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Abstract
In this dissertation I advance a novel strategy of inclusion in Rawls’ theory of distributive justice for livestock animals. I argue that the restriction that consideration is only given to free and equal moral persons in the generation of principles in Rawls’ ideal theory, does not prevent these principles from being applied to nonmoral persons in the decisions of how to structure the institutions of the basic structure of society. Livestock animals, due to their intertwined nature with humans and their location within the basic structure, force decisions to be made as to how the principles would apply to structuring their institutionalized lives in the animal product use industry. Animal welfare science and the historical account of animal husbandry provides the knowledge base necessary for the participants in Rawls’ original position to determine what is owed to this dependent portion of society. I suggest a conclusion for how this determination would be made and analyze its support through the secondary justification structure Rawls provides for the application of the generated principles to a democratic society, characterized by pluralism.