THE DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS OF THE "CLOSING SPACE" OF CIVIL SOCIETY

by

SHANSHAN LIAN

(Under the Direction of Amanda Murdie)

ABSTRACT

INGOs' (International Non-Governmental Organizations) transnational advocacy has achieved many phenomenal successes. A typical case is that INGOs' conflictual stands can pressure governments for better policies. However, it is puzzling that INGOs have increasingly used moderation, such as an acquiescent attitude towards repression, compliance with civil society crackdowns, and cooperation with non-democracies. The moderate attitudes seem to be inconsistent with INGOs' liberal core.

What motivates INGOs' moderation? What is the cost of the contentious attitude? In my dissertation, I use three chapters to explore INGOs' moderate responses towards governments in the current political environment, including the administrative repression of civil society organizations since the 2000s and the global pandemic since 2020. Each chapter independently addresses a specific research question.

In chapter one, I propose that high trust in INGOs from local communities tends to increase the level of civil society repression in middling countries. The interaction between local trust and regime types justifies INGOs' detachment from local communities, a moderate gesture, in authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes. The second chapter concentrates on how individual donors respond to INGOs' adaptation with ongoing civil society repression. It infers

that highlighting the advocacy activities of INGOs could help the organizations maintain private donations, a critical source of INGOs' survival. Finally, I discuss INGO-to-government moderation in the context of the covid-19. Taking leading HROs (Human Rights INGOs) as an example, I find that these INGOs tend to shame governments in a moderate tone during the pandemic. It suggests INGOs' flexibility when interacting with governments, who are the individual human rights violators but public health contributors in health crises.

The dissertation can help update our understanding of INGO-to-government interactions in the current political environment. Also, I expect to offer suggestions for INGOs' survival and success in the global pushback.

INDEX WORDS: international non-governmental organizations, civil society repression, human rights

THE DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS OF THE "CLOSING SPACE" OF CIVIL SOCIETY

by

SHANSHAN LIAN

MA, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, 2017

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2023

THE DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS OF THE "CLOSING SPACE" OF CIVIL SOCIETY

by

SHANSHAN LIAN

Major Professor:	Amanda Murdie
Committee:	K. Chad Clay
	Ryan Powers
	Justin Strait

Electronic Version Approved:

Ron Walcott
Vice Provost for Graduate Education and Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2023

DEDICATION

The work is dedicated to my parents, Quanfa Lian and Dongmei Shan, and my husband, Jie Lian. Thank you for constantly encouraging and supporting me to pursue the life I want.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Dr. Amanda Murdie, my major advisor and chair of my dissertation committee. I could not have undertaken this journey without her professional guidance, generous support, invaluable patience, and positive feedback. She contributed to and witnessed many wonderful moments in my past six years. I enjoyed working with her on our co-authored papers, one of which won the award and got publication. Without her tutoring, I could not publish my first solo work. She also taught me how to be an educator with a warm heart for all the students. Her assistance is the key to my survival in the job market. With her training and recognition, I have gained fantastic six years at UGA.

I am also grateful to my committee members. Dr. K. Chad Clay's expertise in human rights inspired my research and career in NGO-to-government interactions. I am also thankful to Dr. Ryan Powers. He improved my experiment operation and offered me the opportunity to conduct my online experiment. Thanks should also go to Dr. Justin Strait, who significantly contributed to my dissertation for my Ph.D. program as well as my thesis for my M.S. program in statistics. It is a pleasant experience to work with these excellent scholars.

Last, I'd like to mention my parents, Quanfa Lian and Dongmei Shan. Instead of forcing their only child to have a settled-down life as typical Chinese parents did, they helped me start my Ph.D. program in my 30s. I am grateful that you always prioritize my happiness over the social pressure you bear in Chinese culture. I would be remiss in not mentioning my husband, Jie Lian. Thank you for identifying me as a scholar and wife. I appreciate your positive comments on my research and a good appetite for everything I cook.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

INTRODUCTION

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have been known for their achievements in human security. INGOs' transnational advocacy can improve human rights respect (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Davis 2012), public health quality (Murdie and Hick 2013), democracy promotion (Murdie and Davis 2012), and environment protection (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015; Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2021), while service delivery is INGOs' another contribution to disaster relief (Luna 2001), poverty alleviation (Murdie and Kakietek 2012), education (Rose 2009), etc.

The political environment plays a decisive role in INGOs' activities (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Lian and Murdie 2023; Stroup and Murdie 2012). For instance, a supportive government in funding and policymaking can increase INGOs' vitality while it is challenging for these organizations to exist in a hostile country. Given the importance of governments, what can improve INGOs' performance in human rights protection? How can INGOs better help local communities, especially vulnerable populations like women and children across countries? I attempt to puzzle some of these contentious issues out and publicize the works as evidence for possible solutions.

In my dissertation, I focus on the interactions between INGOs, the essential contributors to human security, and governments, one highly-capable human rights abuser. Specifically, the three chapters center on INGO-state interactions in the context of global civil society repression since the 2000s, often called the "closing space" of civil society (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014), as well as the current global pandemic. In these cases, NGOs are often forced to employ

"contentious moderation" under new government-imposed civil society restraints legitimized by terrorist attacks (Hayes 2012; Koo and Murdie 2023), foreign intervention (Dupuy et al. 2016), etc.

The first chapter explores what causes the variation of state repression of INGOs. Although violence has always been in governments' toolkit against civil society organizations (CSOs), there has been a global trend where governments set legal and logistical barriers to nonviolently repress CSOs, especially INGOs since the mid-2000s. During this period, states present variations in CSO repression, ranging from moderate regulation to violent expulsion. Why do countries vary the repression? I argue that different levels of repression are based on governments' perceived repression effectiveness in reducing INGOs' threats. For better illustration, I propose *the effectiveness-perception framework*, where repression *effectiveness* comes from the interaction between regime type and local trust in INGOs, while the *perception* of effectiveness is rooted in the domestic political structure. To conduct empirical tests, I create a latent variable, local trust, to measure threats of INGOs conditional on local communities. Relying on the sample from 1996 to 2012, I find that consolidated democracies and autocracies, compared to middling countries, are more likely to adjust the repression levels based on local trust in INGOs.

In the second chapter, I examine the response of individual donors to INGOs' *adaptation* towards repression. The current era of closing civil society space forces INGOs to make difficult decisions, including compliance with repressive governments. This *adaptation* contradicts INGOs' ideals regarding human rights. However, the *adaptation* could also be justified since physical existence in a repressive country could better achieve INGOs' norms in the long run. What are the effects of INGOs' contentious *adaptation* on

private donations in the harsh political environment? In this project, I argue that two perceived factors, the *level of democracy* of the repressive country and the *organizational type* of the INGO, could determine to which extent individual donors accept an organization's *adaptation*. Relying on an online experiment with factorial design, I find that only an INGO's organizational type influences donors' assessments, where respondents prefer the *adaptation* of advocacy INGOs over service organizations in the case of "closing space."

The last chapter discusses how INGOs respond to governments in human rights issues during the health crisis of covid-19. HROs (Human Rights INGOs) tend to name and shame repressive governments for human rights protection. Based on their worldwide fame and abundant resources, leading HROs are expected to stand out against human rights abuses. However, in the case of covid-19, it is challenging for leading HROs to name and shame governments, significant contributors to collective public health but capable human rights violators when coping with the pandemic. I propose *target specificity*, where leading HROs tend to vary their tone towards different branches/levels of government, to illustrate how leading HROs strategically adapt to this case. Based on the sentiment analysis of tweet text as data, I find out that first, compared to central governments, extended branches of government, such as prisons and police departments, tend to be named and shamed more harshly. Second, leading HROs tend to be more conflictual towards national governments but moderate the tone towards local governments.

I expect that the projects will help us better understand INGO-to-government interactions in the current political environment. On the other hand, the findings can

produce some strategy-relevant insights for INGOs' survival and success in challenging environment.

Reference

Carothers, Thomas, and Saskia Brechenmacher. 2014. *Closing space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/20/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire-pub-54503. Accessed 8 November 2022

Dupuy, Kendra, Aseem Prakash, and James Ron. 2016. Hands off My Regime! Governments' Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries. *World Development* 84(2): 299-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.02.001

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press.

Koo, Jeong-Woo and Murdie, Amanda. 2022. Do NGO Restrictions Limit Terrorism? Smear Campaigns or Counterterrorism Tools. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7(1): ogab035. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab035

Lian, Shanshan and Amanda Murdie. 2023. How Closing Civil Society Space Affects NGO-Government Interactions. *Journal of Human Rights*: 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2022.2158723

Luna, Emmanuel M. 2001. Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness: The Case of NGOs in the Philippines. *Disasters* 25(3): 216-226. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00173

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x

Murdie, Amanda, and Alexander Hicks. 2013. Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health. *International Organization* 67(3): 541-573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000143

Murdie, Amanda, and Jakub Kakietek. 2012. Do Development INGOs Really Work? The Impact of International Development NGOs on Human Capital and Economic Growth. *Journal of Sustainable Society* 1(1): 1-10. https://doi.org/10.11634/21682585140356

Murdie, Amanda, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2015. Why Pick on Us? Environmental INGOs and State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute. Political Studies 63(2): 353-372. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12101

Pacheco-Vega, Raul, and Amanda Murdie. 2021. When Do Environmental NGOs Work? A Test of the Conditional Effectiveness of Environmental Advocacy. *Environmental Politics* 30 (1-2): 180-201. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2020.1785261

Rose, Pauline. 2009. NGO Provision of Basic Education: Alternative or Complementary Service Delivery to Support Access to the Excluded?. Compare 39(2): 219-233. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057920902750475

Stroup, Sarah S., and Amanda Murdie. 2012. There's No Place Like Home: Explaining International NGO Advocacy. The Review of International Organizations 7: 425-448. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-012-9145-x

Hayes, Ben. 2012. Counterterrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 14(1-2): 5-48.

CHAPTER 1

MORE MURDER IN THE MIDDLE:

HOW LOCAL TRUST CONDITIONS REPRESSION TOWARDS INGOS

IR scholars have explained why governments initiated the global pushback to civil society organizations since the 2000s (Dupuy et al. 2016; Bakke et al. 2020; Glasius et al. 2020). Here raises a follow-up question: Why do countries vary CSO (Civil Society Organization)[1] repression, a type of repression targeted at organized civil society groups? Instead of dividing state repression into violence and nonviolence (Chaudhry 2022), I identify CSO repression as a continuous variable. In the spectrum of repression extent, between the two extremes, one for moderate regulation and the other for states' violence, we can find other levels of repression, such as cutting off funding, program suspension, radical attacks, and violent expulsion. On this spectrum, for instance, restraints on funding could be more deleterious for CSOs than administrative registering since CSOs cannot produce profits for the operation.

In this paper, I focus on INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) to illustrate the underlying dynamic of CSO repression. Compared to domestic NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), INGOs seem to gain more attention from governments in the current crackdown on CSOs. One typical case is Russia's "foreign agents" law, which treats INGOs as spies to legitimize the crackdown.[2] I propose a new theoretical approach, the

[1] I identify CSO as organized entities in civil society which include organized groups and individuals. CSOs are not-profit, non-party, voluntary, legal, and independent from government control. In most cases, CSO is often taken as synonymous with NGO. Hence, domestic NGOs and INGOs are the two main types of CSOs.

[2] The official report of Russia's "foreign agents" law can be found at: http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/54760/. Accessed 6 November 2022

effectiveness-perception framework, to illustrate how governments vary this type of repression. *Effectiveness* here means *repression effectiveness*. Governments, as decision-makers, will weigh the gains and losses to maximize the utility of decisions under constraints (Snidal 2012). Since CSO repression is essentially a decision to achieve certain goals, governments tend to maximize *effectiveness*, achieving the least INGO threats after the interventions.

Further, I argue that *repression effectiveness* is determined by regime type and local trust. A country's regime type or democratic level indicates the odds of the government encountering INGOs' threats (Boulding 2010) and the preferred threatening forms of INGOs' (Cornell and Grimes 2015), which will ultimately decide which level of repression tends to be optimal as the response. For instance, in countries where INGOs prefer protests rather than political participation, it would be more effective for the regimes to moderate the repression since a violent crackdown is more likely to ignite social mobilization. Another determinant, local trust, measures how much local communities support INGOs. Local resistance can thwart the implementation and even nullify the repression (Berger-Kern et al. 2021), which can significantly affect *repression effectiveness*. Therefore, for countries with strong civil society support for INGOs, even moderate repression would face significant backlash.

Perception indicates how a government perceives its *repression effectiveness*. Pursuing *repression effectiveness* requires governments' efforts in decision-making and efficient government-society communication, so it is challenging for governments to accurately know their *repression effectiveness* before implementation. The obstacles can be summarized as (1) the unaccountability of officials in decision-making and (2) the lack of channels to receive consistent voice from local communities. Accordingly, to illustrate how governments' *perception* forms in terms of *repression effectiveness* when responding to INGO threats, I apply the MMM (More

Murder in the Middle) theory, a model of repression based on the government-society interaction (Fein 1995; King 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

According to the *effectiveness-perception* theory, which logic is presented in **Figure 1.1**, I propose that compared to middling countries, the countries in the extremes of the democratic-level spectrum, typically consolidated democracies and autocracies, are more likely to reduce the CSO repression when local trust in INGOs is high.



Figure 1.1: The Dynamic of Varying Civil Society Repression: The *Effectiveness-Perception* Framework

I use a Bayesian model to create a latent variable, *Local Trust*, based on all the significant observable indicators. To test the implication, my sample is a time-series, cross-sectional panel data from 1996 to 2012. The sample temporally overlaps with the global crackdown on civil society, a phenomenon where most countries prioritize administrative tools to repress CSOs (Dupuy et al., 2016; Glasius et al., 2020). The outcome infers that local bonding of INGOs is

more likely to depress CSO repression within consolidated democracies and autocracies. However, middling countries are less likely to vary the repression when local trust in INGOs is high.

The findings can inform how INGOs adapt to different countries' repression in the current political environment. It implies that by adjusting the distance from local communities, INGOs can gain more survival space in some regimes. Beyond INGOs' adaptation, another implication of this project is under which circumstances INGOs can take advantage of local support to decrease CSO repression. As civil society struggles to survive, these implications could help support people-led efforts to build better TANs (Transnational Advocacy Networks) for human rights improvement and democracy promotion.

States' Motivations to Repress INGOs

CSO Repression and INGOs

CSO repression is a type of state repression against organizational entities of civil society. I highlight three attributes of CSO repression for this project. First, unlike other types of human rights repression, CSO repression specifically aims at civic associations rather than individuals or less organized groups in civil society. Local individuals, the targets of general human rights repression, could avoid government attacks in this case by detaching themselves from CSOs. Second, CSO repression is a government's response, including policies and quick actions, through institutional decision-making. The expected outcome is to significantly reduce CSOs' threats against governments. Third, two main tactics can be found in the government toolkit: violent repression and nonviolent/administrative repression (Chaudhry 2022). Although state violence against civil society organizations can still be seen, there has been a trend where

most governments tend to administratively repress civil society organizations – countries legitimize the repression by preventatively setting legal and logistical barriers against CSOs. This global crackdown is called the "closing space" of civil society (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).

In this project, I select INGOs, the typical "victims" of CSO repression, to study the variation of state responses. Although the laws or regulations do not explicitly distinguish CSOs based on their origins, compared to domestic NGOs, INGOs are more likely to be targeted in this repression (Chaudhry 2022). One explanation is that INGOs tend to be more threatening to repressive governments. INGOs' TANs justify and spread local grievances to international audiences (Keck and Sikkink 1998), offer great financial support for organizations' activities (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), and bring the boomerang effects to the governments in economic development and foreign aid by shaming (Barry et al. 2013; Dietrich and Murdie 2017).

Therefore, the variation of CSO repression is more likely to project on INGOs than other CSOs. On the one hand, governments legitimize the repression by initiating smear campaigns against INGOs (Koo and Murdie 2022). The governments can pressure the INGOs back by presenting different reasons to the domestic audience. One example is that INGOs' funding orientation can cause problems for local communities (Cooley and Ron 2002). Corruption[3] also hurts INGOs' independence and norms. And restraints on INGOs can be a legitimate excuse against terrorism (Hayes 2012). On the other hand, the barriers are designed to block entry, funding, and advocacy for CSOs (Chaudhry 2022). As a result, with fewer local roots, INGOs

[3] One example is INGOs corruption in the humanitarian sector. More information can be found at: https://alternatives-humanitaires.org/en/2016/11/23/corruption-a-challenge-that-doesnt-escape-the-humanitarian-sector/. Accessed 7 November 2022

encounter more difficulties registering with the governments (Li and Farid 2022) and are less capable of attracting local funding (Dupuy et al. 2015). In addition, for those advocating for the change of repressive governments, the INGOs face more challenges under repression (Springman et al. 2022).

Extant Explanation of States' Motivations for Repressing INGOs

IR scholars have explored states' motivations for repressing CSOs. These explanations can be applied to the crackdown on INGOs. The reason for states' violent repression of INGOs is the short-term threat brought by INGOs (Chaudhry 2022). Meanwhile, to address why states rely on administrative repression of INGOs, the scholarship suggests the repression of INGOs can be a measure against political opponents (Dupuy et al. 2016), a strategy to disguise noncompliance with human rights treaties (Bakke et al. 2020), the spillover effect of repressive policies (Glasius et al. 2020), and the potential domestic threat from NGOs in the long term (Chaudhry 2022). In sum, the extant literature assumes that *INGOs' threats to states* drive the repression and identifies these threats regarding state legitimacy, social stability, and information credibility from other countries.

These efforts improve our understanding of why states initiate civil society repression and deploy different strategies against INGOs. I'd like to further the exploration with a follow-up question in terms of state motivations: ***why do states vary the level of civil society repression?*** Instead of identifying the repression as a binary indicator, violent or nonviolent (Chaudhry 2022), I define civil society repression against INGOs as a continuous variable. The violent and nonviolent tactics can appear simultaneously based on observational evidence. For instance, sporadic confrontations and conflicts between INGOs and governments are reported in

implementing restraint policies.[4] Since INGOs' survival strategies are based on governments' attitudes, bluntly dividing the types of repression based on governments' use of violence could confuse INGOs and fail to offer inaccurate information about INGOs' survival. Therefore, measuring the level of repression by incorporating government violence and nonviolence can help better figure out the survival environment of INGOs.

The Dynamic of Varying Repression

Reconceptualization of INGO Threat

The extant scholarship on INGOs' threat is critical to understand civil society repression. However, to better explain repression variation, I upgrade this argument from two aspects. One is that I use INGOs' capacity rather than behaviors to reconceptualize their threats to governments. The other is that I classify INGOs' threats into two categories, *pre-threats* and *post-threats*, to illustrate what effective repression is.

First, I argue that ***INGO threats to governments come from the organizations' capacity rather than behaviors*** since the underlying strength of INGOs can be transferred to substantive pressure in the short term and ultimately threaten governments. Admittedly, some actions taken by INGOs can be equivalent to their threatening capability. However, in many cases, preventative repression is based on potential threats even though the targets have not done anything substantive against the authorities yet (Danneman and Ritter 2014). The observable indicators of INGOs' capacity can, to some extent, suggest possible threats to governments. In this case, INGOs' expanding organization size (Murdie and Davis 2012), increasing exposure to

[4] Amnesty International specifies different repressive tactics legitimized by CSO repression laws. The report can be found at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/global-assault-on-ngos-reaches-crisis-point/. Accessed 7 November 2022

media (Meernik et al. 2002; Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012), and local influence (Bracic 2016), can all suggest the threatening potential on governments.

Second, in exploring state motivations in repression, it is crucial to disaggregate the threats based on whether governments repress. In this project, I use *pre-threats* and *post-threats* to define INGO threats before and after the government intervention, respectively. IR scholars discuss how *pre-threats* trigger governments' nonviolent or violent responses. Yet *pre-threats* themselves can hardly decide the level of CSO repression, especially when governments would face larger threats after repression.

Therefore, I argue that the variation in the countries' responses to the organizations comes from governments' expectation to gain fewer *post-threats* relative to *pre-threats*.

