UNCANNY HANNIBAL: HANNIBAL AS A ROMAN-LIKE FIGURE DURING THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

by

C.W. WILKINSON

(Under the Direction of Erika Hermanowicz)

ABSTRACT

By examining evidence from Livy's accounts of the Battles the River Trebia and Lake Trasimene during the Second Punic War, this thesis argues that Hannibal becomes an uncomfortably Roman-like figure in Livy's *ab Urbe Condita*. This study examines Livy's decision to tell the Battle of the River Trebia through Hannibal's perspective, as well as examines Livy's word choice describing the Roman army during the Battle of Lake Trasimene. I argue that Livy sees Hannibal as someone who encroaches on Roman exceptionalism and poses a challenge to Roman legitimacy to rule its Mediterranean empire.

INDEX WORDS: Ancient history

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C.W. WILKINSON

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C.W. WILKINSON

Major Professor:	Erika Hermanowicz
Committee:	Peter O'Connell
	Jordan Pickett

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the very small bit of my thumb I accidentally sliced off in Spring 2021 while cutting a lemon. You were not the first casualty of this MA, nor were you the last, but you were the one I was most attached to.

May a flight of grasping angels sing thee to thy apposable rest.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In an attempt to better understand human relationships with robots, robotics professor Masahiro Mori published an article in which he graphed human reactions to robots. On the horizontal access, he imagined a robot's similarity to human appearance, and on the vertical he measured people's affinity for the automaton (Mori 2). According to Mori, as robots become more and more human, people have a greater and greater affinity for them, but only up to a point. If an object were too human, but not quite human enough, people would begin to find the object unsettling. As an example, Mori suggests we consider a highly realistic prosthetic hand. The hand might seem human like at first glance. It might simulate wrinkles, veins, and fingernails, but appear "pinker, as if it had just come out of the bath" (Mori 2). However, when we take a closer look, we "experience an eerie sensation. For example, we could be startled during a handshake by its limp boneless grip together with its texture and coldness" (Mori 3).[1] That eerie feeling gives rise to what Mori called the "uncanny valley", in which something that is too human, but not quite human enough, causes people to feel apprehensive (Mori 2-5). Since Mori coined the phrase in the 1970's, the "uncanny valley" has become well known in modern popular culture. It also provides helpful insight into ancient depictions of the famous Carthaginian general, Hannibal Barca.

[1] However, as an object becomes more and more human like, the effect is reversed, until an object is identifiably a healthy human being (Mori 2). This gives the graph a sort of "U" shape, and results in the eponymous valley.

It is the intention of this thesis to demonstrate that in his history of Rome, *ab Urbe Condita*, Livy describes Hannibal as something like an "uncanny valley" of a Roman during the Battles of Trebia River and Lake Trasimene — that is to say, Livy portrays Hannibal as a figure who is eerily Roman while still being distinctly Carthaginian. His depictions of Hannibal at these battles blur the line between Hannibal and his Roman opponents in such a way as to depict the general as surprisingly Roman and relatable. As I demonstrate, Hannibal and his subordinates carry out Roman religious rituals during events associated with both of these battles, and Livy's narrative treats Hannibal in ways similar to how it treats Roman generals.

Scope and Methodology

At the core of this thesis is the idea that Livy viewed Hannibal as an uncanny reflection of a Roman and a challenge to Roman exceptionalism. Livy's work, however, is truly massive in scope, and examining his entire account of Hannibal is well outside the boundaries of what I can accomplish in this format. Hostilities between Rome and Carthage lasted from Hannibal's siege of Saguntum (modern Sagunto on the Eastern coast of Spain) in 219 BCE until Hannibal's final defeat at the Battle of Zama in October 202 BCE. Livy's account of the war spans nearly the entire third decade, from books 21 to 30. His account of the combatants' actions is lengthy and sometimes goes into fulsome detail. In order to render this study manageable in length, I have confined my analysis to three battles: the first two major battles of the war, the Battle of Trebia River in 218 BCE and the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BCE as well as, for the sake of comparison, the Battle of the Upper Baetis in southwestern Spain in 211 BCE.[2] I include the Battle of the

[2] The Battle of the Upper Baetis was a double battle, consisting of the Battle of Castulo and the Battle of Ilorca, fought on successive days. I refer to this event by its collective name for the sake of clarity.

Upper Baetis because of the significance of its contrast to the other two battles. The Battle of the Upper Baetis was the only Carthaginian victory on land at which Hannibal was not present, but instead Hannibal's brothers, Mago and Hasdrubal, were in command.

My analysis of the Battles of Trebia River and the Upper Baetis focuses on Livy's use of names, perspective and the narrative access to Carthaginian thoughts and motivations. I argue that Livy uses these elements to humanize Hannibal in a way uncommon to other Carthaginian generals, and I dwell on Livy's description of the Battle of the Upper Baetis in order to demonstrate the difference. This in turn allows (or, perhaps, causes) Livy's readers to identify with Hannibal in a way which would otherwise be impossible, and rhetorically places the Carthaginian on an even footing with his Roman opponents.

This phenomenon also occurs during Livy's description of the Battle of Lake Trasimene. My focus in this battle is illustrating how Hannibal "disparages" consul Gaius Flaminius and makes him a less like a respectable Roman commander while at the same time "inflates" Hannibal and his subordinate Ducarius (an Insubrian Gaul who fights a duel against Flaminius at the climax of the battle and, I argue, is a literary stand in for Hannibal) to make him more like a Roman. I show that the single combat between Ducarius and Flaminius at the end of the battle is an inversion of typical duel scenes in Livy. I also contend that Ducarius performs a ritual uncannily similar to a Roman *devotio*, a ritual in which a Roman commander sacrifices himself and the enemy army to chthonic deities in order to attain victory in battle.

I chose to focus on military matters for several reasons: personal interest; because Livy's account of Hannibal is most concerned with his military career; and because battles present the clearest juxtaposition between Hannibal and the Romans. During the battles of the Second Punic War, Livy clearly depicts martial movements, and it is easy to compare the two sides. Because the opening battles of the war happen in close succession and end with decisive Roman defeats, it becomes useful to compare them to one another.

Throughout this thesis, I will discuss the number of times Livy uses certain words. If there is no source listed in these instances, I generated the data myself using the digital humanities resources available at www.perseus.com. Under the "general search tools" option, I searched in Latin for the words in questions after checking the "search for all possible forms" option. Because the text of Livy is divided among several documents in the Perseus archive, I repeated this process for each book of Livy, unless otherwise noted.

When quoting from Livy, I have defaulted to the Latin Library's text, unless there was a problem or discrepancy within the text. In those instances (which I have marked with a footnote), I have gone to the Loeb Classical Library's text, although I have normalized the V's found in the Loeb to U's for consistency. When simple biographical information is necessary for context, I have turned to T. Robert S. Broughton's book *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*.

Before turning to the battles in question, it is useful to examine the Roman army and the force Hannibal brought with him into, and then back out of, Italy. I have two objectives: first, to establish a historical background for understanding the battles Livy describes; second, to argue that Hannibal's army became more like a Roman army over

the course of the Second Punic War in terms of ethnic makeup, equipment, and strategy, while at the same time the Roman way of war came to resemble more traditionally Carthaginian practice. In this way, Hannibal and his army became a microcosm for Livy's depiction of the war as a whole.

The Roman Military System

The Roman armies were a mixture of Roman legions, made up of Roman citizens, and allied legions, comprised of citizens from Italian cities under Roman sway. Five classes of soldiers composed the Roman legions. The majority of its strength was in its three classes of heavy infantry, divided by age (*AUC* 88.5-10, Goldsworthy 46). The youngest soldiers formed the *hastati*, the first rank of heavy infantry (*AUC* 8.8.5).[3] These men were "the flower of growing youth" (*florem iuvenum pubescentium* 8.8.6), and were the first line of heavy infantry to engage the enemy. After the *hastati* came the *principes*. According to Livy, the *principes* were "of a more solid age" (*robustior inde aetas, AUC* 8.8.6). After the *principes* came the standards and so, Livy tells us, the *hastati* and *principes* were known as the *antepilani* or "the men who fight in front of the standards" (*AUC* 8.8.7). Finally came the *triarii*, the most experienced infantry.

According to Adrian Goldsworthy in his book *The Punic Wars*, the Roman heavy infantryman was first of all a swordsman, who used a cut-and-thrust sword known to the Romans as the "Spanish sword." The *hastati* and *principes* also carried two javelins, while the *triarii* instead bore a thrusting spear (Goldsworthy 47). The heavy infantry were

[3] Livy's account differs in a few material ways from Polybius's well-known description of the Roman army, and may be describing an army which reformed into the state Polybius describes. In Livy's description the *velites* are not a separate variety of troops, but the light infantry come from half of the maniples of *hastati*, and there are three divisions of men which make up the third line. I have chosen to follow Polybius's model in general, since it seems a more accurate description of the Roman army during the Second Punic War.

also equipped with a large, formidable shield with an iron boss in the middle and were armored in what Polybius called "the full panoply" (πανοπλίαν, *Hist*. 6.23.1). The heavy infantry fought in companies called maniples (*AUC* 8.8.5).

The fourth class was the light infantry, known as the *velites*. These men were armed with small shields, swords, javelins and helmets, which were sometimes decorated with wolf pelts (*Hist*. 6.22.1-3). The cavalry, the fifth class of soldier, were drawn from higher classes of citizens, and in his book *Hannibal: A History of the Art of War Among the Carthaginians and the Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C.* Theodore Dodge says the Roman cavalry were "by no means as good" as the infantry and "considered a mere auxiliary" to the infantry (Dodge 55).

Roman armies were also supplemented by a large force of allied troops, sometimes known as the *socii*. Polybius says the allies provided the same number of infantry as the Romans, but three times as much cavalry (*Hist*. 6.26.7). As Paul Erdkamp points out in his chapter "Polybius and Livy on the Allies in the Roman Army," Livy generally treats the Italian allies as identical to the Roman troops. "In short, in the majority of full-scale battle narratives, including all the major battles of the Hannibalic War, no mention is made of specific allied units" (Erdkamp 56). There is little information available about allied forces, but Goldsworthy says they probably used equipment and tactics more or less identical to the Roman troops (Goldsworthy 49). In this thesis, I follow the ancient habit of erasing the distinction between allies and citizen legions.

It was standard practice for Roman armies to deploy the heavy infantry in three lines: first the *hastati*, then the *principes*, and finally the *triarii* (*AUC* 8.8.5-12 and

Goldsworthy 53).[4] The maniples deployed in lines with intervals in their lines equal to their own fronting. The *principes* covered the intervals in the line of the *hastati*, and likewise the *triarii* to cover the intervals in the lines of the *principes*. As a result, the army was deployed like a checkerboard, or the number five on a gaming die (Goldsworthy 53). As the army advanced, the light infantry would engage, then the *hastati* who, if they could not overcome the enemy, would retire through the gaps in the *principes* lines. The second line would, if necessary, retire between the lines of the *triarii* in turn, and these men would rise from a kneeling position, close the gaps, and attempt break the enemy's lines (*AUC* 8.8.9-12). As Goldsworthy points out, the three-line formation was an innovation unique to the Romans, and all other armies in the ancient Mediterranean preferred to deepen lines rather than to form secondary lines of reserves (Goldsworthy 60). The Roman army was "well suited" for pitched battles (Goldsworthy 60), and it was the Roman habit to bring armies against the enemy's forces and defeat them on the field to achieve war goals (Goldsworthy 153).

By the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Roman armies had come to contain locally recruited auxiliary Livy considers distinct from the Roman and *socii* legions. For instance, we learn that Publius Cornelius Scipio (consul in 218-19 BCE, whose role in the war I examine in chapter 2) had an auxiliary force of Gauls with him before the Battle of Trebia River (*AUC* 21.55.1 *et al.*), and later recruited a substantial force of local troops from central Spain (*AUC* 25.33.2 *et al.*). When discussing these troops, Livy is careful to separate them from the Roman and allied troops, and so we have the impression they were not as well integrated into the Roman system as their Italian comrades-in-arms.

[4] Livy here says the third line was composed of *triarii*, the most senior of this line, and two other groups of soldiers, the *rorarii*, the next youngest, and the *accensi*, the least dependable troops in the army.

The Roman system of politics and command meant that generals did not frequently remain in command for longer than a year, although, according to Goldsworthy, the average Roman commander was about as skilled as his Punic counterpart (Goldsworthy 52). As Dodge points out, it was the Roman habit to always attack, both in a strategic sense and in any individual battle (Dodge 46). "No nation ever grasped the idea of the initiative so firmly. Nothing but their dread of Hannibal ever altered this habit" (Dodge 65).

The Roman war goals during the Second Punic War were straightforward. Goldsworthy says the senate's objective was simply to win the war (150). The Senate's plan was to attack Spain and Carthage simultaneously (*AUC* 21.17.1). Both of these plans were disrupted by Hannibal's invasion of Italy, which became the most important theater of the war. The Roman plan for executing the war thereafter shifted and Roman armies would no longer attempt to fight Hannibal in large pitched battles. Instead, the war focused on skirmishes, raids, and blockades as the two sides attempted to slowly grind one another down (Goldsworthy 220-221).

These tactics closely resembles Goldsworthy's description of traditional Carthaginian tactics, which was "enduring an enemy's onslaught till its power began to dissipate" (153), rather than the Roman one. And so, throughout the long middle period of the war, we see the Romans employing traditionally Carthaginian, rather than Roman, tactics. Meanwhile, Hannibal employed Roman tactics to open the war.

Hannibal's War Goals and Army

We must surmise, rather than read, Hannibal's goals for his invasion of Italy. Goldsworthy argues the source has been the topic of a long and ferocious debate, largely

centering on Hannibal's decision not to attack Rome after his massive battlefield victories in 217 and 216 BCE. "The most commonly held view now is that Hannibal's plan was never to capture the city of Rome itself, but to weaken her power by persuading as many of her Italian and Latin allies as possible to defect" (155). In the aftermath of the Battle of Cannae, Livy has Hannibal make a speech to that effect to his Roman prisoners.

> *cum captiuis productis segregatisque socios, sicut ante ad Trebiam Trasumennumque lacum, benigne adlocutus sine pretio dimisisset, Romanos quoque uocatos, quod nunquam alias antea, satis miti sermone adloquitur: non interneciuum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum; de dignitate atque imperio certare* (*AUC* 22.58.1-2).
>
> When, after the captives were produced, and the *socii* separated out, just as before at [The Battle of] Trebia River and Lake Trasimene, he spoke kindly to [the *socii*] and released them without ransom. He also called forth the Romans, which he had done at no other time, and spoke to them quite mildly, [saying that] his war with the Romans was not a fight to the death; but was about a contest for rank and power.

