PLAYING THE PART: AN EXPERIMENT OF MASCULINITY UNDER THREAT IN

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SETTINGS

by

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(Under the Direction of DAWN T. ROBINSON)

ABSTRACT

Amid ongoing political and gender-based violence, it is essential to understand how perceived threats to masculinity influences men's behavior. What part does social setting play in this relationship? Do internalized norms of masculinity moderate the influence of threat on behavior? To investigate responses to masculinity threat in public and private settings, I conducted an online survey experiment with 398 white, cis-gender, straight men. When their masculinity is threatened, respondents increase their adherence to traditional masculine role norms. The public nature of the setting does not directly influence masculinity performance, However, those in the private setting had significantly different responses depending on whether their masculinity was threatened. Across settings, respondents initially reporting greater adherence to traditional male role norms responded more intensely to masculinity threat—by signaling their adherence to traditional masculinity even more strongly. These results support predictions from hybrid masculinity theory and control theories of identity.

INDEX WORDS: Identity, Threat, Hybrid masculinity, Affect control theory, CMNI-30

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Over a decade ago, Willer and colleagues published a test of the overcompensation thesis using masculinity. They found that "...men react to masculine insecurity by enacting extreme demonstrations of their masculinity" (2013:981). When told they were feminine, men would perform an even more extreme form of masculinity as shown by their increased "...support for war, homophobic attitudes, and interest in purchasing an SUV" (2013:980). They argue that this may be because these men endorse a narrower conception of masculinity and potentially have a more traditional cultural world view. They also called for future studies to look into the influence of status through the use of different settings in the reveal of the threat condition (2013:1014).

In a laboratory experiment, these researchers threatened participants' gender identities with false feedback and measured the degree to which they compensated in following self-presentations. This thesis builds on Willer and colleagues' (2013) paper on the masculine overcompensation thesis and previous critical masculinity research in light of the backlash against cultural changes in gender. Given the ongoing instances of political and gender-based violence, we must better understand how traditional masculinity norms can lead to harmful behavior in response to a perceived threat. In turn, it is crucial to understand the influence of different social settings as they may play a part in how men navigate their gender identity and their likelihood to overcompensate. To do this, I develop a more direct test of the competing arguments in contemporary masculinity theory – by measuring masculinity prior to the intervention, adding public and private as an additional manipulated design factor, and including

men from multiple age cohorts in the study sample. Their overcompensation thesis preceded Bridges and Pascoe's hybrid masculinity theory (2014) and in turn focused on the narrowness type masculinity that men subscribed to using hegemonic and inclusive masculinity theories (Connell 2005; Anderson 2009). This study aims to delve into the reasoning behind different reactions to a masculinity threat and in turn how this public private reveal, as Willer and colleagues describe, could also be used to study Hybrid Masculinity's premise that some men perform different masculinities based on their audience in order to maintain power and prestige (Bridges and Pascoe 2014). This thesis also aims to look at the overcompensation hypothesis through a different lens of affect control theory (ACT) and its ideas of reactions to deflection. Deflection being "the distance between the transient impressions inspired by an experienced event and the fundamental sentiments associated with the original definition of the situation" (Affectcontroltheory.org:Overview).

I hope to understand the relationship between threats to masculinity and men's reaction moderated by a public or private environment. These environments are the presence of other people or lack thereof during the experiment. More specifically, I hope to answer the question of how does the presence of a threat to masculinity impact the demonstration of inclusive or hybrid forms of masculinity amongst straight, white, middle-class, cis-gender men and what part does the type of social environment play?

Cultural understandings of masculinity evolve over time, as does our body of scholarship about the construct of masculinity. This thesis begins with a survey of the sometimes parallel, and sometimes conflicting, theories and constructs of masculinity within the literature. Specifically, I start this work with a discussion of hegemonic, inclusive, and hybrid masculinity theories. I describe Connell's (1995) introduction of hegemonic masculinity or the "ideal

masculinity" within a society and then present the shift in scholarly though regarding cultural shifts in masculinity. Eric Anderson's (2009) inclusive masculinity theory asserts that there is a new hegemonic inclusive masculinity that some men are now positioning themselves in relation to. Bridges and C.J. Pascoe (2014) advanced a theory of hybrid masculinity arguing that this shift to a "softer" masculinity is a performance rather than a genuine adoption of inclusive norms. According to their theory, men are attempting to maintain their power and prestige in society through situational displays of inclusive masculinity without changing what they believe.

Are men turning towards a more inclusive masculinity as opposed to subscribing to traditional male role norms? If they are demonstrating inclusive masculinity, is this a genuine change or due to public pressure to display a certain type of masculinity? Is this public pressure hinting at change in our cultural understandings of what it means to be a man? In order to address these research questions, I conducted a survey experiment with a 2 (threat of masculinity vs no threat) by 2 (private versus public environment) factorial design blocked by age (25 to 35 versus 45 and older) with a non-experimental covariate of masculinity type (inclusive, moderate, and orthodox). This manipulation of public and private environments in this experiment allows me to see whether men respond differently due to the presence of other people during performance of gender versus responding in a private setting. Through this audience condition of public versus private, I am testing hybrid masculinity theory and in turn seeing if men perceive there to be a shift towards more inclusive general social norms of masculinity that no longer match up with their more traditional internalized norms of masculinity.

Before I attempt to answer these questions, it is important to note the different arguments I am using as the foundations for my hypotheses and methodology. First, I will go through general masculinity theories and moderate the scholarly arguments for how to tackle the ever-

evolving concept of masculinity over time. After addressing the overarching masculinity theories in the literature, I address identity and self-presentation using concepts from Goffman's dramaturgy and ACT. I also argue that though there are examinations of masculinity using a threat to masculinity, these studies have not included the idea of a public or private environment to understand how "genuine" inclusive masculinity might be and how the environment shapes the severity of reactions. I anticipate that this study will be able to add to the current conversation on how scholars should approach different theories of masculinities in future works as well as build on the literature regarding how challenges to masculinity influence the size of deflection. Previous research specifically calls for more work on gender performance in different social environments (Willer et al. 2013:1014). I answer this call through the addition of a public or private environment in my experiment. Asking, does context matter?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Masculinity

Before delving into the theories of masculinity, it is important to understand and define

what masculinity is. However, this is not an easy task as Raewyn Connell acknowledges that

"masculinity" does not exist in all places and across all cultures (2005:67-68). Because of this, I

define *masculinity* as the characteristics usually ascribed to men and boys within a society. As I

am using masculinity theories from predominantly white and western scholarship with a white,

American, cis-gendered, straight sample, I will provide a brief discussion of the history and

development of white, American masculinity.

In his chronicling of the recent history of masculinity, Michael Kimmel focuses on the

idea of a "masculinity crisis" within America between the early 1800s into the early 1900s in a

chapter of his 2005 book *The History of Men*. He argues that many modern behaviors associated

with men and masculinity stem from the early destabilization of manhood and the attempt to find

it again through the implementation of rules and restrictions in the 1920s (2005:37). These rules

and regulations included the focus on a "masculine" body through set ideas about physical

fitness and sexuality, the separation of "men" from other genders, other races, and other

sexualities through a focus on differences as opposed to similarities, as well as the need to

"escape" (2005:37). It is important to understand these underpinnings and historical shifts of

masculinity as it helps scholars understand the root of current social behaviors.

One useful example of a connection between current-day social behavior and the historical explanation in Kimmel's book would be the transition to a new type of man. He describes this crisis of masculinity near the end of the 19th century as the fear that there was a "feminization" of general culture and in turn masculinity (2005:45). This worry potentially stemmed from the transition from independent and more physical occupations to "sitting behind a desk" (2005:43). That is when these "rules and regulations" of masculinity were established. This fear of feminization of culture is where the connection between the historical crisis and current social behavior lies as there was a backlash at both the change in masculinity but also at femininity in general. Not to say that women had not already been seen as second-class citizens for all of history but that femininity in any form across genders was seen as an illness to American society.

Kimmel explained that people lamented the loss of the "good old days" where young boys exhibited more forms of violence in their social interactions with one another; however, the new "feminized" boys were no longer beating one another senselessly on the playground leading to a generation of "sissies" (2005:47). Femininity and women were used as a form of insult meant to reorient the masculinity of young boys towards violence and a bigger, more powerful physique. This showcases how Kimmel's work takes the historical analysis of events and connects it to social behavior still in use. Throughout history, society has emphasized traditional gender roles, particularly regarding masculinity. The pressure to conform to a certain ideal of what it means to be a 'real man' has led to complex and often harmful behaviors, affecting not only individuals but also entire communities. Are these harmful, traditional ideals of masculinity still subscribed to even now? Is what it means to be a man and the characteristics of a man changing? Is the landscape of gender, its expression, and its ideals changing with a new

expanded understanding of gender? In the following section, I will explore the major constructs and theories of masculinity as well as the most current discussions to showcase the scholarly landscape of masculinity.

Hegemonic Masculinity

Over the last few decades, researchers have developed several major theories of masculinity including hegemonic masculinity, multiple masculinities, inclusive masculinity, hybrid masculinity, and manhood acts (Bird 1996; Connell 2005; Anderson 2009; Bridges and Pascoe 2014; Schrock and Schwalbe 2018). However, this thesis focuses on hegemonic, inclusive, and hybrid masculinity as I am testing these theories in my experiment and because they speak to the broad, major characteristics of masculinity in society.

In the 1980s, multiple scholars started to include the idea of "hegemonic masculinity" in their work, most prominently Raewyn Connell. She continued her work on this theory in her book *Masculinities* in the chapter "The Social Organization of Masculinity" and her article "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept" (1995; 2005). This term originates from Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony which referred to how the ruling class is able to control the working class without coercion or force; instead, they legitimize certain values and norms to be used as informal social control (Gramsci 1971). This aligns well with Connell's more recent definition of hegemonic masculinity as "...the currently most honored way of being a man, it required all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the global subordination of women to men" (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:832). This is the "ideal" form of masculinity, or hegemonic form, that men attempt to live up to and that is ever evolving as the definition of what it means to be a "man" in America changes. Connell and Messerschmidt make an important note that though this is the normative form of masculinity

within a society by no means is it enacted by a large swath of men (2005:832). Integrating these perspectives, in this thesis I define *hegemonic masculinity* as the theory that there is a culturally agreed upon hegemonic masculinity and that this is the metric on which men believe that they are judged by and gain and lose prestige from other people.

