SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE MEGA-EVENT STRATEGY

by

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(Under the Direction of K. Chad Clay)

ABSTRACT

This research examines the overall effectiveness of both domestic and international social movements that form in reaction to a host nation's success in acquiring a mega-event. I focus on this relationship in Mexico City (1968 Summer Olympics), Beijing (2008 Summer Olympics), and South Africa (2010 World Cup), which are all cases where each nation's bid and subsequent preparations became a catalyst for varying levels of social movements at both the domestic and international level. Combined with an examination and evaluation of these three cases, I analyze instances in which a mega-event has occurred since 1970. From my analysis, I have concluded that due to the publicity generated by the mega-event the amount of social movements increase in the lead-up to the mega-event; nevertheless, these movement rarely have any significant effects and decrease dramatically after the mega-event has concluded.

INDEX WORDS: Mega-event; Social Movement; Olympics; World Cup

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On June 30, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed into law a bill banning the

"propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations to minors," thus opening a new, dark chapter in

the history of gay rights in Russia. Aimed at limiting the rights of the country's lesbian, gay,

bisexual, transgender, and intersex people, the law capped off a period of discriminatory activity

by the Russian government (Grekov 2013). Not even a month later, Putin also passed a law that

banned demonstrations and rallies in Sochi around the Winter Olympics in 2014 (*BBC News*

August 23, 2013). Naturally controversial, these laws have caused outrage in both the domestic

and international communities. Passed only eight months before hosting a major international

event, the Sochi Winter Olympics had the potential to be a platform for both international and

domestic dissent.

For many athletes that have dreams of participating in international mega-events, global

anonymity is expected and often embraced. With events such as the Olympic Games and the

FIFA World Cup occurring every two to four years; however, these athletes have the capability

to briefly attract the attention of an international audience. While many of these athletes combine

their personality and skill set to captivate the world, others use the platform that such a mega-

events offer to not only make a name for themselves but also to represent social movements that

form in reaction to the injustices that the host nation either ignores or perpetuates.

Not even a month after the new laws were passed, Moscow hosted the World

Championships in Athletics (Track and Field). Although not as large as the Olympics or World

Cup, this event served as a litmus test for the level of social dissent and protest. Without any semblance of large-scale international or domestic movements, the Russian Federation was confident that their actions had been forgotten and that there would not be any reprisal from the international community. However, individual athletes subtly took up the mantle not only for gay rights but also for human rights in general. In the qualifying rounds of the women's high jump competition, Swedish athlete Emma Green Tregaro painted her nails in a rainbow pattern in order to support gay rights. Concerned with a violation of the rules, officials forced Green Tregaro to remove the nail polish. Satisfied by a quick end to her protest, officials allowed Green Tregaro to compete in the finals where she finished in fifth place but was constantly visible. Her preferred nail polish color during the finals? Red, a symbol of love (Chase 2013).

In the International Affairs community, scant literature exists in regard to the connection between mega-events and their influence on government and vice versa. Although there is a binding relationship between international sport and politics that is simultaneously trying to be separated and intertwined, much of the available research is narrow and focuses on the economic impact that mega-events can have on urban areas (e.g. Andranovich et al 2001; Baade 1996; Essex and Chalkley 2003). This focus on economics generally concerns the construction of large-scale infrastructure on both public and private lands. Because of the proximity of such construction efforts, many people have not only had some personal experience, but have also been exposed to media coverage that details both domestic and international reactions to a country's efforts to prepare for the event after its acquisition. This exposure has sparked an interest as to whether social movement is an effective tool for advocating real change in the face of a mega-event. After the pomp and circumstance of the games, the success of a social

movement is ultimately determined by whether or not the movement has had any short or long term tangible effects for either the host nation or international community.

Countries host mega-events to showcase themselves to the world. This is especially true for nations seeking to establish their place in the international community. It is also true for faltering nations that see the mega-event as a way to re-establish power. Unfortunately, the bid frequently acts as a double-edged sword and has the potential to become a catalyst for social movements at both a domestic and international level. While many of these movements are ignored after the event commences, a select few resonate throughout history because of the tangible effects felt by the host country.

Throughout this paper, I examine the effectiveness of social movements in relation to the mega-event strategy by studying the conditions in certain countries before and after the hosting of a certain mega-event. In the following sections, I will review and summarize previous works of literature which explore the history, attributes, and variations of the mega-event strategy. Moreover, I will examine the various types of domestic and international social movements used in response to mega-events and the reaction of the host nation to such dissent. These relationships will be evaluated through an investigation of the cases under which they fall and the data gained will be applied to each case in a qualitative format. Additionally, a quantitative analysis of each host country since 1970 will be used to determine the significance of each relationship. Finally, I will offer some conclusions and future implications.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Mega Event Thesis

In 1894, the Frenchman Baron Pierre de Coubertin convened an international congress at the Sorbonne in Paris. At this meeting, Coubertin proposed the revival of the Olympic Games that once dominated the Greek landscape. Two years later, Coubertin's dream came to fruition and the first Olympiad of the modern era was held in Athens, Greece. Although rooted in an ulterior motive to enhance French culture and military presence, Coubertin could not understand the implications of the event that he set in motion. While it had been prominent since the first World's Fair in 1851, the mega-event strategy was now able to reach its full potential through the conduit of the Olympic Games. Masked by the promise of good will and the highest ideal of sportsmanship between countries, a mass gathering of the countries of the world in a competitive setting created the perfect storm for not only international rivalry but also domestic dissent (Mackenzie 2003). In 1930, the quadrennial FIFA World Cup of soccer came into being and along with the Olympics has become one the last true major international events.

The mega-event strategy states that a nation will vie for a high profile event in order to stimulate and justify the development of a country (Andranovich et al., 2001). Although mega-events generally garner a significant amount of controversy and attention, the consequences of this strategy have not received any substantial attention. While discussion over the acquisition of a mega-event generally focuses on its economic impact via the creation of new infrastructure, the

value of a city's image, or the revenues generated by new taxes, it frequently ignores more salient issues; namely, the broader political and social ramifications (Roche 1992).

Because of their infrequent occurrence, the perceived value of mega-events is subject to prospective inflation and frequently becomes a factor in the pursuit of such a strategy. With each version of the mega-event occurring on a quadrennial basis, the IOC and FIFA governing bodies have generally abided by a tacit agreement in which the location of the event rotates between continents, although this is not always the case. Moreover, an increasing number of cities have cemented their status as serious contenders in the bidding process due to the promise of financial benefits such as the escalating amounts paid for broadcasting rights. For example, a Swiss-German intermediary purchased the broadcast rights for the 2002 FIFA World Cup tournament, in which 197 nations participated, for $960 million. Afterward, the rights to the broadcast were resold to television companies around the world for a substantial profit (Jones 1999). Similar to the intensity that fans exude while cheering on both athlete and country in a mega-event, the struggle to host these events can take years of planning and is equally aggressive. By reaching a global television audience, international mega-events not only serve as high profile events but also as catalysts for the host city or country. Undoubtedly, local officials who are debating whether or not to pursue the mega-event strategy are cognizant that the process will be long and wearisome. Nevertheless, for those cities willing to accept these difficulties, the promise of potential benefits is always there.

The appeal of acquiring a mega-event for a host city is easily apparent. While lasting only a short period of time, the event offers both tangible and intangible benefits. For instance, the general influx of tourists, whether the domestic population or foreign dignitaries and other important people, can be a boon for local businesses. On a different scale, the host city becomes

the center of the world for a brief amount of time and will be the focus of the global media for the duration of the event. While association with such events is positive in and of itself, critics nearly always claim that the real value of an event frequently comes from being associated with imagery such that the Olympic Games provide. (Andranovich et al., 2001, 1). Image creation, however, can become a dangerous and unpredictable endeavor.

Since the start of the modern Olympic Games in 1896, there have been thirty Summer Olympiads, twenty-two Winter Olympiads, and nineteen FIFA World Cups held around the world. While most, if not all, of these events have had underlying motives behind them, there are three main attributes of mega-events that demonstrate why a country would want to bid on, and eventually become the host of such large-scale affairs. Explained in previous literature (e.g. Guttmann (1992); Baade (1996); Essex and Chalkley (2003), these three attributes include the promise of global significance attached to such an event, large-scale economic development based on improvement in infrastructure, and the excessive media coverage that places the nation in the international spotlight. While the focus of the mega-event strategy originally reflected an emphasis on economic stimulation, countries have molded it to fit their various desires.

The first and most prominent variation of the mega-event strategy was the Eleventh Olympiad which was hosted by Berlin in 1936. Instead of using the mega-event strategy in its original design, Adolf Hitler reconfigured it in order to showcase his vision, a new Germany. In the throes of depression, Germany used economic techniques, national pride, and the human ingenuity in order to portray the nation as one that transcended such global epidemics. The Olympic Games presented them with just the right opportunity to present such a blinding façade to the world at large (Walters 2006). Not even forty years after the original idea of the Olympic Games was reconceived, forces collaborated to destroy the pageantry, amateurism, and

international ideals that were intended. Instead, fervent nationalism and a desire for global significance were used to transform the 1936 Olympics into one of the most hotly contested sporting events of the 20th century (Preuss 2004).