Effectiveness Matters: Two Determinants of Repression Effectiveness

Repression Effectiveness

There is an underlying assumption in the extant literature addressing why states initiate CSO repression: CSO repression is an approach to decreasing INGOs' threats. However, it is problematic to assume that INGOs' *post-threats* would be fewer than before. CSO repression can activate INGOs' networks against the governments. CSO repression could initiate a round of pressure on governments from internal and external actors, such as local activists, liberal countries, and international organizations, who are connected by INGOs' TANs. Consequently, the boomerang effect would increase INGOs' threats by spotlighting repressive governments in the international community and boosting the support for INGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Typical cases can be found in Azerbaijan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Zambia, where the repression irritated INGO to mobilize local resistance on a larger scale and finally frustrated the restraints.[5]

Then, how do governments achieve fewer INGO threats in decision-making? I introduce *repression effectiveness* to illustrate how governments weigh the threats at these two stages to vary repression. Governments consider costs and benefits to assess policy effectiveness in decision-making (Mishan and Quah 2020; Thunström et al. 2020). In this case, most *repression effectiveness* can be achieved by reducing the threats of INGOs, *post-threats* minus *pre-threats*, ideally with minimum costs to governments.

Governments have been learning the costs of repression from previous interactions. The lessons come from the backlashes, probably the protests from the constituents or the stark decrease in foreign aid. One learning progress is that states moderate the repression with more regulatory tools and less violent methods. It further explains why governments are more likely to evaluate the implementation of civil society restraints in countries with a geographical affinity before initiating administrative repression (Glasius et al. 2020) – countries are learning from each other to minimize INGO *post-threats*.

In short, the introduction of *repression effectiveness* is consistent with the literature, where the perceived pre-repression threats can initiate repression. Yet the expected *repression effectiveness* also determines the levels of repression by achieving the least *post-threats*.

[5] More information about the successful resistance to civil society repression can be found in this report: https://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/preventing-civic-space-restrictions-an-exploratory-study-of-successful-resistance-against-ngo-laws/. Accessed 8 November 2022

Two Determinants of Repression Effectiveness: Regime Type and Local Trust

Given governments' pursuit of *repression effectiveness*, under what circumstances can legal restraints outperform radical attacks to achieve fewer INGOs post-threats? Why do countries choose different forms of administrative repression to narrow down INGOs' survival space in recent decades?

I propose two determinants of *repression effectiveness*, regime type and local trust (in INGOs). Their interaction indicates possible INGO *post-threats* and then offers evidence for repression variation. The scholarship has suggested how the interaction between regime type and local community threatens the governments in public service distribution – Citizens and civic associations with a robust civil society are more likely to resort to disruptive protests against governments prioritizing some groups' interests regarding public services (Cornell and Grimes 2015).

In the case of CSO repression, the regime type can indicate a country's odds of encountering threats of INGOs and the level of INGO threats. I argue that there exists the selection effect, where actors tend to "self-select" into specific interactions based on their preferences (Von Stein 2005; Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016), when INGOs choose state targets. On the one hand, the belief of INGOs is to develop transnational activities to help people in need (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, INGOs are more likely to target less democratic governments, which are more likely to violate human rights (e.g., Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Krain 1997; Poe and Tate 1994) and be short of social services (Cooley and Ron 2002). On the other hand, less democratic countries, including weakly democratic countries, are more likely to encounter protests (Boulding 2010). In TANs, the protests can be identified as typical signals for international assistance to local activists and facilitate a wave of pressure on

governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998). As a result, keeping the repression level constant, less democratic governments tend to encounter more radical responses from INGOs like naming and shaming.

The trust of local communities in INGOs is the other determinant of the organizations' *post-threats* to governments. Ceteris paribus, I argue that the stronger local trust is, the more likely INGOs can maintain significant threats to governments. First, consistency between local grievances and INGOs' global advocacy legitimizes INGOs' pressure on governments. A supportive local community tends to stand with INGOs, while the swaying mass under the influence of state power could confuse international communities and make INGOs' advocacy less credible. That is why governments rely on smear campaigns, for instance, to legitimize civil society repression, which could buy domestic audience understanding and even support of the restraints (Koo and Murdie 2022). Second, strong support from local communities can guarantee INGOs' political opportunities, the chances for social organizations to affect governments (Asal et al. 2014). For example, INGOs tend to encounter difficulties in local fundraising in countries where civil society is relatively weaker (Brechenmacher 2017; Dupuy, Ron, and Prakash 2015; Baoumi 2016). It would make INGOs less capable of social mobilization.

Worth noting, I emphasize local trust rather than the capacity of local communities. I argue that the unwavering support for INGOs is the underlying factor behind a robust civil society, which is believed to result in policy change (Cornell and Grimes 2015). Local support based on trust in INGOs would increase the capacity of the local community. In TANs, local individuals signal their demands to the trustworthy INGOs, and then the INGOs channel international support to local communities to boost their capacity. This cooperation can quickly grow the pressure from the bottom (Keck and Sikkink 1998). That is why the power of social

mobilization led by INGOs, rather than civil society robustness, is more likely to change the repressive policies in this global crackdown on INGOs (Berger-Kern et al. 2021).

Admittedly, international factors are essential in understanding CSO repression. However, I emphasize the significance of local communities regarding repressive variation for two reasons. First, the local response is the starting point of the boomerang campaign, where the international community pressure repressive governments for policy change. By implication, *repression effectiveness* can increase by avoiding international intervention, the costs to reduce *post-threats*. Second, local communities tend to bring a more direct and significant impact on the governments. IR scholars have found that domestic audience costs can moderate state behaviors (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008; Simmons and Danner 2010).

Perception Matters: The Dynamic of Repression Decisions

Governments' Perception in Repression Decision-Making

Not all countries can maximize or even achieve *repression effectiveness*. How does the interaction between regime type and local trust affect states' decision-making in civil society repression? How do governments evaluate *repression effectiveness* before implementation? I argue that the *perception* of *repression effectiveness* matters in this case. A government's *perception* based on its regime type and the local trust could decide to what extent the repression would face the backlash. Specifically, if (1) a regime type fails to maintain accountability of decision-makers and (2) local trust fails to be channeled to decision-makers, it is less likely for the perceived repression to be effective.

Less accountable governments caused by regime types are less likely to weigh *pre-threats* and *post-threats* carefully. Unable to enforce decision-making accountability with the

punishment of ineffective policies or policymaking monitoring, these countries tend to gain more INGO threats after the thoughtless repression. It explains inconsistent policies of civil society repression in the countries, such as Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, given the same extent of local resistance.

In addition, if governments fail to capture the level of local trust, which is latent and needs efficient communication with local communities to gain, it is also difficult to make effective repressive policies or actions. Credible information is critical for governments to achieve successful interaction (e.g., Filson and Werner 2002; Reiter 2003). In this case, when states fail to access all the significant indicators of local trust, it is challenging to decide what level of repression is optimal.

The Dynamic of Repression in Terms of Regime Type and Local Trust

What is the dynamic for governments to perceive repression effectiveness based on regime type and local trust? I apply the MMM (More Murder in the Middle) theory (Fein 1995; King 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004) to illustrate the dynamic. It uses the domestic political structure to incorporate government-society interaction into discussing repression.

Compared to the other alternatives, such as the repression-democracy linearity theory and the threshold theory for democratic pacification[6], the MMM is more applicable to civil society

[6] Davenport and Armstrong (2004) summarize three explanations for states' repressive activities. The variation of state repression in terms of human rights violation, first, can be linearly visualized based on democratic levels. Specifically, the more democratic a country is, the more protection of human rights is conducted. Second, some scholars believe that middling countries are more likely to be repressive since the lack of systemic coherence, which is measured by the effectiveness of domestic political structure and local participation. Third, there exists a threshold for state repressive behaviors. In the case of human rights, governments tend to significantly reduce repression when growing to a certain level of democracy. In this project, I apply the MMM model, the second theory, to discuss CSO repression.

repression, a specific type of repression. On the one hand, it incorporates the interactions between regime type and local trust, the two determinants of varying CSO repression, into exploring state motivation. On the other hand, compared to other theoretical alternatives, the inference of the MMM model, more repression in the middling countries, is more consistent with the empirical evidence of civil society repression. For instance, according to the indicator of democratic level (e_p_polity) from the dataset of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)[7] (Coppedge et al. 2020), Algeria was identified as a middling country, while Kazakhstan was an autocracy in 2015. However, the latter's level of CSO repression (v2csreprss) is lower than the former in the same year.[8]

Relying on an incoherence between governments and the mass population embedded in the domestic institutions, the MMM argues that the middling countries tend to maintain high repression against human rights. This systemic incoherence comes from middling countries' inflexibility to citizens' demands since (1) the political system fails to constrain the leaders to be accountable towards the citizens and (2) the information channeled through the political system to the governments are too mixed to assist decision-making. In CSO repression, the systemic incoherence could hardly present INGOs' local bonding in a middling country, which fails to form the government's significant perception of INGOs' threats. Therefore, here raises the first testable implication: ***Middling countries are more likely to repress INGOs when local trust in the organizations is high***.

[7] More information about the V-Dem dataset is on the website: https://www.v-dem.net Access on November 11, 2022.

[8] The polity scores, ranging from -10 and 10, for Algeria and Kazakhstan are 2 and -6, respectively. The higher the value is, the more democratic a country is. And the CSO repression, from 0 to 4, for Algeria and Kazakhstan are 2.1 and 1.77, respectively. Smaller value indicates more CSO repression.

However, the countries in the two extremes of the democratic-level spectrum, including consolidated democracies and autocracies, are more responsive to public opinion, according to the MMM theory. By implication, for consolidated democracies, the well-developed domestic political structure can successfully (1) regulate the government-to-society responses to INGOs and (2) convey local support for INGOs to governments. Meanwhile, autocracies also can present consistency with consolidated democracies regarding civil society repression. As (1) the legitimacy hinging on the mass population drives the decision-makers to be concerned about citizens' attitudes and (2) they rely on an alternative outside political participation to efficiently channel the message of local trust in INGOs to governments, the least democratic countries own the political structure to maintain government-society coherence. Accordingly, I propose that ***consolidated democracies and autocracies are less likely to repress INGOs when local trust in the organizations is high***.

Local Trust: A Latent Variable

To my knowledge, there is no data set describing the sub-national trust in INGOs. The global survey agents, including the Pew Research Center and the World Value Survey (WVS), have not yet asked the participants the exact question about how they evaluate INGOs. Moreover, the existing indicator of sub-national trust in IR is social trust, which is still too broad to offer accurate information on local trust in INGOs (Justwan et al. 2018).

Fortunately, the extant literature and dataset, although incomplete and less direct, can help us capture some attributes of the local trust. I summarize four types of correlates from the psychological perspective, the social perspective, INGOs' performance, and aid to NGOs. I present the summary of all indicators in **Table 1.1**.

I pick up the survey outcome of people's trust in NGOs for the psychological correlate of the local trust. I expect people's trust in NGOs to present certain consistency with the one in INGOs, which is one type of NGO. Even though the difference exists between local NGOs and INGOs, the cooperation can be found in the humanitarian sector, for instance.[9] And the cooperation could result in the evaluation of NGOs as the one for INGOs.

Table 1.1: Indicators for Measurement Model

Indicator Type	Indicator Name	Data Source	Value Range	Exp.[a]
The Psychological Correlate of Local Trust[b]	WVS Trust in NGOs	World Value Survey	3~5.028	+
The Social Correlate of Local Trust	De Facto Social Globalization	The KOF Globalization Index	10.62~91.78	+
The Correlate of INGOs' Performance	The Permanent offices of HROs	Barry et al. (2015)	0~1	+
	The Memberships of HROs	Barry et al. (2015)	0~139	+
The Correlate of Aid to NGOs[c]	Aid to INGOs	Dietrich and Murdie (2017)	0~36488464	-
	Aid to National NGOs	Dietrich and Murdie (2017)	0~2806041	-
	Aid to All NGOs	Dietrich and Murdie (2017)	0~36565929	-
	Aid to Non-NGOs	Dietrich and Murdie (2017)	0~ $1.352*10^{10}$	-

[a] Expectation for the correlation between a given indicator and the estimated latent trust variable. The positive relationship is marked as "+" and the negative one is "-" in the last column in **Table 1**.
[b] I attempt to include the correlates of *Trust in Government* and *Worry about Terrorism* from the World Value Survey. However, they fail to demonstrate significance when creating the latent variable. Therefore, the variable of Local Trust used in this project excludes the information of *Trust in Government and Worry about Terrorism*.
[c] I attempt to include the correlate of *Aid to Local and Regional NGOs*. However, it fails to demonstrate significance when creating the latent variable. Therefore, the variable of Local Trust used in this project excludes the information of *Aid to Local and Regional NGOs*.

The social correlate is de facto social globalization from the revised version of the KOF Globalization Index (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al 2008). Since it is the indicator of the openness of a society, I argue that more de facto social globalization might correlate to higher local trust.

[9] The cooperation between local NGOs and INGOs in the humanitarian sector can be found here: https://www.orange.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/rethinkingtherelationshipofinternationalngoslocalpartners.pdf. Accessed 7 November 2022

The third type of indicator, the correlate of INGOs' performance, includes the number of human rights INGOs (HROs) memberships and the permanent offices of HROs (Barry et al. 2015). The correlations with people's evaluation of INGOs could base on the influence of HROs, which use media exposure to attract more public attention. Meanwhile, the greater presence of HROs is associated with higher successful odds of HROs' naming and shaming across countries(Murdie and Davis 2012).

I also include some indicators of aid to NGOs as the correlates of INGOs. Foreign aid can change NGOs' behaviors (Dietrich and Murdie 2017), which could further vary local trust in INGOs. Also, the local impression of INGOs tends to be consistent with the evaluations of the countries which the organizations come from (Guarrieri 2018). It suggests that the aid from these foreign countries could be identified as foreign intervention, which has been used to legitimize CSO repression. Therefore, I propose that the increase in foreign aid might be associated with less local trust.

To measure the unobservable trust, I rely on the Bayesian model in **Figure 1.2** to create a latent variable of *Local Trust*. The algorithm treats the latent local trust as the explanatory variable and the observable indicators as the response variables. IR scholars have recognized the efficacy of this Bayesian technique in latent variable creation (Fariss 2014; Justwan et al. 2018; Treier and Jackman 2008).

$$y_{i,j} \sim N(\mu_{i,j}, \sigma_j^2)$$
$$\mu_{i,j} = \beta_j X_{i,j} \varepsilon_{i,j}$$
$$X_{i,j} \sim N(0,1)$$
$$\varepsilon_{i,j} \sim N(0,1)$$
$$\sigma_j^2 \sim IG(0.1,0.1)$$
$$\beta_{i,j} \sim N(0,1)$$

Figure 1.2: The Model for the Bayesian Latent Variable

Before the estimation, I first standardize the model by rescaling all variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to make the factor loadings comparable. Then, I estimate the model above using MCMC in JAGS with 500,000 iterations and 4 separate chains. The first 20,000 iterations are discarded as a burn-in. **Table 1.2** displays the means and 95% credible intervals for the regression coefficients after reaching convergence. All the indicators of the latent variable, *Local Trust*, are statistically distinguishable from zero since the indicators gain posterior densities for which at least 95% lie above or below zero. It suggests that *Local Trust* is successfully created based on the eight significant correlates. At the same time, the signs for the confidence intervals, either positive or negative, suggest the relationships of the indicators to *Local Trust*. The direction of the association is consistent with the expectation in **Table 1.1**.

Table 1.2: Summary of Coefficient Posterior Distributions

Variable	Coefficient	5% Credible Interval	95% Credible Interval
Local Trust			
WVS Trust in NGOs	0.086	0.004	0.238
De Facto Social Globalization	0.522	0.475	0.569
Permanent Offices of HROs	0.834	0.775	0.893
Memberships of HROs	0.264	0.074	0.460
Aid to INGOs	-0.893	-1.061	-0.735
Aid to National NGOs	-0.234	-0.430	-0.043
Aid to All NGOs	-0.897	-1.066	-0.741
Aid to Non-NGOs	-0.383	-0.577	-0.199

Empirical Test

Key Variables and Controls

There are two key independent variables. Besides the latent variable *Local Trust*, I rely on the Polity V project (Marshall et al. 2019) to create a categorical variable of *Polity Score* with three levels: autocracy (ranging from -10 to -6 corresponding to the Polity V), middling country (from -5 to 5), and consolidated democracy (from 6 to 10). The new variable is consistent with the regime types in the MMM theory.

For the dependent variable, I pick up *CSO Repression* (v2csreprss) from the dataset of Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)[10] (Coppedge et al. 2020) from 1996 to 2012. It measures whether "the government attempts to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)." The original indicator is continuous from 0, severe control, to 4, no control. For better interpretation, I invert the order of the original data. As a result, in this project, the dependent variable, *CSO Repression*, continuously ranges from 0 (least repression of INGOs) to 4 (most repression of INGOs). It suggests that the bigger the number is, the greater the state repression of INGOs.

[10] More information about the V-Dem dataset is on the website: https://www.v-dem.net

I also control some variables identified as confounders of civil society repression by IR scholarship in the model. The first control is *Mean Intensity of NGO-to-Government Conflicts*, capturing INGOs' radical behaviors towards states. I create the predictor by dividing the intensity by the number of events within a fixed country-year from the ICREWS (Integrated Crisis Early Warning System) data set. I expect a decrease in civil society repression based on radical external pressure since INGOs' "naming and shaming," a typical conflictual NGO-to-government interaction, can stimulate governments to change policies (Meernik et al. 2002; Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012).

Another two variables are *GDP per Capita* and *Population* from World Bank dataset. I think a well-developed economy tends to moderate repression since countries have more resources to cope with social problems rather than increase the repression. Meanwhile, a large population is more likely to threaten governments since social mobilization with more people can lead to more instability. To address the skewness of the data, I control for their natural logged form, *Logged GDP per Capita* and *Logged Population*.

I also control for *Neighborhood Effects*, measuring "the percentage of countries in a geographic region that have adopted administrative crackdown measures on NGOs, such as restriction on foreign funding or political activities" (Chaudhry 2022). While this variable emphasizes the number of administrative repressions in the neighboring countries, it can still affect the variation of CSO repression in the country within the same region. Neighboring countries' repression could create a regional political atmosphere, where INGOs' "problems" have been recognized as a consensus and legitimized across the region. Therefore, it appears to be legitimate for a country to increase CSO repression. Hence, I expect that a government tends

to increase CSO repression when the countries with a geographical affinity growingly repress INGOs.

The last control is *HR Protection Score*, an indicator of human rights protection in a given country-year (Fariss et al. 2022). It ranges from 0, the least respect for human rights, to 8, the highest respect for human rights. I use this predictor to control for general human rights repression since more *HR Protection Score* indicates less general repression of human rights. I argue that a country with less respect for human rights is more likely to increase CSO repression since the crackdown on INGOs can be identified as a human rights violation.

Model Specification and Outcome Discussion

I fit a linear regression model to the time-series cross-sectional panel data from 1996 to 2012. The unit of analysis is country-year. The 17-year span of the sample overlaps with the "closing space" of civil society, where most governments initiated administrative repression of INGOs, while sporadic violent attacks against INGOs have also been reported. Therefore, this sample can offer insights into the repression of INGO based on the *effectiveness-perception* framework.

The response variable is led for one year to exclude confounding events of each predictor before the practices in the same country-year. Therefore, the measurement of *CSO Repression* is at the future time *(t+1)*, while other variables, including independent variables and controls, are at the time *t*. I present the outcome in **Table 1.3**, where the right column displays the outcomes of the Baseline Model for the implication test.

For the two key independent variables, it is interesting to notice the insignificance of *Local Trust* and the significance of *Polity Score* at the 99% confidence interval. To further

understand how the two predictors affect *CSO Repression*, we have to rely on the outcome of the interaction terms.

