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Abstract
Fundraising and campaign contributions are commonplace among members of the U.S. Congress. However, questions of how much influence and access these contributions allow, for groups outside of the confines of Congress, have plagued the institution. This work seeks to understand how interest groups can influence the legislative behavior of the members of Congress. Specifically, this dissertation attempts to examine how political action committee (PAC) contributions can influence the amending behavior of the members in the House of Representatives. The effect of contributions on amending behavior is an often-overlooked component within the literature on interest groups. This analysis provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. Accompanying the qualitative study are two quantitative chapters examining the amending activity of House members on the floor and the committee stage from the 109th through the 113th Congress. The data gleaned from the quantitative analyses did not produce substantively significant support between the relationship of PAC contributions and amending activity of House members. However, the analyses do contribute to the overall conversation of interest group access and influence, while also highlighting promising avenues for future research in the topic.