The Rhetoric of Feminist Foreign Policy:
Transforming Relationships Among Actors in Global Governance
by
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the rise of a feminist foreign policy perspective at different levels of

global governance. I argue that feminist foreign policy rhetorics represent a departure from

established gender mainstreaming programs by making gender equality the primary

consideration in the policy decision-making process. Because a feminist foreign policy

perspective is relatively new, this dissertation takes advantage of the opportunity to study how

relationships are renegotiated between actors in global governance as rhetorical norms are being

shaped. This project exposes how actors in global governance developed rhetorical strategies

aimed at shifting and transforming the relationships between stakeholders in the policy creation

process in order to enable them to produce polices that are friendly to women and girls. To track

how multiple actors act and react within the multi-layered political context of global governance,

I employ a transnational feminist perspective and public address methods. My first case study

analyzes three years of United Nations Security Council debates on the status of the Women,

Peace and Security Agenda. I find that the United Nations articulated a conservative feminist

foreign policy perspective that prioritized incremental change that preserved the existing

hierarchies between actors in global governance. My second case study analyzes the rhetoric of

Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström. I find that she constructed a moderate feminist

foreign policy perspective that prioritized cooperation and collaboration between actors in global

governance. My final case study analyzes a conference of more than 130 women's rights

activists organized by Women in Development Europe. I find that these feminist activists

advanced a radical feminist foreign policy perspective that called for the disruption and

transformation of the institutions and norms of global governance. Together these case studies

reveal how actors in global governance developed a range of rhetorical strategies to articulate

their role in crafting and implementing feminist foreign policies and in turn, shaped how a larger

network of actors can relate to one another to better enable the passage of women's and girl's

rights policies.

INDEX WORDS: Rhetoric, Global Governance, Transnational Feminism, Foreign Policy

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AMONG ACTORS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

by

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CHAPTER 1

Introducing the Rhetoric of Feminist Foreign Policy

On June 9, 2017, the Canadian government announced a "Feminist International Assistance Policy."[1] This policy, formed in consultation with a "wide range of partners, including Canadian NGOs, donor and partner governments, youth, people in developing countries and experts in the field of international assistance," asserts that, "society is more prosperous, peaceful, secure and united when women's rights are respected and women are valued and empowered in their communities."[2] In a statement that accompanied the program launch, Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland elaborated upon the new policy: "It is important - and historic - that we have a prime minister and a government proud to proclaim themselves as feminists. Women's rights are human rights. . . . These rights are at the core of our foreign policy."[3] Launching the Feminist International Assistance Policy, Canada joined Sweden as nations that explicitly take up the label "feminist" to explain a new perspective on policy creation. Previously, Sweden claimed to be "the first feminist government in the world,"[4] a claim based largely on Foreign Minister Margot Wallström's 2014 announcement that Sweden would pursue "feminist foreign policy."[5] Wallström's feminist foreign policy asserts that ensuring the rights of women and girls "is both an obligation within the framework of our international commitments, and a prerequisite for reaching Sweden's broader foreign policy goals on peace, and security and sustainable development."[6] Both Canada's and Sweden's foreign ministers suggest that feminist policies will transform international diplomacy and policymaking by welcoming civil society actors into the decision-making process and by prioritizing gender equality as the primary consideration of any new policy.

Responses to Canada's and Sweden's feminist policies were mixed. Coverage of each nation's feminist policy ranged from praise to skepticism to derision. For example, after Wallström canceled a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia over human rights concerns, Madeleine Reese, the Secretary General of the Women's League for Peace and Freedom, an international NGO with a presence in thirty-three countries around the globe including Sweden, praised Wallström's decision for exposing the political potential of feminist policymaking. She argued: "Margot Wallström's decision not to sell arms to Saudi Arabia demonstrates the fundamental rethink needed to achieve a feminist foreign policy. Herein lies women's power to stop war."[7] Katarina Tracz, a research fellow at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, housed at the University of Arizona, was less complimentary. She equated Sweden's feminist policy to a branding strategy and argued that "it is not at all clear what a feminist foreign policy can achieve."[8] She accused Sweden's feminist foreign policy of lacking "concrete suggestions."[9]

Canada's Feminist Assistance Policy was also praised and criticized. Like Sweden, Canada's feminist policy perspective was considered an innovative approach to increasing gender equality. Michael Messenger, the President and CEO of World Vision Canada, called the policy an "ambitious new agenda. . . . [I]t will make the world a better place to live for everyone, everywhere."[10] Nobel Laureate Leymah Gbowee claimed, "this is a game changer."[11] Those who were more critical of the policy noted that it did not benefit from an allocation of new funds, and instead, focused on reallocating existing funds to target gender equality projects. Robert Aubin, a Canadian Member of Parliament, criticized Canada's feminist policy for not going far enough. He argued, "Feminist should not be used as a buzzword or a way to easily brand a political policy. And if you are going to label it as feminist, it must have real substance."[12]

Much of the commentary on Sweden's and Canada's feminist foreign policy focused on the extent to which the content of the policy served feminist ends. However, an examination of the shifting context within which "feminist foreign policy" emerged suggests that "feminist" also describes an ideological perspective on policymaking that attends to how multiple actors relate to one another within an ever-shifting network of global power relationships. Indeed, the rise of feminist foreign policymaking aligns with the rise of more contemporary theories and practices of public diplomacy. A traditional conception of public diplomacy understands diplomacy as a process that is conducted, often privately, by official representatives of sovereign states for the "purpose of promoting national interest and advancing foreign policy goals."[13] This understanding has been widely criticized by scholars who argue that we have entered a "new phase in the development of public diplomacy."[14] Eytan Gilboa argues that the majority of public diplomacy research suffers from two shortcomings. First, most studies are historical and often focus on Cold War diplomacy. Second, research has primarily attended to US diplomacy and has failed to adequately study the public diplomacy processes of nations other than the United States or the emerging role of "new international actors such as NGOs, civil society groups, and individuals."[15] Likewise, Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault argue that scholars have prioritized "monologic (i.e., one-way) communication and dialogue (i.e., two-way or multidirectional) communication,"[16] while overlooking collaborative public diplomacy, or an "initiative in which people work together on a joint venture."[17] They add that collaborative public diplomacy may be especially useful when crafting policy among an expanded number actors who engage in diplomacy across national borders.[18]

These critiques have led to what the Center on Public Diplomacy, housed at the University of Southern California,[19] calls "new public diplomacy." New public diplomacy, much like Sweden's and Canada's feminist foreign policy:

aims to capture the emerging trends in international relations where a range of non-state actors with some standing in world politics . . . communicate and engage meaningfully with foreign publics and thereby develop and promote public diplomacy policies and practices of their own.[20]

Put differently, new public diplomacy seeks to move beyond state-centered notions of how world politics is conducted, and instead, attends to interactions between a range of actors "operating in a fluid global environment of new issues and contexts."[21] No longer can nation-states work alone or in partnership to address issues such as climate change, poverty, and human trafficking. These issues require the input and resources of organizations on the ground, civil society actors, state actors, transnational governmental organizations, and supranational governing structures.

The rise of "feminist foreign policy" in both content and perspective, however, cannot be explained by context alone. If, as Matthew G. Gerber says, public diplomacy is "a necessarily *suasive* endeavor,"[22] then these shifts are inherently rhetorical. Diplomacy was traditionally conceived as a bilateral process in which national representatives negotiated policies that would be in the best interest of their nation. However, within the context of new diplomacy, the pursuit of feminist foreign policies requires that actors engage the symbolic processes of shifting norms of global governance, circulate discourses that place women's and girls' lives at the center of national and international agendas, and appeal to multiple, interconnected stakeholders who have the authority to pass national, regional, and supranational policies.

Because feminist foreign policy can shape the material and symbolic realities of women's and girls' lives around the world, studying *how* the rhetorical processes of creating networked relationships among foreign policy actors develop can reveal concrete rhetorical practices to be modeled by foreign policy leaders in the future. Towards that goal, this dissertation analyzes three case studies in which actors working at various levels of global governance articulated a feminist foreign policy perspective to better enable them to produce polices that are friendly to women and girls. I argue that these feminist foreign policy perspectives were developed through

rhetorical strategies that transformed the normative standards of policymaking in global governance and shifted the relationships between stakeholders in the policymaking process. Because prioritizing gender equality as the primary consideration in the policymaking processes is relatively new, this dissertation takes advantage of the opportunity to study how relationships are renegotiated between actors in global governance as rhetorical norms are being shaped.

Specifically, this dissertation asks how supranational organizations, nation-states, and feminist civil society activists developed rhetorical strategies to articulate their role in crafting and implementing feminist foreign policies and in turn, shaped how a larger network of actors can relate to one another and better enable the passage of women's and girl's rights policies. Additionally, I ask how each actor negotiated or transformed the shifting network of relationships in global governance in order to establish new rhetorical dynamics for how actors will interact with one another in the pursuit of feminist policy. Thus, this dissertation asks: What rhetorical strategies do supranational organizations, nation-state representatives, and transnational feminist activists develop to frame their role in a feminist policy creation process? Next, how does each kind of actor articulate its relationship to other actors in ways that reshape the policymaking process and enable the passage of policies that are kind to women and girls?

To answer these questions, I situate feminist foreign policy rhetorics in a constellation of both historical contexts and theoretical conversations. The emergence of feminist foreign policy rhetorics is dependent on a global governance conception of world politics and transnational feminist theory and activism. The relationship between transnational feminism and global governance is not causal or chronological. Instead, I conceive of the relationship between the two as multidirectional. They are forces that interact in different times, at different places, and in a multitude of ways in order to create the conditions that allow a feminist foreign policy perspective to emerge. In what follows, I describe how each force enables the rise of feminist

foreign policy rhetorics. After explaining how feminist policy emerged in relation to global governance and transnational feminism, I offer my reading strategy, which brings a public address approach to transnational rhetorical studies. Through this perspective, I study the rhetorical nuances of the *relationships* between and among actors in global governance who ascribe to a feminist foreign policy perspective.

Global Governance, Gender Mainstreaming, and Transnational Feminist Networks

As of September 1, 2016, the United Nations recognized the consultative status of 4,513 non-governmental organizations.[23] These non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are only one component of an ever-increasing network of international, transnational, regional, local, and global organizations, of varying size and scope, that scholars describe as "global governance." Global governance is "conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity-from the family to international organization-in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions."[24] While global governance now encompasses a "wide variety of actors - international organizations, corporations, professional associations, advocacy groups and the like - seeking to 'govern' activity in issue areas they care about,"[25] the concept initially explained relationships between nation-states. For example, David Clark MacKenzie argues that we can find the origins of global governance in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which established nation-state sovereignty as the guiding principle of international law and set a precedent of non-interference in another nation's domestic affairs.[26] However, the current global model of organizing, as opposed to inter-national or regional models, can be traced to the League of Nations. According to Thomas Richard Davis, "the structural form of the League of Nations and its relationship with INGOs bore remarkable similarities to those of its successor."[27] The rise of global governance enables the emergence of a feminist foreign policy perspective by altering the ways in which nation-states, international organizations, and activists interact with one

another in the formation of new policies. In order to understand how calls for feminist foreign policy transformed the relationships between actors, it is first necessary to understand the system of world politics that those actors operate within. I begin by establishing how a theory of global governance differs from other models of world politics. I'll then turn to how a theory of global governance highlights the importance of studying shifting relationships between actors.

As "global governance" stretches to accommodate an expanding milieu of national, international, and transnational actors, scholars have grown concerned that the term has lost a precise meaning. For example, Lawrence S. Finkelstein argues, "we say 'governance' because we don't really know what to call what is going on."[28] To establish global governance as a useful theory of world politics, I begin by comparing the concept to nation-state focused theories of international relations and more recent theories of transnationalism.

Klaus Dingwerth and Phillipp Pattberg argue that global governance departs from theories of international relations in important ways. While traditional understandings of international relations focus on relationships between nations, often ignoring non-state actors, global governance does not establish a hierarchy among actors. Instead, global governance embraces a "multiactor perspective on world politics" that "attaches equal importance"[29] to a range of national, international, and transnational actors. Additionally, while traditional understandings of international relations suggest that interactions between nations can be isolated and analyzed separately from other levels of social interaction, global governance "conceives of world politics as a multilevel system in which local, national, regional, and global political processes are inseparably linked."[30] Of note for this dissertation, the authors emphasize that studying the current state of world politics requires one to attend to "how different spaces and levels of the system interact."[31] Finally, global governance recognizes sources of authority and mechanisms of power that do not emanate from nation-state sovereignty.[32] James N. Rosenau

and Ernst-Otto Czempiel explain these differences as the difference between governance and government. They argue:

> Governance is not synonymous with government . . . [G]overnment suggests activities that are backed by formal authority . . . whereas governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities . . . Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. [33]

While it is true that the practice of global governance often continues to privilege the concerns and authority of nation-states over other actors,[34] as a concept, it seeks to encompass the "crazy-quilt"[35] of actors, institutions, organizations, and corporations that comprise world politics.

A theory of world politics as global governance is especially important in our current transnational milieu. Wendy S. Hesford and Eileen E. Schell explain what it means to adopt a transnational orientation. They argue, *"Transnationality* refers to movements of people, goods, and ideas across national borders" and works to "highlight forms of cultural hybridity and intertextuality."[36] Put differently, transnational politics tend to organize around ideas, problems, and conditions that transcend national borders, such as women's equality, economic development, human rights, or peace and security.[37] Often, scholars of world politics exclude nation-state activities from understandings of transnationalism. Steven Vertovec argues that, when discussing interactions between national governments or the exchange of people, goods, or ideas between nations, "we might best retain our description of these practices as inter-national."[38] For Vertovec, transnationalism describes exchanges between non-state actors.[39] Unlike international relations, which usually describes activities between nation-state governments, or transnationalism, which describes exchanges between non-state actors, global governance is a theory of world politics that encompasses both. Dingwerth and Pattberg explain, "a global governance perspective acknowledges that world politics is neither international governance plus transnational actors nor transnational governance plus international actors."[40]

Instead, global governance asks after the dynamics that characterize the relationships between the two spheres. Because this dissertation analyzes how a feminist foreign policy perspective is articulated at supranational, national, and transnational levels of organizing, global governance offers a useful theory of world politics that encompasses all three levels of organizing in a single theory of world politics.

Scholars of global governance also note the important role relationships between actors play in the evolution of global governance and the implementation of new policy. While many scholars focus on the political, rather than rhetorical implications of relationship building, their work reminds us that relationships between actors in global governance are constantly shifting, have implications for the material realities of people around the world, and deserve sustained critical attention. Deborah D. Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell argue that we have not done enough to attend to the role relationships play in world politics. They explain that recent work has tended to focus on "the characteristics of types of non-states actors or private authority,"[41] but contend that "it is not the type of actor but the *character of relationships,* both among governors and between governors and governed, that is key to understanding global politics."[42] Craig N. Murphy agrees that studying interactions between global governance actors, especially interactions between the relatively powerful and powerless, is essential. He argues that we are at a "cusp," in the history of multilateral governance between the system that dominated after WWII and the "system of international governance that will characterize the world for the next generation. That system may keep the long-standing promise to serve the world's least advantaged, or it may serve to marginalize them further."[43] For Murphy, the outcome will depend on relationships between various actors, especially the influence of "the political action and the ideas of social movements representing at least some of the world's marginalized."[44] Finally, Dingwerth and Pattberg suggest research questions that should guide scholars working

in the field of global governance. These questions prioritize the study of relationship building

and maintenance between actors with different levels of power. For example, they ask: "What

forms of social regulation exist at the global level? Where do global norms, rules, and standards

come from? How are they constructed, interpreted, implemented, and adjudicated? What

relationships exist between rule makers and rule takers?"[45] Because the norms, rules and

standards of a feminist foreign policy perspective are just now being developed, I argue that

there is a unique opportunity to study how various levels of global governance rhetorically

position themselves and one another before norms and standards are solidified.

Gender Mainstreaming

Actors in global governance often work together to improve gender equality around the

world. Typically, these efforts are labeled "gender mainstreaming." Jacqui True and Michael

Mintrom define gender mainstreaming as "efforts to scrutinize and reinvent processes of policy

formulation and implementation across all issue areas to address and rectify persistent and

emerging disparities between men and women."[46] A feminist foreign policy perspective enables

greater gender mainstreaming efforts. Both a feminist foreign policy perspective and gender

mainstreaming initiatives posit that "gender equality is the overarching and long-term

development goal."[47] Gender mainstreaming works to achieve this goal through a set of

"specific, and strategic approaches as well as technical and institutional processes."[48] Put

otherwise, gender mainstreaming efforts promote concrete policies, such as a 30 percent quota

for women's representation in governing bodies in order to place women's issues at the forefront

of national and international agendas. Gender mainstreaming frequently takes place through top-

down political processes in which nations or supranational institutions write policy, direct

resources, and set benchmarks to measure progress. While a feminist foreign policy perspective

often advocates for gender mainstreaming initiatives, it also offers a guiding philosophy, or

perspective, that critically examines the policy creation process itself, challenging the norms of who gets to propose, create, and implement policies.[49]

Gender mainstreaming occurs at all levels of global governance. For example, gender mainstreaming has been an ongoing process at the UN since the creation of the Commission on the Status of Women in 1949, "the first global intergovernmental body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women."[50] UN gender mainstreaming efforts have produced many policies that contribute to the betterment of women's lives around the world. For example, Security Council Resolution 1325 argues that women should be involved in the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts.[51] Subsequent research found that women's participation increases the likelihood of peace agreements lasting for at least two years by 20 percent.[52] Since the signing of UNSCR1325, the percentage of peace agreements that reference women increased from just under 20 percent to just under 60 percent.[53] The UN also works to increase the representation of women in member states' legislative bodies. The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action set a 30 percent target for women in government decision-making bodies. The Platform for Action argued that this was the "critical mass" needed to make a "visible impact on the style and content of political decision making."[54] In 2005, eleven member states met that goal.[55] As of June 2017, "46 single or lower houses" were composed of at least 30 percent women.[56]

Gender mainstreaming also occurs at the nation-state level. For example, Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl argue that during her Secretary of State tenure, Hillary Clinton advanced the "Hillary Doctrine," which recognized that the oppression of women posed a direct threat to US security and advanced "the proposition that the empowerment of women and girls is a stabilizing force for peace in the world, and should thus be a cornerstone of American foreign policy."[57] US efforts to empower women and girls takes place through a variety of gender

mainstreaming policies and programs that increase access to education,[58] invests in the prevention of gender-based violence,[59] and offers training so that women can adopt new technologies to improve economic stability.[60] The Hillary Doctrine, while not identified as a feminist foreign policy, adopted many of the same tenets as Sweden and Canada. It seems then, that nations and institutions that take up a feminist foreign policy perspective can better enable and promote gender mainstreaming policies.

Feminist Transformations of Global Governance

A feminist foreign policy perspective requires actors to develop rhetorical strategies that renegotiate the relationships between stakeholders in global governance so that new relationships can emerge that place women's voices and concerns at the heart of the policymaking process. While theories of global governance draw our attention to the shifting network of relationships between actors that constitutes global politics, these theories do not usually attend to the ways in which women's lives and material realities are implicated in the making of new policies. Despite gender mainstreaming efforts, existing systems of global governance remain relatively patriarchal, often pursuing top-down political processes that marginalize the voices of civil society actors. For an understanding of how global governance can be transformed into a more feminist political system, I turn to theories of transnational feminism and the activist work of TFNs. Transnational feminist activism offers a model through which actors can pursue policies aimed at improving the lives of women and girls by both utilizing and challenging the rhetorical norms and opportunities presented by systems of global governance. Therefore, transnational feminism, and the work of TFNs, offers a model or precedent for how a feminist foreign policy perspective might transform the relationships of global governance in ways that are kind to women and girls.

As Valentine M. Moghadam defines them, TFNs are:

Structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda . . .They are part of the family of political change organizations operating above and across national borders . . . and which, along with international nongovernmental organizations, constitute the making of a transnational public sphere.[61]

In addition to operating "above and across" national borders, TFNs pursue alternative methods of political decision-making. Specifically, TFNs highlight the voices of traditionally disenfranchised women to draw attention to how intertwined systems of oppression shape women's lives. Rachel Stohr explains that the political goal of TFNs is to "garner public attention and develop solutions to overlapping issues." She adds that this process depends on networks "accurately representing, persuasively translating, and effectively circulating the interests of disempowered citizens to powerful decision-making bodies."[62] Similarly, during a 2015 transnational feminisms roundtable discussion, scholar and activist Maylei Blackwell argued that transnational feminist work requires an openness to "an alternative set of origin stories and the complicated ways diverse people are situated or constructed by the nation."[63] TFNs are often in conversation with national and supranational decision-making bodies in order to draw attention to the ways women's lives are shaped by the overlapping forces of gender, globalization, culture, and economics.

TFNs simultaneously work within and challenge global governance systems. To gain legitimacy, transnational feminist organizations need to work within established norms and structures of global governance. For example, Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl note that international women's movements have successfully carved out spaces for women inside multilateral institutions, often finding more success in systems of global governance than in the governing bodies of individual nation-states.[64] Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson further explain that by appealing to a global community, instead of individual nations, feminist organizations are

able to bypass the entrenched patriarchal norms of formal nation-state bureaucratic political institutions.[65] The authors add that transnational feminist organizations often pursue a two-pronged strategy of first, agenda setting that "mak[es] gender a relevant dimension of global politics"[66] and second, agenda keeping to ensures that feminist values are "consistently translated into policies and programs."[67] As such, TFNs often choose to work within systems of global governance to ensure that gender friendly policies are legitimated by being written into law.

However, transnational feminist organizations also challenge norms and structures of global governance to expose the patriarchal nature of current governmental systems and to promote more democratic decision-making processes. For example, several scholars argue that transnational feminist political movements formed, in part, to challenge the patriarchal nature of nation-state systems of global governance. Stohr explains, "Animated by the spirit of the 1960s and 1970s, the transnational feminist resistance movement arose in response to the routine exclusion of women's contributions from global governance processes."[68] These movements sought to change discriminatory policies and gender norms that affected women across nation-state borders, such as violence against women, education for women, human trafficking, and reproductive rights. Shirin Rai suggests that the process of challenging these systems often has productive results, leading to what she calls "good global governance."[69] In pursuit of "good global governance" many transnational feminist organizations promote alternative, and more democratic, decision-making processes. Specifically, they value the voices and opinions of everyday women—women considered "civil society actors," in contradistinction to political elites. For example, Mignonette Chiu argues that "the question about who makes choices, and how, is important because it speaks to whether transnational feminist frameworks can effect political change."[70] Through an examination of the Women's Environment and Development Organization, Stohr concluded: "WEDO's lateral communication processes represent an

alternative model of organizing that invites multiple stakeholders to converge on global social

problems and develop collaborative solutions."[71] TFNs recognize that many of the actors and

levels of power in global governance remain unfriendly to women. TFNs challenge these norms

by highlighting the concerns of women whose lives are shaped by the overlapping forces of

gender, economics, and globalization. These processes of simultaneously working within and

challenging the norms of global governance offer a precedent for understanding how a feminist

foreign policy perspective might approach a renegotiation of the relationships between actors.

Reading Strategy

The research questions central to this dissertation require a reading strategy that attends

to the rhetorical force of multiple actors within a complex global context. To track how multiple

actors act and react within a multi-layered political context, I employ a transnational feminist

perspective. This perspective allows readers to see how a feminist foreign policy perspective

seeks to make global governance more democratic, egalitarian, and equitable by inviting a wider

range of actors to participate. Also, because this project is primarily concerned with *rhetorical*

action, a public address perspective will draw the reader's eye to how actors' rhetorical strategies

shape and are shaped by the power dynamics of a multi-layered context.

A public address method highlights the rhetorical force of text when situated within

context.[72] Traditionally, the process involves "identifying rhetorical motives, strategies of

argument and style, and the effects of public discourse on particular audiences."[73] While early

scholars of public address concerned themselves with a "canon" of great speeches and speakers,

Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan argue that the field has since taken an "ideological

turn" that foregrounds how rhetoric shapes and is shaped by race, gender, sexuality, and class,

and highlights "the role of power and politics in history."[74] This study embraces both traditional

and ideological senses of public address as a "method." I examine the rhetorical strategies of

texts, traditionally conceived, such as speeches, debate proceedings, and public statements. I consider how the rhetorical strategies of each text effected audiences and shaped contexts in both intentional and unintentional ways. In addition to addressing the obvious effects of policy change, I also attend to how the rhetorical strategies of each actor shaped relationships among actors in a context of global political power.

This study also embraces public address's ideological turn, which acknowledges that rhetoric is shaped by "the influence of established interests and the reality of alternative worldviews." The ideological turn in public address "commands rhetorical analyses not only of the actions implied but also of the interests represented."[75] This project's focus on feminist foreign policy discourses draws attention to how societies are structured by gender, and more specifically, how political power in global, national, regional, and local communities often relies upon the oppression of women and girls. Thus, I embrace rhetoric's power to "shape perception, recognition, interpretation, and response"[76] as I study feminist foreign policy discourses for their emancipatory potential.

Next, scholars agree that public address methods must expand to account for the global nature of today's discourse. For example, David Zarefsky suggests, "A much needed effort to 'push the envelope' would be to internationalize public address studies."[77] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell agrees, and adds that "our critical work is weakest where our linguistic competence and cultural knowledge are limited."[78] In order to account for these shortcomings in public address methodologies, I adopt a transnational perspective. This does not simply mean that one studies texts from non-American sources through a public address lens. A transnational perspective requires an understanding of contexts as both national and non-national. Thus, in addition to contextualizing texts within a somewhat unfamiliar rhetorical context, a transnational perspective requires situating a text as part of a *network* of non-national contexts and actors

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shaped less so by *where* a text is produced and more so by the *relationships* between and among the communities that a text speaks to.

To Raka Shome, American scholars have failed to adequately consider the full range of communities, or "other worlds," that might shape or be shaped by a text. She argues that the field of communication "has been so embarrassingly US centered that it has left little room for examining the ways in which America's violent relations with 'other worlds'. . . continue to impact diverse populations."[79] Likewise, Wendy Hesford and Eileen Schell argue that our current methodologies cause us to think unidirectionally, either West to East or North to South, instead of attending to the complex web of interactions in which the nation-state is only one unit or node.[80] On their view, a transnational perspective:

> Attempts to offer a more complex and sophisticated theory of culture, cultural interconnectivity, and language, addressing how cultures transact and interact with one another in a variety of mediums . . . and through international policy making and transnational organizing.[81]

Transnational perspectives have urged scholars to reevaluate rhetorical theories and methods that were developed with nation-state centered discourse in mind.

One such project that guides this analysis of feminist foreign policy discourse is Nancy Fraser's work on the public sphere as transnational. Fraser argues that transnationality prompts scholars to rethink the conditions of "legitimacy" and "efficacy" that constitute the "critical force" of the concept of the public sphere.[82] For Fraser, "the task is to detach those two ideas from the Westphalian premises the previously underpinned them and to reconstruct them for a post-Westphalian world."[83] First, Fraser retheorizes the condition of legitimacy, or the belief that public opinion must meet the tests of *inclusiveness*, meaning that the discussion is open to everyone with a stake in the outcome, and *participatory parity,* meaning that interlocutors have a roughly equal opportunity to shape the agenda, state their opinions, and question the opinions of others.[84] In the Westphalian understanding of the public sphere, these conditions were linked to

citizenship. In a post-Westphalian, transnational concept of the public sphere, Fraser argues that critics should apply the "all-affected principle" to test legitimacy. The "all-affected principle" "holds that what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not shared citizenship, but their co-imbrication in a common set of structures and/or institutions that affect their lives."[85] A "legitimate" transnational public sphere therefore follows a communicative process in which everyone who is potentially affected can participate, regardless of political citizenship. Fraser also rethinks the efficacy condition, which suggests that public opinion is efficacious when it is translated into laws and holds public powers accountable.[86] Traditionally, the addressee of public opinion was assumed to be the Westphalian state. In a transnational reimagining, this is no longer the case. Instead, Fraser argues that we must consider the likelihood that public opinion does not flow to an "already known and constituted addressee."[87] Our critical conception of the public sphere must "consider the need to construct new addresses for public opinion, in the sense of new, transnational public powers that possess the administrative capacity to solve transnational problems."[88] In part, this dissertation traces the processes and strategies through which actors in global governance articulated their role in a transnational public sphere aimed at producing polices (efficacy) that better the lives of women and girls, whether or not they count as card-carrying national citizens (legitimacy).

This dissertation also relies on and extends, Rebecca Dingo's method of networking arguments. Following Dingo, I approach my three case studies of feminist foreign policy not as three "static rhetorical occasions,"[89] but rather, as opportunities to study how "policy rhetorics are disseminated, received, rewritten, and put into action-in unexpected ways."[90] Dingo offers the metaphor of a "network" to explain her methodology. She argues that this metaphor draws attention to how "complex networks of relationships affect rhetorical meaning."[91] Importantly, these relationships are shaped by unequal and shifting power dynamics.[92] Drawing on the work

of Inderpal Grewal, Dingo explains a network as a "collection of nodes,"[93] each of which represents a concentration of power or a lack of political power. The connections between nodes are complex and varied; some are closely connected while some are widely dispersed.[94] It is the critic's task to "demonstrate the complex ways that rhetorical appeals reach a diffused yet linked audience while also accounting for how contiguous power relationships add meaning and force to arguments."[95] In *Networking Arguments*, Dingo traced how meanings of gender mainstreaming, fitness, and empowerment fluctuate as the terms circulated through a variety of transnational contexts. In this project, I study how a feminist foreign policy perspective is articulated differently at different levels of global governance. However, in addition to tracing how the meaning of feminist policymaking is "networked," I contend that it is also important to study how rhetoric constitutes the relationships necessary for meanings to fluctuate as they are taken up by various actors in a network. Therefore, this dissertation builds on Dingo's method by arguing that a network model might reveal how various nodes conceive of their relationships to other actors in a transnational network. Dingo argues that a network model allows critics to study how "complex networks of relationships affect rhetorical meaning."[96] While Dingo interrogated how *rhetorical meaning* fluctuates in a network, I suggest that we must also attend to the rhetorical nuances of how the *relationships* in a network are articulated, negotiated, and transformed through policy discourse.

Chapter Previews

This dissertation investigates the rhetorical strategies actors at different levels of global governance crafted to articulate a feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritized gender equality as the primary consideration of decision-making. I find that each actor developed different rhetorical strategies to renegotiate or transform the relationships that govern interactions between civil society activists, nations, and supranational institutions. Chapter two

analyzes the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on the Status of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. During these debates, the UN constructed a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritized incremental policy change and worked to preserve existing hierarchies between actors in global governance. Through the debate process, civil society briefers, national representatives, and UN officials simultaneously reconfigured the policymaking norms of global governance while reinforcing exiting relational hierarchies. Chapter three studies the rhetoric of Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström. I find that she developed a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective that was steeped in the principles of cooperation, collaboration, and compromise and worked to enable global governance actors to work together in new ways. Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy reimagined the hierarchical relationships between actors in global governance as equal policymaking partnerships. Finally, chapter four analyzes a 2016 conference organized by Women in Development Europe. At this conference, civil society activists articulated a radical feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritized the structural transformation of global governance while also drawing upon conservative rhetorical strategies.

