

# **IS CHINA CORPORATIST?**

by

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**(Under the direction of Howard J. Wiarda)**

## **Abstract**

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the character of the Chinese political system writ large. Generally speaking, previous scholarly work on the Chinese political system consists of divergent conclusions; but perhaps what is more important is the debate about the form of the system not only remains inconclusive but also has faded into the background. In its place, studies consisting of narrow topics focusing on China have emerged, and they generally have no lessons learned for the larger picture. This trend is puzzling because China is gaining in prominence in the international system, but concomitantly less and less scholarly work is being conducted on the Chinese political system broadly construed. Since domestic systems drive a country's behavior in the international system, this study aims to address this gap by examining the broad research question of: what factors explain the form of the contemporary Chinese political system? This study, however, unlike previous studies that perhaps undervalue sociopolitical cultural variables, specifically examines Chinese culture and history to investigate the character of the system. The study

advances the theory that the Chinese elite used historical corporatism to facilitate China's transition from the imperial era to the contemporary era – meaning they meshed traditional elements with modern features – and as a result of taking this approach the modern system contains many features from the imperial system. Moreover the leadership continues to leverage forms of corporatism to achieve an eastern holistic order, or perhaps more aptly put, a system more reflective more of Chinese history and culture as opposed to copying another system. The project employs a case methodology of sociopolitical corporatism and uses process tracing in conjunction with elite interviewing to examine the sociopolitical cultural variables that contribute to the form of the Chinese political system. In doing so, this study makes several theoretical, empirical, and policy contributions, including employing an underrated sociopolitical cultural approach, using a unique but under used corporatist approach, engaging in an in-depth investigation of the Chinese political system, and providing a way to understand the sources and order of the contemporary Chinese political system.

**Key words:** People's Republic of China, China, the Communist Party of China (CPC), culture, history, ideology, Imperial System, Confucianism, Marxism, Leninism, Corporatism, Army, State, Society, Sociopolitical Culture, Institutions.

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**DEDICATION**

To my family for their love and support as well as to Joe, Theresa, Tony, Mary, and Jude for  
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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Purpose of the Study**

This study seeks to understand the factors that explain the character of the Chinese political system writ large. Three reasons drive this study. The first of these reasons is the scholarly community has investigated the form of the Chinese political and the conclusions are divergent. Some scholars even contend that the system defies encapsulation. Although divergent and inconclusive conclusions are nothing new for academia, the second reason elaborates on why the foregoing development is important to remedy. The second of these is in recent years, particularly over the last decade or so, there is a dearth of scholarly work attempting to classify the Chinese political system. The majority of scholars no longer focuses on the broad questions of China, namely what factors explain the form of the political system, but instead focuses on the narrow questions and makes no extrapolations for what the results mean to the bigger picture. This trend is particularly disconcerting because as China's role in the international system expands, we know less and less about the changing domestic system that drives China's behaviors in that system. The third of these reasons is that, although many scholarly works are exceptional, the classifications underrate crucial variables that could help better encapsulate the form of the Chinese political system and potentially

explain its trajectory. Thus it is the position of the author of this study that the outcome could provide a succinct classification of a complex and seemingly indescribable system.

### **How This Study is Original**

This study is unlike the previous studies conducted on the Chinese political system broadly construed for several reasons. The first of these reasons is that the study conducts an investigation examining underrated sociopolitical cultural factors. The second of these reasons is that, because the study aims to better capture the sociopolitical cultural factors, it employs a much overlooked social science paradigm. This social science paradigm is sociopolitical corporatism. The specific purpose of the paradigm is to conduct rigorous investigations of nonwestern systems that typically are difficult to classify because they are subject to distinctive traditions and unique imperatives. This paradigm overcomes these challenges because it contains concepts that facilitate the investigation of these variables. These ideas include unique imperative, historical antecedents, distinctive traditions, ideology, and institutions. Furthermore, sociopolitical corporatism provides the methodology to bring to light how the foregoing variables shape a country's transition and transformation, and, how these variables influence the manifest form of the political system. The third of these reasons is by conducting this investigation and employing this approach, the study provides a more recent and unique assessment of the Chinese political system writ large.

### **Expected Results**

The study advances the theory that the form of the contemporary Chinese political system has similar features to the imperial system. Concurrently, the study expects that the system adopted a lesser-known variety of corporatism to manage the existing and emerging conditions in the system. The study expects to find the character of the Chinese political

system is best defined by the imperial system, the republic, combined with a unique brand of corporatism.

## CHAPTER 2

### DEFYING ENCAPSULATION?

#### Introduction

China's current system defies encapsulation in a single short phrase...[as these depictions] miss the complexity of China's state structure today.

-- Michel Oksenberg,  
"China's Political System:  
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century", *The China Journal*, 2001, p. 21.

Michel Oksenberg's observation provides incisive insight into the challenges associated with characterizing the form of the Chinese political system. Although the political system seemingly defies encapsulation, this study contends that this is due in large part to the employed social science paradigms. These paradigms are primarily western frames of references crafted for specific developments at specific times. Meaning they miss and / or underrate China's transitional experiences and the system's complexities. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate the Chinese political system writ large. The main argument driving this study is the political system is influenced by sociopolitical cultural variables that create the distinctive manifest form.

Although the study uses sociopolitical culture as an explanatory approach, it is defined in terms of specific traits. These characteristics include historical traditions, antecedents, and unique imperatives, and in this study are collectively referred to terms of a ‘complex of distinctive characteristics’. The ‘complex of distinctive characteristics’ shapes the form of the political system and produces a distinctive system. This means the project relies on a decidedly nonwestern framework of analysis to conduct its investigation of the Chinese political system. In taking this approach, the study aims to better understand the factors that shape and define the political system.

To this end, this chapter provides an overview of the study’s research design. First, the chapter identifies the puzzle driving this study. Second, it reviews the extant literature and in particular what has been written on the Chinese political system writ large. Third, the chapter poses the research question framing the study. With the research question in mind, it unpacks how the study aims to answer the question. This specifically includes hypothesis development, variable identification, variable operationalization, and data collection. Finally, the chapter concludes with some final remarks as well as provides an outline for the rest of the dissertation.

### **The Puzzle**

China is a major player in the international society and therefore the form of China’s political system affects how it functions and interacts within that order. If we are unaware of the form, it is difficult to understand China’s actions on the world stage and, perhaps what is more important, it is even more difficult to craft appropriate policies. Many academics provide incisive insights in to the character of the Chinese political system, however the

assessments are conflicting and conclusions are divergent. Furthermore, in more recent times less and less scholarly work focuses on analyzing the Chinese political structure writ large.

However in the immediate aftermath of the June 4<sup>th</sup> incident (Tiananmen 1989) and throughout the 1990s scholarly work on the Chinese political system in America academia did intensify. The academics debates were so intense and so prolific that Michel Oksenberg, a leading American China expert in his time, wrote an article in 1999 not for citation and then in 2001 published an updated version of it, addressing this issue. In the article, Oksenberg contends that the Chinese political system simply “defies encapsulation in a single short phrase”. He argues ‘previous encapsulations, such as ‘totalitarianism,’ a ‘Leninist party state,’ ‘fragmented authoritarianism,’ ‘soft authoritarianism’ or ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ fail to capture the complexity of the Chinese political system today’.<sup>1</sup> His astute observation is a major driver of this study, as the study contends his assertions still hold true today.

Despite China’s growing importance in the world today, scholarly work focuses on other topics wholly unrelated to the Chinese political system writ large. In place of examining the form of the political system two specific trends have emerged.<sup>2</sup> The first of these trends is toward “disciplinary specialization”. “Disciplinary specialization” means that the study of China is “being integrated into” the field of international relations and the sub-field of comparative politics “to an extent unseen before”. This trend is positive because previously the field of Chinese studies stood in isolation from other fields. However the scholarly debates are “polemical, narrow-gauge, or marked by agreement as much as disagreement”. The second of these trends is toward “topical specialization”. This means that

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<sup>1</sup> China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Michel Oksenberg. 2001. *The China Journal*, 45:21.

<sup>2</sup> Studying Chinese Politics in an Age of Specialization, Kevin O’Brien. 2010. University of California, Berkeley. available at: <http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/OBrienK/OBrien%20Final.pdf> (accessed 2 August 2012).



scholars select “narrow topics” making China scholars “more like other area specialists in political science and even natural scientists”. These scholars, however, often ‘hesitate to link their findings to larger questions about how the Chinese political system works’.<sup>3</sup>

While there are some advantages to ‘topical and disciplinary specialization’, there are ‘some troubling implications’. As for topical specialization, it tends to dig a trench a mile deep and an inch wide. According to Kevin O’Brien, an American China expert at the University of California, Berkeley, China’s rapid economic growth and growing prominence in international affairs has generated extraordinary interest, but few scholars are willing “to take a stab at characterizing the polity”. This trend is disconcerting because we exist in an era in which ‘policy makers, citizens and other scholars need maps of Chinese politics more than ever’. As for disciplinary specialization, it increasingly ‘discourages interdisciplinary, China-centered discussion’. Instead it encourages “new islands of research, fenced off by disciplinary jargon, and parochial concerns, which can inhibit interdisciplinary work and hamper efforts to develop a holistic understand of Chinese politics”.<sup>4</sup>

O’Brien also observes that the foregoing trends affect teaching. His current graduate seminars often arrive at “prosaic conclusions” about China, such as “China is globalizing”, “international actors play a growing role in domestic politics”, and “it is helpful to disaggregate the state”. The general conclusion reached about China’s political system ‘nearly every week in his seminars’ is “China is in transition”, “it is a moving target”, or “a political hybrid that is unfamiliar and difficult to get our arms around”. China’s reform era is “now longer than the Maoist era”, and thus the abovementioned conclusions are

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 1;3.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 8-9.

“unsatisfying”. He is starting to ‘worry that for his entire career, from his first day of graduate school in 1979 we will be saying ‘China is in transition’.<sup>5</sup>

Elizabeth Perry, a prominent American China scholar at Harvard University, makes very similar observations to O’Brien’s. The CPC has held on to power for many decades now and has survived many challenges including reform and leadership transition. How is it possible that the system is in transition? Specifically, ‘if the Chinese political system is “transitional”, how has the current regime held on to power for decades now, weathering a series of potentially destabilizing leadership successions (e.g., Mao to Hua to Deng to Jiang to Hu)<sup>6</sup> while presiding over what may well be the fastest sustained economic and socio-cultural transformation than any nation has ever undergone?’<sup>7</sup>

This discussion leads to the observations of: Why do we know less and less about the Chinese political system writ large when at this time we should know more and more? More importantly, why are our conclusions about the form of the political system rather pedestrian and general?

### **The Research Question**

The previous discussion leads to this study’s overall endeavor. The study aims to provide a more current assessment of the Chinese political system broadly construed. The study primarily focuses upon the sociopolitical cultural variables that ostensibly contribute to the shape of the contemporary political system. In taking this approach, the study specifically aims to encapsulate the character of the political system. Accordingly, the research question guiding this project is: What factors explain the form of the Chinese political system? To

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>6</sup> The more recent leadership transition could be added to this list as well (e.g., Hu Jintao handed over power to Xi Jinping at the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in November 2012). The author of this study lived in China during this power transition and watched the handover on Chinese TV.

<sup>7</sup> Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?, Elizabeth J. Perry. 2007. *China Journal*. 57:7.

this end, the following section reviews the extant literature written about the Chinese political system.

### **Literature Review**

The extant literature on the Chinese political system demonstrates several trends. The first of these trends is that scholarly work on characterizing the Chinese political system proliferated in the 1990s within American academic circles. The second of these is the academic debate never reached a consensus about the form of the Chinese system. In other words, the debate remains unresolved, which is unsurprising for academic but the implications, especially for the policymaking community, are huge. The third of these trends is the debate shifted from too many characterizations of the system to only a handful in the last decade; in fact, with some notable exceptions, over the past decade fewer and fewer studies investigate the Chinese political structure as a whole. In this context, this section reviews the extant literature.

One group of scholars contends the Chinese political system is authoritarian in nature. However, although these scholars agree the Chinese political system follows authoritarianism, they debate the exact form. In China, the Chinese and especially the intellectuals were drawn to the development model employed by Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong, newly industrializing areas and countries. They concluded that employing their respective approach – the pursuit of economic modernization using a form of authoritarianism – might work for China. However, they preferred to employ and modify the traditional model historically practiced in China. Some Chinese experts contend this traditional model – a particular form of a republic – originated in the Zhou Dynasty and perhaps even before that

dynasty.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the Chinese created the neo-authoritarian approach suitable to China and for Chinese conditions.<sup>9</sup> Despite movement toward this model within elite circles, the debate subsided following 1989 incident in China.<sup>10</sup>

While the open debate on authoritarianism came to a close in China, American academia picked up where the Chinese scholars left off. In the post-1989 era, many American scholars believed the Chinese political system no longer followed Marxism and Leninism but rather some form of authoritarianism. Lee contends China is an authoritarian developmental state specifically because Leninism and market oriented reforms are incompatible.<sup>11</sup> Elizabeth Perry classifies the Chinese system as neo-authoritarianism in which the market economy develops “under the stern rule of a political strongman”.<sup>12</sup>

Both Dennis Roy and Chalmers Johnson argue China is an aspiring ‘soft authoritarian’ state. As for Roy, he contends Francis Fukuyama’s definition of soft authoritarianism best characterizes China. Fukuyama’s rendering consists of two characteristics. The first of these is a “market oriented system with “a kind of paternalistic authoritarianism that persuades rather than coerces”. The second of these is the emphasis on “conformity to group interests

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<sup>8</sup> Informal discussions with different Chinese experts about the meaning and interpretation of ‘Republic’, namely the People’s Republic of China, in Beijing in September and October 2012.

<sup>9</sup> The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique, Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong. 1990. *Asian Survey*, 11:1101; Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *China Quarterly*, 129:72.

<sup>10</sup> The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique, Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong. 1990. *Asian Survey*, 11:1101. Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *China Quarterly*, 129:72.

<sup>11</sup> *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China*, H.Y. Lee. 1991. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>12</sup> China in 1992: An Experiment in Neo-Authoritarianism, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1992. *Asian Survey*. 33:13. Perry also states that the term not the concept of neo-authoritarianism “was officially discredited because of the active participation of several of its advocates in the uprising of 1989. She references Barry Sautman who summarizes the neo-authoritarian debate in China in the lead up to 1989 in Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *China Quarterly*. 129: 72-102.

over individual rights”.<sup>13</sup> This means Confucianism has a strong influence on the system, as it values order, a strong but moral state, and the needs of society as a whole over personal freedoms and limitations on government.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, a more precise characterization of the Chinese political system would be classified as “Confucian soft authoritarianism”.<sup>15</sup>

As for Chalmers Johnson, a well-known American East Asia expert during his tenure, he posits China follows ‘soft authoritarianism’. China’s ‘soft authoritarianism’ consists of two characteristics. The first of these characteristics is how the Communist Party of China (CPC) rules through a combination of authoritarian governance and market driven economic policies. The second of these is the general shift away from an ideology dominated by communism to one dominated by nationalism.<sup>16</sup>

Other scholars agree that the Chinese political system follows authoritarianism. Kenneth Lieberthal, arguably the foremost American expert on the form of China’s political system, classifies the political system as ‘fragmented authoritarian’. This model is best characterized as being extremely complex, “increasingly decentralized, and suffering from ideological deflation, growing corruption, and petty despotism”.<sup>17</sup>

Harry Harding, another leading American China expert, suggests the Chinese political system follows ‘hard authoritarianism’. According to Harding the political system ‘is shifting away from totalitarianism because party officials and ideology play increasingly reduced roles. Concurrently, there is an increased range of activities unfolding outside the scope of

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<sup>13</sup> Asia’s Soft Authoritarian Alternative, Francis Fukuyama. 1992. *New Perspective Quarterly*. 9: 60-61. This work is cited in Singapore, China, and the “Soft Authoritarian” Challenge, Denny Roy. 1994. *Asian Survey*. 3:231.

<sup>14</sup> Singapore, China, and the “Soft Authoritarian” Challenge, Denny Roy. 1994. *Asian Survey*. 3:231.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 232.

<sup>16</sup> Soft Totalitarianism in China, Chalmers Johnson. 1997. *New Perspective Quarterly*. 3: 18-21.

<sup>17</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution to Reform*. Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York; London: W&W Norton Company. 169;180.

central economic planning, ideological constraint, or political control'. Although the system is moving away from totalitarianism, it follows a hard variety of authoritarianism because the Chinese are unable to express freely their political beliefs or challenge official ideology and because truly independent social and political institutions remain prohibited.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly to Chalmers, Lieberthal, and Harding, Robert A. Scalapino, a leading American China scholar during his time, agreed that authoritarianism emerged in China in the mid to late 1990s. However, Scalapino argues "the most basic political trend in China today is the gradual transformation of Leninism into authoritarian pluralism".<sup>19</sup> His rendering of authoritarian pluralism has several characteristics. The first of these is 'political life remains under the unchallenged control of a dominant-party and strict limits are placed on liberty; the military or national security organs maintain tight control on things'. The second of these characteristics is the existence of "a civil society apart from the state"; this means civil society enjoys 'a degree of autonomy' and articulates diverse interests. The third of these is the presence of a mixed economy in which the market economy plays an increasing role. Developing East Asian countries use authoritarian pluralism because it accommodates political culture, and perhaps most important, it enables the leaders to maintain stability in the midst of rapid economic and social transformation.<sup>20</sup>

Other scholars also classify the Chinese political structure as authoritarian. Jie Chen and Peng Deng contend in the post-Mao era Deng Xiaoping's reforms shifted China away from totalitarianism to authoritarianism.<sup>21</sup> Daniel Bell defines the form of the Chinese

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<sup>18</sup>The Halting Advances of Pluralism, Harry Harding. 1998. *Journal of Democracy*. 1:13.

<sup>19</sup>Current Trends and Future Prospects, Robert Scalapino. 1998. *Journal of Democracy*. 1:38.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>21</sup>*China Since the Cultural Revolution: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism*, Jie Chen and Peng Deng. 1995. Westport Connecticut: Praeger.

political system as ‘harsh totalitarianism’.<sup>22</sup> In addition, Chū labels the Chinese system as ‘benevolent authoritarianism’.<sup>23</sup>

Although the debate subsided for a few years, it resurfaced again. Andrew Nathan believes the system exhibits a ‘resilient form of authoritarianism’. Resilient authoritarianism draws strength from patterns of institutionalization that increase “the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of state organization”. The causes of this form are the increasingly norm-bound succession processes, the increasing use of meritocracy for top leadership selection, increasing functional differentiation and specialization of state institutions, as well as increasing participatory institutions that enhance the CPC’s legitimacy.<sup>24</sup> Kang characterizes the political system as a form of ‘benevolent authoritarianism’, a ‘dictatorship by a community of Confucian scholars’.<sup>25</sup> He and Warren contend the manifest form is ‘authoritarian deliberation’, meaning China is subject to a wide variety of deliberative practices.<sup>26</sup>

Some scholars believe revolution still plays a major role in shaping the political system and its trajectory. Specifically, Perry contends the Chinese leadership has not “jettisoned its revolutionary past as it “transits” toward a democratic future”. Instead the leadership has developed a “durable brand” of authoritarianism called ‘revolutionary authoritarianism’. The CPC has held on to power for so long because it has retained and

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<sup>22</sup> A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism, Daniel Bell. 1997. *Society*. 5: 38-43.

<sup>23</sup> *Understanding China: Center Stage of the Fourth Power*, Yen-an Chū. 1996. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

<sup>24</sup> Authoritarian Resilience, Andrew J. Nathan. 2003. *Journal of Democracy*. 14:6-7.

<sup>25</sup> Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition, Xiaoguang Kang. 2006. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*. 1:96.

<sup>26</sup> Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development, He Baogang and Mark E. Warren. 2008. *Prepared for Presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, Boston, August 28-31.

reinvented many elements of “China’s revolutionary heritage” and most likely will continue to do so.<sup>27</sup> In other words, China’s revolutionary legacy remains a factor.

Pan Wei, a well-known professor at the highly respected Peking University, classifies the form of the Chinese political system as ‘authoritarianism’. However Pan makes other crucial observations about the system. He hypothesizes the system may experience political liberalization but without democratization. Specifically, the party is willing to reform by implementing a consultative rule of law regime. This may occur because the party wants to control corruption not pursue western-style democracy. The party aims to constrain the power of officials with political consultation mechanisms, a politically impartial civil service (e.g., meritocratic system), and rule *by law* (emphasis added). This way China’s authoritarian system could be made stronger and less corrupt. This approach specifically involves restraining, strengthening, and improving the Chinese leadership rather than empowering Chinese citizens with greater individual rights.

Pan’s work contains two noteworthy aspects. The first of these aspects is his dismissal and criticism of electoral democracy as a system. This system has done more harm than good in many countries. The second of these is many Chinese intellectuals, political reformers, and ordinary citizens share his views. Specifically like Pan these groups are committed to political reform but disagree with the western scholars’ view on political reform leading to western style democracy.<sup>28</sup>

More recently, many scholars examining the Chinese political system also classify the system as authoritarian. For instance, Weller characterizes the political system as ‘responsive authoritarianism’. ‘Responsive authoritarianism’ means that social forces might create a shift

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<sup>27</sup> Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?, Elizabeth J. Perry. 2007. *China Journal*. 57:7;21.

<sup>28</sup> Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, Pan Wei. 2006. In Suisheng Zhao, (ed.), *Debating political reform in China: Rule of law vs. Democratization*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.



in China, like the forces did in Taiwan whereby Taiwan moved from a traditional authoritarian regime to a democratic one.<sup>29</sup> Other scholars classify the Chinese political system as ‘decentralized authoritarianism’,<sup>30</sup> ‘fragmented authoritarianism 2.0’,<sup>31</sup> ‘fragmented authoritarianism’,<sup>32</sup> ‘authoritarianism’,<sup>33</sup> ‘undemocratic authoritarian regime’,<sup>34</sup> and ‘market authoritarian model’ in which the Chinese leadership mixes repression and state capitalism.<sup>35</sup>

While many scholars contend the Chinese political system is best characterized as some variation of authoritarianism, other scholars see the emergence of corporatism. These scholars found evidence not of full-blown corporatism but of elements of societal, state, and Leninist corporatism. For instance, in the mid 1990s Margaret Pearson, a recognized American China political economy expert, contends the form of the Chinese political system best reflects ‘socialist corporatism’.<sup>36</sup> However Pearson later suggests that, because of the emergence of China’s new business elite and its unwillingness or inability to convert its economic position into political power, China is locked in a state-society hybrid model

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<sup>29</sup>Responsive Authoritarianism, Robert P. Weller. 2008. In Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond (eds.) *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan*. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. 117-133.

<sup>30</sup>*Decentralized authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party's control of local elites in the post-Mao era*, Pierre F. Landry. 2008. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>31</sup>Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0: Political Pluralization in the Policy Process, Andrew C. Mertha. 2009. *China Quarterly*. 995-1012.

<sup>32</sup>The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?, Suisheng Zhao. 2010. *Journal of Contemporary China*. 65:419-436.

<sup>33</sup>*Accepting Authoritarians: State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era*, Teresa Wright. 2010. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Uneven Opening of China's Society, Economy, and Politics: Pro-Growth Authoritarian Governance and Protest in China, Hongyi Lai. 2010. *Journal of Contemporary China*. 67: 819-835.

<sup>34</sup>Democracy, development, and authoritarianism, Mark Beeson. 2010. In Mark Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds.) *Democracy, development, and authoritarianism*. The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge. 236-247.

<sup>35</sup>*The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*, Stefan A. Halper. 2010. New York: Basic Books.

<sup>36</sup>The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises, Margaret M. Pearson. 1994. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (now titled *The China Journal*). 31:25-46.

combining both ‘socialist corporatism’ and ‘clientelist’ characteristics. Although Pearson contends the emerging pattern in China reflects the statism form practiced in Taiwan and South Korea, the Chinese variant consists of weak corporatist institutions that are less effective at coordinating business and government relations. Although the business and commercial elites have a degree of structural and ideological independence from the state, they are not a serious force for democratization. In other words, these elites are ‘do not “represent an emerging civil society”’.<sup>37</sup>

Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan contend the emerging form of the Chinese system is not necessarily advanced state corporatism, but this approach has “strong explanatory value for some of the more important trends” emerging in China.<sup>38</sup> The Chinese leadership “approaches state corporatism from the opposite direction as the East Asian NIEs”. Specifically, the leadership employs corporatism “not as a mechanism for strengthening the state’s grip over the economy and over society but rather the reverse, a mechanism through which the state’s grip could loosen”.<sup>39</sup> The emerging model in China is not the NIE model but instead an approach more appropriate for China and its conditions.

Bruce Dickson, a leading American China scholar, acknowledges corporatism captures the main elements of the Chinese system, “especially its political economy”.<sup>40</sup> However Dickson argues these corporatist elements are similar to key Leninist elements. Those who advocate the corporatist model in China “highlight examples of leaders who change from being agents of the state to become advocates for their associations”. This

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<sup>37</sup> *China's New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform*, Margaret M. Pearson. 1997. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 8-9;101.

<sup>38</sup> China, Corporatism, and the East Asia Model, Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan. 1995. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*. 33:29.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>40</sup> Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 4:534.

corporatist approach assumes the state is “naturally divided entity with different interests derived from its relations with economic and professional groups”.<sup>41</sup> However “one cannot talk of state interests as opposed to those of society when the state is in fact made up of ties with interests in society”.<sup>42</sup> Dickson concludes, ‘despite the Party’s policies of inclusion, the Chinese political system is ruled by a Leninist party’ particular since the CPC aims to “preserve its power” and protects its monopoly of political organization”.<sup>43</sup>

In a later work, Dickson explores the direction of China’s Leninist political system and market economy. He submits that as Leninist systems experience economic transformation, they shift from exclusionary to inclusionary systems. In other words, as the economic system changes the Chinese leadership is forced to include previously excluded elements of society. To this end, Dickson examines the relationship between the state and business elite through the attitudes and behaviors of the emerging class of business entrepreneurs. In the end the Chinese business elite took on the role of “red capitalists”, meaning they integrated into the political system. This development leads to the emergence of a form of corporatism between the state and civil society, which should provide the system with a high degree of stability. It means that the “perceived harmony of interests between the state and business associations rises with economic development”.<sup>44</sup> Dickson dashes the hopes of those who examine China through the prism of democracy by concluding the business civil society is not bringing democracy to China any time soon because societal

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 535.

<sup>42</sup> Corporatism and Comparative Politics, Douglas A. Chalmers. 1985. In Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Dickson also cites the foregoing source in his work titled, Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 4:535.

<sup>43</sup> Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 4:535.

<sup>44</sup> *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*, Bruce Dickson. 2003. New York: Cambridge University Press. 78.

corporatism is truly incompatible with the Leninist system.<sup>45</sup> If democracy comes to China, it most likely emerges from splits within the Chinese elite.<sup>46</sup>

Similarly to Dickson, other scholars also contend Leninism is the dominant feature of the Chinese political system. Goldstein observes, ‘as China approaches nearly 50 years of existence, it appears to be an anomaly. The Party has survived “the mass extinction of Leninist regimes” and continues along the reform path. The Chinese leadership pursues this path despite the widely held assumption that Soviet-style systems are inherently incompatible with systemic reform, specifically the leaders’ gradual and incremental transformation of economic and political systems using and building “upon the existing structures of society”.’<sup>47</sup> More recent academic scholarship also suggests Leninism best characterizes the form of the Chinese political system. For instance, Jeanne Wilson, my former professor at Wheaton College, concludes the political system is best classified as ‘Marxist Leninist’.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, both leading American China scholars, assert Leninism best defines the Chinese political system. For instance, Schell classifies the system as a “hybrid / capitalist Leninist system of governance”.<sup>49</sup> Shambaugh

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<sup>45</sup> Those who see the emergence of corporatist trends in China may interpret these trends as a path from “state corporatism” to “societal corporatism” (e.g., political liberalization) as argued by Schmitter in Still the Century of Corporatism? Philippe Schmitter. 1974. *Review of Politics*. 36:85-131.

<sup>46</sup> *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*, Bruce Dickson. 2003. New York: Cambridge University Press. 78.

<sup>47</sup> China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform, Steven M. Goldstein. 1995. *The China Quarterly*. 144:1105-1131.

<sup>48</sup> China’s Transformation toward Capitalism, Jeanne Wilson. 2006. In David Lane and Martin Myant (eds.), *Varieties of Capitalism in Post Communist Societies*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave. 239-257.

<sup>49</sup> China, the Olympics, and Global Leadership, Orville Schell. 2007. *Project Syndicate*. Available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china--the-olympics--and-global-leadership> (accessed on 8 August 2012).

contends that even though the Chinese leadership adopts reforms from other countries and thus has an "eclectic system", it remains Leninist at its core.<sup>50</sup>

Tsang also argues the political system follows a form of Leninism. The CPC has made the Leninist system “more resilient” in order to deal with “the huge social and political challenges that the global financial crisis may unleash in China”. It has done so “by incorporating consultative elements”. Tsang labels this form of Leninism as ‘consultative Leninism’.<sup>51</sup>

Michel Oksenberg posits the Chinese political system simply defies encapsulation in a single short phrase. Rather it is best characterized as “bureaucratic eclecticism”. Bureaucratic eclecticism is defined as an “eclectic set of three types of institutions”. The first type of institution is the core apparatus, the origin of which is Soviet Leninism. The second is the linkages among Chinese institutions. The third type of institution is the legal, semi-legal, and illegal organizations and associations emerging in the social and economic space created by China’s market economy as well as the state’s retreat from total control over society and culture. In addition, “bureaucratic eclecticism” emphasizes the importance of ideology, the mobilization system, and CPC control over the mobilization through “transmission organizations”, namely official trade union, the Communist Youth League, and the Women’s Federation.<sup>52</sup>

Some scholars argue the form of the Chinese political system shows signs of democratization. In the mid-1990s, Minxin Pei argued China would eventually undergo

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<sup>50</sup> *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

<sup>51</sup> Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework, Steve Tsang. 2009. *Journal of Contemporary China*. 62: 865-880.

<sup>52</sup> China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Michel Oksenberg. 2001. *The China Journal*. 45:21-23.

democratization.<sup>53</sup> More recently, both Edward Friedman and Larry Diamond are unwilling to accept the possibility that the Chinese political system could develop successfully without following the western model of development.<sup>54</sup> Andrew Nathan concedes that in the aftermath of the 1989 crisis “many China specialists and democracy theorists – myself among them – expected the regime to fall to democratization’s ‘third wave’. Instead the regime has reconsolidated itself.”<sup>55</sup> Inglehart and Welzel predict “China will make a transition to liberal democracy within the next two decades”.<sup>56</sup>

Shaohua Hu explains why a democratic system in China has not emerged. These factors include historical legacies, local forces, the world system, socialist values, and economic development. These factors have had varying effects on the democratization process in different time periods in China, however they have not been favorable to the emergence of political liberalization in China. Hu contends other obstacles to political liberalization leading to western democratization in China exist, and these obstacles are China’s long history, traditions, and large population.<sup>57</sup>

Other scholars agree with Hu’s viewpoint. Specifically they contend there is little interest in China in western-style democracy. For instance, Kang claims, “for China, western democracy is useless as a tool, and is not helpful as a value. It is useless because it will not necessarily resolve the problem of political corruption, nor break the collusion between the

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<sup>53</sup> *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union*, Minxin Pei. 1994. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>54</sup> The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China, Larry Diamond. 2006. In Suisheng Zhao, (ed.,) *Debating political reform in China: Rule of law vs. Democratization*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. A Comparative Politics of Democratization in China, Edward Friedman. 2006. In Suisheng Zhao (ed.,) *Debating political reform in China: Rule of law vs. Democratization*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

<sup>55</sup> Authoritarian Resilience, Andrew J. Nathan. 2003. *Journal of Democracy*. 14:6.

