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Abstract
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation began the process of rebuilding itself as a great power. I argue that this process involves a grand strategy of establishing a sphere of influence. We see this sphere expanding as Russian foreign policy has intensified towards certain states, and we are told by the Kremlin that intervention is done on behalf of ethnic Russians living abroad in these states. Curiously, there are several states which appear to be actively targeted for the Russian sphere, but lack an ethnic Russian population. Conversely, there are several states which face little attention from the Kremlin, but have large numbers of ethnic Russians. This observational discrepancy prompted my empirical investigation of the types of states that Russia targets for its sphere of influence. In this investigation, I contrast the effect that geostrategic significance and historical legacy have on the intensity to which Moscow pursues astate as a part of its sphere. In doing so, I find that the percentage of ethnic Russians is not significant in determining whether or not a state is targeted by the Kremlin. Instead, results show that legacies of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union and geostrategic states with ethnic Russian residents are more intensely targeted. These findings inform us as to a) how spheres of influence are constructed, b) how spheres of influence contribute to a states grand strategy, c) how collapsed powers attempt to rebound to great power status, and d) how states follow realpolitik and/or constructivist approaches to foreign policy. On an applied level, this research clarifies observational inconsistencies in the Kremlins foreign policy, highlights Moscows grand strategy, and aids in prediction of potential new targets for the Russian sphere.