THE INTERNATIONAL IS PERSONAL: COLLECTIVE MEMORY, POSITIONALITY, AND NEGOTIATING THE U.S. BLOCKADE WITH CUBA

by

JAMIE L. PALMER

(Under the Direction of James J. Dowd)

ABSTRACT

This project explores the way the 50 year U.S. blockade of Cuba affects how people remember, experience, and view the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. Using a transnational intersectional approach, it explores differences in collective memory and the role positionality play in the way people imagine, remember, and experience tourism in Cuba. It questions how the relationship, an over half-century social closure between the two nations, is collectively remembered. Given the lessened restrictions in travel and exchange that created a surge in tourism through U.S. study abroad to Cuba and Cuban American travel (in addition to remittances) in 2014, it also questions how these two groups negotiate these collective memories and view the relationship. My research focuses on how this geo-political relationship is remembered in both nation-states (the U.S. and Cuba) through (a) content analysis of U.S. media from 1959- 2010 and (b) monuments, museums, and memorials in Cuba. Using a mixed methods approach that combines content analysis, ethnography, and interviewing, I demonstrate that Cuba is portrayed as "Frozen in time" in the U.S. media; however, in Cuba, U.S.-Cuban relations are portrayed through the lens of the "Politics of Revolution." The portrayals differ dramatically where one frames the relationship as merely a legacy of the Cold War (in the U.S.) versus the

dynamic and continuing control of U.S imperialism (in Cuba). Findings reveal that competition over collective memory add an additional “scape” for transnational relations: a memoryscape. The competition over memory is embedded in structures of tourism, economics, as well as informed by norms of race/ethnicity, nation, and gender.

INDEX WORDS: Intersectionality, Transnational Relations, Collective Memory, Race/Ethnicity, U.S.-Cuban Relations, U.S. blockade, Privilege, Power, Gender, and Tourism

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CHAPTER 1

TRANSNATIONAL INTERSECTIONALITY: US –CUBAN RELATIONS

The relationship between the U.S. and Cuba has been one characterized by longstanding political and economic inequality. From the fight for Cuban Independence, recognized as the Spanish American War, to the Cuban Revolution, and contemporary politics, the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba has and continues to be characterized by (neo)colonialism where the U.S. imposes foreign policy that has a disparate impact on Cuba. The U.S. embargo, commonly referred to as the U.S. blockade in Cuba, was imposed by the U.S. in 1962 and has remained a dynamically changing policy yet goes unrecognized by many Americans U.S. citizens. The half-century U.S. embargo of Cuba recently came under scrutiny, and interest in the forbidden island 90 miles off the Florida coast has been on the rise; furthermore, President Obama's move to lessen travel restrictions (in 2014) have led to a surging[1] interest in and access to the "forbidden island."

Given a 50-year blockade, the relationship between U.S. and Cuba makes a ripe case for the study of transnational intersectionality and collective memory. In this study, I argue that the U.S. embargo of Cuba has informed both interpersonal and macro inequalities between the two

[1] On August 31st 2016 Jet Blue Flight 387 became the first commercial flight to Cuba from the United States since 1961. One USA Today report by Alan Gomez notes that Flight 387 "was the first regularly scheduled commercial flight between the Cold War foes in 55 years" and that interest in Cuba is at all time high with "About 161,000 Americans – not including Cuban Americans visiting relatives – made the journey in 2015, a 77% jump from the previous year" (Gomez 2016).

nations and their peoples through relying on racialized and gendered collective memories of international relations. The U.S. embargo of Cuba, which prohibited nearly all exchange between peoples of the U.S. and Cuba, meant that Cuba and its people have become "frozen" in U.S. memory. The Revolution, Bay of Pigs Invasion, and Cuban Missile Crisis (the three major events leading up to the embargo) have become the central features in U.S. popular memory and media portrayals. The restrictions on travel and trade under the embargo along with political tensions with the Cuban government has meant that many Cuban Americans have also been left with fractured memories and connections to Cuba[2].

This project combines literature on collective memory and transnational intersectional feminist theory to examine how even under one of the most enduring and restrictive blockades in the world, people navigate the restrictions of the state, differing collective memories, and positionalities to illuminate the way transnational structures of power operate within and across the U.S. and Cuba. It questions how positionality and experience impact collective remembering. The project interrogates transnational intersectionality through analyzing how two groups, despite the blockade, have been able to navigate the international relationship. Through these two groups, namely U.S. students who study abroad in Cuba and Cuban Americans, I examine the ways in which national identity, race/ethnicity, and gender affect both the understanding of the Cuba-U.S. relationship and experiences navigating the blockade, as a social closure.

Transnational Intersectionality

[2] The restrictions imposed by both the U.S. and Cuba, as well as structural conditions tied to the impact of the blockade such as access to technology, is more systematically discussed in Chapter 4. All of these factors impact the fractured maintenance of connections to Cuba for Cuban Americans.

For the last 25 years, intersectionality theory has been one of the most well known theoretical frameworks for social scientific analyses across a number of disciplines (Collins 2000, Crenshaw 1991). Two works in particular, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw's "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity, and Violence Against Women of Color," and Patricia Hill Collin's Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, have guided the development of this theory. In fact, Hancock (2016) notes that these two scholars' work, which coined intersectionality in the fields of law and sociology, have been cited over 50,000 times (Hancock 2016). Despite all of the attention given to intersectionality as a theory and field of inquiry, there is one area, specifically transnational inequalities, that scholars largely agree has yet to be addressed and fully explored through an intersectional lens (Hancock 2016, Mahalingham 2009, Mahler 2015).

The argument that transnationalism has not yet been fully explored in intersectionality theories is not to say that intersectionality has not been applied internationally but rather that it is often fixed to a single nation-state. For instance, much feminist intersectional analysis has documented the ways that gender, race/ethnicity and nation-state are embedded in global inequality through capital, labor, legacies of colonialism and imperialism, and state power and polices (Dhruvarajan and Vickers 2002, Grewal and Kaplan 1994, McClintock 1997, Ong 1999, Richards 2004, Yuval-Davis 1997). However, many transnational feminist scholars argue that "this research would be greatly enhanced if it took a transnational intersectional approach, one addressing the various axes of differentiation *not just within but simultaneously across* national borders" (Mahler p.101, 2015). Purkayastha (2010) highlights this point stating that "since the structures of exclusion and inclusion vary by country, there may not be a fit of social locations across countries. Instead people may be relatively privileged – and actively seek privilege – in

one country to balance the marginalization in another… Just as we recognize the fragmentation and contradictions mark social locations within nations, we need to recognize it [the fragmentations and contradictions] at the transnational level" (Purkayastha p. 40, 2010). In fact, previous scholarship refers to the focus on differentiation within the nation as "domestic intersectionality" (Patil p.849, 2013), which limits intersectionality studies to within rather than across national borders and limits the unit of analysis to "*methodological nationalism*" (Wimmer 2002). Transnational feminist scholars find the lack of transnational intersectionality particularly important to expanding intersectionality theory given that "people's lives increasingly span national borders," where more than 232 million people live outside the nation in which they were born, according to the United Nations 2013 estimates (Mahler p.100, 2015). Transnational feminists argue that "for many good reasons, the paradigm of intersectionality has enjoyed tremendous popularity and influence. Yet, intersectionality has not exhausted its potential given that few scholars today apply it beyond national borders despite the fact that people and their families live [work and travel] transnationally" (Mahler p. 109, 2015).

The calls to recognize how intersectionality applies to transnational understandings of power and inequality and an interrogation of what units of analysis are necessary to employ this framework are not new (Enloe 2000, Kaplan 2002, McClintock 1997); however, little work has put forth a plan for how to examine various axes of power and inequality *within and across* national borders[3]. Intersectionality has led to questions regarding the number of conceptual axes

[33] Mahler et al in their 2015 article note that only 3 studies to date have employed a transnational intersectional framework that examined power structures within and across nation-state boundaries Mahler, Sarah J., Mayurakshi Chaudhuri, Vrushali Patil. 2015. "Scaling Intersectionality: Advancing Feminist Analysis of Transnational Families." *Sex Roles* 73:100-12.

of social differentiation necessary, questions of how to "do" intersectionality methodologically, and whose experiences should be "centered."

In this dissertation, I seek to contribute to our sociological understanding in four key areas. First, I will develop one possible example of how to address this theoretical and conceptual gap in intersectionality literature through examining the case of U.S. and Cuba, particularly through the experiences of people who break the nation-state boundaries and blockade through study-abroad and immigration. Second, I will extend intersectionality theories to address the current questions and debates on how to conceptually and methodologically employ transnational intersectionality. Third, my research will provide a case study of how work in feminist intersectionality may be productively used to inform the sociology of culture, specifically collective memory, and by so doing to develop the strengths of and connections between these two areas of study. Finally, I will show how intersectionality theory both illuminates transnational inequality *within and between* nations and helps us better understand the way privilege and power informs U.S. and Cuban relations on both macro and micro levels.

In this chapter, I detail how U.S. and Cuban relations make for an excellent case for exploring transnational intersectionality. I will first define what transnational intersectionality is and why looking at those who transgress or cross the U.S. and Cuban divide are important. I will then describe how the sociology of culture, particularly the research tradition stemming from Halbwachs' analysis of collective memory, may enhance transnational intersectionality and offer a more thorough and robust understanding of the way national and transnational structures of inequality are reinforced and undermined as well as the inconsistencies in policies and international relations. I conclude with a description of the remaining chapters of the dissertation

and how they address the question of how to employ transnational intersectionality epistemologically and in practice through detailing the case of U.S. and Cuban relations.

Intersectionality Theory: Central Tenets

The central tenets of intersectionality as a theory are to "render the invisible visible" by paying serious and significant attention to structural power and privilege (Hancock 57, 2016). It is a commitment to praxis where there is an intentional engagement with power and a commitment to engaging difference without reproducing homogeneity, or new/old stereotypes, and therefore, always requires an examination of standpoints, or the ways people (and cultural objects) are embedded simultaneously in several structures of inequality. While the original theory was created to explore the intersectional marginalization and resistance of women of color, particularly Black women in the United States (Collins 2000, Crenshaw 1991), some contemporary applications of intersectionality theory have come under scrutiny for erasing the significance of race and/or fetishizing difference. For instance, Hancock (2016) notes how "current global examinations of intersectionality problematically erase race or other elements of the US approach in ways that are contrary to intersectionality's aspirational social justice ideals" (35). Similarly, Choo and Ferree (2010) believe that "while the theory calls for critical consideration of normative cases as well as the excluded or marginalized, a methodological emphasis on inclusion sometimes fetishizes study of 'difference' without giving sufficient attention to its relation to unmarked categories, especially to how the more powerful are defined as normative standards" (133). For example, they point out that the focus on marginalized people of color mask the ways white privilege (as an unmarked category) is negotiated and operates across nation-state boundaries. Furthermore, May (2015) offers that the preoccupation with how

to "deal" with difference as a critique of intersectionality has erased the power and scope of the theory which "invites us to pry open and contest the asymmetries, enter the 'cracks'… and remember that the spaces between and alongside systems of power can also be sites of knowledge and resistance" (May p. 29, 2015).

When employing intersectionality as a theoretical framework to explore transnational level inequality these debates and critiques are even more important: Who do we include? Why? How can we be "intersectional" without reinforcing essentialized notions of difference or reinforcing invisibility and marginalization? All of these questions, and arguably more, are what have made intersectionality so important and yet the subject of persistent criticism as well. It may also be the reason why transnational intersectionality remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless, like Patil (2013), Hancock (2016), May (2015), and many others, I contend that intersectionality has just begun to demonstrate its potential for making sense of international relations and inequalities as well as offer and recognize aspirational social justice possibilities on a transnational level.

In order to explore the possibilities and limitations of transnational intersectional theory, I argue we must turn back to the original tenets of the framework where Collins (1980) outlines the importance of interrogating social systems. In this formulation, Collins refers to a "Matrix of Domination comprising cultural portrayals, or "controlling images," community (including imagined and symbolic boundaries), and standpoint (where experience and epistemology are informed by one's position within a Matrix of Domination). We must note that Collins' focus was on U.S. Black women in order to reveal the way race, gender, and class had and continues to inform the definition and portrayal of Black womanhood in the academy and U.S. culture. She employs self-evaluation and self-definitions of black women's politics and theoretical

contributions through art to reveal the structural boundaries and limitations that black women have faced to defining their own lives and communities. Her work on controlling images, as furthered by Melissa Harris-Perry, details the way collective (especially national) memory of black womanhood impacts black women's bodies and citizenship. This bridge between collective memory as national imaginings of the past and possibly simultaneously "controlling images" inform my exploration of bridging intersectionality and sociology of culture theories through an examination of collective memory and people's experiences with these texts and narratives of Cuba and U.S. - Cuban relations. Therefore in this dissertation, I examine what collective memory narratives about Cuba (Cuban and Cuban American people) are present in mainstream U.S. media as well as how these memories and narratives are portrayed in Cuba. Furthermore, I examine how collective memory is present in the narratives of Cuba and Cuban-American relations provided by American study abroad students during their time in Cuba.

Transnational Intersectionality and the Case of U.S. and Cuban Relations

Essential to transnational intersectionality theory is the way that boundaries are constructed, change, and undermined to reveal the way that unequal power and privilege operate in our social world. It is precisely in the "cracks," or boundaries to power, that Collins begins her inquiry, which defines "what difference" is central to explore in her theoretical questions[4]. Boundaries may be based on difference that are economic, political, cultural, and/or national (by the state) and may frequently be broken; however, transnational intersectionality theory, as

[4] Collins would also argue that it stems from her own standpoint within the Matrix of Domination as a black woman. Similar to Smith (2001) Collins argues that "lived experience" is an important epistemological standpoint that is connected to both materiality and requires an examination of one's own perspective as limited.

borrowed from Collins and Crenshaw, maintains a focus on inconsistencies in the way power operates and the material impact it has for peoples' lives. The U.S. and Cuban case is an optimal case for exploring transnational intersectionality for several reasons.

First, it has been characterized as one of the most restrictive economic, political, and social boundaries in the world for nearly half a century. While the estimated weight of the impact of the blockade on Cuba varies, as would be expected, depending on one's position on the policy, the United Nations, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, and the Cuban government all recognize that it has had a profound impact. For instance, the Cuban Foreign Minister stated to the United Nations that the economic embargo of Cuba by the United States works as an:

> "economic war waged by the United States against Cuba for more than four decades [and] had been the longest and cruellest in history; it was an 'act of genocide' and a flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The United States was pursuing plans to re-colonize Cuba, and further tightening restrictions. Those limitations encroached on family-related visits by Cuban residents in the United States and involved further restraints on academic, cultural, scientific, medical and sports exchanges with the United States" (Statement by Cuban Foreign Minister to the United Nations: November 8th, 2006).

While this statement was made by the Cuban Foreign Minister at the United Nations, it is important to point out that the United Nations General Assembly has approved a resolution condemning the U.S. Embargo every year since 1991 with 188 countries backing the resolution and only two – the United States and Israel – opposing. In addition, even the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations has acknowledged that the Embargo against Cuba has amounted to a loss of $1.126 trillion dollars. The U.S. Blockade of Cuba has unarguably had a large impact on the economic security of the Cuban government as well as the economic opportunities and standard of living for Cubans in Cuba.

Second, the relations between the U.S. and Cuba have been informed by historical legacies of colonialism where the U.S., specifically politically and economically, has been

interested in controlling (and suppressing) Cuban independence as a way to maintain systems of domination in the United States. For instance, Perez Jr. (2008) notes that "All that is American imperialism has been practiced in Cuba" (1). In addition, scholars note U.S. political interest in Cuba could be seen as early as the 19th Century, where possible annexation as a state was proposed as a means to uphold U.S. slavery[5]. Perez Jr.'s body of work, in addition to that of other scholars, demonstrates the way the Cuban Revolution was perceived as a threat to the U.S. racial, gender, and economic structure as well, especially in light of the social upheaval of the Civil Rights Movement occurring simultaneously in the United States (Nadel 2005, Pérez 2008b, Pérez-Stable 2011). Even though many scholars have noted the way unequal power relations have informed relations between the U.S. and Cuba historically (Eckstein 2003, Ferrer 1999, Pérez 2005, Spadoni 2010), Perez Jr. (2008), one of the most prominent and prolific scholars on U.S. and Cuban history has also noted the role played by collective imagining in perpetuating this problematic relationship:

> "Americans came to their knowledge of Cuba principally by way of representations entirely of their own creation, which is to suggest that the Cuba that Americans chose to engage was, in fact, a figment of their own imagination and a projection of their own needs. Americans rarely engaged the Cuban reality on its own terms or as a condition possessed of an internal logic, or Cubans as a people possessed of an interior history or as a nation possessed of an inner-directed destiny. It has always been thus between the United States and Cuba" (Pérez 2008b).

[5]Perez Jr. (2008) details the quotes and actions of Southern politicians in pursuing Cuba as a possible state for U.S. annexation so that "slave states" would have greater political control and influence in Congress to stop emancipation. In addition, U.S. politicians, in spite of political party, were concerned with Cuba, a predominately "black" colony becoming "another Haiti," or free black republic, so close to U.S. borders (40-41).

Therefore, Perez Jr.'s work paves the way to explore the links between collective memory studies and controlling images[6] in addition to how it may impact international relations in the case of U.S. and Cuban relations. He proposes that "to understand the North American use of metaphor [of Cuba] is to gain insight into the use of cultural models and social relationships in which the U.S. imperial project was conditioned" (18). To understand the way metaphor and imaginings of Cuba are employed is to investigate the "maintenance of systems of domination" (19). In employing an analysis "through the prism of metaphor," his work in many ways employs an "intersectionality-like thinking[7]" where he argues that in the 20th and beginnings of the 21st century Americans began planning a "post-Castro Cuba" which excluded the interests and views of any of the 11 million people on the island (274). The critical importance of this work is the clear evidence that no study of U.S. and Cuban relations can effectively account for contemporary political, economic, or inter-personal social relations without an engagement of collective memory.

Third, the U.S. imposition of an economic embargo against Cuba still stands, and it impacts Cuba's legitimacy and power as a nation in the world sphere. It illustrates unequal power relations of nations-states and has yet to be repealed. In fact, only Congress has the ability to lift the Embargo on Cuba, which continues to be unlikely (at least in the near future). Despite the

[6] Controlling images, one of the major tenets of intersectionality, are defined as a generalized ideology of domination based on interlocking systems of power designed to make oppression appear normal. Patricia Hill Collins (1990) in *Black Feminist Thought* lays out the power of "controlling images" in fully understanding the oppression of black women illustrating many key points two of which are: (1) that "even when the political and economic conditions that originally generated disappear, such images prove remarkably tenacious" (68); (2) that "[it] is a major instrument of power" often used to justify oppression (67).

[7] Hancock (2016) points out that there is work that is "intersectionality-like thinking" even if it may not directly employ a black feminist intersectional framework.

narrative of U.S. policy as "frozen" in the past, in practice U.S. policy towards Cuba is continuously altered. One of the aspects of the U.S. and Cuban relationship that is frequently overlooked is how it has changed over the last half century and is itself an example of inconsistencies. For example, even relatively recently under George W. Bush (2004), policy toward Cuba was restricted even further severely diminishing the already limited U.S. travel to Cuba for education as well as Cuban American travel to the island and remittances (money sent to family and friends in Cuba). Due to the struggling agricultural industry in the United States, however, Bush's policy created a loophole in the blockade allowing agricultural sales to Cuba which made the United States, Cuba's fifth largest trading partner. This is in spite of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, also known as the Torricelli Act, that tightened the embargo in several ways, including a ban on subsidiaries of American companies located in other countries from doing business with Cuba; the prevention of vessels that had gone to Cuba in the last 180 days from entering U.S. ports; and restriction of U.S. aid and free trade deals from any country providing aid to Cuba (Wylie 2005). Therefore, U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba has and continues to be a dynamic, rather than stagnant, process centered on interest in control over Cuba.

There are two things scholars agree on when it comes to U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba: (1) It cannot be understood without recognizing the relationship between these two nations even when they were "mere colonial holdings" (Wylie 2005); and (2) that the "self images and perceptions" of domestic politics in the U.S. have fundamentally informed the way Cuba is understood, perceived, and experienced (Pérez 2008b, Wylie 2005). Even the recent changes under President Barack Obama, which have chipped away at the restrictions allowing greater travel and trade between the U.S. and Cuba, have not fundamentally changed this relationship.

While President Obama broke the barrier to visit Cuba in March 2016, being the first of any sitting President in over eighty-five years to do so, it is still through an interest of "promoting democracy abroad" that is rooted in this colonial legacy.

While travel and trade have risen in the last year since the changes in restrictions so too have the fines. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the United States Council on Foreign Relations business between the U.S. and Cuba is up 30% since 2014, remittances have doubled to an estimated 1.4 billion dollars in 2015, and American tourism has nearly doubled to 150,000 people in 2015; however, since the change in policy took effect in December 2014, the United States Department of Treasury has fined companies an estimated $5.2 million for violating the embargo. Furthermore, given that President Trump has promised to undo any policy and/or executive order enacted by President Obama without the support of Congress, future relations between the U.S. and Cuba are ripe with uncertainty. In fact, even though President Trump has not yet fully rolled back Obama's loosened restrictions he has promised to "reinstate restrictions on Americans traveling to Cuba…but will not break diplomatic relations" and leaves in place the investments made by U.S. businesses including direct flights, cruise ship routes, and hotel ventures[8] (Barria 2017).

Finally, in spite of the incredible restrictions imposed on travel, trade, and maintenance of social relations between the U.S. and Cuba under the U.S. Blockade, people have and continue to negotiate this socio-political boundary. In fact, one of the main loopholes of the U.S. blockade of Cuba is that it has created exceptions for U.S. citizens' ability to travel to Cuba for religious and

[8] See Council on Foreign Relations U.S. - Cuban relations Timeline for Updated Changes

academic purposes[9]. In addition, the U.S. (until January 12th 2017 when President Obama ended this policy by executive order) had one of the most unique immigration policies for Cubans who arrive in the United States[10]; however, the ability of Cuban Americans to visit Cuba or send money (otherwise referred to as remittances) has varied over the course of history of the U.S. blockade and has also been informed by restrictions from the Cuban state[11] (Eckstein 2009). The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act has given Cubans a unique privilege in comparison to other immigrants, particularly other Latin American and Caribbean immigrants currently targeted by "illegal" immigration policies in the United States. This policy, more commonly referred to as the "wet foot, dry foot policy," allows Cubans who arrive in the United States (and are not intercepted at sea) a legal pathway to residency and citizenship after one year (Pérez-Stable 2011). Interestingly, Cubans are the third largest Latino group in the United States, behind people of Mexican and Puerto Rican decent and make up over an estimated 2 million people, in the United States, with over 57% being "foreign born" (Krogstad 2017)

[9] As previously noted the accessibility of utilizing these programs for travel and exchange between U.S. citizens to Cuba has varied over the last 50 years. For instance, the recommendations imposed by President George W. Bush in 2004 had a drastic impact on the viability of U.S. student travel to Cuba, resulting in a 92% decrease in the number of U.S. students studying in Cuba. In fact from 2004 – 2010, fewer than 300 students per year traveled to Cuba under the academic provision (Rosenberg 2015).

[10] This was so until President Obama's January 2017 announcement to end the Cuban Immigration Act as one of his last acts as President of the United States.

[11] The Cuban government barred Cuban exiles from returning to visit Cuba until the fall of the Soviet Union in which the Cuban state re-envisioned the Cuban diaspora as a means to obtain much needed funds through remittances and tourism (Eckstein 2009). Cuban born U.S. citizens still must travel to Cuba using a Cuban passport and are treated as Cuban citizens (see US Government Travel Requirements 2018).

While this is only a small sample of the many reasons why U.S. Cuban relations are an important case, the reasons listed above are particularly relevant for a transnational intersectional analysis. Remembering that the goal of transnational intersectional theory is to "bring to the center" recognition of power between and among (or within) nations in order to examine how structures of power and inequality are reinforced and/or challenged; furthermore, it also assesses how the status of individuals (based on their standpoint) may shift between these nations. The relationship between the U.S. and Cuba, and those that navigate both nations, make it an important case for study. As Chávez (2016) notes in Border Lives, boundaries themselves are sites for interrogating power relations and state power through recognizing how immigration policy, enforcement, the allocation of passports and travel, all shape the movement of people and their lives even if unequally; furthermore, the implementation of these policies and privileges foster "what sociologist Max Weber terms 'social closure,' or the exclusive access to resources based on elements of social status such as race, social origin, residence, [and gender]" (Chavez p. 5, 2016). If intersectionality, especially intersectionality at the transnational level is a study of "asymmetries…[to] enter the 'cracks... [and examine] the spaces between or alongside systems of power [as well as acknowledge that those] can also be sites of knowledge and resistance, then the transgression of national boundaries may be key to examining what Patil calls "scaling intersectionality" (Patil p.103, 2013). "Scaling intersectionality" according to Patil (2013) is to incorporate multiple scales of analysis concurrently from the local to the national (103).

Nevertheless, a focus on "scaling transnational intersectionality" may require an analysis of the personal to account for the ways people are embedded in both structural and cultural systems of inequality (including social statuses – race/ethnicity, gender, and citizenship status – and also families, institutions, and nation-states) (Patil 2013). Enloe (1990) illustrates the

importance of thinking about the international and national through the "personal" rather than macro level of the nation-state through stating:

> "To make sense of international politics we also have to read power backwards and forwards. Power relations between countries and their governments involve more than gunboat maneuvers and diplomatic telegrams. Read forward, 'the personal is international' insofar as ideas about what it means to be a 'respectable' woman or an 'honorable' man have been shaped by colonizing policies, trading strategies and military doctrines…We persist, none the less, in discussing personal power relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states…The implications of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief when one reads 'the personal is international' the other way around: the international is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments to ally with each other, compete with and wage war against each other… [it] implies that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs" (Enloe p. 196, 2007).

"The personal" is an important site for revealing the way nation and national ideologies frame understandings of our world, because as McClintock (1997) highlights, the international colonial historical inequities have produced a "constellation of processes" that inform imbalances of power where "nations are not simply phantasmagoria of the mind but historical practices through which social difference is both invented and performed" (McClintock 1997:335). In this sense, social difference is multilayered as intersectional scholars argue. It is a recognition that national character develops as a response to unavoidable contacts, interdependencies, and power struggles as well as the "through the production of a common foe[12]" (Featherstone 1996:56). That national discourse may reveal "a set of more or less coherent images and memories which deal with the crucial questions of the origins, difference, and distinctiveness of a people… through which mobilization of the population through the idea

[12] Featherstone argues that scholars focusing only on bilateral relations are missing the more telling relationships which reveal national character (57-58).

of distinctiveness of the nation and difference from its neighbors" in part relies on, or intersects with[13], normative discourses of race and gender (Featherstone 1996:55).

Arguably this "constellation of processes," or the argument that "no social category exists in privileged isolation [but rather] each comes into being in social relation to other categories, if in uneven and contradictory ways" is best captured through an analysis at the micro level, where people's lived experiences and intersectional social positions may better reveal these contradictions (McClintock 1997). The micro level also requires an acknowledgement that people can and do break national *boundaries* in their lived experience and as Patil (2013) notes intersectional studies have often not paid close attention to this as a site of analysis. It is particularly the ways in which the boundaries of nationhood are maintained and broken that allow for greater interrogation and require greater conceptual clarity of the intersections between race, nation, ethnicity, and gender as well as how the political, cultural, and economic structures operate.

From Transnational Intersectionality and 'the Personal' to Sociology of Culture and Memory

In order to investigate the way social difference is employed in international relations, especially those informed by "social closure," there must be critical recognition of the role of culture, particularly national culture as constructed through the media, monuments, and memory. First, the media is one of the means by which people learn the cultural, political, economic, and "ethnic" boundaries of the nation (Hechter 1987). Anderson argues that "the members of even

[13] "Intersects with" aims to recognize "intersectionality" borrowing from Hill Collins (1998) article "It's all in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation" where Hill Collins reveal that social difference is not only mutually constituting but impacts people's lived experience and opportunities.

the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" and that this image of "communion" is produced through mass media (Anderson 1997:59). Anderson clearly lays out that "the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of the human language [that] created the possibility for a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation (Anderson 1997:67). Scholars mark print capitalism as having been necessary for constructions of nationhood in part not only for its systematic encoding of a unifying language, cultural cues, and cultural norms and values but also for the availability of widespread consumption print capitalism provides (Anderson 1991, Featherstone 1996, Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 2003).

In other words, that people across a vast space who might otherwise not see themselves in common with one another are now able to receive these same images and narratives. Frosh and Wolfsfeld articulate that these media representations provide individuals with a version of what their societies look like as a whole, "imparting a seemingly natural sense of how society 'is' and how one is located within it…[and that] These portraits lead to 'narrative accrual' in which the "flagging or reminding of nationhood…[becomes] routine and unnoticed (Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007:107). In fact, Frosh and Wolfsfeld's empirical project captures how nations may be represented through overt symbols or through assembly of their constituent parts, or "components of the nation's civil society as a kind of aggregation of social sub units (Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007:108). To clarify, representations of nations rely on, or simultaneously tell, stories of the norms and proper behavior around race, class, gender, sexuality, and family (Collins 2001, Lorde 1997, McClintock 1997). It provides a kind of or rite "in order to ensure the

reproduction of the totemic species [where]one can turn equally to offerings, practical initiatives, or commemorative representations" (Durkheim 1995).

On the other hand, mass media also reveal our national "foes." Herman and Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media articulate the profound influence of the mass media through in part through illustrating how it plays a large role in "popular governments," in particular that the media is able to specifically portray problems to the nation as a nation. The media reports on that "status" of nations and uses national discourse and portrayals of "other" nations to help "mobilize the populace against an enemy" (Herman and Chomsky 2002:29). As an example, Herman and Chomsky illustrate the importance and utility of anticommunist propaganda in the United States mass media where "this [national] ideology helps mobilize the populace against an enemy… [because] the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with communist states and radicalism" (Herman and Chomsky 2002:29). They argue that "propaganda themes quickly become established as true even without real evidence" and that this national "propaganda" may be part of the way not only national discourse and international conflicts are "invented and performed" (34). In fact, according to Herman and Chomsky (2002), "the media not only suspend critical judgment and investigative zeal, they compete to find ways to put the newly established truth in a supportive light. Themes and facts- even careful and well documented analyses- that are incompatible with the now institutionalized theme are suppressed or ignored. If the theme collapses of its own burdens of fabrications, the mass media will quickly fold their tents and move on to another topic" (34). As such the work by Herman and Chomsky (1988) also reveal evidence that news stories about "worthy and unworthy victims (or enemy and friendly [nations]) to differ in quality." In portrayals of national "others," or as they

coin “enemy states,” “refugees and other dissident sources” are used and there is “great investigatory zeal in the search for enemy villainy and the responsibility of high officials for abuses in enemy states, but diminished enterprise in examining such matters in connection with one’s own and friendly states [and nations]” (34-5).

There exists a considerable volume of media scholarship that links the relationships between the mass media as the major source for, on the one hand, the construction and understanding of national discourses and, on the other hand, the construction and maintenance of national “friends and enemies. Arguments that the mass media are critical due to widespread dissemination, means that the mass media are one major means for uncovering discourses about national “others,” also referred to as “foes” or “enemies.” Therefore, in order to adequately address the theoretical question of how social differences of nation, race, gender, & ethnicity are employed in narratives/ discourses of national character, it is necessary that we undertake an investigation of mass media portrayals of a national “foe” that at minimum recognize the way social difference may works as boundaries between nations.

Scholars have critiqued ideas around the pervasiveness of media portrayals through opening up research that highlights the importance of cultural context and agency around both the production and reception of cultural texts. The empirical and theoretical work of Griswold (1987) and Swidler (1986) require scholars to push past “reflection theory,” or the argument that these cultural texts reflect society and account for how these texts are made as well as how people understand or resist these portrayals and meanings (Corse 1995, Griswold 1981, Griswold 1987, Swidler 1986). This approach to deconstructing media texts is necessary for both recognizing the myths within discourses of nationhood and recognizing the invisibility of some groups as well. As such, media analyses that take into account “intended meanings” are

important to understanding the limitations of cultural narratives. These analyses are only half of the story, because as people are grounded in their social, political, and economic positions in the intersecting global and national realities, we inevitably respond to, understand, or relate to these media discourses (on nation) in similar and different ways.

Nevertheless, media is not the only form of national culture; in fact, collective memory as an area of study has emerged as a critical tool for understanding national and global connectedness. Collective memory studies articulate the importance of cultural sites, practices, and traditions particularly in understanding transnational relationships. For example, Philips and Reyes (2011) argue that "the expansion of transnational networks does not, it is important to stress here, mean the end of the nation-state or of national cultures. Instead, the process of global encounters cause us to rethink both national and local identities and cultures" (8). They point out that the conflicts are not erased by confronting different national cultures but rather they are more clearly articulated and sometimes altered. One example is the hybrid identity of ethnic groups where the transnational relations and cultures are not dislocated but increasing hybrid and transnational. Recent work has borrowed from Arjun Appadurai to articulate the term "global memoryscape" as a framework for analyzing the "complex and vibrant plane upon which memories emerge, are contested, transform, encounter other memories, mutate, and multiply" (14). They encourage a topography of the past for how communities and not just individuals remember the past. As well as a rigorous analysis of how international visitors may challenge the intended meanings of national sites and monuments (even if they are in part the intended audience for such sites).

Due to the unique context of U.S. and Cuban relations as near "social closure," this project is attentive to memory as articulated through U.S. media, Cuban monuments, and the

accounts of immigration by Cuban Americans. It recognizes memory as another site where the international and personal merge. Furthermore, in this project I propose that bridging the fields of intersectionality and memory studies helps to address respective debates and limitations of each. While debates and strengths of intersectionality have been briefly highlighted above[14], collective memory as a field of inquiry has raised the question of whether group memories are better conceptualized as "collective" or "collected"(Olick 1999). While the debate is extensive one of its central features centers on how to deal with competing accounts and "social difference." In contrast, I argue that "memory" may be an extension but also a counter point for self-definition and community. An analysis of the collective memory of social groups may illuminate how "controlling images" operate intersectionally at the international level, are resisted by people at particular positionalities, and also may inform shifts in popular opinion and even policy.

As an example we might consider President Barack Obama's March 2016 visit to Cuba (the first of any sitting president in over eighty five years). During that visit, President Obama alluded to the symbolic and historical memory that he shares with other African American men, articulating the ways his standpoint informs his memory of U.S. and Cuban relations:

> "Havana is only 90 miles from Florida, but to get here we had to travel a great distance -- over barriers of history and ideology; barriers of pain and separation. The blue waters beneath Air Force One once carried American battleships to this island -- to liberate, but also to exert control over Cuba. Those waters also carried generations of Cuban revolutionaries to the United States, where they built support for their cause. And that short distance has been crossed by hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles -- on planes and makeshift rafts -- who

[14] Given that intersectionality is one of the most prolific fields of inquiry, this is in no way representative of all the debates or issues in the field. For more thorough accounts of debates around intersectionality see Davis, Kathy. 2008. "Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Theory Successful." *Feminist Theory* 9:67 - 85.

> came to America in pursuit of freedom and opportunity, sometimes leaving behind everything they owned and every person that they loved.
>
> *Like so many people in both of our countries, my lifetime has spanned a time of isolation between us. The Cuban Revolution took place the same year that my father came to the United States from Kenya. The Bay of Pigs took place the year that I was born* (emphasis my own). The next year, the entire world held its breath, watching our two countries, as humanity came as close as we ever have to the horror of nuclear war. As the decades rolled by, our governments settled into a seemingly endless confrontation, fighting battles through proxies. In a world that remade itself time and again, one constant was the conflict between the United States and Cuba.
>
> I want to be clear: The differences between our governments over these many years are real and they are important. I'm sure President Castro would say the same thing -- I know, because I've heard him address those differences at length. But before I discuss those issues, we also need to recognize how much we share. Because in many ways, the United States and Cuba are like two brothers who've been estranged for many years, even as we share the same blood.
>
> *We both live in a new world, colonized by Europeans. Cuba, like the United States, was built in part by slaves brought here from Africa. Like the United States, the Cuban people can trace their heritage to both slaves and slave-owners (emphasis my own).* We've welcomed both immigrants who came a great distance to start new lives in the Americas.

What President Obama's speech highlights is how transnational relations of power inform histories between and across the United States, but what it also highlights is the role memory (particularly national memory) plays in the articulation of international relations. In fact, further into this landmark speech, he addresses the question of "why now?" The question is one that as a researcher I have also encountered. Despite the fact that the Embargo, also known in Cuba and by Cuban Americans as the Blockade - or "el bloqueo," may be the longest running Embargo in modern history, it had become a sort of "tradition" in U.S. memory. President Obama continues:

> "Many people on both sides of this debate have asked: Why now? Why now?
>
> There is one simple answer: What the United States was doing was not working. We have to have the courage to acknowledge that truth. A policy of isolation designed for the Cold War made little sense in the 21st century. The embargo was only hurting the Cuban people instead of helping them. *And I've*

> *always believed in what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "the fierce urgency of now" -- we should not fear change, we should embrace it (emphasis my own).* (Applause.)
>
> That leads me to a bigger and more important reason for these changes: Creo en el pueblo Cubano. I believe in the Cuban people. (Applause.)…" (Whitehouse.gov).

President Obama's speech[15] (and actions of visiting Cuba) highlight his positionality as important to understanding his memory of and position on Cuba. It is important to recognize that one memory does not exist on a transnational intersectional global memoryscape. In fact, the reflections, contestations, and multiplicity in memory informed by cultural and social structures of power and inequality may be critical for understanding relations within and between the U.S. and Cuba.

Methodology

In order to understand how people who breach the U.S. blockade of Cuba, negotiate divergent collective memories (of nations) and their positionality, I used a four-pronged approach. The research examines: (1) U.S. Collective memory of Cuba through a content analysis of widespread and mainstream portraits of Cuba in Time and Newsweek from 1959-2010; (2) the way Cuba and U.S. relations are collectively remembered in Cuba through museums, national sites, and public spaces (billboards, posters, and stories); (3) the memories, motivations, and experiences of study abroad students who are able to directly experience Cuba through their studies; (4) the ways Cuban-Americans remember Cuba, U.S.-Cuban relations, and

[15] President Obama's speech is noted due to his role in representing the nation as the president of the United States; however, his speech also works as an example for how memories may differ. For example, Senator Marco Rubio's speeches differ greatly as well as his positionality. In addition, President Obama was protested and critiques as well as praised for his speech and actions to change U.S. policy toward Cuba.

their experiences of immigration and cultural identity. As such, my principle methods included content analysis, ethnography, and semi-structured open-ended interviews. For this research, I collected 763 articles from Time and Newsweek from 1959-2010 for my content analysis of U.S. memory of U.S. – Cuban relations. I conducted 34 interviews with U.S. citizens who studied abroad in Cuba as part of U.S. educational programs in Cuba and conducted 33 interviews with Cuban-Americans in the metro-Atlanta area. I also conducted 6 weeks of field work in Cuba examining portraits of Cuban collective memory of U.S. – Cuban relations through monuments, memorials, and art. I utilized this four-pronged strategy in order to provide a comparative analysis between collective remembering in the U.S. and Cuba. Additionally, an analysis of tourism through U.S. study abroad students and Cuban Americans, allows for a more thorough understanding of the negotiation of different positionalities and memory in a transnational context.

Outline of Dissertation

In chapter two, I set up the historical context for which the project was executed. First, this chapter details how U.S.-Cuban relations make an exceptional case for exploring transnational intersectionality as a theoretical and methodological framework. Second, it illustrates the rationale for the conceptual focus on U.S. study abroad students and Cuban Americans as two main mechanisms for cross-border relations despite the strong social closure between the U.S. and Cuba. Third, it reveals the way, as McClintock and Enloe suggest, that government policies rely on personally private relationships to conduct foreign policy. Furthermore, it outlines why U.S. study abroad and Cuban Americans have been of particular focus in U.S. foreign policy, particularly the U.S. embargo. Fourth, it highlights why including

collective memory in both the U.S. and Cuba is important for a transnational intersectional analysis. Fifth, I detail the methods, sample, and reflect on barriers in conducting this type of research and in this particular international (and socio-historical) relationship.

In chapter 3, I discuss how the recreation of portraits of Cuba in U.S. media work as a sort of commemorative practice to the U.S. blockade. I explain that narratives that portray Cuba, and its people, as *frozen in time*, function as a sort of controlling image of a national "other." I demonstrate that it creates a "politics of nostalgia" where there is a sense of longing for a version of 1950s America embedded in these narratives of Cuba. While it does not explicitly connote racial and gender inequalities, I argue that in practice it creates a metaphor that legitimates the global inequality between the U.S. and Cuba, particularly as connected to race and gender, through "the politics of nostalgia" narrative that invokes memories of Cuba as both "phobia and fetish."

I then move to examine the Cuban case for how U.S. – Cuban relations (and Cuba itself) are collectively remembered in Cuba. In Chapter 4, through ethnographic fieldwork of monument and memorials in Cuba, I argue that portraits of collective memory of U.S.-Cuban relations diverge from a "politics of nostalgia" that portray the island as *frozen in time*, and instead offer a counter remembering. The counter frame, or "scape," reveals a competing understanding and portrayal of U.S. – Cuban political relations. I find that in Cuba the "politics of revolution" is a frame of cultural memory that retells Cuban national identity as subversive to U.S. imperialism and centered on equality. Nevertheless, this frame of collective remembering in Cuba is constrained by pressures from world heritage organizations and economic pressure for tourist development that simultaneously construct and memorialize a "politics of colonial nostalgia." I also find that "the politics of colonial nostalgia" invites tourists to take on the

imaginary position of colonizer, or master, that in many ways reinscribes the inequalities "the politics of revolution" frame attempts to show as having been dismantled. In sum, I argue that the structural conditions and interlocking inequalities, such as global economic inequality, racial inequalities rooted in colonization, and the reliance of 3rd world developing countries on tourism and foreign investment, have created two sets of collective remembering in Cuba. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the two sets of collective remembering are at odds with one another where one critiques global imperialism while the other seeks to benefit from spaces of colonial imperialist legacies in Cuba.

In Chapter 5, I examine how the positionality of U.S. study abroad students inform their interests, experiences, and views on U.S. –Cuban relations. First, I demonstrate why U.S. study abroad is a particularly important case for exploring the key aspects of transnational intersectionality theory. Second, I find that students of color and white students differ in their motivations for traveling to Cuba. Students of color, particularly black and Hispanic/Latino, students sought out travel to Cuba to *Forge Diasporic Ties*. Their goal was not necessarily "to bring democracy and capitalism" to Cuba but rather to re-establish connections to empower people of color. This manifested in re-establishing actual family ties and/or contemplating ways to improve relations and connections across the diasporas (Black, Latino, and/or Latin American). White students were largely motivated by the notion of Cuba as frozen in time where they could "go back in time." They also were motivated by the sense of urgency that if the U.S. blockade ended Cuba would quickly be over-run by U.S. capitalism which could put them at a competitive advantage for business opportunities there. In sum, findings reveal that study abroad students positionalities, in terms of race and gender, not only informed their motivations for going to Cuba but also their experiences there. While as tourists, they undoubtedly exercised

their 1st world privilege, their experiences gave them a new "dual frame of reference" which made them reflect critically on the U.S. as well.

In Chapter 6, I examine Cuban Americans' Memories, Nostalgia, and Divergent Motivations for Maintaining or Re-establishing Ties in Cuba. I discuss how changes in the restrictions for travel and caps on remittances have facilitated greater engagement with Cuba among Cuban Americans. I find that Cuban Americans do not reiterate a collective memory of Cuba as *frozen in time* and instead view Cuba as a place that has dramatically changed and evolved. The change and evolution of Cuba is what has created a nostalgic longing where many (white or Spanish-descended) Cuban Americans are interested in traveling to Cuba to re-visit their "roots." On the other hand, for Cubans of color (those that identify as racially Hispanic or Afro-Cuban) there isn't a sense of nostalgia but rather a sense of responsibility to empower and give back to family in Cuba. Cubans of color also do not articulate the same anti-Cuban government sentiment, as a group, partly due to their experiences of racism in the United States and partly because they tend to have immigrated more recently. Their more recent migration provides them a different "dual frame of reference" in regards to race and inequality in both nation-states. Therefore, race/ethnicity is at least equally as significant as period of immigration (although these things are highly intertwined) in understanding shifts in perspectives and engagement with Cuba by Cuban Americans. Additionally, Cuban American women narrate their memories of Cuba and migration as actors. Given the widespread erasure of women (and gender) in national memory, it provides a counter portrait for understanding collective memory.

Throughout the dissertation, it will become apparent that transnational intersectionality as a conceptual framework allows for a more complete analysis and understanding of how the international is personal in U.S. – Cuban relations. Moreover, collective memory can function as

a means of constructing "controlling images" of international foes that reinforces structure of white masculine hegemony. Both the U.S. mainstream media portraits as well as Cuban memorialization reveal the unsurprising erasure of women in national (and international) memory.

Given the long standing social closure between the U.S. and Cuba, the portrayals of memory on both sides may carry a great deal of power, and this analysis demonstrates how competing "memoryscapes" can function as controlling images. For instance, not only do white study abroad students reiterate many of the narratives portrayed in the way Cuba and U.S.-Cuban relations are collective remembered in the U.S. as motivations for going to Cuba (and reservations); furthermore, recently migrated Cuban Americans also articulate how collective memory in Cuba carries this influence. Furthermore, beyond the way collective memory is used as a controlling image and political tool by both the U.S. and Cuban state, it has also become a means of economic development for Cuba through the rise in interest of "world heritage" and tourism development models.

This research reveals how tourism, not unlike migration, can function as a critical unit of transnational intersectional analysis, where race/ethnicity, gender, and national identity are actively negotiated. The U.S. plays a major role in the rise of tourism in Cuba through two groups: U.S. study abroad and Cuban Americans. In U.S. study abroad to Cuba, I demonstrate how motivations and outcomes differ greatly by positionality: race/ethnicity and gender. Despite the goals of both nation-states, students of color are critical of the way racism exists within and among the two nations. While the U.S. government's rationale, under President Obama for growing travel and exchange, was to promote democracy, capitalism, and freedom abroad, students of color often saw themselves as also bringing back greater criticisms of the role U.S.

has played in maintaining oppression abroad. White women also carried a greater sense of criticism and reflexivity in regards to their "American character." Nevertheless, many white male students saw their travel to Cuba as part of a future avenue of bringing business (and capitalist enterprise) to Cuba in the future. Additionally, white students frequently capitalized on their privilege abroad, while the privilege of students of color was mitigated by their race in cases where they "passed as Cuban." The outcome was largely a near unanimous call for the repeal of the U.S. blockade. In sum, this means that there is no "one" experience or impact in transnational relations. That these relationships are informed by macro and micro level structures of inequality that are actively negotiated and impact how people understand and respond to controlling images and foreign policy.

