

WORLDS OF WELFARE DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF GERMANY, SWEDEN
AND THE USA

by

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(Under the Direction of Christopher S. Allen)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation focuses on the everyday discourses on the welfare state in Germany, Sweden and the USA to explore the link between welfare regimes and national political cultures. It utilizes focus group discussions and Q studies to locate these discourses. In the focus group discussions, participants debate different aspects of the welfare state with each other. I analyze these discussions and contrast the patterns within and across national welfare cultures. For a more systematic and replicable comparison of discourses, I employ the Q method. I conduct two sets of Q studies (one unique for each country and the other identical across countries). In these studies, respondents are asked to rank the given statements according to their level of agreement or disagreement. Statements for the unique Q studies are drawn from the focus group discussions, and statements for the standard Q study are drawn from international public opinion surveys. I factor-analyze the responses to locate the groups of arguments that cluster together to form rival discourses. The discourses that emerge from the analysis of the unique (country-specific) statements produce stark differences that parallel the welfare regime institutions of the respective nations and support the main hypothesis of this study. The implications of these findings for the study of the relationship between political institutions and discourses are discussed.

INDEX WORDS: welfare state, welfare regimes, discourse, public opinion, Q method, focus groups, deservingness, post-industrial nations, discursive institutionalism, Germany, Sweden, USA, comparative politics

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Introduction

Although there is much debate on the particulars, welfare states can be categorized into distinctive regime types, which show differences in almost every aspect. It is intuitive that there should be significant variations in public opinion on welfare state principles among countries with different welfare regimes, but findings suggest otherwise. Despite numerous studies, there is no significant evidence of such consistent variation. On the contrary, there seem to be more similarities than differences in public opinion on welfare state principles, and those differences we find rarely conform to the welfare typologies.

In this dissertation, I argue that we can explain these puzzling findings by drawing a distinction between public opinion measured as an accumulation of discrete answers to close-ended questions in surveys, and public opinion as discourse. Based on this distinction, I contend that despite the seeming convergence in public opinion on the welfare state principles across different welfare regimes, there is likely to be a significant variation in national discourses among different regimes. I attempt to locate national discourses on welfare by employing focus groups and Q studies, in which respondents are asked to rank statements according to agreement.

The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that while rival discourses are likely to appear in all three countries, discourses that parallel the institutional structures of the welfare state will be hegemonic in each country under study. In Sweden, an egalitarian/social democratic discourse that emphasizes solidarity, a need for government and social responsibility, in the US, a liberal (market-oriented) discourse that emphasizes individualism, limited government and personal responsibility, and in Germany, a

discourse that emphasizes the desirability of government intervention in the economy are expected to be hegemonic. The corollary of this hypothesis is that poverty is more commonly ascribed to structural causes than to individual failure in Sweden, while the opposite will be the case in the US, with Germany falling in the middle of the two. I hypothesize that elements of the hegemonic discourses infiltrate rival discourses in each political culture. My second hypothesis concerns the perceived deservingness of welfare recipients. I hypothesize that deservingness is a culturally constructed concept and therefore different nations designate different groups as deserving of government assistance.

The first chapter focuses on the significance of everyday discourses, reviews the general link between public opinion and government policies, discusses the lack of such a link between public opinion on the welfare state and welfare regimes, and examines the definition of the welfare state and the types of welfare regimes. I conclude that in order to unearth differences in how people think and talk about the welfare state, we need to focus on discourses instead of public opinion surveys.

As a first step to find the missing link between public opinion and welfare regimes, the second chapter employs hierarchical clustering method to analyze International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1999 and ISSP 2006 survey data on public opinion about the role of the government in the economy and distributive justice. The goal of the analysis is to group nations according to their opinions on welfare state related issues. The groupings from the ISSP 2006 survey parallel Siaroff's welfare state typology, which uses female mobilization and gender relationships as the most important variable in categorizing welfare regimes. This chapter suggests that the level of economic

development, the institutional configuration and culture all exert influence on public opinion, but the interaction of these factors varies by country. Therefore, clustering nations according to their responses to survey questions reasserts the puzzle of this study. When studying opinion polls, regime type matters in predicting which nations think similarly, but not in predicting what they think.

The third chapter focuses on the concept of discourse and argues for a shift in research focus from public opinion as measured by surveys to an analysis of discourses embedded in national political cultures. It explains how national political cultures are constituted and how ideological discourses shape the perception of policy issues by means of frames, which happens in the realm of welfare policies specifically through the application of different distributive justice principles, blame attribution and deservingness criteria. The chapter further argues for an extension of the classical ‘attribution-affect-action’ motivational sequence in line with the Brickman Model of Responsibility.

Chapter 4 presents the findings from the focus group interviews in Sweden, Germany and the US. In these discussions participants are asked to debate different aspects of the welfare state with each other in their native languages. Focus groups generate discussions reflecting national discourses on the topic. I discourse analyze these discussions. I also draw Q study statements from them.

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the Q method study results. Selecting a representative sample of statements from the focus group transcripts, a unique statement list is prepared for each country in the study. I also prepare a standard Q study using the same statement sample in all three countries to allow a direct comparison of findings across countries.

The statements in the standard Q study are drawn from international surveys such as Eurobarometer and ISSP.

I conduct two sets of Q studies (one unique and one standard) in Sweden, Germany and the US. In these surveys, respondents are asked to rank the given statements according to their level of agreement or disagreement. I then factor-analyze the responses to locate the groups of arguments that cluster together to form rival discourses. The public discourses discovered in the Q studies using statements from international surveys show slight variation across countries, but exhibit large differences within countries. The discourses that emerge from the analysis of the unique (country-specific) statements produce stark differences that parallel the welfare regime institutions of the respective nations and support the main hypothesis of this study. I compare the discourses within and across countries. Then I discuss the implications of these findings.

Chapter 1. Discourse and the Welfare State

There is neither a first nor a last word.

(Bakhtin, 1986, p. 170)

1.1 Everyday Discourses

The question of who supports redistribution and welfare is commonly researched. Welfare institutions inevitably reflect shared conceptions of distributive justice in their respective societies. If welfare institutions vary by country, this is partly because they reflect and promote different distributive justice values. Everyday discourses provide the communicative context in which the public makes assessments of what is just, who is to blame and who deserves what. Discourses problematize certain issues, diagnose their causes and prescribe remedies. Neither do everyday discourses exist independently of political institutions, nor do political institutions exist in a vacuum. The relationship between political institutions and discourses is circular and co-constructive. Discursive Institutionalism (DI) has focused on this dynamic in recent years (Cox, 2001, 2004; Schmidt, 2002; Hay, 2006; Jacoby, 2006). However, the emphasis has been mostly on elite discourses (the political elite includes elected and appointed members of the political establishment), whether coordinative (discourses that facilitate bargaining and decision-making among the elite) or communicative (top-down discourses that convey elite messages to the public). However, everyday discourses, that is, those discourses people participate in and reproduce in everyday communication with peers, communities, friends and families, have not yet received sufficient attention in the field of comparative politics. This dissertation explores everyday discourses on the welfare state in three

different nations and analyzes the links of these discourses to their respective welfare state institutions. This focus places this study within the DI tradition, but on its margins.

As such, this study concerns itself not with “who supports” the welfare state but rather with the discourses that motivate the public to support it and how these motives are addressed, framed and activated in the political discourses concerning redistribution, poverty alleviation and other welfare state activities. Everyday discourses are crucial in understanding the political process in democratic nations because it is in these discourses that elite discourses are understood and reconstructed, legitimacy of policies and institutions are negotiated and accepted or rejected, and finally, the reaction of “the people” is articulated. These discourses are shaped by elite discourses and institutional practices, but this is neither a deterministic, nor unidirectional relationship. Everyday discourses endow political institutions and actors with legitimacy in the absence of which institutions cannot successfully function.

The co-construction of institutions and discourses is a dynamic process that not only allows but effects change. Discourses are ideational phenomena that change through ideational factors such as deliberation, conversation and manipulation, but they are also affected by material factors such as institutions. On the other hand, institutional change is both facilitated and limited by everyday political discourses. The dynamic communication within and between discourses creates room for change because there is ample room for debate and deliberation within and among everyday discourses as well as between everyday discourses and elite discourses. Yet discourses also confer limits on what is acceptable and legitimate. Everyday discourses are the depositories of cultural commonsense knowledge. What is considered commonsense and natural in a culture is

difficult to change. As such, everyday discourses constitute the points of resistance that limit extensive and quick political transformation. They may be built on material interests and coalitions, they may be vestiges of the past, or they may simply reflect a shared understanding of how the political world operates. Regardless of their connection (or there lack of it) to material interests, they exert real influence on the political process and thereby the material reality.

In political discourses, political ideas, norms and values are not just represented and communicated, but also constructed. Interests of individuals, groups and nations are defined on the basis of these constructions. Hence discourses are not just a prelude to political action. They are political action.

Almost everybody who lives in a culture has a basic understanding of its everyday discourses. Successful politicians have an intuitive understanding of how their communicative discourse will be received, reconstructed and returned to them in the form of demands in everyday discourses. The best reformers have the rare talent to influence these discourses so as to either create acceptance of or demand for the political change they desire to bring. This seemingly intuitive and apparent nature of everyday discourses makes them unattractive targets of examination. While examining discourses does not provide us information on what percentage of the population supports a policy measure at a given point in time, it offers something that is just as – if not more - crucial to the study of politics. They help us understand and explain from where opinion survey figures come and what they mean. They allow us to see the ideational opening through which change sneaks and how change is legitimized. There are many possibilities for change in any political system, in any issue area, at any given time, but these possibilities are not

limitless. Discourses place limits on action and change, but they are not purely constrictive structures. They are also the domains in which possibilities for transformation flourish. Therefore, understanding everyday discourses provides us with great comparative insight. Why does a certain institutional configuration work in one country, and not in another? What facilitates and impedes institutional change? Why do some institutions persist as others come under increasing pressure for reform? Answering these questions by differences in group interests, class alliances, and material conditions leaves out the normative and ideational dimension of politics that is just as real as its material dimensions.

It is difficult to provide reproducible and comparative findings on everyday discourses because it is not possible to simultaneously capture their richness and diversity and make meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Comparisons of this magnitude necessitate reduction and categorization, rendering the loss of wealth of detail unavoidable to some extent. At the same time, this challenge should not prevent scholars of comparative political science from venturing into this relatively novel area. Examining, discovering and analyzing everyday discourses promises to provide students of politics crucial advantages. Such an enterprise allows us to lay an essential part of the mechanism, which breeds institutional continuity and change, under the microscope. A corollary of this is that studying everyday discourses opens a window into the psyches of nations, permitting us to examine why certain institutions wither, while others flourish in seemingly similar material environments. Political institutions and policies are often likened to seeds that have trouble growing in certain national soils, while burgeoning in others, but perhaps a more apt analogy is that they are like grafts. It is possible to grow an

orange, lemon or lime tree from a tangerine tree by grafting it, but no one can expect to turn an apple tree into an orange tree. Studying discourses lets us see which institutional grafts are likely to work in which national contexts.

This study aims to understand the differences in everyday discourses on the welfare state in Germany, Sweden and the US. To accomplish this, it utilizes focus group discussions and Q studies. In doing this, it diverges from studies that rely on opinion surveys to understand what the public thinks on the topic. Previous public opinion literature, which fails to provide convincing evidence that public opinion on the welfare state and institutions of the welfare state co-vary across nations, provides the puzzle and the departure point of this dissertation. Focus groups give us an understanding of everyday discourses on the welfare state. However, they do not provide statistical or reproducible data. I turn to Q method for a more systematic investigation of discourses. This investigation reveals that there are significant differences in the welfare discourses of these nations that cannot be captured through opinion surveys.

The next section lays out the puzzle of this study. It reviews some of the literature on the public opinion and policy linkage and inquires whether there are cross-national differences in public opinion on the welfare state. As the literature review on the topic will illustrate, despite numerous studies, there is no significant evidence of such variation. On the contrary, there seem to be more similarities than differences in public opinion on welfare policies and principles, and those differences we find rarely conform to the expectations of the scholars in the field. These surprising results form the puzzle of my dissertation. Next, I propose several alternative explanations, none of which will prove satisfactory.

The third section of the chapter focuses on the definition, the functions and the types of “the welfare state” and its hypothesized connection to public opinion and discourse in Germany, Sweden and the US. The main aim of this study is to explore how different national cultures differ in their views on the principles, goals, scope and functions of the welfare state. This cannot be accomplished without defining what the welfare state is. As is the case with most political concepts, the welfare state is a poorly defined concept. It is often used with the assumption that the reader knows its meaning. Yet, different nations mean vastly different institutions, policies and clienteles when they refer to “the welfare state.” Without understanding what people mean when they refer to “the welfare state,” we cannot place their opinions in context.

1.2 Public Opinion and Policy Link: The Missing Link

Notwithstanding the fact that the nature and formation of public opinion are complex and its impact on government policies is unclear, scholars expect to observe significant cross-national differences in public opinion on welfare state policies for two reasons. First, welfare state institutions, policies and spending vary considerably from country to country. Second, most theories predict a convergence between public opinion and government policies, despite describing vastly different mechanisms of public opinion and policy formation and disagreeing on how they influence each other. Policies and public opinion can interact and influence each other in a myriad of ways. Changes in policies may follow changes in public opinion (Page & Shapiro, 1983, p. 86; Whiteley, 1981) or they can precede changes in public opinion. In the end, however, we do not expect to see long term and drastic disparities between public opinion and public policies in democratic polities.

The most basic argument is that in democratic countries, public opinion influences public policy through democratic channels such as elections. However, not many scholars subscribe to this view because both the nature of the role of political elites in public opinion formation, and the magnitude of this role are unclear. Since public opinion on any given issue includes a variety of preferences, this variety provides political elites the opportunity to influence public opinion. They can frame (define the issue) and prime (highlight certain aspects and preferences) the public debate (Koch, 1998). Alternatively, elites can emphasize certain opinions and mobilize those sections of the public that support their goals (Wilensky, 1981), manipulate preferences using the power of agenda setting and by “structuring the world so” they “can win” (Riker, 1986, p. ix), or even create public opinion that will advance their goals (Edelman, 1977). While this sort of manipulation falls short of deception of the public through misinformation as in the Marxist concept of ‘false consciousness’, it is enough to suppress the genuine will of the people that would have emerged in a truly deliberative democratic debate.

However, convergence between public policy and public opinion need not necessarily emerge as a result of elite manipulation. Neither the public nor policy-makers may be willing to take risks and diverge too far from the existing arrangement, after living in a certain political arrangement for long periods. The *status quo* may continue even when none of the parties involved are content with it, due to a fear of uncertainty. In some cases, approval of policies increases retroactively (Monroe, 1998). Finally, both public opinion and government policies may vary depending on a third factor. For instance, Rogowski and MacRae (2004) demonstrate that increases in public demand for equality follow technological changes that lead to increased economic equality (and *vice*

versa). Other scholars similarly point out that higher economic inequality results in less demand for decreasing inequality (Moene & Wallerstein, 2003). Therefore, a third outside factor can influence both public opinion and policies in the same direction. In such cases, public opinion as well as government policies may be shaped by structural changes rather than shaping them.

As all these theories point out, whether it is public opinion that shapes government policies, policies and elites shaping public opinion, or outside factors that shape both, it is reasonable to expect a significant degree of convergence and consistency between public opinion, institutional arrangements and policies in democratic countries. In theory, this consistency increases particularly when there is no demand for change and the issue is not salient, and decreases when the public wants change (Monroe, 1998) and the issue is salient, in which case the government will be more willing to implement the desired changes because greater attention to the issue will force the government to be more responsive (Jones, 1994).¹

1.3 The Missing Link between Welfare State and Public Opinion

There should be a considerable degree of convergence between public opinion and long-term policies and institutions in democratic polities. From a comparative perspective, the primary implication of this premise is that where there are substantial cross-national differences in policies and institutions, there should also be differences in public opinion. Although there is much debate and disagreement on the particulars, there

¹Alan Monroe observes a “bias against change” effect in public policy making, which leads to lower consistency between public opinion and policies when the public desires a policy change as opposed to when it desires the continuation of an existing policy. (Monroe, 1998, p. 17-19)

is a consensus among welfare scholars that welfare states can be categorized into distinctive regime types, which show differences in almost every aspect (Castles & Mitchell, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi & Palme, 1998). It follows that we should expect to observe significant variations in public opinion on welfare policies, institutions and related principles among countries with different welfare regimes, but findings suggest otherwise.

If there is a positive relationship between public opinion and policies, it follows that the structure of governmental welfare institutions and policies in a democratic country should correspond to public opinion on related issues such as social justice, equality and the role of government in the economy. Since there are huge disparities in the welfare regimes and political cultures in advanced capitalist democracies, we should also expect to find significant differences across countries in the attitudes towards the welfare state and the principles underlying it. We would expect to witness more public support for the welfare state principles, policies and programs in countries with more extensive and generous welfare states. However, a brief review of the literature on the topic reveals that this is not the case. Despite the proliferation of comparative research on the topic that tries to establish such a link, there seems to be no significant relationship between public opinion and the welfare regime institutions in the expected direction. Some research even suggests that there might be an inverse relationship between the support for the welfare state and its generosity and universality.

In fact, if anything, data on public opinion on the welfare state contradict intuitive explanations. It is Wilensky (1975) who first suggests the lack of a significant variation in public opinion on social justice across capitalist democracies. He argues that social

policy differences among these countries are based on factors other than differences in public opinion. When he tests this hypothesis, the results lend support to his argument (Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn & Jamieson, 1985). However, his research suffered from serious methodological shortcomings due to lack of data at the time. Wilensky combines dissimilar studies and surveys in his research and his results are far from being conclusive. Contrary to the theory that welfare regimes which target the poor would lead to a welfare-backlash and universal welfare regimes would create stronger loyalties from the population, particularly middle-classes, Papadakis (1990) finds no evidence of a massive decline in the popularity of the Australian welfare state despite the targeted welfare policies. Even more surprisingly, Hadenius (1986) uncovers a dormant but powerful opposition to the universal welfare state in Sweden. Pontusson (1988) concludes that national differences are to be found in the way interests are historically organized, not in public attitudes. The implication is that culture is not a missing variable in understanding social policy.

The availability of systematic international survey data such as ISSP, World Values Survey, ISJP and Eurobarometer, combined with the impact of Esping-Andersen's pivotal work on "Worlds of Welfare" (1990), which distinguishes the distinct types of welfare states, led to a proliferation of cross-national studies on the anticipated relationship between welfare policy and public opinion. However, this flurry of publications only served to highlight the seeming lack of any significant relationship (e.g., Andress & Heien, 2001; Arts & Gelissen, 2001; Bean & Papadakis, 1998; Blekesaune, 2007; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Edlund, 1999; Evans, 1996; Gelissen, 2000; Jaeger, 2006; Linos & West, 2003; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Mehrrens,

2004; Papadakis & Bean, 1993; Svallfors, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2006; Blomberg & Kroll, 1999; Fraile and Ferrer, 2005; Kluegel & Miyano, 1995a, 1995b).

Svallfors (1993) examines public opinion on inequality in a most-different-systems study of Sweden and Britain. Sweden is considered to come closest to the ideal-typical Social Democratic welfare state model, while Britain has the most liberal welfare regime in Europe. It is almost universally assumed that there are vast disparities in the attitudes towards inequalities between these two countries, with egalitarianism permeating Swedish society and individualism dominating British society. Furthermore, Svallfors uses ISSP data collected in 1985 when Thatcherism was allegedly at its peak in Britain and the Swedish electorate had just elected the Social Democratic Party back to power. Yet he fails to find considerable differences between the opinions of the two nations on inequality and concludes that “in the light of the results from this article one could add that greatly diverging political practices, such as found in Britain and Swedish experiences of the 1980s, need not necessarily be based on large differences in mass values and commitments” (Svallfors, 1993, pp. 282-3).

Kluegel and Miyano (1995a) initially hypothesize that there should be significant differences in beliefs and attitudes about justice across countries. They suggest that the lack of supporting evidence for this hypothesis may be the result of the surveys from which data were drawn in previous studies. They try to resolve this problem by using data from the International Social Justice Project survey, which is “the first comprehensive sociological survey of popular beliefs about distributive justice” (Kluegel, Mason, & Wegener, 1995, p. 15). However, their conclusions are mixed at best. They do not find statistically significant differences among countries on topics like success ideology,

market justice and egalitarianism. Likewise, Arts and Gelissen (2001) cannot find significant differences among the countries included in ISSP and EVS studies.

Bean and Papadakis's findings (1998, pp. 229-231) also support the previous research. Their analysis:

demonstrates that the argument about the variation in **mass** support for services in different types of **welfare** regime is weak. The time-series and cross-national data show that even in liberal regimes there is not an overwhelming body of opinion against supporting the poor and disadvantaged...support for the **welfare state** as for many other policies is often a consequence of a deliberate and innovative attempt by political and other elites to mobilize public opinion.

In the most extensive book regarding public opinion on the welfare state to date, *Worlds of Welfare, Worlds of Consent?* Gelissen (2002) combines and expands on his earlier work. In general, Gelissen's findings parallel former research. In many areas, welfare state type appears to explain the variation in the levels of public support for neither the welfare state, nor the principles underlying it. He finds no support "for the thesis that there is a relationship between the type of welfare state, as defined by Esping-Andersen, and the levels of support for it" (Gelissen, 2002, p. 86). He shows that, mystifyingly, citizens of liberal welfare regimes show higher levels of support for the welfare state than the citizens of both conservative and social democratic regimes.

Gelissen also tests the hypothesis that as the welfare regime type becomes more universalistic, the support level for institutionalized solidarity increases. There is, in fact, a significant relationship between regime type and support levels, but the direction of this relationship is contrary to his prediction. He finds that the more universalistic the welfare state type is, the less support for institutionalized solidarity there is, with support being highest in liberal welfare regimes and lowest in social democratic regimes. Similarly surprising is the finding that the citizens of Mediterranean and Liberal countries put a

stronger emphasis on the equality principle than those of Social Democratic countries. Although counterintuitive, these findings are also consistent with former research.

In short, the literature indicates that regardless of the welfare regime type, slight variations withstanding, solidarity and justice principles seem to be highly valued by citizens of all surveyed countries (Gelissen, 2002) and that there is a consistently similar pattern across advanced industrialized nations with only minor disparities in the average support for welfare state principles and policies. The puzzle that is at the core of my study is this unexplained disconnect between public opinion and welfare state institutions and policies. Why does public opinion on welfare share more similarities than differences across different welfare regime types, while institutions and policies differ so widely?

This puzzle leads to my research question: Are there no significant differences in public opinion across different welfare regimes? In other words, is it possible that there is no meaningful relationship between the type of the welfare state a nation has and how that nation feels about its welfare state? If we are to believe the mounting evidence from the international surveys, the answer should be a resounding yes, but despite the surveys, welfare scholars find it hard to believe that Americans are as egalitarian as Swedes.

The consistent disparity between the actual survey results and the theories on the topic is confounding. The most straightforward conclusion is that either the surveys or the scholars' expectations are wrong. To suggest that the data are wrong amounts to questioning the reliability of a series of (while far from being perfect) meticulously prepared, established and widely used international surveys, like World Values Survey, Eurobarometer and ISSP merely because the answers to a few questions on the surveys do not fit our expectations. It might come as a surprise that the Swedes are less

supportive of the welfare state and less solidaristic than the Italians or the British, but this is precisely what we expect from objectively collected data: to deliver us the facts rather than conveniently confirm our preconceived ideas.

Scientific method dictates that we question our hypotheses in the face of contradicting data unless there is a good basis to suspect the validity or the reliability of that data. After all, hypotheses are all but educated guesses and many hypotheses have been authoritatively proven to be wrong in the past. In fact, this is precisely how science progresses and knowledge accumulates. That being said, when the results of a survey on a given topic are so counterintuitive that they challenge the consensus in a field and no published work offers an explanation to accommodate the new findings, there is a good reason to examine the data before we reach the conclusion that we have indeed been wrong all along.

Our suspicions should be exacerbated by the fact that we are dealing with cross-country public opinion surveys in which the same questions are addressed to people of different cultures in different languages, where much can be lost in translation. How can we explain these puzzling results? I propose that we turn to the concept of discourse to understand the context in which opinions are expressed.

Discourse is important in understanding what the people think because material motives such as self and group-interest are not sufficient in explaining political opinions. Research demonstrates that self-interest is not the only motive in supporting or opposing redistribution and welfare spending. While it is true that lower-income people are more likely to support social spending (Hasenfeld & Rafferty, 1989; Groskind, 1994), and women tend to emphasize need and equality as opposed to men who are more prone to

emphasize merit (Arts & Gelissen, 2001), self-interest is only one determinant of attitudes toward redistribution and social spending. Symbolic politics, that emerge from and reside in discourses, can be more important than self-interest in determining one's position on social policies (Henderson, Monroe, Garand & Burts, 1995). People support policies that are against their self-interest (Jaeger, 2006, 1992; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003, van Oorschot, 2002, Van Oorschot, 2000a) for various reasons including ideology, affective judgments about the beneficiaries of policies, group-identity, justice beliefs and trust. Identities, beliefs, emotions are influenced by discourse.

How do people acquire the core beliefs and values that they use to understand the political world? While there are many personal factors, one societal element that shapes political beliefs is the political culture or ethos. National political cultures are not like ideologies that provide structured and somewhat coherent worldviews. They are a hodgepodge of ideas, norms, attachment to certain ideals and understandings of how the political, social and economic world operates and ought to operate. More concisely, political culture or ethos is a “set of widely shared beliefs, values, and norms concerning the relationship of citizens to their government and to one another in matters affecting public affairs” (McClosky & Zaller, 1984).

National political cultures persist because they are reproduced and disseminated to the public continuously through political institutions, policies (Wills, 1971) and by the political elite (McClosky & Zaller, 1984). These discourses and frames that are rooted in the national political culture manifest themselves in popular attitudes concerning politics, and they help shape institutions and policies. Thus, institutions and political culture co-construct each other in a dialectical fashion.

National political culture provides the anchor that limits the spectrum within which ideological discourses gain prevalence in a society. Norman Fairclough defines discourse as “language as social practice determined by social structures [...]. [D]iscourse has effects upon social structures, as well as being determined by them, and so contributes to social continuity and change.” It is “a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). Similarly, Jäger argues that discourses are not just expressions; they serve certain goals and exercise power through transportation of knowledge and formation of the “consciousness that is the basis of individual and collective action” that produces subjects, social reality and ultimately society.

Some beliefs are treated as indisputable truths in one culture, even though they may be considered unreasonable and unacceptable in another. Thus, despite the fact that there is ample room for a variety of potential discourses in a political culture, a discourse that strongly challenges the political culture of a nation will not be influential in that polity. National political cultures accommodate and also limit discourses. Exercising such power over society, language is the site in and over which ideological struggle takes place. “Having the power to determine things like which word meanings or which linguistic and communicative norms are legitimate or ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate’ is an important aspect of social and ideological power, and therefore a focus of ideological struggle” (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 88). Ideologies achieve the highest effectiveness when their assumptions so thoroughly pervade the language (and therefore society) that these assumptions become implicit and invisible, and come to be considered ‘commonsense’ rather than ideological notions. An ideology dominates political culture when it

transforms into the ‘natural’ discourse for the discussion of politics, legitimizes policy and reproduces existing power relations. This can be termed as the naturalization of a discourse.

Naturalization occurs through the suppression of rival discourses. Naturalization is never complete as dominated ideologies continue to challenge the dominant discourse and a dominated discourse can become the dominant discourse when the balance of power shifts in social struggles (Fairclough, 1989). However, a naturalized discourse ceases to be seen as ideological. It appears neutral (above ideologies), generates commonsense, forms consciousness and regulates what is normal, acceptable and utterable at a given time in a certain society. What falls outside the limits of ‘acceptable’ utterances as sanctioned by the dominant discourse cannot be spoken without facing punishment, unless special tactics are used (Link & Link-Heer, 1990, p. 90; Fairclough, 1989, pp. 91-92; Jäger 2001, pp. 34). In other words, a naturalized discourse constitutes an integral segment of the political culture of a nation.

To understand differences in how nations understand and debate the welfare state, we should shift our focus from public opinion understood as the aggregation of responses to close-ended questions in surveys to the analysis of discourses that are embedded in national political cultures. It is not merely which idea is being conveyed, but also how and through what kind of language and frame it is being conveyed that matters. People are continuously exposed to statements that are loaded with connotations, imagery and explicit or covert bias. Similar formulations are repeatedly and consistently made available to the public in association with the same idea. When we strip ideas of their associated language, we also strip them of the connotations, cognitive shortcuts and clues

that language provides. Discourses recycle frames, imagery and words to clue people in on how to react to a statement. Context gives meaning to text, but surveys fail to capture context.

Supplementing a quantitative measurement of public opinion with a qualitative understanding of public discourses can be the key to the puzzle in welfare opinion research. Some scholars have already hinted at this. Svallfors speculates that privately held views and public discourses on the welfare state may be different in both Sweden and Britain (Svallfors, 1993, p. 283). He states that:

Attitudes should be seen as a reservoir for political articulation, a raw material for various organized interests which, due to its ambivalent or even contradictory character, may be differently directed (Svallfors, 1989 and 1993). The fact that attitudes to inequality tended to diverge into two different frameworks, one focusing on redistribution and one emphasizing incentives, could mean that the space may be especially large here for quite divergent political articulations from almost the same attitudes. The Swedes and the British may not differ in their privately held views on inequality, but in the arena of decisions on public policies we may still find differences in the perspectives that are used to perceive and assess inequality. The existence of a vigorous Tory tabloid press in Britain, and the splits in the political right in Sweden, are among the factors that could lead to differences in the public discourse about inequality.

If attitudes are merely a “reservoir for political articulation” or “raw material” as Svallfors contends, then measuring attitudes is not sufficient to understand how they influence public opinion.

Zaller and Feldman (1992) discover a pattern in the US that befits Svallfors’s argument. When asked, many Americans give egalitarian responses to close-ended questions. The same group of people also tends to give pro-welfare state responses to close-ended questions. Yet, in in-depth interviews, when they are asked to justify their support for welfare policies, they do not evoke any egalitarian arguments. Instead, they rely heavily on humanitarian motivations – that are readily available in the public

discourse – to explain their support for welfare policies (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001). They also fall back on ad hoc justifications for specific welfare programs instead of abstract arguments for general welfare principles.

Without an in-depth interview, we would assume that egalitarianism is one or perhaps the cause of pro-welfare attitudes in the US. However, based on their interviews, Feldman and Zaller (1992) come to an unanticipated conclusion: there are no egalitarian arguments available in the American political discourse. As a result, even people with egalitarian tendencies do not (or cannot) make the connection between their egalitarian belief systems and opinions on the welfare state. In its place, they use humanitarian arguments, which are available in American discourses on the issue of welfare policies (*ibid*). Thus, national frameworks shape the way inequality is perceived and interpreted (Scase, 1977).

Traditional public opinion surveys are not suitable tools to locate discourses, most importantly because they focus on fragmented individual opinions and variables. Discourses are structures that develop from the interaction of these opinions. They are more than the sum of their parts. If attitudes are flour, yeast and water, public discourses amount to bread. It is in the mixing and the baking that bread is made and different recipes yield different types of bread even when same ingredients are used.

In a study, Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997, p. 230) provide their subjects with a list of statements about welfare with the aim of finding out with which arguments they were familiar. They use the answers to divide people into categories according to their level of information on the topic, but although the focus of their research is elsewhere,

the answers to the familiarity index supplies us with other information that is useful for this study.

Table 1: Familiarity with Arguments About Welfare Policy

Welfare Argument	% of Subjects Familiar with Argument
People on welfare are mostly lazy.	94.0
Welfare destroys the motivation to work.	89.7
Welfare costs add considerably to the nation's budget deficit.	73.3
Excessive welfare payments are seriously threatening the American economy.	72.4
Most people on welfare truly need the help because they can't work, or they can't find decent work.	68.1
Welfare is necessary because we are morally obligated to help those who are less fortunate than ourselves.	57.8
Welfare provides a necessary second chance for many poor people.	55.2
People on welfare could probably get along without the help.	43.1
Welfare is needed because the bad U.S. economy has put many people out of work.	42

The four most familiar arguments are all anti-welfare, and four of the five least familiar statements are pro-welfare. The most recognized argument attributes the blame for the neediness of welfare recipients on their laziness. A stunning 94% of the subjects in the study are familiar with the claim that people on welfare were mostly lazy, and 87% of them previously encountered the argument that welfare destroys the motivation to work. On the other hand, a meekly 42% of the subjects are familiar with the argument that welfare is needed because the bad U.S. economy put many people out of work, only 52% previously heard the claim that welfare provided a necessary second chance and

58% heard the contention that welfare was a necessity that was rooted in the moral obligation to help those who were less fortunate than ourselves. The most recognized pro-welfare statement is that most people on welfare truly need the help because they cannot work, or they cannot find decent work, and even then 32% of the respondents has never heard of it. All in all, almost half the 116 subjects (and in one case, more than half) are simply unexposed to three of the four pro-welfare arguments. Let us take a look at this familiarity index (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997, p. 230):

It is not possible to agree or disagree with arguments with which one is not familiar. According to Table 1, most Americans are familiar with the negative statements on the welfare state, but not with the positive ones. When a public opinion survey asks a person to agree or disagree with a statement, the respondent can decide that she agrees with the statement that supports welfare assistance on the spot, but if she has never heard of that argument in her life, this agreement is merely hypothetical. As long as she does not encounter this argument in real life, she will not take it into consideration when forming opinions and attitudes on welfare policies. If a national culture does not include discourses that represent a perspective, people will not be familiar with that perspective and therefore they will not be in favor of it.

The meaning of the welfare state changes in each discourse. A definition of the welfare state and an overview of the functions and categories of welfare states are essential conceptual guides to comprehend how each nation places its welfare state on this definitional map, what functions they demand from it, and what associations they connote to it. In this section, I will discuss a variety of welfare state definitions, address some of the problems in these definitions and propose an alternative conceptualization.

1.4 Defining the Welfare State

There is a wealth of literature on the topic of the welfare state going back to the immediate aftermath of World War II, when most modern welfare systems in Western industrialized democracies were established. As some scholars point out (Barr, 2004; Briggs, 1961; Esping-Andersen, 1990) despite the vast number of publications on the welfare state that focus on the history, development, retrenchment, policy differences, expenditure differentials and many other aspects of the welfare state, seldom is there an attempt to answer the elementary question of what the welfare state is. Esping-Andersen notes that there is a “lack of much genuine interest in the welfare state as such” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 18). Political scientists have not come a long way in establishing a commonly accepted, definitive and comprehensive definition of the welfare state since Richard Titmuss (1958) wittingly put ‘the welfare state’ in quotation marks in the title of his book to draw attention to the ambiguity of the concept.

Today, the welfare state is as popular and vague a concept as ever, partly because of the plethora of approaches by scholars, political practitioners and laymen to “the welfare state” and partly because of its ever-changing nature. The nature of the welfare state changes according to the time-period in question as well as the country. The welfare state of Bismarck’s Germany hardly qualifies as a welfare state in contemporary terms, although many scholars consider it to be the first emergence of the modern welfare state, and nobody can deny that the welfare state in Sweden and the United States are very different animals, not to mention the differences between the more established and well-funded welfare states of post-industrial countries and the emerging and poorly-funded welfare states of industrializing countries.

Despite these enormous dissimilarities, there are enough commonalities between these vast array of institutions, programs and practices to justify clustering them under the tag of “the welfare state.” While most studies focus on the differences between welfare states across nations or across time (or both), focusing on the commonalities can provide us with an operational definition of the welfare state. It is possible to avoid defining the welfare state altogether -as most studies do- and using “the welfare state” as a label for a variety of state activities concerning cash benefits, health care, education, food, housing and other welfare services, since in effect and based on practical observation, these are the areas the welfare state covers (Lampman, 1984). However, this is more of an *ad hoc* categorization rather than a conceptual definition, since it does not provide any theoretical reasoning as to why the welfare state is supposed to consist of these and only these activities.

A non-conceptual definition may lead to the inclusion of theoretically irrelevant state activities, while excluding conceptually crucial state activities. Indirect spending programs are a case in point. As some scholars have pointed out, it is a mistake to use only direct spending to define and measure welfare states (Titmuss, 1958). “By equating the welfare state with direct spending programs like Social Security, scholars have neglected indirect tools of social policy such as loans, loan guarantees and tax expenditures. This oversight has meant that scholars ignored dozens of indirect spending programs costing hundreds of billions of dollars” (Howard, 1993, p. 304).

When we survey the welfare state literature, the definitions vary depending on whether they are constructed with regard to the objectives or the structures of the welfare state. Identifying the objectives of the welfare state is an inescapably normative task.

From a utilitarian perspective, the objective of the welfare state is the maximization of the total welfare of society, however welfare is defined. For some it is the attainment of social justice, while for others it is the realization of equality. When equality is in question, it can be the equality of classes for democratic socialists, sexes for feminists, generations, or socially constructed groups such as races and ethnic groups. The goal can be the accomplishment of individual freedoms for liberals or building social solidarity among different groups in society for socialists. For many, particularly practitioners like Lord Beveridge, or Franklin D. Roosevelt, the target may simply be the eradication of social ills such as poverty, ignorance and disease. For authoritarian statesmen like Otto von Bismarck, the welfare state serves the more cynical purpose of taming radical movements (Barr, 2004).

Barr categorizes the objectives of the welfare state under three broad headings: efficiency, equity and administrative feasibility. However, he fails to point out that two of these categories (efficiency and administrative feasibility) are essentially of secondary character since they concern the effective operation of the welfare state rather than its underlying objective. The efficiency objectives include those of not distorting the market too much, efficiently dividing the resources between different kinds and programs of welfare spending and minimizing the adverse effects of welfare spending on labor supply, employment and savings, whereas administrative feasibility objectives include intelligibility, that is, making the mechanism as simple, easy to understand and cheap to administer as possible and minimizing abuse.

On the other hand, equity objectives are of primary nature. They include the goals of relieving poverty, providing insurance to citizens to prevent unexpected and

unacceptable drops in living standards, smoothing income over lifetime, decreasing vertical and horizontal inequality, protecting the dignity of recipients and fostering social solidarity (Barr, 2004). Barr identifies two major problems with these objectives. First, some of these concepts, such as dignity, are hard to define and measure. Second, some of them are in direct conflict with each other. The second problem does not only involve the age-old contradiction between equity and efficiency, but also multiple equity concerns. Goals such as decreasing inequality and protecting dignity may conflict with one another. For instance, decreasing inequality might require the government to redistribute resources from the upper classes to the lower classes, thereby stigmatizing them and damaging social solidarity (although this is an debatable point, it is plausible). Given the influence of multiple and disparate forces on the development of the welfare state throughout its development, it is possible that the welfare state serves contradicting objectives, but it is also possible that these seemingly contradictory objectives are different expressions of one overarching goal.

Charles Howard attempts to provide such a general objective when he refers to the welfare state as an “instrument of social control or social betterment” (Howard, 1993, p. 304). Likewise, Asa Briggs’ definition of the welfare state focuses on the objectives of the welfare state. She defines the welfare state as a:

state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions-first by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain “social contingencies” (for example sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services.

(Briggs, 1961, p. 228)

Goodin and Mitchell propose that the welfare state is:

characterized by its *systematic social* concern for the welfare of people who might otherwise lack the *basic necessities* required for effective functioning within their community. The term welfare state points, as the name implies, to *state* activity –organized social action, rather than uncoordinated action of private individuals or groups. Either the state performs welfare activities itself, or else it ensures that they are done (by, for example, legality mandating people to insure with private underwriters).

(Goodin & Mitchell, 2000, p. ix)

Another way of defining the welfare state is focusing on its structure as Therborn (1983) does. Therborn derives his conception of the welfare state from the historical transformation of state activities, suggesting that welfare activities should constitute the majority of the activities of a welfare state. Until 1970s, all states devoted most of their time and resources to defense, administration, or law-and-order. Based on this structural definition, the welfare state is a very contemporary creation (Therborn, 1983).

Gosta Esping-Andersen tries to identify both the objectives and the structures of the welfare state. His definition of the welfare state includes the objective of the granting of social rights (as put forth by T.H. Marshall (1950)), but the structure of state activities and state-market relations is crucial, too. According to Esping-Andersen “a common text book definition is that it involves state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 18-19). However, he argues that such a definition excludes many vital questions: whether the welfare system has an emancipatory nature, whether it serves legitimation purposes for the system, and whether welfare institutions contradict or aid the market process. Emancipatory role of the welfare state is pivotal to Esping-Andersen’s analysis. He famously makes the case that emancipation comes with *decommodification*, that is, relief of citizens from their status as

a commodity in the market as well as relief from their dependence on the market for their survival.

To understand the welfare state, one should take into account “how state activities are interlocked with the market’s and the family’s role in social provision” (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p.21). Esping-Andersen argues that the first generation of welfare scholars misunderstood the nature of the welfare state because they equated the level of social expenditure with the commitment of a state to welfare, which is an inadequate and potentially misleading approach. He further asserts that “(E)xpenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of the welfare states,” and that sociologically “power, democracy, or welfare are relational and structured phenomena” as opposed to linear. Hence, not all spending counts equally and spending alone does not reveal the character of the welfare state because it is not only how much money the states spend, but on what and how they spend it that matters (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.19).

Esping-Andersen gives a striking illustration of how spending *per se* does not give away much about the welfare state structure. Welfare spending grew under Thatcher, a staunchly anti-welfare leader determined to decrease welfare, only because of high unemployment levels. Likewise, a government committed to full-employment may decrease welfare spending, although their commitment to full-employment is in fact supportive of increased welfare provisions. In such cases, changes in the welfare spending would tell little about the nature of the welfare state in a country.

If we are to agree to Therborn’s (1983) definition of the welfare state, it follows that the welfare state did not emerge until the 1970s. In other words, there were no welfare states in the ‘golden era’ of welfare states and even today, only some states

qualify as such. However, this study does not interest itself in the study of the welfare state as a type of state. Instead, the welfare state will be identified as a domain that exists within every state, although the extent and reach of this domain varies. Briggs's definition, with its emphasis on very specific objectives and conditions, is too exclusive. There are many states, which neither guarantee a minimum income to their citizens, nor provide services to "all citizens without distinction of status or class". In fact, in some states all or most services are delivered specifically according to status and class. Nonetheless they are commonly accepted as welfare states. Viewing the welfare state as an "instrument of social control or social betterment" (Howard, 1993, p. 304), on the other hand, is too general a definition, since virtually every aspect of government activity targets social control or social betterment. Goodin and Mitchell's definition (2000) overlooks the fact that much of welfare state activity involves providing goods and services beyond basic necessities and extends to groups and individuals that do not need governmental assistance for effective functioning.

Therefore, a satisfactory definition of the welfare state should identify the overarching objective of the welfare state. This definition should not be too broad as to include all activities of the state, yet it should not be too specific to exclude activities that are universally considered to be within the domain of the welfare state, countries which are considered to have welfare states, or periods in history which are deemed to have had welfare state presence. Finally, the definition should have a theoretical basis and not be a collection of empirical observations. I derive my definition and conceptualization of the welfare state mainly from Briggs's and Esping-Andersen's definitions.

This study defines the welfare state as *a set of government institutions and policies of which the primary aim is to moderate the impact of market forces, contingencies, and brute luck on the life chances and well-being of individuals and/or social groups. While individual protections are extended to all citizens or residents of a state, social group protections are extended only to the members of select groups and are conditional on group membership. These social groups mainly include but are not exclusive to the elderly, single-parent households, the unemployed, the disabled, the poor, widows, orphans, and certain occupations.*

Despite being a broad definition, this characterization of the welfare state signifies its domain by focusing on its fundamental objectives while allowing variation across time and space. For instance, a welfare state may target decreasing inequality and increasing solidarity among its citizenry, but this is not a necessary condition.