So, what does hegemonic masculinity look like in America? More generally, what defines current and ongoing masculinities? What makes the modern man? In Sharon Bird's "Welcome to the Men's Club," she explores hegemonic masculinity through "male homosocial interactions" focusing on heterosexual men and how being "straight" is a dominant characteristic of traditional male role norms (Kimmel 1994; Levant et al. 2020; O'Connor et al 2017; Rivera and Dasgupta 2018). In her piece, she describes three major patterns of behavior that men use to maintain and reinforce the hegemonic ideal of masculinity: "emotional detachment, competitiveness, and sexual objectification of women" (1996:122). Masculinity measurement scales and inventories have also highlighted "winning, emotional control, pursuit of status, playboy, power over women, risk-taking, primacy of work, heterosexual self-presentation, violence, and self-reliance" as important characteristics of male role norms (Levant et al. 2020:631).

Though there is this ideal man that all men, in their cultural or particular society, position themselves against, Connell argues that there are "multiple masculinities" beyond hegemonic masculinity such as subordinate, marginalized, complicit and masculinities (Connell 1987; Connell 2005). These are the types of masculinity born out of being unable to meet the hegemonic ideal such as expressing overtly "feminine" qualities such as being a gay man, or being apart of the "other" based on gender, race, class or additional minority group, and finally those who may not meet all of the criteria of the idea man but they still benefit just from being a

man and fail to challenge the hegemonic norm (Connell 1987; Connell 2005). The following scholars in this section on hegemonic masculinity will highlight what exactly makes up hegemonic masculinity as well as how it maintains dominance over other forms of masculinity.

Conceptions of the ideal man shifted and changed as we saw men in the 10th century wearing high-heeled boots whilst men now would be stigmatized and policed for this choice of footwear. If masculinity can change and adapt, then why do the responses such as policing and violence continue to be so pervasive in different forms of masculinity? Kimmel brought this up in his discussion of "masculinity as homophobia" and reiterated Connell's concept of complicity. In a chapter from *Theorizing Masculinities*, Michael Kimmel says that:

> Homophobia is the fear that other men will unmask us, emasculate us, reveal to us and the world that we do not measure up, that we are not real men. We are afraid to let other men see that fear. Fear makes us ashamed, because the recognition of fear in ourselves is proof to ourselves that we are not as manly as we pretend, that we are, like the young man in a poem by Yeats, "one that ruffles in a manly pose for all his timid heart." Our fear is the fear of humiliation. We are ashamed to be afraid. Shame leads to silence— the silences that keep other people believing that we actually approve of the things that are done to women, to minorities, to gays and lesbians in our culture. (1994:131)

Kimmel's quote highlights not only the continued relevance of the term hegemonic masculinity but also its use when understanding why the many men who do not even meet the hegemonic standard choose to uphold and maintain it. The answer is met with a mixture of arguments for both fear as Kimmel states and power (Anderson 2009). Though they are unable to be the hegemonic man they still derived power, privilege, and prestige from just being a man in society and they only benefit even more the closer they get to this ideal. Being complicit in this

unobtainable masculinity also allows them to continue to subjugate women, men of marginalized or subordinate masculinities, and those who do not subscribe to the binary concept of gender.

Many seminal works on masculinity focused not only on men's treatment of women but also their determination to separate themselves from gay men; however, there is evidence of a movement away from specifically targeting gay men to evolving and expanding understanding of gender more generally. As of August 2024, there are 26 states with laws that ban gender-affirming healthcare (HRC Foundation 2023). A few months prior, an anti-drag law passed in Tennessee with 13 states following suit (Burga 2023). Over the course of the 2023-2024 school year, "…over 10,000 books were banned in public schools" due to their inclusion of characters of color, discussions of race or racism, and portrayals of gender and sexuality outside of the binary and heterosexual norm (Meehan and Baeta 2024).These may be seen as reactions or backlashes to the changes in how gender categories have broadened in recent years from a strict binary to a more fluid or spectrum understanding of gender.

We can see the changes in cultural norms surrounding gender reflected in everyday interactions such as the movement towards displaying one's pronouns on social media and the inclusion of non-binary, gender fluid, and transgender options on forms and surveys. The United States appears to be moving into a period of gender hysteria with attacks on all sectors from the LGBTQ community to gender performance at large. Not only are there attacks on specifically those who do not follow the binary understanding of gender, but also emerging movements on how straight men and women are supposed to be "men" and "women" (Sitler-Elbel 2021). In her new book, Judith Butler discusses this gender hysteria as well, specifically a "anti-gender movement," as a threat or "apocalyptic fear" (2024:256-257). This calls back to the fear that

Kimmel argues is the reasoning behind the subscription to hegemonic norms of masculinity despite not agreeing with them or being a part of a marginalized or subordinate masculinity.

As this is following a similar logic to Anderson's passage on homohysteria and Kimmel's passage on homophobia, this backlash may be a way that men in society are attempting to reinstate a hegemonic form of both masculinity and gender more generally. This gender hysteria may be a reaction to recent progress made such as the legalization of gay marriage, the movement towards DEI policies in schools, and diversity initiatives in companies. These could all be perceived as threats to masculinity. These reactions demand more research into the responses to a threat to one's masculinity and the harmful behavioral consequences. It is important to note that I will be differentiating the theory of hegemonic masculinity and my actual measure of adherence to these traditional masculine role norms using the term "orthodox" to note those with strong adherence and "inclusive" to note those with weak adherence as used by Eric Anderson in the following section.

Inclusive Masculinity

Hegemonic masculinity tends to lend itself to a rather dismal overview of masculinity in that all men, even if they do not meet hegemonic standards, feel a pressure to conform to traditional male norms of violence, domination, and emotional control. But when you look around, I imagine you see men in your life who actively rebel against hegemonic ideals and who acknowledge their own privilege and position in society unlike Connell's complicit masculinity. Eric Anderson first approached this idea in his book titled *Inclusive Masculinity: The Changing Nature of Masculinities.* He contends that homophobia is an essential aspect of hegemonic masculinity. But also, he argues that hegemonic masculinity was not able to conceptualize the idea that multiple forms of masculinity could exist within a society without the need for an

overarching hegemonic form. Anderson argues "...that as cultural homohysteria significantly declines…softer masculinities will exist without the use of social stigma to police them" that "...blur[s] the lines between masculinity and femininity" (Anderson 2009:96) which he coins as inclusive masculinity.

Anderson cites prior studies that show a movement away from "orthodox masculinity" such as Swain who studied masculinity in children and teenagers (2006). His earlier argument asserts that this idea of orthodox masculinity may be running more in parallel to inclusive masculinity as opposed to being the one dominating form of masculinity. This descriptive theory highlights a period of cultural change and argues that this tends to happen not incrementally but may be changing in groups. Eric Anderson and Mark McCormack explain, in the 2018 update to inclusive masculinity, that these shifts in behavior are amongst "...primarily...young men" and studies of inclusive masculinity tend to focus on those in the "millennial cohort" (2018:549). Through my age blocking and inclusion of this Millennial cohort along with slightly younger Generation Z and Generation X participants, I hope to pull men from the inclusive side and also see if this is truly a shift amongst younger generations or if this cultural shift permeates older generations.

Perhaps the cultural shift towards privileging more inclusive characteristics is what is causing this backlash due to progressive policies and shifts in societal standards of gender. Anderson is careful to clarify that this introduction of inclusive masculinity does not lead to a gender utopia where all violence and policing cease to exist (2009:98). Rather, other groups will slowly begin to gain some of the power and privilege that certain men automatically receive through their compliance and adherence to hegemonic masculinity (2009:98). It also does not mean that these men are too much of a jump from their orthodox counterparts. Anderson also

acknowledges that even with the rise of inclusive masculinity, there will still be homophobia, patriarchy, and other remnants from orthodox masculinity. Inclusive masculinity is the diminishing of orthodox characteristics and the increase of "social benefit for women" (2018:41). Though this seemingly "too good to be true" theory of masculinity sounds promising for society, others disagree with this emerging, genuine inclusivity that men appear to be demonstrating.

Hybrid Masculinity

Five years after the emergence of Anderson's inclusive masculinity theory, Tristan Bridges and C.J. Pascoe introduced hybrid masculinity theory to better explain the shift of seemingly inclusive masculinity and Anderson's argument expanding on Connell's hegemonic masculinity theory and concept of multiple masculinities. They believe that instead of an emergence of a new inclusive masculinity there is "...the selective incorporation of elements of identity typically associated with various marginalized and subordinate masculinities and–at times–femininities into privileged men's gender performances and identities" (Bridges and Pascoe 2018:246). This idea argues that this newfound inclusive masculinity that Anderson points to is not genuine and is not open to all men across race, class, sexuality, etc.

The authors also emphasize just how well hybrid masculinity can mask the disingenuous motivations for including inclusive elements in one's presentation of masculinity (Bridges and Pascoe 2014:246). Does this mean that the potential progress that inclusive masculinity asserts is merely a clever way men are able to hold on to their power in an ever-changing world? Bridges and Pascoe go on to explain three ways that men use hybrid masculinity to perpetuate and maintain inequality: discursive distancing, strategic borrowing, and fortifying boundaries (2014:250-254).

They first start out with the concept of *discursive distancing* which explains the modern patriarchy's newfound "gender flexibility" as a tool to make it appear as if the patriarchy is fading despite it being ever present (2018:49). Discursive distancing is best described as the way men separate themselves from hegemonic masculinity through things such as participating in women's right marches or voting for policies and politicians who aim to help more marginalized groups; however, at the exact same time, these men may joke about things or actions being "gay" or state that voting for women's rights is "what a manly man actually does." They are oscillating between demonstrating inclusive characteristics while their behavior with other men or their reasons for doing these inclusive things maintain hegemonic characteristics for men.

Men also *strategically borrow* and combine other marginalized identities with their dominant identity (white or heterosexual masculinity) to make it seem as if that dominant masculinity is not "normative" (2018:50). Essentially, when white masculinity or heterosexual masculinity comes to the front of discussion it runs and positions itself away from the center using these borrowed identities. Finally, the authors point out that men use hybrid masculinity as an "egalitarian" front that *fortifies boundaries* and makes them appear to be inclusive when in reality their underlying power and privilege within society continue. It is the appearance of progress without the actual work or change involved and a way to hide continuing gender inequality (2018:52).

This theory of hybrid masculinity stipulates that masculinity changes because of forces similar to demand characteristics in research (McCambridge 2012). Men have noticed changes to social norms in society. They feel the external pressure to seem as if there is a new masculinity ideal and they need to adapt to continue to reap the benefits of power and prestige. This change is externally driven not internally driven. Rather than changing one's own understanding of

masculinity due to the internalization of these new social norms, men are responding to changes in reward systems because behavioral norms are changing faster than their internalized norms. The first to actually change their internalized norms are those disadvantaged by the previous regime and the ones who benefited are the last to change.

