

ROMANIA'S QUEST FOR EU MEMBERSHIP:
TRUE LOVE OR SEEKING A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

by

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(Under the direction of MARKUS CREPAZ)

ABSTRACT

This paper brings a double contribution to the literature on public support for European integration. From an empirical perspective, it produces important systematic evidence about a largely unexplained case, testing for a wide range of variables and using survey data from Romania. From a theoretical perspective, it engages in a thorough reorganization of the theory of public support for supranational integration identifying and testing for four major competing theoretical perspectives on support for the EU. My main concern is whether the nature of determinants of support for EU accession in Romania is predominantly utilitarian or value-based. My findings suggest that while utilitarian motivations play an important role in shaping Romanian's attitudes toward the EU, these are primarily determined by value attachments: such as European identity or attitudes towards democracy. I find also that the mass-media and the government play an influential role in the formation of attitudes toward the EU.

INDEX WORDS: European Union, Romania, Public opinion, Public support, European integration, European accession, Transition

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The public opinion dimension of European integration has received an increased attention in scholarly publications in the last decades. Its relevance is multiple. First, as a practical matter, European integration depends at least to some extent on public opinion. In the context of democratic politics, public opinion has a determinant role for policy (even if we might admit that there are other influences on policy and that public opinion itself can be influenced and changed).¹ For example, whether a further deepening of the European Union or its enlargement will take place as planned depends to a great extent on the publics of the member and candidate countries because the process of European Accession, and after that the very fact of being a member of the EU, involves the public in several ways: directly, through referenda and European elections, and indirectly through the fact that political decisions taken by national politicians with respect to European as well as national issues are accountable to their publics.

Secondly, the evolution of public opinion towards regional integration has a more theoretical relevance, certainly not less important. The study of public opinion in this context is helpful for the understanding of the formation of supranational identity (be it regional or maybe global) and its interplay with the building of supranational institutions. Thirdly, and this time also from a theoretical perspective, in the case of the former communist countries the public opinion dimension of the process of European integration allows us to better comprehend the

¹ There has been an intense debate about what has been called the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU institutions (see for example Lord 1998; Lord and Beetham 2001; Majone 1998; 1999, 2002; Moravcsik 2002; Schmitter 2000), that seems to question to some extent the influence of the public on EU politics. However no account of the democratic problems in the EU seem to claim that public opinion is not at all relevant with respect to policymaking.

post-communist transition and what it involves, and how the choice to join the EU has intervened in this process.

With the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice that have expanded the policy areas in which the EU is involved, the study of public opinion towards this organization has received a new impetus. With the prospect of new memberships the universe of countries to be studied has expanded. This might explain the rather large number of studies on this topic in the last decade. Nevertheless, in spite of the large and growing body of literature a lot remains to be done for a fuller understanding of this phenomenon; many gaps in the theory and empirical evidence available have yet to be filled.

This paper attempts at bringing a double contribution to the literature explaining support European integration. First, from an empirical perspective, it presents some of the first systematic findings on Romania, one of the candidate countries which – as will be argued – in spite of a whole set of interesting peculiarities with respect to the public attitudes towards the EU has been surprisingly little studied. Secondly, from a theoretical perspective, this study attempts at thorough reorganization of the general theory of determinants of public support for regional integration. It also aims at the improvement of the validity of most measures of these determinants and it tests simultaneously for a large number of variables controlling for possible spurious effects that might have not been detected by previous studies.

The next section is intended to show why studying Romania's case is important within the general picture of support for European integration, it points to some peculiarities of this country that should be puzzling for the student of public support for the EU and it explains the questions that this study tries to address with regard to public opinion in this country. In the third section a general review of the literature is undertaken in order to clarify the conceptualization of


political support and identify the major competing theoretical perspectives on determinants of public support for supranational integration. Section four presents the methodology and the data employed in this study. The methodological and theoretical discussion is continued in section five where the variables considered in this study are introduced and operationalized. Section six completes the analysis and interpretation of results while the conclusions of this study are presented in section seven.

CHAPTER 2

WHY STUDY ROMANIA?

A look at the aggregate levels of support for the EU in candidate countries shows that Romania is the country whose citizens are the most supportive of EU accession. In 2003, 81% of Romanians considered that membership in the EU would be a “good thing” while only 2% were skeptical of EU membership considering it a “bad thing.”

Figure 1: Support for EU accession



Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2003.4,

Survey made in October – November 2003

Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (COUNTRY)'s membership to the European Union would be...?

%, “neither good, nor bad”, “don’t know” and “no answer” not shown.

If one looks at the level of support for EU accession in candidate countries as it evolved over time, one can see that ever since the beginning of surveying of such indicators through the

Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer (CEEB, 1991-1998) and later through the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB, 2001 – 2003) Romanians have constantly been the most supportive of their country's membership in the EU among citizens of candidate countries. While in most other countries the level of support for EU accession has varied having in some cases significant ups and downs, Romania has probably been the most stable, and constantly the first in this ranking. At no moment does the *Eurobarometer* show any other country higher on this scale.

This aspect appears puzzling since Romania has also “led” in the ranking of worst performers in fulfilling the criteria of accession to the EU. Romania was one of the last countries to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria of membership in the EU; being one of the last to democratize and it still has problems fulfilling the economic criterion requiring candidate countries to have “functional market economies.” Romania has also lagged in the process of negotiation for accession having closed the fewest chapters of negotiation. Moreover, recently Romania has almost faced the prospect of suspension of negotiations for admission in the EU due mainly to problems such as widespread corruption and lack of economic and institutional reform. Nevertheless in spite of their government's slowness in advancing on the way to accession, Romanian's have remained highly Euroenthusiastic.

Other factors contribute to making the high level of support for EU interesting. Geographically Romania is the most distant from the EU, having no common border with any EU member state.² Historically, during communism Romania has been also the most ‘distant’ from Western Europe; it has had the harshest, most repressive communist regimes in Eastern

² While other countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus don't have a common border with EU countries either they are in a more privileged position. The first three have are close across the Baltic Sea to Scandinavian countries especially Finland, while the last two are Mediterranean countries close respectively to Italy (Malta) and Greece. A majority of Cypriot population is in fact Greek.

Europe in the 80s (except maybe for Albania which is not a candidate country), Ceaușescu – the communist dictator – being one of the last Stalinist leaders in the region. This has meant that internationally Romania was one of the most isolated countries in the region in the 80s. Economically Romania has been also among the most distant countries from the European Union, being one of the least developed among the candidate countries (together with Bulgaria and Turkey at similar levels of development), with a GDP per capita in 2003 of \$1920 at exchange rate parity, and around \$7000 in purchasing power parity.

Given the overwhelming Euro-enthusiasm of the people in this country, it is also surprising how little the literature on public attitudes toward EU integration has focused on Romania. When studies of public opinion in candidate countries have compared the structure of determinants of support for EU in candidate countries, they have often not taken Romania into account (see for example Cichovski 2000; Ehin 2001; Löwenhardt, Hill and Light 2001; White et al. 2002). Some studies take into account Romania when they comment on Central and Eastern European views of EU enlargement but they only comment on some descriptive aggregate data without going further to perform more in-depth empirical analysis (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky do take into account Romania in a cross-national study of attitudes towards EU membership in all post-communist countries (2002), but the results of the model they develop are all statistically insignificant in the case of Romania. This however did not preclude them from drawing some conclusions with respect to this country.

In an article dedicated to Romanian public perceptions of EU, Năstase (2002) attempts to link current public opinion to communist legacies, arguing that Ceaușescu's terribly oppressive regime and his deceivably pro-Western foreign policy in the 70s and apparent independence from Moscow have somehow (not really clear how from the article) co-worked to render

Romanians highly supportive of EU accession decades later. This claim is supported by unclear historical and theoretical arguments and by no empirical evidence. One other study, by Linden and Pohlman, compares Romanian and Czech anti-EU politics by examining political parties in these countries. It generates some very useful conclusions regarding anti-EU politics in these countries explaining it through mass-to-elite cues, political culture and socio-economic expectations, but it does not attempt to take the testing of these claims in the public opinion area by using survey data.

In probably the only empirical article examining this subject using survey data, Bjola (2001)³ showed that several determinants such as distrust in national institutions, partisanship, tolerance, living in border areas have a significant positive impact on people's level of support for EU. While this article makes some first steps in empirically elucidating the causes of support for EU accession in Romania its model, probably also because the available data, remains to some extent incomplete and arbitrary, many possible variables being left out. Also the empirical findings and their implications are not sufficiently discussed. The author merely enumerates them to move then to conclude about issues not necessarily tested for such as the fact that the EU might benefit from enlargement with the new more Euro-enthusiast members by reinvigorating its initial ideals.

Therefore, few studies have approached the subject of Romanian support for EU accession. Most of those that did so did not generate any systematic evidence to support their conclusions, and the only one that tackles the public opinion subject using survey data, even if it makes some pioneering steps, a lot remains to be added to the model it develops. The Romanian Euro-enthusiasm remains to a great extent an unelucidated topic.

³ According to my knowledge, after a pretty intense search of bibliography in Romanian and international sources, it is the only one.

Given peculiarity of the Romanian citizenry in terms of having constantly had the highest level of support for the EU, given other factors such as governmental performance, history, geography and economic development which suggest we should not necessarily expect Romanians to be so Euroenthusiastic, and finally, given the fact that Romania's popular support for EU accession has remained a little understood phenomenon, this study finds it opportune to address the general problem of what determines support for EU accession in Romania. In doing so this paper is guided by several concerns suggested to some extent by previous literature and by some knowledge of certain facts about Romania.

On one hand the lower level of economic development of Romania compared to the EU and most other candidate countries would suggest the rather cynical view that it is mostly because of the low levels of development that Romanians wish to join the EU, hoping that in this way they will have the opportunity of a quick boost of their living standards. On the other hand however, this hypothesis faces some difficulties: Bulgaria and Turkey, countries with similar levels of economic development have had lower levels of support for the EU. Moreover, the stubbornness of Romanians in their Euroenthusiasm seems not to correspond exactly to the inconstant nature of support predicted by the theory of economic support. If Romanians' support for the EU is mainly utilitarian in nature than it should have been highly dependent on events related to EU accession such as the decision not to begin negotiations with Romania in 1997 and later in 1999 the decision to begin them.⁴ Since this has not been the case the obstinacy of Romanians in their Euroenthusiasm might suggest a value based nature of their support. These contradictory suggestions of the aggregate level data determine the first and foremost concern of this paper. Throughout this paper I ask the question what is the nature of determinants of public

⁴ Most countries, when they saw their prospective accession date being postponed have registered declining levels of support.

support for EU accession in Romania; that is do Romanians want to join the EU because of expected material benefits or due to some value attachments?

Secondly, the theory suggests that European integration has generally been an elite driven process in both established members of the EU and in candidate countries. Nevertheless in Romania, at least when it comes to the governmental elite, the government has generally not performed well in providing its citizens with the much desired EU accession. The Romanian governmental institutions have also not been very popular and trusted by Romanians (in comparison to the level of institutional trust in most other candidate countries). That is why it is important to ask: what is the role of the political elites in shaping the level of support of Romanians for EU accession. Thirdly I explore the question of what other individual differences (on socio-economic and demographic dimensions) are relevant in structuring Romanian citizens' support for EU accession. These questions are explored in a case study analyzing survey data from Romania.

These concerns are explored by approaching the topic of support for the EU in a case study of Romania inquiring variations of support for the EU at the individual level. Therefore this paper does not aim at comparing Romania's level of support with that of other countries, it does not make cross-country comparisons but focuses on within-country variation.⁵

⁵ The methodological choices made by this study are further described and explained in Chapter 4: Methodology and Data

CHAPTER 3

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU

3.1. Conceptualizing Public Support for Regional Integration

David Easton defined political support as an “attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively” (1975, 436). He conceptualized it within his more general systems theory as an important ‘input’ for political systems essential for their survival (persistence) and effective functioning (transformation of demands into outputs) (1975; 1979). He distinguished between several types of support according to how manifest it is: ‘covert’ or ‘overt’, and according to what is the object of support: different authorities⁶, regime, institutions, structures and political community (1979, 153-91). But he asserts that not only these aspects external to support (its object and clarity of manifestation) distinguish between types of support. More importantly for this discussion, Easton considered that from a psychological perspective support as an attitude is of two types *specific* and *diffuse*. Specific support is oriented towards specific demands and is the result of evaluations of fulfillment of those demands and therefore of governmental performance. Consequently it is a more short term and varying attitude. Diffuse support is more abstract and oriented towards a general assessment of the regime and the community it represents; it constitutes a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (1979, 273). The two types of support are considered as clearly separable empirically

⁶ He employs the term *authorities* to refer to individual elites or political leaders as opposed to more impersonal institutions.

and, to an important extent, independent from one another: “except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs” (1979, 273).