Goldsworthy argues that Hannibal envisioned a negotiated peace after the war in which Rome still existed as a power in Italy (Goldsworthy 156). In his book *Hannibal's War,* J.F. Lazenby argues that it must have been clear to Hannibal that the war would be fought on land, since the Carthaginian fleet was too small to contend with the Roman navy. This means that the war would be fought in Spain or Africa or Italy. If Hannibal had delayed invasion of Roman allied territory, he would not have had the opportunity to peel the peoples of Italy away from their Roman alliances and domination, Lazenby argues. Some of these alliances were less than 50-years-old, and the Gauls of the Po valley were only recently subdued, meaning the ground was fertile for Hannibal's plan. Lazenby sees these factors, as well as the speech Hannibal gives to the Romans after the Battle of Cannae,

which I mentioned above, as evidence that Hannibal's plan to break off the *socii* was novel (Lazenby 29-32).[5]

We also see in Livy's report of Hannibal's speech to the Roman prisoners from the Battle of Cannae, which I quoted above, evidence that Hannibal was thinking about the *socii* differently than he was thinking about the Romans in that Hannibal may have been attempting to replace Rome as the hegemon of the Italian peninsula. If this is the case, Hannibal would have presented a unique threat to the Romans, while also building an empire which functioned in a way substantially similar to how Romans led Italy. His ploy starts to work — several towns, including Capua, defected to Hannibal in the aftermath of The Battle of Cannae (*AUC* 23.1-7.1). And so, what we see from Hannibal's plan for the early years of the war replicates Roman tactics (that is, to engage the enemy's strength with his own), and that plan is partially successful. This means that in general during the war, when the conflict is fought on Roman terms, Hannibal is victorious and, when it is fought on traditionally Carthaginian terms, the Romans are victorious.[6]

It is clear, however, that the Roman and Carthaginian systems for maintaining their empires were, superficially at least, similar. Lazenby points out that the Carthaginian client states were generally bound by looser ties to Carthage than the Italians allies to Rome, and there does not appear to have been an opportunity to move

[5] It is important to note that Goldsworthy disagrees, arguing that all major states of this time were supported by a constellation of allies, each of which contained factions ready to betray their overlords in exchange for control of their own people. He argues the novelty of Hannibal's strategy was its aggressiveness, not its attempt to break off the Italian and Latin allies. This was "waging war in the normal way" (Goldsworthy 156).

[6] The war does eventually come down to a pitched battle in the Roman style in which the Romans are victorious, but in this way too the war in general mirrors Hannibal in particular. As we shall see, the army Hannibal led at Zama was very similar to the armies Romans had been leading throughout the conflict.

toward citizenship as in the Roman system. The relationships, however, between patron and client states were similar in many important ways. There is a clear hierarchy of alliances, dependencies and tributaries among Carthage's dependent states, all of which involved contributing troops to Carthage (Lazenby 9).

Not much detail has survived regarding Carthaginian armies, especially in comparison to the exacting detail we have from Polybius about the Roman military during the third century BCE. The First Punic War demonstrated that Carthage was primarily a naval power. Very little can be said about what a "typical" Carthaginian army might have been like, if such a thing even existed in the first place, but we can extract some details of Hannibal's army.

The army Hannibal brought with him to Italy was truly multinational. Not much can be said about the organization of the men who invaded Italy, except that diversity, rather than uniformity, appears to have been the defining factor. At the time of the Battles of Trebia River and Lake Trasimene, it was made up of African, Iberian and Gallic components.

At the heart of Hannibal's army was a core of African troops. These were best troops available to a Punic commander and came from the Phoenician and Libyan cities in the vicinity of Carthage. They fought as heavy infantry, armed with a spear, shield, helmet and a linen cuirass, according to Goldsworthy (32). Dodge adds they were sometimes equipped with "special arms" such as flails and harpoons attached to ropes (22). Goldsworthy calls these men the "steadiest and most disciplined element in most armies" (32).

The rest of the armies were made up of troops which are traditionally referred to as mercenaries; however, as Goldsworthy points out, that is an oversimplification.

> It is conventional to describe Punic armies as consisting of mercenaries, but this is a gross oversimplification, since these forces included soldiers raised in many different ways with a great variety of different motivations. Some contingents were not hired, but provided by allied kingdoms or states as part of their treaty obligations. [...] Numidian contingents were usually led by their own princes. Similarly, many of the tribes in Spain and Gaul were formally allied to Carthage and fielded contingents identical to their own tribal armies and commanded by their own chieftains (Goldsworthy 33).

This relationship, as we have seen, is not unlike the relationship the Romans had with their allies. The Spanish and Gallic contingents were, respectively, the next most and least reliable portions of Hannibal's army. The Iberian tribes provided heavy infantry, armed with a cut-and-thrust sword (the inspiration for the Roman Spanish sword) and a leather buckler. The Gauls, according to Dodge, fought "almost naked," usually armed with swords, but sometimes with spears, pikes, halberds, or clubs (20).[7]

Hannibal's light infantry were drawn from a mixture of Libyans and Iberians, particularly from the Balearic Islands. The light infantry from here are traditionally considered to have been slingers, but according to Lazenby, it is likely they were mostly standard light infantry. The Libyans and Spanish skirmishers infantry fought, as most light infantry at the time did, with javelins and shields. Lazenby theorizes all of Hannibal's light infantry was also armed with a stabbing spear (Lazenby 14-15).

Hannibal also invaded Italy with light and heavy cavalry, as well as his famous force of war elephants. The cavalry in the army were the Numidians, light horse who were usually critical in determining the outcome of Hannibal's battles. They fought

[7] There is also a longer discussion of what we can glean about Hannibal's army in Lazenby 14-16.

mostly with javelins and swords (Doge 23). The heavy cavalry, like the infantry, were drawn from Africa, Iberia and Gaul.

Hannibal also brought a number of elephants with him into Italy, although Livy does not tell us how many. Lazenby argues the elephants were from a now-extinct species of African forest elephant (*Loxodonta africana cyclotis*), smaller and more easily trained than the extant African variety.[8] These creatures, he argues, were too small to carry a howdah, and the elephant itself would have been the primary weapon.

Livy himself was unsure how large Hannibal's army was once it crossed the Alps, and says he found wildly varying numbers in his sources. Polybius, who gives one of the numbers Livy repeats, says Hannibal erected a column after crossing the Alps on which he himself wrote that 12,000 Libyans, 8,000 Iberians and 6,000 cavalry survived the crossing (*Hist.* 3.56). To this force Hannibal added some number of Gauls from northern Italy, although Livy says he finds confusion among his sources about their number and the time they were recruited (*AUC* 21.38).

However large Livy thought Hannibal's force was, it is important to understand that he considered the army not as unified coalition of allies, but rather a conglomeration of men from every part of the Western Mediterranean which never fully meshed together, but was also not entirely disparate. This is in contrast to how Livy describes Roman armies. While Roman armies were multinational, as we have seen, Livy tends to think of all these troops as identical. It also contains no Roman citizens; whose presence was the

[8] Lazenby also notes that at least one of the elephants, named Surus (the Syrian) may have come from Syria, and so imported from India. This may have been the elephant that survived the winter 218-217 BCE and died during the marsh crossing (Lazenby 16).

most important factor in making an army Roman. But this subtlety is not the only way in which Livy reminds his readers that Hannibal is not a Roman.

Livy is often painstaking in his descriptions of Hannibal's battle lines, and he is inclined to delineate the location of troops by ethnicity, as we shall see in the rest of this thesis. Furthermore, diversity is a critical component to how Livy thought of this army.

> *ac nescio an mirabilior aduersis quam secundis rebus fuerit, quippe qui cum in hostium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab domo, uaria fortuna bellum gereret, exercitu non suo ciuili sed mixto ex conluuione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia uestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope di essent* (*AUC* 28.12.3).
>
> I suppose he was more marvelous in adversity than when things were good, after all he had waged a war of varying fortune in enemy lands for thirteen years, so far from home, with an army not of his own citizens but a jumbled mix from all races, among whom there was no common law, or custom, or language, each had their own habits, their own dress, their own weapons, their rites, their own rituals, and their own gods.

While we see Hannibal's army become more like a Roman army over the course of the war, Livy's descriptions indicate they were always a group of contingents with a single commander rather than a unified force. But this does not fully encapsulate the way in which Livy thought about Hannibal's army.

After the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Hannibal re-equipped his African infantry with Roman weapons and armor, taken from the dead. The result of this is telling.

> *Afros Romanam crederes aciem; ita armati erant armis et ad Trebiam ceterum magna ex parte ad Trasumennum captis* (*AUC* 22.46.4).[9]
>
> You would've thought that the Africans were Romans; since they were armed with weapons captured at [The Battle of River] Trebia and, for the most part, at [The Battle of Lake] Trasimene.

[9] Loeb quotation.

Eventually, as Hannibal's plan to peel away Roman allies met with initial success, he began to recruit soldiers from the former Roman allies. Hannibal's most important troops of this class were from the Bruttii, a people who inhabited what is now Calabria. As I said before, these soldiers would have been equipped and fought identically to Roman troops, and so for most of the 13 years Hannibal was in Italy, his army would have become more similar a Roman army.

Hannibal also eventually adopted Roman tactics. As we have seen, it was the Roman custom to deploy the heavy infantry in three lines, with sturdier troops in the rear acting as a reserve for weaker troops in the front. Hannibal replicated this formation at the Battle of Zama, the climactic battle of the war.

> *Hannibal ad terrorem primos elephantos — octoginta autem erant, quot nulla unquam in acie ante habuerat — instruxit, deinde auxilia Ligurum Gallorumque, Baliaribus Maurisque admixtis: in secunda acie Carthaginienses Afrosque et Macedonum legionem: modico deinde interuallo relicto subsidiariam aciem Italicorum militum — Bruttii plerique erant, ui ac necessitate plures quam sua uoluntate decedentem ex Italia secuti — instruxit. equitatum et ipse circumdedit cornibus; dextrum Carthaginienses, sinistrum Numidae tenuerunt* (*AUC* 30.33.4-7).
>
> Hannibal drew up the elephants first — there were 80 of them, and he had never had that number in the line before — in order to terrify, then the Ligurian and Gallic auxiliaries, mixed with the Balaerics and Moorish. In the second line the Carthaginian, African, and Macedonian troops: then, after an interval he placed his Italian soldiers in reserve — most were Bruttii, who had followed from Italy more because of force and necessity than their own volition. He surrounded his wings with horse; Carthaginians held the right, and Numidians the left.

I see Hannibal's deployment at this battle as a clear metaphor for how Livy portrays Hannibal. There are recognizably Roman aspects of his army — the three-line deployment and reliance on reserve, the presence of Italian auxiliary, and the African

infantry who, as we have seen, also fought with captured Roman equipment. There are, however, also important differences.

…Yet Always Our Enemy

Throughout this thesis, I largely focus on the ways in which Hannibal is like a Roman. This is largely because the text is often actively hostile to Hannibal, and so it is not difficult to argue that Livy had negative thoughts about him. However, it is important not to let the characterization of Hannibal as a villain go un-remarked.

At 21.4, Livy gives a lengthy account of Hannibal's character. After listing numerous virtues, including his virtue as a soldier, but finishes his characterization with harsh criticism:

> *Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant, inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio* (*AUC* 21.4.9).
>
> These great virtues balanced out enormous criminal defects: inhuman cruelty, more than Punic perfidy, he held nothing true, nothing sacred, feared no god, vowed obedience to no one, had no religion.

Similarly, when the Carthaginians captured the survivors of the Battle of Lake Trasimene, they promised to let the men go if they surrendered. The Romans surrendered and were "protected by Hannibal with Punic reverence" and enslaved (*quae Punica religione seruata fides ab Hannibale est, AUC* 22.6.12). Finally, it is impossible to overlook the fact that Hannibal was a great enemy of the Roman people.

Similarly, in Sallust's admiring dread of Hannibal is the sentiment that the general ground down the Romans more than anyone else since they became great (*post magnitudinem nominis Romani Italiae opes maxime attriverat, Jug*. 5.3). Meanwhile, in his biography of Hannibal, Cornelius Nepos is much more complementary, but the

memory of hatred remains. He calls Hannibal a commander who surpassed all others in skill, just as the Romans surpassed all other peoples in valor (*Si verum est, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit, non est infitiandum Hannibalem tanto praestitisse ceteros imperatores prudentia, quanto populus Romanus antecedat fortitudine cunctas nationes* (*Hannibal*, 1.1), and his narrative focuses on the numerous times Hannibal used trickery to outwit his enemies (e.g. *Han.* 5 were Nepos describes Hannibal's escape from Quintus Fabius Maximus by tying burning torches to the horns of cattle).

While over the course of this thesis I argue that Livy's portrayal of Hannibal strays toward making him like a Roman, he is never fully Roman. What is surprising about his portrayal is the way in which these instances turn Hannibal into something that is *like* both Carthaginian and Roman. The line between the two, which is so thick elsewhere, is in Hannibal's case made thin and blurry. It is this disconcerting portrayal of Hannibal as both similar to the Romans and the "other," that I wish to examine.

It is necessary to discuss *why* Livy turns Hannibal into such a complex, vibrantly contradictory character. There are, I think, two major factors at play. Primarily, it is crucial to remember that Livy is a consummate story teller. Hannibal is a major character for a significant portion of Livy's history, and the story is more interesting and dramatic if Hannibal is complex, uncannily familiar, and compellingly relatable.

More importantly, Hannibal represented a serious challenge to Roman exceptionalism. The similarity between the Roman and Carthaginian empires, combined with the nearness of Hannibal's victory and early successes, mean that Hannibal and his family could realistically have replaced the Romans as the dominate power. If that had

happened, it seems likely there would have been little change in relationships Western Mediterranean states had with their overlords, except for that the name of that overlord. It follows that there was nothing inherent to the Romans that allowed them to build their empire, but anyone could have done the same. And so, it seems to me that Livy saw something of himself and his people in Hannibal and the Carthaginians, and so it makes sense that he might assign some Roman traits to his greatest enemy.