Between 1919 and 1933, Germany was a weak nation devastated by World War I and the ineptitude of the Weimar Republic. However, with the arrival of Hitler and the opportunity to reinvigorate a nation, Germany returned to the world stage in a major way. While the leaders of the world during this time have become known for their appeasement of Adolf Hitler, they were not the only ones captivated by his charismatic attitude and veneer of stability. Even with domestic social movements that included calls for a boycott, United States Olympic Committee (USOC) President Avery Brundage effectively silenced dissent and lent credibility to the Games by supporting the Berlin Olympics, something which Hitler never relinquished (Wamsley 2002). While latent social movements existed before the Games, this dissent was cast aside and forgotten as the Berlin Olympics ran its course. Without the recognition and acceptance of the international community gained by its performance in 1936, it is possible that the events that Germany pursued in the years after would have been drastically different (Mandell 1987). Once again a prominent player on the world's stage, Hitler found little opposition in leading Germany on a quest to become the most powerful and recognizable country in the world.

Portrayed by the example of the Berlin Olympics, the variations of the mega-event strategy are vast and can be applied to nearly any situation. The reasons and prior situations that contribute to a nation's desire to host the games are paramount to judging why social movements occur and ultimately whether or not they succeed. While most of the research on the mega-event strategy focuses on the motives for why social movements have sprung up in reaction to mega-events, a definitive study on the repercussions of those movements has not been undertaken. This

judgment of success or failure is important in order for us to understand the factors that have shaped the international community and how countries act when successfully acquiring a mega-event. When future generations look back and wonder why certain countries rose and fell in the struggle for dominance, they will be able to point to specific instances that either had long-term effects or were ignored in the international arena. The domestic and international response before and after a mega-event directly correlates to this and provides a foundation for the success of future mega-event hosts.

Mega-Events in the Era of Globalization

Since 1896, the question of whether sporting events matter in both a political and social context has undergirded every international mega-event that has taken place. History and experience have indicated that the answer to that question is a resounding yes. Because of their immense symbolic significance and the ability to alter the public allocation of scarce resources within a host country, international sporting events have significant influence both socially and politically. An example of such allocation of scarce resources is corroborated by a report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (2000) in which it was revealed that numerous federal government agencies have combined to spend nearly $2 billion in order to support the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics. Because of the major events in each city, these hosts received federal money to improve infrastructure, beautify the city, and shore up security. While these three cities were able to improve their image with the extra funding, the diversion of federal funds caused other cities to suffer (Andranovich et al., 2001, 33).

While the mega-event strategy is not a new phenomenon, it has undergone a metamorphosis over the past fifty years. Since its inception, various high-profile international cities have sought to host showcase events in the hope of transforming their city into a global icon. In the past half-century, however, the mega-event strategy has changed and has taken on a renewed prominence in cities around the world. While there are many facets to this transformation, the most significant factors were the success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics and the rise of the global economy.

The event that renewed the focus on mega-events was the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. Although the Soviet boycott of the games negated some of the pageantry and quality of the Los Angeles Olympics, the 1984 Summer Olympics were widely regarded as a success. In the view of other cities, however, the success of the games did not merely arise from the level of athletic competition, collegiality amongst nations, or even a triumph of development and infrastructure. Rather, potential host cities saw that the success of the 1984 Olympics was rooted in two main areas. First, combined with the athletic aspect of the games, organizers were able to put together opening and closing ceremonies with all of the advantages that Hollywood had to offer; therefore, the games brought in enormous television audiences and generated positive publicity for the city with minimal public opposition. Secondly, because a significant amount of private money was raised via corporate sponsorships, the city was able to attract this positive attention with minimal use of local tax dollars and ended with sizable surplus. For host cities searching for a way to simultaneously enhance their city's image and attract the world's attention, hosting the Olympics now appeared to offer a perfect way to do so with little cost to local taxpayers (Andranovich et al., 2001, 5). Because of the success of the 1984 Los Angeles games, the Olympics have become the preferred mega-event in the international community due to its

appeal to corporate sponsors, the pageantry of the games, and its potential as a catalyst for development.

As other countries began to copy the template provided by the Los Angeles Olympics, the rise of the global economy became a powerful force and ushered in innovative entrepreneurial techniques to promote development on the world stage. Therefore, the expansion of globalization greatly increased interest in international mega-events. This increase in worldwide competition is most obvious in "global" or "world" cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo. Proponents of this view subscribe to what is known as the "world cities" thesis. This idea states that the rise of a global economy is leading to the creation of a handful of cities throughout the world that fill an economic niche (Sassen 1991; Friedmann 1995). In effect, a specific number of major urban centers across the world are driving the global economy.

With this knowledge, the pursuit of a mega-event by city officials has multiple underlying motivations. The desire of the bid's organizers to make their city a cosmopolitan location capable of hosting an international event of the magnitude of the Olympic Games plays a major role in the process of acquiring such an event. For those seeking development and restructuring opportunities, mega-events are desirable not only due to the promise of short-term revenue but also national and international recognition for the city in an increasingly global competition for investment capital. Because hosting a mega-event is about gaining the attention of the world, hosting an event such as the FIFA World Cup has great potential to justify a comprehensive development program to improve the city's image that might not be politically feasible if attempted in the context of everyday politics (Andranovich et al., 2001, 29).

The creation and management of a city's image; however, can become a point of political contestation. Always a salient topic in regard to economics, the question of equality is behind this backlash. By distributing a large amount of public funds for the development of infrastructure such as an Olympic village or soccer stadia, areas of the community that could use funding such as the public school system, security and safety operations, or neighborhood projects suffer. This allocation of resources raises questions about the competence of those who are making decisions. Although development policy that brings sustainable production based on economic activities and meaningful jobs into a city is one thing; policies based on consumption are another. While some residents may benefit in the short-term, such short-sighted policies may bring extensive negative consequences for others in the form of low-wage jobs, lack of affordable housing, bankruptcy of small businesses and markets, and the continuous fiscal strain on the public sector. (Parker 1999, 118-121).

Social Movements and Mega-Events

According to Andranovich et al., (2008), preparing to host a mega-event can be a critical opportunity for a nation seeking to make its presence felt in the international arena. This opportunity can be used either for development or for exploitation, and the choice is generally made through policy decisions in the lead up to the mega-event. Access to and representation in these decisions not only becomes a defining issue for how a host nation will prepare but also provides clues related to changes in the nature of citizenship and community in an era of increasing globalization. Examining the fine line that policy decisions walk between development and exploitation, Essex and Chalkley (2003) pose three essential questions to be addressed by policymakers: (1) Are local funds being diverted from service and education needs to support mega-event infrastructure? (2) Are local taxes being increased to pay for the new

infrastructure? (3) Will the mega-event displace those in low-income communities or disrupt their neighborhoods? When answering these questions, it is important for policymakers to remember that a significant amount of literature has shown that investing in sports does not result in more jobs, higher income, or better residential areas. Moreover, investing in sports infrastructure is generally not profitable to cities (Baade 1996; Baim 1994; Noll and Zimbalist 1997; Rosentraub 1999).

Although there are many negatives associated with hosting a mega-event, host cities are frequently seduced by the potential of such large-scale events. Given the size of a mega-event, the opportunity to redevelop large metropolitan areas is vast. Because of this, a mega-event frequently acts as a catalyst for development. Unfortunately, this restructuring brings up the question of whose interests are actually being served by the development projects since the new infrastructure is frequently at odds with the actual needs of the residents (Andranovich et al., 2008). Multiple examples exist where the hosting of an event has either led to evictions or the infringement of the rights of groups such as the homeless, those living in poverty, and ethnic or racial minorities (COHRE 2007; Olds 1998). Consequently, because of their immense size and issues related to development, mega-events can have a significant effect not only on political outcomes but also on social activities. Because of these issues, mega-events hold great potential to provoke societal opposition.

According to Cornelissen (2012), numerous scholars (e.g. Roche 2000) have noted that international sport, especially in the form of mega-events, has become a hotbed for social movements in which groups seek to challenge a range of perceived social injustices that have been implemented in response to acquiring the rights to the mega-event. However, social movement in reaction to international mega-events is nothing new. Historically, events such as

the Olympic Games have been marked by a temporal succession of contestation which carries over from one Olympiad to the next (Kelly 2010).

