

EUROPEAN UNION ELECTORAL SUPPORT TO TRANSITIONAL AND NON-ESTABLISHED  
DEMOCRACIES:

THE CASE OF EU'S ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS (1993-2008)

by

MARIE V. MILWARD

(Under the direction of Howard Wiarda)

I ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHAT EXPLAINS THE DECISION OF THE EU TO  
OBSERVE OR NOT OBSERVE ELECTIONS AROUND THE WORLD? I PROPOSE THAT,  
BEYOND SIMPLY PROMOTING DEMOCRACY, ELECTION OBSERVATION IS A FOREIGN  
POLICY TOOL THAT THE EU CAN USE TO FURTHER ITS LARGER INTERESTS. MORE  
SPECIFICALLY, I CONTRAST THREE DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES OF THE EU'S  
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORING POLICY: INTERNATIONAL ROLE, INTERNAL  
FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL ALTRUISM. WITH A COMBINATION OF  
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS OF ANALYSIS, I PRESENT ORIGINAL  
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF MY ARGUMENT: I FIND THAT THE EU IS IN FACT MORE  
LIKELY TO USE ITS ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONS AS A MEDIUM TO IMPROVE ITS  
STRATEGIC STANDING ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE.

INDEX WORDS: International Election Monitoring, Election Observation, Election  
Assistance, Democracy Assistance, European Union, Africa, European  
Foreign Policy

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# Dedication

To Christopher S. Allen

In memory of a wonderful teacher, mentor and friend.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Research Agenda

In this dissertation, I explain why the European Union (EU) decides to act outside of its borders to support electoral processes in transitional and non established democracies around the world. Understanding the reasons that are important to and influential in the EU's decision to observe some elections but not others will shed light on the process leading to this decision and the question of why the EU observes elections abroad.

The EU's election support policy can take multiple forms among which are electoral assistance projects and election observation missions. Election assistance is the technical and material support given to the electoral process, and election observation is its political complement. The EU has been active in the area of election support since the early 1990s, and it has become one of the leading actors in the world in this domain. Over the past decade, the EU's electoral support programs have played a critical role in the democratization processes of many countries. For example, the EU launched its first election support mission in 1993, with the observation of Russia's first multiparty elections. The following year, the EU observed the first post-apartheid elections in South Africa. Concomitantly, the

EU developed assistance programs providing financial and technical support to the first legislative and presidential elections since the end of the civil war in Mozambique. Since then, the EU has observed eighty-three elections, in forty-six countries, in every region of the world. In the past five years alone, the EU has distributed close to €400 millions in electoral assistance to more than forty countries. In light of this brief history, one can say that the EU has become a high profile actor in this area of foreign aid and democratization and therefore deserves more attention.

Although election assistance is a crucial part of the EU's election support and democratization policy, I think that studying the EU's election monitoring activities is more puzzling since it involves some form of political intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign countries.

It is interesting to see election monitoring as a form of intervention. Indeed, because of the principle of sovereignty, no country is obligated to accept and even less, invite international actors to observe their electoral process which are by definition the most sovereign responsibilities of a state. If invited to observe an election and if the invitation is accepted, the international organization -non-governmental or governmental- will then physically deploy a mission on the ground and be present in the field to observe every stage of the electoral process (campaigning, voting, counting, tabulation, post-election legal disputes ...). Furthermore, these organization will fulfill important roles in the process, ranging from providing legitimacy to the process to providing constructive feedback for improving subsequent rounds of the observed election cycle or future elections cycles. Therefore, such activity can legitimately be considered as a form of foreign intervention on the part of international actors, both governmental and non-governmental.

Although the EU's foreign policy is widely studied, including its role on the international stage, very little attention has been given to explaining why the EU has become such an important actor in the area of election support in general and more specifically in the domain

of international election monitoring (IEM). In addition, a systematic study of the EU's motivating factors to carry out election monitoring missions is conspicuously missing from the literature, a void this research is attempting to fill. Therefore, I think that the EU's election monitoring activity is an excellent case of the EU's growing projection of its role on the international stage and, consequently, deserves more attention.

An important source of debate in the field of election monitoring, among academics as well as policy makers and organizations themselves, is the question of the rationale behind this type of activity. In a recent document, the *Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers*, the International Community represented in this case by the major intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations, has endorsed a definition of international election observation:

“the systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards of accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. International election observation should, when possible, offer recommendations for improving the integrity and effectiveness of electoral and related processes, while not interfering in and thus hindering such processes. International election observation missions are: organized efforts of intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations and associations to conduct international election observation.” (United-Nations 2005, p. 2)

This document, endorsed by many including the European Commission, states that “international election observation expresses the interest of the international community in the

achievement of democratic elections, as part of democratic development, including respect for human rights and the rule of law.” (United-Nations 2005, p.1). Further, it explicitly acknowledges the goals of international election observation as:

“International election observation has the potential to enhance the integrity of election processes, by deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and by providing recommendations for improving electoral processes. It can promote public confidence. I also serves to enhance international understanding through the sharing of experiences and information about democratic development.”(United-Nations 2005, p.2)

According to this document, the rationale behind international election observation seems to be based on the needs of the countries holding elections. However, the *Declaration* also acknowledges that “international election observation is conducted for the benefit of the people of the country holding the elections and for the benefit of the International Community.” (United-Nations 2005, p.3) Even though the document gives only a vague explanation about what it means by “for the benefit of the International Community,” it is logical to assume that observing organizations are involved in such activities because it is in their interest to do so.

In practice, scholars of election observation have found that such an activity is not always effective in deterring fraud or in providing constructive criticisms in order to improve the process in the future. Thus, Judith Kelley finds that monitoring organizations do endorse highly flawed elections (Kelley 2009a), or Susan Hyde concludes that many leaders and governments invite monitoring organizations even though they have no intention to organize and hold free and fair elections sending the odds of a fraudulent election sky-rocketing (Hyde 2006).

Such conclusions lead us to wonder why the International Community would be wasting precious resources in activities that seem to not be efficient, at least from the perspective of

the countries holding the elections. A large part of the academic literature on foreign aid focuses on explaining what motivates wealthy countries and/or multilateral organizations to provide assistance to poorer, needy country; in other words, why give foreign aid? This is an important question in the foreign aid literature, and much has been written. Overall, two general models have had sustaining power in explaining why governments and organization give foreign aid to third countries (McKinley & Little 1979, Frey & Schneider 1986, Alesina & Dollar 2000, Easterly 2003, Chong & Gradstein 2008, Wright & Winters 2010). Indeed, it appears that the “the direction of aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by economic needs and policy performance of the recipients”.(Alesina & Dollar 2000, p.5) Further, “the literature on aid allocation shows that recipient-country need is only one factor among many strategic interests for donor countries, research showing that donors rarely give aid non-strategically,” (Wright & Winters 2010, p.63) therefore giving traction to both the donor interest and the recipient needs model of foreign aid allocation.