CHAPTER 2

Perspective Inversion on Trebia River

Hannibal arrived in northern Italy in October of 218 BCE. His first major battle against the Romans, the Battle of Trebia River, occurred about two months later, at the end of December. Both Roman consuls, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Titus Sempronius Longus, were present, although P. Cornelius Scipio did not participate because of a wound he had suffered a few weeks earlier. In this chapter, I discuss Livy's use of perspective and personal names during his account of the Battle of Trebia River. Throughout his description of the battle, Livy's narrative perspective is locked on Hannibal, and the narrator appears to only have access to what Hannibal thinks and knows. I argue this allows readers to identify with Hannibal. Livy also uses the names of commanders strategically in his description of the battle, carefully controlling when readers are either reminded of who is responsible for which actions when he uses the name, or alternatively when an actor is separated from his actions by the omission of his name, and so is allowed to fade into relative obscurity. As we shall see, at the Battle of Trebia River, Hannibal's name is used repeatedly, and he becomes the controlling figure in the narrative while the consul Sempronius (who commanded the Roman army) disappears nearly entirely so the Roman army seems to act of its own accord rather than at the orders of its commander.

As a point of comparison to the Battle of Trebia River, I also describe the Battle of the Upper Baetis, fought in southern Spain in 211, paying close attention to how Livy

uses the same narrative elements in that description, including the use of names. The Battle of the Upper Baetis was the only major land battle the Carthaginians won during the Second Punic War at which Hannibal was not present. Hannibal's absence from the event, as well as the lack of similar Carthaginian representation during the battle, makes it a critical point of comparison.

I also dwell on Livy's description of Roman and Carthaginian movements leading up to the Battles of the Trebia River and Upper Baetis, focusing on the actions of the Scipio brothers, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio (hereafter Gnaeus) and his younger brother, Publius Cornelius Scipio, (who was present during the Battle of the Trebia River but did not fight in it, henceforth Publius), before and during the Battle of the Upper Baetis. My point is to illustrate the amount of time Livy dedicates to recounting the actions of each side. This chapter argues that when Livy is describing one of Hannibal's campaigns, Hannibal is visible and active. His name is used often, and Livy is (usually) clear about what actions he is taking and the results of those actions. This is Livy's usual treatment of Roman generals, whose actions, thoughts, and feelings are also reported. This is not the case in the Battle of the Upper Baetis, where instead the Carthaginian generals (of which there are three) are nearly invisible, and Livy's narrative focuses almost entirely on the action of the Romans. By recounting Livy's version of these events, my goal is to show the difference between the two descriptions, and to establish a sort of "control" narrative against which we can judge Livy's descriptions of Hannibal.

There are three sections in this chapter. The first section deals with the maneuvering of armies leading up to the Battle of the River Trebia, and explores an incident in which Hannibal mimics the Roman ritual for declaring war. The second

examines Livy's account of the battle itself, and the final one examines the Battle of the Upper Baetis which occurred in Spain in the year 211 BCE, during which both of the Scipio brothers were killed.

1, 2, 3, 4, I Declare a Punic War

Livy's account of the campaign leading to the Battle of Trebia River begins with lengthy speeches by Hannibal and Publius Scipio to invigorate their troops before battle. The two armies began maneuvering in the Po Valley in Northern Italy, at the end of which Hannibal gathered his forces in the city of Victumulae. Suspecting he had not done enough to steel the nerves of the men, Hannibal made a litany of promises to the army if they should be victorious against the Romans (e.g. tax-free lands in Italy, Spain, or Africa; freedom for slaves and recompence for masters; and citizenship at Carthage, *AUC* 21.45.1-5). To demonstrate his sincerity, Hannibal took a characteristically Roman action.

> *Eaque ut rata scirent fore, agnum laeva manu, dextra silicem retinens, si falleret, Iovem ceterosque precatur deos ita se mactarent quemadmodum ipse agnum mactasset, et secundum precationem caput pecudis saxo elisit.* (*AUC* 21.45.8)
>
> And so that they would know he was being earnest, taking a lamb in his left and, after a prayer, a flint in his right, he prayed that, if he should renege on his promise, then Jupiter and other gods should slaughter him in the same way he slaughtered the lamb, and then he struck the lamb on the head with the stone.

As Benjamin Foster points out in his translation of Livy, this is a "rite characteristic of the Roman fetials," the college of Roman priests concerned with declaring war and peace (Foster 134, n. 1). As I demonstrate, Hannibal's actions in this passage are remarkably similar to a Roman rite. By performing one of the fetial rituals immediately before the

fighting with Rome breaks out, Hannibal is acting in the same way we might expect a Roman to, and so confuses the boundary between Roman and Carthaginian.

Livy describes the ritual in *AUC* 1.24. He describes the process by which treaties were made and ratified, and includes a lengthy exchange between the fetial priest and the Roman king, as well as a recitation of an oath and the conditions of the treaty before the other state's envoy.

> *"Audi" inquit, "Iuppiter; audi, pater patrate populi Albani; audi tu, populus Albanus. Ut illa palam prima postrema ex illis tabulis cerave recitata sunt sine dolo malo, utique ea hic hodie rectissime intellecta sunt, illis legibus populus Romanus prior non deficiet. Si prior defexit publico consilio dolo malo, tum ille Diespiter populum Romanum sic ferito ut ego hunc porcum hic hodie feriam; tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes pollesque."* (*AUC* 1.24.7-8)
>
> "Witness, oh Jupiter," he said, "witness, oh representative father of the Alban nation; witness, oh Alban people. The Roman people will not be the first to break from these terms, as they were read from the beginning all the way to the very end from this wax tablet without wicked treachery, as they are honestly understood here today. If they should break from them first by public decision with evil deceit, then, oh Diespiter, strike down the Roman people as I strike down this pig. And smite them more mightily, as you are so much stronger than I.

The similarity to Hannibal's speech and actions at Victumulae is remarkable. By causing Hannibal to act out a Roman ritual, Livy is infusing him with something like the trappings of a Roman fetial. This helps erode some of the cultural boundaries between Hannibal and the Romans, allowing Roman readers to more easily identify with the Carthaginian.

But there is an additional important layer to this characterization. Hannibal is replicating the ritual of the fetial college. In his article, "The Fetial and their '*ius*,'" Frederico Santangelo demonstrates that the fetial college was concerned with declaring war and peace, and ensuring wars were prosecuted justly. Since early Rome was so

aggressive, “it was essential to set rules defining the cases in which war might be declared, and a ritual that would precede the declaration of war” (Santangelo 65). As Santangelo goes on to point out, the length and specificity of Livy’s description “suggest that he was well informed on the topic” (Santangelo 66), meaning it is likely that Livy was also aware of the fetial college’s association with propriety in making war and peace. This makes Hannibal’s ritual very similar to one a Roman would have recognized as a religiously appropriate declaration of war. However, there is also a notable difference: when Hannibal performs the ritual, he sacrifices a lamb instead of a pig. While the ritual significance of each of these animals is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is a recognizable difference between the rites, and gives Hannibal’s performance a slightly alien feel. Nevertheless, if we read the ritual as a sincere imitation of the fetial rite (and the solemnity with which it is reported and Livy’s lack of condemnation suggest that we should) Hannibal’s activity with the lamb at Victumulae could be seen as giving him the authority to wage war against the Roman state in the same way a Roman general would have the authority to wage war against its enemies. This is not a position in which Rome’s enemies often find themselves in Livy’s history, and makes it more difficult to characterize Hannibal.

What follows in Livy’s account are several chapters which detail the movements of the armies leading up to the battle. I will examine Livy’s final chapter before the battle in greater detail as an example of the content of the others, but for our purposes no more than a cursory summary is necessary for the others.

Publius Scipio was wounded in a clash with Hannibal’s cavalry, and once Sempronius (the other consul who had been in Sicily) joined Scipio’s army, the Romans

and Carthaginian cavalry met again. The result was inconclusive, but more Carthaginians died than Romans, so Sempronius declared victory (*AUC* 21.46-52). The win, such as it was, lifted Sempronius's spirits. Scipio was hesitant to go to battle with Hannibal, but Sempronius was insistent that, now that the consuls were together, victory was within their grasp. In the days before the battle, Sempronius roamed through the camp loudly proclaiming, among other things, that the spirits of the men were restored; that Scipio was merely recalling his wound, which made him fear going to battle; that their fathers would groan over their inability to confront the Carthaginians on Italian soil. Now that Sempronius had convinced himself that the time to act was at hand, he ordered the Romans to prepare for an early battle (*AUC* 21.53.1-7). Hannibal, meanwhile, was watching the enemy camp.

> *Hannibal cum quid optimum foret hosti cerneret, vix ullam spem habebat temere atque improvide quicquam consules acturos; cum alterius ingenium, fama prius, deinde re cognitum, percitum ac ferox sciret esse ferociusque factum prospero cum praedatoribus suis certamine crederet, adesse gerendae rei fortunam haud diffidebat.* (*AUC* 21.53.8)
>
> Since Hannibal understood what was best for the enemy, he had hardly any hope that the consuls would do anything stupid or rash. But he knew that one of them was volatile and arrogant by nature — at first by reputation, and then later from experience — and that he would put great stock in his recent slim victory in the fight with the raiders, so he expected things would soon fall out favorably.

When his Gallic scouts reported the Romans were preparing for battle, Hannibal began looking for a place to lay an ambush.

We see in this chapter, as has been true of the pre-battle maneuvering more generally, how Livy treats Hannibal in much the same way he treats the Romans. Both armies are commanded by generals with plans they are capable of executing. In each chapter, Livy gives space to the thoughts of both sides, and explains what they are doing

and why. For instance, in 21.48, we learn that, after some of his Gallic auxiliary deserted, Scipio decided to move camp to a more secure location because he feared the desertion of the auxiliary would cause a general uprising throughout Cisalpine Gaul. Hannibal, meanwhile, was experiencing anxiety.

> *Nec procul inde Hannibal cum consedisset, quantum victoria equestri elatus, tantum anxius inopia quae per hostium agros euntem, nusquam praeparatis commeatibus, maior in dies excipiebat.* (*AUC* 21.48.8)
>
> When Hannibal made camp not far away [from Scipio], as much as he was elated by the cavalry's victory, he was equally anxious because of the lack of food, getting worse by the day while going through enemy territory since he had not prepared anywhere for supplies.

In order to solve his supply issue, Hannibal sent a detachment to a nearby Roman food dump, and his men convinced the garrison commander to defect to the Carthaginian side. In this series of events, we see Livy treating Hannibal and Scipio the same way. Both men discover a problem, decide on a solution, and then successfully execute the solution.

The narrator has access to the thoughts and beliefs of all three commanders, and gives the audience insight into these thoughts. We understand the motivations of both Roman and Carthaginian commanders, and we can understand the problems they face and the steps they take to solve those problems. All three commanders are named, and it is obvious what their goals and strategies are. As we shall see later in this chapter, Livy's narrative voice does not always afford this level of access to other Carthaginian commanders. Elevating Hannibal to the same level as a Roman in these terms makes him a more active participant in the story that Livy is telling, and adds a level of drama to the telling which would be otherwise lacking. Additionally, the audience is told the story from the point of view of both sides. Telling the story in this way, in a sense, makes both

perspectives on the conflict valid, and makes both Roman and Carthaginian generals into equally important characters.

As I argue later in this chapter, however, this is not how Livy typically treats Carthaginians. Even Hannibal's brothers Mago and Hasdrubal are not afforded the same visibility as Hannibal. The contrast between Hannibal and his brothers illustrates that it is Hannibal alone who is afforded this treatment, and for whom Livy blurs the lines between Roman and Carthaginian. Once the fighting starts at the Trebia River, that boundary is crossed again.

From a Certain Point of View

The Battle of the Trebia River took place on either December 22nd or 23rd of 218 BCE. According to J.F. Lazenby, the exact location of the battle has never been identified, although the approximate location, in northwestern Italy, is just east of modern Piacenza in Emilia-Romagna.

During much of the battle, the narrative point of view remains locked on Hannibal. We survey the battlefield along with him. We watch him discover the overgrown patch of brambles in which he plans to hide 2,000 men to outflank the Romans once the fighting begins. We hear the speech Hannibal gives his brother Mago about the importance of the ambush they will spring on the Romans. We also listen to him commission the 2,000 men Mago picks for duty. It is clear that Hannibal is the protagonist of this particular story. After he dispatched Mago's flanking force, Hannibal ordered the rest of the men to prepare for the coming battle (*AUC* 21.54.1-4).

By the command of Hannibal, the Numidian cavalry attacked the Roman camp at dawn, with orders to lure the Romans across the river and into battle (*AUC* 21.54.4-5).

Sempronius, confident in his cavalry after the recent "resounding" victory, sent his men to battle and chased the Numidians away from the Roman camp.

> *Ut vero refugientes Numidas insequentes aquam ingressi sunt—et erat pectoribus tenus aucta nocturno imbri—tum utique egressis rigere omnibus corpora ut vix armorum tenendorum potentia esset, tum utique egressis rigere omnibus corpora ut vix armorum tenendorum potentia esset, et simul lassitudine et procedente iam die fame etiam deficere. [55] Hannibalis interim miles ignibus ante tentoria factis oleoque per manipulos, ut mollirent artus, misso et cibo per otium capto, ubi transgressos flumen hostes nuntiatum est, alacer animis corporibusque arma capit atque in aciem procedit.* (*AUC* 21.54.9-55.1)
>
> In pursuit of the escaping Numidians they entered the water — and it had swollen to chest height by nocturnal rain — when they made it across the river all the men were so numbed that they could hardly hold their weapons, and at the same time were growing weak because of fatigue and, as the day wore on, hunger. [55] Meanwhile, Hannibal's soldiers made fires before their tents, and oil to loosen the joints and a leisurely breakfast were sent into the maniples. When it was announced that the enemy had crossed the river, they took up their weapons with eager bodies and minds and went to battle.

We have seen throughout the description of the battle that Hannibal is the one in control of the situation. In Livy's account, Hannibal is the most active character. He is the one making the decisions which lead to victory, and at the moment the Romans cross the Trebia, we see that his victory is the result of his decision making. As I demonstrate later in this chapter, and in the next chapter, it is more common for Livy to describe battles with Romans in this role. By choosing to use Hannibal as the most active actor in *this* battle, Livy is portraying Hannibal similarly to the way he portrays Roman commanders.

As the Romans approached, the Carthaginians deployed for battle. Hannibal posted his 8,000 light infantry from the Balearic Islands in front of the heavy infantry, and placed his 10,000 horse and handful of elephants on the wings (*AUC* 21.55). The army was orderly, and its deployment was well considered. The Roman force, on the

other hand, was not. Upon Hannibal's attack, Sempronius sent his cavalry out first, and after they had chased off the Numidians, he then sent out 6,000 infantry, with the rest of the army following to fight Hannibal.[10] As a result, the troops were scattered and physically exhausted (*AUC* 21.54-55). Livy does not mention how the Romans deployed for battle, except that the cavalry was in its traditional location flanking the army on both sides. It is reasonable to assume Sempronius deployed his troops in the usual fashion, with 18,000 Romans in the center, flanked on either side by 20,000 Italian allies on the wings, and the Gauls positioned at the far left.