While the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were an immense success and confirmed the mega-event strategy as the best way to pursue large-scale development strategies, this was not always the case. While unthinkable today, it had become quite difficult to sell the Olympics to host cities before the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles (Simson and Jennings 1992, 241). The lack of intense bidding during this time can be traced back to the two negative experiences of North American host cities in the 1970s. The financial catastrophe that resulted from Montreal's 1976 summer games, and Denver's acquisition and subsequent rejection of the 1976 winter games caused many nations to become wary of such high profile events.

In late 1972, the city officials of Denver made a stunning announcement and stated that they would no longer be able to host the 1976 Winter Olympics. This shocking news came only two years after the city had been awarded the games by the IOC. A surprise to nearly everyone, this change of heart arose at a grassroots level as a debate over growth and expansion. Throughout the 1960s, the state of Colorado had become a hotbed for both pro-growth and anti-growth forces. Mobilized by the controversy surrounding the acquisition of the 1976 Winter Olympics, each side vociferously argued their stance. For the proponents of growth, the winter games meant a comprehensive development strategy that included new and modern infrastructure in the form of new housing and new stadia to host international events. Moreover, the promise of global publicity and substantial profits for local business was ever present. Furthermore, buoyed by the success of previously televised events such as the 1968 Winter Olympics, the pro-growth coalition advocated taking advantage of the coverage that television would provide for winter sports (Andranovich et al., 2001). Represented by groups as diverse as

environmentalists and the urban poor, the anti-growth coalition saw continued development as destructive to wildlife habitats and an impediment to affordable living conditions.

By early 1972, over 20,000 Coloradans had signed petitions against the Denver Winter Olympics. Both well-organized and unprecedented, these petitions were presented to the IOC in Sapporo, Japan, the site of the 1972 Winter Olympics. In conjunction with the presentation of the petitions to the IOC, another petition, pushing for the addition of a constitutional amendment forbidding the legislature from spending public funds on the Olympics, was being circulated statewide. Moreover, a similar petition was being circulated in Denver to amend the city charter. After both of these initiatives passed in November of 1972, it was evident that the Denver Olympics had neither the requisite public support nor the financial backing to continue (Andranovich et al., 2001). The IOC eventually issued an emergency declaration and awarded the event to Innsbruck, Austria who had previously hosted in 1964.

Similar to Denver, Montreal was awarded the 1976 Summer Olympics in 1970, beating out Moscow and Los Angeles, the respective hosts of the next two Olympiads. Unlike Denver, however, the Montreal games were celebrated by the public and did not face strong local opposition. Unfortunately for Montreal, it's time to host was marred by broader economic circumstances that left a disastrous fiscal legacy. While city leaders began ambitious plans to restructure parts of the city and implement development programs, both the domestic and international economic system faced serious bouts of inflation and began to deteriorate. Due to cost overruns, the 1976 Olympics left Montreal with a debt of nearly $1 billion dollars, a sum that was only recently repaid in full (Hall 1992, 40).

Frequently, social movements resort to protest action to signal dissatisfaction with certain issues. While the motivations for opposition to different types of mega-events show widespread variance, they are often marked by claims that mega-events have harmful political, cultural, and environmental impacts. Therefore, in line with the strengthening of a human rights agenda and a greater demand for public accountability in relation to international mega-events, social movements have become normalized and are now just another facet of mega-events (Cornelissen 2012).

CHAPTER 3

THEORY

While many countries use mega-events as justification for implementing urban development plans and improving local infrastructure, the overriding impetus for hosting such large-scale events is to portray the city or nation as an elite member of the global community. This is especially true for nations that lack the resources or military capability to establish their place in the international community. It is also true for faltering nations that see the mega-event as a way to re-establish power. This desire to portray the city as an elite member of the global community has led to three interconnected hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: A nation's bid and subsequent preparations for a mega-event will act as a catalyst for both domestic and international social movement prior to the mega-event.

Hypothesis 2: Social movements use the publicity generated by the mega-event to draw attention to various social issues.

Hypothesis 3: Social movements rarely have any conventional or visible long-lasting effects and dramatically decrease in number after the mega-event has concluded.

When analyzing different levels of social movement, scholars (e.g. Pape 1996; Pape 1997; Horowitz and Reiter 2001) often assume that violent methods of resistance are the most coercive or the most likely to force accommodation, thereby producing desired policy changes; nevertheless, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) assert that nonviolent resistance is a forceful substitute to political violence. This alternative has the potential to pose effective challenges to

both democratic and nondemocratic opponents, and at times can do so more effectively than violent resistance. Moreover, the potential for long-term benefits increases when resistance takes on a non-violent form. While some of the social movements that form in reaction to the acquisition of a mega-event do turn violent, a vast majority are nonviolent and work to change policy through peaceful means. Nonviolent resistance is a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. Although nonviolent resistors eschew the threat or use of violence, the "peaceful" designation often given to nonviolent movements belies the often highly disruptive nature of organized nonviolent resistance (Sharp 2005).

Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) argue that nonviolent resistance may have a strategic advantage over violent resistance for two reasons. First, a commitment to nonviolent methods increases a movement's domestic and international legitimacy while simultaneously encouraging more broad-based participation in the resistance. In effect, this leads to increased pressure being brought to bear on the target. Because it is rare for domestic movements to affect change on their own, this is an important step for gaining the support of the international community. Second, the repression of nonviolent social movements may backfire and result in the breakdown of support for the regime, mobilization of the population against the regime, and international condemnation of the regime. Externally, the international community is more likely to denounce and sanction states for repressing nonviolent campaigns than it is violent campaigns.

Since many mega-events are held in developed countries with stable democratic governments, it is important to note that democratic regimes should have greater tolerance for dissent, a greater aversion to using violence to crack down on domestic opposition, and a more easily coercible public. Accordingly, both violent and nonviolent struggles should be more

effective against democratic targets than authoritarian targets (Fearon 1997). In my analysis, however, there is no differentiation between violent and nonviolent methods of resistance. Rather, a holistic approach that uses Arthur Banks (2011) conflict index is employed to trace the exponential rise (pre-event) and dramatic fall (post-event) of social movements in relation to mega-events.

CHAPTER 4

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION

The concepts or ideas in this research include mega-events, protests and social movements, and a

host nation or city. Although seemingly unconnected on the surface, these concepts have become

inseparable in the contemporary world. Conceptualized as a large-scale global occurrence, a

mega-event promises significance in the international community, large-scale economic

development based on improvement in infrastructure, and excessive media coverage that places

the nation in the international spotlight. These three attributes are the main reasons why host

nations actively pursue such events. While many cities bid on mega-events, only one can be

chosen. The country or city that wins the bid eventually becomes the host and has the

opportunity to cement its legacy in history. Unfortunately, becoming the host nation frequently

acts as a double edged sword and has the potential to become a catalyst for social movement and

protest at both the domestic and international levels. These social movements can be defined as

any consistent effort by a group of people to protest perceived injustices brought about by the

success of the host nation's bid. They include, but are not limited to, nonviolent tactics such as

demonstrations and protests and violent tactics such as riots or assassinations. When turning

these concepts into variables, the presence of any social movement becomes the dependent

variable. Quantitatively, this is measured by a weighted conflict index in Arthur Banks' cross-

national time-series data set which includes assassinations, general strikes, guerilla warfare,

government crises, purges, riots, and revolutions. Although Murdie and Bhasin (2011) provide a

compelling argument for using an alternative data set based on Bhasin's (2008) research, the

time period (1994-2008) only provides a microcosm of the entire population of mega-events. Measured using a time counter approach, the amount of time until a mega-event occurs becomes the independent variable. Beginning at 0 and advancing annually by a unit of one year, the time counter covers the population of cases since 1970 and resets in the year following a mega-event. For nations that have hosted multiple iterations of mega-events, the counter resets upon completion of each event. If successful, the time counter approach will most accurately portray the hypothesis that the level of social movement increases in the amount of time before a mega-event is hosted and then declines immediately afterward. Additional control variables include a squared version of the time counter measure, population density of a country, a nation's GDP per capita, university enrollment per capita, literacy rate, and the effectiveness of the legislature (Banks 2011). While not representative of the full range of characteristics endemic to social movements within countries, these control variables accurately capture many of the features that help explain the rise of social movements.

These concepts and their interconnected relationships will be evaluated through an investigation of the cases under which they fall and the data gained will then be applied in a qualitative format. Additionally, data related to the host nation, including the control variables listed above, and the conflict index in each country will be tested in a quantitative format to determine whether or not social movements are effective tools for bringing about real change. In this research, there are many intervening variables that can affect both the independent variable and dependent variable. Some examples in the cases mentioned include: government structure and stability, a country's status in the international community, the wealth of a country, and where it is located geographically amongst others. While all of these may have an effect on the results, they are discussed and controlled for in each case study.

Methodology

In order to best determine whether or not social movements are an effective tool for advocating real change in the face of a mega-event, this research employs both qualitative and quantitative techniques and is influenced by the best of both methods. When measuring the variables, a qualitative approach that studies the cases of Mexico City, South Africa, and Beijing is used. Additionally, a quantitative analysis of the population of cases since 1970 will be employed as a supplement to strengthen the case studies.