<div align="center">*Current Discussions*</div>

These basic introductions of each theory have been updated but are still outdated by six years and much has happened in the field since then. Tristian Bridges and Kendall Ota expanded hybrid masculinity theory to incorporate a more specific, and relevant, concept—*hybrid hegemonic masculinity*. This hybrid hegemonic masculinity is the "hybrid configurations of hegemonic masculinity that simultaneously obscure and secure power and inequality" (Bridges and Ota 2020:275). They assert the need to specify a hybrid hegemonic masculinity as, though hybrid masculinity is used by a variety of men with different masculinities, there are distinct motivations, and meanings for the hybrid masculinity used by men who exist at the intersection of many privileged identities (2020: 275).

Seven years after the original introduction of hybrid masculinity theory, Andria Christofidou pointed out that there is clearly inequality in those who can afford to breach some masculine norms and utilize other subordinate or marginalized masculinities (2021:87). Because of this, Christofidou argues that it is more important to understand why men use different masculinities to understand why there appears to be change in the first place. She also points out that many studies using these major theories of masculinity focus on cis-gender, white, straight men, so it is difficult to theoretically generalize them to other groups of men. Christofidou also asserts that masculinity studies need to consider intersectionality more in the formation and analysis of their studies (87).

In response to Christofidou's arguments, Steven Roberts, Karla Elliott, and Brittany Ralph offered a critique focused on the unintended consequences of the current ways of discussing masculinity. In particular, Roberts and colleagues question the utility of pitting inclusive masculinity theory and hybrid masculinity theory against one another (2021:190). They argue for a more "paradigmatically non-competitive" approach pulling from Bridges, McCormack, and Diefendorf (2021:192). The authors believe that scholars should not fight over one all-encompassing theory of masculinity; instead, they should acknowledge the contributions of each theory to understand the complexity of masculinity. One of their main issues with Christofidou's article is the focus on how privileged men are able to enact "change" because of their ability to have gender flexibility, but that is also implied that change is only occurring among privileged men.

Scholars should view these as non-conflicting theories as in truth they do not completely clash with one another and also to avoid the pitfalls Roberts and colleagues identified. Anderson stipulated that there was a cohort of men displaying this new inclusive masculinity and internalizing new social norms due to internal pressure to change as opposed to external pressure with the caveat of still maintaining some hegemonic characteristics. Bridges and Pascoe built on this argument in that they believe this change that Anderson sees is due to external pressure from changing social norms. This means they believe that the change to a more inclusive masculinity is due to wanting to continue having power and prestige but being forced to adapt instead of men taking advantage of the space created for exploring other forms of masculinity. Men's internal social norms are still hegemonic, but they know that societal norms are different.

Therefore, the big question out of all of this is whether we are seeing a cohort of men changing because they genuinely want to or if men are changing their behavior to reap the

benefits of a society that prefers less hegemonic men. I address this question through a public versus private condition to test the internal and external social norms of masculinity. I continue my thesis with the understanding that these theories are actually complimentary in many ways and that there is not a perfect, overarching, general theory of masculinity. Especially, as Christofidou pointed out, many of these general theories of masculinity are rooted in research on white, western men.

Identity and Self-presentation

The previous section focuses on the broad, overarching narratives of masculinity within scholarship. However, because one's gender identity is so often utilized in everyday interactions, it is important to also include theories and literature from work on identity and self-presentation (MacKinnon and Heise 2010:95). It shapes the way people behave especially through their performances of gender across different interactions (West and Zimmerman 2009). Pulling from Goffman, West and Zimmerman famously argued to view gender "...as [an] accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction[s]" through the idea of gender performance or "doing gender" (1987:125). They assert that gender is not fixed, as previous scholarship had believed, and that it is not solely housed in the individual; rather, it functions at the interactional and even institutional level. As opposed to a stagnant category, gender is an outcome and something one accomplishes. They explain that unlike social identities, gender is a consistent resource to pull from in interactions. Their argument provides a bridge between Goffman's ideas of gender and the responses to a threat to one's gender identity through ACT.

Goffman's Dramaturgy

Gender and masculinity scholars regularly turn to Goffman's notion of dramaturgy as a way of understanding masculinity performance (Butler 1988; West and Zimmerman 2009). I

adopt that approach here, making use of the concepts of frontstage and backstage, and recognizing that, like a role in a play, masculinity performances may differ based on setting, time, motives, and audience. However, masculinity is more complex than a simple character in a play and elicits different interactions with different audience members. Each man is an actor for a general audience out in front of them with other men sitting in the box seats watching their every move through binoculars. Previous scholarship has used ethnographic methods to explore the interactions between men and other men finding heightened hegemonic characteristics in these interactions (Bird 1996). This thesis focuses more on the interaction between the man and the general audience to understand how more general social norms of masculinity differ from internalized norms. This front stage act of masculinity is based on the audience and their expectations and norms which I test using the public setting condition. However, once actors walk off stage, they enter what Goffman calls the back stage where they are not held as strongly to the norms of the audience (1959:69). Though the presence of social norms still exists, this back stage provides them with breathing room and space to enact their "true" or "genuine" form of themselves and in turn their internalized norms of masculinity. When they walk off stage, is the character they play and the actual actor's beliefs congruent? In order to control for the time and motive, I have selected a very narrow demographic of men to engage in experimental manipulation of just the setting with the presence or absence of "strangers" who act as a general audience.

Affect Control Theory

MacKinnon and Heise focus not only on front stage and back stage but also on the different identities, or characters in dramaturgy, in different situations. They argue that we enact these different characters, or roles as they use, to solidify our identities (2010:112). In affect

control theory, there is a focus on identities and how, in order to confirm them, we attempt to behave in ways that are consistent with them. However, they also discuss the process we engage in when our identity is not confirmed with this event referred to as deflection. "... A specific deflection arises as transient impressions of the individual with the selected identity are compared to the identity sentiment" and this comparison shows distance between the impressions and sentiments (2010:202). Within the realm of masculinity, this would mean that a deflection occurs as ongoing impressions of the man with his selected masculine identity are compared with attitudes of that identity and there is difference between them. So, what happens when there is deflection because these comparisons do not add up, such as when one's identity is threatened? MacKinnon and Heise believe that people create "restorative events" to help "reconfirm" the identity that was threatened.

People can be located anywhere along the spectrum of masculinity and femininity; however, what kind of "restorative" events help reconfirm their gender identity? If they exist along a spectrum does that also mean that there is a spectrum of possible restorative events? Willer and colleagues argue that people overcompensate when their gender identity is challenged (2010:203). In ACT, scholars argue that when dealing with deflection people tend to select an identity from their existing set that helps ease the deflection. Specifically, people confirm an identity that is equally distant and in the opposite direction of the deflection similar to Willer and colleagues' idea of overcompensation.

Within this thesis' context, this would mean that individuals select a gender identity equal distance and in the opposite direction of the deflection to resolve the difference between their self-sentiment and the transient sentiment due to the threat. I believe that following the threat in my experiment the behavioral response will be due to the size of the initial deflection. This is

because one's gender identity exists along a spectrum of masculinity and femininity. Their

original identity meanings could exist at any point in between which means that a challenge to

one man's gender identity might not be threatening for someone else. They do not have to make

as big a jump to reconfirm their identity as displayed in figure 1. The size of the response

corresponds to the size of the deflection from their baseline identity to where the threat shifts

them.

Figure 1. Response to Deflection in Terms of Masculinity Type

IT1/IT2: Inclusive masculinity time 1/time 2
OT1/OT2: Orthodox masculinity time 1/time 2

Using language from inclusive masculinity theory, I believe that inclusive men who are

already leaning more towards femininity than their orthodox counterpart will be less threatened

by the challenge to their masculinity as it does not push them too far away from their gender

identity. But if the man is more orthodox and starts off farther away from femininity, a threat

will create a larger initial deflection. He will need to overcompensate past his initial gender

identity to resolve the deflection. In the case of this thesis a person's size of the resolution

depends on the size of the deflection.

On top of adding onto the literature surrounding ACT and deflection, I wish to work towards answering the question of why certain men can enact certain types of masculinities. Understanding how the baseline masculinity influences their reaction to threat can help us better understand why we are seeing more political violence, mass shootings, and hate crimes as a backlash to changes in gender norms. We can also see the relationship between specifically gender and violent behavior in the number of self-identifying involuntary celibates "incels" and far-right online organization memberships of mass shooters. These men feel threatened by something within society, women or expansions in society's understanding of gender, that may also threaten more inclusive men but the majority of those reacting with extreme levels of violence tend to subscribe to extreme forms of masculinity. I am using an experimental methodology that looks at men controlled for major demographic characteristics such as race, gender, class, and sexual orientation as this prevents confounding results due to varying characteristics of hegemonic masculinity for different groups of men. Anderson hints at this idea of presentation differences among men due to what is socially acceptable because of what characteristics are stigmatized among different cultures (2009).

In order to understand if there is more variety in men's performances of masculinity based on what characteristics they perceive to be more or less stigmatized, I am employing different social settings that I am called the audience condition. Setting can include a variety of different variables but for this study, I focused on a private versus public condition. A private setting in my experiment is a social environment where participants' behavior will not be observed by any other party beyond the researcher after the participant finishes the experiment. A public setting in my experiment is a social environment where the participants believe that their behavior will be observed by another individual at the end of their experiment. I am only

theorizing about public settings where a stranger is present and not friends, family, or acquaintances. This stranger acts as a proxy for what the men perceive the general social norms to be. Based on both hybrid and inclusive masculinity theories, there are new social norms that deviate from traditional masculine norms and promote more inclusive behavior especially in the presence of strangers. This would indicate that the stranger should prompt a more inclusive response.

CHAPTER 3

METHODLOGY

I conducted an online survey experiment to test Willer et al.'s findings on masculine

overcompensation and to examine Bridges and Pascoe's theory of hybrid masculinity. An

experiment is the most appropriate for this study because I seek to test previous scholarship that

used experiments and because I seek to isolate the influence of social setting that would not be

possible using other quantitative or qualitative methods such as surveys or interviews.

Conducting an experiment also provides this research with strong internal validity so that I can

identify how the public and private settings moderate the relationship between threat and

masculine response.

Due to the predominantly white and western nature of the overarching masculinity

theories, I used a sample of white, cis-gender, heterosexual, American men. To get

representation of different types of masculinity, I blocked participants by age (25-35 and 45 and

older), following Anderson's idea that inclusive men are predominantly younger than their

orthodox counterparts. I measured adherence to masculine norms using the Conformity to

Masculine Norms Inventory (CMNI-30) before and after two manipulation conditions. For the

threat condition, I provided feedback indicating that they either scored "like a woman" or "about

average for men" on the CMNI-30. After the I also manipulated the social setting by informing

participants about interactions with a partner or emphasizing confidentiality, influencing how

they might respond to the second CMNI-30. Based on Willer and colleagues' research, I

hypothesize that men whose masculinity is threatened to adhere more to traditional male role

norms. In line with hybrid masculinity, I expect men who believe they are working with a partner to adhere less to traditional male role norms than those who were told their answers are confidential. To build on Willer and colleagues' work and affect control theory, I anticipate that the amount that one's adherence to traditional male role norms increases is due to their initial level of adherence.

