BRANCHING OUT: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA'S EXPERIENCE IN THE CREATION, MANAGEMENT, AND EVOLUTION OF EXTENDED CAMPUSES

by

KATHY ROGERS PHARR

(Under the Direction of Libby V. Morris)

ABSTRACT

Across the United States, policymakers at the state and federal level increasingly call for universities to expand access to higher learning, yet these institutions face funding constraints that make it difficult to maintain quality programs for the existing students enrolled. How will this demand be met? For a growing number of colleges and institutions, the answer lies at the periphery, as they become more entrepreneurial and expand instructional programs in extended (or branch) locations. In addition to helping to increase access, peripheral expansion offers other strategic advantages to an institution as well, many of them financially motivated. Also, extending the university across the state can build its brand, strengthening the connection to local citizens and policymakers, who wield an enormous influence over the funding allocated to public institutions.

However, establishing an extended campus is not a decision to be made lightly. It represents a major strategic move for an institution because it devotes significant academic, financial, and political resources to the effort. The question of whether to establish a branch campus, and if so where, is a critically important one, as the costs of a poor decision could be quite damaging to the institution.

This dissertation examines the experience of the University of Georgia in establishing an instructional extended campus in Gwinnett County, a rapidly growing metropolitan area less than an hour away from the main campus. Three primary questions drive the research: 1) What are the motivations for research universities to establish extended instructional campuses? 2) What are the internal and external dynamics that influence decisions regarding whether to establish branch instructional campuses, how to manage them, and where to site them? 3) Why and how do the stated purposes and missions of extended instructional campuses evolve over time? The dissertation connects the literature from political science, strategy, academic capitalism, organizational theory, finance, governance, adult education, and access to the topic of branch campuses in order to provide relevant information for academic leaders such as presidents, provosts, and deans to consider when contemplating the establishment of extended campuses.

INDEX WORDS: extended, branch, establishment, creation, Gwinnett, Georgia

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated first to my family, whose unwavering support has always been instrumental to any accomplishment I have achieved. To my husband, Jerry, who assumed more than his fair share of household and parenting responsibilities while I was either away in class or engrossed in research or writing, thank you. You are my soul mate and best friend, and I could not have accomplished this without you; I love you. To my sons, Joshua and Andrew, thank you for your tolerance—for understanding when Mom needed quiet time, for forgiving me when I had to miss a soccer game or concert, and for distracting me when I had been focused on my studies too long and you realized that I needed a break! I hope that my experience has made a positive impression and that you have developed an appreciation for the value of hard work and the pleasure of lifelong learning.

Second, I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Doris Grist Rogers, and my late father, W. Harold Rogers. Although they did not have college degrees, they emphasized to me and my siblings from an early age the importance of an education and its ability to transform your life in a very positive way. My father challenged me to strive for excellence, and my mother provided constant support in all pursuits. Mama, you have my eternal love, respect, and gratitude.

And last but certainly not least, I dedicate this dissertation to my late friend, Dr. J. Douglas Toma. It was Doug Toma's vision that made the Executive Ed.D. program at the University of Georgia's Institute of Higher Education a reality, and it was Doug who

convinced me to throw my hat into the ring as a member of the charter class. Although I was on the fence about the possibility, Doug persuaded me that this would be “a great idea”! Doug, I thank you for always dreaming big and for your uncanny ability to convince others to do the same. You are sorely missed.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Across the United States, policymakers at the state and federal level increasingly call for universities to expand access to higher learning, yet these institutions face funding constraints that make it difficult to maintain quality programs for the existing students enrolled. How will this demand be met? For a growing number of colleges and institutions, the answer lies at the periphery, as they become more entrepreneurial and expand instructional programs in extended (or branch) locations.[1]

In addition to helping to address the national aspiration for greater student access, peripheral expansion offers other strategic advantages to an institution as well, many of them financially motivated. For example, by expanding outside the confines of the main campus and taking the institution to the consumer, universities can charge "convenience" prices and keep instructional costs low through the use of adjunct faculty. Toma (2009) notes that universities increasingly rely on "revenues generated at their more agile peripheries" (p. 9). Also, profit generated at extended locations can be applied to support the educational mission at the home campus (Bok, 2003). Extending the university across the state can build its brand, strengthening the connection to local citizens as well as ties to policymakers, who wield an enormous influence over the funding allocated to public institutions (Weerts & Ronca, 2006).

[1] This dissertation treats the terms "extended" and "branch" campuses synonymously, and they are applied interchangeably.

Establishing an extended campus is not a decision to be made lightly. It represents a major strategic move for an institution because it devotes significant academic, financial, and political resources to the effort. The question of whether to establish a branch campus, and if so where, is a critically important one, as the costs of a poor decision could be quite damaging to the institution. However, in my exploration of the scholarship concerning extended campuses, I discovered that there is very little information specifically dedicated to the topic. While this made my task as a researcher more challenging, it also offered the rewarding opportunity to add to the knowledge base of the literature by filling a void that could be of relevance to institutional policymakers in the future.

The internal and external dynamics that influence the critical decisions to establish branch campuses most intrigue me. I examine these issues through the lens of the experience of the flagship institution within the University System of Georgia (USG)—the University of Georgia (UGA) in Athens—concentrating on the central role of the USG Board of Regents in the process. The university has established several branch campuses over the last decade, and in the case examined, it did so amidst considerable political pressure.

The University of Georgia, chartered in 1785 as the nation's first public university, is the state's largest and most diversified institution of higher learning (UGA, 2011). It is designated as a land-grant and sea-grant institution[2] and, as such, is compelled to extend its tripartite mission of teaching, research, and service to practical application across the state. With an enrollment of nearly 35,000 students at the undergraduate,

[2] The Morrill Land Grant Act, which first established land-grant institutions in 1862, will be explored in more detail in the literature review that follows in Chapter 2.

graduate, and professional levels, it offers baccalaureate and advanced degree programs in hundreds of fields through its 16 colleges and schools. Admission is increasingly competitive, with approximately 18,000 applicants vying for 4,900 slots in the 2011 freshman class.[3] An admissions press release notes that of those matriculating in the entering class, approximately 12 percent are from out-of-state (Hannon, 2011). The main campus of the University of Georgia is situated on approximately 600 acres in Athens, Georgia, a mid-sized city with a population of approximately 115,000 (including students) (ACC Unified Government, 2010). The University of Georgia has three extended campuses in Griffin, Tifton, and Gwinnett, and its business school has an extended location in Buckhead, the midtown region of Atlanta.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I will focus on the establishment of the University of Georgia's branch campus in Gwinnett County, a rapidly growing suburb of metropolitan Atlanta. UGA had delivered higher education services in the form of graduate, professional, and continuing education in Gwinnett since the mid-1980s. However, community leaders had long advocated the establishment of a new institution of the University System of Georgia, and a 1984 proposal noted that Gwinnett had the largest population of any county east of the Mississippi River that did not have its own college campus at the time (Younts, 1984). Others, however, contended that the prestige of a diploma from the flagship institution of the University of Georgia, presently ranked as a top 25 public university by *U.S. News & World Report* (U.S. News, 2011), would have far more distinction than a degree from a fledgling institution.

[3] The yield of the freshman class in Fall 2011 was much higher than the 4,900 anticipated (McDuff, 2011); 5,500 students actually enrolled (Hannon, 2011).

In a partnership approved by the University System of Georgia Board of Regents in 1997, UGA agreed to offer undergraduate degree programs in collaboration with DeKalb College (later to be known as Georgia Perimeter College) on 180 acres of land donated by Gwinnett County. The premise of the Gwinnett University Center (GUC) was that students would complete their core requirements in the two-year program offered by Georgia Perimeter and then would transfer into the University of Georgia Gwinnett program, where they would ultimately earn a degree from the University of Georgia (USG Minutes, December 1997). The first building at the Gwinnett University Center was dedicated in January 2002; however, within a few short years of GUC's establishment, Georgia Perimeter and the University of Georgia essentially received eviction notices from the Board of Regents. Each would have to develop a three-year exit strategy to divest itself of the undergraduate degree market in Gwinnett by the end of June 30, 2008,[4] when the 35th institution of the University of Georgia, Georgia Gwinnett College, would be fully operational at the GUC site at the intersection of Highway 316 and Collins Hill Road. Consequently the University of Georgia opened its own, separate site and reverted to its original delivery of graduate, professional, and continuing degree programs.

I selected the University of Georgia's Gwinnett branch for research instead of its other extended campuses for two reasons: 1) the rich example of internal and external forces involved in the various iterations of its Gwinnett campus; and 2) the Gwinnett campus is more mature than the university's other campuses and reflects the involvement of many of its colleges and schools. The UGA extended campus in Tifton is an extension of the College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, much like the Buckhead

[4] In the state of Georgia, the fiscal year runs from July 1 – June 30.

campus is an arm of the Terry College of Business, while the Griffin campus is still struggling to transform from its roots as the state's first agricultural research station (established in 1888) to assume its additional role (as of 2005) as a resident instruction site.

Originally I had intended to juxtapose the experience of the University of Georgia in Gwinnett County with that of the other leading public research university in the state, the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech), in establishing its branch campus in the coastal city of Savannah, Georgia. The Georgia Institute of Technology was established in 1885 in Atlanta, the capital city of the state of Georgia and now a thriving commercial and transportation hub of more than 540,000 people (a population that surges nearly 10 times when the entire metropolitan area is considered) (Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, 2011). More than 20,000 undergraduate and graduate students attend Georgia Tech, earning degrees from its six colleges of architecture, computing, engineering, liberal arts, management, and sciences (Georgia Tech, 2010). Similar to UGA, admission is highly competitive. In 2011, more than 14,250 prospective students applied for an entering class of 2,650, and nearly 30 percent of the freshmen are from out-of-state (Georgia Tech, 2011).

For many years, South Georgia citizens had advocated for the establishment of a regional engineering program, contending that many of their sons and daughters were not being admitted to Georgia Tech. Some local political leaders wanted the Board of Regents to establish an engineering program at Georgia Southern in Statesboro; however, others contended that the best decision would be to establish an extended location of Georgia Tech, a premier technological institution consistently ranked in the top 10 of

U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News, 2011). The Board of Regents approved Georgia Tech as the purveyor of the program in September 1998, and by fall 1999, Georgia Tech's initial engineering programs at its Savannah campus were underway (USG Minutes, 1998 and 2000).

However, in November 2010, the Board of Regents approved electrical, mechanical, and civil engineering programs at Georgia Southern University in Statesboro, Georgia, approximately one hour north of Savannah (USG Minutes, 2010).[5] In the wake of that decision, Georgia Tech administrators initiated a self-study to determine how to transition their program offerings in Savannah.[6] Due to the ongoing self-study, Georgia Tech senior administrators declined permission for me to interview any faculty or staff associated with the program other than the program director, Vice Provost J. David Frost. Realizing that a robust case study could not be sufficiently developed via a single interview and review of archival documents, I decided to wait to pursue an examination of Georgia Tech's experience until a later time, when greater access to interview subjects could be granted. Therefore, instead of a contrasting study of two institutions, my dissertation consists of a single, detailed case study. Figure 1 on the following page shows a map of Georgia that depicts the locations of the main and branch campuses discussed thus far: the University of Georgia in Athens and its extended campuses in Gwinnett, Tifton, Griffin, and Buckhead; and the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta and its branch campus in Savannah.

[5] It should be noted that these engineering programs also were approved for the University of Georgia (main campus in Athens) at the same meeting.

[6] The transition plan proposed for Georgia Tech's Savannah campus by the internal task force was adopted by Georgia Tech President G.P. "Bud" Peterson in June 2011. Tech will phase out its current degree offerings and develop a new academic and operational model focusing on programs for the military as well as professional master's and executive programs. For complete details, read *Defining a Path Forward for Georgia Tech-Savannah* (June 2011).

Figure 1. Map of UGA and Georgia Tech's Main and Extended Locations in Georgia
UGA's main campus in Athens and its extended campuses are noted by the Arch logo; Georgia Tech's main and extended locations are denoted by a tower icon. The Arch and tower are respective symbols of the institutions.

In both situations, the ultimate decisions of whether to establish the extended campuses, where to place them, and the degree programs to be offered rested with the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia. The USG Board of Regents was created in 1931 as part of a reorganization of state government. The establishment of the board unified oversight of state colleges and universities under a single governing and management authority for the first time. The infamous "Cocking affair"[7] a decade later

[7] For a full treatment of the Cocking affair, read Chapter 10 of Tom Dyer's The *University of Georgia: A Bicentennial History, 1785-1985* (1985). In a nutshell, Dean Cocking of UGA's College of Education was targeted by segregationist governor Herman Talmadge for promoting integration. Talmadge stacked the Board of Regents with his supporters and fired Cocking. The firing was a costly political miscalculation for the powerful Talmadge. The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools voted unanimously to pull the

prompted the Georgia legislature to confer constitutional status to the Board of Regents, strengthening its power and independence from political influence.

Today, the Georgia governor appoints 18 members to the board who serve renewable terms of seven years; 13 of the members are appointed from each of the state's congressional districts, and five are appointed from the state at-large. The board appoints a chancellor who serves as the USG's chief executive and administrative officer. The University System of Georgia is comprised of 35 colleges and universities: four research universities, two regional universities, 13 state universities, 14 state colleges, and two two-year colleges (USG Institutions, 2011). These institutions enrolled approximately 312,000 students as of Fall 2010 (USG Facts, 2011).

After determining the single site for study, I then developed the following research questions to guide my exploration:

1. What are the motivations for research universities to establish extended instructional campuses?
2. What are the internal and external dynamics that influence decisions regarding whether to establish branch instructional campuses, how to manage them, and where to site them?
3. Why and how do the stated purposes and missions of extended instructional campuses evolve over time?

It is my hope that this dissertation expands the body of knowledge by supplementing the few existing studies specifically related to the topic of the creation of

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accreditation of every white school in the University System of Georgia, and Georgia voters in response elected a new governor to replace Talmadge. Incoming Governor Ellis Arnall moved immediately to enact reforms to insulate the Board of Regents from such overt political interference. He preserved the basic structure of the board established in 1931, but removed the governor from direct membership and extended regents' terms of service by one year. SACS restored accreditation shortly thereafter.

extended campuses. It attempts to fill a void for academic leaders such as presidents, provosts, and deans, who might be contemplating the establishment of extended campuses in the near future. By connecting the literature from political science, strategy, academic capitalism, organizational theory, finance, governance, adult education, and access to the topic of branch campuses, I provide further resources for institutional policymakers to consider. The answers to my research questions form the basis for the conclusions reached in Chapter 5, shedding light on factors that academic leaders should consider when deciding whether to establish a branch campus. Through a rich and detailed case study, institutional leaders can learn from the specific experience of a leading public research university and apply the lessons learned to inform their own decision-making in the future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

An examination of the literature specifically related to the establishment of extended (or branch) campuses reveals a thin and underdeveloped repository of information. The subject has not generated a great deal of focused exploration, and specific scholarship on the topic is sparse, save for a limited number of dissertations addressing various facets of organizational issues. Therefore, most of the literature is linked to it only tangentially. One can look to the literature on funding or academic capitalism to understand the interest in developing new sources of revenue, to the adult education literature to appreciate the historic pressures to expand educational opportunity, to the organizational literature to grasp some of the major challenges that can arise in extended locations, or to the literature on strategy to comprehend some of the factors that should be considered when deciding whether to develop an extended campus. However, it is in the political literature where some of the strongest links to the topic of branch campus creation can be found. Policy trends and statewide politics permeate decisions to establish branch campuses, determine where they will be located, and decide what degree programs will be offered. Through theoretical frameworks borrowed and expanded from political science literature, the motivations and power struggles involved in establishing extended campuses are more clearly revealed. One case study in particular by deGive and Olswang (1999)—to be explored later in this chapter—enlightens the scholar and provides a direct link to the literature.

This literature review flows loosely through two general sections. The first section defines branch campuses for the purpose of this dissertation. The second examines a host of internal and external forces that exert pressure on institutions to establish extended campuses, addressing broad policy issues such as fiscal and physical constraints, access, branding, governance, boosterism, political influence, faculty culture, and strategy.

Defining a Branch Campus

To set the ground for discussion, a definition of extended campuses will at first be useful. As today's institutions face the paradox of increased demand but decreased revenue, they are compelled to pursue innovative ways to create capacity and grow beyond the bounds of their brick-and-mortar institutions. Consumerism in the marketplace drives the means of delivery through several models: the establishment of branch campuses; the proliferation of distance learning (or distributed) programs; partnerships through degree-granting or non-degree-granting consortia; and the advent of corporate universities.

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Commission on Colleges[8] defines a branch campus as follows:

[8] SACS is one of seven regional accrediting associations in the United States comprising eight commissions that grant institution-wide accreditation. The eight commissions are: Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, Commission on Higher Education; New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Commission on Institutions of Higher Education; New England Association of Schools and Colleges, Commission on Technical and Career Institutions; North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, The Higher Learning Commission; Northwest Association of Schools, Colleges and Universities, Commission on Colleges and Universities; Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, Commission on Colleges; Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges; and Western Association of Schools and Colleges, Accrediting Commission for Senior Colleges and Universities (Council for Higher Education Accreditation, 2001). SACS has jurisdiction over institutions in the state of Georgia. Its process is to accredit the entire institution, including reported branch campuses, online programs, distance learning programs, and instructional sites (SACS Commission on Schools, 2010).

> a location of an institution that is geographically apart and independent of the main campus of the institution. A location is independent of the main campus if the location is 1) permanent in nature, 2) offers courses in educational programs leading to a degree, certificate or other recognized educational credential, 3) has its own faculty and administrative or supervisory organization, and 4) has its own budgeting and hiring authority. (2010, p. 11)

The National Center for Educational Statistics' Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) offers a similar, yet slightly different description: "a campus or site of an educational institution that is not temporary, is located in a community beyond a reasonable commuting distance from its parent institution, and offers organized programs of study, not just courses" (2011).

According to Fonseca and Bird (2007), the defining criterion for a true branch, as opposed to a rented or "storefront" operation, is the presence of a resident faculty and a permanent, physical facility. They point out that 79 percent of students attend college within their home state, most within a few hours' drive of home.

> These students appear to desire education within a 30-minute commuting range, leading to much of the explosive demand for branches. In fact, one could argue that branches have helped to create much of the explosion in college attendance by nontraditional students as much as one could argue that branches exist because they are a response to that burgeoning enrollment. (p. 1)

Fonseca and Bird identified eight different types of extended campuses, according to their mission and affiliation. (I have summarized this information in Table 1 on the following page.) For example, a *co-located branch* is a joint venture with an institution of

another type at the same site; UGA's initial undergraduate venture in Gwinnett, coupled with the two-year access institution, Georgia Perimeter College, would be an example of this type. Another classification is the *distant branch*, much like those Georgia Tech has established overseas. For the purpose of this dissertation, and for simplification, only the SACS and IPEDS definitions will be applied.[9]

Table 1. Types of Branch Campuses

Name	Type	Example
Transfer Program Model	Campuses exist solely to offer two-year transfer programs	University of Wisconsin System
Upper-Division Model	Campuses offer junior and senior-level baccalaureate completion programs, as well as some master's degree programs	States in South and West with thriving community college systems
Distributed University Model	Branches house specialized programs and research opportunities not offered at the main campus	University of Connecticut's campus at Avery Point in Groton specializes in marine sciences and oceanography
Co-located Campuses	Combinations of two institutions, often four-year branches and two-year technical schools; can also be a flagship partnering to serve a metropolitan area	Common in Ohio
Very Distant Campuses	Prestigious institutions establish branches far away	Carnegie Mellon's West Coast Campus in Mountain View, California
Mini-Universities/Four-Year Branches	Two- and four-year degree programs offered, as well as some graduate degrees; curriculum controlled through the central campus	23 university branches in Ohio and the 12 branch campuses of Penn State University
Twigs	Branches of branch campuses served by commuting faculty	Ohio University – 3 of 5 branches have own branches
Community College Branch Campuses	Highly developed branches at the largest community colleges	Miami Dade College and Northern Virginia Community College

Source: Fonseca, J.W. & Bird, C.P. (2007). Under the Radar: Branch Campuses Take Off. *University Business, 10*(10), 8-14.

[9] However, it bears noting that the University of Georgia's Gwinnett campus is a hybrid. While it is permanent and offers courses leading to a degree, its faculty and administrators are not independent of the main campus; rather, the academic programs are overseen by the departments in Athens, with the same faculty sharing the teaching load at the main and extended sites. Also, the degree conferred is a University of Georgia degree, not a University of Georgia-Gwinnett degree, and it is awarded at the commencement ceremony in Athens.

Distance learning, as defined by the American Council on Education (ACE),[10] "is a subset of distributed learning, focusing on students who may be separated in time and space from their peers and the instructor," whereas distributed learning "can occur either on or off campus, providing students with greater flexibility and eliminating time as a barrier to learning" (Oblinger, Barone, & Hawkins, 2001, p. 1). This type of setting also is sometimes referred to as a virtual campus comprised of "clicks and mortar" as opposed to "bricks and mortar" (Oblinger et al., 2001) and is particularly attractive to working adults, who are striving to complete or advance their degrees while juggling career demands.

Through degree-granting consortia, which are aimed at employees of global corporations, institutions leverage their collective market presence and expertise in a degree that is awarded through the organizing entity (Eaton, 2001). Non-degree consortia, such as the one offered by the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB),[11] allow students to select from thousands of courses offered by hundreds of participating institutions in the 16 member states of the SREB (SREB, 2010).

Corporate universities are private instructional and training enterprises maintained by a corporation for its employees. They can be both site-based (such as McDonald's Hamburger University in Oak Brook, Illinois), electronic, or even blended in nature, such as the higher education program announced in 2010 by Walmart. In partnership with American Public University (APU), employees at Walmart and Sam's Club stores around

[10] ACE is the major coordinating organization for all the nation's higher education institutions. Founded in 1918, it is the only higher education organization that represents the interests of institutions of all types of U.S. accredited, degree-granting institutions.

[11] Founded by the region's governors and legislators in 1948, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that works with 16 member states to improve K-12 and higher education.

the country can earn college degrees through a combination of Walmart job learning and experience, coupled with online courses offered by APU (APU, 2010).

Eaton writes that the academic issues posed by distance learning are challenging the traditional academic work of colleges and universities and creating interesting conundrums for accrediting agencies. "An 'institution' no longer needs to be anchored in physical space and time; it can exist anywhere, any time. . . . Electronic access encourages and supports more mobile student behavior, allowing students to attend more than one institution either serially or simultaneously, online or onsite" (Eaton, 2001, p. 10). As a result, the eight accrediting commissions adopted a common platform for review of distance learning (CHEA, 2001).[12]

An investment in distributed learning, whatever the chosen model, is a significant one for an institution. According to the ACE, institutional motivations driving a commitment to distributed learning typically fall into one of four broad categories: 1) to expand access; 2) to alleviate capacity constraints; 3) to generate revenue; and 4) to serve as a catalyst for institutional transformation in order to be more nimble in meeting the demands of the marketplace (Oblinger et al., 2001). All four of these motivations also apply to the establishment of branch campuses. In addition, of the top 10 higher education state policy issues cited by the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU, 2010), at least three affect the establishment of branch campuses: 1) states' fiscal crises; 2)

[12] The Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) serves as a national advocate for self-regulation of academic quality through accreditation. The organization was established in 1996-97 and represents more than 3,000 degree-granting colleges and universities.

President Barack Obama's graduation initiative for the U.S. to lead the world again in production of college graduates by 2020;[13] and 3) enrollment capacity.