The puzzle that Easton tries to solve through this theoretical distinction proceeds from his observation that some regimes/systems are more dependent on performance and more vulnerable to dissatisfaction with outputs than others that seem to tolerate better periods of low level of performance and distress on the system. Consequently, Easton distinguishes between the two types of support arguing that one (the specific one) is more related to performance and the other (diffuse) more related to legitimacy. He further argues that it is the higher level of diffuse support or legitimacy of some regimes that enable them to survive difficult periods. Although we may see other reasons besides diffuse support that may explain regime stability in tough times and that may account for the solution for Easton’s puzzle⁷ we can clearly see that Easton’s distinction has an important theoretical value. It transposes in the realm of public opinion an older distinction that between legitimacy and performance. Specific support is thus a public perception of and response to performance and diffuse support is a public perception of legitimacy.

But exactly because Easton assumes that the public clearly makes a rather difficult theoretical distinction between legitimacy and performance his distinction entails some empirical difficulties. In survey research, it is hard to phrase questions referring to political support in such way as to address only one type of support and not the other and thus perfectly separate the two types of support. Secondly, even if questions might refer more and might be closer in meaning to one or another ideal type of support it is difficult to rely that the public understands well the difference. Therefore, while different questions might tackle more one or more the other type of

⁷ Such as availability of alternatives leaders, resources, ideologies for possible opposition or the resources and determination of elites to maintain the old regime (see for example Dahl 1971, 48-9) or institutional establishment (see for example Lijphart 1977, 1999)

support it is hard to assume that there will be no ‘spillover’ from one measure of support to the other. In other words, people who are asked some general question about how much they support the regime might be influenced in their answer by concrete evaluations of recent output and their opinions of the particular leaders at that time; and the other way around, evaluations of output and leaders might reflect partly their support for the regime as a whole. In conclusion, while Easton relies very much in defining the two types of support on their independence (at least in the short run (1975, 444; 1979, 273)) the same independence is hard to achieve when operationalizing the two concepts and when measuring them. Moreover, theoretically it is hard to justify the existence of two (and no less or more) distinct types of support, and consequently a conception of schizoid individuals with two independent, sometimes contradictory attitudes both termed as support. It is theoretically more defensible to conceive support as continuum from more specific aspects to more general ones, rather intercorrelated with one another to some extent and independent from one another to another extent.

To exemplify this theoretical discussion let us refer to previous research of public support for EU. Gabel (1998, 15-37) claims that he employs and tests the Eastonian model of political support applied to the public support for the EU. He distinguishes between *affective* (the way Gabel renames diffuse) and *utilitarian* (the way he renames specific) support.⁸ He operationalizes utilitarian support in terms of two questions: *Evaluation of [Country’s]*

⁸ Note that Gabel changes somewhat the meaning of the distinction even though he claims that he employs the same one. He equates specific with utilitarian and diffuse with affective (p. 16) while Easton did not explicitly do so. Generally we could agree that more specific support tends to be more utilitarian (since individuals are asked about more specific institutions and policies and they might have a better idea of their outcomes and their concrete effect on them) and that diffuse support should be of a more affective nature (in the absence of specificity and clarity of effects), nevertheless, this might not always be the case. We could conceive people having a strong support or opposition to a specific policy which might be of affective nature. For example support for the specific policy of school desegregation in the South by people not directly affected (by say whites in the North) might be of affective nature. Conversely diffuse support can be utilitarian if for example people support a regime based on the belief that on the long run it will lead to prosperity and their own prosperity in particular, even if it might not be clear how. But based on Easton’s referred texts while the equivalence between diffuse-specific and affective-utilitarian is not explicit it is rather implied to some extent. This leads us to say that it is not Gabel alone to be ‘blamed’ for this lack of clarity but Easton too since his definition of the types was not sufficiently clarified.

Membership and *National Benefit* and affective support using three questions referring to people's *European Identity* and their attitudes towards *European Solidarity* and *European Unification*.⁹ A first conclusion that can be drawn from this operationalization is that the questions employed fail to capture one type of support while excluding the other. One can make the case that some people's evaluation of membership and assessment of national benefit is not purely utilitarian and self interested but it entails some values of attachment to the nation. Furthermore, the assessment of country's membership as good or bad does not necessarily involve utilitarian motivations but they could be of affective nature such as the people see membership as good because it promotes some values people feel attached to. The same argument can be made about the questions considered by Gabel to capture affective support. Each of them does not exclude support for European Unification or Solidarity or European Identity also because of individual cost-benefit analyses. Thus I conclude that while Gabel's operationalization is of such nature as to group the indicators according to closeness of meaning it fails to separate them clearly.

Furthermore, Gabel's analysis leads to similar conclusions. The factor analysis shows that two factors better predict the covariation than one, however one factor is able to predict much of the covariation and all indicators correlate positively with this factor. In other words the two groups of indicators tend to correlate better within the group than outside. He concludes that the two factor model is better and that this confirms the Eastonian model. However, while it is apparent that the two factor model is a better one predicting more of the covariance, I disagree that this necessarily confirms the Eastonian model. Gabel does not show the independence between the two groups of questions that the Eastonian theory would entail. His analysis shows that indicators about a similar object – support for EU –, yet differently phrased tend to cluster

⁹ For details about the phrasing of the questions see Gabel 1998, 20.

according to their closeness in meaning. But it fails to show the independence of the two types of support that results from Easton's theory, in fact according to his analysis the two groups of questions are still highly correlated with one another.

Based on Easton's theoretical discussion and Gabel's analysis I would conclude that the theoretical and empirical independence of two types of public support (specific and diffuse) is difficult to sustain. Easton's theory should rather be interpreted as suggesting two ideal types of variables and closeness of indicators to one or the other of the types is likely to lead these indicators to correlate better but is unlikely to make them independent from the indicators close to the opposite type.

What is the purpose of this discussion? My point is that rather than trying to distinguish between two different types of support (whether we call them diffuse v. specific, or affective v. utilitarian), it makes sense to talk of a single measure of support. In this case we will be interested in operationalizing a measure of support that is as neutral as possible with respect to the two opposite ideal types which we might call *general support*. This is not a third type of support different than the previous types discussed but on the contrary it should be operationalized as undifferentiated support.¹⁰ Analyzing the nature of support and in particular support for EU accession is still important. However the position adopted by this paper is that this problem would be better answered by simply looking at the structure of its determinants.

3.2 Theories and Classes of Determinants of Support for Regional Integration

Even if we talk of one type of support rather than several, it still makes sense to discuss the "nature" of that support. We can agree with Easton that the nature of support would tell us about what support depends on and whether it is steady or likely to be fluctuating. However, as I

¹⁰ Further discussion on operationalizing support for the EU in the operationalization section of this paper.

argued above, such discussion should be in terms of motivations that lead to support rather than in terms of different and empirically separable types of support.¹¹ But before speaking of each individual determinant of public support we need to see what are the classes of determinants we can identify and what are the theoretical perspectives they involve. This paper, based on a critical discussion of the literature draws a distinction between four main theoretical perspectives and four corresponding classes of variables they advance.

A first distinction that has been made in the literature was the distinction between *utilitarian* (or economic) factors and *value-based* (or cultural, or affective) factors. Since, however, the language employed has generally been quite confuse and since this distinction has not always been made with much clarity it is required that we go into a more detailed theoretical discussion of previous studies.

First, we can consider that the origin of this debate goes back to Easton's distinction between specific and diffuse support. In spite of the above formulated criticism of the Eastonian theory of political support, here we have to acknowledge that Easton's intuition that the "nature" of support may be different from case to case was correct and theoretically valuable. Whether the level of support is strictly oriented towards particular outcomes perceived as benefits, or whether it is diffuse or affective is highly relevant for the study of political support in general. Knowing to what extent political support is value based or utilitarian helps us determine whether that support is likely to be stable and principled or conditioned by particular expectations of benefit and therefore dependent upon their possible change. However, based on the discussion in the previous section I established that it makes little sense to talk of two empirically separable types of support. In order to determine the nature of support in these terms we need to refer to different

¹¹ The difference here is that rather than having a one dimensional scale between *specific* and *diffuse* we employ a multidimensional categorization depending on how many determinants of support and how many types thereof we find.

motivations leading to support. If we understand Easton's distinction in this way we can see that the literature has generally made this distinction (oftentimes with explicit references to Easton), albeit not always with enough theoretical clarity.¹²

Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), in a pooled cross-sectional and time series study of the level of support for the EU within the EU member states, propose two distinctions among the determinants of attitudes towards European integration. First, they distinguish between national and international level factors, arguing that the aggregate level of support for the EU in the member states is determined by both domestic and international phenomena. Then, they draw a second distinction between the factors influencing the level of support, these being either economic or political factors.

Cichovski, in an article about public opinion in five candidate countries, identifies three perspectives in the literature studying public opinion about the EU; these are the "utilitarian, value, and political economic perspectives" (2000, 1246). The utilitarian perspective suggests that people support regional integration based on a cost-benefit calculation; the value perspective asserts that "political values and cognitive capabilities affect a citizen's ability to form concrete opinions" (1247) about supranational institutions; and, finally, the political economic approach proposes macroeconomic conditions as the main explanatory factors.

Further on, Bielsiak, when explaining Poland's declining level of support for EU accession, considers that there are four types of factors, which he classifies under four labels: economic voting, political values, human resources, and cultural lifestyle (2001). Finally, Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky only draw the distinction between "utilitarian factors" and "political values" (2002).

¹² One can easily see that the much of the literature on determinants of support for EU accession, has more pronounced empirical concerns (that is it is concerned with finding new variables to be thrown in their regression analysis) than concerns aimed at theoretical clarity.

I consider that the typology of factors could be further clarified and simplified. First we should be aware that the distinction drawn by Eichenberg and Dalton between international and domestic factors is only useful for the kind of research design they used: based on aggregate level data and having the different countries as the units of analysis. In this case it makes sense to argue that economic development (for example) is a domestic factor, while a European election is a foreign one. However, this distinction is of little or no use for individual-level determinants where one deals primarily with psychological and social characteristics of individuals (where a distinction national-international makes little sense). Furthermore, Cichovski's typology makes sense with respect to the first two "perspectives," utilitarian versus value based being two philosophically and psychologically opposed types of motivations. However, the third type of "perspective" can only be added in this typology at the expense of a loss of logical clarity, because a different criterion is used to define it. The "political economic perspective" differs from the others because of the aggregate level perspective on support for EU integration.¹³ Bielsiak's four-fold distinction suffers also because it is not clear why we should distinguish the last two types from the first two (more exactly economic voting from human resources factors and political values from cultural lifestyle); the way he explains the impact of *human resources* attributes like education and occupational status make this category of determinants be impossible to distinguish from the utilitarian factors described under the first heading, and the *cultural lifestyle* attributes that he considers are hard to distinguish from the more general category of values, or value attachments.

¹³ Otherwise even the macroeconomic perspective needs micro-level rationales for why the macroeconomic factors would work. For example macro-economic factors may need to employ the "utilitarian perspective" to explain the rationale of the influence of macroeconomic indicators on people's attitude towards the EU by referring to their personal (microeconomic) gain from a positive macroeconomic situation. Or alternatively macroeconomic factors could be interpreted as leading to a different value outlook for individuals.

Thus, while preserving some complications of a more basic division between the determinants of public support for European integration, the literature appears to converge (although not always very straightforwardly) towards the suggestion that we can first distinguish between two important categories of such determinants. It appears to suggest the same distinction made by Easton and Gabel, only it employs it with respect to determinants of support rather than to make a distinction between two empirically different types of support. Following this strand of the research literature, although with the hope of adding some measure of clarity, we can make therefore a first distinction between *utilitarian or economic motivations* and *cultural or value based factors*.

However this twofold typology is not exhaustive, it does not include all the determinants that have been advanced by previous studies. Thus much of the literature has argued that not only individual *psychological* (I include here both value based and utilitarian) considerations determine support for supranational integration. People often take their cues as to what their attitude towards supranational institutions should be from a variety of other sources, generally from the national political arena. Thus from the early days of the study of European integration, some scholars have argued that this process, including its public opinion dimension is very much elite driven (see for example Inglehart 1970a and 1970b, also more recently Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 2002). Related to this strand of literature some authors have referred to political parties as being relevant in structuring citizens' preferences with regard to European integration (Pierce Valen and Listhaug 1983; Anderson 1998; Schmitt and Thomassen. 2000; Cichowski 2000; Carruba 2001; Bielsiak 2001; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002). Also, previous studies have found the trust in the national governmental institutions to be relevant for the level of support for the EU (Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Ehin 2001). Therefore,

even though it does not classify these variables as a separate type and it does not identify their common theoretical perspective, the literature advances the idea that people's relationships (trust, preference, membership, exposure, etc.) with a variety of social groups and political actors (parties, media, state institutions, interest groups etc.) may constitute also a class of determinants. I choose to call this class *social relationships* or *influences*.¹⁴

Most of the authors support this theoretical perspective with the assumption that people manifest a certain degree of (rational?) ignorance with respect to the issue of European integration, and therefore that is why they are more predisposed to taking cues from the outside. This entails that the influence of social/political actors on people's support for the EU is direct, to the extent that people are exposed to or in contact with a social and political group or institution, they tend to internalize that group's or institution's attitude towards the EU. However, I would add that this influence should not be considered as being direct only. The same political actors may influence the public support for supranational integration via other attitudes. Thus the influence of social and political groups should be both direct on the level of support for EU and indirect via other psychological determinants of support. While it does not deny it, this addition nuances somewhat the rational ignorance perspective. While people may be generally influenced by cues from political actors this influence is not always unmediated, sometimes people are influenced, they are receptive to input from political actors, but this input is not necessarily direct on the level of support but on some of the value-based and rational premises people employ to arrive at their attitudes towards the EU.

