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Abstract
The goal of my dissertation project is to defend two logically independent but related conclusions regarding epistemic justification. The first is that epistemic justification is correctly described only by a deontological theory (abbreviated hereafter as DCEJ, for, deontological conception of epistemic justification), meaning justification is analyzed in terms of duty fulfillment. The second is that we have at least one epistemic duty: an unconditional obligation to believe the truth. The first thesis provokes something of a ground-breaking in contemporary epistemology. While the DCEJ is controversial in itself, my review of the related literature suggests no one has correctly identified what, precisely, the DCEJ is. Once one resolves this latter issue, one is faced with a set of hitherto unconsidered questions. The second thesis finds support in the strong intuition that justification and truth are importantly connected, but stands opposed to almost every theorist on epistemic justification in that it denies the possibility of justified, but false belief. Finally, given the truth of these theses, epistemic norms are incommensurable with other types of norms, meaning the importance of obeying our obligation to believe the truth cannot be weighed against the importance of any moral obligations we might face.