1.5 Categorizing Welfare States: Regimes

The welfare state takes various shapes and creates different social and political patterns and alliances in each country, but these variations are not random. Welfare states can be classified into groups, according to the specific patterns in which they organize the interaction of markets, the state and families. Gosta Esping-Andersen's typology of welfare regimes in *Worlds of Welfare* (1990), a book routinely labeled as seminal, has become the most commonly accepted classification in the welfare state literature. Building on the work of Richard Titmuss, Esping-Andersen constructs Weberian ideal types of welfare regimes. *Worlds of Welfare* led to a revival, if not the emergence, of academic interest in the types of welfare state. A rich literature on types of welfare states has flourished, and Esping-Andersen's typology has been continually challenged and

revised by other researchers. There emerged a consensus among scholars that welfare states can be classified into distinct regime types, but there is still much disagreement on the specifics.

Esping-Andersen (1990) differentiates welfare regimes based on three criteria: the degree of decommodification of labor, the pattern in which entitlements are connected to need, contributions and citizenship, and how public provisions are delivered. Esping-Andersen identifies three welfare regimes: the liberal regime, the corporatist regime and the social democratic regime. Each regime type encourages a different type of social stratification and solidarity. In Liberal regimes, the state does not interfere with the market stratification of class and status according to income, and only engages in poverty relief. Corporatist regimes reinforce social stratification based on occupational status, and mandate contributory social insurance. Social Democratic regimes try to achieve social equality and provide universal welfare benefits.

Esping-Andersen operationalizes these criteria using quantitative data, which enables him to categorize actual welfare states under the ideal regime type to which they most closely correspond. According to Esping-Andersen's classification, English-speaking countries fall under the Liberal regime, and the Conservative regime comprises of Italy, Japan, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, while Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden constitute the Social Democratic regime.

There are two main lines of criticism regarding Esping-Andersen's typology. Firstly, most scholars contend that there are more than three types of welfare regimes and therefore Esping-Andersen's typology is inadequate. The most common critique along this line is that Esping-Andersen's typology fails to recognize the Mediterranean and East

Asian welfare states as separate regimes. According to some typologies developed later, these regions constitute distinct regimes (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Trifiletti, 1999). Some scholars also argue that Antipodean countries do not belong in the Liberal regime but constitute a distinct type. Esping-Andersen responds to these arguments by widening the scope of his research to Mediterranean welfare states. He concludes that Southern European countries do not form a separate regime category but are merely Conservative regimes that are at an earlier stage of development than their Central European counterparts. He maintains that there are three ideal types of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 2000). Secondly, there is an ongoing debate about which countries fall under which regime (see Arts & Gelissen, 2002 for a detailed review of this literature).

Both of these criticisms emanate from a more fundamental disagreement over the criteria employed in the construction of the ideal types. These debates have spurred a large number of studies, which look at different indicators to classify welfare regimes. The classification criteria and data as well as the resulting categories of countries vary, but there is significant overlap among the typologies. Germany, Sweden and the US appear to be the epitomes of their respective regime types in all typologies, when they are included in the study. Germany is always classified as a Conservative/Corporatist regime, Sweden as a Social Democratic/Nordic regime and the US as a Liberal/Anglo-Saxon regime, although labels for regimes change. This is the main reason this study uses Germany, Sweden and the US for a small-n, comparative case study on welfare regimes.

More recently, there is an effort to classify Eastern European welfare states, the most prominent question being whether they comprise a distinctive “Post-Communist”

type, or are modeled after existing welfare state types (Fenger, 2007). Esping-Andersen is of the conviction that Eastern European countries do not constitute a separate category and any difference between Western and Eastern European welfare states is of transitory nature (Esping-Andersen, 1996).

The next chapter looks at the groups nations form when clustered according to the survey responses of their citizens on the welfare state, distributive justice and government role in the economy.

Chapter 2. Opinion Regimes

Before turning our full attention to everyday discourses, let us examine public opinion surveys once again, this time with a fresh methodological approach. Many studies have dealt with the question of how and how much public opinion varies across welfare regimes. Previous studies presort countries into regimes based on an existing typology and examine whether and how their opinions differ across these regime types. While clustering has been employed to classify welfare regime types (Kangas, 1994; Obinger & Wagschal, 1998), there is no study that classifies nations according to their opinions on the welfare state yet. In this chapter, I employ hierarchical clustering method (HCM) to group nations according to survey responses. It is possible that the public opinion clusters do not coincide with any of the welfare regime typologies in the literature. Even if resulting clusters are consistent with regime types, their response patterns may not match the institutional logic of the regime, but findings will show that this is not the case. Emergent clusters are similar to regime groupings in the welfare regime. This is hardly surprising, but nonetheless reassuring, demonstrating that public opinion surveys manage to capture similarities across countries with similar welfare regimes. My analysis of the results focus on the questions that divide these clusters most starkly. When we only focus on these few questions, there are predictable differences in public opinion between regime types. However, these differences are limited because on many questions that are just as crucial, there are very small differences across post-industrial nations. While the HCM analysis in this chapter emphasizes the differences, the bottomline remains that industrial countries are more similar than dissimilar in their public opinion on the welfare state.

There are many questions that need to be answered. Do opinions cluster along regime types at all? If they do, are there only three worlds of welfare opinion, or are there also Southern, Eastern European and Antipodean worlds? Does the Netherlands (a mostly hybrid-regime) belong in the conservative or social democratic opinion cluster? Whose typology most resembles the opinion clusters? In the next section, I will examine (1) whether public opinion clusters closely match any of the welfare regime classifications in the literature, and, if they do, (2) whether the opinion differences between these clusters reflect the differences between their welfare regime types. First section of this chapter explains the hierarchical clustering method. Second section presents the findings, and the final section reviews the results in light of the relevant literature.

2.1 Method

I apply hierarchical cluster analysis to the data from two international surveys, which are on issues that are related to the welfare state. The first survey I analyze is ISSP 1999 in which the respondents are asked questions about inequality and redistribution. The second survey is ISSP 2006, which is about the role of the government. (A new ISSP survey on inequality and redistribution was completed in 2009, but the results had not been released at the time of the writing of this study.) I select ISSP surveys because they include many countries from all over the world, (most importantly, they include the cases selected for this study: Germany, Sweden and the US), and they ask the same battery of questions across countries, rendering them superior to other surveys that are either conducted in one continent (e.g. Eurobarometer) or ask different sets of questions in different countries (e.g. World Values Survey). In addition, the high response rates for ISSP surveys increase their reliability. Questions that are not pertinent to the role of the

government in the economy, inequality, or redistribution such as demographic questions as well as questions that measure the level of respondents' political sophistication and interest are excluded from the analysis.² Complete linkage³ method is employed for cluster-analyzing the data. The results of the analysis combine familiar and surprising elements.

2.2 Findings

2.2.1 ISSP 1999

Figure 1 illustrates the cluster analysis results of the ISSP 1999 survey on inequality and redistribution. All the countries that participated in the 1999 ISSP survey are included in the cluster analysis. 29 items from the survey are selected for this analysis. A group of questions that asks the respondents what the average incomes of certain occupational groups are (based on their best guess) and what they ought to be is left out of the cluster analysis, although these items are theoretically relevant to the purpose of the study. Without these items, the results are robust.

Employing wards linkage⁴ and complete linkage method in the cluster analysis produces almost identical results, and excluding one or several other items from the

² See the Appendix for the Z scores of statements.

³ "The complete linkage clustering (or the farthest neighbor method) is a method of calculating distance between clusters in hierarchical cluster analysis. The linkage_function_specifying the distance between two clusters is computed as the maximal object-to-object distance $D(x_i, y_j)$, where objects x_i belong to the first cluster, and objects y_j belong to the second cluster. In other words, the distance between two clusters is computed as the distance between the two farthest objects in the two clusters.

Mathematically the linkage function - the distance between clusters X and Y- is described by the following expression:

$$D(X,Y) = \max_{x \in X, y \in Y} d(x,y)$$

where

$D(x, y)$ is the distance between x and y;

X and Y are two sets of objects (clusters)" (<http://www.statistics.com>).

⁴ "Ward's linkage is a method for hierarchical cluster analysis. The idea has much in common with analysis of variance (ANOVA). The linkage function specifying the distance between two clusters is computed as the increase in the "error sum of squares" (ESS) after fusing two clusters into a single cluster. Ward's Method seeks to choose the successive clustering steps so as to minimize the increase in ESS at each step.

analysis does not substantially alter the findings. However, when the battery of questions on income is added to the study, the results of the analysis turn out to be fully erratic.




Figure 1: Inequality and Redistribution, ISSP 1999

This is largely due to the fact that nations that are likeminded on inequality and redistribution have completely different estimates of the average income levels of occupational groups. For instance, Swedish respondents significantly underestimate the

The ESS of a set X of N_x values is the sum of squares of the deviations from the mean value or the mean vector (centroid). For a set X the ESS is described by the following expression:

$$ESS(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{N_x} |x_i - \frac{1}{N_x} \sum_{j=1}^{N_x} x_j|^2$$

where $|\cdot|$ is the absolute value of a scalar value or the norm (the "length") of a vector.

Mathematically the linkage function - the distance between clusters X and Y - is described by the following expression $(X, Y) = ESS(XY) - [ESS(X) + ESS(Y)]$ where XY is the combined cluster resulting from fusion clusters X and Y ; $ESS(\cdot)$ is the error sum of squares describe above" (<http://www.statistics.com>).

income levels of their fellow citizens, particularly of those who have high-income occupations, but Norwegians have much more realistic estimates. Consequently, respondents' estimates of real incomes of different occupational groups significantly color their judgment of what their income levels ought to be. Those nations that have higher estimates of real incomes are also more generous about just levels of income. Divisions between welfare regimes and post-industrial and industrial nations completely erode, when people are asked to guess the income levels of their compatriots. It is also noteworthy that respondents underestimate the income levels of the high-earning groups in every country. These are unexpected findings that call for further research into the topic.

The cluster analysis of the 29 items selected from the 1999 ISSP survey on inequality and redistribution produced two main clusters: a post-industrial and an industrializing cluster. The division between the post-industrial and industrializing countries according to their opinion on inequality and redistribution almost perfectly reflects the division of countries according to economic and institutional criteria. One point to keep in mind when examining opinion and value differences in postindustrial societies is that differences within this group are easily dwarfed by the divisions between postindustrial and industrial clusters. Industrial nations are divided into two subclusters: a post-Communist subcluster and a Latin subcluster, but the industrial group is beyond the scope of this study. There are a few exceptions to the elegant cluster pattern. Despite being a European Union (EU) member since 1986, Portugal clusters with industrial

countries. On the other hand, two formerly communist countries, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, group with post-industrial nations.⁶

There are two main groups within the Postindustrial cluster: a Continental European group and a group that consists of Anglo-Saxon countries along with Japan, which is labeled as the Liberal cluster. If we look closer, Continental countries are divided into a Central European cluster (Slovenia, Czech Republic and France), a Mediterranean cluster (Spain and Cyprus), a Nordic Cluster (Sweden and Norway) and a Germanic cluster (Austria, East Germany and West Germany). Liberal countries are divided into an Antipodean group (New Zealand and Australia), a UK cluster (Great Britain and Northern Ireland), the US and Japan, both of which stand alone. I will examine the survey questions that separate the clusters in a hierarchical order, starting at the highest level of the clusters and continuing with the subclusters.

The two largest clusters within the post-industrial group are the Continental and the Liberal clusters. The Continental European cluster includes Austria, East and West Germany, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Cyprus, France, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The Liberal cluster is made up of Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, North Ireland, United States and Japan.

The graphs in this section illustrate the percentage responses to the questions that divide these two clusters most significantly. The score for each item is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the respondents that agree strongly or very strongly with the

⁶ Perhaps the least surprising of these exceptions is the Czech Republic. Czech Republic constituted one of the two regions of Czechoslovakia in the past. Although Czechoslovakia was a communist republic, it had always been more independent of Soviet influence and closer to Western Europe than the other countries to the east of the Iron Curtain. Following an exceptionally smooth transition period from an oppressive, communist regime to a full-fledged capitalist democracy, which was hailed as the “velvet revolution” by the international community, the Czech Republic and its less wealthy partner Slovakia quickly parted ways. The Czech Republic quickly moved up to the top strata of the rankings on many international economic and social indicators and became an EU member in 2004.

statement from the percentage of the respondents that disagree strongly or very strongly with it. Neutral opinions are not included. Values are converted to ensure that higher values in graphs always indicate support for more egalitarian and less capitalist values, and lower values indicate less egalitarian and more capitalist attitudes.




Figure 2: Continental vs. Liberal Clusters

As can be clearly seen in Figure 2, the Continental group is considerably more egalitarian on all items that separate the two clusters. The most pronounced difference is on the issue of education and health care. In both groups, the majority of the respondents find it unjust that the rich can buy better education for their children, but in Continental countries, the share of the respondents that believe this is unjust is 66% higher than those who believe it is just. In Liberal countries this difference falls to 15% percent. The gap between the two clusters is a staggering 51%. This gap goes down to 45% on the topic of

health care, and to 27% on the importance of having children to support in deciding how much one should earn.

Similarly, 27% more of the respondents in Liberal countries than in Continental countries believe that people get rewarded for their effort in their country. There is also a 26% difference in the same direction between Continental and Liberal countries when it comes to the belief that people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills in their country. 25% more of the Continental cluster respondents than the Liberal cluster respondents believe that you have to be corrupt to get all the way to the top in their country, and also that it is the responsibility of the government to reduce income differences.

At the second level of this hierarchical analysis, I examine the subclusters in the Continental cluster: Sweden, Norway, East and West Germany and Austria form one group, while the remaining Continental European countries (France, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Spain and Cyprus) form another.

The Central European-Mediterranean group scores consistently higher on anti-capitalist and pro-redistributive attitudes than the Scandinavian- Germanic group on the four questions that these groups most significantly diverge. 47% more of the respondents in the Scandinavian-Germanic cluster than in the Central European-Mediterranean cluster believe that people in their countries get rewarded for their effort and 42% more think that people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills. 30% fewer of the Scandinavian-Germanic group respondents think that wealthy countries should help poorer countries and that there are strong conflicts between management and workers in their respective countries.




Figure 3: Scandinavian-German Cluster vs. Central European – Mediterranean Cluster

If we further split the Scandinavian-Germanic cluster, Sweden and Norway form a Scandinavian cluster, while Austria, East Germany and West Germany constitute a Germanic cluster. Figure 4 illustrates the responses to the differentiating statements between the Scandinavian and the Germanic clusters.

The question that divides these two clusters most deeply is what should be important in deciding one's salary. 51% more of Germanic respondents than Scandinavian ones believe that having children to support should be an important criterion in deciding how much a person should be paid. Similarly, 27% fewer respondents from Scandinavia think that having a family to support ought to be important in deciding pay. The share of people who think that one needs to be corrupt to get all the way to the top in their country is 49% more in the Germanic countries. Germanic respondents also overwhelmingly

agree with the statement “no one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers,” while 32% fewer Scandinavian respondents agree with this statement. 27% more in the Germanic cluster than in the Scandinavian cluster share the sentiment that there are strong conflicts between management and workers in their country.




Figure 4: Scandinavian vs. Germanic Clusters

Other Continental countries are divided into a Mediterranean subcluster consisting of Spain and Cyprus and a second subcluster that includes France, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.




Figure 5: English-Speaking Cluster vs. Japan

In comparison to Japanese respondents, 64% more of English-speaking respondents believe that education and training should be important in determining salary levels and 48% more believe the same for supervision of others (Figure 5). 43% more of the Japanese respondents than the Anglo-Saxon respondents believe that in their society, to get all the way to the top, you have to be corrupt, but 34% more of the respondents from Anglo-Saxon countries feel that connections (knowing the right people) is important for getting ahead. Compared to the Japanese, 34% more of Anglo-Saxons are convinced that most people would not study for years unless they expected to earn more than ordinary workers. Respondents who feel that it is not just for the richer people to be able to buy better education or health care constitute respectively 27 and 26 percent more of the respondents in Japan than in the English speaking cluster.




Figure 6: USA vs. Other English-Speaking Countries

As Figure 6 shows, American respondents view the world as significantly more prone to conflict between different socioeconomic groups than the nationals of other English-speaking countries. The share of respondents who believe that there are strong conflicts between the rich and the poor is 33% higher in the US than in other English speaking countries. A significantly larger number of respondents in America sees conflict between rich and poor people compared to other Post-industrialized countries as well, but when asked whether the government should reduce differences between those with low and high incomes, 32% more of Americans oppose the idea than other English-speaking nations. In comparison to other English-speaking nations, 29 percent more of Americans believe that their compatriots are rewarded for their effort, and 26 percent more believe they are rewarded for their intelligence and skills.

2.2.2 ISSP 2006

In this section, I cluster-analyze the responses to questions about government role in the 2006 ISSP survey. 22 items are included in the analysis. Figure 7 is a dendrogram that summarizes the results of the cluster analysis of the survey data. The analysis includes all the countries that participated in the 2006 ISSP survey. All the questions that are about the role of the government in the economy are included in the analysis except for those that ask whether the respondent finds the government successful. These questions are excluded because they are not designed to explore the attitudes of respondents on an issue. They aim to measure whether the respondent approves of the policies of the political party or parties in power. What I intend to measure in my analysis is the fundamental preferences of people about the economic role of the government, regardless of which party or coalition is in power. In addition, these questions yield ambiguous results for the purposes of this study. Learning whether a person finds the government successful or not does not provide us any information about her preferences. Questions that measure respondents' attitudes toward the role of the government in noneconomic spheres such as military and culture are also excluded from the cluster analysis.

The general pattern of the findings is very familiar. Post-industrial and industrializing countries form two distinct clusters as expected. However, Spain, Ireland and Portugal - all of them EU (European Union) and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) members for over 20 years - are grouped with industrializing countries in the cluster analysis. Figure 8 illustrates how much the means

of responses in these three countries and in other post-industrial countries deviate from the mean of all post-industrial countries. I label this group as the Peripheral cluster.




Figure 7: Government Role, ISSP 2006

The higher the score in the graph, the higher the support for government intervention, increased governmental spending and redistribution is. As the graph clearly demonstrates, the Spanish, Portuguese and Irish consistently support a more prominent government role and redistribution than other post-industrial nations in every sphere of economic activity. The difference in support between this group and other post-industrial nations is considerably big on some issues. From here on, Spain, Portugal and Ireland will be included in the industrializing cluster. Another intriguing result of the cluster analysis is that Japan is in the same cluster with Continental countries, while Taiwan and

South Korea form a separate cluster outside the post-industrial group. The Czech Republic clusters with post-industrial nations in this survey as it does in the ISSP 1999.




Figure 8: Post-Industrial vs. Peripheral Clusters

Figure 9 demonstrates how the responses to the questions related to the welfare state compare to each other between the industrializing and the post-industrial clusters. The graph presents the distance of all the responses to the mean of the two clusters. All values have been converted such that higher response values indicate higher support for government involvement. The difference between industrializing and postindustrial countries is large and consistent across many questions. Industrializing nations support a larger government role than post-industrial nations in almost every sphere ranging from providing jobs to taking care of the elderly to product development, but there are exceptions. Most notably, the industrializing nations are more in favor of cuts in the government budget than the post-industrial nations. This is a contradictory position given

that the industrializing cluster responses show consistently higher levels of support for high or increased government spending in a large number of areas ranging from taking care of the unemployed to health care and product development.




Figure 9: Post-Industrial vs. Industrializing Clusters

Post-industrial countries in the 2006 ISSP survey split into four clusters. Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland form one cluster, while Germany, France and the Netherlands form a second set. Japan and Switzerland make up a third group, and English-speaking countries along with the Czech Republic constitute a fourth one.

Figure 10 demonstrates how these four clusters of nations differ from the mean of the four clusters in their support for a strong government role in social and economic life. Values are adjusted so that the higher the value is, the higher the support for government involvement and redistribution it denotes. All of these constellations (including the Social Democratic cluster) are opposed to an active role for the government, but levels of

opposition vary. Of the four groups, Switzerland-Japan cluster has the highest level of opposition against government intervention in the economy and society, and Social Democratic cluster is the most supportive of an active role for the government in the economy. The Conservative and Liberal clusters are visibly less supportive of an active government role in the economy than the Social Democratic cluster and more so than the Switzerland-Japan cluster, but overall the Conservative cluster is only slightly more pro-government than the Liberal cluster.




Figure 10: Differences among Post-Industrial Clusters

Which questions divide the opinion clusters most significantly? Starting on the broadest level, I examine the questions that differentiate clusters of post-industrial nations at each point. The main clusters within the post-industrial category are the Liberal and the Continental groups. Liberal group includes all English-speaking nations and the Czech Republic. Continental cluster includes all European countries and Japan.




Figure 11: Liberal vs. Continental Clusters

Figure 11 demonstrates that the share of people who believe that it should be the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (livstunem) and those who agree that it should be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (jobeverly) are respectively 40 percent and 24 percent higher in Continental countries than in Liberal countries. Likewise, 22 percent more of the respondents in Continental countries compared to those from Liberal countries think that the government should reduce income differences between the rich and the poor (redincdif). 25 percent more of the respondents in the Liberal cluster agree with the statement that taxes are too high for those with high incomes (taxhigh), showing a much higher level of sympathy for the rich than their Continental counterparts. Liberal nations display an uncharacteristically high level support for government intervention in the economy on the issue of industrial growth (indgrow). A vast majority of respondents from Liberal nations believe that it is among the responsibilities of the government to

provide industry with the help it needs to grow. The percentage of respondents who believe this is 29 percent higher in the Liberal cluster than in the Continental cluster.




Figure 12: Conservative-Social Democratic vs. Swiss-Japanese Clusters

Figure 12 illustrates that in comparison to Switzerland-Japan cluster respondents, 63 percent more of the Conservative/Social Democratic cluster respondents agree that it is the duty of the government to provide decent housing for those who cannot afford it (housing), 33 percent more think that the government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (livstunem), 26 percent more think the government ought to help industry grow (indgrow) and 25 percent more think that it should provide a job for everyone who wants one (jobeverly). 25 percent more in Conservative/Social Democratic cluster also want to see increased government spending in health (health). Those who agree that taxes for high incomes are too high are 28 percent fewer in Conservative/Social Democratic countries (taxhigh).




Figure 13: Conservative vs. Social Democratic Clusters

Figure 13 illustrates the three survey questions on which the Conservative and Social Democratic clusters most disagree. In both clusters the share of people who desire more cuts in government spending and less regulation exceeds those who do not, but 52 percent more of the respondents are in favor of cuts in government spending and 40 percent more of the respondents are in favor of less government regulation of business in the Conservative cluster than in the Social Democratic cluster. The share of people who agree that it should be the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed is 28 percent higher in the Social Democratic cluster.

2.3 Discussion

I employed hierarchical cluster analysis to examine which nations hold similar opinions on equality and government role in the economy, and which beliefs separate nation groupings. Analysis of both ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2006 surveys reveal that nations

can be separated into two broad categories according to their opinions on these issues: industrializing and post-industrial. However, there are exceptions. In the ISSP 2006 analysis, three countries that are ordinarily grouped with post-industrial countries (Portugal, Spain and Ireland) cluster with industrializing countries. Japan and the Czech Republic are oddballs, which are in the post-industrial category in both surveys, but switch between Liberal and Continental European groups. In the ISSP 1999 analysis, Japan is in the Liberal cluster with Anglo-Saxon countries. In the ISSP 2006 analysis, it was with Continental European countries. The reverse is true for the Czech Republic. The Czech group belonged to the Central European cluster in the ISSP 1999 survey. In the ISSP 2006 survey, they are in the same group with Liberal Anglo-Saxon countries.

More interesting than the outliers is the finding that the rest of the post-industrialized nations cluster in groups that approximate what the welfare state literature suggest. ISSP 1999 clusters fit well with most of the typologies in the scholarship, but ISSP 2006 corresponds best to the Siaroff's typology, which employs gender as a central factor in categorizing welfare states. I will first discuss the odd case of Japan and then address some of the questions raised by other outliers. Next I will talk about Siaroff's welfare state typology and examine the statements that distinguish the post-industrial clusters from each other in the ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2006 surveys.

Some scholars and policy-makers identify a distinct brand of welfare regime in East Asia, which is a non-Western type of corporationist arrangement rooted in Confucian culture (Jones 1993; Gould, 1994; Goodman & Peng 1996, Saunder, 1996). The hallmarks of this culture are "hierarchy, duty, compliance, consensus, order, harmony, stability – and staying power" (Jones, 1993, p. 200). There are also studies that

try to discover what separates the East Asian model from Western models, which rely on contrasting Japanese and Western societies (Rose & Shiratori, 1986; Kato, 1991; Gould, 1993). Kasza (2006) opposes the idea of a distinct East Asian model by pointing out that such explanations are anecdotal and a careful examination of the East Asian countries reveal that they have very different welfare institutions and continue to follow different trajectories. Esping-Andersen (1997) also argues that there is no distinct Pacific model, and that Japan seems to be a hybrid model combining the occupational segmentation and familialism of the Catholic-Conservative model and the private welfare plans of Liberal welfare regimes.

Whether or not there is a distinct East Asian (or Pacific) welfare state model lies beyond the ambitions of this study. However, based on the cluster analyses presented in this chapter, the assumption that Japanese welfare culture is in any way representative of East Asia is highly questionable. In two separate opinion surveys, Japan clusters with Western societies, not with Taiwanese and South Korean societies. This is the case, despite the fact that among East Asian countries, Taiwanese and South Korean welfare states are closest to the Japanese model because these countries emulated the Japanese model (Goodman, White & Kwon, 1998). It is true that Japan, like the Czech Republic, is an oddity. Both countries cluster with post-industrial countries in ISSP 1999 and ISSP 2006 surveys. Both act as free agents, which group with Liberal and Catholic-Conservative countries depending on the study; nonetheless, they are unmistakably part of the post-industrial cluster. This is also similar to the pattern Marshall et al. find in their analysis (1999) of International Social Justice Project (ISJP), in which they group Japan with Western capitalist societies to examine the differences between capitalist and post-

communist regimes. If the Japanese welfare state is indeed a hybrid of Liberal and Catholic-Conservative regimes, it is not perplexing that Japanese public opinion on welfare and government role in the economy meanders between Liberal and Catholic-Conservative clusters.

What makes the Japanese case particularly conspicuous is that Japanese culture is the only non-European culture in the post-industrial opinion cluster, and it is closer to the so-called Western welfare culture than Portugal in the 1999 ISSP survey, and Portugal, Ireland and Spain in the 2006 survey. While it is expedient to refer to Confucianism when talking about the Japanese welfare culture, it may not be very helpful. Cultures change slowly, but they are not immune to change, and it is not implausible that the Japanese and Western welfare cultures have converged over the last one and a half centuries under the combined influence of industrialization, capitalism and democracy, despite their disparate starting points. Government institutions and policies that organize the interaction of state, market and society play a large role in the shaping of cultural norms. What may easily be chalked up to tradition may be a result of policy decisions. For instance, Miyamoto (2003) argues that withdrawal of Japanese women from the workforce is a post-World War II phenomenon was a result of deliberate governmental policies and not an organic consequence of Japanese culture. It is probable that contemporary Euro-American welfare culture is nothing specifically Western, but it is first and foremost a post-industrial ethos defined more by the state and market institutions than the ancient cultural and religious traditions. The convergence may also - largely, or partly - be a result of the emulation of Western policies and practices by Japan. Kasza (2006) explains that Japanese bureaucrats were heavily influenced by British and Western German welfare

states in the post-World War II period. As he puts it so wryly, the problem with relying on Confucianism to explain the contemporary welfare culture in East Asia is that “(C)onfucius never said anything about old-age pensions or unemployment insurance” (Kasza, 2006, p. 117).

The cluster analysis of ISSP 2006 leaves us with some questions, too. Spain, Portugal and Ireland cluster with industrializing countries, although they are EU members. The most visible trait these breakaway countries share is religion, since they all have predominantly Catholic societies, but given that there are other Catholic countries within the post-industrial group, this is not sufficient to set these countries apart from the rest of post-industrial nations. They were also comparatively less wealthy than other EU members for a long time, although this is no longer the case for Spain and Ireland. All three countries have low social spending (as percentage of GDP) compared to other EU countries, but their social spending is still higher than that of Liberal countries. I label these three countries as the Peripheral European countries because they do not really form a cluster.

Spain is in a cluster with Latin American countries, while Portugal clusters with Eastern European Post-Communist nations. Ireland is in a cluster with Russia and this cluster is separate from the Eastern European group. Given the welfare state typologies, we would expect Spain to cluster with other Mediterranean and European countries with which it shares borders as well as comparable levels of economic development and similar institutions. Yet the Spanish are closer to Latin American nations in their opinions on the role of the government. We could, then, conclude that historical ties, language, religion and language are more important in shaping opinions than the level of capitalist

development and institutions. However, if culture were the decisive factor, Japan would group with its regional neighbors Taiwan and South Korea and not with other post-industrialized countries, yet the cluster analysis suggests that the Japanese think more like Americans than the East Asians on the role of the government. Therefore, in the case of Japan, the level of capitalist development influences public opinion more than culture and geography.

Japan stands in sharp contrast to Spain, where linguistic and colonial ties seem to be more critical than the level of capitalist advancement and contemporary institutional ties. Even more curious is the case of Ireland. Why is an English speaking, post-industrial, wealthy, Catholic nation from Northern Europe in the same cluster with post-communist, Orthodox Russians from Eastern Europe? This is probably a tenuous clustering. What brings this odd couple together is most likely to be the fact that they are different from other countries. The Czech Republic is yet another curious case. Had the Czech Republic clustered with Central European, Christian Democratic regimes, it would not have been surprising. Aspalter, Jinsoo, & Sojeung (2009) argue that post-communist Central European countries have returned to their Bismarckian roots in the last 20 years, but it is difficult to explain why the Czech cluster with English-Speaking nations, and not with other post-communist or Central European nations. What these irregularities in clusters suggest is that no single factor stands out in explaining differences and similarities in opinion on the government role. For some countries, it is cultural ties, for others it is geography, but for others, it is the level of capitalist development that determines with which countries they cluster.

The hierarchical cluster analysis of responses to the ISSP 1999 survey divides post-industrial nations into Liberal (including Japan) and Continental groups. What separates Liberal and Continental European countries most prominently is the dominance of the belief in Continental countries that the quality of the education and health care one receives should not be related to income, and that everybody is entitled to equal education and health care. In other words, the biggest division between Continental Europeans and Liberal countries is the egalitarianism of Europeans regarding access to education and health care.

Continental European nations are much more egalitarian than Liberal nations. Particularly when it comes to education and health care, Continental respondents refuse inequality much more adamantly than respondents from Liberal countries. As experiments reveal, people are much more accepting of inequality when they believe the system is highly meritocratic (Mitchell et al, 1993, 2003). Thus the difference in tolerance toward inequality may be related to the difference in the conviction that the system is just, which is a significantly more common belief in Liberal countries, as expressed by the statements that people get rewarded for their effort, intelligence and skills, and that you do not have to be corrupt to rise to the top. Continental respondents appear to be more skeptical that merit and hard work are enough to rise all the way to the top.

The question of whether people are rewarded for their effort, intelligence and skills in the system also divides the Continental group into Scandinavian-German and Central European-Mediterranean countries. Scandinavian-German respondents are much more likely to believe that their system rewards efforts and skills. They are also less in

favor of redistribution across countries and less likely to believe that there are strong conflicts between management and workers.

There is an unusually low level of support for non-merit based salary adjustments among Scandinavian respondents compared to other post-industrial countries. They are much more likely to oppose the idea that that one's level of need or educational attainment justify higher salaries. Need-based salary is a socialist ideal that aims to achieve equality, whereas linking one's pay to pedigree is a traditional practice based on compensation principle (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of justice principles) that serves to protect privileged classes and justifies the distinction between high-status and low-status occupations. What these two criteria have in common is that neither of them is related to the value created by a worker because both are extraneous to job responsibility and performance, i.e., both are non-performance-related criteria. Nordic respondents are much more prone to believe that corruption is not necessary for success. They also have a significantly more harmonious view of worker-management relations.

The Liberal cluster is divided into Japanese and English-speaking groups. Japanese and English-speaking respondents differ most drastically on their attitudes toward the importance of education, training and supervision of others in deciding pay. Respondents from English-speaking countries overwhelmingly believe that the number of years one spends in education and training and whether she supervises others is important in determining how much one ought to earn. The Japanese diverge from not only English-speaking nations, but also from most other post-industrial nations in that respect. They are similar to Scandinavian respondents in their low level of support for the principle of paying higher salaries to people who receive longer years of education.

ISSP 2006 country clusters overlap with Esping-Andersen's classification to some degree, but according to Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare regimes, Finland, Japan and Switzerland have Conservative welfare states and the Netherlands belong in the Social Democratic welfare cluster. Yet according to this hierarchical cluster analysis Finnish public opinion is closer to that of the neighboring Nordic nations than Conservative countries and the Dutch think more like the neighboring Central European nations than Social Democratic welfare states. The Japanese and the Swiss form a separate cluster all together, instead of grouping with other Conservative countries.

These opinion clusters do not fit Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology well, but they correspond to Siaroff's (1994) welfare regime classification almost perfectly. Siaroff's categorization shows a strong resemblance to that of Esping-Andersen's, but it refines the Esping-Andersen classification by introducing gender as a central variable. Siaroff categorizes welfare states according to gender relationships with respect to welfare state and market. He views Protestantism as an important distinguishing factor for the way gender relations are structured in market and welfare state. In predominantly Protestant countries women receive family benefits and a large proportion of women works. In other countries, male heads of households tend to receive government benefits and fewer women work. Siaroff examines who receives the welfare benefits in the family, what the extent of these benefits is and whether female participation in the market is encouraged. He classifies Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand as the Protestant-Liberal cluster. In these countries, there is little welfare offered by the state to families, benefits are paid to mothers, but they are rather inadequate, and there is a high level of gender equality in the market. In Protestant Social-democratic

Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, women receive generous family benefits and they participate in the labor force in large numbers. Advanced Christian-democratic countries are West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg and Belgium, where women are encouraged to stay at home. The Late Female Mobilization group includes the Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal as well as Ireland, Japan and Switzerland. In this cluster, fathers receive family benefits and women's participation levels in the workforce are low.

The overlap between the clusters in Siaroff's regime classification and the clusters that are generated from the ISSP 2006 survey indicates that gender equality is a variable that should not be overlooked in examining welfare regimes. The opinion clusters indicate that the timing of female mobilization and the type of gender relations a welfare regime produces have a patent impact on public opinion, most likely because gender-related policies are embedded in a complex web of institutional arrangements encompassing the labor market, taxation, social security benefits, welfare assistance and education.

In the 2006 ISSP hierarchical cluster analysis, post-industrial countries are divided into a Liberal cluster that includes all Anglo-Saxon countries and the Czech Republic, and a Continental Cluster that consists of Continental European countries and Japan. When we focus on the survey items that significantly divide the two clusters, the Continental cluster supports a broader role for the government and more egalitarian policies in comparison to the Liberal cluster, although in both categories pluralities (albeit not necessarily majorities) agree that it is the responsibility of the government to provide living standards for the unemployed, help industries grow and reduce income

differences, and disagree that taxes for rich groups are too high. A small plurality in Liberal countries believes that it is not the responsibility of the government to provide a job to everyone who wants one, while a majority of the respondents in the Continental cluster believes that providing work to its citizens is the duty of the government. The only question that breaks the pattern asks whether the government should intervene to stimulate industrial growth. Compared to Continental respondents, a significantly larger majority of Liberal cluster respondents agree that it is the job of the government to help industrial growth.

The questions that cause the largest rift between the Conservative/Social Democratic and Switzerland-Japan clusters are almost identical to those that separate the Liberal and Continental clusters. The Conservative/Social Democratic cluster demonstrates a higher level of support for government involvement in economic affairs than the Switzerland-Japan cluster on each of these items. Social Democratic/Conservative cluster is further broken down into a Social Democratic and a Conservative group. As in the previous cases, the difference between these two clusters is not one of direction but of magnitude. In both groups, the people who believe that the government should cut spending, deregulate business and help the unemployed maintain a standard of living outnumber those who do not. However, Conservative nations are much more supportive of cutting spending and decreasing government regulation of business, and Social Democratic cluster is much more supportive of government assistance to the unemployed.

When we focus on the questions that divide clusters, Social Democratic cluster ranks as the grouping, which is most supportive of government intervention in the

economy and of more egalitarian policies. The Conservative, Switzerland-Japan and Liberal clusters follow it in this order. However, there are three important points that needs to be reiterated. First, I do not employ a particular welfare state typology. Instead, I group countries based on survey responses, and label the resulting opinion clusters according to the welfare state literature. Second, I do not look at the overall difference between these clusters. My analysis focuses on those questions that distinguish these groups from each other. Third, and most importantly, if outliers are ignored, the clustering of post-industrialized nations approximates the typologies in the welfare state literature, but both the clustering pattern and the outliers indicate that religion, language, gender-related policies, geography, level of economic development, and existing welfare state institutions all exert influence on the welfare culture, but it is not possible to identify one of them as the primary factor because the interaction of these factors varies by country. Most importantly, clustering nations purely according to their responses to survey questions reasserts the puzzle of this study. As these findings make evident, when we study opinion polls, regime type matters in predicting which nations think similarly, but not in predicting what they think.

Chapter 3. Distributive Justice and Deservingness

Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.

(Rawls, 1999, p.3)

At the heart of most discussions about the welfare state lies the question “who gets what”. Welfare state serves many functions, but regardless of what its goals may be - social control, solidarity, equality, stability - it achieves them through mechanisms that distribute and redistribute resources across individuals and socioeconomic groups. The existence of the welfare state alters the distribution of resources within a society, whether through labor market organization, taxation, education policies, or direct and indirect payments to clients. Who gets what varied with institutional configurations, which are built on normative understandings of “who deserves what.” Conceptions of distributive justice, and understandings of who deserves what are varied like welfare institutions.

This chapter focuses on the competing constructions and framings of distributive justice principles. I review theoretical debates, empirical findings and historical analyses to explore which factors play a prominent role in making distributive justice assessments. The fundamental assertion of this chapter is that the conceptions of distributive justice are not only diverse but also fluid. Not only do they change according to person, and culture, but also according to context. Following chapters use the insights from this review in the analysis of the everyday discourses that emerge from focus group discussions and Q studies.

The next section discusses the mechanisms through which responsibility and blame for poverty are attributed to individuals, groups and causes. The second section examines deservingness, that is, who deserves how much. Here, I present my findings on

the variation in deservingness across cultures. The final section introduces a two-dimensional model of responsibility, which classifies problem and solution responsibility ascriptions, and discusses its implications for welfare policies.

3.1 Distributive Justice Principles

Which justice principles do people follow in making allocative decisions? Empirical findings demonstrate that distributive judgments are sensitive to context. People resort to different justice principles when they allocate resources within a family and among strangers. This is the reason abstract and general questions about distributive justice cannot adequately capture how people think and make decisions about just distribution in real life. Thus, people's views of how resources should be distributed in their country are strongly influenced by how they view the economic system, state and society, among other things, and how they view them is affected by the national institutional arrangements.

Ordinarily we may assume that norms guide practices. However, practices constitute the basis of distributive justice norms as well. People "slowly and semi-consciously" deduce social norms of what ought to be from the social experience of what is (Fave, 1991, p. 26-27). In their everyday lives people find their behavior constrained by powerful societal institutions that often place them in asymmetrical and disadvantageous bargaining positions. Unable to escape societal constraints without being stigmatized, people begin to recognize them as parameters of normality, and internalize the restrained practices as norms (Bourdieu, 1977; Cicourel, 1973; Fave, 1991). Such internalization, which legitimizes the subordination that one experiences in the sociopolitical order and therefore the system itself, is necessary to maintain self-esteem

and serves to reproduce the system. “What people say ought to be is determined in the long run and with some lag by what they find in fact to be the case” (Homans, 1974, p. 249-250). Norms are derived from long-term arrangements, which come to be accepted over time as alternatives cease to be seen as viable options (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Tahler, 1986).

Through internalization of the existing arrangements, people in a society continue to share justice norms. Economic and political systems, cultures and individuals differ in the type of justice principles they view as legitimate. Historically, if not in theory, all systems of distribution legitimate certain types of stratification systems, that is, inequalities. Accepting the normative legitimacy of a system is recognizing as just the type of inequalities and stratification that system entails and being ready to defend these inequalities against challenges by evoking justice principles that support the system (Fave, 1991).

All post-industrial societies are capitalist, but capitalism comes in different varieties. They also all have welfare states that redistribute income, but there are considerable differences in the degree and manner in which they redistribute resources. Each welfare regime enables a different type of social stratification. Hence, discourses on distributive justice in these countries should be similar (particularly in comparison to industrializing countries) but not identical. Each nation is expected to possess a unique medley of capitalist and redistributive sentiments. Before we examine the national discourses on distributive justice, it is useful to review how context influences the way individuals make distributive decisions.

I will focus on three justice principles identified as central by Deutsch equity (desert), need and equality. Desert principle dictates that people should be rewarded for their contributions and punished for their transgressions, the need principle requires that basic needs of all people be met, and equality principle necessitates that all people receive equal resources. People subscribe to multiple, competing distributive justice principles, they alternate between these principles in deciding what a fair distribution ought to be, and they weigh principles differently depending on the context (Miller, 1999). Desert is the main principle of distribution in capitalist markets, in which people are supposed to be rewarded their just deserts, but even desert has multiple definitions that are not necessarily compatible.

Contribution, effort and compensation are three possible criteria for determining desert. Contribution criterion requires that people be paid according to the value of their contribution (Miller, 1976, 1989; Riley, 1989). This principle is embodied in the feminist edict, “equal pay for equal work.” Alternatively, society can reward effort (Sadurski, 1985, Milne, 1986). Basing payments solely on contribution disregards the fact that some people are able to contribute greatly to society despite expending little effort compared to others. These differences may result from differences in acquired skills, innate abilities, position or a combination of these factors. In any case, many people value effort, and routinely emphasize how hard they work to justify their earnings, instead of simply enumerating their contributions. A third principle of rewarding desert is compensation of the costs incurred in job-related activities (Dick, 1975; Lamont, 1994). When people justify high earnings of medical doctors by referring to the time and money

one is required to spend on medical education to become a doctor, they invoke the compensation principle of desert.

A society can simultaneously promote all three desert criteria, i.e. that one deserves to be rewarded for producing goods or services that are of value, spending effort in work-related activities, or accruing work-related costs. However, in practice these criteria may be in conflict. Should the person who is most productive, who works the hardest, or who has had the highest level of education be promoted? In experimental designs, subjects tend to reward contribution most highly, and disregard innate ability. If they are provided information on how much effort is spent by each contributor, they make adjustments to reward high effort as well, but if two people perform on the same level, the one who spends more effort is rewarded more. However, if the performances are different, judgments change with context. For instance, subjects in one study rewarded performance more than effort for academic achievement, but they counted effort more heavily than performance in distributing rewards for athletic achievement (Leventhal, & Michaels, 1971).

While desert tends to be the default justice principle people draw on, several factors lead people to make more egalitarian decisions when it comes to the kind of goods and services distributed, the quality of the relationships within the group in which they are distributed, the goal of the distribution, and whether the person is asked to consider microjustice or macrojustice implications of the distribution influence what type of criteria people choose. Matania and Ilan (2007) find that justice considerations vary depending on the type of resources distributed. When distributing basic resources such as health care, people rely less on efficiency considerations than when they are distributing

non-basic resources. Similarly, subjects utilize contribution as the dominant distributive criterion when making distributive decisions for a group that is transient, engaged in intra-group competition, consists of unlike or unrelated individuals. However, people shift to egalitarian criteria when they make allocative decisions about groups that are long-term, work on a cooperative task such as team sports, or consist of like-minded individuals or friends. Moreover, the sex of allocator and sex of recipient plays a role in the type of justice principle employed. Men opt for equity principle and women choose equality principle more often. In making decisions about just allocations to individuals, people tend to prioritize the desert principle, but when they evaluate the resulting distribution and take macrojustice into account, they revise the distribution employing more egalitarian criteria. Experiments also reveal that justice considerations can be manipulated through frames. When the exact same allocation principle is framed positively (benefits), it is rated as more just than when it is framed negatively (harms). Furthermore, decision method affects the criteria people emphasize. Moreover, when groups are allowed to debate and choose the distributive principle they will implement for themselves, they are more likely to opt for the principle of equality.