One interaction term of *Polity Score* and *Local Trust* is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. To better interpret the outcome, I visualize the marginal effect of *Local Trust* on *CSO Repression* by *Polity Score* in **Figure 1.3**, where each line presents the predicted values of *CSO Repression*, while the areas around the line within the lighter color indicate the 95% prediction interval. To present the difference between middling countries and the other two regime types, I use a dotted line for middling country and solid lines for consolidated democracy and autocracy. It demonstrates that, compared to middling countries, consolidated democracies and autocracies tend to be more responsive to local trust, where the more local trust is, the more friendly the political environment is. On the other hand, the difference in the predicted values of *CSO Repression* conditioned on *Polity Score* is discernible at the 95% confidence interval when *Local Trust* is between -2 to 2. Although the absolute value of civil society repression is consistent with the democratic level, where a more democratic regime tends to present less repression, it is a bit counterintuitive that compared to less democratic regimes, middling countries are less sensitive to local communities in terms of INGOs' survival. The outcomes echo the expectations in the two hypotheses.

Table 1.3: The Baseline Model of the Effect of the Interaction of Regime Type and Local Trust on Civil Society Repression, 1996-2012[11]

	Dependent Variable
	CSO Repression (t+1) **Baseline Model**
Local Trust	0.109 (0.125)
Polity Score: consolidated democracy (baseline = "middling country")	-1.178*** (0.052)
Polity Score: autocracy (baseline = "middling country")	1.150*** (0.066)
Mean Intensity of NGO-to-Government Conflicts	-0.019** (0.009)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.050*** (0.018)
Logged Population	-0.082*** (0.016)
Neighborhood Effects	2.048*** (0.273)
HR Protection Score	-0.269*** (0.022)
*Local Trust * Polity Score: consolidated democracy (baseline = "middling country")*	-0.199 (0.127)
*Local Trust * Polity Score: autocracy (baseline = "middling country")*	-0.435** (0.182)
Constant	1.097*** (0.274)
Observations	1,729
R^2	0.702
Adjusted R^2	0.700
Residual Std. Error	0.773 (df = 1718)
F Statistic	404.121*** (df = 10; 1718)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[11] The R^2s are relatively high across the models. After checking the correlation, I exclude that it is caused by correlations problem.



Figure 1.3: Marginal Effect of *Local Trust* by *Polity Score*, Based on Results in Baseline Model

All control variables present significance in affecting *CSO Repression* at the 95% confidence interval. It indicates that a one-unit increase in *Mean Intensity of NGO-to-Government Conflicts* tends to decrease the CSO repression in the next year by 0.019 units on average, keeping other predictors fixed. It suggests the effectiveness of NGOs' radical attacks on governments. Moreover, ceteris paribus, when one unit increases in *Logged GDP per Capita*, it tends to result in a 0.050-unit decrease in the next-year repression on average. It echoes the expectation of economic development — a country with a better economy tends to decrease repression. And keeping other predictors constant, a one-unit increase in *Logged Population* tends to decrease the CSO repression by 0.082 units on average in the next year. It seems to contradict the expectation where threatened governments are assumed to increase CSO repression. The finding suggests that governments with a larger population tend to be more cautious when repressing INGOs. In addition, ceteris paribus, more restraints in the neighboring

countries are associated with high CSO repression of the state since a one-unit increase in *Neighborhood Effects* tends to cause a 2.048-unit increase on average in *CSO Repression* in the next year. Lastly, all else being equal, when one unit grows in *HR Protection Score*, CSO next-year repression tends to decrease by 0.269 units on average. It suggests that a country with less human rights repression is less likely to increase the repression of INGOs.

Robustness Check

To check the robustness of the outcomes, especially the interaction of local trust and regime types, I introduce two new variables from the V-Dem dataset. First, I rely on *Institutionalization* as the new measure of regime type to re-run the model. I name the new model Robustness-Check Model 1. *Institutionalization* comes from the V-Dem indicator Political Competition (*e_polcomp*), measuring to what extent the political competition is institutionalized based on the institutionalized competition degree and government restriction on political competition. Political Competition ranges from 1 (repressed competition) to 10 (institutionalized open electoral participation). I create *Institutionalization* as a 3-level categorical variable with values of uninstitutionalized (based on the range from 1 to 3), less institutionalized (from 4 to 7), and institutionalized (from 8 to 10). Since I highlight the domestic political structure of regime type in this project, this variable can be used as an approximation of regime type by capturing the accountability of decision-makers and efficient government-society interaction.

I then adapt the Baseline Model to the Robustness-Check Model 2 by using *CSO Entry and Exist* (v2cseeorgs) as the new approximation of civil society repression. It addresses that "to what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society

organizations (CSO) into public life?" It can be an indicator of state repression of INGOs since INGOs are more likely to be restrained from access to public life. After being inverted order, a higher value in *CSO Entry and Exist* suggests more government control.

The outcomes are presented in the last two columns of **Table 1.4**, respectively. According to the visuals for the marginal effects based on the interactive terms in **Figure 1.4**, the consistency with the outcome of the Baseline Model can be presented in the two aspects. First, there exists a 95% confidence interval discerning the responsiveness of governments towards local trust in INGOs, ranging from -2 to 2 across the models. Second, although the direction of middling governments' response towards local trust slightly goes in the opposite direction in the right visual of **Figure 1.4,** compared to **Figure 1.3**, where more local trust tends to increase civil society repression, it does not violate the assumption that middling governments are more likely to repress INGOs regardless of the high local trust. These tests again agree with the theoretical implications.

Table 1.4: The Robustness-Check Models of the Effect of the Interaction of Regime Type and Local Trust on Civil Society Repression, 1996-2012

	Dependent Variable	
	CSO Repression (t+1)	*CSO Entry and Exit (t+1)*
	Robustness-Check Model 1	**Robustness-Check Model 2**
Local Trust	-0.031 (0.113)	-0.023 (0.132)
Institutionalization: institutionalized (baseline = "less institutionalized")	-1.034*** (0.056)	
Institutionalization: uninstitutionalized (baseline = "less institutionalized")	1.009*** (0.063)	
Polity Score: consolidated democracy (baseline = "middling country")		-1.078*** (0.055)
Polity Score: autocracy (baseline = "middling country")		1.534*** (0.070)
Mean Intensity of NGO-to-Government Conflicts	-0.0002 (0.009)	-0.023** (0.009)
Logged GDP per Capita	-0.096*** (0.018)	0.072*** (0.019)
Logged Population	-0.057*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.017)
Neighborhood Effects	2.474*** (0.292)	1.669*** (0.287)
HR Protection Score	-0.218*** (0.025)	-0.181*** (0.023)
*Local Trust * Institutionalization: institutionalized (baseline = "less institutionalized")*	-0.066 (0.116)	
*Local Trust * Institutionalization: uninstitutionalized (baseline = "less institutionalized")*	-0.514*** (0.175)	
*Local Trust * Polity Score: consolidated democracy (baseline = "middling country")*		-0.031 (0.134)
*Local Trust * Polity Score: autocracy (baseline = "middling country")*		-0.139 (0.155)
Constant	0.849*** (0.293)	0.550* (0.288)
Observations	1,719	1,729
R^2	0.665	0.640
Adjusted R^2	0.663	0.637
Residual Std. Error	0.826 (df = 1708)	0.813 (df = 1718)
F Statistic	339.178*** (df = 10; 1708)	304.884*** (df = 10; 1718)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure 1.4: Marginal Effect of *Local Trust* by *Institutionalization* and *Polity Score*, Based on Results in Robustness-Check Models (the Left for Robustness-Check Model 1 and the Right for Robustness-Check Model 2)

Conclusion

Why do states vary their civil society repression? This is a critical question for CSOs, especially INGOs, in the global pushback to civil society development. NGOs have attempted different strategies in response to civil society repression (Lian and Murdie 2023). For INGOs, simply compliance with the repression is not the panacea. On the one hand, the distrust of governments in INGOs makes the organizations' moderation less credible. Some governments even do not offer a chance for INGOs to comply with the repressive policies. That is why many INGOs tried to legally register under the repressive laws but failed, and some got expelled after signaling moderation. On the other hand, while moderation in the short term can be identified as expediency (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014), long-term compliance could be conflictual

with the norms held by INGOs, such as independence from governments, standing for local communities, and freedom of expression. The deviance from donors' normative expectations would ultimately impair INGOs' survival.

Therefore, grasping the dynamic of CSO repression variation is essential to help INGOs figure out strategies to maintain their physical existence as well as their values within repressive countries. This understanding is also critical for INGOs to strategically adapt TANs in the current new political environment. This project contributes to the understanding of CSO repression in two aspects.

First, I create a framework to analyze the repression variation by integrating the existing theories, such as the TANs, the MMM, and the group of explanations focusing on INGOs' threats. It involves critical actors of extant research to offer a comprehensive understanding. The literature suggests that governments' concern about the backlash of TANs would affect the odds or timing of CSO repression (Glasius et al. 2020; Chaudhry 2022). However, governments have learned more from TANs than what the scholarship expects. Countries can flexibly vary the repression levels to reduce the costs of minimizing INGOs' post-threats. In addition, I incorporate the current explanations of governments' motivations for CSO repression into one analysis framework by disaggregating INGOs' threats into *pre-threats* and *post-threats*. In short, *pre-threats* tend to initiate the repression, while the concern about *post-threats* affected by local trust and regime type is more likely to vary the CSO repression. Moreover, I apply the MMM model to a specific repression form, the CSO repression. IR scholars have modeled the repressive behaviors against human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), the repression based on political democracy (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Ward 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), and the repression at the

dimension of political competition and participation (Gate et al. 2006; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). These efforts offer valuable insights to explore the dynamics of different government repressions. Adapting the MMM theory in CSO repression is a successful attempt to use the existing knowledge for a new form of repression.

Second, this project provides the INGO study with a new sub-national measure. I create a Latent Variable, *Local Trust*, with a Bayesian model, which has been justified in political science (Fariss 2014; Justwan et al. 2018; Treier and Jackman 2008). This algorithm can deal with incomplete data by simulation and integrate the current literature by setting the prior. For this project, the latent *Local Trust* makes it possible to test the INGO threats conceptualized by the underlying capacity rather than substantive actions. Therefore, this paper is another example suggesting that the method can offer a handy and economy way to access the data of INGOs or even actors at the sub-national level.

Accordingly, I propose future works in three possible directions. Future research can discuss the role of local trust in the study of INGOs. One possible project is to explore how local trust affects general human rights repression. Would governments compete with INGOs for the support of local communities? If yes, is the competing tendency conditional regime types? Moreover, the scholarship could examine how local trust affects INGOs' local funding, a critical factor for the organizations' survival in the current harsh political environment.

It would be also interesting to study INGOs' successful responses to CSO repression. Could we propose a pattern to summarize how INGOs succeed in the repression targeting the organizations? The idea of repression variation in this project can help conceptualize INGOs' success as a continuous variable in CSO repression. Success can be defined based on different levels of repression. For instance, safe withdrawal can be identified as a success compared to

imprisonment and violent expulsion under extreme repression, while the outcome of overturning the repressive laws is a success in the political environment where INGOs can organize protests and sue the governments. Another contribution to this future work is the idea of *pre-threats* and *post-threats*. This evaluation mechanism is applicable to INGOs. The concern about the increased government *post-threats* based on different determinants of retaliation can explain the variation in INGO responses for success.

The third possible future research can be the study of local/domestic NGOs. How do organizations of this type affect CSO repression? If the capacity of these NGOs matters, it is possible to create a latent variable, *Local NGO Capacity*, to address this question. Further, how does the local trust of domestic NGOs determine the repression? Will the local trust in the domestic organizations is consistent with the trust in the governments since the origin and the growth of domestic NGOs tend to entangle with the governments more?

The project offers strategy-relevant insights for INGOs' survival in the current political environment. One possible strategy is to increase local bonding in consolidated democracies and autocracies, where local support could result in less CSO repression. Notably, local trust, the key to INGOs' survival, relies on accountable decision-makers in the governments and the accurate information of local communities received by the governments. Therefore, for the INGOs in middling countries, before investing in more local support, the organizations can re-distribute the resources to increase governments' accountability and the efficiency of government-society communication.

Another critical implication of the project is that INGOs can use local trust to build better TANs, especially when the pandemic increases the attention and expectation of INGOs and further increases the urgency of INGOs' global contributions. Since local trust can play a critical

role in INGOs' success, INGOs need to consider local bonding in TANs, which mainly emphasizes the importance of local activists rather than local communities. INGO can integrate local communities into TANs through public education and localized programs.

Reference

Asal, Victor, Justin Conrad, and Peter White. 2014. Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations. *International Organization* 68(4): 945-978. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000228

Barry, Colin M., K. Chad Clay, and Michael E. Flynn. 2013. Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3): 532-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12039

Berger-Kern, Nora, Fabian Hetz, Rebecca Wagner, and Jonas Wolff. 2021. Defending Civic Space: Successful Resistance Against NGO Laws in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. *Global Policy* 12: 84-94. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12976

Boulding, Carew E. 2010. NGOs and Political Participation in Weak Democracies: Subnational Evidence on Protest and Voter Turnout Brom Bolivia. *The Journal of Politics* 72(2): 456-468. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990922

Bracic, Ana. 2016. Reaching the Individual: EU Accession, NGOs, and human rights. *American Political Science Review* 110(3): 530-546. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541600023X

Carothers, Thomas, and Saskia Brechenmacher. 2014 *Closing space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/20/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire-pub-54503. Accessed 8 November 2022

Chaudhry, Suparna. 2022. The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs. *International Organization*: 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000473

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-violent Conflict*. Columbia University Press.

Cingranelli, David. L., and David L., Richards. 1999. Measuring the Level, Pattern and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(2): 407-18. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00126

Cornell, Agnes, and Marcia Grimes. 2015. Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action: Bureaucratic Structures, Civil Society, and Disruptive Protests. *The Journal of Politics* 77(3): 664-678. https://doi.org/10.1086/681058

Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International security* 27(1): 5-39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092151. Accessed 8 November 2022

Danneman, Nathan, and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2014. Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(2): 254-279. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468720

Davenport, Christian and David A. Armstrong II. 2004. Democracy and Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 538-554. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x

Dietrich, Simone, and Amanda Murdie. 2017. Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery. *Review of International Organizations* 12(1): 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9242-8

Dupuy, Kendra, Aseem Prakash, and James Ron. 2016. Hands off My Regime! Governments' Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries. *World Development* 84(2): 299-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.02.001

Dupuy, Kendra, James Ron, and Aseem Prakash. 2015. Who Survived? Ethiopia's Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs. *Review of International Political Economy* 22(2): 419-56. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.903854

Dreher, Axel. 2006. Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization. *Applied Economics* 38(10): 1091-1110. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840500392078

Dreher, Axel, Noel Gaston, and Pim Martens. 2008. Measuring Globalisation. *Gauging its Consequences* Springer, New York.

Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability. *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 297-318. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000070.

Fein, Helen. 1995. More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World. *Human Rights Quarterly* 17: 170-91. http://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.1995.0001

Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. *American Journal of Political Science*: 819-837. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088436

Franklin, James C. 2018. Shame on you: The impact of human rights criticism on political repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (1): 187-211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00496.x

Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Yonatan Lupu. 2016. Do Arms Control Treaties Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. *International Studies Quarterly* 60(3): 530-539. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw013

Gates, Scott, Håvard Heger, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand. 2006. Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity During, 1800-2000. American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 893-908. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00222.x

Glasius, Marlies, Jelmer Schalk, and Meta De Lange. 2020. Illiberal Norm Diffusion: How Do Governments Learn to Restrict Nongovernmental Organizations?. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(2): 453-468. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa019

Guarrieri, Thomas R. 2018. Guilty as Perceived: How Opinions About States Influence Opinions about NGOs. *The Review of International Organization* 13(4): 573-593. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9291-2

Hafner-Burton, E. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62(4): 689-716. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247

Hayes, Ben. 2012. Counterterrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 14(1-2): 5-48. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ijnpl14&div=6&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 8 November 2022

Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Gurr. 1995. Transitions to Democracy: Tracking the Third Wave with Polity III Indicators of Democracy and Autocracy. *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4): 469-82. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343395032004007

Justwan, Florian, Ryan Bakker, and Jeffrey D. Berejikian. 2018. Measuring Social Trust and Trusting the Measure. *The Social Science Journal* 55(2): 149-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2017.10.001

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press.

King, John. 1998. Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 26(2): 1-27. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45294024. Accessed 8 November 2022

Koo, Jeong-Woo and Murdie, Amanda. 2022. Do NGO Restrictions Limit Terrorism? Smear Campaigns or Counterterrorism Tools. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7(1): ogab035. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab035

Krain, Matthew. 1997. State-Sponsored Mass Murder: A Study of the Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3): 331-60. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200279704100300

Li, Hui, and May Farid. 2022. Stay or Exit: How do International Nongovernmental Organizations Respond to Institutional Pressure Under Authoritarianism? *Regulation & Governance*. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12473

Lian, Shanshan, and Amanda Murdie. 2023. How Closing Civil Society Space Affects NGO-Government Interactions. *Journal of Human Rights*: 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2022.2158723

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 269-294. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002707313691

Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers. 2019. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transition, 1800-2018. *Center for Systemic Peace*. https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. Accessed 8 November 2022

Meernik, James, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols. 2012. The impact of human rights organizations on naming and shaming campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (2): 233-256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711431417

Mishan, Edward J., and Euston Quah. 2020. *Cost-Benefit Analysis*. Routledge.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x

Peo, Steven, and C. Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of Personal Integrity Rights in the 1980's: A Global Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88: 853-72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082712

Poe, Steven, C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global, Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993. *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 291-313. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00121

Regan, Patric, and Errol Henderson. 2002. Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent? *Third World Quarterly* 23(1): 119-36. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590220108207

Reiter, Dan. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 27-43. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000033

Thunström, Linda, Stephen C. Newbold, David Finnoff, Madison Ashworth, and Jason F. Shogren. 2020. The Benefits and Costs of Using Social Discing to Flatten the Curve for COVID-19. *Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis* 11(2): 179-195. https://doi.org/10.1017/bca.2020.12

Treier, Shawn, and Simon Jackman. 2008. Democracy as a Latent Variable. American Journal of Political Science. 52(1): 201-217. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00308.x

Simmons, Beth A. and Allison Danner. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organizations* 64(2): 225-256. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000044

Snidal, Duncan. 2002. Rational Choice and International Relations. In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Carlsnaes, Walter, Beth A. Simmons, and Thomas Risse: 73-94. London: Sage.

Springman, Jeremy, Edmund Malesky, Luch Right, and Erik Wibbels. 2022. The Effect of Government Repression on Civil Society: Evidence from Cambodia. *International Studies Quarterly* 66(3): sqac028. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac028

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051919

Ward, Michael. 2002. Green Binders in Cyberspace: A Modest Proposal. *Comparative Political Studies* 13(1): 46-51. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/001041400203500104. Accessed 8 November 2022

CHAPTER 2

THE UNDERSTOOD ADAPTATION:

INDIVIDUAL DONORS" EVALUATION OF INGOS IN THE "CLOSING SPACE" OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Like businesses, INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) often have to work with countries that do not share their core ideals. Some INGOs have to adjust their approaches to continue to work in those countries (e.g., Heiss 2019; Heurlin 2010; Kimemia 2014; Lopa et al. 2016). Compliance with repressive regimes is one strategic *adaption* of INGOs to the "closing space" of civil society, where most governments, to varying degrees, narrow down the survival space of CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) through laws (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Fransen et al. 2021; Lian and Murdie 2023; Noakes and Teets 2020).

The adaptation to repressive regimes is a difficult decision that INGOs are forced to make in the "closing space." INGOs have been known for taking harsh stands against repressive governments in transnational activities (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Davis 2012a). The anti-repression efforts echo INGOs' ideals for liberal values (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mathews 1997; Price 1998; Simmons 1998). However, to strategically adapt to the current global crackdown, many INGOs comply with repression, such as acquiescence and cooperation with governments, to maintain physical existence in the countries (Lian and Murdie 2023).

