REMARKABLE TEXTS: THE TECHNE OF MEMORY AND DELIVERY AND THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CLASSROOM

by

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(Under the Direction of CHRISTY DESMET)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to connect classical rhetorical technai to the use of digital technologies in the writing classroom, specifically investigating the ways the canons of memory and delivery are reborn in twenty-first century composition. As I trace the history of canons of memory and delivery in the rhetorical tradition, I reveal the ways in which these canons have been used to develop ethical appeals, specifically analyzing the complex ethos of Virginia Woolf. Foregrounding the ethical implications of digital culture, I situate my analysis within the posthuman landscape and address the limitations of postmodern composition theory in the digital writing classroom, arguing for pedagogies that are based in materiality and practice. As it is my argument that digital technology provides increasing opportunities for the use of the canons of memory and delivery in composition, I connect the concept of rhetorical techne to the use of epideictic argumentation in digital culture, arguing that the rhetorical endeavors of twenty-first century necessitate attention to the tasks of telematic memory: the digital mediums of communication that access knowledge through screens, cables and wires. The telematic memory of the twenty-first century operates as invention, bringing forth new knowledge at the same time as it works to reveal our ideological practices to us. This dissertation specifically analyzes the

uses of technology in two college writing courses, articulating the ways that ethical appeals are

created through the interconnection between ancient techniques, such as rhetorical figuration that

calls upon operations of memory and/or delivery, and digital displays. This dissertation examines

the relationships created between machines, students, and teachers, arguing against the

disembodied discourses of recent postmodern rhetorical theory and seeking to foreground the

need for specific, pragmatic, and materially-concerned pedagogies in the twenty-first century.

INDEX WORDS: techne, posthuman, postmodern, technology, digital writing, composition,
Virginia Woolf, epideictic, ethos, practice, pragmatism, memory and delivery, rhetoric, canons,
pedagogy, telematic.

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For my parents, Lewis Wayne Mitchell and Joan Lee West

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INTRODUCTION

Here we are at Monks House, & Greece is perceptibly melting: just for a moment England and Greece stood side
byside, each much enlivened by the other. --Virginia Woolf, *Diary*, 15 May 1932

Vague as all definitions are, a good essay must have this permanent quality about it, it must draw its curtain
round us, but it must be a curtain that shuts us in not out. --Virginia Woolf, "The Modern Essay"

As an essayist, Virginia Woolf recognized the power of memory to deliver

"enlivened" writing in the present. In her essays, Woolf often called upon the rhetorical

canons of memory and delivery to construct persuasive arguments, thus representing the

nature of techne as "revealing": using past knowledge "to bring forth" new possibilities.[1]

Throughout this dissertation, I call upon the techne of Virginia Woolf and the ancient

canons of memory and delivery in order to complicate and "enliven" our twenty-first

century pedagogical approaches to composition instruction. Following Woolf, I believe

that composition pedagogy is most successful if it acknowledges the necessity of

"drawing a curtain" to help students create focused, specific, arguments. Emergent digital

technologies, particularly as they highlight renewed uses of the ancient techne of the

canons of memory and delivery, can be used in the writing classroom to "draw a curtain,"

allowing for specialized and effective teaching practices in the twenty-first century.[2] In

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[1] In classical Aristotelian rhetoric, there were five parts to speech-making, 1) invention 2) arrangement 3) style 4)
memory 5) delivery. As I discuss in Chapter Two, the canons of memory and delivery have been neglected in
rhetorical training since the 18th century. This dissertation argues for their re-emergence in the digitized twenty-first
century. In emphasizing techne as a "revealing" or a "bringing forth," I am referring to techne as it has been defined
by Martin Heidegger in "The Question Concerning Technology" (294).

[2] Throughout this dissertation, I use the singular form of techne to refer to techne as a body of knowledge or to
demarcate an individual instance of techne (i.e., anamnesis is a techne but anamnesis and epicrisis are technai). I use
the plural form of techne (technai) only when I am discussing multiple techniques, processes, or procedures of
techne.

this dissertation, I seek to highlight the ways in which certain ancient technai can help composition instructors use digital technologies more effectively in the writing classroom; in fact, the composition pedagogy of the twenty-first century can be most effective if it draws attention to two particular areas of rhetorical endeavor: 1) teaching our students to use the techne of rhetorical figuration, particularly technai that call upon the operations of memory and delivery and can be used to create the ethical appeals that form the predominantly epideictic argumentation occurring on the World Wide Web; and, 2) teaching our students to draw upon the techne of telematic memory: the media of delivery (cables, screens, wires) that access knowledge stored as external memories. Both of these rhetorical endeavors highlight the way in which techne operates, as it has been defined by Martin Heidegger in "The Question Concerning Technology," as a "revealing" or a "bringing forth" (294). While some postmodern rhetoricians might argue that the techne I promote in this dissertation works to exclude and limit the possibilities of writing, I argue that the curtain of techne works, "to shut us in not out;" revealing our ideological practices to us and providing for localized spaces for teaching in the complex techno-culture of the twenty-first century.

Indeed, as media of digital communication become more prevalent in composition pedagogy, it becomes necessary to understand the particular social and cultural environment that has allowed these new technologies to flourish. Techno-culture, a term first coined by Jean Baudrillard in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* designates the "passage from an industrial political economy to a trans-political economy" (186). This "trans-political economy" is largely configured in terms of its relation to the complex business of "high-tech" technology. One of the main

characteristics of high-tech techno-culture is "reproducibility." According to Fredric

Jameson in *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,* "high-tech"

technology can be defined in terms "of reproduction rather than of production" (37) [3] An

example of high-tech aesthetics, for instance, can be seen in the reproduction of articles

usually found in factories or warehouses for design only-- "simulations" that are

abstracted from function for purely aesthetic purposes (Rutsky 12-13).[4] Techno-culture

can also be defined by the way in which it reproduces knowledge. As R.L. Rutsky argues

in *High-techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman*, the

"matrix" of knowledge in the twenty-first century is "the sum of all data that surrounds us

in a techno-cultural world. Indeed, the space of this memory is techno-culture itself"

(153). Through our connections to this matrix of memory (through media culture, the

WWW, or through specific software such as the University of Georgia's XML application

named <emma>), we become posthuman cyborgs, accessing endlessly reproducible

knowledge(s) through the techne of networks, cables and screens.[5] In fact, the ways in

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[3] According to Fredric Jameson, modernism and postmodernism are associated with particular stages of capitalism. In *Postmodernism or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Jameson outlines three primary phases of capitalism that require particular cultural practices. The first is market capitalism, which occurred in the eighteenth through the late nineteenth centuries in Western Europe, England, and the United States. This first phase is associated technologically with the steam-driven motor) and, aesthetically, with realism. The second phase occurred from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century; in this phase, monopoly capitalism is associated with electric and internal combustion motors and with modernism. The third phase is multinational or consumer capitalism (with the emphasis placed on marketing, selling, and consuming commodities, not on producing them); this phase associated with nuclear and electronic technologies, and correlated with postmodernism.

[4] As Walter Benjamin argued in the mid-twentieth century in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," it is through "technological reproducibility" that the modernist instrumental function of technology changes into a non-instrumental aesthetic.

[5] Cyborg, etymologically derived from cybernetics and organism, is a term coined by Manfred Clynes in 1960 to describe the need for mankind to artificially enhance biological functions in order to survive in the hostile environment of Space. Originally, a cyborg referred to a human being with bodily functions aided or controlled by technological devices, such as an artificial heart valve. Over the years, the term has acquired a more general meaning, describing the dependence of human beings on technology. In this sense, cyborg can be used to characterize anyone who consistently uses a computer to work or play.

which cyborgs are constructed by technai are what make them the "embodiment" of

posthumanism.

In the opening pages of *How We Became Posthuman*, N. Katherine Hayles

provides a clear outline of posthumanism. According to Hayles, the posthuman favors

"informational pattern over material instantiation" and sees one's body as "an accident of

history rather than an inevitability of life" (3). The posthuman considers consciousness as

"a minor evolutionary sideshow" and views the body as a prosthesis, connected to

computer networks and machines (3). Further, the posthuman constructs the human body

to be "seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines" (3). Although the term

posthuman can be used to support the deconstruction of individual agency in anti-

humanist postmodern discourses, the posthuman is actually more of an extension of

humanism than a refutation of it.[6] According to Hayles, posthuman prostheses, no matter

how far they reach into our biological bodies, will never completely eliminate the "body."

Hayles argues that the form of the body may change, as well as the concept of

"embodiment," but that, as humans, materiality forms the basis of our lives.[7] The

posthuman constitutes an awareness that embodiment can exist outside of the biological

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[6] Some posthuman theory focuses on the "liberatory potential" of the posthuman cyborg. For example, see Donna
Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto," For Haraway, the cyborg has no familiar links with Western humanist culture. She
maintains that stories of origins are concerned with humanist values ". . . the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss
and terror, represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate, the task of individual
development and of history..." (151). The cyborg represents a value system that has no connection with our deeply
entrenched liberal humanist past: "The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality,
pre-oedipal symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final appropriation of
all the powers of the parts into a higher unity" (150). I disagree with Haraway, here; the posthuman cyborg is not
necessarily liberated by technology, nor does the cyborg reveal the end of humanism: the technological prostheses of
the cyborg are extensions of the human and merely create different kinds of bodies: bodies created through techne.
[7] Hayles makes a clear distinction between body and embodiment: "Embodiment differs from the concept of the
body in that the body is always normative relative to some set of criteria...In contrast to the body, embodiment is
contextual, enmeshed within the specifics of place, time, physiology, and culture, which together compose
enactment. Embodiment never coincides exactly with "the body", however normalised that concept is
understood...Embodiment is thus destabilising with respect to the body, for at any given time this tension can widen
into a perceived disparity" (*How We Became* 196-97).

body: according to Hayles, through a new understanding of "the dialectic of pattern/randomness," humans are all "data made flesh" (*How We Became* 5). Thus, rhetorically speaking, bodies are created through the technai which allow them to access that data. Although posthumanism has often been (mis)used as a malapropism for postmodernism, as it calls upon techne, posthumanism constitutes a radical break from postmodernist discourses and comprises a more viable theory for our current rhetorical condition.

Although postmodernism is a complicated term with various definitions, it has often been defined, following Jean Francois Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,* as a radical break from modernism, characterized not by the fact that it follows the end of the modern period, but by its status as a cyclical movement that returns before the emergence of newer modernisms. Lyotard defines the postmodern as the process of developing a new epistemology that responds to new conditions of knowledge (Kellner 1990). Specifically, postmodernism, according to Lyotard, embodies "incredulity toward metanarratives" (*Postmodern Condition* xxiv). In general, postmodernism has been defined in several key ways: Most definitions of postmodernism reject "universal," teleological theories of human history, particularly those that have arisen from Enlightenment ideas about reason and progress. Postmodern theories often investigate the relationship between truth and power, de-emphasizing the role of the "subject" or individual consciousness. Finally postmodern theorists frequently focus on examining the ways that language is intersubjective.[8]

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[8] For more on postmodernism, see Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson: "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An

In my opinion, while posthumanism is largely developed from postmodern discourses, there are articulations of postmodernism that seek to overlook the material forces (forces enacted through techne) that I believe construct posthumanism. Further, while some may argue that the posthumanist techno- culture I advocate by arguing for a renewed use of techne may characterize a nostalgic turn towards more modernist "current traditional" writing pedagogies, it is my argument that the posthumanist techno-culture created by emerging digital technologies cannot be "read" in terms of the modern. Not only do contemporary digital technologies refuse the "modernist" instrumental function of technology, but the significant uses of memory and delivery operations in techno-culture also refuse conflation with modernist practices.[9] Indeed, Jean-Francois Lyotard's famous definition of the cyclical process of the modern and the postmodern is actually connected to his understanding of anamnesis, a techne of memory that seeks "to call to mind past matters."[10] For Lyotard, modernism desires to break from tradition and create something absolutely new. In so doing, Lyotard argues, modernism represents a way of forgetting or repressing the past, ultimately only serving to repeat the past instead of surpass it. Modernist texts resist reduction to the status of a mere commodity and are in an antagonistic relationship with modernity; thus, while many modernist texts attempt, in Ezra Pound's words, to "make it new," they actually represent a nostalgia for the past, seeking to reorganize the shattered fragments of modernity into an organic, meaningful

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Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism." In *Feminism/Postmodernism*. Ed. L. Nicholson. New York: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1990; Douglas Kellner: "The Postmodern Turn: Positions, Problems, and Prospects." In *Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Synthesis*. Ed. George Ritzer. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1990; Jean Francois Lyotard: "The Postmodern Condition" in *The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory*. Ed. Steven Seidman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[9] As R.L. Rutsky argues in *the introduction to High-techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman,* modernism sees technology only in terms of its function; postmodernism often sees technology as "non-instrumental."

[10] See Appendix F for a definition and example of anamnesis.

whole. In the attempt to construct an organic meaningful whole, modernist texts exclude contradictions. In digital culture the way that one accesses memories is through digital mediums of delivery. In techno-culture, the media of delivery that construct posthuman prostheses create the "embodiment" of memory and, therefore, cannot be read in terms of the nostalgic, but ultimately forgetful, modernist project. Through media of digital delivery and the "memories" they enact, the bodies of the twenty-first century are presented and represented through techne itself. One of modernism's characteristics is that it relies upon binary oppositions in order to define the world; thus, as digital technologies become more enmeshed with knowledge-making in the twenty-first century, the boundaries between form and content, user and message, or self and other are not sustainable: the high-tech technologies of twenty-first century techno-culture obscure the possibilities for the bifurcation that modernism needs to exclude.[11]

According to Lyotard, however, to be postmodern is to remember that one forgot and to seek to represent the unrepresentable, or what has been excluded. For Lyotard, the postmodern project operates as anamnesis: to call us to remember what is not susceptible of representation, the sublime.[12] In the appendix to *The Postmodern Condition*, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?," Lyotard views the sublime as that which takes place "when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept" (78). Although modern aesthetics also attempt to represent the sublime, they do so nostalgically: According to Lyotard, modernism "allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; but the form, because of

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[11] For useful discussions of modernism, see: M.H. Abrams, *A Glossary of Literary Terms* (167-69); and R.L. Rutsky,'s introduction to *High-techne: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman.*
[12] I have culled this summary of Lyotard's much more complex argument from the following texts: See Jean-Francois Lyotard: *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge; The Differend; Heidegger and "the jews;"* and *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime*.

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its recognizable consistency, continues to offer the reader or viewer solace or pleasure (81). The postmodern "puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself," and "denies itself the solace of good forms" (81). Lyotard considers the sublime to be central to the postmodern critical enterprise, and links it to a type of critical reflection: "with reflection, thinking seems to have at its disposal the critical weapon itself. For in critical philosophy the very possibility of philosophy bears the name of reflection" (12). The importance of reflective judgment becomes apparent once we recognize what Lyotard calls the "enigmatic" character of the postmodern critical project-- the immemorial--, which Bill Readings, in *Introducing Lyotard*, describes as 'That which can neither be remembered (represented to consciousness) nor forgotten (consigned to oblivion). It is that which returns, uncannily"(5). The immemorial enacts anamnesis, remembering that one forgot and seeking to call to mind past matters creates the sublime. The postmodern project to represent the sublime always "comes to nothing" because the unpresentable can never be presented, it strives to create "allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented" (Lyotard, *Postmodern Condition,* 81). While both postmodernism and posthumanism call upon the techne of anmanesis, what differentiates postmodern from posthuman endeavors is the fact that the tasks of anamnesis in posthumanism are predicated on the use of mediums of digital delivery. Digital media complicate postmodernism in that they require a specific use of technai, a requirement that, as I discuss at length in Chapter One of this dissertation, many postmodern scholars would see to be antithetical to the postmodern project. Thus, it is my argument that the posthumanist pedagogies I put forth in this dissertation cannot be easily conflated with either modernism or postmodernism. More to the point, the technai of memory and delivery are so entertwined with the material,

pragmatic, concerns of posthumanism that they become crucial factors in understanding

the ethics of our twenty-first century rhetorical situation.

For rhetoricians, the most distinct difference between postmodern and posthuman

theory is that postmodern rhetorical theory refuses to acknowledge the more pragmatic,

material, affects of techno-culture in the writing classroom that, in my opinion,

posthumanist discourses necessitate. In fact, I argue, the all too frequent "postmodern"

attempt to develop disembodied discourses, particularly as they tap the "liberatory"

potential of Donna Haraway's cyborg, are inadequate for dealing with the actual issues

faced by our students in navigating high-tech techno-culture.[13] Thus, following Katherine

Hayles, I argue that posthumanism cannot be read outside of material concerns.

According to Hayles,

> Following Jean-Francois Lyotard, many theorists of postmodernity accept that the
>
> postmodern condition implies an incredulity toward metanarrative . . . one way to
>
> construct virtuality is the way Moravec and Minsky do—as a metanarrative about
>
> the transformation of the human into a disembodied posthuman. I think we should
>
> be skeptical about this metanarrative. (*How We Became* 22)

As Hayles argues, one of the most prevalent metanarratives in contemporary theory

revolves around the promotion of "disembodied posthumans," which, in rhetorical terms,

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[13] Donna Haraway's *Cyborg Manifesto* has been used to affirm postmodernism's project of removing the body from the scene of writing and constructing it as a scene of relational texts upon which identity is written in fragmentation and multiplicity. Much of Victor Vitanza's work seeks to develop "faceless" or disembodied discourses: As a case in point, in his "Afterward" in *Writing Histories of Rhetoric,* Vitanza writes: "I am who I ham. And I ham who I am. (I h/am, among the various "It's," [cum-schizoid "they'd"] a Zuni clown.) The primary language game, then, not being the language game of knowledge, *is* the language game of avant-garde art . . .An hysteria and a schizoid--after all is said and un/done--know that s/he can (Finnegan's) wake up from the nightmare of history, and, therefore, desire a desire to Trotsky (farcically dance) through it" (251).

can be seen to refuse our students any possibilities for ethos.[14] And yet, twenty-first

century rhetoricians who use digital technology to erase notions of ethos are overlooking

the ways our students' bodies are "figured" in digital texts through rhetorical techne.

Thus, one goal of this dissertation is to articulate the way rhetorical figuration can be

used to create complex ethical appeals in online arguments.

Figurative language can be defined as a "conspicuous departure from what users

of a language apprehend as the standard meaning of words, or the standard order of

words, in order to achieve some special meaning or effect (Abrams 96).[15] In the rhetorical

tradition, figurative language has been often divided into two categories: figures of

thought or tropes ("turns") that occur when words are used in a way that deviates from

their standard meaning; and, figures of speech or schemes, that occur when they depart

from standard usage in the order and syntactical patterns. Throughout this dissertation, I

seek to reveal how digital writing requires highly figured writing. For instance, in

Chapter Two, I present the ways in which hypertext delivery is based on schemes or the

reordering of syntactic patterns. Throughout Chapter Four, I analyze the way in which

ethos is created through figures utilizing the canons of memory and delivery, and I also

look at the ways in which XML (the ultimate "scheme machine") reorders conventional

patterns of syntax to produce new ways of seeing. Additionally, Chapter Three discusses

students' use of language in chat rooms as overwhelmingly figurative, drawing heavily on

figures that utilize delivery techniques. The performance of ethical appeals in online

environments often highlights rhetorical figuration that uses the operations of the canons

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[14] Some postmodern rhetorical scholars such as Victor Vitanza have argued that postmodernism is "the age after ethos," where the notion of the sovereign individual is deconstructed. For example, see Vitanza's in "Concerning a Postclassical Ethos."

[15] Although figurative language is often accorded to poetic discourse, it is integral to language and all modes of discourse.

of memory and delivery. For example, physical actions are implied by figures often used

on the WWW, such as *mycterismus* and *litotes*, both of which suggest particular voices

and gestures.[16] In addition, ethical appeals on the web amplify both persona (the role the

speaker intentionally "acts") and character (the credibility the speaker conveys). When

analyzing the use of the techne of the canons of memory and delivery we can see how

style is always connected to action. As vehicles of memory, figures draw upon patterns

and shared assumptions while also working to create new ideas. Both the canons of

memory and delivery and figures, as behaviors, use patterns and conventions to

communicate, but also invent new ways of seeing. For example, in *Metaphors We Live*

By, Lakoff and Johnson define metaphor as tools to understand and experience "one kind

of thing in terms of another" (5). A metaphor comprises an "interaction" between

different categories, taking place on a shared, common, ground. The interaction creates

new knowledges and works to create new patterns: as a techne, rhetorical figuration does

not close down the possibilities of knowledge-making, but actually opens them up.

Another example of an ancient rhetorical techne that illustrates how techne

operates as a "revealing," is the rhetorical topoi or commonplaces. In classical rhetoric,

the topics were "stock formulas in which arguments may be cast. They include

comparison and contrast, cause and effect" (Bizzell and Herzberg 4). Commonplaces

have often been devalued as mindless repetitions, but actually, just like figuration,

commonplaces operate as instruments of inquiry. The topoi can help one try out new

perspectives, or to generate a new idea or direction. Just like the ancient art of memory,

use of commonplaces reveal how phrases created in the past can be used to create new

and different ideas in the future. The topoi also emphasize the notion of seeking

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[16] For definition and examples of these figures, see Appendix F.

"common ground" by calling upon shared assumptions and ideas. The result is not mere repetition but, discovery. In "Shakespeare's Imagery: Emblem and the Imitation of Nature," for instance, Judith Dundas discusses how Shakespeare used commonplaces in revelatory ways: "Shakespeare's use of the commonplaces, however, is his adaptation of them to individuals, so that they are not so much presented as possessing universal validity as expressing a character's nature and response to circumstances" (50). While uses of the topoi in the Renaissance are well-known, commonplaces would seem to be out of place in techno-culture. Actually, however, commonplaces are prevalent in the twenty-first century. Even the radical postmodernist Avital Rone ll acknowledges in an interview with Diane Davis that her work starts from commonplaces:

> You know, in this regard, I'm sure I could be taken to task because I do, in fact, begin with common places. I think I remain in many ways Aristotelian. What could be more common than drugs, the telephone, secretarial relations in writing, stupid mistakes, housewife psychosis, and so forth? In that regard, I think I do follow the prescriptive pad. So the odd thing is that there are moments when you can trace a lineage. Those who might consider my work outrageous, or completely unfathomable in terms of a secured contextual milieu, might consider precisely such moments in which I answer the ancient call to begin with common places. (Davis 271)[17]

Indeed, I would argue that many of the tasks and arguments that digital media require can be seen to utilize commonplaces. For example, in the advanced writing class, "Writing for the World Wide Web," that I discuss throughout this dissertation, students were asked to create a bulletin board of commonplaces often used on the web, an assignment that not

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[17] This interview can also be fond online at: http://www.cwrl.utexas.edu/~davis/ronell.htm.

only helped them to recognize the "stock" arguments of web-based communication, but also helped them develop ways to re-order those topics to generate new ideas for their own work. In addition, many of the more mundane tasks that digital media necessitate, from the rituals of software applications to the mark up of XML applications, can be seen as repetitions of commonplaces, habitual tasks that allow for the possibility of new ideas to surface.

Further, as the writing of the WWW often uses commonplaces and figures to create identification, it enacts a type of epideictic argumentation. In classical rhetoric, there were seen to be three kinds of speech: deliberative or political oratory concerned with future action; forensic or legal oratory concerned with matters of the past; and, ceremonial or epideictic oratory concerned with matters of praise or blame. Audiences for both forensic and deliberative oratory judge a speech on the merits of its argument. In epideictic oratory, however, the audience is expected to judge on the basis of the orator's skill. While deliberative and forensic speaking are concerned with matters of policy and fact, epideictic oratory is concerned with matters of value. As Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg note in *The Rhetorical Tradition*, epideictic oratory is intended to "strengthen shared beliefs"(3). Because the epideictic is the form of argumentation most closely associated with values and is judged on style instead of content, Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca in *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation,* suggest that a theory of argument in which values, like facts and policies, can be assessed rationally is crucial to contemporary rhetoric: "The epideictic genre is not only important but essential from an educational point of view, since it too has an effective and distinctive part to play–that, namely, of bringing about a consensus in the minds of the audience regarding

the values that are celebrated in the speech" (33). Since, as I argue throughout this dissertation, digital writing is overwhelmingly epideictic and requires attention to stylistic technai, theories and pedagogies need to be developed that address the connection between techne and value-making in techno-culture. As I will discuss in Chapter Two, the epideictic can be seen in the spectacle of the World Wide Web with its characteristics of exaggeration and excess, and its propensity for the transmission of dominant values.[18] Examples of the dominance of epideictic argumentation can be seen in the style of home pages, or in the increasing appearance of sites, such as marthatalks.com and MoveOn.org, which seek to praise or blame a person or situation and are becoming more prevalent ways of presenting oneself or one's ideas in the public arena. Significantly, the ceremonial discourse of the World Wide Web does not enact "style for style's sake:" it is the crucial mode of argumentation in the twenty-first century. Discourses of praise and blame can instruct publics in moral rectitude and establish common ground for action. Often, on the World Wide Web, the epideictic is simultaneously a vehicle for both marginal or controversial ideas and traditional value systems.[19]

In the rhetorical tradition, however, the epideictic has been seen to be the "lowest" type of oratory and has often been associated with deception. For example, the ancient sophist Gorgias often has been praised or blamed for his style of artistic prose that operates with rhetorical figures. The epideictic speech derives its power from the affective influence of its rhetorical form on the audience and, according to Gorgias in the

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[18] According to Poulakos and Poulakos in *Classical Rhetorical Theory,* the four characteristics of the epideictic form are: the affinity for competition; its propensity to become a spectacle; its proclivity to excess and exaggeration and; its susceptibility to the propagation of dominant values (63 – 64).

[19] Recently, in "Aristotle on Epideictic: The Formation of Public Morality," Gerard Hauser has explored the didactic function of epideictic in laying the ground for political action. Hauser argues against critical scholars who bemoan the inherently conservative tendencies in ceremonial discourse. Instead he notes the democratic potential of epideictic.

Encomium of Helen, it can "stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity" (Gorgias 41). For Gorgias, the intent of oratory is not speak the truth but to influence the audience. Therefore, rhetoric consciously operates within the realm of opinion. In this respect, Gorgias was censured by Plato, who perceived beauty as the reflection of an invariable truth or idea. Plato condemned Gorgias's rhetoric as deceptive illusion and an "art of flattery" (Plato, *Gorgias*, 71). Concomitantly, argumentation on the web is often seen as deceptive, with that deception often constructed around issues of ethos. Think, for instance of the deceptive marketing strategies of Internet advertising, the misrepresentations of one's appearance on "singles" websites, or the overwhelming use of personaes in chatrooms. Thus, while some postmodernists may claim that the age of ethos has ended, ethical appeals and the technai that create them, technai that, I argue, are most often associated with operations of memory and or delivery, are increasingly relevant in posthumanist techno-culture. [20]

More to the point, the epideictic cannot be considered apart from techne: at its core the epideictic is defined by its manipulation of techniques that are "fit for display." In digital culture, however, what becomes crucial, then, is one's access not only to the display, but also to the techne that helps one construct or "read" any given display. Interestingly, much of "postmodern" theory can be seen to refuse acknowledgement of the ways access to techne is the crucial feature of the techno-culture. As a case in point, while the section "Education and its Legitimation through Performativity," in *The*

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[20] As Victor Vitanza points out in *Negation, Subjectivity and The History of Rhetoric*, some philosophers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, have claimed that epideictic discourse is not possible after Auschwitz (38-39). My observation that the epideictic is increasingly evident in digital techno-culture appears, perhaps, to question such an argument. In addition, although the WWW does operate to promulgate dominant values, it also operates to provide spaces for marginal voices; thus one could argue that and there is a way in which Lyotard's differend (the excluded, silenced, terriorized) appears to be finding spaces for representation in the locus of memories in digital culture.

Postmodern Condition, actually directly discusses the impact of access to technology

(and thereby anticipates posthumanism), it is often overlooked by rhetorical and

technological scholars alike. Significantly, however, Lyotard's argument foresees a

crucial aspect of posthuman rhetorical endeavors: it points to the way in which access to

information will be (is!) the determining factor in educational pedagogy. Although I do

not agree with Lyotard's negative appraisal of the effects of technology in higher

education, this dissertation, at its core, addresses the ways in which access to

reproducible knowledge through the media of digital communication constitutes the most

important feature of posthumanism. Indeed, access represents another way in which the

posthuman is always already located within material concerns.

Katherine Hayles also sees access, particularly as it is related to reproducibility, as

the most significant feature of the posthuman. As she argues in "The Condition of

Virtuality," the crucial issue with information is thus not possession but access . . . How

can you publish something on the WWW and get paid for it?" (78). In turn, to teach

composition in the twenty-first century is to teach ways to access knowledge or

information. The processes by which we access and deliver knowledge are the technai of

the posthuman. Thus techne is bound up by material concerns: acquiring the actual

physical prostheses we use to access knowledge as well as disseminating the effects on

the actual bodies that use them. The canons of memory and delivery are truly relevant in

the twenty-first century in that digital techno-culture enacts "telematic memory."

According to Elena Esposito, telematic memory focuses not on memorizing actual

information or knowledge, but on remembering the processes or procedures that allow

access to that knowledge.[21] As I will argue throughout this dissertation, telematic

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[21] Esposito's *Soziales Vergessen. Formen und Medien des Gedächtnisses der Gesellschaft has not yet been*

memory involves the use of the techne of the ancient rhetorical canons of memory and delivery. Significantly, the techne of telematic memory does not create agency or knowledge based on instrumental or technical mastery, but constructs access to the processes and procedures that may create a situated, contextual, knowledge or agency. In this way, techne works as a "bringing forth." Techne engenders possibility, not mastery or even predictable behavior.[22] In addition, the reproducibility of techno-culture means that knowledge can no longer be possessed, only accessed. Consequently, the techne of telematic memory can be seen to create spaces for community and collective knowledge-making.

The return of memory and delivery to the forefront of the rhetorical paideia means a return to a more fully rhetorical consciousness, and, in short it marks the return of rhetoric as a potent force in our educational system. If a "classical" rhetorical mind-set is one that embraces the precepts underlying the canons of memory and delivery (namely the way in which knowledge is produced in any given situation), the resurgence of memory and delivery in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries also seems to be a return to earlier notions of education, experience, ownership, and community. For example, Sharon Crowley observes in "Modern Rhetoric and Memory" that "rhetorical consciousness is fully consonant with memory arts, which were designed to facilitate copious accretion of knowledge . . . a rhetorical attitude towards composition emphasizes copiousness, abundance, plentitude and aggregation" (43). Digital multimedia technologies such as hypertext and the WWW also emphasize a "copious accretion of

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translated into English. .For an excellent review and summary of Elena Esposito's work on telematic memory, see Michael Boyden's article in *Image and Narrative* (February 2003).
[22] As the logs from chat room analyses show in Chapter Three, techne is not always successful, but it always engenders possibility.

knowledge" and provide "writing spaces," to use Jay David Bolter's words, where memory and delivery can flourish. These new writing spaces (which are continuations of Plato's wax tablet and Freud's mystic writing pad) create places, whether stored in a computer's memory or delivered on a screen, where writers and readers come together to create knowledge. Significantly, then, the valuation of the canons of memory and delivery are linked to the valuation of rhetoric in any given society. As Mary Carruthers observes in *The Book of Memory*, the value of memory and delivery depends more on the role that rhetoric has in a culture than whether its texts are presented in oral or written forms (11).

The advent of electronic technologies brings memory and delivery back to the center of the rhetorical paideia, they also reconfigure the ethical implications of rhetoric. Since delivery has always been intimately connected with ethos, new media are not only bringing ethical concerns back to rhetorical study, but also changing the nature and scope of those concerns. As Sam Dragga notes, the "revival of delivery has given writers new rhetorical power. And with this new power to design information comes new obligations, specifically ethical obligations" (80). Consequently, new technologies reconfigure not only the techniques of rhetorical engagement, but also the ethical implications of that engagement. Throughout this dissertation, I seek to articulate the effect new technologies are having on our composition theories as I introduce purposeful, focused, pedagogical applications using the techne of the canons of memory and delivery.

In Chapter One, I argue against the way in which rhetoric's pragmatic uses and effects have often been ignored in postmodern rhetorical theory. Defining rhetoric as an art of praxis (as a techne that examines the effects, whether grammatical, figurative,

social or political, of texts), I develop a neo-pragmatic pedagogical approach towards the use of digital technologies. Since this chapter argues against the separation of the technological practices of writing from larger rhetorical frameworks, I investigate the ways in which revaluations of ancient conceptions of techne (as an art, as productive knowledge, as revealing rather than manufacturing) actually merge with digital technologies to create new strategies for teaching writing. Disagreeing with arguments from rhetorical scholars who see techne and concomitantly, pragmatism, as exclusionary and limiting, I identify the problems with enacting theories that are not grounded in practice and present ways in which applications of techne (such as the canons of memory and delivery or the mode of ethos) that are seemingly cancelled out in postmodern doxologies actually re-emerge in the twenty-first century classroom.

Chapter Two provides a historical analysis of the canons of memory and delivery and links key aspects of those ancient canons, specifically the uses of imagery and spatialization, to the creation of ethical appeals in digital culture. As the canons of memory and delivery can be used to create powerful epideictic texts, the technai of these canons are particularly appropriate for navigating online writing situations. First, I outline the major developments in the canons of memory and delivery in the rhetorical tradition. Second, I provide an example of the ways in which the canons of memory and delivery can be used to create ethical appeals in the form of epideictic by analyzing Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own*. In the final part of the chapter, I discuss new rhetorical modes in digital culture and foreground the way in which the ancient technai of memory and delivery can provide a constructive context for using these "memory machines." In this chapter, I pay particular attention to spatial argumentation on the WWW, arguing

that the spaces of digital writing reflect operations of the ancient arts of memory. This chapter furthers the arguments outlined in Chapter One, claiming that our technai (our processes for generating and communicating production knowledge) reveal our, often hidden, ideological practices. Through analyzing the technai often utilized on the web, I seek to reveal the rich and complicated ways in which twenty-first century writers find places to argue.

In Chapter Three, I analyze the ways in which writers construct ethos through the techne of the canons of memory and delivery in online writing environments, highlighting the spectral quality of ethos on the WWW and linking that ethos to ancient notions of ethea and the use of the figure *prosopopoeia*. A techne taken from the Greek word *prosopon*, meaning visage or mask, *prosopopoeia* is etymologically derived from the term persona, and uses amplification or projection. Amplifying the etymological connection between with the Greek word *ethea*, meaning "to haunt" or "hang out," I argue for the way in which the figure of prosopopoeia creates ethical appeals in digital writing. The first part of the chapter focuses on the ways student writers develop ethical appeals in chatrooms—analyzing both invented and situated ethos in terms of the techne of the canons of memory and delivery. Specifically, I investigate the ways that ethos is constructed in chat rooms of the online composition classroom, foregrounding the ways those digital spaces allow for both the expansion and limitation of identity through performativity. Although performativity is a complex term that I attempt to define at length in Chapter Three, in short, the performativity I use to discuss chat room performances can be most clearly defined, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Andrew Parker articulate in the introduction to *Performativity and Performance* in terms of

"When is saying something doing something? And how is saying something doing something?" (1). The performative language enacted in online classrooms requires attention to the way our students' ethical appeals are "impacted" by cyberspace. Furthering my analysis of ethos in digital writing, I also analyze the way in which students' hypertextual autobiographical essays from an advanced technical writing course incorporate the technai of the tropes and figures accorded to memory and delivery (mimesis, anamnesis, litotes, etc).[23] Situating my analysis within posthuman discourses and specifically analyzing technai which create ethos in online situations, I argue that digital arguments require particular attention to the ways ethical appeals create "bodies" in cyberspace.

In Chapter Four, I seek to connect the cognitive applications of the techne of memory and delivery to applications in digital writing technologies. Drawing on Dual Coding Theory that argues for the importance of both verbal and nonverbal in literacy acquisition, I specifically discuss the importance of writing pedagogies that utilize imagery. Using cognitive analyses of the techne of the canons of memory and delivery, I discuss the significance of spatial arguments in digital texts. Specifically analyzing the use of an XML pedagogical database named <emma> in composition classes at the University of Georgia, I argue for the ways in which our uses of the visual and spatial technai can inform our students' writing practices, and present detailed analyses of the spatial argumentation used to organize, store, and display various aspects of student writing in <emma>. I also provide an example from an advanced writing course to show how <emma> can be used to help develop and revise ethical appeals using the techne of the canons of memory and delivery. In addition, I anticipate criticisms of <emma> (and

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[23] See Appendix F for a chart of these figures.

its concomitant use of techne) that might claim that the application promotes limiting, exclusionary, practices resembling current-traditional rhetoric. Finally, I seek to place the cognitive uses of <emma> within a larger rhetorical framework that provides ample evidence of the importance of the techne of memory and delivery in the writing classroom of the twenty-first century.

Throughout this dissertation, I analyze how the ancient techne of memory and delivery can provide a useful context for our twenty-first century students in composing; however, use of rhetorical technai has often been seen, either positively or negatively, not to create truth or represent reality, but "magically" to create illusion. As Gorgias observes in the "Encomium of Helen":

> All who have and do persuade people of things do so by molding a false
> argument. For if all men on all subjects had <both> memory of things past and
> <awareness> of things present and foreknowledge of the future, speech would not
> be similarly similar, since as things are now it is not easy for them to recall the
> past nor to consider the present nor to predict the future. (41)

While in Gorgias's time, it was not easy for rhetoricans to recall the past, consider the present, or predict the future, digital technologies have created an ease of access that changes the rhetorical situation completely. Interestingly, however, the posthuman rhetorical situation still benefits from the application of ancient rhetorical technai, particularly since, as I argue, digital writing emphasizes the creation of ethical appeals. At one and the same time, digital technologies require pragmatic, specialized, tasks as they also reveal the unlimited possibilities of language, a tension allowed for in the increasing access to memories (knowledge) through mediums of digital delivery, such as

XML databases like the University of Georgia's <emma> program, which allows students to see their writing in a potentially endless variety of displays. Thus, I disagree with Michelle Ballif in her essay "Writing the Third Sophistic: Periphrasis on an [In]TenseRhetoric" who, after arguing against the limitations of both pragmatism and techne in postmodern culture calls, for "civic bodies who, in Gorgias's words "neither remember the past nor observe the present nor prophesy the future" (67). Although Ballif's concerns in this essay are more theoretical than pedagogical, as I discuss in Chapter One, her concern with the exclusionary practices of techne and pragmatism are helpful in understanding the postmodern condition. Ultimately, however, it is my argument that techne and the neo-pragmatic approach it engenders offers the most useful parameters for teaching composition instruction in the twenty-first century. Providing our students with the processes and procedures they need to access knowledge calls for reflection on the lessons learned from past, awareness of the bodies constructed in the present, and self-conscious consideration of how arguments are best delivered for future action. Thus, this dissertation addresses the ways our twenty-first century classrooms can "draw a curtain" within the complex matrix of techno-culture, allowing for specific, focused, classroom practices. Although the techne of memory and delivery was largely developed and utilized in eras quite different from our own (whether in ancient Greece or medieval England), it is my argument that many of the rhetorical practices associated with these canons are highly useful in providing a context and framework for our students as we introduce them to the uses of digital technologies in the writing classroom. In turn, because my work is located within posthuman discourses, my approach is always connected to pragmatic considerations of materiality and physicality, for the posthuman

(still deeply intertwined with humanism) represents a physical, material, extension of the body, not the destruction of it. Although much of this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the student and the machine, at its core this is really a dissertation about the relationship between student and teacher in the writing classroom of the twenty-first century. By specifically investigating the way the telematic memory engendered in digital technologies connects to the ancient canons of memory and delivery, I believe that we can develop composition pedagogies that remember the techne of the past and use the technology of the future, without forgetting the bodies of the present.

CHAPTER ONE

REVEALING TECHNE: THE ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF TEACHING IN A HIGH TECH

POSTHUMANIST CLASSROOM

It is words that are to blame. They are the wildest, freest, most irresponsible, most unteachable of all things. --
Virginia Woolf, "Craftmanship"

If, like Virginia Woolf, we simultaneously praise and blame words for being too wild and

too free, we may also reach the same conclusion that teaching writing might be an impossible

endeavor. How many composition instructors continuously engage in epideictic arguments with

themselves, praising their desire to show students the expansiveness of language while blaming

their actual pedagogies for limiting its scope? Since its emergence, the field of composition has

had a large service component and been focused on the teaching of "basic skills" to create

effective literacy in the world beyond the writing classroom. As John Schlib writes in "Cultural

Studies, Postmodernism and Composition," "Historians agree that composition was invented

purely to train students in the mechanics of language, to help them face the newly specialized

demands of higher education and the emerging circumstances of corporate life. The field is a

product of modernism" (178). While the teaching of basic literacy skills in composition

developed because of the particular social, political, and economic forces of the time, it also

arose, I argue, out of the sheer difficulty of teaching writing that Woolf articulates in

"Craftmanship." In the twenty-first century, Woolf's dilemma in teaching writing remains for

contemporary composition pedagogues who wish to embrace postmodern theories, a dilemma

which has all too often created an atmosphere of saying one thing in publications and doing

another in the classroom. The split between theory and practice in postmodern composition studies can be especially troubling to instructors who believe that one of rhetoric's greatest strengths to be its potential for merging theory and practice.

While pedagogies built on teaching basic technical skills seem out of place in the postmodern realm, they are ubiquitous in actual practice.[24] Although this disjunction may occur in part because our institutions and traditions have been founded on modernist ideologies and goals, the rise of digital technologies to teach writing involves significant attention to technical procedures and processes. It is my argument, however, that the technical practices demanded by digital technologies are connected to more expansive kinds of knowledge, knowledge developed through techne. While I analyze the definition of techne at length later in this chapter, my understanding of the term, which merges definitions of Martin Heidegger and Janet Atwill, characterizes techne as a "productive knowledge" that works self-reflexively to reveal our practices to us. Concomitantly, the new tasks required by digital technologies often call upon techniques, processes, or procedures that can be seen to re-introduce the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to the center of the rhetorical paideia. Computer technologies enact a type of telematic memory, where what is memorized is not information or knowledge but the techniques or procedures to make information available to use; in short, telematic memory describes the memories obtained through delivery processes.[25] In this way, the canons of memory and delivery re-emerge in the expansion of technologies which re-introduce memorial operations (i.e., the WWW as the ultimate "Memory Theater") and link them to delivery

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[24] One only needs to look at the syllabi of First-Year Composition courses at major universities to see the focus on "basic skills" as demonstrated in current-traditional rhetoric. While many writing programs still demonstrate attention to current traditional practices, literacy has evolved with emerging technologies to include a wide range of practices that have, in turn, created an expansion of our understanding of literacy.

[25] For an excellent review and summary of Elena Esposito's work on telematic memory, see Michael Boyden's article in *Image and Narrative* (February 2003).

operations (i.e., XML display options). Throughout this dissertation, I seek to show how the

techne of the canons of memory and delivery can provide purpose-driven pedagogical

applications and strategies for our high-tech classrooms.

Indeed, the need for purposeful applications in our writing classrooms remains crucial to

teaching effectiveness in the twenty-first century. In "The Rhetorical Paideia," written in 1986,

Richard Lanham argues for embracing three kinds of motives in postmodern pedagogical

practices: "play, game, and purpose" (133). Most rhetoric and composition scholars who have

since attempted to imagine a postmodern classroom have focused on the classroom as a

playground or carnival, often discussing the importance of playing language games.[26] While the

"playful" potential of postmodern classrooms has been much discussed, I believe that in giving

more emphasis to purpose, we can create specific, tailored, pedagogies that address the myriad of

tasks and issues our students navigate in order to be literate in the techno-culture of the twenty-

first century. Further, a posthumanist understanding of our contemporary situation requires, I

argue, engagements with technai.[27]

In this chapter, I will analyze the arguments of contemporary rhetoricians who argue

against the use of techne in postmodern culture. Anticipating arguments from scholars who see

techne and concomitantly, neo-pragmatism, as exclusionary and limiting, this chapter identifies

the problems with enacting postmodern pedagogical theories that are not grounded in practice

and reveals the ways in which applications of techne (such as can be found in the canons of

memory and delivery or the mode of ethos) that are seemingly cancelled out in postmodern

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[26] For an excellent summary of early postmodern pedagogies see James Sosnoski's "Postmodern Teachers in their Postmodern Classrooms: Socrates Begone!" in *Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age*. New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 1991.

[27] In the opening pages of *How We Became Posthuman*, N. Katherine Hayles argues that, "in the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals" (3).

doxologies actually re-emerge in the twenty-first century classroom in significant form. Specifically, I will investigate the validity of a pragmatic approach towards the use of computer technologies, linking a contemporary neopragmatism to definitions of techne discussed by, most significantly, Martin Heidegger and Janet Atwill. I will also analyze the connection between techne and technology, articulating an understanding of techne that seeks to explain its presence and relevance in a high-tech classroom.

Postmodern Techne?

Throughout this dissertation, I promote rhetorical strategies, classroom pedagogies, and writing technologies that, at times, work to monitor and/or control language. In making these arguments, critics may argue that I am endorsing a limiting view of language and refusing to acknowledge the difficult issues of our "postmodern" world: issues of exclusion, power, lack of subjectivity and history. Furthermore, my claim that the canons of memory and delivery reemerge in significant ways in twenty-first century pedagogies can be seen to imply that classical models can be easily grafted onto our current rhetorical endeavors.[28] In her provocative essay, "Writing the Third-Sophistic Cyborg: Periphrasis on an [In]Tense Rhetoric," Michelle Ballif argues against many of the uses of rhetoric that I make throughout this dissertation. She argues for a third-sophist, by which she suggests, "a rhetorical situation negotiated by m?tis rather than mastered by technê" (67). By m?tis, Ballif refers to " a knowing, doing, and making not in regards to Truth (either certain or probable), but in regards to a "transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous" situation such as our postmodern condition" (53). Ballif sees her

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[28] While I use the next three chapters to discuss specifically the techne of the canons of memory and delivery that I believe reemerge in composition classrooms, in short, it can include attention to the tropes and figures that enact memorial or delivery techniques, the inclusion mu ltimedia (images, sounds) in argumentation as in web pages, the use of voice and persona in chat rooms, the use of storage systems as visual displays or in XML databases that externally create versions of ancient "arts of memory."

Third-Sophistic Cyborg as part and parcel of postmodern culture: "a Third-Sophistic rhetoric embodied in the postmodern, posthuman, post-Aristotelian figure of the Cyborg."[1] Calling upon Haraway's Cyborg, Ballif ends her essay by seeking civic bodies who, in Gorgias's words, "neither remember the past nor observe the present nor prophesy the future"(67). In short Ballif seeks a new kind of rhetorician who is not bound by the limitations of ancient rhetorical technai, such as deliberative, forensic or epideictic "occasions." While I do not seek to enact the third-sophistic rhetoric that Ballif develops, in a dissertation that stresses both the techne of memory and the "usefulness" of technologies of delivery that serve primarily communicative functions, Ballif's essay represents the type of criticisms that could be made against the strategies, pedagogies, and technologies that I promote.

As a case in point, if I had not wrestled with Ballif's argument, I might have been tempted to argue that the memory and delivery functions we apply in our computer classes (i.e., chat rooms, XML programs such as <emma>) create "Student Cyborgs" whose memories and voices are mediated by the technology. And yet, as Ballif's article argues, the Cyborg, as it has been defined by Donna Haraway at least, is "not necessarily controlled by the exchange demands of communication" that most composition classes require (64). Quoting Haraway's manifesto, Ballif reminds us that Haraway's Cyborg politics constitute "the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication; Cyborg politics insist on noise" (qtd. in Ballif 64). Ballif argues, in third-sophistic language, that the Cyborg is "a technological figure, which will have preceded, paradoxically, the conception of rhetoric as technê" (65). Arguing that third-sophistic rhetoric may be more productively viewed as involving m?tis instead of techne, Ballif offers m?tis in exchange of techne because, in her view, techne is too closely aligned with "method" (59). While I seek a more expansive definition of techne than Ballif uses, her essay clearly reveals that the

transformative potential of Haraway's Cyborg cannot be easily transferred to the technologically-based pedagogies I will discuss later in this dissertation. Ballif's essay is also useful in contextualizing our field within the postmodern "moment." In fact, much of this dissertation developed as I wrestled with what I saw to be the (im)possibilities of postmodern rhetorical theory for the actual classroom practices that are developing within our high-tech culture.

In "Writing the Third-Sophistic Cyborg," Ballif aligns herself with another Third-sophistic rhetorician, Victor Vitanza:

> I am arguing that a postmodern/Third Sophistic practice should be understood in terms that Victor Vitanza offered: a "Postmodern/ParaRhetoric" as an art of resisting and disrupting the available means (that is the cultural codes) that allow for persuasion and identification: the art of not only refusing the available (capitalist/socialist) codes but also of refusing altogether to recode or to reterritorialize power relations. (56)

Perhaps the most sophistic of postmodern rhetoricians, Vitanza shakes the foundations of rhetorical pedagogy to its very core. In "Three CounterTheses Or, A Critical In(ter)vention into Composition Theories and Pedagogies," Vitanza seeks to get outside of the field of composition's will to control language. He states that the field of composition theory has enacted its will to control by systematizing the language of composing (140). Vitanza's notion of language as a game resists traditional composition theories that he believes have sought to control language and to "totalize" (140).

In order to show the ways in which modernist pedagogies can be seen to totalize, Vitanza recalls the famous debate between Habermas and Lyotard, showing Habermas to favor a critical rationalism and legitimation of knowledge that falls back on universal conditions, while

supporting Lyotard's position (which he favors but expands with Deleuze and Guattari) that questions any possible universal condition and sees the notion of consensus as suspect.[29] According to Vitanza, Lyotard's game is the game of the 'avant-garde.' Vitanza also discusses the notion of paralogy, which can be seen as a means of discovering what is at stake in literature, philosophy, and politics and "which bears witness to differends, the unintelligible, the silenced or unspoken" (146). In "Three Counter Theses," Vitanza also discusses the question of authorship— who speaks when something is spoken—and reiterates Lyotard's notion that humans don't speak, they are spoken (152). He writes that the question of who speaks is a question "of origins, groundings, sources, and capacities" (156). He favors a postmodern theatrics where the goal is "gaming," and "cutting up" knowledge (158). Significantly, Vitanza declares a moratorium on turning theory into practice, from watering down theory to the point of losing its edge (160). For Vitanza, theory should remain fluid and unstable; it should always be linked with epistemology. He calls for a postpedagogy that turns away from metanarratives and works through "little" narratives (163). This post-pedagogy would be a means of "continuous dissensus" and "drifting" (165). In short, Vitanza's postpedagogy does away with all of the foundations of traditional rhetoric. As Sharon Crowley writes in "Reimagining the Writing Scene," Vitanza's "subversive project amounts to nothing less than rewriting the history of rhetoric and composition" (192). Nevertheless, while Vitanza's theories have greatly contributed to the "rewriting" of rhetorical history and theory, his work may have little to offer to rhetoricians who decline to declare a "moratorium" on turning their theory and scholarship into practice in the classroom.

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[29] The tension between consensus and dissensus as the ends of discourse can be seen in the debate between Habermas and Lyotard. Habermas desires to return to the early Hegel, to unify in terms of pragmatics. Lyotard disagrees with Habermas, and says that dissensus, not consensus, is the real end of discourse.

Connecting Theory and Practice

Rhetoric as a field deals with the effects of texts--effects that are created through the application of multiple and often conflicting technai. If rhetoric can be defined, as Stephen Mailloux defines it in *Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism*, as the "the political effectivity of trope and argument in culture," then the ways in which we teach students to produce those effects through technai has very real ethical considerations (4). It can only be useful to investigate our uses, appropriations, and definitions of techne in order to reveal the ways we theorize ourselves as a field, as well as the ways we may improve our practices in the classroom (53). In other words, I am not merely re-defining techne contra Ballif's definition in "Writing the Third-Sophistic."[30] While in her essay, Ballif concedes that techne has a part to play in fashioning rhetoric in the postmodern, "according to the occasion, vacillating moments and opportunities-and by the relativity of argument and truth," she argues that it works only in conjunction with m?tis (knowing/doing/making), tuch? (luck/chance), and kairos (opportune moment) (67). Conversely, it is my argument that it is not possible to encourage m?tis, take advantage of tuch?, demonstrate arête (excellence), or even recognize the kairotic moment, without techne.

