LUCAN'S CHARACTERIZATION OF CAESAR THROUGH SPEECH

by

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(Under the Direction of Thomas Biggs)

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Caesar's three extended battle exhortations in Lucan's *Bellum Civile* (1.299-351, 5.319-364, 7.250-329) and the speeches that accompany them in an effort to discover patterns in the character's speech. Lucan did not seem to develop a specific Caesarian style of speech, but he does make an effort to show the changing relationship between the General and his soldiers in the three scenes analyzed. The troops, initially under the spell of madness that pervades the poem, rebel. Caesar, through speech, is able to bring them into line. Caesar caters to the soldiers' interests and egos and crafts his speeches in order to keep his army working together.

INDEX WORDS: Lucan, Caesar, Bellum Civile, Pharsalia, Cohortatio, Battle Exhortation, Latin Literature

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 CROSSED WIRES: CAESAR'S EXHORTATION AT ARIMINUM.....6

3 REBELLION SUPPRESSED: THE MUTINY AT PLACENTIA 37

4 SUCCESS AT THE FINAL BATTLE.....69

5 CONCLUSION.....103

REFERENCES 108

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The figure of Caesar in Lucan's *Bellum Civile* is a harsh, bloodthirsty, unflinching commander. He derives joy from slaughtering his enemies, demands that his soldiers kill their family members, and aims at absolute rule. The only quality he seems to have taken from Caesar's literary version of himself is his policy of *clementia*. In keeping with the larger literary tradition of the character of Caesar, Lucan also depicts the General as a skilled orator and gives him three extended speeches to his troops (1.299-351, 5.319-364, 7.250-329). The first and last of these three are drawn from the tradition of the *cohortatio* in battle narratives, in which a general exhorts his men to begin fighting or return to battle. The second, however, quells his soldiers' rebellion during a mutiny. Through all three speeches, Lucan shows Caesar focusing on the soldiers' personal interests (or what he thinks their interests are) to persuade them to commit the atrocious acts necessary to wage a civil war. Caesar tailors his speeches to his soldiers differently throughout the text as the relationship between Caesar and his men shifts through varying grades of obedience. This project aims to discover what techniques Caesar employs to persuade his men, whether there are any patterns in his style, and how the verbal exchanges with his troops help determine Caesar's leadership-style. In order to achieve this, I examine all three of Caesar's extended speeches and look for trends across the group, instead of studying the speeches individually as scholars have done in the past. As a result, the thesis will show that although Lucan does not craft a unique style for Caesar's speech, he does develop Caesar as a speaker with the ability to adapt his style to match the needs of his troops as they challenge him during the war.

Most, if not all, Lucanian scholars have commented on Caesar's character and would agree to some extent that Lucan's depiction of the General is critical.[1] There are, however, only a few scholars that have studied his speeches. Helzle took a data-driven approach to all of Caesar's speeches and clearly demonstrated that Caesar used a higher rate of violent and military vocabulary than Pompey or Cato, the other two major characters in the epic.[2] His findings support the dominant view on the characterization of Caesar but do not explore how Caesar employed such language or in what contexts. His study also failed to move much beyond enumerating the occurrences of words. Both Hardie and Fantham have conducted studies that take into account the many facets of Caesar's speeches. Hardie has included a discussion of Caesar's speech at Ariminum (1.299-351) in his study of programmatic mutiny scenes.[3] His labeling of that scene as a mutiny stands alone in scholarship, and I agree with the consensus that it is drawn from the tradition of the *cohortatio*.[4] Fantham has examined Caesar's speech during the mutiny at Placentia. She identified the interaction between that speech and Caesar's first speech at Ariminum as well as the tradition of Alexander the Great. De Moura has analyzed Caesar's third speech at Pharsalus (7.250-329). Scholars have also commented on the influence of declamation on Lucan's poetic style and on the speeches he wrote within the poem.[5] When viewed as a collective Caesar's

[1]Fratantuono (2012) makes the argument that Caesar is consumed by madness throughout the text. For Leigh (1997), he is a villain, as he is for Bartsch (1997), Johnson (1987), and Ahl (1976). Dilke (1972) discusses the negative portrayal of Caesar in relation to Lucan's political views as does Ahl (1976) and Roche (2009). Masters (1992) argues that the poet aligns himself with Caesar, but at the same time, condemns Caesar for his atrocities. Some, however, would argue that Caesar becomes harsher beginning in Book 4, as Lucan's opinion of empire and tyranny becomes more critical. Along with Roche, I see no such inconsistency. Roche (2009), 7.

[2] Helzle (1994), 134-135.

[3] Hardie (2010), 20-23.

[4] The tradition of the *cohortatio* will be discussed below. Hardie's interpretation of that scene will be revisited briefly in Chapter 2.

[5] Morford (1965) and Bonner (1966) are primarily concerned with the influence of declamation on Lucan's narrative style.

exhortations reveal a general that is constantly trying to strike the right note with his troops and to develop a beneficial working relationship with them.

In addition to studies of speech in Lucan, scholarship on the battle exhortation more generally will be useful for an initial analysis of whether or not Caesar's speeches adhere to traditional speech structures and strategies. Iglesias-Zoido and Albertus have already identified common motifs in this speech type. Although their labeling of the motifs is different, the two analyses almost completely overlap, and from the two scholars we can glean the following primary topics of the *cohortatio*: the nobility of dying in a battle in service of one's country, upholding the honor of one's country and customs, likelihood of victory, justice (including the relationship between the gods and the actions of men), and expediency (what is at stake).[6] This certainly is not an exhaustive list, but it is a good starting point for addressing the content of Caesar's exhortations. Of course, a speaker can treat each of these items wildly differently based on the current circumstances and the character of the men he is addressing. While it is true that Caesar includes all of these motifs at least once in his extended speeches, his treatment of them can vary from speech to speech. Appealing more to his soldiers' emotions than their reason, he focuses on his fated victory and the promise of reward for his men.

According to Cicero, the crowd is an essential tools for the orator, since without an audience, his speaking serves no purpose.[7] In the same way, a general's most important tool is his army. Caesar must be able to persuade his men to do as he orders; thus his ability to command the soldiers is based on his rhetorical skills. This is especially true for Lucan's Caesar, for whom he writes not only three extended orations but also shorter direct quotations. In order to lead his troops

[6] Iglesias-Zoido (2007), 142-143. Keitel (1987), 153-154. Keitel summarizes Albertus' argument first expressed in Albertus (1908).
[7] *sic orator sine multitudine audiente eloquens esse non possit*, thus without a crowd listening, he is not able to speak eloquently, Cic. *de Or.* 2.338.

effectively, Caesar needs to address the needs and interests of his men in particular. As Cicero wrote in his *de Oratore*, the orator ought to take time to determine the thoughts, judgements, anticipations, and wishes of the audience, so that he is able to persuade the men according to their pre-existing biases.[8] For Caesar's troops, the most important aspect of their Commander's exhortations is how he approaches their relationship. Caesar's own version of himself in his *Commentarii de bello Gallico* is that of a strong leader who is tightly bonded with his forces. The army follows his commands, and as a result the General and his men function as a well-ordered unit.[9] Lucan's Caesar – and the reader – discover that this is not the case in the epic version of events when the troops show dissatisfaction with Caesar's *cohortatio* at Ariminum (1.299-351). The reader's first impression of Caesar's leadership ability is that it is weak, since he is unable to rouse his soldiers, despite delivering an impassioned speech. Furthermore, Lucan includes in his poem the mutiny at Placentia, an historical event that Caesar omits from his own account of the war. Caesar recognizes that he must change tactics to control his men. As a result of the rebellion, Caesar is forced to alter the way he addresses the soldiers in order to persuade them to continue following him. As the soldiers' attitude toward their commander changes – from their initial desire for Caesar to give orders without question, to their weariness of his tyrannical leadership-style, to their unwavering loyalty – Caesar continues to appraise their feelings and craft his orations to persuade them best.

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[8] *omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odorer, quam sagacissime possim, quid sentiant, quid existiment, quid exspectent, quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur*, I consider these things in my whole mind with consideration and care, so that I sniff out, which I am able to do as wisely as possible, what they feel, what they value, and what they wish, by what they seem to be most able to be led by my oration, Cic. *de Or*. 2.186. Cicero touches on this topic again at 2.337.

[9] Ash (1999), 5-8.

I employ a close reading of Caesar's three extended battle exhortations (1.299-351, 5.319-364, 7.250-329) and the speeches that accompany them.[10] To make this analysis, I look at verbal and topical resonances between the speeches and other passages within Lucan's text as well as with literary precedents, primarily in historiography and epic. Where applicable, I compare and contrast Lucan's Caesar with Caesar's own version of himself, which provide, in some cases, inspiration for Lucan's Caesar. I also engage with rhetorical models and handbooks, especially those of Cicero and Quintilian. In the third and fourth chapters, the changes in Caesar's rhetorical strategies will become important, so a comparative analysis of the three scenes in the poem are included in those chapters.

The organization of the thesis follows the narrative of the epic as it unfolds, assuming that the audience, while knowledgeable about the historical events, is hearing this version of the story for the first time and is unaware of how Lucan has constructed his narrative. The second chapter addresses the successes and errors in Caesar's first exhortation to his troops at Ariminum and a response from one of his soldiers, Laelius. The third chapter discusses the implications of the mutiny at Placentia for the dynamic relationship between Caesar and his troops. The soldiers deliver the mutiny speech first, and Caesar follows with a commanding speech that quells the unrest. The fourth chapter looks at Caesar's final battle exhortation before Pharsalus. In this case, the companion speech is not from his soldiers, but from his rival Pompey. This pairing highlights the dichotomy between the audacious Caesar and the wavering Pompey and their respective armies. In the conclusion, I discuss the self-crafting of Caesar's presentation throughout all of his addresses to his troops as a part of the maintenance of their working relationship.

[10] Caesar does speak to other characters and for shorter amounts of time throughout the text. These other instances of direct speech are taken into consideration along with his extended speeches but are not the focus of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

CAESAR'S INEFFECTIVE EXHORTATION AT ARIMINUM

Caesar's first battle exhortation in the epic occurs in Ariminum, beginning at line 1.299, only 107 lines after the narrative begins.[11] In the first 90 lines of the poem, Caesar crosses the Rubicon and sacks Ariminum, the first Italian casualty. After crossing the Rubicon, Caesar speaks briefly and urges on his troops by proclaiming his desertion of law (*temerataque iura relinquo*, 1.225)[12] and war as the new judge (*iudice bello*, 1.227).[13] If at any time the troops were inclined to speak against their movement towards Rome, this would have been that time. The army, however, remains silent, showing that they will follow their general no matter what the order, or perhaps that they want to march on Rome.[14] Shortly after this address, the army reaches and sacks Ariminium, at which point the narrative pauses again while Caesar and two of his subordinates speak.[15] The general's exhortation is preceded by a speech from Curio, an exiled tribune (1.273-291), and followed by another speech from Laelius, one of his soldiers (1.359-386). This placement makes Caesar's the second speech in a triad, which are examined in this paper in order.

After they sack Ariminum, Curio joins Caesar and is moved to speak when he sees that the General doubts his own actions (*dubiae...menti*, 262; *ducem varias volventem pectore cura*, 272). The tribune affirms Caesar's current course and kindles his desire for battle. Caesar then calls his

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[11] The first 183 lines include a proem, invocation to Nero, and description of the two rivals, Caesar and Pompey.
[12] The text of the *Bellum Civile* used here is the edition of A.E. Housman (1929, rpt. 1950).
[13] Caesar does, however, receive resistance from the appearance of the abstract *Italia* as he approaches the Rubicon, 1.190-192.
[14] Caesar makes no mention of the Rubicon. His narrative progresses from exhorting the troops (presumably on the north bank of the river) to meeting the tribunes at Ariminum. (*BC* 1.7-8). He does, however, include his troops' willingness to proceed: *cognita militum voluntate*, *BC* 1.8.
[15] Lucan also relates the grievances of the men at Ariminum in direct speech (1.248-257), but this speech sits outside the triad of speeches, and so is not be under consideration here.

troops to encourage them. His battle exhortation leaves his troops doubtful and confused (*dubium non claro murmure volgus/secum incerta fremit*, the wavering crowd groaned uncertain words with an indistinct murmuring among themselves, 1.352-353).[16] In response, Laelius[17] corrects what is wrong with Caesar's speech: he calls on Caesar to lead. The troops are so dedicated to their Commander that they will do whatever he orders, including laying aside their *pietas*. His speech succeeds in rousing the troops in part because of his language and in part because he talks about what the troops want to do, namely fight and be victorious for Caesar. As we will see, these three speeches together reveal the core motivating factors for the troops and how they depart from Republican values.

Caesar's inability to move his men with appeals to their duty to Rome suggests that Caesar does not understand the soldiers' motives. His troops are not interested in saving Rome, and their interests lie elsewhere. The troops do not need encouragement, since they are already desirous of war and victory. Instead of harnessing their zeal for battle, Caesar engenders *pietas*, which hampers the soldiers' desire to attack Rome.[18] Caesar tries to encourage them to fight by painting Pompey as a foreign invader and the aggressor. By defeating Pompey, they will be saviors of Rome. Interwoven with this larger theme are appeals to the troops' entitlement to recognition and reward for services already rendered. I argue that these themes do not resonate with the troops for a number of reasons: Caesar uses language that makes him more their peer than their leader; Caesar addresses Pompey instead of the troops for much of the speech; and by drumming up their *pietas*, Caesar inadvertently makes them remember that their duty lies with Rome and their families.

[16] All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
[17] The character of Laelius is unknown and likely fictional. Roche (2009), 261. Duff (1928), 28.
[18] *pietas patriique penates/quamquam caede feras mentes animosque tumentes/frangunt*. The pietas and *penates* of their fatherland break up their minds even though they are wild with slaughter and swelling spirits, 1.353-355.

These ideas evoke their identities as Romans too much, which creates cognitive dissonance with their desire to attack Rome.

Curio's Address to Caesar (1.273-291)

The trio of speeches begins with Curio's appeal to Caesar not to delay, but to continue his march against Rome. The tribune speaks frankly and directly about the coming conflict and proclaims his loyalty to Caesar. He openly states that since they are now exiles of their homeland, they must take Rome as a spoil of war if they want to be citizens again:

> *...dum voce tuae potuere iuvari,*
> *Caesar, ait,* ***partes****, quamvis nolente senatu,*
> *traximus* ***imperium****, tum cum mihi rostra tenere*
> ***ius*** *erat et dubios in te transferre Quirites.*
> *at postquam leges bello siluere coactae,*
> ***pellimur*** *e patriis laribus patimurque volentes*
> ***exilium****; tua nos faciet victoria cives.*
> *dum trepidant nullo firmatae* ***robore partes****,*
> ***tolle moras****; semper nocuit differre* ***paratis****.*
> ***par*** *labor atque metus,* ***pretio maiore*** *petuntur.*
> *bellantem geminis tenuit te Gallia lustris,*
> ***pars*** *quota terrarum! facili si proelia pauca*
> *gesseris eventu, tibi Roma subegerit orbem.*
> *nunc neque te longi remeantem pompa triumphi*
> *excipit, aut sacras poscunt Capitolia laurus;*
> *livor edax tibi cuncta negat, gentesque subactas*
> ***vix inpune*** *feres.* ***socerum*** *depellere regno*
> *decretum* ***genero*** *est;* ***partiri non*** *potes orbem,*
> ***solus*** *habere potes.*

> While it was possible for your factions to be assisted by my voice, Caesar, even with an unwilling Senate, I obtained the *imperium* [for you], at that time when it was right for me to hold the Rostra and to bring over wavering citizens to your side. But after the laws were forced into silence by war, we were driven from our native *lares*, and we suffer exile willingly; your victory will make us citizens. While the factions are strengthened by no resolution and while they are in a state of confusion, stop delaying! To delay is always harmful for those that are prepared. The toil and fear are equal, but they are sought for a greater reward. For ten years you were fighting in Gaul, what a small part of the

> earth! If you should wage a few battles with a favorable outcome, then Rome would have subjugated the whole world for you. Now no parade of a long triumph receives you returning, nor does the Capitolium beg for sacred laurels; greedy jealousy denies you everything, and you will barely go unpunished, even though you bear conquered [foreign] races. It has been decided by the father-in-law to expel the son-in-law from dominion; you are not able to share the world, but you are able to have it [all] alone.

Curio begins his speech by expressing the power he held before he was expelled from Rome. He reminds Caesar that he spoke on his behalf in his absence to ingratiate himself with his commander. The use of the first person plural verbs (*pellimur...patimur*, 278) involves Caesar in the recent expulsion of his political supporter, so that the insult of being thrown out of Rome applies to the Commander as well, even though he had been out of the city for the past nine years.[19] Even though the tribunes were most recently cast out of the city, the declaration of a *tumultum* and the *senatus consultum ultimum* were primarily concerned with Caesar.[20] The fresh offense from the opposing faction is intended to rouse Caesar's anger.

He establishes the theme of a torn Rome in his speech. Words beginning with the sound "par" appear six times in the speech (*partes*, 274 & 280; *paratis*, 280; *par*, 282; *pars*, 284; and *partiri*, 290). The repetition emphasises the rift between the two factions. In the final lines of his speech, Curio brings the split to a climax by specifying that the two *partes* are led by two kinsmen.[21] The use of *gener* and *socer* recalls the first four lines of the epic, in which Lucan highlights that this war was worse than civil because the two warring factions were led by kin

[19] Caesar also uses the first person plural to create unity between himself and his addresses. See discussion below.
[20] As Golden (2013) notes, if the decree had really been concerned with the tribunes, Pompey would not have continued preparing for war after the tribunes left the city. Golden (2013), 145.
[21] This is the second occurrence of *gener* and *socer* in the text. They previously appeared at 1.118, when Lucan compared Julia to the Sabine women begging their fathers and husbands not to fight.

(*bella...plus quam civilia*, 1.1).[22] Curio turns the horror of familicide into a particularly egregious offense against Caesar.

The tribune does not shy away from the realities of civil war: Rome is split into two factions (*tuae...partes*, 273-274; *nullo firmatae robore partes*, 280), Caesar and his men are outsiders (*exilium*, 279), a son-in-law (*socerum*, 289) and a father-in-law (*genero*, 290) fight one another, and Rome is the prize (*pretio maiore*, 282).[23] He addresses Caesar with such direct language because he anticipates that the facts, as Curio presents them, will inspire his leader.

Beginning at line 286, Curio indignantly points out the triumph and praise that Caesar would not get if he were to return to Rome. Despite his subjugation of Gaul (*gentes subactas*, 288), he would not be honored and would scarcely go unpunished. The image of Caesar returning to Rome is vividly described with indicative present verbs, forcing the hypothetical into reality. The use of *vix inpune* (1.289) glosses over the execution that may very well have awaited Caesar in Rome. Even though the scenario Curio paints is far from ideal, he does not go so far as to suggest to Caesar that he would be killed, since the possibility of dishonor is worse than death.

Curio concludes his speech by turning the negative political situation into a positive: Caesar cannot share a part, but he alone will have the whole, namely the *pretium maior* that the Tribune alluded to earlier in his speech. The *solus* punctuates the shift from two *partes*, which persists throughout the speech, into one. Caesar will be the sole ruler of the *regnum* from which he has been thrown out (1.289-290). Calling Rome a *regnum* reveals that both Curio and Caesar are aware of what they are fighting for, even though Caesar will claim otherwise when talking to his troops.[24]

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[22] Cf. Roche (2009), 241.
[23] Caesar avoids using such direct language about the civil war. See my discussion below.
[24] The desire for *regnum* will be damning for Pompey in Caesar's speech. See below.

The speech ends on a note of Caesar's success, leaving the Commander with a mind oriented toward victory.

The speech effectively motivates Caesar through appeals to his desire for victory, despite the need for civil slaughter (or, as will be revealed throughout the narrative, because of such language).[25] Rome and its territories makes a *pretium maior* than Gaul. The reference to family increases the personal slight against Caesar instead of revealing the amorality of the conflict. Caesar's excitement following Curio's speech characterizes the Commander as self-interested to the detriment of his family and state. Regardless of his true motives, he goes on to tell his troops that saving Rome is at the core of his concerns.[26]

Caesar's Exhortation (1.299-351)

Moved by Curio's words, Caesar turns toward his troops and directly addresses them in order to spur them to action. The Commander's speech does not directly respond to the content of the previous speech. Instead of speaking frankly about the civil war as Curio did, Caesar avoids language about the realities facing the soldiers. Even though fighting family and seizing Rome as his prize excite Caesar, he reframes these ideas, which he seems to think would be off-putting to his troops. The speech includes topics that were successful in Lucan's models:[27] he appeals to his troops personally through common suffering, vilification of the enemy, and references to favorable gods. He attempts to motivate them by focusing on Pompey as the instigator of civil war, the necessity of saving Rome from an aspiring tyrant, and the favor of the gods and Fates. The troops

[25] 2.439-461: while on campaign, Caesar takes pleasure in massacring Italian towns and causing terror in the people that live there.

[26] As he says at the end of his exhortation (discussed below): *nam neque praeda meis neque regnum quaeritur armis:/detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae*, for neither booty nor kingdom are sought by my arms: we are dragging a ruler from a city ready to submit! 1.350-351.

[27] For a brief discussion of common topics in battle exhortations generally, see Introduction p. 4. For studies of battle exhortation in historiography and Homer see Anson (2010), Iglesias-Zoido (2007) and Keitel (1987).

find these points unmotivating and are doubtful (*dubium...volgus*, 1.352). The troops' uncertain reaction and their indiscriminate murmuring (*non claro murmure*, 1.352) indicate that the speech has not achieved its goal. Caesar's mistake stems from a misunderstanding of his troops' character. He tries to motivate them through their *pietas* and their duty to save Rome from a tyrant, Pompey. The speech succeeds in rousing their *pietas*, but calling upon their duty does not succeed in persuading the troops to wage war on their homeland.

Not all scholars interpret this speech as unsuccessful. When comparing the responses to Caesar's and Pompey's speeches, Elaine Fantham argues that Caesar's achieves a better result, since Pompey's troops are silent (*nullo partes clamore secuntur*, 2.596).[28] However, I will show that Caesar's words are clearly ineffective when compared with the successful outcome of Laelius' speech that immediately follows. What the soldiers needed were directives to fight, which Laelius shows Caesar in his response. Philip Hardie interprets the speech as a response to a mutiny.[29] In that case, the murmurs following the speech are indicative of soldiers effectively silenced by their Commander. Prior to Caesar's speech, however, the soldiers were clearly not mutinous; Caesar, acting as agent, gathers the troops together (*convocat*, 1.296; *conposuit*, 1.298), and Lucan describes them as *trepidum* (1.297).[30] The murmurs then are a mark of confusion and hesitation.

Caesar bookends his speech with direct addresses to his troops, in order to grab their attention at the beginning and to re-engage them at the end. The bulk of the speech, however, is occupied with characterizing Pompey as Rome's enemy. In the middle of the address, Caesar calls out to the absent General in an extended apostrophe. Following the direct address to Pompey, he cites his grievances against his rival. In the final lines of the speech, Caesar orders his men with

[28] Fantham (2010), 60.
[29] Hardie (2010), 20-23.
[30] As we will see in Chapter 3, Lucan does not present mutinies in such subtle terms. Chapter 3, p. 45-55.

imperatives to take up arms to save Rome. Based on the addressee, the structure of the speech breaks down into three parts:

I. 1.299-326: address to troops
   A. 1.299-302: their past suffering makes them undeserving of dishonor from Rome
   B. 1.303-311: the gravity of the situation at Rome
   C. 1.311-326: grievances against Pompey
II. 1.326-346: direct address to Pompey
   A. 1.326-332: simile comparing Pompey to tigers
   B. 1.333-340: more accusations of Pompey's desire for a dictatorship and his association with Sulla
   C. 1.340-346: direct questions to Pompey: what will become of Caesar's troops if Pompey wins?
III. 1.347-351: directives to soldiers

Part I: Address to the Troops

Caesar opens the speech by addressing his troops as *bellorum o socii*, a salutation that treats the soldiers as his equals (1.299-302):

> ***bellorum o socii**, qui mille pericula*
> ***mecum**" ait "experti decimo iam vinctis anno,* 300
> *hoc cruor Arctois meruit diffusus in arvis*
> *volneraque et mortes hiemesque sub Alpibus actae?*
>
> Allies of wars, who suffered one thousand dangers of Mars with me, now during the tenth year you conquer, did blood, spread out in Arctic lands, and wounds, and deaths, and winters, spent under the Alps deserve this?

