

GRAND STRATEGY OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: CHOICE OF STRATEGY
AMONG REVOLUTIONARY NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE STATE

by

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(Under the Direction of Han Park)

ABSTRACT

This paper is a case study on the grand strategy adopted by major actors during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and the deeper motivations for their choice of strategy. It gives an in depth understanding of the clash of grand strategies between actors and how conclusions from this clash advance existing literature on revolution and social change in Muslim societies. Unique characteristics from the Egyptian case show how non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and “We Are All Khalid Said” could converge in their temporal grand strategy despite diverging in purpose, organizational structure and membership. This is contrasted with stages of counter-revolutionary strategy applied by the regime. Differences between traditionalist Sunni and Salafi movements of Egypt contextualize the moral basis for revolution as well as clashing grand strategic goals of newly emerging actors both in Egypt and the larger Arab Spring.

INDEX WORDS: Grand Strategy, Revolution, Counter-Revolution, Egypt, Islam, Muslim Brotherhood, We Are All Khalid Said, Mubarak Regime, April 6th Movement, Arab Spring, Salafi Movement

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the brave revolutionaries of the Arab Spring particularly those who died for the cause of freedom and justice so future generations could live to benefit from it.

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

On January 25th massive protests rocked the nation of Egypt and perpetuated it into a full blown revolution, the largest seen in the Middle East in decades. Among the actors involved were newer groups composed mostly of young Egyptians such as “We Are All Khalid Said” (WAAKS), which was formed after the brutal slaying of Egyptian activist Khalid Said. There were also older, more established organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood composed of men and women from a cross-section of society. The regime of Hosni Mubarak was the main counter force confronting them. This paper will contrast strategies pursued by each of these actors leading up to and through the revolution as well as their deeper motivations. WAAKS and the Brotherhood are good examples of two different yet crucial movements which converged to overthrow the regime. Each of these groups pursued strategies towards ends based on the conditioning factors and means available to them. The Brotherhood is further contrasted with the Salafi Movement to understand its religious foundations and how this has affected grand strategic goals.

Research Question

This paper investigates the templates for grand strategy adopted by major actors in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. It also analyses the grand strategic template pursued by an authoritarian regime in reaction to radically different revolutionary movements. It seeks to answer why revolutionary actors chose strategies of cooperation over competition as well as the morally driven motivation for revolution by these actors. Wider implications are how grand

strategic theory can be applied to non-state actors and the interaction of opposing grand strategies. Specifically, this paper will investigate what grand strategy non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and “We Are All Khalid Said” pursued during the revolution and what the deeper motivations for their choice of strategy were. It also investigates how the regime reacted to these actors through implementing its own counter-revolutionary strategy. A case study of the Egyptian Revolution was chosen because of the historic implications of such an event at a global level. The strategic importance of Egypt located at the heart of the Middle East and the nexus of three continents makes it a highly coveted subject of study.

This paper advances literature on grand strategy in two major ways. It implements theory testing to see how well Gene Sharp’s highly influential theories on nonviolent grand strategy explain the Egyptian Revolution. It also proposes that in situations of conflict or competition grand strategy is better understood as a series of actions and reactions between conflicting actors. In addition to these two major objectives, the unique circumstances of the Egyptian Revolution enable us to refine non-violent revolutionary strategy in a number of ways. This includes finding the place of violence and leadership or lack thereof in revolution.

In terms of strategies of counter-revolution, the place of fitna (chaos) and counter mass-mobilization by the regime is cross-examined. The regime historically used the threat of fitna by non-state actors as moral justification for its own rule and suppression of all opposition. Counter mass-mobilization was quickly adapted to show that the existing regime enjoyed popular support in a democratic context. A case study of Egypt shows how counter-revolutionary strategy by the regime was adapted to fit 21st century technological and political conditions. The presence of counter-revolutionary forces in electronic social media and in public protests was to bolster a populist image of such forces while dissuading electronic activists from political participation.

The Egyptian Revolution highlights the importance of digital and physical space as a crucial aspect of strategy formulation and implementation. The transition of revolutionary protests from the digital to physical realm and struggle with counter-revolutionary forces in both of these realms highlights the evolution of 21st century social movement.

The conceptualization of clashing grand strategies is done using a timeline of events. As the revolution progressed various actors adjusted their strategies to changes on the ground but remained within the context of their larger grand strategy. A visual framework will be used to compare what strategies each actor made in response to other actors and how well this fits into the larger grand strategy. Interviews and documented news reports will be used to reconstruct what types of strategies and tactics were being implemented by various actors and their deeper motivations. Process tracing is used to show how major strategies and tactics adapted by WAAKS and the Brotherhood can be traced back to the Tunisian Revolution, the Serbian Revolution and to earlier theories of non-violent grand strategy. A series of interacting strategies and counter-strategies are then constructed depending on the objectives of each actor.

Analyzing the Mubarak regime gives us a better understanding of how authoritarian regimes are either constrained or unconstrained in their response by the 21st Century nature of revolution. The use of asymmetrical strategies, counter-mobilization, and media monopolization were all highlights of this particular revolution. The unique case of the Egyptian Revolution reveals how regimes can become intrinsically locked in a losing struggle with revolutionary actors. A series of escalating strategies can either improve or hamper prospects of attaining strategic goals.

The uniqueness of WAAKS highlights the growing importance of cyber-based revolutionary actors. WAAKS was constrained in that it was a relatively young actor with an

almost exclusive virtual presence until the early stages of physical mobilization. It was also unique in terms of its leadership. Previous literature on non-violent social change emphasizes the importance of strong central leadership; examples are Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. In contrast to this, WAAKS's strategy was to de-emphasize the importance of leadership and to rally supporters around its cause. This movement was also outstanding in that it attempted to manifest itself physically and conducted dynamic strategy formulation through feedback from its page. WAAKS founder Wael Ghonim refers to this as the "sales tunnel" approach in which activists join a Facebook page, contribute to it, and ultimately take its cause to the streets.¹

The Muslim Brotherhood is uniquely important due to its emphasis on moral and religious legitimacy to that end. It provides context to understand the axiom of chaos around which the regime was structuring itself. Members of the Brotherhood were some of the leading strategic thinkers behind the revolution. Through symbolic and physical protest, the Brotherhood solidified its place as a central revolutionary actor. This study will dissect strategic choices made by the MB and why it chose to make them.

In the time since the 2011 revolution, the Brotherhood has come to political power in Egypt, this paper will analyze whether there were changes to the grand strategy of the Brotherhood. Events since the revolution present a clearer picture of their broader goals. Evaluating strategies chosen by the Brotherhood during the revolution and those chosen after will help us determine whether they were laying the foundations for a leading role in the future of the nation.

Since the beginning of the Arab Spring elections have swept aside old regimes in favor of long suppressed alternatives. From the "Justice and Development Party" in Morocco to the Ennehdha (Renaissance) in Tunisia to the Muslim Brotherhood's "Freedom and Justice Party"

¹ Ghonim, Wael; "Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir

(FJP) in Egypt, the people are choosing more religiously oriented governments long belittled and suppressed by previous regimes. Yet, there is little information on how these regimes will govern.

Political and civil strife have been a daily reality among modern day Muslim nations, particularly since the beginning of colonization. The struggle for an Islamic response to modernity has been a centuries old question and there is little debate that Muslim societies are in need of political and social reform. Since the end of colonization two distinct approaches have emerged on how reform should take place. One was the direct, top-down approach in which social reformers would come to direct political power, including through coup d'états or rebellion. The other option was a gradualist, bottom-up approach in which social change among the masses would eventually lead to political change.² One of the best modern day adherents to the latter approach is Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Strong arguments could be made that many modern Salafi movements have historically favored the top-down approach. Chapter Eight contrasts the two movements with particular emphasis on the approach taken by the Brotherhood in the context of its larger grand strategy.

Following the revolutions of 2011-2012 across the Arab world a distinct pattern seemed to emerge between different strains of Sunni Islam in this region. Some nations such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen witnessed widespread support for revolutionary movement opposed to dictatorships. Other nations such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain which also witnessed protests were quick to declare such actions as un-Islamic acts of sedition. The same type of pattern emerged nationally within Egypt. There were two distinct reactions to the revolution by Muslim religious authorities within the country. Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood officially supported the revolution soon after demonstrators mobilized. The Brotherhood's senior spiritual

² Bayat, Asef, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post Islamist Turn*, Stanford University Press; 1st Edition, pg 50

advisor, Al-Azhar educated Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, released statements in support of the revolution. In the days since the Egyptian Revolution Al-Azhar has officially backed revolutionary movements across the region.³ Yet other officials, particularly those belonging to the Salafi movement initially opposed revolting against the Egyptian government and appeared fragmented in their response.

In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, political theory is based on Islamic principles and how they are understood and interpreted in the modern era. Conclusions from this research will address why compatibility between Islamic thought and democratic forms of governance occurred in Egypt defying claims made by previous scholars. Also, why religiously oriented parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood chose a strategy of shared political power and reduced government centralization. Finally I will be looking at the alternative solutions being presented by such movements and how the promise of these alternatives is the central force behind their strategic thinking.

³ “Commentary on the Al-Azhar Declaration in Support of the Arab Revolutions” Judge Adel Mged, Amsterdam Law Forum, University Amsterdam

Chapter 2:

Literature Review: Conceptual Framework of Grand Strategy

In the modern era some of the most influential work on practical non-violent strategy has been conducted by Gene Sharp. Revolutionary handbooks such as “Dictatorship to Democracy” are credited with influencing revolutions around the world including the Arab Spring.⁴ Therefore his works will be used as a comparison for revolutionary strategy in the case of Egypt. Prior to Sharp, works by Gandhi and Henry Thoreau were essential to non-violent movement. Thoreau argued that citizens who accepted immoral acts of the state in silence were complacent in them. He also believed that acts of “disobedience” even by a minority would hinder the state.⁵ Gandhi is well known for his development of Satyagraha or non-violent disobedience with which he was able to pressure the British Empire into negotiations for Indian independence. Yet, Sharp was the first to lay out a comprehensive hand guide for revolutionary actors.

Though Sharp applies theories of grand strategy to non-violent action, literature on this subject has its origins in the military theater. One of the earlier works of grand strategy, “On War” by the great Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz (d. 1831) is almost a strategy guide on how to philosophically and practically view and conduct war. He is best known to view war as an extension of policy through other means and emphasize its much broader, “grand strategic” goals. Rather than limiting goals to the battlefield, Clausewitz emphasizes the ultimate political goals behind the choice to go to war. Similar to Clausewitz Sharp views non-violent revolutionary

⁴ Gene Sharp: A dictator’s worst nightmare < <http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/23/world/gene-sharp-revolutionary/index.html>>

⁵ McCarthy Ronald, Krueger Christopher; *Toward Research and Theory Building in the Study of Nonviolent Action*, 1993 pg. 5

strategy as a means for grand strategic goals without the need for war.⁶

On the concept of strategy and combat, we see a larger picture of how military commanders must utilize all their resources for the attainment of ultimate goals. Concepts such as the necessity of discipline and the indirect approach are concentrated upon where enemy territory may be seized not as the ultimate objective but rather to weaken the opponent and to make the oppression of war greater than the sought concession. This thinking could be directly observed during the Egyptian Revolution when the regime attempted to use attrition as a strategy against revolutionary actors. It also delves into the need for discipline and use of the indirect approach during revolutionary mass movement. In modern revolutions it can be demonstrated by the occupation of key geographic landmarks and territories.⁷

Historically, grand strategy was restricted to state actors in the realm of political and military policy. British historian, Paul Kennedy's widely accepted definition, is "The crux of grand strategy lies in policy, in the capacity to bring together all elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long term best interests." (Kennedy 5). Though this definition applies to states, I will attempt to apply it to a set of non-state actors. The challenge of undertaking such a task is that the actor must have some organizational mechanism for decision making and a set of objectives. Non-state actors could include any number of entities but those most effective for this template are ones with strategic objectives to particular ends. This paper is an attempt to apply such a template and investigate what differences emerge from the classic definition when applied to non-state actors.

⁶ This observation is outlined by Kruegler & McCarthy (1993) in their analysis of Sharp's approach towards non-violent action.

⁷ During the Arab Spring uprisings occupation of central squares became key to media coverage and a powerful indication of the resolve of revolutionaries.

In “Strategy” British military historian Liddell Hart introduces what grand strategy is and how it differs from strategy and tactics. Hart believed Carl von Clausewitz’s understanding on strategy has been misunderstood and misapplied. He believes that though strategy initially referred to the military sphere it also had applications in economics and even morality. “Grand strategy too should regulate the distribution of power between the several services and between the services and industry.”⁸ He goes on to widen the definition of Grand Strategy by including all the resources of the state including financial, diplomatic and commercial aspects.

Grand strategy in Sharp’s work goes along a similar strain. He mentions that the strength of a regime is in its tangible and intangible resources. These can include authority, human and material resources, skills and knowledge and the ability to mobilize these. The strength of non-violent revolutionary movements lies less in their material resources or means and more in strategies aimed at weaknesses of the regime. Due to the non-violent nature of these movements mass-mobilization and non-cooperation is their central strength.

Strategic thinking during the Egyptian Revolution like other modern revolutions has been influenced by earlier works on military strategy. Direct examples of the indirect approach, ceasing of symbolic territory, and larger political objectives of revolutionary operations could be observed during this time period. The fact that the Mubarak regime originated from a military background emphasizes how it was also influenced by such thinking. This could also be observed in its method of conducting counter-revolution similar to a military operation.

