HOMELESS CAMPS TO CAMPUSES: CHRONICLING CO-LOCATION IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA

By

CORY ROSALIO SANCHEZ

(Under the direction of Joshua Barkan)

ABSTRACT

This is a case study of the Human Services Campus (HSC) in Phoenix, Arizona. The HSC spatially integrates social services with case management. I show a series of political and geographic tactics that attempt to spatially know and manage people experiencing housing precarity through the concept of co-location. Co-located facilities reflect the intersection of social services with the urban landscape and have social and spatial consequences for communities of people who are struggling for housing. I describe the creation of the HSC in Phoenix and demonstrate that the HSC is an institution that espouses self-sufficiency tutelage through disciplinary tactics. The HSC spatially regulates the precariously housed to contribute to the general sense of order in Phoenix, built, as it is, around property development in the downtown corridor.

INDEX WORDS: Co-location, Homelessness, Houselessness, Phoenix, Arizona.

HOMELESS CAMPS TO CAMPUSES: CHRONICLING CO-LOCATION IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA

By

CORY ROSALIO SANCHEZ

B.S., Arizona State University, 1999

M.S., Arizona State University, 2011

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2022

HOMELESS CAMPS TO CAMPUSES: CHRONICALING CO-LOCATION IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA

By

CORY ROSALIO SANCHEZ

Major Professor:	Joshua Barkan
Committee:	Amy Ross Steve Holloway Sarah Shannon

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The long-standing social problem known as "homelessness" is structured by houselessness, extreme poverty, and social inequality. The term, *homeless* is problematic. It is dehumanizing and implies a "less than" status. The terms *homeless population* and *homeless people* reflect the creation of a category of state knowledge that objectifies people who are precariously housed or without housing for political uses. I critique those terms. The "homeless population" and "homeless people" are individuals who are struggling for housing. I distinguish houselessness from "homelessness" and use the terms *houseless, unhoused, and precariously housed* to refer to the people without housing. I employ the dominant terminology of "homeless populations" and "homeless people" to denote the state's construction of these people as objects.

In the United States, the nature, size, and scope of houselessness has undergone shifts. During the 1870s houselessness emerged as a national problem at the same time cities like New York and Chicago were rapidly urbanizing. The Great Depression of the 1930s saw widespread poverty, hunger, and unemployment, as nearly two million unhoused people migrated across the United States looking for work (Howard, 2013). During the 1950s and 1960s, the combinatory effects of skid row demolition and the shuttering of state psychiatric hospitals, which scholars refer to as "deinstitutionalization," increased urban houselessness.

Urban fiscal crises of the 1970s pushed increasing numbers of people to the streets. In response, 1980s activists advocated for stronger interventions from the federal government. Their impact was remarkably ambivalent. During the 1990s, the federal state devolved administration of houselessness to local state policy makers. The co-location model, in which social services for precariously housed people were integrated into a single campus complex, emerged to address urban houselessness during the 2000s. In spite of a long history of interventions, the social problem of houselessness has persisted into the present.

Part I – Dominant ideologies about "homeless people" and "homelessness"

Dominant ideologies about homeless people create the frame in which they are represented. Contemporary frameworks focus on their perceived degree of productivity, perceived degree of dangerousness, and assessment of personal culpability (Takahashi, 1996). These ideologies focus on the ways houseless people are dependent on social services or government entitlements. These same ideologies associate urban houselessness with disorder, crime, and danger. The stereotypes about people without housing portray them as criminals, addicts, and irrational. Dominant ideologies about unhoused people focus on "individual deficiencies" to cast them as undeserving. These ideologies on their own are problematic, but more troublesome is that they are not removed from intervention efforts. The individual deficiency view of houselessness facilitates clinically therapeutic solutions and displaces concerns with structural social inequalities (Wright, 1997). These ideologies help to maintain the values of dominant society by stigmatizing others as outside of the norm. As Said noted concerning Western writing on "the Orient", the conceptualization of homelessness as a social

problem serves the interest of those claiming to know and define the other as an object of knowledge and analysis (Said, 1978; Wright, 1997).

These kinds of ideologies about “homeless people” render public aid and assistance for them as conditional. Social Security income is contingent upon eligibility requirements such as age, work history, and medical conditions. Case management practices include time constraints and eligibility requirements. Case managers regulate how social services are administered. They require progress toward the completion of goals outlined in case plans to continue receiving social services. Case managers, thus, act as gatekeepers for services in some instances. Some nonprofits have time constraints that limit how long an individual can access services. There are several kinds of housing, utility, and entitlement programs, but many of them have similar requirements for income, age, medical and mental health status, and criminal background restrictions. Some precariously housed people are forced to participate in religious practices in order to access services. Others are encouraged to undergo normative lifestyle tutelage.

The social stigmatization of “homelessness” accompanies individuals wherever they go. Facing social stigmatization, unhoused people are often pushed into specific parts of the city that contain social services. A cursory examination of social service spaces in the city demonstrates unhoused people’s social and spatial marginalization from normative society. Social service institutions, such as nonprofits, state welfare offices, and even faith-based organization are often regarded as depressing and dreary. Ongoing stigmatization of unhoused people reflects governmental and institutional indifference. Consequently, houseless people are viewed as separate beyond the norm.

Part II – Co-location as a response to "homeless" ideologies

This project describes a series of political and geographic attempts to spatially know and manage unhoused people in the city. The object of this dissertation is the state's construction of "homelessness" as a problem and the responses to "homelessness" that such knowledge generates. These responses occur at both the national and local level and involve not only the state and government officials, but also social service providers, business leaders, urban planners and developers. The object of this dissertation, however, is not unhoused people themselves. As such, this work begins with an explanation of how the state generates information on "homelessness" through the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the US Census Bureau. HUD conducts censuses of unhoused people called point-in-time (PIT) counts in order to view them as a segment of the wider population. I address the purpose of these numerations and ways that unhoused people have been typologized. Such categorizations inform and are deployed within "homeless" social services as management strategies. I concentrate on urban houselessness and the efforts of the local state to regulate unhoused people.

The work examines social services for precariously housed people through the concept of co-location. Co-location is the siting of several social service agencies onto a single space. Co-location differs from multiservice facilities because they strive be an all-in-one facility. Whereas a nonprofit that offers shelter and meal provision constitutes multiservice, co-location is designed to offer a holistic service array. Co-location proponents tout the high level of accessibility to social services for unhoused individuals. The co-location model endeavors to eliminate geographical burdens that precariously housed people confront when trying to obtain

services. Co-location also aims to deliver social services in a coordinated and progressive manner. This model is designed to build supportive peer relations among unhoused people.

The heart of this project is a case study of the Human Services Campus, (HSC) in Phoenix, Arizona. The HSC is an 11-acre co-located facility built in 2005, when co-location was a novel approach to urban houselessness. There are 15 social service agencies at the HSC. The facility contains a large shelter, overflow shelters, dining hall, day-resource center, employment assistance, medical clinic, behavioral healthcare, substance abuse counseling, identification document retrieval, storage, and a post-office. The campus layout offers common areas for people to gather and lounge. The capacity of the HSC is approximately 1,000 people. The HSC was devised to meet individual's basic survival needs, redress their causes of "homelessness", and help them to obtain housing.

Co-location advocates focus on how the model increases service accessibility. This dissertation thus attempts to assess the improvements to service accessibility because it is not clear that co-location absolutely removes all barriers to social services. While co-location eases geographical burdens that precariously housed people often deal with in accessing social service agencies, there is no guarantee that services themselves are always accessible. Service provision is not necessarily coordinated. The most basic level of co-location is analogous to a mall: a collection of independently owned and operated entities who happen to be on the same spot. Claims about the model's accessibility reflects overconfidence in the social service array. Additionally, co-location facilities vary in design and scope which renders the notion of an 'all-in-one' facility uneven. Moreover, the co-location model presumes individuals are motivated and focused on ending their houseless condition. In this light, accessibility is designed to

challenge “homeless people’s” perceived dependency. This kind of care work involves attempting to terminate precariously housed people’s use of social services and welfare.

Co-located facilities demonstrate how punitive logics have infiltrated the local welfare state. Co-located facilities are spaces of social service provision *and* disciplinary locations where techniques of management and control are exercised on people who are presumed to be dependent, undeserving, and responsible for their predicament. Unhoused people are disciplined to become self-reliant, which is seen as a remedy to “homelessness.” What we can see is that service accessibility is about easing people into those ways of being, making them, in the words of Michel Foucault, docile subjects (Foucault, 1995). Ending “homelessness” is about the restoration of individual self-reliance and self-regulation to prevent recidivism. The HSC and similar co-located facilities can thus be considered, following Erving Goffman (1961), as total social institutions. By that I mean that they are closed systems in which inhabitants are severed from society, strict rules govern all aspects of daily life, and the objective is reform and normalization.

This project focuses on the spatiality of the co-location model and how it gradually developed through its intersection with broader transformations of the urban landscape in downtown Phoenix. I position the origin of the co-location model within the demolition of skid row districts in the United States. The widespread clearing of skid row districts did not actually eradicate the need for the sociospatial functions of skid row, but rather demolished these districts and displaced poor and unhoused communities to different parts of the city. Once there, policy makers addressed “homelessness” and “homeless people” in ways that gave rise

to a series of spatial reconfigurations of the built environment which ultimately led to the creation of co-located facilities.

My interest in studying co-location comes from concerns about spatial justice in the city, the persistence of unhoused people in the city, and my attempts to understand why that is so. Houselessness is deeply troubling. I am motivated to stand against the stigmatization and marginalization of people who are struggling for housing. I have never sought to understand unhoused people as a sociologically distinct group and, thus, critique the ways they are categorized and typologized. Houselessness is also intrinsically spatial. The spaces designed for unhoused people and social services are significant because they are not integrated with the urban landscape. The co-location model and facilities are fascinating for the ways that they appear to be an advantageous and worthwhile way to address precariously housed people. Co-location seems commonsensical not only for unhoused people, but also for social service operators and case managers.

Part III – Methodology

I first learned about the HSC through my master's research which investigated how urban unhoused people cope with heat related morbidity and mortality in Phoenix. The HSC is part of Phoenix's Heat Relief Network, a collection of sites that provide water or a place of refuge. I was struck by the size, layout, and location of the HSC. I became interested in the HSC because it was a new creation even though it replaced existing nonprofits in nearly the same spot. I wanted to understand the Human Services Campus and learn what it did, what it was like, and why and how it was built. I sought to ascertain how the HSC took shape amidst several other "revitalization" projects designed to raise the profile and attractiveness of downtown

Phoenix. To do this, I needed to examine who built the HSC, and their rationales for doing so, and the relevant history of downtown Phoenix. That led me to two key aspects of the HSC's creation. First, was the coalition of social service operators, business leaders, and government officials that made the HSC a reality. The HSC coalition's efforts gave me a glimpse at their assessment of "homelessness" as a sociospatial problem which led to the creation of the HSC. Moreover, the HSC is an interesting "solution" to houselessness. Studying its construction helped me understand how the campus "worked" to meet the differing objectives among the HSC coalition members. Second was the rise of the Zone neighborhood, where the HSC was built. The Zone neighborhood is a segment of the larger Capitol Mall District (CMD), which houses the state capitol building, state senate chambers, the historic state capitol building, and the Arizona Supreme Court. My initial inquiries about the Zone neighborhood's history focused my research on the origins and development of co-location. Interestingly, the Zone had been long regarded as a place in the city where people without housing could gather. The Zone neighborhood initially had several encampments where people without housing lived. I began to consider the spatial organization of the urban spaces that contained unhoused people and preceded co-location. That line of inquiry led me to study skid rows, their functions, and their downfall. I started to understand skid row beyond its negative characterizations, recognizing it as an important urban district that met the needs of the poor and precariously housed. Thus, I also needed to understand the fall of skid row and what followed them. There is continuity between skid row and co-location based on their spatial functionality to residents. I sought to construct a relation between skid rows and co-located facilities. Interestingly, there is evidence that the demolition of skid row gave rise to co-location in other cities besides Phoenix.

I formulated three research questions for this dissertation. What is co-location and the Human Services Campus? What is the lived experience of the HSC? Who created the HSC and how did it emerge? This case study of the HSC is an extension of my spatial justice concerns in Phoenix and in cities more broadly.

I found Foucault's genealogical methodology useful for grasping the way the present is structured by the past. My methodology employed a combination of participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and archival research. Prior to conducting interviews, in total, I completed 26 hours of observations. I began with the HSC's common lawn area, the Lodestar Day Resources Center (LDRC) dayroom, and the St. Vincent de Paul's cafeteria. I conducted observations from several different vantage points in those three spaces for total of 12 hours. I observed the HSC intake procedures I shadowed intake appointments for 8 hours and viewed the intake lobby for 2 hours. I observed case manager appointments for 4 hours. I limited each observational period to 2 hours, during which I made jottings, shorthand words or phrases that can be fleshed out later (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). Shortly after each observation, I added detail to these field notes for a complete recording. I chose to create field notes in this way to remain focused on what I was seeing. This protocol gave me a sensory experience of parts of the campus instead of depending on a set of analytical descriptions (Emerson et al., 1995). Since I was interested in the lived experience of the HSC, it was important to have a clearer impression of the HSC prior to interviewing. My purpose for these observations was an attempt to gain a sharper sense of the lived experience of the HSC. I thought that my observations would prevent or at least limit me from asking needless questions and

demonstrate my sincere desire to learn as much as I could about the lived experience of the HSC.

I volunteered to work in the HSC's post office. I worked for a total of 72 hours. Through volunteering at the HSC, I attempted to ingratiate myself with the HSC Coalition members, staff, and some of their volunteers. Since entrée is not a one-time event or interaction (Warren & Karner, 2005), my purpose in volunteering was to secure repeated entrée to the different groups of people involved with the HSC. I also wanted to present a sense of cooperation in my role as a researcher. As a volunteer, I had repeated contacts and communication with HSC staff and volunteers. Hence, volunteering was also an opportunity to have access to some of the internal operations and happenings at the HSC. I was able to talk about my research with staff and volunteers who, in turn, offered and led me to additional data sources. Volunteering proved to be significant because I learned about other relevant stakeholder, HSC publications, and some of the intra-personal relations among HSC staff.

I completed a total of 46 semi-structured interviews, averaging about 60 minutes each. I interviewed 8 members of the HSC Coalition; 8 HSC administrators; 6 case mangers; 2 intake staff; 18 homeless people; and 4 relevant stakeholders. I conducted semi-structured interviews because it combines the strengths of structured and unstructured interviewing. This interview format responded to my preconceived questions and allowed each participant to speak freely. This approach afforded my informants the opportunity to share their stories. I benefited by learning about issues or concerns that I had not considered and semi structured interviews gave me the opportunity to revise my initial questions. This was especially useful when interviewing houseless participants. This interview style facilitated more storytelling in a conversational

tone. This was important to gain a more complete understanding of the lived experience of the HSC. I attempted to build rapport with houseless participants by assuring them that whatever they shared would not be used against them or prevent them from accessing the HSC. When interviewing, I grouped my preplanned questions into topics, but was also flexible during the actual interviews. I allowed my informants talk about what was important to them and asked open-ended questions because they elicit participant's experiences and stories (Fontana & Prokos, 2007). I used non-formal language in the wording of my questions and manner of speaking to so as not to appear as condescending. This style of interviewing was designed to engender a more genuine conversation and allow participants to speak freely. At the same time, I was able to create new questions on the fly and allow the conversation to take on a life of their own.

It was necessary to secure permission to conduct this research. I contacted informants from my master's work to identify the current gatekeepers at the HSC. I reached out to David Bridge, the director of the HSC to obtain authorization to carry out this research. I composed and sent a letter to the director that summarized my case study. After gaining approval, I was able to create a preliminary list of potential interviewees except for houseless individuals. I divided these participants into four groups; 1) HSC Coalition members; 2) HSC administrators; 3) HSC staff and; 4) people without stable housing. I revised these groups to specify staff in their role as case managers and intake personnel. I also added another category to include relevant stakeholders who did not fit the previous grouping. Bridge was extremely helpful because he introduced me to other relevant informants, specifically other members of the HSC Coalition. Additionally, several members of the HSC Coalition identified other potential participants and,

in some cases, introduced me to them. With respect to houseless people, I used non-experimental design with a non-probability sampling strategy. Sampling of houseless participants began at the Lodestar Day Resource Center and Central Arizona Shelter Services (CASS). I intended to give houseless participants a small cash compensation for their time and willingness to be interviewed. However, that idea was not supported by Bridge. We agreed that I would give houseless interviewees a gift card to McDonalds. I did not inform participants that they would receive compensation. I had a private room to conduct interviews with houseless informants. A long hallway led to this and other similar rooms in the rear of the LDRC building. The hallway obscured the view of LDRC staff who might see who was being interviewed. As an added layer of anonymity, I did not enter or leave this room with any of my participants. I interviewed a total of 18 houseless people; the sample was comprised of 9 men and 9 women. The age range was from 22 to 69. Nobody under the 18 of eighteen was interviewed. I gave informed consent letters to all participants and explained that they could refuse the interview or stop it any time they wished. None stopped the interview and 4 people declined to participate.

I conducted archival research in order understand the history of the research area. The Arizona Capitol Museum and Arizona State Library Archives contained newspaper articles, legislative committee reports, planning documents, and design charrettes pertaining to the Deuce neighborhood, downtown Phoenix, the Capitol Mall District and the Human Services Campus. Archives are comprised of historical documents about the past, which are political and often stand as the official record of a past that is no longer observable (Subotic, 2021). In this case, I sought archival materials to depict the history of the Zone neighborhood because it is

not a part of the 'official record' of the CMD, even though aspects of its formation and persistence are directly tied to the CMD. My goal was to produce a richer account of this contested space.

Part IV – Organization of the dissertation

Chapter one focuses on how the state makes "homeless" populations into political objects, that that can be rationally organized and acted upon. The stated goal of PIT numerations is to determine the size, scope, and funding allocations for social services. I describe activists who demanded national numerations of unhoused people and the initial efforts to count them. I show that although PIT counts do not achieve their stated goal, they do portray "homelessness" as a "natural" occurrence and make it seem intractable. I argue that these annual censuses, known as point-in-time (PIT) counts, *create "*homeless" populations, the thing PIT counts claim to be describing. PIT counts are how the state makes "the homeless" population legible (Scott, 1998). This represents the state's imperative to know and manage "homeless" people.

Chapter two describes the rise and fall of skid row as a precursor to co-location. Skid row was a place in the city that offered affordable housing even if it was substandard (Miller, 1982). There were opportunities for employment, even if they were short-term (Bogue, 1963). Skid row had opportunities for recreation and socialization (Bogue, 1963). Though skid rows were destroyed, the functionality of cheap lodgings, employment, and recreation accommodated a segment of the urban population. It is that functionality that set the stage for the gradual development of co-location. I describe some of the places in the city that proceeded skid row, arguing each was an incremental step toward the co-location model. Co-

location is the culmination of the evolution of skid row. The co-location model reconfigures social service providers onto a single facility while also serving as an urban spatial management tactic.

Chapter three demonstrates the rise of co-location in Phoenix. I claim that the demolition of the Deuce, Phoenix's skid row, caused the creation of the Zone neighborhood the place in the city where unhoused people congregated. The rise of the Zone neighborhood was viewed as problematic by business leaders and politicians because it took shape within Phoenix's Capitol Mall District which was a contested space between social service operators and downtown boosters. I describe the Zone neighborhood's morphology from tent encampments to a service hub which gave rise to the HSC.

Chapter four describes the HSC Coalition, a group of social service operators, business leaders, and governmental officials who created the HSC. Social service operators initiated the creation of co-location as a joint solution among themselves. I describe how the HSC was well-received with business and governmental leaders, even though they disagreed on siting the campus in the Zone neighborhood. I show how the service community enrolled the business and governmental community to building the HSC in the Zone neighborhood. The HSC represented a compromise among the coalition's spatial management strategy toward urban "homelessness", though their rationales differed.

Chapter five characterizes the HSC as a total social institution, a closed system, which segregates people without housing from the rest of society and subjectifies "homeless" people to disciplinary tactics meant to 'normalize' them. The HSC's objective of self-sufficiency and the ways that social services attempt to reach that goal are significant. The HSC's method to make

homeless individuals self-sufficient is disciplinary and subjectivizing. This chapter provides an insider's look at the daily life for people at the HSC.

The conclusion section emphasizes that co-located facilities have re-institutionalized unhoused people in the city because they are presumed to be deviant and undeserving. The co-location model's service accessibility substitutes for care work. Disciplinary techniques and self-sufficiency reflect the promotion of neoliberal values for the individual. By that I mean, an emphasis on internal self-regulation, individual responsibility, and a non-dependence on social services and the welfare state more broadly.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL OBJECTS

Introduction

Homelessness, as the name of a social problem, is never removed from attempts to understand its causes. How policy makers understand "homelessness" shapes policy and intervention efforts and thus the experience of houselessness. This chapter analyzes how the state has conceptualized "homelessness" and "homeless" people. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines homelessness as the lack of a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence a definition established by the 1987 McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. Yet, HUD's definition is not the consensus among scholars, activists, social workers, and government officials. Politicians often frame "homelessness" as an individual problem and assert that deficiencies such as unemployment, substance abuse, or mental illness are the causes. However, such things only increase the *risk* of becoming "homeless" (Wright, Rubin, & Devine, 1998). Mistaking risks for causes, officials focus on the attributes of some unhoused people as the cause of "homelessness" as a social phenomenon.

The state's attention on unhoused people has consequences. In particular, it has created a category of people ("the homeless") that the state is invested in knowing and managing. Following the work of Michel Foucault, we can consider this discourse on "the homeless" as part of making "homeless" populations into political objects. As such, this chapter

argues that these state practices directed toward the “homeless” can be better understood as techniques of government or governmental rationality than a solution to problems of housing.

To support this claim, this chapter is divided into four parts. I begin by clarifying Foucault’s concept of political objects. I then lay out their relation to Point-in-Time (PIT) counts, the concept of legibility, and the state’s imperative to know and manage “homeless” populations. The second part argues that the fallout of the 1970s urban fiscal crises contributed to the empirical rise of houselessness in the 1980s. This increase in houselessness came to be known as the ‘new homeless.’ The ‘new homeless’ was not qualitatively different from previous historical periods, it was instead, a broad change in discernment about “homelessness” and “homeless” people. Part three discusses the ‘new homeless’ as a political object through the struggles of activists and state agents to numerate unhoused people in the US. Section four shows precisely how PIT counts struggle to find their objects, which have enabled policy makers to “naturalize” “homelessness” as an intractable problem.

Part I – Political Objects

The US Census Bureau conducts a counting of the nation’s entire population every ten years through the decennial census. The census is important for the state, particularly for purposes of taxation and the ability to wage war (Scott, 1998). More importantly, the state uses censuses to make the population visible and legible for state intervention (Scott, 1998). Censuses are the state’s technical snapshot portrait of its population (Scott, 1998). Alternatively, the counting people in the census is more consequential than the mere recording of the population (Hacking, 1986).

According to Scott (1998), the state uses the census to render its population legible. Sub-populations are a dimension of legibility. For instance, the nation-state often records the number of retirees, ethnic groups, and children, etc. These groups are often the target of policies that reflect governmental rationality. Legibility helps to turn people into a population because they are presumed to be numerable. Legibility homogenizes the population, ignoring or collapsing relevant distinctions. Legibility turns the population into a separate thing and facilitates policy maker's ability to parse it into components. One objective of these numerations is to turn the population into a scientifically describable object (Scott, 1998)

In order to *see* the "homeless" population, HUD conducts annual PIT counts, the numeration of the nation's "homeless" people. PIT counts are significant because officials assert they are necessary to ascertain the scope of "homelessness" which is used for funding allocations associated with intervention efforts. In this way, "homelessness" becomes framed as a social and political problem. According to Foucault (2007), governing the nation-state involves state sovereignty over its territory. The state governs its territory and not necessarily the people themselves. The census attempts to count people, and no matter how accurate the count was, creates the political object called, population (Foucault, 2007).

Annual PIT counts represent what Foucault would call political objects. By that I mean, the numerations of "homeless" people don't describe them, they produce them. PIT counts create "the homeless" as a sub-population *and* as an object of knowledge. In this way "the homeless" are studied and reproduced. The problem with PIT counts is that they generate the thing it says it's describing. PIT counts represent the concept of legibility because it shows the

state's imperative to "know" and "manage" a subset of people who come to be described and acted upon as "the homeless."

PIT counts produce the "homeless" population and demonstrate Ian Hacking's (1986), concept of made-up people, a reference to what people could be instead of what they are. The state uses markers such as age, race, ethnicity, and gender to know its population (Foucault, Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). According to Hacking (1986), during the 19th century, deviant statistics enumerating incidences of suicide, prostitution, drunkenness, vagrancy, madness, and crime were important to nation-states. These statistics contributed to the creation of many additional categories of people. However, Foucault's work on discourses reflected that categorizing is just one dimension of making up people (Hacking, 1986). "The homeless" are often considered deviant, even though unhoused people are a diverse group. PIT counts collapse those distinctions, ascribing deviancy to people experiencing homelessness as a whole. The "deviant" labels assigned to "homeless" people is an example of how the state is able to "know" them.

A legible "homeless" population fits with Foucault's concept of governmentality. According to Foucault et al., (1991), governmentality combines the terms government and rationality. Foucault outlines two interrelated forms of state power within governmentality. First is the state's sovereign power, its capacity to define its population and territory. The second form of state power is disciplinary, which valorizes self-governance. Self-governance is an individual's internal motivation to regulate one's own conduct. Self-governance presumes that rational individuals make systematic and logical decisions toward their benefit. Within the

frame of governmentality, disciplinary power abides by the maxim, “for each and for all” (Foucault et al., 1991).

Whenever individuals do not self-govern, the state justifies its exercise of disciplinary tactics on them. The "deviant” label has long been a rationalization for the state to carryout disciplinary action. The state targets so-called deviants and enacts practices that promote self-governance with the intent to affect an individual’s conduct (Foucault et al., 1991). Policy makers create classification schemes on the basis of “deviant” markers, which facilitate systems of ordering, regulation, and control (Foucault et al., 1991). The state’s exertion of discipline on “homeless” people relies upon stereotypes which portray them as irrational, shiftless, and lazy. The desired outcome of state disciplinary power on “homeless” populations is the “rehabilitation” of their self-governance.