Caesar's use of *o socii* is striking for two reasons. First, addressing soldiers as *socii* is rare in Roman literature, and it denotes a stronger relationship between the leader and his soldiers than the typical forms of address (*milites, miles, commilitones, iuvenes*).[31] *Socii* marks the soldiers as his allies and not his inferiors. Second, the unusual usage of *socii* recalls Aeneas' address to

[31] Dickey (2002), 291 and 368.

encourage his troops after the shipwreck off the shores of Carthage (*O socii neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum/O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem*, friends, truly we were not ignorant of hardships before now. Oh you who have suffered worse things, Jupiter will give an end to these things, *Aen*. 1.198-199).[32] Aeneas employed shared hardship to relate to his people, a topic commonly employed successfully in earlier battle exhortations. The use of the first person plural (*sumus*) includes both the leader and his followers, letting the people know that they are a unit.[33] Likewise, Caesar emphasizes the shared aspect of their suffering through *mecum* in the following line and with first person, plural verbs at other points throughout his speech. In the first four lines, he cites their sufferings on campaign together: *cruor...volneraque et mortes hiemesque*. He introduces these sufferings through a rhetorical question, asking them whether their sufferings deserve (*meruit*) such treatment (*hoc*). Since the soldiers want to be compensated for their efforts, a resounding "no" would be anticipated. Presenting himself as equal to his men worked for Aeneas but not for Caesar, whose troops demand a clear delineation between their Commander and themselves.[34]

Lucan's allusion to Aeneas' speech introduces a connection between Caesar and a leader that stands in stark contrast to how Caesar is portrayed in *BC*.[35] The *pietas* that defines Aeneas' character is absent from Caesar, who has been portrayed as a beast by the narrator. For the external audience, the comparison of values is out of place based on Lucan's depiction of Caesar thus far

[32] The allusions to the *Aeneid* in this speech are numerous. I discuss only the connections that are pertinent to my argument. For more allusions to the *Aeneid*, see Roche's commentary on Book 1 (2009) and Thompson and Bruere (1968). All quotations from the *Aeneid* are from Mynors' edition (1969).
[33] The use of first person plurals occurs throughout the passage. Most commonly it is used to create unity with his troops. Usages of note will be discussed individually as they arise in the speech.
[34] We will see this below in my discussion of Laelius' speech.
[35] For Caesar as a new Aeneas, see Ahl (1976), Conte (1999), and Martindale (1976). For Caesar as the anti-Aeneas, see e.g. Narducci (2010), 391.

in the epic.[36] Right as Caesar begins to persuade his men to commit impious acts, Lucan places the words of pious Aeneas in his mouth, creating a tension between the dutiful hero and the transgressive Caesar, an antithesis that puts the spotlight on Caesar's impiety. The inappropriate use of the comparison has the potential to alienate the Neronian reader. The troops, on the other hand, are unaware of the allusion. For them, this introduction is unpersuasive because they do not want Caesar to be their ally; they want him to be their commander.[37]

After asking the troops whether or not they deserve more suffering in exchange for their hardship, Caesar shifts to the severity of the state of affairs to establish a necessity for battle (1.303-311):

> *non secus ingenti bellorum Roma tumultu*
> *concutitur, quam si Poenus transcenderit Alpes*
> *Hannibal: inpletur validae tirone cohortes*
> *in classem cadit omne nemus, terraque marique*
> *iussus Caesar agi. quid si signa iacerent*
> *Marte sub adverso ruerentque in terga feroces*
> *Gallorum populi? nunc, cum fortuna secundis*
> *mecum rebus agat superique ad summa vocantes,*
> *temptamur.*

> Rome is shaken to its foundation by a huge disturbance of war, not otherwise than if the Punic Hannibal crossed the Alps: the powerful cohorts are filled with young men, and every grove falls for the purpose of a fleet, and Caesar has been ordered to be driven across land and sea. What would they do if my standards were to lie under Mars turned against them and the ferocious tribes of Gaul were rushing at their backs? Now, as fortune treats me with pleasing affairs, and the gods are calling me to the highest matters, we are tested.

[36] He is a terrifying and uncontrollable lightning bolt, 1.151-157. He is a Libyan lion preparing to attack, 1.205-212. He is eager for war like a racehorse ready to run, 1.292-295. The second and third similes in this list recall Vergil's descriptions of Turnus, thus bestowing upon Caesar some of Turnus' qualities, such as his hostility to Aeneas and by extension Rome. cf. *Aen*. 11.492-497 and 12.4-9.

[37] Their desire for strong, decisive leadership will be expressed in Laelius' speech, discussed below.

He states that he and his men do not deserve a home state in such turmoil that entire groves were cut down to build ships in preparation to fight them.[38] As saviors of Rome, they ought to be celebrated and not face persecution from those for whom they fought. Caesar states that Rome has been shaken by an *ingenti tumultu* (303), referring to an official declaration of the Senate that signifies an imminent threat on Rome.[39] In his eighth *Philippic*, Cicero explains that the state of *tumultus* is worse than war because "greater than normal fear arises."[40] The crises that led to a declaration of *tumultūs* in the past had primarily been against foreign enemies. The most recent domestic *tumultus* was during the Catilinarian conspiracy. As seen later in the speech, Caesar labels Pompey as the enemy by bringing troops into a civil space.[41] By referring to Pompey's martial presence in Rome as a *tumultus*, he claims that Pompey is either a successor of Catiline or equivalent to a foreign enemy.

In addition to linking Pompey to a traitor, Caesar also likens his rival to the famous Roman enemy, Hannibal by comparing Pompey's transgressions in Rome to the Carthaginian general's crossing of the Alps – a reference intended to villainize Pompey. As Caesar argues later in his speech, Pompey is the foreign invader bringing troops into civil space.[42] Despite Caesar's intention to link Pompey's invasion to Hannibal's, the reference to Rome's famous foreign enemy creates a problem. Both the soldiers and the external audience will think of Caesar as the enemy instead of

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[38] This line has also been read as a connection to Caesar cutting down the grove at Massilia. See Masters (1992), 25-29. It may also allude to Pompey, who has already been depicted as an oak tree by Lucan. Rowland (1969), 207.
[39] Golden (2013), 43-44. A *tumultus* had been declared as recently as 63 BCE during the Catilinarian crisis, Dio 37.31.1 (Dio uses *taraxe* for *tumultus*), and during the slave revolt of 73-71 BCE. Golden (2008), 104-107 and 77-82.
[40] *perturbatio tanta ut maior timor oriatur*, *Phil* 8.2. Translation by Golden (2013).
[41] *BC* 1.314-326.
[42] *BC* 1.319-323. Later in Book 1, Lucan refers to Caesar's standards as *barbicas...alas* (1.476), revealing the narrator's point of view that Caesar is not a savior of Rome but a foreign invader, reinforcing Caesar's viewpoint as out of touch with the reality of this epic civil war.

Pompey, since Caesar is more like Hannibal.[43] Although he draws the analogy to show how desperate Rome's situation is, he unwittingly draws a parallel between himself and the boundary-crossing enemy. His soldiers, too, are enemies, since they followed him through the mountains and across the river. This connection between Caesar and enemy forces is unlikely to be intentional on Caesar's part, since he attempts to portray himself as Rome's savior against the invaders - Pompey and his troops. Purposefully associating himself with a foreign enemy would confuse his message about his own role in the conflict.[44] These lines attempt to show that Rome has been taken over by paralleling Pompey's *imperium* to a foreign invasion.[45]

Similarly, through his reference to the Gauls (1.307-309), Caesar conflates a reference with one of Rome's enemies with his own army. He incorporates the Gauls into his speech to show that he has already achieved staus as Rome's savior by fighting off the northern enemy, famous for its own march on Rome in 390 BCE. Caesar argues that now that Pompey has brought war into Rome, Caesar and his men must reprise their roles as protectors of Rome and defend the city against an internal enemy. Even though Caesar tries to glorify his status, this reference blurs the lines between Caesar and the foreign enemy on account of the similar paths of the two armies. Caesar is unaware that the scenarios he presented to his troops align them with their former enemies.[46]

While he lists his grievances against Pompey, Caesar contrasts his depiction of himself as savior with Pompey as enemy of state. Caesar criticizes Pompey for having already introduced

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[43] Masters has also noted Lucan's portrayal of Caesar as Hannibal from the first time the reader encounters Caesar. Masters (1992), 1-2.

[44] The connections, while unintentional on the part of the character Caesar, is deliberately brought into play by the poet to color further Caesar as the enemy of Rome.

[45] In his exhortation at Pharsalus, Caesar points out to his troops that Pompey's forces are primarily drawn from other, Eastern nations, in order to make the point that Caesar's troops are fighting against foreign enemies. The efficacy of this theme in that speech will be taken up in Chapter 4.

[46] Even if Caesar wants to align himself with Rome's enemies in order to demonstrate that he and his men are exiles, the examples do not prove that point. Hannibal and the Gauls are not exiles but foreign invaders. Furthermore, Lucan has already established the link between Caesar's actions and Hannibal's (1.183 and 1.247).

troops to Rome and for desiring that his power granted by the Senate continue indefinitely, thus making him the perpetrator of civil war (1.311-326):

> *...veniat longa dux pace solutus* 311
> *milite cum subito partesque in* ***bella togatae***
> *Marcellusque loquax et nomina vana Catones.*
> *scilicet extremi Pompeium emptique clientes*
> *continuo per tot satiabunt tempora regno?* 315
> ***ille reget*** *currus nondum patientibus annis?*
> ***ille*** *semel raptos numquam dimittet honores?*
> *quid iam rura querar totum suppressa per orbem*
> *ac iussam servire famem? quis castra timenti*
> *nescit mixta* ***foro****,* ***gladii*** *cum triste micantes* 320
> *iudicium insolita trepidum cinxere corona*
> *atque auso medias perrumpere milite leges*
> *Pompeiana reum clauserunt signa Milonem?*
> ***nunc quoque****, ne lassum teneat privata senectus,*
> ***bella nefanda parat suetus civilibus armis*** 325
> ***et docilis Sullam scelerum vicisse magistrum.***

> May the leader, undone by a long peace, enter suddenly into war with a soldiery of togaed factions: chattering Marcellus and Catos, the empty names. Surely, the basest, purchased clients will satisfy Pompey through all time with a continuous reign? Will that man guide the chariots in years not yet experienced, will that man never release honors once they are seized? Why should I complain that the fields now have been subdued throughout the whole earth and that he ordered famine to be at his service? Who does not know that the troops have mixed with the fearful forum, swords flashing with sadness surrounded the trembling court with an unfamiliar encirclement and after the army dared to break the laws in half, the Pompeian standards trapped the defendant Milo? And even now, lest private old age hold the weary man, he, accustomed to civil arms and taught to surpass his teacher Sulla in respect to wickedness, prepares unspeakable wars.

As Caesar lists Pompey's offenses, he picks up the pace: the repetitive questions are brief, and each question takes up no more than two lines.[47] The shortest questions, at 316 and 317, are only one line each, and Caesar pounds out emphatic questions punctuated by the repetitive *ille* at the beginning of each line. The increased pace reflects a heightened emotional state as Caesar grows

[47] Each sense unit in the first twelve lines of the speech is over two lines long (1.299-311). The first sentence alone is four lines long.

angrier and tries to excite the troops.[48] The hypothetical questions quickly shift into an historical event – Pompey bringing guards into the Forum during the trial of Milo.

Caesar accuses Pompey of mixing judicial and military business. The juxtaposition of *bella togatae* (312) and *foro, gladii* (320) highlights the mingling of two sets of affairs that ought to remain separate.[49] These two pairings emphasize Caesar's assertion that the soldiers have been introduced into the Forum (*quis castra timenti nescit mixta*, 319-320). Following Pompey's first offense of leading senators to war, Caesar suggests that the powers that were granted to Pompey have given him too much power for too long. The details of the *continuo...regno* (315) go unmentioned. Undoubtedly, he refers to the *imperia* that Pompey was granted in the *lex Gabinia*, *lex Manilia*, his consulships, and his proconsulship.[50] Although Pompey's power was unprecedented, he gained it legally. So for Caesar, it is more effective to draw attention to the power he holds over Rome than to the details, which would reveal that Pompey has committed no crime in assuming his positions of power. This strategic omission helps build his case against Pompey as a would-be tyrant.

The element of time is critical to Caesar's argument that Pompey has overstepped his bounds and has begun acting like a tyrant. He suggests that an unlimited reign will not satisfy Pompey (*scilicet extremi Pompeium emptique clientes/continuo per tot satiabunt tempora regno*, 314-315). The near silver line construction layers the two phrases that emphasize perpetuity and dramatically delays the *regno* until the end of the line (1.315). The chiasmus allows both *continuo* and *tot* to fall at the beginning of the line, giving the adjectives emphasis and forcing the listener

[48] At *de Oratore* 3.217, Cicero describes angry language as "shrill, hasty, with short abrupt clauses" (*acutum, incitatum, crebro incidens*,). Translation by Rackham (1942).
[49] Caesar himself will be depicted negatively for "forgetting to act the toga-ed part" (*oblitus simulare togam*, 3.143) when he robs the treasury upon his return to Rome.
[50] Roche (2009), 250.

to wait to hear what goes on forever. When *regno* appears at the end, it stands out as an accusation that Pompey intends to make himself a monarch. Pompey as monarch occurs again in the next line: *ille reget currus nondum patientibus annis* (1.316), suggesting that Pompey will continue to hold indefinitely the power he has into future years.[51]

Toward the end of his harangue, Caesar cites a specific event to corroborate his accusations against Pompey: the presence of Pompey and his troops at the trial of Milo, the final point to which the rhetorical questions have escalated. At the beginning of his grievances against Pompey, Caesar uses potential subjunctives to indicate what may happen if Pompey were to attack, but he gives the details of the event in the indicative. The shift from potential to indicative shows how leaving the opportunity open for someone to take over by force can turn into a reality. In the speech, the idea of troops entering civic life frames Caesar's accusations that Pompey intends to seize a kingship and to deny power to others. The integration of the two concepts unites force and monarchy: force is necessary to seize power, and force is necessary to maintain power. The troops in the Forum come both before and after the coup.

The irony of Caesar's accusations against Pompey would be apparent to any of Lucan's readers; as history unfolded, Caesar became the dictator and not Pompey, and as the poem has progressed thus far, Caesar is the savage beast according to the narrator. For the Neronian reader, who knows well the course of events, Caesar's assertions about Pompey's aims reveal Caesar's interest in fashioning a particular image of himself and his motives. Lucan is concerned with creating a Caesar that has a point of view at odds with that of the narrator, even if that results in dissonance with a reader's opinion of Caesar.

[51] Roche suggests that *nondum patientibus annis* refers to Pompey's triumph in 81 BCE when he was only 25. The future tense of *reget*, however, parallels the other rhetorical questions about the future.

In case any soldier might think that the threat is no longer imminent, *nunc quoque* at the beginning of the next line (1.324) indicates that the threat is still ongoing. The fury in Caesar's speech comes out when he escalates the accusations against Pompey. He claims that Pompey is not just seeking monarchy, but also he is preparing *bella nefanda*, is *suetus civilibus armis*, and even surpasses Sulla, *scelerum vicisse magistrum*. According to Caesar, Pompey is aiming to succeed Sulla as the next perpetrator of civil war. With Pompey as the enemy of the state, Caesar can position himself as savior for waging war against him.

Part II: Address to Pompey

In the address to Pompey, the voice of Caesar is most similar to the style of the poetic narrator. The Commander employs an extended simile (1.327-332), *sententiae*, and apostrophe. All three of these devices were commonly used in Roman oratory and literature to elicit emotion from the audience. Rousing emotions from the audience is both effective at persuading them of one's cause and at delighting them.[52] In order to persuade his audience of his foe's savagery, Caesar brings his speech to an emotional peak with a simile comparing Pompey to wild tigers (1.327-332):

> *utque ferae tigres numquam posuere furorem,*
> *quas, nemore Hyrcano matrum dum lustra secuntur,*
> *altus caesorum pavit cruor armentorum,*
> *sic et Sullanum solito tibi lambere ferrum* 330
> *durat, Magne, sitis. nullus semel ore receptus*
> *pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.*

> Just as wild tigers never set aside their rage, whom, while they pass through their mother's den in the Hyrcanian glade, deep blood of slaughtered cattle feeds, thus the thirst endures for you, Magnus, accustomed to lick the sword of Sulla. No blood once received by the mouth allows the polluted throat to grow tame.

[52] Morford (1965), 1-3. The inclination to heighten emotion and to entertain the listener was a common practice among declaimers. Caesar is primarily interested in persuasion, while Lucan also wants to please his audience.

The simile, loaded with gory imagery, elaborates on Pompey's wickedness, turning him into a ravenous beast – even baser than a traitor. In the first line, the tigers are *ferae* and are unable to set aside their *furorem*, both attributes of animals and not men. In the dramatic third line of the simile, it is revealed that blood feeds the tigers. To the external audience, equating Pompey to bloodthirsty tigers reveals Caesar's strategic reframing of Pompey's character to match his argument. Prior to this speech, the epic narrator compared Caesar himself with uncontrollable lightning and ferocious beasts.[53] Only 200 lines before this speech, Lucan set up Pompey and Caesar as an opposing pair: a revered oak tree and an uncontrollable and destructive lightning bolt.[54] In the earlier simile, Caesar cannot be controlled (*nulla exire vetante materia*, no matter is able to forbid [the lightening bolt] to go forth, 1.155-156). In the passage at hand, however, it is Pompey who lacks control due to his wild, unquenchable ferocity. The simile recalls Seneca's *Epistle* 85.8,[55] in which a tiger simile is used to show that just as a tiger can never fully erase his ferocity, so too is man unable to smooth over his faults fully. Here, ferocity is present in both the man and the animals. Caesar gives Pompey the nature of an animal in place of the character of a man, presenting him as subhuman and unable rid himself of his lust for slaughter. Compared with the characters that Lucan creates for the two generals, Caesar's description of Pompey shows how Caesar does not want to reveal his self-interested motives, which Curio effectively outlined. In order to incite his troops, the General creates a fiction in which Pompey is the self-interested aggressor. To the soldiers, this simile adds to the development of Pompey as other: he is not only not Roman but also inhuman.

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[53] Examples of this characterization are mentioned in footnote 36 above.

[54] These characteristics appear several more times between the simile and Caesar's speech. The consistency of the characteristics that Lucan gives to Pompey and Caesar in the first simile is noted by Rosner-Siegel (2010). Fire and lightning type imagery shows up again at the crossing of the Rubicon and the assault on Ariminum, both of which occur before this speech.

[55] *Tigres leonesque numquam feritatem exuunt, aliquando summittunt, et cum minime expectaveris, exasperatur torvitas mitigata. Numquam bona fide vitia mansuescunt.* Roche (2009) notes the connection, 254.

In addition to Seneca's *Epistle*, the imagery of bloodthirsty animals is also common in battle narratives. Throughout the *Iliad*, the Greeks are compared with predatory beasts.[56] Vergil, too, employs such similes, often in his depictions of Turnus. Above, in note 36, I mentioned the connections between Caesar and Turnus through the simile of the race horse. Turnus is also compared to other, wilder animals, including a tiger.[57] As enemies of the Trojans, both the Greeks and Turnus are enemies of the Romans. By conferring upon Pompey the qualities of predators, Lucan makes Caesar align his current rival with past enemies of Rome. The ferocity that is typically ascribed in the context of battle, is here used to describe a man that has, as of late, been acting in a civil capacity. Thus, even without such a connection to literary precedents, the simile of vicious beasts further highlights Pompey's inappropriate melding of civil and martial environments.

This passage also includes the first direct address to Pompey (*Magne*, 331), which Caesar continues for most of the remainder of his exhortation. He stops speaking to the men before him and invokes his rival, as if it were his troops that were absent. The use of apostrophe amplifies the speech's emotional charge by conveying the speaker's own feelings and by carrying away the audience. In fact, Longinus describes the device as suggesting that the speaker is possessed and influenced by the gods.[58] The addition of apostrophe gives the impression that Caesar has been moved by his own graphic description and has become lost in his preoccupation with his enemy.

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[56] These similes are prevalent throughout the epic. A few instances can be found at 5.134, 5.161-165, 13.197-202, 20.164-165.

[57] Other similes include comparisons with a wolf (9.59-66) and a lion (9.792-98 and 10.452-55).

[58] Longinus describes apostrophe as inspired (ἐμπνευσθεὶς ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ θεοῦ, *Sub*. 16.2) and possessed (φοιβόληπτος, *Sub*. 16.2), so that it engages the audience emotionally. Quintilian, too, finds the device "wonderfully moving" (*mire movetur*, 9.2.38; translation by Leigh (1997), 307) Cf. Behr (2007), 1-2. Bartsch's (2011) discussion on apostrophe at 312-313 complements this concept as she mentions how the technique "collapses the temporal distance" between the addressee and the reader. Asso (2010) argues that the success of apostrophe to engage the reader relies on the complicity of the audience.

Whether or not he is putting on a show of emotion or is genuinely caught up in the moment cannot be gleaned from the speech alone.[59]

Following the simile, Caesar continues his apostrophe to Pompey and directs a series of quick, indignant questions at him (1.333-346):

> *quem tamen inveniet tam **longa potentia** finem?*
> *quis scelerum modus est? ex hoc iam te, **inprobe**, regno*
> *ille **tuus** saltem doceat descendere **Sulla**.* 335
> *post Cilicasne vagos et lassi Pontica regis*
> *proelia barbarico vix consummata veneno*
> *ultima Pompeio dabitur provincia Caesar,*
> *quod non victrices aquilas deponere iussus*
> *paruerim? mihi si merces erepta laborum est,* 340
> *his saltem longi non cum duce praemia belli*
> *reddantur; miles sub quolibet iste triumphet.*
> *conferet exanguis quo se post bella senectus?*
> *quae sedes erit emeritis? quae rura dabuntur?*
> *quae noster veteranus aret? quae moenia fessis?* 345
> *an melius fient piratae, **Magne**, coloni?*

> Will such a long reign come to an end? What is the limit of such wickedness? Let that man – your Sulla – teach you, shameless man, at least to depart from the reign. After the roaming Cilicians and the Pontic battles are scarcely completed with barbarian poison of the exhausted king, will Caesar be given as the final province to Pompey,
> because I, ordered to lay down my victorious standards, would not obey? If the reward of my labor has been seized, then let the booty of the long war be returned to them without their leader; let the soldier triumph under whatever leader that man may be. To what place will lifeless old-age turn after the war? What abode will the veterans have? What countryside will be given [to them]? What lands will our veterans till? What walls will there be for the exhausted men? Will pirates become preferable to colonists, Magnus?

Caesar's questions focus on what would happen to the Caesareans should Pompey win. The questions would be better directed at the soldiers, who would receive the brunt of any punishment

[59] The sincerity of displays of emotion was not a common topic in handbooks on rhetoric, but it was viewed as a moral issue, Hall (2010), 232-233. Cicero defends the use of emotional manipulation by claiming that the orator too may be moved by his own words (*De Or.* 2.191-2). Likewise, Quintilian argues that in order for an orator to move others, he must be moved himself (*Inst. Or.* 6.2.35).

that Pompey might bear against them if he were to win. Even if these questions were spoken to the troops, the type of questions asked still pose a problem: they assume Caesar and his troops have lost. In the final lines of this section, Caesar runs through a series of quick, rhetorical questions directed at Pompey, each one taking up no more than one line (343-345). The questions culminate in the most egregious possible result of a Pompeian victory: the colonies that should be given to the veterans might be given to pirates, a betrayal to both Rome and the soldiers that fought for her. The rapid succession of questions builds the urgency and anger of the speech, showing Caesar's increasing fervor as he addresses Pompey.

The extended series of questions that dwell on failure instead of victory does not inspire the soldiers. Curio's speech included a negative hypothetical scenario, but it was immediately followed by the suggestion that Caesar will take Rome for himself. Ending with victory was a key part of Curio's success. Here, Caesar does not include the positive alternative to receiving nothing, thus he does not take advantage of his troops' desire for reward. Even though greed can be a powerful incentive, the absence of spoils due to a loss is not as motivating as mentioning the spoils one would receive in victory. Caesar may feel the need to avoid a direct discussion of spoils, since in a civil war, the plunder will come from Rome.[60] Openly addressing the spoliation of Rome would upset the narrative of Pompey as enemy that he has been building. By avoiding the reality of an attack on Rome, Caesar maintains his savior persona. This circumlocution, however, is unnecessary, as will be revealed by Laelius' speech, which exposes the soldiers' indifference to the identity of their enemy.[61] Caesar's avoidance of direct discussion of spoils is a missed opportunity for him to appeal to his troops' enthusiasm for material goods.[62]

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[60] Unlike Curio who called Rome *pretio maiore*, 1.282.
[61] 1.383-386. See my discussion below.
[62] Fantham interprets these questions as showing concern for the troops, which results in a positive outcome. I argue below that the outcome of the speech is not favorable. Fantham (2010), 60-61.

Part III: Directives to Soldiers

Caesar abruptly shifts from addressing Pompey to ordering his troops. The previous addressee is named in the second to last word of line 346. Then, without transition, Caesar directs his troops with an imperative, *tollite* (1.347-351).