Sharp applies some of the same strategies recommended by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Hart in non-violent social movement. In his preeminent book “From Dictatorship to Democracy”, he outlines the grand strategy of non-violent revolution. He rejects violent methods of resistance because, “By placing confidence in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with

⁸ Hart, Liddell “Strategy” pg. 322

which the oppressors nearly always have superiority.”⁹ In contrast to earlier theories on grand strategy, Sharp takes a radically different view by projecting it through the lens of non-state, non-violent social change. In essence the template for grand strategy is the same but the means and actors involved are quite different. Sharp’s definition of grand strategy pertains to non-violent revolution and social change. He defines it as,

“The conception that serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and available resources (e.g. economic, human, moral) of the nation or other group to attain its objectives in a conflict. The master plan for conducting the conflict. Grand strategy sets the basic framework for the selection of more limited strategies for waging the struggle. Grand strategy also determines the allocation of general tasks to particular groups and the distribution of resources to them for use in the struggle.”¹⁰

Sharp describes the next level of the grand strategic template as strategy, “Strategy is the plan for the practical distribution, adaptation and application of available means to attain desired objectives. Strategy is the basic idea of how the battle or campaign should develop, how its separate components should best be fitted together to contribute most advantageously to achieving its objectives. Strategy accounts for one’s own and the opponent’s objectives, resources, strengths, and means of action, offensive and defensive.”

Below the level of grand strategy and strategy Sharp defines methods and tactics. Tactics are “A limited plan of action based on a conception of how best in a restricted phase of a conflict to utilize the available means of fighting to achieve a limited objective as part of the wider strategy. A tactic fits within the broad strategy, just as strategy fits within the grand strategy.”.

“Tactics are applied for shorter periods of time than strategies, or in smaller areas (geographical,

⁹ Sharp, Gene “Dictatorship to Democracy” pg. 5, The Albert Einstein Institute

¹⁰ Ibid pg. 43

institutional, etc.), or by a more limited number of people, or for more limited objectives.”¹¹ He describes methods as “A specific form of action within the technique of nonviolent action”.

“specific weapons or means of action. Within the technique of nonviolent struggle, these include dozens of particular forms of action (strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation etc...) Sharp describes no less than 198 escalating methods of non-violent revolution.¹²

Based on earlier practical works by Henry Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi and a multitude of global examples, Sharp builds a guideline for non-violent revolution. He identifies the six major sources of power for a regime. *Authority*, the belief that a regime is legitimate, *Human resources*, the level of support and cooperation the regime receives *Skills and knowledge* and *intangible factors*, which may be psychological or ideological. Finally, *material resources*, and *sanctions* against non-cooperative members of society are factored in.¹³

He systematically outlines a method of overthrowing dictatorship by first identifying the Achilles heel of the regime. In his view, each regime has some weakness which must be identified by actors for change and taken advantage of. He says, “Despite the appearances of strength, all dictatorships have weaknesses, internal inefficiencies, personal rivalries, institutional inefficiencies, and conflicts between organizations and departments.” In the Egyptian case, this proved to be the government’s inability to react to ingenious methods of mass mobilization by actors for change.

According to Sharp there are four mechanisms of change: conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion and disintegration. Conversion is the acceptance of the regime that change is needed and carries it out on its own; it is deemed least likely to happen by Sharp.

Accommodation is the mutual compromise between the regime and actors for change and is not

¹¹ Ibid pg.44

¹² Ibid pgs. 79-86

¹³ Ibid pg. 67-68

an option leading to regime change.¹⁴ Nonviolent coercion occurs when the leader's ability to act effectively is removed. This means the regime is constrained by the opposition and no longer has all available options to restrain opponents. Disintegration, the most drastic method of change is making the regime so ineffective that it is no longer capable of even surrendering. Disintegration is viewed by Sharp as being the only mechanism of change that ultimately leads to the eradication and collapse of the existing regime.¹⁵

Throughout his outline for revolutionary strategy, Sharp is adamant on his emphasis for non-violent means of change. "Even limited resistance violence during a political defiance campaign will be counterproductive, for it will shift the struggle to one in which the dictators have an overwhelming advantage (military warfare). Nonviolent discipline is a key to success and must be maintained despite provocations and brutalities by the dictators and their agents."¹⁶

The objective in Sharp's theory of non-violent revolution is changing a political system based on dictatorship to one on democracy. This type of grand strategy must be ongoing even after the accomplishment of central objectives. Sharp summarizes this by stating "A grand strategy that limits its objective to merely destroying the incumbent dictatorship runs the risk of producing another tyrant."¹⁷

Religion in the Grand Strategic Framework

Following the 2011 Arab Spring and preceding elections at least two out of three nations undergoing regime changing revolutions (Egypt and Tunisia) brought to power religiously oriented political parties. This may come as a surprise to some audiences and political scholars outside the Middle East. Particularly those who believed religious values and culture in these

¹⁴ Sharp, Gene; "From Dictatorship to Democracy", pg. 44

¹⁵ Sharp, Gene; "From Dictatorship to Democracy"; pg. 43

¹⁶ Sharp, Gene; "From Dictatorship to Democracy" pg. 44 The Albert Einstein Institution , Boston MA

¹⁷ Ibid pg.40

nations were at odds with democratic governance. This does not mean every revolutionary actor had a religious platform but rather they had an ethical platform which larger society could embrace. In the case of the Egyptian Revolution, the struggle over the moral high ground between the regime and revolutionaries took precedence. If revolutionaries could prove that their cause was just, they would gain the support of larger society. The regime had to make a similar case, that although it had its own flaws; it was still the better alternative.

To better understand the meaning of religion in the context of the Egyptian Revolution we must first understand its contextual framework. Religion, according to orthodox Islam, officially adhered to by the Brotherhood and larger Egyptian society is much broader in scope than a collection of beliefs and rituals. The Arabic concept of *deen* or way of life is more encompassing and includes in it adherence to a set of beliefs, values, and principles on how to conduct one's self. As traditionally understood, Islam is viewed as a source for guiding principles behind social, political, economic, and cultural life. Its all-encompassing nature means it is a source for guidance to humanity's greatest challenges under any circumstances.

The role of religious morality during the Egyptian Revolution cannot be understated. From its early stages as a grassroots effort for social justice to the dramatic casting of those killed as revolutionary martyrs. The fact that Egyptian society is largely conservative and Muslim meant that whoever was going to win the revolutionary struggle had to have the moral support of the Egyptian people. To better understand this struggle over morality we must contextualize it within a larger historic framework.

Modern day revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa did not occur spontaneously nor did they receive mass support in a vacuum. Rather they were based on the premise of a just social order which meant restructuring the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Support

for revolution was based on a moral framework in which the ruler was declared an oppressor and revolutionaries the just advocates for a new order. Indeed, a large segment of revolutionaries used moral justification for their actions and attempted to portray their struggle as a moral one aligned with Islamic values on human ethics and justice. Organizations such as WAAKS and the Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly used moral references to reinforce and justify their actions. Indeed the Brotherhood based its strategic decision making upon its future role in the nation. To better understand the Brotherhood's strategy during the revolution, this paper will outline larger goals within their grand strategy and how they influenced crucial decisions made during the revolution.

Although organizations such as the Brotherhood had long been vying for a regime change, they historically opted for peaceful elections even if rigged. The regime, claiming itself as the secular, Western oriented alternative historically suppressed their movement. During the Egyptian Revolution major actors such as the Brotherhood, influential social & religious personalities, as well as organizations supported revolutionary change. Other scholars and personalities were co-opted to speak in favor of the regime. To understand the struggle between the two we must take into account the larger movement for reform within Muslim societies and their struggle with modernity.

Tamimi outlines how the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 brought the disparity between the newly invigorated European powers and Muslim nations to the forefront of intellectual thought. Islamic reformers strove to understand what had caused this socio-political and technological gap which had allowed European powers to invade and harass their lands. Tamimi explains that reformers such as Tahtawi (d. 1873), Tunisi (d. 1899), Al Afghani (d. 1897), and Abduh (d. 1905) had all believed that the underlying cause was not Islam itself but rather the

lack of political rights which had stifled the much needed reform in these societies.

They believed that rather than rejecting European knowledge it would be more beneficial to learn from and build upon it. Scholars such as Al Afghani believed the prevention by authorities of allowing men such as himself into policy formulation is what was preventing nations from becoming competitive members of the international community. The lack of the Islamic concept of Shura (consultation) was what prevented new ideas and people from entering the decision making process. The political elite were unaware of the geopolitical changes in other parts of the world and were unable to restructure their nations to keep up with these changes.

Chapter 3:

Hypothesis, Process Tracing, and Actors for Revolution

During the phenomenon now known as the Arab Spring beginning in 2010 one of the most noticeable characteristics was the similar adaptation of strategies across national movements. From Tunisia to Egypt to Libya, protesters and regimes adapted very similar revolutionary and counter-revolutionary strategies. Yet this was not simply a demonstration effect whereby protesters and regimes imitated one another. Evidence suggests that revolutionary actors in each of these nations adapted very similar strategies against regimes with similar institutional structures. The assistance of outside organizations such as the Albert Einstein Institute and revolutionary handbooks such as “Dictatorship to Democracy” assisted revolutionaries with key organizational skills.¹⁸ These proved precisely effective against the institutional structures of regimes they were opposing.

To understand the grand strategy of the Egyptian Revolution it is crucial to understand the different actors that took part in this phenomenon. This section contains a short introduction to three of the leading actors who played a core role in the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood, “We Are All Khalid Said”, and the Mubarak Regime. The time frame of events will be from the beginnings of social activism by the Brotherhood and “WAAKS” until the fall of the regime and emergence of a democratic government, one of the central goals of both the MB and WAAKS. Analysis of the Serbian Revolution of 1999 and Tunisian Revolution of 2011 will be done to

¹⁸ Multiple sources have cited and identified Gene Sharp’s recommendations for non-violent revolution and their implementation during the Serbian Revolution and the Arab Spring. These include documented youth training programs in which groups such as Otpor! and The 6th of April Movement trained in strategies and tactics for social change.

understand their influence on transnational revolutionary groups on Egypt. Additional actors during the revolution were both internal such as the revolutionary April 6th Movement, external such as international governments and media, and transnational such as Anonymous and a global network of public supporters an in depth analysis of these groups is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Egyptian Revolution in the larger context of the Arab Spring is truly a 21st Century revolution where the role of states, non-state actors and technology all converged to motivate the outcome. The use of digital technology in revolution is certainly not a new phenomenon but its dramatic effects have never been seen at such a scale. The effectiveness of social media in physical mobilization so overwhelmed the regime it proved to be one of the decisive factors in organization and strategy making. The well-publicized and documented nature of events forced the regime to re-evaluate how it would fight the revolution without losing the public relations struggle. Yet social media alone cannot be credited with mass mobilization. Rather, it acted as an incubator for revolutionary movement which ultimately relied on ingenious strategies and tactics.

My hypothesis on the grand strategy of actors involved in the Egyptian Revolution is that organizations for dynamic social change such as WAAKS and April 6th wanted to provide the spark for drastic revolutionary social and political change. In the short term this meant complete removal of the Mubarak regime. Long term, it meant guarding accomplishments of the revolution without allowing the emergence of another unjust social order. Yet these initiators of revolution could not accomplish their goals alone. The grand strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood has been to redevelop Egypt as a regional and civilizational leader with moral Islamic guidelines. They believe in democratic governance and re-attaining Egypt's traditionally strong role in the Mid-East. The grand strategy of the regime, being most direct, was surviving and ending the

revolution. I hypothesize that the Mubarak regime was constrained in its actions by a number of international and domestic factors. The regime, which for decades attempted to portray itself in a populist, democratic image, could not afford to lose the PR war with revolutionary actors. If the regime openly employed brutal tactics this would not only widen fissures within it self but would increase domestic and international pressure for regime change. It would also undermine its allegations that revolutionary actors were responsible for the fitna or chaos prevailing in the country. Internationally, it would call into question Egypt's agreements to uphold human rights and strengthen arguments by revolutionary actors that brutality was central to the regime's power.

This hypothesis states that the Egyptian Revolution was carried out in four distinct stages. The first stage was psychologically overcoming the barrier of fear by revolutionary organizations. The second stage was mass mobilization by opposition activists which was met by counter-mobilization by the regime. The third stage was government disruption and occupation of public spaces by revolutionaries, again this was countered by violence and chaos by the regime. The fourth stage of revolution witnessed in Egypt was rejuvenated mobilization and formulation of a united front by revolutionary actors. The regime attempted but failed to counter this through the use of economic attrition before its final fracture and collapse.

Evidence for determining the grand strategy of each actor is based upon documented events which occurred during the Egyptian Revolution and first-hand accounts of participants. To identify different strategies and stages undertaken during the revolution I will use documented evidence from events and individual participants, particularly leaders within each group. The Muslim Brotherhood has had long standing policy goals and its hierarchical structure facilitated the types of policies undertaken during and after the revolution. WAAKS, primarily a social media based actor, also had clearly stated goals and updates on its Facebook page. Documented

evidence will also be presented on how WAAKS took on a physical form during protests and broader strategic goals it supported. The regime, perhaps the most difficult to assess, also released official statements and acted through its police and military force. Evidence from each of these sources will be used to construct a grand strategic template by each actor and show how these grand strategies clashed throughout the revolution.

Egypt is a unique case in the Middle East not only qualitatively in terms of a being a heavily urbanized, rapidly modernizing nation state but also in its religious make up. My second hypothesis is that qualities of the predominant, traditionalist Hanafi and Shafi schools of Islamic thought in Egypt were conducive to revolutionary change in comparison with newer Salafi schools. Ethical teachings from these schools contributed to the revolutionary appeal felt across the nation. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on more traditionalist schools of Islamic thought. Their choice to join the revolution was based on an ethical appeal for greater justice in Egyptian society. Strategies were derived based upon this ethical foundation which consolidated support against a ruler deemed unjust. The Brotherhood brought with it a comprehensive program for democratic social and political reform. This can be contrasted with more Salafi oriented scholars who opposed the overthrow of the ruler on the basis of the potential for ensuing fitna (chaos) in society. Traditional Sunni organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood were more easily able to consolidate their religious values with democratic structures of power. This could be seen in the Brotherhood's internal use of elections for selection of leadership. It strongly contrasted with the Salafi movement of Egypt which shunned electoral and democratic institutions as an innovation of the West. Ironically, it was the Salafi who had to reverse their policies and form democratic political parties once elections took place.