Among Cuban Americans, I demonstrate similarly that positionality matters for views, experiences, and social ties to Cuba. While previous research has focused a great deal on how wave of immigration, Cuban state political and economic status, and means of travel to arrive in the United States (plane, Mariel (boat), balseros (rafters)) may inform experiences and ties, there has been little that has interrogated the way race/ethnicity and gender informs memories and experiences. Memory plays a particularly relevant role among this group as their memories of Cuba are what inform part of their identity as Cuban American. Cubans of color detail facing racism and hostility in the United States that lead to their understanding and self-definition as "people of color" that they may or may not have identified with in Cuba. Some of which see their role in support of Cuba as fostering transnational ties among Afro-descended people or among people of color. Nevertheless, white Cubans, or Spanish-descended Cubans, are largely interested in "experiencing the past" or fostering ties or travel to better understand their "heritage." The diverging motivations among Cuban Americans help demonstrate how "scaling

transnational intersectionality" reveals multiple memoryscapes that inform relationships and views on U.S.- Cuban relations.

The general implications are essential for understanding transnational ties and how they are informed by macro level inequalities. One such important element of this inequality is how collective memory can re-create controlling images of the national "other." These images and narratives mask the dynamic changes in policies and realities of people, particularly Cuban people. The end result is the modern creation of a "world's fair" spectacle where U.S. travelers can witness the progress and success of capitalism and democracy that sets them apart from 3rd world "others" particularly Cubans. The interest of predominately white Cuban Americans seeking "heritage tourism" also fall into this gaze. Even though they understand Cuba as "dynamically evolved" rather than "frozen in time" the evolution is perceived to be the "wrong type" and has caused catastrophic loss of family ties, revered places, and the previous prosperity of their homeland. It is an opportunity to witness the "failed socialist experiment" first hand.

Nevertheless, the fall of the Soviet Union which had a drastic impact on economic stability of Cuba as well as the growing availability of much needed funds through world heritage organizations (UNESCO and WHO), along with foreign investment through tourism as the "development model for 3rd world, has meant that Cuba has capitalized on these narratives even as they resist it. The Cuban state has invested enormous amount of money to develop and preserve monuments and memorials in Cuba which serve two purposes: preserve the Cuban Revolution and new national identity and create tourist sites. These spaces are contradictory in their messages about racial progress in Cuba and they reinforce the erasure of women from national memory in Cuba.

Moreover, positionality, particularly along the lines of race, matters for how these collective memories are interpreted, experienced, and understood. People of color, both U.S. study abroad and Cuban Americans of color, struggle against the notion of people of color's suffering as spectacle. People of color, both U.S. and Cuban American, acknowledged the ways that people of color still face less resources, segregation, and police surveillance in both nations. This often informed their motivations to send money home, visit, maintain ties, or reflect on cross-national ways to struggle against racism.

In sum, merging an analysis of collective memory in both nations with how people negotiate these narratives and navigate the social closure between the U.S. and Cuba provide a more thorough understanding of how experiences differ along the lines of race/ethnicity and gender. It also provides a more thorough understanding of the ways in which people negotiate structures of race/ethnicity and gender across nation-states including whether they reinforce these inequities or seek to resist them.

In the end, the international is personal and political. Furthermore, future research would benefit from a transnational intersectional analysis of tourism and memory in international relations. Tourism has long been linked to the construction of controlling images and the legacies of imperialist projects; however, the rise in tourism and memory culture today make it an even more critical time for analysis. This project has offered one example among many: U.S. – Cuban relations.

CHAPTER 2

THE CASE OF U.S. – CUBAN RELATIONS: A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Through the lens of transnational intersectionality, this work explores perspectives, memories, and experiences negotiating identity, power, and community (from local to global) often simultaneously. The examination of power, exercised in part by the U.S. blockade[1] of Cuba, reflects on how cultural, political, and economic structures both constrain human action but also may reinforce structures of privilege. In addition, it brings to light the way political and economic policy, in this case the blockade, impacts the lived realities of people differently through transnational structures of domination that inform our understandings of human rights and social justice. For instance, Hernandez-Truyol (2009) states:

> "The Cuba sanctions…reflect another aspect of economic sanctions: their deleterious and harmful effects on civil society, the innocent citizenry of the targeted country. By depriving citizens of the benefits of trade, of travel, of family life; by creating circumstances in which people's health, nutrition, standard of living and overall welfare are negatively affected, sanctions have effected serious denials of human rights - a moral if not legal failure" (85).

The blockade of Cuba, according to many scholars, activists, international organizations, and Cuban citizens, is a global human rights issue (Hernández-Truyol 2009; Assembly 2016; Pérez 2003). While the blockade disproportionally impacts the lives of Cubans, it also impacts the lives of those who have immigrated and/or live in exile from Cuba in the U.S. in addition to broader international barriers to advance human rights and liberties[2]. The American Civil Liberties

[1] I use the Spanish/Cuban word for the embargo which is "el bloqueo," or the blockade.

[2] For instance, one such example, the World Health Organization has confirmed Cuba's "elimination of mother to child transmission of HIV and syphilis" through a vaccine among other

Union has recognized how the blockade can impact the human and civil rights of Cuban Americans "who can no longer visit their relatives with regularity nor spend time with them in either times of joy or times of need[3]" and where the "real impact on real people of the embargo borders on unconscionable" (Hernández-Truyol 2009). Furthermore, it also impacts the viability of travel, exchange, and engagement of U.S. citizens with Cuba.

Due to this among many other factors, Cuba continues to be a country of significant interest in the global sphere where the country "is always an interesting topic of conversation, regardless of where one travels…[in fact] There is no such thing as a neutral feeling about the Perla de las Antillas (Pearl of the Antilles)" (Hernández-Truyol 2009). The fascination with Cuba paired with the near complete social closure between U.S. and Cuba under the blockade makes understanding collective memories tied to nationhood and international relations between the two countries particularly interesting and useful for understanding how "the international is personal." Therefore, this project interrogates several questions: How is collective memory of the break in U.S. and Cuban relations portrayed in the media in each of these two countries? How do logics of domination operate in these collective memories? How do people who break the "social

major advances in medicine (such as Cancer, the Zeka virus, and many others), bringing about discussions of how the Blockade impacts global health (Chaib 2015; Feldbaum and Michaud 2010). In addition, the U.S. has a disproportionally high rate of HIV/AIDS, which can put Cubans at risk. For instance, Burr (2010) points out that changes in U.S. travel to Cuba coupled with the rise and reliance on sex work in Cuba (due to lack of economic prosperity) and U.S. HIV/AIDS rates 31 to 35 times that of Cuba, makes this a critical world health issue for both nations (and others) (Burr 1997).

[3] While President Obama eased these restrictions for Cuban Americans beginning in 2011, there has still been decades of fractured relations and impact. Additionally, scholars note that because the blockade is still in place and requires an act of Congress to remove it and changes enacted by the new administration, more permanent changes in repealing the U.S. blockade appear bleak (Hernandez-Truyol 2009; Sullivan 2016).

closure" of the blockade negotiate these different constructions of collective memory? How does one's positionality reveal the different impacts of the social closure, responses to these varying collective memories, and their own views of identity and membership? By studying, through a transnational intersectional lens, people's memories and experiences negotiating U.S. –Cuban policies and cultures, I am able to demonstrate how (sometimes even in spite of people's desires and actions) structural limitations reinforce inequalities in both the U.S. and Cuba.

Theorizing a Border – the U.S. Blockade and "Social Closure"

Examining collective memories and experiences of people negotiating the U.S. blockade makes for an important case. In effect, the U.S. blockade of Cuba has worked as a form of "social closure," where exclusive access to resources based upon social statuses including race, gender, national origin, and others shapes the movement of people and their livelihoods (Chávez 2016; Weber [1922] 1978). In order to understand the extent to which relations between the U.S. and Cuba function as a form of social closure, especially considering that Cuba is a country with a long history of close ties to the U.S. and geographically is merely 90 miles off the coast of Florida, it is important to highlight the way the "border" is enforced both politically and economically. While the power to maintain this border, or social closure, is not equally shared between the two nations, it is important to note the way that the Cuban government has also participated in the maintenance of this social closure. The Cuban government, through policies and sanctions imposed upon Cubans and Cuban Americans, has also played a role in the maintenance of this social closure particularly as it relates to travel and communication (Pérez 2013). The event that spurred the enactment of policies that initially imposed this social closure

were a direct result of the Cuban Revolution[164] in which both countries portrayed the other as international adversaries threatening the safety and freedom of their respective nations (Dudziak 2000; Pérez-Stable 2011). While the relationship between the two countries, including political and economic policies, have remained far from stagnant, the social closure has been effectively maintained for half a century[5]. Each of these points individually would make this case an important one for examining transnational intersectionality and collective memory; furthermore, these points altogether make this case exceptional.

In order to fully articulate the degree to which the U.S. and Cuba make for a critical case of social closure in a globally interconnected world, I briefly detail the half-century history of the blockade and changes in U.S. foreign policy. Many, if not most, of these policies seek to expand the degree to which social closure is imposed; however, the history also delineates two ways in which this social closure is breached. Chavez[6] (2016) notes how passports, identification cards (such as visas), and implementation of borders (for instance, the U.S. and Cuba have negotiated a political line in international waters), reveals state mechanisms "for regulating and controlling cross-border movement" (Chávez 2016). Cross-border movement, as a means to reinforce the interests of the state, often relies on personal (private) relationships (Enloe 2000; McClintock 1997; Kaplan 2002). For instance, Enloe (2000) argues that we have a more thorough

[164] The implementation of the U.S. blockade of Cuba came (partly) in response to the rejection of "Yankee Imperialism" where Fidel Castro's Cabinet nationalized 382 businesses many of which were owned by people in the U.S. (Pérez-Stable 2011).

[5] It is cited as one of the longest running embargos in U.S. history; in fact, North Korea being the only country with a longer embargo imposed by the U.S.

[6] Chavez (2016) examines social closure of the border between the U.S. and Mexico. While this case is very different politically, economically, and geographically, Chavez offers in depth theoretical and empirical evidence on ways in which "borders" are reinforced that can be applied to understanding the U.S. Blockade of Cuba as a political, economic, and geographic border.

understanding of international relationships when we reimagine "what it takes for governments to ally with each other, compete with and wage war against each other… [and recognize] that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs" (119). The "international is personal" as conceptual practice requires an examination of people's lived experiences to understand how structures of domination are reinforced and undermined in international relations.

There are two main ways[7] that both the U.S. and Cuban states allow for cross-border movement: (1) education – particularly U.S. study abroad and (2) Cuban immigration[8] to the U.S. Below I will detail the way policies have more deeply instituted this social closure and created these two main mechanisms for legal boundary crossing. This makes these two entry points important for studying transnational intersectionality empirically. Additionally, I describe why examining (differing and sometimes overlapping) collective memories in a case of near social closure is important. Overwhelmingly, Cuba as a case for recognizing nationalism and the U.S. imperialist project, plays a particular role in U.S. collective memory. This strategy helps to provide a means to recognize and uncover the way national character and national discourse is multiple, changing, and located within other systems of power and inequity (Kaplan 2002; McClintock 1995).

[7] While I do acknowledge that there has been "illegal" travel and exchange where U.S. citizens have sought to travel to Cuba through other nations (such as Canada and Mexico) as well as activist resistance to undermine the Blockade through U.S. Brigidistas in Cuba, these cases are beyond the scope of this study.

[8] Cuban immigration was one main legal means of cross border movement under the Cuban Adjustment Act.

My project will extend this work in problematizing the stability and consistency of empire through recognizing both (1) the variation in the media claims, supports, and warrants[9] in portraits of Cuba in the United States (taking careful note of what symbolic relationship it illustrates between the two nations) as well as recognizing (2) the "unstable boundaries" of people who breach national boundaries with "known others," in this case even under a fifty year embargo where access to travel and restrictions are very strong. Therefore, while this project takes the position that nationhood and national ideologies are closely aligned with unequal international power relations that "entail not only violent force but also conflict, negotiation, discipline, and fantasy, which together reshape the colonized world and the imperial metropolis" (Kaplan 2002; 14), it does so by recognizing how the media portrayals of these boundaries and construction of a national "other" are fraught with inconsistencies including interpellation (or how people understand/interpret these media messages) and people "between worlds," or the people who travel or identify with two nations (Hunt 1997; Kaplan 2002). In other words, like Dabashi (2011), Said (1993), and Moaddel (2005), I recognize the way in which in spite of ideological and state political boundaries that people breach this ideological divide between the U.S. and Cuba.

[9] Darnell Hunt (1997), while taking special care to analyze the variation in interpellation, or how people receive and unpack media messages, also codes his media texts for (1) the claim, "or proposition the communicator is attempting to prove," (2) the support, or "motivational appeals that might convince audiences to accept the claim," and (3) the warrant, or "a stated or unstated assumption, 'a principle belief or a belief that is taken for granted and that the [communicator] and audience must share for the [communicator's] argument to be accepted'" (38). Hunt codes these "intended meanings" in order to capture interpellation.

History of the U.S. Blockade

Beginning October 13th of 1960, the U.S. implemented the blockade[10] of Cuba, commonly referred to as "the Embargo" in the U.S., as a means to isolate Cuba economically and as an attempt to foster internal discontent (Pérez 2003). The U.S. informed nations receiving aid that continued assistance was contingent upon ending economic relations with Cuba (particularly emphasizing the purchase of Cuban sugar and financial lending). While the U.S. blockade of Cuba is often articulated as a "hands off" or "isolationist" approach (Wylie 2005), U.S. political interest and intervention did not end with the blockade. Throughout the 1960s, the CIA conducted economic sabotage with paramilitary operations designed to destroy "sugar mills, sugar, tobacco plantations, farm machinery, mines, oil refineries, lumber yards, water systems, warehouses, and chemical plants" (Pérez 2003). During this time, the U.S. developed a number of plots to assassinate Cuban leaders and tensions between the two countries were at an all-time high, in part heightened by the "Cold War" and "Red Scare." While the leaders of the Cuban Revolution were seeking independence and self-determination that had been denied previously by the U.S. under the Platt Amendment,[11] U.S. control of Cuba was important to ensure: (a)

[10] Angered by the rise of the Castro-led Communists in Cuba "…on October 13 [1960], the United States responded with an economic embargo on Cuba, a ban on all U.S. exports except medicine and food stuffs. Cuba reacted the same day…nationalizing additional properties…In January 1961 the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba" (Perez 2003 p. 243). The severance of diplomatic relations remained in place for decades; it was not until December 2014 when President Barack Obama announced his meeting with Raúl Castro that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations once again became possible (Felter 2014).

[11] The Platt Amendment (ratified May 20 1902) "granted the United States government the right to intervene in internal Cuban affairs to preserve Cuban independence, and to protect 'life, property, and individual liberty'" (Ferrer 2005) In effect, the Platt Amendment took away from Cubans the hard won sovereignty of the Cuban fight for Independence from Spain rooted in a Revolution in part defined by anti-racism and led by Antonio Maceo. Furthermore, Washington gave Cubans two choices: either "Cubans would accept the Platt Amendment or there would be no end to the [US] military occupation" (Pérez 2005).

communism was not viable in the Western Hemisphere, (b) U.S. status as a global power particularly of the Western Hemisphere remain undiminished (restrict influence of Soviet Union) during the Cold War, and (c) that the threat of domestic unrest associated with the Civil Rights movement in both in the U.S. and in the western hemisphere be contained.[12]

Despite the economic and political strangle hold implemented by the U.S. as well as heightened political tension of the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. policy on Cuban immigration was the opposite of what one might expect. In effect, the U.S. immigration policy (of the 1960s and 1970s) made it possible for Cuban exiles "to enter the U.S. in unlimited numbers" (Pérez 2003). This policy made for strong "propaganda" against the Cuban revolution and government, and it provided the U.S. "with an opportunity to cause Havana hardship by draining the island of trained personnel" (253). In essence, Cuban Americans, at least initially, were an "ideal type" for promoting the "American ideological machinery" where the immigrants are there to convince the public that invading, bombing, and occupying the homeland of others is a good and moral thing (Dabashi 2011). Furthermore, US streamlined naturalization and residency for Cuban emigrants in a way that was unparalleled. In effect, this made Cuban Americans a privileged group providing Cuban Americans with greater political and economic opportunities than many

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[12] The importance of U.S. control over Cuba as a means to undermine civil rights movements, particularly on racial emancipation and equality, dates back to at least 1868 where "Cuba's nationalist leaders preached… a raceless nation in the period that represented the nadir in American racial politics" (Ferrer 1999). Antonio Maceo, "a mulatto who had joined the movement in 1868 as a common foot soldier and rose to the rank of general" was leading a "multiracial movement that was explicitly antiracist" (5). This was both "unthinkable" on a national level in the U.S. and made Cuba particularly interesting case for Black scholars (perhaps most notably Du Bois) and revolutions in the U.S. Furthermore, the Cuban Revolution of the 1960s, which promised to fulfill José Martí's promise of racial equality for all, was a call back to this earlier period of Cuban national history that stood to reject U.S. imperialism and racism.

other refugees and immigrants (including those from other Latin American countries). In effect, this created the construction of Cuban Americans as a model Hispanic minority in U.S. culture (and sometimes even in research) (Pedraza 2007; Grenier 2005).

Nevertheless, the history of Cuban immigration is not equally shared among Cuban emigres and there are two central points critical to characterizing Cuban immigration to the U.S. First, the waves[13] of Cuban immigrants over the years are more different than they are similar. They differ in terms of reasons for immigration, experiences with U.S. immigration (particularly the ability and means of arriving in the U.S.), and privileges. The 1960s Cuban Exiles enjoyed privileges of higher economic standing, higher education, racial privilege (and sometimes knowledge of the English language) and also direct ties to the U.S. (personally or professionally) generally as a group (Pedraza and Rumbaut 1996). Later waves of immigrants are characterized by fewer resources (economic and social), professional skills, less homogeneity of race (higher rates of Afro-Cuban and multiracial Cubans), and fewer direct ties to the U.S. These later waves are also characterized through a lens that labels those groups as less desirable immigrants because of the means through which they arrived to the U.S., including Marielitos[14], balseros (rafters)[15], and "border crossers[16]."

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[13] For more detailed information on the in depth political and economic differences between the different waves of Cuban immigrants see (Guridy 2010; Pedraza 2007; Grenier 2003; Gonzalez-Pando 1998; Current 2010; Grenier 2005; Pedraza and Rumbaut 1996)

[14] Marielitos refers to the mass exodus of 120,000 Cubans to the United States in 1980 from the port of Mariel, Cuba (Pedraza 2007; Wylie 2005).

[15] While balseros have been a means of exodus from Cuba throughout the years of the Revolution, the "balsero crisis" "reached its peak in the summer of 1994" where a total of 33,395 people were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard (Pedraza 2007).

[16] Border-crossing has become a major means of the most recent wave of Cuban immigrants to the U.S.; in fact, Krogstad (2017) highlights that two-thirds of all Cubans entering the U.S. in 2015 came through the U.S. Border Patrol Laredo sector in Texas.

After the implementation of the U.S. blockade, U.S. sanctions continued to grow, deepening the social closure. U.S. policy throughout the last half of the century, Perez Jr (2003) argues was "punitive" in an attempt to demonstrate "to the people of the American Republics that communism has no future in the western hemisphere" (259). The U.S. moved to have Cuba expelled from OAS, the Organization of American States, which resulted in all Latin American countries severing diplomatic relations and, with the single exception of Mexico, participating in a trade boycott of Cuba. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration further increased restrictions suspending U.S. tourism and all general and business travel. In addition, limits on cash and gifts that Cuban Americans in the U.S. were able to send family on the island were reduced to $1,200 per relative per year (Pedraza 2007). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s sanctions continued to increase (Pérez 2003). The Torricelli Bill, also known as the "Cuban Democracy Act," in 1992 further tightened the blockade through prohibiting subsidiaries of U.S. corporations in Third World countries from trading with Cuba. This bill also explicitly authorized withholdings of U.S. foreign aid, debt relief, and free trade agreements with any country providing assistance to Cuba. Additionally, it denied ships U.S. port facilities for 180 days after having visited Cuba's shores. For example, U.S. authorities even denied permission for a Greek freighter to enter Long Beach for repairs, because it was carrying Chinese rice to Cuba. This event occurred during Cuba's "Special Period" where the blockade coupled with the implosion of the Soviet Union meant Cuba was scrounging for resources to feed their people making hunger and malnutrition a national crisis (Pérez 2003). U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 1990s "seemed particularly harsh, both in timing and kind…for [it] struck directly at the flow of goods by way of people to people, principally through friends and family…[it meant] the needs of everyday life in their most ordinary and common place forms, could be met only by Herculean efforts" (265).

While the U.S. policy was an effort to put pressure on Cuban people to change their government, the Cuban government responded with increased sanctions for political dissidents (Pérez 2013). Rather than spurring the uprising intended by U.S. politicians, the 1990s crisis (known as the Special Period) spurred another large wave of Cuban immigration. This period of immigration put pressure on the two countries to establish a compromise on immigration policies including the establishment of the "wet foot dry foot" policy, where Cubans intercepted at sea (commonly referred to as balseros or rafters) would be returned to Cuba. Furthermore, the 1990s were characterized by new policies to further tighten restrictions. For instance, the Torricelli Act, also known as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, sanctioned foreign based U.S. subsidiaries from doing business with Cuba as well as prohibiting travel and remittances to Cuba by Cuban Americans. Perhaps most notably, the Helms-Burton bill, commonly referred to as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, was signed into law effectively transferring all control over U.S. foreign policy on Cuba from the executive branch to Congress. In addition to these policies which reinforced this closure, this period was marked by other socio-political events that reinforced this social closure as well. For instance, the "Brothers to the Rescue" crisis (1996), incarceration of the "Cuban Five" (1998), and the international debate and fervor sparked by the case of Elian Gonzalez (1999) spurred further tensions and call for sanctions in U.S.-Cuban relations (Pérez 2003). This period was marked by changes that meant that any hope for repealing the blockade in the future would require U.S. Congress, making any possibility of change that much more difficult.

Interestingly, while popular culture characterizes U.S. foreign policy as an outdated legacy of the Cold War through films re-creating the Cuban Missile Crisis such as Thirteen Days (2000) and Xmen First Class (2011), U.S. foreign policy on Cuba in the 1990s was

arguably as punitive as that of the early 1960s. While relations between the two countries were dismal, Clinton implemented policies to expand "people to people" exchanges in an effort to subvert Cuba through personal international relationships. The idea was that U.S. citizens and Cuban Americans were the "best ambassadors for promoting freedom and democracy (and capitalism)" in Cuba. U.S. travel was expanded for licenses "related to education, religious, and human rights activities." This approach was continually changed, sometimes supported while at other times restricted depending on views of the current U.S. Presidential administration. The Bush administration's call for a "war on terrorism" and invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s put the Cuban government on guard (Pérez 2013). After all, Cuba wasn't removed from the U.S.'s list of state sponsors of terror until May 29th 2015 (State 2015), and Cuba was one of four countries listed as state sponsors of terror during Bush's presidency. And coupled with the "war on terror," the Bush Administration while simultaneously invading Iraq had created a "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba" report and plan for action (see CAFC[17]), and arrested Cubans and Cuban Americans as spies (Pérez 2003). Under the Bush Administration relations between the U.S. and Cuba became ever more bleak. Previous opportunities awarded to academics and students through person to person exchange were nearly halted entirely (Sullivan 2014). The impact was a 92% decrease in academic and study abroad travel (Rosenberg 2016). Furthermore, Cuban American travel and remittances to Cuba were also drastically reduced under the Bush administration limiting travel to Cuba to only once every three years for Cuban Americans and capping remittances at $300 per year, which had a large impact on the Cuban American community as well as the lives of Cubans. (Sullivan 2014;

[17] While the Commission has been suspended the US Department of State has the archival information, report, and plan: See https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/c12238.html

Pérez-Stable 2011). The Bush Administration effectively implemented a travel ban even increasing punishments for U.S. citizens who dared to travel to Cuba illegally. These policies remained in effect until 2011 when the Obama administration was the first administration to ease sanctions on Cuba in a decade (Felter 2014).

Critical Timing of the Project

Therefore, in sum recent landmark changes in social closure made for a unique and timely opportunity to critically analyze how collective memories of U.S. and Cuban relations differ between the U.S., Cuba, and Cuban Americans. For instance, President Barack Obama is famous for being the first sitting President to visit Cuba in a century (since President Calvin Coolidge's visit in 1928) and pushing for opening of relations and dialogue between the two nations (Relations 2014). Furthermore, initially the Obama administration focused on lessening restrictions for travel for academic or "educational purposes" through "person to person exchange and for Cuban Americans seeking to visit relatives on the island" making it possible to analyze how people experience and negotiate these memories in practice (Relations 2014). President Obama's push to reinstate the availability of programs and opportunities to foster cross-national dialogue and exchange moved from an isolationist approach to an "engaged" approach (Relations 2014) where he argued that "Americans" (referring to U.S. citizens) and Cuban Americans are the "best ambassadors for freedom abroad" (Relations 2008). The 2014 - 2016 Obama Administration's policies set unprecedented changes, in that many of these policies to re-establish relations were the 1st of their kind since the establishment of the blockade (Sullivan 2014). Additionally, President Obama's landmark changes did two things important to considering the context of this study. First, he outlines his memory of U.S. and Cuban history

drawing particularly on the commonalities, particularly based on histories of colonization, rather than differences in effort to gain support for his change to policies to both a U.S. and Cuban audience:

> "I want to be clear: The differences between our governments over these many years are real and they are important. I'm sure President Castro would say the same thing -- I know, because I've heard him address those differences at length. But before I discuss those issues, we also need to recognize how much we share. Because in many ways, the United States and Cuba are like two brothers who've been estranged for many years, even as we share the same blood. *We both live in a new world, colonized by Europeans. Cuba, like the United States, was built in part by slaves brought here from Africa. Like the United States, the Cuban people can trace their heritage to both slaves and slave-owners (emphasis mine)* We've welcomed both immigrants who came a great distance to start new lives in the Americas." (Remarks By President Obama to the People of Cuba 2016)

The way in which President Obama calls upon a collective remembering of this history rooted in his positionality as a black person is tied to his rationale for deviating from the longstanding policy of isolation. The significance of this explicit call to recognize race and colonization in the memory of US –Cuba history will be further examined in Chapter 3. Second, President Obama not only changed policy to support greater travel and exchange, but also encouraged it through "the urgency of now." Further into this landmark speech, he addresses the question of "why now?" In President Obama's landmark speech, he answers:

> "Many people on both sides of this debate have asked: Why now? Why now? There is one simple answer: What the United States was doing was not working. We have to have the courage to acknowledge that truth. A policy of isolation designed for the Cold War made little sense in the 21st century. The embargo was only hurting the Cuban people instead of helping them. And I've always believed in what Martin Luther King, Jr. called "the fierce urgency of now" -- we should not fear change, we should embrace it. (Applause.) That leads me to a bigger and more important reason for these changes: Creo en el pueblo Cubano. I believe in the Cuban people. (Applause.)…" (Remarks By President Obama to the People of Cuba 2016).

Exploring the narrative of the history of U.S. relations and the blockade is critical to understanding the construction of collective U.S. memory and how (or if) those narratives inform the motivations for traveling to Cuba through US study abroad. That the blockade has created a "taboo" of visiting Cuba, in part, is what makes it so "fascinating" to so many US travelers who want to "see it before it changes." The "urgency of now" coupled with changes in the ability to travel to Cuba, made under the Obama Administration, created a massive rise in travel to Cuba for both "Americans" (US citizens) and Cuban Americans. While President Obama expanded the ability to travel to Cuba to 12 categories as of December 2015, the sanction of going to Cuba purely for tourism still stands. Therefore, travelers must demonstrate how they fulfill education, journalistic, religious, athletic, artistic, or humanitarian reasons for travel to Cuba. President Obama's urgency of now has been replicated by travelers (both U.S. citizens and Cuban Americans) that fear the lessened restrictions on travel won't last under a new administration (Sullivan 2014) and want to see Cuba before it becomes "Americanized."

In addition to policy changes that have affected this research project, other factors have also impinged on the real and perceived contexts in which the project has been conducted. Among these is the fact that this study was conducted during a period of widespread change in perception in the U.S. on U.S. foreign policy on Cuba, as well as changes in Cuban American public perception, and increased Cuban immigration and study abroad travel. From 2014 to 2016, U.S. public opinion on Cuba and views on U.S. policy toward Cuba shifted for both U.S. citizens/Americans and Cuban Americans (respectively). According to Gallup Polls, the percentage of Americans who viewed Cuba positively" increased 33 percent since 2006 with 2016 being the first time since the U.S. blockade that the majority of Americans polled view Cuba "favorably" (Gallup 2016). Additionally, the Florida International University 2014 poll

demonstrates a similar shift in the views of the Miami-Dade Cuban American population where 52% of respondents opposed the Embargo, 69% reported favoring unrestricted travel to Cuba, and 66% reported support for the continuation of the Cuban Adjustment Act (Grenier, Guillermo J. and Hugh Gladwin. 2015). These shifts in perception were coupled with a rise in cross-border movement through the two main means of navigating the still enforced social closure. During the mid to late 2000s, study abroad programs with U.S. students studying in Cuba jumped from 375 students in 2011 (which was twice the number of students as in 2004) to a whopping 2,384 students in 2014(Rosenberg 2016). Similarly, Cuban immigration spiked yet again. According to the Migration Policy Institute (2013), 38% of the total Cuban immigrant population in the United States arrived to the U.S. after the year 2000. And according to the Pew Research Center the number of Cubans entering the U.S. jumped from 10,000 per year in 2005 to 60,000 per year in 2016 (Krogstad 2017).

Methods & Sample

In order to investigate how intersectionality informs collective memories of U.S. - Cuban relations and how those memories and positionalities may shed light on transnational structures of inequality, I have used a four-pronged approach. This four-pronged approach is conceptually organized into two components: memory and experience. Through these two conceptual categories, I interrogate both important differences and cross-national structures that can reinforce inequality through an examination of collective memory and experiences negotiating the social closure between the US and Cuba. First, I examined collective memories of US-Cuban relations in both the U.S. and Cuba. Using mainstream cultural texts, I analyze how this relationship is remembered in each nation; nevertheless, through an examination of people's

experience, I leave room to interrogate resistances to these dominant narratives in national constructions of collective memory taking into account how race, gender, and nation inform these experiences with memory and social closure. As such this project examines the following questions: (1) How is collective memory of the break in U.S. and Cuban relations portrayed in both nations-states? (2) How do logics of domination operate in these collective memories? (3) How do people who break the "social closure" of the blockade negotiate these different constructions of collective memory? (4) How does one's positionality inform both the availability to navigate the social closure, responses to these varying collective memories, and their own views of identity and membership?

Collective Memory: Contested Spaces of National and Personal Identity & Community

Memory studies have articulated the ways memory is a personal and individual domain as well as the ways in which it disseminates a collective component of group identity, consciousness, and history. The collective component of memory, specifically as a social phenomenon, was first articulated by Émile Durkheim in the *Elementary Forms of Religious Life.* It was in this foundational sociological text that Durkheim denotes the way ancestral memory is transmitted across generations through both group rituals and symbol systems that represent the sacred in society (Durkheim 1995). Halbwachs, Durkheim's student, extended this work through specifically laying out the social components of memory. Halbwachs in "The Social Frameworks of Memory" states:

> "It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize memories…It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection" (Halbwachs 1992, p.38).

As the field of collective memory within sociology has grown over the last half century, the centrality of collective memory to understanding the formation of national and group identity has come to the forefront (Jacobs 2010). One of the major contributions is identifying the mediums in which collective memory is disseminated through culturally constructed texts including landmarks, social locations, monuments, and media (Olick 1997; Schwartz 1982, 1996; Connerton 1989; Nora 1996). These elements are used to identify the global memory "scapes," or the "complex landscape upon which memories and memory practices move, come into contact, are contested by, and contest other forms of remembrance" (Phillips 2011) p 13. For this study, I combine an analysis of cultural texts including media portraits, monuments, landmarks, and biography to account for the dominant constructions and personal experiences (and resistances) with these dominant narratives.

First, I conducted a content analysis of media portraits of Cuba in Time and Newsweek from 1959-2010 where I employed David Altheide's ethnographic content analysis methodology to uncover how and what types of "memories" of Cuba are highlighted in the United States (Altheide 1987). Using a content analysis of 763 articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek, I employed an ethnographic content analysis (ECA) to guide my research. Initially focusing on a question of how the blockade endured for over 50 years and was still largely supported by a U.S. public given that this public has had very little access to or knowledge of Cuba, my focus gradually expanded to include questions concerning US and Cuba relations, history, and the blockade. I utilize ECA as a tool for a systematic and rigorous analysis of all modes of information exchange found in my data including modes such as narrative, visual imagery, style, maps, and extent of coverage (Altheide 1987). While ECA closely resembles textual analysis what it offers in contrast to quantitative content analysis is an emphasis on "constant discovery

and comparison [where]…data are often coded conceptually so that one item may be relevant for several purposes" rather than reliable discrete predetermined categories (69). Ethnographic content analysis is a useful tool for this inquiry, because it allows data to be coded with a rigorous emphasis on narrative, provides rich descriptive information, and allows for in depth analysis where conceptual tensions may emerge. It also is a better method for capturing the construction and changes in collective memory over time that is key to collective memory scholarship. In other words, it allows for the conceptual clarity of how the narrative or story regarding the reasons for the blockade and US constructions of memory in regards to the Cuban Revolution (the historical moment that spurred the severing of US –Cuban relations). In sum, it allows the researcher to take into account the overall intended meaning of the text rather than only its discrete parts.

My sample includes 763 articles and covers of Cuba from two major U.S. media outlets Time and Newsweek from January 1959 to May 2010[17]. The study focuses on magazines for several reasons: (1) among all media genres magazines are one of the most central to the production of national social imaginaries, or the social totality and individuals' relationship with it, because they report events of key interest to the society as a society, are readily available in digital and print form, and have potential to reach a wide audience (Couldry 2003; Chomsky and Herman 1988); (2) magazines like Time and Newsweek have the status of flagship newsmagazines meaning that they report the highest readership, generally over four million

[17] My sampling frame for articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek came from The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature Retrospective (1890 to 1982) and The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature (1983 to Present), a reference guide to recently published articles in periodical magazines and scholarly journals organized by subject. This provided a sample of 793 articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek from January 1959 to May 2010. After an initial reading, thirty articles were eliminated from the analysis, because they were not articles on Cuba but rather only mentioned Cuba once, usually as a location.

readers every week, and are upheld as quintessentially American publications (Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007); (3) Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report, have devoted and are known for substantial attention to national and global affairs; (4) these magazines are part of large American conglomerates where media portrayals and journalism are often shared among other internal agencies (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Lippmann 2008); (5) as they are part of large conglomerates, especially Time as a unit within Time Warner, these magazines have a global reach (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 2003); and (6) Time and Newsweek are the only flagship magazines that span the whole period from the Cuban Revolution to the present, which captures the entire period of the blockade where travel and trade were restricted making American reliance on media discourse on Cuba even more essential.

Second, I conducted 6 weeks of fieldwork from May to June of 2014 in La Habana, Cuba of monuments, landmarks, and media (particularly public billboards) that focused on, or emphasized, the history of U.S. –Cuban relations. This was conducted as part of participant observations of a study abroad program, where U.S. students travel to Cuba as part of "an immersion program that offers the opportunity to bridge the gap between two nations whose history and politics keep them together and apart…[and to provide] invaluable insight of the political, social, and cultural situation of the island, promoting at the same time the understanding of and respect for cultural differences, beyond the political strife" (UNV en Cuba[18]). During this time, I visited major museums and tourist sites creating a small archive of official and unofficial spaces for public memory of US- Cuban history. For example, I visited the Museum of the Revolution (Museo de la Revolución), The Capital (El Capitolio), the National

[18] UNV en Cuba is a pseudonym for the study abroad program to protect the confidentiality of the program and participants.

Hotel (Hotel Nacional de Cuba), Revolutionary Mall (Plaza de la Revolución), Military Mall (Plaza de Armas), Old Havana (Habana Vieja), Martin Luther King Center and Monument (Centro y Monumento de Martin Luther King Jr.), the historic Spanish fort (El Castillo de los Tres Reyes del Morro), the monument to recognize runaway slaves (Monumento al Cimarrón), monument to recognize the victims of the US Maine explosion (Monumento a las Víctimas del Maine), the Trinidad Museum (Museo de Historia Municipal, Trinidad), the National Museum of the Committees for Defense of the Revolution (Museo Nacional de los Comités Defensa de la Revolución), and other public sites either as part of the study abroad program or referred to me by Cuban people. These sites were essential to capturing public memory of the US –Cuban relations in part because tourism is the single largest source of revenue for Cuba[19]. The Cuban government has dedicated money to developing (and/or reviving) these tourist sites to both construct national identity in a communist/socialist nation-state and to encourage and maintain tourism as an industry. Both of these factors are critical to understanding the social context. First, Cuba faced a crisis of national identity after the Cuban Revolution and worked diligently to produce a new national identity and consciousness that reinforced the core principles of the Revolution. Second, revitalization of buildings in Cuba (particularly Havana) privilege tourist spaces such as museums, monuments, and particular sites over the surrounding buildings in which Cuban people live.[20] Finally, memory is particularly interesting component in the Cuban context, because of its domestic importance and as a site for disseminating information on global

[19] Since at least 2013 10% or more of the GDP of Cuba has come from tourism. The recent changes in U.S. policy on travel to Cuba has resulted in a spike in U.S. tourism resulting in a 176% increase in Cuban tourism in 2015 (Brookings Institute 2015 and Office of Cuba 2016)

[20] Centro Habana has some nearly 230 buildings collapse each year. This not only renders many Cubans without their homes but also results in death and disability.

inequity (particularly the deleterious impact of the U.S. blockade) to tourists around the world.

Negotiating Social Closure – Study Abroad Students and Cuban Americans

In order to examine how positionality impacts people's negotiation of the blockade, memories, and experiences, I conducted interviews with U.S. citizens that studied abroad in Cuba and Cuban-Americans in the Metro-Atlanta area. First, I conducted interviews and participant observations with a study abroad program to Cuba (8 week program in La Habana, Cuba) that was supported by a large flagship university in the Southeastern United States (UNV en Cuba). Due to my interest in capturing differences in experiences based on race and gender, I selectively sampled participants for interviews. These participants were recruited through social media[21] (particularly Facebook) and through snowball sampling, or personal connections to others who had participated in studying abroad in Cuba. In coordination with the interviews, I collected brief survey data that captured information about their program, views on Cuba, impact of studying abroad, major cities and tourist spaces observed, and demographic information. In total, I conducted 34 interviews with students that studied abroad in Cuba. Interviews ranged from 34 minutes to 132 minutes. All respondents completed the accompanied survey and many contributed photographs that captured the major themes of their experience in Cuba.

Second, I conducted observations and interviews with Cuban Americans. My particular sample was Cubans-Americans from the metro-Atlanta area for several reasons. First, seventy-

[21] Due to Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act as well as the political nature of traveling to Cuba due to the Blockade, program coordinators, universities, and colleges were unwilling to share contact information for their study abroad students. Many were also reluctant to pass on information about the study; however, most programs have unofficial Facebook groups that allowed me to solicit students from across the country to participate.

seven percent of U.S. Cubans reside in the Southeast (U.S. Census 2010). Georgia, particularly the Metro-Atlanta area[24], has arguably the fastest growing Latino population in which the 3rd largest group of Latinos self-identifies as of Cuban descent (US Census 2010). While the largest population of people of Cuban descent is the Miami-Dade area in Florida, Atlanta provides a unique site for selective sampling of participants to understand negotiated memory as it pertains to U.S.-Cuban relations, the revolution, immigration, and negotiations of cultural differences between the two nations. Atlanta is unique, because while it does not have the concrete established exile community that is present (and powerful) in the Miami-Dade area, it has a longstanding history of ties with Havana that requires a transnational recognition of race and ethnicity. Atlanta has and continues to foster transnational Afro-diasporic connections to address racism in the western hemisphere. In addition, the early Cuban exile community founded the "Cuban Club" in Atlanta in 1977 to help foster and maintain Cuban American community culture and identity in the Atlanta area. Atlanta was home to the infamous prison riots of Marielitos in the 1980s. A number of Atlanta's HBCUs had direct civil rights ties to the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. Atlanta leaders went to Cuba to advocate for the 1996 Olympics to be hosted in Atlanta, GA. Atlanta's Cuban American population is nearly equally represented across the major periods of immigration to the US; and therefore, construction of a community identity has been important and difficult. Finally, Atlanta leaders were and continue to be influential in re-establishing direct ties to Cuba[25] and to working toward a repeal of the blockade (EngageCubaGA).

[24] Even more specifically the Atlanta metro counties of Gwinnett, Henry, Douglas, and Fulton.

[25] Mayor Kaseem Reed immediately traveled to Cuba to discuss opportunities for cultural and business exchange when the new travel policy under the Obama Administration was announced. This made Atlanta one of the 3 major cities to have the first direct flights to Cuba since the

In order to establish a strategically selected sample of participants, I used both social media (particularly facebook) and community events. I conducted interviews and participant observation of memory and community identity work, in the metro Atlanta Cuban American population. I observed 2 major sites: (1) a historic public community organization that was originally established in the 1970s (Havana Club) and (2) a new public community space (Somos Cubanos). I recruited participants and was a participant-observer at these events approximately monthly for one year (2014-2015). I also conducted 33 interviews with Cuban Americans from the Metro Atlanta area. Interviews ranged from 42 minutes to 3 hours and 14 minutes. All respondents completed the accompanied survey.

In sum, all interviews were transcribed and analyzed using qualitative software (Atlas TI), where I coded data for emergent themes regarding motivations for travel/immigration, experiences with travel/immigration, memories of the Cuban Revolution, difficulties faced, excitements/privileges, views on how blockade has impacted their lives, personal identity, and the ways in which race and gender informed these experiences. These themes revealed the ways in which the social closure and inequality is experienced differently and similarly for respondents based on their intersectional standpoint of race, gender, and nationality. In addition, it highlighted the way strong sense of community is informed by collective memories and narratives that recreate social inequalities for people of color – both U.S. citizens and Cuban Americans.

Blockade. Mayor Kaseem Reed has actively articulated that "Atlanta is a key gateway to Cuba" (both historically and today).

Reflection on Barriers to Research: Access, Resources, and Privilege

There were a number of barriers to this research that were directly and indirectly informed by the implications of the blockade and my own standpoint as a white woman and U.S. citizen. First, U.S.- Cuban relations made attaining funding (and my own ability to travel to Cuba) subject to the limitations of the U.S. Blockade. In 2014, when I began my data collection, it was strategic for me to go to Cuba as part of a study abroad program not only for participant-observation, but also access to legally traveling to Cuba. At the time, access to travel to Cuba independently would have involved additional expenses and time (an up to 6 months review and approval wait time by the U.S. government). Nevertheless, the availability of resources and ability to travel to Cuba was one major barrier in addition to barriers to participation and access.

Due to the political nature of travel to Cuba as well as the experiences of political repression of Cuban Americans in Cuba, both study abroad respondents and Cuban American respondents were often leery of participation. This meant word of mouth, social networks, and proof of my identity, role, and motivation as a researcher affiliated with a major research institute was key to access. Several respondents contacted my department and university directly to verify my identity and research. Many of these respondents recounted how they researched who I was before participating and passing on information to others. This disclosure from my respondents revealed the unique role my positionality played in my research. Initially, when I started this project and I was working to uncover access to funds, nearly all dissertation research fellowships excluded funds to conduct research on Cuba (due to the blockade). As I searched for funds independent of U.S. governmental aid, I located Cuban American organizational funds that specified financial support but specified that the research that would have to demonstrate a particular set of findings. Therefore, at the outset, I knew this research would reveal the

multilayered political nature of understanding power and inequality in U.S. –Cuban relations that decentered a focus exclusively on the Castro Regime. In addition, many Cuban American respondents voiced concerns of judgment and alienation by other Cuban Americans (particularly the Cuban Exile Anti-Castro community) for desiring a direct connection and better life opportunities for Cubans. This is not to say that respondents were supportive of the Cuban government (particularly Castro regime) but rather that some felt the Cuban American community has played a role in maintaining the Blockade against Cuba, which in their view has had deleterious impact on Cubans and Cuban Americans. My positionality meant that my respondents felt compelled to tell me what they would like to see my work convey and were interested to see what other respondents had shared.

Similarly, U.S. study abroad program officials were reluctant to disseminate information on my research to help recruit participants. While this could have to do with time and other duties of program administrators, some administrators replied to my requests providing some insight to barriers in access. These administrators stated that due to the political nature of the relationship and of Cuba study abroad programs themselves, they would not be able to help me with this research. Others requested further proof of my Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and/or stated that they felt unable to disseminate information due to Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Many of the study abroad respondents also verified my institutional affiliation prior to participation. Many of these respondents were more willing to participate and share other contacts speak after verification that I had been to Cuba as well.

Furthermore, at the outset of my data collection my advisor and I had discussed the possibility of interviewing Cubans in Cuba about the blockade and memories of the Cuban Revolution. After all, this is the group arguably most directly impacted by the maintenance of the

blockade in their day-to-day lives, and most directly the memory of the Cuban Revolution, which played a (if not the) major role in the impetus of the U.S. move to impose the blockade. This aspect of the study proved to be incredibly difficult.

Even though I was able to access some respondents for participation, the practical, political, and ethical barriers to conducting this research required me to postpone this aspect of the study (at that time). Furthermore, this experience resulted in an in-depth reflection on feminist research methods. Following the theoretical argument posed in Stacy Allen's (1988) article that questions if a feminist research method is possible (particularly in sites of multilayered inequalities in power and privilege), this issue is highly relevant in the context of U.S. –Cuba relations.

