Incarceration Disparities by Jurisdiction: Evidence from Georgia 2009-2022

By

Emmett Allen

(Under the Direction of David Mustard)

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to measure the effects of jurisdiction on sentence and time served (from here on "incarceration outcomes") in Georgia. Specifically, I use multivariate regression models on a sample of 96,281 felony offenders in Georgia who 1) were released from Georgia prisons during the 2009-2022 time-span after serving time for a single primary offense and 2) had no convictions in Georgia prior to this offense, in order to estimate the effects of being convicted in each of Georgia's 49 judicial circuits on incarceration outcomes. Using regression models that control for a number of observable characteristics, I find that between the 49 judicial circuits in Georgia, there is a range of 8.97 years in sentencing effects, with a median effect of 2.98 years and a standard deviation of effect size of 1.81 years. Furthermore, I find that this effect persists when looking at actual time served, with a range of 2.29 years in time served effects, a median effect of 0.72 years, and a standard deviation of effect size of 0.54 years. To put these results in context, note that the median sentence in this sample is 9.86 years and the median time served in this sample is 3.00 years.The core finding of this paper is that, even when adjusting for a wide range of control variables, the effect of where an individual is prosecuted is both statistically and economically significant.

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Table of Contents

Literature Review

The bulk of the economic literature on incarceration outcomes has focused on sentencing disparities on the basis of race, age, sex, income, education, or other personal characteristics. For instance, in his 2001 paper, "Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts," David Mustard found that Black people, men, and offenders with low levels of education and income received longer sentences than their peers, primarily due to deviations from the federal sentencing guidelines that were created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Mustard, 2001

There have since been many similar papers that seek to establish causality between personal characteristics and sentencing outcomes. In her 2014 paper "Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing," Crystal Yang measured the changes in these sentencing disparities that occurred in the wake of *United States v. Booker (2005)*, a U.S. Supreme Court case that struck down the sentencing guidelines that had been created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Yang exploits random assignment of cases to judges and finds that after *Booker*, racial disparities in sentencing became larger than they were under the sentencing guidelines. Yang, 2015

These are just two of many influential papers in a rich literature that has found that sentencing disparities occur across the U.S. on the basis of personal characteristics such as race, sex, age, education level, and income, and that these disparities are facilitated by discretion that judges have to deviate from sentencing guidelines.

Notably sparse in this literature, however, is a robust analysis of how jurisdictional differences contribute to disparities in sentencing and time served. While there have been many papers showing that personal characteristics have a causal effect on incarceration outcomes and measuring the size of these effects, there has been next to no substantive research attempting to do the same for jurisdictional effects. Overwhelmingly, study of jurisdictional effects is absent from the economic literature on incarceration outcomes.

There are a few exceptions to this of course. One such exception is a 1999 paper from Anderson, Kling, and Stith, in which they analyzed inter-judge sentencing disparities before

and after the creation of the 1984 sentencing reforms. The authors found significant disparities in the sentences that judges give both before and after the guidelines were implemented, with the core finding that these inter-judge disparities became smaller when the guidelines were put in place. However, this study is limited in its answer to the jurisdictional question in three major ways. For one, it only looks at differences between judges, not differences between full jurisdictions. This captures some of the variation in incarceration by jurisdiction, but only from the judge side– systematic differences in outcomes that occur by jurisdiction for reasons other than judge preference are not captured by this study. Second, it looks only at sentencing disparities, and does not examine whether these disparities carry over to actual time served. Lastly, the paper is simply outdated– the data it examines comes from the 1986 to 1993 range, long enough ago that it can't be used to draw conclusions about the modern day. Anderson, Kling, and Stith, 1999

This paper seeks to fill some of these gaps in the literature. By looking at time served as an incarceration outcome in addition to sentencing, I can measure the extent to which disparities in sentencing that occur at the jurisdictional level carry over to actual time served. Furthermore, this paper compares the effects of entire judicial circuits, not just inter-judge variation, allowing us to see a more full picture of the effects of jurisdictions on incarceration outcomes. This paper provides a novel look at how much it matters where an individual is prosecuted, specifically measuring circuit effects in Georgia for what seems to be the first time in the literature. Furthermore, this paper is in rare company in its use of time served as an outcome variable, as most papers focus solely on sentencing outcomes. In short, this paper provides novel, statistically robust estimates of the circuit effects in Georgia from the 2009-2022 period that should inform and motivate policymakers with respect to their views of how incarceration outcomes vary by jurisdiction.

Overview of Georgia's Judicial System

Georgia is divided into 10 judicial districts, which each contain 1 or more of 49 judicial circuits, as shown in the map below. Each of the 49 judicial circuits elects one or more Superior Court

judge to try all felony cases in the circuit. These judges are elected to 4-year terms in nonpartisan elections, with vacancies filled by appointment from the Governor in cases of resignation, retirement, or death. The Superior Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over felony cases– that is to say, felonies can be appealed up to the Appellate and Supreme Court levels, but they are not tried at any level lower than that of the Superior Courts which are organized by judicial district. Additionally, each of these 49 judicial circuits has a District Attorney that is elected to a 4-year term to prosecute all felonies and appeals for the Circuit. The names used here are a bit unconventional, so I'll emphasize again that *district attorneys* are elected at the *judicial circuit* level, not at the "district" level. In fact, the 10 judicial districts are *administrative* districts, not jurisdictional ones, and they have no courts, prosecutors, or elected officials assigned to them other than those associated with the circuits within each district. These circuits and districts can be seen in the map below. *Legislator's Guide to the Judicial Branch* 2006

Judicial District Map



The significance of this circuit-based structure for the prosecution of felonies is that there are a number of elected and appointed government officials– including Superior Court Judges, District Attorneys, and Assistant District Attorneys– who have direct influence over the outcomes of people who are convicted in their Circuit, including sentencing, appeal, and actual time-served outcomes. The differences between these officials, as well as the circumstances they face, have the potential to cause disparities in incarceration outcomes, even among people with a similar case and similar personal characteristics. For instance, on average, the judges in

one circuit may be more inclined than judges in another circuit to give maximum sentences, or the district attorney in one circuit may be more inclined to offer plea bargains than the district attorney in another circuit.

Even beyond these differences between judges and prosecutors, there are a number of other factors that could cause inter-circuit variation in incarceration outcomes. For example, perhaps the backlog of cases in one circuit is significantly longer than that in another circuit because of differences in crime rates or differences in the allocation of funds for that judicial circuit. This could cause prosecutors to be more likely to make plea bargains for lesser sentences, whereas prosecutors in lower backlog circuits may be more likely to take such cases to trial for a longer sentence. This exposition is of course speculative, however it illustrates some of the reasons why we may expect incarceration outcomes to vary by judicial circuit in a causal way.

The mechanisms of the appellate process in Georgia are also worth discussing. Recall that the 10 judicial districts are *administrative* entities, not jurisdictional ones– they exist to perform human resources and administrative tasks, not to exercise any legal or jurisdictional authority over the circuits contained within them. The appellate process in Georgia is entirely independent of these geographic entities. Following a successful appeal of a Superior Court ruling in any of the 49 judicial circuits, the case goes to one of two statewide institutions: either the Georgia Court of Appeals or the Georgia Supreme Court, depending on the nature of the case. *About the Court* n.d.

The significance of this appellate structure for our purposes is this: in every circuit in Georgia, defendants are subject to the same appellate system. Any variation in incarceration outcomes that is caused by jurisdiction must be variation that occurs at the judicial circuit level, because the appeals process is the same in every part of the state, and does not vary by region in any way. This appellate process is demonstrated in the figure below.*Legislator's Guide to the Judicial Branch* 2006

Figure 2: Georgia Appellate Court Structure



The parole process in Georgia is similarly uniform across circuits. There is 1 parole board for the entire state, not a set of regional parole boards. So, anyone who is up for parole at a given time will have their fate decided by the same group of people, regardless of which circuit they were convicted in. Furthermore, the parole board grants automatic review to almost all offenders (with the exception of defendants who are not eligible for parole) at one-third of the way through the offender's sentence. This fact erases the potential for selection bias that would occur if parole were only granted by application. So, because the parole board is a statewide institution (just like the court of appeals and supreme court), and because it grants automatic review to all eligible defendants, the parole process does not add selection bias or additional jurisdictional bias to our results. *Parole Consideration* n.d.

These mechanical characteristics of Georgia's judicial system make it a good setting for the measurement of the jurisdictional effects. Because defendants in every part of the state are subject to the same legal system once you go above the superior court level, any differences in outcome that can be attributed to jurisdiction must be attributable to variation at the superior court level or lower– that is to say, there is no bias being introduced by differences in regional appellate courts, like there might be in a study of another state.

With all of this in mind, I use 4 multivariate regression models with robust standard errors to estimate the causal effect of being prosecuted in each judicial circuit and each judicial district. The design and parameters of these models, as well as the controls used to draw causal conclusions, are detailed in the following section.

Study Design

The empirical component of this paper focuses on a sample of Georgia's population of convicted felons. Particularly, this sample is composed of 96,281 felony offenders who had no prior incarcerations in Georgia at the time of their conviction, and who were released between January 1st, 2009 and December 31st, 2022.

This sample is limited to include only offenders with no prior Georgia incarcerations in order to avoid omitted variable bias from the nature of the prior incarceration. While the number of prior Georgia incarcerations for each individual is included in the data, this data does not specify what individuals with prior incarcerations were incarcerated for or how long they were incarcerated for. It is likely that these details of an individual's prior incarceration would have some causal effect on incarceration outcomes, and it is plausible that these characteristics could also be correlated with explanatory variables in the model such as race, age, or sex. So, I limit the sample to only people with no prior Georgia incarcerations to avoid this potential omitted variable bias. Note that the number of prior offenses in other states is not in the data, so it is possible that some of the people in this sample have prior convictions from other states, but unfortunately this potential source of bias cannot be resolved with the available data.

Table 1 breaks down the demographic composition of this sample, and contrasts it with the demographic compositions of the state of Georgia as a whole and the Georgia prison population as a whole. Statewide demographics are based on US Census Bureau 2022 Quick Facts, *U.S. Census Bureau Quickfacts: Georgia* 2022 and prison population demographics are from the GDC's annual profile of inmate admissions for Calendar Year 2022 *Profile of Inmate Admissions, Calendar Year 2022* n.d.