Evidence will be taken not only from historic literature on the subject but also stated motivations by major actors behind the revolution. Influential religious and social leaders will be quoted to determine why they took such a stance. Though religion was a state controlled institution in Egypt the January 25th Revolution gave congregations in mosques and churches unprecedented independence in determining which stance they would take. The fact that some religious actors more openly embraced the struggle for political and social change requires an in depth analysis of what makes these actors unique.

The Egyptian case also diverges from previous literature by Gene Sharp in a number of ways. In his “Dictatorship to Democracy” Sharp’s most well-known work he recommends a number of strategies and characteristics for successful revolutionary actors. Among these are the use of strictly non-violent means and the non-essentiality of centralized leadership. Sharp believes that violence would corrupt the cause of revolution and would favor the regime which is better predisposed to win such a conflict. He also says that having particular leaders among groups would create specific targets for the regime. The Egyptian case diverts from these recommendations in that defensive violence was used by revolutionaries when it became necessary. The MB and WAAKS also had particular leaders in positions of decision making thus diverting from Sharp’s recommendations. More importantly conditioning factors (qualities and characteristics) of each revolutionary actor played an essential role in their decision making and ultimately the outcome of the revolution.

Among these, hypothesis one would be falsified if evidence suggests revolutionary actors had grand strategies other than those identified and constructed in this paper. The premise for the templates suggested here is based on earlier work on grand strategy particularly in the theater of war. Hypothesis two would be falsified if it can be proven that there was no significant difference

between Salafi and traditionalist schools of Islam on the decision to support the Egyptian Revolution and a democratic political vision for the Egyptian state.

Chapter 4:

Historical Context of Struggle in Egypt

In chapter four process tracing is used to identify and show how other actors influenced revolutionaries in Egypt and eventually the entire nation. The Serbian Revolution was a watershed moment following the Cold War in which non-violent activists successfully deposed a sitting ruler. Lessons from this revolution were directly applied to the uprising witnessed in Tunisia and from there the rest of the Arab Spring particularly Egypt. By tracing back how revolutionaries influenced one another we can see the impact of the Albert Einstein Institute, and other American based pro-democracy NGOs. Predictions can then be made on how close strategic choices by Egyptian revolutionaries reflected recommendations made by such institutions. We can also determine how these differences contribute to literature on revolutionary grand strategy.

Egypt has prominent geopolitical and historical importance at the heart of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It has long been known as a trend setting nation in the region and exerts a strong influence not only on its Arab neighbors but more broadly on African and Muslim nations. It shares borders with Israel, with which it had four wars but since the 1979 Egypt-Israel Treaty a state of cold peace. Geographically it sits on the historic Nile Delta, long known as an agricultural heartland and has control over the Suez Canal. Cairo is the largest city in Africa and the Middle East and houses the prominent Al-Azhar University, one of the oldest universities in the world.

Egypt is a nation of 80 million people, geographically about 10% of its land is inhabited with 90% desert. This led to the development of heavily urbanized cities along the coastline and the Suez Canal. Ismailia, an industrial city near the canal had historic importance as the site of clashes which led to the Second Revolution against the British and is heavily settled by armed Bedouin (Nomadic) tribes. Cairo, nicknamed “The City of a Thousand Minarets” is located 200km from the Mediterranean with a population of about 7 million. The second largest city Alexandria, with about 4 million people, is located on the Mediterranean, and is significantly known as the heartland of the Muslim Brotherhood. Religiously the population is 90% mainly Sunni Muslim and 10% Coptic Christian; sectarian violence was one of the main justifications for authoritarian policies by various leaders.

Modern Egypt was founded after Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the last King of Egypt, Farouk, in 1952 and renamed it the Arab Republic of Egypt. Nasser’s reign lasted until 1971 when he was succeeded by his Vice President Anwar Sadat. After Sadat’s assassination by suspected extremists in 1981 his VP Hosni Mubarak came to power until the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Thus in its 60 year history, Egypt was ruled by three leaders all from military backgrounds. Domestically, Emergency Law was first instituted in 1958 and continually since 1967. Following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, the Emergency Law was expanded along with a steady growth in the internal security apparatus. President Mubarak justified this expansion not only due to the Assassination of Anwar Sadat but also terrorist attacks by groups such as Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya and Jihad.

The uprising witnessed in Egypt did not occur spontaneously, efforts at civil disobedience were made since the colonial era when Britain shortly occupied Egypt, previously an autonomous Ottoman province. Known as the “First Egyptian Revolution”, uprisings occurred in

1919 after Britain's refusal to recognize Egypt as an independent state. The British were forced to abdicate following the “Second Revolution” which ended in a coup by the Gamal Abdul Nasser and the Free Officer's Movement. This was the beginning of six decades of authoritarian martial rule from Gamal Nasser until the end of the Mubarak regime (Kamrava 93).

Though revolutionary movements were present in Egypt for almost a century the unprecedented scale of the January 25th uprising had its roots in modern day movements. Historically, the global struggle between the Soviet Union and United States during the Cold War had massive social and political implications for the rest of the world. Each superpower supported violent and non-violent movements sympathetic with its own ideology. It was within this context that institutions such as the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute were formulated within the United States. The Albert Einstein Institute facilitated the education and training of democratic activists around the world.¹⁹ The work of these institutions directly impacted revolutionary democratic actors and eventually the Arab Spring of the present era.

One revolution in particular would influence strategies and tactics adapted by later Tunisian and Egyptian activists. The Serbian Revolution of 1999 in which Slobodan Milosevic was ousted. During this revolution the Serbian youth movement, Otpor!, successfully waged a non-violent revolutionary campaign which led to the eventual collapse of the regime. Serbian activists used tactics found in hand books such as “Dictatorship to Democracy” as well as massive rallies to eventually push for the end of the Milosevic regime. The Serbian revolution was unique in that student activists were able to build a powerful movement that would eventually topple a regime using non-violence. Lessons from Otpor! directly influenced activists

¹⁹ The Albert Einstein Institute < <http://www.aeinstein.org/>> International Republican Institute < <http://www.iri.org/>> National Democratic Institute < <http://www.ndi.org/>>

in Egypt particularly the April 6th Movement which would play a leading role in mobilizing support against the Mubarak Regime.²⁰

Prior to the events of January 25th other underground opposition movements attempted to mobilize and spark wider unrest. Members of the April 6th Movement traveled to Serbia and learned about tactics and strategies from Otpor!. Its attempts to organize protests on April 6th 2008 were cracked down by government forces yet it was able to survive and take part in more general protests in 2011. WAAKS was anonymously run by Wael Ghonim, the Google executive for the MENA region, who took on the cause of Khalid Said. The page quickly attracted hundreds of thousands of members and became a powerful mechanism for social activism across the country.

April 6th was the powerful Egyptian youth led movement for economic and social change which began in 2008 and gained momentum through its Facebook page. Its attempt to organize large rallies on April 6th 2008 brought it to prominence in Egypt as a successful model of activism within the stiff confines of Egyptian political life. Leading activists such as Ahmed Maher, Esraa Rashid and Mohammed Adel not only took lessons from Otpor! but Adel gained additional training through the US State Department sponsored “Alliance of Youth Movement’s Summit” held in 2008. April 6th worked hand in hand with “We Are All Khalid Said” to organize and execute the January 25th Revolution.²¹

WAAKS or “We Are All Khalid Said” was formed after the brutal death of Khalid Said who according to the official web and Facebook pages was killed by Egyptian police.²² Similar

²⁰Rosenburg, Tina “ Revolution U: What Egypt Learned from Students Who Overthrew Milosevic”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u February 16, 2011

²¹ April 6 Youth Movement, PBS:Frontline < <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/>>

²² “We Are All Khalid Said” < <http://www.elshaheed.co.uk/home-khaled-said-full-story-background-truth-what-happened-torture-in-egypt-by-egyptian-police/>>

to Tunisia's Mohamed Bouazizi whose suicide sparked the revolution there, Said's death led to a massive campaign for social justice across Egypt. Egyptian activists such as Wael Ghonim, and Mohamed Ibrahim organized Arabic and English based Facebook pages and websites to rally Egyptian youth around calls for justice and accountability within the Egyptian government.²³ "WAAKS" would form an alliance with April 6th and other opposition groups to launch the January 25 Revolution and the ensuing campaign for comprehensive social and political change.

The largest and most organized actor in this study, the Muslim Brotherhood was historically based on a grass roots campaign of social activism. Though evidence suggests that youth among the Brotherhood were already involved in organizing the January 25th Revolution, the older leadership of the Brotherhood officially joined once massive rallies began taking shape. Though it was somewhat of a late comer the Brotherhood was also the largest, best organized, and most resourceful revolutionary actor. The Brotherhood would come to compliment the initial thrust made by youth movements and reinforce gains made when the regime was taken by surprise.²⁴

In order to correctly understand choice of strategy by different actors during the Egyptian Revolution it is important to first understand their reasons for revolting and what they would face. This chapter gives an in depth understanding of the type of rule exerted by the Mubarak regime, its strengths, weaknesses and what ultimately led to its downfall. Though Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981 much of the legal framework for authoritarian rule was already in existence. The historic imposition of Emergency Law since 1958 sharply curtailed individual freedoms and the ability to dissent against the government. Article 3 of the Emergency Law prevented freedom of opinion and media when deemed necessary by the military ruler. Article 9 gave the President

²³ Wael, Ghonim Revolution 2.0 The Power of the People Is Greater Than the People in Power: A Memoir

²⁴ PBS: Frontline "Revolution in Cairo"< <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-muslim-brotherhood/>>

exclusive rights to hold trials in special state security courts.²⁵ Additional amendments made in 1981 allowed the president to appoint judges, including military judges when deemed necessary in violation of the Egyptian constitution.

Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat the Egyptian state imposed strict new laws banning religious and secular parties opposing the government. Thousands of religious activists were rounded up and arrested after blame for the assassination was placed on religiously inspired revolutionaries in the military.²⁶ Since then the Mubarak regime strengthened laws preventing speech or assembly particularly against the government. Trade unions were banned and street activists prevented from gathering in protest or even public meetings. The regime took a freehand in brutalizing many of its opponents. Though torture was often applied to those who defied it, extrajudicial killings and arrest were also common.²⁷

The judicial system was closely aligned with the ruling government, implementing its laws and lacking independent judgment. For decades the regime was able to strengthen its grip over the judiciary and manipulate its cases against opponents. The government initially cracked down on religious and secular opposition groups following the ascendance of the Mubarak regime. Prior to the attacks on 9/11 the government faced armed opposition from groups such as Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya. The severe crackdown on and widespread imprisonment of its members forced its leaders to largely abandon armed opposition.²⁸

The strong hand of the state restricted most political groups in particular those with a religious platform to the private realm. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to

²⁵ FIDH Worldwide Human Rights Movement “The Emergency Law in Egypt”, <http://www.fidh.org/THE-EMERGENCY-LAW-IN-EGYPT>

²⁶ “30 year later questions remain over Sadat killing, peace with Israel”, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/06/world/meast/egypt-sadat-assassination/index.html>

²⁷ Crime and Society Country Reports: Egypt <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/egypt.html>

²⁸ Background Jamaat Al-Islamiyya, <http://www.cfr.org/egypt/jamaat-al-islamiyya/p9156>

run social services but restricted in political participation and public speaking. Opposition to the government was punished by imprisonment, blackmail, torture and various other means.²⁹ Many individuals and groups took their opposition to the less regulated blogosphere, social media, and other sites. Though the regime initially felt less threatened by the non-physical opposition it eventually began cracking down on bloggers and online activists.

The primary institution through which individuals could protest their cases was the Egyptian court system. In some cases people were able to successfully protest their detention and were released. Temporary detention was often employed during elections. Many opposition activists including those running for office were detained until after the elections. During the 2005 presidential elections the main opposition candidate, Ayman Nour, was arrested by police while campaigning.³⁰ During the Mubarak regime, courts had little effect on the outcome of administrative rulings meted out by the government and police. There were very few cases in which security forces could be held accountable for abuse or death during detention. The key cases of Khalid Said and other young men was a primary force behind major protests that took shape in the Egyptian Revolution.

For most of the modern era the Egyptian people were ruled by authoritarian regimes which gave them minimal individual freedoms particularly in political participation. Additional restrictions on speech, assembly, and prevalent cronyism were signs of a bleak future. The judiciary was largely compromised and co-opted by the government. Cases against arbitrary detentions and extra-judicial killings were delayed for years in courts incapable of serving justice. All these restrictions finally came to a head during the sudden revolutions erupting in the region

²⁹ Egyptian police crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood before elections;
<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/23/world/la-fg-egypt-brotherhood-20101123> November, 23, 2010

³⁰ Egypt restores Ayman Nour's political rights, Al Jazeera English,
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u>

throughout 2011. Thus major opposition parties were all composed of those most restricted during the Mubarak Era. The Muslim Brotherhood facing almost seven decades of persecution and modern day bloggers and electronic activists were at the forefront for political change.