<sup>56</sup> *Modernization, Cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel. 2005. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 191.

<sup>57</sup> *Explaining Chinese Democratization*, Shao-hua Hu. 2000. Westport, CT: Praegar Publishers.

officials and private businessmen, nor protect the interests of the masses, nor prevent the elite from plundering”.<sup>58</sup>

These views are supported by Andrew Nathan’s recent work. Nathan conducted an analysis of the Chinese political and academic discourses. These discourses reveal little interest in Western-style democracy characterized by competitive elections for public office. While the CPC aims to retain its leadership position and pursue limited consultation, it remains committed to its own conception of reform.<sup>59</sup>

Gordon Chang and Minxin Pei both provide entirely different interpretations of China’s political system. As for Chang, he advances a thesis suggesting beneath China’s economic success is a deeply flawed economic system lorded over by an increasingly corrupt ruling party. Lacking solutions to the structural economic problems plaguing the economic system and unwilling to reform the political system, the CPC increasingly resorts to coercion to maintain control. This approach ultimately leads to a CPC collapse following a failed attempt to take back Taiwan.<sup>60</sup> Similarly to Chang, Pei provides an updated assessment of his original political liberalization theory and suggests corruption is a serious problem plaguing the Chinese political system. China’s rapid economic development has reinforced the Chinese elite and its power base and, as a result, the state has devolved in to a

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<sup>58</sup>Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition, Xiaoguang Kang. 2006. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*. 1:93.

<sup>59</sup>Authoritarian Impermanence, Andrew H. Nathan. 2009. *Journal of Democracy*, 3:37-40. During my time living and working in China from 1998—2002, 2008, and 2012, I have found little interest among the common people (In Chinese: “老百姓 In Chinese pinyin: *laobaixing*) for a western style democratic system; they are interested in the government increasing its governance capacity and expanding programs to care for them.

<sup>60</sup>*The Coming Collapse of China*, Gordon Chang. 2001. New York: Random House.

“decentralized predatory state” in which corruption has permeated “all public sectors and all levels of the state”.<sup>61</sup>

One scholar observes the emergence of a harmonious socialist state model. This means the CPC reasserts control over a liberalizing society – brought about by market-oriented reforms – in order to provide domestic stability, re-establish the party’s central authority, particularly over provinces and towns, foster limited democracy, and institute rule by law. It also attempts to synthesize traditional values and institutions along side modernization.<sup>62</sup> Along this line of argument some scholars contend China follows the China-is-China-is-China paradigm. This paradigm submits “China’s communist economic landscape, psychological mindset, and bureaucratic processes are basically the same as those of imperial China”.<sup>63</sup>

This literature review demonstrates several things. First, the academic debate surrounding the character of the Chinese political system consists of widely divergent interpretations, some even emerging within the same timeframe, and it also remains inconclusive. Second, in more recent years there is a dearth of scholarly work conducting investigations in to the character of the Chinese political system. Third, many classifications are oversimplifications of a more complex reality. Fourth, some scholars hope to find evidence of democracy in China and thus have tendencies to view it through the democracy prism. These observations and general conclusions beg the question of: What factors explain the form of the Chinese political system?

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<sup>61</sup>*China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Minxin Pei. 2006. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 132;133.

<sup>62</sup>Basic Concepts of the Harmonious Society, Chenming Deng. 2007. *Nature, Society & Thought*. 20:199-204.

<sup>63</sup>*China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 14;114.



### Theory

This study theorizes that the Chinese political system is influenced by two factors. The first factor is sociopolitical culture variables. The second factor is state corporatism. As for the sociopolitical culture elements, these include long-standing traditions from the imperial era, as well as experiences from both the imperial and contemporary era. These traditions specifically include the dynastic cycle, the role of the military, philosophy and especially the Confucian system, and the mandarin bureaucracy. As for these traditions, they were adapted and assimilated within a framework that sought to reconcile traditional features with modern elements.<sup>64</sup> The modern elements include Marxism and Leninism. As a result, these long-standing traditions and modern elements became intrinsic parts of the fabric of the Chinese modern state. Therefore the foregoing accounts in large part for the distinctive form of the contemporary political system. The current political system most likely consists of traditions and traditional institutions that are nearly the same as those of imperial China.

In addition, China was subject to certain national experiences. These experiences shape the form and trajectory of system. These events include the foreign impact on China and in particular the Century of Humiliation or the 100 years of Humiliation (In Chinese: 百年国耻; In Chinese pinyin: *bainian guochi*), the CPC takeover of the mainland in 1949, and the Cultural Revolution, all of which had effects on the Chinese leaders and their approach to crafting the contemporary form of the political system. In particular, retain the powerful center, adherence to the Chinese ways, modify and adapt foreign influences to suit Chinese

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<sup>64</sup> Wiarda makes this observation about Iberic-Latin American societies. I apply the logic he advances in his work regarding the Iberic-Latin American societies to China. See: Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 2:206-235.

conditions (e.g., ‘with Chinese characteristics’ or 中国特色), as well as maintain both order and stability.

As for corporatism, the study speculates the system may follow a form of corporatism called sociopolitical corporatism. This form has three characteristics. First, there is a strong directing state. Second, there is increasing restrictions on interest groups’ freedoms and activities. Third, there is the incorporation of interest groups in to and as part of the state system; in doing so, they become responsible for representing members’ interests in and to the state and for helping the state administer and carry out policies.<sup>65</sup>

In this context, the study submits that the Chinese leaders are not constructing an original political system. Instead it submits they are engaging in an experiment aimed at re-establishing the traditional Chinese republic. Although the republic elements are meshed with modern elements to accommodate the western order, the system is grounded in Chinese imperial traditions and Chinese culture.

### **Hypotheses**

The primary hypothesis could be the form of the Chinese political system is best characterized by the imperial republic system and corporatism in which we see the existence of distinctive sociopolitical cultural features along side restrictions in interest groups’ freedoms and activities and the incorporation of interest groups as part of the state system. There are several alternate hypotheses. The first alternate hypothesis is that the shape of the Chinese political system is best defined by neo-authoritarianism in which we see sociopolitical cultural features along side a strong center backed by a powerful military and market reforms. The second alternate hypotheses is that the political system is best defined

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<sup>65</sup> This approach is Wiarda’s. *Corporatism and comparative politics: the other great "ism"*, Howard J. Wiarda. 1997. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 16.

by imperial features in conjunction with Leninism in which we see sociopolitical cultural features combined with a central power restricting political competition and increasingly promoting inclusiveness.

Because the study aims to define the form of the Chinese political system and because its driving argument is sociopolitical culture and corporatism best define the system, this study employs a case methodology of sociopolitical corporatism. Sociopolitical corporatism is a departure from European based corporatism because it places significant emphasis on the role of culture within the system. The sociopolitical corporatist approach emerges out of empirical investigations of the Iberic-Latin American nations. These countries were subject to distinctive traditions, historical antecedents, and ideologies that were different from other societies, so they developed differently. Change in Iberic-Latin American countries transpires through incremental processes as well as adaptation and assimilation in which traditional elements are reconciled and meshed with modern elements. Sociopolitical corporatism offers a formula for examining the “special imperatives and interpretations” inherent in the political and social development of particular culture areas not served well by western paradigms of development.<sup>66</sup> In short, this approach allows for an in-depth examination of sociopolitical cultural variables that contribute to the distinctive form of a political system. Because this approach is employed to analyze nonwestern systems and because it provides the concepts to unpack the political system, it should help produce a more accurate portrayal of the character of the Chinese political system writ large.

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<sup>66</sup>Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 25: 208.

### **Operationalization of Concepts**

The primary hypothesis contains two concepts. The first concept is sociopolitical cultural features. The second concept is corporatism. As for the sociopolitical cultural features, this concept consists of unique imperatives, historical antecedents, ideology, and institutions. Historical antecedents consist of long-standing traditions from the imperial system, namely the bureaucratic traditions, the military, the dynastic cycle, and philosophy (e.g., Confucianism). Unique imperatives encompass national experiences contributing to the manifest form of the system. For the purposes of this study, these include China's interactions with foreign powers constituting the '100 Years of National Humiliation', internal convulsions that shaped the system, such as the Cultural Revolution, as well as the 1949 CPC takeover of mainland China. Ideology consists of several dimensions, including the imperial tradition of Confucianism, modern approaches of Marxism, and Leninism, as well as the Chinese leaders' value or belief systems. These specifically include Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. The CPC, the military, the state, and the society constitute the major institutions of the political system. As for corporatism, the study investigates whether the leadership follows a form of corporatism such as historical and / or state corporatism.

### **Variables**

This study is explaining the factors that shape the form of the Chinese political system. It specifically investigates the sociopolitical cultural variables contributing to the distinctive form of the political system.

### **Causal Mechanism**

This study posits that the argument is correlational. The study contends that the Chinese political system is influenced by sociopolitical cultural variables from China's imperial system and corporatism; however the study acknowledges that intervening variables could condition the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Accordingly, the project employs process tracing in conjunction with elite interviewing to determine better the relationship between these variables.<sup>67</sup>

### **Implications**

This study will have theoretical, empirical, and policy implications. As for the theoretical implications, the study makes a contribution to the field of contemporary Chinese studies. In particular, it contributes to the stalled academic debate on the character of the Chinese political system writ large. Perhaps more importantly, it employs a fairly underrated approach to examine the system, a sociopolitical cultural approach. It also makes contribution to the sub-field of comparative politics including the literature on corporatism and in particular sociopolitical cultural corporatism. As for the empirical implications, the project improves the empirical evidence of sociopolitical cultural corporatism in action. As for the policy implications, the dissertation has two implications. The first implication is the study provides general map of the Chinese political system. In doing so, it might help policy makers better understand the system. The second implication is the study should demonstrate to some degree whether the current system is durable and has the capacity to persist, which affects how the Chinese operate within the international system. According to Susan Shirk, a leading authority on US-China relations at the University of California, San Diego, if the

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<sup>67</sup>Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Nonprobability Sampling, Oisín Tansey. 2009. *Method Der Vergleichenden Politik – Und Socialwissenschaft*. Available at: [www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2006/tansey.pdf](http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2006/tansey.pdf) (accessed on 8 June 2012).

Chinese system is durable, the durability may guarantee China's peaceful rise in the international system; however, if the system is fragile, it might derail China's peaceful rise in the international system.<sup>68</sup>

### **Data Collection**

The study takes the following approach to data collection. First, the study relies on both primary and secondary sources from the leading American and Chinese scholars. Where possible the study uses primary sources, though information on China's political system in Chinese online is extremely limited; this is particularly the case regarding the operational dimensions of the political system and especially the military's role within that system. Second, the study uses elite interviewing with Chinese experts and scholars working in academic, defense and government entities. The author of this study lived in China from 1998—2002, 2008, and from 2012 through to the present. She also briefly visited the country on several occasions including in the fall of 2005 and in October of 2011. The interviews come from these visits as well as personal exchanges with experts either over the Internet and / or in person when they visited the US. Third, it uses speeches and statements from Chinese leaders and Chinese Party experts. Fourth, the study examines official reports and white papers published by relevant Chinese government agencies, groups, institutions, and organizations. Fifth, it uses press releases, media reports, newspaper articles, and published commentary and analysis from Chinese experts. Finally, it includes interviews conducted by journalists online with respected western and Chinese experts (e.g., Orville Schell's "China

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<sup>68</sup> *China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise*, Susan Shirk. 2008. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. In addition, the author attended two separate talks on China given by Susan Shirk at the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Public Policy and Nuclear Threats (PPNT) summer training program that I attended in the summer of 2010, as well as at IGCC China and Technology summer training program that I attended in the summer of 2011.

Boom project”). By taking this approach I hope to collect and read materials from enough sources to acquire the most accurate portrayal of Chinese political system writ large.

### **Outline of the Study**

This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one briefly overviews the purpose of the study, the original contributions of the study, and the expected results. Chapter two provides the study’s overall research design. Chapter three explores several theories in search of an explanation of the China model. Chapter four investigates the complex of distinctive characteristics that influence the form of the Chinese political system. Chapter five explores Chinese ideology as well as the Chinese leaders’ belief systems. Chapter six examines the major hierarchies constituting the Chinese political system. Chapter seven concludes with some final remarks and observations.

## CHAPTER 3

### SIX THEORIES IN SEARCH OF THE CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

#### Introduction

“...China is both a pioneer and a developmental curiosity. It remains a conundrum as to China’s current path, what nation the Chinese leadership aspire China to be, where China is heading; the China experiment truly is an “unprecedented and unusual experiment in nation building”.

-- Orville Schell, “China, the Olympics, and Global Leadership”,  
2007,  
*Project Syndicate*<sup>69</sup>

The previous chapter established the study’s overall research design. The noteworthy aspects of the previous chapter include the literature review, the theory, and the hypothesis. The literature review led to the emergence of a research question that drives this study, specifically: What factors explain the form of the Chinese political system? To answer this, the study theorizes that the political system is best characterized by China’s imperial system in conjunction with Asian state corporatism. This means the political system should show signs of the China imperial system along with the emergence of a differentiated system. In order to analyze this assertion, the study employs the framework of analysis of sociopolitical corporatism that allows the investigation of sociopolitical cultural values and corporatism.

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<sup>69</sup>China, the Olympics, and Global Leadership, Orville Schell. 2007. *Project Syndicate*. Available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china--the-olympics--and-global-leadership> (accessed on 7 August 2012).



In this context, this chapter has several purposes. First, the chapter selects several approaches from the previous chapter's literature review. These classificatory schemes include: authoritarianism, Leninism, bureaucratic eclecticism, China-is-China-is-China paradigm, state-society, and corporatism. Second, the chapter aims to identify an approach that best captures the complexities of the Chinese political system, avoids drawn out explanations and qualifications, and provides a simple encapsulation of the form of the Chinese political system. Third, the chapter also wants the approach to provide a way to better understand the system's potential trajectories.

### **Authoritarianism**

The first of these approaches is authoritarianism. The previous chapter examined several types of authoritarianism. One of these types is the neo-authoritarian thesis. The Chinese elite was drawn to this authoritarian development model because the newly industrializing countries (NIEs) in East Asia, namely Singapore and South Korea, as well as the entities of Taiwan and Hong Kong, successfully employed authoritarianism to achieve rapid economic modernization. The Chinese elite concluded that the approach might be the optimal course for China to pursue in its endeavor to restore China. However the elite preferred distinguishing between the authoritarianism employed by the East Asian countries and entities and the traditional model of authoritarianism historically practiced by China.<sup>70</sup> Accordingly the Chinese elite developed the neo-authoritarian thesis for China and her particular conditions.

The neo-authoritarian approach contains a set of distinctive traits. First, it advocates a powerful central bureaucracy. Second, there is a powerful central bureaucracy is backed by a

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<sup>70</sup>The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique, Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong. 1990. *Asian Survey*. 11:1101; Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *The China Quarterly*. 72.

strong military. The military supports the modernization efforts of the state, but in particular, the military responds when called upon to suppress political opposition. Third, there is the promotion of economic and social institutional reforms. Fourth, the leaders initiate market-oriented reforms. Fifth, there is the development and / or emergence of the middle class. Sixth, inter-elite political competition best defines the elite politics. Seventh, there is the promotion of nationalism using traditional culture, namely Confucianism. Eighth, the leaders pursue capitalism and science, as well as fostering an open-door policy towards the West. Finally, the leaders promote stability and prosperity.<sup>71</sup> Because the advocates of the neo-authoritarian thesis participated in the 1989 Incident, the thesis was abandoned.<sup>72</sup>

Although the approach captures many major features of the contemporary Chinese political system, it fails to account for some critical traits. Specifically one trait is the powerful role that the Chinese provinces play in the political system. During the imperial era, the provinces played an influential role within the system. In contemporary times, the provinces' role within the system is powerful. Evidence of this is the major role the provincial officials played in the implementation and eventual success of China's economic reforms.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, following the 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the provinces emerged as "the most powerful institution in Chinese politics".<sup>74</sup> Although this brief description only scratches the surface of the role that provinces play within the system, suffice to say they occupy a powerful role and thus must be accounted for within the selected approach.

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<sup>71</sup> Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *The China Quarterly*. 82; 89; 101-102.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 72-102.

<sup>73</sup> Playing to The Provinces, Susan Shirk. 2010. *Project Syndicate*. Available at: <http://chinaboom.asiasociety.org/period/emancipation/0/116> (accessed 9 April 2011).

<sup>74</sup> The 16<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups, Zhiyue Bo. 2011. *Journal of Contemporary China*. 39:223.

### **Bureaucratic Eclecticism**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Michel Oksenberg contends that the Chinese political system defies encapsulation. More specifically, Oksenberg observes that the political system simply “defies encapsulation in a single short phrase”. He argues that ‘previous encapsulations, such as ‘totalitarianism,’ a ‘Leninist party state,’ ‘fragmented authoritarianism,’ ‘soft authoritarianism’ or ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ fail to capture the complexities of the Chinese political system today’.<sup>75</sup> Instead he posits that the system is best characterized as “bureaucratic eclecticism”.

Bureaucratic eclecticism is defined as an “eclectic set of three types of institutions”. The first of these types is institution at the core apparatus. The origin of the core is essentially Soviet Leninism, but it consists of a fused Communist Party of China, the government, and the military at the national, provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels. The second of these Chinese institutions are linkage and intermediary institutions. These institutions are created to “manipulate, control, isolate, and exploit the outside world”. The third of these types is the legal, semi-legal, and illegal organizations and associations emerging in the social and economic space created by China’s market economy as well as the state’s retreat from total control over society and culture.<sup>76</sup>

Bureaucratic eclecticism has several other features. One of these features is ideology, defined as “a set of explicitly held beliefs that guide action”. Although Chinese ideology is not limited to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese leaders remain committed to the notion of state control over and ownership of the “core means of production”. Perhaps what is more important, the leaders distrust the capitalist class. In the

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<sup>75</sup>China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Michel Oksenberg. 2001. *The China Journal*, 45:21.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 22.

post-Mao era for instance, “the ideological premises have been extended to involve an unquestioned and explicit commitment to modernization, industrialization, and urbanization and include self-conscious nationalistic themes infused with Confucian rhetoric”.<sup>77</sup>

The second of these features is the Chinese system is characterized by the mobilization system. Although there are no longer campaigns called *yundong*, but mobilization campaigns called *dongyuan* still occur, though they are limited in scope, intensity, and number. Some examples include “strike hard” campaigns against corruption, Jiang Zemin’s “three emphases” and the attacks against the Falun gong sect. The Party exercises control over mobilization system through “transmission organizations” such as the official trade union, the Communist Youth League, and the Women’s Federation. This way the Party extends its reach into “specific sectors of society”. These transmission organizations serve as conduits for mobilizing the support of these sectors of society for state policies. In addition, the organizations “serve as a recruitment ground for Party membership and officialdom”.<sup>78</sup>

Oksenberg provides an excellent analysis of the potential form of the Chinese political system. Indeed his approach is meticulous and incorporates fundamental elements of the political system. One element is the division of the core apparatus. This core apparatus consists of a fused CPC, government, and military at the national level all the way down to the township level. The second element is the role that linkage institutions, associations, and organizations play within the system. The third element is his evidence about the integral role that ideology plays within the system. The fourth is the leaderships’ use of the mobilization system and transmission organizations in political campaigns. Indeed, all these factors inform to varying degrees the shape of the Chinese political system today.

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

Although the approach is quite functional and provides incisive insight into the structure and workings of the political system, the approach has several shortcomings. In particular, it fails to account for how the system might change. For instance, his model includes a reference to the Chinese leadership's distrust of the capitalist class. While this observation may have been true nearly a decade ago, the Chinese leaders have since transformed their position on the commercial and business elite. Evidence of this is Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents' in which the CPC leadership expands Party membership to include the advanced productive forces – meaning the commercial and business elite.<sup>79</sup>

Although this approach deftly encapsulates the complexities of the Chinese political system for the most part, and, in doing so, provides much needed insight into the system writ large, it is missing some important elements. As mentioned above, the first element is how to account for change within the political system. The second element is the lack of consideration for the Chinese leaders' value systems. These systems address the existing and emerging conditions in China and thus provide incisive insight to the system. Specifically including the leaders' belief systems is crucial to understanding the form of the system, how the leaders' interpret that form, and how the leaders view its potential trajectory.

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<sup>79</sup>First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *Xinhua News Agency*. Available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 26 June 2012); Great Theoretical Progress for the CPC in Past Decade, no author. 2003. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/17/content\\_923593.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/17/content_923593.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

### **China-is-China-is-China Paradigm**<sup>80</sup>

Along similar lines of Michel Oksenberg and his approach is the China-is-China-is-China paradigm. This paradigm advances the theory that the form of the Chinese political system is distinctive and that existing social science paradigms fail to properly encapsulate the complexities. More specifically, this approach submits that China is following its own path. The clues to the path are in China's past, namely China's imperial history. The imperial history holds the evidence to make determinations about China's current state and future. Succinctly put, the paradigm contends "China's communist economic landscape, psychological mindset, and bureaucratic processes are the same as those of imperial China".<sup>81</sup>

The China-is-China-is-China paradigm closely fits with one dimension of this study's argument. In particular, both this paradigm and the study's theory contend that the imperial system contributes to the form of the contemporary Chinese political system. Despite this similarity, however, the China-is-China-is-China paradigm might contain several shortcomings. The first shortcoming is that China's past may not necessarily provide the 'perfect guide' to China's current and future state.<sup>82</sup> Although China's past provides crucial clues and incisive insight, it should be used in conjunction with other approaches. In doing so, it could allow for the examination of China's contemporary political system, such as the

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<sup>80</sup> There is a body of literature arguing China occupies a unique place in the modern world for various reasons, but most specifically that it is imperative to examine China's past to understand its present and future. These include *When China Rules the World*. Martin Jacques. 2009. Penguin; *The China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age*, Liu Ming Fu. 2010. Zhongguo youyi chubanshe; *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*, David C. Kang. 2007. Columbia University Press; *Rising China and Its Post-modern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context*, Charles Horner. 2011. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. William A. Callahan conducts an excellent analysis of this extant literature, see Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History, William A. Callahan. 2012. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 71: 33-55.

<sup>81</sup> *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 14; 114.

<sup>82</sup> Callahan makes this observation about scholars who rely on China's past to explain the current and future state of China. Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History, William A. Callahan. 2012. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 71:52.

effects of economic and political reforms as well as the nature and scope of ongoing ideological shifts. This way the paradigm could avoid falling into a ‘Sino-speak’<sup>83</sup> trap, which more often than not isolates the study of China from other fields of study. The second shortcoming is it provides no method to probe how the current Chinese leadership interprets the existing and emerging conditions in China (e.g., the Chinese leaderships’ value systems). The final shortcoming is the approach offers no way to understand the direction of the system. However, with all that being said this study believes this paradigm potentially offers a valid and accurate characterization of the Chinese political system broadly construed and thus intends to revisit it.

### **Leninism**

Leninism is associated with two approaches. The first of these approaches is what most people interpret as the Leninist system – “the authoritarian, top-down, steel-hard party”. The second of these is perhaps more accurate or at least what Lenin envisioned as Leninism. Specifically, Lenin envisioned a model ‘appropriate for liberal democracies in advanced capitalist societies’, specifically “party organization that allowed tremendous scope for debate, disagreement and discussion, party organization where the central unit was not the Central Committee, but the local organization, party organization imbued with democracy from top to bottom”.<sup>84</sup>

In addition, Lenin is associated with the concept of democratic centralism. It is noteworthy that he developed this concept not during a period of repression and tight centralization. This means democratic centralism was not employed to “insist on the

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<sup>83</sup> This term belongs to William A. Callahan. Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History, William A. Callahan. 2012. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 71.

<sup>84</sup> Leninism: It’s Not What You Think, Paul Kellogg. 2009. *The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies*, 2:43.

necessity of centralism as part of a polemic against too loose an organization structure and too much democracy.” Rather the concept was introduced “as part of a polemic against too much centralism, too tight an organizational structure, and too little democracy”.<sup>85</sup> Its application ‘implies universal and full freedom to criticize, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action’. Most notably, those who have the power to issue the calls for ‘a definite action’ are the party congresses.<sup>86</sup> Lenin “insisted on local autonomy, on freedom to criticism – in public and in private – on frequent elections and frequent meetings so to make actual the accountability of elected committees”.<sup>87</sup> In addition, Lenin insisted on the rights of national minorities to “assert their own cultural and political autonomy; this was the ‘main feature of self-determination and socialism’<sup>88</sup>

Leninism also includes several other features. First, Lenin believed that Marx crafted the laws of development to move a country from feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to socialism. Second, the working classes could not develop class conscious on their own and thus could not serve as a reliable force for revolutionary purposes. Out of this belief emerged the Leninist concept of vanguard party. The vanguard party would lead people through the stages of ‘economic, political, and social development normally provided by capitalism’. This party could be fulfilled only by a party organized for conspiracy and for seizure of power – a party of professional revolutionaries who are guided by the most advanced theory. Third,

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>86</sup> *Leninism Under Lenin*, Marcel Liebman, 1975. London: Merlin Press. 51. As cited in *Leninism: It's Not What You Think*, Paul Kellogg. 2009. *The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies*. 5:49-50.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 52.



Lenin created a model of state capitalism; this means the state replaces the monopolies (e.g., state monopoly), making it different from the western model of monopoly capitalism.<sup>89</sup>

Some American China experts contend Leninism best characterizes the form of the Chinese political system. For instance, both Steven Goldstein and Bruce Dickson contend that China remains a Leninist system. As for Goldstein, China has remained Leninist and the CPC has avoided extinction like the other regimes. The CPC has done this by pursuing the path of reform through gradual and incremental transformation of both the economic and political systems. More specifically, the CPC employs and ‘builds on the existing structures of society’ to manage the transition and retain the Leninist system.<sup>90</sup>

As for Bruce Dickson, he writes a brilliant piece comparing and contrasting corporatism and Leninism and applies the discussion to China.<sup>91</sup> Dickson contends that as the CPC engaged in economic modernization, it took measures to incorporate emerging groups and ‘adapt while upholding party traditions’.<sup>92</sup> Typically, Leninist regimes that abandon class struggle for economic reform shift from employing exclusionary to inclusionary tactics.<sup>93</sup> This trend toward inclusion coupled with the fact that the CPC “enjoys and protects its monopoly of political organization” clearly indicates China remains a Leninist system.<sup>94</sup> In addition, the CPC rejects and some times even violently repress demands for new and

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<sup>89</sup>Leninism: What it was and what it was not’, George Brinkley. 1998. *Review of Politics*. 1:151. In this article Brinkley offers his own insights on Leninism as well as engages in reviews of several books written on Leninism.

<sup>90</sup>China in Transition: The Political Foundations of Incremental Reform, Steven M. Goldstein. 1995. *The China Quarterly*. 144:1105-1131.

<sup>91</sup>Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 517-540.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 518.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 519. Dickson also references Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems, Samuel P. Huntington. 1970. In Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, (eds.), *Authoritarianism Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* New York: Basic Books.

<sup>94</sup>Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 535.

independent organizations. This demonstrates that ‘Leninism, not corporatism, still define the form of the China’s political system’.<sup>95</sup>

Dickson also evaluated the role of the emerging business and commercial elite within Chinese political system. He found that the CPC co-opted these elites into the system. The economic reforms actually propelled the Chinese leaders to include the previously excluded elements of society (e.g., the red capitalists). Thus Dickson concluded that Leninism best characterizes the form of the political system because as the Leninist system experiences economic transformation it changes from an exclusionary to an inclusionary system.<sup>96</sup>

Steve Tsang also contends that Chinese political system follows Leninism. Specifically the CPC has made the Leninist system “more resilient in confronting the huge social and political challenges that the global financial crisis may unleash in China by incorporating consultative elements”. He classifies this new form of Leninism as ‘consultative Leninism’.<sup>97</sup>

Consultative Leninism is composed of five characteristics. First, the Party increasingly focuses on retaining power. Second, the ongoing governance reforms are directed at pre-empting demands for political liberalization. Third, the Party continually enhances its capacity to “elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion”. Fourth, the Party uses a pragmatic approach in the field of “economic and financial management”. Finally, the Party promotes “nationalism in place of Communism”.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 535.

<sup>96</sup> *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*, Bruce Dickson. 2003. New York: Cambridge University Press. 78.

<sup>97</sup> Consultative Leninism: China’s New Political Framework, Steve Tsang. 2009. *Journal of Contemporary China*. 62: 865-880.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 865.

Although Leninism offers a powerful explanation of the form of the Chinese political systems, the approach has some weaknesses. First, it fails to capture the intricacies of the Chinese system, such as the regional and bureaucratic differentiations. Second, there is a lack of consideration of the other influential players in the system, namely the provincial leaders. Third, it fails to account for changes within the system. Although it explains how the system moves in one direction, such as the economic system develops the leadership becomes increasingly inclusive, this explanation can be described by other approaches, such as corporatism. What is more important, Leninism fails to account for how the system may fail or collapse. Finally, Leninism includes no consideration of two of the most fundamental components of the Chinese political system, specifically the roles of ideology and the Chinese leaders' belief systems.

### **State–Society**

The study also considers the approach of state – society relations. It selects this approach because the Chinese state has a unique relationship with society, so it is imperative to investigate the complexities of this relationship. This approach, as defined by Joel Migdal (who updates Max Weber's interpretation), classifies the state as '*the image of a coherent, controlling organization within a territory*' and '*the actual practices of its multiple parts*'.<sup>99</sup> Essentially this approach examines how a state operates in a society and shapes the daily practices; and, in turn, how a society shapes the state. The outstanding disadvantage of this approach is that it locks the state into dichotomous relationships and fails to account for variation within the relationship across different areas.

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<sup>99</sup>*State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Joel S. Migdal. 2001. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 15-16 (emphasis in original).

According to Elizabeth Perry, ‘a central feature of China history is, of course, a rich tradition of both regionalism and bureaucratic differentiation that both pre- and post- dates Europe’s modern transition’. State-society relations fail to capture the enormous variation differentiating one Chinese region and one level of government from another. Although state-society approaches spared the study of China from the “grip of the totalitarian model that straitjacketed the first generation of analysts and from the parochialism that marked some of the second generation’s proclivity for pluralism, China demands “a further disaggregation of the unwieldy concepts of “state” and “society”’.<sup>100</sup>

Although the concept of ‘civil society may provide to ‘further disaggregate the unwieldy concepts of state and society’, there is a certain lack of currency in using this approach. Perry contends that ‘like so many social science constructs, the concept of civil society derives from the effort to explain the emergence and transformation of European capitalism. Because of this, there exists a “legitimate question about its applicability to a country like China, where the economic trends characteristic of modern Europe never really took hold”’.<sup>101</sup> Perry observes that “rather than search so energetically for parallels in European history, might it not be better to pay greater attention to China’s own past?”<sup>102</sup>

In addition to Perry’s observations, Pan Wei, a well-known professor in the highly respected Peking University, contends that the Chinese society ‘is organized differently from those in the West’. In other words, the ‘state-society dichotomy does not apply to China.

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<sup>100</sup> Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1994. *The China Quarterly*. 139:707-709.

<sup>101</sup> Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1994. *The China Quarterly*. 139:709. According to Perry, an argument for the inapplicability of the concept of civil society to the Third World as a whole can be found in A Response to Society, Partha Chatterjee. 1990. *Public Culture*. 3:119-132.

<sup>102</sup> Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1994. *The China Quarterly*. 139:709.