Variable	Sample	Prison Population	Statewide
Median Age	29	35	37.5
% Female	16%	11.7%	51.2%
% White	41%	46.6%	51.0%
% Black	52%	50.8%	33.0%
% Hispanic	6%	2.1%	10.2%
% Other	1%	0.5%	5.8%

TABLE 1: Age, Sex, and Race Compositions

This table shows that the prison population has significantly different characteristics on average than Georgia's population as a whole. Particularly, Men and Black people are over-represented in Georgia's overall prison population and in our sample, while Women and people of all other races are under-represented in both Georgia's overall prison population and our sample. This overrepresentation demonstrates the importance of using control variables for personal characteristics such as race, age, and sex when measuring jurisdictional effects, and it serves as a reminder of why the literature about disparities in incarceration outcomes focuses so heavily on personal characteristics.

This paper uses 4 multivariate regression models with robust standard errors on the previously described sample of 96,281 felony offenders to measure the effect of being prosecuted in a particular circuit, ceteris paribus.

In order to measure to these jurisdictional effects accurately and make causal inference more plausible, I included a number of control variables in the models. The list of control variables used in these models is:

1. Primary Offense
2. Age at admission (with Age squared effects)
3. Date of admission into prison
4. Race
5. Sex
6. Race:Sex interaction effects

7. Level of Education (broken into the following 5 categories: 1) Less than High School, 2) High School/GED, 3) Some College/Associates, 4) Bachelor's degree, 5) Graduate degree. Education level is self-reported upon entry into prison.
8. Number of disciplinary violations while incarcerated
9. Number of escape attempts (used in time-served outcome models only)
10. Marital Status (self-reported upon entry)
11. Number of dependents (self-reported upon entry) (top-coded with maximum at 6+)

There are a few things worth noting about this set of control variables. First, it is worth noting that Level of Education, Marital Status, and Number of Dependents are all self-reported upon admission into prison. This poses two major issues in the use of these variables as controls.

1) Each variable has missing observations. In the sample of 96,281 individuals, 15,794 (16.4% of the sample) are missing Number of Dependents, 10,257 (10.7%) are missing Level of Education, and 4,104 (4.3%) are missing Marital Status. To resolve this issue, I replaced all missing values with a dummy variable for "missing." These dummy missing variables are all statistically significant, indicating that this information is not missing at random and I cannot assume ignorability. However, this should not be a problem for our purposes, because I are not attempting to prove that these variables are causal, I are only using them to account for omitted variable bias, and the use of the missing dummy variables achieves that function sufficiently.

2) Because these variables are self-reported, there is a possibility of people lying in their responses. Furthermore, I would argue that there is likely to be a perceived incentive to lie on the part of the respondents, because they may believe that their responses to these questions could affect how they are treated by guards, the parole board, or other personnel. For example, it is plausible that someone could be inclined to say that they have more dependents than they actually do, biasing the data. Unlike with the missing values, there is nothing I can do to resolve this bias– however, I argue it is immaterial for our purposes because I am not attempting

to show a causal relationship between these variables and incarceration outcomes, and instead am only using them as controls to reduce omitted variable bias. In order for this to bias our results on jurisdictional effects, it would have to be the case that the propensity to lie on these surveys is correlated with circuit of prosecution.

I should also note that number of escape attempts is only included in models 2 and 4, the Time Served models, because escape attempts occur after sentencing and are uncorrelated with Sentence Length when included in models 1 and 3. However, I do include disciplinary violations in all 4 models. The reason for this is that, even though these violations occur after sentencing, they are statistically significant across all 4 models. The disciplinary violations variable does explain some of the variation in sentencing outcomes, presumably because there are some unobserved characteristics that both affect sentencing and are correlated with the number of disciplinary violations an individual receives while incarcerated. So, while clearly not casual in models 1 and 3, their inclusion in all 4 models strengthens the explanatory value of these models and strengthens the causal argument for circuit effects.

The primary regression models for this paper can be divided into two categories: those with judicial circuit of prosecution as an explanatory variable (models 1 and 2), and those with judicial district as an explanatory variable (models 3 and 4). There are pros and cons to the use of each jurisdictional variable. The 49 judicial circuits provide more specificity and include the variation between each circuit, whereas the 10 districts provide a greater sample size per district, but don't capture inter-district variation between circuits. For each of these two categories, I run a regression for two incarceration outcome variables: 1) Sentence in years, and 2) Actual time served in prison or jail. Using time served as an outcome variable is my motivation for limiting the sample to only people who have been released, so as to not add bias from partially served sentences into the results. Note that time served does include time served prior to conviction, but does not include time served for people who were charged and put in jail but not convicted, as the sample is limited to only people who were convicted.

The 4 main regression models in this paper can be most simply expressed in the following form:

1) Sentence Length = Judicial Circuit Effects + Controls

2) Time Served = Judicial Circuit Effects + Controls

3) Sentence Length = Judicial District Effects + Controls

4) Time Served = Judicial District Effects + Controls

It is important to note that models 1 and 2 are strictly preferable to models 3 and 4 as true measurements of jurisdictional effects. While the 4 models all have a strong amount of explanatory power (with R-squared statistics of 0.33, 0.48, 0.30, and 0.48, respectively), Models 1 and 2 are our preferred models because they include circuit effects, which are more specific than district effects. As previously explained, these judicial districts are administrative, not jurisdictional areas. There may be some variation that is caused by administrative differences at the district level– for instance, an HR policy in District 1 may differ from the policy in District 7 in a way that affects incarceration outcomes. However, for the most part each district is essentially just a bunching of neighboring circuits, and the perceived "district effects" in the models are primarily just weighted averages of the circuit effects of the circuits in each district.

The reason that models 3 and 4 are included in this paper is not because they produce estimates as credible as those in models 1 and 2, but because they demonstrate that the results of models 1 and 2 hold up even when sample size for geographic effects is much larger. That is to say, models 3 and 4 show that it still makes a big difference where you are prosecuted in Georgia even if I "water down" the circuit effects by clumping them into districts. The fact that the results hold up across just these 10 districts implies that the circuit effects are genuine, and are not a result of having too many dimensions divided up across 49 circuits.

In the following section, I will go through the results of these regression models, with the core finding being that there is a statistically and economically significant difference in the outcomes of people prosecuted in different judicial circuits, even when controlling for all of these variables.

Results: Personal Characteristic Effects

While jurisdictional effects are the primary focus of this paper, some discussion of the time and personal characteristic effects found in the sample is warranted, even if these effects are unlikely to be causal. These effects can be seen in Table 2.

First, let's look at sex effects. Across the 4 models, I consistently see men getting longer sentences and serving more time in prison, at a statistically significant level. For instance in Model 1, I find that on ceteris paribus, on average, men are given sentences 0.201 years (74 days) longer than women. This effect holds up similarly across time served.

Second, I'll discuss age effects. Across all 4 models, age follows a nonlinear path: that is to say, at younger ages, being older at the time of admission is associated with longer sentences and time served, whereas at older ages, being older at the time of admission is associated with shorter sentences and time served. For instance, in Model 1, going from being 18 to 36 is associated with an increased sentence of 0.62 years (226 days). Then, going from age 36 to 54 is associated with a reduced sentence of 0.74 years (269 days). For a last example, going from age 54 to 72 is associated with a reduced sentence of 2.10 years (767 days). So, referring to age at admission into prison, as an individual goes from youth to middle age, their expected sentence length gets larger, until it reaches a point where it begins to decline precipitously, and once you get up to older ages, being older becomes associated with a shorter sentence.

Next, let's go through the race effects. As discussed in the literature review, the bulk of the literature on sentencing disparities by race has found the Black people, and especially Black men, are given longer sentences on average than their white peers. This paper deviates from that finding. In Model 1, looking at sentencing disparities by circuit, I find no statistically significant effects for Race. However, in Model 2, looking at time served disparities by circuit, I do find an effect, specifically for Black women. On average, Black women serve 0.33 years (120 days) less in prison than their white counterparts. The interaction effect between being Black and Male all but erases this effect, as Black men end up serving .032 years (or just under 12 days) less time in prison than their white counterparts.

While these coefficients get bigger in models 3 and 4, this is likely due to OVB from the omission of judicial circuit as a control variable. That is to say, since models 3 and 4 use judicial district as an explanatory variable instead of judicial circuit, and since the racial composition of circuits may be correlated with how harsh their sentencing practices are, these estimates are even less credible than those in models 1 and 2.

The race effects in particular are a surprising result that appear to contradict the bulk of the prior literature on this topic. However, there are three main reasons why this result should not be taken as causal, or even as an accurate estimate of the true effects of race, age, and sex. These reasons are as follows.

1) First, this regression does not account for "within-offense" variation. For instance, take two people convicted of aggravated assault in the same circuit who both received the same sentence. Even though they committed the same crime and received the same sentence, there could be a wide degree of variation in the amount of damage each of these individuals did to the victim, and this could affect the parole board's decision of when to grant parole. For another example, take the 599 individuals in the sample who were convicted of trafficking less than 200 grams of cocaine. In this data, there is no distinction between someone who trafficked 15 grams and someone who trafficked 150 grams of cocaine. Furthermore, since it is possible that this within-offense variation could be correlated with both incarceration outcomes (sentence and time served) and personal characteristics (race, age, and sex), I cannot rule out the possibility that OVB caused by the omission of within-offense variation is the true source of these estimates, and so I cannot take these results as causal.

2) Perhaps even more significantly, I don't have access to federal criminal history. This sample was limited to only people with no prior convictions in Georgia in order to reduce OVB, however I do not know who among this group had prior convictions in other states. This is another potential source of omitted variable bias that could explain the appearance of personal characteristic effects, when in reality these effects are not causal, but are instead due to omission of needed variables.