The rise of the information age in the 1990s has revolutionized both societies and how states apply their security apparatus to control them. Through much of the 1990s the Egyptian regime cultivated a major network of uniformed and undercover police.³¹ Intelligence collection was primarily conducted by the internal police but also a network of informants. The spread of the internet, cell phones, and satellites all worked to undermine information control and the authority of the regime. By the late 2000s the digital revolution had moved beyond the control of the Egyptian government. The massive security apparatus had failed to understand how powerful social media could be in a society. Its main strength was in instant information sharing. YouTube and picture sharing were used to expose the states brutality and show people a better form of existence. The failure of the regime was forming a massive physical apparatus that couldn't cope with electronic activism. According to Egyptian activists internet usage increased from 1.5 million to 13.6 million users between 2004 and 2008. In the decade following 9/11 Egyptian security forces purchased wiretapping technology from US and British firms.³² This provided the security apparatus with powerful new tools with which to spy on and control the populace. The rapid rise of digital technologies ultimately overpowered the control mechanisms put in place by the regime during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011-2012.

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace the Egyptian Interior Ministry headed a force of 150,000 in 1974. It rose dramatically to about 1.7 million personnel

³¹ State Security Investigative Service (SSIS) General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI) Gihaz Mabahith Amn al-Dawla; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/egypt/ssis.html> , 2/6/2012

³² "Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion"
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970862420038.html> , 02/20/2012

by 2009. According to Carnegie, “Egypt’s internal security personnel outnumber its active-duty military troops by a ratio of three to one and by 2002 accounted for one-fifth of all central government employees.”³³ For a nation of 80 million people these staggering numbers show the primary strategy of Egyptian state security was its dramatic size. Internal security was built around physical threats from a large force such as riots or even revolution. By the late 1990s and 2000s threats from small terrorist groups were not as prominent in security strategy.

Although the Egyptian government largely relied on a network of undercover agents for intelligence collection in recent years it began a campaign of electronic surveillance. The spread of the internet and communication devices opened a new front for social and political control. A 2011 raid on the State Security building revealed a treasure trove of documents on electronic wire-tapping. Not only was state security collecting emails, and recording phone conversations, it had successfully bugged computers and networks.³⁴ The purchase of surveillance technology from US and British companies allowed the government to contend with the changing dynamics of information control.³⁵

The spread of blogs, Facebook, twitter, and other social media made it extremely difficult for state security to control mass amounts of information. Egypt had come into the information age full thrust making it much harder for the regime to prevent social change. Leaders of social change movements were often located outside the country making them difficult to detain and prosecute. Essentially, the internet opened up space for dissent and political freedom not given

³³ “Rethinking Internal Security in Egypt” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/rethinking-internal-security-in-egypt/bdj> Carnegie Endowment

³⁴ Mackinnon, Rebecca, “Consent of the Networked” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/01/consent_of_the_networked_rebecca_mackinnon_expains_why_we_must_assert_our_rights_as_citizens_of_the_internet_.html

³⁵ Stecklow, Steve et al.; “Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970862420038.html>

by the government.³⁶

There is an important distinction to be made on who the government was spying on. Despite claims that the primary targets were part of terrorist organizations, many targets were involved in democratic and human rights activism. Detailed transcripts on Egyptian security's ability to penetrate Skype chats were revealed after the storming of state security buildings during the 2011 Revolution.³⁷ Though it was an age old strategy to arrest terrorism suspects along with political opponents, this was a new development in the digital world.

To understand how electronic spying increased in Egypt post 9/11 we must view it as an adjustment to larger changes in society. New technologies made an extremely large security apparatus obsolete. Many activists and anti-regime critics had moved online to blogging communities, twitter, and social media. During the 2010 parliamentary election, democracy advocates were spied on by the regime.³⁸ Newer tactics adopted by the regime included infiltration of social media networks by agents posing as either activists to collect information or detractors to movements for change.³⁹

Copious amounts of information collected by the interior ministry gave evidence to its deeply entrenched presence in public life. The state was reaching deeper into people's electronic lives and prosecuting anyone suspected of harboring anti-regime inclinations. Raids on security force headquarters revealed the scope of information collection. Activists found files on

³⁶ Nayeri, Farah; "Google's Ghonim Recalls Sparking Egypt Mutiny in 'Revolution 2.0': Books"
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-21/google-s-ghonim-recalls-sparking-egyptian-mutiny-via-facebook.html>
02/20/2012

³⁷ Stecklow, Steve et al.; "Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion"
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970862420038.html>

³⁸ Stecklow, Steve et al.; "Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion"
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970862420038.html>

³⁹ "Evidence of Egyptian Security Monitoring Activists on The Social Network, Facebook"
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=26320>

themselves and others tied to the democratic movement for change.⁴⁰

The attempted controls and restraints placed on social media were indicative of the new desperation of the regime. Protests were not only in the electronic realm but were taking shape physically. The regime found this intolerable and began to closely monitor electronic cafes and traced back electronic posts to their sources. The new spyware acquired by the country was used to conduct surveillance on users of Skype, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. The change in communication technologies forced the regime to adapt to the digital age.

A lack of external constraints allowed the state to adopt draconian policies. It justified its massive spying networks using claims of counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence. Yet, the threat of terrorism was often secondary to preventing social change. The more immediate threat to the regime came not from a string of terrorist attacks but a string of growing anti-regime protests. For decades the regime had cracked down on organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood and Gama Islamiyya. These movements had largely been controlled by the time the 9/11 attacks occurred. The Muslim Brotherhood had given up anti-regime violence and Gama members were largely under arrest. The Carnegie Endowment reports “Declared targets of the crackdown were the domestic terrorist groups al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya and al-Gihad, but in practice, the security forces also employed their sweeping powers to neutralize political opponents of the regime.”⁴¹ It cracked down on leftist and centrist political parties during occasional elections. Perhaps the most dramatic application of digital technology by the government was the unprecedented, total internet blackout applied during the final days of the

⁴⁰ Stein, Jeff, “Egyptian protesters breach ‘torture center,’ seize files” http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2011/03/egyptian_protesters_breach_tor.html

⁴¹ “Rethinking Internal Security in Egypt” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/rethinking-internal-security-in-egypt/bdj>

Mubarak Regime.⁴² There was no major surveillance upgrade by the security apparatus post 9/11 because violent groups threatening the state were largely deemed impotent. Major changes did take shape in electronic surveillance to control social and political movements. Yet, these were too late to prevent the eventual downfall of the regime.

⁴² Evangelista, Benny; "Tech world stunned at Egypt's Internet shutdown" <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/01/28/BU3T1HFPGM.DTL>

Chapter 5:

The Stage and its Actors

The Muslim Brotherhood and WAAKS were chosen because each of these organizations played a leading role in strategies pursued to outmaneuver the regime. The MB has long been active in reforming Egyptian society and has spent much of its history as an opposition movement to various governments. Although it is in actuality a transnational actor, this paper only considers its role in Egypt. The Brotherhood was responsible not in beginning the revolution, though much of its younger membership took part, but rather in reinforcing gains made by protesters. Once the leadership of the Brotherhood was convinced by its younger membership that the Egyptian people were ready for dramatic reform, they mobilized their entire organizational apparatus to aid the protesters in their cause.

During the era of British occupation, Hassan Al-Banna (b. 1906) began a small social movement emphasizing Islamic piety and social justice; it quickly grew across Egypt and by the end of the decade became a formidable social force known as Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen (The Muslim Brotherhood). This new movement which began during the era of colonization and resulting Islamic revivalism spread into several other nations. The main purpose of Al-Banna and the Brotherhood was a return to Islamic teachings and reversal of colonization which they felt was eroding the Islamic character of their nations. The Brotherhood soon became a formidable force opposing the British backed monarchy and backing the Second Revolution during which Banna was assassinated.

The movement supported Gamal Nasser in his early days but this was a short lived relationship since Gamal viewed the Brotherhood as challengers. It subsequently renounced the use of violence but was banned as an organization in 1954 (BBC 2011). It continued to function on a platform of piety and social justice through which it established clinics, schools, and continued growing in membership. In 1984 it joined Leftist opposition parties and continued to be a part of the opposition winning an unprecedented 20% of parliamentary seats in 2005. During the elections of 2010 which were strongly skewed in favor of the NDP (National Democratic Party), the official government party, the Brotherhood along with all other opposition parties was unable to win seats (Nelson 2010).

WAAKS was much younger than the Brotherhood not only as an organization but also in membership. It largely grew in cyberspace, through its website but ultimately through Facebook where it had over 1 million members by the outbreak of revolution. WAAKS rallied around the story of Khalid Said a young Egyptian man who was brutally murdered by Egyptian police after publicizing police corruption.⁴³ It took full advantage of the information revolution in spreading its cause and played a prominent role in outsmarting security services and mobilizing its members on the streets.

The Mubarak Regime was the status quo actor opposed by the Brotherhood and WAAKS. The regime was composed of Hosni Mubarak, a former military officer and 30 year ruler of Egypt. He was supported by the NDP (National Democratic Party) the official government party composed of political and business elites and initially the military. To fully understand what transpired during the Revolution, the clash between strategies and objectives of each of these

⁴³ Logan, Lara, "The Deadly Beating that Sparked Egyptian Revolution"; < http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-7311469.html>

actors will provide the context. Each actor was continually evolving and improvising their strategies to compensate for changes made by others.

Internal Security in Egypt has historically consisted of the State Security Investigative Service (SSIS), General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI), and General Intelligence Service (GIS).⁴⁴ These forces were primarily responsible for controlling internal opponents to the Mubarak regime. The headquarters of state security was located in the Interior Ministry which became the primary arm of the regime to enforce its writ. An eventual distinction evolved between military and internal security forces during the reigns of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. Both of them proclaimed themselves civilian rulers despite having military backgrounds and began to rely on internal security to maintain their regimes.

The State Security Investigative Service was the largest organization with an estimated force of almost a half-million personnel. Uniformed police and undercover operatives constituted another 800,000 members.⁴⁵ These forces faced down the primary physical threat from violent and civil opposition groups. They also enabled the regime to control political representatives within and exclusive to the regime. During political elections the police and Battaghi (secret police) were used to control outcomes.⁴⁶ The interior ministry is one of the strongest institutions of government following the military and embodied internal security for the ruling National Democratic Party.

Over time the Interior Ministry gradually became more powerful reaching into every major structure of state power and permeating across society. Interior ministry forces became the

⁴⁴ State Security Investigative Service (SSIS) General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI) Gihaz Mabahith Amn al-Dawla; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/egypt/ssis.html> , accessed 10/6/2012

⁴⁵ “Rethinking Internal Security in Egypt” <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/rethinking-internal-security-in-egypt/bdj>

⁴⁶ Egyptian Elections: Opposition Alleges Fraud, November 29 2010
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/egyptian-opposition-alleges-election-fraud>

primary tool for successive governments to implicate thousands of citizens, mainly political prisoners of conscience. Although regime preservation was always a primary function of internal security, the signing of peace accords with Israel enabled the government to focus more on internal threats to security. The assassination of Anwar Sadat was a watershed moment after which state security services became increasingly powerful and a crackdown on political and physical opponents intensified.⁴⁷

Justifications used by the regime to consolidate power included internal and external threats. The regime often justified the need for a massive internal security apparatus by magnifying threats emerging from both fronts. Domestically it emphasized the threat from foreign intelligence agencies while externally the regime argued of the need to crack down on extremists and transnational threats. The \$1.5 Billion in annual US military assistance following the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel in 1978 allowed the regime to expand its state security services.

The Egyptian national police was the most visible embodiment of internal security in Egypt. It is responsible not only for public safety and dispute settlement but was often used for coercive regime control. The police was constituted to contain social unrest and protests particularly against the regime. Amnesty International reports, “A hallmark of the repression has been a system of detaining people without charge or trial, sometimes for more than 10 years, on the basis of administrative orders by the Minister of Interior under emergency and anti-terrorism laws.”⁴⁸ Massive infrastructure and tools such as large prisoner transport vans, trucks, and riot equipment were applied by the police to carry out its work of political repression.

⁴⁷ Crime and Society Country Reports: Egypt <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/egypt.html>
Nelson, Furor Grows Over Egypt's Election Results November 30, 2010,
<http://www.npr.org/2010/11/30/131704396/calls-grow-to-set-aside-egypt-s-election-results>

⁴⁸ State Security Investigative Service (SSIS) General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI) Gihaz Mabath al-Dawla; <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/egypt/ssis.html> , accessed 2/6/2012

The Secret Police and Battaghi were often used to not only infiltrate organizations and crack down on political opponents but even as paramilitaries. The primary purpose of the Battaghi was to maintain political power through arrest and intimidation. During the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 these undercover forces were used to arrest protesters and brutally crack down on them. The Battaghi were mobilized to form an alternative front against government opponents, they organized pro-regime protests and assaulted protesters as seen dramatically in Tahrir Square.⁴⁹ They were a unique, versatile force that was used to manipulate conditions within the state favoring the ruling elite. The greatest effect of the Battaghi was its ability to evoke terror and fear of the existing government and to remove any opponents or suspected opponents of the regime at will.

State Security under control of the Interior Ministry was used to ensure the National Democratic Party maintained control over government. The broad reach of this force enabled it to extend into all sectors of society and contain any government opposition. The SSIS had a vast network of informants focusing on the views and behavior of various opposition actors as well as government officials.⁵⁰ They were also the primary force used by the regime to ensure that policies and public views adhered to official government doctrine.

Although a host of other actors were also involved both international and domestic these are outside the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note that the regime was continually influenced by international powers, both for and against its policies. Similarly revolutionaries on the ground were given major international support through civil activism

⁴⁹ Whitlock and Jaffe, Where Egypt military's loyalties lie remains unclear, February 5, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020407250.html>

⁵⁰ Kirkpatrick, David ;“After Second Day of Voting in Egypt, Islamists Offer Challenge to Generals” <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/voting-in-historic-egyptian-elections-enters-second-day.html>

world-wide. The Tunisian revolution in particular played a major role by providing a precedent on how to oust a regime and activists advised Egyptians on doing the same.