> *tollite iam pridem victricia tollite signa:*
> *viribus utendum est quas fecimus. arma tenenti*
> *omnia dat, qui iusta negat. nec numina derunt;*
> *nam neque praeda meis neque regnum quaeritur armis:* 350
> *detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae.*

> Now raise up the recently victorious standards! Raise them up! We must take advantage of the strength, which we created. He who denies justice gives all to him holding arms. Divine powers are not absent; for neither booty nor kingdom are sought by my arms: we are dragging a ruler from a city ready to submit!

The sudden change of addressee marks the end of Caesar's emotionally driven digression and his return to the outward address to his troops. The final lines quickly move through four styles of address and four motives for fighting. This rapid fire change between styles and themes show Caesar grasping for a way to appeal to his troops. Instead of reading the crowd and choosing an approach that will move it, Caesar tests different types of persuasion, hoping one of them will prove effective. Quintilian writes that a good orator should be able to switch tactics mid-speech, if circumstances change.[63] Caesar, however, abandons each strategy after only a line or two instead of taking time to develop one and observe how his men react.[64]

In line 347, Caesar uses a direct order to spur the troops to prepare for battle. He briefly expands on why they should follow his command: they have already generated martial strength from earlier victories. Then, at the end of line 1.348, he abruptly changes to encouraging his men

[63] Quintilian 10.7.3-4.
[64] Quintilian 10.7.6. *nec confundent ex diversis orationem velut salientes huc illuc nec usquam insistentes*. One must not mix up a speech from different thoughts as if leaping from this place to that place and not pursuing anything.

with a moralizing *sententia*: since they have been treated unjustly, they ought to seize power through arms. Third, Caesar returns to the motif of the favorable gods (1.349), but quickly changes his tactic after only three words. Finally, Caesar turns to an appeal to the soldiers' duty to Rome by making the claim that he does not seek personal gain but that he only wants to save Rome from Pompey.[65] The Neronian reader would have known that this final statement was false, but the internal audience would not have had any reason not to take him at his word. To the soldiers, Caesar would appear to be placing duty to Rome above his own interests and to be unwilling to take spoils from his own city.

Just as Caesar denies his individual self-interest at the beginning of his speech by showing that he shares in the troops' hardships, he finishes by telling them that they will wage this war not for his own advantage but for Rome.[66] The external audience is aware that Caesar is lying, both from history and from Caesar's earlier excitement over the prospect of ruling Rome. The soldiers, on the other hand, are not privy to Curio's words and thus Caesar may be able to convince them of an alternate motivation. To persuade his troops of his lack of self-interest, he contrasts the first person singular possessive adjective (*meis...armis*) with the first person plural verb (*detrahimus*) in the following line. Caesar uses the first person plural to emphasize that the war will be waged by them as a unit to remove a tyrant from Rome. These final two lines drive home a number of points Caesar made throughout the speech: the unity between himself and his troops, favor of the gods, Caesar and troops as saviors, and Pompey as *rex*. Caesar effectively caused the troops to recall their *pietas*. Unfortunately for Caesar, generating *pietas* in his troops cools their interest in

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[65] Cf. *Il.* 17.220-232: Hector addresses the Trojan allies following the death of Patroclus, during which he stresses fighting for honor instead of reward.

[66] In Caesar's own *De bello Civile*, the General, although writing that he values personal *dignitas* over life (*BC* 1.9.2), presents himself and his troops as "a grand coalition of good citizens and true Romans" (Raaflaub's words). Raaflaub (2010), 162. This last line of Caesar's exhortation in Lucan echoes Caesar's portrayal of himself, even though Curio's speech has betrayed Caesar's true motives. Also on *dignitas* as a motive for civil war, see Ruebel (1996).

battle instead of kindling a desire to fight. Reminding them of their duty is a call to *ethos*,[67] which is ineffective for men that need to cast aside their moral compass to continue on their mission against their own family and country.

The Commander incorporates motifs that should motivate the troops: the merit of the troops, justification for fighting, the wickedness of their foe, and the favor of the gods. Furthermore, the General charged his speech with emotional appeals through both heightened poetic language and altering the pace of his speech.[68] Instead of cheering, the troops are torn (*dubium...volgus*, 1.352) and grumble with an unintelligible murmur (*non claro murmure...secum incerta fremit*, 1.352-353). The speech has not convinced them of anything.[69] As Cicero explains in his *Brutus*, the reaction of the crowd determines whether or not an orator is good, since an orator should be judged by the effect his performance has on the crowd.[70] Thus the soldiers' muddled response would indicate that this oration was faulty, but as the narrator goes on to explain, Caesar did in fact successfully stir up the emotions he hoped to, namely *pietas*. Duty to country, however, turned out to be a poor motivator for his men.

The soldiers were primed to be convinced to fight; as the narrator points out, they already had *caede feras mentes animosque tumentes* (minds wild with slaughter and swelling spirits, 1.354) prior to the speech. However, their *pietas*, brought on by Caesar's exhortation to save Rome,

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[67] Of the three elements of rhetoric outline by Aristotle, *ethos* and *pathos* are most commonly utilized in the *cohortatio*. Caesar's men, however, have no interest in their general's *ethos*. Arist. *Rhet*. 1.2.2. "*ethos,*" *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, 2001. "*Exhortation,*" *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, 2001.

[68] Pleasing the audience and stirring up emotions are two of the three aims of oratory. Cic. *Brut*. 185.

[69] When comparing the response to Caesar's and Pompey's speeches, Fantham argues that the response to Caesar's is better, since Pompey's troops are silent (*nullo partes clamore secuntur*, 2.596), Fantham (2010), 60. However, when compared with the outcome of Laelius' speech that immediately follows Caesar's, Caesar's words are clearly ineffective. Additionally, the adjective *dubius* appears during the mutiny in Spain to describe the soldiers' disinclination toward Caesar (*dubias mentes*, 2.256). Thus the *dubium volgus* is not favorable.

[70] Cic. *Brut*. 182-203, and especially 184-185.

weakened their spirits (*pietas patriique penates/quamquam...frangunt*, 1.353-355).[71] Fortunately for Caesar, their *pietas* is squashed because they "are recalled by the harsh love of the sword and the fear of their general" (*sed diro ferri revocantur amore/ductoris metu*, 1.355-356). The troops' minds are ruled not by the traditional *mores* that would make them amenable to pro-Roman encouragement but by ferocity and a love of battle. Caesar's exhortation needed to diminish their *pietas*, instead of urging it on by telling them that Rome needed saving. In contrast, the speech delivered by Laelius, a subordinate, succeeds in spurring on the troops' *amor ferri* and *ductoris metus*.

Laelius' Address to Caesar (1.359-386)

Based on the tradition of paired speeches, the reader would expect the second speech to come from someone of a similar rank to Caesar. Instead, Laelius, a subordinate of Caesar's, stands up and addresses his general directly. His speech, as I will show, is not only more effective than Caesar's but it also instructs the General on how to command the soldiers. Such an act violates the existing power-structure of commander over soldiers, and for a moment, a subordinate gives the orders.[72] Even though he directly addresses Caesar, Laelius excites the army with a rousing speech proclaiming the army's dedication to its leader and thus attains what Caesar's exhortation could not. He achieves the zealous response by speaking openly about their desire for victory at all costs and by expressing undying loyalty to Caesar, even if he commands them to murder their own families. He does not dwell on political motives for war, except how it affects them immediately.

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[71] Tension between the soldiers' *pietas* and their bloodlust will continue on throughout the poem. Passages of note are mentioned in Chapter 3, p. 39-41. Two notable examples of where *pietas* will also cause hesitation are at Ilerda (4.25-26) and Pharsalus (7.468). In the latter battle, it is looking upon the faces of kinsmen that imbue the soldiers with *pietas* after Caesar's speech has fired them up.

[72] Connolly discusses speeches as a way for the elites to reinforce their power through constant negotiation of authority and obedience. Connolly (2007), 43-46. I apply this same notion to the relationship between a commander and his army.

The troops' enthusiastic reaction to Laelius shows that his speech better reflects the interests of the troops: to follow Caesar and to conquer.

The opening of his speech conveys his dedication to Caesar and his impatience at their delay. Curio, too, showed respect and loyalty, but Laelius inflates Caesar's position even further by addressing him as a god (1.359-366):

> *"si licet," exclamat, "**Romani maxime rector***
> ***nominis**, et ius est veras expromere voces,* 360
> *quod tam lenta tuas tenuit patientia vires,*
> *conquerimur. deratne tibi fiducia nostri?*
> *dum movet haec calidus spirantia corpora sanguis,*
> *et dum pila valent fortes torquere lacerti,*
> *degenerem patiere togam **regnum**que senatus?* 365
> ***usque adeo miserum est civili vincere bello**?*

> "If it is permitted," he exclaims, "Greatest Leader of the Roman people, and if it is right to express the truth, we complain that such long-lasting endurance has restricted your strength. Was confidence in us lacking in you? While our strong arms are able to hurl javelins and while warm blood moves through these breathing bodies, will you reduce yourself to the base toga and the tyranny of the Senate? And is it even so wretched to be victorious in a civil war?

Laelius assigns to Caesar a title worthy of Jupiter, *Romani maxime rector/nominis*. This phrasing even recalls Evander's address to Jupiter in *Aeneid* 8: *divum tu maxime rector*,/ *Iuppiter*, 8.572-573.[73] Adding to his already hubristic speech, Laelius uses prayer-like language by requesting permission to voice complaints: *si licet...et ius est*, if it is permitted...and if it is right. This polite request indicates Laelius' subordinate position. Both the use of *si licet* and the godly address demonstrate the importance Laelius places on Caesar's dominant position as commander; there is no slippage in hierarchy between leader and troops as there was at the beginning of Caesar's speech. Laelius corrects Caesar's mistake of treating his men as his equals.

[73] Connection noted by Roche (2009), 265 and George (1988), 337. Fantham also notes that this language is commonly used for Jupiter, Fantham (2010), 61 n. 18.

The first complaint mentioned in the speech echoes a complaint of Curio's (*tolle moras*, set aside delay!, 1.281):[74] Caesar has been delaying the war too long (*quod tam lenta tuas tenuit patientia vires*). Just as *pietas* held back the soldiers from fighting, Caesar's endurance of his exile status holds him back from marching on Rome.[75] Alternatively, the very act of speaking delays their endeavor. The Commander's lengthy exhortation, laden with personal and political complaints, is too long for the soldiers. The men are eager to fight, and listening to another speech wastes their energy.

At line 1.365, Laelius reiterates Caesar's frustration with the *regnum* that the Senate has seized: the relationship of the *regnum* to the fight has changed. Caesar argued that Rome should be freed from Pompey's kingship, but Laelius claims that the Senate rules a kingdom, since the Senate decreed that Caesar lay down his arms and enter Rome as a private citizen. The Senate's decree strips them of their role as soldiers, which makes up the core of their identity. Entering Rome as soldiers poses no problems for Laelius, as he reveals in the following line: is it really so awful to conquer, even in civil war (*usque adeo miserum est civili vincere bello*? 1.366). Even though he complains about the *regnum* of the Senate, this last line shows that he and the troops are no different from Pompey; both are comfortable with troops in the city. Considering this attitude toward marching on their own city, it is no wonder that Caesar's interest in saving Rome did not inspire the soldiers.

At line 366, Lucan further emphasizes Laelius' desire to follow Caesar above all else through an allusion to *Aeneid* 12.646: *usque adeone mori miserum est*, Is it so wretched to die [for one's city]?[76] Laelius flips Turnus' words of dedication to his homeland into dedication to one's

[74] Roche (2009), 261.
[75] Or as Masters argues, Lucan has set up a series of boundaries for Caesar, causing narrative delay. Masters (1992), 3-10.
[76] Connection noted by Roche (2009), 267.

own interest in victory. Here, the phrase reveals that he cares more about his own interests than those of his city. At this moment, his identity as one of Caesar's soldiers is more important than his identity as a Roman; victory is more important than Roman values.

Immediately following his suggestion that victory in civil war is not terrible, Laelius further expresses his dedication to Caesar while boldly commanding his general with imperatives (1.367-372):

> ***duc age*** *per Scythiae populos, per inhospita Syrtis*
> *litora, per calidas Libyae sitientis harenas:*
> *haec manus, ut victum post terga relinqueret orbem,*
> *oceani tumidas remo conpescuit undas,* 370
> *fregit et arctoo spumantem vertice Rhenum:*
> ***iussa*** *sequi tam posse mihi quam velle necesse est.*

> Come on! Lead us through the Scythian peoples, through the inhospitable shores of Syrtis, through the hot sands of thirsty Libya: this band, so that it might leave a conquered world at its back, restrained the ocean's waves swollen by oars, and it broke up the Rhine foaming with icy whirlpools: I must be able as much as be willing to follow orders.

The audacity of ordering one's own general is at odds with the content of his words. They will follow him, but they need him to give the command first. Laelius is not the first man to suggest to another that he rise to the role of a leader; in Apollonius' *Argonautica*, Heracles politely, yet forcefully, passes to position of leader to Jason.[77] The relationship between Laelius and Caesar, however, is more clearly hierarchical than that between the two Greek heroes, despite Caesar's egalitarian language. Laelius' language, too, ignores the power disparity between himself and his commander, as he directs imperatives at Caesar. When discussing the mutiny in Spain, Johnson suggests that the soldiers want to be persuaded to commit crimes, and so they want to be ordered

[77] αὐτός, ὅτις ξυνάγειρε, καὶ ἀρχεύοι ὁμάδοιο, May the man, who gathered us together, be the leader of the noisy throng, Ap. Rhod. *Argon*. 1.347.

to commit them.[78] That desire first appears here: the soldiers so desperately need Caesar to take the reins and lead them on the warpath that Laelius must overstep his bounds.

Laelius expresses the troops' dedication to Caesar: they have gone to the ends of the earth to fight for Caesar and will go wherever he wishes them to go, a standard trope for expressing loyalty, such as in Catullus 11. By including a statement of commitment already known to the reader, Lucan initially presents the soldiers' devotion to Caesar in such a way that it does not go beyond the bounds of dedication set forth in literary precedent. Then, in the following lines, Laelius escalates the demonstration of his loyalty even further, by stating that he would even kill his own family if Caesar were to order it (1.373-386):

> *nec civis **meus** est, in quem **tua classica**, Caesar,*
> *audiero. per signa decem felicia castris*
> *perque tuos iuro quocumque ex hoste triumphos:*
> *pectore si fratris gladium iuguloque parentis*
> *condere me **iubeas** plenaeque in viscera partu*
> *coniugis, **invita** peragam tamen omnia dextra;*
> *si **spoliare** deos ignemque inmittere templis,*
> *numina miscebit castrensis flamma monetae;*
> *castra super Tusci si ponere Thybridis undas,*
> *Hesperios audax veniam metator in agros;*
> *tu quoscumque voles in planum effundere muros,*
> *his aries actus disperget saxa lacertis,*
> *illa licet, penitus tolli quam **iusseris** urbem,*
> *Roma sit."*

> He is not my fellow citizen, against whom I hear your signal, Caesar. I swear by the standards fortunate in ten campaigns, by your triumphs over any enemy: if you should order me to hide my sword in the chest of my brother and the throat of my father and in the pregnant belly of my wife, I would do everything even with an unwilling right hand; if you order me to plunder the gods and to light fire to the temples, the flame of the army mint will mix with the statues; if you order me to make camp by the waters of the Tuscan Tiber, I, an unhesitating surveyor, would come into the Hesperian fields; whatever walls you want to pour to the ground, the battering-ram driven by my arms will scatter the rocks. It is right to raze thoroughly whatever city you order, even if that city is Rome.

[78] Johnson (1987), 114. This exchange is discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

In this last section of his speech, Laelius shows Caesar that he had no need to hold back the language of civil war. The men will do as Caesar commands, even the most atrocious acts. By repeating language that emphasizes Caesar's orders (*iussa*, *tua classica, iubeas*, *iusseris*), Laelius makes clear that they do not desire to kill their families just because they enjoy slaughter, but because they want to follow Caesar to victory above all else. The graphic imagery of familicide shocks and shows the extreme to which the soldiers are committed to following Caesar. Their Commander's call determines who the enemy is (*nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,/audiero*) and what city they will sack (*tolli quam iusseris urbem,/Roma sit*). Laelius' acceptance of despoiling Rome (*spoliare*) recalls a similar sentiment from Curio, that Rome is a *pretio maiore* (1.282). Both subordinates acknowledge the desire for both material gain and glory in their audience. It is only Caesar who tries to gloss over the problematic spoliation of Rome.

Laelius may claim that they are unwilling to commit familicide (*invita...dextra*), but the soldiers' positive response to his speech indicates otherwise. At its conclusion, they assent (*adsensere*, 386), raise their hands (*elatasque alte...manus*, 387-388), promise Caesar that they would fight in whatever war he asked (*quaecumque ad bella vocaret/promisere*, 387-388), and shout loudly (*it tantus ad aethera clamor*, 388). Their excitement for this speech starkly contrasts with their earlier lack of enthusiasm following Caesar's speech when they were silent except for indiscriminate murmurs (*non claro murmure*). Laelius succeeds where Caesar does not because he connects with the soldiers' passion for battle and victory and because he energizes the soldiers through their emotions and not through *ethos* or *logos*. By ignoring the impiety of the crimes they are about to commit, Laelius gives his fellow troops permission to rejoice in the potential slaughter and eventual victory.

Laelius' speech focuses on the troops' dedication to do whatever Caesar orders. Orders are what the troops wait for. As Nordling points out in his discussion of Caesar's pre-battle speech at Pharsalus in Caesar's own *Bellum Civile*, the soldiers are weary of marching and ready to fight.[79] Caesar senses their desire and exhorts them accordingly, ordering them to stop marching and start thinking about battle.[80] He uses passives periphrastic to indicate necessity and urgency. His speech takes advantage of the soldiers' zeal and encourages it with directives to action. This urgency and direction are what the troops in Lucan's *BC* want as well. They need a strong leader, without which they are nothing but a mob. A general gives the army not only its orders but also its mission. Saving Rome is not a mission that the soldiers are interested in pursuing; they want to be guided to self-satisfaction through victory and spoils.

Caesar's speech effectively engenders *pietas* in his troops through citing Pompey's martial presence in Rome and calling upon them to save Rome from a potential *rex*. Unfortunately for Caesar, the feelings he roused in his troops hampered their interest in fighting. His rhetoric is effective, but the content of his speech is not appropriately chosen, showing a misalignment between the leader and his men and Caesar's poor assessment of his troops' enthusiasm. Caesar's ineffective speech stands in contrast to the two successful speeches that surround it. Neither Curio nor Laelius shy away from discussing the realities of civil war when exhorting their audience. Even though it is not civil war specifically that either Caesar or the troops desire, it is necessary for both to get what they crave: victory. Even though the Commander and the troops are of the same mind, Caesar does not recognize his troops' dedication to him and desire for victory.

Despite their enthusiasm for battle at the outset of the war, their interest in victory at the expense of piety does not last. The bloodlust for fellow Romans that the soldiers feel at the end of

[79] Nordling (2005), 186.
[80] Caes. *BC* 3.85.4.

Laelius' speech is possible at this stage of the war, since no battle has taken place and the men are still inexperienced in civil battle. When Caesar's troops first encounter their kinsmen at Ilerda, they change their minds at the sight of the familiar faces, and each army greets the other warmly. Shortly thereafter, the troops will mutiny and claim that Caesar has given them the horrors of civil war instead of a just reward for their services.[81] Now, at Ariminum, they have not met their foe face-to-face and do not yet fully understand the atrocities to come. The soldiers do not feel horrified; the reader, instead, is horrified at their zeal for civil slaughter.

[81] This scene is discussed below in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

REBELLION SUPPRESSED: THE MUTINY AT PLACENTIA

At the outset of the civil war, Caesar's troops were eager for battle and ready to fight for their commander, regardless of the foe. Despite their initial zeal, the soldiers' attitude toward combat vacillates as they march and fight. They are often torn between their desire to fight and their *pietas*, just as they were after hearing Caesar's exhortation at Ariminum (1.299-351). This tension, among other problems, reappears in the soldiers' mutinous speech at Placentia (5.261-295), where the troops stage a mutiny based on their desire to retire and their outrage at Caesar for denying them spoils in Rome. The soldiers do not attempt to assassinate Caesar; instead, they engage Caesar in a rhetorical battle for power. The contest consists of a pair of speeches: one by the troops (5.261-295) and another by Caesar (5.319-364).[82] The soldiers pitiably list their requests and then indirectly threaten Caesar with assassination. Caesar, on the verge of losing control of his army, must employ a different rhetorical strategy than he did at the outset of the war. The Commander now knows what truly motivates his men: battle, victory, plunder, and a forceful general. Thus, in response, Caesar aggressively displays his disregard for the soldiers' pleas and declarations of power by baring his chest to them and threatening them with the loss of spoils, glory, and status.[83] His new tactics allow him to suppress successfully the mutiny and renew both the soldiers' mercenary tendencies and latent desire for slaughter.

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[82] This pair of speeches in Book 5 is the second speech grouping in which Caesar participates. The first time Caesar addressed his troops was at Ariminum (1.299-351). That speech was discussed in Chapter 2, p. 11-29 in conjunction with speeches from Curio (1.273-291) and Laelius (1.359-386).

[83] Recall Cicero's argument that knowledge of the audience's opinions and biases are a key element for oratorical success. Cic. *de Or.* 2.186 and 2.337. See discussion in Introduction 5-6.

This chapter examines the rhetorical power-struggle between the soldiers and Caesar as each party maneuvers for control. I contend that this passage demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the leader and his men as they negotiate a balance between his *auctoritas* and their obedience. Caesar's stakes are higher during a mutiny for he must deliver a convincing speech, since his soldiers may make an attempt on his life if he does not. Troops and their commander have a mutually dependant relationship: the soldiers give the leader power, and the leader gives the troops a vision. Without someone to lead them, the troops are nothing but individuals, and without followers, the leader is just a man. The troops, even though they are at the bottom of the military hierarchy, remind Caesar of their own part in this relationship in order to maneuver for power. Despite their display, the troops truly want to continue on their path of slaughter, but they need Caesar to eliminate any remnants of *pietas* and to remind them of their desire. Their language reveals a tension between restraint and madness. In turn, Caesar harnesses their madness and greed through forceful, violent language and counter-arguments, in order to regain control and restore order.

Before any analysis is made, however, I will first look at the most significant movements of Caesar and his forces in Books 1-5. Additionally, I will also note any issues that arise regarding the troops' attitude to war between Caesar's exhortation at Ariminum and the mutiny at Placentia. The outline of these scenes will be followed by a brief discussion of the historiographical accounts of the mutiny in Cassius Dio and Appian. I will then examine each of the speeches in order: first the soldiers' and then Caesar's.

Caesar's Movements: 1.392-5.236

Following the triad of speeches in Book One, the troops march toward Rome, inciting fear and panic throughout Italy. As the people flee Rome, the Senate follows - an inversion of authority. Book 2 opens with details about the distress of the people left in Rome. Meanwhile, Caesar takes pleasure in slaughtering his enemies, and the narrator describes the rampage as if it were Caesar's alone. Caesar is the agent of attack throughout the passage, and the troops are not even the Commander's accomplices or tools.[84] After the battle at Corfinium, Caesar captures Domitius Ahenobarbus and frees him in a display of mercy.[85] Meanwhile, Pompey exhorts his troops for the first time.[86] At the conclusion of the speech, his troops are silent, and Pompey takes this as a sign that they are not prepared to fight, and so he decides to retreat. Note that the disinterest of Pompey's troops contrasts sharply with the bloodlust of Caesar's soldiers at the conclusion of exchange at Ariminum. Like Caesar, Pompey takes his cues from the army, showing a recognition of the symbiotic relationship between the general and his men. Pompey flees by sea to Brundisium, while Caesar finally enters Rome with his troops.[87] Thus Caesar accomplishes what he claimed to be his duty – to throw a would-be *rex* out of Rome.