External and Internal Dynamics

Money

Market demands play an increasingly important role in American higher education. Weisbrod, Ballou and Asch (2008) explain that the fundamental reason is quite simple: "Every school does two things: it raises revenue and it spends it. It spends money to pursue its mission and it raises revenue to finance those expenditures" (p. 58). In recent years, however, revenues for state schools have been harder to come by. Mandated program costs, such as K-12 and Medicaid, can consume as much as 40-50 percent of state expenditures, while higher education—often the largest discretionary item in a state's budget—becomes the balancing wheel, suffering severe cuts in economic downturns. "Because governors and state legislatures recognize that higher education has a revenue source (tuition and fees) in contrast to most other governmental services, higher education tends to be the 'budget balancer'" (McGuinness, 2005, p. 202). According to Gold (1990), general state fiscal conditions are the most important determinant of state funding for higher education (as quoted in Weerts & Ronca, 2006, p. 938). McGuinness concurs, likening the ups and downs of state funding in good times and recessions to a "rollercoaster pattern" (2005, p. 201).

[13] In July 2009, President Obama announced the American Graduation Initiative, an ambitious 10-year program designed to increase the number of college graduates by 5 million and return the United States to the top of the international graduation rankings. The program concentrates federal investment in access programs at community colleges. (White House Press Secretary, 2009)

Adding fuel to the fire is the fact that a growing segment of policymakers no longer regards higher education primarily as a public good that benefits the whole of society but rather as a private good that primarily accrues to the benefit of the individual earning the degree. As such, their view is that the burden for payment should rest more heavily on the student.[14] However, this also raises the ire of the public.

An affordability "squeeze play" results. A 2010 national public opinion poll reveals that 55 percent of the respondents think higher education is absolutely necessary for success, up from 31 percent just a decade ago; however, 69 percent believe that there are many qualified people who do not have access to higher education, up from 47 percent in 2000 (Public Agenda & NCPPHE, 2010). With such conflicting trend lines, higher education is challenged to respond to President Obama's initiative and the many reports calling for dramatic increases in college matriculation or even "college for all" (Lumina Foundation, 2009; Carnevale, 2008). The biannual "Measuring Up" reports (NCPPHE, 2008) provide states with report cards to help improve delivery of higher education in such areas as preparation, participation, affordability, completion, benefits, and learning. However, public opinion data also show that while citizens are more concerned than ever about assuring access to higher education, which they see as essential in the modern economy, they are resistant to paying much more for it either in tuition or taxes. Their responses indicate that they want to see institutions find ways to be more efficient (Zumeta, 1998, p. 7).

[14] McMahon (2009) argues that such a perspective is based on poor information about the value of the non-market and social benefits of higher education. In *Higher Learning, Greater Good* (Johns Hopkins University Press), the education economist places a measurable value on the non-monetary benefits of higher education, such as improved health, reduced crime rates, and promotion of democracy. He advocates for greater public investment.

State support for higher education has dropped dramatically in recent years, with state dollars per student in public education lower in 2010 ($6,451 per FTE in constant dollars) than in any year since 1980 (SHEEO, 2010, p. 19). While total state dollars have increased, relative state dollars have decreased, falling from an average of 45 percent in 1980-81 to 35 percent by 2000-01 (Toutkoushian, 2009). State appropriations generally have not kept pace with expenditures in higher education. “States have become minority partners in the colleges and universities that typically bear their names” (Zusman, 2005, pp. 116-117). The reduction in state funding has prompted many institutions to declare that the time-honored social contract between higher education and the general public is broken. University of California President Mark Yudof (formerly chancellor of the Texas University System) shares the frustration of many when he explains the strain on the relationship:

> State governments and public research universities developed an extraordinary compact. In return for financial support from taxpayers, universities agreed to keep tuition low and provide access for students from a broad range of economic backgrounds, train graduate and professional students, promote arts and culture, help solve problems in the community, and perform groundbreaking research. Yet over the past 25 years, that agreement has withered, leaving public research institutions in a purgatory of insufficient resources and declining competitiveness. (Yudof, 2002, as cited in Burke, 2005, p. 14)

According to Altbach (2005), the broken social pact has “significant implications for both higher education and society” (p. 15). In order to ascend from this financial purgatory, universities have become more entrepreneurial, creating new economic

markets such as research patents, corporate partnerships, and licensing of university brands to build revenue (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). In a rapidly advancing process that Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) term "academic capitalism," universities are not so much the victim in this transformation as they are active players, eagerly engaged in the chance to enhance their economic status while being freed of the accountability demands tied into state and federal purse strings. Faculty members who bring in lucrative grant dollars have risen to "star" status, commanding salaries much higher than campus peers in less high-profile disciplines, and academic departments have become revenue centers, striving to increase credit hour production (and concomitant tuition dollars) by enrolling more undergraduates and establishing new programs. "The development of master's degrees is a dramatic break from the past and reflects a significant reorientation at the graduate level to the external employment market and to revenue generation" (p. 191).

Scholars concur (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) that the conjoining of two major federal policy changes spawned this sea change in the stance of higher education: 1) the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1972, which transformed students into consumers by allocating the bulk of financial aid money directly to them rather than to institutions, as had previously been the case; and 2) the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which enabled universities to license the intellectual property of their faculty members. "In the new economy, knowledge is a critical raw material to be mined and extracted from any unprotected site: patented, copyrighted, trademarked, or held as a trade secret; then sold in the marketplace for a profit" (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, p. 4).

While the emergence of a knowledge economy has stimulated exiting new entrepreneurial opportunities for higher education, it has exacted a price. In order to excel in the marketplace and attract the best faculty and students, universities must successfully compete in a battle for prestige. Numerous rankings, such as the annual assessment of undergraduate and graduate programs by *U.S. News & World Report*, purport to assist students in selecting the school that is right for them.[15] The result of this intense competition has launched a veritable "arms race" in campus life amenities such as elaborate recreational facilities, expansive meal plan options, and magnificent residence halls (Toma, 2009; Weisbrod et al., 2008). Some scholars worry that universities are selling their souls in Faustian attempts to climb the prestige ladder, investing millions in cosmetic changes to amenities or finding ways to game the student selectivity numbers while doing little to improve the quality of the educational program.[16] Rather than daring to adhere to Porter's (1996) definition of strategy—performing unique activities and maintaining that difference—they succumb to a pack mentality in an isomorphic pursuit to emulate the practices of those at the top of the rankings. Toma (2009) finds it ironic that, despite the diversity of institution types in American higher education, as well as the level of autonomy and resources afforded to them, those that are even remotely similar

[15] Each year *U.S. News & World Report* ranks American colleges and universities for the quality of the overall learning experience at the undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as for specific programs (e.g., law, business, etc.). *U.S. News* conducts similar assessments of hospitals, high schools, vacations, and even cars and trucks. In the case of higher education, an institution's ranking is determined by its collective scores on seven weighted criteria: peer assessments (22.5%); retention (20% in institutions deemed as national institutions or liberal arts colleges and 25% in master's or baccalaureate colleges); faculty resources (20%); student selectivity (15%); financial resources (10%); graduation rate performance (7.5% – only considered for national universities and liberal arts colleges); and alumni giving rate (5%). To arrive at a school's rank, *U.S. News* calculates the sum of the weighted scores, with the highest score being 100. (*U.S. News*, 2011)

[16] Goethe's *Faust* is widely regarded as one the greatest works of German literature. In the story, Dr. Faust, a righteous man who is obsessed with the quest for knowledge, sells his soul to the devil (Mephistopheles) in exchange for infinite knowledge and pleasure on earth. It is a deal sealed in blood that Faust soon regrets (von Goethe, 2001).

seem to converge on a common aspiration: “They are eerily similar in vision, in fact, seemingly obsessed with ‘moving to the next level’” (p. 1). However, many barriers preclude ascent into the upper echelons—primarily monetary ones. The wealthy schools have cornered the market.

Kirp (2003) warns that “market talk is increasingly heard, and it’s more than talk—from the periphery, money moves close to the core; from a means, making money has become an end” (as quoted in Newman, Couturier & Scurry, 2004, p. 35). Birnbaum and Eckel (2005) fear a similar encroachment:

> Our narratives once told of education for democracy, for social justice, for the whole person, for the perpetuation of civilization. That is what people came to believe colleges and universities did, and that is why we enjoyed such support and admiration. Our narratives now increasingly talk about being engines of the economy” (p. 352).

Despite financial motivations, however, public schools will undertake some activities that might actually lose money because they are considered essential to the mission of the institution—e.g., basic scientific research, outreach programs, etc. This practice marks a fundamental difference between public higher education and for-profit institutions, whose sole purpose (as indicated by their taxonomy) is to make money. Such programs, which run counter to the ideals of the marketplace and would not even be considered in those terms, are often cross-subsidized by other revenue-generating enterprises, such as continuing education programs, distance learning, or branch campus programs. Bok (2003) argues that such peripheral ventures are revenue goods, generating profits that can support “those precious forms of teaching and research that cannot be

supported by the marketplace alone" (p. 97). Weisbrod et al. (2008) agree that "the pursuit of profit is never far below the surface" (p. 174). They call public institutions of higher education "two-good firms" that must choose which methods to use for raising money (revenue goods) and which activities should benefit from the profits (mission goods). "Revenue-raising potential depends on the school's goals, that is, how the revenue would be spent, and those goals, or at least how they are pursued, depend on the revenue consequences of alternative policies" (p. 59).

Access

Coupled with the necessity for research universities to generate other sources of revenue is the responsibility to increase access to education for state citizens, although Bok (2003) contends that the motivation now is more entrepreneurial than altruistic. The origins of this commitment to service—a notion that Scott (2006) notes is "uniquely American"—date back to 1862, when President Abraham Lincoln signed the original Morrill Land Grant Act into law. This bill, which appropriated the proceeds of federal land sales in the west to support the establishment of schools dedicated to technical education in the agricultural and industrial sciences, helped to democratize higher education and expand access. A second Morrill Act, passed in 1890, further extended land-grant status to a select group of African-American agricultural and mechanical colleges. In exchange for the gift of federal monies, states were expected to extend the scope of their public universities by sharing the knowledge produced by their faculty members with state constituents, helping to improve the quality of life and productivity of their citizens (Thelin, 2004). In his inaugural address in 1904, University of Wisconsin

President Charles Van Hise articulated the rationale that would ultimately shape American higher education and become known as “the Wisconsin Idea”:

> Be the choice of the sons and daughters of the state, language, literature, history, political economy, pure science, agriculture, engineering, architecture, sculpture, painting or music, they should find at the state university ample opportunity for the pursuit of the chosen subject. . . . Nothing short of such opportunity is just, for each has an equal right to find at the state university the advanced intellectual life adapted to his need. Any narrower view is indefensible. (as quoted in Grubb & Lazerson, 2005, p. 3)

In 2009, in anticipation of the sesquicentennial of the anniversary of the Morrill Act, Michigan State University President Lou Anna K. Simon called upon leaders of the nation’s best public universities to reaffirm their commitment and embrace the act’s expansion in the 21st century as the World Grant Ideal. She explained that the issues confronting the United States as it entered the second decade of the 21st century paralleled those that led to the establishment of the first Morrill Act and that knowledge and information, particularly in science and technology, were growing at an unprecedented rate. “In a world as interrelated and complex as ours, it is increasingly difficult to imagine any significant challenge in the context of a single location; nothing occurs in a vacuum” (Simon, 2009, p. 4). Further, she added: “The more widely educated the population, the more widely dispersed are opportunity and access to the benefits of prosperity” (p. 9).

Opportunity is at the heart of the social contract America has made with its citizens. For this to be meaningful, many scholars feel that a greater share of the

population—particularly students from low-income families and students of color—need to enter and successfully exit the doors of America's colleges and universities (Newman et al., 2004, p. 154). Some systems are projecting astronomical growth in the number of high school graduates entering the college pipeline within the next decade, with the number expected to grow by more than 20 percent in 16 states and by more than 10 percent in 15 others (Zumeta, 2010). Demand is far outstripping capacity—fiscally and physically. Many institutions find themselves constrained by the state of their infrastructure or by a lack of sufficient capital funding to expand campus facilities. Their current facilities are pushed to the limit. "As public support diminished, public demands escalated, confirming that taxpayer support and public demands are seldom in sync" (Burke, 2005, p. 9), an assessment echoed by McGuinness (2005).

Branding

Concurrent with pressure to diversify and increase revenue while extending the institution's access and service mission is the lure of opportunities to build prestige and reputation. Holt (2002) writes that a brand culture is like a heuristic; once recognized and firmly established, it can cause instant association in the minds of consumers. This can be a powerful advantage in the marketplace. For example, a university with a sterling reputation that is in high demand for enrollment can leverage its brand by opening a branch campus and affixing its name to the new institution. The Oregon University System affirmed the importance of a branded identity in the findings of a 2001 report that it conducted on the best means of expanding higher education access in central Oregon. The branch campus model was selected due to its cost-effectiveness, relative ease of

implementation, and marketing advantage from name recognition (Oregon University System, 2001).

However, there is inherent risk in capitalizing on the brand, whether it is within the boundaries of the institution's own state or a more ambitious undertaking overseas. As the recent experience of Michigan State University in its failed attempt to establish a Middle Eastern branch illustrates, it is not a decision to be taken lightly.[17] A high degree of due diligence is required:

> The institution must assess the environment in which it may enter, understand the extensive range of accreditation issues, and be able to answer a series of strategic and operational questions. These questions involve the alignment of such an initiative with the strategic priorities of the institution, the full range of academic issues associated with establishing a cross-border program, and the financial and administrative implications of pursuing such a strategy. (Stack, 2008, p. 82)

Altbach (2010), also in the context of examining international branch campuses, observes that there is a great deal of ambiguity about their establishment and that universities in general have not considered the long-term implications of creating them.

> Establishing a real branch campus that provides an education the same as at the home institution is not an initially easy task, and it is much more difficult as time goes on. . . . Branch campuses may be the 'flavor of the month,' but the pitfalls,

[17] In July 2010, Michigan State abandoned its two-year effort to establish a branch campus in Dubai. The "noble experiment," as President Lou Anna K. Simon referred to MSU Dubai in an interview in *The Chronicle of Higher Education,* yielded just 85 students instead of the 400 that had been anticipated. Simon attributed the low enrollment to factors that were "out of our control": a lack of qualified students, a crowded higher education market, and the "economic tsunami" that hit Dubai particularly hard. Other Dubai competitors in the article, whose enrollment figures were much higher, contended that Michigan State made crucial strategic errors, including pricing the degrees too high and not giving the enterprise enough time to stand on its own. (Mills, July 19, 2010)

> with resulting damage to academic reputations, financial losses, and of course poor service to students, loom as significant prospects. (2010, p. 3)

In an analysis of the most pressing risk management issues facing colleges and universities on the student affairs front, Abraham (2010) pinpoints program restructuring in the top five. Poorly planned or executed forays into extended campuses that culminate in program cancellation or campus closures could lead to costly lawsuits and damaging public relations. Weisbrod et al. (2008) add to this refrain:

> Reputations, like buildings and machinery, deteriorate over time in the absence of continued investment in faculty, facilities, information technology, and library resources. If a university does not devote resources to sustain its reputation, it will ultimately diminish over time as will the capacity to earn profits from programs—such as extension schools or summer programs—that were profitable precisely *because* of the school's reputation. (p. 192)

Governance

There is also danger in establishing too much, too fast. Institutional growth must be managed, and this responsibility falls within the purview of the state governing or coordinating body and state higher education executive officer (SHEEO). The state has a fundamental role to control several key factors, including the roles, missions, and performance of its public institutions (Newman et al., 2004; Berdahl, 1971). Glenny (1970) contends that societal interests should trump institutional self-interests and that the best way to accomplish this is through statewide coordination. The institution must have

the discipline to avoid mission creep and to eliminate activities that are marginal (Newman et al., 2004).

Clark's (1983) "accountability triangle" sheds light on how systems govern conflict in higher education. Clark created the triangle to explain how the three forces of state control, academic oligarchy, and market model dominate coordination of higher education systems in a comparative international context (as cited in Burke, 2005, p. 21).[18] Burke (2005) advances the theory by substituting state priorities, academic concerns, and market forces to create an accountability triangle for higher education in the United States.

> State priorities can constitute what the citizens of a state need most from higher education, such as better schoolteachers, an educated workforce, and an educated citizenry. . . . Academic concerns can encourage free inquiry and discussion of ideas, beliefs, and institutions. . . . Market forces can mean meeting the real needs of citizens and society for programs and services or responding to the dominant economic interest in a state or to commercial schemes or consumer fads. (p. 22)

Often these three corners of the accountability triangle are in conflict, Burke says, and the challenge for state-level policymakers is to strike a balance that serves all three without being subservient to any one particular constituency.

[18] However, it bears noting that Clark's model has been disparaged by other scholars in recent years (Slaughter and Cantwell, 2011) who find that it is increasingly difficult to theorize that the three poles in the accountability triangle remain separate and distinct. They view the forces as commingled, rather than isolated. Slaughter and Cantwell explain that Clark's assumption of the entrepreneurial university, based on his theory of the accountability triangle, "assumes universities will be able to incorporate entrepreneurial activity and energy without harming academic values and faculty voice, if not governance" (p. 6). However, they observe that universities are increasingly distancing themselves from the state and engaging in market-like activities, such as the operation of satellite entities, as peripheral activities move to the core.

Boosterism

One of the prime ways for a public institution to demonstrate its value to society is to prove its worth to the community in economic terms. Since the genesis of the American system of higher education with the founding of Harvard University by the Massachusetts Bay colonists in 1636, colleges and universities have endeavored to be responsive to the needs of the communities that they serve. For example, the Puritan colonists abhorred the idea of an illiterate ministry, so they responded to the market by establishing a denominationally-based school focused on morals and the European model of classical education (Geiger, 1992; Thelin, 2004; Vine, 1976). During the American Revolution, curriculum continued to focus on the classics but was imbued with a sense of republicanism, as the colonial leaders demanded that their institutions prepare the sons of the elite to assume leadership roles in society (Geiger, 1992; Thelin, 2004; Vine, 1976). The early 1800s ushered in the pioneer spirit and a hunger for expansion. Land was cheap and readily available, and hundreds of "booster colleges" sprung up across the frontier (Boorstin, 1965; Geiger, 1992; Thelin, 2004). They were regarded as essential components of a modern city, along with a railroad and a hotel. In isomorphic form, these colleges were established in towns whose names reflected enlightenment: Athens, Oxford, Paris, etc. Their charters had regal flourishes, their mottoes invoked lofty aspirations, their buildings featured Gothic architecture, and their very presence bespoke the ambition of the community.

Similar lofty expectations can be attached to branch campuses. Communities crave expanded access for their sons and daughters and covet the economic development that an extended campus will bring, particularly if it is a prestigious branch of a flagship

or research institution with a strong brand. Institutions, on the other hand, eagerly anticipate the opportunity to plant a foothold in new territory, expanding their base of support and generating new sources of tuition revenue. Toma (2009) notes universities' increasing reliance on "revenues generated at their more agile peripheries," such as academic programs at satellite sites, virtual platforms or programs tailored to students in professional fields (p. 9). Weerts and Ronca (2006) contend that an institution's stewardship of public education goals (i.e., its "buy-in" to the state's plan) might correlate to how well it is supported by the legislature.

Politics

A handful of dissertations in the 1990s touched on the role of political support at the local and state levels in the organization of branch campuses (deGive, 1995; Doherty, 1991; Gibson-Benninger, 1998; McCullaugh, 1992; Morris, 1997). Most recently Brown (2010) focused on the establishment of a branch campus of Gainesville State College, another institution in the University System of Georgia, in Watkinsville, near the main campus of the University of Georgia. However, because the branch was, at the time, an extension of a two-year, open access institution,[19] the external and internal dynamics were markedly different from that of the leading research institution in my study.

deGive's research, particularly a study of the formation of the branch campus system in the state of Washington in the 1980s (deGive & Olswang, 1999), demonstrates some interesting parallels to the research questions addressed in this dissertation. In that study, de Give and Olswang posed three major questions: 1) Who were the major actors involved and what were their resources or potential sources of influence? 2) What

[19] In 2005, Gainesville State College transitioned to a four-year institution. It retains its access mission.

strategies did the primary actors deploy to impact the branch campus decision outcome? and 3) What effect did actor influence efforts have on decision-making?

In the mid-1980s, the state of Washington was categorized as having "two Washingtons"—one reliant on agriculture and the other more urban in nature. The demographics of the state were changing, with an influx of minorities to the cities and a growing number of impoverished single-parent households. Access to higher education for these groups was traditionally low. Up to this point, Washington's system had struggled with fragmentation. The Higher Education Council (HEC) Board, formed in 1985, was charged with creating a master plan for the system that would serve "the interests of the population, not the interests of the institution" (de Give & Olswang, 1999, p. 293). The HEC Board assumed that access for all state residents who sought it was a public good, providing educational opportunities that would lead to a more vibrant economy and attract further industry to the state.

Washington State enthusiastically entered the discussion, sensing that the ability to extend its influence beyond the rural eastern part of the state and into the urban area of Puget Sound would result in enhanced legislative support and greater political influence. Administrators set to work behind the scenes, building coalitions of support among the community leaders where the proposed campuses would be based in hopes of successfully lobbying state legislators to approve the plan for expansion of the system. Washington State also had to convince its counterpart, the University of Washington, to participate. Until the summer of 1987, Washington had viewed branch campuses as a distraction from its main mission. However, de Give and Olswang explain that once University of Washington administrators saw the vested interest that the urban areas had

in campus development, they had no choice but to join forces with the HEC Board, WSU, and booster groups in favor of the branch campus plan (p. 295).

de Give and Olswang found that the actions of participants occurred in three functional stages in which policy inputs or demands were converted into policy outputs or decisions:

> First, at the agenda-setting stage, policy wants were transformed into demands through the articulation of interests and the positioning of issues or bundles of demands (Easton, 1979) on the public policy agenda. Second, during alternative formation, the conversion process within the political system was activated; policy proposals gained support through the dissemination of diverse solutions by competing actors. Decision enactment, the final stage in the policy conversion process, denoted the selection of policy choice through formalized legislative action. (p. 289)

They concluded that: “Coalitions of special interests and their audiences were ultimately combined with legislative champions and branch campus delegations to propel the branch campus notion through the legislative process and into political mandate” (p. 307).

These developments are consistent with the viewpoint of the university from a political frame. In fact, Birnbaum (1991) posits that colleges and universities are governed through the coordination of conflict. Pfeffer (1981) explains that when preferences conflict, the interests, subunits or individuals wielding the most power will reap the greatest rewards. McGuinness (2005) explains that regional stresses within a state—in terms of economic, political and cultural disparities—can amplify and play out on a state stage through the postsecondary education system:

> A common scenario begins with pressure from a growing urban area to have accessible graduate and professional programs. Subsequent local campaigns and state lobbying efforts to expand these initiatives from a few courses to full-scale programs and then new campuses lead to opposition from existing universities and other regions. The same scenario often plays out when isolated rural areas struggle to gain access to programs for place-bound adults. Local and regional end runs to the governor or legislature to get special attention either to advance or block such initiatives usually spark political struggles that eventually lead to restructuring proposals. (p. 215)

McGuinness (2005) adds that similar conflict can occur when two institutions within the same geographic region feud over which institutions have the right to offer coveted high-cost graduate and professional programs.

Such a strong confluence of external pressures is not uncommon in higher education. Sabatier's (1998) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) attempts to capture the organic nature of policymaking by focusing on the policy actors who form coalitions because they share a "set of normative and causal beliefs and engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time" (p. 103). Shakespeare (2008) applies Sabatier's framework to analyze the coalition alignment that occurred in New York State's consideration of its tuition assistance program and the information sources that each coalition used to promote its side of the case in the budgeting process.