¹⁴ I use the word "relationship" because these variables measure a certain relationship individuals have with social groups or political actors. Also the word influence suggests that when these relationships are considered as possible determinants (independent variables) of support then they measure a certain influence that is received by the individual via that relationship.


Furthermore, there is yet another class of commonly used variables and it cannot be strictly considered as belonging to the types mentioned above. These are the *socio-economic and demographic variables*. The theoretical perspective advancing these factors claims that objective identifiable characteristics of individuals such as gender, age, level of education, area of residency, etc. have particular effects on their levels of support for supranational integration and institutions. Studies have generally confirmed that there are systematic differences in the level of support for the EU between different socio-economic and demographic categories of individuals. However, the explanations given by the literature as for why these factors should be relevant generally appeal to rationales that involve the psychological factors. In other words the literature has not found reasons why biological and physical differences between individuals would impact support for supranational integration except indirectly via an impact on their structure of values or interests. For this reason some researchers have used these socio-economic variables as proxies for different value-based or utilitarian factors. However, the difficulty that these studies run into is that for almost each of these variables there can be more than one rationale of how they can be relevant for the level of support for EU integration. Generally both utilitarian and value based rationales can be conceived for each. For example Inglehart (1970a and 1970b) conceived education as an indicator of ‘cognitive mobilization’ and a certain value outlook of being more cosmopolitan and exposed to new ideas. However, Gabel (1998) conceives the same variable as a proxy of human capital and therefore a utilitarian variable measuring how much people expect to benefit from the common market (similar arguments can be formed about each of the other socio-economic and demographic variables).¹⁵

¹⁵ A further more detailed discussion of socio-economic and demographic factors follows in Section 5.5 *Socio-Economic and Demographic Variables*.

Thus, since the literature doesn't seem to find any reasons why these variables would have a direct impact on support for supranational integration, and since all the rationales proposed for these variables seem to suggest causal path that is mediated by the psychological variables (although most of the times several such different psychological rationales can be suggested for each socio-economic and demographic factor) we are compelled to consider these variables as antecedent to the other previously discussed classes.

Therefore this study tests for four competing theoretical perspectives explaining support for European integration. In doing so it employs a fourfold typology of determinants of public attitudes: 1) *utilitarian or economic motivations*, 2) *value based or cultural motivations*, 3) *social relationships and influences*, 4) *socio-economic and demographic factors*.

Figure 2: Types of Determinants of Political Support




The first two can be classified under the more general label *psychological variables* since they both refer to individual motivations. The contrast between the theoretical perspectives offered by the utilitarian and value based motivations reflects the philosophical and psychological distinction between interests and values as well as the distinction made by Easton

between specific and diffuse support. It is useful for answering the first concern of this study related to the ‘type’ of support or in other words it helps us determine whether the prevailing motivations of people are of utilitarian or affective type.¹⁶ Furthermore, separating the third type of factors (the *influences*) from the first two (the psychological factors) helps us determine the extent to which people’s support is influenced by other actors or is based on judgments and value attachments of their own and also to what extent the influence of social and political actors is direct (leading directly to more or less support) or indirect that is leading to other attitudes (psychological factors) that in turn lead to support for European integration. Finally, the socio-economic and demographic factors are presented by the theory as having an indirect effect on political support via the other types of variables. Therefore, although no direct empirical effect of these variables should be theoretically expected (if we control for a wide range of psychological factors and social influences), they are useful methodologically (as important control variables checking for possible spuriousness of findings) and theoretically (including them helps us see whether there are other important variables that were not taken into account in the first three classes).¹⁷

¹⁶ Therefore here we rediscover the Easton’s and Gabel’s distinction between specific (utilitarian) and diffuse (affective) support at the level of determinants of support rather than as a distinction between different types of support. Different “types” of support should mean that the level of support for EU may have different motivations backing it rather than the fact that there are two empirically clearly distinguishable types of support.

¹⁷ For a further more detailed discussion of socio-economic and demographic (as well as the other) variables see Section 5.5 *Socio-Economic and Demographic Variables* of this paper.

Figure 3: Direct and Indirect Effects of the Classes of Determinants of Political Support



CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

From a methodological perspective, the question “Why Romanians are supportive of EU accession?” like any question in comparative politics, has at least two dimensions depending on the level of analysis employed. For a full understanding of this issue one would need to inquire this subject at both cross systemic (cross-national) and individual level (see Przeworski and Teune 1982, 74-87). Such a full investigation, however, is not always possible in a single study due to space limitations. Also, due to availability of data some methodological decisions are required. This section describes the methodological choices made in this study.

In order to tackle directly the question what makes Romania more supportive of EU accession than other countries one would need a cross-country design working with aggregate data. However such data is not sufficient to generate enough data points for the moment. While such a design would allow the inquiry of possible system level effects (nevertheless important) and the approximation of individual level motivations by using aggregate measures thereof would not allow for a direct inquiry into the individual motivations for a favorable attitude towards EU, from which extrapolation to individual level (where the rationale of causation would be better understood) would remain rather speculative.

On the other hand trying to use individual data in a cross-country study based on a cross-country survey (such as the CCEB) encounters also limitations. While the CEEB and CCEB have surveyed simultaneously several countries the number and type of questions asked does not allow for the inclusion of too many explanatory variables except at the expense of a diminished validity of some of them (as it was the case with many of the studies discussed in the previous

section). Moreover, if working with cross-country individual level data one faces two options. First, one can pool the data and refer to all the candidate countries as the unit of analysis and thus obtain a higher level of generality but at the expense of accuracy. Second, one can test a model separately for each country but in this case when testing for the relevance of the model for each country in each situation one tests for variations within each country therefore each such test not being more valuable than separate studies focusing independently on one or another of the countries. There is one advantage such studies can have over those that focus exclusively on one country, that is one can compare the extent to which the same model works for each country and whether there is a difference between the explanatory power and the significance of variables, thus seeing whether some factors are more relevant in some countries than in others. While such an approach would be useful it runs into two important problems, the available data allows for very incomplete models to be built (because of fewer questions generally asked in many of the cross-national surveys). Secondly, one would lose in accuracy and explanatory power by trying to use the same set of variables for all countries. Since the determinants evident in one country are not the same as those in others, one may need to use different models to enhance the explanatory power of each case.

That is why this paper – while recognizing that there are some theoretical advantages of the other types of designs but also claiming that there are problems of feasibility that such designs encounter if it is for them to have significant contributions – proposes a more focused yet feasible approach. It doesn't look at cross-country variation of aggregate or individual levels of support but this paper proposes a cross-sectional study of determinants of individual support for EU accession in Romania. I test simultaneously for a wide variety of explanatory variables (all the ones proposed by the literature some in several versions plus two variables that haven't been

tested for). Even if there is no direct comparison with other candidate countries since the sample is drawn only from among Romanians, some comparison is possible by comparing the results of this study with theoretical expectations and findings drawn from previous studies of other countries. As will be seen I expect that some of the findings of this paper would be strongly suggestive of system level effects.

This study relies on data made available by the Open Society Foundation (OSF) in Romania. Since 1994 OSF has run a program called the Public Opinion Barometer (POB) generally at least twice a year surveying a wide variety of social indicators in Romania by contracting generally with well reputed polling agencies in Romania. Starting with 2001 the POB included a larger number of questions about people's attitudes towards EU as well as other issues, allowing for a very detailed inquiry of the determinants of support for EU accession. During the last few years POB has used large samples of people ($n > 2000$), highly representative of the population of the country. Given the very wide variety of questions asked in the May 2002 POB I chose to use this one and not the most recent one (there are in total more than 450 questions that each respondent was asked).

CHAPTER 5

VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES

One of the advantages of this study is that, due to the large number of questions that were asked in the POB survey, it could not only include a large number of variables and test simultaneously for them, but even the variables that were included could generally be composed of several different indicators, thus improving their validity. Three different methods of composing indexes were used: 1) *Standardization*: When the indicators composing the index had different scales of measurement they were standardized (z scores were calculated), added together and then this index was standardized again. 2) *Average*: When the indicators had the same measurement scale in order to maintain the intuitive meaning of the measuring scale the indicators were averaged. 3) *Sum*: When all the indicators composing an index were dichotomous (yes-no questions codified as 0-1) again in order to maintain an intuitive meaning of the index the method of indexing used was simply adding them together. Thus the index signifies how many answers (be them *yes* or *no* depending on how the question was phrased) were answered such as to suggest the quality measured by the index.¹⁸ As a general rule a value was considered missing in an index if more than 2/5 of the values of the indicators composing it were missing. The variables and their measurement are presented below.

¹⁸ Besides the fact that adding these dummies preserves an intuitive meaning of the scale of measurement of the index, this method has the advantage that it weights more fairly the different measures composing the index. Since dummy variables in general are less likely to be normally distributed, standardizing them and adding them together tends to give an undue weight to those whose distribution is skewed, that is those in which most answers fall in only one of the categories.

5.1 The Dependent Variable: Support for the EU

As mentioned, the approach followed by this study in conceptualizing support is that of referring to a *general* or *undifferentiated* support. In practical terms this means that when building a measure of support for the EU the questions taken into account do not aim at specific benefits from European integration but rather at positive or negative perceptions of general issues, such as membership, further integration or the image of and trust in the European Union as a whole. The extent to which this general support is determined by utilitarian, value based or other type of motivations will be seen from the analysis of determinants of the support for the EU.

Previous studies of support for EU accession or support for further European integration for those countries that were already members of the Union, have used measures of public support for European integration that relied on one single question: citizens of member states were generally asked whether their country's membership was a good thing, or a bad thing (a neutral value, neither good nor bad, was included also), while citizens of candidate countries were asked how they would vote in a referendum about EU accession (yes, no or undecided). Even if generally, surveys dealing with this issue, like the Eurobarometer or the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, have usually included other questions referring to this issue, generally they haven't been considered, or included in the studies explaining the level of support for European integration.

This paper proposes a different approach in measuring support for European integration. While how people would vote in a referendum might turn out to be one crucial aspect of European accession, this question alone does not allow for the measurement of too much variation, and this is even more the case of Romania where only a small minority of people

would vote against EU membership.¹⁹ It is also questionable whether the whole meaning of the level of support for EU or for EU accession can be captured by asking one single question. That is why, I believe, that the validity of the measure could be improved by combining several questions addressing the issue.

In the POB May 2002 survey people were asked several questions about their attitude towards the European Union and towards Romania's possible membership in the EU. Table 2 (in the appendix) presents those questions and their scales of measurement and Table 3 displays the correlations among these indicators. These indicators were combined into a composite index called *Support for the EU*.

5.2 Utilitarian Factors

The literature has proposed several alternative ways of measuring utilitarian motivations.²⁰ One approach has been to use a measure the socio-economic status of people through 'objective' indicators such as social class (Inglehart 1970b) or more targeted indicators such as income (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Bielsiak 2002), occupational status (Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002) etc. The rationale proposed for the effects of these variables was that people with a higher socioeconomic status are in a better position to benefit from EU accession and therefore they are expected to be more supportive of supranational integration. While I do accept that the inclusion of variables referring to socio-economic status may be important, I deem that there are better, more direct measures of utilitarian or economic motivations. There are two major problems with using measures of socioeconomic status as proxies for utilitarian motivations. Firstly, it is not clear why only this

¹⁹ Which might be an explanation of why previous studies failed in explaining the individual support for EU accession in Romania.

²⁰ I will not refer here to operationalizations employed in aggregate level studies (see Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000) since this paper performs an analysis at individual level.

mechanism proposed by these authors would be at work and not also its opposite. Especially in candidate countries one can make the argument that many people with low socio-economic status may be supportive of EU accession exactly because they see the EU accession (whether rightfully or not) as an only chance for the improvement of their standard of living. Secondly, this measure does not manage sufficiently well to separate utilitarian motivations from value based and cultural ones. A higher socio-economic status may mean not only a better position in the common market and therefore a higher likelihood of benefit (as argued by previous studies), but also a different cultural outlook, for example being more cosmopolitan, which might act in the same direction making people more supportive of the EU.²¹ Therefore, rather than using these variables as proxies of utilitarian motivations, I argue for using them for what they are: measures of socio-economic status. Thus this type of measures will be discussed in section 5.5 *Socio-Economic and Demographic Variables*.