Moreover, the society is not organized in terms of civil societies'. Instead the state and the society are "intermingled" with each other, "penetrated by each other into an entity or many entities like waves of concentric circles". Pan concludes that 'those who champion the dichotomous approach would find China's political structure most annoying, as the dichotomy explains nothing in Chinese history'.<sup>103</sup>

One final observation about the approach of state-society is the role of bureaucracy within the Chinese political system. In the post-Mao era, China lacks a "corporately coherent Weberian bureaucracies collaborating with active civil associations in seeking collective goals". Instead the Chinese state channels "all significant social power" through "its command structure in institutional building and policy implementation" (e.g., mass mobilizations). There is no civil society serving as the "interlayer between the state and society". Rather "state institutional building is limited to raising administrative capacities". This means, the Chinese bureaucracy and its capacity are the factors determining state-society relations.<sup>104</sup> It is noteworthy that these observations have implications for this study's theory about corporatism; in other words, if these observations are correct, they could very well falsify the study's main hypothesis.

### **Corporatism**

This study considers corporatism as an approach that could explain the form of the Chinese political system. The study selects corporatism because elements of corporatism

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<sup>103</sup>The Chinese Model of Development, Pan Wei. 2007. *The Foreign Policy Centre*. 2-3. Available at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf> (accessed 8 August 2012).

<sup>104</sup>Bureaucratic Capacity and State-Society Relations in China, Yanzhong Huang and Dali L. Yang. 2002. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 38-39.

have existed in China in some form since the establishment of communist party in 1921 and subsequently during the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949.<sup>105</sup>

There are two common definitions associated with corporatism. The first of these definitions is Philippe Schmitter. In his seminal piece on corporatism, he defines it as:

A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.<sup>106</sup>

Schmitter's approach is valuable because it moves away from the approaches of pluralism, statism, and syndicalism that tend to dominate corporatism. However he makes the assumption that states are divided entities. This means the approach fails to account for variations across different areas and among different representational groups.

In addition, in his approach he makes another assumption. In particular he assumes the emergence of corporatist trends may be a path from "state corporatism" to "societal corporatism". In other words, the presence of corporatist characteristics within a society may indicate the emergence of political liberalization.<sup>107</sup> This assumption is problematic because more often than not it leads scholars to search for evidence of corporatism in non-western societies in hopes of finding elements of political liberalization that may lead the country down the road to democracy.<sup>108</sup> While Schmitter's approach has significant value, for the

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<sup>105</sup> China's Political System, Alice L. Miller. University of California, San Diego, Institute for Global Cooperation and Conflict (IGCC) Summer China Forum, 2011; *China: A New History*, John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 282; *Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony*, Gerry Groot. 2004. New York: Routledge.

<sup>106</sup> Still the Century of Corporatism?, Phillippe Schmitter. 1974. *The Review of Politics*. 36:93-94.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 85-131.

<sup>108</sup> Many scholars have searched for evidence of corporatism in China to determine whether China in the era of economic reform is showing signs of political liberalization. Some examples include: Private

purposes of this study it might be better to stop looking for parallels in western history and instead focus on Chinese history.<sup>109</sup>

The second definition most commonly associated with corporatism is Howard Wiarda's. His definition of corporatism consists of three distinctive characteristics:

- strong directing state
- restrictions on interest-groups' freedom and activity
- incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the state system, responsible both for representing members' interests in and to the state and for helping the state administer and carry out policies

This approach to corporatism stems from his work on the Iberic-Latin tradition. In his seminal piece on corporatism, Wiarda focuses on the unique aspects to the process of sociopolitical change in the Iberic-Latin tradition that do not correspond to the models often used to analyze national development. This approach was a dramatic departure from Rostow's stages of growth, Easton's and Almond's system theory, the functionalist development literature, and the class analysis as well as the power elite paradigm. Iberic-Latin American nations are subject to unique imperatives such as Catholicism, Iberic, patrimonialist, semi-feudal Europe characteristics. Iberic-Latin society has distinct traditions and antecedents, which Wiarda characterizes as conservative, reactive, closed ideology. As a

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Business Associations in China. Evidence of Civil Society or Local State Power, Christopher Earle Nevitt. 1997. *China Journal*. 36:25-43; Bridges: Private Business, the Chinese Government, and the Rise of New Associations, Jonathan Unger. 1996. *China Quarterly*. 147:795-819; The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises, Margaret M. Pearson. 1994. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (now titled *The China Journal*). 31:25-46; *China's New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform*, Margaret M. Pearson. 1997. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; China, Corporatism, and the East Asia Model, Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan. 1995. *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*. 33:29-53; *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change*, Bruce Dickson. 2003. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>109</sup> Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1994. *The China Quarterly*. 139:709.

result, these societies developed rather uniquely and thus represent ‘fourth world of development’.<sup>110</sup>

Iberic-Latin society is unique because great revolutions associated with the creation of the modern world largely bypassed those nations. The nations missed out on the Protestant Reformation, the rise of capitalism, the scientific revolution, the rise of socially more pluralistic and politically more democratic societies, and the industrial revolution, for example. Moreover, the socio-political dimensions of these nations related directly with their religio-cultural tradition. In other words, the structure of the nations comprised horizontal networks with distinct and rigid layers, and vertical networks with a number of corporate elites and interests. The central state apparatus controlled and guided the various components of these dichotomous but complementary networks. In addition, change in Iberic-Latin context transpired through a unique process. Change occurred gradually and incrementally through adaptation and assimilation within a framework that combines and seeks to reconcile traditional and modern elements. This means, it does not imply the transcendence of one stage over the other.<sup>111</sup>

The theory driving this study is that sociopolitical cultural features explain the form of the contemporary Chinese political system. The form of corporatism is Wiarda’s sociopolitical corporatist approach. This approach dovetails well with the imperial thesis. Although this combined approach may not have an all-encompassing explanatory value, it may have a more powerful explanatory value than the other approaches discussed in this chapter.

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<sup>110</sup> Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 25:206-23.

<sup>111</sup> Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 25:206-235.



## **Conclusion**

This chapter conducted an examination of six approaches that could possibly provide explanations for the form of the contemporary Chinese political system. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the study theorizes that both sociopolitical cultural factors and corporatism shape the form of the political system. So although the study bears in mind the five other theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter as possible explanations for the form of the Chinese political system, it conducts its investigation within the sociopolitical corporatist framework of analysis and searches for elements of the imperial system and sociopolitical corporatism.

With this in mind, chapter four investigates the Chinese political system writ large. It begins this investigation using several concepts specific to socio-political corporatist that allows the researcher to strike at the roots of Chinese political culture. These ideas are composed of historical antecedents, unique imperatives, and historical traditions. These features primarily originate from China's imperial past, persist into the contemporary era, and collectively influence the manifest form of the Chinese political system. This study collapses these ideas into a single concept referred to in this study as a 'complex of distinctive characteristics'. Accordingly, the next chapter examines this 'complex of distinctive characteristics' to see whether or not they persist into the contemporary era and influence the form of the contemporary Chinese political system.

## CHAPTER 4

### COMPLEX OF DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS

#### Introduction

No culture in the world matches China's in durability.

-- Lucian W. Pye  
*The Mandarin and the Cadre:  
 China's Political Cultures*, 1988, p. ix.<sup>112</sup>

The previous chapter examined several theories in search of finding an approach best explaining the form of the Chinese political system. As the chapter demonstrates, the character of the political system fails to correspond neatly to any one particular social science paradigm. Since the theories generally fail to capture and explain the complexities of the system as well as its potential trajectories, the study employs the sociopolitical cultural framework dovetailed with corporatism to conduct an investigation of the political system. In doing so, it may encapsulate the form in a single concept as well as provide some insight in to how the system changes over time.

As previously discussed in both chapters two and three, the sociopolitical cultural framework contains ideas aiming to capture distinctive features of a political system and thus explains and captures the unique manifest form. One concept is China's unique imperatives.

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<sup>112</sup>*The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Michigan: The Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan. ix.

The second concept is its historical antecedents. The third concept is China's distinctive traditions. As for unique imperatives, in the case of China these include the Middle Kingdom complex, the Chinese perception of cultural superiority, a dual political culture consisting of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and the imperial Confucian system. As for historical antecedents, these include external challenges posed by foreign powers to China as well as the internal convulsions that previously gripped the country. As for distinctive traditions, these consist of long standing traditions, namely the mandarin bureaucracy, dynastic cycles, and the role of the military. This chapter aggregates the foregoing concepts and collectively categorizes them as a 'complex of distinctive characteristics'. This 'complex of distinctive characteristics' suggests the weight of a country's culture, traditions, and history, all contribute to the distinctive manifest form of the country's political system.<sup>113</sup>

Jonathan Spence, an eminent British historian specializing in Chinese history at Yale University, once said, "to understand China today it is crucial to understand China in the past".<sup>114</sup> Accordingly this chapter investigates the "complex of distinctive characteristics". It specifically examines these characteristics to strike at the roots of the Chinese imperial system and to see whether these imperial features persist into the contemporary era. If these imperial features persist, the chapter then examines precisely how they shape the character of the system. What the chapter expects to see is that these characteristics from the imperial era are grafted on to modern elements and persist through to the contemporary era and thus contribute to the distinctive form of the Chinese political system. In other words the Chinese elite use historical corporatism to maintain the strength of Chinese culture, values, norms, and

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<sup>113</sup>Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 2: 209-210; 215.

<sup>114</sup>*The Search for Modern China*, Jonathan D. Spence. 1990. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. xix-xx.

institutions during its transition and in the face of foreign infiltration. .<sup>115</sup> Accordingly the contemporary system is similar to or informed by the imperial system.

### **Unique Imperatives**

China has many unique imperatives. One example is the Confucian literati's promotion of a worldview based on the concept of the Celestial Empire. This concept was embodied in the Chinese system of tribute. The tribute system meant that China's world order failed to fit into the European nations' definition of a world order.<sup>116</sup> Specifically, China's view did not correspond to the western concepts of nation, sovereignty, and equality with states. Instead, the Chinese viewed China as a 'middle country' ruled by the 'Son of Heaven' and surrounded by less civilized, barbaric states, referred to as the 'periphery'. Non-Chinese observed Chinese forms and ceremonies (In Chinese: 礼; In Chinese pinyin: *li*) in their contact with the 'Son of Heaven'. These forms and ceremonies consisted of a 'ritualized exchange of goods and pledges of loyalty' and required the "foreigners performed the kowtow", or 'knocking one's head upon the ground in an act of surrender' to the imperial court.<sup>117</sup> Because non-Chinese participated in this system, the Chinese viewed the 'mystical influence and all wise example and virtue of the 'Son of Heaven' pervaded China and beyond China's borders to all mankind. This gave the Chinese peace and order as a part of a concentric hierarchy' with China at the center.<sup>118</sup> The Chinese truly believed that those

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<sup>115</sup> *Corporatism and comparative politics: the other great "ism"*, Howard J. Wiarda. 1997. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 16-17.

<sup>116</sup> Western International Law and China's Confucianism in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century: Collision and Integration, Zewei Yang. 2011. *Journal of the History of International Law*. 2:285-306.

<sup>117</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution to Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York; London: W&W Norton Company. 8. This study uses the first edition of Lieberthal's book because his discussion of the imperial system and in particular the bureaucratic system is outstanding. Tributary Trade and China's Relations with The West, John K. Fairbank. 1942. *The Far Eastern Quarterly*. 2:134.

<sup>118</sup> *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, John King Fairbank (ed.). 1968. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 5-10.

barbarians traveling to China and who participated in the system sought transformation (In Chinese: 来华; In Chinese pinyin: *lai hua*).<sup>119</sup>

China's tributary system served as the framework in which the Chinese conducted foreign relations, trade, and diplomacy. This system restricted Chinese interactions with foreigners to the Canton area, effectively preventing foreigners from penetrating into the Middle Kingdom.<sup>120</sup> More importantly, it upheld the Confucian system, the ideological foundation of the entire Chinese system throughout the imperial era.<sup>121</sup> This perception influences Chinese statecraft today.<sup>122</sup> Evidence of this exists in some of China's current territorial claims, including the Diaoyu Islands.<sup>123</sup>

The tributary system provides insight into the nature of China's political culture. The Chinese believe they are associated with "historical greatness", to be Chinese is to be "part of the greatest phenomenon of history". This theme runs far greater than the expressions commonly associated with the Chinese emotion, namely the "Middle Kingdom complex" or the exaggerated sense of "national pride" or "racial arrogance". The tributary system was "a natural expression of Chinese cultural egocentricity".<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, John King Fairbank. 1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 27. Today the Chinese still use this expression '来华' when asking foreigners why they are visiting China, which literally translates into 'have you come to be transformed?'.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 3; The Canton trade and the Opium War, Frederic Wakeman, Jr. 1978. In John K. Fairbank (ed.), *Cambridge History of China*. 10:163.

<sup>121</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution to Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York; London: W&W Norton Company. 8.

<sup>122</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 102.

<sup>123</sup> The author of this project lives and works in China and has seen evidence of this in a series of Chinese newspaper articles published in various newspapers between September 2012 and October 2012, including *The China Daily*; she has viewed many Chinese television news programs and formal talks shows that discuss the issue of China's territorial claims, as well as engaged in informal discussions with Chinese students and experts on this particular subject.

<sup>124</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 50-51;129.

The character 华 (In Chinese pinyin: hua) means ‘Chinese’ and ‘China’ but specifically “connotes culture and civilization”. Those who lived in China were “cultured and civilized” (e.g., agrarian community of the central plains). This distinguishes them from the barbarians (e.g., nomadic tribes of the steppes) who dwell on the periphery.<sup>125</sup> The Chinese feeling of cultural superiority was reinforced by “a powerful historical consciousness informed by one of the most voluminous veritable documents in human history: the chronological annals that have flowed uninterruptedly since 841 B.C. The Middle Kingdom complex flows from this, making it difficult for the Chinese to abandon their sense of cultural superiority.”<sup>126</sup> Evidence of this exists even in modern China in which the Chinese make territorial claims based on the imperial tributary system.<sup>127</sup>

During the imperial era, Emperors adopted the Confucian system as the state ideology. According to Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘the imperial system nurtured the idea of building the state system on ideological commitment’. Thus Imperial China was best characterized as a ‘monarchical system of government and a patriarchal social system. And society was guided by the official state ideology of Confucianism’.<sup>128</sup>

Specifically the Confucian system is composed of orientations and principles aimed at the creation of a “frictionless holistic order”.<sup>129</sup> The order manifests in several Confucian

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<sup>125</sup> *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, Owen Lattimore. 1940. London: Oxford University Press. As cited in *Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center*, Wei Ming Tu. 2005. *Daedalus*. 4:147.

<sup>126</sup> Both Pye and Ming discuss this point. *China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society*, Lucian W. Pye. 1990. *Foreign Affairs*. 4:62; *Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center*, Wei Ming Tu. 2005. *Daedalus*. 4:147.

<sup>127</sup> China questions Japan’s “rule” on Okinawa, no author. 2012. *Asia Daily Wire*. available at: <http://www.asiadailywire.com/2012/07/china-questions-japans-rule-on-okinawa/> (accessed 9 August 2012).

<sup>128</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution to Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York; London: W&W Norton Company. 4.

<sup>129</sup> Values, roles, and Personalities, Arthur F. Wright. 1962. In Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (eds.,) *Confucian Personalities*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 6; Implications of the

ideals, including ‘Xiao Kang’ (moderately well-off) (In Chinese: 小康), a concept conceived during the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC-25AD), as well as “the ideal of ‘Datong’ (Great Harmony or Great Unity).<sup>130</sup> These ideal orientations overlap with the cosmopolitan worldview articulated in Communism works.<sup>131</sup> Specifically Mao’s ultimate goal was to achieve the Great Harmony or Great Unity.<sup>132</sup> In addition, Jiang Zemin cast a vision of a harmonious society in terms of building a “Xiao Kang society”.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore under the tenure of Hu Jintao emerges the concept of the ‘Socialist Harmonious Society’ (In Chinese: 社会主义 和谐 社会; In Chinese pinyin: *Shehui zhuyi hexie shehui*).<sup>134</sup> This society aims to preserve ‘social harmony within a vast population experiencing both unprecedented prosperity and unaccustomed levels of inequality’.<sup>135</sup> Finally the Communist Part of China (CPC) is pursuing a social experiment in which the entire “social and economic development” is directed at constructing a “harmonious socialist society to safeguard the country’s unification as well as social harmony and stability”.<sup>136</sup>

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Rise of “Confucian” East Asia, Wei Ming Tu. 2000. *Journal of the Academy of Arts and Sciences*. 129:13.

<sup>130</sup> *From the May Fourth Movement to Communist Revolution: Guo Moruo and the Chinese Path to Communism*, Xiaoming Chen. 2007. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 2; 86-90.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, 2; 86-90.

<sup>132</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 95.

<sup>133</sup> Word by word, China’s Communist Party touches up “Xiao Kang” blueprint, Cheng Yunjie. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. Available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content\\_6872116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content_6872116.htm); Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: A Report to the 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin. 2002. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content\\_360558\\_2.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content_360558_2.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>134</sup> Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China’s Progress: Hu, no author. 2005. *People Daily Online*. available at: [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627\\_192495.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192495.html) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>135</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 491.

<sup>136</sup> The CPC Led the People to Become Masters of the State, no author. no date. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/145937.htm> (accessed 22 August 2012).

Unity is a major theme that dominated imperial China. The Middle Kingdom evolved from a fragmented state into a confederation of “several equally developed cultural areas”. It evolved – not out of ‘ever-expanding, definable core’<sup>137</sup> – but rather out of an ongoing cycle of consolidation and fragmentation.<sup>138</sup> The CPC ‘similarly to its imperial and republican predecessor states, emphasizes the importance of national unity’.<sup>139</sup> Specifically China is not a uniform or homogeneous country but a multinational state.<sup>140</sup> “The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multi-national state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities.”<sup>141</sup> China consists of 56 distinct ethnic groups<sup>142</sup> and approximately 100 million ethnic minorities occupy about 50 to 60 percent of China’s territory located all along China’s strategic national borders.<sup>143</sup> The 2008 White Paper on China’s National Defense cites how “separatist forces” in Xinjiang and Tibet still threaten Chinese national security.<sup>144</sup> The 2010 White Paper on

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<sup>137</sup> *The Archaeology of Ancient China*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., rev. and enl, Kwang-chih Chang. 1986. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. As cited in *Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center*, Wei Ming Tu. 2005. *Daedalus*. 4:146.

<sup>138</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International; Conundrum at Red Cliffs, Ralph D. Sawyer. 2009. *Military History*. 1:64-70.

<sup>139</sup> Xinjiang at the turn of a century: the causes of separatism, Colin Mackerras. 2007. *Central Asian Survey*. 3:289-303.

<sup>140</sup> The System of Ethnic Regional Autonomy, Official Government White Paper on Political Democracy. 2005. *The Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China*. Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/145931.htm> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>141</sup> Preamble of The People’s Republic of China’s Constitution, Official Government Document. no date. available at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>142</sup> The Chinese government officially recognizes 56 nationalities in China including the majority Han Chinese group and 55 minority groups. National Minorities Policy and its Practice in China, Official Government White Paper on National Minorities. 1999. *The Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/4/index.htm> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>143</sup> Margins and Centers: A Decade of Publishing on China’s Ethnic Minorities, Susan Blum. 2002. *The Journal of Asian Studies*. 4:1288. A noteworthy point here is that the Chinese state assigns to the “autonomous regions” of the minority nationalities more land area than to the Han Chinese majority. *China: A New History*, John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 25.

<sup>144</sup> China’s National Defense in 2008, Official Government White Paper, no author. 2008. *The Information Office of the State Council of The People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node\\_7060059.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm) (accessed 10 October 2012).



China's National Defense contends 'separatist forces' are working for 'East Turkistan Independence' and 'Tibet Independence', and this 'causes significant damage to China's national security and social stability'. Pressure is building on the Chinese authorities to maintain China's territorial integrity.<sup>145</sup>

From the imperial era through to contemporary times, Xinjiang is a major threat to unity. During the imperial era, authorities 'were wary of Muslim rebellions that had periodically paralyzed large parts of northwest China'.<sup>146</sup> During the interim era, Chiang Kai-shek wrote about the importance of Xinjiang, "the significance of Xinjiang in the survival of our Chinese nation is no different from the four provinces of Manchuria."<sup>147</sup> Today the Chinese leadership fears instability in Xinjiang 'could bring instability to other parts of China including Tibet, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia'.<sup>148</sup>

Although unity is a central theme throughout Chinese history, maintaining order is another dominant theme. Specifically, Confucius (551-472BCE) lived during the Warring states period. During this time he traveled from state to state, educating the leaders on how to institute stability, unity, and prosperity.<sup>149</sup> This Confucian tradition is referred to as the concept of "rectification". This means, "bringing order to a society that had been allowed to fall into a dangerous imbalance". Confucius's aim was to 'restore China to its golden age'.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> 2010 White Paper on China's National Defense, Official Government White Paper, no author. 2010. *The Information Office of the State Council of The People's Republic of China*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c\\_13806851.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm) (accessed 10 October 2012).

<sup>146</sup> China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism, June Teufel Dreyer. 2005. *Asian Affairs*, 72.

<sup>147</sup> The Return of Xinjiang to Chinese Central Control During the Late Period of the Sino-Japanese War: A Reappraisal Based on Chiang Kai-shek's Diary, Wang Jianlang. 2010. *Journal of Modern Chinese History*. 4:146.

<sup>148</sup> Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China, Elizabeth Van Wie Davis. 2008. *Asian Affairs*. 15.

<sup>149</sup> Implications of the Rise of "Confucian" East Asia, Wei Ming Tu. 2000. *Journal of the Academy of Arts and Sciences*. 129:13; *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 6.

<sup>150</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 96.

To this end Confucianism experienced three stages.<sup>151</sup> The first stage is Classical Confucianism. It changed in direct response to the rapid advancements in technology, arts, and communication under the “Chou rent”; during this era the “political fabric” was torn asunder and resulted in the era of the Warring States (481-221 B.C.).<sup>152</sup> Subsequently the Confucian system shaped the ensuing political and social orders for two thousand years.<sup>153</sup> The second stage was neo-Confucianism. This stage started with the revival of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and dominated China from 960 to the early 1800s. Three specific features best characterize it:<sup>154</sup>

- Conservative governing ideology emphasizing order
- Hierarchical social and political spheres producing social harmony
- Chinese society accepting the “correct” conduct required by each type of relationship and acting according to the respective role to promote a harmonious society

This stage ostensibly manifests in the contemporary Chinese political system. Evidence of this exists in several leaders’ approach to the system including Mao and his

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<sup>151</sup> Implications of the Rise of “Confucian” East Asia, Wei Ming Tu. 2000. *Journal of the Academy of Arts and Sciences*. 129:13.

<sup>152</sup> *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, Arthur F. Wright. 1964. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. viii.

<sup>153</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 12; Traditional Confucianism and Its Contemporary Relevance, Lin Hang. 2011. *Cross Cultural Communication*. 2:35; *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*, Arthur F. Wright. 1964. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. viii.

<sup>154</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 7.

project of achieving Great Harmony,<sup>155</sup> Jiang Zemin's vision of a harmonious society,<sup>156</sup> and Hu Jintao's concept of the 'Socialist Harmonious Society'.<sup>157</sup>

The third stage of Confucianism is called 'Confucian Humanism'. This stage began under the Qing rule specifically in response to the outbreak and aftermath of the First Opium War (1839-42). This war led China from being the center of the Asian cosmos (e.g., the tribute system) to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial state.<sup>158</sup> The foreign invasion, the Chinese military defeat, and the signing of the unequal treaties that demolished the tributary system and established a new system of unequal treaties favoring foreign barbarians in Chinese territory, the Qing ruler developed an elaborate legal system to maintain 'the Confucian hierarchy of relationships and the social order'.<sup>159</sup> This system was Confucian Humanism.

Confucianism made its way into contemporary China. During China's transition from the imperial era to the post-imperial era, the Chinese leadership facilitated China's transition meshing traditional and foreign concepts. The Chinese employed Marxism and Leninism, specifically because these ideals presented secular political ideologies that could be used in

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<sup>155</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 95.

<sup>156</sup> Word by word, China's Communist Party touches up "Xiao Kang" blueprint, Cheng Yunjie. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. Available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content\\_6872116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content_6872116.htm); Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: A Report to the 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin. 2002. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content\\_360558\\_2.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content_360558_2.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>157</sup> Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China's Progress: Hu. 2005. *People Daily Online*. Available at: [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627\\_192495.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192495.html) accessed 22 August 2012.

<sup>158</sup> Traditional Confucianism and Its Contemporary Relevance, Lin Hang. 2011. *Cross Cultural Communication*. 2:39.

<sup>159</sup> Implications of the Rise of "Confucian" East Asia, Wei Ming Tu. 2000. *Journal of the Academy of Arts and Sciences*. 129:13; *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, John King Fairbank. 1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 3; The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868: Views of Leading Chinese Statesmen Regarding the Further opening of China to Western Influence, Knight Biggerstaff. 1950. *The Journal of Modern History*. 2:123; *The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: HarperPerennial. 92; Tributary Trade and China's Relations with The West, John King Fairbank. 1942. *The Far Eastern Quarterly*. 2:129; 134.

nation building.<sup>160</sup> Moreover, Leninism presented an imperialism theory that fit the Chinese discourse that emerged out of China's experiences with foreign powers. Marxism and Leninism "filled a deep psychological need created by the long tension between Chinese and Western civilizations". Most notably, China could become modern without becoming western.<sup>161</sup>

The imperial order was best characterized by despotism, though Confucianism contributed to the "softening and humanizing of Chinese despotism".<sup>162</sup> Thus, at the outset of the CPC rule, the party promised a clean break with China's despotic past. But ultimately it relied on "the centralized bureaucratic structures and almost unlimited despotisms of the past".<sup>163</sup> Emerging from Mao's struggle with restoring the Chinese state came a "potent mixture" of Confucianism, and, Marxism and Leninism.<sup>164</sup> Confucianism, and, Marxism and Leninism were appropriate combinations that neatly paired Chinese traditions with modern conditions.<sup>165</sup> Confucianism and both Marxism and Leninism seek to "keep a straitjacket on

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<sup>160</sup> *The May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Tse-Tung. 1960. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 32-33.

<sup>161</sup> Communist Ethics and Chinese Traditions, David Nivison. 1956. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 16:53.

<sup>162</sup> Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal A Seventeenth Century View, W.T. De Bary. 1957. In John King Fairbank (ed.) *Chinese Thought and Institutions: Exploring twenty-five centuries of Chinese ideas in action*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 164.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>164</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 30 – 31. Pye also points out that conformity gives way to period explosion, so Chinese political cultural consists of conformity and rebellion, characteristics that makeup Chinese politics.

<sup>165</sup> Lucian Pye observes the initial political analysis relating Chinese culture and Communism failed because "culture and values were treated in much too literal a form". Some analyses contended that Chinese culture and Communism "were incompatible because Marxism and Leninism stressed "class conflict" while Confucianism emphasized harmony (e.g., Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China, Arthur F. Wright. 1983. *World Politics*. 31-44). Pye states these analyses missed the point. The Confucian tradition of harmony persisted and reinforced the CPC's requirement for conformity and consensus. The Party's rhetoric about struggle was "in particular only a revival of the traditional Confucian view that the upholders of orthodoxy should stamp out all heterodox views and not that challenges to orthodoxy should be allowed". See *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 185-186.

dissent”<sup>166</sup> and emphasize socialization through different institutions. In today’s China, these institutions are the work units (*danwei*) and the communities (*shequ*).<sup>167</sup> Mao’s governance “turned into a version of the Confucian tradition” relying on the imperial system of governance, the state as an ethical project, and the mandarin bureaucracy.<sup>168</sup> This practice of reliance on traditional governance and administration remains a prevalent feature in the Chinese system today.<sup>169</sup>

Succinctly put, ‘the umbilical cord between the Confucian tradition and modern China has not been severed’.<sup>170</sup> The Chinese leadership relied upon the traditional Confucian system to facilitate China’s transition while meshing the system with both Marxism and Leninism.<sup>171</sup> In China, “when reformed occurred it was incremental and put forward as the “restoration” of previously held values”.<sup>172</sup> Indeed the CPC has taken a gradual approach to

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<sup>166</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 31.

<sup>167</sup> *From the May Fourth Movement to Communist Revolution: Guo Moruo and the Chinese Path to Communism*, Xiaoming Chen. 2007. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. 101; *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 31; *Social Space and Governance in Urban China*, David Bray. 2005. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 7; 9; 36.

<sup>168</sup> *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Franz Schurmann. 1968. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, xxxvi; *Traditional Confucianism and Its Contemporary Relevance*, Hang Lin. 2011. *Cross-Cultural Communications*. 2:36; *Communist Ethics and Chinese Traditions*, David S. Nivison. 1956. *Journal of Asian Studies*. 1:270-230. As cited in *Traditional Confucianism and Its Contemporary Relevance*, Hang Lin. 2011. *Cross-Cultural Communications*. 7:36; *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 95.

<sup>169</sup> *Traditional Confucianism and Its Contemporary Relevance*, Lin Hang. 2011. *Cross Cultural Communication*. 2:37.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

<sup>171</sup> *The One That Pervades The All*, Yuri Pines. 2000. In *Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of “The Great Unity” Paradigm*, T’oung Pao. 310; Introduction, Arthur F. Wright. 1964. In Arthur F. Wright (ed.), *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. xi; Introduction, David S. Nivison. 1959. In David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (eds.), *Confucianism in Action*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 3-4; *Communist Ethics and Chinese Traditions*, David S. Nivison. 1956. *Journal of Asian Studies*. 1:51.

<sup>172</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 94.

in order to restore China.<sup>173</sup> The Chinese are striving for the revitalization of the Great Nation.<sup>174</sup>

China's philosophical roots consist of the orthodox practice of Confucianism, and the heterodox blend of Taoism, Buddhism, and more localized belief systems'.<sup>175</sup> This continuum, with orthodoxy occupying one end and heterodoxy occupying the other, follows an up-and-down rhythm with one polarity 'emphasizing conformity, repressive centralized controls and orthodox beliefs and disciple', and the other polarity consisting of 'a greater tolerance for private initiatives, a relaxation of controls, decentralization and a liberation from orthodox'. This ideological system originates from traditional China "where the basic tension was between the central imperial authorities at the capital and local authorities". This tradition system was not organized around competing interests (e.g., "left" versus "right") but organized around tensions within institutionalized hierarchies. As a result conflicts surfaced between centralization and decentralization, between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.<sup>176</sup>

### **Historical Antecedents**

China's interactions with foreign powers as well as internal convulsions shape the nature of the contemporary Chinese state, which tends to be highly reactive (due to its perception of cultural superiority) and closed (resulting from foreign infiltration and occupation). John K. Fairbank, a great historian of Chinese history, observes a 'scholar must grasp the profound challenges that came "from within" and "from without" to understand how

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<sup>173</sup> Reform Must Be Incremental, Yu Keping. 2011. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-06/11/content\\_12676680.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-06/11/content_12676680.htm) (accessed 12 September 2012).

<sup>174</sup> President Hu Eulogizes Three-Decade Reform, no author. 2008. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2008-12/19/content\\_170979.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2008-12/19/content_170979.htm) (accessed 12 September 2012).

