OSTRACISM AFTER OSTPOLITIK?

THE “SECOND-CLASS CITIZEN” PHENOMENON AMONG EAST GERMANS

by

MELANIE KOLBE

(Under the Direction of Christopher S. Allen)

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the perceived “second-class citizenship” among East Germans after German reunification in 1990 in scrutinizing the relationship between societal exclusion and sources of material discontent. Further, it explores the effect of societal exclusion on support for the national government. It finds evidence to suggest that meaningful societal inclusion requires material ability to participate and that this relationship is more pronounced among East Germans. However, societal exclusion was not found to impede governmental support among East Germans.

INDEX WORDS: Second-Class Citizenship, East Germans, Societal Exclusion

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This year marks the twenty year anniversary of the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Not only does it signify the end of a separated country, but also the end of the Cold War and the East-West bloc divide. Scholars as well as laypeople assumed that Germans from the East and West would eventually unite socially, politically and economically. They also assumed that existing political and economic differences as well as differentiations between the two social groups of East and West Germans would be overcome with time. This prediction seemed to be confirmed in the late 1990s, as living standards in Eastern regions rose, East/West salaries began to converge, and more East Germans were identifying with the Federal Republic and Western democratic values. However, over the last ten years a divide between the two peoples remains. According to a survey by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research in 2009, 42 percent of West Germans think that differences between people from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the people of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) outweigh similarities, while only twenty percent see more similarities than differences. East Germans perceive this even more strongly; only every tenth person feels that similarities are more prevalent. Sixty-three percent of East Germans see that West and East Germans are more different than similar from each other.[1] Stereotypes such as the "know-it-all", arrogant West Germans and morose, "whining" East Germans are

[1]Cp. Allensbacher Archiv, "Allensbacherbericht No.7/2009", Allensbach 2009 on: http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/pdf/prd_0907.pdf, accessed: 11/05/2009

common expressions of these perceptions of inter-group differences and are frequently invoked in media as well as public political discourses as a mental divide between people from the East and West part of Germany.

Apart from this, East and West Germans also disagree on the merits and disadvantages that unification caused for both parts of the country. In 1998, three quarters of West German respondents believed that unification mainly had brought disadvantages for them. Roughly 80 percent thought that East Germans instead had clearly received the merits of joining the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). By contrast, 75 percent of East German respondents charged West Germans with profiting from unification, and more than half of the Eastern respondents agreed that unification was disadvantageous for them.[2] Despite these obvious differences, reunification is still deemed the right decision and desired by both West and East Germans. Retrospectively, 80 percent of Germans wanted reunification immediately after the wall came down in 1990; and even in 2000, 85 percent of Germans surveyed believed it was desirable to reunify Germany (89 percent in the East and 85 percent in the West).[3]

However, ascribed differences and stereotypes between different regions are nothing new in Germany. In fact, they predate the 19th century German Confederation of what were then different German speaking states. Moreover, taking into consideration that East and West Germans had been ideologically and physically separated from each other, it is not surprising that these differences persist. But what is most politically noticeable and relevant (beyond the dynamics of collective identities) is the fact that when asked about their perception on citizenship in the Federal Republic, East Germans, on average, feel less like all-German citizens. They

[2] Cp. W. Wagner 1999 so cited in: Hufnagel, Rainer/ Simon, Titus, *Problemfall Deutsche Einheit – Interdisziplinäre Betrachtungen zu gesamtdeutschen Fragestellungen*, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 31
[3] Cp. Roth, Dieter, "Meinungsbild in Ost und West" in: Appel, Reinhard (ed.), *Einheit die ich meine 1990-2000*, Eltville 2000, p. 206

frequently express a feeling of being more like a "second-class citizen", a "Bürger zweiter Klasse", than a full member of society. According to surveys published by the EMNID market and social research company, 87 percent of East Germans agreed to the self-description of being a "second-class citizen" in 1990. By 1995 this number declined to about 70 percent, but increased again to 80 percent in 1997/1998. In April 1999, the feeling of "second-class citizenship" was back to the figure of 1990.[4] These statistics are confirmed by a recent study conducted by the University of Bielefeld in 2008. According to the survey, 73 percent of East Germans believed that they are indeed disadvantaged in comparison to their West German peers. By contrast, only 13 percent of West Germans reported feeling like "second-class citizens," and only a fourth felt disadvantaged in comparison to East Germans.[5]

A comparable finding is presented by Allensbach. Interestingly, East Germans seem to be evenly split in their feelings of second-class citizenship. In 1999, 45 percent of respondents disagreed with this description; in 2002, 36%; and in 2004, again 42% of respondents did not share this feeling.[6] Finally, the latest aggregate study published by Volkssolidarität organization finds similar sentiments, highlighting a continuous problem amongst East Germans with identifying themselves as "full citizens." In 1997, 68 percent of East Germans agreed that they did not feel like full citizens, but did not wish back the GDR either. Although this number decreased to 60 percent by 2008, the number of East Germans that already felt like full citizens only increased minimally from 16 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2008. It fell back to 17

[4] Cp. Schroeder, Klaus, *Der Preis der Einheit – Eine Bilanz*, München 2000, p. 186; cp. Pollack, Detlef/ Pickel, Gert, "Die ostdeutsche Identität – Erbe des DDR-Sozialismus oder Produkt der Wiedervereinigung? Die Einstellung der Ostdeutschen zur sozialen Ungleichheit und Demokratie?", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ), B41-42, 1998, p. 15 ff

[5] Cp. Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung Universität Bielefeld, "Deutsche Zustände im 20. Jahr nach dem Fall der Mauer", Bielefeld 2008 on*:* www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/download/Pressemappe2008.doc, accessed: 12/04/2009

[6] Cp. Schroeder 2006, p. 396

percent in 2004, but increased to 25 percent in 2008.[7] The combined observations in Figure 1 convey the picture that East Germans appear to maintain high levels of "second-class citizenship" identification, although a clear decline is evident.



Source: Cross-Survey Results: (1) Deutsche Volkssolidarität 2009; (2) EMNID so cited in: Schroeder 2000, p. 186; (3) Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung Universität Bielefeld 2008, (4) Allensbach so cited in: Schroeder 2006, p. 396

Figure 1: Agreement Among East German Respondents to "Second-Class Citizen Feeling"

It is worth noting that East German identity involves a "cognitive" disadvantage, not an actual legal or political discrimination. Yet, whether this feeling is real or imagined, self-inflicted or through no fault of one's own is irrelevant; a substantial portion of the East German population

[7] Cp. Deutsche Volkssolidarität, "20 Jahre friedliche Revolution 1989 bis 2009 - Die Sicht der Bürger der neuen Bundesländer" on: http://www.sfz-ev.de/Aktuelles/Medien/presse_2009/Pressematerial_20_07_2009.pdf, accessed: 12/04/2009

still feels marginalized and as “Büger zweiter Klasse.” The above-named survey results present, therefore, a fascinating puzzle. After twenty years of unification, it seems that differences between the East and West still prevail, and East Germans on average find it hard to identify as full citizens of the Federal Republic. This contrasts with the rosy predictions of eventual German unity and integration of both peoples under one nation. Therefore, this research investigates why a substantial number of East Germans still perceive themselves as “second-class citizens.” It focuses specifically on socio-structural indicators over time, offering possible explanations for these persistent feelings of exclusion. Further, this study also examines the disturbing question as to whether this feeling is strong enough to translate into a lack of political support for the state of Germany. Will East Germans support a state of which they do not feel a part? This question is a critical one, as there may be considerable political implications if East Germans are found to be unsupportive of the Federal Republic. Finally, knowing if and why cleavages between East and West Germans exist is vital for politicians and their strategic positioning in party competition. In sum, this thesis aims at a spatial and temporal examination of the sources of civic discontent among East Germans leading to a self-classification as only partial citizens of Germany and its implications for the support of the political system.

In the following, this thesis will present a review on existing literature regarding this topic and will also elucidate its societal background in Germany. It will then proceed to highlight the concept of “second-class citizenship” among East Germans, interpreting it as a feeling of relative societal exclusion, and the role of employment in it. From this on, a theory of lacking societal inclusion will be developed that argues that there is a meaningful relationship between feelings of exclusion and relative material concerns that sets East Germans apart from others. Furthermore, it will be argued that this feeling of exclusion can impede governmental support. In

testing this theory via descriptive as well as multivariate analyses the thesis aims to explore possible evidence for this over time as well as across sections. Finally, the findings and possible implication will be discussed. Here, implications of this thesis's work will be expanded to cases similar to this one. Although it focuses on Germany as a crucial case of economic "second-class citizenship" this thesis argues that theory as well as findings of the impact of economic exclusion of individuals of same kinship is important for potential international shadow cases such as China and South Korea.

CHAPTER 2

Public Discourse on East Germans

The "second-class citizen" phenomenon is embedded in the overall East German "special identity" - "Sonderidentität" - issue. The so-called "East German" identity that has emerged publicly over the past years is characterized by its regard to value-hierarchies, socio-political behavior, and most importantly, internal and external identification as a collective group. This is a markedly different distinction as compared to West Germans. This topic is a highly controversial one that easily incites what are partly emotion-laden arguments. Specifically, the surprising persistence of the aforementioned East German characteristics a whole generation after the political system change strikes a nerve in public, political and social science circles. In the course of this work, identity shall be understood as the consciousness and the belonging to a group with significant characteristics and similarities that are, on the one hand, ascribed by the members themselves, and, on the other hand, ascribed similarly by individuals outside this group. This internal as well as external identification is formed and reformed in historical interaction processes that contain role-ascription and communication over these characteristics.[8]

Putting the question of identity in a comparative perspective, local identification among West as well as East Germans is important but not exclusive. Yet, the East German identity is a collective identity that is treated differently from previously existing regional identities such as Bavarian, Swabian, Berliners and people from the Ruhr region, or the prominent divide between

[8] Cp. Faulenbach, Bernd et al., *Zweierlei Geschichte – Lebensgeschichte und Geschichtsbewußtsein von Arbeitnehmern in West- und Ostdeutschland*, Essen 2000, p. 425; Neller in Falter et al. 2006: p. 14

northern and southern Germans. The salience of the East-West differentiation might appear as a case of a quasi- ethnic conflict, with rivaling group identities at the core. Post-industrial societies like Germany and specifically Western-style democracies are often assumed to be culturally homogenous and therefore have little nourishing ground for possible conflicts. Yet, scholars such as Connor (1994) have shown that there are but few nation-states that are so culturally homogenous as to actually deserve the term "nation" hyphenated before "state"[9], which allow the assumption ethnic and/or social cleavages are possible even in culturally homogenous societies.

One major work dealing with societal heterogeneity in democracies is Lijphart's "Consociational Democracy" model. Although his work focuses more on variations of democratic government, his theory and subsequent model are built on the vital assumption that apparent homogeneity in a society might be a misconception.[10] In plural societies, political divisions follow lines of objective and salient social differentiation closely.[11] These cleavages can be of a religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature. The groups of populations bounded by such cleavages are then called "segments".[12] In context of this line of idea, the German case could be seen as matter of identity struggles that are the symptom of a quasi-ethnic cleavage between the two German "segments".

However, although identity appears to be a valid factor in the "second-class feeling" among East Germans, its nature is not ethnic. Germans from both parts share the same historical background, the same language and the same culture. The only separating factor is the different ideologies they have been exposed to. Closely connected to this are social stereotypes that both

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[9] Connor, Walker, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a…", in: Hutchinson, John/ Smith, Anthony D. (eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford 1994, pp. 36 – 39
[10] Lijphart, Arend, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, 2nd ed., New Haven 1980, p. 21
[11] Lijphart 1980: p. 3
[12] Lijphart 1980: pp. 3-4

groups to differentiate themselves from each other. However, similar negative social stereotypes are held against each other between Berliners (former Prussian capital) and Bavarians, or between North and South Germans. Therefore, this thesis aims to go beyond quasi-ethnic differentiation and explore developing divides between groups in an otherwise homogenous society like Germany.

In reviewing the scientific literature on the divide between East and West Germans -as well as public commentary and news - two prominent camps of scholars, journalists, and public figures emerge. On the one hand, there are critics, mainly Western scholars, who criticize the East for failing to engage the West and for lags in political, social, and economic development. These critics claim that East Germans have an overall tendency to "whine" and complain about the realities of democracy and the free market. Such critics include Arnulf Bahring, Christian Pfeiffer and Werner Patzelt, whose views are expressed in public and media discourses. On the other hand, there are the apologists, mainly eastern German scholars, who stress the disadvantage and economic as well as social injustice caused by the radical transformational process and the overall treatment of East Germans by the Western media. Prominent public authors are Daniela Dahn and Wolfgang Engler. Especially amongst the public camps, the discourse often appears to be more of an ideological argument than an objective view on East German identity. This observation is also supported by Ahbe (2004) who observes that in the "East-West differences"-argument often it is not the actual differences between East and West Germans that is the topic at hand, but rather other cleavages or conflicts that have amplified or even caused it. These are conflicts between milieus, generation cohorts, and hierarchies of exploitation; between the haves and have-nots; or, finally, between political ideological poles.[13]

[13] Cp. Ahbe, Thomas, "Konstruktion der Ostdeutschen – Diskursive Spannungen, Stereotype und Identitäten seit 1989" in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ), B41-42/2004, p. 12

In the social scientific community, there is little consensus regarding the East German identity topic as well. Some scholars argue that differences between East and West Germans in terms of socio-cultural values and mentality are marginal and the "innere Einheit" (the inner unity) has already arrived. It seems, however, that East Germans have not noticed this yet (Veen 1997) and mainly complain about differences as an expression of their anti-West German sentiments (Pollack/Pickel 1998).[14] Other scholars argue that differences in attitudes and values amongst East and West Germans are so large that instead of an "inner unity" rather an "internal wall" has emerged (Schluchter 1996, Fuchs et al. 1997).[15] As a part of this East German identity issue, those general statements do not rule out the "second-class citizen" notion. Therefore, concrete theories regarding the question of second class citizenship need to be investigated.