Another variable suggested within this class of utilitarian variables, more targeted at what it is supposed to measure, has been people's subjective *satisfaction with [their] economic status*. Thus, Cichovski (2000) and Tucker, Pacek and Berinski (2002) argue that a measure of satisfaction with one's economic status is appropriate especially in post-communist transitional countries: people's satisfaction is a measure related to people's reaction to economic reforms in the first years of transition. Since EU membership entails continuation of those reforms she expects that there would be a positive correlation between financial satisfaction and support for the EU. In other words winners of transition expect to be winners of EU membership. Following

²¹ Note that the phrase *economic status* can be misleading at times; the economic status may refer to the financial status, income or material possessions of people, but the fact that this is a measure of economic status does not imply that when it is correlated with support for the EU it necessarily reflects economic motivations. A difference of economic status may reflect different economic (utilitarian) motivations but also a different value outlook. This study argues, thus, that when motivations (be they utilitarian or value-based) are the target of measurement then we should use more direct measurements of motivations.

this literature I included in the analysis a measure of *Satisfaction with Economic Status*. However, in order to improve the validity of measurement I chose to use several questions addressing this issue. Table 4 and Table 5 present the indicators indexed in the composite measure of *Satisfaction with Economic Status*. Following previous findings and theoretical formulations I hypothesize that *the more satisfied people are with their economic status the more supportive they are of the EU and EU membership*. Nevertheless, since other better measures of utilitarian motivations are included in the model (see below) the influence of this variable should be rather low.

Furthermore, probably a better measure of utilitarian motivations is people's economic expectations for the future. Thus, Ehin (2001), in a study of public opinion in the Baltic states, deems that it is not the material standing (be it the "objective" or the perceived one) that should be taken into account here; instead one needs a more direct measure of the subjective individual economic expectations from accession as a determinant of attitudes toward EU. A similar argument is in fact made by Tucker, Pacek and Berinski (2002), but they combine the economic expectations for the future with the measure of satisfaction with one's economic status in an index. I included in the analysis a measure of *Expectations of Economic Benefit* similar with the one employed by Tucker, Pacek and Berinski (2002). Respondents were asked: "how do you think you will live after one year?"²² (1 = *much worse*, 2 = *worse*, 3 = *the same*, 3 = *better*, 4 = *much better*). I created dummy variables for each value and only the first two and last two were included in the regression analysis, thus the value *same* is taken as reference point. This question does have one shortcoming; it limits the horizon of expectation to one year, obviously not within the time horizon of Romania's accession to the EU. Nevertheless, it remains a good

²² This is a literal translation of the question from Romanian "Cum credeți că veți trăi peste un an?". When phrased this way this question addresses more closely the economic concept of standard of living (in Romanian "nivel de trai") rather than a general concept of life (how life would be after one year).

approximation of general expectations of economic benefit on the short to medium term and generally I believe it is a better measure of utilitarian motivations than the satisfaction with [one's] economic status because it addresses more closely the issue of economic benefits since it refers to personal expectations for future standard of living it. I hypothesize that *the higher people's expectations for their future standard of living the more supportive they are for EU accession.*

Finally we can employ a measure of utilitarian motivations that targets more directly possible economic benefits resulting from EU accession. People were asked also "Do you think that through Romania's entry to the EU your and your family's income will...? (1 = decrease, 2 = stay the same, 3 = increase)." Similarly dummies were created for each value and the middle value *stay the same* was excluded from the analysis and therefore considered as reference value. I named this variable *Expected Change in Income with EU Accession*. When introduced into the analysis I expected that *expectations of positive changes in income make people more supportive of EU accession.*

Unlike many measures employed by previous studies of support for the EU this question does come much closer in meaning to the target concept *utilitarian motivations*. But it has a major shortcoming: that of coming too close in meaning to the dependent variable *Support for the EU*. This is a problem somewhat similar to the one discussed above when critiquing Easton's distinction between specific and diffuse support. This question targets a very specific possible outcome of EU accession. But it remains unclear to what extent people support EU accession because they expect material benefits or they associate financial benefits (as well as possibly others) with EU accession because they have a general positive view of it. This problem is not as high as not to be able to distinguish between the two variables. After all, semantically this

question is phrased somewhat differently than those in the dependent variable, and statistically there are a large enough number of observations to make the two variables distinguishable. But it is a sufficiently high problem as to bias somewhat the results of the analysis. This would be the only independent variable measured with a question making direct reference to the EU, thus capturing to some extent the meaning of the dependent variable. More exactly, introducing this variable into the regression analysis would lead to an inflated R^2 and we should also expect that this variable would capture some of the 'effect' (Beta coefficients) of the other independent variables. In this paper, concerned not only with whether the variables proposed are significant or not but also with their relative importance this is a serious shortcoming.

Therefore in evaluating the effect of utilitarian factors this paper uses several variables suggested by previous research and it tests simultaneously for all of them. Apparently no measure is really 'problem free', that is all of them have some imperfections. Some of them (I especially have in mind *Expectations of Economic Benefit*) were somewhat far from the concept we intended to measure and therefore I expect that the statistical results to be somewhat deflated. Others (*Expected Change in Income with EU Accession*) were close in meaning to the target concept but had also the problem of coming too close to the meaning of the dependent variable therefore we would expect that such a measure would artificially inflate the Beta weight of this variable. Since none of these measures were perfect the approach followed in this study is to try alternative models with the last variable included and then excluded. The results will rather give us an interval where the 'real' importance of the utilitarian factors is situated.

5.3 Value Based Motivations

The rationales proposed by the literature for these variables are similar to one another which has allowed us to subsume them under the same theoretical perspective. People attached

to value X are more likely to support the EU if they perceive the EU as advancing or being at least compatible with value X, and conversely they oppose the EU if they perceive it as incompatible with that value. Several value dimensions are investigated in this study.

5.3.1 *Democratic Culture*

It has often been argued that the level of support for European integration depends on public attitudes towards democracy. This argument is stronger for candidate countries, where the influence of the EU has been perceived as a stabilizer for democratic institutions, both in the case of the southern enlargement of the EU (back then EC) and in the case of the current enlargement (see Freyberg-Inan 2002; Grabbe and Hughes 1999; Cichovski 2000; Pridham 2002).²³ In the context in which the CEECs have only recently built democratic institutions and a democratic culture is still not completely in place in these societies, it shouldn't be surprising if this is a relevant variable. Previous literature has investigated to some extent this variable with different operationalizations of it being tried – satisfaction with democracy in one's country (Cichovski, 2000), support for authoritarian alternatives (Ehin 2001) – but its employment has remained limited and its operationalization in the context of studies of support for the EU can be improved.

When one speaks of democracy, one generally refers to collective actors: countries, states, organizations, etc. The very attribute of democratic does not apply to individuals. However there is certainly a cultural-individual dimension of democracy besides the systemic institutional dimension (Diamond 1999). Yet such a concept might be quite diffuse, with a myriad of aspects. Therefore in measuring the *democratic culture* the question is “what are the features or virtues of the democratic citizen?” The dimensions of a democratic culture might be

²³ While there is a large body of literature debating the “democratic deficit” of the European Union that points to a lot of the imperfections of this organizations in this respect (see for example Lord 1998; Lord and Beetham 2001; Majone 1999 and 2002; Moravcsik 2002; Schmitter 2000) nevertheless, the impacts of EU with respect to democratization in Eastern Europe have generally been appreciated as positive.

multiple and for the purpose of this study (given also the large number of questions that were asked) I believe it is important to maintain them separate. That is why under this heading I introduced four variables each representing a different dimension of what might be termed “democratic culture.”

Before discussing the variables that were introduced in the analysis I first describe one that was left out. Several studies have pointed to the fact that the frequently used variable of *Satisfaction with Democracy* is rather improper as a measure of support for democratic norms and institutions (Diamond 1999, 169; Linde and Ekman 2003). In particular to recently democratized or transitional countries (but not only) this indicator is rather difficult to interpret. This is because people may be dissatisfied with “democracy in their country” either because they want more democracy and they consider their institutions fall short of ideal democracy, or because they are opposed to democracy in general and whatever level of democracy is present in their country is “dissatisfying” for them. This being the case this variable should be interpreted as a general measure for overall support for the system (although not the best possible one see Linde and Ekman 2003).

What variables should then be included under the heading *democratic culture*? In answering this question I first proceeded from the idea that at the most basic level *democratic culture*” means a conscious attitude that favors democracy and its institutional features and opposes its alternatives: authoritarianism, communism etc.²⁴ This requires a favorable attitude towards democracy in general but also an awareness of some basic institutions democracy involves and a favorable attitude towards them. Several questions in the POB addressed some of these aspects; consequently an index of *Attitudes towards Democracy, Democratic Institutions*

²⁴ Such a measure is especially relevant in recently democratized countries, where the memory of alternatives to democracy is still alive, where a strong general awareness of what democracy is in not present and the attitudes towards democracy are not always positive.

and Practices (in short *Attitude toward Democracy*) was created and included in the analysis. For details about the questions asked see Table 6 and Table 7. Since the European Union has had an important role in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe one of the means being the incentive of membership offered to the current candidate countries (democracy is also one of the criteria of admission in the EU) and since it is to be expected that people associate to some extent EU accession with democratization I hypothesize that *the more citizens are attached to democratic practices and institutions the more they will support the EU and EU accession since this organization.*

Another core aspect of democracy besides what people think of its institutions and practices is citizen participation.²⁵ In other words, it matters not only what people think of democracy and whether they favor it or not but to what extent they get involved in self-government and they feel that their involvement can make a difference. Therefore the index of *Participation v. Alienation and Powerlessness* (in short *Participation*) measures to what extent citizens think their participation can be effective (or on the contrary they might feel alienated from the political system) and to what extent they actually participate and are willing to participate in political life by writing petitions, participating in demonstrations, etc. See Table 8 for more details. There are probably fewer logical reasons why participation would be related to the level of support for the EU. Nevertheless, since it is a part of a wider concept of democratic culture which we expect to be connected to people's support for the EU I specify this hypothesis as: *the more people participate in politics (therefore the more they put democracy in practice) the more supportive they are of EU and EU accession.*

²⁵ A similar argument is made by Putnam (1993, 87-8; 1995) when he refers to *civic engagement* as an important measure of social capital and an important 'ingredient' of a functioning democracy. Here I measure not so much engagement in civic associations, but the participation and feeling of effectiveness and empowerment of citizens within the political community.

One other important aspect of democracy and of democratic culture is *tolerance*. Since democracy generally functions by means of rule of the majority and since it also involves equality even among very different people, and minority rights, tolerance can be considered as part of a more general idea of democratic culture. For example in order for minority rights to be effective, and in order for minorities to accept the majority rule and not feel threatened by it, a certain sense of tolerance, acceptance of the different and equality has to exist among the citizens of a democracy for it to be effective. Thus again as part of the larger concept of democratic culture, an index of *Tolerance* (see Table 9) was included in this analysis measuring ethnic and religious tolerance as well as tolerance towards sexual minorities. I hypothesize that *the higher the level of tolerance of a person manifests, the higher the level of support of EU*.

Finally, a fourth measure of democratic culture is *Interpersonal Trust* (Putnam 1993; 1995). People were asked “Do you think most people can be trusted? (0 = No, 1 = Yes)”. Again, logically it is hard to connect interpersonal trust to support for the EU; it appears that in some respects the two are disconnected the former relating people to their nearby community while the later to a remote supranational community. That is why if the effect of *interpersonal trust* is confirmed it shouldn’t be expected to be strong. Since I considered this concept as part of the more general *democratic culture* I hypothesize that *the higher the level of interpersonal trust the more supportive people are of the EU*.²⁶

5.3.2 *Economic Liberty v. State Interventionism*

Some of the previous literature discusses the possible impact of value orientations on a left right scale, but these studies do not always make a clear distinction between partisanship

²⁶ Social capital in general (and interpersonal trust in particular) is a controversial concept. Different interpretations and different expectations of its effects can be formulated. If one understands trust and social capital as measures of local networking and possibly attachment to local immediate community (and not as part of a more general concept of democratic culture) then probably an opposite expectation can be formulated: that people with higher social capital would be skeptical of a supranational community.