Allocative judgments are also influenced by the perception of the economic system. In a hypothetical situation, as meritocracy increases, people become more tolerant of inequality. If the process is seen as fair, the outcome is accepted much more readily. In a highly meritocratic system, in which effort and income are closely correlated, people prefer efficiency (desert) principle with a floor constraint, but in a weakly meritocratic society, people choose a more egalitarian approach that maximizes the minimum standard of living befitting the Rawlsian difference principle (Mitchell,

Tetlock, Mellers & Ordóñez, 1993). Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman & Lerner (2003) corroborate the finding that higher meritocracy increases tolerance toward inequality, particularly people consider the interclass transfers redistribution necessitates. In other words, if the procedure is seen as fair, the outcome is more easily accepted. It is in a moderately meritocratic system that ideology has the strongest intervening effect. When the system is described as moderately meritocratic, liberals pay more attention to the role of chance (brute luck), while conservatives emphasize the role of effort and ability (merit) on the outcome (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordóñez, 1993).

Based on these experimental findings, we can infer that what people think about how meritocratic their society is will influence beliefs on welfare programs. If the system is believed to be highly meritocratic, and if most people believe that they get their just deserts through the market, they will be more prone to blaming the poor for their failures and reluctant to take structural measures. If the system is believed to function badly, people will be more likely to blame poverty on the system, and demand institutional reform to address poverty. Thus, they will substitute wholly distinct principles of distributive justice in place of each other. They endorse redistribution based on the principles of equality or need, when they believe the system fails to distribute resources according to desert criteria.

A person's judgment is also prone to be influenced by her affective state that is unrelated to the justice situation (Scher & Heise, 1993). This effect is particularly prominent under conditions of information uncertainty (van den Bos, 2003). When people do not have adequate procedural justice information, their feelings about the outcome justice shape their procedural justice satisfaction assessments (van den Bos,

1997), and when they are not sufficiently informed about the outcome justice, their procedural justice satisfaction levels affect their outcome justice evaluations. This is a crucial factor in explaining why people may feel differently about market distribution and governmental distribution.

Equalizing primary and secondary distribution are different goals and require different policies. Inequalities in pre-tax market earnings can be decreased by the government through active labor market policies, but further equalization requires transfer payments. In practice, it is difficult to agree on what rewards are appropriate for contributions, what basic needs are, and what equality means. Most importantly, context determines which principle people prioritize.

Redistribution suffers from the uncertainty problem. Markets are the domain of primary distribution that results from the production process. Government is in charge of secondary distribution, that is redistribution, which involves transfer payments. Distributive justice criteria are different for primary and secondary distribution. Markets distribute to individuals, which appears to be a transparent process, and it is easier to believe that whatever amount one earns in the market is a result of one's merit. Redistribution transfers resources from some groups to others groups. It is a highly visible political process, where every group may end up resenting the results.

For the market, people use procedural fairness criterion, which is easier to satisfy, but for the government they reserve the harsher criterion of outcome justice. If the procedure is just, the outcome, no matter how unfavorable, is also deemed just. If the outcome is all people see (as in government redistribution), and all groups feel that they are getting less than they deserve from the government, judging from the outcome, they

may surmise that the procedure must have been unjust. This resentment delegitimizes the welfare state (Arts, 1985: 142). Another problem with political distribution is the moral hazard concerns. Markets are believed to punish free riders, whereas political distribution is considered to reward them. This is yet another cause for resentment against redistribution. In the end, markets are viewed as a domain of positive-sum results and harmony of interests, as opposed to politics as a sphere of zero-sum results, where one group's gain is another's loss (Lane, 1986).

In experiments held under "veil of ignorance" conditions, the principle of maximizing the average income with a floor constraint is ranked the highest and the Rawlsian difference principle (where the welfare of the least well-off in society is maximized) is ranked lowest by subjects (Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Eavy 1987a, 1987b; Lissowski, Tyszka & Okrasa, 1991). In other words, people seek a compromise between the interests of the majority and the interests of the least well off, even when they do not know to which class they belong. Their goal is not maximizing their self-interest, but satisfying certain justice norms.

Perfect application of the desert principle through the markets produces a weak meritocracy, where people are rewarded according to their contribution, effort and job-related costs. Weak meritocracy requires a lack of discrimination against a person based on race, sex, creed, etc so that they can receive their just deserts. This is more of a legal equality, and aims to lift barriers that stand in the way of the "possibility" of achievement, although it is labeled as "equality of opportunity" in the American culture. Possibility and probability are different considerations. There is either a possibility for someone to achieve something, or there is not. However, probability of achievement

increases and decreases incrementally depending on multiple factors. Although everyone can have the possibility of achievement, provided there are no legal barriers, it is highly improbable for a person from a disadvantaged background to attain the same level of achievement as someone from a privileged background. Legal measures to prevent active discrimination against individuals are all that is required to satisfy the fairness condition of weak merititarianism. Then, every person will have the chance to achieve anything she sets out to do. That some people start the race earlier and with better equipment is not a concern. Some people may have a higher probability of achieving their goals due to the advantages they enjoy, but as long as everyone has the possibility to reach the same target, the process (and hence the outcome) is deemed fair.

When a society opts to equalize probability of life chances without abandoning desert as the basic distributive principle, this is strong merititarianism. Strong merititarianism necessitates the equalization of the starting point for each individual so that in a fair race, the most meritorious can win. Strong merititarianism supplements the desert principle with egalitarian norms, and attempts to improve conditions that may lead to lower qualifications later in life. Remedying this type of inequality requires equalizing access to good education and basic necessities, particularly for children. Basic necessities can include anything that a society believes one needs to have in order to equalize the playing field such as health care, housing, nutrition and recreation. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds need to have access to good schooling, good health care and decent housing so that their life chances approach those of the children from advantaged backgrounds. If the starting point is not equal, then the process cannot be fair, which means the system will not be considered just according to strongly merititarian norms.

Inequalities will not be the result of the differences in ability and effort, but differences in personal backgrounds. Hence, strong merititarianism requires redistribution and intervention in the economic and educational sphere by the government.

There are always some people who will have to live in destitute in a desert based distribution system. Some people may not be able to find work, some may not be able to work at all due to disabilities, and others may have no desire to work. In post-industrial societies, resources are redistributed to these people, in breach of the desert principle. There are various possible reasons to help the poor in a desert-based system. First, no system is perfectly desert-based. Regardless of the desert criteria used, some people earn more than they deserve, while others earn less than they deserve. The perception of such injustice leads people to demand that it be remedied. Second, even in a perfectly meritocratic system, where everyone earns precisely what they deserve, humanitarian and egalitarian concerns can push society to help the poor. In this case, society does not provide assistance to the needy because they “deserve” assistance, but because of the conviction that justice requires helping those in need, or that justice necessitates an equal distribution of resources in society. Both weak and strong merititarianism can be complemented with outcome oriented humanitarian and egalitarian principles. How much weight a national ethos gives to each distributive justice principle affects what types of welfare policies will be instituted.

Focusing on the equality of the starting conditions and focusing on the equality of the outcome are fundamentally different approaches. In desert-based distribution systems, justness of a system can be deduced from the process, not the outcome. If the process is fair (defined as lack of discrimination in weak merititarianism, and equal access to

opportunities in strong meritarianism), then the outcome is considered fair, regardless of the distribution it yields. In other words, desert principle does not produce an ideal model of macro justice. A perfectly equal distribution of income is not inherently more or less just than a highly unequal distribution. Inequalities resulting from unequal natural endowments and brute luck are not remedied by the desert principle.

However, no society is purely meritarian in its convictions. Desert principle dictates that everyone should keep what she earns, as long as the earnings are deserved. While desert is the dominant principle of distributive justice in capitalism, desert principle is often complemented and moderated with humanitarian and egalitarian principles, both of which are outcome oriented justice principles. Humanitarianism requires helping those in need, regardless of their utility to society. Egalitarianism, on the other hand, requires that resources in society be distributed equally to all persons. Most people simultaneously lend support to these three competing justice principles, albeit to varying degrees. Redistributive justice relies on a combination of satisfying need and achieving equality, and redistribution is procured by the government through taxation of earnings, which are presumably desert-based. Although there is a lot of dispute on the particulars, very few people completely oppose the principle of redistribution because they hold need and equality based justice beliefs as well, but their support for these beliefs are context dependent. A person may not approve of determining salaries based on need or equality principles, but accept redistribution of resources based on these criteria.

Societies try to satisfy all justice principles they value. However, both individuals and societies have difficulties reconciling the conflicting principles of justice they hold. For instance, Americans are convinced that people should work for their share of income.

On the other hand, they feel that everybody needs to have adequate income. This reflects a fundamental conflict between desert and need principles. However, advocates of free market liberalism argue that free markets can resolve the tension among competing justice principles. If markets are perfectly meritocratic and spoils are distributed in accordance with desert, they will produce outcomes that reasonably satisfy humanitarian and egalitarian justice concerns as well. That is, everybody will earn in proportion to her effort and talents (desert), a vast majority of the population will have their basic needs met (need), and there will not be too much inequality in income (equality). Ellis's (1992) argument that Americans have historically subscribed to the theory that equal processes produce equal outcomes helps us understand how they reconcile these contradictory beliefs. Americans may feel conflicted when forced to choose between desert and need principles, but if they believe that desert principle produces a distribution that also satisfies need and equality criteria, the dilemma vanishes. Yet, redistribution continues to bring desert principle in conflict with need and equality principles. While the markets seem to reward desert, the political system appears to punish it, and despite claims that process equality leads to outcome equality, poverty continues to exist.

Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) demonstrate that the principle of humanitarianism is a stronger element in the American ethos than egalitarianism, and humanitarian considerations lead to dissimilar sets of policy preferences than egalitarian considerations. In comparison to humanitarianism, egalitarianism is linked to an acceptance of more ambitious policies that require the government to have a broader and more invasive role in the economy. That is not to say that Americans do not have egalitarian impulses. For example, in surveys, people tend to rate "very low income"

groups as underpaid regardless of the merits of the individual, and they reserve “overpaid judgment” for highest incomes. Most people believe that there is a minimum and maximum limit to just earnings, but high earners allow for higher maxima and low earners desire higher minima (Alves & Rossi, 1978). Of course, these preferences are not strictly egalitarian. Capping incomes still allows for considerable degree of inequality. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that even in capitalist societies people want to limit the extent of inequality. However, Americans do not have the vocabulary and the arguments to think and talk about equality in their national discourse, as they do about desert and need.

Discourses on distributive justice are consequential because they influence policy. Whether a government focuses on poverty or inequality, how it measures poverty, which unit of analysis it selects are political questions and these questions attract considerable public attention. Poverty alleviation is one of the most, if not the most, contentious functions of the welfare state, for the simple reason that it requires visible redistribution. While there are usually no public discussions on the mathematical functions and technical issues surrounding the measurement of poverty, any debate on who needs how much governmental assistance, in what form and for how long reflects our political judgments on how poverty should be defined and measured. Therefore, it is highly probable that national discourse on poverty relief influences how poverty is defined and measured in a country.

Poverty relief is one of the most visible and controversial functions of the welfare state, although it constitutes a much smaller share of the overall welfare spending compared to social security and health care expenditures in post-industrial countries.

Poverty alleviation programs tend to redistribute social resources among social groups from top to bottom. Specifically because of their redistributive character, they tend to be the most politicized and controversial types of programs. Each state measures poverty differently. Poverty line is arbitrary and it changes according to the country and time. The arbitrariness stems from the fact that there is no magic point after which poverty immediately disappears. Poverty is a gradual condition, not a binary state. Moreover, its effects are not linear. For instance, the impact of a thousand-dollar drop in income does not have the same impact on the poverty level of a person who earns \$10,000 a year as it does on the poverty level of a person who makes \$20,000 dollars a year.

Even if we disregard the arbitrariness and nonlinearity of the poverty threshold, we are still faced with the problem of “how to measure” poverty. Units of analysis vary. We can measure the income of individuals, families or households. Once we settle on a unit of analysis there are multiple methods of measuring poverty. One method is a simple ‘head-count’ to find out how many people live below the poverty threshold. Another approach is to measure the ‘poverty-gap’- or the quantity of the gap between income and the poverty threshold (or need). A very small percentage of the population may be poor, but those who are poor may be in deep poverty.

There is also the problem of measuring the period of poverty, since static poverty measures are incomplete without taking into account the span of poverty. Is it the case that different segments of the population fall into and out of poverty for short periods of time, or are certain segments in permanent poverty? For example, many college students may fall below the poverty threshold, but they are not deemed “poor” by most, since their poverty is temporary and they are expected to earn a higher-than-average income after

graduation. This type of temporary poverty is distinctly different from inherited poverty that persists through generations and creates an underclass in society (Atkinson, 1987). A strongly meritarian or egalitarian person would be deeply concerned by intergenerational poverty as it decreases life chances for certain groups of people, but not so much with temporary poverty. If we are concerned with need only, there is not necessarily any difference experienced by a person who inherited poverty and is likely to be trapped in it throughout her life, and by a young person who is experiencing temporary poverty between jobs. Thus, need-based judgments will tend to be less concerned with the span of poverty.

In post-industrial societies, poverty alleviation is not only about alleviating absolute poverty. Poverty is also a relative condition. In a society where virtually every household owns a refrigerator, not being able to afford a refrigerator makes one poor. This is not the case in a society where only a minority of the population can afford refrigerators. Because of this relativity, poverty and inequality are separate but closely related concepts. For instance, a Europe-wide study found that in Turkey, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia, the richest 25% of citizens are more materially deprived than the poorest 25% in Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Living and Working in Europe, 2008). If the poorest in Sweden can afford a more comfortable life than the richest in most Eastern European countries, then the definition of poverty in Sweden can only be relative. Therefore, when speak of poverty in Sweden, we are inadvertently speaking more of inequality than absolute poverty.⁷ Relative poverty is not a large problem according to humanitarian and

⁷“European citizens were asked if they lacked any of a range of six items because they were unable to afford

meritarian principles (although certain conceptions of need and desert will be less tolerant of relative poverty than others), but it is always a major concern in egalitarianism.

What types of distributive justice principles a society subscribes to influences how a government measures poverty, and the policies that aim to alleviate poverty. For example, a government emphasizing head counts would focus on the least needy of the people under the poverty threshold since it is easier to get them out of poverty and hence decrease the number of people in poverty, but this focus would result in the poorest getting even poorer. While the number of people below poverty line may decrease, the poorest people would be neglected and the poverty gap would increase. Likewise, focusing on intergenerational effects and trying to equalize life chances leads to substantially different policies than focusing on immediate poverty levels (Barr, 2004). Equalizing life chances may lead to increased spending on primary and secondary public education for the neediest regions and neighborhoods, while alleviation of immediate poverty may lead to an emphasis on cash assistance programs. Furthermore, some governments may focus on decreasing inequality rather than addressing absolute poverty. Once again, which principles a government decides to prioritize in addressing poverty will guide action.

them: adequate home heating; an annual holiday; new furniture to replace worn-out items; a meal with meat every second day; new clothes; and the means to entertain guests at home.” (Living and Working in Europe, 2008, p.6)

By this measure, citizens in the EU15 (the first 15 EU member states) fare best among the survey countries: on average, a citizen in the EU15 is deprived of less than one of these items, as against just over two items for a citizen of the 12 new member states, and more than three items for someone in the three candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey). The disparity in terms of deprivation also varies substantially within countries: in Romania, the poorest 25% of citizens are deprived of four of the six essential items, while the richest 25% citizens are deprived of only one. By contrast, the disparity (as well as the extent) of deprivation among citizens in Sweden is extremely low. What is also striking is that in some of the poorer countries among the candidate countries and the new member states, the richest citizens are more deprived than the poorest citizens in some of the EU15. In Turkey, FYR Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia, the richest 25% of citizens are more deprived than the poorest 25% in Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Living and Working in Europe, 2008, pp.7-8).

3.1.1 Poverty

“I am for doing good to the poor, but I differ in opinion of the means. -- I think the best way of doing good to the poor, is not making them easy in poverty, but leading or driving them out of it. In my youth I travelled much, and I observed in different countries, that the more public provisions were made for the poor, the less they provided for themselves, and of course became poorer. And, on the contrary, the less was done for them, the more they did for themselves, and became richer. There is no country in the world where so many provisions are established for them; so many hospitals to receive them when they are sick or lame, founded and maintained by voluntary charities; so many alms-houses for the aged of both sexes, together with a solemn general law made by the rich to subject their estates to a heavy tax for the support of the poor. Under all these obligations, are our poor modest, humble, and thankful; and do they use their best endeavours to maintain themselves, and lighten our shoulders of this burthen? -- On the contrary, I affirm that there is no country in the world in which the poor are more idle, dissolute, drunken, and insolent. The day you passed that act, you took away from before their eyes the greatest of all inducements to industry, frugality, and sobriety, by giving them a dependance on somewhat else than a careful accumulation during youth and health, for support in age or sickness. In short, you offered a premium for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now wonder that it has had its effect in the increase of poverty. Repeat that law, and you will soon see a change in their manners. St. Monday, and St. Tuesday, will cease to be holidays. SIX days shalt thou labour, though one of the old commandments long treated as out of date, will again be looked upon as a respectable precept; industry will increase, and with it plenty among the lower people; their circumstances will mend, and more will be done for their happiness by inuring them to provide for themselves, than could be done by dividing all your estates among them.”

Benjamin Franklin, “On the Price of Corn, and Management of the Poor, The London Chronicle, November 29, 1766.

“This law dramatically changes the Nation’s welfare system so that no longer will it fail our people, trap so many families in a cycle of dependency, but instead will now help people to move from welfare to work...The door has now been opened to a new era of freedom and independence. And now it’s up to us, to all of us, to help all the people who need it through that door, one family at a time.”

Bill Clinton’s Radio Address on the Welfare Reform Act (1996)

Unites States measures poverty in absolute terms as opposed to the EU countries, which measure poverty in relative terms. However, official poverty lines are used for reporting purposes to determine the number of poor people in a country. Falling below the official poverty threshold does not entitle a person to receive government assistance.

There are more specific rules about the conditions under which a person qualifies for government assistance in each country.

In EU countries, official poverty threshold is 60% of the mean income. In the US, however, it is measured according to the Orshansky Poverty Threshold⁸. This formula is based on the price of necessary food items that would be adequate to sustain a person for a temporary period. Orshansky had calculated several nutritionally adequate food baskets, and the cheapest of these baskets was selected by the American government as the basis for the official national poverty threshold in 1964. Since an average American family spent approximately one third of their income on food at the time, Orshansky calculated a threshold level by multiplying the cost of this food basket by three. In 1969, the amount was tied to Consumer Index and it is recalculated annually. The threshold is the same for all states except for Hawaii and Alaska, both of which have higher thresholds for poverty.

In the US, which is a weak meritocracy, the conditions for receiving welfare payments and the generosity of the payments change from state to state. On the other hand, in Germany and Sweden, which qualify as strong meritocracies, rules and entitlements are national, although Swedish local governments have a lot of discretion in the implementation of these rules. As of 2010, German unemployment insurance pays 60% of the net income to individuals who lose their jobs for the first year, upon which the long-term unemployment insurance starts, which is called *Arbeitslosengeld II* (Unemployment money II). This program is commonly referred to as *Hartz IV* in Germany. This second type of insurance pays a standard amount to all persons and also acts as universal minimum income for all citizens in Germany, where there is no

⁸The formula was developed by Mollie Orshansky in 1964, an economist and a statistician who worked for the U.S. Social Security Administration at the time.

minimum wage. This amount is determined by adding up the estimated expenses an average adult has. The index of expenses include basic needs such as food and clothes as well as discretionary expenses such as alcohol, shoe repair and movie tickets. While the index is published by the government, the precise method of calculation is not disclosed and it is contested in courts. The partner receives 90% of the amount the head of the household receives, and children receive between 60-80% depending on their age.⁹ Recipients of this program also receive up to 82% of their heating costs and some or all of their rent as well as job-search related costs depending on the assessment of social workers.

To encourage work, recipients are allowed to keep all of the first EUR 100 of their income, if they find a job. However, the amount they can retain decreases to 20%, if they make more than EUR 100 per month, and down to 10% if they make above EUR 800. People with no children who earn above EUR 1200 are not eligible for unemployment benefits. This cutoff point varies according to the number of dependents. All recipients are automatically covered by government health insurance, and a standard payment is made towards their retirement account by the government each month.

Swedish residents have a legal right to means-tested social assistance since 1982. The national government mandates the standard level of assistance and municipalities fund and administer the payments. As in Germany, Swedish cash payments are intended to cover the basic needs of the recipients. On top of the cash payment, municipalities pay

⁹This method of calculating assistance to children was ruled unconstitutional due to lack of transparency on February 9, 2010. Children have different needs from adults (for instance, they do not consume alcohol, but they need school supplies and toys) and the German government is ordered to revise the method of calculation of the amount children receive until December 31, 2010.

for rent, insurance, union fees and unemployment funds. They may also choose to pay other expenses (Lindquist, 2007).

Unlike German and Swedish systems, there is no national standard for American welfare payments. The payments are not as generous as German and Swedish payments, and recipients are required to re-apply for assistance periodically. The payment to a single person household is \$129 in 2010 in Texas, and the amount increases to \$312 for a four-person household. The assistance is temporary, and it is available to families with children. There is a limit to the maximum number of months a family can receive assistance, although these time limits vary by state. Welfare recipients may also be required to meet some moral criteria of deservingness. For instance, in Texas, drug and alcohol abusers do not qualify for assistance, and recipients may have to take parenting classes. Qualifying recipients are also allowed to enroll in the Medicaid program, a governmental health insurance program for the needy. Welfare payments are generally supplemented with food stamps that are funded by the Department of Agriculture, but distributed through state governments. As of 2010, a qualifying person receives \$200 dollars per month in food stamps, and a family of four receives \$667. However, an adult with no children and no disabilities cannot receive food stamps longer than 3 months. Like TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), this program targets children and their caretakers. 74.5% of TANF recipients in 2002 were children.

3.2 Framing

Sir Humphrey Appleby: Mr. Woolley, are you worried about the rise in crime among teenagers?

Bernard Woolley: Yes.

Sir Humphrey Appleby: Do you think there is lack of discipline and vigorous training in our Comprehensive Schools?

Bernard Woolley: Yes.

Sir Humphrey Appleby: Do you think young people welcome some structure and leadership in their lives?

Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Do they respond to a challenge?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Might you be in favor of reintroducing National Service?
 Bernard Woolley: Er, I might be.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Yes or no?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Of course, after all you've said you can't say no to that. On the other hand, the surveys can reach opposite conclusions.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Mr. Woolley, are you worried about the danger of war?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Are you unhappy about the growth of armaments?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Do you think there's a danger in giving young people guns and teaching them how to kill?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Do you think it's wrong to force people to take arms against their will?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: Would you oppose the reintroduction of conscription?
 Bernard Woolley: Yes.
 Sir Humphrey Appleby: There you are, Bernard. The perfectly balanced sample.

(Yes, Minister)

If you don't like what is being said, then change the conversation.

(Mad Men)

A narrative is neutral neither in its conception nor in its reception. Any narrative requires an inclusion of, as well as elaboration and emphasis on, parts of the whole story at the expense of others. Likewise, no narrative falls on neutral ears but is contested by and filtered through the lens of the belief systems and political ideologies of the audience. There is intense political struggle over which dimensions of an issue should receive public attention. As a result, framing is immensely important in the political arena. What aspects of an issue the public pays attention to depends on what aspects are emphasized in the political discourse. How the public perceives an issue is influenced by the

descriptive and prescriptive frames in which they receive the information. Public opinion is shaped by the way issues are framed to a large extent.

Social reality is complex and multidimensional, but human cognitive capacity as well as people's knowledge and interest in any given issue is limited (Fiske and Taylor 1991). People have many competing and inconsistent considerations, beliefs and opinions (Chong, 1993; Hochschild, 1981). Framing "is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*" (emphasis in original) (Entman, 1993: 52), so the audience weighs the information differently as a result of framing. A frame is not only a presentation of a position on an issue but also a construction of it. It provides a narrative teaching the audience what to pay attention to and how to interpret it, e.g. what the pertinent actors, and causal relations are, who is to be blamed and credited and what are consequences of policies (McGraw, Best, & Timpone, 1995). A frame is "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, p. 143).

Framing does not aim to move a person from one end of the spectrum to the other on an issue. Rather, it aims to move her to another dimension. Frames change belief content by providing people with new information, and convincing them to switch positions based on the new information (Nelson & Oxley, 1999), but their impact is not restricted to this. They also change the importance attached to information by "activating information already at the recipients' disposal, stored in long-term memory" (Nelson,

Oxley & Clawson, 1997, p. 225), that is, by making certain information more accessible. People who are already informed about the content of the issue can also switch frames, if a frame does not contradict their beliefs. Beyond matters of reasoning, “by altering the information or considerations available to individuals, frames may influence not only opinion but also the emotional responses that people report.” (Gross & D’Ambrosio, 2004, p. 19). Through framing, media and politicians can shape how people think about issues without manipulation, although framing can be a manipulative effort, too.

A political question can be framed as an economic, moral, or security issue. For instance, teenage sexuality can be framed as a moral issue, or a public health issue. Likewise, gun control can be presented as an affront to individual freedoms, or a crime control measure (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001, p. 529). Thus, two political candidates hardly ever take opposing positions on an issue. They try to frame it in different ways in a bid to appeal to their voters. Political framing manages to alter what people remember and what policy positions they take on issue areas as varied as foreign policy (Kinder & Berinsky, 1999), AIDS, (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Portz 1996; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994) and partial birth abortion (Freedman, 1997). When a frame prevails over others in interpreting an issue area, the parameters of the debate are set, the relevant concerns, actors and possible range of actions are defined. It becomes more difficult and less acceptable to take the discussion outside these boundaries. Hence, framing is indispensable aspect of political discourse. There is a continuing battle among elites on every political issue over which frame will prevail - whoever wins the battle, wins the public opinion (Skocpol, 1994). In the most contentious issues multiple frames exist side by side, competing for dominance.

Naturally, the impact frames have on people varies. There are limits to the degree to which frames can influence people's opinions. Predispositions condition the responses to a communicated frame. When people are presented with a frame that contradicts their predispositions, they will resist the frame. (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Zaller & Feldman 1992), but when it aligns with their predispositions they will be open to the influence of the frame. (Lau, Smith, & Fiske, 1991). Hence elite frames are more successful in priming and bolstering existing opinions than changing minds (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001: 536). Ideology and party identification is an important indicator (and source) of predispositions. For instance, Republicans and Independents are much more likely to change their attitudes depending on the frame than Democrats on concealed handgun laws when the frames presented to them are individual rights and public safety. Democrats resist the individual rights frame because it is inconsistent with their predispositions. Republicans, on the other hand are receptive to both individual rights (Carmines & Layman, 1999; Feldman, 1999) and public safety frames (Haider-Markel & O'Brien 1997). Therefore, which of the two frames they are exposed to affects their judgment. Independents are also influenced by both frames because they do not have strong dispositions (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001).

Another limit is the source of the message. In a study of gun control frames, Callaghan & Schnell (2009) show that "source cues moderate the impact of the frames, even when controlling for other variables." If the source presenting the frame is perceived as credible, the persuasive effect of the frame increases, but if the source is seen as biased, its impact decreases. Level of knowledge is another limitation on the power of frames. A high level of knowledge can cause one to resist external information cues

(Converse, 1962; McGuire, 1968). Less knowledgeable respondents are more likely to accommodate new information frames (Kinder & Sanders, 1990). While highly knowledgeable respondents show opinion stability, respondents with low-level knowledge show variation across different framing experiments (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001, p. 529).

To sum it up, people are more open to be influenced by the frames that are communicated to them by sources that they find credible and frames that do not contradict their existing beliefs on the issue, and more knowledgeable people are less open to framing influences. Moreover, some people may be repeatedly exposed to a certain issue frame, while others may rarely be exposed to it for a variety of reasons. People tend to follow media outlets that conform to their political ideology and they tend to speak about politics with like-minded people. Furthermore, they find elites who share their political convictions more credible, while they are likely to see media outlets and political elites from opposing political camps as more biased. The cumulative effect of this bias in source selection is continuous exposure to the same frames and avoidance of alternative frames.

Most importantly, there is only a limited number of competing frames on an issue in any given national context. A dominant American frame on welfare may simply not be available in Germany or Sweden. Elites do not conjure frames out of thin air. To appeal to the people, frames should be consistent with existing national and discursive traditions, beliefs, keywords and ideologies. A frame has a chance of influencing the target audience only if it can resonate with their viewpoint (Walsh, 2004, p.18).

In the study of discourses on the welfare state, I divide political communication into three levels: national discourses, ideological discourses, which are embedded in national discourses and compete with each other for the attention and acceptance of the public on an issue domain, and frames, which are embedded in discourses to explain and understand specific aspects of issue areas. Not only are ideological discourses embedded in and therefore limited by the national discourse on any given topic, but also do they exist only in relation to and in conversation with the rival discourses within the national discourse, that is, they are dialectic in nature. Every frame an ideological discourse presents gains meaning within the context of the national discourse, with respect to the frames other discourses offer. There is always a talk and talk back among rival discourses vying for the attention and support of the citizenry. Furthermore, discourses try to maintain a degree of coherence, thus a frame a discourse constructs in one issue area should not explicitly contradict frames that same discourse presents in other issue areas.

An ideological discourse frames a multiplicity of issues and builds a narrative about a political domain. If a political group fails to build a discourse with its own frames through which the audience can interpret the domain, they are constrained to debating the issue within the parameters set by the frames of rival political discourses. Trying to establish dominance whilst being restrained by the frames of the rival discourse is difficult.

Abortion is possibly the best-known example of issue framing in the US. Once abortion was framed as a moral issue by the anti-abortion discourse, it was a losing position to defend that it was not immoral. Instead of arguing with the rival discourse within the frame they constructed, American pro-abortion discourse shifted the debate to

another frame by presenting the issue as a matter of right to choose and reproductive rights of the mother. Seeing the appeal of the choice frame to the American public, anti-abortion discourse once more reframed the abortion debate, now as an issue of the right-to-life of aborted fetuses. Today, no group defines itself as pro or anti-abortion. They label their positions as pro-life and pro-choice. Both are successful cases of framing and these frames develop and exist only in relation to each other. The language they use are drawn from cherished American values and keywords to which Americans respond very positively. Choice, privacy, right and life are all words that resonate well with the American public. Taken out of their dialectic relationship, both frames lose part of their meaning and potency.

As the abortion debate example illustrates, constructing alternative frames is crucial in successfully challenging a rival discourse. In the case of welfare discourses, arguing for merely quantitative changes in the welfare expenditures indicates a tacit acceptance of the premises of the existing welfare frames and limits the argument to minor questions. However, if the *raison d'être* of the welfare state is successfully reframed, this brings about a qualitative change in the manner people perceive the issue, and can lead to fundamental restructuring of welfare state institutions.

Political elites can frame a situation in multiple ways, and use vocabulary that is already popular in the national arsenal in their frames. They do not try to create a new set of values. They take values and “show” to the public that their ideas, policies, arguments are most in line with the existing values of the people. They return to the well of old and perennially popular concepts and words and redefine them. Cox (2001) provides an example of reframing of the debate on welfare benefits in Denmark. The Danish right

reframed the debate on the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s by arguing that there was a need for a qualitative restructuring of the welfare state, and not merely a quantitative reduction in social expenditures. Bourgeois parties (Conservatives and Liberals) defended that the welfare state at its height damaged duties of citizenship and undermined social solidarity, a central Danish value, by creating calculating citizens and discouraging civil society from flourishing.

Borrowing a page from the Anglo-Saxon right, Danish rightists emphasized that providing unlimited unemployment payments with no strings attached led people to remain unemployed for long periods during which their skills deteriorated, which led to continued unemployment and dependency on social assistance. To avoid this undesirable outcome, the Danish right pushed for limitations and conditions on social assistance, leading to a fundamental shift in the Danish welfare state principles, wherein the right to receive assistance used to be automatic. They drew justification from some articles of the Danish constitution making the point that there needed to be reciprocity between the responsibilities of the government and citizens according to the Danish tradition. Reformers claimed to restore the historical core of the Danish welfare state rather than attempting a drastic departure from it. Cox argues that once the Danish Social Democrats accepted this new frame, they could not challenge the need for quantitative and sweeping reforms, and they could only negotiated the content of it.

According to Cox, the route Danish right parties took is very different from the German Christian Democrats, who defended cutting welfare spending for fiscal reasons instead of reframing the debate in qualitative terms and failed. A study of media coverage in Germany in early 2000s reflects some attempts at drawing attention to the underclass

as undeserving of social assistance. The language and discourse is borrowed directly from Anglo-Saxon countries, down to the term “white trash” and pictures lifted from the works of British artists, as well as the discourse on permanent underclass and welfare dependency. That German magazines choose to publish pictures of the British poor and use the term “white trash” without translating it into German indicate that Germans do not have the vocabulary that English-speaking countries do for the undeserving poor (Chassé, 2010). Trying to frame poverty as an individual failing, a consequence of perversity is a foreign concept in Germany and as such it requires the importation of a foreign perspective and vocabulary.

To compare Swedish media depictions with poverty to German media depictions as described by Chassé, I surveyed all articles that were categorized under the keywords “poverty” or “welfare state” in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* for the two-year period from January 2004 through December 2006. *Dagens Nyheter* is considered to be one of the two newspapers of record in Sweden, and it has the largest circulation among Swedish morning papers, and it has an economically liberal (pro-free market) bent. I catalogued all the images in the articles. 59 articles included images (including the photograph of the author, interviewer or the interviewee). In these images, poverty is almost invariably framed as a social problem rather than an individual problem. The images depicted in graphs, statistics and cartoons instead of photographs of poor people. Personal stories and photographs have no place in this narrative.

3.3 Blame Attribution

Blame attribution is central to explanations for poverty and inequality in society (Lane, 2001). Beliefs about the causes of a behavior provide the key for attribution. Ross

(1977) found that people tend to attribute behavior to dispositional factors such as personality, abilities and motives, and underestimate the importance of situational factors in explaining behavior, even when they are given evidence for situational explanations. Other studies demonstrated the persistence of dispositional attributions in the face of contradictory facts (Jones, 1979; Synder & Jones, 1979). Ross labeled dispositional attributions as the “fundamental attribution error”, due to their dominance as a causal explanation for behavior, even though they are often demonstrably wrong.

The actor’s view of his behavior emphasizes the role of environmental conditions at the moment of the action. The observer’s view emphasizes the causal role of stable dispositional properties of the actor. We wish to argue that there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions.

(Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 2)

Once an attribution is made, it activates an “attribution-affect-action” motivational sequence in which “thoughts determine what is felt and feelings determine what is done,” (Weiner, 1980a). When people attribute the need state to controllable reasons (attribution), they experience feelings of anger toward the person in need (affect), which leads them to neglect need (action), but attribution of uncontrollability for the need state induces pity or sympathy for the person in need and results in judgments of help-giving. The common thread in all perceptions of undeservingness is the attribution of blame to internal factors, or dispositional attribution, for a negative outcome. When blame is ascribed to the disposition of individuals, people are less likely to believe they can help the target.

When the attribution of responsibility for adverse outcomes shifts from dispositional to situational, that is, from the “individual” to the “environment” or “fate”, this shift bears significant consequences in the perception of who or what is to blame for

the outcome and what needs to be done to ameliorate it. The more a person's condition is perceived to be situational, that is, the result of her environment, circumstances or luck, rather than dispositional, the further the blame is removed from the person. Thus, saying that someone deserves help is the equivalent of saying that she cannot be blamed for her situation (Barnes, Ickes, & Kidd, 1979).

In simulation experiments, which described a student trying to borrow class notes, when the notes were needed because of a lack of academic effort, participants perceived controllability, expressed anger, and neglected the request. When the notes were needed due to a physical disability, participants expressed perceptions of uncontrollability and feelings of pity, and they helped (Weiner, 1980a). Schmidt, & Weiner's (1988) experiments show that instructing the subjects to ignore their emotions and focus on the objective situation does not alter the attributional sequence. When perceptions of causal controllability are manipulated, attributional shifts cause changes in affective and behavioral judgments for stigmas, but it is not possible to alter attribution for some social stigmas (Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1988), suggesting that some blame attributions are too strongly ingrained to be altered through manipulation in experiments.

The attribution effect is observed in attitudes toward poverty. Negative events and failure initiate more attributional evaluation than positive events and success (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Weiner, 1985). It is likely that poverty is more subject to attributional analysis than wealth for this reason. This means people think more about why the poor are poor than why the rich are rich. Attributional assessment is a strong predictor of willingness to help the poor, and support for policies that target poverty.

People who subscribe to dispositional attribution theories are more likely to blame the poor for their poverty resulting in unwillingness to help the needy. Generous policies are more likely to be recommended when the target's poverty is attributed to society rather than the target's disposition (Appelbaum, 2001). Americans who think that society provides equal opportunities are more opposed to redistribution (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). People feel less sympathetic towards unemployed people and are less inclined to help them, if the unemployed are represented as having spent low effort to search employment. They also report more satisfaction when employment or unemployment outcomes are viewed as deserved rather than underserved. For instance, if a hypothetical person spends a lot of effort to look for employment and then gets a job, the satisfaction level of observers tend to be higher than when the hypothetical person finds a job without showing much effort (Feather, 1998).

Patterns of attribution for poverty are observable at early ages. In a study of kindergarteners' and primary school students' causal explanations for poverty, only those who provide choice scripts for wealth and few no-choice scripts for poverty derogate the poor (Karniol, 1985). In other words, if children believe that the level of economic success is a result of personal factors, their attitude is negative toward the poor. Even pre-school children base their attitudes about the poor on their attributional assessment of the causes of wealth and poverty.

Blame attribution is not limited to human agents. Lane (1986) argues that as agents of distribution, markets and governments are also subject to different assessment criteria. Put in attributional theory language, Lane contends Americans view markets and market agents as situationally constrained in their actions. In contrast, they view the

government as an agent with freewill and therefore they attribute governmental policies to dispositional factors. This allows firms to escape criticism for their decisions. They are bound by market forces and survival considerations in a competitive market and they do what they have to do, even if their decisions harm their workers or customers. However, the government is not perceived as constrained and governmental actions are viewed as choices, therefore unlike market players, the government is seen as liable for the consequences of its policies. Americans tend to use different attributional criteria to evaluate market justice and governmental justice.

How attributional causations are framed affects where the public places the blame for a negative event. Increased exposure to a particular frame affects the attribution process. When people are exposed to increased coverage of economic problems in the media, they are more likely to attribute their personal financial problems to macroeconomic factors and blame politicians (Abramowitz, Lanoue, & Ramesh, 1988), demonstrating that even the most neutral media coverage can alter attribution, if only by giving the audience clues on what is pertinent to the issue. If coverage of the economy increases, people start viewing their economic wellbeing as part of a larger picture. Highlighting a set of causal relationships also renders them more accessible, causing people to weigh them more heavily (Rholes & Pryor, 1982). Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) demonstrated that how the Columbine school shooting was framed influenced whether the respondents attributed the responsibility for the event to media violence or gun control laws. Framing of attribution changes not only opinions but also feelings, although these changes vary according to ideological leanings. In an experiment about people's reactions to riots, drawing the attention away from individual responsibility to

the underlying poverty and economic conditions decreased the likelihood that conservative respondents reported feelings of anger for the rioters and increased expression of pity for them, while the same frame increased the likelihood that the most liberal respondents would express anger at the socioeconomic conditions and sympathy for the rioters¹⁰ (Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004).

3.3.1 The Blamers' Characteristics

Most people recognize that there are multiple reasons that may lead to poverty. These reasons can be sorted into three broad categories: individualistic, societal, and fatalistic. Individualistic explanations such as laziness are dispositional attributions, while societal explanations such as poor economy and fatalistic explanations such as bad luck are situational attributions (Zucker & B. Weiner, 1993, Feagin, 1972). However, when making a judgment, people are likely to emphasize either dispositional or situational factors. Attributional theories of poverty (and achievement as its corollary) vary according to ideology, belief systems and demographic variables such as economic class, race, religion, educational attainment level, age and gender. There are also differences in dominant attributional theories across nations.

For instance, Kluegel and Smith (1986) argue that while Americans recognize the situational factors contributing to poverty, they maintain that people can overcome structural disadvantages through personal effort. Earlier studies suggested that while dispositional theories are more common among North Americans than among Europeans

¹⁰“This is consistent with Miller's (1997) notion that pity retains an element of contempt. For conservatives, ...the situational frame diminishes that anger by providing some additional explanation for behavior. Yet conservatives still see these individuals as different and unequal. Pity allows one to retain a bit of moral outrage.” (Gross & D'Ambrosio, 2004: 14)

(Katona, Strümpel, & Zahn, 1971) and Australians (Feather, 1974), they are the dominant mode of attribution in all post-industrial societies, and situational theories for poverty are more popular in industrializing societies (Brislin, 1983, p. 384), but van Oorschot and Halman's (2000) analysis of more recent data indicates that situational theories that place the blame for poverty on society are dominant in Western European societies and - to a lesser extent - in Eastern European societies.

Economic status is another important factor that affects attribution. Welfare recipients are "more likely to make structural attributions for poverty and to reject restrictive welfare-reform policies than middle-class respondents" (Bullock, 1999). Therefore, welfare recipients are more likely to support helping the poor not only as a result of self-interest but also because they tend to make situational attributions for poverty. However, Hunt's research (1996) qualifies the relationship between income and attributions for poverty. Hunt finds that in the US, greater income increases dispositional explanations for poverty among whites, but not among blacks and Latinos. On the contrary, higher income results in more structuralist explanations for poverty among blacks according to this research.

Religion is a factor in determining people's beliefs about the causes of poverty. Adherence to Protestant Ethic in particular is a predictor of dispositional attributions for poverty in Anglo-Saxon societies. In America and Australia Protestants are more likely to rely on individualistic explanations for poverty compared to Catholics (Feather, 1974). Cozzarelli, Tagler and Wilkinson (2001) find that the degree of endorsement of the Protestant Ethic is a predictor of dispositional attributions for poverty. Conservative Protestant white Americans are also more likely to attribute racial inequalities to

dispositional factors than other white Americans, and “emphasize perceived dysfunctional social relations among African Americans” as an explanation for racial inequalities (Emerson, C. Smith, & Sikkink, 1999). Findings on gender differences are mixed. Hunt (1996) shows that women tend to hold more structuralist beliefs than men, but Cozzarelli, Tagler & Wilkinson (2001) fail to find any gender differences.

Ideology and attributional theories are closely related. Zucker and Weiner (1993) discover that conservatives are more likely to attribute poverty to individualistic causes, believe that the poor are in control of their state, feel anger toward the poor as a result of that attribution and do not express intentions to help. Their experiments show that lower support for welfare policies are directly related to individualistic attributions and conservative ideology, but personal help is emotionally determined (Zucker & B. Weiner, 1993). Authoritarianism also correlates positively with dispositional attributions for poverty (Cozzarelli et al., 2001).

The relationship between ideology and attribution is not always straightforward but nonetheless follows a predictable pattern. Conservatives and liberals respond divergently to people who need assistance. Skitka and Tetlock (1993) identify punitiveness as the key motive in allocative decisions for American conservatives. The main factor in determining the conservative response to need is the responsibility attribution. When conservatives attribute the responsibility for the state of need to claimants, they feel anger towards them for violating norms and punish them by denying assistance. This response is consistent across issue domains (health care, allocation of medicine to AIDS patients, vocational training to the unemployed, and foreign aid) and does not change under conditions of no resource scarcity even when the denial of

assistance may lead to death (Skitka, McMurray, & Burroughs, 1991; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). Therefore, it is neither the resource scarcity, nor the nature or magnitude of need, but mainly the responsibility attribution that determines the American conservative reaction to assistance demands. However, if the claimants change their behavior and conform to social norms, most conservatives forgive the reformed claimants for their past behavior and extend assistance to them.

