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Abstract
Transcendental arguments have been a topic of considerable debate in philosophy during the last several decades. Most of the debate surrounding transcendental arguments has centered on their failure to accomplish what their advocates intend them to accomplish. They are typically called upon to settle decisively the philosophical difficulties they address by establishing necessary metaphysical claims through a consideration of the conditions of the possibility of epistemological premises. That is, transcendental arguments make a claim about reality, what is actually the case, based upon appearance, what is believed to be the case or how things seem. In Chapters One and Two, I will give an account of the chief characteristics and structure of transcendental arguments and provide several canonical exemplars, which will exhibit not only different manifestations that transcendental arguments can take but also the issues they have been used to address. The most common criticism of transcendental arguments is that they are not able to span the justificatory gap between appearance and reality or to accomplish the seemingly impossible task of moving from mind to world. In Chapter Three, I will consider criticisms of transcendental arguments, focusing on the most common criticism given by Barry Stroud. In light of Strouds trenchant criticism, recent work reveals an optimistic undertone by some philosophers who would promote a more moderate use of transcendental arguments. Rather than establish necessary claims about reality, transcendental arguments reveal necessary epistemological connections. I will argue that although these moderate versions are indeed legitimate as transcendental arguments, there is no need to discard the more ambitious version. Through the work of John McDowell, I will show how Strouds criticism can be overcome, thereby removing the incentive to endorse moderate versions as substitutes for ambitious versions and placing renewed confidence in transcendental argumentation. In Chapter Three, I will present and offer a critique of these moderate versions. In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I will consider McDowells work in my defense of transcendental arguments against the criticisms previously noted.