(that is the intention to vote for parties of the left or right) and personal value attachments (which at their turn may be located on a left-right axis). From previous literature it is not always clear that we deal with two types of variables when we talk of the right-left axis: one is a psychological factor, more exactly a value attachment, and the other shows a social influence of parties on structuring support of EU accession. I will discuss partisanship below in section 5.4 *Social Relationships and Influences*. Here I concentrate on the value aspect of the left right distinction. The way previous studies of support for the EU have addressed this issue was by asking people about what they think of market economy and what effect it might have on their country (Cichovski 2000; Tucker, Pacek and Berinski 2002). For the purpose of this analysis I created an index *Economic Liberty v. State Interventionism* addressing the issue of attitudes towards free market not through an explicit question relying on a maybe too abstract concept – “the free market” – for the usual citizen but through a set of questions evaluating people’s preferences for more economic liberty or for more state interventionism. Table 11 displays the indicators composing this index. Since one of EU’s main objectives is free trade and the maintenance of a common market and since the EU has been one supporter of market reforms in candidate countries including Romania we should expect that *the more people are in favor of economic liberty the more supportive of EU they are*.

5.3.3 Religiosity

Following previous studies that have shown some evidence that religious variables are relevant for the level of support for the EU, I included a measure of strength of religious commitment in the analysis. Since the majority (around 85%) of Romanians are of Eastern Orthodox faith, and since religion was not of central importance for this study, I left for future more detailed inquiry the question of distinguishing the different other Christian denominations

existing in Romania (Greek-Catholic, Catholic, Protestant etc.). Thus what I was concerned with here was only the declared strength of religious belief termed *Religiosity*. Table 13 and Table 14 show the questions included in the index measuring people's religiosity. Here I have to mention that *Religiosity* is an indicator that is somewhat more difficult to categorize in one of the types of variables in the classification employed in this study. This is because religiosity may be a very fundamental value attachment but at the same time such an indicator may capture the influence of particular social organizations: the Churches. This has to be taken into account when formulating expectations and interpreting results.

It is rather difficult to formulate clear expectations about the direction in which this variable should correlate with the level of support for the EU in Romania. Nelsen, Guth and Frasner (2001) found that the Religious factor has some importance in shaping people's preferences for supranational integration in Western European countries; Catholics being generally more pro-integration while Protestants being more Euroskeptic. Bielsiak found that in Poland the Catholic Church tended to be "skeptical of integration as a threat to Christian values of the Polish nation," (2001, 24), yet even there he noted that there were divisions within the religious establishment with regard to this issue. As for the Orthodox Church in Romania there are different and somewhat contradictory arguments that can be made. On the one hand, the fact that the same concern about the preservation of the "national religious values" exists within the Orthodox Church, as well as the fact that religious people tend to be more traditional would lead us to think that more religious people should be more Euroskeptic in Romania. On the other hand, the Orthodox Church, at least at an explicit, declarative level, has been a supporter of European Accession, being one of the cosignatories of a declaration agreed with by all major political actors (The Strategy for Preparing Romania's Accession to the European Union, June

1995). The research on the Orthodox Church in Romania is again contradictory when it comes to the issue of support for the EU. Some authors consider that the Orthodox Church, in spite of its declaratory support for EU accession, is predominantly traditional and fundamentally anti-European through its values and oftentimes nationalist message (Andreescu 2002). Others adopt an opposite view, while acknowledging some traditionalist and nationalist tendencies of religious message, they emphasize the effort the Church has made and the positive attitude it has expressed vis-à-vis the European integration project (Tudor 2002; Bulai and Pralong 2002). Therefore while previous research finds that the religious factor may be relevant in the equation of support for the EU, no clear suggestions are formulated as to whether it has a positive or negative effect in Romania. I consequently leave this variable with no expectations formulated as to whether it should correlate positively or negatively with the level of support for the EU.

5.3.4 National and Supranational Identity

The creation of a European identity is an intensely debated subject in the literature about the European Union. But generally the issue is approached from a more theoretical perspective in studies of European identity or about democracy in the European Union. One approach has been to study the growing of a sense of attachment to Europe (as a cultural dimension of European integration) and the concomitant decline of nationalism²⁷. This cultural dimension of integration is often seen as a reinforcing factor for further political-institutional integration. A second way to look at the creation of a European identity is as a precondition for a European democracy; there should be a European *demos*, which involves a stronger sense of a common identity, before one can establish a European democracy. In either case the cultural dimension of integration appears to be a precondition for the building of a more integrated and open European polity.

²⁷ These studies tend to define the national and European identity as opposite poles of identity: the growth of one entails the diminishment of the other (see for example Dogan 1994)

These theoretical debates have recently been explored empirically in studies of public support towards supranational integration in EU member states. Several studies (McLaren 2002; Carey 2002; Muller-Peters 1998) found that national identity, nationalism and perceptions of cultural threat are important determinants of skepticism towards the EU and the Euro while a feeling of European identity or patriotism tends to lead to stronger pro-integrationist feelings.

This paper investigates for the first time the relationship between national and European identity and support for European integration in a candidate country. Based on previous research and theoretical arguments we should expect that the more people feel European the more supportive they are for EU accession, and the more they feel attached to the nation the less they are in favor of EU accession. While it might be expected that the two measures be opposite, that is the more people feel emotionally bound to the nation the less they feel the same for Europe, this might not necessarily be the case. That is why in order to see their separate influence two distinct indicators of the two concepts were built. Therefore we can express two separate expectations: a) *the more people feel emotionally attached to Europe the more they are supportive of EU accession* and b) *the more people are emotionally attached to their nation the less supportive they are supportive of EU accession*. To measure the degree of *European Identity* people were asked “To what extent do you feel emotionally attached to Europe? (1 = very little, 2 = little, 3 = much, 4 = very much)”. Dummies were created for each value and the second value was taken as reference point and left out of the regression analysis. To measure the degree of *National Identity* people were asked three questions which were added in a composite index (see Table 15 and Table 16 for details).

5.4 Social Relationships and Influences

5.4.1 Exposure to the Mass Media

Newspaper readership is often considered a measure of political participation. For the purpose of this study newspaper readership, as well as the exposure to the traditional mass-media in general (including here TV and radio), was considered separately from the index of participation. While this variable has been proposed as a relevant factor early on in the study of support for European integration (Inglehart 1970b), it has remained surprisingly little investigated in later studies even though it should be expected that the media should have a strong formative influence on people's attitudes towards European integration. This variable is an index composed of four indicators measuring how often people read newspapers, how often they read political articles in the newspapers, how often they watch TV and listen to the radio (See Table 17 and Table 18).

Romanian politics of has been significantly influenced by the EU and the European accession prospect in the last decade (Freyberg-Inan 2002) and the press reacted to this through an extended coverage of the EU and EU news related to Romania. While the mass media have been criticized for failing to inform well the public on the European issue and for a lack of critical understanding of the European integration, qualitative research on this topic in Romania has pointed out that it has had an overwhelmingly positive message with respect to the EU (Niculae 2002; Kalambayi 2002). Because of this my expectation is that: *the more people are exposed to the media the more they are supportive of the European accession.*

5.4.2 The National Government: Institutional Trust and Perceptions of Corruption

The commonsense view of the support for European integration in Southern European countries has been that the publics in these countries are often more supportive of EU than

northern European countries because they are unhappy with governmental performance and corruption at home and they rely that by transferring more responsibility to the EU their governments will be constrained to perform better. For example Duncan (1994) referring to the late eighties and early nineties in Italy, writes:

The atmosphere of moral and economic confusion inclined many in Italy to turn to the European Community for salvation. Italy had always been among the strongly pro-European of the EC member states – a sentiment rooted historically in the desire, dating back to the eighteenth century, to avoid being relegated to the position of a second-rate power on the periphery of the continent.(1994)

A recent study (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000) conducting both individual and aggregate level analysis confirms this hypothesis finding that citizens of the EU tend to be more supportive of European integration when they are distrustful of their government and when they perceive their governments as corrupt. However Anderson (1998) and Ehin (2001) find evidence that system and government support lead to a more pro-European attitude.

The general view in Romania is that EU accession may have a stabilizing and disciplining effect on the Romanian government (Freyberg-Inan 2002). Also Romanians, as mentioned, have had a high level of support for EU accession, but on the other hand their level of trust in their government has been low. This data suggests that in Romania we should rather expect findings similar to those of Sanchez-Cuenca; supporting the hypothesis of support of EU as defection from supporting the national government. Bjola (2001) found similar results in Romania.

To test this hypothesis I created two variables. First, an Index of Trust in Governmental Institutions has been created combining four measures of trust in the presidency, executive, parliament and the judiciary (see Table 19 and Table 20 for details).²⁸ A second more specific

²⁸ Note that Romania is a semi-presidential republic; therefore it makes sense to ask people different questions about the Executive (the Cabinet headed by the prime-minister) and the Presidency.

measure of distrust was composed: the Index of Perceptions of Corruption (see Table 21 and Table 22). I hypothesize that in Romania *the lower people's trust in their governmental institutions the higher their support for the EU and the more people perceive their government as corrupt the more they support the EU.*

5.4.3 Political Partisanship

The relationship between partisanship and support for European integration has been much researched in the last decade. Nevertheless, there is some disagreement as to how this relationship is structured. Several studies found limited evidence that the left right dimension determines to some extent the position of parties on the issue of integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Gabel and Anderson 2002). But this relationship has generally shown to have some limitations. Some have argued that it is a rather curvilinear relationship (Hooghe Marks and Wilson 2002) or that other dimensions of classification are more important such as the division establishment/anti-establishment parties (Anderson 1998) or the distinction between green/alternative/libertarian and traditional/authoritarian/nationalist parties (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). Some studies bring evidence that the relationship between the left-right axis and the level of support for the EU has changed over time (Gabel and Hix 2002).

Following Cichovski (2000) and Bielsiak (2001) who argue that in the case of Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries the left-right division of parties is not yet well crystallized, it seems that it makes more sense to look at the influence of party affiliations on the level of support for EU accession not on the left-right dimension but based on their explicit programmatic position vis-à-vis EU accession, such a measure being relevant for the attitude formation role of parties. Some recent studies (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002; Kopecky and Mudde 2002) have built similar frameworks of analysis of party positions towards European

integration in Central and Eastern Europe. The main distinction they made is that between attitudes of principled support (or conversely skepticism) towards the idea of European unity and attitudes of support (or skepticism) for the EU and EU policies. Combining these criteria Kopecky and Mudde came up with a four fold classification from most supportive to most skeptical of EU integration: 1. Euroenthusiasts (supportive of the idea of European integration and optimists with respect to the EU), 2. Europragmatists (not supportive of the idea of European integration but optimistic with respect to important policies of EU), 3. Euroskeptics (supportive of the idea of European integration but skeptical with respect to the EU) and 4. Eurorejects (rejecting both the idea of European integration and the EU). This framework is useful to categorize the attitudes of Romanian parties.

A first remark that can be made with regard to Romanian parties is that there is an explicit consensus among all major parties to support EU accession; all parties have signed a protocol of support for EU accession in 1995 and have maintained their support for EU since. Thus the category of Euroreject or (hard Euroskepticism) is not present in Romania. However the nationalist and populist Greater Romania Party (PRM)²⁹ in spite of its declarative support for EU membership its program and overall message is oftentimes incompatible with the goal of European accession (Linden and Pohlman 2003; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). The GRP can be best categorized as Euroskeptic. Secondly the *Social Democratic Party* (PSD), the inheritor of the former communist party (presently forming the government in coalition with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania – UDMR), even if it has recently acted in government actively for EU accession, it has had a history of nationalistic tendencies and delays of reforms (especially in the early 90s) necessary (among other things) for accession (see again Linden and Pohlman 2003 for a similar evaluation). The position of PSD has followed a trajectory from

²⁹ Throughout this paper I use the Romanian abbreviations for political parties.

Euroskeptic in the early nineties to Europragmatist in the late nineties and almost Euroenthusiast as they took the lead of the governing coalition in 2000. Thus currently PSD can be categorized somewhere between Europragmatist and Euroenthusiastic. Most of the other parties like the *Democratic Party* (PD), *National Liberal Party* (PNL) and the *National Peasant Christian Democratic Party* (PNTCD), UDMR have traditionally made the European Integration one of their main points in their platforms. Even if their performance in following this goal when forming the government is questionable, when interested in attitude formation it makes sense to consider these parties as the most supportive of European integration and most coherent in doing so. Using the framework described above these parties may be described as Euroenthusiasts.

Taking advantage of the fact that we focus on a single country and therefore we deal with few parties, since we can only order the degree of supportiveness for the EU without knowing more about the distance between categories, I preferred to create dummies for each of the major parties. Therefore I hypothesize that *voting for PNL, PNTCD, UDMR and PD might make voters most supportive of EU, voters of PSD should be moderately supportive while voters of PRM should be least supportive of EU*. I also expected that *voters of all parties (except maybe for PRM) should be more supportive of EU than undecided voters and undecided voters should be more supportive of EU than non-voters*.