In order to complete the qualitative case studies, it is important to not only look at the population of cases but also to determine what type of cases will be used to supplement the data. Moreover, it is essential that the selected cases operate as an example of something that can be considered a vital contribution to the literature. With a fairly small population to choose from, host countries in this instance, the cases should also serve a functional role as the most essential examples of why the data is important.

When critically analyzing case selection and the type of case study involved in such a decision, it is useful to understand the specific style of the case. Using Gerring's (2010) breakdown of case typology, we are able to categorize each case study into one of nine different forms. Unfortunately, the clarity of Gerring's models can frequently be confusing, thereby making it difficult to exclusively classify certain cases. When assessing the individual cases in relation to the variables, the typical case model seems to be the best fit. When taken together however, these cases characterize the diverse technique of case selection. Although Mexico City, South Africa, and Beijing characterize the full range of values being tested, these cases are merely representative in the minimal sense when compared to the many variations present in the

population. Each of the cases was chosen for not only its historical significance but also because of the high degree of representativeness related to the dependent variable.

While seemingly a simpler task, measuring the quantitative data is imperative in helping determine if there is a strong relationship. Setting the weighted conflict index as the dependent variable and variations of the time counter as the primary independent variables, additional control variables have been added to accurately account for intervening factors. To determine the significance of the relationship, a squared version of the time counter measure, population density of a country, a nation's GDP per capita, university enrollment per capita, literacy rate, and the effectiveness of the legislature measured on a 0 (least effective) to 3 (most effective) scale were included. An interpretation of the multivariate regression results will supplement each case study with hard data.

Quantitative Analysis

At the outset of this study, I sought to determine whether social movements were an effective tool for advocating real change in the face of a mega-event. I hypothesized that a nation's bid and subsequent preparations acted as a catalyst for both domestic and international social movements prior to the mega-event. Social movements then use the publicity generated by the mega-event to draw attention to various causes; however, these movements rarely have any significant effects and dramatically decrease after the mega-event has concluded. This suggests that host nations have the ability to freely implement reform in order to pay for such improvements as infrastructure and other technical endeavors with impunity. In countries where mega-events have been hosted, the effects of social movement have been minimal. Any gains made would be offset by the pageantry that an event such as the Olympics would provide and would dramatically decline at the conclusion of the mega-event. In countries where a mega-event

has been hosted and protest levels have been low or non-existent, it is clear that the host nation would not experience any backlash from the community. By implementing a time counter variable that begins at 0 and resets in the year following a mega-event, a substantive interpretation of the increase in social movements prior to a mega-event and the immediate decline in the time after the event can be portrayed. Not only is such a hypothesis theoretically feasible, but the research presented suggests that it bears out.

In addition to the case studies presented in the following section, the summary statistics (Tables 1-4) and multivariate regression analysis (Table 5)[1] also suggest that many of these protests are ignored and it is rare that social movements have a tangible effect on either the host nation or international community. Measured at a 90% confidence interval both the dependent variable and the primary independent variables are significant. As the time counter increases by one year, we can expect a 75.66 increase in the conflict index while for every yearly increase in the squared time counter we can expect a 3.31 decrease in the conflict index on average and holding all other variables constant. For the additional control variables, GDP per capita and legislative effectiveness also proved to be significant. As GDP per capita increased by one unit, a .06 decrease was expected in the conflict index. Similarly, as the legislative effectiveness scale increased from least effective to most effective, a 238.43 decrease in the conflict index was expected. While characteristic of various forms of social movement, population density, university enrollment, and literacy rate were not determined to be significant in the analysis.

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[1] All tables appear in the appendix

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES

Mexico City: Symbolic Gestures, Real Deaths

Nearly forty years after Adolf Hitler first decided to make the Olympic Games a political event, Mexico decided that it was time to use the Olympics as an international springboard. Almost twenty years into the post-World War II era, Mexico City bid against cities in entrenched world powers such as the United States and France in order to host the 1968 Summer Olympics. With the IOC looking to expand its influence outside the Western and Eastern spheres of influence to stable, developing nations, the Mexican bid was enticing and rapidly moved to the top of the voting list. When the bidding process began for the 1968 Olympics, the Mexican government became cognizant of its true status in a world that had essentially become dominated by dichotomous Cold War ideologies. Wishing to assert itself as a country that transcended both the United States and Soviet spheres of influence, the Mexican government decided that the best way to draw the world's attention to their country was to host an Olympiad, which idealized friendship and cooperation, but really was a showcase for the host country. This shrewd diplomatic attempt to not only distance itself from the two dominant political philosophies but also to separate itself from the "developing" country label was bold; however, if the gamble worked, Mexico would have been able to fully establish itself as a powerful player on the world stage and possibly provide a blueprint for other countries to make their own way in an increasingly polarized world (Guttmann 1992).

In the decade preceding World War II, Mexican political leadership not only directed their country towards industrialization but also a focus on economic growth and wealth creation. Due to the vast need for manufacturing in America during the war, Mexican infrastructure was created quickly and directly led to economic prosperity. Bolstered by the prosperity that the war helped provide, Mexico entered into a period that has been termed the "Mexican Miracle." Deemed by some historians as the Golden Age of modern Mexico, this period lasted for nearly thirty years and transformed Mexico from a poor, undeveloped nation to a nation considered to be an emerging economic power. This view was confirmed by various economic statistics which included a consistent GNP growth rate of 6% from 1940 to 1970 (Witherspoon 2008). Overall, the ability of the Mexican government to reshape the country in such a short amount of time, the economic statistics showing consistent growth patterns, and the image of Mexico as both conveniently progressive yet traditional all made the country an attractive choice for Olympic voters; however, these images would prove to be fallacious in the months leading up to the Games. Overlooked by many IOC members and effectively covered up by the Mexican delegation, a massive fracture between the wealthiest and most marginalized citizens was growing and would eventually create a vast schism. Ignorant of these critical issues and intent on spreading the Olympic ideal to the global south, the IOC declared that the most critical issue with the Mexican bid was the presence of high altitude environments. For a developing nation seeking to augment its position in the international status quo, the acquisition of the Olympics and the ignorance of the IOC provided the perfect conduit to do so. (Guttmann 1992; Witherspoon 2008.)

While many people believe that the collapse of the Mexican economy began in the mid-1970s, the true beginning occurred when the Mexican delegation boldly bid on the Olympics in

1963. While the Mexican economy had been growing at a consistent rate for nearly 30 years, the raw data greatly obscured the details of what was happening at the country's lowest levels. While government officials, powerful businessmen, and those who resided in urban areas lived comfortably, were wealthy enough to not worry about basic necessities, and enjoyed the full rights accorded to all human beings, the foundation of the country was eroding (Meyer et al., 2003). Stability in Mexico did not translate into prosperity and happiness for all citizens. A gross disparity of wealth between urban and rural citizens, an electoral system that was neither democratic nor authoritarian, and bureaucratic corruption hid behind the façade put forth by the Mexican government. Although these injustices were successfully carried out for a brief time, the combination of all three eventually became too much and began to manifest in the protests of students throughout the country (Preston and Dillon 2004). Standing together in support of human rights, social justice, and a general reform of an unaccountable political system, protest activity began to increase in the months leading up to the Olympic Games.

While the spirit of dissent was simmering at the national level in Mexico, a smaller movement was taking shape in the United States. While different in their overarching goals and recognized for their worth at different times, these two movements continue to be the face of the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. In the wake of the Civil Rights movement in the United States, many African Americans still suffered from racial discrimination and the division between the white and black community continued to persist. Seeking to attract international attention to this societal cleavage, many leading African American sports figures debated boycotting the Olympics. While the idea of a boycott provided black athletes with a sounding board for dissent, it was decided that active participation and success in the Olympics would truly provide a platform for change (Smith and Steele 2007).

Two of the men who would take advantage of this platform were sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos. Teammates at San Jose State University, Smith and Carlos not only expected to win in Mexico City but also be prepared to make a statement if they were successful. On October 16th, 1968, Tommie Smith broke the world record in the 200 meter dash and secured a gold medal for the United States. Barely missing out on the silver medal, Carlos was still able to settle for bronze. Frequently overlooked in the history of the 1968 Olympics, Peter Norman, a white Australian athlete, finished in the second place and would play a major role in the events that were about to take place.

After the race was completed, the three went to the podium for the traditional medal ceremony. As Smith and Carlos turned to face the flags and hear the American national anthem, they each raised a black-gloved fist and kept them raised until the anthem had finished. Moreover, Smith and Carlos chose to receive their medals while only wearing black socks in ordered to represent the plight of impoverished blacks. Other items such as Smith's black scarf and Carlos' beaded necklace and unzipped tracksuit also represented those being discriminated against in the United States. Most importantly however, all three athletes wore Olympic Project for Human Rights (OPHR) badges after Norman, a critic of Australia's White Australia Policy, expressed empathy with their ideals (Smith and Steele 2007). To this day, the actions of these three men are regarded as one of the most overtly political statements in the history of the modern Olympic Games. Unfortunately, this symbolic action, which actually changed very little, is remembered more than the actions that took place in the week before the actual start of the Olympics.