Sample

I sampled white, cis-gender, heterosexual, American men between the ages of 25 and 35 as well as 45 years and older in the United States via Prolific, an online participant pool. The decision to block by age allows me to examine whether Anderson's idea that age is related to masculinity type is correct and increase the variability of masculinity type in my data – which is necessary for testing my hypotheses. Masculinity type is treated as a non-experimental blocking factor within the statistical analyses. Even if this approach is successful in increasing variation in masculinity types, I do not have the statistical power to not conflate age and masculinity if they are very correlated. My sample includes 398 participants resulting in approximately 199 participants per condition and when including the masculinity type as a non-experimental condition there are roughly 50 in each of the 8 possible condition groups.

Previous scholars have already pointed out that there are "multiple masculinities" as masculinity is unique to the individual; however, there are "patterns of masculinity" that exist throughout society (Connell 1987; Connell 2005). Therefore, I chose to use those most likely to subscribe to the hegemonic norm of masculinity in the United States so that I am better able to control for cultural, racial, and gender differences. I also chose to use this sample of men because of the theories I am using come from a primarily white and western perspective. Therefore as one of few experimental tests of these theories, it is likely to apply to a more white and western

men sample which is a more conservative sample and whose results could then be more theoretically generalized to other groups of men. It is also important to study those who hold the most power in society as they are often seen as the "norm" and are overlooked. I did not recruit a "nationally representative" sample of the general U.S. population because of the reasons I stipulated above; however, I believe that the results from this sample of men will be theoretically generalizable. Using this niche sample of men allows me to experiment using a conservative sample of men who are most likely to subscribe to hegemonic masculinity and see if the environment they are in influences the behavior they exude. If they demonstrate inclusive behavior in either public or private condition, I am potentially able to theoretically generalize the findings to a less conservative population of men.

Using online participant pools can be helpful in obtaining a diverse sample with varying demographics compared to the usual undergraduate pool. The diverse characteristics of this pool are especially helpful when looking at masculinity as it is influenced by a variety of factors such as class, region, family background, etc. Though I created the experiment using Qualtrics, recruiting subjects through Prolific helped me avoid issues with bots and prescreening. I limited my population on age, gender, race, and sexuality. The representation of these characteristics on these web panels is less important for my study. I did not limit my participants on the basis of education; however, most participants on web panels do tend to have at least some college or an associate degree indicating a higher level of education than the general public (Stanton et al. 2022:435).

Procedure

Cover story

On Prolific, this survey experiment was titled "Survey instrument testing" and the description stated "We are testing different combinations of statements and different wording in a new survey before using it in future research. Though this study is for a future project, your answers to questions will have an important impact on this new survey. You will answer basic demographic questions and then take two different versions of the survey. It will also help us determine how different wordings of statements change how you answer them." A similar statement was reiterated after they completed the informed consent form on Qualtrics.

Demographic variables

I collected data on participants' age, education, SES, income, relationship status, religious affiliation, political affiliation, and residence type. I prescreened participants on the basis of race, gender identity, citizenship, and sexual orientation.

Age is a continuous variable in which participants were able to enter their current age in years, but they were recruited with a prescreen for individuals 25 to 35 years of age and 45 years of age and older.

Education was measured from "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" with 7 categories from less than high school to doctorate. These were collapsed into no college/uncompleted college, completed college, and highest education with each as a dichotomous variable.

Socioeconomic status (SES) was a measure of one's believed place on the socioeconomic "ladder" from 1 (top) to 10 (bottom) asked as "Where would you position yourself on the

socioeconomic ladder?" These 10 positions were collapsed into upper (1-4), middle (5-6), and lower (7-10) which are all dichotomous variables.

Income was a measured as "What is your personal income per year (after taxes)?" from less than 10,000 to more than 150,000 in ranges of 10,000 dollars up until 100,000 which went from 100,000 to 149,000 resulting in 12 categories. These were further collapsed into lower (less than 10,000 to 49,000) , middle (50,000-150,000), and upper class (more than 150,000). Class distinctions are highly variable on time and location so for the purposes of this analysis they were condensed in what is commonly associated with each class generally in the United States.

Relationship status was measured as "What is your relationship status?" with the options single, long-term relationship but not married, married, widowed, divorced, separated, and in a civil partnership. For analysis, I created the variables unpartnered (single, widowed, divorced, separated) and partnered (long-term relationship, married, and in a civil partnership). I also dichotomized each answer option to run in the analyzes.

Religious affiliation was measured as "What is your religious affiliation?" with 11 options: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Non-Religious, Paganism, Unitarianism, other, and prefer not to answer. Almost all of the participants fit within Christianity, Judaism, and Non-Religious leading me to make these each dichotomous variables and to lump all of the other religious affiliations into an "other" variable. Those who preferred not to answer were treated as missing data.

Political affiliation was measured as "When it comes to politics, where would you place yourself?" and included four options—Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, and prefer not to answer. I created a dichotomous variable for Conservative, Moderate, and Liberal. Those who preferred not to answer were treated as missing data.

Residence type was measured as "How would you define your current place of residence?" and included urban, suburban, and rural. I dichotomized each option for the purpose of analysis.

Measures

Conformity to Masculine Norms-30

The Conformity to Masculine Norms Inventory (CMNI) is a questionnaire developed in 2003 by Mahalik and colleagues that attempts to better examine men's performance of masculinity through 10 norms of masculinity which are measured through a different number of items (depending on the version) that are answered using a 6-point Likert. I used the CMNI-30, which is the latest development of this inventory from Levant and colleagues in 2020 that has strong indicators of validity and a better fit than the previous 29, 46, or 94 item versions (Levant et al. 2020). The factors for this version of the CMNI include emotional control, winning, playboy, violence, heterosexual self-presentation, pursuit of status, primacy of work, power over women, self-reliance, and risk-taking.

Change score

In order to calculate the influence of the experimental conditions on the CMNI-30 score, participants took it before and after the conditions allowing me to calculate the "change score" or time 2 score minus time 1 score.

Masculinity type

Masculinity type is used as a way to further explore the relationship between initial CMNI-30 score and the size of a participant's change score. This is a non-experimental factor created by grouping initial CMNI-30 scores into three types based on which percentile they are in from an analysis of all of the initial scores. The CMNI-30 initial scores range from 40 to 144

with a possible range of 30 to 180. The inclusive masculinity type contains all of the scores within the lower 25th percentile (40-76). The moderate masculinity type contains all of the scores within the middle 50th percentile (77-99). The orthodox masculinity type contains all of the scores within the top 25th percentile (100-144). These masculinity types were coded accordingly as inclusive (0), moderate (1), orthodox (2).

Conditions

Threat to Masculinity

After consenting to participate in the study, participants were asked to fill out the CMNI-30 to get a baseline understanding of their tendencies towards or away from traditional masculine norms. In the masculinity threat condition, the men's inventory will be "graded," and they were presented with the result that indicates that they are "feminine leaning" with a score of 55 out of a possible 150 along with a scale to show them visually were they scored along the spectrum of total possible points. In the no-threat condition, they were presented with results, a 75 out of 150, and told that they scored about average for men.

Public Versus Private Environment

After they consented and prior to taking the first CMNI-30, those in the public condition were told that "...you will be working with a partner to evaluate each of the questions in the survey based on how well they measure different topics. Your answers on the next survey will be sent to your partner and their survey answers will be sent to you prior to working together on the task." In the private condition, participants were reminded that "... all of your answers will be confidential and deidentified so that no one is able to connect you to your answers."

This thesis has outlined a variety of masculinity theories and theories from affect control theorists that would have their own hypotheses regarding this study. My previous theory section

discusses some of the additional elements that might explain the process of gender performance in the metaphor of a play while Connell's gender theory points to the idea that gender is reproduced by individuals through their behavior and that it differs based on their different characteristics such as race, class, etc. It also discussed how different affect control theorists believe deflection influences succeeding behavior.

Manipulation and attention checks

My survey included four attention checks with two checks in CMNI-30 time 1 and two in CMNI-30 time 2. I asked participants to indicate that they are paying attention by selecting a specified option, that differed for each attention check, from the Likert scale options used throughout the CMNI-30 questions. Overall, very few participants failed any of the attention checks (2.26% time 1 question 1, 1.01% time 1 question 2, 0.5% time 2 question 1, and 0% time 2, question2). I conducted a variety of robustness checks using this information. First, I replicated all reported models excluding those who missed an attention check. I did not find any substantive difference between my results before dropping those who failed and the results after I did. I also replicated the reported models using the pass/fail attention check variable as a dummy control variable and did not find any substantive difference in the results. This is not surprising, given how few people there were that failed any of the attention checks.

My survey also included a manipulation check for each option in the threat condition and audience condition. In the threat and no threat conditions, I asked participants what score they received on the first survey. They were offered four range options where those in the threat condition needed to choose the range that included 55 and those in the no threat condition needed to choose the range that included 75. For the audience condition, I asked participants whether or not they were going to be working with a partner on the next activity. If the participant selected

the incorrect answer for either of the manipulation check questions for the conditions they were in, an error box popped up and informed them that they needed to select the correct answer. They were provided with the correct answer for their condition and once they selected the correct answer they could move on to the next part of the survey. Unfortunately, the survey failed to collect data on whether their first answer to these questions was correct or incorrect. Thus, I am unable to say who initially passed the manipulation check. Due to the inclusion of the error box for incorrect answers, each participant did have their manipulation conditions reconfirmed.

The Outcomes of Each Type of Masculinity

Hegemonic Masculinity

Men will enact orthodox masculinity regardless of the condition of public or private space even if they do not inherently agree with or are able to accomplish this type of masculinity.

Inclusive Masculinity

Men will enact inclusive forms of masculinity in both public and private spaces because the previous social norms associated with orthodox masculinity are no longer socially acceptable.

Hybrid Masculinity

Men will enact inclusive forms of masculinity in public spaces but enact orthodox forms of masculinity in private. This showcases the lack of genuine movement towards change in an effort to both preserve their reputation amongst changing social norms but also to maintain their power within society.

