

BRIDGING NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

by

ANN PAWLIK KRYZANEK

(Under the Direction of Markus Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

This thesis contributes to the debate on the viability of civil society in Africa, and its potential to consolidate the continent's emerging democracies. It explores democratic participation among the African citizenry within a social trust framework, comparing the experiences of South Africa and Botswana. Using Afrobarometer data from the 2003 survey set, this project disaggregates patterns of social trust into two specific forms, namely generalized and particularized trust. These values are then measured against various dimensions of national political participation, including voting, contacting parliamentarians, protesting, and other forms of activity. The research findings establish that the presence of high levels of particularized trust within divided societies discourages participation in national political activity at the individual level, while generalized trust in cohesive societies induces participation in national political life. Ultimately, the findings suggest that the dynamics of social cohesion in Africa must be taken into account when forecasting the future of democracy on the continent.

INDEX WORDS: Democratization, Africa, political participation, generalized trust, particularized trust

BRIDGING NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

by

ANN PAWLIK KRYZANEK

B.A. Boston College, 2005

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2008

© 2008

Ann Pawlik Kryzanek

All Rights Reserved

BRIDGING NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE DYNAMICS OF TRUST AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

by

ANN PAWLIK KRYZANEK

Major Professor:	Markus Crepaz
Committee:	Abdulahi Osman Sherry Lowrance

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December, 2008

DEDICATION

To my mother and father, with gratitude.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Markus Crepaz for his direction, guidance, encouragement, and enthusiasm throughout this thesis project. I would also like to thank Drs. Sherry Lowrance, Abdulahi Osman, and Shaheen Mozzaffar for their assistance and advice. I am also grateful for the support of my peers in the School of Public and International Affairs; in particular Johannes Karreth, Mwita Chacha, and all of my colleagues at GLOBIS. Lastly, I am forever indebted to my parents, and my sisters Laura and Kathryn, for their unceasing love and encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
 CHAPTER	
1 An Introduction	1
Associational Life, Participation, and Social Trust	2
2 A Review of the Literature	7
General Theories of Participation	7
Political Participation in Africa	12
3 A Theoretical Framework	15
The Mechanics of Social Trust	16
Bonds and Bridges in Africa	18
Bridging to National Participation	22
4 Comparative Hypotheses	26
South Africa	26
Botswana	30
Conclusion	34
5 The Research Design	35
Operationalization of Concepts	36

	The Dependent Variable.....	37
	Independent Variables.....	39
	Alternative Hypotheses and Control Variables	40
6	Research Findings and Discussion.....	41
	Bonding and Bridging in South Africa.....	41
	Participation Findings in South Africa.....	44
	Bonding and Bridging in Botswana	47
	Participation Findings in Botswana	48
	Model Fit	51
7	Conclusion and Implications.....	53
	REFERENCES	56

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: A Sample of Civil Society Organizations throughout Africa	3
Table 2: Factor Analysis of Types of Trust in South Africa (Varimax Rotation)	42
Table 3: Regression Results of the Impact of Bonding Social Trust on Participation in National Political Life in South Africa	45
Table 4: Factor Analysis of Types of Trust in Botswana (Varimax Rotation)	48
Table 5: Regression Results of the Impact of Bonding Social Trust on Participation in National Political Life in Botswana	49

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1: Pattern of Social Trust across Africa.....	5
Figure 2: A Comparison of Language Fractionalization	32
Figure 3: Comparing Experiences with Corruption in Botswana and South Africa.....	34

CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION

“Mlimbua nchi ni mwananchi. It is the citizen who profits from the fruit of his country.”

- Swahili Proverb

After decades of dictatorship, the latest wave of democratization has permeated across Africa. The continent is now confronting the trying task of democratic consolidation, in the face of considerable obstacles and challenges. Promoters of democracy have emphasized a need for ‘good governance’ and a stable market system in order to achieve consolidation. But a third, “bottom-up” approach to democratization has been vigorously debated among academic and policy circles. This agenda involves strengthening the capacity of the African citizenry and building a solid civil society organism. Many have wrestled with the idea that African civil society has the potential to democratize the continent and perhaps even lift its people out of poverty.

But in order to determine the potential of this third way for Africa, one must closely examine the dynamics of social capital on the continent. Evaluating African civil society requires one to observe how the citizenry relates to one another and how it relates to the political arena. When examining Afrobarometer data specific to these kind of inquiries, one will find a puzzling occurrence. There appears to be a thriving civic life and a politically active citizenry throughout the continent, but also a minimal degree of interpersonal trust among individuals.

While nearly three quarters of African citizens surveyed claimed to take part in a voluntary or political organization of some kind, more than 80 percent of these respondents exhibited low levels of interpersonal trust. In many respects, this occurrence in Afrobarometer data runs counter to theoretical expectations. Robert Putnam (1995) and other scholars have established an empirical link between the strength of associational life and the degree of social trust within a society. Putnam explains, “The greater the associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens. Trust and engagement are two facets of the same underlying factor—social capital (1995, 73).”

Associational Life, Participation, and Social Trust

In recent years, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a promising surge in civic and political participation. The authoritarian grip of the African state has receded since the Cold War’s end, opening up political space for civil society groups and non-state actors. As such, civic life has flourished in this new public milieu. In Uganda, one can observe civil society groups lobbying their local government councils, in order to help shape national HIV/AIDS policies and implementation processes.¹ In South Africa, we find a host of powerful urban social movements that use protest mechanisms to secure better redistributive policies. In cities all over Kenya, we hear roaring crowds at massive election rallies. And in Burundi and Senegal, one can observe flourishing civic communities within the Christian churches and the Islamic brotherhoods. In fact, veritable Africanists have acknowledged that associational life in Africa is “high by world standards” (Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). According to Afrobarometer research, 74 percent of Africans surveyed acknowledged that they belong to, and are active,

¹ Pan African Conference of Ministers for Local Government: Leadership Capacity Building for Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa: Lesotho, 2006, pp. 12-15

within a voluntary organization. Moreover, roughly one-third of these respondents stated that they belonged to more than one voluntary organization.² Though participation in political movements and civic associations assumes distinctive forms in each of these countries, there appears to be a common thread throughout Africa of individuals joining together in pursuit of shared goals. Below, Table 1 demonstrates the variety of civil society organizations that exist throughout the African continent.

Table 1: A Sample of Civil Society Organizations throughout Africa

Nigeria	Country Women's Association of Nigeria
Cameroon	Betterworld Cameroon
Ghana	City Environmental Foundation
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lique Congolaise De Lutte Contre La Corruption-Licoco
Nigeria	Safe Water for Africa Community Initiative (SWACI)
Cote D'Ivoire	Ivoire Developpment Durable
South Africa	Landless People's Movement Treatment Action Campaign
Uganda	The AIDS Support Organization (TASO)
Senegal	Jamra SIDA Service

The continent's thriving civic life leads one to expect that levels of interpersonal trust between African citizens are high. According to the literature, a robust and growing associational life should co-exist with an environment of social trust. Where there is coordinated

² See Bratton, Mattes, Gyimah-Boadi (2005) for discussion, including full explanation of survey question and responses.

political action, there is likely a degree of trust among individuals (Krishna, 2005). Where there are communities of civic interaction, we should observe horizontal linkage (Putnam, 1993). However, statistical data from a recent round of the Afrobarometer survey reveals that across the continent, social trust among people is, in fact, starkly low. In 18 African countries, Afrobarometer respondents were asked to answer a question that read: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful when dealing with people?”³ In each of the 18 countries, respondent answers were markedly weighted to the latter. Figure 1, on the next page, displays the aggregate results from each of the surveys.

Low levels of trust are ubiquitous across Africa, characterizing both rural, agrarian nations like Malawi and urban and industrialized countries like South Africa. How is it that we can observe healthy associational life in Africa if there are considerably low levels of trust among individuals? If African societies are indeed characterized by low social trust, why is that we observe an ever-growing degree of civic and political engagement?

In order to explain this puzzling occurrence, this thesis aims to deconstruct the dynamics of social trust in Africa. Understanding such complex social processes requires one to disaggregate the concept of social trust into its specific forms, namely that which is generalized and that which is particular. By conceptually parsing out these social processes and mapping their separate effects on participation, we will be able to consider whether African civil society will remain pocketed and particularized or if it has the potential to broaden, deepen, and eventually induce change.

³ Countries include: Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe




Figure 1: Pattern of Social Trust Across Africa⁴

Scholars of the developing world have indeed established a link between social trust and various dimensions of political participation. Anirudh Krishna (2005) conducted research in 69 Indian villages and discovered high rates of political participation within high-trusting villages. But despite her interesting results, Krishna's work fails to account for different forms of social trust. In doing so, this thesis finds that different forms of social trust have systematically different effects on citizen participation in Africa.

In more general terms, this thesis aims to better understand civic and political participation in Africa and to explore how its course is shaped by dynamics of social cohesion. The paper will be structured as follows. First, the relevant literature regarding participation and politics in Africa is examined. Secondly, a theoretical perspective is laid out and hypotheses are

⁴ Source: Round 3 Afrobarometer Survey, conducted from March 2005 through February 2006

set forth. The hypotheses relate to the experiences of the two countries that I examine in detail, South Africa and Botswana. Following this, the design of the research is explained and a statistical analysis of the two countries is presented. Finally, concluding remarks bring together the various elements of this study.

CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The existing literature on the dynamics of civic and political participation is vast. Substantive research has been put forth in the area of participation in the United States and other industrialized democracies, but more recent work explores these concepts in new democracies throughout the developing world.

General Theories of Participation

Three general theories regarding the origins and mechanisms of participation appear in the literature. The first theory is, in many respects, a contextualist argument that espouses socio-economic, class, ethnic, linguistic, and religious explanations for political phenomena. In this framework engagement is a function of an individual's socio-economic status (SES), level of education, and other demographic characteristics (Verba and Nie, 1972). It has been established that general literacy as well as civic and factual political knowledge are often prerequisites to political participation. As such, educated citizens tend to participate more broadly. There is a substantial body of empirical research that corroborates this speculation, as it has been found that schooling has a positive effect on citizen's attendance at the ballot box as well as their political actions in between elections (Bratton, 1999). In addition to education, social status affects an individual's propensity for participation, as higher social status is often correlated with feelings of political efficacy. In their work *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing*

Countries, Huntington and Nelson state that peasants and urban poor often exhibit low political efficacy, as these groups tend to lack sufficient information, contacts, income, and time. Often they expect their requests to be ignored, and they may fear repression from the government or discrimination from employers, creditors, or landlords (Huntington and Nelson, 1987).

The fundamental axiom of the SES model is that, *ceteris paribus*, those individuals that possess greater motivation and resources for political or civic activity will be more inclined to become active (Verba and Nie, 1987; Leighley, 1995). In many respects, both motivation and resources tend to be a function of certain ascriptive and achievement characteristics. But some scholars have deconstructed the SES theory, isolating resources as the main determinant of participation (Brady, et. al, 1995). These scholars propose that the presence or absence of resources, such as time, money, and civic skills, can explain the variation in participation levels within and across nations. The presence or absence of resources—which are determined by both accidents of birth and individual choices—also establishes the theoretical and empirical mechanism that links socioeconomic status to participatory activity.

A second and related theory within the literature recognizes an attitudinal component to participation. This theory proposes that the sources of an individual's participation in political and civic life are their values, attitudes, and motivations, which can either be linked to their socio-economic status or be independent from it. Essentially, this model espouses a psychological explanation of participation, proposing that a citizen's "interest in politics" or "political engagement" induces action (Bratton, 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001). Empirical evidence from a recent focus group study of participation in Zambia has supported this claim, as it was found that an individual's level of interest in political affairs was positively related to

multiple dimensions of participation (Bratton, 1999).⁵ In addition to levels of engagement in political affairs, scholars suspect that an individual's trust in government leaders and institutions may affect their propensity for civic action. Evidence from the same focus group established that individuals' trust in government was positively correlated with the act of contacting political leaders.⁶

While attitudinal variables command explanatory and empirical power, they may also be theoretically and methodologically unsound. Attitudes and behavior are often inter-related, making it difficult to distinguish the direction of the causal connection. While some posit that political engagement induces action, it is just as likely that a citizen's participation in a voluntary association or isolated event may generate an interest in political affairs. Similarly, participatory acts may build one's trust in government, as much as institutional trust spurs action (Bratton, 1999). Moreover, attitudinal variables tend to conceptually conflate political participation and psychological involvement in politics. While these concepts are related, their processes produce different outcomes and, therefore, should be theoretically separated (Verba and Nie, 1987). Lastly, scholars are unable to accurately identify how attitudes relate to socio-economic characteristics. They have employed various assumptions regarding education levels and political involvement, but these assumptions have not been empirically verified. This is especially true of studies in developing countries, where research in this area is mostly embryonic.

A third theory of participation posits institutions as the primary causal factor. In their seminal work, March and Olsen define institutions as "...collections of standard operating

⁶ Both findings were the product of simple bi-variate tests.

procedures and structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own right” (March and Olsen, 1983, p. 738).

Both political behaviorists and contextualists have dismissed institutions as mere arenas in which more fundamental or even primordial factors play out. Institutionalists recognize an interdependence between society and autonomous social and political organizations, elevating the latter’s importance in driving the contextual arrangements of political outcomes. March and Olsen state, “Institutions seem to be neither neutral reflections of exogenous environmental forces nor neutral arenas for the performances of individuals driven by exogenous preferences and expectations” (March and Olsen, 1983, 742).

Institutions may affect a wide-range of political processes and practices. Those that influence mass participation can be macro-level institutions or more proximate, micro-level organizations. Some scholars have identified precisely how macro-level institutions have affected voter turnout in industrialized democracies. According to Jackman and Miller, institutional arrangements embodied in electoral laws can account for variation in turnout across Europe in the 1980s (Jackman and Miller, 1995). Similarly, proportional representation structures have been found to mobilize voters in a systematically different way than single-member districts (Jackman, 1987; Powell, 1986; Blais and Carty, 1988). As such, these structural differences have had a substantial effect on the dynamics of voter turnout in these systems. In addition, other scholars have gone beyond the specifics of system rules and design, to examine how the institutional politics affects participation. Numbers and types of parties as well as the degree of party polarization within a country have proven to have a significant effect on voter turnout in industrialized democracies (Crepaz, 1990).

Some scholars use a more narrow perspective of institutions in their analysis of political participation. From a micro-perspective an institution is merely an organized grouping of formal rules. As Michael Bratton notes, “Citizens obtain institutional affiliations with organized bodies of formal rule when they register as voters or when they join political parties or voluntary associations” (Bratton, 1999, 554). While some would consider large-scale formal institutions to be more influential in mobilizing participation, it is often more proximate institutions that garner citizens into the political process. Individuals often organize in groups around community, religious, ethnic, or workplace issues. Essentially, they take cues from these organizations, which they use to shape their beliefs and actions. These organizations also provide an opportunity for individuals’ to sharpen their citizenship skills and learn the democratic process. Like local associations, political parties also mobilize individuals into political life by acting as an “organized conduit” to government agencies and decision-making structures (Levy, 1996). Cross-continental survey studies have established that individuals who have carried party membership cards have been more likely to participate in national politics (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

Lastly, a group of scholars have considered how meso-level factors, such as social capital, may intersect with micro and macro-level explanations of political participation. Robert Putnam’s seminal work laid out how horizontal linkages among citizens through voluntary associational life leads to the kind of civic engagement that makes democracy work (Putnam, 1993). Political Scientist Anirudh Krishna found that meso-level factors were indeed important to the nature of political participation within villages in India. While individual characteristics played a pivotal role, group level variables determined to what extent the villagers participated in politics (Krishna, 2002). Social capital is essential in these villages as it is, “...the glue, which

binds community members together in collective action and the gear, which directs community members toward participating in democracy building” (Krishna, 2002, p. 439).

While it is evident that socio-economic, attitudinal, institutional, and meso-level variables are each important determinants of mass participation, it is necessary to assess which factor holds more weight in the African political arena.

Political Participation in Africa

To some extent, one must employ a state-society framework of political science in order to understand political and civic participation in Africa. Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (1988) present an image of state and society in Africa as “precariously balanced.” Since independence the state has enjoyed a curious relationship with African society, at once both overextended and entirely disconnected from the populace. Its citizens are simultaneously attracted and wary of the state. While Africans have never entirely legitimized the state, it is nevertheless the most central body on the continent and the only capable provider for the populace. As such, society appears to be both incorporated and disengaged from the state, depending upon the field of opportunity at a particular point in time.

This reality helps to explain patterns of engagement in Africa. Because citizens frequently evade the state, political contact tends to remain informal and within parochial settings. When contact does occur, it is often through local councils, as opposed to Members of Parliament. Research has shown that Africans are more likely to approach influential community members rather than public officials connected to the state (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyiamah Boadi, 2004). Moreover, modes of political communication are primarily oral, as opposed to written. For these reasons, the parochial setting is often the center of political

orientation, giving “political action a centrifugal character” (Hyden and Williams, 1994; Monga, 1996). This may be a result of what Michael Bratton terms the African “hybrid culture.” Bratton argues that Africans conceive of political life both from the perspective of traditional chieftanship and from the modern state, and from a local rather than national perspective (Bratton, 1999).

These attributes of political culture appear in literature on participation in Africa, a body of research that is varied in scope and content. A number of studies have focused on the dynamics of electoral participation in new African democracies (Bratton, 1998; Nohlen et. al, 1999; Elklit et. al, 1997). Voter turnout statistics have been abnormally high in some transitioning countries, as citizens relish in the opportunity to participate in inaugural democratic elections. While electoral participation within African countries has been widespread during transitions from authoritarianism, it often quickly subsides as citizens face the more difficult challenges of democratic consolidation.

Analyzing new patterns of participatory democracy in transitioning Africa may require one to delve deeper than electoral activity. There is a propensity within the literature to view participation through an electoral lens. However, this approach may ignore what Naomi Chazan labels “subnational participatory patterns” (Chazan, 1982, 172). Essentially, these sub-national patterns entail processes of non-formal political association. There are two types of non-formal participatory structures, volunteer and ascriptive or primary organizations. Grasping these participatory structures is essential to understanding behavior in an African setting, as these structures are outgrowths of traditional forms of political association across the continent. Non-formal political participation is clearly delineated by the group (not the individual) and is

voluntary (not compulsory) (Chazan, 1982, Hyden and Williams, 1994). In fact, African political culture has been historically marked by the tradition of group action and voluntarism.