Although the differences between the students and the government had been growing for months and had already engendered some forms of repression, the protest movement finally met

its climax as the world came to Mexico. On October 2, 1968, just days before the Opening Ceremonies, around 10,000 university and high school students gathered in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas to protest the government's actions and listen peacefully to speeches. Along with active members of the protest movement, many men, women, and children who were not associated with the students gathered in the plaza as spectators of the demonstration (Werner 1997). Immediately after the crowd had gathered, the Olympia Battalion, a secret Special Forces unit specifically designated as Olympic security by the government, were authorized to use force and ordered to arrest the leaders of the gathering. Composed of soldiers, police officers, and federal security agents, the Olympia Battalion wore white to differentiate themselves from the crowd and prevent the soldiers from shooting them. The following attack in the plaza appeared to be coordinated and continued well into the night. Both demonstrators and innocent bystanders were beaten or shot to death and eventually the dead began to accumulate. On October 2nd, 1968, nearly 300 people gave their lives in order to protest the injustices that they had witnessed throughout their country, and Mexico continued along as if nothing had happened (Poniatowska 1991).While the specific details are still unclear even today, what is clear is that the Mexican government willfully used overt repression against its own people without reprisal just days before hosting a major international event. What is also clear is that the Olympic Games proceeded as if nothing had happened.

South Africa: The Gateway to a Continent

Since its inception in 1930, the opening match of the FIFA World Cup has been ruled by tradition. In 2010, the tournament adhered to its traditions and began with the host country officially opening up the competition. Although the tournament began as it had done for the past eighty years, the 2010 opening match between South Africa and Mexico opened up a new era not

only for the World Cup but also for sport in general. While African nations had previously competed and done well at the tournament, the continent itself had never had the opportunity to host the most prestigious international soccer event in the world. Lacking a strong international squad, many analysts projected that South Africa would not only be eliminated early on but also be embarrassed in the competition. While the team would eventually be eliminated in the group stage, the South Africans were not embarrassed and played with a passion that captivated the entire country. Combining the energetic performances of the host country and a successful tournament overall, it would not be unthinkable for one to forget that a country that was banned from international competition only two decades ago had now become the 2010 FIFA World Cup host (Haferburg 2011). Indeed, the transformation of South Africa into a viable host nation is a story that truly represents how social movements related to mega-events can have a positive and lasting effect on a country.

On May 10th, 1994, the celebrations held in honor of the inauguration of South African President Nelson Mandela included a soccer match between South Africa and Zambia. Held at Ellis Park in Johannesburg, Mandela surprised the crowd at halftime by arriving via helicopter. Inspired by the arrival of the South African icon, the huge crowd erupted in a thunderous roar. After halftime, the South African team seemed to absorb the energy brought on by Mandela and went on to win the match (Alegi and Bolsmann 2010). Nearly ten years later, it was Mandela that was overwhelmed with emotion when FIFA chose South Africa as the first African nation to host one of the largest mega-events in the world. While Mandela joyously wept in celebration, South Africans celebrated in the streets.

While South Africa became the first African nation to host a mega-event at the level of the World Cup in 2010, the pursuit of mega-events had been a goal since the election of

Mandela. After successfully hosting and winning both the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and the Africa Cup of Nations in 1996, South Africa began to actively bid on acquiring both the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. Since both the Rugby World Cup and the Africa Cup of Nations came at a particularly pivotal moment in the reconciliation and nation-building efforts of the post-apartheid government, these two events resonated strongly in the domestic sphere (Cornelissen 2004).

Guided by the influence of Mandela, athletics have become an important unifying instrument in post-apartheid South Africa. Since the success of the Rugby World Cup and the Africa Cup of Nations; however, South Africa's national teams have been extremely inconsistent and have suffered many humiliating international defeats. Moreover, the initial bids for the 2004 Olympics and the 2006 World Cup were rejected by the respective governing bodies.

While progressive government regulations and a marked increase in social interaction have lessened the stigma of apartheid, athletic opportunities are still marred by racial identities. Traditionally, the main sports in South Africa, rugby and cricket, have been played by the white minority. Conversely, a large majority of the black population have taken to soccer as the main country's main sport. Because of its ease and affordability, soccer is more widely played within the country. Taking advantage of the lessons learned from the nation's failed bids for the 2004 Summer Olympics and the 2006 World Cup, the South African Football Association (SAFA) put together a bid for the 2010 World Cup that would better reflect on South African society.

Justifying the 2010 World Cup bid as a catalyst for economic growth, political stability, and social unification, South Africa positioned itself as the optimal host amongst African nations. If a mega-event was to finally occur on African continent, South Africa made sure that it would be the one to host it. When the moment came to finalize its submission, the South African

bid committee appealed to both fact and emotion. Making an impassioned argument, the South African bid drove home the potential of an African World Cup while simultaneously appealing to the international community's generosity and penchant for wanting to further the development of Africa, a continent long derided not only in the international sporting community but also global thought in general (Cornelissen 2004). Whether or not it was for the best, South Africa had become the gateway for sport in Africa.

Although South Africa's acquisition of a mega-event at the level of the FIFA World Cup was important to the African continent as a whole, it also represented an acknowledgement of the role that global south would play in the 21st century. Ignoring the previous success of the small scale mega-events held in South Africa in the mid-1990s (Swart and Bob 2004: 1316), those residing in the global north doubted that South Africa would be able to successfully host the 2010 World Cup due to concerns related to stadium upkeep, social unrest, and a significant crime rate.

While the successes of the mid-1990s can be attributed to the political leadership of Nelson Mandela, the acquisition of the 2010 FIFA World Cup was the result of a confluence of many various factors. After the success of the 1984 Olympics, host cities not only sought to replicate the model used by Los Angeles but also to build upon it. Corresponding to the escalation in competition between host cities, the cost of mega-events increased exponentially. Frequently bearing the burden of such cost increases, citizens of those countries bidding on a mega-event, generally from the global north, began to question whether their tax dollars could be put to better use. Without consistent support from nations in the North, many candidates from the South have entered into the fray. Indeed, countries such as Brazil (2014 World Cup, 2016

Summer Olympics), Russia (2014 Winter Olympics, 2018 World Cup), and Qatar (2022 World Cup) have been selected as hosts for upcoming mega-events.

For the nine host cities in South Africa, the inherent problems of the country were palpable and superseded the extra effort required to become ready for such an event. Rooted in urban policy dating back to the apartheid era, spatial issues related to transportation between traditionally non-white areas and newly developed urban centers became a major issue. Prior to the fall of apartheid, the South African state simultaneously enforced the distinction of population groups and urban functions: all commercial, educational, cultural and recreational areas above an arbitrary level of sophistication were concentrated in those areas defined as 'white' (Western, 1981; Robinson, 1996). Moreover, unemployment and a lack of affordable housing were also issues for a nation seeking to justify urban development in the face of abject poverty.

Although the South African government has taken almost full responsibility for the planning, construction, maintenance, development, and cost of ten modern stadiums throughout the country while also undertaking the complete reconstruction and development program for Soccer City, the development process sparked a new urban crisis throughout South Africa (Cornelissen 2012). Already beset by high levels of inequality, instances of economic segregation only served to exacerbate the disparity between the wealthy and poverty stricken. Moreover, crime rates continued to rise while the issues related to transportation caused massive backlogs related to the service industry. All of these examples can be directly linked to the old patterns of urban fragmentation evident in the apartheid era. Eventually, these issues came to a head.

South Africa's new urban crisis translated well into development practices that are in accordance with the conclusions of Friedmann's and Sassen's (1986; 1991) world cities hypothesis. For the nine host cities of South Africa, major plans for reconstruction were used in order to present a new image to the international community. Set against the background of major metropolitan municipalities, most of the host cities including Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Thswane, Mangaung, and Nelson Mandela Bay underwent drastic development (Haferburg 2011). Seeking to strengthen South Africa's international standing via image gains and various economic techniques, the bid committee set aside the detrimental aspects of this strategy in favor of the perceived benefits.

Only a few months before South Africa kicked off the World Cup against Mexico, a violent demonstration occurred in an impoverished township just outside the host city of Johannesburg, which had recently been renovated at a cost of over $510 million dollars. Located within immediate walking distance to Soccer City Stadium, the predominantly black neighborhood of Riverlea saw the immediate impact of the redevelopment program but did not become the beneficiaries of it. Upset by the actions of the government, those in Riverlea, stated that 'the government is 'pouring money into [the] 2010 [World Cup] . . . why are they not pouring money into housing?' and they vowed 'there will be no 2010 [World Cup] because [we have] no houses and no jobs' (*The Times* 2009).