Not only does a deliberate and self-conscious engagement with techne allow us to see through the illusions of many of our theoretical pursuits into our real, actual, practices, but the renewed understandings of techne that result may also, I argue, allow for us to reconceive our pedagogical practices in the classroom in more fruitful ways than "postmodern postpedagogy" alone has done. The pragmatic outcomes of teaching techne are unavoidable in the composition classroom of the twenty-first century, a classroom more and more likely to ask students to

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[30] I would also add that her use of mêtis cannot be substituted for my use of techne—most significantly, I think because techne, as I will define it, works as revealing, a mode that is not applicable to third-sophistic theories as I understand them.

employ computer skills. And yet, to teach techne is not a simple proposition, for I agree with Ballif that:

> To teach "academic discourse" is not only to "invent the university" (Bartholomae), but also to ensure its survival and the survival of other institutions which operate in conjunction with the university. This is precisely why technê, or method, has been so highly valued within the history of rhetoric and why composition pedagogy has sought to control language. (59)

Our use of emerging technologies may in fact expose our continuing desire for control over language and our students; there are very real ways in which digital technologies reinforce the very traditional values that postmodernists desire to do away with, including notions of identity and the fixedness of language. Rhetorical scholars who question the uses of techne in our classrooms are not off-target; as Sharon Crowley notes in *Composition in the University*, much of the techne that we have espoused in the last century arises from current-traditional pedagogy that "forces students to repeatedly display their use of institutionally sanctioned forms" (95). Indeed, Crowley's claim that current-traditional pedagogy "perfectly met the humanist requirement that students' expression of character be put under constant surveillance so that they could be improved by correction" could easily be applied to the panopticon effect that online writing technologies can encourage (97).[31] There are also very real ways in which the teaching of the skills for "writing on the web" justify our existence as writing instructors; the creation of the <emma> system, in part by the First-Year Composition department, can be seen as a vehicle for justifying our right to exist by *revealing* all student "errors" through XML display. I believe,

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[31] To be sure, I share Michelle Ballif's concerns that we "may be recolonizing ourselves and others as we begin to write, read and live with and within electronic information spaces such as hypertext (Johnson Eiola 383) that we may be constructing and electronic panopticon, and as Anne Balsamo argues, we may be obscuring "the disciplining and surveillant consequences of these [bio] technologies- in short, the biopolitics of technological formations" (62).

however, along with Christy Desmet in "Equivalent Students, Equitable Classrooms," that it is possible to create a classroom "that acknowledges the panopticon without assenting to its replication" (169). In addition, an analysis of techne reveals how emerging technologies do not create new problems for rhetoric and composition instructors, but only serves to highlight issues already deeply ingrained within our field. As our analyses of techne call attention to our field's long-standing issues, our uses of technology reveal the obligation for a neo-pragmatic approach in the writing classroom.

The Benefits of a Neo-pragmatic Approach

To use computer technologies in the classroom is to already engage in pragmatic approaches to teaching writing. As Richard Coyne notes in his highly influential text, *Designing Information Technology in the Postmodern Age*, "The current wave of popular and accessible computing systems seems to be attributable, whether through declared allegiance or not, largely to the pragmatic orientation" (19). Pragmatism places importance on the primacy of human action, the practicalities of human involvement, the materiality of the world, the interaction of the senses, and the formative power of technologies. Pragmatic analyses do not privilege theory over practice, or the individual over the collective; therefore, pragmatism can be seen as a refutation of the Cartesian ideologies which have held such a vice-like grip on the field of rhetoric (Coyne 19).[32] Coyne also notes that computer system design has been influenced by pragmatism through the philosophies of John Dewey, Marshall McLuhan, and Martin Heidegger, all of whom can be seen to articulate pragmatic positions (19). Because pragmatism values "what works," actions and consequences, it begins with an understanding of technologies in the human

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[32] As this dissertation will show, I believe that a vigilant neo-pragmatic approach to our theoretical and pedagogical practices is crucial in also avoiding the postmodern trap of stating one thing theoretically and doing quite another in practice, a problem inherent in many of the postmodern pedagogies of the past decade.

context: how the technology works within the day-to-day practical activity of human beings. For composition studies, the pragmatic orientation requires theorists to critique the ways in which the computer system is *actually* used instead of articulating theories about how it *may be used* (31).

Richard Coyne presents pragmatism as the most useful approach to understanding the design of computer systems. Since design constitutes a matter of doing, of engaging the materials of specific design situations. For the pragmatist, design focuses on projecting the expectations of the user-population instead of the expectations or desires of the individual programmer or designer. Imbued with considerations of authority, legitimation, responsibility, and the interweaving of varying roles, practices and technologies, "designing and design evaluations are situated within communities" (*Designing*, 11). Indeed, as Coyne notes, pragmatic design represents a kind of "reflection in action" where "needs are commonly identified in retrospect or during the development of the design rather than at the outset of the design process" (11). A pragmatic approach also recognizes the formative power of technology on the individual and on society, for as Sherry Turkle states in *The Second Self*: "Technology catalyzes changes not only in what we do but in how we think. It changes people's awareness of themselves, of one another, of their relationship to the world" (13). Therefore, technology functions not simply as a tool, but as a tool that has seminal powers.[33]

Pragmatism, as Richard Rorty notes, "is usually regarded as an outdated philosophical movement-- one which flourished in the early years of this century in a rather provincial atmosphere" (xvii). Rorty, of course, does not believe that his pragmatic theory is outdated. Many recent scholars, however, find fault in Rorty's notion of communicative action and

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[33] The emphasis here is on seminal, not just as creation, but as reproduction, a quality that is inherent in our digital technologies and in the canons of memory and delivery.

underscore concerns about the ways in which his pragmatic analyses can exclude difference. Other scholars have argued that pragmatism never broke out of positivism, is not radical, antiplatonic, or rigorous enough, and needs to be sharper and more detailed in its definitions (Rorty xvii). Other critics of pragmatism claim that rhetorical pragmatists allow for a vulgar relativism and pluralism that does not allow for political agency.

Although Richard Coyne uses the term "pragmatism" in *Designing Information Technology*, the pragmatism he espouses throughout his text, influenced as it is with postmodern and poststructuralist theory, is perhaps more akin to the radical neopragmatism of postmodern rhetorical scholars such as Stephen Mailloux. Still, neopragmatism has had its own share of detractors. For instance, although in *Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism,* Mailloux argues that contemporary neopragmatism can be viewed as a postmodern reception of sophistic rhetoric, Michelle Ballif argues that neopragmatism falls short of her third-sophistic desires:

> For although [neopragmatism] dispenses with the demand for Truth and with
> Reason as the only suitable mode of inquiry, it still figures language as a tool, as
> communicative in function. And, as such, it requires a disciplined language,
> constituted across a series of exclusions, particularly (as Jarratt argued) of not
> only who can speak and when, but also what can possibly be said. (58)

Susan Jarratt actually calls for a new kind of radical neopragmatism, one which places the rhetoric of neopragmatism "into a more diverse and polyvocal context," which does not relinquish theory as an intellectual project, continually locates intellectual inquiry in specific contexts, and "enact[s] theories as discursive and social practices with a goal of transformation, with language always at the center of effort" (219; 227). The composition classroom, particularly

the digital writing classroom, is one place where this new kind of neopragmatism can be enacted. As David Downing argues in "The Political Consequences of Pragmatism":

> If those of us in the humanities neglect the important work that needs to be done
>
> in constructing caring environments in "cyberspace," the worst fears of the
>
> humanist "anti-tech" views will be indeed realized by the machine-like precision
>
> and logistical skills of the systems analysts and "techies." (193)

Importantly, neopragmatism can allow us to "develop an especially vigilant rhetorical analysis and institutional critique" (Downing 201). A vigilant neo-pragmatic analysis can help us better understand how our departments and classrooms are structured and allow us to see the ways in which our students, technologies, and pedagogies connect and disconnect with institutional goals and directives, as well as with our own theoretical aspirations. For rhetorical neopragmatists, renewed analyses of techne may be the first step toward achieving this self-reflexivity in the classroom.

Neopragmatists recognize that new technologies reveal aspects of our practices to us that hitherto may have been covered over. For example, as I discuss in Chapter Four of this dissertation, "Remarkable Texts: XML, Cognition, and the Canons of Memory and Delivery," <emma> not only reveals our students' grammatical errors, but also reveals our long-standing institutional drives to hypercorrection. Revealing the power matrices that inform our pedagogical practices is a crucial step towards improvement. Very simply, if we define techne as the production of textual effects, rhetoric as analysis of the effects of texts, and neopragmatism as an approach to understanding those effects in a social and political context, then techne becomes the means by which we can reconstruct ourselves in productive ways in the posthumanist classroom.

Investigating Techne

      As Janet Atwill makes clear in *Rhetoric Reclaimed*, the term techne has roots in two

epistemological traditions: the "humanist" liberal arts tradition, as illustrated by Quintilian and

founded in normative conceptions of knowledge and subjectivity; and in what Atwill refers to as

"an older model" of techne understood as art, notably in the rhetoric of Protagorous, Isocrates,

and Aristotle (5). From the very beginning, techne has not been an easy term to define. The early

sophists used techne to describe the knowledge they taught; in 450 BC, Corax and Tisias wrote

technai of rhetoric (arts of rhetoric) that were probably more illustrative than proscriptive or

taxonomical. Protagorous described his instruction as political techne, and Isocrates referred to

his instruction as logon techne, or the art of discourse. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato, while naming the

alphabet, Greek tragedy, and epic poetry as techne, famously condemns rhetoric because it was

not techne. As Martha Nussbaum makes clear in *The Fragility of Goodness*, the term techne was

used in a number of ways in ancient Greek culture, with 'craft,' 'art,' and 'science' being the most

common (94). Nussbaum argues that the ancient Greek word for techne was more inclusive than

any equivalent term in our language, claiming that early in Greek culture techne was associated

with episteme, which is usually translated as knowledge: "In fact, to judge from my own work

and in the consensus of philologists, there is, at least through Plato's time, no systematic or

general distinction between episteme and techne" (94). Nussbaum further argues that: "Even in

some of Aristotle's more important writings on this topic the two terms are used

interchangeably"(94). Although Aristotle ultimately splits techne from episteme in creating his

triad of knowledge in *Nicomachean Ethics* (episteme, techne, and phronesis), Aristotle saw

techne as "productive knowledge" and included within its domain a wide range of arts: medicine,

military strategy, architecture, poetics and rhetoric (Atwill 6). For Aristotle, techne is productive in that it "brings forth":

> Since building is an art [techne] and is essentially a reasoned productive state, and since there is no art that is not a state of this kind, and no state of this kind that is not an art, it follows that art is the same as a productive state that is truly reasoned. Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that is capable either of being or of not being . . . Art . . .operates in the sphere of the variable. [*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a1 23]

In *The Fragility of Goodness*, Nussbaum discusses the complex background of techne in depth because she argues that " recently there has been an attempt to give the demand for a practical techne a much narrower definition" (97). She specifically argues against attempts, most notably seen in the work of Terence Irwin, to conflate techne with "the notion of an external end or product, providing instrumental means to. . . [a] independently specifiable end" (97). As Nussbaum argues, there is not a "single prominent ancient author who speaks of techne only in connection with craft production of a separately specifiable product" (97). Nussbaum proposes a more expansive understanding of ancient techne, arguing that: "The Greeks recognized [this more expansive understanding of techne] from the time of Homer. Achilles did not value his shield simply because it served well the requirements he could have set down antecedently" (98). The end-product (the shield) is not determined solely by the techniques, methods, or procedures that were followed to create it, but also functions as "an example of high-techne just because the craftsman has done so much more than Achilles' untutored imagination could have conceived or requested" (98). There are also examples of technai, Nussbaum argues, that do not have any

identifiable end-product, such as dancing or music. According to Nussbaum, the ancient Greeks did not, as modernists do, equate the processes and procedures of techne merely with the creation of a final product. Janet Atwill confirms Nussbaum's connection between techne and artistic creation, arguing that since Aristotle's understanding of techne as productive knowledge is "always situated in some form of social exchange, art can never be concerned with determinate knowledge or value . . . productive knowledge has no external arbiter, no final judge, but only 'makers' and 'users' who change with every exercise of an art" (176). Atwill also claims that art, or productive knowledge, actually lies at the heart of Aristotle's teleogical perspective, and her book, *Rhetoric Reclaimed,* represents a desire to revise "the scholarly neglect of Aristotle's domain of productive knowledge [as it] bears witness to the power of the philosophical paradigm to obscure alternative, situated standards of knowledge and value" (173; 11). Nussbaum and Atwill's representations of techne, particularly as they both contribute to understandings of Aristotle's productive knowledge, pose serious challenges to definitions of techne that conflate it with technique or method.

Some of the most limiting definitions of techne come from critics who emphasize the way in which the term has been linked to notions of power, mastery, and control in the rhetorical tradition. Roland Barthes describes Aristotle's techne as the "speculative institution of a power to produce what may or may not exist" ("The Old Rhetoric" 48). Michelle Ballif wishes to distance notions of techne from sophistic rhetoric because techne, in her opinion, excludes difference: "Indeed the entire history of rhetoric can be read as the attempt to deal with the problem of the "third man" by codifying language, to ensure rhetoric's Being as a "true technê" (a true art or method) rather than a false one" (59). In *Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle,* Joseph Dunne also comments on the relationships among

techne, mastery, and pedagogy, explaining that: "[t]echne is not itself a useful thing but rather generative source (arche) of useful things, a habitual activity (dunamis) of the maker through which he can reliably produce and reproduce them" (249). A master of a techne is in a position to teach and therefore transmit knowledge to others. According to Dunne's account, techne becomes a "source of the maker's mastery of his trade and of his ability therefore to not only accomplish a successful result but in doing so to give a rational account (logos) of his procedures" (250). The connection between traditional relationships of techne and logos cannot be denied: to use techne is, very often, to engage in logos; indeed, it is this connection between techne and logos that troubles so many postmodern rhetoricians. While it is my argument that our classroom practices cannot be totally devoid of logos, digital techne can also be seen to engage in epos (characteristics of oral literacy such as narrative and figuration), which characterized ancient oral communication and poetry. According to Eric Havelock in *The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present,* the Greeks used different words for two distinct forms of human communication -- epos, which characterized orally preserved forms of speech and poetic tradition, and logos, which referred to "discourse both as spoken and as written . . . and also to the mental operation (the reasoning power) required to produce it . . ." (*The Muse* 113). This new concept of logos eventually formed the foundation of all subsequent Western moral philosophy by giving rise to the concept of the psyche, since "the inscribed language and thought and the person who spoke it became separated from each other, leading to a new focus on the personality of the speaker" (*The Muse* 120).

In order to make claims about the limiting nature of techne, scholars have to provide a limiting definition of techne itself, one that does not account for all the different uses of the term. To equate techne with methodology or instrumentality (particularly in the attempt to create an

end-product) not only refuses acknowledgement of a more expansive understanding of ancient

techne, but, more importantly for our purposes in 2004, also refuses acknowledgement of the

interconnectedness between episteme and technology in current "postmodern" scientific,

theoretical, and rhetorical pursuits.[34] To avoid a limiting comprehension of techne, it is crucial to

consider more fully the complex account of techne that Janet Atwill puts forth in *Rhetoric*

Reclaimed: here, techne concerns "knowledge as production, not product; intervention and

articulation, rather than representation" (7). For Atwill: "a techne is never a representational body

of knowledge; a techne resists identification with a static, normative subject and it marks a

domain of human intervention and invention" (2). Atwill's definition of techne pragmatically

enacts the social context in which rhetoric operates. Atwill relates techne to what she calls "the

ambiguity of the limit" ("Refiguring" 48).[35] She also claims that "a techne aims to create paths in

uncharted territories . . . to help one find one's way in the dark" ("Refiguring" 69). Techne

"bend[s] limits into new paths in order to reach, or better yet, produce, alternative destinations

("Refiguring" 68-69). Techne does not necessarily concern fixed methodologies or procedures;

rather, it involves investigating ambiguities and stretching the limits of prior theories and

applications in order to generate new practices. Thus, our conventional conceptions of techne

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[34] In fact, in "Refiguring Rhetoric as an Art: Aristotle's Concept of Techne*."* Janet Atwill and Janice Lauer claim that conceiving rhetoric as a *techne*--as a productive knowledge that draws on "a suppressed tradition of cunning intelligence" rather than logic--circumvents the theory/practice binary and "ensures that rhetoric could not authorize itself as knowledge for its own sake nor be the instrument of a specific social and political objective" (36, 29). According to Atwill and Lauer, as a *techne*, "rhetoric possesses the capacity not only to distribute social power but to expose its arbitrary nature--to put the terms of cultural authority into question, where they can be challenged by competing social, epistemological, and political standards" (37).

[35] Atwill's notion of the "ambiguity of the limit" is reinforced by Heidegger who argues that a space cannot exist unless there is, first, a site and a site cannot exist without there first being a boundary. "A boundary is not that at which something stops, as the Greeks recognized, a boundary is that from which something begins its presencing."("Building, Dwelling, Thinking" 332). In other words, the boundary, or the marking, always precedes and makes possible, a space. Techne often concerns "testing" and expanding those boundaries. According to N. Katherine Hayles, in "The Condition of Virtuality," the acknowledgement of the boundaries of cyberspace is crucial to posthuman endeavors (92).

and, concomitantly, technology, are expanded in the twenty-first century posthumanist classroom.

As we introduce more "technologies" to the writing classroom, it becomes crucial to seek an understanding of the relations between our conceptions of techne and technology. Although Atwill oversimplifies the etymological connection between techne and technology, merely stating that technology is an "obvious cognate of techne," she persuasively argues that the distinctions between art, craft, and instrumental knowledge that we are accustomed to in modern society were largely "ignored" in ancient conceptions of techne (53). In order to better understand the complicated historical relationship between techne and technology, it is useful to investigate the theories of techne and technology that Martin Heidegger advances in the mid-twentieth century.

Revealing Techne

In "The Question Concerning Technology," Heidegger articulates fascinating claims about the origins of techne and the consequences of technology. First, Heidegger observes two things about the ancient Greek meaning of techne: techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also the arts of the mind and fine arts: "Techne belongs to bringing forth, to poiesis; it is something poetic" (294). Second, Heidegger agrees with Nussbaum's account of the relationship between techne and episteme, claiming that from earliest times until Plato, techne was linked with episteme, with both words concerning knowledge in the widest sense; as Heidegger notes, "To be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it" (294). Heidegger states that such a knowing provides an "Opening up . . . it is revealing" (294). Indeed, for Heidegger, it is the mode of aletheuin (to reveal) which is the

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crucial aspect of techne: "It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another" (295). For Heidegger, it is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is "a bringing forth." Through Heidegger's interpretation of the breadth and richness of ancient conceptions of techne, we can begin to see how throughout much of the history of rhetoric, techne has been wrongly conflated with method.

According to Walter Ong in *Rhetoric, Romance and Technology*, the concept of method actually developed concomitantly with the need to rationalize medical cures and to justify the expansion of pedagogical procedures and curriculum in the Middle Ages (227). Although, interestingly, methods actually began as explanations in the Middle Ages, they later became procedures in Cartesian rationalism. Following Descartes, a method in philosophy is taken as a procedure for arriving logically at truth. As Descartes writes in *Discourse on Method*, what pleases him most about his "method" is that "by means of it I was assured of using reason in everything" (12). Methods are deeply wedded to notions of science and were developed in line with Cartesian rationalism. Unlike method, techne developed long before the Middle Ages, and ancient understandings of the term are free from the problems of Cartesian methodology and reason. For Heidegger, the essence of techne is prior to (and by no means a consequence of) the Scientific Revolution. To conflate techne with method is, therefore, a blindness created in our post-Cartesian world.

Interestingly, however, Heidegger connects the ancient Greek understanding of techne to technology, noting that technikon means that which belongs to techne (294). Heidegger's connection of techne to technology may seem contradictory to those who see Heidegger as critical of technologies; however, Heidegger is not a simple luddite. Significantly, for Heidegger,

it is not the technology itself which is potentially dangerous. As Heidegger argues in "The Question Concerning Technology": "The Threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology; the actual threat has already affected man in his essence" (309). For Heidegger, the "threat" actually occurred with Plato, when thinking became philosophy, when things became objects, and techne as revealing became manufacturing. Hence, it is the bifurcation that Plato enacts between rhetoric and philosophy, between art and techne, which is so problematic. It is at that moment, Heidegger argues, that we became "enframed"-- his term for the way in which we conceal Being, his "God term." This enframing essence concerns Heidegger, not the individual instances of technological apparatus, and his misgivings about the enframing essence of technology develop from his belief that technological thinking imprisons us, encouraging totalizing and fixed ways of looking at *things* rather than allowing *things* to reveal themselves as different and situational. Techne and technology do not, in themselves, create this enframing; rather, enframing occurs through totalizing thinking-- through the type of codification of language that Plato enacts. As R.L. Rutsky argues in *High-techne*: *Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to the Posthuman*, "Thus while enframing stresses setting in place, regulating and securing, [Heidegger's] emphasis on techne is on setting free, on unsecuring, on allowing the world to be 'brought forth' in noninstrumental terms" (7). For Heidegger, the moment of resistance to enframing is always already "within things": by using the metaphor of the earth to explain the profundity of techne, Heidegger clarifies how techne, "like the earth, is inviolable and shatters every attempt to penetrate it" (Coyne, *Designing*, 313). Much like Thomas Kuhn's characterization of anomalies in normal science, Heidegger's impenetrable earth forces a revolution when anomalies occur, and we become aware there is the possibility of a breakdown

in the current "paradigm." For Heidegger, the notions of earth, resistance, anomaly, and

disengagement promote engagement with, in Richard Coyne's words', "to the different, the local,

and the recalcitrant in our current practices" (Coyne 313). According to Heidegger, we do not

need to resist particular technologies, but rather our totalizing belief systems about those

technologies, a resistance that that, I argue, requires a neo-pragmatic approach. [36] To argue that

Heidegger's use of techne allows for nontotalizing thinking may be questioned by critics who

claim that his philosophy led him to be complicit with the National Socialist party in the 1930's.

Indeed, in oversimplified terms, it can be argued that Heidegger's notion of "Being" in "Being

and Time," which characterizes everyday existence, everyday language, and everyday thinking

as inauthentic, emphasizes authentic origins and thus has problematic connections to fascism.

While I will not dispute that Heidegger was a card carrying member of the Nazi regime, what is

important for my discussion here is the way in which his understanding of techne and technology

could be connected to authoritarian tyranny. "The Question Concerning Technology" grew out of

lectures he gave to the Bremen Club in 1949, and was significantly revised for publication under

the current title in 1953. His work on technology from the 1950's onward appears to argue for

nontotalizing thinking; in fact, all of his work after the end of World War II can be seen as a

response to the issues of modernism itself, of which fascism was part and parcel. Indeed,

modernism's understanding of the instrumental function of technology is characteristic not only

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[36] For the most provocative look at the connection between Heidegger's views on technology and fascism, see
Avital Ronell's *The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech*. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989.
Other discussions of Heidegger in this context can be found in: Vitanza, Victor J. *Negation, Subjectivity, and The
History of Rhetoric*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1997; Derrida, Jacques. *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*. Trans.
Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989;Lyotard, Jean-Francois. *Heidegger and
"the jews."* Trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1990; Olafson, Frederick.
Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.

of fascism, but of modernism as a whole, and Heidegger's essay actually seeks to revise the modernist conception of technology as nonartistic and functional. Although I do not see Heidegger as a postmodernist, I do see his analyses of technology as critical of the "modernist" function of technology. In 2004, science and technology are inextricable parts of our culture; and a Heideggerian understanding of technology which emphasizes that science and technology are built upon something that cannot be understood in merely scientific or technological terms, is crucial, I think, to understanding the posthumanist techno-culture in which we exist today.

To argue for a renewed sense of techne that calls upon Heidegger's insights is not simply to argue that traditional understandings of techne limit the domain of rhetoric; many of the conventional "technologies" of rhetoric, as it happens, do not allow for this limiting understanding of techne. For instance, consider one of the most important techne in the canon of style, the tropes and figures, or flowers of rhetoric. The flowers of rhetoric enact "difference" because the dialectical play of the figures reveals the ways in which language is always already unstable, as well as they ways it is connected to the indeterminate and the contingent. As Thomas McLaughlin writes in "Figurative Language," "If figures tell us anything, it's that meaning is up for grabs, that the world can be shaped in an endless variety of forms, that language is a battleground of value systems" (90). Very simply, figures can work as anomalies, creating difference from conventional, or accepted notions, functioning to reveal language as a system with endless "potential weaknesses" (McLaughlin 89). One critical of this understanding of figuration as transgressive, however, might view figures, particularly metaphors, as more static. As McLaughlin concedes, one can define metaphor as involving "a transfer of meaning from the word that properly possesses it to another word," thereby transferring the qualities of one word to another. Thus, metaphor has been seen by many scholars to be totalizing because within the

transfer of meaning, a metaphor becomes a "compressed analogy," asserting, in McLaughlin's words' a "connection on the basis of a deep logic" (84). In this analysis of metaphors, logos and metaphor appear to be deeply connected, which, according to Christy Desmet allows Paul de Man to label metaphors as "paradigmatic" and hierarchical" (Desmet, "Reading,"58). And yet, tropes and figures actually work to break paradigms. For example metonymy, which "accomplishes its transfer of meaning on the basis of associations that develop out of specific contexts rather than from participation in the structure of meaning," is seen to easily demonstrate the contingent nature of language. As Desmet writes in "Reading the Web as Fetish," metonymy . . . is the figure of association; one word, one idea, one sign represents another by virtue of a purely contingent relation between them" (58). Even metaphors, as de Man's analysis ultimately reveals, are always already unstable—they metamorphose into metonymies while metonymies metamorphose into metaphors (Desmet 59). By this analysis, therefore, techne is not a method or technique to control language; uses of technai, such as the figures of speech, actually create places where anomalies occur.

Techne in a Posthumanist Culture

The relevance of Heidegger's discussion of techne in "A Question Concerning Technology" concerns not only the fact that we have "forgotten" the connection between art and technology that ancient techne represented, but that, ultimately, art and technology cannot be separated. At the end of the essay, Heidegger anticipates a "turn" where technologies will begin to undermine the modernist, instrumental conception of technology and techne. In 2004, this "turn" is clearly evident in the technologies of our high-tech culture that embrace their connection to the aesthetic. As R.L. Rutsky argues in *High-techne,* "high-tech, with its emphasis

on issues of representation, style, and design, seems to signal a reemergence of [a] repressed aesthetic aspect within the conception of technology" (4). Indeed, Rutsky argues that technology as "high-tech" can no longer be defined only in terms of its function, "in high-tech, rather, technology becomes much more a matter of representation, of aesthetics, of style" (4). In high-tech, design refuses to be limited by function, with function merely becoming a matter of representation, of "technological reproducibility" (4). High-tech reproduces style; in this sense, the high-tech culture of the web is overwhelmingly epideictic, with, as Rutsky argues, technology emerging into an "aesthetic movement" (5). Of course this "aesthetic movement" could be seen merely in terms of postmodernism, which has been discussed as the phenomenon of mass aestheticization, where aesthetic value assumes predominance over scientific and moral values.[37] As I argue more fully in Chapter Two of this dissertation, techno-culture, as it has emerged in the twenty-first century, expresses the epideictic functions of rhetoric, which, although stylistic and ceremonial, also work to argue for particular (always present-oriented and contextual) ideological values.

More to the point, in 2004 it is no longer possible to divorce scientific and moral values from the aesthetics of digital technologies. This connection between digital aesthetics and ethics can be seen in the work of N. Katherine Hayles. In *How We Became Posthuman,* Hayles articulates the less analyzed, but by no means less significant, pragmatic issues of Cyborg theory: specifically, she argues for the need to underscore the materiality of the Cyborg. For Hayles, the problem of agency and choice cannot be dissolved into a network of endless significations, perpetually mutating and recombining, because this endless multiplicity ignores the concrete material situations of particular human beings in particular spaces and times. Hayles offers her

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[37] See, for instance: Mike Featherstone, *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991.

book as an intervention at "a critical juncture when interventions might be made to keep

disembodiment from being rewritten, once again, into prevailing concepts of subjectivity" (5).

Hayles seeks to bring materiality, specifically conditions of space and ethics, into the

posthumanist discussion:

> If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their
>
> bodies as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is
>
> a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information
>
> technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and
>
> disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a
>
> condition of human being, and that understands human life as embedded
>
> in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our
>
> continued survival. (5)[38]

For Hayles, it is important to remember that the recurrent argument that computer media are

"disembodying technologies" actually constitutes only a historical construction, one that, in her

opinion, refuses analyses of actual uses and interactions with computers. According to Hayles,

the argument that the computer comprises a disembodying technology is, "almost never used by

the people who are engaged in developing the technologies, for they cannot afford to ignore the

materiality of the interfaces they create" ("Condition" 93-94). Thus, much of Hayles's work

emphasizes the spatiality of cyberspace, analyzing, for example, proprioception, or "the sense

that tells us where the boundaries of our bodies are" ("Condition" 88). According to Hayles, "

Proprioceptive coherence in interplay with electronic prostheses plays an important role in

reconfiguring perceived body boundaries, especially when it gives the user the impression that

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[38]Victoria Vesna's site, n0time, discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation, represents a particularly tangible enactment of Hayles's posthumanism.

her subjectivity is flowing into the space of the screen" (92). In appropriating Hayles's argument for the composition classroom, I argue that by pragmatically analyzing the proprioceptive occurrences created by techne in our digital writing pedagogies, we can ground our theories in the materiality of the classroom. It is through analyzing the boundaries that techne constructs and deconstructs through digital technologies that we can create more purposeful pedagogies for the posthuman classroom than postmodern theory has done. In turn, since high-tech applications can create much excitement in composition classrooms, a neo-pragmatic approach that seeks to explore techne "as revealing" can be seen to refuse the utopian views of technology that have been evident in postmodern composition theories in the past decade.

Refusing Technoromanticism

Another benefit for the field of rhetoric and composition that can be gleaned from Heidegger's insights about techne and technology comes from the way in which his conception of techne helps us to avoid the ubiquitous utopian narratives that seem to surround discussions of the use of emerging technologies in the composition classroom, a phenomenon occurring throughout our culture that Richard Coyne calls, technoromanticism. In *Technoromanticism*, Coyne writes that we need to be critical of narratives of digital utopias: "Digital narratives, as narratives of progress, commonly take the form of extravagant predictions of unlikely outcomes"(19). Indeed, in the past fifteen years, the field of composition has been overwhelmed with utopian narratives about the ways in which computer technologies may improve students' writing processes and our own pedagogical practices.

As early as 1990 Barker and Kemp write that electronic conversation is "enfranchising, open, and egalitarian in emphasis" (23). In 1993, Lester Faigley writes that online writing

classrooms are "a means of liberation, particularly for those marginalized in American classrooms" (291). In a 1998 article entitled "From a High-Tech to a Low-Tech Writing Classroom: You Can't Go Home Again," Charles Moran describes how radically different a traditional classroom is from a networked classroom. Moran describes his networked classroom as a less "Authorized" space:

> With the advent of networking, our computer-equipped classrooms had become for me and others "constructivist" classrooms, spaces in which students work, usually in groups, on tasks: responding to other's writing, editing and publishing bi- or tri- weekly class anthologies, working with community organizations on writing tasks and reviewing and organizing their own writing portfolios. In these classrooms the teacher is responsible for structuring the students' writing activities, but generally the teacher is not in the center of these activities. During class, the teacher chiefly circulates, helping student teams accomplish the tasks that have been assigned. By, and large, in these classrooms students go about their work independently. They do not steadily look to the teacher for direction. (10)

In keeping with the way computer technologies have been seen to decenter the writing classroom, utopian narratives of the potential uses of computer technologies often focus on the theoretical possibilities of hypertexual writing.

In 1992 's *Hypertext,* George Landow states that hyperext implements Derrida's call for a new form of hieroglyphic writing "that avoids the problems implicit and inevitable in Western writing systems and their print versions" (43). Viewed as an interactive text, hypertext, according to Landow, creates spaces where readers and writers can work together to collaborate on research or writing assignments. Hypertext is also reputed to encourage students to write in a

non-linear fashion. As Anne and Mike DiPardo write in "Towards the Metapersonal Essay: Exploring the Potential of Hypertext in the Composition Class":

> Nonlinearity might allow a closer match between writer's thoughts and
>
> their written words by supporting a recursive looping back and forth among
>
> multiple possibilities and among multiple aspects of an issue, including private
>
> and public dimensions, and both personal story and abstracted exposition (10).

Many composition scholars state that hypertext may aid students in the exploration and discovery processes of writing. DiPardo and DiPardo note that while this nonlinear thinking may be difficult for students at first, hypertext can help them to begin "to grasp the challenge of using writing as a way of making connections with others" (10). According to Landow, hypertext assignments can also encourage critical thinking skills, allow students to shape and control major portions of what they read, and provide a way of quickly exploring a body of scholarship or field of knowledge.

Proponents of hypertext, such as Landow, also state that hypertext can encourage participation by students who are uncomfortable with in-class discussions or debates: "Hypertext produces an additional form of discussion and a new means of contributing to class discussions," acting as a "permissive technology" that allows students to contribute to the activity of class (227-228). Many composition instructors believe that as hypertext shifts the boundaries between one text and another, as well as between the reader and the writer, it also shifts the boundaries between teachers and students. As Carolyn Handa observes, in a review, "hypertext proponents often claim hypertext liberates students from control, linearity and artificial academic divisions-- thus, by extension, it emancipates and empowers oppressed groups in society" (81). One type of hypertextual virtual community that has been hailed as a way to enhance the writing classroom is

a MOO. In "At Home in the MUD," Eric Crump writes that MOOs are the future of writing.

MOOs are:

> A new dimension. A new world to inhabit. A new world written into existence
> using familiar words. MOOing is living with writers, living in writing, a whole new
> kind of thing. Writing centers become residual artifacts of print culture and give way
> to virtual writing environments, the space for living, conversing writers (178).

For many composition instructors interested in creating a postmodern classroom, active

participation and creativity with language make MOOs appealing-- they require that students

actively work together to create a text-based virtual world. As Beth Kolko writes in "Bodies in

Place: Real Politics, Real Pedagogy, and Virtual Space," "learning to read the gap between the

articulated, traveling, virtual self and the placed, familiar, physical self holds the key to

envisioning the political possibilities of online worlds" (254). Hence, the very assumptions that

we bring to understandings of the self can be called into question with MOO technology. As

Kolko writes, "the fact remains that sooner or later participants in a text-based virtual world

come to recognize that their sense of self, of identity, is slippery" (254). And yet, as promising as

such assertions appear to be, we need to look at the root of these claims.

Remarkably, these types of utopian narratives, as radical and postmodern as many of

them attempt to be, actually enact a type of Enlightenment rhetoric of progress. As Richard

Coyne observes, "the narratives of virtual communities . . . seem to depend more on what is soon

to be accomplished than on what is now possible" (*Technoromanticism*, 10). To be sure, these

types of utopian narratives are not limited to the field of rhetoric and composition, but are

evident throughout our culture's depiction of computer technologies. For example, Michael

Sullivan-Trainor writes in 1994's *Detour: The Truth about the Information Superhighway*:

Technology today is taking the form of the information superhighway, a concept

with the goal of exchanging ideas, information and commerce. The vision of this

technology is no less than easy access for anyone, anywhere. Nearly unlimited

business opportunities will be opened for the average person. (xi)

Obviously in 2004, we understand the ways in which the information superhighway has proved

not to be accessible to all. This type of rhetoric on technology reveals the ways in which our

much thinking about computer technologies has developed within Cartesian narratives.

Since much of the rhetoric that surrounds emerging digital technologies echoes romantic

utopian narratives, they would, at first glance, appear to resist Enlightenment rationalism. Yet, as

Coyne notes, while "romanticism is the Enlightenment movement that reacted against the

rationalism of the day, romanticism was not against science but rather science as reduction" (29)

According to Coyne, "Romanticism actually gave science its momentum, promoting the concept

of nature and the reverence for it that features prominently in popular science writing and digital

utopias" (29). Consider the major blockbuster of science fiction cinema, *The Matrix*, in which the

city of the future is seen as fluid (feminine), as one in which technology has gotten out of control

and needs to be mastered by Neo, or The One. In a more interesting example, the original version

of *Blade Runner* imagines a city of the future figured as an uncontrollable, dense, landscape, in

which the male protagonist Deckard finds himself to be "the other" he was seeking to capture

and control. In this film, the memories of the mutants have been manufactured, with their self-

knowledge arising only from reproduced images. They are able, however, to escape the

limitations of their memories when they acknowledge that they are manufactured, a limiting but

still remarkable kind of freedom from mastery. This "freedom" however is enmeshed within the

mutants' production: in cybernetic terms, they are "autopoetic machines" in that they realize their

production but still remain confined within the system that created them.[39] The movie studio that released *Blade Runner*, however, required the director to change his original ending, with any reference to Deckard as mutant removed.[40] In the revised studio version, the film ends in a snow-filled natural landscape that holds out the promise that Deckard will become a "master" of the mutant technology. The highly popular romantic narratives of *The Matrix* and the studio version of *Blade Runner* do not resist Enlightenment notions of scientific progress; they actually serve to articulate discourses that reinforce the foundations upon which Cartesianism exists, where scientific progress reveals itself as one which seeks to master and control that which is other, figured in these narratives as women, minorities, or technology out of the master's control. The first version of *Blade Runner*, while it articulates the tension between technology and control that Cartesian discourses enforce, also represents the "posthuman" possibility for navigating techno-culture by interacting with it-- in other words by immersing oneself with techne. A high-tech culture requires that we use the processes and procedures of technology to move through the posthumanist landscape (like Deckard we have no choice—we are all to some extent productions of technology); thus, a neo-pragmatic view of techne, I argue, requires that we acknowledge our immersion in techne and seek to find ways to navigate the network in which we find ourselves. As R.L Rutsky argues:

> The position of human beings in relation to this techno-cultural unconscious
> cannot, therefore, be that of the analyst (or theorist) who, standing outside this

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[39] In their 1979 book *Autopoiesis and Cognition*, cyberneticists Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela coin the phrase "autopoietic machines" to describe the process of mechanised autoproduction. In cybernetics, the term autopoietic refers to machines organized as a network of processes of production, transformation, and destruction, a network that creates elements that transform and regenerate which then, like the mutants in *Blade Runner*, "realize" the network or processes that produced them. At the same time these elements that constitute autopoietic machines generate "recursively," supporting the network of processes by which they are produced.

[40] It is interesting to note that the studio's reluctance to release the first version was based on the "artistic" representation of Deckard's memories as flashes of images, which were disconnected from the basic narrative of the film.

space, presumes to know or control it. It must instead be a relation of connection

to, of interaction with, that which has been seen as other, including the unsettling

processes of techno-culture itself. (21)

The posthumanist situation requires a neo-pragmatic approach that seeks to acknowledge its

position inside the realm of techne. In fact, what may truly be unsettling to some postmodern

theorists is the extent to which we must interact and apply techne in the posthuman world.

It is my argument that postmodern pedagogies have often fallen victim to the allures of

technoromaticism precisely because they have failed to address techne. The actual uses of

postmodern theories in online classrooms have proved to be problematic; one needs only to

remember the cyber-rape in Lambda Moo or the possibilities of chat room outings to realize that

the practical uses of such a postmodern pedagogy are not simple. For example, Sherry Turkle

affirms that in playing networked computer games one can assume various identities. For Turkle,

in online performances "the self is not only decentered but multiplied without limit, and in such

role games we "encounter slippages" (185). And yet, she also acknowledges that these slippages

do not necessarily produce sites of "radical disjunction, discontinuity, contradiction,

incommensurability, and schizophrenia" but are actually places where persona and self emerge

(*Life on the Screen* 185). As I will show in Chapter Three of this dissertation, these personae are

not necessarily radical or resistant to normalizing systems or ways of thinking; in many ways

online personae exacerbate conventional stereotypes and classifications. Recognition and

evaluation of these occurrences can be made only through a neo-pragmatic analysis of the

processes and procedures that create or dismantle these moments of self-production, an analysis

that does not resort to utopian narratives that offer few resources for analyzing the broad

constellation of actual chat room practices.

Constellations of Practice

Since in contrast to rationalist, empiricist, and romantic conceptions of computing, a neo-pragmatic view allows composition instructors to use technology without romanticizing it, a neo-pragmatic approach can begin with the presupposition that computers and their accompanying technological systems are elements within "constellations of practice." Designing, configuring, coding, distributing, using, teaching, and even writing about computers constitute a complicated praxis. Although the term praxis may seem outmoded to some twenty-first century postmodern scholars, critical theorist Theodor Adorno developed a notion of praxis as a "constellation" which can be helpful for neo-pragmatic analyses in the twenty-first century. According to Martin Jay in *Adorno*, Adorno sees praxis as a "constellation" of juxtaposed and changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle (14-15). In the context of composition studies, the constellation of activities includes our practices as scholars, instructors, technologists, and administrators. Adorno recognizes that there is a "force field" of relational and diverse elements that constitute "the dynamic, transmutational structure of a complex phenomenon" such as what occurs in a writing classroom (Jay 14-15). Richard Coyne also sees this type of interrelationship, what he calls "dependencies," in the ways technologies (and our uses of technologies) are interrelated:

> Technologies are connected to each other. Items of technological equipment form
> parts of complex technological systems that involve different kinds of
> dependencies. Some dependencies are physical, such as the dependence of
> computer systems on the electricity grid and the telephone system. Some
> dependencies are metaphoric—computer aided design (CAD) systems are related
> to manual drawing tools, multimedia is related to film and video, aspects of e-

mail are metaphorically related to telex and CB radio, etc. Also there are

institutional dependencies through industries' systems of distribution, regulations,

training and education systems. Other dependencies are local—computer requires

the printer, etc. (304)

These technological constellations are entangled within the complex constellation of praxis and a

new technology has the potential to disturb the current constellation; hence, as Coyne notes,

echoing Heidegger, "new technologies reveal aspects of our practices" to us (*Designing* 305).

Therefore, by analyzing the use of emerging computer technologies in the classroom, we find

ourselves discerning multiple and often conflicting constellations of practice-- constellations that

serve to ground our work in the realization that our uses of technology always occur in a social

context.

The neo-pragmatic approach emphasizes the importance of everyday activities and

recognizes that we are always socially situated; it does not allow us to forget, in Gunther Kress's

words, that "technology is socially applied knowledge" (114). As Robert Johnson argues in

User-Centered Technology: A Rhetorical Theory for Computers and Other Mundane Artifacts,

"The ancient Greeks considered technology an art whose end resided in the use rather than

design or manufacturing of the product, with users' special knowledge being privileged within

this epistemological perspective" (24). Johnson's use of techne, what he considers the "the root of

the modern term technology" allows him, like Atwill, to redefine user-practice as "a generative

source of knowledge" and connect this user-centered approach with a conceptualization of the

world as mutable, uncertain, and constantly coming into being (24; 52). Within this rubric, users

consciously and actively engage in the rhetorical construction of new, undetermined,

technologies. Johnson's radical refiguration also envisions users as the manipulators and producers of knowledge and technologies in a complex constellation.

The Ethics of Techne

Thus, if techne is not a universal body of knowledge, if instead it comprises knowledge as production, what specifically constitutes techne in a writing class? Indeed, composition pedagogy has attempted to systemize rhetoric in order to teach it. The goal, then, becomes finding ways of bringing techne into play in a composition class without systematizing the writing process. As twenty-first century pedagogues, we are obligated to reconceive techne in ways that does not conflate it with mere technique. Technique, unlike techne, is the "application of the law of principle in order" to achieve certain results (*OED*). To teach technique would be to tell students that learning writing is about acquiring a certain skill in order to create a specific product. Techne, on the other hand, as Atwill, Heidegger, Rutksy, and Johnson use it, not only teaches students how to read and write in practical ways, but *reveals* to them how different social agents write and are written by culture, how meaning is constructed, how different languages and discourses are connected to different histories, locations, and experiences. Techne locates writing within a constellation of practices.

Cynthia Haynes analyzes the relationship between techne, technology, logos, and teaching in "Virtual Diffusion: Ethics, Techne, and Feminism at the End of the Cold Millennium," arguing that techne has been both a poison and a remedy, and concomitantly, technology is also both threat and ally (338). As Haynes reveals, the links between technology and techne and techne and logos have shaped the ways in which we see and interact with the world. According to Haynes, because a fear of technology (and of technology's connection to

logos, for example) often leads educators to use techne uncritically, it is important that we establish "responsive relation" to it (338). In order to accomplish this, Haynes offers a potential new relationship between techne, ethos, and feminist teaching to replace the techne/logos binary (339). For Haynes, the way to get beyond the techne/logos binary includes "practicing safe rhetoric": a rhetoric that is inclusionary, understanding, analytical, and looks "to literally stand under something in order to speak about it, or against it or with it . . . to question without being cynical, to look for answers without creating new problems . . . to include rather than exclude, to act rather than react" (342).[41] It also includes evaluating the impacts of technologies and protecting freedom, at the same time as protecting individuals and collectives within our classrooms (342). Consequently, ethics and techne are inextricably linked-- our networked classrooms are seen already to be bound with notions of ethos and ethics; therefore, in order to get past the techne/logos binary, we need also to take on another problem for postmodern scholars: ethos.

Postmodern Ethos?

To speak of ethos in the twenty-first century may seem disingenuous to some rhetorical scholars who feel that that postmodernism is "the age after ethos," where the notion of the sovereign individual is deconstructed.[42] Interestingly, however, the *OED* defines ethos as: "The characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment, of a people or community; the `genius' of an institution or system." Ethos at its core, therefore, concerns not the sovereign individual but the collective, the communal. Although we can only approach ethos through paradoxes (ethos as a practice finds its place in a number of contradictory constellations), it is crucial to remember that

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[41] For Haynes, to practice safe rhetoric "means to look at something from a number of perspectives, to analyze our culture in terms of how discourse shapes culture, shapes material and social conditions, and shapes attitudes" (342).

[42] See Victor Vitanza in "Concerning a Postclassical Ethos."

ethos has a profound connection to the body politic: it is at one and the same time the individual and the collective. Significantly, the type of definition of ethos that has had a stranglehold on the rhetorical tradition, the one that postmodernists deconstruct, is not constructed rhetorically, but philosophically. As Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds remind us in "The Splitting Image," "Platonic metaphysics splits the representation of 'self' in the speech away from the real self with access to a source of Truth and Good beyond the polis" (40). Hence, some may argue that ethic and ethos are also divided. And yet, the ethical dimension of ethos was always a crucial facet in ancient Greece. According to Foucault in an interview shortly before his death, in ancient Greece,

> Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject's mode of
> being and a certain manner of acting visible to others. One's ethos was seen by his
> dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc.
> For them, this is the concrete expression of liberty. That is the way they
> "problematized' their freedom. The man who had good ethos, who can be
> admitted and held up as an example, he is a person who practices freedom in a
> certain manner . . . Ethos implies also a relation with others to the extent that care
> for self renders one competent to occupy a place in the city, in the community or
> in interindividual relationships which are proper-whether it be to exercise a
> magistry or to have friendly relationships. (*Final Foucault* 7)

Ethos, therefore, concerns both the personal and the social/political. It concerns appearance and performance, and is situated within a network of social relationships. Notably, the techne of the long-neglected canon of memory can offer us ways to more fully understand the connection between ethos and ethics in the communal sphere.

Ethos and Memory

Through a revaluation of a "dark" corner of the rhetorical tradition, we can revise our current understandings of techne and ethos. In ancient Greece, moral ethos was thought to arise from memory, experience, and habit; thus, ethos is created within a social context. In his *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states that ethical excellence, or "character" results from habituation or repetition. "Habitus," built-up by the repetition of particular emotional responses or acts performed in the past and remembered, creates the same response in the future. Vices and virtues are habitual dispositions, with the individual becoming a "moral organism" akin to and embodied in the physical organism. And yet, this "individual organism" is not one, but many. According to Mary Carruthers in *The Book of Memory*, ethos, created through memory, is communal and individual at one and the same time:

> Experience is made from many repeated memories, which in turn are permanent vestiges of sense perceptions. Thus [a] sense perception {aisthesos} gives rise to a memory as we hold it; and repeated memories of the same thing give rise to experience; because through memories, though numerically many, constitute a single experience. And experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the soul—the One that corresponds to the Many. (68)

Significantly, techne is created through the same process as ethical composition; as Carruthers notes, "Experience-- memories generalized and judged-- gives rise to all knowledge, art, science, and ethical judgment" (69). Techne and ethics, then, have been historically linked and, as I analyze in Chapter Two of this dissertation, " Figuring "in" Rhetorical Techne: Memory, Delivery, and the Ethos of Cyberspace" revised understandings of the connections among techne, ethos, and ethics have crucial implications for our postmodern classrooms.

Pedagogical uses of the techne of memory can reveal the ways the communal nature of ethos constructs the ethical situations that occur in writing and the writing classroom. As Carruthers notes,

> It seems to me that the basic notion of a memory place as a commonplace into which one gathers a variety of material is essential to understanding how the process of ethical valorizing occurs. In considering what is the ethical nature of reading, one could do much worse than to start with Gregory the Great's comment, that what we see in a text is not rules for what we ought to be, but images of what we are, "our own beauty and ugliness." It is this which enables us to make these texts our own. (181)

For Carruthers, we read rhetorically, with memory making our reading into our own ethical equipment, expressing our ethos in rhetorical situations which we ourselves create from our "remembered" experience, and which we design to valorize our work to others (182). Hence, according to Carruthers, "Ethics is inseparable from the copiousness of the text itself and its effect upon the memoria of its audiences and witnesses" (183). Memory and authority are inextricably linked for, as Carruthers argues, there are two distinct stages in the creation of an authority, the first being the individual process of "authoring" and the second being the "matter of authorizing" which Carruthers remarks is a "social and communal activity" (189). Authorizing occurs first in the realm of the individual's memory and second in the domain of the "public memory" (189). Importantly, the social context of memory functions allow for ethics. As Albertus Magnus wrote, "memory has two functions, that is, it is a condition for what we know rationally and a condition for making ethical judgments" (qtd in Carruthers, *Book* 269).[43]

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[43] Mary Carruthers provides the text of Albertus Magnus's *De bono, Tractus IV, Quaestio II "De Partibus Prudentia"* in Appendix B of *The Book of Memory (267-289).*

Consequently, when we think of ethos not simply as one's character, person, or individual authority or status, we begin to see how ethos concerns collective decisions about how we make value assertions and how we justify them in the public realm. While some postmodern scholars may feel that the authorizing that occurs through memory operations enforces cultural codes of exclusion and power, the delivery mediums of the twenty-first century require self-conscious and deliberate uses of the techne to create ethical appeals.

Ethos and Delivery

Although some postmodern rhetoricians seek to do away with classical notions of ethos, it is precisely those ancient understandings of ethos that can help us in the twenty-first century to understand the ways in which credibility and ethics interconnect through the delivery mediums of the postmodern classroom. In Teresa Enos and Shane Borrowman's "Authority and Credibility: Classical Rhetoric, the Internet and the Teaching of Techno-Ethos," the authors claim:

> Because the internet is a virtual agora in which any rhetor with a small amount of
> technological know-how and in possession of minimal hardware can make her or
> his voice heard, our preoccupation with this new technology turns, very naturally,
> to questions of credibility and authority-to classical notions of ethos. (93)

As most composition instructors are well aware, there are dilemmas for readers and writers that exist in online environments that do not occur in print. For example, sources on the Internet are not static-- the text can change or cease to exist at any time. Online writing can also exist without an identifiable author or the without any markers of authority or credibility (degrees, professional information, affiliations, etc). Because of the plethora of sources (both credible and not) on the

WWW, students are faced with increased ability to plagiarize, which further deconstructs print notions of intellectual property and authorship. Students who read and write for the WWW must therefore navigate (or create) ethical situations that are always already constructed in the public realm-- in the memories of networked computers throughout the world, where according to Enos and Brown, "traditional notions of authorship and ethos are challenged" (95).

In the carnival atmosphere that makes up the WWW, ethos (reflecting its etymological connection to ethea, the greek word for "haunts" or "hangs out") is virtual; online ethos is a ghost-like shape shifter, one who moves without boundaries and adapts its form to a myriad of rhetorical mediums and contexts. And yet, this virtual ethos is always bound up with the ethical contexts and considerations that a world-wide public forum (however carnivalesque) creates, a posthuman ethos. If the WWW can be seen as endless pathways of dialogue, having our students read and write online allows them to participate in a colossal posthuman variation of dissoi logi, a process that is always concerned with ethical contexts and judgments. Significantly, in my view, this virtual posthuman ethos remains always already connected to ethical contexts; the media of digital literacy allow students to spaces for a critical engagement with public discourse and a position in ongoing public conversation, one which affects how they view themselves, their efficacy, and the world with which they interact.