Today, the informal participation of civil society groups is becoming a more important component of the African political arena. The neo-liberal prescriptions of the international community have forced the state to recede slightly from the landscape in Africa, making room for more organized and assertive volunteer associations (Bratton, 1989). These groups are an important subject of investigation, as the effects of associational activity and other processes of non-formal action are often more direct than formal, state-sponsored mechanisms of participation.

This thesis aims to contribute to the growing literature on political behavior in Africa. Much of this research examines public opinion towards democracy in Africa, in an attempt to gauge how the African populace is adjusting to this new political order. Scholars have gauged whether perceptions of democracy are culturally specific or universal, intrinsic or instrumental, politically or economically driven. A lesser number of scholars have examined the manifestations of popular support for democracy, that is, participation in its processes. While some have speculated about the origins and characteristics of participation in African democracies, most of these studies are country-specific examinations of political action or narrowly focused analyses of electoral patterns. This thesis aims to present a broader, two-country study of participation in Africa so as to make a more systematic claim regarding mass political behavior on the continent. Likewise, this thesis aims to focus on a theory of meso-level characteristics in participation, as the next chapter will explore.

CHAPTER 3

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section develops a theoretical framework from which various hypotheses may be tested. This theory aims to explain the sources and mechanisms of participation in Africa, specifically examining the experiences of South Africa and Botswana and laying out theoretical expectations with respect to these countries.

In many respects, political behavior in Africa is conditioned by its multiple crises. Africans inhabit an environment of persistent underdevelopment, economic stagnation, tenacious disease, and political instability. Some choose to be associated with the state as mere “consumers”, recognizing that the limited distributive capacities of the government are perhaps their only means of survival (Azarya, 1988). Others have chosen to withdraw and disengage, having recognized the state’s diminishing resource base. This “exit” population chooses to participate in the informal economy of smuggling and black markets. These individuals also rely on indigenous social institutions to manage crises, making use of traditional leadership, clanship, and patronage.

Still others have voiced their dissatisfaction with the state’s operation in an effort to modify policies and improve governmental performance. Across the continent, we see pockets of emphatic and vocal political participation. But whose voices are these? And what factors effect who participates in shaping Africa’s future?

In order to explore these questions this thesis examines meso-level characteristics to explain participatory patterns across the continent. Building off an expansive literature on the subject, I argue that patterns of social capital within a nation will determine the levels of citizen participation. At the individual level, I argue that citizens who exhibit strong generalized trust will be more inclined to participate in national political life.

The most important contribution to the literature on African participation has been Michael Bratton's (1999) "Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from Zambia." In his article Bratton contends that both institutions and attitudes "evolve co-determinately" in Africa to affect citizen participation (Bratton, 1999, 583). He finds a positive and significant relationship between three types of institutional association and multiple dimensions of political participation.⁷ Moreover, he found that certain attitudinal variables such as "orientation toward traditional authority" and "interest in politics" are also important predictors of participation. However, his analysis may be too narrowly focused on specific macro-level institutions or explicit micro-level attitudes. He fails to consider what lies between these thresholds. Foreseeably, meso-level characteristics and under-lying patterns of societal cohesion may affect engagement in Africa. Through the lens of a social trust framework, we can better understand how individuals are channeled toward democratic participation.

The Mechanics of Social Trust

Trust between persons is a fundamental part of social life and an essential building block of any civil society. In its simplest form, trust can be characterized as "faith in people." In

⁷ He explains affiliations with agencies of voter registration, to political parties, and voluntary associations, are the institutions that link citizen and state.

many ways, it is a mechanism that facilitates processes of social interaction. Markus Crepaz explains, “Trust is a societal resource that allows people to achieve outcomes and engage with each other in social interactions that make all of them better off than they would be if they didn’t trust each other. (Crepaz, 2008, 94).

Some scholars believe that trust is a moral value, learned from one’s parents and independent of personal experience or societal interaction (Uslaner, 2002). Others consider it to be a product of societal linkages and civic networks (Putnam, 1993). Regardless of this debate, trust is of great importance to social science because it has proven to induce powerful externalities. On an individual level, empirical evidence has demonstrated that people who feel that others in society can be trusted are more likely to be engaged in civic life, to be optimistic about their circumstances, and to have more positive views of government institutions (Putnam, 2000). On a macro level, more trusting societies tend to have better functioning democracies, less crime and corruption, and greater economic growth (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Knack and Keefer, 1997).

The literature asserts that social trust is an important component of any civil society. Essentially, it fosters cooperation by creating linkages between people who are different from one another (Uslaner, 2002). And so, social capital becomes an important part of a democratic system, muting opportunities for free riding and opportunism (Putnam, 2000). Various scholars have attempted to empirically corroborate the relationship between trust and democracy, but have found competing evidence for their correlation. Some studies assert that trust causes democracy and others argue the contrary (Muller and Seligson, 1994; Inglehart, 1997). It is often quite difficult to disaggregate the conceptual notion of “democracy” to find an empirical relationship between it and social trust. We cannot be certain of the relationship between these

two concepts, but we can examine how social trust affects a building block of any democracy, political participation.

Social science literature has approached the relationship between trust and participation. Putnam (2000) finds a strong association between social trust and forms of engagement, noting that nations with high rates of voter turnout are also more trusting. However, Uslaner's (2002) cross-continental study finds minimal evidence to assert that high "trustors" are more likely to participate in political life. Their competing evidence suggests that this relationship has yet to be completely fleshed out in the literature. Perhaps we need to examine how these forces are related in an African context, where the dynamics of social trust are marked by experiences different than most other social systems.

Bonds and Bridges in Africa

Before we can examine political participation within this framework, we must first disaggregate the concept of trust. Any study of social trust must recognize that it is conceptually divided into two forms, particularized and generalized. Particularized trustors place faith only in members of their own "in-group", that is people they know. Generalized trustors place faith in all members of their society, including strangers or members of their "out-group." Robert Putnam has explained this concept in terms of a "bonding-bridging axis." He explains, "bonding social capital brings together people who are like one another in important ways (ethnicity, age, gender, class, and so on), whereas bridging social capital refers to social networks that bring together people who are unlike one another" (Putnam, 2002, 11).⁸ Uslaner relates this dichotomy to the moral foundations of trust. He views the difference between "bonders" and "bridgers" as, essentially, a difference in the inclusiveness of one's moral community. He

⁸ This thesis will use generalized and bridging trust as well as particularized and bonding trust interchangeably.

explains, “When you only trust your own kind, your moral community is rather restricted” (Uslaner, 2002, 27).

The complexity of social trust is nowhere more apparent than on the continent of Africa. For a number of reasons, one is likely to observe a high degree of “bonding” social trust in Africa, as most countries are composed of highly fractious societies. Groups are divided along ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, and religious lines. Moreover, African societies have displayed intense affinities for these groupings, as indicated by the myriad of political cleavages, inter-ethnic violence, and civil war on the continent. For the most part, these affinities originate in a shared livelihood, common values, and a collective memory. Donald Rothschild explains, “Ethnicity, or a sense of peoplehood, has its foundation in combined remembrances of past experience, and in common aspirations, values, norms, and expectations” (Rothschild, 1997, 4). As such, these ethnic affinities are intense and difficult to break. Many scholars—particularly those that adhere to the axioms of “conflict theory”—have agreed that ethnic heterogeneity often fosters out-group distrust and in-group solidarity (Putnam, 2007).⁹ And so, we are likely to observe “bonding” as opposed to “bridging” social trust in African countries.

The tradition of collectivity in African societies also contributes to high “bonding” trust. To a great extent, social organization in Africa is largely dominated by communal and familial structures. Goran Hyden and Donald Williams present a “Community Model” of African politics, which details the “communitarian orientation” of social action across the continent (Hyden and Williams, 1994). The community—which originates in and is maintained by primordial attachments—is the most ascendant realm in African society. Basic norms of social organization are located at this level, and this includes institutions such as the family unit, the kin, the village grouping, and the ethnic clan. Moreover, norms of morality are developed within

⁹ For an explanation and discussion of conflict theory, see Chapter 5.

these structures. As such, political ideology, viewpoints, and preferences emanate from the communal polity. The well-known African proverb, “It takes a village to raise a child” is perhaps the most salient illustration of bonding trust on the continent.

Conversely, we would expect a lesser degree of “bridging” social trust across Africa. Robert Putnam has argued that bonding social trust is a form of “...inward looking social capital which tends to promote the material, social, or political interests of their own members” (Putnam, 2002, 11). On the other hand, he explains that forms of bridging social capital are inherently “outward looking” and “concern themselves with public goods.” If we agree with Putnam’s formulation, we are less likely to observe bridging social trust in an African context because there is, in many respects, a scarcity of public goods across the continent.