The recipient-need model assumes that donors are motivated by the need of the recipients or, in other words, this model assume that the amount of aid received will be proportional to the recipient’s needs. In the case of international election observation, such a model would predict that organizations observe elections in countries where it is the most needed. Alternatively, the donor interest model argues that aid is used first and foremost to promote the strategic interests of the donor country or organization and that that aid is used as a tool of foreign policy by these actors. This model can also be applied to international election observation as such activity is perceived to also be beneficial to the international community as a whole or to the actors involved in election observation more specifically (United-Nations 2005).

The question ‘Why does the European Union observe elections?’ is, in the context of the literature on foreign aid allocation, very salient. In this dissertation, I seek to answer the more specific question ‘What explains the EU’s decision to send Election Observation

Missions (EOMs) to some transitional and non-established democracies but not others?’ which ultimately sheds light on the former question. This dissertation focuses on explaining the motivations behind European election monitoring in general and more specifically proposes to explore the process of election monitoring allocation employed by the EU. In this dissertation, I argue the EU follows a ‘donor interest approach’ to decide where to observe elections.

### **1.1.1 Self-interest vs. Altruism**

In this dissertation, I present three alternative explanations for the EU’s decision to observe elections in some countries but not others. First, the decision can be seen as being self-interested in the goal of strengthening the EU’s position in international politics. Second, the decision can also be self-interested but this time with the goal of strengthening EU’s internal cohesion. Finally, observing elections could be seen as an altruistic action in order to help host countries democratize successfully. In this dissertation, I argue that the first argument has the most explanatory power: the EU’s is in fact interested in improving its projected role as a strategic actor on the international stage and is using international election observation as a means to further this position. Consequently, I argue that the EU uses election observation as an instrument of its broader foreign policy.

Overall, the literature on the European Union traditionally sees it as this idealist, often benevolent actor because of a poorly designed and weakly institutionalized foreign policy authority at the level of the EU. However, this dissertation argues that the EU could and should be considered as a self interested strategic actor motivated by its own interests and not necessarily concerned with the interest or the well-being of other international actors. Considering the current global economic recession and the economic problems the EU is now facing, I think it is important to investigate whether the EU has a future in the global system as something more than an economic superpower.

More specifically, I argue that EU's international election observation policy reflects its interest in strengthening its position in international politics. The EU is pursuing an external strategy aimed at positioning itself in the broader international system by increasing its systemic role in this area of foreign policy. Ultimately, I argue that the EU's intentions are to position itself as an actor capable of intervening abroad in order to stabilize countries and/or regions in difficulty, strengthen trade partnerships, and increase its influence on third countries. If such an argument is true, it would have important implications on our understanding of the EU as a global actor. Indeed, it would show that by acting first and foremost for its own benefits, the EU might not be as benevolent an actor as many politicians and academics alike have been arguing for decades. Further, it would show that, in a world where democracy assistance is an important rationale for foreign policy and/or foreign intervention, the EU might have the tools and further, the comparative advantage in using this specific tool of foreign policy for its own benefit. In a nutshell, the EU would be considered as a macro-state with expanding power. Such an argument highlights the EU's cosmopolitanism as it projects its ideals on other countries via soft power methods and the language of democracy. At a time when the EU's economic power on the world stage is questioned, it might be time for the EU to explore other avenues for developing its international standing. If this theory is verified, democracy assistance in general and international election observation might be politically beneficial areas of expansion. If the EU is using IEM with the goal of advancing its external position in the international system, we should expect the EU to behave as a state and to pursue power and use its election observation activities as a way to promote international security, economic partnership, soft-power gains, and information gathering.

Alternatively, one could argue that the EU's motivations to observe elections in some countries are self-interested with the goal of strengthening the EU's internal cohesion and to further institutional integration in the area of external action and foreign policy. Inspired by

the neo-functionalist framework fathered by Ernst Haas in 1958 in *The Uniting of Europe*, an argument can be made that the EU's international election monitoring policy fits into its overall incremental integration strategy (Haas 1958). Since the 1950s, one of the main objective of the literature on the EU was to explain how and why the tasks of the EU have been expanding. Overall, the expansion of power of the EU has happened in two different ways. There has been an expansion of the tasks of the EU from the level of the states to the level of the supranational organization. In addition, there has been an expansion in scope of the tasks that the EU has to manage. In other words some tasks are still subject to the veto of states (2nd pillar) when other tasks are more autonomously managed at the supranational level of the European Commission (EC). The most important theory, or framework, used to explain European deepening integration has been neo-functionalism. Moravcsik frames the context of European integration very well: "over the past half century, the EU has evolved until its policies and institutions are of a scope and significance without parallel among international organizations." (Moravcsik 2005, p.349) It is therefore interesting to understand how such integration took place. With integration processes such as functional and political spillovers, the EU became, over time, more and more integrated (Haas 1958, Moravcsik 2005). In matters of foreign policy, since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU has expanded its jurisdiction into more 'sovereign' policies of external and internal security. However such expansion in level hasn't necessarily been followed with an expansion in scope as justice and home affairs have move to the supranational 1st pillar institutions when the Common Foreign and Security Policy has, overall, remained under the more intergovernmental 2nd pillar institutions. That being said, in the matter of democracy assistance in general and election observation in particular, we have observed an expansion in scope of the EU supranational institution –i.e. the European Commission– since the turn of the century. In this context, it is interesting to argue that the EU's election observation policy is, in fact, internally motivated. Indeed, the EU could use IEM as a way to further its internal institutional

integration via both functional and political spillover. In this case, making a case that a part of the EU's foreign policy agenda –election monitoring– is better managed at the supranational level could help making the case that other areas of the Foreign Policy agenda should be managed in the same way. Therefore, IEM policy would be used by the EU in an effort to increase member states cohesion around a common foreign policy. As such, the EU would decide to act in cases that are relatively non-controversial and functionally practical and convenient for its institutional integration. Therefore, the EU should find advantageous to observe ‘easy’ elections in order to build internal confidence in its potential as a foreign policy actor within this functional area of foreign policy. If the EU is using IEM as a way to further its internal development, we should expect the following considerations to be more important: normative, feasibility, and to some extent the internal politics of the EU.

Finally, the third potential explanation for the EU's international election observation policy assume –as many observers of the EU do– that the EU is first and foremost a benevolent actor on the international stage and doesn't have a claim to any type of coherent and strategic foreign policy. In this case, the EU's election observation is seen as an altruistic act intended to help host countries democratize successfully. If this argument were true, we would expect the EU to respond to election observation requests where the need is highest, regardless of self-interest. In other words, one can see the goals of the EU's foreign policy in general and election observation more specifically to be “driven by an honest concern for the well-being of others in an altruistic sense.”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.8)

## 1.2 Puzzle

Since 1993, the European Union policy regarding EOMs has changed dramatically. Indeed, according to Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner,

“There have been significant advances in the field of international election ob-

ervation since the European Union deployed its first mission in 1993. Over this relatively short period of time, EU election observation has developed from a short-term, ad hoc, operation into a long term process with a rigorous and systematic methodology endorsed by the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Commission.” (European Commission 2008, Preface)

She also adds that :

“Election observation is a vital component of European Union activities to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide (...) Election observation also serves to reinforce other key European Union foreign policy objectives, notably peace-making and peace-building. With these objectives in mind, the European Union has become a leading force in international election observation (...)” (European Commission 2008, Preface)

The EU’s policy to send EOMs to monitor electoral processes in transitional and non-established democracies is puzzling for several reasons both theoretically and empirically.

