This dissertation addresses the concept of life and how the philosophical understanding of life underlies scientific investigation of biological phenomena. The first part critically examines Aristotle’s attempt to distinguish living from non-living beings in virtue of the apparent self-moving “ensouled” character of organisms. Aristotle’s conception of life is shown to be marred by incompatible features of his conception of causality and motion. The dissertation next turns to Kant’s understanding of life to examine whether Kant’s appeal to a conception of internal teleology is better able to capture the essence of life. Kant’s mechanistic conception of nature, however, is shown to render teleology unknowable by our understanding. The dissertation next turns to Hegel to find a remedy to the problems Kant leaves unresolved. Hegel’s understanding of chemistry is shown to provide objective knowledge about the features of life that Kant thinks but cannot know. Although Hegel’s understanding of life is limited by the scientific knowledge of his time, Hegel’s basic conception of the chemistry of living organisms proves to be compatible with some of the most current scientific theories of life, such as those that appeal to autocatalytic and autopoietic reactions. In addition, Hegel’s discussion of the geological environment in which life can emerge and sustain itself anticipates some aspects of the Gaia Hypothesis, according to which the earth can be considered a living system. The dissertation concludes by showing how Hegel’s account of life and its biosphere provides strong arguments for countering the Gaia Hypothesis that the earth is alive.