The scarcity of public goods has its source in the feeble African state. The weaknesses of the state apparatus are pervasive in Africa, prompting many scholars to categorize it as a “Lame Leviathan” (Callaghy, 1987; Bratton, 1993; Mamdani, 1992). The chronic economic crisis and fragile institutional environment has undermined the political authority of the state in Africa, preventing the state from effectively governing society. The state has even failed to meet popular expectations of basic need service. Because the social contract between the state and African society is infirm, one observes only a shallow penetration of the state into society structures. And considerable portions of Africans evade state structures entirely (Chabal, 1986; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1988). Michael Bratton explains:

“In many African countries, ordinary people are ceasing to regard the state as their own and are refusing to comply with official injunctions. This loss of legitimacy is manifest in numerous ways, from an irresponsible underground culture of jest at official corruption, to outright disregard of the rule of law in crime and banditry” (Bratton, 1989, 410).

But the disconnect between state and society has more fundamental origins. In their “Community Model” Hyden and Williams (1994) argue that the “social collectivity” of the state is merely a secondary realm in African life, left over from the colonial era of indirect rule. The state is largely a construct and the national polity in Africa is largely fabricated. The African has little connection to the impersonal and bureaucratic mechanisms of rule that are embodied in the state, as they have “weak foundations” in the community. As Hyden and Williams conclude, the state is merely a source of material benefit for much of African society (Hyden and Williams, 1994, 75).

In short, the state’s incapacities, the legacies of colonialism, and the presence of strong sub-national affinities have melded together to degrade national consciousness across Africa. For these reasons, one will likely observe less bridging trust in African countries. In such an environment, individuals are less likely to exhibit feelings of solidarity with their fellow citizens or perceive a “shared fate” with others across their nation.

Perhaps the factor most detrimental to bridging trust in African societies is the high levels of state-sponsored corruption that exist across the continent. The practice of corruption is rampant and pervasive in African countries, costing the continent nearly 150 billion U.S. dollars in revenue a year.¹⁰ But the social costs of widespread corruption may, in fact, inflict more harm. Uslaner argues that the roots of generalized trust in any society lie in the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities. Corruption, therefore, degrades generalized trust by degrading equitability. Rothstein and Uslaner explain, “[C]orruption is based upon loyalty to the in-group and *not* to the larger society... Corrupt societies reflect patron-client relationships and corrupt leaders reward *only those who show their loyalty rather than the entire society*”

¹⁰ Elizabeth Blunt, BBC News, September 2002 (news.bbc.co.uk)

(Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, 53,).¹¹ This in turn, increases social tensions and decreases social trust, as people think that the only “route to prosperity is through dishonesty” (55). Because markedly high levels of corruption characterize African countries, one should expect low levels of bridging trust and social cohesion.

Bridging to National Participation

But the question remains, can these patterns of social trust in Africa explain who participates in the political process? I argue that they indeed may. Those who demonstrate greater “bridging” social trust will be more likely to participate in national political activities. Generalized trusters are more likely to perceive a “shared fate” among citizens in a nation. Their sense of solidarity bridges the boundaries of distinctive groupings and adheres to the notion of one society, united by common sets of goals (Uslaner, 2002). This “shared fate” provides an attitudinal impetus for national political participation. Using Uslaner’s terminology, generalized trusters have a more inclusive moral community, and may feel an obligation to improve the country’s collective lot by participating in its political processes.

In his work *Trust Beyond Borders: Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies*, Markus Crepaz (2008) examines the outcomes of both “bonding” and “bridging” social trust in industrial democracies. According to Crepaz, the differences between these forms of social capital in welfare states can be observed simply in one’s willingness to pay taxes. Although his framework applies to developed countries, the processes are one in the same. He explains:

¹¹ Italics in original.

“[P]rimordial trusters should favor more local forms of representation, which are more congruent with the width of their moral community. They ask what is in it for them, what can they get out of it, rather than what, or even why, they should put anything into a distant institution that affects them only tangentially. Universal trusters, on the other hand, should be more willing to what in German is called a Vertrauensvorschuss or trust advance to institutions that operate at a higher level and produce nationwide policies. This is because universal trusters’ sense of ethical commitment transcends the boundaries of their own identity and extends beyond their immediate in-group. They see institutions operating at the distant federal level to be designed to represent everybody, not just their own immediate interests” (Crepaz, 2008, 123).

Keeping this in mind, it is important to examine the breadth of the participatory process, including that which goes beyond trust. Mediating forms of agency are often necessary causal mechanisms in this process because they channel individual preferences and induce democratic participation. Institutions often serve as this mediating agent. Verba and Nie explain, “Institutions expose those affiliated with them to politically relevant stimuli such as discussion about politics or concern for social issues” (Verba and Nie, 1987, 81). They continue, “Institutions may provide opportunities to be active within them and thereby provide skills and expectations that are then generalized to political activity” (Verba and Nie, 1987, 81).

Political parties have traditionally been the primary institutional mechanism, linking citizen and state. They are assumed to be the primary channel for citizen expression within the formal governmental system (Schmitz and Hutchful, 1992). Even in nations where party systems are weak, they provide access to government. In addition, they provide “short cuts” for individuals who rely on organizations or symbols to “orient” themselves in the political system (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). The party system in Africa, although weak, is not inconsequential. The one-party state induced great loyalty among the populace towards political parties, and this loyalty still lingers, even after transitions to multiparty-ism.

Although this thesis examines participation within a framework of social trust, it nevertheless recognizes the importance of institutional linkage. Bratton has determined the significance of institutions to outcomes of participation, and so any discussion that neglects their role is, perhaps, incomplete. As is discussed in chapter 2, social capital only provides the “glue” that coheres society. Institutions of agency are needed to “gear” one’s action toward participation (Krishna, 2002). Berman has suggested that social capital is a “politically neutral multiplier” (Berman, 1997a, 427), and so agency becomes necessary to direct social capital towards an objective or purpose. Nonetheless, the process begins with and depends on trust within societies.

Critics of such an approach may question the importance of trust variables in exceedingly poor, developing countries. Given the dire poverty levels in many African countries, one could assume that any civic or political participation is directly related to one’s material well-being. The logic is that an individual will be unable to “participate” if one is engaged in daily struggles for survival and livelihood. Although this argument makes intuitive sense, there is scant evidence to support its claim. In his study on Zambia, Bratton (1997) found that his measure of household income could not predict whether Zambians would vote, engage in communal political actions, or contact their Members of Parliament.¹² In addition, he found that an increase in educational attainment decreased the propensity for Zambians to vote. Bratton’s finding suggest that participation across Africa is perhaps more complex than what one would consider from a bird’s eye view of the continent. Although conditions of poverty undoubtedly influence one’s propensity to participate in the political system, its singular explanatory power is rather

¹² The survey measure was based on a monthly assessment of household income.

limited. Meso-level characteristics may fill in gaps left over from a “politics of the belly” explanation of participation.

On the most fundamental level, examining the meso-level characteristics of social trust in Africa is important to our understanding of contemporary Africa. It will likely clear up ambiguities about the state of civil society in Africa that exist within the literature. In his seminal article “Beyond the State: Associational Life in Africa”, Michael Bratton argues that there has been an opening of political space for associational life. As the state retreats in the neo-liberal order, voluntary associations are becoming more organized and assertive (Bratton, 1989). According to Bratton and others who have expanded his thesis, civic society in Africa stands to be an influential part of the political milieu in the future. But before we accept Bratton’s argument, we must first take into account the dynamics of social capital in African civil society. If bridging social trust has strengthened within civil society in the past decade, the prospects for participatory democracy across the continent may be vast. However, if associational life has only strengthened along strict boundaries, democratic consolidation in Africa may remain incomplete well into the future.

CHAPTER 4

COMPARATIVE HYPOTHESES

In order to explore the relationship between trust and participation in national political life, it is useful to compare the experiences of countries in which we would expect different outcomes. I examine two countries in particular, South Africa and Botswana. Both of these Southern African nations have notably strong democratic institutions, and both have garnered praise from the international community for their successful transitions to democracy. However, these two nations differ markedly in their demographic, ethnic, and socio-economic composition and in their prevalence of government corruption. As such, I expect dissimilar patterns of social trust between these countries and, hence, different outcomes with respect to political participation.

South Africa

Post-Apartheid South Africa has faced a host of divisive problems, which contribute to a lack of social cohesion there. The most pressing issues of the past decade have been the persistence of high inequality, racial and ethnic tensions, and high levels of crime and corruption. These are exactly the kinds of problems that often degrade social trust within a society, according to Uslaner (2000), Rothstein (2002) and Putnam (2007). For these reasons, one should expect a low degree of bridging trust and a high degree of bonding trust in South Africa.

Socio-economic inequality in South Africa remains the country's greatest demon. According to recent statistics, the 10 percent of South Africans with the highest income earn more than half of the nation's total income. Moreover, the average income of the top-earning 20 % of South African households is nearly 45 times that of the bottom earning 20 percent.¹³ Although South Africa scores high on the Human Development Index (HDI) in relation to its neighbors, poverty plagues a substantial portion of the population. According to I. Woolard, an estimated 23 percent of the population in 2000 was living on less than \$2 a day. The nation's inequality is perhaps most apparent in its glaring unemployment rate of 38.8 percent.¹⁴ A substantial portion of the populace functions entirely outside of formal structures, as indicated by South Africa's enormous informal economy. Figures from 2004 have revealed that between 25 and 30 percent of the South African labor force is working in the informal economy (Devey, Skinner and Valodia, 2003). This populace is ubiquitous throughout the nation, inhabiting both the urban townships of the Western Cape and the rural outposts of Kwazulu-Natal.