First of all, quantitatively, Figure 1.1 shows that since the deployment of its first EUEOM in 1993, the frequency of EUEOMs has increased almost consistently every year. In addition, Figure 1.2 illustrates, in comparative perspective, the total number of elections in transitional and non established democracies for each year since 1993. It also shows the number of elections the EU observed or didn’t observe for each year. It is interesting to notice that the EU only observed a small portion (around 25%) of the total number of elections scheduled for each year. Therefore, since 2000, the European Commission has observed 70 elections out of a total of 266 elections in developing countries in almost every region of the world. In other words, the EU has sent an EOM in 26.3% of the cases. This could be considered a rare event and therefore justifies us asking the question of what makes these cases so special for the EU to physically intervene and deploy an EOM in the field.

Figure 1.1: Total Number of EUEOM per Year (1993-2008)





Figure 1.2: Elections and Election Observation Missions (1993-2008)



In addition to presenting a quantitative puzzle, EU International Election Monitoring activities also bring up a theoretical puzzle. With Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner previous statements in mind, one can wonder what exactly the motivations of the EU to get involved in election observations are. Indeed, it is unclear whether election observation is part of the EU's development cooperation policy, or a part of the EU's strategic foreign policy, or whether it is a little of both. Indeed, contrary to foreign aid and election assistance which are technical, material or financial, election observation, like peace-keeping operations are monitoring missions and physical interventions on the territory of a sovereign country and can therefore also be seen as strategic interventions.

The EU started to observe elections on an ad hoc basis in 1993, shortly after many IGOs (United Nations, OSCE, OAS, AU, SADC Parliamentary Forum ...) and NGOs (EISA, IFES, Carter Center, NDI, IRI ...) started to systematize such activities in this area of foreign intervention. The EU formalized its approach to election monitoring with several Council regulations in 1999 followed by a Communication from the European Commission in 2000.<sup>1</sup> One can therefore wonder what were the reasons for the EU's decision to get involved in the supply of election monitoring. Further, even though European foreign policy is the subject of an increasing literature, the factors shaping it are still very unclear. Indeed, answers to questions such as 'what motivate European foreign policy?' or 'can there be a common European foreign policy?' remain quite misunderstood.

As I discuss further in the background chapter of this dissertation, quite a few research programs in the field of International Relations can help improve our understanding of why the European Union engages in IEM. For example, recent works on foreign aid and peacekeeping operations ask very similar questions to the one I ask in this dissertation: What are the factors/frames shaping specific foreign policy course of action (van der

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<sup>1</sup>Council regulations 975/99 and 976/99 and Communication from the Commission on Election Assistance and Observation.

Veen manuscript, Lancaster 2007). Therefore, we will try to apply their findings to the specific case of EUEOM policy. Moreover, the existing literature on IEM is also very underdeveloped and under-theorized. Even though a few descriptive studies of the process of IEM and the actors involved in it exist, (Bjornlund 2004, Carothers 1997, Carothers 2004) only recently did a couple of authors, Judith Kelley and Susan Hyde, started to answer some of the important questions related to IEM such as “what countries invite monitors and how do organizations decide which election to observe?”(Kelley N.d., Hyde 2006, p1) Even though these research ventures represent steps in the right direction, they mostly emphasize the demand side of IEM and only provide an overview of the factors shaping its supply side. Indeed, very rarely do scholars focus on the supply of IEM and the motivations for providing it (Kelley N.d.). Because countries and/or organizations voluntarily engage in IEM and because their activities are constrained by budgetary considerations, it is important to understand why these actors decide to spend scarce resources in IEM instead of other areas of domestic and/or foreign policy.

### **1.3 Research Question**

Considering the empirical and theoretical puzzles presented above, I am interested in answering the following question: *What explains the decision of the EU to observe or not observe elections around the world?*

In other words, does the EU randomly choose the elections it observes or does the choice of some elections over others illustrates a more interesting strategy on the part of the EU. Ultimately, answering this question will help us shed light on the broader question of why does the EU observe elections around the world.

## 1.4 General Implications and Value Added: Why Study European Union International Election Monitoring Policy?

With this dissertation, I contribute to the existing research on foreign policy in general and, more specifically, I further explain the factors shaping International Organizations' behavior in IEM. Indeed, this dissertation has important theoretical implications for the study of democracy promotion, the European Union, International Organizations more generally, and ultimately the broader international relations literature.

International election monitoring is an important part of democracy promotion policy in general. More specifically, EUEOMs are an interesting case to study because “they have to be seen in the context of EU’s foreign policy, particularly because the EU deploys EOMs in its own name, rather than leaving this work to nongovernmental organizations” as states usually do. (Meyer-Resende 2006, p.1) Consequently, they are a legitimate example of the EU’s foreign policy towards third countries.

Finally, the research presented in this dissertation adds value to existing theories and frameworks studying election observation. In fact, it is important to see the activity of International Election Monitoring as a two-stage process. First, the monitoring organization needs to decide what countries should be considered priority countries for election monitoring and then whether or not it should observe the election process. Second, there is the actual observation of the election process. A large part of the literature on IEM focuses on the second part of this process and studies the methods, results, and performance of monitoring organizations. (Hyde 2006, Kelley N.d.) My research focuses on the first stage of the IEM process in order to better understand this strategic behavior of International Organizations. In addition, EOMs are highly political and risky interventions on the part of IOs such as the

EU. EOMs in general and EUEOMs in particular are politically charged interventions and can carry important strategic consequences for the future of relations between the EU and the host countries. In fact, depending on the findings of a particular observation mission, the EU and its member states will have to follow-up in an appropriate manner which will consist in either sanctions or rewards and could potentially result in tensions or, alternatively, increased cooperation between the host country and the EU. In other words, a better understanding of the EU's external behavior in IEM will improve our understanding of the EU's foreign policy and its role as an international actor.

# Chapter 2

## Theoretical Background

### **2.1 Context: Why did the EU join the IEM bandwagon in the late 20th Century?**

In this project, I argue that the reason why the European Union joined the IEM bandwagon reflects the strategic and functional development of a common European foreign policy based on common principles and interests. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the EU was looking to develop its political integration, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. An opportunity presented itself with extremely visible elections which would push the EU's foreign policy in the spotlights: in 1993 and 1994, extremely salient elections were scheduled in Mozambique, Russia and South Africa. At the same time there seemed to be a consensus on the value of self-determination and EU leaders saw in IEM the opportunity to functionally develop its nascent foreign policy and to develop its soft power and increase the projection of its role on the international stage. In order to understand this new role undertaken by the EU, let's dive deeper in the context in which it happened.