[14] Cp. Veen, Hans-Joachim, "Innere Einheit, aber wo liegt sie? Eine Bestandsaufnahme im siebten Jahr nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ), B 40-41, 1997, p.28; cp. Pollack/ Pickel 1998, p. 22

[15] Cp. Schluchter, Wolfgang, *Neubeginn durch Anpassung? Studien zum ostdeutschen Übergang*, Frankfurt 1996, p. 17 ff ; cp. Fuchs, Dieter et al., "Die Akzeptanz der Demokratie des vereinigten Deutschlands, Oder: Wann ist ein Unterschied ein Unterschied?" in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B51/1997, pp. 3-12

CHAPTER 3

Theories of East German Distinctiveness

In the discourses of East German distinctiveness and its implication for perceived citizenship, scholars have advanced several explanatory theories that can offer an explanation for the observation of "second-class citizen" perceptions. Although they have been separated for the research overview, some of the subsequent arguments are, to some extent, also related to other main arguments.

The Eastern Socialization Theory

A number of political science, psychology, and other social science scholars argue that East German distinctiveness, defined as the aberration from the unified German norms in political and social values and behavior is due to the GDR's authoritarian and oppressive socialist education and the socio-psychological adaptation strategies that resulted from it. East German distinctiveness seems to be a product of the high pressure to conform and subsequent political resignation (Schroeder 2006, Maaz 1991).[16] This argument is brought up by scholars such as Patzelt (1995) who argue that GDR socialization created a specific socio-political culture, if not a certain "type of GDR citizen" who is characterized as risk-averse, authority-timid; or focused, formalist, conflict-, and risk- avoiding and security-needing.[17] Another stance is taken by authors

[16] Cp. Schroeder, Klaus, *Die veränderte Republik*, Stamsried 2006, p.385; cp. Maaz, Hans-Joachim, *Das gestürzte Volk oder die verunglückte Einheit*, Berlin 1991

[17] Cp. Templin, Wolfgang, "Ein Staat – zwei Gesellschaften?" in: Süß, Werner (ed.), *Deutschland in den neunziger Jahren – Politik und Gesellschaft zwischen Wiedervereinigung und Globalisierung*, Opladen 2002, p. 195; Cp.

like Schluchter (1996) who see the East German mentality as tied to their experiences of a completely new political order. Moreover, Fuchs et al. (1997) argue that differences in interpretation of what democracy means results in differences in values pertaining to values of equality and justice or, more generally, an incompatibility with the values stemming from the Western system of market competition, political pluralism, and active citizenship. These differences in values, it is argued by these scholars, impede full economic, political, and social integration into the democratic Federal Republic.[18] This argument is often referred to as the *Sozialisationshypothese*, the socialization hypothesis. Regarding being a "second-class citizen" the literature argues that this delineation derives from one or several inferiority complexes, each rooted in a mixture of previous humiliations consisting of feelings of being disadvantaged in the job market and/or unequally paid, which are preserved in the East German collective memory. In defiance toward the dominance of Western institutions and from the incapacity to recognize and articulate their own attitudes and inactions, East Germans have built up an "underdog" identity - a "Trotzidentität"- that also includes being "citizens of second class" (Schroeder 2000, 2006; Templin 2002).[19]

Despite the acknowledgement that socialization affects political behavior, this thesis criticizes that it remains questionable whether the GDR-style socialism really has been as formative as assumed and whether it is applicable for the entire group of East Germans. Focusing on how East Germans were socialized means assuming that these acquired political values are stable. This argument then presumes that beyond the school age and after reunification occurred

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Patzelt, Werner J., "Deutsche Politik unter Reformdruck", in: Hettlage, Robert/ Lenz, Karl (eds.), *Deutschland nach der Wende – Eine Bilanz*, Munich 1995, pp. 85 -87

[18]Cp. Schluchter 1996, p. 17 ff.; cp. Fuchs, Dieter, "Welche Demokratie wollen die Deutschen? Einstellungen zur Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland", in: Oscar W. Gabriel (ed.), Politische Einstellungen und politisches Verhalten im Transformationsprozess Opladen 1997, p. 5, 112 f.; cp. Gensicke, Thomas, *Die Neuen Bundesbürger – Eine Transformation ohne Integration*, Wiesbaden 1998, p. 193

[19] Cp. Schroeder 2000, pp. 186-188; cp. Templin 2002, p. 195; cp. Schroeder 2006, p. 395

political values and attitudes remained exactly the same. Moreover, this line of thinking also presupposes that this ossification is to be the case for the entire and diverse group of 15 million East Germans thus ignoring age, gender, and income differences within the group. Therefore, the socialization hypothesis can offer no insights on intra-group differences regarding more or less perceived marginalization. In addition, as Veen (1999) criticizes correctly, the socialization hypothesis cannot explain the increasing lack of support for the GDR system starting in the early 1980s which was so pronounced as to include mass exodus and mass protest. The argument fails to clarify why after reunification political attitudes and evaluations towards the GDR have been more critical than at any time before.[20] Findings on different hierarchies of values are insightful to understand different preferences in a pluralistic society. Yet, as Reißig (2000) argues, specifically when opposing researchers seek to back the argument that East Germans hold non-democratic values, survey results regarding democracy-criticism and the purportedly anti-democratic value-system of East Germans have been selectively prepared and interpreted, so that East Germans, solely as a consequence of their GDR socialization, appear as non-democratic, prone to dictatorship, and supportive of authoritarian structures.[21] Moreover, although authors such as Gensicke (1998) have supported the theory with empirical findings, the socialization theory has been recognized as too weak for an all-encompassing single explanatory theory.[22] The argument that East Germans have trouble integrating as citizens in a system whose values they do not share and therefore cannot fully identify as citizens of this state can be challenged by the fact that, despite remaining differences over time, values have converged with West German

[20] Cp. Veen 1997, p. 23 f.
[21] Cp. Reißig, Rolf, "Die Ostdeutschen – zehn Jahre nach der Wende: Einstellungen, Wertemuster, Identitätsbildungen" in: Vilmar, Fritz (ed.), *Zehn Jahre Vereinigungspolitik – Kritische Bilanz und humane Alternativen*, Berlin 2000, p. 57
[22] Cp. Gensicke 1998, p. 193 ff.

values.[23] This is supported by findings that social cleavages between East and West Germans are not related to differences in values (Kaase/ Bauer-Kaase 1998; Pollack/Pickel 1998).[24] Finally, this theory neglects too much the experiences of the transformational process and does not offer an explanation as to how the different value system could possibly translate into the feeling of not being a full citizen.

The Situational Theory

Being the strongest alternative theory to the socialization hypothesis, the Situational Theory, *Situationshypothese*, argues, generally, that differences in values and attitudes between East and West Germans are consequences of the reunification process. Disparities in wages, income, and the levels of unemployment are some of the indicators of the acute situation in which many East Germans have found themselves. This, in and of itself, has caused the development of East German differentiation from West.[25] Two main lines of argument within this theory can be observed: a cognitive argument of disappointed expectations and a material equality argument.

Scholars have addressed the "second-class citizenship" and the nature of East German identity with different aspects of justified or unjustified cognitive disillusionment of economic and political expectations held by East Germans prior to reunification. The disillusionment is first and foremost related to the failure of the "nachholende Modernisierung im Zeitraffertempo" (literally "the catch-up modernization in time-lapse motion") that was expected to facilitate an economic "catch-up" and lead to a convergence in living standards, salaries, opportunities, and

[23] Cp. Reißig 2000, p. 62
[24] Cp. Kaase, Max/ Bauer-Kaase, Petra, „Deutsche Vereinigung und innere Einheit 1990-1997", in: Meulemann, Heiner (ed.), *Wert und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland – Erklärungsansätze der Umfrageforschung*, Opladen 1998, pp. 251-267
[25] Cp. Kettenburg, Steffen, "Der deutsche Vereinigungsprozeß und die 'innere Einheit', *Studien zur Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. 40, Hamburg 2004, p. 54

economic productivity. Yet, the past twenty years have left the East more underdeveloped than expected and "catch-up" modernization could not fulfill these expectations. This is, as most scholars agree, due to the problematic economic and structural heritage of the GDR that has caused substantial underdevelopment in comparison to the FRG. Staab (1998) and Hildebrandt (2000) argue that the hardship of the economic transformation, the loss of the all-encompassing welfare state, the subsidy system, and employment security confronted Easterners with experience of instability and social insecurity for the first time in their lives, even though they had expected to profit from the merits of western social democracy.[26] The grim outlook they have articulated for themselves subsequently explains their alienation as citizens in this system. A similar argument has been made in terms of political institutions. Templin (2002) argues that Easterners, who had long hoped for democracy, became disillusioned by democracy when practiced, because they held an idealized, non-realistic image of it. In addition to this naïve view, there were disappointments over parties' financial scandals and the overly broad, non-particularistic focus of parties on the electorate.[27] In other words, disillusionment about promised development and anticipated growth explains the alienation with the political system and state.

A second strand of the situational theory addresses less cognitive aspects, but more environmental causes for grievance. It argues that the "Westernization of East Germany," or the complete transfer of public, political, and legal institutions from the West to the East, introduced a new inequality on top of the already ailing economy. This produced something similar to a "North-South cleavage" or the "Mezzogiorno effect," creating an actual collective disadvantage

[26] Cp. Staab, Andreas, *National Identity in Eastern Germany – Inner Unification or Continued Separation?*, Westport 1998, p. 95; cp. Hildebrandt, Regine, "Der Preis war zu hoch … - Mauern auf Ostdeutschlands Weg in die Marktwirtschaft" in: Appel, Reinhard (ed.), *Einheit die ich meine 1990-2000*, Eltville 2000, p. 139
[27] Cp. Templin 2002, p. 198

for East Germans.[28] The argument states that these structures have re-introduced gender inequality, generational conflicts, the bottom-top polarization of material goods, and the classification of labor. As an aggravation, power has shifted to Western elites who were transferred to top positions in East Germany, and public property has been privatized and sold out by the Treuhand, the public trust organization in charge of the GDR's property. In addition to new inequalities, the previous social "safety net" had been removed and thus created the feeling of belonging to the losers of reunification.[29] Furthermore, scholars of this theory argue that even aside from economic hardship, the participatory exclusion from a reorganization of a unified Germany after the revolution that was *led* by East Germans resulted in resignation to a status as "second-class citizens".[30] Welker (1995), as well as Walz and Brunner (1997), argue that the success of the "innere Einheit" (the "inner unity") thus depends heavily on the quick adjustment of living standards in East and West.[31] Authors such as Pollack and Pickel (1998) claim that the East German identity, in general, is a product of economic differences between East and West Germany as well as the desire for recognition among many East Germans. The feeling of being "citizens of second class" directly results from feeling unrecognized in the Federal Republic, as exemplified by the constant and often devaluation of educational degrees and qualifications, and the experiences of their lives during the GDR in public discourse.[32] Walz and Brunner (1997) agree, yet specifically argue that the "Bürger zweiter Klasse" statement is primarily rooted in the

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[28] Cp. Dahn, Daniela, "Thesen zur inneren Uneinigkeit" in: Vilmar, Fritz (ed.), *Zehn Jahre Vereinigungspolitik – Kritische Bilanz und humane Alternativen*, Berlin 2000, p. 11 ff.
[29] Cp. Geißler, Rainer, "Neue Strukturen der sozialen Ungleichheit im Vereinten Deutschland" in: Hettlage, Robert/ Lenz, Karl (eds.), *Deutschland nach der Wende – Eine Bilanz*, Munich 1995, pp. 119-139; cp. Brie, André, "Deutsch-deutsche Fremdheiten – Mentale Unterschiede und ihre sozialen Ursachen" in: Bahrmann, Hannes/ Links, Hannes (eds.), *Am Ziel vorbei: Die deutsche Einheit – Eine Zwischenbilanz*, Berlin 2005, pp. 208 -220
[30] Cp. Meier, Helmut, "'Definitionsmacht' als Realitätsblockade. Statt eines Vorwortes" in: Meier, Helmut (ed.), *Uneinige Einheit – Der öffentliche Umgang mit Problemen der deutschen Einheit*, Berlin 2005, p.10
[31] Cp. Welker, Stephan, "Wirtschaftliche und soziale Zufriedenheit: Voraussetzung für das Gelingen der inneren Einheit?", in: Amsler, Peter et. al. (eds.),*Was eint und was trennt die Deutschen? Stimmungs- und Meinungsbilder nach der Vereinigung*, Main 1995; cp.Walz/Brunner 1997, p. 19
[32] Cp. Pollack/ Pickel 1998, p. 9 f.

feeling of being disadvantaged socio-economically and only secondarily influenced by the socio-cultural impression of indignation.[33] It seems, Faulenbach argues, many former GDR citizens now feel much more as "Ossis" than in 1990, when they attempted to discard the concept of identity as "East Germans."[34]

This situational theory connects not only held expectations and values with concrete institutions of the political system, but also offers a relationship between citizenship and institutions. It is hard to dismiss the effect of individual disappointment in the social-market economy and democracy as practiced by not feeling like a full citizen of a system that holds these two main institutions as cornerstones of the state. Yet, Neller (2006) points out that a big point of criticism is the fact that the GDR existed for 40 years and certainly had a socializational impact on its citizens. To assume that only situational factors influence East German identification would mean that, the system change in 1990 was figuratively a "tabula rasa".[35] Furthermore, even though this theory sheds light on the underlying inequality structures, it appears to be rather one-sided, as well. First of all, it implies that East Germans as a collective group share a common fate; but most East Germans perceive themselves as winners rather than losers of reunification: Thirty-nine percent see themselves as winners and 29 percent see wins as well as losses for themselves; meanwhile only 28 percent (specifically unemployed and low-income individuals) identify themselves as losers of the reunification.[36] Lastly, this approach at parts is an over-emphasis of victimized East Germans that might not be appropriate as it is too

[33] Cp. Walz/Brunner 1997, p. 15
[34] Cp. Faulenbach et al. 2000, p. 428
[35] Cp. Neller, Katja, "Getrennt vereint? Ost-West-Identitäten, Stereotpyen und Fremdheitsgefühle nach 15 Jahren deutscher Einheit", in: Falter, Jürgen W. et al. (eds.), *Sind wir ein Volk? Ost- und Westdeutschland im Vergleich*, Munich 2006, p. 19
[36]Cp. Sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungszentrum Berlin-Brandenburg e.V., "Sozialreform und soziale Sicherungsziele Bewertungen und Vorstellungen der Bürger der neuen Bundesländer
im Jahre 2008" on: http://www.sfz-ev.de/Publikationen/basis_Leben_xx/2008/Sozialreform.pdf, accessed: 12/11/2009

deterministic. This makes the situational theory prone to be overly apologetic and oriented towards structural problems, instead of assuming agency among East German actors. Agency, however, is crucial in political system transformations such as it occurred in East Germany.