South Africa has failed to escape the remnants of the apartheid regime, as its socio-economic structure is largely race-based. Even now there are gaping disparities in income, education, and health status among racial groups. President Thabo Mbeki has famously spoken of "two nations" within South Africa. In a speech before the National Assembly, he stated, "One of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with

¹³ <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/South-Africa-POVERTY-AND-WEALTH.html>

¹⁴ Source: ALDRU data from South African Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town; October Household Survey (OHS) and Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from Statistical Releases of Statistics South Africa. <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/usam/default.html>

the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled.”¹⁵

The persistence of inequality in South Africa can be partly attributed to government policy. In 1996 the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s dominant party, replaced their Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) with the current Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Act (GEAR). The former was an established policy agenda aimed at achieving equitable growth and opportunity, while the latter policy has maintained economic orthodoxy in South Africa as to strengthen the competitive edge of the country’s capitalist markets. GEAR has largely undermined achievements made towards eradicating the socio-economic inconsistencies left over from the apartheid era.

In such an environment of high inequality, generalized trust diminishes and particularized trust thrives. Uslaner and Rothstein explain, “In societies with high levels of economic inequality and with few (or inefficient) policies in place for increasing equality of opportunity, there is less concern for people of different backgrounds. The rich and the poor in a country with a highly unequal distribution of wealth such as Brazil may live next to each other, but their lives do not intersect... each group looks out for its own interests and is likely to see the demands of the other as conflicting with its own well-being” (Uslaner and Rothstein, 2005, 46).

In addition to distributive inequality, high rates of crime in South Africa may also be impinging on social trust within the society. According to Interpol data, South Africa retained the world’s highest murder rate in 1997.¹⁶ Crime has continued to be a serious problem well into the new century, as 2003 statistics reported South Africa’s murder rate at 47.4 per 100,000

¹⁵ Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the opening of the debate in the National Assembly, on “Reconciliation and Nation Building”; Cape Town, May 29, 1998, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998

¹⁶ 64 murders per 100,000. Source: Beall, Gelb, and Hassim (2005)

people. Crime has become so egregious and pervasive that it is stretching the capacities of the state. Robert Mattes explains,

“Law enforcement is so hard-pressed to fight ordinary crime that the national police commissioner recently refused the minister of health’s request to commit personnel to enforce newly passed antismoking legislation.” (Mattes, 2002, 4)

Finally, the degree of ethnic and racial heterogeneity within South Africa may contribute to high levels of bonding social trust and, consequently, low levels of bridging trust. South Africa is a racially mixed society—comprised of blacks of Bantu descent, whites of European ancestry, Indians and Malay people, and “coloured” persons of mixed black and white descent. South Africa’s black population comprises a majority of the total populace, within which there are a host of ethnic groups. This includes the Khoi-San, Xhosa, Zulu, Ndebele, Sotho, Shangaan, Venda, and Tswana, among other smaller groups.¹⁷ Moreover, South Africa is as fractionalized linguistically as it is ethnically. The “rainbow” nation has eleven official languages, including the widely-used Zulu (isiZulu), Xhosa (isiXhosa), Afrikaans, and English. The less prominent languages of specific ethnicities include isiNdebele, sePedi, seSotho, seTswana, siSwati, tshiVenda, and xiTsonga.

A study by Sociologist Nadine Dolby (2001) captures the dichotomy of bridging and bonding trust in South Africa. In her article, “White Fright: The Politics of White Youth Identity in South Africa”, she examines white youth identity in post-apartheid South Africa. She argues that the current white youth population feels a great degree of resentment and alienation, as they have lost political and cultural power in South Africa’s new order. One student in a Durban school expressed his apathy regarding an upcoming national election. “... I really don’t care who wins, because in three months, if I don’t get into The Navy I’m leaving the country. If I

¹⁷ http://www.jyu.fi/viesti/verkkotuotanto/kp/sa/peop_ethnicgrps.shtml

don't, I'm either going to England to become a pilot, or to Mauritius to live there, because my Dad lives there, it's my Dad's home country" (Dolby, 2001, 11). Her study reveals how situations of high bonding and low bridging can lead to outcomes of citizen passivity, apathy, and even cynicism.

But the experiences of white youth across South Africa reflect broader societal patterns in South Africa. Beall, Gelb, and Hassim note that the South African population is largely "pessimistic" and "risk-averse" in their decision-making for the future (Beall, Gelb, Hassim, 2005, 698). These scholars argue that South African society lacks a "collective power" in pursuing its national goals. But the absence of a national collectivity in South Africa is more than just a by-product of a passive citizenry. It also reflects patterns of "hunkering" among discrete groups in South Africa, which have little connection to each other.¹⁸ There is little incentive for an individual to participate in national processes or lobby for change, especially when he can retreat to his own in-group to fulfill his needs. From this perspective, I generate a hypothesis expressing the expected relationship:

H1: High bonding trust α lower levels of political participation

High levels of bonding social trust in South Africa will decrease participation in national political activity.

Botswana

In contrast to South Africa, one may expect higher levels of bridging social trust in the neighboring country of Botswana. Because the nation has attained paramount economic growth in the past two decades, scholars and international policy-makers alike have toted Botswana as

¹⁸ Putnam, 2007

the “African Miracle.”¹⁹ A former British protectorate, Botswana was formerly considered one of the poorest nations on the continent. However, relief came in 1971 with the beginning of mineral exploitation by the DeBeer family diamond entrepreneurs. Following a market-driven model of development, Botswana has efficiently capitalized on its diamond, cattle, and tourism industries and has implemented smart fiscal policies. As such, it has reached the level of “middle income country”, according to the World Bank (Taylor, 2004, 12).

Its political institutions have shown a similar strength and stability. Botswana has developed a solid and legitimate multi-party democracy, based on the Westminster model of its British colonizer. Elections are free and fair, opposition parties are represented in parliament, and voter turnout has been quite substantial. Moreover, the absence of a strong and influential army in Botswana has successfully prevented coup d’etats for thirty years, a fate that has swept many of its neighbors.

Regardless of Botswana’s promising developments, one would expect high levels of social trust within the country because of its ethnically homogenous make-up. Botswana contains a small and relatively cohesive population. 79 percent of Botswana’s population is of Tswana ethnicity, while the remaining population is split between Kalanga, Basawra, and Kgalagadi groups.²⁰ As such, most of the population is linked by a common Tswana culture and value system. A similar homogeneity exists among various religious groups, with Christians occupying an overwhelming majority in Botswana. Moreover, the country is united under one common language, Setswana. Figure 2 below compares the number of language groups in Botswana and South Africa. It appears that the bridges connecting members of Botswana society are many. In such a homogenous and cohesive society, individuals are more likely to perceive a

¹⁹ Samatar, 1999

²⁰ CIA World Factbook (2006 Edition).

“shared fate” with others. It is my theory that the consequences of such solidarity will be increased participation in national political activity, as the Batswana people will have an interest in shaping their country’s future.




Figure 2: A Comparison of Language Fractionalization

As mentioned above, inequality is an important predictor of societal trust levels. Like South Africa, Botswana has been plagued with problems of socio-economic inequality. Botswana has ranked high on the HDI for specific indicators of income inequality. However, inequality in Botswana is far from pervasive. Evidence suggests that the inequality may not be entrenched enough to effect levels of social trust within Batswana society. For example, inequality has not plagued access to education or healthcare. Ninety percent of the Batswana population is enrolled in primary school and eighty percent of the rural population maintains access to primary health care (N’idaye, 2001). Moreover, a 2003 Household Survey from

Botswana reported that although income inequality slightly increased in rural areas between 1993 and 2003, overall inequality decreased in both cities and towns.

Finally, one would expect a higher degree of bridging social trust in Botswana because of the low levels of corruption in government. Botswana has been praised for its efforts to curb corruption. Transparency International--a non-profit watchdog that computes a yearly ordinal measure of corruption—has ranked Botswana as the least corrupt country in Africa.²¹ A BBC reporter writes of a sign that he encountered in a national airport, which read, “Botswana has ZERO tolerance for corruption. It is illegal to offer or ask for a bribe.”²² Perceptions of corruption are more important to this framework than actual observed levels of graft. And in Botswana, perceptions of government corruption among the mass public are moderate. Figure 5 compares perceptions of corruption among the police in Botswana and South Africa.

²¹ Source:

²² Peter Biles, “Botswana: Africa’s Success Story?” BBC News, March 7, 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4318777.stm>




Figure 3: Comparing Experiences with Corruption in Botswana and South Africa

Higher levels of bridging trust in Botswana may encourage participation within the polity. Individuals in a socially cohesive society may feel an impetus to participate in political life, as to take part in directing their country's fate. And so, my second hypothesis expresses an expected relationship in Botswana opposite to that of South Africa:

H2: High bridging trust α higher levels of political participation

High levels of bridging social trust in Botswana will increase participation in national political activity.

Conclusion

The next chapter of the thesis lays out a conceptual operationalization of these hypotheses. It also addresses the model's variables and the data that will be used to test these hypotheses.

