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Public Policy and Legislative Choice
(Under the Direction of CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III)

Current research on legislatures sees several competing schools of thought: distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative organization dominate the literature. This study contends that many of the differences between the contemporary theories can be resolved by accounting for the type of policy under consideration.

Chapter 3 of the study examines the creation of party leadership groups in the United States House of Representatives for the 94th through the 103rd Congresses. Most researchers have dismissed the creation of these groups as inconsequential and symbolic. The analysis presented herein finds otherwise. Using a Monte Carlo design, it concludes that the creation of the leadership groups is systematic. The floor median aims to create a leadership body that is representative of his preferences. The median voter is a member of the majority party. Hence he must temper his choices according to his party alignment. Ultimately, the median's true preferences are revealed toward the majority party's caucus median. In this case, the median voter selects a leadership cadre with an ideology somewhat to the left of his own. It is also found that the floor creates leadership groups that are ideologically homogeneous as opposed to covering a broad range of ideological positions. Additionally it is determined that the selection of the Speaker of the House does not follow an ideological pattern; the popular view that Speakers are chosen for charisma and competence rather than for ideological reasons is supported by the study.

Chapter 4 turns its attention to the dynamics of voting on the floor of the House. Adopting Lowi's typology of public policy (1964, 1972), and a variant of Kingdon's model of congressional voting (1989), policy motions from the 103rd Congress are

grouped according to policy content. The votes are treated as dependent variables. Four groups of independent variables are used to model the dynamics of floor voting: committees, parties, ideology, and members' narrow, district-specific interests. The relative weight of the independent variables fluctuates according to the type of policy under consideration. These findings are taken as support of Lowi's thesis that different types of public policy produce different types of politics.

INDEX WORDS: Congress, House of Representatives, Public Policy, Policy Typologies, Political Parties, Roll Call Voting, Monte Carlo Design, Logit Analysis

PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE CHOICE

by

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DEDICATION

For Melissa. Your love, understanding, and patience have made this work possible. May the next chapters of our life be as amazing and wonderful as the one that is now closing.

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FOREWORD

At the risk of oversimplifying, American political science can be divided into two types of research: behavioral and institutional. Perhaps the origin of this dichotomy can be traced to the formation of the republic itself. The Founding Fathers focused on two major questions: *What behavior can we expect from people?* and *What types of institutions will put their tendencies to best use?* James Madison offers many of the best known answers to these questions in the *Federalist Papers*: People are naturally motivated by particularistic desires, and people naturally cluster together to promote their narrow interests.¹ People are far from perfect, and so need to have a government.² Of course, the same imperfect people who *need* the government will *form* the government; this is not

¹ “The latent causes of faction are thus sown into the nature of man.... A zeal for different opinions... [has] divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good” (Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 10).

² “If men were angels, no government would be necessary” (Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 51).

unproblematic.³ What we need, then, are institutional arrangements whereby people motivated by narrow self-interests keep each other in check.⁴

It has been the task of American political scientists to examine the behavior of citizens working within many of the institutions shaped by Madison. We continue with the effort to understand human behavior within political institutions. Concentrating on the House of Representatives, we ask: How is government organized? What is the influence of self-interest? How do factions operate? How does government coerce? What are the roles of ideas and information? How do we promote the common good, or do we?

It is a testament to the timelessness of these questions that after two centuries of thought and investigation (by individuals of far greater wisdom and analytic ability than we can hope to claim), we still believe that we have something to contribute to the discourse. It is our aim to develop a theory of legislative organization and behavior that incorporates both the narrow, particularistic goals of legislators and their desire to promote the general public welfare, and explicitly accounts for parties as a legislative force. *Briefly, we posit that the individual and collective behaviors of legislators are a function of the type of*

³ “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself” (Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 51).

⁴ “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place” (Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, No. 51).

*policy under consideration.*⁵ We refer to this position as the *policy perspective* of legislative organization.

⁵ We use the phrase “type of policy” as it is developed by Lowi (1964, 1972), rather than in reference to the topical content of a policy proposal.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A Puzzle: Congressional Organization and Policy Making

Research on legislatures, Congress in particular, is extensive. Most of the research on Congress conducted during the last three decades can be classified as one of three major types: distributive, informational, and partisan.⁶

Distributive Theories of Congressional Organization

Distributive perspectives dominate the literature of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and are alive and well at the present time (for example, Baron 1991; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Benson 1981; Brady 1988; Bullock 1972; Cowart 1981; Fenno 1973; Ferejohn 1974; Shepsle 1978, 1979, 1986a, 1986b; Shepsle and Weingast 1981, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1984d, 1987a, 1987b, 1994; Weingast 1979, 1989; Weingast and Marshal 1988). According to this view, Congress is made up of “legislative high demanders” who seek to capture “gains from exchange.” Members of legislatures aim to influence the creation of policy that is of greatest concern to their district, thereby furthering their chances for re-election (Fenno 1973; Fiorina 1974, 1977; Mayhew 1974). According to the distributive

⁶ That is to say, three major types within rational choice theory, the dominant paradigm for the study of legislatures over the last quarter-century. Our review of the literature largely forgoes discussion of behavioral, sociological, structural-functionalist, and elitist/Marxist approaches, which have fallen by the wayside.

school of congressional research, the floor defers to “interesteds” when voting. Members without a particular interest in a given policy area support the high-demand positions of members who have an interest. In exchange, these cooperative members receive support in their own policy area when questions on it arise. Leaders try to accommodate the requests of committee-assignment-seeking members, disinterested members defer to the wishes of interested members, and floor votes are characterized by logrolling.

Informational Theories of Congressional Organization

The distributive theory of organization has certainly had a great deal of influence on congressional research over the last thirty years. However, this theory has proved to be a less-than-complete paradigm for students of legislatures. The last decade has seen the emergence of an *informational* theory of congressional organization (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1990a, 1990b; Austen-Smith and Riker 1987, 1990; Banks 1989, 1990, 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Krehbiel 1990, 1991). The informational perspective argues that legislators do not organize themselves for the distribution of narrow benefits, but rather to gain insight into the uncertain outcomes of policy decisions. They do not seek gains from exchange, as the distributive perspective holds, but rather seek “gains from specialization.” The goal of the floor is to enact efficient legislation, which is to say, policy which deviates minimally from majority preferences.

As one might expect, the informational theorists take issue with the picture of Congress drawn by adherents to the distributive theory. They argue that distributive theory in general is incomplete, and that the empirical evidence is too mixed for us to accept it outright. Incomplete and asymmetric information needs to be taken into account, as

does legislators' desire to make good policy. The major point of contention between the two schools of thought centers on the interpretation of policy. Should policy be taken as a means or an end? The distributive perspective takes policy as an end in itself; once Congress makes policy, the legislative game is over. Informational theorists, on the other hand, argue that policy is a means to an outcome. The relationship between the policy enacted (the means) and the eventual outcome (the end) is unclear because of incomplete information. Policy makers want to produce good outcomes; accurate information is therefore necessary. Given that information is necessarily incomplete, the last thing the legislature wants to do is compound the problem by making it more asymmetric than it has to be. Hence, legislative powers, such as committee assignments and parliamentary rules are distributed in order not to allow high demanders to satisfy their extreme preferences, but rather to reflect the preferences of the chamber's median voter.

Partisan Theories of Congressional Organization

A survey of the congressional literature of the last century shows that parties have rarely been seen as a major factor in the operation of our national legislature. Wilson's *Congressional Government* (1885) describes Congress as "committee government," an arrangement that lacks the single strong leaders found in parliamentary systems and distributes power to committee chairmen. This view was common through most of the twentieth century: scholars concluded that parties were not an important legislative force (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977 [1989]). By the 1970s, influential works explicitly discouraged future researchers from using parties as a focal point.

Despite the predominant view that parties are not an important factor in congressional operation, a party-based rationale for legislative organization has emerged in recent years. Upon further consideration of the House and party reforms of the 1970s, researchers are beginning to revise their view of the role of parties in Congress. The perspective that is developing, thanks to important contributions by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Rohde (1991), and Cox and McCubbins (1993), is that parties do matter in Congress, but that researchers must reevaluate their notions of what it is for a party to be powerful.

“Our doubts about the [weakness of parties] grow out of a sense that political scientists have been preoccupied with what congressional parties are not, and with what they are unable to do” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 19). The powerful party leader no longer rules with the iron fist of Reed or Cannon, but carefully gives power away in order to achieve his aims. Today, parties rule “conditionally” (Rohde 1991), and “delegate” in order to achieve their aims (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991), but still, “congressional parties exert a strong and systematic influence upon national policy making!” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 232-33).

Which Theory is Right?

For the time being it will suffice to say that previous research has built a strong case for each organizational rationale. Each seems to have intuitive face validity, each has seen extensive and explicit theoretical development, and empirical evidence has been presented to support each argument. Ultimately, it strikes the student of Congress that no theory is all right or all wrong. Rather, it seems quite likely that each organizational rationale may apply, but under different sets of circumstances. Pressures for distribution

and information exist simultaneously; legislators may need (and perhaps get) information at one time, distribution of benefits at another. Parties may play an important role at some points, but have diminished influence in other instances.

The question is, under which circumstances will a given pressure predominate? What is the underlying thread that ties the theories together, but has yet to be identified? It is the goal of this research to provide the missing link, the underlying connection. In short, this work is an attempt to specify the conditions under which the given organizational rationale becomes manifest. We believe that the missing theoretical link is provided by a proper consideration of the type of policy at hand. We hypothesize that *the dominating pressure and resulting organizational rationale is contingent upon the type of policy under consideration*. We believe that by adopting this *policy perspective* of legislative organization, the scholarly understanding of Congress will be advanced substantially. The following chapter reviews several attempts to create organizational frameworks and general theories of public policy. By employing Lowi's (1964, 1972) systematic typology of public policy, the creation of a viable policy-based theory of congressional organization is possible.

The Empirical Focus

While many phenomena at many stages of the legislative process can be examined empirically in light of the policy perspective, the dissertation's focus is on the selection of party leaders, the composition of committees, and the making of policy through floor voting. The selection of party leaders has seen surprisingly little study over the years. The selection of leaders is among the first and most important acts of the legislative body once

it convenes, and understanding the process of leadership selection is crucial, for it affects the making of all other types of policy. In Chapter 3 we examine the selection of party leaders. We test the proposition that party leaders are, on the whole, ideologically representative of the party.

Having gained insight into the selection of party leaders, we move on to examine the composition of committees and the creation of substantive public policy in Chapter 4.

In studying the making of public policy, floor votes are useful objects of analysis because they provide distinct and objective expressions of legislators' preferences. When voting, the influences on House members are many and varied. It is widely agreed that no legislator fully understands the implications of every policy motion. Kingdon (1989, xi) states that the "basic problem on the floor" is that there are "too many decisions and too little time to investigate them." Therefore, cues from various sources are needed to make decisions (Kingdon 1989). The major influences on voting observed over the last several decades have been party, the committees, ideology, and constituent interests. These four forces comprise the core of our model of voting. Within our model of voting we control for committee membership, and are thereby able to determine if committee members are preference outliers or if they vote like other chamber members.

Our third task is to examine the creation of policies within each of the policy areas defined by Lowi. Our strategy is to select votes on motions which fall squarely into each of the policy types. If the theory is correct, then each cell, each type of policy, will have its own type of politics. Specifically, the weight of each of the influences on a member's voting decisions will vary predictably.

Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 will review the literature on congressional organization, the composition and role of committees, parties and leaders in the House, policy typologies, and voting on the floor.

Constituent policy – the creation of the “state within the state” (Lowi 1972) – has logical priority to other policy types. The state apparatus, the institutional structure of the House in this case, must be created before other policy can be enacted. One of the first steps in building the state is the selection of party leaders. This, then, is the focus of Chapter 3: the selection of speakers of the House and the composition of party leadership cadres will be examined.

Having gained an understanding of how House members select their leaders – the first step in the creation of the machinery of government – Chapter 4 proceeds to examine the creation of substantive policy within the four policy types. The theory holds that within each of the policy types the weight of each of four major legislative forces (parties, committees, district-specific concerns, and ideology) will vary predictably. Within this examination of policy creation we are able to determine the preference structure of the committees; that is, we determine if committees are composed of subsets of members which have extreme preferences.

Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings, draws conclusions, discusses the implications for those seeking to shape and design policy, and points to directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

CONGRESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

If anything is clear about research on Congress and public policy, it is that there is a great deal of it. However, the development of the literature exhibits some clear trends, making the task of surveying it somewhat more manageable. This chapter reviews research on Congress, surveys various attempts to create taxonomies of public policies, and examines previous research on the voting decisions of members of Congress. By incorporating the literature of policy types with the research on congressional behavior and organization, a more general theory of Congress, one which begins to reconcile differences in distributive, informational, and party perspectives, can be created and put to fruitful use.

The Development of Congressional Research

In the years following the Civil War, political science emerged from jurisprudence, political philosophy, history, sociology, and economics, and became an academic discipline in its own right. Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* (1885) established Congress as an important object of examination for contemporary political scientists. Following in Wilson's footsteps, political scientists of the early twentieth century continued to examine Congress. Their work was primarily descriptive in nature, and

chiefly was concerned with the rules, structures, organization, and precedents of congressional action and policymaking. However, a notable exception to this legalistic vein of work was provided by Stuart Rice's *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928). Rice's systematic analysis of party voting in Congress had a lasting impact on legislative analysis.

Following World War II, there was a concerted effort to move away from the legalistic, descriptive work of the first part of the twentieth century and, following the trail blazed by Rice, to make the study of politics more scientific. To accomplish this, changes in both theory and method were necessary. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, two theories, each associated with a set of research methods, emerged as the major explanatory frameworks for the discipline. *Behavioralism*, drawing largely on the theoretical concepts of psychology and sociology, and *rational choice theory*, which developed from the microeconomic theory of price equilibrium, became the two major research paradigms of American political science.

Behavioralists, whose work revolutionized political science in the 1950s and 1960s, rely on inductive logic and empirical investigation and make use of quantitative statistical methods in their research. According to the behavioral view, individuals are the fundamental building blocks of social and political phenomena;⁷ political results are merely the aggregation of individuals' behavior, which are in turn products of sociological and psychological forces. The behavioral program, with its emphasis on clear hypotheses and accurate measurement, was a great leap forward for the scientific study of politics.

Rational choice theory, which sparked its own revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, also takes individuals as the fundamental social unit. Unlike the behavioral approach,

however, the theory begins with the premise that individuals are self-interested utility-maximizers. Individual actions are not a response to social-psychological stimuli, as the behavioralists hold, but rather purposive behaviors designed to produce maximum individual utility. Formal microeconomic models of political reality are deduced according to this postulate of utility maximization. The social-psychological forces that cause individuals to consider some outcomes more useful than others are largely ignored. Shepsle (1989, 134) provides a succinct summary of the two major approaches:

A behavioral theory aggregates individual behaviors based on role, status, and learned responses. A rational theory aggregates individual choices based on preferences or privately held values. Sociologically based theories emphasize (or seek to explain) the source and causes of the learned responses, worrying less about the manner in which they are aggregated into social outcomes. Rationality-based theories worry hardly at all about the sources of preferences and beliefs, emphasizing instead how these data, however arrived at, get summed into social outcomes.

Together, behavioralism and rational choice form the theoretical spine of American political science today. During the 1950s and 1960s, behavioral theory was quite influential in congressional studies⁸ as well as in research on political participation.⁹ Today, behavioralism remains a major theoretical component of research on voting and other types of political behavior. Rational choice theory, on the other hand, has become the dominant analytic framework for researchers of legislatures and other political institutions.

⁷ As opposed to classes or other social structures.

⁸ See, for example, the *Studies on Congress* series published by Little Brown for examples of behavioral research on the national legislature.

In contemporary practice, however, the line between behavioralism and rational choice theory is often blurry (Collie 1988, 428). Contemporary congressional researchers generally begin with the premise that members of Congress are self-interested utility-maximizers. Formal models are often created to show that political outcomes are the product of the interplay of self-interested lawmakers. More often than not, however, formal deductive models are supplanted by specific, but less formal, statements of how self-interested members of Congress are expected to behave and interact as they rationally pursue their goals. These statements are formulated as hypotheses to be tested empirically. The empirical tests then rely on the methods employed in classical behavioral research, namely empirical statistical models.

This mixed deductive-empirical approach has been characteristic of the great bulk of the literature on Congress that has been published over the last thirty years. By using the theoretical premises of instrumental rationality in combination with formal microeconomic and empirical statistical models, a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the operation of legislatures in general, and Congress in particular. This is not to say that there is complete agreement among researchers, however. Over the last decade three major perspectives on Congressional organization have developed, as outlined in Chapter 1 and detailed below. In the following sections the development of the contemporary rational choice theory of Congress is reviewed, and the three major schools of thought on Congress that exist currently within the rational choice camp are examined.

⁹ Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes's *American Voter* is the classic example of behavioral research on voter behavior.

Particular attention is paid to the implications of the theories on the variables used in this analysis.

The Evolution of Rational Choice Theories of Majority Rule Institutions

Pure Theories of Voting

Theories of elections and voting are actually as old as Congress itself. Duncan Black (1958) traces the development of a “Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections” to Jean-Charles de Borda's “Mémoire sur les Élections au Scrutin,” *Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences* (1781), Condorcet's *Essai sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Redues à la Pluralité des Voix* (1785), and Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace (1812).¹⁰ Not to be outdone by their neighbors to the south, Englishmen E.J. Nanson (1907), Francis Galton (1907), and the Rev. C.L. Dodgson (1873-8) (who also wrote *Alice in Wonderland* and other works under the pseudonym Lewis Carroll) contributed to the development of a mathematical theory of voting (Black 1958, Part II.)

Contemporary interest in formal theories of voting can be tied more directly to the work of several authors, most notably Kenneth Arrow (1951), Duncan Black (1948, 1958), Black and R.A. Newing (1951), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Anthony Downs (1957), William Riker (1961, 1962, 1965), and Amartya Sen (1966). Dur-

¹⁰ Interestingly, in addition to his work on voting theory, Laplace is noted as an influential philosopher of science. He argued that if the position, motion, and rules of behavior of all particles could be known, then any and all future events could be determined. This position, dubbed *scientific determinism*, has been undermined by the development of quantum theory's uncertainty principle. Nevertheless, his theory was influential among (*cont'd.*)

ing the 1950s and 1960s these and other authors created precise, formal, and highly abstract models of rational individuals in majority-rule situations. The general conclusion of this body of work is that majority-rule situations are unstable; that is, there is no method of determining the preferences of voters that guarantees a majority-preference outcome when there are more than two alternatives from which to choose (Riker 1980, 434). This lack of stable equilibria implies that any political outcome is provisional and is likely to be changed in the near future.

Applying Pure Theories of Voting to Congress: Insights and Reevaluation

The abstract body of work described in the preceding paragraphs was adopted as a theoretical platform by a group of scholars concerned with a very specific majority-rule situation: the United States Congress. The late 1960s and 1970s saw the development of a literature concerned with the behavior of utility-maximizing members of Congress, and the irrational collective outcomes that could result as a consequence of voting instability. Scholars further refined rational choice theory as they applied it to Congress and used the theory as the guiding principle for substantive empirical investigations (Arnold 1979; Fenno 1973; Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina 1974, 1977 [1989]; Mayhew 1974; McKelvey 1976, 1979; Plott 1967; Shepsle 1978). This body of work characterizes Congress as a marketplace where legislators exchange influence so that each member gets a lot of what is most important to his or her constituents, and hence wins reelection. In the formal language of positive political theorists, “congressional politics reflects the gains from cooperation in

nineteenth century scientists and philosophers, and was often adhered to dogmatically by Soviet scientists and Marxist philosophers (Hawking 1988).

which legislators make themselves better off through exchange and concerted action” (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, 152). The result of this cooperation among high demanders is that Congress distributes (i.e., spends) more than is economically efficient.

Early attempts to marry solid theory to rigorous empirical investigation were instructive, though not because they showed how well the theory worked. Instead, empirical work of the 1970s showed that the rational choice theory of legislatures needed further refinement. Simply put, the theory predicted many outcomes that were seldom seen and ignored or failed to predict many common occurrences. For example, the unstable voting cycles often predicted by pure rational choice theorists are rarely seen in practice; Congress often reaches stable political decisions. The question was not what to do about unstable majority rule, but rather why so much stability existed (Tullock 1981).

One way around the chaos problem (or the lack thereof) is to revisit assumptions of legislator goals and preferences, and the behaviors that result. Surely legislators are concerned with reelection, as Mayhew posits (1974). This may not be their only motivation, however. Fenno (1973) finds that attaining power within the chamber and formulating good public policy are also legislator goals. Drawing on Fenno's triad of goals, Weingast (1979) examines the development of congressional norms, specifically the norm of “policy universalism.”

Weingast shows that with a very slight adjustment to our assumptions about legislator goals, rational choice theory can account for norms that develop and serve to bring about stable policy outcomes. For example, early formal models predict that in distributing benefits legislators will form minimum winning coalitions (i.e. a coalition of $\frac{1}{2}N+1$ members) (Riker 1962, Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Riker and Ordeshook 1973). Em-

pirical studies, however, reveal that this is simply not the case; members of Congress (apparently unaware of how they should behave according to scholars) form *universal* coalitions which give at least some distributive benefit to nearly all chamber members (Ferejohn 1974; Fenno 1966, 1973; Manley 1970). Weingast reasons that the purest theory fails to explain policy universalism because it does not account for the possibility that the goals of a district and the goals of its representative are not necessarily one and the same:

While the district may wish to enrich itself at the expense of the rest of the country, the representative wishes to retain the prestige and power which accompanies continued membership in the legislature. This feature, when explicitly incorporated into a model of the legislature, destroys the [minimum winning coalition] theory and gives rise to the norm of universalism (Weingast 1979, 249).

In so doing it helps explain why distributive votes are almost always non-cyclical: since everyone gets something there is no reason to defect, nor is there a potential majority coalition to which a member *could* defect.

While Weingast's (1979) exploration of norms is informative, it is not entirely characteristic of the great bulk of literature that developed during the early and mid-1980s. Like other researchers of the period, Weingast characterizes legislators who are concerned with distribution. The insight provided by his above-cited research comes from reexamining assumptions about legislator goals, and the behavior that results from these goals. Over the next decade, however, most congressional research focused not on goals and preferences, but on the institutional context within which legislators act.

By the 1980s it was clear that most models of legislative operation were incomplete; the conclusion that many reached was that the theory of the interplay of rational individuals was too thin because it did not account for the context in which utility-max-

imizers coexisted. While seeking an equilibrium of *preferences*, rational choice theory ignored the *institutional structures* that shaped the behavior of rational individuals, critics charged. For example, Riker (1980, 432) complains that

While contemporary political science ... tends to emphasize the study of values and tastes (because of an assumption that political outcomes – like market outcomes – are determined by the amalgamation of individual preferences), the older tradition of political science emphasized the study of institutions. The line of research in political theory followed in the last generation has involved seeking an equilibrium of tastes; but it has revealed that such an equilibrium exists only rarely, if at all.

Hence,

The inference ... is that prudence in research directs the science of politics toward investigation of empirical regularities in *institutions*, which, through congealed tastes, are “unstable constants” amenable to scientific research (Riker 1980, 432, emphasis added).

Shepsle (1979, 1986a, 1986b) argues similarly that institutions must be taken into account if we are to understand how political equilibria are attained. Recalling his experience in Congress while researching *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (1978), he stresses that “*structural features*, the division and specialization of labor (committees), leadership (organization, staffing arrangements, party grouping), and *procedures* (rules of debate, amendment, and those regulating other features of daily official life)” are of utmost important to substantive scholars and members of Congress alike, but are notably absent from formal models of legislative behavior (1989, 135).

In their quest for analytic generality, most formal theorists had suppressed institutional details such as these, thinking that to include them would be to specialize and render idiosyncratic otherwise general theories.... [R]ational choice theories that begin – ‘Assume a set $N = (1, 2, \dots, n)$ of agents and a set $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k)$ of alternatives...’ – are impoverished, since the sets N and A are precisely what institutional rules delineate.

The Road to Equilibrium: Institutions, Information, and Parties

The 1980s witnessed many attempts to improve Spartan models of Congress developed during the 1970s. The result of these attempts has been the development of the three major schools of thought on congressional organization and behavior outlined in Chapter 1. Distributive theories, informational theories, and partisan theories of Congress became the major analytic frameworks of the 1990s. The three views have often been presented as substitutes for one another; this may not be the case, however. It seems quite likely that the perspectives differ from one another because scholars have concentrated on different aspects of legislative reality as they have sought to improve the thin theoretical models of the 1970s.

Like the proverbial blind men describing an elephant, each school of thought has given a different description of Congress because it has examined different aspects of our national legislature. Distributive theories have concentrated on the effect of official structures like committees and various procedural rules. Informational models, while continuing to focus on committees and rules, incorporate the more realistic assumptions of incomplete information and risk aversion, and argue that while legislators are concerned with distribution, they also care about the common good. The partisan perspective (as one might gather from the moniker) looks at the effect of parties on Congress ; in so doing it has revived interest in a feature of Congress long thought to be unimportant by scholars, and shows that parties can be used as solutions to collective action problems in the legislature. In this section we outline the major research and predictions of the three theories, and point to possibilities for reconciliation between them.

Distributive Theories

Empirical investigations of Congress during the 1970s characterize an institution populated by legislators who are high demanders of district-specific benefits. Members cooperate with one another in order to acquire benefits of greatest concern to their constituents (Bullock 1972; Fenno 1973; Ferejohn 1974; Fiorina 1974, 1977 [1989]; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle 1978). As noted above, theoretic models of legislatures developed in the 1970s have a great deal of trouble making sense of such cooperative arrangements, for there is no deal that can be derived which does not include winning coalition members who would prefer some other deal; that is, the deals are not Pareto optimal.

The solution, argues Kenneth A. Shepsle, one of the founders of the “new institutionalism,” is to account for institutional structures (1979). To make models of Congress more verisimilar, the institutional detail that permeated congressional research in the first half of the century must be incorporated into a theory of Congress based on utility-maximizing legislators. The goal is to create a happy marriage between the elegance of the economic theory of equilibrium and the minute institutional detail of older congressional research. (It is this combination of positive theory and structural minutiae that makes this brand of institutionalism “new.”) In a series of articles, Shepsle (1979, 1986a, 1986b) demonstrates that while preference-induced equilibria (PIE) are few and far between, models which account for institutional structures can explain the stable outcomes that are often observed as high-demanding legislators make bargains. New models are hence free of the chaos that characterized the early, more pure theories; structure-induced equilibria (SIE) are theoretically possible and empirically common.

A detailed review of the literature that followed Shepsle's seminal work (1978) would scarcely be possible, and would certainly be beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to say that many researchers heard his call, and the next decade saw a spate of research that incorporated institutional structures into models of legislatures (Baron and Ferejohn 1989a, 1989b; Benson 1983; Denzau and McKay 1983; Dobra 1983; Enelow 1986; Hill 1985; Hoenack 1983; Koford 1982; McCubbins and Schwartz 1985; Niemi 1983; Ostrom 1986; Shepsle 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast 1981, 1984a, 1984b, 1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988). These research projects are similar in that nearly all focus on the committee system and procedural rules as the institutional features that allow equilibrium outcomes.

Central to the distributive argument is the “self-selection” thesis: legislators are able, by-and-large, to obtain committee assignments that help them garner benefits of great concern to their constituents (Shepsle 1978). Representatives determine for themselves which committee assignments will be good ones given the makeup of their constituency; party leaders do their best to accommodate members in their committee requests.¹¹ Committee members are then endowed with a set of “property rights.” That is, committees have specific policy jurisdictions, and parliamentary rules make it difficult for the floor to influence policy within the purview of any given committee (Shepsle 1979, Weingast and Marshall 1988, Fiorina 1977 [1989]; but see King 1997 for an elaboration on jurisdictional struggles). Because committees decide when to report bills to the floor,

¹¹ Each member must decide which assignments will be the most beneficial to pursue. Perhaps in an earlier time a young political scientist would have said “With committees, as with women, beauty is often in the eye of the beholder” (Bullock 1972, 997). We will (*cont’d.*)

they are, in essence, the agenda setters of the chamber. Once legislation reaches the floor, the floor generally defers to the committee's wishes. If the floor does not defer to the committee, and instead alters the proposal to an extent considered unacceptable by the committee, the bicameral arrangement of Congress gives committee members an *ex post* veto; substantive committee members, who dominate the conference committees, can simply undo the floor changes in conference (Shepsle 1979).

Finally, the committee system ensures that deals that have been struck can be maintained over time (Weingast and Marshal 1988). Many scholars have treated bargains in legislatures as if they were simple transactions in the marketplace, with the value of vote A being traded for the value of vote B. Weingast and Marshal (1988), however, argue that if a legislature is simply a marketplace where spot deals are struck, then transactions that require continued legislative support over time will eventually (if not immediately) fall apart. Deals that are struck today can be undone or ignored in the next session or tomorrow.

Of course, not all deals fall apart. Legislatures, they contend, are not organized like markets, but are organized like firms within markets. Firms are created in the market in order to reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs within firms are lower than the transaction costs across firms in the marketplace. Similarly, legislatures create committees in order to reduce the number of costly market transactions required, and to minimize the chance that a party to a transaction will renege. "Legislators ... devise institutions for

simply summarize the self-selection hypothesis by stating that each member tries to obtain the assignments that she finds to be the most beneficial for her own district.

long-term durability of agreements that ensure the flow of benefits beyond the session of the legislature” (Weingast and Marshal 1988, 139).

Consider this example. Group A wants to build a bridge. Group B wants to promulgate a new regulation. A spot deal is struck between A and B. Group A gets its bridge, and Group B gets its regulation. Once the bridge is built, it is built. What now keeps group A from undoing the deal with B, removing its support for the regulation, and returning to the *status quo ante* in the next legislative session (assuming that tearing down the bridge is not an option)?

The solution is provided by the committee system. It is assumed that each committee has a specific number of seats which are held by members of the parent chamber. Seats are held for as long as the committee member wants the seat, or until he or she dies, loses the election, or otherwise leaves the chamber. Each committee has jurisdiction over a certain subset of topically-related policies. Within jurisdictions, only the committee has the ability to propose alternatives to the status quo. Committee proposals need a majority vote in the parent chamber to change the status quo. Seats on committees are won by floor members through a bidding process. There are both direct and opportunity costs associated with bidding on an open committee position, so members must be selective in bidding on seats.

Now consider the deal between A and B in light of the committee system. A and B are no longer simple coalitions of floor members, but are committees. Under the assumptions described above, A cannot renege on its commitment once its bridges are built, because committee B has gate-keeping power over legislation that could alter the regulation. To alter the bargain post facto, B, having monopoly power to propose alternatives

to the new status quo, has to agree to any changes in its policy area, and propose alternative policy to the floor. “[R]estricting access to the agenda serves as a mechanism to prevent ex post renegeing” (Weingast and Marshall 1988, 144). Hence, the committee system ensures that deals struck can be maintained over time.¹²

Responses to Distributive Theories

The new institutional view characterized a Congress where legislative structures and rules condition legislator behaviors in order to provide stable policy outcomes; equilibrium is hence structure-induced. Accounting for structures certainly went a long way in making models of legislatures more realistic. By the mid-1980s great progress was made in bringing rational choice theory and observation closer together. However, the establishment of any new research paradigm ultimately causes new research problems to surface. Three such features of this literature came to light by the mid-1980s, and gave rise to further thought and investigation.

¹² A criticism of this characterization of the committee system is that it is static, failing to capture the shifting jurisdictions of committees. However, the comments on Weingast and Marshall (1988) article are intended to show how a committee system allows deals to be struck when there are non-contemporaneous flows of benefits between coalitions. Of course, jurisdictional struggles are important to life in Congress, as King (1997) details in his book *Turf Wars*. However, Weingast and Marshall’s piece seems more “fundamental” because they offer a justification of why committees exist at all. Jurisdictional struggles can occur only after jurisdictions exist; that is, after there is a committee system in place.

Moreover, multiple and shifting jurisdictions have no impact on the empirical investigation of Chapter 5 of this dissertation, as the study of the substantive committees is cross-sectional. The point would be of greater concern in a longitudinal study. Even so, multiple committee assignments (i.e., overlapping jurisdictions) are accounted for in that if a bill is referred to two committees, for example, then the members of both committees are seen as committee members (i.e., experts in that policy area), and their voting cues are considered by floor members.

First, policy choice may well be liberated from voting chaos by institutional structures; but if institutions are themselves the product of a majority-rule decision mechanism, then how can stable majority-rule institutions be created? Early products of the new institutional approach accept the all-important institutional structures as given; that is, institutions are taken as *exogenous*. In reality, of course, the institutions themselves are the products of politics; if majority rule is characterized by chaos, how can we, by relying on majority rule, create and maintain stable institutions? Would not the process of institution formation and maintenance also be chaotic? How is it that we can choose institutional rules which are themselves in equilibrium?

Second, the committee system (which had become the foundation of new institutional analysis) may well *enable* legislators to control the policy areas which they care most about, but it is not clear that the system was created *in order* to allow members to control the policy that they care about most deeply. What if committees were created not to allow individuals to enrich themselves at the expense of the whole, but rather to serve as repositories of policy expertise? If this is in fact the case, then what are the implications for the policy which results (Krehbiel 1990, 1991)?

Third, the “property rights” granted to committees may well allow equilibrium outcomes within the marketplace of policy distribution. Systems of rights, however, come with some problems: rights must be enforced, and enforcement has costs. Furthermore, property rights do improve the function of markets, but markets are generally imperfect: “problems of externality, malcoordination, and collective action” exist (Shepsle and Weingast 1994). Central coordinators are often needed to rectify market imperfections. If Congress is a market, is it really able to run without any institutionalized mecha-

nism for overcoming market failures? Or, does some such mechanism exist? Enter the partisan theorists: parties and leaders can serve as solutions to the failures of the congressional market, they argue (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993, Rohde 1991).

In summary, the problems of institutional choice, information, and “market imperfections” and coordination have been the focal points of the congressional literature of the 1990s.

Institutional Choice

Structures provide stability so that preferences can find an equilibrium, argue the new institutionalists. But how can we create stable institutions? The importance of this question was certainly not lost on the neo-institutionalists. It was clear that a mature theory of legislatures could not accept structures as simply exogenous. During the early and mid-1980s there were several attempts to provide rational comprehensive models of institutional choice and maintenance. Some attempted to apply Rawls's “veil of ignorance” to the problem, asking what institutions would be chosen by players who did not know (or, more realistically, had only limited knowledge of) what their personal attributes would be once the game started (see Rawls, 1972; Harsanyi 1977 for development of the theory; Sugden 1986 for an application to institutional choice; Shepsle 1989 for discussion). Others attempted to apply the theory of firms (Williamson 1975, 1985), theories of principles and agents (Fama and Jensen 1983; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985) and transaction-cost economics (Williamson 1979) to the problem of institutional choice.

While comprehensive rational models are intellectually seductive, they often prove to be very difficult to apply. The alternative view that emerged from the neo-institutional camp is that institutional selection is neither completely rational nor comprehensive, and is in fact quite different from the sphere of policy choice. Instead, structural choice is characterized by three features: it is incremental, it is often the product of unintended consequences, and it is fraught with risk and uncertainty.

Institutions are created and maintained incrementally (Shepsle 1986a). For example, even the most radical break in the institutional history of the US, the creation and ratification of the Constitution, offers evidence of incrementalism: the Virginia Plan, which proved to be too drastic a leap for small states, had to be modified. The result, the Connecticut Compromise, was a major change from the Articles of Confederation; nevertheless, it was an incremental change: the framers could only stray so far from the scheme in which states were given equal representation as sovereign entities. There is no point at which we start with a clean institutional slate: structures are always conditioned by what preceded them.

Note, however, that this incremental position should not be confused with an older institutional tradition which holds that institutions are not chosen at all. Sait (1938) argues that institutions are “erected, almost like coral reefs, without conscious design. There has been no pre-arranged plan, no architect's drawings and blue prints; man has carried out the purpose of nature, we might say, acting blindly in response to her obscure commands” (quoted in Shepsle 1989, 143). This notion, which harkens back to the ideas of Edmund Burke (1789-90), does not argue that institutions are static, but merely that we cannot determine the cause of their change; grand theories of institutional evolu-

tion will not come to fruition. While contemporary theorists are willing to accept incremental theories of institutional change, they do indeed (unlike Sait and Burke) seek to explain the causes of incremental change. As Shepsle (1989, 145) puts it “The whole of Roman law may not have sprung fully formed from any one person's forehead, but its bits and pieces, much like the bits and pieces of a European cathedral built over many centuries, were surely the result of human agency.”