5.5 Socio-Economic and Demographic Variables

There are few or no theoretical reasons why factors such as gender, age, economic status, area of residence etc, should impact directly on the attitudes towards the EU. When previous research has employed these factors it has used them as proxies especially of psychological factors in the absence of more straightforward measures of them. However, in most cases more than one psychological rationale for why these factors are relevant can be suggested. Therefore, I

take the stance that these measures are bad approximations of psychological variables. For example age is suggested by Inglehart (1970 a and b) as a proxy for traditionalist and nationalistic values arguing that older people have been socialized in a more nationalistic environment. Consequently he argues that older people should be for this reason less supportive of the EU. However, advocates of the utilitarian perspective can suggest that older people are less able to compete in the Common Market consequently they would be less supportive of European integration because of economic fears.

The fact remains that in the absence of more direct measures of psychological variables the interpretation of socio-economic and demographic variables – if they are found significant – remains speculative (nevertheless useful if better data is missing and suggestive for future research). If on the contrary some psychological variables are introduced measuring more directly the rationales for which socio-economic and demographic factors should be relevant, then the later factors should appear irrelevant. Since this study employs a wide range of psychological variables I expect that these variables would be generally less significant and relevant than previous studies have found them to be. For control purposes I chose to introduce the following socio-economic and demographic variables in the analysis: income, gender, education, age, ethnic group and area of residency (whether rural or urban). Out of all these the ethnic group is probably the variable whose rationale for why it would be relevant for the support for EU is least captured by the psychological variables. Some ethnic minorities in Romania, especially the Hungarians and Germans, might want to join the EU out because of expectations of better protection of minority rights, or out of a sense of identity and desire to be closer to Hungary and Germany already members of the EU. Therefore it is probable that some of the dummies for *ethnic groups* be significant and positively correlated with the support for the EU.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

In order to test the theoretical perspectives presented several alternative models were built. Model 1 – 4 test for variables within each of the four classes presented: utilitarian, value-based, social-influences, and socio-economic and demographic. In Model 5 (a and b) all variables are pooled. Whenever the utilitarian factors were used in the regression analysis (Models 1 and 5) two variants of those models were employed (a and b): one (a) without the variable *Expectations of Change in Economic Status due to EU Accession* the other (b) with this variable added. The explanation for this choice (as mentioned in Section 5.2 *Utilitarian Factors*) is that in expect that Model 1a and 5a should capture less than the ‘real’ importance of utilitarian variables while Models 1b and 5b should capture probably more than the real relative importance of the same. Thus Models 1 – 4 should be useful to see how much each of the four classes of variables manages to explain the independent variable on their own. Models 5a and 5b pooled all the variables showing how relevant and significant each variable and class of variable is when controlling for all the others. In interpreting the data I will make reference primarily to Model 5a unless otherwise specified. Also given the fact that many of the variables employed are standardized indexes in interpreting the data I will refer mostly to β -weights of these variables.

Before interpreting the results I should mention that given the theoretical framework we employed in this study, grouping variables in classes of variables with similar rationales and consequently being part of particular theoretical perspectives, the interpretation of results will be done at two levels of abstraction. One is the level of each particular variable, the other one is the one of classes of variables and the theoretical perspectives they advance. I believe that such an

analysis allows for both a broader and more in depth understanding of empirical results. I will first discuss each finding within each class of variables and later I will move towards a discussion of the competing theoretical perspectives.

Table 1: Regression Coefficients

			Model 1a Utilitarian			Model 1b Utilitarian			Model 2 Values			Model 3 Influences			Model 4 Socio-Ec. & Dem		
			B	B	Sig.	B	B	Sig.	B	β	Sig.	B	β	Sig.	B	β	Sig.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS																	
Utilitarian Motivations																	
Satisfaction with economic status			.177	.174	.000	.156	.152	.000									
Expect. of change in economic status:																	
		Much Worse	-.294	-.086	.001	-.079	-.023	.375									
		Worse	-.224	-.094	.000	-.141	-.058	.025									
		Better	.214	.095	.000	.111	.050	.051									
		Much Better	.185	.025	.293	.119	.016	.477									
Expectations of change in economic status due to EU accession –																	
		Decrease				-.713	-.224	.000									
		Increase				.453	.222	.000									
Value Based Motivations																	
Democratic Culture	Explicit attitude towards democracy								.238	.227	.000						
	Participation								.013	.027	.235						
	Tolerance								.017	.039	.088						
	Inter-personal trust (social capital)								.008	.011	.629						
	Economic liberty v. State Interventionism								-.082	-.065	.006						
	Religiosity								.019	.019	.396						
	National Identity								.082	.084	.001						
	European Identity								.324	.164	.000						
		Very Much						.222	.112	.002							
		Much						-.045	-.008	.744							
		Very Little															
RELATIONSHIPS / INFLUENCES																	
Exposure to the Mass Media												.228	.213	.000			
Trust in Governmental Institutions												.159	.144	.000			
Perception of Corruption of Government												-.113	-.113	.000			
Partisanship												.604	.064	.006			
		PNTCD										.614	.098	.000			
		UDMR										.553	.097	.000			
		PNL										.343	.087	.002			
		PD										.348	.161	.000			
		PSD										.013	.004	.901			
		PRM										-.076	-.005	.832			
		Other										.267	.127	.001			
		NK - Undecided															
SOCIO-ECONOMIC & DEMOGRPAHIC FACTORS																	
Family Income (divided by family size)															6.613E-05	.102	.000
Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)															.101	.050	.031
Education															.019	.058	.021
Age															-.002	-.044	.065
Ethnic group															.283	.070	.003
		Hungarian													-.271	.028	.226
		Roma / Gypsy													.497	.026	.263
		German													-.484	-.058	.014
		Other													.047	.023	.357
Rural (Urban = 0, Rural =1)																	
Constant			-.002	-	.957	-.088	-	.041	-.232	-	.112	-.627	-	.000	-.152		.103
Adjusted R ²				.084			.201			.099		.137			.025		
N				1758			1577			1785		1782			1806		

Table 1: Regression Coefficients (continued)

		<i>Model 5a Pooled</i>			<i>Model 5b Pooled</i>			
		<i>B</i>	β	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>B</i>	β	<i>Sig.</i>	
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS								
Utilitarian Motivations								
Satisfaction with economic status		.034	.033	.250	.023	.023	.423	
Expect. of change in economic status:								
	Much Worse	-.202	-.062	.028	-.008	-.002	.930	
	Worse	-.153	-.065	.021	-.013	-.043	.113	
	Better	.141	.065	.019	.053	.025	.362	
	Much Better	.162	.021	.391	.134	.018	.448	
Expectations of change in economic status due to EU accession –								
	Decrease				-.650	-.212	.000	
	Increase				.407	.205	.000	
Value Based Motivations								
Democratic Culture	Explicit attitude towards democracy		.184	.175	.000	.152	.143	.000
	Participation		-.014	-.029	.255	-.014	-.028	.256
	Tolerance		.018	.041	.106	.016	.036	.140
	Inter-personal trust (social capital)		.011	.014	.575	.011	.013	.577
	Economic liberty v. State Interventionism		-.035	-.027	.289	-.019	-.015	.563
	Religiosity		.019	.019	.448	.032	.032	.192
	National Identity		.072	.072	.019	.079	.079	.008
	European Identity							
		Very Much	.306	.153	.000	.294	.148	.000
		Much	.260	.130	.001	.231	.116	.003
	Very Little	.136	.024	.369	.117	.021	.422	
RELATIONSHIPS / INFLUENCES								
Exposure to the Mass Media		.128	.121	.000	.114	.105	.000	
Trust in Governmental Institutions		.127	.117	.000	.103	.096	.001	
Perception of Corruption		-.063	-.063	.019	-.045	-.045	.085	
Partisanship								
	PNTCD	.248	.027	.289	.244	.026	.291	
	UDMR	.138	.019	.532	.204	.028	.340	
	PNL	.191	.035	.214	.177	.034	.225	
	PD	.093	.025	.446	.100	.027	.394	
	PSD	.144	.069	.136	.183	.088	.049	
	PRM	-.112	-.035	.306	-.081	-.026	.443	
	Other	-.310	-.022	.380	-.278	-.021	.401	
	NK - Undecided	.072	.034	.437	.095	.045	.289	
SOCIO-ECONOMIC & DEMOGRPAHIC FACTORS								
Family Income (divided by family size)		3.628E-05	.060	.028	3.404E-05	.058	.028	
Gender (Female = 0, Male = 1)		.049	.025	.319	.056	.029	.240	
Education		-.002	-.007	.795	-.003	-.010	.685	
Age		-.002	-.033	.205	-.001	-.017	.511	
Ethnic group								
	Hungarian	.304	.073	.013	.279	.067	.018	
	Rroma / Gypsy	.255	.027	.282	.291	.029	.222	
	German	.466	.028	.249	.739	.047	.051	
	Other	-.234	-.022	.368	-.396	-.037	.118	
Rural (Urban = 0, Rural =1)		.049	.025	.360	-.031	.016	.550	
Constant		-.669	-	.001	-.755	-	.000	
Adjusted R ²			.201			.300		
N			1403			1298		

Within the class of utilitarian variables I have tested for what – for the purpose of this study – represents rather alternative measures of the same concept (expectations of gain due to EU accession) than different variables capturing different concepts. I have argued that some measures tackle this concept more straightforwardly than others and therefore represent more valid measures. These findings seem to confirm our expectations, when a better measure than *Satisfaction with Economic Status* is introduced in the regression such as *Expectations of Change in Economic Status*, the former becomes insignificant while the latter is significant and appears more important in the overall regression analysis than the former. When a measure that is even more straightforward in capturing the meaning of utilitarian motivations (such as *Expectations of Change in Economic Status Due to EU Accession*) is introduced in the regression, the previous one becomes insignificant while the new better measure has an even higher level of significance and relative importance (β -weight). These results are of nature to confirm: 1) our expectation that for the purpose of this analysis all these measures capture (more or less) the same concept 2) those measures expected to capture the concept of utilitarian motivations better, actually do so³⁰, 3) those measures capturing less the same concept do not also capture a different dimension of the same concept that would be still relevant for our study.³¹ Nevertheless, the fact that *Expectations of Change in Economic Status due to EU Accession* is a more clear-cut measure of utilitarian motivations does not mean that for the purpose of this research it is a better measure.

³⁰ Certainly for a more thorough confirmation of these general methodological conclusions further study employing data from other countries would be useful and necessary.

³¹ This phrase requires some clarification. What I mean is that a variable like *Satisfaction with Economic Status* does not capture a different measure a different dimension of the concept of utilitarian motivations (that would still be relevant for the Support for the EU) than the measure of *Expectations of Change in Economic Status*. In other words these findings seem to suggest that when employed for the purpose of studying support for the EU the variable *Satisfaction with Economic Status* may only be expected to be relevant because of being a proxy of *Expectations of Change in Economic Status* (due to the tendency that more satisfied people would also be more optimistic about their economic status, and in particular in post-communist countries because winners of transition would also expect to be winners of European integration). However once a more direct measure of utilitarian motivations is introduced, the measure of Satisfaction becomes insignificant, this result suggesting that satisfaction, independent of expectations, is most probably irrelevant for the level of support for the EU. This suggests that for the future it makes more sense to rely on measures of expectations of gain rather than measures of satisfaction.

As I expect this measure to have an inflated β -weight due to greater closeness in meaning to the independent variable. For a correct assessment of the importance of utilitarian factors, given the existing measures, we can only give an interval where their real relative importance is situated. Whichever model we look at: 1a, 1b, 5a or 5b, the utilitarian theoretical perspective seem to be confirmed. In Romania, like in many other countries where this theory was tested, utilitarian motivations seem to play an important role. Possibly (depending which model we employ 5a or 5b) the expectations of gain represent the most important single variable. Therefore we can assert that to an important extent Romanians support the EU and want their country to join this organization because of expectations of material gain.

The results concerning the value-based class of variables strongly suggest that the utilitarian factors are far from being the only important determinant of Support for the EU in Romania. In fact much of why Romanians support the EU and EU accession is due to their value attachments. The *European Identity* variable is positively related to *Support for the EU* as expected, and it is probably³² the most important variable with a β -weight of .283 (if we add the β -weights for the *Very Much* and *Much* dummies in Model 5a) and highly significant (.001 level). This suggests that to an important extent European integration is a matter of identity for Romanians. As expected European identity is positively related to the level of Support for the EU, but we could not have anticipated that this aspect would be such a driving force of support for European integration. This confirms the view that sees the European integration process as accompanied or preconditioned by a sense of European identity. Whether we interpret this finding with a rather negative connotation as a “fear or frustration” of being left out or in a “gray zone” (see Phinnemore 2001a) or with a positive optimistic view as an authentic identification

³² I use the word probably here to suggest that given the uncertainty that exists with respect to the relative importance of utilitarian variables, it is hard to assess which exact variable is the one that contributes the most to the explanation of variation of levels of support for the EU in Romania.

with Europe and positive desire to rejoin it fully (see for example OPTEM S.A.R.L 2001), the statistical analysis suggests that the quest of EU accession in Romania could be interpreted as being mostly a matter of identity. Thus the desire to join the European Union, has to some extent the symbolic meaning of joining the European “family of nations” to which many Romanians feel they belong to.

