The Quality of Peace after Civil War:
Human Rights and International Interventions in Post-Conflict Societies
1981 -2006

by

Cynthia Carol McMeekin

(Under the Direction of Howard Wiarda)

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the impact of international intervention on state repression after civil war. After civil war, some leaders employ repression to establish political order. Understanding why one leader decides to use torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, while others carryout the task of state-building after war with little or no infringement of human rights may help to limit future repression. Choosing repression during an unstable post-conflict period may be an appealing option for leaders with few alternatives. However, constraints on a leaders power can remove this strategic option from a list of policy alternatives; and international intervention may provide such a constraint. I argue international aid and international monitoring can, under certain conditions, compel leaders to use policies other than repression in post-conflict societies.

Index words: Intervention, Repression, Human Rights, International Organizations

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CYNTHIA CAROL MCMEEKIN

B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1995

M.A., California State University, Northridge, 2004

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CYNTHIA CAROL MCMEEKIN

Major Professor: Howard Wiarda

Committee: Patricia Sullivan
Jeffery Berejikian
Brock Tessman

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2013

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Cynthia C. McMeekin

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the impact of intervention by international organizations on state repression after civil war. Post conflict, some leaders employ repression to establish political order. Understanding why some leaders chooses to use torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, or extrajudicial killings, while others carry out the task of state-building after war with little or no infringement of human rights might help to limit future repression. Intervention by international organizations, monetary and military, represents a potentially important influence on the whether governments use repression or not.

International organizations can influence whether state leaders choose to use repression as a tool to control those who oppose the government. International intervention, particularly international aid and monitoring, can increase domestic respect for human rights.[1] I argue that international aid directed at specific sectors of society can enhance government legitimacy and positively affect government respect for human rights in post-conflict societies. International monitors, including election monitors and peacekeepers, can increase the cost of repression for leaders. Calling attention to violations of human rights in post-conflict societies can elicit international repercus-

[1] I use the terms repression and respect for human rights interchangeably. Respect for human rights refers to respect for physical integrity rights, political rights, civil liberties, and social and economic rights. An increase in repression equates with a decrease in respect for human rights and vice versa.

sions and encourage leaders to respect human rights.

Post-conflict societies are particularly susceptible to the use of repression by government leaders. The ill treatment of citizens during a war often begets continued ill treatment after the conflict ends, likely because state actors who continue to feel threatened by the possibility of armed resistance resort to repressive tactics (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1978, Poe & Tate 1994). Some post-conflict leaders, fearing a resumption in armed resistance, use repression as a tactic to maintain political order. Civil wars threaten the very existence of a government and thus an increase in repression occurs during times of intrastate conflict (Poe & Tate 1994, Poe, Tate & Keith 1999). In the aftermath of a war between states, combatants can generally remove themselves to their respective territories. At the end of a civil war opponents often must find a way live together within the same society. The end of a civil war does not necessarily diminish mistrust between former combatants.

Civilians can suffer violent acts by warring parties during civil wars and post-civil war periods. Civil wars since 1945 have caused the deaths of more than 16.2 million civilians (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Government armed forces, militias (aligned with the government or independent), and insurgents have all been known to commit crimes against noncombatants. In Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sudan, government forces and supporters sought to eliminate entire ethnic groups (Mueller 2004, Prunier 1997, Prunier 2005, Humphreys & Weinstein 2006). The infamy of insurgents in Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army, stems from their abducting children to become fighters and killing civilians indiscriminately (International Crisis Group 2004). Repression of civilians by belligerents often becomes a common practice during intrastate conflicts. This behavior does not always desist when the war ends.

Leaders who have used repression in the past are more likely to use repressive tactics in the future (Davenport 2007*a*). After a war, whether it be a complete victory for either side or a negotiated peace between warring parties, post-conflict leaders tend to abuse human rights. If repression proved useful during the conflict, leader might use similar policies in times of peace. Governments can violate human rights in several ways. Abusing a person's physical integrity is the most serious

type of violation. Physical integrity violations include torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Figure 1.1, below, shows physical integrity scores for low income and lower middle income countries[2] that have experienced civil war at some time between 1981 and 2006 and those countries that have had no civil war in the same time period. Low scores indicate little or no torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, or extrajudicial killings. High scores indicate governments that frequently violate the physical integrity rights of their citizens. Countries that have suffered civil wars skew toward increased incidents of physical integrity violations and countries with no civil war have much lower rates of violations. Figure 1.1 indicates that low income countries that have experienced civil war, on average, score two points higher on the CIRI scale of physical integrity violations than those that have not recently experienced a civil war. A two point change on the scale can show the difference between a country that has absolutely no extrajudicial killings by the government in a year and a country that experiences fifty or more extrajudicial government killings in a year.

Choosing repression during an unstable post-conflict period may be an appealing option for leaders with few alternatives. International organizations can help to expand policy choices through financial contributions and limit repression through military intervention. The next section briefly explains how intervention by international organizations can compel leaders to use policies other than repression in post-conflict societies.

The argument in brief

International intervention, via international aid and international monitoring, can increase respect for human rights and contribute to the quality of the peace after civil war, or, potentially, increase

[2]Low income countries and lower middle income countries, classified by the World Bank, as countries where Gross National Income (GNI) is 1,005 U.S. dollars or less; and lower middle income, where GNI is between 1,006 and 3,975 U.S. dollars. Countries included in Figure 1.1 fell into the lower income, or lower middle income, classification at least one year between 1981 and 2006. I utilize physical integrity scores from lower income countries to avoid comparison of developed and developing countries.



Figure 1.1: Civil war and physical integrity violations.

the risk of repression in a post-conflict environment. International aid can boost the legitimacy of a new government and provide benefits to citizens that give the government the ability to accommodate public needs. International monitoring can increase the costs of repression in post-conflict countries. International peacekeepers oversee the behavior of key government actors and former rebels. International monitoring can publicize acts of repression and jeopardize the support of the international community for the government.

Peacekeepers observe government respect for human rights in post-conflict countries. Violations of human rights can include threats to the integrity of a person, denial of political rights and civil liberties, and neglecting social and economic rights. International monitors can call attention to violations of human rights and threaten the support of the international community. International organizations can renege on promised or expected political and financial support if governments choose to use repression. Lebovic and Voten (2009) find that when the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (UNCHR) adopts a resolution condemning the human rights record of a country, a reduction in multilateral aid follows. Hafner-Burton (2008) finds a correlation between international naming and shaming of countries that violate the human rights of their citizens and better protections for political rights. When monitors are present, violations of the person, political rights, and social and economic rights will more likely become public and aid from the international community can be put at risk. While the act of international monitoring and the successful implementations of projects and elections have been systematically studied, the relationship between international monitoring and repression has not been considered.[3]

IOs do not provide peacekeeping missions in a uniform manner. Each mission is distinct, but can be categorized by who sends the peacekeeper, and the level of commitment of the mission. The UN sends peacekeeping missions based on Chapters VI and VII of its mandate. Chapter VIII allows the international body to delegate peacekeeping to regional organizations. Because the UN has more resources at its disposal, is more likely to be perceived as a neutral actor than regional

[3]Doyle and Sambanis (2006) consider "participatory peace" which examines some elements of political repression.

IOs, and has greater authority for peacekeeping, I expect the UN to inspire greater respect for human rights than regional missions. UN missions, however, do not all fall into a single category. Some entail more commitment than others, in terms of number of personnel, including troops, civilian police, and administrators, and duration. The more personnel and the greater the time commitment of the mission, the more successful at improving respect for human rights. Beyond peacekeeping, resources for post-conflict rehabilitation will be important to achieve a reduction in the risk of repression in post-conflict countries.

An extensive literature considering the impact of international aid on post-conflict countries exists, but few examine international aid and its impact on repression. International aid expands policy options by providing resources to supply public goods that are not otherwise available. Providing public goods increases government legitimacy (Beetham 1991). Providing public goods to the greatest number of people in the shortest period of time will generate the greatest amount of legitimacy in the first post-conflict years. For example, repairing a cross-country highway used by many will provide more immediate legitimacy to the government than international debt relief. This is not to suggest rebuilding infrastructure holds more import than macroeconomic stabilization, but the road offers immediate tangible benefits to a large number of people in a short period of time. Debt relief can help to slowly stabilize and grow the economy. Providing public goods in the first post-conflict years will afford post-conflict governments some legitimacy. Legitimate governments do not need to use repression to ensure political order (Jackman 1993). Strengthening legitimacy by providing the resources to provide public goods strengthens the government and can help to limit repression.

Official Development Assistance refers to aid distributed to developing countries. Aid given to post-conflict countries can be categorized as aid to build government institutions, aid to recover the economy, and aid to promote social rehabilitation. Each type of aid can be thought of as providing public goods, but distributing some public goods may actually increase the risk of repression in post-conflict countries. Helping to rebuild the military and civilian police forces can increase

public security, an essential for public good for any post-conflict country. However, increasing the capacity of the military and civilian police forces, common perpetrators of physical integrity violations and coups to oust democratically elected governments, might actually increase the risk of repression. Proffering military aid could achieve law and order at the expense of respect for human rights.

Project relevance and policy implications

This project fills a significant gap in the literature. State repression after civil war is an understudied phenomenon. Scholarly literature on post-conflict societies, especially quantitative studies, tends to look at what conditions extend or shorten periods of peace (Hoddie & Hartzell 2005, Hartzell 1999, Walter 1997, Walter 1999, Fortna 2008). Peace is most often defined solely as the absence of war. A lot of violence can occur between peace and war. A common threshold for recurrence of civil war includes at least a thousand battle deaths where a minimum of five percent of the casualties are suffered by oppositional forces (Small & Singer 1982, Hoddie & Hartzell 2005, Licklider 1995, Hartzell 1999, Davenport 1999, Walter 1997, Mukherjee 2006, Doyle & Sambanis 2006). By defining civil war in this way, such studies fail to capture respect for civilian human rights after a conflict. Genocides, politicides, disappearances, and murders carried out by the state do not fall under the most common definition of civil war; yet, these categories of violence are associated with both civil war and the termination of civil war. The quality of the lasting peace may not be any better than civil war in instances where genocide, politicide, or other types of extensive state repression exist.

Respect for human rights plays an important role in rebuilding post-conflict societies. A framework for successful intervention in post-conflict societies includes establishing a safe and secure environment, rule of law, a stable democracy, sustainable economy and social well-being (Serwer & Thomson 2007). The absence of war focuses on a singular objective within this framework,

preventing the renewal of fighting. This project seeks to expand the focus to consider the quality of peace after civil war, specifically by, examining respect for human rights in the areas of physical integrity, political rights, civil liberties, social and economic rights.

Each post-conflict situation is unique and international involvement varies across cases. However, the international community generally attempts to promote democracy and respect for human rights in all cases. Elections are encouraged and often paid for by the international community. A country that requests international monitors for elections will most likely receive them (Kelley 2008). The international community often sponsors restructuring of the judicial system and security forces in post-conflict societies to foster institutional respect for political and physical integrity rights. Additionally, food aid and rebuilding infrastructures nourish economic and social rights in post-conflict countries finding it difficult to provide basic needs to its citizens. Rebuilding a post-conflict society entails improving respect for human rights within those societies.

In fact, a strong association between state repression and civil conflict exists. Thoms and Ron (2007) find that violations of physical integrity and political violations by the state relate to escalations of internal conflict that may lead to civil war. Additionally, violations of economic and social rights might be underlying conditions relevant to intrastate conflict. Working toward respect for human rights can be equated with working toward a positive peace. Alternatively, state repression can transform grievances that lay dormant into active antagonisms (Thoms & Ron 2007). Thus, limiting repression suits the interests of state leaders and the international community ultimately concerned with the termination of civil wars.

The goal of my analysis is to determine what types of intervention by international organizations influence government repression. International aid and international monitoring will be examined to identify intervention policies that inhibit or exacerbate government repression. This research will inform policymakers of any causal relationship between international intervention and repression.

Important terms and concepts

For the sake of clarity, I define several terms and concepts used frequently throughout the dissertation. Central conceits to this project include, post-conflict episodes, peace, repression, international intervention, and international organizations.

Post-conflict episodes

Determining when a civil war ends is not an easy task. Ceasefires breakdown often and fighting is resumed, offering only a brief reprieve from hostilities. Civil conflict may end in victory for one side, a formally negotiated settlement, an informal settlement between opposing parties, or simply peter out over time. Each ending type, at its start, is tenuous. A victory may be declared too soon and fighting may resume. Fairly easily identifiable civil war endings include a military victory where the opposition wins and forms a new government, or the signing of a lasting peace treaty by all parties to the conflict. Another concrete measure of intrastate conflict used in all general definitions of civil war is the number of battle deaths incurred by the government and the opposition. Generally accepted definitions of civil war, and civil war termination, use different numbers of battle deaths to indicate the end of civil war. This study will follow Sambanis's (2004) determination of civil war termination where, if there are no other indicators, a civil war terminates if battle deaths equal 500 or less in a three year period.

The term post-conflict society refers to countries that have recently terminated a civil war. A post-conflict episode is the time between a war ending and a war recurrence. A post-conflict episode may last in perpetuity. Or, post-conflict societies can experience multiple post-conflict episodes between 1981 and 2006. In other words, some countries experience multiple episodes of war and peace during this time. For example, the government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel group ended fighting in 1991 and a post-conflict episode (peace) began. Fighting between the two groups started again in 1992 and ended again in

1994. A second post-conflict episode began in 1994. Fighting resumed once more in 1997 and the conflict between the two parties ceased again in 2002. Angola experienced three civil wars with UNITA and three post-conflict episodes between 1981 and 2006. El Salvador's civil war ended in 1992 and never resumed fighting. El Salvador experience one post-conflict episode between 1981 and 2006.This study examines seventy-eight post-conflict episodes that occurred sixty different countries.[4]

Peace

Repression has been linked to both the underlying and proximate causes of conflict (Thoms & Ron 2007), thus making repression an important concern for policymakers trying to establish peace in post-conflict societies. Two types of peace are generally recognized in the political science literature: negative peace and positive peace.[5] Negative peace connotes the absence of violence and is an essential element of any definition of peace. Keeping violence from recurring after civil war is a primary goal of any intervention by international organizations. However, ending violence without alleviating the root causes of the conflict, whatever they may be, invites war recurrence.

Positive peace encompasses both negative peace and eliminating the root causes of the conflict. Galtung (1969) identifies positive peace with social justice. A country not at war, but experiencing social injustice, endures a negative peace. Quantitative studies examining intervention and conflict often consider the impact of intervention on negative peace, but fail to consider the effects of intervention on positive aspects of peace.[6] Considering positive peace in post-conflict societies means taking a closer look at the quality of the peace after civil war, especially respect for human

[4]See Appendix A for a full list of post-conflict episodes from 1981-2006.

[5]For a full explanation of the distinction between negative and positive peace, see Galtung, Johan (1969) "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" Journal of Peace Research 6(2) pp. 167-91.

[6]A recent exception is Murdie and Davis (2010) "Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars, Human Rights Quarterly. 32 (1): 50-73. The authors examine the effect of peacekeeping on human rights in conflict prone societies, without distinguishing between times of civil war and post-conflict time periods. For additional quantitative studies that consider some aspect of the positive peace, see Toft, Monica. 2010. Securing the Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. and Krain, Matthew. 2000. Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States, St. Martin's Press, New York, NY.

rights.

Repression can contribute to conflict and diminish the quality of peace for citizens living in a post-conflict society. Interventions by international organizations in post-conflict countries often seek to help build a well-functioning society that will avoid violent conflict in the future. Continued repression after civil war can exacerbate grievances held throughout society and contribute to future violent conflict. A study by Moore (2000) shows that when accommodation by the state is met with dissent or rebellion, the state will switch tactics and use violence. When both sides turn to violence, a cycle of violence ensues (Thoms & Ron 2007) and war may resume. Additionally, Walter (2004) finds that a higher quality of life and access to political participation make war recurrence in post-conflict countries less likely. Thus, repression, or lack of repression, should be considered an important aspect of peace. Limiting repression, not only promotes better quality of life for citizens but also contributes to maintaining a negative peace. Addressing the root causes of conflict during post-conflict peacekeeping calls for careful consideration of government practices of repression and developing positive peace.

Repression

Repression refers to systematic violations of human rights by a state government. Violations can intrude upon a person's physical integrity, political rights and civil liberties, and economic and social rights. Goldstein describes political repression as, "government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies because of their perceived political beliefs" (Goldstein 1978, p. xvi). Governments can discriminate against groups based on their religion, ethnicity, or any other distinct difference a group may present. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlines international standards intended to preclude government abuse of individuals and groups of individuals. The document's thirty articles assert the right to several freedoms from government intrusion and the right to participate in the government. Countries have increasingly

adopted international human rights standards through signed treaties and international agreements.

Human rights abuses by states have increasingly come under the scrutiny of the international community. Notably, states can no longer claim state sovereignty in defense of extreme human rights abuses (Simmons 2009). The United Nations has created several international tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses or extreme repression. For example, the UN founded the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to punish persons who committed war crimes during the civil conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 created a standing institution to bring suit against those who commit severe violations of human rights. The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in March 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity demonstrating that even current state leaders cannot expect immunity. Leaders, like Al-Bashir, may violate the human rights of citizens in many different ways. For the purposes of this study, repression by government leaders will be loosely grouped into three main categories: violations of physical integrity rights, violations of civil liberties and political rights, and violations of economic and social rights.

Physical integrity rights

Physical integrity rights refer to the right to life of individuals living within a state. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) enumerates the right to life in several articles. Violations of the right to life represent the most egregious forms of state repression. Torture, disappearances, political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings carried out, or sponsored, by the government all comprise physical integrity violations of the person. International human rights law explicitly singles out violations of the person as unacceptable government behavior and provides a legal basis for pressuring governments to avoid such violations (Mitchell & McCormick 1988). States have difficulty asserting the sovereign right to violate a person's physical integrity with impunity. Physical abuse by governments still occur, but a state can no longer expect large scale physical integrity violations to be ignored by the international community under the principle of state sovereignty.

Politcal rights and civil liberties

In addition to physical integrity rights, governments are expected to respect political and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, electoral self-determination, workers' rights and the right to travel domestically and internationally (Cingranelli & Richards 2008). The right to participate in in government and the right to protest government policies represent the core of these liberties.

Rummel (1997) argues that within democratic societies, leaders and the governed create a government through bargaining. Voters and interest groups support candidates when they agree to promote their interests upon attaining office. Society and leaders renegotiate agreements during each election cycle. Voters can expel repressive leaders from office, and, therefore, repression will not likely enhance the career of a democratic leader. This type of government experiences the least repression because power dynamics are continuously redefined with input from society.

Not all democracies are the same and some may repress more readily than others. Regan and Henderson's 2002 study reveals a nonlinear relationship between democracy and repression. They suggest new and developing democracies will more likely use repression than well-established democracies or well-established autocracies. Their research indicates that in some instances repression is more common in democracies than autocracies. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) find that non-developed democracies have no relationship with repression. Creating a democracy in name does not correlate with an increase or decrease in repression. Only well-established democracies correlate with low levels of repression. This nonlinear relationship is an important distinction for post-conflict countries that tend to have new and developing governments. If only well-established democracies promote government respect for human rights, democracy will have little explanatory power for repression meted out in the first years following war in countries with unstable governments. Established democracies take time to develop. Immediately holding elections and making political parties legal does not necessarily stop government repression.

Social and economic rights

Economic and social rights require meeting the basic material conditions for human livelihood without discrimination. Basic material conditions include food with adequate nutritional content, clothing, shelter, clean water and sanitation, basic health, and primary education (Beetham 1995). Human rights scholars tend to pay less attention to economic and social rights than physical integrity rights, political rights, and civil liberties. Scholars sometimes refer to physical integrity rights, political rights, and civil liberties as first generation rights. Economic and social rights, also enumerated in the the UDHR, have been designated second generation rights (Vasak 1977). The universality of second generation rights creates more controversy than first generation rights, especially in less economically developed countries. Developing countries may not have the resources or capacity to provide basic needs to all citizens.

Second generation rights, however, play an important role in post-conflict societies. Groups opposing the government may be particularly susceptible to economic and social discrimination. In theory, governments might repress any individual living within the territorial borders of the state with equal likelihood. In practice, groups that oppose the government based on political ideals and ethnopolitical minority groups that have been historically singled out by the government are more likely to experience economic and social discrimination. Groups have often been victimized based on their communal identity[7] (Gurr 1993) or political associations (Harff 2003). Groups that have taken up arms against the government in the past, during a civil war, make good targets for government repression, including violations of social and economic rights.

Directly addressing second generation human rights might provide the most expedient way to build legitimacy after civil war. Providing public goods can build political legitimacy (Beetham 1991). Social and economic conditions contribute to the quality of the peace after civil war and those living a better life with political access in post-conflict societies are less likely to take up arms against the government (Walter 2004).

[7]Communal identity refers to groups that share a common language, religion, national or racial origin, or common culture, and are attached to a particular territory. They can be described as ethnopolitical groups when the group becomes politically active based on their shared communal identity (Minority at Risk Project 2009).

International intervention

The term intervention can refer to a number of different actions by a number of different parties. Intervention, in this study, means the provision of international aid or international monitors by an international organization in a post-conflict state. International monitoring refers to peacekeepers deployed during peacekeeping missions to carryout tasks enumerated in the mission's mandate. Economic intervention occurs when international organizations contribute financial resources directly to post-conflict states.

International organizations that provide funding to peacebuilding and peacekeeping offer resources to leaders of war-torn countries. International aid often comes from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Developmental aid also regularly comes from United Nations agencies, funds and commissions, European Union institutions, regional development banks, and a number of small focused organizations like the International African Institute and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (PLAID 2010). The main objective of official development assistance must be to promote economic development and social welfare. As such, development aid from these international institutions excludes contributions for military operations (OECD 2010). Thus economic aid is distinct from military contributions, including peacekeepers, to post-conflict societies.

International peacekeepers monitor how well domestic actors follow domestic laws and agreements. In each case, the observers constitute international bodies invited by sitting governments to actively observe compliance with domestic laws and agreements.[8] Peacekeepers can supply an element of legitimacy to recipient governments, provided observers find them compliant with domestic laws and agreements. Peacekeepers observe government respect for human rights. The meaning of the term peacekeeping has evolved as the missions of peacekeepers have changed over time. Before the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping generally referred to missions where

[8] In the special, and rare, case of enforcement peacekeeping the mission may proceed without the invitation of the government.

peacekeepers were tasked exclusively with monitoring and reporting what they saw to the United Nations. The bulk of their tasks was related to monitoring ceasefires. Currently, missions that exclusively entail the monitoring of a ceasefire now are called "traditional" peacekeeping missions (Diehl 2008). The fall of the Soviet Union brought about the end of a virtual deadlock on the UN Security Council. The end of the Cold War also put an end to the many proxy wars the US and the Soviet Union were fighting in developing countries. Global interests of the Soviet Union and the US were no longer at logger heads, and this meant that the two countries agreed to many different interventions as Security Council members. Thereafter, a number of peacekeeping missions with a multitude of tasks ensued. In addition to monitoring ceasefires, peacekeepers became involved in organizing elections, training police forces, monitoring human rights, and other tasks associated with building peace after war (Fortna 2004). These multidimensional missions became known as peacebuilding missions. Both traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations require the consent of the state government where the intervention occurs and most often has the assent of other belligerents involved in a civil conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, a few missions have taken place without consent from host governments and other parties to the conflict. These enforcement missions fall under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter and do not require the consent of any of the participants to the conflict. Enforcement missions may include tasks generally associated with traditional peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. All variations of peacekeeping and peacebuilding by international organizations all have the potential to influence the use of repression in post-conflict states.

International organizations

Thousands of IOs exist in the international system, all with distinct missions and mandates.[9] Some IOs have expansive missions, are well-funded, and are also well-known, like the United Nations,

[9]The number of international non-governmental organizations alone has been estimated at 40,000. (Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.) 2001, "Global Civil Society 2001", Oxford University Press, NY, NY.)

the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Other IOs are less well-known with limited funding and a limited agenda, like the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, Global Environment Facility, and the International Organization for Migration. International organizations can be generally divided into two categories: intergovernmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations. An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is a formal entity comprised of state members and has some indication of institutionalization such as a permanent secretariat (Pevehouse, Nordstrom & Warnke 2005). In contrast, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are not comprised of states, though funding may be derived from governments. While INGOs play important roles in post-conflict societies, they are not capable of providing the commitment required to influence the decision-making of leaders. Most INGOs operate on a much smaller scale than intergovernmental organizations and are often funded by states or IGOs initiating the intervention. IGOs, on the other hand, carry the credibility and prestige of the international community. This study will, therefore, focus on the role of IGO interventions after civil war.[10]

Limiting the field to IGOs condenses the number of international organizations being considered in this study. The scope of many IGOs does not pertain to peacekeeping or peacebuilding after civil conflict, further reducing the number of relevant international organizations. In fact, because the United Nations (UN) has played such a dominant role in international peace operations since World War II, many studies considering peace operations only examine the United Nations peacekeeping missions (Hill & Malik 1996, Doyle & Sambanis 2006). However, there are also several regional organizations that have contributed peacekeeping and peacebuilding troops and many more that have aided post-conflict governments financially. Interventions by all IOs that have participated in peacekeeping missions and contributed economic aid from 1981 - 2006 are included in this study.

The United Nations bears responsibility for international peace and security, according to its

[10]Because this study does not consider non-governmental organizations, the use of the term "international organization" will refer exclusively to intergovernmental organizations.

charter. The charter also recognizes its organizational limitations and encourages delegating responsibilities to regional organizations in Chapter VIII (Tavares 2010). Several regional IOs include a mandate for ensuring regional security within their own charters. In Africa, for example, the African Union (AU), the Organization of African States (OAU, the precursor to the AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IAD), and the South African Development Community (SADC) all include security mandates in their charters and have engaged in peacekeeping and/or peacebuilding to some degree. The Americas established the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. Though military interventions have been rare for the OAS, an explicit mandate for keeping regional peace and security leaves open the option for the collective defense of democracy in the region (Tavares 2010). Regional organizations within the greater Asian region of the world that have a mandate for regional peace and security include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). The League of Arab States (LAS) also has a security mandate. The European Union (EU) dominates regional security concerns in Europe. Finally, though the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) is not technically a regional organization, its actions replicate those of a regional organization with a security mandate. Regional organizations frequently contribute to peacekeeping between 1981 and 2006.

Project outline

I seek to answer the following research questions with this study: first, does international intervention affect repression in post-conflict societies? If the answer is yes, what type(s) of intervention serve to limit government repression, and what type(s) of intervention exacerbate repressive policies? The project proceeds by summarizing the relevant literature in the next chapter. Though, many contributing factors for repression have been thoroughly studied, the relationship between international intervention and repression in post-conflict countries requires additional attention.

Chapter three advances a theory of how interventions influence government repression and from this theory I derive a series of hypotheses for empirical testing. This project uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate the effect of interventions on repression. Chapter four quantitatively analyzes whether international aid spent to improve government institutions, the economy, and/or to elevate social services has any impact on repression. Chapter five examines the impact of international monitoring on repression from a quantitative perspective. Chapter six presents case studies of El Salvador and Cambodia. Both countries experienced civil wars in the late 20th century that ended with the help of international organizations. The case studies seek to discover the causal mechanisms at work and determine if the cases fit the models presented in chapters four and five. Finally, chapter seven discusses the findings of the study, highlights the policy implications, and points to avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

The relationship between IOs and post-conflict states has changed over time. During the Cold War, the United States and the USSR, involved themselves in many regional and civil conflicts around the world (Karns & Mingst 2004). The USSR and the US involved themselves in proxy wars where the USSR backed communist groups and the US supported anti-communist groups. When the proxy wars ended, IOs, like the United Nations, became much more important actors in resolution of civil conflicts.

In the past few decades scholars have debated the importance of international organizations. In that time, many researchers have empirically demonstrated that IOs and international agreements play a relevant role in international politics, e.g. (Duffield 1992, Mitchell 1992, Martin 1992, Victor, Raustiala & Skolnikoff 1998, Hafner-Burton 2005, Fortna 2004, Fortna 2008, Doyle & Sambanis 2006).[1] Turning from the question of whether IOs matter in international politics, recent scholarship has focused on more empirical questions that ask how IOs function in global politics (Hafner Burton, von Stein & Gartzke 2008). This study assumes state behavior can be altered through the actions of IOs and focuses, not on whether IOs matter, but how and when IOs can influence state behavior. Member state interests bound the activities of IOs, but within those

[1] See Mearshimer 1994/1995 for a counterargument.

boundaries IOs can, and do, act independently.

My dissertation builds on theories of liberal institutionalism to explain how intervention by IOs affects government respect for human rights in post-conflict societies. Liberal institutionalism asserts that institutions can facilitate cooperation between states (Keohane & Martin 1995). States join international organizations to coordinate international cooperation and to increase influence over third-parties (Martin 1992). In the aftermath of civil conflicts, IOs often step in to help negotiate agreements, to keep the peace through the promotion of democracy and human rights, stabilization of the economy, rebuilding the state infrastructure, and complying with any agreements made between former belligerents. Two common ways that IOs intervene to influence state leaders in post-conflict societies include, international aid contributions and providing international monitors via peacekeeping missions.

International intervention

The concept of acceptable intervention by international organizations has changed over time. Prior to the advent of formal international institutions, the treaty of Westphalia established sovereignty among nation-states in 1648 (Karns & Mingst 2004). The notion of sovereignty acknowledged territorial boundaries between states and an forged an agreement whereby external actors would not interfere with the domestic authority of governments within the agreed upon territorial boundaries (Miller 1999). Any military intervention under the Westphalian system constituted an act of war by one sovereign state upon another. While the Westphalian system has not been abandoned, arguably, the strength of the system has eroded and allowed for more intervention in the affairs of states by the international community.

Erosion began as states created international institutions that claimed to supersede aspects of state sovereignty in specific situations. The charter of the League of Nations, officially established in 1920, formally articulated the concept of collective security. Collective security is the idea that

peace within the international community can be kept through a binding predetermined agreement to take collective action against members of the community that violate the peace (Miller 1999), and this idea began to alter the expectations regarding interventions within the international system. The international community could legally intervene to keep peace among its members. Though the League of Nations formally adopted collective security as a part of its charter, the members imposed this policy option infrequently. The League of Nations intervened with military troops, with little success, on two occasions under the auspices of collective security. With the League's failed attempts at collective security, the concept remained dormant until the creation of the United Nations.

The United Nations revived the idea of collective security for the international community and expanded the possibility for intervention beyond acts of war between sovereign states. Though, until the end of the Cold War, the UN chose to intervene with military troops on very few occasions; and even when they did intervene, they used lightly armed troops not authorized to use force except in instances of self-defense. The rivalry between the US and the USSR prevented the Security Council from coming to agreement on where and when intervention by the international body might be helpful. Collective action by members of the UN, approved by the Security Council, became more tenable as the USSR dissolved and Cold War tensions decreased (Diehl 2008).

With the assertion of international responsibility for peace and security, the concept of strict sovereignty diminished. The international community has argued that in some instances states do not have the right to treat their citizens as they please. The Right to Protect codified this sentiment in 2005. The Right to Protect, agreed upon by the UN General Assembly and affirmed by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1674) in 2006 (Bellamy 2008), contends there are limits to state sovereignty. The Right to Protect asserts that with sovereignty comes responsibilities and leaders who do not fulfill these responsibilities should not enjoy all the benefits. Thus giving the international community the right to intervene in cases where leaders commit war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The right to protect justifies humanitarian interventions.

Even with the passage of the Right to Protect, however, international intervention still generally requires permission from the recipient state. International actors may have weakened the certainty of sovereignty, but sovereignty remains a relevant concept in international politics.

Since the inception of the UN, many new IOs have joined the international forum. Some also play a part in keeping peace and security in the international community. The next section explores the roles intervening IOs play in post-conflict societies.

IOs and intervention

Three important roles IOs perform on the international stage include that of, instruments, arenas, and actors (Archer 2001). As an instrument, IOs act as realist and neorealists anticipate, they merely reflect the foreign policy choices of powerful member states. IOs can be used as a tool of powerful states. For example, in 1950, UN Resolution 83 stated that North Korea had breached the peace with its invasion of South Korea and recommended armed attack to restore international peace and security.[2] Arguably, in this case, the US used the UN as an instrument to support its intervention into the Korean War (Archer 2001). States sometimes harness the benefits of an IO to directly support their international agenda.

Other times, IOs can act as forums, or arenas, to negotiate, settle disputes, and share information. IOs have an existing set of rules and codes of conduct for interactions between states and serve to centralize and coordinate actions between member states. Members can utilize an IO to articulate their interests and come to agreements on international issues. Through the UN General Assembly, Latin American, African, and Asian developing countries expressed their mutual economic interests through the Group of 77 (G-77). Establishment of the group came out of a need to voice opposition to the international economic policies of powerful Western states that had assembled with common interests to create the Group of 7 (G-7). The General Assembly presented a

[2]Source: UN website, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/96/IMG/NR006496.pdf/OpenElement, accessed January 24, 2012.

forum where the G-77 could openly criticize the policies of the G-7 and recommend changes that would better suit the interests of developing nations. The General Assembly's egalitarian decision-making rules appealed to weaker states looking for a voice international politics (Gregg 1981). An established arena where international politics can be discussed, criticized, publicized, and negotiated under existing rules can add efficiency to relations between states.

IOs can also function as independent actors. The interests of powerful states bound independent actions, but many of the benefits states seek from IOs rely on a degree of independence from the concerns of member states. Independence distances the IOs from the foreign policy of its powerful member states and allows the IO to act as a neutral participant during intervention, a role that states could not achieve. Unilaterally intervening in the name of humanitarianism by any individual state will inevitably come under suspicion (Finnemore 2003). States, other than the intervening state, most often assume national interests play a role in unilateral interventions. The United States cited humanitarian reasons for its 1983 military intervention into Grenada. The international community rejected claims of a humanitarianism justification for what could be otherwise construed as a military invasion (Teson 2003). Unlike unilateral interventions, multilateral military interventions do not prove difficult to justify under the auspices of humanitarianism. The international community does not automatically assume the motivations of IOs to be tied particular national interests. In fact, in order for a humanitarian intervention to achieve any degree of international legitimacy, multiple states must agree on the intervention (Finnemore 2003). IOs have an easier time working as a neutral actor when states perceive it as having a degree of independence from member states.

Managing substantive operations also requires a degree independence. Abbott and Snidal (1998) liken the structure of an IO to a publicly owned company. Shareholders own the company and those who run the company answer to the shareholders, but the company is not run by the shareholders. In terms of intervention, economic and military interventions fall under the purview of member states, but conducting the intervention is left to the IO. International organizations distribute funds to post-conflict countries and oversee the use of said funds. IOs run peacekeeping

and election monitoring campaigns without much input from the member states. This allows IOs to perform functions that require neutral third parties.

When IOs act independently, they can act as managers and enforcers. In post-conflict societies, acting as a manager, IOs can reduce ambiguity through the use of good offices, fact finding, interpretation of agreements, and mediation (Abbott & Snidal 1998). They help to facilitate activities such as rebuilding the state infrastructure, interpreting the dictates of a peace agreement, abiding by the outcomes of democratic elections, respecting human rights, and stabilizing the economy. IOs acting as managers help to coordinate the actions of former belligerents. Self-interested state leaders seeking to avoid future conflict and rebuild their societies have an incentive to work with IOs offering post-conflict aid, including managerial services. IOs contributing to the rebuilding of post-war countries have an incentive to take on the role of manager to ensure the effectiveness of the contribution.

Where actions of state leaders diverge from the expected, IOs can sometimes use enforcement to encourage behavior. Direct monitoring of behavior can provide credible information from a neutral source to facilitate enforcement. International actors have a limited number of enforcement tools at hand, but some have the potential to affect the decisions of state leaders. Public criticism can act as a tool of enforcement. IOs can name and publicize state behavior, such as human rights violations, to discourage continued abuse. This strategy, known as "naming and shaming" (Hafner Burton 2008), can impact the international and domestic support of state leaders. Criticism may hurt a state's international standing and empower private domestic groups to pressure national governments, thus increasing domestic "audience costs" (Fearon 1994). Beyond public criticism, enforcement by IOs can include actually withholding benefits from noncompliant state leaders (Abbott & Snidal 1998). Withdrawing peacekeepers or other international aid workers and cutting funding for state projects can negatively impact state leaders. Leaders who rely on the benefits provided by IOs consider the implications of this type of enforcement. Taking on the roles of manager and enforcer allows IOs to influence the decision-making of post-conflict leaders.