As evidenced by the demonstration outside of Johannesburg, social movements in reaction to preparations for the World Cup greatly increased in the months leading up the start of the tournament. While many protests sprang up in reaction to issues relating to socioeconomic matters and were not overly violent, many of the demonstration did pose a direct threat to the

viability of the tournament. Moreover, many of these movements posed questions directly related to the long-term social effects of the World Cup.

In post-apartheid South Africa, policies such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) put a specific focus on neoliberal priorities such as increasing exports, promoting fiscal austerity, and being competitive in the international arena. While improving South Africa's standing in the international community, GEAR has been criticized for ignoring those at the lowest levels of society (Sinwell 2011). Although superficial indicators show improvement within South Africa, other indicators suggest that socioeconomic inequality has not decreased (Terreblanche 2002).

While soccer plays an important role in changing stereotypes based on race, class, gender, and ethnicity, it also has the ability to generate huge revenue streams. Because of this, the 2010 World Cup, the first to be held on African soil, was loaded with political, economic and symbolic significance for a democratic and globalizing South Africa. While the projected economic impact of the tournament was optimistic and included the addition of 77, 400 permanent jobs, an income that would constitute 2% of the country's Gross Domestic Product, and additional tax income of roughly US $550 million, unemployment still persists and vacillates between 35%-40% (Cornelissen 2004; Cornelissen 2012).

In the period leading up to the tournament, impoverished and disadvantaged groups actively campaigned against such conditions and caused a substantial rise in public demonstrations and activism. In the five years leading up to the tournament, statistics suggest that social movements involving over 15 participants occurred nearly 8,000 times per year on average. While not all of these protests were specific demonstrations against the World Cup, the average of 22 protests per day was significant for South Africa (Bond 2010). Moreover, as the

start of the tournament approached so too did the instances of social unrest. With over 100 protests in the first three months of 2010, it was clear that the World Cup was having an effect on the country (Death 2010).

Because of the large amount of activism throughout the country, demonstrations varied in their scope and level of intensity. However, the most significant social movements were organized by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) – the country's largest labor federation and historically a powerful political actor. Focusing mainly on securing higher wages for workers and involving state employees in the education, public works, health and public security sectors, COSATU became the leader in organizing large-scale public sector strikes. With the estimated cost in working days lost from two recent public sector strikes in 2007 and 2010 in excess of $14 million, COSATU's strikes had devastating effects on the economy (Ceruti 2011).

While detrimental to the national economy, the increase in social movement also caused problems for the South African government. In conjunction with FIFA regulations, the South African government passed the 2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Act. Not only did this act set the conditions for security and commercial activities but it also demanded the cessation of all public demonstrations (Republic of South Africa 2006). Without permission from authorities or the police, the right to protest was suspended during the duration of the tournament. In addition to restrictions on the right to protest, commercial entrepreneurs claimed that host city by-laws were punishing those traders who were already disadvantaged, limiting their chances to draw gain from the event. In order to combat this, street vendor associations were established in host cities to organize marches in order to convince local councils to extend their trading rights into demarcated World Cup zones (Gonzalez 2010).

During the same period there was a large-scale demonstration by minibus taxi drivers who protested against the introduction of new urban commuter systems in several of the host cities. As is the case with many mega-events, many existing projects were fast-tracked in order to coincide with the opening deadline. Unfortunately for South Africans, many new projects such as the rail system, the bus rapid transit (BRT) system, and the King Shaka Airport caused hardships. Excluded from using most of the newer thoroughfares in favor of government sponsored forms of transport, many private taxis and other forms of transport claimed that these new projects would adversely affect their income (Steinbrink et al., 2010). In response to the government subsidized competition, various transportation industries organized large-scale marches and demonstrations that disrupted transport flows.

In a time where the World Cup is increasing in significance, it is also increasing in its dimensions. While many host cities committed to various redevelopment plans, some of the larger sites such as Durban and Johannesburg were completely redesigned which caused side effects for the residents of the area; namely, a lack of access to housing and fear of forced relocation by the government. A few weeks before the start of the World Cup, another protest broke out in reaction to the forced eviction and relocation of residents to an informal settlement close to Cape Town. Removed to the periphery of the city, these citizens were left in a holding pattern until affordable housing could be supplied. Relocated by the government's redevelopment strategy, these citizens became the residents of a new settlement known as Blikkiesdorp, which roughly translates to "tin can." For those at the lower levels in South Africa, the impact of hosting the World Cup was quite direct (Ley 2010).

Similar to a large majority of mega-events, the 2010 FIFA World Cup will be considered a success in the long-run. The consistency and intensity of multiple demonstrations before and

during the event; however, suggest that issues such as race, political division, social inequality, and other major problems still exist today. Within South Africa, many of the redevelopment projects have led to the privatization of housing and fenced-off neighborhoods that only serve to exacerbate the inequality issue. Moreover, questions remain about the budget for the tournament and whether or not the promised economic spinoffs will materialize to alleviate poverty throughout the country (Pillay & Bass, 2008; Sunday Independent, 2010). While social movements in the early 1990s helped elevate sport and destroy the remnants of apartheid, the same cannot be said for improving South African society in the wake of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Given this, it would appear that the 'World Cup moment' was not only a fleeting one for the social movements reviewed here, but also for South Africa's larger nation-building project.

Beijing: The Sick Man of East Asia

During The 112th IOC session in Moscow in 2001, Beijing defeated bids from the cities of Toronto, Istanbul, Osaka, and Paris to secure the twenty-ninth iteration of the Summer Olympics to be held in 2008. Frequently overshadowed by Beijing's victory, the election of Jacques Rogge as president of the IOC also occurred at the Moscow session. While running for the IOC presidency, Rogge promised to take control of the largesse and gigantism in the Olympic Games (Brownell 2008). While committed to the ideals of the Olympic Games, Rogge pragmatically articulated his platform as one that would greatly benefit those countries in the Third World. Due to the immensity of the Olympic Games, only a select number of cities throughout the world; namely, those in the West, were capable of hosting an Olympiad. For those cities in areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia which have never hosted an Olympiad, Rogge's platform promised hope where there once was none. Although Rogge won the IOC presidency, he now had to deliver on a promise that could never be fulfilled. Ironically,

the Beijing Olympics would not only come to represent the disadvantaged areas in the world but would also become the largest Summer Olympics held to date.

Using a strategy similar to that of other host countries, China first used smaller, regional events in order to prepare their bid for the Olympic Games. After successfully hosting the 1990 Asian Games, Beijing and the people of China felt prepared to take the next step. For those who experienced the Asian Games, the belief that hosting other mega-events would be beneficial for development of the host city and the general promotion of international goodwill took hold. As early as 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng authorized a combined effort by the China Sports Commission, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Treasury and the Beijing Municipal Government to support Beijing's bid for the 2000 Olympic Games (Brownell 2008).

While the Chinese put together a robust bid in preparation for the 2000 Summer Olympics, the rest of the world had strong reservations about allowing Beijing to become the host of such a major event. With opposition coming mainly from traditional developed nations, many leaders made their opposition heard. On August 19th, 1993, United States IOC member Anita DeFrantz received a letter from the U.S. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights that expressed opposition to the Beijing bid. The author of the letter, James Ross, expressed additional concern about the level of human rights violations within the country and how awarding an event such as the Olympics would legitimize and reward such practices (Jarvie et al., 2008).

In the early rounds of the Monte Carlo Session in 1993, optimism was high that Beijing would secure the rights to host the 2000 Summer Olympics. Continuously the leader in every round of vote-getting, Beijing only had to defeat Sydney in the last round in order to become the

host city. After the final vote, however, Sydney was declared the winner and the host of the 2000

Olympic Games. Understandably, the Chinese delegation was upset and left in disbelief.

Disappointed and angry because of the loss, it would take the Chinese government another five

years before approving a bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. While Beijing was unable to secure

the rights to host the 2000 Olympic Games, the application and near victory was considered by

the central government and state media as a foundation to be built upon.

This interpretation of success by the government and state media was proven correct in

1998 when a corruption scandal nearly tore apart the IOC. In the investigations that followed, it

was revealed that just before the final vote, the President of the Australian Olympic Committee

had offered 50,000 Australian dollars to both the Kenyan and Ugandan IOC members and their

national Olympic Committees. While the ballots are kept a secret and it could not be proved that

the money was accepted by the African delegations, the records do indicate that Beijing lost to

Sydney by only two votes (Brownell 2008). In China, the general consensus was the West had

stolen the 2000 Olympics. On November 25th, 1998, the Beijing government sought to rectify

this situation and officially announced their decision to bid for the 2008 Olympic Games.