American liberals, on the other hand, are not consistent in their allocative decisions, and alter their response to need according to two factors: condition of resource scarcity and type of need. Under conditions of scarcity, when only some claimants can receive help, liberals, like conservatives, rely on attributional judgments to decide which claimants deserve to receive assistance. However, under conditions of no scarcity, they are more likely to throw out deservingness judgments and provide assistance to all claimants. When the need is not basic, liberals react in a manner closer to conservatives and discriminate claimants based on responsibility attributions, even under no scarcity conditions (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). When the type of need is survival-related (such as organ transplants, medicine for AIDS patients and low-income housing), liberals avoid making decisions based on attributional assessments, and help all claimants. Liberals are also more generous in their allocations than conservatives across all conditions.

3.3.1.1 Belief in a Just World and Imminent Justice

An important factor in blame attribution is whether or not one believes in a just world. The belief that people get what they deserve and deserve what they get is labeled as Belief in a Just World (BJW) (Lerner 1980). BJW is theorized to help people maintain

a sense of security regarding the world surrounding them by providing a causal link between actions and results. Therefore, deducing deservingness from outcomes is crucial to maintaining BJW. If the reverse were true and outcomes were not indicative of people's deservingness, this would show that the world is not just and our condition is not a punishment or reward for our actions. Simply put, this would mean that bad things can happen to good people and that life is random, or possibly unjust. Such a conclusion would shatter BJW, therefore, it is not surprising that people with a high BJW are threatened when they encounter an innocent victim. Faced with facts that contradict BJW, they revise their perceptions of reality rather than question the justness of the world (Lane, 2001, p. 476). To cope with threats to their belief system, people who score high on BJW scales tend to blame the victim. Consequently, high BJW is positively correlated with victim-blaming.

Victim-blaming, that is, the conviction that the victim has brought the trouble upon herself, allows people with high BJW to maintain their belief that life is just and not simply random. Such reasoning provides one with a sense of control over life outcomes. If a person is punished, she must have deserved punishment or if a person gets sick, she must have deserved the sickness. In experiments, justice related beliefs predicted participants' tendency to disassociate themselves from the victim and derogate her. These findings suggest that innocent victims threaten justice beliefs and responses to these victims may, at times, be attempts to reduce this threat (Hafer, 2000). This threat is especially prominent for people who have greater psychological investment in long-term and deserved outcomes (Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & Dempsey, 2005). Poverty is a condition that threatens BJW, and blaming the poor for their poverty fits in with the

pattern of victim blaming in people with high BJW. The more their belief in a just world is threatened, the more people with high BJW engage in victim blaming.

Consistent with their belief system, people with high BJW tend to attribute poverty to individual factors and blame the poor and needy for their situation (Smith, 1985; Harper, Wagstaff, Newton, & Harrison 1990; Appelbaum, 2000/2002; Dalbert, 1997/1998; Dalbert, Fisch, & Montada, 1992; Furnham & Procter, 1989; Mohiyeddini & Montada, 1998; Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998; Cozzarelli, Tagler & Wilkinson, 2001), and have negative attitudes toward the poor (Furnham & Gunter, 1984). From this defense mechanism, a startling pattern emerges that turns the standard attribution-affect-action sequence upside down. While people with weak BJW rate people who spend more effort to find employment as more deserving of government assistance, people with high BJW rate them as less deserving (Appelbaum, Lennon & Lawrence, 2006). In an effort to maintain BJW, they engage in reverse reasoning and make attributional judgments based on the outcome.

In BJW¹¹, life outcomes are not random and they provide verification of deservingness. If the world is just, then not only do people get what they deserve, but they also deserve what they get. Therefore, one can deduce the deservingness or blameworthiness of an individual from the condition in which she is. According to this worldview, positive results are proof of deservingness and negative outcomes are proof of undeservingness. For instance, if people get what they deserve, it follows that people

¹¹ More recent literature categorizes BJW into two subgroups: BJW-self and BJW-others. BJW-self refers to the belief that life treats one fairly and one gets what she deserves in life, while BJW-others refers to the generalized belief that life treats people fairly (Lipkusa et. al., 1996; Sutton & Douglas, 2005). Studies indicate that this distinction is crucial since BWJ-self and BWJ-others have different psychological effects. Whereas high BJW-self is positively correlated with the subjective wellbeing of the person, high BJW-others is positively correlated with severe social attitudes. (Dalbert, et al. 1999, Bègue & Bastounis, 2003; Sutton & Douglas, 2005).

who are doing well have deserved their success and those who are in need are undeserving of wealth. Therefore, BJW is closely linked to Immanent Justice (IJ) reasoning which occurs when people believe that negative events are retribution for prior wrongs, and positive events are rewards for prior good deeds despite the lack of conceivable connections between prior actions and events (Piaget, 1965). It is not IJ reasoning when a person believes that a sedentary life style caused her to develop diabetes. However, if the person believes that she has diabetes because she treated her family poorly when she was younger, then she is engaging in immanent justice reasoning. IJ reasoning is particularly strong when good things happen to “good people” and bad things happen to “bad people” in line with deservingness expectations in a just world, but when people are exposed to scenarios that threaten their just world beliefs, their IJ reasoning may weaken in evaluating subsequent situations (Callan, Ellard & Nicol, 2006). Thus, people who engage in IJ are likely to assume that the poor have done bad deeds to deserve their bad fortune and the rich have deserved their good fortune. Poverty and wealth themselves are indications of deservingness.

Studies suggest that prevalence of BJW varies within and across nations. A study among British university students found that just world beliefs were associated with negative attitudes toward the poor and BJW varied according to ideology, religion and employment status. Unemployed and part-time employed people, leftists and agnostics were less likely to believe in a just world (Furnham, 1982). Based on the results of his experiments in Britain and South Africa, which showed that South African students scored higher on BJW scales, Furnham (1985) concludes that BJW is more widely spread in unequal societies because it helps justify the status quo. Mahler, Greenberg and

Hayashi (1981) find that the BJW beliefs are much stronger in the US than in Japan. Loo's (2002) Canadian sample scored significantly higher than did the European and Hawaiian samples reported by Dalbert et al. (1999). In a crossnational study covering 12 countries, USA ranked right behind India and South Africa in BJW levels, both of which are developing countries with high levels of inequality (Furnham, 1993). Despite their limitations, these studies suggest that BJW varies across nations and it may be affected by political, social and economic conditions of a country. Furnham (1993, p. 326-327) explains the social component of BJW:

One of the most robust findings in the literature is the fact that just world beliefs help people cope with disturbing or threatening events (rape, poverty, racism) and that the shared experience of these events help people develop a consensual view of reality. Because just world beliefs reduce or prevent feelings of guilt, they are retained and passed on to succeeding generations. In Third World countries, just world beliefs held by the rich and powerful condemn or devalue the poor. Some people believe in a just world because of their personal pathology and experience but there is evidence that just world beliefs are a function not only of personal experience, but also of societal functionalism (i.e., a country's structural and societal factors). In this sense just world beliefs are variables of both personal and social psychology.

BJW fits well with the equity paradigm of the free-market economy, where the only way to know the worth of a person's contribution to the market is to look at how much she is paid for her contributions. In the market-justice frame, that one is paid the amount she is paid is both the outcome and the justification for the earning.

3.3.2 Target Group Characteristics

Group-centered judgments are also a determinant of blame attribution and the resulting welfare attitudes. Determining the perceived proximity of an out-group to the in-group is pivotal to understanding the attribution process. The more distant an out-group is perceived to be, the more its negative actions will be attributed to innate (dispositional) factors.

Converse (1964) argued that many people did not have an adequate grasp of ideologies because they were too abstract, so less-informed citizens based their policy judgments on their opinions about the “visible social groupings” that those policies appeared to help or harm (Converse, 1964: 234). In other words, most people do not base their support for policies in abstract ideological principles and beliefs about government role and society, but about how they feel about the visible groups that those policies seem to target. Accordingly, policy judgments turn into referenda about the moral qualifications of the groups in question, in which race, religion, nationality, class, gender and other identifying characteristics of target groups serve as shortcuts in evaluating complex political proposals.

Psychological experiments show that in economic decision-making out-group members face a risk of being discriminated against, regardless of grouping procedure, due to higher expectations or favoritism of in-group members (Ahmed, 2007). For example, in the US, support for welfare services decreases as the number of welfare recipients in the community increases, but when the recipients are of one’s own race, the level of support increases (Luttmer, 2001). Therefore, if an economic policy seems to benefit an out-group more than their in-group, people will be more opposed to it, but the intensity of the opposition also depends on how much they dislike the out-group. The more they dislike an out-group, the more they will oppose policies that benefit that group. People tend to like groups that they find more similar to themselves (Clement & Krueger, 1998). It follows that groups that are viewed as distant by the majority of the population are most prone to suffer from target-group-based policy judgments. That is, blame attribution is crucial in judging whether a social group deserves benefiting from

government policies. Even when the issue is as abstract as the constitutional right to freedom of speech and free assembly, support for these rights are contingent upon the opinion of the public on the groups that are expected to be protected by them (Kuklinski et al. 1991; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1982).

Recent research suggests that in making policy decisions, “perceptions that each group violates a specific value played a more important role in predicting political attitudes than abstract value expressions, general negative affect directed toward the group, and political ideology” (Henry & Reyna, 2007). When it comes to poverty, the most significant perceived norm violation for many people is laziness. If a person does not exhibit high levels of effort to find and maintain employment, many people will attribute her poverty to her character and will be unwilling to help her. The continuous construction and representation of social groups determines what moral qualities and behaviors are ascribed to them by society and how close other groups find them. Similar target groups are ascribed different qualities, or stereotypes, resulting in different responsibility attributions across time and space.

Stereotypes about social groups shape the attribution process. When a stereotype about an out-group is negative, people need less confirmative evidence to believe it than to refute it, but when the stereotype is positive, they need more confirmatory evidence to agree with it and less disconfirmatory evidence to revise it. Thus, people find negative stereotypes about out-groups easy to accept, but difficult to modify in the light of contradictory information. No such pattern is observed for in-group stereotypes. Moreover, abstract stereotypes such as “lazy” or “immoral” are more difficult to challenge than concrete stereotypes such as “enjoying spicy foods” or “talking loudly”,

and they are more resistant to change. This is relevant for intergroup stereotyping because people tend to attribute positive abstract stereotypes to in-groups and negative abstract stereotypes to out-groups. Over time, more concrete elements of stereotypes disappear, while abstract elements, which are impervious to disconfirmation, endure. As a result, historically disadvantaged groups are most vulnerable to abstract and negative stereotypes, and it is exceedingly difficult to change these stereotypes (Maass, Montalcini, & Biciotti, 1998).

Based on the literature on stereotypes, it is reasonable to assume that stereotypes about historically disadvantaged groups, which also tend to be poor, are likely to be abstract and negative in every society. Indeed, a study by Jost et al. (2005) that spanned Italy, Israel and Britain shows that low-status ethnic and regional groups are described as communal and interpersonally-oriented, in contrast to high-status groups, which are described as agentic and achievement-oriented. The content of these status-related group stereotypes are remarkably similar across different cultures. Such stereotypes serve to justify stratification and inequality in the system. In Jost et al.'s experiment they "were endorsed more strongly when system-justification motives were activated." By attributing less desirable economic behavior to low-status groups, people seek to explain and justify the stratification in their society and their place within that hierarchy. If a group is achievement-oriented and the other is interpersonally-oriented, it is easier to attribute economic inequalities between the two groups to dispositional factors rather than structural injustices and discrimination.

In the US, welfare related attitudes can be largely traced to group-based policy assessments. Even self-identified American conservatives generally desire more

government spending, but welfare remains as the single policy area where Americans do not desire more spending (Stimson, 2004). Americans feel more negatively about welfare programs and welfare recipients than they do about poverty and the poor (Smith, 1987). How the welfare recipients are represented - their race, gender, perceived motivation and loyalty to moral norms- is particularly relevant to the attribution of responsibility for their situation and judgments of deservingness. Media framing and stereotypes about certain groups play a big role in blame attribution. Henry, Reyna and Weiner (2004) demonstrate that people attribute more responsibility to welfare recipients (than poor people) for their poverty and argue that this is a result of the negative stereotypes about welfare recipients that permeate political discussions.

Wilson shows that people have different causal attributions for the poverty of different social groups and that racial prejudice is an important factor in shaping causal beliefs about poverty. The respondents in his study believe that the poverty of welfare recipients is a result of dispositional factors, but homelessness is caused by situational determinants, whereas migrant laborers' poverty occupies a middle ground between the two explanations (Wilson, 1996).

Gilens shows that most Americans believe that the majority of welfare recipients are black, and negative attitudes toward blacks are the single most important predictor of opposition to public spending on the poor. People who agree with the stereotype that blacks are lazy oppose generous welfare policies because they think welfare programs benefit mostly blacks (Gilens, 1995, 1996).

It is difficult to observe and measure racist attitudes because they do not fit into the old-fashioned racism paradigm. Symbolic racism (SR) has replaced old-fashioned

racism as a political force that shapes white Americans' stance on racially charged policy domains and it serves as a more powerful explanatory variable than self-interest. SR is historically conditioned (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, & Kosterman, 1997), and its cognitive content "focuses explicitly on blacks in particular" (Kinder & Sears, 1981: p. 22). Old-fashioned racism asserts that stereotypes about a group apply to all individuals belonging to that group. If blacks are believed to be inferior to whites, all blacks are considered to be inferior to all whites.

SR is different in that it is based not on a racial superiority theory but a set of beliefs about African-American culture. It is largely founded on the resentment and punitive motives that stem from the convictions that discrimination ended long ago, contemporary inequalities between blacks and whites are a result of blacks' unwillingness to work hard, African Americans demand and receive undeserved attention and benefits from elites and the government, and that black culture violates mainstream American values such as work ethic, traditional family values and lack of respect for traditional authorities (Kinder & Sears, 1981: p. 22). SR ascribes negative stereotypes to blacks, but allows for evaluating individual blacks independently of their group (Sears & Kinder 1971). A person who subscribes to symbolic racism can simultaneously believe that African Americans are lazy on average and hold that this stereotype does not apply to her friends, colleagues or President Obama. SR originates from a blend of anti-Black affect and conservative individualism (Sears & Henry, 2003).

SR is based on abstract stereotypes and hides under the rubric of ideological principles to rationalize opposition to certain policies. However, psychological research shows that symbolic racism has a larger impact on the policy preferences of whites on

“coded” racial issue domains such as welfare, affirmative action and crime than abstract political principles. People who do not load highly on symbolic racism scale are less adamant in their opposition to these policies regardless of their political bent. A study shows that opposition to affirmative action is based more on negative affect toward the groups that benefit from affirmative action than on conservative principles (Reyna, Henry & Tucker, 2006).

In racially charged policy areas, racial attitudes and political ideology are also more important determinants than self-interest (Sidanius, Devereaux & Pratto, 1992). Although SR research is confined to white Americans’ attitudes toward African Americans; there is ample reason to believe that similar belief structures are observable in every society with historically disadvantaged, visible minorities that continue to remain in poverty. However, the US stands alone among developed countries in having a large, previously enslaved, visible minority group that has been a part of the country since its foundation. Nonetheless, Dambrun (2007) finds that in France, when an issue is framed in racial terms, racist attitudes play a large role in supporting punitive laws, which people think will punish racial minorities. Although psychological and political research on the effects of racism on public opinion has led separate lives so far, political science research on public opinion supports the argument that when it comes to welfare, racism is the crux of the opposition toward welfare recipients in the US.

In his study of white Floridians, McDonald (2001) finds that whites rely significantly more on dispositional attributions (lack of motivation) as a cause of black inequality than Hispanic inequality. Martin Gilens’s studies shed light on the possible causes of contemporary stereotypes about African Americans. He suggests that there

exists a link between media representation of the poor and the overwhelmingly negative public perception of African Americans and the poor in the US. The American public believes the ratio of blacks among the poor to be considerably larger than it actually is and those who believe that blacks constitute the majority of the poor are much more likely to oppose welfare (Gilens, 1996a). Gilens surveys print and visual media in the US and demonstrates that this exaggerated perception is not accidental and blacks are significantly overrepresented among the poor in American media. Despite constituting 29% of the poor in the US during the period, approximately 60% of the poor in the sampled media story images were African American (*ibid*). Similarly, Clawson and Kegler (2000) found that African-Americans and Native Americans were drastically overrepresented among the images of the poor in college textbooks.

According to Gilens' research, African Americans are the face of poverty in American media. What commends further attention is the underrepresentation of the "deserving poor" among African Americans in these pictures. Not only are African-Americans disproportionately depicted as poor in the media but also as the underclass and the "undeserving poor." The public finds the working, elderly and sick poor to be more deserving than the nonworking, young and able-bodied poor. However, among the pictures collected by Gilens, the pictures of non-African Americans are more than twice as likely to include working people as those of African Americans; all but one of the elderly poor is white, and only 17% of the poor in the stories on Medicaid - a health insurance program for the qualifying poor - are African American.

We can deduce from this research that contemporary American media frames poverty in a racially-charged manner by hugely overrepresenting African Americans

among the poor and underrepresenting them among the deserving poor, thereby painting poverty as a distinctively African-American phenomenon and reinforcing negative stereotypes about African-American work ethic. Given the long history and pervasiveness of such racist stereotypes about African Americans, this depiction has dramatic consequences for shaping the public opinion on poverty in the US.

The racial framing of the debate on poverty causes many Americans to assume, falsely, that poverty is largely confined to African Americans and that they constitute the majority of welfare recipients. Even welfare recipients underestimate the percentage of white Americans who receive welfare (Bullock, 1999). This assumption, bolstered with the stereotype that African Americans are unwilling to work and therefore dependent on government assistance for their livelihood, reinforces the perception that the cause of black poverty is a lack of personal effort. This belief strengthens the tendency to attribute blame for poverty on individual factors as opposed to social and structural factors.

The color of poverty matters in blame attribution. In Iyengar's study (1990) Americans were more likely to attribute responsibility for poverty to the individual when the individual in question was black, or a single mother than when the individual was white or an unemployed male. A psychological experiment conducted by Hannah and Cafferty (2006) further buttresses this finding. In their experiment, individuals who were shown presentations depicting the poor as white felt stronger that too little was being spent on poverty programs and were more likely to take a flyer about volunteering with a poverty charity than the participants who were shown presentations depicting the poor as black. African-American and white students reacted similarly to the race of the person in the news story, illustrating the power of cultural stereotypes and their impact on blame

attribution and action. Although white Americans tend to have negative views of both black and white mothers receiving welfare benefits, negative views of black welfare mothers increase opposition to welfare more (Gilens, 1996b). Iyengar (1990) also found less support for societal assistance to black single mothers than white single mothers. This difference is likely to emanate from the fear that supporting single black mothers is tantamount to encouraging them to pass on their “immoral culture” and “poor work ethic” to their children.

3.3.3 Framing Welfare and Poverty

Race is not the only factor that shapes the public discourse on poverty in the US. Whether poverty is presented episodically or thematically in the news also bears a significant influence on the causal attribution of responsibility for poverty (Iyengar, 1990). Episodic news stories are event-oriented and they focus on individual stories. In contrast, thematic news stories present contextual information on the topic such as statistics, policy and historical background. In Iyengar’s study, when people watch episodic treatment of poverty on TV with a focus on individuals, they are much more likely to attribute the cause and treatment responsibility of poverty to individual factors than when they watch thematic news. Given that in the period between 1980 and 1985, network news coverage included twice as many episodic stories as thematic stories on poverty, we can safely assume that the coverage of poverty in American media directs the public to attribute the responsibility of poverty to individual factors (*ibid*).

The group-centeredness of public opinion is partially a result of group-centered frames, which focus on the moral shortcomings of the target groups. Nelson and Kinder (1996, p. 1055) show through experiments that “group centrism hinges in part on how

issues are framed in public debate. When issues are framed in ways that draw attention to a policy's beneficiaries, group-centrism increases; when issues are framed in ways that deflect attention away from the beneficiaries, group-centrism declines." As such, frames that emphasize target groups should increase group-centeredness of blame attribution. Welfare recipients are a case in point. The dominant welfare frame in the US presents welfare recipients as people who prefer to avoid work and receive money from the government, and politicians as credulous agents who allow them to abuse the system Gamson and Lasch (1983).

3.3.4 Responsibility Models: Framing of Responsibility

Possession of agency is a prerequisite for accountability and blame attribution. A case for the blamelessness of an individual largely relies on relieving the individual from accountability and blame through the successful construction of a narrative of the lack of agency in a particular situation.

In other words, whether an individual's life condition is portrayed as something that has happened to her as a result of environmental factors outside her control or as something she has done to herself (whether through action or inaction), plays a fundamental role in determining whom or where to assign blame. A person who has committed a crime can be perceived as a victim, when her behavior is convincingly narrated as the inevitable result of her circumstances, while the victim of a crime can be seen as culpable for the crime, when the crime is narrated as the consequence of the "victim's" character defects and irresponsible behavior.

Blameworthiness of an object is largely culturally framed. In the economic sphere blamelessness is a gendered and age-dependent concept. Typically, we would expect

women, children and the elderly to be conceived as victims or benefactors of a destiny determined for them rather than active agents. Adult males, on the other, possess economic agency unlike women and children and are more likely to be blamed for their economic fortunes. This distinction does not have to be rooted in hard facts as long as it fits gender stereotypes in a culture. However, this is a culturally determined distinction and the gender-specific blamelessness has evolved in a surprising direction over time. By all accounts, women were blamed less for their economic hardships and seen as more deserving of aid in the past. However, in contemporary American society, women are viewed as the least deserving group of welfare recipients, more so than healthy, able-bodied men. This is probably the result of decades-long vilification of single mothers, racialization and feminization of poverty (Reese, 2005).

Media representation of poverty and the poor has a significant impact on where the public will assign blame for poverty and what kind of remedies they will support. The contrast between the depiction of poverty in the Great Depression era media and the contemporary media strongly illustrates this effect. The Great Depression is the single most important turning point for the American welfare state, however broadly it is defined. The basic institutions of the American welfare state, from programs that are horizontally distributive such as Social Security to the vertically distributive such as assistance to families in need, were established during and immediately after the Great Depression under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is an unusual period in American history because Roosevelt enjoyed a great amount of public support for the new programs introduced throughout his presidency (Baum & Kernell, 2001).

Retrospectively, the support Roosevelt garnered from the public for his policies and programs to counteract the effects of the Great Depression appears natural to most casual observers, given the severity of economic conditions most of the population faced during the era. However, a more careful inspection reveals that it was not the reality of the Great Depression that brought about this turnaround in public opinion so much as the depiction of it by the political elite and the media. Great Depression was a great depression, but as an economic crisis, it was neither unprecedented nor unique for the American nation, which only half a century earlier in 1873 and again in 1893, had lived through a similar (although admittedly smaller) economic turmoil that had not led to any comparable government intervention. Neither would subsequent economic crises, such as the stagflation of 1970s, lead to the expansion of government programs, and unlike the programs established during the Great Depression era, Great Society programs of 1960s were met with a strong backlash from large parts of the electorate (Lassiter, 2005). What, then, explains the public support for the colossal transformation of the government role during the 1930s?

The political acumen of Roosevelt and his political allies was to turn the Great Depression into an opportunity for garnering support for the establishment of extensive governmental programs from a public that was historically antagonistic to government intervention. In her study Michele L. Landis (1999) explains how this was achieved through the careful construction of a narrative of the Great Depression as a large-scale natural disaster. Simply put, a natural disaster is viewed an act of God that can be neither predicted nor controlled by any individual; hence (as discussed in the previous section) the individual is blameless for the misfortune from which she is suffering. Portraying the

economic situation as a natural disaster essentially transforms the unemployed and displaced populations to “victims” of a situation that is unequivocally outside their control.

This narrative of a natural disaster still retains a strong appeal in the American national discourse. Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein, January 13, 2010, attempted to frame the financial crisis as a natural disaster by drawing an analogy between hurricanes and economic crises during the congressional commission hearings much to the chagrin of chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Phil Angelides. The exchange is a powerful illustration of an attempt to frame an issue so as to deflect responsibility and blame, and a rebuttal:

BLANKFEIN (CEO, Goldman Sachs): After 10 benign years in the context where we were, look, how would you look at the risk of a hurricane?

ANGELIDES: Mr. Blankfein, I must say this, having sat on the Board of the California Earthquake Authority, acts of God we’ll exempt. These were acts of men and women.

BLANKFEIN: I’m just saying...

ANGELIDES: No.

BLANKFEIN: that you’re asking me a question

ANGELIDES: These were controllable is my only observation.

BLANKFEIN: I agree.

(<http://www.npr.org>)

Attributing blame to the structure rather than the individuals was not a ‘natural’ or necessary interpretation of the economic turndown in the aftermath of the 1929 economic crisis. In fact, establishing the narrative required extensive use of imagery that depicted the needy as “blameless and deserving victims” to evoke sympathy for their plight. Landis (1999) lays out how this was achieved by the prudent selection and filtering of

images to be distributed to the media from among photographs taken by the most gifted photographers of the time whose mission was to take photographs that would convey the scale of the depression and draw sympathy to the poor. No detail in these photographs seems coincidental. Photographers focused their lenses on one faceless crowd after another, always waiting peacefully in long lines in front of soup kitchens and unemployment offices. They were, in other words, thematic representations of poverty. There was no place for demonstrators or unruly crowds in these pictures.

If the photographs of crowds were meant to communicate the magnitude of poverty and present it as a societal rather than an individual problem, photographs of individuals were employed to generate sympathy for the “victims” of this natural disaster. The photographers took great care to make sure that the pictured person exuded a sense of pride and dignity. They focused on Caucasian faces, particularly mothers holding their babies, evoking the innocence of Madonna paintings. Pictures of African-Americans and working age males were usually discarded. Most of the family photographs distributed to newspapers excluded older male children and fathers. When the father was included in the photograph, the text provided a long description of the circumstances that led to his unemployment. In contrast, when only the mother and children were in the pictures, little information was provided. The backgrounds in these pictures were neutral and did not include many cues about the person in the photograph (Landis, 1999).

The Roosevelt administration closely scrutinized which photographs would be distributed to the media and what text would accompany each photograph. A most telling example is the iconic image of the Great Depression that has survived to this day, a white mother holding her baby in her arms, looking concerned and exhausted yet dignified. The

readers were not informed that she had seven children, a fact that could have led some to blame this woman for her poverty. Without this information, she was a blameless mother (ibid, pp. 300).

3.3.4.1 Brickman Model of Responsibility

Brickman et al. (1982) develop a two-dimensional model of attribution by separating blame and control attributions for problems and applies this model to the welfare debate. This scheme adds another dimension to the attribution-affect-action theory, and it has different implications.

...the question of moral responsibility can be conceptualized as involving two separate issues—blame and control (cf. Feinberg, 1970). We assign blame to people when we hold them responsible for having created problems. We assign control to people when we hold them responsible for influencing or changing events. In the language of causal attribution, blame and control are not spoken of directly... We need a conceptual framework that makes the questions of blame and control the explicit focus.

(Brickman et al., 1982: 369)

According to this model, one can attribute the blame to an actor but still support action to help her, or attribute the blame to situational factors and still be unwilling to help her. Based on blame attribution for problem and solution, Brickman et al. (1982) identify four attributional models.

Table 2: Brickman Models of Responsibility Attribution

Solution \ Problem	Responsible	Not Responsible
Responsible	Moral Model	Compensatory Model
Not Responsible	Enlightenment Model	Medical Model

In the Moral Model, people are assigned responsibility for both the problem and the solution. In the Medical Model, they are responsible for neither the problem, nor the solution. In the Compensatory Model, they are responsible for the solution even though they are not held responsible for causing the problem. In the Enlightenment Model, they are not responsible for finding a solution, even though they are responsible for causing the problem. Similarly, Iyengar (1989) identifies two dimensions of issue responsibility: causal responsibility and treatment responsibility.

The second dimension of responsibility is crucial to explain ideological and discursive differences that shape people's thinking about welfare policies by qualifying the attribution-affect-action sequence theory. According to this model, attributing the problems a person experiences to dispositional factors does not necessarily mean that people will deny her help. Conversely, attributing a problem to situational factors does not automatically indicate that everybody will support extending assistance to the person. Although attribution-affect-action theory can explain behavior in many situations, it fails to explain why some people help others even if they blame them for their situation, and support policies that assist people regardless of where the blame lies. An asymmetry between attribution and prescription for helping sets Compensatory and Enlightenment models apart from Moral and Medical models, which follow the standard attribution-affect-action sequence.

Let us first examine the moral and medical models from a welfare policy perspective, which fit in with the attributional theory. In the moral model, the poor are responsible for their poverty and difficulties. Therefore, the government is not obliged to help them. In the medical model, the poor are not responsible for their problems,

therefore they should be assisted by the state. These two models use the same attributional paradigm, but they have fundamentally different beliefs about why the poor fall into poverty. People who subscribe to the moral model believe that poverty is caused by individual/dispositional shortcomings. Adherents of the medical model believe that the roots of poverty are to be found in structural injustices. Therefore, it is not surprising that these two models have opposing policy proposals to solve poverty.

Compensatory and Enlightenment models are fundamentally different from Moral and Medical models in that they focus on the solution responsibility rather than problem responsibility. In these models, attribution is divorced from recommended action. Compensatory model posits that the poor are not to be blamed for their problems, but argues that they should nonetheless be expected to take care of themselves and not demand any aid from the government. This model is familiar to many people because parents often evoke compensatory principles in dealing with their children. When children complain about the unfairness of a situation, many parents tell them to take responsibility and solve the problem, even if they had no fault in causing it. The focus is not on fairness and deservingness, therefore there is no point in determining which party is to blame. This model emphasizes the importance of finding an effective solution to the problem at hand and is predicated on the belief that problems can best be solved by the agent experiencing the problem. In the case of poverty, the agents are the poor themselves. The poor should help themselves, not because they are responsible for their poverty, but because self-help is a more effective solution to poverty than welfare assistance.

Enlightenment model also concentrates on the solution, but contrary to the Compensatory model, it insists that the poor cannot overcome poverty without outside assistance. As in the Compensatory Model, whether poverty can be attributed to laziness, or discrimination is irrelevant. What informs this model is the conviction that the only effective solution to poverty is governmental and societal help to the poor. People who use Compensatory and Enlightenment models in approaching poverty are not motivated by a desire to give people what they deserve. By focusing on the most effective solution to the problem of poverty, they ignore deservingness considerations. When politicians talk about not playing the blame game, they are asking their audiences to employ a Compensatory or Enlightenment model.

People use different responsibility models in different domains of life. In politics, models we use vary according to the issue. Framing can be used to change the model people employ to evaluate an issue. In the case of poverty and welfare policies, I hypothesize that we will locate leftist discourses, which use Medical and Enlightenment models, while rightist discourses will use Moral and Compensatory discourses.

3.4 Deservingness

What am I, Governors both? I ask you, what am I? I'm one of the undeserving poor: that's what I am. Think of what that means to a man. It means that he's up agen middle class morality all the time. If there's anything going, and I put in for a bit of it, it's always the same story: "You're undeserving; so you can't have it." But my needs is as great as the most deserving widow's that ever got money out of six different charities in one week for the death of the same husband. I don't need less than a deserving man: I need more. I don't eat less hearty than him; and I drink a lot more. I want a bit of amusement, cause I'm a thinking man. I want cheerfulness and a song and a band when I feel low. Well, they charge me just the same for everything as they charge the deserving. What is middle class morality? Just an excuse for never giving me anything. Therefore, I ask you, as two gentlemen, not to play that game on me. I'm playing straight with you. I ain't pretending to be deserving. I'm undeserving; and I mean to go on being undeserving. I like it; and that's the truth.

(Bernard Shaw, Pygmalion)

The results are somewhat surprising: wealth, race and schooling are important to the inheritance of economic status, but IQ is not a major contributor, and, as we have seen above, the genetic transmission of IQ is even less important. A policymaker seeking to level the playing field might use these results to design interventions that would loosen the connection between the economic success of parents and the economic prospects of their children.

(Bowles and Gintis, 2002, p. 22)

The belief that we are each responsible for our own fates is a major impediment to redistribution wherever that belief occurs...And in the West, it is the dispositional theories that prevail (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, pp.30, 31)...even though as a general explanation of behavior it is usually false...

International research over the last three decades shows that deservingness criteria and ranking of groups according to deservingness shows a surprising cross-cultural consistency and is unrelated to welfare regime type or spending (Coughlin, 1980; Petterson, 1995; Van Oorschot 2000; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Coughlin labels these shared attitudes “a universal dimension of support”, while Van Oorschot (2006) calls it “a common and fundamental deservingness culture” in Europe. I challenge the assertion that there is a universal order of deservingness of groups that shows no variation across cultures. While people may use the same criteria for judging deservingness, application of identical criteria can lead to very disparate judgments in different countries due to the effects of national discourse, frames and historical status of the groups in question. I hypothesize that deservingness is a cultural construction and it varies among nations.

The five shared deservingness criteria according to van Oorschot are control, need, identity, attitude and reciprocity for targets of governmental assistance (van Oorschot, 2005). Issue of control, that is, to what degree the poor are in control of their situation, is the most significant criterion. Concepts of “control” and “locus of responsibility” both refer to blame attribution, and research in different national contexts

support the thesis that the designation of blame is the central factor in determining deservingness. For example, Americans' views on supporting the poor are also affected by their judgments on where the "locus of responsibility"(control) lies (Cook, 1980). Whether an American attributes blame for poverty on society or on individuals has a more statistically significant and consistent effect on her poverty policy preferences and presidential approval on these policies than both ideology and party identification (Iyengar, 1990). Similarly, in Germany, the deservingness ratings of target groups are influenced by responsibility for neediness (attribution) along with likability (affect), and the respondent's Belief in a Just World (Appelbaum, 2002).

Van Oorschot finds that across Europe, the elderly are seen as the most deserving group followed by sick and disabled people, and the unemployed, while immigrants are rated as the least deserving group (van Oorschot, 2000, 2006, 2008). Americans are more likely to support giving aid to the poor when they are in economic need (e.g. having more children or having a disability) and have more motivation (e.g. looking for a job), but less likely to do so when they do not approve of the moral behaviour of the poor (e.g. having a child out of wedlock) (Iyengar, 1990). Disability and effort are important in that they lead people to attribute the target's poverty to situational factors. Moral criteria are significant in deciding who is deserving of help because they influence affect toward the group target and they also help people make attributional judgments. If a woman is poor because she had children out-of-wedlock, some people can explain away her poverty as a result of her poor moral character (disposition). If need alone were enough to elicit sympathy, single mothers, who are the most needy category, would receive more sympathy from Americans. If the decision to have more children than one can afford to

take care of is adequate to elicit negative attributional judgments, families with many children would not receive any sympathy from the public. This inconsistency can only be explained by the differing levels of affect the public feels for the target groups due to historical and discursive elements in the political culture.

Table 3: Deservingness and Undeservingness by Group and Country

Country	Deserving			Undeserving		
	Sweden	Germany	USA	Sweden	Germany	USA
Children	-	16	11	-	1	0
Disabled people	11	9	29	3	0	2
Elderly poor	5	24	22	2	2	2
Families with many children	2	7	2	21	5	11
Recent immigrants	2	1	0	24	45	40
Disadvantaged minority groups	3	2	0	1	5	10
Others	6	2	3	27	19	19
Severely sick people	23	11	12	0	1	1
Single mothers	20	23	1	3	2	4
Students	3	2	1	9	10	5
Unemployed people	13	0	8	2	4	3
Working poor	7	0	10	3	3	2
Total	95	97	99	95	97	99

In my study, I test deservingness judgments by asking the respondents to rank the deservingness and the undeservingness of social groups that are typically dependent on governmental assistance. 100 respondents from each country -selected to maximize socioeconomic and demographic diversity- are asked to pick the most deserving and most undeserving groups from among those listed.¹³ Drawing a distinction between “least

¹³ Some respondents did not answer the question. The number of respondents that answered is 95 in

deserving” and “most undeserving” proves to be consequential for rankings, and brings a new dimension to the deservingness debate. If a country diverges significantly from the other two in its assessment of the deservingness (or undeservingness) of a group, it is marked in red. The groups that are ranked as most deserving and most undeserving are bolded.

A majority of American respondents view the disabled and the elderly poor as the most deserving groups. Swedish respondents, on the other hand, believe that severely sick people and single mothers are the most deserving. German respondents find the elderly poor and single mothers as more deserving than other groups. The biggest rift on deservingness is on single mothers. While over 20% percent of respondents from Europe believe that single mothers are the most deserving group of all, there is only one respondent from the US who shares this belief¹⁵. The second group that creates a significant division is the elderly poor. Approximately 5% of the Swedish respondents, as opposed to 24% of the Germans and 22% of the Americans believe that the elderly poor are the most deserving group.

The low ranking of the elderly on deservingness scale contradicts van Oorschot’s findings on the “common” European culture of deservingness. Swedes are also much more likely to believe that severely sick people deserve help than Germans and Americans. Moreover, not a single German respondent selected the unemployed or the

Sweden, 97 in Germany and 99 in the US.

¹⁵ Due to a programming error, “children” were not included as an option in Swedish questionnaires. Children are rarely, if ever, seen as undeserving. Thus, the omission is highly unlikely to have affected the results in the “undeserving” column. However, it has probably altered the rankings in the deserving column in Sweden. Four groups are ranked as highly deserving as Swedes: severely sick people, single mothers, unemployed people and disabled people. Of these four groups, “single mothers” is the most likely designation for the people who would otherwise pick children. The safest assumption is that the majority of the people who would pick children as the most deserving group in Sweden picked “single mothers” as a proxy, since single mothers are deserving by the virtue of being caretakers of children.

working poor as the most deserving groups. These findings support my hypothesis that deservingness criteria are not universal. For example, according to these rankings, single mothers are exceptionally unpopular in the US, Germans are particularly unsympathetic to the plight of the unemployed, and Swedes are not as concerned about the elderly as the other two nations. These differences are not a fluke; they signal the national differences in the culture of deservingness. German welfare state suffers from chronic high unemployment and the high number of people who receive unemployment benefits. American discourse vilifies single mothers as I discussed in this chapter. Swedes may not see elderly as vulnerable due to the strong, universal safety net for the elderly.

Immigrants are the most unpopular group in all three countries, which is in line with other surveys, but the similarities with surveys end there. Van Oorschot (2008) finds that solidarity towards immigrants is higher in culturally more diverse countries. In this study, however, the percentage of American and German respondents who ranked immigrants as undeserving are almost twice as high as that of the Swedes, even though the US is by far the most culturally diverse of the three countries, and Sweden is very homogenous.

The second most undeserving group in Germany and the US is “others”, displaying the relative difficulty of assigning undeservingness as opposed to deservingness to a group. Swedes particularly avoid labeling any of the listed groups as undeserving. 27 of the 95 Swedes picked “others” as the most undeserving group in Sweden, making this the most popular category.

I argue that the differences in the findings on deservingness in this study are a result of the method. First of all, it reveals that deservingness and undeservingness are

different concepts. Just because a group is not seen as deserving, it does not necessarily mean that it is seen as “undeserving”. There is a neutral area into which many social groups fall. Requiring people to choose one “most deserving” and one “most undeserving” group forces them to think about different criteria, employ different principles of justice in their assessment. Deservingness appears to reflect considerations of “need”. The most needy groups are generally selected as the most deserving ones. However, when the same respondents are asked to rank undeservingness of groups, they tend to focus more on out-groups, and they turn to contribution (desert) principle of justice.

Immigrants suffer from the undeservingness criteria most prominently. They are distant out-groups and as such most of the economic problems they face are likely to be attributed to their dispositional attributes, such as unwillingness to work hard or to integrate. Moreover, many people may see them as contributing little to society, while taking advantage of social assistance. Therefore, immigrants activate most negative out-group attributions, and they are judged by desert criteria, which puts them at double disadvantage.

In Sweden, the third most undeserving group (following “others” and immigrants) is families with many children. This group is ranked as the most undeserving by 21 Swedish respondents, but in other countries big families are not seen as undeserving by many people. The Swedish animosity toward these families may be a result of the fact that Swedish welfare state assumes a big portion of the expenses of child rearing, but the more likely explanation is that “families with many children” is a coded anti-immigrant word in the Swedish discourse, and this group acts as a proxy for immigrants. This is a

plausible explanation because on average ethnic Swedes and European immigrants in Sweden do not have many children. That would also explain why the undeservingness ranking of recent immigrants is exceptionally low compared to other countries. If this is the case, it means that there are many Swedes who find it politically unacceptable to talk negatively about immigrants, but nonetheless feel a strong resentment toward this group. This would be similar to the anti-black affect in the US.

Finally, (university) students are seen as undeserving by 9 Swedish and 10 German respondents. This is likely to be a result of the application of the contribution criteria as well. University students receive free education, go on to take high-earning jobs (compared to high school graduates) and during their studies they do not contribute much to the welfare of society. However, they use up many resources (and many receive social assistance). Moreover, their poverty is often temporary, and they tend to come from middle class and upper class families. Thus, the combination of desert and need criteria make European university students appear as undeserving of social assistance.

In summary, my findings suggest that when deservingness is framed negatively as “undeservingness” rankings of deservingness change considerably. Moreover, when people are forced to pick one deserving/undeserving group, and when those groups include culturally relevant target groups, rankings differ even among post-industrial countries. These results support my assertion that there is no universal ranking of deservingness and national political discourse has a significant impact on which groups are deemed as deserving of assistance. The next chapter examines everyday discourses on the welfare state in Germany, Sweden and the US.

Chapter 4. Focus Group Study

To explore variations in national discourses, I conduct focus group discussions in Germany, Sweden and the US. The following section explains the focus group research design. Second section presents the findings and discourse-analyzes them. The third section is a brief overview of the findings.

4.1 Research Design

Focus group interview is a qualitative research method in which an instructor, acting as moderator, interviews a group of research participants. However, focus group interview is different from standard interview technique in the sense that the emphasis shifts from the interaction between interviewer and interviewees to the interaction among participants (Morgan, 1988:9,18). Therefore, a focus group is not simply an interview with multiple interviewees. It is a discussion among research participants moderated by an instructor, who provides the topics to be discussed to the participants, opens the discussion with questions and intervenes only minimally, since the goal of the method is to generate discussions that mirror conversations in natural settings.

The stress on intra-group discussion is the main advantage of conducting focus group research in comparison to interviews. Interaction among participants leads to a higher degree of participation and brings out more spontaneous responses from group members than would be the case in a structured interview (Bellenger, 1976), allowing the researcher to explore topics and generate hypotheses by gaining a deeper insight into the participants' stated positions and accessing their natural vocabularies on the topic (Levy, 1979). The disadvantage of the method is the limits it imposes on the ability of the researcher to control the direction of the discussion and the content of the consequent

data (Morgan, 1988:21). Furthermore, focus group research does not provide generalizable data. However, focus groups can be employed not only “as self-contained means of data collection,” but also “as one of several components in a larger research program” (Morgan, 1988:9).

Although most of the scholarly research on public deliberation has focused on the political elite, casual political discussions are crucial to help individuals understand and interpret politics. Walsh calls these “perspectives” which are the lenses through which people view issues.

4.2 Findings

This section presents findings of focus group discussions. First, I summarize the discussions in thematic order. Next, I illustrate how people express ideas, which they believe to be unpopular, by prefacing them with qualifying statements to make their utterances acceptable to others. Finally, I focus on the differences in metaphors and imagery several key concepts evoke in different national discourses.

Three focus groups in Germany and the US and four focus groups in Sweden were conducted in this study. Each group consisted of four to six people. Each group debated for one hour. Some groups were gathered using fliers that were distributed in city centers (Heidelberg, Germany and Stockholm, Sweden). In these groups, most of the discussants did not know each other prior to the discussion. These groups were very diverse bringing together people from many different age groups, ethnicities, socio-economic backgrounds, educational levels, sexes and ideologies. They were paid for their participation, although some of them tried to decline the payment (and in one case, gave the money to other participants who were in need). Other groups were composed of

discussants who were friends, neighbors or relatives with each other (Athens, Georgia, USA and Philadelphia, PA, USA). These participants were contacted through informal networks. Some of them were paid for their participation and others volunteered. Each group was diverse in age, sex, and ideology. Most groups had socioeconomic diversity, while some consisted of people from similar socioeconomic backgrounds.