Charged with balancing the dual demands of institutional autonomy and statewide demands for accountability, it is no surprise that politically-charged situations often confront the governing (or coordinating) board and SHEEO. At the institutional level,

presidents also must know how to navigate political waters in order to survive. They must be political players and entrepreneurs, forming coalitions, exploiting markets that offer necessary resources for their institutions and proposing compromises to achieve "peace with progress" (Birnbaum & Eckel, 2005, p. 343). To this point, Baldridge, Curtis, Ecker and Riley (1977) add:

> Establishing the right of authority over a decision is a political question, subject to conflict, power manipulation, and struggles between interest groups. Thus the political model always asks tough questions: Who has the right to make the decision? What are the conflict-ridden processes by which the decision was located at this point rather than at another? The crucial point is that often the issue of *who* makes the decision has already limited, structured, and preformed *how* it will be made. (p. 16)

Cohen and March (1986) contend that decision-making on a college or university campus occurs in a state of chaos. In this "organized anarchy," participants are fluid and apathetic, caring only about the issues that affect them personally and retaining little institutional memory; the total system has high inertia, and anything that requires a coordinated, concerted effort is not likely to be initiated; also, the processes of choice are easily subject to overload, with decisions often being made outside the formal power structure. Perhaps the most important component of Cohen and March's organized anarchy is the "garbage can theory," which posits that decisions can easily become a garbage can, filling with other problems along the way. The entire process is fundamentally ambiguous with answers unclear in all areas. Sometimes in the garbage can, however, the problems attach to solutions. Hammond (2004) goes a step further,

applying the simile that running an organized anarchy with so many independent actors is akin to “herding cats.”

But—is this seeming lack of control necessarily counterproductive? According to Weick (1976), the chaotic nature of the organized anarchy leads to greater flexibility and enhanced ability to adapt. As Hearn and McLendon (forthcoming) explain of Baldridge’s interest-articulation model, it “emphasized the importance of factions, interests, coalitional activities and bargaining in shaping institutional governance processes and outcomes” (p. 6). Further, conflict was regarded as a basic ingredient in fermenting healthy organizational change.

In an examination of federal policymaking, Kingdon (1984) advances the garbage can framework to become the “revised garbage can” model or “multiple streams” framework. McLendon (2003) conducts variations on this theme when he revises and expands the theory to states that have experimented with greater flexibility and autonomy from state control. He explains of the Kingdon model:

> The Revised Garbage Can model proffers a dynamic set of processes whereby problems, ideas, and politics combine with choice opportunities to elevate issues to prominence. It holds that three separate “streams”—a stream each of problems, policies (ideas or solutions), and politics—flow through the national government largely independent of one another. An issue attracts the attention of policymakers only when the separate streams conjoin with a choice opportunity. Separate streams may become coupled when a “window of opportunity” opens, briefly allowing “policy entrepreneurs” to push attention to their pet problems or to push pet solutions. Thus, what gets onto the agenda is a function of the contents

> floating in the metaphorical garbage can at the moment in time a policy entrepreneur successfully couples the separate streams of activity. (p. 487)

This "revised garbage can" or "multiple streams theory" relies on timing and, as Kingdon (1984) concludes, politics exerts the most influence on the outcome. Ness (2010) notes in a study that applies Kingdon's theory to eligibility for state merit aid programs that an entrepreneur must be savvy, strategic and quick to seize upon the "serendipitous and fleeting" opportunity. "The policy window represents an ephemeral opening during which the 'black box' influence of political manipulation and deal-brokering along with the consideration of issue-specific information are weighed and deliberated until ultimately reaching a final policy decision" (p. 54).

In addition to further expanding upon Kingdon's multiple streams theory, Ness discusses the explanatory power of yet another potential framework: punctuated equilibrium. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) first developed the theory of punctuated equilibrium when they observed that policy in the United States experiences long periods of stability punctuated by momentary departures. The theory emanates from evolutionary fossil theory, because scientists have discovered that the fossil record works much the same way: long periods of constancy punctuated by interruptions. In Ness's study, he observes that the swift transition from need-based financial aid to merit-based financial aid in 14 states over the last decade may mark a break (or punctuation) in the policy record. Particularly important to this framework is the creation of new venues in which policy entrepreneurs can become involved in the process.

Faculty Culture

Whichever of the four motivational factors cited by Oblinger in the ACE report (2001) prompts an institution to establish a branch campus (access, alleviation of capacity constraints, revenue generation, or transformation to meet the needs of the market) and whatever political processes come into play in building coalitions and enacting policy, even more challenges await once the ultimate decision is made to expand. As an example, consider the impact of organizational culture. Clark (1972) coined the term "organizational saga" when describing the history, heroes, rituals, custom, ceremony, and symbols that endow an institution with a special sense of place. The indoctrination into this heritage is a rite of passage, imbuing the initiate with a sense of belonging and collective pride. "[T]he story helps rationalize for the individual his commitment of time and energy for years, perhaps for a lifetime, to a particular enterprise" (p. 179). Similarly, Chapman (2006) writes of the importance of the campus as place: "the sum of the people, experiences, activities, events, and memories that come alive within and because of the exceptional arrangement that we call the campus" (p. xxiii).

However, when the campus extends past its home base, the ability to connect with a unified sense of heritage and purpose becomes more challenging. As Mintzberg (1979) observes: "The problem of maintaining loyalty to the organization becomes magnified, since the professionals do their autonomous work in remote locations, far from the administrative structure" (p. 369). Mintzberg uses the example of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, spy organizations, and even forest ranger services. The employees are indoctrinated strongly before they are sent to their extended locations; then, they are rotated frequently in their jobs "to ensure that their loyalty remains with the organization and does not shift to the geographical area they serve" (p. 370).

Such is the danger when universities extend at their periphery, warns Kerr (1994) in his article on the multiversity: "When 'the borders of the campus are the boundaries of our state,' the lines dividing what is internal from what is external become quite blurred; taking the campus to the state brings the state to the campus" (p. 20). In other words, expanding the outreach of the institution empowers many more stakeholders who suddenly have a vested interest in its activities. The aforementioned organized anarchy described by Cohen and March (1986)—replete with its vexing ambiguities over purpose, power, experience, and success—becomes even more complex and difficult to manage. The president is doomed to "live within a normative context that presumes purpose and within an organizational context that denies it" (Cohen & March, 1986, p. 197). Birnbaum (1989) calls the prospect of leadership in higher education "responsibility without authority." It is not too much of a stretch to apply Birnbaum's assessment to the extended campuses: "As the locus of influence moves from the campus to the state, public sector presidents may find themselves becoming more like middle managers in public agencies than campus leaders" (p. 38). Baldridge et al. (1977) also express concern about the creeping influence of external actors to the autonomy of a different group—the faculty:

> . . . when strong external pressure is applied to colleges and universities, the operating autonomy of the academic professionals is seriously reduced. The faculty and administrators lose some control over the curriculum, the goals, and the daily operation of the institution. Under these circumstances, the academic professionals are frequently reduced to the role of hired employees doing the bidding of bureaucratic managers. (p. 6)

In a study of faculty life and culture at a small, rural two-year branch campus of a state university, Wolfe and Strange (2003) found evidence of a sense of professional isolation among faculty that brings a degree of autonomy that some find liberating, while others lament that it exacts a professional toll. Engagement in the community was a high priority for the branch campus faculty, and those interviewed in the study expressed their satisfaction in reaching out to provide an education to many first-generation students who might not otherwise have access to the opportunity. Yet at the same time, due to the smaller size of their academic departments, some missed the camaraderie of colleagues in their discipline. Others cited the sting of the "ivory tower" versus "vo-tech" mentality and resented the elitist attitude held by some that those serving appointments at the branch campus were inferior to the faculty members at the main campus. Wolfe and Strange believe that the competing missions of the branch campus are troublesome:

> To serve both a community-based constituency and to comply with the standards of a comprehensive, doctoral-granting university may be more than can be met, and perhaps is ill advised in the first place. The strengths of one seem to detract from the strengths of the other, ultimately risking the status of those most committed to the campus. (p. 362)

Several theories about faculty engagement apply in this circumstance. First, as Cohen and March (1986) observe when discussing the organized anarchy, most issues have low salience; in other words, a great deal of apathy exists among faculty members until an issue involves them personally. Clark (1963) further notes the segmentation of the faculty, leading to the clustering of experts who identify with their own disciplines rather than the campus community as a whole. In terms of governance, Clark states that a

number of “actives” take part, but that many others care little about campus life and prefer to focus on their own scholarship. Gouldner (1957, as cited in Birnbaum, 1991) observes this same phenomenon, referring to the faculty groups as “locals” and “cosmopolitans.” Clark (1987) further expounds upon the dilemma of faculty engagement:

> The expansion of nominal universities, state colleges, and especially community colleges during the last quarter-century has notably put the majority of academics in locales far from the fellowships of the old-time colleges and the special worlds of the top private universities. Organizationally, those academics may have a champagne taste, but what they get is bottled beer. (as cited in Wolfe & Strange, 2003, pp. 260-261)

Strategy

What should institutions consider when determining whether to establish a branch campus in order to ensure that they have a realistic view of all the issues, an understanding of the political forces at work, and that they do not have champagne tastes on a beer budget? An exploration of the strategy literature is instructive on this issue. Sahlman (1996) advises that before entering any entrepreneurial venture, potential investors should carefully examine a business plan to make certain that four dynamic elements are coming together in a well integrated “fit”:

- The people – to what degree do the people have the right experience, skills and attitudes, given the nature of the opportunity, the context, and the deals struck?

- The opportunity – To what degree does the opportunity make sense, given the people involved, the context, and the deals struck? Sahlman says two questions are critical: 1) Is the total market for the venture's product or service large and/or rapidly growing? and 2) Is the industry one that is now or can become structurally attractive?
- The external context – To what degree is the context favorable for the venture, given the people involved, the nature of the opportunity, and the deals struck?
- The deal – To what degree do the deals involved in the venture make sense, given the people involved, the nature of the opportunity, and the context?

These four components must be well integrated, working in concert much like an effective sports team. "Excellence in any single dimension is not sufficient: the proper perspective from which to make an evaluation takes into account all of the elements simultaneously" (p. 296). If the venture fails to pass muster in any one area and a good fit is not obtained, then Sahlman says the venture should be scrapped.

Sahlman contends that the most critical section of a business plan is the resume section: Are the people selected to lead the initiative experienced and prepared to do so? "I'd rather back an 'A' team with a 'B' idea than a 'B' team with an 'A' idea" (p. 299). Collins (2001) concurs with this assessment, stressing the importance of first getting "the right people on the bus," then figuring out where to drive it. Collins also emphasizes simplicity, using the metaphor of the hedgehog to explain his rationale. When a hedgehog is being attacked, it has one and only one response: to roll up into a ball with its quills pointing out. The wily fox has many different responses but not a single one can crack the hedgehog's sole defense mechanism: Roll up and stay there. Collins encourages

businesses (or other enterprises) to identify their hedgehog concept—what they can be the best in the world at—and then, to borrow another metaphor, to let it become a flywheel, building positive momentum in order to propel the institution from good to great.

Porter (1987) states that good corporate strategy will specify the conditions under which diversification will truly create shareholder value. Extending these conditions to the question of whether to establish a branch campus, decision makers must ensure that public stakeholders (i.e., taxpayers) derive benefit when three tests are met:
1) attractiveness – the venture is structurally attractive; 2) cost-of-entry will not capitalize all future profits; and 3) better-off test—either the new unit or the corporation (in this case, the extended campus or the university, respectively) must gain competitive advantage (p. 182).

Chaffee (1987) counsels careful deliberation when contemplating such a venture: "Leaders need thoughtful assistance in deciding how to focus and communicate their mission (interpretive), how far to let the mission stray from its historical definition in order to respond to new environments (adaptive), and how to organize the institution in order to implement the mission (linear)" (p. 27). Without such reflection, an institution might find itself chasing foxes (a distraction) rather than feeding the hedgehog (the core missions that make an institution great) (Collins, 2001).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this research is to examine the internal and external motivations that compel a public research institution to establish an instructional campus in an extended location and to further examine why and how the mission of that campus evolves over time. I employed qualitative research methods, commonly referred to as interpretive or inductive research, to address the research questions (Stake, 2010; Merriam, 2009). In qualitative research, understanding is gained as concepts and theories are developed (Toma, 2011). Merriam (2009) and Stake (2010) state that one of the most effective means of exploring a question of contemporary concern is through the case study method. Yin (2003) concurs, noting "the case study relies on many of the same techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian's repertoire: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons involved in the events" (p. 11). The research design for the case study essentially served as the blueprint for my study—a map of sorts to guide me from beginning to end.

While some scholars consider quantitative research to be more objective because of its carefully articulated steps to test a hypothesis and the ability to replicate results to prove external validity, it is not the preferred method in this scenario. A quantitative method, such as a random survey, will not examine the sorts of questions posed in this study. In essence, the quantitative method is most appropriate to explore questions of what, whereas the qualitative method allows the researcher to question why and how.

"Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world" (Merriam, 2009, p. 13).

A primary benefit of the case study method is that it delimits the research questions, providing "an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such as a program, an institution, a person, a process, or a social unit" (Merriam, 2009, p. x). I employed the principle of purposeful sampling (Merriam, 2009) to narrow my focus to the branch campus experience of one of the primary public research institutions in the state of Georgia—the University of Georgia (UGA). While UGA has several extended campuses, I further focused on one specific site: its Gwinnett campus (a suburb of metro Atlanta), in part because its other campuses are underdeveloped by comparison. The University of Georgia entered the undergraduate market in Gwinnett approximately a decade ago and within only a few years, reverted to its original (and longstanding) mission to provide graduate, professional, and continuing education to the local community. A new four-year institution, Georgia Gwinnett College, was established to handle the demand for undergraduate education. The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, the governing body for the state's 35 public institutions, ultimately authorized these decisions, amidst a confluence of strategic and political pressures. I believe that by conducting a richly detailed review of the University of Georgia's experience in the Gwinnett market, valuable lessons can be extracted.

As is true for any good qualitative study, it is essential to define the research questions which will be addressed. "The research questions should be general enough to

permit exploration but focused enough to delimit the study" (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). If the questions are too general, the researcher will drown in a sea of data, which could result in a simple recitation of facts. A scholar, however, needs to delve deeper and find the linkages between what is emerging through the research. My desire is not simply to describe what transpired at UGA in establishing its branch in Gwinnett County but to analyze the experience carefully and bring forth lessons that can have relevance for decision-making in the future. Three research questions will inform these lessons and reveal factors that academic leaders should consider when contemplating the establishment of an extended campus:

1. What are the motivations for research universities to establish extended instructional campuses?
2. What are the internal and external dynamics that influence decisions regarding whether to establish instructional branch campuses, how to manage them, and where to site them?
3. Why and how do the stated purposes and missions of extended instructional campuses evolve over time?

It is important to state upfront to the reader what this dissertation will *not* examine. This analysis is not an examination of the legitimacy of the decisions made by academic leaders at the University of Georgia nor by central figures at the Board of Regents; i.e., it is not a question of what was right or wrong. Rather, the dissertation focuses primarily on the motivations to establish branch campuses in the first place, how these motivations evolve over time, and what lessons can be extrapolated from the case studies to inform academic policymakers contemplating the establishment of such

branches in the future. Clearly, with such a paucity of scholarly research directly pertaining to the topic of the establishment of branch campuses, there is plenty of ground left to cover. Other issues, however, are fodder for future studies; for the specific purposes of this dissertation, the research questions will remain far more targeted.

In qualitative research, the researcher is the research instrument (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 2009; Stake, 2010; Yin, 2003; Toma, 2011). Therefore, strenuous self-discipline is required to ensure that research adheres to accepted methodology in order to instill trust in the outcomes produced. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest alternative constructs for qualitative research: a parallel set of standards emphasizing credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability to correlate with validity, reliability, generalizability, and objectivity on the quantitative front.

As the primary research instrument, I acknowledge that qualitative research is an iterative process that evolves as it develops. I also understand that "bias is ubiquitous" (Stake, 2010, p. 164) and, as an administrator at the institution being examined, have been particularly diligent in guarding against its influence. I divulge upfront that my positions as an assistant vice president for finance and administration and former assistant to the president at the University of Georgia have afforded me access to high-level administrators as an insider researcher that other external researchers might not have experienced. Stake (2010) and Toma, Hartley, and Montoto (2008) note that it is entirely appropriate to study one's own institution so long as due diligence is exercised to avoid the trap of over-reliance on the researcher's own experience and promotion of the home point of view.

The obvious advantage for an insider researcher is access. As an 18-year employee of UGA, with an office in the central administration building, I know all of the key players involved in the establishment of UGA's branch campus in Gwinnett. These administrators trust me, and they granted interviews and access to documents that might have been more difficult for an outsider to obtain. They also lent their assistance in identifying key colleagues (past and present) with the University System of Georgia with whom I should speak, and their influence helped to open doors to assist me in gaining access to these administrators.

However, while this level of access can be advantageous, it also has the potential to be detrimental. When studying one's own institution, it is feasible that internal influences could arise that would taint the credibility of research, such as pressure to tell the story in a particular way or to talk only with those the administration recommends, without ensuring that all angles of an issue are examined. Administrators at the University of Georgia demonstrated the utmost respect for my independence as a researcher and never interfered with my efforts. To ensure that readers accept the veracity of this statement and appreciate the integrity of my research, I took other measures to guard against bias, as the further explanation of my research methodology will attest.

Erickson (1986) identifies five major types of evidentiary inadequacy in qualitative research: inadequate amounts of evidence; inadequate variety in kinds of evidence to warrant key assertions; faulty interpretative status of evidence; inadequate collection of disconfirming evidence; and inadequate discrepant case analysis. Scholars (Merriam, 2009; Creswell, 2003; Toma, 2011) contend that the best defense to ensure credibility is to have a rich, complex case study. Unlike the quantitative method, which

often focuses on sets of yes/no answers and mutually exclusive categories, enlightenment from a case study results when a more complicated scenario is deeply examined. To borrow a colloquial term, you get to the bottom of the story, rather than merely touching on the surface.

The ability to conduct effective interviews is absolutely essential to the development of a quality case study. Therefore, I abided by Yin's (2003) five basic attributes for strong execution:

1. A good case study investigator should be able to ask good questions—and interpret the answers.
2. An investigator should be a good "listener" and not be trapped by her or his own ideologies or perceptions.
3. An investigator should be adaptive and flexible, so that newly encountered situations can be seen as opportunities, not threats.
4. An investigator must have a firm grasp of the issues being studied.
5. A person should be unbiased by preconceived notions, including those derived from theory. Thus, a person should be sensitive and responsive to contradictory evidence. (p. 69)

To counter Erickson's concerns regarding qualitative research that lacks rigor, I used triangulation; that is, I employed a variety of methods to examine the research questions in order to achieve overlap (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), identifying trends through examination of disparate sources until saturation was achieved (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Stake (2010) refers to this practice, a necessary method to instill confidence in data collection and analysis, as the requirement "to look again and again, several times."

Prior to the onset of interviews, I conducted a thorough examination of archival documents such as newspaper articles from local and state media, various speeches, minutes of Board of Regents meetings, program reviews, reports from special studies, correspondence, and institutional histories. Yin points out that the most important use of such documents is to corroborate and support evidence from other sources (2003, p. 103); i.e., to triangulate. This research, coupled with the intense review of the relevant literature summarized in Chapter 2, instilled me with a deep understanding of the issues, enabling me to ask more informed questions of the interview subjects. A selected list of archival documents—meant to be representative but not exhaustive—appears below in Table 2.

Table 2. Representative Sample of Archival Documents

Newspaper Articles
Diamond, L. (2011, July 25). Costly investment today for 'campus of tomorrow.' *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, p. A1.
Fogaley, R. (1998, August 28). New programs to build on 'world's best.' *Savannah Morning News*. Retrieved November 15, 2010, from http://savannahnow.com/stories/082898/LOCengineering.html
Jones, W. C., & Larrabee, B. (2004, August 26). Gwinnett County satellite campus could become separate state school. Retrieved June 26, 2010, from *Athens Banner-Herald*. http://onlineathens.com/stories/082704/new_20040827030.shtml
Madan, R. (2006, June 5). First students admitted to Georgia Gwinnett College. *Gwinnett Daily Post*.
Salzer, J. (1998, September 9). Regents OK Tech's engineering classes in South Georgia. *Savannah Morning News*. Retrieved November 15, 2010, from http://savannahnow.com/stories/090998/LOCregentsengineering.html
Shearer, L. (2010, November 10). Regents OK UGA engineering programs. *Athens Banner-Herald*. Retrieved November 10, 2010, from http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/111010/uga_733656846.shtml
Williams, D. (2005, October 12). School Dubbed Georgia Gwinnett College. *Gwinnett Daily Post*.
Press Releases
Hannon, S. (2008, May 20). University of Georgia Gwinnett Campus relocates in Lawrenceville. Retrieved June 21, 2010, from www.uga.edu/news/artman/publish/050520_Gwinnett_Move.shtml
Millsaps, J. (1998, August 27). Portch further outlines proposal to address engineering needs. Retrieved July 26, 2010, from http://www.usg.edu/news/release/portch_further_outlines_proposal_to_address_engineering_needs/
Speeches and Presentations
Adams, M. F. (2011, January 20). *The State of the University Address 2011*. Athens.
Clough, G. W. (2001, May 4). *South Georgia College Graduation Remarks*. From SMARTech: President's Speeches and Presentations.
Clough, G. W., & Frost, D. (2002, May 8). *Georgia Tech Regional Engineering Program: Presentation to the Board of Regents Meeting*. From SMARTech: President's Speeches and Presentations.
Watts, R. E., & Pierce, J. R. (2007, June 13). *BOR strategic plan goal 2: Creating capacity*.
Minutes
University Council. (1998, November 19). Minutes. University of Georgia Office of the Registrar.
University System of Georgia Board of Regents (http://www.usg.edu/regents/meetings)

• December 9-10, 1997
• July 7-8, 1998
• September 8-9, 1998
• January 11-12, 2000
• October 12-13, 2004
Program Reviews
Georgia Institute of Technology. (2010). *Designing the future: A strategic vision and plan.*
Office of Academic Affairs. (2010, February). *Review of the UGA extended campuses program: Final report of the review committee*.
Office of Academic Affairs. (2009, August). *University of Georgia Gwinnett campus self-study: Fiscal years 2006 to 2009*.
University of Georgia. (2010). *Building on excellence: University of Georgia 2020 strategic plan.*
University of Georgia. (2010). *Compliance certification for the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, appendix b: Extended campuses.*
University System of Georgia. (2004, October). *Final report of the committee on off-campus instruction.*
Special Studies
Donaldson, J., & Register, B. (2008, May 9). *Consultation project: The University of Georgia Gwinnett campus.* From Boehmer Files.
Dunn, D. D. (1998, December 18). *Report of the University of Georgia Gwinnett program committee.*
Graduate School. (2005, June). *University of Georgia graduate education in Gwinnett County: A report to the dean of the graduate school.*
Morgan, D. (2003, January). *21st century baccalaureate programs for Gwinnett University Center: A report to the director and management team of the Gwinnett University Center.*
Prokasy, W. F., & Watts, R. E. (1996, May 15). Report and Recommendations of the Gwinnett Policy Advisory Council.
Selig Center. (2011, July). The Economic Impact of the University System of Georgia 2010. http://www.terry.uga.edu/selig/docs/economic-impact-2010.pdf
University System of Georgia Board of Regents. (2009, October 23). *Fiscal year 2009 annual report of the University System of Georgia*.
Correspondence
Adams, M. F. (2005, February 3). Letter to Chancellor Tom Meredith.
Boehmer, R. G. (2005, July 19). Memorandum to Arnett C. Mace, Jr.: UGA at Gwinnett (status report). From Boehmer Files: The University of Georgia Gwinnett Campus.
Boehmer, R. G. (2002, January 1). Memorandum to Karen Holbrook: Gwinnett University Center. From Boehmer Files: The University of Georgia Gwinnett Campus.
Burgess, T. P. (2007, June 26). Letter to Linda Daniels.
Watts, R. E., Boehmer, R. G., & Warren, C. J. (2002, December 20). Draft Memorandum of Understanding for the Gwinnett University Center. From Boehmer Files: The University of Georgia Campus.
Institutional Histories
Fincher, C. (2003). *Historical development of the University System of Georgia: 1932 – 2002.* 2d ed. Institute of Higher Education: Athens.
Dyer, T. G. (1985). *The University of Georgia: A bicentennial history, 1785-1985*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Georgia Gwinnett College. (2011, August 8). History. http://www.ggc.edu/about-ggc/history.html
McMath, R. C., Jr., Bayor, R. H., Brittain, J. E., Foster, L., Giebelhaus, A. W., & Reed, G. M. (1985). *Engineering the New South: Georgia Tech, 1885 – 1985*. University of Georgia Press: Athens.