More interestingly, even if not such a strong predictor, *National Identity* appears positively correlated with the level of support for European integration with a β -weight of .072 significant at the .05 level. Contrary to our expectations it appears that in Romania the more people identify with their nation (that is the more they identify with Romania, the more they are proud of being Romanian and the more they are ready to sacrifice their life for their country in case of a war) or we might say the more nationalistic people are, the more they are likely to support European integration. This finding is contrary to previous research in member states of the EU and it is rather counter-intuitive. Building a supranational community and a supranational identity associated to some extent to it is largely perceived as leading to less nationalism and conversely nationalism is generally conceived as an obstacle to European integration (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Muller-Peters 1998). This finding is even more surprising in the context in which we controlled for a sense of European identity. Thus national identity is well separated from a more general and diffuse concept of belonging to a community which might include European identity. In the context in which *National Identity*'s impact is significant while controlling for *European Identity* this means that *National Identity* cannot be taken to be a proxy of European Identity. How can such a finding be interpreted?

We could start by just stating what it says, namely, although nationalism is generally perceived as an obstacle to supranational integration and supranational identity, that a sense of

national identity on one hand and a sense of belonging to a supranational community and support for supranational institutions do not have to be opposites. At times, in some cases, probably to some extent, the two can be mutually reinforcing. In other words Romanians see European integration as advancing their sense of national identity. At this moment two facts come to mind that would help put this finding in the right context. The first one is that many studies of nationalism in Eastern Europe and in Romania in particular (mainly focusing on extremist nationalist movements their leaders and discourses) characterizing it as primitive – a form of underdevelopment – authoritarian and illiberal, or reflecting Communist or Leninist legacies (see for example Chen 2003; Dobrescu 2003; Haddock and Caraiani 1999; Krauss 2002; Pigenko and Novak 2002) have failed to acknowledge that there might be an important pro-European dimension of national identity in these countries. In Romania since the nineteenth century when the process of state and nation building begun, national identity has often been defined with a strong sense of belonging to the West, to Europe as a whole (Dumitrica 2000). Moreover the Latin heritage was often emphasized; the perception of Romania as an “island of Latinity” in Eastern Europe was not uncommon among the architects of Romanian nation-building.

Secondly, in order to understand this finding – and maybe not unrelated to the point made above – one has to pay attention to the peripheral status of Romania compared to Western Europe and the EU, and consequently what European integration means for Romanians. Unlike members of the Western European members of the EU or other candidate countries well advanced on their way to accession, Romanians are not faced with the question of fine tuning whether they want more or less integration, but with more radically distinct possibilities of being in or out of the EU. The symbolic stake is thus higher for Romanians, and their desire of membership is much related to a wish of being accepted in a European “family of nations.” It is

possible that once Romania becomes a member of the EU, or simply the prospect of accession moves closer, as the people would become more certain that accession is a *fait accompli* and as they become more aware of costs (material or symbolic) of accession this relationship might change. Whether such a finding will be stable over time or this relationship between national identity and support for EU membership will change as the prospect of accession moves closer, remains to be seen and it is subject well worth studying in the future. Nevertheless, in spite of these qualifications of these findings, our statistical evidence from Romania raises questions with regard to the widespread perception of nationalism and a sense of national identity and supranational integration. This study suggests that multiple subsumed identities (national and supranational) are not only theoretically possible but they do exist. The national and supranational identities do not have to be contradictory.

Furthermore, the *Democratic Culture* seems to also play an important role in shaping people's attitudes toward the EU. The fact that people perceive positively the role of the EU in consolidating democracy in their country and the more they are supportive of democratic values the more they are supportive of EU accession are confirmed. However, only people's explicit support for democracy and its institutions play a role (in fact an important role with a β -weight of .175 and significance level of $p < .001$) in forming their support for the EU. Interestingly, the other three variables: *Participation*, *Tolerance* and *Inter-personal Trust* are not significant. This tells us that only one dimension of democratic culture is in fact relevant for the level of support for the EU and that is the explicit attitude people have towards democracy and democratic institutions. Increased levels of participation or inter-personal trust do not lead to different attitudes towards EU accession. Also the level of tolerance towards different ethnic, religious or

sexual orientation minorities does not appear to influence people's level of support for EU membership.³³

However not all value attachments are relevant for support of EU accession. Religiosity is not significant and thus it appears that people's strength of religious commitment in Romania has no impact on their attitudes towards the EU. This might be due to the fact that obviously supranational political integration is not a central object of religion and religious belief. But to the extent that religiosity and churches can have an impact on it, as suggested by previous research, the Romanian Orthodox Church has sent rather contradictory signals to Orthodox believers. Probably more surprisingly, the *Economic Liberty v. State Interventionism* dimension of classification of economic values does not have any evident impact on the level of support for EU accession in Romania. This is more surprising because the achievement of a common free market is one of the central objectives of the EU. We can conclude that even if values play generally an important role in shaping Romanians' views of the EU, they are mainly political values and not economic ones. When, however, economic considerations shape Romanian's support for the EU, then it is not a matter of values but of expectations of personal gain.

Within the third class of variables, showing the influence of several political actors (media, governmental institutions, parties) on public attitudes towards the EU, contrary to our expectations Trust in Governmental institutions is positively related and *Perceptions of Corruption* negatively related to the *Support for the EU*. These correlations are quite strong and highly significant. The hypothesis of support for the EU as defection from national governmental institutions is disconfirmed in Romania. This tends to confirm the theory that in Romania (like in most members and candidates of the EU) support for supranational integration is to an important

³³ *Tolerance* is the only one close to the level of significance of .05 (one tailed). Further study of the impact of this variable might be worth conducting.

extent elite-driven, and that governmental elites play a significant role in this respect. Conversely, this shows that in Romania distrust in the national government tends to lead not to a reorientation of citizens towards supranational institutions but towards alienation from governance in general whether national or supranational.

But the government is not the only elite group driving public support for the EU. The media appears to play an important role in this equation too. As expected, the more people are exposed to the media, the more they are likely to support EU accession. This finding reflects the strong and consistently positive message of the Romanian media vis-à-vis the European Union and the process of EU accession. But it also raises the question of whether the media is maybe too positive and rather uncritical of this process.

A further interesting finding is that related to the influence of political parties on support for the EU. In Model 3, limited to the only to the political influences variables the dummies for political parties appear highly influential and significant. However, once all the other variables are introduced in the regression analysis all the party dummies become insignificant. This suggests that either the effect of parties on public support toward the EU is not direct but mediated (probably by the other psychological variables) or that the relationship apparent in Model 3 is spurious and consequently the intention to vote as well as the level of support for the EU are both determined primarily by the other attitudinal variables. The first possibility is less likely: it is unclear how parties could influence people's opinions of the EU only indirectly and not also directly offering them cues as to whether EU accession is a good or bad thing. The second possibility makes more theoretical sense. In the context in which the issue of EU accession is not very divisive, on the contrary there is much consensus at least in open discourse about the objective of EU accession among Romanian parties, it is possible that parties do not

exercise much of an active influence on public opinion on this issue, but they do reflect some of the differences in public support for the EU so that parties that are more outspoken of their support for the EU capture more votes of voters that are more supportive of the EU accession. If partisanship only reflects to some extent voters' preferences and it does not independently influence them (in the absence of active political debate on the issue) then this empirical finding make sense. It is still interesting to see that Model 3 confirms to a great extent our expectations as to which parties should be more supportive of the EU (and consequently have voters more supportive of the EU). PNTCD, PNL and PNL are the parties attracting most supportive voters of EU accession. Rather surprisingly voters of PD are somewhat less supportive on the average than PSD voters. Voters of PRM and voters of other parties are not significantly different in their level of support for EU than people who would not vote. Finally, overall, voters of major parties (except for PRM which can be considered an antiestablishment party) are more supportive of EU accession than undecided voters which at their turn are more supportive of the EU than people who would not vote.

Finally in the case of socio-economic and demographic factors our analysis shows some mixed results. If considered separately from the other variables the socioeconomic and demographic factors most of them are significant and showing that people with higher economic status, men, educated persons, the youth and the Hungarian minority (compared to ethnic Romanians) are tend to be more supportive of EU accession. Nevertheless, these factors have a low explanatory power ($\text{Adj. } R^2 = .025$). Moreover, most of them— gender, education, age, rural community —, as expected, are statistically insignificant in the pooled models, showing that many of the theoretical reasons why previous studies have expected these variables to be relevant were measured by the other variables. Nevertheless income appears significant at the .05 level

although having a little overall impact (with a β -weight of .06) on the dependent variable. I have stated above that income may be a proxy of utilitarian expectations as well as a proxy of different values shared by higher and lower class people such as the tendency of higher class people to be somewhat more cosmopolitan, to have traveled more maybe to be more exposed to the media. Given that fact that we control for more direct measures expectations of economic gain because of EU accession and a whole set of value attachments including attachment to Europe (which could be considered a measure of cosmopolitanism) and for exposure to the media this finding is rather puzzling. It suggests that there is something else (maybe other material benefits expected or other value attachments shared predominantly by higher income people) that make people with higher incomes more likely to support EU accession. At any rate this variable is not extremely important in the overall economy of determinants of support for EU accession in Romania. Further research would be required to clarify its rationale.

Finally being ethnically Hungarian in Romania makes people significantly more supportive of EU accession. As mentioned before there are important reasons why its rationale would not be captured by the other variables employed in this study. Hungarians in Romania may be more supportive of the EU because they perceive this organization as a better guarantee of their rights, because if Romania joins the EU they would be “closer” to Hungary in terms of not having the EU border separating them from this country.

More than discussing the significance of each variable, this study allows comparing the relative importance of classes of variables. It confirms that the first three theoretical perspectives have an important role in explaining support for the EU in Romania, while the fourth has a rather limited role. It is apparent that most of the variation in support for EU accession in Romania is determined by the psychological factors. Within this category the most important are the value

based attachments. The expectations of economic gain could possibly (although not surely) be the most important single determinant of support for EU accession in Romania. But overall (if we add together the absolute values of β -weights of significant variables within each class) in both models 5a and 5b the value based factors have a higher explanatory power (with a total β -weight between .530 and .486) than the utilitarian factors (with total β -weights between .192 and .417). This leads us to conclude that the nature of support for EU accession in Romania is mainly value based. Moreover, we can conclude that most of the explanatory power lies with the psychological factors in general. That is, support for EU accession is mostly determined by individual motivations related to values and expectations of gain as opposed to influences of outside groups and of socio-economic and demographic factors. Nevertheless, the influences of major political actors are relevant; elites clearly play an important role in driving the level of support of EU accession in Romania. Finally, the socio-economic and demographic variables have a minor indirect effect on support for the EU in Romania and for the most part they appear to have no significant direct effect (except for the income level which remains an interesting subject for further research and for the *Hungarian* dummy for which the rationales of its influence refer mainly to some unmeasured value-based variables).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This study has produced one of the first systematic accounts of public support for EU accession in Romania. It has proceeded from three questions suggested by an overview of aggregate level data on support for EU accession in candidate countries and taken the study of these questions to an individual level of analysis in a case study of Romania. The first question I have asked was: what is the nature of support for the EU in Romania, utilitarian or value-based? Secondly, I was interested in the role of elites and organized political actors in forming attitudes towards the EU. Thirdly I looked at what might be the effects of socioeconomic and demographic differences between individuals on forming their support for European integration.

In answering these questions this study has undertaken a review of the theory of public support for supranational integration and its determinants. I have distinguished between four competing theoretical perspectives on determinants of political support: utilitarian, value-based, social influences and socioeconomic and demographic. In order to answer the above mentioned questions I tested for these competing theories using survey data from Romania.

The findings presented suggest that in Romania, contrary to some expectations, the economic factors do not play the most important role in defining people's attitudes towards European accession.³⁴ Romanians want to join the EU mainly due to their value attachments, and especially because of a sense of European identity. It is also relevant that for the most part people in Romania seem to define their national identity not in opposition to but as belonging to Europe.

³⁴ Remember that this study does not compare Romania with other countries. The claim made here is not that in Romania the motivations are more value-based than in other countries but that in this country they are probably more value based than utilitarian.

The attitudes towards democracy also play a major role in structuring people's support for the EU, most Romanians seeming to be appreciative of the positive role of EU in stabilizing democracy.

Elites play also an important role in driving European integration in Romania. The media and – contrary to our expectations – the governmental elites play an important role in making people supportive of this process: directly – through cues offered to the public as to what their attitudes should be –, and indirectly – by influencing people's value outlook and their economic expectations. Political parties do not seem to have a direct influence on formation of attitudes towards the EU, but they seem to reflect differences of attitudes. This confirms the existence of an elite consensus and the rather uncontroversial nature of the issue of EU accession in Romania. But at the same time this finding raises the question whether in the absence of an active political debate on the subject Romanians are fully aware of what EU accession entails.