Chapter 6:

The Template for Grand Strategy

This section will look at the means, ends, strategies and the importance of conditioning factors in decisions made by the Brotherhood and WAAKS throughout the revolution.

Conditioning factors play an eminent role in grand strategy because all other factors will directly or indirectly be influenced by ground realities. The conditioning factors include leadership, any central ethos of the actor, the geopolitical situation of the nation and all other dispositions actors find themselves in on the eve of events. The means are all available material or immaterial resources that can be used by actors to obtain the ends. The ends themselves are the objectives being pursued by actors through the choice of grand strategy. Strategies are the mechanisms through which the actors apply their means to obtain their ends. Tactics are particular methods through which strategies are carried out. They are also applied to prevent counter-strategies from being effective and can even be used to change conditioning factors in their favor. Finally, grand strategy is the ultimate goal of the actor and strategies are applied towards this ultimate end.

Prior to the revolution, there was unrest among the Christian population which felt restricted by the government. Jumuah (Friday), prayers were led by state Imams (religious leaders) whose speeches were approved through security services. There were restrictions on public gatherings particularly those with political implications (Nelson 2010). Elections held in November 2010 were widely seen as fraudulent with the detested NDP winning an overwhelming victory (Guardian 2010). All these events accumulated to form the geopolitical geography upon which the revolution was to occur.

Groups most closely following earlier theories on non-violent revolution remained loyal to this strategy. Organizations such as April 6th and WAAKS were vehement proponents for social change but did not intend on using violent tactics. Having rejected violence decades earlier, the Brotherhood was also a supporter of non-violent political change. The use of violent tactics to suppress these organizations and their supporters by the regime led the public to react violently in the face of police brutality.

The open nature of strategy making by organizations such as April 6th and WAAKS and their close collaboration with the Brotherhood allowed for the development of defensive and offensive strategies. Revolutionaries were not given direct guidance from top leaders who, in the midst of revolution, faced severe crackdown. Instead, organizers on the ground were able to formulate counter-measures against the regime which included the use of violence. Top leaders did organize the larger strategies of occupation and mass rallies but the fluid nature of events gave grassroots organizers enormous autonomy in strategy formulation. Additionally, actors not adapting non-violent strategy did make use of violent resistance. For instance, Bedouin tribes in the Sinai took up an armed rebellion against police forces in their region. The creation of vigilante neighborhood watches was an additional precaution against undercover regime proponents.

WAAKS and the Brotherhood differed and concurred in their approaches to strategy within the framework of their possible grand strategies. To begin with each of these organizations had different, yet similar conditioning factors. The MB was in existence for over eight decades and had a long history of struggle with the Egyptian government. It was composed of a cross section of society including professionals, laymen, men and women from all age groups. The strategies it pursued were from a prospective mindset taking account of future

relations with the government including the possibility that revolution wouldn't be successful (Shenker and Whitaker 2011). The Brotherhood's elected leadership was composed of senior members of the movement such as Mohammed Badie, who had a more conservative outlook and wanted to work for peaceful social and political reform within Egyptian law (Newsweek 2010). Younger, reformist minded leaders such as Moaz Abdel Karim believed the organization had common political and human rights causes with other youth movements and needed a more active platform. Leaders such as this were at the forefront of organizing the revolution in conjunction with more secular youth movements (Levinson 2011). Despite these differences, decades of persecution by the government had instilled discipline within the movement to officially act on a united front.

WAAKS was being led by dynamic leadership which was strongly opposed to the status quo and was working to motivate common Egyptians to take up its cause. It consolidated itself behind the message of social justice for Khalid Said. Its organizers also stayed largely underground to avoid government scrutiny but slowly emerged over the course of events. WAAKS is a unique actor in that it purposefully did not declare its leadership to prevent government persecution. The movement was run anonymously, with a few top leaders spreading news and information online. It largely communicated its message and networked through social media while the Brotherhood, historically persecuted by the government, relied on face to face communication and official statements.

The Brotherhood, being a faith based social and political organization had ends both in Egyptian society where it enjoyed popular, moral credibility as well as the government from which it was often banned. In terms of means it had widespread moral appeal and a network of chapters giving it national mobility. Its ends include furthering Islamic values in the social and

political spheres, social justice and basic human rights which it shared with WAAKS. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the template for the Brotherhood.

WAAKS, being much younger, became incredibly widespread in membership over a short time period, it wanted social justice, accountability, and by the beginning of the revolution the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. Figure 2 in the Appendix shows that WAAKS had a clearly defined grand strategy; it wanted to use the mechanism of revolutionary change for its ends. The ends were defined as the fall of the regime, removal of emergency law, freedom, justice, and a new civilian government. In terms of means, it had very widespread support and appeal among Egyptians from across religious and economic backgrounds. I also had the ability to distribute information despite the regime's attempt to control this. It was an example of a revolutionary organization whose objectives changed over time.

The tactics used by each of these organizations saw incredible change over the course of events when each day brought a different set of circumstances. The senior Brotherhood leadership had to quickly learn both from its younger constituents and WAAKS both of which became powerful driving forces behind the revolution. WAAKS, much less experienced in civil disobedience and dealing with government tactics, had to learn from the Brotherhood which was much better prepared for a sustained campaign and if needed confrontation. Each organization taking part in this high stakes gamble would be tested to its limits during the revolution as a dramatic struggle of strategies and counter-strategies took shape between the regime and movements to change it.

The Mubarak Regime, inherently being a state based actor was in control of Egypt and had national resources at its disposal. Figure 3 in the appendix shows there was a massive overt and covert police force as well as military reinforcement. The regime also had the backing on

political and business elites who were benefiting from it. The main objectives of the regime were to survive the unrest, re-establish control, resist pressure for radical reform, and to project itself as the best alternative.

Chapter 7:

Courage, Fear, and the Struggle of Strategies

Although the most visible aspects of revolution were seen in Egypt the uprisings hitting the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) nations began in Tunisia where Mohamed Bouazizi, a post graduate turned street vendor burned himself to death after being brutalized by police. This sparked the fuel which spread across Tunisia leading to the ouster of 23 year authoritarian ruler Ben Ali (Beatty 2011). From there uprisings spread all over the MENA region from Morocco to Pakistan. The Tunisian Revolution was important in creating a precedent on how an entrenched regime could be ousted despite a firm grip on power. Leading opposition groups in Egypt watched the strategies and tactics applied against Ben Ali's forces closely and were given advice from revolutionaries around the region on how to deal with counter-strategies being applied by their regime.

The strategies adapted by the regime and protesters can best be understood as a series of escalations. Each actor had a set of offensive and defensive strategies depending on the conditioning factors on the ground. Organizations such as WAAKS and the Brotherhood differed somewhat in their methods but complimented one another in the goal of overthrowing the regime. In the period following up to the revolution, WAAKS and other youth movements adapted a strategy of “defeating fear”. Covert electronic media and overt mobilization were used to destroy the fear factor instilled by the regime. Leading organizers kept their identities hidden while bringing to light injustices such as the 2010 election fraud and especially cases such as Khalid Said where young men and women were kidnapped and tortured by police. Once the events of

Tunisia unfolded various youth organizations including WAAKS quickly launched a campaign to mobilize their members for a similar revolution in Egypt. Secret meetings were reported to have taken place between these youth movements, political opposition and labor groups as well as members of the Brotherhood (Levinson and Coker 2011). An ingenious strategy to evade security services was agreed upon in which activists published 20 sites of protests as well as a secret 21st site which was communicated outside government monitored media. By then, Ghonim returned to Egypt to take part in the revolution, joined by thousands of other international activists such as Mohammed Baradei to challenge the regime. It used all means of social media including YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and SMS texting.

An “Action Plan”, shown in Appendix 3, was distributed by revolutionary leaders in the first few days titled “How to Protest Intelligently” outlining major goals and strategies to be pursued by protesters (Madrigal 2011). This document was used both by the Brotherhood, WAAKS, and multiple other movements taking part in protests. The major ends outlined in it were; “The downfall of the regime and it's ministers, the end of Emergency Law, freedom, justice, formation of a new government, and finally the constructive administration of Egyptian resources”. It further stated the main strategies to be adapted by protesters; “The takeover of primary government buildings, winning members of the police and army on the side of the people, and finally to protect one another during the revolution”. This, in the words of Egyptian protesters themselves, was the main document adhered to throughout the revolution until the toppling of the regime and will be given reference to throughout the paper.

It's important to note here that many younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood were active alongside other youth movements calling for change in the streets of Egypt. The senior leadership of the Brotherhood was hesitant at first but once they realized the time had come for

radical political change they officially backed the movement. Mohammed Mursi, a leader of the group, said, 'We are not pushing this movement, but we are moving with it. We don't wish to lead it but we want to be part of it.' (Bryan 2011). The Brotherhood in essence was adapting some of the same strategies it used to survive eight decades of authoritarian rule. It did not want to be positioned in a manner advantageous to the regime which was eager to justify itself as the better alternative to an "Islamist" takeover by the Brotherhood. Once the Brotherhood officially backed the movement, its members were told not to use official banners but rather to join the people in creating a national opposition front.

Thus the second strategy of the revolution emerged on January 25th, Police Day in Egypt, "mass mobilization", the purpose of this was to defy the regime and show that the fear factor had been overcome. As agreed upon protesters met at locations across the nation; in Cairo the secret 21st site became the Achilles heel in the regime's armor. They successfully mobilized the poor neighborhood of Bulaq al-Dakrou, and were joined by thousands of others as they broke security cordons and entered Tahrir Square. Once the fear factor of public gatherings was broken, the frustration finally came to the fore, common Egyptians began joining. WAAKS had achieved one of its major goals which was to mobilize the Egyptian people onto the streets. The regime quickly attempted to block Twitter but activists reverted to proxies to spread their information. WAAKS urged its members to ready camera's to capture the expected government crackdown while the Brotherhood added moral legitimacy on the side of protesters. State backed clerics and the regime had earlier attempted to convince the population that protests and opposition to the leader were immoral (Shook 2011). The element of surprise had favored the revolution, giving it the visibility and impact leading organizers had desired.

The Mubarak regime though caught off guard by the tenacity of protests first reacted by attempting to establish a “media monopoly”. For the first time in Egyptian history all internet servers were completely shut down on January 27, foreign media correspondents were arrested, and cell-phone networks made sparse (Tsotsis 2011). News organizations seen as fomenting the revolution such as Al-Jazeera, and CNN were particularly targeted, the regime then used official State TV to present its narrative of events. Yet such maneuvers backfired; after the closure of internet and media outlets, even greater numbers of Egyptians came out on the streets to join in events. International media also became more critical of the regime for its crackdown and attempt to control information.

Ultimately, this strategy was only partially successful due to protesters ability to improvise through word-of-mouth communication as well as switching to satellite feeds for information (Sigal 2011). Additionally, they had the advantage of Jumuah (Friday) prayers, during which millions of Egyptians would already be gathered in mosques. This became central to mass mobilization since protesters would gather at mosques and depart to key areas from there. The regime responded by attempting to reestablish a fear threshold, this meant mobilizing hundreds of thousands of overt and covert police officers to intimidate and beat them back. By the first Friday of the revolution major battles were erupting all over the nation, particularly in Ismailia where Bedouin tribes had taken up weapons against government forces (Reuters 2011).

“Military deployment” by the regime led the most powerful actor in Egyptian to enter the fray (Shanker and Schmitt 2011). Widespread reports indicated the Mubarak regime was willing to go to great extents to suppress the uprising. The military on the other hand was hesitant to lose its respected position in society, it instead attempted to take a buffering position between protesters and Mubarak's forces. The regime attempted to use the military as a show of force and

intimidation, armored personnel carriers and tanks were deployed to central squares and surrounded key buildings such as the Presidential Palace and State TV. The protesters, coincidentally were prepared for such a scenario, the “Action Plan” outlined that roses should be handed out to security forces in order to win over their support. Thus, the military was put in a difficult dilemma where it had to either stay loyal to the regime or join the revolution. The use of military deployment further isolated the regime internationally; WAAKS used it as an opportunity to call for international support before escalation could occur any further. The inexperience of the regime began to show following this strategy, its police force was not strong enough to hold back protesters but the military was too strong a force. This weakened Mubarak's international support and gave the revolutionaries an opportunity to bond with the military at the individual level.

Early indications from the Egyptian military made it unclear which side they would choose. Cables from the American Embassy in 2008 had a bleak assessment on top Egyptian General, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, "He and Mubarak are focused on regime stability and maintaining the status quo through the end of their time. They simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently "(Whitlock and Jaffe 2011). Yet the more nuanced stance by the military meant they were more independent of the regime than previously thought.

Winning over the military became a top goal for protesters who knew the revolution would be unsuccessful without its support. Slogans by protesters made a clear distinction between the military and the regime; “The army and the people are united!” and “The army and the people are one, hand-in-hand” (Pfeffer 2011). The military indicated it was not willing to alienate protesters through rash actions. "To the great people of Egypt, your armed forces,

acknowledging the legitimate rights of the people," stress that "they have not and will not use force against the Egyptian people" read a statement a week into the unrest (Al Jazeera 2011). Though the army was at first welcomed by the protesters, a tense relationship would ensue until decisive steps were taken by the military as to which side it would take.