3) Lastly, even if I could account for this OVB, this study is too limited in scope to estimate the true effects of race, age, and sex on incarceration outcomes. This study does not include potential race, age, or sex effects on what crime someone is charged with, on their probability of being convicted, or on their probability of arrest. For instance, someone's race could be the difference between them being charged with murder or with voluntary manslaughter, or someone's sex could be the difference between being charged with aggravated battery and being charged with aggravated assault. Or, prosecutors could be more likely to drop charges against someone who is older than they would be against someone who is younger. All of this is speculation, of course, but all of it is plausible, and none of these scenarios would be accounted for in our models. For this reason, I cannot draw any conclusions about race, age, or sex effects from these models.

For these same reasons, I cannot draw conclusions about the effect of any of our other controls like education level or marital status. However, that does not mean these variables are without value– these variables explain a significant amount of the variation in both sentencing and time served, as seen in Table 2 below. Furthermore, while we cannot conclude that these control variables are causal, their inclusion in the model is essential to our argument that the judicial circuit effects are causal.

Table 2. Sentence and Time Served by Personal Characteristics

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
(Intercept)	23.860***	24.214***	23.676***	23.996***
	(0.584)	(0.273)	(0.597)	(0.274)
RACEBLACK	−0.065	−0.330***	−0.580***	−0.467***
	(0.107)	(0.050)	(0.109)	(0.050)
RACEHISPANIC	0.341	−0.203	−0.316	−0.366*
	(0.396)	(0.184)	(0.405)	(0.186)
RACEOTHER	0.329	−0.152	−0.326	−0.320
	(0.695)	(0.324)	(0.712)	(0.326)
AGE_AT_ADMISSION	0.148***	0.117***	0.157***	0.122***
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)
AGE_SQ	−0.002***	−0.001***	−0.002***	−0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.00007)	(0.0001)	(0.00007)
SEXMALE	0.201**	0.138***	0.167*	0.140***
	(0.075)	(0.035)	(0.077)	(0.035)
ADMITTED	−0.0004***	−0.0005***	−0.0004***	−0.0005***
	(0.00001)	(0.000006)	(0.00001)	(0.000006)
RACEBLACK × SEXMALE	−0.037	0.298***	0.009	0.306***
	(0.112)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.053)
RACEHISPANIC × SEXMALE	−0.631	−0.367+	−0.534	−0.342+
	(0.404)	(0.188)	(0.414)	(0.190)
RACEOTHER × SEXMALE	−0.629	−0.148	−0.468	−0.102
	(0.738)	(0.344)	(0.756)	(0.347)
N	96281	96281	96281	96281
R^2^	0.33	0.48	0.30	0.48

Columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for Judicial Circuit, Columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for Judicial District, and all Columns include fixed effects for Primary Offense

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Results: Jurisdictional Effects

The following heat maps show the effect of being prosecuted in each judicial circuit, compared to The Atlanta Judicial Circuit, which is also equivalent to the 5th District. I chose the Atlanta Circuit as the comparison point for this model because it is the only circuit that is its own district– that is, the 5th district does not contain any circuits other than the Atlanta Circuit. Furthermore, the Atlanta Circuit has the 3rd highest number of observations in the sample of any circuit, with 6,425 observations, and it is among the most lenient circuits (by which I mean it has lower averages sentences and lower average time served than almost all other circuits across the 4 models). This is beneficial because it makes understanding the context of the effects easier.

For reference, keep in mind that the median sentence is 9.86 years, the mean sentence is 10.98 years, the mean amount of time served is 4.18 years, and the median time served is 3.00 years. This is important to know for understanding just how large these circuit effects are in the context of the typical sentence length and amount of time served in this sample.

Map 1 shows the sentencing effect of each judicial circuit with the previously specified control variables adjusted for (Model 1). Compared to the Atlanta Circuit, these circuit effects range from a 0.83 year reduction in sentence to a 8.14 year increase in sentence, for a min-max range of 8.97 years. The median circuit effect is 2.98 years and the mean circuit effect is 2.90 years. The standard deviation of the circuit effects is 1.81 years. For context, recall that the median sentence is 9.86 years and the mean sentence is 10.98 years.

If you would have received the median sentence of 9.86 years in the Atlanta Circuit, in a hypothetical mean circuit you would receive a sentence 29.4% longer– not because of the crime you committed, or any personal characteristic like race, age, and sex, or any other observed variable in the model, but because of where you were prosecuted. If you were to pick 1 circuit at random to be tried in instead of the Atlanta Circuit, the best case is that you would (on average) get a sentence 0.83 years shorter in the Clayton Circuit (an 8.4% decrease in sentence length), and the worst case is that you would (on average) get a sentence 8.14 years longer in the Pataula Circuit (an 82.6% increase in sentence length).

The standard deviation of 1.81 years (18.4% of the median sentence) tells us that this effect is not being driven by a few outlier circuits, but rather that there is a high degree of variance in sentencing outcomes across circuits.

Map 1: Sentence Effect by Judicial Circuit



Map 2 shows the time served effect of each judicial circuit with the previously specified control variables adjusted for (Model 2). Compared to the Atlanta Circuit, these circuit effects range from no statistically significant difference in time served to a 2.29 year increase in time served, for a min-max range of 2.29 years. The median circuit effect is 0.72 years and the mean circuit effect is 0.80 years. The standard deviation of the circuit effects is 0.54 years. For context, recall that the median time served is 3.00 years, and the mean time served is 4.18 years.

The key takeaway here is that the sentencing effects seen in Model 1 carry over to time served, the actual amount of time people spend in jail or prison. Looking at Map 1, one could wonder if these sentencing effects really carry over to time-served, and looking at Map 2, it is clear that they do.

Map 2: Time Served Effect by Judicial Circuit



Map 3 shows the sentencing effect of each judicial district with the previously specified control variables adjusted for (Model 3). Compared to the 5th District (aka the Atlanta Circuit), these district effects range from no statistically significant difference in sentence to a 3.83 year increase in sentence, for a min-max range of 3.83 years. The median district effect is 2.41 years and the mean district effect is 1.99 years. The standard deviation of the district effects is 1.21 years. This demonstrates that the circuit effects still hold up even when you use districts instead of circuits as the jurisdictional variable in order to attain a better sample size.

Map 3: Sentence Effect by Judicial District



Map 4 shows the time served effect of each judicial district with the previously specified control variables adjusted for (Model 4). Compared to the 5th District (aka the Atlanta Circuit), these district effects range from no statistically significant difference in time served to a 1.28 year increase in time served, for a min-max range of 1.28 years. The median district effect is 0.50 additional years served and the mean district effect is 0.58 additional years served. The standard deviation of the district effects is 0.40 years. This demonstrates that the district effects seen in model 3 hold up for time served as well as sentencing.

For the full regression estimates and jurisdictional effects, see Appendix A.

Map 4: Time Served Effect by Judicial District



Discussion and Conclusion

There are several reasons why I cannot make causal inferences about personal characteristics, such as race, age, and sex, from this model. First, the sample used has large potential for omitted variable bias. For instance, because I only have data on prior Georgia incarcerations, not prior federal incarcerations, even with the limitation of the sample to only people with no prior offenses in Georgia, I cannot rule out a scenario in which prior federal criminal history is correlated with both personal characteristics and incarceration outcomes, causing omitted variable bias. Another cause of omitted variable bias is "within-offense" variation. For instance, 2 people convicted of aggravated assault may have done significantly different amounts of damage to the victim, and this amount of damage could be correlated with personal characteristics, causing omitted variable bias to change the effect estimates for personal characteristics. Another example is drug possession crimes– while I know within ranges how much drugs someone was convicted of trafficking, manufacturing, or possessing, I don't know precise numbers, and there could be bias in the model from this. For these reasons, this study does not produce any strong causal arguments for the effects of race, age, sex, education, or other personal characteristics that have often been studied in previous sentencing disparities papers.

However, I would argue that there is a good case to be made that the jurisdictional effects are causal. In addition to the clear, intuitive mechanism by which being prosecuted in a different judicial circuit can change someone's sentence and time served in prison, the effect sizes are much larger, and are therefore harder to explain as being caused by omitted variable bias. Furthermore, the OVB arguments that make us skeptical of personal characteristic effects as causal are less applicable to jurisdictional effects than they are to personal characteristic effects. In order for OVB to be the cause of these effect estimates, it would have to be the case that people in different judicial circuits have significantly different federal criminal histories, or significantly different within-offense variation, *even with personal characteristics adjusted for*. This seems implausible to me, and so I believe these estimates are most likely causal.

This is by no means a definitive proof that these circuit effects are causal. However, this paper does provide the most credible causal estimate of Georgia's circuit effects to date. Future research could improve upon this study and strengthen the argument that these effects are causal by accessing data that was confidential or not made available to me because of my civilian status. For instance, HIPAA-protected variables about health, as well as government records about marital status, education, and number of dependents (all variables that this study uses self-reported measures for), could be used to reduce omitted variable bias in the sample. Furthermore, confidential information about the details of the case– e.g. the federal criminal records of individuals in the study, or details like the amount of drugs a drug offender was caught with, can strengthen this causal argument and provide a less biased estimate of the varying effects of being prosecuted in these circuits. Overall, this study finds significant differences in incarceration outcomes by jurisdiction in Georgia during the 2009-2022 period, and makes a compelling case for future research in this area that could better estimate this variation and more credibly establish causality.

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Appendix A: Full Regression Tables

The following pages detail the full regression results of models 1-4 as described in the paper.