The concept of self-governance is strongly represented within “homeless” social services and often referred to as self-sufficiency. In this context, self-sufficiency is comprised of the internal regulation of the self so as to be productive and temperate. In other words, “self-sufficiency” amounts to a normative lifestyle involving living in a domicile, working full-time, paying bills, and not letting mental health issues or substance use get in the way. Why is self-sufficiency so important? Self-sufficiency in “homeless” social services supersedes the goal of rehousing because rehousing itself leaves open the possibility of recidivism. By contrast, “self-sufficient” individuals would not recidivate. Since self-sufficiency corresponds to a normative lifestyle, normative society does not often question the state’s exercise of discipline on “homeless” people.

Part II – Urban Fiscal Crisis and the emergence of the 'new homeless'

During the early 1970s, "homelessness" was on the periphery of urban social concerns, as politicians and policy makers were preoccupied by anti-war and counterculture social movements (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). By the late 1970s, the effects of urban disinvestment and deindustrialization were beginning to push more people onto the streets. The sharp rise in houselessness was not without provocation, therefore it is useful to provide a broad political history of the 1970s urban fiscal crises. This section discusses the coincidence of the empirical rise of houselessness and the emergence of the 'new homeless.' The 'new homeless' refers to changes in demographics of the "homeless" population, but also how they were conflated with a broader discourse of criminality. The increasing numbers of "homeless" people and the so-called new homeless facilitated the link between homeless PIT counts, the concept of legibility and governmentality.

The fallout from 1970s urban fiscal crises contributed to the empirical rise in houselessness in the proceeding decade. The concept of urban fiscal crisis centers on a situation in which a city's expenditures exceed its revenue. The roots of urban fiscal crises were deindustrialization and population decline in Frostbelt cities (King & Gurr, 1988). During the 1960s, automation wrecked the automobile manufacturing industry in Detroit (Sugrue, 2005). As of 1967, the state of New York had a net loss in manufacturing jobs (Hoffman, 1983). These changes were accompanied by decaying infrastructure and increases in poverty and crime (King & Gurr, 1988). Those factors prompted increased demands for municipal public services at a time when revenue intake was declining because of a falling tax base, subsequently creating

financial problems (King & Gurr, 1988). During 1970-74, the state of New York had an 8% net loss in all jobs (Hoffman, 1983).

According to Hoffman (1983), New York City's 1975 fiscal crisis was driven by; 1) the erosion of the city's tax base; 2) increasing public expenditures; 3) unemployment; and 4) international investments. These conditions prompted bankers to deny financial credit to the city, even though the municipal officials had been running deficits in their budgets for several years before the stoppage. The curtailment of New York City's tax base was due to post World War II suburbanization, the advent of highways, and subsidized mortgages. By 1970, 40% of suburban commuters had professional, technical, and managerial jobs; city residents had only 24% of them. Since New York's county and municipal government were integrated, it was difficult for policy makers to offset revenue shortfalls. New York City's municipal officials cut health care and education spending far more than law-enforcement. Unemployment exacerbated the issue. By the end of the 1970s, New York City lost 23% of its work force. The notion of the "last hired, first fired" characterized the city's job cuts and disproportionately affected poor urban communities, Black people, and women (Hoffman, 1983). Racism in Detroit's auto manufacturing labor market had relegated Black workers to second-class and menial jobs (Sugrue, 2005).

According to King and Gurr (1988), the fiscal survival of cities was a paramount concern for the state. The problem for government officials was that they were caught between two competing fiscal expenditures. The first was social capital expenses which go toward productivity and efficiency and second were social costs directed at public service and welfare outlays. The economic downturn of 1974-75 constituted a conflict for officials because social

movements were resisting social capital spending initiatives. Policy makers clashed with each other on how fulfill these competing interests. That conflict created a long-term buildup of cumulative expenditures and state policies, which defied the notion that deficit spending alone constituted urban crises. However, policy makers blamed fiscal problems on inefficiencies of public service and welfare in order to create austerity policies (King & Gurr, 1988).

Urban fiscal crises were a component of broad structural economic changes. One significant aspect was the transition from an industrial to post-industrial economy. America's economic transition occurred within a scenario of developing global relations (Barak, 1991). The decline of manufacturing jobs in the Frostbelt gave rise of manufacturing jobs in the Sunbelt (King & Gurr, 1988). Disinvestment in Detroit was triggered by Cold War defense spending in the Sunbelt (Sugrue, 2005). Yet, growth in the Sunbelt during 1969-1979 had already slowed (Hoffman, 1983). The relocation of manufacturing industry and jobs outside of the United States caused further rounds of deindustrialization and economic restructuring.

Urban political economies help explain the empirical rise of 1980s houselessness because it was, in part, a result of domestic policy decisions involving health care, education, housing, and law and order (Barak, 1991). However, policy makers insisted "homelessness" was a result of labor surpluses and under production (Barak, 1991). In 1980, policy makers also attributed the rise of "homelessness" to the economic recession of that same year (Hertzberg, 1992; Kusmer, 2002). Policy makers asserted that the upswing in "homelessness" would be temporary (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). Additionally, they assured the public that economic recovery would arrest the growth of "homelessness" (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). However, the economic recovery of 1983-84 did not stop the increases in "homelessness" (Kusmer, 2002).

Welfare retrenchment was another factor that caused houselessness to increase during the 1980s. As a presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan attacked “welfare queens” living in the US (Levin, 2019). Reagan’s victory endorsed his harsh views against welfare recipients. Policy makers, in step with the Reagan administration’s stance, made cuts to welfare aid (Kusmer, 2002). During 1981-1982 the Reagan administration made drastic budget decreases to social security, food stamps, Medicaid, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). Specifically, the Reagan administration changed more than 50 categorical social service programs into block grants and handed states discretion over their allocation (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). The 1980s cash, welfare, and social security benefits to unhoused people were less than skid row predecessors due to inflation (Kusmer, 2002).

The result of urban fiscal crises, structural economic changes, and welfare cuts led to a sharp rise in houselessness. Disinvestment in municipal public services left unhoused people to fend for themselves on the streets. Overcrowded municipal shelters forced people without housing to seek alternatives such as abandoned buildings, parks, and alleyways (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). According to Kusmer (2002), one effect of deindustrialization was that it stranded many factory workers and their children who expected to obtain factory jobs as did their fathers. At the same time, unhoused people resorted to panhandling in the streets of urban cores. More importantly, the transition from manufacturing to high-tech and service economy made houselessness a permanent feature of the postindustrial economy (Kusmer, 2002). Additionally, welfare retrenchment propelled houselessness (Dear & Wolch, 1993; Kusmer, 2002).

The discourse of the 'new homeless' arose as an explanation for visible upswing of unhoused people during the 1980s. Whereas, before, people without housing were hidden because they relied on the remnants of cheap hotels located in spatially distinct skid row districts (Wagner & Gilman, 2012), the 'new homeless' refers to the recognition of the rising numbers of unhoused women, children, and people who were younger (Barak, 1991). The 'new homeless' corresponded with cultural frameworks that conservatives used to characterize the 1970s urban fiscal crises. According to Weaver (2017), cultural frameworks associated poverty, violence, and social unrest with the "inner-city." Conservatives used "inner-city" tropes to stoke fears among suburbanites. Additionally, these portrayals revived longstanding conceptualizations of "undeserving" poor people. For instance, Oscar Lewis' Culture of Poverty thesis, the notion that poverty was a hereditary pathology within Black families gained traction in the political conflicts of the time (Weaver, 2017). Conservatives turned to culture of poverty arguments because is placed the problems back on poor and Black families, rather than recognizing a social obligation.

The discourse around the 'new homeless' was a changeover from the previous stereotypes of "homeless" people as older, white men, struggling with alcohol and living in skid rows to a new set of stereotypes portraying "the homeless" as younger, black, drug addicted, and located in inner-cities (Dear & Wolch, 1987). The discourse of the so-called new homeless represented a different face on the same problem, because it was a shift in society's perception of "homeless" people (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). Until the 1980s, several American newspapers used assorted labels like vagabond, tramp, bum, hobo, transient, derelict, and street people to refer to unhoused individuals (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). Prior to 1982, the New York Times

newspaper indexed “homeless” news stories using the term vagrancy (Bogard, 2003). The ‘new homeless’ also associated unhoused people with mental illness and criminality (Dear & Wolch, 1987).

Activists responded to the upsurge of houselessness and the emergence of the ‘new homeless’ discourse. They began mobilizing in the late 1970s due to the increasing visibility of unhoused people on the streets of cities like New York, Washington D.C., and Philadelphia (Bogard, 2003). However, the met fierce opposition from the federal government. The federal state insisted “homelessness” was a concern for Christian and other faith-based organizations, and was not a public problem (Bogard, 2003). However, activists regarded houselessness as a humanitarian issue on the two pillars of housing and hunger. This represented a rebuke of cultural frames which racialized, feminized, criminalized, and stigmatized the people struggling for housing. Activists sought to compel the federal government to engage houselessness as a public matter. I highlight the efforts of two activist organizations, The National Coalition for the Homelessness (NCH) and The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV).

The NCH is a legal advocacy organization co-founded in 1979 by Robert Hayes, an attorney in New York City (Burt, 1992). The NCH activists advocated for universal housing rights and pressed the federal government to establish them (Burt, 1992). According to the NCH’s publication, *The Callahan Legacy: Callahan v. Carey and the Legal Right to Shelter,* during the 1970s, thousands of unhoused people suffered injuries or died attempting to survive on the streets of New York City (National Coalition for the Homeless, n.d.). In 1979, Hayes, brought a class action lawsuit against the City and State of New York, arguing that a constitutional right to shelter existed. Hayes raised the lawsuit on behalf of Robert Callahan, a Bowery skid row man,

but he argued for all of the state's houseless people. The New York State Supreme Court ordered the city and state to provide shelter for all unhoused people in 1979, and the lawsuit was settled as a consent decree in 1981. The terms of the settlement were that the city and state of New York agreed to provide shelter beds for all unhoused people and established basic health and safety standards for them (National Coalition for the Homeless, n.d.). Activists declared victory in Callahan v. Carey decision known as the "shelter mandate," and other cities began creating and providing shelter beds for their houseless populations (Burt, 1992).

According to the CCNV's webpage, they are a human rights advocacy organization initiated by Edward Guinan and a group of graduates of George Washington University (Community for Creative Non-Violence, n.d.). They opened a communal home dedicated to social change in Washington, D.C. during the early 1970s. The CCNV launched protests that raised houselessness to national prominence in spite of the Reagan administration's opposition to fund social services (Community for Creative Non-Violence, n.d.). Anderson (2013) recounts that Mitchell Snyder, known for his direct-action tactics, joined the CCNV in 1973 and became its director. On Thanksgiving Day 1981, Snyder and the CCNV built "Reaganvilles," encampments near the White House, a throwback to "Hoovervilles" during the Great Depression. In 1984, Snyder led an occupation of Washington D.C.'s Federal City shelter for people without housing, followed by a 51-day hunger strike, seeking federal funds to renovate the building (Anderson, 2013).

According to Wagner and Gilman (2012), activist's campaigns for housing rights had both victories and losses. Legal activists sought housing rights, but failed to articulate what kind of housing. Their call for shelters was based on the argument that they were preferable to more

formal state institutions, such as prisons or asylums. However, shelters buildings were often distressed and had limited capacity which led to overcrowding. CCNV activists claimed that smaller and more intimate shelters would be more effective than large dormitory ones. However, the shelter mandate ruling destroyed activists' opposition to them. The shelter mandate probably saved lives, but the ruling advanced shelters as the only option. The use of shelters persisted because of disagreements over the type of shelters among activists and the Reagan Administration's refusal make "homelessness" a priority. Since the shelter mandate can represent housing for all, or legal and political cover for governmental inaction as long as their obligation is met (Wagner & Gilman, 2012).

Although these represented some victories, advocates also lost the war to define the issue. According to Bogard (2003), during the early 1980s the CCNV used the media to advocate for houseless people on moralistic grounds. The CCNV forged relations with press outlets and their campaigns were covered by the media. They got sympathetic stories about houseless people published in the New York Times and Washington Post. The dialogue of these accounts centered on hunger and housing. More importantly, such stories achieved prominence (Bogard, 2003). Alternatively, according to Wagner and Gilman (2012), activists garnered attention on the basis of an "alarmed discovery," which lasted for an only a short period of time. The CCNV and NCH's humanitarian framing of "homelessness" excluded any negative stereotypes about unhoused people, but their activism quickly faded from public consciousness. Sympathetic media stories gradually waned while newspapers and other media continued to publish sensationalized stories about "homeless" people's criminality and undeserving characteristics. Consequently, "homelessness" was defined by journalists, editorialists, mental health

administrators, and shelter operators. The problem of "homelessness" was shaped by Reaganomics, perceptions of deservedness, stereotypes of unhoused people, and the solution of shelters (big or small, public or private) (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). After activists lost their grip on the framing of houselessness in the news, their ability to influence policy decisions faded as well (Gowan, 2010). The activists' inability to define houselessness as a systemic problem advanced the dominant solution of municipal sheltering. Shelters were seen as necessary in the absence of housing rights, but they are only useful as a short-term fix. They are misused as a long-term solution. It is unclear what could have happened if activists had succeeded in defining the social issue or how policy makers would think differently about "homelessness."

The legacy of the 1980s activists is ambivalent. Their push for universal housing was important, but resulted in a proliferation in shelters, which are a poor substitute for housing. Scholars have credited activists for the passage of the 1987 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, the only legislation that provides for direct funding of social services for unhoused people (Wright et al., 1998). The problem with the 1987 bill is that funding allocations were linked to PIT counts which shifted housing policy work to funding of social services and many of the direct funding measures have been eroded (Gowan, 2010). The activism on behalf of unhoused people during the 1980s was short-lived. According to Anderson (2013), in 1990, Mitchell Snyder committed suicide. His death created tensions within the CCNV and prompted a transformative period for the organization. The CCNV activists dropped high-profile direct-action protests. They began to work with policy makers to achieve funding stability for social services because that was the overall direction of "homeless"

activism (Anderson, 2013). The combination of shelter and funding for social services remains essentially unchanged from the 1980s and the prospects of universal housing are still murky today. The proliferation, persistence, and funding protocols for shelters and social services reflect "homelessness" as a political object.

Part III – The 'new homeless' as a political object and the creation of PIT counts

One of the ways that activists from the 1980s believed "homelessness" could be solved was by having a clearer sense of the problem. To do so, they called for national numerations of unhoused people. Activists believed that numerations would demonstrate an empirical reality about the size and scope of the problem. Then, they could use that to leverage the federal government to address their immediate survival and hunger needs as well as housing policies.

National PIT counts of unhoused people in the US were almost nonexistent until the 1980s. The evolution of PIT numerations is significant to my arguments that "homelessness" is a matter of government rationality, so a review of them is useful. According to Wright et al., (1998), the first national PIT count was conducted by HUD in 1984. HUD determined that there were between 250,000 and 350,000 "homeless" people on any given night, however HUD's methodology was shoddy. HUD's procedures did not involve verification procedures, direct numeration, or checks for bias. The count simply tallied the number of shelter beds in large cities and included shelter operator's estimate of unsheltered individuals nearby their facility (Wright et al., 1998). Unsheltered refers to the people who did not receive a shelter bed due to capacity limits and the people who spend the night near but outside the shelter. Gabbard et al. (2007) argued that HUD count did not use a consensus definition of "homelessness", their

methodology was unsatisfactory, and without a consensus definition any subsequent count would be substantially flawed.

The results of HUD's 1984 count were controversial. HUD's figures represented only one-tenth of what activists had claimed, and they argued that HUD had deliberately downplayed the magnitude of "homelessness" (Wright et al., 1998). The second national count was conducted by the Urban Institute in 1987, it estimated between 567,000 and 600,000 "homeless" people in the United States (Wright & Devine, 1995). Though this count's results were higher than HUD's 1984 estimate, it still fell short of activists' assessment of the "homeless" population. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1980s, activists, scholars, and government officials agreed to a "working figure" of between 500,000 and 1 million unhoused people on any given night (Wright & Devine, 1995).

During the 1990 decennial census, the US Census Bureau conducted a PIT count. According to Wright et al., (1998), the count was known as the S-Night, in which "S" refers to shelter and street. This numeration took place in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and New Orleans. The S-Night count sought to improve upon the procedures used by HUD in 1984. New protocols relied on collaboration with shelter operators and volunteer numerators. The count used a verified list of "homeless" shelters and volunteers were sent to predesignated sites for direct numeration (Wright et al., 1998). The street counts took place between 2:00am-4:00am; the timing sought to reduce duplication, because shelters close during these hours (Burt, 1995).

Scholars identified several methodological problems with the S-Night census. Wright et al., (1998) explain that the use of verified lists of shelters and actual tallies of people inside

them were relatively unproblematic except in cases of inclement weather. PIT counts often take place in January, when poor weather can trigger “freeze nights,” a temporary expansion of shelter capacity. These “freeze night” can falsely inflate figures for sheltered individuals. But there were additional problems as well. First, volunteer numerators often violated procedures because they failed to remain in their predesignated areas, woke people, and asked people if they were “homeless.” Second, unhoused people who moved about predesignated sites were counted twice or missed multiple times. Third, other sites including hospital emergency rooms, bars, cheap lodging houses, churches, and other hidden spots that unhoused people often use for shelter were problematically excluded. In New Orleans, evaluators showed that only 22%-66% of decoys were counted (Wright et al., 1998). Stark (1992) evaluated the S-Night numeration in Phoenix. She explained that another problem with the S-Night count was that census officials labeled predesignated sites as commercial, dangerous, and non-dangerous. Dangerous sites were numerated between 6:00am-10:00am, during daylight houses, which produced undercounting of the unsheltered people. Moreover, the predesignated site addresses in Phoenix did not exist or were so confusing that volunteer numerators wound up in spots without “homeless” people. Volunteers in Phoenix counted only 2 out of 10 unsheltered decoys (Stark, 1992). The results of the S-Night were 228,621 “homeless” people on any given night, which is much less than the “working figure” and even lower than HUD’s 1984 estimate at a time when poverty was rising in the US (Wright et al., 1998).

In 2000, census officials conducted another PIT count known as the Service-Based Enumeration (SBE). According to Kearns (2012), the SBE attempted to improve upon the previous S-Night count. The SBE retained the use of a verified shelter list, direct numerations,

and volunteer training. In contrast to S-Night procedures, the SBE ended the practice of roaming enumerators. Sites such as soup kitchens and mobile food trucks were included for direct numeration but abandoned buildings were excluded. The SBE methodology expanded the counting period from 1 to 3 days. On day one, volunteers went to shelters, next they went to soup kitchens and food trucks, and concluded with predesignated outdoor locations. Additionally, census officials distributed "Be Counted" promotional materials at public libraries, state, and municipal health clinics. They also created walk-in centers to assist people with questions, documents, and forms. The distribution of promotional materials and use of walk-in assistance centers likely improved the count, but was offset by undercounting due to the lack of roaming enumerators and counting in abandoned buildings (Kearns, 2012).

PIT counts are beset by problems including: 1) discordant definitions of "homelessness;" 2) methodological inconsistencies; 3) variable operationalization of homelessness; and 4) competing purposes (Straw, 1995). The absence of a consensus definition of "homelessness" created dilemmas among activists, social workers, scholars, and bureaucrats (Hopper, 1995). For instance, one challenge was whether to consider the people staying with relatives and friends as houseless (Hertzberg, 1992). Another disagreement concerned the classification of people who spend the night in hospitals or jail as homeless (Wright et al., 1998). Lastly, there were disagreements about including people who live in precarious circumstances and face substantial housing precarity (Wright et al., 1998).

According to Wright et al., (1998), the lack of a consensus definition of "homelessness" is a problem also leads to problems of undercounting. In the absence of a consensus definition of "homelessness," HUD uses the literal definition of "homelessness". This definition is the

narrowest because it limits “homelessness” to people sleeping in shelters or places not meant for human habitation. The use of the literal “homeless” definition produces undercounting. Methodological problems with PIT count also contribute to undercounting. Numerators will surely miss some of the people who sleep in places unintended for human habitation such as cars, on riverbanks, under bridges, alleyways, etc. Additionally, unhoused people are often fearful of police and state agents, which leads some to evade numerators. Lastly, sometimes unhoused people are simply not in the predesignated sites when numerators arrive (Wright et al., 1998).

The inconsistent operationalization of houselessness is another methodological problem related to PIT counts. This refers the amount of time an individual needs to be without a fixed nighttime residence in order to be considered “homeless” (Burt, 1995). This problem stems from discretion given to local governmental entities responsible for numerations (Schneider, Brisson, & Burnes, 2016). These entities have divergently operationalized “homelessness.” As explained by Burt (1995), “homelessness” has been operationalized as the lack housing for five or more nights in a given week, being unsheltered the previous night, or experiencing “homelessness” at least one night over the previous 60 days. Moreover, local government entities also have discretion over site expansion, the amount of time allowed to conduct numerations. Site expansion differs greatly between urban and rural areas and can range from 1-60 days. Site expansion significantly affects results (Burt, 1995).

Another reason that PIT counts are problematic is there is not a clear and unified purpose for conducting PIT counts among activists, scholars, and government officials. HUD asserts that PIT counts are necessary to determine the number of shelter beds, transitional

housing programs, safe haven housing, rapid rehousing programs, and permanent supportive housing (Schneider et al., 2016). Yet, PIT counts are unable to achieve policy maker's stated goal of determining the size and scope of "homelessness" and associated funding allocations. The problem of undercounting significantly distorts the size of the "homeless" population and leads to a considerable misallocation of significant amounts of federal dollars. The estimated undercount in the 2000 SBE census most adversely affected 58 counties, costing millions of dollars to municipalities (Kearns, 2012). There is also a misconception about funding allocations. PIT count figures do not reflect direct one-to-one funding distribution for social services, such decisions are formula based (Jocoy, 2013). Additionally, the regional entities that address "homelessness" interpret the results of PIT counts differently, creating non-uniform responses within and between urban and rural regions across the United States (Schneider et al., 2016). Some scholars have argued that PIT counts are methodologically imperfect but still have value (Kasianovitz, 2005). Additionally, they claim that the actual figures produced from PIT counts are not critical because they merely reflect trends (Hertzberg, 1992). Alternatively, activists thought PIT counts would establish a humanitarian basis for universal housing rights (Burt, 1995). Since the top end of 'working figure' agreement is 1,000,000 people, we can wonder how high that number would need to get to establish a basis for housing rights.

PIT counts thus have a series of shortcomings. It is clear that a precise count is out of reach. We don't need more attempts to improve upon PIT counts methodology given that the range of the working figure is half a million. The question that remains is, how should we make sense of the expansive body of PIT feasibility research? One answer is to consider that PIT feasibility studies have demonstrated the limits of statistical knowledge production (Marquardt,

2016). In that light, PIT feasibility literature stands as a genre of calculable territory, numerable populations, and statistical problematizations (Marquardt, 2016).

Part IV – PIT counts and the legibility of "homeless" people

If PIT counts have a number of problems, why do policy makers rely on them? According to Jocoy (2013) the early PIT counts helped to produce the "size" of the "homeless" population which became fact among the dialoged of activists and bureaucrats alike, even though they disagreed on the figures. Policy makers conduct PIT counts because they reflect the "culture of quantification, the preference for counting as a means of identifying and addressing social problems. The penchant for quantification arises from its apparent stability, objectivity, standardization, and portability which lends a technical apparatus for governance. Policy makers claim that quantification is impartial and that there is little room for interpretation or miscommunication. Legislators use quantification as epistemological facts to set up practices associated with specific political objectives (Jocoy, 2013). The publication, C*ounting the Hard to Count in a Census,* claims that the challenge of counting "homeless" people is the lack of a physical address and the response is to conduct service-based numerations (US Census Bureau, 2019). The previous policy brief does not say or do anything new. It only reflects what was attempted back in 1990 with the S-Night count.

Interestingly, despite the problems with the S-Night and SBE numerations PIT counts are still in use. Significantly, in 2005, the United States Congress mandated HUD to conduct annual PIT counts and to publish the findings in the Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) (Kasianovitz, 2005). The first AHAR was published in 2007. Table 2.1, shows the overall estimate of people experiencing houselessness on any given night during 2007-2020 (HUD, 2021).

Table 2.1: Summary of Annual Homeless Assessment Reports

Year:	Total Number of Homeless people:
2007	754,147
2008	664,000
2009	643,067
2010	649,917
2011	636,017
2012	633,782
2013	591,768
2014	578,424
2015	564,708
2016	549,928
2017	550,996
2018	553,000
2019	568,000
2020	558,000

The problems with annual quantification of "homeless" populations may seem benign, however their institutionalization amounts to the foundation of the state's management strategy toward "homeless" people. The state has incorporated "homeless" people as a formally marginalized group. They are the 'hard to count' population (US Census Bureau, 2019). "Homelessness" itself was institutionalized. What table 2.1 demonstrates is the reproduction of the "working figure" (500,000-1,000,000) of "homeless" people on any given night, which was agreed to at the end of the 1980s (Wright et al., 1998). The reproduction of the "working

figure" has political uses, naturalizing "homelessness" as a stable and calculable number. Moreover, this notion resonates with the "natural" rate of unemployment in the United States. It is difficult for the federal government to use fiscal and monetary policies to jumpstart the economy without engendering inflation (King & Gurr, 1988). Consequently, since the late 1960s increasingly high levels of unemployment have become "officially" tolerable and normal, occurring in economic texts and formal policy statements (King & Gurr, 1988). The reproduction of the working figure allows the state to declare that the existence and persistence of "homelessness" is "natural" and an intractable social problem.

Once calculated at a natural rate, state estimates made a general level of "homelessness" "officially" tolerable. Doing so undermined activist's claims for universal housing. Worse still, any subsequent rise of "homelessness" must surpass the "working figure" in order to become an object of further state action. Another "alarmed discovery" of increasing rates of "homelessness" may engender new policies, but the state would apply a temporary frame upon those concerns. By way of example, the 2020 AHAR was the first time since 2005 that unsheltered "homeless" people exceeded sheltered "homeless" people (HUD, 2021). Additionally, 2020 is the first time there was an increase in unsheltered families, or people with children under 12, experiencing "homelessness" (HUD, 2021). The AHAR vaguely associated the figures with the COVID-19 pandemic (HUD, 2021). Nonetheless, since the 1980s the message to activists is clear. They need not speak out because the state considers "homelessness" as intractable. What we can see is that PIT counts are critical to meet the obligations established by the "shelter mandate," which helps shelters stand in the place of universal housing rights. In

between PIT counts and the shelter mandate lies the case that the state is unwilling to seriously engage the problem "homelessness" or to establish meaningful housing rights.