Hannibal's cavalry and light infantry were able to scatter the Roman cavalry, and the heavy infantry lines closed. Mago's ambushing force attacked the Roman flank, and the elephants charged at the Roman front, but were rebuffed by Roman light infantry stationed there for that purpose. The javelins caused elephants to stampede toward Hannibal's men, but he ordered them driven into the Roman's Gallic auxiliary, who panicked and ran. Their flight caused the remainder of the Romans to flee as well. About half the army managed to cut its way free, but the rest were caught and killed, or captured after pursuit, or drowned in the river (*AUC* 21.55-56).

It is noteworthy that throughout the entire account of the fight (*AUC* 21.54.1-21.56.9), Livy uses only Carthaginian names, first using Hannibal's at 21.55.1, as I quoted above. This reminds the reader that he is the focus of the narrative here, and the one in this account who is worthy of our attention. His presence is felt throughout the passage through the orders he gives and the command he has over the battle. For

[10]True to form, Livy does not offer any insight into why he would do so or what he was hoping to accomplish, other than that he had already made up his mind to offer battle.

instance, it is on Hannibal's direct orders that the elephants are driven against the weakest part of the Roman line.

> *Trepidantesque et prope iam in suos consternatos e media acie in extremam ad sinistrum cornu adversus Gallos auxiliares agi iussit Hannibal.* (*AUC* 21.56.1)
>
> [The elephants were] panicked, they were nearly upon their own horrified men, when Hannibal ordered them be driven from the middle of the line against the Gauls on the extreme left.

This stands in direct contrast to the Roman army which appears, especially at first, to have no real organization. Furthermore, it seems as though the Roman army was not even under the command of a specific person. Livy refers to Sempronius on this occasion merely as *consul* (21.55.3). On its own, calling a sitting consul "*consul*" is not noteworthy, but combined with the lack of more specific reference to Sempronius it becomes a noteworthy moment of removing the Roman from the reader's view. Livy does the same thing when he discusses the Roman light infantry who defeat the elephants.

> *Eos velites ad id ipsum locati verutis coniectis et avertere et insecuti aversos sub caudis, qua maxime molli cute volnera accipiunt, fodiebant.* (*AUC* 21.55.11)
>
> Velites,[11] placed at that location for this very purpose, threw their javelins and turned them aside and pursued them, stabbing them under their tails, where the skin is softest and can be wounded.

While it is clear from Livy's text that the Roman line was drawn up in order to deal with Hannibal's elephants, it is unclear *who* was responsible for doing so. By not crediting Sempronius with the forward thinking necessary to counter the elephants, Livy declines

[11]Velites are Roman light infantry. See the introductory chapter of this thesis and Polybius 4.21-22. *Velites* can also be simply "light infantry", but the reference to javelins in the text (*verutis*) leads me to retain the technical term

to make him more visible and active in the battle. He is, in fact, so absent from the battle it is not even clear where he was during the fighting, if he was fighting at all. We do hear he "lead out" (*eduxit* 21.54.6) various contingents of the army, as I mentioned before, but it is not clear where he was physically. In fact, we do not read his name again until after the battle ends, when he arrives at Rome to hold elections, having made a daring escape through enemy lines in order to do so, before returning to winter quarters (21.57.3). These choices together make Hannibal the character to watch during the battle, rather than the Roman commander we would usually expect to occupy that place. An examination of the Battle of the Upper Baetis in Spain will help make the contrast more clear.

An "Us" Versus "Them" Narrative

As this chapter demonstrates, much of the campaign leading to the Battle of the Trebia River and the battle itself, are told from Hannibal's perspective. The story of the Battle of the Upper Baetis, on the other hand, is told almost exclusively from a Roman perspective, inviting a Roman audience to identify with the Roman troops. It is useful to recount Livy's account of the maneuvering leading up to the Battle of the Upper Baetis and the fight itself in order to demonstrate my point.

Publius Scipio (consul of 218-17, who was too wounded from battle to participate in the Battle of the Trebia River) and his brother, Gnaeus Scipio, had invaded Iberia in 218 BCE in an attempt to disrupt the Carthaginian empire there, and to prevent Hannibal's brothers, Mago (this is the same Mago who led the ambushing force at the Trebia River) and Hasdrubal, from bringing reinforcements overland into Italy. The Scipio brothers met with some initial success, but were stymied by a lack of

reinforcements. In 211 they raised 20,000 auxiliaries from the Celtiberian peoples in north-central Spain[12] and decided that, since they had so far accomplished nothing except for keeping Hasdrubal Barca (Hannibal's younger brother) tied up in Spain, it was time to go on the offensive. The Roman army was made up of Roman and allied troops, as well as a sizable contingent of Celtiberian troops who had been recruited locally.

The Romans were presented with three enemy armies. One force was led by Hannibal's middle brother Hasdrubal Barca, a second under Mago, who also fought at the Battle of the Trebia River, and a third army, which operated alongside Mago's army throughout the campaign was under Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo (*AUC* 25.32.1-5). Livy relates the plans of a Roman council of war: the goal was to destroy Hasdrubal Barca's force while keeping Mago's army occupied so they could not wage a guerilla war against the Romans. In order to achieve this goal, the council decided to send two-thirds of the Roman and allied troops with Publius against Mago; the remaining one-third, as well as the entire Celtiberian auxiliary, were sent with Gnaeus (*AUC* 25.32).

But Hasdrubal did not sit idle as the Romans executed their strategy. Instead he executed his own plan.

> *Hasdrubal postquam animaduertit exiguum Romanum exercitum in castris et spem omnem in Celtiberorum auxiliis esse, peritus omnis barbaricae et praecipue omnium earum gentium in quibus per tot annos militabat perfidiae* (*AUC* 25.33.2)
>
> Hasdrubal [Barca] noticed there the Roman army in the camp was small and had placed all its hopes on the Celtiberian auxiliary, and he was skilled in all sorts of barbarian treachery, and those which the tribes practiced among themselves, on account of so many years of military service.

[12] There is debate about who these people were. They may have been Celts who lived in Iberia, Iberians who lived in traditionally Celtic lands, a people group who combined Celtic and Iberian cultural traits, or either Celts or Iberians who had conquered the other group. See Francisco Burillo Mozota and A. Cremin's article "The Origin of the Celtiberians" (1991). In any case, it is inconceivable this is what the group called itself, although it is the term Livy uses.

Hasdrubal convinced the Celtiberians to desert the Romans with a combination of a bribe and an argument. The Celtiberians, he argued, would easily be able to escape from the Romans, since they made up the bulk of Gnaeus's army and no one could prevent them from leaving if they chose. Furthermore, he was not asking the Celtiberians to fight against the Romans, but rather to return home and abandon the war altogether. The Celtiberians were convinced, and left the Roman camp. Gnaeus retreated, staying off level ground (where the Carthaginian cavalry would have been most effective), and was pursued by Mago's army (*AUC* 25.32).

Livy's description of Hasdrubal's skill at treachery is condemnatory. As I argue in the next chapter of this thesis, Livy chose to depict Hannibal in a way that made it easier for Roman readers to identify with him when he hid from Gallic assassins before the Battle of Lake Trasimene. Hasdrubal, on the other hand, is instead depicted as "other." The use of *perfidia* and *barbarica* are crucial in creating this effect. As the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* points out, *perfidia* carries a harshly negative connotation, describing a person whom others cannot trust ("*usu originario dicitur de eis quibus alii confidere non possunt*" *s.v. perfidia*). *Barbarica* is related to *barbarus*, itself a term for "an external people" ("*in proprie gentis externae*" *TLL s.v. barbarus*). By describing Hasdrubal's stratagem as, in essence, "alien perfidy," Livy is separating Hasdrubal both from his Roman audience and Hannibal.

Additionally, Hasdrubal Barca's argument to the Celtiberians is presented as a direct address, and the sentence which describes the reasons to desert has an impersonal subject. The structure of the sentence muddles who is doing the speaking.

> *nec atrox uisum facinus — non enim ut in Romanos uerterent arma agebatur — et merces quanta uel pro bello satis esset dabatur ne bellum gererent, et cum quies ipsa, tum reditus domum fructusque uidendi suos suaque grata uolgo erant.* (*AUC* 25.33.4)
>
> It did not seem an atrocious thing to do — for they were not driven to turn their weapons against the Romans — and they would be given as much money *not* to wage war as they would to fight, and rest itself, and a return home and seeing their crops and families were agreeable to the soldiers.

This structure serves to divorce Hasdrubal from his arguments and make him a less active participant in the incident. If, for instance, Hasdrubal's words were presented in indirect discourse or as a quoted speech, we would feel his presence strongly. Instead, we are left to supply his role in the affair from context, and infer that he was responsible. In fact, Hasdrubal is only the subject of one sentence in the chapter which describes his actions leading up to the Battle of the Upper Baetis. The focus of the storytelling is clearly on the Romans. Livy even uses the story to give explicit advice to future Roman generals:

> *id quidem cauendum semper Romanis ducibus erit exemplaque haec uere pro documentis habenda, ne ita externis credant auxiliis ut non plus sui roboris suarumque proprie uirium in castris habeant.* (*AUC* 25.33.6)
>
> Indeed, it will always be a necessary precaution for Roman generals and it will be crucial to remember this lesson not to trust foreign auxiliaries, and do not have more of their strength in camp than their own.

This sentence reminds a Roman reader of his own (and the Scipio brothers') Roman identity and does not allow for any ambiguity. The Romans are active and, when possible, aggressive; the Celtiberians are treacherous barbarians; and the Carthaginians are sneaky tricksters. This stands in stark contrast to what we have seen of Hannibal, who exists in a liminal space between being a Roman and a Carthaginian. Hannibal, although he is capable of deceitful tactics, is not a sneaky trickster, but instead acts like a Roman,

despite being a Carthaginian. The difference between the Carthaginian generals draws our attention to the strange portrayal of Hannibal.

While Hasdrubal Barca was bribing Gnaeus's Spanish troops, Publius Scipio was having trouble against Mago's army. In Livy's telling of the events, we see a similar distance between the Carthaginian generals and the actions taken by their armies.

Masinissa, a commander of Mago's Numidian cavalry, was harassing Publius's army so aggressively that the Romans were confined to their camp. The situation was about to worsen with the approach of Mago's reinforcement of 7,500 Spanish troops. As a result, Publius decided to leave a small garrison in camp under the legate Tiberius Fonteius and moved at midnight to intercept the Spanish contingent. The armies fought in order of march rather than in battle lines, but the Romans had the advantage, until Masinissa's Numidians realized Publius had slipped out of his camp and joined the attack (*AUC* 25.34.1-9). Shortly thereafter the "Carthaginian generals" (*duces Poeni,* 25.34.9) arrived and surrounded the Roman lines.

> *pugnanti hortantique imperatori et offerenti se ubi plurimus labor erat latus dextrum lancea traicitur; cuneusque is hostium, qui in confertos circa ducem impetum fecerat, ut exanimem labentem ex equo Scipionem uidit, alacres gaudio cum clamore per totam aciem nuntiantes discurrunt imperatorem Romanum cecidisse.* (*AUC* 25.34.11)
>
> The general [Publius] was fighting and encouraging his men and exposing himself where there was the most work to be done, he was pierced by a lance through the right side; and the phalanx of the enemy, who were attacking, pressed around the general, when they saw Scipio falling dead from his horse, they immediately rejoiced and dashed through the whole army, announcing the fall of the Roman general.

When the word of Publius's death spread to the rest of the Roman army, the Romans were routed and all would have been cut down in flight if night had not fallen (*AUC* 25.34.12-14).

The Carthaginians followed up their victory by approaching Gnaeus's camp. Gnaeus, recognizing he was outmatched, attempted to retreat to some nearby hills and built a makeshift fortification out of whatever was available from the baggage train. The Carthaginian soldiers hesitated before attacking, unsure of how best to overcome the obstacles, but their generals urged them to attack (*AUC* 25.35-36.8).

> *Punici exercitus postquam aduenere, in tumulum quidem perfacile agmen erexere; munitionis facies noua primo eos uelut miraculo quodam tenuit, cum duces undique uociferarentur quid starent et non ludibrium illud, uix feminis puerisue morandis satis ualidum, distraherent diriperentque? captum hostem teneri, latentem post sarcinas.* (*AUC* 25.36.8)
>
> When the Punic armies arrived, the columns marched very easily up the hill; at first, the novelty of the fortifications held them fast, when the leaders, mocked and shouted along the whole line, asking why [the soldiers] were standing around, since the fortifications were hardly strong enough to delay boys and women, why weren't they pulling them apart? The enemy was held captive, skulking behind bundles and baggage!

This use of *hostis* is also worth commenting on. As we have seen, the "enemy" in question is frequently relative with regards to the character point of view. It is clear that Livy wrote the Battle of Trebia River from Hannibal's point of view and that the Romans were Hannibal's enemies. Here the use is more obvious, (the word occurs in indirect speech) but Livy once again obliterates the names (and presence) of Hannibal's brothers from his account, and it is instead the *duces* who are speaking to the men. It is not even entirely clear from Livy's narrative if any of the generals in questions were even at the final confrontation Gnaeus.

In fact, their names are absent from the entire description of the fighting, occurring only twice at the beginning of Livy's account (in 25.35), to indicate that Mago's army was marching to meet up with Hasdrubal Barca's.

> *Haud segniter inde duces Poeni fortuna usi confestim e proelio, uix necessaria quiete data militibus, ad Hasdrubalem Hamilcaris citatum agmen rapiunt non dubia spe, si se coniunxissent, debellari posse.* (*AUC* 25.35.1)[13]
>
> Then the Carthaginian leaders getting the full benefit from the battle, hardly gave their soldiers the necessary rest. They pushed their men into a speedy march toward Hasdrubal [Barca], son of Hamilcar, not doubting that if they linked up with him, they would bring the war to an end.

Hasdrubal and Mago's names occur in indirect statement, when Gnaeus comes to realize that there was little hope for victory, and his brother's army must have been destroyed. He asks himself:

> *quonam modo enim Hasdrubalem ac Magonem, nisi defunctos suo bello, sine certamine adducere exercitus potuisse?* (*AUC* 25.35.4-5)
>
> How could Hasdrubal [son of Gisgo] and Mago bring up their army unopposed unless they had finished their own war?