The Failed Communication Theory

In connection to the situational theory, intergroup communication problems can be a further approach to explain the differentiation between both groups of Germans. Several scholars have observed that a lack of understanding between East and West Germans regarding their respective situations and problems constitutes a misinterpretation of each other's actions and hamper an approach to the new reality of unified Germany. West German perception barriers and perception refusals about the social and economic struggles of East Germans due to the modernization process has led to a renaissance of a "Sonderbewusstsein," (literally "distinctiveness consciousness") among East Germans.[37] On the other side, the West Germans feel misunderstood as well and have developed a perception of East Germans as being ungrateful and prone to complaining unjustly.

In public discourse the representation and construction of East Germans as a collective group is an expression of this misinterpretation. East Germans are described as "naïve," "frightened," fast to adapt, and prone to complaints and whining. West Germans are described as "presumptuous," "arrogant," "know-it-all," "big shots," and as "looking down."[38] These stereotypes are mostly one-sided descriptions of the once divided nation featuring pejorative

[37] Cp. Detjen, Claus, *Die anderen Deutschen – Wie der Osten die Republik verändert*, Bonn 1999, p. 12f; cp. Probst, Lothar, "Ost-West-Unterschiede und das kommunitäre Erbe der DDR: Über die Rede von der ‚Inneren Einheit'" in: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/Probst, Lothar (ed.), *Differenz in der Einheit – Über die kulturellen Unterschiede der Deutschen in Ost und West*, Berlin 1999, p. 18

[38] Himmler, Norbert, "Wie sehen sich die Deutschen? Eine Identitätsstudie" in: Amsler, Peter et al., *Was eint und was trennt die Deutschen? Stimmungs- und Meinungsbilder nach der Vereinigung*, Main 1995, p. 40

portrayals.[39] This sometimes ideologically-tinged portrait of East Germans is best represented by magazines like *Der Spiegel,* which has contributed to public attention focused on the deficits and negatives of eastern Germany and its development.[40] In addition, it is argued that East Germans have developed a "Trotzidentität," or "defiant identity" (Schröder 1991)[41], because of the non-recognition of East German accomplishment in the peaceful revolution, collective suspicion of compliance with the repressive system, and the disqualification of many professional, social, ethical, and political qualifications of East Germans. The citizens' relationships to the new state were further complicated with the establishment of the "Gauck Office," which created a central archive and opened for inspection all available files from the former SED internal intelligence apparatus. This not only uncovered one of the most negative sides of the GDR, but also revealed the legacy of the old regime. The extravagance of the political elites in retrospect turned the proclaimed egalitarian society into a farce.[42] Though admittedly extreme, Dümcke and Vilmar (2000) posited that the process and handling of the reunification was an act comparable to that of a colonial power (West Germany) over a colonized territory (East Germany). In this metaphor, East Germans lost all independence, became colonial vassals, and were turned into economic and social dependents. A social classification is therefore an inevitable distinction between the dominant and the dominated group.[43] It is this distinction that subsequently explains the lesser degree of identification as real citizen that East Germans feel.

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[39] Cp.Vilmar, Fritz, „Zum Begriff der ‚Strukturellen Kolonialisierung'" in: Vilmar, Fritz (ed.), *Zehn Jahre Vereinigungspolitik – Kritische Bilanz und humane Alternativen*, Berlin 2000, p. 21-31

[40] Cp. Fischer, Gerhard, "Überkommenes Selbstverständis auch in den Medien – Eine Fallstudie" in: Meier, Helmut (ed.), *Uneinige Einheit – Der öffentliche Umgang mit Problemen der deutschen Einheit*, Berlin 2005, p. 189

[41] Cp. Schröder, Richard, "Warum sollten wir eine Nation sein? Von einigen gemeinsamen Aufgaben der Deutschen" in: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung/Probst, Lothar (ed.), *Differenz in der Einheit – Über die kulturellen Unterschiede der Deutschen in Ost und West*, Berlin 1999, p. 41-44

[42] Cp. Staab 1998, p. 87

[43] Cp. Vilmar 2000, p. 21-31; Cp. Cooke, Paul, *Representing East Germany since Unification - From Colonization to Nostalgia*, Oxford 2005, p. 2 ff.

More than others, this theory identifies communicative discourse issues. It sees the manner of communication as the reason East Germans feel unwanted or inferior and therefore not equal to other citizens. Arguing that they feel second-class because they are misunderstood and misrepresented by West German media, one may also draw the inverse assumption that East Germans withdraw into what is deemed their negative identity because they misunderstand or misinterpret the behavior of West Germans. However, would such a conclusion of "second-class citizen" perception be applicable on a collective level? Do East Germans infer a personal attack from the discourse about them? Moreover, are not unflattering discourses and societal stereotypes a kind of social reality to be accepted considering the establishment of the German Confederation attempted to unite various German-speaking peoples with different state identities, different traditions, and different dialects? After all, other geographical distinctions like the one described here also are observable in north-south stereotypes within the USA, Italy, and France. Related, unflattering stereotypes of this kind are also traceable in Wales, Scotland, and England. Thus, the negative social differentiation does not necessarily lead to a second guessing of citizenship. Finally, the colonialization aspect seems inaccurate as East Germans do not constitute another ethnicity; there is nothing ethnically different between Germans of both sides.

CHAPTER 4

The Concept of "Second-Class Citizenship"

The Perception of Being "Second-Class Citizens"

The concept of citizenship describes the specific relationship between an individual and the political community they live in. On the one hand, it entitles the citizen to a variety of legal rights and liberties, but on the other hand, it also confers certain duties and responsibilities on them in return. As a critical anchor, loyalty and personal attachment to the state are specifically important in this state membership.[44] Apart from this state-centered and eminent perception, T.H. Marshall sees citizenship also in a more non-state centered and imminent way. In this view citizenship should also be understood as being a member of a social community who holds equal status that requires a particular kind of social bonding.[45] Therefore, citizenship cannot only be understood as a relationship with the state, based on a rightful legal status, but one also based on an integrative social network between members. If this relationship is disturbed, either socially or regarding status, the individual might withdraw support from this state or develop apathy towards its political community. Moreover, if this is not only valid on the individual level but characteristic of a larger collective, it can seriously compromise societal cohesion and public support for the state and its institutions.

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[44] Cp. Staab 1998, p. 47

[45] Cp. Stewart, Angus, "Two Conceptions of Citizenship" in: *The British Journal of Scoiology*, Vol. 46, No.1/1995, pp. 63-78

The self-ascription of second-class citizenship is clearly an indicator of a disturbance in the relationship between individuals and their state. It denotes the impression that affected individuals consider themselves as inferior in status and equality in comparison to their peers. In severe cases this also includes public and/or political discrimination against such individuals. In the specific case of united Germany, the self-ascription among East Germans as "second class" is largely the expression of having partial identification with the German state. In this case, it is first and foremost a perceptional definition of "second-class citizenry" and entails a felt discrimination in terms of equal social recognition and treatment. It diverges from usual notions of this concept, as this particular discrimination is not based on legal or actual political terms. In the German case there is no actual discrimination against East Germans, legally or politically. Although both groups had been separated for 40 years, previous survey results show that East and West Germans do not mourn inter-group differences in terms of ethnic differences or any ethnic favoritism. Indeed, from the point of shared language, cultural similarities, historical heritage, despite the partition years, and blood-ties, Germans from both parts do not feel different from each other.

Therefore, to state that one does feel like a "second-class citizen" is to imply a *perceived* social marginalization, based on an assessment of relative deprivation and a lack of social recognition. Social recognition shall be understood here as the interdependent positional recognition as a member of a collective who is equal to all others. Two questions are important in regards to social recognition. First, how is this matter of positional recognition characterized in the East German case and, secondly, who among the East Germans feels unrecognized?

Social Recognition as a Citizen

Two lines of argument have been made previously regarding the non-recognition aspect of East German identification. First, non-recognition arises from the impression amongst East Germans that they are not being recognized socially or in the popular discourse (Pollack 1997, Pollack/Pickel 1998). This non-recognition by the Western population and specifically the West German dominated media includes the disregard or discrediting of the biographies of East Germans as former GDR-citizens, the devaluation of job qualification of East Germans after reunification, sometimes personal negative experiences with the Western system and the general, sometimes subtle, portrayal of East Germans as inferior or underdeveloped in economic or political regards. Here, scholars have often argued that non-recognition is the product of the ongoing feeling of humiliation as well as already existing inferiority complexes that might have their origins before 1989. This then is compensated as disdain for the Western System. [46]

Secondly, scholars argue that non-recognition arises from material inequalities between East and West, the exclusion from the job market through high unemployment in the East, and the sharp awareness that previous full-employment had turned into a high socio-economic insecurity. The "second-class" feeling is therefore mainly, but not exclusively, based upon economic differences and the particular equation of East Germany as the poorer part of Germany. Researchers see this situation a structural problem that originated before reunification, but has also been continued by the current government policies (Walz/Brunner 1997). [47]

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[46] Cp. Pollack, Detlef, "Das Bedürfnis nach Anerkennung: Der Wandel der Akzeptanz von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft in Ostdeutschland", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B13/1997, p. 9ff; cp. Pollack/ Pickel 1998, p. 22 f.; cp. Brunner, Wolfgang/ Walz, Dieter, "Selbstidentifikation der Ostdeutschen 1990-1997 – Warum sich die Ostdeutschen zwar als ‚Bürger zweiter Klasse' fühlen, wir aber nicht auf die ‚innere Mauer treffen'", in: Meulemann, Heiner (ed.), *Werte und nationale Identität im vereinten Deutschland – Erklärungsansätze der Umfrageforschung*, Opladen 1998, p.233

[47] Cp. Walz, Dieter/ Brunner, Wolfram, „Das Sein bestimmt das Bewußtsein. Oder: Warum sich die Ostdeutschen als Bürger 2. Klasse fühlen", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (APuZ), Vol. 51/1997, p. 14 ff.

This thesis assumes that both lines of arguments are valid, yet, the question remains: Who feels unfairly treated and therefore not recognized? The first argument presented suggests that the majority of East Germans are affected by a group-based invalidation. Consequently and excepting for generational differences, there should be differentiation between East and West Germans with East Germans feeling "second class" based upon non-recognition in the public discourse. Yet, Walz and Brunner (1997) show that, increasingly, East German pensioners, those aged between 18 and 29, those respondents with higher education, Christian and/or conservative voters, and those respondents from the New Land Sachsen (which is economically more developed than other parts of East Germany) feel more equal than the average East German.[48] Thus, the feeling of being unrecognized appears to affect East German demographic and political groups differently.

From this, this research concludes that the recognition in terms of equal parity is closely connected to economic adjustment of status and wages. Walz and Brunner show that the majority of people connected to "second-class citizenship" statements first and foremost criticize differences in wages in East and West, despite doing the same work.[49] Walz and Brunner argue that the "second class" issue is not a result of long-term attitudes but short-term economic factors relating to the economic situation in East Germany.[50] It represents humiliation over the still existing unequal economic situations, despite large improvements in living standards, and can be read as the expression that the worth of one's own work is not recognized and valued.[51] This leads to the assumption that most people who are lower in socio-economic status, such as long-term or repeatedly unemployed or low-income individuals, display non-recognition attitudes and

[48] Cp. Walz/ Brunner 1997, p. 15
[49] Cp. Walz/Brunner 1997, p. 16
[50] Cp. Walz/Brunner 1997, p. 17
[51] Cp. Pollack 1997, p. 450

thusly develop the feeling as being unequal members of society. The assumption can be corroborated by several descriptive studies as well as empirical and qualitative findings of authors, suggesting that employment and participation in the market are of crucial impact to the feeling of being recognized as equal and integrated part of society.

The Meaning of Unemployment

The indicator of unemployment is frequently mentioned in literature concerning East German identity. The latest survey on behalf of Deutsche Volkssolidarität highlights specifically that East German respondents of a low-income background or without current employment have displayed little or no identification with the Federal Republic.[52] Another decisive factor for identifying with the new political system and state is age. Interviewees that already feel like full citizens were usually younger: In 2009, 41 percent of those below the age of 30, as well as 30% of those over the age of 70 identified as full citizens.[53] That the feeling of belonging to the new state is related to age is not surprising here and might also explain the decline in statements of "second-class citizenship." However, still over half of East Germans agree to feeling less than full citizens. Moreover, in terms of decreasing support for the political system, Brunner and Walz (1998b) highlight the high correlation between indicators of political discontent and unemployment.[54] Figure 2 shows the ongoing high unemployment in East Germany, which remains double of the unemployment rate in West Germany.

[52] Cp. Deutsche Volkssolidarität 2009, on: http://www.sfz ev.de/Aktuelles/Medien/presse_2009/Pressematerial_20_07_2009.pdf, accessed: 11/05/2009
[53] Cp. Deutsche Volkssolidarität 2009, on: http://www.sfz-ev.de/Aktuelles/Medien/presse_2009/Pressematerial_20_07_2009.pdf, accessed: 11/05/2009
[54] Cp. Brunner/ Walz 1998, p.244

Among several problems that have arisen during the process of reunification, the high unemployment among East Germans is certainly one of the most severe as it divides the population between those integrated into gainful employment and those that have been excluded from society because of their unemployment.[55]



	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
New Länder	15,56	14,42	16,04	18,34	18,36	17,7	17,48	17,6	17,88	18,8	18,78	18,82	17,38	15,06	13,04	12,74
Old Länder	8,77	8,85	9,7	10,6	10,17	9,48	8,42	7,96	8,33	9,06	9,07	10,73	9,8	8,14	7,1	7,54

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 2010. Released by the Federal Employment Office, Nürnberg. From January 2005 on the data on counted unemployed of the Federal Employment Office are not comparable to earlier data anymore, due to the consolidation of unemployment benefit and social welfare.