The targeted research participants represented a diverse and carefully selected group, including a broad array of senior leaders with varying perspectives on issues. I conducted a total of 23 one-on-one interviews, consisting of high-ranking administrators

and faculty of the University of Georgia and University System of Georgia, as well as two former chairs of the Board of Regents and Gwinnett community leaders. Several of these interviews were with past employees, including two former University System chancellors, in recognition of the fact that sometimes those who have left employment feel that they can speak more freely about issues. I took special care to interview senior administrators at both the central and unit levels of the University of Georgia, understanding that their perspectives might be markedly different. In addition, I employed snowball sampling (Merriam, 2009; Trosset, 2007; Weis & Fine, 2000), asking each interview subject to recommend others with whom I should be speaking. My goal was to talk with key players "in the know" at the local community, campus, and state level and to achieve diverse perspectives among the interview subjects.

In all but seven instances, interviews were conducted in the offices of the subjects being interviewed; I made my own direct observations during each interview and recorded these observations in field notes prepared immediately following each session. Each focused interview lasted an average of 41 minutes, with eight running closer to an hour in duration and two being very brief, lasting less than 20 minutes. Telephone interviews were conducted with four subjects in distant locations (New York, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi) and with three subjects whose schedules would not permit face-to-face interviews.

Interviews were semi-structured; that is, I entered each session with a list of potential questions but maintained an open mind that allowed the conversation to be free-flowing. The questions were not designed to elicit yes/no responses but rather were broadly constructed to prompt more detailed reflections from the interview subjects and

encourage them to expound upon their opinions and assessments. I recorded each interview and took copious notes. I painstakingly transcribed each of the 23 interviews myself; this enabled me to hear the conversations a second time, removed from the environment of the interview setting. I also conducted selected member checks (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Stake, 2010), asking some key players from whom I am utilizing quotes or particular pieces of information to review specific sections of the dissertation to ensure accurate transcription and/or interpretation.

The general interview questions asked are listed below; however, each was refined to reflect the role of the individual interview subject. In other words, someone in the Board of Regents would be asked slightly different questions than a branch campus or institutional leader, yet all would focus on the same sorts of issues.

1. Why did you feel it was important to establish this particular branch campus?
2. Why do you feel that an extension of your main campus was the best solution of the options that were being explored?
3. Tell me about those other options.
4. What were some of the major external forces pushing for or against the establishment of the branch campus?
5. Who were the major external players?
6. What were some of the internal issues involved?
7. Who were the major internal players?
8. How did you gain support for your position?
9. Since having a campus in this extended location, how has the mission or purpose changed?

10. What lessons have you learned from this experience?
11. What haven't I asked you that you think I should know?
12. Who else do you recommend that I speak with about the creation of this extended campus?

In talking with the Board of Regents, I examined the centralized role of the state higher education executive officer (SHEEO) in sorting out the local arguments in an issue. In other words, since it is the responsibility of the board to determine what is best for the system as a whole, rather than what is merely in the best interests of a single institution—perhaps a dramatically different position from a campus leader or alumni leader—what were the questions they asked themselves? What were the internal and external dynamics in play?

It was never my intention to treat the interview subjects anonymously, as it is my strong belief that their identities could easily be discerned from reading the facts of the case itself. Also, I believe that this particular case study is greatly strengthened when the reader appreciates the positional power of those providing commentary: three former and current University System chancellors, two former chairs of the Board of Regents, five past or present university presidents, two former or present chairs of the Gwinnett County Commission, and several other senior officials at the system, university, departmental, and local community level. All subjects consented to full disclosure, as indicated by their signatures on the Consent Letter provided to them as required by the Institutional Research Board (IRB, Project #2011-10750-0). The Consent Form appears as Appendix A, and the full list of interview subjects appears in Appendix B.

I pursued as many interviews as necessary to reach the point of data saturation (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yin, 2003; Merriam, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Once I started hearing the same themes repeated, I came to the realization that it was time to stop the data-gathering phase of the iterative research process and begin the analysis. Coding, the process of identifying the categories in which responses and other data belong (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Howard & Borland, 2007; Stake, 2010), played a critical role in my analysis. Weis and Fine (2000) refer to coding as "chunking" and note that it is virtually impossible to analyze thousands of pages of documents and interviews in a systematic manner without employing this technique. I meticulously reviewed the minutiae of each document—both the interview transcripts and various archival documents—for common themes while also paying careful attention to nuances. I thought critically about experiences that could have application to policy decisions. In other words, what did UGA learn the hard way that might be helpful to other institutions in the future?

Although this process was undeniably tedious, I was constantly mindful that the richer and more complex that a case study is, the more informative it will be. As Trosset (2007) noted, "qualitative analysis is about taking messy stuff and turning it into categorical data. It's a data reduction exercise" (p. 15). Peer debriefing (or peer review) (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Merriam, 2009)—seeking input from colleagues in the Ed.D. cohort and expert counsel from the professors on my dissertation committee—was also of immense value in resolving questions and refining conclusions.

Finally, I was careful to maintain an audit trail (or chain of evidence) of my work (Yin, 2003; Merriam, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) so that, if ever requested, other

researchers or participants in the case study could confirm the path I took to reach my conclusions. As Toma (2011) explains, “the case is credible when what the researcher presents describes the reality of the participants who informed the research in ways that resonate with them” (p. 14). Pursuant to the goal of transparency in the research process, I retained copies of the interviews, both on tape and in transcript form, as well as all of the archival materials. These documents will remain in their coded form, which will clearly demonstrate the connections I made to reach my conclusions. In accordance with the requirements of the IRB, I will retain the transcribed documents for a period of three years.

The collective impact of this concerted effort enabled me to develop findings that were grounded in the data as the information evolved, hence the term “grounded theory” (Merriam, 2009, p. 29). Corbin and Strauss (2008) describe the process as “theoretical sampling,” a form of sampling that is based on concepts derived from data. In other words, concepts are extracted from the data during analysis, and new questions about these concepts drive the next round of questioning, leading to a deeper understanding. Also, the due diligence I took to diversify sources of information and verify the accuracy of findings will counter Erickson’s description of the major qualitative research flaws and imbue readers with confidence in my findings.

Through the research methodology described above, it is my hope that the care I have exercised will yield an end product that will enlighten policymakers and scholars alike. As consistently stated in this document, I strongly believe that a case study is the best means by which to explore my research questions regarding the establishment of extended campuses. It provides the means to extract rich meaning from a very narrowly

focused example, and by adhering to time-honored principles of integrity, I will be able to ensure trust in the validity of my findings. After all, qualitative research is only valuable if it is grounded in trustworthiness.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY

To say that Gwinnett County was thriving in the 1990s would be a vast understatement. Strategically located along Interstate 85 just north of metropolitan Atlanta, the former agricultural community was undergoing a metamorphosis, rapidly transforming from a sleepy rural area to a bustling, wealthy suburb. A comprehensive study conducted by retired USG administrator David M. Morgan for the Gwinnett University Center management team found that from 1970 to 2000, Gwinnett's population grew from 72,349 to 588,448—a remarkable increase of 713 percent over the three decade period, making it one of the fastest growing counties in the nation (Morgan, 2003). Gwinnett benefitted from visionary leadership—philanthropic business leaders and progressive local government leaders who banded together to promote an aggressive agenda. Real estate was booming, with high-tech industrial parks dotting the landscape, bringing well-educated and high-end wage earners into the community. Gwinnett's public schools were widely recognized as being among the best in the state system. As the county grew in size, education, and wealth, so too did it grow in political influence. Water towers along the interstate proudly proclaimed "Gwinnett is Great" and "Success Lives Here." Yet for all that it had going in its favor, city fathers and mothers felt that something critical was missing: Gwinnett was the largest county east of the Mississippi River without its own institution of higher learning.[20]

[20] Of the 23 interview subjects, approximately half recalled this mantra verbatim.

The need for a college or university was great; local demand was high; and political interest was strong. The crux of the dilemma facing the University System of Georgia Board of Regents—the ultimate arbiter—was not a question of justification but rather a question of delivery. How could the need for higher education in Gwinnett best be served and in a manner that was optimal for the state system as a whole? The solution did not present itself immediately. Instead, the final decision was reached only after several operating models were attempted, numerous competing missions were resolved, and the emerging political muscle of the Gwinnett community was flexed. In the process, academic leaders at the institutional and system level wrestled with a multitude of competing internal and external dynamics.

To assist the reader, a chronology of major events in the development of the Gwinnett campus is provided in Appendix C. This listing is complemented by a similar compilation of major leadership developments that appears as Appendix D.

Dynamics

The Need for Access

A proposal for a resident higher education center in Gwinnett County was first presented to the University System Board of Regents in March 1984. S.E. Younts, vice president for services (outreach) at the University of Georgia, presented the report on behalf of the Coordinating Committee for Higher Education in Gwinnett County, a group he had been charged by the University System with chairing. According to the report, Gwinnett was the "most rapidly growing county in Georgia accounting for over 13 percent of the entire population increase experienced in the state during the past 10 years"

(Younts, 1984, p. 1). The report forecast that the county would reach 296,155 citizens by 1990. It recommended that a Gwinnett University Center be established, through which interested USG schools in close proximity to Gwinnett County could offer an assortment of associate, baccalaureate, and graduate programs in selected fields of study. Gwinnett County citizens thus "would be provided post-secondary education services without the enormous investment required in the construction and maintenance of a local college of university" (p. 1).

The Coordinating Committee's concept of a resident higher education center was jointly adopted by the Board of Regents and the Gwinnett County Board of Education in April 1984. The rationale was that the resident center would provide a single point of contact for the public school system with the University System of Georgia: The school system would bear the primary responsibility for identifying and assessing the higher education needs of the community, and the University System would be responsible for delivering the instructional programs to meet those needs. The University System would coordinate closely to eliminate overconcentration of programs and duplication of effort.

At first, four institutions were authorized to begin programming: Gainesville Junior College (later to become Gainesville State College); Georgia State University; Southern Technical Institute (later to become Southern Polytechnic State University); and the University of Georgia (Younts, 1985). The first courses were taught in Fall 1984 at the Gwinnett Technical School location and were delivered by just two of the identified institutions: Gainesville State, providing three associate's degrees; and the University of Georgia, providing a master's degree in early childhood education and a specialist degree in educational administration.

Gainesville State relinquished its interest in Gwinnett shortly thereafter, and another two-year access institution, DeKalb College (designated in 1997 as Georgia Perimeter College) stepped up to fill the gap. Robert E. Watts served as DeKalb College's director of institutional research and planning from 1986-1991 and recalled in an interview the school's keen interest in the opportunity:

> DeKalb College started aggressively as two-year colleges are wont to do—two year colleges move much more quickly than four-year colleges; they don't seem to have the same kind of faculty governance, they seem to be able to make decisions more quickly, and they saw that as a real growth market. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

Southern Polytechnic's program in Gwinnett failed to materialize, so it also pulled out of the market. Over time Georgia State receded from Gwinnett, deciding to concentrate its efforts instead in the Alpharetta area of north Fulton County, another of the most affluent areas in the Atlanta metropolitan region.

In 1989, the resident center (now called University System Center – Gwinnett) moved from the Gwinnett Technical Institute to an office park on Sugarloaf Parkway. In 1991, in an attempt to reflect its mission and identity more accurately, the name of the center was again changed to the Gwinnett University System Center or, as it was colloquially known, the Gwinnett Center.

By the mid-1990s, enrollment in the Gwinnett Center had grown exponentially, from 750 at its opening to more than 3,400 students (Prokasy & Watts, 1996). In 1996, University of Georgia President Charles B. Knapp and DeKalb College President Jacquelyn M. Belcher jointly charged the Gwinnett Policy Advisory Council, consisting

of officials of the two colleges and Gwinnett civic leader Glenn S. White (at the time a local bank president and a past-president of the Gwinnett Chamber of Commerce), to examine the case for expanding higher education services in the county. The committee met six times, conducting interviews with county school officials and business leaders and gathering new projections for growth. William F. Prokasy, provost of the University of Georgia, and Robert E. Watts, then DeKalb College's vice president for financial affairs, co-chaired the committee.

The council recommended overwhelmingly that the time was ripe for expansion and that three steps should be taken: 1) the Board of Regents should approve the concept of a partnership between DeKalb College and the University of Georgia to operate a campus and develop programs; 2) the Board of Regents should approve capital outlay funding to plan, design, and construct a high-tech teaching and public service facility; and 3) an appropriate working group should be established to undertake more detailed program and facility planning. Highlighted in the report was the fact that Gwinnett had doubled its population twice since 1970 and was expected to do so again by the year 2020. By the mid-1990s, yet another major highway traversed through the once-rural area: Highway 316, connecting Athens to the metropolitan area. The county was young, with most residents averaging 20 – 59 years of age and earning a median household income of $50,000, far above the average salary in neighboring counties. Education was the single most important factor influencing the relocation of jobs and families to the area (Prokasy & Watts, 1996). Conservative estimates placed the Gwinnett Center's enrollment at 5,000 by the year 2000, with approximately 80 percent of Gwinnett's high

school seniors expressing their intention to pursue higher education (Prokasy & Watts, 1996).

Academic Boosterism: A Matter of Civic Pride

Pressure from the local community was mounting. Like the pioneers long before them, Gwinnett County civic and educational leaders identified a gap in their community's quest for greatness: a college. Glenn White, who represented the community on the Gwinnett Policy Advisory Committee and later served as chair of the University System of Georgia Board of Regents, said he made the establishment of an institution of higher learning one of the top three priorities on his agenda when he led the Gwinnett County Chamber of Commerce in 1993. For him, a major factor was not only the burgeoning population but also the specific growth of the high school feeder pipeline in Gwinnett.

> It was about that time that Gwinnett was actually graduating more kids out of high school than any other county in Georgia and sending them elsewhere for their college education, and so part of it [the reason] was to try to start keeping some of these kids on a local basis. (White, personal communication, May 27, 2011)

Developer Richard L. Tucker, who served as president and chief executive officer of the Gwinnett Chamber from 1996-2003 and as its chair in 2005 (and who also chaired the Board of Regents in 2008-09 and remains a regent today), reflected that the establishment of a four-year institution was always on Gwinnett County's "bucket list." Civic leaders recognized the need for greater access, Tucker said, as well as the economic benefit of a home-based higher education institution.

> It [The Gwinnett County School System] has always been a source of pride, and as we've always over the past three decades tried to attract business and industry here, our public school system has been the shining star. And there's a lot of effort and a lot of support from the business community to that end. So we just thought that the college would be a natural extension of that. (Personal communication, June 2, 2011)

Add to this mix of impressive demographics and civic interest the fact that the Gwinnett Commission demonstrated its commitment in a very tangible way in the mid-1990s, investing $6 million in taxpayers' money to purchase a large tract of land along Highway 316, which it pledged to the University System of Georgia for development of an institution of higher learning.

Three interview subjects (former Gwinnett County Commission Chair F. Wayne Hill, former County Administrator and current Gwinnett County Commission Chair Charlotte J. Nash, and former County Commissioner Thomas P. "Tommy" Hughes) recalled that the catalyst for the purchase of the 180-acre tract of land came from a pivotal phone call received during a commission meeting. According to all three, Hill put the meeting on hold when his administrative assistant informed him that the Governor's Office was on the line. Hill said he took the call and spoke to Virgil R. Williams, an influential local business leader who was serving as a close advisor for then-Governor Zell Miller. Hill said Williams informed him that if the community was willing to buy a piece of land, the governor would provide political support to make a four-year college

happen.[21] Former Commissioner Hughes remembered that the leap of faith was an intimidating prospect:

> You know, it was scary for us because if they [Board of Regents] weren't going to build a college there, we certainly didn't need the property, but Virgil being connected with the Governor's Office, we felt like he's the local person, and we didn't think he would be leading us the wrong path. (Personal communication, June 15, 2011)

Hill, Nash, and Hughes recalled that the commission went into executive session and authorized the pursuit of land. The commissioners conducted their search quietly but efficiently, considering 10 – 15 potential sites before settling on the tract at the intersection of Highway 316 and Collins Hill Road in the county seat of Lawrenceville. Hill said in an interview he had a passion for the cause:

> I think it was important to our heritage. I just felt like if we could get a college built, forever and ever we'd be able to educate our people in Gwinnett County, they wouldn't have to drive somewhere else or go out of state, and they'd take pride in the county. (Personal communication, June 2, 2011)

Nash concurred:

> This was a long journey for Gwinnett County. We knew 25 years ago that we wanted a four-year college in the county, and it took a long time to get to that point. . . . We were patient, but we did a lot of homework, got ourselves together, got our story together in advance of having a chance. (Personal communication, June 16, 2011)

[21] Virgil Williams also served a one-year term on the University System of Georgia Board of Regents in 1993. My request to interview him was not answered.

To UGA President Knapp, further investment in Gwinnett was inevitable:

> Even at a political level it was untenable and God forbid, there was a big substantive issue out there as well, with a lot of underserved students. Sometimes politics and substance go in opposite directions. This was a case where both made it clear to me that we were going to have to do something. . . It was just a question of working it through the regents and finding the right combination. (Personal communication, June 20, 2011)

Mounting External Pressure

Many exciting things were happening in higher education in the state of Georgia in the mid-1990s. The HOPE scholarship, introduced by Governor Zell Miller, was raising the level of all boats in the 34 institutions of the University System, as Georgia's best and brightest students opted to stay in-state for their undergraduate studies. Also, Miller's commitment to increase the salaries of all public educators, from K-12 through higher education, by six percent for each of four successive years, was dramatically improving the recruitment and retention of top faculty. The entire system was on an upward trajectory, and demand for admission into the state flagship institution of higher learning had never been higher.

Upon arrival in 1994, former Chancellor Stephen R. Portch saw a system in need of a steadying hand, with political pressure mounting to elevate the status of more than a dozen institutions in the system. Portch responded judiciously, in a measured approach.

> What I essentially did, I think in my first press conference, was establish a moratorium on any changes and any new developments until we had a strategic

> plan and we had some data rather than just pure politics behind pressures, and so it was within that context that we tried to address this [the Gwinnett] situation. (Personal communication, June 15, 2011)

The needs and desires of Gwinnett County quickly moved into view on Portch's radar screen. He said while it would be naïve to think that politics did not enter into any decision of this nature, he did not experience overt pressure from the governor, who had strong ties to supporters in Gwinnett County. "He [Governor Miller] never micromanaged any decision that we made," Portch reflected in the interview. "He said, 'I want a plan, and I want you to execute the plan, and I want you to do what's good for Georgia, and I want you to propel this system.'" By the following year, when Portch's staff had developed a strategic plan for growth, it was clear to him that Gwinnett's need was justified, yet the vexing dilemma remained: What would be the best model for delivery?

The University of Georgia was not a reluctant partner in the venture. Former President Knapp recalled that he was under intense pressure to admit more applicants, yet the capabilities of the Athens campus' infrastructure limited him to an enrollment cap of approximately 30,000 students. Gwinnett promised the potential for a release valve. At the same time, with a greater footprint in Gwinnett, the University of Georgia could establish a more stable environment for graduate and professional programs, which offered significant potential for revenue growth. "I understood that there was a kind of a statewide obligation that we were not the University of Georgia at Athens, we were the University of Georgia, and when you saw something like Gwinnett County, that you needed to respond to it" (Knapp, personal communication, June 20, 2011).

"There was a good healthy dose of academic need and a good healthy dose of political reality, and I don't think that's all bad," opined Michael F. Adams, who succeeded Knapp as president of the University of Georgia in 1997. Adams recalled that Miller asked him to work toward expanding the university's programs in Gwinnett during his first meeting with him.

> Governor Miller could be direct and forceful when he needed to be, as everybody knows, but he didn't need to be in this case because we were in agreement that it was a good thing for the university to do. The need was certainly there, and we had the capacity to deliver. (Personal communication, June 14, 2011).

Adams also noted that with the support of both the chancellor and the governor, venture capital to get the initiative off the ground would be forthcoming. "It wasn't any big battle because we were all in sync with one another," he said. Chancellor Emeritus Portch agreed:

> UGA wasn't the initiator of the Gwinnett situation. They were a willing, active and good partner in getting it done, but it wasn't—I didn't get the sense that it was on the top of UGA's priority list in any way to go in there. I think they saw an opportunity to expand in there to some extent, but they were doing it for some wider reasons as well, in part because we asked them to. (Personal communication, June 15, 2011)

The Mission Evolves: Undergraduate Programs on the Horizon

In December 1997, Adams presented the plan for joint development of a Gwinnett Center by the University of Georgia and DeKalb College to the University System of

Georgia Board of Regents for approval. According to the plan, DeKalb would control and expand its first and second-year programs and confer all associate degrees. Upper-division courses would be offered by the University of Georgia, and all bachelor's, master's, and special certificates would be conferred by UGA. Adams reminded the board that not only had Gwinnett County stepped forward with a significant tract of land on which to locate the center, but it also had provided $3 million to prepare the infrastructure for the development of the site. He pledged to work with DeKalb College to establish programmatic guidelines, pedagogical approaches, and curriculum elements quickly. He emphasized that "creativity and innovation should be the key words in every facet" of the center's development and stated that he hoped to have upper-division courses underway within two years (USG Minutes, December 2007). The regents unanimously approved the creation of the Gwinnett University Center.

Adams appointed the Gwinnett Program Committee in March 1998 and charged the group with preparing an educational program for UGA-Gwinnett which would "creatively address the needs of a growing metropolitan area" (Gwinnett Program Committee, 1998). Chaired by senior political science faculty member Delmer D. Dunn, the committee met 16 times throughout the remainder of the year. Members consulted the advisory council's 1996 report, numerous demographic studies, a Gwinnett Chamber of Commerce educational needs profile, surveys of current students, and enrollment data for various courses. The group's final report, issued on December 18, 1998, was presented to the University Council (the faculty senate at the University of Georgia) as an information item in interim form in November 1998 (University Council Minutes, November 1998). The following recommendations were among principal aspects of the report: 1) the

formation of a separate UGA-Gwinnett faculty to provide baccalaureate instruction to juniors and seniors, to be recruited well in advance of initial course offerings and to have the authority to develop statutes and bylaws for campus governance, as well as unique promotion and tenure standards; 2) the use of flexible and innovative teaching methods, to be supported by state-of-the-art instructional technology; 3) the development of a unique undergraduate curriculum that would include arts and sciences degrees with an interdisciplinary focus, business, education, and the consideration of nursing and an honors program in the future; 4) the establishment of an administrative structure to include a dean of UGA-Gwinnett and academic chairs of the three major divisions (Arts and Sciences, Business, and Education) to oversee administration of the undergraduate program; 5) the granting of undergraduate degrees by UGA-Gwinnett (not the University of Georgia); and 6) that graduate programs would remain the responsibility of Athens-based colleges, schools or departments, with existing graduate programs in education, public administration, and social work to be augmented with an array of others, such as business, pharmacy, and expanded educational offerings.

Although the Gwinnett Program Committee Report (known to the faculty as the "Dunn Report") was never formally adopted by the University Council, it was clear that many faculty members assumed that it had been or, at the very least, that a variation of it would serve as the guideline for the campus' development. However, this was not the case, as the new senior administrator for the Gwinnett campus program discovered shortly after his appointment.