Regardless of the nationality and composition of the group, discussions were very lively and cordial. It was not difficult to elicit discussion and often, the participants were reluctant to end the debate. In groups where there were working-class participants and recipients of government assistance, some participants became so overwhelmed with emotion that they cried, revealing how personal the topic can be.

In the US, I acted as the moderator. In Germany and Sweden, native-speakers were hired as moderators. In every country, the moderator asked similar questions without any reference to specific government programs, persons, parties or political events. The questions were very general, pertaining to the basic principles of economic justice and government role in the economy and to certain functions of the welfare state such as taxation and health care. We tried to ask as few questions as possible, directing questions only when necessary to continue the conversation, change to a new topic or to steer the group back to the subject.

Well-educated participants tended to stay on topic and discuss more general issues, very rarely requiring intervention from the moderator, whereas the participants with lower educational levels tended to relay their personal experiences rather than talk about general principles. Participants with very low educational levels, particularly in the US, posed a problem since they were unable to understand and respond to certain

questions, due to either vocabulary limitations or their relative lack of opinion on some issues. For instance, the respondents in an American group were not familiar with the word “economic.” This group consisted of native speakers who were taking literacy courses, although all of them had attended school for over 6 years and some of them had graduated from high school. In any future focus group debate involving preliterate subjects and complex political topics, I would recommend considering the information and vocabulary limitations of preliterate participants in preparing directions and questions. This group was different from all other groups in that the participants admitted that they did not know enough to form an opinion on the topic and did not answer some of the questions. This may be a result of their self-consciousness about their educational level, or it may be a result of questions targeting functionally literate groups.

Swedish focus groups generated far more discussion than the focus groups in Germany and the US. This was largely due to the differences in discussion styles. German and American participants tended to talk longer when it was their turn and waited for others to finish before taking turns, whereas in Swedish groups the discussions were much more dynamic. It was expected, yet remarkable how very similar questions led to utterly different venues of discussion in different countries. What was also interesting was how similar and almost repetitive the discussions were among the different groups within each country.

4.2.1 Discussion Topics

In Germany, unemployment was the single most important issue, dominating every conversation followed by complaints about immigration, aging of the population, corporate greed and inefficiencies in government bureaucracy, while in Sweden

immigration, health care, equality, the Swedish model, taxation, government regulation, and welfare cheating were the most discussed topics. In the US, health care, government role, equality, immigration, welfare cheating and individual responsibility were the most commonly discussed topics. It is remarkable that while unemployment was not a topic in the US, individual responsibility was discussed only in the US. Anti-market sentiment was very strong in Germany and somewhat strong in Sweden, while no such sentiment existed in the US discussions except in the context of the health care industry. There was no allusion to religion outside the US. There were strong anti-immigrant and anti-minority attitudes in all three countries. Only in Sweden this was balanced by equally strong pro-immigration attitudes.

Many German and Swedish participants expressed a longing for the “golden age” of the welfare state, in which they believed everything functioned well, and they voiced concerns about the future, even if they thought the welfare state was functioning well in the present. There was no nostalgia for a past golden age, or any concern regarding the future of the welfare state in the US except for the Social Security program. Germans were particularly concerned that the aging population and high unemployment levels increased the costs and decreased the revenue sources of the social state. Swedish participants often compared their welfare state to those of other European countries and the USA. Even though they were generally critical of the Swedish welfare system, many believed that it performed better than those of other countries. Some Swedish participants believed that the welfare state had grown too much and a large segment of the population had become dependent on it for either employment or benefits. Some participants were unhappy with the growing size and cost of social entitlements, which they stated, was the

cause of increases in the taxation rates for higher income levels. Germans expressed the concern that their social state did worse than other countries. Some of them singled out Sweden as the example of a good social state. Both in Germany and Sweden, participants evoked the US health care model as a scare story, giving the exact same example of being asked about insurance in an emergency room or hospital. Although some Swedes were very critical of the lack of welfare services in the US, some of them admired the relative weakness of government regulation in the American economy.

A complete lack of individualist statements in Germany contrasted sharply with Sweden and the US. There were no references to individualism or freedom in German discussions. Participants in the US and Sweden often stressed the importance and desirability of individual freedoms. In the US, participants praised the American system for providing freedom to citizens, whereas in Sweden some participants complained that the Swedish state punished economic success with high taxes, while Swedish society did the same by expecting the rich and successful to act and spend modestly.

Living up to the cultural stereotypes, debates on equality dominated Swedish discussions. However, contrary to what one might expect in a predominantly social democratic country, there were deep divisions and very diverse perspectives on equality in Sweden. While some complained that the Swedish model had overreached in its efforts to create equality, that the Swedish government and society discouraged personal ambition and sacrificed individualism by suppressing individual differences for the good of the masses, others disagreed vehemently. This group argued that the Swedish model had failed to create an equal society despite paying lip service to the notion of equality and had created a class society with elites at the top and marginalized poor at the bottom.

Some participants voiced opposition to policies, taxes and institutions aimed at increasing equality, arguing that too much equality stifled economic progress, while most participants argued that equality was desirable, and society and the state should strive for it. Furthermore, Swedish participants not only referred to economic egalitarianism in their discussions but also to gender, democratic and ethnic equality, and perhaps most surprisingly, the equal treatment of people with disabilities, a topic that was brought up in two Swedish groups, but in no German or American group.

What was remarkable was the fact that regardless of the topic – identity, welfare state, immigration, taxation, health care or women’s rights – Swedish discussions revolved around the question of equality. As I will demonstrate in the next section, sometimes participants who made anti-egalitarian arguments qualified them with egalitarian statements, whereas those who advanced egalitarian arguments did so without any qualifications. Participants who were critical of the egalitarianism of the Swedish state and society did not argue against the principle of redistribution and government efforts to create a more equal economic environment. Their arguments generally targeted the level rather than the principle of redistribution and government intervention.

Swedish and German discussants made no distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. References to equality indirectly defined it as “equality of outcome”, or confounded the two definitions, whereas a sharp distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome shaped the debate on equality in the US. American participants emphasized the desirability of equality of opportunity, legal equality and nondiscrimination – tenets of weak meritocracy – but opposed equality

of outcome. Some participants also opposed all forms of redistribution and argued that redistribution was unjust.

There were not many direct references to equality in Germany, although most German participants indirectly articulated their support for egalitarian policies when discussing topics such as health care and unemployment. The moderator asked questions about social justice (*soziale Gerechtigkeit*) alongside the word equality (*Gleichheit*) since the latter is rarely employed in Germany in reference to economic equality. Some participants criticized egalitarian policies, particularly the ones they perceived to assist immigrants and minorities.

What was remarkably similar in all three countries was the hostility toward immigrants and minorities. It was the hot button issue in every country that generated the most discussion. In Germany and the US, almost no pro-immigrant arguments were made. All statements were directly or indirectly hostile, at best neutral, toward immigrants. In Sweden, opinion on immigration was divided. While some participants saw a multicultural society as valuable and blamed the Swedish state and society for failing to accept and integrate immigrants, others raised concerns about the self-isolating behavior of immigrant communities and criticized their refusal to integrate. There was, however, general agreement that immigration policies were not successful.

A crucial point in this study is how “native citizens” see immigrants with regard to the welfare state. In the US, there was considerable resentment among some against minorities and illegal immigrants based on the charge that they were a drain on scarce government sources and taxpayers, and received unfairly preferential treatment from the government. Other Americans did not debate the virtues or vices of immigration and did

not talk about immigrants. Immigration appeared to be a non-issue for liberal discussants within the context of the welfare state.

The definition of an “immigrant” changed from country to country, too. All Americans made a distinction between native-born minorities (mostly African-Americans) and immigrants. In Sweden some participants made the distinction between Nordic (Scandinavian), Western European and “other” immigrants. Some explicitly stated that they did not refer to Nordic people when they talked about immigrants and other participants agreed. Germans made a distinction between German immigrants from former Communist countries and other immigrants (mostly Turks). In Germany and Sweden, the word “immigrant” did not refer only to the people who had immigrated to the country, but also to those who were born there as children of immigrants as Swedish citizens. Similar to Americans, Germans voiced their resentment along with complaints about high welfare cheating and welfare abuse among immigrants (including immigrants of German descent from former Soviet Republics). Germans were also concerned with the lack of integration of immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, into German society. In Sweden, discussions mostly revolved around integration problems, cultural differences and discriminatory practices. One group blamed the government for giving too much to immigrants and blamed immigrants for isolating themselves from Swedish society, while another group blamed the government for doing too little for the immigrants and blamed Swedes for discriminating against and isolating immigrants from mainstream society. There were many complaints about welfare abuse and cheating, but these complaints targeted Swedes as much as immigrants. In this respect Swedes were different from other nationalities.

There was significant anti-tax sentiment in all countries. There was evidence of a strong tax-backlash in Sweden. Sweden has one of the most progressive tax systems in the world, if we exclude the value-added tax. Some upper-class Swedish participants were very critical of progressive taxation, high rates of income, sales and inheritance taxes. One participant referred to them as “untenable” and “immoral.” They argued that tax money does not go back to citizens but feeds an ever growing, inefficient and incompetent public sector that does not want to lose its grip over citizens. There was frequent reference to the limitations taxation and state regulation impose on individual freedoms. This translated into an anti-egalitarian sentiment as well. Respondents felt that the government was crossing the border in its desire to achieve economic equality in society, putting effective ceilings on incomes by discouraging economic achievement, and preventing people from realizing their potentials, getting returns on their investments and getting rich. There was a long non sequitur about whether Swedes went too far when they considered forcing hairdressers to charge men and women the same amount for their haircuts.

However, most of the Swedish participants felt positively about the social state. Some felt that taxes were going back to society, funding beneficial and desirable programs. Women were particularly supportive of state programs designed to give flexibility to working parents (more specifically, mothers) by providing day-long school education to students and subsidizing kindergartens for younger children. There was almost universal support for these programs, and many participants expressed contentment and pride in the way the Swedish welfare state enables women to work and have a family at the same time. This was also one area in which Swedes felt their system

was superior to others. One male discussant complained about the negative impact of such programs on family life by contending that when the government school system takes care of the children and both parents work fulltime, parents and children are estranged and family life disintegrates. Some participants raised similar concerns about the care of the elderly.

In Germany, some participants opposed high taxes and some criticized progressive taxation, while others supported flat rate taxation. In the US, some participants opposed all income tax, and proposed to replace all income tax with sales tax and some criticized the loopholes for the rich in the tax system.

In Germany, the sense of dissatisfaction with the current system was almost universal. While there was support for a prominent government role in economy and the provision of citizen welfare in principle, there was also strong resentment toward the inertia, ineffectiveness and arbitrariness of the existing welfare system. Discussants complained about the bureaucracy in general and unemployment agencies in particular. What set Germans apart from the Swedish and the Americans, however, was their pervasive distrust in and distaste for market economy. Participants repeatedly complained that big companies and the managerial class have too much influence over politics and that the free market rewards selfish actions, even when such actions harm the public interest. Discussants argued that this conflicted with the principle of the social economy and proposed to increase government regulation to curb market power. Swedish discussants voiced similar sentiments on a few occasions and American discussants did not criticize the free market at all, except with regard to health insurance companies. In

the aftermath of the current global economic recession, the attitudes of the American public toward the markets may have shifted.

4.2.2 Qualifiers

Discourse theorists contend that dominant discourses set limits on the speech of subjects by making natural and thereby legitimizing certain opinions and delegitimizing others. Subjects can avoid negative sanctions only through the use of special strategies when they put forth arguments that challenge the dominant ideology. In this section, I attempt to provide an example of one such ‘strategy’ and illustrate how dominant discourses shape discussions by drawing the borders of acceptable and natural opinions. The tactic I examine here is that of qualifying an argument that challenges the dominant discourse, by prefacing it with an argument that is supportive of the discourse. Subjects try to avoid expected negative sanctions by claiming support for a principle and then criticizing certain aspects of it. They first align themselves with the perceived opinion of larger society, and only then proceed to challenge it. In a sense, they add disclaimers to their arguments. The following example drawn from a focus group discussion in Sweden illustrates this strategy:

Qualifier: “Society is kind of like a family. The parents need to take care of the children up to a certain level.”

Main argument: “After that, one has to let them go and let them live on their own. In Sweden, we have kindly taken care of the citizens, but politicians and bureaucrats like to have influence over them, but I think we should see, if we could loosen the grip on the citizens a little.”

The main argument of this statement is that the government should loosen its grip over citizens. However, the participant feels the need to explain that he in fact defends government support for citizens in principle, but that the government has gone too far in the application of this principle. He reinforces this qualification by saying “a little” in the end. Note that he could have said “politicians and bureaucrats like to have influence over them, but I think we should see, if we could loosen the grip on the citizens,” but chooses to qualify the statement, presumably to make the argument more acceptable.

4.2.2.1 Sweden

In Sweden, almost all qualifiers stated support for egalitarian principles or a strong welfare state and then challenged it. Some of these qualifiers were apologetic. Below are some examples:

Qualifier: “I may be very liberal” (meaning pro-free market in Swedish politics),

Main argument: “but I do think it is important that you don’t hinder an individual from making a choice of their own.”

The speaker is stating that he is aware of the unpopularity of his stance by acknowledging that he may be very liberal and only then makes a pro-market argument.

Qualifier: “Of course the national social insurance is good,”

Main argument: “but it is **almost a little** too much.”

Not only does the sentence start with a qualifier, but also the following declaration that national social insurance is too much is preceded with two adverbs, “almost” and “a little”, that water down the strength of the assertion.

Qualifier: “The government should give you possibilities,”

Main argument: “but they should not help too much in a way that they are always there behind you. You have to do it yourself.”

Second qualifier: “But on the other hand, it is good that they exist, as a social safety net.”

Continuation of the main argument: “But in the end I think it should be the individual who decides what should happen. You should control your own situation.”

Here the statement starts with a qualifier and in the middle of the statement is a second qualifier, in which the speaker offers limits to his argument.

Qualifier: “It is good that the government wants to care for people,”

Main argument: “but it is taken too far.”

As in the previous statements, the speaker declares his support for the principle of government intervention before providing a criticism of the extent of this intervention.

Qualifier: “The idea of the welfare state is good,”

Main argument: “but it is abused way too much. You ask yourself why it is so; all people are actually dishonest in some way, that’s an established fact.”

In this statement, the speaker seems to offer a fundamental critique of the welfare state by arguing that the dishonesty in human nature makes the abuse of the welfare state inevitable. Yet, he still starts his statement with the suggestion that “the idea of the welfare state is good.”

There was only one statement in Swedish that prefaced an anti-market statement with a pro-market qualifier:

Qualifier: “It is so typical to involve the market in all of it, **which I don’t mind at all. On the contrary, take the step if it is profitable and cheaper than having employees,**”

Main argument: “but they don’t look to whether it really is good...”

The speaker criticizes the free market ideology, but qualifies his argument by saying that he is not opposed to it in principle.

This pattern is an indication that Swedish participants who made anti-welfare state statements felt that they were putting forth arguments that fell outside the boundaries of what is natural and acceptable in the dominant Swedish discourse. It is important to note that there were also many pro-market, anti-welfare state and anti-egalitarian statements that were not prefaced with any qualifiers. However, what is more important is the fact that there was not a single instance of a participant who qualified an egalitarian, pro-welfare state or communitarian argument, pointing to the naturalized status of egalitarian, pro-welfare state and communitarian ideology, although this naturalization appears to be far from complete and under attack from competing discourses.

4.2.2.2 Germany

German participants used very few qualifiers. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze which discourse is perceived as natural by subjects. This may be an indication of the lack of a naturalized, dominant discourse on the social state and market ideology in Germany.

4.2.2.3 USA

The pattern of qualifiers in the American statements were almost the exact opposite of the Swedish pattern. A majority of the qualifiers were used by participants whose statements were either egalitarian or in support of an active government role. These statements were prefaced by pro-market, anti-government qualifiers or qualifiers that espoused individual responsibility. Below are some examples of this type of statements:

Qualifier: “I’m all for doing things as efficiently as possible and through the market,”

Main argument: “but you cannot run something like health care industry purely on a profit motive.”

The speaker starts his statement by assuring the other discussants that he is strongly in favor of market solutions to the extent that it is possible. Therefore, he is implying that health care is an exception to the principle that things should be done through the market, but he is not challenging the principle. He concludes that health care, a special case, should not be provided on a profit basis, but he also qualifies this statement by adding the adverb “purely”. He is not opposed to profit in the health care sector, but he is opposed to it being purely based on profit.

Qualifier: “I don’t think there is any system that could perfectly solve the problem of providing equal opportunity to everyone,”

Main argument: “but you need to have a system that is at least trying.”

The main argument is that the system should try to provide equal opportunity to everyone, but it is qualified by the statement that no system can solve the problem.

Qualifier: “Even though there may be individual sources for why you end up where you are,”

Main argument: “I think it’s mostly the environment. If that’s the case, then it’s just a luck-of-the-draw where you end up.”

The speaker believes that inequalities are mostly caused by environmental factors (rather than individual failings), an idea that is deeply at odds with the American ideal of self-made individuals, but he prefaces this argument with the caveat that there may be individual factors that affect the outcome.

There were also some qualifiers that prefaced arguments in favor of individual responsibility as in the following statement. This suggests that while individual responsibility discourse is an important part of the American discourse, it faces competition from rival discourses:

Qualifier: “You may not be responsible for your illness. It can happen to anyone,”

Main argument: “but it is still your responsibility to take care of your family and take precautions.”

The main point of the statement is that one is responsible for taking care of himself and his family, regardless of who is at fault for the situation. The speaker emphasizes that the sick may not be responsible for their illness, but insists that this does not absolve them of their responsibilities.

4.2.3 Key Concepts

In this section, I analyze two politically charged concepts and the differences in their usage in the discussions: state and society. Discussants frequently resorted to

metaphors when they talked about state and society. These metaphors reflected profound differences in the way nations perceived what the proper role of the state was, how they viewed themselves in relation to the state, and what the meaning and function of society was.

In Swedish discussions, the word ‘state’ was mostly used in connection with the welfare state. The welfare state had four symbolic constructions in discussions: an organism, medicine, a parasite and a material possession. The first analogy represents the welfare state as a biological organism that is alive, reaches a level of maturity and ceases to exist (die) in the future. A second analogy is the welfare state as medicine, which has both positive effects and (negative) side effects on society. A third analogy is the welfare state as a parasite that eats up the resources of its host. A final analogy is the welfare state as a material good that one possesses. When the word state was used independently of the term welfare state, it was evoked exclusively as a parent and citizens were portrayed as children. In this formulation, the state is often a good, nurturing parent and occasionally an overbearing “helicopter” parent. As a nurturing parent, the state observes what is wrong with society, fixes problems, takes care of its citizens and supports weaker ones, and loses money because of corrupt citizens (bad children). As an overbearing parent, the state is a well-meaning and good parent for adolescents, but suffocates its adult children by not letting go of them.

In German discussions, the state was almost exclusively framed as a parent. German discussants made a distinction between the state as it ought to be and the state as it is. The ideal state was generally described as a nurturing parent that should take care of its “children”, which are citizens and markets. In this way, it is different from the

Swedish conception where the children were citizens and society but not markets. The state helps them when they are in difficulty, and gives them financial support when they are in need. However, German participants described the actual state negatively, either as a negligent or controlling parent. The state as a negligent parent is selfish and greedy, ignoring the condition of its citizens, and does nothing to alleviate the problems of a changing society, while the state as a controlling parent regulates too much and imposes its unreasonable preferences on citizens. In only one instance, the word state referred directly to an organization. The word state was also used in the phrase “social state” and as a synonym for nation.

In the US, the word “state” always referred to administrative units of the United States. Thus, instead, I examined the occurrence of the word “government”. Unlike in Sweden and Germany, the word government had no imagery or metaphors attached to it, but the meaning of the word changed dramatically from group to group. In the white and rural group, government was referred to as a unitary actor, and it was a symbolic, vague entity, and there was a struggle over the role of the government among political parties in this narrative wherein the Democratic party tried to expand the government much to the consternation of some participants. In this depiction, the government is only good when it has a limited role (although where those limits are change from person to person). In the liberal, white group, the government was depicted as a unitary and vague institution, too. In this portrayal, the role of the government was shaped by what the American people demanded and was much more limited than what the participants desired (although the limits they desired changed as well).

I will discuss the meaning of the word government in one American group separately. The African-American, pre-literate focus group was unique not only among American groups but among all focus groups in its portrayal of the government. It is probably because this group included only minority members who were poor and low levels of education, creating a powerful narrative of powerlessness and exclusion. The participants sometimes referred to the government as “they”. They frequently talked about specific state (and occasionally federal) agencies instead of a singular, abstract “government”. The government was depicted as a collection of mostly local agencies and government agents that held power over ordinary, powerless communities of which these participants were a part. This was a completely different formulation from the portrayals of white, middle-class groups, which defined societal actors as the (federal) government, society, families and individuals. For this inner-city group, however, the ontological categories were “those in power”, their community and other communities, with little reference to society or individuals.

Almost all examples and references in this discussion were based on specific, personal experiences instead of abstract political opinions about the government. Policemen, social workers, courts, politicians were mentioned as government agents. The government represented a power that extended to everyone, every group and every category that was a part of this structure, such as the media, laws, practices and regulations. Participants expressed a paternal understanding of the government wherein they saw themselves as powerless and the government as powerful, mean, scary and stingy, but they mentioned that the government had been more benevolent in the past and had become stingy toward them over time. They also resented that the government was

more generous toward other groups, defined as other racial and ethnic minorities (but whites were not mentioned). The participants voiced a desire for a more generous government that provided more social services but was less punitive and intrusive.

Like the term welfare state, society took on multiple associations in Swedish discussions. While some discussion participants talked about it as a family that took care of its members, others saw it as a community that could be entered (not born into) and was shared. The discussants also invoked the imagery of a functional machine. The word society was used in reference to different concepts: e.g. Swedish society, multicultural society, consumption society and class society. The term 'class society' appeared multiple times in discussions. It was used only in a negative context along with the words 'division' and 'elite.'

In German discussions, there were very few (only three) references to society and these references created a picture of society as an organism that changes and can be harmed. There were more frequent references to the state. This difference reveals the state-centric nature of the discussion in German focus groups and is probably reflective of the state-centricism of German political discourse.

In the American groups the word society was portrayed as a house with a foundation by one participant. Other references were devoid of any imagery. This difference between American and European discussions is puzzling.

4.3 Discussion

Focus groups are useful tools to gain insight into public discourses on any given topic and supply ample material to analyze. When given the liberty to debate a topic in all of its dimensions, what is (and what is not) discussed and how it is discussed can be very

revealing. With minimal researcher intervention and manipulation, the use or omission of certain words, analogies, imagery, arguments and the manner of interaction in these discussions showed, as expected, significant variation across societies.

Assuming that these focus groups are reflective of the larger national discourses, what do focus groups reveal about public discourses on welfare in Germany, Sweden and the US? Some of the results are expected and far from surprising, yet they are intriguing. Contrary to what survey results depict, these three nations are as different as day and night when it comes to their understanding of what the role of the government should be in providing for the welfare of its citizens. They have different vocabularies, different definitions and different priorities. They talk about different issues even when they answer the same questions. If these discussions are indicative of the larger discourses on welfare, Americans, Germans and Swedes refer to entirely different things when talking about the state, society and welfare and it is impossible to capture these differences by using the same vocabulary or out of context statements as in surveys. These are crucial distinctions because what justice principles people choose to adopt in a situation depends on how they define the situation and the actors as experiments demonstrate. People use more egalitarian principles in allocating resources within groups whose members have close bonds and work cooperatively. If Swedish discourse defines society as an extended family with common interests, it is not surprising that Swedes apply more egalitarian principles in deciding what an ideal distribution ought to be. Swedes need not be more egalitarian in abstract to employ the equality principle more often. The discursive context predisposes them to egalitarianism. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, these discussions make it clear that people have an acute understanding of what kind of

language and arguments are acceptable in their society and they are careful to position their arguments within the boundaries of “acceptability.”

There are some differences among nations that questionnaires and quantitative methods cannot capture. National discourses form the context in which individual words and opinions gain meaning. In the absence of that context, public opinion survey results may be difficult to interpret. In such instances, it is best to go back to the source and ask people what they mean, rather than guessing the meaning behind words. In this study, focus group discussions managed to capture national differences in discourses on equality and the welfare state that international survey analyses could not detect. In some cases, these differences were precisely as theory would predict. In other cases, discussions shed light on the puzzling survey results.

One of the most significant conclusions we can draw from this research is that Swedish discourse is not necessarily overwhelmingly egalitarian but overwhelmingly preoccupied with equality, whether people are for or against it. This is a crucial distinction that surveys fail to capture. For instance, many discussants referred to Swedes and Sweden as “egalitarian” or as a nation that values equality. Some of them thought there was too much emphasis on equality in Sweden, while others believed there was not enough. Swedes in these discussion groups were profoundly torn about the desirable level of equality and some participants made anti-egalitarian statements, but discussions – be it on markets, families, or immigration – revolved around the concept of equality. There was general agreement on the desirability of achieving social equality (if not economic equality) and not allowing too much economic inequality (with the US serving as the scary example of extreme inequality). In contrast, equality was rarely discussed in

German groups, even when discussants were specifically asked about their opinions on the issue.

What is also noteworthy is the overwhelming disagreement about the outcomes of policies among German and American discussants as opposed to Swedes. Swedes were deeply torn between conflicting principles and policy goals, but they agreed on the likely outcomes of certain policy prescriptions. At least on a rhetorical level, Americans wanted equality of opportunity, but they did not agree on what it meant, or how it could be achieved, as opposed to Swedes who disagreed on basic principles such as what was fair (equality or desert) and how much equality was desirable (given the trade-offs between equality, efficiency and dynamism), although all parties agreed that higher taxation, a generous welfare state and redistribution was the best way to decrease inequality. Thus, Americans agreed on what they desired, but not on how to get there, while Swedes were in disagreement over what was desirable, but they agreed on how to achieve a stated end. Germans agreed on neither what they desired, nor on how to achieve what they desired.

Chapter 5. Q Study

This chapter presents the findings of my Q study conducted in Germany, Sweden and the US. First, I explain why I use the Q method in my research by describing what Q method is, how a Q study is conducted and by pinpointing some differences between Q and R surveys as well as addressing some problems associated with R method (traditional quantitative survey methodology). Then I elucidate the weaknesses and strengths of employing the Q method. After laying out the research design of this Q study, and I analyze the results. The analysis is categorized by statement set type, ideological discourse type and country.

I neither intend to argue that the Q method is superior to the R method, nor suggest Q methodology as a replacement for R method. The Q method is not a purely quantitative method. As such, it is fundamentally different from traditional survey methodology. It can be very helpful where traditional surveys are inadequate or unfitting to answer research questions. I also suggest employing it as a complimentary method to quantitative methods to provide context for understanding survey findings or prepare better survey questionnaires.

The Q method lies at the intersection of quantitative and qualitative research, combining interpretive and statistical-mathematical methods (Stephenson, 1956). Upon choosing a domain of study, a researcher would draw a sample of statements representative of opinions and multiple aspects of the domain from the ‘concourse’—the ‘volume of discussion on any topic’ representing an interplay or running together of, positions, ideas and opinions. (Brown, 1986, p. 58)” (Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993, p. 50)

Sources for these statements can be focus groups, speeches, media, literature or any other medium through which people express themselves.

In Q method, each subject is asked to rank a set of statements according to her level of agreement or disagreement with them. The resulting rank-ordered set of statements is called a Q sort. Each Q sort mirrors the respondent's subjective understanding of and reaction to the area of interest. In Q method, statements are not the variables, because unlike R method, Q method does not look for relationships among statements but among subjects. Once the responses are collected, factor analysis is used to search for patterns of ordering among subjects.

The number of statements in a Q set is limited by the attention span of an average respondent. Hence most Q studies include 40 to 70 statements that represent the range of communications in the concourse. Since statements are the cases and the subjects are the variables in a Q study, the number of respondents one can include in a study is limited by the number of statements. In my research, two Q studies are carried out in each country, and 50 responses are collected per study, totaling 300 respondents. The subjects are selected based on demographic criteria to achieve maximum diversity. Studies are conducted on the Internet. Selected respondents are invited to respond to the study, and those who complete the study are paid for their participation.

I conducted two parallel Q studies in Germany, Sweden and the US. The first Q study in each country consists of statements that were taken from international surveys. The statements were collected from English surveys and then translated into German and Swedish. Therefore, subjects rank the same sets in each country. The second Q study consists of separate statement sets for each country. These statements are drawn from

national discourses. While political party platforms, political speeches, newspaper articles, transcripts of political radio, television shows and books and mostly focus groups are used for collecting statements in the US, statements are largely pulled from focus group discussions in Germany and Sweden.

While creating a different set of statements for each country instead of translating one set of statements into other languages¹⁶ decreases direct comparability among nations, the benefits of creating statement sets that reflect the unique concourse of each country outweigh this disadvantage. The main concern of this study is to reflect the diversity of the points of view in national concourses by screening a wide array of media or collecting statements from people who subscribe to a variety of discourses.

Although a Q study may not be able to locate all existing factors, it is certain that all the factors that are discovered exist. These factors correspond to discourses in this research. “Factors indicate clusters of persons who have ranked the statements in essentially the same fashion. Explanation of factors is advanced in terms of commonly shared attitudes or perspectives” (Brown, 1986, p. 6). In contrast, R methodology searches for patterns across variables, not subjects. In traditional R methodology surveys, the possible range of responses is limited from the start since a scale is constructed by the researcher **prior to conducting research**. Questions reflect the categories in the mind of the researcher, and through operational definitions, the meanings of responses are defined in advance. The assumption of objectivity elevates researchers’ constructions of the social world above those of subjects. Unlike R methodology, Q method embraces human subjectivity and aspires to capture the subjective world-views of people. What Q method

¹⁶ For an implementation of this approach, see Dryzek, 2002.

measures is not individual subjectivity but the shared subjectivity of respondents. It allows subjects to speak for themselves. Q methodology tries to find a model, instead of constructing it.

The researcher is removed from the process of preparing questions and responses in Q methodology. Instead, she becomes an observer and collector of statements. This is similar to collecting samples for research in the natural sciences. Systematic and thorough research should result in a set of statements that adequately represent the diversity of the discourse on the topic. Wording of statements is kept as found in the source to retain their subjective character in communication because the manner in which ideas and opinions are articulated can be just as important as their content. To draw another metaphor from the natural sciences, Q method preserves statements as they are found in their natural habitat, with their implied meanings and connotations.

Anecdotes can illuminate how researchers sometimes fail to capture the language with which categories are expressed in respondents' minds. Levitt and Dubner (2005, p. 93) recount the interesting story of Sudhir Venkatesh, a graduate student of sociology, who interacts with and listens to his subjects by coincidence:

His undergraduate advisor, the eminent poverty scholar William Julius Wilson, promptly sent Venkatesh into the field. His assignment: to visit Chicago's poorest black neighborhoods with a clipboard and a seventy-question, multiple-choice survey. This was the first question on the survey:

How do you feel about being Black and poor?

Very bad

Bad

Neither Bad nor good

Somewhat good

Very good

However, once he starts interacting with the respondents, gang members in a poor black neighborhood, Venkatesh is no longer confident about the survey:

As Venkatesh would later tell his university colleagues, he realized that the multiple-choice answers A through E were insufficient. In reality, the answers should have looked like this:

Very bad

Bad

Neither Bad nor good

Somewhat good

Very good

Fuck you (*ibid*: 95)

After he reads the survey question, Venkatesh was warned by the leader of the gang that the question itself was not worded well.

J.T. wanted to know what was going on. Then he told Venkatesh to read him the survey question. He listened but then said that he couldn't answer the question because he wasn't black. "Well then", Venkatesh said, 'How does it feel to be African American and poor?' "I ain't no African American either, you idiot. I'm a nigger." J.T. then administered a lively though not unfriendly taxonomical lesson in "nigger" versus "African-American" versus "black".

As this example illustrates, colloquialisms as well as politically incorrect, ideologically extreme and logically inconsistent statements may help us understand a respondent's viewpoint. Such statements can be included as long as they are representative of the universe of statements on the topic. While Q method allows the inclusion of even explicitly racist, misogynist or other types of hate speech in the surveys, the true benefit is the ability to add in covertly bigoted statements - that imply and denigrate certain groups - to a Q set. This is particularly important in the area of welfare research, since literature suggests that covert racism toward minorities (Gilens, 1995) is linked to hostility toward welfare policies. An example of covertly racist language is the

frequent mentioning of “welfare queens” when talking about welfare recipients in the US. Although there is no allusion to race in the term and it refers to a welfare recipient who cheats the system, it nonetheless conjures up the image of an African-American woman in contemporary American culture, sending a decidedly racist message to the audience. Not only is it safer to employ such coded language in everyday speech (rather than overtly racist language), it is also safer to agree with it. In selecting statements, the main duty of the researcher becomes setting the limits of the topic and ensuring that all points of views on the topic are included as they are expressed in public discourse. Albeit unacceptable in traditional R methodology, this approach is the strength of Q methodology. Letting the subjects express themselves can take the research into unforeseen territory and lead to the emergence of unanticipated factors.

Allowing subjects to express themselves solves many problems associated with wording bias. In R surveys questions are supposed to be objective and neutral. Therefore, bias in phrasing violates one of the fundamental assumptions of the method and poses a big problem. Q methodology, on the other hand, views all communication as inherently subjective. “Language-in-use is by its nature symbolic and self-referential, with each combination of words being capable of carrying a wide range of meanings. For an investigator to regard his own understanding as in some sense more objective or correct is therefore pretentious in the extreme” (Brown, 1986:3). Questions or statements can never be completely neutral since language is not neutral. All words carry connotations. Statements take on different associations and meanings according to the context and audience. Q methodology does not try to avoid subjectivity, but to capture it as it is expressed. It removes the premise of objectivity from opinion as “the most fully

developed paradigm of human subjectivity” (Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993, p. 49). In Q methodology statements are expected to be subjective and reflect the biases of their source, but they do not reflect the bias of the researcher. Granted that the concourse is adequately represented, respondents will be able to find statements that articulate their subjective perspectives in a Q sample. We need not concern ourselves with such bias, but welcome it. Hence, phrasing bias ceases to be a problem in Q methodology.

A problem with traditional R surveys is the inconsistency of respondents in answering questions. Feldman and Zaller argue that when called upon to give an answer, people will not always give the same consistent answer. Rather, most people will respond “on the basis of whatever ideas are at the top of their heads at the moment of answering” (Feldman & Zaller, 1992: 579). What is at the top of people’s head is basically what is salient¹⁷ and available¹⁸ to them at the time of decision-making. They will either pick a few salient factors and consider them (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), or they will pick the most immediately available factor as the cause of the event. Most people give contradictory responses in surveys simply because the mere inclusion of a factor in a survey makes it available and increases the salience of it to the respondent.

At first look, availability and salience problems may seem to exist in Q surveys, too. However, what statements are included in the Q sample depends on the concourse rather than the model of the issue at hand as constructed by the researcher. Concourses are crucial because they affect both salience and availability: they determine what is deemed salient, and they make certain factors available to individuals. If some arguments

¹⁷ Those factors that are noticeable and draw the attention of the person are salient (Taylor and Fiske, 1978).

¹⁸ Factors that can be “easily retrieved from the memory”, are “available” to the person (Kluegel and Smith, 1986:15).

are repeatedly made available to the public in the concourse, while others are ignored, the Q-sample should reflect and repeat the availability bias in the concourse. Therefore, the most important task of the researcher is to provide statements that reflect the concourse in question as exhaustively as the sample size allows and make the most commonly stated opinions in the concourse available to the respondents.

People attach semantic, evaluative and affective associations to concepts and store these connections in their long-term memory (e.g. Fazio et al., 1986). When a political concept is recalled, these semantic and affective associations are automatically retrieved to the working memory along with the concept (Lodge and Taber, 2002). Therefore, seeing the word “Obama” carries to working memory a number of semantically connected, congruent words such as “president”, and “Democrat” as well as evaluative and affective tags such as “humble/snobbish” and “honest/dishonest”.

Affective associations of political words are more rapidly recalled than semantic associations, lending support to the theory of “primacy of affect” (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) even in the domain of politics. More notably, high-valence political concepts (concepts that elicit strongly positive or negative reactions) influence the reactions to subsequent words even when these words are not semantically related and even when they are nonpolitical. For instance, a person who is very unsympathetic to welfare will take longer to correctly identify the adjective “attractive” as a positive word when it follows the word “welfare” than a person who is a supporter of welfare policies. In this case, the word welfare creates such a strong affective reaction that it alters the evaluation of the following word even though the two words are completely disconnected.

Questions on solidarity and equality principles in traditional opinion surveys also provide good examples of validity problems. These questions are generally phrased in a rather abstract fashion creating a potential validity problem. High levels of commitment to solidarity in all nations may simply be the result of the way a question is worded. When asked whether “guaranteeing the basic needs are met for all” should be an important goal of the government, people are likely to answer affirmatively given the absence of another alternative in this wording (such as private charity) and the rather vague nature of the commitment.

Arts and van der Veen (1992) draw attention to the Marxist analysis that this agreement is only superficial and is a result of the ‘abstract’ formulation of such questions. Kangas (1997) also criticizes such wording by pointing out that while respondents tend to demonstrate a higher commitment to general level solidarity questions, their commitment decreases as the questions become more particular and start identifying the recipients of redistributive policies. This is not unlike asking if one supports world peace. Hardly anyone would answer negatively, yet when asked more specific questions about foreign policies, the same people may lend support to belligerent policies that would in fact hinder world peace. Many studies may find that Americans and Swedes similarly place high value on equality, but finding out what equality and valuing equality mean in different national contexts could change how we interpret these survey results.

In Q methodology all statements are presented to the respondents together, eliminating any ordering problem. In R methodology, questions on a survey are presented independently of each other. In contrast, Q-methodology presumes that statements are

representations of beliefs and opinions, and are not isolated items. They relate to and interact with each other. Respondents are asked to think in context and link separate statements in order to rank them in relation to each other. In this method, subjects' responses to single statements have meaning only in relation to their responses to the whole set of statements in the Q sort (Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993). "The meaning of any detail depends upon the context of which it is a part" (Lasswell, 1948, p. 218).

The ranking requirement of Q method compels respondents to reveal their true preference structures, whereas traditional surveys usually do not. An infamous survey illustrates this point vividly. A 1994 poll asked Americans between the ages of 18 and 34 whether they thought Social Security would still exist by the time they retire. 63% of the respondents replied negatively. When asked whether they believed in the existence of UFOs on the same questionnaire, 46% said yes, leading some to argue that Americans had more faith in the existence of UFOs than the sustainability of Social Security (Third Millennium, 1994). However, when a consecutive survey asked people to directly compare the two possibilities, Americans of the same age group chose Social Security over UFOs by a margin of 63 to 33 percent (Employee Benefits Research Institute, 1998). As it turned out, most Americans believed that they were more likely to receive a pension check from the government than be visited by aliens.

Presenting all items as competing alternatives generates drastically different outcomes from presenting them independently as in most traditional surveys. If asked separately, people will want to have their cake and eat it, too: if asked independently of each other, they simultaneously will support higher spending on education and lower taxes. When taken together, these may be incompatible or inconsistent responses.

However, when faced with an “either/or” question, respondents are forced to consider two (or more) alternatives together. When studying opinions on the welfare state, this may prove to be a key advantage.

The major problem of employing Q methodology is that it does not provide statistical information. It is possible to locate many and maybe all discourses, but not possible to tell what percentage of the population or which demographic group subscribes to a certain discourse due to the lack of statistically generalizable data. To circumvent this limitation, it is crucial to determine the nature, goals and scope of the research from the onset. The next section details the research design of my Q study.

5.1 Research Design

I conducted two sets of studies in Germany, Sweden and the US. The first set includes 56 statements most of which are selected from Eurobarometer, ISSP and World Values Survey questions. I used the original translations from these surveys, when they were available. When unavailable, statements were translated into German and Swedish from English codebooks. Heretofore, I refer to this statement set as “standard sets” or “standard studies” since the statements are standard across countries. The second set consists of three separate surveys of which the statements were selected from focus group discussions conducted in each country (as well as national media and speeches in the US). Since focus groups yielded different statements in every country, these surveys have only two common statements, which were inserted to allow testing some hypotheses comparison as I explain in more detail below. Hereafter, I refer to the second set as “unique studies” or “unique sets.”

Conducting two sets of studies simultaneously provides a number of advantages. Standard studies provide us the opportunity to compare and contrast responses across nations. Since their statements were selected from other surveys, we can also compare these surveys to international R surveys, although limitations apply due to the differences in method. Unique studies, on the other hand, have the advantage of being directly drawn from national concourses. If they are more limited in breadth than their standard counterparts, that is mostly because they reflect the limitations of national discourses. These statements were grammatically corrected. They were also abridged when too long. However, these alterations were kept to a minimum so that the statements mirror the authentic language about the welfare state. This chapter presents the results of the standard Q study.

5.2 Findings

In my analysis, I identify and analyze American, German and Swedish discourses. I use principal factor analysis to generate factors from each national concourse. Four statistically significant discourses emerge from each statement set,¹⁹ and a total of 24 discourses are uncovered in this study. In these discourses, 5 denotes the highest level of agreement with a statement, and -5 denotes the highest level of disagreement. Significant statements (those which rank 2 and higher, or -2 and lower in a factor) are included in the analysis and neutral statements are excluded. Discourses are categorized according to two criteria. First, standard statement set discourses and unique statement discourses are

¹⁹ I employ the Cattell scree test to determine the number of factors to emerge from each factor analysis. This scree plot displays factors as the X-axis and the corresponding eigenvalues as the Y-axis. The line makes an elbow and flattens out at a certain point. Cattell's scree test recommends that the factors after the elbow be dropped. I dropped the factors after the first elbow. All of the factor analyses produced four factors as a result of the Cattell scree test.

separated. Second, discourses are divided into ideological categories for meaningful cross-national comparison.

In every country, the standard statement sets and the unique statement sets yield a liberal, a social democratic, a populist and a fourth discourse, which changes by country. Since the starting point of this study is the comparative welfare literature, discourses are labeled in line with the names of welfare regime types in Esping-Andersen's typology. Particularly, students of American politics may be confused by these labels. Liberalism refers to economically right discourses where the government role is minimized. Social democracy refers to economically leftist discourses that support an expansive social state. Economic populism refers to discourses that are non-ideological in nature, but demand that the government protect the regular people against the transgressions of the markets, the rich and, in some cases, the poor.

In Chapter 5, I analyze standard discourses. Chapter 6 presents unique discourses. Each factor constitutes a discourse. Statements that load significantly (Z score $\geq |.931|$, or Q score $\geq |2|$) in the factor analysis constitute the discourse. Discourses are presented in paragraph forms, and every paragraph centers on one of the following issues: government role, trust, equality, immigration and minorities. Statements that do not belong to any of these categories are listed in the last paragraph. Please see the Appendix for the statistical ranking of the statements in each discourse.

5.2.1 Standard Discourses

Table 4 presents the standard statements.

Table 4: Standard Statements

STANDARD STATEMENTS	
1	Private sector cannot be trusted.
2	Most people are trustworthy.
3	Life is often not fair.
4	Society is like a family. We should take care of those who are in need.
5	The government cannot be trusted.
6	People generally get what they deserve in life.
7	People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.
8	Health services should be taken care of more by the government.
9	Education should be taken care of more by the government.
10	In schools, where there are too many children from some minority groups, the quality of education suffers.
11	People from some minority groups are given preferential treatment by the authorities.
12	The authorities should make efforts to improve the situation of people from minority groups.
13	People from some minority groups are doing the jobs which others do not want to do. In order to improve life for families the government should make the amount of leave a mother and father can take around the child's birth, the availability of child care arrangements and flexible working hours a top priority.
14	There are people who live in need because of laziness and lack of willpower.
15	There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.
16	There are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society.
17	Anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives.
18	The unemployed should be forced to take a job quickly, even if it is not as good as their previous job.
19	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
20	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
21	The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
22	Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.
23	There should be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.
24	A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement.
25	There are too many immigrants in the US.
26	Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against our American values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
27	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Americans.
28	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years.
29	There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept.
30	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
31	We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual.
32	The government intervenes too much in our lives.
33	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
34	It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.
35	In deciding pay, what is needed to support a family ought to be very important.
36	Coming from a wealthy family is essential for getting ahead.
37	In the US, people get rewarded for their effort.
38	No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.
39	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of the US.
40	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the US.
41	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
42	

- 43 Immigrants improve American society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too
- 44 little.
- 45 A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
It is more important for the government to get people to claim benefits to which they are entitled than
- 46 to stop people claiming benefits to which they are entitled.
- 47 The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other.
- 48 If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
- 49 Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth.
It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with
- 50 high incomes and those with low incomes.
- 51 People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low
- 52 incomes.
There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in
- 53 the US.
The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid
- 54 into the pension scheme.
- 55 The government should provide decent housing for all who cannot afford it.
- 56 The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities
and less by the government.