Besides repressive governments, individual donors also matter for INGOs' survival (OECD 2021). The *adaptation*, at the price of violating INGOs' norms, might not help INGOs survive if it irritates individual donors, critical financial contributors to INGOs' success. In other

words, given the significant support from private donations, these non-profit organizations would lose the source of private funding by *adaptation* to repression. In this project, I explore under what circumstances individual donors tend to accept INGOs' *adaptation*. Since the physical existence is vital for INGOs' constant influence on repressive countries (Murdie and Davis 2012a; Murdie and Hicks 2013), would the population understand the *adaptation* as expediency in the harsh political environment? Or is it more likely for individual donors to identify INGOs' cooperation with repressive governments as a deviance from the norms, the legitimacy source of NGOs' transnational activities (Keck and Sikkink 1998)?

I argue that individual donors expect INGOs to achieve normative goals. Meanwhile, this population can be flexible to the organizations' *approaches to norms* or ways to achieve normative goals. When immediate normative achievement would be unavailable for INGOs, individual donors could accept an incrementalist approach to success. Accordingly, if the *adaptation* to repressive governments would better help INGOs make a difference in the long run, such as accessibility to decision-makers and involvement in local issues, individual donors could understand the *adaptation*.

In the "closing space" of civil society, INGOs demonstrate two approaches to norms: ***remaining firm against repressive regimes* vs. *cooperating with repressive regimes***. Some INGOs shame the repressive governments, initiate online campaigns, and organize protests, while others choose acquiescence, compliance with the policies, and seek the support of the repressive governments (Lian and Murdie 2023). Which tends to be identified as a better approach to norms? The evaluation of INGOs' *adaptation*, I argue, is based on the perceived information, where the specifics can help individual donors decide which approach is more likely to achieve INGOs' normative goals.

Based on the IR (International Relations) scholarship (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021), I summarize two determinants affecting individual donors' evaluations of *adaptation* in the "closing space": the *level of democracy* (more democratic vs. less democratic) of the repressive regime and the *organizational type* of the INGO (advocacy INGO vs. service INGO). For individual donors emphasizing the *level of democracy* of the country where INGOs work, the *adaptation* towards a less democratic regime seems more acceptable in the current repression since the radical behaviors are more likely to irritate the governments and reduce INGOs' chance to achieve norms; For individual donors highlighting the *organizational type* of INGOs, advocacy INGOs' *adaptation* tends to be encouraged since they are more likely to be the targets of repressive governments, determined to decrease the threats of INGOs. In other words, compared to advocacy INGOs, governments' demand for the functions makes the service INGOs more likely to maintain their values in the current repression.

The logic of the evaluation is presented in **Figure 2.1**. First, an individual donor receives information about an INGOs' *adaptation* in the harsh political environment. The source of information could be newspapers, social media, or posts on INGOs' websites. Being affected by either the *level of democracy* of the repressive country or the *organizational type* of the INGO, the donor will weigh whether the *adaptation* would be a better approach to norms than a radical response. What I expect to find is that individual donors are more likely to accept the *adaptation* from advocacy INGOs or INGOs work within less democratic countries.



Figure 2.1: The Logic of Individual Donors' Evaluation of INGOs' *Adaptation* in the "Closing Space"

The outcome of the survey experiment demonstrates individual donors' significant acceptance of advocacy INGOs' *adaptation*. In other words, advocacy INGOs' *adaptation* rather than conflict with repressive countries is more likely to be understood as a better approach to norms in the context of "closing space." However, there is no significant effect of the *level of democracy* on individual donors' evaluations.

The findings can help INGOs achieve the normative goals in the "closing space" since individual donors' understanding is one determinant for INGOs' success. When framing their *adaptation* for the support from individual donors, INGOs can emphasize their involvement in politically salient issues.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, I discuss the motivations and effects of INGOs' *adaptation* in the "closing space." After figuring out how individual donors use INGOs'

approaches and the perceived information to evaluate INGOs' behaviors, I hypothesize that the variations of assessment can be caused by the *level of democracy* of the repressive regime and the *organizational type* of the INGO. Then, an online survey experiment is introduced for empirical tests. Finally, I suggest future work and survival-relevant strategies for INGOs based on the contributions of this project.

INGOs' Adaptation in the "Closing Space" of Civil Society

The "Closing Space" of Civil Society

NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are non-profit, voluntary, non-party, legal, and independent from government control. Based on the working scope, they can be divided into domestic NGOs and INGOs. Compared to domestic NGOs focusing on the issues within a country, INGOs are active in at least two countries. Legitimized by "shared" values, INGOs' transnational efforts in improving state behaviors have been recognized by IR scholars (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999).

INGOs' success can be affected by different actors. The scholarship uses "network" to illustrate how INGOs bridge various supporters, such as local activists, liberal countries, and IOs (International Organizations), to achieve normative goals, such as peace, justice, equality, and liberty (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie 2014; Murdie and Polizzi 2017; Wilson et al. 2016). By implication, the allies in INGOs' networks can affect NGOs' success by boosting the organizations' capacity in the short term. That is why the networked supporters are identified as INGOs' stakeholders (Carpenter 2011; Stroup and Wong 2017), who can "contribute to the visibility, evaluation, and deference of INGOs' capability, principled commitments, and expertise" (Stroup and Wong 2017). By working with different stakeholders, INGOs have

significantly improved human rights protection (Murdie and Davis 2012b), democracy (Murdie and Davis 2012a), environmental protection (Murdie and Urpelainen 2015; Pacheco-Vega and Murdie 2021), public health (Murdie and Hicks 2013), etc.

However, the progress has been slowed down by a global pushback to civil society organizations since the 2000s. The governments rely on administrative tools, such as registering under the government branches, limiting access to resources, and engaging less politically salient programs, to restrain the working space of NGOs, including INGOs (Chaudhry 2022; Glasius et al. 2020). This worldwide trend is called the "closing space" of civil society organizations (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Governments can use NGOs' resistance to justify violent repression. NGOs' radical response could initiate retaliation, such as arrest and expulsion, rather than policy change.

The "closing space" presents two attributes regarding INGOs' survival. First, *most regimes*, to varying degrees, repress INGOs. Less democratic countries legitimize the repression by claiming INGOs' challenges as foreign intervention (Dupuy et al. 2016). For instance, Russia, which defines NGOs as "foreign agents," is a typical case.[12] Meanwhile, some democracies narrow down the survival space of NGOs in the name of anti-terrorism (Hayes 2012; Koo and Murdie 2023). Admittedly, the level of repression varies across regimes, from administrative "regulating" to violent expulsion. However, the shrinking space for INGOs is worldwide (Carothers and Brechenmache 2014; Chaudhry 2022; Lian and Murdie 2023).

Second, *different types of INGOs* are affected by the global crackdown. INGOs advocating for political change are the targets of repression since they challenge the legitimacy of governments by spotlighting the problems towards domestic and international audiences and

[12] More information can be found at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/global-assault-on-ngos-reaches-crisis-point/

pressuring governments to change the status quo (Springman et al. 2022). That is why INGOs in the human rights sector tend to face substantive loss in the global crackdown (Dupuy et al. 2015). Although INGOs offering services are less likely to be targeted, IR scholars still find that the repression can restrain service INGOs' activities (Heinzel and Koenig-Archibugi 2022; Springman et al. 2022). For instance, in the current global pandemic, health INGOs face difficulties channeling international resources to local communities.[13] Another empirical example is the expulsion of INGOs offering aid.[14]

INGOs' Responses to Repressive Governments

INGOs present various responses in the "closing space," including cooperation, silence, protests, and leaving (Lian and Murdie 2023). These responses can be summarized as two main options for INGOs to respond to repressive governments in this harsh political environment: ***remaining firm against repressive regimes*** **vs.** ***cooperating with repressive regimes***.

In the current political environment, the options could cause a dilemma for INGOs since choosing one option might lose the support from the stakeholders preferring the alternative and ultimately reduce the efficacy of the selected option regarding survival. Specifically, INGOs fighting against repressive regimes can gain support from allied actors like liberal countries, local activists, and IOs. They share the values against any form of repression. Previously, with the help of these value-sharers, INGOs' confrontation succeeded in pressuring governments to change policies (Keck and Sikkink 1999). Meanwhile, the conflictual stands against repressive governments are more likely to cause a backlash in the current "closing space." Admittedly,

[13] The report can be found at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-57095591
[14] One example can be found at: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/12/07/674624977/pakistan-ousts-18-aid-agencies-human-rights-minister-tweets-they-must-leave

NGOs, including INGOs, successfully nullified the repressive policies in Azerbaijan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Zambia from 2009 to 2014.[15] However, in most cases, INGOs' resistance has hardly improved and even worsened their survival environment. Many governments have taken violent actions against INGOs' conflictual response.[16] Accordingly, the *adaptation* to repressive regimes becomes a more practical option in the current context for INGOs, whose success relies on physical existence within the countries (Murdie and Davis 2012).

Unfortunately, if INGOs adapt to repressive governments, the contextual expediency might make them lose the support of the networked allies. The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), an IO, has decreased the aid channeled through INGOs, which need strategic *adaptation* to stay within the repressive countries (Dupuy and Prakash 2018). In addition, local individuals are less likely to support INGOs under repression (Dupuy et al. 2015).

How do individual donors, critical actors in INGOs' networks (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021), assess INGOs' *adaptation* to repressive governments? To figure this question out in the current "closing space" of civil society, I will first define individual donors and summarize what can affect this population's assessment of INGOs in a broad sense in the next section. Then, I will specify how individual donors vary their evaluations in the current global pushback to INGOs.

[15] More information can be found at: https://www.external-democracy-promotion.eu/preventing-civic-space-restrictions-an-exploratory-study-of-successful-resistance-against-ngo-laws/
[16] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/global-assault-on-ngos-reaches-crisis-point/

Individual Donors' Evaluation of INGOs' Adaptation

Individual Donors

Individual donors, citizens voluntarily donating to NGOs, are critical supporters of INGOs' transnational activities. Compared to the financial assistance from organizational donors, such as governments, international organizations, and enterprises, the small-scaled donations from each individual donor seem to be trivial. However, the aggregated donation of this population is surprisingly large.[17] Given that international philanthropy is influential for INGOs' survival, I identify individual donors as stakeholders of INGOs.

In this project, I focus on individual donors in the Global North. Individual donors in the Global South tend to receive more restraints in assisting INGOs (Baoumi 2016) and even be reluctant to help INGOs working on politically salient issues (Brechenmacher 2017; Dupuy et al. 2015). Therefore, the individual donors in the Global North are more likely to contribute to INGOs' survival in the current civil society repression.

What motivates individual donors' support of INGOs? For organizational donors, IR scholars suggest that both norm and function can drive international philanthropy. Liberal countries' standing out with INGOs are assumed for norm promotion in TANs (Transnational Advocacy Networks) (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Organizational donors check INGOs' normative achievements to decide on a new round of donations (Cooley and Ron 2002). Meanwhile, in some politically salient cases, for instance, some countries could manipulate INGOs for foreign intervention (Dupuy et al. 2016). The emphasis on INGOs' function could also explain why some behaviors are inconsistent with norms, such as INGOs' bribery practices for local access

[17] More statistics about individual donors' contribution to INGOs can be found at: https://givingusa.org/giving-usa-2017-total-charitable-donations-rise-to-new-high-of-390-05-billion/. Accessed 5 March 2023

(Lopa et al. 2016; Kimemia 2014) and working as consultants for authoritarian regimes (Heiss 2019; Heurlin 2010), can be maintained.

However, compared to organizational donors, individual donations to INGOs are more likely to be motivated by norms since they can hardly benefit from INGOs' functions. In other words, their contributions are more likely to be driven by a sense of normative achievement or the altruism of helping others they barely know. For example, Chaudhry et al. (2021) demonstrate that social trust, shaped by norms, can drive individual donors' support to INGOs. It also explains why private donations to humanitarian crises overseas "grew by 9% to US$6.8 billion in 2016"[18]. Accordingly, I propose that in international philanthropy, norms tend to be prioritized in motivating private donations.

Evaluations Based on Approaches to Norms

Individual donors can use different indicators to evaluate whether INGOs achieve the expected norms. The straightforward one is the outcome itself. That is why INGOs routinize reports of what they do and publish annual auditing outcomes for donors. It, to some extent, justifies marketizing financial assistance to service INGOs, where new funds are based on INGOs' previous achievements (Cooley and Ron 2002).

At the same time, individual donors can rely on some indirect evidence, such as government support (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021) and NGOs' authority (Stroup and Wong 2017), as evaluation alternatives to estimate the outcome. These determinants can indicate INGOs' chance of achieving normative goals. For instance, gaining sufficient and constant government funds will help INGOs hire talented staff and develop more programs. The justification of other

[18] Available at: https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2021/chapter-3-donors-and-recipients-humanitarian-and-wider-crisis-financing/. Accessed 5 March 2023

evidence is that it takes years for a norm to be accepted by different parties (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Additionally, in this back-and-forth process, it would be challenging for individual donors to evaluate the consistency between outcomes and principles since achievements and failures can be temporary (Risse et al. 1999).

In this project, I propose another option for donors to evaluate INGOs based on the odds of normative success: INGOs' *approaches to norms*. To put it another way, individual donors would prefer INGOs to choose the approach with a higher chance of achieving normative goals. INGOs use different approaches, such as consultation, naming and shaming, and protests. All these approaches can be located in a conflictual-to-cooperative spectrum based on attitudes and intensity (Johnson 2016; Lian and Murdie 2023). For example, working with IOs falls on the cooperative side of INGOs' attitude spectrum, while radical protests can be placed on the other side for conflictual gestures. Meanwhile, some scholars use the binary division of NGOs' approaches: conflictual and cooperative approaches (e.g., Atack 1999; Heurlin 2010; Natsios 1995). The *adaptation* to repression demonstrates INGOs' cooperation with the governments.

Why can INGOs' approaches become an alternative for individual donors' evaluation? I argue that it relies on ***the normative outcomes suggested by the approaches rather than the approaches themselves***. Individual donors tend to respond to local needs (Indiana University Lily Family School of Philanthropy 2022). Therefore, individual donors would prioritize the normative outcomes. That is why international private donations flow to natural disasters and health crises regardless of receiving countries' regime types. It infers that although the donation could be a relief to repressive governments, individual donors are more likely to focus on local demand.

Take INGOs' naming and shaming as another example. The support for this conflictual behavior is based on normative success by pressuring governments rather than publicizing the problems (Meernik et al. 2002; Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012a). In other words, compared to the naming and shaming action, if cooperation is more likely to achieve the norms, individual donors would prefer the moderate attitude of INGOs. It could explain why private donations keep flowing towards leading INGOs, who choose an incrementalist approach rather than a conflictual gesture when interacting with repressive governments (Stroup and Wong 2017). Donor individuals might think the conflictual attitudes would irritate the repressive regimes and prevent INGOs from accessing local communities.

Therefore, I argue that individual donors can be flexible in INGOs' approaches to norms if what INGOs do suggests a higher chance of achieving the norms. By implication, both *adaptation* and *non-adaptation* from INGOs can be identified as approaches to norms.

Evaluation Based on Perceived Information

Here raises a follow-up question: how do individual donors perceive INGOs' *adaptation* as a better approach to norms? What can make the *adaptation* more acceptable? My answer is that the information they perceive matters.

Chaudhry and Heiss (2021) propose two types of information affecting individual donors' perception of INGO-to-country interactions. First, the information highlighting *structural characteristics* or attributes of the survival environment can affect individual donors' evaluation. *Structural characteristics* can include regime types (Lian 2023), local attitudes (Dupuy et al. 2015; Lian 2023), and international support (Barry et al. 2013; Cooley and Ron 2002; Dietrich and Murdie 2017). In the "closing space," if INGOs can bear less civil society

repression in the countries where they work, individual donors could be less motivated to donate (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021). The other type of information emphasizes the *organizational characteristics* of INGOs. This determinant can be interpreted as organizational types (Murdie 2014), funding sources (Dupuy and Prakash 2018), and closeness to governments (Dupuy et al. 2016). One finding is that INGOs receiving more government funding are less likely to gain financial support from donor individuals (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021).

Why can these two determinants affect individual donors' perceptions? Facing much information related to INGOs, how do the two types of information impact private donations? On the one hand, the information received by individual donors tends to be framed based on *structural* and *organizational* characteristics, the basic and critical information of INGOs. Specifically, *structural characteristics* offer background information for INGOs' works, progress, and problems. Meanwhile, since *organizational characteristics*, whether INGOs provide service or advocate for change or whether they are independent of governments, are related to what INGOs do, they will be mentioned in the information. Also, *organizational characteristics* can indicate what norms INGOs attempt to achieve. For instance, service INGOs tend to prioritize local demands (Murdie 2014). INGOs, as one critical source of information to donors or media, would emphasize their *organizational characteristics* since "people gave more to organizations and informal groups that closely align with their values" (Indiana University Lily Family School of Philanthropy 2022).

On the other hand, the two determinants are sufficient to trigger individual donors' assessment of INGOs. It is unrealistic for individual donors to go through all the information for the evaluation. Chaudhry and Heiss (2021) conceptualize the decision-making method of individual donors regarding INGOs' evaluation as heuristics, which is a method to speed up the

process of finding a satisfactory solution based on limited time and attention. Since *structural* and *organizational characteristics* tend to be highlighted and repeated, individual donors would use these two determinants to evaluate INGOs' behaviors.

I summarize what can affect individual donors' evaluation of INGOs in **Figure 2.2**. Given that *adaptation* and *non- adaptation* can be interpreted as INGOs' approaches to norms, individual donors tend to rely on the perceived information in *structural* and/or *organizational characteristics* to decide the optimal response of INGOs based on the context.



Figure 2.2: How Individual Donors Evaluate INGOs' *Adaptation*

The Understood Adaptation in the "Closing Space" of Civil Society

In the "closing space," although repressive regimes, to a varying extent, cut off international funding to INGOs, individual donors are still important to INGOs' success. Countries have removed INGOs from foreign "aid delivery chains" in the "closing space" (Dupuy and Prakash 2018). Given the decrease in INGOs' funding sources, private philanthropy has become increasingly crucial for the organizations' survival overseas. Moreover, private donation is more likely to be channeled into INGOs since the funding source is less likely to be

identified as foreign intervention, one reason for government repression of INGOs (Dupuy et al. 2016).

Under which circumstance do individual donors tend to understand INGOs' *adaptation* as an approach to norms rather than a violation of their core ideals? What characteristics related to INGOs make people perceive *adaptation* as a better approach to norms? In the scenario of "closing space," I propose the *Level of Democracy* as the structural characteristic and the *Organizational Type* as the organizational characteristic. Then, I hypothesize how individual donors understand INGOs' *adaptation* based on each determinant.

Level of Democracy: Structural Characteristics in the Perceived Adaptation

The repression from the countries where INGO work is the primary reason for the organizations' survival difficulty. Therefore, in this project, I mainly explore the *structural characteristics* of repressive governments rather than those of liberal countries supporting INGOs.

I identify a repressive regime's *level of democracy* as the *structural characteristic* in the perceived INGOs' *adaptation* in the "closing space." Civil society repression varies across countries. Countries tend to use administrative restrictions: A few countries regulate INGOs' activities with, to some degree, acceptable regulations, while some harshly limit INGOs' funding sources (Chaudhry 2022). Several governments violently attacked and expelled INGOs at the policy implementation stage (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014).

A country's *level of democracy*, I argue, indicates to what extent the government can accept INGOs' conflictual approach to norms. In the global pushback to NGOs, countries vary their level of repression (Chaudhry 2022). More democratic countries can handle domestic

issues, including INGOs' threat and resistance, within political institutions rather than employ repression (e.g., Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Krain 1997; Poe and Tate 1994; Zanger 2000). Therefore, governments tend to present different attitudes towards INGOs' radicals in the "closing space" based on to what extent INGOs' threats can be coped with in the domestic systems. The more democratic the domestic institutions are, the more capable the countries of addressing INGOs' radicals peacefully.

Individual donors can use the *level of democracy* to weigh INGOs' conflictual responses to civil society repression regarding the chance of normative success. In more democratic countries where the repression appears low, since INGOs can gain more freedom and face less backlash to use radical resistance towards governments, the conflictual response would present a higher probability of approaching norms. However, in less democratic countries, where civil society repression tends to increase, INGOs' conflictual response might not be a good choice since the restrictions would significantly decrease INGOs' capability by blocking local and international assistance and legitimizing the backlash towards the radical response.