IOs that have intervened in post-conflict countries have acted as managers and enforcers to different degrees of success. Researchers have come to varied conclusions when considering the effectiveness of aid and monitoring. The next two sections discuss the different conclusions of these scholars.

International aid and repression

International aid refers to funds from IOs given to post-conflict states to promote peace and rebuild the country. Scholars have construed economic intervention by the international community to be both indispensable and detrimental to developing countries. In fact, economists, academics, and policymakers dispute the effect of foreign aid on the development of economies. Some advocate the benefits of economic assistance (Zedillo Panel 2001 (Devarajan, Miller & Swanson 2002, **?**), while others argue economic aid facilitates corruption and other unintended consequences rather than economic growth (White 1998, Burnside & Dollar 2000, Moyo 2009, Ear 2013). The impact of economic assistance on development remains inconclusive. Closely related studies that specifically look at foreign aid and human rights come to similarly contradictory findings.

Two main lines of inquiry regarding human rights and foreign aid appear in the literature. Scholars have questioned the determinants and effects of aid. Investigating what drives donors to provide aid has been considered by many researchers. Fewer have examined aid's influence on human rights.

Authors have considered whether or not aid providers consider human rights abuses as a qualification for aid recipients, e.g.(Cingranelli & Pasquarello 1985, Stohl, Carleton & Johnson 1984, Mitchell & McCormick 1988, McCormick & Mitchell 1989, Poe 1992, Meernik, Krueger & Poe 1998, Neumayer 2003, Gibler 2008, Lebovic & Voeten 2009). Because the United States distributes a large percentage of foreign aid, many of these studies singularly consider U.S. aid requirements. Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) examine the relationship between U.S. aid to Latin America and human rights abuses. They use a two step analysis first considering whether a

country receives any aid, and then what amount of aid chosen countries receive. They find a correlation between U.S. aid and respect for human rights.[3] Also disaggregating the selection of aid recipients and the amount of aid allotted, Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998) find that while human rights policy affects whether or not a state receives any aid, it does not play a role in the amount of aid a country gets once the decision to provide aid has been made. Gibler (2008), additionally, finds that the U.S. chooses which states to give foreign aid to based partly on their human rights record, but repression records do not influence the amount of money a country receives. Once a state becomes a qualified aid recipient the amount it receives is based on need.

The literature addressing whether receiving aid alters respect for human rights is scant. Regan (1995) finds no relationship between economic intervention and improvement in human rights policies. Gibler (2008) finds U.S. aid policy affects human rights behavior indirectly. States that are not eligible for aid based on human rights abuses consider their opportunity costs, or loss of potential income, and will alter their behavior in expectation of future aid. In other words, state leaders understand that human rights abuses are the reason they are not receiving aid and improve their human rights policies to increase the likelihood future aid. Gibler's study presents one of the few studies to find a relationship between aid disbursed and an improvement in respect for human rights.

Other studies suggest that foreign aid negatively affects human rights. Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) find that when the World Bank requires structural adjustments of states that receive their loans, government violations of physical integrity rights increase. Governments are more likely to torture, imprison people for political reasons, commit extrajudicial killings and disappearances when the World Bank attaches structural adjustments to their loans. The World Bank seeks to improve economic conditions with their loans, but inadvertently promotes human rights violations when they require economic policy changes of the government. Bueno de Mesquita and

[3] Stohl and Carleton (1987) dispute the validity of Cingranelli and Pasquarello's study arguing their results are not robust to the exclusion of outliers. Stohl and Carleton define El Salvador as an outlier, and when included in the study Stohl and Carleton's results are no longer statistically significant.

Smith (2010) also find a reduction in respect for human rights related to an increase in foreign aid. The authors argue that leaders will offer side payments to elite supporters and limit political rights when they receive unearned income, like foreign aid, from international donors.

Aggregate analysis of financial assistance could partly explain why contradictory findings exist in the literature. Scholars who have examined foreign aid and its impact on human rights, whether they find a positive, negative, or no relationship, look at foreign aid as a whole and do not consider in what sectors spending occurs. Loans and grants issued by IOs have specific purposes. Money given to improve government institutions will not affect human rights in the same way as money spent on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former rebels into society. Ignoring the way foreign aid is disbursed when examining the effect of aid on human rights may provide an inaccurate assessment of the relationship between these variables. Disaggregating aid to discover how independent categories of aid might affect human rights differently gets at more specific relationships. Aid directed toward the government, society, and the economy hold different expectations in their influence on repressive policies.

International monitoring

Peacekeepers face several challenges in carrying out the tasks of IOs in post-conflict countries and the effectiveness of their efforts are questioned by scholars. This section elaborates on the effectiveness of sending peacekeepers into post-conflict countries, according to the extant literature. Effectiveness can be assessed in several different way. This section directs attention toward studies that examine peace generally, and human rights particularly.

All peacekeepers act as monitors as they interact with representatives of the government and former rebels, and report back to their sending institution. Peacekeepers can manage a number of tasks and carry out a multitude of duties inside post-conflict countries. Peacekeepers sent on traditional missions monitor ceasefires (Karns & Mingst 2004). Peacekeepers engaged in multidimensional missions and enforcement missions can verify demobilization, disarmament, and

reintegration of former combatants, participate directly in state building, monitor the behavior of former belligerents, aid in civil policing, and perform additional tasks associated post-conflict reconstruction (Diehl 2008). Whether they are tasked with traditional peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or enforcement missions, peacekeepers report their progress and ground conditions to the sending IO. They monitor the behavior of former belligerents and the progress made in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Thus, the international community will likely know more about conditions of repression where international monitors are present than where there is no international presence. Thus, peacekeepers help IOs and post-conflict actors share information making transactions between parties more efficient.

International intervention into post-conflict societies has increased over time. The absolute number of peacekeeping operations by international organizations remained low between the 1940s and 1980s, but experienced a dramatic surge in the 1990s and the number of operations remains comparatively high in the 2000s (Heldt & Wallensteen 2006). Scholarly interest coincided with the increase in peacekeeping missions and the assessment of interventions has become a familiar topic in academic scholarship. But, the effectiveness of intervention into post-conflict societies remains inconclusive and controversial based on the current literature. Research finds that international intervention can both harm and improve the conditions in post-conflict states. IOs have participated in state-building to greater and lesser degrees of success; and scholars and policymakers alike have criticized the performance of peacekeeping missions and professed the benefits of intervening in the affairs of sovereign states.

Some of the harshest criticisms of peacekeeping call into question the usefulness of this type of intervention at all; and others simply suggest the necessity of drastic changes so that missions might effectively keep the peace. Roland Paris (2004) suggests outside intervention by IOs can hinder reconstruction. He argues that the emphases of interventions have proved wrongheaded. IOs focus on electoral democracy and free markets when institutionalization should come first. Paris would like IOs to build local institutions to help stabilize society and then work on promoting democracy.

Contentious elections can help to reignite antagonisms between former belligerents without the aid of stable institutions and lead to renewed violence (Daxecker 2012). States cannot be made to work from the outside and when IOs circumvent local government, acting as a patron rather than a partner, they can do more harm than good (Chesterman, Ignatieff & Thakur 2005). Industrious IOs can create dependent weak states that have come to rely on their services and are disadvantaged once international interventions come to an end. Call and Cook (2003) call on IOs offering external aid to build on existing local institutions that already achieve some degree of legitimacy in post-war societies to encourage the integration of existing power and external efforts at state building. Jett (2001) suggests modern interventions, especially UN interventions, promise more than they can deliver. According to Jett, the UN may be well-suited to verify ceasefires between belligerents after interstate wars, but lacks the capacity to settle civil wars and build states in the aftermath of war. Dubey (2002) finds no correlation between third-party intervention and peace duration, suggesting that all peacebuiliding attempts by third parties have no impact on war recurrence.

Recent studies have also found a positive relationship between international intervention and peace duration. These studies assert that if war resumes the intervention has failed and if peace holds the intervention has succeeded. Conflicts recur less frequently if an intervention takes place (Fortna 2008). Fortna's research follows most quantitative studies that evaluate a successful mission as no renewed fighting. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) also take stock of peacekeeping missions by international organizations and discover three important contributing factors to a successful mission. Success is affected by the intensity of conflict hostilities, the local government capacity, and degree of international commitment. International peacekeeping positively affects peace according to Doyle and Sambanis.

Several additional studies consider the outcomes of interventions by international organizations after civil war, i.e. (Montgomery 1996, Adebajo 2002, Akashi 1995, Biermann & Vadset 1998, Boulden 2001), but few define success and failure as the quality of peace for civilians living in the

post-war society.[4] As mentioned in chapter one, a more comprehensive framework for successful intervention includes establishing a safe and secure environment, rule of law, a stable democracy, sustainable economy and social well-being (Thoms & Ron 2007). Respect for human rights and limiting government repression falls under this broad definition of success. Peacekeeping missions can affect government respect for physical integrity rights, political rights and civil liberties, and social and economic rights.

Physical integrity rights

Hultman (2010) considers peace operations during civil wars. She looks at whether these operations increase or decrease civilian deaths. She finds that, during civil wars, peace operations actually increase the number of civilian deaths committed by rebels, except interventions by the UN with a mandate to protect civilians. Peace operations during civil wars have no impact on government killing of civilians. Krain (2005) examines how interventions by third-parties influence the severity of genocides and politicides. He finds that interventions that challenge the perpetrators of mass killings reduce the severity of genocides and politicides. His measure of interventions includes a range of interventions, including peacekeeping missions. His findings indicate that neutral interventions, like those carried out by the UN and many regional organizations, will not reduce the number of civilians killed. Interventions must challenge the perpetrators of violence.

Kathman, Hultman, and Shannon (2011) note that most studies that consider the successes and failures of peacekeeping missions by the UN consider only whether a mission was present or not, and do not acknowledge the distinctions between each mission. The UN mission in Georgia from 1993 - 2009, UNOMIG, deployed a maximum of 459 personnel over the entire mission. UNAMIS, the UN mission positioned in Sudan from 2005 through 2011 sent a maximum of 10,519 troops to carry out its mandate. The difference in commitment to each mission makes the results incomparable. Kathman, Hultman and Shannon find that the UN's ability to protect civilians from

[4]For an exception, see Krain 2000. He examines repression and accommodation after internal war in Iran, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Cuba. He analyzes the domestic political causes of government repression and accommodation after internal conflicts.

death depends upon the number of troops deployed for that purpose.[5] The greater the number of troops, the better protection UN peacekeeping missions provide. Kathman, Hultman and Shannon make an excellent point. Mission strength varies and can provide different outcomes based on the level of commitment provided by the sending institution. Who intervenes can also make a difference in outcomes.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former Secretary-General of the UN, in his *Agenda for Peace*, argues that the way forward in peacekeeping should include regional peacekeepers. Regional organizations have a vested interest in ending conflicts in their region. However, Carolyn Shaw (1995) investigates the differences in a regional mission by ECOWAS in Liberia, and a UN mission carried out in Somalia. She comes to the conclusion that regional peacekeeping missions do not exceed the performance of UN missions. But, as mentioned above, Hultman finds that only UN missions reduce the killing of civilians during civil wars. The possible advantages of UN peacekeeping has been explained by Dorn (1998) in his article, Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way. He argues the UN has superior international authority, neutrality, and capacity to execute peacekeeping missions. On the other hand, Tavares (2010) expound on the advantages of regional organizations over the UN. Neither author conducts a systematic study to assess the accuracy of their arguments. The question of who better implements peacekeeping missions, especially to reduce government repression, remains unanswered.

The type of institution and mission type may play a role in respect for human rights in post-conflict countries. This may be especially true for political rights. Particular institutions and mission types may direct more attention to political rights and civil liberties than others.

Political rights

Post-conflict interventions frequently focus on implementing elections after civil war as a way to emphasize political rights and civil liberties. IOs may provide help in financing the elections and often monitor the elections to let national and international audiences know whether they

[5]Their study examines UN peacekeeping mission in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 - 2011.

considered them free and fair. Peacekeepers can function as election monitors to promote political rights and civil liberties in a post-conflict setting.

International election monitoring has become standard procedure for elections in post-conflict countries and in countries transitioning to democracy. After the Cold War, election monitoring increased dramatically, with up to eighty-six (86) percent of all elections employing international monitors (Hyde & Marinov 2008). Election monitors can have a positive influence on pushing for a fair election process. International election monitoring leads to fewer post-election protests (Hyde & Marinov 2008), suggesting that international verification and endorsement of the election process leads the public to accept the elections as valid. Elections can have a stabilizing effect when citizens and former opponents accept the results. Also, finding fraud in elections can have real consequences for those guilty of election manipulations. Hyde and Marinov (2008) find that international donors punish governments that commit election fraud by reducing their aid after the elections. They look at aid given three years pre-election and a three years post-election and find a reduction in aid for committers of fraud. These findings are congruent with the possibility that leaders who would like to hold on to their aid will not violate political rights and civil liberties. Expanding political rights and civil liberties to allow all citizens to participate in the election process makes sense for a leader who invites the international community to monitor a domestic election and would like to encourage the continued flow of foreign aid.

Despite the positive influence of election monitors on elections held in developing countries, they face specific challenges in post-conflict societies. The advantages of quick post-conflict elections to insinuate democratic legitimacy and to enhance the legitimacy of the government has been questioned (Hegre & Fjeld 2009, Paris 2004). Elections can destabilize post-conflict countries by promoting competition between former combatants and reigniting old conflicts. Elections can lead to violence, having the direct opposite consequence of the intended effect (Daxecker 2012). Countries face a number of challenges in creating free and fair elections, especially where the democratic process is new and incumbents have little incentive to promote fair elections. Ndulo

and Lulo (2010) note that post-conflict countries tend to have weak political parties, weak governance and institutions, lack democratic culture and tolerance, have ineffective police forces, may have rebel forces that fail to demobilize, and have logistical and security concerns not often faced by countries not plagued with conflict. Speedy elections under these conditions can exacerbate tensions and lead to increased violence instead of a peaceful democracy. Election monitors can verify fair voter registration, help with legal issues and the logistics of elections, ensure ballot materials are delivered countrywide, and make general election fraud more difficult (Hyde & Kelley 2011), but they cannot fix the underlying causes of conflict in post-war countries.

In addition to difficulties on the ground, election monitors must contend with pressure from the international community (Hyde & Kelley 2011). Monitors can face international pressure to endorse an election for political reasons. An election process endorsed by international monitors can mark a successful international intervention and allow for IOs planning to exit the country (Ndulo & Lulo 2010). Additionally, sham election monitoring sponsored by Russia through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Association of China (SCA) make the tasks of international election monitors more difficult. Monitoring sponsored by CIS and SCA will legitimize elections so long as their favored candidate wins the election (Ndulo & Lulo 2010). When IOs willfully endorse fraudulent elections, it complicates the job of monitors genuinely interested in detecting fraud. And, leaders who desire the legitimacy of international election verification, but also willfully manipulate elections (Kelley 2008) can take advantage of false reports and tout them as evidence of their impartiality.

The analysis in this dissertation seeks to illuminate the impact of post-conflict interventions's attentions to the election process on the political rights and civil liberties of post-conflict societies.

Social and economic rights

Studies considering social and economic factors in post-conflict countries tend to only evaluate their impact on peace and peace duration. The focus also tends to be on per capita GDP, and per capita economic growth, which are very important topics, because they strongly correlate with

conflict recurrence. For instance Collier, Hoeffler, and Sderbom (2008) find that increases in GDP and increases in economic growth decrease the risk of conflict significantly. To bolster GDP and economic growth, IOs concentrate their efforts on macroeconomic policies. Post-conflict countries often have defaulted on payments to their international creditors and lack of payments must be addressed because being in arrears affects the international aid a country can receive. Macroeconomic policies are important aspects of economic recovery in post-conflict states.

Some argue that economic and social inequality facilitate conflict and provide root causes of civil war. Ostby (2008) finds that group social inequality and social polarization are positively related to conflict outbreak. Peacekeeping missions generate a lot of emergency humanitarian aid, such as food distributions for the hungry, emergency medical aid for the sick, and providing shelter to the homeless (del Castillo 2008). Donors also show inclination for investing in building and rebuilding infrastructure. In terms of social development, donors prefer to fund concrete occupations, often literally, because buildings and projects that provide visual proof of completion are more open to accountancy. Short-term "hard" visible reconstruction are more easily audited than long-term "soft" social programs (Pugh 2000).

Soft programs can potentially reduce social and economic inequalities. Programs like the "land for arms" program in El Salvador attempt to reduce economic disparities. The program provided land to former combatants. It was considered particularly important in El Salvador, because land distribution was considered a root cause of their civil war (Orr 2001). International donors hesitate to fund these types of programs because they are difficult to audit. In addition to difficulty in appraising soft programs, they also can take quite some time to demonstrate results and short-term funding commonly lasts from three to twelve months (Pasic & Weiss 1997). Post-conflict states also experience intermittent financing with spikes and drop offs. These states often have difficulty absorbing spikes in financing so that aid is spent effectively. Large amounts of aid during brief periods of time provide opportunities for corruption (del Castillo 2008). Donors, therefore, want to be able to inspect the progress of the programs they support. Funding for social and economic

programs with long-term goals may be harder to fund in post-conflict states. This may have a negative impact on social and economic rights.

Conclusion

The extant literature does not fully explain why post-conflict state leaders choose to use repression or not. Civil war, democracy, and the state of the domestic economy do not fully account for whether or not leaders choose to respect human rights during post-conflict episodes. International intervention can also affect repression. Existing studies come to contradictory finds when considering how international aid affects human rights. The explanation for some of the contradictory findings may come from how scholars measure international aid. Disaggregating aid to find out how it affects different sectors of society will add to existing scholarship.

Studies considering the the effect of international monitors on post-conflict episodes often only consider the negative peace. This study is specifically concerned with the relationship between international monitors and the positive peace, or human rights. The type of mission carried out by an IO, or the identity of the institution itself may affect government respect for human rights. Examination of international monitoring may complement existing explanations for the use of repression after civil war.

In the next chapter I argue that international aid affects the risk of government repression. Leaders relying on foreign aid to bolster domestic legitimacy will expand political rights and civil liberties to maintain international financial contributions. However, aid provided to improve public security may inadvertently increase government repression. International monitors can help to keep leaders from cheating on their commitments to respect human rights and adhere to agreements made to keep the domestic peace.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Expectations

IOs have the capacity to alter incentive structures of states leaders as they make policy choices. According to Abbot and Snidal (1998), states join IOs for the purposes of centralization and independence. Centralization allows formal institutions to manage the collective action of member states. Independence gives the organization the ability to act with some degree of autonomy and neutrality in defined areas. More particularly, "states consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms, and expectations; to carry out and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or delegitimate particular ideas and practices; and to enhance their capacities and power"(Abbott & Snidal 1998). IOs can represent member states by playing a number of different roles on the international stage. In terms of post-conflict intervention, member states authorize intervening IOs to provide services to post-conflict societies and encourage and discourage specific behavior of former belligerents. In short, IOs can provide benefits and elicit costs from states to promote specific policies of state leaders.

This project seeks to determine the relationship between international intervention and government use of repression. International intervention refers to economic aid provided by IOs, and the contribution of international monitors to post-conflict societies. Repression refers to violations of physical integrity rights (i.e. torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and disap-

pearances), violations of political rights and civil liberties, and violations of social and economic rights.[1] Acting as managers and enforcers, IOs can affect respect for human rights in post-conflict countries. Acting as managers, IOs help to coordinate the actions of former belligerents, through the use of good offices, mediation, fact finding, and interpretation of agreements. Acting as enforcers, international monitors also facilitate cooperation between former combatants. International aid can provide a tool of enforcement for IOs. The desire to retain international aid can compel governments to reduce repressive acts.

While serving as managers and enforcers, IOs can potentially improve post-conflict government polices of repression in two ways. First, IOs can assist in creating policy alternatives that enhance government legitimacy and reduce government inclination to use repression. Policies that provide public goods can increase the legitimacy of the government and stymie human rights violations. IOs can help leaders provide these public goods to their constituents and choose to accommodate their citizens over repressing them. Economic aid presents the most likely way an IO will help to increase policy alternatives and boost legitimacy. Second, IOs can increase the cost of repressive policies. The presence of international organizations after civil war can serve to highlight the repressive actions of post-conflict leaders and in turn limit the abuse of human rights by these leaders. International monitors, such as election monitors and peacekeepers, can directly monitor the behavior of post-conflict actors potentially contribute to reducing repression through this role.

In this chapter, I will explore how economic contributions and monitoring by international actors can affect human rights in post-conflict societies.

Expanding policy alternatives to enhance legitimacy

A leader, first and foremost, wants to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson & Morrow 2003). Without retaining office, leaders have no way to implement changes or, if desirable,

[1] For a thorough definition of repression as it applies to this project, see Chapter 1, Section: Definitions.

ensure the political status quo. Retaining power requires that the government of the post-conflict society have some degree of legitimacy.[2] Post-conflict governments have a particular problem with achieving legitimacy with all segments of society regardless of how they come to power. If government leaders of the conflict remain in power after the war, a large segment of society has already proved willing to violently challenge their authority. If rebels attain a military victory and assume power after a civil war, it is likely that the former government and their supporters remain in opposition to the legitimacy of their leadership and have also demonstrated a willingness to violently oppose the new leadership. Any post-conflict leader faces the dilemma of deep divisions within society that threaten the government's legitimacy. Once a segment of society has been mobilized based on their right to self-determination, they are difficult to demobilize (Jackman 1993). Leaders want hostile segments of society to accept the legitimacy of their rule.

Krain (2000) asserts that leaders in post-conflict societies face the choice of accommodation or repression when rebuilding state capacity. He argues that leaders will tend to repress rather than accommodate because, among other reasons, accommodation depletes finite political and economic capital. Repression costs less than providing public goods. It follows that governments with increased financial resources might choose accommodation over repression. I argue, IOs bolstering economic resources for a short period of time may promote the use of accommodation, policies that build legitimacy, by leaders. As leaders increase efforts to gain legitimacy, repressive policies should begin to diminish. Repressive policies cannot build legitimacy. Repression may increase costs to political opponents and even demobilize the opposition for long periods of time, but cannot create legitimacy (Jackman 1993). Leaders seeking legitimacy do not want to use repression against civilians.

Actions by IOs in post-conflict societies can be categorized as peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping refers to IOs monitoring ceasefires and creating buffer zones between belligerents,

[2]A legitimate government, here, simply refers to widespread acceptance of a leader's rule (Buchanan & Keohane 2006).

otherwise known as traditional peacekeeping. The term peacebuilding emerged in former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, defined as "action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict." When peacebuilding, IOs support peace consolidation through conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi 2004). Activities promoting peacebuilding and peacemaking will also advocate accommodation over repression.

Peacekeeping facilitates a negative peace between belligerents, and peacebuilding demonstrates a commitment to creating a positive peace in post-conflict societies. A supplement to *An Agenda for Peace* elaborated on the distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The supplement noted that peacebuilding activities generally fall under the mandate of offices and agencies of the UN responsible for economic, social, humanitarian and human rights. Yet, peacebuilding does not fall into the categories of humanitarian relief or traditional development (Tschirgi 2004). Peacebuilding is unique to post-conflict societies. The supplement also notes that in post-conflict countries ravaged by war, peacebuilding may initially have to be relegated to, or at least coordinated by, a multifunctional peacekeeping mission. As the peacebuilding operation succeeds, local offices can gradually take over from the peacekeepers. Assistance with peacebuilding activities can allow governments to choose to accommodate citizens instead of controlling them through the use of repression.

According to the extant literature, leaders turn to repression because they have no viable alternative for control. Developing countries violate human rights more often because they have fewer resources for welfare payments, higher wages, and bribery to influence the population (Davenport 2007*b*). Using repression against its own citizens demonstrates the weakness of the state in its inability to coerce behavior through any other means (Jackman 1993). The more serious the loss of legitimacy within a given society, the more likely citizens will revolt against the existing government (Rogowski 1974). Simply put, "A state which can only coerce its subjects is not governing them, it is at war with them" (Barker 1990, p.138). Repression, therefore, is not the

ideal policy choice for post-conflict leaders.

This argument, in turn, suggests that building legitimacy can help to stave off revolts. Increasing legitimacy enhances government efficiency and reduces the cost of enforcement (Gilley 2009). Interventions by international organizations can help to reduce government use of repression through contributions to government legitimacy. Expanding policy choices through contributing to the abundance of goods and services provided by the state or aiding in the perception of fairness when leaders are chosen may render repression less likely. According to Beetham (1991), there are four different ways to establish government legitimacy: (1) through tradition (2) through a leader's charisma (3) through a regime's production of goods and services (4) through public belief in the fairness of the selection process for leaders. International interventions cannot affect tradition or the charisma of a leader, but they can contribute to a leaders ability to provide goods and services and the perception of fairness in choosing leaders. IOs that provide training, troops, food aid, institution building, etc. help the government satisfy a public need for goods and services. Assisting in post-conflict development can boost the legitimacy of a government.

Peacekeeping missions, especially those that include peacebuilding, often help with creating or monitoring democratic institutions and the election process. In this way, peacekeepers can help with the public belief in the fairness of the selection process for leaders. Providing transparency, information, and technical assistance with elections can enhance public belief in the fairness of the selection process. International aid and peacebuilding operations help weak governments provide public goods and services to their constituents. Aid and monitoring by IOs give temporary aid to governments that cannot afford to distribute public goods on their own.Temporary aid gives post-conflict governments time to develop or re-establish revenue sources that ensure its ability to provide public goods. The willingness of a citizenry to pay taxes hinges on the perception of the government's ability to provide public goods (Boyce 2007). IOs can direct post-war aid toward increasing government legitimacy and encouraging respect for human rights.

International aid

Not all international aid will positively affect respect for human rights. Much like the foreign aid and development literature, the findings concerning aid and human rights come to differing results. Some conclude that economic aid, under specific conditions, can contribute to the promotion of human rights (Gibler 2008), whereas other scholars find a negative correlation, or no correlation, between economic intervention and and human rights (Regan 1995). Some of the disharmony in the literature may stem from assuming that all money will have a uniform impact on human rights. Most studies measure aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA) from either international organizations or bilateral donor countries. ODA combines all sectors of aid into a yearly measure to recipient countries. The measure makes sense if all aid is expected to affect government repression equally, but if different types of aid affect human rights differently, the data should be analyzed in another way.

States can choose to establish political order through accommodation or repression. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) find that leaders use repression[3] to reduce revolutionary threats when they receive unearned income, like foreign aid and oil revenues. They assert that leaders faced with the choice of increasing spending on public goods to improve the general welfare or reducing access to public goods (political rights) that help people organize, will opt for a reduction in public goods if they receive income that does not come from the public. They essentially argue that if the government does not rely on the public for its revenue, the public cannot compel the government to provide public goods. However, the empirical tests used in their study look at ODA as a singular variable, and do not consider the independent effects that different types of aid might have on using repression, or reducing public goods, versus spending on public goods. Disaggregation of ODA may show an association between aid directed toward specific sectors of society and an increase or decrease in respect for human rights.

[3]Bueno de Mesquita and Smith refer to suppressing the provision of public goods, such as free press, ease of transparency, and communication. Suppressing these public goods equates with violations of political rights.

I break up aid into three distinct categories, rebuilding government institutions, recovering the economy, and rebuilding society through social programs and infrastructure. Rehabilitating government institutions that provide meaningful political inclusion, legal protection for groups and individuals, and public safety help to implement important aspects of positive peace, and create mechanisms for resolving conflict and addressing grievances (Cousens 2001). Basic government services, like clean water, education, access to healthcare, and passable roads constitute social services. Without these provisions, its difficult to establish a tax base that will pay for these and other services. A well-functioning economy provides the necessary resources to run government institutions and provide social services once international aid diminishes or completely stops. Post-conflict international aid can boost a damaged post-war economy. Well-functioning government institutions, social services, and a well-functioning economy are all important aspects of a positive peace. However, in the short-term, I expect that aid directed toward government institutions and the economy will negatively affect respect for human rights, and aid given to improve social services will improve government respect for human rights. The diagram below illustrates my expectations for international aid contributions and respect for human rights. I elaborate on why I expect these outcomes below.

$$
\begin{aligned}
IntlAid \rightarrow Government \quad &\overset{Social}{\rightarrow} \quad Accomodate \\
&\overset{Economy}{\rightarrow} \quad Repress \\
&\overset{Government}{\rightarrow} \quad Repress
\end{aligned}
$$

IOs generally provide ODA to improve state capacity. The ability to coerce and provide benefits to citizens of a country determines state capacity. Strong governments provide security and social services to their publics (Levi 2006). International aid should enhance the ability of states to provide services to the public. However, the ability to coerce is also a function of state capacity. A weak state will focus on repression instead of redistribution (Azam 2001). Transitioning from a weak state to a strong state does not guarantee a government will not repress its citizens. State capacity is necessary for both accommodation and repression (Hendrix 2010). And, augmenting state

capacity with financial contributions will not always generate benefits to the majority of a population. International aid gives states the opportunity to provide better services to its constituents, or money to aid in bolstering coercive capabilities.

Building efficient government institutions, strengthening the economy, and providing social services to the public all fall under the auspices of state capacity. Even though each of these enterprises serve to build state capacity, aid to improve the efficiency of the government will not have the same effect as international aid directed toward the economy, or toward social services.

Foreign aid directed at specific sectors of government and society will not equally affect all citizens. I expect two factors to generally influence whether aid given to a specific sector of society will improve general human rights conditions in post-conflict societies. First, the size of the group that benefits from spending will particularly influence change in human rights policies. Where the greatest number of people share in the benefits of international contributions, the greatest legitimacy will be achieved and the appeal of the use of repression will abate. Second, spending sometimes aims to improve social conditions in a short period of time and other spending has only a long-term impact.[4] Projects that have the greatest impact in the shortest amount of time will create the greatest improvement in government legitimacy. Long term projects are not less important than shorter term aid projects, but the effects of long-term projects are less obvious and therefore garner less immediate legitimacy. Spending directed at short-term improvement with the greatest number of beneficiaries will be most likely to positively alter human rights policies in the time period analyzed.

All monies provided by the international community seek to improve the economy, to strengthen government institutions, or to improve the conditions of society on some level. Though the in-

[4]Clemens, Radelet and Bhavnani (2005) make a similar argument regarding the impact of short term aid, but look at spending effects on short-term economic growth rather than government repression. Also distinct from this project, they categorize, "budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry" as aid that can plausibly stimulate growth in four years. They argue social spending and spending on infrastructure will have negative and long-term effects respectively. In other words they argue spending in the business sector will promote short-term growth while government and social spending will not.

tended beneficiaries of projects may certainly overlap, most aid projects can be identified as having one main area of interest.[5] For example, providing better access to the judicial system in rural areas of the country benefits both government institutions and citizens who desire or require access to the system. However, strengthening government institutions can be identified as the primary purpose of the described project.

A comparison of physical integrity violations and foreign aid, by sector and as a percentage of GDP, suggests that foreign aid can have a positive, a negative, and no impact on human rights in post-conflict countries. Figure 3.1 compares physical repression scores established by the CIRI scale[6] from 1981 - 2006 and foreign aid directed toward the economy, government, and social needs as a percentage of GDP, in post-conflict countries from 1981-2006. The graph shows a potential association between higher mean social aid and fewer physical integrity violations. Though the worst offenders, countries with a score of 8, receive more aid than countries with marginally less repression, countries scoring 5, 6, and 7, social aid rises considerably in countries with less repression, or countries scoring a 0 - 4 on the CIRI scale. A cursory glance at the relationship between aid spent on rebuilding the government suggests a more complicated relationship between aid for government institutions and physical integrity violations. There is no discernible pattern for countries with higher physical integrity violations, but countries with low levels of repression receive more aid designated for improving government institutions. Aid directed toward improving the economy during this time period suggest no obvious relationship with respect for human rights.

Government institutions include a military, police force, judiciary, parliamentary or presidential institutions in democratic societies, etc. Aid to government institutions can negatively affect respect for human rights because the benefits of stronger institutions may take decades to achieve, and building some institutions may lead to coercion rather than accommodation. One of the pri-

[5] See chapter 4 for a breakdown of government, economic, and social spending.
[6] See chapter 4 for a detailed explanation of the CIRI scale.



Figure 3.1: International aid by physical integrity violations.

mary responsibilities of government is to provide security for its citizens. Weber's well-known definition of the state refers to a government's monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a given territory (Weber 1972). A strong military is associated with the capacity to provide security. Aid spent to enhance military capabilities improves state capacity, benefits members of the military, but might negatively impact respect for human rights because military units perpetrate physical integrity violations.[7] Increasing the capacity of a government's military may benefit a few and increase the risk of harm to a great many. Increasing a state's security capacity can simultaneously increase the risk of physical integrity violations.

If security were meted out equally to all, military spending would not be expected to correlate with government repression. In post-conflict societies with a limited history of government repression during a civil conflict, aid spent on peace and security should not negatively affect respect for human rights. To illustrate the point, in 1998 the United Kingdom ended a civil conflict with the Irish Republican Army. Military spending five years post-conflict increased by 2,486 million US dollars[8] and yet respect for human rights improved in the post-conflict era. The UK CIRI physical integrity score[9] averaged 2.4 five years before the end of the conflict. Five years after the end of the conflict the UK scored a 2.2 on the CIRI scale, placing them closer to a zero, a score representing little to no government repression. Israel, on the other hand, committed many physical integrity violations during their civil conflict ending in 1997. Their CIRI score, a five-year average prior to the end of the conflict in 1997, was a 6.4. Their military spending increased by 1,513 million US dollars[10] in the five years after the conflict and Israel's CIRI score shows that this country increased repression after civil war. Their five year post-war average score was 7.0. Unfortunately, civil war significantly increases government repression in most countries and increased spending

[7] By definition, a military applies organized violence in defense of the state (Thee 1977).

[8] 2010 constant US dollars. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Spending Index, accessed at http://www.sipri.org, on September 27, 2012

[9] In this study, the CIRI physical integrity score ranges from 0 = no repression to 8 = no respect for human rights

[10] 2010 constant US dollars. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Spending Index, accessed at http://www.sipri.org, on September 27, 2012.

on the government institutions responsible for peace and security may diminish respect for human rights.

Over time institution building can benefit a large number of people, but initially, the distribution of international aid used for this purpose will only touch a few. Those contracted to build domestic institutions will likely be chosen by the government of the day. Current leaders can dole out aid based on merit or provide benefits to groups who support the regime, but either way, initially, money contributed to build government institutions will likely go to an elite few. A small number of people are expected to directly benefit from institution building, in the short-term. Roland Paris (2009) suggests that institution building generally takes more time than the average peacekeeping mission. He notes that the occupation in Germany and Japan lasted five and seven years respectively, but the U.S. continued to offer support for decades to maintain stability in these countries. Roland recommends, to build functioning institutions, peacekeeping missions should plan to stay at least five years, but should remain as long as it takes to establish or reestablish working institutions. His book highlights both the importance of institutions and the long-term state-building necessary to improve post-war government institutions. Because institution building potentially takes decades, and aid spent to improve government institutions will likely benefit a few in the short term, and will increase military and police capacity, I expect that, in the short-term:

$$IntlAid \rightarrow Government \overset{Increasemilitarycapacity}{\rightarrow} Repress$$

H1: International aid directed toward government institution building will increase the risk of repression in post-conflict societies.

In other instances, aid given to specific sectors of society will positively affect respect for human rights. In terms of legitimacy, the most significant international aid should bolster programs within the short-term. Aid directed toward health, education, and social security can provide direct social insurance, and have an immediate impact on people's quality of life (Snyder & Bhavnani 2005, Burgoon 2006). Food aid and rebuilding infrastructure should also have short-term effects on people, and help to build government legitimacy. Results should be measured in terms of years

and not decades.