Conclusion

Composition involves learning the ability to navigate shifting and multiple discursive strategies; significantly, I argue, the ability to navigate these strategies begins with techne. By using techne, students can articulate and frame their various and multiple situations as writers, situations that are always already bound with an ethics of obligation. The ethics of obligation is a

phrase made famous by Jean-Francois Lyotard in his text with Jean-Loup Thebaud, 1979's *Just Gaming*. Interestingly, Lyotard derives his understanding of obligation from narrative pragmatics:

> Someone speaks to me; he places me under an obligation . . .What kind of
> obligation? The obligation to retell. But not necessarily to my teller. I am not
> obligated to give it back to him, no, that is not it; but I am obligated in the way of
> a relay that may not keep its charge but must pass it on. (31)

Hence, obligation forms a crucial aspect of language; it forces one to ask: "What does language want of me?" (38) Obligation "focuses on the receiver, on the priority of the listener and is thus social and political, not merely personal" (37). Lyotard's ethics of obligation involves a responsibility to listen and to pass on "the specific dynamics of an exchange" between speaker and listener, a process that demands that the listener be active (37). While I am necessarily simplifying Lyotard's argument and appropriating it for my own more practical purposes, my use of it reveals the importance of the type of neo-pragmatic analyses I am advocating throughout this dissertation. In emphasizing the obligation to learn (listen) and transmit (pass it on) the specific dynamics (techne) of an exchange (the text), Lyotard's ethics of obligation constitutes a useful contract for teachers and students. An ethics of obligation for the classroom would entail composition teachers' attention to the actual practices their students engage in when participating in the discourses that form our classrooms, connecting both students and teachers in constellation of ethical practices.

Teachers and students are bound within this "ethics of obligation" to write and speak to the discourses which surround them. A successful pedagogy for our techno-culture would be one that focuses on teaching students the processes for intervention and articulation which help them

to become self-conscious participants in the multiple and diverse conversations which construct

their lives. For this reason, techne becomes the means by which we can redefine the field of

rhetoric for the twenty-first century in constructive and purposeful ways. In our high-tech

culture, techne does not reinforce technology as instrument or method, but concerns an artistic

revealing, one which foregrounds the epideictic in composing. If we define techne, following

Heidegger, "as revealing," techne works to reveal what has been suppressed, to expose what has

been hidden. Our high-tech culture involves aspects that, following Heidegger, undermine the

modern conception of technology. As R.L. Rutsky argues, the "noninstrumental" aspects of

contemporary technology reveal the way Heidegger's essence of technology is linked to art and

aesthetics (105). Our high-tech techno-culture has at its core a concern with style that refuses the

bifurcation of form and function (Rutsky 5). Since as Peter Lunenfield argues in "Unfinished

Business," "virtual space blurs the distinction between form and use," digital technologies do not

allow for an instrumental conception of techne or technology (11). Further, the emergence of the

techne of the canons of memory and delivery in digital environments reinforce the posthumanist

connection between technology and epistemology in the twenty-first century, revealing how we

are immersed, in Katherine Hayles's words, in a world of "distributed cognition" (*How We

Became Posthuman* ix). This "distributed cognition" reinforces applications of digital

technologies which merge the operations of memory and delivery as they fuse form and function.

It is my argument that the merging of form and function in high-tech applications

(evidenced, I will show in the next three chapters of this dissertation, in web-sites such as

Victoria Vesna's *nOtime*, in the linguistic performances in chat rooms, or through <emma>'s

displays) utilize telematic memory: in short, memory in our posthumanist techno culture focuses

on how the data stored in the space of the computer's memory is recalled and delivered on the

screen. Just like ancient mnemonic techniques, the memory of the computer is always mediated

by the processes of delivery. The information "screened" is always fractional and able to be

reprocessed and reproduced in any manner of forms or displays. The techne of telematic memory

(the processes and procedures of recalling and screening data) call upon processes and

procedures that can be seen to reintroduce the canons of memory and delivery. By emphasizing

the uses of telematic memory that digital technologies create, twenty-first century composition

instructors can utilize the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to create specific,

purposeful pedagogies in their classrooms. The following three chapters will investigate the

usefulness of the techne of memory and delivery in creating ethical appeals, arguing that the

techno-culture of the WWW reinforces their use in the twenty-first century and makes

applications that draw on telematic memory crucial to contemporary composition pedagogies.

Thus, the teaching of writing in the twenty-first century is not, finally, an impossible endeavor,

but one that is immersed in both the demarcations and transgressions of techne in posthuman

culture.

CHAPTER TWO

FIGURING "IN" RHETORICAL TECHNE: MEMORY, DELIVERY AND THE ETHOS OF

CYBERSPACE

> The anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time. --Michel Foucault, 1969

> Let us trespass at once. Literature is no one's private ground; literature is common ground. It is not cut up into nations; there are no wars there. Let us trespass freely and fearlessly and find our own way ourselves. It is thus that English literature will survive this war and cross the gulf—if commoners and outsiders like ourselves make that country our country, if we teach ourselves how to read and to write, how to preserve, and how to create. --Virginia Woolf, 1940

If the anxiety of contemporary society is manifested, as Foucault argues, not in time, but in space, then the spaces of our arguments are places where rhetorical technai can reveal intense ideological struggles. Although writing nearly forty years before Foucault, in "The Leaning Tower" Virginia Woolf also recognized the significance of spatial politics, paradoxically arguing that artists can create "a common ground" by trespassing on excluded spaces.[44] Throughout her career as an essayist, Woolf brilliantly utilizes the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to create ethical appeals that, while at first seeming distant and impersonal, actually create powerful epideictic arguments to improve the place of women in her society. By constructing a feminist position through sophisticated epideictic arguments, Woolf creates an ethos that escapes the type of reductionary criticism often made about more didactic political positions. The success of Woolf's essays often lies in her ability to use the rhetorical processes associated with the canons of memory and delivery to emphasize community without sacrificing individual artistry.

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[44] "The Leaning Tower" grew out of public addresses Woolf gave at the Women's Institute in Brighton and to the WEA in the spring of 1940.

Throughout the classical, medieval, and Renaissance rhetorical traditions, the techne of the canons of memory and delivery were also often used to create communal knowledge, locating that knowledge- production within the use of various techniques and procedures, most often related to the construction of ethos. Since the 18th century, however, the field of rhetoric has largely ignored the canons of memory and delivery. In what has become a standard explanation for their demise, Edward Corbett in *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, hardly gives the two canons more than a paragraph, stating that because rhetoric has come to be "concerned mainly with written discourse," both memory and delivery are inconsequential to the rhetoric student of the twentieth century (38-39). As Woolf's essays reveal, however, the canons of memory and delivery have actually remained vital to print-based constructions of ethos. In fact, the rise of written discourse was not the crucial factor determining the status of memory and delivery in the rhetorical traditions of the twentiethcentury. As Sharon Crowley has argued, memory and delivery have constituted a troubling axis for enlightenment and modernist rhetorics because they invoke an understanding of rhetoric that works against the notions of the privatized individual and his/her relation to knowledge.[45] Writers such as Virginia Woolf who have refused to adhere to the limiting enlightenment/ modernist understandings of the individual's relationship to knowledge, frequently articulate arguments that call upon the more classical uses of the canons of memory and delivery. In the twenty-first century, these types of ethical articulations can now be located within a matrix of digital technologies that refuse the limiting conceptions of knowledge derived from Cartesian ideology.

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[45]."From Campbell's day forward, modern rhetoricians substituted something they called "experience" for communal memory. This curious entity was presumed to be constituted by an individual's sensory relation to the physical world. Modern rhetoricians simply forgot or neglected the roles played by ideology, communal tradition, and memory in forming a self. This forgetfulness of common knowledge led in turn to the privatization of invention, because its results were thought to be solely the product of "individual experience."("Modern Rhetoric" 39).

A key way in which the canons of memory and delivery are being reborn in twenty-first century rhetoric is through the development of spatial arguments in digital contexts. Since, as I will argue in this chapter, the occasion for argumentation on the web is overwhelmingly epideictic, the techne of digital rhetoric not only reinforces certain rhetorical figures, such as mimesis and amplification, but also enacts the ceremonial aspect of ethos, one that is deeply wedded with the operations of the canons of memory and delivery. Just as Woolf uses the epideictic to create sophisticated ethical appeals, the arguments of the WWW are not merely stylistic or ceremonial: cyberspace is often a place where intense ideological struggles can be seen. Thus, even in the twenty-first century, rhetorical analyses cannot escape ethical obligations: the analysis of spatial technai on the WWW necessitates an understanding of the spatial politics that Woolf and Foucault articulate and that can also be seen in the feminist analyses of situated knowledges that I discuss throughout this dissertation. As we utilize the telematic memory that the WWW engenders, we recover the techne of the ancient canons of memory and delivery and open up the possibilities for analyzing the performance of ideological struggle in the twenty-first century.

This chapter provides an historical analysis of the canons of memory and delivery and argues that the techne of these canons construct sophisticated ways of creating, storing, and communicating knowledge. This also chapter connects the uses of key aspects of the canons of memory and delivery, specifically imagery and spatialization, to the formation of ethical appeals in a digital techno-culture. Further, it is my argument that the canons of memory and delivery can be used to create powerful epideictic texts that are particularly fitting for arguments delivered in cyberspace. The first part of the chapter outlines the major developments of the canons of memory and delivery in the rhetorical tradition. In the second part of the chapter, using

Virginia Woolf's *A Room of One's Own*, I illustrate the ways in which the canons of memory and delivery can be used to create ethical appeals, showing how a feminist politics of location is intertwined with Woolf's epideictic rhetoric. The third part of the chapter discusses new modes of memory and delivery in digital culture and emphasizes the constructions of ethical appeals utilizing what can be learned from ancient techne. Although the telematic memory of the WWW renews many of the rhetorical processes developed in the classical canons of memory and delivery, I also discuss how the WWW unites the canons of memory and delivery in exciting new ways. As I argued in Chapter One, this dissertation focuses on the way techne reveals our, often hidden, ideological practices. At its core, this chapter seeks to provide a foundation for analysis of the ways the techne of the canons of memory and delivery can provide a useful framework for investigating the relationship between theory and practice in the techno-culture spaces of the twenty-first century classroom.

Memory

In *The Book of Memory*, Mary Carruthers reminds us that while contemporary culture awards the highest creative value to the imagination, ancient scholars attributed the greatest creative powers to those with the most superior memories. In fact, ancient rhetors would not understand a definition of intelligence that did not include a superior memory. [46] As Carruthers observes, "in their understanding of the matter, it was memory that made knowledge into useful experience, and memory that combined these pieces of information-become-experience into what we call 'ideas,' what they were more likely to call judgments" (*Book* 3). In the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium,* the most detailed source of ancient artificial memory techniques, memory is of two types: natural and artificial. Natural memory is spontaneous and occurs simultaneously with

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[46] Mneme was first added to rhetorical textbooks by the Stoics (Carruthers *Craft* 9).

thought, while artificial memory is gained through disciplined training. For ancient rhetors, artificial memory training employed the use of locations and images, commonly referred to as the loci method. The loci were usually analogous to real places, such as rooms in a house. A speech could be built as a house, with different rooms symbolizing different parts of the speech. When delivered, the orator recalled the speech by mentally moving from room to room of the house. Vivid images were placed after every fifth locus, possibly so that the organization of the speech could be traced on the fingers (Sadoski and Paivio 13).

Many ancient orators attribute the development of the loci method to Simonides (556-468 B.C.). In *De Oratore*, Cicero recounts the now-famous story of Simonides and marks it as the origin of the loci method. One night after Simonides gave a speech at a great house, the building collapsed, and many people were buried beneath the rubble. Using his superior memory, Simonides reconstructed the scene in the house before it collapsed, pointing to the places where people laid buried beneath the ruined building. From this event, in *De Oratore*, Cicero states that:

> [Simonides] inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty (of memory) must select places and form mental images of the things they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the things themselves, and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it. (II. lxxxvii)

The key to the loci method is the use of visual images in an ordered, spatial, arrangement.[47] Since classical discovery and invention are intimately tied to memory, the artificial memory techniques depicted in ancient textbooks, such as those described in the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, work as heuristic devices. Although these mnemonic techniques can be viewed as attempts to turn the human memory into a technology like external writing, these memory arts constitute more than simple techniques to facilitate retention.

For ancient scholars, memory was critical to invention, arrangement, style and delivery. Memory was the connection to "the divinity of the soul" for Plato," the "locus point" for the topoi and the key to invention for Aristotle, the proof of the soul's divinity for Cicero and the source of the orator's power to Quintilian (Reynolds 5). In ancient culture, memory functions as a participatory act and also serves to maintain social consensus (Hobart 2).[48] To recognize that the canon of memory functions as a commemorative act is to appreciate that memory is actually concerned not so much with the past as it is with the present and future. It provides the community with a way of continually redefining itself and its aspirations amid ever-changing circumstances. Memory binds the community together as a living entity rather than passively storing information about it.

In the Middle Ages, memory systems took on an ethical dimension and were used to focus the mind on vivid images of vice and virtue (Yates 80-81). With the rise of Christianity, memory operations become ways to connect with God's wisdom—memory becomes

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[47] In *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian claims that the loci method was limited not only in the difficulty of imaging abstract ideas and particular words, but also in the memory overload that would occur if one had to image every word.

[48] Of course there are distinct differences between ancient and contemporary approaches to consensus. The contemporary tension between consensus and dissensus as the ends of discourse can be seen in the debate between Habermas and Lyotard. Habermas desires to return to the early Hegel, to unify in terms of pragmatics. Lyotard disagrees with Habermas, and says that dissensus, not consensus, is the real end of discourse. See Chapter One of this dissertation for a fuller account of the Habermas/Lyotard debate.

remembrance of God (mneme theou). As Mary Carruthers writes in *The Craft of Thought*, medieval rhetoric focused on invention: "The cognitive procedures of traditional rhetoric were practiced as a craft of composition, rather than as one of persuasion" (3). Medieval practices involved making mental images or cognitive "pictures" for thinking and composing (*Craft* 3). The tools or devices of rhetorical memory were comprised both of language and image, specifically through the use of tropes and figures. Carruthers calls memoria "a machine" that allowed for the creation of intricate networks. Memory in medieval culture was seen as a techne, a type of productive knowledge that led its practitioners towards inspiration.

During the Renaissance, many different conceptions of memory prevailed. Although Ramist rhetorics would reduce rhetoric to style and its expressions mainly to print-- de-emphasizing the use of imagery in favor of abstract verbal expressions and logical categorizations-- the rebirth of interest in classical culture led some Renaissance scholars, such as Thomas Wilson, to bring back all five canons to the rhetorical sphere. In *The Arte of Rhetorique*, Wilson claims: "orators must have five thinges to make them perfect" (593). Wilson presents "memorie" as the foundation for good rhetoric, not only discussing both natural and artificial memory, but directly connecting memorial operations to delivery operations:

> Therefore this poynct nedes folowe, to beautifie the cause, the whiche being
>
> called Elocucion, is an appliying of apte words and sentences to the matter,
>
> founde out to confirme the cause. When all these are had together, it availeth
>
> little, if manne have no Memorie to contein theim. (593)

Memorie, Wilson notes, should be "cherished" because it holds both matter and words together (593). He places memory operations at the foundation of rhetoric, arguing that nothing is possible without memory.

Highly imaginative memory systems developed during the Renaissance. Imagery became the means by which to search for knowledge and was elevated to divine status. As Sadoski and Paivio observe in *Imagery and Text*: "Some renaissance scholars believed that through the faculty of imagination and elaborate imaginal memory systems, the entire universe could be understood" (21). According to Frances Yates, for instance, Dante's *Divine Comedy* emphasized the faculty of imagination through an elaborate system of loci, with the poem based on locations in hell, purgatory, and heaven (Yates 22). In the Renaissance, images and letters were often combined in memory systems. One of the most complicated memory systems ever designed was created by Giordano Bruno. In his abstract system, Bruno combined mystical numbers, the stars and planets, and letters from several different alphabets. While his highly complicated system uses esoteric occult references, it reflects the importance that many Renaissance scholars put not only on imagery, but on artificial memory systems as well. Memory systems decline after the Renaissance as neoplatonism advances, emphasizing abstract ideals over mental images and the imagination.

The demise of the memory arts after the Renaissance has also been attributed to the rise of writing and other literacy technologies, such as the printing press. These external memory technologies limited the need for "memory as memorizing," and, with the rise of ideologies of the private self and ownership of knowledge, memory's focus on communal knowledge‑making also weakened. As Sharon Crowley argues, writing and its attendant technologies, such as the printing press, are "much friendlier than memorial composition to modern notions like the sovereignty of the individuals (and hence authors) to language conceived as a representative medium for thought, and to method as a means of inquiry" ("Modern Rhetoric" 41). Ancient memorial techniques are incompatible with enlightenment beliefs in the "discovery" of

knowledge and the privileging of empirical knowledge. For example, in Part II of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric,* George Campbell separates memory from sense experience, stating that memory, is "the only original voucher extant of those past realities for which we once had evidence of sense" (762). For Campbell, memory operations become tools for reasoning based on experience. As a result, the canon of memory becomes defined as the mere retention of sensory experience (a simple act of recall), a characterization that persisted in rhetorical theory throughout the next four centuries. Even in the great elocutionary movement of the eighteenth century, memory remained simply "memory as memorizing," so that the commemorative and communal aspects of knowledge‑making disappeared.

All conceptions of memory in the rhetorical tradition, however are concerned with the perception of images and their link to memory operations. Since memory mediates our understanding of the flow of sensory perceptions, the arts of memory have always been focused on imagery. Thus, since classical times, knowledge has been linked to perception, and metaphors of understanding, such as "seeing the light," have been prevalent throughout diverse cultures. The term "insight" itself can be read as having a direct link to memory perceptions, and it is the inward sight (the memory image) that has been valued throughout the centuries.

Imagery and Memory

Although for Plato, thought without images is a possibility (ironically, perhaps, because the advent of writing enabled the possibilities for abstract thought), for Aristotle, images function as the vehicle for moving perceptions into thought, leading him to the claim in the *Rhetoric*, "it is not possible to think without an image" (103). In the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, the power of memory is seen as the power of perception and is linked with the imagination in creating vivid

images with which to remember. As Virginia Allen argues, the "key point for the mneumonic arts of rhetoric as codified in the *Ad Herennium* is that remembering is perceptual rather than intellectual" (51). In fact, even Plato believed that recollection involved "the seeing of internal pictures" that are imprinted upon the memory "as if with signet rings" (99-100).[49] Plato's metaphor, in the *Theaetetus,* of memory as a wax tablet upon which impressions can be imprinted has had lasting value in Western society. In Plato's *Theatetus*, our minds are a wax block (which was the gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the muses), "and whenever we want to remember something we've seen or hear or conceived on our own, we subject the block to the perception or the idea and stamp the impression onto it, as if we were making marks with signet rings. We remember and know anything imprinted, as long s the impression remains in the block, but we forget and do not know anything which is erased or cannot be imprinted" (99-100). In classical culture, memories, therefore, were seen to be copies of experiences stored on the brain and called up by the rhetor at will. Mary Carruthers observes:

> According to the Greek tradition, all perceptions, however, presented to the mind are encoded as phantasmata, "representations" or a kind of eikon. Because they are themselves "sort-of pictures," these representations were thought to be the best retained for recollection by marking them in an order that was readable, a process the ancients thought most to be like the act of seeing. (*Book* 17)[50]

Arts of memory construct vivid images that allow the rhetor to recall them from his or her "storehouse" of knowledge. This classical use of imagery to spark memory became firmly established in Roman education by the fifth century (Sadoski and Paivio 16).

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[50] The word eikon can be translated as image, effigy, or representation. Mimesis is the relationship between the present image and the absent thing, the past event.

While many medieval scholars were focused on abstract, rational, and linguistic inquiry, others, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, used classical imagery consistently in their texts. Both classical and medieval memory arts utilized dramatic representations, but these images were not conceived of as faithful pictures of reality; they were vividly, even artfully designed. Both ancient and medieval memory techniques, therefore, encouraged the role played by craft in composing.[51] Because these memory arts concerned the storage, retrieval, and recomposition of signs, memory, like reading, becomes an act of interpretation.[52]

During the Renaissance, images became important tools with which to investigate the universe and search for knowledge. The slogan of humanistic education that grew of out the Renaissance, "things not words," epitomizes the significance Renaissance scholars and educators placed on the power of the image. While the significance of imagery weakens during the Enlightenment's focus on abstract ideas, during the Romantic period, imagery again becomes a focal point. For example, in the tradition of the medieval illuminated manuscript, William Blake fused the vivid images of his mind's eye with his poems in engravings and paintings. In Romanticism, imagery was the route towards creativity and inspiration. Although rhetorical studies of the time were, in large part, quite divorced from romantic notions of literature, the importance of imagery to romantic culture influenced technological advances of the following centuries that emphasized "seeing" above all.

The role of imagery in literacy education from the mid-nineteenth to twentieth century was influenced by the development of science and technology as well as by the philosophy of

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[51] As many twentieth century rhetoricians have pointed out, the modern turn to plain style has been read as an attempt to banish the supplemental play of language from the composing process.

[52] As Mary Carruthers notes in *The Book of Memory*, "all these early writers agreed that writing on the memory is the only writing that is truly valuable for one's education, literary style, reasoning ability, moral judgment and (later) salvation, for in memorizing one writes upon a surface one always has with one. And the corollary assumption is that what one writes on the memory can be at least as orderly and accessible to thought as what is written upon a surface such as wax or parchment" (30).

pragmatist philosophers such as Edmund Burke Huey, George Herbert Mead, and John Dewy.[53]

Pragmatist philosophy emphasized the dual operations of imagery and language in knowledge-making. The imagists of the modern movement also focused on creating poetry that recalled the slogan of the Renaissance's humanist movement: "no words but in things." As I will discuss later in this chapter, in the twentieth century, images began to take on more significance with the development of technologies that emphasize imagery over language, such as photography, television, film, and digital media. Indeed, in contemporary society, our communal memory banks are stored with shared memories from the proliferation of dominant images in contemporary media culture. While many of the images and icons of our culture are rooted in repetitive advertising tactics or fantastical pop-cultural representations, the power of imagery has also, as in the case of 9-11, become used for terror in the way Gorgias seems to predict in the *Encomium of Helen*:

> It has happened that people, after having seen frightening sights have also lost
>
> presence of mind . . . In this way the sight engraves upon the mind images of
>
> things which have been seen. And many frightening impressions linger, and what
>
> lingers is exactly analogous to <what is> spoken. (Gorgias 41)

The domination of the images of the World Trade Centers became representational to the terrorists for locating the symbols of our culture: in that place, particularly, they located their image of America. While the cultural memory of 9-11 appears at first glance to be constituted on the date (9-11) in temporal form, the ubiquitous media images of the event place these memories in spatial form in localized spaces of terror. Our memories of those who died that day are rooted

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[53] As discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation, pragmatist philosophy is concerned with action; pragmatists believed that knowledge derived from action, practice and experience. Opposed to behaviorism emphasis on verbal learning and behavior, pragmatism emphasized the way mental images from the past created an understanding of the present and future.

in the places immortalized in the images of that day. The spaces of our memories locate our understanding of 9-11, situating us within a practice of grief that is organized around the place of the terroristic event. What we know of 9-11, we know through images, and the event of 9-11 was aestheticized through the media images that represented it. The movement, force, and terror of the event was "localized" and given a form that was immediately identifiable. The "aestheticization of terror" is enacted spatially, with an "event" becoming a "place" where the spatial component of memorial operations works to organize our experiences and record them for future understanding and action.

The Architecture of Memory

The spatialization of memory operations was habitual throughout the rhetorical tradition. The *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* describes artificial memory as spatial: memory consists of backgrounds and images (III. xvi. 29). While Aristotle and Augustine focus on the temporal nature of memories, as Mary Carruthers argues, most rhetors who analyze memory operations connect the temporal to the spatial, such as Albert Magnus in "On the Good" who states that: "place is required for the mental task of recollection" (qtd. in Carruthers *Craft* 13). Since all memories stem from the past, what distinguishes them from one another are spatial relationships in the mind's eye. Space organizes and collects our memories. As Mary Carruthers observes, "mneumonic places are entirely pragmatic: they are cognitive schemas rather than objects" (*Craft* 13). As we saw with Simonides, in ancient mnemonics, architecture provided the most useful source for the creation of familiar memory locations (*Craft* 13). In order to create knowledge, rhetors relied upon the architecture of their memories; therefore, memory became the way to invention. As Carruthers argues, both invention and inventory arose from the Latin word

inventio, connecting memory not only to invention, but also emphasizing "that one's memory-store is effectively "inventoried" . . . its matters are in readily-recovered locations" (*Craft* 12). The key to the art of memory focuses on the use of visual images in an ordered, spatial, arrangement-- striking visual images arranged against a fixed architectural background. By fixing our memories in space, we are able to move into the future. The architectural background lays the groundwork for action.

Gaston Bachelard, a French philosopher who devoted the early part of his career to the study of space in contemporary physics, describes the localization of our memories-- what he calls "topoanlaysis,"-- or the systematic study of the sites of our intimate lives:

> Memories are motionless, and the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are. To localize a memory in time is merely a matter for the biographer and only corresponds to a sort of external history, for external use, to be communicated to others . . . for a knowledge of intimacy, localization in the spaces of our intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates. (9)

Topoanalysis not only concerns the external spaces of our lives; it ultimately concerns the connection between the external spaces we inhabit and the internal places of our memories. The fixedness of images from the past in the architecture of memorial operations allows them to be used for the present and future. For Bachelard, the memory of spaces is rooted in communal activities and draws on common sense. In *Matter and Memory*, Henri Bergson also sees action as the goal of memorial operations. According to Bergson, memory is a "synthesis of past and present with an eye to the future, in that it contracts the moments of this matter in order to use them and to manifest itself by actions" (220). One way in which memory unites the past and present for future action is through writing. The space of the page works as a type of mnemonic

device: in the history of western culture, there has always been a close link between memory and writing: indeed, the Latin root memoria means both memory and memoir.

Writing and Memory

As far back as the 5th century, Greek poets and historians noted that the power of writing was to fix ideas-- to extend the human memory. And yet, writing has also been seen as harmful to memory operations. In the *Phaedrus*, for example, Socrates tells Phaedrus a myth about the genesis of writing. In this myth, Theuth, the inventor of writing, brings his invention to the Egyptian King, Thammus. Thammus objects to what he calls Theuth's "recipe" for memory, stating that writing is a mere gimmick that substitutes appearance for reality. Consequently, the king warns Theuth that writing will destroy the faculty of memory:

> They will not need to exercise their memories, being able to rely on what is written, calling things to mind no longer from within themselves by their own unaided powers, but under the stimulus of external marks that are alien to themselves. (140)

Socrates's story suggests not only that writing is dispensable to knowledge or language (which is seen as oral), but also that writing may even destroy wisdom that has been stored in a culture's collective memory. Because writing externalizes language and memory by moving them out into the "visible" realm, for Plato, writing distorts and diminishes the philosopher king's memory.

In what marks the beginning, perhaps, of Western society's ambivalence toward writing, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato also uses the metaphor of "writing in the mind" to assert that the best argument is "that which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner" (141). Elaborating further on his association between writing and memory in *Theaetetus*, Plato compares memory to a writing surface, the wax tablet:

And whenever we want to remember something we've seen or heard or conceived on our own, we subject the block to the perception or the idea and stamp the impression onto it, as if we were making marks with signet rings. We remember and know anything imprinted, as long as the impression remains in the block, but we forget and do not know anything which is erased or cannot be imprinted. (109)

Both Aristotle in *De Sensu and De Memoria* and Cicero in *De Oratore* also refer to memory as a wax tablet, as does the author of the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*: "For the places are very much like wax tablets or papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the script and the delivery is like the reading" (III xii). Even after the wax tablet had been replaced by parchment, the metaphor of the wax tablet remained consistent in conceptions of memory. In the thirteenth century, for example, Thomas Aquinas wrote that a memory is a diminution of the original perception: as wax adapts the image of the seal, but does not allow one to see from the impression whether gold or bronze was used, memory is also a reduction of the original experience (Draaisma 26).

In the twentieth century, Sigmund Freud's mystic writing pad also reinscribes the metaphor of the wax tablet. Freud's mystic writing pad consists of a wax layer, covered by a sheet of wax paper and a transparent celluloid sheet. When one writes on the celluloid sheet, the words appear on the wax paper. To erase the text, one pulls the paper free of the wax layer; however, if one looks closely at the wax tablet beneath the sheets, the "trace" of the words has been preserved. The mystic writing pad functions for Freud, as the wax tablets did for Plato, to describe the memory's function: "the layer which receives the stimuli . . . forms no permanent traces, the foundations of memory come about in other adjoining systems" (Freud "Mystic" 179). Freud also observes in "A Note Upon the Mystic Writing Pad": "Whenever I distrust my

memory, I can resort to pen and paper" (176). And yet, Freud sees writing as inferior to the operations of the memory because paper and slates lack what makes human memory so efficient: "our mental apparatus accomplishes precisely what they cannot: it has an unlimited receptive capacity for new perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent, though not unalterable, memory traces of them" ("Mystic" 176).

Unlike Plato, Freud is willing to consider the ways in which writing constructs the self; Derrida notes in *Of Grammatology*, that Freud "speculates that the very mansion of the presence, the perceiving self, is shaped by . . . writing" (xi). None of us, Derrida claims, apprehends the world directly, but only retrospectively; our sense of that which is beyond ourselves is the product of previous memories, previous writings. Through writing, one draws upon one's memories and delivers them, or at least fragments of them, to create something new. Delivery, then, works closely with memory to create our perceptions of everything-- including ourselves. It is in this way that the canons of memory and delivery are crucially related: while the canon of delivery has been defined in many different ways throughout the centuries, delivery, whether through oral, written, or digital mediums is the way our memories are put into action.

Delivery

In Book III of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines delivery as "a matter of the right management of the voice to express the various emotions" (165). Not surprisingly, Aristotle systematically categorized the rules a speaker should follow, thereby creating the foundation of the canon of delivery in the classical tradition. While Aristotle defined delivery in somewhat limiting terms, highly regarded orators such as Cicero, the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, and Quintilian expanded Aristotle's definition and further discussed the ways in

which a speaker's delivery may be affected by variations in speech and body movements. For Cicero in *De Inventione,* delivery is defined as " the control of the voice and body in a manner suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and style" (VII. 9). Cicero consistently focused on the importance of skilled orators and oratory, believing that the orator is a "summation of the virtues of a civilized society" (Kinneavy 222). In *De Oratore,* Cicero again emphasizes the importance of delivery when he recounts the famous story of the orator, Demosthenes, who, when asked what were the three most important aspects of oratory, replied, "delivery, delivery, delivery" (III. 213). In the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, the most detailed analysis of ancient delivery, the author notes that good delivery means that everything looks as if it comes straight from the heart (III. 27). And yet, while delivery is often praised in ancient culture, it is very rarely discussed in the same detail as the other canons, a fact that may due as much to its shameful emphasis on appearances as it is with a more practical reason: the difficulty of discussing delivery techniques in writing.

The *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* indicates that delivery is often not thoroughly analyzed in rhetorical handbooks because its operations escape the boundaries of language. As Erik Gunderson argues in *Staging Masculinity*, "delivery offers to rhetorical theory a sort of limit-point that might possibly lie beyond its own capacities" (30). Techniques of oral delivery (whether pronunciation, gesticulation, or persona) are methods that can be taught only to a certain degree; a rhetor's success in delivery lies as much in natural talent and charisma as in any handbook education. Though it may be difficult to teach, a powerful delivery was often seen as the single most important factor in making the argument, as well as in making the man. For example, Quintilian states, "I would assert that even a mediocre speech recommended by the vigor of its delivery will have more effect than a superlative one whose delivery has left it in the

lurch" (11.3.5). Quintilian highlighted the importance of delivery, privileging it over the speech's content. Quintilian also expanded the purview of delivery, emphasizing the connection between ethos and action, and stressing the idea that a "true orator must be . . . the good man speaking well" (11.3.5). Quintilian's "good man speaking well" was not to endure, however, as Roman political upheavals and corrupt rulers took delivery operations in a much different direction.

In the period after Quintilian, known as the second sophistic, oratorical excesses were rooted in the unpredictability of the Roman leaders because, as Murphy observes in *Synoptic History*, no orator felt safe delivering a deliberative or political speech (177-78). Machinations of delivery became more important than anything else, and the excesses of delivery style can be seen in orators of the period such as Herodes Atticus.[54] In *Dramatizing Writing*, Virginia Skinner-Linnenberg argues, "clearly the sophists of that period were interested in the way a thing was said, not in what was said" (6). Orators became highly dramatic and adopted superfluities that, as Kennedy argues in *Classical Rhetoric*, eventually led to the decline of interest in the operations of delivery (105).

In the Middle Ages, delivery found its relevance in the expansion of Christianity, and many classical methods were re-conceived in terms of pulpit oratory. Ciceronian rhetoric was the basis for medieval rhetoric, and, according to Murphy in *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, most medieval rhetoricians thought "delivery should not be proud nor rough nor unctuous nor harsh, but modest and humble, agreeable, and consistent with the plan of the sermon and the nature of the subject matter" (313-4). Stylistic excesses in delivery were to be avoided in the pulpit during this time, a fact that greatly impacted the canon of delivery since most rhetoricians during the middle ages were also ministers (Skinner-Linnenberg 7). It was not until the Renaissance that

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[54] For more information see Angela Mitchell, "Herodes Atticus" *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians.* Ed. Michelle Ballif and Michael Moran. Greenwood Press (forthcoming).

new understandings of the operations of delivery developed, with the uses of delivery moving from the religious orders to the educated classes.

In Stephen Hawes's *Pastime of Pleasure*, published in 1509, delivery, referred to as "pronuncyacyon," becomes a way for a speaker to cultivate and refine him or herself, thereby appealing to sophisticated audiences. As Virginia Skinner-Linnenberg argues in *Dramatizing Writing*, in this allegorical poem, "Lady Rhetoric" states that the standards of delivery are formulated by considering the audience, with appeals to one's audience focused on class distinctions, such as elegance and refinement (Skinner-Linnenberg 7). Later in the fourteenth century, Peter Ramus, following Erasmus, relegated rhetoric to the study of style (limited to tropes and figures) and delivery (limited to voice and gesture). Rhetoric becomes greatly limited in scope, with invention removed from rhetorical processes. In 1544 Omer Talon, influenced by Ramus's ideas, published *Rhetorica*, putting forward a rule-based rhetoric. Talon stated that for successful delivery, rigid rules must be followed, de-emphasizing any notion of context or kairos (Skinner-Linnenberg 8). Francis Bacon, however, after studying Ciceronian rhetoric, sought to incorporate Cicero's' ideas into his own philosophy, re-making the canons of rhetoric into four "arts": Art of Inquiry or Invention; Art of Examination or Judgement; Art of Custody or Memory; and Art of Elocution or Tradition (Bizzell and Herzberg 625-26). Delivery was classified under "Tradition," which Bacon defined as "the means by which knowledge is used and incorporated into social institutions, which are maintained in memory" (Bizzell and Herzberg 624). Bacon merged delivery operations with memorial operations, connecting both rhetorical canons to the development of communal understanding. In so doing, Bacon returns the primary expansive function of rhetoric by linking rhetoric to social communication and action.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, delivery flourished as oratory became central in political, religious, and dramatic realms. The orators of the eighteenth century explored the significance of delivery as a fundamental canon of rhetoric. In 1806, Gilbert Austin published *Chironomia*, a lengthy treatise entirely devoted to the canon of delivery. As expansive as his text was, his understanding of delivery was limited to "the management of voice, the expression of the countenance, and the gesture of the head, the body and the limbs" (1). In *Chironomia*, Austin summarizes ancient discussions of the canons of delivery and includes detailed illustrations of various gestures. For Austin, delivery is an essential part of the speech and can have a serious affect on one's audience:

> It may therefore be fairly concluded that to neglect all or any part of the labour
> which constitutes delivery; whether it be the management of the voice, the
> expression of the countenance, or the appropriate gesture, is so far an injury to
> the cause in which the speaker is engaged and so far deprives his completion of
> just effect. (5)

Through 580 pages, Austin meticulously details all aspects of physical and oral delivery, providing rules and methods for persuasion and regarding those methods as necessary for successful persuasion. As Bizzell and Herzberg observe, "During this time, courses in delivery and elocution became a standard part of the United States curriculum," contributing to the publication of treatises on proper delivery, such as Austin's *Chironomia* (651). The quest for correctness that dominated this era made declamation a large part of the education curriculum in both America and the British Isles.

According to Michael Moran in *Eighteenth-Century British and American Rhetorics and Rhetoricians,* James Burgh, a Scottish educator in the eighteenth century, was greatly influenced

by Cicero's ideas and even went so far as to say that delivery is the most important canon of rhetoric (Moran 36). Burgh taught delivery exclusively, and although his oratorical training was often scorned, he was able to establish an educational foundation for the British and Americans, that remained well into the nineteenth century (Moran 40). Ironically, although the elocutionary movement returned delivery to the forefront, its significance was limited to pronunciation and the creation of rigid rules for gesticulation.

Not all rhetoricians during the elocutionary movement adhered to the strict rules and regulations that dominated the era. George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately eschewed the rules of elocution and called for a natural manner of delivery (Skinner-Linnenberg 16). For these scholars, the speaker should focus his or her attention on the subject matter, allowing an artless delivery to occur naturally. As Richard Whately argues in *Elements of Rhetoric*, "one naturally falls into who is really speaking, in earnest, and with a mind exclusively intent on what he has to say" (236). The privileging of delivery declined greatly after the elocutionary movement in large part due to the fact that it no longer met the needs of students training for professions in law and ministry (Skinner-Linnenberg 18).

Novel types of delivery, however, can be seen in the twentieth century development of new mediums of expression. Although most of my analysis of delivery heretofore has focused on oral speech-making, as Robert Connors notes in "Actio: a Rhetoric of Written Delivery," that "the canon of delivery has to do simply with the manner in which the material is delivered" (65). Indeed, the canon of delivery was often utilized in print, even before the twentieth century. Kathleen Welch writes in "Reconfiguring Writing and Delivery": "Delivery is weakened if it refers only to the gesture, physical movement and expression" (21). Medieval codices and manuscripts offered ways of investigating the effects of the delivery of print, and typographic

clues have also been analyzed as delivery techniques. With the rise of manuscripts, delivery

often became linked to of mneumonic techniques that oral speech-making would not allow. For

example in the twelfth century, Hugh of St. Victor taught his pupils to remember by focusing on

the layout and design of the page:

> It is of great value when fixing a memory image that when we read books, we
>
> study to impress upon our memories . . .the color shape, position, and placement
>
> of the letters . . .in what location, at the top, the middle or bottom we saw
>
> [something] positioned . . . in what color we observed the trace of the letter or the
>
> ornamented surface of the parchment. Indeed, I consider nothing so useful for
>
> stimulating the memory as this. (qtd. in Carruthers *Book* 264)[55]

The canons of memory and delivery come together through their use of spatial analysis: the

space of the page becomes crucial in getting to "the heart of the matter." For example, in a

fifteenth century *ars memortiva*, the space of the page becomes a place for a different kind of

delivery: "Wherefore one best learns by studying from illuminated book, for the different colors

bestow remembrance of the different lines and consequently of that thing which one wants to get

to by heart" (qtd in Carruthers *Book* 9). Here, the layout of the text on the space of the page

utilizes both memory and delivery operations. The way in which typographic clues are delivered,

whether in illuminated medieval manuscripts or in the use of fonts or paragraph spacing in

twentieth century books, calls upon both memory and delivery. Very simply, for example, the

space of a printed page in a book utilizes printed delivery techniques to arrange the text and

deliver it to the reader in a comprehensible manner. Paragraph indentations and margins also use

space to organize and create coherence. Thus, memory and delivery have an integral relationship.

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[55] At the end of *The Book of Memory*, Mary Carruthers provides a complete translation of High of St. Victor's "*De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum*" (261-266).

Media of delivery, whether oral, print, or digital, all focus on the treatment of space and the way in which that space can be best utilized for the performance of the rhetor. Indeed, it is the connection of memory to delivery and the performance of ethos that constitutes the axis of my argument in this dissertation: not only do the canons of memory and delivery function to create ethical appeals, but they also reinforce the performance of identity. New digital media reinforce the operations of the canons of memory and delivery in the way they create ethical performances in digitized "theaters of memory."

Theaters of Memory

The canon of delivery emphasizes notions of space by focusing on how the body takes up a space, moves throughout that space, and ultimately manages that space. Because delivery methods utilize both natural and artificial memorial techniques, delivery operations cannot be separated from memorial operations. The performance of delivery therefore was often seen as a physical extension of the "theater of memory." Since the crux of memory concerns presentation, or display, the performance of a speech is rooted in memory, whether it is a conscious use of techne, such as an artificial memory system, or whether it is an unconscious use of experience and visions from the past. In *The Poetics of Space*, for instance, Gaston Bachelard links the performance of memory to a dramatic setting. For Bachelard:

> In the theater of the past that is constituted by memory, the stage setting maintains
> the characters in their dominant roles. At times we think we know ourselves in
> time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being's
> stability . . . in its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what
> space is for. (9)

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Space provides the foundation for our memories: the theater of the memory, as seen in artificial memory systems, organizes our cognitive processes.

In the fifteenth century, Giulio Camillo worked to develop a highly complex theater of memory which would use the "performance of memory" to locate and dramatize the knowledge of the whole universe. While no trace is left of his theater of memory, interest in his work was revived by Francis Yates in *The Art of Memory*. Camillo's theater was a wooden building in the form of an amphitheater. The theater was divided into seven sections, so that when the "visitor" stood on the stage and gazed out into the auditorium, he/she would see seven arches spanning seven rising tiers. As Peter Matussek explains in "The Renaissance of the Theater of Memory,"

> The seven sections were divided according to the seven planets known at the
> time—they represented the divine macrocosm of alchemical astrology. The seven
> tiers that rose up from them, coded by motifs from classical mythology,
> represented the seven spheres of the sublunary down to the elementary
> microcosm. On each of these stood emblematic images and signs, next to
> compartments for scrolls.[56]

Camillo based his theater on hermetic occult sciences, and the exact operation of the theater remains a mystery. However mysterious, Camillo's theater of memory dramatized memorial methods by using those techniques in a performance of remembering. It fused the canons of memory and delivery not only by locating one's memory through performance on a stage, but by indicating that spatial organizations and movements are crucial to coalescing abstract ideas. Camillo's theater of memory makes connections to ancient theories of delivery and memory such as the loci method; however, it can also be used to prefigure newer methods and process of memory and delivery. For instance, Yates has connected Camillo's theater with the mechanism

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[56] See paragraph 12 of "The Renaissance" (http://141.20.150.19/PM/Pub/A_39.html)

of the digital calculator, leading other scholars to connect his theater to computer programming and virtual reality.[57]

The conventions of knowledge-making on the WWW enact a type of ritual behavior akin to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Defined by Bourdieu, habitus is a culturally specific way not only of doing and speaking, but also of seeing, thinking and categorizing. Habitus is usually "naturalized" or assimilated into the unconscious and becomes a necessary condition of action and shared understanding. Bourdieu's concept of habitus has important connections not only to the twenty-first century enactments of the canons of memory and delivery, but to ethos and performativity as well. According to Pierre Bourdieu, "The body believes in what it plays at: it weeps if it mimes grief. It does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to life" (*Logic* 73). The performance of the body enacts the past—it performs the past at the same time that it creates knowledge in the space of the present.

Significantly, the inculcation of habitus occurs spatially, not temporally. Bourdieu's habitus highlights codes of spatial performance in the context of social situations. Bourdieu argues that space gains its meaning from routine practices and conventions and is a product of ongoing social negotiation (Sorensen 149). The way it is organized creates perception and leads to action. According to Bourdieu, spatial knowledge and experience is social; it is learned through processes of interaction (Sorensen 166). As I will argue shortly, the habits of interaction on the WWW, for instance, encourage epideictic rhetoric, arguments that are visually and spatially determined, largely ceremonial, and rooted in patterns of praise and blame. Another way in which a society interacts to create patterns of meaning is through rhetorical technai, such as the figures of speech. Tropes and figures are prime examples of shared social phenomenon on

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[57] Scholars working on the connections between virtual reality and theaters of memory include: Lina Bolzoni, Hartmut Winkler and Stephen Boyd Davis.

which habitus is based. Because habitus creates conventions for ethical action in society, the techne of the figures of speech, which utilize memory and delivery operations, can be used to create ethical appeals. As Mary Carruthers acknowledges in *The Craft of Thought,* all tropes and figures utilize memorial operations:

> An art of tropes and figures is an art of patterns and pattern-making, and thus an
>
> art of mneme or memoria, of cogitation, thinking. To observe the obvious, tropes
>
> cannot exist unless they are recognized. That is the function of memory and
>
> shared experience, including shared education. Thus tropes are also social
>
> phenomena. (4)

I would argue that tropes and figures are also functions of delivery operations (Ramus, whatever else he did to rhetoric, recognized this): they use patterns of style to encourage the audience to make the "right" connections.

Figures constitute examples of techne not only because they are established techniques, but also because they operate as productive knowledge. As I will discuss in Chapter Four of this dissertation, students are satisfied in significant ways when they are taught to utilize the figures of speech in their writing: not only do they appreciate the tangible knowledge they represent, but the teaching of techne also works to bring students into the history of writing and allows them access to conventions of interaction. The canons of memory and delivery call upon particular traditions and conventions that are rooted in the notion of display and, interestingly, their use reinforces writing (whether on the page or the screen) as epideictic. It is my argument that epideictic rhetoric often provides the most subtle performance(s) of ethos, performances are often located within a matrix of technai relying on the canons of memory and delivery. The ethical appeals created in epideictic rhetoric constitute procedures for making sophisticated

arguments that can often escape the limitations and criticisms of more didactic arguments. While epideictic argumentation has been successfully performed in print essays, such as the feminist essays of Virginia Woolf, epideictic argumentation is, as I will argue shortly, particularly suited to new modes of delivery in techno-culture.

Memory, Delivery and the Epideictic

Ancient rhetoric recognized three speech acts or occasions for speaking: deliberative (focused on the future), judiciary (focused on the past), and epideictic (focused on the present). Where deliberative rhetoric was used for setting policy or making laws, and judiciary rhetoric was concerned with analyzing what happened in the past, epideictic rhetoric was used for ceremonial purposes. Epideictic rhetoric can be defined as the persuasive use of praise or blame, often for public entertainment. In "The Practical Celebration of the Epideictic," Lawrence Rosenfield notes that the term "epideictic" comes from epideixis ('to shine or show forth'); the word suggests an exhibiting or making apparent "what might otherwise remain unnoticed or invisible" (135). In the rhetorical tradition, epideictic rhetoric has been seen to lessen opposition by masking its arguments as simple praise or blame and by assuming that the rhetor and the audience are already in agreement.

Although epideictic rhetoric has been seen to be concerned with the present, it is my argument that it actually relies on memorial operations to a significant degree: ceremonial rhetoric depends on the techne of the canon of memory. In turn, the epideictic is also focused on connecting form and content; one's delivery becomes paramount in epideictic arguments. In fact, epideictic rhetoric, as it incorporates the techne of the canons of memory and delivery, can create some of the most complex and sophisticated arguments. An excellent example of the way in

which a writer effectively uses the form of the epideictic to argue for ideological claims can be seen in the nonfiction of Virginia Woolf. Much of Virginia Woolf's non-fiction can be seen to incorporate intense, masked ideological struggle. Serious political and artistic contradictions lie at the heart of much of her non-fiction, contradictions that, I argue, can only be explained through rhetorical analysis. Utilizing the techne of the canons of memory and delivery, Woolf's texts enact an epideictic rhetoric that allows her to make seemingly paradoxical claims about the purpose of art in political struggle, claims that actually work to reveal a complex and situated feminist ethos. An analysis of Woolf's use of the epideictic reveals the importance of the techne of the canons of memory and delivery in developing ethical appeals and creating arguments that unite form and content.

Woolf's Architecture of Ethos

Although Virginia Woolf was denied the formal education of her brothers at Cambridge (not without much resentment), she was clearly knowledgeable about the classical rhetorical tradition. As Krystyna Colburn observes in "Women's Oral Tradition in *A Room of One's Own*," oral tradition [is] visible in *A Room of One's Own*" (59). In *Anglo-American Feminist Challenges to the Rhetorical Traditions: Virginia, Woolf, Mary Daly, Adrienne Rich*, Krista Ratcliffe, in turn, points out that Woolf "imitates" and then "revises" classical rhetorical principles (86). James Hoban argues in "Rhetorical Topoi in A Room of One's Own" that Woolf' employs a "distinctive voice and reveals herself to be an inventive rhetorician" (149). For Hoban, *A Room of One's Own* is a text about rhetoric itself, offering "creative alternatives to the classical system of topics" (149). Significantly, I argue, Woolf carries out this re-invention of rhetoric and ethos by utilizing the ancient canons of memory and delivery. Woolf's techniques of invention in this

text actually recall the ancient process of employing topics from a storehouse of knowledge found in one's mind as well as in the repositories of one's culture. Her mnemonic devices are spatially determined, recalling the ancient concept of topoi. It is clear that Woolf knew of classical oratorical conventions when she states in the last chapter of *A Room of One's Own* that she is refusing to add her peroration, although she knows this is the "place" for it. All of the voices of the text-- whether Mary Beton, Mary Seton, and Mary Carmichael invent their arguments from bricolage-- put their arguments together from ad hoc, seemingly personalized but actually communal, "memories." The various speakers build a structure that spatially resembles the way women have been "shut out" of the educational, intellectual, and cultural spheres. In this way, the temporal dimensions of memory are deconstructed in Woolf's text, replaced with an architecture of "moments."[58]

Significantly, space, whether imagined as one's room or a place where the writer momentarily finds herself, is the dominant topos in Woolf's rhetoric (Hoban 153). Not only does the title of *A Room of One's Own* suggest a concern for the spatial location of the self, but Woolf actually defines a book in *A Room of One's Own* as "not made of sentences laid end to end, [but] built of sentences . . . into castles and domes" (77). Throughout *A Room of One's Own,* Woolf focuses on the divisions and collisions between private and public space. Early in the chapter, the speaker reminiscences about a day spent at Oxbridge, reflecting that initially the spaces of the university gave her peace: "Strolling through those colleges past those ancient halls the roughness of the present seemed smoothed away" (6). As the speaker continues to reflect upon her walk through the university spaces (to which she has been denied formal entrance), the architecture of the campus becomes restrictive. She is chastised for walking off the path and is

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[58] Virginia Woolf's focus on memory can be seen throughout her fiction and nonfiction. Much of her oeuvre reflects a fixation with remembering past events, using intense sensory memories to make sense of the present and lay the groundwork for future action.

told to remember her "place." Throughout the rest of the chapter, the speaker describes the "spaces" of Oxbridge that she is not allowed to enter, such the Fellows' dining hall and the library. The bricks and mortar of the university are seen as structural elements that do not allow the speaker to continue her argument; for example, as she ponders "what is style and what is meaning" in prose, she is refused entrance to the library:

—but here I was actually at the door which leads to the library itself. I must have opened it, for instantly there issued, like a guardian angel barring the way with a flutter of black gown instead of white wings, a deprecating, silvery, kindly gentleman, who regretted in a low voice as he waved me back that ladies are only admitted to the library if accompanied by a Fellow of the College. (7-8)

Woolf's analysis of the connection between form and content in writing is disrupted by her rejection at the library doors. It is significant that Woolf uses the word "but" to interrupt her musings as she attempts to enter the library-- she begins her first and final sentences of *A Room of One's Own* with this small word. Woolf, a master at figures of interruption, uses "but" to foreground not only women's denial to the university system, "but" also as a way of highlighting her desire to interrupt the smooth flow of patriarchy.

In Chapter Two of *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf metaphorically describes the culture of patriarchy as the British Museum: "The swing doors swung open; and there stood one under the vast dome, as if one were a thought in the huge bald forehead which is so splendidly encircled with names" (26). Here, the speaker's identity becomes housed within the dome of the British Museum, a clear reference to the architecture of patriarchal culture: her speaker is encircled, closed in, as well as shut out, by the names of those male authors canonized around her. As a female and an outsider to the rhetorical tradition, Woolf uses *A Room of One's Own* to create an

alternative system to the classical system of topics. She employs, as Margaret Morgan observes, "elements such as intuition, mystery, silence and desire, elements that are usually exiled in classical rhetoric on the grounds that they interfere with clear apprehension and articulation of the truth can be reintegrated as resources" (18). Woolf anticipated that *A Room of One's Own* would be considered "feminine logic" and that its message would not be taken seriously (*Diary* 3: 262). Her concern is clearly manifested in Arnold Bennett's criticism that Woolf "is merely the victim of her extraordinary gift for fancy" (147-48). And yet, Woolf's fancy throughout *A Room of One's Own* is built around the deliberate re-invention of elements from the classical rhetorical tradition, particularly those that are used to create ethical appeals. In so doing, she attempts to turn the rhetorical tradition on its head and argue for the material and social needs of women during her time.