5.2.1.1 Liberalism

5.2.1.2 American Liberalism

It is the responsibility of the government to set a legal minimum wage so that no one is paid too little, but it is not the responsibility of the government to provide a basic income to everyone. The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor, but it should also avoid trying to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor. Inequalities in income are necessary as an incentive for people to go into occupations that require extensive education, but large differences in income are not necessary for the prosperity of the country. If it means we are going to have less freedom, we do not need more equality and justice. The government should not require children to financially support their elderly parents, if they don't have enough income of their own.

Coming from a wealthy family not necessary for getting ahead. Life is often not fair, and anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives, but many people are in poverty because they are lazy and they lack willpower. People should take care of themselves and not rely on help from others.

It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures, and there is no limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept.

Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Americans, but we should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who

have been working in the US for several years. Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.

People from some minority groups are doing the jobs, which others do not want to do. The authorities should not make efforts to improve the situation of people from minority groups.

American liberalism assigns responsibility for income inequalities and poverty to the disposition of the poor, who are deemed to be lazy and lacking the willpower to work hard, and argues that anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives (presumably implying that while everyone is prone to similar risks, some people manage to avoid poverty through personal will) while German and Swedish liberal discourses are silent on responsibility attribution. American liberalism allows the government to continue to provide some poverty relief and legislate minimum wage so that every working person can receive a living wage. However, it is strongly opposed to the idea of the government providing everyone with a basic income, unlike Swedish and German liberalisms, which are less opposed to it. In addition, American liberalism does not oppose helping the poor through taxes and does not defend the virtues of free competition as strongly as Swedish and German liberal discourses. That is not to say that American liberalism is not in agreement with Swedish and German liberalisms on these issues, but that they rank (and therefore prioritize) other statements higher.

American liberalism does not defend a more generous pension system for the high-income groups. On the contrary, it wants to do away with the governmental pension system altogether. This may be a result of the fact that American pension payments are very meager in comparison to European pensions, and middle and upper class Americans are encouraged to rely on their tax-exempt savings and investments for their retirement, and they are used to thinking of social security payments only as supplementary income.

American liberalism holds a particularly positive view of diversity, but argues that their government spends too much money on immigrants and opposes amnesty for illegal immigrants. Possibly due to the fact that illegal immigration is a problem with which the German and Swedish are largely unfamiliar, this is not a concern in Europe.

5.2.1.2 German Liberalism

The government can be trusted, and education should be taken care of more by the government, but it is not the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. If some jobs did not have much higher salaries, people would not study for years to get them. The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme.

We don't need more equality and justice, if this means less freedom for the individual. You can trust the private sector. Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity. Coming from a wealthy family is not essential for success. People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others. I would not be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.

Poverty is not an inevitable part of modern progress.

German liberalism is in some ways different from American and Swedish liberalisms. For instance, it asserts government can be trusted, and it should be responsible for providing education. It also emphasizes that private sector can be trusted. This discourse also defends that pensions should be tied to contributions, which is a tenet of the German model. German liberalism denies the fatalistic assumption that poverty is an inevitable part of modern progress. Moreover, unlike the other liberal discourses, this one does not strongly oppose the idea that children should be held responsible for their parents in financial difficulty.

5.2.1.3 Swedish Liberalism

A lot of false benefit claims are a result of dishonesty. Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity. The

government intervenes too much in our lives. It shouldn't provide housing to those who cannot afford it. We should not sacrifice freedom for more equality and justice. Government should not take higher percentage of taxes from the richer. It is not the job of the government to reduce income inequalities. I wouldn't want to pay higher taxes to help the poor. People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others. People study for years because they expect to earn much more than ordinary workers, but they do not get rewarded for their effort. A good pension system should allow people to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their pre-retirement income.

Legal immigrants should have the same rights as Swedes. They do not take jobs away from the Swedish.

Swedish liberal discourse objects to the government providing housing, and criticizes the government for intervening too much in the lives of its citizens. It is also the only liberal discourse, which does not specify any positive function for the government to fulfill. Swedish libertarians believe that the system is unfair unlike their counterparts in other countries. If we look at the context and rankings of other statements, it is highly likely that Swedish libertarians refer to "high taxes" for the rich, when they talk about the unfairness of the system. Swedish liberalism is also less trusting of welfare recipients than either American or German liberalisms, arguing strongly that most false claims for welfare benefits are a result of dishonesty. American and German liberal discourses oppose the assertion that coming from a wealthy family is not essential for getting ahead, but Swedish liberal discourse does not. Therefore, Swedish liberalism has more faith in the meritocratic nature of the economic system.

5.2.2 Social Democracy

5.2.2.1 American Social Democracy

The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one, and guarantee a basic income, and decent housing for people who cannot afford it. It should also take care of education more.

Welfare doesn't cause people to be more dependent, and welfare state does not discourage people from helping each other. The government should not decrease spending on the benefits for the poor. Taking care of the needs is the duty of the government first, charities second. I would be ready to pay more tax to help the poor. Richer people should pay higher percentage of taxes. Large differences in income are not necessary for our national prosperity.

We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years. There are not too many immigrants in the US. There is no such thing as too much diversity. Immigrants should not be expelled because they follow different customs. They improve society bring in new ideas and cultures to the US. Government doesn't spend too much on the poor.

The most important difference between the American social democratic discourse and the other two social democratic discourses is that American social democrats neither support nor oppose the belief that it is just for rich people to be able to buy better health care, but German and Swedish social democrats disagree with this statement vehemently.

Despite being less egalitarian in health care, American social democratic discourse is more in support of government involvement in the economy than either of the European social democratic discourses, demanding that the government provide jobs, housing, education and income to citizens. No other social democratic discourse wants the government to provide a job for everyone. It is possible that American leftists prefer providing jobs to the unemployed to providing social benefits to the unemployed indefinitely as the European systems do.

American social democratic discourse is also set apart from other social democratic discourses by its opposition to the statement that the welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other. The inclusion of this statement in this discourse is a result of the dialectic nature of discourse formation. When American social democrats are making a statement, they are doing so always with other American discourses in mind. In

this case, they are speaking against commonly the repeated claim in the American national discourse that a big welfare state is detrimental to individual philanthropy.

Despite the sympathy American social democratic discourse espouses on immigration, unlike Swedish and German social democratic discourses, it does not oppose the statement that immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the country. This fits in with the general pattern. Americans generally oppose immigration for economic reasons, not for cultural reasons. American social democratic discourse is also alone among social democratic discourses in its support for legalizing the status of illegal immigrants, in its complaint that ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth, and in the wish for the government to provide a job for everyone. The statement on illegal immigration does not make sense in German and Swedish national contexts since these countries do not experience a large "illegal immigration" problem like the US does, therefore what is a contentious issue in the US is a nonissue in Germany and Sweden.

5.2.2.2 German Social Democracy

The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income, and decent housing and education. People should not be able to buy better health care because they are richer. People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, but pensions should not be strictly tied to contribution levels. Life is not fair. There are people who are poor because of injustice. In Germany, people don't get rewarded for their effort. Large differences in income are not necessary for prosperity. Poverty is not inevitable. Many false claims are a result of confusion, not dishonesty. Welfare benefits are not the cause of dependency. Government should not spend less on the poor.

Immigrants don't take away jobs from Germans. They improve German society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. There aren't too many immigrants in Germany, and government doesn't spend too much to help them.

German social democratic discourse is the only social democratic discourse that objects to the principle that one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme. This is another case of dialecticism. Linking pensions to contribution is such a strongly supported principle in liberal (and other) German discourses that it is impossible for an egalitarian German discourse to not address it.

As important as determining which statements are specific to the standard German social democratic discourse (among all standard social democratic discourses) is paying attention to those statements that are common to the other social democratic discourses, but do not appear in the German social democratic discourse. German social democratic discourse is also alone among social democratic discourses in attributing poverty to social injustices, that is, situational reasons, opposing the inevitability of poverty, criticizing the system for not rewarding effort and expressing trust in welfare recipients. Despite these positions, German social democrats –unlike their American and Swedish counterparts- do not state that they are willing to pay higher taxes to support the poor, nor do they state that it is the job of the government (as opposed to charities) to take care of the poor. Likewise, they do not state a preference for the government to be more involved in health care.

The complete absence of statements that praise diversity and oppose expelling legal immigrants on cultural grounds sets German social democratic discourse apart from other social democratic discourses, and marks it as less sympathetic toward immigration.

5.2.2.3 Swedish Social Democracy

Diversity is good for a society and immigrants improve Swedish society by bringing new ideas and cultures. There aren't too many

immigrants. Legal immigrants should have the same rights as Swedes. They do not have to follow Swedish customs to stay here. They don't take jobs away from Swedes, and government doesn't spend too much on immigrants.

It is not just if the rich can buy better health care. Health care should be taken care of more by the government. Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests. It is right to have a minimum wage.

Life is not fair. Large differences in income are not needed for the prosperity of the nation. Society is like a family. We should take care of those in need. Richer people should pay higher share of their income in taxes. I would pay more tax to improve the situation of the poor. It should be the government, not charities, which should help the needy more. The government should not spend less on benefits on the poor. Cutting welfare benefits would not help people to become independent.

Swedish social democratic discourse is highly internally consistent and coherent.

This discourse reflects passionately positive sentiments on immigration. It embraces and praises diversity; strongly supports immigrant rights and is very tolerant toward immigrants. It is also steadfastly egalitarian, particularly on the issue of health care, but also on taxation and redistribution. It is supportive of labor, and an active welfare state. Among social democratic discourses, only the Swedish one includes the statement that workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests. Swedish social democratic discourse is also unique among social democratic discourses in asserting that society is like a family, and those who are in need should be taken care of.

Swedish social democratic discourse also diverges from other social democratic discourses in its opposition to a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents, if the parents do not have enough income of their own. In contrast to standard American and German social democratic discourses, the Swedish one does not support a guaranteed basic income, government provided housing for those who need it and increased government role in education. The opposition to a financial obligation to

support parents and the relative lack of support for government involvement in education are positions that are shared by other standard Swedish statements, and they distinguish Swedish discourses from American and German discourses.

Given the high egalitarian and pro-government stance of this discourse, it is likely that statements that support basic income and government provided housing are not ranked highly because they are standard rights in Sweden, but this explanation is wanting in that the same could be said of a number of things. However, despite these omissions, support for diversity and immigrant rights, endorsement of trade unions, a vision of society as a family and a concern for the needy fit the ideal social democratic regime perfectly. There are no statements that contradict social democratic ideology in this discourse.

5.2.3 Populism

Whether it defined as a “thin” ideology (Stanley, 2008) or a syndrome (Wiles, 1969), the traits of populism are well established, and it continues to be a persistent, and possibly inherent, force in democratic politics (Gellner & Ionescu, 1969; Schedler, 1996; Stanley, 2008; Ardit, 2004; Canovan, 1982; Canovan, 1999). Populism is often described as a syndrome as opposed to a doctrine. It is a discourse that claims to speak for “the people,” “ordinary people” or “the real people,” and pits “ordinary people” against other groups, building on resentment against a perceived exclusion of “the people” from the political and economic system. Political, economic and intellectual elites, certain minorities and immigrants are the typical targets of populist ire, as they are the ones that benefit from the political and economic system at the expense of the imagined group of ordinary people. The demand of populism is to return the power to the people.

Populist movements typically coalesce around a charismatic leader who is deemed as an outsider to the system and established institutions, and who has a claim to be one of the people, not the elite. Rejection of the elite brings with it an anti-intellectualism and suspicion of complex and technical policy solutions. Populism demands simple and direct solutions, which non-experts can easily understand. Anti-system affect combined with the suspicion of technical solutions renders populist discourse particularly negative toward government institutions and mechanisms, which are viewed as unnecessarily complex and opaque and disconnect the people from the government and the leaders. This leads to the rejection of many government policies, including taxation and welfare state institutions and policies.

The charismatic populist leader, speaking for “the people,” typically vows to get rid of such intervening mechanisms and to restore the direct link between the people and the government. Lack of expertise on these institutions is not seen as a liability but as an asset, a sign of authenticity and of belonging to “the people.” Historically, populism appears as a rightist discourse due to the fact that many rightist politicians rise to power as charismatic leaders of rising populist movements, particularly in democratizing countries. Hitler and Peron come to mind as the most successful populist leaders. In democratic countries, populist anxiety is generally captured by right-wing parties as well. From National Front party of France that rose to prominence under the leadership of Le Pen to Alliance of the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich), right wing nationalist parties in Europe are populist. However, populism is not innately rightist.

Populist discourse takes pride in its anti-intellectual and anti-ideological nature, but it can be channeled through rightist and leftist parties and movements. It is a discourse of discontentment and if a populist movement succeeds in seizing power, it inevitably leads to a populist reaction, since populism is inherently anti-institutional and anti-establishment. In summation, populism is defined by hostility and resentment toward any group that is not considered a part of “the ordinary people,” a belief that the political establishment and government policies hurt the common people, that the link between the people and the government needs to be restored so that the government starts serving the people instead of narrow interests of privileged groups, and a conviction that simple and straightforward solutions are superior to intellectually complex and technical solutions, which are often no more than smoke and mirrors to keep the people in the dark.

What does this mean for the welfare state? A populist discourse will reject the complex welfare state institutions and policies, including difficult-to-understand taxation systems, welfare and social security programs, which exclude the common people and benefit “the privileged groups,” display low levels of trust toward all elements of the establishment including the government and the private sector, but particularly against “the privileged groups.” Naturally, who the privileged groups are is subject to dispute and changes from country to country. However, in the case of the welfare state, visibly disadvantaged communities, such as ethnic minorities, the unemployed, and immigrants, which are viewed as the main beneficiaries of welfare programs are perceived as the privileged groups of the political system, along with the political elite, who serve the interests of these beneficiaries, and the economic elite, who benefit from the economic system.

Therefore, the anti-welfare sentiment expressed in populism is not based on an ideologically liberal defense of free market capitalism but an articulation of “welfare chauvinism, inspired by a rigid form of social conservatism and a profound distrust of current social policy arrangements” (Derks, 2004, p. 519). The populist pro-welfare sentiment is not a result of egalitarian inclinations, but a demand for “the people” to receive what is rightfully theirs.

5.2.3.1 American Populism

The rich should pay a higher share of their income than the low-income people. Ordinary working people do not get their share of the national wealth. There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and the people at the bottom of society. People do not get rewarded for their effort in the US. Free competition is not the best guarantee of prosperity. Government should take care of health services more. A person’s pension should not be based on the amount of contributions he made. Pensions should allow everyone to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to his income before retirement.

The government cannot be trusted. Most people cannot be trusted, either. There are too many immigrants in the US. They take away jobs from Americans, jobs that Americans want. Government spends too much money assisting them. Legal immigrants should not have the same rights as Americans. They should be expelled, if they follow customs against American values. It is not true that it is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures. Immigrants do not improve American society.

This discourse exhibits low-levels of trust, and a sense of resentment toward the system, which is unfair to ordinary working people. The resentment toward the government is based on the perception that it is not doing enough to protect the ordinary people against other groups (such as the rich and the immigrants).

This is a strongly anti-immigrant discourse. Of the five highest ranked statements, four reflect negative attitudes toward immigrants. The anti-immigration sentiment is not rooted in economic anxiety alone. This discourse views diversity as detrimental to society

believes there are too many immigrants in the country. Although it is very similar to German and Swedish populist discourses in this respect, the anti-immigration sentiment in the American discourse is more pronounced. It includes the argument that there are too many immigrants in the country and supports the expulsion of legal immigrants who do not conform to American cultural norms. In addition, unlike in other populist discourses, there is some anti-minority sentiment, which is different from anti-immigration sentiment.

Despite the distrust American populism manifests toward the government, it nonetheless wishes the government to have a bigger hand in health care and poverty alleviation, and provide more generous pensions. There is no visible anti-welfare sentiment in this discourse (unlike in the unique American populism), but contrary Swedish and German populist discourses, it does not claim that it is the responsibility of the government to reduce income differences.

5.2.3.2 German Populism

In Germany, people don't get rewarded for their effort. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. *It is not just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.* It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little. In order to improve life for families the government should make the amount of leave a mother and father can take around the child's birth, the availability of child care arrangements and flexible working hours a top priority.

The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme. The government cannot be trusted. I would not be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.

People do not live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress. Free competition is not the best guarantee for economic prosperity. Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.

There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in Germany.

Government spends too much money assisting immigrants. The authorities should not make efforts to improve the situation of people from minority groups. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany. In schools, where there are too many children from some minority groups, the quality of education suffers. Immigrants don't improve German society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. We should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Germany for several years.

German populist discourse is typically populist in that it trusts neither the government, nor the markets, believes there are strong conflicts of interests between the people and the economic elite. German populism includes workers in “the people” category and defends their right to organize. While it is against rich people getting better health care, it is definitely not egalitarian as the strong support for tying pension payments to contributions and the opposition to paying more taxes for the poor demonstrates. The inegalitarian stance on pension payments separates this discourse from other populist discourses but brings it closer to non-populist German discourses. It is noticeably silent on the issue of progressive taxation, although American and Swedish populist discourses support the principle. It also shows a higher level of generalized trust than Swedish and American populisms. One oddity in this discourse is the support for policies that help parents of newly born and young children. Such policies are designed to help women in the workforce and tend to garner support from leftist discourses. It is possible to interpret this as an extension of support for workers, with whom German populism seems to identify.

5.2.3.3 Swedish Populism

The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor. Society is like a family. We should take care of those who are in need. People should (be able to) rely on help from others. There are people who

live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress, and there are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society. Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth. People don't generally get what they deserve in life.

The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income, and it should provide a job for everyone who wants one. Large differences in income are not necessary for the prosperity of Sweden. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes. Most people are not trustworthy.

It is not a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures. Immigrants do not improve Swedish society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. Immigrants should not have exactly the same rights as Swedes. We should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Sweden for several years. In schools, where there are too many children from some minority groups, the quality of education suffers.

There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in Sweden.

Swedish populism has a different tone than American and German populist discourses. The enemy toward which the populist resentment is directed is very vague. It is not the government, or the rich or the poor, but an unjust system. While the resentment that ordinary people do not get their fair share is there, the definition of "ordinary people" is less class-based than it is in German and American populisms. There is no discernible animosity against the elites, or against the poor and the unemployed. On the contrary, this discourse is very protective of the poor, blames structural injustices for poverty and demands that they society and the government help the needy in every possible manner: by providing income and jobs. It is very egalitarian, and more trusting of the government. The only group that is excluded from society envisioned as a family is immigrants. Anti-immigration affect runs deep in the Swedish populist discourse. Overall, Swedish populism reads as a yearning for the ideal-typical Swedish welfare state model for an

ethnically and economically homogenous Swedish society. As such, it is a remarkably Swedish brand of populism.

5.2.4 Other Discourses

The remaining discourses are presented in this section. They are not ideologically similar. Hence, it is not possible to give them a common label. The American discourse exhibits a very positive, humanitarian and trusting attitude toward people, society and market institutions, whereas the German discourse betrays a very alienated, distrusting and cynical perspective; and the Swedish discourse has a middle-of-the-road attitude toward welfare. All three discourses are staunchly anti-immigrant, but anti-immigrant sentiment is not specific to these discourses.

5.2.4.1 American: Group-Centric Humanitarianism

Life is generally fair. In the US, people get rewarded for their effort. It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care. *The government should not take care of education more* and it should not set up programs for people to find work. Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of less by the government and more by charities. Society is like a family, we should take care of those who are in need. The government should not spend less on the poor. Most people are trustworthy, and a lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.

What is needed to support a family ought to be very important in deciding salaries. Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests. Not everyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives.

We should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the US. It is not true that people from some minority groups are doing the jobs, which others do not want to do. Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against American values should not be expelled, if they are legally settled.

The defining element of this discourse is a view of society as a family, which manifests itself in high levels of trust for people (including welfare recipients), a desire to

help the poor (though charities and a lesser degree through the government), protect workers through unions, consider the needs of families in salary decisions and tolerate immigrant cultures, even when immigrants are unwanted for economic reasons. While this discourse is humanitarian in many respects, it is non-egalitarian and envisions a small role for the government as can be evidenced in the strong desire to limit the role of the government in education, a preference for charity help over government help for the poor, and the opposition to the government involvement in finding jobs for the unemployed.

Generalized trust and a fraternal worldview appears to make this discourse sympathetic to the needy, but the belief that life and economic system in system are fair, and that inequality is not unjust dampen the desire for government involvement in social policies. There is also some anti-minority affect exposed by the rejection of the proposition that some minorities are doing jobs others do not want to do. High level of trust and sympathy for people who are considered to be a part of American society, and resentment toward immigrants and minorities go hand in hand in this discourse. Overall, this discourse accepts the American ethos of rival spheres of society and government, and places itself firmly on the side of society due to its confidence in the fairness of market economy and the trustworthiness of people.

5.2.4.2 German: Alienated Cynicism

A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement. No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.

Large differences in income are not necessary for the prosperity of Germany, but it is not the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor. I would not be ready

to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.

Life is often not fair. Anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives. There are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society, and there are people who live in need because of laziness and lack of willpower.

Most people are not trustworthy. A lot of false benefit claims are a result of dishonesty rather than confusion. It is more important for the government to stop people claiming benefits to which they are not entitled than to get people to claim benefits to which they are entitled.

Workers don't need strong trade unions to protect their interests.

Legal immigrants should not have exactly the same rights as Germans. Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against our German values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled. There are too many immigrants in Germany. Immigrants do not improve Germany society by bringing in new ideas and cultures. We should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Germany for several years.

A strong sense of disenchantment is the most prominent characteristic of this discourse. It does not exhibit trust or sympathy toward any institution, group or element of the system, and it expresses no expectations. Although life and the system are not seen as fair, there is no expressed desire for the government, markets or society to do anything about it. Even though too much inequality is undesirable, the government should not do anything to decrease income differences. Like most other German discourses, there is a preference for occupational hierarchy in incomes. Unlike in the German populist discourse, the dissatisfaction and distrust in this discourse is not channeled into anger and demand for government action. It fizzles into cynicism and a lack of willingness to change undesired aspects of the polity. While this discourse cannot decide whether poverty is caused by dispositional or societal factors, this indecision does not influence the policy recommendation, since the poverty responsibility does not belong to society or the government. Despite not openly stating it, the only option left is for people to resolve

their own problems. This attitude places the alienated, cynical German discourse in the Compensatory model of the Brickman typology. This discourse is unlike any other discourse in Sweden and the US, but it is very similar to the German alienated cynicism discourse that emerges out of the uniquely German statements.

5.2.4.3 Swedish: Group-Centric Humanitarianism

There are too many immigrants in Sweden. There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept. Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against our Swedish values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled. Government spends too much money assisting immigrants. We should not legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Sweden for several years.

Ordinary working people get their share of the nation's wealth in Sweden. Coming from a wealthy family is not essential for getting ahead. It is not the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes, or to provide a guaranteed basic income.

A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement. There should not be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.

Most people are trustworthy. A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty. Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by the government and less by charities. People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes. The government should not spend less on benefits for the poor. The generosity of welfare benefits doesn't cause dependency.

I would not be ready to pay more tax, if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor. People do not live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.

This discourse is characterized by strongly anti-immigrant attitudes and high level of social capital. It trusts that the Swedish system is fair, although it does not support the egalitarian and statist tenets of the Swedish model. Nonetheless, high levels of trust and sympathy for the poor lead this group to back government assistance to the needy.

Among the standard Swedish discourses, it is situated in the economic center because it is not as egalitarian as populist or social democratic discourses in Sweden, but it is in support of a larger government role than Swedish libertarianism. That is also the reason it is very different from the unique Swedish anti-immigrant egalitarian discourse. While both discourses share a passionate opposition to immigration, and both are very trusting, anti-immigrant egalitarianism is, as its name suggests, very egalitarian.

5.3 Discussion

Standard American, German and Swedish liberal discourses are very similar. They are all inegalitarian, pro-market and have low levels of generalized trust. The inegalitarian attitude of the liberal discourse is rooted in the certainty that the market economy is fair, offers opportunities to everyone regardless of their circumstances and rewards people for their effort, coupled with the beliefs that income inequality provides an incentive for hard work, that people should be responsible for themselves and that most people cannot be trusted. Consequently, inequalities produced by free markets are not only acceptable but also welcome, and redistribution by the government aimed at decreasing inequality is a limitation on economic freedoms. Individual freedom is a higher value than equality and justice, therefore redistribution is objectionable. There is also considerable opposition to the idea that the government should force children to help their parents economically. All three liberal discourses are largely sympathetic to immigrants. In these respects, American, German and Swedish liberal discourses have few differences.

Standard social democratic discourses –like standard liberal discourses- are very similar across Germany, Sweden and the US. They are all egalitarian, they all share the

conviction that life is unfair and express a desire for an expanded role for the government to rectify the unfairness of life (and the economic system) and therefore strongly support redistribution, poverty relief and government provision of social services. They claim that cutting welfare would not cause people to stand on their own feet. They also argue that diversity and immigration contribute to society in various ways. The differences among these discourses are largely differences of degree, but there are some statements that differentiate social democratic discourses.

While the American social democratic discourse voices an opposition to the idea that there is a limit to racial, religious or cultural diversity, Swedish social democratic discourse strongly endorses the belief that it is good for any society to have racial, religious or cultural diversity. Albeit being very similar, these statements reveal differences in the national approach to diversity. Swedish social democratic discourse praises the benefits of diversity very powerfully, while American social democratic discourse opposes the idea that there is a limit to diversity, but does so less forcefully. Therefore, the support for diversity in the Swedish social democratic discourse is more intensive but the nature of the support in the American discourse is more extensive. After all, one can support diversity but still maintain that there is a limit to it. The historically heterogeneous nature of American society and the comparative homogeneity of Swedish society may account for this difference in the formulation of positions on diversity.

Swedish and American social democratic discourses fit in the Enlightenment Model of the Brickman categorization of responsibility attribution because they assign solution responsibility for poverty to the government while refraining from attributing problem responsibility to any agent or cause, signaling that their focus is on how to solve

the problem, rather than identifying who is responsible for creating it. German social democratic discourse is not very different, but it identifies social injustice as a cause of poverty, thereby pointing to the socioeconomic structure as one root cause of poverty. Therefore, I classify German social democratic discourse in the Medical Model, wherein the responsibility for both poverty and its solution lies outside the agency of the poor.

Unlike its European brethren, standard American social democratic discourse does not endorse minimum wage. This could be due to the fact that the US is the only country of the three that has a federally mandated minimum wage. American social democratic discourse could, therefore, be less focused on defending the need for a minimum wage. Also, unlike German and Swedish standard social democratic discourses, the American one does not include the statement “life is often not fair.” As discussed earlier, belief in a just world is correlated with negative attitudes toward the poor. American social democratic discourse may be more conducive (or less opposed) to the belief that the poor deserve their status than European social democratic discourses.

All populist discourses in this study share the claim to speak for “the people,” or the middle/working class. They exhibit high levels of disappointment with the government, distrust and resentment toward out-groups, which are defined as all or some of the following: economic elites, immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities. Standard populist discourses tend to agree that there are strong conflicts between ordinary people and other groups in their country, that immigrants do not improve society by bringing new ideas and cultures, and that the status of illegal immigrants should not be legalized. They also distrust people in general. Believing that the economic system is unfair, they distrust both private companies, and the government. They also resent immigrants and

welfare recipients – any group that they do not classify as one of them - for taking away what should be their fair share from the government. To this end, they generally demand that the government step in on their behalf, protect them from private companies, and distribute more resources to the ordinary people. Even though they may advocate redistributive policies, populist positions reflect perceived group interests, not ideological convictions. Populist discourses base their policy positions on their knowledge of who is benefiting from them. They are the most clearly target-group oriented discourses. However, the main target changes from country to country. For instance, in the US, welfare recipients are the biggest target of the populist ire, whereas in Sweden, populist anger is directed mostly at private companies and managers. German populists have the broadest brush, and blame the whole German public for Germany's problems. Interestingly, Swedish populists are not anti-immigrant. This finding corroborates Crepaz's (2008) findings that universal welfare states reduce welfare chauvinism. According to this theory, the universal safety net that the welfare state provides decreases the competition for welfare benefits among native and immigrant groups. In this case, this allows Swedish populists to disentangle their opinions on immigration and the welfare state. Unlike in the US, where the perception that immigrants receive a disproportionate share of the welfare spending channels the populist anger toward immigrants, in Sweden ethnic Swedes continue to see themselves as clients of the universal welfare state, and they do not feel threatened by welfare competition. Thus, when they talk about the welfare state, these groups switch to a frame in which immigration-related concerns are discarded and the welfare state is evaluated separately.

One standard discourse emerged in each country that could not be classified under an ideology. These discourses are internally inconsistent, combining many contradictory positions. They are not intellectually sophisticated. What they have in common is strong anti-immigrant attitudes, but beyond that there are no similarities among the “other” discourses. However, their lack of intellectual and ideological sophistication may provide a revealing insight into their respective nation’s welfare culture. For example, the American discourse, which I label Group-Centric Humanitarianism, is very trusting (except toward immigrants) and employs need as the main distributive justice principle. However, this discourse does not desire the government to provide for the needy. It prefers that jobs pay according to need and private charities help the poor. German discourse is named “Alienated Cynicism.” This discourse manifests high levels of distrust toward every economic and political institution, as well as toward people in general. Unlike populism, this discourse has no demands from the government. It does not claim to speak for any group. It does not offer any solutions to problems, and it is inegalitarian. It exhibits signs of alienation from the system. It reads as a “depressed” discourse. It is startling that unique discourses produced a very similar discourse in Germany, suggesting that a certain segment of the German population is deeply disaffected by the economic system.

Swedish group-centric humanitarianism is defined most strongly by its high level of generalized trust and its opposition to immigration. This discourse trusts the government, the fairness of the Swedish system and people in general. Standard social democratic and populist discourses are internally consistent, whereas group-centric humanitarianism appears as less consistent due to the combination of support for

progressive taxation, assistance to the poor and opposition to redistribution. However, these are not necessarily contradictory positions. I label this discourse as “humanitarian” because, while it is highly sympathetic to the poor (and trusting of people in general), it is not egalitarian. It reflects a humanitarian, need-based justice ideal, wherein the needy are cared for by the government, but it does not advocate redistribution to achieve more equality. It is group-centric because the sympathies and humanitarian impulses of this discourse are reserved for non-immigrants.

Chapter 6. Unique Discourses

In this section, I analyze the discourses that emerge from the statement sets unique to each nation. As in the standard statement sets, four discourses are drawn by factor analysis from each national discourse. These discourses are also categorized into liberal, social democratic and populist groups, and once again there is a discourse in each language, which does not fit any of the general ideological categories. However, as the analysis makes clear, the content of the unique discourses are worlds apart from those of standard discourses.

The language of focus group statements is more vivid, colloquial and emotional. For instance, the following statement echoes the kind of sentiment and language that is recognizable to any student of American political culture:

“You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with everybody, has five or six kids and who’s too lazy to get a job.”

Yet, the above statement is unlikely to appear in a regular survey. It is angry and resentful. It draws a sharp distinction between the sexually promiscuous single mother who receives undeserved government benefits and the hardworking, tax-paying speaker. What we find in surveys instead are the following statements:

“People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.”

“There are people who live in need because of laziness and lack of willpower.”

These statements often elicit very different reactions from respondents, although they aim to measure similar sentiments. One may agree that “people should take responsibility and not rely on help from others,” but which people and whose help are we

referring to specifically? Why do they need help in the first place? Are the helpers willing or are they forced into this arrangement by a third party (e.g. the government)? Are the recipients of help deserving and moral? When the speaker chooses to speak about the gender, parental status, sexual and reproductive behavior as well as the work ethic of the recipient, he does not do so in a cultural vacuum. These criteria of deservingness matter to him because they matter in his society. The single mother in the first statement specifies “the people” that need to be responsible. Although he never talks about the race, many Americans who read this statement are likely to think of African-American women due to the history of the welfare discourse in the US. The speaker is the helper, but not a willing one. This statement is more likely to polarize an American audience than a vague statement about personal responsibility and work ethic, but it does not translate into other languages because it reflects a debate and stereotypes that are specific to contemporary American culture.

Contrast that American statement with a statement from Sweden: “Many people don’t want to receive benefits, for example single mothers and such. They try, they work hard. They have just gotten stuck in it.” Here, the example of single mothers aims to draw attention to the deservingness of welfare recipients. The single mother is deserving of aid in that she is not lazy, she doesn’t avoid work and she does not really want to receive benefits. She is a victim of her circumstances. Of all the groups, he could pick as an example of deservingness, a Swedish discussant picks single mothers. Of all the groups, he could pick as an example of undeservingness, an American participant picks single mothers. This may be pure coincidence, but if these images spring from national

discourses, as I argue, country specific statements will allow us to explore such differences.

Focus group statements do not only differ in language and imagery from standard survey questions. They also reflect the categories in the minds of the speakers in a national discourse. This is a statement drawn from American focus group debates:

“The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church.”

What makes this statement interesting is that only Americans made references to religion and religious institutions during debates on the welfare state. Therefore, only the American focus group survey includes a statement about the church. Since Swedes and Germans did not make any explicit or implicit references to religion, faith or religious organizations during focus group discussions, I do not include any statements about the role of religious organizations in relation to the welfare state in the Swedish and German country specific studies. Similarly, Germans talked about the social market economy, a concept alien to Americans and Swedes. Therefore, only the unique German study includes the terms “social market economy” and “social justice”.

All but three of the statements included in the country specific samples are unique to each country. Two statements are translated and included in all three samples. One statement is included in the American and German samples but not in the Swedish sample because the Swedish sample already includes statements that approximate the content and argument of this statement. These three statements are included for two reasons: first, they allow the testing of some of the hypotheses put forth in this study; second, they provide an anchor for analyzing the results. That is, there are three statements that these samples share with each other and with standard statements, thereby

they may enable us to make some comparisons. As discussed above, country specific statement sets do not lend themselves to comparability in the manner standard group samples do because they ask respondents to rank different statements, which may bear no resemblance to each other. However, they allow us to capture national discourses and contrast the differences among nations to a degree that is not possible with culturally neutral statements, which are identical in every language.

The analysis and comparisons in this chapter only refer to unique discourses. For instance, when there is a reference to “German discourses”, or “all German discourses” it is to be understood that the reference is to unique German discourses, unless it is specifically stated otherwise. Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 list the unique statement sets for each country.

Table 5: Unique US Statements

1	Men can generally be paid more, but if a woman can achieve to the same degree that a man can, if a woman can get a law degree that a man can, or a business degree or whatever, that is equality.
2	We should have long paternal leaves so that the parents can take care of their kids and employers should provide for day care.
3	It's not the government's responsibility to take care of me. It is the government's responsibility to protect me and to keep the world economic trade system in balance.
4	The government should help people that can't help themselves.
5	We spend so much of our tax money on military and corporate bailouts, etc. I would like to live in a society where we spend on things that are important in terms of gaining more equality of opportunity.
6	Even though there may be individual sources for why you end up where you are, I think it's mostly the environment. If that's the case, then it's just a luck of the draw where you end up.
7	The way the education is funded in our country is skewed and highly unequal. When you live in a more affluent area, you have higher property values, you pay higher taxes, the schools are better funded.
8	The only thing that the government is good at is the military. Anything else that the government gets into is a mess.
9	The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church.
10	I would say that there's more equality in the US than anywhere else in the world and even more so in present day than anytime in history. There are more opportunities than ever.
11	Too much equality may be bad for society. It is against human nature and capitalism.
12	When people don't achieve something, that's their choice.
13	Education won't fix problems. Everyone is entitled to an education. What you make with

13 Education won't fix problems. Everyone is entitled to an education. What you make with that education determines whether you make it out of the slums of Harlem or the swamps of New Orleans.

14 Discrimination means that someone else is affecting what's happening to you. Inequality does not necessarily mean that. Just because there is inequality, it doesn't mean that there is discrimination.

15 There is equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. When we talk about equality of opportunity, we think that everybody's treated equally and fairly under the law. Generally, we should hold to that type of equality.

16 I don't think there is any system that could perfectly solve the problem of providing equal opportunity to everyone, but you need to have a system that is at least trying.

17 I don't think you can draw a sharp distinction between the equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. One depends on the other.

18 None of the money goes to where it really matters, the elementary education. The kids from bad school systems, even the brightest of them, suffer. They cannot read and write well. You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with everybody, has five or six kids and who's too lazy to get a job.

20 I would much prefer the welfare system to be more productive, if you have any physical ability at all, you should be required to attend a given task in order to receive welfare, anything.

21 We're eventually moving to a place where race, in and of itself, declines in importance in determining outcomes.

22 If inequalities are economic rather than culture-based, then why are some minorities moving up economically, and others not? There is the perception of racism and victimization, not necessarily the reality of it.

23 Most poor people are not on welfare. They work hard everyday.

24 Those who are on welfare are in real need. They are the poorest of the poor. Even people who are under the federal poverty line do not always qualify for food stamps.

25 What I would like to see is the government establishing a program to get people back to work, checking people, but at the same time not forcing them to taking a job that they are not comfortable doing.

26 Blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation -- all of them from the same enemy. The government has failed the blacks. You can't deny that.

27 Income tax today is unfair. Property tax today is unfair. And illegal immigrants don't have to pay those taxes. The only fair tax is the sales tax. There is a fixed percentage sales tax for everybody across the board. In that way, everybody's taxed, legal or illegal.

28 The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor.

29 The middle class pays most of the taxes and gets nothing. Instead the government pours money to people who don't show any effort to lift themselves out of poverty.

30 It's exploitation when corporate chief executives make hundreds of times more each year than their average workers.

31 Welfare is the most abused system of our government today. A large section of our society today feels that they're entitled to a free-ride.

32 Socialized health care just means lower quality for everybody and slower service. The government will be more in control of your life and your being. This is a socialist government.

33 You may not be responsible for your illness. It can happen to anyone, but it is still your responsibility to take care of your family and take precautions.

34 Health care is a basic human right. The government should make sure that every American is insured.

35 Even when you pay high premiums, you cannot guarantee that you will get anything in return from insurance companies when you get sick. The insurance companies will put up as many obstacles as they can to not pay because that's how they make money.

36 I'm all for doing things as efficiently as possible and through the market, but you cannot run something like health care industry purely on a profit motive.

38	Illegal immigrants come over here, get paid to work, receive welfare and Medicaid and they don't pay taxes. It's not fair.
39	Immigrants do the jobs we don't want to do. They work hard, they help our economy and businesses need them.
40	We are a nation of immigrants. All Americans are descendants of immigrants. How can we close our borders to immigrants now?
41	The United States of America is the greatest nation because we have freedom and choice.
42	America is 24/7 coverage of Paris Hilton. America is pop culture. If there is one thing we can claim, it's pop culture.
43	It's not necessarily fair for companies if they're getting someone with lower qualifications who is not good for the job and he's getting the job just for demographic reasons.
44	Affirmative action is definitely not fair at the individual level, but it is fair at the macro level.
45	Welfare creates a cycle of dependency.
46	Most people can be trusted.
47	People get what they deserve.
48	For many low-income parents, neither marriage nor work is enough to get their families off welfare, let alone out of poverty.
49	Despite its pitfalls, American system is still the better than others.
50	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.

Table 6: Unique German Statements

1	One must ask, how can I make a happy life for the biggest part of society? And, consequently, one has to regulate it financially as well.
2	Paying taxes is a necessary evil.
3	It is not social, if there is a social security contribution assessment ceiling above which health insurance contributions are not raised.
4	The managers that wasted millions through faulty sales and such. And they don't have to be liable for that.
5	I find it difficult to give health care to private hands because there are life risks that one cannot carry alone financially. One cannot protect oneself in case of certain diseases.
6	The 400 Euro jobs are a problem. They are used by the big firms and the people remain without social security.
7	The government should not raise some taxes and abolish corporate taxes because a corporation says, "if the taxes are not lowered we will lay off people."
8	The big industry and the corporations that acquire billion Euro contracts and have record profits are the same ones that lay off people. This is where the problem lies.
9	A firm lays off people and immediately their stocks go up. In no way is this social.
10	Today it is like the early days of industrialization again.
11	If the hiring costs fall, fewer jobs will be outsourced to other countries.
12	Once the state is the employer, its costs will increase because bureaucratism (sic) is constructed ad infinitum.
13	The state makes money out of gas and oil [at our expense]. They should have infinite income and not have to think about road tolls.
14	The problem that we had was that both parties were social state parties. Both tried to attract voters by [promising] social services. And many people are dependent on the social state, for the dole or for their salaries. Therefore, it's so difficult to change anything because this is such a sensitive topic.
15	I think that, whoever wants, should pay unemployment insurance voluntarily from their salary.
16	Due to a lack of efficiency a lot is lost and thus a lot of [our] solidarity is lost, too, and solidarity is the basis [of the system].

17 How much money the CEOs get, it is not normal that one gets so much money for something.

18 The FDR could strive for more equality in redistribution. Not in a socialist sense, but it's a goal.

19 Those who make 25.000 Euros per month should pay a little higher percentage in taxes and someone who earns 800 or 900 Euros per month, should pay a lower percentage.

20 I can imagine people paying a little less for insurance, if they live healthier, to create an incentive.

21 It is unrealistic for the social niveau to be equal or egalitarian.

22 I regard many taxes to be wrong. These capital yields taxes and the tax forms are much too complex. Why do we not simply say, everyone should be taxed according to a fixed percentage. Then one can lay off people in the internal revenue service.

23 Everyone tries to see where to get the most from. Social justice does not work like that.

24 Abuse destroys the social system.

25 It is very difficult to receive social services in Germany.

26 For many unemployed, it somehow does not pay to get a job.

27 In the USA somebody comes to the hospital and they ask if he is insured. I don't want such a thing here.

28 We'd need someone like Jurgen Klinsmann for the socialstate. Someone who really hits on the table so that something happens.

29 If someone speaks German and has lived here for long, then he is German for me.

30 If we didn't have foreigners, we would have to do those jobs.

31 German society excludes foreigners consistently.

32 The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture.

33 I cannot understand when people live together as foreigners and isolate themselves. To me, they are not Germans. One can nurture his culture, but it should not be the cornerstone.

34 Some people from abroad have figured out that their families can live very well on social welfare.

35 The more foreigners isolate themselves, the more unemployed they will be. One should simply speak German.

36 One should see whether he thinks globally or thinks of Germany. And lately, a lot has been spent for non-Germans.

37 It is so unjust that men get better jobs and make more money. There sit the women at home, although they don't really want to.

38 Most people are trustworthy.

39 People get what they deserve.

40 I think that most Muslims in Germany don't know what we do in the church.

41 One should simply say that some other countries are much more socially just.

42 We all want to work for 30 years and then the pension should pay for it all. The entitlement of the people has increased dramatically.

43 The state regulates too much.

44 Some employers are not able to afford all the taxes and duties they have to pay.

45 People come for work, but say, they don't want to work. They just want the stamp.

46 I believe that roads, education and health should be the duty of the state. So that the basic needs of citizens can be met.

47 We had growth in the economy. Then there was the welfare state. Then there were children. The generational contract still worked. It isn't so anymore." These should be the same, which translation you decide to go for.