This stands in stark contrast to the prevalence of other non-Carthaginian names which occur in the passage. Throughout the description of the battle and the campaign leading up to it, Livy conspicuously uses the names of the Romans. We have already seen in this chapter Livy's willingness to name Romans of various ranks (for instance, at 25.37.2 he mentions Lucius Marcius, a knight who helped rescue the remnants of the Scipio's army), and he takes care to provide the name of the Roman general who was in charge of the Roman camp, as we have seen. The names of the Scipio brothers occur regularly throughout the passage, usually in conjunction with a description of their actions or reactions to new circumstances. For instance, after the Celtiberians desert:

> *Scipio, postquam socii nec precibus nec ui retineri poterant, nec se aut parem sine illis hosti esse aut fratri rursus coniungi uidit posse, nec ullum aliud salutare consilium in promptu esse retro quantum posset cedere statuit, in id omni cura intentus nec ubi hosti aequo se committeret loco, qui transgressus flumen prope uestigiis abeuntium insistebat.* (*AUC* 25.33.8)

[13] Loeb quotation.

> [Gnaeus] Scipio, since his allies could be retained by neither requests nor force, saw he could neither be a match for the enemy nor return to link up with his brother; nor was there any other reasonable plan, so he immediately retreated as much as possible. In this he took every possible care, lest on level ground he meet with the enemy, who nearly stood in the footprints of those retreating.

By naming the Romans, Livy is inviting his audience to think of them as their brethren, rather than nameless officials. He furthers this effect by describing the reaction to Gnaeus's and Publius's deaths in Spain and Italy.

> *luctus ex morte eorum non Romae maior quam per totam Hispaniam fuit; quin apud ciues partem doloris et exercitus amissi et alienata prouincia et publica trahebat clades; Hispaniae ipsos lugebant desiderabantque duces, Gnaeum magis, quod diutius praefuerat iis priorque et fauorem occupauerat et specimen iustitiae temperantiaeque Romanae primus dederat.* (*AUC* 25.36.15-16)

> The sorrow caused by their deaths was not greater in Rome than throughout all of Spain; among Romans the grief was for the destruction of the army, the loss of the province, and the national calamity; the Spanish mourned for the generals themselves, especially for Gnaeus, because he had been in charge for a longer time, had earned their good will and had given the first example of Roman justice and moderation.

Furthermore, Mago and Hasdrubal Barca are conspicuously absent from Livy's telling of the Battle of the Upper Baetis. While we read of events which must, surely, have come about because of their orders, the tone of the descriptions imply that their soldiers are acting of their own accord. Livy's choice to do so continues the trend we have seen in his description of the battle to dehumanize the Carthaginians, and mirrors the way Livy described the Romans at the Battle of Trebia River.

Although they are victorious against the Scipio brothers, Mago and Hasdrubal are distinctly Carthaginian. Hannibal, on the other hand, is active in the descriptions of the battle he wins, and present in the depiction of the campaign he leads. As the Battle of the

Upper Baetis demonstrates, we would normally expect these traits to be attributed to a Roman. By attributing them instead to Hannibal, Livy is moving Hannibal into the liminal space, where the line between Roman and Carthaginian begins to blur. Livy does not make it clear if we should applaud Hannibal's actions, or be revolted by them. The comparison between Hasdrubal Barca and Hannibal in particular is stark. As we saw in this chapter, Hasdrubal was practiced in all forms of barbarian trickery, whereas, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, Hannibal is portrayed with sympathy and understanding when he uses disguises to escape an assassination attempt. This comparison helps us see that it is Hannibal in particular, rather than Carthaginians broadly or Hamilcar's sons generally, who is given roles and qualities we would usually expect in a Roman magistrate.

More broadly, this continues a trend we have seen of Hannibal being portrayed like a Roman. Throughout this chapter, we have seen how Livy's frequent use of Hannibal's name and access to his thoughts and motivation serve to make him a fully fleshed out character. During the campaign leading up to the Battle of River Trebia, we saw that the narrator had the same access to Publius's and Sempronius's thoughts and motivations. On the other hand, before the Battle of the Upper Baetis, Livy's narration only has access to the thoughts and motivations of the Scipio brothers.

While we have seen Hannibal sometimes act like a Roman (both broadly in terms of his conduct of and plan for the war and his emulation of the fetial ritual), Livy's singular portrayal of him comes much more from word choice. We are, in a sense, told (rather than shown) by word choice, point of view and description that Hannibal is uniquely Roman-like. During the next major battle at lake Trasimene, Hannibal practices

and pantomimes Roman rituals much more explicitly than we have seen in Livy's history thus far.

CHAPTER 3

Confusion at Lake Trasimene

In the aftermath of the Roman defeat at the Battle of the River Trebia in December 218 BCE, it must have been clear to the senate it had a serious problem on its hands, although its true scope may not have yet been as clear. Gaius Flaminius and Tiberius Sempronius Longus were elected consuls for 217, and Flaminius was assigned to Etruria by lot. Flaminius had a history of feuding with the senate, most especially because of a law he supported designed to prevent the senators and the sons of senators from owning large boats, which they could use to sell goods and therefore become rich. The acquisition of wealth was thought to be "unbecoming" (*indecorus*, AUC 21.63.4) among senators, and Flaminius' attempt to restrain senatorial bad behavior by law is a significant cause of the dispute between the consul and the senate. His campaign against Hannibal, and his life, ended on the shores of Lake Trasimene in late June of the same year.

This chapter argues that throughout the account of the campaign leading up to the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Livy blurs the lines between Romans and the Carthaginian Hannibal, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is not how he treats other Punic generals. He does this by having Hannibal and Ducarius (an Insubrian Gaul who I argue is a literary stand-in for Hannibal) act like Romans and reap the same rewards as a Roman would. In this way, Livy "elevates" the Carthaginian army (and so Hannibal) to a literary status similar to the Romans. At other times, Livy uses language not typically

associated with Romans to describe the Roman army fighting at the Battle of Lake Trasimene, specifically by inverting the relationship we would usually expect between a *globus* of men attempting to get to the fighting, and an *agmen* of men attempting to flee it. In this way, Livy shows Romans acting in ways good Romans do not typically act.

This chapter has four sections. I begin with an examination of the actions Hannibal and Flaminius took in the months leading up to the Battle of Lake Trasimene. The section also examines the ominous occurrences surrounding Flaminius entering into the consulship. Finally, this section recounts the events of the battle, and argues it was Hannibal's army, not Flaminius's, which was acting like a Roman army during the Battle of Lake Trasimene.

Next, I offer a lexical analysis of Livy's use of the word *globus* in a military context in order to better understand the contrast between the disorderly heap of men trying to get to the battle, and the seemingly disciplined line of those withdrawing.

The battle ends with a duel between Flaminius and a Gallic horseman named Ducarius, which is the focus of sections three and four. This particular duel constitutes an inversion of Livy's typical successful duel scenes, as described by Andrew Feldherr in his book *Spectacle and Society in Livy's History*. In order to better understand the role of duels in Livy's work, the third section looks at two duels in the first decade of Livy where Romans were victorious, and then Flaminius's duel with Ducarius. For my analysis, the most important part of Livy's battle description is the campaign leading up to the battle, both Hannibal's

and Flaminus's, and the duel between Flaminius and Ducarius, the latter being a literary stand-in for Hannibal. Hannibal, although around 30-years-old, was by that time monocular, and so it makes little sense for him to be personally involved in the duel with Flaminius. Furthermore, Livy's Hannibal has a sense of his own importance to his army and its goals in Italy, which make it make sense he would not be personally involved in combat. In all four of the major battles he fought during the war (Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae and Zama), we never hear in Livy of Hannibal fighting in person. But this does not draw Livy's scorn. As I show later in this chapter, Roman generals routinely send others to fight duels. For Livy, the place of the commander is commanding, not fighting.

I also focuses on the consequences of the *devotio*, a Roman ritual in which a commander offers his own life and the enemy army to chthonic gods in exchange for victory in battle. I argue that Ducarius (a Gaul) performs a ritual similar to a traditional Roman *devotio* and gets similar results as both Publius Decius Mus the Elder and Younger did after their own *devotio*.

By examining these aspects of Livy's battle narratives, I show that Livy assigns quintessentially "Roman" attributes and actions to non-Romans, and blurs the line between Romans and Hannibal, and moving Hannibal into a liminal space between what is like a Roman, and what is not like a Roman.

A Lack of Wigs and a Break with the State

At the start of the spring 217 BCE following the Battle of the River Trebia, Hannibal broke camp and crossed the marshes near the mouth of the Arno river. In winter quarters, Hannibal faced assassination plots from the Gauls. Livy and Polybius agree these plots came about because of the perfidy of the Gauls, stirred to treachery because

they had hoped for Roman booty, but they instead found themselves still in their own territory, burdening their own lands with feeding both armies (*AUC* 22.1). Hannibal gives them the slip by using a disguise. In Livy he changes his headgear and clothing, and in Polybius he uses wigs.

The specific way in which the authors handle this ruse, however, is telling. Polybius says he "used a certain very Punic stratagem" to escape his assassins (ἐχρήσατο δέ τινι καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι *Hist* 3.78), and using numerous wigs to appear as men of various ages and nationalities, he hid his identity so well that even "those accustomed to know him" (ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν συνηθείᾳ γεγονόσιν *Hist* 3.78) were unsure of who he is. Having escaped the Gauls, Hannibal learned of a way into central Italy from guides and moved out of winter quarters.

Livy's account, on the other hand, focuses on the incompetence of the Gauls, rather than the guile of Hannibal.

> *petitusque saepe principum insidiis, ipsorum inter se fraude, eadem leuitate qua consenserant consensum indicantium, seruatus erat et mutando nunc uestem nunc tegumenta capitis errore etiam sese ab insidiis munierat* (*AUC* 22.1.3).
>
> Although [Hannibal] was often sought by the plots of the leaders, he was saved by the treachery among them, since they revealed schemes with the same levity as they made them; and by changing sometimes his clothing, sometimes his headwear he protected himself by deception from their plots.

The effect is twofold. On one hand, this description makes Hannibal a less impressive foe. In Polybius's account, Hannibal is wily enough to out-think the Gauls. On the other hand, by omitting most of the details of Hannibal's escape, Livy does not "otherize" Hannibal in the same way Polybius does. Polybius wants his readers to see a difference between themselves and Hannibal, while Livy leaves open the possibility that one may

identify with him. This is not to say, however, that Hannibal comes off as a perfect man in Livy's history, and Romans tended to have ambiguous feelings about the use of disguise.[14] The presence of *errore* here serves as a reminder that, while Hannibal may appear *like* a Roman, he is not a Roman by reminding readers of Hannibal's disguise.

There is another element to Hannibal's deception: he was driven to disguise only after his attempt earlier that winter to cross the Apennine Mountains had failed.

> *Iam uer appetebat; itaque Hannibal ex hibernis mouit, et nequiquam ante conatus transcendere Appenninum intolerandis frigoribus [...] Ceterum hic quoque ei timor causa fuit maturius mouendi ex hibernis* (*AUC* 22.1.1-4).

> Now spring was drawing near and so Hannibal moved from his winter quarters. He had, earlier, tried to cross the Apennine mountains in vain because of the intolerable cold. [...][15] Still, the fear of these plots was also a cause for his early move from winter quarters.

Furthermore, it was not only fear of the Gauls that drove Hannibal to abandon winter quarters early, but he demonstrated a clear desire to begin acting before the Romans could counter his movement. Speed was crucial to his next movement. Livy says there were two main approaches open to him: one via Arretium, defended by Flaminius and his army, and one via the marshes at the Arno. Hannibal took the path through the marshes, because it was shorter (AUC 22.2.1-2).

By leaving winter quarters early, Hannibal was able to ensure his army was effectively the only one in the field in Italy in the early spring, and so he could move unopposed. Furthermore, his choice to move over the rough country gave him the initiative against the Romans, itself a Roman tactic. Hannibal's use of disguise gave him

[14] See, for instance, Aeneas' use of disguise in Aeneid 2, when Aeneas uses disguise to creep through the burning city of Troy.
[15] I have excluded the story of the Gallic plot against Hannibal and the means by which he survived it, which I quoted above from 22.1.3.

freedom of movement he might otherwise have lacked. And so, Hannibal's next move was to cross the marshes at the mouth of the Arno, during which his army suffered significantly; all but one of the elephants died; and Hannibal himself lost an eye.

Meanwhile, the Romans were moving less decisively. Thinking his enemies at Rome might employ the numerous tactics at their disposal to detain a consul in the city (for instance, claiming a sacrifice or ritual had not been performed precisely enough, or that the omens were not perfect), Flaminius slipped out of Rome and entered into office in Ariminum. The senate reacted strongly. Livy gives a litany of complaints the senators had against Flaminius, including his failure to tend to religious duties and take up the correct regalia of office. They say to themselves:

> *ne die initi magistratus Iovis optimi maximi templum adiret, ne senatum invisus ipse et sibi uni invisum videret consuleretque* (*AUC* 21.63).
>
> [they said that] on the day of beginning the magistracy he did not approach the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus to visit and consult with the senate, to which he himself was hateful and which he alone hated.

There is a strong connection between the senate's complaints against Flaminius and what they saw as his religious duties. Flaminius's break with the senate was simultaneously a break with the power of the state. The senators also pointed out that Flaminius has disrespected his household gods by not taking his oath of office before his hearth and *lares*. In response, the senate demanded Flaminius return to Rome to see to their complaints, and dispatched two delegates to ensure he did so. In this passage authority, to exercise power comes from divine authority. By ignoring his responsibilities to both, Flaminius is also making himself something like an illegitimate consul.

For his part, Flaminius ignored the senatorial delegation and took up his office in Ariminum.

> *Paucos post dies magistratum iniit, immolantique ei vitulus iam ictus e manibus sacrificantium sese cum proripuisset, multos circumstantes cruore respersit; fuga procul etiam maior apud ignaros quid trepidaretur et concursatio fuit. Id a plerisque in omen magni terroris acceptum.* (*AUC* 21.63.13-14)
>
> After a few days he began his magistracy, and while he was sacrificing the calf, already having been struck, broke loose from the hands of the sacrificers, and splattered many bystanders with blood. Among those very far away from and unaware of the proceedings, the flight was a greater concern, which was feared and caused a disturbance. Many took from this a truly terrifying omen.

The varying interpretations of the omen sheds light on Flaminius's consulship. According to Pauline Ripat in her article "Roman Omens, Roman Audiences, and Roman History," Roman audiences expected portents of the future, but the message and recipient were equally important. A portent would describe the personal future of the recipient, with the important caveat that the recipient of the message was the worthiest recipient, and there might be (and often was) a difference between the person who *sees* a sign, and the person for whom it was *intended* (Ripat 159).