While Woolf's text argues coherently for the betterment of women's material and economic situation, the ethos of the text is not as clear. Woolf uses many points of view in her text and plays with the personae of her speaker(s). In fact, one of the ways in which Woolf rewrites the traditional (Ciceronian) rhetorical canon is through the multiplicity of voices in her text. Traditional (Ciceronian) rhetoric is univocal; however, Woolf's text is polyphonic. Significantly, Woolf's style, as Morgan observes, "embodies her themes" (Morgan 17). Woolf's figurative language is not ornamental: form, as her speaker muses before attempting to enter the library, is intimately connected with meaning. In point of fact, it is my argument that Woolf's use of techne (specifically, for this discussion, the figures accorded to the canons of memory and delivery) reveals the way in which she attempted to resolve the incommensurable differences which plagued her: through formal rhetorical figuration.[59] Furthermore, Woolf's use of figuration

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[59] An analysis of Woolf's nonfiction career, reveals that her oeuvre is comprised of striking contradictions: contradictions that are manifested, for example, in her shifting alliances to political and artistic pursuits.

to construct ethical appeals in *A Room of One's Own* has much to teach us, almost a century later, about the techne of the canons of memory and delivery in constructing ethos.

The Figure of Ethos in *A Room of One's Own*

Although a rhetorical analysis of the first chapter of *A Room of One's Own* shows that Woolf uses a great many rhetorical elements to make her case that women need equality in material conditions before they can rise to their potential as writers and artists, Woolf specifically uses the tropes and figures accorded to the ancient canons of memory and delivery.[60] These rhetorical elements allow Woolf to create the semblance of a personal narrative that argues for a very public and political position. By using the tropes and figures of memory and delivery, Woolf creates both a personal and public ethos, one which seeks to unite women's positions. These rhetorical elements are useful to rhetors in creating a powerful ethos because they consistently work to create personal credibility at the same time as they construct commonality of vision.

Throughout her career as an essayist, Woolf often positions herself as a "skeptical" feminist, one who elides easy definitions and positions. In *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf takes on multiple personae and voices in order to argue for the betterment of women's economic conditions. The figures accorded to memory and delivery allow her to create ethical appeals that are founded on past reconstructions (imagined or actual) and that work in creating a persuasive political argument. To view ethos in light of the canons of memory and delivery is to see ethos as connected to action: not only do both canons emphasize the public construction of knowledge,

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[60] See Appendix F for a chart delineating these figures. For a fuller discussion of the use of these figures in composition pedagogy, see Chapter Four of this dissertation.

but both also articulate ethical understandings of the uses for that knowledge, uses that are inextricably bound with moral judgment and civic action.

For instance, throughout the first chapter of *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf uses vivid memorial descriptions of her fictionalized Oxbridge, providing highly detailed images of the landscape, of the meals, of the university square. These descriptions, depicted as "memories," create an atmosphere in the text both of personal reflection and critical distance. Her voices in the text are made concrete by their "experiences" in being denied access to the library, or in being chastised for walking "off the path." These memories create a powerful sense of the speaker's credibility. Personal narratives of exclusion in the past help writers form a strong foundation for changes that need to be made in the future. In this case, these types of memorial reflections (even if "imagined") are presented as ways of "remembering" as a culture. As Toni McNaron notes in "Memoir as Imprint," "For many on the margins who are the objects of the culture's various destructive prejudices and privileges, to remember is politically radical. To then write what one remembers becomes even more radical an act. The status quo depends centrally on silence and forgetting" (228). Memorial operations, then, whether real or imagined as they are in *A Room of One's Own,* form a feminist act, one that allows the speaker to remake her future and emphasize communal knowledge-making. Woolf's uses of memory recall ancient uses and attitudes towards memorial composing. Augustine, for instance, depicts memory in the *Confessions* as a complex and social reconstructive process rather than a simple and individual process of retrieval (McNaron 228). Similarly, Woolf's mimesis of memorial operations for her everywoman personae in *A Room of One's Own* reinforces the communal aspect of Woolf's argument and positions her performance of a "personal" ethos as socially situated.

Personal narratives of exclusion in the past help writers form a strong foundation for understanding the changes that must be made in the future. *A Room of One's Own* also uses a great deal of anamnesis (calling to memory past matters) and epicrisis (quoting a passage and then commenting on it), rhetorical figures that establish Woolf as a credible speaker and writer by depicting her as well-read and well-educated. Since Woolf argues that women have failed to establish themselves in the literary canon because they have been denied equality in education, her use of anamnesis and epicrisis is particularly rich and complicated. Her female personae refer to such literary figures as Christina Rossetti, Charles Lamb, and Robert Browning, at once demonstrating their credibility and marking themselves as outsiders in the world of letters. In a brilliant use of these figures, Woolf illustrates the intellectual credibility of women at the same time as she reveals their lack of formal education.

While Woolf makes vivid the "experiences" of her personae, her own narrative voice remains emotionally detached. For example, Woolf uses litotes, or deliberate understatement, effectively throughout the first chapter of *A Room of One's Own*. In oral delivery, litotes allows a speaker to "humble" him or herself in front of the audience in order to gain their good will. By underplaying her speakers' accomplishments or intelligence, Woolf therefore draws attention not to herself but to the issues at hand; her use of litotes works to create a consistent repetition of the reasons why women need equality in material conditions before they can write. Woolf also often uses mycterismus, defined as a mocking gesture or ironic statement; indeed, Woolf writes much of *A Room of One's Own* with her tongue planted firmly in cheek. By mocking the conventions and attitudes which have kept women out of the academy, she exposes the ridiculous nature of these traditions.

Rhetorical figures in *A Room of One's Own* work not only to make real the plight of women writers, but also to construct a new community of writers and readers. Woolf uses a great deal of metaphor, a figure that works to create meaning through shared experiences. Metaphor is a figure that depends upon communal knowledge-making, on creating a collective "common" meaning. By comparing the position of women to that of a manx cat (a being whose "lack" foregrounds other cats' tails), Woolf demonstrates how women's inequality in education draws attention to the education of their brothers. This metaphor also works to create, as in *Three Gunieas*, a society of outsiders--women and manx cats--who construct their identity by what they lack.

Throughout *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf creates powerful ethical appeals and demonstrates the importance of ethos for the essay writer. Through Woolf's long and complicated career as an essayist, her exemplary technical skills display the ethical situation of the feminist writer, which requires a committed stance but refuses to be limited by it. What Woolf's essay reveals is an understanding of positioning, what Linda Alcoff, following Teresa de Lauretis, sees as "a place from which values are interpreted and constructed rather than as a locus of an already determined set of values" (434). This type of positioning, as Woolf well knew, is open to "outsiders." As Nancy Miller argues, "Because the female subject has juridicially been excluded from the polis, hence decentered, "disoriginated," disinstitutionalized, etc., her relation to integrity and textuality, desire and authority, displays structurally important differences from that universal position" (6). Because ethos is an admission of a standpoint, if only momentarily, ethical appeals become a process of "locating" knowledge. This "politics of location," according to Teresa de Lauretis, "is a strategy of spatial politics which avoids the naïve privileging of individual experience . . . one which insists on reminding the speaker at every moment of her

continuous engagement in social reality" (de Lauretis 19). In terms of representation, de Lauretis argues, this type of spatial politics is created in negativity because the radical place for women is a negative one (19). As de Lauretis contends, "This negativity of woman, her lacking or transcending the laws and processes of signification . . . reveals the way in which woman is 'unrepresentable'"(20). Phyllis Rose has argued that Woolf's ethos (she discusses it as androgynous) is comparable to Keats's description of "negative capability," that state which allows one to be in uncertainty, doubt, and mystery (188). This negative capability creates an aesthetic distance, that allows Woolf to move through her texts as a skeptical outsider, to elide easy definitions and to refuse, even if painfully, the resolution of differences.

In "The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of Ethos," Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds write that a feminist politics of positioning, like rhetoric, "requires distance" (53). This feminist politics of positioning is not one that (as in Adrienne Richs's discussions) simply privileges individual experience. A feminist politics of location looks for a commonality in multiplicity-- exactly the goal that Woolf strives to achieve throughout her career. More akin to Donna Haraway's "situated knowledges," Woolf's ethical appeals reveal, as Haraway writes, "the split and contradictory self . . .one who can interrogate positionings and be accountable, who can construct and join rational conversations and fantastic imaginings . . . multiplicities that are simultaneously salient and partial in all its guises" (586). Like Haraway's situated feminist, Woolf reveals that the "split and contradictory self is never finished, always constructed and stitched together imperfectly and therefore able to join another" (586). These split selves are guises, ethical appeals re-constructed moment by moment. As Jarratt and Reynolds argue, reread through feminism, a feminist ethos is a created self, but one which requires "ethical obligation" (56).

Through her essays, Woolf continually constructs and deconstructs her created selves, but she never forgets the importance of ethical obligations. The techne behind Woolf's ethical appeals reveals her purposeful use of figures to create those ethical appeals; therefore, much of her nonfiction can be seen as epideictic texts of display. Her texts attempt to make visible the invisible and amplify, through the use of masks and personae, the ideologically assumptions of patriarchal culture. In using the form of the epideictic, Woolf's feminist texts complicate the limitations of patriarchy without becoming didactic. The form of the epideictic allows for political arguments that can still be rich and complicated as works of art. As much of her nonfiction reveals, Woolf was simultaneously terrified of writing limiting didactic prose while she also steadfastly recognized the political necessity to do so. Many of the contradictions in her fiction and nonfiction, I argue, can be seen to develop from the paradoxical stance Woolf took between artist and activist. The form of the epideictic was one strategy Woolf used to write politically without compromising her artistic desires. The epideictic also allowed her a certain freedom from prosecution as a feminist--its rich and complicated form allowed her to elide many of her would be critics and detractors. By foregrounding style, especially the figures accorded to the canons of memory and delivery, Woolf places her ethical constructions within a topos of situated knowledges that cannot be resolved. Thus, Woolf's ethical appeals reveal themselves, through rhetorical analysis, to be feminist strategies used to manage the ethical situations in which she located herself within in the first half of the twentieth century. Virginia Woolf's formal strategies are, I argue, viable technai for students in the twenty-first century who are looking for ways to deal with the multiple and conflicting positions and spaces in which they find themselves when writing in digital contexts. Memory and delivery are returning to the

forefront with new technologies that emphasize imagery and that use imagery, as Virginia Woolf does, to create a spatial rhetoric appropriate for epideictic arguments.

Architecture of Twenty-first Century Education

Digital space celebrates multiple voices and encourages the type of masked performances that Virginia Woolf displayed in print. While digital technologies are not required in order to perform the type of ethical appeals Woolf utilized, the development of cyberspace "occasions" the return of the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to the center of the rhetorical paideia. It is clear that technologies alter perceptions of time, place and space. In *The Electronic Word*, Lanham claims that electronic text creates a new "writing space" and, calls for an entirely different "educational space" with reconfigured physical, administrative and disciplinary structures. These new writing spaces, I argue, place the techniques of the canons of memory and delivery squarely at the center of the twenty-first century paideia.

An analysis of the canons of memory and delivery in the twenty-first century reveals the ways in which modes, or techniques of presentation, are intimately connected with cognitive operations, with discovery and invention being inextricably entangled with the processes of memory and delivery. The processes of perception which the memory arts collect, store, and "discover" anew, along with the delivery techniques of "making" and disseminating those perceptions, are actually processes that not only redefine what we think of as knowledge, but actively create that knowledge as well. Hence, hypertextual presentations are not merely virtual reflections of ideas (although the data on the screen is always already an eikon, or copy, of what is stored in the computer's memory), but also operate as the generation of those ideas. The computer screen is the display, or delivery, of memory in exterior graphic form, externally

enacting Aristotle's premise that "it is impossible to think without an image." The visual

component of new media technologies allow the techne accorded to the canons of memory and

delivery to create powerful epideictic arguments on the WWW. Indeed, it may be quickly

becoming impossible to avoid the use of imagery in constructing arguments in an image-driven

techno-culture.

Reverse Ekphrasis

In *Postmodernism and the Logic of Late Capitalism*, Fredric Jameson writes that we are

living in an visual age: "My sense is that this is essentially a visual culture, wired for sound—but

one where the linguistic element . . . is slack and flabby and not to be made interesting without

ingenuity, daring and keen motivation" (299). Although the use of images for cultural

communication is by no means new, the ubiquity of images in our culture is unrivaled. We have

been dominated by the word for many centuries; however, the relationship between the word and

image, as Jay David Bolter notes in *Writing Space*, is becoming "increasingly unstable" (49). As

the relationship between word and image changes in significant ways with the emergence of

digital discourse, the image is increasingly being used to supplement the "limitations" of words.

As Bolter notes, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, we now have a kind of

reverse ekphrasis, where images are used to explain words (56). The reversal of this "ekphrastic

impulse" is most prevalent in digital writing, where the tension between the word and the image

is constantly being redefined (57).

Digital discourse illuminates the persistent, but, often oblique, connection between image

and word. Although for Richard Lanham, new "digital" rhetoric would not make distinctions

among visual, written, or auditory stimuli, others such as Michael Joyce and Bolter believe that

"hyperext is, before anything else, a visual form" (Joyce 19). And yet, hypertext is a visual form whose beginnings were founded on programming languages--on the word, on the ekphrastic impulse taken to the extreme. As computer technologies have developed, however, graphic representations, which have been prominent in our society throughout the twentieth century in print and television, are now overtaking the WWW. Classes on visual arguments and visual literacy are cropping up in colleges and universities, and rhetorical analyses are investigating this "new found," but actually ancient, way of discovering and disseminating information. Although many rhetoricians are investigating the new boundaries around what has been called "visual literacy," there are some who wonder about the future of prose in an era that is so captivated with the visual. As Gunther Kress notes, the "exponential expansion of electronic technologies will entrench visual modes of communication as a rival to language" (54). New delivery techniques that focus on the visual perception and dissemination of data change our understandings of what constitutes information and argument.

While we are living in an age dominated by the image, there are residual prejudices against images, prejudices that linger from print medium. As George Landow writes, "Much of our prejudice against the inclusion of visual information in text derives from print technology" (Landow 51). These prejudices against visual knowledge, storage, and communication are made evident in texts such as Jacques Ellul's 1985 *The Humiliation of the Word*, which argues that we have allowed the visual to triumph over the spoken and written. And yet, there has always been an attendant relationship between the word and the image; indeed, as Douwe Draaisma notes in *Metaphors of Memory*, "the dissemination of the book meant not only an expansion of the written word, but also an expansion if the image" (34). While print media allowed for the ascendancy of the word, there were also ways in which it created spaces where the image could

also expand its possibilities. In 2004, new modes of memory and delivery are created in digital techno-culture, creating new possibilities for the use of imagery in constructing, overwhelmingly epideictic arguments.

(New) Modes of Memory and Delivery

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the new modes of memory and delivery created by digital culture is the presence of imagery in constructing rhetorical argumentation on the web. With new digital technologies, visual literacy becomes an obvious focal point in the field of rhetoric. The impact of visual media in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries rapidly changes the epistemological and ethical foundations of writing developed since the Enlightenment. In *Material Literacy and Visual Design*, Lester Faigley argues that "although all cultures past and present have had a language of images, the dominance of alphabetic literacy from the Enlightenment to the present consequently made images appear trivial, fleeting and manipulative" (236). With the emergence of technologies that allow for the effortless manipulation of images, however, the ascendancy of the image in our culture has had dramatic effects, particularly in the way it revives the techne of the ancient canons of memory and delivery.

Digital writing spaces reveal correlations between ancient techniques of memory and digital computer technologies. The emphasis on arrangement in hypertextual documents brings memorial operations to the forefront of digital composing because the arrangement of the topics, as well as the display of the images which recall these topics in the mind's eye, are crucial in determining retention and retrieval and movement in digital texts. As Bolter observes, "The mental maps of ancient rhetors can easily remind us of hypertextual maps, especially the graphic

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structures" (*Writing Space* 109). In fact, the speed and precision of computer technologies can be seen as the ultimate memory structure. According to Mary Carruthers, "The proof of a good memory lies not in the simple retention even of large amounts of material, rather it is the ability to move it about instantly, directly and securely that is admired" (19). Digital writing, as Gunther Kress observes, "signals the shift from inwardly focused, physical and cognitive action" (65). With our memories having been exteriorized into media (from photography, to cinema, to the phonograph, television and computer), we can see how delivery techniques vitally interact with the processes and procedures of memory.

Since the computer enacts both the storage and display of information, it concomitantly reveals the close connection between memory and delivery. As Ilana Snyder writes in the preface to *Page to Screen* "the new writing spaces include the screen where text is displayed and the electronic memory in which is stored" (xx). Because arrangement and display are the essential features of the logic of the visual, memory and delivery, which focus on the (re)presentation of ideas, are interconnected. As Aristotle claims in *De Anima*, "the key to memory . . . is "presentation" (Gronberg 140). Just like ancient mneumonic techniques, delivery techniques also emphasize presentation and display, whether in oral, written, or digital forms. George Yoos claims in "The Pragmatics of Graphics within Written Discourse" that the use of textual cues and graphics is rhetorical (101). Computer technologies, in turn, are also focused on the various possibilities of arrangement and display, and, as Jay David Bolter, contends in "Hypertext and the Rhetorical Canons," hypertext brings together delivery and arrangement, for "the arrangement of a hypertext is determined in act of delivery" (100). Interestingly, in hypertext, there is no text prior to delivery; the delivery is the text, and it always changes: the medium, in McLuhan's words, actually becomes the message. What occurs with new digital technologies is a

shift from modernist ideologies that focus on depth, to postmodernist ideologies that emphasize the surface of the text.[61] As Johndan Johnson-Eilola notes in "Living on the Surface: Learning in the Age of Global Communications Networks:"

> postmodernism abducts modernist technologies: the computer, a device originally
>
> constructed to calculate weapons trajectories, is reconstructed and redistributed to
>
> provide a fluid, flowing space where users experiment with multiple
>
> subjectivities; where stories lose concrete beginnings, middles and ends; where
>
> the rules of games shift, are overwritten, and sometimes even disappear. (186)

Significantly, digital technologies deconstruct the functional, instrumental uses of technology to create epidiectic texts that confuse the boundaries between form and function, memory and delivery, and information and knowledge.

An interesting aspect of emerging computer technologies is not only the way in which they transform the relationships between the rhetorical canons, but also the way in which they blur the boundaries that Western society has been so steadfast in constructing since the Enlightenment. For instance, according to Richard Lanham, "the new digital rhetorics would be inclusive and would make no invidious distinctions between high and low culture, commercial and pure usage, talented or chance creation, visual or auditory stimulus, iconic or alphabetic information" (*Electronic Word* 14). What we have in contemporary society is a view of knowledge as collections of verbal and visual ideas that can arrange themselves into a multiplicity of hierarchical and associative patterns-- much like Vannevar Bush's memex

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[61] Johndan Johnson- Eilola on surface: "if a postmodern stance seems to offer a position from which people can negotiate new understandings and capabilities in computer-supported environments, this same stance sometimes degenerates into the purely superficial. When surface replaces history as life's organizing paradigm, stable identities seem to disintegrate. Traditionally, the weight of history held us in place . . ." (205).

machine. And yet, cyberspace is a universe that needs to be organized to be useful.[62] Thus, spatial metaphors have developed on the web to allow for productive, yet open-ended, use of cyberspace.

Since the computer screen embodies both retrieval and display, knowledge that was once interiorized in the individual, now becomes a part of every viewer's exteriorized mind. Unlike the internal memory maps of ancient mnemonics, the methods for organizing knowledge are now located in the processes of retrieval and display on the screen, creating exteriorized spaces of social memory and collapsing the difference between (speaker) reader and (audience) writer. As Locke Carter argues in a recent article for *Computers and Composition*, "the spirit of a hypertextual essay is that it does not privilege a sequential structure," leaving the task of arrangement primarily with the reader (3). Carter also discusses the way in which spatial metaphors have become abundant in web design.[63] A writer of hypertext arguments can choose spatial metaphors within a hypertext argument to overlay the content and suggest a path through the argument (Carter 14). Metaphors of space are the dominant figures of speech in cyberspace and have become more than merely symbolic; they operate as mnemonic systems on the web. Spatial metaphors in cyberspace, then, recall ancient artificial memory systems, allowing twenty-first century applications of classical techniques.

The spatial metaphors used in web pages and hypertext allow readers to orient themselves in what is an abstract network. To think of oneself as a bodily force moving in space presents a useful perspective for users. If users think of nodes as places and links as tunnels, they

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[62] As Jay Bolter remind us: "Those who have studied hypertext theory well know that that it has its roots in Bush's memex, oral discourse and medieval codices. But we should not forget that Plato and Aristotle shaped the way we categorize and hierarchalize information—an important issue when we consider that without the notion of structure, sorti6ng and retrieving data from hypertextual environments would be impossible" (*Writing Space* 54).

[63] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued that metaphors are necessary for cognition: physical metaphors of space are used to make sense of abstract concepts. As Lakoff and Johnson write: "most of our fundamental concepts are organized in terms of one or more spatialization metaphors" (17).

have a better grasp on where we are going and where we have been. For example, Landow's famous rhetoric of departures and arrivals help readers choose possible movements and provide maps of their "journey." Carter contends, "these navigational metaphors are not just figurative, but literal, at least at the cognitive level" (15). Metaphors of space on the web, therefore, have a pragmatic function. As Catherine Marshall and Frank Shipmann write, spatial metaphors of abstract concepts on the web allow readers "to interpret intertextual relationships according to perceptual conventions" (227). The spaces of web pages and the graphical representations and layout of those pages have become significant rhetorical acts in and of themselves. As Jay Bolter argues in *Writing Space*, web pages and hypertextual documents have become a kind of topographical writing, where space is part of the argument, not just a medium for that argument.

In fact, some of the most damaging things one can do to one's digital ethos occur through uninformed or deliberate misuse of the spatial conventions of the web. If readers are unable to retrace their steps, find more information, or move outside of the website, the designer/writer has created a serious fallacy: they have imprisoned their reader in what should be a nonstop, open, journey. If readers are unable to make choices about their movement, the designer/writer has compromised her ethos. Spatial metaphors are necessary to communicate on the web because the ethos of the web demands that hypertextual or web based arguments are conducted in a cooperative spaces that provide useful techniques and procedures for navigating those spaces. Since digital technologies can so easily manipulate and lead astray, digital writers need technai that allow them to communicate to their users where they have been as well as where they are going (Carter 19). The importance of ethical appeals in digital culture is not limited, however, to the use of back buttons and site maps.

The development of virtual reality creates new possibilities for ethical configurations. In a recent article in *Artforum*, entitled "Virtual Reality," Scott Bukatman argues that the spatiality of VR is connected to the importance it places on bodily experience:

> Data is experienced in a sensorially-enriched fashion, and the promise of fully realized, hyperreal alternate realities continues to lurk just behind most non specialist discussions of VR. The mapping of a familiar physical orientation onto unfamiliar systems of information literally transforms the digital into the tactile. (13)

While we may be delivering our bodies in cyber-form, the performance of our virtual bodies is still distinctly tangible, showing that it is not the actual body, but the performance of that body, which is crucial to identity. In addition, as N. Katherine Hayles argues, the performance of virtual bodies also can reveal that computer technologies are not, as has been argued, "disembodying technologies." Hayles seeks to "articulate interpretations that contest the illusion of disembodiment" by being "attentive to the materialities of the media and their implications" ("Condition" 94). In analyzing the representation of the body on the WWW, I argue, we can begin to see that possibilities for enacting ethos on the WWW are tied to spatial rhetorics that call upon the techne of the canons of memory and delivery. For although cyberspace actually constitutes a "figure of speech" created to represent a gap we cannot account for other than linguistically, cyberspace also creates, what I call proprioceptive positions of ethos: positions that reveal the materiality of the bodies on the web, where as Hayles observes, experienced users feel "the proprioceptive coherence with the keyboard, experiencing the screen surface as a space into which her subjectivity can flow" ("Condition" 88). [64] The telematic processes and

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[64] It is important to note that virtual reality can be anything from what occurs in the transmission of the telephone or television to the computer: it is comprised of a "cyber"space that is not real but appears to be. For instance when you

procedures of the WWW are based in techne—they exist in the way in which the use and reuse, and form and transform, the boundaries of a rhetorical, not literal, (cyber)space.

Virtual Spaces and Bodies

If it is true that contemporary life now takes place on the screen, then in the era of the visual, one's perspective determines everything: one's location or place in cyberspace or virtual reality functions to determine one's access to information and knowledge. As Nicholas Mirzoeff states in "An Introduction to Visual Culture," The first move towards visual culture studies is a recognition that the visual image is not stable but changes its relations to exterior reality at particular moments (7). One's place, or movement through cyberspace, mirrors the movement or rapid appearance or disappearance of images in postmodern culture. Hence, Foucault's claim in *The Order of Things* that "in a visual culture, humanity may find itself in serene nonexistence" seems to have come to fruition in digital culture; as a visual culture seeks to constantly visualize abstractions, it not only places emphasis on the power of representation, but also changes men and women's relationships to their own bodies (386).

In Victoria Vesna's[65] website BodiescINCoprorated,[66] power relationships are mediated through the creation and destruction of virtual bodies who are always under the control of the site organizer, referred to as God/dess. The user of the site designs and names a body, choosing from twelve possible materials, such as black rubber or water. The body is then equipped with sound, such as "CHAOS." The body can be made of multiple genders, say a feminine leg and masculine arm, and the age can be selected as anything from 0-999. Although the body can role-play for the

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talk on the phone, virtual reality comes into being in the space between the two speakers (Mirzoeff 91). For another discussion of the rhetorical nature of cyberspace, see: William J. Mitchell, "Replacing Place." *The Digital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media.* Peter Lunenfield, ed. Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press, 1999 (112).

[65] http://vv.arts.ucla.edu/index.html

[66] www.bodiesinc.ucla.edu/

user, and the user can modify the body at any time, the "fate" of the body is always ultimately under the control of the God/dess. The body can become deceased or placed in limbo at any time. The dramatic space of the site is called Showplace!!! where the body is displayed in ceremonial fashion. Interestingly, the narrative on the page starts by stating that this body is a copy of the original, a "mirror image." In Showplace!!!, the copy of a copy is fetishized. The narrative on this page situates the body in a space where the image can be delivered in true capitalist fashion-- on a billboard seen by millions of eyes. Here, the boundaries collapse between consumer and consumed, or in rhetorical terms, speaker and audience. The user who created the body becomes one of the millions of eyes watching his or her now larger-- than-- life creation: "Immediately available is a mirror image of your self. The camera zooms in, you feel an enormously warm and glowing light directly above you. Your image is projected onto a large billboard that millions of people are watching. You are being watched by countless eyes through multiple lenses—all in sharp focus." In a more recent creation, nOtime,[67] Vesna has constructed a site where users can create and download another type of virtual body, one that, unlike BodiesINCorporated, does not resemble the human body. These bodies are constructed from moving geometric figures (tetrahedrons) bound together by text. The bodies can be constructed from text either pre-selected by the site creators or from text written by the user. The body both grows and (eventually) implodes based on how many other users download the body to use as screen savers. These bodies exist only in "no time" because they "live" only in cyberspace-- as screen savers they are present only in the down time of the computer; their fate depends on how many other users display them in the space of their own computers. These bodies are rhetorical configurations that reveal, following Hayles's posthumanism, the way bodies are constructed through "boundaries" or, for the purposes of my argument, through, techne.

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[67] http://notime.arts.ucla.edu/notime3/

Vesna uses her virtual bodies to reveal the lack of control one has over the body. Her bodies are bodies that are interactively constructed and destroyed. While the virtual bodies operate outside physical and natural laws, they are still controlled by social and cultural forces. The bodies are always recorded statistically in the site's database, and they perform only as they are allowed to by the architects of the site. The performance of these bodies change in relation to exterior reality; as representations they are unstable. Significantly, these bodies are an example of the epideictic: they are focused on the praise and blame of the body and their creations emphasize the amplification of certain traits, for instance, sexuality or language. These bodies exist in the eternal present, where the excitement they generate is not built around what they currently are, but what they are to become, even in their death or explosion, evoking Foucault's "serene non-existence" in a tangible way (*Order* 386).

The virtual spaces of the web, as literalized in Vesna's work, reveal the way in which space is a social construction of knowledge, built around both the demarcations and transgressions that techne engenders. Although space is made of the places we inhabit, it is also, as Vesna shows, shaped dynamically, socially, and rhetorically. Vesna's bodies extend the domain of the body, showing how a body can be an open and complex structure in cyberspace. Virtual spaces expand concepts of the body and spatiality, but at the same time, they also draw upon ancient conceptions of memory and delivery. Virtual bodies are made of localized data, or memories, which then allow them to perform, or be delivered, to a global audience. These bodies "perform" in cyberspace, using combinations of words and images to deliver their messages. As ceremonial objects, these bodies enact a type of epideictic rhetoric, one that focuses its attention on the praise and blame of the cyber-body. These are bodies built (with data chips as memories)

for public display; they are exteriorized social beings created from techniques and procedures, bodies created purely by techne.

In a less obvious, but more crucial way, all of our online creations, whether e-mails, hypertext arguments, or our hardware's memory bank, construct a digital matrix of our cyber-selves, where processes and techniques (per)form ethos. In fact, media scholars have recently begun to describe digital memory as a theater instead of as a storehouse. According to Mattussek, the WWW is now, "the performativeness of images in motion."[68] Brenda Laurel discusses the potential of this view of the computer as theater in *Computers as Theater*, stating that "for virtual reality to fulfill its highest potential, we must reinvent the sacred spaces where we collaborate in order to transform it and ourselves" (196). Richard Bolt, an MIT scholar studying the spatialization of data management systems also argues that viewing computers as theaters returns the loci method to the forefront, stating that the "Simonides Effect" operates in computer data systems (13). Theaters of memory like Camillo's theater and the WWW store and retrieve information from the past, but that information is perceived as always already future-oriented. On the WWW, delivery is the enactment of our compressed memories in the space of the present. In fact, digital photographs and sounds are nothing other than compressed bits of information stored in the computer's memory. The WWW is more than just a storehouse of information, however; it is enactive, displaying the product and process at the same time. Since the term "enactive" means both to perform and to establish or create, the WWW becomes as much of a performance of knowledge-making as it is a storehouse of that knowledge-- enacting above all, the execution of the means and methods of the canons of memory and delivery in what are becoming repetitive, habitual, conventions. Significantly, the conventions of the WWW are uniquely related to the conventions of ancient epideictic rhetoric.

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[68] See paragraph 12 (http://141.20.150.19/PM/Pub/A_39.html)

The WWW and the Rise of the Epideictic

It is my argument that the predominant occasion for speaking/writing on the WWW is overwhelmingly epideictic. In *Classical Rhetorical Theory,* Poulakos and Poulakos outline four characteristics of the epideictic form: the affinity for competition; its propensity to become a spectacle; its proclivity to excess and exaggeration and; its susceptibility to the propagation of dominant values (63 – 64). Interestingly, all four of these qualities can be evidenced on the WWW. As Poulakos and Poulakos note: "Epideictic rhetoric was also influenced by the culture's fondness of, and delight in, exhibition. … Developed along the lines of a spectacle, epideictic rhetoric helped create the awareness that words do more than call forth the world; they also create and display symbolic worlds of human design and purpose" (64). The WWW delights in exhibition; it easily can be defined as a global spectacle, and can be seen to create rhetorical arguments that use techne such as figuration and narrative. In addition, since most websites on the WWW can easily be seen as sites for praise and blame, the WWW enacts ceremonial discourse taken to the extreme. Digital technologies use ceremonial procedures of recalling information and amplify the uses of data. Indeed, the predominant figure of speech on the web can be seen to be amplification, the figure most often used in the epideictic.[69] It is, however, the way in which the WWW operates as a database public memory that it serves the most interesting epideictic functions.

The connection between public, communal, memory and the epideictic can be found in classical times. As Kendall Phillips writes the "question of where an individual should fit in the narratives of public memory has long been a rhetorical one, embodied by one of the oldest

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[69] See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* Chapter 9, 1368a.

genres of rhetoric, epideictic -- the speech of praise or blame."[70] Phillips argues that Aristotle, for

instance, considered epideictic a form of education whereby citizens were presented with models

of civic conduct. She also claims that a similar observation might be made about the aesthetic

experience of rhetoric in a digital culture:

> The mechanical (digital) capacity for reproducing moments of public address also
>
> complicates any sense of the contexts in which an audience renders such rhetoric
>
> sensible and where these moments fit within the configurations of public memory.[71]

Calling upon Walter Benjamin's claim about the reduction of aesthetic aura in the reproduction

of art, Phillips's argument calls attention to the necessity of examining the amalgamation of the

temporal and spatial contexts of the web. With time located spatially on the WWW, digital texts

enact epideictic rhetoric creating, in Victoria Vesna's words, a *n0time* that fuses the operations of

memory and delivery.

    While the arguments of the WWW are always already located in the present (what

appears online today may be gone tomorrow), the time of the WWW occurs, as Victor Vitanza

suggests in "In-Between: Or, Writing on the Midway" in the "eternal present."[72] Although

Vitanza's reference to the eternal present is probably related more to Nietzsche's understanding

of the eternal return, the phrase "eternal present" actually has religious and spiritual connotations.

The eternal present is an actual term used in both pagan and Christian religions to denote the

spiritual reality of cyclical and mythological events that return in an everlasting "Yeatsian"

spiral. The eternal present claims that events are very likely to recur, but does not see time as

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[70]See paragraph 23 of Kendall Phillips's "Rhetorical 'Rivers of Blood:' Mediated Interpretive Controversy and *The trial of Enoch Powell."* http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0300/kpfr9b.htm
[71] Ibid.
[72] Victor Vitanza sees the epideictic in context of deliberative and judicial acts: "thinking of it as the combination of the other two speech acts and specifically in terms of the grammatical tense of the future perfect—what will have passed" ("Midway" 76).

linear. I agree with Vitanza (perhaps for different reasons) that the WWW is overwhelmingly constructed as an "eternal present"— a space where the past is constructed spatially and is called upon through ceremonial conventions. In this sense, the epideictic reveals the connections of the past to the future as signified in the eternal present and thus incorporates both memorial and delivery operations.

The way in which the canons of memory and delivery are most significantly engendered in the epideictic rhetoric of the WWW can be seen in a recent argument, made by Elena Esposito, that the advent of computer technologies enacts telematic memory. Esposito substantiates the connection between the canons of memory and delivery on the WWW by claiming that the telematic memory of digital rhetoric does not refer to information or knowledge, but to the techniques or procedures that make information or knowledge available to use: in Florian Brody's words, "the medium is the memory" (135). Telematic memory concerns the means by which one has access to knowledge, reinforcing N. Katherine Hayles's argument that "the crucial issue with information [in digital culture] is access" (78). Telematic memory represents a mobile form of memory, constantly establishing and de-establishing links, or connections and pathways to information.[73] Esposito argues that telematic memory does not rely on temporal progression, but is spatially organized. She argues that time is moving so fast that the past continually catches up with the present, creating, as I have argued, an eternal present. The eternal present of digital writing reinforces the WWW as primarily epideictic. Oriented towards public entertainment, the epideictic focuses on what is "fit for display." And yet, as is abundantly clear even to the novice web surfer, in terms of content, at least, anything and everything is now fit for display.

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[73] Esposito's text has not yet been translated into English. For an excellent review and summary of Esposito's work, see Michael Boyden's article in *Image and Narrative* (February 2003).

Significantly, it is the techne of the display, the spatial organization and reorganization of our individual and social memories, that creates effective rhetoric on the web. Mary Carruthers argues in *The Craft of Memory* that the cardinal sin in ancient mnemonics was not forgetting but disorder (82). The sin in contemporary mnemonics, what could be called the techniques of digital data management and processing, concern forms which are not "fit for display." Digital technologies bring the techne of the canons of memory and delivery back to the forefront, but with striking differences. Since memories have been exteriorized, we no longer need elaborate internal memory systems to gather and place the points of our arguments. Our technologies have become our new memory palaces; we place our memories in cyber-locations, using new techniques and procedures to recall them as we need them. Our memories are now delivered to us not through neural pathways, but through networks of wires and telephone lines. The presentation of our memories (our past writings, our past selves, our past chain of hyperlinks) now takes place digitally, not in our mind's eye, but on our computer screen and in our hard-drive's memory. Since software applications deliver arguments in oral, written and graphic contexts, we have not only merged media, but we have merged genres as well: the medium of rhetoric is everything at once.

Conclusion

The exteriorization of knowledge on the WWW has created spaces for building community, not just through increased communication, but through communal knowledge-making as well. The WWW does away with Enlightenment understandings of authorship and the ownership of ideas and becomes a colossal communal mind, always shifting, allowing for public spaces for consensus, dissensus, rationality, and irrationality. From the fifth century, through the

Enlightenment, and the twenty-first century, there have been those who have lamented the nature of language and knowledge as collective undertakings. The technologies of the twenty-first century are rapidly challenging these definitions of writing and knowledge; the advance of hypertext and Internet technologies would probably deeply trouble a philosopher king such as Plato. In fact, Plato's deepest concerns about the invention of writing in the *Phaedrus* can be seen to come to fruition in hypertext:

> And once a thing is put into writing, the composition, whatever it may be, drifts
>
> all over the place, getting into the hands not only of those who understand it, but
>
> equally of those who have no business with it; it doesn't know how to address the
>
> right people and not address the wrong. (141)

Not only do computer technologies allow for meaning to become unfixed and destabilized, they also allow for the rapid and unrestricted dissemination of information on the web. As McLuhan writes in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, " the simultaneous 'field' of electronic information structures today reconstitutes the conditions and need for dialogue and participation, rather than specialization and private initiative, in all levels of social experience"(141). Significantly, the endless possibility of the WWW engenders the need for ethos in twenty-first century culture, ethical appeals that, I argue, can be constructed from the techne of the canons of memory and delivery.

Indeed, digital culture emphasizes the need for the kinds of ethical appeals that Virginia Woolf demonstrated in the early part of the twentieth century. According to Nedra Reynolds, in "Ethos as Location: New Sites for Understanding Discursive Authority," in the postmodern world ethos cannot be seen as "a stable quality possessed by the rhetor, but as a relational location articulated in writing" (327). If politics of positioning requires distance, as Reynolds

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argues with Susan Jarratt in "The Splitting Image," the distance created by digital technologies can serve to encourage these kinds of situated knowledges. As cyberspace is perceived through spatial metaphors, writers and readers on the web can continually place and replace themselves through the matrix of locations and knowledges on the web. Woolf 's enactment of the situated feminist is given abundant resources in digital culture, from the speed of movement which digital technology allows to the multiplicity of spaces for the performance of identities. Significantly, the politics of feminist location can find fruition on the web through the increased opportunities for collaboration, a collaboration assisted by the operations of the canons of memory and delivery.

Emerging computer technologies allow for the collaboration among writers and readers, and the "network" of the WWW creates a matrix of memory systems in which all texts interconnect and collaborate with one another. As Landow notes in *Hypertext 2.0*:

Any document placed on any networked system that supports electronically

linked materials potentially exists in collaboration with any and all other

documents on that system . . . and any document electronically linked to any other

document collaborates with it. (89)

Since digital discourse supports collective knowledge-making, the canons of memory and delivery, which in turn support an approach to the creation and dissemination of knowledge that relies upon the strength of community, are reborn into the rhetorical paideia. As Dene Grigar notes in *New Words, New Worlds*: "electronic discourse does appear to offer opportunities for public discourse, on a grand scale, perhaps much in the same way that oral discourse did [in ancient Greece]" (46). The new agora is the WWW: it exists in the virtual spaces between telephone lines and hard-drives, fusing our public and private memories and delivering them

externally through digital interfaces. Since the WWW most often uses the conventions of epideictic, digital argumentation entails the use of ceremonial discourse conventions, techniques of argumentation that often attempt to mask, as Virginia Woolf's nonfiction reveals in the middle of the twentieth century, intense and complicated ideological struggles. In this way, the techne of digital argumentation can be used, following Heidegger, to reveal our practices to us. Analyses of techne often utilized on the WWW, such as the techne of the canons of memory and delivery, illustrate the rich and complicated ways twenty-first century writers find places to argue.

CHAPTER THREE

SPECTERS OF ETHOS: THE TECHNE OF MEMORY AND DELIVERY AND THE

PERFORMANCE OF THE DIGITAL

I dreamt that I was looking in a glass when a horrible face—the face of an animal—suddenly showed over my shoulder. I cannot be sure if this was a dream, or if it happened. Was I looking in the glass one day when something in the background moved, and seemed to me alive? I cannot be sure. But I have always remembered the other face in the glass, whether it was a dream or a fact, and that it frightened me. --Virginia Woolf, "A Sketch of the Past"

The logic of the ghost . . . points toward a thinking of the event . . . demonstrated today better than ever by the fantastic, ghostly, "synthetic," "prosthetic," virtual happenings in the scientific domain and, therefore, the domain of the techno-media and, therefore, the public and political domain. --Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*

I shall cover my head before I begin; then, I can rush through my speech at top speed without looking at you or breaking down for shame. --Socrates to Lysias in the *Phaedrus*

The specter in the mirror that frightens Virginia Woolf in her memoir, "A Sketch of the

Past," reflects her anxiety concerning the relationships among memory, truth, and selfhood. The

mirror operates as a device of prosopopoeia, a techne of delivery related to personification and

used to "project."[74] Prosopopoeia operates as amplification and often magnifies what has been

covered over, in Woolf's case revealing the "monster" within. Because Virginia Woolf's

"nightmare" comes from the confusion of boundaries between memory and narrative, self and

other, past and present, it reflects the complex position of the twenty-first century posthuman,

where, according to Katherine Hayles boundary confusion amplifies both terror and excitement

(4). In contemporary techno-culture, our rhetorical mirrors are constructed in cyberspace and

reveal the spectral quality of a posthuman ethos, one in which digital prostheses allow us to flow

through boundaries, like ghosts, to create a "proprioceptive coherence" (Hayles "Condition" 88).

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[74] A techne taken from the Greek word prosopon, meaning visage or mask, and the etymological origin of the term persona.

This proprioceptive coherence demonstrates the etymological connection of ethos to the Greek word ethea, meaning "to haunt" or "hang out." Thus, Derrida's claim in *Specters of Marx* that the ghostly, prosthetic, happenings in cyberspace demonstrate "the logic of the ghost" reveals the significance of the traces left by our posthuman specters in cyberspace performances. Cyberspace, then, is not really a "space" at all, but a linguistic construction where rhetorical technai can construct "shape-shifting" ethical appeals that, I argue, are often created by the techne of the canons of memory and delivery. Significantly, however, the connection between the specter and ethos is not a contemporary construction, but rooted in of the most powerful and complex ancient displays of ethos: Plato's *Phaedrus.*

On the face of it, Socrates's famous masked performance to Lysias occurs because Socrates finds the nature of his mock speech morally offensive; however, this act of covering in Plato's *Phaedrus* functions not only as a declaration of shame, but also as a revelation by Plato about the complicated connection between "truth" and ethos. Through his shape-shifting performance, Socrates enacts a commentary on the ethics of rhetoric that simultaneously opens and closes the possibilities for the play of ethos. In *The Art of Persuasion in Greece,* George Kennedy argues that Lysias, credited with the elaboration on the structures and strategies of ethos, serves as a "strawman" whom Socrates can use to question the ethics of invented ethos (57-8). By covering his head in his first speech, Socrates speaks the words but does not appear in them, masking rather than revealing the self and its intentions (Baumlin xii). Therefore, Socrates also enacts the figure of prosopopoeia; however, instead of amplifying and enlarging, Socrates's mask actually covers him up, disconnecting the speaker from his supposed "true character" while magnifying Plato's disdain for invented ethos. Here, Socrates performs both a refutation of what Plato perceives as the corrupt nature of ethical appeals and a demonstration of the value of

ethical operations. While Socrates's linguistic performance in the *Phaedrus* seems to bolster Plato's claim that truth is bound up with notions of ethos, whereby even the performance of an ersatz speech by Socrates can be seen to damage his very person, it also brilliantly employs illusion and deception to reach that "truth." As Socrates covers his head and becomes a ghost-like figure, haunting the scene of the "unreal" phantom speech, he also amplifies the etymological connection of ethos to ethea, and, thereby, performs the fantastic spirit of classical ethos.

In spite of this *spect*acular performance, Socrates's act of uncovering in his second speech to Lysias serves as an assertion of Plato's belief concerning the necessary ethical relation between a speaker and his words. In a dramatic turn, Plato, again through his adroit use of the figure of prosopopoeia, deceptively manipulates Socrates's ethos in order to argue that language, and, hence, one's ethos, must be placed in the service of truth (Baumlin xii). While the argument that language must be handmaiden to the truth was not an unproblematic construction in the fifth century, twenty-first century culture calls truth into question, problematizing the possibility of a postmodern ethos.[75] For example, Victor Vitanza argues in "Concerning a Postclassical Ethos,"

> The problem of a Postclassical *Ethos*--and it is a most serious, though at the same time a most comedic, problem--is from a postmodern perspective a problem of the "Speaking - (Acting-Thinking)-Subject" (also called the problem of the Ethical Subject) . . . It is always already, in these various discussions, a Subject that is "subjected" in either a master/slave relationship (Hegel, *Phenomenology*) or "subjected" to a master/slave morality (Nietzsche, *Genealogy*). (390)[76]

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[75] As Michelle Ballif asks in "Writing the Third Sophistic Cyborg: Periphrasis on an [In]Tense Rhetoric," "What, then, are the prospects for rhetoric when the terms of the triad (including "speaker" [ethos], "audience" [pathos], and "message" [logos] which have long since defined rhetoric) are rendered referentless? (53).

[76] Unconventional in style, Victor Vitanza's text is presented exactly as it appears in his text

Vitanza desires new forms of subjectivity that are "separate from and resistant to classical/modern social constructions of Ethos" (394). Although some rhetoricians, such as Vitanza, argue that postmodern culture and the concomitant digital revolution render classical notions of ethos obsolete, or, at the very least, "comedic," the digital revolution, particularly in the way in which it restores the uses of the classical canons of memory and delivery to rhetoric, actually opens up possibilities for the creation and performance of ethos for the student writer.[77]

Indeed, Vitanza's conflation of classical and modern understandings of ethos seems surprisingly uncomplicated, for as Jan Swearingen makes clear in "Ethos: Imitation, Impersonation, and Voice," the conception of ethos as a fixed stable character (which, therefore, is no longer viable in a postmodern culture) is in fact a hangover of Enlightenment thinking.[78] Moreover, the electronic agora works as a global prosopopoeia device, amplifying the possibilities for one's ethos as well as covering and uncovering the phantom-like web of identities made possible by electronic technologies. Ethos has become an electronic poltergeist, simultaneously fabricating and disturbing the many possibilities for identity in the twenty-first century. As the private, individual, self of Romantic and Enlightenment lore becomes absorbed by the public selves of the digital age, the ethical appeals that occur in cyberspace reveal the complicated nature of selfhood itself. As Richard Lanham argues in *The Motives of Eloquence*, the Western self "has from the beginning been composed of a shifting and perpetually uneasy combination of homo rhetoricus and homo serious, of a social and a central self" (6). Digital

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[77] While speech is always to some extent out of our control, agency is not an outmoded concept in the twenty-first century. According to Judith Butler, "Whereas some critics mistake the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the outset" (*Excitable Speech* 15-6).

[78] In "Ethos: Imitation, Impersonation, and Voice" C. Jan Swearingen argues, "The value of authenticity that informs modern concepts of ethos, to the extent that it emphasizes candid self-expression, is a post-Romantic paradigm of an inward-looking, reflective self . . . We look at questions of identity, voice, self, and authenticity as intrinsic to ethos. Classical thinkers, I will argue, did not" (115).

spaces encourage the movement between public and private selves, allowing for complex ethical rhetorical appeals.

In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which writers construct ethos through the techne of the canons of memory and delivery and, in turn, look to the ways that ethos can be analyzed pragmatically as multiple and conflicting strategies to maneuver through the ethical situations and contexts encountered digital writing. Initially, I will focus on the ways the techne of the canons of memory and delivery construct ethical appeals for student writers and examine how students develop that ethos in online writing environments. I will specifically investigate constructions of ethos in the chat rooms of an online composition classroom, looking to the ways the digital spaces in "distance learning" allow for both the expansion and limitation of identity. I will also analyze advanced student writers' use of ethical appeals in autobiographical digital essays. By specifically analyzing the techne of the canons of memory and delivery that create ethos in online situations, I argue that digital arguments require particular attention to ethical appeals and the ways those appeals create "bodies" in cyberspace. Following Heidegger, I argue that analyzing the techne used in digital environments reveals our practices to us, illuminating the myriad of strategies students use to place themselves in cyberspace.

The Problem of a Posthuman Ethos

While this dissertation seeks to discover the valuable ways in which classical conceptions of ethos are being reborn in the electronic agora, simplified conflations of the terms all too often used interchangeably with ethos (individual, self, identity, and subject) can hinder analysis of ethical appeals in twenty-first century writing. In a thorough analysis that links contemporary definitions of the terms self, subject, and identity to the arrival of digital media, Mark Poster, in

What's the Matter with the Internet?, offers a helpful overview of definitions and uses for these terms in the past century. According to Poster, "individual" is an "empty term" that needs explanation to specify itself with a certain time and space (6). Poster claims that "self" delineates the mind, personality, soul, and psyche of the individual (6). The terms "identity" and "subject," however, are embedded in cultural analysis with "much more theoretical and political weight" (6). For Poster, the term "subject" is used to delineate the modern self, which has at its foundation the Cartesian ontological separation from material objects; "subject" makes up the foundation of the individual, creating "a distance from the world that enables the exercise of reason, reason that may grasp reality as a certain truth"(6). Poster notes that the figure of the individual (as in Foucault's analyses) provides the legitimacy for most modern institutions— representative democracy, law capitalist economics, science, education (6). Identity comes into "discursive play" when the individual, as a cultural figure, begins to collapse with the recognition of "the failure of Western culture" (7). According to Poster, however, with the advent of new digital media, the difference between the individual as subject and the individual as identity becomes crucial.

Since individuals are created as subjects or identities within language, becoming, through repeated enunciations, "interpellated" and, therefore, recognized as coherent selves, definitions of identity and subjectivity are becoming radically altered as they are progressively filtered through "mediations of information"(9). As Poster writes, "networked computing shift[s] the scene in which the individual becomes and continues to practice selfhood" (9). Although Poster defines this shift to digital interpellations as postmodern, I would argue that this is a distinctly posthuman situation. (9). Posthumanism has created new possibilities for the elaboration of habitual, ritualized, ethical practices. These practices form a digitized "treasure-house" of ethical

appeals and identity performances that blur the boundaries between public and private and writer and text. Interestingly, classical conceptions of ethos can provide some of the most valuable insights into the identities created in posthuman digital interpellations.

Reclassifying Contemporary Ethos

The etymological connection of ethos to ethea, as one that haunts or "hangs out, reveals the way in which identity survives on web—moving from background to foreground, disappearing, and shape-shifting, representing ghosts of past memories of the self with irony and parody. In its connection to ethea, a digital ethos cannot be seen to reinforce notions of an authentic self. Indeed, according to Jan Swearingen, classical conceptions of ethos did not incorporate the questions of authenticity that modernist philosophies have emphasized (115). The idea of character in ancient Greece was seen to be elastic and one's ethos was created by one's practices. In *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students,* Sharon Crowley notes, "Within certain limits imposed by class and gender restrictions, one could become any sort of person he or she wished to be, simply by engaging in the practices that produced that sort of character" (85). Similarly, Foucault has described classical ethos as a performance demonstrated in "a certain manner of acting visible to others" (*Final Foucault* 6). According to Foucault, classical notions of ethos implied a performance to the extent that "care for self," demonstrated through one's "gait" or "dress," rendered one competent to occupy a place in the city, in the community, or in inter-individual relationships (7). Hence one's practices allowed for the development of character and determined one's "place" in ancient Greece. For classical rhetors, one's situated

ethos did not develop from an intrinsic character, but was constructed, self-consciously, through the conventional practices of every day life.[79]

Since classical rhetors believed that ethos was created by habituation, both in terms of custom of the text and customs of behavior and deportment, ethics were linked to memory operations. As Francis Yates notes:

> In Aristotle's system the speaker attains ethos through ethical habits, through being the type of good person by whom an audience can be persuaded. But the speaker can effectively use ethos only by practicing the virtuous habits that lead one to develop good character: virtue comes about not by process of nature, but by habituation. (97)

Cicero also gave memory ethical implications. In his discussion of the four virtues (Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperence), he places memory under Prudence along with intelligence and foresight (Yates 20). Long seen as the prototype of religious autobiography, Augustine's *Confessions* describes how memory operations connect to the process of self-production, articulating the complex ways one writes oneself into being.[80] Indeed, Augustine's techniques of reflection and the consequent productions of identity in the *Confessions* utilize many of the technai that later writers would use, particularly autobiographical writers. These techniques include technai of memory and delivery (anamnesis, catachresis, litotes, mycterismus, chreia, epicrisis and metaphor) as well as the techniques of style in which one can create voice and distance.[81]

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[79] The next section of this dissertation will discuss the difference in classical rhetoric between invented and situated ethos. The purpose of my argument here, is not to conflate invented and situated ethos, but to argue for the ways in which all constructions of ethos, whether created inside or outside the text, were seen to be self-conscious creations in classical times.