Civil wars destroy infrastructure and frequently prevent distribution of basic social services. Reinstating and expanding social services proffers one way to establish government legitimacy to large numbers of people post-conflict. If people can conduct transactions more easily and have access to services that were not available during the war, and the improvements can be attributed to the government, and this accommodation will establish political legitimacy. Political legitimacy deems repression unnecessary, in terms of political control.

Providing social services can also address issues of social inequality, and develop political legitimacy with groups likely to oppose the government. Gurr (1968) notes that poverty and grievances associated with injustice and inequality can have the power to incite rebellion. Sen (1973) asserts that the relationship between rebellion and inequality is a close one. Spending on social welfare provides goods and services to those with potential political grievances. Redistribution of wealth by the government can co-opt the political opposition and reduce incentives for rebellion (Taydas & Peksen 2012). Establishing political legitimacy entails convincing the political opposition to recognize the authority of the government. Providing goods and services to those who might otherwise rebel is a way to establish political legitimacy (Beetham 1991) and reduce the need for government repression.

Providing public goods to society at large will increase government legitimacy in the short term and aid in altering the appeal of using repressive policies by the government. A government considered legitimate through providing necessary goods and services to the public will need to spend less resources seeking public order through repressive policies. This reasoning suggests that:

$$IntlAid \rightarrow Socialaid \overset{Increaselegitimacy}{\rightarrow} \rightarrow Accommodate$$

H2: International aid directed social services will reduce the risk of repression in post-conflict societies.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) represents one of the major international financial institutions providing loans to developing countries. The primary purpose of the IMF is to ensure the

stability of the international monetary system (IMF 2012). Loans from the IMF and other IGOs provided to spur economic growth can come with structural adjustment agreements that require liberalizing the loan recipient's economy (Abouharb & Cingranelli 2006). Structural adjustment agreements almost always cause hardship to the poor because they require some combination of reduction in social services provided by the government, public employment, and state subsidies for essential services and commodities (Abouharb & Cingranelli 2006). Aid to stimulate the economy, combined with structural adjustment agreements, can have the opposite effect of spending on social services.

Structural adjustment agreements require loan recipients to alter policies in order to receive aid. Donors intend to make the economies of recipient countries more efficient with policy changes. Even though some individuals who depend on the government for jobs, healthcare, education, or other types of subsidies will be adversely affected, the macroeconomy will flourish. Over time, those individuals who were detrimentally affected by policy changes will benefit from the overall economic growth of the country. Prior to the end of El Salvador's war, in 1989, the government signed an agreement with the IMF to bring about macroeconomic stability. In 1992, the terms of the peace agreement signed by the government and the rebels contradicted the policies prescribed in the agreement with the IMF. During the first post-conflict years, the IMF ignored the terms of the peace agreement, insisting that El Salvador meet the terms of their loan from the international financial institution (de Soto & del Castillo 1994). Contradictions in macroeconomic stabilizations plans and peacekeeping and peacebuilding agreements can limit the expansion of social services planned by the government. Limiting social services will limit the political legitimacy to be garnered from the provision of social services. In the short term, people may be negatively affected by macroeconomic policy changes, while overtime the benefits of the new policies will be realized.

A stable and growing economy can benefit the majority of people within a society. Economic growth tends to create jobs and improve general living conditions for many. However, the immediate effects of economic recovery plans may provide benefits to the few and not the many. Funds

provided to the few to strengthen economic conditions can actually be a detriment to some sectors of society. Conditions of loans provided by IOs to improve economic conditions often require cuts in social spending. In fact, some research suggests that loans provided by IOs, especially those that require stringent structural adjustments that scale back social spending, have a significant negative impact on respect for human rights (Abouharb & Cingranelli 2006). Aid to induce economic recovery puts the actual aid in the hands of a few and often requires less social spending on the many. Suggesting that in the short term,

$$IntlAid \rightarrow Economy \overset{Austerityprograms}{\rightarrow} \rightarrow Repress$$

H3: International aid that addresses economic recovery will increase the risk repression in post-conflict societies.

Economic aid might be spent on banking and financial services, business and other services, fishing and forestry, industry and construction, trade policies, agriculture, minerals, and mining, or regulation and tourism. These specific industries can benefit directly from international aid in the short-term. However, simultaneous cuts in social spending can make this aid unpopular and prove detrimental to those in need of social benefits including, government jobs, health benefits, education, and welfare payments, from the government. Government legitimacy may rise in specific industries, but diminish amongst those disadvantaged by the changes in policy.

The number of beneficiaries of aid varies across projects and across sectors. For example, infrastructure projects do not generally limit the number of beneficiaries to an elite few. On the other hand, general budget support provided to the government might be allocated to elicit the support of an elite group of benefactors. I expect monies spent to benefit the greatest number of people to increase government legitimacy and to simultaneously decrease government repression. Where the beneficiaries of aid spending is limited to an elite few, spending will diminish respect for human rights. In the case of spending on government institutions, evidence of strengthened institutions for the greater good of society will not likely be immediate, and the money may easily do the greatest immediate good for small groups within government agencies while simultaneously

increasing the capacity to repress. Aid toward social services should reach a large section of society in a short period of time. While money spent to improve the economy will initially benefit a small number of people, and may even negatively affect those who receive social services from the government.

I expect foreign aid to improve respect for human rights when it is spent on projects and programs that will increase government legitimacy. Spending directed at the greatest number of people, and meant to have a short-term impact will improve human rights in post-conflict societies. International aid can be divided into three sectors, aid to rebuild government institutions, aid aimed at recovering the economy, and aid directed toward rebuilding society. Spending on social programs to help rebuild society should affect the greatest number of people in the shortest period of time and, therefore, should have the greatest positive impact on improving respect for human rights in first years following a civil war.

Increasing the cost of repression

The actions of IOs can also increase the cost of using repressive polices for post-conflict leaders. An international presence can increase the cost of violations of human rights by calling international attention to government policies of repression. IOs can reduce the probability a state will use repression through monitoring government behavior.

Post-conflict states frequently turn to international actors to help establish peace after civil war. After war, international organizations can provide credible commitments for security and enforcement of agreements that former combatants cannot provide to each other. Walter (1997, 2002) argues that civil war combatants who have agreed to negotiate, compromise on goals and principles, and come to a peace agreement benefit from security guarantees by third parties. In post-conflict societies where a clear victor emerges, the winning actors can dictate the terms of the peace. Negotiating peace leaves much uncertainty as to the intent of all parties to the settlement.

Even when combatants agree in theory on a plan to keep the peace, implementation may leave

either side feeling vulnerable to an unexpected attack or resumption of hostilities from the other side. Rebels forced to disarm and demobilize no longer present the same threat to a government that resumes a monopoly of the violent use of force within the territorial boundaries of the state. Likewise, a state military force that agrees to reduce its size and combat readiness fears that rebels may have used negotiations as a strategic opportunity rather than acting in good faith. Rebels might stockpile undisclosed weaponry and assault an unsuspecting government that has reduced its military capabilities. Former belligerents find it hard to trust each other to follow the rules set out by a negotiated peace. According to Walter, a security guarantee from the international community can reduce fears of reneging on an agreement or truce.

Walter makes a compelling argument for the difficulties of negotiations after civil war, however, her argument regarding a security guarantee holds less certainty. Walter argues that in order for a third-party commitment to be credible, the third party must: (1) have self-interest in keeping its promises; (2) be willing to use force if necessary, and have sufficient military power to punish the violator of an agreement; and (3) the state must be able to signal resolve (Walter 1997). Empirically, she defines a security guarantee as any implicit or explicit commitment by a third-party to protect belligerents should a treaty process break down. The more troops deployed by the third-party, the stronger the commitment. A formal promise of support with no troops constitutes a weak guarantee; a moderate guarantee deploys a minimum of 500 troops; and a strong guarantee includes at least 10,000 troops provided by a third-party(Walter 1997). The drawback to her argument is two-fold.

While this argument has merit in a small subset of cases, it fails to explain a majority of post-conflict episodes. Firstly, it ignores all cases that do not end in a negotiated settlement. Thirty-four of seventy-eight civil wars ending between 1981 and 2006, almost half, terminated with a victory for the rebels or the government. While she argues there is a categorical difference between victory and negotiated settlement, wars that end in a complete victory for a particular side cannot be explained through Walter's analysis. Secondly, rarely do third-parties, especially IOs, provide

actual security guarantees to post-conflict countries. Assuming that a third-party's willingness to use force if war resumes presumes too much. Even when IOs provide troops, should a peace treaty break down and fighting resume, international troops generally pull out. Getting involved directly in a civil war proves too costly in most situations and international troops are more likely to withdraw than to protect belligerents. Take Rwanda in 1994, where fighting resumed, a genocide ensued, and the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) drew down its forces rather than protecting targets of a genocide when the treaty process broke down. Eventually the UN chose to bolster troops, but long after the genocide had come to a close (Jones 1999). The security guarantee provided by a third-party failed to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, and also failed to protect belligerents from renewed violence.

According to Walter's empirical breakdown, the UN provided a 'moderate' security guarantee in the case of Rwanda. UNAMIR committed 2,548 troops between October 1993 and April 1994, well above the 500 minimum troop number defining a moderate security guarantee.[11] Interestingly, the promoters of the genocide in Rwanda did not anticipate that the UN would provide an actual security guarantee. Part of their strategy included attacking UN troops to falter the security resolve of the IO. The plan included killing ten Belgian peacekeeping troops to motivate the withdrawal of the UN from Rwanda (Jones 1999). The strategy worked in rendering UNAMIR an inadequate force in thwarting their plans of genocide. The security guarantee provided by IOs is minimal, and even government leaders do not believe that IOs will continue their missions, as planned, once fighting has resumed. But, other benefits that IOs proffer in the roles of manger and enforcer do aid in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies and are sought out by post-conflict leaders.

Services offered by IOs fall short of a security guarantee should peace between belligerents falter, but IOs acting as managers and enforcers can still play an important role in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies. Former belligerents recognize the importance of the provision of good

[11] Source: UN Peacekeeping website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirF.htm, accessed January 9, 2012.

offices, transparency, a neutral mediator, fact finders, verification and exposing any cheating on the part of the former rebels or the government. Government leaders desire the aid and legitimacy provided by IOs during post-conflict episodes. Even though leaders do not anticipate an actual security guarantee should war resume, leaders interested in peace do recognize the benefits offered by IO intervention and often invite the international community to participate in the rebuilding of their war-torn societies.

International monitors dispatched to observe and report on the behavior of former belligerents aid in keeping the peace. International peacekeepers fulfill many different tasks, including direct participation in post-war reconstruction. No matter the individual task, the presence of international actors provides the participating IO and the international community with reports on the behavior of the post-war government. International involvement with post-war reconstruction can come with implicit or explicit expectations of respect for human rights. Overt commissions of repression by the government will be reported to participating IOs and their repressive activity will be made known.

International monitors can increase the cost of repression. Repressive behavior by governments may come with international costs. Although foreign aid does not make a government responsible to its constituency as tax collection might, aid from IOs comes with a responsibility to the international donor (Lebovic & Voeten 2009). Violating the terms of the peace risks the loss of international benefits provided by IOs. However, violations of the peace can only cost governments if the international community becomes aware of government behavior. International monitors demonstrate the commitment of the international community and can help to increase respect for human rights in post-conflict societies.

International monitoring

Peacekeepers provided by international organizations may increase the cost of repression to post-conflict governments. IOs intervene with different purposes during post-conflict episodes, but



Figure 3.2: Peacekeeping by physical integrity violations.

no matter the purpose, government behavior will be monitored by the peacekeepers. Through monitoring the behavior of both the government and former rebels, troops can encourage the government to keep human rights abuses to a minimum. When international monitors are absent, governments can more easily hide and deny violations of human rights. With monitors present this becomes more difficult and leaders, who lean on the presence of international troops to contribute to state-building, or rely on international funding, may reduce repressive acts against civilians. See Figure 3.2 for a comparison of post-conflict violations of physical integrity rights with and without peacekeepers present.

The difference in the range of physical integrity scores for post-conflict countries with and

without peacekeeping may look insignificant according to Figure 3.2. The graph shows countries without peacekeeping score a mere one point higher than their no peacekeeping counterparts. However, based on the CIRI scale of physical integrity violations, a one point difference can indicate a country with just forty-nine incidents of extrajudicial killing, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances compared to a country with thousands of such violations. Looking at just extrajudicial killings, a country with 30 incidents of extrajudicial killings in one year would score a one on a scale ranging from zero to two. A country with 10,000 extrajudicial killings in that same year would earn a score of two. Holding torture, political imprisonments, and disappearances equal, the distinction between these two countries on the CIRI scale is one point. A one point difference on the CIRI scale of physical integrity scores can show a substantial difference between two countries in their respect for human rights.

Post-conflict countries with peacekeeping missions show greater respect for physical integrity rights. Figure 3.2 shows that countries with peacekeeping missions are less likely to torture, commit extrajudicial killings, torture, and incarcerate for political reasons. Included in the graph are missions carried out by the UN and regional international organizations. Also included in the graph are missions with different levels of commitment. Some missions included less than 100 peacekeepers and lasted but a few months, while others committed thousands of troops and lasted for years. The range of commitment and different organizations suggest that generally,

H5: The presence of international peacekeepers will decrease repression in post-conflict societies.

It is also possible that certain types of missions have a greater impact on human rights than others. As mentioned above, peacekeeping can refer to less committed mission where fewer troops, less time, and a less expansive mandate intervene in post-conflict countries to help curtail conflict. These missions do not address the full range of human rights issues. They maintain ceasefires and buffer zones between belligerents, but do not monitor other aspects of government or rebel behavior. They are not concerned with political participation, law and order, the state of the country's

infrastructure, political imprisonment, the treatment of prisoners. Peacekeepers, involved in missions that do not directly examine how governments and rebels treat civilians may have absolutely no impact on human rights. In fact, it is possible that:

H6: Less committed peacekeeping missions will not influence repression in post-conflict societies.

Other missions involve peacebuilding. These missions directly address human rights issues. During missions that include peacebuilding, international military troops frequently disarm and demobilize civil war combatants, limiting their coercive power over civilians. Peacebuilding can also include international monitoring of military reform, making it more likely that international monitors would be exposed to the execution of human rights violations by the military. Common reforms in post-conflict armies include a reduction in the size of the military and the removal of military officers responsible for repression during the war. International monitoring of these reforms make it more likely that the government will effectuate changes in the coercive branch of the regime in a timely fashion. International military troops included in peacebuilding missions will be more likely to curb physical integrity violations than less committed peacekeeping missions.

Civilian police officers provided by IOs during peacebuilding missions are often tasked with monitoring human rights. They observe civilian police forces, another common source of physical integrity violations against civilians. Monitoring of civilian police forces can decrease the risk of repression in post-conflict countries. For example, oppositional parties in both Guatemala and El Salvador made human rights agreements prior to signing the final peace accords that would permanently end the wars.[12] In each case the governments allowed peacekeepers from the United Nations to ensure adherence to the human rights agreements by the signatories. They monitored the coercive forces, police and military, of the governments and the rebels. As a result, prior to the signing of the final peace accords, respect for human rights improved in both Guatemala and

[12]In Guatemala a human rights agreement was signed in 1994 and the final peace accords were not reached until 1996. A UN observer mission (ONUSAL) tasked with monitoring respect for human rights entered EI Salvador in early 1991 and the final accords were signed on December 31, 1991.

El Salvador (Canas 1999, Stanley 2002). International monitoring by international military troops and international civilian police can help to ensure parties comply with the terms of an agreement.

Peacebuilding missions also contribute election observers to directly influence political rights and civil liberties. International election observers provided by IOs to post-conflict countries serve several purposes. Some tasks are carried out on election day, like deterring and reporting fraud during ballot casting and during the counting processes. Reporting the overall fairness of the election itself and the election process and assessing respect for election results to the international community occurs post-election. Prior to the election, an in depth evaluation of the election process including appraisal of the quality of election laws, election campaigns, and voter registration occurs (McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991). International assessment of the election process demands careful examination of political participation rights. IOs that agree to observe elections begin examining the election process well before citizens cast their ballots.

For example, when the European Union agrees to observe elections, they send both "long-term observers" and "short-term observers." Long-term observers arrive well in advance of the actual election and assess the performance of the electoral management body, the political context of the election, the reliability and efficiency of voter registration, the process of candidate registration and campaign activities, freedom of expression, assembly and movement, issues of human rights related to the election, the role of the media, and the role of civil society in relation to the election. Long-term and short-term observers monitor voting, the counting and tabulation process, the presence of intimidation or restrictions on the freedom of movement on election day, the implementation of voting procedures, and the publication of election results.[13] An Election Observation Mission by the European Union assesses the political rights of a country, as well as the fairness of the actual electoral process. Governments that open themselves up to the scrutiny of IOs risk the condemnation of international observers. Where international election observers are present during

[13]Handbook for European Union Election Observation, Second Edition, European Commission, 2008. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide.

elections, government policies should lean toward respect for political rights and civil liberties.

Peacebuilding missions also engage in improving social and economic rights. Overseeing and contributing to rebuilding the country's infrastructure might improve the social and economic rights of civilians in post-conflict countries. International monitors can provide technical assistance to aid social programs and help to ensure international funding is used for its intended purpose. There is always the potential for misuse of international funding meant to fund improvement projects. With international monitors tracking international funding and helping to implement social and economic programs abuse of funding may be less likely. International monitors involved in peacebuilding can directly influence respect for social and economic rights. So, I expect that in general,

H7:Peacebuilding missions will decrease the risk repression in post-conflict societies.

Peacekeeping by IOs offer different level of commitment to different post-conflict environments. Peacekeepers tasked with monitoring ceasefires and implementing buffer zones between belligerents are less directly involved in monitoring human rights than those committed to peacebuilding missions. Therefore, I expect peacebuilding missions to have a greater impact on government respect for human rights than less committed peacekeeping missions.

One final important distinction between peacekeeping missions to consider is who sends the peacekeepers. The UN has sent more peacekeeping missions than any other IO, but regional organizations with a peace and security mandate have also organized post-conflict peacekeeping missions.

Interventions by regional organizations may differently influence repression in post-conflict countries. Intervening institutions can be generally divided into the UN and regional IOs, such as the African Union, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Walter Dorn (1998) notes that regional organization peacekeeping missions have a disadvantage compared to UN missions, due to state interests, perceptions of neutrality, IO capacity, and IO authority. Part of the appeal of inviting the UN to intervene in a post-conflict state pertains to

the appearance of neutrality. Belligerents may respond to a neutral arbitrator in a different way than when they negotiate directly with the former enemies. Regional organizations do not always invite the perception of neutrality. State members of regional organizations often have interests in the outcome of a conflict, and the post-conflict policies of the government. For example, arms embargoes necessary to ensure an end to violent conflict may affect powerful members of the regional organization, and they may hesitate to implement policies that negatively impact their own countries. Members of regional organizations may seek to protect their interests, and even if members do not put their own interests first, there may be the perception of bias by parties to the conflict, and, therefore, they lack the perceived neutrality often important for international interventions.

In addition to interests and perceptions of neutrality, regional organizations do not have the same capacity and authority as the UN. Regional peacekeeping missions have fewer available resources (Diehl 2008) and their peacekeepers have been viewed as corrupt by local populations (Jett 2001). The UN boasts 193 member states, including those with the most robust economies in the world. Potential donors include most of the countries in the world. Many civil conflicts occur in the less developed regions of the world meaning that regional organizations have significantly less capacity in terms of member contributions. Regional organizations have fewer members than the UN, and therefore, have fewer states to contribute to peacekeeping missions. It can be difficult for the UN to sustain a peacekeeping mission, and can prove even more difficult for a mission sponsored by a less affluent regional international organization. The UN also possess authority that regional organizations lack, unless granted by the UN. The UN charter asserts its position as the keeper of international peace and security. Subcontracting out peacekeeping to regional organizations may siphon off resources and financing for UN initiatives and work less well because the regional organizations do not share the same international status as the UN.

An alternate argument put forth by Tavares (2010) suggests that regional organizations have a comparative advantage over global organizations when it comes to intervention. He states that be-

cause of the geographical closeness, interveners are more likely to share a cultural closeness, and, therefore, share a deeper understanding of the conflicts occurring in their region. Participants to the peacekeeping mission will be more fully informed of the causes of the conflict, knowledgeable of local customs because they share historical roots, are more easily accepted as neutral arbitrators of the peace by local populations (Diehl 2008). Understanding the ins and outs of the conflict should make the efforts of intervention more effective. Also, regional organizations are in a better position to respond in a timely manner at less cost because they are located closer to conflicts in their region. It takes the UN, on average, three to six months to actually deploy a peacekeeping mission once the Security Council has approved a mission (Tavares 2010). The African Standing Force, created by the African Union, anticipates deployment of a robust military force will take fourteen days and just thirty days for a full scale peacekeeping force on the African continent. According to this argument, regional peacekeeping missions may have higher success rates, by way of cultural and geographic closeness to a conflict, than those carried out by the UN.

Tavares makes a cogent and compelling argument, but actual peacekeeping missions executed by regional organizations support Dorn's notion that UN missions have an advantage over regional missions. Claims at greater accepted neutrality for regional organizations remain unsubstantiated. It seems that groups closer to the conflict that have a better understanding of the issues driving the war, might be subject to greater biases or simply viewed as having a bias toward one group or another. Jett (2001) notes that members of a regional peacekeeping mission in Liberia in the early 1990s were never viewed as neutral to conflict by warring parties. Any action taken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that did not directly benefit a particular group was viewed as biased against them and specifically meant to help the cause of their enemies. Peacekeepers from ECOWAS in Liberia were also viewed as corrupt and incompetent. The acronym for the ECOWAS peacekeeping force is ECOMOG. In half jest, locals in Liberia referred to this as Every Car or Moveable Object Gone (Jett 2001). Liberians generally regarded the ECOWAS peacekeepers as biased and corrupt. Biased and corrupt peacekeepers might actually

promote human rights violations instead of discouraging them. If peacekeepers engage in illegal activity, they may turn a blind eye to others doing the same. Local officials aware of the corrupt actions of peacekeepers will not take seriously the threat of exposure to the international community by obviously corrupt actors. In line with Dorn and Jett, a study by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that regional peacekeeping contributes to the breakdown of peacebuilding. I expect separating UN missions from regional missions will show that UN missions drive the positive influence on human rights garnered from all international interventions.

Conclusion

IOs can influence the use of government repression in post-conflict societies. I expect the threat of losing international support to pressure governments into increasing respect for human rights when international monitors are present. International peacekeepers tasked with observing post-conflict government behavior can call attention to systematic violations of human rights in post-conflict countries. Exposure of human rights abuses is more likely during peacebuilding missions where international monitors directly monitor human rights as opposed to peacekeeping missions that simply monitor ceasefires and have no mandate regarding human rights. I expect UN missions, because of the perception of neutrality of the institutions, access to resources, and authority to intervene internationally, will be more successful at decreasing the risk of repression in post-conflict countries than regional peacekeeping missions.

Additionally, IOs may enhance government legitimacy and improve human rights through supplementing public goods directly after civil wars. Supplementing public goods can be achieved especially through support for social programs. While economic recovery and reconstruction of government institutions may benefit the masses in decades to come, this type of aid will likely benefit the few and not contribute to increasing respect for human rights in the short term. Efforts to improve government institutions such as the military and civilian police forces will increase a government's capacity to repress in the short term and, thus, will diminish government respect for

human rights. Structural adjustment agreements attached to aid to improve the economy will also increase repression in the short term.

To analyze the hypotheses put forth in this chapter, I employ both qualitative and quantitative methods. Each method of inquiry has distinct advantages that cannot be found in the other. Quantitative testing can assess causal effects of variables and allows for generalization across cases. A well-done quantitative study can achieve a level of parsimony unlikely to be found in case studies. However, parsimony comes at the cost of context and consideration of important intervening variables. One way to address the limitations of quantitative testing is to use case studies to consider the appropriateness of the statistical tests and the validity of the statistical results in particular cases. Case studies can help to verify or contradict the findings of a quantitative study and to explain outlying cases.

The next two chapters will consider international intervention and repression through quantitative analyses. I follow up with case studies of Cambodia and El Salvador to explore the fit of the statistical analysis with these two post-conflict episodes.

Chapter 4

International Aid

In this chapter, I examine how economic contributions from international organizations influence repression in post-conflict societies, testing the argument that foreign aid contributions can improve or worsen government respect for human rights including, respect for physical integrity of the person, political rights, civil liberties, and providing for social and economic betterment.

Studies that examine the impact of aid on human rights or the use of repression within states generally look at aggregate Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by international organizations (White 1998; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Moyo 2008; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Poe 1992; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Regan 1995; Neumayer 2003; Gibler 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2009). Providers of aid generally direct the money toward a specific purpose and not all directed aid should affect human rights in the same fashion. Looking at all aid dispersed together does not get at the intention of the specific aid allotments and the potential distinctions between aid meant to affect business, government, civil society, infrastructure, social services, etc.

Current research has examined aid allotments given by particular institutions, like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, to determine aid effectiveness and country qualifications for aid disbursement. Abouharb and Cingranelli (2006) demonstrate that when the World Bank

attaches structural adjustment agreements to their loans, respect for human rights diminishes in the recipient country. Abouharb and Cingranelli assert that specific institutional policies affect how aid affects recipient countries, but ignores where the aid is directed and how the money is spent. Aid provided with the intent to enhance certain sectors of society will affect a recipient country's human rights policies differently. Research that considers the distinction between aid given by specific institutions begins to address the fact that not all aid will have the same impact on recipient countries.

While distinct conditions on money granted from different institutions may have an impact on the effectiveness of aid, a more compelling question might address who benefits from the aid. Money spent on food distribution will not affect the county, or its human rights policies, in the same way aid spent on bolstering financial institutions affects the country's human rights practices. Just as money provided to stabilize the economy will not affect human rights in the same way that aid given to aid social and political projects can.

I argue that disaggregating financial data can reveal more about the effectiveness of aid, particularly the impact of aid on repression, than an aggregate measure of international financial aid. I proceed by describing the collected data and the quantitative methods I will use to analyze these data in this chapter. I follow with an explanation of the quantitative analysis, and discussion of the broader implications of the results.

Data and methods

To test how economic aid, when unpacked, affects government policy in post-conflict countries, I have collected data on repression and international aid in countries that have ended a civil war between the years 1981 and 2006. The data are collected annually and analyzed over a five year post-conflict period.[1] I examine the impact of aid, cumulatively, five years post-conflict. A five-

[1]The actual time periods are 5-plus years, including data from the year the conflict ended, regardless of the month the conflict ended, and a full five years after the conflict ended.

year analysis demonstrates the initial and intermediate effects of financial aid on repression in a post-conflict setting. Five years post-conflict represents a critical time in rebuilding elements of society and infrastructure after war (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Examining the relationship between aid and human rights at this juncture provides insight into the initial impact of aid on human rights. Ultimately, international donors provide aid to prevent war recurrence and to stabilize the country in the long-term, but the first five years represent a crucial historical period for countries emerging from a civil war. [2]

I have collected time series cross sectional (TSCS) data for this analysis.[3] TSCS data have repeated observations (often collected yearly) on the same political units (usually countries or states) (Beck 2001). My data have been collected for post-conflict countries by year, making the unit of analysis country-year. The data are clustered by country and over time. Such clustered data can provide rich information on processes at different levels of analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). Clustering can also results in statistical difficulties associated with specification and estimation. Namely, cluster-dependence violates assumptions of simple statistical analyses. Cluster dependence indicates, in this case, that specific countries may have unobserved variations that provide some explanation of the outcome variable. In other words, variables not included in the statistical analysis may influence repression scores in individual countries. Clustered data may also result in serial correlation. Serial correlation, with regard to the dependent variable, refers to how repression scores for one year correlate with the score for the next year. These two data conditions violate assumptions of independence made many statistical models, including Ordinary Least Squares regression. Luckily, several recommendations for dealing with clustered data and serial correlation exist within the body of statistics literature.

One option for handling clustered data involves using a hierarchal or multilevel model. Multi-

[2]Some country-data in the 5 year analysis are truncated because 5 years of post-conflict data between 1981 and 2006 do not exist. These countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka.

[3]Additional terms for such data include, longitudinal data, panel data, and repeated measures (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008)

level modeling extends conventional regression to handle clustering of data and utilize the richness of the data (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). The goal of multilevel modeling is to account for variance in the dependent variable at the lowest level (level 1) using information from all levels of analysis (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). TSCS data can be viewed as two levels of data with occasions nested in subjects (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008), or years nested in countries. Multilevel analysis allow researchers to combine levels of analysis into one comprehensive model and is less likely to suffer from model misspecification compared to single level models (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Ignoring the character of multilevel data can result in incorrect standard errors and an increase in Type I errors (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). In the mulitlevel model used here, years are nested within countries. Level one variables include occasions, or years, and these years are clustered within level 2 variables, or countries. Multilevel modeling can account for both level 2 and level 1 variation in estimating level 2 regression coefficients (Gelman & Hill 2007). The table below analyzes the levels of variance in null models for each measure of repression used in this chapter.

Table 4.1 shows estimates of the grand means and variance components.[4] All of the variance components are statistically significant suggesting that there is significant variation between and within countries.[5] An additional comparison of null multilevel-models with null single-level models with a likelihood ratio test also suggest it is appropriate to use multilevel modeling rather than single-level models.

Another suggestion for dealing with clustered data entails using a fixed effects model with a lagged dependent variable and robust standard errors(Wawro & Kristensen 2003). One standard way to eliminate serial correlation when dealing with TSCS data is to include a lagged dependent variable in the model. There can also be substantive reasons to include a lagged dependent variable

[4]These estimates, as all other estimates in this chapter, were obtained using STATA 12.

[5]Interclass correlation (ICC) measures the proportion of variation at level-2, or across countries, and at level-1, across occasions. ICC is similar to the R squared effect measure in a regression (Peugh 2010). An ICC value of zero indicates all variation occurs at the individual level, and there is no need for multilevel modeling. The ICC measurements for each model falls between 0 and 1, indicating variation at both level-1 and level-2.

Table 4.1: Variance Component Models

Parameters	Physical integrity	Political rights	Civil liberties	Human development
Fixed effects				
Constant	4.86***	4.62***	4.73***	.466***
	(.238)	(.220)	(.169)	(.022)
Variance Components (Random part)				
Level 2	2.92***	2.62***	1.54***	.025***
	(.594)	(.514)	(.302)	(.005)
Level 1	1.34***	.650***	.363***	.000***
	(.101)	(.049)	(.027)	(.000)
-2 x Log likelihood	1430.19	1186.49	947.89	-1763.06
Maximum likelihood estimates.				
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

(Wawro & Kristensen 2003). If unmodeled unit effects remain after correction for serial correlation the resulting coefficients may be biased and inconsistent (Green, Kim & Yoon 2001). Standard fixed effects estimators can eliminate the problem of unmodeled unit effects. With a fixed effects model, all estimates refer to within country effects. To obtain purely within country effects, the random intercept for each country is replace by a fixed intercept. In a fixed effects model, all country-specific effects are accommodated by a fixed intercept, leaving only the within-country effects to be explained by covariates (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). In chapter five of *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata*, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal note,"A great advantage of these estimates is that they are not susceptible to bias due to omitted subject-level covariates. Each subject truly serves as their own control in the fixed-effects model (p. 189). Unfortunately, fixed effects models also eliminate the ability to test between cluster hypotheses and one cannot retrieve good estimates of sluggish independent variables (Beck 2001). Any time time-invariant variables will be dropped in FE models and estimates of slow moving variables will be inconsistent and

biased (Wawro & Kristensen 2003).

To account for data issues mentioned above, I employ multilevel models with both fixed and random effects for all dependent variables. The mixed effects models allow for better assessment of slow moving variables, and include between country effects in the estimations.[6] The fixed effects models ensure the absence of omitted variable biases and estimates only the variation within each country. Several variables attain significance across random and fixed effects models.

Before continuing on to the next section, the potential problem of endogeneity must be addressed. Previous studies have shown that international organizations sometimes use human rights as a qualifications for aid distribution(Cingranelli & Pasquarello 1985, Stohl, Carleton & Johnson 1984, Mitchell & McCormick 1988, McCormick & Mitchell 1989, Meernik, Krueger & Poe 1998, Neumayer 2003, Gibler 2008, Lebovic & Voeten 2009). To ensure aid is impacting human rights instead of the other way around, I lag the independent variables by one year, so that the amount of aid precedes the measure of repression.[7] Lagging the foreign aid variables also makes theoretical sense. Aid may take some time before having a genuine effect on repression. One year seems a more reasonable expectation than an immediate effect.

Dependent variables

State repression infringes on an individual's right to physical integrity, political right and civil liberties, or economic and social rights. No single variable can assess all types of repression together. To evaluate the various types of repression, I use several different measures. CIRI Human Rights Data Project measure global violations of physical integrity. Freedom House monitors political rights and civil liberties. The Human Development Index, that includes measures of

[6]Specifying a random intercept model and including a lagged variable can present a problem. The lagged responses, included as a covariate, are correlated with the random intercept. To avoid this problem I eliminate lagged responses from models with random intercepts.

[7]Using an instrument variable and 2 stage least squares may be the best way to account for endogeneity. An instrument variable requires that it be associated with foreign aid, but completely unassociated with repression. After testing several variables, I was unable to find one with these charateristics , and therefore utilize a second best option commonly used to test endogeneity and temporal persistence (Walsh & Piazza 2010).

health, education, and living standards, considers social and economic rights. I explain each of these variables in detail below.

Physical integrity rights. Source material for CIRI measures of repression comes from US State Department reports. The CIRI scale bases its measurement on the number of physical integrity violations recorded each year. Each physical integrity violation (torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, disappearances) is given a numerical value based on frequency of occurrence.[8] For example, a score of 2 for torture indicates no torture has occurred in a particular country for a particular year. A score of 1 shows between 1 and 49 occurrences of torture within a particular country for a particular year. A score of 0 indicates 50 or more incidents of torture. Each country scores between a 0 and 2 for torture, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. CIRI coders then generate a comprehensive physical integrity score by adding the individual torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and disappearance scores. With this nine-point additive scale, a score of zero indicates the highest level of violent repression by the state government and a score of eight shows no evidence of violent repression by the government. CIRI coders count the number of infractions to generate a state repression score for each country, each year. To allow for the most objective measurements possible, context does not influence the coding in any way, coders merely count the number of incidents in each country for each year examined. [9]

As mentioned above, CIRI's scale ranges from zero, the most repression a country can mete out, to eight, indicating the lowest levels of repression. This scale can cause confusion when

[8]For further details on the construction of this scale, see David L. Richards, Ronald Gelleny, and David Sacko. 2001. "Money With A Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries" International Studies Quarterly, 45:2 pp. 219 - 239.

[9]CIRI nicely disaggregates individual categories of abuse so that each can be analyzed individually. However, perhaps due to CIRI's drive toward precise objective measurements, some important context is left out of its index ranking. For example, a country that has fifty incidents of extrajudicial killings will receive the same score as a country that commits 5,000 or 50,000 extrajudicial killings.The authors of the data suggest that removing context from the measure of repression allows for a more objective interpretation of state repression statistics. Thus, the data are also not weighted for different types of infractions. Political imprisonment carries the same weight as extrajudicial killing. For a complete critical assessment of the CIRI dataset, see Wood, Reed and Mark Gibney. 2010. "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI." Human Rights Quarterly 32(2):367400.

interpreting results because its lowest number 0, indicates the highest levels of repression and the highest number, 8, represents the lowest country levels of repression. In hopes of avoiding this confusion when interpreting the results of my analysis, I have flipped the scale so that the highest score of 8 indicates the highest levels of repression, and a score of zero will demonstrate a country with little or no repression.

Civil liberties and political rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees political rights and civil liberties to all individuals. Additionally, many states have created and signed international treaties agreeing to preserve political rights and civil liberties. To assess the administration of these rights, Freedom House offers measures of state political rights and civil liberties in countries throughout the world.