Figure 2: Unemployment in East and West Germany Since Reunification (1991-2009)

Yet, the negative side of a less regulated market economy has led to a perceived societal exclusion by East Germans who found themselves involuntarily unemployed after reunification. The social disintegration has been even more complicated by the fact that the duration of unemployment influences substantially the categorization in the new social hierarchy, even reaching to the private sphere of the ones affected by it.[56]

[55] Cp. Kettenburg 2004, p. 175
[56] Cp. Kettenburg 2004, p. 176

The scarcity of chances to find employment or vocational training places in the East of Germany has led many people, specifically under 30-year-olds, to move to the West. Between 1991 and 2005 about 2.8 million people moved from the East to West, and 1.9 million in the opposite direction. However, how many of those are people that simply returned to the East is not known. All in all, the net emigration from the East for this time frame is around 917,000 people. Overproportionally, young people move away. Of the people moving from the East to the West in 2005, 44% were under 30 and over 50% were women.[57]

The new Länder Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen have experienced the biggest net loss of people moving away with over 13,600 and 12,000, respectively. Here, the East-West migration, as well as urban-rural relationships and neighborhood proximity, play a role. The Western Länder Bayern, Baden-Württemberg und Nordrhein-Westfalen have highest immigration rate from migrants from East as well as West. This might be an obvious trend as those states have higher rates of prosperity as well as productivity and are thusly attractive for job-seeking individuals.[58] This data supports the supposition that unemployment unfolds an unhealthy effect on the East German region, as mostly young people and women who are more likely to aspire to social upward mobility leave the regions in search of employment.

Furthermore, unemployment is also closely tied to recognition as a social human being when seen in relation to societal positioning in the labor market. In Agoff's (2002) interviews, interviewees expressed that one does not feel recognized if one is of no use to the labor market.[59] It seems that unemployment unfolds a highly emotive impact on East Germans. In a certain way,

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[57] Cp. Grobecker, Claire et al., „Bevölkerungsentwicklung 2005" in: *Wirtschaft und Statistik 1/2007*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 50-52

[58] Cp. Grobecker, Claire et al., „Bevölkerungsentwicklung 2005" in: *Wirtschaft und Statistik 1/2007*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2007, pp. 50-52

[59] Agoff, Maria C., *Auf der Suche nach neuer Identität: die Verortung einer ostdeutschen Generation nach der deutschen Vereinigung*, Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 69

Agoff notes, one can see it as the image of the sudden end of an entire life.[60] The discontent in employment issues is not so much a matter of sheer outcome equality or equality in terms of income or wage, but more like "Gleichberechtigung," or an "equal treatment of chances." "Alle anderen Rechte sind weniger bedeutend, nur die Anerkennung als sozialer Mensch als Berufstätiger. […] The Gleichberechtigung erfolgt durch die Anerkennung des sozialen Menschen als Berufstätiger."[61] Yet, the reality of unemployment not only affects the ones unemployed, but also the ones that still have work but have experienced cases of unemployment in their circle of friends or family. Unemployment is thus perceived as a latent danger.[62] In addition to this, East Germans have experienced a nearly full employment during the GDR regime, as labor was seen as the motor and defining element of socialism. It was not only a means to achieving a living standard, but also a means of participation, contribution and identification in a society that defined itself as a state of workers and held a constitutional right to labor. Thusly, the sudden change to a growth of unemployment after reunification unfolded a disproportionally harsh impact on East Germans and the factor of unemployment is therefore a crucial element of East German discontent and struggle.

[60] Cp. Agoff 2002, p. 61
[61] „All other rights are less important, only the recognition as social human being as employed. […] Equality results from recognition of the social human being as employed person." Agoff 2002, p. 74
[62] Cp. Agoff 2002, p. 63

CHAPTER 5

A Theory of Societal Inclusion

Causal Mechanism

This thesis understands "second-class citizenship" as the expression of social marginalization based on lack of being meaningfully integrated. Exclusion from societal participation, specifically in material regards, is thusly interpreted as the root of discontent among East Germans. High unemployment and subsequent loss of ability to keep up with the rest of society lead to feelings of being marginalized, excluded, and unable to participate in society to the same extent as others. Furthermore, this constitutes as consequence for political support, as East Germans interpret the material shortcomings as lacking government efficacy to guarantee the level of integration necessary to participate in an inclusionary manner in society.

Societal Inclusion and Exclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion this research assumes that "second-class citizenship" must not only be read as non-recognition, but also as the feeling of not being an integrated, productive member of society. Furthermore, in order to feel integrated, one has to have the opportunity to participate in society. The German term "gesellschaftliche Teilhabe," translated as "societal inclusion," includes the notion of participation and also the idea that one holds a stake in social, political, and economic realms via, e.g., a socially recognized status, democratic rights and

representation, and employment to receive one's own share of a common living standard.[63] The concept of equality in societal inclusion - the equality in opportunities to be an integrated member – therefore describes the opportunities, means, and access to be able to participate in society within these three dimensions. If inclusion in these dimensions is perceived to be inhibited or impossible, the individual feels excluded. Sociological theory recognizes this as the process of "disintegration." Social cohesion is seriously impaired if individuals perceive that their chances for securing the own existence in a highly individualistic society as well as available possibilities in order to seize these are not evenly distributed. Thus, solidarity among a society suffers if fairness and social justice in these chances are perceived to be lacking.[64]

A lack of societal inclusion can therefore be defined as "societal exclusion." The concept of exclusion is broadly defined as the fear by a part of society of losing a previously held social status. It is directly connected to the state of unemployment with the underlying assumptions that prolonged unemployment causes societal cleavages and that these cleavages will be observable through the exclusion from substantial ways of participating in society. This is specifically problematic in industrialized and individualized societies, where individualism and the securing of one's own share has been the mantra for decades.[65] For the individual affected by exclusion, this translates to having no recognized place in society, feeling social isolation, not being able to keep up with "the rest," and the feelings of powerlessness and/or of having little chance, or being cut off from commonly shared life goals.[66]

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[63] Cp. Kronauer, Martin, *Exklusion – Die Gefährdung des Sozialen im hoch entwickelten Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt 2002, p. 11

[64] Cp. Heitmeyer, Wilhelm, "Leben wir immer noch in zwei Gesellschaften? 20 Jahre Vereinigungsprozeß und die Situation", in: Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.), *Deutsch-deutsche Zustände 20 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall*, Bonn 2009, p.25

[65] Cp. Kronauer 2002, p. 10 ff., 37

[66] Cp. Kronauer, p. 156 -193

There are three different dimensions and two different levels of what is termed "Teilhabe". The three dimensions concern the material, the political, and the social/cultural. The two levels involve "passive" versus "active" participation. "Passive participation," is societal participation and represents the inclusionary, integrated dimension of citizenship. It entails the idea of being and feeling a part of a greater community, being recognized as a proper member by others, and having the access to institutions of the social and political system. Furthermore, it entails not only the legal but also material *ability* to participate. Members of a group who assume that their group has only limited opportunities to participate in society and realize their fair share of societal living standard or whose interests and problems remain unheard feel not only marginalized but also unrecognized as full-citizens. "Active participation" implies using accessible opportunities and legal channels to influence or achieve representation in political outcomes. It denotes the active use of resources to participate and realize one's fair share of living standard. The most salient feature of active participation is participation in the political realm. Passive participating is the initial position of an active participant, influencing the disposition to be active in society. Exclusion occurs at the stage of integrative passive participation, meaning not being included in vital aspects of societal life and excluded from chances of active participation. What follows is a feeling of being at the periphery of social hierarchy, and perceiving oneself at a lower social rank than other members of society.

The previously highlighted dilemma of unemployment in this regard is only one side of the exclusion phenomenon; the other side is the disaggregation of social ties.[67] This disaggregation has been historically identified as the weakening of social ties in the process of urbanization and secularization. In the case of East Germany, these processes are not prevalent, yet the intensity of the social and political turnover caused by reunification can clearly be read as

[67] Cp. Kronauer 2002, p. 49-52

the loss of previously defined social ties. Closely tied to this is the understanding of social inequality, delineating societal "periphery" and "center." Yet, exclusion goes beyond marginalization by social inequality to a qualitative break between belonging and exclusion to the point of feeling useless.[68] However, being unemployed does not necessarily lead to exclusion and a loss of social integration. The welfare state can prevent subsequent social stigmatization in buffering this via status alternatives such as "stay home mums," or "early pensioner."[69] As Marshall and Dahrendorf discuss it, the welfare state is also seen as able to buffer this with the help of social rights ensuring equality in access to societal institutions in order to expand societal participation.[70] Apart from these state interventions, exclusion can also be ameliorated if other social networks such as family, religion, or civil societal activities and participation remain strong. However, if such "safety nets" are not available or sufficient, individuals that feel excluded from societal participation will see themselves as "disadvantaged" and marginalized. If this correlates with specific perceived inequality along group lines it can even proceed to a collectively felt marginalization.

To sum up, societal inclusion can be anchored between participation and integration as a member of a community. Individuals who perceive themselves to be less able to participate – hence, excluded – are thusly more likely to see themselves in an inferior social positioning vis-à-vis other members in society. Furthermore, it also denotes the idea of having a stake in society and, thus, becoming a stakeholder. Consequently, if an individual feels one has no access to this community and no stake in it, it can have negative implications for their active citizenship. Societal exclusion in terms of "Teilhabe" can therefore lead to a weakening of the support of the political system and display instances of distrust or rejection.

[68] Cp. Kronauer 2002, p. 49-52
[69] Cp. Kronauer 2002, p. 156
[70] Cp. Kronauer 2002, p. 92

Implications for Political Support

How can integration or exclusion affect support for the political system and government? Here, a review of Easton's (1965) environment input-output-feedback model of political systems is helpful to distinguish implications for political support. Political "support" is to Easton next to "political demands" one of the main input indicators within the political system.[71] As objects of support, three hierarchically ordered entities are available: the political community, the regime, and the authorities.[72] Furthermore, he defines two principle ways of support: "diffuse" and "specific" support. "Diffuse support" can be seen as a dichotomous concept, with subcategories of trust and legitimacy. It is mainly focused on the support of a system or a part of a system independent of its output, but more about what it is and or what it represents.[73] Easton defines this as "reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants."[74] "Specific support," meanwhile, is accessed via opinions on the performance of a legitimate state actor and is thus output focused.[75]

As discussed in the aforementioned section, this thesis believes that exclusion, specifically of the material kind, is seen as corrosive to political support. The reasoning behind this assumption is that individuals see the lack of employment chances as a collective societal phenomenon that cannot be fixed by the individuals themselves. Thusly, they regarded this as the task of the government. Consequently, if high unemployment is not just a temporal glitch but a prolonged and collectively experienced situation, that increases the likelihood to feel excluded. This thesis therefore assumes, firstly, that it is mainly "specific support" that surfaces in the

[71] Cp. Easton, David, *A System Analysis of Political Life*, New York 1965, p. 26
[72] Cp. Easton 1965, p. 157 f.
[73] Cp. Easton 1965, p. 444 f.
[74] Easton 1965, p. 237
[75] Cp. Easton 1965, p. 438

question of political impact of exclusion, and, secondly, that the assessment is one of government efficacy to provide the above eluded fairness and social equality in provide chances to participate in society. Furthermore, if instead social cleavages and unequal access to material dispositions are perceived as existing, the lack of implementation of justice principles affects the level of satisfaction of the democratic system.[76] This has previously been observed in terms of evaluations of key institutions of the German system, namely representative democracy and the social-market economy. Regarding the institution of democracy, Reißig (2000) elucidates that Easterners do not criticize democracy itself, but rather performance of German democratic institutions in fulfilling their promised merits.[77] In terms of the the social-market economy, Hildebrandt (2000) argues that there is a discrepancy between the intentions of what the social-market economy offers in terms of liberty, prosperity, and development versus the reality for the East that subsequently creates discontent and disappointment.[78] In both statements it shows that merit-based expectations clash with the reality of economic structures that cannot offer chances to perform in a way that would produce related merits. Thus, this research assumes that satisfaction and support of the political system suffers in light of the exclusionary feelings of people who perceive themselves not able to participate in society.

A principle bone of contention here is the nature of specific "demands" towards the state. Relating the theoretic reasoning to the East German case, supporters of the socialization hypothesis argue that expectations of employment and the state's obligation to provide these are erroneously held by East Germans. For example, Wenzel (2006) argues that because of the socialization in the socialist system in the GDR, East Germans demonstrate higher expectations

[76] Cp. Heitmeyer 2009, p.30
[77] Cp. Reißig 2000, p. 58 f.
[78] Cp. Hildebrandt 2000, p. 139

towards the state to promote social justice and material security.[79] Kettenburg (2004) argues that East Germans had been misguided by their rather idealized image of West Germany that everyone seeking work would be able to find it. Specifically, the performance-related wages had been attractive to them.[80] Yet, the experiences of the downsides of the merit principle during the painful transformation process led to a lack of support for the merit principle. Previously, this principle had maintained equally high support among East and West due to the inability to be paid according to merit in the GDR.[81] He states that the merit principle now constrains East Germans to help themselves and creates the disposition to expect something from others instead;[82] in this case, to expect something from the state. This is a case of "diffuse support" as it relates more to concepts of political culture.

According to Almond and Verba's (1963) work regarding civic culture, major orientations of citizens towards their political system are decisive for their participation in it. If civic culture does not match the requirements of the political system, support for it is lacking.[83] Here, opponents would argue that East Germans do not possess the civic culture due to their socialist socialization, and, therefore, would not support democratic institutions and the political system at the same level as West Germans who had been socialized with them. This has been a major point of criticism by scholars of the socializational school.

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[79] Cp. Wenzel, Eva, "'Sozial ist, was Arbeit schafft'? Einstellungen zur Wirtschafslage und sozialen Gerechtigkeit in Deutschland", in: Falter, Jürgen W. et al. (eds.), *Sind wir ein Volk? Ost- und Westdeutschland im Vergleich*, Munich 2006, p. 38

[80] Cp. Kettenburg 2004, p. 175

[81] Cp. Meulemann, Heiner, "Die Scheu der Ostdeutschen vor dem Leistungsprinzip: Versuch einer Erklärung mit der Kohortenanalyse" in: Kecskes, Robert et al., *Angewandte Soziologie*, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 159 ff.