Although there was a strong motivation to rectify the injustice of losing the 2000

Olympic bidding process, Beijing's bid for the 2008 Olympics was much stronger than their

previous attempt and contained many facets. After being snubbed by the Western nations,

Beijing looked to use a mega-event such as the Olympics in order to increase its international

stature. Treating the acquisition of the 2008 Olympics as a coming-out party, China sought to use

such a high profile event to not only increase its standing within the international community but

also to achieve certain domestic goals such as consolidating internal control, assuaging memories

of Tiananmen Square, and delegitimizing Taiwan. Buoyed by a government commitment of over

$57 billion dollars, Beijing's bid included plans for a long-term development plan which included new transit lines, a new airport, and the redevelopment of traditional neighborhoods. Additionally, the city of Beijing promised to plant over 200 million trees and experiment with various traffic control measures in order to protect the environment (Jarvie et al., 2008).

In 2001, Jacques Rogge put forth a vision of a scaled down Olympic celebration. Seven years later, Rogge's vision was shattered by the Chinese. The 2008 Beijing Olympics was the biggest and the most expensive games in Olympic history. A total of 11,028 athletes from 204 NOCs competed in 28 sports and 302 events. There were 43 world records and 132 Olympic records set at the 2008 Summer Olympics and unprecedented 86 countries won at least one medal during the Games (Luo and Huang 2013). Just as the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 closed the book on wartime Japan, the Beijing Games ended China's past century as the 'sick man' of Asia and opened a new chapter as a modern, advanced nation.

As demonstrated, international sporting events are not simply arenas where a pure ideal of athletics can be contested. Nearly always tainted by political imperatives, various factors have coalesced to make international sport a political endeavor. While areas such as the former Yugoslavia and East Germany provide great examples of how sport and politics were inseparable on the world's stage, international sport in Asia has arguably become more political than anywhere else in the world. With mega-events such as the Olympic Games being awarded to Asian hosts so infrequently, the political significance of acquiring such an event is immeasurable. Since the revival of the modern Olympic Games in 1896, Asia has only secured the rights to three Summer Olympics in 1964 (Tokyo), 1988 (Seoul) and 2008 (Beijing). Tokyo has also won the rights to host the 2020 Summer Olympics. Until the 1956 Melbourne Summer Olympics, each Olympiad had been held in either Europe or the United States, although the 1940

Summer Olympics were to be held in Japan. Additionally, the Winter Olympics have only come to Asia twice since 1924, however, Pyeongchang, South Korea will host in 2018.

In conjunction with the infrequency of hosting the Olympics, the demographic makeup of the IOC members also reflect the politicization of sport within Asia. Although certain Asian nations have precluded themselves from joining the IOC over the years, members from Asia have traditionally been under-represented. This obviously puts Asian nations at a disadvantage when voting for host cities takes place. Therefore, when an Olympiad is awarded to an Asian nation, it is truly considered to be a mega-event. More so than other nations or regions, mega-events in Asia are celebrated as monumental occasions that serve as economic and developmental benchmarks. Moreover, they contribute to the credibility of the host governments. In combination, these factors arguably cause athletic endeavors to become much more politicized than they would be in developed nations (Cha 2013).

Perhaps the most important reason why sport is more political in Asia than anywhere else in the world has to do with both the historical and contemporary dynamics of the region. For many countries who neither have the means nor capabilities to engage in regular diplomacy, athletic events represent an outlet for nations to not only channel aggression but also gain a measure of pride. While U.S. and Soviet athletic relations during the Cold War are the best example of this alternative to actual warfare, rivalries between Asian nations frequently spill over into the realm of athletics. Whether it is due to land disputes, perceived slights, or simply nationalistic feelings of pride, some level of general animosity exists between most nations in Asia (Cha 2013). Historically, the combination of Japan's imperialistic ambitions and previous militaristic action throughout Asia has caused many of its neighbors, including Russia, to view every athletic contest with Japan as repayment for past injustices.

Moreover, the recent speed in which Asian nations are developing means that continual statecraft and nation-building is constantly taking place. As a part of this proactive approach to nation-building, the symbolic meaning of events such as the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup is very strong. Without China's incredible economic growth over the past two decades helping to transform the country into a world power, the 2008 Beijing Games might have garnered less attention. With mega-events only reaching Asia at intermittent times, the combination of history, sport, and politics plays a vital role within society.

Although China is one of the oldest civilizations in history, the country's experience with the Olympic Games has been much shorter than a majority of other established countries. With the modern Olympic Games in full swing at the outset of the 20th century, the Chinese became cognizant of the importance of international sport and put forth a specific set of goals related to the Olympic Games. Translated into questions, the three goals included: when can the Chinese compete in the Olympic Games, when can a Chinese athlete win an Olympic gold medal, and when can the Chinese host an Olympic Games? Famously known in international sporting circles as China's "three questions," these aims guided nearly every decision of the Chinese Olympic movement until 2008 (Jarvie et al., 2008).

By participating in the 1932 Los Angeles Summer Olympics, China was able to quickly realize its dream of participating in the Olympic Games. While it did not take long for China to answer the first question, the next two answers would come much later and be achieved in spite of many obstacles. After a protracted civil war for control of the country, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) eventually established the People's Republic of China (PRC) and installed Mao Zedong as first Chairman in 1949. For the new government, mega-events such as the Olympics were viewed as the perfect opportunity to not only enhance its international

reputation but also to promote Maoism. For Chinese sport, the reign of Chairman Mao (1949-1978) was an important developmental stage and drastically influenced China's participation level in international athletics. It was Mao's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism that directly influenced Chinese socialism and the eventual Cultural Revolution (Jarvie et al., 2008). During the early stages of the PRC, Mao's socialist vision for Chinese sport guided the direction of both physical culture and mass participation. Although still recovering from the effects of the civil war, China continued to remain active in the Olympic movement and participated in the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games.

Although the PRC continued to take part in Olympic activities, their participation in such events quickly came to an end. Although the CCP was able to take control of mainland China during the civil war, Chiang Kai-Shek was able to set up a government in exile in Taiwan. Trying to avoid a political stance, the IOC officially recognized both the PRC Olympic Committee and the Taiwanese delegation as well. After extremely hostile negotiations with disputes ranging from colors to flags to the name of each participating country, China decided to withdraw from the IOC in 1958 and other international sport federations as well. Until 1979, the "Two Chinas' dispute prevented the Chinese from pursuing their last two questions (Brownell 2008).

After the death of Mao, rejoining the IOC in 1979, and boycotting the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, China began to pay serious attention to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Representing the largest communist presence in terms of participation due to the boycott by the Soviet Union and its allies, China placed fourth in the medal count at the 1984 Olympics. In addition to participating, the Chinese sent an exploratory committee to understand how the Los Angeles organizers set up such a large-scale event without incurring an extreme amount of

debt. After returning, the Chinese delegation noted that hosting mega-events could not only bring in massive profits but also increase Chinese nationalism. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics became one of the first tangible steps for the advancement of Chinese sport. More importantly, however, a Chinese athlete was finally able to win the nation's first gold medal. The second question had been answered.

By the turn of the century, China had established itself as a major economic power and had already surpassed France and Italy in terms of GDP per capita as of 2006. Moreover, conservative estimates predict that China will have overtaken the United States as the world's largest economy within the next thirty years. Between 1996 and 2006, China's GDP growth averaged nearly 9% a year and as a result the average real income of the average Chinese citizen doubled in less than ten years (O'Toole et al., 2006). Since then, the Chinese economy has recovered well from the recent global recession and continues apace. In conjunction with its economic expansion, Chinese diplomatic and military strength has also grown and caused the West to simultaneously fear China's expansion while also welcoming new global opportunities. With such expansive growth patterns, China demonstrated that it had the potential to host the Olympic Games. After potentially having the right to host in 2000 stolen from them, Beijing was eventually rewarded with the 2008 Summer Olympics. Although it took nearly 112 years and was fraught with difficulty, the three great questions of the Chinese Olympic movement had finally been answered.

While China has only recently started its developmental ascent, it has created conditions that both confuse free market capitalists and engender jealousy amongst world leaders. In addition to finally securing a mega-event at the level of the Olympic Games, the Chinese have started a campaign to alleviate poverty within the country. Nevertheless, the rapid advancement

of Chinese society should not gloss over the challenges that the country still faces. While

working to improve the economy, the CCP simultaneously downgraded the right to public

education, made healthcare less affordable, greatly interfered with the state sector, created vast

amounts of inequality, and displaced a significant proportion of the population from areas that

were used for the Olympics (Jarvie et al., 2008).

Similar to the experience of nearly every other host of a mega-event, the Chinese faced a

variety of intense social pressures including, but not limited to, environmental concerns about air

quality and human rights issues not only in a domestic sense but also in areas such as the Darfur

region of Sudan. While individual hosts have reacted to various pressures in multiple ways,

illiberal regimes (e.g. Mexico City 1968) frequently seek to control the narrative of the Games

by turning the event into a way to portray both domestic and international strength. While this

heavy-handed approach can be beneficial to the host, it also provides an outlet for others to

promote dissent in a way not normally allowed by domestic politics.