> This is simply because self-offering signs were expected to be sent to the person in the best position and with the greatest responsibility to act upon the message, that is, the person with the most real power and influence. Though messengers of divine messages could come — and often did — in unexpected forms, such as two-headed children [or] talking cows [...] the *addressee* of a divine message could not be of similarly unexpected status. Thus, and ideally, social inferiors ought to recognize themselves as mere messengers, not recipients, of divine messages, which were to be passed up the chain of command to their true addressees (Ripat 159-60).

The recipient then, in turn, lends credibility to the interpretation because of his authority, both by his ability to pick out "true" omens from "false" ones, and by the fact that, as the recipient of the message, he must be able to do something to avert the coming

disaster (Ripat 164-5). This led to a mutually supportive relationship between legitimacy and the ability to foresee events. If a magistrate held his office legitimately, he would have a special relationship with the gods, which enabled him to foresee, rather than be surprised by, events (Ripat 165). The system was self-reinforcing, and so when a Roman lost authority (or never obtained it correctly), he often continued to meet with uninterpretable bad omens and disaster, as the gods sent message after message to the Romans to indicate their displeasure.

If we follow Ripat's model for understanding divination, it seems clear that since bystanders understood the calf's escape as a bad omen, Flaminius ought to have done so, too, if his authority had been legitimate. As the elected consul he seems to have been the most obvious addressee of the omen. However, his inability to interpret the sign correctly indicates he was not, meaning there must be a more appropriate recipient.

I argue that the omen at his sacrifice did not appear to Flaminius, but rather to the people who witnessed the sacrifice. Since omens were open to interpretation by those who had the authority to understand and interpret them, the interpretation of the witnesses is valid, because they are the intended recipient. Flaminius's reaction to the sacrifice is significant in demonstrating his unsuitability to interpret the message. We would expect him to attempt some sort of expiation of the sacrifice, as the senate does in the next chapter after a litany of bad omens. Flaminius did not do so. Nor did he offer any interpretation of why

the escape of the victim was not as troublesome an omen as it seemed.[16] Instead, Flaminius goes about his business, as though nothing has happened. The witnesses, on the other hand, *do* have an opinion on the omen, and they interpret it correctly. The difference in these actions demonstrates that Flaminius had no authority to lead (and so was not able to correctly interpret the messages the gods were sending him) and denies him the authority to do so.

Likewise, a litany of bad omens occurred across Italy and were all reported at the same time. In Sicily, javelins burst into flames of their own accord. On Sardinia, a Roman Knight, who must have had one of the most harrowing nights in history while making his rounds, saw three miraculous events: his watchman's club caught fire; flames miraculously appeared on the shore; and two shields spontaneously combusted. Glowing stones fell from the heavens in Praeneste. The sky burned in Capua and the moon fell in a rain shower. In Capena, two moons appeared in the daylight. In Falerii, the sky rent itself apart and a bright light showed through the fissure; and the wooden lots shrunk and one "fell out" (*excidisse*) on their own accord, on which was written "Mavors is shaking his spear" (AUC 22.1.11). In Arpi, two shields appeared in the sky and the sun fought with the moon. There was blood in the waters of Caere, blood flowing from the spring of Hercules, and blood in the grain harvested at Antium. At Rome, a statue of Mars on the Appian Way and the images of wolves were sweating (AUC 22.1.8-12).[17]

[16] There is an example of this sort of interpretation in Suetonius's biography of Julius Caesar. The incident occurred at the outset of Caesar's expedition to Africa against Metellus Scipio. Suetonius says Caesar fell while disembarking, but turned the omen to a positive when he exclaimed "Africa, I embrace you!" (*"Teneo te," inquit, "Africa."* Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 59)

[17] The senate and Servilius did attempt to expiate the signs with sacrifices, gifts to the gods and festivals.

There were, in other words, good reasons to suspect that the gods were not happy. By setting out for a campaign against Hannibal, Flaminius, unable to interpret the omens, "denigrates" himself from the level of a Roman commander, and so comes to exist in a liminal area where he is neither fully like a successful Roman, nor fully unlike one.

Upon learning Flaminius had taken command of the forces at Ariminum, Hannibal began laying waste to the countryside between Arretium (modern Arezzo) and Perusia (modern Perugia) until he came to Lake Trasimene, where he deployed his army in ambush (*AUC* 22.2.2-22.4.3).[18] On the crest of the hill he camped with his African and Spanish infantry (his best and second best infantry, respectively), and stationed the Celts and cavalry on the hills to his left, westward towards Passignano, so as to close off the narrow pass between the lake and the mountains. His right wing ran to the east toward Torricella, and was composed of his slingers and spearmen, whom Hannibal stationed on the slopes to the right of the valley (Lazenby 63). Flaminius marched down the road and into Hannibal's trap. The battle occurred on or about June 21, and a heavy mist rose from the lake, obscuring the Romans' vision (*AUC* 22.4.6). According to Livy, the entire Carthaginian line charged simultaneously, each unit attacking the enemies closest to them (AUC 22.4.6).

> The beauty of the scenery [of Lake Trasimene] helps to conjure up a picture of what it must have been like as the doomed Roman army marched along the reed-fingered shore of the lake in the early light of that misty morning, past Passignano, where the hills crowd down to the water, and on into the little valley at Torricella. Here, perhaps, the van caught sight of the outposts of Hannibal's main body of infantry, and pressed on up the slope, possibly

[18] There is debate on the specific location of the battle (see Lazenby 61-63), but merely 'on the shores of Lake Trasimene' will be sufficient for our purposes

> thinking that it had only to deal with a rearguard, or even that it might surprise the Carthaginian camp, while behind, the rest of the army could still see nothing for the mist rising from the lake and clinging to the slopes of the hills (Lazenby 64).

And then the Romans must have heard the blowing of mist-muffled horns sounding Hannibal's advance. The Roman vanguard must have been the first to encounter the enemy horse, but all along the line men would have begun dying as sling bullets and javelins flew out of the fog. They must have been able to hear the enemy coming: the tramp of 100,000 feet, the whinnying and hooves of the horses, and the rasping slide of dirt and gravel that Hannibal's men sent sliding down the slopes.

The surprise was complete.

The panicked Romans did not even have time to form into maniples (*AUC* 22.7.4). Nearly all along the line, the Carthaginians pushed the Romans back. Around Flaminius himself the Romans fought back ferociously, but he was struck down by an Insubrian Gaul in single combat (*AUC* 22.6). With his death, what little remained of Roman discipline collapsed. Some attempted to flee into the lake where they either drowned or were slaughtered by their enemies (*AUC* 22.6.5-6). About 6,000 men in the vanguard cut their way free, but the mist was so thick that they were unaware of the events behind them. The next day, they surrendered (*AUC* 22.6.11-12).

The Roman army was annihilated: 15,000 men were killed (Lazenby 65). Hannibal's losses, according to Livy, were 2,500 (*AUC* 22.7.2).

As Andrew Feldherr notes in his chapter "The Challenge of Historiographic Enargeia and the Battle of Lake Trasimene," the narrative isolates and blinds the Romans in the story as well as those reading (Feldherr, "Challenge" 83-4). The narrative moves from Hannibal who can see in his mind's eye how the entire battle will play out, to

Carthaginian soldiers who can see the entire battlefield and one another as they charge, to the Roman army more broadly, and finally to "the Romans within the narrative [who] seem to attain complete sensory isolation" (Feldherr, "Challenge" 84). The narrative itself also encourages a highly visual understanding of the battle. Most scholars who write a description of the combat do so by adding sensory details of their own, sometimes based on little or no information. Lazenby tells us what the lakeshore looks like — and we more readily believe his thoughts about the course of the Second Punic War because he has clearly seen many of the battlefields himself. I added my own speculation (such as the sound of sliding rocks) to my description. When writers seek to participate in the act of creating and framing the Battle of Lake Trasimene, they often do so with sensory details.

Livy's manipulation of the optics, and his emphasis on who can see whom, gives the impression that the Carthaginians were the ones in control of the battle. The Romans spend nearly the entire battle enveloped in a thick fog, but the Carthaginians were able to easily see one another.

> *Qui ubi, qua cuique proximum fuit, decucurrerunt, eo magis Romanis subita atque improuisa res fuit, quod orta ex lacu nebula campo quam montibus densior sederat agminaque hostium ex pluribus collibus ipsa inter se satis conspecta eoque magis pariter decucurrerant* (*AUC* 22.4.7).
>
> When they, each by whichever way was closest, charged, it was so much less expected and foreseen by the Romans, for the mist from the lake settled more heavily on the field than on the mountains. The enemy battle line could easily see one another among the many hills, and charged together that much more readily.

In addition, Livy draws a distinction throughout the description between the organization of the Romans and the Carthaginians. In the Roman military system, maintaining a well-organized battlefield was crucial to victory. In Livy's description, the Carthaginian army

was well organized into units, delineated by ethnicity. They are able to communicate and coordinate with one another, and are acting together as an army, rather than disparately. The Romans, on the other hand, were completely disorganized.

> *non illa ordinata per principes hastatosque ac triarios nec ut pro signis antesignani, post signa alia pugnaret acies nec ut in sua legione miles aut cohorte aut manipulo esset* (*AUC* 22.5.7).
>
> [They didn't fight] in the accustomed order, *principes* and *hastati* and *triarii*; and so, some of the lines of those who went before the standards[19] were fighting behind them, nor were the soldiers in their own cohort or legion or maniple.

As J. Thompson and F. Plaistowe point out in their commentary on Livy book 22, Livy does not name the types of Roman soldiers in the order they were accustomed to fight, and the cohort was, at the time of Trasimene, a purely organizational unit (Thompson and Plaistowe 78, n. on *non illa ordinata*). The effect of doing so is to highlight the confusion experienced by the Roman army, and its inability to deploy for battle in its accustomed way. The confusion in the Roman ranks becomes even clearer after the Romans begin to flee from battle.

> *Alii fugientes pugnantium globo inlati haerebant; alios redeuntes in pugnam avertebat fugientium agmen* (AUC 22.5.5).
>
> Some escapees were stuck, having been brought into the mass of fighters; others were prevented from returning to battle by ranks of fugitives.

Here, Livy inverts the use of *globus* and *agmen* in order to highlight the confusion felt by the Romans after discipline begins to break down. As I will demonstrate, the *globus* in question must refer to the Romans, and only the Romans. Livy uses *globus* to indicate a disorganized mass which is not suitable for fighting in a battle, while an *agmen* is an

[19] Although "*antesignani*" typically refers to the *hastati*, I have chosen to translate it more literally here so that the rest of the sentence makes sense.

organized battle line. By inverting these terms, Livy is pointing out how unlike Romans the Roman army was acting during the battle, and laying the groundwork for the inversion he uses to make Hannibal seem more like a Roman. To better understand this inversion, it is necessary to understand how Livy used *globus* and *agmen*.

Globes and Globs, Blobs and Lines

The Oxford Latin Dictionary lists four translations for *globus*, the most relevant of which is "A closely packed throng of soldiers or other persons, or of animals" (*OLD s.v. globus*). *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* lists, most relevantly "in a broader sense, a crowd of armed and unarmed men, joined in equal zeal" (*s.v. globus* 9.2055.15-16). [20]

Crucial to my understanding of *globus* is the absence of order. If we take the senses of the word implied by these sources, we are left with a picture of a circular-shaped, compressed mass of men without a clear purpose or any effective leadership. If the context is military, we must further imagine them as being a mixture of armed and unarmed men. Its use to describe the Battle of Lake Trasimene implies perhaps that ranks of men are mixed (which, in fact, they are in Livy's account) or perhaps that some of the men from the baggage train have gotten mixed among the fighting men.[21] Such a mass of men lacks both the space and the organization to put up any resistance to the enemy.

[20] "*sensu latiore de caterva tam armata quam inermi, pari studio iuncta.*" Both texts also mention *globus* can also refer to a spherical mass as in a planet or similar body. The *TLL* also notes a *globus* can also be a technical, military term (*s.v. globus* 9.2055.3).

[21] The totality of the description implies both to me, although my understanding can also sustain either reading independently. It is notable that the Roman baggage train does not appear anywhere in Livy's description of the Battle of Lake Trasimene.

We see a similar use in Lucan's *De Bello Civili* book 6 when a Roman army finds itself in comparable circumstances. During Lucan's description of Gaius Scribonius Curio's battle against the Numidian king Juba we again find *globus* describing an army facing defeat. Over the course of the battle, Curio's forces are surrounded and eventually fall back to form an *orbis* (Lucan 6.787 *et al*). The pressure on the lines increases, and the soldiers become a *globus*.

> *densaturque globus, quantum pede prima relato*
> *constrinxit gyros acies. non arma mouendi*
> *iam locus est pressis, stipataque membra teruntur;*
> *frangitur armatum conliso pectore pectus* (Lucan 6.780-783).
>
> And the clump thickened, the more so with the first rank retreating
> the line constricted into a circle. Weapons could not be moved.
> Now the place was tightly pressed, and crowded limbs were crushed
> armored breasts were flattened by armored breasts.

Here there is an implication of density and a lack of order. The density of the mass *globus* describes is, in this instance, so great that not even the men's armor survived unscathed. In this instance, *globus* is a strong indication of an ongoing or impending disaster and a total lack of order.

Similarly, in military passages within *Ab Urbe Condita*, *globus* carries a negative connotation. In this instance we should understand Livy to mean a compact mass of soldiers. There is no implication of orderliness — rather just the opposite. A word like *globus* makes the reader think of a disorderly mob, a dense mass. The density of the mass is also relevant. A Roman soldier (and, probably also an African infantryman, see my introduction) needed enough space behind him and to his sides to ply his shield and sword effectively.[22] The density implicit in *globus* tells us that the men rushing to battle,

[22] Roman soldiers fought more open and fluid ranks than many of their enemies. See M.J. Taylor's article "Roman Infantry tactics in the Mid-Republic: A Reassessment" in *Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte*

and also those getting stuck in the mass as they tried to withdraw, did not have the space to fight. The use of *globus* is an indication that Romans who were stuck in contact with the Carthaginians were not well situated to participate in the fighting because they were too disordered and tightly compacted.

This reading is reinforced by the way in which Livy uses *globus*. The word occurs eleven times in his extant work. As I catalog in Table 1, with the exception of this use, Livy only uses *globus* in the first decade.[23] Of the six times *globus* occurs in the context of battle, it is used to describe non-Romans every time, except during the Battle of Lake Trasimene.