In spite of how shelters are used as a substitute for housing rights, the AHARs indicate that the state still has a significant "homeless" population to manage. The management of "homeless" people reflects Foucault's concept of governmentality. To do this, officials need to have multifaceted systems to know and manage "homeless" people. The scholarly creation of "homeless types" is one way, in which various attributes such as unemployment, mental illness, or substance abuse are converted into permanent attributes defining segments of the population. "Homeless types" are rooted in scholarly research. They represent sociological and quasi-biological categorizations of "homeless" people. Policy makers, social workers, bureaucrats, and PIT counts contribute to the creation of "homeless types." Once created, these typologies of "homeless" people are then are used by bureaucrats, shelter operators, social workers, and case managers.

Understanding the ways "homeless types" are created links to my claims of governmental rationality. "Homeless types" reflect Ian Hacking's (1986), concept of dynamic nominalism, the creation of made-up people. Dynamic nominalism is incremental constitution of made-up people through a multiplicity of institutional, governmental, and societal, interplays. This process illustrates how a specific made-up-person arrives on the scene at the same time as that type was generated (Hacking, 2006). For instance, "bag ladies" appeared on the scene alongside the 'new homeless' (Wagner & Gilman, 2012). According to Hacking (2006), dynamic nominalism is an interaction between the namers and the named, it encapsulates the creation and categorization of made-up people themselves, as well as related relevant

institutions. Made-up people are moving targets. They can be remade, revised, and reborn. Such interplay facilitates the generation of technocrats who produce, judge, and use the knowledge about made-up people. (Hacking, 2006).

The problem with "homeless types" is that technocrats use them as political objects, which can be rationally organized and acted upon. Interestingly, they are only 3 primary "homeless types." These 3 kinds were described in Kuhn and Culhane's (1998) seminal study on "homeless types." Their research analyzed administrative shelter data in New York City and Philadelphia, and they posited three "homeless types;" chronic, episodic, and transitional, each of which was based on patterns of shelter use. The "transitional types" refer to comparatively short shelter stays lasting less than 30 days. This group is often younger, presenting fewer symptoms of psychosis, addiction, and physical health concerns. "Episodic types" refer to somewhat frequent shelters stays that last less than a total of 3 months. This group is characterized as those with moderate to serious issues with psychosis, addiction, and physical health issues. "Chronic types" refer to less frequent but comparatively longer shelter stays of greater than 90 days. This group is presented as older than their counterparts. They often have severe issues with psychosis, addiction, and physical health needs, along with physical disabilities. Of the three groups, transitional types make up about 80% of "homeless" people, with 10% of people falling into episodic and chronic categories respectively. Subsequently, McAllister, Kuang, and Lennon (2010), confirmed the transitional, episodic, and chronic types, but they added 10 additional sub-types due to the high degree of heterogeneity among them. In Denmark, Benjaminsen and Andrade (2015) confirmed the three primary types and concluded that the transitional group makeup about 80% of the "homeless" population there.

Waldron, O'Donoghue-Hynes, & Redmond, (2019), validated the same three types in Dublin City, Ireland. During 2012-2016, 78% of shelter users were transitional, 10% were episodic, and 12% were chronic types (Waldron et al., 2019).

The parsing of the "homeless population" into 3 types fails to deal with the complex social issues structuring access to housing, while also demonstrating state logics of "homeless" management. One example of how homeless types are used as political objects comes from the relatively new Housing First (HF) approach to "homelessness." The Housing First model rehouses individuals and then provides in-home social services. The HF model is arguably a more humane approach, but it wasn't the humanists who advanced it. According to Mike McQuaid, the initial executive director of the HSC, Housing First was created to address "chronically homeless" people, because research showed that they use about 60% of resources but only comprise about 10% of the overall "homeless" population. The Housing First model intended to free up scarce monies for shelter operators (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016).

In this way, certain segments of the population are target for specific state interventions based on somewhat arbitrary classificatory systems. These systems are both generated and used by policy makers, legislators, scholars, therapists, social workers, case managers, shelter operators, etc. The institutions involved in this classificatory system include shelters, hospitals, medical clinics, mental health facilities, nonprofits, etc. Throughout history, the names and classificatory schemes to describe "homeless" people have undergone significant changes. In other historical periods, "homeless" people have been referred to as *vagabonds, vagrants, beggars, tramps, hobos, bums, street people, transients, rough sleepers*, and "the homeless."

Names changes reflect corresponding shifts in the ways technocrats, policy makers, social service providers, medical professionals, and religious institutions, among others, have conceptualized the problems and solutions to housing insecurity. In each case, however, it is "homeless" people themselves – rather than social structures, practices, or institutions - that have been classified as problematic.

Conclusion

The activists of the 1980s compelled the state to re-acknowledge "homelessness" through the passage of the 1987 McKinley-Vento Homeless Assistance Act which obliged them to pay for social services. However, the act also secured the literal definition of "homelessness." That definition has permitted policy makers to understand that "homelessness" is caused by one's own volition and makes individuals responsible to end their own "homelessness." As such, the state is not funding social services for human beings in the strictest sense. What they are doing is communicating that "homelessness" is absolutely an individual problem while endorsing interventions that target an individual's "undeserving" behaviors and conduct. This facilitates the state's ability to eschew universal housing rights or meaningful housing policy.

The state has turned the 1980s empirical rise in "homelessness" into a normalized aspect of the population through annual PIT counts and the institutionalization of the 'working figure.' The so-called facts of the case are that the size of the "homeless" population is stable and "homelessness" has been "naturalized." The "naturalization" of "homelessness" dampened critics and activists. Forestalling critics and activists facilitate governmentality of "homeless" people. The portrayal that "homelessness" as intractable allows that state to position itself as

the only entity capable of managing such a large issue. As such, the state's governmentality is perpetual and its intervention efforts are insulated from failure.

The state is engaged in an effort to "know" and manage "homelessness" and "homeless" people. PIT counts, "homeless types", and institutions are three tactics the state uses toward those ends. Yet, the management of "homeless" people is also spatial. Interestingly, the spatial management of "homeless" people was once was the function of skid row. The next chapter reviews the rise and fall of skid row, demonstrating how subsequent urban districts arose to fulfill the function of spatially managing the "homeless" after the demise of skid row districts. Co-location can be understood as an extension of these techniques of spatial management and control.

CHAPTER 3

THE ORIGINS OF CO-LOCATION

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that counting "the homeless" is a method to "know" a portion of the population as "homeless" in order to more effectively manage them. I also argued that this form of knowledge, which creates and justifies a "natural" level of "homelessness" through the PIT counts, functions as a substitute for housing policy and an alibi against more transformational projects of social housing. This chapter discusses the spatial dimensions of those arguments through the concept of co-location. By co-location, I mean the spatial integration of case management and social services for "homeless" populations. The stated goal of co-location is to create an all-in-one facility with easy access to holistic social services. These services include the provision of shelter, food, and clothing along with employment resources, mental health and substance abuse counseling. Co-located facilities aim to resemble college campuses. They have dormitories, communal dining, and common areas. The campus layout is designed to build supportive peer relationships among service users, another stated goal. Essentially, the co-location model attempts to create the first and last stop for people wanting to end their "homelessness."

I situate the origin of the co-location model with the demise of American skid row districts. The 1949 Housing Act created broad state power to declare an area as "blighted," allowing local governments the authority to exercise eminent domain and giving them access to

massive funding for demolition (Chananiah, 2020). Local state authorities took advantage of their power and razed skid rows as unprofitable and stigmatized spaces in the city. The legislation initiated the state sponsored commercial gentrification of skid rows near Central Business Districts (CBDs), destroying housing that accommodated poor and "homeless" communities. Policy makers intended to separate the CBD from associations with "homelessness" (Howard, 2013). Slum clearance paved the way for the return of capital to downtowns (Chananiah, 2020). These clearance projects involved a discursive strategy whereby officials used the language of "renewal" to displace poor urban communities. Policy makers and boosters often employed Urban Growth Machine discourses of "growth" which often overlook human and social costs (Chananiah, 2020). I show that contemporary "re-development" discourses build on the history of urban renewal and are central to the creation of co-located facilities today.

The story I tell focuses on skid row, but is grounded in a long history of the state's attempts to socially and spatially control "homeless" people's mobility. Their mobility has long since been conceptualized by authorities as a problem that spreads moral and spatial degradation. Consequently, "homeless" people have long confronted social control measures directed at them. According to Kusmer (2002), policy makers have attempted to regulate people who lacked housing during the late 1700s and early 1800s, referring to them as the "wandering poor" or vagrants. Vagrancy laws sought to control their mobility, punish defiance, and promote work over idleness because affluent people believed that indiscriminate aid would entrench them as beggars. As far back as 1685, officials in Plymouth Colony built a house for vagrants, in which residents where compelled to work though corporal punishment. The

whipping of people showed that authorities regarded vagrants as comparatively no different than inmates in jails or workhouses (Kusmer, 2002). I argue that, although corporal punishment itself is outdated, the same disciplinary objective remains a component of contemporary "homelessness" intervention policies.

This chapter explains the rise and fall of skid row districts before describing a series of urban districts that followed in the wake of skid row. Local state officials helped to create these smaller and denser "homeless" districts in the city. Initially, scholars identified these districts as service dependent ghettos (SDGs) (Dear & Wolch, 1987). Within SDGs, scholars recognized that service users exercised agency through their mobility pathways (Wolch & Rowe, 1992). Mobility pathway research led scholars to characterize SDGs as service hubs, based on service accessibility (Dear, Wolch, & Wilton, 1994). I argue that the co-location model gradually developed from service hubs, and co-located facilities are the most condensed urban space for "homeless" people.

More recent changes in "homeless" containment have been shaped by changing sentiments regarding welfare provisions. Federal legislation, including the 1987 McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, funded social services while also shaping the creation of service hubs. Welfare reform legislation known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) scaled back welfare. These oscillations in welfare shaped the co-location model through cost-efficiency rationales. I argue that cost-efficiency has been crucial to co-location practices, as social service leaders have needed to demonstrate to government officials and business interests that co-location is cost-efficient. The emphasis on cost-efficiency reflects how punitive logics have become a component of welfare provision.

The development of the co-location model is interesting because of the ways that government officials acted as arbitrators between social service providers and business elites. Whereas local social service leaders, business elites, and government officials each advanced the co-location model as a spatial management tactic, their rationales differed. Nonprofit leaders supported co-location because it resolved several geographic problems with their service delivery chains. Business leaders raised funds for co-located facilities to keep "homeless" people away from areas of the city that could be profitably redeveloped. Government officials supported co-location because of overlaps with the goals of social service and business leaders.

Part I – Skid row

The life span of nearly all skid rows runs from about 1870 to 1970. Kusmer (2002) explains that until the middle of the 19th century, "homeless" people were not concentrated in skid rows. Instead, cities contained several "poverty and vice" districts, often with gambling and prostitution. More importantly, these spaces contained low-grade housing that was substandard, but affordable. Skid rows emerged in these marginal areas of the city, as people without secure housing moved into these low-grade, affordable units (Kusmer, 2002). DePastino (2005) claims that the term "skid row" was not popular until the 1930s when it replaced "main stem" and "Hobohemia." The term "skid row" signaled that "homeless" people's lifestyle was defined by downward mobility ("hitting the skids") and they were confined to a physical space (row). The "hobos" who represented working-class masculinity had transformed into "bums" (DePastino, 2005). Police officers were directed to patrol the edges of

skid row, which confined precariously housed people to these zones and delineated these areas as separate districts in the city (Kusmer, 2002).

New York City's Bowery neighborhood was one of America's oldest skid rows, forming when a nightly gospel mission and communal lodging house opened in the early 1870s (Bahr, 1973). This combination of social services and communal housing became central to other skid row districts in the United States (Bahr, 1973). Their defining characteristics were Single-Room-Occupancy (SRO) hotels, religious missions, and casual labor staffing agencies (Miller, 1982). However, housing was skid row's most infamous quality (Kusmer, 2002). Cubicle hotel rooms resembled cages that perhaps contained a bed, a single light, and a communal bathroom (Kusmer, 2002). Hotels buildings were distressed. Chicago's West Madison skid row residents considered some of them fire traps (Bogue, 1963). Flophouses emerged during the 1880s and 1890s and also varied in quality, with some containing a bed or hammock (Kusmer, 2002). The least expensive consisted of a spot on the floor (Kusmer, 2002). The essence of skid row housing was that it was cramped, noisy, and without privacy (Kusmer, 2002). Bars, barbershops, restaurants, and second-hand stores rounded out the other types of business located in skid rows (Ford, 1994).

Skid rows were prominent between 1900 and 1930 (Bahr, 1973) and their population peaked with a rise in temporary employment opportunities between the years 1880-1920 (Ellickson, 1996). Kusmer (2002) argued that during the early 20th century, the mechanization of agricultural labor forced former farm workers to migrate to the city in search of industrial jobs. Many found themselves in skid row districts when looking for work. Those unable to find jobs became semi-permanent residents of skid row (Kusmer, 2002). After the 1929 stock market

crash, the patchwork system of private and faith-based organizations in skid row could not meet the demands of the vastly increasing poor populations (Howard, 2013). In response, local officials demanded more federal funding for municipal shelters (Howard, 2013).

According to Howard (2013), the Great Depression relaxed some policymaker's harsh attitudes toward "homeless" people and paved the way for New Deal programs. New Deal programs targeting "homelessness" included the Federal Transient Program, (FTP) which made "homeless" people eligible for aid by exempting the requirement for legal residence. However, the New Deal programs including the FTP were meant to stabilize the economy and get people back to work. They were not intended to provide long-term assistance. Hence, policy makers shifted emergency relief to the provision of benefits through Social Security, which excluded seasonal and migratory workers who were often "homeless." Moreover, normative gender ideologies organized aid provision. Women, often lacking job skills and education, were shuffled into domestic roles that dominated poor relief efforts. Gender norms about men as "breadwinners" made panhandling unattractive for many (Howard, 2013). The state increased its funding of skid row labor staffing agencies to help the massive number of unemployed men find work (Bahr, 1973). However, job seekers often took a dim view of skid row labor staffing agencies, suggesting they amounted to "slave markets" (Kusmer, 2002).

The mobilization for World War II initiated the downfall of skid rows. There are few scholarly accounts that address homelessness during World War II (Kusmer, 2002). What can be said is that the population of skid rows decreased as many people found work making armaments for the war effort (Bahr, 1973). Elderly and less mobile men who were unable to find employment, remained on skid row (Bahr, 1973). After the war, the population of skid row

continued to decline, and since 1945, policy makers treated “homelessness” as primarily an urban problem (Kusmer, 2002). SRO hotel construction largely halted by 1930 and by the end of the 1950s much of the stock was gone (Ford, 1994). The physical plant of skid row shrunk with the closing of SRO housing (DePastino, 2005). During 1950-1970, census data on 41 skid row districts showed an aggregate population loss of nearly 58% (DePastino, 2005).

Bahr (1973) explains that the general public stereotyped skid row men as hopeless, unredeemable, and without a stake in life during the 1950s. The technocrats who paid for treatment interventions also stereotyped skid row men in the same way. He concluded that skid row was a place for “disaffiliates,” people who refused to conform to normative lifestyles involving male breadwinning and head of household roles (Bahr 1974). Bogue’s (1963) investigation of Chicago’s West Madison skid row, however, contradicted these stereotypes and others that presented skid row as “alcohol colonies.” He showed that 40-45% of skid row residents consumed less than two drinks per week, or did not consume alcohol at all. Moreover, he showed that many men on skid row sought work and accepted temporary and menial jobs. The problem was that elderly men confronted age-based discrimination within casual labor staffing agencies. The pensioners and unemployed elderly men living in skid row were essentially forgotten. Bogue (1963) called skid row a “complex neighborhood” that appealed to a variety of people for a variety of reasons. Miller (1982) argued that skid row was a neighborhood with institutions, social services, and businesses that catered to residents but were characterized by degrading and sub-standard conditions.

Stereotypes about skid row men are important because they often were often used to describe and define the essential characteristics of skid rows as a place or neighborhood. I claim

that skid rows were neglected and disinvested districts that unintentionally became home for people who were considered undesirable. DePastino (2005), explains that the collective animosity toward "homeless" people came from journalists. Sensationalized stories of individual "homeless" people stressed their "abnormality," and associating it with the physical space of skid row. Journalists characterized skid row as taboo places outside of the normative order of suburban domestication (DePastino, 2005).

The changing fortunes of skid row were closely linked to the politics of urban renewal and state sponsored projects of suburbanization. According to Jackson (1985), during the 1940s policy makers decided that housing was a pressing need after several years of economic depression and war. But even before World War II ended, the federal government and the housing industry advocated suburban homes. During 1941-1946, home designers were advertising in women's magazines. The 1944 Serviceman's Readjustment Act created the Veterans Administration (VA) mortgage program and promoted the notion that the 16 million returning soldiers ought to live in suburban homes. Single dwelling housing rose dramatically, from 114,000 homes in 1944 to 1,692,000 by 1950. Federal subsidies, FHA, and VA lending terms denied racialized urban communities the opportunity to purchase suburban homes. By 1950, suburban expansion had outpaced growth in central cities by a factor of ten. Urban in-fill development was economically uncompetitive against mass produced suburban housing. Policy makers allowed empty central city neighborhoods to languish without buyers (Jackson, 1985).

Although skid row served an important urban function for poor people without stable work, they were targeted for renewal based on their lack of profitability. According to Miller (1982) throughout the 1940s, business owners and social service operators had an adversarial

relation. The conflict was between high property values associated with CBDs and social service providers associated with “homeless” people and skid row districts. Business owners supported the demolition of skid row because “homelessness” and “homeless” people were considered “bad for business.” Policy makers gave the impression to social service leaders that urban renewal would eradicate skid row, but preserve some of the social service functions (Miller, 1982). However, urban renewal projects often displaced social service providers (Howard, 2013), making way for professional sports stadiums (Ford, 1994).

The fall of skid row occurred from the 1950s through the 1970s (Miller, 1982). Skid rows were principal targets for demolition because of their stigmatization (Kusmer, 2002). Policy makers justified clearance projects by conflating individual behaviors with negative connotations of the neighborhood (Howard, 2013). Policy makers used the language of “revitalization” and “re-birth” to advocate for the projects to transform the CBD (Mungin, 2016). The problem with the notion of re-birth was that the language fused the “death” of skid row to “homeless” people, making renewal contingent on the removal of “homeless” and poor people from the city (Mungin, 2016).

By the end of the 1970s, municipal officials had destroyed what was left of SRO hotels in skid rows (Miller, 1982). One of the biggest problems with urban renewal was that policy makers did not replace these affordable housing units (Howard, 2013). According to Ford (1994), urban renewal legislation targeted SROs, citing their lack of kitchens and bathrooms, but also discriminated against poor communities. Portland city officials destroyed nearly 1,800 SRO units, about 75% of its stock, between 1970 and 1978. Government officials in Denver demolished 28 of 45 SRO hotels, between 1976 and 1981. Municipal authorities in San

Francisco eradicated 6,085 SRO units, almost 20% of the stock. After the majority of SRO housing was demolished, policy makers halted demolitions in order to preserve particular neighborhoods as historic or tourist attractions. Those SRO hotel owners sold their buildings (Ford, 1994).

Skid row was an urban district that fell to the bulldozer, but the subsequent districts that followed were evidence of their enduring functionality as affordable zones for precariously housed people. After skid row became the permanent home for surplus agricultural workers it unintentionally negated historical vagrancy laws designed to exclude the "wandering poor" from cities and towns. The mobilization for World War II transformed skid row into an urban holding area for elderly men. Postwar suburbanization emptied central city neighborhoods. Then, policy makers allowed skid rows to degrade and pathologized its residents, setting up the justification to demolish them. Urban renewal legislation federally funded the local state's destruction of skid row (Howard, 2013). Clearance projects represented a cure to urban ills by amputation, but did not purge skid row's sociospatial functions to accommodate and serve the needs of very poor and homeless communities. Former skid row residents and social service providers were displaced to the next closest marginal area of the CBD (Miller, 1982), with these spaces taking up the functions formerly located within skid row. I describe these spaces as the subsequent districts in the city where unhoused people were displaced to. These districts underwent a series of transmutations but remained as "homeless" districts because each change repackaged the crucial functions of skid row, but discarded the socialization and recreation components. The relation in which the federal state funds the local state's

administration of these homeless districts endorsed local state's spatial management of urban homelessness.

Part II – Service Dependent Ghettos

Service dependent ghettos (SDGs) were the urban districts that followed the end of skid rows. According to Dear and Wolch (1987), service dependent ghettos were places that concentrated service dependent people and social services. Service dependent ghettos arose from changes to the urban provisioning of welfare. During the late 19th century, social welfare began with private and faith-based charitable organizations located in the urban core, near the population they served. Later, officials used public asylums located on the outskirts of cities as the preferred treatment location for dependent populations. Social service providers during the early 1900s conceptualized service dependent populations as deviant and dangerous. Institutionalization was the popular therapeutic response until the late 1900s, when policy makers began using asylums purely for their custodial function. Policy makers hoped to segregate urban communities from the "diseases" and "degeneracy" that characterized "homelessness" through the use of asylums. The spatial organization of these institutions also sought to control the behaviors of people on the fringes of cities (Dear & Wolch, 1987).

As explained by Dear and Wolch (1987), during the 1950s, mental health advocates-initiated deinstitutionalization, the shuttering of large-scale mental asylums. The advocates intended to establish a more humane treatment of mental patients by spatially integrating mental health care providers within urban cores. However, the integration failed because of strong community hostility, based on stereotypes about psychiatric patients. Consequently, deinstitutionalization discharged many former patients into unprepared communities. In these

communities, there was a propensity for communal and halfway housing for the intellectually disabled, elderly, and parolee populations. Following deinstitutionalization, land-use planners, seeking the path of least resistance, sited mental health facilities in SDGs. Planners took advantage of older and cheaper housing and they created the spatial concentration of social services which defined the built environment of SDGs (Dear & Wolch, 1987).

Service dependent ghettos were problematic because the public associated them with stigma. The public has long since stigmatized people based on the attribute of mental illness, specifically asylum patients (Goffman, 1963). Deinstitutionalization did not break that pattern. Whereas asylums previously located on urban fringes functioned as the territorial base for mental health patients (Goffman, 1963), deinstitutionalization relocated that territorial base from the city's outskirts to the urban core. The public's stigmatization of asylum patients accompanied them to the urban cores. More importantly, the relocation of stigma tainted all of the other service users in SDGs. Likewise, the space of service dependent ghettos themselves was also stigmatized.

SDGs had a stronger institutional presence than skid row neighborhoods. Service dependent ghettos took form in hollowed out industrial districts near the CBD (Dear & Wolch, 1987). Police officers created a restrictive landscape beyond SDG's borders. Service dependent ghettos lacked SRO hotels and recreational opportunities found in skid row. Service dependent ghettos lacked SRO housing and the associated autonomy and privacy they afforded residents. Municipal emergency shelters were essentially contemporary flophouses. Some faith-based organizations continued to proselytize and require that service users pray before they provide meals and shelter. Moreover, SDGs lacked the personal relationships that could exist within the

confines of skid row. Within skid row, men formed relationships with "friendly" SRO hotel clerks who occasionally spotted them a night's rent, checked on their wellbeing, or provided job information (Bogue, 1963). Similarly, skid row men could rely on "friendly bartenders" that would offer free food, paycheck cashing, or a spot to spend the night (Bogue, 1963). Though skid row also had institutional components such as flophouses and religious missions, they were not dominated by service institutions. The institutional presence was counter-balanced by opportunities for socialization and recreation with taverns, movie theaters, pool halls, and arcades.

Dear and Wolch (1987) concluded that SDGs were "institutions without walls." Miller (1982) predicted that urban renewal would turn skid row into an "open asylum." But SDGs were not as "open" as these claims suggest. Deinstitutionalization linked madness to both the people within SDGs and the space itself. Urban renewal transformed semi-permanent housing into transitional housing. These factors contributed to the institutional nature of SDGs, but also created spatial barriers between SDGs and other urban places. These walls were primarily discursive, as Dear and Wolch (1987) note, SDGs were deliberately created and distinct spaces in the city. Moreover, SDGs were spatially shaped by community opposition. The absence of material walls was irrelevant because the public community and service users obeyed non-material borders.

SDGs were institutional spaces in the city because they lacked SRO hotels and other recreational amenities offered by skid row. Moreover, the public conflated former patients and homeless people and associated both groups with madness. Mungin (2016) concluded that SDGs were "psychiatric ghettos," a reference to the surge of former mental patients along with

uncoordinated and illogical provision of social services. Nonprofit organizations in SDGs often didn't have formal collaborative relations or partnerships among themselves (Dear & Wolch, 1987).

Dear and Wolch (1987) explain that the fall of service dependent ghettos occurred through concerted actions of the national and local state. The Reagan administration made massive cuts to federal mental health funding and raised eligibility requirements for mental health services. Municipal officials attempted to disperse SDGs and reduce their capacity. They forced social service providers to shut down or relocate without any requirement to replace or to provide alternatives. As such, municipal emergency shelters were overwhelmed and unsheltered "homeless" people took refuge in the nooks and crannies nearby. The SDGs reflect the failure to validate the community care model (Dear & Wolch, 1987). Consequently, service delivery relied on the voluntary attitudes, willingness, and capacity of service users to engage non-profits. However, transferring homeless people to and from nonprofits proved difficult.

Part III – Service Hubs

This section describes the transmutation of service dependent ghettos into service hubs, before examining an interstitial period in which problems with the service hub model gave rise to co-location. SDG were under-equipped to handle the needs of service users (Dear & Wolch, 1987). Service hubs grew out of SDGs because they responded to the absence of coordinated social service delivery. As the name suggests, service hubs were programmatically different and had a less stigmatizing name than SDGs. Social service operators sought improve service accessibility through geographic proximity and provider coordination based on homeless people's routes and routines. Service hubs underwent an interstitial period from about 1995-

2000. During that period, the geographic proximity of providers fledging service coordination in hubs created the context in which co-location took shape.

The service hub model was driven by federal legislation and scholarly recognition of "homeless" people's agency. As discussed previously, activists worked with Congress to pass the 1987 McKinney-Vento Homelessness Act. The legislation was the first of its kind, establishing block grants for emergency shelters and transitional housing, as well as direct funding of food banks and mobile health care (National Coalition for the Homeless, 2006). The legislation made the federal state into a significant actor in "homeless" intervention and solidified the relationship in which it funded the local state's administration of urban "homeless" districts. More importantly, the 1987 bill established a massive and bureaucratized "homeless" industry in which shelters functioned as warehouses (Gowan, 2010). Activists unintentionally helped to create a "homeless" archipelago, defined by shelters and charitable meal centers (Gowan, 2010). "Homeless" shelters attract nearly the same amount of opposition as landfills and prisons (Takahashi & Gaber, 1998). So additional nonprofits were proximately sited. This kind of in-fill land-use constituted the built environment of hubs. Yet, SDGs provided the context and space for service hubs to grow.