The cathedral metaphor is instructive. If we see a European cathedral we can conclude that its builders had a cathedral in mind when they began building; that is, their action was purposive. However, it is erroneous to conclude that they also intended all of the social consequences of cathedral building. For example, while religion often serves as a force of social stability; it is incorrect to assume that religions are founded in order to produce social stability; in fact they are often begun as a challenge to the status quo. Similarly, the committee system may well provide for the possibility of policy equilibrium, but it is wrong to conclude that it was created for this reason. According to Gamm and Shepsle (1988), the creation of the committee system was not a rationally negotiated settlement to a problem of information, distribution, or workload; rather it was a byproduct of Speaker Henry Clay's attempts to enhance his own power:

Specifically, [the creation of the committee system] enabled him to remain leader of a once singleminded coalition which, after the War of 1812, had split into many factions. By decentralizing the operations of the House of Representatives, Clay was able to distribute pieces of turf to various factions as a substitute for a unified platform of political objectives around which the coalition had formerly unified (but which was now infeasible). The lasting effects of this institutional innovation could hardly have been anticipated, much less desired by Clay. They were by-products (and proved to be the more enduring and important products) of self-interested leadership behavior (Shepsle 1989, 140-1)

Finally, Shepsle (1986a) concludes that institutional choice and policy choice are inherently different, for institutional choice contains a great deal more uncertainty and risk than policy choice. In short, “it is risky to try to change institutional arrangements in a manner adverse to the interests of those currently in control” (1986a, 69-70). For example, suppose legislator Smith wants to pass policy x. He attempts to form a coalition to pass this favored policy. If he cannot manage to, then all he has lost is policy x. On the other hand, suppose Smith wants to change the manner in which the Speaker is elected to his post. If he cannot put together a coalition to do so, he risks incurring the wrath of the Speaker for the duration of his career. Because of the risk involved, institutional changes are less likely to be initiated by legislators. Hence, institutions are much “stickier” than simple policies. This stickiness allows institutions to find stable (if not everlasting) equilibria, and consequently, policy equilibria are possible. For practical purposes, treating institutions *as if* they are exogenous to the process of policy choice generally should not be problematic (Shepsle 1986a). “Not so fast,” say informational theorists.¹³

Informational Perspectives on Congress

While the distributive models developed during the 1980s were important contributions to the scholarly understanding of Congress, not all researchers were satisfied with

¹³ Actually, Shepsle himself was not satisfied with this answer. In a 1989 review article he states that “the structure-induced equilibrium approach elaborates the temporally subsequent effects of structure and procedure while ignoring temporally prior causes. It is my view that one cannot understand or explain institutions, however, without first explicating their effects. So it is quite proper to examine effects first. *But the rational choice of institutions remains a challenge*” (Shepsle 1989, emphasis added).

the answers they provided. The new institutionalists, like their theoretical and empirical forerunners in the 1970s, characterized a Congress populated with legislators who were high demanders of district-specific benefits. Perfect information was generally assumed,¹⁴ and institutions were, for all practical purposes, taken as exogenous.

As a response to the challenges posed by the new institutional paradigm, a new type of rational choice theory of legislatures began to develop in the mid-1980s. The informational theory of legislative organization, in contrast to the distributive position developed by the new institutionalists, focuses not on the demand for distribution, but rather on the supply of it. (See Krehbiel 1991, and Shepsle and Weingast 1994 for characterizations of the debate in terms of the supply and demand side of utility calculations.) Through the 1980s, several researchers made notable contributions to the development of the theory (Austen-Smith and Riker 1987; Banks 1989; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989a, 1989b). Theoretical development and empirical research continued through the 1990s and into the 2000s (Austen-Smith 1990a, 1990b; Austen-Smith and Riker 1990; Banks 1990, 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1990; Saving 1997; Baron 2000). The theory (along with empirical tests of it) is presented in its most complete state by Keith Krehbiel's *Information and Legislative Organization* (1991).

The goal of informational theorists is to explain *both* policy and institutional choices; one of the major motivations in developing the theory was to remedy the shortcomings of distributive theory with regard to institutional choice. It is simply not enough

¹⁴ “[D]ebate and deliberation ... were dismissed as mere mood music, as inconsequential position-taking preliminaries to the main event of distributing the gains from cooperation” (Shepsle and Weingast 1994, 152).

to characterize institutions as “sticky” and assume the rest away: “As organizations of collective decision making, legislatures operate continuously and interactively in two domains of choice: *procedure* and *policy*” (Krehbiel 1991, 15).

The theory rests on two central postulates. First, *all* decisions (both policy and institutional choice) ultimately rely on majority rule, albeit a majority that is often far removed. Seemingly minoritarian features of legislatures are ultimately predicated upon the consent of the majority. Hence, all procedural and institutional choices are endogenous (Krehbiel 1991 15-19). Second, “[l]egislators are often uncertain about the relationship between policies and their outcomes” (Krehbiel 1991, 20). The legislative process is an attempt to reduce this policy uncertainty. Every policy that the legislature passes is characterized as being constructed of two components, one systematic and the other random. Legislators desire to increase the former and decrease the latter of the two elements; to do so they must gather information. Of course, not every legislator can gather information about every policy with which the legislature deals; work is delegated to a subset of policy experts, namely the committees. Hence, committee members in a legislature have an informational advantage relative to others.¹⁵ The legislative game is a battle over the magnitude of this advantage.

By combining these two postulates, Krehbiel carefully elaborates the informational theory. The goal of a legislature is to pass policy that is *efficient*; that is, policy which deviates minimally from the preferences of the chamber's median voter. Proce-

¹⁵ Ainsworth and Akins (1997) find that informational caucuses play a role in the legislative process by providing complementary or balancing information, thereby mitigating the informational advantage held by committee members. These caucuses are often stocked (*cont'd.*)

dures and structures are used strategically by the floor's median voter to capture potential gains in information. While distributive theories characterized committees as being composed of self-selecting preference outliers, informational theory describes committees designed to discover and reveal information which can be used to minimize policy uncertainty. Herein lies the complication, however: preference outliers have incentives to discover policy-relevant information, but little incentive to reveal it to the floor; moderates have few incentives to obscure information, but do not possess the incentives to work hard to unearth the highly-technical information needed to formulate contemporary legislation. The majority therefore carefully crafts the composition of committees and uses procedures to maximize the quantity and quality of uncertainty-reducing policy information supplied by the committees (Krehbiel 1991).

Krehbiel's empirical evaluation of the House suggests that the informational approach, while not supplanting distributive rationales, is certainly a viable alternative or complement to them: historical evaluation shows that committees were formed in order to provide information, not to conceal it to the detriment of the floor; committees tend to be preferentially heterogeneous, not homogeneous (as distributive theories predict); homogeneous high-demanding committees are rare; violations of the seniority rule are consistent with an informational interpretation (Krehbiel 1991, chapt. 4).

Informational models have certainly enriched the scholarly view of Congress in the last several years. Theoretically-tenuous models based on perfect information have been improved by the successful incorporation of incomplete information assumptions.

with preference outliers, but when this is the case, there are generally outliers from opposite sides of the floor median.

Legislators are not formally characterized as one-dimensional utility maximizers; considerations of the common good are taken into account by informational models. Institutional choice has been endogenized by informational models with a considerable amount of success.

Nevertheless, informational models are similar to distributive models in that they continue to focus on committees and procedures, and view parties as irrelevant to the legislative process. As informational models were being developed in the mid 1980s as a response to the incompleteness of distributive views, another group of scholars took up a feature of Congress long thought to be unimportant by researchers. Parties, the new brand of research argues, can be used to solve many of the collective action problems presented by the standard distributive view. Because the incorporation of parties into a theory of congressional organization was a rather radical departure from mainstream legislative research, a brief history of parties and partisan research is on order. Hence, the following section discusses the history of parties in Congress and scholarly research on legislative parties. We then examine contemporary research on congressional parties, a vein of research which constitutes the third and final variant of the rational choice approach to legislative study.

Partisan Perspectives on House Organization

While parties and their leaders are one of the four major components of our theory of policy making in the House, it is difficult to integrate a discussion of research on partisanship into the preceding review of research on Congress, which has focused almost ex-

clusively on the committee system. One must look either to the distant or to the very recent past to find research that gives much emphasis to parties as a force in Congress.

In *Congressional Government* (1885), Woodrow Wilson discussed the role of party leaders in what he called “committee government.” He found that the House had no single recognizable leader. The closest thing to a leader was the Speaker of the House, but his power was nothing like that of a prime minister. In short, the leaders of the House were the chairmen of the committees. There were as many leaders as there were subjects of legislation, and there was little notion of general public accountability by the ruling party; each member was simply accountable to his constituents. Wilson concluded that “[t]he legislation of a session is simply an aggregate of the bills recommended by Committees composed of members from both sides of the House” (Wilson 1885, 80, as cited in Rohde 1991, 3).

Of course, Wilson's findings were shaped by the time in which he was writing. Two major factors conditioned his conclusions: the politics particular to the 1870s and 1880s, and his frame of reference for what a strong party in a legislative body looks like (Rohde 1991, 3-4). Subsequent research shows that party strength in Congress ebbs and flows over time (Cooper and Brady 1981, Brady 1988); Wilson's study was conducted at one of the low points of House partisan power. Moreover, Wilson, like many early political scientists, tried to navigate American political institutions with the map of European parliaments. When scholars looked for programmatic, responsive parties, and for members who voted based on party platforms as is the case in parliamentary systems, their search was fruitless. Wilson hoped that parties could become the vehicle for pro-

grammatic policy; but he knew that without public accountability there would be no party program, and without a program the factions of the House went their separate ways.¹⁶

Revolution and Counterrevolution

Of course, the world of politics is the world of Heraclitus: change is the only constant. Within a short time of the appearance of Wilson's work, a revolution swept the House, and an era of strong party leaders began. Two of the most dynamic figures in House history embodied the revolution: Thomas F. Reed and Joseph G. Cannon. Reed, first elected to the House in 1876, came of age during the era of weak parties described by Wilson. He became an expert on the rules and procedures of the House, and believed that they made minority vetoes too easy. He was elected to the Speakership in 1889, and

¹⁶ A fascinating insight into Wilson's developing view of government and power is provided by Walter Lippmann's introduction to the 1972 reprinting of the 1959 edition of Wilson's classic work. Wilson's work, his doctoral dissertation, was written in 1883 and 1884. When Wilson revisited the work in preparation for its fifteenth reprinting in 1900, he questioned seriously the original premise of the study, that the flaws of the government stemmed from a weak executive. In 1885 he had considered the presidency to be a meaningless post, and believed that all real power lay with the Congress, (though he stopped short of recommending that Article I, Section 6 of the constitution be amended, and that executive power be vested with a cabinet committee in Congress, much as it is in the English Parliament). This view of a weak presidency would seem to be in accord with the events of his life up until that point. Wilson, who grew up in reconstruction Georgia, had been an admirer of Abraham Lincoln, but believed that the power that Lincoln exercised was extra-Constitutional. The only other strong president in his lifetime was Grover Cleveland. As Wilson saw it, power in a democracy was the power of the legislature, not the executive. (His original goal, notes Lippmann, was to be the Senator from Virginia, not the President of the US.) By 1900, the Spanish-American war and other events near the turn of the century had caused him to modify his view, and prompted him to write *Constitutional Government in the United States*, superceding *Congressional Government*. He argued that a vigorous executive, the kind that was seen in the early days of the republic, was apparently possible, and that such a presidency cured many of the ills he had diagnosed previously. In a move that is somewhat unusual within the academic (cont'd.)

made major revisions to House rules, which soon became known as “Reed’s Rules.” He greatly strengthened the hand of the Speaker, and reduced the ability of a minority to block legislation. Cannon was elected speaker in 1903. He soon altered the rules so that he had the power to appoint all Republican committee members, and he could keep a very tight rein on the Rules committee; if he did not want to deal with an issue, it simply never received a rule (Rohde 1991, 3-5).

The weak party system observed by Wilson eventually came to an end under Reed; similarly, this strong party system came to an end with a revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910. Progressive Republicans united with Democrats to strip the Speaker of most of his power. As a result, the influence of party declined over the years, and the House reverted to a situation of committee government much like the one observed by Wilson. Between 1910 and 1940 the House organization moved “from hierarchy to bargaining” (Cooper and Brady 1981, 417). Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, Democrats were highly factionalized by region and ideology. The most common cleavage in the House was between liberal Democrats on the left, and conservative, southern Democrats aligned with Republicans on the right (Manley 1973; Brady and Bullock 1980, 1981). This “conservative coalition” was able to control much of the legislation in the chamber.

Two major factors in the electorate and in the House helped the conservative coalition retain its hold on power. Within the House, committee chairmanships were awarded strictly by seniority. When combined with the southern states’ tendency to re-

demic subfield of presidential-congressional relations, Wilson became President in order to prove his point.

elect conservative Democratic incumbents, the situation that resulted was one in which conservative members of the majority party could align with conservative members of the minority party, control legislation within committees, and control its movement to the floor. Speaker Rayburn's leadership during this period can best be described as accommodationist. He could not rule his party with the heavy hand of a czar, but instead had to build temporary alliances on an issue-by-issue basis (Cooper and Brady 1981). In short, by the 1960s the House looked very much like it did in the 1880s.

The Shifting Interest of Scholars

Despite Wilson's conclusion that party played a small role, and the relatively short period of strong partisanship between 1889 and 1910, scholarly interest in congressional partisanship remained strong for quite some time. In fact, the “party in government” concept was a major focal point for political scientists even as the strength of parties in the House declined. For example, Rice (1928) engaged in one of the earliest studies of party voting in the House. In so doing he developed his well-known party cohesion index (a version of which will be used later in this dissertation), and became one of the founding fathers of quantitative research in American politics. Interest in party remained high during the height of post-World War II committee government. Turner (1951), and Truman (1959) contributed major studies of parties in Congress during the height of the behavioral revolution, and the trend continued into the 1960s (Patterson 1963; Jones 1968; Peabody 1967; Ripley 1964, 1967).

Eventually, however, the academic notion that parties might make a difference waned. During the 1880s, Wilson observed weak parties, but thought that they could be

made strong with the proper reforms. During the post World War II era there was still a notion that parties could be made stronger vehicles of policy platforms, as evidenced by the American Political Science Association's issuing of *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (1950). By the 1970s, however, parties were seen not only as weak, but as impossible to resuscitate (e.g., Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977 [1989]). Mayhew went as far as to say that “No theoretical treatment of the United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far” (1974, 27). These findings explicitly discouraged future researchers from using parties as a focal point. Proponents of the notion that parties are of little if any consequence can still be found (Krehbiel 1993, 1998). To the extent that parties existed in the House, conventional wisdom held, they were merely collections of like-minded legislators who represented like-minded constituents; the appearance of party action was a residual product of similar legislators representing similar constituents and taking similar policy positions. Party leaders were not able to provide any direction of their own, and “existed primarily to assist in smoothing the flow of legislation and mediating conflict, not to provide policy leadership and coordination” (Dodd and Oppenheimer 1981, 41).

One, and perhaps the only exception to the predominant view of the early-1970s that congressional parties were weak and unimportant is offered by Saloma and Sontag (1972). They believe that congressional parties are important and powerful, a view they derive from the size of caucus budgets, the number of party offices that exist within the House and Senate office buildings, and the number of formal and informal party-related organizations that exist (121-122). However, the bulk of their fourth chapter, “The Con-

gressional Parties: The Insulation of Power,” focuses on the *lack* of hard evidence that they can find that parties are important, even present, in the Capitol.

Saloma and Sontag argue the “conventional view” of congressional parties has unjustifiably emphasized their weakness and lack of coherence:

This view, with its assumptions that power is dispersed and will inevitably remain so within Congress, ignores two important points – the degree to which power is coherently exercised by a congressional establishment and the potential that exists for Congressmen to develop formal and informal party organizations as part of a broad effort toward party modernization.

While they dispute the notion that parties are weak, they hardly make the case that parties are transparent. Instead, they refer to congressional parties as “the complex, informal, largely hidden system of leadership that actually governs Congress” (121), and cite “[a]t least half a dozen factors [that] have operated to insulate the congressional parties and to undermine the efforts of activists and reformers to make the parties more responsive and useful” (123). For example, minutes were rarely taken in party meetings, and those that were recorded were marked “absolutely confidential” (124), and were not released to investigators. The rules that govern parties, if written at all, also were not readily available.

Party offices were unmarked and located in remote corners of the Capitol buildings in order to discourage visitors from the press or the public. (In one case, the office of the House Republican Whip was so off the beaten track that the office staff itself could not get any work done there, and so worked out of Whip Leslie C. Arends’s (R-IL) regular congressional office. The result was that the Whip office was abandoned; if anyone had stumbled across it, no one would be there to help them (123).) Party offices produced no literature that could shed light on their organization for the public, and published no annual reports on the activities of leaders. One office staffer expressed discon-

tent with researchers who were “always interrupting the real work and sticking their noses into things where they didn’t belong” (124). What this real work actually was was not specified.

While Saloma and Sontag could not unearth what it was that the parties were actually doing, it was clear to them that they must be doing something. They were able to document that party organizations controlled considerable blocks of campaign funding: the National Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee controlled more than \$1.2 million in campaign funds in 1970. The Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, which met only once or twice a year, had over \$3 million in campaign funds to disperse to members of the minority caucus. Other spoils were meted out by party leaders. “Public funding and party funding, government and private office space, and party staff and committee staff and members’ office staff are all intermixed with the formal and informal blessing or the tacit approval of the leadership” (126).

The power of the parties was also formalized by law: “The two party policy committees in the Senate, authorized by statute, receive annual appropriations of \$250,000 each” (126). Nevertheless, the average citizen would be hard pressed to find out what the caucus did with its money. Interested people were referred to raw expenditure data filed on and item-by-item with the Clerk of the House. The Clerk’s office, being staffed with patronage positions, had little reason to let members of the public have easy access to records about members’ behind-the-scenes activities. Staying within the bounds of the law, the Clerk’s office did allow for public inspection of records inside the Clerk’s office; public inspection, as they interpreted it, meant that a visitor could read records and take notes

with pencil and paper. No photocopies or typewriters were allowed in the Clerk's office (128).

Despite Saloma and Sontag's argument that congressional parties were actually powerful forces behind a curtain of bureaucratic red tape, few eyebrows were raised in academic circles. Perhaps their description of the tedious and arcane bureaucracy of congressional parties, designed to send up warning flags for the public and the academy alike, actually had the opposite effect and discouraged the attention of scholars. Time in the nation's capital is a precious commodity for most students of Congress. No matter how interesting a question is, few researchers are likely to rush to a project where other members of the discipline have told them "Abandon hope: ye will find no data here."

In any event, the predominant view that emerged from the 1970s was that parties were not powerful, and they were not likely to become powerful, especially in the wake of reforms that led to the formation of "subcommittee government." But as has been seen time and time again, the world of politics is generally a step ahead of the world of political scientists; when we think we have a situation figured out, the situation changes.

The Reforms of the 1970s

During the early and mid-1970s, just as scholars were coming to the conclusion that party did not matter in House politics, a series of reforms set in motion by events going back to the 1950s was put into effect (Rohde 1991, 17-20).¹⁷ Backed by public inter-

¹⁷ Since this period, scholarly attention to the reform of congressional organization has been copious. See Huntington 1973; Ornstein 1974, 1975; Welch and Peters 1977; Rieselbach 1977, 1978; Patterson 1978; Sundquist 1981; and Unekis and Rieselbach 1984 among others for details on the reform period of the early 1970s.

est groups such as Common Cause, the National Committee for an Effective Congress, and the followers of Ralph Nader, reformers in Congress began to demand changes in the organization of the national legislature (Orfield 1974). These reforms had the effect of greatly enhancing the role of parties at the expense of the most senior committee members (James 1974, 198).

The Roots of Reform. The 1958 congressional elections saw an influx of liberal Democrats to Washington. These left-leaning freshmen spurred the creation of the Democratic Study Group in 1959, a group that served as a congressional base of White House support during the Kennedy-Johnson years and became a major source of independent liberal policy initiatives during the Nixon era. There were some electoral setbacks for liberals in the 1960 and 1962 elections, but Johnson's landslide defeat of Goldwater in 1964 brought many new liberal Democrats to Congress, solidifying the liberal bloc of Democrats that was forming in the House.

All was not sweetness and light within the party, however; the majority caucus soon found itself factionalized when young liberals (predominantly from the Northeast) found themselves locked out of a committee system dominated by very conservative southern Democrats. "In many ways this situation was reminiscent of the House in 1910 under Cannon: members of the majority party were frustrated by the arbitrary exercise of institutional power which prevented them from securing the passage of policies they supported" (Rohde 1991, 8). By the late 1960s, following the Supreme Court's 1962 *Baker v. Carr* decision (which ordered that legislative districts in states be drawn so as to have approximately equal populations within them), urban and suburban representation increased, resulting in further gains in the House for the left. Many of the new, liberal

members of Congress, were clamoring for procedural change (Smith and Deering 1997, 33).

Vehicles for Reform. The rift in the majority party resulted in a series of reforms initiated by the young liberals, who aimed to make the committee chairs responsible to the party that they represented (Sheppard 1985; Rohde 1991). The reform came in several waves. The first wave crashed upon Congress in the form of the Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1970. Prompted by members of the minority, work on the act actually had begun as far back as 1965. The effort died by 1968, however. Ironically, it was the members of the majority party (albeit the newly-elected members) who resurrected the reform movement the following year. The legislation finally had the support to make it to the floor by 1970. After eleven days of debate (stretched over four months) and some sixty-five amendments later, H.R. 17645 was passed as the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (Wolfensberger 2000, 94). Reform continued in the House between 1971 and 1973, as a result of the work of the Hansen and Bolling committees (Smith and Deering 1993). Following the elections of 1974, seventy-five “Watergate Babies,” new liberal Democratic members of the House elected in the wake of Nixon’s scandal, were able to build upon the success of the 1970-1973 reforms. The period of reforms culminated with the ouster of four powerful committee chairs.

Areas of Reform. There were five major areas of reform that are relevant to this study. The first concerned the election of committee chairmen. Previously, chairmanships had been decided on a pure seniority system (or “senility system” as Representative Allard Lowenstein (D-NY) put it) (Orfield 1975, 26). The seniority system had given a major advantage to the conservative southern members, whose constituents nearly always

returned them to their seats. The LRA of 1970 left seniority untouched, and focused instead on internal committee procedures (Smith and Deering 1990, 46). Bolstered by the passage of the LRA, however, reformers continued to work for change of the seniority system.

In contrast to the LRA of 1970, a bill passed on the floor, the reforms of 1971 were put into effect at the caucus level, and were based on the recommendations of the Hansen committee, a committee of the majority caucus chaired by Julia Butler Hansen of Washington. (The minority caucus had similar rule changes which “mirrored ... and frequently preceded ... those of the Democrats.” [Smith and Deering 1990, 50].) On the recommendation of the Hansen committee, the Democratic caucus of 1971 voted to change the rules governing seniority. No longer was ascendancy to a committee chair only a matter of seniority: a request by ten or more caucus members would initiate a debate and vote on the chairmanship of a committee. In the event of the defeat of the most senior member, the Committee on Committees would have to make a new nomination for the position. Moreover, the caucus would vote on committee chairs and members one committee at a time, rather than all of the committees at once. In 1972, this rule was again altered on the recommendation of a reconvened Hansen committee: committee chairs would be put to an *automatic* vote, and at the request of one-fifth of the caucus, the vote would be secret (Smith and Deering 1990, 50). The reforms did not have an immediate impact. No chairholders lost their positions in 1972.

The second area of reform dealt with the internal workings of committees and the powers of chairpersons within them. The 1970 LRA required that committees make all

recorded votes public,¹⁸ allowed for a majority of the committee to convene a meeting, and encouraged committees to hold more open meetings. Additionally, the most senior member of a committee was allowed to preside over a meeting if the chairman was not present (thus preventing the chair from blocking legislation with his or her absence), and the LRA allowed a committee majority to move legislation to the floor for consideration once it was cleared by the Rules Committee, even over the objections of the chair. The LRA also limited the use of proxy votes in committee. Proxy voting in committees subsequently was banned altogether in 1974 by a floor vote in the House. Other 1974 reforms in this area increased the size of committee staff, and guaranteed at least one-third of this staff to the minority (Smith and Deering 1990, 51).

The third area of reform focused on the organization of subcommittees, and on the powers of committee chairmen with regard to their subcommittees. In 1971 Democrats limited their members to holding one legislative subcommittee chair. Each subcommittee chair was allowed to have a professional staff member for its subcommittee (Smith and Deering 1990, 51). In 1973, the so-called “subcommittee bill of rights” was passed by the majority caucus. Committee chairs would no longer be able to determine single-handedly

¹⁸ Perhaps the most important result of this provision was that more of what effectively were floor votes were recorded. Most activity on the floor of the House is actually conducted in the Committee of the Whole because the procedural rules are more flexible. House rules at the time barred the recording of votes in the Committee of the Whole. Many liberals believed that more moderate members were trading away their votes behind a veil of secrecy; if their constituents could know how they were voting, then the moderates would have to back the liberal positions. The LRA’s provision that all committee votes be recorded meant that all floor votes in the Committee of the Whole would be recorded (Rohde 1991, 21).

the subcommittee assignments of committee members,¹⁹ nor would they have the power to change arbitrarily the substantive policy jurisdiction of subcommittees. Subcommittee chairs would have the resources needed to assemble policy proposals (such as staff and funds), and committee chairs would no longer be able to block unilaterally subcommittee proposals from being considered by the full committee. As a result of these reforms, committee chairs had fewer ways to punish unruly committee members (Rohde 1991, 20-23).

The fourth area of reform centered on making committee activities more transparent to the public. These so-called “sunshine” provisions altered traditions and practices of congressional secrecy dating back to the first Continental Congress of 1774 (Wolfensberg 2000, 87-89). The LRA of 1970 required recorded votes in committees (as discussed above), and further reforms in 1974 allowed for the recording, photographing, and broadcast of committee proceedings. Committees were required to meet at least one day a month, and committee meetings were open to the public unless voted otherwise by a committee majority.

Fifth and finally, the powers of the Democratic party leadership were greatly enhanced. The Steering and Policy Committee was created in 1973 in order to formulate policy directives agreeable to the party majority. The majority of the committee was to be comprised of party leaders and Speaker appointees, greatly strengthening the hand of the Speaker and other party leaders. Its greatest power came in 1975, when it gained the authority to make committee assignments, a power that had been held by the Committee on

¹⁹ Committee members would bid in order of seniority for positions on and chairs of subcommittees.

Committees, a group comprised of the very conservative Democratic contingent on Ways and Means. “As a result of this change the distribution of perhaps the most valuable ‘commodity’ in the House [i.e. committee assignments] was moved from a group largely independent of the party leadership to one in which half the votes were controlled by the leadership and its appointees” (Rohde 1991, 24). Additionally, the Speaker gained the power to appoint the Democrats on the Rules Committee, greatly enhancing his ability to control the movement of bills to the floor, and the Speaker was authorized to refer bills to more than one committee making it more difficult for minorities to bottleneck legislation (Rohde 1991, 23-25).

Initial Scholarly Reactions

Did these reforms cause a drastic change in scholarly thought? Was Mayhew's declaration of the unimportance of parties discarded as a result? In a word, no. Unlike the reforms of 1910, these changes were not perceived as a revolution; not only did the reforms fail to give power to the majority party, the scholarly mantra went, but in fact they actually dispersed power in the House to an even greater extent, moving the chamber from committee to sub-committee government.

Why, even in the face of major reforms in the House, did scholars give so little credence to the notion that parties might emerge as vehicles for cohesive public policy platforms? Why did the profession turn away from the interest that had been paid to parties in the first half of the century? After all, there have been times that party was weak before, but the discipline did not give up on parties as important objects of investigation. Why at this point when not earlier? The answer lies in what researchers saw as the par-

ties' *latent* strength. Before, party was weak as an organizational force, but it looked like it *could* be made strong if some changes were made. Now it appeared weak, and furthermore, mounting evidence indicated that changes in the electorate as well as the Congress would almost surely prevent party from becoming a strong force in the chamber, at least in the foreseeable future. For example, beginning in the 1970s, multiple studies indicated that party voting had shown long-term declines since the 1910 revolt (Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1979; Deckard and Stanley 1974; Collie and Brady 1985; but see Patterson 1978 for evidence of a rise in party votes during the 1970s.) In their study of floor votes from the New Deal through 1980, Collie and Brady (1985) found that party voting in the House is high when party voting is high in the electorate. At that time, neither party in government nor in the electorate was providing constraints on members; hence, party voting on the House floor declined. Because of increased reliance on primary elections to nominate congressional candidates, and the increasing tendency for congressional elections to be candidate-centered, it did not appear that partisanship in the electorate could cause an increase in House partisanship.

When these factors were combined with growing regionalism in the House (Deckard and Stanley 1974) and the growth of independent information sources within the chamber, such as the conservative coalition (Manley 1977; Brady and Bullock 1980, 1981) and the Democratic Study Group (Stevens, Miller, and Mann 1974), it appeared unlikely that programmatic parties with cohesive platforms would *ever* emerge in the House again. Ironically, the final nail in the party coffin was apparently driven in by the reforms of the 1970s; rather than strengthening the hand of party leadership, it was widely held by researchers that because of the changes in House rules, the committee govern-

ment that existed in the House since 1910 had been replaced with subcommittee government (Lowi 1979; Davidson 1981; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1981; Smith and Deering 1984; Collie and Brady 1985; Rieselbach 1986). Power was even more dispersed throughout the House, making it more difficult than ever for party leaders to put together or enact anything that looked like a party platform.

During the early part of the century, scholars were studying congressional parties and finding them weak, but with potential; by the 1970s, they were seen as broken and beyond repair. It is difficult to determine exactly what scholarly opinion was by the mid-1980s, for almost no one was studying parties in Congress. Political scientists were unwilling to use congressional parties as an analytic unit or as a measure of party power in the body politic. As Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) note, several studies have used partisan control of the White House as an operational definition of the nation's ruling party, leaving partisanship in Congress out of the equation entirely. Additionally, very sophisticated models of congressional organization developed during the 1980s pay no attention to parties; Weingast and Marshall's (1988) "industrial organization" model of Congress goes as far as to assume that parties "place no constraints on the behavior of individual representatives" (1988, 6). Krehbiel (1991, 102), in developing his informational model of congressional organization, does not rule out parties as a legislative force, but he does take a "show me" attitude: if parties matter, then someone will have to offer empirical evidence to prove that they do. Melissa Collie (1986) examines four major journals of American political science from 1985 and 1986. She finds only three articles on congressional parties, and two of these conclude that party does not matter all that much. To all appearances, congressional parties are the discipline's dead letter.

The Emerging View of Party

When the Master governs, the people
are hardly aware that he exists.
Next best is a leader who is loved.
Next, one who is feared.

The worst is one who is despised.
If you don't trust the people,
you make them untrustworthy.

The Master doesn't talk, he acts.
When his work is done,
the people say, "Amazing:
we did it, all by ourselves!"

(Lao Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, Chapter 17. [Mitchel 1992 trans.])

It appears that scholars have been too quick in reaching their final judgment on the reforms of the 1970s and the resulting strength of congressional partisanship. Upon further consideration of the reforms, researchers are beginning to revise their view of the role of parties in Congress. The view that is beginning to emerge, thanks to important contributions by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Rohde (1991), and Cox and McCubbins (1993), is that parties do matter in Congress, but that researchers must reevaluate their notions of what it is for a party to be powerful. The powerful party leader no longer rules with the iron fist of Reed or Cannon, but, like the Taoist master, gives power away in order to achieve his aims. Today, parties rule "conditionally" (Rohde 1991), and "delegate" in order to achieve their aims (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991).

Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) survey the literature on parties in Congress, and find, as detailed above, that most scholars have come to see parties as ineffective organizations which matter little in the grand picture of congressional organization. Political scientists (Lowi 1979; Davidson 1981; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1981; Cooper and Brady

1981; Collie and Brady 1985; Rieselbach 1986) view parties as groups which have sold their birthright; their power has slipped away to the committees, the subcommittees, the administration, and the bureaucracy, and parties are no longer effective vehicles for the formation of viable and cohesive policy platforms. Kiewiet and McCubbins gather these findings under the rubric of the “abdication hypothesis.” “There is, however, a serious flaw in the simple, compelling account of national politics that the abdication hypothesis provides: congressional parties exert a strong and systematic influence upon national policy making!” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 232-33).

As a counter to the abdication hypothesis, they offer the delegation hypothesis. Their work, which focuses primarily on the operation of the Appropriations Committee and its relationship to the Democratic party, argues that the party has strategically delegated its power to the committees, subcommittees, administration, and bureaucracy. The majority party increases efficiency and expertise by dividing the workload and delegating authority, but monitors its delegation of power quite carefully so that its policy aims are achieved. Drawing from micro-economic and management theory, Kiewiet and McCubbins employ the concepts of principals and agents. Delegation invariably entails “agency losses.” That is, there is some conflict between the goals of the principal, the delegator of power, and the goals of the agent, the power recipient. Agents behave opportunistically, and will rationally pursue “their own interests subject only to the constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 5). In essence, their work is an investigation of the nature of the power relationship. If the principal's gains in efficiency through delegation are less than the loss of efficiency through opportunist-

tic agency behavior, then the abdication hypothesis is supported. However, if the gains in efficiency are greater than the losses, the alternative delegation hypothesis is borne out.

Their empirical analysis of the Appropriations Committee assignments shows that the Democratic party attempted to, and was on the whole successful at, creating a committee that was representative of the caucus. Over the period of their study the Appropriations committee is slightly more conservative than expected, but the bias is small in general, and absent after the 1970s reforms. The bias that does appear seems to be an artifact of changes within the party as a whole; as soon as a representative committee is formed, incoming Democratic freshmen cause the caucus to move to the left. The minority Republicans are less consistent in filling their slots over the period of Kiewiet and McCubbins's study, but like the Democrats, their Appropriations Committee delegations were representative of the party as a whole after House reforms (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, chapter 5). By structuring this major committee so that it is an “ideological microcosm” of the party as a whole, party leaders use their “passive power” to ensure that committee decisions are in accord with the preferences of the party rank and file. They conclude that:

congressional parties can use delegation to effectively pursue their policy objectives. What is generally taken as the exercise of power – floor amendments, presidential vetoes, or dumping committee chairmen – tells us nothing about the success of delegation.... Do policies that emerge from Congress reflect the preferences of the majority party? Do the expenditures that agencies make from the appropriations they receive follow the intent of the legislation? These are questions that we can answer, and the answer is yes (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 234).

In another important study published in 1991, David Rohde focuses specifically on the House reforms of the 1970s and the effects that they had on parties and leaders.

He finds that just as it became a well-established “fact” of political science that party did not matter in Congress, party began to matter in Congress. The reforms of the 1970s did what they were intended to do, but only after the ideological homogeneity of the Democratic caucus increased, there were changes in leadership positions, and leaders learned how to wield their new power. “Despite all the arguments we have seen about the continuing weakening of party inside and outside the institution, the decline did not persist” (Rohde 1991, 14).

In making the case for what he calls *conditional party government* (an argument very much like the one made by Kiewiet and McCubbins in 1991), he notes that scholars have been defining strong party leadership too narrowly, and that the boss model is not the only possibility for effective power. In enacting the reforms of the 1970s,

[m]embers were willing to enhance the leadership's influence over the agenda in order to facilitate moving legislation; they were not prepared to accept a dictatorship of the leadership that made decisions on legislative matters and then commanded the rank and file. The leadership (like the chairmen) was to be responsible to the members, not the other way around (Rohde 1991, 31).

Leaders might use strong-arm tactics with a few individuals at the margins when their votes will make the difference between winning and losing, but for the most part they refrain from such manipulation. Instead, leaders use the powers granted by the party majority to get the majority party to do what it wants collectively.

Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 232) conclude their analysis by stating that they “do not wish to dismiss the importance to members of narrowly defined, constituency-oriented concerns. But it should also be recognized that for the vast majority of them, the party label, which conveys a simple, low-cost signal to voters about policy preferences, is

not a liability. It is instead their most important electoral asset.” This statement serves as a point of departure for Cox and McCubbins’ *Legislative Leviathan* (1993). Building on the work of Rohde (1991) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that the party will be active when there is widespread agreement among partisans, but individuals within the party have incentives to defect.

The authors argue that parties with real organizational coherence can emerge from the interplay of rationally-motivated legislators. Although it is well documented that congressional campaigns are candidate-centered, the party label still has an important influence on elections; it is the voters’ strongest signal of the candidate’s policy preferences. National party fortunes have an impact on each legislator who wears the party label; shifts in this party fortune are linked to the party’s policy reputation on Capitol Hill. Hence, members’ personal electoral fortunes are tied to this collective reputation. Party reputation, however, is a public good among partisans; it may well be in their interest to have a good collective party reputation, but individual members cannot act alone to create it. That is, building a good reputation nationally will not be possible if each member of the party must constantly act as a high-demander of district-specific benefits. Therefore, a central coordinating authority (like Hobbes’ *Leviathan*) is needed so that members can act collectively to build the party reputation. A party organization is created to accomplish this. When there is widespread agreement on how the party should act to improve its collective reputation, the party leadership makes a vote part of the “party agenda.” (This notion is very similar to Rohde’s concept of conditional party government.) To vote against the party agenda too often will not bode well for a legislator; punishment may come in the form of the denial of a desired committee post. The party leaders stop the

rank-and-file members from producing too much particularistic legislation, and spur them to produce more collectively-beneficial policy to build the party's national reputation.

The organization and function of party in our account is informed by the work of Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Rohde (1991), and Cox and McCubbins (1993). In this work we will try to separate the effects of “party-as-organization” and “party-as-collection-of-like-minded-individuals.” When we speak of the effects of party, we refer to party-as-organization. When measuring the effect of party, we reject the simple dichotomous measure generally used (1 if Democrat, 0 if Republican), and instead account for the strength of party by looking at the unity of the party leadership on a motion. This allows us better to isolate the effect of party as an organization. Ideology, though certainly related to party positions and partisan identification, will be taken as theoretically distinct from the effects of party-as-organization.

A Summary of the Views of Congress

A survey of the theoretical literature on Congress thus shows three different views. The first characterizes a body of self-interested individuals who use the committee system to satisfy their preferences for high distribution: committees are stocked with homogeneous high demanders, parties are not influential, and members defer to the high demands of their colleagues. The second view paints a picture in which self-interested members pursue their narrow goals, but also have a desire to make good policy; committees are composed of members representative of the floor's preferences so that information is revealed and the uncertainty of policy outcomes is reduced. Again, parties are not an important feature of legislative reality. The third version of Congress has members

concerned with re-election, and who know that party is the strongest signal to voters at the polls. These legislators are concerned with improving the party's reputation for good governing. To accomplish this, partisans select leaders representative of the rank and file, and give leaders power to make the committee system representative of the party as a whole. Because committees look like the party, the delegation of authority produces legislation that satisfies the majority party as a whole.

Congress and Public Policy

The rational choice revolution certainly has had a great impact on congressional research. One is hard pressed to find an investigation of Congress that is not predicated on legislators who ultimately are characterized as atomized utility-maximizers.²⁰ The last twenty years have witnessed an explosion of research that emphasizes and examines rational actors within rationally-structured institutions.

