainly by ideological identity, while Republicans were motivated by partisan strength and identity as well as ideological self-placement.

7.2 Discussion

Next, I discuss limitations of the dissertation, future avenues of research, and implications for American politics. The main limitation to this dissertation is the sources of data used. For Chapters 4 and 6, I used student samples. While student samples are typically generalizable to the mass electorate (Hanel and Vione 2016), young voters differ greatly from their older counterparts, particularly in terms of ideology. According to my results, young Democrats are much more liberal than young Republicans are conservative. Additionally, young Republicans are stronger partisan identifiers than young Democrats. While the student samples did have the benefit of allowing me to use measures to gauge ideology and partisanship as expressive constructs, the age of the respondents likely skewed my results greatly. Additionally, I was somewhat limited in terms of sample size. While the ANES does offer the benefit of being a nationally representative sample and did provide some results in support of my hypotheses, it does not include expressive gauges of partisanship or ideology. Finally, the experimental treatments in Chapter 6 were likely not strong enough to trigger the intended emotions (i.e. in-group enthusiasm and out-group anger). Alternatively, the respondents may not have viewed the generated tweets as genuine.

Future research on this topic would benefit from a user-generated survey administered to a nationally representative sample. I argue that collecting measures of partisan and ideological identity from a nationally representative sample would likely

yield results more in line with my hypotheses. Additionally, a stronger treatment than the generated tweets used in Chapter 6 would be more likely to elicit in-group enthusiasm and out-group anger. Future treatments could possibly include video clips of politicians attacking a given political identity (e.g. showing Democrats a video of former President Donald Trump criticizing Joe Biden as being on the "Radical Left" to threaten their liberal identity).

Another future research avenue is focusing on the impact of negative partisanship on my findings. Negative partisanship refers to the tendency of some voters to form their political opinions and decide to participate in politics primarily in opposition to political parties they dislike rather than in favor of their own party (Abramowitz and Webster 2018). Bankert (2020) also demonstrates that voters hold both positive and negative partisan *identity* (i.e. voters psychologically identify as *not* members of the other party). This helps explain why voters turned out in the 2016 presidential election despite both the Democratic and Republican candidates having record low favorability ratings– Democrats were likely voting *against* Donald Trump and Republicans were likely voting *against* Hillary Clinton. I argue that this concept of negative identity possibly also applies to ideology. In other words, it is possible that many Republicans could be relatively moderate in terms of policy preference or ideological identity but be strongly anti-liberal. Given the findings presented in Chapter 5, it seems likely that Republicans may be more anti-liberal in terms of *identity* while Democrats may be more anti-conservative in terms of *policy*. Next, I discuss this dissertation's contributions to political science literature.

This dissertation adds to political science literature by highlighting the importance of partisan and ideological identity among the mass electorate, and how these identities vary between Democratic and Republican voters. As Grossman and Hopkins (2016) highlight differences in ideological emphasis among the parties in government, I highlight such differences in the mass electorate. I also highlight the importance of 1) considering both of these identities when analyzing political behavior and 2) considering differential effects of these constructs between Democrats and Republicans. I also add to a growing

body literature that considers ideology as an expressive social identity rather than a purely instrumental concept. Additionally, I demonstrate that ideology functions differently between members of the two parties. Among Democrats, ideology functions mainly as an instrumental construct, suggesting Democrats focus on policy positions. Among Republicans, on the other hand, ideology functions mainly as an expressive concept– Republicans care less about policy and more about conservative *identity*.

Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my dissertation's findings for American politics. Regardless of its shortcomings, this dissertation does contain some interesting findings. First, the results suggest that young voters are quite different from their older counterparts and that young Democrats are very different from young Republicans. I found that young Democrats hold a very strong liberal identity as well as very liberal policy preferences. Young Republicans, on the other hand, are relatively ideologically moderate (both in terms of expressive and instrumental identity). Unlike young Democrats, young Republicans are also strong partisan identifiers. If these trends hold, this suggests we should see a shift in the behavior of politicians among both parties. Arguably, we are beginning to see somewhat of a shift in Democratic politics. For example, there has been a slight increase in very liberal members of Congress, such as "The Squad" (i.e. Ilhan Omar, Rashida Talib, and Alexandria Occasio-Cortez). There has not been a requisite shift in Republican politics, though this may change in years to come.