Freedom House data represents a measure widely used used to assess political freedoms throughout the globe. Freedom House provides a yearly score for 194 countries, evaluating current political freedoms and civil liberties. Each country receives a score of 1 - 7 for both political freedoms and civil liberties. A score of 1 indicates the lowest degree of repression and a score of 7, the highest. Scores are based on 10 questions regarding political freedoms and fifteen questions regarding civil liberties. Political questions fall under the categories of: (1) The Electoral Process, (2) Political Pluralism and Participation, and (3) Functioning Government. Questions regarding civil liberties are categorized under: (1) Freedom of Expression and Belief, (2) Associational and Organizational Rights, (3) Rule of Law, and (4) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.[10]

Social and economic rights. Other forms of repression include social and economic repression. The Human Development Index (HDI) provides one way of assessing the quality of social and economic well-being in countries around the world. [11] Assembled by the United Nations Development Programme, the HDI provides an aggregate measure of progress along three dimensions, health,

[10]For an in depth explanation of Freedom House ratings, please visit the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org

[11]Data collected from the Human Development Index can be acquired at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, accessed January 30, 2012.

education and income. More specifically, life expectancy, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling, and per capita income are combined into a singular index that compare human development in individual countries. The index measures life expectancy at birth and uses this as a proxy for measuring the health of a country. A geometric mean of years of expected schooling at the age of entering school and mean years of actual schooling at age 25 generates the educational portion of the index. Finally, wealth is measured through per capita gross national income. The index ranges from 0 to 1. An increase in an HDI score indicates an improvement in general social and economic conditions. This study utilizes the HDI index to assess social and economic conditions in post-conflict societies. An improvement in an HDI score indicates less social and economic repression. [12]

Explanatory variables

The main predictor variables include spending by intergovernmental organizations in particular sectors of society. The sectors examined include money directed toward improving the government, the economy, and social services. I explain the categorization of aid in each of these three sectors below.

International aid

Economic aid specifically includes all official development assistance including concessional loans, grants, and developmental assistance extended by multilateral institutions. Aid consists of net disbursements, from all multilateral institutions, and therefore, subtracts all repayments from the total yearly aid. I argue that international aid, when lumped together, masks the effects of aid spent in particular areas. I disaggregate the data to discern what impact international aid has on specific sectors of society. I expect aid to the government, aid to the economy, and aid to improve social conditions to have different implications for respect for human rights.

[12]Unfortunately, the HDI index only reports scores for individual countries every five years. A yearly account of change in social and economic indicators would better fit my data set.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) data collected by the World Bank can be found in many empirical studies involving international aid. ODA aggregates aid given to recipient countries from international organizations and/or donor states on a yearly basis.[13] The data can be disaggregated by organization or state quite easily, but are not so easily separated according to the purpose of the funds. While these data prove useful in many empirical studies, they cannot answer questions concerning the relationship between directed aid and its effectiveness with particular programs or sectors of government and society that it has been directed toward. Examining whether aid directed at improving society has an impact on human rights or not, requires aid disaggregated according to its intended purpose.

Researchers at William and Mary and Brigham Young University make project level aid data available through the PLAID Project.[14] The project tracks international development finance project by project. These data are divided according to the purpose of the aid. For example, all money intended to contribute to education falls, first, under the heading education and additional subheadings indicate the level of education. For the purposes of this dissertation all purposes have been categorized as aid directed toward social services, the economy, and government.

I argue that aid to benefit social conditions will have a significant positive impact on human rights because the benefits of this aid reach a large number of people in a short period of time. It demonstrates the government's intention to gain legitimacy through accommodation rather than repression. Aid to improve social conditions will include projects such as rebuilding infrastructure, money for education, health services, and food aid.The benefits of aid directed toward improving government institutions and bolstering the economy will realize more slowly. Projects directed at the government will include, but are not limited to, funds for rebuilding the justice system, security,

[13]This project looks at how economic intervention and international monitoring affect respect for human rights in post-conflict societies. As such, this study only considers intervention by multilateral institutions. Unilateral state interventions and multilateral state interventions that do not utilize an international organization are left for another study.

[14]Daniel L. Nielson, Ryan M. Powers, and Michael J. Tierney. Broad Trends in Foreign Aid: Insights from PLAID 1.9.1. Conference paper presented at Aid Transparency and Development Finance: Lessons and Insights from AidData, Oxford, U.K. 22-25 March 2010

and the administrative functions of government. International aid to improve the economy includes projects aimed at rebuilding trade, industry, and small businesses, and so forth.

The table below shows the general purpose codes for spending and their categorizations. The data are further separated by activity codes, such that the activity code for "school management and governance" falls under the general purpose code for "education."Some purpose codes do not easily fit into and require further division by activity purpose. For example, I break down the purpose code, Government and Civil Society, by activity code so that, to the greatest extent possible, spending on the government is categorized as government spending, and spending on civil society is categorized as social spending.

Table 4.2: General Categorization of International Spending By Sector

Social	Government	Economic
Education	General budget support	Banking and financial services
Health	Conflict prevention	Business and other services
Water supply and sanitation	General budget support	Fishing and forestry
Civil society	Action relating to debt	Industry and construction
Support to NGOs	Peace and security	Trade policies
Other social services and infrastructure		Agriculture
Population and reproductive health		Minerals,and mining
Communications		Regulation and tourism
Energy generation and supply		
Environmental protection		
Food aid		
Women		
Emergency response		

Table 4.1 presents the break down of government, economic, and social sector spending in post-conflict countries[15] I will utilize statistical analyses with these three main explanatory variables to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter three, namely:

[15]Predictor variables are often centered in multilevel models so that a value of zero can be interpreted meaningfully (Peugh 2010). For example, a value of zero can be nonsensical when measuring gross domestic product for a country. Centering values of gross domestic product makes estimates easier to interpret. Because a value of zero for government, economic, or social aid is meaningful in this study, I refrain from centering these variables.

H1: International aid directed toward government institution building will increase repression in post-conflict societies.

H2: International aid spent on social programs will decrease repression in post-conflict societies.

H3: International aid that addresses economic recovery will increase repression in post-conflict societies.

Additionally, I must consider alternative hypotheses. There may be an alternative explanation that better accounts for how government leaders mete out repression while receiving international aid. The next section explores potential reasons government leaders may not be inclined to increase respect for human rights, even though international organizations provide them with monetary incentives.

Alternative hypotheses

Governments react to perceived threats with accommodation or repression (Krain 2000). Accommodation is more likely to establish political legitimacy than repression. According to Beetham (1991), governments can garner legitimacy through the provision of goods and services, but what if a government simply desires legitimacy of a majority, and does not require the support of a minority group? If a government directs repression exclusively toward a minority group and navigates the benefits of international aid to the majority, from which it seeks legitimacy, then perhaps international aid will have little or no influence of the use of repression.

Ethnic groups[16] often represent significant minorities within the political boundaries of an international state. Some studies find a prevalence of civil conflict in countries with significant ethnic minority groups (Collier & Hoeffler 1998, Ellingsen 2000, Sambanis 2001). Defining a minority group, particularly a minority ethnic group, as other, or the enemy, may give the government

[16]I utilize Gellner's (1983: p. 7) definition of an ethnic group, indicating, "a shared culture and the recognition by self and others of belonging to the same group."

license to treat the group differently from the rest of the population. Governments may deny political, social, and economic rights to specific groups (Gurr 1993). The majority of a population may approve of the repression of a group of dissenters. Groups that dissent may be perceived as terrorists and enemies of the state do not elicit the sympathy of the majority population. Heterogeneous post-conflict countries may not increase their political legitimacy by reducing repression against minority ethnic groups.

Societies with ethnic minorities exhibit situations rife with possibilities for majority support of minority repression. Arend Lijphart notes that in societies with deep ethnic divides, "majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy." In most societies, most of the time, ethnic groups pursue their interests through appropriate political channels. However, when ethnicity connects with uncertainty, a history of conflict and fear of the future, it emerges as a deep social divide (Newland 1993). Lake and Rothchild (1996) cite state weakness as a necessary precondition for ethnic violence. They also note that, although the ability to repress minority groups may appear to demonstrate a strong state, reliance on coercion instead of political legitimacy actually reveals weakness. Post-conflict governments, predisposed to weakness due to the preceding conflict, may seek to control minorities through repression with the complicity of the majority. Post-conflict governments seeking legitimacy through policy improvements have little incentive to decrease repression where the majority support repression of the minority population. If a majority supports repression of a minority group, an increase in policy options will not diminish government repression of the minority group.

If states that discriminate against minorities do not have the incentive of gaining legitimacy through halting repression, we can expect that repression will continue, or even increase, in these countries. Political and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities indicate a general acceptance of mistreatment of minority populations, especially where official public polices substantially restrict a group's political participation and/or economic opportunities. Where a group is singled out for discrimination with the consent of the majority, one would expect to find continued

or increased government repression. Improving human rights for a minority will not increase political legitimacy by the majority. Political and economic limitations experienced by minorities will continue regardless of international financial contributions. This reasoning leads to the following alternative hypotheses:

H1A: Among countries with an ethnic minority comprising at least 5 percent of the population, greater ethnic diversity should associate with an increase in repression.

To test whether majority attitudes or apathy toward the treatment of ethnic minorities influence the use of repression in post-conflict societies I use the ethnic fractionalization index developed by Fearon (2003). This index reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. The index ranges from 0 to 1. A 0 indicates a completely homogenous country and a 1 suggests a completely heterogenous country, with all countries included in this study falling somewhere between the two extremes.[17]

There are, of course, instances in which minorities do not represent a particular ethnic group, but simply constitute the losers of a war in a post-conflict society. Political groups, such as marxists, may have only politics in common, but may still constitute a groups of winners or losers in a post-conflict environment. Alternately, a minority ethnic group or political group might win a civil war, an in these instances the government would not be expected to violate the human rights of the the ethnic minority. Victory may provide another explanation for the treatment of citizens in post-conflict countries.

Government leaders desire political legitimacy, but if a majority of the population supports repression against those who lost the war, and the government only represses the losers, the government does not have any incentive to curb repression. In fact, according to Herreros (2011), sometimes to appease its supporters, the government will turn a blind eye to repression meted out as revenge on the losers by people on the winning side. Or, the government might strike its op-

[17]Bangladesh has the least degree of ethnic fractionalization scoring .005 on the ethnic fractionalization index. The greatest degree of heterogeneity is found in the Democratic Republic of Congo, scoring a .90, according the the index developed by Fearon (2003).

position while its weak to ensure no further rebellion. An intuitive argument suggests that an end to organized violence will come with a reduction in government repression. An end to hostilities between belligerents means that government repression is no longer necessary. With an end to armed dissent, repression becomes a less useful tool for the government. Herreos (2011) suggests otherwise. He argues that the dynamics of a civil war determine the level of violence in post-war states. He asserts that a victory for one side will lead to indiscriminate and retaliatory repression of the defeated group and will take on more than one dimension. First, a government that has won a military victory will preemptively strike the defeated group to prevent future dissent by the group. Second, the government, in dire economic circumstances, will offer retaliatory repression to compensate its supporters. Civilians who suffered at the hands of the defeated during the conflict can inflict harm on the defeated without consequence as a sort of payment from the government. This study finds support from its statistical analysis, but only looks at post-war Spain in the 1940s. If victors are more inclined to repress the defeated, I expect:

H2A: States with conflicts that end in victory for a particular side will engage in more repression than other states.

I include a dummy variable that indicates the outcome of the civil war to test hypothesis H2A. A zero represents civil wars that end in truce or negotiated settlement, and a one shows civil wars that end in victory for a particular set of belligerents. If victory is associated with increased repression exclusively meted out to the losers, perhaps the government does not need to decrease repression to increase political legitimacy.

If states generally repress ethnic minority groups, or groups who have lost the war, with the approval or collusion of the majority of the population, improving human rights policies may not garner political legitimacy from the governments constituents. If this is the case, then expanding policy options through international aid to specific sectors of society will not reduce repression in post-conflict societies. This section has elaborated on alternative hypotheses to the possibility that IOs can reduce government repression by increasing policy options and political legitimacy

through with distribution of monetary aid. In the next section I discuss the control variables that will be included in the statistical analysis.

Control variables

Cumulative research exploring the causes of repression shows that previous incidents of repression, country wealth, war, and form of government can all influence how much repression a government will use against its citizens. Past acts of repression beget future acts of repression. More democratic countries use less repression. Political violence will increase the occurrence of repression. To determine how much influence international aid has on respect for human rights, I control for these variables that are commonly associated with repression. Below, I describe how I operationalization these concepts for this study.

Past repression

Governments that have used repressive tactics in the past will more likely use repressive measures in the future. Perhaps, because the use of repression has worked, or seemed to contribute to maintaining political stability, in the past, leaders will rely on the tried tactics in the coming years. To account for previous violations of human rights, I utilize a one-year lag of the dependent variable in the analysis. This lagged variable accounts previous use of repression.

Democracy

The type of government, or political regime, influences the amount of repression it will use. Authoritarian regimes have been known to flagrantly committed acts of repression. Stalin, Franco, and most other notoriously repressive leaders who have perpetrated acts of violence were leaders of authoritarian governments. Authoritarian regimes are characterized by a limited amount of political opposition, a lack of political mobilization, and a leader or small group that effectively rules (Linz 1975) Authoritarian states limit political rights and tend to repress more than democratic states. And, while democratic states generally see less government repression (Goldstein 1978, Dahl 1966, Rummel 1997), democracy does not rule out the use of repression by its leaders.

By definition, democratic governments should not violate human rights, and research shows that more democratic states tend to use less repression.Within a society where citizens can vote leaders out of office, repression does not serve the purpose of maintaining power. However, quantifying political systems presents a difficult task. Distinguishing a democracy from a pseudo-democracy, from a mixed regime type, from a genuine autocracy requires the quantification of elusive concepts. No perfect measure of political systems exists, but a widely used proxy for the concept of democracy was developed by the Polity I Project, under the direction of Ted Gurr and associates, and later modified by the Polity IV Project. The Polity IV Dataset, developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2003), creates a yearly democracy/autocracy score for each country in in the international system, based on the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints placed on the executive, and the competitiveness of political participation within each country. A combined democracy/autocracy score represents a 21 point additive scale ranging from -10 to 10. Coders establish an autocracy and democracy score fore each country, and then, the autocracy score is subtracted from a country's democracy score to generate a combined autocracy/democracy score. On a scale of -10 to 10, a score of -10 represents a political system of hereditary monarchy and a 10 indicates a consolidated democracy.

Davenport and Armstrong (2004) find that the relationship between democracy and repression varies depending on the level of democracy achieved, and is not a simple linear relationship as some studies suggest (Poe & Tate 1994). According to Davenport and Armstrong, countries that have not established consolidated democracies will not impact repression. In other words, democracy does not tend to improve human rights until a country achieves a rather high level of democracy. In terms of the Polity IV, the authors find that a country must attain a democracy score of approximately 7 before democracy has an influence on physical integrity rights. Based on these findings, I use a dummy variable as a proxy for democracy, where a 0 indicates a Polity score of 6 or below, or a nondemocratic state, and a 1 indicates a Polity score of 7 or above, or a democratic form of government.

The economy

Wealth is another variable consistently associated with government repression. Wealthy nations tend to show greater respect for human rights (Mitchell & McCormick 1988, Poe & Tate 1994, Poe, Tate & Keith 1999, Henderson 1991), but the reasoning remains unclear. Several explanations have been proffered to describe why wealthier countries have less repression. Some surmise that governments with greater resources have more strategic options to elicit political order than poorer countries. Addressing grievances with material benefits instead of repressing those with grievances is easier for states with greater wealth. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue fewer resources result in less efficient repression, so poorer countries must use more repression to be effective. Henderson (1991) suggests that more development will mean less grievances and therefore less need for government repression. Governments do not need to repress satisfied citizens. Whether the explanation is multiple options for establishing political order, greater efficiency through greater resources, or a generally more satisfied public, wealthy countries demonstrate greater respect for human rights. This model uses the natural log of GDP per capita as a proxy for state wealth. GDP data was culled from the World Bank and is reported in constant 2000 dollars.,[18]

Population size

The population size of a country can influence government repression. Larger populations may experience more repression due to an increase in potential incidents of repression due to a greater number of people. As a matter of probability, as the number of people in country increases there are a a greater number of opportunities for repression to take place (Poe & Tate 1994). Alternately, Henderson (1991) argues that increases in population may place stress on limited resources and the government may use repression as a coping mechanism. The inability of the government to satisfy the public because of scarce resources may lead the government to repression to maintain order in the midst of dissatisfaction. A greater number of people places greater demands on a government with little or no resources to satisfy a large population. The natural logarithm of total population

[18]World Bank GDP data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator accessed January 30, 2012.

data comes from Penn World Tables. Penn World Tables population statistics available through http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu, accessed January 30, 2012.

Ongoing conflict

Civil wars have long been associated with an increase in government repression (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1978, Poe & Tate 1994). When dissenters turn to violence the government will often respond with violence (Moore 2000). Government violence can focus on established rebels, or can be more indiscriminate and included civilians not involved in the conflict. Because rebels do not generally wear uniform or announce their affiliation publicly, identifying rebels can be difficult. This difficulty often leads to violence against citizens not involved in the conflict even when the government intends to repress rebels exclusively. Violence against the public increases during civil wars.

While each country has ended a civil war as it enters the dataset, war recurrence or significant political violence, during the period examined post-conflict, can promote continued repression. I include a dummy variable that denotes an ongoing conflict equivalent to onset of another civil war during the post-conflict period examined. If a post-conflict country reenters or starts a new conflict, repression will increase.

Former British colony

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) argue that historical political culture may importantly influence whether a country uses repression or not. Specifically, former British colonial status is thought to be associated with the development of democracy after achieving independence from Britain. Poe and Tate (1994) find statistical support for this assertion. British cultural influence tends to promote respect for human rights in former colonies. I include a dummy variable where a 1 indicates that a country held the status of British colony at any time in its history and a 0 for all other countries.

Time

A politically stable government will likely commit less repression than a less stable govern-

ment. Theoretically, the more time that passes after a civil war, without war recurrence, the more stable a political system becomes. Time may play a role in how repression changes in post-conflict countries. I operationalize time by including a variable that counts years since war-end.

The end of the Cold War also presents a significant time marker for interaction between International Organizations and post-conflict states. During the stand off between the USSR and the United States, many civil conflicts in developing countries served as proxy wars for the great powers. The US and the USSR often blocked international intervention of the other in IOs such as the United Nations. The end of the Cold War altered the way the US and USSR got involved in civil conflicts around the world. There may be a distinct difference in how IOs distributed foreign aid during the Cold War versus how they allotted it after the Cold War. Therefore I include a dummy variable distinguishing pre-1990 post-conflict episodes from post-1990 post-conflict episodes. A zero indicates the is pre-1990 and a one shows the time is 1990 or later.

Physical integrity and foreign aid

Table 3 shows predictions of torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances, in post-conflict countries, based on international aid contributions by IOs. As expected, money spent to improve the economy, enhance the government, rebuild social services have different implications for physical integrity rights. Money spent on the economy has no significant impact on physical intimidation of citizens by the government. Foreign aid given to the government, however, tends to increase the level of physical integrity violations in post-conflict countries. Money distributed to governments in the first five years post-conflict may have the unfortunate, and unintended, consequence of increasing government use of physical repression. Estimates strongly support the relationship, as the international aid toward rebuilding the government demonstrates significance across models one through four. The models support H1, which states: “International aid directed toward government institution building will diminish respect for human rights in post-conflict societies.”

Aid to promote social services and generally rebuild societal infrastructure, on the other hand, has a consistently positive impact on respect for physical integrity. Social aid reduces physical integrity violations in post-conflict societies. The estimates for this variable show only marginal significance in two of the models, but significance persists in the fixed effects models, suggesting a consistent relationship between social aid and respect for physical integrity rights.

As expected, in models 1 and 3, an increase in country wealth and a stable democratic government reduces the likelihood of repression. Also countries with larger populations experience a higher risk of physical integrity violations than less populous countries. Similarly, countries experiencing ongoing conflict will suffer more government repression. And, former colonies of the British Empire are statistically less likely to endure violations of physical integrity. Each of these control variables moves in the expected direction, though the years post-conflict and cold war variables fall short of statistical significance. Surprisingly, the lagged dependent variable in models 2 and 4 also fails to reach statistical significance.

Models 3 and 4 show no support for alternative hypotheses H1A and H2A. Ethnic fractionalization[19] and war outcome do not significantly affect physical integrity rights in post-conflict countries. Adding in proxies for war outcomes and ethnic fractionalization also does not alter the significance of the other variables in the model. The argument that minority repression, supported by the majority, would find higher risk of physical integrity violations is not supported by this analysis.

Short term government aid has more than an innocuous effect on respect for human rights, it has a significant negative impact. Governments given foreign aid to improve post-conflict government institutions increase acts of repression in the five years following the end of a civil war. One possible explanation for this unexpected finding can be found in the categorization of spending on

[19]Using political and economic discrimination indexes gleaned from the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) (2009) also produces no statistically significant results. The political discrimination index uses a five point ordinal scale, ranging from scores of 0 to 4, to denote different levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities. The MAR economic index is also a five-point ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 4. States that receive a score of zero economically discriminate the least, and states with a score of 4 discriminate the most.

government institutions. Government spending includes contributions to prevent conflict, achieve peace and security, general budget support, and action relating to debt. Among the government institutions responsible for peace and security and conflict prevention are the military and the police. Strengthening the police and/or military just after a civil war may have the unintended consequence of increasing incidents of violations of physical integrity.

In El Salvador, prior the signing of the peace accords, the military controlled all internal security forces. Death squads mainly operated out of police forces and military intelligence units during the war (Call 2003). The peace accords demanded the creation of an entirely new civilian police force,called the National Civilian Police (PNC), and the dismantling of the military run police system that included the Treasury Police, National Guard, Customs Police, and National Police.[20] The terms of the peace demanded that the military not have anything to do with internal security, but as the PNC failed to stop an increase in crime directly after the war, the government and citizens alike turned to the military for help. Despite the terms of the accords, President Cristiani called upon the military to guard highways and oversee coffee production in 1993 without the approval of the legislature. Cristiani sought the help of the military to deter and catch highway robbers, to protect El Salvador's primary export during its harvest, and to lower national crime rates. The public supported Crisitani's actions because domestic police forces failed to curb rising national crime rates on their own (Williams & Walter 1997).

Reduction in military power is difficult to achieve even when a negotiated peace agreement demands it. Contributions toward increasing peace and security and preventing conflict may strengthen institutions largely responsible for violations of physical integrity. This is not the only possible explanation for a correlation between foreign aid spent on the government and an increase in human rights violations, but it is a plausible one.

Spending on social services five years post-conflict has a positive influence on respect for phys-

[20]See, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The National Civilian Police (PNC), 1 April 1998, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a800e.html [accessed 4 August 2011]

ical integrity rights. This finding suggests that short term financial support of social services may indeed increase government legitimacy. Public goods are distributed instead of violations of physical integrity. Meeting the needs of the public with goods and services through accommodation reduces the need of the government to rely on repression.

Political rights, civil liberties, and foreign aid

Tables 4 and 5 consider the impact of foreign aid on political rights and civil liberties in post-conflict countries. Results demonstrate that the effect of aid on human rights varies both by sector spending and by type of human rights. Though spending on the government had a significant negative impact across all models measuring physical integrity rights, no such relationship exists when looking at spending on the government and political rights or civil liberties. Estimates suggest that if the relationship between these variables were significant, spending on the government could improve political rights and civil liberties. Though, because zero falls within the confidence intervals of each model for both political rights and civil liberties, in addition to no finding of statistical significance, estimates do not allow the assumption of a positive impact of international aid to the government on political rights or civil liberties.

Social spending, on the other hand, continues to associate with a reduction in violations of political rights, civil liberties, and, therefore, generally improves political freedoms. The greater magnitude of the coefficients in the mixed models suggest that the impact of social spending on political rights may exceed its impact on physical integrity rights. Social spending also correlates with improved civil liberties in post-conflict countries. Because political rights and civil liberties correlate at .85 the similarity in results is not surprising.

Despite a high correlation between political rights and civil liberties, the Cold War, years post-conflict, war outcome and ethnic fractionalization have distinct effects on these two dependent variables. Post-Cold War political rights are improved whereas civil liberties remain unaffected by the end of that particular era. Moving away from the conflict in years positively affects civil

Table 4.3: Physical integrity in post-conflict countries: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.098		.097
1 year lag		(.080)		(.080)
Government aid (ln)	.039**	.037**	.039**	.037**
1 year lag	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)
Economic aid (ln)	.015	.018	.014	.019
1year lag	(.013)	(.015)	(.012)	(.015)
Social aid (ln)	-.094*	-.126**	-.093*	-.123**
1 year lag	(.054)	(.045)	(.054)	(.045)
GDP	-.379**	-.806	-.419**	.793
1 year lag	(.162)	(.698)	(.167)	(.693)
Population (ln)	1.04***	1.39	1.08***	1.41
1 year lag	(.223)	(1.67)	(..229)	(1.69)
Political regime	.-604**	-.096	-.618**	-.096
1 year lag	(.272)	(.366)	(.273)	(.364)
Ongoing conflict	.860***	.700**	.873***	.711**
	(.188)	(.308)	(.189)	(.308)
Years post-conflict	-.032	-.018	-.033	-.021
	(.041)	(.065)	(.042)	(.067)
Cold war	.578	-.675	-.565	-.721
	(.389)	(.795)	(.389)	(.816)
British colony	-.1.05**		-.954**	
	(.471)		(.482)	
War outcome			.205	-.215
			(.205)	(.143)
Ethnic fractionalization			-.073	
			(.105)	
Constant	-2.84	-.524	-.237	-.146
	(2.60)	(31.18)	(2.66)	(31.44)
Variance components				
Level 2 variance	1.77		1.73	
Level 1 variance	1.04		1.04	
-2 x Log likelihood	1009.65		1008.77	
Observations	309	309	309	309
Post-conflict countries	51	51	51	51
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

liberties, and yet, has no statistical impact on political rights. This suggests that any conflict that has ended in 1990, or after, suffers less risk of violations of political rights than their Cold War post-conflict counterparts. Civil liberties are not thusly affected, but moving away from the end of the conflict in time will improve respect for civil liberties.

Ethnic fractionalization and war outcome do not affect political rights, but significantly impact civil liberties in unexpected ways. H1A and H2A hypothesized that a war ending in victory for one side and an ethnically diverse society would increase the risk of repression in post-conflict countries. Table 4, models 3 and 4, suggest otherwise. Victories for one party to the conflict significantly reduce the risk for violations of civil liberties. This finding suggests no support for my alternative hypothesis, but corresponds to the assertion by Licklinder (1995), that wars ending in victory lead to more stable governments, and, therefore, these governments do not need to repress their citizens, because they are more stable. Also unanticipated, comes ethnic fractionalization's positive influence on respect for civil liberties. Though only marginally significant, at the .10 level, the reason for this unforeseen relationship remains unclear. However, like the international aid toward government spending variable, zero also falls with the confidence interval calling into question the validity of this finding.

As with physical integrity rights, ongoing conflict has a strong negative influence on respect for political rights and civil liberties and the status of former British colony continues to positively affect respect for human rights. The estimates for the remaining control variables, GDP and Population, are not straight forward and deserve some consideration. Both variables follow expectation in the mixed effects models. Wealth decreases the risk of violations of political rights and civil liberties, whereas, an increase in population has the opposite effect. However, the fixed effects estimates, while also significant, flip the signs on these two variables.[21] This is possibly a statistical artifact. Achen (2001) notes that often when a lagged dependent variable is added to a model it can

[21]Population and GDP correlate at .8 and may introduce multicollinearity into the models. Because I believe that, even though the variables are highly correlated, they measure two distinct concepts, I keep both variables in each model.

acquire a large statistically significant coefficient, improving the model fit, while all of the other substantive variables are reduced to incredibly small and insignificant values, and, occasionally, the substantive variables take on the wrong sign. Because the fixed effects models include a largely significant lagged dependent variable, and all other models conform to expectations, I attribute the irregular estimates to the impact of the lagged dependent variable. Thus, estimation of GDP and population in the civil liberties fixed effects models likely represent a statistical anomaly, rather than a breakthrough finding.

Social spending in the five years post-conflict is associated with lower risk of political rights and civil liberties violations. Short term spending on social services pays of in terms of decreasing this type of repression.

Social and economic rights, and foreign aid

Table 6 shows how foreign aid affects social and economic rights. I use the human development index (HDI) as a proxy for these rights. Unlike the measures of physical integrity rights, political rights and civil liberties, a negative coefficient in these models indicates more social and economic repression. A positive coefficient shows an increase in respect for social and economic rights, or better overall social and economic conditions within the country. Most notable about the results for HDI is how they differ from the above results. Government and social aid have no significant impact on HDI, while spending on the economic sector has a positive impact on social and economic rights. The small magnitude of the coefficient and the marginal statistical significance may partly represent the structure of the dependent variable. The fact that a new HDI score only becomes available every five years might affect the size of the coefficient and potentially the significance.

Greater population and ongoing conflict also negatively affects social and economic rights. Whereas moving away from a conflict, in time, increasing GDP, and having a stable democracy significantly increaser social and economic rights. And, while former British colony status affects other types of human rights, it has no impact on social and economic rights. Additionally, war

Table 4.4: Political rights: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.596***		.596***
1 year lag		(.131)		(.131)
Government aid (ln)	-.012	-.006	-.012	-.006
1 year lag	(.009)	(.008)	(.009)	(.008)
Economic aid (ln)	.002	. 001	.001	.001
1year lag	(.009)	(.013)	(.009)	(.013)
Social aid (ln)	-.117**	-.085**	-.116**	-.085**
1 year lag	(.039)	(.032)	(.040)	(.032)
GDP	-.463**	.356**	-.520***	.359**
	(.0146)	(.279)	(.149)	(.138)
Population (ln)	-.366*	.759	.425**	-.759
	(.207)	(1.08)	(.211)	(1.08)
Ongoing conflict	.638***	.338**	.640***	.341**
	(.141)	(.163)	(.142)	(.164)
Years post-conflict	.057*	-.009	-.057*	-.010
	(.030)	(.053)	(.030)	(.048)
Cold war	-.585*	-.644***	-.609**	-.637***
	(.303)	(.142)	(.372)	(.136)
British colony	-.785		-.649	
	(.476)		(.479)	
War outcome			-.116	-.047
			(.258)	(.161)
Ethnic fractionalization			-891.	
			(.762)	
Constant	12.22***	8.39	12.94***	8.32
	(2.49)	(17.11)	(2.52)	(17.21)
Variance components				
Level 2	.913		.785	
Level 1	.476		.479	
-2 x Log likelihood	881.06		879.412	
Observations	320	320	320	320
Post-conflict countries	53	53	53	53
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Table 4.5: Civil liberties: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.396***		.378***
1 year lag		(.064)		(.070)
Government aid (ln)	-.000	.002	-.001	-.001
1 year lag	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.869)
Economic aid (ln)	-.001	.001	-.000	-.000
1year lag	(.006)	(.005)	(.006)	(.000)
Social aid (ln)	-.080**	-.061**	-.077**	-.058**
1 year lag	(.026)	(.026)	(.025)	(.025)
GDP	-.375***	.017	-.406***	-.038
	(.105)	(.150)	(.109)	(.142)
Population (ln)	-.316**	-.995	.410**	-.995
	(.152)	(.926)	(.157)	(.957)
Ongoing conflict	.862***	.559**	.884***	.587**
	(.092)	(.171)	(.091)	(.161)
Years post-conflict	-.069***	-.018	-.074***	-.025
	(.019)	(.028)	(.019)	(.030)
Cold war	. -.200	.095	-.159	-.222
	(.199)	(.203)	(.198)	(.281)
British colony	-.802**		-.809**	
	(.358)		(.368)	
War outcome			-.384**	-.477**
			(.176)	(.213)
Ethnic Fractionalization			-1.02*	
			(.584)	
Constant	9.99***	19.80	9.82***	19.54
	(1.83)	(16.22)	(5.20)	(16.91)
Variance components				
Level 2	.767		.720	
Level 1	.215		.208	
-2 x Log likelihood	615.26		608.15	
Observations	306	306	306	306
Post-conflict countries	52	52	52	52
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

outcome and ethnic fractionalization have no statistical significance in any models estimating what affects HDI.

Generally speaking, the only foreign aid to increase respect for social and economic rights is spending on the economy and these results are only marginally significant.

Conclusion

This paper explores the relationship between international aid and government repression in post-conflict countries. The answer to the research question, does international aid expand the policy options of government leaders, allowing them to enhance their own legitimacy, and, thus, lead to a reduction in repression, is neither yes or no. International aid has a nuanced impact on repression, with some aid improving respect for human rights, while other types of aid do not influence acts of repression at all, and still others that have a decidedly negative affect on respect for human rights.

International aid given to post-conflict countries with the intent of building government institutions can negatively affect human rights. These monies are expected to improve the functioning of government generally, prevent conflict, reduce debt, and to increase peace and security, but can produce unintended negative consequences. Results from the analyses in this chapter suggest that spending on government actually increases violations of physical integrity. That means, generally, the more international aid given to build up the government, the more torture, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, or disappearances a post-conflict country can expect. This finding, while generally disturbing, may entail several different scenarios that have not been revealed by this study. For example, hoping to increase peace and security and prevent further conflict, a government may round up opponents and send them to prison. With opponents in prison, the government might use torture to find out about their activities and sponsors. Or, in another imagined scenario, government leaders can use international aid to fund militias, or increase government abductions or extrajudicial killings. Governments that increase physical integrity abuses while given international aid may employ any combination of violations, with some having much worse

Table 4.6: Social and economic rights: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.582***		.581***
1 year lag		(.063)		(.063)
Government aid (ln)	-.000	-.000	-.000	.000
1 year lag	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Economic aid (ln)	.000*	.000*	.000*	.000*
1year lag	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Social aid (ln)	.001	.000	.001	.000
1 year lag	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
GDP	.044***	.043***	.043***	.017**
1 year lag	(.006)	(.006)	(.005)	(.007)
Population (ln)	-.034**	-.032**	-.032**	-.013
1 year lag	(.012)	(.011)	(.012)	(.013)
Political regime	.012**	.000	.012**	-.000
	(.004)	(.005)	(.004)	(.004)
Ongoing conflict	-.005*	-.005*	-.005*	-.004*
	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)
Years post-conflict	.003***	.002**	.002***	.002 **
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
Cold war	-.002	-.001	-.001	-.001
	(.006)	(.003)	(.006)	(.003)
British colony	.005		.003	
	(.037)		(.037)	
War outcome			.004	.001
			(.006)	(.002)
Ethnic Fractionalization			-.086	
			(.060)	
Constant	.014	-.001	.013	.000
	(.157)	(.274)	(.057)	(.275)
Variance components				
Level 2	.012		.012	
Level 1	.000		.000	
-2 x Log likelihood	-1447.08		-1449.42	
Observations	304	304	304	304
Post-conflict countries	50	50	50	50
Robust standard errors, FE models. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

consequences than others. Further examination of the relationship between government aid from international institutions and an increase in physical integrity abuses is necessary before making any specific recommendations to avoid this unintended consequence.

International aid directed toward improving education, health, social services and infrastructure, communications, energy generation, the environment, food aid, and emergency aid positively affects respect for human rights, especially physical integrity rights, political rights, and civil liberties, but no significant impact on social and economic rights. These results are surprising in two ways. First, social spending does not significantly affect social and economic rights. Two of the major components of the Human Development Index are education and health, so it is somewhat surprising that international aid guided toward education and health programs does not influence this measure. It may be that education takes longer than five years to achieve significant improvement, and the result is an artifact of how I set up the study. A twenty year examination might find that social aid has a positive impact on social and economic rights. As a second surprise, while social aid has a positive impact on political rights and civil liberties, government aid does not. As the government is directly responsible for instituting elections and altering policies to include better political rights and civil liberties, one would expect building election institutions to positively affect political rights. No direct correlation between these two variables actually supports the argument that increasing government legitimacy through providing more goods and services to the public does expand policy options for government leaders and lead to a reduction in repression.