The development of the theory of individual action within institutions has come at a price, however. Other potentially-important organizational principles been left unexamined. The goal of this dissertation is to develop a policy rationale of congressional organization. The hope is to enrich the understanding of institutions, actions, and outcomes that has developed over the last twenty years by incorporating a systematic theory of public policy. In so doing, many of the seeming contradictions of the three major views of Congress can be resolved. We argue that different types of public policy will have differ-

²⁰ Certainly the legislators characterized by the informational and partisan perspectives are much more subtle and complex than the stylized members of Congress offered in Mayhew's influential study (1974). Nevertheless, self-interested rational actors form the *(cont'd.)*

ent organizational and behavioral rationales. Committee members may be preference outliers in some instances, while they may look very much like their floor colleagues at other times. Parties may constrain or otherwise influence member behavior in some cases, while they may be ignored or unimportant in other instances. Members' narrow interests may dominate some policy issues, while other battles may be drawn along more general ideological lines. Informational cues may come from several sources; informational signals from these sources will be discounted by considerations of party, ideology, and narrow interests. In short, the politics of Congress will vary predictably by the policy at hand.

The possibility of a policy theory of congressional organization has been considered in recent years, but its prospects have been considered limited (Krehbiel 1991, 7-14). The reason for this gloomy outlook, however, is that it is assumed that policy must be considered on a topic-by-topic basis, where agricultural policy constitutes a policy domain, as does labor policy, educational policy, etc. If each policy topic must be considered as a separate domain, then a policy rationale for congressional organization is quite unlikely to be a useful theoretical framework given the myriad of policy topics. However, if there is a way to group policy not according to its substantive topic, but by some other scheme which renders only a few general *types* of policy, then the prospects for a policy rationale are dramatically improved. Such a policy typology does exist, and it has the potential to serve as a useful tool in making a policy perspective of congressional organization viable.

core of congressional research; cooperative behaviors are not evidence of altruism, but of enlightened self interest.

A Taxonomy of Policy

The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectations – by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others. In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs of policies. Therefore, *a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.*

– Theodore Lowi (1964, 688, emphasis added).

The goal is to develop a more general theory of congressional organization which subsumes the major organizational theories seen previously. The central argument is that the individual and collective behaviors of legislators are determined by the type of policy at stake.

The history of Western thought can be characterized as a search for principles by which to classify the diverse objects and phenomena that comprise the world around us. Aristotle, the original taxonomist, believed that the categories he observed were objectively true and part of the external world. Contemporary thinkers generally recognize that categories and concepts are not part of the external world as such, but rather are creations of the human mind; as such, attempts to categorize and conceptualize phenomena are imperfect, incomplete, and subject to revision as new information is acquired (Kuhn 1970; Piaget 1973; von Glasersfeld 1987, 1995). Nevertheless, categorization and conceptualization, with all of their imperfections, provide analytic power; without constructed categories, imperfect though they may be, the world would be incomprehensible and action impossible (Foucault 1970, 1972, 1980). In short, the creation of concepts and categories is imperfect, perhaps even dangerous, yet fundamental to the advancement of knowledge.

Unfortunately, the study of public policy oftentimes has proceeded without the aid of well-developed analytic frameworks. The post-World War II “scientific revolution” in political science had less impact on the subfield of public policy study, relative to the study of political institutions and behaviors. Certain areas of policy research have been characterized as suffering from “conceptual anarchy” (Elmore 1978, 187). As a result, a great deal of public policy research is descriptive and case-specific (at worst), or analyzed with the tools of micro-economists who evaluate policy in terms of its economic efficiency. These techniques, refined though they may be, are not particularly useful for the political scientists who wishes to treat policy as a political object rather than as a purely economic proposal. In all fairness, policy research is often directed toward policy-implementing public servants who have a need for technical, area-specific information; these field workers have a diminished need for general political concepts, and find the scholarly quest for generality rather far removed from the daily operation of a bureaucracy. This is small consolation for the political scientist who wishes to understand the politics of policy. The political scientist needs a guiding framework to find generalities within a sea of detail.

Nevertheless, there are some notable and laudable exceptions to the pattern described above. Over the last three decades, a handful of theorists of public policy have attempted to create more general concepts of policy and politics in order to advance the scholarly understanding of contemporary democracy. Policy theorists have directed their energy toward three major areas: developing an understanding of the organizational structures within which policy formulation and implementation take place (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Elmore 1978; Hall and O’Toole 2000; Hjern and Porter 1981; Jenkins-Smith

1990; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1972; Milward 1982; O'Toole 1986; Provan and Milward 1995; Ripley and Franklin 1986), developing diachronic models of the policy process (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Goggin, et al. 1990; Kingdon 1984; Sabatier 1986, 1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and creating more general typologies of policy. This third area is of greatest concern here.

Typologies of Policy

The most common way to organize policy is according to the substance with which it deals; that is, policy is generally arranged by *topic*: agricultural policy is lumped together, as is education policy, environmental policy, defense policy, etc. This organizational scheme is not a true typology in our estimation: it is merely a clustering of policies around a topic which tells us little about the workings and politics of the policy at hand. A true conceptual typology must find some common thread among policies of disparate topics and allow for comparison and discrimination based on some deeper political, economic, social, or psychological grounds. In short, we are not concerned with *topics* of policy, but with *types* of policy. A review of the literature shows several attempts to create authentic typologies of public policy.

The Symbolic Use of Politics. Murray Edelman (1964) proposes typing policies as “real” or “symbolic.” However, the “reality” of a policy seems to be quite subjective, and this framework would be very difficult to put to use. Consider the “reality” of U.S. policy toward South Africa. For many years Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) introduced legislation on the floor of the House which would establish sanctions against South Africa. When he began to promote the idea it was clear that the motion could not pass;

clearly his effort was symbolic. After many years, however, his idea was considered seriously, and gradually gained support. Finally his proposal passed and sanctions were established. Ultimately the apartheid regime collapsed, and South Africa is a fledgling democracy today. Was Dellums's proposal symbolic or real? When did its status change? How would we know? This example demonstrates the difficulty of employing Edelman's typology. In practice, we do not think it can be employed.

Legal Theories of Policy. Two organizational schemes of public policy have been derived by scholars of jurisprudence. Summers and Howard (1972) create a five-part taxonomy of law (which can be taken as synonymous with the phrase "public policy" as it is used here.) The system views laws as instruments of grievance remediation, administering penalties, regulation and administration, ordering governmental distribution of public benefits, and of facilitating private agreements. While noteworthy for attempting to classify policy according to more than the topic of the policy with which it deals, the scheme has been criticized for being "asymmetrical" and for failing to "provide a logic for their distinctions or for their significance" (Lowi 1985, 72).

A more systematic legal theory is offered by H.L.A. Hart (1961), who suggests that laws can be categorized as one of two types. The first type fits the traditional definition of law used by legal scholars: "a rule that imposes an obligation and then applies a sanction for noncompliance." Hart refers to this as Primary Rule. Unsatisfied with the limitations of this traditional definition, Hart distinguishes Primary Rule from Secondary Rule: Secondary Rule is law which does not impose sanctions directly on any citizens. For example, Primary Rules regarding marriage establish obligations of husbands and wives, define adultery and bigamy, and establish penalties for breeches of the law. Sec-

ondary Rules regarding marriage determine who is able to perform weddings, and establish rules for keeping state marriage records.

Hart's theory advances the cause of a taxonomy of policy, but it is still incomplete (Lowi 1985). Hart's theory is, in the end, a theory of jurisprudence, and is most concerned with the operation of government through the courts upon individuals.

[P]owerful though Hart's dichotomy is, it does not appear to exhaust all the possibilities, especially when considering legislation instead of the judge-made law with which students of jurisprudence tend most to concern themselves. For example, some policies may appear at first to fit the definition of the Primary Rule in that they are involuntary, but they fall outside the definition in that they do not attempt to impose obligations directly on individuals. That is to say, some patently coercive rules do not seem to work through individual conduct but instead seek to influence the individual by working through the *environment of conduct* (Lowi 1985, 73, emphasis added).


In order to complete the taxonomy that Hart begins, Theodore Lowi (1972) accounts for this environment of conduct; this accounting does not result in the creation of a *third category* of rule, but rather in the formation of a *second axis*. Hence, policy can be one of four types.

Lowi: Objects and Environments of Coercion. In what is undoubtedly the discipline's longest and most influential book review, Lowi (1964) proposes a scheme comprised of three major categories of policy: distributive, redistributive, and regulatory. The typology is made complete when Lowi adds a second axis to Hart's dichotomy, as described above. Hence, a fourth category, constituent policy, is added to his three part scheme in 1972. Lowi's argument, as seen in the quotation at the beginning of this section, is that "a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship." Lowi (1972) begins with the premise that public policy (law, statute, etc.) is public coer-

cion. Different methods of coercion provide different contexts within which politics take place. In short, he reverses the direction of the arrow of causality that is generally assumed: politics does not determine policy, but rather policy determines politics.

Public coercion can be classified along two axes: the immediacy or likelihood of coercion (Hart's dichotomy), and the applicability of coercion, or the environment of conduct. Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 display Lowi's derivation and identification of different types of coercion (i.e., policy).²¹ The vertical dimension indicates the immediacy of governmental coercion. Remote coercion indicates a lack of statutory sanctions.

²¹ Figure 2.1 is taken from Lowi's 1972 study of congressional policymaking. Table 2.1, is taken from his 1985 comparative study of U.S. and French bureaucracy. Although they convey essentially the same information, we present both, for each has its strengths. Figure 2.1 is well known, and subsequent studies have been conducted in its light. Table 2.1 clearly illustrates Lowi's derivation of his typology from Hart's work (a point not mentioned in the 1964 or 1972 pieces), and it has the advantage of being relatively uncluttered and readily understood.



Source: Lowi 1972, 300.

Figure 2.1: Types of Coercion, Types of Policy, and Types of Politics

Table 2.1: Categorization of Public Policies (Lowi 1985, 74)

Form of Expressed Intention	Form of Intended Impact	
	<i>Works through Individual Conduct</i>	<i>Works through Environment of Conduct</i>
Primary Rule (imposes obligations or positions)	<i>Regulatory Policies:</i> <i>Rules</i> impose obligations; rules of individual conduct, criminal in form <i>Synonyms:</i> police power government intervention <i>Examples:</i> public health laws, industrial safety, traffic laws, antitrust	<i>Redistributive policies:</i> <i>Rules</i> impose classification or status; rules categorizing activity <i>Synonyms:</i> fiscal and monetary policy, overall budget policies <i>Examples:</i> income tax, Federal Reserve discount rates, Social Security
Secondary Rule (confers powers or privileges)	<i>Distributive policies:</i> <i>Rules</i> confer facilities or privileges unconditionally <i>Synonyms:</i> patronage, subsidy, pork barrel <i>Examples:</i> public works, agricultural extension, land grants	<i>Constituent Policies</i> <i>Rules</i> confer powers; rules about rules and about authority <i>Synonyms:</i> overhead, auxiliary, government organization <i>Examples:</i> agencies for budgetary and personnel policy, laws establishing judicial jurisdiction

The horizontal dimension indicates when a policy is in effect. Some policy operates on the particular conduct of particular individuals. For example, if a manufacturer makes unsafe goods he is subject to the general rule of a certain regulatory policy; however, the policy's sanctions go into effect only once he has manufactured the unsafe goods. Other

types of policy, however, work within a general environment of conduct. These policies do not wait for a particular behavior to occur in order to go into effect. As Lowi (1972, 299) puts it: “a minor change in the Federal Reserve discount rate can have a major impact on my propensity to invest, yet no official need know of my existence.”

Lowi's two-dimensional framework generates four types of policy, and, if the theory is correct, four types of politics. Distributive policy operates on individuals but imposes no sanctions. “These are policies that are not policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that only by accumulation can be called a policy” (Lowi 1964, 690).

This type of policy has many names: clientele, pork-barrel, and patronage politics are taken as synonymous with distribution. Regulatory politics similarly operate on individuals, but the threat of coercion is immediate: if individual x has not complied with policy y , then sanction z will be imposed. Redistributive politics “impose something on the private sphere but work through the environment of conduct rather than directly upon conduct itself. Rules impose classifications or statuses,” and the policy operates on members of the class rather than on individuals as such. “[I]ndividual membership in a classification is involuntary and ... categoric” (Lowi 1985, 73). Finally, constituent policy grants authority, creates jurisdictions for agents of the state, and creates the environment in which political and social action takes place. (The name should not be confused with what some have called constituent politics: legislators acting to provide benefits to their constituents. Instead, the name is derived from the fact that these policies “constitute” the state's framework and create the arena in which other political games are played.) Constituent policy has been referred to as “rules about powers,” “rules about rules,” “rules about authority” (Lowi 1985) or, the “creation of the state within the state” (Lowi 1988). Lowi

(1972) cites electoral apportionment, propaganda campaigns, and the creation of new agencies as examples of constituent policy.

Lowi presents scholars of policy with the possibility of categorizing policy around something other than its topical content. Ultimately we adopt his policy typology in our investigation of congressional organization and voting. Before continuing, however, Lowi's taxonomy bears comparison to another, that developed by James Q. Wilson.

Wilson: The Costs and Benefits of Policy. In many respects, Lowi's typology is quite similar to one constructed by Wilson (1980a, 1980b). Wilson's explicit intent is to develop a typology of *regulatory* policy. As he has constructed his scheme, however, it appears to be applicable to many types of government action. That is, it is *apparently* not limited to the more constrained definition of regulation that Lowi develops above. (We return to this apparentness below.) Although Wilson does not state explicitly, as Lowi does, that policies generate politics, it is implied by his argument.

Wilson's theory is appealing in its elegance, as it is founded on two rather simple concepts which are quite familiar to anyone who has opened a book on social theory in the last two centuries: costs and benefits. He is quite clear, however, that he is constructing more than a simple economic argument. Politics and economics are inherently different:

[W]hereas economics is based on the assumption that preferences are given, politics must take into account the efforts made to change preferences.... Both economics and politics deal with the problems of scarcity and conflicting preferences. Both deal with persons who ordinarily act rationally. But politics differs from economics in that it manages conflict by forming heterogeneous coalitions out of persons with changeable and incommensurable preferences in order to make binding decisions for everyone. Political science is an effort to make statements about the formation of preferences and nonmarket methods of managing conflict among those preferences (Wilson 1980a, 363).

Hence, in formulating a taxonomy of policy based on costs and benefits, Wilson uses these terms in their largest possible sense: “These costs and benefits may well be monetary or non-monetary, and the value assigned to them, as well as beliefs about the likelihood of their materializing, can change” (Wilson 1980a, 366).

Wilson's scheme, like Lowi's, consists of two axes. The first establishes the distribution of costs, the second, the distribution of benefits; a four part typology naturally results. When both costs and benefits are widely spread, *majoritarian* politics result. Most members of the society can expect to gain and to pay; no small segment of the population has an overriding interest regarding this type of policy. Examples include Social Security, and the policy to have a large standing army before and after World War II (Wilson 1980a).

When both costs and benefits are narrowly distributed, *interest-group* politics result: one small group will benefit at the expense of another, but the public at large will be generally unaffected. An example includes the politics surrounding the Shipping Act of 1916. Producers who shipped their goods by sea were pitted against those who owned the shipping lines. A shipping cartel had been keeping shipping prices artificially high, an unpopular practice among the producers to be sure. However, the producers did not want to eliminate the shipping cartel entirely, because they feared that within a few years many of the small shippers in the cartel would be driven out of business by market forces, and the resulting shipping rates would be driven even higher by an unregulated oligopoly of shippers. What the producers really wanted was a regulated shipping industry. The shippers, knowing that the days of the unregulated cartel were numbered, found the regulated industry approach to be fairly agreeable. In the end, the producers won, but the final

statute had something to make everyone happy, a feature that Wilson notes is fairly common in interest group politics.

When the costs are widely distributed, but the benefits are narrowly focused, *client* politics are the outcome. Subsidies of any sort are an excellent example of client politics, as are some regulatory arrangements. (Wilson points to the fact that the public utility commission movement was spearheaded by a group of utility owners who knew they were better off with a regulated monopoly than with unregulated competition.) State laws that license and protect certain occupations, such as lawyers, are also examples of client politics.

Finally, when benefits are widespread, but a narrow segment of the population must bear the costs, *entrepreneurial* politics result. An example includes clean air regulations imposed on automobile manufacturers. It is strange to even think that such a policy can exist at all given that the benefits are remote for the large, often unorganized group, but the costs borne by the small group are high and immediate. To change the status quo in such a situation, a policy entrepreneur must step forward and work on behalf of the larger group in order to extract the costs from the small, highly-interested group. Ralph Nader served as such a policy entrepreneur with clean air (Wilson 1980a, 367-72).

Interestingly, it seems as though Lowi's and Wilson's typologies resemble one another to a considerable degree. Figure 2.2 shows the combination of the two typologies.




Figure 2.2: Combination of Lowi's and Wilson's Typologies

That two theorists independently derived such similar taxonomies bodes well for the soundness of the schemes, and it may be that the two can be reconciled and used in future research endeavors. However, this analysis ultimately adopts Lowi's framework for two reasons. First, we may be overstating the applicability of Wilson's typology to non-regulatory policy; Wilson does state that his typology is a classification of *regulatory* policy. While it seems to be possible to apply it to all types of public policy, it is not entirely clear that he intends for the framework to be put to such a use. Lowi seemingly agrees with the proposition that Wilson's scheme should be interpreted narrowly: “[a]lthough very interesting, [Wilson's typology] does not sharpen the distinction between regulation and other types of state action” (Lowi 1985, 71). If, however, Wilson's taxonomy is in

fact suited for regulatory policy alone, then it is surely subsumed by Lowi's scheme, and it follows that we should adopt Lowi's framework for our analysis of many policy types.

Second, Lowi's work has received considerable attention in the policy literature. Over the last thirty years the idea has captured the interest of political scientists, has been put to use in several empirical studies, and has seen theoretical refinement (Anderson 1997; Heckathorn and Maser 1990; Lowi 1969, 1979, 1985, 1988; Miller 1990; Ripley and Franklin 1991; Spitzer 1979; Tatalovich and Daynes 1988; Newman 1994). That this approach provides some significant insight into the policy process may be indicated by the fact that Ripley and Franklin's work (1991) is currently in its fifth edition.

Strangely, this theory of policy has not often been applied to studies of Congress. Lowi's 1972 paper reanalyzes seventeen published case studies of policy making in Congress in light of the taxonomy. Spitzer (1979) engages in quantitative analysis of the seventeen cases used by Lowi and generally confirms Lowi's conclusions. Outside of these two inquiries, the taxonomy has not been employed by legislative scholars. Given the advances in legislative theory that have been made over the last twenty years, it is necessary to examine congressional organization and behavior in light of the policy theory of politics.

Floor Voting in the House

Congressional research conducted during the last three decades has focused on committees, parties, and procedures, and the role that these play in the creation of policy. One area of Congressional research that has received substantial attention is that of floor voting. However, the emphasis of studies of floor voting has changed over the last

twenty-five years. While earlier works puzzled over the forces that led to the outcome of the floor vote, more recently, the focus has shifted to the dimensions of floor voting. Poole and Rosenthal's various studies are a prime examples of such work. Clausen (1973) is another who has focused on dimensions, showing their stability over time. Only Kingdon (1973, 1989) seems to have kept up the tradition of modeling general floor votes.

Perhaps the reason for this shift in emphasis is that distributive theories (which dominated the literature in the 1970s and 1980s) hinged upon the notion that deference to interested parties is *the* defining characteristic of Congress; once a motion reaches the floor, it is largely a settled issue: the floor merely defers to interests on relevant committees. Informational and partisan theories have called this deference into question, but little attention has been paid to floor voting by informational or partisan theorists. Our task is to examine House organization and member behavior in light of Lowi's theory of policy within the context of floor voting.

Our model of floor voting is derived from one of the most exhaustive empirical examinations of floor voting: John Kingdon's *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (1973), now in its third edition (1989). An exhaustive review of the literature on floor voting is quite unnecessary for the task at hand, as Kingdon's model of voting captures all theoretically important (and perhaps a few minor) influences. Moreover, his model is quite successful at predicting vote choice in empirical investigations. In short, there is little need to reinvent the wheel, and Kingdon's model, after some modification for the sake of parsimony, is adopted for the examination of floor voting. (As shown below in Chapter 5,

the model derived from Kingdon's framework has a great deal of explanatory power, correctly predicting individual votes between 80 and 90 percent of the time.)

Kingdon (1989) examines the congressional decision making process and finds that there are seven major influences on vote choice: constituents, colleagues, party leaders and ranking committee members, interest groups, the administration and bureaucracy, staff, and the media. As noted, we condense his model; nevertheless, the basic elements remain. Our model of four influences (see Figure 2.3) effectively captures the correlates of voting posited by Kingdon, but takes several of them as being indirect. For example, Kingdon considers that interest groups have an effect on decisions. We labor under the assumption that interest groups affect House members indirectly, i.e., their effect is filtered through constituent interests. This is quite in line with Kingdon's construction:

Congressmen repeatedly said during the course of the interviews that, unless an interest group had some connection with their constituencies, the group would have little or no influence on their decisions. Said one, "It doesn't make any difference to me unless it is from the district" (Kingdon 1989, 150).

Similarly, we take other influences as having indirect effects. Figure 2.3 shows how Kingdon's influences work indirectly through our four major factors. By collapsing the seven influences into four, we are left with a more parsimonious and workable model. Henceforth, these influences will be considered implicit components of each of the four factors. However, we will not examine each of them in explicit detail.

Toward a Policy Theory of Congress

Having examined the literature on Congress, taxonomies of policies, and the voting decisions of House members, we now turn our attention to developing further the-

policy perspective of Congress. Chapter 3 examines one crucial constituent policy, namely the creation of the party leadership groups. Chapter 4 employs the four-part model of floor voting derived from Kingdon's (1989) work and examines the decisions of House members as they create policy within each of the cells of Lowi's typology.




Figure 2.3: Determinants of House Votes

CHAPTER 3

THE FIRST CONSTITUENT POLICY: THE CREATION OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP CADRE

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 2, scholarly attention given to both parties and party leaders in Congress has been relatively scant since the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this period, party was seen as a mere collection of like-minded legislators, or as a group that marched under the same banner, but a banner that often meant different things in different regions, states, and districts (Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Collie and Brady 1985). By the late 1980s political scientists were paying almost no attention to parties, and when they did, they usually concluded that parties mattered little. Partisan decline in Congress was attributed to both the rise of candidate-centered elections, and to changes within the House itself (which was increasingly decentralized following the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon). While no one disputed that party labels still explained a great deal of the variance in roll call voting, congressional parties were not viewed as anything like cohesive organizations. In short, party did not matter much.

In the early 1990s, work by Rohde (1991), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), and Cox and McCubbins (1993) revived the notion that party organization and leadership matters in Congress. In our view as well, parties and leaders are important for understanding the operation of Congress. The creation of the group of party leaders can potentially affect all types of policy. Therefore, in this study we treat the creation of the party

leadership group and several special “monitoring” committees (to which we collectively refer as the “leadership cadre”) as the first constituent policy enacted in each Congress. Given that this is the first policy of the type which sets the “rules of the game” for all other types, a proper understanding of the composition of party leadership in the House is crucial.

Our investigation is quite different from most other work on parties, leaders, and voting that has been conducted over the last quarter-century. Most studies of party concentrate on the share of seats held by the majority, the proportion of party-line votes, and the cohesion of caucuses over a series of congresses. The object of such investigations is to determine the waxing and waning of party strength and cohesion over a given period of time. Furthermore, nearly all investigations treat party as a sort of brand name which members adopt; measurement of partisanship is a simple matter: 1 if Democrat, 0 if Republican. We engage in neither of these practices. Our concern is neither with how many seats are held by the majority, nor with fluctuations in party cohesion over time. While both of these concepts are of general interest, our concern is with how rank-and-file party members choose their leaders and take direction from them.

Often the process of leadership selection is dismissed as being too idiosyncratic to warrant study. The selection of leaders is seen as a decision made in proverbial smoke-filled rooms; the rank-and-file vote on the leadership merely rubber-stamps what has been decided by the party big shots in behind-the-scenes bargains. However, the student of our national legislature should not be deceived by the straight party-line votes on leaders seen at the beginning of each Congress. As will be demonstrated below, this is not a rank-and-

file acquiescence to the deals cut by party bosses, but rather the grand finale of a very delicate balancing act.

In the following chapter we also reject the simple dichotomous measure of party that is generally employed. Instead, we take our bearing from a concept employed by Cox and McCubbins (1993). In their view, a party vote is one in which the floor leader and the whip both vote the same way on a given measure. This view moves away from the notion of party as label, and toward the concept of party as an organization. They argue “that investigations of parties as floor voting coalitions ought to be conducted in terms of loyalty to the party leaders and not, as has usually been done in the previous literature, in terms of general party cohesion” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 137). We agree wholeheartedly. We too are interested in parties as organizations, as more than mere labels. Consequently we employ a measure inspired by theirs. (However, because of problems to which Cox and McCubbins themselves point, we expand the definition of party leadership beyond the Speaker-floor leader concept, and include many of the whips and members of several “monitoring” committees. The principle is the same, but the conceptual definition is improved.) The goal is to determine how the rank-and-file selects a subset of the party to act as its leadership and when this sub-group in turn exerts pressure on the rank-and-file. In short, we ask, “how are the leaders chosen, and when do the leaders lead?”

Theories of Leadership Selection

For many years the composition of the House leadership has been all but overlooked as uninteresting. In a review of the literature on legislative leadership, Peabody

(1985, 245) states that “leadership selection is often routine, with little or no competition.” From an initial glance at roll call votes, it appears that the selection of party leaders is indeed a cut-and-dried matter: leaders are chosen by party-line votes which are rather uncontroversial. However, this view ignores the many behind-the-scenes actions that go into selecting acceptable party leaders. Would the rank and file accept any proposed party leadership put before it, no matter how extreme? We think not. A good deal of consideration goes into selecting acceptable candidates for House leadership positions. The party rank-and-file must follow the leadership in the face of legislative uncertainty so that collective action problems can be solved; therefore, it takes great care in choosing leaders. In this chapter we investigate the selection of the Speaker, the party leaders, and the membership of several “monitoring” committees.

Drawing on the work of Cox and McCubbins (1993), we argue that parties are, at certain predictable times, used as solutions to collective action problems. Partisans do not elect leaders in order to follow them blindly; what the caucus wants is leadership that is active when there is fairly widespread agreement on an issue among partisans (Rohde 1991), but when individuals within the party still have incentives to defect from the party line for personal gain. To achieve such leadership, the rank-and-file selects a representative body that mirrors its preferences. In creating the party leadership cadre, we hypothesize that the majority-party rank-and-file will select a speaker from near the party median, and the leadership team of the party will be ideologically representative of the caucus.

In discussing “political entrepreneurs,” the central authorities who make collective action possible, Cox and McCubbins list three essential characteristics:

- (1) they bear the costs of *monitoring* the community faced with the collective dilemma; (2) they possess *selective incentives* (individually targetable

punishments and rewards) with which to reward those whom they find co-operating or punishing those whom they find “defecting”; (3) they are *paid*, in various ways, for the valuable services they provide (1993, 91, italics in original.)

A fourth point must be added to this list: political entrepreneurs must have the *ability* to monitor the community faced with the collective dilemma. This may seem to be so obvious a point that it need not be mentioned. It is important however: if the party leaders are not able to monitor rank-and-file members and policy specialists, they cannot function as central authorities.

Monitoring the rank-and-file is simple: the leadership need only look at their votes. Keeping tabs on policy specialists is a bit more difficult, however. Leadership needs a way to gain insight into and have some control over the proposed policy coming out of authorization committees. It gains this insight and control by keeping fairly tight rein on a smaller set of special “monitoring” committees: Steering and Policy/Committee on Committees, Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means. These committees are special because they occupy a vantage point which allows them to gather information on a wide variety of substantive policies, and they allow leaders to exert control over the party rank-and-file. Substantive policy coming out of authorization committees must pass through the monitoring committees, where it is subject to intense scrutiny. The Steering and Policy Committee (in the case of the Democrats) and the Committee on Committees (for the Republicans) make committee assignments, and hence have the selective rewards and punishments needed to entice members to toe the party line when necessary. Because these monitoring committees are comprised of and have additional

members selected by the caucus leadership, we hypothesize that members of these special subunits will also be representative of the party as a whole.

While relatively few studies have concentrated on the systematic selection of party leaders, the literature on both committees and parties reviewed above provides us with three major theoretical rationales for how the leadership cadre might be selected. In this section we examine what we should expect the party leadership cadre to look like based on each of the three theories. A fourth hybrid theory is also developed. We draw hypotheses from each theory, and in the next section, test the hypotheses.

Party-Representative Theory

The most obvious rationale for the selection of party leaders is drawn from the body of literature on parties that has emerged in the last decade (Rohde 1991, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993). This school of thought holds that parties choose leaders representative of the caucus. According to this literature, parties should create leadership bodies which are ideologically representative of the caucus as a whole. Kiewiet and McCubbins hypothesize that:

the congressional party, in order to achieve its desired policy goals, strives to make the median voter in its contingent on a committee coincide with the median voter of the caucus as a whole (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 92-3).

Cox and McCubbins (1993) go on to characterize the leadership of the majority party as a “leviathan.” While this metaphor should not be taken too literally, it is apt. According to the Cox and McCubbins thesis, it is rational for the caucus to choose a leadership group that is ideologically representative of it, and to give it the power over the caucus. Creat-

ing such a group has the potential to solve some collective action problems, and the rank and file can rest assured knowing that the leaders' power cannot be abused too badly.²²

Accordingly, we draw our first major hypothesis and two related sub-hypotheses from the party-representation theory:

1. Parties (in general) select leadership groups which are ideologically representative of the caucus as a whole
2. Democrats select leadership groups which are ideologically representative of the Democratic caucus as a whole
3. Republicans select leadership groups which are ideologically representative of the Republican caucus as a whole

Gains from Exchange Theory: Random Composition or Preference Outliers

As seen in Chapter 2, the vast majority of research on Congress over the last thirty-five years comes from the gains-from-exchange school. Several hypotheses can be derived from this body of literature. As discussed, most of this literature implies or explicitly states that parties are simply a non-factor in the operation of the House. Based on this aspect of this school of thought, we should expect to find no consistent pattern when ob-

²² As in the original *Leviathan*, the ruled give power to the sovereign in order to solve a collective action problem: in Hobbes's case it was to keep individuals from killing one another in a war of all against all; in Cox and McCubbins's account it is to keep party members with an incentive to defect from the party line from doing so, so that the national party reputation, and the electoral prospects of all party members will be improved. However, in Hobbes's case, the sovereign had absolute and irrevocable power once he was installed. In the House, however, leaders hardly have absolute power, and they cannot stray too far from the interests of those they represent, for unlike omnipotent kings and university professors, they do not have lifetime tenure; they can be replaced at the beginning of the next congress, if not sooner. This possibility of removal is an important safety mechanism for House members wary of creating leadership cadres as unrepresentative as the committee chairmen were in the 1940-1970s period.

serving the formation of the leadership cadre: the cadre will be chosen at random. Hence, from the implications of the gains-from-exchange school we have derived the null hypothesis against which all alternative hypotheses will be tested:

0. Leadership cadres, being unimportant to the operation of the House, are created randomly.

However, random selection is but one hypothesis that might be derived from the gains-from-exchange school; this body of thought also goes to great lengths to demonstrate that committees are stocked with preference outliers: representatives from farming districts flock to the Agriculture Committee, while members from urban districts seek to control legislation on banking, and so forth. The result is that the committees are loaded with “legislative high demanders.” To further their own agendas, legislators trade votes on issues that they care little about. Congress is characterized as an endless series of back scratches and logrolls. Might this also be the case for the leadership cadre? Might the parties create leadership groups that are extreme ideological outliers? Two possible scenarios could develop that would lead to this outcome.

First, extreme members might gravitate toward leadership posts. Having extreme views, very conservative or very liberal members might desire to shift the balance of House leadership and move their party, and ostensibly the nation, toward their own ideal preference point. If members with extreme preferences with regard to agriculture, banking, or the like seek assignments so that they can shape policy in those areas, then it seems plausible that members with preferences that are extreme in general (i.e., ideological outliers), will desire positions which will allow them to shape policy in very broad, ideological terms.

Of course, there is a snag in this argument: an extremist's desire for a position is much different than the ability to secure it. An essential element of the gains from exchange hypothesis is that members are able to *self-select* their committee assignments. Such self-selection does not seem to be plausible in the case of leadership positions. Ostensibly, any member would rather have a leadership position than not have one. The supply of leadership slots is clearly much smaller than its demand. Furthermore, members with extreme views in specific policy areas are able to gain their committee seats because other members simply do not care about the policy which affects them so deeply. This is not the case with leadership positions; all members could be affected by an extreme leadership cadre, in a way that they would not be by an extreme Merchant Marine Committee, for example. Hence, the self-selection process that is at least plausible with regard to the formation of substantive policy committees is not at all feasible with regard to the leadership cadre.

However, the possibility remains that the cadres will be stacked with ideologues. While the *self-selection* of extremists into leadership positions is implausible, it is conceivable that the caucus might *collectively* select extreme leadership committees. Schick (1980) uses a game-theoretic approach to explain extremism on the Budget Committee (which is one component of the leadership cadre, as defined below). He finds that in 1977 the Democrats intentionally loaded Budget with liberals to counteract the very conservative contingent that the Republicans had assembled. From this perspective, the possibility of extreme leadership groups becomes theoretically plausible. A moderate member of either party might be willing to select an extreme leadership group for his own party if the opposition is doing the same; the balance between the two groups of extrem-

ists might well produce an overall balance that is near his ideal preference point. Hence, the following hypotheses can be derived:

4. Parties (in general) select ideologically-outlying leadership cadres
5. Democrats select liberal outliers as party leaders
6. Republicans select conservative outliers as party leaders

Two related hypotheses can also be derived from this line of thought. Instead of attempting to counteract one another, the parties might instead opt for a cooperative strategy: Democrats might select members from the right wing of their party, while Republicans select more liberal members of their caucus. To do so would allow for enhanced bipartisan cooperation, and smoother operation of the House in general. Given the public's declining attachment to party labels, incumbent members of the House might well decide that their best electoral strategy is to downplay partisan conflict within the House by selecting cooperative leadership bodies. This also seems possible from a game-theoretic perspective, since this is a game quite unlike the classic prisoners' dilemma: neither party is ignorant of the leadership choices of the other; each knows the other's proposed slate of party leaders well before the final vote at the opening of each Congress. Furthermore the ideological preference of each member of the House is rather well-known; it is therefore impossible for nominees of one party to obscure their true ideological preferences in an attempt to deceive the other party into accepting an opposing leadership slate that is not what it really appears to be. In sum, the cooperative strategy is theoretically plausible; from it, we derive the following hypotheses:

7. Democrats select conservative Democrats to fill leadership positions
8. Republicans select liberal Republicans to fill leadership positions

Informational Theory: Floor Representation

As discussed in Chapter 2, informational theories of congressional organization have seen a great deal of theoretical refinement and empirical investigation over the last decade. But like the gains-from-exchange school, informational theory still places little if any emphasis on the role of congressional parties. Nevertheless, its major premise – the majoritarian postulate, which holds that any action taken by a legislative body ultimately rests on majority rule (i.e., the preference of the floor's median voter) – can be applied to the formation of leadership cadres. With regard to the composition of committees, informational theory holds that the parent chamber structures sub-groups such that members of the sub-group have incentives to work hard and develop expertise, but still send information-rich signals back to the floor (Krehbiel 1991, 66-77). Generally this means that committees are not stacked with outliers, but are balanced on the whole. Applying this logic to the selection of leadership cadres, we hypothesize that

9. The floor chooses leaders who reflect the preferences of the floor's median voter

When looking through the lens of informational theory, the focus shifts from how two parties select two partisan leadership groups to how the floor as a whole selects a single House leadership group comprised of both Republicans and Democrats. The combination of the Democratic and Republican leadership groups is taken to be the collective

leadership cadre of the floor. The ideological median of this bipartisan group should be near the ideological median of the floor.

In our test of this hypothesis, we deviate somewhat from the purest interpretation of informational theory, and make the realistic assumption that partisan identification constrains the choices of House members; Democrats will only select other Democrats as House leaders, and Republicans will only select other Republicans. (Under the purest interpretation of informational theory, party would place no such constraint on the choice of the median voter; the floor would be free to structure the floor's leadership without regard to partisan affiliation. This is unrealistic, of course – choices are always made from within respective parties.²³) Nevertheless, the focus remains on the choice of the floor median. The question is, does the floor select a leadership group that is ideologically similar to the floor median? Testing our ninth hypothesis will provide an answer to this question.

A Hybrid Theory

[T]hough [a theory] be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1991 [1859], 59).

²³ That House members always choose from within their own caucus is also more than a matter of ideological similarity. Consider the difficulty that Independent/self-declared socialist Bernie Sanders had in securing any committee assignments during his first term. Although there are a number of Democrats who are farther to the left than he is, the Democratic leaders did not want to allot any of their committee slots to him. While finally capitulating and allowing him to be seated with the Democrats on the committee, it seems safe to say that he will never gain a seat on one of the major committees as long as he remains an independent.

A final hypothesis is derived by combining assumptions of the party-representative theory with the informational theory. The former posits that parties will choose a leadership cadre that is representative of the party caucus. The latter posits that the floor will choose a House leadership cadre which is ideologically similar to the floor's median voter. Both theories have intuitive validity, and each has seen theoretical refinement and empirical support over the last decade. Which is correct? It seems that this is not really an either-or question – it is quite plausible that both forces are simultaneously in operation.

For example, consider the hypothetical legislative body displayed in Figure 3.1. The legislature has thirty-four seats, two parties, and ideological preferences which are bimodally distributed along a single dimension from left to right. Twenty-five of the seats are held by the party on the left, while the remaining nine are held by the party on the right. By definition, the chamber's median voter decides outcomes in any majority rule institution. But also true by definition, the floor's median is a member of the majority party, and therefore, according to the argument developed by Cox and McCubbins (1993), is under pressure to improve the collective reputation of the party in order to enhance the electoral viability of the party label. The most efficient way to do this, according to the new literature on parties, is to create leadership groups which reflect the median preferences of the caucus.

