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Abstract
A common belief often articulated in American political discourse is that judicial institutions are above the political fray, and courts can usher in sweeping social change as a result. Substantial political science research casts doubt on this romanticized ideal of courts. This dissertation posits a dialectal theory of courts where judicial institutions can legitimize and fuel social movements, but must also rely on outside actors to enhance their social reform efficacy. Under this theory, courts can be effective agents of social change by incrementally educating the public and encouraging movement in the political branches. A body of evidence marshaled from court rulings, legal filings, public opinion polling, interviews with elected officials, legislative histories, and media accounts detailing the same-sex marriage movement tests this theory. The dissertation concludes that the dialectical theory of judicial influence is supported by the evidence. Courts played a vital role in fueling the same-sex marriage movement, but they were not unbridled agents of social change because they relied on external forces to maximize their influence.