Appendix A. Sentence and Time Served by Circuit and District

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
(Intercept)	23.860***	24.214***	23.676***	23.996***
	(0.584)	(0.273)	(0.597)	(0.274)
RACEBLACK	−0.065	−0.330***	−0.580***	−0.467***
	(0.107)	(0.050)	(0.109)	(0.050)
RACEHISPANIC	0.341	−0.203	−0.316	−0.366*
	(0.396)	(0.184)	(0.405)	(0.186)
RACEOTHER	0.329	−0.152	−0.326	−0.320
	(0.695)	(0.324)	(0.712)	(0.326)
AGE_AT_ADMISSION	0.148***	0.117***	0.157***	0.122***
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.005)
AGE_SQ	−0.002***	−0.001***	−0.002***	−0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.00007)	(0.0001)	(0.00007)
SEXMALE	0.201**	0.138***	0.167*	0.140***
	(0.075)	(0.035)	(0.077)	(0.035)
EDU_CATBachelor	0.905***	−0.275***	0.556***	−0.376***
	(0.145)	(0.067)	(0.148)	(0.068)
EDU_CATGRADUATE	1.718***	−0.212	1.346***	−0.293*
	(0.284)	(0.132)	(0.291)	(0.133)
EDU_CATLess than High School	−0.799***	−0.201***	−0.811***	−0.195***
	(0.046)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.021)
EDU_CATMISSING	−0.821***	−0.080+	−0.845***	−0.088*
	(0.088)	(0.041)	(0.090)	(0.041)
EDU_CATSome College/Associates	−0.063	−0.242***	−0.238***	−0.287***
	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.066)	(0.030)
DISCIPLINARIES_FULL	0.061***	0.018***	0.070***	0.021***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
ADMITTED	−0.0004***	−0.0005***	−0.0004***	−0.0005***
	(0.00001)	(0.000006)	(0.00001)	(0.000006)
MARITAL_STATUS_FULLDIVORCED	0.158*	−0.174***	0.222**	−0.149***
	(0.072)	(0.034)	(0.074)	(0.034)
MARITAL_STATUS_FULLMARRIED	0.293***	−0.254***	0.366***	−0.243***
	(0.062)	(0.029)	(0.063)	(0.029)
MARITAL_STATUS_FULLMISSING	−0.712***	−0.883***	−0.715***	−0.897***
	(0.109)	(0.051)	(0.112)	(0.051)
MARITAL_STATUS_FULLSEPARATED	−0.196+	−0.246***	−0.136	−0.225***
	(0.101)	(0.047)	(0.103)	(0.047)
MARITAL_STATUS_FULLWIDOW	0.184	−0.072	0.280	−0.025
	(0.209)	(0.097)	(0.214)	(0.098)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED1	0.128*	0.062*	0.165**	0.071**
	(0.057)	(0.027)	(0.058)	(0.027)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED2	0.128*	0.047	0.158*	0.059*
	(0.062)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.029)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED3	0.202**	0.086*	0.279***	0.105**
	(0.076)	(0.035)	(0.078)	(0.036)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED4	0.279**	0.070	0.305**	0.078
	(0.101)	(0.047)	(0.103)	(0.047)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED5	0.646***	0.271***	0.666***	0.285***
	(0.140)	(0.065)	(0.144)	(0.066)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODED6+	0.508***	0.125+	0.525***	0.134*
	(0.141)	(0.066)	(0.144)	(0.066)
DEPENDENTS_TOPCODEDMISSING	0.470***	0.331***	0.438***	0.320***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.078)	(0.036)	(0.080)	(0.037)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITALAPAHA CIRCUIT	4.100***	1.639***		
	(0.258)	(0.120)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITALCOVY CIRCUIT	4.046***	0.393***		
	(0.140)	(0.065)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITAPPALACHIAN CIRCUIT	3.844***	0.685***		
	(0.260)	(0.121)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITATLANTIC CIRCUIT	0.491**	0.967***		
	(0.175)	(0.081)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITAUGUSTA CIRCUIT	2.075***	0.739***		
	(0.121)	(0.056)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITBELL-FORSYTH J.C.	2.403***	0.400***		
	(0.211)	(0.098)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITBLUE RIDGE CIRCUIT	1.673***	0.340***		
	(0.172)	(0.080)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITBRUNSWICK CIRCUIT	3.671***	1.292***		
	(0.165)	(0.077)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCHATTAHOOCHEE CIRCUIT	2.208***	0.418***		
	(0.137)	(0.064)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCHEROKEE CIRCUIT	5.436***	0.801***		
	(0.154)	(0.072)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCLAYTON CIRCUIT	−0.829***	0.034		
	(0.127)	(0.059)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCOBB CIRCUIT	0.394***	0.062		
	(0.106)	(0.050)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCONASAUGA CIRCUIT	1.954***	0.568***		

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.152)	(0.071)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCORDELE CIRCUIT	5.202***	1.847***		
	(0.206)	(0.096)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITCOWETA CIRCUIT	2.491***	0.413***		
	(0.123)	(0.057)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITDOUGHERTY CIRCUIT	3.943***	1.021***		
	(0.179)	(0.083)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITDOUGLAS CIRCUIT	3.922***	0.208**		
	(0.139)	(0.065)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITDUBLIN CIRCUIT	2.973***	1.011***		
	(0.229)	(0.107)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITEASTERN CIRCUIT	0.259*	−0.052		
	(0.129)	(0.060)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITENOTAH CIRCUIT	4.632***	0.727***		
	(0.214)	(0.100)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITFLINT CIRCUIT	1.179***	0.579***		
	(0.167)	(0.078)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITGRIFFIN CIRCUIT	0.842***	0.447***		
	(0.149)	(0.069)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITGWINNETT CIRCUIT	2.527***	0.275***		
	(0.107)	(0.050)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITHOUSTON CIRCUIT	3.433***	1.136***		
	(0.194)	(0.091)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITLOOKOUT MOUNTAIN CIRCUIT	5.534***	1.522***		
	(0.152)	(0.071)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITMACON CIRCUIT	2.618***	1.298***		

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.162)	(0.076)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITMIDDLE CIRCUIT	4.292***	1.326***		
	(0.186)	(0.087)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITMOUNTAIN CIRCUIT	1.519***	0.782***		
	(0.239)	(0.111)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITNORTHEASTERN CIRCUIT	3.236***	0.393***		
	(0.170)	(0.079)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITNORTHERN CIRCUIT	3.506***	0.715***		
	(0.189)	(0.088)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITOCMULGEE CIRCUIT	3.384***	1.093***		
	(0.151)	(0.071)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITOCONEE CIRCUIT	−0.612**	0.849***		
	(0.223)	(0.104)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITOGEECHEE CIRCUIT	2.506***	1.109***		
	(0.174)	(0.081)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITPATAULA CIRCUIT	8.140***	2.291***		
	(0.250)	(0.117)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITPAULDING CIRCUIT	4.610***	0.489***		
	(0.270)	(0.126)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITPIEDMONT CIRCUIT	4.492***	0.998***		
	(0.185)	(0.086)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITROCKDALE CIRCUIT	2.033***	−0.069		
	(0.187)	(0.087)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITROME CIRCUIT	2.226***	0.654***		
	(0.177)	(0.083)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITSOUTH GEORGIA CIRCUIT	4.878***	1.066***		

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.199)	(0.093)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITSOUTHERN CIRCUIT	1.589***	0.958***		
	(0.165)	(0.077)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITSOUTHWESTERN CIRCUIT	5.124***	1.433***		
	(0.258)	(0.120)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITSTONE MOUNTAIN CIRCUIT	−0.060	0.225***		
	(0.111)	(0.052)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITTALLAPOOSA CIRCUIT	4.140***	1.190***		
	(0.270)	(0.126)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITTIFTON CIRCUIT	4.676***	2.084***		
	(0.240)	(0.112)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITTOOMBS CIRCUIT	3.351***	0.546***		
	(0.257)	(0.120)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITTOWALIGA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT	1.963***	0.691***		
	(0.234)	(0.109)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITWAYCROSS CIRCUIT	2.559***	1.507***		
	(0.178)	(0.083)		
MAJOR_OFFENSE_CIRCUITWESTERN CIRCUIT	3.193***	0.507***		
	(0.216)	(0.101)		
PRIMARY_OFFENSEABANDONMENT OF CHILD	−9.741***	−2.764**	−9.606***	−2.792**
	(1.997)	(0.930)	(2.046)	(0.938)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEABUSE NEGLECT ELDER/DISAB	0.512	−0.373	0.046	−0.528*
	(0.532)	(0.248)	(0.545)	(0.250)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGG ASLT W INTNT TO RAPE	0.562	0.501	0.403	0.518
	(0.685)	(0.319)	(0.702)	(0.322)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGG SEX BATTERY ATMPT	−2.478	−0.190	−3.511	−0.273

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.446)	(1.140)	(2.507)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV BATTERY	1.458***	0.530***	1.470***	0.510***
	(0.143)	(0.067)	(0.146)	(0.067)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV BATTERY PEACE OFCR	0.520	0.879+	0.420	0.878+
	(1.060)	(0.494)	(1.086)	(0.498)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV CH MOLEST ATMPT	4.228+	−0.689	4.058	−0.723
	(2.447)	(1.140)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV CHILD MOLESTATION	8.062***	7.016***	8.232***	7.096***
	(0.224)	(0.105)	(0.230)	(0.105)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV CRUELTY TO ANIMALS	−4.566***	−1.552***	−4.948***	−1.546***
	(0.825)	(0.384)	(0.845)	(0.387)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV SEXUAL BATTERY	2.745***	4.557***	2.890***	4.652***
	(0.556)	(0.259)	(0.570)	(0.261)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV SODOMY	7.588***	7.418***	7.812***	7.524***
	(0.643)	(0.300)	(0.659)	(0.302)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAV STALKING	−3.766***	−0.955***	−3.814***	−0.968***
	(0.203)	(0.095)	(0.208)	(0.095)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON 65+	7.375***	2.539**	6.791***	2.572**
	(1.730)	(0.806)	(1.772)	(0.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAGRAV ASSAULT PEACE OFCR	1.278***	0.475***	1.270***	0.501***
	(0.282)	(0.132)	(0.289)	(0.133)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEAIDING ESCAPE	−8.209***	−2.246*	−7.167***	−2.229*
	(2.119)	(0.987)	(2.171)	(0.995)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEALTER ID	−6.575***	−1.624**	−6.730***	−1.585*
	(1.340)	(0.624)	(1.373)	(0.629)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEARMED ROBBERY	3.461***	5.382***	3.367***	5.376***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.113)	(0.053)	(0.116)	(0.053)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEARSON 1ST DEGREE	0.633	−0.793***	0.549	−0.768***
	(0.396)	(0.185)	(0.406)	(0.186)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEARSON 2ND DEGREE	−2.632*	−1.312*	−2.269*	−1.269*
	(1.114)	(0.519)	(1.141)	(0.523)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEARSON 3RD DEGREE	−5.199**	−1.653*	−5.554***	−1.740*
	(1.601)	(0.746)	(1.641)	(0.752)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEARSON MISC	−1.793	3.878*	−1.200	4.340*
	(4.235)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT AGGRAV SODOMY	−0.950	−0.999	−0.390	−0.919
	(3.457)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT AGRAV ASSAULT	0.336	0.037	−0.238	0.025
	(1.412)	(0.658)	(1.447)	(0.663)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT ARMED ROBBERY	−0.270	−0.429*	−0.254	−0.393+
	(0.429)	(0.200)	(0.439)	(0.201)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT BURGLARY	−5.926***	−1.217***	−5.956***	−1.235***
	(0.656)	(0.306)	(0.672)	(0.308)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT CHILD MOLESTATION	0.168	−0.677*	−0.344	−0.673*
	(0.669)	(0.312)	(0.685)	(0.314)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT CRUELTY TO CHILDREN	0.716	−1.163	0.504	−1.062
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT ESCAPE	−12.177*	−4.263	−9.602	−4.012
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT FINAN IDENT FRD	−0.990	−2.656+	−0.027	−2.318
	(3.459)	(1.611)	(3.544)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT FORGERY	−8.713*	−2.265	−7.828*	−2.194