<sup>175</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 39.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

these challenges dealt a blow to the prestige and perception of superiority that pervaded the Chinese civilization and to the very existence of the Manchu Qing Dynasty.<sup>177</sup> Philip Kuhn, a renowned American Sinologist at Harvard University, contends the character of the modern Chinese state has been shaped decisively by the flow of its internal history.<sup>178</sup>

As for “from without” events, the Chinese experienced five foreign invasions. These include the first British-Chinese Opium War of 1839-42 to the second Opium War (1856-1860) to the nearly decade long Japanese invasion, 1937-45.<sup>179</sup> As for the First Opium War, western powers delivered the Chinese their first military defeat, which ultimately resulted in the signing of several treaties, including Treaty of Nanjing (1842).<sup>180</sup> The signing signaled a tectonic shift in China’s relations with foreign powers as it shifted the relationship from being based on the tributary system to being based on a new system of unequal treaties favoring foreign barbarians in Chinese territory.<sup>181</sup> From the viewpoint of Chinese historians, the Opium War of 1839-42 “marked the beginning of foreign imperialism in their country, and, Chinese history, thereafter, was largely one of imperialism in China”. For the Marxist historians, the war was the epitome of the evils of capitalism and imperialism, which plunged the “semi-feudal” Chinese state into the abyss of “semi-colonialism”.<sup>182</sup>

As for the Second Opium War (1856-1860), it caused the acceleration of foreign activity in China and the decline of imperial China. By 1860 the Chinese suffered another

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<sup>177</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x.

<sup>178</sup> *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, Philip A. Kuhn. 2001. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1.

<sup>179</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x.

<sup>180</sup> The Manchu Appeasement Policy of 1843, John K. Fairbank. 1939. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. 4:483.

<sup>181</sup> *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*, John King Fairbank. 1953. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 3.

<sup>182</sup> *The Rise of Modern China*, Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü. 2000. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5.

humiliating defeat at the hands of the foreign powers when a joint Anglo-French military force occupied the Chinese capital. These forces eventually compelled Manchu Qing leaders to sign another series of unequal treaties. The treaties required the leaders to cede territories, pay indemnities, and open trading ports. They believed these concessions would keep the foreigners at bay until the Chinese could remove them from China and restore the old order.<sup>183</sup> However the Manchu Qing leaders “lacked the values and institutional capacities” to lead China toward self-sufficiency and modernization. Instead they ‘acquiesced to the imperialism embodied in the unequal treaty system inaugurated in 1842’.<sup>184</sup>

The Manchu Qing leaders realized the imperative of taking control. They instituted the Tongzhi restoration (1862-1874), or ‘unified government’. But the entire restoration was interpreted as a self-strengthening movement that would occur in line with the Confucian system. A slogan dominated this restoration, namely ‘Chinese culture for the foundation, Western learning for the practical use’. This movement however failed. The failure proved devastating because the Japanese successfully engaged in restoration and emerged as major power (e.g., the Meiji Restoration of 1894-1895).<sup>185</sup> It is noteworthy however the ‘self-strengthening movement’ never disappeared; it remains in tact today and evidence of this exists in the leaderships’ ongoing push to develop and acquire technology and innovate.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868: Views of Leading Chinese Statesmen Regarding the Further opening of China to Western Influence, Knight Biggerstaff. 1950. *The Journal of Modern History*. 22:123.

<sup>184</sup>*The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. 40; *China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, June Teufel Dreyer, 2012. Boston: Longman. 48-49.

<sup>185</sup>*China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, June Teufel Dreyer, 2012. Boston: Longman. 48-50.

<sup>186</sup>The author of this study attended a summer symposium at the University of California San Diego’s Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation in the summer of 2011. The symposium’s topic concerned China, technology, and national security.



As for “from within”, the Chinese experienced five revolutionary civil wars that occurred during the same period. These internal convulsions include the Taiping Movement of 1850-64 and the related uprisings, which all failed; the Republican Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen, which led to a change in polity; the partial Nationalist Revolution of 1925-28, which aimed to unite the country against Japanese aggression; and the Kuomintang-Communist civil war of 1945-49. These national experiences dealt a blow to the prestige and perception of superiority that pervaded the Chinese civilization.<sup>187</sup>

The Taiping Movement and the internal rebellion of the Boxers are particularly noteworthy events. As for the Taiping Movement, this clash occurred between the foreign powers and traditional Chinese society.<sup>188</sup> Foreign forces introduced new concepts and ideals about governance and rights while the Chinese society clung to Chinese customs and culture. The Chinese failed to integrate foreign ideas with Chinese ones.<sup>189</sup> As for the internal rebellion of the Boxers (1899-1901), it challenged the moribund Manchu Qing leaders and caused them to rely on foreign forces – a humiliating concession – to put down the uprising.<sup>190</sup>

The resulting Boxer Protocol devastated what remained of the Chinese imperial system. The terms interfered with Chinese sovereignty, “compromised China’s power of self-

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<sup>187</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x.

<sup>188</sup> *The Rise of Modern China*, Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü. 2000. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 221; 249; *The Taiping vision of a Christian China, 1836-1864*, Jonathan D. Spence. 1998. Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press; *God’s Chinese son: the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan*, Jonathan D. Spence. 1996. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. *Mercenaries and Mandarin: the Ever-Victorious Army in nineteenth century China*, Richard J. Smith with foreword by John King Fairbank. 1978. Millwood, NY: KTO Press.

<sup>189</sup> *The Failures of Contemporary Chinese Intellectual History*, Benjamin A. Elman. 2010. *Eighteenth Century Studies*. 43:374. Also available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~elman/documents/Elman%20--%20Failures%20of%20Chinese%20Intellectual%20History.pdf> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>190</sup> *Chinese Democracy: The Self-Government Movement in Local Provincial and National Politics, 1905-1914*, John Fincher. 1982. Palgrave Macmillan.

defense, restricted the free exercise of rights”, and suspended government examinations in many parts of the country, essentially interfering with the Chinese internal administration”.<sup>191</sup> Allied occupation of Peking and the imperialistic activities in China reduced China’s international position “in the society of nations” to “rock bottom”. Many Chinese believed China was viewed in “an uncivilized light in the community of nations”. The display of power by the foreign forces “created such an image of invincibility and superiority that Chinese pride and self-respect were shattered”.<sup>192</sup>

The Republican Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen resulted in the collapse of the Manchu Qing Dynasty.<sup>193</sup> The collapse ended China’s 4,000 year old dynastic cycle and started China’s transition to modernity.<sup>194</sup> At this time, China’s national finances were in disarray – there was no money in the treasury in Peking and, perhaps most notably no money was coming in from the provinces.<sup>195</sup> According to Jonathan Spence also notes the military units occupying Peking were “hard to control” and “of doubtful loyalty”. The country and especially the countryside were plagued with natural disasters. Many supporters of the Manchu Qing Dynasty remained loyal. Moreover, foreign forces pressured China and foreign invasion appeared imminent, as did the emergence of separatist regimes in the macroregions of central, western, and southern China that could further weaken the center’s authority.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> *The Rise of Modern China*, Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü. 2000. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 404-405.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 404-405

<sup>193</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x; *Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Andre Gunder Frank. 1998. Berkeley: University of California Press, 52-130.

<sup>194</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 2. *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 28. China’s National Comprehensive Power, Yan Xuetong. 1995 (personal copy).

<sup>195</sup> *The Search for Modern China*, Jonathan D. Spence. 1990. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 275.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 275.

The Chinese were indebted to seven predatory foreign powers, and the country was undergoing a significant economic transformation with the introduction of new modes of communication, transportation, and industrial development.<sup>197</sup> China in other words experienced a transition “far before the world fully understood and valued the inherent challenges and difficulties associated with development”.<sup>198</sup>

The Chinese attempted to rectify the previously foreign imposed unequal treaties. A Chinese delegation attended the Paris Peace Conference to “seek recovery of Shantung and the complete abolition of the unequal treaties”.<sup>199</sup> Their main concern was the status of Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius and Mencius, in which the Chinese consider the Holy Land of China. German previously leased the territory from China and the German defeat in World War I (WWI) suggested the territory would revert to Chinese control. However the peace conference adjudicated the question of Shantung in favor of the Japanese.<sup>200</sup> For the Chinese, the outcome of the Paris Conference proved to be another devastating blow to the Chinese. It only exacerbated and extended the “period of national crisis and humiliation”,<sup>201</sup> something that manifests in disputes with foreign powers and especially Japan, today.

The CPC takeover of mainland China in 1949 ended the era of humiliation at the hands of foreign barbarians. This major accomplishment is embedded in the constitution of the PRC:

..After waging hard, protracted and tortuous struggles, armed and otherwise, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 295.

<sup>198</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 2.

<sup>199</sup> *The Rise of Modern China*, Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü. 2000. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 503.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., 503-504.

<sup>201</sup> *The Rise of Modern China*, Immanuel Chung-yueh Hsü. 2000. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 504.

China with Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of foreign imperialistic threats, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, won the great victory of the new-democratic revolution and founded the People's Republic of China. Thereupon the Chinese people took power into their own hands and became masters of the country.<sup>202</sup>

This simply underscores the importance the CPC attach to this monumental defeat of the foreign powers.

### **Distinctive Traditions**

China uses a different periodization system. Although the European periodization system of classification by centuries is the most commonly accepted and widely used, it is inappropriate for measuring China's dynastic tradition.<sup>203</sup> China's dynasties are classified by dynastic sequences referred to as entire "political ventures". These ventures consisted of three trends: unification, growth, and decline. As previously discussed, political unification is an ideal best represented by the concept of the Great Unity (*Da Yitong*).<sup>204</sup> This paradigm emerged as a "reasonable political solution to the immanent state of anarchy embedded in the multi-state system in Chinese history". It was a "precondition for the imperial unification of 221 BC" and was a "rational response to the disintegration of the Eastern Zhou multi-state order".<sup>205</sup> The multi-state system failed to bring stability to the war-torn Zhou, and thus a consensus was reached that "stability is in unity".<sup>206</sup> Ongoing "bloodshed and turmoil" could

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<sup>202</sup>Preamble: The People's Republic of China's Constitution, no author. *People's Daily*. available at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>203</sup>*China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 47.

<sup>204</sup>The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past, and Present, Benjamin Schwartz. 1968. In John King Fairbank (ed.,) *The Chinese World Order*, Cambridge, Massachusetts Harvard University Press. 279. The Reunification of China, John King Fairbank. 1987. In Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.,) *Cambridge History of China, Vol 14: The People's Republic. Part 1: The Emergence of Revolution China, 1949-1965*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 14-21.

<sup>205</sup> The One That Pervades The All, Yuri Pines. 2000. In *Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of "The Great Unity" Paradigm*, *T'oung Pao*. 282.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 301.

be resolved through the “unification of the realm”, whereas ongoing disunion meant “endemic warfare, devastation of the country, large-scale bloodshed, and finally the most dreadful of all –chaos” (In Chinese: 亂; In Chinese pinyin: *luan*).<sup>207</sup> The CPC ‘similarly to its imperial and republican predecessor states, emphasizes the importance of national unity’.<sup>208</sup>

As previously mentioned, Confucius outlined the advantages of “unified rule over All under Heaven”. National unity would restore the ‘political potency of the Son of Heaven’ and bring stability, peace, and prosperity.<sup>209</sup> Even though national unity imposed stability, it was insecurely dependent on the “historical rhythms”, the “waxing and waning”, of China’s dynasties.<sup>210</sup> Dominating the cycle was the chronic “Chinese impulse during a dynastic interregnum toward political reunification”. China “never developed adequate means of peaceful coexistence between contending regimes, and as their conflicts were not confined to border incidents but were wars of mutual extermination, the only way to stop such bloodshed was unification”.<sup>211</sup> This perception underpins the current leadership’s aim to maintain unity and to achieve national reunification with Taiwan, as mentioned above.

Another difference between China and Europe is the European rulers never “governed self-sufficient lands or held the final word on law and justice, moral thought, religion, art, the military and public works that was claimed by and for China’s Sons of Heaven”.<sup>212</sup> The Sons of Heaven authority however was not absolute; it could be undermined if his immorality

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 301; 324.

<sup>208</sup> Xinjiang and the causes of separatism, Colin Mackerras. 2001. *Central Asian Survey*. 3:289-303.

<sup>209</sup> The One That Pervades The All, Yuri Pines. 2000. In *Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of ‘The Great Unity’ Paradigm*. *T’oung Pao*. 301-302.

<sup>210</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 47.

<sup>211</sup> The One That Pervades The All, Yuri Pines. 2000. In *Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of ‘The Great Unity’ Paradigm*. *T’oung Pao*. 324.

<sup>212</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University.

caused him to lose the “mandate of heaven”.<sup>213</sup> The Mandate of Heaven<sup>214</sup> is a traditional doctrine establishing the moral criteria for holding power.<sup>215</sup> This mandate is the inherited right to rule and provides legitimacy to the dynasty.<sup>216</sup> Since the Manchu Qing Dynasty lost the Mandate of Heaven and the CPC ultimately engaged in a successful rebellion that eventually installed it as the central authority in China. This means the CPC can claim legitimacy because it (eventually) ‘toppled’ the rulers and thus inherited the right to rule.<sup>217</sup>

Each dynasty’s decline and collapse stem from “natural calamities, earthquakes, floods, comets, eclipses, and other heavenly portents. As they become more numerous, it suggests the ruler’s improper conduct was losing him the Mandate of Heaven”.<sup>218</sup> In addition, the Chinese theory of the mandate of heaven suggests “if the people faced economic troubles they had the right to blame government, for the obligation of government was to do right to

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<sup>213</sup> Confucianism and Democracy, Francis Fukuyama. 1995. *Journal of Democracy*. 6:27.

<sup>214</sup> The CPC believes it is the rightful inheritor of the Mandate of Heaven from the Manchu Qing Dynasty. This Mandate consists of several concepts. The “moral theory of the dynastic cycle” is perpetuated by the Mandate. Once a ruler violates the mandate, it could be revoked and then revolt was legitimate. The emperor ruled according to this mandate, and it effectively legitimizes the right to rebellion “without requiring any structural or organizational changes”. See *China: An Introduction*, Lucian W. Pye. 1978. Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company. 52; 62. Pye also suggests it is contingent upon the economic well being of the masses. If they encountered economic difficulties, they reserved the right to blame the government because it is the government that must provide for the welfare of the people. Pye contends Mao altered the course of this Mandate because he “taught the masses that government could be the enemy of their well-being”. *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 165-166. Perhaps Pye is correct as it could have caused a shift from how the Chinese previously viewed the government as a benevolent force to viewing it as a threat; however the emergence of Confucianism in the form of ‘Xiao Kang’ and ‘Socialist Harmonious Society’ suggest the CPC and perhaps the majority of people who still have not overthrown the Party view the CPC as the holders of the Mandate.

<sup>215</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 40.

<sup>216</sup> Morality, Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy in China from Past to the Present, Yangqi Tong. 2011. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 16:145.

<sup>217</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 49. *Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China*, Elizabeth J. Perry. 2001. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

<sup>218</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 48.

bring material benefits to all”.<sup>219</sup> The succession of dynastic sequences over the centuries is testimony to the impermanence of Chinese political authority.<sup>220</sup>

A classic example of the loss of the mandate of heaven comes from the Han Dynasty. Problems of China’s past were due in large part to an ineffective military and the inability of the central government to cope with natural disasters and with foreign intervention. The downfall of the Han Dynasty occurred as a result of a combination of economic problems, natural disasters, peasant discontent, and ineffective government.<sup>221</sup> With historical traditions as a guide, the CPC should develop an effective military, deal with national disasters, pre-empt foreign intervention, as well as cope with economic programs and social discontent, otherwise it could lose the mandate heaven.

The imperial era created bureaucratic traditions. This tradition reaches back prior to China’s unification by the Qin.<sup>222</sup> The ruler of the state of Qin needed to figure out how the center could dominate local lineages in order to consolidate power. As a result he aimed to undermine group ties and loyalties and, in its place, he wanted to create obedience to the state. This means he wanted to subordinate kinship relations to nonkinship relations. To this end, he set up a complex bureaucratic system.<sup>223</sup> The establishment of the bureaucratic system proved to be quite effective, because it achieved the stated goals of undermining group ties

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<sup>219</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 165.

<sup>220</sup> Confucianism and Democracy, Francis Fukuyama. 1995. *Journal of Democracy*. 6:27.

<sup>221</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International. 9.

<sup>222</sup> *Modernization and Revolution in China*, June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort. 1997. Armonk, New York; London, England: ME Sharpe. 22.

<sup>223</sup> *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 24; 50; 54-55.

and loyalties and cultivating “obedience to the state”. In achieving this, the state controlled the people, which in turn increased the Qin state’s military power.<sup>224</sup>

The successors of the Qin Dynasty were the emperors of the Earlier and Later Han dynasties (206 BC-AD 220). These rulers “continued to extend Qin’s methods of bureaucratic control”, however they implemented measures gradually and incrementally, and in particular, they combined it “with comprehensive moral cosmology that focused on the emperor”. The Han emperors created a tax system that designated men of merit to collect the taxes. This created “local aristocratic supporters of the throne”. The emperors created a government post that sent communications on the highways. Another bureaucracy was the institution of regional inspectors who traveled throughout their designated areas and annually reported on “local administrations to the imperial secretariat at the capital city of Chang’an”.<sup>225</sup>

The Chinese bureaucratic system assumed certain characteristics associated with Western-style bureaucracy. The characteristics included “highly defined offices, merit-based appointments, clearly articulated reward structures, considerable specialization in functions, highly developed formal systems of communications, detailed rules concerning proper lines of authority, regularized reporting obligations, formalized structures for monitoring compliance and deviance, and so forth”. The bureaucracy “relied on a strong, ideologically motivated bureaucracy”, based on Confucian precepts that established a robust foundation “for a civilized, harmonious society”. It also depended upon officials to fulfill their obligations in accordance with the system. If they failed, however, they would be removed from office. While the Chinese bureaucratic system took on many of the characteristics of the

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., 57-58.



Western bureaucracy, the Chinese system rejected the western preference for diffusing power and “limiting the reach of the government in society”.<sup>226</sup> This approach was directly antithetical to the fundamental tents of the traditional Chinese polity”.<sup>227</sup>

Although the Chinese bureaucracy departed somewhat from the reality of the “formal prescriptions”, it was “extraordinary in its scope, capabilities, and modernity”. The system was highly “nonpluralistic”. It was based on the “notions of hierarchy, centralization, and the state as the propagator of the correct moral framework for the society”. “This centuries-long tradition of centralized bureaucratic rule was one of China’s most extraordinary accomplishments.”<sup>228</sup> In contemporary China, the CPC created an intricate web of bureaucratic organization by the late 1950s; this encompassed all Chinese society and penetrated deeply into its fabric.<sup>229</sup> In the post-Mao era, the Chinese leaders seek to ensure “all significant social power goes through its command structure in institutional building and policy implementation”.<sup>230</sup> Lucian Pye observes, “communism gave the Chinese a political system that reflects Chinese political traditions: a system centered on a bureaucratic hierarchy”.<sup>231</sup> Moreover Michel Oksenberg said to David Shambaugh “if you want to

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<sup>226</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 11-12. The Chinese bureaucratic system existed in the Tang (618-907 BC) and the Song (Northern Song with Liao Empire on the north border (960-1125) and Southern Song with Jin Empire in North China (1127-1279) and the Ming era (1368-1622), *China: A New History*. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman. 2006. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 24.

<sup>227</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 12.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>229</sup> *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Franz Schurmann. 1968. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 17.

<sup>230</sup> Bureaucratic Capacity and State-Society Relations in China, Yanzhong Huang and Dali L. Yang. 2002. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 38.

<sup>231</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 15.

understand China, you have to understand bureaucracy. If you want to understand communist systems, you have to understand bureaucracy.”<sup>232</sup>

Chinese history also contains a long tradition of war. Both Chinese ancient and contemporary history has an extraordinarily long tradition of warfare, including war, conquest, occupation, and a sustained military culture spanning several millennia.<sup>233</sup> Modern Chinese history ‘reveals the frequency of warfare over the last several centuries’.<sup>234</sup> The Confucian minded class of literati that ruled China for nearly 2000 years during the imperial system promoted the civil (In Chinese: 文; In Chinese pinyin: *wen*) over the military (In Chinese: 武; In Chinese pinyin: *wu*). However war and the military played a prominent role, as wars were ubiquitous throughout imperial times through to the CPC’s takeover of mainland China in 1949. China’s martial past created famous generals, demonstrated China’s capacity for massive armies, and pervades Chinese literature.<sup>235</sup>

The military has dominated much of Chinese history from the warring states to the unification of China under the Emperor Qin Shihuang two thousand years ago. As for the warring states, both intellectuals and officials borrow methods designed to promote military discipline and order among the larger military units and applied these methods to the increasing population within their respective states; when unifying the warring states, they also

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<sup>232</sup> Michel Okensberg to David Shambaugh. *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. xii.

<sup>233</sup> Introduction, Nicola Di Cosmo. 2009. In *Military Culture in Imperial China*, Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>234</sup> *A Military History of Modern China: From the Manchu Conquest to Tian’anmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International. vii.

<sup>235</sup> Introduction, Nicola Di Cosmo. 2009. In *Military Culture in Imperial China*, Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

It is noteworthy that some subway stops and streets in Beijing are named after famous Chinese military personnel, including two who died in China’s war of resistance against Japan; this means the Chinese leadership embeds the martial spirit in the people’s daily lives.

employed methods from the military to control the population.<sup>236</sup> Emperor Qin Shihuang united China through the use of force and almost every subsequent dynasty thereafter used force to unify China. Emperor Qin is not the only emperor that known for his ‘innovation in military culture’. Han Qudi (156-87 BCE) and Tang Taizong (599-649) left military innovation legacies. These leaders taught the Chinese that “realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation requires the rejuvenation of the Chinese national’s martial spirit”.<sup>237</sup> This is something that the Chinese today aim to revitalize.

China’s imperial era under the tenure of the Manchu Qing Dynasty ended as a result of a military coup that morphed into a warlord era.<sup>238</sup> Emerging out of this came the subsequent establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy.<sup>239</sup> The rise and fall of the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek came from military support from the Whampoa group. This group consisted of generals who first became his followers as cadets at the Military Academy in 1924-26 and then dominated the Guomindang armies for nearly 25 years after that.<sup>240</sup>

The CPC takeover of mainland China emerged out of a brutal three-year civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the Kuomintang-Communist civil war of 1945-49.<sup>241</sup> The Chinese historian classifies this war as the Chinese People’s War of Liberation or the Third Revolutionary Civil War.<sup>242</sup> In this war, the People’s Liberation

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<sup>236</sup> Law and the Military in Early China, Robin D.S. Yates. 2009. In *Military Culture in Imperial China*, Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>237</sup> *The China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Age*, Liu Ming Fu. 2010. Beijing, Zhongguo youyi chunban gongsi. 245.

<sup>238</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>240</sup> *Military History of Modern China (1924-1949)*, Frederick Fu Liu. 1956. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

<sup>241</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x.

<sup>242</sup> *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949*, Suzanne Pepper. 1999. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 3 footnote 1.

Army (PLA) continually defeated the Kuomintang and sent them fleeing for refuge to Taiwan.<sup>243</sup> This war followed on the eight-year war of resistance against the Japanese aggression in China.<sup>244</sup>

Chinese culture is also suffused with several martial themes. These themes include the bronze weapons of the Shang and the Zhou. It also includes the first emperor's warriors in terracotta form, one of the most celebrate symbols of Chinese culture along with the Great Wall. The most popular culture hero is Zhuge Liang, a great strategist and outstanding statesman of Three Kingdoms, who helped defeat Cao Cao, a Chinese warlord of the Wei Kingdom, at the Battle of Redcliff (AD 208). The actions of Redcliff have been discussed and analyzed in every martial text over the past 1,500 years. This Battle represents the processes-consolidation and fragmentation that characterizes the Chinese state throughout its history.<sup>245</sup>

According to Kuhn, "Chinese unity has been imposed by military force, and behind the civilianized regimes that followed the conquerors, military force has stood not far offstage".<sup>246</sup> It was by force not philosophy or nationalism that ultimately united the Chinese empire.<sup>247</sup> In 221 B.C. the majority of China proper was unified under the Qin dynasty by force. The Qin Emperor 'became known for his achievements as a unifier'. The Emperor broke local traditions and loyalties by ordering the "burying of the books," the destruction of

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<sup>243</sup> Guerilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military operations in Manchuria 1945-1947, Harold M. Tanner. 2003. *Journal of Military History*. 4:1178.

<sup>244</sup> *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, John King Fairbank. 1986. New York: Harper & Row. x.

<sup>245</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International; Conundrum at Red Cliffs, Ralph D. Sawyer. 2009. *Military History*. 1:64-70.

<sup>246</sup> *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, Philip Kuhn. 2002. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 134.

<sup>247</sup> *Modernization and Revolution in China*, June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort. 1997. Armonk, New York; London, England: ME Sharpe. 21.

local records and philosophical works that predated his reign. He broke the power of the local landlords, codified China's laws, standardized the writing system and weights and measures, and largely completed the Great Wall. His "relentless attacks on local traditions and autonomy is credited with contributing significantly to the forging the unity of China's vast length and breadth".<sup>248</sup>

Another example is Emperor Qianlong (1736-95). This Emperor took China to its present borders, winning imperial military victories in Xinjiang, which he commissioned European Jesuit artists to illustrate.<sup>249</sup> His territorial acquisitions have consequences for China today.<sup>250</sup> Although in 1962 the Chinese military restored the Chinese government's authority to imperial historical borders by reoccupying Xinjiang and Xizang (with the exception of Taiwan and Mongolia),<sup>251</sup> the Beijing government continues to struggle to assert sovereignty over Qianlong's conquests.<sup>252</sup> China under the Manchu Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) also experienced the militarization of culture. The Qing Dynasty supported the expansionist wars that created the boundaries of modern China by removing 文 (civil) from its privileged position and replacing it with 武 (military).<sup>253</sup> In recent times the Chinese

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid., 21

<sup>249</sup> On the Militarization of Culture in the Eighteenth Century Qing Empire, Joanna Waley-Cohen. 2006. *Common Knowledge*. 1:96-106.

<sup>250</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 2007. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger Security International.

<sup>251</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 184.

<sup>252</sup> Tibet: A Nation in Exile, Ramesh Chandra Dhussa. 2009. *American Geographical Society's Focus on Geography*. 52:1-6. *Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia: 1949-2009: A History*, Michael E. Clarke. 2001. London: Routledge. *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing*, Yingcong Dai. 2009. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.

<sup>253</sup> Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth Century China, Joanna Waley-Cohen. 2009. In Nicola Di Cosmo (ed.), *Military Culture in Imperial China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

leaders garrison the minority areas such Xinjiang and Xijang, as well as other areas operating under different administrative systems, namely Hong Kong and Macau.<sup>254</sup>

China's centuries of problems and military defeat at the hands of foreign powers ended when Mao Zedong revived the traditional martial spirit and led the CPC to victory in the wars against the Japanese, the Guomindang, the US in the Korean War. The CPC employed a strategy called the People's War, a 'strategy to maximize China's strengths (e.g., size and population) to defend mainland China from attack by foreign or domestic enemies'. From 1998 forward, the people's war has become a more integral part of Chinese leadership's approach, as every White Paper on China's National Defense has mentioned that the People's Liberation Army PLA (PLA) adheres to the "strategic concept" of the people's war as part of China's military strategy of active defense.<sup>255</sup>

In addition, the self-strengthening movement is a program of reform and modernization, with one feature involving significantly improving China's military "through a combination of new technology and Western style training". As the movement progressed during the Manchu Qing era, 'the concern among the leaders was learning superior technologies and military techniques of the West'. Then the Chinese leaders interpreted that the 'basis of western military power lay in its wealth'.<sup>256</sup> This sentiment remains in China today. For instance following the collapse of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, by the first decade of

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<sup>254</sup> In 2004, Hong Kong even held its first garrison parade in which the PLA marched. Hong Kong Cheers First Garrison Parade, no author. 2004. *Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in New York*. available at: <http://www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/eng/xw/t145467.htm> (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>255</sup> Chinese Strategic Thinking: People's War in the 21st Century, Dennis J. Blasko. 2010. *China Brief, Jamestown Foundation*. 6. available at: [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=36166](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36166) (accessed 21 August 2012).

<sup>256</sup> *A Military History of Modern China From the Manchu Conquest to Tiananmen Square*, Peter Worthing. 60-61.

the twentieth century all political camps accepted that the central state must build up its military and economic strength on behalf of the nation's "wealth and power."<sup>257</sup>

The CPC today still advocates for China's restoration. As Shambaugh states, "what the party has consistently advocated is really little different from the core themes that the Chinese rules since the Self-Strengtheners of the 1870s have advocated: attaining wealth and power (In Chinese: 富强 In Chinese pinyin: *fu qiang*)' enhancing nationalism and international dignity; preserving unity and preventing chaos. While the self-strengtheners of the 1870s advocated attaining fu-qiang, in these respects, contemporary Chinese leaders are no different from Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek, Yuan Shikai, and Li Hongzhang."<sup>258</sup>

### **Conclusion**

This chapter investigated China's "complex of distinctive characteristics". It examined China's historical antecedents, unique imperatives, and historical traditions. The chapter aimed to understand whether imperial traditions, culture, and history influence the contemporary form of the Chinese system. It found "the legacies of China's past remain particularly strong".<sup>259</sup> The Chinese leaders meshed these legacies with modern elements to facilitate China's transition and creation of a contemporary political system. In other words, the chapter demonstrates that long-standing imperial traditions into persist into the contemporary era and influence the form of the Chinese political system.

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<sup>257</sup> *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, Philip Kuhn. 2002. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 135.

<sup>258</sup> *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 169.

<sup>259</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 12.

Because these traditions are factors shaping the character of the contemporary political system, it leads to the logical conclusion that two approaches discussed in the previous chapter are applicable. The first is the China-is-China-is-China paradigm. The second is the neo-authoritarian thesis. As for the China-is-China-is-China paradigm, it suggests “China’s communist economic landscape, psychological mindset, and bureaucratic processes are basically the same as those of imperial China”.<sup>260</sup> As for the neo-authoritarian thesis, it incorporates the imperial era’s long-standing traditions, including bureaucracy, military, and ideology.

Although these approaches are applicable to a certain degree, two points are noteworthy. First, neither approach explains how China transitioned from the imperial era to the contemporary era. In other words, they both fail to explain China’s transformation from the imperial era to the modern era. Second, the neo-authoritarian thesis approach provides no explanations or indications about the potential trajectory of the system, whereas the China-is-China-is-China paradigm does because the paradigm contains the concept of the dynastic cycle.

Specifically, the dynastic cycle provides indicators of the system’s direction but in particular provides clues about the lifespan and demise of ruling elite, now the CPC. For instance, the CPC rule most likely will follow the cycle of consolidation and fragmentation; this cycle could span decades or centuries. The CPC most likely will retain the mandate of heaven, so long as it develops an effective military, deals with national disasters, pre-empts foreign intervention, as well as handles economic programs and social discontent. Otherwise

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<sup>260</sup> *China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 14; 114.



the CPC most likely will experience gradual or rapid fragmentation and the eventual loss of the mandate and ultimately become increasingly moribund and / or be overthrown.

Emerging from this chapter's discussion is evidence that ideology plays a central role in shaping the form of the system. During the imperial era ideology and in particular the Confucian system served as a state tool of governance and administration. Because Confucianism was used to facilitate China's transition and meshed with modern elements, it raises additional questions about the role that ideology and in particular Confucianism plays in shaping the contemporary Chinese political system. In particular does ideology contribute to the form of the political system? If so, how? Is the ideology continuous or discontinuous? Meaning, does it persist or transform with the changing conditions in China? Moreover what is the role of the Chinese leaders' belief systems? Do these systems play a part in the ideological system? If so, what role do they play? Do they contribute to the form of the political system or do they signal the existing form and its potential trajectory, or both? Accordingly, the next chapter investigates Chinese ideology and the Chinese leaders' belief systems.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

#### Introduction

The Chinese government has pervasive influence because it “sets the moral framework for the entire society”, which is “a product of the imperial” times.