Finally, results from the ANES presented in Chapter 5 suggest that my hypotheses were partially correct applied to the mass electorate. While partisan identity operates similarly among both Democratic and Republican voters, contrary to Hypothesis 1, Republicans do value ideology much more than Democrats. Additionally, I find that ideology acts as an instrumental construct at a higher rate among Democrats than among Republican voters. These findings suggest that, at least currently, Democratic politicians should prioritize appeals to their loyalty to the party. Arguably, they do this frequently. For example, President Joe Biden made the case that he was a Democrat first and avoided ties to the left. While Democrats should arguably not appeal to ideological identity, they may benefit from touting specific policies. Again, we see President Biden

touting somewhat liberal policy positions (e.g. universal healthcare, expanding voting rights, increasing firearm regulations, etc.) without identifying them as explicitly "liberal." For Republican politicians, they should appeal to conservative identity. Like Democrats, I would argue that Republicans do currently do this fairly often. For example, in the 2020 election, President Donald Trump frequently attempted to tie rival Joe Biden to the so-called "Radical Left." Additionally, in 2018, Georgia governor Brian Kemp ran an advertisement touting himself as a "politically incorrect conservative" while taking very vague issue positions. Because young Republicans are more partisan than they are ideology, Republicans may benefit from appealing to voters' partisan identity in the future rather than appealing to ideology.

My findings also help explain intra-party conflict within the Democratic Party. Because the Democratic electorate, especially young voters, are focused intensely on both ideological identity and policy preferences, more moderate, so-called "establishment" Democrats feel pressure to shift policy positions to the left. Indeed, we see several calls on social media for more and more liberal actions from President Biden despite him arguably holding one of the most liberal policy platforms in US history. This focus on policy aligns with Hopkins and Grossman's (2016) argument that Democrats in government represent a coalition focused on disparate issue groups. Republicans in government, on the other hand, do not face such pressure to adopt right-wing policy positions. Instead, they focus on attacking liberal policies and preventing Democratic representatives from passing any legislation. This is because the Republican electorate is focused on ideological identity rather than policy positions– they do not want Democrats to pass any policy that could be viewed as liberal. These findings suggest that both American politicians and voters remain deeply divided, though focused on different political identities.

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Appendix

Table 6.10: Interactive OLS Models for In-group Enthusiasm (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-group Enthusiasm		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.977***		0.862***
	(0.097)		(0.123)
Ideological Identity		0.555***	0.145
		(0.085)	(0.095)
Condition = Ideological Condition	-0.088	-0.063	-0.088
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Condition = Ideological Condition	0.034	0.081	0.064
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.075)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	0.058		0.052
	(0.147)		(0.187)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	-0.161		-0.013
	(0.140)		(0.177)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		0.011	0.001
		(0.126)	(0.141)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.215*	-0.184
		(0.119)	(0.133)
Constant	0.016	0.172***	-0.009
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Observations	469	469	469
R^2	0.356	0.174	0.362
Adjusted R^2	0.349	0.165	0.351
Residual Std. Error	0.247 (df = 463)	0.280 (df = 463)	0.247 (df = 460)
F Statistic	51.265*** (df = 5; 463)	19.539*** (df = 5; 463)	32.693*** (df = 8; 460)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Table 6.11 Interactive OLS Models for Out-group Anger (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:		
	Out-group Anger		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.518^{***}		0.212

	(0.142)		(0.177)
Ideological Identity		0.486***	0.385***
		(0.108)	(0.137)
Ideological Condition	0.183*	0.142	0.190*
	(0.111)	(0.098)	(0.114)
Partisan Condition	0.047	0.045	0.059
	(0.105)	(0.092)	(0.108)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	-0.246		-0.230
	(0.215)		(0.269)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	-0.096		-0.082
	(0.205)		(0.254)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-0.146	-0.036
		(0.160)	(0.203)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.079	-0.037
		(0.151)	(0.191)
Constant	0.314***	0.292***	0.248***
	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.075)
Observations	469	469	469
R^2	0.058	0.094	0.097
Adjusted R^2	0.048	0.084	0.082
Residual Std. Error	0.361 (df = 463)	0.354 (df = 463)	0.354 (df = 460)
F Statistic	5.682*** (df = 5; 463)	9.560*** (df = 5; 463)	6.204*** (df = 8; 460)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Table 6.12: Interactive Logit Models for In-party Vote (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-party Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	5.946		-91.377
	(5.331)		(6,279.263)
Ideological Identity		176.086	371.916
		(10,890.110)	(21,458.880)
Ideological Condition	-1.059	-0.438	-20.527
	(1.803)	(1.278)	(1,449.060)
Partisan Condition	-1.136	-0.943	-20.714
	(1.730)	(1.215)	(1,449.060)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	-4.501		91.091
	(5.578)		(6,279.263)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	-5.303		89.947
	(5.474)		(6,279.263)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-173.603	-369.325
		(10,890.110)	(21,458.880)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-173.400	-368.643
		(10,890.110)	(21,458.880)
Constant	2.832*	1.609	21.780
	(1.608)	(1.095)	(1,449.060)
Observations	474	474	474

Log Likelihood	-111.816	-104.251	-102.955
Akaike Inf. Crit.	235.633	220.502	223.911

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Table 6.13: Interactive OLS Models for Political Participation (Democrats)