CHAPTER 5

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter presents two hypotheses that I have generated from my theoretical framework regarding political participation in Africa. It also details how these hypotheses will be tested and the data that will be used in my analysis.

In the previous chapter I outlined the relationship between patterns of social trust in African societies and the propensity for individuals to participate in politics. I highlighted that individuals with high levels of bridging social trust are likely to perceive a “shared fate” with other members of their society. These individuals will have an attitudinal impetus for participating in political life. Therefore, I argue that high levels of bridging trust will lead to increased participation in national political activity. I have generated two hypotheses regarding the expected effects in South Africa and Botswana:

H1: High bonding trust α lower levels of political participation

High levels of bonding social trust in South Africa will decrease participation in national political activity.

H2: High bridging trust α higher levels of political participation

High levels of bridging social trust in Botswana will increase participation in national political activity.

This set of hypotheses lends itself to a most different systems design. In this design, I will test my hypotheses using quantitative methodology. The unit of my analysis is the

individual whose responses have been collected from the third and most recent round of the Afrobarometer survey.²³ The spatial parameters reach from South Africa to Botswana. These countries vary in demography, regime characteristics, economic trends, and historical experiences, and thus they allow me to gauge more general trends across the continent. The temporal parameters are limited to the third published survey, conducted from March 2005 through February 2006. Ideally, a time-series analysis would be conducted, so that trends over time could be captured. However, a panel data design was not feasible for this project due to survey restrictions. The country sample and respondent questions differ slightly between each round of the Afrobarometer.

Operationalization of Concepts

My hypothesis contains two divergent conceptual ideas that warrant proper operationalization. The thesis' explandum is participation in national political life in Africa, and is operationalized as rates of participation along various dimensions of activity. I will measure actions that include contacting national leaders, attending protests or demonstrations, and voting. These actions qualify as "national" in concept because they require individuals to step out of the bounds of his or her community in a figurative and, often, literal way. There are other measures of civic action included in the Afrobarometer, such as contacting local representatives or joining community groups. But these actions do not conform to my theoretical framework, and thus were excluded from the design. The thesis' explanan is levels of bonding and bridging social trust within these two countries, and will be measured using Afrobarometer questions that capture a radius of trust in these countries.

²³ www.afrobarometer.org. Afrobarometer is currently conducting a fourth round of the survey (2008), which was not available for use at the time of writing.

The Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is taken from a group of survey questions within Round 3 of the Afrobarometer. To garner multiple dimensions of participation, I chose to merge the values of four different questions. Subsequently, I found the mean of these values, creating a cohesive dependent variable that could be used in an OLS model. The respondents were given a list of political actions and were asked to identify which of these actions, if any, had they participated in over the past year. The values of the responses numbered from 0 to 4—0 being a respondent that had not participated in the corresponding activity and 4 being a respondent that had “often” engaged in such action. Because I used the mean of these values, the values of the responses were broken into decimal increments, allowing me to treat the variable as continuous. The following survey questions were asked and response categories given²⁴:

A) “Understanding that some South Africans were not able to register as voters for the 2002 elections, which statement is true for you?”

- [-1] Missing
- [1] You were registered to vote
- [2] You did not want to register
- [3] You could not find a place to register
- [4] You were prevented from registering
- [5] You were too young to register
- [6] Did not register for some other reason
- [9] Don't know/Can't remember²⁵

B) “With regard to the most recent, 2002 General elections, which statement is true for you?”²⁶

²⁴ Afrobarometer Data Codebook for Round 2 Afrobarometer Surveys: Merge, Prepared by Virginia Beard, July 2006, p. 18 (www.afrobarometer.org)

²⁵ Across all questions, 9 values were coded as missing.

- [-1] Missing
- [1] You voted in the elections
- [2] You decided not to vote
- [3] You could not find the polling station
- [4] You were prevented from voting
- [5] You did not have time to vote
- [6] Did not vote for some other reason
- [7] You were not registered
- [9] Don't know/Can't remember

Both of these questions were subsequently recoded as a dichotomous variable. Those respondents who were registered to vote were coded as 1, and those who were not were coded as 0. Those respondents who voted in the last election were coded as 1, while those who did not vote were coded as 0. Four remaining questions were added to the index of political participation. They read:

C) “Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a demonstration or protest march?”

- [-1] Missing
- [0] No, would never do this
- [1] No, but would do if had the chance
- [2] Yes, once or twice
- [3] Yes, several times
- [4] Yes, often
- [9] Don't know

D) During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views²⁷:

- 1) A Member of parliament?
- 2) Official of a government ministry
- 3) Political Party Official

²⁶ Question varied with each country, as the latest elections varied.

²⁷ Each survey question administered separately.

- [-1] Missing
- [0] Never
- [1] Only once
- [2] A few times
- [3] Often
- [9] Don't know

Independent Variables

My explanatory variable was also taken from a group of surveys questions within the third round of the Afrobarometer. Five questions within the dataset attempt to gauge various dimensions of social trust, including bridging and bonding trust. Together these questions capture a radius of trust, from family members to strangers.

A) “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing with people?”

- [-1] Missing data
- [0] You must be very careful
- [1] Most people can be trusted
- [9] Don't know

B) How much do you trust each of the following types of people²⁸:

- 1) Your relatives?
- 2) Your neighbors?
- 3) People from your own ethnic group?
- 4) People from other ethnic groups?

- [-1] Missing data
- [0] Not at all
- [1] Just a little
- [2] Somewhat
- [3] A lot
- [9] Don't know
- [997] Not applicable²⁹

²⁸ Each question administered separately.

²⁹ Coded as missing across models.

Alternative Hypotheses and Control Variables

The comparative literature highlighted in Chapter 2 presents several competing explanations for political participation. Attitudinal and demographic features may, in fact, determine participatory patterns in Africa or may better predict political activity in our model. In order to test the independent effect of my explanatory variable, I introduced a set of attitudinal and demographic control variables into the model. I control for an important attitudinal predictor, namely a respondent's "interest in public affairs."³⁰ This variable was measured ordinally, with values ranging from 0 to 4. I also control for the effects of gender and educational attainment, as these characteristics may particularly bias the model results. Gender is measured dichotomously, with males coded as 0 and females coded as 1. The respondent's level of education was measured ordinally, with 0 coded as "no formal schooling" and 9 coded as "post-graduate."³¹

The next chapter of this thesis discusses the results of the statistical model. I will discuss the statistical findings of the model and comment on their substantive interpretation.

³⁰ Survey question read: "How interested would you say you are in public affairs?" Response values are as follows: -1=Missing, 0=Not at all interested, 1=Not very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested, 9=Don't know

³¹ Coding is as follows: 0= No formal schooling, 1= Informal schooling, 2= Some primary schooling, 3= Primary school completed, 4= Some secondary school/High School, 5= Secondary school completed/High School, 6= Post-secondary qualifications, not university, 7= Some university, college, 8= University, college completed, 9= Post-graduate

CHAPTER 6

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In the preceding chapters I presented two hypotheses, which predict a relationship between patterns of social trust in two African countries and rates of national political participation. This chapter of the thesis presents my research findings and discusses their substantive meanings.

Bonding and Bridging in South Africa

In order to test these hypotheses, I first needed to examine the dynamics of social trust in each of these countries. To do so I conducted an exploratory factor analysis for the South African data set. The factor analysis gauged how similarly individuals responded to five distinct questions presented in the Afrobarometer. Essentially, it uncovered the relationship between various indicators of trust. Table 2 below presents the results of a varimax rotation of the factors in the South African data set:

Table 2: Factor Analysis of Types of Trust in South Africa (Varimax Rotation)

Item	Bonding Trust	Bridging Trust
Relatives	.5499	.2826
Neighbors	.5803	.4397
People from own ethnic group	.3787	.6544
People from other ethnic groups	.2249	.6181
Cronbach's Alpha	.6882	.7240
Observations	2400	2400

The results of the analysis suggest a strong relationship between two different sets of questions. As was expected, individuals responded similarly when asked if they trust relatives and if they trust neighbors. The Cronbach's alpha scale reliability coefficient for these two questions is 0.6882. This scale is essentially a measure of how well two variables capture a single latent construct. The measure is within an acceptable range, and thus indicates that there is strong internal coherence between these two questions. Moreover, a simple test for correlation reveals a strong and statistically significant relationship between the two questions. It is important to note that the first question, which dichotomously measured generalized and particularized trust, showed little comparability to the others. Consequently, it was removed from the analysis.

The more interesting finding, however, appears in the second set of questions. It seems that individuals responded in much the same way when asked if they trust people from their own ethnic group and if they trust people from other ethnic groups. The results of two diagnostic

tests indicate that there is, indeed, a strong relationship between these two measures of trust. The Cronbach's alpha for these questions is 0.724, which is within the acceptable range. And a simple correlation test revealed a strong and statistically significant correlation between the questions.