- Kenneth Lieberthal,  
*Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*  
1995, p.4<sup>261</sup>

The previous chapter investigated the complex of distinctive characteristics. The chapter posited these characteristics, derived from Chinese history, influence and shape the form of the contemporary Chinese political system and contribute to its distinctive manifestation. The chapter specifically examined and discussed China’s unique imperatives, historical antecedents, and historical traditions. The in-depth discussion revealed that the features of the contemporary political system are similar to those of imperial China. This means the Chinese political system may best reflect the China-is-China-is-China paradigm.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 4.

<sup>262</sup> *China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 14;114.

Briefly put this paradigm suggests “China’s communist economic landscape, psychological mindset, and bureaucratic processes are basically the same as those of imperial China”.<sup>263</sup>

Investigating ideology more closely may tell us more about how the Chinese leaders order the modern political system and its constituent parts. As noted in the previous chapters, ideology played an integral role during the imperial times and the imperial leaders even adopted Confucianism as the state ideology. During China’s transition to modernity the Chinese leaders modified Confucianism and meshed it with Marxism and Leninism. The leaders did this to facilitate China’s transition from the imperial era to the contemporary era and to prevent China from becoming westernized and / or perhaps less Chinese.

Because ideology played an integral role in the imperial system and because the previous chapter demonstrated that ideology also plays a central role in the contemporary system, this chapter conducts an investigation of Chinese ideology and its role within the contemporary political system. The chapter contends that similarly to imperial times the Chinese leaders employ ideology to administer and govern; they also use it to adapt the system to existing and emerging conditions. It is noteworthy that because the Chinese system is based on ideology, the CPC leaders retain the right – as did the imperial leaders – to define and redefine legitimacy.<sup>264</sup>

The chapter is divided into several sections. One section examines the various Chinese leaders' value system. The leaders under examination include Mao Zedong and his approach, Deng Xiaoping and his Theory, Jiang Zemin and his “Three Represents”, and Hu Jintao and his “Scientific Outlook on Development” and “Harmonious Society”. Another section concludes with some final remarks and observations.

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid.,14; 114.

<sup>264</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 164.

Kissinger did not mention the imperial leaders however; the author of this project makes this observation.

### **Mao Zedong Thought**

Following the outbreak of the War of Resistance (1937-1945), in 1938 Mao Zedong at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee proposed adapting Marxism and Leninism to Chinese conditions. He made this proposal because the discourses of Marxism and Leninism were virtually ‘inseparable from the Chinese discourses’.<sup>265</sup> The CPC under the tenure of Mao Zedong incorporated these foreign approaches into the Chinese system because they best suited China’s existing discourse, conditions, and goals. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, chapter four, the leaders meshed these approaches with Chinese traditions and especially Confucianism. As in building Chinese communism, the Chinese leadership relied upon the traditional Confucian system and made significant efforts to mesh the Confucian system with the emerging brand of Chinese communism.<sup>266</sup> The Chinese leaders, especially Mao Zedong who aimed to destroy traditional Chinese political thought and in particular Confucianism and universal harmony, ultimately relied “on many of China’s traditional institutions”<sup>267</sup> to facilitate China’s transition from the imperial era to contemporary times.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Destructive Will and Ideological Holocaust: Maoism as a Source of Social Suffering in China, Weiming Tu. 1996. *Social Suffering*. 1:150.

<sup>266</sup> The One That Pervades The All, Yuri Pines. 2000. In *Ancient Chinese Political Thought: The Origins of ‘The Great Unity’ Paradigm*. *T’oung Pao*. 310; Introduction, Arthur F. Wright. 1964. In Arthur F. Wright (ed.), *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. xi. Introduction, David S. Nivison. 1959. In David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (ed.), *Confucianism in Action*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 3-4; Communist Ethics and Chinese Traditions, David S. Nivison. 1956. *Journal of Asian Studies*. 1:51.

<sup>267</sup> *On China*, Henry Kissinger. 2011. Penguin Press. 94-95.

<sup>268</sup> Although the study focuses on other forms of corporatism, it is noteworthy that historical corporatism applies in the case of China. Leaders employ historical corporatism in several ways. For instance, leaders of emerging or new states may try to manipulate historic corporatist institution to solidify their power. A second way is to hold society together during the early stages of statehood or modernization. A third way is to maintain the strength of indigenous values, norms, and institutions in the face of infiltration by foreign factors. See *Corporatism and comparative politics: the other great “ism”*, Howard J. Wiarda. 1997. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 16-17.

Mao's works "On New Democracy" presented a way to 'save China' and offered a pathway to guide China ahead of the West while revitalizing the Chinese nation.<sup>269</sup> The "material conditions and pressing contradictions imposed by" the foreign imperialist and colonialist 'as producing the need in China to create a "national, scientific, and mass culture" that would restore and uphold the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation'.<sup>270</sup> In 1940 Mao gave a speech entitled "Politics and Culture of New Democracy" at the First Congress of Cultural Association in Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region. He asked: "which way will China go?" and answered the Chinese "want to build a new China. We Communists, for many years, have not only fought for China's political and economic revolution, but also struggled for China's Cultural Revolution; all these aims are to build a new society and new Chinese nation-state".<sup>271</sup>

A communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied. There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is, Marxism applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China and not Marxism absolutely used.<sup>272</sup>

In other words, Mao engaged in the 'sinification' of Marxism and this meant freeing the CPC from strategies mandated by Marxist ideology that had no application to Chinese reality. He aimed to eliminate Chinese reliance on "eight-legged essays on foreign models" in

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<sup>269</sup> Mao's Life, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66095/4468893.html> (accessed 22 August 2012). Destructive Will and Ideological Holocaust: Maoism as a Source of Social Suffering in China, Wei-ming Tu. 1996. *Social Suffering*. 1:160. Communist Ethics and Chinese Traditions, David S. Nivison. 1956. *Journal of Asian Studies*. 1:51.

<sup>270</sup> Ideology, *Telos*, and the "Communist Vanguard" from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 146.

<sup>271</sup> Jan 9, 1940: Mao Zedong Makes A Speech on "New Democracy", no author. 2011 (date posted). *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2011-03/25/content\\_12473668.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/cpc2011/2011-03/25/content_12473668.htm) (accessed 24 August 2012).

<sup>272</sup> *China's Political System: Modernization and Transition*, June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 3.

favor of strategies that fit China's "national peculiarities."”<sup>273</sup> Although convergences existed between Confucianism and the approaches of Marxism and Leninism, Mao Zedong's theory at times proved to be in conflict with those approaches, specifically with regard to the mass line and dialectical materialism.

As for the mass line, it went against the Confucian precept that rulers “know what to do because of their knowledge of the classic doctrine”. Mao disliked this principle because it also asserted, “that the poorly educated masses must simply obey their superiors”. The approach of the mass line sought to alleviate two challenges faced by dictatorships: first, losing touch the populace and generating political apathy among the people.<sup>274</sup> The mass line is “the basic working method by which Communist cadres seek to initiate and promote a unified relation between themselves and the Chinese population and thus to bring about the supported and active participation of the people”.<sup>275</sup> Mao knew “in order to lead an effective national revolution” he had to rectify the CPC with a consistent political message of the mass line.<sup>276</sup> Mao felt he could mobilize the Chinese nation to change the direction of the nation through this concept of mass line or ‘people power’.<sup>277</sup> According to Kenneth Lieberthal Mao summed up the entire concept of the mass line in “one pithy saying”: “from the masses, to the masses”. However despite Mao's focus on the role of the masses – something Hu Jintao later emphasizes in his “Socialist Harmonious Society” – he retained the Confucian traditional

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<sup>273</sup> *Modernization and Revolution in China*, June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort. 1997. Armonk, New York; London, England: ME Sharpe.

<sup>274</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 64.

<sup>275</sup> *Leadership in Communist China*, John W. Lewis. 1963. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press. 70.

<sup>276</sup> Ideology, *Telos*, and the “Communist Vanguard” from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 145.

<sup>277</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 65.

principle of leadership that ‘regards moral instruction to be the first duty of the head of state’.<sup>278</sup>

As for the theory of dialectical materialism, Mao made some adaptations to it. His adaptations are best illustrated in his two publications *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*. In the former work, Mao integrated dialectical materialism and the neo-Confucian school of Idealism. He emphasized that the knowledge process has three specific stages consisting of perception, conception, and verification; and, concomitantly, he stressed the importance of ideology to practice, meaning the unification and application of theory and practice. His other work *On Contradiction* also employed the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and stressed “universality of contradiction such as the offense and defense, advance and retreat of war”; but concurrently he emphasized that, “their particularity was determined by the needs of time and place”.<sup>279</sup> Mao interpreted Marxist’s principles of contradiction as applicable to the conditions at that place in time. This means that the “real can be represented”. It is noteworthy that this concept emerges later in Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Seek Truth From Facts’.<sup>280</sup>

The last modification Mao made to Marxism and Leninism is the introduction of the concept of “permanent revolution”.<sup>281</sup> However this concept resulted in some disastrous policies, including destabilizing internal events such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These internal convulsions, according to some experts, damaged the Chinese leadership use of ideology. Specifically according to Kenneth Lieberthal, “the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath did fundamental damage to the use of

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<sup>278</sup>The ideological paradigm shifts of China’s World Views: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, Winberg Chai. 2003. *Asian Affairs*. 30:166.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., 166.

<sup>280</sup>Ideology, *Telos*, and the “Communist Vanguard” from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 146.

<sup>281</sup>The ideological paradigm shifts of China’s World Views: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, Winberg Chai. 2003. *Asian Affairs*. 30:166.

ideology as a resource of the Center. Officials at all levels lost their innocent belief in the automatic validity of the Center-mandated policies when they witnessed the enormous destruction and waste produced by the ill-conceived policies of Mao and his radical supporters”.<sup>282</sup> It may be more appropriate to suggest that Mao’s attempt to mesh foreign approaches with Chinese traditional thought failed, because the Chinese leaders increasingly rely upon ideas derived from Confucianism, signaling the reemergence of ideology, as well as a shift along the ideological continuum from heterodoxy to orthodoxy.

There are two other concepts developed by Mao that deserve consideration. One minor concept highlights the ongoing importance of Confucian ideas to the Chinese ideological system. The other notion is a major theme in Mao Zedong Thought that still has broad implications for the Chinese political system. As for the first concept, this concept is Mao’s idea of ‘self-criticism’. The principle derives from the Confucian orientation of *xiushen* (In Chinese: 修身 In English: morally cultivate the self). This is similar to Mao’s self-criticism (In Chinese: 检讨 In Chinese pinyin: *jiantaoy*). The second notion is self-reliance (In Chinese: 自立更生 In Chinese pinyin: *zili gengsheng*). This means the Chinese need to “keep the initiative in one’s own hands”.<sup>283</sup> When PRC-USSR relations deteriorated and negatively affected China’s economic development, Mao ‘insisted that China follow a strategy of self-reliance’.<sup>284</sup> This self-reliance policy impacted the provincial and local areas, which led the respective officials of those areas to protect their interests and obstruct national policies if the foregoing policies threatened their interests. It therefore creates a tension

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<sup>282</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 172.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, 76-77.



between the center and the provinces,<sup>285</sup> and evidence of this exists in a later discussion in chapter eight which focuses on center-province relations.

The Chinese leaders credit Mao with integrating Marxism and Leninism with the “concrete practices of the Chinese revolution”.<sup>286</sup> However, even though the leaders “still praise Marxism-Leninism-Maoism” as if Mao’s thought was “one of a triumvirate, Lucian W. Pye asserts that any lasting contributions by the Chairman to that ideological tradition are so puny as to be close to zero”.<sup>287</sup> Mao’s legacy was declared by the CPC as “70 percent positive and 30 percent negative”.<sup>288</sup> This is generous because Mao completely failed as a nation-builder.<sup>289</sup> What Maoism represents though is one polar extreme on the ideological continuum; it is not an anomaly but rather representational of one aspect of Chinese political culture. To understand the other polar extreme of Chinese political culture, the next section examines Deng Xiaoping and his theory.

### **Deng Xiaoping Theory**

Although Mao moved China toward one polarity of the political culture continuum consisting of heterodoxy, China under the tenure of Deng Xiaoping experienced the reemergence of the second political culture characterized by orthodoxy. Deng Xiaoping

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<sup>285</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 156.

<sup>286</sup> Constitution of the Communist Party of China, no author. 2007 (updated). *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/Cover\\_Stories\\_Series\\_2011/2007-12/13/content\\_375934\\_2.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/Cover_Stories_Series_2011/2007-12/13/content_375934_2.htm) (accessed 12 September 2012).

<sup>287</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 170. Some Chinese also feel this way and even speculate that the Chinese leaders are going to remove his portrait that hangs so prominently at the Southern Gate of the Forbidden City overlooking Tian’an men Square - discussions with Chinese teachers, experts, and officials in several Chinese cities including Shaoshan in Xiangtan, Hunan Province (Mao’s birthplace), Jingangshan in Luoxiao Mountains in the remote border region between Jiangxi and Hunan which is the birthplace of the Chinese Red army now known as the People’s Liberation Army (the author of this study spent two weeks traveling in this area), as well as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Beijing in 1998-2001; 2008; 2011.

<sup>288</sup> *China’s Political System: Modernization and Transition*, June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman. 120.

<sup>289</sup> *China Without Mao: The Search For a New Order*, Immanuel C.Y. Hsü. 1983. New York: Oxford.

recognized the sea of change in the Chinese political climate when he began to articulate his programs.<sup>290</sup> His theory establishes the path for the Chinese state to shift away from Mao's revolution and move China toward modernization, though modernization (In Chinese: 现代化 In Chinese pinyin: *xiandaihua*) means the development of core industries aimed at strengthening and restoring China, not movement toward westernization.

The shift between Mao's theory and Deng's provides incisive insight into Chinese political culture because it clearly demonstrates the existence of two political cultures operating in China. On the one hand there is Maoism. This ideology defined the Chinese revolution and “captured what was most distinctive about China's drive to find a place in the modern world”. On the other hand, there is Deng Xiaoping's approach. This approach, discussed below, was also very Chinese and equally suitable to the Chinese conditions, even though it is completely different from Maoism. These shifts indicate the Chinese ideological system consists not of a dichotomy of “left” and “right” or “ideology” versus “pragmatism”, but rather they demonstrate the existence of a far more complex reality.<sup>291</sup>

Specifically, the Chinese ideological system fails to follow the dichotomous pattern. Instead the system exists on a continuum and follows an up-and-down rhythm with the polarity consisting of “an emphasis on conformity, repressive centralized controls and orthodox beliefs and disciple, on one end, whereas the other extreme involves a greater tolerance for private initiatives, a relaxation of controls, decentralization and a liberation from orthodoxy”. This approach existed in traditional China “where the basic tension was between the central imperial authorities at the capital and local authorities”. The traditional system

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<sup>290</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 172.

<sup>291</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 37-38.

was not organized according to competing interests (e.g., “left” versus “right”), but rather the system was organized by tensions within institutionalized hierarchies, and as a result, conflicts surfaced between centralization and decentralization, between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The tensions in Chinese ideological systems exists as a result of Chinese traditions, namely the ‘orthodoxy of Confucianism and the heterodox blend of Taoism, Buddhism, and more localized belief systems’.<sup>292</sup> The tensions emerging between the theories advanced by Mao and Deng are not a result of ‘ideological radicalism’ versus ‘ideological pragmatism’. Instead these tensions are part of China’s two political cultures originating from imperial China.

The consequences of Mao’s Cultural Revolution led the Chinese society to want to end extreme ideological politics, heterodoxy. The Chinese society remained “fearful of unpredictable change and sympathetic to heavy-handed authoritarian ways, even to the point of tolerating and rationalizing the need for repression”. More aptly put, the Chinese ideological system in the aftermath of Mao’s tenure placed “an emphasis on conformity, repressive centralize controls and orthodox beliefs and discipline”.<sup>293</sup> As a result when Deng took power, he instituted an ideological reorientation in which he shifted away from Mao’s class struggle and political campaigns.<sup>294</sup> His immediate ideological reforms in the political realm seemed to reflect the orthodox feature of the ideological continuum.

Evidence of Deng’s ideological shift exists in the Third plenary Session of the 11<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. First he reoriented the Party toward

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<sup>292</sup>Ibid., 38-39.

<sup>293</sup>An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture, Lucian W. Pye. 1993. *The China Quarterly*. 135:420. *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 38-39.

<sup>294</sup>Ideology, *Telos*, and the “Communist Vanguard” from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 149.

economic development. Second he replaced Mao's slogan of the 'Two Whatevers' with the initiative of "Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth". The foregoing slogan established the basis for his slogan of 'seek truth from facts'.<sup>295</sup> This approach is based on Mao Zedong's *On Contradiction*, a derivative of Marxist's notion of 'real can be represented'.<sup>296</sup> In the immediate post-Mao era, Deng's doctrine became the CPC's "standard motto".<sup>297</sup> This example demonstrates evidence of a degree of some ideological continuity between Marxism, Mao's theory, and Deng's theory, despite the reality that Mao's approach stood at one pole of the Chinese ideological continuum and Deng's at the other pole. Moreover it highlights the right of the Chinese leaders to redefine and reorient the Chinese system and society.

Unlike Mao's experiment, Deng did not 'seek to shape of ideological thought' in China. Instead he devised a formula that "could lead to a new vision for Marx". This formula is referred to as "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" (In Chinese: 建设中国特色社会主义 In Chinese pinyin: *jianshe zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi*).<sup>298</sup> Specifically Chinese leadership must: "integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics—that is the basic conclusion we have reached after reviewing our long history".<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>295</sup>The Third Plenary Session of the 11<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Community Party of China, no author. 1978 (updated 2009). *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2009-05/26/content\\_197538.htm](http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2009-05/26/content_197538.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>296</sup>From Revolutionary Regime to Normal Governance: China's Long March toward Political Reform, James C. Hsiung. 2009. *Asian Affairs*. 31. Ideology, *Telos*, and the "Communist Vanguard" from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 145;150.

<sup>297</sup>From Revolutionary Regime to Normal Governance: China's Long March toward Political Reform, James C. Hsiung. 2009. *Asian Affairs*. 31.

<sup>298</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 170-171; The ideological paradigm shifts of China's World Views: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, Winberg Chai. 2003. *Asian Affairs*. 30:165.

<sup>299</sup> Power of Collective Wisdom, Zhao Zhikui. 2011. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2011-05/27/content\\_373167.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2011-05/27/content_373167.htm) (accessed 12 September 2012).

If Deng's slogan of "socialism with Chinese characteristics sounds indistinct, it most likely was his intention. He adeptly blends "modesty and a claim of uniqueness, while leaving vague precisely what was the goal".<sup>300</sup> This provides a high degree of ideological flexibility for subsequent leaders who could interpret it according to existing and emerging conditions. For instance, in his statement in the Report of the 17<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao provides a definition of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics":

The theoretical system of Chinese style socialism adheres to and develops Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought embodies the wisdom and untiring efforts leading the people to explore and practice represents the latest achievements in the Sinicization of Marxism, is the Party's most valuable political and spiritual wealth and serves as the common ideological basis for the unity and struggle of peoples of all nationalities.<sup>301</sup> Furthermore, the road of Chinese style socialism is that under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, based on basic country conditions, to take economic development as the center, adhere to the four cardinal principles, persist in the reform an opening up, release and develop the social productive forces, solidify and improve the socialist system, build a socialist market economy, socialist democracy, socialist advanced culture, and as socialist harmonious society, and build a prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country.<sup>302</sup>

The CPC and in particular Deng Xiaoping in the post-Mao era faced a significant dilemma. Maoism failed in practice in China's development from 1957 to 1978.<sup>303</sup> The daunting task for Deng Xiaoping was dismantling and or modifying the superstructure established for Maoism. Since the legitimacy of the party and the state makes necessary

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<sup>300</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. 62.

<sup>301</sup> Outline of the theoretical system of Chinese Style Socialism, Di Chenguang. 2008. available at: <http://blog.cntheory.com/u/pantcg/archives/2009/400.html> (accessed 12 September 2012).

<sup>302</sup> Outline of the theoretical system of Chinese Style Socialism, Di Chenguang. 2008. available at: <http://blog.cntheory.com/u/pantcg/archives/2009/400.html> (accessed 9 August 2012).

<sup>303</sup> Mao's tenure was marred by a series of disastrous policies including the Hundred Flowers Antirightist (1957) to the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) to the Four Cleanups and the Second Three Anti campaigns (1963-1965) to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 66.

ideology, and the remaining ideology was antithetical to the existence of the Chinese state, the CPC needed to reorient and reconstruct ideology more in line with the reform era. This resulted in Deng Xiaoping Theory that incorporated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought into his value system best embodied in the *Four Cardinal Principles* or *Four Insists*.<sup>304</sup>

1. Keep to the socialist road
2. Uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat
3. Uphold the leadership of the Communist Party
4. Uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought

For Deng, these principles were the foundation for China's modernization process.<sup>305</sup> Adhering to Communism meant retaining the Communists organizational structure as well as its power base "rather than preserving the purity of its ideology or adhering rigidly to the Party line". In stark contrast to Mao, Deng adhered to true Leninism. This meant preserving the Party's organizational identity and its monopoly on power, as opposed to maintaining adherences to Marxism. The *Four Insists* need to be understood as 'a pledge to sustain the organizational integrity and the power monopoly of the Party, as opposed to maintaining adherences to Marxism'. Ideological correctness, from Deng's viewpoint, was disruptive to organizational life, namely the Chinese state and society, clearly demonstrated by Mao Zedong and his tenure in Chinese politics.<sup>306</sup>

Deng, in other words, engaged in a feat on an order of magnitude incomprehensible to the outside world. In effect he shifted the entire ideological superstructure established for

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<sup>304</sup> *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, June Teufel Dreyer. 2006. New York: Pearson/Longman. 112. Also cited in *From Revolutionary Regime to Normal Governance: China's Long March toward Political Reform*, James C. Hsiung. 2009. *Asian Affairs*. 32. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Volume 2 (1975-1982)*, Deng Xiaoping. 1975-1982. *People's Daily*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66485/66495/index.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>305</sup> The word "modernization" in Chinese is 现代化 (*xiandaihua*); it carries a material connotation and means the modernization of specific sectors critical to a country's economic development; it does not mean the development of western liberal capitalism.

<sup>306</sup> An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture, Lucian W. Pye. 1993. *The China Quarterly*. 135:432.

Mao's theory. Deng reconstructed the Chinese institutions and the CPC organizational structure. Moreover Deng shifted Chinese politics away from heterodoxy toward orthodoxy. In doing so, he established the foundation to finally modernize and restore China.

This orthodox trend continues under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. However these two leaders and their respective value systems clearly indicate a return to Confucianism while using corporatist tactics to achieve the Confucian ideal society. Accordingly the following section investigates Jiang Zemin and his 'Three Represents' as well as 'Xiaokang'. Both thoughts emphasize the expansion of the Party and promotion of a more inclusive regime; they also establish the foundation for Hu Jintao's 'Socialist Harmonious Society'.

### **The Three Represents**

In the late 1990s, Jiang Zemin began to craft and advance his vision for China. He started to promote value system in 1998 with the issuance of a lesser known campaign called the "Three Stresses" (In Chinese: 三讲 In Chinese pinyin: *san jiang*), a prelude to his subsequent presentation of his more widely known thought of the "Three Represents" (In Chinese: 三个代表 In Chinese pinyin: *sange daibiao*).<sup>307</sup> It is a corporatist strategy aimed to consolidate powerful elements and incorporate them into the existing political system. It contains three broad principles. First, the CPC represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces. This means the Party wants to include two of the most powerful existing classes in China, specifically the middle class and the entrepreneurs. Second, the

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<sup>307</sup> Ideology, *Telos*, and the "Communist Vanguard" from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, Josef Gregory Mahoney. 2009. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 151;153.

CPC represents the orientation of China's advanced culture. Third, the CPC "represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people".<sup>308</sup>

Jiang's thought work was simple but bold for several reasons. In particular, it not only left out a previous leader's theory but what is more important it contradicted another previous leader's thought. Specifically Jiang never mentioned Deng Xiaoping's *Four Cardinal Principles*. Moreover his approach seemed to signal a greater openness to westernization. Greater openness to westernization hints at the neo-authoritarian thesis that advocated a more open approach to westernization (e.g., science and technology). Finally Jiang aimed to expand Party membership to include "the capitalists, entrepreneurs and educated classes – three groups that Mao Zedong ardently worked to exclude and resist."<sup>309</sup>

Not mentioning Deng's *Four Insists* is not necessarily political dynamite. On the surface it may appear as such but the Chinese leaders as employ ideology in a way that it is brought to the forefront when need be and pushed to the back when need be. The leaders' legacies and belief systems are prominent in times when needed and not so prominent in times when unwanted. In other words it does represent an ideological shift. However the most explosive feature is Jiang's outright contradiction of Mao's thought. When a leader contradicts a previous leader's thought is when a major ideological shift occurs. However the contradiction proved necessary, as Jiang Zemin needed to redefine the Party's legitimacy and to create a Party alliance with the emerging powerful group of the productive forces. The CPC needed to do this to reorient itself to the realities of the existing and emerging conditions

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<sup>308</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012); Great Theoretical Progress for the CPC in Past Decade, no author. 2003. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/17/content\\_923593.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/17/content_923593.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>309</sup> *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman, 2012. 135.



in China. Since the Chinese system is based on ideology and thus the CPC can redefine itself, this is a total fair approach. It merely represents the “policy zig and zag”.<sup>310</sup>

During an inspection tour of Guangdong Province in February Jiang promoted the “Three Represents”.<sup>311</sup> This approach is “an important conclusion can be reached from reviewing our Party’s history over the past 70-odd years; that is, the reason our Party enjoys the people’s support is that throughout the historical periods of revolution, construction and reform, it has always represented the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. With the formulation of the correct line, principles and policies, the Party has untiringly worked for the fundamental interests of the country and the people. Under the new conditions of historic significance, how our Party can better translate the “Three Represents” into action constitutes a major issue that all Party members, especially senior officials, must ponder deeply.”<sup>312</sup>

Evidently the CPC under the tenure of Jiang aimed to redefine the CPC legitimacy and reorient society toward enhancing the power and authority of the state through more inclusion in the existing political system. This represents one major difference between the Chinese and western perspective on authority. The Chinese “associate broader participation not with

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<sup>310</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 209.

<sup>311</sup> This is notable because when Deng Xiaoping promoted his ‘great rich is glorious campaign’ he did so on a southern tour (In Chinese: 南巡 In Chinese pinyin: *nanxu*) and made this pronouncement in Guangdong.

<sup>312</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012). Three Represents, no author. 2007. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/10/content\\_6142053.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/10/content_6142053.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

limiting state power, but with enhancing it; the rational for broader participation was not justice, but governmental effectiveness".<sup>313</sup>

In May 2000 Jiang toured Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces and emphasized the importance of implementing and adhering to the "Three Represents" as a form of governance for the CPC.<sup>314</sup> In October he presented his thought of "Three Represents" at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Party Congress.<sup>315</sup> In his speech, he emphasized the importance of fulfilling "the requirements of the Three Represents" and needing "to ensure that all our measures and work accord with these requirements. If they do, we shall unswervingly stay on our course; if they don't, we shall be realistic and boldly correct them."<sup>316</sup> Jiang is opening space of the possibility that if this approach fails, it is possible (and acceptable) for the CPC to redefine and reorient itself (and society) again.

By 2001 the foundation had been established and Jiang had formally introduced the "Three Represents" at the 80<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Communist Party of China.<sup>317</sup> He underscored the importance of the CPC representing the productive forces emerging in Chinese society. The CPC "represents the development trend of China's advanced productive forces means that the Party's theory, line, program, principles, policies and all its work must be in line with the laws governing the development of productive forces; embody the

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<sup>313</sup> *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, Philip Kuhn. 2002. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 48.

<sup>314</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. Available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>315</sup> The ideological paradigm shifts of China's World Views: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, Winberg Chai. 2003. *Asian Affairs*. 30:169.

<sup>316</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>317</sup> Jiang Zemin's Speech at the 80<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party in China, Jiang Zemin. 2001. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010726/433647.htm> (accessed 12 August 2012).

requisites for constantly furthering the release and development of productive forces, especially advanced productive forces; and steadily raise the people's standard of living by developing the productive forces."<sup>318</sup>

Most notably, Jiang Zemin highlighted the importance of “Three Represents” as a key component in building “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, a concept developed and advanced by Deng Xiaoping during his tenure in office. At the November 2002 Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, Jiang underscored how the CPC must adhere to Deng Xiaoping theory as well as the “Three Represents”, a continuation and advancement of Marxism and Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.<sup>319</sup> This clearly signals the CPC’s reemphasis on the importance of Deng’s thought to China then.

The “Three Represents” attained official status when at the 16<sup>th</sup> National Party Congress the CPC elected it as a guiding ideology of the CPC, along with Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.<sup>320</sup> Moreover, at the National Congress the CPC amended the Party’s Constitution to include the thought of ‘Three Represents’.<sup>321</sup> It is noteworthy and is a rather important development that the CPC associates “Three Represents” not with Jiang Zemin exclusively, but instead with the CPC

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<sup>318</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>319</sup> First Expositions of the Important Thought of Three Represents, no author. 2006. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521344.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>320</sup> The 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress, no author. 2002. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66101/6433209.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>321</sup> Important Thought of Three Represents written into CPC Constitution, no author. 2002. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-11/14/content\\_629738.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-11/14/content_629738.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

broadly construed. In other words, the CPC added his thought work without mentioning the originator, an unprecedented move in the history of the CPC.<sup>322</sup>

After the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee and in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative, acquired a deeper understanding of what socialism is, how to build it and what kind of party to build and how to build it, accumulated new valuable experience in running the Party and state and formed the important thought of Three Represents. The important thought of Three Represents is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory; it reflects new requirements for the work of the Party and state arising from the developments and changes in China and other parts of the world today; it serves as a powerful theoretical weapon for strengthening and improving Party building and for promoting self-improvement and development of socialism in China; and it is the crystallized, collective wisdom of the Communist Party of China. It is a guiding ideology that the Party must uphold for a long time to come. Persistent implementation of the Three Represents is the foundation for building the Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength.<sup>323</sup>

The foregoing is noteworthy for several reasons. Previously the CPC assigned the leaders' value systems to the respective leaders (e.g., Mao and Deng), however the CPC under the tenure of Jiang altered this practice. Instead, the CPC now embraces these approaches as guiding ideologies but without mentioning the originators of the particular thought. This strategy signals several things. First it signals the leadership rules as a collective and reduces the importance of one leader (e.g., Mao Zedong the Helmsman and Deng Xiaoping the paramount leader). Second, it increases the CPC's ability to adapt its ideology to evolving conditions more easily and to provide greater ideological space to redefine and reorient the system and society.