With the advent of continuous cable news coverage, both foreign and domestic

journalists, and millions of spectators with instantaneous access to both cameras and social

media, the 21st century no longer allows a host country to disregard the pressures that come from

various groups. With international attention fixed on a nation for the duration of the Games,

indifference to such salient issues can only cause embarrassment and negative publicity. For the

Chinese, the demand for domestic and international change was palpable and was voiced by

NGOs, journalists, celebrities such as Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg, and major corporations

such as Coca-Cola.

In the run-up to the 2008 Summer Olympics, critics frequently cited elevated air pollution

levels as an obstacle to hosting the Games. In 2007, 80% of the world's top 20 most polluted

cities were from China. Because of the high levels of pollution, many athletes and spectators were concerned for their well-being and used masks to protect themselves while some athletes contemplated skipping the entire event (*Los Angeles Times* March 12, 2008; *New York Times* March 12, 2008 as cited in Chen et al., 2013). This increased awareness of environmental concerns not only placed China's environmental strategy in the international spotlight but also threatened Beijing's hosting chances.

In order to establish a positive image of China, the CCP went to great lengths to improve air quality throughout the nation. Supported by the centralized government, the Chinese implemented a series of drastic actions to quickly reduce the amount of pollution within cities. At a cost of over U.S. $10 billion, these steps included enforcing new emission standards, experimenting with traffic control, upgrading waste facilities, and modernizing energy producing sites (Chen et al., 2013).

Based on the publicly reported air pollution index (API) from 2000 to 2009, it is clear that the CCP's actions effectively reduced API in Beijing by 24.9% during the Games as compared to one year before any other historical Olympic-motivated action (Chen et al., 2013). Nevertheless, this improvement proved to be short-lived as a significant proportion of the effect faded away by October 2009, long after the international community had left Beijing. With the massive expenditure and effort related to building sustainable city infrastructure and Olympic stadiums, the 2008 Summer Olympics were arguably the largest and most expensive natural experiment in air cleaning in Olympic history. Unfortunately for Chinese citizens, their quality of life returned to inadequate levels once the gaze of the world shifted.

While critics rightfully brought attention to the issue of air quality in China, a focus on human rights and accountability in foreign policy matters both at home and abroad would be the

true indicator for whether social movements had any lasting effects after the 2008 Olympics.

China's record on such issues was admittedly mixed. While real adjustments were made to

policies relating to Sudan's handling of the Darfur region, they were disorganized and protracted.

Similar responses to the situations in Myanmar and Tibet focused solely on selective

internationally known human rights cases. Prior to securing the 2008 Summer Olympics, the

situation in Darfur was of no concern to the CCP even though the countries shared diplomatic

ties. Nevertheless, as voices in the global community shared their concerns about the lack of

Chinese effort in Darfur, the situation in Sudan grew in importance to Beijing's own reputation.

While adjustments were made in relation to these countries, no real or lasting change occurred.

Without any real sanctions in place, China continued to import nearly 66% of all Sudanese oil

exports. Moreover, the CCP heavily invested in various Sudanese infrastructure in order to build

a foundation for future energy production (Cha 2013).

Unfortunately, not even the small changes seen in foreign policy were evident in China's

domestic policy. In an effort to modernize the city, Beijing underwent a massive redevelopment

project that effectively redesigned the entire infrastructure of the area and changed the entire

complexion of the city and its residents. In order to create a new global image, the CCP not only

removed citizens from neighborhoods with Communist era apartment buildings but also

destroyed those areas to make way for more residential communities. In addition, old ways of

connecting the city were effectively demolished. Redevelopment of Beijing has displaced nearly

a million people from the center of Beijing, many of whom were forced to move to rural or

suburban areas. Because of this forced removal, public transportation usage has decreased while

personal automobile usage has increased. This rapid inversion has led to an increased amount of

air pollution and traffic congestion. While the Beijing government claims that only 15,000

people have been displaced, the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions

(COHRE) estimates that 1.5 million people have been displaced as a result of construction for

the Games, including residents being moved to make way for new buildings, expressways, and

parks that relate to the Olympic development (COHRE 2007).

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Using qualitative and quantitative measures in combination to test the hypothesis, the research suggests that my theory is valid. In Mexico City, a significant social movement that mainly involved students was brutally suppressed with violence just days before the opening ceremonies for the Olympics and nobody blinked an eye. In South Africa, the 2010 FIFA World Cup attracted many avenues for dissent among those at the lowest levels of society. The first major international sporting event held in Africa, the tournament promised to benefit not only South Africa but also the global south in general. Although considered a success in the international community, the World Cup did nothing to alleviate the gross disparity in income inequality or the forced relocation of residents throughout the country. In Beijing, the story is slightly different. Host of the 2008 Summer Olympics, Beijing faced a significant amount of external pressure regarding their human rights practices. However, the results remained the same. After the opening ceremonies, all protests were pushed to the side and the Olympiad continued without interruption.

Implications

Since the hypothesis has proven to be valid, it has been shown that in the face of a mega-event, it is rare for any type of social movement or protest to become an effective tool for advocating real change. This suggests that although mega-events may lead to more instances of protest, these movements do not have any long-term effects for either the host nation or the international community. For those undertaking research in this area, the inability of social

movement to have a significant impact on mega-events not only adds to the literature surrounding social movements in general but also to the literature that explores the overall impact of mega-events on host countries. While I do not claim that this research is groundbreaking, I do claim that it incrementally adds to the literature and provides a foundation for future research related to implementing reform in such endeavors. In a more practical sense, the insignificance of each social movement not only demonstrates the priorities of the host country but also of the international community. While domestic protest is a common occurrence when a country hosts a mega-event, it is evident that any social movement needs international support and must transcend traditional borders and politics in order to succeed. While domestic pressure may address parts of the problem, human rights responsibility must be shared multilaterally in order to deal with it comprehensively.

Future Research

Since this research only contributes specific aspects to the literature, the prospects for future research are extremely high. First, a more in depth study of the cases is necessary. With more time and resources, this is a strong possibility, especially in relation to the future events happening in Brazil. While three cases provide evidence for the hypothesis, a greater selection from around the world would clearly help solidify the results. Potential cases include but are not limited to host cities such as Sochi (2014 Winter Olympics), London (2012 Summer Olympics), and Seoul (1988 Summer Olympics), each of which has experienced the effects of social movements. Second, a more thorough investigation of IOC efforts to help control social movements could have provided a viable alternative to the original question. Finally, the implementation of alternative quantitative measures may be able to more accurately define the

relationship. While these suggestions are useful, they are clearly not the only avenues that such a

continuously evolving project can take.

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Appendix

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Variance	Min	Max
Conflict Index	1107.10	2084.50	4345072.60	0.00	21.25
Population Density	2796.90	3067.00	9406573.40	42.00	12861.00
GDP per capita	9528.88	9016.97	81305745.59	148.00	40944.00
Legislative Effectiveness	2.52	0.81	0.66	0.00	3.00
Univ. Enrollment per capita	246.78	142.26	20238.74	8.00	702.00
Literacy Rate	942.72	82.08	6737.53	560.00	996.00
Time Counter	10.74	9.10	82.80	0.00	40.00
Time Counter^2	197.95	288.19	83055.90	0.00	1600.00

Table 2: Mexico

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Conflict Index	27	2624.81	4452.19	0	21250
Time Counter	38	11.31	6.40	0	24
Time Counter^2	38	167.95	158.96	0	576

Table 3: South Africa

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Conflict Index	42	2168.00	2615.22	0	10437
Time Counter	42	19.52	12.22	0	40
Time Counter^2	42	527.14	496.58	0	1600

Table 4: China

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Conflict Index	42	1059.42	1418.13	0.00	6312
Time Counter	42	17.47	12.17	0.00	38
Time Counter^2	42	450.10	452.22	0.00	1444

Table 5: Regression Analysis

# of observations=531
F (7, 524)= 8.95
Prob > F = 0.00
R-Squared=.107
Adj R-Squared=.0949

	Estimate	S.E.	t-value	P>|t|	90% Conf. Interval	
Intercept	2961.36	1223.31	2.42	0.02	945.63	4977.10
Time Counter	75.66	39.93	1.89	0.06	9.86	141.46
Time Counter^2	-3.31	1.53	-2.16	0.03	-5.83	-0.79
GDP per capita	-0.06	0.02	-3.94	0.00	-0.08	-0.04
Population Density	0.01	0.03	0.31	0.76	-0.04	0.06
Legislative Effectiveness	-238.43	132.29	-1.80	0.07	-456.42	-20.45
Univ. Enrollment per capita	0.14	0.96	0.14	0.89	-1.44	1.71
Literacy Rate	-0.86	1.42	-0.61	0.54	-3.20	1.47