According to Dear et al., (1994) service hubs were small-scale collections of neighboring social service providers in which interaction between them was at least possible. Direct service provision, favorable proximity, and interest in the wellbeing of service users were components of service hubs. The hub model prioritized accessibility over efficiency. Hubs relied on a series of three networks, including those between users, between users and the facilities, and those between facilities (Dear et al., 1994).

I distinguish service hubs from SDG's because nonprofit leaders were beginning to forge partnerships among themselves based on the ways that precariously housed people moved and accessed social services within these areas of cities. Nonprofit leaders drove facility-facility networks through their partnerships and efforts to coordinate service delivery. Unhoused people's subsistence habits established daily routes and routines. They formed peer relations in which they developed a sense of community through positive and supportive interactions. Such relationships defied the notion that "homeless" people are passive victims of their circumstances. Service leaders sought to capitalize on these networks by coordinating relevant social services. Their fledging coordination contributed to a sense of community among unhoused people. Interestingly, facility-user network can support of inhibit this sense of community. Facility-user networks are often demonstrated by a nonprofit's service philosophy or mission statement, which guides them.

Dear et al., (1994) compared two service hubs in California and showed that their differing service philosophies affected the user-user and user-facility networks. The St. Joseph hub's philosophy centered on the restoration of individual dignity and the Union Station hub relied on employment as the means to rehabilitate. The St. Joseph hub offered daytime shelter, storage lockers, and a post office for service users. Union Station offered services through case management. St. Joseph user-facility connections were more egalitarian than the Union Station hub, which was more authoritative. The St. Joseph hub was located near SRO hotels and the beach and the Union Station hub used shelter dormitories. Significantly, people in the St. Joseph hub had strong user-user networks because they formed friendships and pooled their money to replace stolen items from the facility. Interestingly, people "adopted" each other as

second family members. The formation of such social networks is considered an intervention tactic (Dear et al., 1994). The different housing options in these two hubs also affected both user-user and user-facility networks. Since shelter stays are strictly regulated and regimented, they blunted opportunities to develop user-user and user-facility networks. Because the St. Joseph hub was focused on individual dignity instead of case management people could live more autonomously. The three intra-networks within service hubs went toward the objective of creating a sense of community among the service user population.

Service hubs arose in response to precariously housed people's routes and routines and they offer a place in which they have a layer of protection from sociospatial hostilities in the city. Ethnographies on people without housing demonstrate that individuals exercise agency through their daily subsistence patterns which are in tension with the urban environments. Snow and Anderson (1993) draw attention to the fact that "homeless" people must to live within public spaces and public view, to some degree. Further, the pervasive sense of uncertainty infiltrates street life, because survival tactics are not guaranteed. Unhoused people constantly adapt and scramble to survive (Snow & Anderson, 1993). They confront spatial norms, municipal ordinances, and public hostility against them, and in response they often employ evasion, hiding, and blending tactics (Snow & Mulcahy, 2001). Unhoused people negotiate with spatial regulations, subsistence habits, and adaptive tactics (Snow & Mulcahy, 2001). According to Wolch and Rowe (1992), involuntary and voluntary forces that shape daily subsistence habits and daily routes. Involuntary forces take the form of restrictive eligibility requirements for aid, police sweeps, and threats to summon law-enforcement. Voluntary forces are peer group socialization, recreation, and resource sharing (Wolch & Rowe, 1992). The

context of the hub offers a measure of protection from the challenges within the built environment.

Wolch and Rowe (1992) argued that unhoused people's daily repeated routes and routines are mobility pathways. The repetitious nature of mobility paths coalesces, self-reinforces, and boosts feelings of safety and security, a basis for increasing their sense of self-worth. Mobility paths has generated peer bond. These peer bonds are significant because they can foster increased feelings of bodily safety (Wolch & Rowe, 1992). For instance, unhoused men in San Francisco, bonded through their work habits of recycling used metal and glass containers, which boosted their feeling of safety and self-esteem (Gowan, 2010).

Thus far, I have discussed the local conditions that established service hubs as a separate district in the city, but not the top-down pressure that the federal state exerted. The 1990s was a period of welfare retrenchment that Ellickson (1996) refers to as compassion fatigue, in which politicians united and opposed increased spending on "homeless" social services. Their antagonism was in part a response to the extent of "homelessness" during the 1980s. More importantly, compassion fatigue was fomented in deinstitutionalization, reactions to female-headed households, the crack epidemic, and the notion that relaxing disorder laws had failed. Journalists used compassion fatigue to justify crackdowns on "homeless" people through quality-of-life legislation, whereas before they had published sympathetic stories of "homeless" people emphasizing shared humanity. Interestingly, crackdowns on "homeless" people occurred in what are today considered "liberal" states like New York and California. The backlash also was intended to prevent another sweeping federal legislation bill and leave solutions to local state policy makers (Ellickson, 1996).

Compassion fatigue motivated federal policy makers to make two pivotal changes, which advanced the co-location model. The first change was a programmatic revision of "homeless" policy. Housing Readiness model was a 3-step progressive model to end "homelessness." It was supposed to provide for individual's immediate survival needs while also redressing the "causes" of "homelessness", and provide transition into permanent housing. According to Goodwin, Tiderington, and Noonan (2021) Housing Readiness models were common in the United States. These different intervention policies embraced treatment first. Fundamentally, these programs intended that "homeless" people would progress through the social services system and in which they could gradually obtain more normative housing. The model presumes a linear trajectory, in which people move through the provision of different social services, designed to remedy the causes of an individual's "homelessness." Success in Housing Readiness model is defined by an individual's sobriety, basic living skills, treatment engagement, and compliance with conditions for housing. The model amounts to fulfillment of case management obligations. However, the experience of living in a time-limited, monitored, and regulated setting is not pertinent to the individual experience of independent housing (Goodwin, 2021). Housing Readiness was a pivot toward neoliberal grant funding protocols which emphasized cost-efficiency for social service delivery. This top-down policy sought to nationalize homeless policy, but required local state officials to implement it. To do this, the Clinton Administration created regional entities that addressed "homelessness" called Continuums of Care (CoCs). They applied and competed for grant funding with the goal of allocating federal monies to regional nonprofits (Gowan, 2010). The creation of CoC's was intended to support federally funded urban scale management of "homelessness."

Regional CoCs established five primary roles of service provision (Wong, Park, and Nemon 2006), including: 1) services must address basic needs like shelter, food, and clothing; 2) the provision for general health care, substance abuse, mental health treatments; 3) individually oriented services involving life skills, special trainings, case management, housing assistance, and employment assistance; 4) child-care and domestic violence counseling for families and women; and 5) legal services for people in contact with the criminal justice system and programs designed for veterans. The proliferation of CoC's expanded the "homeless" industry (Gowan, 2010). Interestingly, these changes tacitly struck down the notion that homelessness could be remedied exclusively by short-term supports.

Social work literature on co-location often emphasizes the linking of medical and mental health care providers through cost-efficiency rationales. During the 1970s, the Department of Education and Health and Welfare published an appendix of 29 co-located providers, including two in Phoenix and six in California (Project Share, 1977). These facilities didn't apply to unhoused people, but they demonstrated an emphasis on cost-efficiency through standardized health assessments.

The purpose of CoC's and competitive grant funding was to prioritize cost-efficiency. Blue-Howells (2008) described an unhoused veteran's provider in Los Angeles and determined it was fraught with fragmented service delivery issues. These problems stemmed from underutilization, lack of insurance, geographic problems, institutional barriers, and transitional living arrangements, which complicated scheduling and referral practices. Co-location, along with coordinated intake procedures, were thought to improve care, but stakeholders needed cost-savings rationales to buy-in (Blue-Howells 2008). Stergiopoulos et al. (2010) found unmet

needs and overutilization of mental health services among the residents of a Canadian shelter for precariously housed people. They determined that centralized access, standardized assessments, and multi-tiered treatment options could resolve problems (Stergiopoulos et al., 2010). Gabrielian et al. (2017) examined a pilot program that co-located unhoused patient-centered medical homes (PCMH) with hospital emergency room care. They concluded that co-location reduced acute care needs and better utilized the PCMH model over a four-year period (Gabrielian et al., 2017).

Service hubs were the basis for co-location. The geographic proximity of nonprofits and mobility pathways of service users showed possibilities for an accessible service array and progressive manner of service delivery. Service hubs often had informal and indefinite partnerships between social service operators (Dear et al., 1994). These partnerships paved the way for more robust coordination and progressive service delivery. The co-location combined favorable locations, coordination, and the agency of unhoused people as its foundation.

Part IV – Co-location

One of the first co-located "homeless" facilities was *Father Joe's Village* in San Diego. In 2001, the coalition behind the Human Services Campus visited the co-located facility and based the HSC on it (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). Interestingly, San Antonio's co-located facility, *The Haven for Hope* was modeled from Phoenix's HSC (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016).

Examining Father Joe's Village shows how policy makers transformed urban spaces associated with "homelessness" into co-located facilities. According to their webpage (Historical Timeline, n.d.) the organization has been operating since 1950. The timeline

describes a series of significant social service expansions that correspond to San Diego's urban renewal projects in the Gaslamp Quarter. During the 1960s the Wayside Chapel merged with a Saint Vincent de Paul (SVdP) thrift store and became a co-located facility known as the SVdP Center. In 1982, Fr. Joe Carroll rose to the position of director of the center. He expanded the size of the facility, leased rooms at nearby hotels, and established a robust and reliable volunteer base. By 1985, the center was rebuilt. With the help of donations, an onsite medical clinic was added in 1988. A year later, service leaders expanded their capacity by creating the adjacent Bishop Maher shelter with a capacity of 150 people. In 1991, the facility was renamed as the SVdP Village. In 1994, the Paul Mirabile Center opened, offering short-term shelter for 350 men and women. Fr. Joe Carroll retired in 2011 and four years later the SVdP Village was renamed Father Joe's Village. In 2018, the Transitional Bridge shelter for women and families opened next to the Paul Mirabile shelter. Presently, Fr. Joe's Village is still in operation (Historical Timeline, n.d.).

What we can see from the San Diego story is a general trajectory for the creation of co-located facilities. Co-location is often initiated through urban revitalization projects which displace poor and homeless communities. Their displacement is consequential because housing and nonprofits are not replaced. SDGs arise from these uncontrolled displacements and frequently take shape in the next most proximate marginal area to the CBD. The transition from SDG to a service hub is straightforward. Additional nonprofits are established to respond to the concentration of unhoused people. The collection of nonprofits grows into a service hub through proximity, partnerships, and unhoused people's mobility paths. Co-located facilities emerge from hubs due to well-established presence of nonprofits and their strength in

numbers. This facilitates the funding of infrastructural upgrades or new buildings. The co-located facility emerges as investments in the hub in ways that support business and governmental interests as well. In this way, co-location model responds to the displacement created by revitalization projects.

To understand the spatial model of co-location, I have tracked the growth of co-located facilities in the United States, identifying 28 of them (Homeless Shelters, n.d.) and (Homeless Shelter Directory, n.d.). I searched for co-located facilities that are similar to the HSC in Phoenix. I considered places that promoted themselves as all-in-one facilities and had a campus layout. Their service array must include shelter, meals, dayroom, medical clinics, employment resources, mental health supports, case management, and auxiliary services such laundry. The campus design meant that the facility had both interior and exterior common areas in which residents could lounge and interact with each other. I disqualified faith-based and small-scale transitional housing organizations even if they provided multiple services. I also omitted any multiservice center that addressed specific homeless populations such as domestic violence survivors, unaccompanied minors, or families.

This search for co-located facilities was intended to show how prevalent they were in the United States, but my inquiry revealed other commonalities. I collected and analyzed media accounts on the planning and building of co-located facilities. There are four interesting findings. First, is that these facilities often are located near the downtown core in cities with a population greater than 100,000. Second, all of these facilities reconfigured and condensed an existing service hub. Third, the narratives emphasized the goodwill of those who helped to establish them. Journalists frequently portrayed the construction of such facilities as significant

acts of charity. Such accounts stressed that the improvements to social service accessibility would fulfill a great need. For instance, one account on the conversion of a prison into a co-located facility described the proposed social service array as offering 'unconstrained opportunities' (Watson, 2016). What we can see is that social service accessibility has substituted for housing policy. Fourth, the language used to support co-location echoes the language used to justify urban renewal. There is an emphasis on the profitability of the urban core because it amounts to a general sense of order.

Social service operators, government officials, and business leaders support co-location because it is a spatial management tactic, though their rationales are different. Social service advocates support co-location because it intends to improve service delivery through greater accessibility and a progressive nature of delivery. I have described homeless people mobility in service hubs as beneficial to themselves, without addressing tensions in service delivery. Homeless social work relies on the practice of referrals, in which providers or case managers send service users to the next relevant nonprofit. Conflicts between case managers and service users arise when service users cannot or do not follow their case plans. Case plans attempt to identify the areas that an individual needs to address to secure housing. Case managers write case plans knowing that they will guide, assist, or prod people through them. However, service users cannot or do not always conform to the schedule of their case plans and of nonprofits. Moreover, sometimes people are not focused on carrying out the necessary steps to secure housing.

The logistical issues with service delivery and service users themselves are a parallel track of "problems." Co-location responds to this parallel track of "problems," because it is

supposed to eliminate geographic burdens, uncompleted referrals, and duplication of service. Geographic burdens refer to the need to reach social services spread across the city under conditions where many lack personal transportation and public transportation is inadequate. Uncompleted referrals occur when unhoused people cannot or do not reach the next provider. For service providers and recipients, uncompleted referrals signify stalls, do-overs, and resets within incremental service delivery. Duplication is when multiple nonprofits provide the same services to service users.

Managing "homeless" people is more difficult, but service operators were eager to build upon their agency and mobility. The layout of co-located facilities attests to Wolch and Rowe's (1992) claim that unhoused people's networks are spatially grounded. Social service providers sought to use people's movement within hubs as a corollary that advanced the hub's sense of community. By condensing their mobility pathways, co-located facilities ideally increase the number of opportunities for supportive alliances, friendships, and resource sharing among service users. Service operators and case managers consider these peer relationships as beneficial in ways that they cannot be. Co-located facilities also strive to ease some of the hostilities that "homeless" people confront outside the service hub. The co-location model creates a space for "homeless" people to be contained.

Government officials got behind co-location over demolishing the service hubs because they could prevent an uncontrolled displacement of "homeless" people and meet shelter obligations to poor and homeless communities. They also support co-location because it centralizes social services and ought to reduce the visibility of "homelessness" in the city. In some cases, they accomplish this without expanding service capacity. Moreover, centralization

goes toward cost-efficiency. The inclusion of onsite medical clinics may divert “homeless” people from costly hospital emergency room care.

Business leaders support co-location because it condenses the size and footprint of urban “homeless” districts. The co-location model brings in and busies “homeless” people in an already stigmatized area. Co-located facilities represent the politics of “not-in-my-backyard” or NIMBYism for downtown boosters. The co-located facilities function to decrease visible “homelessness” in the CBD. Business owners consider the reduction in “homelessness” as a restoration of a relative sense of order in the city and, thus, good for business.

Co-location is a compromise between local social service operators, business and government leaders. Instead of demolition and displacement of service hubs, co-location centralizes and condenses them. Business leaders and government officials essentially agreed to cede space in the city for social services and the “homeless” people who are already there. Service operators are allowed to remain in the same spot as the hub. Co-location creates a legitimate area in the city for nonprofits.

Conclusion

I stress that the purpose of skid row and the purpose of subsequent “homeless” districts is to manage “homelessness” more than it intends to address the structural production of housing insecurity, much less end houselessness. Co-location condenses and maintains “homeless” districts in the city. The co-located facility creates a legitimate space for “homeless” people at the same time it expands “illegitimate spaces” in the city. I do not doubt that social service advocates of co-location had sincere intentions to improve the lives of the people they serve. However, I critique the stated claim of an “all-in-one-facility,” because it expressed

overconfidence in the service array. By overconfidence, I mean social service operators' capacity to "know" "homeless" people. The co-located service array is not so very different from social services found in skid row. Although the quality of these services has likely improved greatly from the skid row era, it is not clear that social service leaders actually increased their knowledge of service provision toward "homeless" people. Nor is it clear that improving the accessibility to social services significantly re-houses people or addresses their problems in housing and labor markets.

We should not forget skid rows within the history of urban geography because urban "homeless" districts have persisted into the present moment. I have argued that the subsequent "homeless" districts, service dependent ghettos, service hubs, and co-located facilities are examples of social geomorphology. My argument supports Hopper's (1995) claim that "zones of homelessness," incorrectly refer to the people, places, and institutions as naturally occurring phenomenon. I have claimed that urban renewal demolished skid row, but failed to address or ameliorate the underlying dynamics that gave skid rows their sociospatial functions. Since then, various stakeholders have had a role in the transmutation of skid row into co-located campuses, in which each transmutation took up the sociospatial functions of skid row. Interestingly, co-location represented an investment in "homeless" districts in the city, which is supposed to advance profitability elsewhere in the city. The following chapter looks more specifically at the example of Phoenix and describes the transmutation of Phoenix's skid row into the Human Services Campus.

CHAPTER 4

ZONING PEOPLE IN DOWNTOWN PHOENIX

Introduction

The two previous chapters discussed the federal and local state's attempts to spatially "know" and manage "homeless" people through the concepts of legibility and co-location. Within those attempts we saw tactics which addressed "homelessness" as a sociospatial problem. This chapter examine how those concepts were deployed to govern "homeless" people in downtown Phoenix. This chapter focuses on the relation between three separate spaces within the downtown region of Phoenix. I chart the ways that downtown Phoenix's policy makers first attempted to eradicate "homelessness" through the demolition of its skid row, the Deuce neighborhood. However, bulldozing the Deuce only displaced them to Phoenix's Capitol Mall District (CMD), near the state capitol building, and led to the formation of the Zone neighborhood, an urban district with unhoused people.

The rise of the Zone neighborhood provides a lens to understand how the urban "homeless" problematic has been constructed and addressed by policy makers in Phoenix. I describe the formation of the Zone neighborhood through several planning documents concerning the transformation of the CMD. I also depict the social service providers in the Zone neighborhood, showing how it became a service dependent ghetto (SDG) and, later, a service hub. These transformations established the conditions for co-location and the Human Services

Campus. A full description and analysis of the social service support for the Human Services Campus comprises the next chapter.

The geographic region I discuss encompasses the Deuce neighborhood, downtown Phoenix, the CMD, and the Zone neighborhood. Map 4.1 shows the entire geographic region and highlights each subject area. The substantive portion of this chapter focuses on the period from 1970-2000, however part one outlines an earlier historical moment between the 1940s and the 1970s. For the sake of clarity, when discussing downtown Phoenix before the 1970s, I use the term Central Business District (CBD). After the 1970s, I use the term downtown Phoenix. The CMD has been known as the capitol area or governmental mall, however I refer to that space as the CMD. It's unclear precisely when the name "Zone" became popular, nonetheless I use that designation throughout this chapter.

Since the 1970s, the borders of the downtown Phoenix have remained the same. The east-west boundaries of downtown are 7th Street and 7th Avenue, and the north-south boundaries are McDowell Road and Buckeye Road. The CMD's boundaries, however, have changed. Its current east-west borders are 19th Avenue and 5th Avenue and north-south borders at Van Buren and Harrison. The Zone neighborhood is not formally recognized in municipal planning documents and many policy makers do not use that term. However, social service leaders identify the Zone's east-west borders at 15th Avenue and 5th Avenue and its north-south borders are at Van Buren Street and Harrison Street (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). In spite of the claims of social service leaders, I locate the Zone's east-west borders at just past 17th Avenue and just short of 6th Avenue, based on several of hours of walking tours of the area. Map 4.1 shows the borders of the old Deuce neighborhood, Capitol

Mall District, and the Zone neighborhood in Phoenix. The orange outline shows downtown Phoenix. The yellow outline shows the Deuce neighborhood which existed until about 1975. The red outline shows the Capitol Mall District. The purple box shows the Zone neighborhood according to social service leaders. The blue outline shows the Zone neighborhood as I have defined it (Google, n.d.).



Figure 4.1: Map of research area

Part I - The Fall of Phoenix's Commercial Business District (CBD) and the Deuce neighborhood

During the 1940s, Phoenix's CBD was a prominent metropolitan destination with strong retail sales (Luckingham, 1989). Phoenix's CBD contained high-end department stores, movie theaters, and restaurants (Cook, 1991). Additionally, there were specialty jewelry and saddlery stores (Cook, 1991). Beginning in the 1950s, Phoenix's CBD lost its appeal due to suburbanization (Luckingham, 1989). Phoenix's suburbanization was driven by World War II veterans migrating for employment opportunities (Rex, & Seidman, 2000). Balsas (2007) explains the people were drawn to Phoenix because of the large number of defense industry jobs, cheaper cost of living, and retirement homes. The population of Phoenix in 1950 was 100,000 which grew to 1.4 million over the next 50 years. During this period, the rise of automobiles, shopping malls, and suburbs influenced the decline of central city which shaped Phoenix's growth (Balsas, 2007). During the 1960s, the Salt River Project (SRP) and Arizona Public Service (APS) utility corporations gained control of the city's water and electric infrastructures which enabled Phoenix's rapid suburbanization (Luckingham, 1989). The economic decline of Phoenix's CBD occurred when downtown retailers relocated to the suburbs (Luckingham, 1989). By the 1960s the CBD noticeably lacked pedestrians (Cook, 1991). Phoenix's CBD lost prominence as cars became the dominant means of transportation in the rapidly growing city (Luckingham, 1989). Conservative policy makers finally accepted federal funds for highway construction in 1956, and, after their initial hesitation, they rushed to build them (Luckingham, 1989). Phoenix's period for urban renewal and slum clearances occurred between 1949 and 1973 (Collins, & Arizona State Parks Board, 2005). Initially, city officials were reluctant to use federal funding, but once public housing requirements were eliminated

conservatives began to eagerly use the federal funds (Collins, & Arizona State Parks Board, 2005).

The most robust account of the Deuce is provided by Bernstein (1972) in *Geographical Perspectives on Skid Row in Phoenix, Arizona*. According to Bernstein (1972) skid rows can be identified based on their functions and associated 'ways of life.' He argues that skid rows offer menial and low wage employment for "homeless" individuals who he characterized as 'down and out,' suffer from alcoholism, and lack family or friend networks. Bernstein concludes that skids rows are common, and their evolution was a 'natural' response to meet the needs of the changing urban demographic. Others such as Talton (2015), argue that city leaders were critical of the city's skid row, but allowed vice activities such as prostitution and gambling in the Deuce because it added to the city's treasury. Bernstein (1972) focused on the Deuce's functionality which catered to the needs and habits of its residents. I am concerned with the destruction of skid rows and the urban "homeless" districts that followed. I argue that the positive functions that made skid row a neighborhood were lost and that people suffered greater marginalization and institutionalization in the subsequent "homeless" districts following skid row.

During the 1940s the Deuce neighborhood was a vibrant commercial, entertainment, and industrial district within the CBD. The Deuce neighborhood was an integral part of the CBD offering affordable housing, casual employment, and a local hot spot for nightlife. There was a large and prosperous Spanish speaking community and a thriving Chinatown. Phoenix was a distribution hub for produce in the southwest, and the Deuce included a large warehouse district that supported the produce industry (Bernstein, 1972). However, the produce industry waned due to the expansion trucking and interstate highways (Luckingham, 1989). As the need

for produce labor decreased, the Deuce neighborhood was increasingly associated with crime, drugs, and prostitution (Cook, 1991). Bernstein (1972) explains that the decline of the produce industry was problematic. Unmarried World War II veterans competed with the Deuce's residents for day laborer jobs that were becoming scarce. As such, the Deuce was no longer capable of attracting retail capital, and the services and buildings changed to meet the needs of the population. By 1962, half the land in the CBD was virtually non-income producing. Residents of the once prosperous Chinatown abandoned the neighborhood (Bernstein, 1972). By 1964, city officials cleared entire city blocks in the Deuce, reducing the population from 2,500 to 1,200 semi-permanent residents (Morin, 1974).

Bernstein (1972) describes the visible decline of the Deuce was due to several deteriorating hotel buildings in the area. These older hotels could not compete with newer hotels. Interestingly, many of the older hotels were once part of a thriving prostitution trade with no less than 16 brothels operating inside the Deuce during World War II (Bernstein, 1972). Talton (2015) explains that after the war, Phoenix's policy makers directed police officers to clampdown on prostitution and gambling. The crackdown shrunk these activities and forced them deeper underground. This was a policy shift for municipal officials, who previously allowed these illegal industries to operate. The police crackdown coincided with a decrease in servicemen bringing capital to the area (Talton, 2015).

Bernstein (1972) described the Deuce neighborhood as a contiguous fifteen-block area in Phoenix with seven principal land uses: *commercial, industrial or warehousing, residential, mixed residential, governmental, parking, and vac*ant. Deuce met the geographical definition of a skid row due to its proximity to the CBD, railroads, and the warehouse district. The Deuce

contained distressed buildings and visible trash. In 1970, an inspection by the Fire Prevention Bureau and Housing, Safety Department, and U.S. Bureau of Census revealed that 60% of buildings in the Deuce lacked cold and hot water plumbing (Bernstein, 1972)

The origin of the name Deuce is unclear; however, five explanations are possible. The first is the dictionary definition which suggests the 'devil' and connotations of evil. Second, is that the neighborhood was located along two main arteries. Third, is because of it's of its 2nd street location. Fourth, is a merely a nickname (Bernstein, 1972). Talton (2015) claims that the name was derived from the Phoenix Police Department's designation of the area as beat patrol number two.

Accounts of the history of the Deuce indicate that the neighborhood met the needs of precariously housed people in spite of the deterioration of the physical spaces of the neighborhood. As with other skid rows, the Deuce contained cheap lodging bars, and casual employment opportunities. Housing was often substandard, though considerable variations existed. The Deuce had cubicle hotels, single room occupancy (SRO) hotels, cot-bed dormitories, and flophouses. Additionally, there were five religious missions that provided shelter and food to unhoused people. Bars offered spaces for socialization and entertainment. Liquor store clerks supplied employment information, lines of credit, and check cashing services for residents. Thrift stores, pawnshops and rummage sales were good resources for clothing and small-scale economies. Employment agencies staffed field worker or truck loading jobs associated with the produce industry. The Deuce did not have gay and lesbian bars (Bernstein, 1972).