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<sup>322</sup>Constitution of the Communist Party of China, no author. 2007 (updated). *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>323</sup>Constitution of the Communist Party of China, no author. 2007 (updated). *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

After effectively co-opting a key group within the Chinese society (e.g., the commercial and business elite), toward the end of Jiang Zemin's tenure in office he promoted the idea of the "well-off society" (In Chinese: 小康社会 In Chinese pinyin: *xiaokang shehui*), a signal that the CPC wants to orient the entire society toward an eastern holistic order. He made the call at the 2002 Sixteenth Party Congress.<sup>324</sup> The original concept was conceived during the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC-25AD) and translated as "Xiao Kang", meaning ideal society. The CPC borrowed the idea to "inspire a national drive toward socialism"; and, at the same time, it expanded the concept from "well-off society" (In Chinese: 小康社会, In Chinese pinyin: *Xiaokang Shehui*) to building a Xiao Kang society in an all-round way (In Chinese: 全面建设小康社会 In Chinese pinyin: . *Quanmian Jianshe Xiaokang Shehui*).<sup>325</sup> The emphasis is on all-round, signaling perhaps that the Chinese leadership reached a consensus that the time has arrived to make adjustments to Deng's modernization strategy in which Deng declared 'To get rich is glorious' and 'Poverty is not Socialism', unleashing a great zeal for economic reform and in which a segment of the society has gotten rich, leaving many segments behind.<sup>326</sup> The Chinese leadership wants to ensure that growth occurs not only in the areas that are more favorable to growth (e.g., China's eastern seaboard) but expand

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<sup>324</sup> Build a Well-off Society in an All-round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: A Report to the 16<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin. 2002. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content\\_360558\\_2.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/document/txt/2011-03/24/content_360558_2.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012). Some contend the driver for this approach was the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Word by word, China's Communist Party touches up "Xiao Kang" blueprint, Cheng Yunjie. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content\\_6872116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content_6872116.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>325</sup> Word by word, China's Communist Party touches up "Xiao Kang" blueprint, Cheng Yunjie. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content\\_6872116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content_6872116.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>326</sup> Word by word, China's Communist Party touches up "Xiao Kang" blueprint, Cheng Yunjie. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content\\_6872116.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/12/content_6872116.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012). The ideological paradigm shifts of China's World Views: From Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Pragmatism-Multilateralism of the Deng-Jiang-Hu Era, Winberg Chai. 2003. *Asian Affairs*. 30:169.

the growth potential to other areas and other segments of China and Chinese society.<sup>327</sup> This shift is evidenced by the Chinese leadership's push to develop Western China, a campaign spearheaded in 1999, as well as visits Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao since the adjournment of the 16th Party Congress to the less developed areas and regions of China.<sup>328</sup>

In short, Jiang Zemin and his thought work on “Three Represents” builds on Deng Xiaoping Theory. Like Deng, Jiang continued to emphasize orthodoxy. Moreover Jiang’s “Three Represents” effectively transforms the Party membership, increases its adaptive capacity, and incorporates a powerful segment of society into the existing system. His approach reorients the CPC and bolsters its legitimacy (meaning, there is no loss of the Mandate of Heaven yet); it also moves the Chinese state and society closer to a seamless holistic order. Furthermore, he endorsed achieving the socialist goal emphasized by Deng of achieving class equality. He added to Deng’s approach by supplementing it with the Confucian concept of ‘Xiao Kang’, an ideal that Hu Jintao builds upon in his work on creating a ‘Socialist Harmonious Society’. In this context the following section examines the tough works promoted under the tenure of Hu Jintao; it proved to be quite innovative because it represents the aggregation of both Deng’s and Jiang’s theories as well as moves China closer and closer toward the eastern holistic order. The ongoing ideological movement is rational

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<sup>327</sup>The author of this study published a series for Fortune Magazine on the Chinese government's new efforts to develop the western and other regions of China. This series involved interviewing Chinese officials, Chinese businesspeople, as well as foreign businesspeople in Tianjin (e.g., Tianjin Economic Development Area, TEDA), as well as in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. The series was published in both the Chinese and English editions of *Fortune Magazine* in October 2001. The author also worked for the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai from 1999-2002 and wrote more than 80 articles on investment and business trends in China for the Chamber's publication. These articles typically included interviews with Chinese and American business people as well as government officials.

<sup>328</sup>Leadership Change and Chinese Political Development, Lowell Dittmer. 2003. *The China Quarterly*. 176:916-917.

and purposeful and aimed at retaining the CPC's inherited "Mandate of Heaven". As Lucian Pye once observed, it is "a sign of wisdom to adapt to logic of change".<sup>329</sup>

### **Socialist Harmonious Society**

Hu Jintao assumed the position of the CPC secretary general in 2002, and from that time forward, he modified and advanced his predecessor's thought works, as well as developed and advanced his own theory.<sup>330</sup> As for his predecessors' value systems, Hu Jintao adapted them to better reflect the existing and emerging conditions in China. Specifically Hu modified Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents' to include the 'third represent'. The 'third represent' means the inclusion of the large majority of the Chinese people, those who are not living in the coastal regions but rather those living in the interior areas, for instance.<sup>331</sup> Hu's approach indicates the CPC acknowledgement of local conditions (e.g., the populous) and in doing so increased the CPC's responsiveness to local conditions.

While advancing the 'third represent', Hu Jintao also promoted the idea of 'scientific development'. According to David Shambaugh, Jiang Zemin referenced the foregoing approach in a 2001 Party School speech, however it "was not a central feature of the speech of the Three Represents".<sup>332</sup> At the 2002 Sixteenth Party Congress the CPC proposed the concept of 'Scientific Outlook of Development' (In Chinese: 科学发展观 In Chinese pinyin: *Kexue Fazhanguan*).<sup>333</sup> In 2003 Hu gave his speech at the Party School that developed

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<sup>329</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 252.

<sup>330</sup> From Revolutionary Regime to Normal Governance: China's Long March toward Political Reform, James C. Hsiung. 2009. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*. 36:36.

<sup>331</sup> *China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 114-115.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>333</sup> Hu Jintao Stresses Scientific Development, no author. 2007. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/26/content\\_6142302.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/26/content_6142302.htm) (accessed 18 August 2012).

Scientific Outlook of Development’.<sup>334</sup> By 2003 the Politburo formally endorsed the approach, and Hu initiated the program under his leadership.<sup>335</sup> In 2007 Hu gave a speech at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasizing the importance of the ‘Scientific Outlook of Development’.

This concept “takes development as its essence, putting people first as its core, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic requirement, and overall consideration as its fundamental approach”<sup>336</sup> It emphasizes “scientific development”, (In Chinese: 科学发展 In Chinese pinyin: *kexue fazhan*), “putting people first” (In Chinese: 以人为本, In Chinese pinyin: *yiren weiben*), and, “harmonious society” (In Chinese: 和谐社会 In Chinese pinyin: *hexie shehui*).<sup>337</sup> Concomitantly Hu emphasizes “social harmony” and “building a moderately prosperous society in all respects”.<sup>338</sup> The speech represents Hu’s astute approach to Chinese politics because he integrates his predecessors thought works, including Deng Xiaoping (e.g., socialism with Chinese characteristics) and Jiang Zemin (e.g., ‘Three Represents’ and ‘Xiaokang’ combined with his own thought). In doing so, he creates a significant degree of ideological continuity among the leaders.

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<sup>334</sup> *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 115.

<sup>335</sup> China VP Calls on Officials to Do Their Utmost to Back Scientific Development, no author. 2008. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6505192.html> (accessed 18 August 2012). China’s “two sessions” to use “scientific outlook on development” to tackle problems, no author. 2008. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6362620.html> (accessed 18 August 2012).

<sup>336</sup> Hu Jintao’s Report at the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, no author. 2007. *People’s Daily Online Press Center*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6290207.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>337</sup> Hu Jintao’s Political Thinking and Legitimacy Building: A Post-Marxist Perspective, Guoxin Xing. 2009. *Asian Affairs*. 215.

<sup>338</sup> Hu Jintao’s Report at 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, no author. 2007. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content\\_6938749.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm) (accessed 17 August 2012).



Hu's approach was formalized at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. At this time the CPC adopted Hu's thought of "Scientific Outlook of Development"<sup>339</sup> and amended the constitution to include it while emphasizing the importance of "building socialism with Chinese characteristics".<sup>340</sup> It is noteworthy that similarly to Jiang's "Three Represents", Hu's value system is not tied to him in the CPC Constitution.<sup>341</sup>

The congress notes that since the Sixteenth Congress, the Central Committee has followed the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of the Three Represents, and by pooling the wisdom of the whole Party to meet new requirements of development, formulated the Scientific Outlook on Development, which puts people first and calls on the comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development.

Hu Jintao's report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China does not mention Deng Xiaoping's four principles; however, Hu mentions them at several other important Party meeting. For instance, in 2009 at the 30th anniversary of China's reform and opening up Hu mentions the importance of adhering to Deng Xiaoping Theory and Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represent'.<sup>342</sup> Moreover Hu specifically mentions the *Four Insists* at the 2011 CPC Anniversary Gathering.<sup>343</sup> In his 2012 speech at the CPC

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<sup>339</sup> Hu Jintao's report at the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, no author. 2007. *People's Daily Online Press Center*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6290207.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>340</sup> Resolution on Amendment to CPC Constitution, no author. 2007. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/22/content\\_82062.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/22/content_82062.htm) (accessed 17 August 2012). Hu Jintao's report at the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, no author. 2007. *People's Daily Online Press Center*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6290207.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>341</sup> Hu Stresses Scientific Development, no author. 2007. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/26/content\\_6142302.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/26/content_6142302.htm) (accessed 17 August 2012). Resolution on amendment to CPC Constitution, no author. 2007. *People's Daily*. available at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92341/6287756.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>342</sup> Speech at the Meeting Marking the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up, Hu Jintao. 2008. (updated 2009). *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.beijingreview.com.cn/document/2009-05/11/content\\_195251.htm](http://www.beijingreview.com.cn/document/2009-05/11/content_195251.htm) (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>343</sup> Full Text of Hu Jintao's Speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering, no author. 2011. *Xinhua News Agency* available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2012-03/26/c\\_131489686\\_4.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2012-03/26/c_131489686_4.htm) (accessed 17 August 2012).

Anniversary Gathering, Hu emphasized the importance of advancing socialism with Chinese characteristics, including upholding the Four Cardinal Principles.<sup>344</sup> This highlights again the proclivity of the Chinese leaders to employ a leader's value system when needed.

In 2008 the CPC formally started an 18-month long campaign to study and implement the 'Scientific Outlook of Development' within the CPC and outside the Party.<sup>345</sup> Wen Jiabao wrote an article published in the CPC Central Committee's *Qiushi* journal, calling for the CPC members to "more actively study the theory".<sup>346</sup> In 2009 Xi Jinping (2012-2015) – the designated successor to Hu Jintao – encouraged CPC members and government officials to "learn and implement" the outlook. Furthermore, Xi emphasized that the next round of learning would occur in towns, villages communities, hospitals, and primary and secondary schools.<sup>347</sup> This signals the Party's commitment to spreading Hu's value system as well as the commitment of Hu's successor, Xi Jinping, to this approach, something he may very well build upon during his tenure in office.

In addition, once Hu Jintao assumed a leadership role he further developed Jiang Zemin's idea of well-off society (In Chinese: 小康社会 In Chinese pinyin: *xiaokang shehui*). Specifically he promoted the "Socialist Harmonious Society" (In Chinese: 社会主义和谐社会 In Chinese pinyin: *Shehui zhuyi hexie shehui*). Building a Harmonious Society means several things. In a speech given at the opening ceremony of training course sponsored by the

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<sup>344</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>345</sup> Hu Urges Practical Implementation of Scientific Outlook on Development to Military, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6759962.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>346</sup> Premier Wen calls for implementation of Scientific Outlook on Development, no author. 2008. *People's Daily*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6525981.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>347</sup> Chinese VP Urges Implementation of 'Scientific Outlook on Development, no author. 2009. *People's Daily*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6706564.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

CPC Party School in 2005 and attended by major provincial and ministerial level leaders, Hu Jintao defines the harmonious society as “democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality”.<sup>348</sup> This society will “forge a closer relationship between the people and the government; and this relationship will result in “lasting stability and unity”.

To achieve these goals Chinese officials must:

- Strive for sustained, rapid, and coordinated economic growth
- Develop socialist democracy
- Enforce the principle of the rule of law
- Strengthen ideological and ethical buildup
- Maintain social equity and justice
- Establish a better social management system
- Handle internal contradictions
- Strengthen environmental protection

In 2006 the CPC formalized the vision of a Harmonious Society. It passed the document entitled “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Resolution on Major Issues of Building a Socialist Harmonious Society”.<sup>349</sup> The theme of the Harmonious Society was reiterated at the 17<sup>th</sup> National Party’s Congress and approved as the CPC’s basic line.<sup>350</sup> Building this society, according to Wu Zhongmin, a professor with the Party School of the CPC Central Committee “is a major strategic move taken by the Party to build a fair and just society and attain sustainable social and economic development”.<sup>351</sup> It is an ‘ideal society’,

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<sup>348</sup>Building Harmonious Society Crucial for China’s Progress: Hu, no author. 2005. available at: [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627\\_192495.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/27/eng20050627_192495.html) (accessed 17 August 2012). It is also noteworthy that the phrase “rule of law” using the preposition “of” is used more and more in English. Initially “rule of law” was translated as “rule by law”, which has different implications. One implication is the Chinese leaders would use law to make decisions but not be subordinate to it.

<sup>349</sup>China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, no author. 2006. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm> (accessed 17 August 2012); Communiqué of the Sixth Plenum of the 16<sup>th</sup> CPC Central Committee, no author. 2006. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/183627.htm> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>350</sup>Hu Jintao’s Report at 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, no author. 2007. *People’s Daily*. available online at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6290205.html> (accessed 17 August 2012).

<sup>351</sup>Social Harmony Highlighted at CPC Central Committee Plenum, no author. 2006. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/183595.htm> (accessed 17 August 2012).

advances a ‘positive vision’, and ‘is rooted in the traditional Confucian concept of *Datong* and in more contemporary socialist precepts’.<sup>352</sup>

### **Conclusion**

This chapter investigated Chinese ideology and the leaders’ belief or value systems. As for ideology, this chapter’s investigation demonstrates that ideology has been and continues to be a central feature defining the Chinese political system. In the imperial era, the leadership employed ideology and in particular Confucianism as a state craft to administer and govern society. In the contemporary era, the Chinese leadership leveraged Confucianism to facilitate China’s transition from the imperial era to the contemporary era. Moreover the leadership meshed Confucianism with modified versions of Marxism and Leninism to adapt China and its political system to the contemporary era, without becoming too foreign or without becoming less Chinese. Confucianism remains a feature in the contemporary system as evidenced by the leaders’ value systems.

Regarding the leaders’ value systems, one notable trend comes out of this discussion. Specifically, the CPC no longer ties the leaders to their value systems. This trend suggests several things. First, it indicates the CPC aims to promote the collective rule, a Confucian concept (e.g., rule by the Confucian literati). Second, it suggests is the CPC wants to introduce a greater degree of ideological flexibility. In doing so, subsequent leaders can interpret and adapt the previous leader’s belief systems according to the prevailing and emerging Chinese conditions. This approach increases the Party’s ideological flexibility, making it easier for the Party to adapt to evolving political, social, an economic conditions, as

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<sup>352</sup>Confucian Conceptions of Civil Society, Richard Madsen. 2007. In Daniel Bell, *Confucian Political Ethics*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 117.

well as redefine its legitimacy and reorient society to the new realities, without losing legitimacy.

With that being said, the Chinese leaders' value systems are valuable because they signal several key trends existing and emerging in the system. First these systems typically address the existing conditions within China, such as Jiang Zemin's co-optation of the powerful business and commercial elites. Second, the systems generally point to the emerging conditions within China, namely Hu Jintao's Socialist Harmonious Society that aims to include all segments of the society and especially those left behind by the reforms. Third, the systems signal the intended trajectory of the political system. At present, the leaders are taking an incremental and gradual approach to establishing an integrated "seamless order", a Confucian ideal.

The leaderships' value systems reflect both Leninism and corporatism. As for Leninism, Leninist regimes that abandon class struggle for economic reform shift from employing exclusionary to inclusionary tactics.<sup>353</sup> As for corporatism, it suggests the existence of a strong directing state, as well as incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the state system.<sup>354</sup> These observations raise several questions.

Specifically, what are the main institutions comprising the Chinese political system? How do these institutions interact with one another? Is it a highly centralized system? Is the system characterized by a top-down structure? Is it best characterized by a seamless interaction among the main institutions of power? Or are the system and its parts highly

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<sup>353</sup> Ibid., p. 519. Dickson also references this work. *Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems*, Samuel P. Huntington, 1970. In Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarianism Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* New York: Basic Books.

<sup>354</sup> Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 25:206-23.

differentiated? What is the role of the Party in the political system? Is it the core of the system? Does it serve as a strong directing party? Is it moving toward greater inclusion and / or incorporation? To address these questions, the chapter six investigates the Communist Party of China (CPC) and its role within the Chinese political system, as well as other institutions constituting the political system, namely the military, the society, the state, as well as state enterprises and non-state enterprises.

## CHAPTER 6

### CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

#### Introduction

The Party's power is the core of China's politics. Without understanding the Party's power, one can hardly understand Chinese political model.

- Zheng Yongnian,  
Director of the East Asian Institution,  
National University of Singapore<sup>355</sup>

The previous chapter examined the role of ideology in the Chinese political system. Several things emerge from the examination. First, although Mao Zedong intended to remove Chinese traditions and in particular Confucianism from the system, he ultimately relied upon these traditions to establish his New Republic. Second, Mao adopted both Marxism and Leninism, but he dented these ideologies and created a Chinese brand of communism. In particular, he grafted these two ideologies on to existing Chinese traditions creating an ideological form that meshed Chinese ideological traditions with Marxism and Leninism. Third, the Cultural Revolution damaged the use of ideology by the Chinese leaders, but particularly the use of heterodoxy (e.g., Mao's theory). In the post-Mao era Chinese leaders maintain an orthodox form of ideology. In addition, Chinese leaders mention

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<sup>355</sup> 中国模式的核心是什么? (What is the core of the China Model?), Zheng Yongnian. 2010 *China Review* (2010). Available at: <http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1013/1/8/4/101318425.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&doid=101318425&mdate=0511112515> (accessed 8 August 2012).

Marxism and to a lesser extent Leninism, but actual evidence of their existence in the ideological system is faint. Fourth, the Chinese leaders, despite the lack of clarity regarding the exact application of Marxism and Leninism in China, refrain from refuting outright these ideologies. One reason for this, as the previous chapter mentions, is the Chinese leaders' belief that the abandonment of Marxism by the Soviets contributed to its demise. Fifth, despite the appearance of significant shifts, Chinese ideology displays an unusually high degree of continuity among all the leaders particularly since elements of Confucianism serve as a pillar of the system. Moreover ideology neatly follows the continuum characterizing China's dual political culture consisting of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Finally, although ideology in its heterodoxical form is receding into the background, a seamless Eastern holistic order achieved through co-optation of the elite and the majority is coming to the forefront, as evidenced by the existence of the 'Three Represents', 'Small Society', and 'Socialist Harmonious Society'.

The foregoing chapter's investigation gives rise to many questions about the exact form of the Chinese political system. Specifically how is the political system ordered? What are the main institutions? How are these institutions linked? How is the Communist Party of China (CPC) integrated into the system? At which points within the system does the CPC intersect with other institutions and players operating within the system? How does the CPC maintain a presence at the national, provincial, and local levels? Is the CPC moving toward the principles advanced in the 'Three Represents', 'Small Society', and 'Socialist Harmonious Society'? In other words, is it moving toward the co-optation of elite and other segments of society? Is the political system changing? If so, how is it changing and in what direction is it changing?



This chapter contends the Chinese political system is centered on the CPC. The party maintains its centrality within the system through pervasive institutional linkages with state and army institutions, as well as other organizations, namely political parties and social organizations. Resulting from the leaders' promotion of 'Three Represents', 'Small Society', and 'Harmonious Society', the CPC increasingly employs co-optation tactics – referred in many domestic campaigns as 'inclusiveness' (包容)<sup>356</sup> – to expand and strengthen its presence in major Chinese institutions as well as initiate its presence in new institutions and sectors. The goal is the creation of a powerful coalition of different players who are heavily invested in the maintenance of the existing system and its trajectory, as well as invested in upholding the central role of the CPC within the system and its continuing relevancy to the promotion and advancement of the New China established by Mao in 1949.

The chapter expects to see three things: a strong directing state, restrictions on interest groups' freedoms and activities, incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the state system, responsible both for representing members' interests in and to the state and for helping the state administer and carry out policies.<sup>357</sup> Accordingly, the chapter examines the Party and its role within society, the army and its sub-units, state institutions, as well as state-owned enterprises, and the non-state sector.

### **The Party**

The Chinese political system is a complex web of institutional linkages. At the center of this intricate web is the Communist Party of China (CPC). The CPC structure is expansive

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<sup>356</sup> Posted on the subways and along the highways are signs reading: 'patriotism' (爱国), 'innovation' (创新), 'inclusiveness' (包容), and 'virtue' (德). The two most notable concepts are inclusiveness and virtue. As for inclusiveness, it indicates the ongoing promotion of the 'Xiao Kang' and 'Harmonious Society' discussed in the previous chapters and suggests corporatism; virtue indicates the promotion of Confucianism and Taoism.

<sup>357</sup> Toward a Framework for the Study of Sociopolitical Change in Iberia and Latin America: The Corporative Framework, Howard J. Wiarda. 1973. *World Politics*. 25:206-23.

and connected with other key institutions operating within the system. More often than not, high-ranking CPC officials hold dual posts within key CPC institutions as well as other institutions within the state, army, or enterprise structures.

Sitting at the center of the CPC structure is the Central Committee of the CPC. The Central Committee has the authority to appoint the members to the Political Bureau and, from the foregoing bureau; several CPC members are selected to serve on its Standing Committee. The Politburo Standing Committee is led by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, consists of at least 9 members,<sup>358</sup> and those members typically hold top posts in other powerful institutions operating within the CPC structure. In the party structure, these institutions include the Propaganda Department, the Central Party School, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and the Central Political and Legislative Committee. In the state structure, these posts include Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC), and Premier and Vice-Premier of the State Council and the State Council's Executive Committee, among others.<sup>359</sup> The CPC General Secretary, who also serves as the PRC President, holds the post of Chairman on the Central Military Commission (CMC), both the CPC CMC and the PRC CMC. High-ranking CPC leaders hold other positions in other institutions including the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Leading up to the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in November 2012, the Committee had 9 members. Premier forecasts 'brighter future': Wen Jiabao tells reception to mark 63<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of New China that reform, opening up will continue, Zhao Shengnan. 2012. *China Daily* (paper edition). Now the Committee has 7 members. During the time of this study the author watched the 18<sup>th</sup> Party Congress on Beijing TV and saw the appointment of these seven members to the Committee.

<sup>359</sup> Interview with a foreign analyst in X City in China in September 2012.

<sup>360</sup> Structure of the State, no author. no date. *China.org.cn*. available at: [http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/state\\_structure/64401.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/state_structure/64401.htm) (accessed 9 June 2012).

Two additional concentric circles include the provinces and local areas. Susan Shirk characterizes the central-province relationship as ‘playing to the provinces’. It ‘is a unique but not new feature of the system and reflects party dynamics. According to Shirk, the Central Committee consists of central government and party officials, as well as provincial and military officials. The Central Committee has the authority to elect the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The provincial officials serving on the Central Committee consist of the Party Secretary and the governor of every province. This means the number of provincial officials on the Committee is much greater than the number of military and central officials. This configuration results in provincial officials being one of largest, if not the largest, blocks of power on the Central Committee. Although the nominations come from the top and although the Central Committee “more or less ratifies” these nominations, the Party’s constitution empowers the Central Committee to select the members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo. As a result CPC members at the top ‘have to anticipate the Standing Committee’s reactions and preferences’. If they anticipate correctly, the nominations are accepted; but if they anticipate incorrectly, the nominations could be rejected. Furthermore when the center is trying to build support for policies, the CPC plays to the provinces because it has a proportionally larger block on the Central Committee that influences the direction of CPC policies and agendas.<sup>361</sup> This means that bargaining and negotiation best characterize this relationship; it is not in other words a system best characterized by a top down approach.

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<sup>361</sup> Playing to the Provinces, Susan Shirk. 2010. *Project Syndicate*. available at: <http://chinaboom.asiasociety.org/bio/detail/64> (accessed 5 August 2012).

The CPC employs several governance strategies. First, the CPC uses the Leninist concept of democratic centralism.<sup>362</sup> Democratic centralism means the final decisions are passed along the hierarchy, however these decisions are reached following significant debate among the bureaucracies most affected by or interested in the policies and even those that have vague interests in the policy.<sup>363</sup> Democratic centralism is the tactic used to implement the final decision. Specifically ‘once the government makes a decision, it can be immediately implemented; this approach fosters unity among the people, which makes it a better approach than Western-style democracy’.<sup>364</sup> Second, the CPC uses ‘multiparty cooperation’. According to the CPC Constitution ‘multi-party cooperation and political consultation system occurs under the CPC leadership’, and it appears to be a form of corporatism.<sup>365</sup> Third, the CPC promotes inner party democracy in which the CPC aims to encourage discussion among CPC members, refine the Party congress system (which exists at the national, provincial, and local levels), as well as reform inner-Party elections and supervisions.<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>362</sup>Profile of the Communist Party of China, no author. 2007. *International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/cpcbri/cpcprofile.htm> (accessed 5 September 2012).

<sup>363</sup> In a series of email communications between Dr. Monte R. Bullard and I in 2008 (when I lived in Beijing), I asked him about the nature and scope of the Chinese bureaucracy. He mentioned the following points to me. ‘It is imperative to start with the assumption that every segment of the bureaucracy that has even a vague interest in the policy is asked to provide comment on the initial proposal. Disagreements within and among bureaucracies take place and thus many negotiations also take place. Some bureaucracies are able to manipulate the consensus but not always. It depends upon the scope and time importance of the issues. China’s decisionmaking system however is not – as most people often state, a top-down decision made by the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

<sup>364</sup> The Power of Collective Wisdom, Zhai Zhikui. 2011. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2011-05/27/content\\_361346.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2011-05/27/content_361346.htm) (accessed 5 October 2012).

<sup>365</sup> Constitution of the Communist Party of China, no author. (updated 2009). *News of the Communist Party of China Online*. Available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html> (accessed 5 October 2012).

<sup>366</sup>The Democratic Rule by the Communist Party of China, Official Government White Paper on Building of Political Democracy in China. no author. 2005. *The Information of State Council of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/145924.htm> (accessed 5 September 2012).

Presently the CPC is engaging in an initiative to incorporate non-communist members into the political system. Evidence of this exists at the highest levels of government. For instance in 2007 the CPC promoted two non-communist party members, Wan Gang and Chen Zhu, to the position of ministers of science and technology and ministers of health. These appointments are the first non-Communist cabinet appointments since Deng Xiaoping launched the reform era in the late 1970s. Hu Jintao noted in his address to the 17<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the CPC that the CPC “will select and recommend a greater number of outstanding non-CPC persons for leading positions”.<sup>367</sup> It is noteworthy that the CPC is making significant efforts to co-opt non-communist members. Evidence of this exists in 2010 when the General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued the “2010-2020 Education, Training, Reform, and Development Outline for Non-party Personnel Representatives”.

The plan is the first national plan targeting the education, training, and reform of non-CPC members.<sup>368</sup> The push to adapt its governance strategy and co-opt non-CPC elite stems from the CPC’s assessment of the demise of the communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The CPC spent an extraordinary amount of time and resources examining the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In 2006 the party released a documentary titled ‘Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety – Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism’. The documentary examined the factors contributing to the demise of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), including the resignation of many Party members, the loss of confidence in the CPSU by the remaining members, and the loss of elite

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<sup>367</sup> Hu Promises to Promote More Non-Communists to Leading Positions, no author. 2007. *People’s Daily* available at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92187/6283131.html> (accessed 5 October 2012).

<sup>368</sup> 党外代表人士首个十年培养规划出台, no author. 2010. *People’s Daily*. available at: <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/12610483.html> (accessed 5 October 2012).

support.<sup>369</sup> In his September 2009 speech at the Fourth Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China Hu Jintao advocated strengthening the party membership.<sup>370</sup> On the same day the CPC passed the “Decision on a number of Major Issues regarding Strengthening and Improving the Party’s Growth under New Situations”.<sup>371</sup> Accordingly the following sections examine the Party’s strategies and tactics to strengthen and improve its role in the system, and in particular the society, the army, the state, and other key institutions.

### **The Society**

The CPC structure contains other political parties, as well as social organizations. These entities are highly integrated into the system, lack an independent agenda, and some are highly controlled by the party.<sup>372</sup> This united front system falls under the umbrella of an organization called the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (人民政协), typically headed by a high-ranking CPC member who may sit on the Politburo Standing Committee.<sup>373</sup> The CPC created the CPPCC, a unique institution, to incorporate Communist and non-communist elites, as well as associational and societal leaders into the political

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<sup>369</sup> Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety (Episode Four), State’s Chinese Academy of Social Science Research Project. 2006. personal copy.

<sup>370</sup> 努力开创新形势下党的建设新局面 no author. 2009. *Qiushi*. available at: [http://www.qstheory.cn/qswz/200912/t20091230\\_18088.htm](http://www.qstheory.cn/qswz/200912/t20091230_18088.htm) (accessed 17 July 2012).

<sup>371</sup> 为什么党的十七届四中全会以加强和改进新形势下党的建设为议题, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-10/15/content\\_12240057.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-10/15/content_12240057.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>372</sup> Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference: Process of Founding and Key Achievements in History, no author. no date. *National People’s Congress Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27750.htm> (accessed 9 August 2012).

<sup>373</sup> This documentary explains the origins of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The CPC employed the CPPCC to establish a coalition government to govern the ‘New China’. ‘The Founding of a Republic’ (建国大业). personal copy.

system.<sup>374</sup> Broadly speaking the CPPCC system contains nine different political parties that cooperate with the CPC at the national, provincial, municipal, and township; the majority has local committees in 30 provinces.<sup>375</sup>

The CPPCC also contains social organizations consisting of women, youth, and student groups, as well as a trade union, and, industry and commerce.<sup>376</sup> It is noteworthy that in recent times, the CPC has expanded its presence in the student groups. Specifically, in 2004 the CPC issued the “Opinion on Further Strengthening and Development Political Education for College Students”. In the ensuing period the Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Education and the Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Youth League developed a guideline to systematically strengthen the CPC’s political work throughout the university system. By 2011 some 81, 311 Party branches had been established at 2,383 universities and colleges throughout China. As a result the freshman class has a

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<sup>374</sup> For an excellent piece on the CPPCC, see: Regime Inclusion and the Resilience of Authoritarianism: The Local People’s Political Consultative Conference in Post-Mao Chinese Politics, Yan Xiaojun. 2011. *The China Journal*. 66:53-75.

<sup>375</sup> Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK), China Democratic League (CDL), China National Democratic Construction Association (CNDCA), Jiu San Society, China Association for Promoting Democracy (CAPD), Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party (CPWDP), China Zhi Gong Dang (CZGD) (the public interest party), Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (TSL), and Personages Without Party Affiliation. Official Government White Paper, ‘China’s Political Party System’, (November 15, 2007), available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/news/231852.htm> (accessed October 2, 2012). 3; 18-20; Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, no author. no date. *China.org.cn* available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/chuangye/55437.htm> (accessed 2 October 2012).

<sup>376</sup> These groups are: All-China Women’s Federation, Communist Youth League of China (CYL), the core of the All-China Youth Federation. The CYL and the All-China Youth Federation along with the CPC exercise leadership over the All-China Students Federation (ACSF), which represents universities, colleges, and middle schools. See for instance Youth.cn, 2005, ‘All China Students Federation’, available at: [http://vweb.cycnet.com/cms/2004/cycenglish/chinayouthorganization/200504/t20050405\\_18880.htm](http://vweb.cycnet.com/cms/2004/cycenglish/chinayouthorganization/200504/t20050405_18880.htm); The other group is the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACFIC) (also called the All-China General Chamber of Commerce of the Private Sector). See: All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce, available at: <http://www.chinachamber.org.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/qleng/s2569/index.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

party member, the sophomore class has a party group, and the junior and senior classes have party branches.<sup>377</sup>

Previously the CPC viewed the CPPCC as a tool of a “united front mobilization strategy” helping secure the support of noncommunist constituencies for the Party and its initiatives during the establishment of the New China. More recently, several noteworthy changes have transpired affecting the CPC-CPPCC relationship. For instance, in 2004 the CPPCC – for the first time – incorporated the CPC’s guiding ideology into its charter, namely Mao Zedong’s Thought, Deng Xiaoping’s Theories, Important Ideas of the Three Represents, and the Concept of Scientific Development.<sup>378</sup> In addition, the CPC increasingly consults ‘with the CPPCC and creates new mechanisms for its involvement in the national policy process’. The CPPCC is ‘increasingly brought into the CPC policymaking process’ as a political consultative body; it is shown drafts of various policy initiatives, as well as party and state documents and provides feedback’.<sup>379</sup> In more recent times, the CPC encouraged the CPPCC to continue to “carry out its functions of political consultation, democratic supervisions, and participation in the discussion and management of state affairs”.<sup>380</sup> Evidence of this exists in the changing status of one organization operating within the CPPCC system, namely the all-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).