### **2.1.1 Context: Brief history of IEM and the development of an EU position on IEM**

In order to understand why the EU decided to get involved in the area of international election monitoring in the early 1990s, we need to briefly lay out the history of IEM. The first reported case of international election monitoring was in 1857 in the European countries of Moldavia and Wallachia (now Romania). After World War II, there was a significant increase in the number of elections observed by international organizations (mainly the United Nations). However, because of the respect for the principle of state sovereignty, the UN observed elections only in non-sovereign territories and refused to get more involved in monitoring election in sovereign countries whether or not they requested its presence. After the end of the Cold War, IEM became a more regular occurrence with more organizations participating in this activity: Organization of American States, CSCE and OSCE as well as various NGOs such as the Carter Center, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute(...).

At the same time, some authors have showed that “in the early 1990s there was a broad debate on finding a balance -and resolving a conflict- between two norms: the principles of self determination, free expression and genuine and periodic elections which seemed to violate the established norm of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country.” (Flynn & Farrell 1999, Kelley 2008)

The development of IEM must be seen in the broader context of this debate. Kelley shows that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was intense discussion and debate at the United Nations, about the legitimacy of IEM and whether the UN should take a more active role in this area (Kelley 2008, p. 243). In 1991, the General Assembly voted on a series of draft resolutions regarding the respect of the previously mentioned principles of sovereignty and respect of human rights and self-determination. For the purpose of this

project, it is interesting to go further and look at the specific behavior of the European Union in this decision making process and look at the way EU members and future EU members positioned themselves in balancing these conflicting principles.

Table 2.1: EU Position in UN Debate on Sovereignty Vs. Protection of Human Rights.

Countries	Draft Resolution	Draft Resolution II
EU 12		
Belgium	In Favor	Against
France	In Favor	Against
Germany	In Favor	Against
Italy	In Favor	Against
Luxembourg	In Favor	Against
Netherlands	In Favor	Against
Denmark	In Favor	Against
Ireland	In Favor	Against
United Kingdom	In Favor	Against
Portugal	In Favor	Against
Spain	In Favor	Against
Greece	In Favor	Against
Future Members		
Austria	In Favor	Against
Finland	In Favor	Against
Sweden	In Favor	Against
Cyprus	In Favor	Against
Czechoslovakia	In Favor	Abstain
Estonia	Not a member	Not a member
Hungary	In Favor	Against
Latvia	Not a member	Not a member
Lithuania	Not a member	Not a member
Malta	In Favor	Abstain
Poland	In Favor	Against
Slovenia	Not a member	Not a Member
Bulgaria	In Favor	Against
Romania	In Favor	Against

(General Assembly 1991, Kelley 2008)

In her research, Kelley states that in the early 1990s, the EU Twelve (EU12) have stressed that “it is a moral obligation to intervene to protect and promote human rights, including the right to vote.” (Kelley 2008, p243) In order to understand the EU’s position on this

subject I researched the original UN discussions on this topic with the goal of identifying EU's 'common' position regarding election observation with respect to the norm of national sovereignty.

In 1991, the European Union (then EU 12) spoke with one voice to support the superiority of the principle of self-determination and democratic values relative to the principle of sovereignty. Table 2.1 shows the voting records of the EU 12 members and future member states. All of them supported (or abstained from voting on) the democratic principle against the principles of sovereignty and non intervention. However, at that point in time, it is interesting to note that the EU seemed to favor a stronger role for the United Nations as a supplier of IEM and wasn't considering taking a front stage role in this area of international affairs. Luxembourg presented a reply on July 13th 1991 which was in fact a joint response by the member states of the European Union: Figure 2.1 shows excerpts from a statement illustrating the development of a strong common position regarding the norm of free and fair elections and IEM more generally.<sup>1</sup>

Another explanation for the EU's new behavior in international politics in general and in IEM policy more specifically is that before 1993, the EU didn't see election monitoring as a way to further its strategic interests. More specifically, it can be argued that before the end of the Cold War and the 1990's Third Wave of democratizations, elections were not seen by big powers as being extremely salient to their strategic national interests. In the mid 1990's, elections became more salient and started to be considered strategic events on the international stage. The big powers, including the European Union, started to get interested in these events and saw in IEM a way to further their interests and to increase their soft power and visibility on the international stage. For instance, the EU's first election support missions were the observation of Russia's first multiparty elections and South Africa first

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<sup>1</sup>Then EU 12: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Greece.

Figure 2.1: EU statement illustrating its common position regarding the protection of human rights and election observation.

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“The Twelve endorse the right and the moral obligation of the international community to intervene for the protection and promotion of all human rights. They stress the prime importance of the right to vote and to be elected, at genuine periodic elections, for the full affirmation of human dignity and the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all individuals.”

“The Twelve reiterate their profound conviction that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms should not be construed by any person as interference in the internal affairs of a State.”

“The Twelve attach great importance to the principle of free and periodic elections as the expression of the right of people to self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as to article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and also article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which recognizes the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected, and to have access to public service in his country.”

“The principle of free and fair elections is applied, for example, in activities to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, as well as electoral assistance.”

“Numerous countries in Africa and other regions of the world which are moving towards democracy are seeking electoral assistance from the United Nations. In response to such requests for assistance, the Twelve have taken part in United Nations initiatives in this area in the past, for instance through the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva.”

“The Twelve are keenly aware of the important role of regional and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in the provision of electoral assistance. They would like to draw attention here to the initiatives taken by the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the Paris Summit held in November 1990, which included the establishment of a CSCE assistance centre at Warsaw. Other agencies within the United Nations system could also contribute to the efforts of the Centre for Human Rights for instance through United Nations resident representatives.”

“The Twelve believe that the task of electoral assistance merits not only increased support from all Member States, but also the strengthening of these activities by the Secretary General, in order that the many requests addressed to the different United Nations organs may be more effectively answered.”

“The Twelve wish to reiterate their adherence to the principles of electoral assistance, which embodies not only the letter, but also the spirit of our universal commitment in this area.”

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(General Assembly 1991, pp25-27)

post-apartheid elections. Both electoral events were highly scrutinized by the international community and offered the EU an opportunity to assert its growing role on the international stage.

Additionally, the development of an IEM policy by the EU in the mid-1990's coincides with an effort by EU leaders to further the political integration of the EU. Indeed, further political integration and the creation of a common foreign policy with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty might have given the EU the institutional back bone to act upon its developing common principles regarding the value of elections and democracy more generally. Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the pillar structure and dedicated one pillar (Pillar II) to its Common Foreign and Security Policy.<sup>2</sup>

Very rapidly, election support had become interpreted by decision makers to fall in the area of EU joint actions which signaled the strategic saliency election observation had gained in European foreign policy. The European Council, meeting in Brussels to discuss the implementation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty), concluded that :

“Common foreign and security policy is the framework which must enable the Union to fulfill the hopes born at the end of the Cold War and the new challenges generated by the upheavals on the international scene, with the resultant instability in area bordering the Union. The aim of the common foreign and security policy is to enable the Union to speak with a single voice and to act effectively in the service of its interests and those of the international community in general.”