In order to address the downfall of the Deuce neighborhood, some background information about the Capitol Mall District in downtown Phoenix is necessary. The CMD is significant because homeless people congregated there after the Deuce was demolished. The Capitol Mall District contains Arizona's capitol building, historic capitol building, state congressional chambers, Arizona Supreme Court, and a large governmental office complex. The CMD also included two small neighborhoods consisting of older homes originally constructed for produce workers (Gober, 2006).

Before the arrival of homeless people in the CMD, the area was the subject of several planned redevelopment projects, most of which had not materialized. The Joint Urban Design Program (1997) reviewed previous plans for the CMD. During the 1950s, legislators forecasted that governmental operations would exceed existing office building capacities and city officials demolished part of the Woodland neighborhood to build parking lots. In 1957, a master plan for the Arizona State Capitol Area envisioned a governmental mall similar to Washington D.C. and Brasília, the federal capital district of Brazil. This plan called for a large green space that linked the state capitol building, memorials, a park, and pedestrian friendly amenities to the CBD. The authors were concerned with raising the profile of Phoenix. In 1967, the Phoenix Planning Department formed a committee to study how to create a corridor to the CBD. This committee acknowledged that previous plans were neglected, and they formally designated the area the Capitol Mall District. What makes the CMD region significant is how much importance it was given among legislators, planners, and downtown boosters. Interestingly, many of the subsequent planning documents expressed a theme of frustration over lack of progress in the CMD.

Part II – 1970s

Beginning in the 1970s, policy makers initiated the first of several projects aimed at transforming the CBD into a cultural and entertainment venue. The first project was the construction of the Phoenix Civic Plaza (now known as the Phoenix Convention Center) and Symphony Hall. Plans for the Phoenix Civic Plaza signaled the end of the Deuce because it was to be built in the center of the neighborhood which meant that the last remaining cot-hotel often used by "homeless" people would be razed (Bernstein, 1972). A large 60-block slum clearance project in downtown which included the Deuce neighborhood was approved (Collins & Arizona State Parks Board, 2005). Construction for the civic center began in 1972. That year, over 2,300 affordable housing units in the Deuce were destroyed without replacement (Gober, 2006). Richard Morin (1974), a journalist for The Arizona Republic newspaper, attributed population decline in the Deuce to the falling citrus and cotton industry. He reported that Phoenix police officers who conducted beat patrols in the Deuce claimed that the neighborhood lost its reputation and population after the closure of several bars and hotels during the early 1970s. By 1974, city officials had destroyed most of the old Deuce as policymakers ordered the razing of 22 remaining businesses including several bars and hotels (Morin, 1974).

The 1970s marked the beginning of the contemporary period for downtown Phoenix (Rex & Seidman, 2000). The Phoenix Civic Plaza was the first of several projects that changed the landscape of downtown Phoenix. According to Collins and Arizona State Parks Board (2005), downtown boosters believed that the Civic Plaza would ignite downtown revitalization after the CBD failed as a central retail destination. Once the Civic Plaza was completed, developers

emulated and build a hotel with a revolving restaurant at the top which provides a 360° view of the downtown region. The Hyatt Hotel and The Valley National Bank built in 1972 are still defining points in Phoenix's skyline (Collins, & Arizona State Parks Board, 2005).

The Phoenix Civic Plaza was supposed to raise the prominence of Phoenix among other major cities in the U.S. According to, *A Report and Recommendations to the City Council on the Central Phoenix Plan* (1970) city of Phoenix planners were concerned with transforming downtown Phoenix into an appealing place to "live, work, and play." That report established downtown Phoenix's contemporary boundaries. The authors of the 1970 report suggested that the Central Phoenix Plan should be used as a formal template, guiding both public and private land use in the area. They defended their plan, claiming to have public support based the lack of opposition and the approval of consultants and professionals who reviewed their plan (City of Phoenix, 1970). Additionally, newspaper articles advocated for additional redevelopment projects for the area (Morin, 1974).

By 1970, nearly 20 years of planning work intent on remaking the CMD were unrealized. However, government officials concerned with the CMD sought to piggyback the CMD's redevelopment with projects in downtown Phoenix. The *Arizona Capitol Complex* (1973) report acknowledged the lack of progress in the CMD. In response, the government officials called for the creation of legislative committees that would develop "long-range" planning for the area. They stressed that long range planning would be crucial to overcome the lack of progress in the CMD. Legislators sought construct governmental buildings in clusters to avoid the appearance of a uniform row. The report recommended linking governmental office buildings to the historic state capitol. Legislators believed that the CMD should be remade such to be attractive to

visitors and to provide areas for tourists and governmental employees to rest or visit. In this context, homelessness in the CMD was not directly mentioned. However, this committee opined that without adequate planning the CMD would continue to devolve into mediocrity "unbefitting" of the capitol. They visualized pedestrian and public transportation links to the CBD and called for large shade pavilions and more native vegetation to enhance green spaces (Arizona Capitol Development Committee, 1973). It is highly unlikely that that the commission envisioned unhoused people in their plans.

Displaced people from the Deuce presented a new problem for the remake of the CMD. The demolition of the Deuce neighborhood removed thousands of affordable housing units in downtown. Without replacement housing, displaced people migrated to the CMD. "Homeless" people began to congregate near Carnegie Library Park, only a few blocks away from the historic state capitol building (Polson, 1985). The 1970s planning documents concerning the CMD do not acknowledge "homeless" people or "homelessness" directly. This is striking because the state legislature building was located within a few blocks of where unhoused people were gathering. The CMD's planning documents show that planners and legislators only grudgingly acknowledged "homelessness" in the area. According to one unhoused participant I interviewed, the nickname "Zone" was a reference to the television series, *The Twilight Zone* and means one can easily obtain and use drugs in the area (personal communication, July 28, 2016).

The arrival of unhoused people in the CMD transformed the Zone neighborhood into a service dependent ghetto (SDG). During the 1970s, the Zone neighborhood was predominantly industrial, lacking housing and commercial businesses. Richard Morin (1974) detailed the surge

of “homeless” people in the area who created of a tent encampment in Carnegie Library Park near 10th Ave and Washington Street. They obtained meals from the Saint Vincent de Paul (SVdP) dining hall on 9th Ave and Madison. A few lingering hotels and bars were used by “homeless” people. A nearby alcohol rehabilitation facility provided treatment. Residents in the Woodland Park neighborhood complained to city hall about the increasing numbers of “homeless” people. Homeowner’s alleged that “homeless” people would threaten them and steal from their backyards. Homeowners asked the city to remove the SVdP dining hall (Morin 1974).

Part III – 1980s

In 1983, voters elected Terry Goddard (1984-1990) as mayor of Phoenix, the first democratic mayor in 35 years (Editorial Board, 1983). Goddard’s impact on Phoenix is beyond the scope of this project, but his mayoral years are important because of his role as an influential downtown booster. According to Gober (2006), Goddard successfully urged the city council to purchase and renovate the Orpheum Theater, a 1929 Spanish revival building. The theater was one of the few performing arts and film festival venues in downtown. More importantly, Goddard created a $1.1 billion bond initiative in 1988 which enabled the city of to attract substantial private investment (Gober, 2006). Goddard was a hands-on booster. He held a fundraising event and personally requested $350,000 from local business leaders to pay for promotional materials associated with the $1.1 billion bond initiative (Editorial Board, 1988).

Pro-growth business leaders and government officials including Goddard expanded their vision for downtown Phoenix’s by adding professional sports to its cultural and entertainment profile. In 1984, the Phoenix Community Alliance (PCA), a downtown booster organization,

commissioned a study to estimate the economic benefits of domed stadium in downtown Phoenix. The report titled, *Economic Impact of Proposed Domed Stadium in Downtown Phoenix,* was a cost-benefit analysis of stadium construction and operation. It projected that a domed stadium would generate a $33 million dollars in annual spending within the CBD for the first 20 years of operation. The financial projection was based on the economic impact of Seattle's Kingdome and estimates of net spending from commercial activity, ticket sales, parking and the number of "man-years" of employment the project would create. The report noted that the city government would not acquire direct benefits from the stadium, but indirect benefits from taxable spending (Market Research, 1984).

According to the 1984 report, a domed stadium would be a cultural amenity to downtown Phoenix. The stadium was supposed to raise and expand the profile of the Phoenix Civic Plaza, the city's national convention-meeting space. The authors stated that the stadium would drive up consumer demand for restaurants, commercial retail, and hotels. They predicted a minimum of 1,200 new hotel rooms for the downtown area, which would double the number of "first-class" rooms. Authors claimed that the stadium would attract a "critical mass" of people and recreation activities which would foster a people-friendly downtown. The indirect benefits of a domed stadium were believed to be a reduction in crime and an increase in property values (Market Research, 1984).

Though most of the housing units from the old Deuce had been cleared, municipal officials targeted other businesses for demolition or relocation because of plans to build hotels near the Phoenix Civic Plaza. Arizona Republic journalist Joseph LaPlante (1980) interviewed the owner of Nogales Café, Bill Annos. Annos explained that his diner, which served businessmen

and homeless people alike, was a target for relocation. His restaurant sat on a block in which City of Phoenix planners wanted to build a convention hotel, intending to attract high profile clientele with more disposable income. Policy makers were intent on clearing any remaining businesses from the old Deuce. Paul Harris of the Phoenix's Redevelopment Agency called all the buildings on this particular block blighted and unsafe. Harris did not mince words when he asserted that that the entire block would be razed within a year (LaPlante, 1980).

Only one redevelopment project for the CMD was realized. The Wesley Bolin Memorial Plaza, an outdoor urban park housing several memorials pertinent to Arizona's history, which was directly across the street from the historical state capitol building. Dorothee Polson (1985) a journalist for the Arizona Republic, interviewed James G. Stewart, the director of planning and construction for the memorial plaza. Steward believed that the memorial plaza would lead to other projects in the CMD. He acknowledged that several planning commissions had worked on plans for the CMD for the past 27 years. He said that, "Each commission would come in like a ball of fire, then just fade away" (Polson, 1985: A8). Steward believed that the new commission led by Gov. Bruce Babbitt, which included Phoenix Mayor Terry Goddard, would finally make progress. This commission included business leaders from the private sector along with city, state, and county officials. The new commission planned to redevelop Pioneer Cemetery, a few blocks southeast of the memorial plaza. The cemetery would have been enclosed by an iron fence and the project included plans for tombstone restoration. Moreover, this group addressed Carnegie Library and the surrounding park, where "homeless" people congregated. The library was to be remade into a museum honoring the state's historical figures by 1986. Other plans involved building a domed stadium, a six-story condominium, and private offices in

the CMD (Polson, 1985). In 1985, the commission empowered themselves to produce and maintain a comprehensive long-range developmental plan for the CMD (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997). They extended the CMD's north-south borders to Fillmore Street and Harrison Street and its east-west borders were extended to 8th Avenue and 19th Avenue (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997). Planners, for the first time, used a historical designation to preserve the Woodland Park, Oakland, and University Park neighborhoods (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997).

In the 1989 planning document *Government Mall Urban Design Plan,* planners and legislators claimed that the CMD failed to contribute to the economic vitality of downtown Phoenix (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997). This commission asserted that there was neither the means to fund nor implement development projects in the CMD (Joint Urban Design Plan, 1997). They portrayed the Capitol Mall area as unorderly, unsafe, unattractive, unhealthy, and unpleasant (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997). The language used in this plan was a thinly veiled attack on "homeless" people. Whereas the term unhealthy refers to the pestilence of "homelessness" and unsafe refer to the criminality of "homeless" people. Unattractive and unpleasant is the spatial degradation associated with homelessness. The 1950s era term, 'unbefitting' was replaced by 'unorderly.'

During the early 1980s, city of Phoenix leaders attempted to disperse unhoused people from the Zone neighborhood. In 1981, the city of Phoenix passed an anti-skid row ordinance that discouraged blood banks, bars, soup kitchens, and flophouses (Alter, Buckley, Taylor, & Doherty, 1984). City officials demolished 1,500 low-cost hotel rooms in downtown (Editorial Board, 1983). These actions failed to rid the area of people without housing. After the

demolition, a tent encampment sprang up near 12th Avenue and Madison (Editorial Board, 1983). The Salvation Army oversaw two additional encampments near 9th Avenue and Jefferson (Editorial Board, 1983). Alter et al, (1984) published an unflattering article about Phoenix's stance toward its homeless populations in Newsweek Magazine. The article reported that there was an anti-homeless ad campaign directed at the city's 1,500 homeless people. The "Fight Back" campaign was created to eliminate what is considered to be undesirable behavior of homeless people in downtown Phoenix. The campaign featured an anti-homeless advertisement designed by Sandy Cowen, an employee of a downtown advertising agency. The ad featured a homeless man sleeping on a park bench with a red line strikethrough, similar to traffic signs, and was posted around downtown (Alter et al., 1984).

According to Mark Holleran, the executive director of Central Arizona Shelter Services (CASS), during the early 1980s, Mayor Goddard created a task force dedicated to coping with "homelessness" (personal communication, July 13, 2016). Goddard issued a call for proposals for how to address "homelessness", none of which called for a shelter. Goddard took matters into his own hands and personally advocated for a shelter in downtown Phoenix (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). The original CASS shelter built in 1984 was the same spot in which the HSC would be built approximately 20 years later. The creation of CASS and another shelter provided policymakers justification for the clearing of the tent encampments in the Zone neighborhood. The CASS shelter replaced the tent encampment near 12th Ave and Madison. The second shelter was located near 22nd Ave and Portland, outside of the Zone and CMD. It was operated by the Salvation Army and also opened in 1983 (Editorial Board, 1983b). The two tent city encampments on 9th Ave and Jefferson were scheduled to close shortly after

the opening of these two shelters (Editorial Board, 1983b). Outgoing Phoenix Mayor Margaret Hance and Vice Mayor Barry Starr toured the new CASS shelter and both left without making a statement to the press (Editorial Board, 1983b).

The original CASS shelter was a significant addition to the Zone neighborhood which helped make the Zone neighborhood an SDG. However, the building was an old record storage warehouse that Maricopa County officials had considered beyond is usefulness (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). It had an institutional facade and was never meant for human habitation. Con Bratton, executive director of SVdP who, at the time, administered CASS noted to the press that the raw materials used to renovate the warehouse could have been used to build several homes instead (Editorial Board, 1983b).

The André House, a Catholic hospitality nonprofit arrived in the Zone neighborhood during the 1980s. Their impact would prove to be significant. I interviewed the director of the André House, Fr. Tom Doyle, who discussed the organization. The André House was created by two Jesuit priests from the University of Norte Dame, whose names were not given. They acquired a small home in the Zone neighborhood during October 1984 and had their first guest in November of that same year. Soon after, the André House began providing weekly meals to unhoused people in the Zone neighborhood near Carnegie Library Park. On Christmas day in 1984, using a donated turkey, the André House provided bowls of soup to people. Volunteers were surprised by the overwhelming demand for meals. In response, André House volunteers increased their meal service provision from weekly to nightly. In January of 1987, the organization opened another hospitality house dedicated for women. That hospitality house also provided meals, food boxes, and clothing for children. Also in 1987, André House

volunteers created an employment assistance nonprofit, called Saint Joseph the Worker (SJtW). That organization began operating in April of 1988 and would later become a part of the HSC (T. Doyle, personal communication, July 14, 2016).

Part IV – 1990s

Building upon momentum from the bond funds, downtown Phoenix became home to the several prominent venues including the America West Arena in 1992 (now called the Footprint Center), the Museum of History in 1995, the Arizona Science Center in 1997, and Bank One Ballpark in 1998 (now called Chase Field). The Arizona Science Center was significant addition to downtown Phoenix. According to The Arizona Republic's editorial board (1996), the 120,000 square foot center replaced the small science museum at 147 E. Adams Street. The new museum was contained 40,000 square feet of dedicated to hands-on activities. The total cost of was $47.6 million. $20 million came from the 1988 Phoenix bond initiative. $10 million came from the city of Phoenix and private donations supplied the remaining $17.6 million (Editorial Board, 1996).

Phoenix Mayor Terry Goddard's term ended in 1990, and he left behind a legacy of boosterism. Jerry Colangelo, a Chicago transplant who will always be associated with Phoenix sports, took up Goddard's boosterism. Colangelo was the owner of the Phoenix Suns, professional basketball team. With Goddard's help, he successfully advocated for a new downtown arena, despite the fact that the Suns rarely drew a capacity crowd during the previous 20 years at the Veterans Memorial Coliseum (James, 1988). Colangelo advocated for millions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies for the downtown arena (James, 1988). The basketball arena was the first domed stadium in downtown.

Colangelo was also instrumental in the construction of a professional baseball stadium in downtown Phoenix, Bank One Ballpark (now known as Chase field). According to Collins and Grineski (2007), the construction of the stadium benefits "insiders" of urban regime coalitions at the expense of poor and minority populations and reinforces uneven development. They critique dominant political economy discourses that support such endeavors using the language of "universal benefits." They show that Colangelo founded and funded the Downtown Phoenix Partnership (DPP) in support of the new stadium. Officially, it was supposed to contract with the city to provide additional services to downtown business, through special property taxes on downtown property owners. Other stadium advocates justified it using economic impact studies (Rich, 2000). However, Colangelo successfully leveraged multiple levels of government to overcome voter opposition, and reconfigure several different land-use policies for the stadium (Collins & Grineski, 2007). Downtown Phoenix has long had a reputation for the role of civic elites in managing the capitol and controlling it politically (Collins, & Arizona State Parks Board, 2005). Interestingly, Colangelo would prove to be a strong supporter of the HSC.

There were two significant planning documents for the CMD were published during the 1990s. In *The Capitol Mall District Development Guidelines* (1997) report legislators argued that the CMD should be expanded and divided into four proposed land-uses. They also reiterated frustration with the lack of progress in the CMD. More importantly, the report acknowledged "homelessness" in the area. The legislator's stated goal was the creation of a pedestrian friendly space. They addressed the residential, open, commercial and industrial land-uses, and recommended rehabilitating the older housing stock and creating parks out of the open spaces. The also suggested making the commercial spaces more accessible, and wanted gates and

fences to conceal the industrial areas while relocating loading docks away from streets. They asserted that these changes would reduce crime, which would make the area appealing to residents, employees, and tourists. Their recommendations were a reaction to the formation of a service hub and rising "homelessness" in the neighborhood. The legislators also directly responded to homelessness because they recommended dispersing social service providers to other parts of metropolitan Phoenix (Legislative Governmental Mall Commission, 1997).

The second planning document was comprehensive, reviewing and summarizing previous planning documents for the CMD. The *Renaissance of the Capitol District* (1997) charrette was produced by the Joint Urban Design Program, College of Architecture and Environmental Design at Arizona State University. Their work was sponsored by the Phoenix Community Alliance (PCA) and Arizona Chapter of American Institute of Architects. In 1993, Barry Star, president of the PCA, and Richard Snell of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, the parent company of Arizona Public Service (APS), held meetings about revitalizing the CMD. Marty Shultz, a lobbyist for APS (Arizona's second largest public utility corporation) and a PCA member, became chair of the newly formed Capitol Mall Committee. In 1996, he approved the Arizona Capitol Mall Revitalization Strategic Plan. Interestingly, Marty Shultz would also become pivotal in the creation of the HSC in downtown.

The Joint Urban Design Program (1997) charrette reviewed previous plans for the CMD. The authors were once again critical of the lack of progress in the CMD. They acknowledged the concentration of social services in the area, but, more importantly, attributed "homelessness" in the CMD to the demolition of the Deuce neighborhood. They claimed that the growth of "homelessness" was due to the destruction of low-cost urban hotels since 1970, when the

Phoenix Civic Plaza was built and expanded in the old Deuce neighborhood. No less than 33 hotels were demolished in the area, which represented about 75% of inexpensive housing in the Deuce (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997).

It was significant that this commission acknowledged that clearing the Deuce neighborhood caused "homelessness" in the CMD because it gave them cause not to repeat the process. The case against re-displacement can be found in a single quotation,

> "The problems for the Capitol area worsened as the Deuce, a notorious Phoenix skid row so named because it centered on Second Street, was removed to make way for the Civic Plaza. Displacement was a controversial proposition, as many feared that unfavorable activities formerly contained within the Deuce would spread to other areas once the Civic Plaza was built. That is precisely what happened, and the Capitol was particularly hard-hit" (Joint Urban Design Program 1997: 7).

While it was important that planners and legislators were opposed to displacement, they however still associated "homeless" people (victims of displacement) with crime. The Joint Urban Design Program (1997) asserted that prostitution, open drug use, and gangs migrated from the Deuce to the CMD along with "homeless" people. They recommended that social services be limited by the carrying capacity of the neighborhood, whereby the number of shelter beds is proportional to meals served. They also stated that Phoenix should not bear the burden of "homelessness" alone and called for surrounding cities to take on responsibilities for homeless services (Joint Urban Design Program, 1997). Their call for proportionality of beds and meals was an indirect reference to CASS, SVdP, and the André House.

By 1990, the Zone neighborhood functioned as a service hub, with several neighboring nonprofits located in the area to address "homelessness." Within the Zone, CASS offered shelter and case management. The SVdP dining hall provided meals to unhoused people. A Saint Mary's Food Bank also provided meals. Health Care for the Homeless (HCH) was Maricopa County's low-cost clinic located in the neighborhood that provided basic medical care. Moreover, internal partnerships between non-profits strengthened the Zone's role as a service hub. St. Mary's provided breakfast and SVdP provided dinners. Another partnership involved CASS and HCH, which partnered with each other in order to establish a free dental clinic (A. Stein, personal communication, July 5, 2016). Policing patterns also contributed to the Zone's emergence as a service hub. According to one police officer who worked in the area, police officers allowed homeless people to traverse between CASS and SVdP, calling the corridor "Madison Row" (B. Freudenthal, personal communication, July 7, 2016).

This collection of services in the Zone was opposed by the Capitol Mall Association. According to Creno (1990), Bonnie Towles, executive director of the Capitol Mall Association, filed complaints to the city of Phoenix about homeless people lining up for morning and a nightly meal provision. Towels challenged the operating permit for CASS and forced them to relocate a nightly dinner service line that served 1,000 people in 1990. That same year, Towles' group challenged the operation of the St. Mary's food bank across the street from CASS. The St. Mary's had been serving 500 breakfast meals every morning for the past three years. Towles demanded that St. Mary's leaders file for a food permit or shut down the meal service (Creno, 1990).

The André House located near Library Park would relocate and become an important member of the service hub. The move was driven by opposition from the city of Phoenix officials. The André House had been providing evening meals for six years. Shortly after surpassing the 1 million-meal mark, they were ordered to shut down by Phoenix's zoning administrator (Cannella, 1990). In response, the director of the André House, Rev. Mark Van Wassenhove said, "We need to find a place of our own" (Cannella, 1990: B7). Fr. Tom Doyle explained to me how the André House enlisted help from one of their volunteers, a commercial real estate developer, Mike McQuaid. He helped the organization purchase the St. Mary's Food Bank building across the street from CASS. The move made them an integral part of the service hub when they opened in November of 1990. One month later they re-opened SJtW inside the André House. By June 1996, they were offering meals, laundry, and additional restrooms for unhoused people (T. Doyle, personal communication, July 14, 2016). McQuaid was a key member of the HSC coalition and the HSC's first director.

Conclusion

The razing of the Deuce neighborhood destroyed thousands of affordable housing units and displaced the people that relied on them. This chapter argued that the demolition of Phoenix's skid row district, the Deuce, led to the subsequent formation of the Zone neighborhood which contained a large number of unhoused people and stigmatized the area. Bob Frankenberger, an architect with the State of Arizona Historic Preservation Office, stated,

> With historical perspective, the Deuce can now be seen as an idealized urban necessity that provided support for a societal stratum now known simply as the homeless. The Deuce was "home" to those whose existence depended upon pick-up work at the

> produce market or unloading freight cars. The combination of plentiful day labor and single-room-occupancy hotels (SRO's) is now seen as the baby that was throughout with the bathwater (Joint Urban Design Program 1997: 8).

The Zone neighborhood replaced the Deuce, but it lacked opportunities for casual labor, recreation, and more importantly affordable housing. The tent encampments and SVdP constituted a service dependent ghetto. The CASS shelter along with SVdP and the André House represented the formation of a service hub. The service hub persisted because it was useful, even though it was considered undesirable. By 2000, social service leaders claimed that they could not manage "homelessness" and "homeless" people as they once did. The following chapter discusses the creation of the Human Services Campus.

CHAPTER 5

THE HUMAN SERVICES CAMPUS COALITION

Introduction

The previous chapter described the creation of the Zone neighborhood amidst several beautification plans for the Capitol Mall District and other significant development projects in downtown Phoenix. I showed the evolution of Zone neighborhood from a location for tent cities to a service dependent ghetto and, then, into a service hub. This chapter describes the coalition of social service leaders, business elites, and government officials that turned the service hub into co-located facility, which took form as the Human Services Campus (HSC). This chapter covers the period from 2000-2005, involving the planning, fundraising, and opening of the HSC. Since this discussion is prior to the opening of the HSC, it represents the technocratic vision of what advocates for the HSC hoped the campus would be and do. The next chapter will address people's lived experience of the campus.

It is important to note that the HSC coalition claims that collaboration was central to the creation of the campus. More importantly, they suggested that the HSC was an "everybody wins" solution to "homelessness" in downtown Phoenix. Interestingly, "everybody" included social service leaders, business elites, government officials, but not necessarily "homeless" people or local residents. According to another former director of the HSC, David Bridge, the campus was opposed by local residents. As a compromise, social service leaders made

agreements to consult with them about any service capacity expansion (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016).

The chapter begins by showing how and why social service leaders in the Zone neighborhood mobilized and advocated for co-location. I emphasize social service leader's collective need for new buildings, which initiated their push for the campus model. Initially, downtown business elites and government officials supported the campus but opposed locating it in the CMD. I depict a consequential meeting in which business elites agreed to build the HSC in the CMD before examining the HSC coalition's fundraising efforts that obtained $24 million to build the campus. I analyze the "everybody wins" claim through the coalition's concept of "champions." This concept is crucial to illustrate the competing motivations for creating the HSC.

Part I – The failure of the service hub in the Zone neighborhood

Takahashi and Gaber (1998) explain that often, there is strong opposition to the siting or capacity expansion of urban homeless social services through the concept of NIMBYism (Not-in-my-backyard). This concept acknowledges that homeless social services, waste disposal facilities, and prisons are necessary but, for many property owners and residents, undesirable. NIMBYism is reflected by community opposition, local state land-use decisions, and zoning regulations (Takahashi & Gaber, 1998). The previous chapter showed that policy makers wanted to disperse and reduce capacity of "homelessness" and social services in the Zone neighborhood. The problem with co-located facilities is that they are considered locally undesirable land-use (LULU) by planners and policy makers, objections that reflect a strong degree of NIMBYism (Garnett, 2005).