International aid spent on improving the economy does not improve physical integrity rights, political rights, or civil liberties. However, this spending does marginally improve social and economic rights. Money spent to improve the economy improves economic well being. This might seem an obvious finding, but considering that international aid directed toward the government does not improve government political policies, and international spending on social rights, does not actually improve social rights, the finding is not as self-evident as it might appear. Confirming that international economic aid can improve economic rights is an important finding.

Perhaps the most relevant finding shows that aggregating aid masks the actual consequences of international aid on human rights. The purpose of the aid can alter its impact on human rights. And, different aid purposes also affect distinct types of human rights. Government aid only significantly affects physical integrity rights. Aid directed at social improvements has a positive influence on physical integrity rights, political rights, and civil liberties, but no impact on social and economic rights. Disaggregating types of aid and multiple categories of human rights presents a more accurate assessment of the relationship between international aid and government repression.

This chapter shows that international aid from IOs, in some instances, can enhance policy options, improve legitimacy, and reduce repression and in other instances aid can impede respect for human rights. The next chapter looks at whether increasing the cost of repression can have a diminishing effect on government repression.

Chapter 5

International Monitoring

In this chapter, I use statistical modeling to examine how international monitoring affects government repression in post-conflict countries. I argue the presence of international monitors, peacekeepers, will positively affect respect for human rights in post-conflict countries. Leaders, fully aware that international monitors will make report of their behavior to the international community, will limit repressive behavior for fear of losing international support. Gibler (2008) has demonstrated that leaders will alter their human rights policies in anticipation of receiving aid in the future. I make the argument that leaders will improve respect for human rights to avoid losing future distributions of aid, especially when international monitors are present.

This project focuses on peacekeeping missions carried out by international organizations.[1] The UN charter authorizes peacekeeping sponsored by the UN and also may delegate peacekeeping efforts by other states and organizations, including regional organizations. Regional organizations known for their peacekeeping efforts include the African Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Economic Community Of West African States, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. I disaggregate peacekeeping missions into UN and regional peacekeeping missions to explore whether some institutions are more effec-

[1] See chapter 1 for a thorough discussion of international organizations included in this study.

tive in their monitoring efforts than others. I also examine the different categories of UN missions to discover whether some types of UN missions might be more successful than others. I argue in chapter three that less committed peacekeeping missions will not affect government respect for human rights, because international monitors in these situations are not in position to directly monitor human rights. Alternately, during peacebuilding missions, international monitors directly monitor human rights behavior. UN missions can be categorized into four different mission types, including observer missions, traditional missions, multidimensional missions, and enforcement missions. Observer missions and traditional missions represent less committed missions that do not directly address human rights issues. Multidimensional missions and enforcement missions are peacebuilding missions that directly monitor human rights and can reduce the risk of repression.

In the following sections of this chapter, I will first discuss the main independent variables, UN peacekeeping and regional peacekeeping. In Chapter 3, I introduced the general hypotheses regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In this section I will present more specific hypotheses related to the different types of UN missions and regional peacekeeping. Next, I briefly reprise, from the last chapter, the dependent variables, representing repression, and control variables to be used in the statistical models. I then discuss the types of models used for the statistical tests which were also utilized in chapter four. Finally, I analyze and discuss the results of the statistical tests.

UN peacekeeping missions

Of all IOs, the UN has carried out the most peacekeeping missions to date. Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter authorize international intervention by the United Nations to settle disputes between nations and to quell aggressive acts that threaten the international peace.[2] From its inception through 2006, the UN has conducted 68 peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping operations must be approved by the Security Council and they are generally authorized for a six-month period and reauthorized without contention (Diehl 2008). I anticipate international monitoring by all IOs to decrease the risk of repression generally. I think that UN missions will largely correlate

[2]Charter of the United Nations 1945, accessed at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ on October 19, 2012.

with human rights improvements. However, there is significant variation in the types of mission embarked upon by the UN. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) identify four distinct mission categories, observer missions, traditional missions, multidimensional missions, and enforcement missions. The peacekeeping missions vary in levels of commitment, from observer missions generating the least amount of commitment to enforcement missions with the most commitment from the UN. The table below shows the mission type and country of intervention for the years 1981 - 2006.

Table 5.1: UN Peacekeeping Missions 1981 - 2006

Observer	Traditional	Multidimensional	Enforcement
Angola	Angola	Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Guinea Bissau	Cambodia	Angola	Bosnia Herzegovenia
Haiti	Haiti	Cambodia	Croatia
Morocco	Lebanon	Rwanda	DRC
Nicaragua		CAR	Iraq
Papua New Guinea		DRC	Liberia
Rwanda		El Salvador	Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone		Guatemala	Somalia
South Africa		Mozambique	Sudan
Tajikistan		Namibia	Ivory Coast
Georgia			

Observer missions carried out by the UN refer to mandates that include only "monitoring" and "observing." These missions do not include many military personnel and indicate the weakest form of commitment from the IO, and were among the most common missions prior to the end of the Cold War in 1990. The Security Council approved several truce observations during the Cold War, but did not submit to many expanded peacekeeping missions. Between 1945 and 1990, the UN engaged in 14 observer and traditional missions compared to 54 missions that range from observer to enforcement missions between 1990 and 2006. The UN has had an observer mission in the Jammu and Kashmir region of India and Pakistan since 1949. Pakistan and India have disputed the border in the region since the time of their independence in 1947. The current mission, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), oversees a ceasefire between India

and Pakistan. UNMOGIP consists of forty military observers, twenty-five international civilian personnel, and forty-eight civilian staff members.[3] They oversee The Line of Control established in 1972 demarcating new borders for India and Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir regions and report their findings to the Secretary-General.

Observer mission have the fewest number of monitors in comparison to traditional, multidimensional, and enforcement missions. If the fewest number of monitors and most restrictive mandate indicates the least commitment from the UN, and more commitment is more likely to improve human rights, observer missions will be the least likely mission to decrease government repression. Additionally, observer mission were designed to address straightforward ceasefires between international states, not the more complex situations found in post-conflict societies. I expect, then, **H2: Observer missions by the United Nations not affect the risk of repression in post-conflict countries.**

Traditional missions were also developed to facilitate ceasefires between international states. Traditional missions warrant more troops than an observer mission and demonstrate more commitment from the UN, but engage in little or no peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. Traditional peacekeeping offers only protection, and may include monitoring ceasefires, providing military and civilian policing, create buffer zones between belligerents, overseeing the withdrawal of foreign troops, providing security to those providing humanitarian aid, and so forth. Any institution building or general rebuilding of society done by the UN would be categorized as a multidimensional or enforcement mission. Traditional missions most often monitor ceasefires between belligerents who can retreat to their respective territories.

The longest standing traditional peacekeeping mission by the UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), has maintained international forces in Cyprus since 1964. Since 1974, it has helped to sustain a ceasefire between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As of July 2012, the mission employs 1,079 personnel, including 860 troops, sixty-six police, 144 civilian person-

[3]See UN Department of Peacekeeping website, www.undpko.org, accessed March 6, 2013.

nel, thirty-eight international civilians, and 106 local civilians.[4] In comparison to UNMOGIP, the mission offers more troops and personnel and a slightly more involved mandate. UNFICYP's imperative includes supervising a de facto ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone betweens the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Because traditional peacekeeping missions do not offer much more commitment than observer missions, I anticipate them to have a similar effect on human rights. Namely, **H2: Traditional missions by the United Nations not affect the risk of repression in post-conflict countries.**

The UN began to embrace multidimensional missions after the Cold War. When the UN engages in holding elections, helping to reestablish security forces, providing humanitarian aid, institution building, and other similar activities, the mission is considered multidimensional. Multidimensional missions engage in peacebuilding and are invested in both the cessation of hostilities and rebuilding society to attain a positive peace.They often seek to train security forces to respect the human rights of civilians, investigate claims of human rights violations, and help to build human rights institutions. They also provide humanitarian assistance to those in need, and aid in the rehabilitation of the country's infrastructure. Promoting economic growth is another common feature of a multidimensional mission. In comparison to observer and traditional missions, multidimensional are more likely to oversee investment in accommodation of civilians and attempts to reintegrate former combatants into society. International monitors do more than observe ceasefires, they monitor institution building, the restructuring of military and police forces, and come in greater number to observe the behavior of the government and former combatants.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, represents a post-Cold-War multidimensional mission. In 2004 the UN decided to support the Transitional Government to guarantee a secure and stable environment; to help restructure and reform the Haitian police force; to sustain disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; to maintain the rule of law, public safety; to protect citizens threatened by physical violence; to support constitutional and political processes;

[4]See UN Department of Peacekeeping website, www.undpko.org, accessed March 6, 2013.

to assist in organizing and monitoring free and fair elections; to support Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to protect human rights.[5] The mandates of multidimensional missions are further reaching than observer and traditional missions. Typically they promise to uphold respect for human rights while deployed. Because multidimensional missions demonstrate their intention to protect human rights and because they generally deploy a greater number of monitors than traditional and observer mission, I anticipate they will have more success in decreasing repression in post-conflict countries. I predict the data will show, **H3: Multidimensional missions will decrease the risk of repression in post-conflict societies.**

Enforcement missions diverge from the other three types of missions in that they may be deployed without the consent of the host government. Missions such as these are authorized by Chapter VII, article 42 of the UN Charter. In practice there have been three types of enforcement missions. With the first type of mission, international peace keepers attempt to impose order without local consent and must take control of local factions, like the mission in Somalia. Second, the mission lacks unanimous consent of all participants to the conflict and impose arrangements such as no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors of relief. The third type of enforcement mission attempts to implement the terms of a peace agreement where one or more parties has defected from the peace process (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). The common characteristic of all enforcement mission is that they were authorized under Chapter VII rather than Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

A large number of troops and aid represents another factor common to enforcement missions. In 1999, the UN deployed an enforcement mission to Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL to aid in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement. At its maximum strength in 2002, 17,368 military personnel, eight-seven UN police, 322 international civilian personnel, and 552 local civilian personnel were deployed. The large number of personnel and the fact that the UN willingly sent a mission that, because authorization under Chapter VII is required, will be more challenging than most missions demonstrates a huge level of commitment by the UN. Because of the demonstration of commit-

[5]See UN Department of Peacekeeping website, www.undpko.org, accessed March 6, 2013.

ment, I expect: **H4: Enforcement missions will decrease the risk of repression in post-conflict societies.**

Detractors of UN interventions note that the UN frequently does not fulfill their own mandates. UN peacekeeping missions also suffer from accusations of corruption and ineptitude with regard to monitoring respect for human rights. The UN has come under fire for peacekeepers who allegedly sexually assaulted or abused the populations they served (Allred 2006). Those violating human rights themselves can hardly be trusted to accurately account for violations committed by others. Additionally, reports suggest that the UN will sometimes ignore incidents of violence if members of the mission do not perceive a threat to the stability of a government inside a post-conflict country. In the case of peacekeeping in the Congo, Autesserre (2009) argues that the UN identified violence as "innate" and, therefore, acts of violence during peacetime were expected and acceptable. Corruption among peacekeepers and acceptance of violence as a natural expectation in post-conflict countries might lead to a lack of respect for human rights. In these instances, even if there is no resumption of war, repression may be utilized by the government to maintain political order. UN peacekeeping may not meet my expectations with regard to its impact on human rights.

In addition to flawed peacekeepers and flawed agendas of peacekeeping missions, international troops are generally sent to the worst possible cases (Gilligan & Stedman 2003). Regional and UN peacekeepers could fail to improve human rights because their focus is on no resumption of war, and other aspect of rebuilding society, while alleviating repression may be a secondary concern. If the UN fails to focus its attention on government repression, respect for human rights will not improve, or may even become worse. UN missions may not meet my expectations of improved respect for human rights.

Regional peacekeeping missions

The UN charter authorizes peacekeeping missions carried out by the United Nations, regional organizations, and "coalitions of the willing." While the UN leads in number of peacekeeping missions since 1945, other institutions, and ad hoc coalitions have also contributed to international

peacekeeping operations. Several regional organizations have security mandates and have demonstrated their willingness to contribute to international peacekeeping. For example, the African Union, as authorized by the UN, currently has peacekeeping missions in both Somalia and the Sudan. Regional organizations can act alone as authorized by the UN, or they can intervene in conjunction with other actors.

The table below lists regional peacekeeping missions from 1981-2006.[6] NATO, ECOMOG, the OAU/AU, the CIS and OSCE were largely responsible for peacekeeping by IOs other than the UN in this time period.[7] I will briefly discuss the institutions and provide some examples of the missions carried out by them.

Table 5.2: Regional Peacekeeping Missions 1981 - 2006

NATO	ECOMOG	OAU/AU	CIS	OSCE
Afghanistan	Liberia	CAR	Georgia	Azerbaijan
Bosnia	Guinea Bissau	Rwanda	Moldova	Croatia
Kosovo	Sierra Leone	DRC	Tajikistan	Kosovo
Serbia	Ivory Coast			Bosnia
				Serbia
				Georgia
				Tajikistan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created during the Cold War as an intergovernmental military alliance whereby all members agreed to defend against an external attack. The inception of the organization was based on the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949. The original twelve members included Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Though memberships is not limited to any particular region of the globe, it operates like a regional organization. Originally focused on a potential attack from the Soviet Bloc, NATO had to update its mandate and focus as the Soviet Union disintegrated.

[6] I disaggregate missions in the former Yugoslavia to indicate exactly where the peacekeepers were sent.
[7] The OAS was also involved in the UN mission to Nicaragua from 1990 -1992.

The 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts document produced by NATO helped to move the collective defense IO toward a cooperative security association, including peacekeeping missions. Article 4 of the Strategic Concept of 1991provides for consultation on any issue that affects member security (Michta 2000). This alteration in objectives led to the IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR missions in the Balkans, and IFAR, a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan.NATO peacekeeping missions have consisted of a large number of personnel and have all been enforcement missions approved by the UN Security Council. The peacekeeping missions of NATO address military, civil, and political concerns of the receiving country (Smith 1999). IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR each qualify as enforcement missions as they were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Each of the three NATO missions dispatched to the former Yugoslavian republics were responsible for some degree of implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The first mission, IFOR, took the place of the UN mission, UNPROFOR in 1995. IFOR consisted of 60,000 troops and lasted for one year. The follow-up mission, SFOR was reduced to 31,000 in 1996. [8] IFAR's main objective requires the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and also was enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. NATO peacekeeping comes with controversy. Some have argued that as a military alliance, NATO's military actions are acts of war rather than peacekeeping (Michta 2000). NATO is not often viewed as a neutral arbiter of peace.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) represents the predecessor to the African Union (AU). The AU replaced the OAU in 2002. Prior to the renaming and reconceptualizing of organization, it was structurally weak, often doing no more than holding a forum for a yearly meeting of heads of state on that continent. The AU has recently expanded its activities to include election monitoring and peace operations, including the deployment of forces to Sudan and Somalia. The AU has made a commitment to peacekeeping on the African continent, and has a Peace and Security Council that oversees an African Standby Force (Bogland, Egnell & Lagerstrom 2008). The standby force, in theory, should be able to deploy to any regional crisis in a timely manner. In

[8]Source: NATO website accessed at: http://www.nato.int, February 28, 2013.

practice, the AU generally acts in conjunction with the UN rather than on its own. For example, the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur combines the efforts of the AU and UN in carrying out an enforcement mission in Sudan. The AU lacks the capacity to carry out major peacekeeping missions without financial contributions that reach beyond its member states. During the 1981- 2006 time period, the OAU/AU participated in just three peacekeeping missions.

Another African regional IO, The Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, was more active in its peacekeeping efforts between 1981 and 2006. Though ECOWAS is an economic institution, it has argued that without peace and stability in the region the member states cannot prosper economically. Their revised treaty of 1993 formally assigned the Community the task of settling and preventing regional conflicts. In this spirit, the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, deployed in Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. Difficulties have arisen when ECMOG deploys because the recipient country has viewed the peacekeeping forces as agents of the strongest member of ECOWAS, Nigeria. Liberia, as mentioned above, represents a primary example. ECOMOG had committed some 40,000 troops to Liberia by the time the mission ended in 1999, and most of them were Nigerian.[9] Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) considered ECOMOG a party to the conflict rather than a peacekeeping mission (Dorn 1998). ECOMOG enforcement mission also had difficulty drawing on international legitimacy because, though it intervened as early as 1990, the UN only recognized the authority of the mission under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter retroactively in 1992 (Hutchful 1999). Missions of ECOMOG have been plagued with perceptions of bias.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has also encountered charges of bias. The CIS, an IO created in 1991, consists of Russia and eleven[10] other former Soviet republics. The IO recognizes the sovereignty of each state, but was conceived of as a successor to the USSR to co-

[9]See Official website of the Ghana Armed Forces at: http://www.gaf.mil.gh accessed on March 7, 2013.

[10]Georgia withdrew from the organization in 2008 over a dispute with Russia in South Ossetia.

ordinate the economies and foreign policies of the member states. CIS has deployed peacekeeping missions to maintain stability in the region of the former Soviet Union. In 1992, CIS sent peacekeepers to South Ossetia, a region in the country of Georgia that had a strong separatist movement that wished to rejoin North Ossetia, a part of the Russian Federation. CIS deployed a traditional peacekeeping mission to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the two parties (Allison 1994). The ceasefire held until 2008 when the most powerful member state of CIS, Russia, invaded Georgia over a flare up in hostilities between Georgia and South Ossetia. Russia then recognized the independence of South Ossetia to consolidate the political and military gains it had made during the invasion (Levy 2008). In this instance, the interests of the most powerful member state overran the mandate of monitoring the ceasefire.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE, began peacekeeping in 1992. Since then, there have been a total of thirty-one field missions, mostly in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Missions vary in size and staffing from three or four personnel, to their largest mission in Kosovo that included 495 national and 189 international staff. Still a relatively small mission by UN standards. The mandate of the mission in Kosovo promoted democracy, the rule of law, human rights, election support and monitoring, and police monitoring (USIP 2012). The character of the mission was multidimensional. The objectives of missions by the OSCE have changed over time. In the 1990s, with the break up of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, the focus was on conflict prevention, mediation and monitoring of ceasefires, and post-conflict security building. The organization continues to concentrate on the same region, and has modulated its agenda to help with good governance. Specifically, missions aim to achieve democratization and good governance, election monitoring, human rights, rule of law, rights of persons belonging to minorities, border monitoring, police training, and freedom of the media (USIP 2012). The interest of Russia and the works of the OSCE have clashed in the past causing Russia to end the OSCE's mission in Chechnya in 2002 (de Brichambaut 2006). Russia's desire to keep Western influence out of post-Soviet states has

developed clashes between the regional organization and the regional power (Zellner 2005). Thus, hindering the progress of the OSCE.

Each of these regional organizations has had trouble with either perceptions of bias, the national interests of the most powerful members, or capacity to execute peacekeeping missions. Based on biases held by strong member states, perceived biases of recipient states, and limited resources of regional organizations, I anticipate **H5: The presence of regional peacekeepers will increase or have no effect on the risk of repression in post-conflict societies.**

Data regarding all peacekeeping through 1999 has been culled from Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Fortna (2004), and, to confirm agreement with the collection of these data, I also consulted primary and secondary data sources.[11] Peacekeeping data for the years 2000 - 2006 was collected from primary and secondary data sources exclusively. The independent variables, UN peacekeeping, regional peacekeeping, observer missions, traditional missions, multidimensional missions, and enforcement missions are all dichotomous variables. The number 1 represents the presence of a particular mission type, and a zero indicates no such mission presence. In years where UN mission types might overlap, in other words, one country saw two different types of missions in one year, the more committed mission was coded. For example, a traditional mission was deployed in Cambodia from January - March of 1993 and a multidimensional mission was deployed from March - December of the same year. The year 1993 was coded as a multidimensional mission. In cases where both a regional mission and a UN mission were present, each was code with a 1. UN missions and regional missions deployment often overlap.

Dependent variables

Repression, as in the last chapter, will measure physical integrity violations, political rights and civil liberties, and social and economic rights. Below, I explain how I obtained the measurements

[11] These sources include the UN Department of Peacekeeping website, *The Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*, and various case studies.

that I will used in the statistical analysis to follow.

Physical integrity rights. As mentioned in the previous chapter, data on physical integrity violations comes from The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Source material for CIRI measures of repression comes from US State Department reports. The CIRI scale bases its measurement on the number of physical integrity violations recorded each year. Each physical integrity violation (torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, disappearances) is given a numerical value based on frequency of occurrence.[12] For example, a score of 2 for torture indicates no torture has occurred in a particular country for a particular year. A score of 1 shows between 1 and 49 occurrences of torture within a particular country for a particular year. A score of 0 indicates 50 or more incidents of torture. Each country scores between a 0 and 2 for torture, political imprisonments, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. CIRI coders then generate a comprehensive physical integrity score by adding the individual torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing and disappearance scores. With this nine-point additive scale, a score of zero indicates the highest level of violent repression by the state government and a score of eight shows no evidence of violent repression by the government. CIRI coders count the number of infractions to generate a state repression score for each country, each year. To allow for the most objective measurements possible, context does not influence the coding in any way, coders merely count the number of incidents in each country for each year examined. [13]

CIRI's scale ranges from zero, the most repression a country can mete out, to eight, indicating the lowest levels of repression. This scale can cause confusion when interpreting results because

[12]For further details on the construction of this scale, see David L. Richards, Ronald Gelleny, and David Sacko. 2001. "Money With A Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries" International Studies Quarterly, 45:2 pp. 219 - 239.

[13]CIRI nicely disaggregates individual categories of abuse so that each can be analyzed individually. However, perhaps due to CIRI's drive toward precise objective measurements, some important context is left out of its index ranking. For example, a country that has fifty incidents of extrajudicial killings will receive the same score as a country that commits 5,000 or 50,000 extrajudicial killings.The authors of the data suggest that removing context from the measure of repression allows for a more objective interpretation of state repression statistics. Thus, the data are also not weighted for different types of infractions. Political imprisonment carries the same weight as extrajudicial killing. For a complete critical assessment of the CIRI dataset, see Wood, Reed and Mark Gibney. 2010. "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-introduction and a Comparison to CIRI." Human Rights Quarterly 32(2):367400.

its lowest number 0, indicates the highest levels of repression and the highest number, 8, represents the lowest country levels of repression. In hopes of avoiding this confusion when interpreting the results of my analysis, I have flipped the scale so that the highest score of 8 indicates the highest levels of repression, and a score of zero will demonstrate a country with little or no repression.

Civil liberties and political rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees political rights and civil liberties to all individuals. Additionally, many states have created and signed international treaties agreeing to preserve political rights and civil liberties. To assess the administration of these rights, Freedom House offers measures of state political rights and civil liberties in countries throughout the world.

To measure political rights and civil liberties, I consult Freedom House indicators. Freedom House data represents a measure widely used used to assess political freedoms throughout the globe. Freedom House provides a yearly score for 194 countries, evaluating current political freedoms and civil liberties. Each country receives a score of 1 - 7 for both political freedoms and civil liberties. A score of 1 indicates the lowest degree of repression and a score of 7, the highest. Scores are based on 10 questions regarding political freedoms and fifteen questions regarding civil liberties. Political questions fall under the categories of: (1) The Electoral Process, (2) Political Pluralism and Participation, and (3) Functioning Government. Questions regarding civil liberties are categorized under: (1) Freedom of Expression and Belief, (2) Associational and Organizational Rights, (3) Rule of Law, and (4) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.[14]

Social and economic rights. Other forms of repression include social and economic repression. Global measurements for social and economic indicators, especially those going back to 1981and for seventy-eight countries, are limited. The GINI coefficient that measures economic disparity between the most wealthy and the poorest in society would be an ideal indicator for my study. However, the data for most country-years in my study are missing. Instead, I use the Human

[14]For an in depth explanation of Freedom House ratings, please visit the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org

Development Index (HDI). It provides another way of assessing the quality of social and economic well-being in countries around the world.[15] Assembled by the United Nations Development Programme, the HDI provides an aggregate measure of progress along three dimensions, health, education and income. More specifically, life expectancy, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, mean years of schooling, and per capita income are combined into a singular index that compare human development in individual countries. The index measures life expectancy at birth and uses this as a proxy for measuring the health of a country. A geometric mean of years of expected schooling at the age of entering school and mean years of actual schooling at age 25 generates the educational portion of the index. Finally, wealth is measured through per capita gross national income. To ensure that the results of the test do not just indicate country GDP differences, I also control for country wealth. Any statistically significant results should, indicate a strong relationship between the education and life expectancy indicators and peacekeeping.

The index ranges from 0 to 1. An increase in an HDI score indicates an improvement in general social and economic conditions. This study utilizes the HDI index to assess social and economic conditions in post-conflict societies. An improvement in an HDI score indicates less social and economic repression.[16]

Control variables

As noted in Chapter 4, a number of variables have been shown to significantly affect repression time and again. Because the dependent variables in this chapter are the same as in Chapter 4, I utilize similar control variables. As most of these variable have been thoroughly explained in the previous chapter, I briefly describe them below.

Past repression

[15]Data collected from the Human Development Index can be acquired at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/, accessed January 30, 2012.

[16]Unfortunately, the HDI index only reports scores for individual countries every five years. A yearly account of change in social and economic indicators would better fit my data set.

Governments that have used repressive tactics in the past will more likely use repressive measures in the future. To account for previous violations of human rights, including physical integrity rights, political rights, and social and economic rights, I utilize a one-year lag of the dependent variable in the all fixed effects models. This lagged variable accounts previous use of repression.

Democracy

By definition, democratic governments should not violate human rights, and research shows that more democratic states tend to use less repression (Davenport 2007*a*). Within a society where citizens can vote leaders out of office, repression does not serve the purpose of maintaining power. However, quantifying political systems presents a difficult task. Distinguishing a democracy from a pseudo-democracy, from a mixed regime type, from a genuine autocracy requires the quantification of elusive concepts. No perfect measure of political systems exists, but a widely used proxy for the concept of democracy was developed by the Polity I Project, under the direction of Ted Gurr and associates, and later modified by the Polity IV Project. The Polity IV Dataset, developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2003), creates a yearly democracy/autocracy score for each country in in the international system, based on the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints placed on the executive, and the competitiveness of political participation within each country. A combined democracy/autocracy score represents a 21 point additive scale ranging from -10 to 10.[17] Polity democracy coders establish an autocracy and democracy score fore each country, and then, the autocracy score is subtracted from a country's democracy score to generate a combined autocracy/democracy score. On a scale of -10 to 10, a score of -10 represents a political system of hereditary monarchy and a 10 indicates a consolidated democracy.

The economy

Wealth is another variable consistently associated with government repression. Wealthy nations tend to show greater respect for human rights (Mitchell & McCormick 1988, Poe & Tate 1994, Poe, Tate & Keith 1999, Henderson 1991), but the reasoning remains unclear. Several explanations

[17] All polity scores use the Polity variable polity2 which interpolates values for polity scores -77 and -88.

have been proffered to describe why wealthier countries have less repression. Some surmise that governments with greater resources have more strategic options to elicit political order than poorer countries. Addressing grievances with material benefits instead of repressing those with grievances is easier for states with greater wealth. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue fewer resources result in less efficient repression, so poorer countries must use more repression to be effective. Henderson (1991) suggests that more development will mean less grievances and therefore less need for government repression. Governments do not need to repress satisfied citizens. Whether the explanation is multiple options for establishing political order, greater efficiency through greater resources, or a generally more satisfied public, wealthy countries demonstrate greater respect for human rights. This model uses the GDP per capita as a proxy for state wealth. GDP data was culled from the World Bank and is reported in constant 2000 dollars.[18]

Ongoing conflict

Civil wars have long been associated with an increase in government repression (Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1978, Poe & Tate 1994). When dissenters turn to violence the government will often respond with violence (Moore 2000). Government violence can focus on established rebels, or can be more indiscriminate and included civilians not involved in the conflict. Because rebels do not generally wear uniform or announce their affiliation publicly, identifying rebels can be difficult. This difficulty often leads to violence against citizens not involved in the conflict even when the government intends to repress rebels exclusively. Violence against the public increases during civil wars.

While each country has ended a civil war as it enters the dataset, war recurrence or significant political violence, during the period examined post-conflict, can promote continued repression. I include a dummy variable that denotes an ongoing conflict equivalent to onset of another civil war during the post-conflict period examined. If a post-conflict country reenters or starts a new conflict, repression will increase.

[18]World Bank GDP data available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator accessed January 30, 2012.

Former British colony

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) argue that historical political culture may importantly influence whether a country uses repression or not. Specifically, former British colonial status is thought to be associated with the development of democracy after achieving independence from Britain. Poe and Tate (1994) find statistical support for this assertion. British cultural influence tends to promote respect for human rights in former colonies. I include a dummy variable where a 1 indicates that a country held the status of British colony at any time in its history and a 0 for all other countries.

Conflict deaths

I use conflict deaths as a proxy for the intensity of the conflict. The number of deaths during an civil war can impact peace after civil war (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Higher numbers of casualties may indicate higher levels of repression during the war, and, therefore, a willingness of combatants to repress civilians. Greater number of deaths could also indicate a higher level of hostilities between former combatants. Higher levels of hostilities might lead to the mistreatment of civilians after a civil war. The number of deaths includes natural log of deaths of belligerents and civilians during the time of the conflict. If there is an ongoing conflict after peace was achieve I adjust the number of deaths accordingly. Data were gathered from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002).

Time

Time can be an important variable, especially in a post- war environment. A politically stable government will likely commit less repression than a less stable government. Theoretically, the more time that passes after a civil war, without war recurrence, the more stable a political system becomes. Time may play a role in how repression changes in post-conflict countries. I operationalize time by including a variable that counts years since war-end. The year war ends is coded as 1 year post-conflict, the next year is coded as 2, and so forth.

The end of the Cold War also presents a significant time marker for interaction between IOs

and post-conflict states. During the stand off between the USSR and the United States, many civil conflicts in developing countries served as proxy wars for the great powers. The US and the USSR often blocked international intervention of the other in IOs such as the United Nations. The end of the Cold War altered the way the US and USSR got involved in civil conflicts around the world. There is a distinct difference in how IOs dispatched peacekeepers during the Cold War versus after the Cold War. Therefore I include a dummy variable distinguishing pre-1990 post-conflict episodes from post-1990 post-conflict episodes. A zero indicates the is pre-1990 and a one shows the time is 1990 or later.

Methods

To test how international monitoring affects repression in post-conflict countries, I have collected data on repression and peacekeeping missions in countries that have ended a civil war between the years 1981 and 2006. The data are collected annually and analyzed over a five year post-conflict period.[19] I examine the impact of peacekeeping five years post-conflict. A five-year analysis demonstrates the initial and intermediate effects of peacekeeping on repression in a post-conflict setting. Five years post-conflict represents a critical time in rebuilding elements of society and infrastructure after war (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Examining the relationship between peacekeeping and human rights at this juncture provides insight into the initial impact of peacekeeping on human rights. Ultimately, IOs provide peacekeepers to prevent war recurrence and to stabilize the country in the long-term, but the first five years represent a crucial historical period for countries emerging from a civil war. [20]

I have collected time series cross sectional (TSCS) data for this analysis.[21] TSCS data have

[19]The actual time periods are 5-plus years, including data from the year the conflict ended, regardless of the month the conflict ended, and a full five years after the conflict ended.

[20]Some countries included in the five-year analysis have truncated data because five-year post-conflict data does not exist. They include: Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka.

[21]Additional terms for such data include, longitudinal data, panel data, and repeated measures (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008)

repeated observations (often collected yearly) on the same political units (usually countries or states) (Beck 2001). My data have been collected for post-conflict countries by year, making the unit of analysis country-year. The data are clustered by country and over time. Such clustered data can provide rich information on processes at different levels of analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). Clustering can also results in statistical difficulties associated with specification and estimation. Namely, cluster-dependence violates assumptions of simple statistical analyses. Cluster dependence indicates, in this case, that specific countries may have unobserved variations that provide some explanation of the outcome variable. In other words, variables not included in the statistical analysis may influence repression scores in individual countries. Clustered data may also result in serial correlation. Serial correlation, with regard to the dependent variable, refers to how repression scores for one year correlate with the score for the next year. These two data conditions violate assumptions of independence of many statistical models, including Ordinary Least Squares regression. There are, however, several recommendations for dealing with clustered data and serial correlation exist within the body of statistics literature.

One option for handling clustered data involves using a multilevel model. Multilevel modeling expands on conventional regression to include the effects of data clusting (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). The goal of multilevel modeling is to account for variance in the dependent variable at the lowest level (level 1) using information from all levels of analysis (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). TSCS data can be viewed as two levels of data with occasions nested in subjects (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). In terms of my analysis, level one refers to years nested in countries, or level 2. Multilevel analysis allow researchers to combine levels of analysis into one comprehensive model and is less likely to suffer from model misspecification compared to single level models (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Ignoring the character of multilevel data can result in incorrect standard errors and an increase in Type I errors (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). Here, level one variables include occasions, or years, and these years are clustered within level 2 variables, or countries. Multilevel modeling can account for both level 2 and level 1 variation in estimating

level 2 regression coefficients (Gelman & Hill 2007).[22]

Another suggestion for dealing with clustered data entails using a fixed effects model with a lagged dependent variable and robust standard errors (Wawro & Kristensen 2003). One standard way to eliminate serial correlation when dealing with TSCS data is to include a lagged dependent variable in the model. There can also be substantive reasons to include a lagged dependent variable (Wawro & Kristensen 2003). If unmodeled unit effects remain after correction for serial correlation the resulting coefficients may be biased and inconsistent (Green, Kim & Yoon 2001). Standard fixed effects estimators can eliminate the problem of unmodeled unit effects. With a fixed effects model, all estimates refer to within country effects. To obtain purely within country effects, the random intercept for each country is replace by a fixed intercept. In a fixed effects model, all country-specific effects are accommodated by a fixed intercept, leaving only the within-country effects to be explained by covariates (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008). In chapter five of *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata*, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal note,"A great advantage of these estimates is that they are not susceptible to bias due to omitted subject-level covariates. Each subject truly serves as their own control in the fixed-effects model (p. 189). Unfortunately, fixed effects models also eliminate the ability to test between cluster hypotheses and one cannot retrieve good estimates of sluggish independent variables (Beck 2001). Any time time-invariant variables will be dropped in FE models and estimates of slow moving variables will be inconsistent and biased (Wawro & Kristensen 2003).

To account for data issues mentioned above, I employ multilevel models with both fixed and random effects for all dependent variables. The mixed effects models allow for better assessment of slow moving variables, and include between country effects in the estimations.[23] The fixed effects

[22] An analysis of variance (results not shown) demonstrates variance components are statistically significant suggesting that there is significant variation between and within countries and that multilevel modeling is an appropriate statistical test.

[23] Specifying a random intercept model and including a lagged variable can present a problem. The lagged responses, included as a covariate, are correlated with the random intercept. To avoid this problem I eliminate lagged responses from models with random intercepts.

models ensure the absence of omitted variable biases and estimates only the variation within each country. Several variables attain significance across random and fixed effects models.

Before moving forward to test full models, I analyze the main independent variables and dependent variables to ensure relationships found between the two variables are not driven strictly by the models themselves. Table 1 shows the relationship between repression and peacekeeping generally. Without considering control variables, peacekeeping shows a strong correlation with a decrease in the risk of physical integrity violations and reduced violations of political rights and civil liberties. Peacekeeping also affects social and economic rights positively.

Table 5.3: Peacekeeping and Repression

Monitoring	PI violations	Political violations	Social rights
All peacekeeping	-.780**	-.386**	.100**
	(.229)	(.162)	(.004)
Constant	5.04***	4.72***	.464***
	(.256)	(.235)	(.022)
-2 x Log likelihood	1273.09	1059.51	-1474.88
Maximum likelihood estimates.			
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

According to the simple model below, Traditional peacekeeping associates with the risk of more physical integrity violations than post-conflict incidents without peacekeeping missions. This association is surprising and will be explored further in the results section. At the same time, traditional peacekeeping positively affects social and economic rights. Enforcement mission show a consistent positive effect on both physical integrity rights and political rights. Observer and multidimensional missions do not correspond to any decrease in the risk of physical integrity violations or political rights. These results carry over to the models including all control variables.