(European Union 10/29/1993)

In addition,

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<sup>2</sup>Pillar I: European Communities; Pillar II: Common Foreign and Security Policy, including European Security and Defense Policy; Pillar III: Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.

“The CFSP will be developed gradually and pragmatically according to the importance of the interests common to all Member States; the European Council asks the Council as a matter of priority, to define the conditions and procedures for joint action to be undertaken in the following areas: (i) Promotion of stability and peace in Europe: Stability, reinforcement of the democratic process and development of regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. . . (ii) Middle East (iii) South Africa: Support for the transition towards multi-racial democracy in South Africa through a coordinated program of assistance in preparing for the elections and monitoring them, and through the creation of an appropriate cooperation framework to consolidate the economic and social foundations of this transition (iv) Former Yugoslavia (v) Russia: Support for the democratic process initiated in Russia; in accordance with the wishes of the Russian authorities, dispatch of a team of observers for the parliamentary elections on 12 December. This action will be coordinated with the European Parliament and the international organizations that will also be involved.” (European Union 10/29/1993)

## **2.2 Context: Background on the foreign policy decision making process**

### **2.2.1 The Study of European Foreign Policy**

Recent conceptualizations in the subfield of foreign policy analysis have focused on developing actor-specific theories and are therefore very useful to explain European Foreign Policy (EFP). Indeed, the development of European foreign policy, especially at the beginning of the 1990’s, has triggered a wave of research aimed at understanding why and how foreign policy which is traditionally the resort of nation states, can be developed at the suprana-

tional level of the European Union. In other words, scholars still wonder whether there is such a thing as a substantive foreign policy at the level of the EU similar to the foreign policies developed by nation states. Trying to explain this European challenge to foreign policy, the FPA literature provides us with an interesting theoretical framework applicable to the study of EFP. Indeed, it has been argued that instead of being a pure state centered approach, FPA's adaptability enables us to use it as an actor centered approach and apply it to the case of the EFP. It is interesting to apply this framework to the case of election observation. Indeed, over time, this policy has converged toward becoming a supranational policy with member states and intergovernmental institutions of the EU (i.e. the Council), in theory, retaining only limited power in the decision making process leading to sending monitoring missions to observe electoral processes in foreign countries.

The purpose of this chapter is not to review the literature on European foreign policy integration. However, it is important to briefly summarize the gist of it. Indeed, a lot has been written about the process of political integration in Europe, especially since Maastricht. Since the start, this process has experienced a lot of changes in order to evolve from the European Political Cooperation (EPC) introduced in the 1970s to the addition of a defense/security component with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). When one is asked to qualitatively evaluate the integration process, there seems to be two competing arguments as Musu summarizes very well (Musu 2003). The first argument states that we are witnessing "the edifice of CFSP, of the stratification of the instruments at its disposal, of the overcoming of old taboos with the introduction of the military dimension" and the development of an ever more integrated common foreign policy at the level of the EU (Musu 2003, p.35). The opposite argument, supported by intergovernmentalist scholars, "draws a different picture: that of the persistence of the primacy of national foreign interests, of their continuous struggle to keep foreign policy at a European level within the limits of national control." (Musu 2003,

## **2.2.2 International Election Monitoring (IEM) in the context of European Foreign Policy (EFP)**

A brief study of the EU's decision making in the foreign policy area of election observation shows support for the argument stating that we are witnessing deeper EU political integration in foreign affairs. Further, we can see that by modifying its decision making process in election observation matters in 2000, the EU has institutionalized the creation of some common interests in foreign affairs. Further, it was argued by EU officials that election observation missions have served "to reinforce other key EU foreign policy objectives, notably peace-building" and therefore cannot be ignored from an analysis of the EFP system (?).

Since 1993, there have been radical changes in the election observation policy of the EU. Originally, EU's election support in third countries, including election observation missions was conducted under both Pillar I and Pillar II frameworks, on an ad hoc basis. The political decision whether or no to support and electoral process by sending an election monitoring team was taken by Pillar II institutions and the financing decision was taken by either Pillar I or Pillar II institutions.

Following the adoption of the Council's Human Rights regulations 975/99 and 976/99 in 1999, the decision both to provide electoral assistance and to send EU observers must now be taken within the institutions of Pillar I, on the basis of the Commission's proposals. Therefore, we have observed a transfer of competence from mostly intergovernmental institutions (Pillar II) to mostly supranational institutions (Pillar I). One might argue that this illustrates the idea of a consolidation of a substantive common foreign policy at the supranational level, based on shared interests and values.

More specifically, because the EU's foreign policy is not yet completely integrated, different policy areas require the involvement of different actors which have different level of responsibility and power depending on the type of policy at hand. Since the publication of the European Commission's Communication on election assistance and observation -which recommended a way to implement the two regulations adopted in 1999 (975/99 and 976/99)- the three main European actors involved in the EUEOM decision making process have made considerable efforts in establishing advanced cooperation among themselves (European Commission 2000). It is now recognized that in the domain of election observation, the division of labor follows this model: "EUEOMs are led by Members of the EU Parliament, who act as chief observers, while Member States provide the long term and short term observers who take part in an EUEOM. The final decision on the composition of an EUEOM rests with the European Commission." (European Commission 2008, p.7)

I will now elaborate on the specific role of each major European institution involved in the decision making process leading to the creation of an EUEOM. In the area of democracy assistance in general and election monitoring in particular, the European Commission definitely takes a leadership role and "leads the programming and implementation of election observation activities." (European Commission 2008, p.9) The European Commission also has control over the European Community's budget and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). More specifically, "there are two election observation teams within the European Commission." (European Commission 2008, p.9) The Human Rights and Democratization Unit of the Directorate General for External Relations is in charge of the policy aspects of programming, implementation and follow-up of EUEOMs. In addition, the unit in charge of central management of thematic budget lines (such as EIDHR) in the Directorate General EuropeAid (AIDCO) is responsible for the practical implementation of the EUEOMs. The geographic desks of DG External Relations and DG

Development as well as the Delegations of the European Commission are included in the process when it is relevant.

In this area of supranational policy making, member states have, officially, a limited role. Unofficially, however, it seems that member states can lobby the Commissioner in charge to influence her decision according to their interests. However, in any case, the cooperation and involvement of the member states is crucial for the implementation of each mission. Indeed, because of “the political and diplomatic nature of election observation and to ensure EU policy coherence, the European Commission consults closely with EU Member States on the planning and implementation of election observation” and the Commission recognizes that “the role of the EU Member States is extremely important to the political follow-up of an EUEOM and the nomination of election observers.” (European Commission 2008, p.9) Indeed, depending on the EUEOM’s assessment of the electoral process in a third country, the EU and its member states will have the responsibility to follow up either by imposing sanctions in the case of failure to run free and fair elections, or rewarding and lifting previously imposed sanctions in the case of successful free and fair democratic electoral process.