Associate Provost for Institutional Effectiveness Robert G. Boehmer was asked by Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost Karen A. Holbrook in

November 2001 to assume responsibility for ensuring delivery of the undergraduate programs by Fall 2002 as the new senior administrator for UGA at Gwinnett. In January 2002, just days before the first classroom building of the Gwinnett University Center was to be dedicated, Boehmer provided a grave assessment of the university's progress toward program delivery. In the interim years since the Dunn Report had been issued, graduate programs had indeed prospered, with existing programs maintained and several new ones developed. However, as Boehmer wrote, "planning for the upper-division undergraduate courses by UGA has come to a virtual standstill" (Boehmer, January 2002). Boehmer found that the program had a negligible budget, no onsite support structure for academic programs, and no concrete plan for the specific undergraduate degree programs to be offered. He cautioned the provost that she and the president would likely face some tough questioning about the delay in offering the undergraduate programs from Gwinnett community leaders at the dedication ceremony. These programs had, after all, been approved by the Board of Regents in 1997, and President Adams had publicly stated that he hoped to have them implemented in two years. (A representative list of degree programs developed by UGA in Gwinnett, from the opening of the new center in January 2002 to UGA's present offerings at the graduate level, appears as Appendix E. Enrollment is tracked in Appendix F.)

Internal Opposition – Faculty Governance, Culture, and Funding

Why had development of the undergraduate programs languished? Boehmer found he was confronted by several contributing factors. First was overt faculty aversion; several leading faculty members resented that the Gwinnett campus was not developing

according to the recommendations of the Dunn Report that had been presented to the University Council. Another was fear that the new program would be a financial drain on the departments. Even though the Board of Regents was providing the university with a special allocation to support new faculty hires for the Gwinnett campus, some departments still viewed their participation as an unfunded mandate because of the hidden administrative costs involved with administering a program from afar. Others, particularly those in the sciences, felt that the quality of a degree at the University of Georgia could never be replicated at an extended location because the Gwinnett University Center would lack the research culture and specialized research resources found on the main campus; even if tenured faculty were present, they would be so isolated in an extended location that they would be committing "professional suicide" to be there. "The objection was that you just can't replicate the UGA educational experience at a distant campus, and since you can't, you shouldn't be giving UGA degrees there" (Boehmer, personal communication, May 25, 2011).

Richard L. Daniels, who directs the MBA program for the Terry College of Business, vividly remembers that the opposition of the business faculty centered around two main factors: a financial drain on funds and a potential dilution of the degree. He explained:

> It just kind of came down that we didn't have much choice in the matter, that we were going to be offering the undergraduate business degree in Gwinnett. . . . There was real concern in protecting the brand equity. There was an implication that if you got your degree in Gwinnett, that it was kind of the back door, that the

> quality of the students was lower and that somehow we were hurting ourselves by allowing this to happen. (Personal communication, June 7, 2011)

As Boehmer recalls, some faculty members referred to Gwinnett as "UGA-Light," a disparaging label he disputes as misinformed: The incoming juniors were required to have the same credentials as other transfer students entering degree programs on the main campus.

Such concerns percolated up to the Provost's Office as well. Former Provost Holbrook, who left UGA in 2002 to lead The Ohio State University, praised Boehmer for his "heroic" efforts to shepherd faculty participation in a contentious initiative. She admitted that some of the expressed concerns were not far from her mind either.

> I remember it as huge. I mean, how in the world are we going to pay for this? And unless we've got a really good cash flow from tuition—I think we worried every day that we would have an adequate cash flow from tuition and a cash flow to keep it going, and that we'd find faculty, because it's no small drive to go back and forth. (Personal communication, June 16, 2011)

Even when Boehmer was able to cajole enough faculty support to begin the degree approval process, he hit a logjam. The university did not want to duplicate degree programs at the Gwinnett campus, since it was so close to Athens, but approval of new degree programs was onerous. Any new program would have to go through multiple layers of approval in a long, drawn-out process: originating with department-level faculty, then moving to the school or college, next heading to the University Curriculum Committee, then to the executive committee of the University Council, and ultimately to the Board of Regents for authorization. With only nine months in the gestational period

from conception to delivery of the promised programs, Boehmer knew he did not have time for the traditional process. Instead, he sought approved majors that had been deactivated on the main university's list of course offerings. Whenever he found a match with the general curricular interests of the Gwinnett community, a new major could be added. The three slated for introduction in Fall 2002 were a bachelor's degree in general business offered by the Terry College of Business; a bachelor's of science degree in educational science, training, and technology (intended for students planning careers as educators in the private sector) offered by the College of Education; and a bachelor's of science degree in interdisciplinary studies offered by the Franklin College of Arts and Sciences. In total, 116 sections of undergraduate classes and eight lab sections were planned for the 2002-2003 academic year (Boehmer, April 2002).

Steve W. Wrigley, who joined the University of Georgia as vice president for government relations in 2000 and who (as of July 1, 2011) now serves as executive vice chancellor for administration for the University System of Georgia, summed up the situation as follows:

> I think probably here was an opportunity that was new and different. It required very different thinking on our part, and we being a traditional academic institution with very traditional faculty and very traditional approaches to things, I think we were just slow to recognize the possibilities and slow to be able to respond to them. . . . But you know, I don't necessarily think that's bad. We're a big campus—there's a big footprint here—and our first priority from an instructional standpoint is here, I think. (Personal communication, June 7, 2011)

Wrigley also pointed out that the opportunity to develop the Gwinnett campus came in the midst of the first recession of the new century. The ability of the university to identify resources to spend elsewhere, when it was first trying to resolve how to preserve quality at the main campus in the midst of budget reductions, was a real conundrum.

Internal Support

In stark contrast to the negative reaction to the prospect of offering undergraduate programs in Gwinnett, faculty in many departments were enthusiastic about expanding graduate programs. Their motivation was a mixture of mission and money: Taking the programs closer to Atlanta brought a different, more mature type of student than was to be found on the main campus, and the market opportunity was extremely lucrative. The state funding formula for graduate programs provides a significant differential—as much as $4.50 for every $1.00 of undergraduate credit hour production, depending upon the course type (University System of Georgia, 2007).

Ronald M. Cervero, associate dean for outreach and engagement for the College of Education, explained that mission and money are inextricably linked: “If you’re on mission and you’re doing something for the university, there should be a revenue stream” (Personal communication, May 26, 2011). The College of Education has long regarded its program in Gwinnett as part of its core. Although a faculty line is provided when a program is added, the faculty member is considered part of the main campus faculty; the faculty member must teach one class in Gwinnett, but all faculty members ultimately share the teaching load. “We don’t want our students to get a degree in this person,” said Cervero in the interview. “We want them to get the same degree that we’re offering here.” The College of Education has offered graduate programs in Gwinnett since they

were first authorized in the mid-1980s. Students benefit from more diverse placements in a metropolitan school system, and faculty members benefit from interacting with nontraditional students. As Cervero explained:

> Most of them are working professionals in those degree programs. Some of our faculty believe that there's a lot more diversity in those programs, so it's not an all-white class, so they prefer that. They feel that's more exciting to teach in. . . . These are people who are there because they want to be there and they want to learn, and they're smart and they bring a lot of experience. (Personal communication, May 26, 2011)

A master's in public administration also has been offered in Gwinnett for many years. Associate Professor Vicky M. Wilkins, who directs the MPA program, says all faculty members are assigned to teach there as part of their teaching load; they receive travel reimbursement for their mileage.

> I think faculty have always appreciated how having in-service students in the classroom improves our teaching. I know the first time I taught in Gwinnett, I was shocked by the amount of information and examples and insight I gained from having current in-service students in the classroom, and so that's always been important to us to counter some of the bias that comes on campus from having so many students that have not been in the job market. (Personal communication, June 9, 2011)

Even the business faculty, who were highly critical of the university's undergraduate programs, eagerly embraced the opportunity to enhance graduate programs. "One of the reasons I see greater potential for graduate education is that the

older the students are, the more they're willing to pay," said MBA Director Daniels. "Our motivation was that we shouldn't let the 70 miles between here and Atlanta be an excuse for not putting programs out where the potential customers are." The Terry College introduced a fast-track professional MBA at Gwinnett; for the 2011-12 academic year, the program is priced at $48,000 for in-state students and $60,000 for out-of-state students (Terry College, 2011).

In a rapidly growing county with a highly-educated workforce, the potential for further expansion of graduate programs was excellent. The university had a vested interest in ensuring that its advanced degree programs continued to prosper: UGA retained for its central budget all of the formula-based credit hour revenue that was generated and 20 percent of the tuition revenue. These funds helped to subsidize the core operations (e.g., registrar and other administrative functions) at Gwinnett.

Competing Internal and External Visions

While the university struggled to navigate through the unchartered territory of creating and delivering undergraduate degree programs in an extended location during a recession, the aggressive and well-connected Gwinnett contingent was moving full steam ahead. Commission Chair Hill had delegated Nash and Hughes to serve alongside representatives from UGA and Georgia Perimeter College (formerly DeKalb College) as his representatives on a team assembled by the University System to develop the facilities on the land the county had donated. Chancellor Portch himself took a personal interest in design of the signature building because he was so intent on the instructional model breaking the mold of the norm. He said he tossed the first set of drawings of a traditional

red brick building in the trash and directed the architects to come back with a distinctive design befitting of a 21st-century campus.

Former commissioner Hughes grew weary of the process, which he said dragged on for nearly two years. At one point he suggested to Hill that the commissioners should put a deadline on the development, after which time the land would revert to the county for other potential use. He observed in the interview:

> Gwinnett County was a big government at that time, and I was used to bureaucratic mess, but I never—I never dreamed the college, the Board of Regents and Chancellor's Office was anything like that. I mean, we were a well-oiled machine compared to them. (Personal communication, June 15, 2011)

In February 1999 the Georgia General Assembly allocated $19.7 million for construction of the signature building. Ground was broken at the site in June 2000, and in December of that year, the Board of Regents approved a public-private venture with the University Financing Foundation to fund the first classroom building. In February 2001, construction began. On January 8, 2002, President Adams joined Jacquelyn Belcher, Wayne Hill, and Richard Tucker in cutting the ribbon to the new classroom facility.

During the dedication ceremony, with a "Gwinnett University Center" banner as the backdrop, Commission Chair Hill boldly proclaimed that he looked forward to the day that 'center' was dropped from Gwinnett University's name.[22] While the remark drew chuckles from the audience, it also served as a friendly reminder that Gwinnett

[22] I staffed this ceremony as an assistant to Dr. Michael F. Adams and, although I do not have a tape of the ceremony, clearly recall the statement. Associate Provost Boehmer also cited the remark in an interview on May 25, 2011; however, in an interview on June 2, former Commission Chair Hill said he could not remember it.

County still had its sights set on a more precise and prestigious target: not merely a university center but its own four-year institution.

In addition to Gwinnett's designs for the campus, others were in play as well. A third administrator, in addition to Adams and Belcher, had a key role to serve in the partnership at Gwinnett: James L. Muyskens, who was appointed chief executive officer and dean of the faculty for the Gwinnett University Center in 1999 after serving as senior vice chancellor for academic affairs for the University System of Georgia. At first, Muyskens reported to Adams, Belcher, and Portch, but the position was soon realigned to answer directly to the chancellor. Together with Portch, Muyskens envisioned an umbrella approach for the Gwinnett University Center—not merely a partnership between Georgia Perimeter College and the University of Georgia, but a much broader consortium through which any college or school in the University System could offer programs desired by the community. He would serve as the "broker" for higher education in the region, inviting USG institutions to compete to offer programs at the Gwinnett University Center that were not provided by either UGA or GPC. For example, an engineering course might be offered by Southern Polytechnic State University or by the Georgia Institute of Technology. "My job as I saw it was to get the community leaders, the political leaders, to see that what we could offer under the umbrella concept was even better for them than an independent university" (Muyskens, personal communication, June 22, 2011). By bringing in other participants to offer existing programs, Muyskens could expedite delivery: There would be no need to go through lengthy approval processes, and the programs already would have been accredited.

Muyskens says he succeeded in bringing a nursing program via the Medical College of Georgia to the GUC, but little else. He said Belcher and Adams were opposed to his plan and tenaciously guarded the territory they had staked out. Muyskens said he was thwarted in budgeting because the funding went either to the University of Georgia or to Georgia Perimeter; therefore, he could not manage to hire anyone with overarching responsibilities to help serve as "the" presence of the University System in Gwinnett. This, he says, was a mistake, because the community viewed both institutions as outsiders. "They felt that they would be—they would not be the first interest of either institution," he recalled in the interview.

Even Chancellor Portch had another vision in mind. He had no desire to create another traditional university, but he was intrigued by the opportunity to break new ground. The model he envisioned was experimental: The academic calendar and curriculum would be non-traditional; many of the faculty members would be visitors from other University System schools who wanted to take a year to try some new pedagogy; instruction would be a hybrid model; and distance learning would be a key element. He stated:

> I was particularly driven in this instance not by the desires of the University of Georgia or the desires of Georgia Perimeter, who were kind of stable-mating each other on this thing, but by the opportunity, which doesn't come along very often in American higher education, to create a new campus. . . . I've always felt the power of the system is with multiple institutions, you can try different things and then take the experiments that work and expand them all-system wide. So it was

candidly, always my intent that it would become a stand-alone institution. (Personal communication, 2011)

Coalition-Building as Independence Gains Momentum

By the time the signature building was dedicated in 2002, several prominent state leaders had changed. After serving two terms as governor, Zell B. Miller was now a U.S. senator in Washington. Elected to succeed him was another Democrat, Roy E. Barnes, who had served lengthy terms in the State Senate and State House of Representatives. Stephen Portch had left the University System in 2001 and was succeeded in January 2002 by Thomas C. Meredith, former chancellor of the University System of Alabama. Meredith's first day on the job came just six days before the new classroom building for the Gwinnett University Center was dedicated. As he recalled in an interview on June 1, 2011, "It wasn't very long after I'd gotten into office that Gwinnett popped up on the screen pretty hard." Gwinnett also had a strategically placed advocate by this time: Gwinnett business leader Glenn White had been appointed to a seven-year term on the Board of Regents in 1997 and in Fiscal Year 2001, had served as its chair.

Muyskens stated that it did not take long for him to realize that the new chancellor did not share his interest in an "unorthodox" model of higher education delivery to the Gwinnett market. He resigned as CEO shortly after Meredith's arrival and took a new position as president of Queens College in Flushing, New York. Negotiations for a successor to Muyskens fell through at the last minute, so Meredith turned to a veteran administrator to assume the role as interim director: Robert Watts, who had just completed two successive interim presidencies within the University System at Floyd

College in Rome and at Middle Georgia College in Cochran. At the time of his appointment, Watts was serving as senior policy advisor for the University System of Georgia. Meredith stated in a press release prepared by the staff at the time of the announcement: "Rob Watts has served both the University System and our state quite well. This new assignment will fully utilize his experience, expertise and leadership to maximize the momentum that is building at the Gwinnett University Center" (Millsaps, 2002).

Watts set to work immediately, arranging for meetings between Meredith and principal leaders in the Gwinnett business community—those who had been serving as liaisons for the community with the University System throughout the development of the site at the corner of Highway 316 and Collins Hill Road. Their dissatisfaction was readily apparent at the first lunch meeting that spring, Meredith and Watts recalled. The community thought they would be getting more than the limited degree programs being offered. "It was a very interested group, a very committed group, and a very concerned group, and they wanted a four-year institution, there's no doubt about that," said Meredith in an interview. "That was made very clear early on." As Meredith's conversations with the group progressed and as he began to learn more from his staff, he began to be convinced. "I remember talking with them about the fact that I was pretty sure that it was going to develop into a four-year institution before it was over, and I needed for them to be thinking that way now and planning that way" (Meredith, personal communication, June 1, 2011).

Meredith encouraged the Gwinnett leadership to consider long-term master planning and the acquisition of additional land to accommodate program expansion in the

future. Meanwhile, Daniel S. Papp—who was named by Portch as senior vice chancellor for academic and fiscal affairs when Muyskens accepted the CEO position at the Gwinnett University Center (and who now serves as president of Kennesaw State University)—was in the midst of conducting a statewide assessment of the system. The strategic planning did not examine Gwinnett in particular but rather analyzed the best structure for the University System of Georgia writ large. Among two of the main recommendations: 1) preserve the integrity of the four Research-1 institutions—the University of Georgia, the Georgia Institute of Technology, Georgia State University, and the Medical College of Georgia (renamed as Georgia Health Sciences University in 2011)—but also develop four regional universities to become R-2s—Kennesaw State University, Valdosta State, West Georgia, and Georgia Southern; and 2) to expand the number of state colleges in order to increase the capacity of the University System to grow and extend enrollment opportunity to thousands of additional students.

Institutional Governance

Papp recalled in an interview that the discussion on the latter question almost immediately turned to the situation in Gwinnett and "the wary cooperation" that existed there between the University of Georgia and Georgia Perimeter College.

> It became clear that UGA was putting in separate administrative functions and GPC was putting a separate administrative function in, and on top of that there was the Gwinnett University Center, and it was—tensions were developing, I think is the diplomatic way to put it. (Personal communication, June 17, 2011)

Former Chancellor Meredith also cited governance issues that had come to the attention of the system staff and community leaders:

> What makes it untenable at some point is the numbers. . . When you have a certain amount of space and the thing is that someone has to be thinking—Do we need more space now? How do we finance that?—because neither party is the sole proprietor and so, you get into a space problem. Early on, I can recall one of the headaches of the administration at Gwinnett was assigning space because everyone wanted more space and needed more space, and so who do you give it to? Who gets priority? . . . It just becomes a bear to get your arms around. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

Papp and Watts became convinced that the arrangement was not viable. One key factor was sheer size: By 2003-2004, Georgia Perimeter had more than 7,000 students at the Gwinnett University Center, while the University of Georgia had approximately 250 undergraduates and 600 graduate students (Boehmer, 2007). At nearly 8,000 students, the Gwinnett University Center would have constituted the ninth largest institution in the University System at the time, Watts said. Growth projections indicated enrollment could rise to 10,000 students in the near future. At what point, the University System staff members asked, does an institution cease to be a satellite operation and warrant independent status of its own? “We came to the conclusion and recommended to former Chancellor Meredith that it was time to convert the educational consortium to a freestanding institution and create the 35th unit of the University System” (Watts, personal communication, June 1, 2011).

Papp and Watts presented the recommendation to the Board of Regents at a planning retreat in August 2004. Although no vote was taken, since this was a planning

session only, the report received a favorable response from the board. Watts reflected in the interview that White was particularly supportive:

> Glenn had served as chair of the board at one point, and so he was an influential regent. He came to the conclusion that the staff was right and that it was time to do this, and he was persuasive with his colleagues that it was time to do this. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

At the Board of Regents' October meeting, regents voted to seek legislative endorsement for creating a 35th institution, the first four-year institution added to the University System of Georgia in more than a century (USG Minutes, October 2004). Minutes of the meeting cite Chancellor Meredith as stating that ". . . this proposal should in no way be taken as a negative reflection on those institutions [UGA and GPC]. This is just a natural progression." State Senator Don Balfour, a Republican from Gwinnett County, sponsored the requisite appropriations bill; it passed both houses by overwhelming margins in March 2005 and was signed into law by a new Republican governor, G.E. "Sonny" Perdue III[23] (Georgia Gwinnett College, 2011).

Mixed Signals

The action by the Board of Regents took many at the University of Georgia and Georgia Perimeter College by surprise. For most of the time that Papp had been conducting the strategic study and that Meredith and Watts had been conferring with Gwinnett leaders, Boehmer had been working diligently to forge a Memorandum of

[23]The Georgia Constitution provides the University System of Georgia Board of Regents with the power to close an institution on its own. However, because the establishment of a new institution will require state funding, the Constitution requires that the Board of Regents seeks the approval of the State Legislature before creating one.

Understanding for long-term administration of the Gwinnett University Center in order to alleviate some of the management problems that the University System staff had identified. Boehmer said that Papp, in part due to his insistence, had convened a formal working group to "hammer out a detailed agreement"; that group included Boehmer, GPC Provost Charlotte J. Warren, and GUC Interim Director Watts. As Boehmer recalled, there was "a lot of one-way paperwork": The MOU had been approved in concept by all parties, but it was never formally adopted. He had expended at least two years in the effort. The memory still stings, Boehmer said:

> I felt like the village idiot because this had been—you know, we'd been working hard sort of going through the accepted process, and somebody much more clever had managed to go right to the final source of, the final spot for approval. I knew that vision was out there and that people believed in it, but I didn't really think—I was unaware that it was that close to final adoption. (Personal communication, May 25, 2011)

He surmised: "The political powers completely overshadowed the orderly academic process that we think of here in our cloistered little environment."

Watts acknowledged in the June 1, 2011 interview that many at UGA and GPC were blindsided: "Their working assumptions were this is a long-term arrangement, and both were engaging in planning processes to make that possible." Watts commended Boehmer for the ongoing work to increase degree offerings at the campus; by the time the decision was made to create an independent institution, seven undergraduate degree programs had been established and graduate programs had been expanded (Boehmer,

2005). Despite Boehmer's yeoman efforts, however, Papp said he received mixed signals from other UGA administrators:

> Depending on who you talked with at UGA, there was a tremendously different level of interest expressed in maintaining bachelor degree programs in Gwinnett. Some folks out at UGA said, "Yes, we want to keep our bachelor's programs in Gwinnett." Other folks said, "We really don't have that much interest in Gwinnett. We have interest elsewhere, down in Tifton and in Griffin." . . . But there was no disagreement from UGA—UGA wanted to keep the graduate presence and keep the continuing education presence, so that was a slam dunk. (Personal communication, June 17, 2011)

Senior leaders at the University of Georgia were not deaf to the demands of the Gwinnett community. President Adams said he entered the partnership with "eyes wide open," knowing that the arrangement—which he believed was working well—was merely a stop-gap measure. "As good as somebody like UGA or Georgia Perimeter can be in just going in and offering courses, that's a totally different circumstance than planning, planting a college that an entire community can call its own," he stated in an interview on June 14, 2011. For Adams, the end game was not unexpected, but it did come sooner than anticipated:

> We did what was best for the state, what we thought was best for the state, and our role was quickly limited more than I think it probably should have been, but again, this is not the most central thing that we do as far as our core mission. So do you get in a battle over some set of issues in Gwinnett in a way that could

jeopardize your core mission? Probably not. (Personal communication, June 14, 2011)

The University of Georgia and Georgia Perimeter College were instructed by the Board of Regents to discontinue all undergraduate programs by the end of the spring semester in 2008. The University of Georgia could continue to offer graduate and continuing education programs to the Gwinnett market (USG Minutes, October 2004). The University System's 35th institution, Georgia Gwinnett College, would begin admitting undergraduate students in Fall 2006, with the first freshman class enrolling in Fall 2007 (Georgia Gwinnett College, 2011). The policy entrepreneurs representing Gwinnett County's interests had finally been able to punctuate the equilibrium and seize the window of opportunity. "I'm one of those people that believes that there's the right time for every great idea, but you have to be ready to take advantage of it when that time comes along," said Nash, who now chairs the Gwinnett County Commission. "I think a lot of things came together for us" (Personal communication, June 16, 2011).