CHAPTER 3

COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF THE U.S. BLOCKADE: *FROZEN IN TIME*

> "Cuba occupies a special place in the history of American imperialism. It has served as a sort of laboratory for the development of the methods by which the United States has pursued the creation of global empire. In the aggregate, the means used by the United States in Cuba constitute a microcosm of the American imperial experience…[intervention]. And after 1959, trade sanctions, political isolation, covert operations, and economic embargo. All that is American imperialism has been practiced in Cuba…But it is also true that…what made awareness of Cuba particularly significant were the ways that it acted on the formation of the American consciousness of nationhood." Louis A. Pérez Jr (2008).

My objective in this chapter is to illustrate the way collective memory of Cuba in the United States, specifically through U.S. mainstream media, are portrayed through a lens of nostalgia. I will discuss the ways narratives within the texts in the U.S. media may reinforce structures of inequality domestically and in international relations through the use of a "politics of nostalgia" (Sodaro 2013). Using an intersectional lens for investigating how portraits of Cuba are remembered and framed in U.S. media, I highlight the ways in which portraits of Cuba as *Frozen in Time*, work to reinforce the rationale for perpetuating policies, particularly the embargo, and colonial discursive narratives of Cuba as a nation incapable of sovereignty and self-government that shift from a stance of isolation to engagement. I demonstrate this through the examination of the way the U.S. blockade works as a lens to both remember U.S.-Cuban relations and prophesies the future. This chapter sets the stage for understanding the ways in which these narratives and collective memory in the public sphere,[18] compare to collective

[18] Given Habermas' analysis of memory in the public sphere, I recognize that media is only one aspect of the public sphere through which memories are disseminated.

memory of U.S. –Cuban relations: (a) in Cuba's monuments, memorials, and museum's (Chapter 4); (b) may inform the motivations and experiences of U.S. students studying abroad in Cuba (Chapter 5); and (c) impact the ways Cuba is remembered and the maintenance of Cuban Americans in the U.S. (Chapter 6).

Collective Memory of Cuba in the U.S. & the "politics of Nostalgia

Halbwachs first conceptualized collective memory as that of a shared past, typically societal-level events, that are retained by members of a group, class, or nation (Halbwachs 1992). Since Halbwachs' initial conceptualization of a collective memory, the centrality of collective memory to understanding the formation of national and group identity has come to the forefront (Jacobs 2010, Paletschek 2008). The concern over the maintenance of nation-states in the global sphere which are inherently "imagined" and reliant on collective memories has led to the identification of global memory "scapes," or the "complex landscape upon which memories and memory practices move, come into contact, are contested by, and contest other forms of remembrance" (Phillips 2011) p 13. Cultural memory is historically linked to the development of nation-states and serve the formation of national consciousness which is "very often in delimination to, competition with, and hostility towards other states" (Paletschek 2008) p.10. Memory scholars have clarified the mediums by which collective memory is disseminated through culturally constructed texts including landmarks, social locations, monuments, and media, where media has grown in its significance for solidifying national collective memories in the global sphere (Connerton 1989, Nora 1996, Olick 1997, Schwartz 1982, Schwartz 1996). Nevertheless, the complex landscapes of memory, particularly in international relations, have yet

to be fully explored and contemporary scholarship urgently calls for the rigorous analysis, and plotting, of nostalgia, an aspect of collective memory, because "the fantasies of the past, based on the needs of the present, have a direct impact on the realities of the future"(Boym 2008).

Nostalgia, as a conceptual tool, is a component of collective memory that brings together differing perspectives in collective memory debates regarding tensions between the personal and the collective as well as the past and the future[19]. Svetlana Boym in *The Future of Nostalgia* lays out that nostalgia itself is not necessarily political; however, "the mix of nostalgia and politics can be explosive." Boym (2008), similar to Philips (2011), argues that nostalgia "like globalization, exists in the plural. Studying the sociology, politics, and ethnography of nostalgia, its micropractices and meganarratives, remains as urgent as ever" (Boym 2008) In this field of scholarship the call to work towards a more thorough understanding and "plotting" of the "memoryscape," particularly of nostalgia, have led to defining two prominent forms: the restorative and the reflective (Boym 2008).

While restorative and reflective nostalgia may have overlapping frames of reference, the difference between these two forms is in their narrative, interests, inclusivity, and agendas. *Restorative* nostalgia is closely linked to politics and a return to religious and ethnic traditions, values, family, homeland, and truth. Restorative nostalgia is not so much about "the past" as about the restoration of the past through "invented" traditions (Hobsbawm 1990). Boym articulates restorative nostalgia as having two main plots: "the restoration of origins and the

[19] Boym (2008) actually conceives as nostalgia as not just between past and future but also "sideways" possibilities. She states "nostalgia is about the relationship between individual biography and the biography of groups or nations, between personal and collective memory. While futuristic utopias might be out of fashion, nostalgia itself has a utopian dimension—only it is no longer directed toward the future. Sometimes it is not directed toward the past either, but rather sideways. The nostalgic feels stifled within the conventional confines of time and space."

conspiracy theory [where] the conspiratorial worldview reflects a nostalgia for a transcendental cosmology and a simple premodern conception of good and evil" (Boym 2008). On the other hand *reflective* nostalgia is qualitatively different from restorative nostalgia. Boym (2008) explains further:

> "while restorative nostalgia returns and rebuilds one homeland with paranoid determination, reflective nostalgia fears return with the same passion. Instead of recreation of the lost home, reflective nostalgia can foster the creation of aesthetic individuality…. This type of nostalgic narrative is ironic, inconclusive, and fragmentary… and resist[s] the pressure of external efficiency and take sensual delight in the texture of time not measurable by clocks and calendars" (Boym 2008)

For example, perhaps one of the most profound examples of restorative nostalgia has been the emphasis among some Cuban exiles to restore Havana. Revered architect Nicolas Quintana released in 2008 Havana and its landscapes a nearly five hundred page two-volume book of texts, photos, illustrations, maps, and virtual images. Following the release, Quintana held symposiums featuring thirty-five models and sixty-two minutes of computer animation where "the [estimated] value of a single minute of computer animation is around $10,000 dollars" (Martinez 2007). The project, a nearly $800,000 investment, is centered around "creating a blueprint for the reconstruction of Havana whenever Cuba makes its transition to a free-market society." Quintana has not set eyes on Havana since he left in 1960; yet, he has recreated Havana "city block, by city block," through satellite images, books, and updated photographs smuggled to him by young Cubans (Martinez 2007). This is a clear example of restorative nostalgia through the yearning to return the city to its former glory while fearing actually returning to face the changes in Havana.

These two components of nostalgia can also be exemplified by the divergent themes of the "politics of regret" and "politics of nostalgia." Within the field of collective memory Jeffery Olick (2007) coined the term the "politics of regret" where he cited a surge in public apologies

and expressions of regret that manifested in movements for reparations and acceptance of human rights that worked to directly address past conflicts. As one of several memory scholars that analyze how nations grapple with atrocities, in this case the Holocaust, Olick (2007) defines modernity as a period of memory informed by the theme of "the politics of regret" where "political legitimation depends just as much on collective memory as it ever has but the collective memory is now often one disgusted with itself, a matter of learning the lessons of history more than of fulfilling its promise or remaining faithful to its legacy" (Olick 2007). Olick identified the "politics of regret" as "the past disgusted with itself" and global pressure to recognize and confront the wrongs of the past; however, current movements in the social realm of memory may have moved away from "regret." This is apparent through the recent U.S. movements to "Make American Great Again" utilized by Trump's campaign strategists to capitalize on the wrongs of the past.

Recent scholarship has offered a new frame entitled "the politics of nostalgia." For instance, Amy Sodaro (2013) in "Memory, History, and Nostalgia in Berlin's Jewish Museum" proposes that "Like Olick 's regret, nostalgia is a response to the complications and accelerations of modernity; it is a response that longs for a return to a past that was simpler and more coherent - a past that perhaps never was and certainly can never be again. This nostalgia is not just a symptom present in the post-communist world, but one that has permeated contemporary global society" (88). Sodaro's "politics of nostalgia" emphasizes a different frame of memory where "the past is very much on our minds today - both the negative past that Olick 's 'politics of regret' emphasizes, but also the simpler, happier past that the politics of nostalgia represents… [an] antidote to regret." (88). Sodaro posits that in order for societies to come to terms with their negative past, and past actions "a dose of nostalgic remembrance" can serve to soften the shame

of regret (88). These varying frames for plotting the "memoryscape" of collective memory and nostalgia are frequently fraught with critique on how to capture competing collective memories of varying groups and inequalities embedded within them particularly in international relations.

The call to recognize these struggles over memory and recognition by feminist scholarship is part of a larger critique of erasure and the politics of representation of marginalized groups (Hancock 2016, Harris-Perry 2011, Jacobs 2010). Feminist memory scholarship reminds us that memory studies and feminist studies have a longstanding relationship where feminist studies is in part a recollection of the collective memories of women and their work that was left out of the larger cultural and academic sphere (Hirsch and Smith 2002). Jacobs (2010) in her book *Memorializing the Holocaust* highlights that the strength of "bringing a feminist perspective to the study of memory helps to identify the relationships of power that inform the construction [and embedded images and meanings] of collective memory in both national and community settings" (23). Paletshek and Schraut (2008) in *The Gender of Memory* point out that "cultural memory mirrors the bourgeois gender model and has male orientation despite the claim that it is universal and inclusive" (11). These authors note that women and people of color as "actors, their agency, and self perceptions" are often left out of memory studies. In addition, the impact of memory culture on the construction of masculinity is also often left out (10-11). This analysis seeks to bridge the conceptual gap between memory (and nostalgia) and feminist intersectionality studies, which call for a rigorous analysis of the way power operates in the way US and Cuban relations are remembered and portrayed in the mass media.

Cuba as Nostalgic Metaphor

Cuba has played an integral role in the construction of U.S. national character (Knight and Palmer 1989, Pérez 2008a, Pérez 2003b). The U.S. media has long utilized the island as a means for illustrating what the U.S. is not; nevertheless, as Kaplan (2002) might suggest, this comparison has been fraught with inconsistencies where the U.S. state and citizens at times offer a paradox where Cuba represents a longing for 1950s US culture as well as foe. The cultural significance of Cuba as a national other, or foe, of the United States is longstanding and enduring dating back to the early 19th Century (Knight and Palmer 1989, Pérez 2008a).Nevertheless, the solidification of the 1960 U.S. embargo, may have only perpetuated and exaggerated the extent to which Cuba is a "figment of the [US] imagination," where "Americans arrive at a sense of themselves as a nationality and a nation" (Perez Jr 2008, p 2). While Perez Jr (2008) offers that Cuba is central to US national identity through metaphor, this analysis seeks to expand this work to consider how memory, and nostalgia in particular, play a key role. Nostalgia is an important concept, like that of metaphor, to explore how U.S. –Cuban relations are remembered and the meanings embedded in cultural memories for mass consumption by a U.S. based audience.

From blockbuster films and tv shows such as *Havana (1990), Thirteen Days (2000)*[20] to *Xmen First Class (2011),*[21] *House of Lies (2016),*[22] *Furious 8 (2017)*[23] and many other U.S. cultural texts, Cuba is framed in U.S. memory through the lens of the Cold War (a foe to the U.S.) or frozen in time (stuck in the 1950s). The focus on the Cuban Revolution and fractured relations between the U.S. and Cuba work to both essentialize Cuba as a national "other" yet re-create Cuba as a cultural site of nostalgia for the pre-revolution era. While the narratives of essentializing Cuba in tandem with nostalgia for 1950s "American" culture may seem paradoxical, both rationales reinforce support for US intervention in Cuba.

Nostalgia, as a sociological concept, is useful in analyzing the portraits of U.S-Cuban relations under the blockade. Its utility is its breadth for recognizing varying frames and solutions that disrupt typical uses of time and space. For instance, Svetlana Boym, in *The Future of Nostalgia,* highlights that nostalgia is a "double exposure or a superimposition of two images – of home and abroad, of past and present, of dream and everyday life. The moment we try to

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[20] This blockbuster U.S film is a docudrama of the Cuban Missile Crisis that had an estimated budget of $80,000,000. The film uses black and white images to call back to the coverage of the event that was depicted in Life, Time, and Newsweek magazines from the period.

[21] This Hollywood film is also based on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The film set in 1962 is one of good and evil in preventing nuclear war. It is of course science fiction; however, the emphasis on this event as the major lens for remembering U.S. – Cuban relations is clear.

[22] The season finale of this popular Showtime show was filmed in Cuba. It was the first U.S. show to jump on the opportunity given the loosened restrictions of the blockade. At the time, the director had not yet decided it would be the end of the show. However, he decides it should be the last episode of the series, because the main character is so taken by Cuba and "going back in time" that it alters the protagonist's character.

[23] *Furious 8* is the first Hollywood film to be made in Cuba since the implementation of the 1962 Blockade. According to Hollywood news, "the latest installment in the long-running action franchise, is famous for featuring — and destroying — some of the world's fastest and most exotic cars. [but] Now, it is immortalizing some of the oldest." See Here

force it into a single image, it breaks the frame or burns the surface" (2008: 32). A rigorous engagement with the concept of nostalgia allows for us to make sense of how the U.S. media portrays a longing to return to the pre-revolution time of U.S. and Cuba relations in tandem with rationales for maintaining political power over Cuba through the Embargo, which sanctions such relations. It also facilitates a better understanding of questioning why Cuba, as a nation, is perpetually portrayed as *frozen in time*.

Time and Newsweek 1959-2010: Remembering Cuba

While the U.S. government and media alike have given great attention to Cuba over the last half century, there are few monuments, memorials, or spaces of recognition for the longstanding history between the two nations in the United States. While Cuban American communities have worked to create monuments (such as "Liberty Column[24]," "Cuban Memorial Plaza[25]), libraries and collections (such as "Cuban Heritage Collection,[26] "Cuban Research Institute[27]), and cultural

[24] "Liberty Column" is a monument located in Bay Front Park just outside an intercontinental hotel in Miami, Florida. The monument was revealed in 1994 in remembrance of Cuban rafters by sculpter Enzo Gallo. The plaque accompanying the monument reads:
"Since 1959, thousands of Cubans have perished anonymously while fleeing tyranny in small boats and makeshift rafts although their names, like martyred refugees of other nations, are written solely on the pages of the sea, this column is a permanent testimony of the human need to be free" (see Duke University Caribbean Sea Repository).

[25] Cuban Memorial Plaza is a section of Miami known as "Little Havana" that includes the monument to the those that lost their lives at the Bay of Pigs Invasion as well as a library dedicated to recovering artifacts from the Bay of Pigs Invasion.

[26] The Cuban Heritage Collection is a longstanding collection of artifacts from the Cuban exile diaspora. It was started in the 1960s but established in the 1980s with the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida. (See Cuban Heritage Collection).

[27] The Cuban Research Institute is the leading research institute on Cuba and Cuban Americans in the United States founded in 1991 as part of Florida International University. (See Cuban Research Institute)

spaces to remember this history, arguably the most widespread recognition and attention given to U.S. Cuban relations is through mainstream U.S. media. Opinion polls from *CBS News* and the *New York Times* report that the majority of people in the United States receive their information regarding Cuba and the US relationship with Cuba from television and newspapers. In fact, even members of the Cuban American community in the Miami-Dade area report receiving their information from US television and newspapers[28]

Media, as a conduit of the public sphere, is key to communicating to the nation about the nation and plays a pivotal role in what is remembered. In fact, Anderson (1991) argues that media, particularly the printing press, is what allowed for national imagining and the construction of a symbolic community. Since the works of Anderson (1991) and Smith (1991), scholarship on nationhood has expounded upon these ideas illustrating both the importance of memory and othering to the construction of nationhood. Nationhood involves memory, or "imagining" a national past and present, and is constructed and remade through discussions of national others (Calhoun 1997; Palmer 2017). Jo McCormack in her book *Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954-1962)* makes the connection between memory and media explicit. McCormack states:

> "The mass media now play a crucial role in informing and shaping public consciousness on many issues. A tremendous amount of our understanding of the world is influenced by…media. This is no less true concerning our understanding of the past. The media are a vector of memory in so far as they construct representations of the past in terms of choices concerning what is represented, how, when, where and how often. Memories are transmitted through the media and literally made collective" (133).

[28] According to the 2014 Florida International University (FIU) report, 80 percent of Cuban Americans surveyed received their news on Cuba from US television and newspapers (Cuban Research Institute 2014).

Therefore, the ways in which the media portray Cuba, particularly under the Embargo, may be central to creating a collective memory; not only because media is a major means through which national and international memories may be constructed and retold, but also due to the U.S. embargo which limits opportunities for people in the U.S. to see or hear alternative portraits and/or memories.

U.S. Media – Time and Newsweek

First, in order to capture the narratives of collective memory of Cuba in the United States, I created an archive of articles (and covers) from *Time* and *Newsweek* from 1959 – 2010. My sample includes 763 articles and covers of Cuba from two major U.S. media outlets Time and Newsweek from January 1959 to May 2010[29] (see Figure 1 below). The study focuses on magazines, specifically Time and Newsweek, for several reasons: (1) among all media genres magazines are one of the most central to the production of national social imaginaries, or the social totality and individuals' relationship with it, because it reports events of key interest to the society as a society, are readily available in digital and print form, and have potential to reach a wide audience (Chomsky and Herman 1988, Couldry 2003); (2) have the status of flagship newsmagazines meaning that they report the highest readership, generally over four million readers every week independently, and are upheld as quintessentially American newsmagazines (Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007); (3) Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report, have

[29] My sampling frame for articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek came from The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature Retrospective (1890 to 1982) and The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature (1983 to Present), a reference guide to recently published articles in periodical magazines and scholarly journals organized by subject. This provided a sample of 793 articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek from January 1959 to May 2010. After an initial reading, thirty articles were eliminated from the analysis, because they were not articles on Cuba but rather only mentioned Cuba once, usually as a location.

devoted and are known for substantial attention to national and global affairs; (4) are part of large American conglomerates where media portrayals and journalism are often shared among other internal agencies (Chomsky and Herman 1988, Lippmann 2008); (5) are part of large conglomerates, especially Time as part of Time Warner, which also gives them global reach (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 2003); and (6) are the only flagship magazines that span the whole period from 1959 to 2010, which captures the entire period of the blockade where travel and trade were restricted making American reliance on media discourse on Cuba even more essential.



Figure 1: U.S. Time & Newsweek Articles on Cuba from January 1959 to May 2010

Second, using a content analysis of 763 articles on Cuba in *Time* and *Newsweek*, I employed an ethnographic content analysis (ECA) to guide my research. In this chapter I wish to consider how Cuba is remembered and how U.S. – Cuban relations are portrayed in U.S. mainstream media. Therefore, I utilize ECA as a tool that allows for the systematic and rigorous analysis of all modes of information. This allows for an analysis that includes the modes of narrative, visual imagery, style, maps, and extent of coverage (Altheide 1987). ECA closely resembles textual and places an emphasis on "constant discovery and comparison [where]…data

are often coded conceptually so that one item may be relevant for several purposes" rather than reliable discrete predetermined categories (Altheide 1987). In other words, ECA allows the researcher to take into account the overall intended meaning of the text rather than only its discrete parts. This provides an analysis that centers the importance of narrative, imagery, thick description, and recognition of conceptual tensions that may emerge. It also allows for concepts of memory and nostalgia, which can take many forms, to be more thoroughly explored.

Theme	Intended Meanings	Number of Articles
Ineffective Masculinity	Focuses as Cuba as a problem for the U.S. through highlighting deficiencies in Cuban male leadership	422
Cuba: Frozen in Time under the U.S. blockade	Re-occurring theme that focuses on tourism & critiques of communism as "going back in time."	204
Cuban Migrants	Links between countries; immigration; international negotiations; case of Elián González	174

Table 1: Key Themes of Cuba and U.S. – Cuban relations in U.S. Media (Time and Newsweek: January 1959 – May 2010)

Third, using ECA and an open coding scheme, I coded these articles and images into several general categories (see Table 1 above)[30]. These categories revealed a range of themes for how U.S. – Cuban relations have been portrayed in U.S. media through a lens of being *frozen in time*. In order to fully capture the way in which Cuba is frozen in the US imaginary, I identify the way in which main the blockade is used as a lens that figuratively re-creates Cuba as set in a

[30] The two most frequent categories in U.S. media data and representations of Cuba include "Frozen in time" and "Ineffective Masculinity." For more information on "Ineffective Masculinity" see Palmer, Jamie L. 2017. "Ineffective Masculinity: Intersection of Masculinity and Nationhood in Portraits of Cuban Men from Time and Newsweek 1959–2010." *Men and Masculinities*:1097184X17696184. doi: 10.1177/1097184X17696184.

"cold war time warp." The blockade as a means to remember U.S.-Cuban relations may reinforce controlling images of Cuba to support U.S. foreign policies that reconstruct 19th century narratives of Cuba as a nation not capable of self-government and sovereignty. Together the two narratives work to "figuratively freeze Cuba in time in the US imaginary" (Palmer 2017)and demonstrate the dynamic ways nostalgia is utilized to create a controlling image of Cuba as a nation that functions as a form of social control in the United States.

Patricia Hill Collins defines controlling images as symbols and narratives "designed to make racism, sexism, and poverty appear to be natural, normal, and inevitable" (68). Collins points out that "even when the political and economic conditions that originally generated controlling images disappear, such images prove remarkably tenacious…[and] are key in maintaining interlocking systems of class, race, and gender oppression" (68). Similarly, even though the threat of the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis have long passed, the portrayals of Cuba as *frozen in time* remain as the rationale to promote US foreign policy that reinforces global inequality in power between the first and third world nation. For instance, Landau (2008) in "Cuba" Half a Century of Distorted News and Counting…" points to the way US media has "repeated U.S. government pretexts for anti-Cuban polices" and constructed an image of Cuba as stuck "in the Cold War" (50). Landau goes as far as to critique the US media portraits of Cuba stating that "uninformed readers could well conclude from [US news] stories that only one person lived on the island just south of the Florida Keys and that [Fidel] Castro had won his place in the Guinness Book of World Records for length of time spent disobeying the United States" (Landau 2008; p. 51). Beyond Landau's observation, the representation of Cuba as *Frozen in Time* and a "problem for the United States" perpetuates a much more longstanding controlling image of Cuba. Peréz Jr, notes how Cuba has always played a key role in US foreign

policy for creating a "metaphor" that rarely engages Cuba beyond the "US imagination" and views control over Cuba as essential to maintaining the social order in the United States and Western hemisphere, by ensuring Cuban socialism fails as part of a longer discourse of what Ada Ferrer (1999) as preventing "another Haiti".

Cuba as metaphor, especially through a lens of nostalgia, in many ways explains more about U.S. culture and justifications for U.S. intervention abroad than about Cuba and the people who live there. It is one that requires an analysis of what is remembered as well as what is "forgotten" in order to understand the history and contemporary logics of empire. In *Insurgent Cuba*, Ferrer points out the conspicuous erasure of Cuba's nineteenth-century rebellions and war for independence. She states "interpreting Cuba's nineteenth-century rebellions as an ambitious anticolonial and antiracist revolution makes all the more conspicuous the absence of that revolution from historical cannons…[where] it seems strange that few people in the United States…have ever heard of this revolution. The explanation for this apparent paradox lies largely in the unusual transition to peace in 1898 , when Cuba's anticolonial war ended not with the founding of an independent Cuban republic but with the emergence of the modern world's most powerful empire" (Ferrer 1999). While the metaphors of Cuba utilized in US media to support US intervention in Cuba's war for independence "served to advance US interests and were in turn mediated by racial attitudes and gender hierarchies" which allow "insight into the cultural models and social relationships in which the US imperial project was conditioned" (Pérez 2008a). Nevertheless, how metaphor and memory have been utilized to maintain the American imperial project after the Cold War where Cuba has continued to play a key role is less clear.

The period after the Cold War was both volatile and key in US emergence as a global superpower where Cuba has played a key role for legitimizing US imperial control in Latin

America (Bernell 2011). Said (1993) points out that the US emerged "after the period of the Cold War…as the last superpower" and that "each great metropolitan center that aspired to global dominance has said, and alas done, many of the same things. There is always the appeal to power and national interest in running the affairs of lesser peoples…there is the horrifically predictable disclaimer that 'we' are exceptional, not imperial, not about to repeat the mistake of earlier powers, a disclaimer that has routinely followed by making the mistake, as witness the Vietnam and Golf Wars" (xxiii). Additionally, Said (1993) notes "appeals to the past are among the most common strategies in interpretations about the present" (3). Authors have cited the ways in which the Cuban Revolution came at a time of social unrest in the United States where civil rights leaders in the United States, who brought U.S. racial inequality to the national stage, made other nations question "how the United States could argue that its form of government was a model for the world when American democracy accommodated racial oppression" (Dudziak 2000). African Americans, as the victims of persistent discrimination, became an ever-present threat to US credibility abroad where "the Soviet Union's extensive use of Little Rock[31] in Anti-American propaganda- often simply republishing facts disseminated from U.S. news sources" worked to question the US form of government and democracy as the world model (Dudziak 2000). The Cuban-Soviet connection made Cuba a particular threat to internal stability during the civil rights movement (Nadel 2005), particularly around the issue of race, and "American global interests" in a way that "has not been paralleled (in scope and length of time) by any other regime in the world" (Bernell 2011).

[31] This quote is referring to the "Little Rock Crisis" where nine African American students tried to enroll at Little Rock Arkansas's Central High School. Dudziak (2000) marks this event as a national problem for the United States which garnered international attention.

Cuba in the U.S. media has played a pivotal role in "perpetuating the myth of American superiority" which in "bolster[ing] hegemony, influence, [and] power" (Bernell 2011). Through this analysis, my goal is to offer that metaphor is tied intimately to collective memory and nostalgia of relations between the U.S. and Cuba. In order to provide a more thorough understanding of how the "anarchy of empire" reveals the myths of U.S. superiority "the American Empire has long followed a double impetus to construct boundaries and patrol all movement across them and to break down those borders for unfettered expansion" (Kaplan 2002). The myth according to Bernell (2011) "continually reproduced this superiority over successive generations" used to "justify their [interventionist] policies" are based on "conjuring up a subject in terms of difference" (20). The "American specimen," or the United States, is portrayed as "civilized, cultured, advanced, strong, manly, at the top of the racial hierarchy, rich, prosperous, developed, and a guardian of democracy;" whereas the Latin character is portrayed as "on who is uncivilized, backward, a mongrel, racially and culturally inferior, weak, effeminate, poor, underdeveloped, and incapable of self-government" (Bernell 2011). Through an analysis of representations of Cuba and the significance of memory in understanding the "unusual…escalation in Anti-Cuban sentiment and policy intensify[cation] with the end of the Cold War," my goal is to begin to shed light on Bernell's questions of the role myth plays and how we might better understand "what it is about the United States' relationship with Cuba that provides for the continuation, and even intensification of a Cold War policy into the post-Cold War era" (Bernell 2011).

Remembering Cuba as "frozen in time" the Nostalgia of the Blockade

Portraits of Cuba in *Time* and *Newsweek* as *Frozen in Time* reveal two main modes of remembering U.S.-Cuban relations that through the lens of the blockade figuratively locking

Cuba in time: (a) economic warfare – a failing Cuba and (b) stuck in the past - creating a 1950s US tourist site. These portraits reveal the way in which memory as a "politics of nostalgia" is constructed and perpetuated through a focus on particular historical events (anniversaries of the Cuban Revolution, US Blockade, Bay of Pigs Invasion, and Cuban Missile Crisis) and actors across time, particularly Fidel Castro as the main Cuban male leader. Data reveal the way media highlight and focus on events around the Cuban Revolution and severing of diplomatic relations as a major theme for framing news and information around international relations with Cuba even contemporarily.

The lens of *Frozen in Time* functions as both restorative and reformative. It invokes restorative ideas through a longing to return to the past, through the lens of the blockade; meanwhile also proposing reformative ideas of an alternative future through the projection that after Fidel the country will "inevitably change." Kaplan's articulation of the "anarchy of empire" pulls from both Du Bois who "saw empire itself as the prime cause of anarchy" and "imperialists [who] believed that the anarchic qualities of nonwhite peoples called forth the need for imperial rule" (13). She states that "anarchy is conjured by imperial culture as a haunting specter that must be subdued and controlled, and at the same time, it is a figure of empire's undoing" (13). The focus on Cuba as perpetually constructed through a lens of the Cold War reinforces the nation and its people as a "problem for the US" and a "haunting spectacle" of the cold war crisis that threatened the United States. Nevertheless, tropes simultaneously create a nostalgic place "frozen in time." These portraits for portraying U.S. –Cuban relations are important because they work as a frame of reference for remembering the relationship between U.S. and Cuba. Although this double portrait provides insight into the reasons for the U.S. embargo, and an understanding of U.S. foreign policy and nationhood, they accomplish this only by failing nearly entirely to

recognize the lives of Cuban citizens. Additionally, they are embedded with narratives that reinforce the myth and legitimacy of American imperialism[32]. In other words, they recall to readers what the U.S. and Cuba were in the past, and what could have been, that justify US interventionist ideologies which undermine Cuba's ability to participate, as a sovereign nation, in the world economic system. In turn, the two main modes for figuratively freezing Cuba in time through the lens of the blockade (A) economic warfare - a failing Cuba and (B) stuck in the past, both deviate from previous representations of Cuba. They do not feature women and people of color or refer to Cuba with the once common female pronouns that Pérez Jr shows were common for promoting US intervention in the past. Instead, these two modes work together to demonstrate the legitimacy of US foreign policy and turn Cuba into a place to consume and "experience" a "politics of nostalgia" for 1950s American culture.

Frozen in Time: U.S.-Cuban Relations through the Lens of the Blockade

First, one of the most common ways Cuba is remembered in U.S. media is through the lens of the Cuban Revolution and "cold war politics" through a focus Cuba itself as a place "frozen in time" by the U.S. blockade. The Cuban Revolutionary period is constantly re-made in portraits of Cuba across the decades in many ways erasing any understanding of a contemporary Cuba; however, it is not Cuba but U.S. memory of Cuba that is "frozen" and the U.S. embargo that has become commemorative practice. Of the 763 articles on Cuba in Time and Newsweek

[32] My definition of imperialism is borrowed from Edward Said, where he defines imperialism as "the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory….[and empire] is a relationship formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another…"Said, Edward W. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*: Vintage.

from 1959-2010, 204 recall the U.S. embargo of Cuba. While support for the embargo shifts over the 50 year span, the embargo itself becomes a means for freezing Cuba in a "cold war time warp." The shift in support for the embargo changes with the aging of the Cuban Revolution as embodied by "ineffective masculinity" where the future of the Cuban Revolution is tied to the impossibility for success through the inadequacies of Cuban male leaders (Palmer) and prophecies of their deaths (Bernell 2011). The lens of the Blockade works to highlight a "politics of nostalgia" by being both backward and forward looking in time; furthermore, it works as a means to reinterpret the failures of US foreign policy to dislodge Castro and the Cuban revolution by highlighting how it has led to the unintended consequence of creating a place *frozen in time*. Freezing Cuba in time is a shift in the "anarchy of empire" where colonial portraits of Cuba as inadequate for sovereignty are replaced by a push for tourism in establishing power in Cuba that call upon those portraits as nostalgic.

In spite of consequences of the embargo that have largely in the global sphere been recognized as having deleterious impact on Cuba and its people (Hernández-Truyol 2009), there is no "politics of regret" in remembering U.S. foreign policy and intervention in Cuba; in fact, the Embargo is understood through a "politics of nostalgia." The "politics of nostalgia" fails to recognize the dynamic changes that have more frequently than not tightened the restrictions on U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba (Bernell 2012, Feldbaum and Michaud 2010, Sullivan 2014) and portrays the maintenance of the social closure as a sort of political legacy and commemorative practice that will only end with the end of the Revolution (and death of Fidel and Raul Castro). While the recent efforts under President Obama to begin to "thaw" relations have been impacted by the current Trump administration to uphold the commemorative practice of the U.S. blockade and reinstate restrictions. In sum, the small changes in narrative across time

does not result in support to end the economic restrictions of the blockade entirely, but rather for Americans to be ready to control the "change that will inevitably come" to the island of Cuba (Wylie 2005).

For instance, the TIME article best exemplifies how the blockade is central to effectively *freezing Cuba in time* and celebrating the US policy, is one published in October 2015 entitled "The US trade embargo of Cuba just hit 55". It begins with a picture of Fidel Castro in green army fatigues[33] accompanied by the caption "Fidel Castro announces general mobilization after the announcement of Cuba blockade by US President John F Kennedy, in Havana, on Oct. 29, 1962." The 2015 article highlights the way U.S. media coverage of Cuba focuses on remembering the Cuban Revolution, leaders, and the "communist" turn, but rarely recognizes the contemporary issues or debates around the U.S. embargo. The entire article focuses on a re-cap of the 1960s event, even going as far as to block quote a section from a 1960 TIME article:

> "'Washington last week slapped Havana with the most severe trade embargo imposed on any nation except Red China. Under penalty of a $10,000 fine and ten years' imprisonment, the U.S. barred from Cuba, which traditionally buys 70% of its foreign goods in the U.S., two-thirds of all American imports. Only medicines and nonsubsidized foods, such as canned goods, may still be shipped.'" (Fabry 2015)

It continues with the statement that "The U.S. Commerce Secretary was blasé about the embargo's potential to drive Cuba further to the Soviet side, saying, 'Too bad. After all, we've been the ones who've been pushed around lately.'" And then concludes with "[and today] It's one of the longest running embargoes in U.S. history" (Fabry 2015). On the one hand, the re-creation of the period of the 1960s which led to the embargo and severing of diplomatic relations highlights how the United States was "being pushed around." On the other, however, the

[33] For image see: See TIME

celebratory focus on the "US trade Embargo of Cuba just hit[ting] 55" suggests that the embargo is a significant event in U.S. diplomatic history worthy of commemoration. In addition, the article provides keen insight into how the lens of the blockade is the means through which contemporary dialogue about Cuba is filtered.

Remembering Embargo- Economic Warfare and A Failing Cuba

From the 1960s through the 1980s, media reports frequently referred to the embargo as a means to economically crush the revolution in Cuba, specifically to end "Castro's Revolution." Articles highlight the blockade as a political strategy to "tighten the screws on Cuba" (Newsweek 1962a, Newsweek 1962b), to "forge ahead with an oil blockade, or whatever other measures necessary were needed, to bring down the Cuban dictator [Fidel Castro] (Newsweek 1962a), and to end "Castro's Revolution" (See Time's 1979 reports the "Storm over Cuba" and "the Trouble in the Caribbean"). These articles detail the U.S. foreign policy plan to use the blockade as a means of political and economic warfare that freeze relations and create an image of Cuba as economically, and ideologically, stuck in the past. The shortages in U.S. goods such as "razors," "food," "oil," and "groceries" are highlighted and foreseen to put pressure on the new revolutionary leaders hopefully spurring a future uprising in Cuba against socialism. It is also important to note that these articles attempt to paint Cuban socialism as a "failed experiment." For American readers, this representation of Cuba, and by extension communism itself "as a failed experiment...encourages the metaphor of the endgame, in which the primary concern is the length of time the regime will be able to survive" (Bernell 2011).

Articles highlight the prophecy of the end the Revolution through an emphasis on economic failure where the US Blockade of Cuba is meant to spur a counter-revolution. For

instance, in the article "Pachanga Revised" the author announces that "the results of this [economic] slowdown and of the U.S. embargo are only too dear to shoppers – there are no new radios; it's hard to find razor blades or electric light bulbs. Havana today is studded with traffic lights which don't work…Almost every car that breaks down stays broken down for lack of parts. The shortages even extend to basic foods…[but] They don't mind whatever sacrifices they have to make to build a brave new Cuba; on the contrary they glory in it. *That's the new version of pachanga*" (Levine 1961). Another article from TIME states "*The U.S. intends to keep on applying all the economic and political pressures it can. It also counts on increasing disaffection among the Cubans themselves, based on their lack of food and their lack of liber*ty (emphasis mine)." (TIME 1963). Even after the devastating Hurricane Flora hit Cuba in 1963 where it "killed 1,200 Cubans, flattened 11,000 homes, and ruined over $100 million worth of sugar cane [Cuba's main export in a one-crop economy]" the U.S. refused to budge on the blockade. The article cites "Castro finally pleaded last week for an 'end of the criminal blockade.' But Washington insisted there would be no change…" (Newsweek 1963). In "Anniversary song" the narrative continues by quoting Castro during his anniversary speech that the "revolution…is now invincible. He boasted…that the island's economy was improving by leaps and bounds, and that its sugar production would double to 10 million tons a year by 1970. *But facts say otherwise…The U.S.'s economic blockade is beginning: to hurt hard, as Cuba's shortages of tools, machinery, and fuel increase (emphasis mine)*." (Newsweek 1964b). The articles reveal the tension in the prophecy of the blockade as an effective means to change Cuba, and undermine the revolution, despite its impact on the economic stability and development of the country. It is highlighted as a policy that will spur change by depriving the Cuban people even if it had to "starve them into submission" (Pérez 2003a)

Nevertheless, when the prophecy of the blockade as an effective means to spur counter-revolution seems to be in doubt[34], the arguments claim that it is those countries breaking the political sanction in international trade that are the main source of the problem. For instance, a 1964 article entitled "Cuba: A hole in the Embargo" details this move to sanction the sale of buses from England to Cuba in order to "end the hole" in the embargo. The article highlights:

> "Ever since 1960, the U.S. has been putting an economic squeeze on Communist Cuba with what amounts to be an unofficial trade embargo. Free world nations are urged not to do business with Castro, and all vessels in Cuban trade are blacklisted from picking up U.S. government financed cargo. So far 196 vessels are on the forbidden list; free world trade has skidded from $1.3 billion in 1959 to less than $300 million last year, leaving Castro almost totally dependent on his Iron Curtain friends" (TIME 1964).

The article shows both the success of the blockade in economically stifling Cuba's economy in that "so far 196 vessels are on the forbidden list" and "free world trade has skidded from $1.3 billion to less than $300 million last year;" however, the failure of the policy to achieve its intended results, of ending the revolution, are largely seen as a result of other countries not fully upholding the policy. One such example, in "Breaching the Blockade," the article details how Sweden has made a "mockery of the West's US imposed trade embargo." Nevertheless, the author still fosters support for the policy and its "success" in that "Cuba's trade with the West was cut by more than 75% since Castro's takeover" (Newsweek 1964c). The 1960s articles aver that the US "has no intention to change its policy" (Newsweek 1964a). In this period, the goal is

[34] Authors of these articles telling the history of the blockade as tied to the Cuban revolution, and anniversaries of the revolution, begin to have to confront the revolution as lasting longer than was expected. In fact, even in those years in the immediate aftermath of the revolution there was a tendency in many of these articles to highlight the emergence of anniversaries.

to tighten the blockade as a more effective means of ending "the problem with Cuba" than the previous "failed" attempts of the Bay of Pigs Invasion[35].

This narrative continues throughout the 1970s, articulating the failure of the U.S. foreign policy (blockade) on Cuba as a result of other countries not complying with its restrictions. In "The Trend that Failed" the author continues to highlight the difficulty of maintaining the embargo with other nations in the world. The article which highlights the fear of "revolution spreading in Latin America" asks how "the Castro trip to Chile…fit[s] into the big picture?" The answer it was claimed was that:

> "For Castro himself, it was a highly successful visit-one *that put an end to seven years of U.S. imposed isolation from the hemisphere* (emphasis mine)…'Simpatico' is the Spanish word, and it was used often by Chileans…as they listened to the tall broad-shouldered Cuban talking to them in his own distinctive, chatty style. Castro's dark, curly beard is now flecked with white, and at 44 there are signs of middle age about the waistline. And while he rarely missed an opportunity to berate the 'imperialists' of the 'great, greedy, colossus of the north" (Barnes 1971).

The article ends with the prediction that some Latin American nations might venture to trade with Cuba in spite of the U.S. foreign policy sanctions; nevertheless, the prophecy is that the blockade will outlive Castro, the symbol of Cuba's revolution.

Shifting Discourse – Politics of Nostalgia

By the early 1980s, the blockade was portrayed though of a lens of nostalgia. The position that one may infer from the articles is that the blockade would economically starve

[35] Articles highlight with repetition the failures of the Bay of Pigs Invasion to "dislodge Castro." See TIME. 1965. "Bay of Pigs Revisited: Lessons from a Failure." *TIME*, July 30, 1965., Newsweek. 1965. "How Could I Have Been So Stupid?", August 2, 1965.,Murphy, Charles J.V. 1975. "The Assassination Plot That Failed." *TIME*, June 30, 1975.,Gelman, David. 1977. "Jfk, Castro-and Controversy." *Newsweek*, July 18,1977.,Gelman, David and Elaine Shannon. 1978. "A Tremendous Insanity." Ibid., October 2, 1978.,Gates, David and Linda Prout. 1986. "Lessons from the Bay of Pigs?" Ibid., April 28, 1986, Will, George E. Ibid."The First Contras." March 31, 1986.

Cubans into revolting against the revolution and returning U.S. – Cuban relations to the status quo ante. When it becomes clear that the blockade as economic and political warfare has not spurred the counter-revolution "sure to come to the island," the call to change the policy of the blockade from isolation to an "invasion of ideas" and "capitalism" is highlighted through a nostalgia for the U.S. tourist paradise of the "pre-Castro Cuba."

Articles take note of how support for the U.S. blockade was diminishing among the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as Europe. Instead one can observe in the articles from the 1970s a nostalgia for Cuba as the United States' previous tourist island of choice. Simultaneously a narrative of Cuba as "isolated," "lonely," and "stuck in the past" become more common. In "Waiting for that Yankee Dollar" the author laments the loss of nostalgic sites such as the famous "Tropicana Nightclub". The author highlights "Gone are the brothels and mafia-led casinos; in today's *sanitized Havana…[and] the old deluxe hotels have gone to seed* (emphasis mine)" (Waiting for that Yankee Dollar TIME 1977). The article is paired with the picture of an Afro-Cuban woman, "a brightly plumed show girl performing at the Tropicana nightclub" for a crowd of all men, predominately white tourists. Next to that image is a picture of a "vintage American car." The lamentation of the Cuba that "used- to be" emerges. In "A Cruise to the New Cuba" the article highlights how Cuba is "ill equipped to compete [for tourists] with Nassau, Montego Bay, or with the *bawdy pre-Castro Havana (emphasis mine)*" (Proffitt Newsweek 1977).

These 1970s and 1980s articles begin the narrative of a contemporary Cuba as stuck in the past in a way that creates a longing to revive US tourism as well as undermine the success of the Cuban Revolution. The article "What is Cuba like *today* (emphasis mine)?" perhaps makes this clear. "Havana has become a city with a divided soul. It survives on Marxist-Leninist

austerity and capitalist hand me downs…[where] brand new Russia made Ladas pull up at stop signs alongside 1956 Chevys and Fords that manage somehow to keep running…That is not to say the Cuban Revolution should be judged a complete failure Havana is a clean, if joyless, city" (Rohter 1980). The article "Cuba: The Revolution at 25" remarks:

> "Cubans are eager to point out the progress, *but at first glance what its most striking is evidence of the past*… The Tropicana Club- 'A Paradise Under the Stars'- still shakes to a Latin beat as a seemingly endless line of barely dressed chorus girls strut amid the palm trees. The aging houses line the narrow, winding streets of old Havana as cigar-chomping men in guayaberas saunter about. And, of course*, there are the cars*. Stepping, into the damp night chill at Jose Marti Airport, they catch your eye as you slowly adjust to the early-morning darkness. *It is a sight out of the 1950s -Plymouths, Fords and Chevys in all their prerevolutionary tail-finned glory*." (Gonzalez, David Newsweek 1985).

The articles show the way the narrative of Cuba is fixated on a Cuba as stuck in the past, notably through US cultural items (particularly vintage cars) and previously popular tourist sites (the Tropicana) in a way that combines the past and the present. Cuba no longer represents the same "Cold War threat" and the "sanitized Havana" becomes a place to experience the failures of the Revolution as stuck in the past, poor, and "joyless."

The embargo becomes the means for *freezing Cuba in time* while simultaneously creating an image of Cuba as a nostalgic place for experiencing old U.S. cultural items that re-create Cuba as a uniquely forbidden but enticing place for tourists. For instance, in a 1981 Newsweek article entitled "Castro's Ragged Revolution," the article highlights this connection:

> "The real Cuba is an enervated little island whose *successes* contrast with its *physical decay* (emphasis mine)… [where] many Cubans are getting impatient with the shortages [partially attributed to the success of the blockade] they must endure. Outwardly, their society seems practically *frozen in time (emphasis my own)* by the U.S. trade embargo in 1962. Home telephones are still a luxury. Despite new Soviet cars, Havana's narrow streets are jammed with *Buicks and Chevrolets older than the revolution* (emphasis mine)" (Nissen 1981).

While U.S. tourism to Cuba is sanctioned by the blockade, it doesn't prevent authors from playing up Cuba as a nostalgic site; meanwhile, they use this image to highlight the failures of

the revolution and maintaining a narrative of "what will happen when Fidel goes." The article "Whispers Behind the Slogans: On Castro's Isle, '53 Chevys, boom boxes, and American Dreams" begins with a quote from a 1938 tourist guide book to Cuba. The article follows "Nowadays, of course, the situation is different. For more than two decades, Cuba has been virtually off limits for U.S. citizens. Recently however, TIME's contributor…[spent] roughly three weeks as a tourist of Fidel Castro's Cuba" The contributor, Pico Iyer, remarks

> "the qualities that hit a visitor most forcibly on arrival in Cuba are its beauty and its buoyancy: the crooked streets and the sunlit Spanish courtyards of Old Havana; the chrome polished 1953 Chevrolets that croak along tree-lined streets past faded but still gracious homes of lemon yellow, orange, and sky blue…Yet beneath the infectious island rhythms, there is a sad steady whisper…As Castro's Revolution shuffles through its 29th year…chaos is everywhere apparent" (Iyer, Pico TIME 1987).

The article is accompanied with the pictures of the Tropicana night club and vintage US car followed by images of "Communism with a Caribbean touch." These articles which create an interesting tension through a focus on vintage US cultural items begins to pave the way for re-assessing the blockade as an effective strategy through prophesizing the end of the Revolution, particularly through Fidel Castro's demise or death.

