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Abstract
This dissertation focuses broadly on the behavior of elected elites who have power of the outcomes of the legislative process and policy implementation. In my first chapter, I explore the effect that executive and legislative institutions have on the outcomes of federal services through the example of the US Postal Service. Using data on all established post offices from 1840 to 1915, I find evidence supportive of several prior theories of bureaucratic influence. My second chapter focuses on the House standing committee system and the influence that it has on recording voting behavior by House members. After estimating one dimensional ideal points using Poole and Rosenthal’s W-NOMINATE, I find that recorded votes in committee tended to be more strictly party line then record votes on the floor. Continually I find that when testing to see if there were any individual level differences causing differences in voting behavior between contexts that majority party membership was the primary indicator of how much difference there was in member behavior. Finally, my last chapter looks at member votes on the Journal of the US House to determine if their inclusion in our measures of behavior makes a substantive impact on their results. In testing prior theories about the use of Journal votes, I find that members do vote outside of the normal when voting to approve the Journal though these votes make no substantive difference on our measures of behavior. Overall, I find that party does make a huge impact on both the behavior of Congresspeople when voting and the implementation of the policies they produce.