Chapter 2: A Conservative Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective: The Rhetoric of the Open Debates on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

In 2015, the UN Security Council commissioned a high-level review of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS Agenda). This review called UN members to ask, "What must we do to turn rhetoric into reality for women around the globe?"[97] To answer this question, the UN Security Council hosted a series of Open Debates in which participants discussed how to transform normative standards, implementation mechanisms, and decision-making processes to better implement the WPS Agenda. While the Open Debate on the Status of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda is an annual event, the 2015 debate marked an important shift in the policy

discourse of the UN. The 2015 debate coincided with the unanimous passage of Resolution 2242. Resolution 2242 is the eighth and most recent resolution to appear on the WPS Agenda. This resolution modifies the relationships between actors in global governance in two significant ways. For the first time, civil society briefers were allowed to take part in country-specific deliberations. Additionally, Resolution 2242 signaled the creation of an Informal Expert Group on Women Peace and Security. The goal of this group is to improve "the flow of information and analysis to the Council with respect to women and peace and security."[98] Importantly, this expert group "consults" with civil society actors, but "the meetings are geared towards getting the requisite information to impact Council-level outcomes."[99] I argue that these changes indicate the UN's uptake of a feminist foreign policy perspective. This chapter analyzes an archive of texts that includes the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates along with the Open Letters, UN Reports, and Concept Notes that various interest groups circulated in an attempt to shape debate outcomes. Together, this archive of roughly six hundred pages of documents, debate statements, and UN reports allows me to trace how actors crafted feminist policy recommendations, negotiated policy through a debate process, and wrote policy into UN governing documents.

The open debates were hosted by the Security Council. The purview of the Council is "the maintenance of international peace and security."[100] Scholars have long studied the rhetorical workings of the UN Security Council. In 1948 William A. Behl argued, "It is natural that this body of the world organization should be the focal point of observation and criticism because the security council is the heart of the United Nations."[101] Several scholars note that the Security Council is notoriously resistant to reform. W. Andy Knight outlined several efforts to expand security council membership that emerged during a review of the Security Council by the General Assembly in 1992.[102] These reform efforts resulted in a "virtual log-jam."[103] Ian Hurd argues that any effort to expand formal membership in the Security Council is doomed to fail.

Instead, he calls for reform efforts that focus on transforming and expanding the Security Council's deliberative processes by allowing a greater number of actors to participate.[104] The 2015, 2016, and 2017 WPS Agenda debates represent one effort to reform the Security Council's policymaking processes by expanding participation in deliberation. In part, this chapter asks how a feminist foreign policy perspective led to a renegotiation of UN norms and produced rhetorical strategies that reframed the relationships between the UN and other actors in global governance.

In the scope of the dissertation, the UN's discourse during the 2015, 2016, and 2017 WPS Agenda debates represents a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective. This perspective generated rhetorical strategies aimed at shifting the norms of global governance through incremental policy change. This chapter argues that the UN took important steps to acknowledge the past failures of the WPS Agenda, proposed new policies that would mitigate these failures, and worked to construct new discursive forums that expanded the role of civil society actors in the implementation of the WPS Agenda. Yet, they stopped short of ceding any formal decision-making authority to civil society actors.

Despite the limited nature of the UN's feminist foreign policy perspective, this chapter argues that the rhetorical strategies developed by participants in the WPS Agenda debates precipitated a reconfiguration of the relationships between actors in global governance. This rhetorical reconfiguration has significant implications for the potential of feminist policymaking. The 2015, 2016, and 2017 WPS Agenda debates introduced a feminist foreign policy perspective into a discursive arena that is notoriously slow to change its rhetorical norms. By incorporating a feminist foreign policy perspective into existing policy frameworks, like the WPS Agenda, debate participants began to normalize feminism as a guiding principle in global governance, increased the legitimacy of feminist policymaking in the upper echelons of global policymaking,

and began to open a discursive space in which more voices are able to participate in the policymaking process.

Chapter 3: A Moderate Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective: The Rhetoric of Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström

Margot Wallström was appointed Foreign Minister of Sweden in 2014. Shortly after her appointment, Wallström declared her approach to foreign policy. She announced that Sweden would pursue what she labeled "feminist foreign policy," "even if no one really knows what that means."[105] The Swedish government subsequently explained that "equality between women and men is a fundamental aim of Swedish foreign policy."[106] Following her announcement, Wallström argued that her feminist foreign policy is built on "three R's": rights, representation, and resources.[107] Wallström's feminist foreign policy asserts, "respect for human rights and rule of law constitute a starting point for every discussion about gender equality," "women must be represented at all levels of society," and "resources must be distributed evenly."[108] According to Wallström, her feminist proposals have tended to be met with "skepticism," "considerable derision," and a "giggling factor."[109] In light of these responses, Wallström delivered three speeches between November 28, 2014, and March 3, 2015, in which she introduced, explained, and justified her feminist foreign policy perspective. Wallström delivered her first speech in Stockholm on November 28, 2014, during a seminar arranged by the Swedish organization Kvinna till Kvinna. Kvinna till Kvinna is a registered Swedish non-profit organization that focuses on peace and security.[110] The audience who attended Wallström's speech was primarily feminist activists or "women human rights defenders from all around the globe."[111] Wallström delivered her second speech at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on January 29, 2015. USIP was "created by Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan, federally funded organization."[112] Wallström's prepared speech was followed by a panel discussion with US

Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's issues, Catherine Russell, and Retired US Ambassador Donald Steinberg.[113] Wallström delivered her third speech at the University of Helsinki on March 3, 2015. The event was sponsored by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The Institute is funded the Parliament of Finland but claims to be "autonomous in its research activities."[114] During these speeches, Wallström articulated a feminist foreign policy perspective that worked to integrate the concerns of transnational activists with the demands of nation-states. I argue that Wallström reimagined the relationships between actors in global governance as an equal partnership by developing rhetorical strategies steeped in the principles of cooperation, compromise, and collaboration.

Emerging scholarship on Wallström as a political figure explores how Sweden's feminist foreign policy departs from other foreign policy philosophies. For example, Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond contend that the label "feminist:"

> elevates politics from a broadly consensual orientation of gender mainstreaming towards more controversial politics, and specifically towards those that explicitly seek to renegotiate and challenge power hierarchies and gendered institutions that hitherto defined global institutions and foreign security policies.[115]

The authors suggest that Wallström challenged the norms of global governance in two significant ways. First, her approach to policymaking seeks to ensure that international agenda setting is conducted through a "gender sensitive lens," and second, her proposals are guided by "an ethically informed framework of cosmopolitanism and human rights that seeks to shape global developments in a gender-sensitive direction."[116] Wallström's foreign policy perspective goes further than previous gender mainstreaming efforts by reimagining the structures and institutions of global governance in order to challenge power hierarchies. Instead of viewing feminist foreign policy as something that "adds value"[117] to existing policy initiatives, Wallström seeks to transform existing systems of policymaking to make gender equality a primary consideration rather than an added benefit.

In the scope of this dissertation, Wallström's rhetorical strategies for transforming the relationships between actors in global governance represent a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective. Through this perspective, Wallström worked to meet the demands of both transnational activists and nation-state actors. To do so, she situated herself, and her vision of feminist policymaking, as a link or bridge that might facilitate new partnerships between global governance actors. I find that her rhetoric utilized the opportunities presented by each level of decision making to manage the shortcomings of other actors. For example, she challenged the patriarchal nature of nation-state foreign policy discourse by invoking transnational feminist values, and lent authority to transnational feminist activist organizations by connecting them to national or supranational institutions. In doing so, Wallström reimagined the relationships between actors in global governance as an equal partnership instead of a hierarchy. This transformation of the norms of global governance holds great potential for crafting innovative and gender-sensitive policies.

Chapter 4: A Radical Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective: The Rhetoric of "Movements, Borders, Rights? Feminist Perspectives on the Global Issues in Europe."

On October 24-25, 2016, Women in Development Europe (WIDE+) hosted a two-day conference in Brussels, Belgium, entitled "Movements, Borders, Rights? Feminist Perspectives on the Global Issues in Europe." This conference brought together more than 170 feminist activists from around the world to confront the "rise of authoritarianism, right-wing populism and racism that is usually combined with strong antifeminism and a shrinking of critical civil society spaces."[118] WIDE+ was founded in 1985, and is registered as an International Non-Profit Association (INGO) in compliance with Belgian law.[119] The organization has national platforms in nine EU states.[120] While WIDE+ is a Europe based network, and primarily works to shape EU trade and development policy, they argue that EU policies must be considered in a global

context. WIDE+ therefore prioritizes "learning from global experiences" and considers how EU policies fit "in a larger global development context."[121] These commitments shaped the format of its 2016 conference. Across three panels and eleven workshops, participants worked to "link a perspective from the Global South and a European perspective."[122] Each panel or workshop included at least one speaker from the Global South and one speaker from the Global North. One goal of the conference was to ensure that a variety of feminist perspectives were given equal weight. Across these conference sessions, participants developed a feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritized structural and transformative change.

Previous scholarship on the rhetorical norms of feminist activist organizations suggests that Transnational Feminist Networks must carefully manage their relationships to supranational and national entities who create both opportunities and constraints for civil society actors. For example, in her analysis of the Women's Environment and Development Organization's (WEDO) relationship to global governance, Rachel Stohr points out that networks are forced to "balance integration and change in increasingly interconnected and uncertain environments."[123] She found that WEDO managed the sometimes "oppressive context" of global governance by adopting "action-centered approaches to global governance that direct members toward solutions to problems."[124] Sabine Lang studied the relationships between TFNs and the EU. She found that the EU has provided considerable openings for civil society input, but organizations like WIDE+ remain critical of EU gender mainstreaming efforts.[125] According to Lang, activists take issue with the prevalence of "added value" discourse in gender mainstreaming efforts. She explained, "If quantitative evidence for the added value of including gender is demanded, then arguments about the basic democratic virtues of descriptive representation and the need for a radical restructuring of masculinist governance become sidelined."[126] It is my contention that it is

exactly a *radical restructuring* of global governance that WIDE+ called for during the 2016 conference.

In the scope of this dissertation, the rhetoric of the WIDE+ conference represents a radical feminist foreign policy perspective. Rather than work within the norms and structures of global governance, conference participants demanded structural transformation. This call for transformation was based on the belief that the existing institutions of global governance were fundamentally incapable of meeting the needs of women and girls. Conference participants therefore advanced rhetorical strategies that would dismantle existing norms and structures in order to create space for a new, feminist vision of governance. I argue that this radical perspective has significant implications for the potential of feminist policymaking at all levels of global governance. This chapter demonstrates how feminist activists articulated their role, and framed the roles of others, in a global policymaking process, how they constructed exigencies that shaped the uptake of a feminist foreign policy perspective at other levels of global governance, and how activists resolved tensions among themselves in order to better enable them to engage with other actors in global governance.

The overarching goal for this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of how actors in global governance can work together to produce policies that improve the lives of women and girls. I argue that the UN's conservative feminist foreign policy perspective, Wallström's moderate perspective, and feminist activists' radical perspective reveal the complex relational dynamics that shape global policymaking in which the rhetoric of each actors works to enable, constrain, or shape the discourse of other actors. This dissertation demonstrates how conservative, moderate, and radical visions of feminist policymaking can work both independently and in combination to ensure that gender equality is taken seriously in the policymaking process. My hope is that this project reveals rhetorical strategies and tactics that

policymakers may find effective as they work to transform global governance into a system that produces equitable, inclusive, and effective policies for global problems. In addition to identifying specific rhetorical strategies that policymakers can use in a range of global contexts, this project also makes contributions to rhetorical theory and method. First, this project extends our understanding of how rhetorics circulate in global policymaking contexts. I find that successful policy rhetorics are often polysemic, enabling rhetors to simultaneously appeal to the conservative, moderate, and radical rhetorical norms of different global actors. Moreover, this dissertation illustrates how rhetorical critics and transnational feminist scholars can avoid reproducing top-down, monologic methods for studying policy discourse by conceptualizing the process of policymaking as a network in which the rhetoric of actors at different levels of policymaking is enmeshed in a multi-layered context of global power flows.

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CHAPTER 2

A Conservative Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective:

The Rhetoric of the Open Debates on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

To mark the 15th anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, the

Security Council commissioned a high-level review of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.

This review was tasked with identifying "gaps and challenges and emerging trends and priorities

for future action."[1] In an interview with UN Women, conducted as part of the review process,

Cynthia Enloe suggested that this review was more than routine bureaucratic oversight. She

argued that it had transformative potential. Enloe believed, "The Global Review will be effective

if it makes people nervous. It will be effective if somebody's job is assessed as having been done

ineffectively, because 1325 is not being effectively implemented."[2] The review, led by Radhika

Coomaraswamy, the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children in

Armed Conflict, set lofty goals. It aspired to a "grander purpose: to provide the UN, Member

States and civil society actors with an opportunity to commit to action and accountability to

achieve lasting and meaningful peace and security for women." The review asserted that it was

"time for us all to ask: What must we do to turn rhetoric into reality for women around the

globe?"[3] This question was the impetus for an ongoing reconfiguration of the Women, Peace and

Security (WPS) Agenda.

The reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda emerged in a larger context of shifting

geopolitical norms. Specifically, political actors and activists now recognize the public sphere as

transnational. According to Nancy Fraser, transnationalizing the public sphere involves a process

of "documenting the existence of discursive arenas that overflow the bounds of both nations and

states."[4] This "multiactor perspective on world politics"[5] recognizes that, in addition to nation-

states, international organizations, corporations, advocacy groups, and professional associations all influence policy.[6] Reconfiguring the WPS Agenda is not the UN's first effort to expand roles for non-nation-state actors. In 1996 the UN Economic and Social Council passed guidelines for consultative relationships between the UN and non-governmental organizations.[7] As of 2016, the Economic and Social Council recognized the consultative status of 4,513 non-governmental organizations.[8] Likewise, UN Women established their first Global Civil Society Advisory Group in 2012. A press release accompanying the announcement explained that the group included "grassroots, rural and community-based leaders, leaders of indigenous people's groups, feminist scholars, human rights lawyers, and male leaders working on gender and women's rights issues."[9] While some UN agencies have begun to embrace transnational governance, the Security Council has been slow to change. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom argued that the contributions of civil society actors are often "unrecognized, marginalized, and under-valued" by the Security Council.[10] The 15-year review of the WPS Agenda created an opportunity for UN members to reconsider their deliberative practices in light of geopolitical shifts towards transnational governance.

Following the review, the UN conducted a series of debates in which participants discussed how to transform normative standards, implementation mechanisms, and decision-making processes to better implement the WPS Agenda in the current transnational geopolitical climate.[11] These debates included a combined 278 statements from participants who represented the UN, nation-states, and civil society. Prior to each debate, participants circulated statements and reports pertinent to their contributions. Moreover, the 2015 debate coincided with the passage of Security Council Resolution 2242 and generated new working group guidelines based on the recommendations that emerged from the debates. A rhetorical analysis of this archive reveals how feminist policy recommendations emerged from actors with differing, and at times

conflicting, political exigencies; how they evolved through a debate process that challenged Security Council decision-making norms; and how they were written into official policies and guidelines.

In order to understand the transformative potential of these deliberative texts, this chapter analyzes the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on the Status of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda within the theoretical and political contexts of transnational public spheres and global governance. Scholars of global politics call for a retheorizing of the public sphere so that "no persons, actions, or aspects of a person's life should be forced into privacy" and "no social institutions or practices should be excluded *a priori* from being a proper subject for public discussion and expression."[12] Rachel Stohr argues that the "divorce between public, organizational life and private life produces a variety of consequences."[13] These consequences include the exclusion of women from the public sphere, the denial of women's domestic labor as valuable, and the construction of women's issues as a private, rather than public matter.[14] The concept of global governance and the theory of a transnational public sphere, work to avoid these pitfalls. Both concepts recognize that we are "living in a period of global transformations" that requires new ways of thinking about public deliberation.[15] For Nancy Fraser, transnationalizing the public sphere challenges traditional notions of legitimacy and efficacy. In order to be legitimate, a transnational public sphere must "in principle, be open to all with a stake in the outcome" and "all interlocutors must, in principle, enjoy roughly equal chances to state their views."[16] Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg argue that the concept of global governance does similar rhetorical work. For them, the "attribute *global* - in its more encompassing version - includes the worldwide transboundary interactions not only between a wide array of actors, but also among various policy levels."[17] Fraser also argues that transnationalizing the public sphere requires retheorizing efficacy. For the public sphere to be transnational "the communicative

power generated in civil society must be translated first into binding laws and then into administrative power."[18] Dingwerth and Pattberg argue that the concept of global governance similarly recognizes "a greater variety of steering mechanisms and spheres of authority."[19] Taken together, theories of global governance and a transnational public sphere call critics to study how a wide range of actors, with different levels of political influence and authority, navigate their various relationships to one another in order to advance policy priorities and implement policy recommendations.

The 2015 review of the WPS Agenda offers just such an opportunity. In order to accommodate the shifting rhetorical norms of global governance, participants in the WPS Agenda debates adopted a feminist foreign policy perspective. This perspective created a rhetorical space for UN officials, nation-state representatives, and civil society actors to renegotiate the normative standards, implementation guidelines, and decision-making process of the WPS Agenda. I find that UN members developed three rhetorical strategies that altogether produced a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective. While civil society actors advocated for a wide-scale transformation of the Security Council's decision-making process, UN officials and nation-state representatives preferred incremental change that retained the existing hierarchies between actors. Ultimately, the rhetoric of the WPS Agenda debates produced policies and guidelines that *recognized* the important role civil society actors play in implementing the WPS Agenda but stopped short of fully integrating them into the decision-making process. I argue that this rhetoric of recognition represents a conservative, incremental vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective.

Specifically, I analyze how debate participants accommodated shifting geopolitical norms by developing a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective based in postcolonial reflexivity, "anti-rhetorical" networked policy proposals, and transnational public sphere

deliberative processes. The first task in the reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda was to acknowledge the agenda's shortcomings. This was accomplished through the rhetorical strategy of postcolonial reflexivity, a process of "critical self-analysis and awareness, particularly around issues of positionality and power." [20] Postcolonial reflexivity allows organizations to "reflect on their practices and relationships that are situated in these global/local spaces of struggle."[21] Calls for reflexivity emerged from civil society actors, who criticized the Security Council for failing to uphold the prevention pillar of the WPS Agenda, avoiding deep, structural sources of gender inequality, and prioritizing a narrow set of gendered security issues. When reflecting on these shortcomings, debate participants acknowledged collective, rather than individual failures. UN officials and nation-state representatives used their debate statements to speak on behalf of the WPS Agenda, rather than their individual agencies or nations, thus limiting their individual culpability for the acknowledged shortcomings.

The second step in reconfiguring the WPS agenda was to develop new policies that would mitigate the shortcomings identified through collective postcolonial reflexivity. While debate participants spoke with a collective voice when acknowledging past failures, policies to address these shortcomings were tailored to the specific political norms and rhetorical demands of individual nations or UN agencies. Thus, debate participates engaged in a strategy of networking arguments, a process in which meanings "shift and change as they move across geopolitical boundaries to reflect different ideas."[22] While networking arguments performs important rhetorical work, debate participants framed their policy rhetoric as "anti-rhetorical." "Anti-rhetoric" allows a speaker to present themselves as "innocent of the various procedures associated with rhetorical training and preparation."[23] Put another way, WPS Agenda debate participants framed their policy recommendations as free from "spin" or embellishment.

The final step in reconfiguring the WPS Agenda was to "transnationalize" the implementation process by developing discursive spaces in which the UN, nation-states, and civil society actors could work collaboratively to implement the Agenda outside of the yearly debate process. The political commitments of each actor shaped how they approached this task. Civil society actors embraced the idea of constructing transnational forums. For civil society actors, the WPS Agenda was already a transnational effort. Therefore, any transnationalizing efforts by the UN would amount to the recognition of reality, rather than a new endeavor. UN officials and nation-state representatives approached the transnationalizing process with more caution. For them, transnational governance would need to work in harmony rather than replace, more traditional forms of international governance. This resulted in rhetoric that framed civil society as a tool or resource that could be harnessed by the UN and nation-states to serve existing goals. Framing civil society as a tool, and not an equal partner, allowed existing hierarchies to go unexamined and unchallenged. Taken together, these strategies reveal how power relationships were leveraged and negotiated during the reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda. In sum, this three-tiered process generated a conservative, incremental feminist foreign policy.

Before turning to this chapter's analysis, I trace the history of the WPS Agenda prior to the 2015 review, contextualizing the review's rhetorical practices within decades of rhetorical-political efforts to materialize change for women around the world.

The United Nations Security Council and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

To appreciate the rhetorical strategies used to reconfigure the WPS Agenda, it's important to understand the political and rhetorical forces that shaped the development of the Agenda. To that end, I explore how the WPS Agenda emerged through a series of interactions between civil society, nation-states, and UN entities, outline controversies surrounding Security

Council deliberations, and establish the variety of reports, policy documents, and debate proceedings that comprise this chapter's archive.

The UN emerged at the end of World War II "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights…to establish conditions under which justice…can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."[24] Fifty nations signed the original UN Charter on June 26, 1945, in San Francisco.[25] The charter outlined five missions: to maintain peace and security, to protect human rights, to provide humanitarian aid, to promote sustainable development, and to uphold international law.[26] According to Thomas Weiss, the Director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project, the UN works towards these goals by:

> providing a forum for debate; generating ideas and policies; giving them international legitimacy; promoting their adoption; implementing or testing them at country level; generating resources to pursue them; monitoring progress; and, admittedly too infrequently, acting to bury ideas that seem inconvenient or excessively controversial.[27]

Since its inception at the end of WWII, the UN has grown to include 193 member nations, has a $5.4 billion program budget,[28] and is currently supporting 110,000 peacekeepers across 15 different peacekeeping missions.[29]

The Security Council is the UN body tasked with maintaining international peace and Security.[30] The Security Council "takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression."[31] The Council is comprised of fifteen members. Five members, including the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia, hold permanent seats and have veto powers over Security Council decisions. According to the *New York Times*, these permanent members represent the victors of WWII.[32] The other ten members are elected to two-year terms and do not enjoy veto powers.[33] In 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1325, the first of eight resolutions that make up the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.[34]

Through Resolution 1325, the Security Council formally acknowledged that women and girls are impacted differently by conflict, recognized the important role that women can, and do, play in peace efforts, and affirmed that peace agreements are more sustainable when women are involved.[35] Resolution 1325 identified four priority areas or "pillars." These are: participation, or the need to increase women's political leadership in peace and security decision-making; protection, "of both the rights and bodies of women;" prevention, or improving intervention strategies to combat the spread of violence; and relief and recovery, or considering the specific needs of female conflict survivors.[36] By UN standards, Resolution 1325 is characterized as a "thematic resolution." While considered binding, thematic resolutions lack coercive measures. Instead, they "carry a normative imperative that is intended to influence behavior."[37] Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, the Security Council has expanded or clarified the WPS Agenda through seven subsequent resolutions.[38]

Civil society actors played a critical role in shepherding Resolution 1325 and the WPS Agenda from an idea to a landmark Security Council program. Scholars trace the early roots of the WPS agenda back to the 1946 establishment of the Commission on the Status of Women (CWS). This commission, along with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "set normative and international legal standards that women activists both inside and outside the UN system could build on in their work to strengthen women's rights."[39] Under the auspices of the CWS, the UN organized a series of international women's conferences between 1975 and 1995. The first conference was held in Mexico City in 1975. One hundred thirty-three governments and 6,000 NGO representatives participated in the conference.[40] There, activists raised the issue of gender mainstreaming and called on all nations to establish agencies dedicated to promoting gender equality.[41] Twenty years later the 1995 Beijing conference officially made "women and armed conflict" a priority area by listing it as one of the twelve "critical areas of concern"

identified in the Beijing Platform of Action.[42] This inclusion was due, in part, to the lobbying efforts of more than 30,000 people who participated in the NGO forum that coincided with the official conference.[43] A dedicated NGO working group on the topic of women and security was formed in May 2000 during a Special Session of the UN General Assembly tasked with taking stock of the progress made in implementing the Beijing platform. This working group began advocating for a Security Council resolution on women, peace and security that would increase women's participation in peace agreements.[44] The efforts of this working group eventually led to the adoption of Resolution 1325.

However, the passage of Resolution 1325 required extensive collaboration with, and support from, members of the Security Council. Two nations from the Global South who were serving on the Security Council in 2000, Namibia and Bangladesh, played pivotal roles in the passage of Resolution 1325. The first time a link was made between gender inequality and international security at a Security Council meeting was in a March 2000 statement made by Bangladesh Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury.[45] Additionally, a workshop held in Namibia produced much of the framework for Resolution 1325. In May 2000, Windhoek, Namibia hosted a workshop entitled "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations." The resulting Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action informed the language of Resolution 1325.[46] In October 2000, Namibia served as president of the Security Council when it unanimously adopted Resolution 1325.[47]

In the years since the adoption of Resolution 1325, civil society actors and nation-states have continued to engage one another in the negotiation of subsequent WPS initiatives. The NGO working group that advocated for the passage of 1325 remains active. Their website explains, "following the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1325 in October 2000, the group began the difficult work of monitoring and advocating for the full implementation of the

resolution."[48] In addition to lobbying the Security Council, the NGO working group conducts "country specific advocacy to influence the regular work of the Security Council…to obtain international security policies that reflect the needs and priorities of women affected by conflict."[49] This "country specific advocacy" often includes lobbying nations to develop National Action Plans (NAP). Because thematic resolutions, like those making up the WPS Agenda lack enforcement mechanisms, NAPs are needed to formalize how an individual nation will incorporate the provisions of the WPS Agenda into their domestic and foreign policy.[50] Prior to the 2015 Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security only fifty-five nations had adopted NAPs.[51] The years 2015, 2016, and 2017 saw a marked increase in the number of NAPs. Nineteen additional plans were produced during the time period under analysis in this chapter, bringing the total number to seventy-four.[52] Laura Shepherd studied how NAPs fit into the larger political machinery of a nation. She found that "minority world" NAPs tend to be located in ministries associated with foreign affairs while "majority world" NAPs are driven by ministries responsible for gender equality. She added, "the ownership of the NAP within government will determine its focus (domestic or foreign policy focused) and its level of influence."[53] The process of lobbying for and developing NAPs demonstrates how civil society actors and nation-states continue to engage one another in the ongoing development of the WPS Agenda.

This context illustrates how the successful establishment of the WPS Agenda required cooperation between a wide range of political actors. However, the Security Council, the UN body tasked with promoting and implementing the WPS Agenda, has long been criticized for minimizing the contributions of many of the actors who were integral to the passage of Resolution 1325. Scholars of the Security Council note that the organization is notoriously slow to adapt to changing discursive and political norms. When the Security Council was established in the wake of WWII, the five permanent members bore much of the financial and material

responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. However, that is no longer the case.[54] Shafa V. Gasimova found that none of the five permanent members rank among the five largest peacekeeper providing nations, and only the United States is among the five nations who make the largest financial contributions. Therefore, instead of bearing the financial and material burden of keeping international peace, the Council "now authorizes the actions when others take the burden."[55] Many have accused the Security Council for abusing its political power to serve national, rather than global, security interests. Gasimova found that the Security Council veto is primarily used to protect the national interests of the permanent members.[56] For example, since 1990 the United States has used the veto sixteen times, mostly in situations concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict. Russia has used their veto thirteen times since 1990, including four vetoes that blocked UN intervention in Syria.[57]

These critiques have led Ian Hurd to conclude that "the Council's legitimacy is in peril unless the body can be reformed to account for recent changes in world politics."[58] Many reform efforts have been proposed and rejected. One such effort was the establishment of The Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council in 1993. The group has explored several options for expanding the Security Council, but none have received the required two thirds support from the General Assembly.[59] Expansion plans often fail when nations try to protect their individual interests. For example, the Razlie Plan, which would have resulted in Germany and Japan joining the Council as permanent members, was strongly opposed by Italy. While Italy opposed German membership, they strongly supported a permanent seat for the European Union, an expansion that would increase Italy's political power.[60] Because of the complications caused by national interests, Hurd argued that efforts to increase the legitimacy of the Security Council by expanding formal membership are doomed to fail. Instead, he argued that reform efforts should focus on expanding the Security

Council's deliberative process. For Hurd, it is participation in the decision-making process that legitimizes outcomes.[61] The reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda through the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security represents just such an effort to reform the Security Council by expanding participation in deliberation.

Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, the UN has met every year to "debate" the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.[62] While the open debates are a yearly event, the 2015 debate is historically significant. The 2015 debate included a record-breaking 110 statements made across two days. This represents the largest debate, on any topic, in the Security Council's seventy-year history.[63] In addition, the 2015 debate marked the passage of Resolution 2242. A UN press release accompanying the passage of Resolution 2242 described the changes Resolution 2242 makes to the WPS agenda as "sweeping."[64] In resolution 2242 the UN:

> decided to integrate women, peace and security concerns across all country-specific situations on its agenda. It expressed its intention to dedicate consultations to the topic of women, peace and security implementation, convene meetings of relevant Council experts as part of an informal experts group on women, peace and security, and invite civil society to brief during its country-specific considerations.[65]

These changes signal the UN's willingness to make the deliberative process more inclusive. While the passage of Resolution 2242 represents a significant expansion of the WPS Agenda, it is not without limits. The UN's negotiation of feminist foreign policy ideals reinforced conservative frameworks of global governance. To understand this renegotiation, I analyze a large archive of documents and statements that were produced before, during, and after the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates.

Prior to each debate, different interest groups circulate reports in an attempt to inform the debate. First, the Secretary General issues a report that details UN efforts to implement the WPS Agenda and offers insights on perceived gaps and challenges. Second, The NGO Working Group on the Women, Peace and Security pens an "Open Letter to Permanent Representatives to the

UN" in which the Working Group outlines their priorities for the debate and calls on nation-states to make specific commitments or provide specific information in their debate statements. Finally, the President of the Security Council circulates a "concept note." This "note" sets the parameters of the debate. It identifies which UN officials and civil society actors will brief the council, sets time limits for the length of individual debate statements, and identifies areas of concern that representatives should address in their comments. Debate participants typically include the Secretary-General, The Executive Director of UN Women, civil society actors selected from the NGO Working Group, and representatives from UN Member nation-states. Typically, these participants deliver prepared statements limited to 3-4 minutes in length. Often the Open Debates coincide with the passage of resolutions or formal agreements to establish additional UN enforcement or implementation mechanisms. These official policy documents include Resolution 2242, which was passed just prior to the 2015 debate, and the creation of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security and the Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network, both of which coincided with the 2016 Debate and set new guidelines for how nations should work together and with civil society actors to enforce the WPS Agenda. This archive of roughly six hundred pages of documents allows me to trace how policy recommendations emerged from a variety of actors with different political entanglements, were negotiated through the debate process, and were finally formalized in official UN policy documents.

Expanding the WPS Agenda Through Postcolonial Reflexivity

While the WPS Agenda works to promote gender equality and increase women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution,[66] several scholars contend that it often marginalizes feminist approaches to peacebuilding by reifying masculine, militarized norms.[67] I find, however, that during the Open Debates UN members practiced a degree of postcolonial

reflexivity that helped create a space in which these norms could be challenged. In this section, I argue that UN members performed "collective" postcolonial reflexivity as a strategy to accommodate the demands of feminist activists, who were represented by civil society actors, while limiting the culpability of any singular UN member for the identified shortcomings. I begin this section by reviewing feminist critiques of the WPS Agenda and outlining the process of postcolonial reflexivity. Next, I trace how calls for reflexivity emerged from civil society actors during each Open Debate. Finally, I analyze how UN officials and national representatives managed these demands. I find that UN officials and nation-state representatives developed a collective version of postcolonial reflexivity in which each speaker spoke as the voice of the General Assembly, rather than as a representative of an individual nation or UN entity. This strategy allowed UN members to acknowledge the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda without identifying who would be held responsible. Additionally, I find that the performance of postcolonial reflexivity involved "speaking for" civil society by circulating recommendations that originally emerged from feminist activists, specifically that the council needed to deepen its gender analysis and attend to a wider range of gendered security issues. Therefore, while civil society actors were afforded a relatively short amount of speaking time, their demands created an exigency that shaped the debate. As a whole, the strategy of collective postcolonial reflexivity created a space in which nation-state representatives and UN officials could critique and expand the normative standards of the WPS Agenda by articulating feminist values without implicating individual nations or UN entities as responsible for the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda.

Feminist Critiques of the WPS Agenda

Feminist scholars and activists have offered several critiques of the normative standards that underlie the WPS Agenda, claiming it lacks a feminist perspective. Broadly speaking, critics argue that the WPS Agenda ignores the prevention mandate in favor of privileging militarized

solutions to conflict; it reifies the women-as-victims trope; and it fails to interrogate the underlying structural factors that contribute to women's continued marginalization.