By the first Friday, the fourth day of revolution, the next strategy by protesters had gone into effect, disrupting government, this included renewed attempts to take over Parliament, the Interior Ministry, and key intersections. As stated by Wael Ghonim "We are heading to Tahrir Square now chanting bread, freedom and dignity" (PBS 2011). The strategy of occupation was first to give a psychological victory to protesters but also to disrupt government functions. Government buildings were viewed as symbols of repression, particularly the Interior Ministry, NDP headquarters, Parliament, State TV and most importantly the Presidential Palace. Tahrir Square, at the center of Cairo, was of significance as a psychological and physical heart of the revolution and became central to the battle over the future of revolution. Hundreds of thousands of people were mobilized to break through massive police cordons as they made their way to separate destinations. The importance of disrupting government was to show that common people could have an impact, something not experienced by many in over a generation. Images of police beating back unarmed protesters had massive implications in terms of drawing in international and domestic supporters. The arrest of Wail Ghonim led to an international outcry and further strengthened WAAKS as a leading force for change. Once again the regime did not thoroughly consider the perception of its strategies which were denounced as police brutality and heavy handed tactics.

The Muslim Brotherhood differed from WAAKS and other youth movements in two ways. It had more political experience than many younger organizations and had a far broader

logistical network. The Brotherhood used strategies of “revolutionary reinforcement (overt and covert)” to resupply protesters for the coming struggle of attrition with the regime. The overt and covert means of support were mainly divided along generational lines with senior leadership releasing public statements while the youth wing actively participated on the front lines of the revolution. It also took the “moral imperative” which was in tune with the greater identity of the Brotherhood as a vanguard of Islamic values in Egyptian society. Examples include the use of collective prayer in the midst of revolution which had an extremely powerful psychological impact on both protesters, forces trying to disrupt them, and the military. It simultaneously affirmed to protesters that they had the moral high ground while demoralizing police and winning over neutral or opposition forces to their cause. In essence the strategy of reinforcement was a seamless way for the Brotherhood to give its full support in numbers and resources to the revolution without the appearance of leading it. Having the moral imperative defied the regime by showing that revolutionaries had the moral high ground while the regime had become a threat to social order.

The Mubarak regime counteracted these strategies in two ways, first by attempting to “divide and rule” (BBC 2011). It also used a harsher strategy of “controlled chaos” through tactics of third force terror (TFT), this included the removal of the national police force from streets, the opening of prisons, and finally the unleashing of undercover baltagi (Ackerman 2011). In many ways the regime was predisposed to use third force terror, being a massive police state meant it had hundreds of thousands of paid supporters who were often used to impose its will. During the elections of 2010, the baltagi were used to prevent voter turnout and stuff ballots in the overwhelming victory for the NDP.

Divide and Rule was conducted with the use of political and psychological means to bring about division in the opposition movement. This included political appeasement, such as appointing a Vice President to show the regime was indeed reforming in accordance with the wishes of the opposition. It simultaneously attempted to delegitimize the Muslim Brotherhood and youth movements, which were accused of conspiring against the government with external intelligence agencies. The Brotherhood in particular was articulated as an extremist group and a far worse alternative than the NDP particularly for foreign audiences. It attempted to sow divisions based on religious and ideological differences. The regime argued that Egyptian Christians, Muslims, liberals and conservatives would not be able to live in peace without it.

The difficulty of justifying this strategy was that Christians and Muslims were both on the streets protesting against the regime which was responding with violence. The strategy of the revolution had been non-violent from the beginning, therefore it was very paradoxical for the regime to respond with force and portray itself on the moral high ground. Rather than having a stabilizing affect the regime was, day by day, being seen as responsible for instability in the nation.

Third force terror was employed to remove the psychological and physical confidence protesters had accumulated. The withdrawal of the national police and simultaneous release of prisoners meant that protesters were forced to either defend their homes and families or the squares and circles they had occupied. Marc Lynch of Foreign Policy speaking on the Mubarak regime says:

“His strategy was obvious from the start: to try to buy time until the protest fever broke, by offering a variety of token concessions, seeking to divide the opposition by co-opting political party leaders, playing on Western fears of Islamists, stoking nationalist resentments against

foreign interference, and carefully protecting his relations with the military leadership” (Lynch 2011)

Controlled chaos was the asymmetrical strategy of an increasingly desperate regime to dislodge protesters from its pillars of legitimacy and authority. It was utilized as a means to create the image of the dreaded chaos, to which the regime was the best alternative. This strategy not only intimidated active protesters but equally attempted to deter additional support from those under the flag of neutrality. Not only were direct attacks made on activists and their homes, the regime quickly tracked down and arrested hundreds of members of the MB, WAAKS, April 6th and other leaders of youth movements. The only areas outside its reach seemed to be the liberated squares and circles still held on by desperate protesters.

Controlled chaos further consolidated the revolutionary movement in causing neighborhoods to develop vigilante groups to defend their homes. The regime had further infuriated common Egyptians by compromising the security of the nation to stay in power. This strategy caused a severe setback to its legitimacy and not only infuriated protesters but now armed them to confront the regime. The arrests of protest leaders pushed these organizations to further desperation forcing them to take a last stand. The regime had over-reacted and by doing so it had united the opposition into a high risk losses frame.

By the beginning of the second week the Mubarak regime reinforced its earlier strategies with the added burden of “attrition”, knowing the longer the crisis ensued the stronger its choke hold. Massive food shortages, the closure of schools, businesses, banks, and sudden collapse of tourism, Egypt's largest source of income, was straining the resolve of the opposition. Possibly the most effective strategy used by the regime, attrition was slowly draining the opposition. Without the use of visible violence, it could slowly drain the resources fueling the revolution

shaking the resolve of those behind it. Yet cracks were beginning to emerge within the regime as elite political and business figures began to either flee or join the opposition.

The removal of Ghonim from WAAKS leadership and continued lengthening of the crisis became a major psychological blow which it had to blunt. While the Brotherhood and other organizations continued to reinforce protester held territories, WAAKS attempted to rally its members and the larger public around the kidnapping of Ghonim, who in their words was another casualty like Khalid Said in the long record of injustices by the regime. This was perhaps the time of greatest vulnerability for the opposition which was suffering under the pressure of a sustained campaign against a regime still in power. Despite attempts at causing divisions, opposition movements rallied around the cause of unity, which became an end for the duration of the revolution. Christians and Muslims united taking turns with weekly prayers and defending one another in the common cause to remove the regime. This sent a powerful image to foreign and especially domestic audiences who were shown that people were better off and more united without the interference of the regime.

By “controlling the narrative” of events on the ground, opposition groups were attempting to win the media war with the regime. The MB strongly countered accusations by the regime that it was leading an Islamist takeover first by physically closing ranks with other opposition groups but also by officially clarifying its views for Western audiences. The Mubarak regime had long established support from the United States as the best alternative for stability in the region and as a buffer to extremist movements. The Brotherhood in response released a statement that it would not run in presidential elections or seek a majority in government and would stay loyal to international treaties (Levinson 2011). WAAKS was accused by the government as being a part of efforts to destabilize Egypt and State TV portrayed Ghonim as a

traitor to the Egyptian people. This messages were countered by pictures and videos captured on the ground of attacks on unarmed civilians and arrests of activists. Egyptian State TV began losing its credibility, highlighted by the fact that it broadcast serene pictures of the Nile during the most pitched battles in the streets of Cairo.

Battle for Tahrir

Over the duration of the Revolution Tahrir (Liberation) Square in central Cairo emerged as the national stage in confrontations between the protesters and the regime (NYT 2011). At one of the most climactic and surreal scenes in the revolution, undercover security forces launched a massive attack on protesters lead by cavalry charge. The iconic scenes of pitched battle fought with rocks, swords, and fire before the Egyptian Museum, epitomizing millennia of history, added another chapter to the drama of human history. The battle for control of Tahrir, in essence, represented the struggle over the survival of the revolution. The regime was attempting to accomplish three goals through this strategy, to take back the physical headquarters of the revolution, to create a sense of chaos in the public, and finally to exhaust protesters and hand them a powerful psychological defeat.

It took almost Machiavellian measures in an attempt to terrify the population back into submission. In *The Prince* Machiavelli states, “a prince must not worry about the infamy of being considered cruel when it is a manner of keeping subjects united and loyal”(Machiavelli 57). Yet it failed in truly understanding the objectives of such tactics which were to appear relatively less cruel than other alternatives. The regime had used a disproportionate amount of violence, rather than appearing just it jeopardized the security of the people turning them against it.

The importance of Tahrir couldn't be greater for the protesters; it had become a heartland of the revolution, often described as the liberated territory of Egypt. Protesters had set up tents,

clinics, and resupply centers across the square, while leaders of the revolution led rallies at its center. The assault by pro-regime forces became an impending threat to which they had to quickly adapt. After eventually taking back surrounding buildings from the regime's forces, protesters successfully pushed attackers back, well outside the square. The ability to resist the assault further fueled the revolution, and revealed the true intentions of regime forces. Barriers and multiple checkpoints were then set up to filter pro-Mubarak forces from fomenting descent and chaos.

The ultimate defeat of the regime in the strategy to take Tahrir was that it gave a sense of betrayal to the Egyptian people. The attempt to win a physical and psychological victory backfired as the regime received widespread criticism, internally and internationally for its heavy handed tactics. The planned chaos in the streets of Cairo and throughout the nation had further consolidated the opposition, forcing greater numbers of protesters onto the streets. As unrest continued the military was being forced into taking a decisive role on the future of the nation. It's refusal to halt the violence in Tahrir caused many in the opposition camp to view it with suspicion yet they continued to court the military.

Reigniting the Revolution

By the second week of the revolution, security services suddenly released Ghoneim who immediately took the initiative to revitalize the revolution. His interview on major outlet, Dream TV, on the ordeal of being kidnapped became an ultimate media and psychological victory for activists. He clarified his image as a sincere proponent of change and denounced accusations of being a foreign agent (Malas 2011). Wael rallied the common people of Egypt to Tahrir Square while protesting his arrest, "If you want to arrest me, that's your right. But there are laws and I am not a terrorist or a drug-dealer. We have to tear down this system based on not being able to

speak out.”. Images of his visitation with Khalid Said's mother would prove pivotal to the mobilization of common Egyptians; this had the galvanizing affect the revolution needed.

The psychological appeal given by Ghoneim re-energized the movement and captured the imagination of many ordinary Egyptians. By the third Friday, 18 days into the revolution, unprecedented crowds of protesters emerged on the streets of Cairo and successfully made their way towards Tahrir Square, Parliament, State TV, the Interior Ministry and finally the Presidential Palace. Cracks within the establishment quickly came to the fore as Vice President Amr Sulaiman finally announced the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. By then, the military was fully deployed and announced it was taking control from the regime. WAAKS, the MB, and various other organizations had succeeded in pressured the regime to step down and achieved one of their top objectives.

Chapter 8:

The Brotherhood & the Salafi: Religion within the Grand Strategic Context

Within the context of grand strategy the Muslim Brotherhood had a distinctive socio-religious agenda. The Brotherhood historically viewed itself as a guardian of Islamic values and identity within the Egyptian state. It was therefore necessary that this objective be met during each stage of the Egyptian revolution no matter what the outcome. In terms of socio-political change it emphasized the gradualist approach. This can be seen in the movement's creation of charitable social institutions and emphasis on change beginning at the individual level.⁵¹ Earlier chapters have detailed some of the distinct strategies and tactics applied by the Muslim Brotherhood during the Egyptian Revolution. This chapter takes a closer look at the traditionalist religious character of the Brotherhood and its moral basis both for participating in the revolution and also its future vision for Egypt. To better understand the stance of the Brotherhood it is contrasted with the Salafi movement of Egypt which took a distinctly different approach in the midst of political change.

After the removal of the Mubarak Regime the Brotherhood announced the development of the Freedom & Justice Party which went on to win a majority in parliamentary elections. Perhaps the greatest shock of the elections was the ability of the normally a-political Salafi movement to capture 25% of the vote through its umbrella Al-Nour Party. Prior to these elections the Brotherhood had advanced plans for political and social reform within a democratic context. These plans were decades in the making, which emphasize the early adaptation of basic

⁵¹ Kraemer, Gudrun; Hasan Al-Banna (Makers of the Muslim World)Oneworld; 12/16/2009

democratic principles. The Salafi on the other hand, were strongly against democratic governance and historically opposed opposition against the Mubarak regime.

This paper argues that these two distinct reactions toward revolutionary movement and democratic change can be traced back to religious doctrine on the subject of political governance and change. Traditionalist Hanafi and Maliki schools of Islamic thought have long been dominant across North Africa, the Levant, South Asia, and South East Europe. The transition towards democratic forms of governance in many of these regions has long been accepted as legitimate among religious authorities. The Salafi movement, being much younger and historically based in the Arabian Peninsula was much less apt to accept democratic governance. This also explains the distinct difference in reaction to democratic movements by political authorities in these regions. Religious and political leaders in democratically governed Turkey strongly supported revolutionary actors while those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain opposed them. Thus the religious distinction between traditionalist schools of Islam and the Salafi has extended into the political realm.

Developments at Al-Azhar since the January 25th Revolution are a microcosm of the larger struggle to define the role of religion in Egyptian society. Scholars within the institution have sought to re-assert the authoritative position of Al-Azhar in addressing contemporary issues facing the public. The solution they developed revolves around the concept of wasatiyya (centrism) emphasizing the central idea that religious texts were sent to benefit mankind. Therefore the correct interpretation of these texts should ultimately further the positive development of society. Major adherents to the wasatiyya approach include leading scholars of Al-Azhar including its current leader Ahmad ibn Al-Tayyib, the Muslim Brotherhood and a vast number of religious intellectuals. In contrast to this the literalist approach mostly favored by

Salafi movements, states that religion should be adhered to by the letter without emphasis on contextual interpretation.⁵²

The concept of wasatiyya can be seen in the larger strategic orientation of the Brotherhood. Beyond its foundation among the educated, Egyptian middle class, the Brotherhood has long emphasized a practical and contextual approach with respect to its both its religious views and political strategy. Shortly after developing its political wing the Freedom & Justice Party, the organization launched an official document outlining major political goals. The “Election Program” of the FJP outlines a comprehensive, practical, and egalitarian approach towards modernization.⁵³ A far cry from stereotypical typologies of Islamist movements the document emphasizes social, economic and political rights of all Egyptians with an equal footing for both men and women.