[82] Cp. Meulemann 2004, p. 173

[83] Almond, Gabriel A./ Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton 1963, p. 14

However, for the societal inclusion perspective to counter this argument, the observation that a lack of support due to feelings of material exclusion and/or unemployment must be present among East and West Germans. The fact that a lack of support might be more likely among East Germans, then is explainable due to the higher number of unemployed citizens and its larger collective effect in East Germany than in West Germany.

Hypotheses

Due to the nature of the topic of interest, two sets of hypotheses will be tested. The first set features questions of societal inclusion: If "second-class citizenship" can be interpreted as a "societal exclusion perception," then:

H_{Main}: The relative perception of exclusion among East Germans is significantly higher than among all German citizens.

In order to support this hypothesis the findings should show that being East German is related to an increase in perceived exclusion, denoting that East Germans feel more excluded than West Germans. Moreover, regarding all other hypotheses, this thesis expects East Germans to display a more pronounced and significant positive relationship between exclusion and material concerns as well as unemployment. Furthermore, if the previously outlined assumptions about the importance of employment and economic inclusion in society are vital to social interposition, then:

H_2: The economic dimension of societal inclusion (regarding material well-doing and material integration) are more closely connected to exclusion than the social and political dimension.

For support of this hypothesis, findings should indicate a positive relationship between material concerns and perception of marginalization. With increasing assessment to have less material resources, the feeling to be excluded should increase as well. In addition, this relationship should turn out to be more significant and influential than negative assessments of little social and political integration.

Finally, if the implications from the findings on "second-class citizenship" amongst East Germans are correct and can be explained by the proposed theory:

H_3: Unemployed individuals and individuals with low incomes will display significantly more societal exclusionary attitudes than employed individuals.

Thusly, the factors of unemployment and low-income are assumed to increase exclusionary feelings. Furthermore, the theory leads to the expectation that unemployment is more influential among East Germans.

Secondly, it is interesting to test how exclusion affects the relationship between individual and state. An individual who does not feel to be able to participate – that means they feel excluded - will develop serious reservations towards the state from which he or she feels excluded. Non-recognition manifests itself in the feeling that the state does not care about the specific interests of this individual. Moreover, perceptional sources of inequality in participation opportunities feed on the illegitimacy of institutions that are expected to promote and embody meritocratic social inequality such as democracy. Thusly, the prediction expressed by this reasoning would mean:

H_4: Lack of support for government increases with the relative perception of being excluded.

To corroborate this hypothesis, findings should show that the perceived marginalization has an increasing effect on lack of support for government. Moreover, with the perception of decreasing material resources and unemployment, support for government should decrease as well.

In order to challenge the assumption that the effects of ability to participate are due to socialization factors, the:

H_5: Lack of support for government is more likely among East and West Germans who display exclusionary attitudes.

In order to support this hypothesis the findings should suggest that being East German is related to a decrease in support for government, denoting that East Germans are less supportive of government than West Germans.

If the theory that this thesis proposes is applicable, these hypotheses should be observable and substantially stable among East Germans with unemployment or low-income background over time and cross-sectionally. Furthermore, if they hold true, inferences on the nature of the second-class citizenship can be concretized. The unit of analysis is individuals that are compared cross-sectionally in the East and West, as well as over time. The spatial parameters are therefore the German New and Old Länder (here defined as the eastern and western states of Germany) and the temporal parameters span 1991 to 2006. Cross-sectionally, it is expected that descriptive and multivariate analysis will present a divide between respondents in New and Old Länder. Regarding the development over time, the thesis assumes that employment and social

exclusionary attitudes will be observable. However, regarding the previous figures on the development of the “second-class citizenship” as well as the unemployment rate, a decline in both should be detected.

Alternative Hypotheses

The perception of “second-class citizenship” among East Germans is not only explainable by proposed theory but has also been seized by the three major rival theories as summarized in the literature review. As these theories produce alternate hypotheses challenging the explanative power of the societal exclusion argument, they should be tested fairly against the generated hypotheses resulting from here proposed theory. The socialization theory argues that impact of socialist education and socialization has formed a specific political culture that has made it difficult for East Germans to adapt to the new political and economic system. Moreover, the struggles between this political culture and the new environment have created several inferiority complexes leading to a defiant perception of being excluded by stating to be a “citizen of second class”. Following the argument of the socialization theory, socialist political values and felt distance to people from each respective other part of Germany should be key determinants in any assessment of societal exclusion or integration (A_1) as well as decreased support for the political system (A_2).

In contrast to the socializational argument, the situational theory claims that feeling to be not a full member of society, is grounded in very real structural disadvantages such as inequality in wages and high unemployment that indeed give reasons to East Germans to feel neglected and disadvantaged. Hence, the situational theory would predict considerable impact of material factors as well as a felt collective disadvantage due to reunification on the relative perception of

exclusion (A_3). Consequently, a situational influence would decrease support for the political system as well (A_4). However, the communicational approach requires a discourse analytical approach and thusly cannot be tested by quantitative means here.

CHAPTER 6

Methodology

Data

In order to conduct the testing of proposed theory this thesis uses the data of the "Allgemeinen Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften" conducted between the years 1980 and 2006 (ALLBUS 1980 -2006). The ALLBUS program has been funded by the DFG from 1980 to 1985 and in 1991. Further surveys were financed by the German federal government and states via the Gesellschaft Sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen (GESIS). ALLBUS is conducted within GESIS at locations in Mannheim and Köln in collaboration with an ALLBUS-board. The aforementioned institutions and persons are not responsible for the usage of the data in this thesis. The ALLBUS survey contains representative data surveyed in East and West Germany, including East and West Berlin, in two-year intervals from 1980 to 2006. The last accessible survey year is 2006. This specific dataset was selected for several reasons. First, it allows the testing of the proposed hypotheses over a considerably long period of time. Second, it offers items that allow the measurement of economic, political, and social dimensions of the "inclusion theory," and accommodates the testing of alternative hypotheses as well. Details of the explanatory variables are provided in the appendix to this thesis. However, one limitation of the data should be noted: Not every question asked of respondents was asked in all years. Therefore, in order to use variables of relevant interest to this thesis, the analysis and subsequent models are constrained to only those years when the relevant questions were asked.

Operationalization and Measurement

I. Societal Exclusion

This phenomenon describes the perceived lack of societal inclusion and thusly a social marginalization. This societal marginalization can be captured in the inter-societal position or status an individual perceives to hold. As an indicator of measurement, the respondents' *self-ranking* is used, which lies on a scale capturing their perceived position as existing either in the "bottom," "middle," or "top" of society. This ranking allows the drawing of inferences on how severely a marginalization is felt. Naturally, it can be assumed that most people will hold a more positive image of themselves and thusly rank themselves more frequently as existing within the "middle" rather than within "bottom". Yet, this item is still a valid instrument of measurement as a variable for societal exclusion, as this research specifically focuses on those respondents that would deviate from the stated norm and rank themselves in the "bottom" category, thereby explicitly conveying a feeling of being of lower status and of existing in the societal periphery.

II. Dimensions of Societal Inclusion

The following dimensions are the principal realms of integration in which societal "Teilhabe" can be realized:

The social dimension will be operationalized as the interpersonal, integrative relationship to other members of society. A less socially integrated person should display only little trust in and towards other members of their community. Further, feelings of little social cohesion, expressed as the general perception that people have no interest in their peers, may be displayed. Two explanatory variables are posited to capture these feelings: One is *trust in other people* where respondents had to select amongst "one has to be careful," "it depends," and "one can

trust". The other involves the assessment that *people are not interested* (a dichotomous "disagree"/ "agree" question). Both variables measure an overall level of distrust towards other people in society.

The political dimension will be operationalized as the participational dimension in the political system. Exclusionary tendencies can be a symptom of having few channels with which to express preferences and influence political outcomes. Exclusion can be expressed through perceptional statements of how one's preferences are perceived to be esteemed and considered by political elites and actors. Therefore, the variable most closely corresponding to this operationalization involves respondents either "disagreeing" or "agreeing" to the statement that *politicians are uninterested* in common people.

The economic dimension will be defined as the way the individual perceives to have equal or unequal access to standards in societal prosperity. Exclusionary tendencies should be observed when this access is not seen. This is measured via the assessment of the perceived *individual economic situation* (as a choice amongst "very good," "good," "partly good", "partly bad", "bad," and "very bad"). Furthermore, and specifically important for this theory, is the sense of receiving the *fair share* of the living standard ("more than the fair share", "fair share", "a little less" or "a lot less"). The responses to these two aforementioned survey questions are used as instruments to measure how economically integrated one feels.

III. Unemployed and Low-Income Respondents

As unemployment is a key concept, the variable *unemployment* is utilized to measure differences in means between different social groups. The variable contains the classes "employed" and "unemployed." "Employed" has been coded as "all respondents with current employment."

"Unemployed" has been coded using the classic economic interpretation: "respondents not gainfully employed and actively looking for a job." Other classifications such as "students," "pensioners," and "housewives/housemen" have been coded as well; however, these were not observed in the years used for the analysis. Please see the appendix for further details about classification.

These variables permit testing of the hypothesis that those unemployed or those that have been previously unemployed are more likely to rank themselves lower in society than employed individuals. This sample is to be understood not only as those respondents that were unemployed at the time of the interview, but also those that are now employed but have experienced *previous unemployment* ("no"/"yes") in the past ten years with distinctions concerning the *length of previous unemployment* (six categories ranging from "4 weeks" to "more than 104 weeks"). Further, the *length of repeated unemployment* (again, six categories ranging from "4 weeks" to "more than 104 weeks") is used as an indicator if the individual is currently not employed and has been unemployed within the past ten years. Finally, a perceptional level of measurement is added in with the inclusion of the variable *fear of losing job* for respondents who were currently employed. (The possible responses to this question included: "no", "yes, having to switch jobs" and "yes, losing job.") It is attempted to catch the effect that fear of unemployment could unfold. Moreover, to support the hypothesis that access to economic means and opportunities are relevant, employed and low-income respondents also shall be counted in this group. They will be listed separately among the control variables.

IV. Socializational Effects

Socializational effects are defined here as those effects that show a different political predisposition or outlook; in this case, political values related to the upbringing or continuing effect of education in the GDR system. This can be measured on a level of ideology and on a level of social distance. Corresponding to the former, the *socialism* displays grades of agreement ("completely disagree," "rather disagree," "rather agree," and "completely agree") to the statement that socialism is a good idea but only has been executed poorly. A socializational effect would also be the relative alienation the respondents feel toward the respective people of the other part of the country, East or West, compared to other countries than Germany, due largely to the upbringing in different societies as well as preserved reservations toward members of the opposite region. This is measured by the agreement to the variable *people from other parts are alien* ("do not agree at all," "rather do not agree," "rather agree," and "completely agree").

V. Situational Effects

Situational effects are those effects that depend upon the evaluation of German reunification's impact on individuals possessing the resources and the chances to make the best out them and subsequently satisfy their desires. In light of the assessment of relative deprivation, the assessments regarding whether the *unification benefited West* more so than the East implies a perception of structural disadvantage. Although this question has been asked to all respondents, West Germans tend to disagree with this statement on average, whereas East Germans show higher level of agreement. It is therefore posited to reflect a possible felt disadvantage by East Germans with higher levels of agreement. Individual and personal disadvantage is implied here from the variable *personal economic situation.* Here, admittedly, the theory of societal inclusion

and the situational theory overlap, and a clear decision against any of the theories might not be prudent. However, it is assumed that agreement with the statement that the West benefited from unification more so than the East is probably the strongest indicator for a purely situational assessment.

VI. East/West Germans

East and West Germans are identified as respondents who have been surveyed on the former territory of the GDR and on the former territory of the FRG and will appear in the analysis cross tables as the dichotomous variable *West/East*, denoting "West" as the base of reference. Respondents who have originated in the West/East part and moved to the other have been neglected in this counting.

VII. Support of Government

Support of government is described as the relationship between citizen and state. Firstly, the overall general assessment of the satisfaction of the practical performance of the government is used as an instrument. Secondly, practical political participation, the indicator of *election* (a dichotomous "went to last election"/"did not go to last election") can be used as an expression for support or non-support of the government.

CHAPTER 7

Descriptive Results

In order to provide a graphic and broader overview over the variables of interest and their interaction, this chapter includes some descriptive tables and briefly discusses them. The relationship between perceived social ranking and the economic dimension of exclusion is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, showing the cross-sectional correlation of mean scores of the variables measuring perceived fair share (1 “a lot less”, 2 “a little less”, 3 “fair share”, 4 “more than fair share”) and perceived social ranking in society (scale from 1 “bottom” to 10 “top”) for the years 1991 and 2004. The means are calculated for every German state, also referred to as Länder,[84] keeping in mind that scores are dependent on the number of surveyed individuals in that region. The years were selected in order to allow the biggest time frame while accommodating the variables in the available years. Without taking any other explanatory variables into consideration, the relationship appears to be a linear one, displaying an interesting cross-sectional divide between East and West German Länder. Moreover, the plots suggest that over time the relationship becomes less pronounced. East German Länder with a low mean score in perceived fair share as well as social ranking of surveyed individuals from this region in 1991, already show in 2004 a higher mean score for fair share as well as social ranking. Still, an

[84] State shortcuts: B.-W. = Baden-Württemberg, Bay = Bayern, Berlin-W. = Berlin-West, Berlin-O. = Berlin-Ost, Brand = Brandenburg, Brem = Bremen, Ham = Hamburg, Hess = Hessen, M.-V. = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Nied.-S. = Niedersachsen, NRW = Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rhein. Pf. = Rheinland Pfalz, Saar = Saarland, Schlesw. – H. = Schleswig Holstein, Sachs = Sachsen, Sachs.-A. = Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuer = Thüringen

East/West divide is noticeable, however, correlated mean scores suggest a wider spread cross-sectionally. Both figures display an interesting linear relationship between both variables.



Figure 3: Scatterplot for Mean Scores of “Fair Share” and “Social Ranking” in 1991 (r=.38***)



Figure 4: Scatterplot for Mean Scores of “Fair Share” and “Social Ranking” in 2004 (r=.32***)

On the matter of influence of unemployment, Figure 5 and 6 illustrate the assumed relationship between unemployment and social ranking for the years 1991 and 2006. For better interpretation, social ranking has been collapsed to the categories (1) bottom (2) middle (3) top. Both figures show that despite the difference in frequency in surveyed individuals, East German unemployed identify to a larger portion as of low social rank as opposed to West German unemployed. The ratio between responses remains the same over years, however, one can notice a change in ratio among West German unemployed identifying themselves rather as "bottom" than "middle". However, East as well as West Germans tend to see themselves in the broad middle, with West Germans showing the tendency to rank themselves as top more than East Germans in both employment status groups.