In short, there is a tension between the floor median and the party median's preferences. Because the floor median's choices are constrained somewhat by his partisan identification – he can only choose floor leaders from his own party, who, in turn, will control




Figure 3.1: Ideological Distribution in a Hypothetical Legislature

his committee assignments and other legislative prizes – he must deviate somewhat from his “true” preference as floor median, and move toward the majority party median, as is depicted in Figure 3.1. The theory predicts that in the hypothetical legislature described above, as well as in the House during the entire period of this study, that the ideological composition of the floor's ideal leadership cadre is shifted leftward. (Although not examined in this work, we would expect the equilibrium point to move to the right in the Republican-majority 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses.) Hence, we hypothesize that

10. The floor median, as a member of the majority party, will select leadership cadres shifted away from the floor median toward the majority party's ideological median.

In the context of our time frame, 1975 to 1994, this implies that the leadership of the floor should be to the left of the floor median.

Definitions, Data, and Sample

Cox and McCubbins (1993), borrowing from an older definition which they credit to Mayhew (1966), define a party as having taken a position when the floor leader and the whip vote the same way. This party position subsequently becomes part of the party agenda if the opposition party takes the opposing party position, or no party position. As stated, we similarly are interested in the loyalty of the rank and file to the leadership. We will investigate leaders' influence over the rank and file in the next chapter. In this chapter our interest is in how the rank and file initially selects its leaders.

Cox and McCubbins note that their definition of a floor vote is not perfect:

These operational definitions obviously do not perfectly capture the original conceptions of party agendas and party leadership votes. On the one hand, the operational definitions are likely to be too inclusive. The floor leader and whip of a party may both vote on the same side of a roll call without taking any stand or exerting any effort as *party leaders*. Their votes may both be cast in a purely private capacity. On the other hand, the operational definitions may also, on occasion, be too exclusive. Illness or unavoidable commitments may prevent a leader from voting, even on an issue to which he and the other top leaders have devoted considerable attention (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 146).

Because of these problems, we expand considerably the two-member definition of party leadership that Cox and McCubbins employ. For our purposes we need not define what a party vote is; our chief concern is with who counts as a party leader. (Loyalty to these leaders will be taken up in the next chapter.) For Democrats, we define party leaders as the members holding official party positions, from the Majority Leader through the Deputy Whips, as listed in Congressional Quarterly's *CQ Almanac*.²⁴ The Democratic *leadership cadre* is defined as the party leaders, plus the members of the Steering and Policy committee, and the Democratic contingent on four committees which have special monitoring ability: Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means.²⁵ For the Republi-

²⁴ The At-Large whips are not included in this definition because there are simply too many of them to be included in a meaningful definition of House leadership. Rohde (1991) notes that by the 101st Congress, 40% of House Democrats had some position within the whip system. Furthermore, to call them leaders is a stretch, as they were not responsible for persuading any members to vote the party position. Their role merely was to poll members on how they planned to vote on upcoming motions (Rohde 1991, 86-7). Republicans had a proportionately smaller whip system (10.8% of GOP members held a whip position) (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993, 20-b), but partisan theory consistently stresses the relative unimportance of the minority party.

²⁵ Our conception of these committees as having more influence than others is not without precedent. Rohde notes that “four committees – Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and (cont’d.)

cans, the party leaders are defined as the members of the Republican party leadership group from the Minority Leader through the Assistant Deputy Whips, as listed in the *CQ Almanac*. The Republican leadership cadre is defined as the GOP party leaders, plus the members of the Policy committee, the Committee on Committees, and the Republican contingents on the four monitoring committees listed above. By expanding the Cox and McCubbins definition we are able to reduce the problems that they note; the idiosyncratic behavior of a few leaders will not generate the illusion of a cohesive organization when there is not one, or obscure one that is present.

One party leadership position that is conspicuous by its absence from the list above is that of Speaker of the House. Obviously the Speaker has influence if any party leader does. However, because Speakers rarely vote unless they are needed to break a tie, ideology scores are not compiled for them. Because of this, we will engage in a separate analysis of the choice of Speakers, in order to determine whether or not they are selected for their position in any systematic fashion.

To measure the preferences of the rank and file and the leaders that they select, we rely on Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology. The gains-from-exchange theory predicts that committees will be loaded with *policy* extremists. For example, an extreme member on the Agriculture committee would be one who always voted in a pro-agriculture direction; agricultural extremism is generally measured with a rating from an agricultural lobbying group, such as the National Farmers Union (NFU). (Conversely, the

Ways and Means – are recognized as more important than the others, and they were the focus of special action by the reformers in the effort to enhance the collective control of power” (Rohde 1991, 27). He goes on to call them the 'leadership’ committees (Rohde *cont'd.*)

informational school of thought predicts rather representative committees, in terms of a given policy preference.) Such narrow measures of specific policy preferences are appropriate when examining policy committees with a narrowly defined jurisdictions. However, given that leaders must deal with all issues, a proper measure of their general policy preferences is a rating which measures their preferences across *all* issues – i.e., a score of general *ideology*. Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores are a convenient, accurate, and widely-used measure of ideology. The score is derived from a type of factor analysis of all roll call votes in a given Congress. The technique produces two significant policy dimensions, the first of which explains roughly 85 to 90 percent of the total variance. The scores are highly correlated (over ± 9) with other measures of ideology, such as ratings from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the American Conservative Union (ACU). The scores have been used widely (e.g., in Kiewiet and McCubbins's study of the Appropriations Committee), and have other advantages as well, such as being calculable for all Congresses, or for any decision-making group, for that matter.

This investigation covers the United States House of Representatives between 1975 and 1994. This twenty-year period begins as the reforms of the 1970s were being implemented fully, and continues through the end of the Democratic domination of the House.

1991, 83). They are so powerful because all substantive policy must pass through their hands. Problems with any one of these committees can doom a policy proposal.

The Selection of House Speakers

As noted above, the selection of Speakers of the House has generally been viewed as a process resistant to systematic investigation. Inquires have been largely anecdotal, at worst, or qualitative at best (Peters 1997). It is widely held that prospective leaders are “groomed” for their positions by current leaders; members rise to the rank of Speaker because of their political skills rather than their ideological position with regard to the rest of the party or the floor (Peabody 1985). In short, charisma, political skill, and personal reputation for competence matter more than ideology for the House member wishing to rise to the top leadership position.

The results of our investigation of Speakers, displayed in Table 3.1, generally support the received view, and indicate that the process of Speaker selection is somewhat resistant to quantitative analysis. The table displays the ideological positions of the eighteen different members who held the Speakership between 1889 and 1994. Their positions are derived from their NOMINATE scores for the Congress immediately preceding the session in which they were first elected to the top leadership post. The scores are based on the proportional rank of their ideology within the chamber and their party, and are uniformly distributed. For example, the two most extreme members within the group would score 0 (most liberal) or 1 (most conservative), respectively, while the median legislator would be scored 0.5.

No single pattern of Speaker selection emerges. Henderson and Cannon were located near the center of the floor, which would tend to support the informational theory's dictum that all actions ultimately satisfy the floor's median voter. However, the remaining sixteen cases all are to the right of the floor if Republicans or to the left of the floor if

Democrats. Of course, this pattern in and of itself is rather unremarkable; we need to look to their positions within their parties to learn more. In doing so we see mixed support for two of the theories discussed above. In six of the cases the Speaker comes from the extreme wing of his party, which would support the collective-choice-of-preference-outliers theory. Yet Reed, author of the infamous “Reed's Rules” came from the extreme right of the GOP, while “czar” Cannon, the Speaker most comparable to Reed in so many ways, came from the extreme left of the caucus: only one Republican was to Cannon's left.

Table 3.1: Ideological Positions of Speakers of the House (51st - 103rd Congresses)

Congress	Speaker	Party	Speaker's Floor Position in Previous Congress	Speaker's Party Position in Previous Congress
51st	Thomas B. Reed	R	.938 = Right of Floor from Rightist Party	0.831 = Right Wing of Rightist Party
52nd	Charles F. Crisp	D	.015 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	0.03 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
56th	David B. Henderson	R	.457 = Center of Floor from Rightist Party	.049 = Left Wing of Rightist Party
58th	Joseph G. Cannon	R	.489 = Center of Floor from Rightist Party	.099 = Left Wing of Rightist Party
62nd	James B. "Champ" Clark	D	.108 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.240 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
66th	Frederick H. Gillett	R	.725 = Right of Floor from Rightist Party	.436 = Center of Rightist Party
69th	Nicholas Longworth	R	.777 = Right of Floor from Rightist Party	.569 = Center of Rightist Party
72nd	John Nance Garner	D	.144 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.377 = Center of Leftist Party
73rd	Henry T. Rainey	D	.227 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.442 = Center of Leftist Party
74th	Joseph W. Byrns	D	.278 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.388 = Center of Leftist Party
74th	William B. Bankhead	D	.014 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.019 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
76th	Sam Rayburn	D	.144 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.189 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
80th	Joseph W. Martin, Jr.	R	.740 = Right of Floor from Rightist Party	.398 = Center of Rightist Party
87th	John W. McCormack	D	.066 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.103 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
92nd	Carl Albert	D	.249 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.444 = Center of Leftist Party
95th	Thomas P. O'Neill	D	.172 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.258 = Left Wing of Leftist Party
100th	Jim Wright	D	.309 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.529 = Center of Leftist Party
101st	Thomas S. Foley	D	.198 = Left of Floor from Leftist Party	.335 = Center of Leftist Party

Ultimately, the best support is for the party representative theory; in nine of the cases – half of the total – the leaders are chosen from the center of their caucus, as the theory predicts. Still, given that we would expect six of eighteen leaders to be drawn

from the center of their party due to chance alone,²⁶ nine such examples hardly constitute overwhelming support of the theory. In deference to the theory, however, three of the four Democratic Speakers who headed the party in the post-reform era of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were party centrists. This is notable given that the reforms were designed to make the leadership more responsive to the party as a whole.

In sum, there seems to be no clear and systematic manner in which Speakers are chosen, at least with regard to their ideological preference. The party representation theory receives the strongest support, but even this is rather weak. The charisma/competence model mentioned above is apparently not in danger of being overturned by an ideology-based model of Speaker selection. However, while the speaker is the most visible of the party leaders, he is certainly not the only one. It is quite possible that the rank and file selects a charismatic speaker that will be able to rally the troops when necessary (paying little attention to his ideology), but that it selects the rest of the leadership cadre with deep consideration of ideological position. We now turn to a consideration of the selection of the rest of the cadre, during the post-reform period, 1975-1994.

The Selection of Leadership Cadres

As seen above, our investigation of party leadership takes quite a bit of theoretical guidance from the literature on committee composition. Similarly, our empirical method draws on the committee composition literature. Many empirical studies have attempted to determine whether committees are composed of ideological or policy-specific prefer-

²⁶ As we define “center” here as the middle third of the group.

ence outliers (e.g., Ray 1980; Cowart 1981; Hall and Grofmann 1990; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1991; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993).

The best of the committee preference tests, in our opinion, is provided by Tim Groseclose (1994), who develops a Monte Carlo test of committee preferences. As party leadership cadres are simply another type of sub-group chosen by a larger parent group, the methods used to evaluate the preferences of committees can be applied to leadership groups with relative ease.

Methodological Problems

Groseclose (1994, 441) lists three major reasons that the methods commonly employed by previous studies have led to questionable results: assumptions about data distribution, level of measurement, and falsification design. The first and the third are of greatest concern to us.²⁷ Tests of hypotheses regarding committee composition imply (through the use of t , F , and χ^2 statistics) that legislative preferences (as measured by interest group ratings or NOMINATE scores) are normally distributed. In fact, they almost never are. (For example, see Figure 3.2, a histogram of NOMINATE scores in the 103rd Congress; note, however, the similarity this bears to the hypothetical legislative body in Figure 3.1.) This is not too problematic if we are examining a statistic that is an efficient estimator of central tendency (such as the mean) for a large N . However, theory points to the relatively inefficient *median* as the proper statistic for measuring group preferences (Black 1958). Furthermore, some of the legislative entities being examined – the four-

member Republican contingent on the Rules committee, for example – can hardly be considered large groups. Other statistics, such as the Wilcoxon difference in medians tests used by Cox and McCubbins (1993), do not assume normality, but still assume symmetric distributions (Groseclose 1994, 441). This is a questionable assumption as well, as judged by Figure 3.2.

Problems of falsification also arise in previously-seen tests of committee composition. Tests of the floor and party representative theories (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993) have concluded that if committees are not outliers then they are representative (Groseclose 1994, 442). However, the theories state that they should be *more* representative than we would expect by chance. Hence, we need to test the alternative hypothesis that committees are more representative than chance would lead us to expect. Concluding that committees are inliers simply because they are not outliers is inappropriate.

In this test of leadership cadre composition, as in Groseclose's test of committee composition, we make no assumptions about the shape of the distribution of member preferences. In line with the theory of committees in majority rule settings (Black 1958), we also abandon the examination of groups' *mean* preferences and instead test hypotheses concerning the *median* preferences of the groups in question (leadership groups, party contingents on monitoring committees, the floor, the caucuses, etc.).

²⁷ Measurement problems generally arise with the use of interest group ratings. For example, it is not clear that the difference between 0 and 50 on such scales is the same as (*cont'd.*)

The Monte Carlo Design

To test the hypotheses listed above, we adopt a Monte Carlo design. This research design has been gaining popularity among political scientists in recent years (Adams 1997, Maltzman 1995, Mooney 1996, Peterson and Wrighton 1998, Signorino 1999) and is likely to become more common in future social science research as computers with the necessary computational power become more available (Mooney and Krause 1997). In general, we create 15,000 hypothetical groups at random from the actual distribution of ideological preferences within a given Congress. These 15,000 randomly-chosen groups form a continuum upon which the actual group is plotted. Inferences about the actual group's ideological composition are based on its position on the constructed curve.

For example, during the 103rd Congress, the Democratic leadership group was comprised of twenty-one members. From the set of NOMINATE scores of members of the Democratic caucus during the 103rd Congress, twenty-one members are chosen at random by a computer program. These twenty-one serve as the first hypothetical leadership group. Their NOMINATE scores are recorded, and the median score of this hypothetical group is found and stored. This procedure is then repeated 15,000 times. Eventually, a range of 15,000 hypothetical medians is derived. The median NOMINATE score of the *actual* Democratic leadership group of the 103rd Congress is then added to the list of hypothetical medians, and is flagged as belonging to the actual group. These 15,001 scores are then ranked, and the rank is converted to a proportion for convenience. From this ranking we can draw inferences about the group of Democrats that were actually selected during

the difference between 50 and 100.




Figure 3.2: Distribution of NOMINATE Scores, 103rd Congress

the 103rd Congress. If the actual group ranks in the bottom 5 percent of the distribution of randomly-generated cases, it is considered to be a liberal outlier.²⁸ If it is within the top 5 percent, it is considered to be a conservative outlier. If it is located within the middle 5 percent, i.e. between .475 and .525, it is considered to be representative of the parent group. If it is found in none of these ranges, it is considered random.

This procedure is then repeated for the Democrats' party committee (Steering and Policy), and for the Democratic contingents on the four monitoring committees (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means). It is then repeated for the Republicans leadership group, the two Republican party committees (Policy, and the Committee on Committees), and for the four Republican contingents on the monitoring committees. From these thirteen runs, it is possible to test hypotheses one through eight, as listed above, against the null hypothesis, random selection.

Testing the ninth and tenth hypotheses, those concerned with the representation of the entire floor rather than the caucuses, requires a slight modification of the procedure. During the 103rd Congress there were twenty-one Democratic party leaders and eighteen Republican party leaders. Therefore, twenty-one Democrats and eighteen Republicans are chosen at random.²⁹ The median of this group of thirty-nine floor leaders is then re-

²⁸ Because the direction of the outlying tendency is specified in each of the hypotheses, such a one-tailed test is appropriate.

²⁹ As discussed above, we assume that party identification constrains leadership choice. Under the purest, and unrealistic, interpretation of the floor-representation theory, thirty-nine members would be chosen randomly, without regard to party. Under such an interpretation it would be possible to construct a random floor leadership group comprised of thirty-nine Democrats or thirty-nine Republicans. Clearly this is ludicrous, and our restrictive assumption is warranted. The other restriction built into the model is that freshman cannot be chosen as party leaders.

corded. The procedure is repeated 15,000 times, the actual floor leadership median is added to the list, the 15,001 medians are ranked, and the actual group's rank is recorded. This process is then repeated for the four monitoring committees.

From these eighteen runs we can test the ten alternative hypotheses against the null (random selection) hypothesis. Table 3.2 displays the position of the actual group within the set of 15 thousand randomly-created groups. As described above, groups are considered to be outliers if they fall into the lower or upper 5 percent of the distribution of medians, and representative if they fall within the middle 5 percent. Of course, this five percent criterion is arbitrary; we might decide that 25 percent is the proper measure, or 1/100th of 1 percent, for that matter. In fact, any test criterion from an infinite range of such criteria can be adopted, and it is conceivable that different conclusions would be reached under different criteria. Lacking infinite resources, we have chosen four such criteria with which to test the hypotheses (1, 5, 10, and 25 percent). While as arbitrary as any other, they do cover a reasonable range of values. The results of the different criteria are displayed in Table 3.3. An example serves to clarify the interpretation of Table 3.3. Hypothesis 6 predicts that Republicans will select conservative outliers. At the .05 test criterion, we find this to be the case twice: the GOP selects both a leadership group and a Rules committee contingent that are more conservative than 95 percent of the randomly-generated cases. Hence, two of the seven groups are outliers. This tends to favor the outlier prediction – but enough to reject the random selection null hypothesis? After all, there is a 5 percent chance that groups will appear to be outliers when they are not just by chance. Out of seven groups, we would expect outliers to appear .35 times due to chance

Table 3.2: Monte Carlo Test Results at the 0.05 Test Criterion: The Median Ideology of Actual Leadership Groups Ranked within a Set of 15,000 Randomly-Created Leadership Groups, 103rd Congress

Group	Rank	Conclusion
Leadership (Democrats)	.143	
Steering and Policy (Democrats)	.122	
Appropriations (Democrats)	.149	
Budget (Democrats)	.387	
Rules (Democrats)	.208	
Ways and Means (Democrats)	.142	
Leadership (Republicans)	.997	Conservative
Committee on Committees (Republicans)	.808	
Policy (Republicans)	.728	
Appropriations (Republicans)	.062	
Budget (Republicans)	.141	
Rules (Republicans)	.975	Conservative
Ways and Means (Republicans)	.332	
Leadership (Floor)	.063	
Appropriations (Floor)	.002	Liberal
Budget (Floor)	.759	
Rules (Floor)	.289	
Ways and Means (Floor)	.522	Representative
Note : Blank cells in the Conclusion column represents a pattern of random selection		

($7 \times .05 = .35$). The question is, is two significantly more than .35? To answer this question we again borrow from Groseclose's 1994 study, and perform the following test of significance.

The computer, according to the procedure outlined above, creates seven hypothetical groups of appropriate size to make up a hypothetical Republican leadership cadre. If two or more of these groups are conservative outliers (according to the specified test

level, .05 in this case), the cadre as a whole is considered to be an outlier. This process is repeated 15,000 times. If the proportion of these 15,000 tests that yield two or more outlying groups is less than 5 percent (i.e., the standard test of significance, $\alpha = .05$), then the actual finding of two outlying groups is considered to be significant, and the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative.

Table 3.4 displays the number of times that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of a given alternative at the four test levels listed above during the 103rd Congress. In the example used in the preceding paragraphs, we can see that the two outlying groups (of seven) chosen by the Republicans are indeed significant: in only 4.5 percent of the hypothetical cases generated during the significance test did two or more of the seven groups appear as conservative outliers. Hence, the null (random selection) hypothesis is rejected in favor of the sixth alternative hypothesis. However, given that the Democrats had no liberally-outlying groups among their six (contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 5), we are left with only two of the total thirteen leadership groups as ideological outliers. Consequently, the null hypothesis is not rejected in favor of the more general Hypothesis 4, that parties in general select outliers.

A further examination of Table 3.4, however, shows that different test levels yield somewhat different conclusions. While we conclude that the Republicans did choose conservative leadership cadre at the .05 test level, we make no such conclusion at the

Table 3.3: Monte Carlo Test Results at Four Various Test Criteria: The Median Ideology of Actual Leadership Groups Ranked within a Set of 15,000 Randomly-Created Leadership Groups, 103rd Congress

Group	rank	Test Criterion			
		0.05	0.1	0.25	
Leadership (Democrats)	.143			Liberal	
Steering and Policy (Democrats)	.122			Liberal	
Appropriations (Democrats)	.149			Liberal	
Budget (Democrats)	.387			Representative	
Rules (Democrats)	.208			Liberal	
Ways and Means (Democrats)	.142			Liberal	
Leadership (Republicans)	.997	Conservative	Conservative	Conservative	
Committee on Committees (Republicans)	.808			Conservative	
Policy (Republicans)	.728		Liberal	Liberal	
Appropriations (Republicans)	.062			Liberal	
Budget (Republicans)	.141			Liberal	
Rules (Republicans)	.975	Conservative	Conservative	Conservative	
Ways and Means (Republicans)	.332				
Leadership (Floor)	.063		Liberal	Liberal	
Appropriations (Floor)	.002	Liberal	Liberal	Liberal	
Budget (Floor)	.759			Conservative	
Rules (Floor)	.289				
Ways and Means (Floor)	.522	Representative	Representative	Representative	
.05 Column as Shown in Table 3.2					

other three test levels. At the .25 level, for example, only three of the seven groups appear to be outliers; such a result was produced 24.4 percent of the time by the significance test. Five of the six Democratic groups appear to be liberal outliers at the .25 level, a result produced only 0.5 percent of the time by the significance test. Moreover, eight of the total thirteen leadership groups were outliers at the .25 level, a result seen in only 0.6 percent of the significance test iterations, leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis in favor of the general Hypothesis 4. So far, it is hard to come to any firm conclusion based on the results. We can cast more light on the situation by extending the analysis through time. The entire procedure detailed above was repeated for the 94th through 102nd Congresses. In so doing we get a much better picture of the House of Representatives between the reforms of the 1970s and the end of the Democratic domination of the chamber in 1994.

We test each of the ten alternative hypotheses at each of the four test levels for each of the ten Congresses in our sample. The results of these tests comprise the remainder of Table 3.4. In summarizing these test results, the rightmost column of Table 3.5 shows the total number of times that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the given alternative.³⁰

³⁰ For the sake of robustness we display the totals for both .05 and .10 criteria. These criteria should not be confused with the other test levels discussed above; they are simply the standard .05 criterion, and the more lenient .10 criterion of statistical significance. In either case the pattern that emerges remains unchanged.

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels: The Median Ideology of Actual Leadership Groups Ranked within a Set of 15,000 Randomly-Created Leadership Groups, 103rd Congress

103rd Congress														
Hypothesis														
0.01				0.05				0.1				0.25		
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.		Exp.	Actual	Sig.		Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	.13	0	-	.65	0	-		1.3	0	-		3.25	1	-
2	.06	0	-	.30	0	-		0.6	0	-		1.50	1	-
3	.07	0	-	.35	0	-		0.7	0	-		1.75	0	-
4	.13	1	.122	.65	2	.135		1.3	2	.378		3.25	8	.006
5	.06	0	-	.30	0	-		0.6	0	-		1.50	5	.005
6	.07	1	.068	.35	2	.045		0.7	2	.147		1.75	3	.244
7	.06	0	-	.30	0	-		0.6	0	-		1.50	0	-
8	.07	0	-	.35	0	-		0.7	1	.522		1.75	2	.553
The floor, via the parties, selects groups														
9	.05	0	-	.25	1	.021		0.5	1	.409		1.25	1	-
The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the														
10	.05	1	.049	.25	1	.023		0.5	2	.079		1.25	2	.370
left of the floor median														

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

102nd Congress									
Hypothesis									
		0.01		0.05		0.1		0.25	
		Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	1	.489	1.3	3
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups	.07	0	-	.35	1	.304	0.7	3
4	Parties Select Outliers	.13	0	-	.65	1	.488	1.3	2
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	1
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	.07	0	-	.35	1	.302	0.7	1
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median	.05	1	.049	.25	1	.226	0.5	1
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	.05	1	.049	.25	2	.023	0.5	2
								1.25	3

.414

-

.243

.022

.005

.555

-

.553

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

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Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

101st Congress													
Hypothesis													
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25				
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	1	-
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	1	-
4	Parties Select Outliers	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25	2	-
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	1	.746	1.50	2	.468
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.468	1.75	3	.242
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	0	-
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	3	.100

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

100th Congress													
Hypothesis													
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25				
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25	4	.414
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	1	-
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.519	1.75	3	.243
4	Parties Select Outliers	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	2	.378	3.25	5	.208
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	2	.112	1.50	3	.168
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	2	.555
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	1	-
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	0	-
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	1	.224	0.5	2	.079	1.25	4	.022

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

99th Congress												
Hypothesis												
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25			
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25	1	-
2	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
3	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.519	1.75	1	-
4	.13	0	-	.65	1	.488	1.3	3	.135	3.25	6	.082
5	.06	0	-	.30	1	.268	0.6	2	.112	1.50	4	.036
6	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.520	1.75	2	.555
7	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
8	.07	0	-	.35	1	.300	0.7	2	.148	1.75	2	.553
The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median												
9	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	1	-
The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median												
10	.05	1	.049	.25	1	.224	0.5	2	.079	1.25	3	.100

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

98th Congress									
Hypothesis	0.01			0.05			0.1		
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1 Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	3	.135
2 Democrats Select Representative Groups	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	1	.467
3 Republicans Select Representative Groups	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	2	.150
4 Parties Select Outliers	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-
5 Democrats Select Liberal Outliers	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
6 Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-
7 Democrats Select Conservative Democrats	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
8 Republicans Select Liberal Republicans	.07	0	-	.35	1	-	0.7	1	.522
The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-
The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	1	.224	0.5	2	.079

.414

.243

.468

.553

.016

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

97th Congress											
Hypothesis											
			0.01			0.05			0.1		
			Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups		.13	1	.122	.65	1	.489	1.3	1	-
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups		.06	1	.058	.30	1	.262	0.6	1	.467
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups		.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-
4	Parties Select Outliers		.13	0	-	.65	1	-	1.3	1	-
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers		.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers		.07	0	-	.35	1	-	0.7	1	.520
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats		.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans		.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median		.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median		.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

96th Congress										
Hypothesis										
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25	
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Sig.
1 Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25 2 -
2 Democrats Select Representative Groups	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50 0 -
3 Republicans Select Representative Groups	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.519	1.75 2 .549
4 Parties Select Outliers	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	3	.135	3.25 5 .208
5 Democrats Select Liberal Outliers	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	2	.112	1.50 3 .168
6 Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.520	1.75 2 .555
7 Democrats Select Conservative Democrats	.06	1	.059	.30	1	.265	0.6	1	.468	1.50 1 -
8 Republicans Select Liberal Republicans	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75 0 -
The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25 1 -
The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	.05	1	.049	.25	2	.023	0.5	2	.079	1.25 3 .100

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

95th Congress											
Hypothesis											
			0.01			0.05			0.1		
			Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups		.13	0	-	.65	2	.135	1.3	4	.348
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups		.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	1	.467
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups		.07	0	-	.35	2	.046	0.7	3	.026
4	Parties Select Outliers		.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers		.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers		.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats		.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans		.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median		.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median		.05	1	.049	.25	1	.224	0.5	2	.079
									1.25	4	.016

Table 3.4: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels (Continued)

94th Congress										
Hypothesis										
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25	
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	
1	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3
2	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	2
3	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1
4	.13	0	-	.65	1	.488	1.3	2	.378	6
5	.06	0	-	.30	1	.268	0.6	1	.469	2
6	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.520	4
7	.06	0	-	.30	1	.265	0.6	1	.468	1
8	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	0
The floor, via the parties, selects groups										
9	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	0
The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the										
10	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.408	1
left of the floor median										

Table 3.5: A Summary of Significant Results of Monte Carlo Tests on the Median Ideology of Leadership Groups, 94th through 103rd Congresses

		0.1 Level										
		Number of times that the null hypothesis (random selection) is rejected in favor of the given alternative hypothesis at the .1 level										
Hypothesis:	Congress:	103rd	102nd	101st	100th	99th	98th	97th	96th	95th	94th	Σ
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups											0
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups							2				2
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups			1						2		3
4	Parties Select Outliers			1		1					1	3
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers			1		1						2
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	2									1	3
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats								1			1
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans											0
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median		1	1								2
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	3	4	1	2	3	2		4	3		22

		0.05 Level										
		Number of times that the null hypothesis (random selection) is rejected in favor of the given alternative hypothesis at the .05 level										
Hypothesis:	Congress:	103rd	102nd	101st	100th	99th	98th	97th	96th	95th	94th	Σ
1	Parties Select Representative Leadership Groups											0
2	Democrats Select Representative Groups							1				1
3	Republicans Select Representative Groups			1						2		3
4	Parties Select Outliers			1								1
5	Democrats Select Liberal Outliers			1		1						2
6	Republicans Select Conservative Outliers	1										1
7	Democrats Select Conservative Democrats											0
8	Republicans Select Liberal Republicans											0
9	The floor, via the parties, selects groups representative of the floor median		1	1								2
10	The floor, via the parties, selects groups to the left of the floor median	2	2		1	1	1		2	2		11

By extending the analysis to cover a twenty-year period, it becomes clear that Hypothesis 10 stands head and shoulders above all others. Recall that Hypothesis 10 states that the floor median, as a member of the majority party, will select leadership cadres shifted away from the floor median toward the majority party's ideological median, the left in this case.

Clearly, the hybrid theory is borne out by the tests of these hypotheses. At the $\alpha=.05$ level, the null is rejected in favor of the tenth hypothesis eleven times. The next closest competitor is able to reject the null only three times. The results demonstrate that a tension exists between the floor median and the majority party median. In a legislative setting without any partisan constraints, the floor median does decide outcomes in a majority rule institution (Black 1958). However, because the floor median conducts his affairs as a member of the majority party, and his party controls his committee assignments, his legislative lifeblood, he is forced to defer to his fellow partisans to some degree. His “true” preferences as floor median are “revealed” with an eye to his party's caucus median. *The result is that the leadership of the floor is over-representative of the majority party.*

According to the new literature on parties, members create leadership groups which lead passively. That is, procedures exist such that the rank and file can create a leadership body that is representative of it; the leaders do not often engage in legislative arm twisting (Rohde 1991). The party leaders accomplish party goals by structuring the committee system so that it is representative of the caucus as a whole (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). When leaders do act, they work to solve collective action problems; they take the caucus where it wants to go, but to where it cannot get without a central co-

ordinating authority (Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993). These findings also support the earlier musings of Truman (1959):

One would expect that a Leader who accepted any degree of responsibility for the substantive actions of the party would almost certainly be a middleman, not only in the sense of a negotiator but also in the literal structural sense. One would not expect that he could attract the support necessary for election unless his voting record placed him somewhere near the center in an evenly divided party, and one would not expect him to be effective in his role unless he continued to avoid identification with one of the extreme groups within his nominal following (Truman 1959, 106 as quoted in Keiweit and McCubbins 1991, 49).

The preceding analysis generally supports the new literature on parties. In the final analysis, the ideological composition of the leadership cadre is a “compromise” – a middle way that is a product of both the majority caucus and floor median's preferences.

The Homogeneity of the Leadership Cadres

Having examined the central tendency of the ideological preferences of the House leadership, we are now led to another question. How tightly knit are the leaders? The ideology of the median leader is the product of both the caucus and floor medians, as demonstrated. Are the other members of the leadership cadre selected so that they will be much like the cadre's median, or are they chosen in order to create a leadership cadre with a wide ideological range? Is the leadership cadre ideologically homogeneous or heterogeneous? The three major theories of congressional organization again allow us to derive hypotheses concerning leadership homogeneity.

The gains-from-exchange school argues that members select their committee assignments because they are similar in their high demand of a given policy. That is, it implies *homogeneous* high demanders rather than heterogeneous groups. Members, having

self-selected onto a committee because of their similar high demand of a particular policy, are more alike than different. Applying this logic to the selection of party leaders, we would hypothesize that leadership will be more homogeneous in its ideological makeup than we would expect from chance alone.

Informational and party representative theories, on the other hand, both predict that *heterogeneous* sub-groups will be chosen. Krehbiel (1991, 84), the foremost representative of informational theorists, is a proponent of what he calls the “heterogeneity principle,” namely, that “committee specialists from opposite sides of a policy spectrum are collectively more informative than specialists from only one side of the spectrum.”

He goes on to state:

the underlying logic is simple. Two informed opinions are better than one, especially when the informants are natural adversaries. In one respect, this is simply an extension of the old saw “Politics makes strange bedfellows.” (Krehbiel 1991, 84).

The same view is put forward by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), whose theoretical focus is on caucus representation. Drawing on Masters (1961) and Plott (1982), Kiewiet and McCubbins state:

in the case of major committees such as Appropriations, the congressional parties seek to replicate the entire distribution of policy preferences in the caucus. Doing so helps to keep “peace in the family,” as it allows caucus members across the entire ideological spectrum to infer that their views are fairly represented in committee (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 93).

Hence, we are left with two units of analysis (the floor and the caucuses) and rationales for both heterogeneous and homogeneous sub-groups. After adding specific hypotheses regarding the Democrats and Republicans, we have eight hypotheses which can be tested.

1. Parties (in general) select homogeneous leadership groups
2. Democrats select homogeneous leadership groups
3. Republicans select homogeneous leadership groups
4. Parties (in general) select heterogeneous leadership groups
5. Democrats select heterogeneous leadership groups
6. Republicans select heterogeneous leadership groups
7. The floor, under the constraints of partisan identification,³¹ selects homogeneous leadership groups
8. The floor, under the constraints of partisan identification, selects heterogeneous leadership groups

Monte Carlo Tests of Homogeneity

To test the propositions listed above, we return to the Monte Carlo design. The same procedure detailed above is used, but the relevant statistic is the *standard deviation* of the committee's Nominate scores, rather than the median. The standard deviation of the ideological scores of members of the actual group is calculated. Fifteen-thousand randomly-generated groups are then created, and the standard deviation of the ideology scores of each group is calculated. The score of the actual group is ranked among the hypothetical groups. Table 3.6 displays the results for the 103rd Congress at our four test levels. For example, the Democratic leadership had a ranking of .239, meaning that 23.9% of the hypothetical groups were more ideologically homogeneous than the actual groups, and 76.1% were more ideologically heterogeneous. Note that the Republican

³¹ As discussed above, we assume that House members may only choose leaders from within their respective caucuses.

leadership could not have been more ideologically similar: their rank of 0.000 indicates that not one of the fifteen-thousand hypothetical groups was more tightly packed. Table 3.7 displays the expected and actual values, as well as the significance levels (derived according to the significance test procedure detailed above) for each of the hypothesis tests, over the twenty year period of the study. Table 3.8 summarizes the tests, showing the total number of times that the null hypothesis was rejected in favor of a given alternative at both the .05 and .10 levels.

After consideration of table 3.8, it is quite clear that congressional parties follow the pattern of homogeneity predicted by the gains from exchange school. The House members elected to leadership positions are all quite similar to one another ideologically. Especially noteworthy is the Democrats pattern (Hypothesis 2): at the .05 level, the null is rejected at least once in every Congress, and by the 103rd it has been rejected at three of the four test levels. A similar pattern is seen at the .10 level.

In many ways this is quite surprising. In testing propositions regarding the ideological medians of the leadership cadre, we found that the best predictive power was found by hybridizing the informational and party-representation theories, both of which focus on the parent groups' efforts to create sub-groups which are microcosms of itself. The result was that the ideological composition of the leaders fell somewhere between the majority party median and the floor median. In this investigation of the leadership's ideological homogeneity, we find that the informational and party-representation theories offer little predictive power relative to the theory of homogeneous groups. The gains from exchange theory fares much better. These findings are even more surprising given that the gains from exchange school never really applied the theory of homogeneous

Table 3.6: Monte Carlo Test Results at Four Various Test Criteria: The Standard Deviations of Ideolog Scores of Actual Leadership Groups Ranked within a Set of 15,000 Randomly-Created Leadership Groups, 103rd Congress

Group	rank	Test Level			
		0.01	0.05	0.1	0.25
Leadership (Democrats)	.239				Homogeneous
Steering and Policy (Democrats)	.038		Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Appropriations (Democrats)	.006	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Budget (Democrats)	.827				Heterogeneous
Rules (Democrats)	.051			Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Ways and Means (Democrats)	.510				
Leadership (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Committee on Committees (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Policy (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Appropriations (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Budget (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Rules (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Ways and Means (Republicans)	.000	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous	Homogeneous
Leadership (Floor)	.995	Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous	Heterogeneous
Appropriations (Floor)	.229				Homogeneous
Budget (Floor)	.322				
Rules (Floor)	.748				
Ways and Means (Floor)	.877				Heterogeneous

subgroups to the leadership; parties were simply unimportant. Given what is known about parties in the post-reform House, the expectation has been that the caucuses would select a diverse leadership which would be balanced on the whole, yet would provide a range of opinion by being spread out. This is not found to be the case, however.