The context of "closing space" further justifies INGOs' *adaptation* as an expediency to achieve normative goals in less democratic countries. *Adaptation* rather than elimination of INGOs is the goal of the current repression since governments prioritize administrative repression rather than violent expulsion (Chaudhry 2022). It suggests that governments, especially less democratic ones, need INGOs in the areas such as public health (Murdie and Hicks 2013), service-delivering (Cooley and Ron 2002), and political issues[19]. By *adaptation*,

[19] The United Nations (UN) Democracy Fund is an example where INGOs sponsored by the UN help improve the political environment in some less democratic countries. More projects can be found at: http://projects.undemocracyfund.org/

INGOs cannot only keep helping local communities, which is consistent with the core values, but also use radical approaches to norms if repression decreases in the future.

Accordingly, here comes the first testable implication: ***Individual donors tend to accept the adaptation of INGOs in less democratic countries***.

Organizational Type: Organizational Characteristics in the Perceived Adaptation

One *organizational characteristic* affecting individual donors' evaluation of INGOs' *adaptation* in the "closing space" is the *organizational type* of INGOs, categorized as advocacy INGOs and service INGOs (Brass et al. 2018; Murdie 2014; Springman et al. 2022). Advocacy INGOs tend to advocate for changes, especially in political salience issues, such as human rights, social justice, and political reforms. In contrast, service INGOs focus on service provision in education, public health, etc., to local communities.

Compared with service INGOs, I argue that advocacy INGOs' *adaptation* tends to be more acceptable for individual donors since their radical behavior against repression is less likely to approach norms. Civil society repression is a pre-emptive measure (Danneman and Ritter 2014) against INGOs' threats, which tend to be indicated through conflictual attitudes in politically salient issues. Advocacy INGOs have challenged repressive governments by publicizing governments' problems and spreading local grievances (Keck and Sikkink 1998). INGOs' global advocacy, for instance, can hamper economic development and foreign aid of the shamed countries (Barry et al. 2013; Dietrich and Murdie 2017). Therefore, governments tend to be more sensitive to advocacy INGOs' radical response. Moreover, countries so are determined

to restrain advocacy INGOs that their conflictual response is more likely to irritate governments and stimulate backlashes.[20]

IR scholarship suggests that cooperation with repressive regimes is a typical form for INGOs to offer service since the organizations need access within the country. Hence, individual donors seem to prefer the *adaptation* of service INGOs for local communities. However, in the "closing space," this might not be the case since service INGOs' *adaptation* would limit their assistance to local communities. For instance, the repressive policies aiming at advocacy INGOs could hurt public health INGOs, a type of service INGOs, at the implementation stage (Heinzel and Koenig-Archibugi 2022). One piece of empirical evidence can be found in India, where repressive policies against environmental advocacy INGOs hurt the public health INGOs' funding during covid-19. Further, service INGOs' resistance would cause less backlash since governments rely on their service-providing functions. By implication, service INGOs can use radical opposition to achieve the norms.

In summary, the *adaptation* is more likely for advocacy INGOs to approach normative goals. The incrementalist approach has been an option for INGOs to achieve normative goals. Big INGOs' preference for cooperation rather than conflict with countries can be identified as a way to maintain their influence on governments (Stroup and Wong 2017). In some cases, INGOs have to "buy" their access to local communities (Lopa et al. 2016; Kimemia 2014). And in the current civil society repression, for example, advocacy INGOs can moderately affect repressive countries with strategic *adaptation*, including cooperation with governments (Noaks and Teets 2020).

[20] Empirical evidence shows that INGOs fighting against the repression could stimulate violent repression. More information can be found at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/global-assault-on-ngos-reaches-crisis-point/. Accessed 5 March 2023

As a result, I hypothesize that ***individual donors tend to accept the adaptation of advocacy INGOs in the "closing space."***

Empirical Test

Online Survey Experiment

To test the hypotheses, I choose an online survey experiment, where it is feasible to find the variance in people's responses by manipulating different treatments (Druckman et al. 2011: Chapters 2 and 3). IR scholars have used experiments to examine how specific factors affect individuals' assessment of INGOs (e.g., Bracic and Murdie 2019; Chaudhry and Heiss 2021; McEntire et al. 2017).

In the real world, a repressive country's *level of democracy* tends to interact with *organizational types* of INGOs in the information perceived by individual donors. **Figure 2.3** displays how the information perceived by individual donors could vary based on the interaction of these two dimensions. It would be difficult to identify which factor plays a significant role or whether there exists an interactive effect in the assessment. To address this issue, I introduce the experiment with a 2^2 factorial design, which can disentangle each factor's effect and check the interaction effect's significance (Wu 2000). Also, the factorial design allows different factors to be given to a participant at the same time, which can reasonably scale down the sample size by giving two factors to a participant rather than one factor for one participant and prevent other correlates from being introduced to each participant during the time interval between receiving two factors sequentially.



Figure 2.3: The Variation of Perceived Information Based on the Interaction of *Level of Democracy* and *Organization Type*

The treatments include two factors, *level of democracy* and *organizational type*. For the *level of democracy*, instead of using specific regime types as the approximation of the *level of democracy*, I simply use "less democratic" and "more democratic" as the values. Since understanding the difference between different regime types need knowledge in IR, the relative *level of democracy* is more accessible for participants, who need to capture the treatment information and respond in a limited time. Additionally, in the treatments, I repeated the relevant information on the *level of democracy*. For instance, to demonstrate that a government is "more democratic," I mention that "the government combines democratic features and a few non-democratic features" and that "the government has more democratic characteristics" in the content.

For *organizational type*, I choose "human rights" for advocacy INGO and "education" for service INGO. The specification aims to help participants understand the treatments. Moreover, since an INGO can both advocate against governments and offer service to local

communities in the real world, I specify which aspect, advocating or service-providing, the INGO in the treatments gives priority to. For example, the descriptions for HROs (Human Rights INGOs) include “a big INGO of human rights advocacy with 8 branches in different regions of the world,” working “against governments' violation of the physical-integrity rights of prisoners,” and initiating “campaigns to improve governments' respect for the disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture.”

In the survey experiment, I use a news report as a template to create the treatments (see **Figure 4**). It is about an INGO’s moderation with a repressive government to examine individual donor participants’ responses. The INGO (Better Life) and the country (Binako) are fabricated to reduce the bias with some INGOs and countries existing in the real world. I update the news report for each group of participants by varying the two determinants. **Table 2.1** displays the descriptions for each treatment, corresponding to **Figure 2.3**.

New Wave of Cooperation between Better Life International and Morivida after Binako Implements Restrictive NGO Law

By Andrew White, Staff Writer
December 28, 2018

BINAKO — Morivida took a major step on Thursday in the Prime Minister's drive to impose greater control and limit Western influences on Morividian society, as it passed a new law restricting the work of foreign organizations and their local partners, mainly through police supervision. Some INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) chose to compromise with the Morividian government for INGOs to survive in the harsh political environment. Some organizations have been registering under the new laws, reducing the numbers of their programs, and seeking new funding sources.

It is the third time that Morivida has taken action to repress civil society development. As a small, **[Treatment Description 1]**, for more than 60 years. This new wave of restrictions towards INGOs from the Morividian government is a part of the global push back against civil society organizations since the middle 1990s, which scholars in political science call the "closing space" in civil society.

Better Life International is a big INGO of **[Treatment Description 2]**. In order to ensure its survival in the current harsh political environment, Better Life International is now starting a wave of cooperation with Morivida to boost the government's bureaucratic capacity in **[Treatment Description 3]**, including staff training, structural adjustment, and provision of consultant service.

In summary:
- The government has **[Treatment Description 4]**.
- The government is making it harder for INGOs to work in the country.
- Better Life International is an INGO of **[Treatment Description 5]**.
- The INGO, Better Life International, is cooperating with the government.

Figure 2.4: The Template for Treatment

Table 2.1: The Rhetoric of Description for Treatment

Treatment Description	More Democratic* Education INGO	More Democratic*HRO	Less Democratic* Education INGO	Less Democratic*HRO
1	… more democratic country located in West Africa, the government combines democratic features and a few non-democratic features. In other words, it is a premature state of democracy, which concentrates a certain amount of political power on an authority not responsible to the people…	… more democratic country located in West Africa, the government combines democratic features and a few non-democratic features. In other words, it is a premature state of democracy, which concentrates a certain amount of political power on an authority not responsible to the people…	… less democratic country located in West Africa, the government concentrates most political power on an authority not very responsible to the people…	… less democratic country located in West Africa, the government concentrates most political power on an authority not very responsible to the people…
2	… girls' education with 8 branches in different regions of the world. This INGO works to address the barriers that keep girls out of schools in order to build an equitable environment through which all students can learn, grow and thrive.	… human rights advocacy with 8 branches in different regions of the world. This INGO works against governments' violation of the physical-integrity rights of prisoners. Better Life International tends to initiate campaigns to improve governments' respect for disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture.	… girls' education with 8 branches in different regions of the world. This INGO works to address the barriers that keep girls out of schools in order to build an equitable environment through which all students can learn, grow and thrive.	… human rights advocacy with 8 branches in different regions of the world. This INGO works against governments' violation of the physical-integrity rights of prisoners. Better Life International tends to initiate campaigns to improve governments' respect for disappearance, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture.
3	girls' education	human rights protection	girls' education	human rights protection
4	more democratic characteristics	more democratic characteristics	less democratic characteristics	less democratic characteristics
5	girls' education	human rights advocacy	girls' education	human rights advocacy

To help the participants better understand the treatments, I add the same introduction section before the treatments. The introduction is presented in **Figure 2.5**.

> International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) can be defined as non-profit organizations that are not controlled by a government and are active in multiple countries at one time. Well-known INGOs would include Greenpeace, Oxfam, and Amnesty International. The following questions ask you to evaluate the behavior of an INGO in a recent news report.

Figure 2.5: Introduction Section Before Treatment

The participants will be asked what they think about INGOs' *adaptation*, conditional on the treatments in the experiment survey. According to the theoretical analysis above, I expect the participants to present different evaluations of INGOs' *adaptation* regarding a better approach to norms. The participants' evaluation is measured on an ordinal scale from 1 (not agree with the INGO's *adaptation* at all) to 5 (agree with the INGO's *adaptation* a great deal). The question can be found in **Figure 2.6**. To better capture the nuisance of change in the responses, I treat the evaluation as a continuous variable, ranging from 1 to 5.



Figure 2.6: The Question for Participant Evaluation

I distributed the survey experiment to the population sample in the U.S. through Lucid, a platform for online surveys, in July 2022. According to the demographics in **Table 2.2** of the online appendix, the sample can be identified as the approximation of the individual donor population, which is "younger, more educated, and wealthier" (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021).

The participants are randomly divided into four groups receiving similar news reports about an INGO's response towards a government in the "closing space" based on different specifications of *Organizational Type* and *Level of Democracy*.

Table 2.2: Demographics of Lucid Sample and Comparison Sample from the 2019 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.

Demographic variable	Lucid Sample (N=2203)	2019 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (N=18,000, Weighted) Comparison
Gender		
Male	1064 (48.3%)	52%
Female	1139 (51.7%)	48%
Other	-	-
Income		
Less than $30,000	622 (28.2%)	29.7%
Between $30,000 and $59,999	592 (26.9%)	29.5%
Between $60,000 and $120,000[21]	721 (32.7%)	29.2%
More than $120,000[22]	268 (12.2%)	11.3%
Age		
18–29	465 (21.1%)	18.6%
30–39	443 (20.1%)	19.3%
40–49	400 (18.2%)	15.3%
50–59	335 (15.2%)	17.6%
60–69	344 (15.6%)	20%
70+	216 (9.8%)	10%
Party ID (Leaners coded as partisan)		
Democratic	946 (42.9%)	45.6%
Republican	778 (35.3%)	37.5%
Independent	308 (14.0%)	16.8%
Other	171 (7.8%)	-
No preference	-	-
Education		
Less than high school	71 (3.2%)	9.1%
High school graduate	486 (22.1%)	28.6%
Some college	492 (22.3%)	20.7%
2-year degree	160 (7.3%)	11.1%
4-year degree	566 (25.7%)	19.2%
Post-Grad	422 (19.2%)	11.2%
Prefer not to say	6 (0.3%)	-

[21] The range of income for the Lucid sample is "Between $60,000 and $124,999."
[22] The range of income for the Lucid sample is "More than $124,999."

Descriptive Analysis

The experiment is based on a 2^k factorial design, where each k factor has two values[23]. It is a 2^2 factorial design with factor A (*Level of Democracy*) and factor B (*Organizational Type*). There are two values for each factor. **Table 2.3**'s first two columns display each treatment's combination of factor values. Correspondingly, I present the sample size for each treatment in the third column. In this project, I examine the factorial effects, the dominant and the interaction effects, based on the mean of the response variable $\bar{y}$. The descriptive statistics for the factorial effects, the mean of participants' responses, are listed in the last columns in **Table 2.3**.

Table 2.3. Design Matrix and Evaluation Data of the Experimental

Factor		Effect	
Level of Democracy	**Organizational Type**	N	$\bar{y}$
more democratic	education	418	3.172557
more democratic	human rights	471	3.261146
less democratic	education	499	3.184369
less democratic	human rights	503	3.316103

Determinant Effects

In **Figure 2.7**, the main effects plot, the visualization of the effect caused by a single factor, graphs the average of all the observations at each value of a factor and connects them by line (Wu 2000). For each factor, by comparing the means of the two values, denoted with solid squares, with the horizontal line (indicating the mean of all the responses) between 3.22 and 3.24, it seems that the difference between the values of each factor exists. For instance, for the *Level of Democracy* visualized on the left side of **Figure 2.7**, the solid square symbol above the

[23] In the general factorial design, the values within each factor are called levels. To distinguish the "level" of determinant in a general experiment design and the "*Level" of Democracy*, one factor in this project, I use "values" to indicate the level of factor in a general experiment design. All "levels" in this empirical test are for "*Level of Democracy*."

horizontal line indicates the mean value of responses of participants receiving the treatment with less democratic, while the solid square for more democratic is below the mean. Falling on the different sides of the horizontal line means that there exist different responses from the mean, which is driven by the values of the determinant. Therefore, **Figure 2.7** infers that each determinant can diverge individual donors' evaluations of INGOs' *adaptation* towards repressive governments in the "closing space" of civil society.

Additionally, the vertical height of the line connecting two solid squares indicates the main effect. It is the difference between the average responses of the two values (Wu 2000). **Figure 2.7** shows the main effects based on the difference between the **y** values for the two solid squares within each determinant. Since the height of the *Organizational Type* is larger than the height of the *Level of Democracy*, it seems that *Organizational Type* has a larger main effect based on the mean of the response variable.



Figure 2.7. Main Effects Plot Matrix for the Mean of Evaluation

To examine whether the differences between the main effects presented in **Figure 2.7** are significant, I need to use normal or half-normal plots to judge the effect significance visually. The points in the half-normal plot indicate the effect estimates of all the main effects as well as all the interaction effects.[24] The half-normal plot can visually display the significant factor/s, which will be located in the upper-right corner and far above the insignificant ones close to the lower-left corner. Accordingly, **Figure 2.8** indicates that only the effect of *Organizational Type* is significant. It implies that individual donors tend to evaluate INGOs' *adaptation* based on organizational type rather than structural characteristics indicated by the *Level of Democracy*.

Another inference from **Figure 2.8** is that the interaction between the *Level of Democracy* and *Organizational Type* is statistically insignificant since the interactive term fall in the lower-left corner rather than the upper-right corner. It suggests that individual donors are less likely to weigh both the *Level of Democracy* and the *Organizational Type* simultaneously in the evaluation. It furthers the understanding of the decision-making method of individual donors, who tend to prioritize one determinant with limited time and attention in assessing INGOs' *adaptation*.

By implication, in the harsh political environment, individual donors seem to weigh INGOs' threats based on which type the organization is when assessing INGOs' approaches to norms. Another interesting finding is that donor individuals would simplify the evaluation process by focusing on limited information.

[24] These effect estimates follow the normal probability. Since the absolute values of a normal random variable have a half-normal distribution, the effect estimates can be placed against coordinates based on a half-normal distribution. In the half-norm plot, "all the large estimates appear in the upper-right corner and fall above the line through the small estimated effects" (Wu 2000).



Figure 2.8. Half-Normal Plot of Location Effects for the Mean of Donor Individuals' Evaluation

Robustness Check

To conduct the robustness check, I model individual donors' evaluation with linear regression models by controlling for the demographic characteristics of the participants. The outcomes are in **Table 2.4**. Model 1 examines how the two determinants affect individual donors' evaluations. It assumes ideal randomization, balancing the impact of other potential correlates of individual donors' evaluation. Model 1 is consistent with the analysis of the experiment with the factorial design.

Table 2.4. The Output of Robustness-Check Models

	Dependent Variable	
	Individual Donors' Evaluation	
	Model 1	**Model 2**
Level of Democracy: more democratic (baseline="less democratic")	-0.033 (0.055)	-0.028 (0.055)
Organizational Type: HROs (baseline="education INGOs")	**0.111**** **(0.055)**	**0.103*** **(0.055)**
Gender: female (baseline="male")		0.108** (0.055)
Age		0.007*** (0.002)
Income		0.002 (0.003)
Party: independent (baseline="democratic")		0.445*** (0.085)
Party: other (baseline="democratic")		0.599*** (0.109)
Party: republican (baseline="democratic")		0.230*** (0.063)
Education: less than high school (baseline= "high school graduate")		-0.012 (0.163)
Education: some college (baseline= "high school graduate")		0.021 (0.084)
Education: 2-year degree (baseline="high school graduate")		-0.207* (0.119)
Education: 4-year degree (baseline= "4-year degree")		-0.135* (0.080)
Education: post grad (baseline= "high school graduate")		-0.351*** (0.089)
Education: prefer not to say (baseline= "high school graduate")		0.583 (0.493)
Constant	3.195*** (0.048)	2.831*** (0.099)
Observations	1,954	1,915
R^2	0.002	0.052
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.045
Residual Std. Error	1.222 (df = 1951)	1.197 (df = 1900)
F Statistic	2.195 (df = 2; 1951)	7.458*** (df = 14; 1900)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

However, in social experiments, it is hard to achieve ideal randomization. Would the perceived determinants of INGOs' approaches to norms lose significance when controlling for other predictors? Could any demographic characteristics dominate individual donors' evaluations? To address these concerns, I control for the indicators at the individual level, which significance has been found in the study of individual philanthropists (e.g., Litofcenko et al. 2023).

In model 2, I update model 1 by controlling the demographic information collected from the experiment. The significant positive estimate of *Organizational Type* implies the robustness of the finding, where advocacy INGOs' *adaptation*, compared with service INGOs', is more likely to be accepted by individual donors.

Conclusion

Individual donors' understanding of INGOs' approaches to norms suggests that this population can update their evaluations based on perceived contextual information. It echoes that actors can learn through interactions (Glasius et al. 2020). Being aware of individual donors' learning patterns can help IR scholars better understand INGOs' networks in the current global pushback and offer survival-relevant insights to transnational organizations.

In this project, I explore how individual donors evaluate INGOs' *adaptation* towards repressive governments. Assuming that individual donors are norm-driven, I update two determinants based on INGOs' *structural* and *organizational characteristics*. Specifically, I propose that some individual donors tend to prefer INGOs' *adaptation* by highlighting the harsh political environment, while other individual donors are more likely to accept advocacy INGOs' *adaptation* since this type of INGO tends to face more threats. The underlying logic is that donor

individuals support the response with a higher chance of achieving INGOs' norms. In the empirical test, I use an online survey experiment with a factorial design for the treatments, similar news of INGOs' *adaptation* in the "closing space" of civil society. The outcome echoes the theoretical argument emphasizing the role of *organizational type*: Individual donors are more likely to support the *adaptation* of advocacy INGOs.