The late 1980s and 1990s article titles begin to be question the blockade as an effective policy and rather than "isolation" the possibility of moving toward a policy of "an invasion of ideas," especially when Fidel Castro "dies," become a new proposal. Article titles and headlines demonstrate this prophecy of the "end of Fidel" with incredible frequency: "Fidel's Race Against Time: with Communism fading in the East Bloc, Castro faces his toughest challenge as he clings to his Leninist vision of a socialist state"(Beyer 1990), "Florida waits for Fidel to Fall: 'Conventional wisdom is he can't last a year'" (McKillop 1990), "After Fidel a deluge of deals: U.S. businesses get ready for a post-Castro Cuba" (Reiss 1992b), Autumn of the Patriarch: Is Castro's regime nearing its final months?" (Reiss 1992a), "Putting the Squeeze on Fidel: With

Cuba's economy running on empty should the embargo be tightened or ended?"(Mabry 1992), "Requiem for a Revolution: Few Cubans even pretend to stand 'with Fidel' anymore, as a once defiant outpost of the Soviet bloc slides toward a collapse that Castro cannot stop,"(Reiss 1993), "Cuba Alone: Castro's socialist dream has turned into a nightmare. Isolated, hungry, and broke, the country hopes a touch of capitalism will save it," (McGeary and Booth 1993) and resulting in questioning "Is it time to lift the Cuban Embargo?" (McCallister 1994) and "Will a tighter Embargo really bring down Castro?" (McCallister 1995). The data highlight the prophecy of the "Cuban revolution's demise [which] have been greatly exaggerated for years" and showcases that the Cuban revolution will die with the "deaths of Fidel and Raúl Castro" (Bernell 2011)

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, articles promote an end to the blockade. The shift from "isolation" and economic warfare as a foreign policy strategy is portrayed as a partial failure and outdated; furthermore, the new move towards "engagement" is seen as a superior strategy for "promoting freedom and democracy…[because the new] argument is made that Cuban communism stands no chance in the face of American tourists and business people being let loose upon the island"(Bernell 2011) The data highlight Cuba as effectively *frozen in time*, which now poses little threat to the United States (beyond a mass exodus of more Cuba emigrants). For instance, one Time 2009 article entitled "The Moment" illustrates how the anniversary of the Revolution offers a time to reflect on the status of US-Cuban relations. The article highlights the relations as "stuck in a Cold War time warp" stating:

> "It's fitting that New Year's Day marked the Cuban revolution's 50th anniversary. It's a time for resolutions, and Washington and Havana have an opportunity to make some big ones. They can start by acknowledging that after 50 years of enmity, both sides can claim only partial victories. *Washington has maintained its trade embargo against Havana yet failed to dislodge Fidel Castro* (emphasis mine), alienating much of the hemisphere in the process. The Castro regime has stood up to a half- century of *yanqui* aggression and championed the poor but also sports a basket-case economy and a bleak human-rights record. *Felicidades!* With a new year and a new U.S. Administration, though, *there's*

> *hope that Washington and Havana can wake up from their Cold War time warp* (emphasis mine) and smell the *café cubano"* (Padgett 2009*)*.

The new narrative that Cuba, and U.S.-Cuban relations, as *frozen in time*, have done little to spur the expected changes now purposes, through a politics of nostalgia, a new modus operandi which is engagement.

The argument that Cuba, an island *frozen in time*, now poses little to no threat to the United States, becomes common-place. For instance in the 2008 article "The Wrong Experience," the author states:

> "Consider Cuba policy…Almost anyone who is being honest will acknowledge that America's approach toward Cuba is brain dead. *No one even remembers why we've imposed a total embargo on the island. A policy that was put into place during the height of the cold war, when fears of Soviet missiles and communist penetration were at their peak, has been maintained even though the threat that prompted it has collapsed (emphasis mine)*. What exactly are we afraid that this *moth -eaten* island will do to America today?" (Zakaria 1998).

The author characterizes Cuba as a relatively powerless "moth-eaten" island. The article "Cuba's Chance" highlights this point "With Fidel Castro finally fading from the scene, his brother and heir Raúl, has a golden opportunity to take the country on a new path to freedom. *The U.S. can help if its prepared to break some shackles of its own* (emphasis mine)" (Padgett 2008). The key to the change in support for the U.S. blockade, which has become a commemorative aspect for reflecting on U.S.-Cuban relations, is that soon the U.S. will "succeed," because Castro's "time is running out." The narrative points out that when Fidel, inevitably dies, the U.S. will want to be "there" to guide the Cuba's future.

The blockade, while critiqued as having failed to "dislodge Castro" is only seen as a partial failure; furthermore, Cuba, as *frozen in time,* no longer poses a threat to the United States (beyond the mass emigration of Cubans to the U.S.). Instead, the symbols of U.S. cultural influence prior to the blockade, such as American 1950s cars or frequented American tourist

spaces (such as the Tropicana), are a means through which US media narratives create a longing for a pre-revolutionary Cuba, or a "Paradise Lost (Menendez 2009) that seems conflicted in letting go of the 50 year sanction that makes Cuba "special," by freezing it in time.

The emphasis on the embargo in contemporary U.S. media, when not advocating for the maintenance of the policy, offers that removing the embargo will "save it." For instance, in the article "Forget About Fidel," the author states:

> "The policy of trying to isolate Cuba also works -perversely enough-to bolster the Cuban regime. The U.S. embargo provides Cuba's leaders a convenient excuse -the country's economic travails are due to U.S. sanctions, they can claim, not their own failed policies. The lack of American visitors and investment also helps the government maintain political control. There is one more reason to doubt the wisdom of continuing to isolate Cuba. However slowly, *the country is changing. The question is whether the United States will be in a position to influence the direction and pace of this change. We do not want to see a Cuba that fails, in which the existing regime gives way to a repressive regime of a different stripe or to disorder marked by drugs, criminality, terror or a humanitarian crisis that prompts hundreds of thousands of Cubans to flee their country for the United States*. Rather, Washington should work to shape the behavior and policy of Cuba's leadership so that the country becomes more open politically and economically. Fifty years of animosity cannot be set aside in a stroke, but now is the time for Washington to act" (Haass 2009).

The argument that US tourists can bring democracy and capitalism to an island and "save it" is also coupled with a desire to "see Cuba before it changes."

The lens of the blockade, as a mode for remembering U.S.- Cuban relations, reinforces Cuba as *frozen in time*; furthermore, the theme demonstrates that the blockade was not a complete failure, even if it failed to "dislodge Castro," because it created this "time warp" that is so appealing to U.S. tourists. The frame demonstrates that any policy toward Cuba centers U.S. interests rather than the needs, desires, or interests of the Cuban people. The success of the blockade, initially, is reflected upon and celebrated with each passing anniversary of the revolution. And while the narrative offers no potential for change in the U.S. embargo of Cuba, this rationale shifts when Cuba becomes effectively *frozen in time*, in a "cold war time warp."

When Cuba becomes effectively *frozen in time* in the U.S. imaginary, it is "no longer a threat to the U.S." and instead invokes a "politics of nostalgia," or a place where U.S. tourists might enjoy traveling "back in time" to see old 1950s cars, 1950s tourist sites- such as the infamous Tropicana night club, and experience the last bit of communism before "it changes." The shift in portrayals of Cuba as a threat, are tied to the ways in which the prophecy of the inevitable death of Fidel Castro*,* as a foreshadowed narrative, will result in the end of the Cuban revolution and socialist/communist tenets. Nevertheless, perhaps what is most astounding is the way media portrayals no longer feature Cubans almost at all. Counter to the findings and portrayals of Cuba in the 19th and early 20th Century, where portraits of people through the lens of race and gender ideologies played a key role (Bernell 2011, Ferrer 1999, Pérez 2008a), there's little acknowledgement of race and gender in United States portrayals of Cuba in the post-revolutionary period. The emphasis on the US determination to "recover power over Cuba as a natural order of things" shifted from an idea of spurring internal revolution in Cuba to viewing Cuba as a place *frozen in time* that is ripe for US tourism where Americans might travel back to a 1950s version of the United States.

The intimate tie between a move to end the blockade, even as it is revered as a failed policy that unintentionally created a 1950s nostalgia that is ripe for capitalist profit, and the death of Fidel Castro reinstates the invisibility of Cuban people and the "myth of American superiority" that reinforce the anarchy of empire. The media portraits reinforce a narrative of U.S. superiority that "once Castro is gone," makes the island of Cuba a place where global powers will complete for influence; again denying any recognition of the Cuban people's long history and sacrifice for sovereignty.

For instance, the final article on Cuba in the data highlights the way in which a focus on the past works as a means to prevent engagement with a contemporary Cuba. The article title "Cuba's Endgame?" begins "Over the years countless Cuba watchers have wrongly predicted the fall of Fidel Castro. But now the question is unavoidable: Is the Castro regime entering its final days?"(Castaneda 2010). Meanwhile Campo-Flores (2010) in "Cuba: Can't quit Castro" argues that "everyone is exactly where they were three and a half years ago: waiting for Fidel to die." These articles are not unique in that many of the media narratives begin to treat Fidel Castro's "end" as means to end the Cuban revolution, repair U.S.-Cuban relations, and gain support for repealing the U.S. embargo. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro died November 25th of 2016 and Raúl Castro stepped down as the premiere leader of Cuba this 2018, and the blockade is even tighter than it was just four years ago.

Conclusion

One of the keys to maintaining a policy of isolation and economic warfare through the blockade is through turning an entire nation and its people into a relic of the past. When a culture or place is turned into an object perceived as dead or dying, violence is "soon to come" (Hall 1991). The importance of memory, and a "politics of nostalgia" is that it creates a sort of frame and metaphor to legitimize global inequality. It demonstrates the way in which political and military failures (such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis) result in the U.S. gaining political power and control through legitimation of economic warfare as a sort of commemorative policy; however, even though the policy never "dislodges the Castros" the policy is not viewed through a "politics of regret" as Jeffery Olick might have predicted. The United States media not only fails to acknowledge the dynamic tightening of the blockade across the years and instead features it as a relic of the past but also views it as the instrument that

helped to create this unique site as a "politics of nostalgia." The "politics of nostalgia" of Cuba, as stuck in the past, re-constructs Cuba as a version of "1950s America." This reconstruction of portraits of Cuba, paves the way for promoting new efforts for "engagement" in order to promote US tourism and businesspeople to be the means to promote the interests of US empire.

Furthermore, while independently these tropes offer two ways of understanding and remembering U.S. – Cuban relations, when understood together they highlight the ways in which "othering" is used to reinforce long held narratives of difference that legitimate the unequal power relations between Cuba and the United States (Bhabha 2012, Hall 1990). While Hall (1990), Bhabha (2012), and Peréz Jr (2008) have highlighted the ways in which colonial discourse has typically come in the form of "articulating forms of difference – racialized and sexualized" (Bhabha 2012), the maintenance of discourse which portrays Cuba as "Other" in U.S. media after the 1959 Cuban revolution noticeably, and a rather remarkable change when considering Peréz's (2008; 2010), work, renders race and gender invisible with the exception of emphasis on Cuban male leaders (Palmer 2017) and Cuban emigrants. This doesn't mean that the preferred meanings do not reinforce long held narratives of Cuba based on racialized and sexualized difference, but rather that the emergence of "post[36]" logics have rendered them less visible. The stereotypes, myths, and metaphors of Cuba deploy a strategy of splitting where Cuba is portrayed as the 'Other' and works to ensure the continued exclusion of Cuban perspectives on US-Cuban relations. Hall (1997) notes that stereotyping proves most effective when gross inequalities of power, such as the embargo, allow the dominant group to employ the strategy without challenge, especially when it encompasses various forms of symbolic power as well as

[36] Hall articulates that "post-colonialism" and "post-modernity" tend to be tied to the hegemonic center of US imperialism.

the more obvious economic and military ones. Bhaba (2012) in engagement with Said's (1993) work Culture and Imperialism notes that it is the role of stereotypes as both "phobia and fetish." The larger narrative of Cuba as *Frozen in time*, highlights how cultural memory re-inscribes Cuba as both an exotic and desirable tourist site for US tourists as well as longstanding foe to the U.S.

CHAPTER 4

REMEMBERING U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN CUBA: MONUMENTS, MEMORIALS, AND TOURISM

Los Bloqueos

De los enemigos siempre espera el odio eterno,
La astucia para aniquilarte
o la cobardía para su asfixia:
aguarda de ellos un permanente bloqueo.

De los amigos puede que recibas
Su generosa y desinteresada ayuda
o un abandono ante nuevas realidades;

Y cuando comiencen a endurecerse los años,
Prepárate para confiar y desconfiar a la vez,
Para aceptar el brindis
o para enfrentar un Segundo bloqueo.

Y en tiempos confusos
Evita de ti mismo el tercer bloqueo

-Juan Nicholás Padrón Barquín 2005[37]

My objective in this chapter is to analyze how U.S.-Cuban relations are portrayed, represented, and remembered in Cuba through spaces dedicated to collective memory and the transnational lens of tourists. Given that scholars note how cultural codes and historical context impact the way meaning is embedded for understanding and interpreting historical events, my goal is to analyze how US-Cuban relations, which are both integral to understanding Cuban

[37] Padrón Barquín's (2005) poem in English reads: The Blockades/ From enemies always wait the endless hate/ the astuteness to kill you/ or the cowardice for his suffocation/ await from them a permanent blockade/ From friends you may receive his generous and selfless help/ Or an abandonment in new circumstances/ And when the years start to harden/ get ready to trust and distrust at the time/ to accept the toast/ Or to confront a second blockade/ And in confused times/ try to avoid a third blockade.

history as well as contemporary issues and international relations, are collectively remembered through monuments and museums in Cuba. From ethnographic fieldwork in Cuba, I will discuss the ways in which the collective memory of U.S. and Cuban relations are portrayed in monuments, memorials, and public sphere spaces in Cuba, predominately La Habana. I argue that portraits of collective memory of U.S. Cuban relations in Cuba diverge from a "politics of nostalgia" that portray the island as frozen in time in US media, and instead offer new frames of remembering in the global memoryscape of political relations. These new frames, a "politics of revolution" and "politics of colonial nostalgia" in collective memory of Cuba in tourist spaces are fraught with tensions that reinforce transnational structures of power as constrained by global structures of inequality. The Cuban government's encouragement of tourism to gain access to foreign currency that "partly reflects Cuba's need…made necessary by the decades long blockade by the United States," in addition to tourism whether as a "romantic" opportunity to experience the revolution or not, often "undermines Cuba's struggle against racism and patriarchy" (St. Martin and Thompson 2003). This is coupled with Cuban state's move to memorialize the "new Cuban identity" in order to preserve the future of the revolution; meanwhile, transnational organizations (such as UNESCO) that invest in preserving "world heritage" construct competing memory spaces while also providing funding for development and infrastructure, creating overlapping and disparate discourses of memory: "politics of revolution" and "politics of colonial nostalgia" Together these two frames reveal the erasure of women and afro-descended and indigenous people of color. Additionally, it highlights ways in which inequalities are re-inscribed in part due to transnational inequalities of power that are multilayered and rooted in histories of colonial inequality.

While the "politics of revolution" intends to define a new[38] Cuban national memory and identity in a post-revolutionary Cuba that is critical of imperialism, particularly as it relates to global and racial inequities, it fails to remember the contributions of women and people of color beyond portraits of colonial oppression[39]. "The politics of revolution" as a frame of collective memory in Cuba, with a particular "anti-imperialism" focus (Babb 2011, González 2016), often utilizes sovereignty from the United States as its revolutionary practice both historically and today (Waters 2007). While the "politics of revolution" as a lens for creating a new Cuban national identity in support of the continued fight for revolutionary principles, it is constrained by "the politics of colonial nostalgia" which seeks to commemorate colonial history and its legacies. For instance, while on the one hand "the politics of revolution" as memorializing the Cuban Revolution as a revolution to eradicate racism and imperialism in Cuba (Frank 2013, Pérez 2013), the "politics of colonial nostalgia" relies on reconstructing and preserving those legacies of inequality as sites of Cuban national identity (Babb 2011), world "heritage," and tourist economic development.

International Relations and Memory

Scholars have identified a "memory boom" in many societies worldwide; furthermore researchers advocate for a more thorough understanding of "why the study of international

[38] The concept of "the new man" and "new woman" in Cuba have been discussed in depth. See Hamilton, C. 2012. *Sexual Revolutions in Cuba: Passion, Politics, and Memory*: University of North Carolina Press, Serra, A. 2007. *The "New Man" in Cuba: Culture and Identity in the Revolution*: University Press of Florida.

[39] The move to implement communism meant that there was a huge emphasis on culture and art in Cuba to produce a new identity without invoking a "cult of personality" to do this, artwork was largely abstract rather than representational.

politics should take the concerns of memory more seriously" (Langenbacher 2010). Langenbacher points to two major justifications for taking the concerns of memory "more seriously" including: (1) Concerns of memory have "international and bilateral ramifications, including determining who is responsible for a given historical trauma…deciding who influences domestic debates (diasporas and the home country), forming the identities and values of domestic actors in the international realm…and developing particular foreign policies pursued to rectify the causes of traumatic memory" (Langenbacher 2010) and (2) "memory has had a significant impact on international institutions, laws, and norms…and may be especially important for diasporic identities" (19-20). That memory is political and competing memories exist between nations in the international sphere is not surprising; however, the way in which memory has become institutionalized and commodified in the world sphere as part of the tourist political economy rooted in a longer legacy of colonial roots is under theorized.

The argument that "locally, the tourist as a social fact may become a metaphor of economic and symbolic representation within a 'world outside'" articulates how tourists as a particular migrant point are a means for understanding and exploring the global and local. For instance, Appadurai (1990) and Wallerstein (1990) highlight how tradition and culture "as specific signs of local space" (Frank 2013) may become a way to reflect on world systems and unequal international relationships. Nevertheless, tourism "is about power, increasingly internationalized power" and the commodification of the local – culture, memory, food, etc – is bound to multiplicative and complex political and economic structures (Enloe 2000). In this case, the way in which Cuba as "an idealized symbol to follow as poor nations struggled to develop and provide the most basic essentials to their people" has made the construction of memory in

Cuba and of the Cuban Revolution a complex tourist commodity ripe with tension between a "politics of revolution" and a "politics of colonial nostalgia."

Collective Memory- Context of Cuba

The preservation of collective memory through a lens of a "politics of colonial nostalgia" in some ways reveals the constraints of Cuban revolutionary ideals in a transnational context. One the one hand, Cuba and the Cuban Revolution "with its purist ideology and egalitarianism, its medical and education support for other poor countries, its development of the best health, education, and other services in the Third World despite U.S. sanctions, its sports prowess, and its propaganda machinery, proved one of the most profound challenges to the international status quo in modern history" (Frank 2013). Nevertheless, the initial rejection of tourism by Cuban Revolutionary leaders as a form of neo-colonialism has gradually regressed as internationally indebted countries, such as Cuba, are encouraged to turn to tourism as a solution to a one-export economy of which Cuba has relied mainly on sugar (Enloe 2000). Cuba has not been exempt from this pressure to diversify their export economy for greater stability. Enloe (2000) highlights that "by the mid-1980s, the global tourism business employed more people than the oil industry [and that]the United Nations World Tourism Organization forecasted that by the year 2000, tourism [would] become the single most important global economic activity" (20). Governments, like that of Cuba, have used tourism as a means of diversifying economies, accessing foreign currency, to gain access to new technologies, and gain international visibility and prestige. Cuba, in particular, in the 1990s (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) moved toward tourism as a strategy for economic development "investing $3.5 billion in developing the tourist sector" (Feinberg and Piccone 2014); nevertheless, the tension between tourism and preservation of

revolutionary principles were in some ways at odds. Economic necessity and potential for growth has continued to make tourism enticing and the Cuban government's "2030 Vision Plan" continues to promote it as the "strategic sector" for sustainable development and social, ecological, and cultural preservation.

Formally preserving "the revolution" in Cuba has been essential to consecrating the new Cuban identity and memory as well as constructing a marketable tourist commodity in the world sphere (Babb 2011, Eckstein 2003). For instance, Babb (2011) states "I want to suggest that we may view tourism as both 'saving the revolution' from collapse and as a catalyst for further social and political change – as well as for engagement with the global market economy, in what has been called Cuba's 'hybrid transition' (Colantonio and Potter, 2006: 4–8). The role nostalgia has played in tourism has been made clear in that "nostalgia for the way things were before as well as after the revolution (and even, perhaps, after an awaited 'transition' in the future) has become a stock-in-trade in Cuba, and this represents the biggest calling card for tourism development" (Babb 2011). Nevertheless, the complicated way in which tourism is perceived and embedded with narratives of inequality has yet to be examined.

Collective memory is not merely an abstraction but is manifest physically in museums, monuments, and other markers of the past. Further, this "commodification of difference" has always been an integral part of tourism. In fact, descended through the historical lineage of the "world's fair," monuments and museums and their associated tourism have historically provided legitimacy to imperialism. Enloe (2000) makes this connection explicit explaining that the experience of a world's fair, popularized as part of the larger tourist industry, induces among visitors the understanding that they should feel grateful for the benefits of civilization they enjoyed" (27).

That tourism has been profoundly informed by inequalities and structures of gender and race is well documented. Cuba was long on display in the United States as part of the World's fair where Duany (2002) argues

> "the main idea was to display the indigenous people of America's newly acquired possessions [Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines]…as realistically as possible in their 'natural' habitat. Such a display would educate the public, profit the exposition organizers, and legitimize the incursions of the federal government into distant lands" (46).

That these "tourist portraits," or world's fair exhibits[40] where hundreds of thousands of Americans walked through living exhibits dedicated to these newly acquired territories, had combined "educational, political, and commercial interests in a single project – 'the acquisition of new territory'" (45). These displays were used as a point of comparison for US progress and rationale for US intervention, or empire-making, abroad that celebrated "the United States at the height of the imperial era…[and] dramatize[d] the racial and cultural differences" (Duany 2002)(40). All of which makes the return to tourism through the vantage point of U.S. study abroad students, coupled with the profound investment in constructing Cuban Revolutionary memory in Cuba as well as a half-century blockade of cultural exchange, a particularly interesting case for exploring memory as a field of competing political, economic, and international relations. Not to mention that since the "loosening" on travel restrictions by President Barack Obama in December 2014, US tourists and Cuban diaspora (particularly Cuban-Americans) have become two of the top three most common groups to visit Cuba (Feinberg and Piccone 2014). In spite of Trump's move to impose greater restrictions on travel among these two groups U.S. tourism in Cuba has remained high.

[40] Duany (2002) highlights two specific World's Fairs exhibits: Buffalo, New York and Saint Louis, Missouri in the late 19th century (between 1851 and 1940).

Memory- Politics of Revolution versus Colonial Nostalgia

Collective memory in Cuba has, over time, become explicitly politicized. This is hardly surprising since different interpretations exist not only in the ideological narratives embedded in the collective memories but also in what political events led up to and have maintained the fractured relations between the U.S. and Cuba. The "politics of revolution" as a frame emphasizes that the break between the US and Cuba is one fundamentally rooted in a movement against imperialism, racism, and for sovereignty[41] (Campos 2013, Pérez 2013, St. Martin and Thompson 2003). As a frame of memory, it illustrates these very critical points through memorializing a much longer struggle for anti-racism and independence that pre-dates the 1959 Cuban revolution and stretches beyond Cuba.

The 1959 Cuban revolution is remembered as part of this longer ongoing legacy that had much "to do with the egalitarian vision contained within the nineteenth-century project of nation…that evoked social justice, racial equality, gender equity, and economic opportunity: the purposes to which the sovereign nation was to be dedicated" (Pérez 2013). In The Structure of Cuban History, Pérez Jr. details in great length the way Fidel Castro was able to capitalize on the past as "prophetic…to evoke memories of aspirations thwarted sixty years earlier [by the United States] in the struggle for independence (209). That memory and history played a vital role in the success of the Cuban Revolution is made clear through the fact that "no Latin American country in the nineteenth century experienced wars of independence of longer duration or greater

[41] Please note that just as media portraits of U.S.- Cuban relations in the United States may be accused of distortion and misrepresentation, the construction of collective memory in Cuba is not without bias and inaccuracies. These monuments and memorials are highly influenced by the Cuban government which also means they do not always reflect the struggle over identity and values of the Cuban people. A more extensive explanation of these issues is provided in the appendix.

destruction than Cuba...[where] three successive generations of Cubans endured recurring cycles of privation and impoverishment" (3). Pérez Jr. (2013) is clear that "it was from history [historical memory in particular of the Cuban war for independence] that Castro propounded the mandate for revolution, a self-conscious representation of the revolution as fulfillment of unmet aspirations of the past" (219). Cuban identity has been tied to a centrality of sovereignty that meant "to advance Cuban interests over foreign ones could not fail to produce a confrontation with the United States…[because it] directly challenged the presumption of North American privilege in Cuba" (229).

Nevertheless, that Cuba was "back from the future" in accomplishing what had been set out as impossible, created the issue of how to construct the newly independent society finally realized but originally envisioned by the 1898 leaders such as José Martí, Antonio Maceo, and Maximo Gomez. In this pursuit, historians as the memory workers," who had documented the suffering of Cuban people" from the Siboney Indians to the present, were seen as essential "soldiers of the revolution" to use that history "as an effective instrument in the construction of socialism" (261). That historians, intellectuals, and culture workers were called upon to utilize and construct memory in order to build a new society, set out to fulfill the dreams of the past, only further highlights why memory and memory spaces are of particular importance to understanding Cuba and US-Cuban relations. It provides context and makes clear how the "politics of revolution" frame of memory portrays the revolution and fight for human rights and sovereignty as an ongoing issue, which stands in stark contrast to U.S. frames of Cuba and the Revolution as frozen in time.

Nevertheless, the *politics of colonial nostalgia* highlights the tension between the *politics of revolution* as unfulfilled in part due to the political economy of international relations. For

instance, the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have provided funding support for restoration projects that are deemed "world culture and national heritage.[42]" This funding was acquired during Cuba's "Special Period," which titles a period of Cuban history defined by vast economic crises (1990 – 2010), and provided much needed funds for building restoration and to expand tourism[43] (Babb 2011, Castillo 2002). These sites and spaces often memorialize or erase the suffering of people of color (indigenous and afro-descended); furthermore, they also create a nostalgia for a pre-revolutionary Cuba.

In other words, tourists experience the sites of colonial history as examples of what has been and what could be that reinforces legacies of empire that bleed over to "the politics of revolution" where spaces altered to fulfill revolutionary tenets are not revered by tourists for the changes but rather "what they were back then." The rise in Cuban government investment in tourism as the leading economic strategy for resources has complicated revolutionary tenets, memory, and recreated inequalities based on race and gender (Babb 2011, Castillo 2002, Eckstein 2003). The dual economy in Cuba that privileges those who can access foreign currency (such as US dollars) through remittances or tourism has recreated a class structure that many find reminiscent of "the new plantation"(Enloe 2000). It also means that the revolution is commodified for the world as a "poor society" and "unspoilt" by capitalism; yet, it also works as a modern-day reminder of the legacy of empire that may allow tourists today to compare

[42] http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/

[43] While tourism, as an industry, was nearly wiped out after the 1959 Revolution, it was reintroduced in the 1990s (during the Special Period) as one of the main pillars of Cuba's economic strategy in order to generate hard currency. Between 1990 and 1999, the Cuban government invested $3.5 billion in tourism. The investment in tourism has expanded beyond hotels to cultural spaces and sites Castillo, Ornaldo Gutiérrez and Nélida Gancedo Gaspar. 2002. "Tourism Development for the Cuban Economy." *ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America* (Winter 2002).

"socialism" to "capitalism" and much the same way as the contrast between "uncivilized" and "civilized" were implied in the days of the world's fair. The funding constraints for monuments, memorials, and development coupled with the legacy of colonialism that created an instable one-export economy, makes tourism a necessity. However, that tourism is not apolitical. As Enloe (2000) states tourism works as a form of control, not unlike oil or military weaponry, by more economically powerful nation-states and that is a "powerful motor for global integration" and compliance.

In this chapter, I detail the major themes for how collective memory of US-Cuban relations and Cuban national identity are portrayed. I argue that the radical tenets of the "politics of revolution" frame are undermined by the frames of memory of Cuban national identity through a lens of "the politics of colonial nostalgia." While the politics of revolution frame of remembering US – Cuban relations is unapologetically critical of US influence and imperialism, the politics of colonial nostalgia privileges some of the same structures of inequality. In both cases, national memory is constructed in reference to men and contribute to the erasure of women as meaningful actors and contributors to the nation-state.

Method

In order to capture the collective memory of U.S. and Cuban relations in Cuba, I created an archive of monuments, memorials, and memorabilia from the public sphere. In addition, I also conducted fieldwork as a participant-observer as part of a U.S. study abroad[44] program to Cuba,

[44] Study abroad is one of the exemptions allowing travel to Cuba.

which I will refer to as UNV en Cuba[45]. As a participant-observer of the program I observed both official activities of the program and recreational activities that participants explored on their own time. The duration of this fieldwork was 8 weeks in the summer of 2014[46]. This program, not unlike many others, was a direct effort to foster awareness and bridge the political, cultural, and social gap that has been maintained and reinforced by the social closure of the blockade. The stated goal of the program was to provide immersion into Cuban culture "that offers the opportunity to bridge the gap between two nations whose history and politics keep them together and apart…[and to provide] invaluable insight of the political, social, and cultural situation of the island, promoting at the same time the understanding of and respect for cultural differences, beyond the political strife" (UNV en Cuba[47]). As part of this ethnographic archive, I took field notes, pictures, and visited a number of sites common for many U.S. study abroad programs in Cuba.

These observations show the differences and similarities in how U.S.-Cuban relations and Cuban identity are portrayed and perceived by those who study abroad in Cuba. Both divergent sets of collective memories between the nation-states that seek to place responsibility for economic, and other failures of the Cuban Revolution in Cuba, are heavily critiqued by those who navigate the blockade (study abroad students and Cuban Americans) as well as by Cubans[48]

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[45] Abbreviation for the pseudonym University in Cuba.

[46] The date is significant as it was before then President Obama announced the change in travel restrictions (December 2014) to Cuba and before the U.S Embassy was reopened in Havana (July 2015).

[47] Quote from archival notes from the program.

[48] Cuban political scientist Pedro Campos Santos demonstrates what Perez Jr. in *The Structure of Cuban History: Meanings and Purpose of the Past*, is a critique of a focus on the U.S. Blockade as the explanation for failures of the revolution in a contemporary Cuba. In "Cuba: Dilema y

themselves. Cubans frequently remarked and shared their own views on US foreign policy on Cuba and failures of the Cuban Revolution as two independent problems that intersected and had a significant impact on their lives[49].

Monuments, museums, and public spaces display the way the fight is on-going (rather than a mere legacy of the past) through an emphasis on the "The Cuban Five," U.S. military intervention, and art. Throughout many museums in Cuba, U.S. planes and other military paraphernalia are on display. These displays showcase these items as proof of the perpetual attempts at intervention in Cuba to undermine the tenets and success of Cuban Revolutionary principles (particularly resistance to imperialism and social equality). The "politics of Revolution" frame is actively resistant. Through tapping into memories of longer legacies of resistance to U.S. imperialism dating back to the Cuban battle for independence, U.S. symbols are often used to highlight the ongoing struggle to attain the ideals of the revolution. The use of these symbols and events require observers and participants, U.S. study abroad students in particular, to take on a different embodied experience or to re-imagine historical events through the use of space, exhibits, story-telling, and art.

Context: Ethnographic field work setting of Havana in 2014

esperanza II," Pedro Campos Santos states "We Cubans for the most part support the revolution and socialism, but we are weary with attributing everything that goes wrong to the embargo" Pérez, Louis A. 2013. *The Structure of Cuban History: Meanings and Purpose of the Past*: University of North Carolina Press.

[49] For more on the perceptions of Cuban's views on the relationship between the two nations see the appendix.

When the plane landed at the José Martí[50] International Airport in Havana on a sunny and humid day in May 2014, the plane's travelers cheered. The sanctions that restricted travel to the island meant that the travel to Cuba wasn't a guarantee until the plane landed on Cuban soil. Passengers excited to venture on the island, deplaned using a vintage rollaway staircase. As the UNV en Cuba group made their way through customs and collected their luggage, the group then loaded onto a bus to travel to the city of Havana. The bus full of young college students eager to see "the forbidden island[51]" was unexpectedly quiet as everyone peered out the windows. Billboards critiquing "el bloqueo" and commemorating "la revolución" were common and the commercial advertisements the group was accustomed to, were noticeably absent. Nick remarked "Mannnn, Was this a good idea…what if they don't like Americans?" The uneasiness of the group was palpable yet coupled with the excitement of seeing 1950s U.S. cars veering along the road[52].

After settling into our accommodations in Vedado (a more affluent sector of Havana), the group ventured out to explore. Fliers were posted in a number of shops with the slogan "Obama

[50] It is important to note that this airport in Havana was renamed after Martí by the Cuban government after the 1959 revolution. Martí, while a popular figure across Latin America, was a Cuban Revolutionary in the war for Independence in 1898. Martí played a pivotal role in advancing a Cuban nationalism for independence from Spain with "antiracism as a foundational feature" and was critical of U.S. imperialism, which "intervened" and "won." In some ways, Martí may represent a version of Olick's politics of regret (Olick 2007). Martí's focus on a movement for the "affirmation of rights" that resulted in the intervention and stewardship of a nation [the U.S.] then inventing Jim Crow segregation and a far-flung empire" resulted in discussions of Cuba's national movement as a "revolution postponed" or "unfinished revolution" that plays a significant role in legitimizing the 1959 Revolution in Cuban memory and nationhood.

[51] Paul (pseudonym) and Nick (pseudonym) referred to the island as forbidden. This was one of their main rationales for why they wanted to go to Cuba.

give me five[53]" and posters proposing that U.S. leaders have perpetuated terrorism abroad [54]." The posters throughout the city became intriguing to many of the group's members who were perplexed as to what these fliers were referring to. The fliers themselves became an impetus for talking points and jotting notes where students, frustrated with a lack of technology and internet access, recorded historical events and memories of Cuban people they hadn't heard of before to "look up when I get home."

As the study abroad student groups move throughout the city to explore and negotiate tourist spaces, the tension between the two memory frames "the politics of the revolution" and the "politics of colonial nostalgia" become clear. While the "politics of revolution" as a frame works to highlight injustices to tourists with first world privilege, it in some ways becomes emblematic of the failures of the revolution. Not to mention that in order to capitalize on tourism, spaces that re-inscribe memories of a "politics of colonial nostalgia" are popular tourist sites[55] that demonstrate both global political-economic constraints as well as reinforce the way global inequalities the revolution proposes to be pushing against are reinforced on the island.

The Politics of the Revolution – Remembering Cuban Struggle for Sovereignty

[53] The "Obama Give Me Five" posters were often in places that tourists frequented. This included small shops, stores, as well as hotels.

[54] (Guilty – the government of the United States endorses terrorism. Picture includes head shots of President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney)

[55] Not only has UNESCO helped to financially contribute to the restoration of "world heritage" sites in Cuba, but also those sites were part of larger investments made by the Cuban government to enhance tourism across the island; furthermore, the demarcation of sites in Cuba as UNESCO World Heritage sites adds to their tourist appeal globally.

The *politics of the Revolution* works as a frame of cultural memory that retells Cuban national identity as subversive to US imperialism and centered on radical tenets of socialist equality. The frame showcases U.S. – Cuban relations as divergent actions where human rights are at stake and the dialogue about global inequality is ongoing. For instance, González (2016) notes the process of "transforming ideology into heritage" was critical to Cuba after the fall of the Soviet Union, the onset of the "Special Period," that defines such an extreme economic devastation it is likened to a "natural disaster," and due to the fact that "more than 70% of Cuba's 11.2 million people were born after [the Cuban Revolution]" (Frank 2013). In the 1990s and 2000s "a series of campaigns including the 'Batalla de Ideas' (Battle of Ideas) and the 'Libertad de los Cinco' (Freedom for the Cuban Five), promote[d] the defense of Cuban identity and cultural tradition against a real and perceived enemy" in part represented by the US and by capitalism (González 2016). Meanwhile, the role of collective memory, history, and "encounters" characterize the social and political context for which *politics of revolution* as a frame of memory, that often relies on remembering and retelling US-Cuban relations, can be understood.

In 2014 across Havana, fliers, monuments, public graffiti[56] and art criticize the neo-imperial policy of the blockade as economic warfare (and genocide) while proposing that the Cuban Revolution is centered on human rights[57] and state autonomy. The United States is framed as continuing its imperialist practices through the policy of the blockade which plays a major role in framing the major historical events in Cuban memory, including the Special Period, as in

[56] A bus in Vedado Havana with graffiti that says "Free the Cuban Five" May 2014

[57] Many billboards in Cuba combined messages of preserving the revolution with movements for human rights by using figures such as Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela as well as quotes from these leaders.

part due to continued US intervention in Cuban sovereignty. For U.S. tourists, these public memory spaces are unavoidable and many are embedded into popular tourist sites that work to almost raise the viewer's "consciousness" to re-envision US-Cuban relations from a Cuban nationalistic perspective by using a variety of tactics that require participants to take on a different lived experience or to encounter new and opposing memories.

Museum of Art

One such tactic is the unique exhibit at the Museum of Art, where visitors are encouraged to "experience" what it is like to be one of the Cuban Five[58] The Cuban Five includes five men: Gerardo Hernández Nordelo, Ramón Labañino Salazar, Antonio Guerrero Rodríguez, Fernando González Llort and René González Sehwerert (Koppel 2012). These five men were Cuban spies who came to the United States in the 1990s to thwart terrorist plots against the Cuban government, particularly from the Miami Cuban exile community. They were arrested September 12th 1998 and held in solitary confinement for 17 months awaiting trial. They were convicted June 8th 2001and sentenced to four life sentences. The last remaining members of the Cuban Five were returned to Cuba in exchange for Alan Gross[59], who was held as a U.S. Spy in a Cuban prison, in 2009.

[58] The Cuban Five serve as an important representation of the complex international tension between the US, Cuba, and Cuban Exile community in the United States. The remaining three of the Cuban five were released after Alan Gross's return to the United States in December 2014. The Cuban Five serve as a topic of international discussion about what counts as terrorism and espionage and from who's point of view. While in the United States the Cuban Five have been recognized as spies, in Cuba the Cuban Five are upheld as national heroes (see FreetheFive.org). For more thorough discussion of the Cuban Five in the United States see Waters (2012).

[59] For more about the context in 2014 see Robles, Frances and Julie Hirschfeld Davis. 2014. "U.S. Frees Last of the 'Cuban Five,' Part of a 1990s Spy Ring." in *New York Times*. New York.



(Figure 2: Archival Photo from the National Museum of Art in the Plaza of the Revolution in Old Havana dated May 2014)

The exhibit, located on the main floor, not far from the entrance cannot be missed (see Figure 2 above). Divided in two parts, the exhibit is one side prison cell and one side classroom. The exhibit is set up so that the viewer must take on the role of participant – student, and experience what it is like to be one of the Cuban Five. First, featured on the walls of the prison is the phrase "the silence won't thank you." Second, as one of the Cuban Five, the participant must give up their items and are put in an orange jump suit. The jump suit includes the name of one of the Cuban Five. They are placed in cuffs and hauled away. Before they are placed in their prison cell, they are forced to look at the political prisoners' daily routine. The students who had no knowledge of the Cuban Five just days ago are now taking on their experience in the exhibit.



<u>Figure 3 (left): Archival Photo (A) at Cuban Five Exhibit</u>

Nick, who is in an orange prison uniform, with the name Gerardo Hernandez Nordelo written across the back. Beneath the name is a description of the prison sentence. Nick is required to look at his daily prison routine before he is locked in his cell.

Figure 4 (right): Archival Photo (B) at Cuban Five Exhibit

Nick and Adam are handcuffed. The Cuban men at the exhibit take on the role of U.S. prison guards, where they handcuff them both, pat them down, and take them to their cell.

Figure 5 (left): Archival Photo (C) at Cuban Five Exhibit

While in the very small cell that exhibitioners promise is a (nicer) replica of the one the Cuban Five were held (at the time), the participants sit to experience "what it is like" to be in solitary confinement in a U.S. prison cell. The entire experience, of taking on the persona of one of the Cuban Five, is approximately five minutes long.

After exiting this first half of the exhibit, one enters the second half. Featured on the wall of the classroom is a quote by José Martí "one just principle from the depths of a cave is more powerful than an army" and a classroom (See Figure 6 below). The classroom includes desks that face a

television. On each of the desks is a pamphlet of "16 letters to Obama and a poem to the world." The letters to (then U.S. President) Obama are addressed to his sense of social justice and a history of civil rights struggle both in the United States and the globe.

Figure 6: Cuban Five Exhibit (D)



Figure 7: Cuban Five Exhibit (E) "Letters to Obama"

For example, in a letter from Jane Franklin, dated August 5, 2013, she states:

> "Dear President Obama
> You were born in 1961 so you were not old enough to experience the spirit of the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Power Movement, and the Anti-War Movement all flowing together in a beautiful wave of change. You were only six years old (coming up on seven) when came the shocks of the assassinations of the Reverend Martin Luther King and Senator Robert Kennedy, changing the politics of a crucial presidential election that held the possibility for real change. If you had been a decade older, I think you, as an African American, might now be in a better position to understand the Cuban Revolution and why its destruction has been a persistent goal of U.S. foreign policy[60]…."

[60] Archival material from ethnographic field notes.

Franklin's letter goes on to detail the connection between the blockade and the Cuban Five as well as US attempts to subvert the Cuban Revolution. "The State of Siege began under President Eisenhower with the trade embargo designed to starve the Cuban people into submission and has continued to this day." Franklin cites "Operation Mongoose" as evidence of the covert war against Cuba that led to Cuba's need to develop a state security department to counter US terrorism. She also notes that the blowing up of a Cuban passenger plane in 1976 as "the first time in the Western hemisphere a passenger plane was used as a terrorist weapon[61]. That didn't happen again until 9/11." She further details the times and ways that Cuba's counterterrorism program has benefitted the US, including details of a planned assassination tip of Ronald Reagan in 1984. The letter ends with a plea to "please use your power to release the Cuban Five."

The pamphlet of "16 letters to Obama" includes a number of civil and social justice advocates from around the globe. The pamphlet is signed by notable activists in the United States, who "stand in solidarity with the call for the release of the Cuban Five" including Angela Davis, Dolores Huerta, Ramsey Clark, Martin Garbus, Peter Schey, Wayne S. Smith, Jane Franklin, Vance Levy, Mary-Alice Waters, José Pertierra, Andrés Gómez, and Max Lesnik[62]. This exhibit calls upon the viewer, including tourists, to not "be silent" and take on a new role in addressing the disparate relations between the U.S. and Cuba. The museum is part of larger discourse, not unlike other spaces in museums around Cuba, particularly Havana, that are critical of the United States and its foreign policy in Cuba; furthermore, for many U.S. tourists, it

[61] The 1976 bombing of Cuban passenger plane "Cubana Flight 455" is now largely recognized to have been an attack by Cuban exile and CIA operative Luis Posada Carriles. This is supported by recently declassified information. See Blackistone, Kevin. 2016. "1976 Bombing That Killed Cuban Fencing Team Requires Painful Reflection." in *The Washington Post*.

[62] Signatures and names are from the "Letters to Obama" pamphlet archival photo.

highlights an often completely new and differing perspective of the complicated history than that in US media and US collective memory while embodying the experiences of men.

USS Maine: Remember the Maine

The site of the USS Maine is another important memory site for exploring the way US-Cuban relations are remembered and portrayed in Cuba through a *politics of revolution* frame. The site of the USS Maine represents the long history of US-Cuban relations as a battle over sovereignty and has been key to the construction and maintenance of Cuban identity and adaptability of the Cuban government to preserve Cuban heritage. The site of the USS Maine has become an important public space not only because it represents the war for independence of 1898 but also because it has become *"protestódromo,"* or the protestodrome which replaced "the Square of the Revolution…[as the space] devoted to specific performances of collective belonging such as May Day, 1 January or 26 July" (González 2016)

The monument was originally inaugurated in 1925 as recognition of the USS Maine explosion that led to the US entering in the war against Spain in April of 1898 (Ferrer 1999); however it has been a site of competing historical memory and significant part of the restoration of monuments to construction of Cuban national identity (González 2016). The Associated Process details this brief history stating:

> "The Maine monument was inaugurated in 1925 and bears the names of all 266 sailors who lost their lives. Havana's monument was a tribute to a lasting Cuban-American friendship, a kind of thank-you for Washington's help in shedding the yoke of Spanish colonial rule, which was known for its cruelty. The years since then have been unkind to the twin-columned monument however, and to US-Cuba ties in general." (Associated Press Archive 2013[63])

[63] Associate Press Archive 2013



Figure 8: Associated Press Archival Photo of the USS Maine 2013

The original monument of 1925 (see Figure 8 above) included the names of the 266 sailors who died in the curious explosion[64]. The original eagle erected upon the monument as a "gift" from the United States to represent "long-lasting friendship," somewhat foreshadowing the future[65], was destroyed by a hurricane only two years later. The second eagle, made to replace the first destroyed in the Hurricane, was removed in 1961. Cuban Revolutionaries removed the 3-ton eagle from the monument as a rejection of US imperialism and newly declared independence following the failed US Invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The eagle, which was broken during the removal, was splintered into pieces that severed its body from its head and tail. Since then the eagle, severed, has become emblematic of the split between the two nations. The eagle head, which was "mysteriously" delivered to Swiss diplomats, has been maintained by the Swiss, who up until the re-opening of the US Embassy ran the US Interest Section in Havana, had agreed to

[64] "Inquiries have failed to ascertain the cause of the explosion" and debates around whether Spain or the US caused the explosion of the Maine to justify US intervention that resulted in US military occupation of the Island and US political control up until the 1959 Revolution have become historical debates.

[65] Our Cuban guide pointed the humor at the first eagle's destruction by the hurricane as a foreshadowing metaphor of U.S. – Cuban relations with a chuckle.

keep the "US property." The body and tail have been guarded by the Havana City History Museum. The head now resides in the US Embassy (which was recently reopened in 2015 under President Barack Obama). The popular metaphor of the severed eagle also is narrated as a prediction for the future where "until the body and head are re-united, relations between the US and Cuba won't be healed[66]."

Figure 9: Archival Photo USS Maine 2014

Interestingly, the USS Maine monument restoration by the Cuban government, began after the 100th anniversary of the explosion in 1998, in part in commemoration of José Martí's birthday. The weather tattered monument's restoration was complete in 2013 as part of a larger project to restore monuments and museums for both enhancing tourism and the maintenance of Cuban national identity across the island (Babb 2011, González 2016). The monument's renewed

[66] Quote from guide, Manuel, field notes May 2014.

significance after restoration set the stage for our encounter in that May of 2014. The monument still stands without the infamous eagle and includes two inscriptions that chronicle the unfilled promise of freedom of Cuba from imperial control.