Results

Peacekeeping and physical integrity rights

Table 5.4: UN Peacekeeping and Repression

UN peacekeeping	PI violations	Political violations	Social rights
Observer	-.301	-.147	.002
	(.340)	(.249)	(.006)
Traditional	.921*	.305	.016*
	(.540)	(.391)	(.009)
Multidimensional	-.389	-.325	.008*
	(.306)	(.219)	(.004)
Enforcement	-1.65***	-.751***	.008
	(.353)	(.245)	(.006)
Constant	4.92***	4.68	.465
	(.258)	(.235)	(.022)
-2 x Log likelihood	1255.20	1052.41	-1473.82
Maximum likelihood estimates.			
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01			

Peacekeeping missions by regional organizations decrease the risk of physical integrity violations in contrast to hypothesis five. There are a couple of possible explanations for this finding. First, Taveres's argument that geographic and cultural closeness provide advantages to regional organizations over the UN hold true. Due to this advantage, they are more successful at limiting physical integrity violations. It is possible, despite potential bias and capacity issues that regional organizations have a marked advantage. After all, the UN is not bias free, and regional organizations can look beyond their membership rolls for contributions to the mission. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation (2000) recommended integrating regional organization into UN peacekeeping missions to improve peacekeeping performance. Experts considered adding the expertise of regional institutions a step forward in UN peacekeeping. Also noteworthy are the characteristics of the regional missions deployed between 1981 and 2006. Of the sixteen countries that experienced regional interventions, eleven of them qualified as enforcement missions. Of the

variety of UN mission types, enforcement missions garner the most success in reducing the risk of repression. It could be the mission type claims responsibility for the success of the mission rather than the institution type.

Surprisingly, UN peacekeeping as a whole does not reduce the risk of repression. This finding is unexpected, especially considering Hultman's (2010) article that shows peacekeeping missions by the UN can reduce government killing of civilians. Though her findings assess violence during civil wars and post-conflict, it suggests some relationship between peace operations and government respect for physical integrity rights. The distinction between our findings may reside in the fact that she examines violence during civil wars as well as post-conflict, and how the dependent variables are measured. Hultman looks at the killings of citizens exclusively, and the measure of repression used here also includes political imprisonment, torture, and disappearances. Disaggregation of the dependent variable may yield different results. Another possible explanation presents itself when UN missions are broken down by type. Though enforcement mission seem to reduce the risk of repression, traditional peacekeeping missions increase the same risk. These divergent results may be pulling the UN peacekeeping coefficient in two different directions, resulting in null findings.

Considering UN mission types renders conflicting results. Traditional peacekeeping involves missions intended to offer protection to belligerents and enhance the probability of putting an end to hostilities through monitoring ceasefires, providing police protection, and humanitarian aid to the exclusion of peacebuilding. According models 3 and 4 in Table 5, traditional peacekeeping increases the risk of government violations of physical integrity. During traditional peacekeeping mission by the UN, more political imprisonments, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings can be expected. One possible explanation not found in the models in Table 1 has to do with the number of troops deployed to a post-conflict situation. Kathman, Hultman, and Shannon (2011) find that a greater number of troops deployed to a peacekeeping mission will reduce government violence against civilians. The number of troops deployed are not accounted for in the models displayed above. It may be the case with traditional peacekeeping missions that the number

Table 5.5: Physical integrity and peacekeeping: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.149		.127
1 year lag		(.098)		(.087)
Regional PK	-.789**	-.836*		
1year lag	(.351)	(.440)		
UN PK	.059	.069		
1 year lag	(.842)	(.401)		
Observer PK			-.180	-.069
1 year lag			(.334)	(.337)
Traditional PK			1.18**	1.18**
1 year lag			(.601)	(.447)
Multidimensional PK			-.066	.068
1 year lag			(.846)	(.389)
Enforcement PK			-.1.16**	-1.21
1 year lag			(.390)	(.1.14)
PCGDP	-.000	-.000	-.000	.000
1 year lag	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Democracy	-.042	.001	-.042	-.003
1 year lag	(.019)	(.304)	(.026)	(.018)
Ongoing conflict	1.02***	.850**	.791***	.618*
	(.211)	(.279)	(.214)	(.366)
Years post-conflict	-.005	.004	-.007	.013
	(.045)	(.049)	(.045)	(.052)
British colony	-.434		-.343	
	(.507)		(.514)	
War deaths	.120	-.192***	.121	-.183**
	(.088)	(.031)	(.088)	(.030)
Cold war	.535	.638	.534	-.609
	(.441)	(.772)	(.435)	(.798)
Constant	3.26**	5.57***	3.22**	5.49**
	(.996)	(.857)	(.857)	(.802)
Variance components				
Level 2 variance	2.15		2.22	
Level 1 variance	1.30		1.25	
-2 x Log likelihood	1103.68		1093.01	
Observations	317	317	317	317
Post-conflict countries	51	51	51	51
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

of deployed troops proves insufficient to protect civilians. Kelp and Wallace (2011) suggest that civilians may acquire a false sense of security when international peacekeepers are present. They may present themselves as targets, and unwittingly endanger themselves, when peacekeepers are deployed. If not enough troops have been deployed to make a difference in civilian security, but civilians have a sense of security, then physical integrity violations might increase. However, this explanation would suggest that observer missions, since they generally have fewer personnel than traditional missions, should also increase the risk of repression.

Looking at the traditional peacekeeping missions included in this study may provide a partial explanation. Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, and Lebanon constitute all traditional UN peacekeeping missions between 1981 and 2006. The mission in Lebanon, UNFIL, has a mandate regarding Israeli and Lebanese fighting, and has nothing to do with the civil war that took place in the country. Even though a UN mission was present post-conflict, UN troops had no instructions with regard to Lebanese factional fighting.[24] Angola experienced continued fighting despite signing a peace agreement. Angola's civil war between the government and UNITA ended in 1991, resumed in 1992, ended in 1994, resumed in 1997, and ended again in 2002. Estimated battle deaths in 1999 alone range between 10,000 and 20,000 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). It is not particularly surprising that physical integrity violations increased under these conditions. The traditional peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Haiti were both transitional missions without enough troops to implement their mandates. All together, the traditional missions represent 13 country-years in a study of 319 country-years, and excluding Lebanon reduces the number to seven country-years. These traditional missions may represent four anomalous cases, or, less likely, suggest that traditional peacekeeping can actually exacerbate human rights violations in post-civil-war countries.

The number of troops deployed may help to explain why traditional peacekeeping associates with an increase in repression, and enforcement missions help to decrease the risk of repression.

[24]Removing Lebanon from the analysis does not alter the statistical results. Traditional peacekeeping continues to increase the risk of repression when Lebanon is excluded.

Enforcement missions command more troops than traditional peacekeeping missions. To illustrate the point, consider that the traditional peacekeeping mission in Haiti from 1997 - 2000 had an authorized strength of 300 civilian police, and 215 international and local personnel; while the enforcement mission carried out in Haiti from 1993 - 1996 had authorized 6,000 troops and military support personnel, 900 civilian police, and approximately 430 international and local civilian staff. [25] The UN authorized more than six times the number of troops for the enforcement mission than for the traditional peacekeeping. More troops means more monitors, and, hence, more effective monitoring. The troop number associated with enforcement missions may explain why these missions specifically decrease the risk of repression.

Models 1- 4 show that peacekeeping missions by the United Nations may both increase and decrease physical integrity violations. These results suggest that more international monitors establishes more effective monitoring and accentuates the different types of missions will elicit different repression outcomes.

Peacekeeping, political rights, and civil liberties

Enforcement missions solely influence political rights in post-conflict states. This finding is somewhat curious given the primacy that elections tend to have in UN peacekeeping missions. In Cambodia, a multidimensional mission, UNTAC, failed to maintain a ceasefire, failed to disarm and canton fighting factions, but successfully held elections that were deemed free and fair. A declaration of success was made after UNTAC left Cambodia based on the electoral success. Paris (2009) contends that UN peacekeeping focuses far too much on elections and needs to consider the implications of the elections in the peacebuilding process. Hastily held elections do not translate into political freedoms, according to Table 6. The measure of political rights used in this study considers the state of (1) The Electoral Process, (2) Political Pluralism and Participation, and (3)

[25] Troop numbers can be found at the UN Department of Peacekeeping website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/, accessed December 1, 2012.

Functioning Government in each country assessed. Holding elections does not significantly improve the electoral process, political participation or the functioning of a government, except with the commitment of an enforcement mission.

Without the commitment of an enforcement mission, no significant improvement in political rights is achieved through peacekeeping missions. Enforcement missions employ more armed military and police than observer, traditional, and multidimensional missions. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, entered the country in 1999 and stayed through 2005. The maximum dispatch of troops equaled 17,368 military, eighty-seven police, 322 international civilian personnel, and 552 local civilian personnel. The mandate included disarming and demobilizing fighting factions, and, in due course, holding elections. The mission provided troops that demonstrated its intention of fulfilling the mandate, and time that also demonstrated commitment. UNAMSIL did not simply enter Sierra Leone, hold elections, and declare success. They spent six years working toward fulfilling the mandate and then consigned a smaller mission, UNIOSIL, to continue peace consolidation.

Peacekeeping and social and economic rights

The dependent variable that proxies for social and economic rights is the Human Development Index. This index has a range from 0 to 1, and unlike the measures for physical integrity, political rights and, civil liberties, a positive coefficient indicates an improvement in general social and economic conditions. According to Table 7, peacekeeping missions do not have much of an effect on social and economic rights. All of the control variables move social and economic rights in the expected direction. Per capita GDP, democracy, and the number of years past the end of a conflict all improve social and economic rights. Ongoing conflicts and more deaths during the conflict contribute to the risk of social and economic inequalities.

Two factors might have influenced these results. First, as mentioned before, HDI measures are only taken every five years, and my unit of analysis is country-year. My analysis allows for change every year, and the data can only change every five years. This could contribute to the lack of

Table 5.6: Political rights and peacekeeping: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.590***		.595***
1 year lag		(.106)		(.106)
Regional PK	-.038	-.021		
1year lag	(.238)	(.143)		
UN PK	-.239	-.153		
1 year lag	(.190)	(.133)		
Observer PK			-.100	-.096
1 year lag			(.230)	(.136)
Traditional PK			.178	.113
1 year lag			(.391)	(.110)
Multidimensional PK			-.115	-.745
1 year lag			(.223)	(.124)
Enforcement PK			-.534**	-.514*
1 year lag			(.242)	(.292)
PCGDP	-.000**	-.000	-.000**	-.000
1 year lag	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Ongoing conflict	.728***	.385***	.665***	.311**
	(.140)	(.089)	(.142)	(.089)
Years post-conflict	-.064**	-.018	-.059**	-.011
	(.060)	(.030)	(.029)	(.031)
British colony	-.670		-.672	
	(.477)		(.477)	
War deaths	.287***	.232	.288***	.221
	(.067)	(.186)	(.068)	(.188)
Cold war	-.588*	-.674***	-.594**	-.691
	(.304)	(.115)	(.303)	(.126)
Constant	2.72**	.100	2.72**	.245
	(.788)	(1.99)	(1.89)	(2.03)
Variance components				
Level 2 variance	2.07		.955	
Level 1 variance	.573		.501	
-2 x Log likelihood	916.81		812.45	
Observations	330	330	330	330
Post-conflict countries	53	53	53	53
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

significant results. However, since the measure provided significant findings with other covariates, this is unlike to be the problem. Social and economic inequities may take more time to resolve than physical integrity and political rights. Reducing physical integrity violations is relatively low cost for governments. It requires that military and police forces stop killing and arresting people for political reasons. If the government can maintain political order without committing physical integrity violations, then reduction in this type of repression requires no cost. Political rights also can be achieved fairly quickly with little cost, and often international interveners will offset costs associated with elections and establishing political rights. Social and economic inequality costs more and takes longer to achieve. Establishing schools in improving health such that life expectancy increases likely takes more than 5 years post-war.

Table 5.7: Social and economic rights and peacekeeping: 5 years post-conflict

Variables	Model 1 Mixed effects	Model 2 Fixed effects	Model 3 Mixed effects	Model 4 Fixed effects
Past repression		.576***		.564***
1 year lag		(.061)		(.062)
Regional PK	.003	.000		
1year lag	(.003)	(.003)		
UN PK	.002	-.158		
1 year lag	(.004)	(.180)		
Observer PK			.001	.001
1 year lag			(.005)	(.004)
Traditional PK			.012	.006
1 year lag			(.007)	(.004)
Multidimensional PK			.001	.002
1 year lag			(.004)	(.003)
Enforcement PK			.003	.003
1 year lag			(.005)	(.002)
PCGDP	.000***	.021**	.000***	.023 **
1 year lag	(.000)	(.000)	(.006)	(.014)
Democracy	.002***	.002	.002***	-.002
1 year lag	(.000)	(.003)	(.000)	(.004)
Ongoing conflict	-.008**	-.005*	-.009**	-.005*
	(.003)	(.003)	(.002)	(.002)
Years post-conflict	.003***	.002**	.003***	.002**
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)
British colony	-.012		.005	
	(.039)		(.034)	
War deaths	-.003**	-.003	-.003*	-.003
	(.002)	(.002)	(.001)	(.002)
Cold war	-.002	-.001	-.002	-.001
	(.006)	(.003)	(.006)	(.002)
Constant	.458	.100	.457	.061
	(.027)	(.220)	(.027)	(.240)
Variance components				
Level 2 variance	.014		.011	
Level 1 variance	.000		.000	
-2 x Log likelihood	-1519.72		-1533.47	
Observations	312	312	312	312
Post-conflict countries	50	50	50	50
Standard errors in parentheses.				
Robust standard errors, FE models.				
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01				

Conclusion

The most significant finding in this chapter demonstrates that enforcement missions successfully reduce the risk of physical integrity violations and violations of political rights. I have argued that the basis for success comes from the commitment demonstrated in enforcement missions. Particularly, more troops and more time show governments a level of commitment by engagement missions not often shown with observer, traditional, and multidimensional missions. This suggests that to attain better outcomes, mission do not have to be deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but require sufficient troops, equipment, and time to accomplish what the IO sets out to achieve. Expansive mandates cannot come to fruition without adequate resources.

Traditional missions carried out by the UN increase the risk of physical integrity violations. While this may be an artifact of the cases of traditional missions included in this study, the result still commands attention due to its antithetical nature as to why the UN intervenes in post-conflict situations. Preventing civilian harm is central to all UN missions (Wills 2009). If traditional missions are simply not equipped to contend with civil wars, as they were developed to oversee ceasefires after interstate wars, sending traditional missions to post-conflict countries should be reconsidered.

Finally, regional institutions demonstrate a correlation with reduced risk of physical integrity violations. Regional IOs may have an advantage when it comes to addressing conflict issues in its own area of expertise. UN hybrid missions, like the ones being carried out with the AU in Somalia and Sudan may provided the benefits of both the UN and regional IOs. The understanding and proximity of regional organizations combined with the resources, perceived neutrality, and authority of the UN might produces greater respect for human rights in future peacekeeping missions.

This chapter and the previous chapter looked at the general trends of post-conflict countries from 1981-2006. The next chapter will consider the countries of El Salvador and Cambodia to examine the causal mechanisms at work in theses particular cases.

Chapter 6

Case Studies

The case studies included in this project serve to support and call into question my theoretical expectations by closely examining the causal mechanisms at work in each post-conflict case study. In this chapter I examine a set of "most similar" and "most-likely" post-conflict episodes that experience variation in the dependent variable (repression). Most-similar cases are chosen to avoid as many confounding variables, that might provide another reasonable explanation for variation in the outcome variable, as possible. Most-likely cases are episodes wherein the value of the independent variable strongly posits an outcome (George & Bennett 2005). In this instance, most-likely cases include peacekeeping missions by international organizations. International funding and commitment of monitors should affect respect for human rights. According to chapter four, using international aid to augment social spending improves political legitimacy and leads to improved respect for human rights. International aid directed toward government institutions tends to diminish respect for human rights. Statistical analysis in chapter 5 indicates that enforcement missions, peacekeeping missions that deploy the most troops and time without consent of the government, reduce physical integrity violations by the government. Case studies that conform to the expectations of my theory and statistical analysis will demonstrate greater respect for human rights where international aid is directed at social services and restoring infrastructure, and where more

troops are deployed for greater monitoring capabilities. I will compare the post-conflict cases of El Salvador and Cambodia against my findings in chapters 4 and 5.

The results of these case studies both sustain and refute my findings in the quantitative analysis. El Salvador achieves greater respect for human rights than Cambodia five-years post-conflict, despite presenting similar cases. The UN's mission in Cambodia contributed more military troops and civilian police, but the mission in El Salvador committed more time to carry out its mandate. El Salvador's unified government, the cooperation of the rebels, and the time commitment of the UN mission, allowed it to utilized international aid from IOs and international monitoring by the UN effectively. Cambodia's factional fighting and the time frame of the UN mission limited the achievements of the UN intervention.

The next section of this chapter will clarify my case study choices, El Salvador and Cambodia. El Salvador ended its civil war in 1992 through a peace treaty, as did Cambodia in 1991. Both countries invited UN peacekeeping missions to help implement the terms of their peace accords. After examining case selection, I provide background information on the conditions of repression prior to the post-conflict episode. I then investigate the monitoring by United Nations in both cases. In the following section, I consider the impact of international aid contributions to both peacekeeping missions. Finally, I offer thoughts and conclusions as to how well these cases fit with my theoretical expectations.

Case selection

The question driving this research, under what conditions do international interventions increase or decrease respect for human rights, suggests that the most interesting and relevant case studies will have experienced international interventions. The most interesting case comparisons will show variation in the dependent variable with a strong international commitment in both cases; suggesting that nuances in international commitment might explain some degree of the variation in repression. Close examination of both types of cases should help to explain what aspects of inter-

national funding and monitoring enhance respect for human rights and, conversely, what aspects of international commitment do not or negatively affect respect for human rights. To determine what countries show an increase or decrease in repression, I compare their repression scores five years before the end of the war and five years after the end of the civil war.

Variation in the dependent variable is measured by change in repression after the war. A five year average of the country's score on violations of physical integrity[1] prior to the end of the civil war subtracted from a five year average post-civil war gives the measure for change in repression. Table 6.1 below shows a breakdown of post-conflict country repression scores by peacekeeping.[2] As expected, a majority of cases with peacekeeping fall into the category where government respect for human rights increases at a rate above the average. However, five countries where IOs commit to peacekeeping fall below the general average for change in respect for human rights. Comparing cases with peacekeepers that have above average and below average physical integrity scores may help to reveal distinct policy options chosen by international organizations that influence respect for human rights.

Ten post-conflict countries, with peacekeeping, have above average respect for human rights, and five countries, with peacekeeping, have below average human rights records. To select the most similar countries for comparison, I consider similarity in key control variable that might alternately explain variation in the dependent variable (Krain 2000). The cases chosen for case study are a subset of the global post-conflict episodes, from 1981-2006, examined and analyzed in the quantitative portion of this project. Below I expound on the key control variables used to help in the selection of the subset of cases.

Conflict. Scholars have established a consistently significant relationship between conflict and repression (Davenport 2007*a*). Leaders confronted with dissent, especially with the intent to over-

[1]Scores are taken from the CIRI measure of violations of physical integrity. See chapter 4, above, for details on CIRI measures of repression.

[2]Countries that experience recurring conflict or concurrent conflict within five years after the end of the war are excluded from the table.

Table 6.1: Five Year Post-Conflict Change in Repression

International intervention	Above average change	Below average change
Peacekeeping	Croatia	Azerbaijan
	El Salvador	Cambodia
	Haiti	Central African Republican
	Mozambique	Guatemala
	Namibia	Morocco
	Nicaragua	
	Papa New Guinea	
	South Africa	
	Tajikistan	
	Zimbabwe	
No Peacekeeping	Mali	Bangladesh
	Peru	Egypt
	Thailand	Guinea Bissau
	Turkey	Iran
		Nigeria
		Pakistan
		Sudan
		Syria
		United Kindom
		Yemen

throw the government, often respond with repression. The quantitative section of this study examines post-conflict episodes where war may recur anytime after war termination, and cases where a concurrent conflict with another opponent continues despite the end of a particular conflict. Because of the strong association between conflict and repression, cases with war recurrence or war concurrence within five years after the end of a civil war will not be considered for case study.

Conflict duration. The length of a conflict can affect post-conflict policies following interstate wars (Gurr 1988, Licklider 1995). Longer conflicts inflict higher death tolls, use up more resources, and engender more repression than shorter conflicts (Krain 2000). Because international organizations tend to intervene in more difficult cases (Fortna 2008), I expect to find more cases of intervention in cases with longer wars. To control for duration, case studies will only include post-conflict episodes that follow conflicts that have lasted ten years or more.

War outcome. Civil wars can end in a truce, negotiated settlement, or a complete victory for the rebels or the government. Governments that have achieved a complete victory will act differently from a government that has achieved peace through a negotiated settlement, or a truce. Leaders who have achieved a complete victory may lean toward the desired policies of their supporters whereas peace achieved through negotiated settlements may require particular policies according to signed agreements. Peace through a truce may be more tenuous than a complete victory or a negotiated settlement and policies may reflect the tenuousness of the peace. International organizations tend to send peacekeeping missions to post-conflict countries with negotiated settlements. To highlight the independent variable of interest, peacekeeping missions, case studies will only consider cases where war ends in negotiated settlement.

Economic conditions. The economic status of a country limits the options available to leaders. Those who want to accommodate rather than repress may not have the resources to choose accommodation, because they lack resources (Mason 1989). Countries with greater resources are less likely to utilize repression (Poe & Tate 1994, Poe, Tate & Keith 1999, Henderson 1991). To avoid comparing countries with disparate economic conditions each post-conflict episode considered will

have a per capita GDP that falls below 1,000 dollars per year.

Ethnic war. Ethnic cleavages often supersede all other cross-cutting social cleavages, and construes a strong barrier between groups in many societies (Kuper 1977). Wars based on ethnicity can influence post-conflict policies. If the post-conflict episode examined follows an ethnic civil war, the government may be prone to accommodate supporters and repress former opponents simultaneously. While this might occur in any post-conflict situations, the drive may be stronger in instances of ethnic tensions. To ensure most similar cases of post-conflict episodes, the chosen case studies will not include episodes following ethnic warfare.

After considering the above contextual conditions in each case, four cases remain. Cambodia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mozambique represent the sample of most similar cases in my study. Looking at the absolute value of physical integrity violations five years post-UN intervention in these four countries, the greatest disparity between them appears in Cambodia and El Salvador. Graph 6.1 below shows the average physical integrity scores, post-conflict, for the four remaining countries. Though Guatemala falls below average change in physical integrity violations and Mozambique scores marginally higher than average, the difference, between change in repression and average physical integrity scores, is negligible. Graph 6.2 shows a similar accounting of political repression in each of the four countries. El Salvador demonstrates significantly greater respect for political rights than Cambodia. Guatemala and Mozambique scores fall between El Salvador and Cambodia showing only slight differences between each other's scores. Because I want to explain why government repression differs in otherwise similar post-conflict situations, I will focus on the two similar countries with the greatest disparity in their repression scores, Cambodia and El Salvador.

Methods and data

To compare the cases of Cambodia and El Salvador, I employ a structured and focused case study approach. A focused case study examines but one aspect of a case to analyze the variables of in-



Figure 6.1: Absolute physical integrity scores five-years post-conflict



Figure 6.2: Absolute political repression scores five-years post-conflict

terest, and eschews other important historical details that are not relevant to the research questions being addressed. A structured study asks a set of standardized questions of each case to get the best basis for comparison and generalized data collection (George & Bennett 2005). In the cases of Cambodia and El Salvador, I ask the following questions:

Questions for evaluating change in repression after the civil war:

1. Has respect for physical integrity rights, civil and political rights increased?

2. Are there still government or government sponsored groups that kill, torture, disappear, and politically imprison members of the opposition post-conflict?

3. Does the leadership and membership of the military and security forces include former members of the opposition?

4. Are former members of the opposition allowed to participate in government leadership?

5. Have regular elections been held?

6. Were the elections considered free and fair by international and internal standards?

7. Are former opposition members free to participate in elections?

9. Have there been any institutional changes to indicate increased respect for civil and political rights?

Questions regarding international aid and specific sector spending:

1. What portion of international aid is spent on economic recovery, government institutional recovery, and social recovery?

2. Is there a change in the distribution of spending over the 5 year post-conflict episode, and if so, is there a concurrent change in repression.

3. Does public opinion play the role that is assumed in the quantitative analysis? i.e. When social spending increases, does the public's trust in government increase?

4. Do government leaders direct international funding at a small coalition of supporters to ensure their continued support in power?

Questions about the international monitoring:

1.Do peacekeepers have a positive impact on government respect for human rights?

2. Is there a qualitative difference between peacekeepers sent only to observe and armed peacekeepers?

3. How do peacekeepers influence the use of repression?

4. What are the short term effects of election monitoring in post-conflict countries?

5. Does election monitoring have a lasting effect on political and civil rights in post-conflict countries?

I engage in historical process tracing to find answers to these questions. The process tracing method attempts to identify the causal chain between the independent variable and the dependent variable (George & Bennett 2005). David Laitin notes, "If statistical work addresses questions of propensities, narratives address questions of process (Laitin 2002: p.5). In the following case studies I strive to identify the processes that lead from international intervention to changes in levels of repression. To do so, I utilize primary sources, such as documentation on peacekeeping missions by international organizations, reports on election monitoring from international organizations, negotiated settlements signed by opposing parties, statements made by parties to the bargaining process, and secondary sources featuring case analyses by country experts. Using a variety of source material provides a variety of perspective and will help to minimize the bias introduced into my own case studies.

Conditions of repression - El Salvador

Civilians in El Salvador suffered significant state repression for most of the twentieth century. From the beginning of the century, the military and the economic elite have strongly influenced who governs El Salvador. The alliance generally protected the status quo and thwarted any attempts to alter the economic policies and political leadership by leftists and moderates alike. Rather than opening political space for opposing views, the military regularly invoked repression to quiet the opposition. Over time there was a break between hardliners and reformers within the military

and, to some extent, the economic elite. As a result of the struggle for reform during the 1960s, the military encouraged active political opposition. However, the space for political change was limited and the military never allowed opposing parties to actually take power (Montgomery 1996).

A military coup in 1979 sought to implement reform by ousting the current leaders and instituting a reform-minded military junta. The junta promised to address human rights abuses, confront political corruption, and address problems of economic disparity. (Mazzei 2009). Though the coup was successful, the resultant struggle for leadership within the military junta altered the directive of the new government and ended up increasing repression, and despite limited land reform, generally maintained status quo polices that benefited the existing elite. Following the coup, the extreme right-wing sector of the economic elite developed a political-military strategy that entailed the use of paramilitary forces in conjunction with a political party (Montgomery 1996). As the right ramped up the violence, leftist rebels responded with violent acts of their own until low level violence escalated to civil war.

During the war, both the government and the rebels violated the human rights of civilians, but the military and paramilitary troops associated with the government carried out the bulk of repressive acts. (See Table 6.2 for examples.) Violence by the state became more indiscriminate, as their strategy to ramp up violence outpaced the available intelligence on opposition leaders and supporters. Alternatively, the rebels sought the support of the population at large and offered protection from government sponsored death squads in return for their assistance (Stanley 1996). The rebels succeeded in more remote areas where the had a larger presence, and the military successfully limited rebel activity through repression in central areas of the country.

Repression by the right was carried out by the military and security forces that named leftists and moderates as their enemies. The military sponsored some paramilitary groups to carry out extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and assassinations. Creating groups that existed outside the formal military provided political cover for illegal activities backed by the military. For example, the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an outspoken supporter of political and economic reform,

Table 6.2: Civilian Killings in El Salvador 1980

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
State Forces	320	293	584	634	1,424	963	1,077	869	1,818	1,389	1,360	1,164
Leftists Groups	17	23	0	37	63	80	261	314	258	109	17	64[1]

can be traced back to a paramilitary group supported by the military (Report of the Commission on Truth for El Salvador 1993). In addition to security forces initiated by the military, economic elites establish some of their own security forces. The coup carried out by reformists made some elites unsure of the reliability of the military. Elites created their own security forces to fight against leftist rebels. The Santiago death squad (FAR), initially a Boy Scout troop set up by the US Peace Corps, reappeared as an independently financed security force. As a security force, the FAR fought leftist opposition. The group's sponsor profited from the FAR's illegal activities by charging landowners for killing activists. Despite its independent beginnings, the FAR eventually coordinated with the national intelligence agency (ANSESAL) and the National Guard (Stanley 1996) to become a full-fledged paramilitary operation. Because the military and the security forces had a common enemy, they cooperated and often coordinated their efforts.

In the early 1980s, disparate rebel groups also came together to fight the government under the title of Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The group sought to enlist the support of the general populace and thought the repressive policies of the government would help their cause. Because paramilitary groups committed the majority of repression by the right, and so they would not aggravate reformers within the military, the left tended to target their violence toward paramilitary forces. While this strategy garnered support from many, it did not elicit the widespread uprising anticipated by the FMLN. In 1981and again in 1989, the rebels engaged in offensives intended to drive enough of the population to rally behind their efforts and force the

government's hand. Each offensive amassed significant support, but the military eventually beat opposition forces. The attack on San Salvador in 1989 helped to bring about a stalemate between the opponents and aided in the onset of peace talks.

Conditions of repression - Cambodia

Cambodia achieved independence from France in 1953. Unlike several other post-colonial states, the government in Cambodia did not immediately change leadership after gaining independence. Norodom Sihanouk led Cambodia from 1945 through 1970 as king, and later as prime minister when a parliamentarian government was introduced (Chandler 1997). The French chose Sihanouk as king in 1945 because they thought he would prove a malleable leader. In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated the throne and participated in parliamentary elections. His desire to win, coupled with the fact that he controlled the police and the media, led Sihanouk to harass and intimidate his opponents. He imprisoned many and killed some. After the election, Sihanouk's party, Sangkum, was declared to have won all parliamentary seats, despite evidence that an opposing party, the Democrats, had won at least three seats (Chandler 1992). This election would be the last choice of leaders Cambodians would have through the year 1993. Respect for physical integrity rights and political rights and civil liberties was limited during Sihanouk's tenure.

Table 6.3: Changes in Government in Cambodia 1970 - 1991

Year	1970	1975	1978	1991
Type of Change	Coup	Civil War Victory	Vietnam Invasion	Peace Agreement
New Government	Lon Nol	Khmer Rouge	Peoples Rep. of Kampuchea	Supreme Council/UNTAC

A 1970 coup d'etat removed Sihanouk from power and inserted Lon Nol as leader of the country. Notably, Lon Nol allied with the United States at the time of the Vietnam war, and subsequently engaged Cambodia in the fight against Vietnamese communists. In country communist

opposition forces, know as the Khmer Rouge, benefited from weapons and training provided by Vietnamese communist units (Chandler 1997). The South Vietnamese, the United States, and North Vietnamese staged parts of their war in Cambodia. A cease fire between these parties led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, but the Khmer Rouge, fearing a loss of momentum in their bid for power, refused to abide by the a ceasefire. The refusal brought on a bombing campaign by the United States. The US dropped 250,000 tons of explosives on Khmer Rouge positions. Estimates suggest thousands of Khmer Rouge troops were killed during the attacks and civilian casualties were likely higher.[3] The bombings prompted hundreds of Cambodian civilians to join the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan 1985). Civil war between the Lon Nol regime and the Khmer Rouge and international war carried out within the borders of Cambodia made casualties of thousands of soldiers and civilians. The high number of casualties produced by the US bombardment and the civil war appears relatively small when compared to the immense number of civilians killed by the Khmer Rouge in the years following the US attacks.

War in Cambodia did not end once international forces exited the country. Civil war between the Lon Nol regime and the Khmer Rouge lasted thorough April 17, 1975. On this date, the Khmer Rouge declared victory as they overtook Phnom Penh, and the communist revolution that killed approximately 1.7 million Cambodians, or about 21 percent of the population (Cambodian Genocide Project 2010). In addition to physical integrity violations, the Khmer Rouge killed through starvation, overwork, disease, and execution (Chandler 1997). The first declaration of the regime called for people living within the cities to move out to agricultural regions to produce food. The government dispensed with money and made every Cambodian an employee of the state. The Khmer Rouge, led by Saloth Sar, or Pol Pot, conceived of the "Party's Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields." The plan focused on agricultural growth, especially expanding the export of rice. The production of rice was expected to double, or triple in some instances, with out monetary investment, in a country torn apart by civil strife. To achieve some of the unreasonable

[3]Total estimates of casualties suffered due to US bombings range from 150,000 to 750,000 (Tully 2006).

goals set by the regime, food meant for consumption was redirected toward exports, civilians were required to work 12 hour days, and, still, the country fell short of the unattainable goals. Under the circumstances, starvation was common (Fein 1997) and some died due to over exertion. In addition to conditions promoting starvation, the government abused the population through rooting out "enemies." Those who opposed the government, or were suspected enemies, were sent to a Khmer Rouge facility in Phnom Penh where torture and execution were routinely carried out (Chandler 1997). The regime targeted intellectuals and school teachers for execution and burned down schools as a matter of course (Kiernan 2004). The ambitious regime also carried out attacks against the Vietnamese during their brief tenure.

In 1978, antagonism of Vietnam brought about an invasion of some 150,000 Vietnamese troops, and the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Working through a government known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), Vietnam created a protectorate in Cambodia that lasted until 1989. The PRK government largely consisted of defectors from the Khmer Rouge, but Vietnamese advisors were visible at all levels of government administration, and had ultimate decision-making power in Cambodian affairs (Martin 1994). The PRK have been viewed as liberators of a suffering Cambodian people, and alternately as a decade of an unwanted occupation by the Vietnamese in Cambodia. The bias against the PRK and the predisposition to support the actions of the PRK hold some truths and exaggerations about the regime.

Social conditions eventually improved under the PRK, but the poor condition of the infrastructure, lack of food resources, and general societal dysfunction found in the wake of the Khmer did not allow for immediate recovery. In the first year of the PRK takeover, between 350,000 and 625,000 people died (Tully 2006). Many of the deaths were attributed to starvation. A fleeing Khmer Rouge absconded with all the food stuff they could take with them and destroyed all they could on the way out. Granaries, crops, and any remaining industry was destroyed. The PRK instituted a number of pragmatic policies in order to promote economic recovery. Under the PRK, markets reappeared, health care and education became more accessible, and some social freedoms

were restored (Deth 2009). However, achieving a society more desirable than living under the Khmer Rouge, arguably, set a low threshold for improvement.

International and domestic factors served to limit economic, social, and political recovery in Cambodia during Vietnam's occupation. International isolation, due to China, the US, and ASEAN countries opposing the expansion of a Soviet-backed Vietnam, hindered progress to some degree (Tully 2006). Cambodia was denied aid available to other developing countries because of international politics. The PRK also perpetuated human rights violations such as torture and imprisonment of thousands involved in violent and nonviolent opposition to the government (Peou 2000). A 1987 report by Amnesty International reported unfair trials, political prisoners detained without trial, torture during interrogation, and those who held private meetings or criticized the administration were labelled "traitors to the revolution." Heder (1980) also recorded eyewitness accounts of arbitrary shootings, by the PRK, of the Khmer people on the Thai - Cambodian border. Perhaps the most unpopular policy and greatest abuse of human rights was the launch of the K5 Plan. The plan sought to seal off the Thai - Cambodian border by lining it with ditches, walls, fences, forts, fences, and minefields (Deth 2009). In order to complete the plan, the regime conscripted 50,000 civilian laborers. Poor sanitation, limited food supplies, and heavy manual labor led to the deaths of thousands of workers (Tully 2006). The unpopular K5 Plan cost the PRK a great deal of support from those who initially viewed them as liberators from the Khmer Rouge regime.

While the PRK meted out less repression than the Khmer Rouge between during their rule, civil war continued through the signing of the Paris Peace agreement in 1991. The 150,000 soldiers that helped the PRK take over the government did not remain to act as an army for the PRK. The PRK required soldiers to fight the Khmer Rouge and other resistance movements. To achieve an army, the PRK, first, sought volunteers. Joining the army was unpopular at this time because so many Cambodians had experienced first hand violence and did not want to continue fighting. Also, signing up for an army ultimately controlled by the Vietnamese government was not attractive to many Cambodians, and the PRK did not pay very well. In 1982 the PRK began military conscrip-

tion of men between the ages of 17 and 25 (Deth 2009). By April of 1985, the PRK reported that it had 80,000 Cambodian Troops to fight the estimated 40,000 Khmer Rouge resistance fighters, the 14,000 Khmer People's National Front troops, and 10,000 troops of the Arme Nationaliste Sihanoukienne (Gottesman 2004).