The WPS Agenda has been critiqued for ignoring the prevention mandate in favor of managing conflicts after they emerge.[68] Paul Kirby and Laura Shepherd explain that the meaning of prevention "has steadily shifted from a general opposition to war to a limited focus on civilian victimization and war crimes."[69] Instead of working to prevent conflicts, the Security Council has primarily focused on eliminating certain gender-based war crimes once conflict emerges. Soumita Sasu and Catia C. Confortini argue that this preference for management instead of prevention makes the WPS Agenda complicit in "supporting the contemporary militarized international security system."[70] Cora Weiss worries that the WPS Agenda has been reduced to a set of policies intended to "make war safe for women."[71] Rather than manage conflicts as they emerge, these scholars and activists contend that the Security Council should use the WPS Agenda as a forum for questioning the system of militarism and militarization that has thus far been the basis of the international peace and security system.[72]

Critics also argue that the WPS Agenda disproportionately focuses its attention on cases of sexual violence, often ignoring other ways in which women are marginalized in conflict and post-conflict settings.[73] A restricted focus on wartime sexual violence obscures the "continuum of violence" that women experience every day, regardless of armed conflict. The "continuum of violence" recognizes that women's "lives are marked not only by the extraordinary violence of rape as a weapon of war, but by the everyday forms of violence that occur everywhere and may be more prevalent in inequitable and unstable societal environments."[74] By prioritizing cases of wartime sexual violence, the Security Council risks obscuring other forms of marginalization, or the "mundane" violence women face every day. Additionally, by focusing on sexual violence, the WPS Agenda reinscribes restrictive gender norms that produce engagement with women "in

an essentializing, even imperializing, fashion as gendered and vulnerable actors who require little more than protection."[75] Put differently, the focus on sexual violence "undermines women's agency, diminishes their value in society and obscures their right to full and equal participation in society."[76]

Finally, critics argue that the WPS Agenda ignores deeper, structural sources of conflict in favor of solving immediate problems.[77] Feminist scholars argue that the WPS Agenda defines peace in narrow, superficial terms that work to "marginalize discussion of those structural factors that are an obstacle to women's agency."[78] Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond explain that thus far, the Security Council has focused on "quick fixes or ideological goals with little regard for structural matters or causes of conflict or local everyday dynamics of peace."[79] They argue that the Security Council needs to adopt a critical perspective that is "prepared to question the fundamental basis of problems and our understandings of them."[80] Postcolonial reflexivity is one strategy that allows rhetors to engage in "critical self-analysis and awareness particularly around issues of positionality and power."[81]

Postcolonial reflexivity emerges from postcolonial theory, and more specifically, from postcolonial feminists who sought to challenge a legacy of Western feminism speaking on behalf of all women in ways that erase and essentialize the experiences of women from the "third world."[82] Stephanie Norander and Lynn M. Harter argue that postcolonial reflexivity is an especially useful concept for understanding organizations "that actively strive to reflect on their practices and relationships that are situated in these global/local spaces of struggle."[83] Postcolonial reflexivity prompts organizations to "critically examine that paradoxes involved in transnational advocacy efforts."[84] Ideally, rhetors "strive to make sense of their work, their organizations, and their personal and collective political convictions"[85] Jasmine R. Linabary and Stephanie A. Hamel add that this reflexivity often raises questions about voice, or who gets to

speak for whom?[86] They add that there is "power and privilege involved in claiming voice" and dilemmas "arise from attempting to speak as and for women."[87] Norander and Harter suggest that postcolonial reflexivity can mitigate these dilemmas by opening "new discursive spaces to include marginalized Others without devaluing the sociohistorical circumstances that have allowed for one group to be in a position to 'empower' another."[88] Practicing postcolonial reflexivity created a new discursive space in which UN members could reconsider their institutional practices and standards.

Civil Society Demands for Postcolonial Reflexivity

In each debate, civil society actors briefed the Council before nation-state representatives delivered their statements. Civil society actors highlighted the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda and called UN members to reflect on these failures. The identified shortcomings were framed as interconnected and mutually enforcing. To civil society actors, the Security Council failed to prevent conflicts and was unwilling to listen to civil society.

The NGO open letter that circulated prior to the 2015 debate introduced civil society's critique that the Security Council has ignored the WPS Agenda's prevention mandate. The letter asserted, "Conflict prevention lies at the core of the WPS agenda, yet too often is not considered with the same level of urgency as conflict resolution and post-conflict rebuilding."[89] Alaa Murabit, a representative from Voice of Libyan Women, reinforced this critique in her debate statement. She chastised the Security Council for "reactively addressing erupting conflicts and adopting overly militarized, band-aid strategies, which promote rather than diffuse local conflicts."[90] In the 2016 debates, civil society actors again highlighted the Council's failures to promote the prevention mandate. Rita Lopidia, the NGO Working Group Representative and Executive Director of the EVE Organization for Women Development, South Sudan, reminded the Council that "Many other commitments were made last year on…emphasizing conflict

prevention and financing the women and peace and security agenda. Unmet commitments are just words and do nothing to bring about peace."[91] These civil society actors accused the Security Council of failing to uphold the prevention mandate in favor of managing conflicts after they erupt.

After establishing the Council's failure to prevent conflicts, civil society actors linked that shortcoming to the Council's unwillingness to listen to civil society. Civil society actors suggested that listening to the opinions and suggestions of civil society could have prevented past conflicts from erupting. For example, during the 2015 debate, Yanar Mohammed asked the council, "Ten years ago, Iraqi women spoke to the Security Council about their situation. What would Iraq look like if the Council had heeded those calls then and promoted an inclusive process in which women and minority groups were fully engaged?"[92] Also speaking in 2015, Julienne Lusenge argued, "The Council has heard the desperate cries of women many times, without really hearing them. Do not let them go ignored today. I hope today will finally be the day to put an end to this cycle of violence."[93] Mohammed and Lusenge suggested that the inability of the Security Council to prevent conflicts is due in large part to their unwillingness to listen to the warnings of civil society. This argument was reinforced in the 2017 debate. Charo Mina-Rojas, the representative from the NGO Working Group, argued, "The failure to listen to our security concerns and warnings has had devastating results. We believe that to listen and comply is vitally important."[94] These critiques from civil society actors created an exigency for the debates, an exigency that demanded participates reflect on the importance of voice in the WPS Agenda's deliberative process. Civil society actors framed questions of voice – who is allowed to speak? Whose opinions are being listened to? – as critically important to fulfilling the WPS Agenda's prevention mandate.

Acknowledging Shortcomings through "Collective" Postcolonial Reflexivity

UN officials and nation-state representatives responded to this exigency by developing a collective version of postcolonial reflexivity. They acknowledged and grappled with the failings identified by civil society actors but did so by assuming the voice or persona of the "collective." Put differently, when discussing the failures of the WPS agenda, debate participates spoke on behalf of the entire General Assembly, rather than in their official capacity as the representative of an individual nation or UN entity. Debate participants largely agreed that there was a link between the inability to prevent conflicts and their failure to listen to civil society. This link was written into policy in the Focal Points Network guidelines, which asserted: "Women play a crucial role in bolstering conflict prevention. In the short term, they can lead efforts aimed at pre-emptive dialogue and act as early warning systems."[95] Debate participants argued that listening to the voices of civil society actors required the UN to: "acknowledge our collective ownership over the women and peace and security agenda,"[96] "calibrate our collective ambition to promote our shared goal of strengthening the role of women in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and transitional justice systems,"[97] "translate our collective commitments into action,"[98] and meet the "collective responsibility" to implement all four pillars of the WPS Agenda, including prevention.[99] After establishing that it was a "collective" responsibility to listen to the voices of civil society actors in conflict prevention efforts, debate participants acknowledged that the continued "invisibility" of women in Security Council deliberations was a "historical failure we must overcome."[100]

For example, in his 2015 debate statement, the Secretary General recognized that, despite the "vital role" women "play in preventing conflict and building and maintaining peace," they are "prevented from fully participating in peacemaking and peacebuilding." He added, "We are all suffering from the effects of that deficit."[101] Likewise, US Ambassador Samantha Power

reflected on the Liberian peace process in which women surrounded the peace negotiators and refused to let them leave until an agreement was reached. She asked the Council to "imagine our world" if women were "not just calling for peace from outside conference centers," but "were sitting at the table on the inside." She argued, "We on the Council must not rest until paper progress becomes tangible progress and check-the-box participation becomes meaningful participation."[102] The Gambian representative reiterated this argument. He argued that the only way to create "a culture of peace in the world is to ensure that women have access and a voice at the table where policies and programs are articulated."[103] These statements demonstrate how collective postcolonial reflexivity created a space in which debate participants could acknowledge the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda without taking on individual responsibility for those failures. This discursive space allowed debate participants to reflect on the importance of expanding the voice that is afforded to civil society in Council deliberations.

Expanding the WPS Agenda by Circulating Feminist Arguments

In addition to reflecting on the importance of expanding civil society's formal voice in the WPS Agenda deliberative process, debate participants who are typically afforded a larger voice, such as nation-state representatives, worked to bolster the limited voices of civil society actors, who could not participate in the debate. UN representatives used their debate statements to circulate the opinions and policy recommendations of civil society actors, especially feminist activists. Linabary and Hamel argue that organizations "must find ways to *authentically* and *ethically* balance the ability to speak for others while not further marginalizing or constraining the voices of their members and stakeholders."[104] Through their efforts to "speak for" civil society, debate participants challenged and expanded the normative standards of the WPS Agenda by incorporating the critiques and recommendations of feminist activists. More specifically, UN members moved towards a transnational understanding of gendered security

that attends to a wide range of gendered security issues. Additionally, the UN members interrogated the deep, structural causes of discrimination that often go overlooked.

UN officials and national representatives bolstered the voices of civil society actors by circulating arguments predicated on a transnational understanding of gender security. Feminist critics of the WPS Agenda have long argued that the Security Council typically focuses on a narrow set of concerns surrounding sexual crimes perpetrated during armed geopolitical conflicts.[105] In addition to sex-based war crimes, a transnational understanding of gender security attends to a much wider range of ways women experience violence in economic, social, and cultural contexts. Julienne Lusenge, the 2017 NGO representative, called this transnational understanding of gendered security a "holistic approach," something she argued grass-roots groups have been implementing for years. Civil society actors argued that a holistic approach to gender security would "help women acquire skills for economic empowerment and to know their rights.[106] At least fifteen nation-state representatives began their statements by thanking Lusenge for her previously circulated briefing.[107] These statements circulated her "holistic" framing of conflict. For example, the Gabonese representative argued that the Security Council should adopt an "integrated, holistic approach that prioritizes the political, development and human rights perspectives,"[108] while the Estonian representative suggested that the debate offered "an invaluable opportunity to create a more holistic approach to conflict prevention."[109] Additionally, the Moroccan representative acknowledged that the Security Council was "formerly focused only on the prevention of gender-based violence during conflicts rather than on preventing conflicts themselves." He added, "Genuine peace in society requires healthy and inclusive political, economic and social structures."[110] This transnational understanding of gender security was written into the official guidelines of the National Focal Points Network. The guidelines assert, "Women and peace and security is a cross-cutting issue. Gender expertise is needed in all

areas, including climate change, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and development."[111] By circulating arguments that emerged from civil society actors, UN members expanded the normative standards of the WPS Agenda to include a wider range of issues pertaining to human rights, transitional justice, and economic and social equality, pointing to a more inclusionary WPS Agenda.

Bolstering the voices of civil society actors also pushed the UN to deepen its examination of gender oppression. Proponents of feminist conflict prevention argue that a feminist perspective should ask the question "why?" by investigating the structural, systemic causes for gender discrimination.[112] The Security Council has largely failed to exam these deeper causes of gender inequality.[113] NGO briefer Mina-Rojas incorporated this critique into her 2017 debate statement. She argued that peace, "is not simply a matter of ending war and violence but also of addressing collectively the root causes of conflict, including social, gender and racial injustice, and promoting the well-being of all peoples, of all races and religions."[114] Several nation-state representatives circulated arguments that the Security Council needed to deepen its gender analysis. For example, the Jamaican representative argued, "preventative measures need to move beyond addressing the imminence of crisis to tackle structural and root causes, including gender inequality."[115] Likewise, the Sri Lankan represented argued that meeting the goals of the WPS Agenda would require "acknowledging the existence of institutionalized structural gender bias, identifying the associated problems and sincerely seeking solutions to them."[116] In his 2017 review of the WPS Agenda, Secretary General Antonio Guterres argued that investigating the root causes of conflict was the mark of feminist foreign policy. He explained, "a feminist foreign policy and a feminist foreign assistance policy further demonstrate leadership and a commitment to address the root causes of gender inequality."[117] While, not all of the participants in the debates ascribed to a feminist foreign policy perspective, by circulating arguments from feminist

activists calling for an investigation of deep, structural causes of discrimination, they contributed to a reconfiguration of the normative standards of the WPS Agenda.

Through a rhetoric of postcolonial reflexivity, debate participants helped expand upon the purposes of the WPS Agenda. First, by performing collective postcolonial reflexivity, debate participants opened a discursive space in which they could acknowledge and grapple with the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda and engage questions of voice in the deliberative process. Second, by circulating the arguments of feminist activists in an attempt to bolster the voices of civil society actors, debate participants challenged and expanded the normative standards of the WPS Agenda by incorporating a feminist perspective. While civil society actors were afforded a relatively short amount of speaking time in the debates, they created an exigency that prompted UN officials and nation-state representatives to reconsider the goals and standards of the WPS Agenda.

Implementing the WPS Agenda Through "Anti-Rhetorical" Networked Policies

The previous section demonstrates how the exigencies created by civil society actors precipitated a reconsideration of the normative standards of the WPS Agenda. However, the successful reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda required that these new normative standards be translated into specific, enforceable policy proposals. Extrapolating policy from normative standards has long been a weak point for the UN, and the WPS Agenda specifically. Kirby and Shepard analyzed the implementation of the WPS Agenda and found a "mixed but generally disappointing record" of implementation.[118] Because thematic resolutions, like those making up the WPS Agenda, do not contain enforcement mechanisms, it is up to individual nation-states to pass policies (National Action Plans) outlining how they will implement and enforce the normative standards of the WPS Agenda. Therefore, in addition to the exigencies created by civil

society actors, nation-state representatives needed to tailor their feminist foreign policy to the specific rhetorical demands of their individual nations.

In this section, I argue that nation-state representatives developed networked policy proposals that were shaped by their nation's economic and political contexts as well as the rhetorical demands of the Open Debates. These networked policies were framed as "anti-rhetorical." John Kane and Haig Patapan argue that policy makers often dismiss rhetoric as "at best, useless, at worst, dangerous."[119] During the Open Debates, nation-state representatives adamantly denied that their statements were rhetorical, developing instead what Kane and Haig call "an artless art of persuasion." This "anti-rhetorical" rhetoric has a disarming quality. Nation-state representatives suggested that their policy proposals were factually informed, free of manipulation, objective, and politically neutral. I begin this section by reviewing the implementation shortcomings of the WPS Agenda and explicating theories of networked and "non-rhetorical" policy rhetoric. Next, I trace how debate participants developed an "anti-rhetorical" strategy to frame policy proposals as "actions" instead of "words." Finally, I argue that despite claims that policy proposals were "anti-rhetorical," the policy rhetoric developed during the Open Debates was the result of complex rhetorical maneuvering or "networking." The policies advanced by each representative reveal how they managed the competing rhetorical demands of the Security Council and their individual nations by strategically interpreting UN policy goals so that they conformed to national economic and political opportunities and constraints. The policies produced through "anti-rhetorical" networked arguments demonstrate the variety of ways the international community can accommodate a feminist foreign policy perspective in their foreign policy rhetoric.

Identifying Implementation Shortcomings

Critics of the WPS Agenda argue that the Security Council often falls short of translating normative standards into enforceable policies. For example, Kirby and Shepard argue the success of the WPS Agenda is primarily "on paper."[120] They found that women's participation in peacekeeping missions has stagnated; women represent only 10 percent of peace negotiators, and make up less than 4 percent of signatories to peace agreements.[121] Jacqui True adds that while the WPS Agenda represents "a radical departure from past practices excluding women from security decisions," in practice, "we have neither seen the impact of Resolution 1325 on the terms of peace negotiations or collective action on gender mainstreaming from Resolution 1820."[122] Torunn Tyggestad offered three reasons for the WPS Agenda's disappointing record of implementation. First, because Resolution 1325 emerged from the Security Council, it is interpreted by many as advancing Western/First World beliefs.[123] Many developing nations see the WPS Agenda "as being representative of a larger package of liberal ideas primarily promoted by the affluent countries of the North."[124] Second, implementation is slowed by "the UN's ponderous organizational culture and traditional ways of thinking and acting."[125] As True puts it, the UN has "deep organizational pathologies resistant to change."[126] Finally, implementation is slow because the WPS Agenda lacks accountability mechanisms.[127] True explains that until the UN adopts clearer implementation benchmarks, "the prospect of collective action remains bleak, since no conflict country will likely produce a national action plan unless other conflict countries do so as well."[128] The 2015, 2016, and 2017 debates called UN Members to address these shortcomings by translating principles into policies.

Networked and "Non-Rhetorical" Policy Arguments

Rebecca Dingo explains what it means to network an argument. She draws our attention to how arguments "travel and circulate" through transnational contexts. Policy proposals "shift

and change as they move across geopolitical boundaries to reflect different ideas."[129] According to Dingo, networked policies call scholars to track how "meanings shift and change depending upon the contexts in which policy makers and development experts use them"[130] For example, Dingo studied how different nations took up the concept of "gender mainstreaming." She found, "as the term circulates, it ultimately engages different arguments, carries different meanings, and has distinct material effects depending on context and location."[131] Like Dingo, I analyze how nation-state representatives attributed different meanings to WPS Agenda policy goals based on each nation's contextual demands. Additionally, this section demonstrates how the process of networking arguments is increasingly complicated by global policy contexts. While Dingo traced how global rhetorics were translated into national contexts, I add an additional layer of analysis and consider how networked arguments are recirculated in global contexts. Put differently, I find that policy goals emerged in the global context of the Open Debates, were networked to meet the demands of national contexts, and were then presented in subsequent UN debates as "best practices" to be modeled by other nations in the future.

While Dingo's theory of networking arguments reveals the rhetorical force of policy rhetoric, participants in the debates maintained that their policy proposals were an effort to "go beyond rhetoric."[132] Kane and Patpan argue that the democratic deliberative process is often "defined by a unique form of rhetoric, an art of artless persuasion that necessarily presents itself as un-rhetorical."[133] They explain that policy makers dismiss "rhetoric" for two reasons. On one hand, rhetoric is often dismissed as "only words." It works to "cover in beautiful garlands the ulterior motives of untrustworthy politicians who employ deceptive 'spin' to maintain themselves in office."[134] On the other hand, rhetoric is taken to be synonymous with propaganda and is "the chief tool of the demagogue or potential tyrant who would manipulate the people to overthrow conventional and constitutional checks on leadership."[135] To avoid charges that their

policy proposals are "only words" or propaganda, policy makers often develop a rhetorical strategy that scholars have called "anti-rhetorical,"[136] "non-rhetorical,"[137] or "un-rhetorical."[138] Regardless of their chosen label, these scholars agree that "anti-rhetoric" is a strategy that seeks to avoid charges of manipulating or misleading the audience. For example, Hesk argues that speakers use "anti-rhetoric" to "represent themselves as innocent of various procedures associated with rhetorical training and preparation."[139] Edward Panetta and Marouf Hasin, Jr. add that "anti-rhetorics" have the appearance of "being authoritative and authentic"[140] and serve to "mask normative judgments."[141] They argue, "An anti-rhetorical stance is any foundational quest for truth that privileges itself as *the* only or primary 'rational' 'objective,' and 'neutral' means of acquiring epistemic knowledge."[142] As a rhetorical strategy, "anti-rhetoric" has a disarming effect. Through "anti-rhetorics" speakers suggest that their policy recommendations are based on politically neutral evidence, or "best practices," and are free of "spin" and manipulation.

The UN's "Anti-Rhetorical" Policy Rhetoric

The structure and guidelines of the Open Debates on the Women Peace and Security Agenda performed a significant rhetorical function; they created an exigency that demanded "anti-rhetorical" rhetoric. The concept notes, circulated before each debate, set the parameters. These concept notes challenged participants to announce national policies aimed at implementing the WPS Agenda. For example, the 2017 debate concept note "invited" member nations "to present concrete actions and results… to describe the challenges they face with regard to the participation of women and the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, to share innovative practices and announce new commitments." Members were to present this information in "concise but strong and focused statements, lasting no longer than four minutes."[143] Likewise, the 2015 debate concept note asked "participants to deliver concise

but strong and focused statements, lasting no longer than three minutes."[144] Additionally, the

Prime Minister of Spain, Mariano Rajoy, who chaired the 2015 debate called for:

> Member States to go beyond rhetoric by announcing, on the occasion of the high-level review, precise, ambitious and time-bound national commitments in such areas as women's leadership and participation in decision-making, the development and implementation of national action plans, funding allocations, the security and rule of law sectors, countering violent extremism and terrorism, and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.[145]

Rajoy's reference to "rhetoric" performs a disarming function. By calling representatives "to go

beyond rhetoric" or "present concrete actions and results" the concept notes suggested that the

time for rhetoric was over. These statements demanded "anti-rhetorical" policy rhetoric steeped

in discourses of "best practices." Through discourses of "best practices" and "anti-rhetoric" the

debate concept notes set an expectation that the announced policy proposals would be politically

neutral. Policies would be based on objective, observable evidence rather than normative

judgments or political expediency.

Across the three debates, national representatives largely adhered to the "anti-rhetorical"

framing developed in the concept notes. For example, in 2015 the New Zealand representative

argued that the Security Council needed to "focus on practical steps to improve the situation for

women on the ground, rather than just achieving rhetoric."[146] In 2016, the German representative

pledged to "keep my remarks short and operational." He argued that the WPS Agenda's

shortcomings were "due not to a lack of words, but to a lack of action."[147] Finally, in 2017, the

US representative asserted that the Security Council "must continue to move from rhetoric to

reality"[148] and the representative from the United Kingdom argued that the Council "must turn

our words into action."[149] In order to move "beyond rhetoric" and turn "words into action,"

representatives shared "best practices." Policy recommendations based on "best practices" were

framed as grounded in practical experience and observable evidence, rather than the result of a

persuasive deliberative process. Therefore, they were presented as "actions" instead of

"rhetoric." For example, the representative from NATO "pledge(d) to share best practices and valuable lessons learned with our allies and partners."[150] Likewise, the representative from Belgium explained that the nation was "ready to share our experience in this field and welcome with interest all the experiences and best practices that our partners are willing to share."[151] The Norwegian representative claimed: "We have many best practices and positive developments to showcase…Our job is to ensure that best practices become mainstream practice."[152] As an anti-rhetorical strategy, the claim to use "best practices" allowed debate participants to bypass charges that their policy rhetoric served individual political goals. The "anti-rhetoric" of "best practices" framed policy announcements as "actions" based in observable outcomes instead of politically motivated and potentially manipulative "rhetorical" arguments. Therefore the "anti-rhetorical" discourse of "best practices" is best understood as a disarming strategy to obscure the rhetorical maneuverings nation-state representatives performed as they networked policy proposals.

The UN's Networked Policy Proposals

Framing policy proposals as "anti-rhetorical" responded to the exigency created by pre-debate guidelines, however, nation-state representatives also needed to manage the norms and demands of their individual national contexts. To that end, national representatives engaged in a process of networking arguments. National economic and political exigencies ultimately placed constraints on which "best practices" each nation-state representative could articulate or support. In what follows, I demonstrate how two broad policy goals - "allocating resources," and "empowering women" - were networked into a variety of national level policy recommendations. In so doing, the limits of an anti-rhetorical rhetoric are exposed as the variability of how nations created NAPs points to how actions are not the opposite of rhetoric, but rather shape and are shaped by their nation's rhetorical contexts. The process of how nations interpreted UNSCR

2242, translated it into action plans, and then articulated these actions to their UN audience illustrates that what counts as "feminist foreign policy" is different nation-to-nation. First, I illustrate how "resources" took on different meanings as it circulated through national economic contexts. Second, I argue that the meaning of "empowering women" changed based on each nation's experiences with conflicts that have recently or historically *disempowered* women.

First, "allocating resources" took on new meanings as it was networked through different economic contexts. Resolution 2242 argued that the successful implementation of the WPS Agenda required nations to contribute more resources. Resolution 2242 "*Encourages* Member States to increase their funding on women, peace and security including through more aid in conflict and post-conflict situations."[153] The 2015 Secretary General Report expressed a similar theme. In it, Ban Ki-Moon argued, "The failure to allocate sufficient resources to implement commitments on women and peace and security has been one of the most persistent obstacles to achieving progress over the past 15 years."[154] I find that the call for "resources" took on two distinct meanings as it was networked through nations with different economic contexts. Wealthy nations interpreted "resources" as financial aid and used their debate statements to announce large financial contributions to the WPS Agenda. For example, Spain, who has the 13th largest GDP according to the World Bank, pledged to "make a contribution of €1 million to the new Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action and the multi-agency Fund for Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict."[155] Other significant monetary pledges included $1 Million from the United Kingdom (5th largest GDP),[156] €150,000 from France (6th largest GPD),[157] $10 Million from China (2nd largest GPD),[158] and "new commitments to that end totaling $31 million" from the United States (largest global GDP).[159] As the term "resources" was networked through nations with prosperous economic contexts it generated policies that increased national financial contributions.

However, not every nation was in a position to contribute large amounts of financial assistance. Countries with low GDPs were limited in how they could interpret the call for "resources." When constrained by economic contexts, nations tended to interpret "resources" as manpower and training programs. Some of the nations that pledged to increase the number of UN peacekeepers or to train existing peacekeepers included Namibia (131st largest GDP), Pakistan (41st largest GDP), Kazakhstan (55th largest GDP), Bangladesh (44th largest GDP), and Ethiopia (66th largest GDP). As a point of comparison, the National GDP of Pakistan is just slightly larger than the GDP of Missouri.[160] Clearly these nations were not in a position to attach a monetary meaning to "resources." In nations with low GDPs, the UN goal of increasing the allocation of resources was networked to mean increases in manpower or training, two types of resources that require less financial output.

Both monetary and manpower interpretations of "resources" were further networked to meet the demands of national political exigencies. In fact, several representatives used the announcement of financial aid packages to support existing national programs. For example, the United Kingdom earmarked "additional funding of over $800,000, each year for two years, to support new research at the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the London School of Economics."[161] Likewise, the representative from the United States allocated "more than $8 million to implement United States Secretary of State Kerry's accountability initiative to fight impunity for sexual violence in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia."[162] In both of these examples, national representatives framed their financial policy announcements as supportive of existing national initiatives. Policies that interpreted "resources" as training programs were likewise shaped by national political contexts. For example, the Pakistani representative noted that Pakistan is "host to the largest protracted refugee population in the world." He pledged that his nation would increase their contributions to the

WPS Agenda by "conducting training programmes for women security officers so as to enhance their capacity to respond to crisis situations."[163] An increase in well-trained female security officers would have a positive impact on Pakistan's refugee population. Therefore, this interpretation of "resources" served international as well as domestic demands. These different interpretations of "resources" reveal the limits and possibilities of the UN's debate rhetoric. While establishing broad goals like "allocating resources" is effective because most nations are able to articulate support for the initiative, it also leaves open the possibility that a global policy goal will be networked to meet national, rather than global, demands.

Second, the meaning of "empowering women" shifted as it was networked through different national political contexts. The question of how to best empower women produced different answers based on each nation's history of conflict. Broadly, the Secretary General called for "all actors involved in peace processes to make quantifiable, time-sensitive commitments to ensure the direct and meaningful participation of women during all phases of the process."[164] However, nations interpreted the goal of "empowering women" in different ways depending on the conflicts or conflict phases that existed in each nation. For example, Germany, Pakistan, and Turkey all interpreted the question of how to "empower women" through the lens of their ongoing refugee crises. In 2015, Germany had the most asylum applications of any European nation with most applicants fleeing the conflict in Syria.[165] This conflict climate shaped the policies that Germany proposed. The German representative explained that Germany was empowering refugee women by "investing in services that take into account the specific needs of refugee women and girls, in particular those who have lived through the horrors of sexual violence."[166] Pakistan's policy proposals were shaped by the Afghan refugee population living in Pakistan. According to the UN, Pakistan is host to 1.4 million Afghans who were forced to flee conflict.[167] The Pakistani representative explained how his nation worked to empower

these women: "Pakistan has allowed unhindered access by Afghan refugees, including women and girls, to free education and health care and has enabled them to secure employment." He argued that by empowering refugees, his nation helped to ensure that "the core skills acquired by our Afghan sisters in Pakistan are being used for the welfare of their homeland, Afghanistan."[168] In these examples, nations with ongoing refugee crises narrowly interpreted the UN goal of "empowering women" as policies to protect and empower women refugees.

Other nations drew on historic national memories of conflict when developing policies to "empower women." Drawing on national memories of when women were *disempowered* added new levels of meaning to policies aimed at "empowering women." For example, Guatemala's policy proposals were networked through the national memory of the Sepur Zarco sexual slavery case in which soldiers repeatedly raped women who were forced to work at the Sepur Zarco military base.[169] In order to prevent similar atrocities, Guatemala pledged to empower women by improving " access to justice and strengthen(ing) the participation of women in the process of drafting national legislation."[170] Other nations that invoked painful national memories when proposing new policies to empower women included Columbia, Croatia, Vietnam, The Philippines, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. All of these nations argued that the UN should learn from their painful pasts and implement policies that would prevent the repetition of history. While there was widespread agreement that developing policies to "empower women" was an important step in preventing or recovering from conflict, the specific policies that each representative proposed were shaped by national memories of conflict. As "empowering women" was networked, it took on different meanings based on each nation's history of disempowering women in conflict.

Putting a feminist foreign policy perspective into practice required UN Members to translate new normative standards into specific, enforceable, and funded policies. While these

policies were framed as "anti-rhetorical," or the result of objective evidence, I find that they were networked to meet the demands of national economic and political exigencies and the global demands of the Open Debates. The combination of "anti-rhetorical" and networked discourses is an effective strategy for crafting policy in a global forum. "Anti-rhetoric" worked to frame policy proposals as something "more" than rhetoric. Considering critiques that the success of the WPS Agenda was mostly "on paper" instead of in practice, "anti-rhetorics" gave the debates a sense of momentum by suggesting that policy proposals were finally a form of "action." Additionally, the disarming nature of "anti-rhetorics" worked to obfuscate the complex rhetorical maneuvering representatives performed when networking policy proposals to national exigencies. This networking process resulted in a wide variety of policy initiatives aimed at empowering and protecting women in a range of different contexts.

Creating Transnational Public Spheres

Implementing the policies of the newly reconfigured WPS Agenda required actors in global governance to work together in new, more collaborative ways. This section analyzes how the UN, member nations, and civil society actors developed transnational public powers[171] that would work to implement the WPS Agenda outside of the yearly debate process. Put differently, to accommodate a feminist foreign policy perspective, participants in the WPS Agenda debates worked to create transnational public spheres wherein they would work collaboratively to implement the WPS Agenda. The political commitments of each actor shaped how they approached this task. Civil society actors embraced the idea of transnational public powers, arguing that gendered security has always been a transnational issue. For civil society actors, the creation of formal transnational public spheres would amount to a recognition of reality rather than an innovation. The UN and nation-state representatives approached the transnationalizing process with more caution. For them, transnational public powers would need to work in

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harmony with existing systems of state sovereignty. The combination of these two different approaches reveals how actors worked to maintain or strengthen their political influence even as they generated arguments aimed at producing collaborative discursive spaces in which the WPS Agenda could be localized. To illustrate, I begin this section by reviewing Nancy Fraser's theory of transnational public spheres. Next, I trace how civil society actors insisted that transnational spheres for implementing the WPS Agenda already existed but remained unrecognized by the UN and nation-states. Finally, I analyze how the UN and nation-state representatives articulated a conservative vision of a transnational public sphere that would protect existing hierarchies in global governance. I find that these competing approaches were developed through the prioritization of different conditions for legitimate and efficacious transnational public spheres.