	Unemployed - West	Unemployed - East	Employed - West	Employed - East
Bottom	58	164	45	116
Middle	427	329	496	598
Top	168	44	298	95

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 2010. Released by the Federal Employment Office, Nürnberg. From January 2005 on the data on counted unemployed of the Federal Employment Office are not comparable to earlier data anymore, due to the consolidation of unemployment benefit and social welfare.

Figure 5: "Social Ranking" and Employment Status in 1991 (r=.19***)



	Unemployed - West	Unemployed - East	Employed - West	Employed - East
Bottom	162	138	100	49
Middle	607	338	662	386
Top	213	57	360	109

Source: Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden 2010. Released by the Federal Employment Office, Nürnberg. From January 2005 on the data on counted unemployed of the Federal Employment Office are not comparable to earlier data anymore, due to the consolidation of unemployment benefit and social welfare.

Figure 6: “Social Ranking” and Employment Status in 2006 (r=.16***)

As the second part of the theory presumes a decreasing effect of social ranking on the satisfaction with practiced democracy (1 “dissatisfied”, 2 “a little dissatisfied”, 3 “a little satisfied”, 4 “satisfied”), both variables have been plotted for 1991 and 2002. Figure 7 shows That by Länder the mean scores for ranking rather in the middle (scores between 4 and 5) are associated with scores between “a little dissatisfied” and a “little satisfied”, with an increase on the social ranking mean score corresponding to an increase in satisfaction with practiced democracy.

In 1991 a cluster of East German countries at the lower end of the scale is observable. However, average ranking for East German Länder is clearly more indicating a perceived position in the middle rather than top. West German Länder whereas demonstrate a spread between “middle” and “top” rankings on average. In 1991 a heavy outliers is found in the data

point for Schleswig-Holstein. Here it is not clear whether this has structural reasons or is due to a sampling effect for this Land. However, it is noticeable that the scatterplot displays an almost linear relationship between both variables, with a more curvo-linear touch for the East German Länder.

For 2002, figure 8 suggests again the convergence of East and West German Länder to similar social ranking and democracy satisfaction averages. However, East German Länder display still an edge more dissatisfaction than West German Länder. A heavy outlier is here the East German land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, nation's weakest region regarding production and infrastructure. As Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is also one of the most rural regions, economic underdevelopment might be the possible explanation of the low social ranking, as well as low satisfaction with practice democracy.



Figure 7: Scatterplot for Mean Scores of "Democracy" and "Social Ranking" in 1991 (r=.29***)



Figure 8: Scatterplot for Mean Scores of “Democracy” and “Social Ranking” in 2000 (r=.20***)

Finally, the impact of social ranking and electoral participation is interesting. Figure 10 and 11 show frequency of electoral participation by social ranking for 1991 and 2006. To facilitate an easier overview, the social ranking scale was collapsed to three categories “bottom”, “middle” and “top”. According to the theory, this thesis expects to find a correlation between los social ranking and electoral participation. It is assumed that individuals who perceive themselves at the bottom of society are less willing to participate or support the political system. However, in visual ratio to each other both years do not offer descriptive evidence regarding an East/West divide in electoral participation nor a relationship between ranking and electoral participation. Yet, Pearson’s r indicates a significant relationship between the variables. In order to solve this matter a closer analysis is required.



	Yes - West	Yes -East	No -West	No - East
Bottom	78	264	23	61
Middle	801	899	93	139
Top	415	136	42	19

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Author's calculations.

Figure 9: Relationship between Electoral Participation and "Social Ranking" in 1991 (r=.19***)



	Yes - West	Yes -East	No -West	No - East
Bottom	164	130	61	49
Middle	1008	592	135	114
Top	491	153	46	7

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Author's calculations.

Figure 10: Relationship between Electoral Participation and "Social Ranking" in 2006

(r=.10***)

CHAPTER 8

Multivariate Analysis

Social Ranking and Dimensions of Exclusion

To provide a stringent test of the main hypothesis that specifically East Germans show exclusionary tendencies, as well as to test the two hypotheses following regarding unemployment and the material dimension of exclusion, this a multivariate analysis is performed. In order to offer a comparable temporal perspective, the models are run for the years 1991 (model 1), 2000 (model 2) and 2006 (model 3). The years have been selected according to the aim to represent the biggest time range possible, but also according to availability of concepts measuring items and variables.

In order to enable comparison, Table 1 provides estimation results for the dependent variable perceived *social ranking* ("top", "middle", "bottom" in ascending order) for the entirety of German respondents in the representative ALLBUS sample across the models 1- 3.[85] All models have weights attached normalizing the oversample in the New Länder. Table 2 whereas, shows the within-group relationships among East Germans only. Thusly, aberration from all-German results should be detectable. Here, the models 4 to 5 offer insights. Regarding the dependent variable, the original item measures where people perceive their social rank/ status to be on a scale from 1 "low" to 10 "high". The variable has been recoded to three categories in order to improve computation and generalization. As the dependent variable is thusly of ordinal

[85] The format of the table is modeled after the design of Craemer's tables. Cp. Craemer, Thomas, "Psychological 'self–other overlap' and support for slavery reparations", in: *Social Science Research*, No. 38/2009, p. 676

character, the ordered logit model is required. Run as specified, the likelihood ratio test as well as the Wald-test have indicated that the proportional odds assumption may be violated, rendering the normal ordinal logit estimation unsuitable. This is related to the fact that the dependent variable is skewed to the middle class. In order to deal with this problem, a partial proportional odds ordered logit model is used which tests this assumption for each independent variable. The estimator loosens up the proportional odds assumption for each outcome variable for which it does not hold while it keeps it for all others.[86]

The partial proportional odds estimation is a handy hybrid between the multinomial logit and the ordinal logit model, offering the most parsimonious model without ignoring the ordinal nature of the variables (such as a multinomial logit would do) and at the same time is not too parsimonious as to violate the odds assumption.[87] However, the results can be interpreted in the same way as traditional ordered logit models, except that multiple coefficients must be predicted for each variable that goes against the proportional odds assumption. If the parallel-lines assumptions were not broken, all these coefficients (except the intercepts) would be the same across equations except for sampling variability.[88] If this were not the case, Table 1 provides different coefficients. The first coefficient (labeled a) predicts any responses that are higher than "bottom", the second (labeled b) predicts responses of "bottom" ranking compared to "middle" and "top" ranking. Comparing these coefficients allow to follow changes in the effect of independent variables over the range of the ordinal dependent variable.[89]

Table 1 shows that out of 17 variables only one variable in 1991 (education), two in 2000 (people are not interested and fair share), and four in 2006 (individual economic situation, fair

[86] This estimation routine has been provided by: Williams, Richard, "Generalized Ordered Logit/ Partial Proportional Odds Models for Ordinal Dependent Variables", in: *The Stata Journal*, Vol. 61/2006, p. 59
[87] Cp. Williams 2006, p. 67 f.; cp. Craemer 2009, p. 675
[88] Cp. Craemer 2009, p. 675 f.
[89] The differentiation in coefficients are modeled after the design of Craemer 2009, p. 675 f.

share, unification benefited west and West/East) violate the proportional odds assumption. The first set of explanatory variables serve as the variables of the social, political and economic dimension. According to foregoing theorizing this thesis expected that mostly material concerns exert influence on feelings of marginalization.

The estimations show that except for 2000 the political and social dimensions of inclusion/exclusion fail to reach significance at conventional levels. The biggest impact unfolds the assessment on perceived individual economic situation. Here, a one unit increase on the ordinal scale of perceived economic well-doing (from “very good” to “very bad”) increases on average the likelihood to rank lower higher than “bottom” more than two times, with stability over all years. Influential as well is the likelihood for assessments of whether one receives a fair share of societal living standard. A one unit increase in the assessment to get less than the fair share increases the likelihood to rank higher lower than “top” by almost 50 percent. Like the individual economic situation this variable remains relatively stable, yet it is not on the same significance level. However, in 2000 and 2006 respondents were 40 to 30 percent more likely to rank themselves as “bottom” with increasing levels of perceived unfair shares. Taking the negligible impact of broad income groups into consideration, it is noticeable that social ranking, at least in economic perspective, is related to purely perceptional factors.

Furthermore the three models include variables for measuring the impact of unemployment. Unemployment and its long-time effects are assumed to increase likelihood of lower ranking. However, most employment-related variables turned out to be not statistically significant or, in the case of length of repeated unemployment, not very influential.

Table 1: Partial Proportional Odds Ordered Logit Models for Perceived Social Ranking

	Dependent Variable: Social Ranking	Model 1: 1991			Model 2: 2000			Model 3: 2006		
		Coef.	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**
EXCLUSION	People are not interested	n.s.			-.03[(n.s.) a]	.223		n.s.		
					-.69* [b]	.324	0.50			
	Politicians are not interested	n.s.			.58*	.229	1.78	n.s.		
	Individual economic situation	.80***	.117	2.22	.71***	.131	2.03	.71***[a]	.088	2.03
								.24*[b]	.122	1.27
	Fair share	.37**	.134	1.45	.11[(n.s)a]	.153		.13[(n.s.) a]	.092	
					.43*	.210	1.53	.29* [b]	.132	1.33
EMPLOY	Unemployment	n.s.			n.s.			.53**	.207	1.69
	Fear of losing job	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Previous unemployment	n.s						n.s.		
	Length of previous unemployment	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Length of repeated unemployment	n.s.			n.s.			.09**	.029	1.09
ALTERN.	Socialism	.13*	.068	1.14	n.s.			n.s.		
	People from other part alien	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Unification benefited West	n.s.			n.s.			.08[(n.s.) a]	.079	
								.19* [b]	.091	1.20
CONTROL	Age	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Gender	-.31*	.136	0.74	n.s.			n.s.		
	Education	-.48***[a]	.177	0.61	-.39***	.067	0.67	-.43***	.046	0.65
		.30*[b]	.123	1.34						
	Income	n.s.			n.s.			-.003*	.038	
	West/East	.62**	.242	1.89	.84 ***	.191	2.31	.71***[a]	.135	2.03
								-.74***[b]	.202	0.47
	Observations		1922			1046			2426	
	Pseudo R^2		.14			.12			.17	

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Dependent variable coding: (1) top; (2) middle; (3) bottom. First column gives ß-coefficient. The second column gives the standard error (St. E.). The third column gives the odds ratio. Only significant results were reported, except for changes in coefficients across response classes: *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 n.s. = not significant. For variables that violate the proportional odds assumption:

[a]Coefficient for any response lower than "top".

[b]Coefficient for "bottom" compared to any higher rank.

Only in 2006 current unemployment affected ranking significantly, increasing the likelihood by almost 70 percent to rank oneself lower switching from employment to unemployment in the independent variable. Important, but small, is also the effect of length of repeated unemployment. With a one unit increase in duration, respondents were about ten percent more likely to rank lower than “top”.

Finally, the impact of East/West differentiation is investigated as well. According to the theory it is, expected that the difference between East and West Germans is highly salient.
The results suggest evidence for 1991 and 2000. Being East German increases the likelihood to rank lower than “top” by about two times. However, this effect appears to have been dampened over time, as in 2006 the odds of East Germans identifying as “bottom” rather than any higher level are decreased by almost 60 percent. This suggests an upward mobility perception on part of East Germans or a down-leveling of West Germans as most Germans in general identify as ranking in the “middle”. As the first seems more intuitively likely, it is believed that in 2006 East German respondents display a lot less negative perception on where they “stand” in society. However, they are still hesitant to rank themselves as “top” in society.

Turning to the within-group analysis, the research expected that East Germans perceive material concerns as even more important and unemployment is expected to have a significant effect. One can see a comparable impact of high levels of perceived individual economic situation and fair share. In contrast, highly different is the importance of unemployment here. In 1991 unemployment increased the likelihood to rank oneself any lower than “top” by more than 80 percent. In the all-German sample this trend is not reflected and thusly indicates an East German specific tendency, most likely related to the vast transformational change in 1990/1991.

Table 2: Partial Proportional Odds Ordered Logit Models for Perceived Social Ranking for East Germans

	Dependent Variable: Social Ranking	Model 4: East Germans 1991			Model 5: East Germans 2000			Model 6: East Germans 2006		
		Coef.	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**
EXCLUSION	People are not interested	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Politicians are not interested	n.s.			1.00*	.436		n.s.		
	Individual economic situation	.79***	.100	2.22	.98***	.192	2.69	1.07***	.113	2.94
	Fair share	.32**	.108	1.37	n.s.			.25*	.119	1.28
EMPLOYMENT	Unemployment	.62**	.108	1.85	2.13**[a] -2.86***[b]	.716 .630	2.13 0.05	n.s.		
	Fear of losing job	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Previous unemployment	n.s.			-.97*[a] 1.98 ***[b]	.387 .385	0.37 7.24	n.s.		
	Length of previous unemployment	n.s.			n.s.			.07(n.s.) [a] -.18* [b]	.071 .088	0.61
	Length of repeated unemployment	n.s.			n.s.			.10**	.040	1.11
ALTERN.	Socialism	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	People from other part alien	n.s.			n.s.			-.12(n.s.) [a] .31*[b]	.106 .146	1.36
	Unification benefited West	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
CONT.	Age	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Gender	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Education	n.s.			n.s.			-.31***	.079	0.73
	Income	n.s.			n.s.			n.s.		
	Observations		941			386			883	
	Pseudo R^2		0.11			0.14			0.19	

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Dependent variable coding: (1) top (2) middle; (3) bottom. First column gives ß-coefficient. The second column gives the standard error (St. E.). The third column gives the odds ratio. Only significant results were reported, except for changes in coefficients across response classes: *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 n.s. = not significant. For variables that violate the proportional odds assumption:

[a]Coefficient for any response lower than "top".

[b]Coefficient for "bottom" compared to any higher rank

This also holds true for the year 2000. Here, East German respondents were more than two times more likely to rank themselves lower than “top”. However, they were almost three times less likely to rank themselves as “bottom” rather than any higher. As most East Germans as well as Germans in general perceive themselves more in the “middle” of society, this is not surprising. Moreover, these results suggest a decreased feeling of marginalization. Noteworthy is that employment has no significant relationship with social ranking in 2006, as opposed to the all-German sample where it was highly influential.