Hypotheses

H1: Men whose masculinity is threatened will see a higher change score than the men whose masculinity is not threatened

H2: Men who are in the private condition will see a higher change score than the men whose masculinity is not threatened

H3: Men whose masculinity is threatened will exhibit a lower change score when in the public condition compared to the private condition

H4: Men who score higher on the initial CMNI-30 are more likely to overcompensate by having a higher change score when in the masculinity threat condition than men who score lower on the initial CMNI-30

H5: Men who score lower on the initial CMNI-30 will have a higher change score in response to masculinity threat in the private condition than in the public condition opposed to the men who scored higher on the initial CMNI-30

Analytical strategy

I tested my five hypotheses with analysis of variance (ANOVA), regression analyses conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, and Tukey post-hoc test for mean comparison of ANOVAs with significant results. I used ANOVA to test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 which are the relationship between threat and change score, the relationship between audience condition and change score, and the interaction between the threat condition and the audience condition on the dependent variable change. I used OLS regression for hypotheses 4 and 5 because they included the initial CMNI-30 Time 1 scores as ANOVA can only analyze categorical variables. I controlled for education, religious affiliation, political affiliation,

relationship status, residence type, Age, socioeconomic status, and income using analysis of

covariance (ANCOVA) in the additional results section.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

To understand the results of my analyses, it is important to understand sample of men

who provided this data. The following table shows the descriptive statistics of my sample.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Frequency	Range	Percentage	Mean	SD
CMNI-30 Time 1		40-144		89.24	18.06
CMNI-30 Time 2		45-170		92.21	19.86
Change score		-25-79		2.96	7.91
Age	398	25-77		43.55	14.06
25-35 years old	199	25-35	50%	30.87	3
45 years and up	199	45-77	50%	56.23	8.03
Education	397			4.22	
Less than HS	5		1.26%		
HS graduate	6		15.37%		
Some college	73		18.39%		
Associate's degree	45		11.34%		
Bachelor's degree	149		37.53%		
Ma/PhD	58		14.61%		
Professional degree	6		1.51%		
SES ladder	398	2-10		5.78	1.80
1 (top of ladder)	0				
2	3		0.75%		
3	55		13.82%		
4	42		10.55%		
5	83		20.85%		
6	57		14.32%		
7	79		19.85%		
8	60		15.08%		
9	17		4.27%		
10 (bottom of ladder)	2		0.50%		

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Continued

Variables	Frequency	Range	Percentage	Mean	SD
Income	398			6.09	
Less than $10,000	37		9.30%		
$10,000 - $19,999	38		9.55%		
$20,000 - $29,999	38		9.55%		
$30,000 - $39,999	31		7.79%		
$40,000 - $49,999	42		10.55%		
$50,000 - $59,999	47		11.81%		
$60,000 - $69,999	28		7.04%		
$70,000 - $79,999	30		7.54%		
$80,000 - $89,999	19		4.77%		
$90,000 - $99,999	20		5.03%		
$100,000 - $149,999	43		10.80%		
More than $150,000	25		6.28%		
Relationship status	398			2.35	
Long-term relationship	43		10.80%		
Married	167		41.96%		
Widowed	5		1.26%		
Divorced	24		6.03%		
Separated	5		1.26%		
In a civil partnership	4		1.01%		
Religious affiliation	394			4.57	
Christian	195		49.50%		
Jewish	12		3.05%		
Non-religious	177		44.92%		
Other	10		2.54%		
Political affiliation	390			2.12	
Conservative	127		32.57%		
Moderate	104		26.67%		
Liberal	159		40.77%		
Residence type	398				
Urban	91		22.86%	1.97	
Suburban	226		56.78%		
Rural	81		20.35%		
Masculinity type	398				
Inclusive	101	40-76	25.38%	66.75	8.16
Moderate	187	77-99	46.98%	88.46	6.64
Orthodox	110	100-144	27.64%	111.22	9.74

As seen in table 1, the range of the older age block goes from 45 to 77 years old. Within these two age blocks, the average age in the 25 to 35-year-olds is 30.87 and within the 45-year-olds and older the average age is 56.23. The average man in my sample is well-educated with between an associate's and a bachelor's degree. Within my sample, the average man falls between a 5-6 on the SES ladder and makes between $50,000-59,999 a year. As shown in table 2, my sample is predominantly made up of single and married men who identify as Christian or non-religious, politically liberal, and living in a suburban area.

**Figure 2.** Histogram of CMNI-30 (Time 1) Total Scores

Figure 3. Histogram of CMNI-30 (Time 2) Total Scores

Based on the figure 2 and figure 3, there is a close to normal curve on the first CMNI-30 histogram and a little bit more of a tail towards the upper range of scores on the second CMNI-30 histogram. Previous studies also demonstrate a close-to-normal curve for an initial CMNI score though most studies tend to only share the averages of the subsections (Levant et al. 2020; Dinh et al. 2022; Anghel et al. 2023).

Table 3. Correlation Matrix

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1. CMNI-30 T1	1.000						
2. CMNI-30 T2	0.917***	1.000					
3. Change score	0.019	0.416***	1.000				
4. Threat	0.034	0.081	0.123	1.000			
5. Public	-0.057	-0.070	-0.046	0.025	1.000		
6. Masculinity type	-0.727***	-0.657***	0.010	-0.009	0.009	1.000	
7. Age	-0.119*	-0.073	0.090	-0.003	-0.024	0.049	1.000

Note. Threat and Public are dichotomized variables with No threat and Private as reference groups. Masculinity type is dichotomized with Moderate and Orthodox as reference groups and Inclusive as comparison group.
*$p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Before describing my different models, it is important to return to my utilization of age blocking in my design. I originally age blocked my participants to get a good variation of scores in my data but also to specifically reach those who scored at the two extremes of inclusive and orthodox men. I believed that age blocking would help me reach those extreme scores because age is related to masculinity, as explained in Anderson's inclusive masculinity theory, but also more specifically to the CMNI-30 (Herreen et al. 2021). However, I soon discovered that Anderson's belief that this inclusive masculinity cohort is predominantly made up of younger men was not supported by my data.

**Figure 4.** CMNI-30 (Time 1) 25 to 35 Years Old

Figure 5. CMNI-30 (Time 1) 45 to 77 Years Old

CMNI-30 Time 1: Ages 45 to 77

I anticipated both sets of CMNI-30 total scores by age group to be skewed the opposite way with the younger men having lower scores and less adherence to traditional male role norms and older men having higher scores and more adherence to traditional male role norms. As seen in figures 4 and 5, they both hovered around the same range with older men strongly around 90. I expected age blocking to help increase variability in masculinity style and expected it to be conflated with age. But surprisingly, as shown in table 3, I did not find a strong correlation between age and masculinity (-.119). However, I was still able to recruit participants with a wide range in initial CMNI-30 scores. In deciding on the masculinity types, I utilized percentiles of the data to group scores into groups based on the actual spread of the data and not the range of possible scores.

Hypothesis testing

I conducted seven models using ANOVA and OLS regression to understand the relationships between my different variables. Model 1 looked at the main effect of the masculinity threat condition on the change score testing hypothesis 1. Model 2 examined the effect of the audience condition on the change score testing hypothesis 2. Model 3 looked at the effect of the initial masculinity type on the change score. Model 4 examined the effect of the interaction of the masculinity threat condition and the audience condition on the change score testing hypothesis 3. Model 5 looked at the effect of the interaction of the audience condition and masculinity type on the change score. Model 6 examined the effect of the interaction of the masculinity threat condition and initial masculinity type on the change score testing hypothesis 4. Model 7 looked at the effect of the three-way interaction of the masculinity threat condition, the audience condition, and masculinity type on the change score testing hypothesis 5. I am only displaying the models that allow me to examine my hypotheses in this results section. All other models are included in appendix D.

Table 4. Models 1, 2, and 4 ANOVA Results of the Interaction Between Masculinity Threat and Audience Condition on Change Score

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob>F
Threat	382.502	1	382.502	6.24	.013
Public	58.231	1	58.231	0.95	.330
Threat#Public	242.928	1	242.928	3.96	.047
Residual	24154.685	394	61.306		
Total	24835.508	397	62.558		

Note: Adj. R-Squared = .02, N = 398

Hypothesis 1

As shown in table 4, I conducted a two-way ANOVA with 398 across four different groups: threat/public, threat/private, no threat/public, and no threat/private. I did this **in** order to understand the influence of the interaction between the threat condition and the audience

condition on change scores. These results indicate a significant relationship between the threat condition and the change score (F(1, 394) = 6.24, p = .013). These results from table 4 suggest that a perceived threat has an important influence on participants' change scores, which supports hypothesis 1 that men in the threat condition will have significantly higher change scores than those in the no threat condition.

Hypothesis 2

The results of table 4 do not indicate a significant relationship between the audience condition and change scores (F(1, 394) = 0.95, p = .330). These results from table 4 suggest that a perceived threat has an important influence on participants' change scores, which fails to support hypothesis 2 that men who are in the private condition will see a higher change score than those in the public condition.

Hypothesis 3

The results of table 4 indicate a significant interaction between the threat and audience conditions on change scores (F(1, 394) = 3.96, p = .047). This supports hypothesis 3 that the effect of the threat condition on change scores is affected by the audience condition— public versus private condition.

Figure 6. Bar Chart with 95% Confidence Intervals for Masculinity Threat Condition and Audience Condition on Change Score


Table 5. Tukey Test of Model 4

Change score	Mean	SE	Tukey groups
No threat/Private	1.598	.775	A
No threat/Public	2.396	.799	AB
Threat/Private	5.122	.791	B
Threat/Public	2.794	.775	AB
Number of comparisons	6		

Note. Means sharing a letter in the group label are not significantly different at the 5% level.

As shown in table 5, I ran a Tukey post-hoc test to better understand the significant result of the interaction. The results of this test demonstrate significant difference only between the threat/private and no threat/private and no significant difference between the other groups. The lack of significant difference between public and private groups across threat conditions fails to support hypothesis 3, as written. However, this does not necessarily fail to support the idea that hybrid masculinity works under the condition of threat. The significance of the differences

between the threat/private and no threat/private indicates that social setting does matter—

specifically in the absence of an audience. Figure 6 visually demonstrates these findings

illustrating how the average change score between threat/private and no threat/private is both

significantly different but also the largest difference between all of the four groups. It also makes

it easier to view the lack of change in the public condition based on a threat or lack of one.

Hypothesis 4

Table 6. Model 6 Regression of CMNI-30 Time 1 and Masculinity Threat Condition on Change
Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Threat	-7.738	3.957	.051	(-15.51.518, .041)
CMNI-30 Time 1	-.049	.031	.116	(-.110, .012)
Threat#CMNI-30 Time 1	.108	.043	.013	(.023, .194)
Constant	6.323	2.808	.025	(.802, 11.844)
Adj R-Squared	0.023	N		398
F-test	4.17	Prob>F		.006

To test hypothesis 4, I conducted an OLS regression analysis of the interaction between

the threat condition and the initial CMNI-30 time 1 total scores. Based on table 6, the

masculinity threat condition by itself has a negative, non-significant effect on change score (ß = -

7.738, p = .051) while the CMNI-30 time 1 score also has a negative effect on change score that

is non-significant (ß = -.049, p = .116). When these two conditions interact, it results in a

positive, statistically significant effect on change score (ß = .108, p = .013). This supports

hypothesis 4 in that as the CMNI-30 time 1 score increases the change score increases, and in

agreement with ACT, the size of the resolution is based on the size of the deflection.