Transnational Public Spheres

While civil society actors played an important role in the initial adoption of Resolution 1325, they have been systemically excluded from subsequent decisions about the WPS Agenda in favor of concentrating authority in nation-states and the Security Council body.[172] Scholars argue that in order to effectively implement the WPS Agenda, the UN needs to take a "local turn." The "local turn" in global governance can be understood as "a decolonization of knowledge about peace making and peace building."[173] The "local" "is the product of constant social negotiation between localized and non-localized ideas, norms and practices. It can be transnational, transversal and be comprised of a geographically dispersed network."[174] A "local turn" in the context of the UN "poses a fundamental challenge to the dominant ways of thinking and acting about peace."[175] Instead of peace being framed by a "historical discourse of Western/Northern power," the local turn embraces "notions of particularism and local variation that confront universalist ideas and practices."[176] Laura McLeod argues that incorporating a feminist perspective into the "local turn" might "open the way for a richer analysis of power,

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which starts with the popular insight that the personal is political."[177] In order to adopt a feminist foreign policy perspective, the Security Council needed to accommodate a "local turn" in their organizational practices. They did so by developing new transnational public spheres.

According to Fraser, there are four conditions for transnational public spheres. Two conditions establish the legitimacy of the discourse and two conditions speak to the efficacy of public opinion. First, a public sphere is legitimate "if and only if all who are potentially affected are able to participate as peers in deliberations concerning the organization of their common affairs."[178] To have legitimacy, a public sphere must meet the conditions of inclusiveness and participatory parity. Fraser explains, "the inclusiveness condition concerns the question of *who* is authorized to participate in public discussions, the parity condition concerns the question of *how*."[179] For the public sphere to be inclusive, deliberation must be open to everyone with a stake in the outcome. For the public sphere to meet the parity condition, those interlocutors should have equal authority to "state their views, place issues on the agenda, question the tacit and explicit assumptions of others, switch levels as needed and generally receive a fair hearing."[180] Second, a public sphere is efficacious when it is "mobilized as a political force to hold public power accountable, ensuring that the latter's exercise reflects the considered will of the civil society."[181] Fraser explains that efficacy is achieved through the conditions of translation and capacity. The translation condition demands that "communicative power" be translated into binding laws and administrative powers.[182] The capacity condition requires that the public power be able to implement the "public's designs."[183] Thus the challenge of creating efficacy in a transnational public sphere is "twofold; on the one hand, to create new, transnational public powers; on the other, to make them accountable to new, transnational public spheres."[184] While these four conditions represent Fraser's ideal construction of a transnational public sphere, I find that different actors in global governance prioritized different conditions to maintain or advance

their political authority even as they espoused a commitment to creating a transnational public sphere.

Civil Society and Transnational Public Spheres

When discussing how the UN, nation-states, and civil society actors should work together to create transnational forums for the implementation of the WPS Agenda, civil society actors asserted that transnational public spheres already existed and were working to implement the WPS Agenda in local contexts. For civil society actors, all that was lacking was for the UN to recognize and support these existing discursive spaces. Civil society actors chose to prioritize the conditions of participatory parity and capacity. These choices allowed civil society actors to elevate the ongoing work of local women's groups to the level of an unrecognized transnational public sphere. For them, new publics and administrative powers did not need to be created, because they already existed. By focusing on participatory parity and capacity, civil society actors crafted a vision of a transnational public sphere in which UN members would become new participants in an existing discursive space shaped by the voices and concerns of civil society actors.

Civil society actors worked to expand the legitimacy of existing transnational public spheres by calling for participatory parity. According to the NGO Working Group, civil society actors were already participating in the peace process, and therefore, did not need the UN to authorize their *inclusion.* For example, Lusenge argued that local women "force the door to participate and thus take our place in peace processes."[185] Likewise, Murabit explained, "Women already engage in unofficial prevention practices in their communities."[186] The 2017 NGO letter explained how civil society actors forced their inclusion in peace processes. The letter argued, "Local women-led organizations are supporting internally displaced populations, negotiating with militia leaders to release prisoners of war, and finding strategies for surviving sieges."[187]

These statements made it clear that civil society actors did not need an invitation from the UN to take part in transnational peace work because they were already operating in those spaces.

Instead, civil society actors demanded participatory parity, or the equal opportunity to shape the WPS Agenda and question the actions of other actors. Parity for civil society actors required that their inclusion be "recognized and institutionalized."[188] It should take place in "formal consultative forums"[189] and through "formal negotiations."[190] One place civil society lacked parity was in the ability to shape the design of interventions. Murabit argued that the Security Council only engages local women when it's convenient; they are "included only to implement processes that the United Nations and Member States have decided in their absence."[191] She argued the Security Council must engage local groups "at the very onset, at the decision - and policy - making level."[192] The 2016 and 2017 NGO letters made similar arguments. The 2016 letter argued that the Council should "engage women from local communities in the design and implementation of protection of civilian strategies and humanitarian assistance"[193] and the 2017 letter asserted that the Council should prioritize the "strategic objectives" of local women "based on their own assessments of local needs."[194] Civil society actors demanded more than inclusion, they called for parity. For them, a legitimate transnational public sphere would recognize local women as having the same authority as nation-state representatives to propose and even lead implementation programs. By focusing on parity instead of inclusion, civil society actors worked to shift the debate from whether or not transnational policy forums should be created, to a discussion of how to make them more legitimate. For civil society actors, implementing the WPS Agenda has always been a transnational process, all that is left to do is recognize local women as having equal participatory authority.

Civil society actors also chose to prioritize the capacity condition, rather than translation, in order to frame civil society actors as leaders in implementing WPS Agenda policies through unrecognized local efforts. They argued that the UN already had the administrative power to translate WPS principles into binding laws but failed to exercise those powers. For example, Michaëlle Jean, the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie, argued that the Council's focus on *translation* hindered their *capacity* to implement policy. She asked, "How many resolutions, studies, meetings of independent high-level groups and groups of experts must there be…What are we afraid of? Being more effective?"[195] Murabit was likewise critical of the Council's inability to move from translation to implementation. She argued, "the United Nations and its Member States are not meeting the expectations of the global community, and that is because they continue to ignore the one tool that has never been more urgent for us to utilize - the participation of women."[196] Civil society actors added that when the Security Council fails to meet its international commitments, local women's groups step up to fill the gap. Yanar Mohammed explained:

> In the absence of Government-sponsored services, local women's groups meet the needs of those most vulnerable to the conflict. We are at the forefront of providing aid and services in places unreachable by international aid organizations. Yet, we remain vastly underrepresented in our efforts to prevent and address conflict and violent extremism. Our rights are not protected, let alone promoted.[197]

By critiquing the UN as too slow to act, civil society actors framed themselves as leaders in transnationalizing the WPS Agenda. They suggested that the UN needed to catch up to civil society actors who had been leading the way, largely without recognition.

By focusing on the participatory parity condition of legitimacy and the capacity condition of efficiency, civil society actors elevated the work of local women's organizations to the level of an established transnational public sphere that was quietly, and without recognition, leading

the way in implementing the WPS Agenda in local contexts. For civil society actors, the UN did not need to create new discursive spaces. Instead, civil society actors articulated a vision in which UN officials and national representatives could join an existing, civil society created, public sphere by recognizing the rhetorical leadership of civil society actors and supporting the ongoing implementation efforts of local women's groups. This approach to crafting a transnational public sphere in which the UN, nation-states, and civil society actors could work together to implement the WPS Agenda worked to strengthen the political influence of civil society actors, a shift that UN officials and nation-state representatives were unwilling to fully support.

The UN and Transnational Public Spheres

When nation-state representatives and UN officials discussed the creation of new transnational public forums through which civil society actors, the UN, and nations would work together to implement the WPS Agenda outside of the debate process, they did so in ways that maintained or reinforced existing hierarchies between all three actors. First, nation-state representatives and UN officials prioritized inclusion over parity when discussing the legitimacy of deliberation. This framing relegated civil society actors to a subordinate role as a "tool" of the UN instead of an equal partner, or leader, in the deliberative process. Second, national representatives and UN officials prioritized translation over capacity when discussing how to make the WPS Agenda more efficacious. They worked to create new "public powers" through which the UN would localize their efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. These new powers would be accountable to UN authority, rather than to the demands of local women. While these efforts to localize the WPS Agenda represent a significant step forward in recognizing the important role civil society actors and local women's organizations play in implementing UN policy, the "localization" rhetoric that emerged during the debates worked to retain and reinforce

existing power dynamics, even as UN members recognized the need to attend to local contexts.

UN officials and nation-state representatives focused on the inclusion condition of legitimate transnational public spheres. Because the UN prioritized simple participation over parity among interlocutors, civil society actors were framed as tools that would serve the existing goals of the Security Council. For example, while Ban Ki-Moon recognized that "members of civil society have been key actors from the outset of the agenda,"[198] his 2015 Secretary General Report primarily worked to frame civil society as a tool or resource that the UN could harness. He argued that local women are "in the best position to share local concerns with national leaders, bringing the perspectives of women and girls at the grass-roots level to the national, regional and global levels."[199] In addition to being a resource for information gathering, civil society actors were also deemed useful because they could "take the lead on implementing the recommendations put forward by international and regional human rights mechanisms."[200] These statements demonstrate that UN members saw value in the contributions civil society actors could make in implementing the WPS Agenda, but were unwilling to create a transnational public sphere in which civil society actors would have the parity required to propose UN localization efforts.

Like the UN, nation-state representatives viewed the inclusion of civil society actors as something that should be recognized and applauded, but ultimately utilized as a tool to serve national goals. For example, the representative from Australia said, "By harnessing the expertise of civil society organizations on the ground we can be more effective in our efforts to remove barriers and create meaningful opportunities for women to engage equally in all stages of peace processes." Likewise, the Chinese representative argued that nations should focus on "providing guidance" to civil society actors.[201] Prioritizing inclusion without parity worked to reinforce existing hierarchies between actors. UN officials and national representatives took a step forward

by espousing a commitment to creating transnational forums that valued local voices, but those voices were relegated to a subordinate role. This framing offered a vision of a localized policy implementation program that would reinforce existing top-down decision-making processes even as it opened a discursive space for civil society actors to participate.

UN officials and nation-state representatives also worked to maintain existing hierarchies when discussing ways to make the WPS Agenda more efficacious. I find that these actors prioritized the translation condition over the capacity condition such that they worked to create new public powers that would answer to UN authorities, rather than make existing powers accountable to civil society actor's demands. Civil society actors argued that forums through which transnational recommendations could be translated into local implementation programs already existed and were being led by civil society actors. UN officials and nation-state officials did not agree. For them, efficacy could be increased by developing new forums for translating principles into practices. Two UN mechanisms were created after the passage of Resolution 2242. In 2016 the Security Council established the Focal Points Network and the Informal Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. These mechanisms represent a positive step forward in precipitating a "local turn" because they recognized that WPS Agenda principles needed to be tailored to specific, local conflicts. However, both mechanisms remained accountable to the UN, not the local communities they were developed to serve. Therefore, they reinforced existing top-down decision-making processes instead of ceding authority to civil society actors or local women's groups.

For example, The Focal Points Network encouraged UN member nations to appoint a "focal point," or an individual who "is expected to exercise a leading role in women and peace and security efforts at the national or regional level and to maintain direct and ongoing contact with other focal points to streamline implementation of the agenda."[202] The official guidelines

argued that the Network would be an "important tool for identifying and promoting partnerships with civil society and local organizations working on women and peace and security."[203] However, the guidelines also established that each "focal point" would be a national representative. So, while the Network might "partner" with civil society actors, the decision-making process would still be largely a "top-down" process in which civil society actors could make recommendations but final decision-making power rests squarely with national representatives. The Informal Working Group on Women, Peace and Security is likewise a localization, or translation, effort that reinforces existing top-down hierarchies. The purpose of the Working Group is to improve the flow of information by creating a space for "transparent, regular, systematic, and timely" consultation between country experts and the UN regarding "country-specific situations."[204] Put differently, the Working Group is a mechanism through which the Security Council can translate WPS Agenda principles into tailored responses to local conflicts. The working group is chaired by two rotating nations, in 2016 it was Spain and the United Kingdom. These co-chairs "decide which country situations will be on the agenda of the Group."[205] There is no official role for civil society actors in the Working Group. Instead, UN-Women is responsible for preparing a background briefing before meetings. To prepare this briefing UN-Women should "consult with the relevant United Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field, and civil society, to prepare the background reading and key recommendations, to be shared with Council members at least two business days ahead of the meeting."[206] Unless a civil society organization is "consulted" by UN-Women, there appears to be no way for them to hold the working group accountable to local concerns.

Both the Focal Points Network and the Informal Working Group on Women Peace and Security illustrate the tensions that shaped the debate's transnationalization rhetoric. On one hand, UN members recognized that the WPS Agenda needed to be tailored to local contexts and

that civil society actors could provide useful information about the specific needs of diverse communities. On the other hand, the UN worked to reinforce their authority and influence in the global policy making process. Thus, UN members developed new public powers that could harness the ongoing work of civil society actors through bureaucratic processes that consolidated decision-making authority in a small group of nationally appointed representatives or UN officials. These policy mechanisms are significant in that they formalize the Security Council's intention to consider the particular needs of local communities when implementing the WPS Agenda. However, the choice to prioritize translation over capacity ensured that existing hierarches between actors would go unchallenged. This choice allowed UN members to more fully recognize civil society actors as important players in implementing the WPS Agenda while avoiding any loss of decision-making authority.

The rhetoric of transnationalizing the WPS Agenda, prompted by demands for a "local turn" in global governance, highlights the complex and varied power relationships that govern interactions between actors as each works to implement the WPS Agenda. Civil society, nation-states, and UN members all espoused a commitment to forming transnational publics where they would work together outside of the debate process. However, by prioritizing different conditions for legitimate and efficacious public spheres, they constructed competing visions of who gets to participate in those spheres and how that participation would be regulated. These differences reveal how actors worked to maintain or expand their authority, even as they called for cooperation. Despite maintaining existing hierarchies, both the UN and nation-state representatives recognized the important work that is being done by civil society actors to implement the WPS Agenda and took steps to localize their intervention programs. While a world does not yet exist in which civil society actors enjoy full participatory parity in global

governance, the rhetoric of the Open Debates recognized that the local is an inseparable part of global politics and should influence policy deliberation and implementation.

A Conservative Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective

This chapter argued that participants in the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on the WPS Agenda accommodated the shifting norms of global governance by developing a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective. This perspective allowed UN members to articulate and implement transnational feminist policies within the more conservative structure of Security Council norms. Debate participants negotiated this reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda by crafting three rhetorical strategies. First, they engaged in processes of collective postcolonial reflexivity. Through their reflexivity, actors acknowledged the shortcomings of the WPS Agenda and discussed how a feminist foreign policy perspective could mitigate these shortcomings by increasing the representation of civil society, expanding the range of issues that the WPS Agenda would address, and deepening gender analysis to interrogate structural causes of gender discrimination. Next, debate participants developed networked policy arguments to implement the feminist principles of the WPS Agenda. By combining the rhetorical strategies of "anti-rhetoric" and "networking" arguments, national representatives articulated policies that met the demands of multiple exigencies including calls for action from UN officials and the particular economic and political contexts of their individual nations. Finally, debate participants worked to transnationalize the implementation of the WPS Agenda by developing collaborative spaces in which the UN, nation-states, and civil society actors would work together outside of the debate process. These transnationalizing efforts sought to localize the WPS Agenda by translating WPS principles into policies tailored to specific local concerns. While the Council ultimately articulated a conservative vision of a transnational forum that would maintain existing top-down structures, the effort to localize the WPS Agenda demonstrates a feminist foreign policy

perspective's commitment to prioritizing collaboration between actors. These three strategies demonstrate how the UN accommodated the shifting norms of global governance by reconfiguring the WPS Agenda to include a feminist foreign policy perspective.

This reconfiguration points to significant implications for feminist policymaking and highlights the increasing need for scholarly investigation into the relationships between actors in global governance. First, this analysis posits a model through which political institutions can adapt to the changing norms of global governance while maintaining existing organizational systems. By developing a conservative vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective, the UN was able to meet the demands of transnational feminists in ways that adhered to the norms of the Security Council. Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Llasser and Rebecca Trammell explain the role of a conservative flank in social movements. They argue that the conservative flank of a social movement is "strategically oriented to work within existing institutions"; they employ only legal tactics and are "included by the state with a highly routinized role."[207] They add that conservative flanks further a movement by providing "critical linkages to governments and political elites."[208] I find that the reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda worked to link a feminist foreign policy perspective to established institutions like the Security Council and UN General Assembly. While this conservative vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective stopped short of transforming top-down hierarchies between actors in global governance, it represents a step forward in normalizing feminism as a guiding principle in world politics. Because UN members articulated a more conservative feminist foreign policy perspective, in that the policy worked within existing institutions instead of transforming them, it was made palatable for a wider range of actors. Ideally, this conservative vision enables more progressive visions in the future.

Second, this analysis demonstrates that the relationships between actors in global governance are a rich, but understudied, area of rhetorical investigation. While scholars have

attended to international rhetorical norms and transnational rhetorical norms across various organizations, they have generated comparatively less work on how different levels of political organizing interact with one another in a system of global governance.[209] This analysis works to fill this gap by studying how the UN, nation-state representatives, and civil society actors negotiated their relationships to one another as they worked to craft new feminist policies. As these actors interacted, they needed to manage multiple, and at times competing, exigencies. Therefore, actors often produced polysemic rhetoric that could answer the demands of multiple exigencies. For example, nation-state representatives networked arguments so that they simultaneously responded to the exigency of the debate and the demands of national economic and political contexts. How actors collaboratively develop policy, while at the same time, working to maintain or advance their influence and meet the demands of multiple exigencies is a question worthy of more attention.

The Security Council continues to work towards a fuller integration of a feminist foreign policy perspective. For example, Margot Wallström was invited to deliver a keynote address at the April 2018 meeting of the Focal Points Network. In her speech she argued, "Gender equality is the issue of our time. It is not a women issue, it is a peace and security issue."[210] Inviting Wallström, who is recognized as a leading proponent of feminist foreign policy, to deliver a keynote address represents the Security Council's ongoing commitment to incorporating a feminist foreign policy perspective into their organizational practices. While this process is still ongoing, the passage of Resolution 2242 and the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda offer a starting point for transforming the WPS Agenda.

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CHAPTER 3

A Moderate Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective:

The Rhetoric of Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström

In March of 2015, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström[1] found herself in hot water. She had cancelled a defense agreement with the Saudi Arabian government after it sentenced a blogger to 1,000 lashings.[2] Citing human rights concerns, Wallström denounced the sentence as "medieval" and formally cancelled the renewal of an arms deal that had earned Swedish manufacturers over half a billion dollars in previous years.[3] Wallström prioritized human rights over economic concerns. This decision represented a significant shift in Sweden's foreign policy priorities and sparked backlash from both governments. Ali al-Ahmed, the Director of the Institute of Gulf Affairs, argued that Wallström's decision "shows a break in the 50-year view in the West of 'We can't touch Saudi Arabia.'"[4] In response to Wallström's decision, the Saudi government recalled its ambassador from Stockholm and blocked Wallström from delivering a speech in Cairo.[5] In the face of this backlash, Wallström remained committed to what she has termed her "feminist foreign policy." She said, "I won't back down over my statements on women's rights, democracy, and that one shouldn't flog bloggers. I have nothing to be ashamed of."[6] In the face of skepticism and resistance, she remained committed to her new approach to foreign policy.

Many months prior, shortly after her appointment, Wallström made clear her approach to foreign policy. She announced that Sweden would pursue what she considered to be a feminist foreign policy, "even if no one really knows what that means."[7] In light of the "skepticism," "considerable derision," and "giggling factor"[8] that, according to Wallström, were the usual responses to her feminist proposals, she delivered three speeches between November 28, 2014,

and March 3, 2015, in which she introduced, explained, and justified her feminist foreign policy perspective. Although the archive of Wallström's public statements includes twenty-two instances in which she spoke about her feminist foreign policy between November 2014 and May 2016, these three speech texts directly address what Wallström meant by a "feminist foreign policy."

A close look at these three speeches reveals how Wallström managed the relationships and potential conflicts between the different rhetorical norms and demands of transnational feminist activists, nation-states, and supranational institutions, particularly as each actor pursues women-friendly policymaking. To negotiate these demands, Wallström developed rhetorical strategies that would enable global governance actors to form new relationships based in cooperation, collaboration, and compromise. By developing rhetorical strategies steeped in these principles, three terms that highlight the importance of working together, Wallström articulated a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective. Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser and Rebecca Trannell explain that moderate movement rhetorics "link radicals to conservatives" and are used by actors who are willing to "compromise, negotiate, and make concessions for political inroads."[9] Through her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective, Wallström constructed an approach to feminist policymaking that would transform relational hierarchies between global governance actors into equal partnerships.

To articulate her feminist foreign policy perspective, Wallström needed to attend to the rhetorical demands of both transnational activists and nation-states. To understand how Wallström's rhetoric simultaneously negotiated the demands created by each level of global governance, I embrace theories of "new public diplomacy." Traditional methods for analyzing the policymaking process tend to view policymaking as a top-down process in which nation-states play a central role.[10] However, emerging theories of "new public diplomacy" move beyond

a state-centered understanding of policymaking by attending to how a range of actors work together to build policy while "operating in a fluid global environment of new issues and contexts."[11] Because "new public diplomacy" understands policymaking as neither a wholly top-down or an entirely bottom-up process, it is an ideal lens for understanding how Wallström negotiated the policy demands and perspectives of a variety of global governance actors. By situating Wallström's rhetoric at the nexus of a complex network of political forces including transnational activist organizations, global systems of governance, and nation-state demands, this chapter works to avoid Wendy Hesford and Eileen Schell's critique that existing methodologies lead to unidirectional thinking. They bemoan methods that posit West to East or North to South flows of power. They promote attending to the complex web of interactions in which the nation-state is only one of many units or nodes of power.[12] Taking this critique seriously, I attend to how Wallström's rhetoric shaped and was shaped by multiple relationships between nations, transnational activist organizations, and supranational institutions.

To assert her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective, Wallström developed three rhetorical strategies that encouraged nation-states and activist organizations to forge new partnerships through compromise, collaboration, and cooperation. First, she engaged the competing strategies of "feminism from above," an ideology that shapes a set of national policies and initiatives aimed at advancing gender equality at the institutional level, and "feminism from below," an ideology that prioritizes locally situated knowledge in the formation of feminist policy. In order to transform these strategies, Wallström framed her feminist foreign policy as bi-directional such that it enabled power and resources to flow "up" from community activists toward official state policy offices, and "down" from those official organizations to the activists working on the ground. Second, Wallström negotiated the different ways in which state and activist organizations invoke "human rights" rhetoric. While nation-states and supranational

institutions tend to use "human rights" in ways that reveal a "colonial imperative,"[13] activist organizations often redefine "human rights" to serve emancipatory goals.[14] Wallström transformed these rhetorical norms by establishing nation-states and individual women as co-beneficiaries of her human rights proposals. Finally, a third strategy builds upon her transformation of "top-down" and "bottom-up" feminisms and differing approaches to human rights discourse. Wallström expanded the concept of a transnational feminist network to include both nation-states and transnational activists. She argued that this expanded network would be attentive to the demands of nations and activists alike and would pursue cooperative solutions to foreign policy problems. Altogether, these strategies situated Wallström as an official nation-state representative and transnational feminist advocate who championed cooperation, collaboration, and compromise between nations and activist organizations. In her development of these strategies, Wallström offers a model of policymaking that enables global policymakers to transform hierarchical relationships into equal partnerships.

In what follows, I first explore the political forces that Wallström's rhetoric needed to negotiate. These forces include the norms of Swedish national politics and the existing relationships between transnational feminist activists and the institutions of global governance. I then analyze how she transformed the competing rhetorical demands of nation-states and transnational feminist activists through her articulation of a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective. For each section of analysis, I establish the rhetorical demands Wallström sought to transform, address how she appealed to each set of norms, and last, analyze how she transformed the competing demands into an opportunity for new policymaking partnerships. Finally, I offer some conclusions regarding the potential of Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective to link together conservative and radical feminist foreign policy perspectives.

Situating Wallström in Global Governance

In order to understand how Wallström negotiated and transformed the rhetorical norms and demands of global governance actors, it's necessary to first situate Wallström in the complex web of political forces that informed her rhetorical strategies. In what follows, I establish how Swedish political norms and Wallström's background as a political actor uniquely enabled her to appeal to multiple stakeholders in global governance. Next, I outline sources of contention that inform the existing relationships between actors in global governance. Finally, I describe the specific context of each of Wallström's three speeches.

First, Wallström's approach to policymaking is shaped by her membership in the Swedish Democratic Party and Sweden's history of coalitional governance. The 2014 Swedish General Election returned power to Social Democrats. The period of governance prior to this election, from 2006 and 2014, was an anomaly in The Social Democratic Party's control of Swedish governance. For eight years, Sweden was governed by a center right coalition. This coalition was led by Fredrik Reinfeldt who passed a series of conservative policies including cuts to income and corporate taxes, the elimination of a tax on the wealthy, and reductions to welfare benefits.[15] The 2014 election returned power to the more liberal Social Democratic Party, something *BBC News* calls a "return to normality in Swedish politics."[16] The Social Democratic party has historically dominated the Swedish political landscape.[17] Other than a four year break between 1991 and 1994, the Social Democrats have governed Sweden from 1982-2006. Jon Pierre explains that Social Democrats are credited with the establishment of Sweden's celebrated social welfare system and espouse a commitment to gender equality. In fact, since the 2014 election, fifty percent of Swedish cabinet officials have been women.[18] In part, Wallström was enabled to articulate a feminist foreign policy perspective by her political party's control of Swedish governance and their commitment to gender equality.

Likewise, her moderate approach to feminist policymaking is informed by Sweden's history of coalitional governance. Sweden has a unicameral parliamentary system based on proportional representation. There are 329 seats in the Riksdag (Parliament). A political party must win at least four percent of the vote to earn a seat.[19] In the 2014 election, the Social Democratic Party earned 31.01 percent of the vote, followed by the Moderate Party who won 23.33 percent.[20] Because he lacked a clear majority, Social Democratic Leader Stefan Lofven needed to build a coalition with smaller political parties, such as the Green Party, in order to form a government. The *Washington Post* notes that powerful political parties, like the Social Democrats, almost always need to "rely on the support of smaller allied parties to form working government coalitions." In his historical account of the Social Democratic party, Pierre found that the party only controlled a clear majority in the Riskdag from 1968 to 1970, "the remainder of its long tenure in office was secured either by coalition partners or by some other form of collaborative arrangement with one or two parties."[21] To some, "Sweden's diverse political landscape is a feature, rather than a bug."[22] Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective emerged from a political system in which collaboration between political interest groups is the norm. This history of coalitional national governance informed Wallström's commitment to policymaking through collaboration.

Before her appointment as Foreign Minister, Wallström held a variety of positions at different levels of global governance in which she worked to advance gender equality. As an individual political actor, Wallström has worked within national and supranational institutions and in close contact with transnational feminist activists. Her political career began when she was elected as a member of the Swedish Riksdag in 1979. Starting in 1988, she filled a variety of national political positions including Deputy Minister of Public Administration, Minister of Culture, and Minister of Social Affairs.[23] Wallström's political career then moved to the

European Union. In 1999 she was appointed European Commissioner for the Environment and later, in 2004, Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy. Throughout her career, Wallström has "actively engaged in promoting the participation of women in peace and security."[24]

Wallström has held two positions in which she was directly responsible for writing and implementing gender policy. First, Wallström served as Chair of the Council of Women World Leaders Ministerial Initiative from 2007 to 2014. The Ministerial Initiative "seeks to promote ministerial-level exchange on global issues, to identify and address the particular challenges facing women in ministerial leadership positions, and to increase their visibility both nationally and internationally."[25] The Council of Women World Leaders explains that the Ministerial Initiative offers a "unique space for ministers to share best practices from developing and developed country experiences and to form a powerful and united force for policy change, with a gender perspective."[26] Wallström chaired the Initiative until she was appointed Foreign Minister.

Next, in 2010, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon selected Wallström as the first UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.[27] This position required Wallström to travel to areas marked by conflict to investigate claims of sexual violence. These investigations often put Wallström in close contact with civil society groups and feminist activists. For example, during an interview with National Public Radio following one of her first trips to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Wallström explained, "I visited hospitals. I spoke to women survivors. I met with local leaders. I met with the police and ministers, of course, from the government."[28] Wallström also described the process of investigating sexual violence in Columbia. She recalled, "They placed us in a local store, and I sat there with two garden chairs and a long cue of women lining up to tell me their stories."[29] During her tenure as UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Wallström engaged directly with civil society

organizations and activists working in communities shaped by conflict. Because of Wallström's diverse career as a Swedish politician, EU and UN official, and feminist activist, she was uniquely positioned to negotiate new policymaking processes between the various actors in global governance.

To articulate her vision of feminist policymaking, Wallström needed to contend with the complex and varied relationships that currently shape interactions between transnational activist organizations and national and supranational institutions. While frequently positive and productive, the relationships between nation-states and non-governmental (NGO) or intergovernmental (IGO) activist organizations are often contentious. For example, the NGO Human Rights Watch explained that their work requires them to partner with nation-states, through the UN, in order to achieve their goals.[30] However, they are also frequently critical of the very nations with which they partner. For instance, Human Rights Watch raised concerns about the US prison system, explaining that their organization advocates "for reforms to ensure accountability for serious offenses."[31] Conversely, nation-states rely on the tools of activist organizations to reach individual communities, but do so in ways that serve national foreign policy goals. For example, the United States Agency for International Development explained that they "seek to mobilize the expertise, capacity and knowledge of NGOs in a wide variety of ways to achieve our development objectives, contribute to our government and national priorities, and advance community development."[32] Transnational activists engage the nation-state as a source of funding, resources, and as an authority structure that has the ability to assist or hinder their mission, while also challenging the centrality of nation-state systems of power in decision-making processes.[33] Likewise, nations harness the skills of activist organizations while working to preserve state power. Put differently, activist organizations and nations frequently work together to advance common goals, but do so while maintaining different ideological

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commitments. While nation-states promote ideologies that preserve state power, even during

their engagement with NGOs, activist organizations advance ideologies that subvert state power

over marginalized people. Reading Wallström's speeches within this network of shifting and

unequal power relations brings into sharp relief how her foreign policy discourse needed to

respond the demands of nations and activist organizations alike.

     Between November 28, 2014, and March 3, 2015, only months after taking office as

Foreign Minister of Sweden, Wallström delivered three speeches that directly explicated her

feminist foreign policy perspective. These speeches took place in a range of transnational

contexts that were seemingly friendly to Wallström's commitment to feminist policymaking.

Wallström delivered her first speech in Stockholm on November 28, 2014, during a seminar

arranged by the Swedish organization Kvinna till Kvinna. Kvinna till Kvinna was founded in

1993, is headquartered in Stockholm, and supports more than 110 local partner organizations

around the world.[34] The organization is currently active in twenty conflict-affected countries in

the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the South Caucasus. Their work focuses on ending gender-

based violence, increasing women's participation in political and economic decision-making,

promoting gender sensitive peace processes, and lobbying for women's economic

empowerment.[35] Wallström's speech was part of a larger initiative to support the work of female

human rights defenders. Kvinna till Kvinna's 2014 annual newsletter described the events of

November 28-29, 2014, as a seminar focused on protecting and advancing the work of women

human rights defenders. Kvinna till Kvinna used the seminar to introduce the term

"femdefender" to label the work of these women.[36] According to Kvinna till Kvinna, more than

300 people participated the seminar.[37] Wallström's audience was well versed in transnational

politics and included feminist activists from around the world. For example, the 2014 newsletter

published a photo from the event in which Wallström posed with feminist activists from the

Philippines, Albania, Pakistan, and Armenia.[38] This audience of feminist activists was likely supportive of policy rhetorics that prioritized gender equality.