Since support for EU accession in Romania is to a great extent value based and grounded on a sense of European identity, this might suggest that that the overall level of support would stay high in the future too (although obviously this is not something we can predict with certainty). As Romania moves closer to accession and people might become more aware of its consequences and possible material costs, it is possible that support for the EU might follow a declining trend in overall levels of support. Also due to increased awareness of EU accession related aspects this issue might become more controversial politically and some level of more overt opposition to the EU among political parties could appear. But given the given the strong value-based component of the Romanian Euro-enthusiasm, which is to be expected to be rather stable, it is more likely that such a declining trend in the overall level of support would not be very strong.

Romanians appear strongly convinced that they wish to join the EU, yet it remains puzzling that their government does not perform well in insuring their country's accession. The Romanian elites do play a role in driving European integration and the same is true of the governmental elite. But the government seems to drive the process of integration more at the level of rhetoric than that of facts, where it proves to be a rather slow (and not necessarily also a safe) driver. Probably in order for the Romanian government to fulfill the wish of their citizens to accede to the EU and thus really drive Romania to accession in the EU it really needs to push the gas pedal. Or else maybe a new chauffeur is necessary...

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APPENDIX

Table 2: Indicators composing the Index *Support for the EU*.

Question	Scale of measurement						Excluded [†]
	1	2	3	4	5		
1 What is your opinion about Romania's request to become a member of the EU?	bad	neither good nor bad	good	-	-	NA/NK/ Haven't heard of it	
2 Generally speaking your opinion of the EU is...?	very negative	negative	positive	very positive	-	NK/NA	
3 If next Sunday there was a referendum on the issue of Romania's accession to the EU would you vote for or against?	against	NK/Undecided	for	-	-	NA / Not Participate	
4 What kind of effects would Romania's accession in the EU have on the country?	only negative	more negative than positive	no effect	More positive than negative	only positive		

Method of indexing: *Standardization*

Table 3: Correlations among the Indicators composing the Index: *Support for the EU*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.398**	1			
3	.359**	.376**	1		
4	.377**	.322**	.378**	1	
Index	.755**	.705**	.713**	.731**	1

** Correlation is significant at $p < .001$ level (2-tailed)

Table 4: Indicators Composing the Index: *Satisfaction with Economic Status*

	1	2	3	4	5	Excluded
1 How happy are you generally with the way you live?	Not happy at all	Not very happy	Quite happy	Very happy		NA
2 How is your life compared with one year ago?	Much worse	Worse	The same	Better	Much better	NA
3 How satisfied are you with your job?	Not satisfied at all	Not very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied		NA
4 How satisfied are you with the possessions in your household?	Not satisfied at all	Not very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied		NA
5 How satisfied are you with the house you live in?	Not satisfied at all	Not very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied		NA
6 How do you consider the general income in your household?	Not enough for the strictly necessary things	Enough for what is strictly necessary	Enough for a decent living	Can buy some expensive goods with some sacrifices	Afford everything we need without restraining from anything	NA

Method of composing the index: *Standardization*

Table 5: Correlations among the Indicators composing the Index: *Satisfaction with Economic Status*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Index
1	1						
2	.493**	1					
3	.507**	.428**	1				
4	.278**	.207**	.296**	1			
5	.237**	.175**	.232**	.757**	1		
6	.391**	.356**	.489**	.331**	.236**	1	
Index	.708**	.648**	.713**	.700**	.643**	.683**	1

** Correlation is significant at $p < .001$ level (2-tailed)

Table 6: Indicators Composing the Index *Attitudes towards Democracy, Democratic Institutions and Practices*

	Question	Answers					Excluded
		1	2	3	4	5	
1	Which is the best form of government?	Other	NK	Democracy	-	-	NA
2	Communism was...?	a good idea	a good idea wrongly applied	a bad idea	-	-	NK,NA
3	Should the state intervene in the activity of the press?	to a very large extent	to a large extent	to some extent	to a limited extent	not at all	NK,NA
4	Should the state intervene in the activity of political parties?	to a very large extent	to a large extent	to some extent	to a limited extent	not at all	NK,NA
5	It is better to have one or more political parties?	One party	NK	Two or more parties	-	-	NA
6	In order for things to go well do we need the Parliament or we could do well without it?	No	NK	Yes	-	-	NA
7	Do you think it is good that the government should issue laws (emergency ordinances) that are not first discussed by the parliament?	Yes	NK	No			NA

Method of composing the index: *Standardization*

Table 7: Correlations among the Indicators composing the Index: *Attitudes towards Democracy, Democratic Institutions and Practices*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Index
1	1							
2	.225**	1						
3	.092**	.110**	1					
4	.086**	.097**	.647**	1				
5	.236**	.137**	.204**	.137**	1			
6	.170**	.074**	.061**	.099**	.144**	1		
7	.032	.027	.105**	.072**	.050*	.080**	1	
Index	.506**	.439**	.577**	.571**	.538**	.355**	.274**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 8: Indicators Composing the Index: *Participation v. Alienation and Powerlessness*

Question	Answers			Correlations with Index	
	0	1	Excluded		
1	If the government took a decision that affected negatively people like you, do you think ...?	You couldn't do anything against it	You could do something against it	NK,NA	.342**
2	If the city hall took a decision that affected negatively people like you, do you think ...?	You couldn't do anything against it	You could do something against it	NK,NA	.422**
3	As long as things go well, I do not care who holds the power.	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.280**
4	In today's Romania anyone can participate in solving the country's problems.	Disagree	Agree	NK,NA	.292**
5	Better do not get involved in politics because, in the end, it is you who loses.	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.410**
6	It is better not to trust politicians.	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.452**
7	Politicians do everything to know the opinions of the population	Disagree	Agree	NK,NA	.291**
8	Ordinary citizens cannot get into positions of power	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.411**
9	Today, those who get involved in politics do it only to enrich themselves.	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.437**
10	Politicians are interested in people's opinions only at election time.	Agree	Disagree	NK,NA	.370**
11	Voting is a duty of every citizen.	Disagree	Agree	NK,NA	.095**
12	Did you [ever] participate in signing a petition?	No	Yes	NK/NA	.395**
13	Did you [ever] participate in a legal demonstration?	No	Yes	NK/NA	.426**
14	Would you participate in signing a petition (again)?	No	Yes	NK/NA	.512**
15	Would you participate in a legal demonstration (again)?	No	Yes	NK/NA	.536**

** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Method of composing the index: Sum

Table 9: Indicators Composing the Index: *Tolerance*

Question	Answers			
	0	1	Excluded	
1	Homosexuals should be accepted just like any other person.	No	Yes	NK/NA
2	Would it bother you to have Jews as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
3	Would it bother you to have Roma/Gypsies as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
4	Would it bother you to have Hungarians as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
5	Would it bother you to have Romanians as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
6	Would it bother you to have Arabs as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
7	Would it bother you to have Orthodox believers as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
8	Would it bother you to have Adventist believers as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
9	Would it bother you to have Greek-Catholic believers as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
10	Would it bother you to have Jehovah's witnesses as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA
11	Would it bother you to have Muslims as neighbors?	Yes	No	NK/NA

Method of Composing the index: Sum

Table 10: Correlations Among Indicators Composing the *Tolerance* Index

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Index
1	1											
2	.136**	1										
3	.106**	.248**	1									
4	.168**	.451**	.405**	1								
5	.013	.024	-.021	-.011	1							
6	.129**	.429**	.451**	.528**	.045*	1						
7	.054*	.107**	.010	.053**	.505**	.035	1					
8	.139**	.361**	.321**	.441**	.004	.414**	.035	1				
9	.155**	.303**	.405**	.407**	.019	.434**	.035	.675**	1			
10	.151**	.450**	.240**	.471**	.001	.400**	.126**	.542**	.459**	1		
11	.146**	.398**	.399**	.499**	.024	.659**	.045*	.576**	.592**	.610**	1	
Index	.393**	.567**	.635**	.695**	.102**	.732**	.156**	.706**	.737**	.658**	.785**	1

* Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11. Indicators Composing the Index *Economic liberty v. state interventionism*

	1	...	5
1	The income one person gains should not be limited	...	It is necessary to limit the income one can make
2	Each individual should take responsibility for his own wealth	...	State should take more responsibility for each person's welfare
3	Those who want to work should look for jobs by themselves	...	The government should provide with jobs all those who want to work
4	Competition is good, it helps people to work more and develop new ideas.	...	Competition is bad; it emphasizes what is negative in people

Method of composing the index: average

Table 12: Correlations Among the Indicators Composing the Index: *Economic liberty v. state interventionism*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.266**	1			
3	.049*	.110**	1		
4	.201*	.191**	-.051*	1	
Index	.662**	.716**	.457**	.508**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

** . Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 13: Indicators Composing the Index *Religiousness*

	Question	Scale of Measurement									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Other than weddings, funerals, how often do you go to church?	never	yearly	Holydays	Few times a month	Weekly	Few times a week	Daily	-	-	-
2	How important is your religion/belief for your life?	Not at all	Not very	Somewhat important.	Important	Very	-	-	-	-	-
3	Most important to succeed in life (other options were: work, good luck, connections, intelligence, education, something else).	Other	Religious Belief (2 nd Choice)	Religious Belief (1 st Choice)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	Which of the following situations characterizes you?	Not rel., convinced religion is wrong	Not religious, I don not care of the Church's teaching	Couldn't say whether religious or not	Religious in my own way	Religious following Church's teaching					

Method of composing the index: Standardization

Table 14: Correlations among the Indicators Composing the Index: *Religiousness*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.327**	1			
3	.137**	.190**	1		
4	.371**	.414**	.205**	1	
Index	.630**	.608**	.457**	.052*	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

** . Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 15: Indicators composing the Index *National Identity*

	National Identity	1	2	3	4	Excluded
1	Do you feel proud for being a citizen of Romania?	Not very proud	Somewhat proud	Proud	Very proud	NA/NK
2	In case of a war would you be ready to sacrifice your life for the country?	No	NK	Yes	-	NA
3	To what extent do you feel emotionally attached to Romania?	Very little	Little	Much	Very much	

Method of composing the index: Standardization

Table 16: Correlations among Indicators Composing the Index: *National Identity*

	1	2	3	Index
1	1			
2	.316**	1		
3	.337**	.205**	1	
Index	.776**	.705**	.650**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

** . Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 17: Indicators Composing the Index *Exposure to the Mass Media*

		0	1	2	3	4	Excluded
1	How often do you read newspapers?	Never	Once a month	Several times a month	Several times a week	Daily	NA
2	How often do you listen to the radio?	Never	Once a month	Several times a month	Several times a week	Daily	NA
3	How often do you watch TV?	Never	Once a month	Several times a month	Several times a week	Daily	NA
4	How often do you read political articles in the newspapers?	Never	Seldom	Often	-		NA/NK

Method of composing the index: Standardization

Table 18: Correlations among Indicators Composing the Index: *Exposure to the Mass-Media*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.314**	1			
3	.378**	.316**	1		
4	.686**	.259**	.303**	1	
Index	.779**	.606**	.651**	.735**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

** . Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 19: Indicators Composing the Index *Trust in Governmental Institutions*

		1	2	3	4	5
1	How much do you trust the Presidency?	None	Very little	Little	Much	Very much
2	How much do you trust the Executive?	None	Very little	Little	Much	Very much
3	How much do you trust the Parliament?	None	Very little	Little	Much	Very much
4	How much do you trust the Judiciary?	None	Very little	Little	Much	Very much

Method of composing the index: Average

Table 20: Correlations among the Indicators Composing the Index: *Trust in Governmental Institutions*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.789**	1			
3	.675**	.788**	1		
4	.465**	.494**	.576**	1	
Index	.828**	.901**	.842**	.622**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

** . Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 21: Indicators Composing the Index *Perception of Corruption*

		1	2	3	4	5	Excluded
1	Ever since the present government came to power, corruption...?	Has decreased	Has stayed the same	Has increased			NA/NK
2	Do you think that as a consequence of the measures taken by the government in the coming year, corruption will...?	Will decrease	Will stay the same	Will increase			NA/NK
3	In comparison with the last 5 years of Ceausescu's regime, corruption...?	Has decreased	Has stayed the same	Has increased			NA/NK
4	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the activity of the government in the following area: reducing corruption?	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very satisfied		NA/NK

Method of composing the index: Standardization

Table 22: Correlations among the Indicators Composing the Index *Perception of Corruption*

	1	2	3	4	Index
1	1				
2	.533**	1			
3	.256**	.223**	1		
4	.287**	.320**	.206**	1	
Index	.750**	.750**	.615**	.658**	1

*. Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);

**. Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).