[80] See Chapter Two of this dissertation for an analysis of the ways in which print writers, such as Virginia Woolf, similarly have used the canons of memory and delivery to construct powerful ethical appeals.

[81] For descriptions and examples of these figures, see: http://virtual.park.uga.edu/~amitchel/4830_ethos_figures.htm

Pierre Bourdieu similarly discusses the connection of commonplace practices to the development of one's selfhood in his conception of habitus. Bourdieu's habitus renacts "embodied rituals of everydayness by which a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own "obviousness" (152). As I discussed in Chapter One, in *The Logic of Practice*, Bourdieu connects habitus with the mutual operations of memory and delivery, stating: "the body is thus not a purely subjective phenomenon that houses memories of its participation in the conventional games of the social field; its participatory competence is itself dependent on the incorporation of that cultural memory and its knowingness" (154). Hence through the dual operations inherent in the canons of memory and delivery, habitus creates the body. The body itself is formed in the nucleus of this mimetic and acquisitive, *delivered*, activity. Memory allows for ritualized practices that can be enacted through delivery techniques; in classical and digital times, memory and delivery are closely connected in the performance and iteration of ethical appeals, creating an enactive knowledge for both individual and collective identities.[82]

Imitating Ethos

One of the most fascinating, but little analyzed aspects of ethos is its relationship to mimesis. Although in the *Republic*, Plato would use mimetic form to argue, as he did with ethos in the *Phaedrus*, against mimesis (perhaps demonstrating, finally, the power of mimesis by revealing that even arguments against it must employ it), mimesis and the mnemonics that accompanied it formed the basis for the construction of ethos in classical times. As Francis Yates

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[82] I am using the term enactive to mean a mode if learning that allows readers, for instance, to read not only through their own experience but also with their experiences in reading the text against other texts, thereby no longer seeking the author's one "true" meaning, but opening the meaning s that emerge in the moment of interaction with the text. According to Richard Candida Smith in *Art and the Performance of Memory*, "Enactive presentations, if successful, actualize a space where the situations of others. . . become more substantial" (5). Instead of "getting lost" or immersed in a text, enactive readers use the text to learn more about the world outside the text.

notes in *The Art of Memory*: "Many techniques defined in the classical era for guiding the acquisition of eloquence came to be grouped under the broad heading of "mimesis" or "imitation" (117). According to Yates, both literary and rhetorical art in the classical era conceptualized language as that which is used to produce likenesses, copies, or fictive representations of reality (117). The practice and conceptualization of ethos in the classical period emerges out of a distinction between language imitating "natural" language use and language imitating reality. Many post-classical treatments of mimesis and ethos have overlooked this distinction and have focused instead on whether or not a rhetorical statement or poetic representation constructs a plausible image of the "reality" of things "out there" in the world. However, according to Jan Swearingen, "the aspects of imitation that are central to Aristotle's conceptualization of ethos focus on the speaker's ability to represent character through deliberate, imperceptibly imitative replications of natural language, to perform ordinary speech" (119). Classical speakers created their ethical appeals through the ordinary rituals of everyday life, rehearsed and re-preformed through memorial operations.

In turn, many classical rhetoricians saw ethos as directly related to delivery. As Sharon Crowley notes:

> In later antiquity, ethos became associated almost wholly with style. Hermogenes of Tarsus, for example, furnished a long list of the virtues of characters of different styles—simplicity, modesty, solemnity, vehemence—that was read and used by students well into the Renaissance. (*Ancient* 85)

Before Aristotle, the sophistic handbooks separated delivery from invention, arrangement, and style. Aristotle, however, understanding that delivery was directly connected to the creation of the speaker's character, stated that the rhetorical situation makes the speaker become an element

of the discourse itself, with ethos created *inside* the text. Concomitantly, for Aristotle, the orator's physical presence and appearance, his gestures, inflections, and accents of style all construct ethos. Jan Swearingen notes that Aristotle's discussions of style and delivery in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* "emphasize the persuasive power of a speaker's constructed ethos," and "extends the dramatic concepts of an assumed or projected character type-- ethos-- to the rhetorical speaker and observes in both the creation of a surface style, of a personality understood as a mask" (120). Swearingen observes that Book III of the *Rhetoric* begins with the claim that "ethos, understood as the creation of *apparent* character, is improved with the use of style, delivery, and acting" (120). According to Swearingen:

> Aristotle neither defines nor implies the notion of a selfhood, authenticity, or essential identity for the speaker or actor, a univocal "true" self that contrasts with the voice and character taken on for the rhetorical speech or acting. Instead the "apparent " of the voice or character is linked to its successful replication of natural speech in "lack of artifice," a surface characteristic of trusted voices and characters familiar to the audience." (121)

By using the customs of commonplace arguments and plain speech, a classical speaker can create an ethos from surface habits or customs: a trustworthy ethos arises from the text, not from outside truth or authenticity. Although for many contemporary rhetoricians ethos has come to be synonymous with character, or selfhood, for Aristotle it was by no means such a clear distinction.

Our contemporary understandings of ethos are tied to the cultural figure of the modern author, a figure created concomitantly with the emergence of print technology, book marketing, and the Enlightenment (as well as Romantic) ideology of the individual as creator. In order for a

book culture to flourish, the book needed to be legally defined as the "property" of an individual; authorship became inextricably tied with capital. Hence, notions of copyright and the ownership of ideas began to flourish and to bolster beliefs about individual authenticity. Martin Hollis suggests in "Of Masks and Men" that "it is only with legal ideas about rights, Christian ideas about the soul, and Cartesian ideas about the ego that our modern categorical self is born" (223). In the Enlightenment, the book comes to be seen as the creation of an individual authentic author, with notions of the individual, ethos, and author becoming conflated by the emerging technologies of book culture. Therefore, it does not seem so strange that our twenty-first century emerging technologies are once again redefining notions of authorship and ethos. In fact, it appears as if we are beginning to do away with notions of authenticity and returning to constructions of ethos that are, to use Aristotle's term, classically *invented*.

Invented and Situated Ethos

    In his analyses of ethos, Aristotle recognized two kinds of ethos -- invented and situated (Crowley 84). Invented ethos developed in the discourse by the tone and attitude the rhetor took toward his audience and subject: it was the persona that a rhetor created during the course of a message. Situated ethos was the character developed around the speaker/writer: the reputation of the rhetor that preceded the actual address. For the classical rhetor, this situatedness was part of his family name and reputation.[83] Invented ethos, on the other hand, was the kind of character developed "in the text": the ways that the writer's words and phrases, as well as his selection of examples and ideas, establish the writer's authority. Aristotle taught that the character conveyed by a rhetor was most significant in cases where the facts and arguments were in doubt. Since

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[83] As noted earlier in this chapter, one's reputation in classical Greece was a self-conscious construction; in many ways, situated ethos was *invented* as well.

online writers most often rely on invented ethos, with their texts composed for large, often unfamiliar audiences, digital writing allows for delivery to return to the forefront of rhetorical education-- the establishment of one's ethos is now focused on the delivery techniques digital writers use to establish their ethos in a world where facts and logic are turned upside down. As Laura Gurak notes in *Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace: The Online Protests over Lotus Marketplace and the Clipper Chip*:

> Two rhetorical features, community ethos and the novel mode of delivery on
>
> computer networks, are critical to rhetorical online communities because these
>
> features sustain the community and its motive for action in the absence of
>
> physical commonality or traditional face to face methods of establishing presence
>
> and delivering a message. (5)

Digital technologies are not only returning long-neglected classical notions to the forefront of the rhetorical paideia, but they are also creating spaces where new types of communities can be formed as new types of actions can be performed.

Performing Ethos

An important element of delivery concerns its connection to the notion of the performative. A complicated term, performativity has been used by theorists and philosophers in many different contexts. For dramatists, the term performative points toward the theatrical. For Paul de Man, performativity indicates the causal break between the signifier and the world: following his demonstration of a "radical estrangement between the meaning and the performance of any text," the term performative can also refer to the deviant relation of a text to its own reference (298). For Derrida, the performative is "a 'communication' that is not limited

by 'already constituted' truth" (*Limited* 12). Christopher Norris states in *Deconstruction* that for deconstructionists like Derrida "performative speech-acts derive their operative meaning from the fact that they embody *conventional* forms and tokens of utterance which are always already in existence before the speaker comes to use them" (109). Hence the *iterability* of performatives means that they exist in a larger context of signification. In yet another application, Lyotard, in *The Postmodern Condition,* uses performativity to delineate a form of procedural or instrumental rationality: the performative attempts to reduce narratives about goodness or truth to procedures of testing for technical efficiency (Parker and Sedgwick 3).[84] What all of these different notions of performative have in common, however, can be found in their connection to the techne of the rhetorical canons of memory and delivery.

According to Erik Gunderson in *Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World*, "Rhetoric needs performativity to secure its status as a lived modality of power. The performance, though, is never complete. Nor, in its turn, is performance even adequately or exhaustively described by the theory that would encompass it" (26). In the digital arena, the boundaries between words and actions become immediately confused; in a chat room for instance, if a student *says* she is a dominatrix in order to gain power in a particular situation, her words are illocutionary—they are speech acts that in saying what they do, do it in the moment of saying. When a student *performs* her ethos online, she reveals the way that, "identities are constructed iteratively through complex citational practices" (Parker and Sedgwick 2). Therefore, my investigation in this section centers on the relation of speech to act and act to identity.

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[84] Lyotard's critique of the performative brings with it significant issues for my approach to techne and knowledge. Chapter Four of this dissertation will address these issues at length and provide a rationale for the reasons why I finally disagree with Lyotard's arguments against techne and the performative in university education.

Perhaps the most useful application of the term performance for my argument in this dissertation comes from J.L Austin, who defines performatives as illocutionary utterances that accomplish, by their very enunciation, an action that generates effects (Parker and Sedgwick 14). In turn, Austin delineates a special property of the performative--when something goes wrong in the performance of a performative-- as "unhappy" (14).[85] Significantly, the use of performatives implies an "audience." For example, to state to another person, "I dare you" ostensibly involves not only two people (the one giving and the one receiving the dare), but also relies on the implicit demand for a third person (not necessarily literally present), one who acts as an audience or witness to the dare (Parker and Sedgwick 8). Many of the performative utterances in an on-line classroom deal with the witness of a third party—one who acknowledges the "act" and holds the "performers" accountable.[86] Hence the successful delivery of the "performance" is predicated on the recollection (whether actual or not) of spectators (or specters) to the illocutionary act.

Constructions of ethos and their ensuing performances are situated in Pierre Bourdieu's habitus: they are constituted in practice and oriented towards practical functions. In turn, the memorial operations utilized in the performances are not merely reproductions of past presentations, but are also positioned within the realm of invention, creating the possibility for formulating new identities and new knowledge (Gunderson 11). In an assignment for an English 4830 course, *Writing for the World Wide Web*, students were asked to create homepages that to some extent "told the story of their life" and also introduced them to the rest of their

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[85] Unhappy performatives, as shown later in this chapter in my discussion of chat room performances, have perhaps the most valuable things to tell us about the way in which ethical appeals can enact learning in online classrooms.
[86] I agree with Judith Butler in *Excitable Speech* that "As a certain stress has been lifted momentarily from the issues that surround being something, an excitingly charged and spacious stage seems to open up for explorations of that even older, even newer question of how saying something can be doing something" (16).

classmates.[87] Essentially, this was an assignment in self-presentation and the performance of a class ethos. In a course that would require a great deal of group work, this assignment also served as a way for students to size up their peers' technical skills and personal interests in order to help them decide with whom they would like to work. One student, the only sophomore in a class filled with seniors, was at first alienated from many of her classmates. In her homepage assignment, this student recited a narrative of a painful childhood and contextualized her performance within a tale of rebirth: through her difficult past she has overcome many obstacles and is now secure and on her way to success and happiness. The mission statement on her homepage uses a pop culture reference effectively to begin to construct an ethos that is founded on her growth through pain: *"This is the story of a girl/who cried a river and drowned the whole world..." ("Absolutely" Nine Days). This is my story, the tale of my journey through life thus far and my plans for the future. Enjoy the story."* Interestingly, she emphasizes the way in which the information on her home page is a story—a tale constructed from past events in order create a representation of her present self. Her ethos is thus presented as one who could be, if not identified with, than at least understood, one who gained a certain credibility with her more fortunate classmates through the description of herself as a heroine. The student's depiction of herself within a community of Renaissance players also provided her a description of herself comfortably accepted within a community, thereby allowing her self-presentation to be one that focused on her successful integration into a society, even if it was one with which many students did not have any experience.[88] Unlike the other students, who immediately gained recognition by their pronouncement of their membership within a fraternity or sorority, her depiction of her

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[87] For an example of the way in which a student from a Fall 2002 English 4830 (Writing for the World Wide Web) used images and hypertextual narration to "rewrite" a painful past and thereby construct a new, more positive ethos in a homepage assignment, see http://www.arches.uga.edu/~Ekat24601/Write_Web/homepage.index.htm

[88] This student was a member of a group that participated in enactments of Renaissance plays, historical events, etc.

"situated" community status was more complicated. While her pride at being part of such a group was clearly evident, she was fully aware in her presentation that this alliance marked her as different. Indeed, the whole of her performative narrative used her difference as a way to connect with her fellow students.

This student effectively delivered a performance that used her triumph over a painful past as a way to connect with classmates who may have been quick to judge her in person. Her reflections and memories became the techniques through which she re-created herself, and her past became a place from which she could invent her future. Through recounting her life story through hypertextual narrative, she delivers to herself and the class a strong and competent ethos, one that was successful in attracting students to her in the group projects throughout the rest of the course. For her, the past became the treasure-house of invention, with delivery, and consequently ethos inextricably linked with her use of operations of the canon of memory. Thus, online environments can provide places where some students can find strategies to connect with their peers in ways they would not have been able to in a traditional classroom. It is my argument that to write oneself into being in an online environment requires specific attention to the use of ethical appeals derived from the canons of memory and delivery.

Online Performances

The on-line performance takes place in a social sphere that relies not only on the collective memories of the "players," but also on the habitual "gestures" and words that create the performance: hence, the operations of memory and delivery are inextricably tied to performance. Memory, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, exists in an *ongoing process* of performance and response: it is inextricably tied to delivery. Judith Butler's work on the

performative has, perhaps, the most significant relation to the constructions and performances of ethos that I will discuss later in this chapter. Butler makes the notion of performativity central to her understanding of subjects and subjection, and her work is directly applicable to the realms of memory and delivery. Analyses of Butler's use of the performative can highlight the rhetorical significance of ethos in the twenty-first century, with theories of performativity providing the starting point to a richer understanding of the possibilities of ethical performances in the digital world. According to Butler in *Excitable Speech*: "The illocutionary speech act performs its deed at the moment of the utterance, and yet to the extent that the moment is ritualized, it is never merely a single moment" (3). Through ritual interplay, memory functions as habitus, offering practices that are simultaneously practiced, practical and "put on." Through the delivery of those ritualized performances, "other" ethical appeals become not only a condition of possibility, but also set the stage for improvisation on those "set pieces" of performance. For instance, for Maurice Merleau-Ponty in *The Primacy of Perception,* "gesture" brought together impressions of the senses and generated a *response*. According to Merleau-Ponty, a "postural schema" is the foundation of consciousness, for without it there is "no sense of relationality" (8). Consciousness and a sense of self emerge in the contact between subject and audience *through ritualized gestures*. Expressive gestures have a singular meaning in an instantaneous context, but their presence reveals "the constitution of a symbolic system capable of redesigning an infinite number of situations" (8). In turn, words are gestures because they are symbols of reactions that continue in a chain of signification. The connection between the delivery of the word or action and the memory of that action occurs within a chain of other iterations which create the context for the performance. For this reason, words, images, bodily, and vocal gestures-- as well as

spatial relationships-- constitute a tangible course through which *enactive memory* constantly travels (Smith 5).

According to Frances Yates's classical model of recollection, memory is associated with movement through space. Hence students moving through online worlds create a kind of enactive knowledge, a mode of learning that creates space(s) for ethos in which individuals act out multiple possibilities for identity and persuasion. Therefore the collage of streaming voices in a chat space become "interscripts": individual voices that appear to be personal and individual, but are actually patterns of sharing and repetition that reveal, however conditionally, a certain body of knowledge. "Conversations" in digital space can bring into sharper focus the embodied knowledge, or habitus, that underlies and sustains all discourse. Analyses of chat room interactions in an online classroom reveal a habitual use of stereotypes in the students' constructions of ethos. And yet, while every communicative act is dependent upon ritualized performances, there exists, even in ritualized performances, the possibility for improvisation and change. Thus, according to Judith Butler, "performativity has its own social temporality in which it remains enabled precisely by the contexts from which it breaks" (*Excitable* 40). The networked spaces of the computer where our students *perform* their ethical appeals constitute a sphere for *acting out* traditional power-laden stereotypes in hostile, often troubling, identity games. As I will demonstrate in the following analysis of chat room logs, these online spaces can also be places where players can break the rules of the game by re-appropriating negative stereotypes and (re)writing new narratives for change.

The Power of the Epideictic in an Online Classroom[89]

In the following analysis, online student interactions are analyzed in a collaborative cross-campus project that took place among three very different colleges: Flagship University, Tech, and Two-Year College.[90] Analysis of chat room logs, e-mail correspondence, and group projects, makes it clear that students used issues of identity to gain power in collaborative projects.[91] The chat sessions became places where identity markers were consistently called upon by students to negotiate power relationships online. The logs reveal various technai students used to create ethical appeals and attempt to gain presence in the chat space. Although some students used ethical appeals more successfully than others, the chatlogs demonstrate the importance of ethos in cyberspace.

While it is tempting to call the chat participants "cyborgs" who use the space of the chat room to liberate themselves through the possibilities engendered by language, it was more often the case that the students relied on conventional stereotypes and clichés in order to make a "place" for themselves in the chat room. Some students took advantage of the increased freedom of expression in the chat space and engaged in disruptive acts of online "mutiny" and "wilding,"

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[89] Part of this chart room analysis was used, for much different purposes, for an article, "Hypertext From a Distance--New Ways of Writing, New Ways of Talking in Freshman English: One Institution's Perspective." Published in *Kairos.* (6.1) in 2001.

[90] "Rhetorics of Technology" was a course developed with funds provided by a University System of Georgia Teaching and Learning Grant that involved both conventional and distance learning educational tools in its mode of delivery to students. In subject matter and practice, the course engaged students and instructors on the Two-Year College, Flagship University, and Tech campuses in an exploration of Internet technologies and the cultural impact of scientific and technological discourse on diverse representations of subject-identity. Most students from Tech and Two-Year provide "tags" after their names to identity their institution. Tech can be identified as "T" and Two-Year as "TY." The tags occurred because the instructors at Tech and Two-Year required them; however, many Tech and Two students were inconsistent with using the tags and so students without tags cannot necessarily always be identified as Flagship. Where institutional affiliation has impacted the constructions of ethical appeals, I have directly discussed that connection.

[91] The chat room selections that follow have not been modified except to create pseudonyms for the students' names and institutional affiliations. Although the chatlogs are often difficult to read and follow due to typographical errors, illogical sequiturs and inappropriate language, I have chosen not to "clean up" the discourse of the students as their wild, illogical, inconsistent use of language is an important part of what occurs in their performances of online identity.

acts which deviated from the instructor's focus and were characterized by vulgar language and insults. This type of interaction occurred often in several of the groups throughout the semester. Interestingly, the students' inappropriate behavior most often occurred when there was conflict in the group decision-making process. In order to gain power, students developed a technique of ethical appeal in which they would exchange institutional-based stereotypes or insults. As the students were all fairly familiar with the demographics of each college, it appears that demographic issues and stereotypes about intelligence and aptitude with computers were common in many of the groups.[92] Two-Year College students were often marked as less intelligent than the other group members. For instance:

> Sally-T: who is posting the log
>
> Simon-T: LOL
>
> James-TY: my teacher knows
>
> Simon-T: sally
>
> Simon-T: I want to go to TY
>
> James-TY: hey, do ya'll think i ma dumb because i go to TY
>
> Mike-T: *whistle*
>
> Mike-T: *grin*
>
> James-TY: haha
>
> Simon-T: of course not

---

[92] Flagship University, Tech, and Two-Year College are significantly different higher educational institutions. Tech, a four-year college situated in an urban environment, has a total enrollment of approximately 15,000 students. The average SAT scores are above 1200, and the average high school GPA is 3.84. In 2000, Tech was ranked #1 in Industrial Engineering Programs in the United States by *US News and World Report*. Tech also has a large Computer Science Program, which includes a Co-Op program that aids undergraduates in finding internships at local businesses. In such a technical school, many of the students enrolled have had significant experience with computer technology, and many go on to work in computer-related fields after college. Flagship University is a four-year university located in a "college" town, which is about an hour from Tech. The total enrollment of the university is approximately 30,000. The average high school GPA is 3.7, and the average SAT scores are above 1150. The university grants a wide variety of degrees ranging from the fine arts to the hard sciences. Two-Year College is a two-year, nonresidential, college located in a rural-area. Two-Year enrolls about 3,000 students and cites "liberal admissions policies" in its admissions catalog. Many students attend Two-Year College before transferring to a four-year institution.

Simon-T: hmmm, hmmm

James-TY: thank you Simon,

Simon-T: j/k

Mike-T: heh, I can't talk, I'm a 21 year old freshman

James-TY: i went to Flagship last sem, but transferred here so i could work

Although Josh confronts the stereotype of the Two-Year College student directly, he also feels it necessary to explain why he attends Two-Year College: for economic reasons. The stereotype of the Two-Year College student as less intelligent and less hard-working abounded throughout the semester in many different ways. Here we can see the way in which the stereotypes that are present in the external world find a presence in cyberspace as identities created through complex citational practices, where institutional "labels" are transferred to the students. In this way, the student-initiated institutional "tags" following their names operate as one's external appearance operated in ancient Greece: to inform others as to his or her "apparent character."

For instance, in another group encounter, one Two-Year College student uses his identity as a stereotypical Two-Year College student to evade responsibility for posting the group chat log:

todd/--t--/: can anyone save the log?

Brad (T): on it

Brad (T): damn

Sarah: no

Brad (T): i don't know how

Sarah: i dont know how

Sarah: i am dumb

Brad (T): haha

Sarah: keith? you know how

keith(TY): i'm frm T-Y

Sarah: well tino then

Sarah: sorry man, you are the only one that knows how

Brad (T): no one here does

Brad (T): haha

Brad (T): oh well

Sarah: oh

Sarah: well someone has to

keith(TY): Tech people are supposed to be smart

Keith uses the stereotypes of Tech people being "smart" to place the responsibility for the job squarely on Tech's shoulders. In many of the sessions, Tech students were described as the "smart ones" and/or often the "nerds." And in fact, Tech students were, by large, more knowledgeable about technology than the students from the other campuses and most had experience with the chat software from other classes. For this reason, much of the work load was performed by the "techies." These interactions reveal the way that cyberspace is, as N. Katherine Hayles argues, always already connected to material concerns.

Another significant finding was that male students (usually those from Tech) most often controlled the group processes. In fact, sex and gender relationships in the group sessions very clearly show a tendency to misogyny; sex and gender stereotypes often came to the forefront most obviously when issues of responsibility and control came to an explosive point. For instance, early in the semester, when one group was having difficulties assigning responsibilities for their first collaborative project, a male student, Craig (Tech), decides that a female student at Flagship University, Andrea, should be "on top" of everything. Andrea dislikes having been "spoken for" and questions why she is "supposed" to do everything.[93] At that point, another male

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[93] It is important to note that the students were graded on their participation in the chat and in group assignments. Thus, many of the students' power struggles were attempts to demonstrate participation, and/or to "procure" the most desirable assignments. For some students, the desirable assignments were those that gave them the most control over

student from Tech, Paul, breaks up the responsibilities in a desirable manner for the group.

Andrea and Paul then engage in what other members in their group called "Palace Cyber Sex"

where Andrea keeps placing her avatar "on top" of Paul:

> *Andrea: GGRRR!*
>
> *Ted-TY: lol*
>
> *Andrea: just kidding Paul*
>
> *craig(t): haha*
>
> *greg: *plop**
>
> *ted-TY: BBBAAAAHHHHH*
>
> *Paul - TY: hey andrea...i have a question*
>
> *Andrea: yes?*
>
> *Ted-TY: BBBBBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAHHHHHHHHHHHHHH*
>
> *Paul - T: why is your avatar all up on me????????*
>
> *craig(t): anyone want to phrase a specific question*
>
> *greg: *gruuuuuunt**
>
> *greg: *POOOOOP**
>
> *greg: ahhh that was nice*
>
> *Andrea: you just so sexxxy can't stay away...ps snoopy poohed on you*
>
> *Paul - T: i can see that...thank you*
>
> *craig(t): no hes not*

As the only female in the group, Andrea often attempts to use her sexuality to gain power. In this

instance, she uses her avatar to literally "be on top," (re)figuring the previous conversation that

she be "on top" of the assignment. Ultimately, her attempt fails, however, as the conversation

degenerates in a series of sexual allusions that strip her of any credibility within the dynamics of

the chat group:

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the final project. For others, as I suspect for Andrea, the most desirable assignment was the one that allowed her to
look busy to the instructors without necessarily having to do much work.

Ted-TY: snoopy wants to hump the sheep

Ted-TY: get it dog

Ted-TY: ha

craig(t): hey

Paul - T: get off craig

Ted-TY: don't forgot your head

craig(t): im not into this kind of stuff

Ted-TY: ha

Andrea: paul, are you kissing me?

Ted-TY: hey hey hey

craig(t): so someone phrase a question

Ted-TY: get off me

Paul - T: yeah baby yeah

Paul - T: groovy baby

Andrea: Paul!

greg: *wimper* no one wants to be with me

craig(t): NO PALACE CYBER SEX [94]

Andrea: I thought you hateed me all this time!

It is interesting that Andrea ends her "performance" by stating: "I thought you hated me all this time!" Her interaction with Paul seems to be a way to regain a sense of power that she felt she had lost after a dispute about the work responsibilities. In an attempt to refuse Craig's status as the leader (authority) of the group, she also pretends to get more "turned on" as she reads Craig's comments that clearly ask her to end her interaction with Paul. Her attempt, however, results in an "unhappy" performance: her "audience" did not "act upon" her linguistic propositions.

The group's interactions during the semester continued in this vein until the end of the semester, when Craig and Paul took entire control of the final project and effectively "silenced"

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[94] *Palace* is a chat room software developed by Tech.

Andrea. According to Andrea, Craig and Paul refused to use her input or ideas, so that Andrea essentially gave up participating in the last project. While she attempted to re-negotiate her status as the only female in a misogynistic group by using her sexuality, Andrea's ethical appeal (which it was on many levels) failed. In an email to all the teachers of the course, Andrea writes that "tech is at our throats again" and then forwards an email from Paul stating that the only reason the group received an "A" on their last project was due to his effort and that Tech must have final control of the project. Andrea writes that "Tech doesn't trust [Flagship University]" and that Paul and Craig will not allow her to contribute. Although the instructors at both colleges talked to the students, the final project was almost entirely produced by Craig and Paul, and Andrea lost her participation points.

While Andrea's participation in the chat logs at first seems to indicate that she is irresponsible and may seem to explain Paul and Craig's actions, a closer reading of the chat reveals that she is frustrated with Craig's dominance in the group and his "bossy" attitude towards her. She attempts to "displace" some of Craig's power by engaging Paul in "cybersex." Her attempts with Paul, however, fail, mostly due to Craig's repeated dictums about "NO PALACE CYBERSEX!" Demographic stereotypes of the campuses probably had much to do with Paul and Craig's control of the group; however, this demographic cannot be separate from issues of sex and gender. The male students from Tech, by and large, treated the women as sex objects, unworthy of decision-making in the group. Although Andrea tried to invert those sexual stereotypes and use them to gain power (which, in her mind, was the power to make decisions about assignments—not necessarily "do" those assignments), her attempt at re-negotiation failed. In that illocutionary moment of sexualized role-play, however, Andrea opened up the possibility

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for re-writing her group's interscript. The fact that the performance failed does not discount the possibilities that it engendered.

It is clear from the chat transcripts that the software encouraged sexualized conversations by including several male and female avatars dressed in sexy, revealing clothing. These types of avatars are common in software packages, and the students were experienced with and comfortable using the avatars to gain power in online conversations. For example, in one group, male students from all colleges "try on" different avatars and then comment on themselves and others:

> *Simon-T: James, you're damn sexy!*
>
> *James (TY): holy crap Mike, you have been busy*
>
> *Sally -T: oh...sounds like your very busy*
>
> *James (TY): thank you cute*
>
> *Mike: he, James, the last 3 weeks have been like that*
>
> *James (TY): that is what my girlfriend looks like*
>
> *Simon-T: Hey baby, so like, what are you doing after the meeting?*
>
> *James (TY): ha*
>
> *Mike: I sleep every other night if I'm lucky*
>
> *James (TY): why dude, studying??*
>
> *James (TY): has anyone decided on a topic yet*
>
> *Sally -T: okay...guys when do you want to meet*
>
> *James (TY): dudes I dot care when we meet*
>
> *Sally -T: ha*
>
> *Simon-T: I'm damn sexy!!*
>
> *Mike: biggest reason was a harddrive crash, been trying to catch up in everything without just*
>
> *getting behind*
>
> *Sally -T: that sucks*
>
> *James (TY): you are, maybe me and you can hook up--if you know what i mean*

Simon-T: stop crashing your stupid computer Mike!

Simon-T: That would rock! Lesbian's are cool.

James (TY): you and i are in the same gutter Simon

James (TY): haha

Sally-T: yes you are

James (TY): lets do some Eng. now

The sexual avatars certainly distracted the students from their classroom assignments, and yet, the role-play that they produced allowed for a space in which ethos could be performed and where online identity could be immediately transformed. The avatars worked as proprioceptive devices, allowing students to extend their material bodies into cyberspace in tangible form. Thus, the avatars functioned as a techne that allowed students to expand their create new "physical" configurations in cyberspace. And yet, the productions of bodies in chat sessions are not merely individual creations: they are often socially constructed by the group members. To a great extent, the students engage in metaphorical constructions of identity, finding their potency in social constructions of knowledge. The students are always wary of the "acceptability" of their avatar, making choices based on the response and interaction they achieve. More often than not the avatars were sexualized in order to provoke responses.

In one of the most troubling group interactions, a male student from Tech, Brad, is consistently harassed throughout the semester. In an early chat session, another student from Tech commences to attack Brad for seemingly no reason:

Brad: whats up y'all

Leslie P: HAMED

Bill(T): waassupp

Bill(T): watchin the game havin a bud

Angela-T: LAUREN???

James-TY: who is posting the paragraph that describes what we all contirbuted

Lauren: okay I was confused!

Brad: what

Angela-T: is it clear now

Ryan: how about you

Lauren: YES

Lauren: Bye!

Bill(T): brad is FAT

Bill(T): hallo

Brad: leave

Angela-T: this fucksa duck

stephanie-gc: o.k. well we'll get intouch tonight about our info. over e-mail

Bill(T): amelia isnt brad fat

Angela-T: brads a freakin lardass

James-TY: the paragraph that tells who tells what

Bill(T): HAHA

stephanie-ty: see ya

bill(T): thats right

Angela-T: jk brad

Bill(T): brad you got some beef or something

James-TY: bye now

Angela-T: hes soooooooooooo sexy

Bill(T): hey girl

Bill(T): how you doin

Angela-T: whassup--getin kind close

Angela-T: wanna get a private room?

Bill(T): you know it girl

Brad: well i guess were done

As Bill and Angela interact in a sexual way, Brad remains silent and does not respond to slurs against him. Brad is a target for the students, and many of the chat participants gain power for themselves by excluding him. As the semester progresses, Brad becomes (literally) more and more absent from the chat sessions and the group becomes more and more vicious in their attacks, using homosexual stereotypes to "tag" Brad as other:

> *Lauren: so is Brad an expert on feminism or what?*
>
> *mark: he's an interior decorator*
>
> *Stephanie: haha*
>
> *Jeff: hahaha*
>
> *Angela: yea hes gay*
>
> *Bill: brad has his own tv show*
>
> *Stephanie: There's Bill again*
>
> *Bill: on interior decorating*
>
> *Jeff: who are you?*
>
> *Bill: you might have seen him*
>
> *mark: christopher lowell*
>
> *Bill: thats him*
>
> *Angela: hes has a definte lisp*
>
> *Bill: heavy b*
>
> *Angela: he can cook real well too*
>
> *Bill: brad's dorm room has flowers in it*
>
> *Angela: he grows them*
>
> *Jeff: what school does he go to?*
>
> *mark: pansies and dasies*
>
> *Stephanie: easy guys!*
>
> *Bill: he goes to atanta school of interior design*
>
> *Jeff: haha*

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Angela: he jsut takes english here

Angela: bill knows so much about him cause they liev etogether

Stephanie: remind me not to be out when we chat on TechLinc

Lauren: that's not very nice guys-he's not here to defend himself-who is he anyway?has he always

been in our group?

This figurative "outing" of Brad in the chat room serves to strip Brad of any authority or

credibility—the students engage in an "interscript" that aligns homosexuality with a lack of

credibility and, ultimately serves to exclude Brad from the group. By the end of the semester,

Brad has removed himself from participating in the group's sessions until one student questions

if he has ever been in the group at all. Obviously, it is clear that many students could have been

offended by the sexual comments made in the chat sessions. As Stephanie makes clear from her

last comment-- "remind me not to be out when we chat in TechLinc,"-- the chat room does not

appear to be a "safe space."[95] Although all students were told that their chat sessions were

recorded and monitored "for their protection," many obviously still felt that they could write

things online that they would never say in class, and significantly, many of these sessions

appeared to silence several of the students and affect their individual contributions to the web

projects (which, as participation online was a crucial feature of the course, affected their overall

grade).

More important than any participation grade, however, is the way in which the insults

that were prevalent throughout the semester created harmful or traumatic situations that would be

unacceptable in a traditional classroom. As the chat room scripts clearly demonstrate, before we

can "hail" the techne of the chat room as liberating, we must first recognize the injurious quality

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[95] TechLinc is chat room software the students were using to "meet." Many students did not meet in "Palace" outside of class because its graphics required more memory and speed than their home computers could handle.

of the offensive name-calling that often occurred as students successfully deconstructed their peers' unsuccessful ethical appeals.

In *Excitable Speech* Judith Butler, although ultimately focusing on the constructive possibilities that injurious speech allows for the "victim," also discusses the ways in which language has the power to cause significant harm, a power that she says is constituted by the fact that we are "linguistic beings" (1-2). Therefore, following Althusser, she argues that we are called into being, or interpellated, by being "hailed" or called a name. Since language can call us into being, it can also, as we saw in the online interactions above, seek to extinguish that being, and indeed, as Butler notes, to be addressed injuriously displaces a speaker or writer from the scene of action, which in turn disrupts one's "place" within the community of speakers. According to Butler "one can be 'put in one's place' by such speech, but such a place may be no place" (4). Hence as the students' uses of injurious speech were efforts to situate themselves within the space of the chat room, they displaced others, with speaking (or writing) then becoming, as Butler argues, a *bodily act*. Interestingly, this bodily act of name-calling is, according to Butler, constituted in history-- through the repetitive enunciation of the name (10). The memory of this injury also works to create the "subject": the trauma lives on through the memory of the injurious act. As Butler writes:

> If we understand the force of the name to be an effect of its historicity, then that
>
> force is not the mere causal effect of an inflicted blow, but works in part through
>
> an encoded memory or a trauma, one that lives in language and is carried in
>
> language. The force of the name depends not only on its iterability, but on a form
>
> of repetition that is linked to trauma, on what is, strictly speaking, not
>
> remembered, but relived, and relived in and through the linguistic substitution for

the traumatic event. The traumatic event is an extended experience that defies and

propagates representation at once. (36)

Although the delivery of the injurious act lives on and is perpetuated in both the individual and

social consciousness, there are ways in which the specter of that memory trace can be mitigated:

indeed, the technai of the chat room can be seen to open up as many possibilities as it forecloses.

While there were many troubling chat sessions, there were many times where the students

used the technology to interact in a positive manner with other students and, even at times, to

question the institutional stereotypes that they had been using with each other. In an interesting

encounter, a gathering of students drawn from several groups discuss how the stereotype of

"techies" fails:

> *Wendy T: yeah these kids at tech are glued to the computers*
>
> *Jennifer (T): tech people are kind of scary with their computers*
>
> *Christopher: no if there were not computers what else would the do*
>
> *Bob: that's their right amber: not all of us*
>
> *Wendy T: play video games*
>
> *Bob: play d&d*
>
> *Darlene: it's scary to think, but we are all tech people*
>
> *Suzy: i m here and dont have a clue about computers*
>
> *Bob: yeah*
>
> *Sandy: me too*
>
> *Patricia T: i am with you Suzy*
>
> *Bob: so maybe there aren't THAT many "tech people"*
>
> *Jennifer (T): same with me*
>
> *Christopher: i'm not*
>
> *Wendy T: being able to use one is having a clue*
>
> *Christopher: i'm coo*

Bob: if we're all disagreeing

Suzy: i use aol im but that is to keep in touch with my friends at other schools

Darlene: me too

Brittany: i can say, however, that being here is the most time i have spent on the computer in my life

Sandy: but as soon as i go home and say i go to tech, i receive the stereotype of a "tech nerd"

Jennifer (T): i love aol im, cuz long distance is free

Bob: well it's time to go

Darlene: yes, this whole palace thing is new to me

Christopher: same here Brittany

brittany: yeah

Timothy__T: okay its time to go

In this chat, the stereotypes that the students had relied to frame their discussions with each other fails. Interestingly, this failure occurs because it is articulated through language: as Darlene observes: "it's scary to think but maybe we are all tech people." Here the spatial and figurative boundaries between the schools collapse. The self-consciousness with which they approach the stereotype makes the construction of the Tech nerd seen to be just a construction, not necessarily a reality. Therefore, while the technologies are not free from the dominant ideologies that construct "Real Life," stereotypes, they can provide spaces where those ideologies can be demystified and challenged. Although the students who attempted, such as Andrea, to re-appropriate stereotypes in order to gain power were not always successful in gaining more control over group responsibilities, others did succeed in changing the assumptions upon which many of the stereotypes were based, consequently allowing for multiple possibilities for ethical appeals.

Significantly, by returning to the notion of the "unhappy" performative, we can see that injurious speech does not necessarily silence the one toward whom it is directed. Since language

constitutes the subject, but also exists beyond the subject, it is through the "failed" operations of language that the possibility for a new constitution of the subjected always exists. For instance, throughout the semester, the conversations of the following group focused on sexual, often homosexual, subject matter, particularly between James and Simon, who routinely "gang up" on Mike:

> *Simon-T: Mike, don't try to look cool ok?*
>
> *James (TY): haah*
>
> *Simon-T: J/k*
>
> *Mike: heh, I wish I could look cool*
>
> *Sally -T: what defines a person as cool..*
>
> *James (TY): you just cant be as cool as Simon and i, Mike*
>
> *Mike: :if only I was a crossdressing gay lesbian man...*
>
> *Simon-T: not talking about english on a Friday night for starters?*
>
> *James (TY): the amount of women and amount of beer he has*
>
> *Mike: *chuckle**
>
> *Sally -T: whatever*
>
> *James (TY): where is deb?*
>
> *James (TY): i miss her*
>
> *Sally-T: dont i feel loved*
>
> *Simon-T: hey baby*

Here, both Mike and Sally feel left out by James's and Simon's comments. Mike strikes back by making a homosexual slur at James. Significantly, however, Sally uses mimesis of traditional stereotypes to find a presence in the chat room. Sally's performance enables her to re-work the sexualized conversations to her advantage. Her comment that she "doesn't feel loved" works to articulate, on the metaphorical level, the distance she has felt from the group and succeeds in bringing her into the group's radar so that she may participate as a full- fledged member. Perhaps

not surprisingly, Sally returns in the next chat log as a very sexy avatar, which seems to get her more attention from the males in the group. Here, unlike Andrea in the earlier chat session, Sally's attempt to gain power by using the male students' misogyny against them works. However, these moments in which students succeeded at re-writing the narrative "scripts" that their peers gave them were, often, juxtaposed by many other moments (such as with Andrea) in which alienated students' performances failed. If techne can be defined in the way in which it secures and unsecures boundaries, the technai that the students use to navigate cyberspace to their advantage can be both limiting and transgressive and successful or unsuccessful.

According to Butler, while there is no possibility of "purifying" language from its "traumatic residue" through the manipulation of [the insult's] repetition, the injured can begin to use it to work as a "vexed but promising instrument" for change (37). Herein lies the condition for possibility. Butler notes, "Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes" (38) The mimetic re-articulation of the injured speech can allow victims to re-appropriate their subjection. Indeed the linguistic terms with which we are hailed, even injuriously, are according to Butler, "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open" (38). To consider the realm of future possibilities (what might become possible to say, and/or to do), re-iterations of what had previously been closed down through injury or the act of interpellation become the road to the opening of new contexts. As Butler writes, this re-signification is the condition for linguistic survival:

> The word that wounds becomes an instrument of resistance in the redeployment
>
> that destroys the prior territory of its operation. Such a redeployment means|

speaking words without prior authorization and putting into risk the security of

linguistic life, the sense of one's place in language, that one's words do as one

says. That risk, however, has already arrived with injurious language as it calls

into question the linguistic survival of the one addressed. Insurrectionary speech

becomes the necessary response to injurious language, a risk taken in response to

being put at risk, a repetition in language that forces change. (163)

Through the repetition of the insult, the possibility for change is enabled. Through memory

traces of that insult's power, the re-delivered use of the term allows for change in signification,

and in significance. By allowing students to create ritualized performances in online spaces, we

provide opportunities for a digital version of habitus: a nexus of past and present performances

that can be woven together to create ethical appeals that at one and the same time enforce and

disturb those conventions. These chat sessions operate as theaters of ritualized gestures and

performances, used in varying ways for multiple purposes. Online environments like the chat

room described above, heighten the performative nature of language and identity for our students

and can thereby provide dynamic spaces in which students learn to construct ethical appeals that

only allow them multiple possibilities for persuasion.

Whether their strategies are ultimately successful or unsuccessful, the technai of the chat

room allows the students to enact productive knowledge. By calling upon metaphors, using the

proprioceptive possibilities of the avatars, or by creating narratives, the students utilize technai to

create ethical appeals. Indeed, the most important appeal of the chat room is ethical; the way to

gain power and "space" in the chat room is not found by logical or pathetic appeals. Logical

appeals are largely unfeasible in the chat room, and pathetic appeals are often seen as weak

unless they are linked to credibility gained through the manipulations of sexual stereotypes.

Thus, the techne associated with the creation of ethical appeals can allow students to enter the "interscripts" of communal knowledge-making and social collaboration that the chat rooms rhetorically foster. The techne of chat rooms concerns the creation and transgression of boundaries: by utilizing technai associated with memory (i.e., the social construction of group metaphors) or technai associated with delivery (i.e., the performance of avatars), students can find immediate response to their "practiced" ethical appeals.

Prosopopoeia, therefore, dominates the chat room; the majority of the work students do in the chat centers on creating a persona, whether through the use of an avatar, through articulations of institutional affiliation, or through enacting of sexual stereotypes. The knowledge-making that occurs in the chat rooms also uses telematic memory: it is focused on the processes and procedures by which students can access identity or knowledge. Identity and knowledge are created through the digital network, revealing the way, rhetorically, in which knowledge is constructed within a text. In turn, even in places where the techne fails, it operates to reveal, following Heidegger, our students' practices to them. Both the successful and unsuccessful ethical appeals that students used in the chat rooms show the possibilities that language engenders. In this way, the chat room figures rhetoric as epideictic, using ritualized behaviors to argue for ideological claims or power.

Following Poulakos and Poulakos's analysis in *Classical Rhetorical Theory* concerning the four characteristics of epideictic discourse, we can clearly see how the chat room operates as epideictic. In these chat rooms, the "affinity for competition" is overwhelming. Indeed, students compete fiercely not only for power in determining responsibility for assignments, but, most significantly, they compete for "space" in the dialogue: at its foundation the competition is for presence. The chat rooms also encourage ceremonial practices: specifically in the chat sessions

analyzed above, the ceremonial practices were often formed around rituals of sexual interaction. This creates a type of ritualized habitus, where students tap into sexual stereotypes in order to find places to argue in the cyberspace of the chat room. Additionally, the overwhelming type of persuasive technique in the chat room was focused on that of praise and blame: in order to gain power, students either praised the strong members of the group or blamed the weaker ones. In turn, these chat spaces can be seen as spectacles. To many an instructor's dismay, there is a carnival atmosphere in the chat sessions, a playful environment that encourages many students to engage in "inappropriate" behavior. Additionally these epideictic chat sessions revealed the profusion of hyperbole and excess, almost to the extent that the sessions were logically "unreadable." Finally, these sessions often worked to propagate dominant values most often related to identity politics. Thus these chat sessions clearly reveal the often overlooked connection between epideictic argumentation and power.

Indeed, the techne of the chat sessions reveal the way in which the space of the chat room is connected to materiality. In these chat sessions, computers are not a disembodying technology, but a technology that produces bodies. The bodies in chat rooms are proprioceptive: the keyboard links the physical body with the linguistic one, allowing users to construct and reconstruct boundaries through rhetorical technai. Chat sessions reveal the way that digital technologies demonstrate the posthuman: they clearly show how the cyborg's "distributed cognition" operates: secured to the materiality of the external world as much as it is unsecured within the potential linguistic productions in cyberspace. Finally, these chat sessions reveal the importance between ethical appeals and communal knowledge-making.

Techne and Communal Knowledge

In the *Institutes of Oratory*, Quintilian not only links memory and delivery but also reveals the way in which these canons are connected to the creative construction of a speaker's ethos:

> For while we are saying one thing, we must be considering something else that we are going to say: consequently the mind is always looking ahead, it is continually in search of something which is more remote: on the other hand, whatever its discovers, it deposits by some mysterious process in the safe keeping of memory, which acts as a transmitting agent and hands on to the delivery what it has received from the imagination. (213-215)

Quintilian posits the genesis of the speech within a speaker's experience; through an imaginative reconstruction of that experience, the speaker can deliver his argument to the audience. As the canons of memory and delivery are intimately connected to the construction of ethos, the rhetorical trope most often associated with memory, enargia, or vivid description, is at one and the same time the way a writer reaches back into his or her experience to re-create the substance of a speech and also the way in which he or she delivers it to his or her audience. Vivid description constitutes the way a speaker connects to his or her individual experience and also how she translates that experience to others.

Hence the construction of ethos, as it is located within the techne of the canons of memory and delivery, is always a social process. Kathleen Welch notes in "The Platonic Paradox:" "invention, style and arrangement can exist in a vacuum; it is memory and delivery that connect us to history, culture, and the life of the polis" (9). According to Welch, "it takes a complete rhetoric (one which includes memory and delivery) to change our cultures" (4). A

rhetoric that seeks to transform, whether through mind or through actions, utilizes the techne of

memory and delivery. As Katherine Nelson notes in "Remembering: A Functional

Developmental Perspective": "Remembering the past has value insofar as it serves action in the

present or future. Thus what is remembered should be that that enables the individual to carry out

activities, to predict, to plan" (144). Therefore, through the delivery of one's ethos, the speaker

and her audience are linked to a social memory bank. This social memory is akin to Carl Jung's

"collective unconscious":

> In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal
>
> nature and which we believe to be the only empirical psyche . . . there exists a
>
> second psychic system of a collective, universal and impersonal nature which is
>
> identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop
>
> individually but is inherited. It consists of preexistent forms, the archetypes,
>
> which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to
>
> certain psychic contents. (*Archetypes* 43)

Like the characters in Samuel Beckett's play, *Waiting for Godot*, the twentieth century was an

age of forgetting, as Pozzo tells Gogo and Didi: "Forget all I said. . . I don't remember exactly

what it was, but you may be sure there wasn't a word of truth in it." (23). For modernists,

remembering the past appears unnecessary because the past seems impossible, while this lack of

connection with the past causes isolation and alienation. Much of late twentieth century feminist

theory has taught us, however, as Gayle Green observes in "Feminist Fiction and the Uses of

Memory, that "memory is especially important to anyone who cares about change, for forgetting

dooms us to repetition" (291). Without our memories we remain, like Dodo and Gigi, caught in a

paralytic state, a place with no ethos and consequently, no action. Ethos, ethics and the canons of

memory and delivery are inextricably tied, and as we launch into the twenty-first century, we can begin to see how the use of the techne of these long-forgotten canons of ancient rhetoric can help us reinvent our ethos for a new age, one which brings together human and computer memories to construct a communal ethos that enacts change and allows for the pragmatics of action.

Applying Ethos in the Twenty-first Century Classroom

Once again the student work of the advanced writing course Writing for the World Wide Web can illustrate the ways in which the techne of the canons of memory and delivery can be used to re-construct ethical appeals in the digital age. In one assignment, students were asked to study the XML display of the figures accorded to memory and delivery in Virginia Woolf's first chapter of *A Room of One's Own*.[96] The figures anamnesis, litotes, mycterismus, chreia, epicrisis and metaphor were chosen because these figures all work to help construct a speaker or writer's ethos, and they all involve operations of memory and delivery in their execution.[97] The students were asked to analyze how, through the use of these figures, Woolf was able to construct a voice in the text that was at once highly personal and reflective and at the same time, impersonal and collective. They were then asked to construct their own argumentative autobiographical narratives using the same figures Woolf used to effectively construct her argument. One student used this assignment to articulate the particular needs of twenty-first century women writers and effectively mimed Woolf's essay in a way to move beyond Woolf's historically limited argument. This student appropriated Woolf's language and ethos in order to remake that ethos to reach her

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[96] For an example of the way a student writer mimed the first chapter of "A Room of One's Own," utilizing the rhetorical tropes and figures associated with memory, see http://www.arches.uga.edu/~bsillay/WriteWeb/entrancepage.htm. For an XML display of the ways in which Virginia Woolf utilizes the same figures to construct her ethos in "A Room" one which is at one and the same time personal and communal, see: http://online.english.uga.edu:8080/cocoon/mount/engxml/mitchell31.ethos

[97] These figures not only emphasize use of communal knowledge (metaphor) and authorities (anamnesis) but also reinforce consideration of one's audience, illustrating the cooperative nature of the canons of memory and delivery and their importance in creating effective ethical appeals.

goals. By invoking the metaphor of a closet, this student takes Woolf's argument and amplifies

and enlarges it to suit her purposes as a writer. As she writes in her mission statement:

> Throughout this site and adjoining paper, I refer to the image of a closet as a
>
> warehouse for creative expression. This metaphor is meant to serve as a cultural
>
> and communal metaphor that suggests that images from one's past are essential to
>
> creativity. One must delve into one's past to uncover the creative auorora that waits to be
>
> discovered. If one is to truly be successful creatively, one must know to rely on the power
>
> of memory, imagination, and emotion combined, and realize that together these forces
>
> form a triumverate of creative expression that recovers what lies in the dark corners of
>
> every closet.[98]

In a self-conscious display of her ethos, this student creates a hypertextual document that calls

upon and furthers Woolf's claims. Through the use of figures accorded to ethos and the canons of

memory and delivery, the student constructed a powerful ethos by weaving her personal

memories into a collective rhetorical situation, one that argues, particularly, about the needs of a

twenty-first century writer.

As this student's work reveals, metaphors are one of the most common (and most

effective) figures in communal knowledge-making. A metaphor is an image, a picture that stirs

the brain and conjures up the familiar to give insight into the unfamiliar; it operates on the

memory of the reader or listener because we can only learn something about the object being

described if we know the qualities of the object to which it is being compared. We link what we

remember with what we are being told and thus create new knowledge. A successful metaphor

touches something recognizable or personal or familiar or common in the listener or reader; it

generates meaning. Throughout history, rhetoricians have spoken of metaphor's value. For

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[98] See: http://www.arches.uga.edu/~bsillay/WriteWeb/entrancepage.htm

example, Aristotle in *Poetics* writes: "by far the most important thing is to be good at metaphor .