By the year 2000, the service hub was on the brink of collapse. According to David Bridge (August 5, 2016), “homelessness” in the Zone neighborhood was unmanageable. Nonprofit leaders were negotiating with two sets of problems. First, they had pressing need for infrastructural upgrades for their facilities. Second, they stressed their problems with coordinated service delivery. These problems involved geographic burdens from having to travel to different social service providers spread throughout the city. These issues created uncompleted referrals and break up a progressive delivery of service (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). The “Madison Row” service hub relied on the geographic proximity of the CASS shelter, SVdP cafeteria, and the André House to shelter, feed, and clothe people. The absence of formal coordination between service leaders meant “homeless” people had to fulfill any case management responsibilities either from CASS, probation or parole terms, or another provider on their own. The absence of a place to do so presented challenges.

Social service leaders offered a negative portrayal of the Zone neighborhood, due to safety concerns for unhoused people. They claimed that “homeless” people were easy to prey on and often victims of drug dealers, sex traffickers, and muggers. At the same time, social service leaders repeated stereotypes about homeless people’s way of life that also contributed to their lack of safety. They talked about how loitering, littering, and sleeping in public spaces also made unhoused people targets for arrest. (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). The Phoenix Police Department’s ‘arrest and move along’ policy was ineffective because people would be released within 24 hours (B. Freudenthal, personal communication, July 7, 2016). Addressing the amount of visible “homelessness” in the Zone neighborhood would become a key feature of the HSC.

I interviewed the social service leaders in the Zone neighborhood. They discussed the poor condition of their buildings. Steve Zabilski the director of St. Vincent de Paul (SVdP), said that portions of his dining hall were condemnable and they used yellow police tape to block access (S. Zabilski, personal communication, July 7, 2016). Mark Holleran the director of Central Arizona Shelter Services (CASS) remarked that his shelter needed substantial plumbing renovations (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016). Annette Stein, a public health official and director of Healthcare for the Homeless (HCH), a no-cost medical center, stated that her clinic was a shoddy trailer, with faulty air conditioning, and a leaky roof (A. Stein, personal communication, July 5, 2016).

In a conversation with Zabilski, he recounted that, by 2000, he could not wait any longer to address the condition of his dining hall. St. Vincent de Paul had longstanding plans to repair the dining hall, but renovating the 50-year-old building didn't make fiscal sense. Subsequently, acting upon SVdP's board approval, Zabilski filed a permit application with the city of Phoenix to build a new dining hall. City of Phoenix officials expressed concern that it would attract more "homeless" people to the area and exacerbate problems. Nonetheless, Zabilski pressed the application forward (S. Zabilski, personal communication, July 7, 2016). City of Phoenix officials stymied his permitting efforts, for instance, denying the permit due to a lack of sufficient handicap parking spaces (Brinegar, 2003).

In a conversation with Holleran, he explained that St. Vincent de Paul's permit conflict caught his attention because he, too, had long planned to renovate his shelter building. However, he delayed repairs because of the cost and expected opposition from the city of

Phoenix and local residents. He said that there was little financial sense in renovating the CASS shelter in the early 2000s (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016).

The city of Phoenix's objections to expansion of social services created the conditions the helped lead to co-location. The city's opposition to SVdP and to CASS influenced Zabilski and Holleran to delay renovating their buildings (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016 & S. Zabilski, personal communication, July 7, 2016). The dual need for buildings reached a breaking point coincidentally. The city of Phoenix's objections toward expansion of social services led service operators to rationalize co-location as a cost-efficient model (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). The co-location model made sense to nonprofit leaders because it addressed infrastructural needs, services, and safety issues without engendering a massive service capacity expansion in downtown.

Part II – Co-location gains momentum

Co-location picked up steam because of the success of previous collaborations. I discussed Holleran and Stein's collaborative project to establish a free dental clinic for unhoused people. They worked together again in the early 2000s to revise their intake procedures and reduce duplication of services among themselves (A. Stein, personal communication, July 5, 2016). David Bridge informed me that social service leaders in the Zone supported co-location because of these previous collaborations. He said that others, including Mark Holleran, were receptive to the idea of a joint solution. The success of these internal partnerships allowed them to see the potential possibilities and benefits of co-location (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016).

St. Vincent de Paul's permit conflict illustrated the tension between social service leaders, on one hand, and government officials and business leaders concerned with the CMD, on the other. Holleran explained that the shared need for infrastructural upgrades for CASS and SVdP, initiated discussions between him and Zabilski for a joint solution. They brought in other social service leaders in the Zone neighborhood to consider their options. They discussed how co-location would eliminate the need to travel to and from social services throughout the city. They intended to fix the problem of uncompleted referrals, which would contribute to a progressive manner of service delivery (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016).

These meetings guided nonprofit leaders to situate their problems collectively instead of individually, and the co-location model thus gained footing among the social service leaders in the Zone neighborhood, including those associated with HCH, the Andre Housé, and St. Joseph the Worker (SJtW) (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). According to Bridge, service leaders wanted Nova Safe Haven, a behavioral healthcare provider and shelter for homeless people with severe mental illness, to also be part of the campus model. They made the case for this particular provider because they, too, were operating out of a decrepit building, even though they were located outside of the Zone neighborhood (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). What was novel and important about co-location was its potential to serve as a place of refuge during the day. Nonprofit leaders conceived a pilot program that would eventually become the Lodestar Day Resource Center (LDRC) (J. Berg, personal communication, June 13, 2016). The pilot program built a very small day room where precariously housed people could go during the day and have access to phones and computers (J. Berg, personal communication, June 13, 2016). The LDRC is approximately 10 times larger

than the pilot day room. The LDRC was an important resource because it provided a legitimate space for “homeless” people in the city.

The co-location model responds directly to geographic burdens that “homeless” people often face. The model also creates the conditions for service coordination and integration. The problem with geographic burdens is they cause breaks in the service chain. Since most “homeless” people rely on their feet or public transportation, keeping several appointments across the city is difficult, even for people with cars and GPS navigation (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). These “missed hand-offs” led to delays, stalls, and stops in service delivery for clients (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). A distance of a few blocks is sufficient to cause “missed-hand-offs” (M. Holleran, personal communication July 14, 2016, D. Bridge, personal communication August 5, 2016, & A. Stein, personal communication, July 5, 2016). Coordination is intended to progressively guide “homeless” people through a chain of holistic providers (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). Additionally, co-location increases cost-efficiency by reducing uncontrolled demands for emergency services, including calls for police, firefighters, and ambulance paramedics (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). The Zone neighborhood’s service leaders advocated for co-location because it would resolve geographic burdens, service delivery issues, improve coordination, and efficiency (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016).

In a conversation with David Bridge, he said that creating a safe space for HSC clients was another reason that social service leaders in the Zone neighborhood advocated for the co-location. The Zone neighborhood had a terribly negative reputation for crime, drugs, and prostitution. Additionally, “homeless” people were associated with litter, loitering, trespassing,

and property crimes (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). Interestingly, Holleran, Bridge, and McQuaid asserted that people in the Zone neighborhood were victims of intra-personal crimes, including robbery, theft, and assault and many of them accessed the campus in some way. They also claimed that that other non-homeless "predators, pimps and dealers" victimized the people who were accessing the HSC. They admitted that the prevalence of drugs and open drug use within the Zone was a big concern (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016; M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016; & M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). As such, the campus was supposed to offer a refuge for homeless people.

According to Bridge, the campus was supposed to be a dignified environment whereby people could access assistance. The new campus was supposed to reduce stigma associated with being "homeless." Bridge said that he wanted the HSC to be like Disneyland, meaning a safe place that welcomes and engages their guests. Bridge added that the campus nonprofits needed to "meet clients where they're at" This means the all-in-one campus needed to have a robust capacity to fulfill the needs of a large and diverse group of people. Service leaders wanted the campus to be a place that offered holistic services in a respectable environment (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016).

The SVdP permit conflict with the city of Phoenix was not surprising given the longstanding opposition to social services in the Zone neighborhood. However, this case was significant because SVdP had leverage. Since SVdP owned their building and the land, they had the power bypass the city of Phoenix objections and simply rebuild the dining hall (D. Bridge, personal communication August 5, 2016, M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016,

& M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). However, service leaders took advantage of the situation and mobilized for their mutual benefit and to avoid conflicts with the city (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016).

According to Holleran, after social service leaders discussed a joint solution, they composed and sent a letter to government officials. Holleran called it the "Magna Carta" letter, which outlined their issues and proposed the campus model as a solution. Nonprofit leaders claimed they were no longer able to meet the needs of the estimated 1,000-1,500 unhoused people in the Zone neighborhood. They described their infrastructural problems and service delivery issues. The letter conceptualized a 3-pronged approach; a campus layout, a low-barrier shelter, and a pipeline to housing. They asserted that those 3 prongs complimented each other (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016).

Part III – Jesus, champions, and capital

The campus model was supported by county government officials and members of business community including Donald Keuth, director of the Phoenix Community Alliance (PCA) (Editorial Board, 2000). However, they wanted to build the campus on a vacant county-owned near 27th Avenue and Lower Buckeye Road (Editorial Board, 2000). The vacant lot was well beyond the Zone neighborhood and near a landfill and jail. The proposed location would involve the need to move an estimated 900 homeless people to the new campus. The campus would strive to facilitate the revitalization of the CMD (Editorial Board, 2000). Holleran questioned whether people would use the campus if it wasn't near the downtown area (Editorial Board, 2000). Thirteen months later, the editorial board for the *Arizona Republic* newspaper, showed that the boosters still opposed siting the HSC in the CMD (Editorial Board,

2001). “The campus must be attractive, self-contained, and secure - in short, an asset to the neighborhood - if members of the Capitol Mall Association are to consider dropping their opposition” (Editorial Board, 2001: B10).

The fate of the HSC’s location was decided during a meeting between social service leaders, downtown boosters, and Maricopa County governmental officials. The session was referred to as the “Come to Jesus, meeting” (D. Bridge, personal communication August 5, 2016; M. Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016; & A. Stein, personal communication, July 5, 2016). Stein paraphrased the critical moment in which business elites were silenced. She stated that Marty Schultz, an influential lobbyist for Pinnacle West, the parent company of Arizona Public Service (APS), and an influential representative of the business community, stood up and declared that the campus would not be in downtown. Business leaders and Maricopa County government officials wanted the campus to be built far from downtown. In response, faith-based members of the service community replied that they did not care what Schultz, his rich friends, nor the legislators wanted because they answer to a higher power and would not move (A. Stein, personal communication, July 5 2016).

The meeting was significant because Schultz, the business community, and Maricopa County government officials ceased their opposition to siting the HSC within the CMD. More importantly, Schultz, as a member of the Phoenix Community Alliance (PCA) and the Capital Mall Association, became an ardent supporter of the campus in the CMD (M. Holleran, personal communication July 13, 2016). HSC coalition members claimed that Schultz single-handedly mobilized the business community, won support from governmental officials, and was an important part of the fundraising campaign that helped pay for the campus’s construction (M.

Holleran, personal communication, July 14, 2016; M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). The Phoenix-based newspaper *The Business Journal*, in reference to the HSC and to Schultz wrote, "Several prominent business groups and leaders rallied by the Phoenix Community Alliance stepped aboard to support the project along with Maricopa County officials. Jerry Colangelo, owner of the Phoenix Suns and general managing partner of the Arizona Diamondbacks, who serves as chairman of the alliance, and Don Keuth, of the Phoenix Community Alliance, who serves as its president" (Robertson, 2003, para. 3). The "Come to Jesus, meeting," indicated that members of the HSC coalition were now in sync.

Interestingly, after the coalition's pivotal meeting, a new concept emerged from Mark Holleran. Holleran characterized Schultz as a "champion" because he enrolled the business community and government officials to support the HSC in the CMD, something that the service leaders could not do on their own (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). The concept of a "champion" applies when HSC coalition members accomplishes something that others cannot. For example, Shultz who led the push to build the campus outside of the CMD was able to convince the business community to instead build it in the CMD. This apparently, was something that the members of the service community could not do. The other coalition members don't use that precise term, yet the concept still applies because of the ways they reverently praised each other's accomplishments.

As a champion, and in defense of the proposed campus, Schultz (2002) wrote a letter to the editor of the *Arizona Republic* newspaper. He stated that downtown Phoenix's core was working. He underscored the fact that federal, state, local, and county governments and major banks are located in downtown Phoenix. He claimed that millions of people find entertainment

in downtown, specifically naming Bank One Ballpark, America West Arena, the Dodge and Orpheum theaters, and the Arizona Center. Moreover, the city of Phoenix was still intent on revitalizing downtown and the Capitol Mall District. Schultz asserted that the campus would create new buildings and a landscape that would improve the neighborhood that needed revitalization. The lobbyist also stated that the new campus would expedite moving homeless people into housing, and claimed that many need only short-term help. Additionally, he noted that the new campus would co-locate services for chronically homeless people away from downtown businesses and events (Schultz, 2002).

In a conversation with Bridge and McQuaid, they recounted a story of another champion. This "champion" had a significant role in the creation of the HSC. They claimed that the Maricopa County's support was initiated by an unlikely figure, former Arizona governor Jan Brewer. Brewer, a steadfast conservative, is perhaps most remembered for her anti-immigration stance and for finger-wagging President Barak Obama on a Phoenix tarmac in 2012. Prior to that, she was a member of the politically conservative Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (BOS) (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). Brewer was apparently moved by what the campus had promised to do and convinced the BOS to support the HSC. She also directed, Maricopa County manager David R. Smith to help create the campus (M. McQuaid personal communication, June 28, 2016). Brewer fits the champion mold because she was an unlikely advocate and she accomplished something the service community could not do by providing additional governmental support.

David R. Smith had a significant role in the creation of the HSC. In a conversation with the former Maricopa County Manager, he said that he attended some of the preliminary

meetings with social service leaders, including the “Come to Jesus, meeting.” Smith acknowledged the history of competing concerns in the CMD between revitalization and homelessness. He commented that the amount of “homelessness” in the CMD was a shameful. He remarked that his county employees often complained that they had to literally step over homeless people or encounter aggressive panhandling on their way to work. Smith claimed that homeless intervention efforts in the CMD were inadequate. Despite these problems, Smith was reluctant to advocate for social services, but he believed that the campus would make a difference. Smith believed that the HSC would centralize and upgrade social services in the Zone neighborhood (D. Smith, personal communication, August 3, 2016).

Smith became a “champion” because the Maricopa County Manager condemned, donated, and purchased parcels of land that the HSC would be built on (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). Smith explained that, since the land belonged to Maricopa County, the BOS could bypass the city of Phoenix’s zoning regulations. As such, Smith became a “champion” because he did what the service community could not do, get past the city of Phoenix’s land-use objections. Smith stated that no person or entity is statutorily responsible for homelessness, but the government is responsible for public health and safety and thus could not completely escape this issue. He supported the HSC because it would contribute to the public health and safety of the CMD.

Having secured the location and land for the HSC, the coalition’s next step was to design their own campus. Though Phoenix was one of the first cities to build a co-located facility, is was based on the previously discussed Father Joe’s Village in San Diego (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). After touring San Diego’s facility, the HSC coalition created the

conceptual planning and design documents for their campus (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). The next step for the HSC coalition was to fundraise the construction costs of the HSC.

According to Linda Mushkatel, special projects manager for Maricopa County, David R. Smith directed her to lead the fundraising effort for HSC. She discussed her project, dubbed the Capital Campaign, which lasted for approximately 3 years and raised nearly $12 million, half of the $24 million cost to construct the HSC. Approximately, $6 million was public money raised from City of Phoenix bonds, donations from other municipalities, including Tempe, Scottsdale, and Glendale, and other sources. The remaining $6 million came from Maricopa County government through donated county-owned land and in-kind donations from the county's public works department (L. Mushkatel, personal communication, June 2, 2016).

Mushkatel explained that the Capital Campaign emphasized "the power of collaboration" in their pitches to potential donors. The fundraising effort was wildly successful because they almost always received more funds than were requested. Schultz and Smith were key members of the fundraising effort who personally met with donors. Mushkatel remarked that the success of the Capital Campaign reflected an enormous amount of goodwill for the city's homeless population (L. Mushkatel, personal communication, June 2, 2016). The funding effort involved 13 donors who gave $250,000 or more and 33 contributions of $10,000 or greater (Hermann, 2005).

The Human Services Campus opened on November 7, 2005 (Hermann, 2005). The HSC co-located Central Arizona Shelter Services emergency shelter, Healthcare for the Homeless, a clinic operated by Maricopa County, the St. Vincent de Paul dining room, St. Joseph the Worker,

an employment organization, and Nova Safe Haven (Hermann, 2005). The original vision for the HSC included the André House, but their leaders ultimately choose to remain independent. According to Fr. Tom Doyle, the André House works closely with the HSC augmenting meal and shower provisions. They elected not to join the HSC in order to preserve their autonomy, mission, and ministry. Additionally, they wanted to protect their donor funding source (T. Doyle, personal communication, July 14, 2016). Along with co-location, welfare bureaucracies from the state, county, city, and private organizations would also establish satellite offices at the HSC and work directly with service-users (Hermann, 2005).

The novel HSC was designed to offer a holistic service array and to serve as a space where “homeless” people can be safe. “You provide a comfortable place to get off the streets, provide food, medical care, substance-abuse and mental-health counseling, job counseling, housing advisers...everything and everybody in one place," Holleran said (Hermann, 2005: B1) “We've learned you need to offer a sort of 'one-stop shopping' approach," Holleran added (Herman, 2005: B1). The HSC also included a novel amenity, called the Lodestar Day Resource Center (LDRC), a large space where homeless people can receive counseling services or simply be during the day (Hermann, 2005). It offered a large space in which homeless people can escape the elements, use a restroom, shower, or rest (Hermann, 2005). The LDRC is a crucial amenity for homeless people, especially in Phoenix, whose high summer temperatures put homeless people at risk for heat related morbidity and mortality. The LDRC can help people survive summer heat and offer a place where people can focus on obtaining housing.

Part IV – Understanding the HSC Coalition

Holleran's concept of "champions" is useful to understand the HSC coalition and how differently motivated groups coalesced around co-location. The champions of the HSC are Marty Schultz, David R. Smith, and Jan Brewer. They broke ranks and accomplished what social service leaders could not do. Schultz enrolled the downtown business community, including Jerry Colangelo. Brewer gained the support of Maricopa County Government for the project. Smith circumvented the city of Phoenix's opposition to the HSC and acquired land for the campus. Essentially they were the difference-makers that allowed for the construction of the co-located campus. As such, former Phoenix Mayor Terry Goddard might also be considered as the "original champion" because he personally supported the first CASS shelter in 1984. His support is poignant given that he was one of downtown Phoenix's most influential boosters. Although not described by Holleran as such, he fits the discourse of a champion because he accomplished something that the service community could not accomplish independently in building a homeless shelter in downtown Phoenix during the middle of the city's makeover.

Interestingly, Holleran also emerges as a "champion," but of a different sort. In a conversation with the former shelter director, he reflected that campus models and the associated push for coordination, efficiency, and integration was the wrong approach to ending homelessness. He criticized the national trend for coordination, saying that it will not resolve the lack of affordable housing. After the 2006, housing crisis, Holleran took matters into his own hand and became a "champion." He created a nonprofit called, Arizona Housing Inc. and seized the unique opportunity to purchase an old apartment building that would provide transitional housing for his shelter users. He claimed that he could easily double his current

capacity of 533. Holleran smiled when he said that most people are surprised to learn he has been a lifelong Republican, given his 30 plus year career working with homeless people (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). In the end, his concept of a champion, was a useful analytical device.

The Zone's service operator's claim that everyone got what they wanted needs to be clarified. Holleran claimed that the HSC represented only 2 prongs (a campus layout and low-barrier shelter) from the "Magna Carta" letter (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). As such, Holleran described the HSC as lacking a pipeline to housing. He suggested the HSC was more like a vacuum drawing in loose pieces and holding them in a container (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). In a conversation with David Bridge, he elaborated on how the HSC was co-located but not coordinated. He noted that social service leaders had drafted plans to coordinate services but, once the campus opened, those plans were tabled indefinitely. One reason for the initial failure to coordinate arose because creating the campus itself was exceeding difficult. When the HSC opened, it reflected the most basic level of the campus model, co-location. As a result, the campus functioned like a shopping mall and each nonprofit acted like silos even though they were co-located in one complex (D. Bridge, August 5, 2016).

Conclusion

The HSC coalition was a private-public partnership which created the Human Services Campus. The campus responded to the urban "homeless" problematic. By that I mean, the idea that visible "homelessness" is bad for business and contradictory to a general sense of order in the city. More plainly, policy makers often consider "homelessness" as an urban disorder

problem (Garnett, 2005). Phoenix's redevelopment involved neoliberal land-use planning most notably in downtown, which led to the emergence of the HSC (De La Rosa Aceves, 2011).

According to legal scholar Garnett (2005), co-location moves "homeless" people. The relocation of "homelessness" from one place to another involves the perception that urban problems can be moved to where it will be more benign. The HSC coalition was composed of some of the same people that attempted to disperse or displace them from the CMD and downtown Phoenix. Alternate spatial management tactics involve exclusion zones and regulatory sweeps, but the objective of relocation is the same (Garnett, 2005).

De La Rosa Aceves (2011) investigated the HSC and what is represented as an approach to the problem of "homelessness." She argued that the HSC facilitated business leaders and government official's portrayal of "homeless" people as urban problems who must be removed from desirable parts of the city to achieve economic prosperity. The creation of the HSC showed that politicians sought a stable, ordered, and attractive urban landscape in downtown Phoenix (De La Rosa Aceves, 2011). Maricopa County officials noted that the presence of "homeless" people in the CMD impeded their attempts to attract professionals to live, work, and play in downtown (Garnett, 2005). Essentially, the campus sought to concentrate "homeless" people from downtown businesses and events (Amster, 2008). Notably, the former Maricopa County Manager, David R. Smith credited the HSC as causal factor for "hundreds of millions of dollars" of investment in downtown, specifically naming the CityScape, downtown Phoenix's first mixed use skyscraper (D. Smith, personal communication, August 3, 2016).

Maricopa County officials and business leaders supported the HSC because they wanted to avoid the problem of uncontrolled displacement of "homeless" people. According to Garnett

(2005), Maricopa County officials acquired several square blocks of property south of downtown Phoenix to build the HSC. Policy makers helped to move governmental, nonprofit, and faith-based organizations that served "homeless" people. Commentators have hailed these moves as a humanitarian effort. However, county officials also had an interest in transplanting the nearly 1,000 "homeless" people away from the streets of downtown Phoenix. Government officials hoped that by centralizing social services "homeless" people would spend more time on the campus rather than on the streets (Garnett, 2005).

Business leaders and government officials essentially ceded the Zone neighborhood, a section of the CMD, to social service leaders with the expectation they would manage "homeless" people there. Managing "homeless" people is often about granting space for the purposes of containment and control (Amster, 2008). De La Rosa Aceves (2011) explains that the HSC became a legitimate space for "homeless" people against a backdrop of displacement and maltreatment. Since the Zone neighborhood as stigmatized along with the people there, they had to be hidden. The HSC segregates non-stigmatized, domiciled people from stigmatized homeless people. The HSC represented an apology and an attempt to "forget" the Zone neighborhood's history (De La Rosa Aceves, 2011). The HSC's promotional material touts providing better services, greater security, and safety for "homeless" people and the community (Garnett, 2005). However, all the HSC did was remove homeless people from other parts of the city and upgrade some facilities (Amster, 2008).

The HSC coalition fulfilled the competing interests of its members and stakeholders because the campus functions as a place *for* "homeless" people and a place *to put* "homeless" people. The "everybody wins" claim embodied the "homeless" problematic. I don't doubt that

members of the HSC coalition made a genuine effort to improve the lives of “homeless” people in downtown Phoenix. However, I challenge the claim that the HSC was an “everybody wins” solution. Everybody, did not include unhoused people in the conception, planning, nor design of the HSC. This becomes evident in the following chapter, which describes daily life at the HSC.

CHAPTER 6

EXPERIENCING A TOTAL SOCIAL INSTITUTION: DAILY LIFE AND SUBJECTIVITY AT THE HSC

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the HSC coalition and their support for the co-location model in downtown Phoenix. The HSC is an 11-acre facility which can shelter roughly 1,000 people without housing. Significantly, co-location responded to the coalition's various goals. Social service leaders sought a safe, dignified space with new buildings. Business leaders intended to corral and contain "homelessness" in the Zone neighborhood by centralizing social services. County government officials got a little of both, such that they met competing political obligations for "homeless" people and economic interests.

This chapter examines the HSC's stated goal of self-sufficiency. It relies on my observational and interview data. During my observations, I did not attempt to appear houseless. Nor did I attempt to convey that I wasn't. I did not seek out people to talk with, but I listened when people would engage me in conversations. I offered minimal, vague, or evasive responses to their questions about who I was. During my observations, at least one person would initiate a conversation with me. I elected to use the terms participant, interviewee, or informant in the place of the real names of any precariously housed person that I interviewed.

A clear definition of self-sufficiency is complicated because it is an ideology bound up with capitalist social relations. More importantly, self-sufficiency seems so commonsensical it is not challenged. Self-sufficiency is significant because we may be able to critique its disciplinary

nature without recognizing it within our own daily lives. The goal of self-sufficiency has infiltrated "homeless" case work. The HSC's version of self-sufficiency resonates with a normative lifestyle. By that I mean, full-time employment, domiciled living, and behaving in such a way that those things are not in jeopardy. In conversations with the social service leaders, they talked about how employment was essential for most. They noted that people with physical disabilities, chronic medical conditions, and severe mental illness cannot be completely self-sufficient because they are unemployable. Since there are some who will need ongoing and intensive support in their everyday lives, the ideal form of self-sufficiency is not always achievable. Service leaders agreed that self-sufficiency looks a bit different for everyone. They also agreed that income was central to self-sufficiency. Income from employment was often the preferred option social service providers identified to achieve self-sufficiency. Income based on Social Security or disability entitlements would be crucial for people who cannot work (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). Besides income, another form of self-sufficiency is getting people to their highest level of functioning (M. Holleran, personal communication, July 13, 2016). The initial director of the HSC, indicated that self-sufficiency was measured anytime people reduced their use of the campus (M. McQuaid, personal communication, June 28, 2016). These social service leaders were talking about getting people not to need support.