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(3.458)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT KIDNAP	0.153	0.510	0.140	0.532
	(2.118)	(0.987)	(2.171)	(0.994)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT MURDER	7.015***	2.295***	7.242***	2.336***
	(0.841)	(0.392)	(0.862)	(0.395)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT RAPE	1.427	0.399	1.326	0.294
	(0.905)	(0.422)	(0.927)	(0.425)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT ROBBERY	−3.563***	−1.034***	−3.809***	−1.027***
	(0.577)	(0.269)	(0.591)	(0.271)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT SODOMY	−0.361	−0.958	−0.912	−1.401
	(2.995)	(1.396)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT THEFT BY TAKING	−6.949***	−1.801***	−6.856***	−1.847***
	(1.154)	(0.538)	(1.182)	(0.542)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATMPT VIOL SUBSTANCE ACT	−5.480***	−2.142***	−5.127***	−1.964***
	(0.729)	(0.340)	(0.747)	(0.342)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEATT/CONSPRCY COMMT C/S/OF	−2.226***	−1.569***	−1.889***	−1.497***
	(0.452)	(0.211)	(0.463)	(0.212)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBAD CHECKS	−6.610***	−2.377***	−6.877***	−2.361***
	(1.308)	(0.610)	(1.341)	(0.614)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBAIL JUMPING	−7.063***	−1.386**	−7.826***	−1.479***
	(0.949)	(0.442)	(0.972)	(0.445)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBARRATRY	−1.763	0.824	−3.764	0.467
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBESTIALITY	−8.398***	−2.853*	−8.248***	−2.976**
	(2.446)	(1.139)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBIGAMY	−7.893**	−3.268**	−7.741**	−3.233*

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBRIBERY GOVT OFFICER	−1.747	−1.509	−1.364	−1.475
	(2.118)	(0.987)	(2.171)	(0.994)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBRIBERY OF CONTESTANT	−4.239	−1.574	−3.904	−1.762
	(3.457)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBURG 1ST AFT 6/30/12	−0.916***	−0.426***	−0.786***	−0.402***
	(0.123)	(0.057)	(0.126)	(0.058)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBURG 2ND AFT 6/30/12	−3.617***	−0.847***	−3.470***	−0.818***
	(0.186)	(0.087)	(0.191)	(0.087)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBURG BEF 7/1/12	−2.362***	−0.862***	−2.312***	−0.831***
	(0.094)	(0.044)	(0.096)	(0.044)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEburglary	−6.349*	−2.280	−7.103*	−2.558+
	(2.994)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEBURGLARY SMASH AND GRAB	3.296	−1.078	3.606	−1.078
	(2.264)	(1.055)	(2.320)	(1.063)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECARRY CONCEALED WEAPON	−7.518***	−2.304***	−7.772***	−2.292***
	(1.278)	(0.595)	(1.310)	(0.600)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECARRY PISTL WITHOUT LICNS	−7.580	−0.593	−7.519	−0.434
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECARRY WEAPON AT SCHOOL	−5.035***	−1.156**	−5.241***	−1.220**
	(0.905)	(0.422)	(0.927)	(0.425)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECHILD MOLESTATION	3.217***	1.449***	3.331***	1.512***
	(0.119)	(0.055)	(0.122)	(0.056)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECHOP SHOP VIOLATION	−8.268	−3.766	−8.189	−3.801
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECNSPIRE TRAFFIC CNTRL SUB	0.944	−1.066*	1.030	−1.138**

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.927)	(0.432)	(0.950)	(0.435)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECNTRBTNG DELINQENCY MINOR	−6.459+	−0.920	−7.165*	−0.933
	(3.459)	(1.611)	(3.545)	(1.624)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECOMMERICAL GAMBLING	−10.241+	−3.905	−10.384+	−4.011
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.138)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECOMPUTER PORNOGRAPHY	0.984*	−1.210***	1.615***	−1.012***
	(0.385)	(0.179)	(0.394)	(0.180)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECOMPUTER THEFT	1.488*	−0.908**	1.150	−1.039**
	(0.720)	(0.335)	(0.738)	(0.338)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECOMPUTER TRESPASS	1.291	−0.880	1.375	−1.030
	(1.730)	(0.806)	(1.773)	(0.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECONCEAL CONTRABAND	−5.665	−1.489	−6.397	−1.378
	(4.236)	(1.974)	(4.341)	(1.989)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECONCEAL DEATH OF ANOTHER	−1.803*	−0.920*	−1.542+	−0.860*
	(0.895)	(0.417)	(0.917)	(0.420)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECONSPIRACY	−1.791***	−1.513***	−1.862***	−1.575***
	(0.458)	(0.213)	(0.469)	(0.215)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECONSPIRE RESTRAIN FREE	−0.947	−2.262	−0.704	−2.397
	(4.236)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECONVSN PAYMNTS REAL PROPY	−7.331**	−1.245	−6.716**	−1.339
	(2.446)	(1.139)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRIM USE W/ALT ID MARK	−6.483*	−1.642	−7.298*	−1.856
	(2.995)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRML ATMPT FELONY	−3.065**	−1.387**	−3.524**	−1.448**
	(1.095)	(0.510)	(1.122)	(0.514)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL ABORTION	−0.993	−2.983	−3.610	−3.376

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(5.990)	(2.791)	(6.138)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL ATMPT	1.976	3.671**	2.448	3.925**
	(2.994)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL DAMAGE 1ST DEGREE	−5.003***	−1.496***	−5.078***	−1.483***
	(0.539)	(0.251)	(0.552)	(0.253)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL DAMAGE 2ND DEGREE	−6.556***	−1.272***	−6.716***	−1.305***
	(0.303)	(0.141)	(0.311)	(0.142)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL INTERFERE GOVT PROP	−7.916***	−1.639***	−7.961***	−1.660***
	(0.641)	(0.299)	(0.657)	(0.301)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL POSS CREDIT CARD	−9.086	−2.011	−7.429	−2.262
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL POSS EXPLOSIVES	0.411	−2.768	−0.537	−2.772
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL SOLICITATION	−4.334+	1.402	−4.840*	1.332
	(2.264)	(1.055)	(2.321)	(1.063)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRMNL TRESPASSING	−8.300	−1.570	−9.372	−2.305
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRUELTY TO AN INMATE	10.326+	−1.480	11.212+	−1.258
	(5.991)	(2.791)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRUELTY TO ANIMALS	−7.355***	−2.313**	−6.941***	−2.169**
	(1.662)	(0.774)	(1.703)	(0.780)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRUELTY TO CHILDREN	−1.040***	−0.511***	−1.179***	−0.513***
	(0.182)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.085)
PRIMARY_OFFENSECRUELTY TO ELDER PERSON	0.542	−0.548+	0.144	−0.690*
	(0.638)	(0.297)	(0.654)	(0.300)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDAMAGE DESTROY SECR PROP	−8.758**	−1.239	−8.224**	−1.284

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.996)	(1.396)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDEFRAUDING STATE	−4.226*	−0.805	−3.708*	−0.649
	(1.808)	(0.843)	(1.853)	(0.849)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDISTR MAT DEPICT NUDITY	−1.698	−0.380	−2.182	−0.378
	(4.236)	(1.974)	(4.340)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDISTRIBUTING OBSCENE MAT	−12.341*	−3.502	−11.640+	−3.797
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDOGFIGHTING	−0.830	−1.017	−0.396	−0.798
	(3.458)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEdrv w/ improp veh reg	−6.499***	−1.457+	−5.792**	−1.285
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.942)	(0.889)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDRV W/SUSP LICENSE	−8.020*	−2.434	−7.179*	−2.513
	(3.457)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDRVNG HABTL VIOLATOR	−8.215***	−2.811***	−8.376***	−2.826***
	(0.660)	(0.308)	(0.677)	(0.310)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEDSTL ALCOHOL BEVERAGES	−6.642	−0.898	−5.084	−0.796
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEdui	−11.279***	−2.795*	−10.709***	−2.709+
	(2.995)	(1.395)	(3.070)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEEAVESDROP & SURVEILLANCE	−6.544***	−2.686**	−6.848***	−2.840***
	(1.807)	(0.842)	(1.851)	(0.848)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEEMBRACERY	−9.209**	−1.725	−8.254*	−1.728
	(3.461)	(1.612)	(3.546)	(1.624)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEENTERING VEHICLE	−6.435***	−1.757***	−6.422***	−1.761***
	(0.307)	(0.143)	(0.314)	(0.144)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEENTICE CHILD ATTEMPTED	−1.306	−1.249	−1.044	−1.190