The Evolving Mission

UGA Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration Henry M. Huckaby, who now leads the University System as chancellor, said in an interview that the diffused and uncoordinated nature of the Gwinnett University Center probably made it "easy pickings." Former Chancellor Meredith, at the helm when the decision was made to establish Georgia Gwinnett, said that the partnership was, in essence, a victim of its own success:

I think when they started the 2+2, they needed to know that the numbers would be there. They needed to know that the support would be there locally. . . . Two plus

> two is safe. If it doesn't work, you tell UGA to go home and you tell Georgia Perimeter to go home, and it's over. But it just kept growing and expanding, and support and the voices became louder and louder, and then it just became inevitable. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

In the wake of the decision, the University of Georgia's focus turned to development of an exit strategy that would ensure that the needs of all students in the queue to graduate were met, that tenure-track faculty were accommodated, and that some of the money invested to initiate the undergraduate programs was recouped. Boehmer also led the search for a new home for UGA's graduate programs, in a separate location from the new institution.[24]

Papp convened a series of meetings with representatives from Georgia Perimeter and the University of Georgia to devise a smooth transition to the new institution. UGA made the decision to place the tenured or tenure-track faculty hired for the undergraduate programs in positions at the main campus; contract faculty were released at the end of their contracts, when their services were no longer needed. Students were assisted in either finishing their degrees at Gwinnett or the main campus in Athens, or by transferring to another institution. Since the undergraduate programs had not been in existence long enough for the university to recover its initial investment, Boehmer and a

[24] It bears noting that the decision to establish Georgia Gwinnett College was far more disruptive to Georgia Perimeter College than it was to the University of Georgia. GPC had a longer history of undergraduate service and was serving a much larger base of students—nearly a third of its total enrollment. It also had faculty and administrators with long, established careers in the Gwinnett community. However, GPC's experience is fodder for another dissertation. Suffice it to say that a seemingly insurmountable problem was overcome through the innovative leadership of a new president at GPC, Dr. Anthony S. Tricoli. He boldly predicted that GPC would not lose 7,000 students in the transition but would instead increase enrollment. In Fall 2008, Tricoli was proven correct.

small team of academic and financial colleagues[25] pressed for reimbursement—not to be made whole entirely, but at least to be compensated for some expenditures. Adams reinforced this message himself through a strongly worded letter sent to Chancellor Meredith on February 3, 2005, in which he cited an $11 million funding delta that needed to be addressed.[26] He wrote:

> I am not suggesting that the University would have to be made whole to the exact dollar for us to feel salved about this issue; we do have a spirit of service to the State. Clearly, though, we cannot close our eyes to that amount of money without some reasonable response from the State and/or the Regents in expression of the service we have willingly and collegially provided. (p. 4)

Adams lamented that the university's commitment now transcended three governors (Miller, Barnes, and Perdue) and that he had "gone along with the Gwinnett plan despite lean budget times, considerable faculty concern, and often overt campus resentment stemming from a lack of trust in the Regents' willingness to follow through with financial support" (p. 1).

Meredith empathized with Adams' position, recognizing that the state dollars received by the university could have been directed elsewhere:

> They chose to go over and try to meet a need and try to get a foothold. Just in all honesty, they didn't want to give up the fastest growing area in the state, and so they were investing in order to maintain a foothold in that particular area, but you

[25] In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that I served on this team for a brief time as a preliminary representative for the Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration. Additional participants included Associate Provost for Academic Fiscal Affairs Christina J. Miller and Associate Dean Charles R. Kutal of the Franklin College of Arts and Sciences.

[26] Adams wrote that according to estimates by his staff, the University was estimated to have expended $21.8 million through the end of the 2008 academic year (the time of the ordered exit), offset by only $10.8 million in formula funding, tuition, and allocations from the Board of Regents.

couldn't just totally discount their investment. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

Despite his appreciation for the university's position, Meredith took no action on Adams' persistent request. Only when his successor, Erroll B. Davis, Jr., took office as chancellor in 2006 was any reimbursement, albeit modest, provided. Assistant System Budget Director David A. Dickerson informed Senior Vice President Timothy P. Burgess (who had succeeded Huckaby in 2006) via letter that $200,000 would be added to UGA's state appropriation in Fiscal Year 2008 to reflect an allowance for equipment left in place on the property of Georgia Gwinnett College (Dickerson, 2008).

Adams also pushed to stake another claim that was not granted: a 20-year guarantee that the University of Georgia would be the sole provider of post-baccalaureate certificates, graduate and professional programs, and continuing education in Gwinnett County. "I believe your commitment to me all along was that we were to be the provider of post-baccalaureate programs [emphasis in original]," he stated in his letter to Meredith. "If such is not the case, then we need to talk further about the commitment on both sides of the equation" (Adams, 2005, p. 3).

Meredith said while he understood the reasoning behind Adams' request for a 20-year Memorandum of Understanding, he had no intention of consenting: A two-decade guarantee would tie the hands of future chancellors too much. Also, the University of Georgia might not always be the best provider of the needed programs. Huckaby, the current chancellor, who was one of Adams' senior administrators and top policy advisors when the request was made, reflected in an interview that he agreed with Meredith's stance:

> I would have never done that—no need for that. If you're offering graduate programs, then they should stand on their own merits. The needs change over time. . . . but the promise or potentiality of competition is good for schools. You keep your programs relevant. (Personal communication, June 6, 2011)

Clearly Adams wanted written assurance (that could be shared with a skeptical faculty) that the university's investment would not again be in jeopardy. Arnett C. Mace, Jr., provost and senior vice president for academic affairs at the time of the exit from undergraduate programs in Gwinnett, recalled the mood on the Athens campus: "Having invested significant resources and people and commitment, there were some people that had some anxiety that would this occur again at the graduate and continuing education level—which it still could, at some point in time" (Personal communication, May 31, 2011).

Administrators debated where to locate the new graduate programs. Adams and Mace saw merit to remaining on the Georgia Gwinnett College campus, where synergies could be developed with the new school as a feeder into the graduate programs. Boehmer and Huckaby were wary, however, fearing that an investment in a facility on Georgia Gwinnett's territory could be claimed by the new institution down the road, as its programs expanded and more space was needed. Also, UGA could also find itself space-constrained, with limited room to schedule classes as programs grew.

In the fall of 2004, Huckaby's office enlisted the assistance of the University of Georgia's Carl Vinson Institute of Government to analyze and recommend the optimal regions for a stand-alone center. The study, prepared by David R. Lynn and delivered in December 2004, found that the population density in Gwinnett was clearly along the I-85

corridor, with the highest concentration of income and educational attainment in the Norcross, Duluth, and Suwanee areas. Lynn recommended that UGA further analyze the traffic patterns of students to determine where they hailed from and where they were projected to come from in the future (Lynn, 2004).

In June 2005, such a report was delivered to the dean of UGA's Graduate School. The report indicated that even though the University of Georgia had experienced a "healthy" 23 percent increase in graduate enrollment since 1999, that figure had soared by 97 percent over the same period in Gwinnett. The opportunity for growth of the graduate market in Gwinnett was projected to be high, particularly for master's level programs that could be offered in the evenings. The report recommended that the university seize the opportunity to become proactive (rather than reactive) in Gwinnett and develop a long-term strategic plan for enrollment growth in its own center. The report further recommended that a financial model be developed to incentivize participation by academic departments and that an aggressive, three-year marketing plan be enacted to distinguish the new graduate center and its offerings from its former participation at the Gwinnett University Center. The Graduate School's report was bolstered by a May 2005 survey of 11,663 UGA alumni living in the metropolitan Atlanta area conducted by Lori Jordan in the Gwinnett University Center Admissions Office, to which 738 responded. The survey results found that 92 percent of the respondents had considered attending graduate school and that 68 percent would consider enrolling in a graduate center in Gwinnett (Graduate School Report, 2005).[27]

[27] A subsequent report by the University of Georgia Small Business Development Center, commissioned by Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs Janet A. Sandor and delivered in September 2007, affirmed the Graduate School's study in 2005. The report found that Gwinnett had an above average incidence of white-collar professionals with administrative jobs. A quarter of the population within a 10-mile radius of

Armed with these reports, as well as data obtained by Boehmer and Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs Janet A. Sandor on several site visits to branch campuses of the University of Washington and University of Kansas, senior administrators made the decision to seek a stand-alone location. As Boehmer wrote in a July 2005 memo to Mace, the mantra of real estate—location, location, location—was the primary concern of UGA planners.

> This should be located closer to the Atlanta area than the current GUC. A location in the area between Highway 316 and I-85 near Sugarloaf Parkway (near the pre-2002 GUC location) would allow access from either 316 or 85, would not be significantly more inconvenient for UGA faculty and staff traveling from Athens (about five minutes more), would be close to the Gwinnett Civic Center and Chamber of Commerce (high visibility area), and would not be so close to Atlanta as to cause significant objections from other USG institutions (Boehmer, 2005).

Boehmer said the university was particularly sensitive to perceptions of geographic turf and, still stinging from one political battle, did not want to instigate another. Watts agreed that siting the campus was a delicate issue:

> At the time when the University of Georgia was looking for locations, I think there were 3,000-odd students from Gwinnett who were taking classes at Georgia State, and I mean Georgia State could tell you exactly by zip code where these students were in Gwinnett County, and they were cognizant of the potential impact on them. And the board, of course, is trying to balance all of these things.

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the new campus and 20% within a 20-mile radius were “upper-middle-class married couples living in mid-sized homes with few children.“ The report supported the expansion of graduate and professional development by the University. The findings of this report were cited in two documents: a consultation project by Justin Donaldson and Brandon Register for Boehmer in May 2008 and in the August 2009 Self-Study of the Gwinnett Campus, Fiscal Years 2006-2009, conducted by the Office of Academic Affairs.

> They don't want to be helping one institution and hurting another. They want a win for both institutions. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

In late June 2007, UGA Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration Tim Burgess wrote Vice Chancellor for Facilities Linda M. Daniels to inform her that the university had selected a site for the location of its graduate programs: in the former Intellicenter at 4350 Sever Road in Lawrenceville (Burgess, 2007). The university acquired 60,000 square feet of leased space in a corporate building located just off I-85 at the Old Peachtree Road exit. The site was clearly visible from the interstate, with the added marketing bonus of signage rights for the "University of Georgia Gwinnett Campus" to be placed atop the building for utmost branding impact. The university occupied the entire first floor and one-quarter of the second, with first-option rights to lease more if additional space was desired. The space constituted a one-stop shop with classroom, reception areas, meeting, office and support space (library, bookstore, etc.).



Figure 2. Map of Two Campuses in Gwinnett and Proximity to Athens

Both the UGA Gwinnett Campus and Georgia Gwinnett College are located about 45 minutes from Athens. UGA's campus, along I-85, is denoted by the Arch logo, while Georgia Gwinnett College, along Highway 316, is denoted by its "G" logo.

Mission Clarity and Further Investment

After nearly a decade of working toward the establishment and delivery of undergraduate programs, the University of Georgia had finally settled on its mission for Gwinnett: "To be a highly accessible and vibrant center of advanced learning for non-traditional and working professionals in greater Atlanta and northeast Georgia." The stated mission reflected five primary goals: 1) to increase access to graduate degree programs; 2) to build capacity of the University System for graduate and continuing education; 3) to respond to needs in critical fields such as K-12 education, information technology, and social work; 4) to promote economic development by responding to the workforce needs of local and regional businesses; and 5) to increase academic excellence by expanding the number of UGA graduate programs to placebound or economically challenged adults in the Gwinnett area (Gwinnett Self Study, 2009, p. 2).

Enrollment surpassed expectations by the time the doors of the new campus opened. In Fiscal Year 2009, its first full year of operation, 1,433 graduate students[28] were enrolled in the summer, fall, and spring semesters, generating $3,554,435 in tuition revenue. This number far exceeded the prediction forecast during the search for the site in September 2006: a total of 932 students anticipated for Fiscal Year 2009 and 1,156 in Fiscal Year 2013. The core programs offered at the new UGA Gwinnett were those that had relocated from the Gwinnett University Center: 18 graduate programs, the UGA Small Business Development Center at Gwinnett, the UGA Gwinnett Educational

[28] This number varies slightly from that reported in Appendix F. Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs and Director of the Gwinnett Campus Ruth Bettandorff explains that the difference is most likely due to one of the numbers being reported after the conclusion of Drop/Add, whereas the other was taken before; or to a coding error, in which students who should have been credited to the Gwinnett campus were counted at the home campus in Athens.

Technology Center for P-16 Educators, and the UGA Center for Continuing Education-Gwinnett (Gwinnett Self-Study, 2009).

As was the case with the undergraduate programs, those who earned degrees at the Gwinnett campus received diplomas that read "The University of Georgia," as opposed to "The University of Georgia at Gwinnett." There was to be no difference construed about the quality of the instructional program at the main or extended location; the criteria for earning the degrees were the same, regardless of location. All academic programs were under the jurisdiction of the academic unit approved to offer the program, and most of the faculty members were full-time, tenure-track faculty members who traveled from Athens to Gwinnett.[29] Boehmer continued to have overall responsibility for the Gwinnett Office of Academic Affairs, with the assistant vice president having day-to-day oversight. A small central administrative staff was augmented by on-site academic program coordinators from several of the individual units (Terry College of Business, School of Social Work, Pharmacy, etc.). Space was allocated for faculty and administrative offices according to need. Each department funded its own office equipment and supplies. In addition, the campus had its own student affairs staff to support the needs of the nontraditional students, as well as an on-site information technology staff, a virtual library, and a bookstore run by Follett, the same third-party provider which has the contract for operations on the main campus.

A key component to the success of the graduate programs in Gwinnett would be the revamping of the funding formula that had previously been in place. That formula provided tuition return to the departments—first at 90 percent and then at 80 percent,

[29]By 2011, 70 percent of the faculty members teaching in Gwinnett were full-time faculty members (UGA Compliance Certification, 2010), a factor of critical importance to the SACS review team that visited UGA and its extended locations for reaccreditation in 2010 (Bettandorff, personal communication, 2011).

with the university keeping the remainder in its central coffers for overhead or other determined needs. Former Provost Mace recalled in an interview that at least in initiating the undergraduate programs, the "core subsidized the periphery." However, there were intrinsic problems with the old graduate funding model in that it rewarded the wrong behavior, according to Associate Provost for Academic Fiscal Affairs Christina J. Miller:

> If you wanted to create a new program, if you created it on the Athens campus, you may not get funding for that, but if you wanted to put it on the Gwinnett campus, we gave you money for it. So in other words, perhaps other programs that should have rightfully been delivered in Athens weren't being delivered in Athens but were being delivered in Gwinnett because of this reward process. (Personal communication, June 3, 2011)

Sandor relayed the shortsightedness of the funding formula to Boehmer in a November 2007 memo: "The tuition-return funding model currently used to support graduate programs is frequently criticized for creating 'academic silos' and fragmenting, rather than enhancing planned and purposeful academic growth" (Sandor, 2007).

In 2008, the university switched the funding model from one based on tuition return to one based on credit hour production. Miller said the university analyzed the amount that units were consistently earning from tuition return and placed that funding in their base budgets; in addition, they had the added opportunity to earn funding for credit hour production. As Associate Dean Cervero of the College of Education explained:

> If you enroll more students, get more credit hours—you're rewarded for that, and so there's a financial incentive to some extent—not as much as it used to be when

> we had the tuition return model, but certainly, you know, there's some financial incentive now. (Personal communication, May 26, 2011)

The shortcoming of the new funding method, Cervero said, was its lag. While tuition return was unstable because it fluctuated based on the number of students who enrolled each semester, the reward was immediate: Tuition dollars earned in the spring were deposited into the unit's account that semester. Credit hour production, while relatively stable for the purpose of budget planning, is based on a three-year rolling average, so it takes longer for the departments to realize the gains they have made by increasing enrollment. Also, as a component of the base budget, the profits are less visible.

Associate Professor Vicky Wilkins, who directs the MPA program, said that credit hour production "definitely isn't incentivized in the same way as 'every seat counts'" (tuition return). She believes that more departments would be interested in establishing programs in Gwinnett if even greater financial incentives could be provided. Still, she is pleased with the $40,000 the department receives for its efforts in Gwinnett. The funding was used to hire a recruiter/career counselor to support MPA students at both campuses and to provide assistance with job searches. "You're not in our department long before you know Gwinnett produces something for us, we use it in a certain way," said Wilkins. ". . . It's kind of helped us float through the budget cuts" (Personal communication, June 9, 2011). For Cervero, the revenue produced by the College of Education's programs in Gwinnett adds about $150,000 to the college's base budget, but those funds are plowed back into the Gwinnett budget. "We have been spending every dime we've had on Gwinnett, and we've had to use Athens money to help

continue the funding," said Cervero. However, his department considers both programs to be mission-critical:

> We don't call it off-campus. We say it's UGA-Gwinnett," said Cervero. "It's part of our core instructional mission . . . . That's why we don't have Gwinnett faculty. We have UGA faculty. . . . So we don't consider it a periphery. I mean that's a really important issue. (Personal communication, May 26, 2011).

Even though the College of Education is widely described by Gwinnett administrators as the most entrepreneurial of UGA's units in Gwinnett in terms of course development, it is the Terry College of Business that is the "cash cow" due to the high differentials it can charge for enrollment in its executive and fast-track master's-level programs. Its total revenue from all of its programs in the Gwinnett and Buckhead markets is in the range of $8.5 to $9 million, said MBA Director Daniels, and roughly $3.5 million of that comes back to the central university.[30] Daniels regards this as a fair price to pay for benefit from the University of Georgia's brand; so, too, he says, do his fellow faculty members, who receive a research and teaching support (RATS) incentive when teaching in-load, while their departments receive travel money. "Everything just seems to make more sense to people if you can say, 'You know, we can do this great service to the community and we can make money, which allows us to support the greater mission of the college,'" said Daniels in an interview. "It's hard to make an argument against that."

[30] The Terry College of Business runs three cohorts of the part-time, fast-track MBA. Only one is offered in Gwinnett, with the other two in Buckhead (in midtown Atlanta). Daniels says the Gwinnett cohort is the smallest of the three, with about 35 students enrolled.

Maturing to Become a Key Player in Enrollment Growth

In his State of the University Address delivered on January 20, 2011, President Adams called enhancing the institution's commitment to graduate education "one of the next great challenges facing the University of Georgia." He stated:

> It is important to remember here that we cannot decouple graduate education from the research mission of the university. One cannot flourish without the other; UGA cannot be a great graduate institution with a weak research agenda, and it cannot be a great research institution if the graduate programs are not strong. (Adams, 2011)

Adams' pronouncement came as music to the ears of two administrators new to the Gwinnett campus: Ruth S. Bettandorff, a former senior administrator with the University of Georgia's Center for Continuing Education, who was appointed as assistant vice president for academic affairs and director of the Gwinnett campus in March 2009; and Laura D. Jolly, formerly the dean of the College of Family and Consumer Sciences, who was named vice president for instruction in September 2010. Administration of UGA's satellite campuses was moved under the purview of Jolly's office, while Boehmer's duties were focused in a new position as associate provost for academic planning. To Bettandorff, the sky is the limit:

> With the new direction on graduate programs, I think the Gwinnett campus is probably one of the most important new endeavors of the university. This center, more so than any of the other extended campuses certainly, and maybe equally so to Athens, is the place where growth is going to take place. This is where the students are, and in the working segment of graduate students, you have got to go

to them. The university has to reach out. (Personal communication, May 25, 2011)

Jolly concurred in an interview on May 24, 2011: "We're only hampered by our ability to identify populations and programs and make that match, because it's a large population base in that area. . . . I think the University of Georgia's brand recognition in that market is definitely for us."

Bettandorff has been working to become embedded in the community, to market the offerings of the program in any way she can, and to be responsive to community needs. In keeping with this effort, the university has purchased a $5,000 membership in the Gwinnett Chamber of Commerce—the highest level—to enable Bettandorff to be at the table with key movers and shakers in the Gwinnett community and to counter negative impressions of UGA's commitment to the local area.

> Wherever I go, Gwinnett is the institution of choice, and there is some sense that still lingers about UGA not stepping up to the plate at some point in the distant past and coming in here with full-blown programs with great gusto. (Bettandorff, personal communication, May 25, 2011)

Jolly and Bettandorff are working with Miller to find financial incentives to further entice departments to explore new graduate programs at the campus. For the past two fiscal years, $50,000 has been set aside as seed funding for program development. Bettandorff has spread this funding across eight to ten units to conduct preliminary marketing (focus groups, surveys, etc.) and to do some initial curriculum development. Jolly says that five curriculum proposals are in the pipeline—including one for a kinesiology/sport management program in the College of Education and another for a

doctorate in public health by the College of Public Health. At this pace, space management might soon become a real concern; Jolly says the SACS on-site reaccreditation team encouraged the university to conduct a five-year space plan for its Gwinnett programs. “In Gwinnett, we’re more space limited, so we need to know what learning environment they [faculty] need, what kind of technology they need. Many of these programs are technology-rich” (Jolly, personal communication, May 24, 2011).

One of the challenges for Gwinnett administrators is that they are disconnected from the pipeline for approval of graduate programs at the campus. Although there are numerous steps in the process to have an external degree program approved, neither the vice president for instruction nor the Gwinnett campus administrator is directly involved.[31] Because no cue is in place to alert Jolly and Bettandorff that a program is under development, it is feasible that it could reach the University Curriculum Committee and be as little as a semester away from implementation before they are aware of its pending creation. Jolly and Bettandorff say they were caught off guard by the pending approval of the kinesiology/sport management degree, a program that they wholeheartedly endorse for its strong potential but one that they had to scramble to accommodate because of the unexpected influx of 25 to 30 students. Jolly says her office needs to develop a formal process to signal program development and to schedule classes in the settings that best accommodate their needs.

[31] In 2011, external graduate program proposals at the University of Georgia initiate with faculty and require the approval of the department head, school/college curriculum committee, dean of school/college, Graduate School dean for review, Graduate School program committee, Graduate School council, provost, University Curriculum Committee, executive committee (to place on the University Council agenda), University Council, UGA president, and ultimately the Board of Regents for administrative approval from the University System office. (Personal communication with Fiona Liken, director of curriculum management at UGA, October 6, 2011)

These growing pains are good problems to have, Jolly and Bettandorff contend. Final enrollment for Fiscal Year 2011 (including Summer 2010, Fall 2010, and Spring 2011) was 1,236. Total tuition revenue for the same time period was $3,454,853.[32] Although Bettandorff continues to worry about the absence of a signed MOU to be the sole provider of graduate and continuing education in Gwinnett, neither she nor Jolly has any doubt that the university should invest heavily to plant a flag solidly in the Gwinnett market. "In terms of our reach and our brand and the University of Georgia being the major flagship, we can't just be here," said Jolly in the interview. "I think it's helpful and important for the University of Georgia at large to go beyond the bounds of Athens and to be visible in the state in other ways."

Epilogue

A visitor standing at the intersection of Collins Hill Road and Highway 316 in Lawrenceville today will see a bustling Georgia Gwinnett College campus that is alive with activity: more than 8,000 students (a dramatic rise from 118 in Fall 2006), a growing number of whom live in the residence halls added in Fall 2010; more than one million square feet of instructional space, including a new instructional laboratory facility that will eventually become part of a larger allied health building; and a robust athletic program led by a new athletic director, hired to implement a plan to add intercollegiate sports via membership in the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA)

[32] This information was supplied via email from Assistant Vice President Bettandorff on September 23, 2011. Bettandorff notes that the data only capture students coded as being based at Gwinnett; some students also take courses at Gwinnett who are coded as Athens or Buckhead students. The enrollment number again differs from that reported in Appendix F; Bettandorff believes this is most likely a coding issue. Beginning in Fall 2010, she started working with the home departments of every student to verify their coding and found a large number coded as Athens who should have been coded as Gwinnett. Those students were recoded by the Graduate School.

beginning in Fall 2012 (Georgia Gwinnett College, July 28, 2011). The campus even has its own mascot, a grizzly bear. More than three-quarters of the students in the Fall 2010 class (the last class for which statistics are posted) hail from Gwinnett County (GGC Facts, 2011), and according to a report by the Selig Center for Economic Growth in the University of Georgia's Terry College of Business, Georgia Gwinnett College accounted for 1,348 jobs and pumped $130 million into the state's economy during Fiscal Year 2010 (Selig Center, 2011). The state's investment in the campus has been more than $200 million to date (Diamond, 2011).

At the Old Peachtree Road exit just off I-85, the University of Georgia's Gwinnett campus also hums with activity: a total of 465 graduate students are enrolled in Fall 2011, pursuing courses in 18 advanced degree programs and three certificate programs. Continuing education courses offered by the University of Georgia Center for Continuing Education, the Educational Technology Center, and the University of Georgia's Small Business Development Center also are thriving.

