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Abstract
The discovery of CRISPR has provided the most advanced tool for genome editing, making its applications more feasible. This dissertation consists of three parts, each of which morally evaluates a different potential application of genome editing: human heritable genome editing, the eradication of mosquito species through genome editing, and genome editing for human enhancement. I propose a new formulation of the Precautionary Principle called the Protective Precautionary Principle (PPP). The PPP emphasizes the protection of disadvantaged people from significant risk because, in many cases, the application of new technology poses a greater risk to those with fewer means to protect themselves. I argue that the PPP is a preferable tool for morally assessing human heritable genome editing and the eradication of mosquito species through genome editing compared to other tools, such as cost-benefit analysis and Ann Thresher's Worst-Case Clause (WCC). Unlike cost-benefit analysis, the PPP can better handle cases with uncertain outcomes, such as human heritable genome editing. Compared to the WCC, the PPP provides an adequate normative standard for assessing the application of genome editing technology to eradicate mosquito species, while the WCC does not. According to the PPP, human heritable genome editing and the eradication of mosquito species through genome editing would be morally permissible for research purposes only as long as such research does not impose significant risks on disadvantaged groups of people without adequate measures for risk mitigation in place. Finally, this dissertation turns to morally assessing genetic enhancement. I argue that although genetic enhancement diminishes the value of achievement, it does not necessarily imply the impermissibility of genetic enhancement.