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(1.806)	(0.842)	(1.851)	(0.848)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEENTICING CHILD-INDEC PURP	0.526	0.383	0.540	0.341
	(0.505)	(0.235)	(0.517)	(0.237)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEESCAPE	−7.249***	−1.817***	−6.925***	−1.822***
	(0.672)	(0.314)	(0.689)	(0.316)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEEXPLOIT DISABLED/ELDER	−0.164	−1.841**	−0.408	−1.810**
	(1.413)	(0.659)	(1.448)	(0.663)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE CERTIFICATES	−3.695	−1.548	−3.528	−1.444
	(2.265)	(1.055)	(2.320)	(1.063)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE IMPRIS COLOR LEGAL	−4.368	−0.819	−5.761	−1.011
	(5.990)	(2.791)	(6.139)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE IMPRISONMENT	−3.297***	−0.847***	−3.378***	−0.846***
	(0.256)	(0.119)	(0.262)	(0.120)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE PUBLIC ALARM	−4.707	−3.169	−6.056	−3.468+
	(4.234)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE STATEMENTS GOVT	−6.880***	−1.463***	−7.023***	−1.488***
	(0.476)	(0.222)	(0.488)	(0.223)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE SWEARING	−5.327***	−0.762	−5.336***	−0.720
	(1.278)	(0.596)	(1.310)	(0.600)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFALSE SWEARNG WRITTN STMT	−7.270***	−1.989***	−7.953***	−2.052***
	(1.177)	(0.548)	(1.205)	(0.552)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFAMILY VIOLENCE BATTERY	−5.606***	−1.130***	−5.629***	−1.163***
	(0.273)	(0.127)	(0.280)	(0.128)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFETICIDE	4.845+	3.172*	4.633+	2.962*
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.746)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFETICIDE BY VEHICLE	5.531*	1.527	5.827*	1.589

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.746)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFINANCIAL IDENTITY FRAUD	−4.943***	−1.262***	−4.860***	−1.256***
	(0.313)	(0.146)	(0.320)	(0.147)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFLEEING/ELUDING POLICE	−6.144***	−1.673***	−5.793***	−1.622***
	(0.177)	(0.082)	(0.181)	(0.083)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 1ST AFT 6/30/12	−2.830***	−0.605***	−2.760***	−0.642***
	(0.311)	(0.145)	(0.319)	(0.146)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 1ST BEF 7/1/12	−4.525***	−1.208***	−4.522***	−1.240***
	(0.131)	(0.061)	(0.134)	(0.061)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 2ND AFT 6/30/12	−3.833***	−0.995***	−3.688***	−0.998***
	(0.599)	(0.279)	(0.614)	(0.281)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 2ND BEF 7/1/12	−6.854***	−1.603***	−7.114***	−1.687***
	(0.709)	(0.330)	(0.726)	(0.333)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 3RD AFT 6/30/12	−4.377***	−0.971***	−4.473***	−1.006***
	(0.426)	(0.199)	(0.437)	(0.200)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORG 4TH AFT 6/30/12	−4.688***	−0.871*	−4.283***	−0.820+
	(0.938)	(0.437)	(0.961)	(0.440)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEforgery	−8.588*	−3.127	−10.092*	−3.605+
	(4.234)	(1.973)	(4.340)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFORGERY CREDIT CARD	−7.129***	−2.036***	−6.994***	−2.049***
	(1.250)	(0.582)	(1.281)	(0.587)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFRAUDULENT ACCESS COMPUTE	0.826	−0.373	0.630	−0.536
	(1.376)	(0.641)	(1.410)	(0.646)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFRAUDULENT CHECKS	−8.139***	−2.332***	−8.241***	−2.401***
	(1.499)	(0.698)	(1.536)	(0.704)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEFRAUDULENT CREDIT CARD	−5.722***	−1.445***	−5.781***	−1.445***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.282)	(0.132)	(0.289)	(0.133)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEGANG PARTICIPATION	1.000+	−0.687**	0.920+	−0.686**
	(0.527)	(0.246)	(0.540)	(0.248)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEGUARD LINE W/WEAPON/DRUGS	−7.177***	−1.610***	−6.557***	−1.539***
	(0.565)	(0.263)	(0.578)	(0.265)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHABIT TRAF VIOL/IMPAIRED	−8.309***	−2.651***	−8.198***	−2.616***
	(0.668)	(0.311)	(0.685)	(0.314)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHABIT TRAF VIOL/OTHER	−8.294***	−2.549***	−8.189***	−2.590***
	(0.642)	(0.299)	(0.657)	(0.301)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHARBOR/CONCEAL SEX OFFNDR	−0.954	−0.174	−1.230	−0.408
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHIJACKING MOTOR VEHICLE	0.837	1.337***	0.440	1.290***
	(0.789)	(0.368)	(0.809)	(0.370)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHINDERING APPREH OR PUN	−5.451***	−1.792***	−5.390***	−1.714***
	(1.061)	(0.494)	(1.087)	(0.498)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHIT-RUN W/INJURY/FATALITY	−0.824	−0.425	−0.991	−0.502+
	(0.599)	(0.279)	(0.614)	(0.281)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHOME INVASION 1ST DEGREE	3.821*	−0.515	4.804**	−0.276
	(1.548)	(0.721)	(1.586)	(0.726)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEHOMICIDE BY VESSEL	1.508+	0.098	1.259	0.039
	(0.782)	(0.364)	(0.801)	(0.367)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEILLEGAL ATTM TO OBT DRUGS	−6.476***	−1.452***	−6.860***	−1.523***
	(0.867)	(0.404)	(0.888)	(0.407)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEILLGL DIST CONTRLLD SUBST	−5.038	−1.747	−5.989	−1.899
	(4.234)	(1.972)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEIMPERSONATING OFFICER	−7.196***	−0.906	−7.507***	−0.958

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(1.602)	(0.746)	(1.641)	(0.752)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEIMPERSONATION	−3.915*	−1.751*	−4.239*	−1.612+
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.941)	(0.889)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINCEST	5.768***	3.456***	6.078***	3.531***
	(0.446)	(0.208)	(0.456)	(0.209)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINCEST ATMPT	−6.639	−4.470	−7.960	−4.445
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINCITING TO INSURRECTION	−5.791+	−0.351	−4.364	−0.074
	(2.995)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINFLUENCING WITNESS	−5.065***	−0.903	−4.814***	−0.893
	(1.308)	(0.610)	(1.341)	(0.614)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINJURY BY VEHICLE	−0.171	−1.167***	−0.208	−1.201***
	(0.294)	(0.137)	(0.302)	(0.138)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINSTIGATING MUTINY	−2.422	−2.462	−0.981	−2.697
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINSURANCE FRAUD	−3.124	−2.445	−2.799	−2.506
	(4.235)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINSURRECTION	−7.570**	−1.916	−6.705*	−1.935
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.257)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINTERFERE ELECTRONIC DVCE	−8.487**	−2.609*	−9.551***	−3.195*
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY	−4.719***	−1.258**	−4.744***	−1.268**
	(0.885)	(0.412)	(0.907)	(0.415)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEINVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER	−0.113	0.827***	−0.058	0.895***
	(0.354)	(0.165)	(0.363)	(0.166)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEKIDNAPPING	5.723***	6.753***	5.756***	6.782***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.233)	(0.109)	(0.239)	(0.109)
PRIMARY_OFFENSELOTTERY VIOLATION	−6.024+	−0.663	−6.101+	−0.487
	(3.459)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMACHINE GUN ACTIVITIES	−2.909	3.175	−2.714	3.204
	(4.235)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMALICIOUS CONF SANE PERS	−9.601	−3.768	−9.918	−4.139
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANF METHAMPH 200-399 GM	−0.506	−1.879***	−0.204	−1.704**
	(1.224)	(0.570)	(1.254)	(0.575)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANF METHAMPH 28-199 GM	−0.885	−1.702***	−1.172	−1.612***
	(1.001)	(0.466)	(1.025)	(0.470)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANF METHAMPH 400+ GM	−2.796	0.878	−3.087	0.858
	(3.459)	(1.612)	(3.545)	(1.624)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANF METHAMPH UNSPEC AMT	−0.452	−1.530***	0.133	−1.273***
	(0.344)	(0.160)	(0.351)	(0.161)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANUFAC MARIJUANA	−3.706***	−1.374***	−3.467***	−1.228**
	(0.896)	(0.417)	(0.918)	(0.420)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMANUFACT METH NEAR CHILD	−0.940	−2.159***	−1.014	−2.147***
	(0.987)	(0.460)	(1.011)	(0.463)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC ASSAULT/BATTERY	−3.606**	−0.807	−3.732**	−0.811
	(1.176)	(0.548)	(1.205)	(0.552)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC CORRECTIONL INST OFF	−4.895***	−2.221***	−5.691***	−2.104**
	(1.377)	(0.642)	(1.409)	(0.646)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC DRUGS TRAFFICKING	1.367+	−0.684+	1.653*	−0.648+
	(0.818)	(0.381)	(0.838)	(0.384)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC FAMILY VIOLENCE	−1.902	−1.912+	−2.440	−1.956+

