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Abstract
The Arab-Israeli conflict has long been presented as eternal and irresolvable. A rhetorical history argues that the standard narrative can be challenged by considering it a series of rhetorical problems. These rhetorical problems can be reconstructed by drawing on primary sources as well as publicly presented texts. A methodology for doing rhetorical history that draws on Michael Calvin McGee's fragmentation thesis is offered. Four theoretical concepts (the archive, institutional intent, peripheral text, and center text) are articulated. British Colonial Office archives, London Times coverage, and British Parliamentary debates are used to interpret four publicly presented rhetorical acts. In 1915-7, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration and the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. Although these documents are treated as promises in the standard narrative, they are ambiguous declarations. As ambiguous documents, these texts offer opportunities for constitutive readings as well as limiting interpretations. In 1922, the Mandate for Palestine was issued to correct this vagueness. Rather than treating the Mandate as a response to the debate between realist foreign policy and self-determination, Winston Churchill used epideictic rhetoric to foreclose a policy discussion in favor of a vote on Britain's honour. As such, the Mandate did not account for Wilsonian drives in the post-War international sphere. After Arab riots and boycotts highlighted this problem, a commission was appointed to investigate new policy approaches. In the White Paper of 1939, a rhetoric of investigation limited Britain's consideration of possible policies. By extending investigation to the limits of kairos, advocates of partition formulated policy without discussing other potential solutions. At the expiration of the White Paper, Britain withdrew from Palestine. As such, in 1947, the United Nations issued Resolution 181 to divide Palestine into two states. United Nations action was possible only because Britain articulated a rhetoric of failure and an end to Empire. None of these four policies was a panacea; each may have enhanced the problem of Palestine. In the conclusion, lessons from Britain's experience are applied to the current American approach to Palestine. Centering George W. Bush's Rose Garden Speech, and drawing on the Mitchell Commission Report and the Tenet Plan, indicates that consideration of ambiguity, epideictic rhetoric, rhetorics of investigation, and rhetorics of failure should be made when evaluating peace proposals.