Wallström delivered her second speech at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on January 29, 2015. USIP was "Created by Congress in 1984 as an independent, nonpartisan, federally funded organization."[39] USIP is governed by a bipartisan board of directors who are appointed by the President of the United States. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and President of the National Defense University are automatically included on the board.[40] The goal of USIP is to provide "expertise, training, and analysis" to enable governments and civil societies to "solve their own problems peacefully."[41] USIP views their work as a means of advancing US national security. Therefore, unlike Kvinna till kvinna, USIP explicitly serves national foreign policy goals. US Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl explained the relationship between USIP and US national security. He argued, "USIP prevents wars from happening and ends them sooner, on terms more favorable to the United States."[42] Wallström has a long history of working with USIP. For example, she served as a member of the Responsibility to Protect Working Group. The working group was chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and worked to "formulate an adequate response" to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.[43] A review of USIP archives reveals that Wallström spoke at USIP on at least three occasions prior to her 2015 speech. Wallström's 2015 speech was attended by a large and diverse audience including activists, representatives from a variety of NGOs, and members of several nation's diplomatic corps. Additionally, Wallström's prepared speech was followed by a panel discussion with US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's issues, Catherine Russell, and Retired US Ambassador Donald Steinberg.[44] During this exchange, Wallström took questions from her fellow panelists and from members of the audience.

Wallström's third speech took place at the University of Helsinki on March 3, 2015. The speech was sponsored by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and was followed by responses from two researchers affiliated with the Institute.[45] The Institute was founded in 1961 and remained independent from the government until 2006. In 2006, the Institute was brought under the control of the Parliament of Finland.[46] However, while the Institute is dependent on the parliament for its basic funding, it claims to be "autonomous in its research activities."[47] The Institute is primarily a research organization and does not directly lobby policymakers or work to implement policy. Instead, the Institute produces "focused information of a high standard for use by the academic community and decision-makers, and in public debate.[48]" Unlike Wallström's speech at Kvinna till Kvinna and USIP, her speech at Helsinki University was by invitation only and was not open to the public. The Institute of International Affairs has not provided information regarding the nature of Wallström's audience, but the Institute's stated research goals, including "prospects for global governance systems" and "changes in major power structure," suggest that its members would be receptive of Wallström's feminist approach to foreign policy.

These contexts presented a variety of constraints and opportunities that Wallström needed to manage in her articulation of a feminist foreign policy perspective that would appeal to both nation-state systems of power and transnational activists. While some audiences were more amenable to feminist policymaking than others, an analysis of Wallström's rhetoric reveals how she adjusted her rhetoric to meet the demands of her various audiences. Additionally, Wallström's rhetoric likely circulated well beyond the immediate audiences of Kivinna till Kvinna, the USIP, and the University of Helsinki. In each case, Wallstrom's audience was composed of leaders from other civil-society, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, adding to the transnational quality of Wallström's discourse. For example, World

Learning, a non-profit organization with programs in more than 100 countries, reported on Wallström's USIP speech. In addition to a written news story, the organization posted a video of Wallström's appearance and encouraged their members to "watch the entire discussion."[49] By speaking to audiences comprised of activists, scholars, and national representatives, Wallström ensured that her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective would circulate through a variety of global governance contexts.

Transforming "Top-Down" and "Bottom Up" Feminisms

The first set of competing demands Wallström negotiated in her development of a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective were those that emanated from the differences between feminism "from above" and feminism "from below." In Wallström's case, these differences might also be understood as the different ways in which transnational feminist networks (TFNs) and nation-states craft women-friendly policies. Instead of choosing the rhetoric of either "top-down" or "bottom-up" feminism, Wallström reframed her feminist foreign policy as bi-directional. Put differently, Wallström argued that information and policy recommendations could simultaneously flow from TFNs "up" toward official state policy offices, and "down" from those offices to the organizations working on the ground. Wallström framed herself and her moderate feminist foreign policy as the links that would facilitate this bi-directional exchange of ideas and recommendations. In doing so, she offered a model of how policymakers might use the rhetoric of feminist "flows" to transform hierarchies in global governance into opportunities for partnership.

To make this case, the following begins by explaining the differing rhetorical norms of "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches to feminist decision-making. Next, I address how Wallström invoked both sets of norms in her foreign policy rhetoric. Finally, I analyze how she transformed these seemingly incompatible rhetorical norms into an opportunity for nation-states

and activist organizations to forge new partnerships based in collaboration, compromise, and cooperation.

Rhetorical Demands of "Top-Down" and "Bottom-Up" Feminist Flows

Wallström argued that the success of feminist foreign policymaking depended on both "top-down" nation-state gender mainstreaming programs and the bottom-up" activism of TFNs. The first set of demands and opportunities was created by the state feminism pursued by the Swedish government. According to Joyce Outshoorn and Johanna Kantola "state feminism" is a term

> used to denote the efforts by women's policy machineries to pursue social and economic policies beneficial to women. This work is carried out in special units charged with promoting women's rights including offices, commissions, agencies, ministries, committees, secretaries, or advisers for the status of women.[50]

"State feminism" is a label applied to formal nation-state efforts to advance gender equality. In the United States, this work is carried out by the State Department's Office of Global Women's Issues, headed by Ambassador Catherine M. Russell.[51] In Sweden, Asa Regner, the Minster for Children, the Elderly, and Gender Equality conducts similar projects to promote gender equality through state-run programs.[52] Antje Hornsceidt explains that state feminism "has become an important branding strategy for almost all Swedish political parties within the last seven years. Moreover, feminism as part of Swedish public branding strategy has become a positive internationally perceived image."[53] Wallström's pursuit of feminist policymaking was very much in line with the larger Swedish political agenda.[54]

Despite the opportunities created by representing a nation with a feminist agenda, state feminism has been widely criticized by feminist activists. For example, Outshoorn and Kantola questioned just how "feminist" state feminist nation-states really are. They suggest that state feminism promotes a less progressive engagement of feminist issues and that state involvement

might "compromise a more critical feminist stance."[55] Other scholars agree, arguing that

Sweden's uptake of a feminist label has served "to neutralize feminism as a resistant political

movement."[56] For example, Anette Borchorst and Birte Simm found that feminist Scandinavian

countries often fail to attend to the particular conditions faced by non-Scandinavian immigrant

women.[57] Seeking to expand upon Sweden's power to effect positive change for women,

Wallström needed to work within the enabling and disabling conditions of Sweden's state

feminism.

In addition, Wallström needed to attend to the rhetorical demands of TFNs, which

frequently subvert or undermine "top-down" nation-state systems of decision-making by

utilizing a more democratic "bottom-up" approach.[58] Several TFNs use the language of

"grassroots" in their mission statements to explain their democratic approach to decision-making.

For example, the Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR) declare: "Our

actions are informed and led by grassroots and community organizations and the people whose

lives are affected by international agreements."[59] Likewise, MADRE, an organization that works

with women facing the aftermath of war and natural disaster, explained, "Our partners are

grassroots women leaders who know best what threats their communities face and what women

and girls need to thrive."[60] In addition to using a "bottom-up," or community-based decision-

making process, TFNs destabilize state feminist "top-down" processes of gender mainstreaming

by organizing around issues like human rights, reproductive health, violence against women,

peace and antimilitarism, and feminist economics. These are issues not bound by national

borders.[61]

While state feminist nations and TFNs pursue feminist change in very different ways,

Stohr argues that the two must eventually find ways to work together. She explained that

contemporary political problems "will not be solved unilaterally, bilaterally, or even regionally,"

they will require "cooperation from organizations across several sectors of society."[62] Indeed,

Some TFNs have begun to seek ways of working with nation-states. For example, Development

Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) noted that they are "engaging in global and

regional inter-governmental and non-governmental forums and processes to challenge and

change mainstream thinking, policy and practice, which hurt poor women in the South."[63] So,

while TFNs have been generally wary of state systems of decision-making, a call for cooperation

has recently emerged. Wallström continued to develop this cooperative impulse through her use

of rhetorical strategies intended to produce cooperation, compromise, and collaboration between

nation-states and activists.

Meeting Rhetorical Demands

Wallström positioned herself as an intermediary who could facilitate new partnerships

between state feminist political agencies and TFNs. To that end, her first rhetorical task was to

establish herself as an ally to both flows of feminism. To establish herself as an advocate for

TFNs, Wallström appealed to "bottom-up" decision-making by framing her rhetoric as a

conversation or dialogue with fellow activists. As Stohr argued, TFNs avoid "top-down"

decision-making because "it involves little or no public dialogue and lacks democratic measures

to ensure accountability among actors who speak for and about citizens."[64] Resisting this trend,

Wallström positioned her speech as part of an ongoing conversation. For example, she framed

her remarks as an act of "commenting" on "a few policy proposals I have received from Kvinna

till Kvinna."[65] She addressed the organization directly when she argued, "I will need your advice

when moving forward with our feminist foreign policy."[66] Likewise, Wallström frequently

referred to her own conversations with women around the world, such as a meeting in Colombia

where "plastic chairs were brought out and put in a circle and the women told us their stories."[67]

By sharing this example, Wallström created a vision of an intimate safe space where she would

engage with other women as their equal. In her speech at Helsinki University, Wallström continued this "conversation" with fellow activists by quoting Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Leymah Gbowee's assertion that, "You cannot go to another country and make a plan for it. The cultural context is so different from what you know that you will not understand much of what you see."[68] Wallström's reference to Gbowee's statement echoes MADRE's mission statement that it is important to work with "grassroots women leaders who know best what threats their communities face."[69] By framing her remarks as part of an ongoing conversation Wallström avoided speaking "down" to feminist activists and instead sought to speak "with" them. This suggests that Wallström was aware of the authority that TFNs grant to first-person testimony as a source of knowledge. By insinuating herself into an intimate conversation with civil society actors and TFN organizations, Wallström demonstrated that she too valued experience as a source of knowledge and was willing to participate in a ground level exchange as a means of formulating policy. In doing so, Wallström allied herself with TFNs.

In addition to allying herself with transnational feminist activists, Wallström needed to reassure other nation-states that she would continue to advance the official projects of state feminism. While her appeals to TFNs prioritized intimate dialogue, her appeals to state feminism highlighted national leadership. For example, in her speech at USIP, Wallström expressed her "appreciation and support for the leadership of the US administration"[70] and argued that by pursuing gender equality, her feminist foreign policy "essentially seeks to address what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton so aptly described as 'the great unfinished business of the 21st century.'"[71] Wallström's praise of state feminist mechanisms was even more pronounced during her speech at Helsinki University, perhaps because Finland and Sweden share an international reputation for state feminism.[72] For instance, Wallström framed both nations as global leaders in feminism:

> I am very proud that Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Lofven has made it very clear that gender equality is a whole-of-government priority. The Prime Minister himself will pursue the agenda in all facets of the Swedish Government's work- in Sweden, in the EU, and globally. On the same note, I am grateful for a strong ally in Foreign Minister Erkki Toumioja, who consistently makes the case for gender equality as a prerequisite for progress. We would like to work even more closely with Finland to push forward at the global level.[73]

As Outshoorn and Kantola remind us, "state feminism" usually refers to feminist activities carried out by official state policy mechanisms.[74] Therefore, Wallström's praise for official state representatives including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Prime Minister Stefan Lofven, and Foreign Minister Erkki Toumioja signaled that she is not averse to "top-down" systems of decision-making.

Transforming Feminist Stream Discourses

While Wallström appealed to the rhetorical norms of TFNs and state feminism, she used the majority of her three speeches to model how her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective could transform these competing feminist flows into an equal partnership based in collaboration, cooperation, and compromise. In order to transform "top-down" and "bottom-up" streams of feminist decision-making into a collaborative process, Wallström re-conceptualized feminism as bi-directional. Rather than use the labels "top-down, bottom-up" or "from-above, from-below,"[75] Wallström discussed the directionality of her feminist foreign policy through the terms "upstream" and "downstream."[76] She used these labels twice in her speech at USIP, asserting first that, "Achieving gender equality will require new and coherent approaches, upstream and downstream, including everything from agenda setting, information and data gathering, analysis and decision-making, and intervention design to follow up, and accountability."[77] She later reiterated her belief that integrating civil society organizations into the policymaking process "will be crucial both upstream in defining priorities and downstream in implementing the policy on the ground."[78] Choosing the metaphor of "upstream and downstream," instead of "top-down"

and "bottom-up," emphasized the sense of "flow" that is central to Wallström's overall argument. While "top-down/bottom-up" suggests a hierarchy with fixed positions, "upstream/downstream" implies ongoing movement without fixed beginning or end points. Moreover, "stream" metaphors imply that something has agency to move or swim with or against the stream, unlike the "top-down" and "bottom-up" metaphors that imply that things move with unmitigated force. Challenging the hierarchical relationships between global governance actors was essential to Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective and her goal of facilitating partnerships based in collaboration, cooperation, and compromise between global governance actors. In her other two speeches, first at Kvinna till Kvinna and second at Helsinki University, Wallström demonstrated what this bi-directional exchange might look like.

At Kvinna till Kvinna, Wallström told a story that demonstrated how otherwise overlooked information might flow "up" to nation-states. She explained, "When the plan for this bridge in Sri Lanka was presented, women could point out that one thing was missing: a lane for pedestrians. Men travel by cars and motorbikes, but women and children often walk."[79] Wallström used this example to illustrate how a development project could become more feminist if women's experiences and input "on the ground" were taken seriously and helped to flow "upstream." Likewise, in her speech in Helsinki, Wallström argued that recommendations must also flow "downstream." For example, she argued that national level leadership is important to ensure that feminist policies are carried through. She noted that setting a feminist foreign policy agenda "starts at the highest level at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where all the four top positions-two ministers and two state secretaries- are held by women. . . . Pushing forward in all areas we have started to transform norms and values."[80] Here, Wallström demonstrated how a strong state feminist agenda might flow downward to shape more localized

grassroots efforts. In these examples, Wallström modeled how a moderate foreign policy perspective avoids choosing between "top-down" or "bottom-up," by constructing a bi-directional flow of information in which those pursuing "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes would meet as equal partners, exchanging information and working together in pursuit of common gender equality goals.

Importantly, Wallström constructed herself and her feminist foreign policy as the midpoint that would facilitate a cooperative, bi-directional, exchange of information. During her speech at Kvinna till Kvinna, Wallström demonstrated how a foreign minister might facilitate this process. She explained that she had "received some very useful recommendations from Kvinna till Kvinna. Let me mention them, while adding a short comment."[81] Here, Wallström began to situate herself, and her moderate approach to policymaking, as the link through which the Kvinna till Kvinna recommendations would flow "upstream" to the Swedish government. One Kivinna till Kvinna recommendation asserted that "the single biggest threat to women's rights defenders is the lack of recognition from governments and international bodies."[82] Wallström responded that "this analysis is correct" and pledged that her government would "support and hopefully develop the existing legal framework supporting the work of femdefenders."[83] In this exchange, Wallström implied that her position as a nation-state representative would allow her to bring Kvinna till Kvinna's recommendations into the government's formation of future policy. By responding to these recommendations, Wallström began to reverse the "lack of recognition" that served as one source of conflict between nation-state and TFN approaches to feminism.

Wallström's negotiation of different feminist "stream" rhetorics reveals how a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective might transform competing rhetorical norms, in this case "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches to policymaking, into an equal partnership between

actors. Importantly, Wallström's rhetoric suggests that foreign ministers play an essential role in facilitating these new partnerships between global governance actors. Put differently, Wallström's bi-directional strategy necessitates a mid-point at which recommendations converge in their movement either "upstream" or "downstream." It is this midpoint that foreign ministers should occupy in order to enable partnerships to form between transnational feminist activists and the national and supranational institutions of global governance.

Transforming Human Rights Discourses

After 1993, when the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna formally declared that women's rights are human rights, scholars have noted a difference between how nation-states and transnational activists construct human rights discourses. Nation-states frequently take an interventionist approach in their appeals to human rights, while activists use "rights" discourses to critique nation-state hegemony. Leela Fernandes argued that these rhetorical differences have resulted in a tension, forcing scholars and activists to

> navigate between the danger of imposing a universalistic rights framework on cross-cultural contexts and the danger of minimizing the importance of the work that local activists and thinkers have done by strategically using rights-based frameworks to pursue very real struggles against cultural, political, and economic inequalities.[84]

In short, nation-states typically promote a universal idea of human rights, while TFNs ascribe to a more nuanced understanding of human rights that takes into account the unique demands of particular communities. To transform the "human rights" rhetorical norms of nation-states and activist organizations, Wallström constructed nation-states and activist organizations as co-beneficiaries of her human rights policy proposals. Like her transformation of feminist "stream" discourses, this strategy worked to create the conditions in which nations and activists could forge new relationships based in notions of compromise, collaboration, and cooperation. In what follows, I briefly outline the human rights discourses Wallström negotiated, then I explore how

her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective appealed to both nation-states and transnational activists, and finally, I argue that she transformed human rights norms by framing nation-states and activist organizations as co-beneficiaries of her human rights proposals. In doing so, Wallström demonstrated how feminist policymakers might articulate an understanding of human rights that is attentive to both nation-state and transnational feminist activist concerns.

Rhetorical Norms of Human Rights Discourses

To transform hierarchical relationships into partnerships, Wallström needed to demonstrate how her moderate approach to feminist policymaking could advance the human rights work of both nation-states and transnational activists. Within nation-state human rights discourse, Wallström's rhetoric needed to participate in a discursive shift in which nation-states increasingly highlight issues of human rights and gender as important policy considerations.[85] Fernandes explained that this shift took place as nation-states moved toward "a broader conception of foreign policy that included issues such as economic development and women's rights and that was not founded solely on military action."[86] Hillary Clinton's Secretary of State tenure is often cited as an example of this shift, as she suggested that human rights abuses, especially against women, have a significant impact on global security and stability.[87] While this new direction in foreign policy discourse is framed as attentive to the localized struggles of various groups, scholars argue that it obscures an underlying "colonial imperative" that is anything but emancipatory.[88] Multiple critiques have been levied against the use of "human rights" in national discourses. Dana Collins, Sylvanna Falcon, Sharmila Lodhia, and Molly Talcott offered five criticisms of how "human rights" is problematically deployed by nation-states. Nation-state human rights discourse, they contend, tends to be Western-centric, is used to advance imperialist projects, privileges nation-state based forms of governance, frames issues in problematically universal ways that erase considerations of race and gender, and is based in

liberal individualistic systems of justice.[89] As the representative of a Western nation-state, against whom these critiques are often levied, Wallström needed to attend to the larger shift towards human rights in foreign policy discourse while overcoming the critiques of nation-states using "human rights" in universalizing and imperialist ways.

Wallström also needed to contend with the transnational feminist usage of "human rights" as a strategy for critiquing nation-state hegemony. Niamh Reilly argued that a transnational engagement with human rights works by productively "(re)interpreting universal human rights, as part of the fabric of emancipatory forms of transnational feminism."[90] This (re)interpretation involves organizing around concrete, locally situated issues, extending the application of human rights to previously excluded "individuals, groups, issues, and contexts," and challenging the "systemic interplay of oppressive patriarchal, capitalist and racist power relations."[91] Collins et al. label this transnational discourse of human rights as "radically progressive," adding that it emerges "when marginalized communities from around the world demand that the state be accountable to them."[92] The Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), for example, demonstrate what demanding a voice in the decision-making process looks like. Their mission statement says, "We want funders and global policy frameworks to demonstrate increased commitment to resourcing women's rights and gender justice. . . . We want to revolutionize approaches to funding and resources."[93] This mission statement offers one example of how TFNs use human rights to hold governments "accountable for abusive patterns."[94] Seeking the support of TFNs, Wallström needed to negotiate these competing rhetorical impulses in her transformation of human rights rhetoric.

Meeting Rhetorical Demands

In order to achieve this transformation, Wallström first demonstrated that she shared the concerns of both nation-states and activist organizations. To illustrate her commitment to the

human rights concerns of nation-states, Wallström foregrounded national security and military considerations. Scholars note that violations of human rights are often used to justify nation-state military interventions and projects of nation building.[95] For example, Dana Cloud argued that one of the United States's justifications for the war in Afghanistan was to "save" Afghan women from human rights abuses perpetuated against them by Afghan men.[96] Wallström offered a very similar justification for her feminist foreign policy. For example, in her speech at Helsinki University, she cited two examples of human rights abuses against women: the increase in sexual violence perpetrated against women in Eastern Ukraine and the alarming numbers of women and girls being trafficked and sexually assaulted in ISIS controlled territory. From these examples, Wallström concluded, "I hope it is obvious why we must include 100 percent of the population when we face war and conflict."[97] By constructing a relationship between human rights abuses and war, Wallström reinforced the assumption that violations of women's human rights necessitate military action, an assumption that underlies interventionist projects of nation building. Likewise, in her speech at USIP, Wallström again connected women's human rights with national security concerns, arguing, "In many parts of the world, the fact that women and girls continue to be denied their human rights constitutes a growing threat to peace and security."[98] Just as the United States used human rights violations against women to justify military intervention for the sake of peace and security, Wallström constructed a similar relationship between human rights violations and threats to peace and security.

In addition to addressing the human rights concerns of nation-states, Wallström demonstrated how her foreign policy perspective attended to the human rights concerns of transnational feminist activists. One goal of TFN human rights rhetoric is to ensure that the voices of women experiencing human rights abuses are heard. For example, one objective of WEDO is to, "Increase women's participation and leadership role in policy and the economy,

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and strengthen policies and legal frameworks for gender equality and women's access to resources through experience sharing and policy advocacy nationally and internationally."[99] In all three speeches, Wallström criticized how the UN executed Resolution 1325. On her view, it failed to take seriously the contributions made by women human rights defenders on the ground in areas of conflict. Wallström's primary contention was that Resolution1325 often obscures the voices of women living and working in conflict areas in favor of highlighting the opinions of official nation-state representatives. For instance, during her speech to the Kivinna till Kvinna organization, Wallström noted that "governments and international bodies" often fail to recognize the work of activists, and that their work is often "not seen as part of the 'real' work to promote human rights."[100] Likewise, during her speech in Helsinki, Wallström reiterated, "we must remember that women are not only victims or survivors, but most importantly, strong actors for change in their societies."[101] These comments echo the statements civil society briefers made during the UN debates on the WPS Agenda, specifically that the UN does not listen to civil society actors. Thus, while she represented a nation-state, Wallström also worked to deploy "human rights" in ways that resonated with transnational feminist activist concerns.

Transforming Human Rights Discourses

Through her moderate approach to feminist policymaking Wallström constructed nation-states and transnational activist organizations as the co-beneficiaries of her human rights proposals. In doing so, she demonstrates how a feminist foreign policy perspective might successfully articulate transnational feminist human rights values while remaining attentive to the demands of nation-states. Instead of offering different proposals aimed at either the wants and needs of nations and supranational institutions, or directed at the concerns of TFNs, Wallström framed her feminist policy proposals as advantageous to both. In other words, Wallström suggested that transnational feminist organizations and nation-states did not need to

compete for resources and space on the foreign policy agenda because her feminist foreign policy would be mutually beneficial to all actors.

Throughout her three speeches, Wallström repeatedly linked the protection of individual women's human rights to projects for the advancement of human rights on a national level. For example, Wallström discussed the persistent violations of human rights in Columbia. After outlining human rights abuses suffered by individual women, Wallström argued, "The question must be asked: What happens to a woman, to a family, to a village and to an entire country when there is a total lack of justice."[102] Here, Wallström developed a nested construction of human rights in which abuses against individual women have far reaching implications for all segments of society, ranging from families to entire nations. This nested construction of human rights echoes TFN understandings of power. By moving from localized experiences to national policy, Wallström made the experiences of individual women central to national and supranational policymaking. This construction served to bind together the concerns of activists and the concerns of nation-states as part of a single program of human rights protection and advancement. Wallström frequently returned to this nested construction of human rights. For example, at Helsinki University she argued:

> A feminist foreign policy responds to one of the greatest challenges of this century: the continued violations of women's and girls' human rights- in times of peace and in conflict. Failing to do so will ultimately undermine our overarching foreign policy and security objectives.[103]

Likewise, she explained, "Ensuring women's rights has benefited both women and men, and our societies at large."[104] Through this nested construction, Wallström implied that nations and individuals can either succeed together by attending to human rights abuses, or they will fail together by continuing to ignore human rights violations. In doing so, Wallström made nations and activists partners in the work of protecting human rights by addressing them as either co-beneficiaries of progress or co-victims of further abuses.

After establishing nation-states and activist organizations as co-beneficiaries of her human rights proposals, Wallström offered examples of how the actions of feminist activists could advance human rights on the national and global level, and vice versa, how the work of nations could improve the protection of individual women's human rights. First, she argued that the work of activist organizations could make nations and global institutions more democratic and better protectors of human rights. Wallström argued, "By calling for increased influence and measures aimed at improving the lives of women, women's rights defenders are in fact challenging existing power structures and the distribution of power." She added that protecting these female human rights defenders is "crucial to the overall struggle for human rights, peace, democracy and the rule of law."[105] Second, Wallström explained how national human rights policies can benefit communities and individual women. For example, she noted that "A recent visit to Eastern Ukraine by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs . . . brought to light that women were more or less invisible in the humanitarian work, and in the reporting of the conflict." She added that understanding the needs of women was the first step in "addressing these shortcomings."[106] In these examples, Wallström demonstrated how nation-states and activist organizations could work together for their mutual advantage, instead of viewing one another as competitors over policymaking resources. Across her speeches, Wallström refused to prioritize either nations or individual women as the intended beneficiary of her feminist policymaking. Instead, she constructed nation-states and individual women as co-beneficiaries of her proposals. By linking the concerns of nation-states to the concerns of transnational activists through a nested understanding of human rights, Wallström developed a strategy for discussing human rights that privileged cooperation instead of competition and created the conditions in which nations and activists could view one another as collaborators in the advancement of women's human rights.

Wallström's management of different human rights concerns offers an example of how a feminist foreign policy perspective might articulate transnational feminist human rights values without violating nation-state demands, and vice versa, how a national actor can appeal to state interests while still attending to the concerns of activists. In doing so, Wallström constructed a model of feminist policymaking that answers Fernandes's call for a new approach to human rights discourse that "neither condemns nor romanticizes" and is able to "navigate between the danger of imposing a universalistic rights framework . . . and the danger of minimizing the importance of the work that local activists and thinkers have done."[107] Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective offers one example of what this middle ground might look like in practice.

Expanding the Feminist Network

Wallström's third strategy builds upon the transformations discussed in the previous two sections. First, Wallström demonstrated how a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective might transform hierarchical "top-down" and "bottom-up" feminisms into a partnership based on a cooperative, bi-directional exchange of information. Second, she demonstrated how policymakers could manage different human rights concerns by constructing nation-states and activist organizations as co-beneficiaries of feminist policy proposals. By transforming these sets of rhetorical norms, Wallström created the conditions in which her third strategy could emerge. Across her three speeches, Wallström expanded the concept of a transnational feminist network in ways that carved out space for both nation-states and transnational feminist activists. In other words, instead of conceiving of nation-states and TFNs as separate actors, Wallström brought them together within her expanded understanding of a feminist network.

As Suzy D'Enbeau explains, TFNs usually do not included nation-states; instead, they "exemplify the interdependence and flexible forms of cooperation that result when organizing

occurs beyond national borders."[108] Wallström extended the idea of TFNs as sites of "flexible cooperation" and organization around issues instead of nations,[109] by positing nation-states as part of the network, instead of outside of it. Throughout her speeches, Wallström strove to transform the hierarchies that govern interactions between supranational institutions, nations, and activists into a collaborative relationship based on compromise and cooperation. For example, in her speech to Kvinna till Kvinna, Wallström highlighted the need for cooperation between global governance actors. She said, "I do indeed want to pursue, expand and explore further approaches to cooperating with you for the common goals we have in strengthening women's rights."[110] To that end, Wallström proposed building feminist coalitions across levels of power. She asserted: "We will need to work multilaterally and bilaterally, creating global coalitions in order to ensure that gender perspectives are included in strategic discussions, decisions, and most importantly concretized at country level."[111] Likewise, Wallström highlighted the importance of democratizing whose opinions would be taken seriously in the foreign policy decision-making process. She suggested that, "ensuring women's rights and participation in central decision-making processes, including in peace building efforts and peace negotiations" was central to her feminist foreign policy.[112] Here, Wallström goes further than the UN's efforts to transnationalize the implementation of the WPS Agenda. As discussed in chapter two, the UN relegated civil society actors to a subordinate role in the decision-making process. Wallström, on the other hand, calls for incorporating the perspectives of activists "in central decision-making processes." Across these statements Wallström constructed a vision of how nation-states and transnational activists could come together as equal partners in a larger feminist network where everyone would have a valued say in the agenda-setting process.

Additionally, Wallström argued that not only would nations and activist organizations come together to set a feminist foreign policy agenda, they would also work together to achieve

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that agenda by cooperatively using all of the tools available to nation-states and activist organizations. Wallström argued that each actor provided unique tools and resources that were necessary to bring about feminist change. In fact, Wallström frequently suggested that feminist change was more likely if global governance actors worked together. For example, at Helsinki University, Wallström clearly articulated her belief that the existing relationships between activists and the institutions of global governance were not as productive as they could be. She said, "There is a clear gap between what people in conflict zones experience-not least women- and the high-level discussions in the UN and elsewhere."[113] In her speech to Kvinna till Kvinna, Wallström argued that cooperation was an effective approach to filling this gap. She explained how on-the-ground feminist organizations "can help strengthen national investigation, prosecution, legal reforms and law enforcement to promote women's human rights,"[114] noting that, "strong women's organizations increase the chances for better law and policy in terms of gender-based violence."[115] Similarly, she claimed that nation-states also have valuable tools that might improve the work of activists. For example, Wallström suggested that the "leadership of the US administration" was critical to helping to move a human rights agenda forward,[116] implying that formal governmental mechanisms have utility in achieving women's human rights objectives. These statements bound nation-states and activist organizations together as part of a network in which each actor was important and irreplaceable. Ultimately, Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective required global governance actors to work together cooperatively, instead of continuing to pursue different methods of feminist change.

A Moderate Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective

This chapter has argued that Margot Wallström transformed the rhetorical demands of different global governance actors by constructing a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective based on the principles of cooperation, compromise, and collaboration. This vision

of feminist policymaking allowed Wallström, the representative of a nation-state, to articulate

transnational feminist values in her foreign policy discourse. To explain and justify her feminist

foreign policy perspective, Wallström developed three rhetorical strategies. First, she negotiated

different feminist "stream" rhetorics by conceptualizing her feminist foreign policy as bi-

directional. This strategy framed nation-states and activist organizations as collaborators who

would share information in pursuit of common gender equality goals. Second, Wallström

managed different human rights concerns by establishing nations and activists as co-beneficiaries

of her foreign policy human rights proposals. This strategy developed a nested construction of

human rights in which individual women and nations were bound together, allowing

policymakers to address the concerns of both simultaneously. Finally, Wallström expanded the

meaning of a transnational feminist network in order to carve out space for both nation-states and

activist organizations, allowing them to work together as partners in pursuit of feminist and

gender equality goals. These three strategies demonstrate how prioritizing compromise,

collaboration, and cooperation transformed hierarchical relationships between global governance

actors into a policymaking partnership.