48 The attitude of Germans is this: there are worthy jobs and unworthy jobs.

49 We are not constrained by family circumstances. We can make of our lives what we will.

50 It's really a matter of trying hard enough.

51 Despite its pitfalls, German model is still better than others.

Table 7: Unique Swedish Statements

1	I don't think one should support the Swedish model, that everyone should be the same. That is not good. A little inequality stimulates.
2	It is good that there are class differences, but it is bad that they ignore those who are less fortunate. They should get what they need, but not more.
3	If the rich are to have a higher tax percentage than the poor, then it's not fair.
4	We need private company insurance. For example, the CEO of Ericsson can't be away for several months just because he needs surgery and is last on the queue. Then he must go ahead.
5	Manager wages are too high, completely absurd, they have been growing rapidly and that takes away the opportunity to hire more people, and create more jobs in this way.
6	One should never be satisfied. One should always wish for more equality.
7	Compared to other countries Sweden is very equal, but if you look within our own society you can see inequalities everywhere.
8	We should have high taxes and even inequalities out.
9	You can do things in a different way. I think nonprofit organizations in Sweden can really do things that the government can't do.
10	We have a lot of taxes that are supposed to benefit in the long run; employer tax and all that. They actually prevent people from hiring. They increase the unemployment.
11	With lower taxes people have more to spend. I know very well that those who are poor can't afford to save for retirement.
12	The government has to be a little observant. They have to see what happens in society. In a democratic country they have to take measures. They can't just sit there and watch.
13	Some countries pay more to charity, but they don't have the same social security net that we have here in other countries. They are more dependent on charity.
14	I still think I get much for my tax money. When you are sick the system really works. We don't need any private health insurance. There is a safety net.
15	I just think that it is bothersome to socialize with people from completely different cultures. I have nothing in common with them. I don't think what they say is funny. I don't understand them.
16	The serious crimes, homicide, manslaughter and rape are much more frequent among immigrants. I don't say that it is good or bad, but it does intimidate many people.
17	Most immigrants have never been in a Swedish home. They don't know any Swedes. And they are happy where they are. They never go to town. They stay in their area.
18	The government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas. They get a great amount of financial assistance, but they don't do anything with it.
19	In Sweden immigrants live on social welfare. If you can go to "Swedish for immigrants" and you live on social welfare, you don't have to take care of yourself.
20	A person who thinks that "I am a Swedish citizen" is Swedish. You do need to accept the whole midsummer pole tradition to be Swedish.
21	I am not saying that all immigrants will become Swedes in one day. But people who have lived and worked here for 30 years and their children who are born here are still called immigrants. They are born here. They didn't immigrate to any country.
22	The rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish. They have no contact. The differences increase. Then prejudices arise.
23	The immigrants that make trouble are the ones that show, not the shy immigrants who are just as boring as the rest of Sweden .
24	Immigration doesn't need to be a loss for the welfare system, but now it is, since people don't have any means of sustenance, and they don't get people into the work life and that is the government's fault.
25	Swedish stock exchange directors have destroyed Swedish companies, and are still taking out huge bonuses.

26 Previously there were poorhouse auctions; whoever was willing to take care of orphans at
the lowest price, got to take care of the children and were given some money from the
municipality. That is what we get today, when we privatize the care of elderly on private
companies, when we don't check up to see how they are running it.

27 You can live on social welfare without problems. You can live well off the government, and
then that doesn't push people forward. You need to have something to fight for.

28 Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and
make it better.

29 The Swedish people have hung themselves in their own safety harness by accepting too
many benefits. There are many who are afraid of change because they live off the benefits.

30 Of course the national social insurance is good, but it is almost a little too much. We could
have a more positive development in the country if we didn't have such a strong social rule.

31 There are advantages to our day care system, but because of day care and daylong school,
parents don't have to care for their children any more. There is not so much family life any
more.

32 I think that the equality in Sweden has come a long way, because women don't need to be
home. It should not only be the man in a relationship who has a career and is successful.

33 In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room they ask whether or not you have
insurance. So our system is not wrong. It is good that we have a base, but it can always be
improved.

34 Women have state support and rights all over Europe. We have been surpassed long ago.

35 It is good in the long run to have a good safety net. You know you can use it. If you don't
succeed you have that to fall back on.

36 Sweden is the land of moderation. It is not too much of anything. Those who can afford it
do actually move abroad.

37 In Sweden we care and we think about the less fortunate.

38 It is when you go abroad that you realize that things are good in Sweden. The differences
between the rich and the poor are much starker in other countries.

39 The idea of the welfare state is good, but it is abused way too much. You ask yourself why
it is so; all people are actually dishonest in some way.

40 Everyone who shouldn't have benefits has benefits. 1467 Everybody uses the system, even
when they think it's wrong.

41 The social system is good, even if people are unemployed or uneducated, they are getting
by, but you can have a side effect, since some people who could have worked choose
unemployment instead. Better to have it as we do, than having it as it is in the USA.

42 Many people don't want to receive benefits, for example single mothers and such. They try,
they work hard. They have just gotten stuck in it.

43 I absolutely think that those who need benefits should get benefits, and it should not be very
difficult to prove this [the need].

44 I wouldn't mind keeping Sweden as it is but to have a little more individualism.

45 We Swedes are an egalitarian people.

46 Most people can be trusted.

47 The taxes are too high. Way too high.

48 You're happy in Sweden that everyone is doing well. You feel like it is a country that
protects everyone. But if you are thinking about yourself, you want to use your capacity,
and that you are prevented from in Sweden.

49 We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's
really a matter of trying hard enough.

50 People get what they deserve.

6.1 Findings

6.1.1 Liberalism

6.1.1.1 American Liberalism

The richer should not pay higher percentages of tax than the poor. Health care is not a basic human right. The government does not have to make sure that every American is insured. The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church. It's not the government's responsibility to take care of me. It is the government's responsibility to protect me and to keep the world economic trade system in balance. I don't want the government establishing a program to get people back to work (but not forcing them to taking a job that they are not comfortable doing). We should not have long paternal leaves for the parents to take care of their kids and employers should not have to provide for day care.

Despite its pitfalls, American system is still the better than others. The United States of America is the greatest nation because we have freedom and choice. I would say that there's more equality in the US than anywhere else in the world and even more so in present day than any time in history. There are more opportunities than ever. I don't agree that blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation from the government. Discrimination means that someone else is affecting what's happening to you. Inequality does not necessarily mean that. Just because there is inequality, it doesn't mean that there is discrimination. We should not cut back spending on things like military to gain more equality of opportunity.

We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough. Welfare is the most abused system of our government today. A large section of our society today feels that they're entitled to a free ride. Welfare creates a cycle of dependency. Those who are on welfare are not in real need. They are not very poor, and those who are poor qualify for assistance.

Immigrants do not do the jobs we don't want to do. They don't help our economy and businesses don't need them. We have the right to close our borders to immigrants (even if our ancestors were immigrants).

This discourse is the strongest liberal discourse unearthed in this study. Only Swedish social democratic discourse is as coherent as this discourse, and similar to the Swedish social democratic discourse, it is praises the national economic and social model greatly. It is a powerful defense of weak meritocracy. It is strongly nonegalitarian,

distrusting and anti-immigration. The belief that the American economic system is fundamentally fair, that it provides everyone an equal opportunity to shape her own destiny and that inequality is merely the result of differences in personal talent and ambition makes this discourse very unreceptive to redistribution and government assistance to the needy. According to this discourse, inequality is not unfair, if it is not caused by discrimination, and since there is no discrimination in the US, inequality is unproblematic. The opposition to government assistance is abetted by the twin assumptions that welfare only serves to deepen their dependence, and that most people who receive welfare do not really need it in any case. Although this discourse saves its harshest criticism for welfare programs, it also opposes government involvement in all economic issues. This position is predicated on a firm conviction that the role of the government should be limited to the most basic functions, and that it is not the duty of the government to take care of citizens. Its wholesale opposition to an active government role distinguishes American liberal discourse from European liberal discourses. German liberalism barely talks about the government, while Swedish liberalism supports an interventionist government to a certain degree.

Like the social democratic and economic populist discourses in the US, this discourse also opposes the argument that the blacks are discriminated by the government, but other discourses are not as steadfast in their opposition, suggesting that the liberal discourse is infused with higher levels of symbolic racism than other American discourses. The opposition against immigration is not based on cultural prejudices and intolerance, but on the economic anxiety that immigrants take away jobs from Americans. In this respect, it is similar to other American discourses and very different

from European discourses which tend to emphasize the cultural problems immigration creates.

6.1.1.2 German Liberalism

It is not very difficult to receive social services in Germany. People come for work, but they say they don't want to work. They just want the stamp (to qualify for unemployment assistance). Everybody wants to work for only 30 years and expect the retirement funds to pay it all. The entitlement of people has risen dramatically. Abuse destroys the social system.

It is unrealistic for the social niveau to be equal or egalitarian. It is not unjust that men get better jobs and make more money. We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough. I do not find it difficult to give health care to private sector. People should pay a little less for insurance, if they live healthier, to create an incentive.

400 Euro jobs are not a problem. It's not true that managers have wasted millions through faulty sales and they are not held accountable for it.

One should see whether he thinks globally or thinks of Germany. And lately, a lot has been spent for non-Germans. We do not exclude foreigners. We do not need foreigners for jobs. The presence of immigrants does not enrich our city culture. If someone speaks German and has lived here for long, that doesn't make him a German for me.

This is a consistently liberal discourse, which is characterized by strongly inegalitarian, distrusting and anti-immigrant positions. It is founded on the beliefs that people are dishonest and inequality is not unjust. According to this discourse, circumstances don't constrain people and inequalities are based on dispositional factors. Hence, social equality is not possible. Unlike other discourses that focus on the role of the government either because they support it or they are against it, German liberal discourse completely ignores the government, and defends the private sector.

The absence of a stance on government functions sets this discourse apart from other German discourses, which direct most of their attention to the role of the German

government, and refer to the private sector only in a negative context, but it also separates this discourse from American and Swedish liberal discourses, which criticize the government instead of ignoring it. As such, it is not possible to extrapolate what role this discourse assigns to the government, although it is clear that redistributive policies would be strongly opposed. This curious omission leaves us in the dark about the degree to which this discourse approves of German social state institutions and policies. We can speculate that this omission is not accidental, and it is a discursive strategy to avoid crossing the boundaries set by the national discourse. If the German national discourse is hostile to the idea of severely limiting the role of the government, such propositions would make this discourse less acceptable. Hostility toward immigrants in this discourse rests on both cultural and economic reasons.

6.1.1.3 Swedish Liberalism

We should not have high taxes to even inequalities out. The taxes are too high. With lower taxes people have more to spend. Those who are poor can't afford to save for retirement. There are many who are afraid of change because they live off the benefits. The Swedish people have hung themselves in their own safety harness by accepting too many benefits.

We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough. It is good that there are class differences, but it is bad to ignore those who are less fortunate. I absolutely think that those who need benefits should get benefits, and it should not be very difficult to prove this [the need]. They should get what they need, but not more. The idea of the welfare state is good, but it is abused way too much because all people are dishonest in some way. You cannot live well off the government on social welfare. I don't think you need to have something to fight for to push you forward.

Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better. In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room they ask whether or not you have insurance. So our system is not wrong. I wouldn't mind keeping Sweden as it is but to have a little more individualism. It is when you go abroad that you realize that things are good in Sweden. The difference between the poor and the rich is

significantly higher in other countries. Women have more state support and rights in Sweden (than in other countries).

It's not true that the government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas, and they don't do anything with it. The serious crimes, homicide, manslaughter and rape aren't much more frequent among immigrants. Most immigrants do not isolate themselves from Swedes, or just stay in their area. The rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish, which decreases their contact with others and increases differences and prejudice. Immigrants don't go to "Swedish for immigrants", and live on social welfare.

This discourse is largely liberal in nature, but it is fundamentally different from the standard Swedish liberal discourse. The most significant difference is the comparatively high level of support for the Swedish model in this discourse. While it is significantly inegalitarian and anti-government compared to other Swedish discourses, it is pronouncedly more egalitarian and pro-government than German and American liberal discourses. It shows a high level of concern and sympathy for the people in need, despite the strong opposition to redistribution, and it includes statements that refer to equality as a positive value. It wants to retain the national health care system, but also allow for profits in medical care (presumably through a parallel private insurance system), and modify the Swedish model to allow for lower taxation, more individualism and less generous social benefits, but not overhaul it. Moreover, unlike liberal discourses in other countries, Swedish liberalism holds a very positive attitude toward immigrants, defending them on both cultural and economic grounds.

6.1.2 Social Democracy

6.1.2.1 American Social Democracy

People do not get what they deserve, and they don't choose to fail. The government should help people that can't help themselves. The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church. It is not true that the government is only good at the military, and the government should do more than keeping me safe and protecting the

world trade system. It is the government's responsibility to take care of me. It is not the case that the government pours money to people who don't show any effort to lift themselves out of poverty by using taxes paid by the middle class.

The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor. It's exploitation when corporate chief executives make hundreds of times more each year than their average workers. There is equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. When we talk about equality of opportunity, we think that everybody's treated equally and fairly under the law. Generally, we should hold to that type of equality. When there is inequality, it means there is discrimination. Inequalities are economic rather than culture based. Most people are trustworthy.

The way the education is funded in our country is skewed and highly unequal. When you live in a more affluent area, you have higher property values, you pay higher taxes, and the schools are better funded. We should not have long paternal leaves to allow the parents to take care of their kids and have employers provide for daycare.

It is not true that immigrants do the jobs we don't want to do, or that they help our economy and businesses need them. Racism against minorities and victimization are not perceptions, they are real. It's not true that blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation from the government.

There are elements that contradict the ideal-type social democratic ideology in this discourse: "The economy does not need immigrants because Americans are willing to do the jobs that immigrants get. "We" shouldn't provide long parental leaves and childcare. Blacks are not discriminated by the government." Otherwise, this discourse manifests a trusting, strongly egalitarian and pro-government ideology, but the negative stance on immigration, and the opposition to legally mandating workplaces to provide childcare separates it from Swedish and German social democratic discourses. Its focus on equality is similar to that of the Swedish social democratic discourse. Inequalities are blamed on structural reasons such as discrimination and educational and economic opportunities rather than dispositional attributes.

There is a very strong opposition to the idea that people get what they deserve. Explanations subjects provide for this opposition emphasize the role of chance and unequal circumstances in life outcomes. However, the discourse also highlights the distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome and states a firm preference for equality of opportunity. Emphasis on this distinction distinguishes it from Swedish egalitarianism. The discourse supports an active government that redistributes resources, helps the needy, provides equality of opportunity and takes care of American citizens. It denies that the government treats the middle class unfairly. This discourse is not based on class or self-interest but an ideological conviction that it is the duty of the government to provide equality of opportunity and assistance to the people.

The hostility toward immigration is purely economic based on the perception that unemployed Americans need the positions that are currently given to immigrants because they are cheaper to hire. Interestingly, while this discourse argues that generally inequality results from discrimination, not from culture, they contradict that belief when they defend that blacks do not suffer from discrimination by the government. This is another instance of target group-specific perception of government policy, and as the symbolic racism theory suggests, it reflects the wide spread perception in America that blacks are not discriminated any more and they are responsible for their disadvantaged position. The strong opposition to this statement brings together the very disparate discourses of economic liberalism, economic populism and social democracy in America.

The most startling part of this discourse is the opposition to providing long parental leaves and childcare for working parents. United States is one of the two countries in the world (the other being Papua New Guinea) where companies are not

legally required to provide paid maternal leave. Thus, it is imaginable that even the leftist American discourse is accepting of the lack of legal provisions designed to help new parents. However, this discourse goes beyond accepting the status quo. It objects to such provisions. This study offers no explanations for this position.

6.1.2.2 German Social Democracy

Despite its pitfalls, German model is still better than others. Progressive taxation is good. We should not be like the USA, where they ask for insurance when you come to the hospital. I believe that the roads, education and health should be the duty of the government so that the basic needs of citizens are met. Unemployment insurance should be mandatory. The government is not collecting too much money. It doesn't regulate too much. Paying taxes is a necessary evil. We are not living in a wild capitalism. It is not too difficult to get social services in Germany.

We do not spend too much for immigrants. Immigrants enrich our culture. We do not exclude them.

Managers waste money and they are not held accountable. Entitlement of the people has risen. Men get the better jobs and they make more money, and this is so unjust.

This discourse represents a distinctly German perspective. While I label it as a social democratic discourse because it shares a lot of common elements with the social democratic discourses in the US and Sweden in that it favors an active government that protects its citizens and takes care of their basic needs, strongly supports a progressive taxation system, and is very unsympathetic to managers. It could also be called the German model discourse, for it is a consistent defense of the German social market model. It is uniquely German because it is highly supportive of the German model, and because it is concerned with unemployment (insurance) and the inferior earning power of women in the labor market. Although American and Swedish social democratic discourses reflect trust in people, this discourse does not. The underlying worry is not that people are dishonest and they abuse the system, but that Germans feel entitled to

generous pensions, even though they are not committed to working long years to keep the pension system viable. The high level of support for and satisfaction with the German model also distinguishes it from other German discourses.

6.1.2.3 Swedish Social Democracy

We get much for our tax money in Sweden. There is a safety net. When we're sick the system works, we don't need any private health insurance. In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room, they ask if you have insurance, so our system is not wrong. The American system, where people can make so much money is impressive, but then you see the ghetto a few blocks away and you wonder what kind of a society it is. When you go abroad, you realize how equal Sweden is compared to other countries, but that doesn't mean we don't have inequality here, we have it everywhere.

Taxes in Sweden are not too high, and national social insurance is not too much. Social system doesn't impede economic development. People are not dishonest. They do not abuse the welfare state too much, and the people who use the system are those that need it. We should support the Swedish model. Just helping the poor is not enough. Inequality and class differences also need to be addressed.

Managers destroy Swedish companies and still receive huge bonuses. The rich stay in protected areas where everyone is Swedish. They have no contact with different groups (immigrants and the poor), and this increases the differences and prejudices in society.

Socializing with people from different cultures is not bothersome. We have things in common. A person who thinks she's Swedish is Swedish for me. He doesn't have to accept all Swedish traditions. Not all immigrants will become Swedish one day, but we should not call people "immigrants" when they have lived or worked here for a long time, or were born here. They didn't immigrate anywhere. It's not true that immigrants live on welfare.

Of all the discourses uncovered in this Q study, Swedish Social democratic discourse has the most coherent and ideological narrative. This ardently egalitarian discourse reads like a love letter to the social democratic model, and a defense of it against the liberal discourse. All statements in the discourse are consistent with the ideal-type social democratic ideology. They cluster around four broad themes: equality is a

supreme value, government is a force for good, people are trustworthy, and society should be tolerant toward and inclusive of immigrants. Every statement about the government and the social system is positive. Not only does this discourse approve of the abstract tenets of the Swedish social system, which are described as providing social security against risks and promoting equality, it is also satisfied with the implementation of these ideals. Private sector is mentioned only once and it is represented negatively.

The attitude toward immigrants is different from American and German social democratic discourses in that it actively defends immigrants, places the onus of integration on Swedish society, and criticizes Swedes for continuing to label second-generation, non-ethnic Swedes immigrants.

Among unique Swedish discourses, social democrats are most willing to sacrifice their economic self-interest for redistribution, most tolerant towards immigrants, and least prone to believe in class-conflict. This discourse shows an ideological commitment to social justice and equality, rather than a self-interested plea for more equality.

6.1.3 Populism

6.1.3.1 American Populism

Middle class is being unfairly treated and squeezed from all sides. The government taxes them more than other groups, but provides less in return. *The richer should pay higher percentages of tax.* You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with everybody, has five or six kids and who's too lazy to get a job. It is exploitation that there is such a large income gap between managers and workers. Inequality points to the existence of discrimination. Health insurance companies are dishonest and they profit from not paying for sicknesses. It is not true that there is more equality of opportunity in America than other places and other times. Most people cannot be trusted. Blacks are not suffering from discrimination and exploitation at the hands of the government.

The family and the church should not assume the main responsibility. The current system of welfare creates a cycle of

dependency and wastes money on undeserving people, so *the government should not help people who cannot help themselves*. Welfare system should be productive and all able-bodied people should be required to work in exchange for the benefits they receive. Illegal immigrants come over here, get paid to work, receive welfare and Medicaid and they don't pay taxes. It's not fair. Government should help Americans instead of immigrants.

Overall, this discourse claims to speak for the American middle class and reveals resentment toward the government and the market, the rich and the poor, as well as immigrants and minorities, and lists a litany of problems with the current American system. However, most of the opposition to the social state is selective and based on practical concerns rather than normative beliefs. Hostility is directed at the existing social state due to the conviction that the current welfare provisions benefit others (particularly the never-do-well welfare recipients) at the expense of the middle class and perpetuates dependency, but there is no opposition to the idea of the social state. On the contrary, American populism is receptive to the idea of a social state that supports the middle class, that is, hardworking, tax-paying, ordinary Americans.

American populism rejects the idea that there is equality of opportunity in the US compared to other times and places, and argues that inequalities are caused by discrimination, and high discrepancies between the earnings of managers and workers is tantamount to exploitation. However, this attitude only applies to middle class Americans. When it comes to the welfare recipients, this discourse claims that their poverty is not caused by discrimination but by individual laziness. Therefore, this discourse uses a different responsibility frame for middle class and lower class. The two highest ranked statements in this discourse argue for the rich to pay higher taxes and the needy to receive less assistance. The richer should pay higher taxes because the middle class always gets shortchanged by the government. According to this discourse,

progressive taxation is a remedy to this unfair situation as long as it does not benefit the undeserving (lazy and promiscuous) poor, who should not receive government assistance.

6.1.3.2 German Populism

People do not get what they deserve. We are constrained by our circumstances. We cannot make what we want of our lives. I believe that the roads, education and health should be the duty of the government so that the basic needs of citizens are met. I find it difficult to give health care to private hands because there are life risks that one cannot carry alone financially. One cannot protect oneself in case of certain diseases.

It is not normal how much money CEOs get. It is not necessary to organize the economy to make most of society happy, but those who make a lot of money should pay a little higher percentage in taxes and someone who earns very little should pay a lower percentage. 400 Euro Jobs are a problem²⁰. They are used by the big firms and the people remain without social security.

Most people are not trustworthy. Abuse destroys the social system. Everyone tries to see where to get the most from. Social justice does not work like that.

German model is not better than others, but it is not much more socially just in other countries, either.

Some people from abroad have figured out that their families can live very well on social welfare. The presence of immigrants doesn't enrich our city culture. We don't need foreigners to do the jobs we don't want to do. German society does not consistently exclude foreigners.

This discourse is one of disaffection, distrust and resentment. It displays distrust for the government, the economic system, big corporations, the rich, welfare recipients, immigrants and people in general. It is an internally consistent, but non-ideological populist discourse. It appears to be an expression of resentment by people who feel that the system is unjust, that people are constrained by their circumstances and that normal

²⁰ "400 Euro jobs" (also known as 1-Euro jobs) refer to part-time workers who receive unemployment assistance from the German government. The implication in this statement is that because receiving above a certain amount would cause a reduction in unemployment assistance, companies offer people on unemployment assistance part-time jobs with very low wages. In that case, the person would still be eligible for unemployment insurance and the company would be exempt from paying social security, and health care insurance contributions since those are already covered by unemployment assistance.

people do not get what they deserve, while some groups such as the rich, the dishonest recipients of government assistance and the immigrants take advantage of the system. Although they cannot trust the government, they nonetheless believe that it is the duty of the government to protect them against life risks and free markets. They want progressive taxation. They have very negative attitudes toward immigrants for both cultural and economic reasons.

6.1.3.3 Swedish Populism

Swedish stock exchange directors destroyed Swedish companies, but still get huge bonuses. Companies cannot hire more people because they are paying absurdly high salaries to managers and these salaries have been increasing rapidly. We don't think and care for the less fortunate in Sweden. When we privatize the care of the elderly, it is like the old times when there were poorhouse auctions and the care of orphans were given to the highest bidder by the municipality. We don't need private health insurance.

I don't get much for my tax money. Taxes are too high. National social insurance is not too much. It's not true that Sweden would be much better with less strong social rule. Nonprofit organizations cannot do things the government is supposed to do.

People do not get what they deserve. We are constrained by our circumstances. We cannot make what we want of our lives just by trying hard enough.

Immigration doesn't need to be a loss for the welfare system, but now it is, since people don't have any means of sustenance, and they don't get people into the work life and that is the government's fault. The immigrants that make trouble are visible, not the ones that are boring like the rest of Sweden. Serious crimes such as homicide, manslaughter and rape are much more frequent among immigrants and this intimidates many people. It's not true that schools in immigrant areas get a lot of government money and financial assistance, and not do anything with it.

Most of the anger in the Swedish populist discourse is reserved for the private sector, particularly the managers who are deemed undeserving of the high incomes they earn, and is rooted in a distrust of the private sector who is blamed for Sweden's economic troubles, but the government is a target of resentment as well because the taxes

are too high and the services people get in return are not adequate. What this discourse demands is more government support for the regular people, who are victims of private sector greed and high taxation. The position on immigration is rather ambivalent, particularly in comparison to American and German discourses. The opposition is principally to the way immigration is handled and not immigration itself. An observation that violent crimes are more common in the immigrant population is tempered with a suspicion that trouble-making immigrants attract attention while the regular ones are unnoticed. Overall, the misgivings about immigration do not lead to anger toward immigrants. Swedish populism, similar to German populism, does not exhibit any class-conscious. “The people” constitute a singular category against the corporations.

6.1.4 Other Discourses

6.1.4.1 American Anti-Redistribution Populism

Health care is a basic human right. The government should make sure that every American is insured. We spend so much of our tax money on military and corporate bailouts, etc. I would like to live in a society where we spend on things that are important in terms of gaining more equality of opportunity. People do not get what they deserve. It's not people's choice, when they don't achieve something. The government should help people that can't help themselves. The burden of responsibility does not start with the family and the church. What I would like to see is the government establishing a program to get people back to work, checking people, but at the same time not forcing them to taking a job that they are not comfortable doing.

They should take care of Americans first before they take care of outsiders. We can close our borders to immigrants. Illegal immigrants come over here, get paid to work, receive welfare, and Medicaid and they don't pay taxes. It's not fair. The richer should not pay higher percentages of tax than the poor. Income and property taxes today are unfair, and illegal immigrants don't have to pay those taxes. The only fair tax is the sales tax. There is a fixed percentage sales tax for everybody across the board. In that way, everybody's taxed, legal or illegal.

You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with

everybody, has five or six kids and who's too lazy to get a job. Marriage and work are enough to get lower income families off welfare. You end up where you are mostly because of individual differences rather than the environment. It's not just a luck of the draw where you end up. Most people cannot be trusted.

There are many statements that completely contradict each other in this discourse, which makes it appear as inconsistent, but this incoherence can be explained by the heavily non-ideological, target group-oriented nature of the discourse. When talking about people in general and abstract terms, the discourse does not attribute problem or solution responsibility to individuals. Instead problems are attributed to non-dispositional elements and solution responsibility is assigned to the government. However, when target groups are specified as welfare recipients or immigrants, both problem and solution responsibility for poverty is attributed to the poor. In other words, this discourse views economic difficulties in the medical model frame, but switches to the moral model frame when an unpopular group is identified as the subject of discussion. Moreover, taxation policy arguments are framed to emphasize how they benefit or punish these groups.

According to this discourse, illegal immigrants are free riders who do not pay income taxes, yet benefit from government spending, and taxation is framed as an immigration-related issue. As a result, replacing income tax with a flat rate sales tax is proposed as a solution to the free-riding problem. Welfare recipients are the other target group that leads to inconsistencies in the discourse. There is adamant support for an active government role in creating equality of opportunity, providing health care and help people who are unemployed and otherwise in need, but when the needy are identified as welfare recipients, the discourse becomes very hostile, blames them for their poverty, and suggests that the solution to their poverty is hard work, birth control and marriage, contradicting the generalized argument that people do not get what they deserve and do

not fail because they choose to. Once again, taxation is framed as an unfair handout to the undeserving from the hardworking. This element of the discourse is heavily populist, but it is a different brand of populism. A discourse that is heavily in favor of government involvement in the economy to help the people opposes progressive taxation because it perceives immigrants and minorities to be the beneficiaries of progressive taxation.

6.1.4.2 German Alienated Cynicism

Unemployment insurance should be mandatory. Many taxes are (morally) wrong and too complex. Everyone should be taxed according to a fixed percentage. Then we can lay off people in the internal revenue service. Inefficiency in the bureaucracy harms solidarity, and solidarity is the basis of our system.

German model isn't better than others. The state regulates too much. We don't need some authority figure like Jurgen Klinsmann for the social state. Big firms use 400 Euro jobs to keep people without social security. It's not true that if the hiring costs fall, fewer jobs will be outsourced to other countries. The big industry and the corporations that acquire billion Euro contracts and have record profits are the same ones that lay off people. This is where the problem lies. The CEOs get too much money. A firm lays off people and immediately their stocks go up. In no way is this social. It is not like the early days of industrialization today. It is not very difficult to receive social services in Germany. It is not true when people say "we had growth in the economy. Then there was the welfare state. Then there were children. The generational contract still worked. It isn't so anymore."

The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture. Immigrants don't abuse social welfare. German society doesn't exclude foreigners, but very few of Muslims in Germany know what we do in the church.

This discourse is defined by what it opposed rather than what it supports. It is (mostly) anti-government, anti-market and anti-German model. It is strongly against redistribution. The discourse reflects a frustration with the overall system, and opposition to all of its elements. However cynical both may be, this discourse is distinguished from the standard German cynical discourse by the source of its frustration. This discourse is largely positive about immigrants. The resentment is not directed at people, immigrants

or welfare recipients, but at the state bureaucracy and the private sector. Despite the explicit denouncement of the German model, there are hints that this discourse supports the ideal of the German social market but is disappointed the reality does not approximate this vision. The cynicism is mostly a result of lack of proposed solutions to identified problems in this discourse.

6.1.4.3 Swedish Group-Centric Egalitarianism

Most people are trustworthy. The welfare state is not abused too much (people are not dishonest). Many people don't want to receive benefits, for example single mothers and such. They try, they work hard. They have just gotten stuck in it. People do not get what they deserve. One should never be satisfied. One should always wish for more equality. It is not good to accept class differences, and give the poor just what they need, but not more.

Of course I have periods when I think that the system in the US is so good. It is impressive. It is cool that one can make so much money. But if you go a few blocks away you see the ghetto. And then you wonder what kind of a society it is. You do not see inequalities everywhere in Swedish society. Taxes (such as employer tax) don't prevent companies from hiring and increasing unemployment.

Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better. Giving the care of the elderly to private companies is not like poorhouse auctions of the past. We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.

The government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas. They get a great amount of financial assistance, but they don't do anything with it. It's not true that the rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish causing differences to increase and prejudices to arise. I don't find it bothersome to socialize with people from completely different cultures.

This discourse is more trusting than any other discourse uncovered in this study and this high level of trust colors other elements of the discourse. If most people are honest and hard-working, but personal effort is not enough to get some people out of poverty, it follows that they should be helped. However, this discourse does not stop at

that level. Helping the needy is necessary but not sufficient. Society should strive to decrease inequalities. A humanitarian concern for the wellbeing of the needy is combined with the apprehension that an unequal society, which excludes the poor, is an unjust society, even if it promises more wealth. These concerns do not lead to disenchantment with the system. On the contrary they are largely assuaged by the belief that Swedish model is egalitarian, and provides the opportunity to succeed for everyone. However, the trust of and sympathy for the needy does not extend to immigrants. Based on the belief that government resources are wasted by immigrant communities, we can extrapolate that the community imagined in this discourse does not extend beyond ethnic Swedes, and trust and sympathy for others is conditional upon membership in this community. However, at the same time, the anti-immigrant sentiment in this discourse is weak and it has no bearing on trust levels or social policy preferences, except when the policies directly pertain to immigrants. In this respect, it is very different from American discourses, in which the anti-immigrant and anti-minority affect influences stances on broader policy areas.

6.1.5 The Brickman Model of Responsibility

Categorization of all the discourses according responsibility-attribution patterns demonstrates that the most common type of responsibility attribution among these discourses is the Medical Model, in which the poor are held responsible neither for their poverty, nor for lifting themselves out of poverty. No country dominates this category. It includes four American, three Swedish and three German discourses. Enlightenment Model is the second most popular one. In this model the solution responsibility for poverty lies with the government regardless of the cause of the poverty. Most of the

discourses in this category are Swedish. Almost all the discourses in the Moral Model are American. This model puts both the blame and solution responsibility for poverty on the poor themselves. The least crowded category is the Compensatory Model, which includes two German and one Swedish discourse. One American discourse is in two categories because it uses different models for different target groups. This discourse frames poverty in the medical frame for the ingroup (middle class) and in the moral model for the outgroup (welfare recipients).

Table 8: Discourse Categorization according to the Brickman Model

Problem Solution	Responsible	Not Responsible
Responsible	Moral Model Unique American Liberalism Unique American Populism* (for welfare recipients) Standard American Liberalism Unique German Liberalism	Compensatory Model Standard German Alienated Cynicism Standard German Liberalism Standard Swedish Liberalism
Not Responsible	Enlightenment Model Unique Swedish Liberalism Unique Swedish Social Democracy Standard Swedish Social Democracy Swedish Group-Centric Humanitarianism Unique American Social Democracy American Group-Centric Humanitarianism Unique German Social Democracy	Medical Model Unique American Social Democracy Unique American Populism* (for the middle class) American Anti-Redistribution Populism Standard American Populism Unique German Populism Standard German Social Democracy Standard German Populism Unique Swedish Populism Swedish Group-Centric Egalitarianism Standard Swedish Populism

The distribution reveals that Swedish discourses prefer that the government take responsibility for solving poverty. When Swedish discourses attribute responsibility, they

tend to assign it to structural factors, but more often they prefer to avoid discussing the causes of poverty altogether. The discourses in the Enlightenment model focus on the solution, and detach problem and solution responsibility from each other. American discourses constitute the majority of the discourses in the Moral Model category, showing that American discourses are more likely to blame poverty on dispositional factors, and deduce that if people are responsible for their poverty, they should also be responsible for solving their economic troubles. The Compensatory Model is similar to the Enlightenment Model in the sense that it does not follow the attribution-affect-action sequence and focuses on what the most effective solution to the problem is. Two German and one Swedish discourse are in this category because they do not assign any responsibility to any cause or group, but they argue that people should take care of themselves. Discourses from all three nations populate the Medical Model category. This model blames the structure for poverty and turns to the government for helping the poor. This category is similar to the Enlightenment model because they both expect the government to address the problem of poverty, but it is the counterpart of the Moral Model in the sense that it connects solution responsibility to problem responsibility.

Predictably, social democratic discourses make up the majority of the discourses in the Enlightenment model, whereas liberal discourses constitute most of the discourses in the Moral Model. Populism dominates the Medical Model. Compensatory Model includes cynical and liberal discourses.

6.2 Discussion

Unique discourses vary vastly from nation to nation, but they still share common features. All unique liberal discourses include the statement, “(W)e are not constrained by

accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough."²¹ This statement blames individuals for their economic failures, as opposed to the economic system. This constitutes the core of liberal discourses, regardless of the nation, or regime type: the belief that the economic system is fair, that everybody has the chance to achieve success and therefore when people fail, it is their fault, not that of economic or social structure. This individualist attribution of blame is the fundamental difference between liberal and other discourses. Unique liberal discourses also agree on the desirability of some inequality. This attitude hinges on the conviction that some people are more qualified and harder working than others and, therefore, it is both inevitable and desirable that they earn more. However, unique liberalism shifts shape according to the national context, and beyond the basics liberal discourses are not very similar.

American liberalism is noticeable for its remarkable coherence. This discourse is strongly inegalitarian, distrusting and anti-immigration. It is against government intervention in every sphere, particularly in welfare, and supports the ideals of a weak meritocracy. The belief that the American economic system is fundamentally fair, that it provides everyone an equal opportunity to shape her own destiny and that inequality is merely the result of differences in personal talent and ambition makes this discourse very unreceptive to redistribution and government assistance to the needy. Inequality is not unfair, if it is not caused by discrimination, and since there is no discrimination in the US, inequality is unproblematic. The opposition to government assistance is abetted by the

²¹ Although each country received a unique statement set, I added two common statements to be able to test the hypotheses of the study. This is one of the common statements.

twin assumptions that welfare only serves to deepen their dependence, and that most people who receive welfare are not in real need in the first place.

As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, surveys and experiments reveal that in the US symbolic racism and opposition to welfare are strongly correlated. American liberal discourse neatly fits this pattern. Statements that deny discrimination against blacks (which are accepted as a marker of symbolic racism) are very highly ranked in American liberalism. Not only does this discourse oppose the idea that there is discrimination against blacks, but it does so with fervor. American liberals disagree with this statement above all others, showing that they feel very strongly about the topic.

Unique Swedish liberalism is pronouncedly more egalitarian and pro-government than German and American liberal discourses. It shows a high level of concern and sympathy for the people in need, despite its strong opposition to redistribution, and it includes statements that refer to equality as a positive value. It wants to retain the national health care system, but also believes in the necessity of for-profit medical care (presumably through a parallel private insurance system). Swedish liberalism desires to modify the Swedish model to allow for lower taxation, more individualism and less generous social benefits, but does not advocate overhauling the Swedish model. Moreover, unlike liberal discourses in other countries, Swedish liberalism holds a very positive attitude toward immigrants, defending them on both cultural and economic grounds.

Swedish liberalism does not challenge the ideological core of the social democratic welfare discourse, but argues for a more restricted version of social democratic ideals and institutions. This discourse does not want to dismantle the Swedish

model, it only wants to downsize the government and allow for more individualism. It repeatedly takes social democratic positions, such as the following: the poor should receive government help, welfare assistance does not cause laziness and it is good that Sweden is not as unequal as other countries.

In contrast to the unique American liberal discourse, Swedish liberal discourse is internally inconsistent, and it barely passes as a liberal discourse. For instance, the dissimilarity of the following arguments is striking. American liberals assert that health care is not a basic human right, whereas Swedish liberals have very different things to say on health care. One of the highest-ranking statements in the Swedish discourse is a half-hearted, qualified defense of for-profit medical establishments. As the focus group discussions (in Chapter 3) make it clear, the discursive strategy of qualifying liberal statements with social democratic sentiments is common in Swedish political culture. “Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better” is thus a typical Swedish liberal statement. However, if we look at other statements in this discourse, it appears that this caveat is not merely a discursive strategy.

There is evidence that the qualified support for private medical care reflects a genuine incoherence in Swedish liberalism, which is a result of the naturalized status of the social democratic discourse in Swedish welfare culture. Another example of the social democratic hegemony is the high ranking of the statement that compares the Swedish model to the American model and derides the American health care system for denying care to patients: “In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room, they ask whether or not you have insurance. So our system is not wrong.”

American and German liberal discourses hold individuals responsible for their problems and for the solutions to the problems. This places them in the Moral Model in the Brickman typology. In contrast, Swedish liberalism holds individuals responsible for their poverty, but it assigns the responsibility to solve the problem to the Swedish government, which places Swedish liberalism squarely in the Enlightenment Model. Once again, Swedish liberalism shows signs of social democratic hegemony in Sweden.

What is significant about German liberal discourse is its lack of references to the government. Instead of attacking the principle of the welfare state, German liberals attack the recipients of social assistance for abusing the system. They also criticize the general population for expecting to work little and receive pensions for decades. German liberals defend private health care, managers, and jobs that pay below living wage, providing the most enthusiastic support for the private sector among unique liberalisms. Most statements in this discourse criticize the existing welfare state and defend the private sector as it is, rather than proposing a vision of what the system ought to be.

American and German liberal discourses are anti-immigration, as opposed to the Swedish liberal discourse, which is very accepting of immigrants. American liberals oppose immigration on economic grounds. However, German liberalism is against immigration for both economic and cultural reasons. German liberals oppose the statement, "(I)f someone speaks German and has lived here for long, that makes him a German for me." It is likely that this opposition is based on an ethnic ideal of Germanness, in which residence, linguistic and cultural integration, or citizenship are not sufficient to make one German. In strong contrast to German liberalism, Swedish liberalism spiritedly defends immigrants against accusations that they isolate themselves

from society, that crimes are more frequent among immigrants and that they abuse the welfare system and waste resources. Instead, this discourse blames rich, ethnic Swedes for refusing to mingle with immigrants and for harboring prejudices against them.

Unique social democratic discourses diverge from standard ones, but the differences between unique and standard social democratic discourses are not as pronounced as those between unique and standard liberal discourses. All unique social democratic discourses are egalitarian and pro-government (economically), which constitutes the core of social democratic ideology. Nonetheless, there are important cross-national differences among them. American social democratic discourse is conflicted. It is against immigration for economic reasons, and opposes long paternal leaves and employer-provided daycare. This discourse makes a distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, and states that equality of opportunity, that is, weak meritocracy, is to be strived for. American discourse also embraces the belief that poverty is situational and government should provide poverty-relief. Therefore, it presents the poor as being responsible neither for their poverty, nor the solution to their poverty, which falls into the Medical Model of responsibility attribution. German and Swedish social democrats find their national systems better than that of other countries, but American social democrats do not say that.

A preoccupation with equality and poverty is conspicuously missing from the unique German social democratic discourse, in sharp contrast to American and Swedish social democratic discourses. German social democratic discourse is sympathetic to immigrants, but not to the extent the Swedish one is. German social democratic discourse, like its Swedish counterpart, compares the national health care system with

that of the US to highlight the superiority of the German health care system. This discourse opposes gender-based pay inequality and authoritarian government, but it is not possible to compare these two positions with Sweden and the US because similar statements are not included in the statement samples of these countries. The social democratic discourse of Germany does not advance the anti-rich/anti-management arguments that social democratic discourses of Sweden and the US do.

German social democratic discourse rejects the view that German society excludes immigrants, suggesting that any lack of integration is the fault of the immigrant population. American social democratic discourse is very inconsistent on immigration and minorities. On the one hand, it is against immigration for economic reasons and denies the existence of discrimination against African Americans by the government, which is a sign of symbolic racism. On the other hand, it supports the view that some minorities are victims of real discrimination. There are two possible explanations for this contradiction: either this discourse is symbolically racist, which is a type of racism that only targets African Americans, and does not extend to other minorities, or it subscribes to the view that blacks suffer from discrimination, but does not deem the government to be the perpetrator of this discrimination. Swedish social democratic discourse diverges from other unique social democratic discourses in its defense of immigrants. There are many positive statements about immigrants in this discourse, and there are no negative statements.

Swedish social democratic discourse draws a distinction between relieving poverty and fighting inequality, and argues that poverty relief is necessary but not sufficient. Government should address inequalities and class differences, too. This

discourse advances an unequivocal defense of the Swedish model. The ideal social democratic model is compared to the actual system, and the actual system is found wanting. However, when the Swedish model is compared to other systems, despite its shortcomings, it comes out on top because of its safety net, lower levels of inequality and universal health care. There is only one qualified statement in this discourse, and it seems to address Swedish liberalism. After admitting that the American system is admirable due to the opportunities it provides for becoming rich, social democrats point out that this system also creates ghettos. Then Swedish social democratic discourse asks, “and you wonder what kind of a society it is.” This rhetorical wonderment invokes the perception of society as a family that surfaces in Swedish focus group discussions and implies that an unequal society is not a good society.

Swedish social democratic discourse presents a very coherent narrative, defending both the ideal and the practice of the social democratic welfare state, and criticizing the Swedish system only for not fully living up to the ideals of the Swedish model. It is not infiltrated with statements from other discourses that contradict social democratic frames and ideals. Rather, elements from this discourse permeate other Swedish discourses, making it the hegemonic discourse in Sweden.

The unique American liberal discourse and the unique Swedish social democratic discourse are the two most ideologically coherent discourses unearthed in this study. Both discourses extol the virtues of their respective national economic and social models. In this respect, the Swedish social democratic discourse is similar to the American liberal discourse, which is the hegemonic discourse in the US. These findings provide the strongest support for the main hypothesis of this study. In Sweden, the social democratic

discourse is the hegemonic, naturalized discourse. In the US, the liberal discourse fulfills this role.