The first inscription states "the people of the island of Cuba are and should be free and independent - resolution together with the Congress of the United States of America 1898" ("'El pueblo de la isla de Cuba es y de derecho debe ser libre y independiente' -resolucion con junta del congreso de los estados unidos de Norte Americano"). The second inscription features a quote from 1961 when the infamous US eagle was removed from the monument. It states "to the victims of the Maine whom (sic) were sacrificed by the imperialistic voracity and rush to take control of the island of Cuba February 1961" ("'Por las victimas de el Maine que fueron sacrificadas por la voracidad imperialista en su afan de apoderarse de la isla de Cuba' de Febrero de 1961"). Our Cuban guide, Manuel[67] remarks that the monument stands as a reminder of the continued division between the governments of the US and Cuba, their long-intertwined history, and hope for better relations in the future.

The monument to the USS Maine, located in Havana, has been a site that long depicts the historical and continued symbolic area for the negotiation of U.S. –Cuban relations, particularly as highly contentious. It also is the site the Cuban government decided to use to build the Anti-Imperialist Platform, which is a "monumental complex [which] consists of a large long platform presided over by a huge realist statue of Marti crafted by the party-loyal artist Adrian Gonzalez.

[67] This is a pseudonym for the Cuban guide who partnered with our study abroad program. Manuel is a professor at a research institute in Havana. His wife, Maria (also a pseudonym) works for the department of culture.

Marti is holding Elian[68] and pointing towards the US Interests Section with an accusatory finger. The concrete pillars are covered with plaques commemorating Cubans killed by US forces" (González 2016) The space has been used for rallies and "speak-outs" by poets, dancers, musicians, and speakers "under the banner of the Battle of Ideas" where between December 1999 and March 2005 there were 185 of the Saturday speak-outs" (Frank 2013). When the U.S. Interests Section building started displaying political messages as part of the Bush Administration's push to "promote freedom and democracy in Cuba," the Cuban government "countered with the Monument of the Black Flags, intended to symbolize the 3400 Cuban victims of the US forces since 1959" (González 2016). The way history has been utilized to frame collective memory and meaning in these transnational sites is clear through this tension. Frank (2013) details how the U.S. "turned on a Times Square style ticker at the Interests Section…[that] had cost $750,000" (2013: 98). When they turned the sign on, on Martin Luther King Jr's birthday, it featured "his words 'I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up;'" (2013: 98) nevertheless, few Cubans could actually read the ticker "which ran through twenty – five windows on the fifth floor" of the Interests Section, because it was blocked by the huge black flags displayed in the Anti-Imperialist Platform (99).

Museum of the Revolution

[68] Elian refers to Elian Gonzalez, who was a five-year-old boy, whose mother fled with him on a raft from Cuba to the United States. Elian's mother did not survive and Elian's father requested his son be returned to him in Cuba. This made Elian the center of international attention and "struggle between Cuban exiles in Miami and the Cuban government" Pedraza, Silvia. 2007. *Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus*. New York: Cambridge University.

The Museum of the Revolution (Museo de la Revolución) is another space that highlights this complex history and the construction of a Cuban post-revolutionary memory and collective consciousness through the lens of the "politic of revolution." The museum of the revolution was commissioned in 1909 for a cost of 1.5 million pesos. During this period, Cuba was under US military control. America's influence (and extravagance) is clear through the highly ornate décor that was done by Tiffany's of New York. The contractors in conjunction with Tiffany's constructed a palace that featured the Salón de los Espejos, which is a replica of the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles, and the Salón Dorado (Golden Hall), made of yellow marble with gold embossing on the walls (See Figure 10 below). Two other feature rooms include four canvases by artists Esteban Valderrama and Mariano Miguel González mounted on 18-carat gold sheets. As the presidential palace, this luxurious building stands as a site of remembrance of the first days of the revolution including bullet holes in the palace stairway of the failed attempt to assassinate Fulgencio Batista[69].

Figure 10: Tiffany's Golden Hall – Museum of the Revolution Archival Photo 2014

[69] Field notes from museo de la revolución in Habana, Cuba May 2014.

The building has a rich history that highlights the "politics of revolution" where spaces that exemplify imperialism and inequity are altered to promote and display the impact of the Cuban Revolution. The building housed the new Cuban government, Council of Ministers, and the New Communist Party until 1974 when it became a museum. It then became a part of the restoration and an official national monument in 2010. Located in Habana Vieja (Old Havana), it is a site that cannot be easily overlooked, as Habana Vieja is both the tourist center and international business sector of the city. Surrounded by military weaponry used in the Cuban Revolution (the overthrow of Batista and the Bay of Pigs specifically), the museum relates an official history of Cuba that actively resists US narratives of this history.

Figure 11: Archival Photo (A) U.S. Bomber B-26 Museum of the Revolution June 2014

This placard (See Figure 11 above) outside the Museum of the Revolution details how the remains of a destroyed US plane and body of a US pilot[70] were left in Cuba for 19 years because the US government "refused to admit their taking part in the aggression against the island"

[70] The US pilot was later identified as Thomas Pete Ray when CIA files were released. See Gleijeses, Piero. 1995. "Ships in the Night: The Cia, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27(1):1-42.

during the Bay of Pigs in 1961. The remnants of the US Bomber B-26 are also set on display outside the museum as evidence of US intervention before the US government admitted involvement (See Figure 12 below).

Figure 12: Archival Photo (B) U.S. Bomber B-26 Museum of the Revolution June 2014

The museum is organized chronologically starting with early Cuban history at the top floors and most recent history on the main floor, thus following a similar layout as that of the museum of art. Similar again to the museum of art (where the exhibit for the Cuban Five was the last exhibit), the museum of the revolution concludes with reflections on the impact of U.S. government influence; furthermore, it does so through caricatures of political figures that have been known to stand against Cuban revolutionary principles. One of the last exhibits in the museum of the revolution includes the following nearly life size murals where satirically they are paid tribute for the ongoing revolution.

Figure 13: Archival Photo of Batista at Museum of the Revolution

The first in the set (see Figure 13 above) is Fulgencio Batista, which chronologically depicts the 1950s, with an accompanying placard that reads in Spanish and English "Thanks you cretin for helping us TO MAKE THE REVOLUTION." Next to the image of Batista is that of Ronald Reagan in cowboy attire, making the 1980s the next period represented. It features the statement "thanks you cretin for helping us to STRENGTHEN THE REVOLUTION" (See Figure 14 below).



Figure 14: Archival Photo Museum of the Revolution Reagan 2014

The image of President Ronald Reagan is followed by images of Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush. The image of the first President Bush depicting the late 1980s and early 1990s, is accompanied by the text "thanks cretin because you have helped us to CONSOLIDATE THE REVOLUTION" (See Figure 15 below).

Figure 15: Archival Photo Bush Sr.

Figure 16: Archival Photo Bush Jr.

Finally, the last image is that of U.S. President George W. Bush who is holding a book upside down that represents his establishment of the "Commission for assistance to a Free Cuba[71]" while wearing a helmet with the symbol of Nazi Germany on the front. The placard accompanying this image includes the statement "Thanks you cretin for helping us to MAKE SOCIALISM IRREVOCABLE" (See Figure 16 above).

The images and accompanying statements illustrate the criticism and impact of US Foreign policy on Cuba. Each of these presidents is known for using the power of the executive office to further tighten the restrictions of the Blockade while simultaneously promoting a "free Cuba." At the same time, it defines the revolution as not only counter to US imperialistic control

[71] For more information about the establishment of a "Commission for assistance to a free cuba" established under President George W. Bush: CFAFC

but also as empowered by it. Rather than a country or revolution "frozen in time" the "politics of revolution" frame portrays the revolution as dynamically responding to threats to undermine it. While the museum of the revolution is perhaps an extreme example of the way U.S. and Cuban relations are portrayed in Cuba, resistance to US imperialism, including capitalism are not uncommon in other museums and public spaces; furthermore, race as a cultural story of the success of the Cuban revolution plays a vital role even as the battle over sovereignty is played out as one exclusively among men[72].

National School of the Arts

Other popular sites for remembering the toppling of US imperialism and success of the revolution is highlighted in schools and the arts. One such popular site is the Instituto Superior de Artes (The National School of the Arts: See Figure 17 Below).

Figure 17: Archival Photo National School of the Arts 2014

[72] All museums and memorials featured Cuban male leaders and women were noticeably absent. For instance, in the Revolutionary Plaza filled with iconic leaders not one woman is recognized. Since many of the memorials feature U.S. – Cuban relations through military conflict, it reinforces the way masculinity and nationhood are coupled.

The National School of the Arts sits on what once was an exclusive Country Club of Havana representing the fruition of revolutionary aspirations represented in Cuban collective memory. The Country Club of Havana represented the segregation by class (particularly wealthy US tourists), race (it was formally segregated and did not allow black patrons), and corrupt influence (it was known as a popular site for the Mafia) that represents the Pre-Revolutionary inequalities in Cuba. As part of the nationalization of U.S. foreign business and eradication of institutions of inequality, this space was of particular interest to the new Cuban government leaders. The school states "se cumplía la aspiración de Fidel y el Che, quienes soñaron ver convertido el hotel, la piscina y su elitista campo de golf en el espacio idóneo para la ciudad de las artes de Cubanacán" (The aspirations of Fidel and Che were fulfilled, who dreamed to see the hotel, the swimming pool and its elitist golf course become the ideal space for the city of Cubanacan arts) (2017). Today, the university boasts the reputation as the best school for Cuban arts. The dream of creating this cultural center which began in 1962 with three architects, Ricardo Porro, Vittorio Garatti and Roberto Gottardi, stands only partially complete.

The school, opened in 1976, represents the struggle for the Revolutionary government to create a new collective identity and memory in a post-revolutionary Cuba. First, Ricardo Porro, the lead architect for the project, represents in some ways the impassioned debate over "cubanidad" (the expression of Cuban culture and identity of the nation). Although Porro had been commissioned by the government in 1961 for the design and creation of the university, he fled into exile in 1967. Prior to Porro's exile, he "challenged the accepted notion of Spanish-colonial primacy in the modern movement's historical yearnings, advocating a *criollo* (culturally mixed) artistic tendency [and] became a vociferous proponent for the cultivation of Cuba's 'black tradition,' a stylistic notion present in the Afro-Cuban vernacular as well as the island's

artistic vanguard" (Lopez 2016). Porro and the school represent a complex history of the construction of memory and identity in Cuba that demonstrates the tension in the "politics of revolution" lens of collective memory (Lynch 1979).

For instance, Frank Andre Guridy (2010) notes how the new Cuban government in the 1960s and 1970s dismantled Afro-Cuban institutions. Guridy highlights that "the Afro-Cuban societies, like all Cuban associations that were racially segregated, were positioned as symbols of the country's odious history of racial segregation and class exclusivity. With widespread support, the revolutionary government undertook a campaign against racial discrimination by targeting all societies that were segregated along racial lines regardless of their racial makeup" (Guridy 2010) p.198). The unintended consequence of Cuban Revolution's aspirations of racial equality included the erasure and silencing of Afro-Cuban history and memory (as well as transnational connections to African-American institutes, actors, and cultural exchange). While art (music, murals, dance and other practices) works as a means to preserve that history, Guridy highlights the critique by Afro-Cubans of the "nationalist historical narratives that make it difficult to access that history" (204). The *Universidad de las Artes* which stands still incomplete perhaps is a metaphor to the memory and representation of racial progress and equality in Cuba. On one hand, the story of its inception is based on eradicating spaces of racial and class exclusivity that represent the long history of racism and exploitation; meanwhile, on the other, it simultaneously turns sites of historical inequity and oppression into memorialized spaces that become popular tourist sites for a nostalgic past. For instance, members of the study abroad group I shadowed were not interested in the "success" this represented for the revolutionary tenets, but rather a longing for "what it must have looked like back then." A few of the students even lamented the way the overgrown and abandoned architecture hampered what "must've been an amazing

view." John sighed "I wish I could have seen what it was like *then* – you know *before* the revolution." Perhaps what makes Cuba so enticing to many tourists is the "politics of colonial nostalgia" as sites that allow one to encounter the past in the present that is simultaneously a story about racial inequities and power.

Second, the *Universidad de las Artes,* showcases another element in the tension of "politics of revolution" frame of collective memory where art as a necessity for creating a new cubanidad was viewed as integral to the success and maintenance of the revolution; however, art also has and continues to function as a medium that has created difficulties around the lines between artistic freedom and political control. The *Universidad de las Artes* has a unique position within this tension. One that also symbolically works to asset women as integral to the Cuban nation while simultaneously reinforcing objectification. The *Universidad de las Artes* is one of the few memorialized spaces that acknowledges sex and/or gender. It includes a large permanent installation of a very large uterus (and clitoris) at the center of the school grounds. Its centrality and size is astounding and makes it impossible to miss. The addition of this as part of the construction of a new Cuban identity reiterates women's central role in reproducing the nation and its culture through sex organs.

After 1976, the institution was emphasized as a means to "democratize and universalize Cuban culture" and become a Cuban Heritage Center that has developed pedagogical tenets beyond the university to include curricular aims for high school students and early education. Nevertheless, critical artistic visions at times have clashed with Cuban Revolutionary aims. Beyond Guridy's (2010) findings of the erasure of recognition of race and racism in a post-revolutionary Cuba, there is also concern that religion, sexuality, gender and many other social spheres have also been formally sanctioned (Pedraza 2007). Any art that can be read as a critique

of the revolutionary government is a risk because of the "charge of 'enemy propaganda[73]'- a charge that covers all ideas that do not have the approval of the government – is sufficient to land people in jail" (Pedraza 18-19). Considering the many dynamic changes occurring in Cuban society during this past decade, our study abroad visit in 2014 took place at a very propitious time. In addition to the recent change in leadership from Fidel Castro to Raúl Castro, and the possibility for change in US – Cuban relations during the Obama second term, our visit coincided with the rapid rise of *reformistas* and *independentistas,* or political dissidents in Cuba.

The *politics of revolution* lens for remembering U.S. - Cuban relations exists in many public spaces. From museums across the country (in Havana, Trinidad, Guantanamo, and elsewhere) to the usual tourist sites and as presented in local story telling and art. Similar to art, storytelling was a major means for pointing out the tension in the politics of revolution across the island. Study abroad guides pointed out sites of major historical events. One such site in Havana is the Hotel Habana Libre, which at 25 stories can be seen across much of the city skyline. The hotel (in Vedado, a central business district in Havana), is a site committed to the memorialization of the Cuban Revolution and severing of ties with the United States. The Hotel Habana Libre, was originally run and operated by Conrad Hilton, under the auspices of Fulgencio Batista, as a Hilton Hotel. The hotel opened in March 22, 1958 as the tallest and largest hotel in Latin America. In January 1959, during the height of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro had headquarters there where he coordinated with other leaders across the island for three months. After the Revolution, the hotel was run by Hilton until October 1960 when Fidel Castro

[73] While many Cubans, I spoke with in Cuba articulated that this policy had been relaxed a great deal under Raúl Castro, there was still fear in speaking candidly about personal critiques of the government.

nationalized US businesses. At this time, the Hilton hotel was renamed, Hotel Habana Libre. The Hotel was used for a variety of governmental purposes including housing national guests, the Cuban department of tourism, and University of Havana Theater. When Cuba faced the economic destitution of the Special Period and re-instated tourism as a major economic sector the Hotel Habana Libre was turned back into a tourist hotel[74]. This hotel, not unlike the National Hotel, are popular sites for study abroad students to gather when not in class or on excursions. Our guide, who pointed out the hotel as an important part of Cuban history, also pointed out the room where "Fidel hid out- running the revolution." During our stay, the Hotel Habana Libre light was broken, leaving one of the letters in the word Libre dark, causing our guide to remark, chuckling, "the light on the word libre has been out for years…the blockade makes basic things hard to get…telling isn't it?" The statement in context with the history of the hotel highlight how intimately US foreign policy has and continues to impact Cuba (although the critique was not solely of the United States).

The "politics of revolution" as a frame for remembering the fracturing of U.S. and Cuban relations continues to highlight how the Cuban Revolution actively challenges U.S. intervention and defines it as an ongoing problem through the rationale for the Cuban Revolution, Bay of Pigs, Cuban Five, and the U.S. Blockade. Museums, art, and storytelling all contribute to how the "politics of revolution" as a frame of collective memory in the public sphere works to illustrate the necessity or ending US imperialism in order to address social inequities in Cuba; nevertheless, the Revolution in these spaces appears incomplete in its ability to meet its radical tenets. The museums that were intended to display the progress and success of ending vast

[74] To see what the hotel looks like now see Hotel Habana Libre.

economic inequality on the island stand as luxurious buildings surrounded by Cuban homes that display the two-class system between tourists and Cuban people[75]. The School of the Arts illustrates how struggles over defining the *politics of the revolution* has led to a school left still unfinished. The Hotel Habana Libre, a symbol of the Revolution, has been returned to its original state as a luxurious tourist hotel for foreigners. Tourists, including study abroad students, were granted access and provided with amenities without question that are often inaccessible to Cubans themselves. The unintended consequence of these memory spaces is that the tourists who visit them are left with a *politics of colonial nostalgia* where they long to see the versions prior to the Cuban Revolution and benefit from their 1st -world privilege in access to many of these spaces.[76]

Politics of Colonial Nostalgia

The tension between the *politics of revolution* memory frame to display revolutionary tenets and critique US intervention (and capitalism) is at odds with the *politics of colonial nostalgia*, especially for transnational U.S. tourists. The *politics of colonial nostalgia*, which places the history of Spanish colonialization on romantic display, is part of larger movement by transnational organizations (UNESCO and WTO in particular) to end the silence around the slave trade. The UNESCO Slave Route Project created a "Programme on the Memory of

[75] This observation is not unique. Cubans, themselves, and researchers have shown the two-class system through the existence of a two currency system, the CUC (Cuban convertible collar) and CP (Cuban Peso) as well as evidence that Cubans make more money through tourism than through professional occupations (housekeeper versus doctor was a frequent comparison).

[76] I met with many students from other study abroad programs to initiate interview contacts at the Hotel Nacional. The Hotel Nacional, which is a national monument and listed on the World Heritage site, is a choice for international dignitaries and other famous celebrities.

Slavery and the Diaspora which consists of two main objectives: (1) "to identify, restore and promote sites, buildings, and places of memory linked to the slave trade and slavery in order to develop a tourist trade focused on remembrance and to promote economic development through tourism" (Diéne 2000) and (2) "to set up museums of slavery to educate the public on the tangible and intangible cultural heritage of Africans and the African diaspora (Routon 2008). The Cuban National Council of Cultural Patrimony (CNPC) also launched its own local initiative entitled "the Slave Route in Cuba" to coincide with the work done by UNESCO to preserve the "'cultural impact' of this 'heart-wrenching,' dehumanizing phenomenon that was, nevertheless, an 'inseparable' and 'indispensable nutrient in the forging of nationality'" (Routon 2008). Nevertheless, Routon highlights in "Conjuring the past" the way that memorializing Afro-Cuban rituals, such as palo[77], work to appropriate and commodify the historical significance of the transatlantic slave trade and acts of slave resistance for tourism as well as provide a means to appropriate the practice in order to bolster support for the continuation of the revolution. For instance, Routon (2008) argues:

> "I also call attention to how recent efforts by scholars, nation-states, and international organizations attempting to reverse this silence [of the transatlantic slave trade] engender their own politics of memory, which either ignore or seriously distort how local collectivities 'represent the ghost.' In Cuba, such issues are not only entangled in representations that draw parallels between black maroon resistance in the colonial period and the political ideology of the 1959 revolution but also muddied by the cultural politics of post-Soviet Cuban society. Recent efforts to reinvigorate grassroots support for the revolution and bolster a culture of resistance in an era of material scarcity by harnessing the island's Afro-Cuban religions to the ideological agendas of the state have produced some rather peculiar juxtapositions between ritual and revolutionary visions of the slave past" (48).

[77] Palo, also referred to as palo monte, is a religion, or spiritual practice, deriving from "*reglas de congo* (congo cults)… [which have been] traced to Bantu-speaking slaves and their descendants on the island" (Routon 2008: 637).

The paragraph above highlights a few key examples of the tensions in collective remembering of slavery and Afro-Cuban history between commodification of the oppression of slaves and the memorialization of a new Cuban national identity that capitalizes from these stories while denying systemic inequalities. Routon (2008) focuses on the way UNESCO and CNPC come together to create monuments to remember the history of slavery, and slave resistance, in Cuba through the unveiling of the 1997 Monumento al Cimarrón (Monument of the Runaway Slave). In the following section, I will examine the way memorialization both commemorates and erases the legacy of the transatlantic slave trade even in spaces created to commemorate it.

Forgetting as Erasure – Reproduction of Inequalities

Forgetting is as socially constructed and significant as remembrance. For instance, Vivian offers that "memory can be a form of forgetting; and forgetting can offer a medium for reconfiguring memory, or remembering its content, in auspicious ways…as a strategically productive component of public life, ethics, and decision-making (Vivian 2010). Given the monetary and strategic investment in creating a global list of "world heritage" and "sites of memory of the transatlantic slave trade," the choices on what is commemorated and where such commemoration takes place is indeed strategic. This is especially certain given the Cuban government's investment in memorials and museums as both essential for the promotion of tourist development (the leading sector of the Cuban economy) and the preservation of a new Cuban identity to preserve the legacy of the 1959 Revolution.

These historic spaces that feature a "politics of colonial nostalgia" are plentiful throughout Havana as well as on the island in general[78]. As a means of sustainable tourist

[78] You can see the list of cultural sites in Cuba listed as World Heritage.

development as well as ensuring a global interest in preserving the legacy of the slave trade, UNESCO and WTO have invested resources for the preservation of world heritage. For instance, UNESCO states: "In addition to their educational role in informing new generations of that painful past, these memorial places and sites also serve to establish memorial tourism activities relating to the slave route" (UNESCO 2017). Cuba is listed as having four (of the 28) major sites linked to "slavery and slave trade routes" in the world. These four sites: 1) Old Havana and its fortification system; 2) San Pedro de la Roca Castle; 3) Trinidad and the Valley de los Ingenios; 4) Archaeological landscape of the first coffee plantations. In total, Cuba touts seven world heritage sites. Each of these sites having been inducted officially by transnational organizations between 1982 – 2008. While many of these sites pay homage to the resilience and resistance of slaves in Cuba, they simultaneously reproduce their erasure to U.S. tourists.

Old Havana

The first site, the port of Havana and Old Havana (Habana Vieja), boast several historic plazas and castles[79]. Perhaps one of the most famous is Castillo de los Tres Reyes del Morro, or "el Morro" for short. "El Morro" is a giant fortress dating back to the 16th Century. It is a popular tourist site that commemorates the seaport as the "gateway" to the "new world." It serves as part of the earliest monuments to colonization of the Americas. Even though the Spanish had reached Cuba in 1511 and the Spanish stronghold of "conquest and occupation" of Cuba was firmly established by 1514 (Knight and Palmer 1989), el Morro, constructed in the late 1500s, was one

[79] Popular Castles in Havana include Castillo de Los Tres Reyes del Morro (the 16th century fort) and Castillo de la Cabaña (an 18th Century fort famous for the nightly cañonazo ceremony).

of the earliest and expansive forts in the Americas. The fort and the emergence of the *flota* system (where "virtually all transatlantic shipping sailed under the escort of an armed convoy" (Pérez 2005) to protect Spanish commodities. Cuba was geographically, "the point at which the vital sea lanes of the Spanish New World Empire intersected" and Cuba was designated the "Key to the New World." Havana's fortification "gave palpable expression to Cuba's place in the greater imperial scheme of things" (19; 26). One of the highly coveted commodities to pass through these forts were enslaved Africans. According to Perez Jr (2008), "between 1512 and 1763, an estimated total of 60,000 [enslaved Africans] had been introduced into Cuba… and between 1764 and 1790, the number… [of enslaved Africans brought into] Cuba surpassed the 50,000 mark, averaging approximately 2,000 people per year (47). Emancipation in Cuba did not come until 1886.

Nevertheless, the two major forts that are frequently visited by tourists, both "El Morro" and its adjacent fort Castillo de San Carlos de la Cabaña (or La Cabaña), are remarkably silent regarding the thousands of enslaved people who passed through these walls. If forgetting is strategic, the tension in the commemoration of these spaces as "world heritage" while simultaneously erasing this essential aspect of this history, is quite perplexing. And these spaces are some of the most popular sites for tourists on the island. Tourists go to hear the tales of exploration, architectural innovation, military prowess, and pirates. The impressive forts boast some of the best and most coveted scenic views of the city of Havana. The forts, and the popular lore, that guides provide for tourists prompt them to imagine being a Spaniard or a pirate coming to the new world. The story telling takes on a voyeuristic approach where tourists might imagine themselves as colonizers arriving to the "settle" the new world. Members of the UNV en Cuba group climb the fort like a mountain, exploring, standing on the edge – the precipice challenging

the ocean. The erasure of the history of what the *flotas* were protecting is hidden in words like "commodities" and "goods" that continue to silence and make invisible the reality of standing in one of the oldest gateways of the transatlantic slave trade in the Americas.

Furthermore, "La Cabana" is part of the larger fortification of Havana as a walled city – an extension of El Morro. Built in the late 1700s, its construction was intended to further prevent the capture of Havana from the Dutch and English. It includes a museum to Che Guevara, who used the space as a military headquarters and prison after the 1959 revolution, while also commemorating a nightly cannon ceremony. The cannon ceremony, a practice that is so ritualized people in the city listen for it each night, is where reenactors in 18th century period attire re-create a nightly ceremony announcing the closing of the city walls. The drawbridge leads the way through a large market of vendors there to sell souvenirs to tourists. The reenactors read a scroll, announcing to the spectators that the city is preparing to close while professing their allegiance to the Spanish crown. (See Figure 18 Below).

Figure 18: The Cannon Ceremony at Havana Fort "El Morro"

The spectacle of Spanish colonization as wealth and grandeur, perhaps even unintentionally, recreates a kind of modern day version of the imperial inequality the revolution

so vehemently denounced. In contrast to the investments in revitalizing these monuments and spaces to "preserve memory" and "promote tourism," the surrounding buildings and spaces are deteriorating. For many tourists, it is the revolution that has tainted the beauty of the city where grand buildings that once housed the elite of Havana are now home to multiple families, living in crowded conditions, and in decay. The inequalities so fiercely criticized in "the politics of revolution" are easily seen in Havana today. Christopher, a retired Afro-Cuban man, walked me through the city pointing out the two-class system: one for tourists; one for Cubans. The "wall street" of Old Havana filled with tourists and expensive U.S. goods such as Coach, Nike, Adidas, Michael Kors, and more. Beyond "wall street," in the Cuban bodegas where locals go to receive their rations of food (rice, coffee, and other staples), the shelves are near empty.

Members of the UNV en Cuba program while enjoying the privileged access to the most expensive goods, food, and grand spaces, often lamented and were "annoyed" by the haggling of Cubans reliant upon tourism as a central industry. The group was able to access the most notable places with ease: The Hotel Nacional, internationally revered schools, private beaches, and more. The privilege to move about Cuba in ways locals could not is partly what enticed some participants to come. Josh remarked "You bet I want to be treated like royalty [chuckles]; why else would you go to a remote third world country?" And at one point, Nick and Paul had perfected a routine of singing "No Taaango De-Nero" (with their southern drawl) as they walked through the tourist sectors of cities perusing souvenirs as part of their regular routine.

World Heritage

The other sites of world heritage, Trinidad and the Valley de los Ingenios and the Archaeological landscape of the first coffee plantations, also recreate a view from the gaze of the colonizer for tourists. Trinidad, which was founded in the 16th century, and created as a result of

the wealth extracted from the labor performed by slaves at the nearby valley of the sugar mills, is a common tourist site. The ability for the Cuban government to entice tourists to venture outside of the city (Havana) has been key to promoting more egalitarian development between the city and the countryside, which has been a long-held struggle for the island since colonization. Tourists visit these cites to buy souvenirs and be treated to the grandeur of the city.

Furthermore, both los Ingenios and the coffee plantations invite tourists to imagine the past, even if unintentionally through the eyes of the colonizer, overseer, or master. For instance, on the visit to the valley of the sugar mills, tourists are encouraged to climb an old overseer tower (see below) that was used to monitor hundreds of slaves. The Afro-Cuban towns' people line the path to the tower to sell items to the visiting tourists. The commodification of the memory of slavery is a means of economic survival for the area. The tower which is impressively, perhaps even terrifyingly, tall and old stands adjacent to the "master's house" another museum for tourists to explore as part of the move to institutionalize memory of the slave trade. UNESCO states that "The Valley de los Ingenios is a remarkable testimony to the development of the sugar industry. A living museum of Cuban sugar production, it includes the sites of 75 former cane sugar mills, plantation houses, barracks and other facilities related to this vulnerable industry, which has witnessed a gradual and progressive decline….at its peak in 1827 more than 11,000 slaves were working the fields" (UNESCO 2017)

Figure 19: Archival photo View from the Overseer's tower in Trinidad los ingenios 2014

The first coffee plantations in the Southeast of Cuba also re-create this lens for tourists. The focus on the "ingenuity" of the "plantation owners" and their homes in some ways commemorates the horrors of slavery and reinstitutionalizes the silence of the stories of slaves. UNESCO states that the 19th century coffee plantations in the foothills of the Sierra Maestra "speaks to the plantation owners' (primarily of French and Haitian origin) ingenuity in their exploitation of the natural environment through the sweat and blood of their African slaves…Individual plantations exist in varying states of preservation from the restored museum of La Isabelica coffee plantation farm to plantation ruins that are no more than archaeological sites. Typically, plantations include the owner's house, terraced drying floors, production areas for milling and roasting, and workers' quarters." (UNESCO 2017).

On our trip to the coffee plantations, a Canadian couple had rented the coffee plantation home, La Isabelica, for a private wedding. The UNV en Cuba group hurriedly received a tour in order to finish in time to allow final preparations for the wedding. The group was allowed and encouraged to explore the surrounding grounds to see the unique pressing and milling of coffee that had been created in this agricultural landscape. As our guide explained the difficult conditions for creating the aquaducts necessary for the agriculture and the grueling labor required for milling, Adam asked "Can I try it?" The guide nodded. And while Adam pushed with all his force he could barely nudge the enormous wheel to move. Nick joined him to help, and they managed to push it one full rotation. As the guide began to encourage them to imagine "doing this all day" Josh motioned pretending to "crack the whip" to which the group of young men laughed. The reoccurring impetuses that placed "masters," "overseers," and "colonizers" as

the lens through which to encounter Cuban history and memory were realized by many group members throughout the trip.

Transnational Tourism

The memorialization of "the politics of colonial nostalgia" demonstrates the tension of the necessity of tourism for the success of the Cuban economy as well as the impact of the influence of transnational organizations on the sites and places revered for "world heritage." Transnational tourists operate as part of the system, and in being invited to take on the imaginary position of colonizer or master may reinstate the patriarchal white supremacist legacies of imperialism and colonization. In other words, we might question how different "experiencing the other" is today from the "world's fair" of yesterday. In that embedded in the tension between Cuban sovereignty and memorialization of world heritage are the legacies of inequalities in the way that world heritage is remembered, forgotten, and experienced. Furthermore, it highlights the erasure of women from national memory. The absence of women as central to the nation is not unsurprising; in fact, much research remarks that the absence of women in memory studies has been greatly informed by the invisibility of women in national culture (Grever 2008, Nagel 1998, Paletschek 2008).

Conclusion

The structural conditions of multiply interlocking inequalities including global economic inequality, racial inequality rooted in colonization, and the reliance of 3rd world developing nations on tourism and foreign investment has created two sets of memorializations. The two sets of divergent ways of remembering Cuba's history and identity in some ways map onto the dual economy of Cuba. The state's push for a "politics of revolution" is at odds with the commodification of Cuba, under tourism through the "politics of colonial nostalgia" as "frozen

in time". Additionally, the foreign international organizations investment in "world heritage" and the "transatlantic slave trade" in many ways perpetuates the erasure and institutionalized silence of the experiences of enslaved Africans (not to mention Indigenous peoples) through promoting memory in a way that centers the "colonizer," "master," and "overseer." Even as the Cuban state has moved to integrate, and perhaps even appropriate, African religious traditions into the preservation of Cuban revolutionary identity, the state's earlier erasure as part of the move toward equality coupled with foreign influence which minimize those experiences and narratives, has perpetuated its erasure.

The economic instability of Cuba, partly a result of the legacy of being a Spanish colony and partly due to the U.S. economic embargo among other factors, makes the government reliant on foreign tourists, international organizations, and their interests, to employ their principles. The difficulties faced under the Cuban Special Period, has meant an emphasis on moving toward tourism even if at odds with central tenets of the revolution. The U.S., which through its imposition and maintenance of a half-century economic blockade, has played a pivotal role in maintaining the economic vulnerability of Cuba. Even as Cuba utilizes the economic blockade as a means to bolster the "politics of the Cuban Revolution," the move to assuage the interests of foreigners undermines its success and credibility. It has also made the loophole of study abroad and travel particularly enticing where the growth in U.S. tourism in Cuba undoubtedly has a large influence.

The importance of this tension between "the politics of revolution" and the "politics of colonial nostalgia" should not be under estimated. Cuba is often touted as a leading example to other 3rd world governments for its "sustainable development through tourism." The impact the commodification of memory and the resulting institutionalization of global racial inequalities is

important to explore and investigate. This is especially true given that these symbolic inequalities are often coupled with economic inequalities along lines of race and gender for those who work in tourism.

CHAPTER 5

SCALING INTERSECTIONALITY: U.S. US STUDY ABROAD IN CUBA

Thus far this project has examined the embedded meanings of collective remembering of U.S.-Cuban relations on the macro level (national). While U.S. collective memory of U.S.-Cuban relations is portrayed as *frozen in* time, the memory of U.S.-Cuban relations in Cuba are articulated through a lens of the *politics of revolution.* Perhaps unsurprisingly these two ways of remembering stand in stark contrast to one another. Even though both sets of national imaginings show the role of "othering" on a macro level, they do little to provide a more thorough analysis of how people who break the "social closure" (Weber [1922] 1978) of the blockade and experience Cuba, perceive these ideas and understand their own negotiation of these meanings. Therefore, this chapter aims to address precisely these questions. Using a transnational intersectional framework (Mahler 2015), I examine the role tourism, through U.S. study abroad students to Cuba, plays in revealing social structures and cultural discourses of power and inequality. In answering the call for transnational intersectional scholarship (Mahalingham 2009, Mahler 2015, Patil 2013), I apply the theoretical framework of transnational intersectionality to tourism, study abroad in particular, as a unit of analysis to "scale intersectionality" and reveal the ways in which it highlights culturally specific and interlocking systems of power between and within the U.S. and Cuba.

Story:

Nearly every presidential administration since the imposition of the U.S. blockade of Cuba on October 22, 1962, has emphasized the United States' interest in "promoting democracy

and freedom" in Cuba (Bernell 2011, Spadoni 2010, Sullivan 2014, Wylie 2005). The central focus of U.S. foreign policy has incorporated an "isolationist approach" in an effort to impose these ideals upon Cuba and the Cuban government (Wylie 2005). The U.S. blockade has typically had a few exceptions to allow travel and exchange: education, religious purposes, and journalism (Smith 2012). This has meant that religious organizations and study abroad programs have been privileged institutions in having the ability to break the social closure between the U.S. and Cuba. However, even these exceptions have undergone significant changes where access has boomed and waned over the years (Rosenberg 2016, Zebich-Knos 2005).

The recent restoration of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and Cuba, according to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, highlights the move from an isolationist approach to a "hands on" approach:

> "Following Fidel Castro's ascent to power, U.S.-Cuba ties have endured a nuclear crisis, a long-lasting U.S. economic embargo, and ongoing political hostilities. Well beyond the end of the Cold War, the diplomatic relationship between Washington and Havana remains frozen" (2014).

The move to restoring relations, specifically travel and commerce, came along with Democratic Senator Dick Durbin's proposal of an "invasion of ideas" which would bring "commerce and democracy to Cuba" through the relaxing of travel restrictions. Arguably, current political negotiations between the U.S. and Cuba reflect the way the "international is personal" (Enloe 2000). In other words, U.S. contact with Cuba tacitly relies on U.S. citizens who break the political and economic boundary (the U.S. Embargo/Blockade) between the U.S. and Cuba to help implement foreign affairs (Enloe 2000, Kaplan 2002). Enloe (2000) argues that we have a more thorough understanding of international relationships when we reimagine "what it takes for governments to ally with each other, compete with and wage war against each other… [and

recognize] that governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs" (119). The "international is personal" as conceptual practice requires the examination of people's lived experiences. This practice is reflected in my research which queries students about their personal experience and identity during their study abroad stay in Cuba. In order to better understand the connections between the international, national, and personal, my research questions interrogate: a) how U.S. citizens studying abroad negotiate their identity and experiences given the constraints of the U.S. Blockade and (b) how they view their role in the international relationship as well as emerging changes in that relationship.

Study abroad has and remains to be one of the exemptions of the Embargo that allows U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba (Rosenberg 2016, Smith 2012, Sullivan 2014); nevertheless, the rationale for supporting this has largely been based on what Enloe (2000) describes as "the international is personal." The "international is personal" as a conceptual lens is used to understand how international relations and government policy are enacted by "personally private relationships" (119). One such recent example would be the case of Otto Warmbier who was arrested and detained in North Korea during a study abroad trip with "Young Pioneer Tours" (Jenkins 2017). His detainment sparked engagement between the U.S. and North Korea where "Trump's State Department…[initiated] a series of informal talks with North Korean officials" (Jenkins 2017). While the U.S. embargo and changes in the policy have restricted travel to education and religious purposes the extent to which these loopholes to the social closure are accessible has varied. Nevertheless, the basis for creating the possibility for educational exchange as a means to navigate the U.S. Blockade has largely been supported as a means to "promote democracy and freedom" in Cuba (Obama 2008). In fact, even the recent changes in the restrictions of travel and trade were articulated by President Obama as key to U.S. foreign

policy interests where "Americans are the greatest ambassadors for freedom and democracy abroad" (Obama 2014).

In this chapter, I examine the motivations study abroad students have for going to Cuba and how they understand their experiences. Given my goal to employ a transnational intersectional framework, I examine how students understand their negotiations with national identity, gender, and racial dynamics in Cuba. I find that students have very different motivations for traveling to Cuba that are partially informed by their different racial and ethnic backgrounds. In addition, U.S. students' understandings of their role as "global citizens" after their travel to Cuba is also largely divergent along the lines of race. Not unlike MacCannell's (1976) study of tourism, I demonstrate how U.S. study abroad in Cuba is an "ultimate study in power relations" that provides insights into the connections between local and global power relations, inequalities, and understandings of social change.

Objectives

In this chapter, I have five key objectives. First, I set out the case for why tourism, particularly study abroad as a unit of analysis, fits with and is an extension of Mahler, Chaudhuri, and Patil's (2015) proposal for future applications of transnational intersectionality. Second, I highlight why U.S. study abroad to Cuba is a particularly important case for exploring the key aspects of transnational intersectionality theory through its meeting the objectives of a "dual frame of reference," the negotiation of "gender and racial regimes," and an experience that prompts "comparison and agency" (Mahalingham 2009, Mahler 2015). Third, I explain my collection of data and analyses for how U.S. study abroad students become interested in Cuba and view their role and experience in US-Cuban relations. Fourth, I detail the three major themes that emerge from interviews and data of U.S. study abroad students' experience in Cuba

including: (a) Motivations for Studying Abroad in Cuba; (b) Views on the Embargo; and (c) Divergent Experiences. These themes highlight the way students' positionalities specifically along the lines of race and gender inform their motivations, views, and experiences in Cuba. Fifth, I find that "scaling intersectionality" is a strength for exploring interconnected power and privilege in tourism, study abroad in particular, and propose possible intended and unintended consequences on U.S. foreign policy views. I argue that this framework allows the researcher to account for the differences in social positionality and motivations for those negotiating travel to Cuba while also revealing the way in which, regardless of intentions, their unequal power is exercised even if that power among U.S. study abroad students is unequal as well.

The Case for Study Abroad as a Unit for Transnational Intersectionality

First, study abroad works as a possible transnational unit of analysis for the call to "scale intersectionality"(Mahler 2015). In the article "Scaling Intersectionality: Advancing Feminist Analysis of Transnational Families," Mahler et al. (2015) argue that "the overwhelming majority of research taking an intersectional approach to date is hampered by limiting its analysis to the confines of any given country" (100). The authors go on to argue that such "'domestic intersectionality' does not reflect the growing transnationalization of people's lives" (101). While Mahler et al (2015) make the case for studying the "200 million people who now live outside the nation where they were born," they also recognize that family is not the sole possible unit of analysis and that future research should explore their work as a model "adaptable for myriad empirical cases…whose reach spans across an international boundary" (101). Much like transnational families, tourism and international education challenges the confines of the "nation-state" and require we move beyond "methodological nationalism" in a way that is attentive to unequal power relations and their negotiations locally and globally. Furthermore, study abroad

programs are quite diverse ranging from Spring Break excursions that require little immersion, or understanding of the native language, to programs with an emphasis on cultural and/or language immersion with longer stays (usually a semester up to a year) and native family hosts.

Tourism

That tourism itself can be a unit of transnational intersectional analysis that allows researchers to "scale units" beyond one nation state to explore "the interplay between individual behaviors and social relations" with an analysis on the complex impact at local and global levels is not new (MacCannell 1999). Dean MacCannell's 1976 book The Tourist is one example of how tourism can be "the ultimate study in power relationships" (xi). MacCannell's (1976) piece shows how "like the artist, the tourist is usually an inadvertent catalyst for social change" (xii). In fact, in MacCannell's updated (1989) foreward to the book, he actually invites feminist engagement and critique. He states:

> "What is an expeditionary force without guns? Tourists. A combination of feminist theory and tourism research could yield much needed descriptions of the self-destructive elements found at the end of a hegemonic drive" (xxiv). In more recent sociological theories which take tourism into account as part of the "production of a transnational imaginary," it is not unusual to read how the authors "would variously track…the *as-yet-unfigured* horizon… [of national spaces, political allegiances, and economic regulation which] are being reshaped" by experience"(Wilson 1996).

The argument really is a call to examine "the *both/and*" where global processes, like that of the move toward tourist based economies, can lead to, "paradoxically… a strengthening of local ties, allegiances, and identity politics" that are also informed by the global and stress the "enduring asymmetries of domination, injustice, class dynamics, and uneven spatial development" (8). Additionally, the growth of tourism globally is particularly about the both/and relationship of global and local inequalities.

Tourism has become a key development initiative program for "developing countries" by influential transnational organizations and current data from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) show that "youth tourism" is growing faster than global tourism overall. In fact, UNWTO estimates that by 2020, there will be "almost 300 million youth trips per year" (2011). "Youth travel" is not only the fastest segment of global tourism accounting for 20% of global travel, but it also differs from the travel of previous generations. UNWTO have found that youth travelers "spend more money than other tourists," "are likely to return and give more value to the destination over their lifetime," and "are less likely to be deterred from travelling by terrorism, political and civil unrest, disease or natural disasters" (Confederation 2011). Interestingly, youth tourism includes international education and study abroad among other forms.

Study Abroad

Ly Thi Tran's 2016 publication in the *British Journal of Sociology of Education* details the rise in international education where there are "more than 4.3 million students" studying outside the boundaries of their home country (Tran 2016). Furthermore, Tran (2016) notes that "overseas study…is tied to their [students'] desire for transnational mobility" beyond their education. France and Rogers (2012) note that "study abroad is often framed within claims that international exchange 'bridges nations' and increases national security" (391). Furthermore, Open Doors data reveal that both international student exchange and study abroad are on the rise in the United States; in fact, 325,339 U.S. students studied abroad in 2015/2016 for academic credit (IIE 2017). Finally, much like Mahler et al's (2015) arguments for transnational intersectionality and the family as a useful unit of analysis because it pairs individuals with a social group (the family unit) to negotiate and make apparent the negotiations of the "constellation of a person's social locations," U.S. study abroad students are within the social

unit of study abroad programs. Study abroad programs provide resources, support, status, and opportunities for international mobility. It also provides a group with which to compare and negotiate one's experiences. For these reasons, study abroad may be one way to apply a transnational intersectional analysis.

The Unique Aspects of U.S. Study Abroad to Cuba

The U.S. blockade of Cuba created a near complete social closure between the U.S. and Cuba with few exceptions for travel, trade, and cross-cultural exchange. Study abroad as a means of breaching the social closure has remained a unique loophole to the near complete social closure (Clarke 2007, Smith 2012). Nevertheless, it has also dynamically changed over the last twenty years. For instance, NAFSA, the organization for international educators illustrates the impact of different U.S. Administrations on study abroad and international education exchange



Figure 20: NAFSA 2017 Chart with Data from U.S. Open Doors

The figure highlights the impact the tightening of restrictions under the Bush administration had on U.S. students studying abroad to Cuba between the years of 2004 to 2010. The policy restrictions reduced U.S. study abroad from 2,148 students in 2004 to 169 students in 2005. The restrictions on academic travel, one of the few loopholes for international exchange between the

U.S. and Cuba, "reduced the number of study abroad students by 92%" and "forced many academic institutions to end the Cuba study abroad programs" (NAFSA 2017).

During the period for which I recruited student participants and conducted participant observations of the UNV en Cuba program was during a period of rapid growth. My respondents studied abroad in Cuba between 2013 and 2015 in which the rise of U.S. study abroad in Cuba was up 300% (IEE). In fact, Cuba was ranked in 2015 – 2017 on the top 25 U.S. Study abroad destinations in the world (IEE 2017). Contextually, there are two key points to thinking about this growth: (1) The Obama Administration supported study abroad to Cuba as a means to promote democracy and freedom in Cuba. In fact, President Obama argued that this would allow U.S. citizens to be "ambassadors" of these foreign policy initiatives in Cuba. President Obama strategy stood in contrast to that of President Bush's in that it promoted a "hands on" rather than "hands off" approach; (2) Even though the growth has surpassed the previous rates for study abroad, prior to Bush's near complete sanction, U.S. study abroad programs were growing. The number of study abroad students in 2011-2012 mirror the total in 2002-2003; furthermore, this set the stage for both the reinstatement of Cuba programs that had been suspended due to the restrictions during the Bush administration as well as the creation of new Cuba programs.