To Gwinnett County leaders, the blend offers the best of both worlds. "I think it's absolutely working now," said County Administrator Nash in an interview on June 16, 2011. "We're excited about the response from the community, the development that we've been able to put together financial support for." Former Regent White is pleased that the goal of access is being met for Gwinnett high school graduates:

> There are a lot of kids that have to first get into college, and they could not get into UGA because of the requirements. So by having the campus here, if they want to come here and try to transfer to UGA, they obviously have that ability or to any of the schools within the University System. . . . We can get them started

on the right path by having their own separate access institution right here in Lawrenceville. (Personal communication, May 27, 2011)

Even Chancellor Huckaby, at first opposed to the establishment of an independent college, has warmed up to some of the more innovative policies in place at the campus, such as the absence of tenure (faculty receive annual contracts) and a greater infusion of technology in instruction.

> I've changed my mind because I do like what they've done. I like their approach. I like their philosophy, and if they had been under the aegis of the University of Georgia, and in particular, UGA's faculty governance model, it could never have happened. (Huckaby, personal communication, June 6, 2011)

Knapp and Adams are quick to point out that the flagship has a long heritage of service as the genesis of new institutions spawned to strengthen the state system. For example, all three of Georgia's other Research-1 institutions—Georgia State, Georgia Tech, and the Medical College of Georgia—were once part of the University of Georgia.[33]

> In a lot of ways, Georgia Gwinnett is in some ways a spin-off. It started out as its own campus, and I don't deny that history, but the ground was a lot more fertile when Georgia Gwinnett started because of the work that Georgia Perimeter and UGA had already done in the community." (Adams, personal communication, June 14, 2011)

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[33] For more on the establishment of the University System's other research institutions, consult Cameron Fincher's *Historical Development of the University System of Georgia, 1932-2002* (2d ed.; 2003), published by the University of Georgia Institute of Higher Education. T. G. Dyer's *The University of Georgia: A Bicentennial History, 1785-1985*, published by the University of Georgia Press (1985), and *Engineering the New South: Georgia Tech, 1885-1985*, a centennial history written by Robert C. McGrath, Jr. (et al.) and published by the University of Georgia Press (1985), also are valuable resources.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The University of Georgia's experience in entering the undergraduate instructional market but ultimately establishing a robust advanced degree program at an extended campus in Gwinnett County presents a complex case study of a situation that evolved over the course of nearly three decades. It was, as former UGA President Knapp noted, "a unique confluence of substance and politics," with both factors equally at play.

With a case that is so specific, what lessons can be gleaned to be of assistance to academic planners in the future? While I, as a qualitative researcher, cannot purport to derive findings with general application from such a discrete example, I hope that the observations in this chapter will provoke self-reflection on the part of academic planners who are contemplating the development of extended campuses in the future. Perhaps it will prompt them to anticipate potential issues that could arise within the unique context of their own campus (or system) and plan ahead to avoid missteps. In structuring my analysis, I will first review the initial research questions posed in this dissertation, connect them to the literature and case study, and then provide some considerations and practical recommendations.

To review, the research questions guiding this dissertation are as follows:

1. What are the motivations for research universities to establish extended instructional campuses?

2. What are the internal and external dynamics that influence decisions regarding whether to establish instructional branch campuses, how to manage them, and where to site them?
3. Why and how do the stated purposes and missions of extended instructional campuses evolve over time?

Connection to the Literature

As the flagship institution in the state, two university presidents felt obligated to answer the state's call when encouraged to provide instructional programs in one of the fastest growing counties in the country—initially at the graduate level and then with a foray into undergraduate delivery. Although the university placed its first toe into the water of program delivery in Gwinnett via the introduction of advanced degree programs in the mid-1980s, the effort gained significant momentum in the 1990s, due to a convergence of many factors, including demographics, the rising reputational status of the University of Georgia and concomitant demands for greater access, and politics (particularly the important role of positional power and coalitions).

The motives of Presidents Charles B. Knapp and Michael F. Adams touched on all four broad categories cited by Oblinger et al. in the ACE report of 2001 (access, alleviation of capacity constraints, revenue generation, and transformation to meet the needs of the market). They were compelled not only by altruistic motives to increase access but also by the opportunity to relieve admissions pressure on a physically constrained main campus. In addition, by planting the university's flag in a new area, the university could extend its brand, potentially reap entrepreneurial rewards as a first mover in the market, and possibly gain political points from state officials for being a

team player. Birnbaum and Eckel (2005) wrote of the necessity for institutional presidents to be politically astute, navigating tricky waters to achieve "peace with progress." Adams, who commented in the interview that he has become "pretty good at—not perfect at, but pretty good at"—reading the political tea leaves in the state, said that he viewed the expansion of instructional programs at the undergraduate level in Gwinnett as "a fait accompli." He recalled that he "showed up at the time when it was supposed to get done, and it was just one of the things on my plate" (Personal communication, June 14, 2011).

Yet while these internal and external factors prompted a strategic move to enter the Gwinnett market and then to twice change direction (first graduate programs, then additional undergraduate programs, and then back to graduate programs), a host of factors affected implementation. On the homefront, senior administrators struggled to gain faculty buy-in for the introduction of undergraduate programs and calm their fears about a diversion of resources during a recession. Simultaneously, administrators were challenged to work through the morass of bureaucracy required to establish new degree programs. Externally, a politically savvy and well-connected contingent of local leaders amassed support, slowly building the strength of their coalition and positioning themselves to achieve their ultimate goal—creation of their community's own stand-alone institution of higher learning—when the window of opportunity finally presented itself.

The process of the Gwinnett campus' development mirrored the path observed by deGive and Olswang (1999) in the formation of the branch campus system in the state of Washington: 1) agenda-setting; 2) alternative formation (through which diverse potential

solutions were considered); and 3) policy choice through formal legislative action. However, an important distinction is that deGive and Olswang observed a process that was essentially linear, with an identified starting and ending point for each phase. In the case of Gwinnett, the process was much more organic, with some stages occurring concurrently. Plans for the delivery of instructional programs in Gwinnett were developed, and the University of Georgia and Georgia Perimeter College moved forward with implementation. However, other options remained on the table, and ultimately, a different solution was chosen and affirmed through political mandate to fund the newly authorized campus.

McGuinness (2005) noted essentially the same pattern when growing urban areas desired advanced educational programs. The Gwinnett case study also illustrated Kingdon's (1984) exploration of the "window of opportunity," the fleeting moment when adroit policy entrepreneurs can push through their agendas. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) observed that this window often breaks a period of stability, akin to the role of punctuated equilibrium in fossil theory. Civic leaders in Gwinnett had been advocating for an independent institution of higher learning since the 1970s, but only when key state and local players aligned in their mission and the need was clearly justified by data, did the status quo break. The quick success of the 2+2 arrangement of Georgia Perimeter College and the University of Georgia served as pilot program for the establishment of a new institution in the system. However, as Steve Wrigley, the current senior vice chancellor for administration of the University System of Georgia, observed:

> This was not a 'bridge to nowhere' situation in Gwinnett County. . . There was a need and it was not being met, and collectively we the state leadership—

> governors and legislators and Board of Regents—probably much earlier should have dealt with it and seen it coming and addressed it sometime in the 1980s, probably. And so, as a result, anything you put up there was going to be successful. (Personal communication, June 7, 2011)

In addition, Robert Boehmer, UGA's senior administrator for the Gwinnett campus, learned first-hand through his dogged efforts to develop an operational Memo of Understanding with the Board of Regents that the crucial question of *who* makes the decision had already limited *how* it would be made (Baldridge et al., 1977). Boehmer was a prime player on the field of the game but was not in a position of power to be calling the plays; in other words, he did not realize that the end game had been pre-determined. Even President Adams, who—like President Knapp before him—had assumed that the venture would eventually result in the establishment of a new college—did not realize how soon the buzzer would sound.

In the midst of the conflict, straddling both internal and external lines and holding the trump card of power, was the University System of Georgia Board of Regents, putting what former Chancellor Portch termed as the "cold, hard eye" on a strategic plan for optimizing service to the entire state, with the best means of delivery in Gwinnett County representing just one piece of the equation.

> This isn't about institutions; it's about the state's best interests, and that's why you have a Board of Regents at the state level. Data have to inform these decisions. Politics is always going to have a hand in it, but it should never have the upper hand. (Personal communication, June 15, 2011)

Ultimately, the confluence of politics and need flowed in the local contingent's favor. One could argue that, in a system of public higher education, this is exactly what should have transpired. In a testament to the power of the people, and driven by the influence of the leaders they had elected (or, in the case of the regents and chancellor, who were appointed) to represent their interests, the will of the people held sway. Consistent with Pfeffer's (1981) findings, the individuals wielding the most power reaped the greatest rewards. In 2006, the doors to the first four-year institution established by the University System of Georgia in more than a century opened, proudly bearing "Gwinnett" in its moniker.

Over the course of a decade, the University of Georgia had expanded its long-standing commitment to graduate and professional degree programs to encompass undergraduate programs, and then had returned to its original mission. However, UGA recommitted itself to delivery of graduate, professional, and certificate programs with renewed fervor. The university enlisted the aid of several consultants to analyze the market and identify the optimal location for a graduate center solely its own, and in 2008, began teaching classes in that facility. The university also decided to install a full-time administrator in place at the site.

UGA's significant investment in these highly lucrative offerings attests to Slaughter and Rhoades' (2004) observation of the reorienting of graduate-level education to respond to the external employment marketplace and generate revenue. Even though UGA received no guarantee of exclusivity, it gained considerable support from key regents and community leaders to retain its foothold in Gwinnett County. Thus, the venture met Porter's (1987) three conditions for valuable diversification: 1) delivery of

advanced programs remained structurally attractive; 2) the cost of entry could be recouped through rising enrollment in expanding graduate offerings; and 3) the university passed the 'better off' test by maintaining competitive advantage as the first mover in the market for advanced degree programs and by building its rapport with political leaders at the local and state levels.

Other Considerations

While the ties from this case study to the literature are certainly strong, there are several points of deviation, in which other unique factors make the analysis much more complex. These mitigating circumstances are particularly relevant given the budgetary necessity for all state systems to examine how they deliver educational programs and design a means to provide those services more efficiently. Options for extended campus operations and distance learning programs, designed to improve the outreach of fiscally constrained systems, will most likely be considered. In the state of Georgia, for example, Chancellor Huckaby announced in a September press release distributed by Associate Vice Chancellor for Media and Publications John H. Millsaps III the launch of three initiatives to change higher education in Georgia; one of them is to assess whether campus consolidations can better control costs while meeting the system's mission of teaching, research, and service.

> I believe it is time for the system to study if campus consolidations are justified and will enhance our ability to serve the people of Georgia at less cost. We in the university system should be the first to ask questions of ourselves to make sure we are serving the State in the best way. (Millsaps, 2011)

Huckaby stated in the release that a complete and objective analysis will be conducted and that no plans for specific institutional consolidations have been made. Huckaby's staff—and system administrators contemplating similar scenarios in other states to gain efficiencies—might have their decision-making informed by the findings of this dissertation, particularly when considering issues that could arise when two institutions must forge a working relationship to deliver programs. I will focus my examination of these issues on three key points: 1) sharp mission analysis; 2) efficient administrative processes; and 3) the "compass" theory.

Mission Analysis

In the case of any consideration of extended programs, two key questions need to be asked at both the institutional and system levels: 1) What are the needs; and 2) What is the best way to meet them? University leaders should ask themselves whether the proposed program falls within the scope of the institution's mission. If so, does it have the institutional capacity to resource the programs adequately and maintain or enhance its quality, or does the venture weaken the institution's strengths? As Steve Wrigley, the current senior executive vice chancellor for the University System of Georgia said, mission dilution does not benefit anyone:

> You're really not doing anybody any good if you're an A institution in a lot of areas and you decide to pursue an extended campus or campuses and suddenly your home campus is a B+ in order to have a B or B+ extended campus. I think that's a leveling in terms of quality that doesn't serve anybody's needs. (Personal communication, June 7, 2011)

From a system standpoint, arbiters should be prepared to apply Chancellor Portch's "cold eye" to the proposal. In keeping with Glenny (1970), Portch observed in an interview that "state needs have got to trump institutional egos and ambitions every time." Sitting Chancellor Huckaby agreed:

> You have to sit back and try to take a system perspective, state perspective on what public higher education should be doing in the state. If it doesn't happen here, it won't happen anywhere. . . . [E]ach president is going to be looking out for their own institution. That's not necessarily inappropriate, but there will be times when we have to step back and take a larger view. (Personal communication, June 6, 2011)

In addition, both the system and the institution should ask themselves whether another institution, perhaps situated closer to the desired location, would be more familiar with the market and be better positioned to deliver a program quickly. Proximity should not always be the sole determinant, however. In addition, decision makers need to ponder Collins' (2001) hedgehog concept and determine whether the closest institution actually offers the *best* mode of instructional delivery. In the case of the University of Georgia in Gwinnett, the system's flagship—an institution regarded as one of the top public research universities in the country and with ever-rising standards for admission—was charged with providing access programs in a rapidly growing metropolitan area. As USG Senior Policy Advisor Watts noted when co-presenting the recommendation to create Georgia Gwinnett College to the Board of Regents with Senior Vice Chancellor Papp in 2004:

> To have a research university offering baccalaureate programs means having the most expensive faculty in the System with the lowest teaching load and with

> research needs. A state college faculty would be a lower-cost faculty dedicated to teaching with no research component and, thus, would be much more cost-effective. (USG Minutes, October 2004)

As a member within a system of schools, duplication of programs must be avoided and geographic territory respected. This is especially an issue for a land-grant institution like the University of Georgia to consider. While its historic mission may be to serve the entire state, many sister institutions elsewhere in the system also have a vested interest in serving local communities. If a large institution is perceived to be overstepping its boundaries, inner-system conflict can result. It is the governing board's responsibility to keep such situations in check. As former Chancellor Meredith advised:

> You don't have carte blanche to go across the state in every program area just because you're a major research university. You have particular areas in which you have statewide responsibility, but other than that, you've got to play by the same rules that everybody else is playing by. (Personal communication, June 1, 2011)

Administrative Processes

If an extended program is determined to be compatible with the institution's mission, then an institution must next examine its administrative processes in order to determine whether it will be capable of adequately resourcing the program via quickly approved programs, sufficient faculty lines, and a method of funding that entices schools to participate via incentives. It is imperative that an institution understands its priorities and plays to its strengths.

For research universities, this could mean that an institution does not pursue general undergraduate programs in extended locations but rather invests in graduate programs, where the potential for revenue is much higher. Highly specialized undergraduate programs also could fill a niche in the market. Wolfe and Strange (2003) advised that research institutions might face too much of a mission conflict if they attempt to meet not only their traditional needs but also the expectations of a community-based constituency.

Also, research universities are not customarily known for being nimble. An institution that decides to be entrepreneurial and expand its offerings should be prepared to respond quickly to the marketplace, which—as demonstrated in UGA's experience in Gwinnett—will be eager to see results. The administration needs to obtain faculty endorsement and engagement from the outset in any innovative venture in order for it to succeed. This is particularly true if institutional leaders seek to streamline the degree approval process, which appropriately remains the province of the faculty. UGA found it difficult to bring new programs into the Gwinnett market expeditiously. By comparison, its partner—Georgia Perimeter College—could introduce new programs much more efficiently. The difference was faculty governance—a necessary but sometimes laborious process at a research institution that does not wield such significant influence at a two-year institution. If rapidly establishing a program in an extended campus is a priority, then research university administrators must engage the faculty in devising a solution to streamline cumbersome processes that impede its ability to seize entrepreneurial opportunities. As College of Education Associate Dean Cervero opined:

> There's an office on campus that I have never seen but I know its effect, which is to prevent us from achieving our mission. . . . We're using all of the same machinery in 2011 that we could have been using 100 years ago in terms of the approval of academic programs. (Personal communication, May 26, 2011)

In addition, as the University of Georgia has recently experienced, a cue should be initiated in the degree approval process whereby administrators of the extended program are notified that a new program is pending; this will enable them to plan ahead to schedule the classes, arrange for the requisite instructional technology in the most appropriate setting, and avoid scrambling for space at the last minute.

Faculty support also is essential on other fronts. In the case of the University of Georgia, faculty balked when the recommendations of the Gwinnett Program Committee, which had been presented to the faculty senate, were not followed in implementation. Opposition grew more intense when academic units became resentful of the human resource costs of their participation, which some viewed as an unfunded mandate with hidden administrative costs. To counter such concerns, an institution must be prepared to provide financial support to offset travel time and free faculty from demands on the main campus. Ample support of faculty lines to initiate the new programs is essential, although it can be a challenge to secure the funding and justify the expense to the main campus during a recession—yet another challenge faced by the University of Georgia in entering the undergraduate market in Gwinnett. UGA also discovered that the credit hour production model has shortcomings in the eyes of the academic units—chiefly, the lag time before the full value of the earned funding is credited to their accounts.

Compass Theory

In an extension of Collins' (2001) recommendation to ensure that you have "the right people on the bus," I recommend that a compass be issued to all the passengers, especially those who are taking turns at the wheel, and that they head in the same direction.[34] From the outset, asynchronous perceptions of the vision for the Gwinnett campus by administrators at all levels hampered its ability to operate efficiently. Portch and Meredith regarded the UGA/GPC partnership as a pilot program to transition to a four-year campus; Adams and Knapp thought much the same but believed the partnership would last longer than a few short years; Muyskens envisioned an umbrella approach, through which the Gwinnett University Center would offer programs not only delivered by the University of Georgia and Georgia Perimeter College but by many other institutions in the system; and Papp was analyzing the system as a whole but receiving mixed signals from the university about its commitment to Gwinnett. In the midst of this chaos was Boehmer at the managerial level of the campus, striving to secure a Memorandum of Understanding that would establish the bounds of the partnership and set the terms of a long-lasting relationship with the University System of Georgia and Gwinnett community. In the absence of a Memorandum of Understanding, and with no real positional authority vested in Muyskens as CEO of the Gwinnett University Center, both institutional partners established their own administrative support functions and jockeyed with one another over classroom space to teach their courses.

In light of the university's experience, consensus on a clear and consistent direction would be advisable to any institution considering an extended campus—particularly a co-located branch—in the future. In President Adams' 2005 letter to

[34] Collins contends that if you have the right people on the bus, they will figure out how to drive it.

Chancellor Meredith, in which he sought partial reimbursement for the university's outlay of resources in Gwinnett, Adams noted that there was no "pre-nuptial" agreement at the start of the marriage. A Memorandum of Understanding between the governing body and institution(s) that states the mission from the outset to all parties involved would bring clarity and efficiency to the process, allowing administrators and faculty to focus on program development rather than continually striving to establish the bounds of the relationship. But—how practical is such an agreement? Would a newly hired president—charged by the governor and chancellor with expanding operations in a county that was rapidly growing in size, wealth, and political influence—really have been able to turn down the proposition or to hold fast in a demand for an MOU with his superiors?

Even if such an agreement were reached, all parties to it would need to ensure that its terms were not so tightly defined that they limited the organic development of the academic programs at the campus. As an alternative, a sunset clause might be considered. Former Senior Vice Chancellor Papp (now the president of Kennesaw State University) recommended the requirement of a sunset clause to state the duration of the arrangement, or at least a time when it would need to be self-sufficient monetarily or face dissolution. This would not only protect the institution financially but also would help to imbue confidence among internal constituents, who could be assured that there are bounds to the institution's investment. The sunset clause also could help to measure the level of investment by the local community, which cannot always be accepted at face value. Many communities long for a higher education institution, but they are unable to back up that wish with the same remarkable level of support that Gwinnett provided.

Recommendations

When contemplating a major strategic decision to establish programs in an extended location, senior leaders must exercise extreme caution. While the prospect of planting the flag into new territory and tapping new markets for revenue can be alluring, university and system administrators must realize that an institution's reputation is at stake. A decision to introduce instructional programs in a new market should be recognized as a long-term commitment that will require a significant and sustained investment in faculty, facilities, information technology, and library resources, as Weisbrod et al. observed in 2008. Community promises of support sometimes fall short, and a failed venture can harm the value of the institution's brand with internal and external constituents. While this by no means happened in the University of Georgia's experience in Gwinnett, and the graduate/professional program there is now thriving, this is a key point that must be understood by any administrator poised to enter a new market. Tread carefully: A rational process, driven by data and not emotions, must inform decision-making.

Toward that end, I offer four practical recommendations based on the findings of this case study for those who have reached the decision to enter an extended market:

- *Location, location, location.* Follow the real estate adage of "location, location, location," when selecting a site for extended programs. Think critically about proximity to major highways; visibility and curb appeal; the availability of convenient parking; the flexibility of the space; and room for expansion. Be careful not to encroach on the perceived "turf" of other system schools without solid justification for doing so. Think creatively about not

only using the facility for class but also as a means to market it to the community for conferences, meetings, and special events.

- *Know your audience.* Conduct a thorough market study of the needs and opportunities in the proposed market to validate the legitimacy of the community's desire. Investment in a quality survey upfront can pay dividends for the university in the long run. Determine how many people are living in the immediate area with some college but not a completed degree, and be ready to tap into that market. Research desired programs carefully and avoid going on the word of community leaders as to what courses are needed; instead, collect the data required to make an informed decision. Once the study is conducted and analyzed, be prepared to invest in a comprehensive marketing effort to publicize the new programs. This is absolutely essential when entering new territory. If possible, dedicate a pool of central funds to the campaign in order to: 1) help ensure the success of their launch; and 2) demonstrate to the academic units the university's partnership in this mutual commitment.
- *Manage onsite.* Establish a local presence in the community; do not attempt to manage from afar. Several interview subjects emphasized the criticality of being embedded in the community. It demonstrates the institution's sincere commitment to the betterment of the local community, not just to the prestige or profit of the institution itself. Associate Provost Boehmer, who had numerous responsibilities on the main campus other than those required to administer the extended locations, only spent Mondays and Fridays in

Gwinnett. This hampered him, he said, from fully understanding the political environment and from establishing a strong connection to civic and business leaders. Current Gwinnett administrator Bettandorff is determined to keep her finger on the pulse of the community: She has purchased a Chamber of Commerce membership at the highest level, is a regular speaker to Gwinnett civic groups, and stays in close contact with local mayors and public school officials.

- *Stay connected.* Maintain active, two-way communication between the main and extended campuses. Do not allow the faculty and staff in the distant location to feel as if they are a colony, isolated and on their own. This is important not only for the faculty but also for the functional units—admissions, registrar, curricular systems, etc. In Gwinnett, because the faculty are not considered separate and are full-time members of the main campus units, a rich exchange of information occurs. By all accounts, the colony mentality is not an issue in Gwinnett, which is just 45 minutes from the main campus. However, as Mintzberg (1979) noted, it can become an issue at more extended locations. Senior administrators considering such ventures should be mindful of these concerns and take early steps to counter them.

Further Study

When all is said and done, only the academic leaders at a particular institution can determine whether the suggestions presented in this dissertation are truly applicable and practical for their campus. My intention is to provide research that will help to inform

their decision-making and perhaps raise points that they might not have otherwise considered. This dissertation has been limited in its scope, focusing on only one discrete case of the establishment of an extended campus. Several future studies are envisioned:

1. Now that Georgia Tech has reached a decision regarding how it plans to proceed with its extended campus in Savannah, a juxtaposition of Georgia Tech's experience in Savannah contrasted with that of the University of Georgia in Gwinnett could be informative. I discussed this possibility with several of my interview subjects, and former Chancellor Portch, in particular, heartily endorsed it as a "very interesting pairing." In both cases, Portch contends, the decisions were made strategically: In the case of UGA in Gwinnett, to have a nearby institution address access and create an escape valve to vent its own explosive growth; and in the case of Georgia Tech's extended campus in Savannah, to preserve the mission of the state's nationally acclaimed engineering program. "You build on the shoulders of your giants," Portch opined in the interview on June 15, "so we knew we had to build on UGA and strengthen both of these institutions and certainly not weaken them." A further extension of this study could explore the development of branch campuses by flagship institutions in other selected states.
2. An examination of Georgia Perimeter College's investment in Gwinnett also could be enlightening. GPC actually had more at stake in the Gwinnett venture than the University of Georgia, and when the decision was made to transform the Gwinnett University Center into an independent four-year institution, GPC stood a very good chance of losing nearly one-third of its

enrollment overnight. However, rather than suffering such a devastating financial hardship, GPC—under the leadership of a new president, Anthony S. Tricoli—actually turned the situation around and grew enrollment. An examination of how this feat was accomplished could be instructive to fellow administrators.