While the three speeches analyzed here represent a starting point to understanding how a

moderate feminist foreign policy perspective might manage the complex relationships between

global governance, transnational feminism, foreign policy, and the rhetorical leadership of

foreign ministers there is still work to be done. As *The Atlantic* of August 25, 2016 argued,

"Margot Wallström took office as Sweden's foreign minister in 2014, declaring she would

pursue a 'feminist foreign policy.' She's now held the post for two years, and it's still not

entirely clear what she meant."[117] The article later added, "Her ongoing experiment raises bigger

questions about what it means for more women to conduct foreign policy."[118] This chapter offers

an attempt to answer those questions by demonstrating how Wallström constructed a moderate

vision of feminist policymaking that linked transnational feminist values and national foreign policy discourse. This analysis of Wallström's rhetoric points to significant implications regarding the potential of moderate rhetorics to effect policy change and represents a necessary shift in scholarship away from US centered foreign policy rhetoric.

First, this paper reveals the potential of a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective. Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser and Rebecca Trannell note that "moderate" movement rhetorics are inadequately defined in social movement literature.[119] In an attempt to correct this oversight, the authors hypothesize that moderate rhetorics have "a unique role as a key link between the radical and conservative flanks – which might otherwise be so strategically disparate as to seem unrelated or to be unable to work together."[120] This chapter exposes the potential of moderate rhetorics to link together conservative nation-state systems of global governance and the more radical advocacy of transnational feminist activists. While a range of scholars have addressed how transnational feminism emerged as a challenge to nation-state systems of governance, less attention has been paid to how these forces might work together to advance new approaches to policymaking. Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective reveals how policymakers can marshal these forces to articulate new approaches to solving global problems. In this case, Wallström challenged the patriarchal nature of nation-state foreign policy discourse by invoking transnational feminist values, and lent authority to transnational feminist activist organizations by linking them to nation-states. In doing so, Wallström offers a model feminist policymaking that transformed entrenched hierarchies between global governance actors into equal partnerships. Other policymakers may find a moderate perspective useful when crafting innovative approaches to solving other global problems. However, this model of rhetorical leadership is not without constraints. Wallström's rhetoric assumes that nation-states and activists are open to engaging with one another to advance feminist goals. This strategy of

rhetorical leadership would be less effective in negotiating the differing demands of militant

activist organizations, who are often unwilling in engage the nation-state, or isolationist states,

who are unwilling to take seriously the concerns of transnational groups. Thus, while

Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective may help nation-states and

transnational activist organizations forge new cooperative and collaborative relationships, in

order to be effective, nation-states and activists must be willing to engage one another.

Second, this analysis draws attention to the importance of studying foreign policy

discourse outside of a US context. Generally, rhetorical scholars have approached questions of

foreign policy rhetoric from the perspective of American presidents. For example, scholars have

analyzed the foreign policy discourse of Barack Obama,[121] George W. Bush,[122] Bill Clinton,[123]

George H.W. Bush,[124] Ronald Reagan,[125] Jimmy Carter,[126] John F. Kennedy,[127] Dwight D.

Eisenhower,[128] and Harry Truman.[129] This list is far from exhaustive, but it demonstrates G.

Thomas Goodnight and Kathryn M. Olsen's argument that, "Presently, presidential persuasion is

the orientation that underwrites rhetorical analysis."[130] This analysis of Wallström's rhetoric

offers one effort to shift this discussion by contributing an analysis of foreign policy discourse

outside of the context of the US presidency. Wallström's foreign policy rhetoric draws our

attention to the range of nations, organizations, and actors who all make important and influential

foreign policy decisions outside of the US presidency. In order to develop a comprehensive

understanding of foreign policy rhetoric, more work is needed to diversify which case studies are

deemed worthy of analysis.

On January 18, 2019, the Swedish Parliament confirmed Lofven to a second term as

Prime Minister. On January 21, 2019 he appointed Margot Wallström to a second term as

Swedish Foreign Minister, assuring that her feminist foreign policy will remain firmly in place

for the foreseeable future.[131] *ForeignPolicy.com* argues that while more nations like Canada,

Finland, Australia, and the United Kingdom have made moves to embrace feminist policymaking, "there is no universal agreement about how to define a feminist foreign policy. More work is certainly needed to define, test, and study feminist foreign policy on the world stage."[132] This chapter offers a model for studying emerging national feminist foreign policy discourses in ways that avoid thinking in terms of top/down, local/global, either/or, and nation-state/activist organization. Instead, this chapter calls for a more nuanced way of thinking about the relationships between policymakers. Wallström's moderate feminist foreign policy perspective demonstrates how these dichotomous relationships can be transformed into equal policymaking partnerships. This re-envisioning of the relationships between global governance actors will ideally enable greater gains for women's rights and improve the material realities of women across the globe.

Note

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CHAPTER 4

A Radical Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective:

The Rhetoric of the "Movements, Borders, Rights?

Feminist Perspectives on Global Issues in Europe" WIDE+ Conference

On November 13, 2014, *The Economist* argued, "Nationalism is back."[1] Before Donald

Trump announced his candidacy for president of the United States and before Great Britain voted

to leave the EU, *The Economist* predicted, "Politicians who base their appeal on the idea that

they are standing up for their own countries will grow in power and influence."[2] The article

further predicted that a rise in nationalism would lead to an "increase in international tensions

and an uncompromising background for efforts at multilateral co-operation, whether on climate,

trade, taxation or development."[3] These predictions largely proved to be correct. 2014, 2015, and

2016 saw a marked increase in right-wing and nationalist political movements. The resurgence of

nationalism has had global reach. For example, *Politico* labeled Vladimir Putin's annexation of

Crimea the "harbinger of this new global nationalism"[4] while *The Economist* looked to India's

2014 election of right-wing Hindu nationalist Nerendra Modi as an early warning sign of a

global nationalist resurgence.[5]

The resurgence of nationalism in global politics extends to the United States and Western

Europe. On June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced his candidacy for president of the United

States. In his speech, he called Mexicans rapists, pledged to build a wall on the southern border,

and introduced his campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again."[6] As president, he has

withdrawn the US from landmark international treaties including the Paris Climate Accord and

the UN Human Rights Council.[7] Examples of increased nationalism in Western Europe include

Great Britain's June 23, 2016 "Brexit" vote to leave the European Union, Marine Le Pen's

unsuccessful 2017 candidacy for the French Presidency, and the rise of far-right political groups in Germany following Angela Merkel's open door refugee policy.[8] Together, these events represent a turn away from the institutions and agreements of global governance, such as the United Nations, European Union, World Trade Organization, Tans-Pacific Trade Partnership, and Paris Climate Accord. Instead, nationalism has galvanized economic protectionism, reduced immigration, and limited civil society spaces.[9]

This shift towards nationalism and economic protectionism has produced a range of policies that disproportionately harm women. For example, austerity measures in the United Kingdom including cuts to childcare services, income assistance, and health care for the elderly place an undue burden on women who are forced to compensate for gaps in these service with their own unpaid labor.[10] The House of Commons Library, an independent research service of the UK Parliament, found that since 2010 women have carried 86 percent of the burden for austerity measures. They add that by 2020 austerity measures will have cost women £79 billion, compared to a £13 cost to men.[11] In addition to economic hardship, nationalism also leads to restrictive social policies for women. For example, after the Polish national-conservative Law and Justice Party won a majority of seats in the 2015 Parliamentary election, lawmakers proposed a total abortion ban, even in cases of rape, incest, or risk to the mother's health.[12] In the face of these harmful and restrictive nationalist policies, women have organized in new and powerful ways. For example, Polish women's grassroots groups organized mass protests in which an estimated 100,000 women took to the streets and refused to attend school, work, or perform domestic chores until the abortion ban was defeated.[13]

In order to unite the efforts of feminist activists across Europe and to combat the resurgence of nationalism, Women in Development Europe (WIDE+), a Europe based feminist network that that works to influence EU trade and economic policy, held a conference on

October 24-25, 2016, in Brussels, Belgium. This conference was entitled "Movements, Borders, Rights? Feminist Perspectives on Global Issues in Europe." It brought together more than 170 activists from thirty-one countries to decide how feminists should confront "current multiple crises."[14] The conference asserted that "feminist perspectives" needed to be "repoliticized" in order to combat "new regional and global power constellations"[15] Across the conference, participants developed a radical feminist vision of global governance that prioritized structural transformation over adjustive policy. Over the course of the conference, activists who spanned generations, geographical location, class, race, and orientation articulated a new perspective of feminist policymaking aimed at "social transformation."[16] This radical feminist foreign policy perspective was presented as a new vision of global governance that would confront, challenge, and ultimately solve the problems caused by resurgent nationalist movements.

To assert their feminist vision of global governance, conference participants needed to navigate a rhetorical landscape saturated with nationalist rhetorics. In order to bypass the rhetorical norms of resurgent nationalist rhetorics, rhetorics that are often hostile to feminist policymaking, conference participants situated their demands and policy recommendations in a larger context of transnational activism. Bart Cammaerts and Leo Van Audenhove explain that transnational activism takes place "under and above the nation state."[17] Organizations like WIDE+ who work in these transnational contexts have been variously described as "global civil society organizations, transnational advocacy networks, and transnational social movement organizations."[18] Valentine M. Moghadam explains that these organizations pursue policy change by "engag[ing] in information exchange, mutual support, and a combination of lobbying, advocacy and direct action toward the realization of their goals of equality and empowerment for women and social justice and societal democratization."[19] The 2016 WIDE+ conference created an opportunity for geographically dispersed members of the WIDE+ network to construct new

policy priorities and develop new activist tactics that were tailored to confront the nationalist turn in global governance.

Rather than work within the existing structures of global governance to incorporate a feminist perspective into decision-making processes, conference participants argued that the current system of global governance was fundamentally incapable of adequately addressing the concerns of women and girls. Therefore, conference participants demanded transformative and system wide change. For them, a feminist perspective was not something that could be *added on* to existing systems. Rather, conference participants articulated an approach to feminist policymaking in which a feminist perspective would *replace* the existing norms and structures of global governance. I find that conference participants developed rhetorical strategies to establish new policy goals, define advocacy tactics, and construct new relational practices that the WIDE+ network would implement in their pursuit of feminist foreign policy. I argue that these strategies challenged the foundational principles of governance instead of working to improve existing institutions. The result: the WIDE+ conference produced a radical feminist foreign policy perspective.

Specifically, the conference's rhetoric articulated a feminist alternative to global governance by: 1. advancing new normative standards steeped in a feminist ethic of care, 2. justifying radical tactics through rhetorics of nostalgia, and 3. constructing new forms of political influence though a postcolonial understanding of power. First, conference participants articulated an ethic of care as an alternative normative standard for policymaking. Fiona Robinson argues that an ethic of care challenges the "instrumentalism of political realism, the normative ideas of liberalism, and the epistemology of rationalism."[20] An ethic of care, as a perspective for governance, demands policies that support the goals of "caring for the self, caring for others, and caring for the world."[21] To construct this alternative policy perspective, conference participants

worked to deconstruct the existing normative standards of global governance. They did so by framing the current state of global politics as a crisis in which women were the disproportionate victims. By labeling governance as a "crisis of care," participants justified swift and transformative change. Next, conference participants articulated care as a worthwhile alternative philosophy of governance; one that would end the "crisis of care." To do so, conference participants demonstrated how prioritizing care produced benefits that went far beyond increased gender equality.

Second, conference participants constructed nostalgic arguments to justify radical and disruptive feminist activism. Through their nostalgia, conference participants suggested that, while an ethic of care might be a new approach to governance, the tactics required to precipitate that transformation were well established. Conference participants deployed nostalgic arguments to frame radical, non-adjustive tactics as time-tested, effective elements of the global feminist movement. Specifically, they looked to spirit and energy of the feminist movement in the 1990s and early 2000s as a model for how the WIDE+ network should engage with nation-states and supranational organizations in the future. More specifically, I find that conference participants co-opted the types of restorative nostalgia that are more commonly associated with nationalist political movements. Svetlana Boym explains that restorative nostalgias frame change as purification and are used by nationalist movements to "restore" conservative political traditions.[22] In this chapter, I argue that conference participants co-opted the nostalgic rhetorical strategies of nationalist movements to justify radical feminist tactics. Through the use of restorative nostalgia, conference participants framed nationalism as a threat that needed to be eradicated in order to restore the feminist energy and momentum of 1990s and presented radical feminist activism as a traditional, established, and effective element of global politics.

Finally, conference participants renegotiated their relationships to one another in order to generate additional political power. Lise Rolandsen Agustin explains that the political power of civil society actors is largely discursive; it is based on the strength and circulation of ideas.[23] Manual Castells adds that the primary way transnational actors generate power is by forming large transnational networks that can circulate policy recommendations in a variety of institutions.[24] However, as transnational actors form networks, they must negotiate tensions between a universal vision and the particular concerns of diverse members.[25] Norander and Harter argue that postcolonial reflexivity, the process of carefully examining an organization's practices of inclusion and exclusion, might offer a more nuanced understanding of power in transnational networked contexts.[26] Through their practice of postcolonial reflexivity, WIDE+ conference participants developed a new model of generating power in global governance in which universalizing and particularist approaches were presented as complementary strategies. On one hand, conference participants worked to construct new transnational networks that would be large enough to exert pressure on supranational institutions. On the other hand, the conference called individual women to use their unique positions of privilege to advance a feminist policy perspective in the political institutions of individual nation-states.

Altogether these strategies reveal how conference participants renegotiated their relationships to one another in order to develop a unified vision of feminist policymaking that was tailored to confront the rise of nationalism in the institutions of global governance. The radical feminist foreign policy perspective articulated by conference participants challenged the very foundations of global governance. Before turning to my analysis, I will situate the conference in a system of European civil society activism that presents both opportunities and constraints for transnational feminist activists. This context spotlights the complex rhetorical

norms that conference participants needed to navigate as they advanced a new perspective of policymaking.

WIDE+ and European Civil Society Activism

To appreciate the rhetorical strategies that conference participants developed to advance a radical feminist foreign policy perspective, it's important to understand the context of European civil society activism in which the conference was situated. I begin by tracing the development of the WIDE+ organization including their institutional norms and current advocacy tactics. Next, I situate WIDE+ in a larger context of EU policies that create both opportunities and constraints for civil society organizations. Finally, I outline the goals and structure of the 2016 conference. Specifically, I establish that while WIDE+ is a Europe based organization, the conference worked to balance the perspectives of feminist activists from both the Global North and Global South.

WIDE+, in its current form, emerged in 2012. However, the organization stems from WIDE, which was established in 1985 after the 1985 Third World Conference on Women held in Nairobi, Kenya.[27] When WIDE was disbanded in 2011 "due to financial circumstances," WIDE+ was formed from the remains of the WIDE network.[28] The organization's website argues that this history ensures that WIDE+ is "perfectly placed as an indispensable player in influencing and transforming European Union and global economic policies."[29] WIDE's history of activism is significant. From 1985 to 2011, the organization grew to include twelve networked national platforms in Ireland, Austria, Spain, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, England, Switzerland, Holland, Finland, and Denmark.[30] WIDE was an active participant in many of the historic international conferences of the 1990s that "generated an unprecedented global consensus on a shared vision of development."[31]

At these conferences, WIDE worked to highlight what they saw as the inherent male bias in economic adjustment policy and pushed for macroeconomic policies that included human rights targets as well as targets for monetary aggregates.[32] WIDE lobbied for these goals at The UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the International Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994, the World Summit for Social Development in March 1995, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.[33] At Beijing, WIDE's president, Helen O'Connell, presented a statement during the General Exchange of Views.[34] She identified two tensions that plague civil society organizations. First, activists need to balance a good working relationship with official EU governments while remaining critical of their policies. Second, activists face an organizational tension between maintaining a central office that can offer fast and structured interventions while identifying as a network that prioritizes horizontal and grassroots decision-making.[35] WIDE+ worked to resolve these tensions in their organizational hierarchy.

WIDE+ is formally registered as an international non-profit association that fully complies with Belgian law and is headquartered in Brussels. It does not profess a political or religious affiliation.[36] Through their governance structure, WIDE+ works to maintain a "horizontal participatory democracy"[37] that allows them to strike a balance between a well-organized and funded advocacy machine and supports "democratic, decentralized, inclusive, and transparent decision-making processes in which members have ownership over the network."[38] WIDE+'s organizational system includes a General Assembly, Caucus, and Board. The General Assembly is the highest decision-making body and is comprised of all WIDE+ members. The Caucus, who develops an overall strategic direction for the network, and the board, who are responsible for legal and financial oversight and the daily management of WIDE+, are elected by the General Assembly. In addition to these formal governance structures, WIDE+ also maintains

several working groups. Any member can set up a working group and appeal to the Caucus for a formal mandate and funding.[39]

WIDE+ pursues a three-part mission. First, the organization works to create and expand spaces for feminist activism. They "promote feminist approaches as alternatives to/against/in the face of neoliberal agendas through the praxis of collective democratic empowerment."[40] Next, WIDE+ aims to transform development and economic policy to reflect a commitment to "fundamental human rights."[41] Finally, WIDE+ works to build coalitions with activists in pursuit of these goals. They argue that the best way to "bring about transformative change" is through "solidarity with numerous feminist, women's and human rights movements."[42] WIDE+ primarily seeks to influence the external policies of the EU. Rather than focus on domestic policy within the nations that make up the EU, WIDE+ focuses their advocacy on influencing how the EU interacts with the rest of the world. Specifically, WIDE+ works to shape EU trade and development policy. They argue that EU policies must be considered within a larger global context.[43] To them, gender justice and social justice in Europe can only exist if they are part of a global "feminist vision."[44] Therefore, WIDE+ works to build solidarity between European women's groups and global movements for gender equality and human rights. These partnerships include women in Eastern Europe and the Global South, migrants, women of color, and the LGBTQ community. [45]

WIDE+ both benefits from and is constrained by the norms of feminist activism in the European Union. Sabine Lang explains that European women formed transnational feminist networks "long before the inception of the European Community in 1957."[46] She explains that European women have been cooperating with one another and mobilizing across national borders as early as the first women's movement in the late 19th century. Lang adds that transnational women's networks remain "highly active, visible, and overall successful actors in the European

Union."[47] For their part, the EU views civil society activists and NGOs favorably; they are perceived as "stakeholders for disenfranchised and marginalized populations."[48] To ensure that civil society organizations and NGOs are heard, the EU established "minimum standards for consultation and dialogue" in 2003.[49] When these guidelines are updated, civil society groups are invited to participate in the decision-making through "structured dialogue."[50] While the EU espouses a commitment to including civil society groups in the policy-making process, critics note that becoming closely aligned with formal political institutions is not always in the best interest of activist groups.[51] The EU's approach to working with civil society organizations creates both opportunities and constraints for groups like WIDE+ who seek to shape European policy.

Imogen Sudbery identified four resources that the EU provides non-state actors: arenas, policy instruments, funding programs, and points of reference.[52] These resources represent opportunities for groups working within the EU. First, the multi-level nature of EU governance offers non-state actors, who face unfavorable institutional norms at the domestic level, access to policy-makers.[53] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink introduced the term "boomerang mechanism" to explain this process.[54] According to Sudbery, the boomerang mechanism allows "domestic actors whose domestic channels of participation are blocked" to "bypass the state and use international channels to generate pressure on their national government from the outside."[55] Second, the EU produces policy instruments that function as resources for non-governmental organizations. These policy instruments, whether binding or non-binding, "empower non-state actors to hold national authorities to account."[56] Put differently, they allow non-state actors to serve a watchdog function in the EU policy process. Next, the EU offers resources in the form of funding programs that finance the work of NGOs.[57] Finally, the EU provides symbolic resources, or framing mechanisms, that aid NGOs in their efforts to shift domestic discourses.[58] Sudbery

argues that NGOs can use EU norms, laws, rights, and standards to legitimize and normalize progressive policies at the national level.[59]

While the EU offers significant resources to civil society organizations and NGOs, not every group is granted equal access to these valuable tools. The EU also constrains the work of groups hoping to benefit from these material and symbolic resources. Lise Rolandsen Agustin explains that the EU holds substantial power to "give voice and visibility to certain actors by recognizing them as valid interlocutors." She adds that the EU typically empowers groups that express opinions that are similar to official EU policy.[60] Pauline Cullen explains that through the allocation of funding, NGOs are pressured to fit their demands "within a discourse that resonates with EU-level policy-makers."[61] The pressure to conform to institutional demands in order to gain access to resources is especially prominent in the women's movement. Until 2002 there was only a single EU budget line available for women's organizations. This funding was earmarked for the European Women's Lobby (EWL).[62] The EWL was founded in 1990 and is the largest European umbrella organization working to promote gender equality and women's rights. It represents at least 25,000 member organizations from all EU states and candidate countries.[63] Unlike many activist organizations, the EWL is funded primarily by the EU commission. They have been widely criticized for abandoning more progressive gender policies in order to retain their funding and influence. Cullen explains, "the EWL's dependence on EU funding, its professional form, and use of conventional tactics" have led to criticism from "feminist activists and scholars who refer to a lack of inclusiveness in its decision-making and a lack of distance from its institutional sponsors."[64] The EWL co-organized and participated in the WIDE+ conference. Their participation paved the way for a debate among activists over the advantages and disadvantages of working within the EU system or challenging the system from the outside.

In addition to WIDE+ and the EWL, the "Movements, Borders, Rights? Feminist Perspectives on Global Issues in Europe" conference was organized in cooperation with the Heinrich Boll Foundation, the Rosa Luxembrurg Foundation (RLS), and the Fredrich Ebert foundation (FES). The Heinrich Boll Foundation is closely tied to the German Green Party but works independently to promote sustainability, advocate on behalf of the global ecosystem, and advance human rights. They work with 160 partner organizations in 60 countries.[65] The RLS is affiliated with the German Left party and supports "worker's and women's movements." The organization believes that social change requires "reflective confrontation."[66] To bring about change, RLS advocates for dialogue between the Global North and the Global South.[67] FES is associated with the German Social Democratic Party but works independently. The organization is "committed to the advancement of both socio-political and economic development in the spirit of social democracy."[68] Among these partners, WIDE+ was primarily responsible for the conference. WIDE+ hosted the conference website through their online platform and the WIDE+ annual General Assembly meeting took place after the first day's conference activities concluded.[69]

While the conference was organized by European organizations, the goals, participants, and structure of the conference gave equal weight to voices from the Global South. The EWL explained that the conference was a space for activists to expand their understanding of the "current situation in Europe from a feminist perspective" by participating in an exchange of ideas with women from the Global South.[70] The conference included three panels that introduced the broad themes of the conference: new topographies of power, the relationship between migration and women's rights, and the possibility of a feminist development perspective to combat austerity policies. In addition to these panels, the conference included eleven workshops on the same topics. These workshops allowed for greater interaction between speakers and audience

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members.[71] During the panels and workshops, equal speaking time was afforded to representatives from civil society organizations, academics, journalists, and women with first-hand experiences as migrants or refugees. Christa Wichterich, a member of the WIDE+ Caucus who chaired the first panel, explained that the speakers in each session were organized to "link a perspective from the Global South and a European perspective."[72] Each panel or workshop included at least one speaker from the Global North and one speaker from the Global South in order to ensure that different and often conflicting perspectives were given equal weight.

All together the conference produced seventeen hours and 31 minutes of audio recorded conference proceedings. In addition to the recordings, this chapter analyzes the written summaries WIDE+ produced for each panel or workshop and the "Final Conference Statement" published by WIDE+. Across these proceedings, conference participants pursued two goals. In the short term, the conference provided activists with a space to clarify and repair their relationships to each other. As the landscape of global governance grows increasingly saturated with nationalist appeals that have the effect of "shrinking spaces for critical civil society,"[73] conference participants needed to find new ways of working together in the limited spaces afforded to them by other global governance actors. To do so, conference participants worked to resolve the tensions that shape relationships between activists with differing levels of privilege and influence. In addition to offering a space for reflection and relationship building among activists, the conference was also a space to develop new long-term advocacy goals. Conference participants worked to articulate a vision of a feminist future that could serve as a basis for their interactions with other actors in global governance who have the authority to make new policy. Conference participants crafted three rhetorical strategies to achieve these dual internal and external goals. First, they articulated an ethic of care as a fundamentally different philosophy of governance. Next, conference participants deployed nostalgia to justify a return to disruptive and

non-adjustive tactics. Finally, conference participants engaged in postcolonial reflexivity to identify new ways in which activists might work together to influence the decision-making process in global governance institutions. Together these strategies reveal how conference participants developed a radical feminist foreign policy perspective that was able to combat emerging nationalist rhetorics while strengthening relationships among civil society actors.

Constructing "Care-ful" Governance

WIDE+ conference participants called for the "dismantling of patriarchy and other structures of inequality."[74] To them, the "current system" of global governance is "unsustainable in terms of gender norms."[75] As one participant put it, "We've come to the end of a system."[76] Activists agreed that a feminist system of governance could not be achieved by "arguing for one reform after another with governments."[77] Instead of adjustive strategies, aimed at transforming the system of global governance from the inside, conference participants called for non-adjustive, transformative change aimed at dismantling the existing structures of governance in order to create a space in which a feminist philosophy of governance steeped in an ethic of care could emerge.

Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser, and Rebecca Trannell argue that radical movements for political change are characterized by demands for "foundational change"[78] and utilize tactics and arguments that do not always meet the approval of "the broader culture and/or political elites."[79] In 1978, Robert S. Cathcart argued that radical social movements deploy confrontational rhetorics that challenge "underlying epistemology and group ethic" and question "basic values and social norms."[80] Unlike managerial rhetorics which "uphold and reinforce the established order or system," confrontational rhetorics "reject the system, its hierarchy and its values."[81] I argue that conference participants articulated an ethic of care as a fundamentally different system of governance, one that would prioritize social reproduction over traditional

economic production. In what follows, I define "care" and review an ethic of care as an alternative political philosophy. Next, I analyze how conference participants advocated for transforming global governance into a system based on care. To bring about this transformation, conference participants worked to challenge and dismantle the existing normative standards of global governance. They did so by framing the current state of global politics as a crisis in which women were the disproportionate victims. After establishing a crisis, conference participants justified care as a worthwhile alternative philosophy of governance. To do so, conference participants demonstrated how prioritizing care could produce benefits that go far beyond increasing gender equality.

There are two related meanings to "care." First, "care" refers to the physical and emotional labor of social reproduction. This includes child-care, care for the elderly, care for the sick, and forms of household and domestic labor such as preparing food and cleaning.[82] Second, "care" denotes a system of ethics, or a moral orientation towards politics, economics, and citizenship.[83] Care, as the work of social reproduction, involves both physical and emotional labor and can be paid, unpaid, or underpaid.[84] According to Christine Milligan and Janine Wiles, the responsibility of providing both paid and unpaid care falls disproportionately on women.[85] Unpaid care work is often problematically tied to normative assumptions that women are the "natural" caregivers in a family. Milligan and Wiles add that these assumptions about who is responsible for care create "ideological and practical barriers to political equality and participation for women."[86] Shahra Razavi adds that any discussion of care must also "draw attention to other structures of inequality that are inextricably intertwined with gender and implicated in how society arranges care."[87] This is especially true in paid care work where intersecting forces of race, class, and gender force some women to take underpaid and undervalued care work positions, such as housekeepers and nannies. Razavi explains, "women

from disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups have tended to provide care services to meet the needs of the more powerful social groups, while their own needs for care have been downplayed and neglected."[88] Feminist scholars argue that paid and unpaid care are invisible in traditional economic models. Razavi explains that mainstream economics focus on "monetized aspects of the economy, while ignoring the sphere of social reproduction."[89] She adds that policy-makers must move beyond the assumption that "there is an unlimited supply of it [care] flowing from a natural and inexhaustible source," and instead, consider care as a serious factor in the making of social and economic policy.[90]

More recently, feminist scholars have proposed an "ethic of care" as an alternative orientation to social and economic policy. Fiona Robinson argues that care can be understood as, "the basis for an alternative international political theory – one that challenges the instrumentalism of political realism, the normative ideas of liberalism, and the epistemology of rationalism.[91] Amanda Kennedy explains that an ethic of care is especially suited to transforming systems of governance because it "focuses on aspects of humanity historically ignored by dominant discourses written by men largely uninvolved in care practices."[92] Additionally, an ethic of care goes beyond simply critiquing existing political practices, but instead, provides a substantive alternative philosophy.[93] This alternative political philosophy prioritizes "caring for the self, caring for others, and caring for the world."[94] An ethic of care envisions governance as a "compassionate authority" that develops policies to support these goals and "considers closely what concerns people and what their needs are to live a good life."[95]

From the acts of giving and receiving care, Selma Sevenhuijsen extrapolates four values that underpin an ethic of care. These are: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness.[96] To her, these values might serve as the basis for a "new politics of care," that "can enable policymakers to integrate care into their actions and to broaden the political value

systems."[97] In order to overcome the gender bias that is deeply entrenched in notions of care, and

establish an ethic of care as an alternative policy framework, Razivi argues that care must be

retheorized as a "dimension of citizenship with rights that are equal to those attached to

employment."[98] Milligan and Wiles offer the term "care-ful citizenship" to explain how an ethic

of care might transform understandings of democratic citizenship. "Care-ful citizenship"

suggests that the physical and emotional labor of "caring *for* and *about* socially and spatially

distant others can be seen as a form of citizenship."[99] These scholars contend that acts of care,

such as checking in on an elderly neighbor, contributing to local food pantries, or volunteering at

a local school "keep the social fabric together."[100] For them, citizenship is not complete when

you cast a vote or pay taxes. Instead, Sevenhuijsen calls for embracing an understanding of

citizenship that is relational and interdependent. Sevenhuijsen adds that "care-ful" citizenship

transforms policy priorities by relocating things like community building, social service work,

education reform, environmental conservation, and care for the elderly "from the margins to the

center of political judgement and collective action."[101] I argue that WIDE+ conference

participants developed several rhetorical strategies to articulate care as the basis of a new system

of global governance and good citizenship.

Dismantling Policy Norms

      To articulate a new political philosophy based in a feminist ethic of care, conference

participants needed to challenge, and ultimately dismantle, existing political norms. To do so,

they organized panels and workshops in which they presented a feminist economic analysis that

established a "crisis of care"[102] in global governance. Bonnie Dow argues that there are two

forms of crisis rhetoric. First, rhetoric that responds to a crisis is characterized by epideictic

strategies that "allow the audience to reach a communal understanding of the events which have

occurred."[103] Second, rhetoric that *creates* a crisis is steeped in deliberative strategies that justify

a course of action and establish the need for expediency.[104] Here, I argue that conference participants rhetorically constructed a "crisis of care" in order to justify the dismantling or transformation of governance structures. For example, in the second workshop of the conference Nerea Craviotto explained what she called "a crisis of democracy."[105] This crisis included: "huge backlash against human rights," "increasing climate change and environmental disasters," "deeper militarization and humanitarian crises," and "rising inequalities…influencing migration waves."[106] In the final conference session one participant argued that it was time to "acknowledge the systemic nature of the crisis."[107] Emma Dowling introduced the term "crisis of care" to link together the multiple and interconnected crisis points that other speakers identified in their presentations. She argued, "What we have to draw attention to when we talk about feminism and gender issues is an ongoing crisis of care, a crisis that has been exacerbated by neoliberalism and neoliberal restructuring." Across these statements, conference participants synthesized disparate problems, including the rise of right-wing political movements, refugee and migration emergencies, and flawed economic and trade policies into a single crisis of governance that was brought about by a lack of care in the existing normative standards of governance.[108] By constructing a "crisis of care," conference participants created an exigency that demanded transformative and expedited solutions.