The U.S. –Cuban relations offer a particularly unique political, economic, and cultural context for critically analyzing how personal relationships may be utilized (successfully or not) to promote the interests of their nation-state's foreign policy agenda.

Nevertheless, it also may offer insights into the growing number of U.S. students of color studying abroad as it relates to interests and experiences negotiating race and ethnicity abroad. The total number of U.S. students studying abroad in general has grown steadily from approximately 200,000 in 2003/2004 to 325,339 in 2015/2016. While 83% of U.S. study abroad

students identified as "White" in 2005/2006 only 71.6 % identified as "White" in 2015/2016. Considering African American students, the percentage studying abroad has nearly doubled (3.5% in 2005/06 to 5.9% in 2015/2016). An even greater increase occurred among Hispanic/Latino/a students (from 5.4% in 2005/2006 to 9.7% in 2015/2016). Similarly, the number of students identifying "Multiracial" increased as well (from 1.2% in 2005/2006 to 3.9% in 2015/2016) Focusing on Cuba, the data suggests that U.S. study abroad to this island nation also has grown in racial/ethnic diversity. For instance, while Cuba is in the top 25 of U.S. Study abroad destinations for four year institutions, among community colleges and associates programs (which report greater racial and ethnic diversity) Cuba is ranked as the 7th most popular destination in the world. In my own collection of U.S. study abroad in Cuba programs, popular advertisements included courses on global health, education, political science, international affairs, business, and afro-diasporic dance, music, and religion.

Furthermore, conceptually when considering U.S. study abroad to Cuba as a means to examine transnational inequalities and power, it is a particularly compelling case. An article by France and Rogers (2012) ("Cuba Study Abroad: A Pedagogical Tool for Reconstructing American National Identity" *International Studies Perspectives*) highlights a few reasons why:

> "Alternatively while US students traveling to Argentina or Chile may additionally encounter elements of whiteness, economic privilege, or monolingualism, their experiences still lack the highly politicized nature of study abroad to Cuba given the oppositional context of United States-Cuba relations. We argue that this politicization, which frames and permeates the entire stance of US Study Abroad to Cuba, allows students to critically examine American identity in an experiential format…[it] presents a unique and challenging opportunity to confront American national identity in the global context-not only given its [Cuba's] status as a developing, non-white, non-English-speaking country, non-capitalist country, but largely because of the historically antagonistic non-normalized relationship between the United States and Cuba" (395).

Their analysis details some of the ways in which students "studying abroad in Cuba come to understand themselves" (392). Therefore, what France and Rogers demonstrate is the validity in

utilizing U.S. study abroad to Cuba as a means for fulfilling the tenets of a transnational intersectional analysis that "scales" units of inequality. Considering that Mahler et al's (2015) criteria for a transnational intersectional analysis require "negotiations of privilege" in new ways; acknowledgement of embedded individuals within multiple "units;" a dual frame of reference due to international movement; a "degree to which the actors are aware;" negotiations of gender and racial regimes;" and/or that experience abroad often "prompts comparison and agency," it becomes evident that US study abroad to Cuba is a strong fit. Frances and Rogers (2012), as well as Clark (2007), explore within their own institutional study abroad to Cuba programs (College of Charleston and Nova Southeastern University) the motivations and interpretations of U.S. students' experiences in Cuba and their impact on their views of U.S.-Cuban relations, American national identity in particular. Nevertheless, what is missing is an intentional exploration of students' social location and how the "constellation of a person's social location changes" as a result of their movement internationally. In fact, while some of the themes that emerge from Frances and Rogers (2012) study also emerged in this analysis, my findings deviate to show how those themes were contextually based on the positionality of the students by race and gender.

Methods and Sample

This research is based on interviews with students who studied abroad in Cuba between the years 2013 and 2015. Interviews were conducted in person or via skype from April 2014 through January 2016. All interviews were accompanied by a brief survey to provide basic demographic information about the student and study abroad program to which they were a part. Due to the Federal Education and Privacy Act as well as the political nature of U.S. – Cuban relations, many of the faculty and administrative program leaders were reluctant to share invitations to participate in my study. Therefore, in addition to contacting programs, I also reached out directly

to students through ethnographic fieldwork in Cuba, snowball sampling, and designated study abroad groups on social media (facebook in particular). Social media allowed students to verify my identity and that the research was "legitimate." I recruited students to participate in the research from April 2014 to June 2015. In total, 57 people participated in the online survey; 42 provided follow up contact information from that sample, and 34 people participated in the in-depth interview. Interviews with respondents lasted from 34 minutes to 2 hours and 12 minutes (for more information about respondents cited in this chapter see Appendix).

Table 2. U.S. Study Abroad to Cuba Basic Demographic Information

	Sample Respondents Interviewed	**Survey Participants**	**IEE (Study Abroad Data 2014/2015)**
Race			
White	18 (53%)	35 (61%)	72.9%
Black	5 (15%)	8 (14%)	5.6%
Hispanic/Latinx	9 (26%)	11 (19%)	8.8%
Multiracial	2 (6%)	3 (5%)	4.1%
	34	57	91.9[80]
Gender			
Women	21 (62%)	35 (61%)	66.5%
Men	13 (38%)	22 (39%)	33.5%
	34	57	100%

[80] This percent does not add up to 100%, because Asian study abroad students were not included in this table. "Asian, Hawaiian and other pacific islander" accounted for 8.1 percent and "American Indian" accounted for the remaining 0.5 percent IIE. 2017. "Open Doors "Fast Facts 2017"." Vol. New York: Institute of International Education.

Academic Level			
Undergraduate: Associates and Bachelors	32 (94%)	49 (86%)	88%
Graduate: Masters, PHD, Professional School	2 (6%)	8 (14%)	12%
	34	57	100%

Using a qualitative and interpretive approach, I don't purport to make broad generalizations about study abroad in Cuba. In fact, my goal is to more thoroughly understand the complexities of positionality and the negotiation of identity in international relations, particularly the extreme case of U.S. and Cuba. My objective is to seek a better understanding of the following questions: Why do students chose to study abroad in Cuba? Overall, how did they characterize their experiences in Cuba: best and worst? What perceptions of U.S. and Cuban relations did they hold before and after they traveled to Cuba? How did their perceptions of U.S. – Cuban relations, the U.S. embargo in particular, changed as a result of their experience? How do they view their own role in the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba? How did they negotiate norms of race, class, and gender in Cuba? What, if anything, do they hope to do with this newly gained knowledge/experience? While I used these guiding questions, the open-ended interview allowed students to elaborate on particular topics they felt were particularly insightful to their experience. The following themes emerged in which students reflected on how their complex positionalities (of race/ethnicity, gender, and nationality) impacted their interests, experience, and views on U.S. – Cuban relations: 1) *Motivations*: (a) Forging Diasporic Ties, (b) Seeing Cuba Before It Changes, and (c) As a Future Business Opportunity; 2) *Views on the Embargo:* (a) Nostalgic Place versus Necessity of Progress; (b) Economic Autonomy versus

Deepening Inequalities; 3) *Experiences in Cuba:* (a) Blending In; (b) Sticking Out; (c) Negotiating Machismo

Findings

Motivations:

My findings show that there were two main motivations for students to pursue study abroad in Cuba: *Forging Diasporic Ties* and seeing Cuba *Before It Changes*. While these two rationales for pursuing study abroad in Cuba differ they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In addition, they both reinforce larger discourses of collective memory of U.S – Cuban relations. For instance, Roland (2010) demonstrates that the return to tourism in Cuba is extremely strategic and tied to notions that "are also raced and gendered" (Roland 2010a). Roland points out that "Prior to its socialist revolution in 1959, Cuba was imagined around the world based largely on its projected image through the tourist industry" where the connections between "Cuban popular culture, US tourist expectations, and the commodification of those cultural forms for American audiences…invoke the memory of Cuba" (6). While Roland (2010) and Meethan (2001) note the possibility for agency of Cubans in the tourist industry, Meethan laments "the 'patronising elitism' as well as the conception of tourism's Other as 'locked in the past'" that facilitates the global commodification of Cuba through tourism (p. 93). My findings reveal that notions of the past and impending change are the main motivations for study abroad students to travel to Cuba.

Table 3. U.S. Study Abroad Students' Motivations for Traveling to Cuba

Motivations for Traveling to Cuba	Forging Diasporic Ties	Before It Changes	Business Opportunity
Students of Color	X	X	
Non-Hispanic White		X	X

First, *Forging Diasporic Ties* was a common motivation of black and Latino/a study abroad students who stated "I always knew I wanted to go to Cuba" in part to forge or reclaim diasporic ties. Stuart Hall (1989) defines diaspora clearly stating:

> "diaspora does not refer us to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return, even if it means pushing other people into the sea. This is the old, the imperialising, the hegemonising, form of 'ethnicity'… The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of 'identity' which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. One can only think here of what is uniquely - 'essentially' – Caribbean…" (p. 235-236).

That some of the study abroad students see their connection to Cuba as part of a heterogeneous and complex identity that is hybrid, multiple, and rooted in the diversity of postcolonial histories, particularly African and Latin American/Caribbean, fits well with Hall's definition. It also extends research such as that of Bruner's which details "reclaiming lost heritage" as a motivator for tourism among the Black diaspora in Ghana (Bruner 2005). For example, these students are often working to reclaim these complex hybrid identities, social ties, and complex understandings. For instance, one student demonstrated how her interest in Cuba was rooted in a reclamation of symbolic and familial social ties.

> Zoe: "I'm first generation Jamaican. When I was looking at colleges I was mainly interested in liberal arts colleges, particularly the sister schools. The main school I was interested in was Sarah Lawrence *because* they have a Cuba program and I knew from jump street that I wanted to go to Cuba and ummmm Sarah Lawrence has the longest relationship with the University of Havana of any American university…. growing up a lot of us Jamaicans discuss our history and compare it to Cuba so I *knew* I wanted to go there."

Me: "Okay, what do you mean you always discussed Cuba growing up and knew you wanted to go there?"

> Zoe: "Wellllll, many of our family members left to go work in Santiago de Cuba, when they couldn't get jobs in Jamaica. We have lots of uncles and relatives that we lost connection to [pause] and also the political connection between Jamaica and Cuba especially when Jamaica wanted to become a more socialist democracy, they attributed a lot of that to [pause] a connection to Castro"

Zoe highlights both a symbolic and tangible connection to Cuba that she hopes to establish and maintain through her travels. This connection is both: a) symbolic: Caribbean history and relationships; and b) literal: Jamaican relatives that moved to Cuba. As such, while she does seek to understand her place within a "black diaspora," my findings differ from that of Bruner's (2005) where he argues that "many African Americans, while on tour in Ghana, proclaim a black essentialism in their discourse" (pg. 122). These students of color are well aware of their U.S. privilege even as they see themselves connected to a transnational notion of blackness or Hispanic identities that are rich in diversity. Furthermore, Zoe was not unique, Maria also detailed her interest in going to Cuba as a literal reclamation of long lost kin.

> Maria: "Yeahhhh, I knew I wanted to go to Cuba. I'm Hispanic, actually I'm Cuban American, [pause] well my mom is. It's complicated. My mom was born in Cuba and came to the states as a baby, she would like to go visit too but uhh there's just sooo much red tape. It's easier for me actually [chuckles] as crazy as that sounds. But yeah, we have family there, a lot of family. I knew I wanted to go to Cuba to better [pause] understand like what happened and why. I, actually, I was able to, to meet and visit my relatives."
>
> Me: "Really? How did that happen?"
>
> Maria: "It's kinda funny actually. I had just like uhh a little bit, like a tiny bit of uh information. So I asked my house mother, and she helped me. She knew someone that knew one of my aunts, and I was able to call and set a day to meet them. And can you believe it, they threw ME, ME, a party…

Maria highlights a tangible forging of diasporic ties. She is able to use the free time to explore Cuba on her own as an opportunity to go visit extended relatives she'd never met before. She described the experience as "life changing" and sees her relationship to Cuba as "totally different now." Maria details how she never thought she'd actually be able to reconnect with her relatives,

and even if she could, she wasn't sure how she'd be received. Nevertheless, the warm reception she experienced in which they threw her an all weekend party has made her feel passionate and deeply connected to her Cuban relatives and Cuba in general.

Several other students proclaimed that either direct familial connections or larger symbolic Afro-diasporic or Latin American ties led to their interest in Cuba. For instance, not unlike Zoe and Maria, Chris, who identifies as Colombian-American in particular, points out a pan-ethnic identity as "Latin American."

> Chris: Well, you know, I.. I'm Colombian and I [pause] sorry [background noise], I think in Latin America there is an understanding [pause] I'm not sure if I'm explaining this right…but there's a sense that, I guess, I guess it's because the U.S. has intervened in *our* countries that Cuba is special. Ya know? It's special. It [Cuba] stood up to the United States and still is. Man, I hope this makes sense, but I guess I mean Cuba, with all its problems, is like a symbol of hope against imperialism for many Latin Americans. I mean, obviously not everyone would agree with that, but that's the sense I get and well I guess I see myself as Latin American [pause] like connected to that uh struggle, ya know?

What Chris points out that is similar but also different from that of Zoe and Maria is a symbolic tie to Cuba as part of a pan-ethnic identity as Latin American. His identity as Latin American, which he defines as partly a larger struggle against US imperialism, is what made him interested in Cuba. Furthermore, Chris talks about how isolating "being Latin American, or "Latino" is in the United States in higher education and studying abroad in Cuba allowed him a "much needed break" from "white American culture." Even Anne, a black woman, sought out studying abroad in Cuba as a way to alleviate the lack of diversity and inclusion at her home institution. She applied to an independent organization separate from her actual school in order to pursue studying abroad in Cuba. When asked what led her to study abroad in Cuba, she described being excited at the opportunity to study and live in an "Afro-Cuban" area.

> Anne: "I was a freshman at U College* when I was told about a Cuba program by my Spanish professor…I had been really struggling with how white my school was and how like lacking in diversity. And oh look there is this program that includes Afro-Cubans and were going to an Afro-Cuban neighborhood and I was like that would be really great for me so I jumped on the chance to change it up after a rough first year in college…most of the people I saw in Cuba were black and it was nice in Cuba to not be a minority in that environment….But um I went so I would be able to be in an environment where I wasn't the one or one in five that were black in my school…it was nice to be able to experience that, yeah."

Forging diasporic ties is not a surprising trope when you consider the emphasis by transnational organizations to emphasize Cuba's "rich diversity" and "world heritage" as a way to enhance tourism. That Cuba was actively sought out by students in order to *forge diasporic ties* was a political act. They were aware that study abroad was one of the few exceptions that allowed them to travel to Cuba; therefore, many of these students used the opportunity to try to foster long-term connections to family, friends, or institutions. Other students used the opportunity to think about how to improve relations and conditions of "Latin Americans," "Latinos," or "Black people." In fact, even though Anne's description (see above) for studying abroad wasn't a direct way to forge Afro-diasporic lineage, she actually describes it as an unintended outcome. When Anne is describing her opportunity to seek out black culture in Cuba she realizes:

> "I liked drumming as a kid… So apparently I did [have a connection to Afro-Caribbean culture] and didn't realize it because my drum instructor, [my aunt], she practiced it through Yoruba and I didn't realize until I went to Cuba that like this is what she would do or very similar to that and she had talked about how she had been to Nigeria and due to the ceremony she had to wear white year round and I didn't really understand that until I came to Cuba and I was like Whoa this is like what I had been experiencing. Slightly different but same roots." (Anne)

For students of color, there were two trends. The first is that they sought out schools, because "they knew they wanted to go to Cuba" or they sought out Cuba programs even beyond their own institutions of higher education. Their interest in Cuba was often rooted in an interest to

forging diasporic ties. However, their interest in doing so actually revealed the practical difficulties and frustrations of how the U.S. blockade severs intimate connections.

On the other hand, the other main motivations for traveling to Cuba was to see it *Before It Changes* and *As a Business Opportunity.* These were the most common themes for white students. While both students of color and white students, emphasized a vested interest in wanting to visit Cuba before U.S. capitalism, as an evitable force changes Cuba permanently, it was the main motivation for white students. Students provided numerous examples for wanting to see Cuba before it "becomes another Jamaica," "has a Starbucks on every corner," "becomes overrun with tourists." For white students, seeing the new lessened restrictions on US travel to Cuba through study abroad coupled with a notion of impending change and progress created a sense of urgency to see Cuba that led them to choose the island for their study abroad program. Hope, a white woman from Chicago, states this clearly:

> "I could have gone to a number of countries to practice and improve my Spanish, but I saw the opportunity to go to Cuba and my boyfriend he was like 'you have to go…you gotta go see it before the embargo ends'"

In contrast to the students of color who articulated their motivation as deeply rooted in forging diasporic ties either symbolically or tangibly in the reclamation of family ties, white students didn't see themselves as connected to Cuba. Instead they saw it as a timely opportunity to "go back in time" and experience "1950s America" or as a business opportunity to be "ahead on the changes to come."

Lily, a white woman ambassador for the Cuba Study Abroad at Northern U*, explains:

> "well my major is in global health and Cuba has exceptional health especially considering its limited resources *but I really decided to go because it was such a unique opportunity. Things are bound to change in Cuba and so I knew I wanted to see it before it happens*" (emphasis mine).

And perhaps even more explicitly Josh, a white male student, reiterates this point:

> "I've heard that Cuba is like going back to 1950s America. A friend of my family went illegally and he said it's like nothing you'd imagine [pause] I forget his exact words but something along the lines of *'stuck in time*.' He said it's like stepping into the past. I dunno. It sounded really cool and I guess now they made it easier for people to go through study abroad so *I should go, because it's bound to change*" [emphasis mine]

These two study abroad students emphasize how the necessity of change to follow was a major motivator for them to choose study abroad in Cuba. Some students even went as far as to emphasize that they chose Cuba, because they held ideas that not only change is destined to come, but that the change might offer them unique business opportunities.

Nick and Jake both emphasized that "if things really do change, I want to be ready" (Jake), because as business majors they could go anywhere but this has potential as a "new market" (Nick).

For many white students, their motivations for going to Cuba were highly tied to their views that changes in U.S policy are coming and what they thought the result of a repeal of the U.S. Blockade would have on the island; furthermore, it brought a sense of urgency to see Cuba "before it changes" and loses its "1950s decadence." Some even went as far as to see Cuba as a potential new U.S. market where they wanted to "be on the frontlines when it opens up" (Jake). Meanwhile even though students of color also saw the time as a "unique opportunity," their motivations and views on what they predicted as the possible outcome of the impending changes to U.S. foreign policy differed greatly.

Views on the Embargo

Similar to the divergent rationales for pursuing travel to Cuba between students of color and white students, there was a clear split in perceptions of what a repeal of the U.S. Embargo would have on the island. For white students, the looming political discussions of a repeal of the U.S. Embargo, or even lessening of restrictions, created a sense of urgency to "see Cuba now."

White students whether wanting to experience Cuban socialism or "go back in time" believed that repeal of sanctions would lead to major changes in Cuba politically and economically. When asking students about their views on the Embargo and the current moves to change U.S. foreign policy, white students reiterated their perception of Cuba as a nostalgic place that might lose its luster, through the repeal of the Blockade, even if some of them lamented this as "selfish." However, students of color sometimes responded to the notion of Cuba as "stuck in the past" and "under threat" as "ridiculous" and self-serving. Students of color, despite also seeing the opportunity as timely, were invested in opportunities for greater economic power for Cuban people and attentive to the complex outcome that might have. Students of color supported an end to the U.S. blockade but held reservations about how this change might deepen racial inequalities that already exist in Cuba.

A Nostalgic Place

For many students, the perception of Cuba as a nostalgic place to "go back in time" or to "experience the Cuban Revolution" before "it falls" were major motivations for their travel. As I mentioned earlier, these students were studying abroad generally to fulfill language or other university requirements; however, they chose Cuba, in particular, because it was a timely "once in a lifetime" opportunity. For instance, Ashley, a white woman, states:

"I think it's inevitable that the embargo will end and change will come. I'm not looking forward to Starbucks and McDonalds on every corner but I guess that's what comes with progress"

Ashley highlights what she sees as the inevitable outcome of U.S. influence which is the over-abundance of transnational corporations "on every corner." Furthermore, Laura also reiterates this idea:

> "I hope that it's [changes in the Embargo] beneficial and Cuba is able to help with more equal distribution [of new resources]…But I also hope it doesn't become like a lot of

> other places, like Puerto Rico, and like full of McDonalds and stuff. I hope it retains some of its authenticity and unique 1950s decadence but that's kind of selfish and not the best when buildings are like falling down on people"

Laura highlights her view that a stronger relationship between the U.S. and Cuba might mean a loss in "authenticity" and "1950s decadence." Sam, a white student, who chose to travel to Cuba, because he wanted to see "the last surviving socialist project of the 20th Century" also articulates that a change in U.S. policy is "inevitable" and a "double edge sword." He remarks that "I don't think the U.S will change its policy toward Cuba in a meaningful or positive way that engages its socialist elements" that's why he wanted to "see it now for myself." Therefore, white students no matter where they stood on Cuban socialism saw U.S. engagement as a force that would potentially over run Cuba whether positive or negative.

Furthermore, some of the white students not only see the change as inevitable but are preparing to be a part of this change. For instance, Nick states:

> "Look I'm conservative, I'm American, and I support my country. I support U.S. policy. If the U.S. decides to repeal the Embargo, I say great. Hopefully, I can use it [my experience studying abroad] as a business advantage and a competitive opportunity."

Jake, who offers a similar sentiment, argues that he is already prepared and waiting. He says:

> "I'm so excited for the changes. I've already set up relationships in Cuba to start a business. I mean, obviously, it's an informal under the table operation at the moment butttt… a friend and I are ready to really get it rolling when it [blockade] opens up more. It's going to be quite the opportunity for growth and profit as a new market"
>
> Me: "Really? What kind of business?"
>
> Jake: "Well…(chuckles) you know how a lot of Americans really want to go to Cuba to 'go back in time?' at least I know I did, we got this idea to facilitate that kind of tourism… we have our networks in place and it's going to happen"

These two students reveal that they see this opportunity as beyond a means to "practice their Spanish" or "go back in time;" in fact, since they believe changes in U.S. policy are coming they want to be able to capitalize on the opportunity.

In sum, white students emphasize a sense of privilege that they could have "went anywhere" or could have "worked on their Spanish" in many different locales, and what made Cuba appealing is the notion of it as *frozen in time.* As part of my project, I asked interview participants to send me their favorite most memorable pictures from their trip to Cuba and a small explanation. Of the 33 interviewees, 21 sent photos. The photos I received from white students were overwhelmingly of these "nostalgic" and "decadent" places that they were afraid would change or "be gone" as a result of "progress" to come. Pictures included a range of sites but most commonly the old Hershey chocolate train, 1950s US cars in Habana Vieja (Old Havana), Fidel Castro's home, 1950s Vintage hotels, and other sites they feared would be "bought out."

Engagement and Fear of Deepening Inequalities

Meanwhile students of color, both black and Latino/a, were conflicted about what the impact, a repeal of the Embargo, would have on the lives of people in Cuba and what they viewed as successful institutions already in place in Cuba. They were hesitant to see an end to the social closure as anything less than a highly complex issue that could be both empowering and reinforce larger structures of exploitation. For instance, Anne states her skepticism about U.S. engagement as necessarily better than isolation stating:

> "I guess I'm super skeptical…Some folks say 'oh new business opportunities' but I don't know about that…I don't think the U.S. is going to really help [Cuban] people….The idea that Cuba would be America's [tourist] playground again isn't ideal. And [in regards to] U.S. foreign investment, I think buying people out of their homes…well, gentrification doesn't really help people. Overall, I think its [ending the Embargo] a good idea. But I hope they put measures in place that the U.S. will respect and vice versa…"

For Anne, while she appreciates the economic "necessity of tourism" for a "place like Cuba" that "suffered greatly" after the Special Period. She stresses that "look I get it…the youth in Cuba grew up without anything and they see U.S. media and they want things but their sense of U.S. capitalism is different from my experience." She struggled with empathizing with "both sides" (i.e., the older and younger generations) in Cuba and the tension between the two as she saw it. "I think the older [Cuban] generation is scared that the youth who didn't experience and don't understand the downside to U.S. capitalism will sell out everything they worked so hard for…it's really complicated." While Anne emphasizes her support of the repeal of the U.S. Blockade she highlights a deep complexity about her views on the outcome. Other students of color point out this complexity as well. For instance, Zoe points out:

> "I'm SO excited about the changes that are coming now with the blockade coming down. The changes for my friends in the economy and opportunities for people. I think it could be really positive…[and] the weird people who like resist it, because they think Cuba is like a vacuum and has stayed the same all these years, like a tourist voyeurism is weird…[but] I guess my fear is that the breakdown of the blockade is that American companies will come in and perpetuate the type of re-economic colonization that has happened in a lot of other Caribbean countries. So I hope they are able to keep their protections, you see, right now resorts are Cuban--owned so unlike the Canada and American owned resorts in Jamaica which extract the tourist profits, Cuba would be able to capitalize off tourism."

While Zoe is not as critical in regards to the negative possible outcomes as Anne, she articulates a similar notion of "hope" that Cuba can maintain some of its unique socialist elements to prevent foreign extraction of profits. Furthermore, she supports opportunities and autonomy for her Cuban "friends" to make these decisions for themselves.

Later she emphasizes:

> "Look I definitely left Cuba with more questions than answers and while I always saw Cubans as a diverse people, I developed a deeper appreciation for what that means…they're resilient and U.S. capitalism and culture isn't going to overrun them, because they won't let that happen"

The emphasis on Cubans, and changes in U.S. policy, as a necessary requirement to recognize Cubans as an autonomous group of people capable and deserving of full self-sovereignty was a major emphasis for students of color. It also stood in stark contrast to white students who were ready to jump into influencing the Cuban economy and saw U.S. capitalism as a threat to Cuban culture.

> For instance, Travis a Latino student, articulates:
> "Yeah, of course! I think the blockade should end. I think it has the opportunity to be positive. It could definitely deepen inequalities and issues like we've seen in other parts of Latin American, particularly Caribbean countries, but ultimately I think it's up to Cubans. I think despite the fact that I would be sad to see changes that would take away from the successes of socialism there, I think Cubans need to have full citizenship and sovereignty in the world. It's their country and society and they should have the choice to choose what they want for their future whether I agree with those decisions or not."

Travis perhaps, most clearly states what other students of color were suggesting, which is, the right for Cubans to have full autonomy over their economy in the world sphere. The interesting tension is that they did so even as they acknowledged the pitfalls of the Cuban Revolution as not meeting its goals of ending racism, sexism, and homophobia. Students of color supported Cuban autonomy even as they criticized the country's institutionalized systems of inequality, particularly racism, and a failure to acknowledge it which could have "dire consequences for Black Cubans." Ultimately, they articulated a need for greater exchange and communication. For instance, Brittany, a black woman, even went as far as to state an interest in "going back to Cuba" to do research on "colorblind racism" and "aid in anti-racist acts of solidarity" that examine strategies of success and failures in "the global struggle for anti-racism" particularly in the U.S. and Cuba.

While white students were both critical and opportunistic about the changes that a repeal of the U.S Embargo of Cuba would mean for the country and its people, their understanding and

views differed greatly from that of students of color. Students of color did not see these changes as an opportunity to capitalize on the change nor did they see Cuban culture as in jeopardy of no longer being of interest to tourists. While the tension for white students was between "progress" and "nostalgia" the tension for students of color was how to empower Cubans to have full "autonomy" even if that meant that some of Cuba's "successes" in struggling against the exploitation of U.S. imperialism might "deepen" racial inequities, disenfranchise, and make vulnerable Cubans of color. Students of color often felt that they had a deeper understanding of these risks, because they not only were able to have a more "authentic" experience in Cuba but were also able to better relate to the realities of Cubans of color as people of color themselves.

Divergent Experiences: Blending In, Sticking Out, & Negotiating Machismo

While students' race and ethnicity background played a major role in their motivations and perceptions of Cuba and the U.S Embargo, gender and race combined played a more pervasive role in students' understandings of their experiences in Cuba. They often articulated that they thought gender and race/ethnicity was *more influential* to their experiences in Cuba than even their national identity. Their experiences negotiating race/ethnicity and gender in Cuba also impacted their understandings of Cuban culture and overall views about the nation. Even though white men and women both felt that they "stuck out" in Cuba due their race, white men often stated that it "didn't bother me;" however, white women struggled with a combination of "sticking out" due to their race and ethnicity coupled with negotiating "machismo culture" particularly catcalling and "hissing" on the streets. While Black students felt they had an advantage in "blending in," Black women did not feel that this protected them from racism or machismo but rather gave them a deeper understanding of how it "works in Cuba." Black women articulated very different experiences in public spaces, with host families, and dating. Latino/a

students felt that either "the way I look I guess" or the perceptions "that I can speak Spanish" allowed them to "blend in" as well. In their programs, the ability of students of color to "blend in" was perceived as "unfair" and a more "authentic experience" by their white peers and often was described as reinforcing tensions amongst their program group members.

Table 4. U.S. Study Abroad Students' Experiences in Cuba

Negotiating Race and Gender	Blending In	Sticking Out
Students of Color	X	
Non-Hispanic White		X

Sticking Out

For white students, "Sticking Out" was a challenge to having a real "authentic" experience in Cuba. And even though most of them describe having an overwhelmingly positive experience, it left them uncertain if they were able to "experience the real Cuba." For instance, Sam highlights these points through his description:

> "Um..[chuckles] I'm like a really tall white dude so I would just stick out like a sore thumb. Some People in our group could pass for being Cuban…but for me there was no escaping standing out like an Alien in Cuba…[and] I mean I feel like it kept me from experiencing like the 'real Cuba' or like whatever that means just because I was so clearly a foreigner"

When I asked Sam if he thought being a foreigner as a U.S. citizen or "American" in Cuba impacted his experience he countered with "No [chuckles] [because] a lot of people refused to believe I was from the United States… [and they assumed] I was European." A lot of the white students reiterated that "no they thought I was German" (Stephanie), "people would try and speak to me in French and I don't know French [laughs] so yeah, they didn't think I was

'American'" (Julie). And even Stephanie laughingly remarked "I even got into a debate with [Cuban] people, because they just *knew* I was Canadian." The recent changes in U.S. policy that made it possible for the re-establishment of U.S. study abroad programs were still relatively new. To Cubans, white students from the United States, stood out due to their race and ethnic background (English speaking) but were not necessarily associated with their nation of origin (the United States).

Furthermore, even though both white men and white women felt that they stood out in Cuba, the degree to which that was a barrier for them was based on their gender. Jake remarked "I mean yeah it was annoying to always stand out…[but] other than, maaan what's it called? [pause] you know, always asking for money, it wasn't a big deal." Other white male students remarked that "yeah I think it impacted my experience because you know Cuba [the government] has like what it wants tourists to see and what it [the government] doesn't so there's that... but it wasn't a *big* deal." Nick reiterates "it [sticking out] didn't really bother me." But the white women reiterated how "always sticking out" felt "isolating" and was "exhausting." Sarah, who was mugged in Cuba, laughs:

> "Look I was mugged [chuckles]. I loved my experience in Cuba and despite getting mugged I want to go back, like I'm planning to go back now, buttt I think standing out as a white woman is something to be aware of"
>
> Me: You think that is why you were mugged?
>
> Sarah: "I think being white like represents something, money I guess, in Cuba. There are a lot of people without and like I dunno being a woman puts you at greater risk. Look! I want to be careful here, because I loved my experience in Cuba and because I really don't want to perpetuate misconceptions or anything like that about Cuba and Cuban people, but machismo is a real thing. Getting followed and catcalled you know that hiss and kissy sound is a daily issue. Personally, I don't think its *that* different from the U.S. except for the added layer of like standing out all the time. I'm not sure if I'm making this clear or not but I guess I think *it's both*.

Sarah is a unique case. She was the only student who had any physical altercation in Cuba. She stressed over and over again that the incident, which happened two days before her return to U.S., "just doesn't characterize my overall experience in Cuba" and that "I lived in Cuba for 12 weeks and I never felt unsafe [except for that incident]; in fact, I felt much safer than I would have walking alone at night in a major city in the U.S., like Chicago for example. I was just unlucky." And even though the white women students reiterated that they "always felt safe" and "never had any issues" they lamented being exhausted from standing out as foreigners and as women. For instance, Stephanie points out "I dunno at some point some of the group [white women] were just tired ya know and some of us just kinda stayed inside [rather than going out during their free time]." Even some of the men in their programs remarked at the differences between their experience and young women in their program. For instance, Sam remarks

> "I think that like that we mostly interacted with men and there really wasn't very many women around was reflective of deeply rooted sexism…And [as a guy] it was really weird for me like as if me and several of the women in our program were walking down the street together they would just get catcalled like constantly by Cuban men…I had a lot of conversations with the women in the program about the constant public sexism they were experiencing but it was weird… And then I sometimes found myself performing that role [of protector]. And leading away drunk men harassing them and it sucked having to do it and it was like uncomfortable the whole time. To be in the position to have to perform that role. And I did in some way want to protect the women in my group from harassment, but also talking to the other people in the program about what they wanted. It was exhausting and frustrating. I can't even imagine being a woman in Cuba it would be exhausting to have to deal with that shit all the time."

Even though Sam highlights how "machismo culture" was a "culture shock" and "exhausting" he points out that his exhaustion really comes from trying to support the women in his program. He even states "well I really didn't have to deal with it [unless] I was just trying to help."

And while for some of the white women it was a barrier to venturing out beyond coordinated program excursions as a means to cope for others they actively resisted. Kara remarks:

> "I'mma be honest. It got really annoying. And I consider myself a feminist so I wasn't gonna let it ruin my experience or keep me from going out [like some of the others] but it was really hard to come up with witty comebacks on the spot in Spanish. [But] By the time I left, I was getting decent at it I think"

In contrast to the white women who felt the constant reality of standing out coupled with catcalling influenced their behavior in making them more withdrawn some actively challenged it. However, white women overwhelmingly felt that their programs "didn't adequately prepare" them for that experience. Ashley points out that she thinks that is why Northern U* established an ambassador program "because like it's [going to Cuba] not for everyone."

Standing out, coupled with catcalling, and other gender norms in Cuba made white women feel less assured of their experiences and relationships in Cuba. These women often reiterated the difficulties in meeting and interacting with other women in Cuba as well as the warnings about relationships with Cuban men. Kara points out that "I know guys in our program were able to make friends by like playing pick-up basketball but there really weren't those kind of opportunities for us [women]." Hope highlights that "yeah a few men in our program were able to connect with locals through playing soccer but there were no girls out there; in fact, that was something I noticed as a girl in a sorority, it was hard to find other girls to hang out with. Like what was up with that?" And while it was difficult to "find other girls" it was easier to connect with Cuban men but not seen as a "real" or "authentic" experience. This is partly due to the association of Cuban men interested in white women as "probably jineteros[81]."

[81] Jinetero is a Cuban word associated with prostitution. It has most commonly been used to describe female sex workers (jineteras) and usually is associated with being a "hustler." For instance, Allen's (2007) piece entitled "Means of Desire's Production: Male Sex Work" delineates the work of "Jineteros" as different from male sex work, or pingueros, through the following:
"jineteros may sell counterfeit or stolen cigars, suggest paladares (restaurants) and accommodations, often accompanying the foreign client" and "rip tourists off" (187).

> Lily: "I mean, yeah, I was warned and it's kinda my job to warn other students, that a lot of the Cuban men interested in hanging out [with white women] are probably jineteros so at the end of the day like each person can decide for themselves uhh what they want to do with that but…"
>
> Julie: "Uhhh I think I was warned about 1000 times to watch out for jineteros. [laughs] I remember our [Cuban male] professor warning us and telling us these crazy stories [chuckles] about American and Canadian women getting duped. You know falling in love with a Cuban guy who uses them to get out of Cuba. They were very melodramatic stories [laughs]."

Some of the women even remark that "it makes sense," because "we're foreigners." Kara emphasizes "well not too be crude But a lot of the women in the group spoke very little Spanish and knew very little about Cuba so like what else would we have in common with these [Cuban] guys?" What Kara is emphasizing here is the sense of questioning that Cuban men and U.S. white women would have any foundation for a "real" friendship given the major differences and barriers between them. This was not uncommon.

Other white women described establishing friendships with Cuban men, but how the perception and sanctions around "jineterismo" in Cuba put their new Cuban male friends at risk. Stephanie describes "becoming friends with an Afro-Cuban guy" and "hanging out." Their friendship had emerged from "taking classes together" and "we both loved art." Even though Stephanie remarked "we were only friends" she described that "it seemed like every time we were out the police would stop him and like ask him what he was doing with me and ask for his id." She describes this happening "all the time." And she was far from alone. All of the white women respondents noted that this policing of Cuban men and white women's "friendships" either happened to them directly or to someone they knew well in their group. When Stephanie talked with other people in her program including Cuban program leaders, she said that they described it as "normal." This policing of relationships, particularly for white women with

Cuban men added an additional layer to "sticking out," was a barrier to building relationships, and was understood by white women to make their experience "less authentic."

Blending In

Students of color noted not only the "privilege of not sticking out…for once" but how blending in gave them greater access to "spaces other people [white students] didn't." Students of color pointed out the ways that "not standing out" allowed them to move through Cuba differently than their white peers as well as gain a different and perhaps deeper understanding of race, gender, and social class in Cuba. The ability of students of color to move about differently in Cuba was a point of tension many of them highlighted about their study abroad program. And even though many of the students of color felt that their experience was "so much more than I expected," they also developed a deeper critique of the way racism, classism, and sexism functions in Cuba.

First, the number one way that students of color articulated their experience as differing from their white peers was through "blending in." For instance, when I asked Alex to describe "some of her experiences as a black woman traveling in Cuba" she responded with "oh I got a lot of 'Are you Cuban?' and I was like…uhhh nooo." Zoe states "No I didn't stick out. As long as I wasn't speaking English I didn't stick out. When I walked with Cuban friends or by myself, I didn't stick out. Not that I 'passed' a lot but…my blackness was an advantage" Zoe suggests that as long as she wasn't with the larger study abroad group she "didn't stick out." Brittany states that experience directly, "NO, I never stood out unless I was out with our [study abroad] group." Anne further clarified "I blended in for the most part…that was kinda nice." And Miguel remarked "Nah, I didn't stand out…that wasn't a problem for me." Even Cristina who acknowledges "I'm kinda fair skinned but for some reason I didn't really stand out like others

[white study abroad students]. Nevertheless, they all noted that this was indeed a problem for their white peers. Zoe highlights this stating "A lot of the white students I went to Cuba with couldn't handle being so visible, because they had never experienced that in the United States. So we had A LOT of discussions and processing about that in my house." Miguel also emphasized this with detailing "ohh yeah, the white students I studied abroad with got really tired of all the attention. They were clearly tourists [to Cubans] and envied the few of us that could kind of 'blend in.'" While there were many examples of how students of color described being able to blend in as an advantage for having access to more spaces, people, and greater depth in understanding, Zoe articulates this most clearly with:

> "Some [white] students were upset that they felt they weren't having an 'authentic' experience and sometimes the white students [would] want to go with students of color [during their free time] because they felt they were having a more 'authentic' experience or something like that. I find it strange that you want to come with me and my Cuban boyfriend when we go out. So there was like friction over wanting to borrow our friends to try and have an 'authentic' experience…And I was like you have to find your own friends [and] we would stress that how they're feeling is how we feel sometimes in the U.S. being so visible and outside sometimes…it just didn't get any better."

Zoe highlights the degree to which blending in versus sticking out played in discussions of race and their experiences with their study abroad programs. Maria highlights a similar point with

> "it was weird sometimes. For example, when I told the program, because you know if you travel outside the area you're supposed to, you don't have to, but it's encouraged that you, you know, you let them know where you're going [pause] anyways so I told them I was traveling to see some family and some of the others [students] wanted to go with me to "see the real Cuba" and I thought that was weird…they kept pushing too"
>
> Me: "why? What made them interested in going with you?"
>
> Maria: "wellll, these were students that had been complaining, I don't want to talk bad about them, but they were white students that felt they weren't having 'the real' experience but also didn't want to speak Spanish or you know try anything new really"
>
> Me: What did you do? Did you take anyone with you?

> Maria: "definitely not. I was going to meet extended family for the first time and so no, I told them no"

Maria also points out how white students recognized and tried to tap into a more "authentic" experience in Cuba through students of color. Maria continues "they [white students] aren't completely wrong. I was able to see a very different version of Cuba, one not a lot of tourists have access to, through my visit and connections to my family there."

Chris and Zoe also acknowledge how their experiences of dating were quite different from that of their white peers. Chris emphasizes "I guess a lot of the people in my program were maybe put off by the idea of being duped, by like jineteros or whatever, but that wasn't my experience. I had a long-term girlfriend and became close to her family and everything." Zoe also highlights that her experience dating required her to "go and hang out with…[her boyfriend's] mom and dad…I would spend like 4 days a week hang[ing] out with his mom and cook[ing] dinner…[and that] was normal." While Chris and Zoe's descriptions show how greatly their experiences and interactions with Cuban people differ from their white peers who often, due to "standing out" and the sanctioning of "jineterismo" along with other factors, structure their experiences differently.

To further highlight these differences, Brittany and Zoe point out instances that they articulate as key examples. Brittany describes being out with a few of the white students and walking around Old Havana and getting stopped by the Cuban police who asked for her "carnet," which is a Cuban ID. She states, "yeah even the white kids were like ohhh that's racist…but it was scary for me, because I didn't have my ID on me and my Spanish isn't THAT good." Brittany goes on to articulate that the incident helped her to acknowledge the ways that "racism is still an issue in Cuba," how it is "tied to social class," and impacts the lives of Afro-Cubans.

She continues "no one I spoke with in Cuba would use the word racism even though many Afro-Cuban people I spoke with had similar experiences to mine…and then I started noticing that all the poor areas [in Havana] were like Black and…" Brittany's own experience navigating racism in Cuba helped her to see and understand institutionalized forms of racism in Cuba. Zoe also discusses this stating:

> "I had a black boyfriend in Cuba…We didn't really have issues, but you know you don't go back to people's houses, Cuban people's houses. I don't know if you know but especially if you want to have privacy some alone time and intimacy…because…Cuban people live with their families, usually their parents, and there isn't really privacy so you have to rent a room. You can rent a room or something in other people's houses or cupados or, which, would be like really cheap, um. And they're easy to get unless you're not Cuban because they can be penalized for renting those rooms to someone who is not Cuban. So if they think you're not Cuban, you're not getting a room. I guess a lot of the white students were not able to get down, get down or whatever with their significant others and they were upset…frustrated you know, but like I never had a problem because umm I guess I passed as a black person which was great…*But think about what that means right there, right*? Because there are white people who are Cuban there are Chinese people who are Cuban. *That my blackness is immovable and means I must be Cuban and made me question what blackness means here. Like what does it mean. I would go to different areas of Cuba and see that the most impoverished areas were black areas and the poor areas were full of black Cubans and distributions of resources were not equal. Racism is real there*" (emphasis mine).

While "blending in" in some ways was an asset to students of color in reducing the amount of unwanted attention in public spaces, it also meant that "blending in" did not shield them from racism in Cuba. Students of color became privy to the ways institutionalized racism functioned as they were either granted access or mistaken, even temporarily as Cuban. Brittany literally describes being mistaken as a Cuban jinetera and stopped by Cuban police. Zoe details how "the immovable assumptions of Blackness allowed me to access them [spaces, and see] things most travelers and study abroad students wouldn't be privy to due to my skin color and the assumptions it conveys." Chris argues that it allowed him to travel and date "freely" even if that freedom granted him "access" to see "the incredible downsides of Cuban socialism." Alex

highlights that in spite of the formal tourist sites that highlight the great successes of socialism to white tourists in Cuba, "I had not one Afro-Cuban professor…there really wasn't much inclusion of Afro-Cuban people." Alex states "They tried to show it to us…when we were in the provinces we visited a lot of slave master houses and I guess that was like to talk about this history but the way that the history is framed is not from the perspective of the people who were enslaved ever. All of the things we went to visit were like a museum, they're building this museum dedicated to the way of life of the slave owners…it was uhhh weird." The irony of blending in was that tourism to students of color was perceived as white, because tourism was associated with whiteness, and economic privilege, they not only observed the ties between race and social class but sometimes were in a position where they had to navigate those racist assumptions themselves. While women of color acknowledged machismo and described it as "annoying," sexism wasn't as significant in defining their experience in Cuba as racism; in fact, it was the combination of their race and gender that put them at risk of being misidentified as jineteras[82], and/or being sexually victimized themselves.

Discussion

My findings demonstrate the way a transnational intersectional analysis of negotiating race, gender, and national identity in Cuba reveals important differences in the motivations, experiences, and views study abroad students hold along the lines or race and ethnicity. If the "international is personal" what this research shows, is that there are divergent motivations,

[82] Jinetera is associated with sex work in Cuban women's sex work specifically related to tourism. For more information see Daigle, Megan. 2015. *From Cuba with Love: Sex and Money in the Twentieth Century*. Oakland: University of California Press, O'Connell Davidson, Julia. 1996. "Sex Tourism in Cuba." *Race & Class* 38(1):39-48. doi: 10.1177/030639689603800103, Simoni, Valerio. 2014. "From Tourist to Person: The Value of Intimacy in Touristic Cuba." *Journal of Tourism and Cultural Change* 12(3):280-92. doi: 10.1080/14766825.2014.934054.

interests, and possibly even impacts of U.S. study abroad tourism in Cuba. While my data support that of France and Rogers (2012) who argue that "study abroad in Cuba holds potential to redefine and reconstruct… 'an American self' in a transnational context" (392), I reveal that this potential for "students studying abroad in Cuba…to encounter, examine, and renegotiate their American identity" differs by race and gender. Students of color, who already articulate a more critical lens in regard to their American identity, have a thorough understanding of how race and gender operate on a transnational level. From negotiating machismo to *forging diasporic ties,* students begin to compare and examine how racism and sexism operate similar and differently across nation-states.

First, I find that black and Latino/a students sought out study abroad programs to Cuba for the purpose of *forging diasporic ties*; meanwhile, white U.S. men and women studying abroad sought out studying in Cuba to primarily to see it *before it changes* and/or *as a business opportunity*. Both of these motivations fit with Meethan's (2001) analysis that demonstrates the commodification of "experiencing" the past through tourism to Cuba as well as Roland's (2010) broader research which "found a significant consequence of Cuba's revitalized tourism industry to be the racialization of tourists and Cubans conforming to Cuban racial understandings" (Meethan 2001, Roland 2010b).