The HSC is a place where people can get support and also is the place where people are disciplined to become independent. Self-sufficiency is supposed to contradict the so-called individual causes of homelessness and prevent recidivism after leaving the HSC. Detailing daily life at the HSC is important for how it reflects and exposes the institutional and disciplinary

dimensions of the HSC's approach to "homelessness". Daily life at the HSC raises the question that this chapter answers. What is the relation between co-location and self-sufficiency?

Part I – The Human Services Campus as a total social institution

The HSC was conceptualized and built to be a co-located facility. More importantly, it was supposed to be an all-in-one facility capable of ending "homelessness." On one hand, co-location intended to resolve service delivery issues associated with geographic burdens and uncompleted referrals. But, the 'all-in-one' campus spatially segregates "homeless" people from domiciled ones. Segregation is a strong term but, the HSC was a 26-million-dollar investment which was designed as a legitimate space for "homeless" people. The HSC did nothing to change the sociospatial hostilities that pushed people without housing into the Zone neighborhood in the first place. What we can see is that co-location is a containment strategy toward "homeless" people. This tactic is relatively unquestioned since people without housing are stigmatized and marginalized.

The HSC's objective of self-sufficiency appears to be rehabilitative, but it also has disciplinary elements. The former director of the HSC stated that getting people into housing is one goal, but sustaining that housing and preventing them from coming back to the HSC is the more relevant goal (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). The co-location model is designed to remove excuses for not addressing one's "homelessness." The HSC communicates that 'we have provided you with everything you need, now learn to live without us.' This previous message is not lost on any of my research participants. They often talked about how motivation is fundamental to obtain housing. Some discussed that it was very difficult to stay motivated. However, many complained that their peers in the HSC were

unmotivated. Nearly all participants wanted to achieve the HSC's ideal form of self-sufficiency. Even those who cannot work aspired to the "less-than-ideal" model of self-sufficiency involving the ability to meet one's basic needs, such as bathing, transportation to medical appointments, and paying bills. Interviewees articulated that self-sufficiency was an ongoing goal, because it would prevent them from becoming "homeless" again. They related self-sufficiency to their own internal self-regulation. They often talked about how they needed to manage their physical and mental health. Some expressed problems with addiction and the need to address it. Nearly all interviewees stated that surviving without housing created their addiction issues. They talked about altering their lifestyle to maintain their employment and not necessarily be sober. The message of 'not needing support' based on self-sufficiency was understood by precariously housed people at the HSC.

The first part of the pathway to self-sufficiency entails justifying the disciplinary objective of self-sufficiency. The HSC formally labels service users with the "homeless" identity, degrades that identity, and offers self-sufficiency as a remedy. This process resonates with the assignment of a patient identity to people in what Goffman (1961) would call a total institution. As Goffman explained, people undergo a shift from a pre-patient to inpatient identity. Before people enter a total institution, they have been alienated from normative society and are called pre-patients. The transition from pre-patient to inpatient is coercive and involves the destruction of their previous identity. The new inpatient identity is a form of social control. The environment of the total institution is encapsulating, subjecting inpatients to a regimen of reform. Inpatients must prove they are 'fixed' in order to return to normative society as ex-

patients (Goffman, 1961). The HSC deploys a similar logic of shifting identities to justify their narrative and expertise in “ending” homelessness.

The position is significant for the HSC because it establishes the technocratic high-ground from which the institution attempts to make service users self-sufficient. The HSC’s attempts to transform people ought to be understood on the same scale as Foucault’s (1995) concept of the penitentiary. For Foucault, the penitentiary is a space where people are subjected to disciplinary techniques. The penitentiary is supported by moralistic, economic, and technocratic structures. Moral reform allows for the isolation of individuals. Compulsory work is justified by economic systems. The technocratic and quasi-medical knowledge support diagnosis, cure, and normalization tactics. The prison cell, factory, and mental hospital-asylum are spatial examples of penitentiary logics (Foucault, 1995). Thinking about the HSC as a penitentiary is useful because it resonates with Foucault’s claims that we live in a disciplinary society. Most of normative society does not challenge the segregation and institutionalization of convicts and the insane. The HSC shows that “homeless” people are subjected to similar techniques and processes of normalization.

The HSC’s ideology of self-sufficiency is intended to contradict “homelessness”, but more importantly the “crime” of dependency. The HSC’s pathway to self-sufficiency toward “homeless” people reflects Foucault’s (1995) arguments that the focus of discipline had shifted from the offender’s body to their inner-self. Disciplinary techniques are intended to make people docile but useful. Emphasis is placed on training of the body. To do this, bodies are classified, ranked, and subject to regimentation in order to maximize training. Constant surveillance of bodies is one disciplinary technique. Surveillance accumulates into a so-called

knowledge base of “deviants.” The overall purpose of the penitentiary is to prepare people to adjust to similar living conditions outside of its confines (Foucault, 1995).

The HSC is an ‘all-in-one’ facility, not a lock-down institution like a prison or an asylum and people can leave whenever they wish. However, the HSC is closed to the public, access is regulated, and is enclosed by a tall wrought iron fence. Some relevant background information about the campus is useful. When the HSC opened in 2005, it was accessible through 12th Ave. People could walk into the campus and access services. Vehicles entered through a main gate off 12th Ave and Madison that led to a small visitor’s parking lot. Security guards regulated vehicular access. All of that changed when the HSC reoriented their programmatic approach to “homelessness.” In a conversation with an HSC staff member, the campus began to conform to Coordinated Entry in 2013 (personal communication, December 19, 2016). Coordinated Entry was a paradigm shift in social service delivery that involves organization, cooperation, and data sharing among regional providers. To do this, HSC leaders moved and converted their New Arid Club building into the Brian Garcia Welcome Center building. The welcome center sits off Madison Avenue and is where precariously housed people must enter the campus. The main gate to the HSC was closed which prevented vehicles from entering the small visitor’s parking lot. The welcome center started issuing campus identification cards to people and had greeters scan their ID cards upon entering the campus. More importantly, the welcome center staff conduct assessments of entrants to the HSC. The purpose of assessments was to determine needs for specific people such as veterans or domestic violence survivors. HSC leaders also wanted a single point of entry to stop people with severe behavioral health issues from entering the campus. The welcome center officially opened in 2014, and staff replace lost or

stolen ID cards on the spot (HSC staff G, personal communication, December 19, 2016). Staff and visitors accessed the campus through a passcode locked gate off Madison Ave about a block away from the welcome center entrance.

Part II – Intake at the HSC

The HSC's welcome center is the first point of contact between the campus and "homeless" people. It is also a daily stop for anyone who wishes to access the HSC. In general, interviewees spoke favorably about the welcome center building and their experiences there. Many remarked that the building and its restrooms were clean. Several participants noted that staff were inviting and pleasant. According to one participant, "The feeling I got from the welcome center is like, "hey, we got you" (personal communication, July 28, 2016). Another informant remarked that the welcome center is the only time they experienced compassion at the HSC (personal communication, July 28, 2016). Almost all interviewees said that the welcome center building and their experience stands in contrast to the rest of the HSC. My observations of the welcome center support the broad claims about it. The building is noticeably cleaner, and the newer building is in better condition, and a more pleasant environment than the rest of the surrounding facilities. The lobby looks like a decent waiting room and the assessment areas are reasonably comfortable.

The welcome center is designed to be a gentle immersion to the HSC and is supposed to offset the formalization of the "homeless" identity. For many people, entering a shelter for the first-time is a jarring moment because it is an internal admission that they are indeed "homeless" (Lyon-Callo, 2004). One interviewee said, "I didn't realize I was homeless until I got here [HSC]. I'd been couch surfing with a friend and yeah, I turned out to have been homeless

for a while" (personal communication, July 27, 2016). Moreover, many people consider the "homeless" shelter as an option of last resort (Rollinson, 1998). Another informant said, "I did everything I could to avoid this place. While I still had my car, I was living off of peanut butter and trying to stay clean in restaurant bathrooms before I came here" (personal communication, July 28, 2016).

Interestingly, the HSC designates the people that access services as "clients." Service operators indicated that the client label is supposed to counteract the stigma of being identified as a "homeless" person (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). The intention behind calling people clients is to help them feel and experience the HSC as a dignified environment to access social services. Additionally, it is a way for "homeless" people to distinguish themselves as someone who is focused on ending their "homelessness." The branding of people as clients is significant because it resonates with Goffman's (1961) claims that the inpatient identity is a form of social control. It communicates that "clients" are doing what they need to do to address their "homelessness." This puts them in contrast to those who are not doing what they are supposed to be doing. The label is one the way that the HSC attempts to place people on the track to their own self-sufficiency. It's not clear that the practice of calling people clients reduces their experiences of being stigmatized. Informants often talked about how they felt as if they were prison inmates or just another faceless subject that the HSC deals with.

The purpose of the welcome center is to issue HSC ID cards, and complete the Vulnerability Index - Service Prioritization Decision Assistance Tool (VI-SPDAT) assessment. The HSC began using the VI-SPDAT in 2012, which assigns people a "homeless" acuity score,

"homeless type", and corresponding rehousing plan. The intake process lasts between 90-120 minutes. One social service worker remarked that the welcome center has several full-time assessors who are usually able to complete intake appointment the same day people arrive (HSC Staff, personal communication, December 19, 2016). The VI-SPDAT is conducted in a large room with several semi-private partitions, it has 27 oral questions not including a demographic survey. The oral questions focus on people's recent housing history and the reasons they are currently "homeless." There are also questions pertaining to previous and current drug and alcohol use. The assessment involves questions about mental and physical health conditions both past and current. Additionally, there are inquiries regarding employment, criminal, and sexual histories. After the assessment, the intake begins to look like an orientation. Staff summarize services at the HSC, provide an informational packet about services, and offer to give a tour of the campus. Lastly, users have their picture taken and are issued their campus ID card.

Informants had ambivalent attitudes toward the VI-SPDAT assessment. Generally speaking, they considered the VI-SPDAT as standard operating procedure. They stated that assessments like this were common and they have been through similar processes when accessing shelter, social services, and meeting with case managers. Participants also noted that they understood the HSC's rational for doing this. As the same time, they often reported negative sentiments about the intrusive nature of questions, and the implications behind them. In particular, women stated they felt judged by the probes about their sexual history, even though only female staff conduct the assessments. Taken as a whole, interviewees characterized the HSC intake as uncomfortable, yet bearable. The generally positive

descriptions of the welcome center indicate that the intake process is working as service operators had intended.

Part III – Daily life at the HSC

This section discusses relevant lived experiences that people have of the HSC. Participants often characterized daily life as a combination of torment from security guards, a regimented daily schedule, long wait times for service, and living in a dangerous environment. They described their experiences of the HSC as being similar to jail and prison. Informants described being in the HSC as a carceral experience supporting my claim the objective of self-sufficiency had disciplinary components. Participant's comparisons to jail and prison attest to my arguments that the campus is a segregating and institutional environment. This resonates with a house of correction, like jail or prison, but too also with American poorhouses. Spatially, the HSC located in the urban landscape, but remains separate and unintegrated with the broader community.

The HSC employs security guards to patrol the campus at all times. Social service leaders claim that guards are present to enforce rules, respond to incidents of violence, and to minimize conflict (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016). Two security teams work the HSC. They have 12-hour shifts beginning and ending at 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Day shift guards monitor the campus, but they are not visible until summoned.

Interviewees frequently discussed their interactions with security guards and characterized them as negative. They nicknamed the day shift guards as "brownies" and the night shift guards as "greenies" based on the color of their uniforms. Generally speaking, informants claimed that security guards on the campus were rude, treated people harshly, and

degraded people. Interviewees often remarked they felt like they were prison or jail inmates. Significantly, informants who stated they had spent time in jail or prison claimed that the lived experience of the HSC was the same. They insisted that the "greenies" were often decent people who were just doing their jobs, but expressed revulsion at the "brownies." Participants claimed that the "brownies" were provocateurs of many of the conflicts on campus. They asserted that guards instigate conflict by acting rudely, demeaning, or getting in people's faces. One interviewee said, "They talk down to us. They don't care. They don't know how to treat people" (personal communication, July 28, 2016). Interviewees said that "brownies" look for any reason to justify a "put out," either a 12- or 24-hour expulsion from CASS or the HSC. They frequently said the CASS's security team are notorious for such expulsions, even for the slightest violation. Informants claimed guard's targeted people for a "put out" if people filed a grievance against CASS. In general, participants often described 'us versus them' experience with CASS and the "brownies."

One of the most salient user-guard interactions are the daily check-in procedures for the CASS shelter. David Bridge explained that CASS leaders wanted their security team to be visible deterrents against violence. Security guards at CASS conduct the check-in procedures, which leaders say is necessary to keep weapons and contraband from entering the shelter. The check-in involves metal detection scans and searches of bodies and bags. Service leaders claim that security guards are necessary for the safety of everyone inside the shelter. Guards monitor the sleeping areas of CASS during nighttime hours and the HSC hires Phoenix police officers to oversee the Eastlot overflow shelter, which an asphalt parking lot near the campus (D. Bridge, personal communication, August 5, 2016).

CASS's check-in process functions as a security screening which resembles procedures at US airports. CASS residents must empty their pockets and remove their shoes and belts. Then, security guards scan them with metal detecting wands. CASS allows residents to bring one small bag inside the shelter, which is searched. According to participants, the bag search is the most demeaning part of the check-in procedure because guards dump the bag's contents on a metal table for all to see. Participants disliked the exposure of their private processions. One interviewee commented that homeless people don't have many personal processions and the way CASS security treatment of their belongings is demeaning. They wanted to security guards to show respect for their privacy and conduct bag searches more discreetly. Interviewees remarked that it simply wasn't necessary for guards to conduct bag searches that way. Additionally, participants asserted that guards are ruthless when it comes to disposing of items that could be considered contraband. One informant remarked that their nail clipper was unfairly disposed of (personal communication, July 30 2016). Another informant said that their small sewing kit was disposed of (personal communication, August 2, 2016). Service users emphasized that they understood the safety rationale for CASS's procedures, but suggested that guards needed to be more reasonable. One CASS resident remarked that CASS's procedures were "like the TSA on steroids" (personal communication, July 30, 2016). Several interviewees stated they would never return to CASS because of their check-in procedures. Another participant commented on CASS's security procedures, "All that for a pad on a concrete floor with a bunch of other men is bullshit." (Personal communication, July 28, 2016).

Interviewees described a scenario of selective rule enforcement at the CASS shelter. According to Lyon-Callo (2004), selective rule enforcement emerges as an issue because the

number of homeless people requesting beds often exceeds available beds in several US cities. Consequently, subjective, situational, and preconceived notions about homeless people lead to an unfair distribution of beds. Moreover, this has prioritized “deserving,” compliant people over “undeserving,” non-compliant people. Therefore, a shelter bed has become a contractual obligation based on “responsible” habits and actions. In response, people who have experienced several periods of houselessness often refuse to use shelters (Lyon-Callo, 2004).

The following table draws attention to the institutional and disciplinary nature of the HSC. The ‘all-in-one’ facility regiments daily life on campus. Consequently, people are forced to adapt and live their lives in accordance to the HSC service times. This kind of time discipline resonates with the daily life of the workplace or public schools. Case management practices broadly stress the importance of goals; setting them and reaching them. Case managers help homeless people navigate the bureaucratic obstacles for income and housing supports by ensuring the paperwork is in order.

Table 6.1: Summary of service times at the Human Services Campus

5:30 a.m.	Wake-up call all shelters			
6:00 a.m.	Shelters close	SVdP breakfast line forms	Welcome Center opens	
6:30 a.m.	SVdP breakfast line		Welcome Center intakes	
7:00 a.m.	SVdP breakfast		Welcome Center intakes	
7:30 a.m.	SVdP breakfast	LDRC opens	Welcome Center intakes	
8:00 a.m.	SVdP breakfast ends	LDRC walk-up desk opens	Welcome Center intakes	

8:30 a.m.	LDRC walk-up desk		Welcome Center intakes	
9:00 a.m.	LDRC walk-up desk		Welcome Center intakes	
9: 30 a.m.	LDRC walk-up desk		Welcome Center intakes	
10:00 a.m.	LDRC walk-up desk		Welcome Center intakes	
10:30 a.m.	LDRC walk-up desk		SVdP lunch line forms	Welcome Center intakes
11:00 a.m.	SVdP lunch	LDRC closes	CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes
11:30 a.m.	SVdP lunch		CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes
12:00 p.m.	SVdP lunch		CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes
12:45 p.m.	SVdP lunch ends	Line for LDRC		Welcome Center intakes
1:00 p.m.	LDRC walk-up desk re-opens	Post office opens	Welcome Center intakes	CASS walk-up desk
1:30 p.m.	LDRC walk-up desk	Post office	Welcome Center intakes	CASS walk-up desk
2: 00 p.m.	LDRC walk-up desk	Post office	Welcome Center intakes	CASS walk-up desk
2: 30 p.m.	LDRC walk-up desk	Post office	Welcome Center intakes	CASS walk-up desk
3:00 p.m.	LDRC walk-up desk	Post office closes	Welcome Center intakes	Line for CASS check-in CASS walk-up desk
3:30 p.m.	CASS check-in	SVdP dinner line forms (Friday only)	CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes

4:00 p.m.	SVdP inner Service (Friday only)	CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes	
4:30 p.m.	André House dinner line forms (excluding Friday)	CASS walk-up desk	Welcome Center intakes	
5:00 p.m.	André House dinner line (except Friday)	CASS check-in ends CASS walk-up desk closes	LDRC closes	Welcome Center intakes
5:30 p.m.	André House dinner (except Friday)	Welcome Center intakes		
6:00 p.m.	André House dinner (except Friday)	Overflow shelter entry	Welcome Center intakes	
6:30 p.m.	André House dinner ends (except Friday)		Welcome Center intakes	
7:00 p.m.	Welcome Center intakes			
7:30 p.m.	Welcome Center intakes			
8:00 p.m.	Welcome Center intakes			
8:30 p.m.	Welcome Center intakes			
9:00 p.m.	Welcome Center intake closes			

The HSC serves single adults, but works in partnership with the nearby Methodist Outreach Ministries (UMOM) a shelter for women with children. These women have the option of being bussed to and from the HSC. To do so, they need to be ready by 3:30 p.m. to catch the shuttle back to UMOM. The André House, located across the street from the HSC is another partner nonprofit organization. The André House considers themselves as an informal member of the HSC (T. Doyle, personal communication, July 14, 2016). They fill the gaps in SVdP's meal

provision services. Informants said they often obtain dinner, launder their clothes, and get a shower at the André House.

Informants often talked about how waiting in lines for services is an important aspect of daily life on campus. They asserted that they spend a significant portion of their day waiting in lines. One interviewee described their experience as “hurry and wait” (personal communication, July 28, 2016). They often mentioned that it was important to line up for services well before they were scheduled to begin. The HSC’s 15 social service providers each have their own operational hours, wait lists, and procedures attempting to serve over 1,000 people daily. Service users often noted that they waited in lines for an average of 2-2 ½ hours a day. These averages are based on services associated with food (SVdP & the André House) and with shelter (CASS or overflow). This means that people who access additional services will spend more time waiting in lines. Some of the other services that caused users to wait in line include obtaining identification documents and using mail service.

Participants reported that the HSC’s schedules can be difficult to navigate. However, when they need to leave the campus for job interviews, medical, or benefits appointments the HSC’s schedule makes their lives truly complicated. They explained that public transportation in Phoenix is unreliable and time-consuming. Consequently, users said that they have situations where they find themselves choosing between the campus’ services and external ones. This amounts to skipping a meal, risking their spot at CASS or overflow shelters, or not being able to access their personal belongings. The regimenting of daily life also involves keeping several appointments with counselors, medical and dental clinics. Additional appointments with case managers are also required. Lastly, some also need to meet with probation or parole officers.

According to one service user, “you can only survive as much as the campus allows” (personal communication, July 28, 2016)

The social service leaders who advocated for the HSC were concerned with the bodily safety of homeless people on campus. Their concern is significant because shelter residents often do not feel safe inside them (Rollinson, 1998 & Lyon-Callo, 2004). Interviewees frequently talked about the HSC being an unsafe and threatening environment. They stated that the primary reason they do not feel safe is the presence of “crazies” at the HSC. Informants described “crazies” as incoherent people, who talk and holler at themselves and scream at others. Participants asserted that “crazies” usually have some serious mental illness or that they are not taking their medication. All of my interviewees quickly distinguished themselves from the “crazies.” One participant said that the “crazies” were not difficult to identify because they wear coats during the summer, ramble on about nothing, and simply don’t know how to behave (personal communication, July 30, 2016). Informants claimed that the behavior of “crazies” is unpredictable and they act in ways that are a danger to themselves and others. Moreover, participants asserted that the HSC was filled with “crazies” especially in the common areas like the lawn and LDRC building. Participants complained that they had to eat, sleep, and share spaces with them, which forces them to be on alert at all times. They also reported strong degrees of apprehension over the presence of “crazies.” In some ways these informants were expressing stereotypes about homeless people, but also the ways that the HSC is used as an asylum for “undesirables.”

Interviewees asserted that the “crazies” are the people who will never be able get housed even with the HSC’s aid. They remarked that some of the “crazies” would require help

for the remainder of their lives. Participants claimed that the HSC is a mixing pot of all kinds of messed up people. They pointed out that the HSC should be a shelter and not a mental hospital. One informant estimated that about half of the people at the HSC belonged in a mental hospital and not the HSC (personal communication, July 28, 2016). Several interviewees thought the HSC should do a better job of separating the "crazies" from the people who were trying to obtain housing. Participants suggested that the HSC was misused as a dumping ground for people with severe mental illness. They blamed the HSC for not getting these people the help they need.

Part IV – Subjects of self-sufficiency

The HSC's intake procedures make the "homeless" identity official for entrants. Since the "homeless" identity is stigmatizing. The HSC's pathway to self-sufficiency involves making people into subjects. Being self-sufficient within the context of "homeless" social service, represents an individual's ability to prevent subsequent episodes of "homelessness." In practice, self-sufficiency is the maintenance of one's employment and management of physical and mental health needs. This section discusses how people are made into subjects of self-sufficiency.

The VI-SPDAT is central to how the HSC makes people into subjects. The VI-SPDAT subjectifies people because they become living problematics which are linked with technocratic knowledge. The VI-SPDAT creates what Foucault (1995), would call a "truth" about "homeless" people. The VI-SPDAT is how the HSC rationally organizes and acts upon entrants. The HSC does not share the acuity score nor the corresponding "homeless type" with people. This reveals another purpose for the "client" designation. Calling people clients helps to establish a kind of

contractual relation with the HSC and case managers. The term clients suggests that people are focused on addressing their needs and taking action to secure housing. The client label resonates with self-sufficiency because they are taking charge or seizing the initiative to act in their own self-interest.

The HSC has three nonprofits that use case management: CASS, the LDRC, and SJtW. I interviewed case managers and their respective supervisors with all three organizations. Case managers indicated that the very first step of case management involves obtaining a state issued identification which are necessary for housing and employment applications. This entails acquiring proofs of identity such as social security cards and birth certificates. In a conversation with Christie Saracino, CASS's case management supervisor, she said they focus on obtaining housing through employment. CASS requires case management for individuals with an acuity score greater than 4 of a possible 17. These "clients" are given 4 months to find a job and get housed, which can be extended for 2-months on a case-by-case basis. CASS clients that don't meet the threshold for case work have the option for informal case management. CASS created a walk-up desk with case managers, which they staff for about 30 hours per week. Walk-up case managers handle general questions, give directions, and bus passes. CASS expels "clients" who haven't ended their homelessness after their 4 or 6-month period has ended. However, they need not leave the HSC, because they could use overflow shelters (C. Saracino, personal communication, July 20, 2016). In a conversation with an LDRC staff member, they explained that their focus is only on applications for housing assistance (personal communication, July 19, 2016). The LDRC has different case managers who work with people with medical concerns, those who need peer-based support, and other special populations. Medical case managers

work with people who have physical disabilities or chronic medical conditions. Peer-based case managers work with "clients" to develop supportive relations after their housing placement. LDRC case managers continue to manage their "clients" after they obtain housing for a brief period or until they can demonstrate they can live independently, a measure of self-sufficiency. The special population case managers work with people with overlapping issues that need intensive support after housing placement (HSC Staff D, personal communication, July 19, 2016). In a conversation about SJtW, one staff member said they are focused on finding employment, which involves some basic computer skills, and job interviewing help (P. Winters, personal communication, July 8, 2016). St. Joseph the Worker has three case managers that help write resumes and job applications, while also helping to obtain transportation, bus passes, interview clothing, and workplace uniforms. SJtW meets with their clients and develops a case plan based on an individual's needs and skills (P. Winters, personal communication, July 8, 2016).

I previously discussed how an HSC identification card is required to enter the campus but not how they are used to track "clients." In a conversation with HSC staff member, they explained that each time the campus ID cards is scanned, the HSC logs the dates and times. Additionally, the ID card scans send a message to case managers that their "clients" are at the HSC. This notification is used when "clients" need to complete any follow-up with their housing or benefits applications, appointments, or case management appointments (HSC Staff G, personal communication July 20, 2016). The HSC's case management resonates with probation and parole because of the institutional context and case management practices.

Conclusion

We should understand the HSC's power to discipline is produced through the discourse and practices designed to produce self-sufficiency. According to Pylypa (1998), power operates through the production of knowledge and the creation of a desire to conform to the norms that this knowledge establishes. Desire to conform to the norms leads people to sustain their own subjection to disciplinary power voluntarily, though self-disciplining and self-surveillance. Self-monitoring occurs on two interacting levels: practice and discourse. Individuals feel compelled to regulate their bodies to conform to norms, but also to talk about what they should and should not do and confess deviation from these norms. Power is most effective when masked. Manipulation of desire is one mechanism, making that which is constraining appear positive and desirable (Pylypa, 1998).

We should understand the HSC as a total social institution (Goffman, 1961) on the same scale as a penitentiary (Foucault, 1995), both deploy disciplinary techniques to instill internal self-regulation of their "clients." The HSC set the objective of self-sufficiency so as not to return to or need the campus. This is significant because the HSC is attempting to rehabilitate "deficiencies" and rehouse "deviants." The "client" label is significant because it masks the ways service users are made into subjects. What we can see is that the HSC's goal of self-sufficiency is achieved by the disciplinary techniques of isolation, compulsory work, and technocratic knowledge. Isolation takes the form of segregation. The HSC spatially segregates "clients" from normative society in an institutional environment. Compulsory work has two forms. The first is the way that CASS assigns chores to their clients. The chores involve cleaning the dormitory, bathrooms, and common areas of the shelter. The second way is the emphasis

place on employment in the pursuit of self-sufficiency. Users widely understood employment to be mandatory, unless age, medical condition, or physical disability made them eligible for aid. The VI-SPDAT subjectifies “clients” to technocratic knowledge about “homeless” people and case management work. The VI-SPDAT literally establishes the parameters of the case plan and associated intervention. It resonates with diagnosis and treatment plans that medical practitioner use.