One example will stand in for the other uses. The consuls Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus and Decius Mus the Younger (d. 295 BCE) were attacking an army of Samnites and Gauls in Samnium in 295 BCE (*AUC* 10.27). As the battle progressed, Decius Mus the Younger's forces on the Roman left were struggling, and he was unable to bring his men back into line. At the moment all seemed lost, Decius Mus the Younger ordered the Pontifex Maximus, Marcus Livius, to pronounce a *devotio* (a ritual prayer in which a general dedicated his own life and that of the enemy army to the gods, a phenomenon discussed in more detail later this chapter) and Decius Mus the Younger threw himself into the thick of the fighting and was killed (10.28.12-18). The Gauls reacted partly by standing dumbstruck, but mostly by forming into a *globus*.

Geschichte 63, no. 3 (2014) 305-6 for a more complete discussion of Roman maniples and their organization.

[23] It is worth noting that Livy's use of the word at 1.5 could be seen as anomalous, but I argue the youths in question were not Romans (since the city had not yet been founded) and so it does not present a challenge to my argument.

> *Romani duce amisso, quae res terrori alias esse solet, sistere fugam ac nouam de integro velle instaurare pugnam; Galli et maxime globus circumstans consulis corpus velut alienata mente vana in cassum iactare tela; torpere quidam et nec pugnae meminisse nec fugae* (*AUC* 10.29.2).
>
> The Romans, having lost their leader, which at other times is usually a cause of terror, checked their flight and wished to begin the fight anew; and the Gauls, especially the blob standing around the body of the consul, threw their javelins utterly uselessly like men who had forsaken empty minds; some in such a daze their minds could contain neither flight nor combat.

We learn more about the character of the *globus* in the coming sections, when Lucius Cornelius Scipio and Gaius Marcius, legates dispatched by Rullianus with his *triarii* to relieve Decius Mus the Younger's legions, ordered an attack on the Gallic army.

> *Itaque cum Galli structis ante se scutis conferti starent nec facilis pede conlato videretur pugna, iussu legatorum collecta humi pila, quae strata inter duas acies iacebant, atque in testudinem hostium coniecta; quibus plerisque in scuta verutisque raris in corpora ipsa fixis sternitur cuneus ita ut magna pars integris corporibus attoniti conciderent* (*AUC* 10.29.6-7).
>
> And so, since the Gauls formed up with ranks of crammed together shields and it did not seem to be an easy hand-to-hand fight, the legates [Scipio and Marcius] ordered the javelins scattered between the lines collected from the ground thrown into the enemy's *testudo*[24] with many of these javelins having pierced shields, and a few the bodies. And thus, the phalanx was cracked open, although a great part was unwounded in body, they fell over, stupefied.

The image Livy creates is not one of a well-ordered army. In order to form a *testudo* or a phalanx, an army must be very tightly compacted and, while a *testudo* was a useful formation for repelling incoming missiles, it was not an effective formation for hand-to-hand fighting.[25]

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[24] (Military): "A screen formed by troops locking their shields together above their heads, [usually] to cover an advance" (*OLD s.v. testudo*).

[25] As I demonstrate later in this chapter, the Gauls were also rendered incapable to fight as a result of Decius Mus the Younger's *devotio*.

Livy's use of *globus* throughout his work is consistent; and only at the Battle of Lake Trasimene is *globus* used to describe a group of soldiers who are, at least in theory, prepared for battle. Because this is at odds with the description we have already seen of the Carthaginian army as prepared for battle and deployed in well delineated units, it must be referring only to Romans. As we have seen, the Carthagians were able to see the Romans and each other while the Romans were blind to the presence and actions of their attackers. Using *globus* to describe Carthaginians would also be at odds with other ways Livy and Lucan use *globus*. As I have demonstrated, the word is always used to describe armies being compacted and about to be destroyed. This is descriptive of the Roman troops at Lake Trasimene, but does not make sense if applied to the combatants more broadly. If the word were being used to describe the undifferentiated mass of combatants, rather than the clump of Romans going toward or away from the battle, it would be describing such a compacted melee that none of the combatants would be able to use their weapons, similar to the Roman army Lucan described, or the Gallic army Livy described at AUC 10.29. If Carthaginian troops were included in Livy's *globus*, they too would be about to experience disaster, which they are not.

Furthermore, all of the troops present at the battle required space to be able to fight effectively. As I demonstrate in the introduction to this thesis, Hannibal's African infantry likely fought with weapons similar to the Romans', and the Gallic infantry fought with slashing (as opposed to thrusting) swords, meaning if *they* were included in the *globus*, they would be unable to effectively

fight.[26] This would also mean they were not in a position to win the battle, and so if we take *globus* to apply to all of the men fighting, rather than only the Romans, Livy's description falls apart. Since it seems very unlikely his goal was an incomprehensible or nearly nonsensical description, that reading is difficult to accept. On the other hand, if we understand this mass to be made up only of Romans, the condition of the Roman army here matches with its eventual defeat. Additionally, using *globus* matches with Livy's description of armies falling victim to a *devotio*, which, as I argue later in this chapter, the Roman army is at the Battle of lake Trasimene.

The choice of disorganized *globus* to describe men going to battle at Lake Trasimene is in sharp contrast with the "orderly *agmen*" of those attempting to withdraw from the fighting. *The Oxford Latin Dictionary* suggests, most relevantly, "An army drawn up for battle, a line of troops; also, battle, warfare" for *agmen* (*OLD s.v. agmen*). Specifically, an *agmen* describes a group of men with martial order, drawn up for battle. *Agmen*'s discipline contrasts strongly with the pandemonium of the *globus*, and it continues the theme of inversion which occurs throughout Livy's description of the battle.[27]

As we have seen, an orderly battlefield was necessary for the intricate shifting of lines employed by Roman legions in this period.[28] We should expect the Romans to be having an orderly battle in which those going to battle are an *agmen*, and so well

[26] There is a description of the sort of swordplay men from these cultures engaged in later in this chapter, quoted from *AUC* 7.10.9-10

[27] Livy uses the word *agmen* too frequently for a comprehensive analysis to be practical in this study. It occurs 207 times in the first and third decades, and 15 times in book 22 alone. A comprehensive analysis of this word could turn into its own study, and such an analysis would detract from, rather than add to, the argument of this study. This, however, is to be expected given his interest in military matters, and suggests he saw the word, at least largely, to mean "battle line".

[28] We see literary evidence for this sort of activity at *AUC* 8.10.6, which I quote later in this chapter.

organized. Instead, what we see is the best organized Roman troops on the field are those retreating. The choice of *agmen* also hinders the reader's understanding of the battlefield events. By describing those going to battle as a *globus* (and so unable to effectively fight the battle), and those retreating as an *agmen* (and so organized enough to fight, but unwilling to do so) Livy intentionally makes it difficult to distinguish between the two groups, and so reminds us that, throughout the entire conflict with Hannibal, the line between Roman and non-Roman is more porous than usual. The narrative deliberately obscures the readers' ability to picture what is happening on the battlefield while at the same time it paints a picture of the confusion in the Roman army. Livy invites his reader to feel the confusion the Romans felt during the battle — even though confusion is precisely the feeling a Roman would want to avoid during battle. In so doing, it becomes easier for the reader to identify with the Romans in the battle, because Livy's narrative is making the reader feel the same thing the Romans in the story are feeling. At the same time, however, it is more difficult for Livy's Roman audience to identify with the Roman soldiers, because they are confused, disorganized, and unable to take the initiative to fight back against Hannibal, all traits which are typically not associated with a Roman army. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, are well organized, have taken the tactical initiative, have a plan, and are executing it. The Roman formula for victory has been inverted.

Ducarius

Throughout the main phase of the Battle of Lake Trasimene, Livy has portrayed Hannibal's army as orderly and active (and therefore like a Roman

army) in the conflict, and the Roman army as disordered and passive (and therefore unlike a Roman army). The duel at the battle's conclusion continues this inversion by assigning Roman traits to a non-Roman.

My argument in this section is based on the assertion that the Insubrian Gaul Ducarius is a literary stand-in for Hannibal during the duel with Flaminius. Because Ducarius is the only member of Hannibal's army mentioned during the description of the battle proper, our attention is drawn to him. As I argue in the next section, Ducarius performs a ritual similar to a Roman *devotio*. Ducarius's *devotio* has the stench of human sacrifice about it and Ducarius's *devotio* becomes an act of human sacrifice when he uses the word *dabo* in a speech shortly before his combat with Flaminius. By associating Ducarius with human sacrifice, Livy is also associating him with the Carthaginian religion which, in ancient times, was widely believed to employ human sacrifice in extraordinary times.[29] I see the connection between Hannibal and Ducarius as so strong that we should understand the actions performed by Ducarius as actions performed by Hannibal himself.

The course and outcome of the fight between Flaminius and Ducarius is an inversion of typical scenes of one-on-one combat in Livy. As Feldherr points out, there are specific steps a Roman combatant is expected to follow: receive permission to fight from a commander, arm for the combat if applicable, kill the opponent, and finally, return to Roman society victorious. Flaminius does not follow these steps, but Ducarius, his opponent, does follow (most of) the procedure. Ducarius even goes so far as to pronounce something like a *devotio* over Flaminius, and by extension, over his army. The effect of

[29] See Plutarch, *de Superstitione*, 171C8-D6 and Diodorus Siculus *Bibliotheca* 20.14.4-6.

the inversion of typical duel narratives is to "elevate" Ducarius (and so, by extension, also Hannibal) to something like a Roman and portray him acting like a Roman. By acting like a Roman, and seeing the same outcome of those actions a Roman would, Ducarius becomes something like a Roman, and so blurs the line further between a Roman and a non-Roman.

But it is important to remember that while Ducarius can act like a Roman and get similar results, he can never *be* a Roman. Romans were revolted by human sacrifice, including in this instance. By sacrificing Flaminius in this way, Ducarius is performing a ritual exemplary of the liminal space that I argue Hannibal inhabits. The ritual exemplifies the way Ducarius (and so also Hannibal) approaches being a Roman while still being uncannily different from one.

To better understand the way Ducarius's duel is a perversion of the typical duel story, it is useful to discuss the function of duels in roman literature, and a typical scene. Feldherr suggests we ought to see duels as spectacle — "that is, as actions whose effectiveness depends on their being witnessed by others. Each 'performance' puts on display the hierarchies that give structure to Roman civic life and thus offers an image of the distinctive political system that sets Rome apart from her adversaries" (Feldherr, *Spectacle* 84). He identifies a formula for successful duels that Livy follows: the Roman is given permission to fight by his commanding officer (one with *imperium* is preferable); he defeats the enemy; and then is welcomed back to Roman society and praised by the commanding officer. By coming into contact with the power of the state, Roman duelists are, in a sense, acting on behalf of and with the strength of the entire state. The literary

effect is something similar to a blessing from a priest. When the combatant is "blessed" by a magistrate (that is, given permission to fight), he does so as a stand-in for the Republic, but when he does not, he fights only for himself, and accordingly only with his own strength. This means a Roman who fights a duel with permission from his general and who was given permission to fight the duel under the correct circumstances must be successful in his challenge. The idea is best explained with examples, and Feldherr uses the stories of Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus and Marcus Valerius Corvus to understand how dueling functions in Livy's history.

The story of Manlius's duel with a Gaul occurs at *AUC* 7.9-11. In 361 BCE, Manlius received permission to fight a Gallic champion from his commander, the dictator Titus Quinctius Poenus, and was equipped with the traditional armaments of an infantryman by his friends before going out to fight his enemy (7.10.2-4). Livy's description of the fight is relatively long and drawn out, and focuses on the utility of Manlius's equipment and his skill as a swordsman.

> *Ubi constitere inter duas acies tot circa mortalium animis spe metuque pendentibus, Gallus velut moles superne imminens proiecto laeva scuto in advenientis arma hostis vanum caesim cum ingenti sonitu ensem deiecit; Romanus mucrone subrecto, cum scuto scutum imum perculisset totoque corpore interior periculo volneris factus insinuasset se inter corpus armaque, uno alteroque subinde ictu ventrem atque inguina hausit et in spatium ingens ruentem porrexit hostem.* (*AUC* 7.10.9-10)
>
> When they took their places between the two lines, the hearts of so many surrounding them caught between hope and fear. The Gaul, towering above his foe like an enormous boulder, advanced, thrusting forward his shield on his left arm against his enemy's attack, chopping in vain he swung his sword with a deafening crack. The Roman, lifting his blade, after he had struck the lowest part of the Gaul's shield with his own, and had advanced, slipping between sword and torso, protecting his entire body from danger, struck once and immediately again, opening and draining dry his belly and groin, and then his ruined enemy lay stretched out over a huge space.

The boss and horizontal grip of the Roman shield made it very well suited for this kind of attack, and it seems likely at least some of Livy's audience would have understood it intuitively after some kind of military service. The historical context in which the duel would have been understood highlights the importance of Manlius's weaponry, which stands in for his friends' assistance in the duel. As he was commissioned to fight against the man by Poenus, so too was he commissioned to fight by his friends.

Communal effort in single combat is also a theme of Corvus's duel, fought in 348 BCE, although in the second instance, the assistance comes from the gods in the form of a crow. After receiving permission to fight from Consul Lucius Furius Camillus, Corvus walked out between the armies to do battle with an enormous Gaul. As he was walking, a crow landed on his helmet, and aided him in the ensuing duel.

> *Dictu mirabile, tenuit non solum ales captam semel sedem sed, quotienscumque certamen initum est, levans se alis os oculosque hostis rostro et unguibus appetit, donec territum prodigii talis visu oculisque simul ac mente turbatum Valerius obtruncat.* (*AUC* 7.26.5)
>
> It's almost unbelievable to say it, but[30], the bird not only kept to its original perch but, whenever the fight started, taking wing it attacked the enemy's face and eyes with its beak and talons, until, terrified by such a portentous sight and baffled in mind and eye, the foe was slain by [Corvus].

The assistance from the crow reads like an instance of divine intervention, an idea reinforced by Livy's use of *dictum mirabile*. It is also noteworthy that when Camillus commissions Corvus to fight the Gaul:

> *Tum dictator "macte virtute" inquit "ac pietate in partrem patriamque, T. manli, esto. Perge et nomen Romanum invictum invantibus dis praesta*" (*AUC* 7.10.3-4).

[30] There is, I think, no literal translation of *dictu mirabile* which quite catches its sense. "Marvelous to relate", while more literal, is too arcane to be satisfactory. In the lack of better options, I have taken significant liberty.

> Then the dictator said "Titus Manlius, may your bravery and dutifulness to father and fatherland be honored. Go! And with the support of the gods prevail in the name of invincible Rome!"

The use of *"esto*" especially when combined with "*macte virtute*" (as it is here), is formulaic language of religious significance (*AUC* 7.10.3 and *Lewis and Short s.v. mactus*).