The divergent motivations for traveling to Cuba reveal the different perceptions of U.S. culture and their 'American self' prior to even traveling to Cuba. If students do have a "dual frame of reference" (Mahler et al 2015) through their breaking of the U.S. blockade, this "dual frame of reference" is also informed by their positionality, or identity and experiences of race and gender, as well. In fact, while experiences in Cuba often "changed" the way white students

saw themselves or U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, students of color "weren't surprised" and simply felt that it provided them with more complete information.

Second, the positionality of students, in terms of race and gender, also played a major role in how students experienced Cuba including not only how Cubans perceived them but also the spaces and relationships they had access to. Specifically, students of color felt that they "blended in" better than their white peers and white students felt that they "stood out" and lamented the difficulties in having an "authentic" experience. While the concept of "authenticity" is a highly controversial concept, it is still significant in understanding this racial difference. More recent literature on tourism has moved to detail the change in understanding of authenticity and its problematic nature. For instance, Ritzer and Liska (1997) point out that "in contrast to MacCannell…many tourists today are in search of inauthenticity" or a simulated authentic experience (107) which fits with the convenience they are accustomed to having. Nevertheless, the historic ties between jineterismo and an "authentic" Cuban experience for tourists is longstanding and both gender and racialized (Daigle 2015, O'Connell Davidson 1996). The combination of "standing out" combined with the cultural practices of machismo, catcalling in particular, made white women in particular less able to access space beyond organized activities for tourists. For students of color, their embodied racial positionality granted them greater access to spaces beyond typical tourist sites as well as gave them first-hand experience with racism in Cuba. Students of color were able to use their embodied experiences to push back against narratives in Cuba that have long "promoted US Black tourism" to Cuba by claiming that the "new government had eliminated [racial] discrimination" (Benson 2013).

Third, study abroad students were conscious of their economic privilege in Cuba. Not unlike other studies France and Rogers (2012), Roland (2010), and Lopez (2010), the study

abroad students, as tourists, were aware of the two-tier economy in Cuba between themselves who through U.S. dollars had access to the Cuban convertible peso (CUC) versus Cubans who were paid in Cuban national pesos (CUP). They were also aware of the basic conversions between these currencies where "roughly $1 CUC = $24 CUP = $1 US" (France 2012). Nevertheless, privilege was not equally shared among students. The ability to "blend in" as students of color pointed out was mixed in its implications. Students of color were allowed entry into "less touristy" spaces but some of these students also found themselves targeted by institutionalized racism, particularly by Cuban police. Amy St. Martin and Becky Thompson (2003) in "Cuban Tourism: In the name of Progressive Politics" highlight the contradictions U.S. tourism has in Cuba. Martin and Thompson detail their own experiences with how the inequalities informed by tourism, race, and gender re-construct and uphold colonial legacies stating:

> "tourism undermines Cuban economic strategies, supports prostitution, and undercuts Afro-Cubans' struggles against racism. Under the guise of supporting a socialist country - and often in the name of progressive politics - tourism has become an embargo-era means in which white supremacy and patriarchy are upheld" (p.109)

Conclusion

Finally, the experience of studying abroad in Cuba prompted many students to highlight the ways in which the experience impacted their views of U.S.-Cuban relations and of the U.S. in general. Nevertheless, this is a story of undeniable privilege. Unlike Mahler et al (2015) who see transnational families as relatively neutral in their positionality, study abroad students despite their actual class background have economic and national privileges (attached to being from the U.S. or 1st world) in Cuba. France and Rogers (2012) note how in their research on study abroad students who traveled to Cuba as part of the College of Charleston program became very aware

of this privilege. For instance, they highlight the comments of one of their respondents who stated "one minor law that never gets talked about…has a vice grip on an entire country, a whole people, and 90% of the people in [the United States] don't know about it…" (France, 2012: p. 399). U.S. study abroad students become starkly aware of their first world privilege in Cuba in part through the presence of a two-currency system: the CUC and Cuban Peso. This system makes transparent and tangible the vast difference in economic power between U.S. study abroad students, as tourists, and Cubans. In fact, my respondent, Travis remarked "I guess the blockade didn't really affect me in Cuba, because I had access to a lot more money than Cubans. I could get really whatever I wanted on the black market." The unequal privileges between U.S. study abroad students and Cubans is not just monetary either.

Additionally, the emphasis on tourism, particularly U.S. tourism often through education programs due to the blockade, means that study abroad students as part of powerful U.S. institutions (colleges and universities) are granted access to some of the most distinguished places on the island which are often highly inaccessible to Cubans themselves. These places include the most prestigious schools in the country (e.g. University of Havana, University of the Arts), most exclusive and iconic sites (Hotel Nacional, the markets in Old Havana), travel across the island to most, if not all, of the provinces, and access to the best food, transportation, and housing. This has been commonly noted phenomenon in tourism in Cuba (France 2012, Roland 2010a, Roland 2010b) and tourism generally (MacCannell 1999, Meethan 2001).

In conclusion, the findings reveal the way that scaling intersectionality provides a more complex and thorough understanding of the way tourism, through study abroad, complicates multilayered structures of race, gender, nation, and social class as negotiated by U.S tourists in Cuba. The fact that "the sexualized and 'exotic' woman of color is one of the most recognizable

icons of tourism in Cuba today – both officially, as sanctioned by the Cuban government, and unofficially, as practiced jointly by *jineteras* (female sex workers) and sex tourists" reinforces the historical legacies of colonialism and white supremacy that impact not only the experiences of Afro-Cubans but also black U.S. tourists in Cuba (Roland 2010a, St. Martin and Thompson 2003). The fact that the negative connotations of jineterismo as "getting swindled" (Allen 2007) is attached to black bodies functions as a form of white supremacy that exists within and beyond Cuba (Clealand 2013, St. Martin and Thompson 2003). While it allows U.S. black tourists access to spaces white tourists may not have, it still functions to privilege whiteness and tourism. For instance, Roland (2010) helps us to make sense of both the unique cautionary tales and attention (wanted or not) from Cuban men that U.S. white women in Cuba experienced. Roland highlights that while Cuban women of color are constructed as prostitutes for "Johns," often white, who seek "sex tourism," "the real locus of difference in romance tourism, as opposed to sex tourism, is that "Western (white) women continue to be constructed as interested in sex only when attached to the prospect of love… [and] are alternately construed as exploited victims" (14).

Therefore, there are incredible debates over how "engagement" is both exploitative and necessary to end the economic disenfranchisement of Cuba due to unequal power relations. Nevertheless, overwhelming evidence demonstrates the growing representation of Cuba as a playground for U.S. "sex tourism," portrays Cuba through a lens of race and gender that perpetuates these inequalities. As St. Martin and Thompson (2003) point out, the re-emergence of U.S. tourism to Cuba has resulted in a phenomenon where "racism is encoded in a tourist framework that escapes the name 'imperialism' through the use of the term 'progressive.' When Cuba is diametrically imagined as, … 'either a utopia or a backward police state' rather than as an infinitely complex, exciting, damaged, and changing country, it is possible for U.S. tourists to

somehow see ourselves as innocent bystanders, rather than those imposing our own set of unearned privileges onto the scene." (118). What this research helps us explore is how those unearned privileges vary and are understood by these U.S. tourists themselves.

CHAPTER 6

CUBAN AMERICANS' MEMORIES, NOSTALGIA, AND TOURISM IN CUBA

A study that examines memories of U.S.-Cuban relations would not be complete without taking into account the role migrants and diasporic communities play in the construction and maintenance of memory. While scholarship on memory debates many theoretical tenets, there is little disagreement that "there is a persistence of nostalgia among immigrants and their descendants;" in addition, that this is tied to the development of "a highly self-conscious and explicit sense of national and ethnic self" (Bonnett 2016) p 97; 102). Nevertheless, the memories of migrants and diasporic communities are also not monolithic. They are spaces of competition, debate, and contestation. In fact, perhaps the attention to memory as a field of cultural debate and competing ways of remembering is most acknowledged through memory studies that center the experiences of migrant communities (Boym 2008). Furthermore, it is the experiences of migrants that reveal the struggle over nation-state boundaries and reveal competing structures of inequality (Chávez 2016, Paletschek 2008).

If we take seriously, Phillips and Reyes' (2011) call to add a "global memoryscape" to understanding the global landscape and transnational relations, we may have a more thorough analysis of the ways "the international is personal" and political. Phillips and Reyes (2011) work to extend Arjun Appadurai's explanation of globalization (Appadurai 1993). In Appadurai's (2006) work, there's a documented shift from the focus on nation states, described by Benedict Anderson as "imagined communities" to "imagined worlds" (Appadurai 2006). Appadurai notes that the cultural sphere is understood by not just national but also global cultural relations, or

"scapes," including an "ethnoscape," or movement of people, "media scape," images, "technoscape" or technologies, "finanscape," or money and capital, and "ideoscape" or cultural ideologies. These scapes make up the complex contours of the "transnational social imaginary where culture is conceived, performed, received, and contested" (Appadurai 2006). Phillips and Reyes (2011) "recommend" an addition to Appadurai's schema which would include "a new scape…the global memoryscape" (13). They argue "here we imagine a complex landscape in which memories and memory practices move, come into contact, are contested by, and contest other forms of remembrance….[and] older ways of conceptualizing the past…are unsettled" (13-14).

In understanding U.S.-Cuban relations, migrant and exile Cuban Americans not only inform the memoryscape but also are situated as bicultural. This bicultural[83] identity may make many Cuban Americans, aware of the different scapes, or competing technologies, financial realities, and ideologies between the U.S. and Cuba. For instance, the bicultural identity and experience, may serve as an important "dual frame of reference" (Mahler 2015). Part of this, is a result of negotiating the realities in both nation-states to maintain ties to the homeland (Cuba) whether political, symbolic, or familial. As such, an analysis that includes the ways in which Cuban Americans negotiate identity, memory, and U.S. –Cuban relations, also lends itself to a transnational intersectional approach.

Objectives

While the previous chapters applied a transnational intersectional framework to U.S. tourism through study abroad to Cuba, this chapter will examine another means through which

[83] Evoking comparison with Eckstein (2009) this bicultural identity is diverse including "Cuban (lives in the United States), Cuban-American, American (but born in Cuba)."

people navigate the social closure between the U.S. and Cuba. This chapter utilizes a transnational intersectional framework to interrogate how Cuban-Americans negotiate social structures, cultural discourses of power and inequality, and memories of migration to the United States and the choices in maintaining ties to Cuba. Not unlike the way study abroad reveals interlocking systems of power and inequality between the U.S. and Cuba, Cuban American experiences of migration to the United States and return travel to Cuba also reveal the way systems of race, gender, class, and nation inform experiences of migration, identity, and memories of homeland (Cuba).

Thus far chapters 3 and 4 have documented the competing constructions of the memories of U.S. –Cuban relations in the U.S. (through mass media) and in Cuba through U.S. tourism (particularly study abroad). Nevertheless, to end there would be a great disservice to both advancing theoretical understandings of memory and recognition of Cuban Americans in the United States. First, Bonnett (2016) argues that research centering migrant experiences often views it as a "temporary loss," which often centers assimilation; however, he argues that "loss and yearning are chronic aspects of the mobile condition…[which] have diverse consequences that range from and shift between creative attempts to re-script identity in new contexts… [and] is a persistent presence that few are immune from" (97). Second, there is extensive evidence that Cuban Americans, specifically through U.S. government policies that inform Cuban Americans relationship with Cuba, may fit as an example of the way that "governments depend upon certain kinds of allegedly private relationships" in order to conduct their foreign affairs (Enloe 2000, McClintock 1997). Furthermore, Cuban Americans function as a kind of "ideal type" for understanding transnational intersectionality.

In this chapter I have five key objectives. *First*, I set out the case for why an analysis of the experiences of Cuban Americans, as a unit of analysis, works as an "ideal type" for exploring transnational intersectionality. As an extension of Mahler, Chaudhuri, and Patil's (2015) proposal for future applications of transnational intersectionality, I argue that Cuban Americans as a diasporic community help us explore norms of race, gender, and nation not just through immigrant experiences but also through memories and maintained cultural ties. *Second*, I highlight why migrant groups, in this case Cuban Americans, are a particularly important case for exploring the key aspects of transnational intersectionality theory through its meeting the objectives of a "dual frame of reference," the negotiation of "gender and racial regimes," and an experience that prompts "comparison and agency" (Mahler 2015). *Third*, I explain my sampling, collection of data, and analyses of Cuban Americans' memories and understanding of their relationship with Cuba. *Fourth*, I detail six major themes that emerge from interviews and data of Cuban Americans experiences with migration to the United States including: (a) Cuba as Evolved; (b) Preservation of Cuban Culture: The Impact of Cuban Americans; (c) Moving Away from the Hardline; (d) White Cuban Americans as Tourists: Going Back; (e) Cuban Americans of Color and Travel to Cuba; (f) the Gender of Cuban American Memory. *Fifth*, I find that "scaling intersectionality" is a strength for exploring the complex memoryscape of U.S. and Cuba relations as well as for examining the way it informs Cuban Americans' understandings of their role in U.S.-Cuban relationship and views. It also provides a more complete understanding of the emerging rise in Cuban American tourism, and how it differs along the lines of race.

The Case of Cuban-Americans as a Unit for Transnational Intersectionality

Cuban Americans are an ideal case for an analysis which "scales intersectionality" (Mahler 2015) and reveals the way "the personal is international" (Enloe 2000) and political,

specifically in U.S. – Cuban relations (Eckstein 2009). First, Mahler et al (2015) argue for analyses that move beyond a focus on "domestic intersectionality" and instead account for migrant and diasporic communities who "negotiate relations across international borders" to better understand the way privilege and oppression change, shift, and can be reinforced (100). As support they cite Nations estimates (2013), which show that "more than 232 million people live outside the nation where they were born, a 25% increase since 2000" (Mahler 2015)p 100). Similarly, scholars have highlighted the enormous number of Cubans and Cuban descendants who live abroad (Eckstein 2002, García 1996, Gonzalez-Pando 1998, Grenier 2003, Henken 2005).

More specifically, the growth in Cuban population in the United States has been attributed to both an increase in migration as well as growth in U.S.-born Cubans who maintain a Cuban American identity. For instance, according to the Migration Policy Institute, the U.S. is home to the largest number of Cubans living abroad (Batalova 2017). In a Pew Research Center report, Krogstad highlights that "there are 2 million Hispanics of Cuban ancestry living in the United States today…but [despite the extreme rise in Cuban migrants] the growth for the group is now being driven by Cuban Americans born in the US" (Krogstad 2017). Additionally, Pedraza (2007) notes that "between 1959 and 2004 roughly 1,359,650 Cubans left Cuba… [a] number [which] probably represents 12 to 15 percent of the Cuban population" (1)., or the approximate equivalent of the population of Cuba's second largest city – Santiago de Cuba (Pedraza 2007). Despite the disproportionate focus on Cuban exiles (1959 – 1962), the largest period of migration to the United States occurred from May 1995 – January 2017 (see Figure 22 below from (Duany 2017)).

Phase	Dates	Landmark Events	Number of Emigrants
Historical exile	January 1959-October 1962	The success of the revolution onward through the missile crisis	248,100
Freedom flights	December 1965-April 1973	The closing of the port of Camarioca to the end of the airbridge flights	260,600
Mariel exodus	April-September 1980	The opening of the Mariel harbor and closing several months later	124,800
Balsero crisis	August- September 1994	The lifting of Cuban restrictions on migration and eventual U.S.-Cuban migration agreements	30,900
Post-Soviet migration	May 1995-January 2017	Establishment of the "wet-foot, dry-foot" policy, and its rewriting by the Obama administration	649,700 (up to 2015)

Source: Jorge Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States: Migration Waves, Settlement Patterns and Socioeconomic Diversity," *Pouvoirs dans la Caraïbe* 11 (1999): 69–103, available online; María Cristina García, *Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996); DHS, *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* (Washington, DC: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2015), available online.

Figure 21: Cuban Migration Differences Source (Duany 2007)

Therefore, not only are the number of Cubans entering the United States on the rise (See Figure 22 below from the Pew Research Center), but also the total number of people who identify as "of Cuban descent" has grown significantly. Therefore, in spite of the growth in restrictions of the U.S. Blockade that made travel and trade between the U.S. and Cuba even more difficult during the Post-Soviet era, the number of Cuban migrants rose. These gains continued to rise up until Obama's recension of the Cuban Adjustment Act, commonly referred to as the "wet foot, dry foot policy" as one of his last acts in office in January 2017 (Labrador 2018).



Figure 22: Cuban Population in the U.S. Pew Research Center 2007

Second, Mahler et al (2015) is highlights how a focus on (im)migrants reveals "lived experiences of social positioning vis-á-vis power and marginality" particularly in so far as "people raised with particular constellations of norms and practices characteristic of their homeland are likely to encounter and have to negotiate different norms and practices abroad" (101). Their work is a roadmap ~~to~~ extending Purkayastha's (2010) call to analyze the ways in which "people make be relatively privileged – and actively seeking privilege – in one country to balance the marginalization in another…[and to] recognize that fragmentations and contradictions [may] mark social locations…at the transnational level" (40).

The argument that Cubans, and in particular Cuban Americans, represent an ideal type for analyzing both memory and intersectionality transnationally is perhaps made most clear through the recent work entitled "Political Disaffection in Cuba's Revolution and Exodus" by

Silvia Pedraza (2007). Pedraza's (2007) work supports the much earlier analysis of Nelson Amaro and Alejandro Portes (1972) in understanding the change in Cuban migration to the United States over four different waves. In fact, Pedraza's (2007) argument, similar to Mahler et al (2015), is that too little attention has been paid to the particulars of Cuban immigration. She argues that "to date, analyses of the Cuban revolution have focused on the changing stages of the revolution, with only slight mention of the exodus of Cubans[84]…at the same time analyses of the Cuban migration have focused on the incorporation of Cuban immigrants in comparison to other groups…with only a slight mention of the changing stages of Cuban revolution as the backdrop to immigration[85]" (2). For Pedraza (2007) the emphasis on the particulars of the different waves is essential to understand how "each of the major waves of migration has been characterized by a very different social composition with respect to its social class, race, education, gender, and family composition, and values" (2). Pedraza characterizes the four waves as "those who escape" (first wave: 1959-1962), "those who search" (second wave: 1965-1974), "those who hope" (third wave: 1980s Marielitos) and "those who despair" (fourth wave: 1985 – 1993 balseros).

As such my analysis is endebted to both Pedraza's (2007) and Eckstein's (2009) efforts to more thoroughly examine the shift in views and the role memory plays in Cuban American's understanding and relationship to Cuba and Cuban American identity. This analysis differs, however, from their previous research. While Pedraza (1996; 2007) focuses on "the varying

[84] Pedraza (2007) cites that Horowitz (1995), Eckstein (1994), and Dominguez (1978) have been among the few scholars to expand beyond a focus on changing stages of the Cuban Revolution to begin to explore its relation to "the exodus of Cubans as a consequence of the vast upheaval of revolutionary transformation in Cuba" (2).

[85] Pedraza notes the work of Portes and Bach (1985) as the only substantial research to move beyond comparing Cubans to other immigrant groups and explore the differences among Cuban migrants given changing stages of the revolution (2).

political choices people made at different historical moments" and Eckstein (2009) highlights the divide between Exiles and newly immigrant Cubans in their views and choices on travel to Cuba, this analysis explores the way memory, particularly associations with family and nostalgia for the past, along with changes in U.S. policy that coincide with changes in Cuban leadership, served to create a sense of urgency during the last few years to travel to Cuba. It also details how this urgency varies by race and gender.

This period (2014 - 2017) created a unique opportunity where change in U.S. policy not only lessened restrictions but also created conditions that made traveling to Cuba more appealing even among Cuban Americans. The changes which resulted in allowing for legal travel, growth in U.S. industry collaboration with Cuba (e.g. direct flights with Delta and Southwest airlines), the sense of security with the re-opening of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. presence in Cuba, lower costs, and greater access to communication, all helped to ease some concerns and make travel to Cuba more appealing. Additionally, the notion that Cuban Americans can help guide the future of Cuba became more of a conceivable possibility. For instance, President Obama put forth, as one of the rationales for lessening restrictions, the importance of Cuban American leadership. Additionally, the period (2014- 2017) also was coupled with the end of Fidel Castro's 49-year reign over Cuba (officially) in 2008 as well as his death in 2016. All of these factors together, along with the aging of the "hardline" exile community, may have created a sense of urgency and interest in travel to Cuba. For instance, the Brookings Institute cites that "following the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement in December 2014, the Obama administration significantly relaxed restrictions on U.S. travel to the island, resulting in a burgeoning flood of U.S. visitors" (Feinberg 2016) (p.9). Even without including the number of Cuban-Americans, the rise in U.S. visitors almost doubled in a single year, that is, from 91,000 in 2014 to 161,000 in 2015. In

addition, Cuban-American visitors—under relaxed U.S. travel rules—reached nearly 300,000 in 2015" (9). In fact, Cuban Americans were the second largest tourist group in 2015 (See Figure 23 Below).

Arrivals to Cuba by source country	2015 (thousands)	2015 (percent)
Canada	1,300	36.9
United States	161	4.6
Cubans (Diaspora)	293	8.3
Germany	175	5.0
UK	156	4.4
France	138	3.9
Italy	138	3.9
Spain	107	3.0
Mexico	105	3.0
Venezuela	95	2.7
Argentina	85	2.4
Cubans (Non-U.S.)	98	2.8
China	32	0.9
Other	642	18.2
Total	3,525	100.0

Source: ONEI, "Tourismo Internacional: Indicadores seleccionadas," March 2016; and José Luis Perelló Cabrera, "Tourism development in Cuba," (Presentation to the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, July 2016).

Figure 23: Cuban American Tourism in Cuba (Feinberg 2016)

Cuban Americans in the U.S.: Migration Patterns and Views

Scholarship articulates the unique position of people who break national boundaries, or who embody transnational connections and culture. The recognition of the vulnerability of boundaries is clear through evidence that "the margins are dangerous. Societies are most vulnerable, at their edges, along the tattered fringes of the known world" (Kaplan 2002) (24). Pointing to the importance and unique experiences of people who break these boundaries, Dabashi (2011) states that "danger lies in transnational states…the person who must pass from one to another is himself in danger and emanates danger to others" (24). This position helps to

reveal that "there is no single narrative of the nation. Different groups do not experience the myriad national formations in the same way. Nationalisms are invented, performed, and consumed in ways that do not follow universal blueprint" (McClintock 1997) (360).

Peggy Levitt (2001), constructed the term "transnational villagers" to reflect transnational linkages and experiences that do not require migration but instead highlights continued participation in home communities. She illustrates how immigrants who maintain ties to family and friends in their homeland promote an adapting of values and practices. She argues that "transnational villagers" represent social relationships that span two settings, and that even though people "are all firmly rooted in one place and time …their daily lives often depend upon people, money, ideas, and resources in another setting" (Levitt 2012:125). She argues that many Americans expect migrants to "sever ties to their homeland as they become assimilated into the United States. They assume that migrants will eventually transfer their loyalty and community membership from their countries they leave behind to the ones that receive them. But increasing numbers of migrants continue to participate in the political and economic lives of their homelands, even as they are incorporated into their host societies" (125). The importance of Levitt's work is how she documents the ways "some individuals are keeping their feet in both worlds" (Levitt 2012).

The argument that Cuban Americans represent a group that have "their feet in both worlds" and the influence that bi-nationality, as a positionality has upon both homelands, is commonly demonstrated through the impact of political and economic involvement in Cuba (Eckstein 2009). Nevertheless, this involvement differs among the Cuban American community. For instance, Grenier et al (2005) argue that while Cuban Americans are not a monolithic community, the Cuban American community in the Miami-Dade area has maintained an exile

identity even while being upheld as a model immigrant community. While the early Cuban exile community is less likely to send remittances, travel to Cuba, or maintain family ties in Cuba, they remain steadfast and powerful in demanding political power over Cuba, and U.S. – Cuban relations. Grenier et al (2005) remark the way in which this core identity as exiles is an ironic position stating:

> If the goal of exiles is to recover the homeland, and the job of immigrants is to successfully adjust economically and empower themselves in the new country, then we can reach the conclusion first formulated by our colleague Max Castro: Cubans in the United States have been a failure at what they say they are [exiles] and a success at what they say they are not [immigrants] (Grenier 2005) (157).

On the other hand, Cuban American economic influence has also been very powerful. Eckstein (2009) points out that "although remittance-sending rarely occurred during the Soviet era, the annual infusion of diaspora dollars surged from an estimated $50 million in 1990 to over a billion dollars at the start of the new millennium, with the U.S. believed to account for 80-90 percent of all remittances that islanders received" (178). Eckstein (2009) goes into detail the impact remittances had for the Cuban government. The Cuban government's shift on their stance on the legality of the U.S. dollar came with the fall of the Soviet Union. The Cuban government benefitted from their reform on U.S. dollars and remittances through taxes and fees where "early in the 2000s, the [Cuban] government annually took in over $100 million in wire service fees" (215). It also helped to develop the local state run economy, because Cuban's spent "according to estimates [in 2003] 75-80% of remittances they received in purchases at the [state – run] stores" which flowed into state channels. For instance, Eckstein points out that state run stores' sales increased from "$870 million to more than $1.3 billion" between 1998 and 2003 (215). This resulted in the emergence of distinct social classes in Cuba, including a new middle class, that often reinforced racial inequities (Pedraza 2007). Nevertheless, remittances may have

cushioned the post-soviet era crisis in terms of Cubans' views. Eckstein demonstrates that, according to opinion polls, "two to three times as many Cubans as other Latin Americans had such positive assessments of conditions for their children" (288). Furthermore, she points out that the "Post-Soviet era crisis did not shatter Cuban confidence in their government's commitment to cradle-to-grave support, including for the next generation, their country's future" (288).

While Cuban Americans are divided in views and actions between newly immigrated and U.S. born versus the Cuban exile communities, they both maintain an identity whether politically or economically "with their feet in both worlds." This is clear in the irony Grenier et al (2005) points out in the hardliner exile stance. In order to make sense of this position as well as the emerging divide among views in the Cuban American community, this work explores the role of memory, identity, experiences of immigration to the U.S., and dreams for the future among Cuban American respondents.

Given the social facts in regard to the impact Cuban American social and economic capital has had on the improvement of Cubans' standards of living as well as the Cuban government's ability to raise much needed state funds, it is perhaps of little surprise that targeting Cuban Americans who once left Cuba as refugees and/or their descendants, is a key strategy for Cuban development. While Eckstein's (2009) work explores the "transnational ties" and ways the "international is personal," it does so in the period prior to the lifting of several restrictions on travel, trade, and remittances that came in 2010; moreover, it also came prior to the stepping down (and death) of Fidel Castro and new policies expanding opportunities for businesses under the Cuban State. Therefore, this chapter, in many ways extends the work of Eckstein (2009) and Pedraza (2007), through further examining the impact structural changes

which also coincide with a major split in views among Cuban Americans impact how people negotiate having "their feet in both worlds."

Eckstein (2009) points out the shift in views among the Cuban American community that coincide with the initial changes in restrictions on travel and remittances under the Obama administration. First, Eckstein (2009) points out that the traditional Cuban exile hardline approach, which supported sanctions (including the U.S. Blockade) and boundary restrictions began to be forcefully challenged by both U.S. born Cuban Americans and newly immigrated Cubans. Both U.S. born Cuban-Americans and newly immigrated Cubans "favored bridge-building which hardline Exiles aggressively opposed" (Eckstein 2009). Second, this set the stage for support for Obama's policies to lessen restrictions against Cuba. Eckstein emphasizes that "by 2008, the Cuban-American community had become divided in their views" (123). The shift and divide in views as well as lessened restrictions on travel, trade, and remittances in 2010 made the timing of this study particularly advantageous. It allows me to extend the work by Eckstein (2009) which acknowledges this unique shift. It also allows for thorough exploration of the varying motivations and possible impacts of "bridge-building" as well as the role memory may play.

For instance, Eckstein (2009) in the Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans changed the U.S. and their Homeland, argues that "the lenses through which Cuba is remembered, and memory-linked views toward travel, differ among Cubans who uprooted at different times with different experiences" (152). Eckstein points out that more recent arrivals "live with no illusions and thus without the desire to block out the present and live in the past" (152). Eckstein clarifies that the "in honoring the travel taboo [among Cuban Exiles], Exiles could continue to live in

their past [and ignore the changes in Cuba]" (157). She also employs an analysis of the ways "the personal is political" stating:

> "Exile border trespassers came to realize that history had destroyed 'their' Cuba. And for some trips led them to realize that presumed differences between family who had divided over the revolution were unfounded, and to stop believing, in turn that politics should keep them apart" (527).

The maintenance of Cuban-American identity and communities not only help reveal the connection between "two worlds" but also the importance and impact of remittances has also documented the continued connections between Cuban-Americans and Cubans, in Cuba (Eckstein 2003). That there is a shift in the practical and ideological boundaries between the U.S. and Cuba is also proposed by scholars. For instance, Pedraza (2007) highlights that "yet another transition is taking place. Over the time span of the exodus, nearly half a century, Cubans in the United States have been undergoing another profound attitudinal transition: from refugee to immigrants to ethnics…caught between two worlds" (307). Pedraza (2007) as well as Dabashi (2011) work calls for greater research that recognizes the unique experience, reality, and social position of Cubans in the United States, because "while it is an actual condition, exile is also for my purposes a metaphorical condition…[where] lifelong members of a society can, in a manner of speaking, be divided into insiders and outsiders" (38) and this "exilic condition…[can provide] a critical angle on power and a defiant character ill at ease with any communal claim on his or her loyalty" (39). Nevertheless, these positions also reveal the transnational logic of domination that may manifest through memories. For instance, in Questioning the Cuban Exile Model: Race, Gender, and Resettlement, 1959-1979, Current (2010) highlights the erasure of the variation of Cuban immigrants in the United States and the connection to memory stating:

> "The exile model might not have survived if so many Cubans had not embraced it. Building upon the glowing elements of the exile model and nostalgia for their past, Cubans in the US collectively and individually constructed new narratives about their

past and present. The power of these idealistic recollections allowed Cubans in the US to construct a Cuba de Ayer or Cuba of Yesterday as a lament for a Pre-Castro Cuba that never really existed, a mythical Cuba where everyone had wealth, health, and high culture, where there was no racism…these myths allowed Cuban exiles to position themselves as the architects and artifacts of a utopian civilization, who, although wronged were nonetheless endowed with the privileges of a formerly golden life" (p. xi).

Cuban Americans: Divergent Views

Cuban Americans' views on Cuba and U.S.-Cuban relations adds another puzzle to the story: one that makes an interrogation of memory even more pertinent. While early Cuban exiles have always played an influential role in U.S. – Cuban relations politically and economically often reinforcing U.S. political recourse in an attempt to remove the Castro regime; nevertheless, new Cuban immigrants differ greatly in their views on U.S. – Cuban relations. For instance, Florida International University's "Cuba Poll" is the "longest running research project tracking the opinions of the Cuban-American community in South Florida (the largest Cuban enclave in the U.S.). While the respondents of the poll are residents of the Miami-Dade area, it demonstrates a shift in views from isolation to engagement.



Figure 24 "Views on the U.S. Embargo over time" Source: FIU Poll 2016.

Not unlike the shift in "American" views on Cuba, the Cuba Poll reveals that in 2014 the majority (52%) of Cuban American respondents "opposed the continuation of the U.S. embargo." The 2016 poll showed a continuation of this trend where 63.2% opposed the

continuation of the U.S. Embargo with Cuba. This shift coincided with gains in support for the "establishment of diplomatic relations" (69%) and for support for "All Americans to travel to Cuba" (73.5%) (Grenier 2017).



Figure 25: "Attitudes toward unrestricted travel over time" (Source: FIU Cuba Poll 2016)

Duany (2016) notes:

> "the findings of the poll suggest that Cuban immigrants who left the island in the last two decades support engaging with Cuba more often than those who left in the first decades after the revolution. As these later immigrant waves increase their weight within the Cuban-American community, as well as the numbers of those born in the United States increase relative to those born abroad, swift demographic changes are reshaping Cuban-American attitudes regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba"

Therefore, it leaves us with new questions about the shift in views of U.S. – Cuban relations among Cuban Americans. While there is work that explores the differences between early exiles and newly immigrated Cubans, neither fully explain the rise in interest among these groups, and U.S. born Cubans, to visit Cuba and re-establish closer ties. After a half-century blockade that has had profound consequences on ties, as well as on memory of Cuba among different generations of Cubans, the rise in Cuban American tourism and the role of memory is important to explore.

The Unique Aspects of Cuban American Positionality within U.S. Embargo Policy

The travel constraints of the U.S. blockade of Cuba does more than restrict the movement and exchange of U.S. citizens with no ties to Cuba; moreover, it also has set clear and explicit parameters that impact the opportunities of travel and exchange of Cuban-Americans in particular. In addition, it has also come with changes in the legal means for migration and paths to U.S. citizenship for Cuban immigrants coming to the United States. Much like the policy shifts over time in general, Cuban Americans have been subject to restrictive policies that impact the ability to have direct connections with Cuba, as homeland, by the U.S. and Cuban states. The coupling of these restrictions over the span of decades has made memories of Cuba even more pertinent to Cuban American identity. My data reveal that divergent positionalities inform how people remember and reframe their relationship with Cuba. Moreover, the data also reveal that U.S. born Cuban Americans are interested in establishing ties with Cuba through travel and remittances despite having had little direct connection until the change in the U.S. Embargo.

These findings are also closely informed by age, year of migration to the U.S., and gender. The rise in U.S. born Cubans' and newly immigrated Cubans' travel to Cuba has also impacted the interest of some of the Exile wave Cuban Americans who thought they'd never go back to Cuba. Nevertheless, gender plays a role in clarifying connections as well. My findings reveal that women were more interested in reconnecting with extended kin than their male counterparts. They also described their interest in travel to Cuba as defined by an interest in preserving family. Nevertheless, both U.S. and Cuban state policies continue to inform difficulties in opportunities for regular travel and maintenance of family ties in Cuba.

Sample and Site: HavAtlanta

In terms of the context of the sample, this research differs from most other studies in that to date the majority of studies on Cuban Americans sample respondents from the Miami-Dade area[86], specifically focusing on the exile community (Current 2010b, Mirabal 2003, Yolando 2009). My sample of respondents deviates from the more commonly used site of Miami, which is the largest Cuban community in the United States, and is known for having a particularly strong hardline stance on U.S.-Cuban relations partly due to the difference in power and resources of early exile Cubans in that area (Current 2010a). Therefore, I chose metro-Atlanta, as my sampling site, strategically for the following reasons.

First, seventy-seven percent of U.S. Cubans reside in the Southeast (Ennis 2011). While extensive research has been done on Cubans in Miami, Tampa, and New York, very few studies see how Cubans outside of these ethnic enclaves negotiate or maintain their transnational culture and ethnic identities (Current 2010a, Yolando 2009). Researchers also illustrate that many (if not most)Afro-Cuban Americans are outside the bounds of these enclaves (live outside of Miami and Tampa), due to systemic racism in the United States, and have been overlooked in academic research (Grillo 2000, Hay 2009). The metro- Atlanta region offers potential for better inclusion of Afro-Cuban Americans in that Atlanta was a major site of migration for Marielitos (Pedraza 2007), a group of Cuban immigrants that had come in the Mariel boatlift in 1980. It is estimated that "between 20 percent and 50 percent of the approximately 124,000 of these exiles were black and mulatto" (Hay 2009). Additionally, there is a rich history of transnational ties not only between HBCUs and education in Cuba that predates the revolution but between Civil Rights

[86] Current (2010) argues that "Yolando Prito's The Cubans of Union City represents the first book to focus on post-1959 Cubans outside of Miami" (xv).

Movement Activists in Georgia and Cuba during the early stages of the Cuban revolution (Guridy 2010).

Second, Georgia, Atlanta in particular, has a long history of transnational ties to Cuba. Bayala (2006) cites the intimate transnational ties that existed between "Atlantans" and Cuba pre-dating 1959. Bayala (2006) states:

> "Refugees who traveled to Atlanta after 1960 were not the first Cubans to the area; rather, they continued a century-long relationship between the people of Cuba and Georgia. Their travel to Atlanta had been fluid, and the number of Cubans living there at any time fluctuated. Cuban children traveled to the area to attend local schools as well as functions, events, and vacations with their families. Cubans also traveled there for business. Some enjoyed the city and moved their families there, creating a small semi-permanent group of families by 1959." (13).

Furthermore, evidence for the longstanding connections between Cuba (particularly Havana and Atlanta) and Georgia, are clearly referenced by different forms of transnational ties including business (Mintz 2002), tourism (Pomerantz 1997, Schwartz 1999), education (Cole 1980, Guridy 2010), and even movements for struggle against racial oppression (Cole 1980, Hay 2009). For example, Asa Candler, the owner of the Coca Cola company, worked diligently to export "Christ and Coca Cola" (Hall 1977) to Cubans and create strong ties between Atlanta and Havana[87] immediately after the Spanish-American war even "opening at least two Coca Cola bottling plants in Cuba" (Mintz 2002). Coca Cola, as Bayala (2006) argues, demonstrates one important example of the influence and connections between Atlanta businessmen and U.S. corporate investment of Cuba during that period.

[87] Mintz (2002) even notes that during this period Coca Cola was a "regional drink consumed primarily in the South…not well known in other regions of the United States, and was even less known in the rest of the world, with one major exception…Cuba" (353).

That Cuba was a popular destination for the Atlanta elite, both black and white, and helped to establish transnational ties and history between the two locales that inform the history of how Cubans resettled in Atlanta. These historical linkages were informed by structural inequities of race, during segregation, in both Cuba and the U.S. The educational linkages between Cubans and the southeast were situated in that historical context where historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) of the Southeast, Guridy (2010) notes Tuskeegee University in Alabama in particular, but also Morehouse and Spelman provided opportunities for Afro-Cubans to attend and advance their education. This was part of a movement after the Spanish American War where "Afro Cubans and African Americans had reached across cultural and linguistic differences to develop culture exchanges, forge economic relationships and construct political solidarities" (Guridy 2010) (p 2).

Nevertheless, Bayala (2006) notes the connections between Atlanta and Cuba through the Georgia Military Academy and Georgia Tech University[88] in the early 20th century (which were also segregated and thus "white" institutions at the time). The Georgia Military Academy had even developed a "Cuban Good Will Tour" where they visited the Vedado Club (Cuba) regularly and began "in extending invitations to our Cuban friends to visit us in return, Atlanta and Georgia join hands again with Cuba in further cementing the existing friendship between us" (16). Bayala (2006) shows that [white] Cuban students founded the Latino Studies program at Georgia Tech and that by 1948 ties between Cuba (particularly Havana) and Atlanta were so

[88] Georgia Tech University admitted the first black student(s) (Ralph Long Jr., Lawrence Williams and Ford Green) in 1961 (see: Georgia Tech History).

strong that they'd developed the annual "Havatlanta games" including connections between Atlanta and Havana institutions that featured over 300 young athletes.

The importance of this history is two-fold. First, it set the stage for Atlanta to be a site for the resettlement of Cuban exiles and refugees, because transnational ties between institutions and people, for example college friendships, means that social networks and familiarity with the city was already in place (Bayala 2006). Therefore, while the 1959 Cuban revolution and ensuing U.S. blockade severed these ties, the networks had already been established. Bayala (2006) estimates that as of 1966 there were an estimated 2,500 Cubans in Atlanta. In fact, Atlanta was a curious case that Current (2010) marks as significant. Current (2010) states:

> While not numerally great, the post 1959 Cuban population in Atlanta is significant because Cubans constituted the largest Latino group in the city throughout the 1960s and 1970s…[and] prepared the city for later waves of Latinos by compelling the city to hire bilingual staff…[and] successfully lobbied for bilingual staff in schools, social service positions, and the police force" (72).

Even though Atlanta was not numerically largest or have the same established community as Miami, its history has made it central to "some of the newest studies of Cubans outside of Miami" (Current 2010b).

Second, it also demonstrates an aspect of Cuban immigration and U.S. – Cuban history that is often overlooked – the experiences of Afro-Cubans. Hay (2009) points out that the experiences of Afro-Cubans[89] in the United States is often overlooked and understudied. Hay (2009) articulates that "the point is there is very little acknowledgment of the specific

[89] I am using the term Afro-Cuban to denote Cubans of African descent or perceived as Black in the United States. Hay (2009) notes that "blackness" was central to "how they see themselves and in their social experiences…they were black in Cuban and are black in the United States" even as she details and recognizes the varying "ethno-racial labels" her informants used such as "Afro-Cubano, Negro-Cubano, and Cubano-Negro" (101).

experiences of Black Latinos" and that she was "particularly struck by the near-complete absence of Cubans and any discussion of racism among Cuban immigrants" (2). She goes on to document this absence throughout academic studies citing that More than Black: Afro-Cubans in Tampa (Greenbaum 2002) as "the only ethnographic study of Black Cuban immigrants, and in fact one of very few studies on a Latino immigrant group which explicitly addresses the racialized experiences of Latinos of African descent" (3). The historical transnational ties between Afro-Cubans and African Americans in Georgia as well as the influx of black Marielitos in Atlanta during the 1980s makes it a particularly important site for contrasting memories and social ties to Cuba.

Furthermore, the Migration Policy Institute lists metro Atlanta as one of the top ten cities with the greatest concentration of Cuban immigrants between 2011-2015 (Batalova 2017). Therefore, metro Atlanta offers a site in which it's possible to recruit participants across broad categories from exile and early wave Cuban Americans as well as newly immigrated Cuban Americans and U.S. born Cuban Americans. Additionally, unlike the Miami-Dade area, Atlanta offers a more heterogeneous representation of Cuban Americans across waves, age, and race/ethnicity.

Finally, as a researcher access is a significant factor in data collection. Metro-Atlanta, as a site of research, allowed me to spend a greater amount of time in the field and in building extended social networks and community connections. This was a significant advantage over Miami, where that would not have been possible. It also helps facilitate recognition of Cuban Americans that live outside the Miami enclave which are understudied and under-recognized.

Atlanta's Continued Ties to Cuba

Metro-Atlanta provides a unique site for selective sampling of participants to understand negotiated memory as it pertains to U.S.-Cuban relations, the revolution, immigration, and future relations including business, travel, and tourism. The early Cuban exile community founded the "Cuban Club" in Atlanta in 1977 to help foster and maintain Cuban American community culture and identity in the Atlanta area which is still active today. Atlanta was home to the infamous prison riots of Marielitos in the 1980s (Hamm 1995). A number of Atlanta's HBCUs had direct civil rights ties to the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. Additionally, Atlanta leaders went to Cuba to advocate for the 1996 Olympics to be hosted in Atlanta, GA as part of a mutual interest to reassert their history and connections as legacy of the Havatlanta Games.

In recent years, not only has metro-Atlanta become home for newly arrived Cuban Americans, but it also has been on the front lines to re-create "Havatlanta" and make Atlanta "the gateway to Cuba" (Pitts 2015). Then Atlanta Mayor Kaseem Reed noted that "Georgia and Atlanta, unlike Florida, are ready and willing" to re-establish their "historical legacy." Furthermore, Atlanta institutions including Delta airlines, Georgia Tech, and the newly founded Engage Cuba Georgia State Council all have begun working to improve U.S.-Cuban relations in business, travel, tourism, and even agriculture. The impetus was the change in restrictions put in place by President Barack Obama in 2014; however, these Atlanta leaders and organizations continue to be influential in re-establishing, the previous existing, direct ties to Cuba[90] and to working toward a full repeal of the blockade (see Georgia State Council for Engage Cuba).

[90] Mayor Kaseem Reed immediately traveled to Cuba to discuss opportunities for cultural and business exchange when the new travel policy under the Obama Administration was announced. This made Atlanta one of the 3 major cities to have the first direct flights to Cuba since the Blockade. Mayor Kaseem Reed has actively articulated that "Atlanta is a key gateway to Cuba" (both historically and today).

Sample and Methods

This research is based on survey data and interviews with Cuban Americans in the metro-Atlanta (Georgia) area between 2014 and 2016. Interviews were conducted in person or via phone/skype from January 2015 to August 2016. All interviews were accompanied by a brief survey to provide basic demographic information and overall information about views on U.S. –Cuban relations. The survey to Cuban American respondents accounted for race, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and views of/identification with the United States. In addition, it included questions on wave of immigration for themselves and/or their families, age, and length of time residing in Georgia. The survey was offered in English and in Spanish.

Participants were recruited via fliers and snowball sampling. I visited two sites in metro Atlanta: (a) Atlanta Cuban American Society (ACAS),[91] which is a long-standing Cuban American establishment to develop and sustain the Cuban American community in metro-Atlanta and was founded by early Cuban Exiles in the late 1970s (Bayala 2006); (b) Atlanta Cuban Dance (ACD), which is a Cuban community centered social group that meets every third Saturday in downtown Atlanta. Its focus is to bring people of Cuban descent together across race, language, and gender under unifying cultural practices of Cuban food, dance, and music including Cuban Salsa and Cuban Casino. The founder is himself biracial (self identifies as Asian & Afro-Cuban descended). His intent was to create an alternative to the ACAS that was more intentionally inclusive, celebratory of the diversity of Cubans, and attentive to younger Cuban Americans. Yanko[92], who founded ACD told me that he did so, because "I wanted a

[91] This is a pseudonym for the establishment.

[92] Pseudonym.

space where we could find a sense of community that was welcoming. Look, I have no intention of saying anything bad about ACAS, but it is of the old guard. I wanted a space that was welcoming to us [Cubans] in all our diversity [pause] African, Chinese, Jewish, because we [Cubans] are very diverse." He further explains "I also wanted something that [is] welcoming to younger people, but most of all I wanted to pass on Cuban dance which is really at the heart of Cuban culture, the uniting piece of who we are." Yanko's description helps to make clear that these two sites differ mostly along the lines of age and race/ethnic diversity.

I gained access to these sites and activities through key respondents. These sites became central to my ability to recruit additional respondents for my study. They provided a worthwhile comparison of the split between the older generation of exile Cubans and younger newly immigrated Cubans and U.S. born Cubans interested in in retaining cultural ties and identity. I recorded field notes and informal interviews at these field sites. In addition, I also conducted 33 in-depth interviews with selectively sampled respondents across three categories: early wave Cuban Americans, newly immigrated Cuban Americans, and U.S. born Cuban Americans. These three categories were chosen strategically to better interrogate the differences and/or similarities in views toward travel to Cuba, relationship with Cuba and relatives in Cuba, experiences with immigration and/or role memories of heritage play in people's different perceptions and actions. I also strategically sampled across race and gender in order to provide a comparative analysis that brings to the center the experiences of Afro-Cuban Americans that have largely been left out of prior studies (Hay 2009). The interviews lasted from 42 minutes to 3 hours and 14 minutes.

