This dissertation examines the effects of competitive and uncompetitive clientelism on generalized trust in the country of Lebanon. Clientelism, or the exchange of votes for patronage, is common practice in Lebanon and is both uncompetitive and competitive: while some clients are ruled by a single uncontested patron that sets the price of a vote, others are ruled by competing political patrons and as a result receive generous rewards for their votes. I argue that while uncompetitive clientelism harms generalized trust because clients must compete against one another through insincere public sycophancy for their political leaders and are only seldomly rewarded, competitive clientelism boosts generalized trust as it enables clients to receive generous rewards with no need for insincere public sycophancy. I contend that the mechanism connecting different types of clientelism to generalized trust is a perception of fairness of access to patronage. Under uncompetitive clientelism, the distribution of patronage is perceived as unfair since the most insincere of clients usually receive the limited patronage distributed. On the other hand, competitive clientelism instills a perception of fair distribution of patronage. To test my argument, I rely on both observational data collected in Lebanon in 2013 and 2018 as well as experimental data collected through an online survey experiment that I implement in Lebanon in April and May of 2023. Only the observational portion of my design supports my argument. The experimental data intended to test the causal mechanism of perception of fairness of distribution of patronage does not support my argument. I speculate on why this might be in the concluding chapter.