In order to ensure that these solutions would be based in a feminist perspective, conference participants framed women as the primary victims of the crisis. They argued that the current system of global governance was unable to meet the needs of women and was therefore fundamentally flawed. More specifically, conference participants argued that not only was the current system of governance unequipped to achieve gender equality, it depended on gender *inequality* to function. For example, Susan Himmelweit argued that accepted strategies for recovering from an economic crisis, like the implementation of austerity policies, are designed in

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ways that demand greater sacrifices from, and disproportionately harm, women. She argued that

disproportionate gender impacts have been normalized in current economic policy. She

explained, "It's accepted that if you get a bit more austerity it's going to hit women more, it's

just taken for granted."[109] Alejandra Santillana Ortiz added that this burden is tangible in the

daily lives of women. She suggested that "the bodies of women are the last border of capitalism

and we are experiencing that in our practical, concrete lives every day."[110]

Tessa Khan suggested that making women responsible for the burden of economic

austerity policies is an essential aspect of the current economic system, rather than an

unintentional error. She argued, "unpaid care work is work on which our economies are built and

rely, and yet, it isn't even accounted for in the main measures of productive output or progress in

our societies like gross domestic product."[111] She found no significant efforts from politicians to

challenge these norms and concluded that there is a "lack of political will to transform the

current economic and social structures that we are bound by."[112] This feminist economic

analysis, developed over the course of several panels and workshops, was formalized in the final

conference statement. The final conference statement reiterated that the current economic system

was irreparably flawed because it "relies silently on the huge amounts of unpaid and underpaid

care work that mostly women carry out." Until the economic system of governance is

fundamentally transformed, the "crisis of care will only grow," leading to "further gender

discrimination and devaluation of women's work."[113] Not only did conference participants

construct a "crisis of care" to rationalize transformative and swift change, they also positioned

women as the primary victims of the crisis, thereby justifying solutions steeped in a feminist

ethic of care.

Advocating for "Care-ful" Governance

Ultimately, conference participants argued that existing models of economic policymaking were incapable of increasing gender equality. Participants suggested that the entire system was biased towards productive output and did not account for the work of social reproduction. After establishing a crisis that demanded a feminist transformation of global governance, conference participants articulated an alternative model of political decision-making that was steeped in the principles and values of an ethic of care. This alternative would need to be "participatory and inclusive," centered on "care and caring as key elements," and work to construct a "vision of a world that enforces equal rights."[114] Conference participants argued that transforming the economic system into an economy of care was the first step in a larger transformation of governance. Krishanti Dharmraj explained, "until unpaid care work is recognized and integrated as part of an economic growth model, we are not going to get anywhere, especially as women we are not going to get anywhere."[115] Ortiz likewise asked conference participants to consider what could happen if the "reproductive labor force decides to take control of the workspace." She believed that an economy of care would lead to a renegotiation of "freedom, equality, emotions, and maternity."[116] Himmelweit offered her thoughts on what this change in philosophy might mean for concrete policy decisions. She described a "feminist fiscal and economic strategy" based on "significant public investment in what we call social infrastructure. Investment by the government, not in physical buildings and things like bridges, but in having a well-functioning education, health, and care system." She continued that these forms of investment would "build a stock of human and social capital leading to a stream of future benefits" and "foster a caring and sustainable economy with greater gender equality."[117] To these activists, the global economic system was fundamentally flawed. Gender equality could not be achieved by adjusting the current system. Instead, the global

economic system needed to be replaced with an economy of care. As one participant put it, "care economy is the real economy. The issue of care in the feminist economic model is absolutely central and absolutely crucial."[118]

In order to make an ethic of care appealing as an alternative political philosophy, conference participants demonstrated how prioritizing care could produce benefits that go far beyond increasing gender equality. Specifically, they argued that adopting a feminist ethic of care could solve global problems like climate change. One unnamed conference participant explained that prioritizing care benefits everyone, not just women. She explained, "Care is what unites us. . . . [I]t's a collective need and a collective responsibility."[119] Part of the collective responsibility of care is caring for the earth. Dowling explained that economic production often takes place at the expense of "ecology and the environment."[120] Khan likewise argued that climate change is a symptom of a flawed system of governance. To her, climate change is proof "that we can't simply continue to grow, extract, consume, and industrialize as a means to reduce poverty."[121] She added that solving climate change would require "fundamentally challenging how we measure progress, what we value, and what we entrust to markets to achieve."[122] Ortiz argued that an ethic of care should therefore be at the heart of environmental policy. She explained, "We need to make demands about the care of nature and land, water, and seeds."[123] Himmelweit connected the economy of care and care for the environment. She argued that one advantage to investing in a system of care "is that it's very green."[124] She added that the only way to "live in a finite climate" is to prioritize "caring for each other and learning how to care for each other better."[125] By adopting a broad definition of care that included care for the environment as well as care for individuals, conference participants articulated an ethic of care that would benefit men as well as women. To them, an ethic of care was not just a policy

initiative aimed at increasing economic gender equality; it was an alternative philosophy of governance that could be applied across policy concerns.

Radical Nostalgia

While an ethic of care was presented as a new, alternative philosophy of governance, conference participants suggested that the tactics and strategies necessary to transform governance were a well-established part of the global feminist movement. In order to justify the use of non-adjustive, disruptive, and radical tactics, conference participants developed arguments grounded in nostalgia. Through their nostalgia for the feminist activism of the 1990s, conference participants argued that radical, non-adjustive tactics have always played an essential role in global governance, and feminist activism more specifically. To demonstrate how conference participants leveraged nostalgia, I review the role of nostalgia in policy argumentation. Next, I trace how conference participants looked to the past, specifically the 1990s, to advance arguments for feminist governance in the future. I find that conference participants used nostalgia to challenge the rise of right-wing and nationalist movements and grapple with their own complacency in a system that marginalizes feminist policy-making. As a whole, the use of nostalgia framed a turn to radical, non-adjustive strategies as a return to feminist tradition rather than a new and threatening force in global governance.

"Nostalgia" is derived from the Greek words *nostos,* meaning home, and *algia,* meaning longing.[126] Kimberly Smith explains that feelings of nostalgia include, "Longing for one's home, a wistful yearning for the past, [and] distress and depression resulting from rapid change."[127] Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry Giles helpfully differentiate nostalgia from similar concepts regarding how we think about the past. They explain, "History is a record of events, while collective memory is the depository of traditions. . . . Distinctively, nostalgia distorts the past for the sake of affect and is more culturally specific and normative."[128] Svetlana Boym

argues that there are two distinct forms of nostalgia: restorative and reflexive. Reflective

nostalgia "dwells in *algia,* in longing and loss, the imperfect process of remembrance."[129]

Reflective nostalgia is often deployed to justify the construction of memorials and monuments

that commemorate the past. Restorative nostalgias, on the other hand, "do not think themselves

nostalgic, they believe their project is about truth."[130] Restorative nostalgia emphasizes *nostos;*

its "purpose is to rebuild the lost home and patch up the memory gaps."[131] Restorative nostalgias

often look to the past as a template for transforming the future. For example, restorative nostalgia

is frequently deployed to justify new political policies that reinscribe traditional values. Boym

argues that this form of nostalgia characterizes nationalist revivals "which engage in the

antimodern myth-making of history by means of a return to national symbols and myths and,

occasionally, through swapping conspiracy theories."[132] Regardless of the type, nostalgia almost

always includes some element of strategic erasure. As a rhetorical strategy, it is used to simplify,

mythologize, or idealize the past in order to advance arguments about the present or future.[133]

Nostalgia is a powerful rhetorical tool when wielded by policy-makers. In the context of

US politics, Mary Stuckey argues nostalgia is used to frame change as either "a fulfilment of past

promises, and thus not radical or threatening, or that it is a return to past values and practices,

and thus not really change at all." Stuckey finds, "Liberals tend to make the first kind of

argument and conservatives the second."[134] However, in this chapter, I argue that WIDE+

conference participants adopted types of nostalgic arguments that are most commonly found in

right-wing conservative political movements. Stuckey explains that conservative movements use

nostalgia to frame "change as purification." In returning to past values, "wrongs can be made

right, errors can be corrected."[135] For example, Stuckey argues that this type of nostalgia served

as the basis for Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" campaign.[136] I argue that by

calling for a return to the feminist spirit of the 1990s, WIDE+ participants co-opted the

restorative nostalgia that is often used by right-wing, nationalist, and conservative political movements who typically make arguments *against* feminism. Doing so allowed conference participants to exploit the oppositions rhetoric by deploying restorative nostalgia in ways that disrupted a nationalist vision of global governance. Conference participants entertained the nationalist argument that policymaking should be aimed at preserving or restoring past values but identified a feminist history as the tradition they wanted to restore. Through their nostalgic arguments, conference participants framed disruptive and non-adjustive activism as an established and effective tradition in global governance, rather than a threatening change.

WIDE+'s Nostalgic Vision

In order to advance arguments for how feminists should work towards a politics of care, conference participants looked to the past. Specifically, they developed nostalgic arguments that framed the activist spirit of the 1990s as a model to which activists should return in order to transform the future. For example, in the first panel of the conference, Maitrayee Mukhopadhaya referred to the "heydays of the women's movements and rights talk in the 1990s."[137] Christa Wichterich, who moderated the panel, compared the current state of global politics to the 1990s. She argued:

> Different from the 1990s and the 2000s, when the winds of change meant a democratic turn and a breeze of freedom in many countries, now the change in power regimes is informed by the rapid spread of right-wing populism, nationalism, and identitarian policies.[138]

More specifically, conference participants looked nostalgically to the Beijing conference and the debate over Resolution 1325 as a historic moment in which they successfully advocated for ambitious, revolutionary feminist policy. For example, Mukhopadhyay argued that these conferences were spaces "where women's rights activists articulated a distinctive voice, very different from the earlier decades. These global conferences provided both the space and the

opportunity for organizing and taking action."[139] Rosabel Agirregomezkorta explained what she

saw as the successes of these conferences. Speaking as a woman who participated in the activism

of the 1990s she argued, "we contributed to and built a comprehensive and solid architecture

based on human rights, women's rights, disability and global solidarities. Many hegemonic

beliefs were questioned, such as the nature of conflict and violence."[140] These statements

idealized the 1990s and early 2000s as a period in which there was "space and opportunity" for

feminist change, where feminists spoke with a unified "distinctive voice," and the "winds of

change" meant that governments were supportive of a feminist progressive vision. This nostalgia

for the 1990s erased many of the challenges that activists faced in favor of constructing an

optimistic vision of a successful, revolutionary feminist "heyday" of policymaking. The next task

for the WIDE+ conference participants was to determine how "to go back to the future."[141] To do

so, they discussed how historic errors might be corrected in order to reclaim the idealized

momentum and feminist spirit of the 1990s.

Restoring Tradition

Conference participants agreed on two forces that needed to be challenged in order to

regain the idealized progress of the 1990s. First, feminists needed to disrupt nationalist and right-

wing political movements who deployed their own nostalgic arguments to limit the spaces

afforded to civil society. Second, they needed to overcome their own complacency with the

current system of global governance.

First, conference participants argued that nationalist rhetorics needed to be countered in

order to rebuild the vibrant spaces of civil society activism that were supported in the 1990s.

James Scott argues that restorative nostalgia, the type of nostalgia usually employed by

nationalist political movements, often includes a "search for enemies, who must be vanquished

before tradition, and the imagined homeland, can be restored."[142] Feminism and progressive

political movements are frequently the enemies in nationalist nostalgic arguments. WIDE+ conference participants inverted the enemy role in their restorative nostalgia. They argued that progressive feminism, represented by the activism of the 1990s, was a tradition to which they wanted to return, and that recent right-wing and nationalist political movements were a threat that needed to be defeated in order to restore this tradition. The final conference statement established that emergent right-wing and nationalist movements are "often combined with a strong antifeminism."[143] Conference participants therefore saw these movements as a threat that had the potential to destroy the progress made by feminist activists. For example, Mukhopadhaya explained how the "unprecedented and meteoric rise" of nationalist movements including "Trump, with a following of disaffected angry white men and the tea party mob in the US, Modi and RSS in India, Le Pen and National Front in France, and several other fringe and mainstream political movements all over Europe" has "resulted in the shrinking of democratic spaces."[144]

Across the conference, participants exposed how nationalist politicians use restorative nostalgia to reverse feminist policy advances. For example, Agirregomezkorta argued that before the rise of these groups, feminists had developed a "comprehensive system" in which "peace, human rights, women's rights and equality, and development were interlinked and became the pillars for the UN and the whole international community." She added that in the "new security era…the whole comprehensive system just collapsed."[145] Kinga Lohmann offered an example of how nationalist restorative nostalgia was used to reverse feminist gains in Poland. She explained how "gender equality polices" were transformed into "family advancement policies" and "family mainstreaming."[146] She argued that this shift in language was used to justify an attempted total ban on abortion.[147] After hearing these examples, conference participants agreed that the restorative nostalgia of nationalist and right-wing political movements needed to be disrupted in order to reestablish the feminist momentum of the 1990s.

In order to neutralize the nostalgia of nationalist movements, conference participants called for right-wing politicians to be "named and shamed." The final conference statement pledged to "hold our politician's feet to the fire" if they didn't "adhere to the comprehensive architecture of human rights, gender equality, and social justice that was forged by women's organizations."[148] Countering the nostalgic arguments of right-wing and nationalist political movements would require "revealing the misogynist, anti-feminist narratives of the emergent far right, neo-conservative movements."[149] Restorative nostalgia requires an enemy or scapegoat whose symbolic defeat allows for the restoration of past values and traditions. In the restorative nostalgia of nationalist movements, it is often feminists who are cast as the enemy of tradition. However, WIDE+ conference participants co-opted these rhetorical norms to frame emerging nationalist and right-wing revivals as a new and threatening force in global governance that needed to be disrupted in order to return to the idealized past of 1990s activism. Through their use of restorative nostalgia, conference participants normalized radical feminist tactics as established and essential components of global governance.

While the first step in restoring the feminist spirit of the 1990s required a scapegoat or enemy that could be defeated in order for tradition to be restored, the second step in restoring the idealized energy of the 1990s required conference participants to grapple with their own responsibility for the state of global governance. They did so by engaging in Kenneth Burke's process of the comic corrective. Burke explains that the comic corrective encourages people to be "observers of themselves." It offers a path through which actors can "transcend" their flaws by recognizing their mistakes and taking steps to correct them.[150] Conference participants performed the comic corrective by acknowledging that they were partially responsible for the deterioration of a radical feminist spirit. Restoring this spirit would require a transformation of the practices and tactics of the global feminist movement. Only by recognizing and atoning for

their complicity in the failures of global governance could conference participants hope to return to the idealized past of 1990s feminist activism. During a workshop on the rise of sexist, xenophobic, and racist policies, an unnamed audience member confessed to becoming complacent following the successes of the 1990s. The audience member argued, "We've become complacent. We've been comfortable for far too long - holding hands and dancing around saying, 'we're all equal' - but we're not, so maybe we should stop pretending."[151] Other conference participants argued that this complacency emerged after the successes of the 1990s. For example, Mukhopadhyay argued that "victories" like "the successful inclusion of feminist ideas and policy making in institutions was also our limitation." To her, those victories transformed the revolutionary feminists of the 1990s into "governance feminists."[152] Likewise, Isabela Casimiro argued, "mainstreaming gender was an advance at the beginning, but now the institutions, the parties, the governments are using it to do whatever they want to do. We can see that the capacity to change from within is having difficulties."[153] Correcting the error of complacency required conference participants to "be observers of themselves." After recognizing their mistakes following the successes of the 1990s, conference participants discussed the steps they would need to take to correct these failures.

To correct their complacency with the flawed structures of global governance, conference participants called for new strategies and tactics that were grounded in the disruptive spirit of the 1990s. Rather than call for a return to the specific strategies and lines of argument that were successful in the 1990s, conference participants advocated for embracing the disruptive spirit of the 1990s to develop new ideas and tactics that were tailored to 21st century problems. By balancing their nostalgia with a recognition that new problems require new solutions, conference participants were able to frame innovative arguments and tactics as a continuation of an established and effective history of activism. To make the argument that transforming global

governance required new strategies, many conference participants invoked Audre Lorde's quotation, "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house"[154] By invoking Lorde, conference participants suggested that working within the system of global governance was ineffective and that feminists should pursue more radical strategies aimed at dismantling the system itself. Himmelweit explained, "what I'm talking about is a sort of revolutionary understanding. . . . [W]e need a different mindset about what we need from society."[155] The unnamed audience member who accused feminists of complacency argued that a correction would require feminists to "disturb – to break – the status quo. We have to make people uncomfortable because we've become complacent."[156] In the final session of the conference Joanna Maycock summed up the conference's findings by concluding, "It's clear that we need radical and transformative solutions…. We need strategies that resist, rethink, reimagine, and restructure power."[157] Across these comments conference participants argued that solving the current problems of global governance required new strategies and ways of thinking about policymaking.

However, conference participants also argued that in order to be successful these new strategies would need to revive the energy and disruptive spirit of the 1990s. For example, Hening von Bargen argued, "Feminist accomplishments made by an open and liberal society should be depicted in a more aggressive light. Discussed contributions [should be] *once again* filled with personal content."[158] Likewise, Mukhopadhyay called for bases of solidarity to be "*reenergized*,"[159] Khan advocated for strategies in which the "primacy of human rights and sustentative equality is *restored,"*[160] and the unnamed audience member suggested that "it's time to *repoliticize* feminism."[161] All of these language choices suggested that new advocacy efforts should flow from a revival of the feminist spirit of the 1990s. For example, *reenergizing* solidarities suggests that effective solidarities once existed and only needed to be restored. By

grounding arguments for radical, non-adjustive, or disruptive activism in nostalgia, conference participants suggested that feminist policymaking is not new, extreme, or threatening. Instead, it was presented as an established, effective, and acceptable political strategy that feminists should *once again* prioritize.

Generating Power Through Solidarity and Individuality

In order to generate enough discursive power to convince nation-states and supranational institutions to support a feminist transformation of global governance, conference participants worked to construct strong transnational networks. Unlike nation-states, who derive power from traditional notions of sovereignty, authority over large national budgets, or control of a military force, the power of civil society actors is largely a discursive construction.[162] Agustin explains, "The legitimacy on which civil society organizations rest, and thus the legitimacy of their claims-making vis-a-vis the political institutions, is based on their discursive and deliberative power, that is, the strength of their ideas."[163] Manual Castells adds that forming networks is the primary way civil society actors leverage their discursive power. He argues, "the ability to form, enter, and interact with networks . . . are the central means of generating power and counter-power in a global social structure."[164] However, any discussion of generating power in transnational contexts invokes practices of colonization, imperialism, and domination.[165] Norander and Harter argue that networks must develop an understanding of power that moves beyond reproducing a colonizer/colonized relationship. To avoid these problematic associations, WIDE+ conference participants reframed the tension between universalizing and particularist approaches to generating power as complementary strategies. On one hand they called for new, global networks that would be large enough to exert pressure on supranational institutions. On the other hand, they called for individuals to use their unique positions of privilege to pressure national governments. Thus, conference participants argued that power could be generated

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simultaneously by developing new solidarities around a unified vision of a feminist future and leveraging individual power in diverse political contexts.

This section first unpacks the tensions that mark transnational efforts to generate power. Next, I trace how conference participants worked to generate power by developing new solidarities that made space for diversity. I argue that the conference developed a vision of a "feminist future" that was broad enough to contain the concerns and experiences of diverse network members. Finally, I explore how conference participants framed individual political power as a force that could work in harmony with transnational networks, rather than a force that would reproduce colonizing relationships. I find that individual power was framed as a responsibility in ways that made individually powerful European women accountable to a transnational network.

Contemporary transnational feminist organizing is characterized by tensions,[166] frictions,[167] and "conflicts between universalizing and particularist approaches."[168] These tensions, frictions, and conflicts emerge when TFNs work to balance "various national, social, organizational, and individual cultural differences."[169] Alexandra G. Murphy explains that transnational organizations face competing impulses towards developing a collective identity around a "universal vision" and respecting the diverse material realities of organizational members.[170] Much of the current tension or friction in transnational feminist organizing is the result of a problematic history of liberal cosmopolitan feminism that "positions western women as saviors."[171] Sarah E. Dempsey, Patricia S. Parker and Kathleen J. Krone argue that women who identify with the Global South, as lesbians, or as working-class have long criticized global feminist discourses for "ignoring the racial and class power of white feminists."[172] These critiques called for intersectional analyses that would reveal how "categories of difference like class, race, gender, sexuality, nationality, and religion produce interlocking systems of control,

domination, and resistance."[173] The task for contemporary transnational feminist organizations is to navigate these tensions between solidarity and diversity in order to "forge a common identity and politics across multiple forms of difference, thereby avoiding universalizing women's experiences."[174]

WIDE+'s strategy for engaging the inherent tensions between a universal vision of an ethic of care and the diverse material realities of women around the world, was to frame solidarity and individuality as complementary sources of power that could be leveraged to advance a feminist foreign policy perspective. Conference participants embraced the idea that "each individual within the organization embodies more than one status."[175] Participants used the conference to develop ways in which they could act both collectively and individually, as members of a global "unbounded"[176] feminist network and as citizens of bounded nation-states with diverse material and political realities. Dempsey, Parker, and Krone argue that transnational organizations must work to take advantage of the opportunities created by "*power geometries,* or the distinctively different ways in which women are placed relative to global flows and processes."[177] Stephanie Norander and Lynn M. Harter argue that postcolonial reflectivity can offer a "more nuanced conception of power" that does not "merely equate power with domination."[178] They argue that organizations must attend to "ongoing struggles in organizational relationships where inequities pervade but members willingly participate in such relationships." They add that unequal power relationships, when practiced reflexively, can lead to transformative change.[179] This reflexive understanding of power responds to Valerie Palmer-Mehta's call for merging an ethic of care with an ethic of justice. She explains that an ethic of justice offers a universal standard for the rights and liberties that should be granted to all people while an ethic of care "reveals the conditions of inequality and disadvantage that belie the idea of a universal and homogenous citizenry."[180] Together, an ethic of care and an ethic of justice

"create an important synergy or continuum between the particular and the universal."[181] Conference participants worked to balance the universal and the particular by recognizing that the forms of power available to each activist might be different and unequal. In some cases, power flowed from the construction of large transnational networks that could influence policy making "under and above the nation state."[182] In other cases, power could be generated by individual activists manipulating their positionality as citizens of powerful nation states.

Generating Power Through Solidarity

Conference participants argued that transforming global governance into a new system based on an ethic of care required new forms of power. Conference participants agreed that this power could be generated by constructing new cross-interest and cross-region solidarities. First, conference participants called for new solidarities that would unite people across movements or interests. Tessa Khan explained, "I think we need to continue to work across movements and disciplines to continue to advocate for societies and economic frameworks that are sustainable and equitable."[183] For conference participants, building solidarities across interest groups was a way to expand their discursive power and influence. The final conference statement explained, "We must build trans-sectoral alliances with different groups and social movements, integrate feminist demands in their agenda while addressing the power structures in these movements." For WIDE+, "Solidarity not just about a helping hand but about understanding and working together for common political objectives. Solidarity – not charity – is a way of building communities of mutual support and resistance and acting together."[184] Put differently, forming large cross-interest solidarities gave civil society actors more power to resist and act in global governance. An unnamed speaker in the final session of the conference identified several movements that, like WIDE+, were "driving at systems change."[185] She argued that feminist activists could work with these other movements to increase their power. She explained, "We

also need to take hope from other systems and change movements that are emerging and growing and having effects from climate change, to tax justice, from LGBT rights, to Black Lives Matter in the US, to Fees Must Fall in South Africa."[186] The speaker argued that by building cross-interest solidarities, transnational actors might amass the "range of strategies" that were required to "build the new. The new politics, new economics, the new society for the future."[187]

Next, conference participants argued that power could be generated by constructing "solidarity on a translocal and transregional level, across borders and boundaries and between generations."[188] Importantly, conference participants recognized that cross-regional solidarities would need to be constructed carefully so as "not to reproduce North-South-relations of dominance, and stereotypes of othering and patronizing."[189] In order to establish a powerful, cross-regional basis of solidarity that did not erase the diverse lived experiences of women, conference participants called for organizing around a broad vision of a "feminist future" that would "intersect with the multiple and different problems women face."[190] Conference participants suggested that by looking to the future they could construct stronger solidarities in the present. For example, during an audience discussion following the first workshop, one participant argued that feminists should "not just react to events." Instead, transnational feminists should focus on "defining and proposing clear feminist alternatives . . . based in intersectional analysis."[191] Here, the idea of looking proactively to the future was presented as a potential unifying basis of solidarity. In the final conference session one speaker compared the process of building effective and powerful cross-regional solidarities to writing a book. She explained:

> This conference has enabled us to be authors of a book…We have not only
> written the introduction, but also an ending. We talked about the world we wish to
> live in where our theories, research, thoughts are translated into a theory of
> feminist future.[192]

Like a book, in which its covers unify different pages, this speaker argued that a vision of a feminist future could unite diverse women into a powerful solidarity without erasing their

particular experiences. The speaker argued that the conference had successfully produced "a beginning and an ending, but what about the bit in-between? What are the plots of these stories?" To her, the covers of the book, or a feminist vision of the future, must be broad enough to include plots that are not linear, that "cross boundaries," and that "come in different languages, styles, and are written by different authors."[193] The "book" must include "the experiences, the expertise, the knowledge and humanity in all these plots…because they are all valid."[194] Through the metaphor of a book, conference participants suggested that a cross-regional feminist solidary must be flexible enough to include the diverse experiences and concerns of all women in the network.

Developing this powerful cross-regional solidarity would not be an easy task; it required postcolonial reflectivity. Norander and Harter argue that postcolonial reflexivity calls us to attend "not only to the practices of exclusion…but also to the practices of inclusion."[195] They find that transnational organizations often limit the roles cultural others are allowed to inhabit. For example, organizations frequently position non-western women as "authentic insiders" who are denied the opportunity to critique cultures other than their own.[196] In chapter two I discussed how UN members used postcolonial reflectivity to construct a collective voice through which they could acknowledge the UN's failure to listen to the opinions of civil society. Here, conference participants used postcolonial reflexivity to explore the tensions among civil society actors. While the postcolonial reflexivity of the UN was used to create solidarity among UN members, the reflexivity of the WIDE+ conference was deployed to highlight and repair the inequality and difference that exists between civil society actors. To develop a strong cross-regional solidarity, WIDE+ conference participants reflected on their own organizational practices of including diverse perspectives and found that change was required. Several conference participants suggested that the ways non-western voices were included in feminist

civil society organizations were problematic. For example, Krishanti Dharmraj explained that there is a tendency to "bring women from the Global South… and figure out whether they fit into our agenda of the Global North."[197] She argued that European feminists tend to make women from the Global South a "mouthpiece" for the policy goals of the Global North.[198] Emine Aslan identified a similar problem. She called northern feminists to "ask ourselves how much space we give the lived realities of women of color, of refugee women in the feminist agenda, and the feminist mainstream agenda."[199] For Aslan, women from the Global South have not had an equal opportunity to shape the feminist agenda and therefore an equitable solidary does not yet exist.

To build solidarities that moved beyond these limitations, conference participants needed to make space for new voices and listen to their concerns. Dharmraj argued that the North needed to "make space" for women from the Global South to "define what it means to be fully human and [propose] what policies ought to be shared and developed."[200] During a question and answer session following the first workshop, an audience member argued that the goal of listening should be "not to provide a response, but to really understand what is going on."[201] The final conference statement likewise argued, "we must listen to what each of us is saying instead of hearing what we think they are saying."[202] The strategy of listening to build solidarity was reflected in the organization of the conference. Each panel or workshop included speakers from the Global North and Global South. No one was asked to "solve" the problems of the other. Instead, speakers listened to each other's perspectives and explored how the problems they face are marked by both similarity and difference. By establishing a future oriented vision of a feminist solidarity that included space for difference and practicing postcolonial reflexivity, conference participants worked to build a new, more equitable, and more powerful cross-regional solidary that would advocate for the structural transformation of global governance.

Leveraging Individual Power

While WIDE+ conference participants viewed solidarity building as the primary means of generating political power and influence, they also recognized that some individual activists could access additional forms of power based on their position as citizens of powerful European nations. These more traditional forms of power were framed as complementary to the power generated through solidarity building. Norander and Harter argue that many transnational networks are wary of the power associated with nation-state sovereignty, often associating it with systems of colonization and domination.[203] However, when practiced with postcolonial reflexivity, the power generated by holding citizenship in a powerful nation-state system can be leveraged to work in harmony with transnational networks.[204] In order to frame individual power, granted by a Westphalian nation-state system of citizenship, as complementary to the power generated by transnational solidarities, conference participants focused on the responsibilities that come with individual political power.

Conference participants argued that privileged European women have a *responsibility* to use their individual influence to advance the work of the network. Importantly, it was women who identified as from the Global South who called on European women to use their individual power to precipitate global change. Mukhopadhyay began the first panel by establishing that WIDE+ was uniquely positioned in the landscape of global power flows. She explained, "Because you're a European network you're in a very powerful place, and so what I'm going to say is all about power in today's world - power and authority.[205] Hibaaq Osman explained the more specific powers European participants of the conference could access. She argued, "you have power, you can elect, you can kick out anyone who is not really working for peace in your own countries."[206] Khan elaborated that it was their position as voting citizens in European nations that gave some women additional power. She argued, "You are the constituents of

northern policy makers. They're much more responsive to you when you say that you're concerned about the impacts of trade agreements in developing countries than they are to someone like me…That's just politics."[207] Khan argued that in order to work cooperatively with new transnational solidarities, European women should use their individual power to advocate for policies that emerged from less powerfully positioned activists and organizations. She explained, "we need northern feminists to not just give us the space to have a voice, but to adopt and advocate for our positions yourselves because the bottom line is that northern governments only respond to northern constituencies."[208] In these statements, women from the Global South argued that women from the Global North had a unique responsibility to use their individual power to translate transnational demands into national policy change.

These calls for northern feminists to use their privilege and power to advance the work of a transnational network reflects a postcolonial understanding of power in which, according to Norander and Harter, actors "recognize their position and power in relation to their partners but strive to collaborate in ways that allow for reciprocity of knowledge and power and transformation to occur."[209] By framing individual power as complementary to the power generated by transnational solidarities, and privileged individuals as accountable to a network, conference participants developed a model for leveraging individual power in global policy spaces that did not reproduce colonizing relationships.

A Radical Feminist Foreign Policy Perspective

This chapter argued that participants in the 2016 WIDE+ conference challenged the rise of right-wing and nationalist policymaking by advancing a radical feminist foreign policy perspective. This radical perspective called for dismantling the norms of global governance, which conference participants argued were fundamentally flawed and incapable of producing gender equality, and replacing them with new normative standards and governance practices.

Conference participants deployed three rhetorical strategies to articulate their radical vision of feminist global governance. First, they proposed new normative standards for governance steeped in an ethic of care. To justify care as a new basis for policymaking, conference participants framed the current state of governance as a crisis in which women were the disproportionate victims. This crisis demanded swift and transformative change. By constructing a crisis of care, conference participants created an exigency in which they could articulate care as a solution to a variety of global governance problems. Next, conference participants deployed nostalgia to confront and overcome nationalist rhetorics. By using restorative nostalgia, conference participants framed radical, non-adjustive, and disruptive tactics as established and effective components of global governance. Finally, participants argued that implementing a feminist policy perspective would require activists to work together in new ways. To generate new forms of power, conference participants engaged in postcolonial reflexivity to negotiate the tension between their positions as members of a larger transnational network and their individual influence as citizens of powerful western nations. These three strategies demonstrate how, by articulating a radical feminist foreign policy perspective, conference participants confronted both the rise of nationalist rhetorics and repaired discord among feminist activists.

The radical perspective articulated by conference participants has implications for both feminist policymaking and the scholarly investigation of the relationships between actors in global governance. First, this analysis illustrates the important role civil society plays in creating exigencies that push policymaking forward. Robnett, Llasser, and Trammell explain that the radical wing of a social movement is unlikely to garner significant concessions from policy makers. However, they add that the "radical flank effect" often positively impacts the advances of a larger movement. They explain that the disruptive tactics of radical social movement members work to create exigencies that prompt policy makers to take seriously the demands of

moderate movement members.[210] Put differently, radical activists make moderate change appear reasonable. In the case of feminist foreign policy, conference participants' radical calls for dismantling the normative standards of global governance in favor of developing a new system based in an ethic of care are unlikely to be taken up by policymakers at the UN. However, this transformative vision of a feminist future may make moderate change, like Wallström's call for prioritizing human rights in decision-making, seem reasonable in comparison. This chapter suggests that the radical feminist policy rhetoric articulated by conference participants should not be quickly dismissed as unfeasible or unlikely to be seriously considered by the policymakers at the EU or UN. Instead, this radical vision offers an exigency that justifies, and perhaps will hasten, the passage of conservative and moderate policy change.

