Files
Abstract
The modern United State House of Representatives has become a hollow chamber, absent of debate, where rank and file members vote in favor of restrictive rules. Restrictive rules that
strip them of their power and ability to legislate, debate, and amend legislation. This work seeks
to understand the tools party leadership uses to build winning coalitions to pass restrictive rules,
and why rank and file members vote for those rules, as well as the effect those rules have within
the chamber’s committees. More specifically, this dissertation takes an in-depth look at the
utilization of manager’s amendments in an era of Congress that began the most notable transition
to an increasingly closed process. I find that manager’s amendments can be utilized by party
leadership as a tool for intraparty bargaining to incentivize members to vote in favor of
restrictive rules. However, the data show the use of manager’s amendments for this purpose is
inconsistent and provides for more exploration on the topic. This dissertation also provides
insight into the effect restrictive rules have on committee use of power, a long-standing debate in
the field. The data show that under restrictive rules members are willing to utilize their
committee power by holding more hearings as their work is theoretically more protected from
changes on the floor of the chamber.