Thus, we see that, for a Roman, winning a duel was an act of social, military and religious significance. We should see the Corvus and Manlius duels as archetypical, the earlier duels suggesting that religious observance is an indicator of victory. This interpretation allows us to understand more easily the inversion at play in Flaminius's death.

Although Flaminius was the consul, and therefore should in theory be allowed to give himself permission to duel the Gaul Ducarius (and so, by extension, Hannibal), in Livy's narrative Flaminius's right to hold *imperium* is in doubt, because he was unable to correctly interpret omens. On the day he started the campaign which would lead to Trasimene, there were more bad omens. When he vaulted onto his horse, the animal stumbled and threw Flaminius over its head (*AUC* 22.3.11), and his standard bearer could not pull the standard out of the ground (*AUC* 22.3.12). There was, in other words, no reason to believe the gods supported Flaminius, either. Without contact with the state or the gods, Flaminius was without the symbolic support that attended successful duelists. His death and defeat were inevitable. And there is reason to believe the gods were on Hannibal's side.

During the battle, Ducarius picks Flaminius out from among the Romans because of his conspicuous armor and by recognizing his face. He calls out to his men, then charges the consul and kills him. Ducarius's speech, through brief, is significant.

> *"En" inquit "hic est" popularibus suis, "qui legiones nostras cecidit agrosque et urbem est depopulatus; iam ego hanc uictimam manibus peremptorum foede ciuium dabo"* (*AUC* 22.6.3).
>
> "Look, it's him!" [Ducarius] said to his men "the one who destroyed our legions and laid waste our fields and city! Now I will give him as a sacrifice to the shades of our wantonly massacred citizens."

The key word in Ducarius's offering is *dabo*, which, in religious contexts, connotes sacrificial activity. The object of Ducarius's giving is *hanc uictimam* (that is, Flaminius), and his prayer is thus an act of human sacrifice.[31]

He also comes into contact with chthonic entities, and so in his offering of Flaminius's life to the dead, we also see a sort of dark reflection of the *devotio* performed by Decius Mus the Elder (d. 340) (AUC 8.9). Decius's *devotio* is a useful point of comparison because Livy preserves the text of the prayer Decius spoke, and its similarity with Ducarius's speech helps demonstrate how the Gaul is acting like a Roman.

Decius was commanding a Roman army against the Latins along with co-consul Manlius.[32] Manlius's wing of the army was doing well, but Decius's men were beginning to waiver. Seeing a total rout was possible, Decius called out to Marcus Valerius — the pontiff who happened to be on hand — who ordered Decius Mus the Elder to pray the *devotio*.

> *'Iane, Iuppiter, Mars pater, Quirine, Bellona, Lares, Divi Nouensiles, Di Indigetes, Divi, quorum est potestas nostrorum hostiumque, Dique Manes, vos precor veneror, veniam peto feroque, uti populo Romano Quiritium vim victoriam prosperetis hostesque populi Romani Quiritium terrore formidine morteque adficiatis. Sicut verbis nuncupavi, ita pro re publica [populi*

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[31] As S. Farron points out in the article "Aeneas' Human Sacrifice," Livy refers explicitly to human sacrifice at two points: once at 7.15.10, and again at 22.57.6. Farron also lists three instances in Cicero where human sacrifice is described with a word like *impium* or "contrary to '*pietas*'" (Farron 23, italics mine).

[32] I examined Manlius' duel with a Gaul earlier in this chapter.

> *Romani] Quiritium, exercitu, legionibus, auxiliis populi Romani Quiritium, legiones auxiliaque hostium mecum Deis Manibus Tellurique devoveo.'* (*AUC* 8.9)
>
> "Janus, Jupiter, father Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, Lares, divine Novensiles, godly Indigetes, oh gods, in whose power we and our enemies are, and Divine Manes I implore and beg you, I seek and bring favor! Bring strength and victory to the Roman people of the Quirites, and inflict panic and fear and death upon the enemies of the Roman people of the Quirites. Just as I spoke the words, in that way, for the sake of the Roman people of the Quirites, I condemn to the divine Manes and to Earth the enemy legions, the enemy auxiliary, and myself."

After praying, Decius charged at the Latin army. As he approached, the Latin army began to lose its discipline, and, after he was killed, the Romans rallied, eventually winning the battle when Manlius committed the Roman *triarii* to the battle at the right moment (*AUC* 8.10). Decius's prayer also has the air of ritual about it, both because of the language he used and his communication with the pontiff. There are important similarities between Decius Mus the Elder's and Ducarius's dedications. Both invoke *manes* (spirits of the dead, who are sometimes specific deities), and dedicate the enemy *legio* to the entities in the underworld. There are significant differences, too. When Decius Mus the Elder makes his plea to the gods, he does so in the presence of the pontiff. All of the gods he invokes are associated with either the Roman state or the Roman family. By invoking them, Decius Mus the Elder is coming into contact with the state and the gods, in the same way he would if he were a duelist. The result of his prayer is to empower his army to fight with the power and blessing of the gods and the state, in the same way a duelist is empowered by the state and the gods to win his fight. "The way that the actions of the magistrate frame the exploits of both champion and *devotus* emphasizes the importance of the contact in each procedure as the means that allow the

individual to act effectively on the state's behalf" (Feldherr, *Spectacle* 93). Ducarius is doing something similar by invoking the shades of his Gallic ancestors.[33]

There is further evidence that we should read Ducarius's comment in the same way we would read a true Roman *devotio*. After Flaminius's death, the Romans respond with the same torpor as victims of Roman *devotiones*. The similarity in the prayers and results of the prayers show Ducarius (and so, by extension, Hannibal) acting like a Roman (by pronouncing a *devotio*) and receiving similar results as a Roman (when the Roman soldiers collapse into a helpless heap). I argue that when Ducarius performs a Roman-style *devotio*, he afflicts similar ailments upon a Roman army as Roman generals could inflict upon their foes. He is thus a non-Roman behaving like a Roman and likewise seeing comparable results of his actions as a Roman would.

In order to compare the results, it is useful to examine the immediate consequences of the two *devotiones* we have already seen. As we saw earlier in this chapter, after Decius Mus the Younger's (d. 295) *devotio* the Gauls were unable and unwilling to resist their Roman attackers.[34] Livy's description of the Gauls gives the impression of a marionette with most of its strings cut. While they might be able to move about, they do not function as a fighting force any longer.

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[33] It is important to note that Ducarius does not invoke them exactly like a Roman would. He does not follow the forms of a "proper" *devotio*, and he does not have a pontiff nearby to enable his sacrifice. Ducarius is still a Gaul, but we should not understand that to mean the ritual is not the same on that account.

[34] They "threw their javelins utterly uselessly like men who had forsaken empty minds; some in such a daze their minds could contain neither flight nor combat" (*AUC* 10.29.2). I quoted this passage in its entirety on page 55.

Listlessness, vulnerability and harmlessness exhibited by the Gauls are characteristic of what we can expect to see as the result of a Roman *devotio*.

We see the same pattern unfold in the Latin response to Decius Mus the Elder's *devotio*. As we have seen, once Decius Mus the Elder dedicates himself and the Latin army to the gods, he rides at the enemy lines, immediately causing the Latin soldiers to flee or be slain by the Romans (*AUC* 8.9.11-12). When the Roman army advances, the effect on the Latin army becomes even more apparent.

> *Ubi triarii consurrexerunt integri refulgentibus armis, nova ex improviso exorta acies, receptis in intervalla ordinum antepilanis, clamore sublato principia Latinorum perturbant hastisque ora fodientes primo robore virorum caeso per alios manipulos velut inermes prope intacti evasere tantaque caede perrupere cuneos ut vix quartam partem relinquerent hostium.* (*AUC* 8.10.6)
>
> Then the untouched *triarii* arose, armor gleaming, a new line appearing unforeseen, and, receiving the front two lines into the intervals in their lines, they let loose a war cry and broke the Latin's first line. Thrusting spears into faces they erased the first fruits of Latin might, [they scythed] through the other maniples as though the enemy was unarmed and emerged nearly untouched. They broke through the mass with such great slaughter that they left hardly a quarter alive.

Here we see the reaction we would expect from sacrificial victims: resigned acceptance of their fate. These examples demonstrate the way in which Romans expected the victims of a *devotio* to respond: with torpor and an inability to fight back.

This is in keeping with what Romans expected of their sacrifices. In his article "Hammers, Axes, Bulls and Blood" about the mechanics of physically slaughtering sacrificial victims, Gregory S. Aldrete explains Roman victims were traditionally expected to be docile at the moment of sacrifice (29-30). This could sometimes present a problem for sacrificers (very few animals are naturally docile enough to welcome being killed), and often a victim might "naturally express its disapproval" with the process

(Aldrete 30). Aldrete goes on to add that some modern scholarship has pointed out how in Greek sacrifices some natural resistance did not ruin a sacrifice, and speculates that in a Roman context, it is likely that which Aldrete calls "a certain amount of recalcitrant behaviour" was either accepted or easy to expiate (30).

This is the same sort of behavior we see from the Gauls after Decius Mus the Elder's *devotio*.[35] Rather than doing anything to cause or avert their own demise, they simply wait for aggressive Romans to come kill them. The resigned acceptance of *devotio* and sacrifice victims is reflected at Lake Trasimene.

> *Magnae partis fuga inde primum coepit; et iam nec lacus nec montes pauori obstabant; per omnia arta praeruptaque uelut caeci euadunt, armaque et uiri super alium alii praecipitantur. Pars magna, ubi locus fugae deest, per prima uada paludis in aquam progressi, quoad capitibus umerisque exstare possunt, sese immergunt; fuere quos inconsultus pauor nando etiam capessere fugam impulerit; quae ubi immensa ac sine spe erat, aut deficientibus animis hauriebantur gurgitibus aut nequiquam fessi uada retro aegerrime repetebant atque ibi ab ingressis aquam hostium equitibus passim trucidabantur.* (*AUC* 22.6.5-7)[36]
>
> At that point flight began for the greater part [of the Roman army]; and now neither lake nor mountain restrained their fear; they bolted through all the defiles and precipices like blind men, weapons and men were thrown headlong upon one another. A large part, when there was no room to flee, went first into the shallow marshes and then plunged into the water, until only their heads rose above the waves. There were some who, driven by thoughtless panic, tried to escape by swimming, which was an enormous task and hopeless anyway. They either sank into the abyss when their courage gave out or, exhausted in vain, returned bone weary to the shallows and there were butchered by enemy horsemen riding into the water.

Thus, the victims of *devotio* are characterized by torpor, unwillingness and inability to resist any further, and waiting for death. Those who waded into the lake up to their necks had little hope of escape, and were clearly incapable of fighting back. Further, we see the

[35] Although they do demonstrate some recalcitrance to being slaughtered (they *do* throw javelins at their attackers, albeit without much heart [*AUC* 10.29]) they are generally passive as they are cut down.
[36] Loeb quotation.

same fate for those who attempted to swim the lake, and then had to return to the shore.[37] When an enemy of Rome is subjected to a *devotio* they become incapable of either fleeing or fighting. Just so, once Flaminius is sacrificed, and all possibilities of escape are closed off, the Romans themselves displayed the same torpor we have seen in the other victims.

In this way, Ducarius gets the similar results as a Roman commander. As I have maintained throughout this chapter, Ducarius is a stand in for Hannibal and I argue we should see Ducarius's actions as reflecting upon Hannibal. The result is that Hannibal is "elevated" to the same level as a Roman. As we saw with Flaminius, being Roman is not enough to ensure good results. One must also behave properly in order to find success and favor from the gods. The overall effect is to invert the relationship between "correct behavior (which would generally be carried out by Romans) and "good" results (which would be achieved by a Roman doing so). The description of this battle helps us see Hannibal as a challenge to Roman exceptionalism.

[37] The comparison here is not one for one, and the Romans do show slightly more initiative than other *devotio* victims we have seen. In this case, as in the other, I argue this is an allowable amount of recalcitrance.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

As Livy rivets his audience on a man's action, at once familiar yet foreign, he heightens the drama of the narrative. The construction makes more understandable how the Roman people could suffer numerous defeats and be stymied in their efforts to rid Italy of a foreign enemy. Only a general who is as clever as the Romans could beat the Romans.

But Livy, as I argue, may be pushing a bit harder than rendering Hannibal a foe worthy of Rome's metal. Hannibal's Roman-ness and, perhaps more importantly, his army's adoption of Roman fighting style and characteristics, may indicate that Livy saw Hannibal as a figure who could justifiably (and *did*) encroach on Roman exceptionalism, presenting a serious challenge to their legitimately to rule their empire. Hannibal's electric presence in Livy's histories invites readers, Roman readers, to ask themselves why, and if, they have the right to rule the Mediterranean.

TABLE 1: Occurrences of *Globus*

Sentence	Location	Context
alii fugientes pugnantium globo inlati haerebant, alios redeuntes in pugnam avertebat fugientium agmen.	22.5	Lake Trasimene
Romulus non cum globo iuvenum—nec enim erat ad vim apertam par—, sed aliis alio itinere iussis certo tempore ad regiam venire pastoribus ad regem impetum facit, et a domo Numitoris alia comparata manu adiuvat Remus. ita regem obtruncant	1.5	Romulus and Shepherds can't fight Numitor
unam longe ante alias specie ac pulchritudine insignem a globo Talassii cuiusdam raptam ferunt, multisque sciscitantibus, cuinam eam ferrent, identidem, ne quis violaret, Talassio ferri clamitatum; inde nuptialem hanc vocem factam.	1.9	Rape of the Sabines
in eum haec gloriantem cum globo ferocissimorum iuvenum Romulus impetum facit.	1.12	Romulus vs Sabines at Rome
cum staret tacitus et circa eum aliquot hominum, ne forte violaretur, constitisset globus, lictorem ad eum consules mittunt.	2.29	Succession of the Plebs
nam cum incursantes, quacumque exitum ostenderet spes, vano aliquotiens impetu issent, globus iuvenum unus in ipsum consulem insignem armis invadit.	2.47	Manlius vs. Etruscans
cum repelleretur adsertor virginis a globo mulierum circumstantiumque advocatorum, silentium factum per praeconem.	3.47	A court case
Messium impetus per stratos caede hostes cum globo fortissimorum iuvenum extulit ad castra Volscorum, quae nondum capta erant.	4.29	A night fight against Voscans
in arcem munitam natura globus armatorum concessit; infra arcem caesi captique multi mortales.	4.61	Romans take Artena
extrema contio et circa Fabium globus increpabant inclementem dictatorem nec procul seditione aberant.	8.32	A mutiny of Roman soldiers
et maxime globus circumstans consulis corpus, velut alienata mente vana in cassum iactare tela	10.29	After Mus's *Devotio*

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