Once in Rome, Caesar calls a meeting of the Senate with what few senators are left in the city.[88] With the Consuls gone, Caesar is the sole power, even though he is now a private citizen (*omnia Caesar erat; privatae curia vocis/testis adest*, Caesar was everything; the Senate was

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[84] 2.439-461. In this description, Hardie sees the name Caesar used as metonymy for all his forces. Hardie (2010), 23.
[85] 2.494-525. The mercy Caesar shows here is consistent with his treatment of enemies in his own *commentarii*, but Domitius views his pardon as dishonorable. The inclusion of *Caesaris Clementia*, while historically accurate, is ill-suited to Lucan's depiction of Caesar. Ahl (1976) at 192-197 discusses the constraint of the historical record on Lucan's portrayal. For Masters (1992) at 78-90 it is proof that the narrator is sympathetic to Caesar. Leigh (1997) at 54-63, on the other hand, views the practice of *clementia* as possessing a kingly quality.
[86] 2.531-595.
[87] 2.680-3.98.
[88] 3.97-112.

present as a witness of a private voice, 3.108-109). The Senate is willing to ratify any declaration of Caesar's and even to grant him the title of king. Caesar seizes the contents of the treasury, and despite his own theft, he forbids his troops from sacking it.[89] Then Caesar and his men depart from Rome and march over the Alps. As they travel westward, they first encounter a hostile town at Massilia where an unsuccessful siege leads to a bloody naval battle. There, Caesar orders his men to chop down a sacred grove to make siege-works.[90] Since the soldiers were reluctant to offend the gods by transgressing a holy site, Caesar made the first cut, in order to persuade them to follow his order.[91] Neither the commander's act nor his words erase the soldiers' fear of the gods. However, since they fear Caesar more than the gods, they obey him and destroy the sacred grove. The end of the naval battle concludes Book 3.[92]

Book 4 opens in Ilerda where the first pitched battle of the civil war takes place; Caesar and his forces fight Pompeians led by Afranius and Petreius.[93] At the outset of the battle, the soldiers hate the crime of civil war that they are about to commit, and their frenzy is held back by shame (*piguit sceleris; pudor arma furentum/ continuit*, 4.25-26). The following day, they resume hostilities. Caesar spurs his troops on to meet the enemy face to face, but once the soldiers see the men they are about to fight, they recognize their kinsman and embrace one another.[94] With a scathing attack on the troops' cowardice, Petreius shames his soldiers into setting aside their *pietas* and fighting one another (*sic fatur et omnes/concussit mentes scelerumque reduxit amorem,* thus he spoke, and he struck every heart and led back the love of crime, 4.235-236). Despite heavy

[89] 3.112-168. Caesar's order that forbids the soldiers to despoil Rome is omitted from this passage, but the soldiers will cite it in their complaints during the mutiny at Placentia.
[90] 3.436-437.
[91] 3.426-452.
[92] 3.298-762. Duff notes that Lucan omits the fact that Caesar's forces defeat the Massilians at the end of the siege. Duff (1928), 171. With no definitive winner, the battle seems endless and pointless. Furthermore, the second crossing of the Alps turns Massilia into a second, symbolic Rome.
[93] 4.1-401.
[94] 4.169-205.

losses, Caesar prevails by wearing down his enemy. Afranius successfully pleas for Caesar's mercy,[95] so that he and his men can return home. The book ends with Curio's expedition in Libya, where he is defeated and killed by King Juba.[96]

Book 5 begins with the senators gathering in exile. Lentulus[97] encourages the Senate to elect Pompey as their leader. He calls this position *dux* (5.47), but Pompey's relationship with his party is more egalitarian than Caesar's (*non Magni partes sed Magnum in partibus esse*, It was not the party of Magnus but Magnus was one of the partisans, 5.14).[98] In accordance with Lentulus' suggestion, the Senate proclaims Pompey as their representative.[99] Appius, worried about the decision and the outcome of the war, travels to Delphi to learn about his fate.[100] The oracle has been silent for many years, but now Apollo restores the shrine with his breath; the priestess cryptically tells Appius to refrain from war and be at peace in Euboea. The death and burial of Appius is detailed. Then, at line 237, the narrative breaks suddenly and turns to Caesar and the war in Spain.

The Mutiny at Placentia in Historiography

Before we examine the speeches in Lucan's description of the mutiny at Placentia, let us familiarize ourselves with the historical background of the rebellion, as described by Appian and Cassius Dio.[101] Livy also likely recorded the event and served as a common source for the later

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[95] Afranius' acknowledgement of Fate is an important element in persuading Caesar to let him go. As we will see below, the Caesarian soldiers abandon this concept of Fate and replace it with another.
[96] 4.582-824.
[97] Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus, consul in 49 BCE.
[98] Johnson also notes this contrast: Caesar is juxtaposed with the crowd, but Pompey is a part of it. Johnson (1987), 112-113.
[99] 5.1-70.
[100] 5.71-236.
[101] Dio 41.26-36.1. Appian 2.7.47. Suetonius also writes about the mutiny in his biography of Julius Caesar (*Iul*. 69-70).

authors, including Lucan.[102] The mutiny occurred in November 49 BCE while the troops were stationed in Spain. All three extant accounts[103] record that the origins of the mutiny stemmed from exhaustion and a lack of payment for services. There had been no change in the ninth legion since 58 BCE,[104] a factor that resulted in fatigue. In response, Caesar delivered a speech to his troops and punished the instigators of the mutiny. After the mutiny was quelled, Caesar led his troops to Brundisium.

Even though all three authors record similar events, there are marked differences in how each one presents the story.[105] The two historiographers describe the soldiers' complaints briefly and in indirect discourse. Dio writes that the troops misrepresented the true cause of the mutiny: "[S]ome soldiers mutinied...on the pretext that they were exhausted, but really because [Caesar] did not allow them to plunder the country nor to do all the other things on which their minds were set."[106] Appian quickly lists two complaints, prolonging the war and not receiving payment. Unlike Dio, he reports each one as if they are equally true.[107] Both authors give Caesar direct speech, but Dio's version is long-winded while Appian's is concise. The two historiographers present soldiers that are tools of the narrative. According to Fantham, the pairing of Caesar's and the soldiers' speeches is a Lucanian invention. She arrives at this conclusion using Syndikus's argument that Livy reported only Caesar's words in direct speech.[108]

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[102] Even though Livy's account of the civil war is lost, Syndikus argues for his influence on writers of later periods. Syndikus (1958), 38-39, in Fantham (1985), 120.
[103] Cassius Dio, Appian, and Suetonius.
[104] Fantham (1985), 119.
[105] Lucan's presentation of the causes will be discussed below as a part of the analysis of the troops' speech.
[106] καὶ στρατιωτῶν τινων ἐν Πλακεντίᾳ στασιασάντων καὶ μηκέτ᾽ ἀκολουθῆσαί οἱ ἐθελόντων, πρόφασιν μὲν ὡς τεταλαι πωρημένων, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς ὅτι μήτετὴν χώραν διαρπάζειν μήτε τἆλλα ὅσα ἐπεθύμουν ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπέτρεπε. Dio 41.26.1. Translation by Cary (1916).
[107] καὶ στρατιὰ Καίσαρος ἄλλη περὶ Πλακεντίαν στασιάσασα τῶν ἀρχόντων κατεβόησεν, ὡς ἔντε τῇ στρατείᾳ βραδύνοντες καὶ τὰς πέντε μνᾶς οὐ λαβόντες, and another army of Caesar mutinied at Placentia, crying out against their officers for prolonging the war and not paying them the five minae. Appian 2.7.47. Translation by White.
[108] Fantham (1985), 120.

Unlike the historiographers, Caesar omits the mutiny at Placentia from his own *Bellum Civile*. Unruly behavior among the troops would undermine Caesar's portrayal of himself as a masterful commander,[109] especially since he is at pains to develop the bond between the soldiers and himself in his work, as Ash has identified.[110] Thus, Caesar suppresses incidents that reveal discontent among his troops, to preserve the image of control over his forces. As a result, the mutiny at Placentia goes unmentioned in his narrative about the civil war. Nevertheless Caesar still chooses to chronicle other lesser difficulties, such as the mutiny at Vesontio in *De bello Gallico* (1.39-41).[111] These scenes allow Caesar to show the control he could exert over his troops.[112]

The Mutiny at Placentia in Lucan

Lucan divorces the mutiny scene both from the rest of the narrative and from its historical context. He transitions from Appius' death to the mutiny with only the adverb *interea* and without details that connect the preceding scene to the discussion of the mutiny. The abrupt shift and the lack of connecting narrative cut off the following scene from the events preceding it. Additionally, Lucan omits saying that the army is camped at Placentia in Spain, further secluding Caesar's army and the mutiny scene.[113] Despite the lack of historical details, Lucan spends much more time introducing the mutiny (twenty-four lines) than Dio and Appian. The introductory material, instead, gives the reader insight into the personal motivations and thoughts of the characters. Thus, Lucan writes an episode primarily concerned not with history but with the relationship between

[109] Chrissanthos (2001), 64.
[110] Ash (1999), 5.
[111] This scene (1.39-41) will be addressed more fully below in conjunction with my discussion on Caesar's speech in Lucan.
[112] Chrissanthos (2001), 64. Ash (1999), 5-6. Ash cites scenes of difficulty at *BC* 1.86.2, 1.23.3, 1.39, and 1.82.
[113] Fantham (1985), 123.

Caesar and his troops. The inner workings of their minds about their situation and the other party become more important than historical details. In keeping with this priority, Lucan gives his soldiers direct speech and allows their words and audacity to challenge Caesar.

The comments from the narrator are key to understanding the relationship between what each party says and thinks. Throughout the mutiny scene, the narrator's presence is felt much more strongly than at the exchange at Ariminum. Lucan's narrator is never the restrained, unobtrusive narrator of earlier epics; instead he is an overt narrator[114] that attempts to engage with the characters and change the course of events. He often interjects his own emotions and opinions, as if he were a third character in the exchange. Preceding and following the delivery of each speech, the narrator gives his own insights on the speakers and speeches.[115] His personal involvement renders him an unreliable narrator. Despite his unreliability, his comments impact how the reader views the characters, their motivations, and their words. Before either of the speeches are delivered, the narrator asks two rhetorical questions that color the reader's thoughts about the troops (5.244-248):

> *...seu maesto classica paulum*
> *intermissa sono claususque et frigidus ensis* 245
> *expulerat belli furias, seu, praemia miles*
> *dum maiora petit, damnat causamque ducemque*
> *et scelere inbutos etiam nunc venditat enses*?
>
> Was it the brief break in the sad sound of the trumpet and the cold sword in its sheath that cast out the fury of battle, or was it the soldiers' desire for greater booty that damned both the cause and their leader and again put up for sale swords already polluted with crime?

In these lines the narrator affects the way the reader will understand the troops' motivations by suggesting only two possibilities for their dissatisfaction: either a cooling of madness or greed. As

[114] De Jong defines an overt narrator as one that is conscious of his role in the recounting of events. De Jong (2014), 26.
[115] For more on the narrator see Hutchinson (1993), 66-68; Behr (2007), 2-5; Roche (2009), 61; Bartsch (2011), 312.

we will see, the soldiers' argument will suggest that the former, in combination with exhaustion, is the cause of the mutiny. Caesar's speech, however, will compel the soldiers to betray that greed is a significant motivator.

The Soldier's Speech at the Mutiny of Placentia

The soldiers, who have been restrained by fear up until now, use their voice to challenge Caesar's authority. They speak first in direct speech, while Caesar speaks second.[116] It is unusual that the soldiers not only speak first, but have a voice during the mutiny at all. As we saw above, Dio, Appian, and Caesar report the soldiers' complaints in indirect discourse.[117] Most scenes of troop rebellion in other authors are opportunities to demonstrate the leader's skill by relating how he handles the crowd. As a result, the troops become a tool to showcase someone else's rhetorical prowess and are not characters or speakers in their own right. In fact, their reactions are related in the narrative or their thoughts and words are reported through indirect discourse. In contrast, Lucan's choice of direct speech for the soldiers alters the set-piece standard of a commander's speech overpowering the thoughts of his men. As a result, the poet depicts soldiers that attempt to steal the show by overstepping the boundaries of power with speech.

The soldiers' speech, however, is not delivered by just one representative. Instead, the thoughts of many are grouped into one speech.[118] The collective nature of their speech results in two disparate strategies and arguments:

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[116] When taken in relation with Laelius' speech alone (as Fantham does; Fantham, 1985), Caesar's speech in Book 1 is first in a pair as opposed to in the middle of three speeches, as I have interpreted.

[117] Additionally, Quintus Curtius Rufus narrates the soldiers' complaints and only gives them direct discourse in response to Alexander's speech during the mutiny at Hyphasis (Curt. 9.2.1-3.19). We will also see below that Livy does not give the soldiers direct speech in the mutiny at Sucro nor does Caesar at the mutiny at Vesontio.

[118] Similarly, the men of Ariminum complain in one unified voice (1.248-257). It is not uncommon for crowds to be treated as individuals in historiography. Hardie (2010), 9.

I. Pity us and send us home
   A. We have suffered and some have died without reward
   B. We want to die at home in peace as old men
II. If you do not give in to our demands, then we will either kill you or obstruct your ability to fight and conquer
   A. We could kill Caesar but will not, even though it would get us what we want
   B. Caesar cannot be victorious without us

These two points, while not mutually exclusive, are argued with different goals in mind. In the first section the troops beg Caesar to allow them discharge from service by appealing to his sympathies, but in the second they switch tactics to threatening both his life and his ability to wage war. These two approaches reflect a tension between self-control and madness, between *pietas* and bloodlust within the group. This incongruity results in a frenzied atmosphere, which mirrors the soldiers disorganized actions that follow the speech,[119] as if this mutiny is a culmination of their ambivalence between observing the proper *mores* and destroying them.

As we just noted, the first section elicits sympathy for their lamentable situation, and the second threatens Caesar with assassination if he does not grant them their requests. Their stated audience, Caesar, however, is surprisingly absent.[120] The soldiers' words are delivered among their peers and not to their leader. The real internal audience for this speech is the soldiers themselves, as they try to stir one another to action. Nevertheless, Lucan crafts the first part of the speech as if it were addressed to Caesar (5.261-283):

> *...**liceat** discedere, Caesar,*
> *a rabie scelerum. quaeris terraque marique*
> *his ferrum iugulis, animasque effundere viles*
> *quolibet hoste paras: partem tibi Gallia nostri*
> *eripuit, partem duris Hispania bellis,* 265

[119] At the conclusion of the direct discourse: *haec fatus totis discurrere castris/coeperat infestoque ducem deposcere voltu*, they said these things and began to run about the whole camp and to demand their commander with hostile expressions, 5.295-296.

[120] Caesar's absence will not be revealed until he speaks, at which point, it will become clear that the troops were using the same technique as the narrator and as Caesar in his speech at Ariminum. The use of apostrophe here is particularly revealing about the heightened emotional state of the soldiers.

pars iacet Hesperia, totoque exercitus orbe
te vincente perit. terris fudisse cruorem
quid iuvat Arctois Rhodano Rhenoque subactis?
tot mihi pro bellis bellum civile dedisti.

> Caesar, allow us to leave this madness of crime. Through land and sea, you seek iron for these throats, and you are prepared to pour out our cheap lives at the hand of any enemy: Gaul removed part of us for you, Hispania seized part with harsh war, part fell in Hesperia, and the army perished as the whole world is conquered by you. What benefit is there to pour out blood on the earth after the North – the Rhone and the Rhine – has been subdued? In exchange for so many wars, you have given us civil war.

At the outset of their speech, the soldier's chief complaint is that they have been fighting for too long. Now that they have fought against the Gauls and have been engaged in civil war ever since, they have grown old on the battlefield and want to return home to die in peace. They list the battles in which many of their comrades have fallen. The themes in the initial nine lines make the narrator's first speculation about the troops (that their bloodlust has dissipated during the break in fighting) appear correct; they have become more interested in the peace of a civilian's death than the glory of a soldier's, and they lament their lost comrades without celebration of their victories.

Despite the rebellious nature of mutiny, the troops still defer to Caesar's authority. The first word of the speech is *liceat*, a command, but a polite command, echoing the deference at the beginning of Laelius' speech at the outset of the war.[121] The language shows a respect of hierarchy without the hubris of Laelius' *Romani maxime rector* (1.359). Varying forms of *licet* appear three more times throughout the first section of their speech (1.271, 1.278, 1.282), reinforcing the submissive attitude of the soldiers toward their leader. In addition to making polite requests, the soldiers give Caesar control of the action. They do not claim that they will take action but beg Caesar to fulfil their requests, making him the subject of the verbs and themselves the recipients

[121] 1.359-360: Laelius begins his speech with "*si licet.*"

of their commander's decisions. The troops themselves only appear as subjects of two intransitive verbs that show their deaths: *pars iacet* (part lies dead) and *exercitus...perit* (the army perishes). Despite their attempt to seize control, the troops' language reveals how truly powerless they are under Caesar, so much so that even during a mutiny, the troops must still show their submission as a tool to sway their leader.[122] Caesar, on the other hand, has a commanding presence in these lines as the agent. Their language betrays a reluctance to take control fully and an acknowledgement of their inferior position.

The soldiers' emotions run high through the introduction of their speech as evidenced by their apostrophe to Caesar at line 5.261.[123] Caesar's apostrophe to Pompey in his exhortation at Ariminum marked an increase in the emotion of the speaker and an increase in the emotion the speaker was trying to evoke from his audience. By directly addressing an absent figure, they raise the emotional intensity of the revolt, as they say these words to one another.

Following the soldiers' inability to make themselves the agents of verbs at the beginning of their speech, they continue to place Caesar at the helm as they complain about his orders not to despoil Rome (5.270-274):

> *cepimus expulso patriae cum tecta senatu,* 270
> *quos hominum vel quos licuit spoliare deorum?*
> *imus in omne nefas manibus ferroque nocentes,*
> *paupertate pii.* ***finis*** *quis quaeritur armis?*
> *quid satis est, si Roma parum est?...*

> When we seized the structures of our homeland after the Senate had been driven out, who of men and which of the gods did you permit us to despoil? Even though we, killing with hands and iron, advance to every unspeakable deed, we are still pious in our poverty. What end is sought by our arms? What is enough, if Rome is too little?

[122] At the conclusion of the mutiny, the narrator will reveal how true this power dynamic is, when Caesar orders his men to kill and be killed.
[123] See discussion on apostrophe in Chapter 2 on p. 23 n. 58.

The soldiers object to Caesar's order that they not pillage Rome.[124] The narrator's second suggestion about their motives (that greed had made them frustrated with a lack of spoils on their expedition) appears to have a significantly less important role in the mutiny, on account of its short treatment. Despite the brevity of this complaint, the direct references to conquering Rome reveal that spoils take precedence over respect for their homeland: money is more important than upholding Roman values. The men are so removed from their Roman identities that they view piety as a negative trait (*paupertate pii*). Their priorities expose them as mercenaries.[125] Although their *paupertas* is addressed only briefly, Caesar will turn this complaint into a threat against the soldiers.[126]

The indignant questions at lines 5.273-274 recall Caesar's criticism of Pompey (*quem tamen inveniet tam longa potentia finem*; what end will such a far reaching power find, 1.333). The troops turn the complaint of unchecked power on Caesar.[127] They have already taken control of Rome, the goal stated in Caesar's exhortation in Book 1 (*detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae*, we drag a ruler from a city ready to submit! 1.351). Nevertheless, Caesar has continued to chase Pompey. Caesar, though, succeeded in gaining power over the Senate and robbing the treasury. Thus far, only Caesar has profited, despite the appearance that he cared for them in his first speech.

Next, the soldiers switch tactics: instead of barking angry, indignant questions, they draw on strategies used in the law courts to elicit pity from their audience (5.274-283):

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[124] This restraint on Caesar's part does not fit with Lucan's portrayal of the general as he despoils the rest of Italy. From the point of view of the external reader, Caesar's protection of Rome from his soldiers, while not quite complimentary, is not negative. To the soldiers, on the other hand, the order is cause for complaint.
[125] Cagniart (2007) discusses the rise of the professional army in the late Republic, 80-85. A rise in mutinies in the late Republic may have been due in part to mercenary soldiers, Stern (2013), 4646.
[126] This will be fully addressed in my discussion of Caesar's speech below.
[127] The irony of Caesar's complaints about Pompey's endless powers resurface, as the soldiers point out who the real aspiring *rex* is.

...iam respice ***canos****,*
invalidas*que manus et* ***inanes*** *cerne lacertos.* 275
usus abit vitae, bellis consumpsimus aevum:
ad mortem dimitte ***senes****. en inproba vota:*
non duro ***liceat*** *morientia caespite membra*
ponere, non anima galeam fugiente ferire
atque oculos morti clausuram quaerere dextram 280
coniugis inlabi lacrimis, unique paratum
scire rogum; ***liceat*** *morbis finire* ***senectam****;*
sit praeter gladios aliquod sub Caesare fatum.

> Now look at our white hair and see our weak hands and our useless limbs. The enjoyment of life has gone, and we waste our lifetime with battles: send us away to die as old men. Behold our shameless prayers: allow us not to set down our dying limbs on hard earth, not to strike our helmet with a fleeing breath, and allow for me, dying, to seek a right hand to close my eyes and to slip away in the tears of my wife, and to know a grave prepared for one; allow us to finish old age with illness; may death under Caesar be anything other than by swords.

In the absence of a tradition of soldiers' mutiny speeches, the men pull from the techniques and language used in law courts and epic. The language that describes their age (*canos, invalidas, inanes, senes, senectam*) evokes pity and indicates that they are men who should not be fighting. The soldiers call their prayers *inproba*, but the pleas are far from it. An old man's place is not on the battlefield; glory in battle is for younger men. As they mentioned at the beginning of their speech, they have fought in all of Caesar's campaigns.[128] If this is true, then they have been fighting for ten years and are now much older than they had been at the beginning of the Gallic Wars. Even though they were not *senes* yet, with no end of the war in sight (after all, there does not seem to be a defined *finis*) the soldiers foresee themselves turning into old men and dying on the battlefield. The image of old men fighting may have recalled for some Priam's pathetic attempt to defend his

[128] Fantham note that in reality, these men would have probably not been the same as those at Ariminum and may even have been newer recruits. Lucan creates the illusion that these are the same troops by not naming separate legions (which would have also been unpoetic due to the lists of numbers). Fantham (1985), 123 and (2010). The citation of former campaigns at the beginning of the speech further creates continuity between all of the legions.

family in Book 2 of the *Aeneid*.[129] Just as it was pitiful for Priam to wield arms, so too is it pitiful for these aging soldiers.

The attention that the soldiers draw to their physiques imitates the appeal to *pathos* in the speeches of the Roman law courts. To elicit sympathy from the jury and audience, orators often brought before the court pitiable relatives of the defendant. This tactic must have been effective due to its repeated use; Cicero comments on the success of eliciting pity for aged parents: "Many in judging have forgiven the sins of children because they pity their parents."[130] For example, in his defence of Marcus Caelius Rufus, Cicero asks the audience to take pity on Caelius' aged parents and cites their appearance: *squalor patris et haec praesens maestitia quam cernitis luctusque declarat*, His father's filthy garments and this grief before you, which you see and which reveals his sorrow.[131] Similarly, the soldiers use their own bodies as evidence of their lamentable situation. By describing themselves as *senes*, they urge the audience to picture them as old at that moment. In court, the pitiful image is potentially present, as in the case above. Since the soldiers do not point to an image that is readily available, they utilize *enargeia* to turn the audience into viewers.[132] This rhetorical device creates an image so vivid that it seems to be real.[133] *Iam respice* brings their aged features into the present just as Cicero's *praesens* draws the jury's attention to the man at court. The visualization technique amplifies the emotion of the speech and its listeners to aid in persuasion.

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[129] *Aen*. 2.506-558. The language used is not identical, but the sentiment is similar: *arma...desueta...aevo; inutile ferrum; senior; imbelle ictu*.
[130] Cic. *Clu.* 195. *multi saepe in iudicando peccata liberum parentum misericordiae concesserunt*. Translation by Winterbottom (2004), 221.
[131] Cic. *Cael*. 2.4. Other examples include wives and children. Cicero points to a tearful son and father in *Pro Sestio*, 144-145. For the use of family members to affect an emotional response from the jury and audience, see Hall (2007) and Winterbottom (2004).
[132] Goldhill (2007), 3-7, Webb (2009), 131; Longinus *Subl*, 15**:** the use of the visual in the orator's argument has the power to be enslaving (δουλοῦται) and astonishing ἔκπληξις); Quintilian also remarks on the power of pictures to captivate the audience: *Inst. Or.* 6.2.29-32 & 11.3.61-3.
[133] "*Descriptio*," *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, 2001. The entry for *descriptio* includes a discussion on *enargeia*.

After pleading for their lives, they change their strategy yet again: they threaten Caesar. In the second part of the speech, references to Caesar in the third person replace direct address, as if the soldiers have switched to addressing one another (5.284-293):

> *quid velut ignaros ad quae portenta paremur*
> *spe trahis; usque adeo soli civilibus armis* 285
> *nescimus, cuius* ***sceleris*** *sit maxima* ***merces****?*
> *nil actum est bellis, si nondum conperit istas*
> *omnia posse manus. nec fas nec vincula iuris*
> *hoc audere vetant: Rheni mihi Caesar in undis*
> ***dux erat, hic socius****; facinus, quos inquinat, aequat.* 290
> *adde quod ingrato meritorum iudice virtus*
> *nostra perit: quidquid gerimus,* ***fortuna*** *vocatur.*
> *nos* ***fatum*** *sciat esse suum…*

> Why do you drag us on with hope – as if we are ignorant for what monstrosities we are being prepared; are we the only men in civil arms ignorant of which crime would bring the greatest reward? Nothing has been achieved in battles, if he has not yet learned that those hands of ours are capable of everything. Neither duty nor the chains of the law forbid us to dare this: Caesar was my leader in the waves of the Rhine, but here he is our partner; crime equalizes those whom it pollutes. Furthermore, our courage is ruined by the judge ungrateful for our service: whatever we achieved is called luck. Let him learn that we are his fate.