Understanding the HSC as a total social institution is more than harsh and degrading treatment of people struggling for housing. It is a reflection of technocratic knowledge about “homeless” people. They are identified, diagnosed, and subjected to intervention for the crime of experiencing houselessness. Technocratic knowledge attests to claims that they are a knowable population and can be organized and managed as such. Marginalized people without housing are not welcome in the urban landscape nor are the nonprofits that serve them. Unhoused people’s humanity is lost in the shuffle, because the state considers them as fixable objects.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

> The compulsion to stereotype the homeless as dependent and deviant turns the poorest Americans into an abstract 'other,' separate and inferior from everyone else. Although their problems are more severe, however, destitute people living on the streets and in homeless shelters are not so different from the rest of us. They never have been. Any genuine effort to end homelessness must begin with a recognition of that essential truth. Kusmer, 2002: 247.

Throughout history, policy makers have attempted to spatially manage "homeless" people using social control measures. For instance, as far back as the 13th and 14th century, vagrancy laws were used to regulate the "wandering poor" in England (Ellickson, 1996). In America, during the 1950s, all states had vagrancy laws on the books and police officers were used to monitor skid row inhabitants and to guard the edges of skid row districts (Ellickson, 1996). The regulation of vagrants and vagrancy raised questions about police power and the Constitution, including issues involving skid row (Goluboff, 2016). During the 1960's, because of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society initiative, jurists argued that penal solutions were ineffective against public disorder associated with "homeless" people (Howard, 2013). In 1965 and 1975, the US Supreme Court eliminated public disorder statutes, suggesting that their enforcement was vague and arbitrary, even though they had been in use since the founding of the United

States (Goluboff, 2016). As such, the Supreme Court established the right for “homeless” people to exist, but not in the city itself (Goluboff, 2016).

These forms of regulation have long isolated and detached those with insecure housing from normative society. The demolition of skid rows was an attempt to remove skid row residents from the city and demonstrated unique limits on the rights of people to live in public spaces. Yet precariously housed people relied on skid rows as a place to go in the city and because it served their needs. Life on skid row was difficult. The housing was substandard, employment was spotty, and residents were stereotyped by authority figures as alcoholics (Bogue, 1963). In spite of all of that, some people used skid row as a launch pad to return to domiciled living (Bogue, 1963). For others, skid row allowed them to survive. Unfortunately, skid row was similar to a dreary retirement home for single men, divorced men, and estranged fathers (Bogue, 1963). Without skid row, homeless people had to resort to the streets where they were even more isolated from mainstream forms of housing. During the 1980s politicians, media, and popular culture associated poor urban communities with “underclass” behaviors like drug abuse, single parenthood, teen pregnancy, and welfare dependency (Garland, 2001). Social and economic policies justified the disciplinary state as discourses of crime were used to present the poor as undeserving, deviant, and dangerous (Garland, 2001). Politicians stigmatized people without housing as members of the urban “underclass.” Service operators served “homeless” people through institutional emergency shelters and food banks. During the 1990s, Quality-of-Life legislation criminalized “homeless” people’s way of life, and isolated and them even further from normative society.

This dissertation has argued that the state is engaged in an enterprise to spatially know and manage "homeless" people through the concept of co-location and co-located facilities. The rise and fall of skid row acted as a precursor to co-location. After the destruction of skid rows, the co-location model was gradually developed through interactions with policy makers and the changing urban landscape. During the 1980s, activists responded to the increasing numbers of unhoused people and urged the federal government to conduct national numerations. They did not secure housing rights as they intended but they compelled the federal government to acknowledge the extent of people experiencing forms of housing precarity. PIT counts emerged within a context of dispute between activists and the state. The initial PIT estimations carried more implications for policy makers than contemporary counts. They reflected the concept of legibility (Scott, 1998) and were useful to the state to be able to "see" its "homeless" populations. These early counts helped to establish the "facts" of the case (Jocoy, 2013) through the "working figure" agreement between activists and policy makers which estimated between 500,000 and 1 million people were homeless on any given night (Wright & Devine, 1995). Subsequent PIT estimates reflected and reproduced the "working figure" and helped turn people without housing into political objects that policy makers and the state could manage and organize. The state institutionalized PIT numerations as a management strategy to accomplish two things. First was to portray "homelessness" as both "natural" and intractable. Second was to treat "homelessness" a technical problem, which had the added effect of dehumanizing people without homes. By eschewing claims for universal housing, healthcare, and basic income rights, "homeless" intervention has focused more on discipline than care. Even social services that do seek to "care" for "the homeless" do so through a

disciplinary regime of self-sufficiency, which presents unhoused people as a matter of individual deficiency to be rectified by individual behavior. Social services are designed to support individuals in this disciplinary process, but don't address social and systemic barriers people experience in securing and maintaining housing.

These dynamics of the larger construction of "homeless" people as objects of knowledge come together in the HSC and its model of co-location. Following Goffman (1961), I claimed that the HSC itself is a total social institution. The HSC segregates the "deviant" homeless population and subjects them to normalization tactics. The dominant ideologies about people without housing, which cast them as dependent and undeserving, help to justify their segregation and institutionalization. These ideologies involve negative stereotypes about unhoused people which rationalizes the disciplinary mechanisms employed in places like the HSC. The operation of such institutions produces and relies on technocratic "knowledge" about "homeless" people. Service operators depend on "homeless types" for administration of their shelter. "Homeless types" set the parameters for re-housing case plans that social workers and case managers use. The broad purpose of the total social institution is to transform "homeless" inpatients into "normalized" ex-patients as Goffman (1961) would say. Moreover, the discipline of "self-sufficiency" is supposed to turn previously "homeless" people into governable or docile subjects within normative society (Foucault 1995).

The key takeaway from this project is that co-located facilities amount to the re-institutionalization of precariously housed people. What we can see is that unhoused people are spatially alienated from normative society. NIMBYism and land-use decisions prevented the community care model from gaining traction. Co-located facilities emerged as a community

scale response to urban “homelessness”; however, such places are not a part of the community. Government officials and boosters advocate for co-located facilities because they argue that they are more palatable than clearing out old service hub which produces uncontrolled displacement. The centralization of nonprofits supports business interests in other parts of the city. Business and governmental leaders favor co-location because it condenses the size and footprint of urban homeless districts. The co-locating social services busies people without housing in a particular area and reduces their visibility in more profitable areas in the city, making them accessible for new rounds of investment and profitability. We saw this dynamic play out in Phoenix, where the HSC was supported by downtown Phoenix’s boosters. Further case studies in other cities, would help explain more about the relation between downtown boosters and co-located facilities, and the relations between co-location and downtown redevelopment project. This is why we ought to understand that co-location is a spatial management strategy that is supposed to contribute to a general sense of order in the city, and thus could compel support of service, business, and governmental leaders, even though their rationales were very different.

The co-located facility resonates with skid row because they are both places in the city for precariously housed people to go. The dominant ideologies about “homeless” people led to historical vagrancy laws which sought to control them. Co-located facilities do the same, but they are camouflaged as care through accessible social services. Such places are simply one way to administer social services in a way that does not interfere with so-called urban revitalization projects. Urban policy makers have figured out how to co-locate “the homeless.” At the same time, they rendered the urban landscape so hostile to unhoused people they commit

themselves to places like the HSC. Co-location repackages centuries old modes of social control over “undesirables.”

As it stands, the “homeless” identity confers a set of negative characterizations of the person. State power toward people without housing show us that laws, institutions, and knowledge go hand-in-hand with dominant ideologies about “homeless” people and shape people’s experience of housing precarity. What is most needed is a dismantling of such ideologies that render “homeless” people deviant and undeserving. I don’t pretend to know how to undo the marginalization and stigmatization of people without housing. However, one suggestion would be to challenge the scholarship on homeless types. Homeless typologies are dehumanizing, because the characteristics of some are attributed to broader populations. Homeless types are categorizations that remove an individual’s complexity. They function as stereotypes that stigmatize unhoused people and legitimize their objectification as objects of state management.

The problem with such characterizations is that it allows others to “know” an unhoused person without ever speaking to one. We can also combat this by changing the ways we talk about them. For example, one might use terms such as *unhoused people, people without housing, precariously housed people,* or *houselessness* instead of homeless person. This language is less degrading and does not imply that being unhoused is a condition rather than an attribute. This way, we can delink the stigma that is attached to “homelessness” and “homeless” people and alter the focus of inquiry from a set of individual deficiencies that require punishment, correction, and tutelage. If we instead understood houselessness as a condition then we could focus on eradicating it. Scholars could refocus their attention on

transitional and social housing policies as well at the labor market. This would reduce the emphasis on the individual to the broad social condition of houselessness. In this way, houseless policy could also divert more energy toward people who are at risk of becoming houseless and consequently reduce the overall numbers of houselessness.

I have attempted to humanize homeless people because they are a group who are struggling for housing. I have focused on the ways policy makers have constructed "homelessness" through the language of "deviancy" and in opposition to pre-given concepts of the normal. Of course, the term 'normal' is statistical not sociological. Co-location exist as way for urban regimes to manage people without housing. Co-location also meets the state imperative of governmentality while denying the case for social rights, which could lead to their inclusion.

The dominant ideologies about "homeless" people prevent questions about the social distribution of housing, who gets housing, and under what conditions. Universal housing rights support the dignity of all human beings even those who have experienced houselessness. Housing is a medical intervention that aids one's physical and mental health. But we should not stop there. Although it is beyond the empirical scope of this dissertation it is important to explore other policies that might abate the social conditions leading to houselessness. For instance, universal health care could be preventative against addiction, psychosis, and chronic diseases that increase an individual's risk of becoming unhoused. A guaranteed basic income might stem wage repression and provide additional bulwarks against the vicissitudes of unemployment. These and other policy provisions might be more effective at targeting the

social relations that produce the generalized condition of housing precarity, rather than further disciplining and policing those experiencing struggles to secure and maintain housing.

References

Alter, J., Buckley, J., Taylor, M., & Doherty, S. (1984, January 2). Fighting back: Arizona and Massachusetts represents the extremes. *Newsweek,* p26.

Amster, Randall. (2008). *Lost in space: The criminalization, globalization, and urban ecology of homelessness*. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC.

Anderson, M. (2013). Whose downtown? Displacement, resistance, and the future of the CCNV shelter in Washington, D.C. https://whosedowntown.wordpress.com/ccnv-1990-2013

Arizona Capitol Development Committee. (1973). *The Arizona Capitol Complex: The 1973 report of findings and recommendations of the committee for the Arizona Capitol Mall development, Ray Rottas, chairman, Richard Pacheco, vice chairman.* Phoenix, Arizona: Valley Forward Association.

Bahr, H. M. (1973). *Skid row: An introduction to disaffiliation*. Oxford University Press.

Balsas, C. (2007, March). *Homelessness in Phoenix, Implications for downtown revitalization*. Paper presented at the O Combate à Pobreza e à Exclusão Social: estratégias para o século XXI, Lisbon, Portugal.

Barak, G. (1991). *Gimme shelter: A social history of homelessness in contemporary America.* New York. Praeger.

Benjaminsen, L., & Andrade, S., B. (2015). Testing a typology of homelessness across welfare regimes: Shelter use in Denmark and the USA. *Housing Studies*, *30*(6), 858.

Bernstein, Michael, H. (1972). *Geographical perspectives on skid row in Phoenix, Arizona*. [Master's Thesis]. Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University.

Blue-Howells, J. (2008). Co-location of health care services for homeless veterans: A case study of innovation in program implementation. *Social Work in Health Care. 47*(3), 219-231.

Bogard, Cynthia, J. (2003). Seasons such as these: How homelessness took shape in America. Walter de Gruyter, Inc., New York

Bogue, D. J. (1963). Skid row in American cities. Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago.

Brinegar, Sarah, J. (2003). "The social construction of homeless shelters in the Phoenix area." *Urban geography* 24(1), 61–74.

Burt, M., R. (1992). *Over the edge: The growth of homelessness in the 1980s*. Russell Sage Foundation.

Burt, M., R. (1995). Critical factors in counting the homeless: An invited commentary. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 65(3*), 334–339.

Cannella, David. (1990, July 8). It was a 'tough week' for Valley's homeless: Troubles include heat, cut in food, closure of 'shelter'. *The Arizona Republic,* B1, B7.

Chananiah, P. (2020). The churning of skid row: A genealogy of development, gentrification, and displacement. American Journal of Economics & Sociology, 79(2), 475–510.

City of Phoenix. (1970). *A report and recommendations to the city council on the Central Phoenix Plan.* Phoenix, Arizona: Planning Commission.

Collins, T. W., & Grineski, S. E. (2007). Unequal impacts of downtown redevelopment: The case of stadium building in Phoenix, Arizona. *Journal of Poverty, 11*(1), 23-54.

Collins, W., & Arizona State Parks Board. (2005). *The emerging metropolis: Phoenix, 1944-1973*. Phoenix, Ariz.: Arizona State Parks Board.

Cook, James. (1991, March 17). How the Deuce could I have made that error? *The Arizona Republic,* E2.

Creno, Cathryn. (1990, November 20). Phoenix orders downtown food bank to quit serving breakfasts to poor. *The Arizona Republic*, A16.

De La Rosa Aceves, A. (2011). *Phoenix's place for the homeless: Stories from the Maricopa County Human Services Campus.* [Master's thesis]. Retrieved from ASU Electronic Dissertation and Theses. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.A.56414

DePastino, T. (2005). *Citizen hobo: How a century of homelessness shaped America*. University of Chicago Press.

Dear, M. J., & Wolch, J. R. (1987). *Landscapes of despair: From deinstitutionalization to homelessness* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Dear, M. J., Wolch, J. R., & Wilton, R. (1994). The service hub concept in human-services planning. *Progress in Planning*, 42, 173-271.

The Editorial Board. (1983, November 3). Phoenix elects Democrat as mayor. [Editorial]. *The New York Times, A26.*

The Editorial Board. (1983, March 5). Downtown lots for homeless to be shut: Health hazard alleged; opening is scheduled for second shelter. [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* A13.

The Editorial Board. (1983b, March 15). Downtown shelter for homeless officially opens despite needed work. [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* B1.

The Editorial Board. (1987, December 17). Homelessness now a family problem. [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* A12.

The Editorial Board. (1988, March 11). Goddard urges support in $1.1 billion bond vote. [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* B1, B2.

The Editorial Board. (1996, September 22). Arizona Science Center. [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* A33

The Editorial Board. (2000, April 22). Is a full service 'campus' a solution for homelessness? [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* B8.

The Editorial Board. (2001, May 4). Regional strategy is encouraging: County proposal for homeless is a positive step [Editorial]. *The Arizona Republic,* B10.

Ellickson, R., C. (1996). Controlling chronic misconduct in city spaces: Of panhandlers, skid rows, and public-space zoning. Yale Law Journal, 105, 1165.

Emerson, R. M., Fretz, R. I., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). *Writing ethnographic fieldnotes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Fontana, A., & Prokos, A. H. (2007). *The interview: From formal to postmodern*. Routledge.

Ford, L. (1994). *Cities and buildings: Skyscrapers, skid rows, and suburbs*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Foucault, M. (1995). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (2007). *Security, territory, population*: Lectures at the collège de France, 1977-78 Michel Foucault; edited by Michel Senellart; general editors, François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana; translated by graham Burchell Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan: République Française, 2007.

Foucault, M., Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. University of Chicago Press.

Gabbard, W. J., Snyder, C. S., Muh Bi Lin, Chadha, J. H., May, J. D., & Jaggers, J. (2007). Methodological issues in enumerating homeless individuals. *Journal of Social Distress & the Homeless, 16(2),*90–103.

Gabrielian, S., Chen, J. C., Minhaj, B. P., Manchanda, R., Altman, L., Koosis, E., & Gelberg, L. (2017). Feasibility and acceptability of a co-located homeless-tailored primary care clinic and emergency department. Journal of primary care & community health, 8(4), 338–344.

Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Garnett, N. S. (2005). Relocating disorder. Virginia Law Review, 91(5), 1075–1134.

Gober, P. (2006). *Metropolitan Phoenix: Place making and community building in the desert.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Goffman, E. (1961). *Asylums: Essays on the social situations of mental patients and other inmates*. Oxford, England: Doubleday.

Goluboff, Risa, Lauren. (2016). *Vagrant nation: Police power, constitutional change, and the making of the 1960s*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goodwin, J., M., Tiderington, E., & Noonan, E. (2021). Readiness assessments in moving on initiatives: a scoping review, Journal of Social Distress and homelessness, DOI: 10.1080/10530789.2021.1995938

Google. (n.d.). [Google Maps downtown Phoenix]. Retrieved December 18, 2017. from https://www.google.com/maps/place/Downtown+Phoenix,+Phoenix,+AZ/@33.4514652,112.0913905,14z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x872b1222db042be9:0x834ead3495ca6c1a!8m2!3d33.4517174!4d-112.0744643

Gowan, T. (2010). *Hobos, hustlers, and backsliders: Homeless in San Francisco*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hacking, I. (1986). 'Making up people', in Heller, Sosna, and Wellbery (eds), *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 222-236.

Hacking, I. (2006). 'Making up people', *London Review of Books,* 28 (16): 23-26

Hermann, W. (2005, November 6). Campus aims to help homeless in Valley. *The Arizona Republic,* B1, B7.

Hertzberg, E., L. (1992). The homeless in the United States: Conditions, typology and interventions. *International Social Work, 35(2),* 149-162.

Historical Timeline. (n.d.). Father Joes Villages. https://my.neighbor.org/about-us/historical-timeline/

Hoffman, J. (1983). Urban squeeze plays: New York City crises of the 1930s and 1970s. *Review of Radical Political Economics, 15(2),* 29–57.

Homeless Shelters. (n.d.). Shelter listings.org: Find Shelter and Housing. https://www.shelterlistings.org/

Homeless Shelters Directory: Helping the needy of America. (n.d.). Homeless Shelters Directory. https://www.homelessshelterdirectory.org/

Hopper, K. (1995). Definitional quandaries and other hazards in counting the homeless: An invited commentary. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 65(3),* 340–346.

Hopper, K. (2003). *Reckoning with homelessness*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Howard, E. (2013). *Homeless: Poverty and place in urban America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Jackson, K., T. (1985). *Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.

James, V. (1988, July 24). Goddard's record on 10 key issues. *The Arizona Republic*, C2.

Jocoy, Christine, L. (2013). Counting the homeless: The culture of quantification in American social policy. *Cultural Geographies*, *20*(3), 397

Joint Urban Design Program, College of Architecture and Environmental Design; major sponsors, Central Arizona Chapter, American Institute of Architects [and] Phoenix Community Alliance. (1997). *Renaissance of the Capitol District: Proceedings of the Capitol Mall charrette, October 30, 31, November 1, 1996*. Tempe, Arizona. Herberger Center for Design Excellence, Arizona State University.

Kasianovitz, K. (2005). Counting our cities' homeless. *Documents to the People, 33(2),* 10-11.

Kearns, B. (2012). Down for the count: Overcoming the Census Bureau's neglect of the homeless. *Stanford Journal of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, 8(1)*, 155–182.

King, D. S., & Gurr, T., R. (1988). The state and fiscal crisis in advanced industrial democracies. *International Journal of Urban & Regional Research*, *12(1),* 87–106.

Kuhn, R., & Culhane, D., P. (1998). Applying cluster analysis to test a typology of homelessness by pattern of shelter utilization: Results from the analysis of administrative data. American Journal of Community Psychology, 2, 207.

Kusmer, K., L. (2002). *Down and out, on the road: The homeless in American history*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LaPlante, Joseph. (1980, July 27). Bum's rush: Businessmen in the Deuce know walls to tumble down, but when? *The Arizona Republic. p. A1, A14.*

Legislative Governmental Mall Commission. (1997). *Capitol District development guidelines.* Phoenix, Arizona. State of Arizona Department of Administration, General Services Division, City of Phoenix Planning Department, Maricopa County Department of Planning and Infrastructure Development.

Levin, J. (2019). *The queen: The forgotten life behind an American myth* (First edition.). Little, Brown and Company.

Luckingham, B. (1989). *Phoenix: The history of a southwestern metropolis*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

Lyon-Callo, V. (2004). *Inequality, poverty, and neoliberal governance: Activist ethnography in the homeless sheltering industry*. Peterborough, Ont.; Orchard Park, N.Y. Broadview Press.

Market Research Inc. (1984). *Economic impact of proposed domed stadium in downtown Phoenix: A study for Phoenix Community Alliance.* Phoenix, Arizona: Phoenix Community Alliance.

Marquardt, N. (2016). Counting the countless: Statistics on homelessness and the spatial ontology of political numbers. *Environment & Planning D: Society & Space, 34(2),* 301–318.

McAllister, W., Kuang, L., & Lennon, M. C. (2010). Typologizing temporality: Time-aggregated and time-patterned approaches to conceptualizing homelessness. *Social Service Review*, *84*(2), 225–255.

Morin, Richard. (1974, Dec 9). Skid row is a victim of urban renewal. *The Arizona Republic.* p. A1, A12.

The National Coalition for the Homeless. (n.d.). The Callahan legacy: Callahan v. Carey and the legal right to shelter. New York, NY.: The National Coalition for the Homeless National Coalition for the Homeless.

The National Coalition for the Homeless. (2006). NCH fact sheet #18. Washington D.C.: The

Mungin, D. (2016). *There's a skid row everywhere, and this is just the headquarters: Impacts of urban revitalization policies in the homeless community of skid row.* LSU Doctoral Dissertations. Baton Rouge, LA.

Polson, Dorothee. (1985, August 13). Made of stone: Monuments grace plaza dedicated in memory of Gov. Wesley Bolin. *The Arizona Republic.* p. A8.

Project Share. (1977). *Multi-service centers: Co-location and services integration.* Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Intergovernmental Systems.

Pylypa, Jen. (1998). Power and bodily practice: Applying the work of Foucault to an anthropology of the body. *Arizona Anthropologist.* 13: 21-36.

Rex, T., & Seidman, L. (2000). Development of metropolitan Phoenix: Historical, current and future trends. Morrison Institute for Public Policy as part of Brookings Growth Case Study.

Rich, W. C. (2000). *The economics and politics of sports facilities*. Quorum Books.

Robertson, A. (2003, August 24.) Downtown human services campus comes to fruition. *The Business Journal.* https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2003/08/25/story4.html

Rollinson, P. A. (1998). The everyday geography of the homeless in Kansas City. *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography*, (2). 101.

Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* New York: Vintage.

Schneider, M., Brisson, D., & Burnes, D. W. (2016). Do we really know how many are homeless? An analysis of the point-in-time homelessness count. *Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services, 97(4),* 271–273.

Schultz, M. (2002, December 16). Homeless campus fills role downtown. [Letter to the editor]. *The Arizona Republic,* B8.

Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Snow, D., Anderson, L. (1993). *Down on their luck: A study of homeless street people.* University of California Press.

Snow, D., & Mulcahy, M. (2001). Space, politics, and the survival strategies of homeless people. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *45*(1), 149-169.

Stark, L., R. (1992). Counting the homeless: An assessment of S-Night in Phoenix. *Evaluation Review, 16(4),* 400–408.

Stergiopoulos, V., Dewa, C., Durbin, J., Chau, N., & Svoboda, T. (2010). Assessing the mental health service needs of the homeless: A level-of-care approach. *Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved*, (3), 1031.

Straw, R., B. (1995). Looking behind the numbers in counting the homeless: An invited commentary. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 65(3),* 330–333.

Subotic, J. (2021). Ethics of Archival Research on Political Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, *58*(3), 342–354. https://doi.org/https://journals.sagepub.com/loi/JPR

Sugrue, T., J. (1996 [2014]). *The origins of the urban crisis: Race and inequality in postwar Detroit*. Princeton University Press.

Takahashi, Lois (1996). A Decade of Understanding Homelessness in the USA: From characterization to representation. *Progress in Human Geography. 20, 3; 291.*

Takahashi, L. M., & Gaber, S. L. (1998). Controversial facility siting in the urban environment: resident and planner perceptions in the United States. Environment and Behavior, 30(2), 184-215.

Talton, J. (2015). *A brief history of Phoenix.* The History Press. Charleston, SC.

The U.S. Census Bureau. (2019). Counting the hard to count in a census. The U.S. Department of Commerce. Suitland, MD.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2007). The Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2009). The 2008 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2010). The 2009 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2011). The 2010 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2012). The 2011 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2013). The 2012 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2014). The 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2015). The 2014 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2016). The 2015 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2017). The 2016 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2018). The 2017 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2019). The 2018 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2020). The 2019 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2021). The 2020 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress. Office of Community Planning and Development.

Wagner, D., & Gilman, J. B. (2012). *Confronting homelessness: Poverty, politics, and the failure of social policy*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Waldron, R., O'Donoghue-Hynes, B., & Redmond, D. (2019). Emergency homeless shelter use in the Dublin region 2012–2016: Utilizing a cluster analysis of administrative data. *Cities*, *94*, 143–152.

Warren, C. A. B., & Karner, T. X. (2005). *Discovering qualitative methods: Field research, interviews, and analysis*. Oxford University Press.

Watson, Joe. (2016, May 13). Shuttered Florida prison converted into 'Empowerment Center' for homeless. *Prison Legal News.* https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/may/13/shuttered-florida-prison-converted-empowerment-center-homeless/

Weaver, T. (2017). Urban crisis: The genealogy of a concept. *Urban Studies 54(9),* 2039–2055. Sage Publications, Ltd.

Wolch, J. R., & Dear, M., J. (1993). *Malign neglect: Homelessness in an American city*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers

Wolch, J. R., & Rowe, S. (1992). On the streets: Mobility paths of the urban homeless. City & Society, 6(2), 115-140.

Wong, Y.-L. I., Park, J. M., & Nemon, H. (2006). Homeless service delivery in the context of Continuum of Care. *Administration in Social Work*, *30*(1), 67–94.

Wright, J. D., & Devine, J., A. (1995). Housing dynamics of the homeless: Implications for a count. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, *65*(3), 320–329.

Wright, J. D., Rubin, B. A., & Devine, J. A. (1998). *Beside the golden door: Policy, politics, and the Homeless*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Wright, T. (1997). *Out of place: Homeless mobilizations, subcities, and contested landscapes*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press