Figure 7. Regression with 95% Confidence Intervals of CMNI-30 Time 1 and Masculinity Threat Condition on Change Score


Figure 7 depicts the results of the regression of the interaction between the initial CMNI-30 scores and the threat condition on change score. The red line depicts those in the threat condition and the blue line represents those in the no threat condition. These lines are extended to display the range of values within the 95% interval. This figure also shows that these lines stop overlapping around score 95, indicating a more prominent difference between the threat and no threat groups in middle to higher scoring participants.

Table 7. ANOVA Results for Change Score by Masculinity Threat and Masculinity Type

Source of Variation	SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Threat	288.04	1	288.04	4.68	0.0311
Masculinity type	21.09	2	10.54	0.17	0.8426
ThreatXMasculinity type	298.30	2	149.15	2.42	0.0900
Residual	24132.57	392	61.56		
Total	24835.51	397			

Note: Adj. R-Squared = .016, N = 398

Figure 8. Bar Chart with 95% Confidence Intervals of Masculinity Threat Condition and Masculinity Type

d

In order to understand the influence of the interaction between the threat condition and masculinity type on change scores, I conducted a two-way ANOVA with 398 across six different groups: threat/inclusive, threat/moderate, threat/orthodox, no threat/inclusive, no threat/moderate, and no threat/orthodox. These results, as shown in table 7, agree with the results of model 1 and model 3 that there is a significant main effect of the threat condition but a non-significant main effect of masculinity type. The interaction effect between the threat condition and the audience condition was not significant ($F(1, 392) = 2.42$, $p = .090$). I believe that the significance in the regression but a lack of significance in the ANOVA for masculinity type is due to the arbitrary nature of how the masculinity type variable was created. Figure 8 illustrates the lack of significant difference between these groups and how overcompensation differs based on these created masculinity types.

Hypothesis 5

Table 8. Model 7 Interaction Between Masculinity Threat Condition, Audience Condition, and Masculinity Type on Change Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	P-value	95% CI
Threat	-3.981	5.371	.459	(-14.54, 6.578)
Public	2.641	5.646	.64	(-8.459, 13.74)
Threat#Public	-6.618	8.002	.409	(-22.351, 9.115)
CMNI-30 Time 1	-.04	.042	.337	(-.123, .042)
Threat#CMNI-30 Time 1	.083	.058	.155	(-.031, .198)
Public#CMNI-30 Time 1	-.02	.062	.745	(-.143, .102)
Threat#Public#CMNI-30 Time 1	.042	.088	.637	(-.132, .215)
Constant	5.155	3.779	.173	(-2.275, 12.586)
Adj. R-squared	0.024	N		398
F-test	2.39	Prob>F		.021

These results in table 8 show that the effect of the interaction between threat condition, audience condition, and masculinity type on participants' change score is positive and not significant ($ß = .042$, $p = 0.637$). This model fails to support hypothesis 5 that men who score higher on the initial CMNI-30 will have a higher change score in response to masculinity threat more in the private condition than in the public condition opposed to those who scored higher on the initial CMNI-30. This hypothesis is included to test whether or not the threat and audience conditions influence on change score are related to masculinity type. Some scholars might argue that men who are orthodox and strongly adhere to traditional masculine role norms may not be influenced by the audience condition when threatened because they so far in the extreme that their public and private displays would not change because audience does not matter to them.

CHAPTER 5

ADDITIONAL RESULTS

My hypotheses focus on the total scores from the CMNI-30 which are derived from a sum of all of the scores on the different subsections listed below in table 9. The following chapter looks over the exploratory results of the subsection scores and demographic variables that are not included in my main hypotheses.

Subsections

Table 9. Subsection Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full title	Description
POW	Power over women	Control over women
V	Violence	Approving of the use of violence as a reply to certain situations
HSP	Heterosexual self-presentation	The value of not appearing as gay
EC	Emotional control	Control of emotional displays
RT	Risk taking	Willingly putting oneself in risky situations
PS	Pursuit of status	Emphasis on being perceived as an important person
PW	Primacy of work	Seeing work as a focal part of life
W	Winning	Concentrating on winning and being successful
PB	Playboy	Supporting casual sexual endeavors
SR	Self-reliance	Hesitancy to seek help and would rather rely on oneself

Note. Mahalik et al. 2003; Levant et al. 2020:623

Table 10. Paired T-tests of Subsection Means

Subsection	Mean T1	Mean T2	Difference	SD1	SD2	t-value	p-value
POW	7.696	7.782	-.085	3.428	3.748	-1.3	.19
V	9.04	11.246	-2.206	3.647	3.015	-13	.000
HSP	8.684	8.668	.015	4.557	4.785	.25	.795
EC	11.045	11.643	-.598	4.124	4.134	-6.45	.000
RT	9.043	9.213	-.171	3.500	3.748	-2.5	.012
PS	9.699	9.523	.176	3.111	3.400	2.25	.026
PW	9.304	9.201	.103	3.737	4.093	1.4	.161
W	8.274	8.405	-.131	2.893	3.263	-1.75	.077
PB	7.186	7.412	-.226	3.862	4.180	-2.75	.006
SR	9.583	8.965	.618	3.640	3.530	8.4	.000

In table 10, I include the two means for each subsection before and after the manipulations and the difference between them (time 2-time 1). I also include the standard deviations of each subsection at time 1 and 2 as well as the t-value and p-value which provides information on if there is significant difference between mean 1 and mean 2. I showcase that though there is some level of positive or negative change between the time 1 and time 2 in all subsections scores, only 6 of the 10 subsections' means at time 1 and time 2 are significantly different from one another. These include violence, emotional control, risk taking, pursuit of status, playboy, self-reliance, and winning approached significance. Of these, violence, emotional control, risk taking, and playboy's means decrease from time 1 to time 2 while pursuit of status and self-reliance increased.

In Anderson's inclusive masculinity theory, he asserts that different characteristics of hegemonic masculinity will persist in those who are more inclusive despite the emergence of inclusive masculinity; however, there should be some level of improvement when it comes to homophobia and respecting women (2009). To better understand which characteristics are more fluid and those that are more consistent among different masculinities and conditions, I replicated models 1-7 with each subsection's change scores. I found that not all subsections had

significant results; and if so, they tended to be in in the models testing the influence of threat or masculinity type. This supports Anderson's idea that different types of masculinity subscribe to different characteristics. It also points to the idea that certain characteristics are more stable than others as some are more reactive to threat than others. This is apparent in two subsections that are less culturally accepted characteristics of masculinity—power over women and violence.

Table 11. Regression of Masculinity Threat Condition on POW Change Score

POW change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Threat	.371	.129	.004	(.118, .624)
Constant	-.101	.091	.269	(-.28, .078)
Adj. R-Squared	.018	N		398
F-test	8.30	Prob>F		.004

Table 11 shows that the main effect of the masculinity threat condition on participants' POW change score is positive and significant ($ß = .371$, $p = 0.004$). In this particular experiment, the threat condition is strongly associated with femininity and, in turn, women. Therefore, it makes sense that in response men are more in favor of having control over women or femininity. I see similar results in the subsections: risk taking ($ß = .29$, $p = .032$) and playboy ($ß = .41$, $p = .012$) which can be seen in the additional tables in appendix D. Along with power over women, the playboy subsection may signal wanting to have additional and more casual relationships with women to assert their masculinity and dominance over femininity. The finding that threat positively influences risk taking's change score may speak to anecdotal evidence of men planning or enacting dangerous behavior that their family and friends express they would not have expected from them (Hampton et al. 2023). Many of these anecdotes are in relation to planned or enacted violent acts, but there were no significant findings when I ran the regression of threat on violence change score.

Demographics

Conservative

Previous scholars have studied masculinity in relation to different demographic variables and have found, not surprisingly, that men who are threatened "...were more willing to endorse stereotypical gender roles" and "traditional attitudes" (Kosakowska-Berezecka et al. 2016:274). Previous research has also more specifically tied orthodox masculinity to one's support for right-wing political ideology specifically when they feel threatened (Iacoviello et al. 2021:1). As demonstrated in tables 12 and 13, I also found support for the idea that identifying as conservative had a positive, significant relationship with their initial masculinity total score (ß = .10.944, p = .000) as well as a positive, significant relationship on change score when threatened (ß = 4.632, p = .006). Iacoviello and colleagues believe this to be due to the need to hold onto the status quo and is especially strong when participants perceive that men, as a whole, are becoming more feminine (2021:13).

Table 12. Regression of Conservative on CMNI-30 Time 1

CMNI-30 Time 1	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Conservative	10.944	1.866	.000	(7.276, 14.612)
Constant	85.749	1.054	.000	(83.677, 87.821)
Adj. R-Squared	.078	N		398
F-test	34.41	Prob>F		.000

Table 13. Regression of Masculinity Threat and Conservative on Change Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	P>t	95% CI
Threat	.545	.937	.562	(-1.299, 2.388)
Conservative	.25	1.163	.83	(-2.036, 2.536)
Threat#Conservative	4.632	1.66	.006	(1.368, 7.896)
Constant	1.902	.671	.005	(.582, 3.221)
Adj. R-Squared	.049	N		398
F-test	7.79	Prob>F		.000

Married

Table 14. Regression of Married and Public on Change Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Married	2.190	1.130	.053	(-.031, 4.411)
Public	.647	1.038	.533	(-1.393, 2.687)
Married#Public	-3.266	1.602	.042	(-6.415, -.117)
Constant	2.405	.732	.001	(.966, 3.844)
Adj. R-Squared	.006	N		398
F-test	1.83	Prob>F		.141

There is some previous research exploring relationship satisfaction and masculinity conformity demonstrating that men who conform to more traditional masculine norms are less satisfied with their relationships, but their partner tends to be more satisfied with the relationship when the man does conform (Burn and Ward 2005:1). This is interesting in relation to my regression of being married in the public condition on the change score. Table 14 shows that something about being married and publicly performing masculinity results in a negative change score which means they are performing a more inclusive masculinity (ß = -3.266, p = 0.042). This indicates that married men try not to conform to traditional male role norms when married and in public. Perhaps this means that men believe that their partners and the greater society do not like displays of more orthodox masculinity. It could also be that demonstrating more orthodox characteristics such as a likelihood to use violence, take risks, or being a playboy would be associated with being a "bad" husband.

Christian

Table 15. Regression of Christian on CMNI-30 Time 1

CMNI-30 Time 1	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Christian	4.564	1.799	.012	(1.028, 8.101)
Constant	87.005	1.259	.000	(84.529, 89.481)
Adj. R-Squared	.014	N		398
F-test	6.44	Prob>F		.012

In an unsurprising event, being Christian has a significant, positive relationship with CMNI-30 time 1 score as seen in table 15 (ß = 4.564, p = 0.012)**.** First, Christian men tend to be more politically conservative (Pew Research Center n.d.). Secondly, some of the traditional male role norms are maintained and perpetuated through Christian ideals (Werner 2011:63).