The European Parliament also plays a role in election observation. In addition to deploying its own observation missions, EUEOMs are led by a chief observer who is always a member of the European Parliament, and the EP can also give feedback during the programming phase of EUEOMs. In addition, when both the European Commission and the European Parliament decide to send observation missions and although they are independent from one another, they do work together in the context of the Election Coordination Group (ECG) in order to coordinate their efforts. Even though the European Parliament can be involved in IEM, the Commission is always the engine of actions. Therefore, in theory, EUEOMs should really be understood as ECEOMs.

From 2000 onward, “the decision on whether or not to deploy an EUEOM [has been] made by the Commissioner for External Relations, who considers recommendations of an exploratory mission.” (European Commission 2008) This decision is the result of the following steps: identification of priority countries, exploratory mission, and decision to deploy an EUEOM, selection of a core team and observers and finally deployment of an EUEOM. Based on a rolling calendar of upcoming elections in the world, maintained by the DG External Relations, a list of ‘priority’ countries and countries ‘to be followed’ is established following the input of the relevant directorates in DG External Relations, DG Europe Aid, and DG Development as well as Council Working Groups and the Election Coordination Group of the European Parliament (European Commission 2008, p.92). The list of priority countries remains classified and is never set in stone. Some countries can be taken off the list while others can be added at any moment according to changes in EU priorities. Similarly, the EU can decide to observe elections in a ‘non-priority’ country. For example, in 2008, Ghana wasn’t considered to be a priority because of its relatively stable and democratic political system. However, in order to publicize a ‘success story’ the EU decided to observe the Ghana elections anyways. Indeed, the EU considers that Ghana has successfully transitioned to democracy and consequently graduated out of the IEM requirement to provide legitimacy to its government. In order to advertise that such ‘graduation’ is possible, the EU sometimes decide to observe elections in these successful countries as a way to inspire other transitioning democracies.<sup>3</sup>

Before the decision to deploy an EUEOM is made, an exploratory mission is sent to countries of interest in order to assess the situation and recommend whether or not it would be “useful, feasible, and advisable” to send an EUEOM (European Commission 2008, p.93). Exploratory missions have a symbolic value because they are a way to explicitly show an interest in a particular electoral process.

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<sup>3</sup>Interview with EU Commission (Election Desk) Official, Brussels, September 10, 2009

Finally, the Commissioner for External Relations, based on the findings of the exploratory report, will decide whether or not to send a mission. Sometimes, the decision maker follows recommendations of the exploratory team of experts. However, other times, often for ‘political’ and/or strategic reasons, the decision makers will disregard the findings of the exploratory mission.


Once the decision to deploy an EUEOM is made, it follows the implementation cycle showed in Figure 2.2. On average, implementing an EOM takes six months (European Commission AIDCO 2009, Action Fiche 11). An EUEOM is composed of 3 main elements: core team, long term observers (LTOs), and short term observers (STOs).

The core team is a group of 6 to 10 election observation experts and usually follows this format: chief observer, deputy chief observer, legal expert/election analyst, country expert, media expert/press officer, LTO coordinator, operations expert and security expert. This group is led by the chief observer who is usually a member of the European Parliament (MEP) who is appointed by the Commissioner for External Relations. The core team is deployed for an average a two months and its main role is to coordinate and manage LTOs and STOs.

Long Term Observers or LTOs are proposed by the member states to the Commission via the EC roster of election monitors. The European Commission deploys between 15 and 60 LTOs in the field for approximately 2 months. Their role is to follow the electoral process at the regional level in advance of the election and to coordinate STOs closer to Election Day.

Short Term Observers or STOs are also proposed by member states to the Commission via the EC roster of election monitors. The EC deploys, on average, between 80 and 200 observers around 10 days over the election period (5 days before and 5 days after Election Day) to observe voting, counting and tabulation of results. Occasionally, they can be joined by Members of the European Parliament or locally recruited observers (Torcoli 2008).

Figure 2.2: EUEOM Implementation Cycle (Torcoli 2008, p.13)



Usually the European Commissions deploys from 8 to 14 EOMs per year. The average annual cost of such activities has increased over time from €13 million in 2004 to €32 million in 2009.(Torcoli 2008)(European Commission AIDCO 2009, Annex 11) Data shows that the cost for one EOM can range from €1.5 million to €6million depending on the logistics of the mission (size of the population and country, number of polling stations, number of observers needed, logistics ...). Table 2.2 shows a total budget of €2.5 million for a standard EOM with an average of 120 observers for one round.

More concretely, on October 5, 2009, the EU announced the deployment of an EOM to observe the Presidential, National and Provincial assemblies elections of October 28 in Mozambique (European Union 5 October 2009). This mission was led by MEP Fiona Hall and was composed of a core team of 7 experts, 24 LTOs and 72 STOs. The EU allocated a budget of €3.5 million from the EIDHR fund for this particular EOM.

Table 2.2: Budget for standard EUEOM.

Core Team Fees and Allowances	€200,000
Observers Per Diem and Allowances	€350,000
Air Tickets	€250,000
Local Transports	€550,000
Equipments	€250,000
Offices, Local Staff, Other Direct Costs	€650,000
Overheads and Contingencies	€250,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>€2,500,000</b>
(European Commission AIDCO 2009, Annex 11)	

At this point, it is important to note that there has been a division of labor between the OSCE and the EU in the area of international election monitoring. Indeed, even though the EU’s legislation doesn’t exclude its institutions from observing elections in the OSCE region, there is a ‘gentleman agreement’ between the EU and the OSCE granting the latter ‘exclusivity’ to observe elections in OECD countries. According to an EU official<sup>4</sup> there are

<sup>4</sup>Meeting I conducted with an EU official in Brussels on September 10, 2009

several reasons for such a division of labor. First of all, there is a practical reason: the EU and the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) use the same pool of observers and officials on both sides recognize that it would be hard to deploy two equally capable observer teams using the same recruiting pool of candidate. Ultimately, if the EU and OSCE/ODIHR were to compete for observers, the quality of the monitoring by one or both teams would suffer. Second, there is a political reason: in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, OSCE countries agreed to systematic observation of their own elections, giving the OSCE and ODIHR a de facto standing invitation to observe elections in OSCE member states (OSCE 1990). Indeed, leaders came to the conclusion that if the EU and OSCE were to observe the same election (in the OSCE region), each organization could potentially reach a different assessment of the electoral process in which case the host country could use this discrepancy as a mean to discredit the legitimacy and fairness of the monitoring organizations. As a consequence, the EU consistently refuses to observe elections in OSCE countries and always supports OSCE decision to observe or not a given election. Alternatively, it might be better for the EU , in order to assert its influence, to make sure that it goes where it has a comparative advantage and where it won't compete for credibility against other monitoring organizations such as the ODIHR.