. . it is a token of high native gifts, for making good metaphors depends on perceiving the

likenesses in things" (qtd. in Carruthers, *Craft* 16). Again, as evidenced in the Writing for the

World Wide Web class, students often use familiar (and memorable!) metaphors as a way of

communicating amongst themselves. In English 4830, one such common metaphor employed to

confirm one's credibility with one's classmates was the metaphor of the journey as an awakening.

Several students constructed their homepage assignments in terms of the metaphor of a journey.

At one and the same time, this recognizable metaphor allowed them to utilize the dynamic

navigation techniques of the web, as they also worked to present themselves to their fellow

classmates as individuals who have much to offer because they have made their journey and

returned renewed.[99] In his homepage assignment, one student effectively presents an image of

himself on his entrance page as a hiker, one whom has the courage to explore, a characteristic

that he endeavored to prove to his fellow classmates through the rest of the semester in his highly

adventurous and risk-taking web assignments.[100] His metaphor was immediately recognizable to

his fellow students and allowed him to communicate with them within a recognized set of

ritualized behaviors and values among twenty-something college students.

A metaphor works by tapping into common sources of feeling and experience in both

speaker/writer and the audience, by evoking shared knowledge—a social, even cultural memory

(18). When metaphors are used to help construct ethical appeals, ethos can be linked both to

habituation and custom as well as to communal relationships, as in the homepage described

above. Mary Carruthers, in her *Book Of Memory*, reveals that in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle

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[99] It is interesting how applicable this metaphor was in many students' homepages because it allowed for a narrative of movement (through time and metaphorical journey) but also provided a useful organizational pattern for navigation through the site.
[100] For an example of the use of the journey as awakening see:
http://www.arches.uga.edu/~geoj102/writeweb/index.htm.

defines ethical excellence as "character" that results from habituation or repetition: "The organism's hexis or habitus is developed by the repetition of particular emotional responses or acts performed in the past and remembered, which then predispose it to the same response in the future" (68). Carruthers observes that for Aristotle, "vices and virtues are habitual dispositions" (68). Since ethos is created by habituation and custom, what develops, Carruthers notes, is a "moral organism" (68). Carruthers also argues that memory gives rise to experience, since experience is made from many repeated memories: all memories, she argues, though statistically many, work to constitute a single experience (68). Thus, memory operations provide the starting-point of arts and sciences: experience-- which is memory generalized and judged—and gives rise to all knowledge, art, science, and ethical judgment (68). Ethical judgment, since it is based upon habit and training and applies past principles to particular present situations, becomes an art, and part of the "practical intellect" that is directed to the world of process and change (Carruthers *Book* 68). Thus the operations of the canon of memory work as a socializing force; for example, literary texts (oral or written) provide sources for a group's memory, and, thus, origins for that group's actions. Memory and ethos are connected not only by the memorial techniques that allow a speaker or writer to create her ethical appeals, but by the way in which a society's memorial operations create a context for ethical judgment and action.

Conclusion

The first definition for ethos in the *Oxford English Dictionary* follows Aristotle's description in the *Rhetoric*: "The characteristic spirit, prevalent tone of sentiment, of a people or community; the 'genius' of an institution or system." Ethos is, by definition, a spirit-like concept that has the power to join a community together, but can also help individuals adapt to any given

situation. As Plato demonstrates in the *Phaedrus*, ethos, at one and the same time, hides and reveals. By teaching ethos, we teach our students a kind of enactive knowledge, one which allows them to re-work past experiences with others in ways that contribute to the type of learning made possible only by collaboration and shared action. Ethos, when seen in the context of the canons of memory and delivery, is not merely a postmodern dilemma or "comedic" problem; ethos *performs* a significant role in our twenty-first century classroom. Ethos helps students to understand not only the ways in which knowledge is collected and stored in their individual and communal treasure-houses, but also how they can deliver (through actio!) persuasive arguments in online environments such as chat rooms, e-mail, and electronic essays. While I would argue that all language, and all language use, is always already rhetorical, the medium of digital communication works to reveal, as the chat room sessions clearly demonstrate, our rhetorical practices to us in striking ways. Thus, the rhetorical nature of networked writing highlights the need for a return of rhetoric to the center of university education, a return which will, by teaching students to use ancient technai in constructing persuasive appeals online, allow them to navigate the "terrifying" and "exciting" digital realm(s) they encounter.

The heightened rhetorical nature of the networked computer is clearly becoming evident as its dynamic configurations of text replicate the functions of language first theorized by classical rhetoricians. According to Richard Lanham, Aristotle built a model of verbal persuasion and social interaction around the dramatic oscillation between transparency and opacity in the use of language. For Lanham, rhetoric is a pragmatic art, organized around the recognition and evaluation of the consequences of what people say and do:

To look at language self-consciously is to play games with it; to look through

language unselfconsciously is to act purposively with it . . . And rhetoric's long

effort to preserve both kinds of attention, and both kinds of language, however

contradictory in theory the effort may prove to be, attests to its final loyalty to

make things happen in the world. To do that, you must forever estimate human

motive, and *toggle* from contemplating the surface of human behavior to taking a

role in it. (*Electronic* 196)

As I argue in Chapter One of this dissertation, it is my assertion that rhetoric is an art of praxis,

an art that is necessarily intertwined with "making things happen in the world." To view ethos in

light of the canons of memory and delivery is to see ethos connected to action. Both canons

emphasize the public construction of knowledge and both articulate the ways rhetoric is

inextricably bound with moral judgment and civic action.

Thus while contemporary ethos may very well be a spirit-like shape shifter, (much as

Plato's ethos was in the *Phaedrus),* its various enactments contain very "real" effects. While I do

not believe that it is ever possible to exorcise ethos from rhetorical study, to scholars who

question its efficacy in the contemporary "postmodern" rhetorical landscape, I would reiterate

that classical notions of ethos which refuse simplified conflations with the Enlightenment

/Modern subject suggest a multiplicity of invented identity formations for student-writers. In

creating ethos in digital environments, the techne of memory and delivery create ritualized

performances that can work both to limit or transgress the boundaries of online spaces.

In the posthuman landscape, those who have the ability to most fully realize the

"proprioceptive coherence" between themselves and their machines are the ones who can most

easily navigate the complexity of techno-culture. In this way, our students can attempt the

complex machinations of ethical appeals that Plato demonstrates in the *Phaedrus*: online

environments allow students to enter into a wholly rhetorical realm, one that is largely dominated

by prosopopoiea, allowing them to amplify the traces of their various "shape shifting" online

arguments. Many of the arguments that take place online are epideictic, and they reveal the ways

that the use of techne is related to ethical demonstrations of power and identity. Since the

processes and procedures that the students use to access each other, or to create ethical appeals

online, enact telematic memory, online environments create what N. Katherine Hayles has called

"distributed cognition," where access to knowledge takes the precedence over possession. As the

student work from this chapter reveals, the distributed cognition in online environments does not

create disembodied posthumans, but bodies active in the construction of their own ethical

appeals and arguments.

CHAPTER FOUR

REMARKABLE TEXTS: XML, COGNITION, AND THE CANONS OF MEMORY

AND DELIVERY

> In certain favorable moods, memories—what one has forgotten—come to the top. Now, if this is so, is it not possible—I often wonder—that things we have felt with great intensity have an existence independent of our minds; are in fact still in existence? And if so, will it not be possible, in time, that some device will be invented by which we can tap them? I see it—the past—as an avenue lying behind; a long ribbon of scenes, emotions. There at the end of the avenue still, are the garden, the nursery. Instead of remembering here a scene and there a sound, I shall fit a plug into the wall; and listen to the past--Virginia Woolf, "A Sketch of the Past"

Virginia Woolf's desire for invention of a device that would help her more easily tap into past events and reflections reveals the importance she placed on memory in her composing process. Influenced by the development of modern psychology, Woolf's interest in the cognitive aspects involved in the composing process disposed her to draw on memorial operations as invention techniques. Throughout her career as an essayist, Woolf utilized memorial operations to deliver a powerful and effective ethos. By using the techne accorded to the canons of memory and delivery (e.g., figures that capitalize on memory operations and which seek to develop credible ethical appeals), Woolf's essays represent the way in which attention to "significant form" creates persuasive arguments.[101] Contemporary digital technologies allow for the "trip down memory lane" that Woolf desired as they illuminate the formal techniques effective writers use for argumentation. One such technology is an XML application named <emma> (Electronic Management and Markup Application) developed in the University of Georgia's English department. In making the most of specific elements that contemporary cognitive psychologists

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[101] Significant form is a term, coined by Woolf's fellow Bloomsbury intellectual, Clive Bell, describing the way particular formal elements combine to create emotion. The concept is discussed later in this chapter.

argue are important to writing instruction, <emma> also highlights the teaching of the techne associated with the canons of memory and delivery.

This chapter will examine composition pedagogy in light of recent developments in cognitive psychology, drawing heavily on Dual Coding Theory. As Dual Coding Theory emphasizes the connection between verbal and nonverbal operations in literacy acquisition, I will argue that the imagery and spatiality of the techne of memory and delivery provide crucial practices for teaching writing in the twenty-first century. In order to connect recent developments in cognitive psychology with the increased use of this techne in digital technologies, I will specifically address the development and implementation of an XML database (named <emma>) currently being utilized at the University of Georgia to organize, store, and display various aspects of student writing. I will analyze the use of this database as it relates to the recovery of the techne of the ancient canons of memory and delivery and as it points to the ways in which increased attention to nonverbal elements improves composition pedagogy. As a case in point, I will present an advanced writing course assignment that uses <emma> to mark up of Virginia Woolf's ethical appeals in *A Room of One's Own* and helps students develop their own ethical appeals using the techne of the canons of memory and delivery. I will also describe the way <emma> can be seen to promote epideictic rhetoric and discuss the ways <emma> can be used to either reinforce current-traditional practices or move beyond them. I will also, finally, suggest that <emma> can operate as the ultimate techne, revealing ideological biases in our teaching pedagogies and orienting us towards the pragmatic aspects of technologies in the twenty-first century writing classroom.

Cognition and Literacy

One central characteristic of the canons of memory and delivery is their dual focus on what, today, we call visual rhetoric. Although ancient and medieval scholars consistently called upon sensory and emotive activities to create imagery useful for composition, appreciation of the role of nonverbal elements in composing has been sporadic in contemporary rhetorical theory. According to Mark Sadoski and Allan Paivio in *Imagery and Text: A Dual Coding Theory of Reading and Writing,* early in the twentieth century, however, pragmatist philosophy and progressive education maintained that imagery was a crucial aspect of cognition (36). Pragmatists such as George Herbert Mead and John Dewey believed that since knowledge is derived from practice and experience, images (which result from experience in the world) were crucial because they encouraged future action. Margaret Mead, for example, argued that mental images from the past could be projected into the future as tools for action serving as "transactions for reality" (Sadoski and Paivio 36).[102] Literacy education in the early part of the century benefited from the pragmatists' emphasis on imagery and imagination. The development of behaviorism in cognitive psychology during the middle part of the century, however, limited the focus on imagery in literacy education. Literacy educators in the last half of the century were focused on linear, sequential, and abstract ways of teaching language acquisition and writing skills. Behaviorism's influence sparked a return to the view of rhetoric developed by Peter Ramus. The Ramist system, which emphasized the verbal transmission of information, logical categorization, and linear cognitive processing can still be seen in most contemporary writing textbooks. Due to the development of digital technologies that highlight the use of graphics, recent attention has returned to analyzing the role of imagery in literacy education. The latest

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[102] Margaret Mead's position on imagery is consistent with the understanding of the role of imagery in contemporary cognitive psychology (Sadoski and Paivio 37).

cognitive theories, such as Dual Coding Theory, are providing new ways of understanding the role of imagery in literacy acquisition. Rhetorical theory can benefit from this recent research in cognitive psychology, allowing for more complicated understandings of the meta-cognitive operations writers use to compose.

Rhetorical cognitive theory focuses on a "scientific rhetoric of the composing process" so that the mind is studied as a "set of structures that performs in a rational manner" (Berlin, "Rhetoric and Ideology" 682-685). Grounded in cognitive psychology, cognitive rhetoric analyzes the minds of students in order to determine the unconscious goals and problem-solving processes they enact while reading and writing. According to cognitive theorist Linda Flower, literacy, "is an individual constructive act that does not merely invoke or participate in a literate practice but embeds such practices and conventions within a personally meaningful, goal-directed use of literacy" (Flower 18). Together with John Hayes, Linda Flower has done some of the most important work in the field of rhetoric by analyzing cognitive processes used in the writing process.

According to research conducted by Flower and Hayes, writing consists of distinct cognitive processes that are hierarchically embedded. For Flower and Hayes, writing is goal-directed and stimulates the discovery of new goals as it progresses. Flower and Hayes argue that writing is recursive: the stages of prewriting, writing, and revising are seen to occur in no set order. Flower and Hayes have also made important connections between memory and cognition, claiming that a writer's plans often "take the form of names or cues used to retrieve information stored as schemata, episodes, or images" (Sadoski and Paivio 144). For Flowers and Hayes, plans do not consist of consciously fixed objectives, but are found in a collection of distinct memory operations (Sadoski and Paivio 143-144).

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Although the research of cognitive theorists such as Flower and Hayes have led to important findings in writing cognition, critics have challenged their use of a talk-aloud model called protocol analysis, which relies on writers being able to pinpoint what they are doing at any given time. Rhetoricians have also more generally attacked cognitive theory for its reductionism: As James Berlin argues, cognitive theory "argues for the primacy of cognitive structures in composing, arguing that any study of the process must begin with an analysis of these structures" (Berlin, ″Writing Instruction″ 218). Cognitivists have also been criticized for focusing on the individual processes of composing and ignoring the social, collaborative, aspects of writing. According to Berlin, cognitivists "emphasize the private and psychological elements of composing" (Berlin, "Writing Instruction" 211). As rhetorical theory embraced social constructionist theory, however, cognitive theorists such as Linda Flower began to analyze the connections between social collaboration and cognition, arguing that writer's plans and goals need to be studied in a wider context that embraces social learning and collaborative writing practices.

While more recent cognitive theory has begun to analyze the social aspects of writing, it has still not embraced one of the more ancient tools for composing: imagery. One of the most significant weaknesses of the Flower and Hayes model is that it does not distinguish between different types of images: specific representations, such as individual mental images and words, are not differentiated from more general representations, such as plans and goals (Sadoski and Paivio 144). Cognitive rhetorical theory can benefit from placing more emphasis on exploring the connection between the verbal and nonverbal processes that occur during composing, an association that has been made recently in cognitive psychology.

Cognitive psychology focuses on the ways in which individuals gain information from the world, the ways in which information is stored in memory by the brain, and the ways in which stored knowledge is used to solve problems and formulate language (Solso 9). For cognitive psychologists, memory and perception work together to create patterns that allow individuals to make sense of the world around them (Solso 9). While perception has long been seen as a key component of memorial operations, cognitive psychologists have only recently begun to examine how verbal and nonverbal processes work together to shape literacy. As cognitive psychologists Mark Sadoski and Alan Paivio argue: "The methods of many literacy practitioners throughout history tended to emphasize either imagery or verbal memory and study methods rather than combining the two" (Sadoski and Paivio 11-12). Recent research, however, conducted by Paivio suggests that evaluative tasks involve both verbal and nonverbal processing (Paivio, *Mental Representations* 112-113). The latest investigations into verbal and nonverbal processing reveal that imagery comprises a set of independent processes that can be brought into play at various levels of cognitive activity. One type of imaging process crucial for the higher order activities that writing requires is spatialization.

Cognitive psychologists who study the ways that information is stored spatially in the brain argue that cognitive maps play a vital role in helping to organize information for writing. Cognitive maps are a type of internal representation. For example, a cognitive map can be a detailed image of the juxtaposed buildings, streets, street signs stoplights of one's neighborhood. When giving directions to one's home, for instance, one draws out clues in an orderly sequence and then translates those images into language (Sekuler and Blake 10). Because information in the brain is stored both locally and generally, cognitive maps can be general or highly specific (Sekuler and Blake 245). Spatial cognition comprises an important building block of general

cognition because it reinforces the process by which an individual perceives, stores, recalls, creates, edits, and communicates.

It is important to note that cognitive maps are distinct from ideas: they are tools that act as models by which different scenarios can be tried out and discarded. A vehicle the brain uses to process information for storage, retrieval, and meaning-making, imagery works as a medium for meta-cognition. Since imagery can be used to solve problems and is dynamic and changeable, cognitive theorists argue that: "imagery is highly useful for trying out alternative scenarios" (Sadoksi and Paivio 65). Another important finding in contemporary cognitive research concerns the fact that visual images are synchronous. Images allow for a great deal information to be available at one time, with a single image capable of conveying a wide range of information. In addition, since visual images operate separate from the sequential constraints of verbal processes, nonverbal structures are much more flexible. For instance, while most individuals have difficulty processing verbal constructions without moving from left to right, when "reading" visual images, one can move right to left as easily as left to right. Although images tend to be nested within other images in hierarchical fashion, they can be discontinuous and discrete (Sadoski and Paivio 56). Images can also be sequential; for example, one can use a cognitive map to recount successively the streets and stop signs in order to give directions to his/her house (Sadoski and Paivio 57). The flexible association and organization of images permits creativity and imagination (Sadoski and Paivio 57). Since images are tools that can be used to inspire and enhance creative processes, use of images in the writing classroom can be improved by further investigating what occurs between verbal and nonverbal cognitive processes. A cognitive theory that has recently developed to explain the interaction between verbal and nonverbal cognition is Dual Coding Theory (Sadoski and Paivio 57).

Dual Coding Theory

A general theory of cognition that offers a combined account of both verbal and nonverbal cognition, Dual Coding Theory not only argues for the importance for including visual literacies in writing pedagogy, but also offers a key way to analyze the effects of digital programs that emphasize graphics in the writing classroom. A great deal of data collected by behavioral and neurological cognitive scientists in the last ten years supports the basic tenets of Dual Coding Theory (Solso 325). According to Sadoski and Paivio, Dual Coding Theory maintains that information can be coded and stored in both verbal and imaginal systems. The inclusion of nonverbal processes of cognition, such as mental imagery, is the most innovative aspect of this approach, but the theory also accounts for the linguistic features of cognition (Sadoski and Paivio 43). Dual Coding Theory asserts that mental representations are not abstract, but actually preserve specific elements ensuing from sensory perceptions (Sadoski and Paivio 44). Modality-specific representations are categorized by cognitive scientists as either verbal (resulting from speech or writing) or nonverbal (resulting from what is seen, heard, felt, tasted or smelled). As Sadoski and Paivio argue, "mental encodings are concrete rather than abstract" (44). Consequently, successful strategies for teaching reading and writing should employ as many sensory modes as possible.

Dual Coding Theory places a special emphasis on imagery because of the way in which perception is linked to the memorial operations that aid literacy education. An important concept associated with Dual Coding Theory, "chunking" helps explain how images work cognitively. In *Lexical Phrases and Language Teaching,* James Nattinger and Jeanette De Carrico argue that language is stored in "chunks":

Many studies of language processing . . . suggest that language is stored

redundantly. Words, for example, are stored not only as individual morphemes,

but also as parts of phrases, or as longer memorized chunks of speech, and that

they are often retrieved from memory . . . in pre-assembled chunks. (31)

Pragmatist theorist Edmund Huey also argued that imagery occurred primarily in phrases or

sentences because many individual words, such as conjunctions and prepositions, do not evoke

imagery unless they are part of a larger language unit (Sadoski and Paivio 36). Chunking

functions as a part of episodic memory, where pieces of text, such as the different points in an

argument, are held together temporarily and represented by key language and/or images. These

"chunks" serve unifying and symbolizing functions and help to create verbal cohesion. In

Cohesion and English, Michael Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan observe that cohesion includes

lexical, grammatical, causal, and thematic connections that help structure individual units into

coherent episodes. An important concept associated with chunking in Dual Coding Theory is the

Conceptual Peg Hypothesis. The Conceptual Peg Hypothesis maintains that mental images play

a central role in the organization and retrieval of information in episodic memory by serving as

mental "pegs" that "hook" parts of an episode together. While most research has focused on the

ways concrete, descriptive, language operates to "hook" memory episodes together, the

Conceptual Peg Hypothesis also explains how images in general connect abstract ideas together,

revealing how mental imagery plays an important role in chunking information in memory. For

example, the ancient method of loci was an early application of the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis

because it used images as mental reference points to "hook" various parts of a speech together in

the mind of the orator.

Given that Dual Coding Theory claims that mental encodings are concrete in nature, its practitioners assume that there is a profound connection between perception and memory (Sadoski and Paivio 44). Dual Coding Theory refutes contemporary theories of cognition that define all knowledge as abstract and amodal. Dual Coding Theory, by contrast, does not presume that memory and knowledge are separate from each other. Since literacy entails memories called to mind both from the text itself, as well as from non-linguistic sensory registers of what the text evokes (feelings, colors, shapes, sounds, smells), Dual Coding Theory allows for a holistic understanding of the dual processes encountered when reading and writing (Sadoski and Paivio 45-6). This epistemological understanding calls to mind ancient views on the connection between memory and knowledge.

Memory and Cognition

Many ancient and medieval thinkers greatly valued imagery in cognition. Ancient mnemonic techniques focused almost entirely on the role of mental imagery in the composing process. For Aristotle, images functioned as the vehicle for moving perceptions into thought, leading him to claim in the *Rhetoric*, "it is not possible to think without an image" (103). In the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, the most detailed source of ancient artificial memory techniques, the power of memory connects the rhetor to the power of perception. The loci method, outlined in Chapter Two of this dissertation, emphasized the use of cognitive maps and striking images to help a rhetor remember his speech. The loci method is consistent with Dual Coding Theory in several ways: 1) memory and thought employ traces left by the perception of external objects and events; 2) visual sense is mnemonically powerful; 3) mental representations, such as images and words, can be mentally exchanged for each other (Sadoski and Paivio 14). Contemporary

cognitive research does not support the loci method's emphasis on vividness, novelty, or its linear and sequential organization of memory, but it does support the use of imagery and spatialization in aiding cognitive processes (Sadoski and Paivio 15). Many rhetoricians also see the value of the cognitive spatialization of memory. According to Sharon Crowley in *The Methodical Memory*, the "key to the art of memory is use of visual images in an ordered, spatial arrangement. Human memory recalls concrete images far more easily than abstract ideas and remembers an ordered chain of associations more accurately than a random assortment" (31). Understanding the spatialization of memory can help composition theorists better understand how to tap the information reserves of their students.

It is important to note that memory is a tool, a device that can be use to perform higher cognitive operations. Writing itself evolved as a type of memory tool. The human brain places definite limits on the amount of information we can store; therefore, as literacy developed, technologies needed to be created that allowed more words to be remembered. As a result, according to Merlin Donald, the most recent cognitive step in human evolution is the use of writing as an external storage medium (269). Although memory and writing are tools, ancient and medieval scholars did not see them as separate from knowledge-making: they also functioned as ways of creating knowledge.

The ways in which imagery and writing are connected to both memory and knowledge can be seen in Hugh of St. Victor's comments on reading illuminated manuscripts in the twelfth century:

> it is of great value when fixing a memory image that when we read books, we
>
> study to impress on our memory the color, shape, position and placement of the
>
> letters . . . in what location (at the top, the middle or bottom) we saw

something [something] positioned . . . in what color we observed the trace of the letter or the ornamented surface of the parchment. Indeed, I consider nothing so useful for stimulating the memory as this. (qtd. in Carruthers, *Book* 264)[103]

Hugh of St. Victor links the delivery of the text, as well as the visual graphics and spaces of the page, to cognitive operations of retrieval. For Hugh of St. Victor, display affects how one retrieves. Recent cognitive research supports Hugh of St. Victor's claim. According to Sadoski and Paivio, "literacy entails memory form two sources: the text itself and what the text evokes in the form of verbal associations, imagery and emotions" (92). In this way, the display of a text is intimately connected to knowledge-making. While some contemporary psychologists see knowledge as general and memory as specific, ancient and medieval thinkers did not see such a distinction. For ancient and medieval rhetors, memory and knowledge were connected. In ancient and medieval rhetoric, images were often seen as ways of generating, communicating, and retaining knowledge, both externally in textual displays (as Hugh of St. Victor argues), and internally in one's memory. Images, we now know through developments in cognitive science, perform distinct roles in different types of cognitive operations.

Cognitive psychologists have categorized different types of memory: short term memory, working memory, and long term memory. Long term memory has been subdivided into semantic and episodic memory. Semantic memory can be further separated into declarative and procedural memory. While these categories can overlap and interact, cognitive theorists see them as distinct and separate types of memory. Importantly, literacy entails both episodic and semantic memory operations. Individuals use episodic memory for concrete, specific events and semantic memory for abstract, general knowledge. Although most writing instruction focuses on using semantic

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[103] At the end of *The Book of Memory*, Mary Carruthers provides a complete translation of High of St. Victor's "*De Tribus Maximis Circumstantiis Gestorum*" (261-266).

memory operations, recent developments in cognitive psychology reveal that tapping into the concrete, specific elements utilized in episodic memory is crucial to composition. Accordingly, Dual Coding Theory argues that literacy needs to be seen holistically, utilizing all of the senses. Recent psychological experiments demonstrate that "people remember better when more than one of their five senses is engaged simultaneously" (Small 74). The use of the senses in cognitive memorial operations can be most fully realized through analysis of the techniques found in the ancient canon of delivery.

Delivery and Cognition

Although the canon of delivery has not often been seen to play a significant role in composing, Aristotle advocated visualization, gesture, and physical action when composing poetry, drama, or rhetoric. Medieval scholars were known to go into physical states when composing, becoming prostrate or tearful (Carruthers *Craft* xx). Ruminative readings in the Middle Ages drew on ancient oral techniques that were associated with meditation and memorization (Carruthers *Craft* xx). Reading material was memorized through murmuring the words as the text was read over and over. Murmuring accompanied mediation and suggested physical postures and gestures to aid the reading process. According to Mary Carruthers, the purpose of this type of reading was to make the text one's own by "digesting" it and re-experiencing it in memory (Carruthers *Craft* xx). Mental imagery was an important part of ruminative reading: the text would evoke images that the reader should to hold in mind. Reading was made to be corporal, literally incorporated into the reader's senses. This process continues today in the saying of the rosary, where Catholics repeat memorized verses and hold specific religious images in mind at the same time, using multiple senses to reach a meditative state.

The canon of delivery's greatest impact on cognition can be found in its connection to audience and community. In *The Advancement of Learning*, Bacon argues that delivery is "the means by which knowledge is used and incorporated into social institutions, which are maintained in memory" (624). For Bacon, delivery encompasses the way in which knowledge (e.g., through educational institutions) is disseminated. While much of literacy education in the twentieth century has been focused on abstract, verbal, instruction, there have been educators who have recognized the value of delivery operations in the classroom. For example, reading performance in primary schools in the nineteenth century was largely an act of public oral interpretation, emphasizing pronunciation, distinctness, voice, tone, reading posture and other trappings of oral delivery (Sadoski and Paivio 33). A widely used teaching method in the early part of the twentieth century included reading literary stories to children and asking them to visualize the situations and act out the story physically. Extensively illustrated storybooks were also used to teach sentences words and phonics; mental, physical, and pictorial imagery were used with verbal learning (Sadoski and Paivio 33). Recently in *Dramatizing Writing*, Virginia Skinner Linnenberg discusses the merits of incorporating delivery practices into the twenty-first century writing classroom, arguing that: "Delivery in the writing classroom is the use of noetic and physical processes by which students can convey their ideas/life experiences to their peer audiences in an effort to develop the best writing they can achieve" (55). Dana Goia, recently appointed to head the NEA, has also argued for the incorporation of drama into the classroom, stating that role-playing and physicality can be an effective teaching method.[104]

Since physical performance allows students to better remember what they are learning, it can be a highly useful pedagogical approach. The vivid gestures, roles, and dramatic experiences in the classroom help students make connections they may not have done otherwise. Not only

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[104] Student discussion with Dana Goia, October 23, 2002, Athens, Georgia.

does the vividness or novelty of drama aid memorial processes, performing with the body actually helps the mind to remember. In a recent study by the University of Chicago, it was shown that gesturing, or talking with one's hands, stimulates memory.[105] Those who talked with their hands were better able to recall information from their memories and quickly translate the information into verbal form. Researcher Susan Goldin-Meadow argues that speakers tend to gesture more when the task becomes difficult and that gesturing can aid thinking "by reducing cognitive effort" (Langdone "Hands" para. 6). She also claims, "speakers may increase the number of speech errors they produce when they can't gesture" (Langdone "Hands" para. 6). In this way, physical performance can help students more successfully "perform" a variety of tasks in the classroom. Another aspect of performance that affects memory operations can be found in the concept of persona.

The rhetorical concept of persona has its etymological origin in the Latin word for mask and has a history rooted in role-playing and drama. Rhetoricians have long known how persona can be evident in a writer's tone. For example, a familiar, informal tone might use active verbs, second-person pronouns, cumulative sentence constructions, contractions, and sentence fragments (Sadoski and Paivio 159). According to Dual Coding Theory, the concept of persona is central to style in composing because it "deeply affects the selection of information from long-term memory, the formation of plans and goals, the imagined audience, and choices of grammar and vocabulary" (Sadoski and Paivio 160). In this way, persona serves a crucial ethical operation, working as "an inner situational context" that "monitors and governs the writing process" (Sadoski and Paivio 160). This persona or monitor can be explained by "activity within and between representations in the verbal and nonverbal systems as specified in Dual Coding

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[105] John Langdone. "Thinking with the Hands.*" New York Times on the Web*. 21 October 2003.
        <http://www-news.uchicago.edu/citations/03/031021.gesture-ct.html>.

Theory" (Sadoski and Paivio 160). Thus, according to Dual Coding Theory, persona holds a key place in the psychology of writing (Sadoski and Paivio 160). According to Sadoski, "Specifically, a writer must adopt (at least) two personae, one for the author and one for the audience. The process would include the evocation of images, language, and affective states associated with the writing situation that establish the two personae" (Sadoski and Paivio 160). Having split, multiple, personae allows the writer to imagine him/herself as both writer and audience, creating a "feedback loop" of rhetorical decisions to create the most persuasive arguments (Sadoski and Paivio 160). The move into digital media requires a greater use of imagined persona, not only because digital writers may not often receive immediate (if any) feedback from audience, but also because the range of imagined audiences is much more diverse: to write for the web is to write for a global audience.

While at first glance digital media technologies appear to inhibit the use of the types of ethical considerations that create personae (the body, for instance, is not always visible as it is in oral delivery), these technologies actually necessitate the revaluation of the techne used in delivering effective ethos. In *Bodyless Communication: Ethos and the World Wide Web,* an online project by Susan Fielding, James Hetfield, and Lynn Whitaker, the authors argue that "the absence of traditional means for establishing identity requires that we sharpen our language skills and develop new methods for establishing and evaluating ethos in these communication channels."[106] Thus, analysis of the types ethical appeals most effective in writing for the web is crucial for creating credible arguments. According to Sam Dragga, the revival of delivery has given writers new ethical incentives and responsibilities: "with this new power [in] design, information comes with new obligations, specifically ethical obligations" (80). Since digital

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[106] Susan Fielding, James Hetfield, and Lynn Whitaker. *Bodyless Communication: Ethos and the World Wide Web*. 11 December 2003. <http://www.ou.edu/class/engl3143/group3/>.

writing strongly utilizes elements of graphic design as argumentative techniques, critical analysis of these new delivery practices becomes of great importance in composing and analyzing in the twenty-first century. Indeed, as George Yoos asserts in *The Pragmatics of Graphics,* "the use of textual cues and graphics is rhetorical" (107). Graphics serve rhetorical functions, such as displaying causal connections, outlining narrative sequences, or providing lists and menus. Graphics can allow for "enhanced control over readers' perception and comprehension" (Yoos 105). As Hugh of St. Victor argued in the twelfth century, the shapes of letters are memory clues and act as direct stimulus to remembering. New multimedia technologies enable rhetors to use rhetorical techniques never before available (flash, shockwave, hypertext, etc), and to store these techniques and the knowledge they generate in an interactive and unlimited collective "treasure house."

Digital media are changing the way in which we perceive, process, and construct information, a cognitive shift that emphasizes imagery and perception. According to cognitive psychologists Robert Sekuler and Randolph Blake, perception does not necessarily have to provide a comprehensive view of the world; it only needs to provide "a useful view of the world" (1). Perception involves action because individuals move in order to perceive (Sekuler and Blake 8). To be perceptive, one must be able to control and manipulate stimuli (Sekuler and Blake 20). In order to control external stimuli, a variety of mnemonic techniques have been created throughout the ages. For example, ancient rhetors used the method of loci to create cognitive maps to help them remember their speeches (Sekuler and Blake 296). The latest memory and delivery systems can be seen in XML applications that work as collective pattern recognition structures and connect verbal and nonverbal methods in the writing process. XML calls upon the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to store, organize, retrieve and display information

and can be seen to emphasize the aspects of cognition that psychologists believe improves basic

literacy acquisition.

Rhetorical Space for Digital Literacy in XML

A grammatical system for creating customized markup languages, XML is an acronym

for Extensible Markup Language (Castro 21). XML is "extensible" because it allows the

programmer to make her own tags. Unlike HTML, which only tells a web browser how to

display a text, XML allows the author to describe structure of the document. Since the

information stored in XML is fully open, fully documented, and reusable, XML has become

increasingly important in business applications because it allows data to survive software and

hardware changes. XML, a derivative of the more complicated SGML, made its first public

appearance in 1996. After Microsoft announced support for XML in 1997, XML's use in the

business sector increased dramatically (XML is commonly referred to as "the billion dollar

secret"). XML's use for academic purposes is beginning to be seen in colleges, such as the

University of Georgia. Internet-friendly, XML can be used for a variety of applications and is

easy to process. Because XML is a descriptive mark up language (as opposed to the purely

procedural markup of HTML), XML tags encode both structure and content. While HTML tags

(i.e., italics <i> *Italics* </i>) can be lost when the documents move between authors, software, or

hardware, XML tags are well-formed and thus describe the tags' usage through DTDs,

eliminating the loss of data. DTDs, or Document Type Definitions, are formal declaration of tags

in a document. DTD's define certain features and, when marked in the text, allow viewers to see

the structure of text or data as a visual display through eXtensible Stylesheet Language

Transformation (XSLT) transformations (*Introduction to XML*).

Theoretically, XML is spatial as opposed to temporal because it is non linear. For this reason, XML allows for the construction of external spatial maps, like the cognitive maps our brains produce. Just as human beings can combine spatial maps to create an intertextual collection of memories, in turn, XML displays can sort and combine different elements in an interwoven, external, network of displays. According to Jay David Bolter in *Writing Space*, literacy is, among other things, "the realization that language can have a visual as well as an aural dimension" (16). XML's ability to arrange content in a multiplicity of displays capitalizes on the spatial, visual, component of writing. The ancient Greek word topos literally means "place," and ancient rhetoric used the word to refer to commonplaces—conventional units or methods of thought. XML allows for the efficient spatial and graphic revelation of commonplaces created from the selection of DTDs. XML also demonstrates that digital writing comprises not only a visual surface, but also a data structure in the computer. XML spaces are dense and mobile, offering possibilities that may or may not be seen. Of course much of the power of XML space lies in hands of the programmer or DTD writer. And yet, as Locke Carter argues about hypertext in "Argument in Hypertext: Writing Strategies and the Problem of Ordering in a Nonsequential World": the appeal to space, "argumentum ad locum," can be "employed properly if it functioned as an invitation to explore the argument's claims on its own grounds, with all facets of argument open to exploration" (17). The flexible and open-ended nature of XML, while not immune to reductionary practices, encourages multiple possibilities for use and enacts a multimodal approach to literacy instruction.

The most exciting characteristics of XML applications for twenty-first century pedagogy can be found in the ways in which XML allows for a multimodal approach to writing instruction as it offers exciting new possibilities for peer collaboration. Diana George, in "From Analysis to

Design: Visual Communication in the Teaching of Writing," argues that "throughout the history

of writing instruction in this country the terms of debate typical in discussions of visual literacy

and the teaching of writing have limited the kinds of assignments we might imagine for

composition" (11). A multimodal approach to literacy is crucial in twenty-first century rhetoric,

where communication technologies can engage students in a multi-sensory experience. As Mary

Hocks argues, "To use multimedia technologies effectively, writers have to use practices that are

not just verbal, but visual, spatial, aural, and gestural to make meaning" (644). Digital

technologies, like XML applications, require what Hocks calls "hybrid literacies": facility in both

verbal and nonverbal practices (631). The amplification of images in digital culture requires

composition instructors to teach visual literacy in the writing classroom. Thus, digital culture

encourages the use of epideictic rhetoric, or rhetoric that is focused on display.[107] Significantly,

XML applications, which amplify data through display options, can be used to teach the

epideictic rhetoric that is so often utilized in digital writing.

Although at first, the binary coding of XML applications may seem to reinforce the more

logical and procedural aspects of deliberative or juridical rhetoric, XML can be seen to promote

rhetoric as epideictic.[108] The epideictic, as defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, serves "to

show forth, explain, or exhibit . . . which, by full amplification, seeks to persuade." Focused

always already on what is fit for display, XML applications amplify certain aspects of the data

for easier dissemination or use. Just as an ancient ceremonial speaker can dynamically emphasize

or de-emphasize elements of his speech to fit his audience's requirements, XML can alter the

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[107] See Chapter Two of this dissertation for further analysis of the rise of the epideictic in digital culture.

[108] "The Greek *epideictic* means "fit for display." Thus, this branch of oratory is sometimes called "ceremonial" or "demonstrative" oratory. Epideictic oratory was oriented to public occasions calling for speech or writing in the here and now. Funeral orations are a typical example of epideictic oratory. The ends of epideictic included praise or blame, and thus the long history of encomia and invectives, in their various manifestations, can be understood in the tradition of epideictic oratory. Aristotle assigned "virtue (the noble)" and "vice (the base)" as those special topics of invention that pertained to epideictic oratory." Taken from: http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric.htm. For a fuller discussion of the epideictic and its place in the postmodern digital culture, see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

scale or organization of a document, formulating documents as collage, highlighting what

Richard Lanham calls, in *The Electronic Word,* the dramatic, dynamic, nature of writing:

> To replicate and juxtapose at will, as collage does, is to alter scale, and scaling
>
> change is one of the truly enzymatic powers of electronic text. When you click in
>
> the zoom box, you make a big decision: you are deciding on the central decorum
>
> of a human event, on the boundary-conditions within which that event is to be
>
> staged, and hence on the nature of the event itself. (41)

XML encourages users to change scale, or divide parts of a text, allowing different audiences to

view texts differently. Just as epideictic rhetoric focuses on the interaction between the rhetor

and his audience, digital technologies like XML create interfaces that allow for better interaction,

interfaces that are specific and context-bound.[109] XML applications create a more rhetorically

minded analysis of a text, one that actively utilizes the strengths of the canons of memory and

delivery by emphasizing data selection and organization, combined with dramatic re-

interpretation for specialized situations. Amplification anticipates an audience's desires: it

expands or contracts as the audience demands. XML applications restore the oral flexibility of

ancient amplification, reinforcing epideictic rhetoric; XML helps writers to recognize and use

figures more quickly, and it allows for the prompt recollection of techniques of writing that are

"fit for display."[110] Epideictic rhetoric also reinforces the use of style and figuration to create

persuasive arguments. Thus, epideictic rhetoric refuses to split content from form: teaching

epideictic rhetoric helps students understand the connections between techne, such as figuration,

and persuasion. XML programs can easily identify and highlight particular techniques and skills,

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[109] According to Lanham, "To make art of scaling changes means making us self-conscious about perceptual distance and convention, neural and social, that cluster around it. That distance itself can so change an object . . .makes it interactive" (42).

[110] Striking use of figuration is an important quality of the epideictic.

revealing students' practices to them. In the University of Georgia's English department an XML application named <emma> has become a powerful tool in helping students make writing decisions and orient themselves within a defined set of techniques and skills. [111]

Introducing <emma>

     <emma> (Electronic Markup and Management Application), a software XML editor that reads DTD's and guides students to inserting tags correctly, was created by a group of faculty and TA's from UGA. [112] <emma> uses JEdit as an application platform. <emma> runs through Cocoon, an open-source product of the Apache-XML project. [113] An XML publishing framework that runs on the Tomcat servlet engine, Cocoon performs server-side XSLT transformations of the XML documents for a variety of displays and transforms documents that have been previously uploaded. Within the Cocoon framework, <emma> concatenates multiple documents. [114] DTD's are written to define the particular features of a text that the instructor wants to emphasize (e.g., thesis sentences, topic sentences, etc). When marked, these features are displayed in a variety of formats that allow students to see the structure of their argument as "visual display" (Desmet, "Bringing" 2). [115] <emma> helps students, teachers, and peer reviewers to mark up writing in a way that makes particular features visible.

     Although <emma> is constantly evolving and her practices changing, during the time in which we observed her implementation in First-Year writing courses, a class using <emma>

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[111] Aristotle used epideictic rhetoric both as the ceremonial display of a rhetor's own skill and in terms of suggestions for action or belief converted into praise or blame (1.3.3; 1.9.35). Subsequent rhetoricians have focused on the role of epideictic rhetoric in constructing community and reinforcing socially prized values, beliefs, and codes of conduct (see Perelman, 1969). Kathryn Summers in "Epideictic Rhetoric in the Englishwoman's Review" has effectively used the epideictic as rhetoric to transform and renegotiate cultural values and categories of meaning.

[112] For an example of a DTD written for <emma>, see Appendix J.

[113] For an example of Jedit, see Appendix B and Appendix C

[114] Thanks to Ron Balthazor for his help in articulating the more technical aspects of <emma>.

[115] For an example of a student display, see Appendix I.

would often operate as follows: Students enter the First-year computer lab and open the already downloaded application on their computers. Students then open the "assignment" their teacher is utilizing on this day (e.g., paramedic method, topic sentences, transitions, etc.). Since the assignment has embedded within it the particular DTD for this exercise, the students never see any of the XML code: they see a split screen with a menu bar on top, similar to many Windows applications. To the left of the menu bar the students see a place for administrative information that enables their documents to be identified and tracked after uploading to the <emma> archive. The students copy and paste their essays (from disk or e-mail) into <emma>.[116] Students can also choose to compose directly in the editor if time permits or if they have downloaded the application at home. After they have pasted their essays, the students see that the right-hand part of the menu provides a menu of possible tags. Due to the hierarchical nature of XML, students must first mark basic elements of their essay before more specific markup can be done. Thus, students mark each paragraph of the essay with the <paragraph> tags, then use those for <sentence>. If, for instance, the assignment deals with thesis statements and topic sentences, the students then mark up the essay's <thesis> and the series of <topic sentences>. To mark up an element, students highlight the text to mark with their mouse and click on the appropriate tag. After mark up is finished and the document checks itself for errors, students upload their essays to the <emma> database. In the database, the essays are displayed immediately in a variety of formats. For example, the students can see their text in a familiar a word-processing document, or they can see another version that highlights the thesis and topic sentences in bright colors as they appear in the paper or as they appear on their own outside of the context of the rest of their

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[116] As <emma> is constantly evolving, some of these steps may be automated by the time this dissertation is complete. This description reflects <emma> at the stage in which I was observing her in her first year.

paper; they also can see yet another version that collapses the intervening paragraphs to display the essay's skeletal structure in scalable vector graphics.[117]

Once their essays are displayed in <emma>, the instructor can use the students' own texts to teach selected techne. <emma> allows students easy access to others' work and highlights the power of collaboration: thus, <emma> emphasizes telematic memory, where the processes and procedures that allow access to information are foregrounded.[118] <emma>'s telematic memory allows instructors to control what their students "access" and therefore "see": creating highly specific and focused pedagogical applications.

Significantly, through the writing of assignment codes and DTDs, <emma> allows instructors to emphasize discipline-specific techniques.[119] Thus, <emma> helps students tailor their writing to a specific audience. As Christy Desmet writes in "How Do We "Mark" Student Texts?: Describing Composition with XML," "In Technical Writing classes, we discuss the genres and conventions of different academic disciplines and workplace activities, and consider different documentation methods. But [<emma>] allows these genres to be defined very precisely" (47). One of the most successful DTD's that has been used in the University of Georgia's First-Year writing courses is based on Richard Lanham's paramedic method. This DTD helps students identify their use of subjects, verbs, and prepositions, revealing the overuse of the "official" style that is seen so often in First-Year prose. Since the DTD that informs any rhetorical exercise in <emma> has a logical structure (one with rules for what elements are marked and how they are "nested"), students can easily see how rhetorical techniques work to structure a text. Formal rhetorical techniques no longer exist, as Christy Desmet notes, "in a

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[117] For an example of a DTD written for <emma>, see Appendix J; for an example of Jedit, see Appendix B and Appendix C; for an example of a student display, see Appendix I.
[118] As I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, <emma> allows for increased opportunities for peer review.
[119] For an example of an assignment code, see Appendix D.

conceptual vacuum, as fetish objects earnestly desired by teachers for mysterious reasons of their own" (Desmet, "Bringing" 2). For instance, when a composition instructor seeks to discuss the importance of structural technai (topic sentences, transitions, etc.), the instructor can use a DTD (or Document-Type Definition) that defines particular features (e.g., thesis, topic sentences, etc.) that, when marked in a piece of text, will allow students to see their own arguments as a visual display, allowing students to see techne in specific instances, using their own texts. Techne is no longer a generalized abstract concept, but one that is specific and seen in context of its usefulness in furthering or limiting (if it is an unsuccessful use of techne) their own arguments. Not only does <emma> allow students to clearly understand the techne which forms effective writing in specific situations, but it also reinforces many of the aspects of cognition that contribute to constructing effective language use, aspects which have their roots in the ancient canons of memory and delivery.

<emma>, Memory and Delivery and Dual Coding Theory

Emphasizing the storage and display of information as integral to communication, classical and medieval rhetoric have much in common with Dual Coding Theory. Both ancient memorial techniques and Dual Coding Theory reveal the importance that imagery has on the composing process; in turn they show the ways in which an XML database such as <emma> marks a significant development in the history of composition instruction. <emma> allows not only for the quick storage and retrieval of information that ancient mnemonic techniques value, but through the multiplicity of her display options, <emma> also encourages students to tap into the power of delivery.

<emma>, as an application, focuses on the archival, retrieval, and display of information, all of which unite crucial components of the ancient rhetorical canons of memory and delivery with the more contemporary science of Dual Coding Theory. First of all, <emma> focuses on imagery; the display lets students truly re-vision their texts in a global rather than merely cosmetic way. Second, <emma> combines verbal and visual elements in a perfect application of Dual Coding Theory. The display allows students to "imprint" the highlighted material onto their memories. Since <emma>'s various displays make both verbal and visual elements concrete, <emma> serves as a structural vehicle that at once inspires and organizes specific student learning experiences. Third, since students encounter both verbal and nonverbal modes, they can toggle back and forth between these two modes, first on screen and then in their minds, to create a fuller, richer, and more dynamic learning experience.[120]

As a "memory machine," <emma> operates on a number of levels and can be used for a wide variety of purposes. For example, XML displays of grammatical errors allow students to store and retrieve examples of errors, facilitating the learning of basic skills. <emma> also works as an archive of student work, creating a lasting database of student writing that is searchable in innumerable ways. Indeed, <emma> operates as a technologically advanced version of medieval "statim invenire," a mnemonic device "to find something on the spot."[121] As a storehouse of a student's writing, <emma> can search and retrieve all marked up documents easily and quickly. For instance, <emma> can identify all verbs used by a particular student, class, or year. Thus, administrators can track information heretofore impossible to gauge: the amount of passive voice used by all first-years or the use of Shakespeare as authority. As a highly searchable and re-

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[120] For an example of <emma>'s scalable vector graphics, see Appendix E.

[121] In "Statim Invenire: Schools, Preachers, and New Attitudes to the Page," Richard and Mary Rouse argue that mnemonic techniques may have played a role in the fast-paced development of finding devices in the twelfth century. Such mental practices were useful for organizing and remembering material that one had already read and came to be applied to the arrangement of textual aids and encyclopedias.

usable database, <emma>, as Alexis Hart argues in "'Re-viewing' Student Texts with XML," is "limited only by the imagination of teachers and developers" (58). While the application's ability for storage and retrieval is important, it is <emma>'s capitalization on the interconnected operations of the canons of memory and delivery (refined for the twenty-first century) that is really exciting for the future of composition pedagogy.

    <emma> not only reinforces the operations of the canons of memory and delivery by utilizing images in literacy operations, the application also reinforces the foundations of these canons by encouraging the communal, cooperative, functions of writing. <emma> significantly improves peer review; many studies indicate that when student readers encounter mental imagery, they find a text more interesting, comprehensible, and memorable. Since most of <emma>'s applications in the classroom focus on peer review of the XSLT displays, <emma> reinforces communal knowledge-making. While peer review has been used to a great extent in the past twenty years in composition classrooms, <emma> allows for highly effective peer sessions; the change from page to screen creates highly readable and colorful delivery of rhetorical elements. <emma> can also be exciting for instructors who emphasize process pedagogy; the application facilitates multiple readers not only through the database, but also through the in-class use of a projector, allowing a writer to see his/her text in large scale and to share that text with the entire class quickly and easily. One instructor using <emma> for his process-based pedagogy observes how <emma> works extremely well in peer review sessions:

        <emma> has given me several advantages as a teacher, but most importantly it has allowed students to analyze their writing and the writing of their peers in a more immediate fashion . . . <emma> allows students to quickly size up the writing of

the entire class—something that wasn't possible using traditional print methods.

(qtd. in Williams 8)

A typical peer review session using <emma> displays to teach thesis and topic sentences occurs as follows: After the students mark up their essays for thesis statements and topic sentences, they upload them to the <emma> database. Using a projector, the instructor can choose any student's marked up essay and "project" it onto the screen. The amplified text is visible to all students and allows the student-writer to see his or her text in a different, larger, context. The instructor can choose the display that pulls out just the thesis and topic sentences, and the class as a whole can decide whether or not the topic sentences are relevant to the thesis statements. Pulling the selected elements outside of the text and amplifying them onto a screen makes the rhetorical nature of the text more evident to the students. <emma> also has a peer and instructor comment function that allows students and instructors to makes comments within the text. <emma> is a highly interactive technology, one that encourages the communal nature of writing. [122]

Significantly, <emma>'s multiple displays encourage highly detailed rhetorical analyses of a student's text. <emma> allows for the structure of the text to be easily revealed, highlighting the rhetorical nature of cognition itself. Following Dual Coding Theory, <emma> reinforces episodic memory, allowing students to "see" the building blocks of their writing through specific, detailed, displays of general knowledge systems such as rhetorical figuration or grammar rules. <emma> encourages the use of episodic memory by revealing how each marked up text corresponds to larger abstract rhetorical concepts. For instance, if a student uses the Paramedic Method DTD (which marks up all the verbs and prepositions in a text) the student can then display only her verbs, or only her prepositions. Seeing many passive verbs or a great deal of prepositions can make a great impact on the student writer: she sees her text exhibiting

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[122] See Appendix N.

classical rhetorical weaknesses and can place her text within a larger framework.[123] Thus, <emma> emphasizes techne, helping students focus on the rhetorical structure of a text in a self-conscious way. <emma> also reinforces the use of semantic memory. Since semantic memory is typically assessed with tasks that require intentional retrieval of information from a specific episode, students can use <emma> to intentionally select certain elements. <emma> makes deliberation and awareness a key aspect in revising: the application brings a self-reflexiveness to the writing process that is necessary for successful revision. The way in which <emma> reinforces semantic memory is crucial, since beginning writers often fail to use semantic memory, relying too much on tasks that do not require conscious recollection of specific episodes (Schacter 387).

In her display of specific episodes, <emma> uses imagery and display to reveal "veiled" rhetorical elements. <emma> also taps into students' episodic memory processes by emphasizing chunking. Since chunking is a function of episodic memory where pieces of text, such as the different points in an argument, are held together temporarily as represented by key language and/or images, they serve unifying and symbolizing functions. <emma> emphasizes the same cognitive process: the application "chunks" sections of text and holds them together through imagery, enacting a type of external verbal cohesion. This external verbal cohesion helps to structure individual verbal units into coherent episodes and allows students to see the rhetorical elements in their text in a "digestible" fashion. [124] <emma> also reinforces the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis, encouraging images to play a central role in organization and retrieval, with highlighted elements in displays serving as mental "pegs." The highlighted displays are memorable and work to encourage the students to connect their own text with classical rhetorical

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[123] See Appendix N.
[124] See Appendix O for an example of how <emma> "chunks" text.

principles. Because mental imagery plays an important role in collecting information in memory, <emma> reinforces the cognitive operations that occur when students make connections between systematic rhetorical technai and their own texts. <emma> creates cognitive maps that help students "enter" their own texts. By abstracting selected elements from the text, <emma> removes the linear structure of the essay and allows students to see the structure, or "space," of their arguments. Scalable Vector Graphics, which create color images of the essays' various structures, are particularly useful in helping students see the structural spaces of their arguments.[125] As I argued earlier in this chapter, the ancient method of loci was an early application of the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis because it used images as mental reference points: <emma> takes this ancient method and amplifies it, making visual, spatial organization once again an important part of the composing process.