To what extent can the evaluation change individuals' donating behaviors, which can substantively affect INGOs' survival? This is my main concern about the inference. Although the literature suggests that individual donors' behaviors tend to be consistent with the evaluations (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021), the outcomes would be more valuable for INGOs' survival if donating behaviors had been explored. Therefore, future work can examine the substantive change in contributing preferences by asking about individual donors' donating behaviors rather than evaluations.

Also, future work can further examine the role of structural characteristics. In this project, the *Level of Democracy* falls to present significance in individual donors' evaluation of INGOs' adaptation. How I frame this structural characteristic might lead to insignificance. Specifically, the participants in the survey experiment would highlight the attribute of democracy in the less democratic regimes. It would be interesting to frame the regime types based on the *Level of Dictatorship*. The outcomes could offer insights regarding how regime types affect individual donors' evaluation.

Another avenue for future work can examine how other factors produce main and interaction effects on individual donors' evaluation of INGOs' *adaptation* with repressive governments. By introducing the experiment with a factorial design, I can disentangle the interaction effects of the factors. Hence, future work, for instance, can update the experiment in

this project by discussing the gender effects, which present significance in individual donors' evaluations in the robustness check of this project.

In addition, one possible attempt to further the discussion is to explore how local individuals in the Global South assess INGOs' *adaptation* in the "closing space." In this project, instead of treating the international community as a homogenous group, I bring individuals into the discussion of INGOs' transnational activities by focusing on individual donors in the Global North. Local individuals within the repressive countries, who can also be potential individual donors, might matter for INGOs' survival since it would be easier for this population to access INGOs in the repressive countries.

Given individual donors' critical role in INGOs' survival, learning this population's evaluation pattern can help INGOs better adapt to the current civil society repression. One implication for INGOs is highlighting their advocacy activities when communicating information to individual donors. This tactic could significantly suggest INGOs' *adaptation* as a better approach to normative goals in the "closing space."

Reference

Atack, Iain. 1999. Four Criteria of Development NGO Legitimacy. *World Development* 27 (5): 855-864. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00033-9

Baoumi, Hussein. 2016. Local Funding Is Not Always the Answer. OpenDemocracy. Available at < https://www.openglobalrights.org/local-funding-is-not-always-answer/> Accessed 13 January 2023.

Barry, Colin M., K. Chad Clay, and Michael E. Flynn. 2013. Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3): 532-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12039

Bracic, Ana and Amanda Murdie. 2020. Human Rights Abuses? Terrorist Labeling and Individual Reaction to Call to Action. *Political Research Quarterly* 73(4): 878-892. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919861154

Brass, Jennifer, Wesley Longhofer, Rachel Robinson, and Allison Schnable. 2018. *NGOs and International Development: A Review of Thirty-Five Years of Scholarship*. World Development 112: 136-49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.07.016

Brechenmacher, Saskia. 2017. *Civil Society Under Assault: Repression and Response in Russia, Egypt, and Ethiopia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, Thomas, and Saskia Brechenmacher. 2014. *Closing space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/20/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire-pub-54503. Accessed 8 November 2022

Carpenter, R. Charli. 2011. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms. *International Organization* 65(1): 69-102. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000329

Chaudhry, Suparna. 2022. The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs. *International Organization*: 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000473

Chaudhry, Suparna, Marc Dotson, and Andrew Heiss. 2021. Who Cares About Crackdowns? Explore the Role of Trust in Individual Philanthropy. *Global Policy* 12: 45-58. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12984

Chaudhry, Suparna, and Andrew Heiss. 2021. Dynamics of International Giving: How Heuristics Shape Individual Donor Preferences. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 50(3): 481-505. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764020971045

Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International security* 27(1): 5-39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092151. Accessed 8 November 2022

Dietrich, Simone, and Amanda Murdie. 2017. Human Rights Shaming Through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery. *Review of International Organizations* 12(1): 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-015-9242-8

Danneman, Nathan, and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2014. Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(2): 254-279. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468720

Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong II. 2004. Democracy and Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 538-554. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x

Druckman, James N., Donald P. Greene, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia (eds.). 2011. *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*. Cambridge University Press.

Dupuy, Kendra, and Aseem Prakash. 2018. Do Donors Reduce Bilateral Aid to Countries with Restrictive NGO Laws? A Panel Study, 1993-2012. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 47(1): 89-106. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764017737384

Dupuy, Kendra, Aseem Prakash, and James Ron. 2015. Who Survived? Ethiopia's Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs. *Review of International Political Economy* 22(2): 419-456. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2014.903854

Dupuy, Kendra, Aseem Prakash, and James Ron. 2016. Hands off My Regime! Governments' Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-Governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-Income Countries. *World Development* 84(2): 299-311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.02.001

Franklin, James C. 2008. Shame on you: The impact of human rights criticism on political repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (1): 187-211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00496.x

Fransen, Luc, Kendra Dupuy, Marja Hinfelaar, and Sultan Mohammed Zakaria Mazumder. 2021. Tempering Transnational Advocacy? The Effect of Repression and Regulatory Restriction on Transnational NGO Collaborations. *Global Policy* 12: 11-22. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12972

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789

Hafner-Burton, E. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62(4) (2008): 689-716. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247

Hayes, Ben. 2012. Counterterrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 14(1–2): 5–48. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ijnpl14&div=6&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals

Heinzel, Mirko, and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. 2022. Harmful Side Effects: How Government Restrictions Against Transnational Civil Society Affect Global Health. *British Journal of Political Science*: 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000564

Heiss, Andrew. 2019. NGOs and Authoritarianism. In *Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations*, 557-572. Routledge.

Heurlin, Christopher. 2010. Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO-State Relations Under Dictatorship. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 21: 220-239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9103-2

Johnson, Tana. 2016. Cooperation, Co-optation, Competition, Conflict: International Bureaucracies and Non-Governmental Organizations in an Independent World. *Review of International Political Economy*. 23(5): 737-767. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1217902

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press.

Kimemia, Douglas. 2014. Non-Governmental Organizations and Corruption: The Case of Kenya. In *Challenges to Democratic Governance in Developing Countries*, 157-170. Springer, Cham.

Koo, Jeong-Woo and Murdie, Amanda. 2022. Do NGO Restrictions Limit Terrorism? Smear Campaigns or Counterterrorism Tools. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7(1): ogab035. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogab035

Krain, Matthew. 1997. State-Sponsored Mass Murder: A Study of the Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3): 331-60. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200279704100300

Lian, Shanshan. 2023. More Murder in the Middle: How Local Trust Conditions Repression Towards INGOs. *Human Rights Review* 24: 97-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-023-00681-9

Lian, Shanshan and Amanda Murdie. 2023. How Closing Civil Society Space Affects NGO-Government Interactions. *Journal of Human Rights*: 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2022.2158723

Litofcenko, Julia, Michael Meyer, Michaela Neumayr, and Astrid Pennerstorfer. 2023. Charitable Giving in Times of Covid-19: Do Crises Forward the Better or the Worse in Individuals?." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*: 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-023-00558-y

Lopa, Fowzia Gulshana Rashid, and Mokbul Morshed Ahmad. 2016. Participation of CSOs/NGOs in Bangladeshi Climate Change Policy Formulation: Co-Operation or Co-Optation? *Development in Practice* 26(6): 781-793. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1200536

Mathews, Jessica T. 1997. Power Shift. *Foreign Affairs* 76(1): 52-53. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047909

McEntire, Kyla Jo, Michele Leiby, and Matthew Krain. 2017. How Combining Framing Strategies Affects Human Rights Micromobilization. *Research and Politics* 4(2): 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680177029

Meernik, James, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols. The impact of human rights organizations on naming and shaming campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 2 (2012): 233-256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711431417

Murdie, Amanda. 2014. *Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs*. Stanford University Press.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012a. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012b. Looking in the Mirror: Comparing INGO Networks Across Issue Areas. *The Review of International Organizations* 7(2): 177-202. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9134-5

Murdie, Amanda, and Alexander Hicks. 2013. Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health. *International Organization* 67(3): 541-573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000143

Murdie, Amanda, and Marc Polizzi. 2017. Human Rights and Transnational Advocacy Networks, in Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Alexander H. Montgomery, and Mark Lubell (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks*. Oxford Handbook. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190228217.013.31

Murdie, Amanda, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2015. Why Pick on Us? Environmental INGOs and State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute. Political Studies 63(2): 353-372. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12101

Natsios, Andrew S.. 1995. NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict of Cooperation? *Third World Quarterly* 16(3): 405-420. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599550035979

Noakes, Stephen, and Jessica C. Teets. 2020. Learning Under Authoritarianism: Strategic Adaptations Within International Foundations and NGOs in China. *VOLUNTAS:*

International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 31(5): 1093-1113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9939-9

OECD. 2021. *Private Philanthropy for Development – Second Edition: Data for Action*. The Development Dimension, OECD Publishing, Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/cdf37f1e-en

Pacheco-Vega, Raul, and Amanda Murdie. 2021. When Do Environmental NGOs Work? A Test of the Conditional Effectiveness of Environmental Advocacy. *Environmental Politics* 30 (1-2): 180-201. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2020.1785261

Peo, Steven, and C. Neal Tate. 1994. Repression of Personal Integrity Rights in the 1980's: A Global Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88: 853-72. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082712

Price, Richard. 1998. Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. *International Organization* 52(3): 613-644. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550671

Risse, Thomas, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp. 1999. The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices. *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations*, 117.

Simmons, P. J.. 1998. Learning to Live with NGOs. *Foreign Policy* (113): 82-96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1149037

Springman, Jeremy, Edmund Malesky, Luch Right, and Erik Wibbels. 2022. The Effect of Government Repression on Civil Society: Evidence from Cambodia. *International Studies Quarterly* 66(3): sqac028. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac028

Stroup, Sarah S., and Wendy H. Wong. 2017. *The authority trap: Strategic choices of international NGOs*. Cornell University Press.

Wilson, Maya, David R. Davis, and Amanda Murdie. 2016. The View from the Bottom: Networks of Conflict Resolution Organizations and International Peace. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(3): 442-458. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43920600

Wu, C. F. Jeff and Michael S. Hamada. 2009 *Experiments: Planning, Analysis, and Optimization*. Wiley.

Zanger, Sabine C. 2000. A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977-1993. *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 213-33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/424921

CHAPTER 3

LEADING HROS' STRATEGIC ADAPTATION IN THE CASE OF COVID-19

Starting from December 31, 2019,[25] the Covid-19 crisis has been threatening the global population. During the pandemic, anecdotal evidence indicates the puzzling behaviors of leading HROs (Human Rights International Non-Governmental Organizations) in their interaction with governments. For example, Amnesty International, along with more than 100 civil society groups, signed a statement against human rights violations of digital surveillance.[26] As an influential human rights fighter, it makes sense that the organization takes a conflictual stance towards repressive governments. However, it is interesting to notice that Amnesty International was somewhat moderate in its statement, asking for government restrictions instead of an all-out stop on digital surveillance.

Why did the leading HRO emphasize the condition of government surveillance rather than the elimination of information control? Further, in the pandemic, how do leading HROs use naming and shaming, a conflictual strategy of HROs, to interact with states? Motivated by normative principles, fighting for civil society individuals, do the HROs with authority tend to increase the intensity of naming and shaming to pressure governments for human rights protection? Or will leading HROs be friendly for cooperation with countries for collective public health even though the governments are negligent in individual human rights protection?

[25] More information can be found at: https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19
[26] More information can be found at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/04/covid19-digital-surveillance-ngo/

The literature has suggested how NGOs can legitimize the divergence from *normative expectations,* defined as the expectations of NGOs' consistency between norms and behaviors, by emphasizing the long-term benefits compared to the short-term costs of norm violation (e.g., Carothers and Brechenmache 2014). Also, identifying the contentious behaviors as an approach rather than norms can also explain NGOs' deviance from the principles (Stroup and Wong 2017).

In this project, I propose a tactic used by leading HROs' to strategically adapt to the contentious interaction with governments in the current pandemic. I argue that leading HROs tend to rely on *target specificity* to name and shame governments. The underlying logic of *target specificity* is as follows: After classifying governments into different sub-actors, the NGOs tend to achieve *normative expectations* by maintaining conflictual against *value-spoilers* but moderate their behaviors towards *value-sharers*.

The application of *target specificity* in leading HROs' naming and shaming of governments can be seen in two ways. First, leading HROs can vary the intensity of naming and shaming to different branches of government, including (1) central governments, which exercise political authority across different issues; (2) extended governments, which are accountable for specific issues; and (3) general governments, which refer to geographical locations. For instance, central governments are the administrative, legislative, and judicial branches in the U.S., while extended governments include the public security sector and customs. General governments are the names of countries/regions where problems appear. I visualize the conceptualization in **Figure 3.1**.



Figure 3.1 NGOs' *Target Specificity* Based on *Branch of Government*

The second approach to *target specificity* is to present different attitudes towards governments at different levels, national and local. A national government governs the areas within the country's borders, while a local government is accountable for a region. One difference is that local governments can be flexible in adapting policies made at the national level to local communities. Also, some local governments gain the freedom to create policies for the regions they govern.

In this project, I take leading HRO-to-government naming and shaming as an example, where leading HROs are more likely to use *target specificity* in their interaction with governments. Accordingly, I propose two testable implications. One is that leading HROs tend to moderate the naming and shaming of central governments *(value-sharers)* while remaining conflictual towards extended and general governments *(value-spoilers)*. The other is that leading

HROs tend to name and shame national governments *(value-sharers)* more harshly than local governments (*value-spoilers*).

To conduct empirical tests, I use a sample measuring the tones of the leading HROs' "naming and shaming" tweets towards governments regarding Covid-19 in 2020. After fitting the panel data with linear regression models, I find out the outcomes consistent with the two hypotheses.

This project demonstrates leading HROs' *strategic adaptation* in the interaction with governments. The findings can offer strategy-relevant insights for NGOs to deal with contentious issues.

Value-Sharers and Value-Spoilers

NGOs' Different Attitudes Towards Actors in Transnational Networks

NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), organizations not-profit, non-party, voluntary, legal, and independent from government control, rely on a networked approach for their cross-boundary activities. The Boomerang Model (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the Spiral Model (Risse et al. 1999), for instance, specify how NGOs work with domestic and international actors for policy change.

NGOs present different attitudes towards other networked actors in a given event. In the TANs (Transnational Advocacy Networks), for instance, INGOs (International NGOs) stand with international organizations (IOs), liberal countries, and local activists to fight against repressive governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In service providing, some NGOs prioritize international donors' preferences over local demand (e.g., Cooley and Ron 2012; Murdie 2014).

External support is essential to NGOs' success. As non-profit organizations, NGOs need material support from donors for programs. Also, without substantive support from different networked actors, it is hard for NGOs to initiate influential campaigns.

Some behaviors of NGOs are more likely to gain support. A typical case is NGOs' naming and shaming against repressive governments, where NGOs' conflictual attitude tends to be supported by international audiences (Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012). However, some NGOs' behaviors are more likely to be criticized. For instance, managerial wrongdoings, such as fraud and false billing claims, can harm NGOs' public trust (Gibelman and Gelman 2004). Notably, NGOs can also present contentious attitudes, such as cooperation with dictatorships and silence towards repression, which tend to raise mixed evaluations.

Normative Expectations of NGOs

Why do people vary the evaluations of NGOs' performances? Which behaviors of NGOs tend to lead to a mixture of support and critiques towards NGOs? How do people identify the contentious responses of NGOs?

IR scholarship assumes that there exists an expected attitude from NGOs in the interaction with a networked actor. People tend to expect NGOs' independence from governments (Lewis 2010), service to vulnerable or marginal populations (Hodgkinson and McCarthy 1992), and human rights protection (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999).

The expectations come from the norms embodied in NGOs, so-called "norm entrepreneurs" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999) or "conveyors of Western culture" (Guarrieri 2017). It suggests that NGOs are expected to achieve liberal values with their

transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Mathews 1997; Price 1998; Simmons 1998). Many critiques have been raised for NGOs' violation of the norms (Barber 1997; Luttwak 1999).

I conceptualize expectations of NGOs' consistency between norms and behaviors as *normative expectations* towards NGOs. The inconsistency between expectations and behaviors tends to result in people's critiques, while consistency is more likely to motivate the audience's support. By implication, NGOs' deviance from *normative expectations,* not an absolute violation, tends to be identified as contentious behaviors.

Conceptualization of Value-Sharer, Value-Spoiler, and Value-Spoilers and Value Sharers

Under what circumstances do NGOs tend to divert their behaviors from the expectation? Which actors are more likely to motivate NGOs' slight violations of their faiths?

IR scholars use stakeholders to conceptualize NGOs' interactive actors (Carpenter 2011; Stroup and Wong 2017). However, the idea of stakeholders fails to distinguish different actors regarding value consistency with NGOs. For instance, Stroup and Wong (2017) identify stakeholders of INGOs as powerful actors who could "contribute to the visibility, evaluation, and deference of INGOs' capability, principled commitments, and expertise." Since this conceptualization suggests that all the networked actors can be called stakeholders of NGOs, it masks the difference regarding *normative expectations* of NGOs.

Based on the extent to which the actors share the same values with NGOs, I divide NGOs' networked actors into three types: *value-spoilers*, *value-spoilers as value-sharers*, and *value-sharers*. I visualize the conceptualization and corresponding examples in **Figure 3.2**.



Figure 3.2 Types of NGOs' Networked Actors and Corresponding Examples

In a given event, *value-spoilers* are actors with opposite values from NGOs, while *value-sharers* appear to present consistency with NGOs' norms. Take actors in TANs as an example. *Value-spoilers* could be a dictatorship notorious for human rights abuses and a repressive government cracking down on NGOs. And liberal states and international organizations tend to be typical *value-sharers*, offering financial assistance and official announcements for NGOs' human rights protection.

The traditional models explaining NGOs' activities assume the dichotomy of *value-sharers* and *value-spoilers*. They illustrate how *value-sharers* work together to correct the behaviors of *value-spoilers* (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999).

In this project, I introduce the term *value-spoilers as value-sharers* to conceptualize the actors partially sharing norms with NGOs. It is challenging for NGOs to maintain or even tell *normative expectations* in interacting with *value-spoilers as value-sharers*. The confrontation

could harm NGOs' values since the actors share some values with NGOs. Meanwhile, cooperation would result in NGOs violating the expectation since *value-spoilers as value-sharers* also demonstrate opposite principles with NGOs.

One example is NGOs' cooperation with international donors on service distribution. Marketization in achieving international assistance could lead to a violation of norms since compliance with donors' short-term efficiency is at the price of sustainable local development, a principled goal of NGOs (Barnett 2005; Cooley and Ron 2002). By implication, NGOs' contentious behaviors, which can raise both critiques (e.g., twisting local demand and long-term problems) and recognition (e.g., short-term achievement and organizational survival), tend to appear in the interactions with the *value-spoilers as value-sharers*, international donors.

Worth noting, the identification of actors regarding value-sharing is contextual. For example, the government of a consolidated democracy can be identified as a *value-sharer* when working with NGOs to pressure repressive regimes. However, when the same government violates human rights domestically, it is NGOs' *value-spoiler*. And in the case where the same government manipulates NGOs through donations, it is a *value-spoiler as value-sharer*.

Target Specificity for Governments

Typical Cases of NGO-to-Government Contentious Interactions

Governments are critical actors in NGOs' networks. Repressive policies could activate global campaigns where NGOs bridge the supporters for the organizations (Berger-Kern et al. 2021; Carothers and Youngs 2015). Insufficient official service to local communities can legitimize NGOs' engagement in transnational service distribution (Cornell and Grimes 2015;

Dietrich 2013). NGOs' responses in the two examples are consistent with the corresponding normative expectations.

However, in recent decades, there have been contentious NGO-to-government interactions, where mixed evaluations can be found not only in NGOs' connection with repressive governments but also in NGOs' ties with democratic governments. The four contentious issues, where governments can be identified as *value-spoilers as value-sharers*, in the current literature are presented below.

NGOs' bribery of officials. The bribery practice of NGOs can be understood as an acquiescence of corruption. However, in some cases, NGOs have to "buy" their access to local communities (Lopa et al. 2016; Kimemia 2014). These governments inviting NGOs for local people can be treated as *value-sharers*, while asking for bribes for NGOs' involvement can hardly be accepted by NGOs based on norms.