In many respects, this finding counters established expectations. The contact and conflict theories that have colored the literature treat types of social trust as distinctly dichotomous and “zero-sum” in nature. These scholars argue that an individual with a high capacity for “bonding” social trust must, therefore, maintain a low capacity for “bridging” social trust. Contact theory suggests that internal heterogeneity erodes the distinction between in-groups and out-groups, and thus enhances bridging social capital (Allport, 1954). Conversely, conflict theory suggests that diversity heightens this distinction, and thus strengthens in-group solidarity and bonding capital (Dixon, et. al., 2005; Dovidio et. al., 2003). Essentially, both of these frameworks contend that the typologies of social trust are neither synonymous nor co-determinate.

Robert Putnam, however, has questioned the inverse relationship between in-group solidarity and out-group trust, in his article “*E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century*.”³² He contends that the typologies of social trust are not necessarily zero-sum, as high bridging may indeed be compatible with high bonding. Conversely, individuals or societies may be characterized by low bonding and low bridging. As a counter to contact and conflict theory, Putnam develops a “constrict theory”, maintaining that heterogeneity may reduce both in-group and out-group solidarity in a given society. He found empirical evidence within the United States itself to support his theory, employing data from a number of American cities contained in the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. He concludes, “Diversity seems to trigger *not* in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation. In colloquial

³² The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture.

language, people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to ‘hunker down’—that is, to pull in like a turtle” (Putnam, 2007, 149).³³

Within South Africa, my findings provide evidence in support of Putnam’s contention. There is a similarity in the way that individuals in the country responded to questions of in-group ethnic solidarity and out-group trust. This suggests that within African societies, the dynamics of social trust may not be zero-sum in nature, and individuals may possess both types of trust. In many respects, collective wisdom has told us that primordial attachments in Africa are detrimental to social cohesion. Scholars have maintained that ethnic affinities and high bonding patterns stifle cooperation in Africa leading to political cleavages, internal conflict, and divided societies. However, the findings of my exploratory factor analysis suggest that bonding and bridging social trust may be compatible in Africa. In fact, African societies may be more internally cohesive than the literature assumes.

Participation Findings in South Africa

But this thesis is primarily concerned with the externalities of social trust, specifically its effect on patterns of political participation. After assessing the dynamics of trust in South Africa, I created two new variables to be used to model participation. The values of the first two questions (trust among relatives and neighbors) were summed to create a new variable capturing “bonding trust.” The values of the two final questions (trust among and between ethnic groups) were also summed together, to create a variable that captured “bridging trust.” Although these two questions seem antithetical, their strong correlation theoretically justifies their aggregation and use as a measure of generalized trust. These new variables were used in a standard OLS regression model, which measured their effect on various dimensions of national participation.

³³ Italics in original piece.

The model also included the set of control variables that were presented in Chapter 4. The results obtained from the model are presented below in Table 3.

Table 3: Regression Results of the Impact of Bonding Social Trust on Participation in National Political Life in South Africa

Explanatory Variable	Model 1 National Participation	Model 2 National Participation
Bonding Social Trust	-.031*** (.009)	--
Bridging Social Trust	--	-.001 (.006)
Interest in Public Affairs	.018*** (.009)	.017** (.009)
Educational Attainment	.009* (.005)	.009* (.005)
Gender	-.08*** (.018)	-.078** (.018)
Constant	.816*** (.042)	.758** (.04)
Observations	2380	2380
R²	0.017	0.012

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .05 in one-tailed test.

According to the model, for every one unit increase in an individuals' level of bonding trust, there is a .031 decrease in the frequency of their participation in national political action, holding all other variables constant. This variable is statistically significant at the .01 level. It is also a substantively significant decrease, given that the scale used to measure participation ranges from 0 to 3.5. The magnitude of the effect also corresponds with other studies that

measure participation rates in African countries.³⁴ In addition to this, for every one-unit increase in an individuals' interest in public affairs, there is a .018 increase in the frequency of participation, on average. This variable is also significant at the .01 level, within the first model.³⁵ On average, with a one unit increase in an individuals' education level there is a .009 increase in their participation in national political activity. This variable is significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test. Lastly, there is a .08 decrease in national participation among males, and this is statistically significant at the .01 level.

Given these results, I find evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis assumed that high levels of bonding social trust within South Africa would lead to decreased levels of participation in national political activities. As we had expected, social divisions in South Africa appear to be detrimental to political participation. It seems that South Africans who are wary of strangers in their society and maintain an exclusive moral community, are less likely to fulfill their "civic duty." These individuals may feel a disconnect with the national polity and so have little desire to shape the future of their country for themselves or their fellow citizens.

Conversely, when a measure of bridging social trust was regressed on national participation, it failed to produce a statistically significant result. In the case of South Africa, the research findings allow us to conclude that high bonding trust hinders participation in political life. But it is not clear if generalized trust actually encourages participation among the citizenry. More evidence is needed to discern this relationship, but we have found one substantively significant relationship between levels of trust and participation. In addition, the set of control variables perform in the model as expected and in line with previous findings in the literature. It

³⁴ See Bratton, 1999, 562.

³⁵ The differences in the values and standard errors of the control variables are negligible across models.

appears that one's level of political interest, educational attainment, and gender are statistically significant predictors of one's tendency to participate.

Bonding and Bridging in Botswana

The same methodological sequence was used in the analysis of the Botswana data set. Table 4 below presents the values of the trust factors, after conducting a varimax rotation. Like the South African case, there appears to be a relationship between how respondents answered four of the five questions. First, individuals had similar responses when asked if they trust their relatives and their neighbors. The Cronbach's alpha scale reliability measure for these questions is 0.7523, again indicating that there is strong internal coherence between the two variables. A simple correlation test also verified this coherence, as it revealed a statistically significant correlation. Secondly, individuals had similar responses when asked if they trust people from their own ethnic group and people from differing ethnic groups. The Cronbach's alpha measure (0.7947) and a correlation test also indicated relatedness between the questions. Table 4 below presents the results of the factor's varimax rotation.

Given this finding, we come to a similar conclusion with regard to the typologies of trust in Botswana. The similarity in the second set of responses reveals a certain compatibility between bonding and bridging trust. It appears that individuals in Botswana who exhibit bonding social trust may also exhibit bridging social trust. This finding provides more robust evidence that trust in African societies is not necessarily a zero-sum mechanism.

Table 4: Factor Analysis of Types of Trust in Botswana (Varimax Rotation)

Item	Bonding Trust	Bridging Trust
Relatives	.5875	.3420
Neighbors	.7130	.3110
People from own ethnic group	.0662	.8099
People from other ethnic groups	-.0001	.7267
Cronbach's Alpha	.7523	.7947
Observations	1200	1200

Participation Findings in Botswana

The values of the first two questions in the Botswana set were also summed together to create a new variable capturing “bonding trust.” The values of the remaining two questions were summed together to create a new variable capturing “bridging trust.” These new variables were also used in a standard OLS regression model to measure their effect on national participation. The model also included the same set of control variables that were presented in Chapter 4. The results obtained from the model are presented below in Table 5.

Table 5: Regression Results of the Impact of Bonding Social Trust on Participation in National Political Life in Botswana

Explanatory Variable	Model 1 National Participation	Model 2 National Participation
Bonding Social Trust	.021*** (.009)	--
Bridging Social Trust	--	.013* (.007)
Interest in Public Affairs	.055*** (.01)	.055*** (.01)
Educational Attainment	.004*** (.002)	.004*** (.002)
Gender	-.049*** (.019)	-.05*** (.019)
Constant	.386*** (.038)	.404*** (.039)
Observations	1186	1186
R²	.046	.044

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test.

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .05 in a one-tailed test.

According to the model, for every one unit increase in an individuals' level of bonding trust, there is a .021 increase in the frequency of participation in national political action, holding all other variables constant. This variable is statistically significant at the .01 level, and is also a substantively significant increase, given the participation scale. Moreover, on average, for every one unit increase in an individuals' level of bridging trust, there is a .013 increase in the frequency of participation in national political action, holding all other variables constant. This variable is statistically significant at the .05 level, in a one-tailed test. Likewise, for every one unit increase in an individuals' interest in public affairs, there is a .018 increase in the frequency

of participation, on average and holding all else constant. This variable was also significant at the .01 level in the first model.³⁶ On average, with a one unit increase in an individuals' education level there is a .009 increase in their participation in national political activity. This variable is significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test. Lastly, there is a .08 decrease in national participation among male respondents, a decrease which is statistically significant at the .01 level.

Interestingly, these findings suggest that the presence of high bonding social trust in Botswana is positively correlated with participation. Unlike the case of South Africa, an individual who possesses a high degree of bonding trust is still likely to participate in national political life. Thus, it appears that bonding trust within Botswana society is not detrimental to national participation. This finding may simply reflect a society that is homogenous and internally cohesive to begin with, where bonding trust is perhaps less intense. Nevertheless, it suggests that social divisions are less disruptive in Botswana than in South Africa and may not threaten the strength of participatory democracy in the country.