For example, the Central Election Commission of Moldova invited both ODIHR and the European Commission to observe its April 5, 2009 Parliamentary elections. ODIHR sent 200 observers to Moldova and the EC declined to monitor. Similarly, the EU and the European Commission have backed up ODIHR in its ongoing dispute with Russia over election observation. In February 2008, the OSCE canceled its plan to deploy an ODIHR election monitoring team to observe the March 2nd Presidential elections. ODIHR claimed that Russian officials were making it difficult for ODIHR to meaningfully observe elections (restricted access, short time tables, limiting the number of observer accreditations ...). In a statement, the EU Presidency expressed “its full support to the election activities of the

ODIHR” and acknowledged that ODIHR “was put in a situation where it found it impossible to execute its mandate and cancelled the election observation mission.”(EU Presidency 2008)

## **2.3 Theoretical Backdrop: review of the relevant literature**

### **2.3.1 The EU’s Projection of Its Role**

The theoretical framework developed in this dissertation rests on the study of the EU’s projection of its role in the international system.

A significant portion of the scholarly literature on the EU is dedicated to the question of the “foreign policy of the EU and the role this actor, which is less than a state and more than an international organization, can and does play in international relations.” (Sjursen 2006, p.170) Indeed, the increasingly important part the EU is playing in trade, humanitarian assistance, development aid, and to some extent defense, makes it “difficult to neglect the EU’s international role” and push scholars to ask what exactly are the characteristics of the European Union Foreign Policy (Sjursen 2006, p.169).

The literature is filled with debates related to the question of whether the EU is a normative or a military power and even though, “the idea of being civilian, military, and civilizing at the same time is undoubtedly very seductive” to academics, it seems that the discussion is far from being settled (Manners 2006, p.182).

Some argue that “militarizing the EU does not implicitly increase its power in the interstate politics, and (...) is increasingly risking its normative power.”(Manners 2006, p.193) Others, in the neorealist perspective argue that “EU external policy co-operation constitutes a collective attempt at milieu shaping.”(Wolfers 1965, Hyde-Price 2006, p.222) Indeed, “member states explicitly see the EU as a ‘force for good’ in the world, committed to further-

ing shared European political values such as democracy, multilateralism and human rights.” (Hyde-Price 2006, p.223) The catch here is that when it comes to second-order goals, if they ever go against the self interests of the EU or of its most powerful member states, they will be sacrificed. In other words, it is argued that “the EU serves as an instrument of collective hegemony, shaping its external milieu through using power in a variety of forms: political partnership, or ostracism; economic carrots and stick (...) the EU acts as a civilizing power only in the sense that it is used by its most powerful member states to impose their common values and norms” on other countries (Hyde-Price 2006, p.227). Others, attempt to describe the EU as a strategic actor “seeking to position itself as a global player with a broad spectrum of civilian and military capabilities.” (Aggestam 2008*b*, p.1) In this view, the EU is portrayed as an “ethical power” with an emphasis on “the growing strategic role the EU wants to play in the world” and moves the debate on EU foreign policy beyond the concepts of civilian and normative power (Aggestam 2008*b*, p.2). The thesis I present in this dissertation adheres to the latter research agenda on european foreign policy by arguing that the EU’s power depends on its position as a global player on the international stage (Aggestam 2008*b*).

This dissertation fits right within the debate over what type of international actor the European Union is. Indeed, I am interested in assessing the factors shaping the EU’s IEM policy and in doing so, I am asking whether or not the EU is motivated by furthering its position as a strategic international power player or, if the EU is still working on developing its internal development and find a common ground on which to develop a consistent foreign policy, or alternatively, if the EU is only an altruistic ‘power for good’ . With this project I am interested in contributing to this debate about what is the role of the EU in international politics.

### 2.3.2 Foreign Aid

A very important research question in the foreign aid literature is “why would [governments] provide their own scarce public concessional resources to promote, among other things, the well-being of people in other countries?” (Lancaster 2007, p.3) In other words, one can wonder if there is such a thing as international altruism (van der Veen manuscript) in the foreign policy area of foreign aid and election monitoring. Further, are organizations completely disinterested in their delivery of foreign aid?

The international relations literature offers different explanations for why countries and/or organizations decide to “donate” foreign aid. Each explanation is heavily influenced by the main Schools of thought dominating the International Relations literature. In a nutshell, realist scholars argue that states are motivated principally by power, security and survival and will therefore use foreign aid as an instrument to gain more power on the international stage. On the other end of the theoretical spectrum, traditional liberal and liberal internationalists argue that states will tend to cooperate in order to achieve a more efficient resolution of their problems. They see foreign aid as an example of state cooperating in order to solve the problems of underdevelopment and poverty. Moreover, liberal institutionalists argue that foreign aid will be most efficiently managed if states cooperate through a formal international organization as such cooperation will ultimately minimize operational costs of delivering foreign aid. Finally, constructivists in international relations see foreign aid as a norm of international behavior which states that “rich countries should provide assistance to poor countries to help the latter better the quality of lives of other people.” (Lancaster 2007, p.4)

In her 2007 comprehensive study of foreign aid, Carol Lancaster reviews the different motivations and purposes of foreign aid. She finds that foreign aid has mostly been used for four main purposes: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, commercial and to some extent cultural reasons. Later on, mostly after the end of the Cold War, other motives

were raised: “promoting democracy, supporting economic and social transitions, addressing global problems, and preventing and mitigating conflict.”(Lancaster 2007, p5-6)

What is the relationship between democracy assistance in general, election monitoring in particular, and foreign aid? Or, in other words, how can the foreign aid literature inform our understanding of IEM? Some argue that democracy assistance is a distinct form of foreign aid and is different from traditional democracy promotion which uses more rhetorical and diplomatic tools to promote the idea of democracy (Bjornlund 2004, p.13). Because IEM is a specific form of foreign aid, the literature on the factors shaping foreign aid provides us with significant theoretical insights about the potential motivations behind IEM. Indeed, factors such as economic considerations, prevention and/or resolution of conflict, diplomatic considerations, humanitarian considerations, that were found important to explain foreign aid are expected to be significant factors of IEM as well.

### **2.3.3 Peacekeeping**

Very much like peacekeeping operations, EOMs are third party interventions in the internal affairs of a sovereign country and have a democratic and humanitarian appeal. Thus, a brief mention of the peacekeeping literature can enlighten our discussion of EOMs.

Similarly to the historical evolution of EOMs, third party peacekeeping missions have increased in number since the end of the Cold War. In the past decade, the frequency and number of peacekeeping operations have increased and missions are becoming more complex and are mostly deployed in states experiencing civil wars (Mullenbach 2004, pp.529-530). In an attempt to explain the motivations behind states’ contributions to peacekeeping mission, scholars have found that states are mainly motivated by self-interest. Indeed, “in much of the peacekeeping literature, financial and material support for peace operations is attributed to the interests and capabilities of the participants.”(Lebovic 2004, p.911) More specifically, building on the democratic peace research program, Mullenbach found that democracies

have the most interest for participating in peacekeeping operations since they can pursue the liberal objectives associated to peacekeeping without going against their self interests which usually include peace, security and economic development (Lebovic 2004, p.912).