NGOs' dependence on donor countries. NGOs' independence can distinguish their transnational activities from foreign governments' intervention. However, NGOs' reliance on donor governments' aids could raise skeptics in the recipient countries (Dupuy et al. 2016). Therefore, by offering assistance to people in demand, the donor governments are *value-sharers* of NGOs. Yet the support could violate the principle of NGOs' independence with intentional or unintentional conditions on NGOs' use of funding.

NGOs' cooperation with notorious governments. Some NGOs have collaborated with the governments, which are human rights abusers, in official training and service distribution. People could agree on the organizations' efforts in boosting bureaucratic capacity to improve democracy. However, it would be contentious if the regimes took advantage of NGOs to

strategically justify their governance rather than benefit local communities (Heiss 2019; Heurlin 2010).

NGOs' compliance with repressive policies. In the current global crackdown on NGOs since the 1990s, NGOs' moderation is an option for organizational survival (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Fransen et al. 2021; Noakes and Teets 2020). If NGOs' compliance can help local communities in counterterrorism, for example, the governments can be identified as *value-sharers* working for the citizens (Hayes 2012). However, moderation under repression violates NGOs' principles against repressive governments.

Target Specificity: A Tactic of Strategic Adaptation

To illustrate how NGOs cope with *value-spoilers* as *value-sharers*, I update *strategic adaptation* from Noakes and Teets (2020) to conceptualize NGOs' responses in these contentious cases. I argue that NGOs' *strategic adaptation* tends to highlight (1) NGOs' efforts for normative expectations and (2) NGOs' understandable value-spoiling in the adaptation.

To achieve the two goals, NGOs can use different tactics. And these tactics can also be employed simultaneously. One is to suggest that NGOs' adaptation can be identified as an expediency to *value-spoilers as value-sharers* to achieve *normative expectations* in the future. NGOs' success in changing government behaviors tends to be conditional on the physical existence within the countries (Murdie and Davis 2012; Murdie and Hicks 2013). By implication, NGOs' contentious performance can benefit local communities in the long term (NGOs' efforts for normative expectations) based on an acceptable violation of values (NGOs' understandable value-spoiling in the adaptation). One supportive evidence is that NGOs' contentious compliance with repressive policies could be acceptable since private donors tend to

increase the amount of donation given the harsh political environment (Chaudhry and Heiss 2021).

Another tactic is to suggest that *normative expectations* need to base on outcomes rather than approaches. Stroup and Wong (2017) propose that NGOs can make a difference in an incrementalist approach. It suggests that some contentious behaviors, such as working with authoritarian regimes, moderation under repression, and reliance on international donors, are just ways to achieve the norms rather than values. The outcome-oriented approach can be a tactic of strategic adaptation since what NGOs pursue is consistent with *normative expectations* (NGOs' efforts for normative expectations), while the contentious incrementalist approach can be acceptable in some cases (NGOs' understandable value-spoiling in the adaptation), particularly when governments' resistance threatens NGOs' success.

In this project, I propose a new tactic: *target specificity*. It is a tactic where NGOs disaggregate the actors identified as *value-spoilers as value-sharers* into different sub-actors, which are either *value-spoilers* or *value-sharers*. Here, NGOs' *strategic adaptation* is presented in (1) maintaining the *normative expectation* towards *value-spoilers* at the sub-actor level (NGOs' efforts for normative expectations) and (2) violating the normative expectation towards sub-actors sharing the values as expediency (NGOs' understandable value-spoiling in the adaptation). *Target specificity* implies that NGOs' modification of expected behaviors can be an acceptable exception.

I visualize the logic of *target specificity* in **Figure 3.3**. Notably, before disaggregating governments, NGOs first decide whether the governments are their *value-spoilers as value-sharers*. Some NGOs can hardly accept any risks to spoil their faiths (Lopa et al. 2016).

Therefore, it is more likely for them to identify other NGOs' *value-spoilers as value-sharers* as *value-spoilers*.

Figure 3.3 The Logic of *Target Specificity*

I summarize two ways for NGOs to disaggregate governments into different sub-actors. First, governments can be interpreted based on the *branch of government*, including central governments, extended governments, and general governments. Central governments refer to the core branch of government with political authority across all the issues within their governed regions. For example, any of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches in the US can be the central government. For the countries with different institutions, I identify the branches most capable of status-quo change as central governments. The extended governments include government departments with political authority in specific domestic issues, such as prisons, the public security sector, and customs. General governments are the geographical locations where central governments can change the status quo. IR scholars have noticed NGOs' *target specificity* regarding the *branch of government*. In *NGOs' bribes to officials*, NGOs' corruption

seems to appear towards officials implementing the programs, extended governments, rather than central governments (Lopa et al. 2016).

Second, the *level of government*, national and local, can be used for *target specificity*. Murdie (2014) suggests two levels of INGOs' activities within countries' borders: activities at the local community level and at the national government level. In *NGOs' dependence on donor countries*, the contention is more likely to be seen in the interaction with national governments with political interests in the countries where NGOs work (Dupuy et al. 2016; Guarrieri 2018). In *NGOs' cooperation with notorious governments* and *NGOs' compliance with repressive policies*, NGOs tend to present different attitudes towards local governments closely working with the organizations than national governments (Noakes and Teets 2020).

Leading HROs' Target Specificity in the Case of Covid-19

How do NGOs use target specificity to interact with governments? Since *value-spoilers* and *value-sharers* can be contextual, I select leading HROs' (international human rights NGOs) naming and shaming of governments in the case of the current pandemic as an example of *target specificity*.

Leading HROs

HROs are NGOs focusing on human rights and with an international scope. HROs spread information on human rights abuses within a country to the international community by working with local activists. HROs can then transfer international aid to local communities to boost the capacity against the government. Regardless of local presence, the prominent role played by

HROs is to bridge local communities to the international community (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). It implies that HROs are the key to activating the TANs.

HROs prefer the naming and shaming strategy against governments. By spotlighting and criticizing governments' repression, HROs can pressure governments for substantive change (Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012).

A conflictual response, including harsh naming and shaming of governments, is the *normative expectation* from HROs against governments with misconduct. And HROs have enhanced the acceptance of the conflictual tendency with their repetitive and especially successful advocacy against repressive governments. These justify people's significant support for HROs' conflictual response, such as international aid to HROs and social mobilization on a large scale.

Leading HROs are more capable of influencing a wide range of audiences. Their authority is formed by resource concentration, global fame, and a leading role in worldwide activism. However, trapped by the imperative, leading INGOs are more likely to maintain the status quo by avoiding irritating governments contributing to their success (Stroup and Wong 2017). By implication, leading HROs are more likely to identify governments as *value-spoilers as value-sharers*. Governments can be *value-sharers* for leading HROs' sustainability to achieve norms. However, the misconduct of governments can make them *value-spoilers* since these organizations are HROs normatively expected to be conflictual.

Governments: Value-Spoilers as Value-Sharers in the Case of Covid-19

To examine leading HROs' *target specificity*, I focus on leading HROs' naming and shaming in the current global pandemic, which has been bringing tremendous loss to the world

since the end of 2019. According to the WHO report, "as of 5:04 pm CET, 11 March 2021, there have been 117,799,584 confirmed cases of Covid-19, including 2,615,018 deaths."[27] Even the most developed countries are experiencing a hard time in the pandemic.[28] Individuals seeking help include citizens asking for a sufficient supply of PPE (Personal Protection Equipment), health workers requiring substantive support, prisoners needing more space for social distancing, etc. Standing for these individuals against governments can legitimize leading HROs' conflictual activities.

Governments, play a decisive role in preventing and stopping the spread of the disease, especially before the creation of the first vaccine. Without any effective preventive medicine and curing method, appropriate lockdown policies can stop the loss to a large extent (Alfano and Ercolano 2020). Even after the promotion of vaccination, administrative actions can speed up the distribution of shots and reduce exposure to infection.[29] However, governments can spoil the norms by excusing human rights violations with the pandemic and the lack of sufficient and efficient efforts against Covid-19. IR scholars imply that governments' efforts in collective public health are at the expense of individual human rights (Eck and Hatz 2020; Fassin 2020).

Leading HROs' Target Specificity Regarding Naming and Shaming in the Case of Covid-19

When "naming and shaming" governments, leading HROs' new *value-sharers* and *value-spoilers* can be formed based on the *branch of government*: (1) naming and shaming central governments, (2) naming and shaming extended governments, and (3) naming countries but "reporting" problems in geographical locations, the general governments. Meanwhile, leading

[27] More information can be found at: https://covid19.who.int
[28] More information can be found at: https://covid19.who.int/table
[29] More information can be found at: https://www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-03-21/a-rapid-covid-19-vaccine-rollout-backfired-in-some-us-states

HROs' attitudes can differ towards national and local governments. For instance, the Open Society Foundation, a leading HRO, publicizes the inequalities in the city of Chicago.[30]

How do leading HROs name and shame new governments specified as either *value-spoilers* or *value-sharers*? I argue that *target specificity* can be achieved by (1) harshly naming and shaming *value-spoilers* for the *normative expectation* and (2) moderating the interaction with *value-sharers* as understandable expediency for organizations' sustainability in principle maintenance. Accordingly, I develop two hypotheses to examine how leading HROs vary naming and shaming towards different government targets in Covid-19.

First, I argue that leading HROs can use *target specificity* to shape the rhetoric in "naming and shaming" branches of government. In the pandemic, central governments tend to be *value-sharers*. Central governments are more influential in collective public health by making policies applicable across the governed area and deciding how to distribute critical resources to other extended governments for policy implementation. Further, they can decide on NGOs' access to local communities regarding public health. Heinzel and Koenig-Archibugi (2022) find that even though the implementation can precisely target NGOs not focusing on health, the restrictions on HROs initiated by central governments can still depress the activities of health NGOs. Additionally, conflictual response against central governments are more likely to cause backlash rather than progress given the current global crackdown on NGOs.

Therefore, even though leading HROs seem to condemn a government at the aggregated level conflictually, the organizations could tactically avoid a substantive threat to the central government as the shaming power is diverted to the disaggregated *value-spoilers* of government. Take the Open Society Foundations as an example:

[30] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/OpenSociety/status/1338876476247064580

> "The U.S. government should follow other countries' lead in guaranteeing the pay of workers affected by the pandemic, argues our founder and chair George Soros and @INETOxford's @EricBeinhocker…"
>
> -- A Tweet from Open Society Foundations, April 4, 2020[31]

> "@ICEgov could use the order to release kids as another opportunity to rip them away from their parents. The #COVID19 pandemic and ICE's cruelty is putting people in danger, that's why we're demanding that ICE #FreeTheFamilies NOW... "
>
> -- A Tweet Retweeted by Open Society Foundations, July 1, 2020[32]

The tone of the second tweet against ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement), one extended branch of government, is more conflictual. To ICE, the Open Society Foundation increases the shaming intensity by using "cruelty" and "putting people in danger." However, the tweet's rhetoric for the central government is like moderate advocacy.

Accordingly, I propose the first hypothesis: ***In Covid-19, leading HROs tend to moderate naming and shaming towards central governments than extended governments and general governments.***

I also examine how leading HROs name and shame governments based on the *level of government*. In Covid-19, local governments are more likely to perform as leading HROs' *value-sharers*, who are more likely to cope effectively with the health crisis. In policy adaptation, local

[31] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/OpenSociety/status/1250202026010697728
[32] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/fams2gether/status/1277680101619105796

governments tend to be "innovating and taking strategic actions to fight the virus" (Dzigbede et al. 2020). Especially in developing countries, local governments are assumed to play a central role in the implementation of disease control and social security (Dutta and Fischer 2021). Moreover, it appears that leading HROs are more likely to access and then affect local governments' (Noakes and Teets 2020). Consistent with the analysis above, in the tweets below, the Human Rights First is more conflictual towards the national government.

> "Governments are using #COVID19 to abolish checks and balances, trample free speech, and silence critics. Join a discussion with Members of Congress, #humanrights defenders & journos on how the U.S. govt must respond. July 18th 9:30am…"
>
> -- A Tweet from Human Rights First, June 15, 2020[33]

> "Governors must use their authority to prevent the spread of #COVID in vulnerable populations. Call on your governor to release detained migrants and #ProtectUsAll Act Now…"
>
> -- A Tweet from Human Rights First, May 16, 2020[34]

Here comes the second hypothesis: ***In Covid-19, leading HROs' responses towards local governments tend to be more moderate than the tone towards national governments.***

[33] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/humanrights1st/status/1272644295619678210
[34] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/humanrights1st/status/1272644295619678210

Research Design

Dependent Variable

NGOs have relied on social media to interact with the audience (Lovejoy and Saxton 2012). Twitter has been a typical platform for digital activism (e.g., Segerberg and Bennett 2011). NGOs have used Twitter for public education (Guo and Saxon 2014), climate change networking (Vu et al. 2019), disaster response (Tapia et al. 2011), and civic engagement (Obar et al. 2012). In the current pandemic, NGOs use Twitter to identify salient issues (Li et al. 2021) and attract public attention (Yang and Saffer 2021).

Microblogging on Twitter offers data for research across disciplines (William et al. 2013). The word limit for each tweet makes it easier to capture targets. To make the piece of information more precise and powerful, there tends to be one target in each tweet. Therefore, I use Twitter text-as-data to create the dependent variable, *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet*, measuring the "naming and shaming" intensity.

Since the number of followers indicates Twitter users' influence (Cossu et al. 2016; Hemsley 2019), I identify 11 influential HROs leading HROs based on the number of followers (see **Table 3.1**). To create the variable, I first web-scrape the tweets published by the 11 HROs on Twitter in 2020. Then, I select the pieces containing the keywords of Covid-19, such as "COV" and "pandemic." After kicking out the tweets without specific country names, I gain the sample describing leading HROs' "naming and shaming" of governments in the issues of Covid - 19. Notably, this project mainly analyzes leading HROs' "shaming" by "naming" rather than "shaming without naming."

Table 3.1: List of 11 Leading HROs in the Sample Collected in 2020

	Leading HRO Name	**Twitter Account**	**Followers on Twitter**
1	Human Rights Watch	@hrw	4.5M
2	Amnesty International	@amnesty	1.7M
3	Open Society Foundations	@OpenSociety	594.3K
4	Human Rights Foundation	@HRF	213.9K
5	UN Watch	@UNWatch	100.7K
6	Freedom House	@freedomhouse	97.8K
7	Human Rights First	@humanrights1st	69.7K
8	Survival International	@Survival	52.4K
9	Front Line Defenders	@FrontLineHRD	34.2K
10	Physicians for Human Rights	@P4HR	26.3K
11	ISHR (The International Service for Human Rights)	@ISHRglobal	24.9K

Then, I choose context analysis based on the dictionary method to measure the tone of leading HROs' tweets, which is the dependent variable *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet.* I follow the steps for automated text analysis proposed by Grimmer and Stewart (2013). To gain the sentiment score for each corpus, a tweet, I covert the letters to lowercase, remove stop words, get rid of numbers, and eliminate punctuation. Then, I use the "*bing*" dictionary to score each word. After adding up the scores of all the words in each tweet, I gain the sentiment score at the level of tweet. The dependent variable, *Tone of Leading HRO-to-State,* consists of the score for each tweet and is centered at zero. The larger value of the variable is, the more moderate a leading HRO's tone is.

Independent Variables and Controls

The independent variable for hypothesis one is *Branch of Government*, a categorical variable with three levels: central, extended, and general. For instance, if one leading HRO names the country for describing a problem in the pandemic, I code the variable as "general"

since the name is mainly used to locate the issues geographically. The independent variable for hypothesis two is *Level of Government,* a binary variable for the level of a country, national and local. The two variables are manually coded.

Additionally, I select a series of controls.[35] I rely on the indicators from Our World in Data[36] to explore how government performance affects leading HROs' tweet tone.

Two controls are based on the natural log of the covid-19 cases. I select *Logged New Covid-19 Cases per Day* since the number of daily cases, suggesting the effectiveness of governments' work, might affect INGOs' attitudes. To examine the influence of covid-19 deaths, I depend on *Logged Total Covid-19 Deaths* for the cumulative number of confirmed deaths. It seems that a large scale of loss is more impressive in the "naming and shaming" of leading HROs.[37]

Then, I introduce *Government Stringency Index*, an aggregated measure of governments' responses from the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) in 9 aspects: "school closures; workplace closures; cancellation of public events; restrictions on public gatherings; closures of public transport; stay-at-home requirements; public information campaigns; restrictions on internal movements; and international travel controls."[38] Another predictor is *Hospital Beds per Thousand*[39] since leading HROs would blame governments for the conditions of hospitals.[40]

---

[35] I attempt to capture the extent to which state responses to COVID-19 violate democratic standards by adding the Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index from the Pandemic Backsliding Project from the V-Dem Institute (available at: https://www.v-dem.net/pandem.html.). However, the Index is not daily based. It fails to capture the variation of leading HROs' tone on Twitter. Therefore, I exclude the control.
[36] More information about the data can be found at: https://ourworldindata.org
[37] One example can be found at: https://twitter.com/P4HR/status/1338619784821293057
[38] More information can be found at: https://ourworldindata.org/covid-government-stringency-index
[39] More information can be found at: https://twitter.com/UNWatch/status/1336789991926730755
[40] One example can be found at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/04/hungary-health-care-failures-endanger-lives

Discussion of Model Outcomes

The model I choose for the cross-sectional time-series data in 2020 is linear regression. The unit of analysis is tweet-day. I present the outcome of the Baseline Model in the first column beside the predictors in **Table 3.2**. I set "central" as the baseline for the categorical variable *Branch of Government* and "national" as the baseline for *Level of Government*.

Ceteris paribus, leading HROs' tone towards extended governments, compared to central governments, tend to significantly decrease by 0.267 units on average. It infers that leading HROs tend to avoid irritating *value-sharers*, the central governments, and maintain the expected conflictual towards *value-spoilers*, the extended governments.

However, there is no significant difference in leading HROs' attitudes towards central governments and general governments. Therefore, *target specificity* regarding *Branch of Government* tends to present in leading HROs' naming and shaming of central government (*value-sharers)* and extended governments (*value-spoilers*).

Meanwhile, in the baseline model, keeping other predictors fixed, local governments, compared to national governments, tends to significantly increase leading HROs' naming and shaming tone by 0.647 units on average. It echoes hypothesis two, where local governments tend to be leading HROs' *value-sharers* in the case of Covid-19, while national governments are more likely to be treated as *value-spoilers*.

For the control variables, only *Logged New Covid Cases per Day* is statistically significant. One-unit increase *Logged New Covid Cases per Day* tends to stimulate a 0.050-unit increase on average in *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet*, ceteris paribus. It suggests that the growing severity of the pandemic tends to moderate leading HROs' attitudes towards

governments as a whole. One explanation is that leading HROs would encourage governments' engagement when the pandemic worsens.

Table 3.2 The Output of Baseline and Extension Models

	Dependent variable:		
	Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet		
	Baseline Model	**Extension Model 1**	**Extension Model 2**
Branch of Government: extended (baseline=central)	-0.267*	-0.158	-0.436***
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.157)
Branch of Government: general (baseline=central)	0.003	0.028	-0.032
	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.117)
Level of Government: local (baseline=national)	0.647***	0.858***	0.558***
	(0.150)	(0.207)	(0.151)
Logged New Covid Cases per Day	0.050*	0.046*	0.020
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Logged Total Covid Death	0.024	0.024	0.050*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Government Stringent Index	0.002	0.002	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Hospital per Thousand	0.024	0.025	-0.002
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)
*Branch of Government: central (baseline=central) * Level of Government: local (baseline=national)*		-0.919**	
		(0.448)	
Branch of Government: general(baseline=central)* Level of Government: local (baseline=national)*		-0.233	
		(0.330)	
Constant	-1.546***	-1.523***	
	(0.354)	(0.354)	
Observations	1,322	1,322	1,322
R^2	0.034	0.037	0.028
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.030	0.015
Residual Std. Error	1.710 (df = 1314)	1.708 (df = 1312)	
F Statistic	6.596*** (df = 7; 1314)	5.609*** (df = 9; 1312)	5.320*** (df = 7; 1304)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Extension Check

Extension Modeling One

Since leading HROs can combine *Branch of Government* and *Level of Government* in naming and shaming, does the combination affect the significance of *target specificity*? Is *target specificity* regarding *Branch of Government* conditional *Level of Government*? For instance, the significant variation in *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet* between central and extended governments could tend to appear in naming and shaming local governments.