This explains its dynamic political orientation throughout the Egyptian Revolution where the organization officially backed the revolution in its early phases. The fact that younger members helped initiate a 21st century revolution using all the tools of modern technology further emphasizes the Brotherhoods modernist orientation. The decades long struggle between the regime and the Brotherhood gave the brothers ample time to learn the ways of their primary detractor. As outlined in previous chapters the strategy of reinforcing the revolution without appearing to lead it frustrated the regime’s propaganda campaign accusing the Brotherhood of fomenting the disorder. This continued to form the basis of political strategy after the fall of the regime when the FJP vowed not to run a candidate for the presidency and to form a political coalition in parliament. In essence the Brotherhood did not significantly alter political aspects of

⁵² “Post-Revolutionary Al-Azhar”, Nathan Brown, pg.11-13 September, 2011
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/al_azhar.pdf>

⁵³ “Election Program: The Freedom and Justice Party”, Freedom and Justice Party Online <
<http://www.fjponline.com/uploads/FJPprogram.pdf>>

its grand strategy after the removal of Hosni Mubarak. The 2012 presidential election was one of the exceptions to this strategy in that it forced the Brotherhood to gain more power than it originally intended. Yet the dismissal of Parliament by the Egyptian Judiciary gave the Brotherhood a very strong president rather than a broad political coalition as they had originally intended.

The larger goals of the Muslim Brotherhood are much broader with a generational outlook that goes well beyond the accomplishments of the January 25th Revolution. In terms of the long term goals of the organization a number of interviews were conducted with high ranking officials. These officials emphasized that the initial goals would be to redevelop the nation's institutions within a democratic framework. Yet democracy in and of itself wasn't the ultimate objective but rather the realization of Islamic values and teachings in society. This meant the cultivation and development of the guidelines given by the Shariah. This was also the framework under which the revolution itself was justified and carried through.

In individual interviews conducted with Muslim Brotherhood officials during the Summer of 2011, they discussed the organization's stance during and after the revolution. According to Brotherhood member and Parliamentarian Soub He Saleh from the coastal city of Alexandria, the Brotherhood supported the revolution from the beginning. He stated that Brotherhood members officially came out on the streets beginning on January 28. According to him the organization had been resisting the regime for over 60 years but was now being joined by the Egyptian masses.

Mr. Saleh stated that the Brotherhood was active not only after the revolution began but also helped initiate it. "They joined the revolution in steps; every individual participated in a group. The Ikhwan members were in April 6th, Khalid Said, and the Coalition of the Youth of the

Revolution.” The official orders for the Brotherhood to join came on the January 27th, the Friday of Anger. He stated that major leaders of the Brotherhood met and decided not to officially protest on the 25th. If they had done so the people would think this was a Brotherhood led protest and possibly not join. Additionally he said that police would have more easily been able to crackdown on a protest movement accusing it of being led by the Brotherhood and the revolution would not have been successful.

Another important tactical decision made by the Brotherhood was not to show its partisan banners or slogans during protests. According to one of the founders of the FJP, Professor Abdul Rehman, many Brotherhood members were initially suppressed at the beginning of the revolution. This led to the official policy of removing banners and identifiable paraphernalia during protests until the fall of the Mubarak Regime. Almost immediately following celebrations for the downfall of Mubarak different political parties and organizations publicly displayed their partisan affiliations.

In terms of grand strategic goals, Mr. Saleh said that the FJP wanted to establish a system based on the Islamic Shariah but that this was a long term goal not short term. Currently the party and organization favored a democratic system that respects Islamic values. He said that this goal was not different than what the Egyptian constitution already states in Article 2 that laws should be from Islamic teachings. According to Mr. Saleh, the FJP’s views on Shariah were much more comprehensive than the oft cited punishment articles.

Reflecting the official party platform, he stated that the FJP wanted to fix the nation, reverse the military rule and corruption in cooperation with other parties. This would all be done within a democratic system which was not a new concept for the Brotherhood. The party had long practiced Islamic shura or consultation in decision making and didn’t believe in dictatorial

leadership. They also held democratic elections within the organization to select leadership. He boasted about how the Brotherhood had long practiced democratic elections even under the rule of a dictatorship.

According to him the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood through their political wing was “To reestablish the culture and civilization of the country. Through establishing the role of different services in the country, communication, health, etc... through all these things making its goals achievable. Making a role for the mosque, church, and school in raising the country, also to support services for the people such as the justice system and Shariat.”

In terms of political strategy Mr. Saleh stated that the Brotherhood would continue to take a gradualist stance. Rather than campaigning to get maximum political power, they initially maneuvered to gain a dominant vote in parliament yet not enough for unilateral decision making. Mr. Saleh explained; “We want the truth to spread about our group before we gain major power. We need time for the West to know us; we are just people, most information on us was given by the dictator. We believe in human rights.” This meant that initially the political wing of the Brotherhood wanted to govern as a coalition with other political organizations rather than lead government. Not only would this help them gain greater credibility among democratic activists, it would give them time to establish their foreign and domestic image as capable political leaders.

In a case analysis of the revolution by the Doha Institute the official stance by most Salafi groups was not to join the revolutionary movement. In three major statements released by influential leaders of the movement such as Sheikh Yasser Borhami, precedence was given to national stability over revolutionary movement against authoritarian rule. The first came from the Salafist Call which warned Muslims against “sabotage, pillage, theft, and assaulting people” so an end could be put to the chaos. In later statements leaders of the movement supported the some

of the basic goals of the revolution such as the necessity of political change but refused to support protests in favor of them.⁵⁴

In an interview with Yousry Haman Hammad, official spokesperson of the Salafi oriented Al-Noor (The Light) Party, he explained the stance of the Salafi movement during and after the revolution. According to him, Salafi groups were not historically active in politics because they were prevented from forming political organizations. Ideologically, they also believed that joining a government with the Mubark Regime would have implicated them in its policies. Therefore these groups settled for an a-political stance with a focus on social work. This policy was dramatically reversed following the Revolution and new found freedom.

Mr. Hammad further outlined the reasoning behind the Salafi shift towards democratic governance. The reason for making a political party was “Because we can work together, officially, go to the media and present our ideas, and be part of the political future of Egypt”. He particularly emphasized the need for Istakrar or stability and that that his party would bring stability to Egypt.

Social Movement in an Era of Revolution

As outlined by Brotherhood officials traditionalist (in terms of religious values) political movements such as Tunisia’s Ennehda and the FJP are not proposing ultra-conservative forms of government as witnessed in KSA and Afghanistan under the Taliban. Instead they are proposing flexible and contextual based forms of governance that stay loyal to their principles without limiting effective, sustainable, national development in the modern era. Taking the AKP party of Turkey as a model to build upon, these parties have declared a peaceful rise to power and rejected unnecessary violence. Leaders from both Ennehda and FJP have outlined that they

⁵⁴ Abdul Latif, Umaina; Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies: “Salafists and Politics in Egypt” www.dohainstitute.org pgs. 2-5

would like to take the Turkish AKP as a template for their own strategies of governance. In an interview with the journal Foreign Policy the leader of Ennehda, Rached Ghannouchi stated that past mistakes by movements such as the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria would not be repeated. In his view the FIS didn't account for other powerful actors in their nation such as long reigning secular parties and the military leading to a decade long civil conflict. Ennehda, in contrast, would form a coalition government with other parties and did not seek total control of government.⁵⁵

The success of the AKP has been lauded by democratic activists in the region. Recently winning its third consecutive election bid, it has been able to successfully redirect Turkey from military dominance and economic stagnation to sound civilian leadership and an invigorated economy. Turkey is still witnessing unprecedented levels of economic growth in an era of global recession. Ennehda and FJP see in the AKP a modern, capable, faith oriented political force that is active nationally and internationally to address its own and the world's problems. Its allure comes from the balance it has been able to strike between various competing interest groups including the military, secular parties, and the business class. Very importantly, the Turkish model has taken a gradualist approach. What this means is that their strategy for governance has been long term, not a radically different track over a short period as proposed by more Salafist movements.

The traditionalist Sunni Gulen Movement, led by Turkish intellectual Fetullah Gulen, has played a major influence in directing larger Turkish society towards Islamic values and parties such as AKP which adhere to them. The Gulen Movement is most notable for its focus on the spiritual dimensions of Islam, rationalism, and harmonizing modernism with Islamic values.

⁵⁵ "Rached Ghannouchi: the FP interview", Foreign Policy;
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/ghannouchis_advice 12/05/2011

Based on earlier works by Said Nursi, who struggled with Turkish secular authorities for decades, the Gulen Movement has grown to become one of the most influential Islamic movements world-wide.⁵⁶

The AKP is seen as being politically mature particularly in public relations and how it presents itself. Rather than simply basing its political campaigns on religious identity or vocabulary the AKP has spent excruciating amounts of time and money presenting itself as a religiously moderate and meritorious political party. They have simultaneously shown themselves to be politically shrewd without betraying the cultural and religious identity of the Turkish nation. The success of the AKP is largely based on its track record in the political arena including improved governance at home and raising Turkish influence in international politics. Turkey was a leading nation in the region pressing for political reforms and as a maturing democracy has one of the closest forms of democratic political organization to what Ennehda and the FJP are aspiring to.⁵⁷

For some time the growing socio-political forces in Egypt, Tunisia, and other nations have demanded democratic governance. This included religious groups such as the FJP and Ennehda as well as various secular and youth movements. These movements included people from across the political and ideological spectrum. People, from the very conservatively religious, to the staunchly secular and unreligious were united behind the cause of removing the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes from their nations.

Taking into account the rise of corrupt political and economic orders in the world, these parties are proposing the creation of alternate forms of organization. The FJP has outlined a very

⁵⁶ Turkey: Fethullah Gulen Profile, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/world/europe/18iht-19oxan-Turkishpreacherprofile.9324128.html> 01/08/2008

⁵⁷ Why Tunisians Voted for the Islamists; Spiegel, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,794133,00.html> 10/26/2011

comprehensive plan encapsulating their views on national development. Taking a level of analysis approach, they are focusing on the individual, social, and national development of the country. Similarly Ennehda has proposed to keep the needs of Tunisians central to its plans for national development. Tunisia considered among the most secularized nations in the Mid-East requires a subtle, gradualist approach which shapes the nation not only with Ennehda's leadership but other political actors who participated in the nation's revolution.

Perhaps one of the greatest contrasts with prevalent notions of development is the belief by the FJP that religion and politics should not be comprehensively separated. This doesn't mean they would support some type of theocracy, an often misconstrued goal. This would be neither a secular nor theocratic state but rather a democratic civil state. According to this system the ruler will be judged by the Shariah and how he applies it. He has no independent authority to rule and will be directly responsible before the people. Before continuing on to the goals of the FJP and their alternative plan for comprehensive, national development it would be beneficial to elaborate some more on the Shariah.

The Shariah is a comprehensive set of laws based on the Islamic world view and the place of humans in this world. It is based in principle on the Quran, Hadith (recorded sayings of Muhammad) and Sunnah (life of Muhammad), which combined are believed to address most challenges faced by mankind. Beyond textual sources, intellectual scholarship can be applied to understand and apply Shariah in a changing world. Intellectual scholarship doesn't only encompass the religious sphere but any body of knowledge beneficial for the understanding and implementation of the Shariah. The main goals of the Shariah are based on five higher objectives. In order of importance the protection of human religion, life, mind, property and finally

lineage.⁵⁸ Each of these objectives is achieved by a comprehensive set of socio-political policies carried out by the state and overseen by the public. Though the principles of Shariah should be understood to place in context the larger basis of political theory from Ennehda, FJP and others, how it will be approached depends on the conditioning factors within each nation.

According to the FJP the Shariah teaches national unity and freedom of religion. It teaches that all people are equal according to their rights and duties. It teaches respect for human rights since human beings are believed to be the best of creation. The plan for development outlined by the FJP can be understood by taking a level of analysis approach. At the individual level they believe each person should adhere to Islamic principles and teachings. They believe Muslim and Christian Egyptians have many concepts of ethics in common therefore these should be encouraged in society.⁵⁹

At the social level they have a comprehensive plan for human development based on the ability of the individual to meet their basic needs. From attaining an early education that improves the character and mind, to attaining a beneficial job, marriage and even death; the state would help regulate these needs of every citizen. An emphasis would be placed on creating a national culture of intellectualism, ending illiteracy and including women and girls in social development.⁶⁰

Finally, at the national level, the FJP gives a very detailed assessment of national needs and how it plans to attain them. From R&D designed to serve the nation, to improving medical services, protecting the environment, and restructuring residential and commercial infrastructure, the FJP goes to great lengths in presenting its plans.⁶¹ In fact, the decades long struggle of the

⁵⁸ Introduction to Shariah, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_1.shtml

⁵⁹ Program for The Freedom and Justice Party: Chapter 1; Dar Al Tauziya Wa Al-Nashr Published 2011

⁶⁰ Program for The Freedom and Justice Party: Chapter 1, Chapter 3; Dar Al Tauziya Wa Al-Nashr Published 2011

⁶¹ Program for The Freedom and Justice Party: Chapter 3; Dar Al Tauziya Wa Al-Nashr Published 2011

movement not only to survive but thrive under successive authoritarian governments gave it time to hone its political skills and plans for when it would one day come to power.

Similarly, Ennehdha has repeatedly stated that its main goals are the creation of a pluralistic government and banishment of authoritarianism. Its leadership has made a strong attempt to reassure others that its priority is upholding human rights including women's and minority rights. They have extended their time frame for change more so than the FJP believing Tunisian society will need time to adjust to new ideas the party may have for national development.