Second, this chapter demonstrates that the relationships between and among civil society actors are the product of nuanced rhetorical negotiation and are a rich site for scholarly investigation. Often, the format of deliberations between actors in global governance forces civil society actors to speak with a unified voice, thereby erasing important differences between different civil society activists. For example, in the UN debates on the status of the WPS agenda, civil society actors were given only a handful of speaking opportunities and briefers were expected to speak *on behalf* of all civil society activists. Those briefers presented a consensus argument that left little space for discussing the nuances of opinion between and among civil society actors. This chapter demonstrates that when civil society actors are given the space to negotiate policy among themselves, as was the case during the WIDE+ conference, important tensions, differences, and disagreements emerge. How activists negotiate and resolve the tensions that exist between and among civil society groups has a significant effect on how civil society actors engage other actors in global governance. For example, this chapter traced how conference participants engaged in postcolonial reflexivity to repair long standing tensions

between feminist activists from the Global North and Global South. By exploring these tensions, conference participants developed new methods for generating and leveraging power in their interactions with other systems of global governance. Going forward, more work is needed to unpack the rhetorical nuances of how civil society actors engage with one another in pursuit of a unified message and strategy aimed at influencing other actors in global governance.

WIDE+ has not hosted a conference since 2016. Instead, they continue to lobby the institutions of global governance to adopt the ideas and policy recommendations generated during the 2016 conference. For example, in 2017, WIDE+ published a "Gender and Trade Position Paper." In part, this paper demanded that the EU "Do not increase the care burden" and called them to "stop with one-size-fits-all privatization of social services."[211] On March 13, 2018, the EU passed a resolution on "Gender Equality in Trade Agreements." This resolution recognized that women face an "overburden of carrying out unpaid care work resulting from traditional gender roles" and resolved that future trade policies will "require a clear framework contributing to enhancing women's empowerment and their living and working conditions."[212] This resolution was shaped by WIDE+'s activism. A report by the European Parliament, issued prior to the passage of the resolution, recognized the WIDE+ position paper as a document that received "regard" during Parliament's deliberation.[213] Likewise, an explanatory statement released to accompany the passage of the Resolution echoed the WIDE+ conference's position on the importance of care. The statement justifying the EU resolution argued, "It is clear from a feminist perspective" that "an economic policy must also encompass care work, or reproductive work. Such economies cannot be governed by the narrow principles of growth, competition and efficiency that currently dominate the trade agenda."[214] The EU's Gender Equality in Trade Agreements Resolution illustrates how the radical ideas generated during the WIDE+ conference, like establishing new systems of global governance based in an ethic of care,

circulated through policy decision-making forums and were eventually taken up to justify the passage of new gender sensitive policy.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion: The Rhetoric of Feminist Foreign Policy

This dissertation examined how rhetorical actors at different levels of global governance articulated a feminist foreign policy perspective. Supranational institutions, nation-state officials, and civil society actors prioritized gender equality in ways that transformed the complex and networked relationships among them. Their different approaches to feminist policymaking shape and are shaped by the various power imbalances that regulate relationships between these actors. Each actor crafted a feminist foreign policy perspective that established new rhetorical dynamics to enable actors to work together in pursuit of feminist policies.

In this conclusion, I summarize how the United Nations's conservative feminist foreign policy perspective, Margot Wallström's moderate perspective, and WIDE+ conference participants' radical perspective built upon, shifted, and transformed the relationships between stakeholders in the policymaking process in order to produce policies that are friendly to women and girls. Next, I turn to the future of feminist policymaking. I trace how the rhetorical strategies identified in this dissertation continue to inform subsequent efforts to advance feminist policymaking in global governance institutions. Finally, I outline the rhetorical implications that are illuminated by this project. Specifically, I address how this dissertation extends the field's understanding of how policy rhetorics circulate in global contexts, complicates existing methods for the study of global policy rhetorics, and enriches our understanding of transnational feminist discourses.

Conservative, Moderate, and Radical Feminist Foreign Policy Perspectives

Chapter two exposed how participants in the 2015, 2016, and 2017 Open Debates on the Status of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda produced a conservative feminist foreign

policy perspective that prioritized incremental change and worked to preserve existing hierarchies between actors in global governance. While the UN recognized the important role civil society plays in implementing policy, they stopped short of fully integrating civil society actors into the decision-making process. This conservative feminist foreign policy perspective relied on three rhetorical strategies. First, debate participants acknowledged their previous failures to uphold the WPS Agenda by engaging in what I identify as collective postcolonial reflexivity. Through collective postcolonial reflexivity, debate participants spoke on behalf of the entire UN body when acknowledging shortcomings and failures, thus limiting their individual culpability. Second, debate participants advanced new policies to mitigate the problems revealed through their collective postcolonial reflexivity by developing networked policy proposals that were steeped in "anti-rhetoric." These policies were networked to meet the specific political and rhetorical norms of individual nations or UN agencies, but were framed as "anti-rhetorical," or free from spin and embellishment. Finally, debate participants worked to "transnationalize" the implementation of WPS agenda policies by constructing new discursive spaces in which the UN, nation-states, and civil society actors could work collaboratively. However, the UN framed these new discursive spaces as something that would work in harmony with, rather than replace, more traditional top-down forms of governance. Together, these strategies reveal how actors in global governance leveraged their power in the reconfiguration of the WPS Agenda. Ultimately, I find that the WPS Agenda debates generated a conservative vision of feminist policymaking that preserved existing relationships between actors in global governance and prioritized incremental policy change.

This conservative feminist foreign policy perspective reveals how political institutions might adapt to the changing norms of global governance while maintaining their existing norms and structures. While the UN is notoriously slow to adapt to the changing nature of global

politics,[1] this chapter demonstrates how the UN might incorporate the demands of transnational activists into existing policy frameworks like the WPS Agenda. Instead of working to replace the WPS agenda with a feminist foreign policy perspective, participants in the debates identified spaces for incremental, conservative change that would incorporate a feminist perspective into existing policy frameworks. Therefore, the rhetoric of WPS Agenda debates amounts to a reconfiguration rather than a transformation of global governance. This conservative feminist foreign policy perspective has the potential to make feminist policy priorities palatable to a wide range of political actors. Because governments and political elites often embrace conservative movement rhetorics,[2] the espousal of a conservative feminist foreign policy perspective during the WPS Agenda debates gave feminist policymaking increased legitimacy in the upper echelons of global governance. While the policy rhetoric of civil society activists might be dismissed as radical or unrealistic, the conservative policy rhetoric of the WPS Agenda debates was able to link a feminist foreign policy perspective to established policy frameworks like the WPS Agenda. For example, through their postcolonial reflexivity, debate participants legitimated civil society's critiques that the UN fails to adequately listen to civil society actors or uphold the prevention mandate. While not always reflected in official policy, the UN's recognition civil society's role in implementing the WPS Agenda, their commitment to interrogate the deep, structural causes of gender inequality, and their willingness to create new discursive spaces represent a significant step forward in normalizing feminism as a guiding principle in global policymaking.

Chapter three revealed the rhetorical strategies Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström developed to articulate her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective. By advancing rhetorical strategies steeped in the principles of cooperation, collaboration, and compromise, Wallström worked to transform the hierarchies that exist between global

governance actors into equal policymaking partnerships. Through her moderate feminist foreign policy perspective, Wallström situated herself as a link that could facilitate productive partnerships between radical and conservative approaches to policymaking. Her first strategy was to reframe "top-down feminism" and "bottom-up feminism" as a bi-directional process in which information and resources could simultaneously flow from activists "up" to policymakers and "down" from those policymakers to activists working on the ground. Wallström framed herself and her moderate vision of feminist policymaking as the link that would make this bi-directional flow possible. Second, Wallström negotiated the tensions between universal and particular understandings of human rights by constructing nation-states and activists as co-beneficiaries of her policy proposals. In doing so, she demonstrated how policy recommendations might simultaneously attend to nation-state and activist concerns. Finally, Wallström worked to broaden the concept of a transnational feminist network to include nation-states, a component of global governance that is typically excluded from the idea of transnational networks.[3] Through this strategy, Wallström sought to bind nation-states and activist organizations together as partners in feminist policymaking. Together these strategies illustrate how Wallström managed the concerns of different global governance actors by advancing a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritized cooperation, collaboration, and compromise.

This moderate perspective offers a model through which actors in global governance can integrate activist demands and nation-state norms. Moderate movement rhetorics work to "link radicals to conservatives" and are willing to "compromise, negotiate, and make concessions for political inroads."[4] Therefore, Wallström's articulation of a moderate feminist foreign policy perspective does important work to connect the radical demands of WIDE+ to the conservative norms of the WPS agenda. By steeping her moderate perspective in the principles of cooperation,

compromise, and collaboration, Wallström illustrates how actors in global governance might continue to disagree on specific tactics or strategies but work together to advance a broader feminist policy agenda. Wallström's rhetoric demonstrates how conservative and radical proponents of feminist policymaking might advance each other's work without abandoning their own policy priorities. Specifically, Wallström suggests that transnational feminist values can productively challenge the patriarchal nature of nation-state policymaking while global governance norms and frameworks can lend legitimacy and authority to feminist activists. This moderate vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective serves to bind together civil society actors, nation-state representatives, and supranational institutions into an equal partnership working towards feminist foreign policy.

Chapter four uncovered how participants in the "2016 Movements, Borders, Rights? Feminist Perspectives on Global Issues in Europe" conference, organized by Women in Development Europe, constructed a radical feminist foreign policy perspective. Instead of working within the norms and institutions of global governance, WIDE+ conference participants prioritized transformative and structural change. Their radical vision of feminist policymaking was based on the belief that the current system of global governance was fundamentally unable to address the needs of women and girls, and therefore, needed to be replaced with a new, feminist approach to governance. Conference participants crafted three rhetorical strategies to establish new policy goals, advocacy tactics, and relational practices. First, they advanced an ethic of care as an alternative standard for policy decision-making. To do so, they argued that global governance was in a state of crisis, women were the disproportionate victims of that crisis, and the only way to end the crisis was to transform global governance into a system based in an ethic of care. Second, conference participants deployed nostalgia to justify the use of radical and non-adjustive tactics. Through nostalgia, conference participants framed radical feminist

activism as an established and effective component of global governance and confronted nationalist rhetorical norms. Finally, conference participants renegotiated their relationships to one another in order to generate additional political power. By adopting a postcolonial understanding of power, conference participants framed universal and particular approaches to activism as complementary sources of political power that activists could harness to influence decision-making. Together, these strategies reveal how conference participants articulated a radical feminist foreign policy perspective that was tailored to confront the rise of right-wing and nationalist political movements.

This radical feminist foreign policy perspective demonstrates how activists, who have relatively little official policymaking power, can enable feminist foreign policy by constructing an exigency that demands a response from nation-states and supranational institutions. While radical movement rhetorics are unlikely to be taken up by policymakers, they often result in a "radical flank effect" that pressures policymakers to engage with more moderate movement demands.[5] In this case, conference participants' calls for overthrowing the norms of global governance may have made moderate demands for change, like Wallström's calls greater collaboration between activists and nation-states, more tenable. Without the pressure of radical, non-adjustive demands for transformative change, conservative efforts aimed at incremental change are less likely to materialize. The rhetoric of the WIDE+ conference offers a model through which activists might negotiate and resolve tensions among themselves in order to construct a unified strategy for engaging with other actors in global governance. In this case, strategies that emerged from the conference were tailored to confront emerging trends in global governance, like the resurgence of nationalism. Conference participants' radical feminist foreign policy perspective illustrates how activists can influence policymaking by creating exigencies that pressure policymakers to hasten the passage of conservative and moderate policy change.

The Future of Feminist Foreign Policy

The case studies analyzed in this dissertation represent early efforts to adopt a feminist foreign policy perspective at different levels of global governance. However, the process of making gender equality a primary consideration in the policymaking process is ongoing. This dissertation reveals concrete strategies and tactics that different actors in global governance may find effective as they continue to pursue the transformation of global governance into a system that takes seriously the concerns of women and girls. In what follows, I describe how these lessons have informed subsequent efforts to advance a feminist foreign policy perspective at different levels of global governance. I find that the rhetorical strategies uncovered in this dissertation have resulted in policy benchmarks, handbooks, and manifestos that more deeply entrench gender equality as a primary consideration in the policy decision-making process.

Since the Open Debates on the Status of the WPS Agenda, the UN has continued to make incremental changes that align with their conservative approach to feminist policymaking. As was the case in the debates, these changes are often prompted by demands from civil society activists. For example, in 2016 the International Center for Research on Women, a global research institute focused on gender equality, launched the "Feminist UN Campaign" which articulated "a broad vision for feminist leadership across the UN system."[6] Likewise, in November 2018, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom issued a guidance note for Security Council members entitled "Towards a Feminist Security Council." This guidance note identified places where the Security Council could advance feminist policy goals through incremental changes that worked within existing programs and frameworks. The guidance note argued that the UN should "leverage existing working methods" to address gaps that include "women's meaningful participation, local engagement, disarmament, gender power analysis and structural and democratic reform."[7] Women's International League for Peace and Freedom went

on to identify specific policies and methods that they saw as useful stepping stones to a feminist Security Council. The policies and methods they highlighted were initiated during the 2015, 2016, and 2017 WPS Agenda debates. For example, Women's International League for Peace argued that "the normalization of civil society briefers…the creation of the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security and the Women, Peace and Security Focal Point Network" were "opportunities to accelerate action."[8]

For their part, the UN has continued to respond to the demands of civil society by engaging in incremental change that retains the policy frameworks of the WPS Agenda. Since the launch of the Feminist UN Campaign in 2016, the International Center for Research on Women has published an annual report card that scores the UN's progress on six recommendations. In 2017, the organization assigned Secretary General António Guterres an overall grade of C+. In 2018 that grade rose to a B-. The International Center for Research on Women explained that this grade reflects "slow but steady progress across most areas of our agenda."[9] Specifically, they note "a commendable show of both continued commitment to gender equality and considerable regard for civil society opinion, two important attributes of the style of feminist leadership we seek for the United Nations."[10] Examples of "slow but steady progress" reveal how the lessons learned during the 2015, 2016, and 2017 WPS Agenda debates continue to shape UN gender policy. For example, in 2018, the Secretary General emphasized the importance of "listening to women's expressions of their needs and creating spaces for women's leadership." Guterres followed up on this commitment by hosting a "civil society town hall" in which he answered questions and solicited recommendations from civil society organizations.[11] The failure to listen to civil society was one lesson that debate participants learned through their performance of collective postcolonial reflexivity. Guterres's

implementation of civil society town halls is one example how the rhetoric of the debates continues to shape UN gender policy.

Wallström, likewise, continues to advocate for her moderate approach to feminist policymaking. On August 30, 2018, she presented a handbook on Sweden's feminist foreign policy. The handbook was intended to be "a resource for international work relating to gender equality and all women's and girls' full enjoyment of human rights."[12] It contained "a selection of methods and experiences that can provide examples and inspiration for further work of the Swedish Foreign Service, other parts of the civil service, and society as a whole."[13] The final section of this handbook is especially illustrative of Wallström's continued adherence to a moderate vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective that prioritizes cooperation, collaboration and compromise between actors in global governance. The final section of the handbook, entitled "Pursuing a Contentious Issue," contains a bulleted list of tactics and strategies for advancing feminist policymaking in the face of resistance. The advice in this list is steeped in Wallström's rhetorical strategies of bi-directional feminist flows, framing activists and nations as co-beneficiaries of feminist policy, and expanding networks.

First, she advised that proponents of feminist policymaking can overcome resistance by building support both up-stream and down-stream. The handbook explains that feminist policymaking requires practitioners to "Create and support platforms so that more actors are made visible and can contribute" and "Win support and encourage leadership for gender equality at the highest possible level, including with both female and male political, military, religious and economic decision-makers."[14] Through the process of building support both up-stream and down-stream, feminist policymakers can "establish exchanges of experience and knowledge between different actors."[15] Wallström's handbook also suggests that feminist policymakers adopt her strategy of framing governments and women as co-beneficiaries of new policies. She

explained, "One starting point is that gender equality is an objective in itself, but it is also essential for achieving the Government's other overall objectives, such as peace, security and sustainable development."[16] The handbook adds that policymakers must "make it clear that [feminist policy] fits in, and how." Finally, Wallström reaffirmed her commitment to network building as a strategy to counteract resistance to feminist policymaking. She called feminist policymakers to "forge alliances" and "use dialogue with international, national and local women's organizations, and with other human rights and civil society organizations." This dialogue would reveal "knowledge, problem analysis and proposals which are of decisive importance in the work for sustainable solutions."[17]

Foreign ministers continue to adopt Wallström's moderate approach to feminist policymaking in increasing numbers. In 2017, Canada joined Sweden by applying the label "feminist" to their foreign aid program. The number of foreign ministers willing to associate themselves with feminist policymaking continues to grow. In September 2018, Canada hosted the first "Women Foreign Minsters' Meeting." Fifteen female foreign ministers participated in the meeting and "shared their recommendations for advancing a feminist agenda on the world stage."[18] Chrystia Freeland, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the meeting as an "historic opportunity for us, women foreign ministers, to apply a feminist perspective to issues related to the international rules-based order."[19] This conference is an example of the "methodical, systematic work" that Wallström argues is necessary for feminist change. These examples demonstrate the growing traction Wallström's moderate approach to feminist policymaking has among nation-state officials. This approach works to overcome resistance by building collaborative, cooperative, compromise-based relationships between different policymakers in global governance.

Civil society activists also continue to pursue policy change through their radical vision of a feminist foreign policy perspective. On January 15, 2019, the European Women's Lobby, an organization that co-sponsored the 2016 WIDE+ conference, released a "Manifesto for a Feminist Europe."[20] The European Women's Lobby describes their manifesto as a "comprehensive summary of our feminist vision for the future of Europe."[21] It contains a list of demands of both Europe and EU Member States and is intended to guide voting in the 2019 European elections. The vision and demands articulated in this manifesto are built on the rhetorical strategies that emerged during the 2016 Conference. This manifesto offers an example of how rhetorical strategies based in an ethic of care, nostalgia, and a postcolonial understanding of power can be deployed by civil society activists to shape the future of the EU.

A prioritization of care is obvious throughout the manifesto. It demands that the EU adopt a "care guarantee" and "invest in the care economy by directing investments in the EU budget in this area."[22] The manifesto also urges member nations to guarantee paid leave and suggests a system of "care credits" to address a gender gap in pensions.[23] These examples illustrate how an ethic of care can be used to justify specific economic policy demands. The use of nostalgia in the manifesto is subtler. As was the case in the debates, the manifesto deploys nostalgia to critique nationalism. For example, the manifesto asserts, "The rise of anti-feminist populism and isolationist nationalism has drastically changed the political landscape in recent years and we refuse to be defeated by these forces."[24] This statement suggests that at one time the political landscape was more favorable to women. Likewise, the manifesto calls European voters to "promote a renewed vision of our societies based on caring for each other, and our planet."[25] Following the nostalgic rhetoric of the 2016 conference, the manifesto uses nostalgia to frame nationalism as a disruption and feminism as an established and effective component of policymaking. Finally, the manifesto, like the 2016 conference, reflects a postcolonial

understanding of power in which individual and collective power can work in harmony to advance the work of civil society. On one hand, the manifesto works to influence the actions of individually powerful elected officials, while on the other hand, it suggests that achieving a feminist Europe "requires a collective approach between social movements, concerned citizens and everyone who has the power to make positive change happen in our communities."[26] The manifesto both reaffirms the power that elections grant individuals and highlights the collective power of grassroots network building. The next European Parliamentary Election will begin on May 23, 2019. It will serve as a test of the viability of a radical feminist foreign policy perspective at the EU level.

The Rhetoric of Feminist Foreign Policy

Together, these conservative, moderate, and radical feminist foreign policy perspectives illustrate the complex relational dynamics between different actors in a movement. Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser and Rebecca Trannell argue that we must do more to "better understand the complex patterns of interaction" among the different stakeholders in a movement.[27] Their hypothesis is that as a movement develops, the relationships between conservative, moderate, and radical flanks will "converge, overlap, or splinter" in ways that shape movement outcomes.[28] The findings from this study allows me to demonstrate just how flanks can "converge, overlap, or splinter" in ways that create liberatory potential for women and girls.

This analysis reveals how policymaking at one level of global governance is often shaped by the rhetorical strategies of actors working at different levels of policymaking. Put differently, the rhetorical strategies of one actor often create exigencies that enable the policy rhetoric of other actors. For example, postcolonial reflexivity at the supranational level may enable nation-states to pass more aggressive national action plans. These action plans then create a new set of

norms and structures that civil society activists can appeal to in order to lobby for additional reform. In turn, civil society's articulation of an ethic of care may shape a range of policies at national and supranational levels. In some cases, nation-state leaders may be motivated by the exigency of a "crisis of care" to advance groundbreaking policy proposals. In other cases, the effect of one actor's rhetoric on the policy proposals of another actor may be subtler. For example, the rhetoric of civil society actors may have encouraged the UN's willingness to consider issues beyond physical security as important gender security factors.

In addition to illustrating how the rhetoric of one actor creates exigencies that enable policymaking at different levels of global governance, this study also reveals how the rhetorical norms of movement flanks lead them to articulate different versions of the same policy goal. For example, the UN, Wallström, and feminist activists all argued that feminist policymaking requires expanding the role afforded to civil society activists in deliberation. Tracing how a policy goal, in this case expanding civil society participation, was expressed through conservative, moderate, and radical feminist foreign policy perspectives reveals a range of strategies that policymakers may find effective as they appeal to different movement flanks. For example, The UN's transnationalizing rhetoric, through which they constructed new discursive spaces while maintaining existing power hierarchies, suggests that appealing to a conservative movement flank requires rhetors to frame policy proposals as supportive of current governance structures. Wallström's bi-directional rhetoric, in which she expanded the role of civil society actors by framing them as equal partners, suggests that emphasizing cooperation and compromise are effective strategies for rhetors who wish to appeal to moderate movement members. Finally, WIDE+'s care rhetoric, through which conference participants called for shifting policymaking leadership from UN officials to feminist activists, suggests that rhetors can ally themselves with radical movement members by using confrontational rhetorical strategies.

While this dissertation reveals a range of strategies that policymakers may find effective when appealing to conservative, moderate, or radical feminist foreign policy movement flanks, it also argues that feminist policymaking is not the responsibility of any single level of global governance. Instead, feminist policymaking requires actors to work together in new, cooperative ways. Therefore, successful feminist policy rhetorics must be polysemic so that they can simultaneously appeal to different movement flanks or levels of policymaking. Several of the actors analyzed in this dissertation crafted strategies that allowed them to speak to the concerns and policy goals of different global governance actors. For example, the nostalgic rhetoric of the WIDE+ conference illustrates how activists might justify radical and confrontational tactics in ways that resonate with the UN's adherence to tradition. Likewise, Wallström's strategies of articulating bi-directional feminist flows and constructing co-beneficiaries for her policy proposals offer examples of how a rhetor might simultaneously appeal to radical feminist activists and conservative supranational institutions. Together, this analysis demonstrates a range of rhetorical strategies that policymakers may find effective as they appeal to conservative, moderate, and radical feminist foreign policy perspectives either in isolation or combination.

The Importance of Feminist Foreign Policy

As the previous examples illustrate, the rhetoric of feminist foreign policy continues to circulate at all levels of global governance. In fact, the pace at which actors commit to feminist policymaking appears to be accelerating. Since the initial adoption of a feminist foreign policy perspective at different levels of global governance, policymakers and activists have used the strategies identified in this dissertation to shape elections, to organize meetings of high-level government officials, to direct financial resources, and to hold political leaders accountable to the demands of feminist activists. The continued circulation and acceleration of feminist foreign policy rhetorics demands further scholarly investigation. This dissertation offers an example of a

rhetorical analysis that complicates existing approaches to the study of global policy rhetorics and enriches the field's understanding of transnational feminist discourses.

First, this dissertation responds to Wendy Hesford and Eileen Schell's call to expand our methodologies past unidirectional thinking. Rather than tracing how rhetoric moves "West to East or North to South,"[29] this project attends to how policy rhetoric shapes and is shaped by a complex web of interactions and relationships in which the nation-state is only one unit or node in a global policymaking network. Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault explain that scholars have tended to prioritize top-down, monologic, or one-way policy discourses while overlooking the collaborative nature of policymaking in which NGOs, civil society groups, individuals, nation-states, and supranational institutions engage in diplomacy across national borders.[30] Rather than analyze how a feminist foreign policy perspective flows down from nation-state officials and supranational organizations to activists working on the ground, or flows up from activists to government officials, this project conceptualizes the process of policymaking as a network in which the rhetoric of actors at different levels of policymaking is shaped, constrained, or enabled by the rhetoric of other actors. It would be impossible to separate the conservative feminist foreign policy perspective of the UN from the radical perspective of civil society activists or the moderate perspective of some nation-state leaders. Each attempt to advance a feminist foreign policy perspective serves as an exigency, opportunity, or constraint for other actors working to advance a feminist approach to policymaking. This dissertation argues that studying policy rhetorics in the context of global governance requires attending to a network of relationships and power dynamics between a range of actors working at different levels of decision-making.

This networked model of rhetorical analysis creates two challenges that critics must continue to grapple with. While public address scholars like David Zarefsky and Karlyn Kohrs

Campbell suggest that the study of global rhetorics is an important and necessary shift in public address scholarship,[31] this dissertation demonstrates that studying those rhetorics from a networked perspective presents challenges in the form of expansive archives and contexts. None of the chapters in this dissertation analyze a single text or context. A networked model of rhetorical analysis requires attending to several nodes or points in a network in order to account for how different actors interact in the making of new policy discourses. In the case of my analysis of the Open Debates on the WPS Agenda, the network grew to include over 280 different statements. Unlike the more traditional study of presidential policy rhetoric, in which the archive might include a single speech, the study of global policy discourse from a networked perspective requires that rhetoricians manage an expansive archive of texts. Additionally, each of the texts in a global policy network is shaped by a unique context. Campbell argues that our "critical work is weakest where our linguistic competence and cultural knowledge are limited."[32] This dissertation reveals the challenges of grappling with unfamiliar global political contexts. While situating each text in its immediate context of a UN debate, civil society conference, or foreign ministry, I've also worked to note where additional contextual forces such as a nation's specific history of conflict, an individual's positionality as a representative from the Global South, or an organization's ties to sources of funding may have shaped the discourse that was produced. In addition to managing the large archives of texts that are required to establish a global policy network, rhetoricians must also take care to trace how global policy discourses are shaped by complex, multi-layered contexts.

Next, this dissertation enriches the field's understanding of transnational feminist rhetorics. Several definitions of transnational feminist networks frame transnational feminist rhetorics as something separate from the political workings of nation-states and supranational organizations. For example, Valentine M. Moghadam defines transnational feminist networks as,

"Structures organized *above* the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda."[33] Likewise, Bart Cammaerts and Leo Van Audenhove argue that transnational activism takes place "*under* and *above* the nation state."[34] These definitions treat transnational feminism as something that operates outside of the nation-state system of global governance. For example, Rachel A. Stohr argues that TFNs "incite mobilization that operates independently of the nation-state system"[35] This dissertation challenges the understanding of transnational feminism as something that is above, below, or otherwise separate from other actors or levels of power in global governance. Instead, this project reveals how transnational feminist rhetorics are enmeshed in complex global power flows. While it is important to understand how transnational feminism empowers women to "combat patriarchal, exclusionary norms and practices associated with top-down globalization,"[36] we cannot assume that the "bottom-up" rhetorical strategies articulated by TFNs are free from the negotiations over power and influence that shape the rhetoric of other global governance actors. Rather than contrasting top-down and bottom-up approaches to gender sensitive policymaking, this dissertation asserts that we must situate transnational feminist rhetorics in a network of discourses that includes nation-state actors and supranational officials. By tracing how transnational feminist rhetorics circulated through the discourses of other global actors, and likewise attending to how national and global rhetorics shaped the discourse of transnational feminist activists, this dissertation offers a more nuanced understanding of transnational feminist discourse that highlights how global power flows constrain and enable feminist rhetorics.

Note

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[2] Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser and Rebecca Trannell, "Waves of Contention: Relations Among Radical, Moderate, and Conservative Movement Organizations," in *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* edited by Patrick G. Coy (Emerald Group, 2015): 74

[3] Suzy D'Enbeau, "Transnational Feminist Advocacy Online: Identity (Re)Creation Through Diversity, Transparency, and Co-Construction," *Women's Studies in Communication* 34, no. 1 (2011): 65.

[4] Ibid., 76.

[5] Ibid.

[6] "Toward a More Feminist United Nations," *International Center for Research on Women*, September 2016, https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Toward-a-More-Feminist-UN.pdf.

[7] "Toward a Feminist Security Council: A Guidance for Security Council Members," *Women's International League for Peace & Freedom,* November 2018, https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/WILPF_Feminist Security Council Guide_Print.pdf.

[8] Ibid.

[9] "Progress Under Threat: A Report Card on the Secretary General's Second Year from the Feminist U.N. Campaign," *International Center for Research on Women*, 2019, https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICRW_2018_EndofYearReportCard_v5_WebReady.pdf: 1.

[10] Ibid., 25.

[11] Ibid., 9.

[12] "Handbook: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy," *Government Offices of Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,* August 30, 2018, https://www.government.se/4a4752/contentassets/fc115607a4ad4bca913cd8d11c2339dc/handbook_swedens-feminist-foreign-policy.pdf: 6.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 105.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 9.

[17] Ibid., 105.

[18] "Canada Concludes Successful Women Foreign Ministers' Meeting," *Government of Canada* September 22, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/09/canada-concludes-successful-women-foreign-ministers-meeting.html.

[19] "Address by Minister Freeland at a Press Conference to Conclude the Women Foreign Ministers' Meeting," *Government of Canada* September 22, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/09/address-by-minister-freeland-at-a-press-conference-to-conclude-the-women-foreign-ministers-meeting.html.

[20] "Our Manifesto for a Feminist Europe," *European Women's Lobby* January 15, 2019, https://www.womenlobby.org/Our-Manifesto-for-a-Feminist-Europe-7818.

[21] Ibid.

[22] "50/50: Women for Europe, Europe for Women – Manifesto for the 2019 European Elections," *European Women's Lobby*, January 15, 2019, https://www.womenlobby.org/IMG/pdf/european_women_s_lobby_manifesto_2019_final_.pdf.: 4.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 3.

[25] Ibid., 7.

[26] Ibid., 5.

[27] Belinda Robnett, Carol L. Glasser and Rebecca Trannell, "Waves of Contention: Relations Among Radical, Moderate, and Conservative Movement Organizations," 71.

[28] Ibid., 72.

[29] Wendy S. Hesford and Eileen E. Schell, "Introduction: Configuration of Transnationality: Locating Feminist Rhetorics," *College English* 70 no. 5 (2008): 463

[30] Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 11

[31] David Zarefsky, "Public Address Scholarship in the New Century: Achievements and Challenges," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Affairs* Edited by Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 76.; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Cultural Challenges to Rhetorical Criticism," *Rhetoric Review* 25 no. 4 (2006): 360.

[32] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Rhetorical Criticism 2009: A Study in Method," in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Affairs* Edited by Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 92.

[33] Valentine M. Moghadam, *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 4.

[34] Bart Cammaerts and Leo Van Audenhove, "Online Political Debate, Unbounded Citizenship, and the Problematic Nature of a Transnational Public Sphere," *Political Communication* 22, no. 2 (2005): 180.

[35] Rachel A. Stohr, "Transnational Feminism, Global Governance, and the Reimagination of the Organization-Society Relationship: A Case Study of the Women's Environment and Development Organization," *Communication Theory* 25, no. 2 (2015): 212.

[36] Rachel Stohr, "The Evolution of Local and Global Voice in a Case of Transnational Feminist Organizing," *Women & Language* 38 no. 2 (2015): 33.

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