The soldiers switch from pleading with Caesar to threatening his life if he does not comply with their requests. Initially they suggest that they are aware that murder is the easiest way to achieve their goals. Soon, however, they shy away from explicitly stating that they have even thought about killing Caesar. Nevertheless, they refrain from explicitly discussing murder, as if they fear Caesar too much, even in his absence. Their language has been respectful of Caesar's authority thus far, and even though the tone has changed, there is still a line that they will not cross: clearly stating that they would like to execute Caesar.

Nevertheless, even if the soldiers do not explicitly speak of murder, they discuss the justifications for the crime. Chief among their reasons is Caesar's new status as a *socius*, a drastic

demotion from *Romani maxime rector*.[134] In his exhortation at Ariminum, Caesar attempted to appeal to the troops by using *socius* as a means of showing common cause, but the soldiers at Placentia have now turned the term into a negative word.[135] Instead of showing solidarity with the other party, the word insults the General by reducing his rank. By stripping Caesar of his position as *dux*, the soldiers also do away with the crime that comes with killing their leader (*nec fas nec vincula iuris/hoc audere vetant*, neither duty nor the chains of the law forbid us from daring this, 288-289). The troops claim that the demotion is the result of sharing in crimes (*facinus, quos inquinat, aequat*, 290). Legally, the troops are correct that Caesar is no longer a *dux* but only a private citizen, an issue already addressed by the narrator in Book 3 (*privatae curia vocis/testis adest*, 3.108-109).

In the concluding sentence of their speech, the soldiers return to direct address to Caesar and paradoxically threaten him with peace (5.293-295).

> *...**licet** omne deorum*
> *obsequium speres, irato milite, Caesar,*
> ***pax** erit."* 295

> Even though you hope for total allegiance of the gods, with an enraged army, Caesar, there will be peace.

Their final statement begins with yet another use of *licet*, but instead of a polite request, it introduces a concessive clause. Following the polite uses of *licet* earlier in the speech, the adverbial usage indicates a conscious change in tone. The soldiers use the alternate meaning of the word to assert a shift from a submissive to an assertive attitude. They have already stated that they are essential to Caesar's endeavors, and now spell out the result of their anger: peace.

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[134] 1.359.
[135] Fantham (1985), 125.

In most other contexts, peace is not a threat. For Caesar, however, peace means not beating Pompey and not solidifying power in Rome. Peace would bring about the loss of *successus scelerum* (5.241) that he feared when the mutiny first began. In Book 2, the narrator informed the audience that Caesar was never long at rest.[136] Additionally, Caesar has already spelled out to the Massilians that he does not tolerate those that threaten peace: *dabitis poenas pro pace petita*, you will pay the price for seeking peace, 3.370. Throughout the epic, both the characters and the narrator acknowledge that the Fates and the gods favor Caesar.[137] The soldiers' threats set them in opposition to both Caesar and the gods. They knowingly and willingly engage in such hostility by acknowledging that Caesar has the gods on his side. The soldiers not only rebel against their commander but also against the cosmic order of the poem.

Their pleas recall Afranius' requests following the Pompeians' defeat at Ilerda. The defeated commander asks Caesar to have mercy on them and to allow them to leave military service (*otia des fessis, vitam patiaris inermes/degere quam tribuis*, may you give rest to weary [men], and may you permit us to spend our lives, which you grant, unarmed, 4.357-358). Both parties point to their battle weariness as a reason to release them. The Pompeian's speech asks for forgiveness by claiming that Fate is responsible for their crime and for Caesar's victory. Afranius' words persuade Caesar to pardon him and his men. In contrast, the troops focus on their own plight and do not honor but insult Caesar. Afranius honors Caesar by acknowledging him as Fate's favored victor and defers to him as destined ruler of Rome. By playing to Caesar's ego and the cosmic forces within the poem, Afranius make his pleas more compelling than the soldiers'.[138]

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[136] *numquam patiens pacis longaeque quietis/armorum*, never suffering peace or a long respite from war, 2.650-651.
[137] We have already seen this in Caesar's exhortation at Ariminum: *nunc, cum fortuna secundis/mecum rebus agat superique ad summa vocantes*, 1.309-310.
[138] Even though Caesar has a greater interest in keeping his troops in order and on the campaign than he does in pardoning the enemy, it was not unheard of to allow some troops to leave service. Carney (1996), 25.

Following their speech, the soldiers run about the camp in a frenzy (*haec fatus totis discurrere castris/coeperat infestoque ducem deposcere voltu*, they said these things and began to run about the whole camp and to demand their commander with hostile expressions, 295-296). In order to demonstrate the extent of the troops fury, the narrator adds what they would have done if left unchecked by Caesar: sacked temples, including the Tarpeian sanctuary, and raped the female relatives of senators. For a moment, the narrator seems to be giving tribute to Caesar's order that Rome not be violated, since Caesar saved Rome from his soldiers. However, Caesar wants the troops to demand leave of him and to desire booty, as long as they do not return to their senses (307-309): madness is preferable to reason. Their polite language is at odds with how Caesar wants his soldiers to speak. Even though he wants to control the crowd, he also wants them to maintain their anger and cruelty. In his response, Caesar strikes a balance that brings them back onto his side but also allows the frenzy to flourish.

Caesar's Response

In his response speech, Caesar takes a different approach than in his exhortation to his troops at Ariminum. Earlier, in an effort to develop a relationship based on equality (or at least more equal than that between general and troops), Caesar tried to persuade his men by claiming that they were fighting together to save Rome. Now, however, Caesar uses fear and force instead of finding common ground. The situation is more dire and requires a different set of rhetorical tools. To suppress the mutiny, Caesar must exert his unquestionable power and engender fear in his soldiers. Ideally, an orator would want to rouse a more positive emotion in his audience such as hope or desire, or to call them back from emotions that are difficult to control like anger, fear,

and cruelty.[139] Caesar, however, has learned that his troops respond best to him when they are fearful[140] and that they enjoy slaughter. While this is not the case for every mutiny,[141] fear of their leader is necessary for keeping these troops in check.

Caesar asserts his power by addressing the mutineers at the height of the uprising (*medios...furores*, 304). Whether or not Caesar will be able to control this madness would be at the forefront of the audience's mind, since his success would make him a man of eloquence, a common trope in both epic and historiography. Any Roman reader would have known the outcome of the mutiny, but the narrator, constantly begging for a different course of events, introduces a fiction that Caesar may fail. The false potential failure creates suspense over the result of this speech. As Fantham remarks, "[f]or the rhetorical tradition of Rome there was no greater proof of the importance of eloquence and *auctoritas* than this power of the orator to calm an angry mob."[142] If he succeeds in quelling the mutiny, then his prowess would be proven by rhetoric, and he would be included in the ranks of Germanicus, Scipio, and Poseidon.[143] Vergil's simile comparing Poseidon's calming of the seastorm to a persuasive orator provides a mythic and purely literary precedent to Lucan's version of the mutiny.[144] The natural world acts as an angry mob ruled by fury (*furor arma ministrat*, furor controlled their arms, *Aen*. 1.150), and Poseidon controls the rage just like an orator governed by reason. The madness of the natural world is managed by reason, a

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[139] Cic. *de Or*. 2.337.
[140] At Ariminum, it is the return of the soldiers' fear of their leader that rouses their zeal to follow him. *BC* 1.355-356. Discussion in Chapter 2, p. 28-29.
[141] In Quintus Curtius' *History of Alexander*, Alexander begs his troops to go on instead of ordering them (*oro quaesoque*, 9.2.28). In Livy's *Ab urbe condita* (Liv. 28.29.9-12), Scipio chooses to give the troops a lenient punishment by only killing the mutiny leaders. Fear is only one part of the return order; the other part is to give them their delinquent pay. Fear has the opposite effect at the mutiny in Vesontio in *De bello Gallico*. It negatively affects the troops and leads to unrest and disobedience. In order to bring the soldiers back under his control, Caesar convinces them that there is nothing to fear.
[142] Fantham (1985), 123.
[143] Tac. *Ann*. 1.31-32; Liv. 28.27-29; and Verg. *Aen*. 1.148-154 respectively
[144] Although Hardie does not make this precise point, he does include the Vergilian simile in a grouping of programmatic mutiny scenes. Instead of comparing the simile with Lucan's telling of the mutiny at Placentia, he compares it with the scene at Ariminum. Hardie (2010), 10-11 and 18-19.

defining feature of humanity.[145] On the other hand, Lucan's Caesar harnesses his soldiers' madness and returns them to his control through emotions and not through reason. Additionally, instead of calming his men, he redirects their rage so that they want to continue fighting.

Two examples more closely connected to the mutiny at Placentia are Livy's representation of Scipio Africanus at the mutiny at Sucro in Spain (Livy, 28.24-29) and Caesar's depiction of himself at Vesontio. Both accounts prove to be valuable resources as literary depictions of mutiny scenes due to their commonalities with the passage at hand. The causes and punishments in the mutiny at Sucro are comparable to those Lucan' presentation at Placentia. The scene at Vesontio, while quite different in its causes, presents Caesar's portrayal of his own speech at a mutiny.

Similar to the mutiny at Placentia, money was a primary cause of the mutiny at Sucro. Scipio's forces rebel because their payment has been delayed. They ambush their commander in an attempt to take his life. The stern expression on Scipio's face stops the troops, and the commander condemns the ring-leaders to death (Liv. 28.26.5-14). Scipio calls mutiny a crime and chastises the men for turning their backs on Rome, their commander, and their families.

Caesar reports the mutiny at Vesontio in his De *bello Gallico*, 1.39-41. Unlike the mutiny at Placentia, the mutiny at Vesontio did not display discontent among the troops with their commander. Instead, the troops revolted due to fear of the enemy. The ensuing panic gave Caesar the opportunity to show off his ability to restore order to his audience in Rome without risking the image of unity with his men. In composing his *Comentarii*, Caesar reported the soldiers' apprehensions in indirect discourse while giving himself direct speech,[146] in keeping with the tradition of other mutiny scenes in historiography. He calmed the troops by reminding them of

[145] Cicero gives credit to rhetoric for creating civilization and separating men from beasts. *de Inv*. 1.2. Spence (1988) at 15-19 discusses this version of human development in her analysis of the mutiny simile in Vergil.
[146] Soldiers' complaints and fears: *BG* 1.39; Caesar's response: *BG* 1.40.

their strength and by directly addressing each of the concerns that the soldiers brought up. To those soldiers who suggested that they would not advance when Caesar gave the order, he said that he would march on and that if they were loyal then they would follow him. He did not punish the mutineers, nor did he use threats or imperatives to coerce them into following him.

Lucan's Caesar gives a noticeably different speech to bring the soldiers back under his control. As we will see below, this Caesar employs aggressive and threatening language to coerce the soldiers into falling in line. This speech, however, is not the first instance of an increase in militaristic language, a feature lacking in his exhortation at Ariminum. Between Caesar's exhortation in Book 1 and the mutiny at Placentia, Caesar speaks a total of eight times.[147] The register of his speech has become more militaristic and includes a higher frequency of imperatives than his first speech.[148] Caesar no longer treats the soldiers as equals as he did in his first exhortation.

Another dominant feature in Caesar's mutiny speech is his ability to use the soldiers' arguments against them. The troops' pitiful imagery becomes a point of ridicule. Their threats to kill him are mocked as being as only words. Caesar counters their claim that he is no longer their *dux* by diminishing their status: from *socii* to *miles* and then to *Quirites*. In the end, he gives them what they want, liberty to take leave, but his speech has made such an option unappealing. The counter-argument that pervades the whole speech is the insignificance of the troops. By reducing their power, he is able to control it.

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[147] 2.494-499; 2.511-215; 3.91-97; 3.133-140; 3.358-372; 3.435-436; 4.162-166; 4.273-280. This catalogue is taken from Helzle (1994), 129, which lists all instances of Caesar's direct speech.

[148] Helzle argues that Caesar's speeches throughout are militaristic based on the higher frequency of imperatives, violent language, and military vocabulary when compared to the speeches of Pompey and Cato. Helzle (1994), 121-122.

Caesar begins his speech by countering the soldiers' diminution of his own status by reducing theirs and insulting their worth as warriors (5.319-324).

> *qui modo in absentem **voltu dextraque** furebas,*
> ***miles**, habes nudum promptumque ad volnera pectus.* 320
> *hic fuge, si belli **finis** placet, ense relicto.*
> *detegit **inbelles** animas nil fortiter ausa*
> ***seditio** tantumque **fugam** meditata **iuventus***
> *ac **ducis** invicti rebus lassata secundis.*
>
> Soldiers, who were just now raging with your looks and hands against me in my absence, you have my bared chest ready for wounds. Flee with your drawn swords left here, if this end to the war pleases you. The cowardly insurrection you dared covers over your unwarlike spirits, and you are troops intending such flight and wearied by the favorable affairs of your indomitable leader.

At the outset Caesar belittles the mutiny by describing it as *voltu dextraque furebas*, words that refer to oratory and not battle. These were the words Lucan used to describe Caesar before he spoke to his men at Ariminum.[149] This insult responds both to soldiers' reserved language at the beginning of their speech and to their lack of action.[150] In fact, Barratt has pointed out how an antithetical pair in lines 5.322-3 furthers Caesar's strategy of calling them unwarlike. By placing the cowardly objects first (*inbelles*, *fugam*) and delaying the more manly subjects (*seditio*, *iuventus*), Caesar emphasizes the contrast between him and his troops in respect to their suitability for war.[151]

Caesar attacks the troops using the same tactic they used on him: demotion via terms of address. The troops claimed that because he crossed the Rubicon, Caesar lost his title of *dux* and is now their *socius*. In turn, Caesar reduces their status from *socii* (1.299) to *miles* (5.320), common

[149] 1.297-298: Caesar calms the crowd with his *voltu dextraque*. Barratt also notes the connection. Barratt (1979), 105.
[150] Unlike Scipio's soldiers who were bold enough to attempt taking his life. Livy *Ann*. 28.26.5-14.
[151] Barratt (1979), 105-106. Her idea of *seditio* and *iuventus* as manly must stem from *seditio* as a form of action and *iuventus* as a neutral term for "troops."

soldiers. *Miles* would not ordinarily have a negative connotation,[152] but paired with his former address of *socius*, *miles* diminishes the soldiers' standing. Later in the speech, he further reduces their status to *ignavi...Quirites* (5.358).[153] In any other context, *quirites* is a neutral word, but for a commander to address his troops in this way is insulting.[154] This second form of address appears after Caesar has revealed the realities of what becoming a civilian will mean for them: no spoils and no glory (5.330-334). In light of the scenario that Caesar presents, *quirites* is a threat: if they do not follow him, then they will never get the rewards they demand. *Quirites* does not represent the benefits of being a Roman citizen, but the loss and dishonor of a deserter. As citizens, they would no longer be engaged in the war: the ultimate offense to Caesar. According to the General, if the men do not want to fight for him, then they should fight for Pompey so that they would help perpetuate the war. *Ignavi* is insulting on its own, but it is especially so coming from the mouth of Caesar, whose earlier use of the word referenced the Pompeians. Caesar addressed the enemy at Massilia as *ignavi* (*Obstruitis campos, fluviisque arcere paratis,/ ignavi*, you blockade the fields and prepare to hold me off with river, Cowards, 2.496).[155] Thus, *ignavi* also aligns them with the enemy.

In addition to reducing the soldiers' status, Caesar reclaims his title of *dux*. *Invicti*, the modifier of *duces*, creates an antithesis with *inbelles*. This dichotomy highlights the inequality between the two parties and deepens the insult to the troops. By refusing to acknowledge directly

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[152] Livy has Scipio call his troops *milites* during a mutiny, 28.29.3. *Miles* is used instead of *milites* due to its suitability to the meter. Along with *commilitones*, they are the most common words used to refer to soldiers. Dickey (2002), 288-291 and 368.

[153] Cassius Dio also wrote that Caesar called his men *Quirites* (42.53.3) as a form of shame in response to the mutiny at Campagnia. Fantham (1985), 120. On *Quirites* as a way of stripping soldiers of their military status, Stern (2007), 4646.

[154] Calling troops civilians was not an accepted form of military address. Instead, it was used as an insult. Cf. Scipio calling his troops *cives* to rebuke them after the attempted mutiny, Livy 28.27.3-4. Dickey (2002), 291.

[155] *Ignavi* is also used at 1.514 when the narrator describes those who fled from Rome; 4.165 when Caesar tells his soldiers to outpace the Pompeians so that they do not have a coward's death; 4.575 when the narrator describes those that view suicide as heroic.

his troops' argument that he is no longer a *dux*, Caesar denies its validity. His disregard for their words demonstrates that they are unimportant not just as soldiers but as speakers.

Caesar's ability to recognize and respond to their concerns marks him as an excellent orator.[156] Based on his accuracy and the soldiers' direct address to him, the reader would assume that Caesar is present throughout the troops' speech. In the first line of Caesar's speech, however, we learn that Caesar was not present to hear directly what the troops said (*in absentem*, 319). Despite the commander's absence, he still manages to address their complaints: their request for leave, their resentment for not getting spoils, and their threat to kill him.

At line 5.325 and following, Caesar elaborates on just how insignificant the troops are in this war: even if the soldiers leave him, he will still win since he has the Fates on his side. Caesar denies the power they exerted and reclaims it for himself by simultaneously devaluing the troops and increasing his own (5.325-343):

***vadite me**que **meis** ad bella **relinquite** fatis.*
invenient haec arma manus, vobisque repulsis
tot reddet Fortuna viros, quot tela vacabunt.
anne fugam Magni tanta cum classe secuntur
*Hesperiae gentes, **nobis** victoria turbam*
*non dabit, inpulsi tantum quae **praemia** belli*
*auferat et **vestri rapta mercede** laboris*
***lauriferos** nullo comitetur volnere currus?*
***vos** despecta, **senes**, **exhausta**que sanguine turba*
*cernetis **nostros** iam plebs Romana triumphos.*
*Caesaris an cursus **vestrae** sentire putatis*
damnum posse fugae? veluti, si cuncta minentur
flumina quos miscent pelago subducere fontes,
non magis ablatis umquam descenderit aequor
quam nunc crescit, aquis. an vos momenta putatis
ulla dedisse mihi? numquam sic cura deorum
*se premet, ut **vestrae** morti **vestrae**que saluti*
Fata vacent; procerum motus haec cuncta secuntur:
humanum paucis vivit genus.

[156] Fantham (1985), 125.

> Go on! And leave me with my own fates to wage battle. These weapons will find hands, and when you have been cast off, Fortuna will hand over men, as many as there are available weapons. But do the Hesperian tribes follow the flight of Magnus with such a fleet? Will victory not give me the crowd, which will snatch away your booty from a war already won and which, unwounded, will attend my laurel-bearing chariot after seizing the reward of your labor. You, old men, a contemptible crowd drained of blood, will watch my triumphs soon as common Romans. Do you think that Caesar's course is able to feel the injury of your flight? If all the rivers threaten to draw back the water sources that mix with the sea, the ocean level would not decrease on account of the removal of water any more than now it grows. But do you think that you have given anything important to me? The concern of the gods will never so diminish itself to the point that the Fates will care about your death and life; all these events depend on the movements of leaders: the race of men lives for the few.

Caesar treats the troops as if they have already deserted by talking to them as an entity already separate from him. They have become *vos* instead of *nos* and are now outside Caesar's collective. Initially, he marks himself as distinct and emphasizes his own importance through the repetition of the sound "*me*" (*me, meis*, 5.325). Then throughout the passage, his possessions become *noster*, and the troops' become *vester*. The differentiation through pronouns and possessive adjectives divides the two groups and the divergent outcomes for each: Caesar will return as a victor to Rome and receive a triumph while the deserters will watch on the sidelines. Even though the soldiers attempted to elicit Caesar's pity, he does not get caught in their rhetorical trap. Their general knows that greed is what really drives them – that their fear of losing the rewards of war is far greater than their desire to leave the battlefield. Caesar takes six lines to point out that they will no longer receive spoils or honors for the victories they have already gained if they leave his service. The bulk of the speech is focused on the unimportance of the troops. The two topics are interconnected: if the troops are unimportant, then the glory is not theirs but Caesar's. In the picture that Caesar paints of the future, the soldiers have become *senes* in Rome, just as they asked to be, but since they are no longer soldiers, they watch from the sidelines. The soldiers used their exhaustion in

order to evoke pity from their audience; now Caesar turns their claim into the mark of a shameful weakness that makes them unfit for war. *Fortuna* will provide him with *viros*, as if his current soldiers are not themselves men.

When claiming that the troops are unimportant, Caesar masks how much he understands their value. Before the set of speeches the narrator says that this incident taught Caesar how precarious his position was and how soldiers act at will once they begin fighting (*haud magis expertus discrimine Caesar in ullo est/ quam non e stabili tremulo sed culmine cuncta despiceret staretque super titubantia fultus*, 5.249-251). He tells them that they are replaceable in order to manipulate them into following him. If his logic is able to sway them, then they will feel that they need him in order to get what they want.

To drive home further the point that the soldiers are insignificant, Caesar puts the outcome of battle firmly on the leaders' shoulders (5.343-353):

> *...**orbis Hiberi***
> *horror et **arctoi nostro** sub nomine miles,*
> *Pompeio certe fugeres **duce**. fortis in armis*
> *Caesareis Labienus erat; nunc transfuga vilis*
> *cum **duce** praelato terras atque aequora lustrat.*
> *nec melior mihi vestra fides, si bella nec hoste*
> *nec **duce me** geritis. quisquis mea signa relinquens*
> *non Pompeianis tradit sua partibus arma,*
> *hic numquam vult esse meus. sunt ista profecto*
> *curae castra **deis, qui me committere tantis***
> *non nisi mutato voluerunt milite bellis.*

You soldiers, even though you were the horror of the Iberian world and the North under my name, certainly would have fled with Pompey as your leader. Labienus was strong among Caesar's arms; now he is known across land and sea as a lowly deserter with his preferred leader. Your faith is not better for me, if you wage war with neither the enemy nor me as your leader. Whoever relinquishing my standards does not hand over his arms to the Pompeian factions, he never wishes to be mine. Certainly, this camp is cared for by the gods, who did not wish that I fight in such battles except after a change in forces.

The repetition of *duce* throughout this section hammers home the importance of the commander to the success of the campaign. It does not matter to Caesar for whom the soldiers fight, because the gods favor him. As Caesar lists the places they have been victorious, he reinforces that they were only successful because they were under his command (*nostro sub nomine*, 344). *Hiberi* and *arctoi* recall the troops' catalogue of places where their comrades have fallen (5.264-268) and the beginning of his own speech at Ariminum (1.301).

Caesar mocks his troops by expressing relief that they will leave, since he will then have fresh soldiers (5.354-364):

> *Heu, quantum Fortuna* ***umeris*** *iam* ***pondere fessis***
> *amolitur onus! sperantes omnia dextras* 355
> *exarmare datur, quibus hic non sufficit orbis:*
> *iam certe mihi bella geram. discedite castris,*
> *tradite* ***nostra*** *viris* ***ignavi signa Quirites****.*
> *at paucos, quibus haec rabies auctoribus arsit,*
> *non Caesar sed poena tenet.* ***procumbite*** *terra* 360
> *infidumque caput feriendaque tendite colla.*
> *et tu, quo solo stabunt iam robore castra,*
> *tiro rudis,* ***specta*** *poenas et* ***disce*** *ferire,*
> ***disce*** *mori.*

> Alas, what a burden Fortune now removes from my shoulders exhausted by an oppressive weight! I am allowed to disarm hands hoping [to gain] everything, for whom this part of the earth is not enough: now I will certainly wage this war for myself. Get out of the camp! Hand over our standards to men, you cowardly Citizens! Not Caesar but punishment holds the few who inflamed this madness. Lie down on the earth and stretch out your faithless heads and necks for the death blows. And you, inexperienced soldier, upon whose strength alone the camp will now depend, watch the executions and learn to kill and learn to die."

In yet another flipping of language, Caesar reuses the soldiers' argument of exhaustion; he uses the end of his own physical discomfort as a metaphor for the relief that the release of the weary soldiers will bring. By equating his men with a weight (*pondere*), Caesar further reduces them

from their earlier status as *socii* (1.299); they are now a *pondus*, a mere object, no longer people, and no longer worthy of carrying *victricia signa* (1.347).

Caesar ends his speech with a series of commands, first ordering his troops to leave, then ordering them to punish one another. The force of the imperatives exerts power over the soldiers and demonstrates how different language reflects the hierarchy: *liceat* for the soldiers and imperatives for the commander. Caesar gives the troops what they wanted, discharge from service. In light of the realities that Caesar has presented, however, freedom from service is no longer desirable; the soldiers will not only be unable to receive the spoils of war if they leave early, but they will also become enemies of Caesar.