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<sup>377</sup> 赵婀娜, 高校育人新起点上再奋进 (Communist Party

Strengthens Ideology Work at Universities and Colleges), no author. 2012. *People’s Daily*. available at: <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/18239464.html> (accessed 1 October 2012).

<sup>378</sup> CPPCC Charter Embraces Three Represents, no author. 2004. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/12/content\\_1367210.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/12/content_1367210.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>379</sup> *China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation*, David Shambaugh. 2008. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. 137.

<sup>380</sup> CPPCC Urged to Help Boost Reform Development, no author. 2012. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC\\_CPPCC\\_2012/2012-03/03/content\\_24790962.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2012/2012-03/03/content_24790962.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).



Over the past decade or so, labor has incrementally made its way to the top of the political agenda, suggesting neo-corporatism may be alive and well in China, though it is a modified version due to regional differences. The central authorities have established gradually a legal basis protecting laborers. For instance, the 1995 Labor Law of the People's Republic of China standardizes labor policies for foreign and domestic enterprises.<sup>381</sup> Leading up to China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the government passed the 2001 Trade Union Law allowing all workers and employees to join trade unions. At that time, China had approximately 250 million workers but only 100 million belong to unions – primarily in State-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 2001 law targets working conditions in private (e.g., foreign), joint-owned, and township enterprises. It also increases the authority of the ACFTU in dealing with post-WTO conditions in which officials expected both unemployment to rise and instability to spread.<sup>382</sup>

Within the same timeframe government institutions established a tripartite coordination system consisting of government-trade unions-enterprises. In August 2001 the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the ACFTU, and the China Enterprise Association created the 'State Tripartite Conference System of Labor Relations Coordination'. Representatives bringing together government labor and social security departments from the national, provincial, and local levels as well as trade unions and enterprises. They met to discuss and consult on major problems plaguing labor relations. Emerging from the discussions was the agreement that representatives would submit recommendations regarding

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<sup>381</sup> This labor law standardized working hours, wages, social insurance, as well as labor and contract disputes. Labour Law of the People's Republic of China Order of the President of the People's Republic of China, no author. 1994. 28. available at:

<http://www.acftu.org.cn/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=56&aid=31> (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.,

drafting labor and social security regulations, reform programs, as well as policies and initiatives related to adjusting the interests of the three parties.<sup>383</sup>

In the post-WTO environment, the Chinese leaders and in particular the ACFTU continue to institute and propose measures, regulations, and laws at the national and regional levels to address changing work conditions and tackle the associated problems with the changing landscape.<sup>384</sup> For instance, the National People's Congress (NPC) promulgated the 2008 Labor Contract Law,<sup>385</sup> which strengthens workers' rights by providing them with the right to unionize at foreign and domestic enterprises.<sup>386</sup> Once the unions are established the workers can engage in collective bargaining. The law provided the ACFTU with greater authority to organize unions at all foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The 2008 law also

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<sup>383</sup> Labor and Social Security in China, Section II: Formation of New Labor Relations, Official Chinese Government White Paper. 2002. *The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China*. available at: <http://english.people.com.cn/features/isspaper/lss2.html> (accessed 2 September 2012).

<sup>384</sup> The Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, Deng Shasha (ed.), 2011. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/27/c\\_131215899\\_16.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-10/27/c_131215899_16.htm) (accessed 2 September 2012); Trade Union Law Amended, no author. 2011. *China.org.cn*. available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Nov/21551.htm> (accessed 2 September 2012).

<sup>385</sup> The strikes primarily concern compensation, benefits, and the right to not be fired. Interview with three Chinese experts in X Cities in China in October 2001, May 2008, October 2011, and September 2012. Approximately 8,000 workers from the Foster's Electric Company's Nanning Factory, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Japanese company the Foster Group Electric Company, went on strike protesting the management's retention of its bonuses while cancelling the workers' bonuses. About 4,000 workers from Sanyo Electric Company, another Japanese owned company, went on strike demanding compensation; both military and public security units were called in to quell the protests. 8000 Workers Protest Cancellation of Annual Bonuses at Guangxi Japanese Enterprise, no author. 2012. *Radio Free Asia*. available at: <http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/gx-01172012100418.html> (accessed 25 August 2012). 松下整合三洋3年后告知 员工集体罢工要补偿, Liu Xin Ning. 2012. available at: <http://finance.ifeng.com/news/corporate/20120117/5465362.shtml> (accessed 25 August 2012). Changan President Zou Wenchao Deals With Pay Coordination, Strike Continues, no author. 2012. available at: <http://roll.sohu.com/20120117/n332366066.shtml> (accessed 25 August 2012).

<sup>386</sup> Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, no author. 2008. *China Shenzhen International Cultural Industries Fair*. available at: <http://en.cnci.gov.cn/Law/LawDetails.aspx?ID=6079&p=1> (accessed 25 August 2012).

provides the ACFTU with the authority to engage in collective bargaining agreements with employers.<sup>387</sup>

In 2010 the Chinese government implemented additional measures addressing labor issues. At the national level the ACFTU released two measures – the Urgent Notice on Further Enhancing the Establishment of Trade Unions in Enterprises and Fully Exploring the Use of Trade Unions in Enterprises – placing additional pressure on foreign enterprises (even those invested with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan capital) to allow unionization and collective bargaining practices, an ACFTU campaign that has been in place since 2006. Also in 2010 the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued the Notice of Pushing Forward of Collective Bargaining and the Implementation of the Rainbow Plan requiring all enterprises with unions to implement a collective contract scheme, granting considerable power to the laborers to “negotiate for wage increases through collective bargaining”. At the regional level – Beijing, Fujian, Shenzhen, and Guangdong – additional measures considered the rights of unions to engage in negotiations for higher wages, though the measures were defeated in Guangdong.<sup>388</sup> In short these changes suggest the labor market is becoming more and more highly coordinated by the Chinese government and in particular the ACFTU, and the balance of power is shifting (though not uniformly across regions) away from the employers to the laborers, indicating the presence of neo-corporatism.

### **The Army**

The CPC removed “the military from elite politics and the most powerful decision-making councils” in order “to regularize and institutionalize its role in the policy process as a

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<sup>387</sup> “Ibid., especially Articles 51-56. The ACFTU reached collective bargaining with Wal-Mart in several Chinese cities. Wal-Mart Strikes Pay Deal With Chinese Union, no author. 2008. *Forbes*. available at: [http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/25/walmart-china-unions-lead-cx\\_mk\\_0725acftu.html](http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/25/walmart-china-unions-lead-cx_mk_0725acftu.html) (accessed 25 August 2012).

<sup>388</sup> No Longer Straining to be Heard, Luo Ai and David Hartung. 2010. *China Law and Practice*. 24:23.

professional force.”<sup>389</sup> Since 1997 the CPC’s Politburo Standing Committee has no military representation. Furthermore military representation on the CPC Politburo has decreased with military officers holding only a few positions.<sup>390</sup> Despite this ostensible trend toward removing the military from politics, there are two things to remember. First and foremost it is within the scope of Chinese history and military tradition for the relationship between the civilian (文) and the military (武) to shifts along a civilian-military continuum. It is reflective of Chinese political culture.<sup>391</sup> Second, the CPC still treats the Chinese military as a party-army, and vice-versa.

From the CPC viewpoint, the ‘history of the people’s army is the history of being loyal to the CPC’.<sup>392</sup> Only the CPC can maintain the clear mission of the military and can direct the military’.<sup>393</sup> China’s traditional martial spirit in which the military serves the country loyally, defends the nation, and protects the people, supports this party-army model.<sup>394</sup> The military must ‘provide force protection to consolidate the CPC’s power, provide security for crucial strategic opportunities of national development, and provide support for safeguarding national interests’.<sup>395</sup> This means the CPC “determines the nature of

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<sup>389</sup> China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy, Michael D. Swaine. 2012. *China Leadership Monitor*. 36:3-6, available at: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/>article/104181> (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>390</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>391</sup> Lucian Pye makes this observation about Chinese ideology, which I discussed in the previous chapter. I extrapolate his concept to define better and along the lines of Chinese traditions the relationship between the civilian and the military.

<sup>392</sup> 忠诚于党——二谈大力培育当代革命军人核心价值观, no author. 2009. *PLA Daily*. available at: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/8628619.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>393</sup> Interview with Professor Gong Fangbin from the National Defense University conducted by a *People’s Navy* newspaper reporter, Our Army Was Born with the Nature of Obeying the Party and Expressing Loyalty to the Party, *People’s Navy news reporter*. 2008. *Huanqiu*. copy loaned to me.

<sup>394</sup> 传统武德文化与当代革命军人核心价值观培育, no author. 2009. *PLA Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbx1/2009-02/10/content\\_1645604.htm](http://www.chinamil.com.cn/site1/zbx1/2009-02/10/content_1645604.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>395</sup> 肩负人民军队的光荣使命, no author. 2007. *Guangxi Ribao*. available at: <http://www.cpcnews.cn/GB/64093/64099/6049509.html> (accessed 2 August 2012).

the armed forces, and the Party's mission determines the mission of the armed forces".<sup>396</sup> Both People's Liberation Army's General Political Department and the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences published an editorial emphasizing the importance of following the orders of the CPC. In particular, the editorial commented, "the standard of conduct that Party organizations at all levels and all Party members must abide by is the discipline of the Party. It is essential to the unity of will and action within the whole Party. As the military forces of the ruling party implement the political tasks of the Party; we [the People's Liberation Army] must be highly conscious of observing and maintaining Party discipline".<sup>397</sup>

CPC political work within the military helps counter trends toward "non-partisan and apolitical" and "nationalization" that would weaken the Party and trigger a Soviet-style collapse.<sup>398</sup> According to the CPC Constitution:

Party organizations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army carry on their work in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee. The political work organ of the Military Commission of the Central Committee is the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; the General Political Department directs Party and political work in the army. The Military Commission of the Central Committee prescribes the organizational system and organs of the Party in the armed forces.<sup>399</sup>

The CPC political work within the military also helps counter activities threatening the viability of the state, including Taiwan independence forces, territory disputes with India, Japan, Vietnam and other countries, as well as threats from domestic forces including the

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<sup>396</sup> 毫不动摇地坚持党对军队的绝对领导, no author. 2009. *Qiushi*. available at: [http://qstheory.cn/gf/jdsxlljs/200910/t20091013\\_13166.htm](http://qstheory.cn/gf/jdsxlljs/200910/t20091013_13166.htm) (accessed 2 August 2012).

<sup>397</sup> 严格遵守和维护党的纪律, no author. 2012. *People's Liberation Army Daily*. available at: <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/17613793.html> (accessed 2 August 2012).

<sup>398</sup> Notion of Nationalization of the Military, no author. no date. *PLA Daily as Reported by Radio Free Asia (RFA)*. available at: <http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/sd-05162012095617.html> (accessed 2 August 2012).

<sup>399</sup> Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Article 23, no author. 2009. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html> (accessed 15 August 2012).

“East Turkistan” and “Tibet independence” movements, as well as other hostile forces.<sup>400</sup>

The movement to nationalize the Soviet military caused the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus it is imperative to counter a “strategic conspiracy by the hostile forces to westernize and divide China” and underscore the importance of the traditional CPC policy of “the Party Commands the Gun”.<sup>401</sup>

The CPC retains control of the military through its political work and through the Central Military Commission. According to the PRC Constitution,

The Central Military Commission of the PRC directs the armed forces of the country”. The chairman of the CMC is responsible to the National People’s Congress and its standing committee.<sup>402</sup>

The CMC consists of the Communist Party of China Central Military Commission (CPC CMC) and the State Central Military Commission CMC (State CMC). This dual command structure allows the military to have direct access to the CPC General Secretary, the top official in the CPC system. The CPC Central Committee selects the members of the CMC. The CPC’s political work within the military is carried out according to the Central Committee directives and through the General Political Department, the political work

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<sup>400</sup> Lesson Two – The Profound Meaning of the Present Revolutionary Army Personnel’s Core Ideological Values, no author. 2009. *China National Defense Students*. available at: <http://www.guofangsheng.com/n3430c48.aspx>. The Military Officers and Soldiers at One Division in the Lan Zhou Military Area Command Air Force Army Trained on Developing the Character of ‘Loyalty to the Party’, no author. 2009. *The PLA Air Force*. available at: <http://plaaaf.net/html/58/n-24058.html> (accessed 2 September 2012).

<sup>401</sup> Notion of Nationalization of the Military, no author. no date. *PLA Daily as Reported by Radio Free Asia (RFA)*. available at: <http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/sd-05162012095617.html> (accessed 2 September 2012).

<sup>402</sup> Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 93-94, no author. 2004. *The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content\\_1372991.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372991.htm) (accessed 2 September 2012).

institution of the CMC.<sup>403</sup> More specifically the CPC controls the ‘military leadership and command through the CPC’s Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, through the Party committees, political commissars and political institutions at levels above regiments, through the grassroots Party committees (e.g., Party branches), mentors, and instructors at battalions and companies, and through the accountability of Party officials under the unified collective leadership of Party committees (e.g. branches)’.<sup>404</sup>

The CPC CMC issues directives underscoring the CPC’s leadership of the military and more recently instituted an accountability system within the military, an unprecedented move. In 2009, for instance, the CPC CMC issued a directive to the military's high-ranking officers. The directive highlighted the CPC’s role within the military and underscored its absolute leadership.<sup>405</sup> The directive also established an accountability system within the military. This system holds senior military officers responsible for their conduct. This system is the first of its kind in the history of the PLA,<sup>406</sup> and it rather clearly indicates the CPC has increased its presence and authority within the highest ranks of the military.

The Chinese military system consists of a sub-system. This sub-system consists of both police forces and public security. The sub-system is under the direction of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS is subordinate to the State Council,<sup>407</sup> and the Council is linked to the PRC CMC. Both the State Council and the PRC CMC are subordinate to the

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<sup>403</sup>Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Articles 22 and 23, no author. 2009. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/65732/6758063.html> (accessed 2 September 2012).

<sup>404</sup>Shouldering the Glorious Mission of the People’s Army – In Commemoration of the 80<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army, no author. 2007. *News of the Communist Party of China*. available at: <http://www.cpcnews.cn/GB/64093/64099/6049509.html> (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>405</sup> 中央从严治军, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content\\_4720.htm](http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_4720.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>406</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>407</sup> Ministry of Public Security, no author. no date. *Gov.cn Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal*. available at: [http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/02/content\\_74192.htm](http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/02/content_74192.htm) (accessed 7 September 2012).

NPC, which is subordinate to the CPC Central Committee. The army and PAPF participate in national construction, emergency rescue, and disaster relief.<sup>408</sup>

As for the police officers, there are over 2 million police officers serving in China. More than 70 percent of them are CPC members.<sup>409</sup> As for the public security, this institution is the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), and the CPC tasks this force with the responsibility for ensuring social stability and order.<sup>410</sup> PAPF is responsible for 'safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability, and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and contentment'.<sup>411</sup> It must 'obey CPC orders and make greater contributions to creating a Harmonious Society'.<sup>412</sup> PAPF also undertakes military responsibilities in support of PLA operations.<sup>413</sup>

In 2009, the 10<sup>th</sup> session of the Standing Committee of the 11<sup>th</sup> National People's Congress (NPC) took place. The NPC passed the 'Law on the People's Armed Police Force', which authorizes the mobilization of the PAPF to respond to "deal with riots, disruptions, serious violent crimes, terrorist attacks, and other emergencies". It also authorizes the PAPF to 'employ the necessary measures to dispel large groups that may affect the social order'.

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<sup>408</sup> China's National Defense in 2010, no author. 2011. Official Government White Paper. *The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c\\_13806851\\_18.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851_18.htm) (accessed 7 September 2012).

<sup>409</sup> 周永康带领全国公安厅局长座谈会代表在井冈山重温入党誓词, no author. 2009. *Jiangxi Ribao* reprinted on the News of the Communist Party of China website. available at: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/10336906.html> (accessed 15 August 2012).

<sup>410</sup> Chinese Police Urged to Safeguard Social Stability, no author. 2012. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-09/08/content\\_26466840.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-09/08/content_26466840.htm) (accessed 15 August 2012). Top Legislature Passes Armed Police Law, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/27/content\\_8625494.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/27/content_8625494.htm) (accessed 15 August 2012).

<sup>411</sup> China's National Defense in 2006, no author. 2006. *Information Office of the State Council*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/29/content\\_5547029\\_15.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-12/29/content_5547029_15.htm) (accessed 15 August 2012).

<sup>412</sup> Role of Armed Police in Harmonious Society, no author. 2007. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/18/content\\_5424881.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/18/content_5424881.htm) (accessed on 7 August 2012).

<sup>413</sup> China's National Defense in 2010, no author. 2011. *The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c\\_13806851.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm) (accessed on 7 August 2012).



The law allows governments above the county-level to make requests for PAPF deployments but only empowers the State Council and the CMC with the authority to mobilize the PAPF.<sup>414</sup> This law is the first of its kind in China.

### The State

The National People's Congress (NPC) and the NPC Standing Committee are key state institutions. As for the NPC, it is "the highest organ of state power".<sup>415</sup> During the Mao-era it was a rubber stamp institution unanimously approving all the legislation. Deng Xiaoping and other leaders introduced limited political reforms to 'relativize' relations between the NPC and the CPC.<sup>416</sup> In addition, powerful CPC leaders successively headed the NPC and realized the importance of strengthening the NPC influence to place some limits on the CPC.<sup>417</sup> To this end, the CPC 'expanded the NPC's bureaucracy by establishing and a committee system and putting technocrats on the NPC Standing Committee'.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>414</sup> Top Legislature Passes Armed Police Law, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/27/content\\_8625494.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/27/content_8625494.htm) (accessed 15 August 2012). China Greenlights Armed Police to Handle Terrorist Attacks, Riots with New Law, no author. 2009. available at: <http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4560> (accessed on 15 August 2012).

<sup>415</sup> PRC Constitution, Chapter 3, Section 1 on Structure of the State, Article 57, no author. 2012 (updated). *The National Peoples Congress of the People's Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node\\_2824.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2824.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012). The Post-Mao Reform Era, Merle Goldman. 2006. In John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman (ed.), *China: A New History*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 422.

<sup>416</sup> Dr. Monte Bullard made these points in a course on China's Political System that I took while attending the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS).

<sup>417</sup> The leaders include: Peng Zhen, former Beijing party chief; Wan Li, former party secretary of Anhui, where agricultural reforms started; and Qiao Shi, formerly responsible for intelligence affairs and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo until 1997. The Post-Mao Reform Era, Merle Goldman. 2006. In John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman (ed.), *China: A New History*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 422.

<sup>418</sup> The National People's Congress, Murray Scot Tanner. 2006. In Goldman and MacFarquhar, *The Paradox of Post-Mao Reforms*. 114-115. As cited in The Post-Mao Reform Era, Merle Goldman. 2006. In John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman (ed.), *China: A New History*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University. 422.

The NPC's authority has expanded intermittently. For instance, it played a role in calling for government accountability in the Pohai Gulf oilrig disaster of 1979.<sup>419</sup> In the ensuing decade the NPC withheld approval of certain CPC programs; at times, it even criticized the CPC for failing to implement certain laws. However the domestic turmoil in 1989 caused the CPC leaders to constrain the NPC's voice.<sup>420</sup> Several years later in the early to mid 1990s, NPC votes for CPC policies were no longer automatically unanimous. This reason for this change is due in large part to the reality that 'more and more younger, active, and competent people have been elected to its ranks'.<sup>421</sup> In addition, the CPC has brought the NPC into crucial decision-making areas. For instance, the 2005 anti-secession law concerns the conditions of war with Taiwan, and it provides the NPC with a voice in this decision. In other words, the law pluralizes the decision-making process regarding under what conditions China would go to war with Taiwan.<sup>422</sup> Despite the NPC's gradually expanding powers, the institution still lacks the capacity to *completely* reverse any of the CPC's policies. What is more important it is questionable as to whether a reversal could ever occur because the NPC Standing Committee consists of powerful CPC members.

The NPC has a people's congress system. The system enables the CPC to establish a presence at the grassroots levels. CPC leaders call for the "continuous improvement and development of the people's congress system to ensure institutional guarantees for the

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<sup>419</sup> China's Anti-secession Law: The Good News, Monte Bullard, 2005. *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*. available at: [http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard\\_050329.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard_050329.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012).

<sup>420</sup> *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform*, Kenneth Lieberthal. 1995. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company. 162; China's Anti-secession Law: The Good News, Monte Bullard. 2005. *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*. Available at: [http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard\\_050329.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard_050329.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012).

<sup>421</sup> China's Anti-secession Law: The Good News, Monte Bullard. 2005. *Center for Nonproliferation Studies*. Available at: [http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard\\_050329.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/other/bullard_050329.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012).

<sup>422</sup> Ibid. Anti-Secessionist Law Adopted by NPC: Order of the President of the People's Republic of China No 34, no author. 2005. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2005-03/14/content\\_538516.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2005-03/14/content_538516.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012).

country's stability and advancement". Moreover China "needs to organically integrate the leadership of the CPC and the position of the people as masters of the country and the rule of law".<sup>423</sup> The local people's congresses (LPCs) facilitate governance at the local level and serve as a venue to work out disagreements.<sup>424</sup> The LPCs are active and some are closer to the local center of power than the NPC is in Beijing.<sup>425</sup> LPCs' members are vetted through democratic elections. All political parties (e.g., CPPCC) and social organizations can recommend candidates to stand for election.<sup>426</sup>

Subordinate to the NPC and its Standing Committee are other state institutions. These institutions include the State Council, the PRC CMC, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Supreme People's Court. As for the State Council, the council follows the 'premier responsibility' system. Meaning the Premier, who is a CPC Politburo Member, has the most authority. The State Council also has an Executive Committee. This Committee consists of high-ranking CPC members usually from the Politburo, as well as other institutions namely the military, public security, industry, finance, and foreign affairs.<sup>427</sup> Subordinate to the State Council are numerous ministries, ministry-level state commissions and agencies, administrative organs, state council offices and agencies. These institutions follow "the

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<sup>423</sup> Chinese leaders join panel discussions on NPC Standing Committee work report, no author. 2005. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/10/c\\_131459266.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/10/c_131459266.htm) (accessed 22 September 2012).

<sup>424</sup> *The People's Congresses and Governance in China: Toward a Network Mode of Governance*, Ming Xia. 2007. London: Routledge. 228.

<sup>425</sup> *Ibid.*, 250; *Local People's Congresses in China: Development and Transition*, Young Nam Cho. 2008. New York: Cambridge University. 163. When Communist Party Candidates Can Lose, Who Wins? Assessing the Role of the Local People's Congresses in the Selection of Leaders in China, Melanie Manion. 2008. *The China Quarterly*. 195:608.

<sup>426</sup> The System of the People's Congress, no author. 2010. *China Daily*. available at: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010npc/2010-02/09/content\\_9449872.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010npc/2010-02/09/content_9449872.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>427</sup> Interview with a Chinese expert in academia in X City in China in September 2012.

system of ministerial responsibility” but remain subordinate to the State Council and thus to the CPC.<sup>428</sup> In effect the CPC has a pervasive presence within the state system.

As for the judiciary, this institution consists of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court as well as their respective local courts.<sup>429</sup> Although in theory the courts practice judicial independence, political interference occurs in some cases.<sup>430</sup> The interference is based on the type of case, which range from the political to the politically sensitive socio-economic, criminal, and civil cases.<sup>431</sup> Although courts pass judgments in favor of non-state / non-party sides, the cases are carefully selected. For instance, the courts avoid cases involving State owned enterprises (SOEs) or having the potential to produce outcomes that could adversely affect social stability and the CPC’s agenda.<sup>432</sup> Some courts in some provinces, such as Gansu, Shaanxi, and even Guangdong, assume political roles that contribute to the CPC’s agenda of maintaining social stability and promoting harmony.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>428</sup> The State Council, no author. 2005. *Gov.cn Chinese Government Official Web Portal*. available at: [http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content\\_20763.htm](http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20763.htm) (accessed 9 August 2012).

<sup>429</sup> The PRC Constitution provides for the establishment and authority of these courts. For instance, Article 124 establishes the ‘Supreme People’s Court and the people’s courts at the local level, as well as military and other special people’s courts. Article 126 provides the people’s courts with judicial independence. The courts are “not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization, or individual”. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter III The Structure of the State, Section 7, Article 7, The People’s Courts and the People’s Procuratorates, no author. 2004. *The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content\\_1372991.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372991.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012).

<sup>430</sup> The Party and the Courts, Zhu Suli. 2010. In Randall Peerenboom (ed.), *Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion*. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 52-68.

<sup>431</sup> A New Analytic Framework for Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China, Fu Yulin and Randall Peerenboom. 2010. In Randall Peerenboom (ed.), *Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion*. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 95-133.

<sup>432</sup> Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts, Nicholas Calcina Howson. 2010. In Randall Peerenboom (ed.), *Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion*. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 134-153.

<sup>433</sup> Local Courts in Western China: The Quest for Independence and Dignity, Stephanie Balme. 2010. In Randall Peerenboom (ed.), *Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion*. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 154-179. The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power,

Although the judicial institutions are subordinate to NPC and its Standing Committee,<sup>434</sup> the Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee (CPLAC) holds authority over the entire system. The CPLAC oversees all judicial affairs and ‘stands above’ the prosecution and the courts. CPLAC members include representatives (usually high ranking officials) from the Ministry of Public Security, President of the Supreme Court, Attorney General, the Ministry for State Security, the Justice Minister, and the Commander of the Armed Police.<sup>435</sup> While the CPLAC is subordinate to the CPC’s Central Committee, in 2008 the CPC made a subtle but significant institutional change increasing the authority and power over the judiciary; specifically, the CPLAC is reporting directly to the Politburo Standing Committee,<sup>436</sup> clearly indicating the CPC has brought the judicial system further into the existing political system and tightening its control over it.

### **The Enterprises**

The CPC occupies a powerful role within the state and non-state sectors. In the previous chapter on ideology it emerges that the Chinese leadership promotes socialism with Chinese characteristics. This concept becomes clearer through the examination of the CPC’s

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and Politics in Chinese Courts, Xin He. 2010. In Randall Peerenboom (ed.), *Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion*. New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 180-195.

<sup>434</sup> State Structure of the People’s Republic of China: The Supreme People’s Court, no author. 2007. *The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-12/06/content\\_1382076.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-12/06/content_1382076.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012). Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter III Structure of the State, Section 7, Article 127, no author. 2004. *The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content\\_1372991.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372991.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012). Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter III Structure of the State, Section 7, Article 128, no author. 2004. *The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*. available at: [http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content\\_1372991.htm](http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372991.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012). Major Functions of the SPP, no author. 2005. *Gov.cn Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal*. available at: [http://english.gov.cn/2005-09/02/content\\_28500.htm](http://english.gov.cn/2005-09/02/content_28500.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>435</sup> 3300多名政法委书记集中培训 实行半军事化管理, no author. 2012. *Legal New*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-06/13/c\\_123275309.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2012-06/13/c_123275309.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

<sup>436</sup> Interview with Chinese experts in X Cities in China in May 2008, October 2011, and September 2012.

role within state-owned enterprise sector. This sector consists of many state-owned institutions ranging from aviation and space to oil and gas to steel to dual-use technologies to telecommunications. In fact there are approximately 120 SOEs spanning many different sectors.<sup>437</sup> However the most important dimension is the banking sector because the banks provide all the funding to the SOEs, which more often than not in recent times re-lend the funds to other institutions, effectively becoming a quasi-CPC lending institutions.

The most interesting aspect of the banking sector is the CPC's position in these institutions. The State Council is the highest executive organ of state power and state administration, though it is subordinate to the NPC and its Standing Committee. Subordinate to the foregoing institutions and falling directly under the State Council is the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance oversees China's four big banks. These banks in order of size from largest to smallest are the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Bank of China (BOC). These banks do the commercial lending.<sup>438</sup>

Within each bank there is a CPC committee with approximately 4 or 5 CPC members. The head of the CPC committee also serves as the head of the Bank (e.g., President) and the head of the Board of Directors. The NPC and its Standing Committee select the heads of the CPC committee in the Banks; this mean these appointments come from Politburo and its Standing Committee. Along side the CPC structure there is an additional structure consisting of a board of supervisors or directors. Both the CPC committee and the board of supervisors

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<sup>437</sup> The author of the paper served as a consultant for an SOE in 2008 and learned about this particular segment of the economy from people associated with this SOE as well as other Chinese experts that I encountered during my 6 months on the ground in China.

<sup>438</sup> Interviews with Charlene Chu, Senior Director of Fitch Ratings, in Beijing, China in October 2011 and October 2012.

or directors focus on human resource issues; meaning, they ensure the banks implement and adhere to the CPC's agenda and policies.<sup>439</sup>

The second type of bank is the policy bank. These banks are China Development Bank, Agricultural Development Bank of China, and Export / Import Bank of China. The corporate governance structure of these banks is similar to the commercial banks. The CPC tightly controls these banks, specifically because they fund CPC policies, making loans that the commercial banks would not normally fund. These include all the CPC's stimulus plans, as well as infrastructure projects (e.g., Three Gorge Dam), and overseas lending that support China's efforts in resource sectors and infrastructure development in places like Africa and Latin America. In effect these banks are the CPC's lending arm.<sup>440</sup> It is noteworthy that both banking systems lack an independent corporate governance structure; meaning, the CPC constitutes the sole decision-making body

As for the non-state sector, recent developments include the CPC instituting tighter and tighter controls in both law and accounting firms and expanding controls over small and medium-sized enterprises. As for law firms, between 2008 and 2009 CPC organizations doubled their presence in law firms in China.<sup>441</sup> By 2011 approximately 63,000 lawyers became members of the CPC, a significant jump from 2008 in which 44,000 lawyers were CPC members. Moreover China had 14,741 law firms and of that number, 3,895 law firms

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<sup>439</sup> Interviews with Charlene Chu, Senior Director of Fitch Ratings, in Beijing, China in October 2011 and October 2012.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>441</sup> Where There is a Law Firm, There is the Communist Party, no author. 2009. *Legal Daily*. available at: [http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2009-05/22/content\\_1094411.htm](http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2009-05/22/content_1094411.htm) (accessed 19 August 2009). 党的组织、党的工作在我国律师行业基本实现全覆盖, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/24/content\\_11595103.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/24/content_11595103.htm) (accessed 12 August 2012). According to an informal interview with two different Chinese experts in X City in October 2011, the policy shift is due in large part to some Chinese lawyers increasingly representing, and gaining notoriety for representing, defendants of government corruption charges and targets of repression, such as Falun Gong practitioners.

established independent Party branch offices, 8,105 established associated Party branch offices, and 2,741 law firms had no Party members. So the CPC assigned the law firms with no Party members a Party development guidance councilor or Party member contact person.<sup>442</sup> As for accounting firms, the CPC engaged in a similar co-optation strategy. China has more than 7,500 accounting firms, approximately 90,000 Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), and the accounting sector employs 300,000 employees. In 2009 the State's China Institute of Certified Public Accountants announced the establishment of Party branches in every accounting firm. The Ministry of Finance established a CPC Commission for CPAs and encouraged the expansion of CPC's presence in CPA firms.<sup>443</sup>

As part of the 'Three Represents' initiative, the CPC is expanding in to small, medium, and foreign-invested enterprises. In 2012 the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) started establishing Party organizations in single person retail businesses, professional market places, and, small and micro enterprises. Driving the policy is that roughly 80% of China's nearly 10 million non-state enterprises and 38 million individual enterprises have no Party organizations.<sup>444</sup>

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<sup>442</sup> Party Secretaries of over 150 Law Firms Participate in Training Program, no author. 2012. *Guangming Daily*. copy provided to me.