Unique populist discourses are very different in Sweden, Germany and the US. Just like standard populist discourses, they reflect the perspective of “the people” versus one or several out-groups. They are strictly against provision of social services, particularly health care, by the private sector. Although they are critical of existing government policies, they do not view the government as inherently problematic. On the contrary, their anger toward the government stems from their perception that it does not fulfill its welfare obligations and does too little to protect the people. They want the government to be active and protect the people against risks, exploitation and injustices.

Unique American populist discourse establishes immigrants and welfare recipients as the main out-groups, followed by the rich and health care insurance companies. This discourse demonstrates that opposing inequalities and supporting redistribution is not necessarily caused by egalitarian impulses. Self-interest and class resentment can lead to simultaneous hostility toward the upper and lower classes and create a demand for taxing the rich and cutting benefits for the poor so that more money is available for the middle class. American populists believe that illegal immigrants claim government resources without paying any taxes. Unique German populism resents the private sector for exploiting the people and undermining the German system, and blames immigrants with abusing (if not cheating) the welfare system. Swedish populism is slightly different from the other populisms. First, it is ambivalent on the issue of immigration. While there is some resentment and negativity toward immigrants in the unique Swedish populist discourse, they are qualified by positive remarks. Second, the

main target of unique Swedish populism is not an out-group but an ideology: liberalism. Swedish populists attack liberal policies and ardently defend the Swedish welfare state. They fear that the Swedish safety net is being dismantled by privatization of social services. They also resent private companies and managers.

The statements “(P)eople do not get what they deserve” and “(W)e are constrained by our circumstances. We cannot make what we want of our lives” appear in the unique German and Swedish populist discourses, but not in the unique American populist discourse. Combined with other statements that assign responsibility for problems and their solutions, this puts American populism in a different category in the Brickman typology. Swedish and German populist discourses belong in the Medical Model, in which people are not held responsible for their poverty, or for the solution to their poverty. The responsibility to help the poor is assigned to the government. However, American populism is a peculiar case. It moves between two different responsibility models. This discourse subscribes to the Moral Model when it discusses welfare recipients. In other words, welfare recipients are responsible for their poverty and they should also take the responsibility to lift themselves out of poverty instead of relying on help from the government. However, when middle class faces economic difficulties, the government should step in to help. This discourse does not assign the responsibility for the problem or the solution to the middle class (or ordinary Americans), which means that it shifts from Moral Model to Medical Model when discussing “ordinary people,” as opposed to welfare recipients and immigrants.

The remaining discourses are non-ideological, idiosyncratic national discourses. Like their standard counterparts, these discourses are difficult to classify and they are not

politically sophisticated. The American discourse in this category is called anti-redistribution populism. This discourse is very similar to populism, but it does not share the anti-rich, anti-market attitude of populism. The hostility of this discourse is completely directed toward welfare recipients and immigrants. It attributes poverty of welfare recipients to dispositional factors, but it attributes economic problems of other groups to factors outside their control. As a result, it opposes assistance to welfare recipients (and immigrants), but it supports extensive government assistance to other groups. It is also strongly against progressive taxation (and income taxation) due to the persuasion that income taxes unfairly benefit immigrants, who do not pay income taxes, but use government benefits. It proposes replacing income tax with a flat rate sales tax.

German alienated cynicism discourse appears among the unique German statement sets, too. This discourse is not completely hostile toward immigrants. Immigration-related statements reflect a conflicted attitude that is sympathetic to immigrants to some degree. However, this discourse is still very distrusting of government bureaucracy, private firms and managers. Like the American anti-redistribution discourse, it promotes the idea of a flat-rate tax. The motive behind this proposal is a deep aversion to government bureaucracy and the desire to get rid of it rather than hostility toward a social group.

Swedish group-centric egalitarianism is an assortment of strongly egalitarian and pro-government views, the belief in the fairness of the Swedish economic system and the opportunities it provides, combined with anti-immigrant affect. It is a particularly difficult combination to explain because egalitarian ideals are rarely attached to the conviction that people are in charge of their destiny and can make whatever they want of

their lives. Anti-immigrant attitudes are largely dissociated from egalitarian beliefs. Like Swedish group-centric humanitarianism, this discourse compartmentalizes its positive attitudes toward people in general and negative attitudes toward immigrants. Therefore, negative sentiments toward immigrants do not negatively influence welfare-related positions in this discourse.

The group-centric discourses in Sweden combine anti-immigrant sentiments with high level of generalized trust, and a strong support for the welfare state. These positions make strange bedfellows, but it is no coincidence that we witness such compartmentalization of seemingly conflicting attitudes in Sweden. Opinions on immigration have little bearing on opinions on the welfare state in this country. Swedes do not withdraw their support from the welfare state, whether or not they believe immigrants are a drain on the resources.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

In this dissertation, I hypothesize that the hegemonic public discourse on the topic of the welfare state parallels the welfare regime type in a country and therefore we should be able to find significant differences in welfare discourses on distributive justice and the welfare state among countries with social democratic, conservative/corporatist and liberal welfare regimes. To test this hypothesis, I first cluster post-industrial nations according to their public opinion on welfare and then examine welfare discourses in detail in three countries: Sweden, Germany and the US. I explore the welfare discourses in these countries through a survey designed to measure deservingness perceptions, focus group discussions and, most importantly, Q studies.

Hierarchical clustering of public opinion on the welfare state produces country groups that partially parallel welfare regime classifications, but because there are multiple classifications, I review the literature to find which of them most closely resembles the groupings generated by the clustering method and look at statements that divide these country groups. I find that clustering of ISSP 2006 survey results generates country groupings that are most similar to Siaroff's welfare regime clusters, indicating that the structure of gender-relations is an important variable in explaining welfare state types. However, groupings suggest that there are many variables at work such as the level of economic development, geographical proximity, language and welfare regime type, which have a combined effect on how nations cluster.

In the chapter on discourse and justice principles, I discuss the meaning and function of discourses and frames, explore the factors that determine how people make distributive justice decisions, where they attribute the blame for poverty and how they

decide who is deserving of help. I provide examples of discourse construction and framing from Swedish, German and American politics. In the section on deservingness, I posit that deservingness is a cultural and discursive construction and that it varies across countries. Previous literature suggests that there is a universal ranking of deservingness in Europe and North America. However, my research results support my hypothesis that deservingness culture is not universal. I argue that the difference in findings stems from the difference in measurement methods. I ask respondents to choose one social group that is most deserving and one that is least deserving of social assistance, forcing them to consider the relative undeservingness of these groups. Second, I provide a more exhaustive list of target groups than most surveys. This list includes groups such as single mothers, families with many children and students.

The chapter on focus groups provides a discourse analysis of the focus groups conducted in Sweden, Germany and the US. Very similar questions generate discussions that are as different as day and night. Each nation focuses on different concepts and problems, employs a distinct vocabulary and debate style, and projects dissimilar visions of society and state. From these discussions, I draw statements that reflect the national discourses and create Q sets with them.

One of the main arguments of this study is that Q method allows us to detect differences in national political culture and provides discursive context because it lets people rank statements according to their level of agreement. In the case of welfare opinion, this turns out to be only partially correct. When German, Swedish and American respondents are given the same statement set, they generate very similar discourses. Each nation produces a liberal, a social democratic and a populist discourse, and the

differences between American, German and Swedish liberal, social democratic and populist discourses are minor. Like the international surveys from which their statements are drawn, these Q studies reveal some differences among national discourses, but particularly liberal and social democratic ideologies appear to be quite similar across cultures.

However, when subjects are asked to rank the statements that are collected from their national discourse, the emergent discourses diverge remarkably across nations. When it comes to the unique discourses, the subnational divisions are less significant than international divisions. The Swedish discourses, for example, show a pro-government and anti-market bent regardless of their level of generalized trust or belief in the fairness of the world. All unique Swedish discourses support the poverty relief function of the welfare state. The unique Swedish social democratic discourse is very coherent and does not contain any rightist statements, while the unique Swedish liberal discourse is very inconsistent in that it includes many statements one would expect to see in a social democratic discourse. For example, it defends the universal health insurance, supports welfare payments to the poor, and commends Sweden for being more equal than other countries. It is also very reserved in its criticism of the welfare state.

Like the unique Swedish social democratic discourse, the unique American liberal discourse is very consistent. Liberal arguments seep into other American discourses. Even the unique American social democratic discourse argues for a weak meritocracy in which equality is defined as legal equality of opportunity, opposes some traditionally social democratic positions such as parental leave and includes symbolically racist statements. Three out of four unique American discourses show signs of symbolic racism.

The unique German social democratic discourse describes and defends the German social market model, rather than the social democratic ideal type. The Swedish and German social democratic discourses and the American liberal discourse are the naturalized, hegemonic discourses within their nation. These hegemonic discourses compare their national regimes with those of other countries and praise their own national models, whereas American social democrats and Swedish liberals criticize their national systems, albeit timidly.

These results support the central hypothesis of this dissertation: national discourses parallel national welfare regime types. However, it demonstrates that it is not sufficient to use Q method for locating these differences. What is really pivotal in discovering national discourses is using statements (or possibly questions) that are drawn from national discourses. When Swedish liberals are asked to rank standard statements, the discourse they produce is barely discernible and no less liberal than the discourse American and German liberals produce. However, when they rank statements that are collected from the Swedish discourse, they generate a radically different discourse. One could argue that what comes out is what goes in, but this is not the case here. Among the 50 statements that were available in the statement set, Swedish liberals choose those that support the welfare principle of the welfare state, but reflect their concern that the social state has overreached. The unique Swedish liberal discourse does not oppose the idea of universal health care, but it prefers having private health care options and allowing profits in the medical sector. This discourse supports poverty relief, but believes that striving for too much equality is stifling for the economy and unfair to high-income earners. The devil is in the qualifiers.

American social democrats become much less egalitarian when they rank unique statements as opposed to standard statements. Similar to what Zaller and Feldman (1992) find, I discover that the unique American social democratic discourse is more humanitarian than egalitarian because American political culture lacks egalitarian arguments and the language to formulate egalitarian tendencies. This is because discourses frame and limit our utterances. Opinions do not simply exist in people's minds in stable patterns. They partially reside in a collective consciousness and in the language. When freed from the limitations of national political culture, there seems to be no difference between American, German and Swedish liberals. However, political opinions are never formulated and expressed in a vacuum. Once the subjects read statements with which they are familiar or hear words that activate certain cognitive and emotional links, they respond in a completely different fashion than they would to standard statements. Moreover, standard statements do not include the caveats and justifications that are part of every political discourse. It is one thing to say taxes are too high, it is another thing to say that high taxes do not allow the poor to save for retirement. Without the second portion of this statement, Swedish liberals may sound very much like American liberals, but they do not talk like American liberals in their everyday life, and those nuances are what separates one national political culture from the other. Trying to justify opposition to high taxes by mentioning the plight of the poor is not the same as opposing high taxes to avoid paying for welfare assistance to the poor. We can effortlessly make a significant proportion of Germans angry toward private firms just by mentioning 400 Euro jobs, but if issues are not framed with such culture-specific references, German subjects may provide researchers with more positive answers about the private sector. However,

political discourses frame all issues with such specific references, discursive tactics and imagery designed to incite emotions. They are rife with allusions to rival discourses. Thus, ignorance of discourses and their frames leaves us with an incomplete picture of public opinion.

Another important finding is that some phrases have such fluid meanings that they are meaningless for all intents and purposes. One hypothesis in this study is that “People get what they deserve” and “life is not fair” are statements that reflect belief in a just world and that they can explain attitudes toward the poor. However, these statements change meaning in each discourse. If we examine discourses, we see that in libertarian discourses the statement “people do not get what they deserve” usually means that people with higher earning power cannot keep most of their salaries due to high levels of taxation. In social democratic discourses, “people” tends to refer to the general populace, and the statement reflects the belief that they do not get what they deserve because of the inequalities and injustices in the system. When a populist discourse includes the same claim, it is making the case that the middle or working class gets nothing, while all the benefits go to upper and lower classes, or immigrants.

Similarly, “life is not fair” can be followed by “so deal with it,” or by “so we should do something about it.” The breadth of these statements and the vagueness of their wording allow everybody to perceive them in a way that fits their worldview, and the only way to understand the intended meaning is to examine the context. The unfortunate result of the dependence on contextual clues is the uselessness of these statements as a way to fully understand and explain opinion without the discursive context. These findings support the main hypothesis of this study that national institutional structures are

closely linked to national discourses, and that there is a hegemonic welfare discourse in each national discourse that closely parallels the national welfare regime type and infiltrates rival discourses. This relationship is difficult to measure because it resides in shared discursive structures, but if we examine discourses, it is there. It is what provides the legitimacy that welfare institutions require for their survival.

At its very core, this study is about the relationship between norms, beliefs and ideas on the one hand and material institutions on the other. It is in this discursive field that politics is continually negotiated and renegotiated. As discourses shape institutions, institutions shape discourses. As people utter political information, beliefs and facts, they create and perpetuate a common knowledge and the polity is built in the image of that knowledge. No institution of relevance can exist outside the boundaries drawn by this collection of political discourses that make up the national culture.

Politicians have to work with what they are given. They cannot challenge the consensus beliefs that rival discourses share within a political culture. They cannot push ideas or practices that are considered thoroughly alien or illegitimate. They are constrained by discourses. At the same time, they, along with activists and politically conscious groups, shape and change discourses. As institutions transform, and as new institutions are built, they influence the way people think and talk about various issues.

Welfare state institutions need legitimacy to survive, and in the absence of this legitimacy, they fail in the long term, even if all the material conditions for their survival exist. Legitimacy brews in and springs from everyday discourses. Elite discourses communicate information and ideas to the public, but everyday discourses absorb the information and ideas and accept and reconstruct them, or reject them. Through this

process, discourses are also transformed. With regard to any issue, multiple everyday discourses exist that are in a continuous dialog with each other. They reflect elite discourses, but they are not mere mirror images of them. Rival discourses within a culture share beliefs and knowledge. They borrow from each other, and they recognize each other as legitimate competitors. Each political culture has a different discursive field.

It is safe to assume that there is an overlap in elite and everyday discourses. Communicative discourses do not go from a unitary elite to a unitary public. People are much more receptive to the segment of the elite with which they identify (i.e. ideologically, ethnically, etc.). Therefore, differences and contestations in elite discourses will be reflected in everyday discourses. Likewise, commonalities in the everyday discourse have to be respected by all elite parties. Policy makers do not expect to win political victories by challenging the national consensus.

This study takes a snapshot of this cacophony of voices and teases out discourses, which lend themselves to comparison surprisingly well. Germany, Sweden and the US have similar enough welfare cultures that this study finds almost identical categories of discourses in each nation: there are liberal, social democratic and populist discourses on the welfare state in each culture. Yet, the content of these categories is as varied as the welfare institutions of these nations. American liberalism and Swedish liberalism are different creatures, although they are both recognizable as varieties of liberalism. The same goes for social democratic discourses and populist discourses.

These findings demonstrate that people respond to not just ideas but the manner in which those ideas are uttered. This is so because people exist in discourses, they are accustomed to hearing certain articulations, and certain combinations of articulations.

They develop automatic reactions to particular analogies, imagery and vocabulary. These reactions are as emotional as they are intellectual. Familiarity breeds commonsense knowledge, sympathy, rage, agreement and disagreement. The more people are exposed to the repeated formulas and frames of the dominant discourses, the more they are familiar with them and unfamiliar with ideas and utterances outside of them. A social world is constructed around them and by participating in this discursive world, the public perpetuates it and contributes to it. These ideas, and articulations become as much a part of the political reality in a nation as the government buildings.

What goes on inside those buildings is not detached from what is uttered and heard in the private homes of the residents of a country. Public opinion surveys fail to capture it because they lack the discursive context in which statements gain meaning to the people. This context is rich with words, which have strong connotations, and frames and formulations with which people are so familiar that they react to them almost automatically. In this context, no word, no frame and no statement stands alone. All of them are intertwined in the minds of the speaker and the listener. They do not only signify a perspective, but they also signal the broader political allegiance and worldview of the speaker to the listener. The choice of a single loaded word can set the tone of a conversation, whereas a whole statement written in a culturally neutral tone may fail to do so.

Private citizens, as well the elite have to navigate this difficult terrain and communicate with each other with these restriction. In politics, the intended audience of a discourse is not just those who agree with it, but also those who disagree with it vehemently. Ideas do not hang in a space in the minds of individuals. They are opposed

to each other, or they complement each other, but we do not know how they are related and how they complement or challenge each other unless we study discourses. If we do not understand discourses, our understanding of how democratic politics functions, and how both change and continuity of policies and institutions take place is incomplete.

This study reconstructs everyday discourses on the welfare state, and provides discursive contexts within which disparate welfare regimes flourish. It reveals the discourses and frames, which legitimize and challenge these regimes. It demonstrates the areas, which are resistant to change and those which provide an opening for change. The puzzle from which this research sprung is thusly solved. Nations act and talk very differently about their welfare states, distributive justice and deservingness and things related to them, but we are able to capture these differences only if we use their language to talk to them and listen to them. In preparing surveys, we need to understand the limitations of using statements that are devoid of connotation and context. Using the findings in this study, it is possible to develop opinion surveys, which reflect the national sentiments more closely. I also suggest using Q methodology to reconstruct everyday political discourses.

There is a broader contribution of this study to the field of comparative politics. By focusing on everyday discourses rather than elite discourses in relation to institutional regimes, this study places itself parallel to but not quite inside the Discursive Institutionalism school. It reiterates the centrality of ideas and communication in politics but turns its attention to this relatively understudied domain. However, everyday discourses are no less important to the study of institutions than elite discourses. A fruitful new direction for this research will be to triangulate the relationship between

institutions and everyday discourses by adding to them a study of elite discourses. By examining the interaction of elite discourses, everyday discourses, and institutions, we will obtain a fuller insight into politics.

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Appendix

The Q column displays the Q scores of the statements for that discourse. The higher the Q score, the more significant the statement is in that discourse. Positive Q scores indicate agreement. Negative Q scores indicate disagreement.

Standard Discourses

American Liberalism

Q	AGREE
4	It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little.
3	Anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives.
3	Life is often not fair.
3	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
3	There are people who live in need because of laziness and lack of willpower.
2	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Americans.
2	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
2	People from some minority groups are doing the jobs which others do not want to do.
2	People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.
2	No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
-3	The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
-3	Coming from a wealthy family is essential for getting ahead.
-2	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years.
-2	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-2	The authorities should make efforts to improve the situation of people from minority groups.
-2	There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept.
-2	There should be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.
-2	We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual.
-2	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of the US.

German Liberalism

Q	AGREE
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4	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Germans.
3	The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme.
3	People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.
3	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
3	Education should be taken care of more by the government.
2	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
2	No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.
2	People from some minority groups are doing the jobs, which others do not want to do.
	DISAGREE
-4	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany.
-4	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
-3	There are too many immigrants in Germany.
-3	We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual.
-2	The government cannot be trusted.
-2	Coming from a wealthy family is essential for getting ahead.
-2	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
-2	There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.
-2	Private sector cannot be trusted.

Swedish Liberalism

Q	AGREE
4	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
3	The government intervenes too much in our lives.
3	A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement.
3	No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.
3	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Swedes.
2	People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.
	DISAGREE
-4	A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
-3	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
-3	The government should provide decent housing for all who cannot afford it.
-3	We need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual.
-2	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
-2	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
-2	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Sweden.
-2	In Sweden, people get rewarded for their effort.
-2	There should be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.

American Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
3	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years.
3	The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
2	The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
2	The government should provide decent housing for all who cannot afford it.
2	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
2	Health services should be taken care of more by the government.
2	Education should be taken care of more by the government.
2	Immigrants improve American society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
2	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
2	Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth.
	DISAGREE
-4	If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
-3	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-3	There are too many immigrants in the US.
-3	Immigrants who continue to follow customs which are against our American values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
-3	The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other.
-3	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
-2	There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept.
-2	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of the US.
-2	Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities and less by the government.

German Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
5	The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
4	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
3	The government should provide decent housing for all who cannot afford it.
2	Education should be taken care of more by the government.
2	Life is often not fair.
2	Immigrants improve German society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
2	There are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society.
2	It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little.
2	A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.

- 3 The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme.
- 3 Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of Germany.
- 3 There are too many immigrants in Germany.
- 3 Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany.
- 2 In Germany, people get rewarded for their effort.
- 2 If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
- 2 Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
- 2 The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
- 2 There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.

Swedish Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
3	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
3	Immigrants improve Swedish society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
3	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
3	Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.
3	It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little.
2	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Swedes.
2	Health services should be taken care of more by the government.
2	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
2	Life is often not fair.
2	Society is like a family, we should take care of those who are in need.
	DISAGREE
-4	Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities and less by the government.
-3	There are too many immigrants in Sweden.
-3	Immigrants who continue to follow customs which are against our Swedish values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
-3	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Sweden.
-3	There should be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.
-3	It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.
-2	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-2	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
-2	If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
-2	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of Sweden.

American Populism

Q	AGREE
5	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
4	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the US.

4	There are too many immigrants in the US.
4	Immigrants who continue to follow customs which are against our American values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
3	Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth.
2	Health services should be taken care of more by the government.
2	A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement.
2	There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in the US.
2	The government cannot be trusted.
2	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
-4	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Americans.
-3	The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme.
-2	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years.
-2	Immigrants improve American society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
-2	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
-2	People from some minority groups are doing the jobs which others do not want to do.
-2	Most people are trustworthy.
-2	In the US, people get rewarded for their effort.
-2	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
-2	Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities and less by the government.

German Populism

Q	AGREE
4	Life is often not fair.
4	A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement.
3	Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against our German values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
3	There are too many immigrants in Germany.
2	There are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society.
2	There are people who live in need because of laziness and lack of willpower.
2	Anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives.
2	No one would study for years to become a lawyer or doctor unless they expected to earn a lot more than ordinary workers.
2	The unemployed should be forced to take a job quickly, even if it is not as good as their previous job.
	DISAGREE
-4	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Germans.
-3	Immigrants improve Germany society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
-3	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

	In order to improve life for families the government should make the amount of leave a mother and father can take around the child's birth, the availability of child care arrangements and flexible working hours a top priority.
-3	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of Germany.
-2	A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
	It is more important for the government to get people to claim benefits to which they are entitled than to stop people claiming benefits to which they are entitled.
-2	Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.
-2	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Germany for several years.
-2	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
-2	Most people are trustworthy.

Swedish Populism

Q	AGREE
3	The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
	There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in Sweden.
3	Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth.
	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
3	The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
2	Society is like a family, we should take care of those who are in need.
2	There are people who live in need because there is much injustice in our society.
2	There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.
	In schools, where there are too many children from some minority groups, the quality of education suffers.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures.
-4	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-3	Immigrants improve Swedish society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
-3	Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as Swedes.
	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Sweden for several years.
-3	People generally get what they deserve in life.
-2	Most people are trustworthy.
-2	People should take responsibility and not rely on help from others.
-2	Large differences in income are necessary for the prosperity of Sweden.

American Group-Centric Humanitarianism

Q	AGREE
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3	In deciding pay, what is needed to support a family ought to be very important.
3	Society is like a family, we should take care of those who are in need.
3	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the US.
3	Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities and less by the government.
2	Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.
2	A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
2	Most people are trustworthy.
2	In the US, people get rewarded for their effort.
2	It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.
	DISAGREE
	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in the US for several years.
-5	Education should be taken care of more by the government.
-4	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-3	Anyone is at risk of poverty at some point in their lives.
-2	People from some minority groups are doing the jobs which others do not want to do.
-2	Life is often not fair.
-2	The unemployed should be forced to take a job quickly, even if it is not as good as their previous job.
-2	Immigrants who continue to follow customs which are against our American values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.

German Alienated Cynicism

	AGREE
4	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
3	There are very strong conflicts between the people at the top of society and people at the bottom in Germany.
3	The amount of one's pension should be strictly based on the amount of contributions one has paid into the pension scheme.
3	Workers need strong trade unions to protect their interests.
2	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Germany.
2	It is right that the law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little.
2	The government cannot be trusted.
2	In schools, where there are too many children from some minority groups, the quality of education suffers.
2	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
2	In order to improve life for families the government should make the amount of leave a mother and father can take around the child's birth, the availability of child care arrangements and flexible working hours a top priority.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is just that people with higher incomes can buy better health care.
-3	The authorities should make efforts to improve the situation of people from minority groups.
-3	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.

- 3 Immigrants improve German society by bringing in new ideas and cultures.
- 2 Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
- 2 There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.
- 2 In Germany, people get rewarded for their effort.
- 2 We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Germany for several years.

Swedish Group-Centric Humanitarianism

Q	AGREE
5	There are too many immigrants in Sweden.
4	There is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept.
4	Immigrants who continue to follow customs, which are against our Swedish values should be expelled, even if they are legally settled.
2	A good pension system should allow everybody to maintain an adequate standard of living relative to their income before retirement.
2	Government spends too much money assisting immigrants.
2	Most people are trustworthy.
2	People with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes.
2	A lot of false benefit claims are a result of confusion rather than dishonesty.
	DISAGREE
-3	If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
-3	There are people who live in need because it's an inevitable part of modern progress.
-3	I would be ready to pay more tax if it were definitely used to improve the situation of the poor.
-3	There should be a legal obligation for children to financially support their elderly parents if they don't have enough income of their own.
-2	Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity.
-2	Helping disadvantaged people and the socially excluded should be taken care of more by charities and less by the government.
-2	The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.
-2	Ordinary working people do not get their share of the nation's wealth.
-2	Coming from a wealthy family is essential for getting ahead.
-2	We should legalize the status of illegal immigrants who have been working in Sweden for several years.
-2	The government should spend less on benefits for the poor.
-2	It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

Unique Discourses

American Liberalism

Q	AGREE
4	The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church. It's not the government's responsibility to take care of me. It is the government's responsibility to
3	protect me and to keep the world economic trade system in balance.
3	Welfare creates a cycle of dependency.
3	The United States of America is the greatest nation because we have freedom and choice. I would say that there's more equality in the US than anywhere else in the world and even more so
2	in present day than any time in history. There are more opportunities than ever.
2	Discrimination means that someone else is affecting what's happening to you. Inequality does not
2	necessarily mean that. Just because there is inequality, it doesn't mean that there is discrimination.
2	Despite its pitfalls, American system is still the better than others.
2	Welfare is the most abused system of our government today. A large section of our society today
2	feels that they're entitled to a free-ride.
2	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a
2	matter of trying hard enough.
	DISAGREE
-4	The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor.
-4	Health care is a basic human right. The government should make sure that every American is
-4	insured.
-4	Blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation -- all of them
-4	from the same enemy. The government has failed the blacks; you can't deny that.
-3	Those who are on welfare are in real need. They are the poorest of the poor. Even people who are
-3	under the federal poverty line do not always qualify for food stamps.
-2	We spend so much of our tax money on military and corporate bailouts, etc. I would like to live in
-2	a society where we spend on things that are important in terms of gaining more equality of
-2	opportunity.
-2	Immigrants do the jobs we don't want to do. They work hard, they help our economy and
-2	businesses need them.
-2	We are a nation of immigrants. All Americans are descendants of immigrants. How can we close
-2	our borders to immigrants now?
-2	What I would like to see is the government establishing a program to get people back to work,
-2	checking people, but at the same time not forcing them to taking a job that they are not
-2	comfortable doing.
-2	We should have long paternal leaves so that the parents can take care of their kids and employers
-2	should provide for day care.

German Liberalism

Q	AGREE
4	It is unrealistic for the social niveau to be equal or egalitarian.
4	Abuse destroys the social system. We all want to work for only 30 years and then the retirement funds should pay it all. The
3	entitlement of people has risen dramatically.

3	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.
2	One should see whether he thinks globally or thinks of Germany. And lately, a lot has been spent for nonGermans.
2	People come for work, but they say they don't want to work. They just want the stamp.
2	People should pay a little less for insurance, if they live healthier, to create an incentive.
2	The state makes money out of gas and oil [at our expense]. They should have infinite income and not have to think about road tolls.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is very difficult to receive social services in Germany.
-3	If we did not have foreigners, then we would have to do the jobs.
-3	It is so unjust that men get better jobs and make more money. There sit the women at home, although they don't really want to.
-3	The German society consistently excludes foreigners.
-2	The 400 Euro jobs are a problem. They are used by the big firms and the people remain without social security.
-2	The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture.
-2	Managers have simply wasted millions through faulty sales and such and they are not even held accountable for it.
-2	If someone speaks German and has lived here for long, then he is German for me.
-2	I find it difficult to give health care to private hands because there are life risks that one cannot carry alone financially. One cannot protect oneself in case of certain diseases.
-2	We'd need someone like Jurgen Klinsmann for the social state. Someone who really hits on the table so that something happens.

Swedish Liberalism

Q	AGREE
4	Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better.
3	I absolutely think that those who need benefits should get benefits, and it should not be very difficult to prove this [the need].
3	In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room they ask whether or not you have insurance. So our system is not wrong.
3	The Swedish people have hung themselves in their own safety harness by accepting too many benefits. There are many who are afraid of change because they live off the benefits.(854)
2	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.
2	The taxes are too high. Way too high.
2	With lower taxes people have more to spend. I know very well that those who are poor can't afford to save for retirement.
2	I wouldn't mind keeping Sweden as it is but to have a little more individualism.
2	It is when you go abroad that you realize that things are good in Sweden. The difference between the poor and the rich is significantly higher in other countries.
2	The rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish. They have no contact. The differences increase. Then prejudices arise.
2	The idea of the welfare state is good, but it is abused way too much. You ask yourself why it is so; all people are actually dishonest in some way.
2	It is good that there are class differences, but it is bad that they ignore those who are less fortunate.
2	They should get what they need, but not more.
	DISAGREE

-4	We should have high taxes and even inequalities out.
-3	The government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas. They get a great amount of financial assistance, but they don't do anything with it.
-3	The serious crimes, homicide, manslaughter and rape are much more frequent among immigrants. I don't say that it is good or bad, but it does intimidate many people.
-3	Most immigrants have never been in a Swedish home. They don't know any Swedes. And they are happy where they are. They never go to town. They stay in their area.
-3	Women have state support and rights all over Europe. We have been surpassed long ago. In Sweden immigrants live on social welfare. If you can go to "Swedish for immigrants" and you live on social welfare, you don't have to take care of yourself.
-2	You can live on social welfare without problems. You can live well off the government, and then that doesn't push people forward. You need to have something to fight for.

American Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
4	The government should help people that can't help themselves.
4	The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor.
3	It's exploitation when corporate chief executives make hundreds of times more each year than their average workers.
3	There is equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. When we talk about equality of opportunity, we think that everybody's treated equally and fairly under the law. Generally, we should hold to that type of equality.
3	Most people can be trusted.
3	The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church.
2	The way the education is funded in our country is skewed and highly unequal. When you live in a more affluent area, you have higher property values, you pay higher taxes, the schools are better funded.
	DISAGREE
-4	People get what they deserve.
-3	It's not the government's responsibility to take care of me. It is the government's responsibility to protect me and to keep the world economic trade system in balance.
-3	Immigrants do the jobs we don't want to do. They work hard, they help our economy and businesses need them.
-3	The middle class pays most of the taxes and gets nothing. Instead the government pours money to people who don't show any effort to lift themselves out of poverty.
-2	If inequalities are economic rather than culture-based, then why are some minorities moving up economically, and others not? There is the perception of racism and victimization, not necessarily the reality of it.
-2	We should have long paternal leaves so that the parents can take care of their kids and employers should provide for day care.
-2	Discrimination means that someone else is affecting what's happening to you. Inequality does not necessarily mean that. Just because there is inequality, it doesn't mean that there is discrimination.
-2	The only thing that the government is good at is the military. Anything else that the government gets into is a mess.
-2	Blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation -- all of them from the same enemy. The government has failed the blacks; you can't deny that.
-2	When people don't achieve something, that's their choice.

German Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
5	Despite its pitfalls, German model is still better than others.
3	Managers have simply wasted millions through faulty sales and such and they are not even held accountable for it.
3	In the USA somebody comes to the hospital and they ask if he is insured. I don't want such a thing here.
3	I believe that the roads, education and health should be the duty of the government so that the basic needs of citizens are met.
2	We all want to work for only 30 years and then the retirement funds should pay it all. The entitlement of people has risen dramatically.
2	The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture.
2	It is so unjust that men get better jobs and make more money. There sit the women at home, although they don't really want to.
2	Paying taxes is a necessary evil.
	DISAGREE
-4	I regard many taxes to be wrong. These capital yields taxes and the tax forms are much too complex. Why do we not simply say, everyone should be taxed according to a fixed percentage?
-4	Then one can lay off people in the internal revenue service.
-4	We'd need someone like Jurgen Klinsmann for the social state. Someone who really hits on the table so that something happens.
-3	I think that, whoever wants, should pay unemployment insurance voluntarily from their salary.
-3	One should see whether he thinks globally or thinks of Germany. And lately, a lot has been spent for nonGermans.
-3	The state makes money out of gas and oil [at our expense]. They should have infinite income and not have to think about road tolls.
-3	The state regulates too much.
-2	It is very difficult to receive social services in Germany.
-2	The German society consistently excludes foreigners.
-2	Today it is like the early days of industrialization again.

Swedish Social Democracy

Q	AGREE
5	I still think I get much for my tax money. When you are sick the system really works. We don't need any private health insurance. There is a safety net.
4	Swedish stock exchange directors have destroyed Swedish companies, and are still taking out huge bonuses.
3	In the US, when you arrive at the emergency room they ask whether or not you have insurance. So our system is not wrong.
3	It is when you go abroad that you realize that things are good in Sweden. The difference between the poor and the rich is significantly higher in other countries.
2	Compared to other countries Sweden is very equal, but if you look within our own society you can see inequalities everywhere.
2	A person who thinks that "I am a Swedish citizen" is Swedish. You don't need to accept the whole midsummer pole tradition to be Swedish.
2	I am not saying that all immigrants will become Swedes in one day. But people who have lived

	and worked here for 30 years and their children who are born here are still called immigrants. They are born here. They didn't immigrate to any country.
2	The rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish. They have no contact. The differences increase. Then prejudices arise.
2	Of course I have periods when I think that the system in the US is so good. It is impressive. It is cool that one can make so much money. But if you go a few blocks away you see the ghetto. And then you wonder what kind of a society it is.
	DISAGREE
-3	I just think that it is bothersome to socialize with people from completely different cultures. I have nothing in common with them. I don't think what they say is funny. I don't understand them.
-3	Of course the national social insurance is good, but it is almost a little too much. We could have a more positive development in the country if we didn't have such a strong social rule.
-3	The idea of the welfare state is good, but it is abused way too much. You ask yourself why it is so; all people are actually dishonest in some way.
-3	Everyone who shouldn't have benefits has benefits. Everybody uses the system, even when they think it's wrong.
-3	The taxes are too high. Way too high.
-2	I don't think one should support the Swedish model, that everyone should be the same. That is not good. A little inequality stimulates.
-2	It is good that there are class differences, but it is bad that they ignore those who are less fortunate.
-2	They should get what they need, but not more.
-2	In Sweden immigrants live on social welfare. If you can go to "Swedish for immigrants" and you live on social welfare, you don't have to take care of yourself.
-2	You can live on social welfare without problems. You can live well off the government, and then that doesn't push people forward. You need to have something to fight for.
-2	Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better.

American Populism

Q	AGREE
5	The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor.
3	The middle class pays most of the taxes and gets nothing. Instead the government pours money to people who don't show any effort to lift themselves out of poverty.
3	You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with everybody, has five or six kids and who's too lazy to get a job.
3	I would much prefer the welfare system to be more productive, if you have any physical ability at all, you should be required to attend a given task in order to receive welfare, anything.
3	Even when you pay high premiums, you cannot guarantee that you will get anything in return from insurance companies when you get sick. The insurance companies will put up as many obstacles as they can to not pay because that's how they make money.
2	Welfare creates a cycle of dependency.
2	Illegal immigrants come over here, get paid to work, receive welfare and Medicaid and they don't pay taxes. It's not fair.
2	They should take care of the people Americans first, before they take care of the outsiders.
2	It's exploitation when corporate chief executives make hundreds of times more each year than their average workers.
	DISAGREE
-5	The government should help people that can't help themselves.
-3	The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church.

-3	I would say that there's more equality in the US than anywhere else in the world and even more so in present day than any time in history. There are more opportunities than ever.
-2	Discrimination means that someone else is affecting what's happening to you. Inequality does not necessarily mean that. Just because there is inequality, it doesn't mean that there is discrimination.
-2	Most people can be trusted.
-2	Those who are on welfare are in real need. They are the poorest of the poor. Even people who are under the federal poverty line do not always qualify for food stamps.
-2	Blacks suffer political oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation -- all of them from the same enemy. The government has failed the blacks; you can't deny that.

German Populism

Q	AGREE
3	Abuse destroys the social system.
3	I find it difficult to give health care to private hands because there are life risks that one cannot carry alone financially. One cannot protect oneself in case of certain diseases.
3	Some people from abroad have figured out that their families can live very well on social welfare. The 400 Euro jobs are a problem. They are used by the big firms and the people remain without social security.
3	I believe that the roads, education and health should be the duty of the government so that the basic needs of citizens are met.
2	Everyone tries to see where to get the most from. Social justice does not work like that.
2	Those who make 25.000 Euros per month should pay a little higher percentage in taxes and someone who earns 800 or 900 Euros per month should pay a lower percentage.
2	How much money the CEOs get, it is not normal that one gets so much money for something.
	DISAGREE
-5	Most people are trustworthy.
-4	People get what they deserve.
-3	Despite its pitfalls, German model is still better than others.
-3	The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture.
-3	One must ask, how can I make a happy life for the biggest part of society? And, consequently, one has to regulate it financially as well.
-3	One should actually say that is so much more socially just in some other countries.
-3	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.
-2	If we did not have foreigners, then we would have to do the jobs.
-2	The German society consistently excludes foreigners.

Swedish Populism

Q	AGREE
5	Swedish stock exchange directors have destroyed Swedish companies, and are still taking out huge bonuses.
5	Immigration doesn't need to be a loss for the welfare system, but now it is, since people don't have any means of sustenance, and they don't get people into the work life and that is the government's fault.
3	Manager wages are too high, completely absurd, they have been growing rapidly and that takes away the opportunity to hire more people, and create more jobs in this way.
3	Previously there were poorhouse auctions; whoever was willing to take care of orphans at the lowest price and were given some money from the municipality. That is what we get today, when

	we put out the care of elderly on private companies.
3	The immigrants that make trouble are the ones that show, not the shy immigrants who are just as boring as the rest of Sweden.
3	The taxes are too high. Way too high.
2	The serious crimes, homicide, manslaughter and rape are much more frequent among immigrants. I don't say that it is good or bad, but it does intimidate many people.
	DISAGREE
-5	I still think I get much for my tax money. When you are sick the system really works. We don't need any private health insurance. There is a safety net.
-2	In Sweden we care and we think about the less fortunate.
-2	You can do things in a different way. I think nonprofit organizations in Sweden can really do things that the government can't do.
-2	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.
-2	We need private company insurance. For example, the CEO of Ericsson can't be away for several months just because he needs surgery and is last on the queue.
-2	The government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas. They get a great amount of financial assistance, but they don't do anything with it.
-2	People get what they deserve.
-2	Of course the national social insurance is good, but it is almost a little too much. We could have a more positive development in the country if we didn't have such a strong social rule.

American Anti-Redistributionist Populism

Q	AGREE
5	They should take care of the people Americans first, before they take care of the outsiders. Health care is a basic human right. The government should make sure that every American is insured.
5	Illegal immigrants come over here, get paid to work, receive welfare and Medicaid and they don't
4	pay taxes. It's not fair.
4	We spend so much of our tax money on military and corporate bailouts, etc. I would like to live in a society where we spend on things that are important in terms of gaining more equality of opportunity.
2	You cannot explain to me why I work hard every day, while my hard earned tax money goes to support some woman who shacks up with everybody, has five or six kids and who's too lazy to get a job.
2	Income tax today is unfair. Property tax today is unfair. And illegal immigrants don't have to pay those taxes. The only fair tax is the sales tax. There is a fixed percentage sales tax for everybody across the board. In that way, everybody's taxed, legal or illegal.
2	What I would like to see is the government establishing a program to get people back to work, checking people, but at the same time not forcing them to taking a job that they are not comfortable doing.
2	The government should help people that can't help themselves.
	DISAGREE
-4	We are a nation of immigrants. All Americans are descendants of immigrants. How can we close our borders to immigrants now?
-3	The burden of responsibility initially starts with the family and the church.
-2	The richer should pay higher percentages of tax than the poor.
-2	When people don't achieve something, that's their choice.
-2	For many low-income parents, neither marriage nor work is enough to get their families off welfare, let alone out of poverty.

-2	People get what they deserve.
-2	Even though there may be individual sources for why you end up where you are, I think it's mostly the environment. If that's the case, then it's just a luck of the draw where you end up.
-2	Most people can be trusted.

German Alienated Cynicism

Q	AGREE
4	Due to a lack of efficiency in the bureaucracy, a lot is lost and thus a lot of [our] solidarity is lost, too, and solidarity is the basis [of the system].
4	I regard many taxes to be wrong. These capital yields taxes and the tax forms are much too complex. Why do we not simply say, everyone should be taxed according to a fixed percentage? Then one can lay off people in the internal revenue service.
3	The 400 Euro jobs are a problem. They are used by the big firms and the people remain without social security.
3	The big industry and the corporations that acquire billion Euro contracts and have record profits are the same ones that lay off people. This is where the problem lies.
3	The state regulates too much.
2	How much money the CEOs get, it is not normal that one gets so much money for something.
2	A firm lays off people and immediately their stocks go up. In no way is this social.
2	I think that very few of Muslims in Germany know what we do in the church.
2	The presence of immigrants enriches our city culture.
	DISAGREE
-4	It is very difficult to receive social services in Germany.
-4	I think that, whoever wants, should pay unemployment insurance voluntarily from their salary.
-2	Some people from abroad have figured out that their families can live very well on social welfare. We had growth in the economy. Then there was the welfare state. Then there were children. The generational contract still worked. It isn't so anymore.
-2	If the hiring costs fall, fewer jobs will be outsourced to other countries.
-2	Today it is like the early days of industrialization again.
-2	We'd need someone like Jurgen Klinsmann for the social state. Someone who really hits on the table so that something happens.
-2	The German society consistently excludes foreigners.
-2	Despite its pitfalls, German model is still better than others.

Swedish Group-Centric Egalitarianism

Q	AGREE
5	Many people don't want to receive benefits, for example single mothers and such. They try, they work hard. They have just gotten stuck in it.
4	Most people are trustworthy.
3	Medical care should not really be profiting, but it has to be, to push research forward and make it better.
3	We are not constrained by accidents of birth. We can make of our lives what we will. It's really a matter of trying hard enough.
2	Manager wages are too high, completely absurd, they have been growing rapidly and that takes away the opportunity to hire more people, and create more jobs in this way.

- 2 One should never be satisfied. One should always wish for more equality.
The government puts millions of crowns into the schools in immigrant areas. They get a great
2 amount of financial assistance, but they don't do anything with it.
- DISAGREE
- 3 Compared to other countries Sweden is very equal, but if you look within our own society you can
see inequalities everywhere.
- 3 We have a lot of taxes that are supposed to benefit in the long run; employer tax and all that. They
actually prevent people from hiring. They increase the unemployment.
- 3 I just think that it is bothersome to socialize with people from completely different cultures. I have
nothing in common with them. I don't think what they say is funny. I don't understand them.
- 3 It is good that there are class differences, but it is bad that they ignore those who are less fortunate.
They should get what they need, but not more.
- 2 Previously there were poorhouse auctions; whoever was willing to take care of orphans at the lowest
price and were given some money from the municipality. That is what we get today, when we put
out the care of elderly on private companies.
- 2 The rich stay with their children in protected areas where everyone is purely Swedish. They have no
contact. The differences increase. Then prejudices arise.
- 2 Of course I have periods when I think that the system in the US is so good. It is impressive. It is
cool that one can make so much money. But if you go a few blocks away you see the ghetto. And
then you wonder what kind of a society it is.
- 2 The idea of the welfare state is good, but it is abused way too much. You ask yourself why it is so;
all people are actually dishonest in some way.
- 2 People get what they deserve.