Punishment by executing the leaders of a mutiny was a common way of reasserting control in accounts of mutinies throughout historiography.[157] Following a general's reprimand, the killing of mutineers serves as a "physical action [that] reinforces the speech act."[158] Even though a general does not kill the soldiers himself, the act symbolizes the commander's authority, since he gave the order. Furthermore, it displays the power of his speech, since he is able to compel his men to kill one another. The willingness of the soldiers to participate in the punishment of their comrades, however, is unusual. For example, when Scipio ordered the death of the ring-leaders of the mutiny at Sucro, the executioners were chosen from a different legion (Liv. 28.29), creating distance between the punisher and the punished. Soldiers voluntarily punishing their fellow legionnaires is so abnormal that Lucan remarks on Caesar's surprise and delight that they are willing to do so: *vicit patientia saevi/ spem ducis, et iugulos non tantum praestitit enses*, their endurance surpassed the hope of their leader, and they provided not only the throats but also the swords, 5.369-371.

[157] For over forty examples of mutinies and their punishments during the Roman Republic, see Messer (1920).
[158] In the *Iliad*, Odysseus beats Thersites and threatens further punishment for the crime of speaking inappropriately (*Il.* 2.211-277). Odysseus exerts his power through both speech and accompanying action. Laird (1999), 7.

Caesar's words have the power to override legion solidarity and convince them to execute one another. The closeness of killing members of one's own legion mirrors the act of killing one's own kin and countrymen. By convincing them to kill the mutiny leaders, Caesar is re-initiating them into acts of civil war.

In order to maintain his authority, Caesar must exist outside and above his men. Their relationship is based on him exerting power over them. The mutiny scene demonstrates the necessity of this relationship. Without Caesar's strict command, the soldiers are nothing but a group of individuals. As individuals, they will not receive the payment that they have demanded. Even though the soldiers rebel against their commander, they still want him to remind them of their desire to fight. The bitter reality is that Caesar needs the soldiers as much as they need him, so his speech must keep them on his side as much as keep them under control.

The relationship between Caesar and his men contrasts sharply with Pompey's relationship to his followers, which opened Book 5. Pompey can only rise to power through the consensus of his peers, just as in the Republic. Caesar, on the other hand, makes himself the leader of a group of inferiors and controls them through fear. Fear pervades the speeches and the emotions of both parties. Before the speech of the mutineers, Caesar fears (*timuit*, 5.241) that he will lose what he has won (*successus scelerum*, 5.241). The narrator reveals Caesar's priority: power. He needs to maintain his position in the war, hence losing his troops would cause a setback, which is what really concerns him. In no way does he view the rebellion as a legitimate threat to his life. The narrator also makes clear that the troops pose no threat to Caesar. In Caesar's mind, they take second place to his victory. The troops display fear as well: fear of both loss and injury. Using a *sententia*, the narrator states that what prevented the mutiny up until this point was the soldiers' fear of each other. Only when they realized that they felt the same did they overcome their fear.

The soldiers ultimately resubmit themselves to their commander's authority on account of the fear that Caesar's speech and punishment strikes in them.

The fear the soldiers feel at the end of Caesar's speech reinstills obedience to their general. When Caesar first called his troops to hear him speak at Ariminum, they were terrified (*trepidum...tumultum*, 1.297). After Caesar's unconvincing speech, the soldiers were called back by the love of slaughter and the fear of their leader (*sed diro ferri revocantur amore/ductorisque metu*, 1.355-356). Fear of Caesar is an important motivating factor for their compliance with his commands. Fear as a motivator also arose in Book 3 when Caesar ordered the soldiers to chop down a sacred grove for his siege-works. The soldiers fear the gods, but they fear Caesar more; as a result, they follow the orders of their mortal general instead (*Tum paruit omnis/imperiis non sublato secura pavore/turba, sed expensa superorum et Caesaris ira*, 3.437-439).

Caesar shows his skill as an orator by correctly reading his crowd and addressing the circumstance accordingly. His words and orders befit a mob of mutinous soldiers, and he no longer treats them as equals worthy of persuasion, as he did in his first exhortation. Throughout the speech, he not only responds to the soldiers' concerns, but he turns their points against them, showing dominance through language. His speech restores order, although it is an inverted order that allows the civil war to continue.[159] Lucan has crafted Caesar into a perverted version of the eloquent man, whose words are used so skillfully that he convinces the mob to act against Roman *mores*.

Caesar has shown his rhetorical skills and exerted his authority through speech punctuated by physical punishment. He is uncompromising about his power as their general and succeeds in convincing the soldiers that they are better off with him and that it is just to kill one another. The

[159] Fantham (1985), 126.

act of slaughter renews their passion for civil war, and the wavering seen in earlier passages vanishes. Their commitment and adoration of Caesar remain steadfast from this point to the end of the poem.[160] The scene of Caesar and the storm that follows the mutiny punctuates the change in attitude. After Caesar arrogantly attempts a sea crossing during a raging storm, he is blown back to the shore near his army's camp (5.504-677). Upon his arrival, his men chastise him for risking his own life and taxing his good fortune (5.682-699). They now value him as their leader and the leader of the world (*cum tot in hac anima populorum vita salusque/ pendeat...saevitia est voluisse mori*, when the life and safety of all peoples depends upon this life...it is cruel to be willing to die, 5.685-687). After the mutiny and their punishment, the soldiers have done an about-face in their attitude toward their commander. Caesar's calming of the mob is repeated in his survival of the sea storm. Similar to Neptune in *Aeneid* Book 1, Caesar's crowd-management has its counterpart in his ability to conquer a sea storm. The calm after the storm and his men's dedication to him persist to the end of the text. After the episode with the storm, the reader will not see Caesar and his soldiers interact again until they are on the brink of fighting at Pharsalus. These two scenes confirm Caesar as the forceful leader of his obedient and dedicated army, so that when the reader encounters them again, the expectation is that they will continue to act as a well-functioning unit, poised to slaughter the enemy and seize control of the war.

[160] In 47 BCE, another mutiny broke out in Campania, but it is unknown whether Lucan planned on including this episode in the poem.

CHAPTER 4

SUCCESS AT THE FINAL BATTLE

Caesar's third and final exhortation to his soldiers precedes the decisive battle of Pharsalus (7.250-329). The previous two extended speeches delivered by the Commander were paired with those of his inferiors. For the first and only time in the epic, Lucan couples Caesar's speech with that of his rival, Pompey (7.342-382).[161] Although late in the narrative, the audience is asked to compare both generals' rhetorical skills. Each oration at Pharsalus is an exhortation that directs the armies to take action and to end the conflict. In both cases, the speeches are successful in spurring the men to fight. Caesar bolsters his men's desire for battle with promises of power and victory bestowed by the Fates. These enticements are similar to those in his earlier two speeches, but Caesar has tailored them in such a way that they are more appropriate to the immediacy of battle; he talks about the specifics of the battle at hand, the ensuing slaughter, and the results of victory instead of political and legal justifications. This change in tactics shows that he has learned what works to inspire his men: slaughter leading to a certain victory and power both in battle and after victory. In this chapter we will examine both Caesar's and Pompey's speeches. Even though the two commanders are not in direct conversation with one another, Lucan constructs the speeches so that the style and content of Pompey's speech respond to Caesar's. The poet reinterprets the topics of Caesar's address to suit a pro-Republican stance for Pompey's. Beyond politics, Pompey's wavering confidence in the Fates and reliance on an old system that is in the midst of

[161] Fantham (2010) at 61-62 claims that Caesar's speech at Ariminum (1.299-351) and Pompey's first speech at 2.531-595 are a pair. However, the distance between the two speeches prevents the immediate comparison of a typical speech coupling.

destruction characterize him as the weaker general. Both leaders know how to access their soldiers' desire to fight – the Caesareans need promises of slaughter and rewards, but the Pompeians prefer justifications of their cause. The characterizations of Caesar as a lightning bolt and of Pompey as a rootless oak that appear throughout the epic re-emerge in each speech and in each army.

This set of speeches interacts differently than the two others we have seen thus far. Instead of conversing with one another, the two speeches form a parallel pair of harangues, a *topos* common to historiography. Even though this scene reveals information about the relationship between each commander and his troops, the internal audience does not voice its thoughts in this passage; thus the troops are downplayed and comparison between each leader is on display. Both generals cover many of the same topics: the Fates and gods, the finality of the battle, rewards gained from a victory, and the penalties incurred in the event of a defeat. The treatment of each theme, however, differs in the two speeches. Caesar foresees the slaughter and resulting victory. His confidence does not flag; even when discussing a possible defeat, he shows no fear. Pompey, on the other hand, cannot fully trust the Fates and grows cold with fear when he sees the opposing army taking the battlefield.

Both sets of soldiers respond positively to their own commanders, indicating the efficacy of each speech. After the addresses have been made, the soldiers rush forward with equal zeal (*ergo utrim pari procurrunt agmina/motu irarum*, therefore, on either side the columns rushed forward with an equal impulse of anger, 7.385-386). Despite *pari*, they are moved by distinctly different inspirations: Caesar's troops by the promise of victory and clear orders from their commander, and Pompey's by pro-Roman and pro-Republican *virtus*. Each general speaks to his own troops' needs and desires to inspire them to fight.[162]

[162] Recall that this is one of the most important aspects of persuasion according to Cicero. *De or*. 2.186 and 2.337. This is briefly discussed in the Introduction 4-5 and Chapter 3, p. 55-56.

From both a narrative and historical point of view, the soldiers must respond positively to the speeches, since there can be no more delay before the battle takes place.[163] Therefore, the speeches that each general delivers must be pleasing to his army, necessitating either a change in attitude on the part of the soldiers or a change in exhortation tactics from Caesar who spoke ineffectively in his first address at Ariminum. I suggest that a change occurs in both, in regards to Caesar and his party.[164] The soldiers act more like the set-piece soldiers of the typical historiographic *cohortatio* than the outspoken characters that they have been. Their thoughts are not related to the reader, and their actions are the only insight into their reception of Caesar's speech. On account of the diminished role of the soldiers and the clear parallels between the speeches, we will analyse the two commanders primarily in regards to one another instead of in relation to the internal audience, as we have in the previous chapters.

Before the pre-battle speeches at Pharsalus, Lucan builds the reader's anticipation for the climactic battle. Book 7 opens with the armies already at Pharsalus, but the narrator puts off the combat for the first 250 lines until the beginning of Caesar's speech. The first 44 lines of the book are a lament for Rome and Pompey.[165] Pompey receives a vision of his first triumph, and the narrator implies that the General has interpreted the dream positively and anticipates that he will win the battle and die later in Rome (*tu velut Ausonia vadis moriturus in urbe*, you go forth as if you are going to die in the Ausonian city, 7.33). The omen, however, is unclear, since dreams often appear as false promises of the future (7.21-22); the uncertainty that surrounds Pompey's fate will

[163] Delay has been identified as a central issue in the *Bellum Civile*. See Masters (1992), esp. 1-10; 54-5; 95-6; 119-22. In fact, the first 384 lines of Book 7 delay the battle with two pairs of speeches: those of Cicero and Pompey, and then Caesar and Pompey. Additionally, the content of Cicero's speech even complains about the delay (7.67-85). For Lucan's inability to override certain historical facts, see Leigh (1997), 53-54 and Ahl (1976), 192-197.
[164] A brief summary of Pompey's relationship with his soldiers and earlier exhortation style will be included below in the section on Pompey's speech at Pharsalus. Since Pompey is not the focus of this project, I will be discussing Caesar's changing relationship and rhetorical style here. Later, I will address Pompey's speech in relation to Caesar's.
[165] Compare with the openings of Books 3-6, which all begin with narrative.

be echoed in his exhortation. The narrator's suggestion evokes pity from a reader, who knows the fallacy in Pompey's interpretation. The sympathetic characterization of Pompey will be continued when he addresses his troops in a later episode. An exchange between Cicero and Pompey fills the next 105 lines (7.45-150), during which Cicero urges Pompey to take up arms and kill Caesar. Pompey then concedes that the time has come to fight and that fortune is on his side (*res mihi Romanas dederas, Fortuna, regendas*; Fortune, you had given the Roman state to me so that I rule it, 7.110). At the conclusion of his speech, Pompey admits that the outcome of the battle does not matter to him (*neque enim victoria Magno/ laetior*, for victory is no more pleasing to Magnus, 7.119-120), since both victory and defeat hold a wretched future for him; his name will either be hated as a tyrant (*invisum*, 7.120) or pitied as the loser (*miserabile*, 7.121). Such indifference and vacillation will be felt again during his final exhortation. The scene at the Pompeian camp concludes with all Pompey's forces arming and preparing for battle.

The final 62 lines preceding the armies' march into battle (7.151-213) describe the horrible portents foretelling the crimes of the fated day. During a Stygian storm, Caesar's soldiers encounter a vision of their kinsmen's ghosts. Instead of being terrified, the men find these images to be pleasing signs of their own success (*gaudet*, 7.183) – a signal to the reader that the men's desire to win at all costs has not abated. Immediately following the description of the torrent of portents, Pompey's forces march toward the battlefield in an orderly fashion. When Caesar sees them marching, he turns to his own troops and exhorts them.

Caesar's Exhortation at Pharsalus (7.250-329)

Caesar's speech at Pharsalus fills a lengthy 79 lines, his longest in the whole epic. The exhortation cannot easily be broken down into discrete parts as his first one could,[166] since he focuses almost exclusively on one topic, victory. According to Caesar, the soldiers control the outcome of the war; Fate grants them victory; Pompey's troops will be easy to conquer; and in the event of victory, the men's power, granted by Caesar, will extend beyond the confines of the civil war. Despite the length of his speech, the content is largely a variation on the same theme with two dominant subsets: the importance of the troops, and the Fates' role in the war.

Of all of the sources that Lucan may have drawn upon for this speech, there are two that display clear relevance: Caesar's own version of the speech at Pharsalus in his *Bellum Civile* and the speech delivered at Ariminum in Book 1. Previously, I have compared Lucan's representation of Caesar's speech to Caesar's own representation of himself through similar but not parallel examples.[167] Unlike the two other Caesarian speeches that I have addressed, Caesar's exhortation at Pharsalus has a direct parallel in Caesar's own writings (*BC*, 3.85.4):[168]

> *"differendum est" inquit "iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus. animo simus ad dimicandum parati; non facile occasionem postea reperiemus." confestimque expeditas copias educit.*
>
> "We must put off the march for the moment and think about battle as we have always demanded. We are prepared to fight. Not easily shall we get the chance again." And at once he led his troops in light order.[169]

[166] See Chapter 2, p. 13.
[167] See Chapter 2, p. 34-35 and Chapter 3, p. 56-58.
[168] It also has parallels to the same speech as depicted in Appian and Plutarch. For analysis of the speech in all three authors, see Goebel (1981).
[169] Translation by Nordling (2008).

In his own *Bellum Civile*, this exhortation is the only instance of the General's direct speech, a factor that increases its significance for Caesar's self-characterization in his *Commentarii*.[170] Caesar's version of the speech is concise and direct. In so few words, he hits upon a number of common motivating themes in battle exhortations: the necessity of battle, incentive to the troops, and the strength of the army. He uses two passives periphrastic to stress the necessity of action (*differendum*, *cogitandum*) and presses that the time to fight is now (*non facile occasionem postea reperiemus*). Whether or not the men are eager for battle, Caesar introduces the idea that they have desired battle all along by reminding them (or suggesting to them) that they have been begging for it (*depoposcimus*). Finally, he includes the power of his soldiers, doing so not through a lengthy list of their former victories, but with a simple statement of their preparedness for battle. The speech's brevity and its battle-focused content move the narrative forward by inspiring the soldiers to take action.

Lucan's version of the speeches markedly differs from Caesar's in length, style, and content. In the later *Bellum civile*, Caesar's speech is much longer than Pompey's (79 lines vs. 40 lines). The General is aware of the unusual length of his speech and even apologizes for postponing the fight (7.295-296). The brief speech in Caesar's *Bellum civile* facilitates a transition into action, but the exhortation in Lucan's text prevents such a transition, putting off the battle. The narrative effect of the long speech is felt by the reader, who is forced into waiting, just like the soldiers.

This exhortation falls into the same tradition of speeches as his very first address in Book 1. Both scenarios require the Commander to urge the soldiers to fight bravely for their side, and both assume that the troops are obedient. Despite their similarities, there is one key difference: at Ariminum, they were just setting out into battle, but now they stand on the cusp of the finale. Now

[170] Nordling (2008), 184.

that the end is in sight, Caesar needs to convince his men to finish the fight. In order to do this, he reemploys several of the themes of his first speech. Two topics in particular, Fate and his soldiers' importance, are especially persuasive at the end of a campaign and persist throughout his speech. The first of these has been consistent in meaning in each of Caesar's extended speeches: he is destined to win the war, and whoever follows him will be victorious.[171] Caesar's expressed attitude toward his dependence on his troops, however, has shifted. At Ariminum, Caesar attempted to encourage his troops with language that placed them on the same status level. When the troops mutinied at Placentia, he told them they were worthless (even though he knew that they were essential to his success and that his position as general depended on their obedience). In this final speech, Caesar elevates his men's standing (7.250-253):

> *o domitor mundi, rerum fortuna mearum,* 250
> *miles, adest totiens optatae copia pugnae.*
> *nil opus est votis, iam fatum accersite ferro.*
> *in manibus vestris, quantus sit Caesar, habetis.*

> Soldiers, conquerors of the world, fortune of my affairs, the opportunity for battle so often desired is upon us! There is no need for prayers, now summon Fate with the sword. In your hands, you hold the greatness of Caesar.

For the first time in this epic, Caesar openly acknowledges that his troops are essential for victory. The narrator notes his awareness of this fact during the mutiny (5.249-254), but Caesar suppresses his feelings at that time in order to control his forces. Now that they have been following him obediently again, he can use their importance as motivation: they have the power to determine their own Fate and their general's. In effect, Caesar's words change them from subordinates to superiors.

[171] This has been discussed in Chapter 2, p. 26 and Chapter 3, p. 60-62.

In Caesar's speeches in Books 1, 5, and 7, the soldiers have gone from *socii* to *Quirites* to *domitor*. The vacillation between forms of address emphasizes Caesar's navigation of the changing relationship between himself and his troops. Each situation in which he speaks to his men requires a different characterization of the army in order to be rhetorically effective. *Socii* did not achieve the intended effect among his men, causing them to waiver instead of take action. *Quirites* was deployed appropriately as an insult given the circumstances and helped to terrify his soldiers into resubmitting to his command. Similarly, *domitor mundi* is well suited to this pre-battle speech.[172] The phrase both reminds them of their past successes and suggests that they will win the current contest. Following the initial address, he adds on two more forms of address: *rerum fortuna mearum* and *miles*. As a standard form of address for soldiers, *miles* is unremarkable outside of its position, which parallels *o domitor* at the beginning of the previous line. *Rerum fortuna mearum*, however, gives the soldiers an unusual role, Fate itself. Even though later in the speech he will separate Fate from his men as something they control instead of something they are, opening his speech with such a strong association between his men and Fate has a high impact that will resonate throughout the remainder of his exhortation.

Giving the soldiers control over Caesar's Fate seems to raise them above the status of ordinary *milites*, but what Caesar describes is reality, albeit with dramatic hyperbole. The soldiers do, in fact, determine the outcome of the battle. A general's ability to influence combat becomes very limited once the fighting begins. Lucan already put such a thought in Caesar's mind amidst the mutiny: *scit non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses*, he knows that drawn swords do not belong

[172] This phrase will be used one more time by the narrator when he shames the Egyptians for deciding to kill Pompey (8.553). Since the narrator's use of the phrase occurs later, it does not have direct bearing on the lines here, but the usage of the phrase for both sides of the conflict demonstrates the mutability of the meaning of words based on the speaker. Even though Pompey has certainly lost the war by the time the narrator call him *domitor mundi*, in the eyes of the narrator, Pompey is still a master of the world based on his past military conquests, despite his current status.

to the general but to the soldiers, 5.254). Their improved position and power are, in Book 7, convincing incentives to fight. Caesar refrains from much discussion of spoils in this speech; granting to the soldiers a significant role in determining what happens to their leader becomes the new plunder. Relinquishing some of his power to his men puts the Commander in a vulnerable position, since it may lead the troops to mutiny again. At this time, however, Caesar has tested his troops and does not fear that they will revolt. By putting this potentially harmful sentiment in Caesar's mouth, Lucan reveals the trust Caesar has in the loyalty of his soldiers and in their understanding of their symbiotic relationship, which we will see in the next section of his speech.

Caesar also reminds the men that they long for battle (*optatae...pugnae*; *votis*): not only are they in control, but they are in a position finally to get what they want. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, the soldiers truly desire victory at any cost. In fact, the "cost" of success – namely slaughtering their kin – is as much of a motivator as the spoils that follow victory. Now at Pharsalus, the Commander draws on both of those wishes. Just like the control that Caesar gives to his soldiers, he offers up battle as a desired alternative to spoils. The concept of battle as something desirable recalls Caesar's insistence in his own *De bello civile* that the soldiers have demanded to fight.[173] As Caesar urged his men to fight, he proclaimed that the battle was something they had desired all along – they can now cease from the long, exhausting march and take action.

In the next section of his speech, Caesar continues to employ the themes of Fate and power before elaborating on exactly what is at stake in the battle (7.254-269).

> ***haec est illa dies*** *mihi quam Rubiconis ad undas*
> *promissam memini, cuius spe movimus arma,* 255
> *in quam* ***distulimus*** *vetitos remeare triumphos,*
> *haec, fato quae teste probet, quis iustius arma*
> *sumpserit; haec acies victum factura nocentem est.* 260

[173] See the discussion above in this chapter, p. 73-74.

si pro me patriam ferro flammisque petistis,
nunc pugnate truces gladioque exsoluite culpam:
nulla manus, belli mutato iudice, pura est.
non mihi res agitur, sed, vos ut libera sitis
turba, precor gentes ut ius habeatis in omnes. 265
ipse ***ego privatae cupidus*** *me reddere vitae*
plebeiaque toga modicum conponere ciuem,
omnia dum vobis liceant, nihil esse recuso.
invidia regnate mea*.*

> This is that day, which – as I remember – was promised to me at the waves of the Rubicon, in the hope of which we took up arms, until which we put off returning to the triumphs forbidden to us, which determines – with fate as a witness – who has taken up arms more justly; this battle will make the conquered man the guilty man. If you ever attacked the homeland with sword and flame for me, then fight savagely now and absolve your crime with the sword: no hand is innocent, if the judge of the war is changed. These things are not done for me, but they are done so that you may be a free people. I pray that you may have authority over all peoples. I myself want to return to a private life and to wear the common toga as an ordinary citizen. If everything is allowed to you, there is nothing that I refuse to be. You rule, while the odium is mine.

The double demonstrative at the beginning of line 7.254 draws attention to the importance of the fated day. The result of this day will give them their long awaited triumphs. He reminds them of the benefit they will receive from all their efforts (*triumphos*) for which they have been waiting for over ten years. Caesar phrases the long wait for a triumph as a decision they made instead of something that he forced upon them. They chose to put off (*distulimus*) the *vetitos triumphos* by crossing the Rubicon. He retrojects the idea of choice to the beginning of the war, thus giving the illusion that the soldiers have had power all along. This is, as we have seen, not the point of view he pushed in his speech at Ariminum shortly after crossing the Rubicon. Caesar opens that speech by characterizing himself as an exile, forced into fighting Rome by the Senate's decree (*terraque marique/iussus Caesar agi*, Caesar has been ordered to be driven across land and sea, 1.306-307), and his soldiers as collateral victims that do not deserve to be considered enemies of Rome (1.299-302). According to Caesar's first speech, both Caesar and his men lack the agency to determine

their position in society. The presentations in each speech are two sides of the same coin, but the narrative of personal agency fits his men's desire for action.

The power that Caesar gives to his troops over Fate is brought into check by a reminder that only he can absolve them for the acts they have committed: *nulla manus, belli mutato iudice, pura est*, 7.263. As their commander, Caesar can absolve them of their crimes, and victory will maintain the *status quo*, bringing them absolution for the sin of attacking their homeland (7.261-262). Victory will grant them the more just position: *fato quae teste probet, quis iustius arma/sumpserit; haec acies victum factura nocentem est*, 7.259-260. Caesar's words echo those of the narrator in Book 1: *quis iustius induit arma/ scire nefas*, who takes up arms more justly, it is horrible to know, 1.126-127. According to Caesar, the *iudex* will be determined by the outcome of battle, and by committing a crime they will be absolved of it.[174] In the event of a defeat, Caesar would no longer determine their level of guilt, leaving the soldiers in the hands a new judge, Pompey. If there were any inkling of insubordination among the troops, this reminder would eliminate it. The only situation in which they can walk away from the battle with a certain future is a Caesarian victory. Their personal interest forces them to fight for Caesar.

The last six lines of this section (7.264-269) strike a populist note by denying Caesar's desire for power and by continuing the illusion that the troops have control over their own lives. The *res* of line 264 may call to mind *res* as the state, which Caesar refuses for himself and gives to his men. This meaning of *res* was used by Pompey during his dialogue with Cicero (*res mihi Romanas dederas, Fortuna, regendas*, 7.110). Notably, however, he does not present a peaceful life as desirable to his men. Instead, he tells them that they will rule (*regnate*, 7.269), an intangible reward for victory.