Table 3.7: Significance Tests of Monte Carlo Results at Four Various Test Levels: The Standard Deviation of Ideology Scores of Actual Leadership Groups Ranked within a Set of 15,000 Randomly-Created Leadership Groups, 94th - 103rd Congresses

103rd Congress												
Hypothesis												
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25			
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	.13	.08	.0000	.65	9	.0000	1.3	10	.0000	3.25	11	.0000
2	.06	1	.058	.30	2	.031	0.6	3	.015	1.50	4	.035
3	.07	7	.0000	.35	7	.0000	0.7	7	.0000	1.75	7	.0000
4	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	1	-
5	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	1	-
6	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
7	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	1	-
8	.05	1	.049	.25	1	.227	0.5	1	.410	1.25	2	.367
102nd Congress												
Hypothesis												
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25			
	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	.13	.08	.0000	.65	9	.0000	1.3	10	.0000	3.25	10	.0000
2	.06	1	.058	.30	2	.031	0.6	3	.015	1.50	3	.170
3	.07	7	.0000	.35	7	.0000	0.7	7	.0000	1.75	7	.0000
4	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	1	-
5	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	1	-
6	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
7	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	1	-
8	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	2	.367

Table 3.7: Results of Monte Carlo Tests of Alternative Hypotheses, Standard Deviations (continued)

99th Congress		0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25		
Hypothesis		Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Homogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	1	.489	1.3	3	.135	3.25	3	-
2	Democrats Select Homogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	1	.262	0.6	3	.015	1.50	3	.170
3	Republicans Select Homogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
4	Parties Select Heterogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	1	.122	.65	1	.489	1.3	1	-	3.25	1	-
5	Democrats Select Heterogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
6	Republicans Select Heterogeneous LGs	.07	1	.067	.35	1	.304	0.7	1	.519	1.75	1	-
7	The Floor, via parties, selects Homogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	1	.226	0.5	1	.409	1.25	1	-
8	The Floor, via parties, selects Heterogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.410	1.25	3	.104
98th Congress		0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25		
Hypothesis		Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Homogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	1	.489	1.3	4	.348	3.25	8	.006
2	Democrats Select Homogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	3	.015	1.50	5	.004
3	Republicans Select Homogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	1	.304	0.7	1	.519	1.75	3	.243
4	Parties Select Heterogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	1	-
5	Democrats Select Heterogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
6	Republicans Select Heterogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	1	-
7	The Floor, via parties, selects Homogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.409	1.25	1	-
8	The Floor, via parties, selects Heterogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.410	1.25	2	.367

Table 3.7: Results of Monte Carlo Tests of Alternative Hypotheses, Standard Deviations (continued)

97th Congress										
Hypothesis										
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25	
Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual
1	.13	.000	.65	7	.000	1.3	9	.000	3.25	11
2	.06	-	.30	0	-	0.6	2	.116	1.50	4
3	.07	.000	.35	7	.000	0.7	7	.000	1.75	7
4	.13	0	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	0
5	.06	0	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0
6	.07	0	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0
7	.05	0	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	1
8	.05	0	.25	0	-	0.5	0	-	1.25	1
96th Congress										
Hypothesis										
0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25	
Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual
1	.13	0	.65	1	.489	1.3	2	.377	3.25	4
2	.06	0	.30	1	.262	0.6	2	.116	1.50	4
3	.07	0	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0
4	.13	1	.65	3	.025	1.3	3	.135	3.25	4
5	.06	0	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	1
6	.07	1	.35	3	.004	0.7	3	.026	1.75	3
7	.05	0	.25	0	-	0.5	2	.080	1.25	2
8	.05	0	.25	1	.227	0.5	2	.080	1.25	3

Table 3.7: Results of Monte Carlo Tests of Alternative Hypotheses, Standard Deviations (continued)

95th Congress													
Hypothesis		0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25		
		Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Homogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25	7	.024
2	Democrats Select Homogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	1	.467	1.50	4	.035
3	Republicans Select Homogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	3	.243
4	Parties Select Heterogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	0	-	3.25	0	-
5	Democrats Select Heterogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	0	-
6	Republicans Select Heterogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
7	The Floor, via parties, selects Homogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.409	1.25	1	-
8	The Floor, via parties, selects Heterogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	1	.227	0.5	1	.410	1.25	2	.367

94th Congress													
Hypothesis		0.01			0.05			0.1			0.25		
		Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.	Exp.	Actual	Sig.
1	Parties Select Homogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	0	-	1.3	1	-	3.25	4	.414
2	Democrats Select Homogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	0	-	0.6	0	-	1.50	4	.035
3	Republicans Select Homogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	1	.519	1.75	0	-
4	Parties Select Heterogeneous Leadership Groups	.13	0	-	.65	1	.489	1.3	1	-	3.25	2	-
5	Democrats Select Heterogeneous LGs	.06	0	-	.30	1	.262	0.6	1	.467	1.50	2	.465
6	Republicans Select Heterogeneous LGs	.07	0	-	.35	0	-	0.7	0	-	1.75	0	-
7	The Floor, via parties, selects Homogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	0	-	0.5	1	.409	1.25	1	-
8	The Floor, via parties, selects Heterogeneous LGs	.05	0	-	.25	1	.227	0.5	2	.080	1.25	3	.104

Table 3.8: A Summary of Significant Results of Monte Carlo Tests on the Standard Deviation of Ideology Scores of Leadership Groups, 94th through 103rd Congresses

		0.1 Level										
		Number of times that the null hypothesis (random selection) is rejected in favor of the given alternative hypothesis at the .1 level										
Hypothesis:	Congress:	103rd	102nd	101st	100th	99th	98th	97th	96th	95th	94th	Σ
1	Parties Select Homogeneous Leadership Groups	4	4	1	1		1	4		1		16
2	Democrats Select Homogeneous LGs	4	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	19
3	Republicans Select Homogeneous LGs	4	4						4			12
4	Parties Select Moderately-Spread Leadership Groups											0
5	Democrats Select M-S LGs											0
6	Republicans Select M-S LGs										1	1
7	Parties Select Heterogeneous Leadership Groups				2				1			3
8	Democrats Select Heterogeneous LGs											0
9	Republicans Select Heterogeneous LGs				3	1			3			7
10	The Floor, via parties, selects Homog's LGs								1			1
11	The Floor, via parties, selects M-S LGs						1					1
12	The Floor, via parties, selects Heterog's LGs	1							1		1	3

[illegible]

Conclusions

Given the findings of this chapter, it is apparent that the parties have taken an empirically clear but theoretically unexpected course. According to the new party literature, the power of the leadership has been increased by the rank and file, but the caucus has taken steps to ensure that the leadership is representative. For the most part, the leadership is inactive; it only comes to life when there is widespread agreement on an issue within the caucus. This is the essence of Rohde's *conditional party government*, as well as the legislative leviathan of Cox and McCubbins. Our findings indicate that the parties do indeed select rather representative groups. However, the parties want leaders who are unified when action is called for. If the conditions are such that unified party action is actually necessary, the caucus wants a leadership cadre that represents it, but has little chance of being divided within itself. In short, when the action of the leviathan is called for, it cannot be paralyzed by internal division.

Having a better understanding of how party leaders are selected, we can now turn to an investigation of how substantive policy of the four types are made. We will be able to determine when this representative, unified, and generally dormant leadership body comes into play.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLICY PERSPECTIVE AND FLOOR VOTING

In the previous chapter we saw that parties create leadership groups that are representative of the party's median and ideologically homogeneous. The creation of party leadership groups is a fundamental constituent policy. In this chapter we examine whether this representative, tightly-knit group actually has an effect during the policy-making process. We also turn our attention to the creation of another type of leadership group, the House committees, and to the subsequent creation of substantive policy within the four theoretical types constructed by Lowi.

Drawing directly from Lowi's thesis presented in Chapter 2, our central argument is that each type of policy has its own type of politics. In this case, differences in politics can be observed in different patterns of floor voting across policy types. Specifically, when dealing with each type of policy, members of Congress are subjected to pressures from the committees, the parties, their ideology, and narrow, district-specific interests – the four major voting influences shown in Figure 2.3. The relative weight or strength of each of these influences predictably varies across policy types.

In this chapter we draw from the literature on Congress and policy reviewed in Chapter 2, and generate specific, testable hypotheses regarding committee composition and floor voting in each of the policy areas. We then use logistic regression analysis to test the hypotheses, and draw conclusions regarding the policy perspective. Our central question is: How do voting influences affect House members, and how do these influ-

ences vary by policy type? The empirical approach is to create a general model of floor voting which can be used to test alternative hypotheses. We will apply the model to actual floor votes of the four different policy types. If the theory is correct, the relative strength of the independent variables within the model will vary by policy type.

Floor Voting From Various Theoretical Perspectives

The general model of floor voting that will be used for analysis in this work is derived from Kingdon's, as shown in Figure 2.3. In sum, floor votes are the product of four major forces at work in the House: committees, parties, individuals' ideologies, and members' narrow, district-specific interests. The theories of legislative organization and behavior discussed in Chapter 2 yield different predictions regarding the weight of each of the major determinants. According to the policy perspective, the accuracy of the predictions made by the major theoretical frameworks developed over the last forty years is contingent upon the type of policy under consideration. In the following pages we detail the expected findings of our empirical analysis with regard to competing legislative theories. We begin with an examination of the expected findings in light of the distributive, informational, and partisan theories of Congress, noting the expected influence of each of the major independent variables. We then turn our attention to the policy perspective, examining the influence of each voting determinant with regard to the various policy types.

Committees

We take the creation of the party leadership cadre as one of the most fundamental and important constituent policies; hence, the entire preceding chapter was dedicated to

the subject. In this chapter we examine the creation of another important piece of the legislative machine, the House committees. We ask *does the voting behavior of committee members differ from that of non-committee members*, and *how do non-committee members take voting cues from committee members?*

Since the appearance of Shepsle's *Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (1978), a great deal of research on legislatures has focused on the composition of committees and subcommittees.³² The representativeness of committees has been studied in several ways. Are they geographically representative? Are they ideologically representative? Are they representative in terms of their interests in their particular policy domain? Are party contingents on committees microcosms of the party as a whole, or are they different?

As described in Chapter 2, the distributive theory predicts committees stocked with self-selecting preference outliers. The floor takes a very simple voting signal from committee members and responds to the signal in a very simple way: *find out what the committee wants, and give it to them*. Members of the floor defer to high-demanding committee members. In return, they receive deference on matters that are of greatest importance to themselves and their districts. Informational theorists, on the other hand, argue that committees are not stacked with high demanders, but are much more representative of the floor as a whole. Floor members defer to committees, but not because they

³² See, for example, Benson 1981, 1983; Cowart 1981; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989a; Groseclose 1994; Hall and Grofmann 1990; Krehbiel 1990, 1991, 1994; Londregren and Snyder 1994; Smith and Deering 1984; Overby and Kanzee 2000; Peterson and Wrighton 1998; Snyder 1992. Previous to Shepsle, Fenno (1966, esp. chapters 2 and 3) studied the composition of the Appropriations Committee, and examined the committee's relationship to the parent chamber. Nevertheless, credit can probably be attributed to Shepsle for formalizing the question in terms of outlying preferences, and for sparking the wave of literature that followed in the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s.

wish to satisfy the committee's preferences in a game of logrolling. Deference in this case is deference to expertise; the policy specialists on the committees have the best information. Their signals can be taken as sincere without too much worry, for the committees have been created to reflect the floor's preferences. Finally, the partisan view holds that the majority party creates committee delegations representative of the party. Floor voters defer to the committee's expertise in an attempt to govern well, improve the party's reputation, and retain the reins of power in national government. Committees are not composed of outliers since party leaders have carefully structured them to be representative of the party as a whole. Mixed empirical evidence has been found to support each argument.

The Study of Committees and the Policy Perspective. Because the theoretical approach of our study is different from that of previous researchers, we cannot examine the composition of committees in quite the same way. For example, others have looked at the composition of the Agriculture Committee to determine if there are regional biases, ideological biases, or biases in terms of votes on agricultural policy. Of course, we argue that it is a policy's type rather than its topic that is of greater importance. Unfortunately, Congress has not been so kind as to organize itself around these types; as it turns out, there is no "Committee on Redistribution," no "Committee for Regulation." Furthermore, we cannot look at a single committee and expect to find a general pattern. If Lowi's theory is correct, a committee will behave differently when making distributive policy than when making regulatory policy. It is possible (and expected) that a single committee will contain preference outliers in one policy domain but not in another.

Because of our theoretical stance, the examination of the composition of committees necessarily will be more indirect than that of previous research. The approach is to examine the effect of committee membership when voting on the floor; tests of committee composition will be built into the general models of roll call voting. Like many others,³³ we ask, *is being a member of a referent committee associated with behaving differently than other members of the House when voting on the floor?*³⁴ If committee membership is a significant variable in the general model of floor voting, we will have evidence that committee members are indeed different than the rest of the floor.

We also examine the influence that committee members have on floor voters.³⁵ How does the floor take committee signals? Do they simply defer to the wishes of the committee? Or do they discount the votes of the committee membership based on ideology and their own narrow, district-specific interests? Again we argue that variance in committee signal-taking is dependent on the type of policy in question. If the votes of non-committee members can be predicted by their ideological or narrow-interest deviation from the committee median, then it can be concluded that committee-member to floor-member cue-taking is occurring.

³³ See Cowart 1981; Benson 1981, 1983; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989a; Groseclose 1994; Hall and Grofman 1990; Krehbiel 1990, 1991, 1994; Londregren and Snyder 1994; Shepsle 1978; Snyder 1992.

³⁴ Unlike others, we ask this question with respect to the policy typology.

³⁵ See Austen-Smith and Riker 1987, 1990a, b; Banks 1990, 1991; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989a; Krehbiel 1991, 1994; Snyder 1992.

From the theoretical positions summarized above, several null and alternative hypotheses can be derived regarding the voting behavior of committee members and the manner in which floor members take signals from them.

- 1_n Committee members are not different than floor members; hence committee membership will not be a significant variable in the general model of floor voting.
- 1_a Committee members are preference outliers; therefore committee membership will be a significant variable in the general model of floor voting.
- 2_n Floor members do not take any voting cues or signals from committee members
- 2_{a1} Floor members look to committee members for signals on how to vote; these signals are taken with respect to differences in the ideology of floor and committee members.
- 2_{a2} Floor members look to committee members for signals on how to vote; these signals are taken with respect to differences in the narrow, district-specific interests of floor and committee members.

Party

Like our investigation of committees, an investigation of parties must consider two questions: *How are partisan leadership groups formed*, and *how do floor members use the signals that party leaders send?* The answer to the first question was provided by Chapter 3. In this chapter we examine how the floor takes voting signals from their party leaders.

According to distributive theories of Congress, parties are mere collections of like-minded individuals. Party leaders are essentially powerless to change the voting behavior of the rank and file. The appearance of party unity is not the product of an organization which imposes legislative uniformity, but rather the coincidence of members of the legislature with similar interests marching under the same symbolic banner. The informa-

tional theorists take a very similar stance: parties are non-influential in the policy making process.

Partisan theorists, on the other hand, argue that party is a potentially powerful factor. Partisan theory implies that when casting floor votes, partisans will look to the votes of the leadership cadre. Party leaders may have less policy-specific information than the members of the referent committees, but the leadership cadre is concerned with the common good of the party and metes out rewards and punishments to keep the rank and file toeing the party line. This process of partisan cue taking creates “good” legislation, that which improves a party’s reputation for good government on the national stage. This national reputation is vital for it is the electorate’s chief cue at the ballot box. Without a national reputation for good government, the majority will lose its hold in power.

Hence, we derive the null hypothesis regarding signals taken from the leadership cadre from the distributive and informational theories. The alternative is derived from the partisan school of thought:

3_n Floor members’ votes are not influenced by the party’s leadership cadre.

3_a Floor members’ votes are influenced by the party’s leadership cadre.

Ideology and Narrow Interests

Unlike committees and parties, House members’ ideological positions and narrow interests are not products created within the House. That is, these factors are not objects of institutional choice, but are instead taken as given. Members of Congress arrive in Washington with well-defined ideologies and district-specific interests. (It is assumed that their ideological stances and positions on narrow, district-specific issues are in line with the voters of their districts. If they are not in accord, they will be weeded out at the

ballot box in short order.) While these variables are not objects of institutional choice, they are clearly important factors in voting decisions, and as such, are variables for which we must control.

In many ways, the literature on Congress treats narrow interests and ideology in much the same fashion: a preference is a preference, whether it is held to satisfy a specific constituency or because it fits within a larger framework of political beliefs. It is widely held that if general ideology and narrow preferences are in conflict, we can expect that district-specific preferences will win out.³⁶ Nevertheless, ideology is a good predictor of a legislator's behavior when his district is not directly affected by the specific policy content of a motion.

Congressional theory is fairly straightforward on the role of ideology and narrow interests, or, taken collectively, legislator preferences: legislators act to maximize their preferences. What a legislator prefers ultimately is a function of what keeps a winning electoral coalition together back in the home district. If ideology and a specific interest collide, the specific interest will dominate, as noted above.

In our model we control for ideology and district-specific interests, and hypothesize that:

- 4_n Legislators are not affected by ideological considerations when voting on the floor

³⁶ For example, the representative of a rural district may consistently take positions of social conservatism and minimal government intervention in the economy. But he might deviate from his general pattern on questions of farm subsidies, deciding that government support of corn, cotton, or the like is completely justifiable. This position does not fit with his overall ideology of minimal economic intervention, but it makes perfect sense given the preferences of his district's voters. A concrete example of this situation, albeit from the Senate, is Jesse Helms's support of tobacco subsidies, but opposition to the regulation of personal behavior with regard to smoking.

- 4_a A legislator's ideology is a determinant of his or her floor votes
- 5_n Legislators are not affected by the narrow, district-specific concerns of their constituents.
- 5_a Legislators are influenced by the narrow, district-specific concerns of their constituents.

For convenience, the hypotheses to be tested are redisplayed in Table 4.1. The predictions of each theory are summarized in Table 4.2.

Floor Voting From the Policy Perspective

Unlike other theories of Congress, the policy perspective states that the importance of voting determinants will vary by the type of policy under consideration. In general, we model roll call votes as the product of four major influences. When voting, legislators need information about the policy content of the motion. Committee members have that information. The floor uses the votes of committee members as one of its voting cues. However, floor members do not accept committee signals unconditionally; they weigh the signals according to considerations of ideology and narrow interests.³⁷

³⁷ A very liberal floor member will not accept the recommendations of committee experts if she knows that all of these experts are extremely conservative on all other issues, or have districts with narrow interests that are different from or diametrically opposed to her own. Hence, floor members discount the voting signals sent by committees according to the committee's deviation from their own ideology and narrow interests.

Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses to be Tested

- | | |
|-----------------------|--|
| 1_n | Committee members are not different than floor members; hence committee membership will not be a significant variable in the general model of floor voting. |
| 1_a | Committee members are preference outliers; therefore committee membership will be a significant variable in the general model of floor voting. |
| 2_n | Floor members do not take any voting cues or signals from committee members |
| 2_{a1} | Floor members look to committee members for signals on how to vote; these signals are taken with respect to differences in the ideology of floor and committee members. |
| 2_{a2} | Floor members look to committee members for signals on how to vote; these signals are taken with respect to differences in the narrow, district-specific interests of floor and committee members. |
| 3_n | Floor members' votes are not influenced by the party's leadership cadre. |
| 3_a | Floor members' votes are influenced by the party's leadership cadre. |
| 4_n | Legislators are not affected by ideological considerations when voting on the floor |
| 4_a | A legislator's ideology is a determinant of his or her floor votes |
| 5_n | Legislators are not affected by the narrow, district-specific concerns of their constituents. |
| 5_a | Legislators are influenced by the narrow, district-specific concerns of their constituents. |
-

Table 4.2: Summary of Theoretical Predictions of the Voting Model

Theory: Distributive Determinant:		Informational	Partisan
Committees	Individual floor members defer to self-selecting high demanders on committees. Floor voting is an endless series of logrolls.	Voting cues from committee members taken safely by the floor since the committee was created to gain expertise while reflecting the floor median's preferences.	Voting cues from committee members taken safely since the committee was created to reflect the majority party median's preferences
Party	Not relevant as an organization. Any appearance of concerted party action is a by-product of similar members from similar districts with similar preferences marching under a common, symbolic party banner.	Not relevant as an organization. Any appearance of concerted party action is a by-product of similar members from similar districts with similar preferences marching under a common, symbolic party banner.	Important role in creating the committees. On the floor, acts as central coordinating mechanism (i.e., a "Leviathan"), but only when necessary. Leaders use rewards and punishments (i.e., committee assignments) to ensure compliance among the party rank and file on issues which the party has a national reputation. Party governs
Ideology	A proxy for views held over a wide range of topics. The views themselves are in accord with those of members' winning electoral coalitions.	Moderate ideological outcomes are ensured by the majoritarian postulate and the resulting committee system which is designed to satisfy the median voter's preference.	Extreme ideological outcomes kept in check by Leviathan/Conditional Party Government which works to satisfy the majority party's median voter.
Narrow Interests	Individual members pursue pork-barrel projects for district. Extreme policy outcomes are not kept in check, each member gets an extreme amount of what matters to him. The overall result is that government over-distributes everything.	Extreme outcomes on narrow interests are kept in check by majoritarian postulate and the resulting committee system which is designed to satisfy the median voter's preferences.	Extreme outcomes on narrow interests (i.e., boondoggles) are kept in check by the Leviathan/Conditional Party government. Majority party leadership thereby enhances the majority party's national reputation for good government, which is each member's best asset at the polls.

Party leaders also send signals about floor motions; these signals, like the signals sent by committee members, must also be weighted by the rank and file. Finally, legislators' own ideology and narrow interests influence their votes. Our research strategy is to create a general model of roll call voting, and to apply it to votes of the various types. In so doing we will determine the differences in the strength of our major influences as we move from one policy arena to the next.

Constituent Policy

Several political actions can be considered constituent policy.³⁸ As noted above, Lowi (1972) uses electoral apportionment, propaganda campaigns, and the creation of new agencies as examples. The initial formation of a nation's constitution can also be considered constituent policy, as can decisions to expand the franchise (the Twenty-Sixth Amendment) and power struggles between the branches of government (such as the War Powers Act). We take the formation of party leadership cadres and committees to be constituent policy.

It is interesting to note that while this policy type may seem to be the most fundamental, it has received the least amount of investigation in previous research. Lowi's 1972 study, the work which creates the full typology, gives almost no attention to the constituent type and focuses on the other three almost exclusively. Other works which

³⁸ Recall from Chapter 2 that the name has should not be confused with what others have called constituent politics: legislators acting to provide benefits to their constituents. In this case, the name that Lowi ascribes to these policies is derived from the fact that the policies "constitute" the state's framework and create the arena in which other political actions are carried out.

have used policy typologies similar to or derived from Lowi's (e.g., Ripley and Franklin 1991) have not examined this type at all. Perhaps the reason for this is that few congressional policies fall under this type (Lowi 1972, 309). It is also interesting to note that according to Lowi's argument (1972, 309), strong, programmatic parties (the type we are not likely to see in Congress but which are found more frequently in parliaments) are associated with constituent policy.

Both of these points bear further elaboration. First, Lowi contends that few policies fall into the constituent type, and as noted above, neither his 1964 nor his 1972 work (nor the work of other scholars working with the typology) take up constituent policy as an object of analysis. Perhaps this *is* because few policies fall into this type, as his 1972 work contends; however, it should be noted that no difficulty was encountered in finding constituent policies to examine for this analysis. They simply do not seem that uncommon.

Second, Lowi argues that constituent policy will be associated with strong parties (Lowi 1972, 309). His meaning is not entirely clear however. His only statement on the matter is rather cryptic:

Finally, if we wished to introduce strong national parties into our system, we might try to pursue more goals through constituent policies – like effective propaganda in the birth control field, or dealing with monopolies by changing the rules protecting their limited liability rather than by adding regulations affecting their conduct.

This statement is ambiguous in terms of the direction of the arrow of causality: will strong national parties (should we wish to introduce them) make it possible for us to pursue more goals through constituent policy? Or should we instead interpret the statement to mean that by trying to pursue more goals through constituent policy we could realize

the wish of strong national parties? In either case, two things are clear. Lowi believes that there is a correlation between strong parties and constituent policy, and that the US has neither strong parties nor abundant constituent policy.

To avoid belaboring the point, we will simply state that when examining the making of constituent policies, we expect, as Lowi seems to indicate, that *party will be the dominant factor*.³⁹ This also meshes well with the Cox-McCubbins thesis. That is, when building the “state within the state,” majority partisans will want to create structures that secure their hold on power. They aim to create structures and rules that make them effective policy makers in the long run, which, in turn, improve the electoral fortunes of those wearing the party label. Members near the ideological edges of the party may have reason to defect from the caucus. Nevertheless, the bulk of the party (i.e., the party median) wants a united caucus which makes effective policy and governmental structures, which ultimately enhances the possibility of reelection for individuals under the party banner. Party leaders become active as behavior coordinators in order to facilitate the creation of effective governing structures.

What is not theoretically clear, however, is that within this policy type, holding a seat on a committee will be associated with behavior that is different than that of the average floor voter. Distributive theorists argue that committees will be stocked with high demanders. It is not entirely clear what a high demander of constituent policy would be (someone who wants more good government?); it is therefore difficult to make an argu-

³⁹ Perhaps the confusion is ultimately resolved by the conclusion that is reached by the end of the analysis: parties in Congress are actually stronger than many have given them credit for being; however, they do not continually flex their muscle, but rather they use their strength judiciously.

ment that such high demanders are able to self-select committee positions in order to make constituent policy, or that the floor could defer to them.

Second, there is no reason for the floor to allow unrepresentative members to formulate unrepresentative policy given that all members will be affected by it. The logic of distributive theory is that for each vote, only a fairly narrow subset cares about it deeply. Hence, the others allow them to have their way. Constituent policy is much more general, and, by definition, affects all members. For this reason, *it is impossible to identify a narrow, district-specific interest that can be associated with votes on constituent policy.* Hence, the empirical model of floor votes on constituent policy does not contain a measure of narrow, district-specific policy preferences.⁴⁰

We expect that party will be the driving force in the creation of constituent policy. Additionally, ideology should be an important determinant of votes of this type as well, because ideology is, in large part, a view on the proper scope and operation of the state: liberals will favor a state with an extensive capacity to intervene in economic matters, but will want to limit the state's power to regulate individual behaviors. Conversely, conservatives will act to limit the state's role in the economy, but will be willing to expand the state in order to preserve the social fabric of society. Many constituent policies are ideo-

⁴⁰ Unlike the other three types of policy, narrow interests do not play a part in the making of constituent policy, or, more accurately, there is no other narrow interest outside of party and ideology. In this analysis we measure a representative's narrow interest by using scorecard ratings from various interest groups. It is tempting to use a rating from a "good government" group to measure a representative's preferences on the constitution of the state. This is, however untenable for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Interest groups that produce ratings on such legislation are merely stating what they think good government is. In practice, good government ratings are virtually synonymous with ideology scores. If at some point the Philosopher Kings begin to rate members of the House, (cont'd.)

logically charged; we expect ideology to be a major determinant of votes on constituent issues.

Distributive Policy

Distributive policy and its variants. Distributive policy is generally thought of as classic “pork barrel” legislation. Well-known examples have included river and harbor improvement and construction, and agricultural price subsidies. Upon reflection, we find that there are actually three sub-types or levels of distributive policy, which warrant further discussion at this point.

The first sub-type, which includes the two examples given above, has very low costs (relative to the entire budget), benefits which are extremely narrowly distributed, and unimportant to most legislators, but *very* important to members whose districts have an interest in a given bit of pork. The second sub-type of distributive policy has somewhat higher costs, has short-term benefits which are highly concentrated (but long-term benefits which are potentially more widespread), and has the potential to generate some disagreement among legislators. An example of this kind of policy is funding for a national study of back injuries. Suppose a House member has a hospital or university in his district that will receive funding for back injury studies: he may have *immediate* incentives to pursue the creation of such a policy. Other members’ districts may not receive any of the funding, but the members are certainly not opposed to a reduction of back injuries – after all, we will all be better off if the research proves to be successful. Still,

we will employ their scores; until that time, we can only pare our explanatory model of constituent policy down to three major factors: parties, committees, and ideology.

there is room for opposition to such a policy. For example, a fiscal conservative may believe that this is a problem which could be handled by the market; a pharmaceutical company or a private research group could conduct the research without government help. Other things being equal, such a fiscal conservative might vote against the measure. But other things are rarely equal, and in order to achieve some other substantively-unrelated policy goal through logrolling, a conservative might consider the cost of the program inconsequential, and trade his vote for some other motion about which he deeply cares.

The third type of distributive policy has very high costs, but provides benefits that are so general and popular that almost no members of Congress take positions against them. Examples include veterans' benefits, and the basic concept of social security for retirees.

By breaking distributive policy into three subtypes, we can narrow our focus and gain analytic purchase. The first sub-type of policy is made through such idiosyncratic logrolls that it is resistant to systematic analysis. On the other hand, the third sub-type needs no analysis: there is nearly unanimity among legislators. It is the second sub-type that is most interesting, because both the costs and benefits are of moderate size. Each member must make political judgments about the value of the policy: she may sincerely favor it, sincerely oppose it, or be indifferent to it, and decide to trade the vote for something she really cares about. Hence, our analysis concentrates exclusively on the second level of distributive policy.⁴¹

⁴¹ A similar breakdown of distributive policy can be seen in Rhode (1991, 32-33). The first level is "commemorative legislation (e.g., bills designating 'National Milk Week' and other similar national observances,...)" (1991, 32). The second "deals with relatively low-cost distributive programs, which provide benefits to a limited number of districts ... (*cont'd.*)"

Distributive Policy and Narrow Interests. Given its moniker, as well as the underlying logic of the policy type, distributive policy should be best explained by distributive theories of legislatures. In general, we expect the distributive arguments of Mayhew, Shepsle, Weingast, Marshall, Baron, Ferejohn, and others to go a long way in explaining distributive policy. Informational and partisan theories, it would seem, are less well-suited to handle distribution.

The well-known argument of the distributive theory is that members with an interest in a particular policy will try to exert as much influence as possible in the creation of relevant laws. Committees are structured to give interested influence, and votes are traded so that everyone gets what he or she wants. Informational and partisan theorists take issue: why will the median voter allow committees populated with narrowly self-interested members to formulate policy, and then ratify this inefficient legislation with his vote? There is every reason to think that he will not want to over-distribute. The median voter therefore uses procedures and structures committees so that committees produce legislation which deviates from majority preferences only minimally. Legislators vote sincerely to make good policy.

without being so extensive as to damage anyone else's interests" (1991, 32). The third "involves programs that affect large numbers of politically active constituents residing in all districts. Examples include veteran's legislation and Social Security benefits. Virtually all members care a lot about such bills, but they are not likely to involve partisan conflict. Indeed there is likely to be little disagreement of any kind; within broad limits, these constituents get whatever they want" (1991, 32). Finally, there are "substantive matters of national import about which there is disagreement in the electorate" (1991, 33). Rhode's categories match our own fairly well, particularly if one is willing to collapse Rhode's first two categories into one. Our second category of distribution is most like Rhode's fourth. Similarly, he considers his fourth category, and we consider our second category to be the most important for systematic analysis.

In some cases, as we shall see below, the informational argument makes a good deal of sense. If policy has broad effects, most legislators should have a stake in it and support policy motions which satisfy the median voter. This is not the case with a great deal of distributive policy, however. Costs are relatively low and effects, at least in the short run, are narrow; most legislators are not immediately affected by our second-level distributive policy, and so let interesteds have their way. This description fits squarely with the distributive theory.

The major problem with the informational and partisan arguments is that they implicitly consider all votes to be *sincere* expressions of policy preferences; legislators vote for policies that they think are good ideas and against policies which they perceive otherwise. This does a great disservice to a major component of American politics, namely, apathy. Consider: on any given motion there will be a group of legislators who sincerely wants the motion to pass; there may be another group who sincerely wants it to fail. There may also exist a group between these two who sincerely does not care about the outcome one way or the other. *If this subset of sincerely disinterested legislators contains the floor's or majority's median voter, we have a situation ripe for logrolling, for letting interesteds decide what is best for themselves.* The median voter will allow interesteds to make policy and will trade away his own vote so that he can receive another from an apathetic legislator in the future, when his own interests are at stake. The median legislator can afford to be apathetic because the policy has few costs and no direct effects on him and is virtually invisible to voters in his district. The median voter's preferences are satisfied, but are satisfied by potential gains from exchange rather than policy content. The policy outcomes that informational theorists focus on are virtually irrelevant in this

context: Smith assumes that Jones knows what is good for Jones's district. If Jones is wrong, then that is his problem. Conventional wisdom holds that this is a common occurrence. As Mayhew (1966, 82) puts it:

[the] satisfaction of electoral needs requires remarkably little zero-sum conflict among members. That is, one member's gain is not another member's loss; to a remarkable degree, members can successfully engage in electorally useful activities without denying other members the opportunity successfully to engage in them.

It seems then that we should expect to see legislatures conforming fairly closely to the distributive model when making distributive politics. Committees will be stocked with preference outliers, for there is really little reason for a non-interested member to worry about relatively low-costs and narrow benefits that will never affect her. In voting, logrolling will be common among legislators; the gains the median voter receives by trading distributive votes are much higher than the costs incurred by allowing narrow over-distribution. Floor members will simply defer to committee members. Ideology will not be an important determinant, for this is a battle about material, not ideas. In short, narrow interests drive the process. In keeping with distributive theory, we expect that party will have little influence.

Regulatory Policy

Regulatory politics are perhaps the most complex of the policy types because regulation has both ideological and distributive components. Regulation has an *a priori* ideological component regardless of the policy's content: leftists are generally more willing to regulate the economy than rightists – that is, unless we are speaking of social regulation, in which case the poles are reversed. If the experts, the committee members, are

divided along ideological lines, then floor members will take voting cues based on ideological considerations; they will discount the committee's voting cue based on the committee median's deviation from their own ideological preferences. Alternatively, committees may be divided along non-ideological lines. A proposed regulation may pit oil producers against oil consumers, for example. If a committee is divided along these lines then the floor member takes his signal based on the committee median's deviation from his narrow interest; a pro-oil signal coming from a committee majority comprised of Texans and Oklahomans will be discounted by a New Englander whose constituents rely on heating oil.

Of course, committees might not be divided at all (in keeping with informational and partisan theorists). However, the floor member must ask if this is because the regulation is good policy for everyone or because the committee as a whole will benefit at the floor's expense. An essential feature of the well-known iron triangle theory of government is that a single "captured" committee (working with a powerful interest group and a regulatory agency) makes all the policy in an area. Regulations, the argument goes, are made in the interest of the regulated. Informational theorists would argue that this will not satisfy the preferences of the median voter, however. We are inclined to agree; the rational legislator will not consent to being exploited by a few interested parties when his own interests are at stake. If the committee is composed of homogeneous high demanders, the floor member must discount their voting cue according to his own interests. In the end, floor members must be cautious when taking committee signals on regulatory policy. Committee members may or may not be outliers, but the signals will have to be weighted by considerations of ideology and narrow interests.

Our other variables are likely to have mixed importance. A member's own ideology will generally be a good predictor of regulatory votes. However, members have incentives to vote against their predominant ideological tendencies if a given regulation has a strong impact on their districts. (Normally-liberal members may vote against clean air policy if their district manufactures cars, for example.) Because some members have incentives to defect, party may become active to hold the rest of the rank and file to the party line. In the end, the strength of each of these factors is a question to be resolved through empirical investigation.

Redistributive Policy

Redistributive policies are distinct from distributive policies in that the benefits that they confer to one group are perceived as being taken from another. As noted in Chapter 2, all distributive policy is in some sense redistributive. The difference is that a redistributive policy generally affects more citizens than any given distributive policy does (thereby elevating its visibility), and unlike distributive policy, it affects groups differentially along class lines.

Unlike distributive policy, redistributive policies affect legislators widely. However, while distributive policy is often characterized by apathy or consensus, redistributive politics are many times characterized by conflict. In many ways, redistribution is definitive of ideology: socialists want downward redistribution, (classical) liberals want no redistribution, and (classical) conservatives want upward redistribution. (Perhaps it is fair to think of redistribution as ideological distribution.) Because every legislator has a stake in redistributive politics, we expect votes to be sincere. Because legislator preferences

are not heterogeneous, we expect conflict. The severity of the conflict is a function of the extent to which a policy redistributes.

For the most part, party will not play a big role in redistributive politics, simply because *it will not have to*. (Recall, of course, that we are speaking of party-as-organization.) Party action is most important when members have incentives to defect from the party line. Here, because effects are broad and policy is ideological, there are few incentives *to* defect. If members simply vote their ideological preferences, the party remains fairly cohesive, though no actions were taken by party leaders to keep the party cohesive. (This is, of course, most true when parties are ideologically homogeneous.) Ideology outweighs party in this case. The Leviathan can sleep.

The preceding discussion is summarized in Table 4.3. The relative importance of each variable within each policy sphere is displayed.

Empirical Models of Roll Call Voting

Data Selection

To study legislator behavior when voting on the floor, we analyze roll call votes from the 103rd Congress (1993-1994). Is this a time period worth studying? On the one hand, we might be criticized for studying history rather than political science; the 103rd Congress may well be the end of an era of Democratic control of the legislative branch. However, studying the 103rd makes this study comparable to most other research on Congress conducted during the postwar period; if our findings diverge from those of previous studies, critics cannot simply claim that it is a result of a shift in party control. In the future we can expand the analysis to cover the 1995 to 2000 period and compare dif-

ferences in behavioral patterns of House members under Democratic and Republican control. (We expect that there would be few).

It would be most convenient if the House clerk clearly labeled each motion that came to the floor as constituent, distributive, regulatory, or redistributive. Of course, this is not the case, so researchers must select and classify votes. In selecting samples of votes we attempt to find motions that clearly fall into each of Lowi's categories, and which cover a wide range of policy topics. Appendix 1 lists the votes used in this study.

Floor votes will be categorized as pertaining to one of the four policy types based on descriptions given by Congressional Quarterly. Because of the vast number of votes in any given Congress (1,122 in this case), only a sample of the total is used (i.e., 82, or 7.3 percent). To reduce the total we will first drop votes which are clearly unimportant (such as votes to approve the House Journal). We will also try to avoid votes which are essentially redundant. For example, before voting on an actual policy motion, there is a vote to end debate and a vote to bring the motion to the floor. Usually the same members who plan to vote against the proposal also vote for procedural motions which make it less likely to ever reach a final vote. (For example, they may vote to return the bill to committee for further study, or vote against giving a motion a rule.) To avoid this type of duplication, we include only the most important vote on a motion; that is, the vote on the actual substance of the bill or on the decisive procedural motion.