But more importantly, these findings support the paper's second hypothesis. This hypothesis states that high levels of bridging social trust in Botswana will increase participation in national political activity. While the effects of bridging social trust on participation were statistically insignificant in South Africa, the same cannot be said for Botswana. We can garner two important lessons from this finding. First, the evidence indicates that there is, indeed, a great degree of social cohesion in Botswana, as I had expected. Empirically, it suggests that more homogenous societies in Africa may have more bridging social trust. One may even speculate that bridging trust is a function of societal homogeneity. Individuals within homogenous societies may find it easier to trust other individuals if they are inherently *like* them. It may be

³⁶ The differences in the values and standard errors of the control variables are negligible across models.

more difficult to break down barriers in a heterogeneous society where individuals are fractured and groups are separated by race, class, and ethnicity. In essence, these findings present the obverse of Putnam's contention (2007, 138) that ethnic diversity inhibits social solidarity and assert that ethnic homogeneity may indeed foster it.

Secondly, these findings elucidate the link between bridging social trust and various dimensions of national participation. It appears that individuals in Botswana who trust strangers and who maintain an *inclusive* moral community are more likely to be politically active. Those who inhabit an internally cohesive society, in which there are high levels of bridging trust, are more likely to perceive a shared fate with others. Thus, we can conclude that more homogenous societies are, in fact, more participant societies. While Robert Putnam (2007, 13) concludes that democratic participation may flounder in diverse societies, these findings suggest democracy may indeed thrive in more cohesive societies.

A word of caution is perhaps warranted in interpreting the results of the Botswana data set, however. Since Botswana is markedly homogenous in race, ethnicity, and linguistic patterns, there is a danger that bonding and bridging social trust will be conflated in measurement. Survey respondents within a homogeneous society—where one's own neighbor and a stranger from a distant city may be of the same ethnic and linguistic group—may not be able to cognitively separate bridging and bonding trust in their responses. The results may, in fact, be an artifact of the way I measured bonding and bridging trust, and this reality points to the difficulty of precisely measuring such a concept in a homogenous society.

Model Fit

Although the models used have produced both statistical significance and correct directionality with regard to the main explanatory variable, there is a caveat. Across all

countries, the model fit is somewhat poor. This leads one to conclude that these models fail to capture the entirety of the process. I verified the robustness of both the factor analysis and the predictive model using a full structural model (SEM).³⁷ However, the SEM produced similar results of model fit.

Several factors could be contributing to the poor model fit. Using two estimated variables, as opposed to observed values, may have confounded the measurement. This measurement error could be causing a degree of “random noise” in the model. Moreover, the model may suffer from omitted variable bias, as other important factors affecting participation may not be included in the model.

The data themselves may also be contributing to poor model fit. The questions used to gauge social trust may be less than perfect predictors of it. It is possible that the questions may have been poorly asked or that response bias affected the collection of the data. Moreover, there are perhaps other questions not included in the Afrobarometer, which may better reflect actual levels of social trust in these countries. Among other factors, “concern” for the living conditions of other groups may be a robust measure of social trust (Crepaz, 2008).³⁸

Lastly, the inherent variation in the dependent variable presents difficulties for the model. Essentially, participation in Africa is hard to model. The model fit reflects the complexities of participation in Africa. Nevertheless, the regression model does produce statistically significant predictors of it. This allows us to establish that participation in African countries does, in fact, relate to levels and patterns of social trust within these societies.

³⁷ MPlus software was used in this analysis.

³⁸ This question can be found in the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (2000-2001).

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This thesis has explored political participation in two African countries from a social capital perspective. Undoubtedly, micro-level foundations and macro-level institutions are essential to participatory processes. However, it is important to recognize that the dynamics of social cohesion and other meso-level characteristics affect political outcomes in any society. Social dynamics perhaps play an even greater role in Africa, where the institutions that typically facilitate democratic participation are characteristically weak. However, the dynamics of trust in many African countries are complex and must be deconstructed in order to properly understand their effect on participation and civic life.

The research findings suggest that the presence of generalized trust encourages participation in national activities within countries that are internally cohesive. Moreover, the research findings suggest that the presence of strong particularized trust in divided societies discourages participation in national political activity. Experience and scholarship have told us that ethnic, tribal, and other group affinities can be destabilizing and socially divisive. However, these findings imply that these affinities may also be detrimental to democratic consolidation.

As with any research, this thesis has limitations. Due to the restrictions of the survey, I was not able to broaden the spatial or temporal scope of the analysis. In order to make broad-based claims about participation in Africa, it is necessary to include other nations in the study. In essence, this study examines two of Africa's most successful political systems. South Africa

and Botswana have the strongest institutions and most developed economies in all of Africa, and these dynamics may, in fact, be particular to these “star pupils.” It is important to examine how social trust affects participation in other African nations, so as to determine the generalizability of this theory. Moreover, conducting a time-series analysis would be ideal for this type of research. With this kind of design, one would be able to capture how the dynamics of social capital develop during and after regime transitions.

Nevertheless, this research contributes to the literature on democratization in Africa in an important way. My findings suggest that overly optimistic promoters of democracy should proceed with caution on the continent and be cognizant of important social realities. Many policy-makers and scholars alike contend that spreading democracy throughout the region may help to abate poverty and underdevelopment. These individuals have internalized the notion that democracy enhances accountable governance and reduces corruption and graft. However, a working democracy requires a certain aptitude among the citizenry and, thus, is a process that cannot be developed “over night.”

In Africa, a democratic culture is only beginning to take root. Scholars have largely misjudged the recent strengthening of civil society in Africa. While it undoubtedly demonstrates promise for the future of democracy on the continent, civil society is still in an early, developmental stage. And as this thesis has discovered, social dynamics across the continent serve as a roadblock to widespread participation, hindering the development of an expansive democratic culture.

Indeed, participatory processes are the most fundamental axiom of a democracy. But if we only observe political participation among pockets of individuals or groups, democracies in

Africa will fail to consolidate. In short, civil society will not be a savior to Africa until its citizens unite and build bridges across their many divides.

REFERENCES

- Azarya, Victor, and Naomi Chazan. "Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and Guinea." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, no. 1 (1987): 106-31.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, and Norbert Kersting. *Poverty and Democracy : Self-Help and Political Participation in Third World Cities*. London ; New York, New York: Zed Books
- Blais, Andre, and R. K. Carty. "The Effectiveness of the Plurality Rule." *British Journal of Political Science* 18, no. 4 (1988): 550-53.
- Brady, Henry E., Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman. "Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation." *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 2 (1995): 271-94.
- Bratton, Michael. "Review: Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa." *World Politics* 41, no. 3 (1989): 407-30.
- Bratton, Michael, and Beatrice Liatto-Katundu. "A Focus Group Assessment of Political Attitudes in Zambia." *African Affairs* 93, no. 373 (1994): 535-63.
- Bratton, Michael, and Robert Mattes. "Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?" *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 3 (2001): 447-74.
- Bratton, Michael, Robert B. Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Callaghy, Thomas M. "Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Foreign Economic Relations of Sub-Saharan African States." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489 (1987): 148-63.

- Chabal, Patrick. *Political Domination in Africa : Reflections on the Limits of Power*, African Studies Series. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
- Chazan, Naomi. "The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa." *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 2 (1982): 169-89.
- Crepaz, Markus M. L. *Trust Beyond Borders : Immigration, the Welfare State, and Identity in Modern Societies*, Contemporary Political and Social Issues. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008.
- _____. "The Impact of Party Polarization and Postmaterialism on Voter Turnout" *European Journal of Political Research* 18, no. 2 (1990): 183-205.
- De Waal, Alexander. *Aids and Power : Why There Is No Political Crisis--Yet*, African Arguments. London ; New York
- Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. *Democracy in Developing Countries*. 4 vols. Boulder, Colo. London: L. Rienner ; Adamantine Press, 1988.
- Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. *Democratic Reform in Africa : The Quality of Progress*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Huntington, Samuel P., Joan M. Nelson, and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. *No Easy Choice : Political Participation in Developing Countries*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Hyden, Goran, and Donald C. Williams. "A Community Model of African Politics: Illustrations from Nigeria and Tanzania." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36, no. 1 (1994): 68-96.
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization : Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Jackman, Robert W. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 2 (1987): 405-23.

- Jones, Peris, and Kristian Stokke. *Democratising Development : The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa*, Nijhoff Law Specials. Leiden
- Knack, Stephen, and Philip Keefer. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 4 (1997): 1251-88.
- Leighley, Jan E. "Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (1995): 181-209.
- Levy, Carl. *Italian Regionalism : History, Identity and Politics*. Oxford ; Washington, D.C.: Berg, 1996.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. *Building Democratic Institutions : Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Mamdani, Mahmood, E. Wamba-dia-Wamba, and Codesria. *African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy*, Codesria Book Series. [Dakar]: Codesria, 1995.
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-49.
- Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. "Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist Vs. Idealist Theories and Measures." *International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique* 22, no. 4 (2001): 303-20.
- Monga, Célestin. *The Anthropology of Anger : Civil Society and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
- Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships." *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 635-52.
- Pateman, Carole. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1970.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *The American Political Science Review* 80, no. 1 (1986): 17-43.

Putnam, Robert D. "Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28, no. 4 (1995): 664-83.

———. *Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

———. *Democracies in Flux : The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. *Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and Raymond E. Wolfinger. "The Effect of Registration Laws on Voter Turnout." *The American Political Science Review* 72, no. 1 (1978): 22-45.

Rothchild, Donald S., and Naomi Chazan. *The Precarious Balance : State and Society in Africa*, African Modernization and Development Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.

Uslaner, Eric M. *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. *Participation and Political Equality : A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.