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

Consistent with previous research, I found that men whose masculinity is threatened tend to react with a more orthodox expression of masculinity than their baseline masculinity type. To build on this previous line of work, I aimed to understand if social context, demographics, and initial masculinity type influence the pre-established relationship between threat and their response. The results of this study indicate that context does indeed matter. Specifically, I found that the threat condition had different consequences for behavior in private than in public. In particular, the men participated in this study only responded to threat in the private condition. This pattern fails to support hypothesis 3. It may, nonetheless, odder a different source of support for the arguments of hybrid masculinity theory.

It demonstrates that even when threatened, those in the public condition do not show any significant difference between those who were not threatened. This showcases just how strong the motivation to perform inclusive forms of masculinity in public spaces is. This finding of significant difference in the private setting across threat conditions is even more important than what might happen in the public setting. It speaks to many of anecdotal instances in the news where a man commits a violent crime, especially mass shootings and hate crimes, where his family, friends, neighbors, and the U.S. military in Genco's specific case, say they would never have expected it from this individual (DOJ 2022; DOJ 2021; Fugardi 2024; Santucci 2024). But, in some cases when the man is further investigated, they find manifestos, membership in far-right or incel communities, and other clear indications of extreme, orthodox masculinity. It begs

the question, how do these extreme beliefs that are not normally performed publicly to friends and family transform into very public acts of violence? What is the catalyst, as a general threat to masculinity alone does not seem to work in the public setting?

Despite my own, and other scholars', thought that there is a cohort level shift in masculine norms amongst men, I found little difference in the adherence to traditional male role norms between the younger and older cohorts within this study. I planned the design of this study with the idea that there was a big enough difference between my two age groups that age blocking would act as a proxy for inclusive and orthodox masculinity. I based this understanding off of Eric Anderson's research that pointed to larger changes in gender behavior amongst Millennials who are roughly between 28-43 years old today. However, my results better match Herreen and colleagues' graph of conformity to masculine role norms and age where the overall majority of men moderately conform to these traditional masculine role norms with younger men slightly conforming more than older men (2021:Figure 1). I found that the average age for high scorers (orthodox men) was three years younger than both their inclusive and moderate counterparts (41.38 vs 44.72 vs 44.20). Because of this, I had to change my understanding of what I considered inclusive and what I considered orthodox as even Anderson himself did not have an exact way of differentiating the two.

If using Anderson's idea of why men shift towards inclusivity, it sets the basis that the expression of more inclusive masculinities is less stigmatized. Where it differs from hybrid masculinity is the reasoning behind why men are seemingly performing more inclusive masculinities, Anderson believes it is due to a decrease in homohysteria or even a more general diminishing of traditional male role norms that leaves an unstigmatized space for these new masculinities to emerge (2009:95). Hybrid masculinity instead asserts that it is the need to

"...perpetuate existing systems of power and inequality" (Bridges and Pascoe 2018:47). This is where hybrid masculinity may also be explained as the idea of "more style than substance" requiring more research on potentially disingenuous masculinity performances versus one's internalized masculinity—the main goal of my study (Messner 1993:724).

Within this study, I have found support for this "more style than substance" approach by white, straight, cisgender men where there is statistically significant evidence that they conform more to traditional male role norms in a private setting away from the prying eyes of the general audience when threatened. This is important because it points out the legitimacy of the idea of performative progress, usually used in literature on race or organizations, where it may look like improvement on a surface level but, in reality, it is a guise used to uphold existing patriarchal systems and the inequalities they perpetuate (Thimsen 2022).

However, my second hypothesis demonstrates that solely having an audience watching your gender performance does not produce a change in behavior. Hybrid masculinity theory is not the set standard for gender performance in men, and that makes sense. If they were constantly performing a gender identity that does not match their internal standards for men, it would lead to identity inconsistency and in turn negative emotions as described in affect control theory. The significant findings for hypothesis 3 illustrate that to see a big change in internalized masculine norms and their performance of masculinity, a threat must be involved. Essentially, an inconsistency needs to occur before they would modify their behavior—they need something to correct in the first place.

Many masculinity theories also find a threat to masculinity, normally homohysteria, as the reasoning behind an adherence to traditional male role norms and a decline in stigmatization as an opening for inclusive masculinities to emerge (Anderson 2009). But if Anderson found

support for inclusive masculinities forming due to a decline in homohysteria, why in recent years have we continued to see communities of orthodox men grow (Kimmel 2013)? Why do we continue to see an increase in certain types of violence specifically geared at women by young men?

Michael Kimmel, over a decade ago, addressed these questions when he proposed in his book the concept of "aggrieved entitlement" (2013:xiv). This aggrieved entitlement is the feeling that these men can no longer assume that they are entitled to what they used to, and it is unlikely that they will again. Others argue that some these angry men, specifically incels, may be due in part to loneliness and in turn resentment (Tietjen and Tirkkonen 2023). This resentment that "... transforms loneliness into antagonistic emotions" and is only perpetuated by their communities (2023:1229). All of this coming from men losing something and others gaining things, jobs, rights, or opportunities, that these men are accustomed to and believed once were exclusively theirs. This resentment and widening field of perceived threats may explain why what Anderson theorized seems to be almost reversing in the wake of mass shooters, a rise in incel culture, and general antagonism towards change and difference.

In connection with the ongoing orthodox elements we continue to see, Anderson acknowledges that inclusive masculinity does not mean that a culture is some kind of utopia where men are not adhering to any previous traditional norms of masculinity. Rather, they are inclusive with some things while still displaying certain orthodox elements. He also explained that there is not "...a precise formula for determining whether a culture is considered inclusive or not" (2018:42). This makes it tricky to understand his theory of inclusive masculinity through the CMNI-30's total raw score. In truth, other scholars who have more closely studied the CMNI-30 also argue that the total raw score may not be as useful as a measure of masculinity (Hammer et

al. 2018). Anderson explains that different cultures that would be considered inclusive may have different levels of conformity to different tenets of masculinity. However, he does believe that the presence of inclusive masculinity in a culture would result in some level of benefit for women (2018:41).

Despite finding that when threatened, many men tend to hide their stronger adherence to traditional male role norms and don a more inclusive mask, I do not want this study to spread the idea that all men are secretly incels who are hiding their hatred for women until a switch flips and then engage in violent behavior. The average score on the violence subsection is higher than many of the other sections, but it is still relatively mild between 3-4 out of the total possible of 6. In fact, almost all sections before and after the threat and audience conditions remained between 2-3 outside of emotion control. In general, many scholars find that men score rather low on the CMNI indicating that the average man does not subscribe to all traditional male role norms and many men actively distance themselves from it as demonstrated by low scores. Hybrid masculinity postulates that this may be because they wish to maintain power and prestige; however, this study cannot answer why the men behaved the way they did. Future research utilizing mixed methods to study both behavior and the reasons behind it can continue to add to this discussion.

Moving from discussing the influence of threat and the audience condition, I also utilized identity theories to understand how gender as an identity reacts to threat. In hypothesis 4, I tested the conflicting ideas on how people react to a threat to their identity and the deflection or disruption of their identity when it does not match up with what they believe. I intentionally attempted to create disruption by telling them they are considerably more feminine than they believe they are. As a part of this condition, I gave them a fake low score on a clearly gendered

scale and told them that previous research found that they think more like a woman. I predicted that MacKinnon and Heise would be correct about overcompensation, but that the size of the overcompensation would be dependent on their initial adherence level to traditional male role norms.

In the OLS regression when threat condition and baseline CMNI-30 score interact, it does result in a positive, statistically significant effect on change score (ß = .108, p = .013). This demonstrates that in relation to threat, as one's initial CMNI-30 score increases so does their change score as shown in figure 7. Within affect control theory, and more specifically the control theory aspect, when a person is confronted with information that indicates that something about their interaction does not match up with the cultural sentiments of the interaction, they feel negative emotions (MacKinnon and Heise 2010). They need a way to resolve these negative feelings. My results show that men predominantly overcompensation or modify their behavior to swing more traditional and pull themselves closer the cultural sentiments that surround men.

The baseline identity and where it exists on its spectrum influences the restorative event, overcompensation, because the influence of the threat depends on how close they already identify to femininity. If a more orthodox man is on one end of the gender spectrum and I tell him that he is actually on the complete opposite side, he needs to perform an extremely traditional form of masculinity to pull himself across the distance back to where he believes he should be. But if the man is more inclusive, he is already positioned a little closer to femininity, he only needs to perform a slightly more traditional masculinity to cross the much small space to the cultural sentiments for a man that he subscribes to. The context of one's gender identity influences their reaction once again, pointing to the idea that social and personal context matters.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In response to the changes I observed in our societal norms of masculinity along with the clear continuation and even exacerbation of extreme forms of masculinity, I decided to test popular, broad theories of masculinity along with theories relating to identity and self-presentation. I started this thesis by laying out hegemonic, inclusive, hybrid masculinity, and the current discussions surrounding these theories. I explained how the different authors viewed the changes in societal norms of masculinity and most importantly why men may be showcasing more "inclusive" forms of masculinity. Eric Anderson in his theory of inclusive masculinity argues that there may be a cohort shift occurring where we see certain elements of masculinity fading away to more inclusive practices. While Tristan Bridges and C.J. Pascoe argue that yes, we see these changes in behavior happening, but these changes are not due to an actual adoption of these new norms. Instead, men are performing a more inclusive masculinity than what they actually subscribe to in order to maintain their power and prestige within society.

In order to test these theories, I threatened men's masculinity and in turn also included literature on identity and self-presentation. I explored gender performance and the influence of the audience through Goffman's dramaturgy. I also examined the discussion within affect control theory of deflection and restorative events. MacKinnon and Heise argued in 2010 that when there is a deflection due to an incongruency between one's presented identity and other information about their identity that person will overcompensate to restore their identity.

I used a 2 by 2 factorial between-subjects design with a non-experimental covariate of initial masculinity type to test these different theories. My sample included 398 straight, white, cis-gender men who are U.S. citizens through Prolific. Within my results, I found support for two out of my five hypotheses. I found that the threat condition results in a positive, significant change score on the CMNI which indicates that their score increases between the first and second time they take it. I did not find that there was significant difference in the relationship between threat and response in the public condition; however, I did find significant difference in the private condition. I also found support for MacKinnon and Heise's understanding that in order to manage deflection, people are overcompensate. It is especially evident in the fact that how threatening the event was for them, based on their initial masculinity type, influenced the amount of overcompensation needed to resolve the deflection.