Peace talks began as Vietnam left the country, and the end of the Cold War stopped the international support of factions in Cambodia. Four parties to the conflict engaged in the peace talks and, ultimately, the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. First, the State of Cambodia (SOC), led by Hun Sen, represented the PRK and controlled 80 percent of the country at the time of the talks. Second, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea was the political party of the Khmer Rouge. [4] At the time of the talks, the Khmer Rouge controlled area along the Thai-Cambodian border and had a military force of about 30,000. Third, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) led by Sihanouk, constituted royalist supporters. FUNCINPEC administered control over a small section of territory in the northwest with approximately 10,000 soldiers. Finally, fourth, the Khmer People's National Front (KPNLF) was a conservative middle class movement that also controlled a small territory in the northwest and had a disappearing army (Doyle 1995).

Parties to the Paris Agreement assented to a ceasefire, disarming, organization, conducting elections, repatriation of refugees, the promotion of human rights, maintenance of law and order, and control and supervision of civil administration by the UN. The UN helped to negotiate the Paris Agreement and held many firsts for this international organization. Though the four signatories formed a Supreme National Council (SNC) it was to operate in cooperation with the UN. UNTAC was have administrative responsibilities and could potentially overrule the SNC (Doyle 1995).

[4]For the sake of clarity, I will continue to refer to members of the the Party of Democratic Kampuchea as the Khmer Rouge.

Post-conflict change in repression

El Salvador and Cambodia ended their civil wars with peace agreements signed by all parties to the conflict. Both of their agreements elaborated on and endorsed respect for human rights. The UN civil mandate in Cambodia called for civil administration, holding national elections, educating on and enforcing human rights, monitoring civil police, and providing rehabilitation and information (Doyle 1995). The agreements signed by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN covered five primary areas of contention including, human rights, armed forces, judicial reform, civilian police, and social and economic questions (Wilkins 1997*a*). Parties to the conflict in El Salvador signed a separate agreement on human rights. In the San Jose Agreement on Human Rights, both the FMLN and the government agreed to stop practices that contravene international human rights law, punish any continued violations, and create a monitoring mission to ensure the cooperation of both sides (de Soto 1990). Despite all parties to each conflict agreeing to respect human rights, El Salvador had more success with actually reducing repression.

Physical integrity violations include incidents of torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. As explained in previous chapters, the measure of CIRI for political integrity violations ranges from zero to two on each individual type of violation.[5] Cambodia's incidents of extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and torture actually increased in the five years post-conflict. Disappearances remained the same. El Salvador, on the other hand, reduced extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and the number of political prisoners. The Salvadoran government, by the time of the signing of the agreement, had already reduced disappearances to achieve the lowest possible score on the CIRI scale in the first year post-conflict. On average physical integrity violations decreased five years post-conflict in El Salvador. In Cambodia, on average, torture, political imprisonment, and disappearances increased or remained the same five years after the civil war. (See Graph 6.3)

[5]The CIRI scale ranges from 0 to 2 where a zero indicates the most violations of physical integrity and a score of 2 indicates the least repression. I reverse the scale for ease of interpretation.



Figure 6.3: Comparing change in physical integrity violations

Political rights and civil liberties also expanded in El Salvador while shrinking in Cambodia. Both countries held national elections in the presence of their respective UN missions. While El Salvador continued with a democratic tradition that appeared to offer political rights and civil liberties to a greater number of persons, Cambodia returned to a semblance of a monarchy shortly after their election. See Graph 6.4 depicting change in political rights five years post-conflict.

The design of the UN interventions in Cambodia and El Salvador were different from each other. In Cambodia, the UN took an active role in government administration between the signing of the The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris Agreement) and the first elections. A Supreme National Council with representatives of the four factions within Cambodia was also created to help implement the peace. The international community recognized the Supreme National Council as a legitimate governing body of Cambodia,



Figure 6.4: Comparing change in political repression

but it did not govern in practice. The body served as a figurehead during the transition from civil war to establishing an elected government and in the interim, the UN was granted "all necessary powers to insure implementation of the Agreement."[6] These powers made the role of the UN integral to the peace process and ambiguous, in that it had not fulfilled such a role in its history. The four factions struggled to achieve their own agendas in the midst of working toward peace. In practice, between the signing of the agreement in 1991 and the elections held in 1993, Cambodia did not have a functioning government and the UN had trouble asserting the powers granted in the Paris Agreement. The mandate set out for the UN in the Paris Agreement included organizing and carrying out elections, supervising and controlling aspects of civil administration during the transition, monitoring a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces, fostering an environment conducive

[6]See The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, article 6, UN document A/46/608.

to the respect for human rights, encouraging economic and social rehabilitation, and repatriating 350,000 displaced Cambodians residing in camps on the Thai side of the Cambodian-Thai border (Suntharalingam 1997). The parameters set out for the mission allowed eighteen months to complete all tasks.

In El Salvador the identity of the government was firmly established, if challenged repeatedly by rebels. The two sides to the peace process in El Salvador signed six different agreements over a a two year period (LeVine 1997). Human rights assumed a central theme in the design of the agreements signed in relation to Salvadoran peace. The UN's role included only monitoring and facilitating implementation of the agreements signed by former belligerents. The objective of the agreements committed the signatories to ending the armed conflict through political means, promoting democratization of the country, guaranteeing respect for human rights, and reuniting Salvadoran society.[7] The final three agreements laid out plans for disarmament, integration of former rebels into society, rehabilitation, and respect for human rights. Specifically, the San Jose Agreement signed in 1990 committed both parties to respect the human rights of civilians.[8] The Mexico Agreement established a Truth Commission to investigate violence since 1980 in hopes of reconciling the people of El Salvador. The fourth agreement, the New York Agreement, agreed on a reduction in armed forces, the establishment of a new national police force, and reforms in land ownership.[9] The final agreement, the Chapultepec Agreement signed in January 1992, elaborated on the participation of the FMLN in politics, judicial reform, the electoral system, the establishment of the National Civil Police (PNC), economic and social changes, and stages of the ceasefire were coordinated with political agreements (Wilkins 1997*a*).[10]

In some ways, the role of the UN was designed by the agreements signed by the parties. In Cambodia, without a single governing body, the UN took on the position of civil administrator,

[7] See the Geneva Agreement, paragraph 1 April 1990, UN document A/45/706.
[8] See the San Jose Agreements, July 1990, UN document A/44/971.
[9] See the New York Agreements, September 1991, UN document A/46/502.
[10] See also the Chapultepec Agreement, January 1992, UN document A/46/843.

without the complete cooperation of all parties holding power within the country. In El Salvador the UN mission acceded to observe and verify compliance with the agreements, and to provide technical assistance in implementing rehabilitation and reform. UN interventions in Cambodia and El Salvador both comprised multidimensional missions, but the level of involvement and types of monitoring differed. The table below highlights significant differences in the two missions.

Table 6.4: UN Missions in El Salvador and Cambodia

Mission	Duration	Truth Commission	Election	Personnel	Cost
UNTAC	19 months	No	Yes	20250	1.6 billion
ONUSAL	46 months	Yes	Yes	1915	107.7 million

International Monitoring - Cambodia

The Paris Agreement gave the UN the right to implement a human rights education program, monitor human rights conditions in Cambodia, and to take corrective action when confronted with human rights abuses (Suntharalingam 1997). The Paris Agreement, however, did not elaborate on how to execute these tasks. The initial group responsible for implementing the human rights component of the mission included just ten people (Doyle 1995). UNTAC officials assumed that all aspects of the intervention would address human rights issues, but an understaffed human rights department, lack of a well-developed plan to monitor and enforce human rights, and a lack of cooperation by the signatories to the agreement made human rights improvements a problematic task.

Four Cambodian factions signed the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991and phase one of the agreed upon ceasefire began on October 23rd of the same year. UN intervention began with the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and deployed November 9, 1991. Responsible for assessing the situation in Cambodia before a full mission could be deployed, UNAMIC peacekeepers did not have the mandate, troops, or tools to deal with the factional violence that continued

despite the ceasefire. UNAMIC staff, specifically charged with connecting with the four factions in Cambodia and beginning to clear mine fields, met with resistance from the Khmer Rouge especially. Because the Paris Agreement did not specifically mention UNAMIC, the Khmer Rouge refused to acknowledge the authority of the mission (Brown 1992). The Khmer Rouge would prove uncooperative throughout most of the peace process. The personnel put forth by UNAMIC amounted to the equivalent of a traditional peacekeeping mission. Traditional missions were designed to verify ceasefires between two armies that have retreated behind their respective state boundaries. Such missions were not equipped to handle the complicated multidimensional peace process in post-civil-war Cambodia.

Violence after the arrival of the UN mission brought about both soldier and civilian deaths. The second phase of UN intervention, United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) transported a full multidimensional mission to Cambodia, mentioned in the Paris Agreement, yet the Khmer Rouge continued to violate the peace. The Khmer Rouge's disregard for the terms of the peace led to violations by other factions. And, as the UN sponsored election approached, the SOC, fearful of losing control of the majority of the country, committed several political assassinations (Doyle 1995). Thus, UNTAC failed to curb physical integrity violations by at least two factions.

Civil administration, the national election, human rights, civil police, rehabilitation, and information all fell under the civil mandate of UNTAC (Doyle 1997). The military mandate demanded monitoring and supervising the ceasefire, verifying the withdrawal of all foreign forces and that all foreign aid to any faction had ceased, and the disarmament, regroupment, cantonment, and demobilization of all factional forces (Lee Kim & Metrikas 1997). The major components of the mission concerned with human rights included a human rights education program, human rights monitoring, and human rights enforcement. The military component (MILCOM) and civilian police component (CIVPOL) were largely responsible for tasks associated with enforcement of human rights. UNTAC did not arrive in Cambodia until March 1992, and full deployment of troops and civil personnel did not occur until even later in the year. The full mandate would be difficult to

carry out in several years, but UNTAC was supposed to do it in 18 months. The short length of the mission accounted for some of the shortcomings of military and police reform, election reform, and coordinating human rights monitoring generally.

Military and Police Reform

Disarming violent factions provides a first step toward reducing the probability of violations of physical integrity. Carrying out violent acts proves more difficult without weapons, and disarming demonstrates the willingness a faction to work toward peace. Kim and Metrikas (1997) note that the destruction that took place in Cambodia was directly proportional to the availability of weapons to the factional armies. At the time the Paris Agreement was signed, the SOC had approximately 40,000 regular troops and 100,000 militia. The FUNCINPEC army held about 10,000 soldiers. The Khmer Rouge had a military force of approximately 30,000 in 1990, and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front had "disappearing army" (Doyle 1995). After securing a ceasefire, MILCOM's primary mandate entailed disarming the armies of the four factions in Cambodia.

MILCOM was comprised of 15,900 personnel, the largest UN deployment to that date. However, MILCOM did not fully deploy until August 1992, a full ten months after the signing of the Paris Agreement. The mission mandate called for demobilization by September 1992. Even with the largest military deployment in UN history, timing of the deployment delayed reaching MILCOM's objectives in the anticipated amount of time. Slow deployment hindered the effectiveness of the military component of UNTAC.

Beyond timing, the lack of cooperation by the Khmer Rouge impeded progress in the implementation of peace. The Khmer Rouge demanded that UNTAC, as a part of the Paris Agreement, should verify that all foreign (Vietnamese) troops had left Cambodia. While the agreement signified that UNTAC would certify that all foreign troops had left the country, no accord had been reached as to how UNTAC would demonstrate that all troops had left the country. The Khmer Rouge viewed all ethnic Vietnamese as foreign combatants, even those without ties to the Vietnamese government, making the efforts of UNTAC more difficult. The Khmer Rouge refused to

disarm, and, in fact, sought to enhance the size of the territory they controlled after the signing of the treaty (Lee Kim & Metrikas 1997). The Khmer Rouge's refusal to canton and disarm led to other factions that had begun to process to renege on their commitment to a reduction in forces.[11]

In the fall of 1992, with demobilization set aside, fighting between the two factions with the biggest armies, the SOC and the Khmer Rouge, increased. Violence against UNTAC personnel and their helicopters also increased. Civilians suffered from the uptick in violence. The Khmer Rouge army attacked villages with persons of Vietnamese descent, and the SOC carried out political assassinations against opponents they thought might challenge them in the upcoming elections. On December 28, 1992, the Khmer Rouge attacked a Vietnamese village and killed sixteen villagers. The SOC killed party workers in the FUNCINPEC, viewing this party as their strongest political rivals. UNTAC attributed 46 political assassinations to the SOC and 104 of 111 killings of ethnic Vietnamese to the Khmer Rouge. Seventy-six deaths remained unattributed.[12] Fighting amongst factions and killing civilians continued despite the presence of UNTAC.

MILCOM decreased the number of daily deaths and injuries in Cambodia through their mine clearance efforts. Before UNAMIC/UNTAC entered Cambodia an estimated 300 to 700 amputations by mines occurred each month. Cambodia had the largest percentage of disabled persons in the world with 30,000 amputees (Human Rights Watch 1991). UNTAC removed approximately 37,000 mines[13] and trained 2,339 Cambodians in mine removal techniques during its tenure. The success was moderate considering the number of mines that remained in the country when MILCOM pulled out of Cambodia, but more successful than the ceasefire and disarmament efforts.

UNTAC's civilian police unit, CIVPOL, was meant to complement the MILCOM mission. CIVPOL consisted of 3,600 personnel. The Paris Agreement stated that Cambodian police were to, "operate under UNTAC supervision or control, in order to insure that law and order are main-

[11]As of July 1992, 3 factions had cantoned 13,512 soldiers, and the KR had cantoned none. See UN document S/23613.

[12]See the Final Human Rights report, UNTAC, September 1993.

[13]Estimates of the number of mines in Cambodia before UNAMIC/UNTAC arrived vary somewhere between 6 and 10 million (Human Rights Watch 1991).

tained effectively and impartially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected." Cambodia had no national police. Instead, each faction had its own police force within the territory it controlled and the SOC was the only faction that had a force not associated with their military. The SOC also controlled eighty percent of Cambodian territory. Because the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate with UNTAC, and SOC controlled the majority of the territory in Cambodia, CIVPOL focused on the SOC police force. CIVPOL faced several obstacles to fulfilling the mandate enumerated to insure law, order, and respect for human rights.

Maintaining law and order and human rights and fundamental freedoms, first, requires a competent police force. Aware of the inadequacy and partisan nature of the Cambodian police, the UN intended to train all levels of local police to familiarize them with basic policing skills and the concepts of fundamental freedoms and human rights. The implementation of CIVPOL did not go as planned. UNTAC appointed a police commissioner after the date the mission should have deployed. That meant CIVPOL personnel arrived late, and full deployment did not occur until 16 months after the Paris Agreement was signed (Lee Kim & Metrikas 1997). Considering that UNTAC's mission was to last 18 months, the delay severely inhibited realization of the mandate. Few of the CIVPOL officers, once deployed, spoke English or French, the official languages of the mission, or any of the local languages. Under any circumstances, taking control of local police issues by foreign forces presents a difficult task. Communication problems, inadequate training, and late arrival made fulfilling CIVPOL's mandate likely insurmountable.

CIVPOL could not train police officers and had difficulty enforcing respect for human rights. Even a well-functioning police force cannot prosecute violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms without a functioning judiciary. The SOC lacked an independent judicial framework and a satisfactory prison system to hold prisoners. UNTAC and the Paris Agreement did not account for this problem in advance. In attempt to enforce human rights and secure law, CIVPOL was given the power to arrest. Because there was no functioning judicial system, those arrested for human rights violations were held without habeas corpus rights. This put the UN in the awkward

position of violating international human rights law while trying to enforce human rights.

Human rights reform

Trouble with monitoring, enforcing, and providing education regarding human rights became apparent early in the mission. The notion that all aspects of UNTAC would incorporate human rights elements when appropriate, and that ten persons could coordinate all aspects of observing human rights was quickly disabused. The number of human rights personnel increased to twenty-one, one coordinator for each region in the country, and the problem of enforcement was addressed with a special UN prosecutor (Doyle 1997).The prosecutor, in conjunction with granting CIVPOL the power of arrest, and creation of a UN prison temporarily helped with the enforcement of human rights. However, the lack of an impartial judiciary guaranteed that, once the UN mission left Cambodia, enforcing violations of human rights would not continue.

The human rights component garnered more success with their education program. Working through schools and universities, UNTAC personnel organized a campaign to teach Cambodians about basic human rights. It was instrumental in founding Cambodian human rights groups that gained 100,000 members.[14] They also left behind the UN Human Rights Center, responsible for monitoring the progress in Cambodia's democratization (Doyle 1997). Finally, it convinced the SNC to adopt all international human rights instruments and helped to reduce some of the worst abuses in Cambodian prisons.

International monitors had little success in human rights improvement in Cambodia. The short-term nature of the mission combined with the lack of judicial infrastructure made any gains in human rights respect unlikely. Avoiding direct mention of human rights and how to address them during the mission in the Paris Agreement, to placate the Khmer Rouge, made any definitive improvement in human rights less likely. Overall, in terms of physical integrity violations, UNTAC had more success in efforts at human rights awareness than monitoring and enforcement. the mission had slightly better results with political rights and civil liberties.

[14]See Human Rights Component, Final Report. Phnom Penh, September 1993.

Election reform

Doyle (1995) notes that none of the electoral success in Cambodia would have been possible without the aid of MILCOM. The failure of the ceasefire and demobilization obliged UNTAC to look toward election success as a way forward in the peace process. In the past the UN had monitored elections, but UNTAC was the first instance of its organizing and conducting national elections.[15] By the end of 1992, the UN realized its multifaceted mandate had been reduced to ensuring free and fair elections (Doyle 1997). UNTAC's election efforts succeeded where establishing a ceasefire failed. Elections were declared "free and fair", but the success was qualified.

The campaign period began in April 1992, and polling took place May 23 - May 28 of the same year. During the election campaign, the SOC tried to gain the advantage over other political parties by limiting their political rights. The SOC controlled all government media and refused access to government television and radio stations. The SOC also had command of all print shops and refused to print election materials for opposition parties (Findlay 1995). UNTAC interceded and negotiated access to the printing of posters for opposing political parties. In attempt to give voice to other political parties, the UN provided airtime on UNTAC radio. UNTAC became the most popular station in Cambodia. Though cheating and acts of violence permeated the campaign, an estimated 1500 political meetings and rallies took place without incident (UN 1993). The UN succeeded in the dissemination of information about the election.

The actual election also presented a mitigated success, despite the lack of participation and attempts at disruption by the Khmer Rouge, the inability to maintain a ceasefire, and a campaign riddled with violence and cheating. Because MILCOM turned its attention exclusively to establishing free and fair elections,[16] UNTAC had almost 16,000 troops on hand to guarantee the security of the polling process. MILCOM increased security measures in high risk areas, conducted daily security sector reviews for each district in the country, and MILCOM personnel were stationed at

[15] See The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, article 6, UN document A/46/608.

[16] See Operation Order no.2 for the Joint Military Component of UNTAC, issued December 9, 1992.

every polling place in the country (Lee Kim & Metrikas 1997). An estimated 90 percent of registered voters cast their ballots during the election period and the anticipated attacks by the Khmer Rouge never materialized (Findlay 1995). FUNCINPEC won a plurality of seats in parliament, 58 of 120. The SOC's political party, the Cambodian People's Party, came in second winning 51 seats. Together these two parties had won a majority of the parliamentary seats, with two smaller parties accounting for the remaining 11 seats. After the votes were cast, the elected government was tasked with creating a constitution and new government.

UNTAC helped with the post-election process, avoiding political maneuvers by FUNCINPEC and the SOC to take complete control of the government before a constitution could be established. Diplomatic pressure and negotiations by UNTAC got the majority parties to agree to share power through a co-prime minister position (Doyle 1997). Hun Sen, for the CPP, political wing of the SOC, and Norodom Ranariddh for FUNCINPEC. The framework for government, developed by the parliament, established a constitutional monarchy. The monarch was to be a figurehead, and elected officials to govern. UNTAC aided in opening the political space so that many groups contended for seats in parliament and engendered the potential for a liberal democracy in Cambodia. The UNTAC election component met with moderate success in securing political rights for Cambodians.

A coup that ousted first prime minster Norodom Ranariddh from power in 1997, just ahead of the 1998 election, marred the democratic transition in Cambodia. The coup resulted in seventy extrajudicial killings of mostly FUNCINPEC loyalists (Ear 2013). The CCP consolidated power as a result of the coup, and Hun Sen achieved the position of sole prime minister in 1998. Sen continues to serve as prime minister in Cambodia to date. Democratic elections did not ensure that the Cambodian government adopted liberal democratic principles.

International Monitoring - El Salvador

The United Nations played the role of observer, mediator and verifier during the peace process in El Salvador. Initially, the combatants invited the UN to observe negotiations between the parties. After several fits and starts UN representatives took on the official role of mediator. As talks progressed the UN agreed to verify compliance with the human rights agreement. The United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) arrived in El Salvador in 1991 to verify compliance with national and international human rights law. Beyond observing the behavior of former combatants, the UN mission's role included facilitating peace implementation through strengthening domestic institutions (Holiday & Stanley 1993). The UN committed personnel, provided financial assistance, and mediation during the negotiation and implementation of the peace accords.

The final agreement, or the Chapultepec Peace Accords, was signed by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN in December 31, 1991. The peace process produced six agreements that committed the government to reduce the size of and power of the military, create a new national civilian police force, transfer land to former combatants, reform the judicial and electoral systems. The agreement required the FMLN to demobilize and destroy its weaponry (Holiday & Stanley 1993). Cessation of fighting and a revamping of institutions in El Salvador was meant to bring about a lasting peace and improve the plight of Salvadorans.

The UN mission, ONUSAL,[17] originally tasked with verification of human rights, increased its mandate to verifying implementation of the agreement on the part of the government and the FMLN. The mission eventually incorporated a human rights, military, civilian police, and electoral components. The UN served as mediator and made public non-compliance by the government and the FMLN when mediation failed. The UN maintained a presence in El Salvador through 1998, though the mission was scaled back in April 1995 and again in May 1996. The UN played an important role in the negotiation of the peace and implementation of the accords.

[17]The ONUSAL mission officially withdrew from El Salvador in April 1995 and was replaced with a reduced mission, referred to as MINUSAL, and this mission was further reduced to comprise the United Nations Verification Office (UNOV) before its final withdrawal in June 1998.

Military and police reform

Prior the signing of the peace accords, the military controlled all internal security forces. Paramilitary groups, often referred to as death squads, mainly operated out of police forces and military intelligence units during the war (Call 2003). The peace accords demanded the creation of an entirely new civilian police force,called the National Civilian Police (PNC), and the dismantling of the military run police system that included the Treasury Police, National Guard, Customs Police, and National Police.[18] Though the PNC would have no connection to the military hierarchy, up to twenty percent of PNC forces could come from military organizations. An additional twenty percent of PNC police could come from the ranks of the FMLN, and the remaining sixty percent were required to be civilians with no former military or rebel affiliations. Additionally, to monitor police behavior, an Internal Inspector General for the PNC who reported directly to the to the Minister of Public Security and an Internal Control Unit to investigate police corruption was to be created. A Disciplinary Unit would deal with officers found guilty of any misconduct (Call 1997). Recruits had to pass an exam to enter the new National Public Security Academy for police training with special attention to respect for human rights.

ONUSAL contributed to the design of the PNC and helped to execute the transition of the national police and the reduction in size and scope of the military (Call 1997). The peace accords designated the UN to verify the establishment of the new police academy and police force. The UN police component of ONUSAL authorized as many as 631 international CIVPOL officers to observe and facilitate the transition from the National Police to the Civilian National Police. In practice a maximum of 314 international police deployed to El Salvador. The mandate of the accords gave international officers the task of facilitating a "smooth transition" from the old PN to the new PNC and to accompany . In practice, presence of ONUSAL gave national actors an objective third-party to turn to at times when interpretation of the accords and disagreements regarding

[18]See, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, The National Civilian Police (PNC), 1 April 1998, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a800e.html [accessed 4 August 2011]

implementation occurred. When violations of the accords took place, the UN mission was there to publicize the infractions and pressure violators to abide by the terms of the agreement.

Initially, the military resisted being cut out of the internal security matters. As the Treasury Police, National Guard, and National Police dismantled, the military refused to turn over facilities for use by the new police academy (Stanley & Loosle 1998). When the premises were finally relinquished, the buildings had been stripped of any and all items of value, increasing the upstart cost of the academy. The government and military also hindered the transition by enlisting several ineligible former military personnel into the police academy. They also specifically circumvented stipulations of the agreement by transferring the Narcotics Unit and Special Investigation Unit wholesale from the National Police to the new PNC. However, with pressure from the UN mission, members were eventually vetted individually resulting in some officers resigning en mass and others becoming members of the PNC (Call 1999). Thus averting violations of the agreements, but leaving the PNC without an experienced Narcotics Unit and without experienced Special Investigators. While the government and military stalled the transition, eventually the new PNC was created, generally according to the tenants of the peace agreement.

Military intelligence units and the three branches of the police represented the most repressive elements of the government (Stanley & Loosle 1998). The agreement sought to eliminate the culture of repression by placing the police under civilian control, limiting the number of ex-combatants allowed to serve as police officers, and setting up internal mechanisms to eliminate corruption. The terms of the agreement put ex-guerillas, ex-National Police officers, and former civilian police officers within the same branch of government. Senior officials ensured that partisan divisions were not reproduced by integrating those assigned to specific territorial delegations. Ex-military officers and ex-guerillas worked side by side without political incident and human rights violations by police dropped significantly. The composition of the force helped to eliminate tensions between former belligerents and reduce human rights violations, but the make-up of the PNC might also account for the initial ineffectiveness of the newly formed police force.

The success of implementing a new national police force under civilian control was undercut by the inability of the new institution to deftly handle a post-war increase in crime. Some of the institution's ineffectiveness can be attributed to the new composition of the PNC.The stipulation of the agreement required the new force to include twenty percent former rebels and sixty percent civilian members. By the terms of the agreement only twenty percent of the PNC could possess actual police experience and meant that eighty percent of the force had little to no experience (Alta 2008). Eliminating the National Guard and Treasury police abruptly cut the number of available security personnel from 14,000 to 6, 000 (Stanley & Loosle 1998). Overall, the number of police officers decreased and those left to handle the upsurge in crimes were largely neophytes.

Inadequate funding also affected the ability of the PNC to provide security to the public. As the PNC began policing more areas relative to the dismantling PN, they did not possess ample vehicles, radios, uniforms, or investigative equipment (Montgomery 1996). According to an officer who served with the first PNC deployed to the San Vicente area: "When we arrived there was great publicity and the gangs disappeared. But when they discovered there were no vehicles or arms, they reappeared" (Williams and Walter 1997, p. 240). The government failed to sufficiently support training, supply officers with necessary equipment, and compensate PNC officers as agreed. Salaries were lower than originally planned and that made recruiting qualified candidates more difficult while increasing the potential for corruption (Stanley & Loosle 1998). An upswing in crime and an ineffective police force drove the government to turn to the military to aid with internal security challenges.

The peace accords stipulated that the military should not participate in internal security mission except for in exceptional circumstance. The military required legislative approval of exceptional domestic circumstances. Despite the terms of the accords, President Cristiani called upon the military to guard highways and oversee coffee production in 1993 without the approval of the legislature. Joint criminal investigations between the PNC and the military where military officers outnumber police officers were also put into practice without congressional input. Cristiani sought

to deter and catch highway robbers, to protect El Salvador's primary export during its harvest, and to lower national crime rates. The public supported Crisitani's actions because domestic police forces failed to curb rising national crime rates on their own.

Despite some setbacks, by 1995 the military had complied with the general precepts of the agreement. The military that formerly controlled all forms of internal and external security disbanded their internal police forces, demobilized paramilitary civil defense patrols, and reduced their forces by half two years after the signing of the final agreement.[19] Intelligence units shifted from military control to the purview of the President and to be overseen by the legislature. However, training of intelligence officers remained in the hands of the military. These changes all proceeded even though military leaders still considered the FMLN illegitimate and rejected any civilian involvement in military affairs (Call 2003).

Tenets of the agreement regarding human rights also greatly impacted the military. Three major human rights stipulations affected the military in varying degrees. The agreement established a Human Rights Ombudsman for El Salvador, called for a Truth Commission to investigate prior human rights abuses, and created an Ad Hoc Commission to investigate military officers human rights behavior. A UN supervised Truth Commission produced a report outlining and assigning blame for the most egregious human rights violations. As over ninety percent of the violations were committed by the military and police units under military command, the military bore the brunt of responsibility for wartime abuse of human rights.[20] The Ad Hoc Committee looked at the military specifically.The results of the Ad Hoc Commission's investigation recommended that 103 military officers be dismissed based on human rights abuses. The military balked and argued that the commission, staffed by the UN, represented an attack on Salvadoran sovereignty and that the UN was in collusion with leftist Salvadoran political parties. In the end, however, the officers

[19]The military officially reduced their numbers from 63,170 in 1992 to 30,500 in 1994, but the number is thought be overstated due to thousands of 'ghost soldiers.' These soldiers were listed on the original rosters, but didi not actually exist. Instead, corrupt officers pocketed the salaries of the phantom soldiers (Williams & Walter 1997).

[20]From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador, Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador (San Salvador and New York: United Nations, 1992-1993), UN Publication S/25500.

retired or were dismissed.

The commissions' reports addressed human rights violations in the past. The Human Rights Ombudsman, within the newly created institution, the Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights, set out to address current human rights violations. The Ombudsman, chosen by the legislature, would receive complaints against anyone committing human rights violations. In order to eradicate the culture of repression from the military and prevent complaints to the Ombudsman, the military incorporated civilian input and human rights issues into its doctrine. The UNDP provided the office of the Ombudsman with the financial assistance and technical assistance it needed to function and ONUSAL aided the newly formed human rights Ombudsman through joint missions and coordinating regional offices with national offices (Dodson, Jackson & O'Shaughnessy 2001). The Human Rights Ombudsman helped to reduce repressive acts by the military in El Salvador.

Judicial reform

An ineffective judiciary can undermine the reform efforts within institutions of public security. The peace accords laid out police and military reforms in great detail, whereas judicial reforms, left to the last minute, tended toward the vague and were not emphasized immediately. Despite the importance of judicial reforms, they moved forward slowly compared to security reforms. Due to the ambiguous outline for judicial reform, efforts toward depoliticizing the Supreme Court, streamlining procedures and laws, and purging the bench of ineffective judges were sluggish (Call 1997). The war-time judiciary generally ignored human rights violations carried out by government soldiers and guerillas alike. Prior to 1991 not a single military officer has been convicted of a human rights violation (Call 2003). Improvement in respect for human rights hinged as much on prosecution of violations as preventing security forces from committing violations. The Salvadoran Truth Commission addressed the need for judicial reform in its final report.

The peace accords established a Truth Commission to examine human rights violations committed during the war.[21] The Salvadoran Truth Commission published its controversial report in

[21]For more on the Salvadoran Truth Commission see, for example, Pricilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths (New York

1993. The Commission named individuals it found responsible for the human rights violations it investigated, and put forth a set of recommendations it deemed necessary to prevent further human rights violations. Many of the recommendations affected the judiciary, and contrary to the vague recommendations of the peace accords, the recommendations of the Truth Commission for judicial reform were specific. The directives of the report met with resistance from the executive and judiciary branches of the government. Some of the greatest opposition to the recommendations came from the sitting Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court in El Salvador represented a powerful politically appointed body during and directly following the civil war. The legislature chose Supreme Court justices. Traditionally, justices were appointed for a short period of time and, though appointed by the legislature, the president would generally provide a list of names to the Assembly for Court appointments (Popkin 2000). Over time and under different constitutions the number of years served by Supreme Court judges had varied, but the political nature of the appointments remained constant. The responsibilities of the judiciary included judicial appointments, judicial review, reviewing laws prior to legislative voting, determining the constitutionality of Salvadoran laws, and licensing and supervising all lawyers and notaries (Popkin 2000). Efforts at redistributing some of the powers of the Supreme Court and changing the procedures for choosing justices proved difficult, but not impossible.

Because the judiciary was singled out as contributing to continued human rights violations in El Salvador, the Commission recommended dismissing all sitting Supreme Court justices. The government rejected this recommendation arguing that the Truth Commission had exceeded its mandate. Discussion of dismissing the Supreme Court had taken place during the negotiations and had been refused at that time. Even if the government found merit in the recommendation to dismiss the Supreme Court, it is unclear if it could have successfully purged the Court as justices of

2000), Mike Kaye, "The Role of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice, Reconciliation, and Democratisation: The Salvadoran and Honduran Cases," Journal of Latin American Studies 29 (1997) pp. 693-716.

the Court did not acknowledge the authority of the peace agreement over the judicial branch. The president of the Supreme Court, Mauricio Gutiérrez Castro, argued that the political agreement made by the executive branch of the government with the FMLN did not have any authority over an independent judiciary (Popkin 2000). The sitting Supreme Court (1989 - 1994) fought judicial reform efforts during its tenure.

The selection process for Supreme Court justices changed went into effect after the Gutiérrez Castro term. A two-thirds vote of the legislature was required for judicial confirmation. This reform helped to depoliticize the selection of justices by insuring that more than one political party had to agree to all Supreme Court appointments. The Court following Gutiérrez Castro was not so resistant to reform. Still, attempts to purge the judicial system of corrupt and inept judges and implementing new training procedures to produce effective judges encountered many challenges.

The creation of the National Judiciary Council (NCJ) aimed at taking on some of the administrative duties of the Supreme Court and aiding the independence and accountability of the Salvadoran judges. The peace accords established the NCJ and, therefore, the Supreme Court initially fought against sharing any responsibilities with the new institution. The Truth Commission recommended that, in order to redistribute some of the power of the Supreme Court, the NCJ should be tasked with appointing and removing lower court judges to and from office, also judges should be responsible for managing their own resources and be accountable to the NCJ (McCormick 1997). The job of reviewing the performance of judges was passed on to the NCJ, but the power to remove and appoint judges remained with the Supreme Court. The newly formed NCJ reviewed the performance of judges and recommended that forty-eight be removed from office. However, the Supreme Court deemed thirty-two of the judges fit for duty and called the actions of the NCJ unfounded. Power struggles and the lack of enforcement capabilities for the NCJ kept judicial reform moving at a slow pace.

Limited training reforms also did not help to speed up reforms as a purge of corrupt and inept judges could only be effective if they could be replaced with competent judges. According to

the peace accords, the responsibility of establishing a Judicial Training School and ensuring the professionalization of judges fell upon the National Judiciary Council. ONUSAL found that many sitting judges tended not to be well-trained and some showed little familiarity with the Salvadoran Constitution (Popkin 2000). Mandatory judicial training meant to increase professionalism and promote merit based promotion, but the NCJ was slow to assume responsibility for the Judicial Training School and professionalization came more slowly than desired.

To facilitate an effective judiciary, the government committed six percent of El Salvador's GDP to the judiciary. The increase represented a significant funding increase and judges received better compensation after the war. However, only the courts benefited from the increased resources. Parts of the judicial system that fell under the Public Ministry, like the Attorney General's office, saw an increase in responsibility with no corresponding increase in funding. Criminal justice reforms that put oversight of criminal investigations on the Attorney General neglected to account for the cost the responsibility. Even though implementing criminal justice reforms became a priority in 1996 no corresponding funding found its way to the prosecutorial office. Prior to the reforms, prosecutors did not play a large role in the judicial process. Prosecutors working in the office had limited training for the new tasks, and, in fact, many moved from the Attorney General's office to better paying jobs within the courts when the reforms became official policy (Popkin 2000).