Table 4.3: Summary of the Theoretical Predictions of the Voting Model**Theory: The Policy Perspective****Policy Type****Determinant****Constituent Policy**

Committees	Members not outliers Cues taken with respect to ideology
Party	Most important influence on constituent policymaking
Ideology	Influential, but limited once party taken into account
Narrow Interests	N.A.

Distributive Policy

Committees	Members are outliers Cues taken with respect to differences in narrow interests
Party	Not influential
Ideology	Not influential
Narrow Interests	Very influential

Regulatory Policy

Committees	Members are not outliers Cues taken with respect to party, differences in ideology
Party	Somewhat Influential
Ideology	Somewhat Influential
Narrow Interests	Somewhat Influential

Redistributive Policy

Committees	Members are not outliers Cues taken with respect to party, differences in ideology
Party	Not influential
Ideology	Somewhat Influential
Narrow Interests	Somewhat Influential

To clarify the analysis, only policy motions which adhere closely to the types are included. For example, a single motion on the floor of the House may contain multiple policy types within it; omnibus budget legislation is an example: one long bill addresses

many topics and includes all four policy types. This study avoids such votes as they only serve to muddy the waters of analysis. (Because this research is among the first to examine policy by type, we believe that this approach is warranted. If we find few or no differences in legislative behavior when examining policies which fall clearly into our various categories, then there is little reason to continue on this research path. If differences are striking in these “pure” cases, then future research on more complex cases which combine multiple types will be justified.)

After examining the record of the 103rd Congress to find votes that meet the criteria stated above, a sample of nineteen constituent, twenty-five distributive votes, twenty-four regulatory votes, and fourteen redistributive votes was assembled. Each of these floor votes was voted on by an average of four-hundred-twenty-four members. Hence, nearly thirty-five-thousand individual voting decisions are considered in this analysis.

The Empirical Model of Voting

The general empirical model of voting is designed to reflect the theoretical model displayed in Figure 2.3. The dichotomous voting decision is examined using the following logistic regression equation:

$$\text{Logit (Vote)} = b_0 + b_1A + b_2B + b_3C + b_4D + b_5E + b_6F + b_7G$$

where:

A = committee member (dummy variable)

B = non-committee-member dummy variable * $f(d_i)$, where $f(d_i)$ is the committee's median vote discounted for the ideological difference between the given floor member and the committee's median voter's ideology⁴²

⁴² See Appendix 2

C = non-committee-member dummy variable * $f(d_n)$, where $f(d_n)$ is the committee's median vote discounted for the difference of the narrow interests of the given floor member and the committee's median voter's narrow interest⁴²

D = Cohesion of the Democratic Leadership Cadre * Democrat⁴²

E = Cohesion of the Republican Leadership Cadre * Republican⁴²

F = Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology

G = Narrow Interest Score

An Explanation of the Empirical Model: The Dependent Variable

Legislators' votes are used as the dependent variable in the model presented above. Of course, we cannot simply ask what makes a legislator vote "yes" on a given measure – the vote is dependent on the wording of the motion. To always code "yes" votes as a "1" will make the analysis meaningless. What is needed is a reference point so that votes coded "1" mean the same thing across all motions. The solution is to code votes ideologically. That is, if on any given motion a yes vote is positively correlated with liberal ideology,⁴³ then a yea will be coded 1. If a yes vote is negatively correlated with liberalism, then voting nay will be coded 1. Hence, votes coded 1 will always be the liberal vote, and conservative votes will be coded as -1.⁴⁴

⁴³ As measured by Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology (1985, 1997), a now-common measure of legislator ideology. On the NOMINATE scale, -1 is liberal, 0 is moderate, and +1 is conservative.

(cont'd.)

An Explanation of the Empirical Model: The Independent Variables

Although the right-hand side of the equation appears a bit cumbersome at first glance, the logic is straightforward. Variable A is equal to one if the member is on the referent committee, zero otherwise. If the committee members are homogeneous preference outliers – the outcome predicted by the distributive theory – this variable will be significant.⁴⁵

When voting on the floor, committee members are assumed to have all the information that they need to make substantive decisions. Non-committee members, on the other hand, are at a disadvantage; they must look to committee members for voting cues. Variables B and C capture the ideological and narrow-interest voting cues sent from the committee median to floor members. Most previous research implicitly assumes that the floor takes committee signals without prejudice. According to our theory, the cue sent by the committee is weighted by floor members according to considerations of ideology and

⁴⁴ See Appendix 3 for further explanation of options for coding the dependent variable.

⁴⁵ One criticism of this method of measuring the extremism of committee members is that if disinterested floor members defer to the wishes of interested committee members then the extreme preferences of the committee members are masked, and we will incorrectly fail to reject the no-outlier null hypothesis. There are three reasons that this is not a problem for this research. First, the research design does not preclude the possibility of committee outliers. Committee members do appear as outliers when analyzing redistributive policy, as shown below. That is, committee members do appear as outliers when their preferences are substantially different. Second, this study is an examination of votes in which conflict is present. If there is so much deference going on, then why are so many members voting against the narrow interests? Why is the house so divided on so many votes? Third, there is not only deference from the floor to committees, but deference *within* committees (Krehbiel 1994). Certain motions are certainly more important to some committee members than they are to others. Imagine a legislature where floor members were never allowed to defer to a committee member. Only committee members could defer to other committee members. The result would be that the committee as a whole would appear to be more extreme relative to the floor. In the real world, the floor (*cont'd.*)

narrow interests: as the characteristics of the committee median diverge from those of a given legislator, the cue sent by the committee is discounted by considerations of ideology and narrow interests.⁴⁶

The manner in which the voting cues from committees are discounted by floor voters deserves further explanation. The ideological discount of the voting cue is equal to one, minus the absolute difference of the floor member's NOMINATE score and the NOMI-

may well defer to the committee. But committee members also defer to other committee members too. The two forces have the tendency of offsetting each other.

⁴⁶ One might argue that floor members also take voting cues from fellow partisans on committees, and that a floor-voter's signal comes from the median member of her caucus on the committee. Increased partisanship on the House floor might suggest this alternative. However, this study does not model votes in this manner because such an empirical model would be inconsistent with our characterization of party-as-organization. This work has labored to maintain a distinction between ideology and party. Any ideological signal that a fellow partisan might communicate is captured by term b_2B of the model. If we remove the ideological component of a partisan signal, we are left with a cue that says "vote this way because it is good for the party as an organization," (meaning that it will enhance the party's reputation for competent governing and will improve the electoral fortunes of all party members at the ballot box.) But while every member wants his or her party to do well in the electorate, each has a myriad of reasons to defect from the party line for personal gain. The party image, a public good, is maintained only by establishing party loyalty, and party loyalty can only be maintained by the leviathan, the party leaders who mete out rewards and punishments to the rank-and-file. In short, if a partisan signal is sent by a committee member, it has no weight because committee members cannot distribute rewards and punishments in the manner that party leaders can. If there is a viable party signal to be sent, it must come from the party leaders (as captured by terms b_4D and b_5E), not from fellow partisans on committees. Increased partisanship on the House floor cannot be attributed to partisan signals coming from committee members. It is more likely that it is a result of a general increase in party ideological homogeneity.

In the interest of full disclosure it must be noted that early exploratory models of floor voting conducted in the execution of this study did contain a term designed to capture the partisan signal coming from committees. However, inclusion of the term caused multicollinearity with terms b_4D and b_5E , the components which model the party signal sent by party leaders. One of the signals – either the partisan cue coming from the committee or the partisan cue coming from the party leaders – needed to be dropped from the equation. Upon further reflection it became clear, for the theoretical reasons detailed above, that the term modeling the partisan signal of committee members should be ex-
(*cont'd.*)

NOMINATE score of the median voter of the committee's majority, multiplied by the vote of the committee median (one if liberal, negative one if conservative). That is,

$$f(d_i) = 1 - | \text{floor member's NOMINATE score} - \text{committee majority's median NOMINATE score} | * \text{vote of the committee median}$$

Recall that NOMINATE scores range from -1 to 1 . Therefore, as the ideological difference between the floor and the committee approaches zero, the weight of the cue approaches 1 (and this cue is multiplied by 1 or -1 depending on the actual vote of the committee median). In other words, the more ideologically similar the floor member is to the committee majority's median, the more likely he or she is to take the voting cue at face value.

Alternatively, if an extremely liberal floor member (NOMINATE = -1) evaluates a cue from a moderate committee median (NOMINATE = 0), then the weighted cue is zero. Or, if an extremely liberal floor member (NOMINATE = -1) evaluates a cue from an extremely conservative committee median (NOMINATE = 1), the cue is -1 ; the floor member will actually be cued to vote in the *opposite* direction of the committee median.

The discount of the narrow-interest cue works in much the same fashion. Recall that the narrow interests of House members are measured by standardized interest group ratings. The interest group score that is used depends on the substantive issue at hand. The difference between a committee majority's median narrow interest score and the narrow interest score of a floor member is

$$(d_n) = | \text{member's narrow interest score} - \text{committee majority's median narrow interest score} |$$

cluded. In so doing the multicollinearity problem was eliminated, and the model became more theoretically pure.

Because the interest group scores are standardized, the unit of measurement is the standard deviation. We assume that d_n scores of more than three have the same substantive impact on cue-taking floor members. Hence

If $d_n > 3$ then $f(d_n) = -1 * \text{vote of the committee median}$,

else $f(d_n) = 1 - (d_n/1.5) * \text{vote of the committee median}$

For example, if a floor member observes that the committee median's narrow interest is very far from his own (suppose four standard deviations in statistical terms, not that most legislators think this way), then the voting signal is -1 multiplied by the committee median's vote. (That is, they will be cued to do the opposite of what the committee signals.)⁴⁷ If the difference between the floor member and the committee median is moderate – say 1.5 standard deviations – then the cue has no weight in the voting calculus. If the difference between the floor member and the committee is small, 0.1 standard deviations for example, then the weighted cue is 0.9333 in the direction of the committee median's vote.

House members also take voting signals from party leaders. Unlike most studies of roll call voting, we reject the simple dichotomous coding of party. Instead, we examine the effect of a cohesive party leadership cadre on rank and file members. The rank and file of each party looks to its respective leadership cadre. The more unified the leadership is, the more influence it will have on rank-and-file voting. Variables D and E cap-

⁴⁷ Herein lies the logic of counting all differences of more than three standard deviations in the same way. Legislators are not statisticians; differences of three, four, or five standard deviations all mean the same thing to the floor member: "this committee is diametrically opposed to my interests."

ture the effects of party leader cohesion. Party effects should be strong in making constituent policy. They will have some influence when voting on regulatory policy. We expect that there will be few partisan effects when making distributive and redistributive policy.

In addition to the effects that ideology and narrow interests have on the interpretation of committee signals, they should have independent effects as well. Ideology should be most influential when making constituent and redistributive policy, somewhat influential when making regulatory policy, and non-influential when making distributive policy. Variable F is simply Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology.

Finally, narrow interests should be influential when making distributive policy; they may have some influence when making regulatory policy; they should have little to do with redistributive policy (once party and ideology are controlled for). Variable G measures the legislator's commitment to a specific narrow interest. The conceptualization and operationalization of "narrow interests" has proven to be problematic for political scientists. What we seek is a way to measure what a legislator ought to do if she wants to keep her constituents happy, thereby returning her to office. While it might seem that students of legislatures would readily be able to operationalize and measure such a concept, the task has proven to be difficult for scholars.

Bullock (1972), in his study of freshman committee assignments in the House, draws on the work of earlier scholars⁴⁸ and argues that House members will seek commit-

⁴⁸ Masters 1961, 354; Morrow 1969, 43-48; Galloway 1961, 82; Bolling 1965, 108; Goodwin 1970, 77-78; Fenno, from a paper that would eventually contribute to *Congressmen in Committees*; Kessel 1961, 11-16.

tee assignments that further their narrow interests; the attractiveness of particular committee assignments can be predicted by the characteristics of a member's district. Bullock asserts that assignment to one of the "top" committees – Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs – is in the interest of every member. Similarly, Public Works "has utility for any freshman seeking to win the support of their constituents," (Bullock 1972, 999). The attractiveness of an assignment to other committees, however, is predicated upon the characteristics of a representative's district. For example, assignment to Agriculture is assumed to be desirable for members who represent districts in which at least ten percent of the workforce is employed in work on a farm. Urban legislators are assumed to be attracted to the Banking and Currency Committee. Those members representing districts with large concentrations of working-class citizens are seen as being attracted to Education and Labor. The attractiveness of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries committees is determined not by demographic characteristics, but by geographic considerations: the assignment is thought to be sought by those with districts located on the Atlantic or Pacific coast, the Gulf of Mexico, or the shores of the Great Lakes. Finally, assignment to the Interior Committee is desirable for those with districts of more than 8,500 square miles (Bullock 1972, 999-1000).

Similar to Bullock, Shepsle (1978) measures the narrow interests of legislators by examining the characteristics of their districts. For example, legislators whose districts had low population densities (i.e., rural districts) were assumed to have farming interests. Members from urban districts were assumed to have banking and commerce interests. Similarly, Cowart (1981) assesses the narrow interests of members of various Appropria-

tion subcommittees by examining a district's labor force characteristics, population density, and income.

This “constituency characteristic” approach has some problems, however. Fiorina (1974) and Fenno (2000) both demonstrate that since different winning electoral coalitions can be built within the same geographic area, the legislative behavior of individuals elected from that geographic area can be quite different. Fiorina shows that when a new representative of a heterogeneous, competitive district wins a seat from a member of the opposite party, he will establish a significantly different voting record than his predecessor. Clearly, the new member is attempting to appeal to a different set of constituents. Similarly, Fenno develops the concept of concentric constituencies. That is, each legislator has four constituencies: the personal, the primary, the reelection, and the geographic. The constituencies comprise a set of concentric circles radiating outward from the legislator, each larger than the last. The personal constituency is comprised of family, close friends, and confidants. The primary is the set of voters that is needed to secure the party's nomination for the general election. The reelection constituency is the coalition that is built in order to return the member to Congress. Finally, the geographic constituency is comprised of all the people who live in the legislator's state or district, whether they voted for him, against him, or stayed home on election day. The legislator clearly needs to keep the second and third groups happy if he is to return to office. (Keeping the first set happy probably makes life easier, but may not be crucial for winning office.) But clearly, the legislator does not need to account for those who will not vote for him under

any circumstances. Hence, to include the characteristics of all of the members of the fourth group in a calculation of what is in a legislator's interest is inappropriate.⁴⁹

Bullock and Brady (1983) underscore the point with their analysis of roll call votes in the Senate. They analyze the voting patterns of pairs of senators from the same state. They compare the voting records of senators from states with two senators of the same party to the records of senators from states that elected members of the upper chamber from opposing parties. Because two senators represent the same geographic region, it is certain that differences in their roll call votes cannot be attributed to differences in their geographic constituencies, to borrow Fenno's term. They establish that states that are demographically more homogeneous are more likely to produce senators from the same party, while demographically heterogeneous states are likely to split their senators between the opposing parties (1983, 31-32). They then show that states with heterogeneous populations, the type more likely to produce split control, are more likely to elect senators with different reelection constituencies. The reelection constituency is determined by the share of the vote received by the Democratic nominee in each election, as determined by ecological regression. Senators with differing reelection constituencies had substantial differences in roll call voting records, as measured by ADA and Conservative Coalition scores (Bullock and Brady 1983, 37-39).

In short, since representatives from very demographically or geographically similar districts may build quite different electoral coalitions, it is too simple to assume that

⁴⁹ Poole (1988, 126), in discussing logit models of roll call votes in Congress, states that "it is incorrect to use geographic constituency measures of economic self-interest. Rather, the correct procedure is to measure the economic self-interest of the reelection constituency."

they will respond similarly to a given policy proposal. Therefore, we will adopt the technique used by Krehbiel (1991) and judge a representative's narrow interests by his behavior in the House, as operationalized by scores given by various interest groups.

It has become common practice for interest groups of all varieties to rate members of Congress on zero to one-hundred scales based on their floor votes for a set of motions deemed important by the interest group. The scores allow objective observers to determine which members are friendliest to various narrow interests. Previously, the use of interest group scores had been criticized in that the scores are not comparable across groups (it may be very difficult to obtain a perfect score of one-hundred for one group, while quite easy for another), and the scores are not comparable across time (Snyder 1992, Krehbiel 1994). However, these problems have been alleviated in this study. As this study is cross-sectional rather than diachronic, issues of comparability across time do not come into play.⁵⁰ To make scores from different groups comparable within a Congress, they are standardized: a standard deviation above or below the mean means the same for one group as it does for another. Hence, we are confident that the use of standardized interest group scores within a given Congress yields an accurate picture of which members are aligned with various narrow interests.⁵¹ Appendix 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.

⁵⁰ Recent work by Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) may alleviate the problems of comparisons of interest group scores over time for future studies.

⁵¹ After the interest group score is standardized, it is again transformed by multiplying it by 1 or -1, depending on its correlation with NOMINATE. If a narrow interest score is correlated with conservatism, i.e., positively correlated with NOMINATE, it is multiplied by -1. In this way the narrow interest scores of many interest groups that are concerned with (*cont'd.*)

Results

Equation Estimation

Estimating the various logistic regression models using the data described above allows us to test the hypotheses. The tests yield many interesting results in light of the policy perspective: *Indeed, different forces are at work as different types of policy are made.* The parameters for the various equations are displayed in Tables 4.4 through 4.7. Direct statistical comparisons of legislative forces across the policy types can be seen in Table 4.8. Table 4.9 presents a general summary of the analysis.

The Predictability of Voting

In discussing the overall predictive power of the model of roll call voting, two points warrant further discussion: the absolute predictive power of the models (i.e., the percentage correctly predicted by the models as compared to an ideal of one-hundred percent correct explanation), and the relative predictive power of the models (i.e., the predictive power of one policy type's model as compared to the others.)

The Absolute Predictive Power of the Model. In absolute terms, the models seem to fare well, predicting votes correctly between eighty and almost ninety percent of the time. On the one hand, this sounds like extraordinary predictive power: for a social scientist to predict behavior correctly ninety percent of the time is indeed rare. On the other hand, the reader should recall that legislative choice is restricted to a dichotomy when voting on the floor: simply flipping a coin will allow us to predict floor votes correctly in

many policy topics can be compared meaningfully. To fail to do so would be to render the analysis meaningless.

fifty percent of the cases. Hence, the improvement over some baseline is the real criterion by which we should evaluate the model.

Herbert Weisberg (1978) derives four baseline criteria that should be used when evaluating models of roll call voting. The question is, how much better is a proposed model of voting than a model with little or no information about legislators and legislatures? The most rudimentary baseline that Weisberg considers is that of random selection. A proposed model of voting is compared to one in which legislators vote randomly. Proposed models that cannot predict much over fifty percent cannot be taken seriously.

Weisberg's second baseline is derived from the assumption that every member of the chamber will vote with the majority of the floor every time. (While it is mathematically possible for a model to predict less than this majority-vote baseline, it is hard to imagine a researcher who devised such a scheme laying claim to it in public.) Weisberg examines House roll call votes between 1957 and 1974 and finds that the average majority-vote baseline during this period is 74 percent. Hence, a model that can predict 80 percent of the cases from this sample is not really too impressive.

The third and fourth baseline criteria are developed with an eye toward partisanship. The party-voting model assumes that a legislator will vote with the majority of his party on every motion. Many studies of roll call voting have concluded that party is the best predictor of floor voting. However, laments Weisberg, this tells us almost nothing about the political process. *Why* is party such a significant predictor? Is it because party leaders are strong? Or are the partisans sharply divided along ideological lines? Why do legislators adhere to one party and not another? Simply knowing that party predicts floor

Table 4.4: Logit Model of Constituent Votes

$$\text{Logit (Vote)} = b_0 + b_1A + b_2B + b_3D + b_4E + b_5F$$

A = committee member

B = $f(d_i)$ * non committee member

D = Cohesion of the Democratic Leadership * Democrat

E = Cohesion of the Republican Leadership * Republican

F = Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology

N = 8,414

Correctly Predicted = 89.12%

Baseline	Random Vote	Majority Vote	2 Party Vote	3 Party Vote
Baseline Predicts	50.00%	52.49%	60.36%	62.09%
Improvement	39.12%	36.63%	28.76%	27.03%

$\chi^2 = (-2LL_0) - (-2LL_K) = 6605.39$

df = 5

Sig. = 0.0000

Pseudo $R^2 =$

$1 - (-2LL_K / -2LL_0) = 0.5964$

Variable	b	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)	% Δ_i , unit	% Δ_i , s
A	0.2427	0.1238	3.8410	1	0.0500	0.0129	1.2747	6.0	1.8
B	0.9052	0.1040	75.7537	1	0.0000	0.0816	2.4725	21.2	12.3
D	1.8995	0.1512	157.8009	1	0.0000	0.1186	6.6826	37.0	20.7
E	1.1168	0.2172	26.4340	1	0.0000	0.0470	3.0552	25.3	12.8
F	-2.9395	0.1953	226.4991	1	0.0000	-0.1424	0.0529	-44.9	-30.1
const.	-1.2752	0.1263	101.8760	1	0.0000				

Table 4.5: Logit Model of Distributive Votes

$$\text{Logit (Vote)} = b_0 + b_1A + b_2B + b_3C + b_4D + b_5E + b_6F + b_7G$$

A = committee member

B = $f(d_i)$ * non committee member

C = $f(d_k)$ * noncommittee member

D = Cohesion of the Democratic Leadership * Democrat

E = Cohesion of the Republican Leadership * Republican

F = Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology

G = Narrow Interest Score

N = 10,446

Correctly Predicted = 80.83%

Baseline	Random Vote	Majority Vote	2 Party Vote	3 Party Vote
Baseline Predicts	50.00%	52.27%	60.37%	61.59%
Model Improvement	30.83%	28.56%	20.46%	19.24%

$\chi^2 = (-2LL_0) - (-2LL_K) = 6035.545$

df = 7

Sig. = 0.0000

Pseudo $R^2 =$

$1 - (-2LL_K / -2LL_0) = 0.4174$

Variable	b	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)	% Δ_i , unit	% Δ_i , s
A	-0.1834	0.0753	5.9342	1	0.0148	-0.0165	0.8325	-4.6	-1.6
B	-0.7091	0.0806	77.3571	1	0.0000	-0.0722	0.4921	-17.0	-10.1
C	1.4007	0.0848	272.9695	1	0.0000	0.1369	4.0579	30.2	18.6
D	1.8005	0.0882	416.9936	1	0.0000	0.1694	6.0526	35.8	18.6
E	1.2187	0.1071	129.4369	1	0.0000	0.0939	3.3829	27.2	12.5
F	-0.3459	0.1333	6.7304	1	0.0095	-0.0181	0.7076	-8.6	-4.1
G	0.5924	0.0551	115.4968	1	0.0000	0.0886	1.8082	14.4	14.0
const.	-0.0819	0.0530	2.3857	1	0.1225				

Table 4.6: Logit Model of Regulatory Votes

$$\text{Logit (Vote)} = b_0 + b_1A + b_2B + b_3C + b_4D + b_5E + b_6F + b_7G$$

A = committee member

B = $f(d_i)$ * non committee member

C = $f(d_k)$ * noncommittee member

D = Cohesion of the Democratic Leadership * Democrat

E = Cohesion of the Republican Leadership * Republican

F = Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology

G = Narrow Interest Score

N = 10,079

Correctly Predicted = 86.00%

Baseline	Random Vote	Majority Vote	2 Party Vote	3 Party Vote
Baseline Predicts	50.00%	53.52%	59.78%	60.51%
Model Improvement	36.00%	32.48%	26.22%	25.49%

$\chi^2 = (-2LL_0) - (-2LL_K) = 7320.508$

df = 7

Sig. = 0.0000

Pseudo $R^2 =$

$1 - (-2LL_K / -2LL_0) = 0.5256$

Variable	b	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)	% Δ_i , unit	% Δ_i , s
A	-0.1195	0.0726	2.7082	1	0.0998	-0.0071	0.8873	-3.0	-1.2
B	-0.4752	0.1172	16.4464	1	0.0001	-0.0322	0.6217	-11.7	-6.7
C	1.9531	0.1492	171.2592	1	0.0000	0.1102	7.0502	37.6	25.5
D	1.3318	0.0973	187.2882	1	0.0000	0.1153	3.7878	29.1	13.4
E	-0.0353	0.1496	0.0556	1	0.8137	0.0000	0.9654	-0.9	-0.4
F	-0.7922	0.195	16.5136	1	0.0000	-0.0323	0.4528	-18.8	-9.2
G	1.1953	0.088	184.6139	1	0.0000	0.1145	3.3045	26.8	26.0
const.	-0.731	0.0808	81.8445	1	0.0000				

Table 4.7: Logit Model of Redistributive Votes

$$\text{Logit (Vote)} = b_0 + b_1A + b_2B + b_3C + b_4D + b_5E + b_6F + b_7G$$

A = committee member

B = $f(d_i)$ * non committee member

C = $f(d_k)$ * noncommittee member

D = Cohesion of the Democratic Leadership * Democrat

E = Cohesion of the Republican Leadership * Republican

F = Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology

G = Narrow Interest Score

N = 5,799

Correctly Predicted = 89.15%

Baseline	Random Vote	Majority Vote	2 Party Vote	3 Party Vote
Baseline Predicts	50.00%	54.35%	62.05%	63.53%
Model Improvement	39.15%	34.80%	27.10%	25.62%

$\chi^2 = (-2LL_0) - (-2LL_K) = 4797.3808$

df = 7

Sig. = 0.0000

Pseudo $R^2 =$

$1 - (-2LL_K / -2LL_0) = 0.6000$

Variable	b	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	R	Exp(B)	% Δ_i , unit	% Δ_i , s
A	1.0002	0.1365	53.6932	1	0.0000	0.0804	2.7188	23.1	7.7
B	1.4326	0.2035	49.5755	1	0.0000	0.0771	4.1894	30.7	17.4
C	1.1417	0.2184	27.3359	1	0.0000	0.0563	3.1321	25.8	14.9
D	-0.1013	0.2380	0.1810	1	0.6705	0.0000	0.9037	-2.5	-1.1
E	0.9818	0.2382	16.9872	1	0.0000	0.0433	2.6692	22.8	10.7
F	-2.5229	0.3173	63.2373	1	0.0000	-0.0875	0.0802	-42.6	-26.8
G	0.4683	0.1329	12.4249	1	0.0004	0.0361	1.5973	11.5	11.1
const.	-0.4456	0.1559	8.1734	1	0.0043				

Table 4.8: Significance Tests for Differences in Slopes across Policy Types

Slope Pair		b_1	b_2	$S.E._1$	$S.E._2$	n_1	n_2	t value
A	Committee Member, Constituent	0.2427	-0.1834	0.1238	0.0753	8,003	10,446	2.9406 *
	Committee Member, Constituent	0.2427	1.0002	0.1238	0.1365	8,003	5,799	-4.1106 *
	Committee Member, Constituent	0.2427	-0.1195	0.1238	0.0726	8,003	10,079	2.5237 *
	Committee Member, Distributive	-0.1834	1.0002	0.0753	0.1365	10,446	5,799	-7.5924 *
	Committee Member, Distributive	-0.1834	-0.1195	0.0753	0.0726	10,446	10,079	-0.6109
	Committee Member, Redistributive	1.0002	-0.1195	0.1365	0.0726	5,799	10,079	7.2423 *
B	Ideol. Signal, Constituent	0.9052	-0.7091	0.1040	0.0806	8,003	10,446	12.2689 *
	Ideol. Signal, Constituent	0.9052	1.4326	0.1040	0.2035	8,003	5,799	-2.3077
	Ideol. Signal, Constituent	0.9052	-0.4752	0.1040	0.1172	8,003	10,079	8.8097 *
	Ideol. Signal, Distributive	-0.7091	1.4326	0.0806	0.2035	10,446	5,799	-9.7848 *
	Ideol. Signal, Distributive	-0.7091	-0.4752	0.0806	0.1172	10,446	10,079	-1.6444
	Ideol. Signal, Redistributive	1.4326	-0.4752	0.2035	0.1172	5,799	10,079	8.1240 *
C	Narrow Int. Signal, Constituent	NA	1.4007	NA	0.0848	8,003	10,446	NA
	Narrow Int. Signal, Constituent	NA	1.1417	NA	0.2184	8,003	5,799	NA
	Narrow Int. Signal, Constituent	NA	1.9531	NA	0.1492	8,003	10,079	NA
	Narrow Int. Signal, Distributive	1.4007	1.1417	0.0848	0.2184	10,446	5,799	1.1055
	Narrow Int. Signal, Distributive	1.4007	1.9531	0.0848	0.1492	10,446	10,079	-3.2188 *
	Narrow Int. Signal, Redistributive	1.1417	1.9531	0.2184	0.1492	5,799	10,079	-3.0677 *
D	Dem. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.8995	1.8005	0.1512	0.0882	8,003	10,446	0.5656
	Dem. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.8995	-0.1013	0.1512	0.2380	8,003	5,799	7.0959 *
	Dem. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.8995	1.3318	0.1512	0.0973	8,003	10,079	3.1574 *
	Dem. Lead. Signal, Distributive	1.8005	-0.1013	0.0882	0.2380	10,446	5,799	7.4928 *
	Dem. Lead. Signal, Distributive	1.8005	1.3318	0.0882	0.0973	10,446	10,079	3.5690 *
	Dem. Lead. Signal, Redistributive	-0.1013	1.3318	0.2380	0.0973	5,799	10,079	-5.5736 *

(cont'd)

Table 4.8 (continued): Significance Tests for Differences in Slopes across Policy Types

Slope Pair		b_1	b_2	SE_{b_1}	SE_{b_2}	n_1	n_2	t value
E	Rep. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.1168	1.2187	0.2172	0.1071	8,003	10,446	-0.4208
	Rep. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.1168	0.9818	0.2172	0.2382	8,003	5,799	0.4188
	Rep. Lead. Signal, Constituent	1.1168	-0.0353	0.2172	0.1496	8,003	10,079	4.3684 *
	Rep. Lead. Signal, Distributive	1.2187	0.9818	0.1071	0.2382	10,446	5,799	0.9071
	Rep. Lead. Signal, Distributive	1.2187	-0.0353	0.1071	0.1496	10,446	10,079	6.8158 *
	Rep. Lead. Signal, Redistributive	0.9818	-0.0353	0.2382	0.1496	5,799	10,079	3.6159 *
F	Member's Ideology, Constituent	-2.9395	-0.3459	0.1953	0.1333	8,003	10,446	-10.969 *
	Member's Ideology, Constituent	-2.9395	-2.5229	0.1953	0.3173	8,003	5,799	-1.1181
	Member's Ideology, Constituent	-2.9395	-0.7922	0.1953	0.1950	8,003	10,079	-7.7805 *
	Member's Ideology, Distributive	-0.3459	-2.5229	0.1333	0.3173	10,446	5,799	6.3255 *
	Member's Ideology, Distributive	-0.3459	-0.7922	0.1333	0.1950	10,446	10,079	1.8894
	Member's Ideology, Redistributive	-2.5229	-0.7922	0.3173	0.1950	5,799	10,079	-4.6470 *
G	Member's Narrow Int., Constituent	NA	0.5924	NA	0.0551	8,003	10,446	NA
	Member's Narrow Int., Constituent	NA	0.4683	NA	0.1329	8,003	5,799	NA
	Member's Narrow Int., Constituent	NA	1.1953	NA	0.0880	8,003	10,079	NA
	Member's Narrow Int., Distributive	0.5924	0.4683	0.0551	0.1329	10,446	5,799	0.8626
	Member's Narrow Int., Distributive	0.5924	1.1953	0.0551	0.0880	10,446	10,079	-5.8068 *
	Member's Narrow Int., Redistributive	0.4683	1.1953	0.1329	0.0880	5,799	10,079	-4.5610 *

Note: $t = (b_1 - b_2) / [((SE_{b_1}(n_1)^2 / n_1) + (SE_{b_2}(n_2)^2 / n_2))^{1/2}]$, where the critical t value = 2.33, i.e. $t_{0.01}$ with $n-1$ d.f.

Table 4.9: Comparison of Voting Correlates across Policy Types

	Constituent							Distributive							Regulatory							Redistributive						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Constituent	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	H1 - fail to reject H1 _n																											
	H2 ₁ - reject H2 _n																											
	H3d - reject H3 _n																											
	H3r - reject H3 _n																											
	H4 - reject H4 _n																											
	H5 - reject H5 _n																											
Distributive	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	H1 - fail to reject H1 _n																											
	H2 ₁ - fail to reject H2 _n																											
	H2 ₃ - reject H2 _n																											
	H3d - reject H3 _n																											
	H3r - reject H3 _n																											
	H4 - reject H4 _n																											
	H5 - reject H5 _n																											
Regulatory	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	H1 - fail to reject H1 _n																											
	H2 ₁ - fail to reject H2 _n																											
	H2 ₃ - reject H2 _n																											
	H3d - reject H3 _n																											
	H3r - fail to reject H3 _n																											
	H4 - reject H4 _n																											
	H5 - reject H5 _n																											
Redistributive	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
	H1 - reject H1 _n																											
	H2 ₁ - reject H2 _n																											
	H2 ₃ - reject H2 _n																											
	H3d - fail to reject H3 _n																											
	H3r - reject H3 _n																											
	H4 - reject H4 _n																											
	H5 - reject H5 _n																											

Notes: Checked boxes indicate t-test differences in variables across models.

A brief summary of the hypothesis tests of each policy type appears on the diagonal. 3d and 3r imply the tests for Democrats and Republicans.

voting sheds little light on the political phenomenon we are trying to understand. The final baseline is created by treating the House as if it had three political parties: Republicans, Northern Democrats, and Southern Democrats. An examination of House roll call votes between 1965 and 1969 reveals that the two- and three-party models provide baselines in excess of 80 percent.

Having derived the four baseline criteria, Weisberg turns his attention to four empirical models that have been developed to explain roll call votes on the House floor. By applying his various baseline criteria he demonstrates that two of the models that were thought to explain a great deal actually provide little predictive power over the minimal information models.

Matthews and Stimson's (1975) model of House roll call votes is widely viewed as a successful research endeavor because it has a high degree of accuracy in predicting individual choices on the floor. For roll call votes between 1965 and 1969, the Matthews and Stimson model is able to predict 88 percent of votes correctly. At first glance, this is impressive. However, the application of Weisberg's criteria reveals a different picture. During this period that majority-voting baseline was 76.2 percent, the party-voting baseline was 83.7 percent, and the three-party baseline stood at 86.3 percent. In short, the Matthews and Stimson model provides almost no improvement over the three-party model. Similarly, Cherryholmes and Shapiro (1969) are able to predict 84 percent of votes correctly. However, 82 percent of the votes in their sample could have been achieved with a two-party voting model.

The remaining two studies fared better under Weisberg's scalpel. Clausen (1973) is able to predict between 80 and 85 percent correctly. Kingdon (1973) is able to predict

an impressive 89 percent. These high levels of prediction can be taken more seriously in that both studies adopted the practice of eliminating non-controversial votes, thereby lowering the baselines; hence Clausen's 80 percent is better than Matthews and Stimpson's 88 percent. (The actual baselines that could have been applied to the Clausen or the Kingdon models were not determined.)

Based on his review of these studies, Weisberg reaches two conclusions. The first is that simply having a high level of predictive power does not in and of itself make a model successful. We must ask if the model is an improvement over a model with only minimal information. The second point, ironically, is that a model that does not predict substantially more than a minimal information model is not *necessarily* a failure. A model that has high predictive power but that is only marginally better than the minimal information baselines is still successful if it sheds light on the underlying political phenomena we are trying to learn more about. In a departure from conventional thinking on statistical modeling, Weisberg concludes that parsimony is actually not as important as we have been led to think. Instead, "[v]erisimilitude to the process being modeled is desired" (p. 574). For example, a model that predicts 80 percent correctly with two variables is not as informative as a model that predicts 80 percent with many (relevant) variables. The legislative process is complex – certainly more complex than a two-variable model. Hence, our models should reflect this complexity.

From Weisberg's critique of roll call voting models, we can conclude that the best ones will provide a high level of predictive power, improve upon the baseline measures, and be an accurate representation of congressional reality. How then does the model that we have developed rate against Weisberg's criteria? As noted at the outset of this sec-

tion, the model does a good job of predicting votes. Tables 4.4 through 4.7 reveal that the model predicts between 80 and 89 percent of votes. Moreover, the models provide substantial *improvement* over Weisberg's baselines. While it has been observed that the majority-voting model will predict many floor votes, this is not the case in our sample of motions because, like Clausen and Kingdon, we have not included non-controversial motions in the analysis. Weisberg found baselines over 80 percent in some of the votes that he examined; in our sample the baselines tend to hover between 50 and 60 percent.

Hence, we have met the first two criteria: we have a high level of explanation and substantial improvement over the baseline measures. Third and finally, the model is an accurate representation of the dynamics of floor voting. Based on the theory reviewed and developed in the preceding pages, we believe that we have constructed a model that strikes the proper balance between statistical parsimony and legislative complexity. The reality captured by the empirical model is detailed in the following section. Whether or not this is an accurate reflection of the legislative process is left to the judgment of the reader.

The Relative Predictive Power of the Models. Turning to the second point, the predictive power of the models relative to one another, we see that some interesting patterns emerge. Interestingly, the predictive power of the model of distributive votes is markedly lower than that of the other three types. If the whole of legislative politics consists of deals made in smoke-filled rooms, then there is little hope of ever creating systematic explanations of legislative behavior. However, if idiosyncratic log-rolls tend to defy explanation, then a politics based on reason, clearly-visible interests, and public information will yield itself to systematic explanation.

In this respect, the policy categories yield the type of politics that conventional wisdom leads us to expect. Distributive policies, the politics of pork, are the most difficult to explain. The R^2 lags behind the other models because the model simply cannot account for all of the deals that get made behind closed doors. Horse trading, back scratching, log rolling – call it what you will – is not nearly as systematic as the other types. When many legislators are disinterested or apathetic, the predictability of individual votes declines. Constituent and redistributive policy, on the other hand, produce a different type of politics, one that is relatively transparent. Votes are cast based on “big ideas” and legislators’ long-held positions, not on hastily-cobbled-together alliances designed to secure a few scraps of pork. The result is that the models are able to predict almost ninety percent of the votes cast. Finally, regulatory policy, which has both ideological and narrow-interest components, falls somewhere between the other types.