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.264)	(1.055)	(2.320)	(1.063)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC FORGERY	−5.995***	−2.588**	−6.628***	−2.782**
	(1.807)	(0.842)	(1.851)	(0.848)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC FRAUD	−4.967***	−1.575***	−5.013***	−1.604***
	(0.622)	(0.290)	(0.637)	(0.292)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC HOMICIDE OFFENSE	0.846	2.392**	0.207	2.280*
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.942)	(0.890)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC INVASION OF PRIVACY	−3.755*	−1.961**	−4.225**	−2.098**
	(1.499)	(0.698)	(1.536)	(0.704)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEmisc misdemeanor	−12.426*	−2.747	−12.579*	−2.861
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC MRALS/PBLIC H/SAFTY	−5.939***	−2.313**	−6.314***	−2.446**
	(1.662)	(0.774)	(1.703)	(0.780)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC OBSCENITY	0.246	−1.387*	−0.540	−1.595*
	(1.499)	(0.698)	(1.536)	(0.704)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC PUBLIC ORDER	−7.812**	−2.566+	−6.608*	−2.647+
	(2.996)	(1.396)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC SEXUAL OFFENSE	−1.639*	−1.163**	−1.847*	−1.160**
	(0.776)	(0.361)	(0.795)	(0.364)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISC WEAPON/EXPLOSIVE OFF	−1.103	−1.564	−2.517	−1.749
	(2.678)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.257)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISTREATMENT OF DEAD BODY	−3.815	−0.580	−4.695	−0.540
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMISUSE FIREARM HUNTING	2.447	0.719	5.260	1.729
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMURDER	−1.962***	2.537***	−1.896***	2.559***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.539)	(0.251)	(0.552)	(0.253)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMURDER CONSPIRE TO COMMIT	3.964*	0.030	5.018**	0.237
	(1.602)	(0.747)	(1.641)	(0.752)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEMUTINY IN PENAL INST	−4.416*	−1.275	−3.707+	−1.156
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.942)	(0.889)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEobscenity & related offen	−7.712	−2.580	−8.167	−2.550
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEOBSTR OF LAW ENF OFFICER	−5.649***	−1.476***	−5.578***	−1.437***
	(0.169)	(0.079)	(0.174)	(0.080)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEOBT CTRL SUB BY FRD/THEFT	−4.206	−1.529	−6.857	−2.081
	(5.991)	(2.791)	(6.140)	(2.813)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEother misdemeanor	−14.151*	−3.111	−12.507*	−2.699
	(5.991)	(2.791)	(6.138)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPANDERING BY COMPULSION	0.137	−1.947	1.033	−1.840
	(4.236)	(1.973)	(4.340)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPEEPING TOM	−6.179***	−1.762***	−6.487***	−1.831***
	(0.905)	(0.422)	(0.927)	(0.425)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPERJURY	−5.795***	−1.074	−5.687***	−1.098
	(1.548)	(0.721)	(1.586)	(0.727)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPIMPING A MINOR UNDER 18	0.431	−0.343	0.072	−0.368
	(1.413)	(0.658)	(1.448)	(0.663)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS ALPRAZOLAM	−7.955***	−0.876	−7.955***	−0.806
	(1.278)	(0.596)	(1.310)	(0.600)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS BY INM PROH ITEMS	−6.799***	−0.683	−6.157***	−0.571
	(1.454)	(0.677)	(1.490)	(0.683)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS CONTRABAND ARTICLES	−7.066***	−1.580*	−6.466***	−1.472+

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(1.730)	(0.806)	(1.773)	(0.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS DEP STIM CNTRF DRUGS	−7.624***	−1.549***	−7.742***	−1.555***
	(0.277)	(0.129)	(0.284)	(0.130)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS DRUG RELATED MATRL	−6.943***	−1.309***	−6.837***	−1.299***
	(0.606)	(0.282)	(0.620)	(0.284)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS EPHEDRINE	−5.072***	−1.842***	−4.535***	−1.729***
	(1.115)	(0.519)	(1.142)	(0.523)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS FIREARM 1ST OFFENDER	−3.183***	−0.652***	−3.260***	−0.677***
	(0.263)	(0.123)	(0.270)	(0.124)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS FIREARM CONVCT FELON	−3.620***	−0.890***	−3.607***	−0.882***
	(0.143)	(0.067)	(0.146)	(0.067)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS HYDROCODONE	−7.292***	−0.800*	−7.274***	−0.689+
	(0.850)	(0.396)	(0.871)	(0.399)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS KNIFE DURING CRIME	−3.284*	−1.634*	−3.750*	−1.779*
	(1.548)	(0.721)	(1.586)	(0.726)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS MDA/EXTSY	−6.305***	−1.678***	−6.672***	−1.736***
	(0.849)	(0.396)	(0.870)	(0.399)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS METHAMPHETAMINE	−7.191***	−1.248***	−7.203***	−1.214***
	(0.133)	(0.062)	(0.136)	(0.062)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS NARCOTICS OPIATES	−6.866***	−1.168***	−7.009***	−1.162***
	(0.283)	(0.132)	(0.290)	(0.133)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS OF CERTAIN WEAPONS	−3.432***	−1.192***	−3.494***	−1.192***
	(0.571)	(0.266)	(0.586)	(0.268)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS OF COCAINE	−6.648***	−1.809***	−6.876***	−1.838***
	(0.135)	(0.063)	(0.138)	(0.063)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS OF FIREARM DUR CRIME	0.354*	−0.736***	0.393**	−0.749***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.148)	(0.069)	(0.152)	(0.070)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS OF LSD	−7.121**	0.084	−6.171*	0.360
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.257)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS OF MARIJUANA	−6.595***	−1.864***	−6.556***	−1.868***
	(0.287)	(0.134)	(0.294)	(0.135)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS SCHEDULE I DRUG	−8.189***	−0.853	−7.541***	−0.913+
	(1.155)	(0.538)	(1.183)	(0.542)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS TOOLS COMMIT CRIME	−6.641***	−1.699***	−7.041***	−1.864***
	(0.587)	(0.274)	(0.602)	(0.276)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS W INT DIS OTHER DRUG	−3.131***	−1.510***	−3.168***	−1.499***
	(0.305)	(0.142)	(0.312)	(0.143)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS W INT DIST COCAINE	−2.769***	−1.691***	−2.641***	−1.622***
	(0.203)	(0.094)	(0.208)	(0.095)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS W INT DIST MARIJUANA	−4.104***	−1.588***	−3.906***	−1.564***
	(0.131)	(0.061)	(0.134)	(0.062)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS W INT DIST METH	−1.448***	−1.298***	−1.351***	−1.241***
	(0.176)	(0.082)	(0.180)	(0.083)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS WITHIN 1000 HOUS PJT	−0.946	−2.410	−1.887	−2.434
	(3.459)	(1.612)	(3.544)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPOSS WPN DRUGS BY PRISNR	−4.533***	−1.033***	−4.005***	−0.923**
	(0.638)	(0.297)	(0.653)	(0.299)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEPROV SEX MATER TO MINORS	−2.535	−1.375	−3.925	−1.247
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSERACKETEERING	3.437***	−0.583***	3.085***	−0.676***
	(0.355)	(0.166)	(0.364)	(0.167)
PRIMARY_OFFENSERAPE	6.896***	8.523***	6.922***	8.579***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.282)	(0.131)	(0.289)	(0.132)
PRIMARY_OFFENSERECK COND INFECTED PERSON	−3.044*	−0.867	−3.449**	−1.030+
	(1.250)	(0.582)	(1.281)	(0.587)
PRIMARY_OFFENSERECKLESS ABANDONMENT	−0.168	−0.989	−0.811	−1.207
	(3.457)	(1.611)	(3.543)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEreckless driving	−9.280*	−1.977	−8.777*	−1.594
	(4.235)	(1.973)	(4.340)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSERECV GDS SRVS FRAUD OBTND	−9.468**	−3.805**	−8.896**	−3.790**
	(2.995)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEREMOV/ATMPT WPN PUB OFFL	−6.787	−2.379	−7.680	−2.250
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEREMOVAL BAGGAGE CARGO ETC	−7.931**	−2.485*	−9.566***	−2.740*
	(2.680)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEriot	−11.380+	−1.129	−9.811	−1.330
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEROBBERY	−0.291*	0.060	−0.480***	0.043
	(0.124)	(0.058)	(0.127)	(0.058)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEROBBERY BY FORCE	−0.587*	−0.394**	−0.677*	−0.357**
	(0.279)	(0.130)	(0.285)	(0.131)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEROBBERY BY INTIMIDATION	0.252	0.023	0.556+	0.162
	(0.282)	(0.131)	(0.288)	(0.132)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEROBBERY BY SUDDEN SNATCH	−2.100***	−0.810***	−1.971***	−0.798***
	(0.362)	(0.169)	(0.371)	(0.170)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D COCAINE	−3.199***	−2.177***	−2.901***	−2.116***
	(0.195)	(0.091)	(0.199)	(0.091)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D CONT SUB PUBLIC	−1.427	−2.205***	−1.016	−2.168***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.927)	(0.432)	(0.949)	(0.435)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D CONT SUB SCHOOL	−0.994	−1.172***	−0.509	−1.124***
	(0.719)	(0.335)	(0.736)	(0.337)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D DEP STIM CNTRF DRUGS	−3.276***	−1.464***	−2.868***	−1.421***
	(0.379)	(0.177)	(0.388)	(0.178)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D NARCOTICS OPIATES	−3.854***	−1.756***	−3.702***	−1.709***
	(0.606)	(0.282)	(0.620)	(0.284)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D OF LSD	−5.278*	−1.815	−4.840+	−1.723
	(2.446)	(1.140)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSES/D OF MARIJUANA	−3.771***	−1.645***	−3.404***	−1.593***
	(0.197)	(0.092)	(0.202)	(0.092)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESALE MDA/EXTSY	−3.620*	−2.461***	−3.454*	−2.522***
	(1.454)	(0.677)	(1.490)	(0.682)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESALE METHAMPHETAMINE	−1.377***	−1.481***	−0.983***	−1.442***
	(0.241)	(0.112)	(0.246)	(0.113)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEX EXPLOITATION CHILD	3.343***	−0.673***	3.381***	−0.677***
	(0.270)	(0.126)	(0.277)	(0.127)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEX OFFENDER FAIL REGISTR	−3.685***	−0.726***	−3.816***	−0.757***
	(0.306)	(0.143)	(0.314)	(0.144)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEX OFFENDER FAIL TO MOVE	−4.286	−0.065	−5.668*	−0.372
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEXL/ASSLT/AGN/PERS/CSTDY	−0.272	−0.923*	−0.300	−0.905*
	(0.819)	(0.381)	(0.839)	(0.384)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEXUAL ASLT BY THERAPIST	5.294	0.102	4.659	0.240
	(3.469)	(1.616)	(3.555)	(1.629)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESEXUAL BATTERY	−4.906***	−1.155***	−5.025***	−1.115***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.256)	(0.119)	(0.262)	(0.120)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEshoplifting	3.189	−2.623	4.311	−2.482
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESIMPLE BATTERY	−4.209***	−0.302	−4.088***	−0.309
	(0.885)	(0.412)	(0.907)	(0.415)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESODOMY	0.893	0.141	0.990	0.203
	(0.937)	(0.437)	(0.961)	(0.440)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESOLICIT SODOMY FROM MINOR	0.132	−0.690	0.106	−0.548
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.942)	(0.890)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESTALKING	−3.608*	−1.874*	−2.918+	−1.760*
	(1.602)	(0.746)	(1.641)	(0.752)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESTATUTORY RAPE	0.580**	0.597***	0.811***	0.674***
	(0.179)	(0.083)	(0.183)	(0.084)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESTATUTORY RAPE ATMPT	−3.090	−2.414+	−3.571	−2.431+
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.257)
PRIMARY_OFFENSESUBORNATION OF PERJURY	−4.868	−3.399	−3.430	−3.663
	(5.991)	(2.791)	(6.140)	(2.813)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE	−4.455***	−1.612***	−4.588***	−1.625***
	(0.833)	(0.388)	(0.853)	(0.391)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETELECOMMUNICATIONS FRAUD	−4.432+	−0.740	−4.706+	−0.727
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETERRORIST THREATS & ACTS	−5.380***	−1.127***	−5.446***	−1.155***
	(0.179)	(0.083)	(0.183)	(0.084)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEterroristic threats	−9.670*	0.214	−9.510*	0.161
	(4.235)	(1.973)	(4.339)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BRING PROP IN STATE	−6.249***	−1.306**	−5.850***	−1.168**