Ennehdha and the FJP have gone to excruciating lengths in presenting themselves as pluralistic political movements that would rather form coalition governments than rule independently. The FJP purposely ran for about 50% of the electorate and for over a year was promising not to select one of its own representatives for the position of presidency. Ennehdha has reached out to the centrist "Congress for the Republic" (Tunisia's second most popular political party) led by Moncef Marzouki. According to Ghannouchi, Ennehdha's main goal at this juncture isn't implementing Shariah or turning Tunisia into an Islamic state but rather preventing authoritarian dictatorship from ever arising again. The strategy of coalition government serves a two pronged purpose. It first reassures the public that Ennehdha, unlike its predecessor, is not seeking total control nor does it want a monopoly on political power. Second, shared power also means shared responsibility and shared blame in case implemented policies don't generate the desired results. Ennehdha and the FJP want to show that they are part of the popular movements for change and are the political figureheads for parts of the movement that agree with them.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

There were some important distinctions between non-state actors and the regime in this study. WAAKS was unique in its ability to flourish despite having an anonymous ring of leaders until the release of Wael Ghonim. One of its greatest strengths in this conditioning factor was not only avoiding the authorities but rather sending the message that this movement wasn't about personalities but ideas. We Are All Khalid Said gave the powerful projection that anyone could have been Khalid Said and faced what he did. It was able to attract not only Egyptians but supporters around the world. The MB surprisingly showed the regime that it was also capable of making shrewd political decisions while convincingly holding the moral-high ground. Although these organizations were much weaker than the regime they also had more flexibility and the ability to mobilize for their cause.

The regime, being a state-based actor was constrained by its inability to keep pace with movements for change. Each time it applied a strategy, whether it was media monopoly, controlled chaos, or military deployment they seemed to undermine its legitimacy further. Similar to the Clausewitzian approach, the regime viewed the revolution through the scope of war. This was literally a war for its survival therefore all the military, political, and economic resources at its disposal were used in an attempt to resist stepping down. Based on this approach, I conclude that the grand strategy of the Mubarak regime was to stay in power by ending the revolution. Interestingly, the MB and WAAKS similarly used all their strengths and resources as organizations to resist the regime. This means that in some ways non-state and state based actors

take a similar approach when attaining their objectives though they may be radically different. It was also fascinating to see how an actor could split apart such as the military and political division which emerged. This raises the question of how we would then define grand strategy of an actor which is in the process of splintering into multiple groups.

The full impact of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 is yet to be known, unrest continued spreading to multiple countries in the region and far beyond into Serbia and Sub-Saharan Africa. What it did do was undermine previous assessments on the inability of political change to take shape in a strong authoritarian state. Though revolutions are inherently unpredictable and the final outcomes in Egypt are unknown, this paper did show how two non-state actors could cooperate to overthrow a strong, authoritarian regime. The MB and WAAKS differed in their conditioning factors, their means, and strategies and to some extent ends, yet they were able to cooperate in the major goal of removing the regime. Based on their choice of strategies, I believe WAAKS had the most clearly defined grand strategy to further social justice through revolution. The MB wanted to take part in the revolution without appearing to lead it; therefore it had the grand strategy of joining not leading the revolution

The revolution also sparked further debate on the relationship between social, political, and cultural dynamics in the region. Were values of freedom, justice, equality and democracy so alien that the people simply preferred authoritarian regimes? If organizations as diverse as the MB, WAAKS and a host of others were united behind political reform what had prevented these reforms from taking place before? Rather than being puzzled over why such dramatic political change occurred, should the real puzzle be why it didn't occur earlier since authoritarian regimes have long been detested across the region? Indeed these are difficult questions regimes preferred not to answer and indulged the ensuing ignorance to stay in power.

Following the downfall of the regime, WAAKS continued to pursue its goals of social justice, the dismantling of the previous regime, and free elections. Wael Ghonim was hailed as a hero by the Egyptian people and continued playing a strong role among the Egyptian youth. WAAKS's stated goals are helping to rebuild Egypt, furthering the goals of revolution and supporting other reform movements in the region. The combination of classic strategies and modern tactics enabled it to reverse the fear instilled by the regime, mass mobilize its members and the larger public, and challenge the regime without the use of force. Though the movement had an undeclared leadership until the final days of events, the power of psychological appeal with a human face in Wael Ghonim, finally mobilized the Egyptian masses.

The Brotherhood continued to cautiously pursue its goals of peaceful social and political reform in Egyptian society while countering negative media attention. Its use of revolutionary reinforcement, the moral imperative, controlling the narrative, and creation of a united front were in line with its self-perceived role as a moral stalwart in Egyptian society. The Brotherhood strategically chose not to play an overtly leading role during the revolution and has continued to follow this by not contending presidential elections. It announced the creation of “The Freedom and Justice Party” separate from its social wing which will run in parliamentary elections (Masry Al-Youm 2011). Leaders from the Brotherhood have claimed their ultimate goal was the wellbeing of the Egyptian people not pursuit of power.

Distinct differences between traditionalist Sunni political parties such as the FJP and newer Salafi parties such as Al-Noor were reflected both during and after the revolution. The Brotherhood had long adopted a gradualist movement for social and political change. They were able to successfully integrate their organization into the unexpected revolutionary movement without significant shifts in their larger grand strategy. In strong contrast to this, the majority of

Salafi movements objected to revolutionary movement yet radically altered their political stance once democratization occurred to remain politically significant.

Research from this paper shows that modern Muslim political movements such as FJP, Ennehda, and even the AKP have their roots in a traditionalist Islamic identity which most closely embraces the concept of wasatiyya as defined by Al-Azhar. This means their interpretation of implementing a just social order is based on a practical approach accounting for the interests of the individual and society. These movements have historically taken a gradualist approach in their social and political strategy and have been highly conducive to greater democratization.

The modern Salafi movement though divided largely embraces a literalist Islamic understanding of social and political life. Al-Noor party of Egypt, the umbrella entity for various Salafi organizations, shows the extremely fluid and at times contradictory nature of the movement. Though the Salafi in Egypt officially rejected democracy as a bida (innovation) they took no pause in embracing it when the political system opened up. The Salafi also have a much more drastic and immediate program for political and social change in comparison with traditionalist movements.

Revolutions by nature are highly unpredictable and development of democracy is a continual process. This paper does not claim to foresee conclusions to the Egyptian Revolution but rather analyses the use of non-violent revolutionary strategy in the Egyptian case. What the revolution did show was the connection young leaders had with others of their generation across political and religious divides. Leaders of organizations behind the revolution such as the April 6th Movement, WAAKS, the MB, and others agreed to unite for democratic elections. Eighteen days of unprecedented social and political turmoil in the nation of Egypt captured the world's

attention and underscored the global nature of revolution in the 21st Century as the apex of a technological and social vortex. Scenes from Tahrir Square iconically showed Christians and Muslims, men and women, the youth and the elderly from across ideological, political, and social spectrums united behind one cause. It is yet to be seen how their struggle will impact the long term reform and development of Egypt.

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Appendix 1: Grand Strategy Templates (Color Coded for Particular Characteristics, Bold Black represents commonalities)

Figure 1:

Template for the Muslim Brotherhood




Figure 2:

Template for “We Are All Khalid Said”



Figure 3:

Template for the Mubarak Regime and NDP



Figure 4:

Sharp's Template





Figure 5:

Revolutionary Strategy (According to Sharp's Theory)



Appendix 2: Gene Sharp: On Grand Strategy

Non-Violent Revolutionary Actors

Means:

Ends:

Strategies:

1. Political Defiance
2. Conversion
3. Accommodation
4. Non-Violent Coercion
5. Disintegration
6. Counter Coup
7. Democratic Defiance

Methods (Total of 198)

1. Protest & Persuasion
 - i. Symbolic Dimensions (54 Methods)
2. Non-Cooperation
 - i. Social (16 Methods)
 - ii. Economic Boycotts (26 Methods) Strikes (23 Methods)
 - iii. Political (38 Methods)
3. Intervention
 - i. Psychological (4 Methods)

- ii. Physical (12 Methods)
- iii. Social (7 Methods)
- iv. Economic (12 Methods)
- v. Political (6 Methods)

Dictatorships

Means:

1. Authority
2. Human Resources
3. Skills & Knowledge
4. Intangible Factors
5. Material Resources
6. Sanctions
7. Coups

Appendix 3: Documents from the Egyptian Revolution

مطالب شعب مصر

- ١ - إسقاط حكم مبارك ووزرائه.
- ٢ - إلغاء قانون الطوارئ.
- ٣ - حرية.
- ٤ - عدالة.
- ٥ - تكوين حكومة جديدة غير عسكرية
يكون قلبها على الشعب المصري.
- ٦ - الإدارة السليمة لجميع الموارد المصرية.

The Demands of the Egyptian People

1. The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers.
2. The cessation of the Emergency Law
3. Freedom
4. Justice
5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interests of the Egyptian people at heart.
6. The constructive administration of all of Egypt's resources.

كيف تثور بجدارة

معلومات وتكتيكات هامة

نرجو نشرها عن طريق البريد الإلكتروني والطباعة
(والتصوير) فقط.
(Facebook و Twitter) مراقبان. حذاري وقوع هذه
المعلومات في أيدي الشرطة أو أمن الدولة.

مصر.

How to Protest Intelligently

Important information and tactics

Please distribute through email
printing, and photocopies ONLY!

Twitter and facebook are being monitored. Be careful not
to let this fall into the hands of the police or state security.

مصر.

الأهداف التكتيكية للعصيان المدني

- ١- الإستيلاء على المباني الحكومية الهامة.
- ٢- محاولة ضم أفراد الشرطة والجيش إلى صفوف الشعب.
- ٣- حماية إخواننا وأخواتنا الثوار.

The Strategic Goals of Civil Disobedience

1. To take over important government buildings.
2. To attempt to win over members of the policy and army to the side of the people.
3. To protect our brothers and sisters in revolution


خطوات التنفيذ

- ١- التجمع مع الأصدقاء والجيران في الشوارع السكنية البعيدة عن تواجد قوات الأمن.
- ٢- الهتاف بإسم مصر وحرية الشعب (هتافات إيجابية).
- ٣- تشجيع سكان العمارات للانضمام (بشكل إيجابي).
- ٤- الخروج في مجموعات ضخمة إلى الشوارع الرئيسية لجمع أكبر حشد ممكن.
- ٥- السير نحو المباني الحكومية الهامة (مع الهتاف الإيجابي) للاستيلاء عليها.



Steps for Carrying Out the Plan

1. Assemble with your friends and neighbors in residential streets far away from where the security forces are.
2. Shout slogans in the name of Egypt and the people's freedom (positive slogans).
3. Encourage other residents to join in (again with positive language)
4. Go out into the major streets in very large groups in order to form the biggest possible assembly
5. Head toward important government buildings -while shouting positive slogans- in order to take them over.



ملابس و أدوات ضرورية

سويت شيرت أو سويتر ذو زعنونة، فهو يساعد على إبعاد غزات القنابل المسيلة للدموع عن وجوهنا.

غطاء حلق يمكن إستخدامها كدرع ضد ضربات الأمن التركيبي بالهشما أو الرصاص المطاطي.




نظارة واقية تركن شرانها من أي محل حاد أو وجوها.



كوفية خضراء لفتك وأنت من الغارات المسيلة للدموع.



وردة كى نعمل التي غلينا ونمأ بتجمعهم في منطوى السلمية.



دوكو رش غلشان لو حمت ضرب من قبل السطحات، رش الدوكو على زجاج النور والمعدات حسب رأيهم وشل مركتهم.



جوانتيات محارة لتساعد على حماية يداك من حرارة القنابل المسيلة للدموع.



حذاء سريع للحري والحركة السريعة.

Necessary Clothing and Accessories

Sweatshirt or leather jacket with a hood. This helps shield your face from tear gas.

The lid of a pot: you can use this shield when the State Security beats you or shoots rubber bullets.



Protective glasses (Can be bought at any metalworking or paint shop)



Scarf to protect your mouth and lungs from tear gas



A rose so we can show that we can do as we ought to and join together in the most peaceful way possible



Spray Paint so that if the authorities attack us, we can spray paint the visors of their helmets and the windshields of the armored trucks, blocking their vision and hindering their movement



Thick rubber gloves in order to protect your hands from the heat of tear gas containers



Shoes that make it easy to run and move quickly.

كيفية استخدام الأدوات

١ - الدرع والدوكو



إثبت مكانك يامصري. صد العصاية بالدرع
وأنت تقوم بالرش في الوجه.

How to Use the Accessories


Shield and Spray



HOLD YOUR GROUND, EGYPTIAN!
Block the truncheon with your shield
as you're spraying them in the face.

بعض أشكال اللافتات

Some examples of signs



كيفية نشر وتوزيع هذه المعلومات

١ - نرجو عدم إستخدام ال (twitter) أو (facebook) أو المواقع الإلكترونية، فكله مراقب من قبل الداخلية.

٢ - إنشر عن طريق ال email أو الطباعة والتصوير، خصوصاً إن كنت صاحب أو مدير مكتب أو محل.

٣ - لا تخن أهل بلدك وأحرص على عدم وقوع هذه المعلومات في أيدي أي شخص يعمل بالجيش أو الشرطة.

اللهم بلغت، اللهم فاشهد.

تحية مصر.

How to Publish and Disseminate This Information

1. We ask you not to use Twitter or Facebook or other websites because they are all monitored by the Ministry of the Interior.
2. Distribute by email or printing or photocopying especially if you own an office or store.
3. Do not betray your fellow citizens and ensure that this not fall into the hands of anyone who works for the police.

Now that you know, please pass it on!

Long live Egypt!