The Correlates of Voting

An examination of Tables 4.4 through 4.9 underscores the major theoretical premise of this work: *votes on different policy types are the products of different legislative forces*. The R statistic in Tables 4.4 through 4.7 shows the partial correlation of each independent variable with the dependent variable, and are analogous to the beta weight in OLS regression. Looking across policy types we can see that the affects of the same variables are often different in magnitude, significance⁵², and at times, even in direction.⁵³

⁵² Because our sample sizes are very large we will use the $\alpha = .010$ level of significance throughout our analysis.

⁵³ A general note on logit analysis is warranted:
(*cont'd.*)

The last two columns of Tables 4.4 through 4.7, labeled “% Δ_i , unit” and “% Δ_i , S ” show the impact that the independent variable has on i , the indifferent legislator, the hypothetical member of the floor who has a 50 percent chance of voting either yes or no on a given proposal. (The column “% Δ_i , unit” shows the impact in terms of the variable’s *unit* of measurement, while “% Δ_i , S ” shows the standardized effect in terms of a standard deviation, S .) For example, suppose a proposal of the constituent policy type comes up for a vote. If i is a member of a committee to which that bill had been referred (i.e., variable $A = 1$), then, according to Table 4.4, he or she is 6.0 percent more likely to vote for the measure. If, on the other hand, they are not a committee member, and the ideological cue sent by the committee (i.e., variable B) increases by one standard deviation, then they will be 12.3 percent more likely to vote for the measure. If variable F (Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE score of ideology) increases by one unit (i.e., the member moves from being a moderate to an extreme conservative), the likelihood of voting for the measure falls by 44.9 percent. If F increases by one standard deviation (i.e., the member moves

b = Logit slope. A one-unit change in the independent variable leads to a b change in the log odds of the dependent variable. That is, $\log [\text{probability (yes event) / probability (no event)}] = b_0 + b_1X_1 + \dots + b_pX_p$, or, $[\text{probability (yes event) / probability (no event)}] = e^{b_0 + b_1X_1 + \dots + b_pX_p}$

S.E. = the standard error of the slope

Wald = $(b/S.E.)^2$

Sig. = Significance of Wald statistic, which has a χ^2 distribution

$R = \pm [(Wald - 2K / -2LL_{(0)})]^{1/2}$, where K is the degrees of freedom for the variable, and $LL_{(0)}$ is the log likelihood of a base model that contains only the intercept.

The sign of R is the same as that of b .

Exp. (B) = e^{b_i} = the factor by which the odds change when the i^{th} independent variable changes by one unit (Bohrnstedt and Knoke, 1994, 334-352; Norusis 1994, 1-30).

from being a moderate to a fairly strong conservative), the likelihood of voting for the measure decreases by 30.1 percent.⁵⁴

Constituent Policy. The model of constituent voting generally conforms to our theoretical expectations. Without a doubt, the politics generated by constituent policy is characterized by ideological voting and parties which are active as true organizations. That is, members' votes are based on their own ideology, the ideological cues of committee members, and the cohesiveness of their party's leadership cadre.⁵⁵ We reject, therefore, hypothesis 2_n in favor of 2_{a1}, 3_n in favor of 3_a, and 4_n in favor of 4_a.

⁵⁴ When a member has a 50 percent chance of voting either for or against a measure, she is said to be the *indifferent* voter, *i*. At that point *i*'s odds of voting for the measure are 1 (i.e., 50 / 50). Exp(B) shows the magnitude of the change of the odds of voting for a measure when the independent variable increases by one unit. Exp(B) is 1.2747 for variable A in table 4.4. That is, a one-unit increase in variable A leads to a 1.2747 increase in the magnitude of the odds of voting for the proposal. The odds of *i* voting for the proposal are increased from 1 to 1.2747, which is approximately equal to 56 / 44. In other words, the probability that *i* will vote for the measure has increased from 50 to 56 percent because of her committee-member status. (The figures for "% Δ_i, S" are derived in the same manner by re-estimating the equation using standardized versions of the variables so that the estimates calculated are in units of standard deviations.)

⁵⁵ A potential criticism of this model is that it is not entirely clear that leaders are leading and followers are following. The results are also consistent with the premise that the rank and file is cuing the leadership cadre, i.e., that the leaders are following the rank and file. That the leaders lead is an assumption – albeit not a radical one – that is built into the model. Since leaders and rank-and-file members vote at the same point in time, it is not possible to establish firmly the direction of the arrow of causality from these data. However, the results of the equation estimation for distributive votes (see below) does provide some insight. We would expect that distributive theory would hold most true for distributive policy. Legislators have a great opportunity for vote trading in this policy arena. However, we see instances of them refraining. As the leadership becomes more cohesive against voting in favor of distribution, so does the rank-and-file. Did the former cause the latter? We cannot be absolutely certain, but why else would they given that theory indicates that they should want to over-distribute? There must be some central authority reinforcing in their distributive tendency. We interpret this to mean that the leaders are actually providing the leadership.
(*cont'd.*)

We had predicted that partisanship would outweigh members' ideology; as it turns out, ideology is the dominant variable. However, both are highly significant, strong, and in the predicted direction. It is also interesting to note that the partisan signal has more influence for the Democrats, the majority party; all previous theoretical and empirical work from the partisan school of thought has stressed that their predictions regarding partisan government will only hold true with any consistency for the majority party. The minority simply has less to gain by acting cohesively, less to lose by letting members vote their true preferences. The Republicans are significantly affected by the partisan signal, but not to the extent of the Democrats.

Unlike party and ideology, committee membership is not important in the making of constituent policy. That is, members of committees are not significantly different than the rest of the floor when making constituent policy. Variable A, committee membership, fails to achieve significance at the $\alpha=.010$ level in this model, and so we cannot reject hypothesis 1_n. (Of course $\alpha=.010$ is not a magic number; one might argue that 0.05, or any number for that matter, is actually appropriate. Even if $\alpha=0.05$ is accepted, the substantive impact of A is small, judging by the right-most column of Table 4.4.) In keeping with our theoretical predictions, committee members do not have narrow, district-specific interests in the realm of constituent policy, and the floor has no interest in allowing the

To truly solve this problem would take a different kind of investigation and different data. One would need to observe the pattern of information dissemination on the floor, most likely through the whip system. Are leaders sending signals to the rank and file before the vote? Are whips going from the leadership to the rank-and-file with a message that a vote is important, or alternatively, are whips reporting to the leaders what the rank-and-file thinks is important, and the leadership follows suit. A case study called "A Day in the Life of a Whip" would be quite useful in this regard, and should be added to congressional scholars' to-do list.

makers of constituent policy to deviate from floor median preferences. Hence, committee members behave like general floor members when making constituent policy and do not register as substantial preference outliers.

Distributive votes. In keeping with the great bulk of the literature written on legislative behavior in the last thirty years, when casting distributive votes, the narrow interest of lawmakers is more influential than their ideology: variable G, the narrow interest score, clearly has more influence than variable F, ideology. Liberals and conservatives alike will vote for a motion that brings direct benefit to their constituents. However, there is more going on here than simple pork barrel politics. We are quite surprised by both the influence that party leadership has on the votes of the rank-and-file as it votes on distribution, and the preference similarity of committee members to the floor.

Turning our attention to Table 4.5, we see that *the most influential factor in the voting calculus of distributive policy is the cue sent by the majority party's leadership cadre*. Contrary to all of the dismissals of the importance of party leadership by the distributive school of theorists (as well as the informational theorists), party leadership is influential in the making of policy, even distributive policy. This is true for the Democratic majority and the Republican minority alike: as the leadership cadre becomes more cohesive, the rank and file follows its lead. The influence of party leaders in this case is doubly surprising in that this is the policy sphere where we would expect to see the predictions of the distributive theorists most likely to hold true.

Why is this the case? It must be noted that part of the answer lies in the votes that were selected for this study. We are only looking at votes that had some controversy surrounding them. Votes on non-controversial measures, such as the declaration of National

Milk Week, are intentionally left out of the sample. Similarly, we did not include votes on distributive measures so popular that they drew no opposition. (They don't call Social Security the "third rail" of American politics for nothing.) As noted above, votes on either of these types do not have any variance to explain. Of course, one might argue that lack of discord is characteristic of the politics of this policy type; as noted in Chapter 2, members of Congress have a tendency to form large, "universalistic" coalitions rather than minimum winning coalitions, $\frac{1}{2}N+1$. Many researchers have found that distributive policy is especially likely to see the formation of a universalistic coalition.⁵⁶ "Distributive policy making appear[s] to elicit consensus and cooperation rather than conflict and competition, the typical result being legislation that provided 'something for everyone' " (Collie 1988, 430; see also Fiorina 1981, p198). So, in fairness to distributive theorists, their theory seems to work the best for votes we are not examining.

Nevertheless, distributive theory fails when there is controversy – exactly what the partisan school of thought predicts. Partisan theorists do not, of course, claim that party leadership dictates rank and file votes on every motion. They are quite clear in that American parties in government are nothing like parties in parliamentary systems. What they do claim is that parties awaken when there is a need for them; parties rule "conditionally," as Rohde puts it. What we see here are those very conditions: any individual member would like to vote for any given distributive measure, if only to capture future

⁵⁶ Collie (1988, 428) notes that such a tendency has been found across several policy topics within the distributive type: public works (Mass 1951, Ferejohn 1974), appropriations (Fenno 1966), urban renewal (Plott 1968), land and resource management (Fenno 1973), elements of tax policy (Manley 1970), private bills (Froman 1967), tariffs (Schattschneider 1935), military procurement (Rundquist 1973), categorical grants-in-aid (Mayhew 1974), and even some social programs (Stockman 1975).

gains from exchange. However, over-distribution must be kept in check by the majority party's leadership so that the party's reputation for good government is maintained, leading to gains at the ballot box during the next election. In short, the party leadership has to prevent the boondoggles of over-distribution. When a voting outcome is close, when any given member could have a lot of future favors owed to him by changing his vote on a motion that is of little personal importance to him, the influence of the leadership cadre is at its peak. (This finding underscores the importance of the results of Chapter 3: the leadership cadre that is created does matter.) The original prediction was incorrect: party leadership *does* matter when making distributive policy. We must, to our surprise, reject hypothesis 3_n in favor of 3_a.

In addition to missing the mark on the influence of parties, distributive theory's predictions regarding the high demands of committees are also incorrect: committee members are not preference outliers when making distributive policy. Variable A, committee membership, is not significant at the $\alpha = 0.010$ level. (Even if accepted at the $\alpha = 0.050$ level, the substantive impact is very weak, but the coefficient's sign is in the wrong direction! That is, committee members would be less likely to distribute, *ceteris paribus*.) We fail to reject hypothesis 1_n in favor of 1_a.

As predicted by the policy perspective, floor members do take voting cues from committee members. Not surprisingly, the ideological composition of a committee is irrelevant to floor members: the floor does not care about the committee's signal in ideological terms.⁵⁷ Hence, we fail to reject hypothesis 2_n in favor of 2_{a1}. It is the *narrow in-*

⁵⁷ While variable B is significant, its sign is incorrect: the closer the committee median's ideology is to that of the floor member, the less influence they have on her vote.

terest of the committee median that is of concern to the floor voter. As the narrow interest of the committee median and the floor member converge, more weight is given to the voting cue of the committee, as evidenced by the slope of variable C. As predicted, we reject hypothesis 2_n in favor of 2_{a2}.

Our control variables, F and G, the ideology and narrow interests of floor members, are also determinants of the vote. To the amazement of no one, the narrow interests of individual House members are important when making decisions on distributive policies. We reject hypothesis 5_n in favor of 5_a. What is more surprising is that ideology has a statistically significant influence over distributive votes; variable F, Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE score of ideology, is negatively correlated with distributive voting (although the substantive impact is fairly small). That is, liberals are slightly more likely to be in favor of distribution than conservatives. We must, contrary to our original predictions, reject hypothesis 4_n in favor of 4_a.

Regulatory votes. Table 4.6 displays the results of the model of regulatory votes. In this case, the members of regulatory policy referent committees are not preference outliers relative to the floor. As predicted by informational and partisan theory, floor members need reliable information from referent committees; in this policy area, the floor constructs committees that reflect its own preferences. Hence, variable A, the committee membership dummy variable, does not achieve significance. Variable C, on the other hand, is significant and strong, indicating that floor members are strongly influenced by committee members with narrow interests like their own. Yet while floor members are looking for narrow-interest signals from the committee, they completely disregard the ideological signals that the committee sends. (Similar to what was observed in the model

of distributive voting, variable B is significant, but its sign is in the wrong direction. The closer a floor member is to the committee median in ideological terms, the *less* weight it gives to the ideological signal. Why this is the case is unclear; fortunately, the effect is not very strong.)

Variables D and E, the influence of party leaders on the vote, indicate that the majority and the minority leadership cadres have quite different influences on their respective members. The influence of the Democratic leaders is very strong (the most influential variable in the model, in fact), while the Republican leadership has no influence whatsoever over its rank-and-file. (Again, this is in keeping with partisan theory, which states that its predictions apply only to the governing majority party.) Variables F and G follow predictable patterns: liberal members are more willing to regulate, and members are strongly influenced by their own district-specific interests. Overall then, we see that members vote based on their own ideology and interests, but, members of the majority party are kept in check by a highly-influential leadership cadre.

Redistributive votes. The analysis of redistributive policy is striking for several reasons. Of the four types, this is the only case in which committee members are significant preference outliers. When making redistributive policy, the committee members are substantially more liberal in their voting than their colleagues on the floor. As shown in Table 4.7, variable A (the committee membership dummy) is significant and strong. The indifferent voter's probability of voting for a measure is increased 23.1% by being on a committee. We reject hypothesis 1_n in favor of 1_a.

Redistributive policy is often both highly technical and ideologically charged. The floor needs the expertise of committee members, but must weigh the committee's sig-

nal according to committee members' ideology and narrow interests. As evidenced by the slopes and standard errors of variables B and C, the floor members take the ideology and narrow interests of the committee members into account, and then use the resulting cues as aids in casting their own votes. We reject hypothesis 2_n in favor of 2_{a1} , and 2_n in favor of 2_{a2}

While, committees play an important role in signaling the floor when making redistributive policy, the same cannot be said for the party leadership cadres. The theoretically-more-important majority party leadership cadre exerts no influence over the rank and file. (The less important minority leadership does exert some influence. It appears that Republican party leaders may need to do some arm twisting on redistributive issues.)

In general, we fail to reject hypothesis 3_n . This failure to reject 3_n is important for at least two reasons. First, it illustrates the importance of differentiating between parties as labels and parties as organizations. No one will dispute the premise that Democrats are more in favor of redistribution than Republicans are; if this study had operationalized party in the conventional manner, coding 1 for Democrats, 0 for Republicans, we surely would have concluded that party is a strong determinant of voting on redistributive matters. This conclusion would have been both uninteresting and misleading: uninteresting in that everyone already knows that Democrats are more willing to redistribute; misleading in that it simply confounds the effects of partisanship and ideology. Of course Democrats are voting for redistribution, but not because they are Democrats, but rather because they are liberals.

This leads us to the second reason that this finding is important. We see a clear example of governing parties acting cohesively, but without being directed to do so. This

is the essence of partisan theory: party leaders only twist arms when they need to. On redistributive matters, party cohesion is achieved by letting rank-and-file Democrats do what they would do anyway: redistribute. The party is cohesive, but the Leviathan never had to be roused.

Finally, turning to the control variables, we see that ideology is the most important determinant of redistributive voting; liberals are strongly in favor of redistribution. The narrow interest score was also a determinant of the vote.

Comparisons of Voting Determinants across Policy Types

Having examined each of the voting models in isolation, we can now make comparisons among them. The major premise of the policy perspective is that different types of policy cause different types of politics. In this case, different types of politics should be associated with varying pressures on legislators. If this is the case, then the slopes of variables will differ between models. To test the hypothesis that slopes differ across policy types, we perform a t-test for the difference of slopes. Table 4.8 shows the results of the thirty-six tests. Table 4.9 displays a summary. Of the thirty-six tests performed, we find that there are significant differences between slopes result in twenty-five of the cases.⁵⁸ We take this as support of the policy perspective, and the major finding of this study: *different types of policy cause different types of politics to result.*

⁵⁸ One aspect of Tables 4.8 and 4.9 is a departure from standard statistical practices. Namely, it is generally incorrect to make direct comparisons of independent variable coefficients across models unless the models have exactly the same set of independent variables. The model of constituent votes that this study employs is different than the models of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive votes in that it does not contain a component to measure the narrow interests of House members. (That is, variables C and G are omitted.)

Several striking test results bear further discussion. The strongest differences are seen in the effects of ideology between constituent and distributive policy. Floor members are strongly influenced by their own ideology and the ideological signals sent by committee members when making constituent policy. When making distributive policy, on the other hand, ideology is not a consideration.

There is also considerable difference in the use of the party leadership cadres. Looking at the tests of variable D, we see differences in five of the six cases. Moreover, the most interesting result is where we see no difference. Surprisingly, we see a strong similarity between constituent and distributive policy types; while we would expect party effects to be strong in making constituent policy, they are also important when making distributive policy. As discussed above, we see party leaders acting to prevent too much distribution. Along the same lines, we see strong differences between constituent and redistributive policy, and distributive and redistributive policy, with regard to variable D,

ted.) Nevertheless, we do make direct comparisons. There are two reasons for this. First, as argued above, the model of constituent policy making captures precisely the same phenomenon as the other models; while there is not a direct measurement of a narrow interest, anything that could be implied by that term in this case is captured by the measure of ideology, variables B and F. While the equation may differ, the process that is being modeled is actually the same. Second, if we were to forego direct statistical comparisons and rely on qualitative judgments to determine differences between slope coefficients, we would be left with the nagging question: “how different are they *really*?” A good estimate is provided by simply violating the strict rule and running the test. This is actually a fairly common practice. For example, suppose we are comparing the means of two groups which are not samples, but are universes. Are the two groups different? Since the two groups are universes, not samples, *any* difference that we observe is real – it cannot be due to sampling error. But we are still left with the vexing question: “how different are they? Is 0.1 a big difference or a small one?” To quantify the difference we can simply run a t-test, which, strictly speaking, is used to test the differences in means between samples. This is a violation that will probably annoy statisticians, but it is a useful violation. In much the same manner, our tests across models help to quantify the differences between slope coefficients.

the cohesion of the majority party leaders. While party leadership was influential in making constituent and distributive policy, it did not have to be when making redistributive policy.

Table 4.9 shows a direct comparison of each type, a visual summary of the information shown in Table 4.8. Checks indicate differences in variables between types. The comparison of regulatory and redistributive politics is remarkable. It is fair to say that these policy types are characteristic of twentieth century politics, and yet, they are entirely different from one another: we see significant differences between the slopes of all seven of the variables.

Conclusion

Chapter 3 examined one type of constituent policy, the creation of the party leadership cadres, and saw that the parties construct leadership groups that are representative of the party as a whole, and which are ideologically homogeneous. In this chapter we see how those leadership groups are put to use: the rank and file relies on their leadership when there is a need for collective action. We also see how the House creates its committees. In general, the committees are microcosms of the parent chamber; only when making redistributive policy were committees stocked with preference outliers. Floor members do take cues from committee members. In every case the floor members were influenced by the signals sent from the committee members. Considerations of ideology and district specific interests also come into play in the voting calculus. Most importantly, in comparing the policy types to one another, we see that they are indeed associ-

ated with different types of politics. The major premise is borne out by the empirical investigation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The results of this investigation are an important first step toward a policy-based theory of legislative organization. Contrary to those who have dismissed the possibility of a policy-based theory of Congress (Krehbiel 1991, 7-14), it has been demonstrated that by using a theoretically-derived policy taxonomy, analytic power is gained, and our understanding of legislative organization and outcomes is enhanced. Different policies put different pressures on legislators, and different politics result. At some times legislators have pressures for the distribution of legislative spoils, while in other instances, informational needs take precedence. In some cases the strength of party leaders is influential; at other times their power lies dormant. Committee members supply valuable voting cues to floor voters at some points, while at others, the floor member has no need of a cue – their ideology and their constituent-specific narrow interests provide them with all of the “information” that they need.

The correlates of floor votes vary in their influence across policy types. Indeed, we take this as evidence to support Lowi's thesis: “a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.”

In the remaining pages of this work we summarize its major findings, point out some of their practical implications for those involved in the political process, and point to opportunities for future research.

Findings and Implications

Creating the State Machine: Selecting Party Leaders

Selecting House Speakers. The historical analysis of the selection of Speakers finds that ideology is, in the aggregate, not an important criterion in selecting a Speaker of the House. In six of the eighteen cases that were studied, the Speaker came from the extreme wing of his party, which would support the collective-choice-of-preference-outliers theory. But in looking to the most influential speakers in the sample, it is observed that while Reed came from the extreme right of the GOP, Cannon came from the extreme left of the party.

In sum, there seems to be neither a clear nor a systematic manner in which Speakers are chosen, at least with regard to ideological preference. The charisma / competence model of leadership – in which great individuals rise to the top to lead the many – is not in danger of being overturned by an ideology-based model of Speaker selection.

What could a newly-elected member of the House with aspirations of becoming Speaker glean from the findings presented here? In practice, the results imply that new Speakers can be drawn from any point on a party's ideological spectrum: having extreme views does not necessarily preclude a member from obtaining the Speakership. Leadership skills or a reputation for hard work (or some combination of these traits) will allow representatives from the ideological fringes of their caucus to aspire to the post. Never-

theless, young House members with aspirations for the position would be hard-pressed to take direction from these results. Granted, they would do well to work hard and have a good command of the issues and facts of concern to the nation. But it is not too useful to be told that what is really needed is a sort of *je ne sais quoi*. What they might be *able* to do is to jockey for a certain ideological position relative to the rest of their caucus; but the findings show that this has little bearing on election to the Speakership. So, should they conclude that they can take any ideological stance they wish if they want a leadership position in the chamber, or perhaps move to the extreme wing of their party (which seems to be a slightly better position for prospective Speakers)? Not exactly; should they miss the lofty goal of the Speakership and hope to fall into another party leadership position, then coming from the ideological fringes of the caucus is detrimental, as the results of Chapter 3 show. Moreover, even if a member could create the reputation needed for election to the post, it is highly unlikely that she could engineer the conditions necessary for the installation of a new Speaker. (Dennis Hastert probably never envisioned the situation that resulted in his election to the position.)

In addition to the practical implications, there are additional research implications for scholars. Because there are so few cases of election to the Speakership, quantitative analysis is difficult. Qualitative research is probably more appropriate for an in-depth investigation of the Speaker of the House. As ideology has not been found to be an important factor, an investigation and comparison of personality traits (in the tradition of Barber's (1992) analysis of Presidents) and historical circumstance is likely to bear more fruit.

Selecting Party Leaders. In Chapter 3 it was found that the chamber's ideological median, a member of the majority party by definition, selects leadership cadres near the floor median, but shifted toward the majority party's ideological median. In sum, a tension exists between the floor median and the majority party median; in a legislature without the constraints of partisanship, the floor median decides outcomes (Black 1958). However, because the floor median conducts her affairs as a member of the majority party, she is forced to defer to fellow partisans to some degree. The result is that the leadership of the floor is over-representative of the majority party. The analysis presented here supports a hybrid of informational and partisan theory, finding that the ideological composition of the leadership cadre is a "compromise" – a middle way that is a product of both the majority caucus and floor median's preferences.

In practical terms, this means that we should see leadership groups that are drawn from the left of the floor's center when Democrats are in power, and from the right of center when the GOP controls the chamber. Events of the last several years, (and of the next few years if surge and decline theory holds true), will provide the opportunity to test the hypothesis under the control of varying parties. Individual members seeking leadership positions would do well to position themselves near the floor median, but leaning toward their party's median.

The Homogeneity of Party Leaders. One surprising result of this study is that when forming leadership groups, congressional parties follow a pattern of ideological homogeneity. That is, members of the leadership cadres are packed tightly together in ideological terms, rather than covering a broad spectrum that reflects the party as a whole. This finding was doubly interesting in that the outcome is not predicted by the partisan

school of thought on legislative organization, but rather by the gains-from-exchange theorists. The irony is that the gains-from-exchange theory generally insists that party is an irrelevant force in legislative organization. Instead we find that parties are quite deliberate in selecting homogeneous leadership groups. Given what is known about parties in the post-reform House, the initial expectation was that the caucuses would select a diverse leadership which would be balanced on the whole, yet would provide a range of opinion by being ideologically spread out. The individual party member seeking a leadership position must therefore position himself near the floor's center, but shifted in the direction of the majority party, and must follow the cues of current party leaders closely in order to create a voting history of ideological homogeneity with the leadership cadre.

Scholars should take notice of these findings as well. Partisanship and party leadership in the House is not an unimportant factor, as many have asserted. Party leaders are drawn from a well-defined subset of legislators. At times, these party leaders send important voting cues to the rank and file, as is shown in Chapter 4. These findings raise a host of intriguing questions for the political scientist. For example, if an ideologically-defined subset of legislators can be predicted to become the party leaders, then what type of House district is likely to elect a legislator who holds the necessary ideological position? How are these districts alike, and do they receive any special legislative benefits because of their propensity to elect potential congressional leaders?

Floor Voting

Floor Voting Across Policy Types. In Chapter 4 it was determined that votes on certain policy types are more predictable than votes on other types. Constituent policy is the most predictable type, while distributive policy is the most resistant to systematic analysis. Future models of floor voting should account for this finding and assume that “logrolling” votes will be inherently more stochastic than will votes on motions with clear ideological components. Researchers should also not be surprised if, in the aggregate, measures of ideology show more long-term stability than do measures of support for policy in a particular substantive area, especially if a legislator has few direct narrow interests within a policy’s topical area.

Constituent Policy. The model of constituent voting estimated in Chapter 4 conforms to theoretical expectations. The politics of constituent policy are the politics of ideology, and parties are active as organizations. Members’ votes are based on their own ideology, the ideological cues of committee members, and the cohesiveness of their party’s leadership cadre.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Lowi (1972) predicts, for reasons that are ambiguous, that we will not see many constituent votes in a congressional (as opposed to a parliamentary) setting because strong parties are not to be found. Yet we do see many policies of this type – we had no trouble locating these for our sample. The analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4 indicates that party leadership groups are not hastily-thrown-together bodies of legislators, and that when action is called for, leadership cadres are capable of responding. In short, parties are stronger than Lowi assumes them to be – or at least ex-

hibit a different type of strength, a finding that is consistent with the other findings on party.

As noted in the review of the literature, studies that have employed the Lowi typology have tended to give short shrift to the type. Lowi's own 1972 paper is the prime example of this. Others have asked questions and designed research that avoids the constituent policy type; investigators study the differences in agencies that deal with and produce an abundance of regulatory, distributive, and redistributive policy (Ripley and Franklin 1986, 1991; Newman 1994). (It is, for all intents and purposes, impossible to conceive of an agency that deals primarily with constituent policy.) Finally, most research that concedes that there might indeed be types of policy focuses on the effects of regulation.

The results of this study show that Lowi's typology does indeed warrant further investigation, and that constituent policy differs from the other three types on several counts. Other scholars who employ the policy typology should take care to deviate from Lowi's example and examine constituent policy to the extent that it is feasible.

Distributive Policy. When casting distributive votes, the narrow interests of lawmakers are, not surprisingly, more influential than their ideology: liberals and conservatives alike vote for direct benefits to their districts. Floor members look to committee members who have interests that are closely aligned with their own and take their voting cues accordingly. Nevertheless, party leaders have a shocking amount of influence on rank-and-file votes on distribution. In fact, the most influential factor for members of the chamber when voting on distributive matters is the cue sent by the majority party's leadership cadre.

The conclusion of Chapter 4, in keeping with partisan theory, was that when necessary, partisan leaders can send important voting cues to members of the caucus so as to prevent the over-distribution of goods. Moreover, we can also conclude that if enough party leaders are against a piece of distribution, the members of the party will not vote for it. Hence, party leaders can use their own floor votes as a way of rewarding and punishing members of the caucus: they can vote as a bloc against distribution benefiting party members who have failed to toe the party line and know that the rest of the rank-and-file will follow their lead. Conversely, the party member who wants to secure the benefits of distribution for her district is well advised to comply with the party leadership when the leaders are acting in a unified manner.

Regulatory Policy. Regulatory policy is perhaps the most complex of all policy types in that it can be technically complex (requiring uninformed members to seek informational cues from committee members), ideologically charged, and has the likely outcome of rewarding some at the expense of others. Chapter 4 determined that members of regulatory policy referent committees are not preference outliers relative to the floor: in this policy area the floor constructs committees that reflect its own preferences, and the floor takes reliable⁵⁹ narrow-interest cues from the committee. Leaders of the majority party strongly influence the votes of their rank and file, but minority leaders have no effect on members of their caucus. Overall then, we see that members vote based on their

⁵⁹ Reliable in the sense that floor members can be sure that committee members are not obscuring information in order to benefit themselves at the expense of the floor. Krehbiel (1991, 68) states that “[i]ncomplete ‘policy information’ is explicitly characterized by assuming that legislators are uncertain about the relationship between policies and outcomes.... Formally, $x = p + \omega$, where x is the outcome in R^1 , p is a policy in R^1 , and ω is a (cont’d.)

own ideology and interests, but, members of the theoretically-critical majority party are kept in check by a highly-influential leadership cadre.

Two points of practical and academic interest arise here. Regulatory policy does indeed have a distributive component, as evidenced by the importance of narrow interests in the voting calculus. Regulation may well be another mechanism for the distribution of particularistic benefits within a legislature. However, it is important to note that as was the case with distributive policy, party leaders play a vital role in keeping particularism in check. Members of the rank and file can only roll so many logs: they must also consider the signals sent by party leaders.

Redistributive Policy. It was found that of the four types, redistributive policy is the only area in which committee members are preference outliers relative to the floor. When making redistributive policy, the committee members are substantially more redistributive in their voting than their colleagues on the floor. Floor members account for the ideology and narrow interests of committee members; the cues become significant parts of the voting equation when casting their own votes. Floor members are therefore advised to weigh carefully the signals of committee members.

In contrast to committees, party leadership plays little if any role in forming redistributive policy. We take this as evidence that parties can act cohesively without needing to have pressure applied from a leadership group flexing its legislative muscle, underscoring the work of Rohde, and Cox and McCubbins in particular. The party agenda is furthered in this case by letting the members do what they want to do.

random variable whose precise value is unknown....” In the case of regulatory policy therefore, we have found that the uncertainty term ω has been minimized.

Inter-policy Comparisons. Comparing voting models to one another demonstrates further that different types of policy result in different types of politics. Most notably, House members are strongly influenced by their own ideology and the ideological signals sent by committee members when making constituent policy. When making distributive policy, on the other hand, ideology is not a consideration. In terms of the party leadership's influence, a strong similarity is observed between constituent and distributive policy types; while we would expect partisanship to be strong while making constituent policy, it is also an important factor in making distributive policy for the reasons discussed above. Along the same lines, we see strong differences between constituent and redistributive policy, and distributive and redistributive policy, with regard to the cohesion of the majority party leaders. While party leadership was influential in making constituent and distributive policy, it did not have to be when making redistributive policy.

That the model of floor voting had significantly different slope coefficients when used to compare the various policy types is the single most important finding of this research endeavor. The implication for scholars of legislatures is that they must begin to account for the type of policy in question before making broad claims regarding the organization of legislatures and behavior of legislators. For example, if we want to come to a conclusion about whether or not parties are active as organizations, we must ask, *with regard to what type of policy?* Parties are active at some time, inactive at others. Similarly, committee members are preference outliers at some time, representative of the parent chamber at other times. Members' ideology dominates some debates, while it is absent in others. Whether or not any of these factors are influential is predicated upon the type of policy under consideration.

Future Research

Given the findings of this study, further research on congressional organization and behavior focused through the lens of the policy perspective is justified. Chapter 3 indicates that parties are more than mere collections of like-minded legislators. Chapter 4 shows that majority party leaders play a pivotal role in the creation of constituent, distributive, and regulatory policy. Their effect was not felt when making redistributive policy. Hence, the summary dismissals of parties as irrelevant legislative forces, so common in the 1970s and 1980s, are clearly inappropriate. Scholars can expect that the partisan school of thought that began to develop in the 1990s will continue to attract the interest of researchers.

Committees, which have been studied obsessively since the 1960s are an important ingredient in the congressional soup; they are not the only ingredient, however. Committees are outliers at some times, representative of the parent chamber at others. The study of legislative signaling games can benefit from the practice adopted in this thesis; committees send complex signals, and members of the floor weight these signals according to their own ideology and narrow interests.

Of course, few single works are exhaustive. This investigation, like most others, raises more questions than it answers, and the possibilities for future research are extensive. The following examples serve as a sketch for a research agenda.

This investigation studied floor motions that were fairly pure examples of the theoretical types; the justification was that if the thesis was not borne out by examination of pure types, then there was little reason to pursue further research. If the thesis was supported by the pure types, then an investigation of more complex cases would be war-

ranted. This is where we now stand: attention should now be turned to the design of research that can dissect complex bundles of policy and determine the politics that result from it.

Floor votes are an important component of legislative life. However, a great deal must happen before a motion reaches the floor. A myriad of opportunities exist for examining the policy perspective at the committee and subcommittee level. Many of the questions asked about the floor-committee relationship can be asked about the committee-subcommittee dynamic: how do relatively uninformed committee members take signals from the highly-informed subcommittee members? What are the role of ideology, narrow interests, and party in this situation?

One of the central facts shaping the design of this research is that committees are designed around policy topics, not policy types. A single committee handles policy of many, if not all, of the types. However, this does not hold as true at the subcommittee level. We may well be able to determine certain subcommittees that handle predominantly one type of legislation. Within the Agriculture Committee, for example, one subcommittee deals with food stamps, a redistributive issue, while others distribute subsidies to farmers. A comparison of the politics within and between these subcommittees may prove to be enlightening.

Just as a great deal of politicking goes on before a motion reaches the floor, a great deal goes on afterward; the politics of conference committees provide another opportunity to test hypotheses generated by the policy perspective. And while we are on the subject of conference committees, we must begin to ponder the workings of the Senate with regard to Lowi's dictum.

Finally, this research, like most other congressional investigations, would benefit from being exposed to cases generated outside of Washington, D.C. The theoretical work of Arrow, Black, Downs, and others is not about Congress, or even about legislatures, but about groups of people in democratic settings. There are fifty state legislatures and countless city council chambers to which we could turn our eye. A stronger scholarly connection between those who study our national legislature and state and local politics would surely prove to be interesting and informative.

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APPENDIX 1

DESCRIPTION OF VOTES

This appendix lists the eighty-two roll call votes used in the analysis of voting in the 103rd House. Votes were selected based on their conformity to Lowi's typology. We also attempt to cover a wide variety of voting *topics* within each *type*, and to choose votes for which a sizable minority exists. The identification number listed with each vote indicates its number in the Congressional record. For example, 1:51 indicates that the vote was from the first session, vote 51. Each vote within the distributive, regulatory, redistributive types is paired with an interest group which rates members of Congress on a particular policy issue; the rating of that group is used in the model of roll call voting. Descriptions of the votes are provided by *Congressional Quarterly*, and are available electronically from the ICPSR's data base.

Constituent Policy

- 1) 1:51 HR20. Hatch Act Revision/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes106) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to amend the 1939 Hatch Act barring federal employees from most political activities, to allow federal employees and postal workers to run for office, hold positions in political parties and volunteer for campaigns during non-working hours. Adopted 249-163: R 6-161; D 242-2 (ND 163-2, SD 79-0); I 1-0, March 3, 1993.

Referent Committee: Post Office and Civil Service

- 2) 1:120 HRES107. 1993 Committee Funding Resolution/Recommit to Reduce Funding. Dunn, R-Wash., motion to recommit the resolution to the House Administration Committee with instructions to report it back with an amendment reducing the funding level of each committee to specified amounts averaging 25 percent less than last year and requiring that at least one-third of the funds for each committee be available to the minority party. Motion rejected 171-246: R 168-1; D 3-244 (ND 2-162, SD 1-82); I 0-1, March 30, 1993.

Referent Committee: Administration

- 3) 1:129 HR2. National Voter Registration/Instruct Conferees. Thomas, R-Calif., motion to instruct the House conferees to accept the Senate provisions that al-

low states to register people to vote at public assistance or unemployment compensation agencies, rather than requiring it, as the House bill does. Motion rejected 192-222: R 170-0; D 22-221 (ND 8-156, SD 14-65); I 0-1, April 1, 1993.

Referent Committee: Administration

- 4) 1:133 HR1430. Temporary Debt Limit Increase/Passage. Passage of the bill to temporarily increase the public debt limit by \$225 billion from \$4.145 trillion to \$4.370 trillion through Sept. 30, 1993, to provide sufficient borrowing authority for the federal government to meet its obligations. Passed 237-177: R 2-165; D 234-12 (ND 159-6, SD 75-6); I 1-0, April 2, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committee: Ways and Means

- 5) 1:144 HR1578. Expedited Rescissions/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes149) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to allow the president to propose to rescind any part of an appropriations bill and require Congress to vote on that rescission proposal within a specified period. The bill would expire two years after enactment. Adopted 212-208: R 2-165; D 210-42 (ND 138-30, SD 72-12); I 0-1, April 28, 1993.

Referent Committees: Government Operations; Rules

- 6) 1:187 HR2118. Fiscal 1993 Supplemental Appropriations/Funds Transfers. Wolf, R-Va., amendment to eliminate the provisions allowing the White House to transfer funds between White House accounts. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 165-267: R 165-9; D 0-257 (ND 0-173, SD 0-84); I 0-1, May 26, 1993.

