Gains and Losses: How Congressional Apportionment Shapes Partisan and Minority Representation

This thesis investigates how congressional apportionment influences partisan control and minority representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. Using redistricting simulations across six states—Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Illinois, Michigan, and West Virginia—it examines how gains or losses in House seats shape electoral competitiveness and descriptive representation. Grounded in theories of democratic representation, the analysis tests three core hypotheses: that seat gains favor dominant parties, that minority representation improves when redistricting reflects demographic change, and that the fixed size of the House intensifies representational disparities. Using data from the U.S. Census, election results, and DRA2020 mapping software, the findings reveal that partisan actors frequently exploit apportionment changes to entrench power, often to the detriment of minority communities. Results also show that independent redistricting commissions moderate partisan effects. The thesis concludes that equitable representation in the 21st century requires institutional reform and renewed attention to mechanics of apportionment and redistricting.