3. The literature reflects little research on the various funding models for branch campuses. This was—and continues to be—an aspect of branch campus management that the University of Georgia is still striving to improve. At issue is not only the optimal funding model—e.g., credit hour production, tuition return, etc.—but also how to incentivize participation by the academic units. A study that examines best practices in other state systems could be of great benefit to academic fiscal planning.
4. In its examination of motivations to establish branch campuses, this dissertation speaks to the temptation that university and system administrators face to establish extended campuses at their "more agile peripheries" (Toma, 2009, p. 9) in order to increase revenue. However, are those boundaries really agile and lucrative, or do they more frequently result in losses of revenue? In the case of UGA's experience in Gwinnett County, the university was never made whole on an estimated loss of $11 million to develop undergraduate programs (although it can be argued that this delta will eventually be recouped through expanding enrollment in UGA's successful graduate and professional programs). A future study, carefully focused in accounting scope, could consider branch campus development by research universities in several states

and reveal whether those operations generally were profitable, broke even, or lost money.

In short, exploration of the field of extended campuses is an area where scholars have barely scratched the surface.

To summarize, the University of Georgia chose to pursue instructional programs at the undergraduate level in Gwinnett for three primary reasons: 1) service to the state as the flagship institution to address a need; 2) political reality; and 3) the potential for increased revenue. A host of internal and external dynamics affected these decisions as well as the means by which the new instructional programs would be managed and delivered to the local community. Competing visions for the future of the extended campus—what I have termed as the need to have everyone's compasses pointing in the same direction—challenged the university and system to manage the initiative in an efficient and effective way. In the end, the power of the people played a strong hand in determining the fate of the venture, as the coalition representing the interests of the local community seized the window of opportunity and prevailed in establishing the 35th institution of the University System of Georgia, Georgia Gwinnett College.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW REQUEST CONSENT FORM
(As Required for IRB Approval)

I, _____, agree to participate in a research study titled "COMPETING FACTORS IN ESTABLISHING EXTENDED CAMPUSES IN GEORGIA" conducted by Kathy R. Pharr from the Institute of Higher Education at the University of Georgia (542-1361) under the direction of Dr. Libby Morris, Vice Provost of Academic Affairs and Director of the Institute of Higher Education, University of Georgia (542-3464). I understand that my participation is voluntary. I can refuse to participate or stop taking part at anytime without giving any reason, and without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled. I can ask to have all of the information about me returned to me, removed from the research records, or destroyed.

The reason for this study is to examine the motivations for research universities to establish extended campuses, to explore the internal and external dynamics that influence decisions regarding whether to establish branch campuses and where to site them, and to examine how and why the stated purposes and missions of extended campuses evolve over time. The findings of this study will be used to inform academic leaders such as presidents, provosts and deans, who might be contemplating the establishment of extended campuses in the near future.

If I volunteer to take part in this study, I will be asked a series of questions in an interview with Ms. Pharr. It is expected that the interview session will last no more than an hour. Ms. Pharr will make an audio recording of the interview and also will take notes during our conversation. These tapes will be transcribed and the transcriptions maintained for a period of three years.

I will not be compensated for my participation nor receive any other personal benefit from participating in this study. No risk is expected. I understand that my participation will be made public and that my responses could be used in the dissertation. No promise of anonymity or confidentiality has been made to me.

The investigator, Ms. Pharr, will answer any further questions about the research, now or during the course of the project.

I understand that I am agreeing by my signature on this form to take part in this research project and understand that I will receive a signed copy of this consent form for my records.

_____	_____	_____
Name of Researcher	Signature	Date

Telephone: _____
Email: _____

_____	_____	_____
Name of Researcher	Signature	Date

Please sign both copies, keep one and return one to the researcher.

Additional questions or problems regarding your rights as a research participant should be addressed to The Chairperson, Institutional Review Board, University of Georgia, 612 Boyd Graduate Studies Research Center, Athens, Georgia 30602-7411; Telephone (706) 542-3199; E-Mail Address IRB@uga.edu.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SUBJECTS
(In alphabetical order by last name; date of interview appears beside each name)

Michael F. Adams – June 14, 2011
President of the University of Georgia (1997-Present)

Ruth S. Bettandorff – May 25, 2011
Associate Director for Learning Services at the Georgia Center for Continuing Education Conference Center and Hotel (2004-2009); Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs and Director of the Gwinnett Campus (2009-Present)

Robert G. Boehmer – May 25, 2011
Associate Professor of Legal Studies (1994-2004); Director of UGA SACS Accreditation Self-Study (1999-2001); Associate Provost for Institutional Effectiveness (2001-2006); Professor of Legal Studies (2004-Present); Interim Vice Provost (2006-2007); Associate Provost for Institutional Effectiveness and Extended Campuses (2007-2009); Associate Provost for Academic Planning (2010-Present)

Ronald M. Cervero – May 26, 2011
Professor of Adult Education (since 1990); Department Head, Adult Education at the University of Georgia College of Education (2001-2004); Department Head, UGA Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy (2004-2009); Associate Dean for Outreach and Engagement (2009-Present)

Richard L. Daniels – June 7, 2011
Professor of Management at the Terry College of Business (since 2000); Associate Dean for Executive Programs (2000-2003); Director of the Executive MBA Program (2004-2007); Director of Professional MBA Programs (2008); and Director of MBA Programs (2009-Present)

F. Wayne Hill – June 2, 2011
Gwinnett County Commission Chair (1993-2004)

Karen A. Holbrook – June 16, 2011
University of Georgia Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost (1998-2002); President of The Ohio State University (2002-2007); Senior Vice President for Research, Innovation, and Global Affairs and Professor of Molecular Medicine at the University of South Florida (2007-Present)

Henry M. Huckaby – June 6, 2011
University of Georgia Senior Vice President for Finance and Administration (2000-2006); Special Assistant to the President of the University of Georgia (2006-2009); Elected State Representative – House District 113 (January – June 2011); Chancellor of the University System of Georgia (July 1, 2011-Present)

Thomas P. Hughes – June 15, 2011
District 1 Commissioner – Gwinnett County Commission (1993-2001); Member of the Board of Directors of the Gwinnett Convention and Visitors Bureau (1992-Present)

Laura D. Jolly – May 24, 2011
Dean of the College of Family and Consumer Sciences at the University of Georgia (2007-2010); UGA Vice President for Instruction (2010-Present)

Charles B. Knapp – June 20, 2011
President of the University of Georgia (1987-1997); named President Emeritus in 2004; President of the Aspen Institute (1997-1999); Partner with Heidrick & Struggles Executive Search Firm (2000-2004); Senior Fellow at the UGA Institute of Higher Education (2005-Present)

Arnett C. Mace, Jr. – May 31, 2011
Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost at the University of Georgia (2003-January 1, 2010); Special Assistant to the President (2009-2011); Retired

Thomas Meredith – June 1, 2011
Chancellor of the University System of Georgia (2002-2005); Commissioner of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning (2005-2008); Retired

Christina J. Miller – June 3, 2011
Associate to the Provost (2003-2005); Associate Provost for Academic Fiscal Affairs (2005- Present)

James L. Muyskens – June 22, 2011
Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs for the University System of Georgia (1995-1999); Chief Executive Officer and Dean of the Faculty for the Gwinnett University Center (1999-2002); President of Queens College (2002-Present)

Charlotte J. Nash – June 11, 2011
Gwinnett County Administrator (1995-2004); Gwinnett County Commission Chair (since special election in March 15, 2011)

Daniel S. Papp – June 17, 2011
Director, Yamacraw Broadband Educational Programs in the USG Chancellor's Office (1999-2000); Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic and Fiscal Affairs (2000-2006); President of Kennesaw State University (2006-Present)

Stephen R. Portch – June 15, 2011
Chancellor of the University System of Georgia (1994-2001); now Chancellor Emeritus; higher education policy advisor, consultant, and speaker

Richard L. Tucker – June 2, 2011
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Gwinnett County Chamber of Commerce (1996-2003) and Chair (2005); Member of the Board of Regents (2005-2012) and Chair (2008-09); Charter Member of the Georgia Gwinnett College Board of Trustees

Robert E. Watts – June 1, 2011
Executive Vice President for Financial and Administrative Affairs at Georgia Perimeter College (1991-2000); Interim President of Floyd College (now Georgia Highlands) (2000-2001); Interim President of Middle Georgia College (2001-2002); Interim Director of the Gwinnett University Center and Senior Policy Advisor for the University System of Georgia (2002-2005); Interim President of Georgia Perimeter College (2005-2006); Chief of Staff to the Chancellor (2006-2007); Chief Operating Officer of the University System of Georgia (2007-2011)

Glenn S. White – May 27, 2011
Chair of the Gwinnett Chamber of Commerce (1993); Member of the Board of Regents (1997-2004) and Chair (2000-01); now President of the Atlanta Region of United Community Bank, and Charter Member and Chair of the Foundation's Board of Trustees for Georgia Gwinnett College

Vicky M. Wilkins – June 9, 2011
Assistant Professor (UGA) - 2003-2008; Associate Professor, Graduate Coordinator and MPA Director (2008-Present)

Steve W. Wrigley – June 7, 2011
UGA Vice President for Government Relations (2000-2011); Senior Vice President for External Affairs (2002-2006); Director of the Carl Vinson Institute of Government (2006-2011); Interim Vice President for Public Service and Outreach (April – June 2011); now Executive Vice Chancellor for Administration for the University System of Georgia (July 1, 2011-Present)

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY OF MILESTONES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA'S EXTENDED CAMPUS IN GWINNETT COUNTY

Spring 1984	Proposal for Resident Higher Education Center jointly adopted by University System of Georgia (USG) Board of Regents and Gwinnett County Board of Education
Fall 1984	First courses taught at Gwinnett Technical College location by two institutions: Gainesville State (associate's degrees) and University of Georgia (UGA) (advanced degrees)
Fall 1987	DeKalb College (later to become Georgia Perimeter - GPC) offers first courses in Gwinnett
Spring 1989	Resident Center (called University System Center - Gwinnett) moves from Gwinnett Technical Institute location to an office park on Sugarloaf Parkway
1994	Gwinnett County Commission purchases land for a new campus
Spring 1996	Gwinnett Policy Advisory Council jointly charged by UGA President Charles B. Knapp and GPC President Jacquelyn M. Belcher to examine case for expansion of higher education services in Gwinnett County
December 1997	USG Board of Regents unanimously approves a joint plan from UGA and DeKalb College to develop a Gwinnett University Center (GUC) on the land donated by the Gwinnett County Commission. DeKalb would administer two-year offerings, and UGA would confer all bachelor's, master's, and certificates.
Spring 1998	UGA President Michael F. Adams appoints a Gwinnett Program Committee and charges the group with preparing an educational program to meet the needs of Gwinnett County
December 1998	Final report of Gwinnett Program Committee is issued, after sharing preliminary recommendations with University Council in November

February 1999	Georgia General Assembly allocates $19.7 million for signature building at Gwinnett University Center
June 2000	Groundbreaking ceremony for Gwinnett University Center at the corner of Highway 316 and Collins Hill Road in Lawrenceville
December 2000	Board of Regents approves public-private venture with The University Financing Foundation for first classroom building at GUC
February 2001	Construction of first classroom building begins
January 2002	Dedication ceremony for the Gwinnett University Center
January 2002	Classes begin at the Gwinnett University Center
Fall 2002	UGA launches undergraduate degree programs at GUC
Fall 2003 - Spring 04	Total enrollment at GUC approaches 8,000, making it the ninth largest institution in the USG
August 2004	Proposal to transform GUC into 35th institution of the USG, Georgia Gwinnett College, is presented by USG senior administrative staff at a planning retreat for the Board of Regents
October 2004	Board of Regents approves creation of Georgia Gwinnett College; UGA and GPC given three years to exit undergraduate program delivery in Gwinnett, although UGA could retain advanced, professional, and continuing education programs
Fall 2004	UGA initiates efforts to secure its own stand-alone location for delivery of graduate, professional, and continuing education programs in Gwinnett County
Winter 2004	UGA and GPC begin series of negotiations with USG on exit strategy
March 2005	Georgia General Assembly approves funding of the first four-year institution added to the USG in more than a century
Fall 2006	Georgia Gwinnett College begins admitting students
Fall 2007	First freshman class enrolls at Georgia Gwinnett College
Summer 2007	UGA leases space along I-85 (Old Peachtree Road exit) for its graduate, professional, and continuing education programs

Spring 2008	UGA and GPC end undergraduate operations in Gwinnett County
Summer 2008	UGA begins operations in its new location for the University of Georgia Gwinnett Campus
January 2011	UGA President Michael F. Adams restates UGA's commitment to growth of graduate programs in his State of the University Address; Gwinnett is a key player in the effort
Fall 2011	UGA reports graduate enrollment of 465 at its Gwinnett campus

APPENDIX D

MAJOR LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF UGA'S GWINNETT CAMPUS

Spring 1984	UGA Vice President for Services (Outreach) S.E. Younts presents proposal to establish a Resident Higher Education Center on behalf of the Coordinating Committee for Higher Education in Gwinnett County
1993	Gwinnett banker and civic leader Glenn S. White is elected chair of the Gwinnett Chamber of Commerce; establishing an institution of higher learning in Gwinnett is one of his top three priorities
1994	Gwinnett County Commission Chair F. Wayne Hill leads the commission in purchasing land to donate to the University System of Georgia (USG) for a Gwinnett University Center. He appoints County Administrator Charlotte Nash and Commissioner Thomas P. (Tommy) Hughes to represent Gwinnett's interests in planning with the USG.
1993	Virgil Williams, a Gwinnett County leader who served as a close advisor to Governor Zell B. Miller, serves a one-year term on the USG Board of Regents
1994	Stephen R. Portch is appointed University System chancellor by Governor Zell Miller; immediately embarks on a strategic plan for development of the University System as a whole
1996	Enrollment in Gwinnett has grown exponentially; UGA President Charles B. Knapp and Georgia Perimeter College (GPC) President Jacquelyn M. Belcher jointly charge the Gwinnett Policy Advisory Council with examining the case for expansion of higher education offerings in Gwinnett County.
1996 - 2003	Richard L. Tucker serves as president and chief executive officer of the Gwinnett County Chamber of Commerce
1997	Glenn S. White is appointed to a seven-year term on the USG Board of Regents

1997	Michael F. Adams succeeds Charles B. Knapp as president of the University of Georgia. In December 1997, he presents a joint plan (with GPC) to initiate 2+2 programs in Gwinnett.
1998	Senior political science faculty member Delmer D. Dunn chairs the Gwinnett Program Committee, charged with developing recommendations for an educational program in Gwinnett
1998	Karen A. Holbrook is appointed as provost and senior vice president for academic affairs at the University of Georgia
1999	James L. Muyskens is appointed CEO and dean of the faculty of the Gwinnett University Center; was formerly senior vice chancellor for academic affairs for the USG
2000	Chancellor Portch appoints Daniel S. Papp as USG senior vice chancellor for academic and fiscal affairs
2000	Henry M. Huckaby is appointed as senior vice president for finance and administration at UGA
2000	Steve W. Wrigley is named as UGA's vice president for government relations
2000 - 2001	Regent Glenn S. White is elected to serve as chair of the Board of Regents
2001	Provost Holbrook appoints Associate Provost for Institutional Effectiveness Robert G. Boehmer as UGA’s senior administrator in Gwinnett
2002	UGA President Michael F. Adams joins GPC President Jacquelyn M. Belcher, GUC CEO Muyskens, Chamber of Commerce President and CEO Richard L. Tucker, and County Commission Chair Wayne Hill in cutting the ribbon at the dedication ceremony for the new Gwinnett University Center at the corner of Highway 316 and Collins Hill Road
2002	Thomas C. Meredith succeeds Stephen R. Portch as chancellor of the University System of Georgia
2002	CEO Muyskens resigns to take a position as president of Queens College; veteran USG administrator Robert E. Watts is appointed by Meredith as interim director of the Gwinnett University Center

2002	Karen A. Holbrook leaves UGA to become president of The Ohio State University
2003	Arnett C. Mace, Jr. succeeds Holbrook as UGA's provost and senior vice president for academic affairs
2004	Papp and Watts present regents with a recommendation to convert GUC to the 35th institution in the University System
2004	Boehmer begins a series of meetings with Papp, Watts, GPC Provost Charlotte J. Warren and other officials to devise an exit strategy to end undergraduate programs in Gwinnett
2005	Governor G.E. "Sonny" Perdue III signs legislation supporting the appropriation of funds to create the first new four-year institution approved by the USG in more than a century
2005	Richard L. Tucker succeeds Glenn S. White as a member of the University System Board of Regents
2006	Erroll B. Davis, Jr. is appointed chancellor of the University System of Georgia
2006	Timothy P. Burgess succeeds Henry M. Huckaby as senior vice president for finance and administration at UGA
2008-09	Richard L. Tucker serves as chair of the USG Board of Regents
2009	Ruth S. Bettandorff is named assistant vice president for academic affairs and director of the Gwinnett campus for UGA
2010	Laura D. Jolly is appointed UGA vice president for instruction, and instructional efforts at the extended campuses are moved under her purview; Boehmer is named associate provost for academic planning
2011	Charlotte J. Nash is elected chair of the Gwinnett County Commission
2011	Henry M. Huckaby is appointed chancellor of the University System of Georgia by Governor J. Nathan Deal
2011	Steve W. Wrigley is appointed USG executive vice chancellor for administration

APPENDIX E

SELECTED YEARS OF DEGREE DEVELOPMENT BY THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA AT ITS GWINNETT CAMPUS

2002 - 2003 Academic Year*

Undergraduate Programs (3)
Bachelor in Business Administration with a Major in General Business (B.B.A.)
Bachelor of Science in Educational Science, Training, and Technology (B.S.Ed.)
Bachelor of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies (A.B.)

Graduate Programs (11)
Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.)
Master of Social Work (M.S.W.)
Master of Adult Education (M.Ed.)
Master of Early Childhood Education (M.Ed.)
Master of Educational Leadership (M.Ed.)
Master of Instructional Technology (M.Ed.)
Master of Middle School Education (M.Ed.)
Master of Occupational Studies (M.Ed.)
Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.)
Master of Non-Profit Organizations (M.A.)
Master of Food Science and Technology (M.F.T.)

**Academic year 2002-03 marked the introduction of undergraduate degree programs by UGA at the Griffin campus.*
Source: Boehmer, R.G. (2002, April 17). Memo to Karen Holbrook: Rough draft of memo of understanding.

2004 - 2005 Academic Year**

Undergraduate Programs (7)
Bachelor in Business Administration with a Major in General Business (B.B.A.)
Bachelor of Science in Educational Science, Training, and Technology (B.S.Ed.)
Bachelor of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies (A.B.)
Bachelor of Science in Biology (B.S.)
Bachelor of Science in Science Education (B.S.Ed.)
Bachelor of Science in Special Education (B.S.Ed.)
Bachelor of Social Work (B.S.W.)

***2004-05 marked the last year that new undergraduate degree programs were developed by UGA for the Gwinnett campus.*
Source: Bettandorff, Ruth S. and Boehmer, R.G. (2011, October 4). Personal communication via email.

2007-2008 Academic Year

Master's Degree Programs (13)
Master of Adult Education (M.Ed.)
Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.)
Master of Educational Administration and Policy (M.Ed.)
Master of Early Childhood Education (M.Ed.)
Master of Food Technology (M.F.T.)
Master of Human Resources and Organizational Development (M.Ed.)
Master of Instructional Technology (M.Ed.)
Master of Internet Technology (M.I.T)
Master of Occupational Studies (M.Ed.)
Master of Pharmacy Regulatory Affairs (M.S.)
Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.)
Master of Social Work (M.S.W.)
Master of Special Education (M.Ed.)

Education Specialist Degrees (3)
Educational Administration and Policy (Ed.S.)
Instructional Technology (Ed.S.)
Professional School Counseling (Ed.S.)

Certificate Programs (2)
Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Regulatory Affairs
Pharmacy Clinical Trials Management

Doctoral Program (1)
Counseling and Student Personnel Services - Ph.D.

Source: Boehmer, R.G. (August 13, 2007). Letter to Belle S. Wheelan, President of SACS Commission on Colleges.

2011 - 2012 Academic Year:

Master's Degree Programs (10)
Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.)
Master of Educational Administration and Policy (M.Ed.)
Master of Food Technology (M.F.T.)
Master of Human Resources and Organizational Development (M.Ed.)
Master of Learning, Design, and Technology with emphasis in Instructional Design and Development (M.Ed.)

Master of Learning, Design, and Technology with School Library Media Certification
Master of Internet Technology (M.I.T)
Master of Pharmacy with emphasis in Regulatory Affairs (M.S.)
Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.)
Master of Social Work (M.S.W.)

Educational Specialist Degrees (4)
Educational Administration and Policy (Ed.S.)
Learning, Design, and Technology with emphasis in Instructional Design and Development (Ed.S.)
Learning, Design, and Technology with School Library Media Certification (Ed.S.)
Professional School Counseling (Ed.S.)

Doctoral Programs (3)
Adult Education (Ed.D.)
Counseling and Student Personnel Services (Ph.D.)
Educational Leadership (Ed.D.)

Credit Certificate and Certification Programs (3)
Marriage and Family Therapy
Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Regulatory Affairs
Pharmacy Clinical Trials Design and Management

Source: Bettandorff, R. S. (2011). Academic and Continuing Education Programs. List provided via personal communication on September 23, 2011.

APPENDIX F

ENROLLMENT AT UGA'S GWINNETT CAMPUS, 2002 - PRESENT

Semester	***Undergraduate***	***Graduate***	***Total***
Fall 2002*	55	498	553
Spring 2003	94	504	598
Summer 2003	72	506	578
Fall 2003	188	632	820
Spring 2004	237	588	825
Summer 2004	172	584	756
Fall 2004**	318	488	806
Spring 2005	371	526	897
Summer 2005	251	368	619
Fall 2005***	467	570	1037
Spring 2006	398	545	943
Summer 2006	228	452	680
Fall 2006	274	572	846
Spring 2007	209	567	776
Summer 2007	80	382	462
Fall 2007	67	530	597
Spring 2008	38	511	549
Summer 2008****	15	437	452

Fall 2008*****	3	510	513
Spring 2009	3	469	472
Summer 2009	6	351	357
Fall 2009	4	444	448
Spring 2010	3	423	426
Summer 2010	2	370	372
Fall 2010	0	446	446
Spring 2011	1	511	512
Summer 2011	1	415	416
Fall 2011	1	465	466

*First semester for which UGA undergraduate students were admitted.
**As of Fall 2004, only students whose "home" campus was Gwinnett were counted in the figures.
***After Fall 2004, no new UGA undergraduate students were admitted at Gwinnett.
****In Summer 2008, UGA offered programs in its new, stand-alone location for the Gwinnett campus.
*****Any undergraduate students coded for the Gwinnett campus in Fall 2008 or after were enrolled at the Athens campus to finish their degree programs.

Source: University of Georgia Office of Institutional Research FACTS Site (http://www.uga.edu/oir/factbks.htm); data between Fall 2002 and Summer 2004 were obtained from reports in the UGA Registrar's Office.