Professional training of judges and training prosecutors in the Attorney General's office was led by the international community. USAID began judicial reforms during the 1980s and when national funding and political will of Salvadoran politicians fell short, USAID continued its efforts within the Judicial Training School. Furthermore, a training program established by the UN and UNDP trained prosecutors put in charge of criminal investigations under the new Criminal Procedure Code in 1996. International institutions could not fully professionalize Salvadoran judges or provide all the training and resources needed by prosecutors besot by new duties, but they facilitated some training in each instance. Monitoring judges revealed that professionalization of judges and lawyers would require better training at El Salvador's leading law schools (Popkin 2000). Ad-

ditionally, a relationship between the prosecutorial office and the the PNC lacked development. A 1995 ONUSAL study revealed that prosecutors rarely ventured out to crime scenes and PNC officers never informed prosecutors of their actions (ONUSAL, 13th Human Rights Report, paragraph 43).

Electoral reform

Election reform in El Salvador began during the civil war when the country eschewed the military led government for competitive elections. The 1984 presidency established a civilian president in accord with the newly written 1983 constitution. The Christian Democratic Party won the 1984 election and ARENA won the bid for the presidency in 1989. Though there was legitimate competition between existing political parties, the FMLN did not recognize the legitimacy of the elections and blocked voting in territories that they controlled. They argued that the government used sham elections as a tool to ensure continued financial support from the United States (Spence & Vickers 1994). During the war-time elections, few leftist parties participated and a large swath of the population, arguably, remained unrepresented by competing political parties.

Following the outline of the peace accords, the legislative assembly legalized the FMLN as a political party prior to the 1994 elections. The FMLN in turn recognized the authority of the 1983 constitution and the validity of the elections. Participation in the electoral process gave former belligerents a legal outlet to voice their opposition to the sitting government. The exact terms of election reform were not specified in the agreement. General instructions included setting the rules of the game through a Supreme Election Tribunal and creating another body to oversee the Supreme Election Tribunal to ensure the fairness of the political process.

The 1994 elections, termed the "election of the century" because the presidential, legislative and local elections happened to coincide, successfully integrated the FMLN as a political contender within national politics. Calderórn Sol, the candidate for the ARENA party, won the presidency. ARENA won thirty-nine seats in the legislative assembly to the FMLN's twenty-one, and the Christian Democratic party's eighteen seats. ARENA also won 206 mayorships out of 262, while

the FMLN won just sixteen (Johnstone 1997). Former combatants worked within the limits of the constitution and legitimately contested power in the 1994 elections. Despite this achievement, the voting process was marred by limited access to the polls on election day.

Of 2.7 million persons listed on the election rolls, the registration process left 350,000 of these eligible voters without registration cards on the day of the election.[22] Approximately 75,000 had their registration applications rejected. Often the rejection hinged on the fact that their birth certificates were not on file with the Election Tribunal. Some municipal records had been destroyed during the war, but a number of birth certificates were not turned over by mayors belonging to the ARENA party. As many as 25,000 voters went to the polls and were rejected because the number on their documents did not match the numbers on the rosters at the polling places (Lehoucq 1995). Some 400,000 potential voters were prevented from participating in the election. Another large portion of the electorate chose not to vote. In the first round of elections fifty-two percent of registered voters turned out, and only forty-six percent showed up for the run-off between the two presidential candidates (Johnstone 1997).

Voting irregularities tarnished the elections of 1994, but legal participation by the FLMN as political contenders marked an important event in El Salvador. Also important to El Salvador, and unlike the mission in Cambodia, the UN did not choose to exit immediately following the election. ONUSAL's mandate declared it should stay until all aspects of the agreements were implemented. The UN stayed to monitor institutional changes that would play a role in the improvement of human rights.

International aid

Multidimensional missions require more troops, equipment, commitment, and international aid than traditional peacekeeping missions. Cambodia's UNTAC represented the most costly mission the UN had ever embarked upon. In El Salvador, they spent less money, but got better human rights

[22] See UN document S/1994/304, 1994.



Figure 6.5: ODA five-years post-conflict by category

results, suggesting that the amount of money spent by international organizations does not always result in the most government respect for human rights.

In Chapter 4, I disaggregate Official Development Assistance from IOs into aid directed at specific sectors of society, including government institutions, social programs, and aid to bolster the economy. Looking at the graph below, aid distribution in Cambodia and El Salvador is not as different as would be expected, considering the difference in the cost of UNTAC and ONUSAL.

International aid can be used as a tool by international organizations to garner political legitimacy for the post-conflict government. Political legitimacy can promote the cooperation of a government's constituency. With cooperation through political legitimacy, a government will less likely turn to repression to establish political order. I now consider international aid in both Cambodia and El Salvador to investigate if international aid bears any responsibility for the relative

success in El Salvador as compared to Cambodia.

International aid - Cambodia

At the time of the peace accords, the economy in Cambodia suffered from funding cuts by the Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Union diminished and soon divested itself of providing aid to fellow communist countries, including Cambodia. As contributions dried up, the government lacked the money to pay government workers. The SOC, the faction that controlled eighty percent of Cambodian territory and most civil administration, solved this problem by printing money. The solution caused another problem, severe inflation. The salaries of government employees could not keep up with the rise of inflation and public sector funding diminished to almost nothing (Kato 1997). A government facing such dire financial circumstances might respond well to demands placed on the government in return for significant international financial aid. However, two large, related impediments faced the Cambodian government.

Cambodia did not have any unified government in the traditional sense. The Supreme National Council that included the four contending factions in Cambodia never intended to govern. Instead, it represented a transitional figurehead government that the international community would recognize, but would give UNTAC most administrative power. The lines, however, were not clearly demarcated, and the SNC were familiar with Cambodian civil administration, whereas UNTAC was not. The SNC retained considerable power, but could not work together as a unified government because each faction was jockeying for power. For example, FUNCINPEC vetoed a 75 million dollar aid package from the World Bank aimed at Cambodian rehabilitation because it feared such rehabilitation would garner political legitimacy for the SOC, because they controlled most of Cambodia. FUNCINPEC rejected the funds even though the aid would not arrive until after the election (Kato 1997).

Throughout UNTAC's presence in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge opted out of the peace process. In part, because the KR did not require international aid for funding. The Khmer Rouge were impervious to using funding as a reward for conforming with the terms of the Paris Agreement

and taking away funding as a punishment for noncompliance, because they had their own funding sources. The Khmer Rouge controlled territory along the Thai-Cambodian border. They sent troops into the gem mining district of western Battambang where they supervised mining and sold gems to Thai gem dealers. They additionally, took advantage of timber resources in the region to augment their finances (Chandler 1997). Attempts by the UN and other interested countries to convince Thai officials to close the border to the Khmer Rouge failed. They had alternate sources of capital and, therefore, did not look to the UN for international aid.

The rehabilitation component of UNTAC coordinated international aid and provided technical assistance for public administration issues related to the economy. The disorganization and delay in arrival of UNTAC's rehabilitation component frustrated the efficacy of international aid. Additionally, they lacked the staff and the mens to enforce cooperation by donors on projects(Kato 1997). According to the UN Secretary-General's report in May 1992, international aid would focus on food, security, housing, training, education, health, the transportation network, and the restoration of infrastructure and public utilities. Donors did not equally distribute aid to these programs or provide equal distribution of aid throughout the country.

The donors contributing to UNTAC offered 880 million dollars toward rehabilitation in June 1992. However, by February 1993, only 100 million dollars had been distributed. Some of the monies were held up due to technical difficulties, and it was over ambitious to try to distribute 880 million aid dollars in 18 months in Cambodia (Kato 1997). Part of the problem with distribution had to do with the programs donor chose to fund. Request for small grassroots funding was ignored. Larger national projects favored by donors, but slow to materialize, were funded.[23] Donors also preferred to fund repatriation, food, and resettlement over other forms of rehabilitation. Sixty-eight percent of funding was directed toward these categories as of February 1993, with much smaller amounts contributed to rehabilitate education, health and sanitation, community develop-

[23] See UNTAC, the Security General's Consolidated Appeal, May 1992.

ment, public administration, and public utilities.[24] International aid distribution proved slow, and emphasized repatriation of refugees over establishing and reestablishing social services.

UNTAC did not lack for the promise of international aid, but it did have a dearth of planning to effectively spend the aid, and an unrealistic time frame in which it was supposed to execute an expansive mandate with a plethora of financing. UNTAC underscores that throwing aid at post-conflict country will not necessarily produce the desired outcome. A more realistic time frame and incorporating a detailed peace plan with a plan for international aid distribution might have improved UNTAC's results. Of course, the lack of political will on the part of the Khmer Rouge and, to a lesser extent, the SOC cannot be discounted. Cambodia did not have a unified government for the UN to collude with on peace implementation initially, and once a unified government was in place, UNTAC retreated.

International aid - El Salvador

The mission in El Salvador, ONUSAL, claimed fewer international resources, but accomplished much more in terms of reduction in human rights abuses, especially physical integrity violations. The total cost of ONUSAL amounted to 107,003,650.23, whereas UNTAC spent 1.6 billion dollars in a shorter period of time. Clearly the amount of money spent did not account for the distinction in human rights abuses within these two countries. More likely, the direction of the funding and centrality of human rights to the mission played a crucial role in the reduction of human rights abuses in El Salvador.

The roots of the Salvadoran conflict can be traced, in part, to large economic disparities between the landowning class and laborers. The World Bank (2005) notes, "An underlying cause of the civil war in El Salvador stems from the inequitable social and economic structure developed during colonial rule which led to the creation of a coffee oligarchy that controlled most of the country's land and exploited the cheap wage labor of the rural population." The war did nothing to diminish the gap between the rich and the poor. Instead, real per capita income dropped 25

[24]See UNTAC report, Rehabilitation and Development in Cambodia.

percent, and 56 percent of the population fell below the poverty line during the 1980s. Damage to the infrastructure by the war was estimated between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars (del Castillo 2008). In addition to the high costs of executing a war, El Salvador's economy experienced a severe external shock in 1989 when international coffee prices dropped significantly with the breakdown of the International Coffee Agreement in June of the same year. Coffee accounted for a full fifty percent of El Salvador's exports. Inequality and a poor performing economy racked El Salvador as the war came to its conclusion.

The Human Development Index measures and ranks each country's education, health, and income performance every five years. In 1990, El Salvador ranked 110th out of 173 on the Human Development Index with a value of .52. Peace implementation improved the country's HDI score in the next decade. El Salvador's 1995 and 2000 HDI score improved to .58 and .62 respectively, indicating overall improvement in education, health and income.[25] Social programs and plans to alleviate poverty post-conflict helped to improve El Salvador's HDI score.

The post-conflict government in El Salvador sought to to reduce poverty through economic growth, temporary compensatory programs, and investment in human resources (Orr 2001). In striving to try to realize these goals and post-conflict reconstruction, the government created the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP). Established both to insure the funding of the peace process and to alleviate poverty, the NRP covered the years 1992 -1997. The main objectives of the NRP included reconstructing the country's damaged infrastructure, getting aid to those who had been most devastated by the conflict, and reestablishing economic activity in former conflict regions. More specific goals of the NRP set out to achieve the restoration of basic social services, rebuilding damaged infrastructure, reintegrating former combatants and reactivating growth cost more than the Salvadoran government could pay for on its own. Multilateral aid made significant contributions to the financing of the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) (del Castillo 2008).

[25]HDI provides an aggregate measure of progress along three dimensions, health, education and income. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, an increase in an HDI score indicates an improvement in general social and economic conditions.

Two additional programs, the Social Rescue Plan (SRP) and the Social investment Fund (SIF) were implemented in working toward achieving the goals of the NRP. First, the SRP provided subsidies and job creation programs to cushion any repercussions of macroeconomic stabilization programs. Second, the SIF addressed the needs of the extremely poor to help facilitate human development and national reconciliation. The program channel 119 million dollars to local projects to improve education, sewage and access to clean water, and health. Ninety-three percent of the funds for these projects came from the Inter-American Development Bank (Orr 2001).

In addition to institutional changes partly funded and monitored by the UN, and poverty alleviation programs, El Salvador's peace plan called for an "arms for land" program to help reintegrate former rebels into society. The plan provided former combatants with a way to make a living and a small stake in promoting El Salvador's wealth. Beneficiaries were also eligible to receive agricultural training, agricultural tools, household goods, academic instruction, credit for production purposes, housing and technical assistance.[26] As detailed as some aspects of the peace accords were contrived, the ambiguousness of the land reform understanding led to different expectations for both parties to the agreement (del Castillo 1997).

Former FMLN members, government armed forces, and squatters who occupied the land during the war were promised land for arms. The vagueness of the agreement in this area, however, created differing expectations from each of the parties. The accord failed to elaborate on how many would be eligible to receive land, how much land would be allotted to those who were eligible, and how much credit the government would contribute to the beneficiaries (Wilkins 1997*b*). Land recipients expected to receive more than land owners expected to concede. Funding from for the program provided by USAID and the EU also complicated the process. USAID provided funding for 15,000 beneficiaries, giving priority to former FLMN members. EU funding required that their contributions equally benefit former FLMN and armed forces combatants (del Castillo 1997). Thus, confounding who had priority in receiving available land.

[26]See the Chapultepec Agreement, UN document S/23504, December 31, 1991.

The Secretary General promoted a compromise, disliked but accepted by both parties. The number of eligible beneficiaries amounted to 47,500, with 7,500 from the FMLN, 15, 000 from the armed forces, and 25,000 landholders in the former conflict zone. Land was not distributed to 47,500 persons, but by 1995, eight-five percent of those in the running for distributions had received title to plots of land. The plots, on average, were quite small. Additionally, many of the titles had not been registered with the national registry, calling into question the legality of the distributions that were not registered.

The government of El Salvador did not successfully alleviate all poverty, provide land to all who expected to benefit from the "arms for land" program, or even provide enough land for recipients to achieve anything above subsistence living, or less. The government did, however, strive to accommodate the people of El Salvador and some real gains were made. Poverty rates declined from around 60 percent in 1990 to approximately 48 percent in 1995. Extreme poverty rates reduced from 28 to 18 percent over the same time period (Orr 2001). Through accommodation and endeavoring to reintegrate former combatants into society, the government garnered a degree of political legitimacy. As an analyst El Salvador notes, "The peace and stability that El Salvador has achieved today rest in part on the fact that political tension in the countryside has been reduced because the short-term demands of organized campesino grounds for land redistribution have been at least partially addressed" (Foley 1997). Taking steps toward accommodation and reintegration helped assert the legitimacy of the government and to decrease government reliance on repression to ensure political order.

Conclusion

Cambodia and El Salvador represent two of the first multidimensional peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. Both missions are considered successful missions. Both effectively avoided a return to civil war, but Cambodia did not curb human rights abuses in the years directly following the signing of the peace agreements. Three major differences contribute to the differences in

repression: conditions on the ground when the UN arrived, differences in international monitoring and international aid, and the length of the mission. The ability of the UN to influence each of these aspects of the mission varies. The quantitative analyses in chapters four and five do not completely concur with the cases of El Salvador and Cambodia, but neither do they entirely contradict each other.

The UN, of course, has a limited ability to alter the conditions on the ground when they arrive in country. The fact that the Khmer Rouge would not cooperate during the peace process in Cambodia had a huge impact on the limited improvement in Cambodia. As a spoiler to the peace process, the Khmer Rouge broke the terms of the ceasefire, made disarmament impossible for all other factions based on its unwillingness to do the same, targeted those of Vietnamese descent for extrajudicial killing, and generally hindered human rights and peace while UNTAC was in Cambodia. Due to the Khmer Rouge spoiling the peace, other armed factions, especially the SOC, continued to violate the physical integrity rights of the Cambodian people. The Khmer Rouge, in part, could act as a spoiler because it had an independent source of funding and did not rely on the promise of aid dollars from the UN. IOs have less leverage when their financial contributions do not hold any sway. Fighting between other factions also limited the amount and the effectiveness of international funding. Lack of commitment of the four factions to implementing the peace affected respect for human rights in Cambodia. In El Salvador, the FMLN and the government hit several stumbling blocks, but overall both parties wanted a peaceful ending to the war. Traditional donor countries urged the government to make peace with the FMLN through threat of withholding aid if they failed to participate in peace talks. The fact that El Salvador had a traditional unified government that maintained control of most of the country made peace implementation easier than it was in Cambodia.

The differences in El Salvador's government from Cambodia's government made possible the policies that promoted the alleviation of poverty and reintegration former combatants into Salvadoran society. Stability in El Salvador allowed the government to work with the UN and other

international organizations toward social policies that included the most needy. Land reforms and social programs helped the government to achieve a degree of political legitimacy with its political opponents. Cambodian factions proved too busy vying for power within the government to pay close attention to the abject poverty many Cambodians lived in. Also, in Cambodia, a unified government looking for political legitimacy did not exist. Factions sought support from those within their own territories. Providing social benefits to political opponents was difficult, in part, because violence continued to pervade the country. UNTAC's failure to disarm and demobilize soldiers provided a barrier to distribution of humanitarian aid and social programs in rural parts of the country. UNTAC's failure to consider the lack of functioning institutions in Cambodia also hindered human rights improvement in Cambodia.

In chapter four I hypothesized that international aid distributed to build government institutions would increase the risk of repression in post-conflict countries, because providing financial support to the military and police would increase their capacity to repress. The statistical results supported my hypothesis, but the situations in Cambodia and El Salvador suggest institution building was a necessary step for reducing repression. UNTACs failure in human rights monitoring and enforcement can be attributed, in part, to its lack of attention to building institutions in Cambodia. UNTAC's planning for the mission should have happened earlier and paid more attention to details, such as the need for a functioning judiciary. Without a police force to train, and a judiciary to prosecute infractions, UNTAC was unable to make significant progress in human rights enforcement. As a negotiator of the Paris Peace, the UN could have recommended greater consideration for building institutions. Additionally, hosting successful national elections did not provide the lasting liberal democratic institutions it had intended for the new Cambodian government. Ignoring past human rights abuses during the negotiations led to an ambiguousness that hindered the progress of peace implementation, where detailed changes to institutions, monitored by the UN accounted for some of the success in El Salvador.

El Salvador faced past human rights abuses directly. The El Salvador peace agreements cre-

ated a Truth Commission responsible for investigating political violence from 1980 through the present. The Commission was to make recommendations for better respect for human rights, and to reconcile Salvadoran society. The path to reconciliation for El Salvador directly contrasted with the choices made in Cambodia. The Paris Agreement did not refer to past political violence, except through an allusion to past policies and practices should not reoccur. The vague reference was in deference to the cooperation of the Khmer Rouge. Where El Salvador directly addressed abuses of the past, the Cambodian peace plan all but ignored past practices and remained ambiguous in most aspects of the agreement relating to human rights. Directly addressing past human rights abuses allowed the agreements made in El Salvador to address the institutions responsible for abuses, and for the UN to monitor the changes made according to the agreements. Lack of direction and lack of time contributed to the shortcomings of the UNTAC mission in Cambodia.

Other institutional commitments in El Salvador aided in the reduction in repression in El Salvador. Though proportional spending in Cambodia and El Salvador on rebuilding government institutions was not meaningfully distinctive, changes to the military and a new civilian police force, monitored by the UN, contributed to improved respect for human rights. Recommendations by the Truth Commission to remove those in charge of past human rights abuses from the military and police forces took steps toward reconciliation. Monitoring by the UN helped to keep reform on track, and made it hard for the government of El Salvador to circumvent the reforms that they had conceded to in negotiations with the FMLN. Institution building in conjunction with international monitoring, in El Salvador, contributed to a reduction in the risk of repression.

Finally, even though the UN spent more money on the mission in Cambodia, they demonstrated more commitment to ONUSAL through a mandate to extend until it was fulfilled. The extensive mandate of UNTAC did not coincide with the time limit of the mission. Giving the mission a mere eighteen months to disarm, regroup, canton and demobilize troops, verify withdrawal of foreign troops, carry out civil administration, hold national elections, train the police and military to monitor and enforce human rights, training of civil police in law enforcement, rehabilitation of

society, and rebuilding the infrastructure was quixotic at best. ONUSAL's mandate demanded the mission remain in El Salvador until all aspects of the peace plan were implemented. Optimally, a UN mission will be given enough time to fulfill its mandate. The UN mission to UNTAC was poorly planned and did not allow time for corrections. They held elections and called the mission a success, leaving behind a constitutional monarchy that would experience a coup in 1997 and not see a change in leadership to date. Cambodia has not returned to civil war. The negative peace holds, and this counts as an important achievement for the UN and Cambodia. However, no depth of change in physical integrity rights, political rights, and social and economic rights occurred as a result of UNTAC. A mission extending until the mandate was fulfilled might have exacted a positive peace.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Post-conflict leaders sometimes use repression to elicit political control, and sometimes seek to accommodate to attain political legitimacy. Even within countries with international interventions human rights outcomes are mixed. The mixed results call for dissecting and disaggregating pieces of the missions to determine what works well and what tends to fail to reduce the risk of repression in post-conflict peacekeeping situations. Existing quantitative research on the subject tends to consider a negative peace, leaving consideration of a positive peace to case studies. Extant case studies draw important lessons from particular cases, but cannot consider seventy-seven post-conflict cases at once to suggest general trends of success and failures across cases. My study has examined seventy-seven post-conflict episodes, in a twenty-five year period, to draw general conclusions about how international aid and international monitoring affect repression.

At the beginning of this dissertation, I set out to determine how international aid and international monitoring influence repression. I theorized that international aid to benefit social programs and rebuild infrastructure would positively influence human rights, and that government aid and funds to benefit the economy would have a negative effect on human rights. In terms of monitoring I expected the most committed UN missions to improve human rights in post-conflict situations, and those carried out by regional organization to negatively influence respect for human rights.

While I found that aid and monitoring can both positively and negatively influence respect for human rights in post-conflict countries, the investigation did not always reveal the relationships as I anticipated them.

International aid

As expected, aid has a distinct impact on human rights when distributed to different sectors of society. Beyond aid distinctions, there are apparent difference in the categories of human rights and international aid. Aid appropriated to improve government institutions diminishes respect for physical integrity rights, but has no influence on political rights and civil liberties, or social and economic rights. Aid allotted for social programs and infrastructure positively influence respect for both physical integrity and political rights, but fails to impact social and economic rights. International aid allocated to improve the economy, on the other hand, only affects social and economic rights. The models in chapter four did not detect a significant relationship between distributions of aid to influence the economy and physical integrity rights, or political rights.

Social aid

Chapter four shows a positive relationship between social aid and reduced risk of physical integrity violations and political rights and civil liberties. I maintain that political legitimacy facilitates the relationship. Of course, including political legitimacy as a variable would have enhanced my analysis, but political legitimacy is not easily quantified and the significant relationship between social aid and reduced risk of repression provides support for my argument. Provision of basic services from the government and a working infrastructure indicate a government with the resources to accommodate rather than repress. Governments prefer accommodation to repression and leaders with the resources to accommodate will choose it over repression to maintain political order. This simple argument, while supported by statistical modeling, becomes more complex when examined through the lens of case studies.

Both El Salvador and Cambodia received substantial funding to benefit social programs after

their civil wars. El Salvador was able to utilize funding more effectively than Cambodia, despite the cases displaying many similarities. El Salvador's overall cohesive government allowed for plans for social programs to alleviate poverty and the implementation of an "arms for land" program to benefit former combatants. The arms for land program was not completely successful and poverty in El Salvador was not eliminated. However, the accommodation of the government, with the help of international aid, helped to reintegrate former combatants into society. Because economic inequality was one of the root causes of the Salvadoran civil war, this sort of accommodation reduced the chances of conflict recurrence. Social aid did not have a similar effect in Cambodia.

Factional fighting in the Cambodian government prevented any practical planning for the use of social aid by the government. Cambodia lacked the political will to attempt to attain political legitimacy for the government because the factions were engrossed in trying to divide and garner support for their particular parties. Divisions were so stark that FUNCIPEC vetoed seventy-five million dollars in social aid because they were afraid it would bestow political legitimacy upon their rivals, the SOC. Cambodia also had difficulty absorbing large amounts of aid in the nineteen months UNTAC remained in Cambodia. Attempting to distribute such large sums of money in such a short period of time helped to limit the effectiveness of the aid. Donor preference for supporting national social programs with easy accountability meant that rural areas in need of international aid received little help. Continued fighting between factions meant continued violations of physical integrity rights, despite international efforts to provide social aid to promote general political legitimacy. Lack of a unified government and the short duration of the mission contributed to the mitigated failure.

Cambodia did experience some human rights successes. The UN's program to repatriate refugees was largely successful as were the efforts to create human rights groups in Cambodia. Thousands of refugees in camps along the Thai-Cambodia border were effectively repatriated. Upon leaving Cambodia, over 100,000 members had been recruited to human rights groups. It is important to note the success of Cambodia, because the UN often intervenes in countries before

hostilities have completely ended. The UN and regional organizations frequently intervene prior to a civil war having ended. Knowing where social aid can be directed effectively when no unified government exists is useful information. It might prove valuable in cases like Somalia where a UN and African Union mission are currently deployed, and no unified government exists. Future research might further focus on what types of social program can effectively reduce the risk of repression despite the discordant state of government.

Government aid

According to chapter four, international aid directed toward government institutions increases the risk of physical integrity violations in post-conflict countries. I reason that increasing the capacity of government institutions that have the power to coerce, the military and national police, can actually increase the risk of repression. The fact that other types of repression, political repression and social and economic repression are not negatively affected by government aid logically supports my reasoning. The relationship between government aid and political rights and civil liberties shows no significance, and the coefficients, if they were significant would actually decrease the risk of political repression. The signs of the coefficients may indicate that aid directed toward other government institutions can have a positive influence on human rights. Increasing military and police capacity is most likely to have its greatest impact on physical integrity rights over social and economic rights and political rights.

El Salvador showed a marked reduction in physical integrity violations five year post-conflict and the power of the military was substantially reduced. Prior to the end of the war, the Salvadoran military was responsible for all internal security. The peace accords demanded the creation of a new national police force. The new police force recruited former combatants from both sides. Former guerillas worked with former military officers. The new police force faced a number of difficulties, but a reduction in the capacity of the military seems to have contributed to better respect for physical integrity violations.

Roland (2004) promotes rebuilding institutions before holding elections in post-conflict so-

cieties because elections have the potential to rekindle conflict in unstable environments. This study considers aid allocated for government institutions generally and finds that this type of aid increases the risk of violations of physical integrity. Further research that disaggregates aid aimed at specific institutions could confirm that aid given to increase military capacity is responsible for the increased human rights violations, and if aid allocated for other institutions, like the judiciary, might actually improve human rights.

Economic aid

The only significant finding regarding aid indicated to recover the economy shows a significant association with social and economic rights. I measure social and economic rights using the Human Development Index. The Human Development Index measures life expectancy, education, and GDP. The index generates a score from 0 to 1 for each country in the data set. The finding that aid allocated to bolster the economy improves economic rights is not surprising, but it faces a stringent statistical test, in that, I controlled for GDP in all models, suggesting that the result is not just an artifact of a higher country GDP. International aid allocated for economic recovery improves education and life expectancy. Betterment of education and life expectancy can indicate less social and economic inequality.

The Human Development Index provided the best available data on social and economic indicators for the cases included in this study. A more appropriate indicator would have provided more information on social inequalities for my cases. Additionally, HDI measures are taken every five years and my unit of analysis is country-year, so changes may have taken place from year to year, but were not recorded in my dataset. Future research that considers the impact of international intervention on social and economic rights might create a better indicator of social and economic rights. However, social and economic conditions change slowly, and a study of five years post-conflict might not cover enough time to capture significant change. A longer-term study might also provide a better reflection of the relationship between international intervention and social and economic rights.

International monitoring

Peacekeeping missions each have their own individual mandate, but most give reference to some dimension of respect for human rights. Protection of civilians is a central conceit of UN peacekeeping missions, but just as some conflicts renew despite the UN's best efforts, some leaders continue to engage in repression despite the UN's best efforts. Examining different types of missions executed by different IOs demonstrates that some mission types more successfully limit repression than others. International monitors affect the use of repression in post-conflict countries. Enforcement peacekeeping reduces the risk of repression in post-conflict countries, and surprisingly, traditional peacekeeping missions can increase the risk of repression.

Observer and traditional missions

I anticipated observer and traditional missions would not influence the risk of repression because the mandates of these missions do not task peacekeepers with monitoring human rights. Observer missions met this expectation across all human rights indicators. They do not affect physical integrity rights, political rights and civil liberties, or social and economic rights. Limited troops and other personnel and limited mandates of observer missions keep these restricted missions from influencing the risk of repression in post-conflict environments.

Traditional peacekeeping, however, was found to increase the risk of physical integrity violations. Because the dataset only includes four traditional peacekeeping missions, these cases may all be anomalies. The unique circumstances of Cambodia, Angola, Haiti, and Lebanon may have propelled the increased risk of repression. Results based on four individual cases should not be generalized to predict outcomes for all traditional peacekeeping missions. It does, however, call for further investigation into the impact of traditional peacekeeping missions on physical integrity rights. It may be that traditional peacekeeping missions designed for monitoring interstate ceasefires are so ill equipped for the challenges of a complex post-civil-war situation, that these mission types actually do harm. Case studies of the three additional missions might also reveal why physical integrity violations increased in the presence of UN monitors.

In Cambodia the traditional mission, UNAMIC, was transitional and lasted only a few months, from October 1991 through March 1992. UNAMIC was an advanced mission not equipped to carry out the tasks set out in the Paris Agreement for UNTAC. UNAMIC's mandate only asked that the personnel set up communication with the members of the Supreme National Council, to begin mine clearance, and to assess the conditions in Cambodia for the future UNTAC mission. The only incentive UNAMIC could have provided for an increase in physical integrity violations was its lack of a mandate to be concerned with human rights violations. The factions of the SNC were focused on taking control of as much territory as possible before the UN multidimensional mission with administrative authority arrived. El Salvador also sent an advanced mission. Prior to the signing of a peace agreement, ONUSAL sent a delegation, but its mandate demanded it monitor human rights. El Salvador's mission helped to diminish human rights violations, while human rights violations during UNAMIC increased.

Multidimensional and enforcement missions

Multidimensional and enforcement missions generally include human rights monitoring. International military troops and civilian police monitor the disarming of combatants, train and monitor police activities, and oversee the reduction of military force. These tasks can help to reduce physical integrity violations. Peacekeepers also monitor election processes, such as voter registration, the establishment of political parties, and holding actual elections. These actions can have a decided effect on political rights. Peacekeepers also monitor peacebuilding projects that can affect social and economic rights. Because the activities of multidimensional missions and enforcement missions involve the monitoring of all aspects of human rights I expected these types of mission to improve government respect for human rights.

Curiously, multidimensional missions, after controlling for other environmental factors, do not significantly correlate with respect for human rights. Because enforcement missions do correlate with reduced physical integrity and political violations, the difference between these two mission types seems important. Enforcement missions tend to have more personnel, commit more funds,

and more time than multidimensional missions. It may be that multidimensional missions do not always commit enough resources and time to execute their extensive mandates. Enforcement missions proffer similarly extensive mandates, but commit the time and resources requisite to complete their tasks. Another distinction between multidimensional missions and enforcement missions includes the fact that enforcement missions do not necessarily have the consent for their involvement by all parties to conflict. This, however, would seem to be a definite disadvantage of enforcement missions. Political will plays a role in the success of any peacekeeping mission.

The two case studies explored in this dissertation both constitute multidimensional missions. However, even though all parties to the Cambodian peace agreement acceded to the terms, the Khmer Rouge defected from most of the peace process. The lack of cooperation by one party disassembled the basic elements of the peace process. International peacekeepers failed to disarm, demobilize, and canton combatants largely due to the refusal to cooperate by the Khmer Rouge. Because one group refused to disarm, so did the other factions. Lack of consent hindered peace and increased the risk of human rights violations. It is unlikely that proceeding despite lack of cooperation by all parties provides enforcement missions any advantage over multidimensional missions. Political will in El Salvador made improvements in government respect for human rights possible. In Cambodia the same lack of political will hindered human rights improvements.

Regional organizations

Chapter five also considered the differences between missions carried out by regional organizations and UN peacekeeping missions. I predicted that UN missions would have more success, in terms of garnering respect for human rights, than regional missions. The UN commands the authority to intervene internationally to maintain peace and security, has a better reputation for neutrality than regional organizations, and has access to more resources than regional organizations. Due to these advantages, I thought UN missions would achieve reduced risk of repression where regional organizations would fail.

I found the opposite to be true. Regional organization peacekeeping missions significantly

reduce the risk of physical integrity violations.UN missions show no significant correlation with physical integrity violations. The lack of correlation may partly be explained by the negative influence of traditional missions on respect for human rights. All coefficients for UN missions suggest a reduction in the risk of physical integrity violations, even when not significant, except for traditional missions. When UN missions are aggregated, traditional missions pull the coefficient in one direction, and enforcement missions pull in the other direction resulting in a null finding.

One possible explanation for the success of regional organizations is that they are more suited to the task of peacekeeping locally. Regional peacekeepers, who are more familiar with the conflict and more familiar to combatants, are more readily accepted by the local population than international monitors of the UN. Another feasible explanation has to do with my research design. I set it up expecting UN missions would positively influence human rights. I then disaggregated UN missions to consider the categories of missions that might be responsible for human rights improvements. I neglected to disassemble regional peacekeeping missions. It may be that the percentage of enforcement missions is much greater for regional missions than UN missions, and this could account for the correlation between regional missions and an improvement in respect for physical integrity violations and political rights.

In the future, I would like to more closely examine the differences between enforcement missions and all other peacekeeping missions. Despite expressions of concern with human rights in almost every mandate, the only UN missions that successfully reduce violations of human rights are enforcement missions. This may also be the case for regional missions. Further examination of the specific qualities of enforcement missions may provide insight into their positive influence on respect for human rights.

Ultimately, there is no one size fits all peacekeeping mission that will work in all post-conflict countries. This study sought to identify trends in international funding and international peacekeeping that influence human rights, so that positive influences might be replicated and negative influences avoided in the future. Pinpointing a positive association between funding social pro-

grams and a reduction in physical integrity violations and political rights violations represents a small advancement in human rights research. Finding that only enforcement missions consistently reduce the risk of physical integrity violations and political rights violations is actually a bit distressing. The efforts of all peacekeeping missions seek to protect human rights, at least indirectly. This study reveals that most mission types have no significant impact on human rights. Future research should closely consider why enforcement missions successfully diminish the risk of repression and no other mission type can report similar success.

Appendix A: Post-conflict Episodes

1981-2006

Afghanistan 1992
Afghanistan 1996
Afghanistan 2001
Angola 1991
Angola 1994
Angola 1999
Angola 2002
Azerbaijan 1994
Bangladesh 1997
Bosnia 1995
Burundi 1988
Cambodia 1991
Central African Republic 1997
Chad 1994
Chad 1997
Congo - Brazzaville 1997
Congo - Brazzaville 1999
Congo - Zaire 1997
Congo - Zaire 2001
Croatia 1995
Djibouti 1994
El Salvador 1992
Egypt 1997
Ethiopia 1988
Ethiopia 1991
Ethiopia 1991
Georgia 1992
Georgia 1994
Guatemala 1994
Guinea-Bissau 1999
Haiti 1995
India 1993
Indonesia 1991
Indonesia 2002
Iran 1984
Iraq 1993
Iraq 1996
Israel 1997
Ivory Coast 2004
Lebanon 1991
Liberia 1990
Liberia 1997
Liberia 2003
Mali 1995
Moldova 1992
Morocco 1991
Mozambique 1992
Myanmar 1988
Myanmar 1995
Namibia 1989
Nepal 2006
Nicaragua 1990
Nigeria 1985
Pakistan 1999
Papua New Guinea 1998
Peru 1996
Philippines 1992
Russia 1996
Rwanda 1993
Senegal 1999
Sierra Leone 1996
Sierra Leone 2001
Somalia 1991
South Africa 1994
Sri Lanka 1989
Sri Lanka 2002
Sudan 2002
Syria 1982
Tajikistan 1997
Thailand 1982
Turkey 1999
Uganda 1987
Uganda 1992
United Kingdom 1998
Yemen 1994
Yemen PR 1986
Yugoslavia 1999
Zimbabwe 1987

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