[174] Sklenár suggests that the connection between this passage and the lines in Book 1 are a "redefinition of the moral terms of civil war." Sklenár (2003), 145-146.

Additionally, Caesar's plan to step down would take Sulla's career as a precedent. Despite his use of Sulla to paint Pompey as a monster, and despite Sulla's portrayal in imperial literature as an *exemplum* of poor leadership and the nature of cruelty,[175] the Dictator's decision to resign would be viewed as positive.[176] Among all of the savage features of Sulla's tyranny, Caesar pointed out the voluntary end of Sulla's career as a saving grace. In his first exhortation, Caesar suggested to Pompey that he follow Sulla's example by stepping down and ending his monarchical rule (1.334-335).These lines recall an assertion in Caesar's first speech: he only wants to free Rome from an aspiring *rex* (*detrahimus dominos urbi servire paratae*, we are dragging a ruler from a city ready to submit, 1.351).[177] Both the earlier statement and his current claim that he will step down after winning the war are patently untrue, but they are selling points for Caesar to convince his men to fight. He crafts a vision for the future in which there is no single ruler and each man has the ability to shape his own life. According to Caesar's rhetoric, this future is available to the men based on their willingness and ability to fight. Such a vision of the future would have been laughable to the Neronian reader, and Fantham doubts that the troops could possibly have believed him.[178] But the soldiers would certainly want to believe him, since power is their reward for fighting.

Caesar then turns to the inadequacy of the Pompeian forces. An easy and worthy victory adds fuel to the fire of their desire for power (7.269-285):

> *...nec sanguine multo*
> *spem mundi petitis: Grais delecta iuventus* 270
> *gymnasiis aderit studioque ignaua palaestrae*
> *et vix arma ferens, aut mixtae dissona turbae*

[175] Especially in Seneca the Younger's *De clementia* and *De ira*. Dowling (2000), 333-335.
[176] It does, however, introduce other complications. Sulla may have stepped down but acted tyrannically while in power. The reference confers the negative qualities of Sulla's reign as well as the one positive one. The connection is fitting with Lucan's savage characterization of Caesar throughout the epic.
[177] See Chapter 2, p. 25-28.
[178] Fantham (2010), 69.

barbaries, non illa tubas, non agmine moto
clamorem latura suum. civilia paucae
bella manus facient: pugnae pars magna levabit
his orbem populis ***Romanum****que obteret hostem.*
ite per ignauas gentes famosaque regna
et primo ferri motu prosternite mundum;
sitque palam, quas tot duxit Pompeius in urbem
curribus, unius gentes non esse triumphi.
Armeniosne movet ***Romana*** *potentia cuius*
sit ducis, aut emptum minimo volt sanguine quisquam
barbarus Hesperiis Magnum praeponere rebus?
Romanos *odere omnes, dominosque gravantur,*
quos novere, magis.

> You do not seek the hope for the world with much bloodshed: the troops that you will encounter are chosen from the Greek gymnasia and they are cowardly from their study of the palaestra and scarcely able to bear arms, or they are blended, barbarian crowds with dissonant voices, not enduring the trumpet or the noise caused by the movement of their own column. Few units will make civil war: a great part of the battle will relieve the world of these people and crush the Roman enemy. Go through the cowardly races and the infamous kingdoms and lay low the world with the first strike of the sword; and let it be clear that the races, as many as Pompey led into the city with chariots, do not amount to the number of one triumph. Does it matter to the Armenians who rules the Roman powers? Or does any barbarian wish to set Magnus, purchased with little blood, as leader of the Hesperian state? They all hate Romans, and they are aggrieved at their masters, especially those they know.

Caesar encourages his men by telling them that the opposing forces are no match for the seasoned soldiers. The ease of victory comes from a weak foe: the Pompeians are either soft from the Greek gymnasium or foreigners that do not care who rules Rome. The men will hardly have to fight Romans, since the bulk of the combatants will be foreigners. Furthermore, by killing Pompey's forces, they will be doing Rome a favor by killing the city's enemies (*pugnae pars magna...Romanumque obteret hostem*, 7.275-276); their lives and the success of Rome will be made easier by their victory on this day. Caesar mentions Rome for the first time in his speech when describing the enemy, not himself. Of course, he does not call them Romans, as they are quite the opposite. But the triple use of *Romanus* here draws attention to its absence elsewhere in

Caesar's speech – with the exception of line 7.312 to describe the whole event as the *Romanus labor*. Thus, there are four instances of the adjective *Romanus*, but none of them refer to Caesar or his troops.

The poor quality of Pompey's forces provides a foil for the experienced and unified soldiers of Caesar's army. Notice how line 7.285 is split in two: beginning with the hatred Pompey's men feel for Romans and ending with the blessing of fighting with his own men (*quos nouere, magis. sed me fortuna meorum*). The conflicted emotions of the enemy and the benefit Caesar gains from own men (*meorum*) crammed into the same line heighten the advantage that the Caesareans have. Caesar follows up this juxtaposition by further strengthening the bond he has been building between the soldiers and himself by honoring his men's past achievements (7.285-294):

> *...sed me* ***fortuna meorum*** 285
> *commisit* ***manibus****, quarum me Gallia testem*
> *tot fecit bellis. cuius non militis ensem*
> *agnoscam? caelumque tremens cum lancea transit*
> *dicere non fallar quo sit vibrata lacerto.*
> *quod si, signa ducem numquam fallentia uestrum,* 290
> ***conspicio*** *faciesque truces oculosque minaces,*
> *vicistis.* ***videor*** *fluvios* ***spectare*** *cruoris*
> *calcatosque simul reges sparsumque senatus*
> *corpus et inmensa populos in caede natantis.*

> But fortune has entrusted me to the hands of my own men, whose many battles Gaul made me a witness. Which soldier's sword will I not recognize? When the trembling lance crosses the sky, I will not err when I say by whose arm it was launched. But if I see the standards that never fail your commander and your savage faces and threatening expressions, you have conquered. I seem to see rivers of gore and trampled kings and the body of the Senate strewn about and people swimming in boundless slaughter.

Fortune comes into play yet again, and this time she has blessed Caesar with his own men. The combination of *fortuna*, *meorum*, and *manibus* recall the first four lines of Caesar's speech, when he first declared his dependence on the soldiers. The General claims that they have been joined

together by Fortune (*commisit*, 7.286), thus evening out their relationship and creating a unity between himself and his men. In line 7.285, *me* and *meorum* are nearly connected, separated only by *fortuna*. To reinforce this bond further, Caesar asserts that he knows his men so well that he can identify the javelin throw of each one. Although this feat is impossible, Caesar suggests that he can single out the men by their fighting style so that he appears to pay individual attention to the soldiers, thus endearing himself to them.

His faith in the soldiers develops into a visualization of their success in battle (7.290-294). The scene of slaughter is presented as Caesar's own vision (*conspicio*; *videor...spectare*), but is brought before the eyes of both the soldiers and the reader through simple yet specific language. The vivid present tense of the verbs of sight and the completed aspect of the perfect (*vicistis*; *calcatos*; *sparsum*) create an image of the end of the battle. A moment of *phantasia* brings the image of success before their eyes. Let us recall the vivid imagery used in Caesar's exhortation at Ariminum (1.326-332), which compares Pompey to a bloodthirsty tiger. The imagery here can be read in relation to the earlier passage: *cruoris* and *caede* echo *altus caesorum pavit cruor armentorum* (1.329). The trampled Senate replaces the slaughtered cattle. Now Caesar's men are the savage beasts following a wretched master, as Pompey followed Sulla. While his men may not make the connection, the reader, who has been bombarded by graphic depictions of Caesar's voracious love of slaughter, may very well notice the relationship between the two passages, especially considering Caesar's earlier reference to Sulla, which is evocative not only of his willing resignation but also his cruelty, an attribute the soldiers would certainly relish. The *enargeia* reinforces the qualities that the soldiers enjoy.

Caesar treats the preceding, elaborate description of success as a digression by calling it a delay, even though the lines have an essential role in engaging his audience. The downplaying of

his earlier statements functions as a transition and gives Caesar the opportunity to tell the soldiers how anxious they are for battle. He moves from painting a picture of the immediate future to describing the present. Whether or not the soldiers are frustrated with the length of the speech does not matter; Caesar suggests to them that they are and so places the idea into their minds. For those soldiers that were already champing at the bit, pointing out their state of agitation reinforces it (7.295-302):

> *sed **mea fata moror**, qui vos in tela furentis* 295
> ***vocibus his teneo**. veniam date bella trahenti:*
> *spe trepido; haud umquam uidi tam magna daturos*
> *tam prope me **superos**; camporum limite parvo*
> *absumus a **votis**. ego sum cui **Marte** peracto*
> *quae populi regesque tenent donare licebit.* 300
> *quone poli motu, quo caeli sidere verso*
> *Thessalicae tantum, **superi**, permittitis orae?*
>
> But I delay my fates, as I detain you, raging among weapons, with these words. Grant an indulgence to me, delaying the battles: I tremble with hope; I have never seen the gods so near to me and about to give such great things; we are separated from what we have prayed for by the small boundary of our camps. I am the one to whom it is permitted to bestow what peoples and kings may hold, when Mars has been completed. By what motion of the heavens, by what turned constellation of the sky, gods, do you allow such a battle in Thessaly?

Caesar apologizes for the delay he causes with his extended speech.[179] Lucan's Caesar acknowledges that he holds up the war with his words. To return to Caesar's portrayal of his own speech that was taken up at the beginning of this chapter, the concision of the General's speech minimizes delay while getting his point across ("Let's stop marching and start fighting!"). Furthermore, the speech blames Pompey for the wait (*differendum est inquit iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus*, We must put off the march for the moment and think about battle, as we have always demanded, 3.85.4).[180] Even though the reader

[179] Curio and Laelius both complain about delay in Book 1: 1.280-281 and 1.361.
[180] Translation by Nordling (2005).

knows how the engagement will end, the wait to return to the narrative and reach a conclusion creates a forced suspense and builds up anticipation for the coming battle scene; the reader is compelled to wait for the action just as the soldiers do.

Fate, which has been a recurring element in this speech, is featured prominently in lines 7.295-302. Caesar tells his troops that the gods, who favor their cause, are near at hand. Their presence (*prope me*) foretells a fortunate outcome; furthermore, Caesar's claim to see (*vidi*) the gods reinforces their proximity. Caesar's apostrophe to them at the beginning of 7.311 will bring the gods even closer. As we have seen, the favor of the gods is a traditional way of exhorting one's troops, and Caesar has employed it in all of his speeches to move his troops effectively.

Caesar then returns to vivid description, again asking his soldiers to envision the future. In these lines, however, he tells them to imagine their loss (7.303-310):

> *aut merces hodie bellorum aut poena parata.*
> *Caesareas* ***spectate*** *cruces,* ***spectate*** *catenas,*
> *et caput hoc positum rostris effusaque membra* 305
> *Saeptorumque nefas et clausi proelia Campi.*
> ***cum duce Sullano gerimus civilia bella.***
> *vestri cura movet; nam me secura manebit*
> *sors quaesita manu:* ***fodientem viscera*** *cernet*
> *me mea qui nondum victo respexerit hoste.* 310

> Today either reward or punishment for war has been prepared. Look at the Caesarean gallows! Look at the chains and this head set on the *rostra* and these limbs spread about, and the crime of the Saepta and the battles of the enclosed Campus! We wage civil war against the Sullan commander. Concern for you moves me. For a secure Fate sought by my hand will await me: he who will look back, when the enemy is not yet conquered, will see me spoiling my own entrails.

Yet again, Caesar utilizes *enargeia* to engage his troops. The repetition of *spectate* (7.304) demands that the soldiers picture themselves as prisoners in the event of a Pompeian victory. Line 304 stands out from the lines surrounding it with its consonance of "c"s and "s"s. The striking combination of sounds commands the audience to take notice of the simple yet powerful picture

of what they might suffer by painting a picture of the past atrocities of Sulla's tyranny. The images that follow this line are equally remarkable in their brief and direct style: Caesar's head on a stake in the Forum, soldiers' limbs strewn about after a battle, and Sulla's slaughter of prisoners in the *Saepta*. The three scenes give a full picture of the horrors that would befall the Caesareans if they were to lose. Of particular interest to the soldiers is the reference to the Sulla's butchering of prisoners of war: an event which might easily be repeated by a victorious Pompey. Caesar, on the other hand, can avoid this Fate by taking his own life. Caesar's promise to kill himself shows his confidence and trust in the Fates. He is so confident in his fortune that he can make this vow without fear of the need to execute it.[181]

The fate of the Caesareans, of course, is to win. So why would Caesar raise the possibility of defeat? The concrete, specific details of a loss contrasted with victory activates both their desire for power and their fear of death at the hands of the enemy. Furthermore, the particular reference to the slaughter on the Campus Martius, which was well within the memory of their parents if not their own,[182] was a well chosen precedent to instill anxiety about the results of a defeat. Dying as a prisoner carries no nobility, but dying in battle for one's cause confers glory on the soldier. The presentation of an ignoble death inspires them to pursue the opposite – something his battle-ready soldiers understand. Caesar's threat of killing himself through suicide instead of in battle comes as no shock in a world in which what used to be considered shameful is now honorable. Even though suicide may be honorable for a standard bearer of stoicism like Cato, for a military man like Caesar, it is disgraceful. Taking one's own life, however, denies the enemy the glory of killing the opposing general. Suicide, turning the sword into one's own body, arises frequently throughout

[181] This contrasts with Ahl's view on Pompey's fear of death that is revealed in the opposing general's speech. Ahl (1976), 164.
[182] In Book 2, Lucan recounts the grief of Romans who lived long enough to see two civil wars: *at miseros angit sua cura parentes,/ oderuntque gravis vivacia fata senectae/servatosque iterum bellis civilibus annos*, 2.64-66.

the epic and often as a metaphor on a micro-level of civil war itself.[183] A Caesarian suicide would be inappropriate not only since, as a commander, Caesar should champion death while fighting for one's cause, but also since Caesar has never been portrayed as the Stoic within the context of the poem. Bringing up the possibility of his own suicide does show that Caesar is either not afraid of death or has such faith in the Fates that he knows that he will never have to follow through on his promise.[184]

After Caesar's description of defeat, he calls upon the gods and begs that they grant victory to the man that would not destroy his enemy if he should win. The soldiers know that he refers to himself on account of the previous lines that suggest Pompey would kill all of Caesar's forces. The Neronian reader would also understand that Caesar refers to himself, both through the content of the speech and from Caesar's famous *clementia* that he granted to both foreign and domestic enemies (7.311-319).[185]

> ***di**, quorum curas abduxit ab aethere tellus*
> ***Romanus**que labor, vincat quicumque necesse*
> *non putat in victos saevum destringere ferrum*
> *quique **suos cives**, quod signa adversa tulerunt,*
> *non credit fecisse nefas. Pompeius in arto*
> *agmina vestra loco vetita virtute moveri*
> *cum tenuit, **quanto satiavit sanguine ferrum**!*
> *vos tamen hoc oro, iuvenes, ne caedere quisquam*
> *hostis terga velit: **civis qui fugerit esto**.*

> Gods, whose concerns the Roman strife have led from heaven to earth, may he conquer, whoever does not think it necessary to draw the savage sword against his own conquered citizens, because they bore opposing standards, and whoever does not believe that they committed a crime. When Pompey held your army in a narrow space where even valor was not allowed to be moved, oh with how much blood he sated his sword! Nevertheless, you, soldiers, I beg that no one of you wish to stab the enemies in their backs: may whoever has fled be a fellow-citizen.

[183] Roche (2009), 104-105.
[184] Ahl (1967), 164. Ahl also argues that these lines in his speech are directed more toward the external audience than the soldiers, since they look forward to Caesar's assassination, 164 and 319.
[185] See references to *Caesaris Clementia* in Chapter 3, p. 39 n.85.

Suggesting that he would not be the one to commit mass murder should he win, while in keeping with Caesar's *clementia*, suits neither the characterization that Lucan has drawn for Caesar and his army nor the attitude that Caesar has promoted among his men. An end to slaughter would be devastating for Caesar, who prefers war to peace.[186]

Caesar again portrays Pompey as a wild beast, just as he did in his first exhortation. In fact, line 317 specifically recalls the idea that Pompey's bloodlust can never be satisfied (*durat, Magne, sitis. nullus semel ore receptus/ pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces*, the thirst [for slaughter] endures, Magnus. no blood once received by the mouth allows the polluted throat to grow tame, 1.331-332). Caesar's presentation of Pompey has changed little since his first speech: even though the political message has been cut, Pompey is still a savage tiger that follows in the footsteps of the cruel Sulla. Caesar blurs the lines between the two armies by describing them both as lovers of slaughter. The effect of this conflation in Caesar's first speech is at best rhetoric designed to enflame his troops. In this speech, the muddling of the both armies proves Caesar's earlier comment (7.254-260): the winner will decide whom justice favors. There is no gradation in the rightness of the two sides. Caesar may be attempting to draw a distinction between the two sides on technical issues (Pompey's army is comprised of Easterners), but the slaughter-loving nature is common to both. Thus, without a decisive battle, they are no different from one another.

The fluidity of the two parties is furthered when Caesar explains that those who flee are now Caesarians (*ciuis qui fugerit esto*, 7.319). The ability to switch sides so easily has not been accepted in earlier rhetoric that clearly demarcated the other sides. Recall Caesar's damnation of

[186] During the siege of Massilia in Book 3, the Massilians threatened not to fight against Caesar, and he responded: *dabitis poenas pro pace petita*, you will pay the price for seeking peace, 3.370. Again, he is threatened with peace by his soldiers during the mutiny at Placentia: ***licet*** *omne deorum/ obsequium speres, irato milite, Caesar,/* ***pax*** *erit*, Even though you hope for total allegiance of the gods, with an enraged army, Caesar, there will be peace, (5.293-295). See my discussion on threatening peace in Chapter 3, p. 53-54.

deserters in his mutiny speech: Labienus, strong while among Caesar's number (5.345) is now known across the land as a lowly deserter (*transfuga vilis*, 5.346). Caesar's sentiment differs also from Laelius' expression that no one on the opposing battle line is a citizen of his: *nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar, audiero*, He is not my fellow citizen, against whom I hear your signal, Caesar, 1.373-374. Although Laelius does not address the issue of deserters, his absolute statement leaves no room for subtlety. As for those in retreat, Caesar did not view them as potential citizens either. Lusting for battle at Massilia, Caesar urged his men to overtake the Pompeian army, so that they could fight face to face: *nec liceat pavidis ignava occumbere morte/ excipiant recto fugientes pectore ferrum*, do not allow them, fearful to die a coward's death: let them withdraw the sword from their chests straight on, even as they flee, 4.165-166. By outflanking the enemy as they fled, Caesar denied them the ability to be anything but an enemy on the frontline. Unlike in those three previous speeches, the identity of enemy troops is now mutable: retreating or deserting Pompeians become Caesarians. The ability to accept deserters or retreating enemies easily highlights the artificiality of the division between the two sides. Both armies are fierce fighters that are only differentiated by which leader they follow and the outcome of the battle.

Then Caesar tells his men how to act when they encounter kinsmen on the opposing battle line. He urges them not to let piety move them, but to kill indiscriminately (7.320-329):

> *sed, dum tela micant, non vos pietatis imago* 320
> *ulla nec adversa conspecti fronte parentes*
> *commoveant; voltus gladio turbate verendos.*
> *sive quis infesto cognata in pectora ferro*
> *ibit, seu nullum violarit volnere pignus,*
> *ignoti iugulum tamquam scelus inputet hostis.* 325
> *sternite iam vallum fossasque inplete ruina,*
> *exeat ut plenis acies non sparsa maniplis.*
> *parcite ne castris: vallo tendetis in illo*
> *unde acies peritura venit.*

> But, while the weapons glitter, may no image of piety nor parents seen on the opposing side move you; throw into disorder with your sword the faces that ought to be revered. Whether he drives into kinsmen's chests with his hateful sword or whether he violates no pledge with an injury, may he consider wicked the neck of an unknown enemy. Now tear down the fortification and fill the ditches with its ruins, so that the battle-line may depart unseparated in full maniples. Do not spare the camps: advance in that camp from where the army, about to perish, comes.

Anticipating the possibility for a repetition of what happened at the Battle of Ilerda, Caesar urges his men to kill familiar and unfamiliar men alike. His men will experience such conflicted emotions when they stand opposite their fathers and brothers at the opening of the battle (7.460-469). As they recognize the familiar faces, a numbness seizes their hearts (*omnia torpor/ pectora constrinxit*, 466-467) and their blood grows cold (*gelidusque in viscera sanguis/ percussa pietate coit*, 467-468), yet they stand their ground (*nec libuit mutare locum*, 466). Their interest in fighting has overridden their *pietas*, and after a moment of hesitation, they all willingly follow Crastinus, the first of Caesar's soldiers to venture into battle. As the reader knows from the pleasure the soldiers took in the portents before the battle,[187] the men are already inclined toward the murder of their kinsmen. These lines touch that underlying desire and reinforce it.

The final words of Caesar's exhortation mention the imminent death of the enemy (*acies peritura*), leaving his men with the thought of a conquered foe. This statement lends purpose to the series of imperatives that begin at line 7.326.[188] The combination of imperatives with certain victory over the enemy creates an atmosphere of force and conviction.[189] Their zeal is expressed not with cheers but with actions. Barely waiting for the end of their general's exhortation, the troops set to work without delay (*vix cuncta locuto/Caesare quemque suum munus trahit*, when

[187] See this chapter, p. 72.
[188] The final series of imperatives at the end of his speech is a staple of both Caesar's speech in Lucan and in his own writings. Helzle (1994), 134-136.
[189] We will see below that the conclusion of Pompey's speech, which ends with the Commander begging his men not to lose, shows the uncertainty of the Commander and contrasts with Caesar's confidence that the enemy will fall.

Caesar had scarcely finished speaking, each man's duty attracted him 7.329-330), and they act swiftly (*raptim*, 7.330). They waste no time and do not need further encouragement as they did at Ariminum. The soldiers are primarily stirred up by the certainty of Fate (*capiunt praesagia belli/calcatisque ruunt castris...permittuntque omnia fatis*, they took the omens of war, and trampled down their camps and rushed on...and they surrender all to Fate, 7.331-333). Their Commander's emphasis on their destined victory and the conclusion of the conflict at hand have moved the troops to action. In the soldiers' minds, Fate plays a more important role than Caesar's orders. After they have executed Caesar's initial orders to tear down their own camp, they stand ready for battle "without order and without any art of leadership" (*stant ordine nullo/ arte ducis nulla*, 7.332-333). Now that Caesar has convinced them that they are victors, they prepare for battle.

The connection between Caesar and his troops that was evident following the mutiny at Placentia (5.237-373) and Caesar's dangerous sea crossing (5.678-702) reappears in his exhortation before Pharsalus.[190] After the mutiny, they display their willingness to submit to Caesar's command once again, and when Caesar returns safely from his venture into the storm, the troops display their devotion to and affection for Caesar as their commander. In his exhortation at Pharsalus, he reveals his dependence on their fighting prowess and then endears himself to them by reminding them of the close connection they have developed through their years on campaign.[191] The interests of the army resemble those at Ariminum, namely fighting for Caesar. Their positive reaction indicates an approval of Caesar's words. The Commander and his army move forward as a unit. The soldiers rush headlong into battle (*praecipiti ruerent in proelia cursu*,

[190] See discussion in Chapter 3, p. 67-68.
[191] Caesar's own version of this speech also creates unity between Caesar and his men through the use of first person plural verbs. See passage above and Nordling (2005), 185.

7.336) at the conclusion of Caesar's exhortation, before Pompey has a chance to speak, giving the impression that perhaps that battle will come without a complementary speech from the opposing side. The narrative halts again, however, allowing Pompey to address his men and forcing the reader to wait a little longer before battle.

Pompey's Exhortation at Pharsalus (7.341-382)

Following Caesar's speech and his troops' aggressive movements onto the battle-field, Pompey turns to address his men before they too rush into battle. Pompey does not choose this moment to fight, but the Caesarean army and the gods pressure Pompey into action: *nullasque moras permittere bello/sed superis placuisse diem*, [the hostile bands] did not allow any delay for battle, but that day was pleasing to the gods, 7.338-339.[192] Pompey begins his speech and enters into battle in reaction to the desire (*flagransque cupidine*, 7.240) and boldness (*fiducia*, 7.249) of Caesar. The sight of the troops stuns him (*stat corde gelato/attonitus*, he stood stunned with a cold heart, 7.339-340), and he must suppress this initial response before exhorting his troops.