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 7) 1:216 HR2348. Fiscal 1994 Legislative Branch Appropriations/Recommit. Young, R-Fla., motion to recommit the bill to the House Appropriations Committee with instructions to report it back with an amendment reducing various accounts in the bill by 5 percent. Motion rejected 202-209: R 168-0; D 34-208 (ND 17-148, SD 17-60); I 0-1, June 10, 1993.

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 8) 1:247 HR1876. GATT Fast-Track Extension/Passage. Passage of the bill to extend through April 15, 1994, the administration's authority to negotiate an accord strengthening the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and require Congress to consider the accord under expedited procedures that bar amendments. Passed 295-126: R 150-23; D 145-102 (ND 97-70, SD 48-32); I 0-1, June 22, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committee: Ways and Means

- 9) 1:256 HR2403. Fiscal 1994 Treasury-Postal Appropriations/Customs Service Cut. Separate vote at the request of Kolbe, R-Ariz., on the amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole offered by Penny, D-Minn., to cut the U.S. Customs Service appropriation by \$4 million to the amount requested by the administration. Adopted 269-141: R 113-57; D 156-83 (ND 101-60, SD 55-23); I 0-1, June 22, 1993. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, the four delegates and the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico cannot vote. See vote 241.)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 10) 1:396 HR2330. Intelligence Authorization/Public Disclosure. Frank, D-Mass., amendment to require public disclosure of aggregate amounts associated with the bill. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 169-264: R 6-166; D 162-98 (ND 131-46, SD 31-52); I 1-0, Aug. 4, 1993.

Referent Committee: Intelligence; Armed Services

- 11) 1:458 HRES134. Discharge Petition Disclosure/Adoption. Adoption of the resolution to make public the signatures of members on discharge petitions. Adopted 384-40: R 174-0; D 209-40 (ND 139-26, SD 70-14); I 1-0, Sept. 28, 1993.

Referent Committee: Rules

- 12) 1:595 HR51. D.C. Statehood/Passage. Passage of the bill to admit the District of Columbia into the union as the State of New Columbia. Rejected 153-277: R 1-172; D 151-105 (ND 123-49, SD 28-56); I 1-0, Nov. 21, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committee: District of Columbia

- 13) 1:605 HR3. Campaign Finance/Passage. Passage of the bill to give House candidates up to \$200,000 in federal benefits if they agree to voluntary spending limits of \$600,000. The sums would be indexed for inflation from 1992 forward, and a separate funding mechanism would be required. Passed 255-175: R 22-151; D 232-24 (ND 165-6, SD 67-18); I 1-0, Nov. 22, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committees: Administration; Judiciary

- 14) 2:4 HR3425. Department of Environmental Protection/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes312) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to elevate the Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet-level status. Rejected 191-227: R 5-167; D 185-60 (ND 140-28, SD 45-32); I 1-0, Feb. 2, 1994.

Referent Committee: Government Operations

- 15) 2:19 HR811. Independent Counsel Reauthorization/Congressional Coverage. Bryant, D-Texas, substitute amendment to Gekas, R-Pa., amendment to allow but not require the coverage of Congress under the bill. The Gekas amendment would require that independent counsels be used to examine or prosecute serious allegations involving members of Congress. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 230-188: R 2-167; D 227-21 (ND 164-9, SD 63-12); I 1-0, Feb. 10, 1994. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committee: Judiciary

- 16) 2:65 HJRES103. Balanced-Budget Constitutional Amendment/Passage. Passage of the joint resolution to propose a constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget by 2001 or the second fiscal year after ratification by three-fourths of the states, whichever is later. Congress could waive the balanced-budget requirement if three-fifths of the House and Senate approve deficit spending. It also could waive the requirement when a declaration of war was in effect or when there was a declared military threat to national security. Rejected 271-153: R 172-1; D 99-151 (ND 47-122, SD 52-29); I 0-1, March 17, 1994. (A two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting (283 in this case) is required to pass a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.) A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Referent Committee: Judiciary

- 17) 2:386 HR4822. Congressional Compliance/Previous Question. Beilenson, D-Calif., motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and the possibility of amendment) on adoption of the rule (HRes514) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to bring Congress into compliance with federal labor laws, including the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Family Leave Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Motion agreed to 247-185: R 1-176; D 245-9 (ND 168-4, SD 77-5); I 1-0, Aug. 10, 1994. (Subsequently, the rule was adopted by voice vote.)

Referent Committees: Administration; Education and Labor; Government Operations; Rules; Judiciary

- 18) 2:445 HR3171. Agriculture Department Reorganization/Agricultural Service Agency. Allard, R-Colo., amendment to eliminate the Agricultural Service Agency, which the bill would establish by consolidating the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, which manages crop subsidy programs, with the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the Farmers Home Administration. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 177-247: R 171-3; D 6-243 (ND 4-166, SD 2-77); I 0-1, Sept. 28, 1994.

Referent Committee: Agriculture

- 19) 2:449 S349. Lobbying Disclosure/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes550) to provide for House floor consideration of the conference report to expand the disclosure of lobbying activities and impose new restrictions on gifts to members of Congress and their staffs. Adopted 216-205: R 5-170; D 210-35 (ND 156-13, SD 54-22); I 1-0, Sept. 29, 1994.

Referent Committee: Judiciary

Distributive Policy

- 20) 1:66 HR4. National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Back Injury Study. Separate vote at the request of Solomon, R-N.Y., on the amendment adopted by voice vote in the Committee of the Whole offered by Gilman, R-N.Y., to conduct a study of back injuries. Adopted 305-109: R 94-78; D 210-31 (ND 140-22, SD 70-9); I 1-0, March 11, 1993. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, the delegates cannot vote.)

Interest Group Pair: American Public Health Association (APHA)

Referent Committee: Energy and Commerce

- 21) 1:68 HR4. National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Project Aries. Separate vote at the request of Solomon, R-N.Y., on the amendment adopted by voice vote in the Committee of the Whole offered by Sam Johnson, R-Texas, to prohibit further funding by NIH for Project Aries at the University of Washington at Seattle concerning the transmission of the HIV virus. Adopted 278-139: R 168-5; D 110-133 (ND 56-108, SD 54-25); I 0-1, March 11, 1993. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, the delegates cannot vote.)

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Energy and Commerce

- 22) 1:161 HR820. National Competitiveness/Civilian Technology Program. Meyers, R-Kan., en bloc amendment to reduce the authorization for the Civilian Technology Development Program to \$1 million in fiscal 1994 and \$10 million in fiscal 1995, shift the management of the program to the Small Business Administration and provide the government with a share of the profits. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 194-224: R 170-2; D 24-221 (ND 17-146, SD 7-75); I 0-1, May 12, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: Citizens Supporting Science (CSS)

Referent Committee: Science, Space, and Technology

- 23) 1:186 HR2118. Fiscal 1993 Supplemental Appropriations/Defense Spending. Andrews, D-Maine, amendment to cut the \$1.2 billion in the bill for Defense Department activities, which would have forced the Defense Department to finance the activities by cutting existing programs. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 188-244: R 46-128; D 141-116 (ND 103-69, SD 38-47); I 1-0, May 26, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: American Security Council (ASC)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 24) 1:263 HR2200. NASA Authorization/Space Station. Roemer, D-Ind., amendment to eliminate the seven-year \$12.7 billion authorization for the space station, authorizing \$825 million for costs associated with terminating the project. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 215-216: R 61-112; D 153-104 (ND 124-50, SD 29-54); I 1-0, June 23, 1993. A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: CSS

Referent Committee: Science, Space, and Technology

- 25) 1:296 HR2493. Fiscal 1994 Agriculture Appropriations/Market Promotion Program. Durbin, D-Ill., amendment to the Schumer, D-N.Y., substitute amendment to the Arney, R-Texas, amendment, to cut \$20 million from the Market Promotion Program. Schumer would cut \$57.7 million, and Arney would eliminate the program by cutting \$147.7 million. Adopted in Committee of the Whole 330-101: R 120-51; D 209-50 (ND 131-44, SD 78-6); I 1-0, June 29, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: National Farmers Union (NFU)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 26) 1:301 HR2493. Fiscal 1994 Agriculture Appropriations/Across-the-Board Cut. Myers, R-Ind., amendment to recommit the bill to the House Appropriations Committee with instructions to report it back with an amendment to cut the Commodity Credit Corporation by \$4.4 billion and all other programs by five percent. Motion rejected 172-255: R 152-19; D 20-235 (ND 10-161, SD 10-74); I 0-1, June 29, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: NFU

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 27) 1:331 HR2520. Fiscal 1994 Interior Appropriations/Coal Research and Energy Conservation Programs. Walker, R-Pa., amendment to cut fossil energy research and development by approximately \$50 million and increase energy conservation programs by approximately \$25 million. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 276-144: R 129-40; D 146-104 (ND 9-80, SD 57-24); I 1-0, July 15, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: League of Conservation Voters (LCV)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 28) 1:344 HR2519. Fiscal 1994 Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations/Small Business Administration. Separate vote at the request of Smith, D-Iowa, on the amendment adopted by voice vote July 1 in the Committee of the Whole offered by Penny, D-Minn., to cut \$22 million from the Small Business Administration. Rejected 183-242: R 143-29; D 40-212 (ND 24-144, SD 16-68); I 0-1, July 20, 1993. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, delegates cannot vote.)

Interest Group Pair: National Federation of Independent Businessmen (NFIB)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 29) 1:361 HR2200. NASA Authorization/CIESIN. Walker, R-Pa., amendment to cut the \$18 million in the bill for the Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN). Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 189-226: R 157-10; D 32-215 (ND 20-149, SD 12-66); I 0-1, July 23, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: CSS

Referent Committee: Science, Space, and Technology

- 30) 1:414 HR2401. Fiscal 1994 Defense Authorization/Technology Reinvestment Project. Schroeder, D-Colo., amendment to cut the Ballistic Missile Defense program by \$200 million and increase funding for the Technology Reinvestment Project by \$229 million. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 202-227: R 16-156; D 185-71 (ND 152-21, SD 33-50); I 1-0, Sept. 8, 1993. A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 31) 1:420 HR2401. Fiscal 1994 Defense Authorization/European Force Spending Cut. Frank, D-Mass., amendment to reduce funding for overseas forces in Europe by \$1 billion in fiscal 1994 with half the savings going to deficit reduction and half to economic conversion. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 210-216; R 28-143; D 181-73 (ND 146-26, SD 35-47); I 1-0, Sept. 9, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 32) 1:477 HR3116. Fiscal 1994 Defense Appropriations/D-5 Missile. Penny, D-Minn., amendment to eliminate the D-5 missile after fiscal 1993. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 178-248; R 33-137; D 144-111 (ND 124-48, SD 20-63); I 1-0, Sept. 30, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 33) 1:479 HR3116. Fiscal 1994 Defense Appropriations/Rifle Practice Board. Maloney, D-N.Y., amendment to eliminate the \$2.5 million for the Civilian Marksmanship Program. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 190-242; R 37-137; D 153-104 (ND 121-53, SD 32-51); I 0-1, Sept. 30, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: National Rifle Association

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 34) 1:483 HR1845. National Biological Survey/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes262) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to authorize \$180 million in fiscal 1994 and such sums as necessary in fiscal 1995-97 to establish a National Biological Survey to facilitate research and monitoring of America's biological and natural resources on an ecosystem basis. Adopted 238-188; R 11-164; D 226-24 (ND 161-6, SD 65-18); I 1-0, Oct. 6, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Merchant Marine and Fisheries; Natural Resources; Science, Space, and Technology

- 35) 1:496 HR1804. School Improvement/Passage. Passage of the bill to authorize \$427 million for fiscal 1994 for grants to states and local schools and for other costs associated with voluntary adoption of national education goals, standards and tests and improvements to public schools. Passed 307-118: R 57-116; D 249-2 (ND 165-2, SD 84-0); I 1-0, Oct. 13, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: National Education Association

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 36) 2:51 HCONRES218. Fiscal 1995 Budget Resolution/Defense Cuts. Frank, D-Mass., substitute amendment to reduce the \$263.3 billion in defense budget authority in the resolution by \$2.4 billion. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 105-313: R 12-160; D 92-153 (ND 82-85, SD 10-68); I 1-0, March 10, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Budget

- 37) 2:95 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/Passage. Passage of the bill to reauthorize the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act for six years through fiscal 1999, and to authorize \$12.7 billion in fiscal 1995 spending for federal elementary and secondary school programs. Passed 289-128: R 45-124; D 243-4 (ND 169-0, SD 74-4); I 1-0, March 24, 1994. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: NEA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 38) 2:126 HR4092. Omnibus Crime Bill/Prison Construction. Hughes, D-N.J., substitute amendment to the McCollum, R-Fla., amendment, to authorize \$3 billion over five years for state prison construction grants. The McCollum amendment would authorize \$10 billion and condition the grants on the state enactment of "Truth in Sentencing Laws," which require long prison terms and pre-trial detention for violent offenders. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 215-206: R 2-170; D 212-36 (ND 153-16, SD 59-20); I 1-0, April 19, 1994. (Subsequently, the McCollum amendment as amended was adopted by voice vote.)

Interest Group Pair: ACLU

Referent Committees: Judiciary; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; Government Operations

- 39) 2:151 HR3254. National Science Foundation Authorization/Authorization Cut. Boehlert, R-N.Y., amendment to reduce the bill's fiscal 1995 authorization by \$50 million and its fiscal 1996 authorization by \$158 million, to reflect figures in the House-passed budget resolution for fiscal 1995 (HConRes218). Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 227-197: R 169-3; D 58-193 (ND 38-132, SD 20-61); I 0-1, May 4, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: CSS

Referent Committee: Science, Space, and Technology

- 40) 2:189 HR4301. Fiscal 1995 Defense Authorization/Trident II (D-5) Missile Termination. Penny, D-Minn., amendment to terminate production of the Trident II (D-5) missile after fiscal 1994 and cut \$696 million from the Navy's weapons procurement account. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 166-229: R 35-128; D 130-101 (ND 107-46, SD 23-55); I 1-0, May 20, 1994. A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 41) 2:278 HR4603. Fiscal 1995 Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations/Revote GLOBE Program Revote as required when delegate votes provide the margin deciding an issue, as occurred on the Fields, R-Texas, amendment to cut \$7 million from funding for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The amendment was intended to eliminate the GLOBE Program (Global Learning and Observation to Benefit the Environment) proposed in the president's budget, which would create a global network of schoolchildren collecting environmental data. Rejected 184-184: R 144-5; D 40-178 (ND 23-125, SD 17-53; I 0-1, June 24, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 42) 2:364 HR4801. Small Business Administration Reauthorization/Rule. Moakley, D-Mass., motion to order the previous question (thus ending debate and the possibility of amendment) on adoption of the rule (HRes494) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to reauthorize the programs of the Small Business Administration for fiscal 1995-97. Motion agreed to 215-169: R 0-159; D 214-10 (ND 149-6, SD 65-4); I 1-0, July 29, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: NFIB

Referent Committee: Small Business

- 43) 2:404 S2182. Fiscal 1995 Defense Authorization/Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report to authorize \$263.7 billion in fiscal 1995 for the programs of the Department of Defense. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 280-137: R 57-113; D 223-23 (ND 147-20, SD 76-3); I 0-1, Aug. 17, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 44) 2:427 HR4801. Small Business Administration Reauthorization/Recommit. Kim, R-Calif., motion to recommit the bill to the Small Business Committee with instructions to report it back with an amendment to authorize the transfer of \$38 million from the State Department's fiscal 1995 appropriation to two Small Business Administration programs. Motion rejected 176-242: R 154-17; D 22-224 (ND 17-149, SD 5-75); I 0-1, Sept. 21, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: NFIB

Referent Committee: Small Business

Regulatory Policy

- 45) 1:22 HR1. Family and Medical Leave/Passage. Passage of the bill to require employers of more than 50 employees to provide 12 weeks of unpaid leave for an illness or to care for a new child or sick family member. Passed 265-163: R 40-134; D 224-29 (ND 162-8, SD 62-21); I 1-0, Feb. 3, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor; Post Office and Civil Service; Administration

- 46) 1:224 HR5. Striker Replacement/Passage. Passage of the bill to prohibit employers from hiring permanent replacements for striking union workers during economic strikes. Passed 239-190: R 17-157; D 221-33 (ND 169-1, SD 52-32); I 1-0, June 15, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: AFL-CIO

Referent Committee: Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Public Works and Transportation

- 47) 1:313 HR2492. Fiscal 1994 D.C. Appropriation/Domestic Partners. Istook, R-Okla., amendment to prohibit funds from enforcing the District's domestic Partners Ordinance which allows unmarried couples or partners to be eligible for benefits offered married couples. Adopted in Committee of the Whole 251-177; R 157-14; D 94-162 (ND 42-131, SD 52-31); I 0-1, June 30, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: Human Rights Campaign (HRC)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 48) 1:350 HR2010. National Service/Labor Union Consultation. Ballenger, R-N.C., amendment to eliminate the requirement that National Service applicants consult with local unions for their concurrence before engaging in similar work performed by local unions. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 153-276; R 143-30; D 10-245 (ND 0-174, SD 10-71); I 0-1, July 21, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: AFL-CIO

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 49) 1:460 HR2401. Fiscal 1994 Defense Authorization/Gay Ban. Meehan, D-Mass., amendment to strike the provisions codifying a ban on homosexuals in the military and express the sense of Congress that the issue should be determined by the president and his advisers. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 169-264; R 11-163; D 157-101 (ND 131-43, SD 26-58); I 1-0, Sept. 28, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: HRC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 50) 1:476 HR2403. Fiscal 1994 Treasury-Postal Appropriations/Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report to provide \$22,538,822,000 in new budget authority for the Treasury Department, the U.S. Postal Service, the Executive Office of the President and certain independent agencies in fiscal 1994. The administration requested \$22,006,136,000. The bill lifts a prohibition on federal employees' health insurance coverage of abortions. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 207-206; R 11-158; D 195-48 (ND 133-28, SD 62-20); I 1-0, Sept. 29, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL)

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 51) 1:487 HR2739. Airport Improvements/Child Restraints. Oberstar, D-Minn., substitute amendment to the Lightfoot, R-Iowa, amendment, to require airlines to provide child safety restraints upon request. The Lightfoot amendment would require the use of child safety restraints on airplanes. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 270-155: R 105-68; D 165-86 (ND 101-68, SD 64-18); I 0-1, Oct. 7, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Public Works and Transportation

- 52) 1:564 HR1025. Brady Bill/Passage. Passage of the bill to require a five-business-day waiting period before an individual could purchase a handgun to allow local officials to conduct a background check. Passed 238-189: R 54-119; D 184-69 (ND 138-31, SD 46-38); I 0-1, Nov. 10, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: NRA

Referent Committee: Judiciary

- 53) 1:578 HR796. Freedom of Access to Abortion Clinics/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes313) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to establish federal criminal and civil penalties for persons who use force, the threat of force, or physical obstruction to block access to abortion clinics. Adopted 233-192: R 18-156; D 214-36 (ND 146-23, SD 68-13); I 1-0, Nov. 18, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: NARAL

Referent Committee: Judiciary

- 54) 2:74 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/School Prayer. Williams, D-Mont., amendment to the Johnson, R-Texas, amendment, to prohibit states or school districts from using money received under the bill to adopt policies that prohibit voluntary school prayer. The Johnson amendment would withhold federal money from states or school districts that prohibit voluntary, constitutionally protected school prayer. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 171-239: R 7-161; D 163-78 (ND 132-35, SD 31-43); I 1-0, March 21, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: Christian Coalition (CC)

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 55) 2:76 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/Sex Education. Unsoeld, D-Wash., amendment to the Doolittle, R-Calif., amendment, to give local school systems discretion over whether sex education programs should teach abstinence as the only method that is completely effective as protection against unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. The Doolittle amendment would require schools receiving money under the bill to teach abstinence as the only completely effective protection. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 262-166: R 53-119; D 208-47 (ND 156-19, SD 52-28); I 1-0, March 22, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 56) 2:91 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/Obscene Material. Unsoeld, D-Wash., amendment to the Hancock, R-Mo., amendment, to prohibit educational agencies from using money received under the bill to distribute obscene material to minors on school grounds. The amendment also prohibits federal control of school curriculums at the state and local levels. The Hancock amendment would prohibit local educational agencies receiving money under the bill from carrying out programs that encourage or support homosexuality as a positive lifestyle alternative. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 224-194: R 27-139; D 196-55 (ND 154-17, SD 42-38); I 1-0, March 24, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: HRC

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 57) 2:109 HR4092. Omnibus Crime Bill/Death Penalty Instructions. Gekas, R-Pa., amendment to make it easier for juries or courts to impose the death penalty by establishing instructions concerning weighing aggravating factors against mitigating ones. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 226-198: R 166-5; D 60-192 (ND 29-144, SD 31-48); I 0-1, April 14, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: ACLU

Referent Committee: Judiciary; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; Government Operations

- 58) 2:122 HR4092. Omnibus Crime Bill/Three-Time Drug Offenders. Solomon, R-N.Y., amendment to allow a serious drug offense to count as a violent offense for the purpose of imprisoning three-time violent offenders for life. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 303-126: R 172-1; D 131-124 (ND 75-100, SD 56-24); I 0-1, April 19, 1994. A "nay" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: ACLU

Referent Committee: Judiciary; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; Government Operations

- 59) 2:131 HR4092. Omnibus Crime Bill/Racial Justice. McCollum, R-Fla., amendment to delete the provisions that allow the use of statistical evidence to make a claim of racial discrimination by inmates seeking to overturn death sentences. The amendment would have substituted provisions banning the use of such statistics and required jurors to sign certificates in death penalty cases that race had not been a factor in their deliberations. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 212-217: R 164-5; D 48-211 (ND 16-161, SD 32-50); I 0-1, April 20, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: ACLU

Referent Committee: Judiciary; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; Government Operations

- 60) 2:135 HR4092. Omnibus Crime Bill/Made in America. Traficant, D-Ohio, amendment to establish penalties for those convicted of fraudulently labeling products as "Made in America." Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 310-116: R 129-43; D 180-73 (ND 118-56, SD 62-17); I 1-0, April 20, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: AFL-CIO

Referent Committee: Judiciary; Education and Labor; Energy and Commerce; Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs; Government Operations

- 61) 2:156 HR4296. Assault Weapons Ban/Passage. Passage of the bill to ban the manufacture and possession of 19 types of semiautomatic weapons and high-capacity ammunition clips but exempt existing guns and about 670 guns that are deemed to have a legitimate sporting purpose. Passed 216-214: R 38-137; D 177-77 (ND 137-34, SD 40-43); I 1-0, May 5, 1994. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: NRA

Referent Committee: Judiciary

- 62) 2:173 HR2473. Montana Wilderness/Multiple Use of Released Lands. Bryant, D-Texas, amendment to require the Forest Service to preserve native biodiversity on lands used for timber purposes and released for multiple-use management, and to prohibit clear-cutting and road construction on released lands. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 142-283: R 32-141; D 109-142 (ND 84-91, SD 25-51); I 1-0, May 17, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Merchant Marine and Fisheries

- 63) 2:219 HR4301. Fiscal 1995 Defense Authorization/Medical Conditions Separation Requirement. Harman, D-Calif., amendment to modify the section of the bill that requires the services to discharge military personnel who are "permanently non-worldwide assignable" as a result of medical conditions such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes or HIV-positive status. The amendment would give the service secretaries discretion to retain individuals if doing so would not adversely affect the ability of the services to carry out their missions. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 227-192: R 27-144; D 199-48 (ND 154-16, SD 45-32); I 1-0, June 8, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: ASC

Referent Committee: Armed Services

- 64) 2:231 HR518. California Desert Protection/Motorized Vehicle Use. Pombo, R-Calif., amendment to allow the continued use of motorized vehicles on 200 roads and trails in areas designated as wilderness by the bill. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 169-191: R 135-20; D 34-171 (ND 16-133, SD 18-38); I 0-0, June 10, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Natural Resources; Merchant Marine and Fisheries

- 65) 2:316 HR518. California Desert Protection/Hunting Exception. LaRocco, D-Idaho, en bloc amendment to designate the East Mojave Scenic Area a national preserve rather than a national park, thus permitting hunting, fishing and trapping to continue in the East Mojave Scenic Area. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 239-183: R 146-26; D 92-157 (ND 39-131, SD 53-26); I 1-0, July 12, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Natural Resources; Merchant Marine and Fisheries

- 66) 2:339 HR1188. Insurance Anti-Redlining Disclosure/Reasons for Denial. Fields, D-La., amendment to require that in addition to other reports made to the Commerce Department, insurers be required to report the reasons when they deny new insurance or decline to renew existing policies. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 123-305: R 3-173; D 119-132 (ND 91-83, SD 28-49); I 1-0, July 20, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: NAACP

Referent Committee: Energy and Commerce

- 67) 2:353 HR3870. Environmental Technologies/Risk Assessment. Walker, R-Pa., amendment to establish specific criteria for assessing environmental risks and for making comparisons among categories of risks. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 286-139: R 174-0; D 112-138 (ND 59-110, SD 53-28); I 0-1, July 26, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: LCV

Referent Committee: Science, Space, and Technology

- 68) 2:361 HR2448. Radon Gas Disclosure/Passage. Passage of the bill to require property owners to provide pamphlets approved by the Environmental Protection Agency on radon hazards and disclose the results of any known radon tests when selling or renting property and to create programs to increase public awareness of the dangers of radon gas. Passed 255-164: R 29-143; D 225-21 (ND 158-9, SD 67-12); I 1-0, July 28, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Energy and Commerce

Redistributive Policy

- 69) 1:53 HR920. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Benefits Provisions. Motion to agree to Sections 1 through 6 of the Senate amendment to the bill to provide \$5.7 billion to allow for the processing of claims from March 6 through Oct. 2 for federal extended emergency unemployment benefits and designate the funding as emergency spending and thus exempt from the 1990 budget agreement pay-as-you-go rules. Motion agreed to 247-156: R 30-137; D 216-19 (ND 153-5, SD 63-14); I 1-0, March 4, 1993. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: AFL-CIO

Referent Committee: Ways and Means

- 70) 1:84 HCONRES64. Fiscal 1994 Budget Resolution/Black Caucus Substitute. Mfume, D-Md., amendment incorporating the Congressional Black Caucus budget substitute to provide for additional defense cuts and tax increases, with the resulting funds being used for education, job training, health and other domestic programs. Rejected 87-335: R 1-167; D 85-168 (ND 69-101, SD 16-67); I 1-0, March 18, 1993. (During consideration in the Committee of the Whole)

Interest Group Pair: FCNL (Friends Committee on National Legislation)

Referent Committee: Budget

- 71) 1:142 HR1335. Fiscal 1993 Supplemental Appropriations. Natcher, D-Ky., motion to concur in the Senate amendment to eliminate all of the House provisions implementing the administration's economic stimulus package except for the \$4 billion for extended unemployment benefits. The funds are designated as emergency spending and thus exempt from the spending caps of the 1990 budget agreement. Motion agreed to (thus clearing the bill for the president) 301-114: R 69-99; D 231-15 (ND 161-3, SD 70-12); I 1-0, April 22, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: AFL-CIO

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 72) 1:189 HR2244. Fiscal 1993 Supplemental Appropriations/Youth Stipends. Burton, R-Ind., en bloc amendment to eliminate the \$80 million earmark for the Youth Fair Chance Program and strip language that would provide individuals ages 14 through 30 with stipends for transportation, food, grooming and other basic necessities to help with education and training while they participate in paid work experience and classroom programs. Rejected in Committee of the Whole 176-251: R 167-4; D 9-246 (ND 4-168, SD 5-78); I 0-1, May 26, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 73) 1:286 HR2491. Fiscal 1994 VA, HUD Appropriations/HOPE. Separate vote at the request of Stokes, D-Ohio, on the amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole offered by Kolbe, R-Ariz., to increase funding for Homeownership and Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) grants by \$10 million by transfers from HUD's policy and research development account. Adopted 216-204: R 165-4; D 51-199 (ND 17-149, SD 34-50); I 0-1, June 29, 1993. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, the four delegates and the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico cannot vote. See vote 280.)

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 74) 1:328 HR2264. Fiscal 1993 Budget-Reconciliation/Substitute Motion to Instruct Conferees. Sabo, D-Minn., substitute amendment to the Kasich, R-Ohio, motion to instruct the House conferees to accept the Senate's higher threshold for taxing Social Security benefits. The Sabo amendment would omit the provisions of the Kasich motion to direct conferees to accept the lower levels of new spending in the Senate bill. Adopted 235-183: R 0-170; D 234-13 (ND 158-5, SD 76-8); I 1-0, July 14, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Budget

- 75) 1:505 HR3167. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes273) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to extend emergency benefits for the long term unemployed. The rule included a self-executing amendment to the bill that would have shortened the emergency benefits program by one month from Feb. 5, 1994 to Jan. 1, 1994 and eliminated the financing provisions of the bill that limit the availability of certain welfare benefits to new immigrants. Rejected 149-274: R 2-171; D 146-103 (ND 111-57, SD 35-46); I 1-0, Oct. 14, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Ways and Means

- 76) 1:507 HR3167. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Rule. Adoption of the rule (HRes265) to provide for House floor consideration of the bill to provide about \$1 billion for extended unemployment benefits for workers who have exhausted their 26 weeks of state unemployment benefits for an additional seven or 13 weeks of compensation, depending on the unemployment rate in their state. The bill would require legal immigrants to wait five years to become eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income payments. Adopted 239-150: R 24-137; D 214-13 (ND 149-6, SD 65-7); I 1-0, Oct. 15, 1993.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Ways and Means

- 77) 2:40 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/Transition Projects. Boehner, R-Ohio, amendment to eliminate the innovative elementary school transition projects in the bill. Title I provides grants to school districts, particularly high-poverty districts. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 128-287; R 114-57; D 14-229 (ND 10-158, SD 4-71); I 0-1, March 3, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: NEA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 78) 2:93 HR6. Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization/School Construction. Miller, R-Fla., amendment to strike the \$200 million authorization in fiscal 1995 for low-interest direct loans to poor school districts for construction and renovation projects. The program was not included in the Clinton administration's original proposal. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 181-235; R 149-18; D 32-216 (ND 17-151, SD 15-65); I 0-1, March 24, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: NEA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

- 79) 2:302 HR4606. Fiscal 1995 Labor, Health and Human Services Appropriations/Community Health Centers. Separate vote at the request of Smith, D-Iowa, on the amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole offered by Porter, R-Ill., to increase spending on community health centers and rural health outreach grants by \$100 million and offset the increased spending by a corresponding reduction in the administrative and enforcement accounts of the bill. Rejected 211-217; R 173-3; D 38-213 (ND 7-163, SD 31-50); I 0-1, June 29, 1994. (On separate votes, which may be demanded on an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole, the four delegates and the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico cannot vote. See vote 294.)

Interest Group Pair: APHA

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 80) 2:307 HR4624. Fiscal 1995 VA, HUD Appropriations/Assisted Housing. Smith, R-Mich., amendment to cut the accounts for new construction and reconstruction of public housing by \$448 million and increase the amount provided for rental assistance under the Section 8 existing housing certificate program and the housing voucher program by \$179 million. Rejected in the Committee of the Whole 162-269; R 148-29; D 14-239 (ND 5-167, SD 9-72); I 0-1, June 29, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Appropriations

- 81) 2:348 HR3838. Fiscal 1995-96 Housing Reauthorization/Illegal Immigrant Benefits. Kim, R-Calif., amendment, as amended, to prohibit illegal immigrants from receiving benefits under the Food and Shelter Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as contained in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 (PL 100-77). Before being adopted, the Kim amendment was modified by a Roukema, R-N.J., amendment (adopted by a standing vote of 235-0) to provide an exception when a national disaster is declared by the president. Adopted in the Committee of the Whole 220-176; R 158-3; D 62-172 (ND 28-133, SD 34-39); I 0-1, July 22, 1994.

Interest Group Pair: FCNL

Referent Committee: Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs

- 82) 2:456 HR6. Elementary and Secondary School Reauthorization/Conference Report. Adoption of the conference report to reauthorize for five years the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, providing \$12.7 billion to help disadvantaged students. Adopted (thus sent to the Senate) 262-132; R 31-128; D 230-4 (ND 161-2, SD 69-2); I 1-0, Sept. 30, 1994. A "yea" was a vote in support of the president's position.

Interest Group Pair: NEA

Referent Committee: Education and Labor

APPENDIX 2

DERIVATION OF $f(d_i)$, $f(d_n)$, AND PARTY LEADERSHIP COHESION SCORES

$$f(d_i) = 1 - \frac{|\text{floor member's NOMINATE score} - \text{referent committee majority's median NOMINATE}|}{\text{Vote of the committee median}}$$

$$(d_n) = |\text{member's narrow score} - \text{referent committee majority's median narrow score}|$$

$$f(d_n) = \begin{cases} \text{if } d_n > 3 \text{ (i.e., 3 std. dev.) then } f(d_n) = -1 * \text{Vote of the committee median} \\ \text{else } f(d_n) = 1 - (d_n/1.5) * \text{Vote of the committee median} \end{cases}$$

Party leadership cohesion is calculated using the Rice (1928) cohesion index = (yes votes – no votes) / (yes votes + no votes), or in this case (liberal votes – conservative votes) / (liberal votes + conservative votes)

APPENDIX 3

Coding the Dependent Variable

When coding the dependent variable, a common point of reference is needed so that votes coded as “1” mean the same thing across motions. Simply coding “yes” as “1” and “no” as “-1” will yield meaningless results. A standard is needed so that “1” always means the same thing. The decision rule that was used was to code liberal votes as 1, and conservative votes as -1, as judged by a vote’s correlation with Poole and Rosenthal’s NOMINATE score.

The (apparent) problem with this approach, however, is that not all votes will be ideological votes, necessarily. Consider the effect of using the ideological coding scheme described above. If the first variable in the model, A , is not significant, we would conclude that the committees are not composed of preference outliers. However, this is not really the issue in all cases: we do not care if the Agriculture Committee is ideologically biased – we want to know if it is biased in its demand for agricultural benefits. To determine this, we would need a different coding scheme for the dependent variable. We want votes coded 1 to reflect a vote in favor of the *narrow interest* -- agriculture, in this case. Alternatively, votes might be cast along neither ideological nor narrow-interest cleavages; they might be cast along partisan lines. We would need yet another coding scheme.

Given this view, we would need to create the dependent variable in three ways: V_{lib} will be constructed so that +1 is the liberal vote, and -1 is the conservative vote. V_{nar}

will be coded +1 if it is positively correlated with the narrow interest in question, -1 otherwise. V_{dem} will be coded +1 if it is positively with Democratic voting, -1 otherwise.

In the end, however, there is no need for concern on this point. As it turns out, V_{lib} and V_{dem} are the same: the liberal vote and the Democratic vote always coincide, at least within our sample; the reason for this is fairly obvious. Additionally, V_{nar} also turns out to be the same as V_{lib} . The reason here is less clear at first. But consider: we want to know if a vote is in accord with a given narrow interest. The question arises, whose narrow interest? On a proposed environmental regulation, should we look at a vote's correlation with the League of Conservation Voters' scorecard, or to its relationship with ratings given by the National Federation of Independent Businessmen? The problem is not that different groups give ratings, nor even that their notions of what good legislation is is completely opposite. The true problem arises when we want to include votes of many diverse policy topics in our analysis. While we can make the case that any given vote is pro-environmental or pro-business, it is not readily comparable to a vote on public health, or defense, or highway funding. There is one way to standardize votes for direction, so that a positive vote always means the same thing across many policy topics: the standard to use is ideology. The narrow-interest vote, once standardized so as to be comparable with votes on other policy topics, again becomes synonymous with the ideological vote. (Note that this is consistent with Poole and Rosenthal's (1998) finding that both interest groups and legislators are generally ideologically consistent over time during the 1959 to 1981 period.) In the end, therefore, we do not need to worry about the coding of the dependent variable too much. We simply adjust so that liberal votes are coded 1, conservative as -1, and analyze the decision using logit analysis.

APPENDIX 4

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN THE MODEL OF FLOOR VOTING

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N	Label
Constituent Votes						
V _{lib}	-0.05	1	-1	1	8003	Vote
A	0.1	0.3	0	1	8417	Committee Member
B	0.18	0.56	-1	1	8303	Committee Ideol. Signal
D	0.39	0.46	-0.43	1	8417	Dem. Leadership
E	-0.38	0.47	-1	0	8417	Rep. Leadership
F	-0.11	0.47	-0.96	1	8303	Nominate
Distributive Votes						
V _{lib}	0.05	1	-1	1	10448	Vote
A	0.14	0.34	0	1	11075	Committee Member
B	0.07	0.58	-1	1	10925	Committee Ideol. Signal
C	0.05	0.56	-1	1	10915	Committee Narrow Signal
D	0.32	0.43	-0.52	1	11075	Dem. Leadership
E	-0.31	0.42	-1	0.11	11075	Rep. Leadership
F	-0.11	0.47	-0.96	1	10925	Nominate
G	0	0.97	-2.19	2.04	10915	Narrow
Regulatory Votes						
V _{lib}	-0.07	1	-1	1	10087	Vote
A	0.18	0.38	0	1	10632	Committee Member
B	0.05	0.56	-1	1	10488	Committee Ideol. Signal
C	0.01	0.58	-1	1	10474	Committee Narrow Signal
D	0.3	0.41	-0.62	0.9	10632	Dem. Leadership
E	-0.32	0.42	-1	0	10632	Rep. Leadership
F	-0.11	0.47	-0.96	1	10488	Nominate
G	0	0.96	-2.02	1.93	10474	Narrow
Redistributive Votes						
V _{lib}	0.09	1	-1	1	5803	Vote
A	0.11	0.31	0	1	6202	Committee Member
B	0.32	0.51	-0.99	1	6118	Committee Ideol. Signal
C	0.2	0.54	-1	1	6110	Committee Narrow Signal
D	0.48	0.44	0	1	6202	Dem. Leadership
E	-0.35	0.44	-1	0	6202	Rep. Leadership
F	-0.11	0.47	-0.96	1	6118	Nominate
G	0	0.97	-2.02	1.97	6110	Narrow