	Dependent variable:
	Political Participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.699***		0.435***
	(0.093)		(0.116)
Ideological Identity		0.539***	0.331***
		(0.074)	(0.089)
Ideological Condition	-0.008	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.075)
Partisan Condition	-0.028	0.072	0.014
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.070)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	0.001		-0.020
	(0.142)		(0.177)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	0.019		0.206
	(0.134)		(0.166)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-0.003	0.009
		(0.111)	(0.134)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.161	-0.241*
		(0.104)	(0.125)
Constant	-0.044	-0.009	-0.100**
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Observations	467	467	467
R^2	0.252	0.210	0.293
Adjusted R^2	0.244	0.202	0.280
Residual Std. Error	0.236 (df = 461)	0.243 (df = 461)	0.231 (df = 458)
F Statistic	31.014*** (df = 5; 461)	24.579*** (df = 5; 461)	23.671*** (df = 8; 458)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6.14: Interactive OLS Models for In-group Enthusiasm (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-group Enthusiasm		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.965***		0.907***
	(0.093)		(0.128)
Ideological Identity		0.899***	0.108
		(0.131)	(0.162)
Ideological Condition	0.067	0.073	0.037
	(0.075)	(0.096)	(0.088)

Partisan Condition	0.068	0.099	0.081
	(0.074)	(0.097)	(0.088)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	-0.075		-0.301
	(0.131)		(0.186)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	-0.055		-0.061
	(0.129)		(0.189)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-0.072	0.278
		(0.166)	(0.210)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.079	-0.016
		(0.171)	(0.224)
Constant	-0.078	-0.060	-0.105
	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.067)
Observations	437	437	437
R^2	0.416	0.284	0.428
Adjusted R^2	0.409	0.276	0.417
Residual Std. Error	0.257 (df = 431)	0.284 (df = 431)	0.255 (df = 428)
F Statistic	61.319^{***} (df = 5; 431)	34.186^{***} (df = 5; 431)	39.998^{***} (df = 8; 428)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Table 6.15: Interactive OLS Models for Out-group Anger (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:		
	Out-group Anger		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.262**		-0.140
	(0.121)		(0.164)
Ideological Identity		0.623***	0.745***
		(0.151)	(0.208)
Ideological Condition	0.028	0.167	0.166
	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.113)
Partisan Condition	0.001	0.200*	0.179
	(0.096)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	-0.035		0.098
	(0.170)		(0.238)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	-0.013		0.326
	(0.166)		(0.242)
Ideological Identity* Ideological Condition		-0.288	-0.380
		(0.191)	(0.270)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.371*	-0.655**
		(0.196)	(0.288)
Constant	0.224***	0.024	0.031
	(0.069)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Observations	439	439	439

R^2	0.030	0.064	0.068
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.053	0.050
Residual Std. Error	0.333 (df = 433)	0.327 (df = 433)	0.328 (df = 430)
F Statistic	2.651^{**} (df = 5; 433)	5.882^{***} (df = 5; 433)	3.901^{***} (df = 8; 430)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01









Table 6.16: Interactive Logit Models for In-party Vote (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:		
	In-party Vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	4.271**		0.498
	(1.978)		(2.900)
Ideological Identity		9.620***	9.121**
		(3.644)	(4.627)
Ideological Condition	-0.791	1.304	1.000
	(1.005)	(1.455)	(1.482)
Partisan Condition	-1.903*	0.619	0.088
	(1.000)	(1.461)	(1.481)
Partisan Identity * Ideological Condition	-1.204		1.011
	(2.304)		(3.259)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	0.659		3.557
	(2.369)		(3.313)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-6.155	-6.524
		(3.840)	(4.864)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-5.515	-7.700
		(3.843)	(4.878)
Constant	1.252	-1.026	-1.030
	(0.824)	(1.336)	(1.331)
Observations	405	405	405
Log Likelihood	-121.882	-121.417	-117.432
Akaike Inf. Crit.	255.764	254.834	252.863
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		



Table 6.17: Interactive OLS Models for Political Participation (Republicans)

	Dependent variable:		
	partic		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Partisan Identity	0.699***		0.435***
	(0.093)		(0.116)
Ideological Identity		0.539***	0.331***
		(0.074)	(0.089)
Ideological Condition	-0.008	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.075)
Partisan Condition	-0.028	0.072	0.014
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.070)
Partisan Idenity * Ideological Condition	0.001		-0.020
	(0.142)		(0.177)
Partisan Identity * Partisan Condition	0.019		0.206
	(0.134)		(0.166)
Ideological Identity * Ideological Condition		-0.003	0.009
		(0.111)	(0.134)
Ideological Identity * Partisan Condition		-0.161	-0.241*
		(0.104)	(0.125)
Constant	-0.044	-0.009	-0.100**
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.049)

Observations	467	467	467
R^2	0.252	0.210	0.293
Adjusted R^2	0.244	0.202	0.280
Residual Std. Error	0.236 (df = 461)	0.243 (df = 461)	0.231 (df = 458)
F Statistic	31.014^{***} (df = 5; 461)	24.579^{***} (df = 5; 461)	23.671^{***} (df = 8; 458)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01