To address these questions, I create the Extension Model 1, which updates the Baseline Model by adding an interactive term for *Branch of Government* and *Level of Government*. The outcomes are presented next to the Baseline Model in **Table 3.2**. The point estimate of the interactive term is statistical significance at the 95% confidence interval.

To better interpret the outcome, I visualize the interaction in **Figure 3.4**. Notably, I set the confidence interval at 90%. This adjustment makes sense for this relatively small sample with 1312 observations.



Figure 3.4 Predicted *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet* Based on the Interaction Between *Branch of Government* and *Level of Government*

Accordingly, at the national government level, the difference in predicted values across general, central, and extended governments is undiscernible at the 90% confidence interval. However, for local governments, the difference between central and extended governments is significant at the 90% confidence interval. By implication, *target specificity* for *Branch of Government* is more likely to appear in leading HROs' naming and shaming of local governments.

Moreover, the moderation towards local governments is discernable at the 90% confidence interval when leading HROs name and shame general and central governments, respectively. Yet there is no significant difference between local and national extended governments.

In sum, the outcome of Extension Model 1, to some degree, is consistent with the hypotheses. It demonstrates the leading HROs' significant use of *target specificity* under certain circumstances.

Robustness-Check Modeling Two

Given that *target specificity* is for any leading HROs, the patterns of varying *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet* are expected to be found in every leading HRO' naming and shaming. However, in a sample pooling all the tweets of the 11 leading INGOs, the dominance of some leading HROs' tweets could bias the outcomes. For instance, two or three of the HROs may be extremely moderate, while the others behave conflictually in naming and shaming. Supposing that the proportion of the tweets for the moderate leading HROs is substantial, when I fit the aggregated responses with a linear regression model, it could be hard to identify conflictual tweets from most HROs in the sample.

Fig. 5 presents the pair-wise comparison of the difference in mean tone between every two leading HROs in the sample. Although most comparisons have no difference in means at a 95% confidence interval, the significant difference in means (indicated in red) between Human Rights First (@humanrights1st) and Amnesty International (@amnesty), for instance, could twist the findings. It suggests that if I pool the response in one sample, I could hardly infer that each leading HRO tends to behave in the hypothesized patterns.

To avoid the bias caused by the leading HROs' difference in the level of moderation and the proportion of moderate tweets, I rely on NGO-specific fixed effects for the second extension model, which examines how *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government Tweet* varies within each

leading HRO. In other words, the fixed effects model can examine whether the predictors can significantly and consistently affect the dependent variable across all the 11 leading HROs.



Figure 3.5 The Difference in Mean Levels of Leading HROs' Tone with 95% Family-Wise Confidence Interval

The outcome of the Extension Model 2 is presented in the last column of **Table 3.2**. First, keeping other predictors constant, compared to central governments, extended governments tend to significantly receive 0.436 units more radical *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government* on average per leading HRO. Second, ceteris paribus, *Tone of Leading HRO-to-Government* towards local governments tends to significantly increase by 0.558 units on average per leading HRO than towards national governments. The finding is consistent with the hypotheses.

I also perform additional checks by incorporating robust standard errors across all three models. No evidence against the findings is found.

Conclusion

Some scholars explain NGOs' contentious responses towards governments by prioritizing NGOs as organizational entities over the values the organizations carry (e.g., Cooley and Ron 2012, Noakes and Teets 2020). A typical explanation for leading NGOs, including leading HROs, illustrates leading NGOs' contentious moderation towards governments as a way to maintain organizational operation (Stroup and Wong 2017).

In this project, I propose that NGOs' contentious responses are motivated by values, which legitimize the transnational activities and distinguish NGOs from other organizational entities. I argue that when it is hard to identify a government as either a *value-spoiler* or a *value-sharer*, NGOs tend to strategically adapt to the interaction with the *value-spoiler as value-sharer* by achieving the values at the price of limited value-spoiling. One tactic for NGOs' *strategic adaptation* is *target specificity*. Identifying governments as *value-spoilers as value-sharers* in the current pandemic, I rely on leading HROs' varying responses on social media to examine *target specificity*. The patterns found in this project can contribute to the literature in two aspects.

First, I focus on the type of actors, *value-spoilers as value-sharers*, to analyze NGO-to-government contentious interactions. It summarizes the underlying dynamic based on norms across different contentious cases. And based on the interaction with *value-spoilers as value-sharers*, I propose a new tactic, *target specificity*. Future work can keep finding tactics for NGOs' *strategic adaptation*. Also, it would be interesting to figure out NGOs' preferences for these tactics.

Second, I provide a measure of NGOs' naming and shaming. Instead of using the conflict-to-cooperation scale to measure the intensity of behaviors (Goldstein 1992) with verbs, I rely on the context analysis based on the dictionary method to score each tweet by considering

not all types of words. It allows us to capture NGOs' attitudes more accurately. Further, it contributes to the study of NGOs in online activism, where NGOs' transnational activities need to be examined on social media. For future work, more work can focus on improving the measure of INGOs' tone by introducing a sentiment dictionary for context analysis in international relations, for instance.

This project offers strategy-relevant insights for NGOs struggling with contentious interactions in transnational networks. The backlash from previous pressured actors, not just governments, could increase the odds of contentious responses. To minimize the spoiled values, NGOs can rely on *target specificity* or other tactics of *strategic adaptation* for value maintenance.

Reference

Alfano, Vincenzo, and Salvatore Ercolano. 2020. The Efficacy of Lockdown Against COVID-19: A Cross-Country Panel Analysis. *Applied Health Economics and Health Policy* 18: 509-517. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-020-00596-3

Barber, Ben. 1997. Feeding Refugees, or War? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Aid. *Foreign Affairs* 76(4): 8-14. https://doi.org/10.2307/20048117

Barnett, Michael. 2005. Humanitarianism Transformed. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(4): 723-40. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3688176. Accessed 20 November 2022

Berger-Kern, Nora, Fabian Hetz, Rebecca Wagner, and Jonas Wolff. 2021. Defending Civic Space: Successful Resistance Against NGO Laws in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. *Global Policy* 12: 84-94. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12976

Bob, Clifford. 2002. Merchants of Morality. *Foreign Policy* 129: 36-45. https://doi.org/10.2307/3183388

Boulding, Carew E.. 2010. NGOs and Political Participation in Weak Democracies: Subnational Evidence on Protest and Voter Turnout Brom Bolivia. *The Journal of Politics* 72(2): 456-468. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609990922

Carothers, Thomas, and Saskia Brechenmacher. *Closing space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014. https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/20/closing-space-democracy-and-human-rights-support-under-fire-pub-54503. Accessed 8 November 2022

Carpenter, R. Charli. 2011. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms. *International Organization* 65 (1): 69-102. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000329

Chaudhry, Suparna. 2019. Bridging the Gap: The Relationship Between INGO Activism and Human Rights Indicators. *Journal of Human Rights* 18(1): 111-133. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2019.1579638

Chaudhry, Suparna. 2022. The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs. *International Organization*: 1-42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000473

Chaudhry, Suparna, and Andrew Heiss. 2021. Dynamics of International Giving: How Heuristics Shape Individual Donor Preferences. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 50 (3): 481-505. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764020971045

Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. 2002. The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International security* 27(1): 5-39. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092151. Accessed 8 November 2022

Cornell, Agnes, and Marcia Grimes. 2015. Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action: Bureaucratic Structures, Civil Society, and Disruptive Protests. *The Journal of Politics* 77(3): 664-678. https://doi.org/10.1086/681058

Cossu, Jean-Valère, Vincent Labatut, and Nicolas Dugué. 2016. A Review of Features for the Discrimination of Twitter Users: Application to the Prediction of Offline Influence. *Social Network Analysis and Mining* 6(1): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-016-0329-x

De Waal, Alex. 1997. *Famine Crimes: Politics and Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Dietrich, Simone, and Joseph Wright. 2015. Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa. *Journal of Politics*, 77(1): 216-234. https://doi.org/10.1086/678976

Dutta, Anwesha, and Harry W. Fischer. 2021. The Local Governance of COVID-19: Disease Prevention and Social Security in Rural India. *World Development* 138: 105234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105234

Dzigbede, Komla D., Sarah Beth Gehl, and Katherine Willoughby. 2020. Disaster Resiliency of US Local Governments: Insights to Strengthen Local Response and Recovery from the COVID-19 Pandemic. *Public Administrative Review* 80(4): 634-643. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13249

Gibelman, Margaret, and Sheldon R. Gelman. 2004. A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing Among Nongovernmental Organizations. *Voluntas* 15(4): 355-81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-004-1237-7

Goldstein, Joshua S. 1992. A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 369-385. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002792036002007

Guo, Chao, and Gregory D. Saxton. 2014. Tweeting Social Change: How Social Media Are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 43(1): 57-79. https://doi.org/10.1177/089976401247158

Hafner-Burton, E. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62(4) (2008): 689-716. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247

Hayes, Ben. 2012. Counterterrorism, Policy Laundering, and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law* 14(1-2): 5-48. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ijnpl14&div=6&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 8 November 2022

Hemsley, Jeff. 2019. Followers Retweet! The Influence of Middle-Level Gatekeepers on the Spread of Political Information on Twitter. *Policy and Internet* 11(3): 280-304. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.202

Eck, Kristine, and Sophia Hatz. 2020. State Surveillance and the COVID-19 Crisis. *Journal of Human Rights*: 603-612. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1816163

Fassin, Didier. 2020. Hazardous Confinement During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Fate of Migrants Detained Yet Nondeportable. *Journal of Human Rights*: 613-623. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.1822155

Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789

Franklin, James C. Shame on you: The impact of human rights criticism on political repression in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 52.1 (2008): 187-211. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00496.x

Fransen, Luc, Kendra Dupuy, Marja Hinfelaar, and Sultan Mohammed Zakaria Mazumder. 2021. Tempering Transnational NGO Collaborations. *Global Policy* 12(1): 11-22. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12972

Glasius, Marlies, Jelmer Schalk, and Meta De Lange. 2020. Illiberal Norm Diffusion: How Do Governments Learn to Restrict Nongovernmental Organizations?. *International Studies Quarterly* 64(2): 453-468. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa019

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. *Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Guarrieri, Thomas R. 2018. Guilty as Perceived: How Opinions About States Influence Opinions about NGOs. *The Review of International Organization* 13(4): 573-593. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9291-2

Hafner-Burton, E. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62(4) (2008): 689-716. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818308080247

Heinzel, Mirko, and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. 2022. Harmful Side Effects: How Government Restrictions Against Transnational Civil Society Affect Global Health. *British Journal of Political Science*: 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000564

Heiss, Andrew. 2019. NGOs and Authoritarianism. In *Routledge Handbook of NGOs and International Relations*, 557-572. Routledge.

Heurlin, Christopher. 2010. Governing Civil Society: The Political Logic of NGO-State Relations Under Dictatorship. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 21(2): 220-239. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9103-2

Hodgkinson, Virginia A., and Kathleen D. McCarthy. 1992. The Voluntary Sector in International Perspective: An Overview. *In The Nonprofit Sector in the Global Community: Voices from Many Nations*, edited by Kathleen D. McCarthy, Virginia A. Hodgkinson, and Russy D. Summariwalla. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politic*s. Cornell University Press.

Kimemia, Douglas. 2014. Non-Governmental Organizations and Corruption: The Case of Kenya. In *Challenges to Democratic Governance in Developing Countries*, 157-170. Springer, Cham.

Kirilenko, Andrei P., and Svetlana O. Stepchenkova. 2014. Public Microblogging on Climate Change: One Year of Twitter Worldwide. *Global Environmental Change* 26: 171-182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.02.008

Lewis, David. 2010. Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History. In *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society*, edited by Helmut K., Anheier and Stefan Toepler: 1056-62. New York: Springer.

Li, Hui, and May Farid. 2022. Stay or Exit: How do International Nongovernmental Organizations Respond to Institutional Pressure Under Authoritarianism? *Regulation & Governance*. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12473

Li, Yiqi, Jieun Shin, Jingyi Sun, Hye Min Kim, Yan Qu, and Aimei Yang. 2021. Organizational Sensemaking in Tough Times: The Ecology of NGOs' COVID-19 Issue Discourse

Communities on Social Media. *Computers in Human Behavior* 122: 106838. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2021.106838

Lian, Shanshan and Amanda Murdie. 2023. How Closing Civil Society Space Affects NGO-Government Interactions. *Journal of Human Rights*.

Lopa, Fowzia Gulshana Rashid, and Mokbul Morshed Ahmad. 2016. Participation of CSOs/NGOs in Bangladeshi Climate Change Policy Formulation: Co-Operation or Co-Optation? *Development in Practice* 26(6): 781-793. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2016.1200536

Lovejoy, Kristen, and Gregory D. Saxton. 2012. Information, Community, and Action: How Nonprofit Organizations Use Social Media. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* 17(3): 337-353. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01576.x

Lupu, Yonatan. 2013. Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements. *International Organization* 67(3): 469-503. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831300012X

Luttwak. Edward N. 1999. Give War a Chance. *Foreign Affairs* 78(4): 36-44. https://doi.org/10.2307/20049362

Maren, Michael. 1997. *The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity*. New York: Free Express.

Mathews, Jessica T. 1997. Power Shift. *Foreign Affairs* 76(1): 52-53. https://doi.org/10.2307/20047909

Meernik, James, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols. The impact of human rights organizations on naming and shaming campaigns. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 2 (2012): 233-256. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711431417

Murdie, Amanda. 2014. *Help or harm: The human security effects of international NGOs*. Stanford University Press.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x

Murdie, Amanda, and Alexander Hicks. 2013. Can International Nongovernmental Organizations Boost Government Services? The Case of Health. *International Organization* 67(3): 541-573. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000143

Noakes, Stephen, and Jessica C. Teets. 2020. Learning Under Authoritarianism: Strategic Adaptations Within International Foundations and NGOs in China. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 31(5): 1093-1113. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9939-9

Obar, Jonathan A., Paul Zube, and Clifford Lampe. 2012. Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action. *Journal of Information Policy* 2(1): 1-25. https://doi.org/10.5325/jinfopoli.2.2012.0001

Price, Richard. 1998. Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. *International Organization* 52(3): 613-644. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550671

Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction. In *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, 1-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Risse, Thomas, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp. 1999. The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices. *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations*, 117.

Segerberg, Alexandra, and W. Lance Bennett. 2011. Social Media and the Organization of Collective Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two Climate Change Protests. *The Communication Review* 14(3): 197-215. https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1687099

Simmons, P. J.. 1998. Learning to Live with NGOs. *Foreign Policy* (113): 82-96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1149037

Stroup, Sarah S., and Wendy H. Wong. 2017. *The authority trap: Strategic choices of international NGOs*. Cornell University Press.

Tapia, Andrea H., Kartikeya Bajpai, Bernard J. Jansen, John Yen, and Lee Giles. 2011. Seeking the Trustworthy Tweet: Can Microblogged Data Fit the Information Needs of Disaster Response and Humanitarian Relief Organizations. In *ISCRAM*. https://idl.iscram.org/files/tapia/2011/991_Tapia_etal2011.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2022

Vu. Hong Tien, Hung Viet Do, Hyunjin Seo, and Yuchen Liu. 2020. Who Leads the Conversation on Climate Change?: A Study of a Global Network of NGOs on Twitter. *Environmental Communication* 14(4): 450-464. https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2019.1687099

Williams, Shirley A., Melissa M. Terras, and Claire Warwick. 2013. What do People Study When They Study Twitter? Classifying Twitter Related Academic Papers. *Journal of Documentation* 69(3): 384-410. https://doi.org/10.1108/JD-03-2012-0027

Yang, Aimei, and Adam J. Saffer. 2021. Standing Out in a Networked Communication Context: Toward a Network Contingency Model of Public Attention. New Media & Society 23(10): 2902-2925. https://doi.org/10.1177/146144482093944

CONCLUSION

My dissertation touch on different topics, including dynamics of repression, INGOs' accommodation, and public opinions, in the current political environment. These topics are part of the "second image reversed" study of IR, where we look at how international factors and actors, like INGOs, influence domestic government behavior (Gourevitch 1978). I rely on various statistical methods to address these questions. My skill set includes Bayesian models, social experiments, regression modeling, text analysis (web scraping techniques and sentiment analysis), etc.

I summarize three contributions made by my dissertation to IR: theoretical innovation, methodological application, and policy implication. My work extends the understanding of the TANs (Transnational Advocacy Networks), the traditional framework of analysis of NGO-state interactions (Keck and Sikkink 1998). I first discuss the issues unaddressed by the TANs. For instance, the TAN model mainly explains the dynamic of NGOs' success in transnational advocacy. At the same time, it fails to illustrate the possible risks brought by previous success, which could be increased resistance against NGOs' activities or the restraints on NGOs' conflictual behaviors. My research answers what the TANs would be like given states' retaliation. Moreover, assuming states' active roles in TANs, I theorize the behaviors of different actors (e.g., donors and local individuals) to explain the dynamics and effects of the "closing space" of NGOs. Another theoretical contribution of my research is the application of TANs to new issues. On the one hand, given the growingly harsher political environment in recent

decades, I re-examine how NGOs interact with governments in the context of repression. On the other hand, I discuss NGOs in the framework of TANs in the global dynamics.

I employ a variety of methods in my current research. The use of different techniques addresses many new puzzles. I create a latent variable to measure local trust. The introduction of Bayesian statistics makes it possible to access aggregated assessments from local communities. Moreover, I analyze the data collected from a two-way layout and factorial experiment designs. One contribution of the experiment design is to figure out the impact of every single determinant by disentangling the interacting effects. In addition, I use sentimental analysis to test the tone of leading HROs on social media. It can better capture leading HROs' attitudes by integrating all the shaming words rather than only focusing on the verbs.

The third contribution is how my research can work as guidelines for NGOs, a great contributor to human security. Advocacy against human rights abuses of governments can pressure the authorities to change (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Murdie and Davis 2012). Additionally, NGOs' programs can offer significant services to local communities (Murdie and Kakietek 2012). Therefore, it is essential that we figure out how organizations can succeed in repressive environments. On the one hand, highlighting the role of local communities in the study of civil society repression suggests how other actors can affect the survival environment of NGOs. This finding can remind NGOs of the importance of different actors in TANs. On the other hand, pointing out under which circumstances NGOs' moderation tends to work for organizational survival can assist in the accommodating responses of NGOs. For instance, the evaluation of moderation is conditional on the perceived political challenges NGOs face. It suggests that to maintain donor support, NGOs could highlight external threats to legitimize the adaptation.

For my future work, I plan to introduce more methods to puzzle out the questions related to NGOs' contentious moderation in the "closing space" of civil society. One future project will measure advocacy NGOs' responses to repression. I can capture the localized activities of NGOs based on image data, for instance. I hypothesize that advocacy NGOs tend to seek localization for survival in civil society repression since the transition from confrontation against governments to working for local communities can be identified as a strategy for survival. Another possible project is to discuss how international organizations, the actors in TANs, contribute to NGOs' moderation. To check how IOs prefer moderate NGO-to-state interactions, I can model the topics of NGOs' programs financially supported by the UN. I expect that IOs are more likely to use an incrementalist approach to shape state behaviors via NGOs. In the two projects, I will apply a hierarchical model in Bayesian statistics to detect how the factors at the country level affect the variation of NGOs' behaviors, which are nested within countries. The introduction of the Bayesian hierarchical regression model can help integrate the prior study, including the quantitative and qualitative, into the existing sample. Also, the missing values caused by limited information access can be addressed by statistical simulation.

Reference

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. *International Organization* 32(4): 881-912. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003201X

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics*. Cornell University Press.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00694.x