Interesting as well is the effect of length of previous unemployment when the respondent was currently employed at the time of the survey. It was expected that with increasing length of experienced unemployment individuals would also suffer more from the exclusionary effect of unemployment and thusly rank lower. However, the results suggest that length of overcome employment does not follow a linear distribution. Respondent were, with increasing levels of time, 60 percent less likely to rank themselves lower than “top”. But with increasing length they were also more than two times more likely to rank as “bottom”. This appears to be counterintuitive, but is only further evidence of the impact of being employed and the importance attached to it as a qualifier of social status. It can be assumed that respondents who had achieved a return to employment after a longer time of unemployment have experienced a strong social upgrading. Nonetheless, the results of 2000 should not be exaggerated, especially regarding the low number of observations that are a third of the observations of the other years.

Finally, the relevance of the alternate hypotheses shall be addressed. The assumption that socializational effects, specifically the proneness to a more socialist value hierarchy, is still influential among East Germans, leads to the expectation that agreement to socialism as a good idea as well as possibly higher levels of age increase the likelihood to see oneself as ranking

bottom. In the all-German sample, only in 1991 agreement to socialism did not fail significance. Here, Germans from East and West were 13 percent less likely to rank themselves higher with each increase in agreement to that statement. However, in the East German sample socialism did not reach significant levels in any of the survey years. In addition, age did not develop a meaningful influence either. A supportive trend shows the assessment of felt distance to people from the other part of the republic, as it indicates 30 percent higher likelihood to rank oneself "bottom" with increasing agreement. Nonetheless, evidence for A_1 over time and in magnitude is insufficient.

Regarding the impact of situational factors, the thesis would be expected that respondents, specifically East Germans, seeing themselves disadvantaged would agree that the West part benefited most from reunification. On the collective level a perceived disadvantage is expected, signified by a significant relationship between agreements that the West benefited from unification most. On the individual level it is assumed that perceived individual economic well-doing influences the likelihood of ranking oneself positively, and hence bad-doing consequently decreases this. On the collective level, A_2 has not reached significance in the East German sample. However, on the individual level economic indicators of exclusion appear to have stable relationship with social ranking. As the situational argument is related to the proposed theory it cannot neatly be separated and evidence suggest, at least for the individual level, that A_2 is relevant for perceived social ranking.

Support of Government

In order to test the hypotheses that support for government is related to societal exclusion, the following two analyses will examine the effects of social marginalization on support of the

government using two different dependent variables: satisfaction with practiced democracy and participation in federal elections.

I. Satisfaction with Practiced Democracy

In order to test whether social ranking has the expected effect on the evaluation of *democracy* in Germany (“very satisfied”, “rather satisfied”, “a little satisfied”, “a little dissatisfied”, “rather dissatisfied”, “very dissatisfied” in ascending order) models 7 and 8 were constructed. The models contain the main variables of interest, social ranking, as well as the material dimension of social ranking that has proved to be most influential, and additionally the variable for political dissatisfaction as it is assumed to affect the evaluation of democracy considerably. Moreover, the previous unemployment variables, control variables and alternate variables are included here. For a more parsimonious and relevant model some variables have been excluded so that the following models include only variables that are expected to have a relationship with satisfaction in practiced democracy. The model will be run for the years 1991 (Model 7) and 2002 (Model 8) for the all-German sample as the baseline of comparison, with appropriate weights attached. Models 9 and 10 are the corresponding models for the East German only sample. Due to a small number of observations, the ordinal logit has turned out as disadvantageous. Therefore, the dependent variable was treated like a continuous one and an ordinary least squares regression was performed. This decreases the quality and reach of interpretation; however, it allows the pinpointing of differences between the all-German and the East German only observations.

Regarding the relationship between the explanatory variables and dissatisfaction with democracy, it is expected that the perceived individual economic situation has an increasing effect on dissatisfaction. The same is assumed for the fair share assessment. In addition, this direction is expected to be more pronounced in the East German sample. Furthermore, social

ranking is expected to have a tentative relationship with dissatisfaction. Changing from higher to lower classes of ranking, dissatisfaction with practiced democracy should decrease, implying the reverse effect for lower ranks increasing dissatisfaction. The relationship between unemployment and dissatisfaction is expected to be similar. Both tendencies should be more pronounced among East Germans only. Table 3 shows that in 1991 a one unit increase in the perception of economic bad-doing and unfair shares increases dissatisfaction with practiced democracy in all-Germany as well as among East Germans.

Table 3: Ordinary Least Square Regression Models for Dissatisfaction with Democracy

	Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy	**All-German**				**East German**			
		Model 7: 1991		**Model 8: 2000**		**Model 9: 1991**		**Model 10: 2000**	
		Coef.	**St. E.**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**
EXCLUSION	Individual economic situation	.20***	.056	.28***	.062	.27***	.057	.21*	.091
	Fair share	.28***	.066	.18**	.059	.18***	.062	.31***	.086
	Social Ranking	.22***	.067	n.s.		.19**	.074	.22*	.101
	Politicians are not interested	.43***	.074	.20*	.101	.42***	.099	.63**	.219
EMPL.	Unemployment	.41***	.130	n.s.		.24*	.102	n.s.	
	Previous unemployment	.14*	.067	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
	Length of repeated unemployment	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		.08*	.035
A.	Socialism	.10**	.033	n.s.		.24***	.045	n.s.	
	Unification benefited West	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
CONTR.	Age	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
	Gender	n.s.		.17*	.071	n.s.		n.s.	
	Education	n.s.		n.s.		.11**	.039	n.s.	
	Income	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
	West/East	.31**	.111	.58***	.086				
	Observations	1938		1052		941		390	
	R^2	.22		.15		.20		.17	

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Dependent variable coding: (1) “very satisfied”, (2) “rather satisfied”, (3) “a little satisfied”, (4) “a little dissatisfied”, (5) “rather dissatisfied”, (6) “very dissatisfied”. First column gives ß-coefficient. The second column gives the standard error (St. E.). Only significant results were reported: *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 n.s. = not significant.

Moreover, frustration with politicians has a similarly increasing effect on being dissatisfied with practiced democracy and is in both cases significant at the 0.000 level. As expected, social ranking as well as unemployment effects play a significant role for dissatisfaction among East Germans. Yet, the same trend is observable in the all-German regression. Furthermore, both samples show that socialism increases dissatisfaction with practiced democracy, as does one unit increase in level of education. In the East German sample the significance level is more pronounced. This finding might be explainable by the fact that people with higher educational degrees than an average high school diploma usually had to demonstrate party closeness in the GDR. Thusly, it is possible that, especially in 1991, respondents with higher education were more skeptical towards democracy. Noticeably as well is that switching from West to East German increases dissatisfaction in 1991 and 2000.

Models 8 and 10 show that East Germans do not drastically differ from the entirety of the nation in their assessment of practiced democracy. For both years similar trends are observable. Just in comparison in magnitude, the coefficients for East German responses are a little lower. Different in 2000 is, however, the stable impact of social ranking on dissatisfaction levels among East German respondents. A slight increase in dissatisfaction is also caused by the length of repeated unemployment. Neither tendencies are significant in the all-German sample.

Finally, regarding the alternate hypothesis that socializational or situational effects increase dissatisfaction, the findings suggest that for 1991 the socialization affect is clearly observable among East Germans, yet is lacking for 2000. The individual situational indicators of fair share and economic well-doing are significant and increase dissatisfaction. However, collective individual tendencies have failed significance. This leads to the assessment that A_3 and A_4 are applicable for 1991, yet for 2000 these hypotheses are not supported by the findings.

II. Electoral Participation

In this analysis, the thesis tests whether assumed concepts of exclusion and unemployment also have an effect on electoral participation. The variable has been coded so that non-voting is the outcome of interest. The effect of the explanatory variables is estimated via a simple logit model for the years 1991 (Model 11) and 2006 (Model 12) for all of Germany with population weights applied. The same set of explanatory variables has been used as in the previous models. Furthermore, these model specifications are also used for the East German only group (Models 13 and 14) in Table 5. Table 4 shows the estimation for the all-German sample. The expectations are that lower social ranking and unemployment increase the likelihood not to participate in an election.

Table 4: Logit Models for Participation in Last Election in Germany

	Dependent Variable: Electoral participation	**Model 11: 1991**			**Model 12: 2006**		
		Coef.	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**
EXCLUSIO	Individual economic situation	.44**	.134	1.55	.31**	.103	1.35
	Fair share	n.s.			n.s.		
	Social ranking	n.s.			n.s.		
	Politicians are not interested	.48*	.220	1.61	.81**	.259	2.24
EMP.	Unemployment	n.s.			n.s.		
	Previous unemployment	.60***	.166	1.82	.35*	.153	1.41
	Length of repeated unemployment	n.s.			n.s.		
ALT	Socialism	n.s.			n.s.		
	Unification benefited West	n.s.			n.s.		
CONTROL	Age	-.66***	.123	0.50	-.37***	.073	0.68
	Gender	n.s.			n.s.		
	Education	-.55**	.178	0.56	-.30**	.087	0.71
	Income	n.s.			n.s.		
	West/East	n.s.			n.s.		
	Observations		1922			2312	
	Pseudo R^2		.12			.09	

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Dependent variable coding: (0) “voted”, (1) “not voted”. First column gives ß-coefficient. The second column gives the standard error (St. E.). The third column gives the odds ratio. Only significant results were reported: *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 n.s. = not significant

The results suggest for 1991 as well as 2006 that this expectation was incorrect. The impacts of negative social ranking as well as unemployment have failed significance. However, with a one unit increase of negatively perceived economic situation, respondents were 50 percent more likely to not have voted. In the case of those who previously experienced unemployment, respondents were 80 percent more likely to have not voted. Comparing these findings to 2006, an all-German decrease in magnitude can be detected. Increasing levels of age and education decrease the likelihood of not having voted in the past election by around 50 percent. Interesting here is the fact that the East Germans were not more likely than West Germans not to go and vote in both years. Running these models also for the East German group only (Table 5), it becomes apparent that in 1991 only two variables are significant.

Table 5: Logit Models for Participation in Last Election Among East Germans

	Dependent Variable: Electoral participation	**Model 13: East 1991**			**Model 14: East 2006**		
		Coef.	**St. E.**	**Impact**	**Coef.**	**St. E.**	**Impact**
EXCLUSION	Individual economic situation	n.s.			.31*	.141	1.36
	Fair share	n.s.			n.s.		
	Social ranking	n.s.			.46*	.204	1.58
	Politicians are not interested	n.s.			n.s.		
EMP.	Unemployment	n.s.			n.s.		
	Previous unemployment	n.s.			n.s.		
	Length of repeated unemployment	n.s.			n.s.		
ALT.	Socialism	n.s.			-.23*	.108	0.78
	Unification benefited West	n.s.			n.s.		
CONTROL	Age	-.73***	.124	0.47	-.39***	.109	0.67
	Gender	n.s.			n.s.		
	Education	-.46***	.121	0.62	-.56***	.129	0.56
	Income	n.s.			n.s.		
	Observations		935			867	
	Pseudo R^2		.08			.10	

Source: ALLBUS 1980-2006. Dependent variable coding: (0) “voted”, (1) “not voted”. First column gives ß-coefficient. The second column gives the standard error (St. E.). The third column gives the odds ratio. Only significant results were reported: *p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 n.s. = not significant

With increasing levels of age as well as education, East German respondents were 40 to 50 percent less likely not to have voted. However, in 2006, economic and social ranking variables exert influence as well as age and education. In contrast to the all-German results, the East German findings also show a non-significance of political frustration or the length of repeated unemployment. In contrast, a one unit increase in agreement to socialism decreases the likelihood to not have voted the last time by about 20 percent. However, one would have expected that agreement to socialism might have rather an increasing effect. It is assumed that this is spurious relationship that does not necessarily reflect a causal relationship between independent and dependent variable here. Furthermore, employment had in neither 1991 nor 2006 any effect on non-voting. The East German findings suggest that probably personal reasons have been most prominent for non-voting in 1991. Only in 2006 one can observe a tentative relationship between social ranking and electoral participation. Regarding the effect of socializational and situational variables, the findings suggest that A_2 is not supported, where again, A_4 appears to be partially supported. However, considering that there was no significance for non-voting between East and West Germans, this does not unfold a crucial impact on all German voting behavior.

CHAPTER 9

Limitations of Research and Analysis

Despite the interesting findings, a couple of limitations faced in this thesis shall be addressed and possible solutions proposed. First of all, the scope of generalization about East Germans is limited. The findings of this thesis offer insight on broader individual tendencies, however it cannot make meaningful statements on the effects of collective feelings or collectively perceived marginalization. A different research design altogether would be necessary to try to capture groupthink and collectively perceived marginalization.

Furthermore, there are technical limitations. The data has put some constraints on the modeling; specifically the fact that some items of interest have been discontinued in the survey after the first waves and that different items were often not available for the full range of years. This impeded not only the temporal comparison, but also the finding of appropriate instruments of measurement that have been available for at least two years and all models. This affected specifically the alternate variables. Thusly, evidential support for any of the alternate theories is bound to the availability to test them correctly. Affected as well are the measurement instruments of governmental support. Moreover, the numbers of observations are low for some of the years, especially 2000, creating proneness to only limited reliability in findings. These are all data immanent problems that can only be solved in obtaining a different data set. For future research, data should be considered that offer a long time frame, ca. 15 years, with repeated waves and coherent concepts measured each time. Data should include questions on agreement to perceived

“second-class citizenship”, perceived limited ability to be part of society and also more questions regarding support of government, credibility of government and trust in government. In addition to this, a higher number of responses would be desirable as well. This is specifically important for research on unemployment effects. Unemployed individuals were too little observed and thusly the data did not permit an in-depth analysis on how unemployment and length of unemployment is related to “second-class citizenship”. Finally, a direct measurement for testing the feeling of exclusion and the impression of being “second-class citizenship” would be of great help and alleviate many of the problems this research has experienced.