In terms of contemporary cognitive theory, <emma>'s ability to represent texts spatially constitutes her most innovative aspect. Spatial representation makes space visible or audible. <emma> emphasizes the spatiality of texts as the application moves elements of the text from temporal designations into spatial displays.[126] In so doing, <emma> allows students to distance themselves from their writing, encouraging them, in Richard Lanham's words, "to look at and not through their text." According to Lanham in *Revising Prose*, the electronic screen can be a "deeply rhetorical medium" where a writer toggles easily from looking at the text to looking through it (xii). This distancing "radical[ly] enfrancis[es] the perceiver" (17). <emma> further encourages the students to move cognitively from the textual surface to content by "displacing" certain elements for display. This displacement allows see their text as part of a general

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[125] See Appendix O.
[126] See Appendix E.

rhetorical network, scheme, script or body of general knowledge. To see one's text as part of a larger system allows students to realize the rhetorical nature of language itself.

       <emma> increases the rhetoricity of texts for student writers as the application reveals how "physical operations of vision contribute to a more abstract and conceptual understanding" (Hart 56). The digital screen insists on the continual oscillation between unselfconscious expression and self-conscious design. Since the term rhetoric, I argue, defines an information system, the "colors of rhetoric" (e.g., tropes and figures) are not merely decorative but central to the meaning of prose. The space of <emma> allows for a distancing effect that contributes to attaining this critical rhetorical mindset. As Mary Hocks argues: "In terms of visual rhetoric, students need to learn the distanced process of how to critique the saturated visual and technological landscape that surrounds them as something structured and written in a set of deliberate rhetorical moves" (645). As these rhetorical moves are created and analyzed within a certain discipline or culture, <emma> can be seen to emphasize Bourdieu's notion of habitus: the texts stored and displayed in <emma> can be seen as textual performances that enact certain ritual codes of behavior in a given rhetorical context. As habitus works to highlight codes of spatial performance in the context of social situation, <emma> works simultaneously to inculcate students into a particular system of codes, conventions, and beliefs as well as to provide a "displacement" which allows for the increased ability to critique the rhetorical moves of themselves and those around them. <emma>'s ability to simultaneously teach and critique conventions of discourse is perhaps her most powerful feature, and one which, I argue, places her within the realm of a twenty-first century enactment of epideictic discourse.

<emma> and the Epideictic

By enacting ritual coding of behavior in context-bound situations, <emma> emphasizes epideictic rhetoric. In ancient culture, epideictic rhetoric was performed at funerals or celebrations where public speakers often praised the occasion or individuals in order to reinforce the dominant views of the culture. As Chaim Perelman has argued, the importance of epideictic lies in its goal of increasing the adherence of the audience to values the speaker advocates, epideictic speeches "appeal to universal order, to a nature, or a god that would vouch for the unquestioned, and supposedly unquestionable, values" (Perelman 51). Kathryn Summers also sees the epideictic as it is associated with values, arguing that epideictic rhetoric "plays a central role in negotiating values and belief and is "frequently used to define acceptable and unacceptable ways of acting, speaking, or thinking within a culture" (par.1). Summers links epideictic rhetoric to Kenneth Burke's notion of the "incipient act," which serves to increase the audience's disposition to act in accordance with certain values. Although epideictic arguments generally seek to change the audiences' beliefs in the present rather than exhorting them to action in the future, as deliberative rhetoric does, the ways in which present beliefs are connected to actions in the future make epideictic arguments very complex. According to Aristotle in the *Rhetoric,* "The focus of epideictic is praise or blame and is centered upon the present, but sometimes reflecting on the past so as to anticipate the future" (I .3.4). Thus the use of the past to anticipate the future is an important aspect of the epideictic and is crucial to understanding how <emma> reinforces epideictic rhetoric. While I would argue that the flexibility of <emma> refuses appeals to "unquestionable values," it is my argument that <emma> reinforces rhetoric as epideictic by helping students see their own texts in connection with a larger framework of rhetorical principles, conventions, or values. The techne of <emma> works to define acceptable

and unacceptable ways of writing within academic writing. Susan Larson and Patricia Paystrup claim in "A Postmodern Epideictic Celebrating Human Aspiration and Achievements," that the rhetoric of the twenty-first century is epideictic in that contemporary rhetoric "accentuates values" and "spurs us to act on those values by pointing to how others like us overcome challenges and find ways to excel" (par. 1). <emma> demonstrates the intervention of techne and the public-forming potential of epideictic as it works to display certain characteristics or conventions and encourages collaborative discussion of the challenges of writing.

Significantly, both <emma> and epideictic rhetoric focus on creating texts that are "fit for display," and, as Lawrence Rosenfield has argued, the term "epideictic "suggests displaying "what might otherwise remain unnoticed or invisible" (135). The main logic behind <emma>'s displays centers on revealing what may otherwise be unnoticed or invisible. <emma> also takes the technique of amplification to the extreme. Each display in <emma> amplifies certain elements selected by the mark up. The amplification of select data not only helps writers recognize and use rhetorical elements more quickly, but also restores the oral flexibility of ancient amplification. Classes utilizing peer review can amplify certain aspects of a text to be analyzed (e.g., verbs or transitions), encouraging the most significant aspect of epideictic rhetoric: adapting one's speech or text to one's audience. Thus, <emma> operates as a digitized prosopopoeia device, projecting and magnifying selected elements. Just as Plato's use of the device of prosopopoiea in the *Phaedrus* worked to simultaneously amplify and deconstruct ethos, so does <emma> simultaneously amplifies and deconstructs conventions of discourse. Operating in the realm of the epideictic, <emma> magnifies rhetorical moves at the same time that she allows users to distance themselves from their techniques, creating a displacement that provides the space for critique and judgment. <emma> also reinforces epideictic rhetoric by

removing the temporal, sequential, limitations of writing.[127] The primarily epideictic rhetoric enacted in <emma>'s displays encourages self-conscious consideration of the discourse conventions valued in specific writing contexts. Technai of memory and delivery are often utilized in epideictic rhetoric because the epideictic uses highly stylized delivery methods to "praise or blame" past events in order to encourage change in the future. Thus, <emma> is a key revision tool because she always operates to (re)vision a text.

Since <emma> functions primarily in the classroom as a tool for revision, the information stored and retrieved in <emma> is most often used to create action or change in the future. Thus, <emma> enacts one of the most important features of memory: its usefulness for the future. According to Henri Bergson in *Matter and Memory*, memory is " a synthesis of past and present with a view to the future, in that it contracts the moments of this matter in order to use them and to manifest itself by actions" (220). As the perfect memory machine, <emma> synthesizes elements composed in the past to be used for action (e.g., revision) in the future. Significantly, then, <emma> is a pragmatist's tool, performing the ancient roles of memory in an external machine. Indeed, <emma> emphasizes the fact that we live in an age of external memories; the computer has become an extension of human memory. And yet, this change from internal to external memory source has not changed the basic cognitive abilities that occur when composing. As Donald Norman argues: "In general, artifacts don't change our cognitive abilities; they change the tasks we do" (78). While the technology of <emma> (i.e., the markup) may change the kinds of tasks we do, the application calls upon the ancient operations of memory and delivery: cognitive operations that can be successfully emphasized once again in the twenty-first century composition classroom.

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[127] According to Aristotle in the *Rhetoric,* "The focus of epideictic is praise or blame and is centered upon the present, but sometimes reflecting on the past so as to anticipate the future" (I .3.4).

We can see how <emma> exploits the visual and mnemonic resources outlined by Dual Coding Theory from an exercise that asks students both to analyze a well-known author's ethos and to construct their own ethos in a piece of original autobiographical writing.[128] Rendering visible the rhetorical figures of memory that Virginia Woolf utilizes in *A Room of One's Own* and encouraging students to experiment themselves with the figures they have "marked" in Woolf's text, the exercise provides a particularly good example of how <emma> can at once model and describe rhetorical processes.[129] Although a rhetorical analysis of the first chapter of *A Room of One's Own* shows that Woolf uses a great many rhetorical elements to make the case that women need equality in material conditions before they can rise to their potential as writers and artists, Woolf specifically uses the tropes and figures accorded to the ancient canons of memory and delivery.[130] These rhetorical elements are useful to rhetors for creating a powerful ethos because they consistently work to create personal credibility at the same time as they construct a common vision. A powerful demonstration of epideictic rhetoric, *A Room of One's Own* reveals both a personal and public ethos, one that seeks to unite women's positions.[131]

Pedagogical Example: Woolf and <emma>

Throughout *A Room of One's Own*, Woolf creates powerful ethical appeals and demonstrates the importance of ethos for the essay writer. In this way, she models the construction of ethos in a useful way for students in the digital classroom, where ethos becomes more rather than less important. The class in "Writing for the World Wide Web" course focused

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[128] All student work analyzed in this chapter is the product of a human subjects study, accepted and monitored by the University of Georgia's Office for the Vice President of Research.

[129] For a chart of the figures used by Woolf and the students, see Appendix F.

[130] For a fuller discussion of these figures and their connection to the operation of the canons of memory and delivery, see Appendix F.

[131] To see a marked up version of part of *A Room of One's Own*, see Appendix L.

on the construction of what we have come to call digital ethos, and the students spent much of their time investigating the connection between ethical appeals and memorial operations. The assignment asked students to analyze Woolf's ethos in *A Room of One's Own*, then to construct their own argumentative autobiographical narratives using the same figures that Woolf used to construct her argument. The students were then asked to mark up their draft in <emma> and to work with each other to analyze the usefulness of these tropes and figures in establishing ethos in their essays.

As I argued in Chapter Two of this dissertation, in general tropes and figures help to establish ethos because they use memory and delivery techniques. Figures constitute techne not only because they are established techniques, but also because they operate as productive knowledge, as knowledge that can be taught. Students are satisfied in significant ways when they are taught to utilize the figures of speech in their writing: not only do they appreciate the tangible knowledge they represent, but the teaching of techne, such as tropes and figures, also works to bring students into the history of writing and allows them access to conventions of interaction. The particular figures used in this assignment specifically call upon delivery skills as they emphasize patterns of language that appeal to an audience's interest. These figures also often use memorial operations as invention techniques or to locate the writer and reader within a matrix of shared assumptions and knowledges. As the canons of memory and delivery call upon oral traditions and conventions, these conventions are rooted in the notion of display and, interestingly, their use reinforces writing (whether on the page or the screen) as epideictic.

In this particular assignment, students transferred their understanding of ethos, gained from marking up Woolf's text, to their own essays. One student, for instance, constructed an "everyman/woman" ethos to critique the University of Georgia's requirement that full-time

students take a certain number of class hours. As her subsequent rhetorical analysis of her own essay reveals, the <emma> display showed this student that she needed to use more litotes to connect with her audience and to avoid seeming dictatorial.[132] Sarcasm, by contrast, helped her ethos direct itself appropriately to a student audience. The student also found that she needed to incorporate more anamnesis and epicrisis, figures used to create authority and credibility by referring to external sources of knowledge. A second student, in her essay on civility, found that her <emma> display revealed the way in which her ethos figures needed to be more thoroughly incorporated into the text. She learned as well from a peer reviewer that her chreia (employing an anecdote which relates a saying or deed of someone well known) did not fit appropriately into her argument as a whole.[133]

Much of what the students learned from <emma> in this ethos assignment was additive; that is, they responded by adding more figures rather than recasting their entire argument. Nevertheless, the <emma> displays allowed the students and their peer reviewers to see the appropriateness of the figures holistically, in the context of an entire essay, as well as separately. The <emma> displays also encouraged the students to share their individual figures with the class; many of them were very proud of their chreias, for example, and <emma> allowed for easy access to these nuggets of text. When teaching the incorporation of rhetorical elements into a text, <emma> allows students to separate their figures and analyze them apart from their text, a crucial revision exercise that <emma> makes simple. Thus <emma> allows students to see the significant form of their texts.

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[132] To see her rhetorical analysis in full, see Appendix H.
[133] To see her full <emma> display, see Appendix G.

Ethos and Significant Form

Even in assignments that do not specifically seek to create ethical appeals such as the one described above, <emma> works to teach the established rhetorical conventions, habits, and systems that create effective ethos. As Michael Halloran argues in "Aristotle's Concept of Ethos," "If ethos is manifested in rhetorical action and if ethos is formed by choosing ethical modes of action, it follows that educating a person in rhetorical action, schooling [him/her] in proper rhetorical habits is a means of forming his[her] character" (61). <emma> can be seen to develop and display the "rhetorical habits" (determined by the body of DTDs) that form persuasive "character" through formal and technical rules and conventions, thereby linking formal analysis with ethical situations and contexts. The connection between form and ethics is not a new one—in fact, the techne of <emma> furthers discussions of the public, and ethical, consequences of form.

Use of <emma> in the composition classroom can be seen to promote a theory of significant form akin to the one first coined by Virginia Woolf's brother in law and art critic Clive Bell in "Art":

> For a discussion of aesthetics, it need be agreed only that forms arranged and
> combined according to certain unknown and mysterious laws do move us in a
> particular way, and that it is the business of an artist so to combine and arrange
> them that they shall move us. These moving combinations and arrangements I
> have called, for the sake of convenience and for a reason that will appear later,
> "Significant Form." (par. 7)

According to Bell, the term significant form refers to the formal properties of a work of art that create aesthetic emotion; it is not the representative quality of the art (content) that sparks this

aesthetic emotion; rather, it is the line, shape, or color (form) of the art that does so. Bell's aesthetic response develops from formal relationships. This response contains a strong emotion, often a kind of ecstasy, but it is detached and impersonal, akin to the ecstasy felt in religious contemplation. Significant form promotes ethos in that formal techniques combine to create aesthetically persuasive works of art, uniting artist and viewer. For Bell and Woolf, without attention to formal properties, an artist cannot create the type of aesthetic response necessary for enlightenment:

> But provided that there be some fraction of pure aesthetic emotion, even a mixed
> and minor appreciation of art is, I am sure, one of the most valuable things in the
> world - so valuable, indeed, that in my giddier moments I have been tempted to
> believe that art might prove the world's salvation. (par. 22)

The way in which formal elements combine to create ethical situations and contexts can also be seen in Kenneth Burke's concept of form. For Burke, design shapes public memory in that "a work has form in so far as one part of it leads a Reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (*Counter-Statement* 124). Formal elements are linked to memorial operations that are in turn connected to ethical situations and contexts.

As I argued in Chapter Two, Virginia Woolf constructs a communal "impersonal" ethos through attention to formal techniques, especially figuration. When seen in terms of the theory of significant form, her drive towards impersonality is not a move away from ethical appeals, but a move towards ethos and ethics: a way of being egalitarian, a way of moving from a personal (temporal) ethos to a public (spatial) ethos. This impersonality and attention to form allows Woolf to create a distance to critique patriarchal values. Woolf's powerful ethos is connected to the techne of her text; she enacts an epideictic rhetoric that reveals the power of "significant

form."[134] In this way, <emma> helps student writers achieve what Woolf accomplished in her essays. By creating a critical distance, students are able to analyze their techne in order to create a persuasive ethos. <emma> moves their texts from a personal (temporal) position to a public (spatial) arena, forcing students to consider their texts as epideictic or "fit for display." Thus, <emma> serves as a tool to teach our students the strengths of the "significant form" that Woolf's texts exhibit.

Observing <emma>

During the 2002-2003 academic year, I conducted a research study with Dr. Christy Desmet, analyzing the implementation and use of <emma> in writing classrooms in the University of Georgia's English department. While much of our time observing <emma> in this first year was taken up with identifying and fixing bugs in the developing system, we were able to pinpoint the ways in which <emma> could improve composition instruction. We learned a great deal not only from watching <emma> assignments "play out" in the classroom but also from journal entries students wrote describing their experiences with <emma>. While the group of students who worked with <emma> in its first phase complained about technical problems, they generally understood the virtues and purposes of the application. Subsequent groups of writers, such as my advanced class "Writing for the World Wide Web," focused more on the rhetorical and cognitive dimensions of <emma>. Their comments focused equally on processes of discovery, or invention, and of vision. "By having to highlight certain key aspects of your essay, you realize how important they are and how easy they SHOULD be to find!!" one student writes. Isolating bits of text for specific consideration focuses both literal vision and "insight." As another student puts it, "I like how <emma> separates out certain parts so that we can *look at*

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[134] For a fuller discussion of the epideictic qualities of Woolf's nonfiction, see Chapter Two of this dissertation.

them without necessarily *paying attention* to the remainder of the text. *I can ask- what does this figure really do?*" Seeing leads to "paying attention" and, finally, to reflection: "What does this figure really do?" <emma> allows composition instructors to incorporate mnemonic techniques from the rhetorical tradition with contemporary cognitive theories to better teach each student to construct a powerful ethical presence in his/her writing.

Another key aspect that the observations revealed is that the effortlessness of <emma>'s displays constitutes an important aspect of her appeal to instructors and students. As Christy Desmet argues, "the real genius of <emma> is that the program lets you see what you're doing visually" (qtd. in Williams 8). In fact, many students responded in their journals that <emma> helps make the invisible rhetorical aspects of their essays evident. For example, one upper division English major wrote: "The primary way it helped me was from a visual standpoint . . . Highlighting certain parts of my paper with different colors made the weaknesses of my paper easy to identify and correct" (qtd. in Williams 8). Of course, <emma> is by no means a technological baby-sitter; a major finding of our study was that the most effective teachers who used <emma> were those who constantly discussed the use of the technology in terms of specific rhetorical principles, actively making connections between what the students were doing on the computer and what they were learning in the "traditional" classroom.

Most of the assignments that were observed in <emma>'s first year were ones that focused on sentence-level changes: for example, marking the use of verbs or prepositions in an essay. A surprising finding was the lack of basic skills many of our students demonstrated. All too many times, when students were asked to mark up subjects, verbs, or prepositions, they had a difficult time delineating those features in their texts. In one situation, after a student asked the definition of a predicate and was shown the corresponding section in the *St. Martin's Handbook*,

she responded, "This is the kind of teaching I need!" An important feature of <emma> that has been developed in its second year is that the application links certain marked up elements (e.g., transitions) to the corresponding section in the online version of the *St. Martin's Handbook*, allowing students quick access to specific, and tailor-made information. Although our research study revealed exciting possibilities for using <emma> to teach writing, there were also some negative aspects.

The study found that one of the main problems in using <emma> was the amount of time it took for students to use the system to mark up their texts. In <emma>'s first year, at least, the administration and markup took up a substantial amount of class time, relegating actual pedagogical uses to the last few minutes of class, if at all. As the program has developed and the instructors have become more accustomed to <emma>, the amount of time in mark up and administration has decreased significantly. Many instructors have also had success in asking the students to do the mark up for homework, so class time can be completely devoted to pedagogical uses. Another problematic aspect of <emma> was the rigidity of the mark up. If students did not do the mark up correctly, they were not able to display their documents and were frustrated by receiving a message they had "errors."

In fact, the study found that <emma>'s focus on errors, whether in mark up or in peer review sessions, distressed some students. On several occasions, either after an error check or in a peer review session where textual weaknesses were displayed, students were heard to comment "<emma> makes me feel like a bad person" or "<emma> doesn't like me." In this way, <emma> can reinforce writing anxieties, moving some basic writers to feel like bad citizens in "<emma>-society." Without active and positive support from the instructor, <emma> does have the potential to reinforce problematic anxieties about writing. Another potential problem with using

<emma> in the writing classroom is that the program can be seen to limit and/or control the writing process. While there has been a theoretical and pedagogical move away from restrictive current-traditional models for teaching writing, <emma> can be seen to encourage concern with sentence-level grammatical issues.

Problems with <emma> and Epideictic Rhetoric

As <emma> promotes epideictic rhetoric, focusing attention on form, style, and grammar, the program can be seen to limit attention to larger rhetorical issues and to reduce the scope of writing. Not so surprising, perhaps, the second definition of epideictic found in the *Oxford English Dictionary* refers to the collective displays and other conventional behavior seen in animal mating rituals, which are regarded by some anthropologists as having evolved from the need to control the distribution of the population. Some composition instructors may be concerned that <emma> works to develop limiting "collective displays" that control the population of student writers who use the application. In this way, <emma>'s promotion of rhetoric as epideictic can be seen to re-introduce the values of current-traditional rhetoric to the composition classroom of the twenty-first century. <emma> encourages more attention to sentence-level issues and can be seen to emphasize analysis of words, sentences and paragraphs at the exclusion of larger rhetorical issues such as invention. Indeed, <emma> can be seen as "an editing machine" that reinforces correct usage. Additionally, <emma> can promote the systematizing of rhetoric into discrete units, classifying and limiting discourse to the current-traditional paradigm of "description, narration, exposition, and argument." While some more traditional rhetoric scholars may not have a problem with the way in which <emma> develops

ethos through techne, there are some postmodern rhetoricians who may be concerned about the regulating function(s) of <emma>.

The Discipline of <emma>

Since <emma> emphasizes the teaching of techne, some rhetoricians may question <emma>'s effectiveness in the postmodern classroom, arguing that our use of <emma> limits possibilities for student writers and creates a methodology of teaching that forces us to return to current-traditional pedagogical practices. If we look at <emma> through the lens of Foucault's ethical axis, it is possible to see the application as a discipline machine. Foucault's ethical axis examines the relation between language uses, power relations, and the ways that individuals and groups establish their identities, determine conventions, or norms of behavior, and, thereby, " constitute themselves" as moral agents (*Foucault Reader* 351). <emma> certainly connects language-use to conventions of discourse. The application can be seen to encourage individual and group identification with norms of behavior, with proper use of those norms sometimes linked, as we saw with several student comments above, with moral production. Composition theorists critical of <emma>'s use in the composition classroom might also emphasize the insidious nature of the application as a "smoothly functioning" (transparent) system that works to control and promote certain rhetorical and ideological functions. <emma> can also be seen to function as an administrative and institutional monitoring device, enforcing a kind of panopticon on those writing in the English department. In addition, by promoting student writing as public artifact, <emma> can be seen to impinge on student's privacy. Although it did not occur very often, there were a few students in the study who complained about privacy issues and were bothered by what they perceived of as a lack of control over the writing that was stored and

displayed in <emma>. Critics of <emma> also may argue that rather than becoming "enhanced" subjects, many of <emma>'s students are being reduced to statistics in the master database, a database that can be used for control and exploitation. Certainly, in <emma>, there is space for manipulation and exploitation of student work.

In fact it may be the spatiality of <emma> that ties the application most greatly to a disciplining function. Explicating Foucault's understating of discipline in *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutic*, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow argue:

> Discipline proceeds by the organization of individuals in space, and it therefore
> requires a specific enclosure of space. In the hospital, the school, or the military
> field, we find a reliance on an orderly grid. Once established, this grid permits the
> sure distribution of the individuals to be disciplined and supervised; this
> procedure facilitates the reduction of dangerous multitudes or wandering
> vagabonds to fixed and docile individuals. (154-55)

For Foucault, spatiality is a fundamental component of one's relationship to the world (Shields 39). As anthropologist Rob Shields argues in *Places on the Margin,* the spatial has an epistemic and ontological importance, "it is part and parcel of our notions of reality, truth and causality . . . a discourse of space [is] central to our everyday conceptions of ourselves and of reality" (7). The conventions that separate (for example, the real from the unreal, the natural from the supernatural, the reasonable from the insane) are expressed through the spatial logic of exclusion and inclusion (Shields 39). When writing DTD's, one consistently identifies what to include or exclude at any given time. <emma>'s displays always operate within the basic logic of exclusion: in order to see the elements the DTD has selected out, everything else in the text is rendered invisible. Composition theorists who worry about the ethical practices of exclusion that <emma>

engenders may question the application's value in the postmodern classroom. While many of these criticisms are valid, they do not necessitate avoiding the benefits that <emma> produces in the classroom.

Affording Techne

To view <emma> as a technology of discipline and power is to give technology moral powers that it does not actually have. According to Pierre Levy:

> A technology is neither good nor bad (depending on context, use, and point of view), or even neutral, for that matter (since it conditions or constrains, exposes or closes off, the range of possibilities). It is a question not of evaluating its "impact" but of identifying those points of irreversability where technology forces us to commit ourselves and provides us with opportunities of formulating the projects that will exploit the virtualities it bears within it and deciding what we will make of them. (8)

Our use of <emma> holds within it the potential for positive or negative application in the classroom. Availing ourselves of the technology requires that we maintain a vigilant analysis of our practices. As writers of DTD's, or as instructors using those DTD's, we must always be aware of *affordances*: what any language or other system makes possible or rules out.[135]

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[135] The word "affordance" was originally invented by the perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson to refer to the actionable properties between the world and an actor (a person or animal). To Gibson, affordances are a relationship. They are a part of nature: they do not have to be visible, known, or desirable. Some affordances are yet to be discovered. See Gibson's, "The Theory of Affordances." Computer designers have co-opted the term affordances and used it to mean what any system's design makes possible or excludes. The logic of <emma> is one based on affordances.

In any instruction of techne, which as I have argued in Chapter One is crucial to writing instruction in the twenty-first century, we will always, in some sense, be working from a logic of exclusion. At the most basic level, in order to teach a defined set of skills, those skills and techniques must be placed within a matrix of values and beliefs. And yet, it is through our use of techne in the writing classroom that we can offer useful and productive instruction to students. It is important to remember that techne, as defined by Heidegger, works to reveal our practices to us. According to Heidegger, techne comprises not only the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also the arts of the mind and fine arts: "Techne belongs to bringing forth . . . it reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another" ("Question" 295). By investigating the ways in which revaluations of ancient conceptions of techne (as an art, as productive knowledge, as revealing rather than manufacturing) merge with digital technologies, I believe we can create productive strategies for teaching writing. <emma> emphasizes techne as revealing by encouraging students to look at their texts in a different light. What is crucial is that we encourage our students to look at their texts in many different ways, affording them a multiplicity of options and avoiding dogmatic allegiance to any one DTD. Indeed, the combined specificity and multiplicity of available DTDs create <emma>'s greatest strength: the application can be precise and expansive at one and the same time. As I argued in Chapter One of this dissertation, composition theory in the past decade has relegated specific, detailed, technical pedagogies to the background of rhetorical instruction. <emma> creates a spacious, fully open, database that helps teach the specialized writing practices our students need in the twenty-first century.

Through the creation and implementation of DTDs, instructors can teach students specific techniques to improve their writing practices. As Beth Bennett argues in "Toward Finding

Common Critical and Pedagogical Ground" the use of techne capitalizes on memorial operations and infuses a student's writing with ethical concerns:

> Basic skills in competency have to be taught to make full use of the practical and artistic choices available to express oneself. Teaching competency entails some attention to correctness, minimally, to enable appropriate adherence to conventions and norms along with technical proficiency. Such "virtues" of style and presentation not only function to meet the expectations of the laws or customs, thereby giving coherence to a community, but also to improve clarity and aid memoria. (33)

To dismiss techne from the postmodern composition classroom is not only disingenuous, but "virtually" impossible: emerging electronic writing technologies, and the necessarily pragmatic approaches they engender, do not allow for pedagogies which do not address the constellation of practical and theoretical conditions that emerge in the digitized classroom. The problems with enacting postmodern pedagogical theories that are not grounded in practice reveals the ways in which applications of techne (such as the canons of memory and delivery or the mode of ethos) that are seemingly cancelled out in postmodern doxologies actually re-emerge in the twenty-first century classroom.

Conclusion: Encomium of <emma>

As I have argued throughout this dissertation, rhetoric is a pragmatic art, one that analyzes the effects of texts. Perhaps my favorite definition of rhetoric comes from Joseph Palattella who, in describing Richard Lanham's view of rhetoric, defines it as "an architectonic art, pragmatically organized around the recognition and evaluation of the consequences of what

people say and do" (par.6).[136] According to this view of rhetoric, rhetoricians analyze the structure and design of language (architectonic) in terms of its consequences (formal/ethical/political/social). Rhetoric concerns both *actions in form* and *actions in the world.* As Richard Lanham himself observes, throughout the history of rhetoric, there has been a tension between these two kinds of rhetorical action:

> To look at language self-consciously is to play games with it; to look through
> language unselfconsciously is to act purposively with it . . . And rhetoric's long
> effort to preserve both kinds of attention, and both kinds of language, however
> contradictory in theory the effort may prove to be, attests to its final loyalty to
> make things happen in the world. To do that, you must forever estimate human
> motive, and *toggle* from contemplating the surface of human behavior to taking a
> role in it. (*Electronic* 189)

The oscillation between *looking at* and *looking through* thus becomes not merely an oscillation between form and content, but an oscillation between theory and practice. The canons of memory and delivery reinforce this oscillation: both canons strengthen the connection between form/content, theory/practice, and ethics/action. Ancient rhetoricians understood the connection between these canons and ethics. As Mary Carruthers observes, "in their understanding of the matter, it was memory that made knowledge into useful experience, and memory that combined these pieces of information-become-experience into what we call "ideas," what they were more likely to call judgments" (*Book* 3). The canon of delivery, always already connected to memorial operations, has also been connected to ethical and social spheres. Indeed, if we remember Bacon's definition of the canon in *The Advancement of Learning,* delivery is no less than "the

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[136]This essay was originally published in *Afterimage* 23.1 (1995): 13+.

means by which knowledge is used and incorporated into social institutions, which are maintained in memory" (624). When taught as part of the rhetorical curriculum, the canons of memory and delivery reinforce notions of communal knowledge-making and production, connecting the formal elements of systematic rhetorical instruction to the ethical, political, and social impact of writing.

As I have argued throughout this chapter, <emma> reinforces key elements of the canons of memory and delivery in the twenty-first century. <emma> focuses on storage and retrieval of "useful" knowledge and works as the means by which established conventions of writing practice are used, incorporated, and maintained in memory. As a rhetorical device, <emma> dynamically reconfigures text, reinforcing the systematic instructions on the functions of language first theorized by classical rhetoricians. Ancient rhetoric has often been seen to concentrate on the oscillation between transparency and opacity in the use of language. <emma> continues this tradition by providing students with numerous methods for manipulating the surface of a text in order to better emphasize its content. Through <emma>'s displays, composition instructors can use visual, spatial, design as a tool to improve writing instruction. Echoing the importance that the canons of memory and delivery have placed on imagery throughout the rhetorical tradition, recent developments in cognitive psychology have also shown how the visual is more useful for transmitting large amounts of certain kinds of information (Sekuler and Blake 55). <emma> capitalizes on the power of imagery in the composing process, reinforcing key concepts of Dual Coding Theory such as "chunking" and the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis.

<emma> also shows the way that, as Richard Lanham predicts in *The Electronic Word*, digital technologies can return us to ancient rhetorical practices that are also linked to the techne

of the canons of memory and delivery. For instance, Lanham argues that in digital technologies, commonplaces are reborn, making proverbial wisdom become visual: "the traditional dependence on commonplaces in rhetorical education has been transmuted from word to image" (*Electronic* 37). <emma> also restores the use of topics, with DTDs taking the place of pre-formed arguments, allowing students to separate and display discrete chunks of argumentation. Lanham also argues that, "Classical rhetoric argued that repetition, without intrinsically changing the object repeated, changes it absolutely" (*Electronic* 40). <emma> reinforces repetition by allowing students to use mark up to emphasize certain repeatable elements. By repeating defined elements in a specific display, <emma> makes available different interpretations or views of the text without changing the basic data. In addition, <emma> enacts the aesthetic of collage that, Lanham observes, was seen in many ancient mnemonic arts: the application pieces together discrete and variable parts of the text in different display options, creating a cognitive collage of different features of the text.

Another way in which <emma> calls upon ancient rhetorical pedagogy is by enacting a digital version of the modeling often used by ancient rhetors for improving delivery. According to Lanham, classical rhetorical education was founded on the use of modeling: "The key form was the oration, and it was rehearsed again and again in every possible form and context" (*Electronic* 47). <emma> allows students to model multiple versions of text before finalizing a final product. In all of these ways, <emma> capitalizes on cognitive functions that are consistently utilized in the operations of the canons of memory and delivery. Most importantly, by emphasizing the amplification of select features of a text, <emma>'s displays encourage student attention to the connection between stylistic features of a text and their persuasive functions, encouraging rhetoric as epideictic.

Enacting the use of the epideictic, <emma> uses dramatic displays and peer interaction to inform and persuade. <emma> encourages the amplification of what may otherwise be unnoticed or invisible. Instructors who take the time to create DTD's can seek to make visible whatever formal techniques they wish to impress on their students. As <emma> dispenses with temporal readings of a text and locates each and every text spatially in the present, the application encourages highly adaptable and flexible interactions. Through its emphasis of epideictic rhetoric, <emma> develops ethos; the application teaches students to utilize the conventions and techniques of rhetoric in order to create more significant formal revisions of their work. <emma> reveals, above all, the "significant form" of the students' texts. Maximizing digital storage and retrieval techniques and using visual, spatial, arrangements for display, <emma> calls upon the operations of memory and delivery to help students move more effectively between form and content, theory and practice, and ethics and action. <emma> reinforces rhetoric as an architectonic art, and amplifies the possibilities for teaching in the twenty-first century.

CONCLUSION

There is nothing quite so rare as a good essay and nothing quite so dismal as a bad one –Virginia Woolf, "A Book of Essays"

The real purpose of a friendly interface is to diminish the apparent cognitive distance between memory and the external source of information, to close the gap between the mind and the writing space. - Jay David Bolter, *Writing Space*

While most composition instructors would probably agree with Virginia Woolf that there is "nothing quite so dismal "as a bad essay, to teach writing is to acknowledge that while "the good essay" may be a rare commodity, it is a commodity that can be taught. In choosing to use the term commodity in discussing "the good essay," I wish to foreground the way the pragmatics of digital composition pedagogy that I champion throughout this dissertation are deeply intertwined with notions of teaching serviceable, even, "marketable," skills. In arguing for the use of rhetorical technai in conjunction with digital technologies, my argument can be seen to be complicit with the commodification of knowledge in higher education. Indeed, my emphasis on the twenty-first century possibilities of "telematic memory" can be seen to represent the dangers of "education through performativity" that Lyotard outlined decades ago in *The Postmodern Condition*.

In *The Postmodern Condition,* Lyotard clearly anticipates the effect of digital technologies in the "mercantilization" of knowledge that operates in higher education in the twenty-first century. Throughout his "report on knowledge," Lyotard focuses on the way knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, will be radically transformed by new technologies such as computers. He claims that any information "not translatable" into "quantities" that computers can understand will be forgotten (4). Because of the hierarchical and binary nature of

information that computers require, Lyotard argues that computing codes will limit definitions of knowledge: "With the hegemony of computers comes a certain logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining which statements are accepted as 'knowledge' statements" (4). For Lyotard, the exteriorization of knowledge into the computer will have drastic effects on the "status" of knowledge (4). Whereas knowledge was once something gained by internally "training" the mind, knowledge will become a commodity, for as "knowledge ceases to be an end in itself," argues Lyotard, "it loses its use-value" (5). Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to show how in the twenty-first century composition classroom, by contrast, what constitutes "use-value" are the processes and procedures used to access knowledge, what I have called telematic memory.

Lyotard sees the processes and procedures to access knowledge in connection to "job market skills." In fact, in "Education and Its Legitimation through Performativity" in *The Postmodern Condition,* Lyotard's main argument concerns the fact that students entering college will show opposition towards "general education" courses and insist on purely vocational courses that will provide them with "job skills" (47-53). Higher education thus becomes an "industry" of education that produces workers instead of "critical subjects:" In the context of "delegitimation," Lyotard argues that:

> Universities and the institutions of higher learning are called upon to create skills, and no longer ideals . . . The transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions. (48)

Thus, university departments that do not seem linked directly to the job market will find their relevance to the institution diminishing.

Sharon Crowley echoes Lyotard's concerns about the future (now present!) of higher education, in "Composition's Ethic of Service, The Universal Requirement, and The Discourse of Student Need." In this essay, Crowley specifically argues against the instrumental service ethic of the required composition course: "to make student writing available for surveillance until it can be certified to conform to whatever standards are deemed to mark it, and its authors, as suitable for admission to the discourses of the academy" (253). Crowley not only argues against the ways in which the needs of student-writers are seen within a context of "job market" concerns, but also articulates the ways those needs are actually intermeshed with the needs of English and/or Rhetoric departments to justify themselves. And yet, while Crowley argues to do away with the first-year requirement, she also makes the case for the reinvestment of classical rhetoric, arguing for a wider range of rhetorical acts and positions that can provide students with a more rhetorical mindset. I agree with Crowley that (re)newed applications of classical rhetoric can create useful rhetorical contexts for the twenty-first century writing classroom, but, I argue, these renewed visions of classical rhetoric need to be developed within the context of the increasing use of digitized technologies in the writing classroom.

As more and more of our composition instruction comprises how to use computers and the software applications within them, our field will increasingly specialize in teaching telematic memory. The field of rhetoric is particularly suited to teaching telematic memory because rhetoric has always been concerned with accessing and delivering knowledge. Further, it is my argument that the canons of memory and delivery are particularly suited to issues of accessing media of knowledge and communication. In fact, I would argue that rhetoric's reemergence as a

crucial part of higher education in the twenty-first century is largely founded on its relevance to the media of digital communication, a relevance largely connected to the kinds of operations that occur with their use of the techne of memory and delivery. Thus, I feel that rhetoric and composition instructors have an important place in helping to navigate the relationship of digital technologies in higher education. Although Lyotard argues in *The Postmodern Condition* that developing technologies will replace teachers, I argue that quite the opposite is actually taking place.

Lyotard claims in *The Postmodern Condition* that the teacher will be replaced by the machine: "To the extent that learning is translatable into computer language and the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks" (50). Although Lyotard sarcastically concedes that that teachers could still find work "teaching students to use the terminals," he claims that: "A professor is no more competent than memory bank networks in transmitting established knowledge, no more competent than interdisciplinary teams in imaging new moves or new games" (53). While I agree with Lyotard about the ways in which digital technologies reconfigure the status of knowledge in higher education, I disagree that the teacher is being replaced by technology. As our study of <emma>'s implementation and use in first-year writing courses clearly demonstrated, the technology was only really useful to the students when it was contextualized by the teacher. The teachers who spent more time articulating <emma>'s displays in conjunction with a larger rhetorical framework or system were the ones who were most successful using the technology. The students whose teachers let <emma> "do all the work" were the ones who were the most frustrated with the technology, even if those instructors had more "technological" know-how and aptitude with <emma>. The success of <emma> is connected to

explanations of the way the application's displays reveal particular rhetorical concepts or strategies, something that the composition instructor provides, not the technology.

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued for the ways in which digital technologies are creating heightened rhetorical situations for our students; however, uses of the technologies are best developed within contexts that articulate self-reflexive understandings of rhetorical devices, which is what I believe happens by teaching techne. My argument has at its foundation the idea that the composition teacher provides what the machines cannot: the "forgetting" that the machine engenders requires the memory of the teacher. At the end of *The Postmodern Condition,* Lyotard writes about the postmodern obligation to "be witnesses to the unpresentable," what in other essays he calls an act of anamnesis. Anamnesis is a techne of memory where one "calls to memory past matters." Thus, even Lyotard's popular metanarrative on the ethics of obligation is based on the techne of rhetoric, specifically memory. While Lyotard locates anamnesis as it relates to the project of postmodernism, it is my argument that anamnesis, as it is linked to telematic memory, serves a profoundly posthuman role. To access the exteriorized knowledge stored in digital technologies and databanks such as the WWW constitutes knowledge-making in posthumanism and serves to reveal the way in which we are cyborgs. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, the cyborg that I refer to should not be confused with the technoromantic idea of the cyborg as a liberatory creature.[137] In my opinion, a crucial feature of the cyborg constitutes the fact that it is created through its interdependence on technological apparatuses, apparatuses that, as I argued in Chapter One, are constructed pragmatically, with techne. As R.L. Rutsky argues:

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[137] According to Hayles, "Here at the inaugural moment of the computer age, the erasure of embodiment is performed so that "intelligence" becomes a property of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than enaction in the human life-world" (*Posthuman* xi).

> The position of human beings in relation to this techno-cultural unconsciousness cannot, therefore, be that of an analyst (or theorist) who, standing outside this space, presumes to know or control it. It must instead be a relation of connection to, of interaction with, that which has been seen as "other," including the unsettling processes of techno-culture itself. (Rutsky 21)

The unsettling processes of techno-culture are part of what Heidegger argues is the "essence of technology:" techne. As I suggested in Chapter One, techne, as defined as Heigdegger, works to both secure and unsecure boundaries; it is a dynamic on-going process. A crucial feature of posthuman techno-culture in the twenty-first century is that high-tech digital technologies, with their emphases on representation, style, design (the epideictic aspects of argumentation), reveal the connection between art and technology that was part of ancient conceptions of techne. Crucial to my argument, however, is that these epideictic digital arguments cannot be separated from material concerns. Significantly, this "unsecuring" does not serve to unsecure users from their bodies, but actually works to recall the significance of the body in delivering knowledge. I do not feel that in teaching telematic memory, one can sidestep issues of materiality; the proprioceptive occurances between humans and machines actually work to remind us of our embodiment, of the material circumstances of our access to knowledge, power, education. To see the cyborg as enmeshed with materiality is not, however, to recuperate or attempt to rebuild the deconstructed liberal subject. As Katherine Hayles, argues:

> Although I think that serious consideration needs to be given to how certain characteristics associated with the liberal subject, especially agency and choice, can be articulated within a posthuman context, I do not mourn the passing of a concept so deeply entertwined with projects of domination and oppression.

Rather, I view the present moment as a critical juncture when interventions might

be made to keep disembodiment from being rewritten, once again, into prevailing

concepts of subjectivity. I see the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject as

an opportunity to put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be erased in

contemporary discussions about cybernetic subjects. (5)

In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how agency and choice may be used and/or misused

through the use of digital technologies. I have also attempted to show the ways in which our

technologies, operating as techne, work to reveal our practices to us. By pragmatically analyzing

the development and use of technologies in the writing classroom, I have argued for the

importance of self-reflexive pedagogies. For instance, in Chapter One, I argued that the

increasing use of telematic memory engendered by the implementation of digital technologies in

the classroom can be most usefully applied in context with larger rhetorical frameworks and

systems, such as those developed through the ancient canons of memory and delivery. In Chapter

Two, I discussed the ethical appeals of Virginia Woolf's *A Room Of One's Own*, analyzing the

ways the techne of the canons of memory and delivery can be used to create powerful epideictic

texts. In Chapter Three, I made a case for the ways composition instructors can use the

performances in chatspaces to articulate the power of ethical appeals in techno-culture. In

Chapter Four, I articulated the ways rhetorical frameworks are useful for amplifying the

connections between the cognitive operations that occur when composing and the possibilities

engendered by applications of emerging digital technologies.

All of the chapters in this dissertation reveal the ways that as the technologies of the

digital age develop, they return us to knowledge-making as a communal enterprise and

reintroduce the largely self-conscious powers of epideictic rhetoric. In explaining the ways in

which epideictic rhetoric can be used to persuade, we teach our students skills that not only allow them to navigate the overwhelmingly epideictic rhetoric of the WWW, but we also provide them with sophisticated technai for constructing their own digital arguments. While the skills we often teach our students in rhetoric and composition courses can be identified with serviceable, marketable skills, these technai are also expansive: to see techne as it is connected to art and aesthetics is to see the way in which the digital technologies of the twenty-first century are interrelated to expansive processes of knowledge-making in communities. Indeed, my argument that rhetoric is an architectionic art is to see rhetoric as techne. As Aristotle argues in *Nicomachean Ethics*:

> Since building is an art [techne] and is essentially a reasoned productive state, and since there is no art that is not a state of this kind, and no state of this kind that is not an art, it follows that art is the same as a productive state that is truly reasoned. Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that is capable either of being or of not being ... Art ... operates in the sphere of the variable.
>
> (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a1 23)

Significantly, the building of techne is located in "the sphere of the variable" and constitutes a "productive state" connected to the practices that call a product into being. It is important to understand the way, as I argued in Chapter One, that ancient techne was concerned with practices and means instead of end-products. As Martha Nussbaum argues in *The Fragility of Goodness*, there is not a "single prominent ancient author who speaks of techne only in connection with craft production of a separately specifiable product" (97). In teaching the techne of telematic memory in the twenty-first century, composition instructors can be seen to teach

practices that "operate in the sphere of the variable" and serve to "bring forth" more expansive kinds of knowledge at the same time as they teach more specific skills and techniques of access.

It is in providing a larger rhetorical framework for understanding the process and procedures of digital technologies that I believe rhetoric finds a significant place in higher education in the twenty-first century. In teaching the techne accorded to the canons of memory and delivery, we can teach our students to write "the good essay" at the same time that we teach them, as Virginia Woolf argued in her essay "Not Knowing Greek," that "What matters is not so much the end we reach as our manner of reaching it" (46). By providing a larger rhetorical framework to the processes and procedures of telematic memory, composition instructors can teach both the basic, marketable, skills demanded by techno-culture at the same time as they, as cyborgs, can create, in Bolter's words, rhetorically "friendly interfaces" between the students and the technology. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, digital technologies enact the techne of memory by acting both as writing spaces and storage and retrieval devices; in turn they enact the techne of delivery while they serve as media of communication between "actual" bodies. I have sought to present the ways in which modes, or techniques of presentation, are intimately connected with cognitive operations, and in so doing, reveal the crucial ways discovery and invention are connected to the processes of memory and delivery. As the computer screen constitutes the display of memory in exterior graphic form, the visual, spatial, component of new media technologies creates exciting possibilities (such as the applications being developed with <emma>) for exploring the connections between the storage, retrieval and display of knowledge in the twenty-first century. Consequently, rhetoric and composition finds a crucial place in higher education: teaching with technology within larger rhetorical frameworks allows the technologies to be seen in context with knowledge-making.

Thus, paradoxically, the most important relationship in our posthuman techno-culture composition courses may not be the one between user and machine, but the one between student and teacher. The processes and procedures of telematic memory are important to composition instruction in two ways: first, they represent the basic skills that create access to knowledge in the twenty-first century; second they recall more ancient ways of creating and sharing knowledge. Since, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, techne is linked with episteme: when the composition instructor of the twenty-first century teaches the first, he or she gives rise to the second. As Heidegger argues, techne allows one "to be entirely at home in something," which in turn provides an "opening up . . . [a] revealing" (294). For Heidegger, aletheuin (to reveal) represents the crucial aspect of techne: "It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another" (295). If, as Aristotle claims in *De Memoria*, the memory-image is "like an imprint or drawing in us" which can allow us to remember "what is not present," then the rhetoric and composition scholar can use the techne of the canons of memory and delivery to represent what lies beyond the scope of technology (450b 11-20). In viewing the various applications of technology in the classroom through the lens of the ancient canons of memory and delivery, I believe that rhetoric and composition instructors can create purposeful, focused, pedagogies for their posthuman students.

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<emma>Display: Thesis and Topic Sentences

thesis **topic sentence**

Elements of Intrigue
Student, Ima

Paragraph 1

When creating a movie, producers and directors have to come up with ideas that will appeal to viewers in order to keep them entertained. The producers may choose to film a fast-paced car chase or violent murder, while the director may choose to cut a seemingly "boring" part of the script. These kinds of modifications can add to the movie, not ultimately changing the plot of the story, but simply adding some interesting scenes. Authors often have to use similar methods to keep their readers interested and involved in the story. **Although, as William Trevor once stated, short stories offer "the art of glimpse" (John Schilb, 79), often these stories use various literary techniques, such as the religious imagery in James Joyce's Araby, which give the story a sense of mystery.**

Paragraph 2

While language in a story can often be colorful, sometimes imagery is more useful at intriguing readers. Although imagery can be used to simply describe a setting or place, often images can create a feeling or sense of wonder about a particular place. Some images are associated with certain feelings, such as dark and bad, or good and light. In Araby, as the day comes to a close and the boy realizes his dreams of love have been crushed, the scene at the bazaar is described using repetition of "darkness." Darkness, though meaning night and no light, can also be thought of as a symbol for sadness or failure. The use of this image of darkness is effective in Araby as a clever way to emphasize the boy's feelings of despair and failure after his realization of the reality of love.

Paragraph 3

==Often a certain idea or image will be repeated throughout a story in order to make a point or create a mood associated with the repeated concept.== Repetition can embed an image in the reader's mind, or simply refer the reader to a situation that took place earlier in the story. By using repeated religious imagery in various situations in Araby, Joyce creates an image of purity and innocence. For instance, the boy regards his love for his friend's sister as a "confused adoration," which enhances the saintly image with which the boy regards her (Schilb, 829). When the boy goes into the bazaar, he finds it is silent "like that which pervades a church after a service," (Schilb, 831). This again reinforces the innocence associated with the boy, and tells readers that religion played a big role in his life. Repetition often makes readers wonder why certain things are being emphasized again and again, which helps them to explore hidden meanings in the story.

Paragraph 4

==Another way of exploring hidden meaning in a story is comparing two seemingly unlike objects or characters.== In everyday life, one might not think that there are many similarities between houses and people. But, in Araby, the neighborhood and house that the boy lives in have similar characteristics to the boy himself. In the first paragraph, the street is described as being "blind," and "quiet," until "the Christian Brothers' School set the boys free" (also another religious repetition), which can be likened to the boy's shyness and his "blindness" about love (Schilb, 828). This could also symbolize how the boy was at the beginning of the story, compared to the ending where he is no longer "blind" about love, and because of this, his innocence is taken away from him. The boy's house is described as "detached from its neighbours," while the other houses are "conscious of decent lives within them," (Schilb, 828). This could possibly suggest that the boy feels alone, and wishes he were as happy as those around him. Sometimes when comparing images or characters in a story, the reader is able to find traits or feelings of a character that would not otherwise be made clear in the remainder of the story.

Paragraph 5

==By using different techniques in a story to create a sense of mystery, readers are more inclined to be involved in the plot.== Imagery can help make a visual association with a word, while repetition can create a mood or aura about a character or scene. A comparison between objects and characters in a story can often add to the character's traits, or simply reveal something that may have been otherwise hidden. Mystery creates a sense of

suspense, or simply "the unknown." By using mystery in a short story, what may seem like an empty plot can be made more colorful and may be more appealing to readers. I think that this element is effective in all writing, and helps the readers to evaluate the story and come up with what they think a particular symbol or image is trying to reveal.

APPENDIX B

Example of Markup in JEDIT

APPENDIX C

Example of DTD in JEDIT

APPENDIX D

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
APPENDIX E

Scalable Vector Graphics in <emma>

APPENDIX F

Rhetorical Figures Associated with Memory and Delivery

Figure	Pronunciation	Etymology	Definition	Example
anamnesis	an'-am-nee'-sis	from ana "again" and mimneeskein "to put in mind" recollectio, recordatio remembrance	Calling to memory past matters. More specifically, citing a past author from memory.	Was it not Socrates who said the unexamined life is not worth living?
litotes	li-to'-tees	from Gk litos, "plain, small, meagre" Also sp. lyptote, liptote antenantiosis diminutio (deminutio), extenuatio the moderatour	Deliberate understatement, especially when expressing a thought by denying its opposite. The Ad Herennium author suggests litotes as a means of expressing modesty (downplaying one's accomplishments) in order to gain the audience's favor (establishing ethos).	It isn't very serious. I have this tiny little tumor on the brain. —J.D. Salinger, *The Catcher in the Rye*
mimesis	my-mee'-sis	Gk. "imitation" Also sp. mimisis imitatio	The imitation of another's gestures, pronunciation, or utterance.	The enemy said, "I will pursue, I will overtake, I will divide the spoil; my lust shall be satisfied upon them; I will draw my sword, my hand shall destroy them." — Exodus 15:9
mycterismus	mik-ter-is'-mus	Also sp. mycterismus, micterismus subsannatio	A mock given with an accompanying gesture, such as a scornful countenance.	In some smiling sort looking aside or by drawing the lip awry or shrinking up the nose, as he had said to one whose words he believed not, "No doubt, sir, of that" — Puttenham
metaphor	met'-a-phor	from meta "beyond, over" and pherein "to carry" metaphora translatio translation, figure of transport	A comparison made by referring to one thing as another	No man is an island —John Donne

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chreia	kray'-a	Gk. "useful" Also sp. chria	Employing an anecdote which relates a saying or deed of someone well "a brief reminiscence referring to some person in a pithy form for the purpose of edification." It takes the form of an anecdote that reports either a saying, an edifying action, or both.	Example /Progymnasmata
epicrisis	e-pi-cris'-is	adiudicatio, adjudicatio	When a speaker quotes a certain passage and makes comment upon it.	The great poet John Donne wrote, "No man is an island, entire unto itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main. . . . Any man's death diminis hes me, because I am involved in mankind." I am moved by a piece of data I received from the office of international education at the end of last year. Student interest in study abroad increased—increased—after the events of Sept. 11. Our students recognize that this world is their world, and that the better they know it, the better it will be. --President Adams in his 2002 State of the University Address

The following information was adapted from BYU's The Forest of Rhetoric.