Just as Pompey is the reactive observer of the enemy's movements and not the primary actor, so too his speech responds to Caesar's. Moreover, Pompey's speech mirrors Caesar's speech in many ways. He discusses life after the war for his soldiers; he lays claim to fated victory; he honors his men by acknowledging their importance; and he evokes vivid imagery to spur on his men. Although the topics and some techniques overlap, the overall tone of the speech differs significantly. Notably, Pompey's conviction flags, and his language evokes pro-Republican sentiments. In this section, I examine how Lucan has altered the ideas of Caesar's speech to suit Pompey's attitudes. The modifications make Pompey both pitiable and frustrating. His lack of

[192] An echo in sense from Pompey and Cicero's earlier exchange, when Cicero urges Pompey to begin the battle and he responds, "*testor...accepisse diem*" (I bear witness that I receive [this] day, 7.91-92).

confidence and his abject fear of defeat depict him as a sad, pathetic figure. Likewise, his steadfastness in his failing cause may cause frustration in the reader. When compared with Caesar's vivid language, passion, and conviction, Pompey comes out the worse – to the chagrin of the narrator.

Pompey begins his speech with a call to arms and the urgency of that moment. He skips the grand opening that Caesar employed in his pre-Pharsalus speech and that Pompey himself used in his opening exhortation in Book 2 (2.531-595).[193]

> *… premit inde metus, totumque per agmen*
> *sublimi praevectus equo 'quem flagitat' inquit*
> *'vestra diem **uirtus**, finis civilibus armis,*
> *quem quaesistis, adest. totas effundite vires:*
> *extremum ferri superest opus, unaque gentis* 345
> *hora trahit.*

> Then he suppressed his fear, and born upright on his lofty horse through the whole column he said, "The day which your courage demands, the end of the civil war, which you have sought, is upon us. Pour out all your strength: a final deed of the sword remains, and one hour drags together the races.

His emphasis on the importance of that day recalls Caesar's words at line 7.254 (*haec est illa dies*), but without the stress on fatedness and the outcome of the battle. The magnitude of the event derives from its finality and size. His men must carry out only one, final effort (*extremum opus*): it demands all (*totas*) their effort, while the peoples to which he allied himself have come together for this one moment. Although the sentiment of these first four lines is strong, the convoluted syntax muddles his statements. His earlier speech in Book 2, along with all of Caesar's extended speeches, starts with clearer, more direct grammar. All of the other speeches also begin with the vocative case, which is far more assertive than beginning with the accusative (*quem*), as Pompey

[193] Pompey opens his first exhortation with "*o scelerum ultores melioraque signa secuti*" (Avengers of crime and followers of the better standards, 2.531).

does here. Furthermore, even though the antecedent of *quem* is *diem*, the use of the accusative case for the first word of his speech highlights Pompey's role as object and not subject. Despite his powerful message and vocabulary, his syntax betrays that the General may not have been entirely successful in suppressing his fear.

Language about the Fates and victory, which is so prevalent in Caesar's speeches, is nearly absent from Pompey's. For Pompey and his men, the reward is not to reign over Rome and all her conquered peoples, but to return to domestic life, the way life was before they embarked on campaign (7.346-355).

> *… quisquis **patriam** carosque **penates**,*
> *qui subolem ac **thalamos** desertaque **pignora** quaerit,*
> *ense petat: medio posuit deus omnia campo.*
> *causa iubet melior **superos** sperare **secundos**:*
> *ipsi tela regent per viscera Caesaris, ipsi*
> *Romanas sancire volent hoc sanguine leges.*
> *si socero dare regna meo mundumque pararent,*
> *praecipitare meam **fatis** potuere senectam:*
> *non iratorum populis urbique deorum est*
> *Pompeium servare ducem.*
>
> Whoever seeks his fatherland and dear *penates*, whoever seeks his offspring and marriage bed, and deserted kinsmen, let him attack them with the sword: god has set all in the middle of the field. The better cause commands us to hope for favorable gods: they will guide weapons through Caesar's entrails; they wish to ratify Roman laws with this blood. If they were prepared to give the kingdom and the world to my father-in-law, then they would have been able to send me in my old age headlong to destruction: it is not a sign of gods angry at our peoples or our city that Pompey serves as leader.

This language recalls Caesar's call to arms: *si pro me patriam ferro flammisque petistis, nunc pugnate truces gladioque exsoluite culpam*, 7.261-262. In both cases, the soldiers seek *patria*, but one views it as a conquest and the other an ideal to return to. For the Pompeian soldiers, the *patria* is their reward. While Caesar offered his men power (*omnia dum uobis liceant, nihil esse recuso. inuidia regnate mea*, 7.268-269), Pompey offers his men a return to domestic life (7.346-348).

Similarly, Caesar claimed that he would return to a private life (7.266-7), but at the same time, he promised his men the power to rule (*invidia regnate mea*, 7.269). The contrast gives Pompey's army a softer, less warlike appearance.

Causa melior replies to Caesar's *quis iustius arma sumpserit* (7.259-260) and also answers the question *quis iustius induit arma/ scire nefas: magno se iudice quisque tuetur;/ victrix causa deis placuit sed victa Catoni*, which the narrator asked in Book 1 (1.126-128). In his speech at Pharsalus, Caesar claims that the result of this day's battle will determine who had the better cause, as the victor will be able to claim that he is favored by the gods. The wording of line 7.349 is ambiguous in regards to who has the better cause and whom the gods favor, but the following two lines make it clear that Pompey has the better cause: the gods will use Caesar's blood to ratify the Roman laws. These lines are another example of Pompey's pro-Roman and pro-Republican stance that is absent from Caesar's rhetoric at Pharsalus. The Pompeians are firmly on the side of Rome and will save her (*Romanas...leges*) by slaughtering Caesar.

Pompey predicts that the gods will favor him because he has the *melior causa* and has not yet been killed, so it must not anger them that he act as commander. The flaw in his argument is transparent even to his soldiers: since neither leader has been killed, the same argument could be made in favor of Caesar. An absence of bad omens does not equal a favorable one. His confidence in fortune has been weakened since he first addressed his men (2.531-595). The readers, too, would find his argument flawed, since the gods have been on Caesar's side throughout the text. The reader is also privy to Pompey's suppressed fear, which the narrator has labeled a bad omen (*tantoque duci sic arma timere/omen erat*, thus for such a leader to fear arms was a bad omen, 7.340-341) Furthermore, the reader knows that Pompey's promises to his soldiers will never come to fruition.

For Caesar, *fata* means victory. Pompey's first usage of *fata* in this speech (7.353) means not just any Fate, but death. The contrast between the two meanings expressed by the generals adds pathos to Pompey's sentiments. In fact, Pompey's continued insistence on the righteousness of his cause and the greatness of his army continues to affect a reader (7.355-368):

> … *quae vincere possent* 355
> *omnia contulimus. subiere pericula clari*
> *sponte viri sacraque antiquus imagine miles.*
> *si* ***Curios*** *his fata darent reducesque* ***Camillos***
> *temporibus* ***Decios****que caput fatale voventis,*
> *hinc starent. primo* ***gentes oriente*** *coactae* 360
> *innumeraeque urbes,* ***quantas in proelia numquam****,*
> *excivere manus. toto simul utimur orbe.*
> *quidquid signiferi conprensum limite caeli*
> *sub Noton et Borean hominum sumus, arma movemus.*
> *nonne superfusis collectum cornibus hostem* 365
> *in medium dabimus?* ***paucas victoria dextras***
> ***exigit****, at plures tantum clamore catervae*
> *bella gerent: Caesar nostris non sufficit armis.*

> We have gathered all peoples, which are able to conquer. Famous men and the army old-fashioned in its sacred appearance join the danger willingly. If the Fates were to allow the Curii and the Camilli and the Decii, pledging their fated heads, to come back to our time, then they would stand with us. Tribes gathered from the far East and innumerable cities, a number never before seen in battle, offer their bands. We utilize the whole world at once. We are [comprised of] however many men are seized by the boundary of the star-bearing sky under Notus and Boreas; we move those troops. Surely we will force the gathered enemy into the middle when we have surrounded them with our wings. Victory requires few hands, but many bands will wage war with only a shout: Caesar [and his army] are not enough for our weapons.

Pompey enumerates the advantages of their forces: they have gathered troops from their allies around the globe, their cause is worthy of great men of contemporary and earlier times, and their forces are greater than any before. They are so great, in fact, that the small size of Caesar's forces does not satisfy the need for every soldier to fight, and only *paucas dextras* are needed to secure a victory. Pompey counts the Eastern nations as a positive addition to his forces, unlike Caesar who

considered them a weakness and a sign of the un-Roman quality of Pompey's army. Beyond their size, their cause is so great it would be supported by the men of noble Roman *gentes*: the Curii, Camilli, and Decii. According to Pompey, both the size of their forces and the rightness of their principle should make victory an easy task. The citation of the Roman *gentes* is undercut by the fact that his forces are largely made up of Easterners, as Pompey admits at lines 7.360-361 and as Caesar pointed out in his own exhortation. Pompey views his Eastern allies as an asset, and not a strike against the Romanness of his troops. Leading a foreign army has been a negative metaphor for Caesar throughout the epic, who has been compared to Hannibal and to the Gauls.[194]

The bold, descriptive language of Caesar's accounts of victory and defeat find their parallel in the following lines (7.369-376):

> ***credite*** *pendentes e summis moenibus urbis*
> *crinibus effusis hortari in proelia matres;*
> ***credite*** *grandaeuum vetitumque aetate senatum*
> *arma sequi sacros pedibus prosternere canos*
> *atque ipsam domini metuentem occurrere Romam;*
> ***credite*** *qui nunc est populus populumque futurum*
> *permixtas adferre preces: haec libera nasci,*
> *haec volt turba mori.*

> Imagine matrons with torn out hair hanging from the lofty walls of the city to urge you into battle; imagine the aged Senate, prevented by age from pursuing arms, prostrating their sacred white-haired heads at your feet and imagine that Roma herself, fearing a master, meets you; imagine the people now and those that come after offer their mixed prayers to you: some wish that they are born free, and others that they die free.

Pompey commands his men to imagine the people of Rome – the matrons, the old senators, and the citizens, both current and future, that want freedom – urging them to fight on their behalf. The *senatus* representing the "old men longing to fight" category gives the scene a particularly Roman flavor, as does, of course, Roma herself. Most recently, the reader encountered this *topos* in the

[194] 1.183; 1.247; 1.304-5.

introductory lines to Book 7 (7.37-44), in which the narrator describes the Romans grieving at the death of both Pompey and Rome. In this episode, the current and future generations beg the soldiers to fight for what the narrator has already lamented will never happen: the preservation of liberty. The pro-Roman and pro-Republican imagery employed here could not have been used effectively by Caesar, whose troops have already rejected such encouragement.[195]

In the final lines of his exhortation, Pompey begs his his forces to fight for him – an act unbecoming of a Roman commander (7.376-384):

> *… siquis post pignora tanta*
> *Pompeio locus est, cum prole et coniuge* ***supplex****,*
> *imperii salva si maiestate liceret,*
> *voluerer ante pedes. Magnus, nisi vincitis,* ***exul****,*
> *ludibrium soceri,* ***vester pudor****, ultima fata* 380
> ***deprecor*** *ac turpes extremi cardinis annos,*
> *ne discam servire* ***senex****.' tam* ***maesta*** *locuti*
> *voce ducis* ***flagrant*** *animi,* ***Romanaque virtus***
> *erigitur,* ***placuitque mori****, si vera timeret.*
>
> If after such pledges, there is a place for Pompey, may I grovel before your feet as a suppliant with my son and wife, if it is permitted while keeping the greatness of my command intact. Unless you win, I, Magnus, as an exile, the laughingstock of his father-in-law, your shame, ward off with prayer the final Fates and the polluted years of my old age, lest I learn to be a slave as an old man." Their minds burn at so sad a speech from the general, and Roman courage rises up, and if what he feared was true, then it would be pleasing to die.

The importance of the troops for success, a theme that runs throughout Caesar's exhortation, only appears toward the end of Pompey's speech. The treatment of this theme in Pompey's speech is self-deprecating. Pompey lowers himself far below his men, supplicating them and begging them to win the war so that he does not have to submit as an old man. While Caesar demotes his own station, he only goes so far as to call himself a *privatus*; his men might have the power, but the General will still have the privileges of a citizen. If Caesar sees that he is losing the battle, he will

[195] Cf. Chapter 2, p. 28-29.

kill himself to avoid the shame of serving under Pompey or receiving an ignoble death. In his brief discussion of what he will do if he loses, Caesar does not show any fearful language.[196] Pompey, on the other hand, betrays his fear of defeat at the hands of Caesar. He calls himself *supplex*, *exul*, *ludibrium*, and *pudor* (7.376-380), all words unbecoming of a commander.

Pompey ends his speech with the word *senex*, a trait that both Caesar and the narrator have commented on as a negative quality of Pompey's. *Senex* is an odd word with which to end a battle exhortation; it is not an image of a powerful man – quite the opposite, in fact. The word points to a weakness, a lack of virility, a quality ill-suited to a soldier or commander. Recall how in their mutiny speech, the soldiers used *senes* (5.277) and *senectam* (5.282) to refer to a time when their hands would be *invalidas* (5.275) and their limbs would be *inanes* (5.275). Caesar, too, in his response speech, call the soldiers *senes* (5.333) as a term of disrespect.

The narrator describes his words as sad (*maesta*), a quality not characteristic of a confident general. Nevertheless, his men are stirred by his words (*flagrant*).[197] The traditional, pro-Republican language of Pompey's speech kindles their *Romana virtus*, a Roman quality never exalted by Caesar's soldiers. Sklenár points out that Caesar only uses the word *virtus* in reference to himself once, but the usage occurs much later in the epic and in relation to his desire to learn more about the geography of Egypt, not warfare, (10.188).[198] *Virtus* appeared above in Caesar's exhortation, but in relation to Pompey's lack of this quality, not to his own men or their martial virtues. *Virtus* frames the narrative around Pompey's speech: the soldiers' courage has brought them to this final battle (7.342), and they are filled with courage following Pompey's address.

[196] Although he does attempt to inspire fear of defeat in his soldiers in order to motivate them.
[197] The same emotion that Caesar felt before he spoke to his troops: *flagransque cupidine*, 7.240.
[198] Sklenár (2003), 146-147.

The references to the old Republic are sad; as noble as Pompey may make his side out to be, the reader knows that he will fail. Even Pompey is uncertain about his Fate and begs pitifully for a victory, so that he will not suffer ignobly. As a consequence, his soldiers consider defeat as a viable possibility (*si uera timeret*). No reference to the Republic or traditional Roman values appears in Caesar's speech except for a denial of *pietas* (7.320-322).[199] Pompey clearly delineates the two sides: he and his men fight for Rome and Caesar against her.

Pompey's speech plays off of the content of Caesar's speech in such a way that it reinforces characterizations of the commanders developed throughout the epic. The Pompeian interest is in preserving Rome and returning to domestic life. His mixed feelings about his fate, his men's *virtus*, and fear of death and servitude evoke pity. The narrator's lamentations at the beginning of the book and during the ominous portents anticipate Pompey's pitiable speech. Pompey's efforts to spur on his men are futile, because no matter how strong their *virtus*, they will lose. This inevitability emerges not only from the force of history, but also in Caesar's own speech, focused as it is on the role of Fate granting him victory. Pompey may rely more clearly on Roman and Republican values such as *virtus* and even *pietas*, but the virtue does not lead to victory in the *Bellum civile*.

The interplay between these two speeches is not unique to this book nor to this epic. Caesar's exhortation at Ariminum (1.299-351) has Laelius' speech (1.359-386) as its immediate partner, but Pompey's speech in Book 2 (2.531-595) interacts with Caesar's in a similar way as the one at Pharsalus does. Pompey's first exhortation matches Caesar's in its obsession with his rival (including the use of extended apostrophe), his claim to be fighting against an aspiring tyrant, his claim that the Fates favor his own party, and his honoring of past successes. Despite the

[199] When Caesar called up *pietas* in his soldiers in his first exhortation, it did not have the desired effect on his soldiers.

commonalities between the two speeches, the reaction of Pompey's men reveals a different relationship between commander and troops. The Pompeian army remains silent at the conclusion of their leader's speech, indicating to Pompey that they are not ready for battle. Pompey follows their lead and retreats. This contrasts sharply with Caesar's troops, who openly express their thoughts to their commander. While they are usually obedient, the soldiers boldly demand from Caesar what they need and want from him. Pompey's troops, in response to the exhortations in Books 2 and 7, remain silent, a reflection of their own pitiable general.

Through a series of parallels, Lucan contrasts the two generals. Even six books later, the similes of the lightning bolt and the oak tree from Book 1 still stand.[200] Caesar speaks of decisive action and destined victory, but Pompey's words betray his wavering confidence. Even though each army is encouraged by different ideals and images of the future, Lucan still describes their ardor for battle as *pari* (equal, 7.385). Despite the generals' outlines of differences between the two armies, they both hold a common desire for slaughter. Throughout both speeches, the commanders try to make the enemy into a distinct other, separate from themselves. Caesar points out the foreignness of Pompey's forces and Pompey's potential cruelty as a victor. However, he also calls Pompey's men Roman, an adjective he never applied to his own men, and he calls on his men to rejoice in the slaughter yet to come. Despite each leader's attempt to describe the opposing side as other, both armies have an element of un-Romanness, and both are merciless. As Caesar reminds his soldiers, Fate determines the victor, and victory determines the just cause.

[200] Pompey as the oak tree: 1.136-143. Caesar as lightning: 1.151-157. Discussion in Chapter 2, p. 21-22.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Of all the times Lucan's Caesar speaks in the epic, he gives only three extended addresses to his soldiers. There are a number of commonalities throughout his speeches, but not enough to define a Caesarian style. In fact, there are so many significant differences that doing so would be difficult, if not impossible. Beyond assigning almost exclusively military speech to Caesar, Lucan did not seem concerned with giving him a separate style or voice. Caesar often employs stylistic elements of the poetic narrator and of other characters. There is, however, one common thread through all of his speeches: a negotiation of his relationship with his soldiers. Lucan's version of the relationship between Caesar and his men does not display the same connection as is found in Caesar's own *Commentarii*. As Ash has argued, Caesar established himself as the always capable leader of an army closely bonded to him.[201] Lucan's Caesar, however, must lead an army whose relationship with him is in flux. Even though they convey their dedication to him, their loyalty does not prevent them from expressing their dissatisfaction with their Commander. Caesar's addresses to his soldiers reveal a general keenly aware of his soldiers' importance, since without them, war and victory would be impossible. By giving the troops direct speech, Lucan also highlights their significance as actors in the war. Despite their loyalty to Caesar, they provide a voice that challenges him, thus forcing the General to adapt his exhortation style in order to keep them on the warpath. And adapt he does, releasing and concealing his selfishness and ferocity as necessary.

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[201] Ash (1999), 5.

In Chapter 2, Caesar's missteps in the first exhortation to his soldiers at Ariminum (1.299-351) were analyzed. In an effort to inspire a desire for battle in his troops, Caesar delivered a speech that evoked *pietas*, which in turn hampered the soldiers' ferocity. One of Caesar's soldiers, Laelius, turned the men's hearts back toward fighting by delivering a speech of his own. He celebrated their dedication to Caesar and to future victory – a dedication that overrode any qualms about committing familicide or despoiling Rome. Even though the troops were dedicated to Caesar, they responded positively to Laelius' speech. His words lacked the crafted style of Caesar's, but his message matched the troops' feelings toward their commander and war. In that scene the reader was introduced to Caesar as a leader that knows how to deliver a speech to loyal Romans, but it also revealed that his soldiers were not that sort of men. Instead of silent, unwaveringly obedient soldiers, they were opinionated and bloodthirsty.

Chapter 3 showed the next development in Caesar's relationship with his soldiers. They were obedient until they reached Placentia, at which point they mutinied against their leader. The soldiers spoke for a second time and revealed their dissatisfaction with fighting in a civil war. Despite their threats on Caesar's life, their words do not turn into action. Caesar's forceful language and reminders of his power terrified the troops and persuaded them to follow his orders to kill the instigators of the mutiny. This scene was the last time the troops rebelled. The men responded to Caesar's reckless sea crossing with pleas for him not to endanger his life, since he was the fated victor.

Chapter 4 looked not at an exhortation by Caesar paired with a speech from his men, but one matched with an exhortation from his rival Pompey. The contrast between the manner in which each general addresses the same topics highlights the differences in character between the two men: Caesar as a bold, assertive leader, and Pompey as a cowardly, wavering one. The dichotomy

between the two generals draws to the forefront the power of Caesar, the champion of fury and enemy of Rome, and the inevitable death of the Republican cause. The first two exhortations showed a development in Caesar's character, especially in relation to his soldiers. This third speech, however, capitalized on the already established characterizations to build the tragedy of the climactic battle about to take place.

Like any good orator, Caesar changed the quality of his speech to match its content, such as the short, angry questions he asked of Pompey in his exhortation at Ariminum, or the grandiose language he used to express the importance of the battle to come at Pharsalus. Caesar's interest in striking the right rhetorical register with his troops came from his desire for victory. The troops were his tool, but he understood that he must play to their egos and emotions as well. Perhaps more importantly, Caesar treated his troops appropriately given the situation: he was harsh during the mutiny, and encouraging before the climactic battle. Even though he told the soldiers that they were worthless and easily replaceable during his mutiny speech, he needed them, and it was easier to persuade them to stay than to recruit and train a new army. Caesar's violent and dismissive language struck the right cord with the troops. Although Caesar was not certain that they would obey his impious orders and disband the mutiny, Laelius' speech in Book 1 about their dedication to Caesar and to his unholy orders indicated that this was the sort of language that inspired them.

Although Lucan's Caesar is most certainly an unflinching, savage beast of a man,[202] as many scholars have noted, the speeches that the poet writes for his character reveal that the Commander was not limited to those features. He was a leader who took care to craft his speeches to what he thought his men needed to hear, as displayed early on in his speech at Ariminum. He was clearly motivated by self-interest, as Curio pointed out, but he spoke of saving Rome to his

[202] See Fratantuono (2012), *passim* and especially 19-20 where he discusses the introduction of Caesar.

troops. The decision to speak of himself and his troops as saviors turned out to be a poor choice, but Caesar crafted that image in an attempt to motivate his soldiers. He chose another portrayal of himself when he reprimanded the soldiers during the mutiny at Placentia. He projected himself as a confident, violent commander – just the sort of leader that Laelius wanted him to be in Book 1. Caesar learned from his error and shifted his message to what his troops needed to hear in order to obey him. He ceased to attempt to persuade them with political and pro-Roman language and gave them short, direct orders in Books 2-5 as they rampaged across Italy and territories to the West. That is not to say that Caesar completely succumbed to battle-loving fury. Even after the battle of Corfinium, Caesar spared Domitius Ahenobarbus. Likewise, after the Battle at Ilerda, he showed mercy to the Pompeian army. Thus, Caesar could, to an extent, control his rage and employ it as necessary. A heavy hand was certainly required when his troops mutinied against him. Even though Caesar recognized that his position as leader was at risk, he did not expose these thoughts to his troops. The commanding and powerful speech he crafted allowed him not only to regain control of his men but also to convince them to kill one another. Finally, at Pharsalus, the fashioning of confidence came without much effort, since both Caesar and his men had received portents of slaughter and success. Nevertheless, Caesar harnessed their confidence in the Fates and their desire for slaughter. He also presented to them a false prediction of their lives after the war, at which point Caesar would step down and they would be in power. The troops either fell for these false promises or they had so much interest in the approaching battle that they overlooked Caesar's insincerity.

Caesar's soldiers were a bit unusual in respect to their speech. Authors rarely gave direct speech to soldiers unless they are rebelling.[203] By giving them the ability to express their thoughts,

[203] See discussion in Chapter 3, p. 45.

Lucan developed a character for the soldiers, who would otherwise remain silent. Even Laelius' act of responding to Caesar at Ariminum was, in a way, an act of rebellion for his character type. He not only dared to speak, but he also subtly corrected his General's method of exhortation. During the mutiny at Placentia, the soldiers spoke openly and without subtly about their displeasure with their current situation. While the troops may have used speech to rebel, Caesar engaged his men in a rhetorical battle to keep them in order. The threats and orders delivered to his mutinous troops were so effective that they even agreed to kill one another as punishment. Caesar's words begot action, just as they would at his final exhortation before Pharsalus. It was the soldiers' positive reactions to Caesar's speeches that mark them as excellent orations.[204] The troops' bloodlust and their perverted sense of justice determined the standards of rhetoric. Caesar demonstrated the power of rhetoric in a skilled user. His exhortations were used to keep his forces pointed in the right direction: perpetuating civil war and causing mayhem. His men, however, had their own egos and could threaten harm and the end of his rampage. Initially, he had trouble understanding his men's motives. It is only through multiple changes in his technique that he learned how to persuade them properly.

[204] This idea comes from Cicero's *Brutus* (184-185). See my discussion on the reaction of the crowd as the primary factor in assessing an orator's skill set. Chapter 2, p. 28.

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