In sum, all interviews were transcribed and analyzed using qualitative software (Atlas TI), where I coded data for emergent themes regarding motivations for travel/immigration, experiences with travel/immigration, memories of the Cuban Revolution, difficulties faced in the

United States, views on how blockade has impacted their lives, personal identity and their relationship to Cuba, the ways in which race and gender informed these experiences, and their plans and experiences maintaining social ties (or not) to Cuba. These themes revealed the ways in which the social closure and inequality is experienced differently and/or similarly for respondents based on their intersectional standpoint of race, gender, and (perceived) nationality. In addition, it highlighted the way a strong sense of community is informed by collective memories and narratives that recreate social inequalities for people of color – both U.S. citizens and Cuban Americans.

Findings

Through an exploration of memory, experiences immigrating to the U.S., and connections (or not) to Cuba through family, remittances, travel, and/or tourism, I find that Cuban Americans occupy a unique positionality through their experience as migrants and part of a diasporic community. In stark contrast to popular U.S. mass media portrayals, and U.S. study abroad students' initial assumptions, of Cuba as "frozen in time," Cuban Americans argue quite the opposite. In fact, it is how much Cuba has changed in ways that drastically differ from the way Cuba is remembered by many Cuban Americans that creates such an emotional sense of loss and nostalgia. Eckstein (2009) found a similar sentiment, in her study, when she states that the reason many Cuban exiles refused to travel to Cuba after the lessening of restrictions by both the Cuban state and the U.S. was "to retain memories of their past, real or imagined…[and that] visuals of Cuba under Castro, were too much for them, for fear that they might destroy the beloved Cuba of their imagination" (p. 152). Even more recently immigrated and U.S. born Cubans in my sample detail the ways Cuba has "changed" and "evolved" as a dynamic place, where changing

relations, could lead to "even more change and new opportunities." For recently immigrated Cuban Americans it's not that they have a fictional idea of the past, pre-revolutionary Cuba, but that they now view their homeland through a "dual frame of reference" where they compare the living situation they experienced and family still does to their lived experiences in the United States.

Similar to Eckstein's (2009) findings this change in perceptions of Cuba do not "stand in the way of homeland visits" (152). Furthermore, this analysis adds something new to Eckstein's (2009) findings that situate these three groups, Cuban Exiles/ Emigres, U.S. born Cubans, and newly immigrated Cuban Americans, differently in their experiences and memories of Cuba. My findings reveal that even newly immigrated and U.S. born Cubans seek to preserve memories of Cuba and Cuban identity both within and beyond the island even as they seek to help Cuba evolve into a more "free" and "prosperous" nation.

Cuba as Evolved

The idea of Cuba as "evolved" rather than "frozen in time" demonstrates a very different construction of Cuba in the memories of Cuban Americans. For instance, Maria (U.S. born Cuban) emphasizes this point stating:

> "You hear what your family tells you Cuba was, and you can see glimpses of it. Of what your family was talking about right? But Cuban society has evolved. Cuban culture has evolved and kept going. Most Cuban Americans I know carry the culture of 1950s Cuba with us. Talk to any of us we consider ourselves 'super Americans' but our Cuban culture our food, our language, our music, our culture is still Cuban. [Pause] What I'm trying to say is, imagine a bunch of Americans moving to another country and preserving 1950s American culture the food, music, all the stuff you had then, and that stayed, and raised their children in that culture. So in my mind we kept ourselves in the 1950s bubble and Cuba kept evolving."

Maria's point is to emphasize that part of reliving the loss of Cuba is through how much Cuba has become something new and different. Furthermore, she also begins to hint at something many other Cuban Americans suggest: that Cuban Americans have preserved Cuban culture better than Cubans in Cuba. She is not alone in pointing out how much Cuba has changed. Many other respondents remark how socialism and the U.S. Embargo have so greatly impacted the economic resources in Cuba that Cubans cannot pass down Cuban culture. Valerie remarks "A lot of Cubans in Cuba don't even know the foods we used to eat because they don't have the resources, the ingredients to prepare it, and pass it down." Sam clarifies that "I haven't been back, I'll never go back, but just from the new Cubans who've come here, they're so different. Even the way they talk. Their slang. I can't even understand their [Cuban] Spanish. We even speak differently." Many of my respondents remarked the ways that Cuban culture had changed and evolved as well as Cuba itself: the government, religion, economy, traditions, and culture. The evolution of Cuba as a new place and culture, due to a half century of a new system, recreates a sense of loss that leave many Émigrés uninterested in the new island.

Preservation of Cuban Culture: The Impact of Cuban Americans

Furthermore, some respondents even went as far as to argue that the preservation of Cuban traditions on the island were being brought back by the diaspora. Eckstein (2009) clarifies that the fiscal crisis that resulted in Cuba after the fall of the Soviet Union led to Cuban authorities, "in desperation," changing their position on Cuban Émigré's visits despite the political risk (135). In fact, it became advantageous for Cuban officials to reimagine "the once-outcast *apatridas* as born again long distance nationalists…[and began to refer] to the diaspora as the Cuban community abroad, part of Greater Cuba" (135). Eckstein's research, which focuses

on Miami and Union City in the early 2000s documents a clear divergence between willingness to visit Cuba between exiles and newly immigrated Cubans.

Similarly, my findings demonstrate that while Cuban exiles and newly immigrated Cubans may appear divergent in their willingness to travel to Cuba, the idea of bringing tradition back to Cuba and preserving their [Cuban] heritage was shared even if envisioned differently. For example, Javier who travels back to Cuba regularly[93] (yearly) now, after a 13-year hiatus due to [Cuban] state barriers, remarks "I guess you don't see it until you go back. See just how much socialism has changed Cuba. It looks so different…." He goes on to explain:

> "Cuba is trying to maintain a perfect image of a socialist country. If you think back to Cuba as a social experiment they were trying to create a perfect society… They believed in Marx and Engels and that religion was the opiate of the people so they wiped out traditions such as La Dia de la Noche Buena, like Christmas eve and Christmas Day, so they've wiped out traditions for younger generations. So we celebrate January 1st not only because it's New Year's Day but also because it's the day Fidel Castro took over. If you ask people in their 20s and 30s the average Cuban have never had one, a Christmas. It wasn't until recently that the culture is being initiated again and it's mainly because of people outside the country like me."

For Javier, Catholicism and Catholic tradition is an essential aspect of Cuban heritage. It is one that has been kept alive by Cuban Americans and is able to be reignited through the "cross-border bonding" and transnational ties that newly immigrated Cubans maintain.

Roberto, a Cuban Émigré who left Cuba as a teen in 1959, remarks that "I left Cuba in 1959. My memory of what it was, will be shaded by the rose-colored glasses of a 12 year old. My memories were mostly of fun…" Roberto has always been interested in "the ongoings in Cuba, because, well Jamie, it's my heritage." While he never thought he would go back, the recent changes which have made it easier to travel to Cuba (he references the direct Delta flights

[93] Direct flights from Atlanta to Havana are as low as $59 one way on Southwest airlines (before taxes and fees).

in Atlanta which make it) have made it "too easy to pass up." He notes, as well, the travel and interest of his U.S. born Cuban children which have led him to reconsider visiting the country of his youth and "bury the hatchet;" however, he remarks how different Cuba of today must be of the Cuba he knew.

> "In order to talk about all this Jamie, we need at least a bottle of wine and it's kinda early [chuckles]…look as far as I see it, I'm an American born in Cuba. Cause I've been here longer than you've been alive, if you think about it…If someone were to drop me off in Cuba today, I don't know if I'd survive, because I don't know the system, I don't know what to do."

As he remarks on his upcoming trip he clarifies

> "It'll be interesting. Because 50 some years is a long, long time…And those who have been there [Cuba] all this time without the benefit of this country [U.S.] are totally different than we are… [But] If your question is are you willing to help, the answer is yes."

Roberto goes on to clarify that he'd like to see Cuba "restored" to its former glory and that he hopes "all the years studying, all the years working, all the time spent developing technology and infrastructure would be useful to helping people in that country, but we shall see." Roberto's account helps to clarify how Cuban Americans view Cuba as a place that has "evolved" and "changed greatly" whether they lived there over 50 years ago or 13 years. Nevertheless, it also shows how negotiating relaxed opportunities to re-establish or maintain transnational ties to Cuba are in hopes to support or preserve Cuban culture which they understand to be religion, specifically Catholic traditions, and ingenuity/hard work.

Other respondents note the importance of preserving Cuban culture and heritage through the preservation of family. Providing remittances, or sending money to Cuban relatives (typically immediate relatives and sometimes extended kin), was often remarked as an essential aspect of maintaining the cultural values of family which many saw as "the essential element of Cuban

culture." Both U.S. born Cubans and newly immigrated Cuban Americans noted an emphasis not just on travel to establish and maintain family ties but even more significantly the importance of providing financial support through bringing much needed resources or money. The lessening of restrictions by the U.S. and the greater access to communication, which allow people to verify that the intended recipients receive their remittances, have also eased concerns that the "money would get stolen by the government." While the Cuban exiles I interviewed were not sending remittances or resources to Cuba, both U.S. born Cuban Americans and newly immigrated Cuban Americans made an effort to send what they could. Andrea who came to the U.S. in 2003 and returns to Cuba regularly argues

> "Look, Cuban people don't believe this change [in U.S. policy] is going to do anything for them really" she goes on to emphasize the importance of family abroad.

Andrea continues:

> "I wish people [in the U.S.] could see past the tourism…it makes me really mad when like Cubans go home and have all these really nice things, clothes, cars, and stuff but their family [in Cuba] is like starving. It makes me really mad…. [because] people depend on family that live in the United States. You can tell the difference in the standard of living between those that have family in the United States and those that don't…[and] if there's one thing that makes us Cuban, it's the importance of family"

Andrea details the hundreds of dollars she's saved to pack up seven pieces of luggage for her next trip to Cuba to see her family, because "more than money, they need resources. Because, if there isn't anything to really buy at the stores in Cuba then money is nice to save, but it can't help you get the food or soap you need now. You know what I'm saying?"

Javier also details how he saves up and brings several suitcases full of "basic necessities like toothbrushes, toothpaste, deodorant, and underwear" back with him to Cuba. Even though he was banned from visiting Cuba for 13 years, which he will "never get over" and his nieces and nephews have grown and "they barely know me, I barely recognize them," he brings them and

many other relatives clothes, resources and money. The importance of supporting family in Cuba was not only essential and a defining difference between "old wave and new wave" Cubans, but surprisingly became of interest to U.S.-born Cuban Americans. Jacqueline remarks that growing up in Georgia (in contrast to Miami) meant she "didn't grow up with the strong anti-Cuba sentiment." She clarifies "I mean our family is very conservative don't get me wrong" but what her mother ingrained in her was "strong Cuban values." I asked her "What Cuban values?" She replied "Family and how important it is to stick together. Family is the most important thing you have period. Good, bad, and imperfect." This value is what made her decide to travel to Cuba and learn about "my roots" and "reconnect with other family members." She goes on to say "the way I see it, my parents were lucky, they were able to get out…if I can help my family [in Cuba] by sending money or bringing some basic things to Cuba with me how can I not?"

Moving Away from the Hardline

In sum, the emphasis on re-establishing transnational ties, and preserving Cuban culture, has multiple facets. While there is a strong interest in heritage, the preservation of Cuban culture, and helping Cuba progress, the role Cuban Americans play, according to my respondents, differs greatly from the way its portrayed. Many respondents pointed out how they saw their role as different from the way "Cuban hardliners" see it. Daniela notes:

> "Some people are kinda kooky in the sense of thinking they're going to get their house back when the Castro's fall. I mean people have lived there for the last 40 something years. My family was poor and I'm not like that. My husband's family had a house but he's realistic he's not getting that back. And the Cuban government didn't allow people to take home or property ownership papers so how can you even prove its yours. It's kinda kooky. I want to go back to see where I'm from but it's not to take from other people."

And most agree that "yes, I think Cuban Americans play a role. Look in the past they [Cuban Americans] pushed for isolation, the Embargo, to try and force change, but it hasn't worked. We can all agree that it hasn't worked" Roberto clarified. Newly immigrated Cubans, such as Juan, remark how "it really only hurts every day Cubans who work very very hard…we [Cubans in the U.S.] have a duty to change that." Christopher exclaims "yes, end the Embargo, change it up." Therefore, the change in policies are seen optimistically as potential for better opportunities to foster transnational ties to support Cubans and as a means for future possibilities to empower Cubans both economically and politically as well as possibly mold Cuba's future evolution.

Cuban Americans as Tourists: Going Back

The emphasis on going back to Cuba blended interests of supporting family and relatives in Cuba, re-discovering their Cuban heritage, and to go back as tourists. Newly immigrated Cuban Americans often recounted that they went back to visit family and "go on vacation." Meanwhile, U.S. born Cubans interest, in going to Cuba, was to see their families' estates. And for Cuban Émigré's, who most frequently said they would not go back, began contemplating the idea of seeing Cuba for themselves "after all this time" and "whatever family is left." The lessening of restrictions by both the U.S. and Cuba made going back easier, less costly, and more attractive to Cuban Americans in general. Nevertheless, motivations differed greatly across race between white passing Cuban Americans and Cuban Americans of color (Afro-descended or multiracial).

"White passing" Cuban Americans were interested in recovering and seeing the wealth and status their family had held in Cuba as well as seeing the pristine beaches their family had treasured. While they in no way thought they would "recover that loss," they were intrigued by

the stories their parents had told of their wealth and status in pre-Castro Cuba, and the magnificence of the island's natural beauty. For instance, Cristina (U.S. born "white" Cuban American) remarks:

> "I would love to go. I'm curious. I'm Cuban. I haven't gone out of respect for my mom, but I would like to go so I don't know. Some of my younger cousins have gone but the majority of my older relatives have not. I would love to go and take my kids. I don't know if it's going to happen or not. I see pictures and I'm like oh my gosh it's so majestic but I don't know if it's really like that you know….but I'd also like to go and see where my family lived. My grandfather had a rice and sugar plantation in Pinar del Rio. My family also had a home in Havana… My mom will tell me stories on how they did have a lot of land and farm and horses and pigs. We talked about the whole slavery situation[94] and its not an easy topic to discuss but its a reality…Yeah, I think we did own slaves, I think everyone with money did. The people who did work in the house were actually paid domestic workers[95]…That's how my mom learned how to cook [Cuban food was] with the domestic workers. Times were different. I just would like to see it"

She yearns to see a glimpse of the wealth her family had and to see if the island is really as majestic as they'd described. As a white Cuban American, her family struggled to re-establish themselves as professionals in the United States. Boundaries around language as well as the loss of wealth meant that her older relatives mourn the loss of their previous life in Cuba where "they were professionals. My uncle actually went to law school with Fidel. He was a very prominent attorney, but law doesn't translate to another country. He had to start over driving a school bus." Cristina hopes for this as an opportunity to learn more about her heritage as well as "see the island for herself.

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[94] Officially slavery was abolished in Cuba on October 7th 1886; however, the legacy of slavery informed the realities of racial and class inequality that set the stage for the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

[95] Cristina notes here that people who had previously been enslaved by her family later became paid indentured servants who her grandfather rented housing to on his land which helped him wealth in real estate.

Nicolas (U.S. born white Cuban American) also laments the loss of status of his family. He states:

> "yes, I want to go back and see the property my family owned. They had mansions, they were members of the country club that is now the art~~'s~~ school, and they ran a really successful tobacco plantation…can you imagine who I'd be if the revolution never happened? It makes me furious what was stolen from my family, but I'd still like to see it."

Nicolas actually remarks how he has used his family's previous status in Cuba to help him better acculturate in Georgia.

> "My family started a successful business here in Georgia that delivered Hispanic food to restaurants and stores when no one else in Georgia was doing it. It was so successful that we were able to move out of our Cuban apartment in downtown Atlanta to Forsythe County. If you don't know Forsythe County is white and southern, but ya see, even though they saw me as a 'spic' I pointed out to them how similar we really are…I'm as Southern and white as them. [Points to his truck] see that confederate flag on the back there. My family owned slaves. My family is proud of what they built. I descended from Spanish lineage…we're not that different…but if you think I want to go back to Cuba, oh hell naw. I'm American, as red, white, and blue as they come."

Nicolas and Cristina demonstrate their interest in visiting Cuba to, in some ways, to "relive the past" of Cuba's "glory days" and see for themselves the wealth they lost. They acknowledge that the status and wealth was built off of slavery, and they lament the change in family status that came with the Cuban revolution.

Even some of the newly immigrated Cuban Americans who are understood as "white" in the U.S. also perpetuate this narrative. Juan, born in Cuba and came to the U.S. in 2006, recounts both being perceived as "white" and the change in his family's status which makes him interested in visiting Cuba to retain proof of that status. Juan [chuckling] "I'm over 6 feet tall and look white, no one suspects I'm anything but, until I speak Spanish." He goes on to detail his interest in traveling to Cuba and its connections to his family's status:

> "I came from very humble beginnings, but my family had been… affiliated with the Batistas. They owned a lot of land… I think they owned the largest land parcels in the

> province. It was the same for my mom. She had two homes. Every time my sister [goes to visit Cuba, she brings something back]. Let me show you, this is a family heirloom. This is the patron saint of charity. La Virgen de Caridad. We were able to get this out of Cuba after we were here. One of the things, I am trying to [go back to Cuba to] get is the old money from Cuba. My grandmother has stacks of it. It's the money from prior to the communist government. I remember playing with it as a kid. And thinking wow, our family was rich"

Juan says he could go anywhere on vacation and there are "so many places on my bucketlist" but he does want to go back now to get these family heirlooms, maybe see some old friends, and revisit the land his family used to have. Adriana a newly immigrated white Cuban American reiterates a similar sentiment. She says:

> "I guess my family never really talked about it that much [in Cuba] about what we lost. I knew we used to be wealthy, we had a ranch and slaves, and we were Spanish. We were even able to get a Spanish passport, that's how we were able to get out of Cuba. But I didn't realize that we'd owned a mansion in Havana. It's a hospital for pregnant women now. I'm planning on one of my trips back to visit it. Just to see, you know, who we were and bring back some pictures."

Maria, who was born in the U.S. and parents were exile's, states that she'd like to go visit Cuba with her children. She states:

> "I'm in the travel business. I look forward to going. Me being of Cuban descent, I would like to go back and travel and have a heritage tour. My older cousin can take me around to see where my family was from, where we lived, the dairy farm, and allow me to just know more about where I'm from."

That "white," or Spanish-descended, Cuban Americans interest in travel to Cuba is at least partially tied to an exploration of their heritage in which allows them to envision themselves as wealthy and powerful. Sam, a Cuban exile, remarks that part of his interest, if he ever returns to Cuba, is to preserve his family heritage. He wants us to remember what happened in Cuba. That "none of us would have left, we never wanted to immigrate, to be immigrants, we were forced out of our homeland, in some ways what happened to us, stripping us of our wealth, jailing us, exiling us, separating us from family… It needs to be remembered."

Cuban Americans of Color and Travel to Cuba

Cubans of Color, either self-identified as Afro-Cuban or of mixed heritage, differed in their interests to travel to Cuba. They differed from their "white" counterparts in that they often struggled in the United States with racism and had fewer family ties to help them acculturate. The process of immigration was so difficult that some feared returning to visit Cuba even though they felt a strong obligation to support Cuban relatives and share information that might help to end the Embargo. Others were able to visit and worked hard to support transnational ties of dance, music, and tourism, because they saw it as opportunities to improve the lives of Cubans "back home."

> For instance, Alejandro, a Black Cuban who came to the U.S. as a teen, notes: "Ohh yeah, I am going to Cuba this year. When I go visit, I am going to see everything. Feel the people. I want to try and see what business and what I can do for the people. I am going to visit my cousins. I send them money and food sometimes when I can. I have an African American [U.S.] friend, he manages a club on Buford highway, and is planning on opening a club in Cuba…I want to help. People say a lot [of negative things] about tourism, but people [in Cuba] can make a much better living working in tourism. If I can help, I will. And understand, hear this, the churches is not helping. People sign up because it's a free trip. I do think the students are better. The key is writing. The key is thinking and sharing and communicating…Look at us sitting here. This doesn't happen often."

Alejandro, notes the difficulties of being Black in Cuba and the U.S., as well as how he's interested in fostering transnational ties.

> "Look Cuba is not free. Cuba needs to be free. But over here it's very rough right now, the way the white Americans are treating outsiders are bad right now. We need to care about each other and remember at the end of the day…we were born and we live on this earth too…and we need to help each other and help change the future. We need to be able to leave something for our kids and our grandkids. Stop going to war. At the end of the day our blood is red, stop going to war. If I cut you, you bleed red too. At the end of the day, we have to do better. We have to remember our differences are good but at the end of the day we're more the same than different. I came to this country. I worked hard. I don't have any felonies but they try to disappear me like I have done something wrong."

Alejandro goes on to detail how moving to Douglasville was a shock. He goes on and says "let me tell you this story"

> "I met this lady, who is now my friend, at a gas station in Douglasville, an older African American lady. And I was like 'hey you are playing casino' and she said 'nah.' I'm a very talkative person and she immediately was like you are not from here. And I was like 'no no, I'm not I just purchased a few properties out here but I'm from Miami. She said to me 'Why the hell you buy properties in Douglasville, my husband got hanged in Douglasville!' I said 'WHAT? I said your husband got hanged in Douglasville?' She said 'yea this is a very racist place out here.' I say 'oh my goodness' and so you know then it happened to me, I felt the racism there. And then what happened, things happen for a reason, that lady was the president of BEHE organization in Douglasville (Black Educational History's Exhibits) and what I did since I was also a Dj and promotor. I told the lady listen, 'I have never felt this amount of racism in my life, but I can help you'. She said 'what could you do' I said listen I am a promotor and a Dj and she said 'oh well the city don't want to let us pass the Juneteenth[96] event' I said 'okay'. I had a meeting… [and] I got a proclamation for the Juneteenth…I know everybody in Douglasville [now] because I went through the process with them to help fight for Juneteenth in Douglasville. The city officials, the commissioner, the sheriff, they says the only reason they like me is because of my accent. That's what they said to me. I got involved, because… I couldn't live in a city like that…They thought I was a nobody and I wasn't going to be able to do it, but we had over 60 performers. The proclamation was not for me it was for the BEHE organization. That was in 2008, look it up. 2008. But that's what happens when we work together. And that's what I want to do in Cuba, work together to help people."

Alejandro's understanding of the situation faced today by the Cuban people might be summed up as a strong humanitarian concern leavened with a certain "spirit of capitalism":

> "Cuba is nice. Cuba is changing. Fidel is old. We need to just forget the past and worry about the present. It's a beautiful island. We have family and smart people and business opportunity."

Alejandro's interest in traveling to Cuba differs greatly from his white Cuban American counter parts. His experience of racism in the U.S. helped him "removed the blindfold" and become interested in doing more business to support black people in general "Cuban or American." He

[96] Juneteenth is an annual celebration to recognize the abolition of slavery and emancipation of slaves in the United States.

has no interest in preserving or reliving the past and instead wants to "forget the past and worry about the present." The kinds of historical legacies he has worked hard to support are things like "Juneteenth" which celebrates freedom and emancipation of slaves in the U.S. and abroad. He sees his travel and ties to Cuba as part of trying to support "being free."

On the other hand, Adria, a Black Cuban woman, who was born in Cuba and came to the U.S. during the Mariel boatlift hasn't been back to Cuba. She says, "I want to go back and see and support my family, but I don't know if I can[97]. I still cry sometimes. I was a little girl, and I was beaten for being a Jehovah's Witness[98]." When I asked why she wants to go back, she responded: "well, I still have family in Cuba. I'm the goddaughter of Celia Cruz. Cuba is a part of me. What happened was horrific, and it pushed me to become a child psychologist. Sometimes I wonder if I could help". She continues to explain "…the [Cuban] revolution has provided some good things, my grandfather was a revolutionary, but it also has gone the wrong direction. People lack political and religious freedom, and they work so hard for so little. In my eyes, the chains are different, but we're [Cubans] still not free." While Adria is not sure if she will return to visit Cuba, she emphasizes the legacy of struggle and how she feels connected to that history which entices her to return to "see if I can help kids there."

Muriel, a Cuban American born in Cuba, identifies as multiracial and has no interest in going to Cuba. When I ask him why, he simply says "it's too painful." I ask him to explain, if he will, he sighs and says "I don't know how much of this I can talk about. As you know, I'm gay,

[97] Adria is uncertain of the process of approval for her return travel due to the additional requirements and barriers Cuban born U.S. citizens are required to fulfill by the Cuban state. She fears having to travel as a "Cuban citizen" with a Cuban passport.

[98] She attributes her arrest and beating to the repression of religion by the Cuban State.

and I was tortured, tortured for being gay [in Cuba].” He begins to sob, “I’m sorry. I can’t talk about it. But that’s why I can’t go back even to visit. I do send money to relatives there though. That’s the best I can do. I try to leave the past in the past, you know.” Unlike, the Cuban exiles or U.S. born Cubans, Muriel, came over as a rafter (bolsero) in the early 2000s.

Yaima, an Afro-Cuban woman, recounts that she married a Spanish man in order to leave Cuba who got a job in the U.S. She’s only lived in the U.S. for 1 year. She intends to go back and visit Cuba as much as possible after she gets her U.S. residency. She remarks:

> “I left because of my studies and my personal life. I was looking for opportunities that we do not have in Cuba. After you finish your studies, you have the ability to work. You don’t have a purpose in your professional life. My family is very sickly because of the economic problems that we have there…I wanted better for myself and my family”

Yet, she also recounts all the progress and positive outcomes, as she sees them, of the [Cuban] revolution. She states, “my family were revolutionaries and I was part of the ‘Young Union Communists’ [and] it was a good experience.” She reiterates that

> “I hope that in the future they keep the good things we have today and that things improve for very very poor people there. I worry about what is going to happen to the poor people in Cuba today… and I know they are not free to speak their mind.”

She articulates that “there is some reason I am here and not there. That counts for something.” She goes on to explain that she misses Cuba, and “if there are more freedoms, if the Embargo is ended, I might go back.” She misses her family and her Cuban culture. She tells me:

> “I haven’t been in this country long so I can’t tell you what I really think yet, but it seems really hard…people are really stressed. And there is a lot of racism here… The Klu Klux Klan and the kind of problems that have happened recently in the United States and these kind of problems in some places are still here. It makes me nervous sometimes.”

Javier, a multiracial Cuban American, remarks that he travels to Cuba all the time. He goes on vacation there and to see family. He chuckles and says “actually, I am going next week. I can

send you pictures if you'd like. I try to support the new businesses and do things so that Cubans get more of the money when I travel even on vacation."

Yanko, a Cuban American of African and Asian descent, remarks that "I go [to Cuba] all the time… [and] I've actually played a role in pushing for Cuban artists, dancers, singers, to be able to come to the United States." He points out that "the embargo just hurts the Cuban people, the hard-working people, not the government, and I want to help support [Cuban] people if I can." He continues to see transnational ties as a means to promote meaningful change in Cuba. He states:

> "As a professional dancer and artist, I know that art can be political, it can bring change. It can also bring people together. Dance is a big part of what makes us Cuban. To me, there are so many differences among us, but dance and the sense of community and tradition it brings, it brings us all together…so yes, I go to see family and go on vacation at the beautiful beaches, but I also go to support art and new relationships"

The data reveal that the transnational ties, particularly around travel to Cuba, differ greatly by race. White, or "Spanish" descended Cuban-Americans are often interested in travel to Cuba to reclaim their heritage often as wealthy white landowners (and sometimes even slaveholders). They hope to see what's left of their family's previous amassed wealth that was lost as a result of the Cuban revolution as well as reclaim family heirlooms. Some, additionally, hope to re-establish ties to long lost relatives and extended kin who stayed in Cuba. On the other hand, Cubans of color, Afro-descended and multiracial, have different motivations for travel while some may not want to return at all. Their motivations are centered around supporting family in Cuba as well as undermining structures that reinforce isolation and poverty in Cuba. Respondents detail how they participate in small sanctioned acts such as changing their money with Cuban people rather than a Cuban bank in order to empower Cubans with dollars (rather than pesos). They also take vacations to support tourism on the island which many see as one of

the few viable occupations to sustain one's self in Cuba. Nevertheless, what makes them stand apart most from their "white" Cuban American counterparts is their complete lack of interest in the "past" or "heritage." Instead, they are invested in today.

Gender of Memory

In contrast to the erasure and invisibility of Cuban women in Cuban national collective memory in Chapter 4, Cuban American women detailed their own or their female relative's role as political actors. Many of my Cuban born women respondents detailed their memories of the Revolution as complicated where their mothers or grandmothers had been involved politically. From whether it was as a political actor outspokenly against the Revolution from the start or as part of the Revolution in the beginning, they detail their memories of women as political actors. Elaine clarifies:

> "My mother was really smart. She went to school with Fidel and she told everyone that he was not to be trusted. You see, he was very charismatic. But my mother knew and saw through it. I was just a kid when we left Cuba, but my father was terrified because my mother would stand outside on the balcony and sing religious hymns as resistance. She even got caught putting up counter-revolutionary fliers…as a kid I remember her going regularly down to Krone to bring things for the balseros and help them connect with family here in the states. My mother was always doing something."

Elaine clarifies her mother's legacy as a counter revolutionary and articulates her action as a political actor. Gabriela, similarly describes her memories and family legacy of political activism among women in her family. Gabriela states:

> "well, I'm not old enough to remember the early Revolution, but my grandmother was a part of the Revolution. She went into the mountains to help improve literacy. She was a teacher and she wanted to help. She used to tell me these stories of how she would be teaching in the mountains while she could hear the sound of bombs going off"

Gabriela goes on to explain "well, she could tell you more, but I think that's why I'm so vocal about my opinion on how stupid the embargo is. I get it from her and my mother to [pause] be politically active." Gabriela describes the memories of her grandmother, and mother, as political

actors in Cuba to her own political voice. Even Adria and Yaima, who differ on their views of returning to visit Cuba, articulate their memories of Cuba as being politically active. Adria who was jailed for her religion recognizes that "it was political choice [for me] to refuse to conform." Yaima who differs from Adria significantly in that Yaima was part of the "Young Union Communists" because it gave her space "to develop my own political opinion even if I didn't share them."

Conclusion

This chapter makes two important contributions. First, it demonstrates that the notions of Cuba as "frozen in time[99]" in U.S. memory are not reiterated by Cuban Americans in the U.S. This means that portraits and understandings of Cuba as frozen in the period of the Cold War, are remade by U.S. media for, predominately, U.S. audiences without ties to Cuba. Cuban Americans, on the other hand, view Cuba as a place that has evolved and changed. It is the change in Cuba that reinscribes what Bonnett (2016) describes as "the power of loss." Bonnett (2016) argues that:

> "…it is useful to consider the way that nostalgia destabilizes the assumption that the past is, indeed, 'lost.' Rather than sustaining an image of the past as past, as so radically different as to be unattainable, nostalgia expects and demands an empathetic transference to the place of loss: it contains an optimistic aspect which hopes to humanize, learn from, and colonize the past" (6-7)

Bonnett's (2016) point is that nostalgia is much more fluid than once conceptualized. "It can be imagined in so many ways; because we moderns *can and do* project our identities back (and forward) to times and places…with such creative relish" (7). Nevertheless, he points out that nostalgia is powerful where "power is the capacity to bring about or resist change." That Cuban

[99] Please see Chapter 3 for examples of Cuba as "frozen in time" in U.S. media.

Americans have played an influential role in attempts to bring about change in Cuba is without denial. While the early Cuban Exile's attempt to promote change (and a return to pre-Castro Cuba) was through isolation, among U.S. born Cuban Americans it is engagement that helps to preserve Cuban culture. Bonnett (2016) further notes that "nostalgia mobilizes, enables, and structures power" (7). Therefore, the different manifestations of nostalgia and interest in Cuba by Cuban Americans may allow us to better understand the competing mobilizations and structures of power that link place (Cuba) with transnational ties of Cuban Americans (in the U.S.).

Furthermore, Eckstein's (2009) findings which demonstrated that hardline exiles which, influenced by their own loss and nostalgia for the pre-Castro Cuba, made bridge-building and transnational ties nearly impossible, as a means to invoke change in Cuba. Nevertheless, she shows that newly immigrated Cuban Americans defied these norms and foster "cross-border bonding" which not only have made a bigger impact on changing Cuba but also have had a profound impact on changing views among Cuban Americans in the U.S. (U.S. born Cuban Americans in particular). For instance, Eckstein (2009) argues that "the New Cubans accordingly did more to transform island socialism than the wealthier and politically influential Exiles who had tried for decades to unravel the revolution." (232).

The gender of memory points out that women's roles as political actors were highlighted by women respondents. Even among stories of women who "had never been politically active" the change in Cuba had motivated them to take some form of action. The memory narratives centered women as political actors. The tension between those who continue to support revolutionary principles even after migrating to the U.S. are explained by being able to empower themselves or their relatives even more. Some of the women recount leaving Cuba based on the changes to religion, access to basic necessities such as formula for their children or food, or to

provide better opportunities for themselves or their children. Nevertheless, Cuban American women's stories were a central focus of recounting memories of immigration to the U.S. and revolution in Cuba.

Moreover, this analysis adds an additional factor that has been understudied and theorized which explores how race and racialized nostalgias inform motivations to travel and maintain ties to Cuba. While Eckstein is sensitive to cohort migration as well as age, the aspects of race and gender have largely been left under-theorized (Hay 2009). As newly immigrated Cubans bring pictures of Cuba and new perspectives, it has (according to my findings) enticed U.S. born children of Exiles to (sometimes defy their parents' stance) and travel to Cuba to rediscover their roots and see their homeland for themselves (Eckstein 2009). While age and cohort matter for understanding stances on the Cuban government, they do not account for or explain the differences in ties and travel to Cuba along the lines of race.

Finally, the experiences of immigration to the United States and motivations for maintaining ties or traveling to Cuba differ greatly along the lines of race. Cubans of color detail facing racism and hostility in the United States. Some of which see their role in support of Cuba as fostering transnational ties among Afro-descended people or among Hispanics. Nevertheless, white Cubans, or Spanish-descended Cubans, are largely interested in "experiencing the past" or fostering ties or travel to better understand their "heritage." The diverging motivations among Cuban Americans help demonstrate how "scaling transnational intersectionality" reveals multiple memoryscapes that inform relationships and views on U.S.- Cuban relations.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: TRANSNATIONAL INTERSECTIONALITY AND COMPETING NOSTALGIAS

At the beginning of this dissertation, I posed the question of how people who breach the boundary, imposed by U.S. blockade of Cuba, negotiate divergent collective memories and their positionality in a new social context (the "other" nation). I examined this question by using a transnational intersectional approach which began with looking at macro cultural portrayals that frame the memory of U.S. Cuban relations in U.S. media and monuments and museums in Cuba. I also examined two different social groups with different nation-state positionalities: U.S. study abroad students and Cuban Americans in the United States. In this chapter, I reflect on how a transnational intersectional analysis sheds new light on understanding the perpetuation, and change in views, of the U.S. blockade of Cuba as well as how it has created new interest in Cuba as a place for "heritage tourism."

My conclusions fall along three inter-related lines. First, the construction of portraits of collective memories of U.S. and Cuban relations in U.S. media and in monuments and memorials in Cuba reveal the complex contestations of collective memory in the global memoryscape. In other words, the competing representations of collective memories of U.S.-Cuban relations reveal the way memory is a "space" not only of competition over politics and history but also over global hegemonies.

Second, the project illustrates tourism as a social institution, like family, may function as a unit of analysis for transnational intersectionality where the impact of U.S. study abroad to

Cuba, as a means of carrying out U.S. foreign interests, is negotiated differently by study abroad students particularly along the lines of race and gender. Moreover, U.S. students seek out travel to Cuba for two divergent purposes: White students, in particular, are interested in seeing Cuba *before it changes* and students of color view their travel as a means of *forging diasporic ties*. Nevertheless, the impact of U.S. study abroad, despite whatever the intentions of students, recreates and reveals their position of privilege and the maintenance of inequalities (particularly race and gender).

Third, a transnational intersectional approach allows for a greater interrogation of the way memory functions dynamically among Cuban Americans. First, it reveals that Cuban Americans' memory of Cuba stands in stark contrast to tropes of Cuba in the U.S. as frozen in time; instead, Cuba is seen as a place forever changed by the Cuban Revolution. In fact, Cuban American's in contrast view their own culture in the U.S. and memories of Cuba as perhaps what is frozen in time. The nostalgia for reclaiming their roots and/or resisting oppression inform differences in the way Cuban Americans engage with Cuba along the lines of race.

Finally, the project reveals the way memory is a field where political battles are fought as well as a growing opportunity for the commodification of marginalized positionalities. Bonnett (2016) argues that:

> "…nostalgia pours over the thin defenses erected to keep it at bay; indeed, it occupies our behavior, identities, and our landscapes without us seeming to notice. And while nostalgia is clearly being enabled and shaped by capitalism, as well as by resistance to capitalism, it also continues to surprise and shape those very forces…"

The Cuban state, which suffered a catastrophic economic downturn after the fall of the Soviet Union, has sought to capitalize off of "heritage tourism" which offers opportunities to entice growth of tourism among U.S. tourists and Cuban Americans. It also provides an opportunity to access much needed dollars into the Cuban economy as well as preserve Cuba's new

revolutionary identity. While the U.S. blockade has clearly failed at changing the Cuban state (as intended), it has (intentionally or not) reinforced a "controlling image" of Cuba that has made travel engagement enticing through nostalgia where Cuba is "the forbidden fruit" and a new "economic frontier."

Cuba is not Frozen in Time

While U.S. media frames Cuba as a place frozen in time, this transnational intersectional analysis reveals the way "nostalgia destabilizes the assumption that the past is, indeed, 'lost'" (Bonnett 2016). No aspect of Cuba, or U.S. –Cuban relations have been stagnant; however, the construction and maintenance of a "controlling image" of Cuba as "stuck in the past" re-creates "phobia and fetish." One the one hand, the phobia of Cuba is re-constructed as a reminder of the Cold War threat long after the missiles have left, the Soviet Union has fallen, and Fidel Castro has died. The phobia, as nostalgia, informs the present and future. It legitimates U.S. policy (the blockade) long after the Cold war.

Additionally, it creates a "controlling image" of Cuba and its people, as "fetish." The portraits and representations of Cuba as a place frozen in time reinforces a legacy of U.S. imperialism. In fact, Said (1993) argues that "the power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main narratives between them" (xiii). The irony that representations of Cuba in the U.S. are *frozen in time* while U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba has dynamically changed, and even most often tightened in restrictions, demand an analysis of memory. Silberman (2013) "…reminds us that while memory feeds on history, it targets the present, it asks questions about who we are and where we come from…" (214). The context of U.S.-Cuban history must be placed within the

larger reality of the emergence of the U.S. as an imperial power (Enloe 2000, Pérez 2013, Pérez 2008). Enloe (2000) details the key role Cuba played in the U.S.'s imperial status articulating:

> "The year was 1898. The US government was extending its imperial reach. American men were exerting their manliness in defeating Spanish, Cuban, and Filipino troops. They were proving in the process that industrialization and the rise of urban middle-class lifestyles were not, as some had feared, weakening white American manhood. Within several decades Americans would no longer have to be satisfied with [world's] fair exhibits of Cuban dancers or Philippines villages. Those countries would have built tourist hotels, beach resorts, and casinos to lure American pleasure seekers- all due to world-wide progress generated by a civilizing sort of American masculinity" (27).

The nationalization of U.S. business and ousting of U.S. imperial control of Cuba by the Cuban revolutionary government threatened the image of the United States as the imperial power of the west, and white American manhood (Pérez 2008). The perpetuation of Cuba as a place *frozen in time* that in some ways memorializes the U.S. blockade re-constructs Cuba as the tourist site from the period of the world's fair. In other words, the coupling of Cuba as frozen in time with my previous findings of Cuban male leaders as portrayed through a lens of "ineffective masculinity" (Palmer 2017) preserve the U.S. status as maintaining imperial control over Cuba through the blockade. It also re-creates Cuba as an ideal tourist site not only to relive the experience of a pleasure-seeking "1950s American" but also to see "the failed socialist experiment." This re-creation of Cuba as an ideal tourist site has made it particularly enticing to Americans and Cuban Americans.

Transnational Intersectionality: Negotiating Race and Gender Across the Blockade

Given the over 50-year blockade of Cuba, the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba is a particularly important case for the study of transnational intersectionality. Not only did recent policy changes under President Obama create the opportunity for greater travel (U.S. tourism) and social exchange (communication and larger remittances), it allowed for the exploration of

how U.S. study abroad students negotiate divergent collective memories in Cuba as well as norms of race and gender. White U.S. study abroad students were predominately interested in traveling to Cuba in order to "see it before it changes" and/or "as a business opportunity," the collective memory of U.S. – Cuban relations, made the opportunity to see the forbidden island particularly enticing. On the other hand, students of color were interested in traveling to Cuba to explore diasporic ties through either direct familial connections or as part of larger diasporic groups as Afro or Latino. If the goal was for U.S. study abroad students to help carry out the goals of the U.S. government of "democracy and capitalism," the unintended consequence was that students also, often through encountering alternative interpretations of U.S.-Cuban history, brought back a critical understanding of the U.S. and U.S. blockade of Cuba.

The move toward engagement has coincided with greater support by U.S. citizens and Cuban Americans alike to end the U.S. blockade of Cuba; however, there is still no move by the U.S. government to do so. In fact, the recent administration, under President Trump, has promised to reintroduce limitations for travel and exchange. Currently, the administration has elevated Cuba's travel risk level which in practice creates barriers for approval for study abroad programs at many universities. This in effect reinstates barriers for travel dollars that Cuba is desperately reliant upon economically; remembering that Key West is only 105 miles from Havana, it is hardly surprising that tourism from the U.S. is such an important potential boost to the Cuban economy.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the death of Fidel Castro, and the recent stepping down of Raúl Castro in April 2018, there is no indication that the U.S. blockade will end any time soon. The collective memory of the U.S. blockade as a commemorative practice in the United States seeks to demonstrate that despite the U.S.'s loss of control over the island, the U.S. is

strong and successful as a nation-state. Until the end of the U.S. blockade of Cuba, it is likely that monuments and memorials in Cuba will continue to buttress Cuban national identity as a redoubt of resistance to the imperialist power to the north. While hardline Cuban exiles with a great deal of political economic power do play a role in maintaining this fractured relationship, they alone cannot explain its persistence. The hardline exiles are aging out, the Castros have stepped down (as desired), and U.S. born and newly immigrated Cuban Americans overwhelmingly do not support the policy. A more thorough understanding of this unique and particularly powerful social closure is made possible through analyses of the strength of collective memory in international relations.

The main way to make sense of the continuation in U.S. investment in control over Cuba, despite changes in popular opinion in the United States (among Americans and Cuban Americans) and over 26 years of UN support to end the U.S. blockade, is the memory of Cuba as a strategic location for international political power. Even among Cuban American respondents, they lament "what is there to be concerned about over a small poor island?" Nevertheless, historically Cuba was a strategic geographic location for the control of goods and materials in the new world, including one of the largest slave ports in the world. Control over Cuba, was also seen as pivotal in the ability to maintain slavery in the new world even as Cubans themselves revolted against it. Cuba became a pivotal site for control by the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War. Finally, Cuba – despite the end of the Cold War – remains crucial in international political power between nation-states and in influence (for independence and autonomy within Latin America. Cuba's rich history as a place (and people) to control since the beginning of colonization may still play a role in U.S. interests to control the island today.

The Emergence of World Heritage and Preservation in Tourism

One of the most surprising aspects of the dissertation is how Cuba has become a site that has contributed to the rise in interest and preservation of world heritage. While scholars note there has been a "memory boom," the creation of organizations to preserve world heritage have emerged. These organizations such as the World Heritage Organization and The Global Slave Route Project seek to preserve the memory of what are now considered world atrocities: slavery and decimation informed by colonization. Nevertheless, the surprising and underlying factors where grants are provided to preserve world heritage "sites" to promote "tourist development" in some ways memorialize the atrocities they seek to critique. This is clear through the overwhelming evidence that the most prominent world heritage sites encourage tourists to take on the position of the master (or colonizer) and provide little on the experiences, stories, and realities of indigenous or African people. While this tension is not unique to this relationship, Jacobs (2010) articulates what she sees as the pros and cons of memorializing atrocities, in her case of Jewish Genocide, for the spectacle of tourism, future research should consider the pros and cons in the rise in interest to memorialize "world heritage" and the "Slave Routes." It should also consider the impact it has perpetuating inequalities not only in constructions of collective memory but also in the field, and job opportunities, of tourism itself.

Final Thoughts

Why should anyone care about the collective memory and experiences of U.S. Study Abroad and Cuban Americans negotiations of the U.S. blockade? The operationalization of collective memory as a means of promoting controlling images that legitimate policies that disempower citizens of other nations are not limited to U.S. – Cuban relations. If we are to better

understand the means for rationalizing violence against international others including the impact it has on family ties, it bears importance to consider how these "others" are collectively remembered as well as the ways it is tied to notions of racial and gender inequities linked to longer legacies of colonialism. Moreover, if "the personal is international" and governments rely on individuals (study abroad students and/or Cuban Americans) to carry out U.S. interests in Cuba, what impact do these actors have? How do they differ? Furthermore, the rise in the commemoration and memorialization of "heritage" globally and locally is a culture space of competition among nations and peoples that are imbued with racial and gender scripts. The acknowledgement of different transnational positionalities that may shift across nation-state boundaries, may help reveal the varying methods people use to uphold or resist these narratives and structures of inequality.

Future questions that need to be addressed might include: Why has there been a rise in "memory culture" and "heritage"? What are the consequences of memorializing "world heritage" for the purposes of tourist development and economic security? How does heritage and memory inform, or impact, people's transnational identities, and or their experiences as immigrants? How does it inform international relations between nations and their people? In what ways, does the memorialization of heritage reinscribe race and gender inequalities on a transnational level? How do people's positionalities inform their reception of the intended meanings of these sites? These questions will be the focus of my future research.

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