<sup>443</sup> 全国会计师事务所明年将全部建立党组织, no author. 2009. *Huanqiu*. available at: <http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-11/640412.html> (accessed 2 September 2012). 为改革发展添砖加瓦 为党建党旗添光加彩 —会计师事务所学习实践活动和行业党建工作扎实推进, no author. 2009. *The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants*. available at: [http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/200911/t20091125\\_20032.htm](http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/200911/t20091125_20032.htm) (accessed 2 September 2012); 加强注册会计师行业党建 推进行业科学发展, no author. 2009. *Xinhua News Agency*. available at: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-11/26/content\\_12544990.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-11/26/content_12544990.htm) (accessed 2 September 2012). The CPC's effort to co-opt the CPAs and accounting firms followed from the problems emerging after Chinese firms listed on the US exchanges. Interview with a foreign China analyst in Beijing in September 2012.

<sup>444</sup> China to Step Up Expansion of Party Organizations in Private Sector, no author. 2012. *United Front Department Central Committee of the CPC*. available at: <http://www.zyztb.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/tzb2010/S2012/201205/726532.html> (accessed 2 August 2012).



## **Conclusion**

This chapter investigated the Chinese political system. It examined the Party and its role within society, the army and its sub-units, state institutions, as well as state-owned enterprises, and the non-state sector. Several observations emerge from the investigation.

The first observation is that the political system is best characterized as a complex institutional web or a series of overlapping concentric circles<sup>445</sup> in which top-down decision-making is not the dominant feature but rather consultation, co-optation, and bargaining are the main features. Evidence of this exists in the dynamics of center-province relations. The second is that CPC system is tightly fused with key segments of society, including political parties and social organizations. These segments are highly integrated into the system. However the CPC increasingly consults with these parties and organizations, and in particular the CPPCC, on certain issues.

Additional evidence of corporatism exists within party-society relations. For instance the CPC and the ACFTU have established a tripartite system consisting of government-trade unions-enterprises. However the majority of enterprises participating in this system are SOEs; perhaps this system is the CPC's modern interpretation of its previous 'iron rice bowl' system in which the CPC guaranteed workers lifetime employment, wages, living units and food. With that being said, the ACFTU is making strides in bringing more and more foreign enterprises into the tripartite system.

One notable trend involves the CPC's approach to students, lawyers, and accountants. As for the students, the CPC has strengthened systematically its political work throughout the university system and has established a pervasive presence at all levels. As for the lawyers

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<sup>445</sup> Pan Wei mentions but fails to explain in his presentation – 'the Contemporary Chinese Political System' – that he emailed to me. He is a professor at Peking University in the School of International Studies and the Director of the Center for Chinese and Global Affairs.

and the accountants, the CPC has co-opted these professional groups into the system. This includes establishing a CPC presence in nearly all the law firms and practically all the accounting firms.

The third observation is that the CPC has a presence in the major bureaucracies constituting the state and military structures. The party is implementing increasingly measures extending its authority within these institutions. Regarding the state, the CPC is bringing the NPC into the decision-making process on key national security issues, namely Taiwan. This move established a form of consultative corporatism on a significant national security issue. As for the judiciary, the CPC brought the CPLAC closer to the top party apparatus. Specifically the CPLAC now reports directly to the Politburo Standing Committee. Along side these changes within the judicial system, the CPC has co-opted all the lawyers and nearly all the law firms. As for the military and its sub-units, the CPC employs both institutions to uphold internal and external agendas, including maintaining the 'harmonious society', defending China's national interests, as well as participating in national construction, emergency rescue, and disaster relief operations. The CPC is increasingly co-opting the judiciary and military in to the system through various measures and initiatives, effectively mitigating judicial independence and constraining the potential for the emergence of a professional or national military.

The fourth observation is the CPC dominates key sectors of the economy to support and advance the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Evidence of this exists with regard to the CPC's position in the banking system. The CPC dominates the commercial lending sector; and, perhaps more important, it has a financing arm that funds its policy agenda. These 'policy banks' fund projects that the commercial banks would not,

including infrastructure projects. The notable aspect is the CPC is the sole decision-making authority; there is no independent corporate governance structure in either banking structure; moreover the banks provide financial support to the 120 SOEs, which often re-lend the money to other institutions.

These observations as well as other evidence presented in this chapter suggest that the CPC is creating a seamless order in which the CPC manages to varying degrees the linkages and interactions among the system's various institutions. Different forms of corporatism are employed to maintain and strengthen the existing system while concurrently bringing additional key segments into the system. In particular, the CPC strives to co-opt the elite and the majority into the political system to prevent demise similar to that of the Soviet Union's. The CPC's approach may result in an unprecedented social experiment that if it succeeds could stun China watchers because the CPC successfully transformed the communist regime and system; but if the experiment fails, it could also stun China watchers because the fallout would be on an order of magnitude yet unseen. With this in mind, the next chapter concludes with some final remarks and observations about the Chinese political system writ large.

## CHAPTER 7

### DOES CHINA DEFY ENCAPSULATION?

#### Introduction

The Chinese are striving for the revitalization of the Great Nation

-- Hu Jintao  
Former Chinese President<sup>446</sup>

This dissertation has investigated the Chinese political system writ large. It has conducted this investigation for several reasons. First, China occupies an increasingly prominent and powerful position within the international system. China's actions within the system in large part are driven and determined by the country's domestic structures, dynamics, and national interests. However we know less about these domestic structures and processes because the scholarly community conducts less and less work on the broad questions about China, such as the factors explaining the Chinese political system broadly construed. Instead the majority of scholars engage in "disciplinary specialization" and "topical specialization".

Indeed these two trends are positive developments in the field of Chinese studies for many reasons as the discussion in chapter two illustrates. China is "being integrated into" the field of international relations and the sub-field of comparative politics "to an extent unseen

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<sup>446</sup> President Hu Eulogizes Three-Decade Reform, no author. 2008. *Beijing Review*. available at: [http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2008-12/19/content\\_170979.htm](http://www.bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2008-12/19/content_170979.htm) (accessed 22 August 2012).

before” and scholars select “narrow topics” making China specialists “more like other area specialists in political science and even natural scientists”.<sup>447</sup> Despite these positive developments there are some disadvantages. As for “disciplinary specialization”, the field is marked more by disagreement than agreement. As for “topical specialization”, more often than not these scholars examining narrow topics fail to extrapolate lessons learned from the narrow investigations and explains what they mean for China broadly construed. As a result, today the trend is such that we know less about the Chinese political system writ large when we should know more about it.

The information available about the Chinese political system consists of conflicting work and divergent conclusions. For instance, the field of political science and the sub-field of Chinese studies provide no consensus on the characterization of the Chinese political system. Although the foregoing phenomenon is common in academia, it is difficult to square this trend with reality. The subject of China has become so important to policymakers and decision-makers at all levels in both the civilian and military sectors of America that it is imperative to provide them with a better understanding of the factors that drive the system and the manifest form of the system.

Accordingly, this study investigated the Chinese political system. Unlike previous studies that conducted thorough and comprehensive examinations of the system, this study specifically identified and examined the sociopolitical cultural factors influencing the form of the contemporary political system. The project employed the sociopolitical culture approach because the review of the extant literature suggested that perhaps other studies underrated these variables. In particular they seem to underestimate the degree to which they affect the

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<sup>447</sup>Studying Chinese Politics in an Age of Specialization, Kevin O’Brien. 2010. University of California, Berkeley. available at: <http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/faculty/OBrienK/OBrien%20Final.pdf> (accessed 2 August 2012). 1;3.

formation and the character of the modern Chinese political system. By employing this distinctive approach, the study produced a different type of investigation of China's political system.

As previously discussed in chapter two, the study made several assumptions. The first of these was that Chinese history influences the contemporary character of the Chinese political system. The second of these assumptions was linked to the first. As previously mentioned in chapter three, Elizabeth Perry makes the perceptive observation that “rather than search so energetically for parallels in European history, might it not be better to pay greater attention to China's own past?”<sup>448</sup> Therefore, this study searched both China's imperial era and China's transitional period for clues explaining more about China's present political form. The third of these assumptions was that China underwent a transition “far before the world fully understood and valued the inherent challenges and difficulties associated with development.”<sup>449</sup> This means the study concluded many existing, mainstream social science models employed to analyze and understand China, its political system, and its experiences may not be entirely suitable for the task of evaluating China's political system, specifically because the majority, if not all, of the approaches were crafted in response to the decolonization era of the 1950s and 60s. China experienced its transition before that era. The last of these assumptions was China – more so than any culture in the world – exists at a great distance from the west. As the renowned American Chinese historian John K. Fairbank once observed, ‘of all the great cultures, China has been the furthest removed from the Western tradition’.<sup>450</sup> These assumptions compelled the author to focus the research on understanding

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<sup>448</sup> Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?, Elizabeth J. Perry. 2007. *China Journal*, 57:709.

<sup>449</sup> *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Lucian W. Pye. 1992. Cambridge MA; London, England: Harvard University Press. 2.

<sup>450</sup> *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, John King Fairbank. 1957. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 4.

the unique features of the Chinese system and use an approach that could best capture these features.

To achieve this, the author established several criteria for selecting a framework of analysis for examining China's political system. Specifically, the framework needed to facilitate the investigation of a nonwestern system. This means, the framework could not impose pre-existing assumptions on the object of observation, namely relationships are dichotomous, development is linear, emerging business and commercial elites are the basis for civil society and eventually democracy, and modernization means westernization. In addition, the framework needed to be applicable to systems that seemingly defy encapsulation. Furthermore, it needed to offer a methodology to examine a wide range of variables. These variables needed to range from the more unique and difficult to capture, such as history and traditions, to the more mundane factors and easy to assess, namely ideology and institutions. Finally the study posited that all of these variables contribute to varying degrees to the form of the contemporary Chinese political system. This led to the selection of a form of corporatism, specifically sociopolitical corporatist paradigm, to investigate the Chinese system.

This study selected sociopolitical corporatism for several reasons. This paradigm has been used to successfully examine nonwestern countries, such as Iberic-Latin countries. The reason for the success of the approach is it contains concepts enabling the researcher to identify and analyze countries' unique historical and traditional features. Moreover, it has been employed to successfully untangle the aforementioned countries' transitional experiences, and, in particular, how these countries' leaders meshed traditional features with modern elements and adapted to the modern world. In addition, the approach provides the

methodology to unpack the complexities of a country's system and, in doing so, perhaps better interpret and identify the manifest political form. It is for these reasons the dissertation employed the sociopolitical corporatist approach to conduct an in-depth investigation of the sociopolitical cultural factors shaping the character of the Chinese political system.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the sociopolitical corporatist model contains specific concepts making possible the untangling of the more complex and / or the more unfamiliar or unique political system. The first of these concepts is unique imperatives. The second of these is historical antecedents. The third of these is distinctive traditions. The study collapsed these variables and classified them as 'a complex of distinctive characteristics'. In short the study found these variables significantly influence the form of the Chinese political system, including the bureaucratic, military, dynastic, and ideological traditions. These long-standing traditions persist through time and ultimately serve as the pillars of and inform the shape of the contemporary political system.

As for ideology in China, the study demonstrated that it consists of two dimensions. The first of these is the blend of Confucianism, Marxism, and Leninism. The second of these is the various leaders' belief systems. As for Confucianism, it helped facilitate China's transitional experience and expressly linked China's past to its present. As for the Chinese leaders' belief systems, the study shows that these value systems provide valuable insight into the political system. Specifically, these systems provide incisive insight into the existing form of the political system, the domestic priorities, and the direction of the system. Generally speaking the Chinese leaderships' driving strategy is inclusiveness and the tactic is co-optation; this suggests evidence of a Leninist political strategy.



The study also examined the institutions constituting the Chinese political system. The study first examined the major Chinese political institutions, namely the linkages between and among these institutions. Then it investigated the CPC, namely how the CPC is ordered, its role in and linkages to the foregoing institutions, as well as its strategy to maintain a presence within China's massive bureaucracy and Chinese society.

As for the institutions, the study examined the major Chinese institutions and their relationship to each other. Specifically these institutions include the party and the army, the party and society, the party and the state, as well as the party and both the state-sector and the non-state sector. This investigation demonstrated several things. The first of these is the institutions and their linkages are not dichotomous and are not functioning in isolation. Rather Chinese political system is a complex, bureaucratic web of institutional relationships similar to the imperial era. The linkages are interlocking in some places and overlapping in most places. The order of the relationships or how power is ordered in the system can be best described as both hierarchical as well as concentric. The CPC is the common thread throughout these institutional relationships and pervades the political fabric.

The CPC is organized around several principles. The first of these is the Leninist concept of democratic centralism. The second of these is the party established an elaborate party congress system. The third of these is the emergence of inter-elite political competition and consultation, including non-party members. As for democratic centralism, this consists of inter-party dialogue and even inter-bureaucracy debate about proposed policies; however once the leaders reach a decision the debate ends and the decision is passed down through this hierarchical system. The congress system is also a Leninist feature and facilitates to varying degrees the CPC's penetration of society in the local areas. As for inter-elite competition and

consultation, the CPC is increasingly relying on a system of meritocracy as well as consultation with many segments of society and bargaining with the provinces.<sup>451</sup>

The CPC is the core of the political system.<sup>452</sup> It provides the linkage between and among the institutions; and, it may be best to describe its presence within the institutions as the center of overlapping concentric circles.<sup>453</sup> Evidence of this exists in the party's relations with all the institutions that constitute the political system, such as the army, society, and state, to name a few. As Pan Wei observes, the institutions are "intermingled, penetrated by each other into an entity or many entities like waves of concentric circles".<sup>454</sup>

The study highlighted several things about the party-army relationship. Since 1997 the CPC has removed gradually the military from the political structures. However the CPC maintains its control over the army through the Central Military Commission (CMC). In addition it continues to expand its political work within the army to ensure the army remains a "party" army and fulfills the CPC's national agenda. Fearing a Soviet style collapse, which the CPC believes occurred in part to the party's loss of the support of the military, the CPC works assiduously to maintain party-army relations and to counter movements toward professionalization and nationalization.

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<sup>451</sup> Meritocracy was a feature of the Confucian system. Consultation and / rule by the collective was an approach used in the imperial era as well as discussed in the aftermath of the CPC's takeover of the mainland in 1949.

<sup>452</sup> 中国模式的核心是什么? (What is the core of the China Model?), Yongnian Zheng. 2010. *China Review*. available at: <http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1013/1/8/4/101318425.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101318425&mdate=0511112515> (accessed on 8 August 2012).

<sup>453</sup> Pan Wei makes the observation about the system reflecting a series of overlapping concentric circles in specific reference to the state and the society. The Chinese Model of Development, Pan Wei. 2007. *The Foreign Policy Centre*. 2-3. Available at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf> (accessed 8 August 2012). 2-3.

<sup>454</sup> The Chinese Model of Development, Pan Wei. 2007. *The Foreign Policy Centre*. 2-3. Available at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf> (accessed 8 August 2012). 2-3.

More recently, the CPC introduced a system of accountability into the army system, an unprecedented move in the history of party-army relations. The accountability system could be aimed at eliminating corruption within the armed forces, countering internal forces wanting to move the army in the direction of professionalization and nationalization, and / or reaffirming party control over the army, or all the above. The relationship is ultimately determined by a continuum consisting of military (In Chinese: 武; In Chinese pinyin: *wu*) on the one end, and civilian (In Chinese: 文; In Chinese pinyin: *wen*) on the other end, a relic of the imperial system in which the civilian sector exerts control over the military sector in times of stability and order and vice versa in times of political stability.

As for society, the CPC has seamlessly co-opted major political, professional and social groups under the umbrella of the CPPCC, a “united front mobilization strategy” that secures the support of noncommunist constituencies. These entities are highly integrated into the system, lack an independent agenda, and some are highly controlled by the party. The CPC-CPPCC relationship has experienced several noteworthy changes including the CPPCC’s incorporation of the CPC’s guiding ideology into its charter; additionally, the CPC treats the CPPCC more and more like a political consultative body and bringing it deeper and deeper into the system as an invested actor.

Evidence of this is the all-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). As discussed in the previous chapter, the ACFTU has undergone a significant transformation. Over the past decade the government has instituted a series of laws covering labor issues such as wages, unionization, and collective bargaining, among others. It also has established a tripartite coordination system consisting of government-trade unions-enterprises. These changes suggest the labor market is becoming more and more highly coordinated by the

Chinese government through the ACFTU, and the balance of power is shifting (though not uniformly across regions) away from the employers (and in particular foreign enterprises) to the laborers. Despite this trend, the party determines the nature of the relations.

Generally speaking China lacks a “corporately coherent Weberian bureaucracies collaborating with active civil associations in seeking collective goals”. Instead the Chinese state channels “all significant social power” through “its command structure in institutional building and policy implementation” (e.g., mass mobilizations). There is no civil society serving as the “interlayer between the state and society”. Rather “state institutional building is limited to raising administrative capacities”. This means the Chinese bureaucracy and its capacity are the factors determining state-society relations.<sup>455</sup> This evidence suggests that Leninism is more predominant in the system than corporatism. However it is noteworthy that the relationship between the center and the provinces is best defined by negotiations and bargaining in which the center has to “play to the provinces” to gain the provincial leaders’ support for the party’s political appointments, agendas, and policies. So indeed Lenin’s democratic centralism has been “dented” by Chinese culture.<sup>456</sup>

With this discussion in mind, the study’s primary endeavor is to encapsulate the form of the Chinese political system. To this end the study selected several theories in search of the character of the Chinese political system. It explored these theories in-depth in chapter two. Briefly put, the first of these theories is authoritarianism and in particular neo-authoritarianism. As previously discussed, the neo-authoritarianism thesis has several distinctive traits. The first of these traits is the existence of a powerful central bureaucracy

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<sup>455</sup> Bureaucratic Capacity and State-Society Relations in China, Yanzhong Huang and Dali L. Yang. 2002. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. 38-39.

<sup>456</sup> Lucian W. Pye often uses the word “dented” to describe how the Chinese culture transforms foreign concepts, theories, and ideas. See for instance: *Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan. ix.

backed by a strong military. The second and third of these traits is the promotion of economic and social institutional reforms as well as the initiation of market-oriented reforms. The fourth and fifth of these traits include the development of the middles class and inter-elite political competition. The sixth of these traits is the promotion of nationalism using traditional culture, namely Confucianism. The seventh of these is the pursuit of capitalism and science, as well as the fostering an open-door policy towards the West. The last of these traits is the promotion of stability and prosperity.<sup>457</sup> This model could characterize the form of the contemporary Chinese political system; however, the approach has several shortcomings in that it fails to account for change, namely the direction of the system in the realm of the society and the economy (the shift away from market-oriented reforms toward greater state intervention).

The second of these is bureaucratic eclecticism. Michel Oksenberg developed this approach because he contended the Chinese system defied encapsulation. Bureaucratic eclecticism is defined as an “eclectic set of three types of institutions”. The first of these types is institution at the core apparatus, which is Soviet Leninism but consists of a fused CPC, the government, and the military at the national, provincial, prefectural, county, and township levels. The second of these are linkage and intermediary institutions created to “manipulate, control, isolate, and exploit the outside world”. The third of these is the legal, semi-legal, and illegal organizations and associations emerging in the social and economic space created by China’s market economy, as well as the state’s retreat from total control over society and culture.<sup>458</sup> In addition, bureaucratic eclecticism contains several other elements.

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<sup>457</sup> Sirens of the Strongman: Neo-Authoritarianism in Recent Chinese Political Theory, Barry Sautman. 1992. *China Quarterly*. 129: 82; 89; 101-102.

<sup>458</sup> China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Michel Oksenberg. 2001. *The China Journal*. 45:22.

One of these features is ideology.<sup>459</sup> The second of these features is the Chinese system is the mobilization system. “Transmission organizations” serve as transmission belts for state policies and help the Party extend its reach into “specific sectors of society”. The organizations include the official trade union, the Communist Youth League, and the Women’s Federation”.<sup>460</sup>

Indeed, Oksenberg’s approach provides incisive insight into the nuances of the Chinese political system. However it also fails to account for change and for the nature of the change. As discussed in chapter two for instance, he refers to the Chinese leadership’s distrust of the capitalist class. However Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms created a powerful business and commercial elite who the CPC has opened party membership for and has even co-opted under the ‘Three Represents’. The CPC also has raised the profile of the All-China Federation of Industry & Commerce (ACFIC) in that the party now consults with on relevant issues.

The third of these theories is the China-is-China-is-China approach. Succinctly put, this paradigm contends, “China’s communist economic landscape, psychological mindset, and bureaucratic processes are basically the same as those of imperial China”.<sup>461</sup> This approach is the most attractive because it fits with the study’s initial goal and overall purpose of identifying the factors that explain the Chinese political system and in particular its unique and elaborate form that seemingly defies encapsulations. Although it provides the Sinologist with incisive insight into the contemporary system, it tells the inexperienced China watcher and / or policy analysts and decision-makers who are new to the field very little about the

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<sup>459</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>460</sup> China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, Michel Oksenberg. 2001. *The China Journal*. 45:22-23.

<sup>461</sup> *China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. June Teufel Dreyer. 2012. Boston: Longman, 2012. 14; 114.

nature and scope of the current Chinese political system. Additionally and perhaps most importantly, this approach provides no way to recognize, demonstrate, and explain change in the contemporary Chinese political system.

The fourth of these is state-society. The study selected this approach because the Chinese state has a unique and long-standing relationship with society. But the study demonstrated that there are “bureaucratic differentiation pre- and post dating Europe’s modern transition”. Moreover the study only scratched the surface of the “enormous variation differentiating one Chinese region and one level of government from another”. This study found that China demands “a further disaggregation of the unwieldy concepts of “state” and “society””.<sup>462</sup> The study also found that the state-society dichotomy is an inappropriate approach for the prevailing traditions and conditions in China. The study found that Pan Wei was correct in his observation about Chinese society: it ‘is organized differently from those in the West’. What is more important, the society is not organized in terms of civil societies’. State and society are “intermingled” with each other, “penetrated by each other into an entity or many entities like waves of concentric circles”.<sup>463</sup>

The fifth of these approaches is corporatism. Initially the study contended the Chinese political system is increasingly following a form of corporatism for several reasons. The first of these is the leaderships’ drive toward an inclusive order employing various tactics including negotiation, bargaining, co-optation, and some times the threat of the use of force. The second of these reasons is the Chinese leaders’ value systems suggest the political system is increasingly following a form of corporatism. Evidence of this exists in Jiang Zemin and

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<sup>462</sup>Trends in the Study of Chinese Politics: State-Society Relations, Elizabeth J. Perry. 1994. *The China Quarterly*. 139: 707-709.

<sup>463</sup>The Chinese Model of Development, Pan Wei. 2007. *The Foreign Policy Centre*. 2-3. available at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/888.pdf> (accessed 8 August 2012).

his promotion of the ‘Three Represents’ and ‘Xiao Kang’ (e.g., a moderately prosperous society, an ancient ideal), as well as Hu Jintao and his endorsement of the ‘Harmonious Society’. The ‘Three Represents’ advocated the co-optation of the business and commercial elites, and ‘Xiao Kang’ promoted the creation of a harmonious and prosperous society. The ‘Harmonious Society’ expands the prosperity and co-optation to the broad populous. These three approaches suggest a variety of corporatism exists in China.

Bruce Dickson acknowledges corporatism captures the main elements of the Chinese system, “especially its political economy”.<sup>464</sup> However these corporatist elements are similar to key elements of the Leninist system. Those who advocate the corporatist model in China “highlight examples of leaders who change from being agents of the state to become advocates for their associations”.<sup>465</sup> Evidence of this exists in the increased role of the ACFTU. This corporatist approach assumes the state is “naturally divided entity with different interests derived from its relations with economic and professional groups”.<sup>466</sup> However “one cannot talk of state interests as opposed to those of society when the state is in fact made up of ties with interests in society”.<sup>467</sup> Dickson concludes, ‘despite the Party’s policies of inclusion, the Chinese political system is ruled by a Leninist party’ particular since the CPC aims to “preserve its power” and protects its monopoly of political organization”.<sup>468</sup> In other words it emerges that Leninism could very well best characterize the form of the Chinese political system, albeit it provides a partial characterization of the system.

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<sup>464</sup> Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 4:534.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid., 535.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid., 535.

<sup>467</sup> Corporatism and Comparative Politics, Douglas A. Chalmers. 1985. In Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

<sup>468</sup> Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Bruce Dickson. 2000-2001. *Political Science Quarterly*. 4:535.



However the definition of sociopolitical corporatism also has explanatory power. The three distinctive characteristics are:

- strong directing state
- restrictions on interest-groups' freedom and activity
- incorporation of interest groups into and as part of the state system, responsible both for representing members' interests in and to the state and for helping the state administer and carry out policies

This approach avoids differentiation in the traditional corporatist sense. Furthermore, it dovetails well with the imperial thesis. In addition the Leninist features of the system could be explained away in large part by the imperial system and the Confucian system. Although this combined approach of the imperial system and sociopolitical corporatism may not have an all-encompassing explanatory value, it may have the most powerful explanatory value.

Several realities emerge from the study. The most outstanding one is the Chinese political system does not defy encapsulation. The reality is contemporary China emerges out of an ancient civilization and an imperial system. These sociopolitical cultural factors significantly determine the form of the contemporary Chinese political system. What emerges is the existence an ancient civilization retaining long-standing traditions and institutions. It becomes wholly evident that the contemporary political system is greatly swayed by the imperial system. As previously discussed, this study labels the imperial system as a 'republic'. At the same, the study shows a unique variety of corporatism plays a role in shaping the China's contemporary political system. Accordingly, the dissertation concludes the form of the Chinese political system could be best characterized as a 'Corporatist Republic'.

### **Implications**

This study has theoretical, empirical and policy implications. As for the theoretical implications, the study makes contributions to the field of political science and in particular contemporary Chinese studies because it engages in a systematic study of the Chinese political system writ large. Additionally the study takes a unique approach in that it examines underrated variables, namely sociopolitical cultural variables that contribute to the distinctive manifest form of the Chinese political system. In addition, the project makes contributions to the sub-field of comparative politics and specifically the bodies of literature on corporatism and culture. As for the empirical implications, the project improves the empirical evidence of corporatism and especially sociopolitical corporatism in action. It also contributes to the case study work previously conducted on the Chinese political system writ large.

As for the policy implications, the dissertation has several implications for policymakers. The first of these is it provides a broad survey of the understudied factors contributing to the unique form of the Chinese political system. It also provides a general map of the political system and, perhaps more importantly its potential trajectory. As mentioned previously, this trajectory is toward the entrenchment of long-standing traditions, the ongoing meshing of contemporary elements, and the overall movement toward greater inclusion. The goal is the establishment of an absolute authority, create a seamless order among all the segments constituting the Chinese system, and restore China as a great nation. Finally, the study proposes an encapsulation of the Chinese political system writ large – a Corporatist Republic. This simply means that the Chinese political system reflects the imperial system, namely it retains the bureaucratic, military, dynastic, ideological, and center-to-provinces

traditions and that the CPC employs sociopolitical corporatism as a political strategy to merge all segments constituting the Chinese system and society into an eastern holistic order.

As the study just mentioned, the direction of the system is toward greater inclusiveness with the aim to re-establish China as a great nation; however, based on this study's examination of historical trends, the loss of the mandate of heaven could result.

### **Future Research**

There are several possible areas of future research. As for this particular project, it could be improved and expanded in several different ways. The first of these ways would involve an in-depth examination of Marxism. This leads to the second way. This way would involve an examination of the Chinese economy. The project could include an assessment of the CPC's role in the national economy, examining its role in the banks and state-owned enterprises, as well as other key institutions. The last of these ways is perhaps the project could include an evaluation of the relationship between CPC and the national minorities; this examination would further test whether the China's system has Leninist features.

The second of these areas could include conducting single case studies of countries that have similar foundations to China's. Some experts previously assert that Japan, Korea, and Vietnam are all based on the Chinese model and the Chinese experience. Moreover, they all share the ideological foundation of Confucianism.<sup>469</sup> Single case studies could be conducted on these individual countries. Building upon the single case studies, a cross-country comparative analysis could be conducted on China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. It

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<sup>469</sup> *Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture*, Lucian W. Pye. 1988. Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan; *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute*, David Kang. 2010. New York: Columbia University Press. 33. As cited in *The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice*, Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan. 2012. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*. 5:24.

could employ the sociopolitical corporatist framework of analysis to better understand these countries' transitional experience and the different manifest forms of the political systems.

The third of these areas of future research could involve employing the sociopolitical corporatist framework of analysis to other countries failing to fit neatly in to existing social science paradigm. Countries like China emerging out of civilizations and evolve into nation-states may have different national experiences and national characters than other countries not derived from great civilizations. As a result, it may be best to investigate these experiences; in particular, it would be practical and useful to employ a nonwestern framework of analysis because the more commonly employed paradigms fail to capture these types of national experiences. Future research in this area could investigate these civilizations and their experiences. Some examples of single and potential comparative case studies could include Egypt, Iran, India, and China.

The fourth of these areas of future research could examine states that are historically characterized by high degrees of state 'interference' or perhaps more aptly put greater levels of state patronage. As demonstrated in this study, China has a long interaction between the state and the society, the state and the military, as well as the state and the economy. As for the relationship between state and society, this relationship in China is quite different from in western states. Existing social paradigms often treat the relationship as a dichotomy. However the approach is not entirely useful for China because, historically speaking, the Chinese state has been embedded in society, as it is today. It might be useful to conduct an investigation of the Chinese state and society relations in the context that these two entities operate as seamless elements embedded in a holistic order. One way to further investigate the relationship is through the lens of state infrastructure projects. For instance, a future study

could examine historical projects such as the construction of the Great Wall of China and the Grand Canal projects, as well as contemporary projects such as the Three Gorge Dam and other elaborate infrastructure projects such as the construction of the rail networks.

Another potential area of research is the relationship between the state and the military. A researcher for instance could conduct a comparative case study of Egypt and China. This approach would be effective for at least two specific reasons. The first of these reasons is that both states emerged out of ‘great civilizations’. Thus there exists the ‘civilizational affect’, which means the systems are subject to unique imperatives and historical antecedents. The second of these is that both states have a high but accepted degree of military intervention in politics, particularly when the political institutions start to fail in times of disorder and instability.

As for the state and the economy, the interaction between these two institutions has been relatively seamless and has been this way throughout Chinese history, apart from a brief period under Mao when the economy was disrupted. In contemporary China, the CPC plays a dominant role in the economic system. It has established powerful state owned enterprises and state owned banks. The CPC controls the roughly 120 state-owned enterprises and has a pervasive presence in the banks, directing commercial and policy-related loans. In effect a large part of the Chinese economic system relies on state patronage. Future research could investigate over time the interaction of the Chinese state and the economy and how that historical relationship influences the economy and by extension the nature of the Chinese political system today.