APPENDIX G

Biographical Sketch Assignment

Web Project #5

Nov 11 (10%): You will write a 1000 word biographical sketch utilizing certain figures accorded to the ancient rhetorical canons of memory and delivery. Your sketch needs to argue for a certain way of viewing the world, yourself, or an issue -- it is an ARGUMENT. You will then mark up that sketch with <emma>, focusing on tropes and figures accorded to ethos. You may want to look closely at Woolf's first chapter of "A Room of One's Own" which uses biographical reminiscences to argue for the need for the improved material conditions of women artists. You will need to post a copy of your <emma> version to the web and submit a brief rhetorical analysis of your biographical sketch, paying particular attention to the analysis of the effect the tropes and figures had on your argument.

APPENDIX H

Student Rhetorical Analysis of Ethos Assignment

I used the figures litotes, epicresis, anamnesis, metaphor, and mycterismus. My ethos was to establish myself as an "everyman" of sorts as the middle class working student that President Adams has pledged to care for. My opening sentences are a litotes once the reader discovers my thesis is fifteen hours is an "over"load for the average student. This litotes makes light of how important my professor's comment was during the rest of the week and the rest of the essay. My second litotes in paragraph three downplays my accomplishments as "mediocre" and "no valedictorian" when I have had a 4.0 semester, kept the HOPE scholarship, and excelled in two AP courses in high school. The epicrisis in the third paragraph is again meant to identify with the average student, the "under dog" by disagreeing with President Adams. My anamnesis referring to John Donne seems tacked on to this essay, unfortunately, and I plan to revise it, perhaps by moving it to the forefront of this paragraph as John, my peer reviewer, suggested, or by reiterating my decision to "help her care for herself, for her island" later in the essay. The metaphor in paragraph six relates words of sympathy to "ice" and "bile." I am trying in this moment, in this metaphor to relate to those who have never greived how hollow and distasteful their words of support feel to the greiving. This metaphor does not relate to my thesis, but I hope it strengthens my ethos in regards to grief, for those people who want to offer such cliches. My final lines are a mycterismus lodged in an imagined dialogue with President Adams. His "smile more sly than any politician's" is a gesture that clues the reader that his statement is really a mockery of myself as a student. It also adds emphasis to his condition "just be sure you graduate as a fourth year senior." If I could offer this essay as a hypertext, I think it would add to the clarity of my ethos and essay. I would link to President Adams' promises and link to his actions. Then my reactions and rejections to his ideas would be easier for a reader not familiar with the situation to relate to my "everyman" ethos.

<emma> Display: Ethos Assignment

mimesis **mycterismus** anamnesis **litotes** metaphor **epicrisis** **chreia**

Hold Your Tongue: American Civility
Student, Eura

Paragraph 1
Concerning civility, I do not mean to compare our current age with any one in the past and then wallow in remembrance of better times. Unlike many, I do not regard the present as any less moral than the past. Crime, corruption, drug use, high teenage pregnancy rates, and a lack of decent manners have existed since this country's founding. However, the pertinence of such societal issues does not diminish simply due to their longevity. And so I will not argue that rudeness has escalated to intolerable levels in recent years as sociologists and talk show hosts might contend. Such an argument requires examining society's ever-changing definitions of rudeness. I wish to speak on one specific topic which both critics and proponents of manners alike relish: speech. The First Amendment declares every person's natural right to speak. However, too often people choose to exercise their ability to speak in completely inappropriate circumstances. When people lack the self-control to refrain from speaking in social gatherings specifically formed for displaying other's expression they act rudely.

Paragraph 2
This matter first began to gnaw at me recently after I attended two movies within the same week, a very rare indulgence. Both times, I drove home fuming with anger at the experience that my seven dollars bought me. My disappointment did not rise from the trite plotline or the producer's favoritism to explosive special

effects over character development. The people smacking on popcorn, rattling contraband, noisy chip-bags, kicking the back of my chair, and talking throughout the entire film infuriated me. I could not help but feel like I was surrounded by barn-yard animals, and eventually their abhorrent behavior started to ruffle my feathers. Somehow in the midst of such baseness my mind wandered to the high-thinking philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. We generally reserve their names for political theory discussions, but we can apply their basic arguments to social situations as well as society as a whole. I believe it was Hobbes who originally presented the social contract theory in Leviathan in which he discusses man's natural rights. He uses the term "social contract" to describe the process whereby man abandons his war-like state in favor of seeking desirable outcomes such as protection within community, and in return he agrees to relinquish some individual rights. Locke further explained that the social contract essentially rests upon the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you. So ideally we attend public performances to experience the performer's expression. In simple terms, we go to the cinema to see a movie. When participating in a social gathering, we give-up the right to perform certain actions. In many movie theaters restricted behaviors include drinking alcohol, smoking, defacating on the floor, using cellular phones, and yes, even talking.

Paragraph 3

Interrupting, and possibly ruining, another's experience falls not into manners or morals, but is just plain rude and discourteous. Many people would scoff to hear even a Beatles tune blairing from a cell phone in a Presidential address, yet they refuse to turn their own phones to vibrate when they go see a movie. Would Locke determine such behavior as compliance to the golden rule? Would you? People acting rudely at performances break their social contract and at the same time make fools of themselves. And so then we must question these fools' education levels. In many countries, the words well-mannered and educated go hand in hand. The Spanish word afable translates to both mannered and intelligent, and amable means likable and well-mannered. We cannot then link wont of education and discourteous behavior. Such a connection would run contrary to the constant problem I see in many upper level University classes: people talking loudly while the professor lectures. Their infraction is not all that serious; they only rid me of valuable knowledge, my grade point average, and the hundreds of dollars that I have

invested in the class. I flatter myself to assume that for them to enroll at the University that they must possess at least above-average education. Perhaps then the flaws lies in assuming a connection between education and intelligence.

Paragraph 4
Egoists who value their own speech over others' expression and enjoyment should consider our great president Abraham Lincoln's words. **Lincoln so eloquently stated, "It is better to be silent and suspected of stupidity than to open your mouth and remove all doubt." We not only remember Lincoln for liberating the slaves, but also as a man of brevity and candor, most famously exhibited his speech "The Gettysburg Address." Lincoln wisely insists that a person quickly reveals his stupidity in his speech. As a man known to speak very little himself, Lincoln warned those inclined to speak without thought that people would likely recognize their stupidity. A stupid man should be quiet, so as to conceal his lack of intelligence and possibly learn something by listening rather than show himself a fool with his words. Speaking when having nothing to say is like trying to paint a picture with animal waste; only an equally stupid person will appreciate your foul creation. For example, many times when people shout out their idiotic comments in a movie theater, they share their excitement of learning a fact that the rest of the audience has know for some time. When the woman in front of me stops shoveling popcorn and Juju Beans into her mouth long enough to exclaim, "He did it," I want to reply thank-you very much Mrs. Obvious. Even snide or witty comments should be saved for reviews because within the theater they only detract from others experiences. George Eliot echoed Lincoln's sentiments when he said, "Blessed is the man who, having nothing to say, abstains from giving wordy evidence of the fact." If you are not naturally inclined to act courteously by sparing others the pain of listening to your stupidity, then at least keep your mouth closed for the sake of your own reputation.**

Paragraph 5
For those of us who choose to refrain from inappropriate speech, we ask then how do we stop the violators. Often we stay quiet so as to avoid the perpetrators labeling us rude. Calling someone on their rude actions might incite even ruder behavior and possibly

verbal abuse. Just remember to bridle your own tongue so as to speak with civility. Although you may want to say "Stop chewing like a cow," opt for a more polite request like "I cannot hear. Can you please be quiet?" Doubtless, you may offend and be thought rude. But they will have a more difficult time writing us off when we combat their rudeness with civility.

APPENDIX J

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APPENDIX K

<emma> Display Two: Ethos Assignment

mimesis mycterismus **anamnesis** litotes **metaphor** epicrisis chreia *…*
(denotes change from original document)

As I left a lecture on Tolkien's philology last Tuesday, I couldn't help but overhear my English 3000 professor say to his friend "Fifteen hours is just too much. I see kids everyday struggling to keep going." * Although I took comfort in the thought that my professor thought a "full" load was really an "over' load, I filed the comment into my memory as something soon to be forgotten.*

I left the lecture that day with a better understanding of why I am content in neither the English department nor the Linguistics department. My poor, tortured soul was meant to be a philologist, meant to study a dead field, my only comrades aged professors. I pondered means of teaching myself this lost art all evening, even as I worked on my papers for English and History. Finally, I decided that not only was my train of thought foolish (it would take four eighteen hour semesters to accomplish, and even then I would have no philology degree, and I certainly would not have the fifteen or so hours a week to work and support myself) but it had distracted me from my work at hand.

As I packed my books and uniform shirt for the next grueling day ahead, I thought again of my professor's words "fifteen hours is just too much…." Maybe if I weren't a middle class mediocre student struggling both to support my self and maintain my only scholarship I could hope to excel under a fifteen hour course load. I was no valedictorian in high school, but I did graduate with honors and eleven AP credits. Yet as a freshman at the University I struggled to keep the HOPE scholarship. Spring semester I accomplished a small miracle, a 4.0 semester, thanks to thoughts of student loans accruing. So why, then, could I not handle a job and a "full" course load this semester? I had quit my well paid job at the "student friendly" grocery store where I slaved thirty hours a week all summer on the first day of class because I was scheduled for a "student friendly" 25 hour week (which they thought "very gracious on our behalf"). Still, with my new position on board UGA Food Services, I still gave in and dropped a course the night before midpoint to save my sanity. * I thought again of my professor's comment and how the University's President had declared an "overload" the norm while claiming to support students.* Do President Adams' words rings any more true than an offhand campaign promise? "I care about the students," I thought over and over. If you care about students, do you push them to a

fifteen hour course load? If you care, do you attempt to shame them into graduating "on time?" Now more than ever a college education isn't a luxury for the wealthy, but a struggle for the under dogs. I'd love to see President Adams take five classes, work a twelve to fifteen hour week busing tables, and still keep a 3.0 GPA.

The next afternoon things progressed from bad to worse. After work, and the typical half hour journey to my car, I drove to the cable office to pay my bill for the month. While waiting for it to clear to turn into the parking lot I was rear ended by a kid and his mom in an Expedition, which amazingly only cracked the bumper on my dilapidated little Taurus. So once the aftermath of paperwork and phone calls was over I was left with no time to work on my History and English papers, both due Friday. Fortunately, I had another day to spare, so I took medicine for my headache and went to bed.

My rest was cut short at 6 am the next morning, however, by a phone call from my Aunt. My grandmother, whom I lived with for three years after my Mom died, was in the hospital. "She had symptoms of a heart attack. They'll keep her through Friday at least to make sure she's alright. Don't worry, dear. It was probably just stress." I thought about that brave woman all day. It wasn't stress, but worry that put her in the hospital. Worrying over me, my brother, my boyfriend, my great grandmother, my great great aunt… she never worried enough about herself. John Donne's words rung in my ears, "no man is an island." Certainly she and I need to heed those words. I decided to help her care for herself, for her island.

I made it through class and work, as I was ordered by my Aunt, though more bad news was lurking for me at work. Angelica, the other student worker, had just called to say her grandfather, whom she was very close to, had just passed away and she would be out until Monday. I offered to pick up her Saturday shift and signed the sympathy card, searching through all the kind cliché's I'd been handed over the years for something comforting to share with her. Finally, I remembered that for the grieving, all cliché's are ice to the heart and bile to the mind and all sympathetic lines are cliché.

So I jotted a cliché and left work to pick up my brother, carry out some unfinished chores at my grandma's house and visit her. I kept telling myself, "If I can make it home by eight there will plenty of time for one paper tonight and one in the morning." Of course, more bad news was waiting for me when my brother and I arrived at the hospital. My Uncle's brother had died and my Aunt needed to go to him the next day to help take care of things. Since she had been up with my grandmother all night and day, she needed to go home and rest. I couldn't leave the woman alone over night with the memories of all the times she'd sat at now passed loved ones' bedsides. * I couldn't leave her alone on her island, as Donne had put it. She needed support against the tide of emotions that would beat against her over the night. *

I stayed through the morning and promised to come see her after work. I rushed home for a shower and coffee and half an hour left to pour some words onto the keyboard and hope for a D (which we all know stands for Diploma). I had survived a week of Hell, thanks to an extension on my History paper, but what if I had braved a "full load?" I imagined a discourse with President Adams: "Do you really understand the needs of the students, President Adams?" "Of course I bear in mind the best interests of the students …" President Adams said with a smile more sly than any politician, "just be sure you graduate as a fourth year senior."

<emma> Display: "A Room of One's Own"

mimesis **mycterismus** <mark>anamnesis</mark> litotes <mark>metaphor</mark> **epicrisis** **chreia**

Chapter One, A Room of One's Own by Virginia Woolf, 1929 Mitchell, Angela

Paragraph 1

But, you may say, we asked you to speak about women and fiction—what has that got to do with a room of one's own? I will try to explain. When you asked me to speak about women and fiction I sat down on the banks of a river and began to wonder what the words meant. They might mean simply a few remarks about Fanny Burney; a few more about Jane Austen; a tribute to the Brontes and a sketch of Haworth Parsonage under snow; some witticisms if possible about Miss Mitford; a respectful allusion to George Eliot; a reference to Mrs. Gaskell and one would have done. But at second sight the words seemed not so simple. The title women and fiction might mean, and you may have meant it to mean women and the fiction they write; or it might mean women and the fiction that is written about them; or it might mean that somehow all three are inextricable mixed together and you want me to consider them in that light. But when I began to consider the subject in this last way, which seemed most interesting, I soon saw that it had one fatal drawback. I should never be able to come to a conclusion. I should never be able to fulfill what it is, I understand, the first duty of a lecturer-to hand you after an hour's discourse a nugget of pure truth to wrap up between the pages of your notebooks and keep on the mantelpiece for ever. **All I could do was to offer you an opinion upon one minor point—a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction; and that, as you will see, leaves the great problem of the true nature of women and the true nature of fiction unsolved. I have shirked the duty of coming to a conclusion upon these two questions—women and fiction remain, so far as I am concerned, unsolved problems.** But in order to make some amends I am going to do what I can to show you how I arrived at this opinion about the room and the money. I am going to develop in your presence as fully and freely as I can the train of thought which led me to think this. Perhaps if I lay bare the ideas, the prejudices, that lie behind this statement you will find that they

have some bearing upon women and some upon fiction. At any rate, when a subject is highly controversial—and any question about sex is that—one cannot hope to tell the truth. One can only show how one came to hold whatever the opinion one does hold. One can only give one's audience the chance of drawing their own conclusions as they observe the limitations, the prejudices, the idiosyncracies of the speaker. Fiction here is likely to contain more truth than fact. Therefore I propose, making use of all the liberties and licences of a novelist, to tell you the story of the two days that preceded my coming here—how, bowed down by the weight of the subject which you laid upon my shoulders, I pondered it, and made it work in and out of my daily life. I need not say that what I am about to describe has no existence; Oxbridge is an invention; so is Fernham; "I" is only a convenient term for somebody who has no real being. Lies will flow from my lips, but there may perhaps be some truth mixed up with them; it is for you to seek out this truth and to decide whether any part of it is worth keeping. If not, you will of course throw the whole of it into the wastepaper basket and forget all about it.

Paragraph 2
Here then was I (call me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name you please—it is not a matter of any importance) sitting on the banks of a river a week or two ago in fine October weather, lost in thought. That collar I have spoken of, of women and fiction, the need of coming to some conclusion on a subject that raises all sorts of prejudices and passions, bowed my head to the ground. To the right and left bushes of some sort, golden and crimson, glowed with the color, even it seemed burnt with the heat, of fire. On the further bank the willows wept in perpetual lamentation, their hair about their hair about their shoulders. The river reflected whatever it chose of sky and bridge and burning tree, and when the undergraduate had oared his boat through the reflections they closed again, completely, as if he had never been. There one might have sat the clock round lost in thought. Thought—to call it by a prouder name than it deserved—had let its line down into the stream. It swayed, minute after minute, hither and thither among the reflections and the weeds, letting the water lift it and sink it, until—you know the little tug—the sudden conglomeration of an idea at the end of one's line: and then the cautious hauling of it in, and the careful laying of it out? Alas, laid out on the grass, how small, how insignificant, this thought of mine looked; the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts back into the water so that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating. I will not trouble you with that thought now, though if you look carefully you may find it for yourselves in the course of what I am going to say.

Paragraph 3

But however small it was, it had, nevertheless, the mysterious property of its kind—put back into the mind, it became at once very exciting, and important; and as it darted and sank, and flashed hither and thither, set up such a wash and tumult of ideas that it was impossible to sit still. It was thus that I found myself walking with extreme rapidity across a grass plot. Instantly a man's figure rose to intercept me. Nor did I at first understand that the gesticulations of a curious-looking object, in a cut-away coat and evening shirt, were aimed at me. His face expressed horror and indignation. Instinct rather than reason came to my help; he was a Beadle; I was a women. This was the turf; there was the path. Only the Fellows and Scholars are allowed here; the gravel is the place for me. Such thoughts were the work of a moment. As I regained the path the arms of the Beadle sank, his face assumed its usual repose, and though turf is better walking than gravel, no very great harm was done. The only charge I could bring against the Fellows and Scholars of whatever the college might happen to be was that in protection of their turf, which has been rolled for 300 years in succession, they had sent my little fish into hiding.

Paragraph 4

What idea it had been that had sent me so audaciously trespassing I could not now remember. The spirit of peace descended like a cloud from heaven, for if the spirit of peace dwells anywhere, it is in the courts and quadrangles of Oxbridge on a fine October morning. Strolling through those colleges past those ancient halls the roughness of the present seemed smoothed away; the body seemed contained in a miraculous glass cabinet through which no sound could penetrate, and the mind, freed from any contact with facts (unless one trespassed on the turf again), was at liberty to settle down upon whatever meditation was in harmony with the moment. **As chance would have it, some stray memory of some old essay about revisiting Oxbridge in the long vacation brought Charles Lamb to mind—Saint Charles, said Thackeray, putting a letter of Lamb's to his forehead.** Indeed, among all the dead (I give you my thoughts as they came to me), Lamb is one of the most congenial; one to whom one would have liked to say, Tell me then how you wrote your essays? For his essays are superior even to Max Beerbohm's, I thought, with all their perfection, because of that wild flash of imagination, that lightning crack of genius in the middle of them which leaves them flawed and imperfect, but starred with poetry. Lamb then came to Oxbridge perhaps a hundred years ago. Certainly he wrote an essay—the name escapes me—about the manuscript of one of Milton's poems which he saw there. It was Lycidas perhaps, and Lamb wrote how it shocked him to think it possible that any word in Lycidas could have been different from what it is. To think of Milton changing the words in that poem

seemed to him a sort of sacrilege. This led me to remember what I could of Lycidas and to amuse myself with guessing which word it could have been that Milton had altered, and why. It then occurred to me that the very manuscript itself which Lamb had looked at was only a few hundred yeards away, so that one could follow Lamb's footsteps across the quadrangle to that famous library where the treasure is kept. Moreover, I recollected, as I put this plan into execution, it is in this famous library that the manuscript of Thackeray's Esmond is also preserved. The critics often say that Esmond is Thackeray's most perfect novel. But the affectation of style, with its imitation of the eighteenth century, hampers one, so far as I can remember; unless indeed the eighteenth-century style was natural to Thackeray—a fact that one might prove by looking at the manuscript and seeing whether the alterations were for the benefit of style or of the sense. But then one would have to decide what is style and what is meaning, a question which—but here I was actually at the door which leads into the library itself. I must have opened it, for instantly there issued, like a guardian angel barring the way with a flutter of black gown instead of white wings, a deprecating, silvery, kindly gentleman, who regretted in a low voice as he waved me back that ladies are only admitted to the library if accompanied by a Fellow of the College or furnished with a letter of introduction.

Paragraph 5
That a famous library has been cursed by a woman is a matter of complete indifference to a famous library. Venerable and calm, with all its treasures safe locked within its breast, it sleeps complacently and will, so far as I am concerned, so sleep for ever. Never will I wake those echoes, never will I ask for that hospitality again, I vowed as I descended the steps in anger. Still an hour remained before luncheon, and what was one to do? Stroll on the meadows? sit by the river? Certainly it was a lovely autumn morning; the leaves were fluttering red to the ground; there was no great hardship in doing either. But the sound of music reached my ear. Some service or celebration was going forward. The organ complained magnificently as I passed the chapel door. Even the sorrow of Christianity sounded in the serene air more like the recollection of sorrow than sorrow itself; even the groanings of the ancient organ seemed lapped in peace. I had no wish to enter had I the right, and this time the verger might have stopped me, demanding perhaps my baptismal certificate, or a letter of introduction from the Dean. But the outside of these magnificent buildings is often as beautiful as the inside. Moreover, it was amusing enough to watch the congregation assembling, coming in and going out again, busying themselves at the door of the chapel like bees at the mouth of the hive. Many were in cap and gown; some had tufts of hair on their shoulders; others were wheeled in bath-chairs; others, though not past middle age, seemed creased and crushed into shapes so singular that one was reminded of those giant crabs

and crayfish who heave with difficulty across the sand of the aquarium. As I leant against the wall the University indeed seemed a sanctuary in which are preserved rare types which would soon be obsolete if left to fight for existence on the pavement of the Strand. **Old stories of old deans and old dons came back to mind, but before I had summoned up courage to whistle—it used to be said that at the sound of a whistle Old Professor –instantly broke into a gallop—the venerable congregation had gone inside.** The outside of the chapel remained. As you know, its high domes and pinnacles can be seen, like a sailing ship always voyaging and never arriving, lit up at night and visible for miles, far away across the hills. Once, presumably, this quadrangle, with its smooth lawns, its massive buildings, and the chapel itself a marsh too, where grasses waved and the swine rootled. Teams of horses and oxen, I thought, must have hauled the stone in wagons from far countries, and then with infinite labour the grey blocks in whose shade I was now standing were poised in order one on top of another, and then the painters brought their glass for the windows, and the masons were busy for centuries up on that roof with putty and cement, spade and trowel. Every Saturday somebody must have poured gold and silver out of a leathern purse into their ancient fists, for they had their beer and skittles presumably of an evening. An unending stream of gold and silver, I thought must have flowed into this court perpetually to keep the stones coming and the masons working; to level, to ditch, to dig and to drain. But it was then the age of faith, and money was poured liberally to set these stones on a deep foundation, and when the stones were raised, still more money was poured in from the coffers of kings and queens and great nobles to ensure that hymns should be sung here and scholars taught. Lands were granted; tithes were paid. And when the age of faith was over and the age of reason had come, still the same flow of gold and silver went on; fellowships were founded; lectureships endowed; only the gold and silver flowed now, not from the coffers of the king, but from the chests of merchants and manufacturers, from the purses of men who had made, say, a foutune from industry, and returned, in their wills, a bounteous share of it to endow more chairs, more lectureships, more fellowships in the university where they had learned their craft. Hence the libraries and laboratories; the observatories; the splendid equipment of costly and delicate instruments which now stands on glass shelves, where centuries ago the grasses waved and the swine rootled. Certainly, as I strolled around the court, the foundation of gold and silver seemed deep enough; the pavement laid solidly over the wild grasses. Men with trays on their heads went busily from staircase to staircase. Gaudy blossoms flowered in window boxes. The strains of the grammaphone blared out from the rooms within. It was impossible not to reflect—the reflection whatever it may have been was cut short. The clock struck. It was time to find one's way to luncheon.

Paragraph 6

It is a curious fact that novelists have a way of making us believe that luncheon parties are invariably memorable for something very witty that was said, or for something very wise that was done. But they seldom spare a word for what was eaten. It is part of a novelist's convention not to mention soup and salmon and ducklings, as if soup and salmon and ducklings were of no importance whatsoever, as if nobody ever smoked a cigar or drank a glass of wine. Here, however, I shall take the liberty to defy that convention and to tell you that the lunch on this occasion began with soles, sunk in a deep dish, over which the college cook had spread a counter pane of the whitest cream, save that it was branded here and there with brown spots like the spots on the flanks of a doe. After that came the partridges, but if this suggests a couple of bald, brown birds on a plate you are mistaken. The partridges, many and various, came with all their retinue of sauces and salads, the sharp and the sweet, each in its order; their potatoes, thin as coins but not so hard; their sprouts, foliated as rosebuds but more succulent. And no sooner had the roast and its retinue been done with than the silent serving-man, the Beadle himself perhaps in a milder manifestation, set before us, wreathed in napkins, a confection which rose all sugar from the waves. To call it pudding and so relate it to rice and tapioca would be an insult. Meanwhile the wineglasses had flushed yellow and flushed crimson; had been emptied; had been filled. And thus by degrees was lit, halfway down the spine, which is the seat of the soul, not that hard little electric light which we call brilliance, as it pops in and out of our lips, but the more profound, subtle and subterranean glow, which is the rich yellow flame of rational discourse. No need to hurry. No need to sparkle. No need to be anybody but oneself. We are all going to heaven and Vandyck is of of the company—in other words, how good life seemed, how sweet its rewards, how trivial this grudge or that grievance, how admirable friendship and the society of one's kind, as, lighting a good cigarette, one sunk among the cushions of a window-seat.

Paragraph 7

If by good luck there had been an ash-tray handy, if one had not knocked the ash out of the window in default, if things had been a little different from what they were, one would not have seen, presumably, a cat without a tail. The sight of that abrupt and truncated animal softly padding across the quadrangle changed by some fluke of the subconscious intelligence the emotional light for me. It was as if some one had let fall a shade. Perhaps the excellent was relinquishing its hold. Certainly, as I watched the Manx cat pause in the middle of the lawn as if it too questioned the universe, something seemed lacking, something seemed different. But what was lacking, what was different, I asked myself, listening to the talk. And to answer that question I had to think myself out of the room, back into the

past, before the war indeed, and to set before my eyes the model of another luncheon party held in rooms not very far distant from these; but different. Everything was different. Meanwhile the talk went on among the guests, who were many and young, some of this sex, some of that; it went on swimmingly, it went on agreeably, freely, amusingly. And as it went on I set it against the background of that other talk, and as I matched the two together I had no doubt that one was the descendent, the legitimate heir of the other. Nothing was changed; nothing was different save only-here I listened with all my ears not entirely to what was being said, but to the murmur or current behind it. Yes, that was it—the change was there. Before the war at a luncheon party like this people would have sounded fifferent, because in those days they were accompanied by a sort of humming noise, not articulate, but musical, exciting, which changed the value of the words themselves. Could one set that humming noise to words? Perhaps with the help of the poets one could. **A book lay beside me and, opening it, I turned casually enough to Tennyson. And here I found Tennyson singing: There has fallen a splendid tear From the passion-flower at the gate. She is coming, my dove, my dear; She is coming my life, my fate; The red rose cries, "She is near, she is near"; And the white rose weeps, "she is late"; The larkspur listens, "I hear, I hear"; And the lily whispers, "I wait." Was that what men hummed at luncheon parties before the war? And the women? My heart is like a singing bird Whose nest is in a water'd shoot: My heart is like an apple tree Whose boughs are bent with thick-set fruit; My heart is like a rainbow shell That paddles in a halcyon sea My heart is gladder than all these Because my love is come to me. Was that what women hummed at luncheon parties before the war?**

Paragraph 8

There was something so ludicrous in thinking of people humming such things even under their breath at luncheon parties before the war that I burst out laughing, and had to explain my laughter by pointing at the Manx cat, who did look a little absurd, poor beast, without a tail, in the middle of the lawn Was he really born so, or had he lost his tail in an accident? The tailless cat, though some are said to exist in the Isle of Man, is rarer than one thinks. It is a queer animal, quaint rather than beautiful. It is strange what a difference a tail makes—you know the sorts of things one says as a lunch party breaks up and people are finding their coats and hats. This one, thanks to the hospitality of the host, had lasted far into the afternoon. The beautiful October day was fading and the leaves were falling from the trees in the avenue as I walked through it. Gate after gate seemed to close with gentle finality behind me. Innumerable beadles were fitting innumerable keys into well-oiled locks; the treasure-house was being made secure for another night. After the avenue one comes out upon a road—I forget its name—

which leads you, if you take the right turning, along to Fernham. But there was plenty of time. Dinner was not till half-past seven. One could almost do without dinner after such a luncheon. **It is strange how a scrap of poetry works in the mind and makes the legs move in time to it along the road. Those words— There has fallen a splendid tear From the passion-flower gate. She is coming, my dove, my dear-- sang in my blood as I stepped quickly along towards Headingley. And then, switching off into the other measure, I sang, where the waters are churned up by the weir: My heart is like a singing bird Whose nest is in a water'd shoot: My heart is like an apple tree What poets, I cried aloud, as one does in the dusk, what poets they were! In a sort of jealousy, I suppose, for our own age, silly and absurd though those comparisons are, I went on to wonder of honestly one could name two living poets now as great as Tennyson and Christina Rossetti were then. Obviously it is impossible, I thought, looking into those foaming waters, to compare them. The very reason why poetry excites one to such abandonment, such rapture, is that it celebrates some feeling that one used to have (at luncheon parties before the war perhaps), so that one responds easily, familiarly, without troubling to check the feeling, or to compare it with any that one has now. But the living poets express a feeling that is actually being made and torn out of us at the moment. One does not recognize it in the first place; often for some reason one fears it; one watches it with keenness and compares it jealously and suspiciously with the old feeling that one knew. Hence the difficulty of modern poetry; and it is because of this difficulty that one cannot remember more than two consecutive lines of any good modern poet.** For this reason— that my memory failed me—the argument flagged for want of material. **But why, I continued, moving on towards Headingley, have we stopped humming under our breath at luncheon parties? Why has Alfred ceased to sing She is coming my dove, my dear? Why has Christina ceased to respond My heart is gladder than all these Because my love is come to me? Shall we lay the blame on the war? When the guns fired in August 1914, did the faces of men and women show so plain in each other's eyes that romance was killed? Certainly it was a shock (to women in particular with their illusions about education, and so on) to see the faces of our rulers in the light of the shell-fire. So ugly the looked—German, English, French—so stupid> But lay the blame where one will, on whom one will, the illusion which inspired Tennyson and Christina Rossetti to sing so passionately about the coming of their loves is far rarer now than then. One only has to read, to look, to listen, to remember. But why say "blame?" Why, if it was an illusion, not praise the catastrophe, whatever it was, that destroyed illusion and put truth in its place?**

For truth. . . those dots mark the spot where, in search of truth, I missed the turning up to Fernham. Yes indeed, which was truth and which was illusion, I asked myself. What was the truth about these houses for example, dim and festive now with their red windows in the dusk, but raw and red and squalid, with their sweets and their boot-laces, at nine o'clock in the morning? And the willows and the river and the gardens that run down to the river, vague now with the mist stealing over them, gold and red in the sunlight—which was the truth, which was the illusion about them? I spare you no twists and turns of my cogitations, for no conclusion was found on the road to Headingley, and I ask you to suppose that I soon found out my mistake about the turning and retraced my steps back to Fernham.

Paragraph 9
As I have said already that it was an October day, I dare not forfeit your respect and imperil the fair name of fiction by changing season and describing lilacs hanging over garden walls, crocuses, tulips and other flowers of spring. Fiction must stick to facts, and the truer the facts the better the fiction—so we are told. Therefore it was still autumn and the leaves were still yellow and falling, if anything, a little faster than before, because it was no evening (seven twenty-three to be precise) and a breeze (from the southwest to be exact) had risen. **But for all that there was something odd at work: My heart is like a singing bird Whose nest is in a water'd shoot: My heart is like an apple tree Whose boughs are bent with thick-set fruit; perhaps the words of Christina Rossetti were partly responsible for the folly of the fancy—it was nothing of course but a fancy—that the lilac was shaking its flowers over the garden walls, and the brimstone butterflies were scuddling hither and tither, and the dust of the pollen was in the air. It was the time between the lights when colours undergo their intensification and purples and golds burn in window-panes like the beat of an excitable heart; when for some reason the beauty of the world revealed and yet soon to perish (here I pushed into the garden, for, unwisely, the door was left open and no beadles seemed about), the beauty of the world which is so soon to perish, has two edges, one of laughter, one of anguish, cutting the heart asunder.** The gardens of Fernham lay before me in the spring twilight, wild and open, and in the long grass, sprinkled and carelessly flung, were daffodils and bluebells, not orderly perhaps at the best of times, and now wind-blown and waving as they tugged at their roots. The windows of the building, curved like ships' windows among generous waves of red brick, changed from lemon to silver under the flight of the quick spring clouds. Somebody was in a hammock, somebody, but in this light they were phantoms only, half-guessed, half-seen, raced across the grass—would no one stop her?-and then on the terrace, as if popping out to breathe the air, to glance at the garden, came a

bent figure, formidable yet humble, with her great forehead and her shabby dress-could it be the famous scholar, could it be J---H--- herself? All was dim, yet intense too, as if the scarf which the dusk had flung over the garden were torn asunder by star or sword—the flash of some terrible reality leaping, as its way is, out of the heart of the spring. For youth—

Paragraph 10

Here was my soup. Dinner was being served in the great dining-hall. Far from being spring it was in fact an evening in October. Everybody was assembled in the big dining-room. Dinner was ready. Here was the soup. It was a plain gravy soup. There was nothing to stir the fancy in that. One could have seen through the transparent liquid any pattern that there might have been on the plate itself. But there was no pattern. The plate was plain. Next came the beef with its attendant greens and potatoes—a homely trinity, suggesting the rumps of cattle in a muddy market, and sprouts curled and yellowed at the edge, and bargaining and cheapening, and women with string bags on Monday morning. There was no reason to complain of human nature's daily food, seeing that the supply was sufficient and coal-miners doubtless were sitting down to less. Prunes and custard followed. And if any one complains that prunes, even when mitigated by custard, are an uncharitable vegetable (fruit they are not), stringy as a miser's heart and exuding a fluid such as might run in miser's veins who have denied themselves wine and warmth for eighty years and yet not given to the poor, he should reflect that there are people whose charity embraces even the prune. Biscuits and cheese came next, and here the water-jug was liberally passed round, for it is the nature of biscuits to be dry, and these were biscuits to the core. That was all. The meal was over. Everybody scraped their chairs back; the swing-doors swung violently to and fro; soon the hall was emptied of every sign of food and made ready no doubt for breakfast next morning. Down corridors and up staircases the youth of England went banging and singing. And it was a guest, a stranger (for I had no more right here in Fernham than in Trinity or Somerville or Girton or Newnham or Christchurch), to say, "The dinner was not good," or to say (we were now, Mary Seton and I, in her sitting room), "Could we not have dined up here alone/" for if I had said anything of the kind I should have been prying and searching into the secret economies of a house which to the stranger wears so fine a front of gaiety and courage. No, one could not say anything of the sort. Indeed, conversation for a moment flagged. The human frame being what it is, heart, body and brain all mixed up together, and not contained in separate compartments as they will be no doubt in another million years, a good dinner is of great importance to good talk. One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well. The lamp in the spine does not light on beef and prunes. We are all probably going to heaven, and Vandyck is, we hope to meet us round the next corner—that is

the dubious and qualifying state of mind that beef and prunes at the end of the day's work breed between them. Happily my friend, who taught science, had a cupboard where there was a squat bottle and little glasses—(but there should have been sole and partridge to begin with)—so that we were able to draw up to the fire and repair some of the damages of the day's living. In a minute or so we were slipping freely in and out among all those objects of curiosity and interest which form in the mind in the absence of a particular person, and are naturally to be discussed on coming together again—how somebody has married, another has not; one thinks this, another that; one has improved out of all knowledge, the other most amazingly gone to the bad—with all those speculations upon human nature and the character of the amazing world we live in which spring naturally from such beginnings. While these things were being said, however, I became shamefacedly aware of a current setting in of its own accord and carrying everything forward to an end of its won. One might be talking of Spain and Portugal, of book or racehorse, but the real interest of whatever was said was none of those things, but a scene of masons on a high roof some five centuries ago. Kings and nobles brought treasure in huge sacks and poured it under the earth. This scene was for ever coming alive in my mind and placing itself by another of lean cows and a muddy market and withered greens and the stringy hearts of old men—these two pictures, disjointed and disconnected and nonsensical they were, were for ever coming together and combating each other and had me entirely at their mercy. The best course, unless the whole talk was to be distorted, was to expose what was in my mind to the air, when with good luck it would fade and crumble like the head of the dead king when they opened the coffin at Windsor. Briefly, then, I told Miss Seton about the masons who had been all those years on the roof of the chapel, and about the kings and queens and nobles bearing sacks of gold and silver on their shoulders, which they shoveled into the earth; and then how the great financial magnates of our own time came and laid cheques and bonds, I suppose, where the others had laid ingots and rough lumps of gold. All that lies beneath the colleges down there, I said; but this college, where we are now sitting, what lies beneath its gallant red brick and the wild unkempt grasses of the garden? What force is behind the plain china off which we dined, and (here it popped out of my mouth before I could stop it) the beef, the custard and the prunes?

Paragraph 11
Well, said Mary Seton, about the year 1860—Oh, but you know the story, she said, bored, I suppose, by the recital. And she told me—rooms were hired. Committees met. Envelopes were addressed. Circulars were drawn up. Meetings were held; letters were read out; so-and-so has promised so much; on the contrary, Mr.—won't give a penny. The Saturday Review has been very rude. How can we raise a fund to pay for offices? Shall we hold a

bazaar? Can't we find a pretty girl to sit in the front row? Let us look up what John Stuart Mill said on the subject. Can any one persuade the editor of the --- to print a letter? Can we get Lady--- to sign it? Lady---is out of town. That was the way it was done, presumably sixty years ago, and it was a prodigious effort, and a great deal of time was spent on it. And it was only after a long struggle and with the utmost difficulty that they got thirty thousand pounds together. So obviously we cannot have wine and partridges and servants carrying tin dishes on their heads, she said. We cannot have sofas and separate rooms. "The amenities," she said, quoting from some book or other, "will have to wait."

Paragraph 12
At the thought of all those women working year after year and finding it hard to get two thousand pounds together, and as much as they could do to get thirty thousand pounds, we burst out in scorn at the reprehensible poverty of our sex. What had our mothers been doing then that they had no wealth to leave us? Powdering their noses? Looking in at shop windows? Flaunting in the sun at Monte Carlo? There were some photographs on the mantel-piece. Mary's mother—if that was her picture—may have been a wastrel in her spare time (she had thirteen children by a minister of the church), but if so her gay and dissipated life had left too few traces of its pleasures on her face. She was a homely body; an old lady in a plaid shawl which was fastened by a large cameo; and she sat in a basket-chair, encouraging a spaniel to look at the camera, with the amused yet strained expression of one who is sure that the dog will move directly the bulb is pressed. Now is she had gone into business; had become a manufacturer of artificial silk or a magnate on the Stock Exchange; if she had left two or three hundred thousand pounds to Fernham, we could have been sitting at our ease tonight and the subject of our talk might have been archeology, botany, anthropology, physics, the nature of the atom, mathematics, astronomy, relativity, geography. If only Mrs. Seton and her mother and her mother before her had learnt the great art of making money and had left their money, like their fathers and their grandmothers before them, to found fellowships and lectureships and prizes and scholarships appropriated to their own sex, we might have dined very tolerably up here alone off a bird and a bottle of wine; we might have looked forward without undue confidence to a pleasant and honourable lifetime spent in the shelter of one of the liberally endowed professions. We might have been exploring or writing; mooning about the venerable places of the earth; sitting contemplative on the steps of the Parthenon, or going at ten to an office and coming home comfortably at half-past four to write a little line of poetry. Only, if Mrs. Seton and her like had gone into business at the age of fifteen, there would have been—that was the sang in the argument—no. Mary. What, I asked, did Mary think of that? There between the curtains was the

October night, calm and lovely, with a star or two caught in the yellowing trees. Was she ready to resign her share of it and her memories (for they had been a happy family, though a large one) of games and quarrels up in Scotland, which she is never tired of praising for the fineness of its air and the quality of its cakes, in order that Fernham might have been endowed with fifty thousand pounds or so by a stroke of the pen? For, to endow a college would necessitate the suppression of families altogether. Making a fortune and bearing thirteen children—no ham being could stand it. Consider the facts, we said. First there are nine months before the baby is born. Then the baby is born. Then there are three or four months spent feeding the baby. After the baby is fed there are certainly five years spent in playing with the baby. You cannot, it seems, let children run about the streets. People who have seen them running wild in Russia say that the sight is not a pleasant one. People say, too, that human nature takes its shape in the years between one and five. If Mrs. Seton, I said, had been making money, what sort of memories would you have had of games and quarrels? What could you have known of Scotland, and its fine air and cakes and all the rest of it? But it is useless to ask these questions at all. Moreover, it is equally useless to ask what might have happened if Mrs. Seton and her mother and her mother before her had amassed great wealth and laid it under the foundations of college and library, because, in the first place, to earn money was impossible for them, and in the second, had it been possible, the law denied them the right to possess what money they earned. It is only for the last forty-eight years that Mrs. Seton has had a penny of her own.

Paragraph 13

For all the centuries before that it would have been her husband's property—a thought which, perhaps, may have had its share in keeping Mrs. Seton and her mothers off the Stock Exchange. Every penny I earn, they may have said, will be taken from me and disposed of according to my husband's wisdom—perhaps to found a scholarship or to endow a fellowship in Balliol or Kings, so that to earn money, even if I could earn money, is not a matter that interests me very greatly. I had better leave it to my husband.

Paragraph 14

At any rate, whether or not the blame rested on the old lady who was looking at the spaniel, there could be no doubt that for some reason or other our mothers had mismanaged their affairs very greatly. Not a penny could be spared for "amenities": for partridges and wine, beadles and turf, books and cigars, libraries and leisure. To raise bare walls out if the bare earth was the utmost they could do. So we talked standing at the window and looking, as so many thousands look every night, down on the domes and towers of the famous city beneath us. It was very beautiful, very mysterious in the autumn moonlight. The old stone looked very white and venerable. One

thought of all the books that were assembled down there; of the pictures of old prelates and worthies hanging in the paneled rooms; of the painted windows that would be throwing strange globes and crescents on the pavement, of the tablets and memorials and inscriptions; of the fountains and the grass; of the quiet rooms looking across the quiet quadrangles. **And (pardon me the thought) I thought, too, of the admirable smoke and drink and the deep armchairs and the pleasant carpets: of the urbanity, the geniality, the dignity which are the offspring of luxury and privacy and space.** Certainly our mothers had not provided us with anything comparable to all this—our mothers who found it difficult to scrape together thirty thousand pounds, our mothers who bore thirteen children to ministers of religion at St. Andrews.

Paragraph 15
So I went back to my inn, and as I walked through the dark streets I pondered this and that, as one does at the end of the day's work. I pondered why it was that Mrs. Seton had no money to leave us; and what effect poverty has on the mind; and what effect wealth has on the mind; and I thought of the queer old gentlemen I had seen that morning with tufts of fur upon their shoulders; and I remembered how if one whistled one of them ran; and I thought of the organ booming in the chapel and of the shut doors of the library; and I thought how unpleasant it is to be lock out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be locked in; and thinking of the safety and prosperity of the one sex and of the poverty and insecurity of the other and of the effect on tradition upon the mind of a writer, I thought at last that it was time to roll up the crumpled skin of the day, with its argument and its impressions and its anger and its laughter, and cast it out into the hedge. A thousand stars were flashing across the blue wastes of the sky. One seemed alone with an inscrutable society. All human beings were laid asleep—prone, horizontal, dumb. Nobody seemed stirring in the streets of Oxbridge. Even the door of the hotel sprang open at the touch of an invisible hand—not a boots was sitting up to light me to bed it was so late.

<emma> Display: Ethos Figures

mimesis mycterismus **anamnesis** litotes **metaphor** epicrisis chreia *…*
(denotes change from original document)

As I left a lecture on Tolkien's philology last Tuesday, I couldn't help but overhear my English 3000 professor say to his friend "Fifteen hours is just too much. I see kids everyday struggling to keep going." * Although I took comfort in the thought that my professor thought a "full" load was really an "over' load, I filed the comment into my memory as something soon to be forgotten.*

I left the lecture that day with a better understanding of why I am content in neither the English department nor the Linguistics department. My poor, tortured soul was meant to be a philologist, meant to study a dead field, my only comrades aged professors. I pondered means of teaching myself this lost art all evening, even as I worked on my papers for English and History. Finally, I decided that not only was my train of thought foolish (it would take four eighteen hour semesters to accomplish, and even then I would have no philology degree, and I certainly would not have the fifteen or so hours a week to work and support myself) but it had distracted me from my work at hand.

As I packed my books and uniform shirt for the next grueling day ahead, I thought again of my professor's words "fifteen hours is just too much…." Maybe if I weren't a middle class mediocre student struggling both to support my self and maintain my only scholarship I could hope to excel under a fifteen hour course load. I was no valedictorian in high school, but I did graduate with honors and eleven AP credits. Yet as a freshman at the University I struggled to keep the HOPE scholarship. Spring semester I accomplished a small miracle, a 4.0 semester, thanks to thoughts of student loans accruing. So why, then, could I not handle a job and a "full" course load this semester? I had quit my well paid job at the "student friendly" grocery store where I slaved thirty hours a week all summer on the first day of class because I was scheduled for a "student friendly" 25 hour week (which they thought "very gracious on our behalf"). Still, with my new position on board UGA Food Services, I still gave in and dropped a course the night before midpoint to save my sanity. * I thought again of my professor's comment and how the University's President had declared an "overload" the norm while claiming to support students.* Do President Adams' words rings any more true than an offhand campaign promise? "I care about the students," I thought over and over. If you care about students, do you push them to a

fifteen hour course load? If you care, do you attempt to shame them into graduating "on time?" Now more than ever a college education isn't a luxury for the wealthy, but a struggle for the under dogs. I'd love to see President Adams take five classes, work a twelve to fifteen hour week busing tables, and still keep a 3.0 GPA.

The next afternoon things progressed from bad to worse. After work, and the typical half hour journey to my car, I drove to the cable office to pay my bill for the month. While waiting for it to clear to turn into the parking lot I was rear ended by a kid and his mom in an Expedition, which amazingly only cracked the bumper on my dilapidated little Taurus. So once the aftermath of paperwork and phone calls was over I was left with no time to work on my History and English papers, both due Friday. Fortunately, I had another day to spare, so I took medicine for my headache and went to bed.

My rest was cut short at 6 am the next morning, however, by a phone call from my Aunt. My grandmother, whom I lived with for three years after my Mom died, was in the hospital. "She had symptoms of a heart attack. They'll keep her through Friday at least to make sure she's alright. Don't worry, dear. It was probably just stress." I thought about that brave woman all day. It wasn't stress, but worry that put her in the hospital. Worrying over me, my brother, my boyfriend, my great grandmother, my great great aunt… she never worried enough about herself. John Donne's words rung in my ears, "no man is an island." Certainly she and I need to heed those words. I decided to help her care for herself, for her island.

I made it through class and work, as I was ordered by my Aunt, though more bad news was lurking for me at work. Angelica, the other student worker, had just called to say her grandfather, whom she was very close to, had just passed away and she would be out until Monday. I offered to pick up her Saturday shift and signed the sympathy card, searching through all the kind cliché's I'd been handed over the years for something comforting to share with her. Finally, I remembered that for the grieving, all cliché's are ice to the heart and bile to the mind and all sympathetic lines are cliché.

So I jotted a cliché and left work to pick up my brother, carry out some unfinished chores at my grandma's house and visit her. I kept telling myself, "If I can make it home by eight there will plenty of time for one paper tonight and one in the morning." Of course, more bad news was waiting for me when my brother and I arrived at the hospital. My Uncle's brother had died and my Aunt needed to go to him the next day to help take care of things. Since she had been up with my grandmother all night and day, she needed to go home and rest. I couldn't leave the woman alone over night with the memories of all the times she'd sat at now passed loved ones' bedsides. * I couldn't leave her alone on her island, as Donne had put it. She needed support against the tide of emotions that would beat against her over the night. *

I stayed through the morning and promised to come see her after work. I rushed home for a shower and coffee and half an hour left to pour some words onto the keyboard and hope for a D (which we all know stands for Diploma). I had survived a week of Hell, thanks to an extension on my History paper, but what if I had braved a "full load?" I imagined a discourse with President Adams: "Do you really understand the needs of the students, President Adams?" "Of course I bear in mind the best interests of the students …" President Adams said with a smile more sly than any politician, "just be sure you graduate as a fourth year senior."

Display of <emma>'s Comment Function

Lawrence Lipking Analyzes Frankenstein
Student, Ima

Comments by Hilton, Nelson

Paragraph 1

"Frankenstein, the True Story; or, Rousseau Judges Jean-Jacques" is Lawrence Lipking's approach to analyzing Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Within his essay, Lipking gives an **overview of the countless others**[1] who have critiqued this novel, and adds what he thinks of their views while contributing some of his own. Such a controversial book, and one that can easily be interpr**ett**[2]ed in many different ways, has proved to be **a feeding ground**[3] for the literary critics since the novel's first publication. "First" should be stressed because of **the dozen or so**[4] editions of Frankenstein, which in itself is another controversy: "Which novel should be taught to students?"(**Lipking**[5]) Lipking analyzes the arguments surrounding the novel, **including the previously mentioned**[6], as well as those that lie within the writing. While analyzing **all**[7] the various interpretations of Frankenstein, he offers the idea that even though there are an **absorbetant**[8] number of **viewpoints to view**[9] the novel from, "there is always room for something completely different."

1 are we certain of this?

2 sp.

3 somewhat an awkward metaphor, imho

4 what are those after the 3rd, 1831?

5 page numbers for citation needed

6 awk.

7 all?

Paragraph 2

Lipking devotes **a lot of**[10] energy attempting to illustrate a common ground for the Frankenstein arguments. The fact that contemporary critics, for the most part, all dissect specific scenes and plot elements, and ignore certain areas in a similiar fashion, shows a kind of consensus. **The lectures about Frankenstein by the "leading romanticists of our time"(Lipking),**[11] each had a totally different approach from one another, yet still talked about the same areas of the novel. An even more general grouping would be to divide readers among those who thought Victor was the innocent one, and those who favored the Creature. One would have a difficult time extracting Lipking's opinion on this question. He has a very "middle of the road" take on most of the arguments he addresses. "My purpose is by no means to make a case for Frankenstein and against the Creature. […] Nor do **i**[12] intend to question the contempt for Victor that oozes through much recent criticism."(Lipking)

Paragraph 3

The amount of research that was put into Lipking's essay is impressive. He explains in detail the influences of the novel, including Mary Shel**ly**[13]'s instruction by her husband and father. By doing so, he can surmise as to what Shelly's philosophies were, and from that information conclude as to what she was trying to get across to readers in her book. The essay is **now**[14] cleanly cut into two sections. The first half could be considered the "inside" half where Lipking details the moral lessons that can be contrived from the novel. The second would be the thorough analyzation and grouping of the critiques of Frankenstein, the "outside" half. The latter being the most remarkable due to the consensus he finds among all the critical confusion, and the variety of arguments he is familiar with. Lipking's essay is a great analysis of Shelley's novel because it pertains to **everything**[15] surrounding its creation, the many meanings contained within, and even a general overview of what readers have derived from it since the original publication.

13 sp.

14 in contrast to when?

15 can't be too careful about falling into exaggeration

APPENDIX O

<emma> Display: Subject and Main Verb

subject`main verb`

Lackluster Hyperreality
Student, Ima

Paragraph 1

1. The **events** of September 11th, 2002 violently `rocked` the world.

2. **Two of New York's tallest skyscrapers tumbled** lifelessly to the ground.

3. **Millions of Americans** `witnessed` the atrocity through the lens of a camera.

4. For months afterwards, **footage** `shot` that day aired over and over again across the nation.

5. **This catastrophe** `seemed` almost surreal as if Hollywood fabricated everything.

6. Unfortunately, the **events** `were` all too real, and the **camera lens** `seemed` to accentuate the images stripping the cinematography down to a minimum.

1. In the narrative "Videotape," **Don Delillo** `attempts` the recreate the same sense of hyper reality by retelling the events of a girl filming one of murders of the Texas Highway Killer.

2. **Delillo** `brings` to light the fact that atrocities viewed first had through a camera appear stripped down and almost super real which draws the

audience in and establishes a common ground between them and the victim.