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.895)	(0.417)	(0.917)	(0.420)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY CONVERSION	−4.567***	−1.095***	−4.973***	−1.221***
	(0.457)	(0.213)	(0.468)	(0.215)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEtheft by conversion <$500	−13.152*	−2.868	−13.039*	−3.115
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.137)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY DECEPTION	−2.945***	−0.837***	−3.054***	−0.855***
	(0.436)	(0.203)	(0.447)	(0.205)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY EXTORTION	−4.689+	−1.086	−5.168+	−1.080
	(2.679)	(1.248)	(2.745)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY REC STOLEN PROP	−4.729***	−1.245***	−4.880***	−1.283***
	(0.141)	(0.065)	(0.144)	(0.066)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY SHOPLIFTING	−5.893***	−1.594***	−6.019***	−1.622***
	(0.170)	(0.079)	(0.175)	(0.080)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT BY TAKING	−3.921***	−1.172***	−3.993***	−1.169***
	(0.119)	(0.056)	(0.122)	(0.056)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT CREDIT CARD	−6.621***	−1.072***	−6.904***	−1.156***
	(0.608)	(0.283)	(0.623)	(0.285)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT MOTORVEH OR PART	−6.406***	−1.470***	−6.481***	−1.487***
	(0.608)	(0.283)	(0.623)	(0.285)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT OF LOST PROPERTY	−2.767	0.424	−3.123	0.274
	(1.997)	(0.930)	(2.046)	(0.937)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT OF SERVICES	−5.410***	−1.440*	−4.988***	−1.407*
	(1.341)	(0.625)	(1.374)	(0.630)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETHEFT RECV PROP OUT STATE	−5.730**	−2.196*	−5.661**	−2.237*
	(1.997)	(0.930)	(2.046)	(0.938)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF AMPHTMINE 200-399 GM	6.499*	0.405	6.499*	0.588

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(2.680)	(1.248)	(2.746)	(1.258)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF AMPHTMINE 28-199 GM	1.291	−0.277	1.260	−0.295
	(1.662)	(0.774)	(1.703)	(0.780)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF AMPHTMINE 400+ GM	1.908	2.306*	1.430	2.215+
	(2.445)	(1.139)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF COCAINE 201-400 GM	7.549***	0.583***	7.781***	0.609***
	(0.376)	(0.175)	(0.385)	(0.176)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF COCAINE 401+ GM	9.746***	1.562***	10.009***	1.571***
	(0.399)	(0.186)	(0.408)	(0.187)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF COCAINE LESS 200 GM	2.936***	−0.662***	3.092***	−0.652***
	(0.253)	(0.118)	(0.259)	(0.119)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MARIJNA 10-2000 LB	−0.234	−1.504***	0.177	−1.474***
	(0.301)	(0.140)	(0.308)	(0.141)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MARIJNA 10001+ LB	−4.409*	−2.027*	−3.698+	−1.922*
	(1.895)	(0.883)	(1.942)	(0.890)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MARIJNA 2001-10K LB	−0.785	−1.840*	−1.064	−2.001**
	(1.548)	(0.721)	(1.586)	(0.727)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MDA/EXTSY 200-399GM	1.689	−1.548+	2.371	−1.517+
	(1.806)	(0.842)	(1.851)	(0.848)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MDA/EXTSY 28-199GM	−1.617+	−2.172***	−1.223	−2.162***
	(0.858)	(0.400)	(0.879)	(0.403)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF MDA/EXTSY 400+GM	6.902**	−0.144	7.851**	−0.145
	(2.445)	(1.139)	(2.506)	(1.148)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF METHAMPH 200-399 GM	7.365***	0.500**	7.538***	0.490**
	(0.397)	(0.185)	(0.407)	(0.186)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF METHAMPH 28-199 GM	4.001***	−0.209*	4.078***	−0.212*

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.226)	(0.105)	(0.231)	(0.106)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF METHAMPH 400+ GM	8.258***	1.328***	8.607***	1.355***
	(0.556)	(0.259)	(0.569)	(0.261)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF METHAMPH UNSPEC AMT	4.977***	0.014	5.407***	0.104
	(0.438)	(0.204)	(0.448)	(0.205)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF METHAQUALONE>=400 GM	0.697	0.315	0.724	0.012
	(4.234)	(1.973)	(4.340)	(1.988)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF NARCOTIC 15-28 GM	5.262***	0.255	4.766***	0.145
	(0.986)	(0.460)	(1.011)	(0.463)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF NARCOTIC 29+ GM	6.634***	0.287	5.891***	0.144
	(1.250)	(0.582)	(1.281)	(0.587)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAF NARCOTIC LESS 14 GM	2.249**	−0.413	2.053*	−0.447
	(0.782)	(0.364)	(0.801)	(0.367)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRAFFICK SEXUAL SERVITUDE	2.386	−0.251	2.392	−0.204
	(1.454)	(0.677)	(1.490)	(0.682)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRANSACTIONS CNTRFT DRUGS	−8.989	−4.000	−10.599+	−4.253
	(5.987)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSETRNSPRT CONTRABAND ARTCLS	−10.554+	−4.458	−9.529	−4.665+
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEUNAUTH DIST CONTRLLD SUB	−4.598	−0.687	−4.938	−0.716
	(3.458)	(1.611)	(3.544)	(1.623)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEUNAUTH DIST RECRD DEVICES	−8.550***	−3.098***	−9.525***	−3.275***
	(1.662)	(0.774)	(1.703)	(0.780)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEUNKNOWN OFFENSE	−4.750***	−1.414***	−4.673***	−1.389***
	(0.572)	(0.267)	(0.586)	(0.268)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEUNLWFL MFG/DEL/DIST N-C S	−4.478***	−2.186***	−4.039***	−2.083***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.926)	(0.432)	(0.949)	(0.435)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEUSE COMM FACLTY VIO C SUB	−5.336***	−1.444*	−5.184***	−1.343*
	(1.413)	(0.658)	(1.448)	(0.663)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVANDALISM TO CHURCH ETC	−10.148+	−0.032	−7.433	0.950
	(5.988)	(2.790)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVEHICULAR HOMICIDE	1.448***	0.743***	1.454***	0.766***
	(0.228)	(0.106)	(0.234)	(0.107)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOL DNGROUS DRGS ACT	−4.663***	−0.833***	−5.083***	−0.946***
	(0.190)	(0.088)	(0.193)	(0.088)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEviol forgery&fraud prac	−6.192	−2.809	−8.308	−3.196
	(5.987)	(2.789)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOL GA CNTRL SBST ACT	−5.967***	−2.129***	−6.096***	−2.122***
	(0.270)	(0.126)	(0.276)	(0.126)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOL GA SECURITIES ACT	−4.839	−1.686	−6.870*	−2.053
	(2.994)	(1.395)	(3.069)	(1.406)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEviol income taxs prov/reg	3.024	−0.058	4.867	0.124
	(5.989)	(2.790)	(6.138)	(2.812)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOL MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS	−6.425***	−1.804***	−6.862***	−1.857***
	(0.422)	(0.197)	(0.432)	(0.198)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOL OATH PUBLIC OFFCR	−5.772***	−2.389***	−5.605***	−2.319***
	(1.279)	(0.596)	(1.310)	(0.600)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVIOLATN OTHR STATES LAW	−2.950***	−1.405***	−3.188***	−1.392***
	(0.631)	(0.294)	(0.646)	(0.296)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVOL MANSLAUGHTER OF FETUS	14.947*	0.338	11.347+	0.043
	(5.990)	(2.791)	(6.136)	(2.811)
PRIMARY_OFFENSEVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER	5.812***	5.767***	5.782***	5.820***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
	(0.196)	(0.091)	(0.201)	(0.092)
RACEBLACK × SEXMALE	−0.037	0.298***	0.009	0.306***
	(0.112)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.053)
RACEHISPANIC × SEXMALE	−0.631	−0.367+	−0.534	−0.342+
	(0.404)	(0.188)	(0.414)	(0.190)
RACEOTHER × SEXMALE	−0.629	−0.148	−0.468	−0.102
	(0.738)	(0.344)	(0.756)	(0.347)
ESCAPE_COUNT		0.841***		0.825***
		(0.125)		(0.126)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT10TH DISTRICT			2.938***	0.586***
			(0.099)	(0.045)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT1ST DISTRICT			1.426***	0.720***
			(0.101)	(0.046)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT2ND DISTRICT			3.833***	1.280***
			(0.111)	(0.051)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT3RD DISTRICT			2.673***	0.848***
			(0.110)	(0.050)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT4TH DISTRICT			0.332**	0.172***
			(0.108)	(0.049)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT6TH DISTRICT			0.843***	0.303***
			(0.097)	(0.044)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT7TH DISTRICT			2.391***	0.422***
			(0.093)	(0.043)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT8TH DISTRICT			3.041***	1.161***
			(0.113)	(0.052)
MAJOR_OFFENSE_DISTRICT9TH DISTRICT			2.428***	0.321***

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
			(0.098)	(0.045)
N	96281	96281	96281	96281
R^2^	0.33	0.48	0.30	0.48

Columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for Judicial Circuit, Columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for Judicial District, and all Columns include fixed effects for Primary Offense

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001