This study was limited by the niche sample of men I was able to use, straight, white, cis-gender, American men, due the scope of the theories I used as well as to control for major demographic variables in my experiment. This was also an online experiment which means I did not get to understand more behind why men answered how they did and reacted to the conditions they were assigned to. Because this was an online and voluntary experiment, there is the possibility of selection bias. The type of men who voluntarily want to participant in this type of experiment may be different from those who do not.

Future research in this area, and specifically using the CMNI, would benefit from including men outside of this niche demographic to see how broad these theories of masculinity actually are. I also believe future research should utilize a more mixed-method approach to be able to get the why behind men's answers and reactions to conditions. In future research, scholars should consider exploring how the gender of the "stranger" that participants are

partnered with influences their reaction to threat. I have demonstrated that social setting is important which contextualizes the relationship between threat and reaction. Though, there are always additional, influential variables about the social setting that could affect responses.

I also believe future research should also include additional measures of someone's family make up and how they were raised. Having a strong masculine or feminine presence while one is growing up may influence their baseline masculinity but also how they fair on specific subsections such as power over women, violence, etc. I also believe that additional work regarding the CMNI-30 should specifically look into how the general nature of the statements may influence responses. Especially when it comes to violence and emotional control, the CMNI-30 does not specify what types of violence, what situation violence is used in, and which emotions the statements are about. A man might be more inclusive and generally disagree with violence but if physically threatened may use it to defend himself. I also believe that future work would benefit from adding additional measures of specifically political and gender-based violence. Though it is outside of the bounds of my experiment, future research should investigate the idea of a new crisis of masculinity stemming from cultural understandings of gender which may help explain current extreme forms of masculinity. Judith Butler's new *book Who's Afraid of Gender* has already started the important work of studying the "anti-gender ideology movement" (2024:256-257), but there is always more about these social phenomena to study.

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APPENDIX

A: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

Q1 How old are you? _____ years old.

_____

Q2 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- o   Less than high school (1)

- o   High school graduate (2)

- o   Some college (3)

- o   Associate's degree (4)

- o   Bachelor's degree (5)

- o   Master's degree (6)

- o   Professional degree (7)

- o   Doctorate (8)

- o   Prefer not to answer (9)

Q3 Where would you position yourself on the socioeconomic ladder?

- o   1 (Top of the ladder) (1)

- o   2 (2)

- o   3 (3)

- o   4 (4)

- o   5 (5)

- o   6 (6)

o   7 (7)

o   8 (8)

o   9 (9)

o   10 (Bottom of the ladder) (10)

Q4 What is your personal income per year (after taxes)?

o   Less than $10,000 (1)

o $10,000 - $19,999 (2)

o $20,000 - $29,999 (3)

o $30,000 - $39,999 (4)

o $40,000 - $49,999 (5)

o $50,000 - $59,999 (6)

o $60,000 - $69,999 (7)

o $70,000 - $79,999 (8)

o $80,000 - $89,999 (9)

o $90,000 - $99,999 (10)

o $100,000 - $149,999 (11)

o   More than $150,000 (12)

Q5 What is your relationship status?

o   Single (1)

o   Long-term relationship but not married (2)

o   Married (3)

o   Widowed (4)

o   Divorced (5)

o   Separated (6)

o   In a civil partnership (7)

Q6 In general, how do you see yourself? Please answer on both scales below.

| | Not at all | Extremely |
| | | |

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Feminine ()	
Masculine ()	

Q7 In general, how do most people see you? Please answer on both scales below.

| | Not at all | Extremely |
| | | |

	0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Feminine ()	
Masculine ()	

Q8 What is your religious affiliation?

o   Buddhism (1)

o   Christianity (e.g. Baptist, Church of England, Roman Catholic, Methodist, Jehovah

    Witness, etc.) (2)

o   Hinduism (3)

o   Islam (4)

o   Jainism (5)

o   Judaism (6)

o   Non Religious (e.g. Agnostic, Atheist, No Religion) (7)

o   Paganism (8)

o   Unitarianism (9)

o   Other (10)

o   Prefer not to answer (11)

Q9 When it comes to politics, where would you place yourself?

o   Conservative (1)

o   Moderate (2)

o   Liberal (3)

o   Prefer not to answer (4)

Q10 How would you define your current place of residence?

o   Urban (1)

o   Suburban (2)

o   Rural (3)

B: CONFORMITY TO MALE NORMS-30

1. I tend to share my feelings
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	16. In general I must get my way
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

2. I would get angry if people thought I was gay
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	17. It would be awful if people thought I was gay
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

3. I dislike any kind of violence
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	18. Having status is not important to me
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

4. It bothers me when I have to ask for help
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	19. I put myself in risky situations
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

5. I bring up my feelings when talking to others
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	20. Things tend to be better when men are in charge
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

6. Work comes first for me
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

7. For me, the best feeling in the world comes from winning
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

8. I enjoy taking risks
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

9. I think that trying to be important is a waste of time
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

10. The women in my life should obey me
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

11. I would be furious if someone thought I was gay
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

21. I feel good when work is my first priority
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

22. I would hate to be important
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

23. I will do anything to win
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

24. I think that violence is sometimes necessary
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

25. I never ask for help
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

26. I need to prioritize my work over other things
- o Strongly disagree
- o Disagree
- o Slightly disagree
- o Slightly agree
- o Agree
- o Strongly agree

12. I would change sexual partners often if I could
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	27. I love it when men are in charge of women
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

13. I like to talk about my feelings
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	28. I am not ashamed to ask for help
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

14. I would find it enjoyable to date more than one person at a time
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	29. I would feel good if I had many sexual partners
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

15. It's never ok for me to be violent
   o Strongly disagree
   o Disagree
   o Slightly disagree
   o Slightly agree
   o Agree
   o Strongly agree
	30. I take risks
	   o Strongly disagree
	   o Disagree
	   o Slightly disagree
	   o Slightly agree
	   o Agree
	   o Strongly agree

C: CONDITIONS

Public condition

After the following survey, you will be working with a partner to evaluate each of the questions in the survey based on how well they measure different topics. Your answers on the next survey will be sent to your partner and their survey answers will be sent to you prior to working together on the task.

Private condition

After the following survey, all of your answers will be confidential and deidentified so that no one is able to connect you to your answers.

Threat condition

Thank you for completing the first part of this study!

Based on previous research, our results indicate that you answered survey questions as most women do. This means that you tend to think like a woman.

More specifically, you scored a **55** out of 150.

For the next part of the study, you will be taking another 30-statement survey.

No threat condition

Thank you for completing the first part of this study!

Based on your answers to the previous survey, our results indicate that you scored about average

for men at **75** out of 150.

For the next part of the study, you will be taking another 30-statement survey.

D: ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Table D1. Model 3 Effect of Masculinity type on Change Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
CMNI-30 Time 1	.008	.022	.706	(-.035, .052)
Constant	2.223	2.003	.268	(-1.714, 6.161)
Adj. R-Squared	-.002	N		398
F-test	0.14	Prob>F		.706

Table D1 shows that the effect of the masculinity type on participants' change score is

slightly positive and not significant (ß = .008, p = 0.706). This demonstrates that initial CMNI-30

time 1 scores do not work in the model without the inclusion of the threat condition.

Table D2. Model 5 Interaction between Audience Condition and CMNI-30 Time 1 on Change
Score

Change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Public	.442	4.045	.913	(-7.511, 8.396)
CMNI-30 Time 1	.013	.029	.663	(-.045, .071)
Public#CMNI-30 Time 1	-.013	.045	.772	(-.100, .075)
Constant	2.169	2.708	.424	(-3.154, 7.493)
Adj. R-Squared	-.005	N		398
F-test	0.34	Prob>F		.796

Table D2 shows that the effect of the audience condition on participants' change scores is

slightly negative and not significant (ß = .442, p = 0.913). The same can be said for the

masculinity type alone, as found in model 3, which is also not significant. The interaction

between the audience condition and the masculinity type has a negative, not significant effect on

change score (ß = -.013, p =.772).

Table D3. Model 7 Marginal Means Continued between Masculinity Threat Condition, Audience Condition, and Masculinity Type on Change Score.

Change score	Margin	SE	P>t	95% CI
Threat				
0	1.996	0.560	0.000	(0.894, 3.098)
1	3.973	0.557	0.000	(2.878, 5.069)
Public				
0	3.348	0.557	0.000	(2.253, 4.443)
1	2.665	0.560	0.000	(1.564, 3.766)
Threat#Public				
0 0	1.579	0.781	0.044	(0.043, 3.114
0 1	2.410	0.801	0.003	(0.835, 3.984)
1 0	5.086	0.801	0.000	(3.512, 6.661)
1 1	2.866	0.779	0.000	(1.334, 4.398)
Masculinity type				
0	3.111	0.781	0.000	(1.575, 4.647)
1	2.796	0.559	0.000	(1.698, 3.894)
2	3.185	0.800	0.000	(1.613, 4.758)
Threat#Masculinity type				
0 0	3.572	1.100	0.001	(1.410, 5.735)
0 1	1.527	0.782	0.052	(-0.011, 3.065)
0 2	1.311	1.161	0.260	(-0.973, 3.594)
1 0	2.680	1.113	0.017	(0.491, 4.869)
1 1	4.107	0.800	0.000	(2.534, 5.680)
1 2	5.059	1.092	0.000	(2.912, 7.207)
Public#Masculinity type				
0 0	2.846	1.113	0.011	(0.657, 5.034)
0 1	3.570	0.797	0.000	(2.004, 5.137)
0 2	3.389	1.107	0.002	(1.212, 5.566)
1 0	3.405	1.100	0.002	(1.242, 5.567)
1 1	2.069	0.786	0.009	(0.525, 3.614)
1 2	2.998	1.147	0.009	(0.743, 5.252)

Table D3 shows the rest of the three-way interaction marginal means that were not included in the report of the results due to its length and the niche part I was writing about. The rest of this table includes the other aspects of the interactions as part of the three-way interaction that have already been addressed in previous discussion of other hypotheses.

Table D4. Regression of Masculinity Threat Condition on RT Change Score

RT change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Threat	.29	.135	.032	(.024, .555)
Constant	.025	.096	.792	(-1.63, .213)
Adj. R-Squared	.009	N		398
F-test	4.61	Prob>F		.033

Table D4 shows that there is a positive, significant relationship between the threat

condition and the risk-taking change score (ß = .29, p =.032). This means that being in the threat

condition increases the CMNI-30 risk-taking subsection between the first and second time.

Table D5. Regression of Masculinity Threat condition on PB change score

PB change score	Coef.	SE	p-value	95% CI
Threat	.41	.162	.012	(.091, .729)
Constant	.02	.115	.861	(-.206, .247)
Adj. R-Squared	.013	N		398
F-test	6.37	Prob>F		.012

Table D5 shows that there is a positive, significant relationship between the threat

condition and the playboy change score (ß = .41, p =.012). This means that being in the threat

condition increases the CMNI-30 playboy subsection between the first and second time.