Moreover, a not to be underestimated limitation on the results is the coding of the employment variable. Here, it must be noted that the number of actual observed unemployed – meaning respondents that are available for the job market but have failed to find employment – is very low. In addition, the ALLBUS survey follows the general German differentiation of people who are “nicht erwerbstätig”, meaning they are not employed, but are not counted as available for the employment market either. From the data description and codebook it does not become clear whether those people are in fact unemployed, but in the bureaucratic language of employment classification, counted as something else. For example, there are differentiations of official unemployment benefit and welfare benefit recipients. In addition, the variable as recoded might be too broad to capture specific differences between different employment groups, such as full-time employment, half-time employment or secondary employment. In future work this differentiation should be taken into consideration and used, provided observations are sufficient to make any reliable statements. Furthermore, it might be advisable to also explore the relationship to self-employed individuals.

Lastly, apart from these technical concerns, some theoretical shortcomings shall be addressed. The relationship between exclusion from participation possibilities as a result of unemployment and perceived lack of material ability is possibly one that unfolds over longer periods of time as opposed to the short-term. Specifically, when defining exclusion from participation possibilities in terms of marginalization, it does not need to unfold an immediate impact on any kind of perceived marginalization. Moreover, a felt marginalization might also be caused by an interaction of, for example low levels of education and unemployment. Specifically in Germany, where educational levels are crucial for social status, education can certainly aggravate the possible effects of unemployment. Intuitively, those two things are of course also causally related in a specifically highly service-organization-oriented economy such as Germany. In contrast, what could dampen an aggravation of exclusion are social networks and other factors of positive social status that can balance out effects of unemployment, especially when these are just short-term. Strong social networks, specifically ones of civil societal nature could cushion discontent with the government. However, these factors have not been accounted for in this thesis. Aforementioned criticisms, technically as well as theoretically, should thusly be considered in the generalization of findings presented in this thesis and improved in further research on this topic.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion and Implications

This thesis investigated the question, why the perception of “second-class citizenship” is still held by a substantial part of East Germans, despite a gain of democratic liberties and living standards. It argued that this specific “second-class” feeling should be understood as the expression of social marginalization based on a lack of being meaningfully integrated in society. Exclusion from societal participation, specifically in material regards, was thusly seen as the root of discontent in the emotive evaluation of one’s civic relationship with the state and its members. Hence, exclusion from participation in society in an equal extent as others is interpreted as the felt marginalization as a “full citizen”. Furthermore, it argued that subsequently support for the government suffers, as the material shortcomings are interpreted as a lack of governmental efficacy to ensure equal integration in society.

The analysis suggests that there is evidence for a tentative relationship between material exclusionary assessments and perceived societal marginalization. The estimations have found that individual economic struggles, perceptions of unfair shares of common living standards and unemployment increase the likelihood of marginalization substantively. Moreover, the all-German analysis suggested that East Germans were much more likely to see themselves more in the middle and bottom of society than West Germans. Yet, this tendency appeared to decrease over time, indicating a shrinking of differences in societal inclusion between both groups. Moreover, the effects of material exclusion among East Germans were not very different in their

impact on marginalization. However, despite the often emphasized importance of material security and thusly employment for East Germans, the finding on its impact, as modeled, is at best mixed. Although experiences of unemployment and its duration have turned out significant up to the year 2000, unemployment effects among East Germans in 2006 were weak, whereas in the entirety of Germany a reverse development is observed.

This finding could indicate that the attached social value to unemployment among East Germans could have eroded over time. The thesis suggests that it is possible that East Germans got accustomed to the new employment situation over time and have experienced unemployment as well as employment and therefore not been exposed to one extreme or the other for a longer time period. Furthermore, the findings on a decreasing importance of unemployment for social marginalization despite stable material concerns influencing this, could also imply that as Germany has an extensive welfare state the effect of material exclusion could be buffered by social and unemployment welfare benefits significantly. This means that although concerns on fair share and personal material situation are influential in assessing integration, welfare benefits can decrease the latent danger of exclusion. Finally, as the numbers on actual employment have been too low, the relationship is not as reliable as needed and therefore unemployment could indeed be crucial in the societal exclusion feeling, despite lacking evidence as this thesis has presented.

Regarding the premise that marginalized individuals will also demonstrate to be at odds with the state, the thesis tested whether marginalization or employment causes dissatisfaction with practiced democracy as well as leads to non-voting in elections. The findings suggest that East Germans are more likely to be dissatisfied with practiced democracy. The main explanatory factor of social ranking is influential over time among East Germans, unlike in the rest of

Germany, but not as big in magnitude as expected. Unemployment, opposed to the premises of the theory, was only influential in 1991. Further, it is clear that economic perceptions are crucial to satisfaction with democracy, however this holds true in the same magnitude for all of Germany, not just the East. Given the fact that East Germans were nonetheless more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy, it can be concluded that there might be other, possibly personal, factors involved that explain dissatisfaction with practiced democracy. Regarding electoral participation, East Germans have not proved to be less likely to vote. It is interesting, however, that while education and gender are, as in all-Germany, influential, social ranking increases the likelihood not to have voted only among East Germans in 2006.

In sum, the findings suggest that the persistence of the "second-class citizen" feeling can be explained as the perceived lack of material integration in society, as indicators have been found influential, despite a lessening degree of influence over time. This mirrors well the survey finding on expressed feeling to be of "second class" and correlates with the decrease in this specific feeling of marginalization over time. But it also shows that the "second-class citizenship" feeling among individuals of the same nationality and ethnicity is a multilayered phenomenon.

Implications from this research indicate that exclusion is processual and as the analysis shows decreased, showing that a convergence between East and West Germans is possible but over coming exclusion might be more time intensive. As the findings are not as pronounced as expected, a possible implication could also be that a collective surrogate exclusion could take place. Individuals that are economically integrated but are related or connected via social networks to individuals who are not, could possibly take over the overall exclusionary attitude from these relations as a self-other overlap reaction. Moreover, the effect of exclusion on the

satisfaction with practiced democracy might mean that with increasing exclusion individuals can also be more critical of government and thusly impede government's ability to raise support for its decisions.

However, further research will be necessary in order to concretize these tendencies and offer a more plausible picture. In order to test the proposed theory, it would be advisable to also consider related and comparable international cases. This would not only broaden the applicability of this theory but also enable to draw on evidence from other cases. The German case could thusly be seen as a crucial case study that offers explanation for other cases of divided societies with tensions along group lines. Possible shadow cases such as migrant workers in China and North Koreans living in South Korea, as indicated in the introduction could answer some of the question left unanswered. Although the German case appears to be unique, this thesis' theory on German-German divides can contribute valuable insights on the relationship between economic exclusion and emerging societal divides.

Regarding a developing divide within an ethnically homogenous society, China offers a comparative case of a drastically increasing material and social exclusion of migrant workers. In China, workers from rural regions are economically disadvantaged when seeking employment in cities. This is rooted in the development of urban growth in China which exploded after the introduction of economic reforms and the fast development of the free market 30 years ago. But this development also caused mass unemployment in the rural regions and hundreds of thousands of young workers left rural areas to earn a living in the cities. Yet, China's hukou system, the household registration system, that denies access to basic services as well as employment benefits for non-urban residents, leads to a vast exclusion of rural migrants from material as well as social participation. As the hukou is inherited, this reduces non-urban migrant workers from

China's rural side to "second-class citizens", excluding them from material participation in the urban societies and in extension creating a crucial societal divide between these two groups.[90]

Material exclusion within an ethnically homogenous society is also a concern in South Korea. Despite being of same kinship, North Korean defectors, living in South Korea experience trouble integrating economically. The *saeteomin* (literally "the new settlers") as they are called, have family incomes starkly below the average of the South Korean society. Moreover, they are more affected by high unemployment than South Koreans and rarely any of them are employed in professional jobs, despite qualifying academic or professional training in North Korea. As South Koreans still see them as "people from the North Korea" they find it difficult to be employed and integrate economically in society, with high crime rates among North Korean defectors correlating with this development.[91]

If material exclusions are here not balanced out with welfare benefits and the effect of unemployment or low-payment even more adverse than in Germany, societal exclusions should be observable even more clearly in those shadow cases. Thusly, the German case could be seen as critical case for analyzing the divisional tendencies in China and the trouble of integration in South Korea. In both cases the relationship between material exclusion and societal marginalization appears evident. This marginalization creates divides between different socio-economic groups, despite the unifying identity of homogenous ethnicity and culture, could lead to a disturbance in the relationship between disadvantaged citizens and the state. The German

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[90] Cp. Branigan, Tania, "Chinese newspapers in joint call to end curb on migrant workers - Thirteen newspapers attacked China's household registration system, which limits the access of rural migrant workers to basic services" in: *The Guardian*, 03/02/2010, p. 23; cp. Chen, Liu, "Chinese Urban Migrant Workers: Current Concerns and Future Prospects" on: http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/ipraweb/paperss/Chinese%20Urban%20Migrant%20Workers-Current%20Concerns%20and%20Future%20Prospects.pdf, accessed: 03/02/2010

[91] Cp. Kim, Jih-Un, "Becoming Aliens among Brothers?: Status and Perception of North Korean Refugees in South Korea" on: http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/0/4/8/pages180485/p180485-1.php, accessed: 03/02/2010

case could thusly foreshadow a possible development of socio-economic identity-cleavages post-industrial societies such as China and Korea, expressed in the emergence of perceived “second-class citizenship” among the economically excluded. However, as this thesis has also shown, this is a complex and not an irreversible process and thusly requires further research. Both cases could contribute to a further expansion of this thesis’ theory and assumptions. Taking an international and comparative perspective will not only offer possible explanations for other international cases but also help deepen and polish the theory introduced in this thesis.

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APPENDIX

List of used variables, question wording and transformations.

I. Social Ranking: In our society there are sections of the population, that are rather at the top, and those that are rather at the bottom. We have got a scale here that goes from bottom to top. If you think about yourself: Where on this scale would you rank yourself? **(**"bottom", "middle", "top")

Note: The original coding went from contained 10 ordinal classes with 1 "bottom" to 10 "top". For easier computation and better interpretation, the scale has been collapsed.

II. Democracy: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you –all things considered – with the democracy, as it is in existence in Germany? ("very satisfied", "rather satisfied", "a little satisfied", "a little dissatisfied", "rather dissatisfied", " very dissatisfied")

Note: The original coding was the reversed trend.

III. Election: [Until 2004] Have you cast your ballot?/ [2006] The last Bundestag election was held at September 18., 2005. Have you cast your ballot at this election? ("yes", "no").

IV. Trust: Some people say that one can trust most people. Others think that one cannot be too cautious when dealing with other people. What is your opinion on that? ("one cannot be too careful", "that depends", "one can trust most people")

V. People are not interested: I will now read some statements to you. Please tell me to each of the statements whether you personally agree with that or disagree. […] Most people do not really worry about what happens to their fellow men. ("disagree", "agree")

VI. Politicians are not interested: I'll now read some statements to you. Please tell me to each of the statements whether you personally agree with that or disagree. […] Most

politicians are not really interested in the problems of common men. (“disagree”, “agree”)

VII. Individual economic situation: And now to some questions regarding the economic situation. How do you judge in general […] your own economic situation today? (“very good”, “good”, “partly, partly”, “bad”, “very bad”)

Note: The directionality of the response categories has been reversed.

VIII. Fair Share: In comparison to how others live here in Germany: Do you think that you received the fair share of it, more than the fair share, a little less or a lot less? (“more than fair share”, “fair share”, “a little less”, “a lot less”)

Note: The directionality of the response categories has been reversed.

IX. Socialism: The following concerns the situation in the Old and New Länder. Please tell me to every question whether you: completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree or completely disagree. […] After all, socialism is a good idea that has just been poorly executed. (“completely disagree”, “rather disagree”, “rather agree”, “completely agree”)

X. People from other part alien: The following concerns the situation in the old and new Länder. Please tell me to every question whether you: completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree or completely disagree. […] The citizens in the other part of Germany are in many things more alien to me than citizens of other states. (“completely disagree”, “rather disagree”, “rather agree”, “completely agree”)

XI. Unification benefited west: The following concerns the situation in the old and new Länder. Please tell me to every question whether you: completely agree, rather agree, rather disagree or completely disagree. […] Reunification has brought more advantages than disadvantages for the citizens of the old Bundesländer. (“completely disagree”, “rather disagree”, “rather agree”, “completely agree”)

XII. West/East: Respondents from the new Länder (including West Berlin) and respondents from the new Länder (including East Berlin)

XIII. Unemployment: What on the list applies to you? (“employed”, “unemployed”)

Note: The original coding included a more diverse differentiation of unemployment and employment classes. They have been collapsed to either “employed” or “unemployed”, not including pensioners, students and housewives/housemen. However, for the years at hand frequency in the non-employment classes has been very low and therefore discounted in the analysis.

XIV. Fear of losing job: (If respondent is employed) Are you worried to be unemployed in near future or have to switch jobs? (“no”, “yes, switching job”, “yes, being unemployed”)

XV. Previous unemployment: (If respondent is employed) Have you been unemployed anytime in the past ten years? (“no”, “yes”)

XVI. Length of previous unemployment: (If respondent is employed and has been unemployed in the past ten years) How long, all in all, have you been unemployed in the last ten years? (“less than 4 weeks”, “4 to 11 weeks”, “12 to 25 weeks”, “26 to 51 weeks”, “52 to 103 weeks”, “104 and more weeks”)

XVII. Length of repeated unemployment: (If respondent has been employed previously and had been employed prior to that) How long have you been, all in all, unemployed in the ten last years? (“less than 4 weeks”, “4 to 11 weeks”, “12 to 25 weeks”, “26 to 51 weeks”, “52 to 103 weeks”, “104 and more weeks”)

XVIII. Age: Please tell me in which month and year you were born. (“18 to 29 years”, “30 to 44 years”, “45 to 59 years”, “60 to 74 years” “75 to 89 years”)

XIX. Gender: Gender of the respondents (“male”, “female”)

XX. Education: Which educational degree do you have? (“none”, “Volks-Hauptschule”, “Mittlere Reife”, “Fachhochschulreife”, “Hochschulreife”)

Note: This variable has been recoded to appear more ordinal.

XXI. Income: Monthly net income of respondent. (“up to 1249 Euro”, “1250 to 2449 Euro”, “2500 and more Euro”)

Note: This variable has been recoded to low, middle and high income classes.