Similarly to the question asked in this research project, peacekeeping scholars have worked on answering the question of where do peacekeepers go and what is determining such a decision. Many potential explanations have been presented in the literature. We will present the most important ones now. Mullenbach offers a brief overview of the international-level explanations for peacekeeping in intrastate disputes with explanatory factors such as: military alliances with states experiencing conflicts; power status of the host state; previous military involvement of major state in target country; involvement of international organizations and regional organization; existence of a non-intervention norm in the international system; existence of a territorial integrity norm in the international system.(Mullenbach 2004) This literature presents many different accounts of the determinants of peacekeeping.

Interests, broadly defined, are the most recurrent category used to explain the decision to deploy peacekeepers. Jacobsen investigates the realist argument that “national interests defined in strategic, economic and ideological terms have always been regarded as the principal determinants of decisions to intervene.”(Jacobsen 1996, p.206) There are many variations of the same argument in the literature with some scholars arguing that peacekeepers are deployed in countries that are of specific strategic interest to the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) (Neack 1995, Oudraat 1996). In the same orientation, it has been argued that imperialistic interests or the opportunity to secure access to primary commodities can be a motivating factor in the decision to send peacekeepers in the field (Oudraat 1996, Gibbs 1997). In the democratic peace tradition, it is argued that Great powers see an interest in deploying peacekeeping as a tool to promote democracy in regions of the world where democratic countries are lacking or in difficulty (Andersson 2000).

Another potential criterion for intervention is whether or not the intervention would be considered legitimate by the international community. In other words, is there a clear legal and/or humanitarian case for authorizing a peacekeeping mission? In assessing this question, Jacobsen finds evidence that peacekeeping can be motivated either by concern about consequences of unambiguous interstate aggression or by humanitarian sentiment (Jacobsen 1996).

Domestic support is also an important factor in the decision to deploy peacekeeping mission. Indeed it is important to consider whether the peacekeeping organization or contributing states are acting in accordance or against the majority opinion of their member states and/or their member states' constituencies. It has been argued that since the end of the Cold War, fewer situations are seen to be of direct threat to the security and integrity of a country, therefore intervention is more and more seen as a choice rather than an obligation (Jacobsen 1996, p.206).

Since the fiascoes of Somalia and Rwanda in 1993-1994, a significant effort has been made to explore the role the media is playing in determining peacekeeping operations in civil wars. Indeed, it has been argued that the "so-called CNN effect has forced Western Governments to intervene after the Cold War."(Jacobsen 1996, p.206) Gowing explains the causal chain of the CNN effect as follows: "television images of atrocities; journalists and opinion leaders criticize government policy in the media (TV, radio, newspapers); the pressure on the government 'to do something' becomes unbearable; the government 'does something.'"(Jacobsen 1996)

Finally, considerations of feasibility remains an important criterion in the decision to deploy a peace-keeping mission. The fifth question focuses on the concept of feasibility. It is then argued that a government or an organization is very unlikely to intervene if the chance of success is not perceived as good (Jacobsen 1996, p.206).

The questions of where do peacekeepers go and what factors shape the peacekeeping organizations' decision to deploy mission in the field are very relevant to the research question tackled in this research project. Indeed, peacekeeping operations are comparable to EOMs

in the sense that they both answer a demand from a third country and they are both forms of foreign activity on the territory of a sovereign country. Therefore, factors such as strategic, economic or ideological interests, international legitimacy, domestic support, and media coverage that significantly shape peacekeeping operations are expected to have a similar influence in shaping IEM policy. Further, one of the main problem in the literature on the determinants of peacekeeping is the tendency to lump every interest together which in the end tends to obscure the analysis. Scholars justly argue that “it makes a great deal of difference whether the interest we are talking about is a security or trade interest as opposed to a humanitarian interest.”(Gilligan & Stedman 2003, p.39) By association, research on the determinants of IEM can face a similar tendency. Acknowledging this theoretical challenge, one of the goal of this research project is to develop a theoretical frame of analysis that allow us to identify and isolate those different clusters of interests shaping IEM policy.

### **2.3.4 The Supply and Demand of International Election Monitoring**

Even though this research project focuses on understanding the supply side of International Election Monitoring (IEM), it is important to review the demand side of what is sometimes called an international election monitoring market. The literature on the demand of IEM asks the very interesting question of why do sovereign countries invite and/or accept the deployment of international elections monitors. Indeed, the puzzle is often obvious in cases when election officials invite observers while at the same time cheating during the election process. Judith Kelley asks the following question: “given that they could simply refuse access, what countries nevertheless invite monitors”?(Kelley N.d., p.2) She argues that international monitoring can be viewed as an example of a ‘traditional’ market because monitoring can only happen when the supply meets a demand. Indeed, monitoring is impossible if there is

no supply (i.e. no observer) or when there is no demand (i.e. when government categorically refuse the presence of observers on their territory). In the case of the international election monitoring market, it is critical that both supply and demand coincide.

Now, what does motivate each side of this peculiar market? Let's start with the more developed literature on the demand for IEM. The first indirect explanations for the emergence of a systematic demand for election monitoring can be found in the commitment and compliance literature. In an attempt to understand why countries decided to voluntarily commit to constraining international legal agreements, Beth Simmons argues that "reputational concerns explain patterns of compliance."(Simmons 2000, p.819) In other words, states bind themselves to a certain course of action (i.e. policy, agreement, treaty) in order to signal a credible commitment. Once committed to this agreement, the costs of violating this commitment are much higher and can be measured in the form of reputational costs. Based on this theory of commitment and compliance, a similar argument was made to more directly explain the demand for election monitoring. For example, Susan Hyde argues that "election observation began as a signal to the international community that the incumbent leader was committed to democratizing."(Hyde 2006) Therefore, just the fact of inviting observers is a way for government to signal their commitment to the democratic process. However, how credible this signal is, will depend on whether or not governments actually comply with the democratic process (i.e. organize free and fair elections). Therefore, the quest for legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, is the main explanation for the demand of election monitoring by sovereign countries. Indeed, Kelley argues that "the search for legitimacy has driven the spread of international election monitoring."(Kelley N.d., p.6) Internationally, governments are inviting international monitors because it has become "a prerequisite for loosening the purse-strings of donor governments."(Kelley N.d., p.7) Therefore, Hyde found that elections were more likely to be observed by international monitors in regions receiving high levels of foreign aid (Hyde 2008). Inviting or allowing international

observers, governments are also looking to legitimize themselves in the eyes of their domestic constituents because “an endorsement by international monitors helps convince citizens that the domestic institutions are reliable and deserve respect.”(Kelley N.d., p.8)

The literature on the supply of IEM is more descriptive and under-theorized than its counterpart. However, Kelley argues that the supply is motivated by monitoring agencies’ desire “to provide information about elections and to improve their quality.” She further argues that the demand is “driven by the desire of governments to obtain domestic and international legitimacy.”(Kelley N.d., p.2) On the one hand, in her research, Kelley aggregates all monitoring agencies and, I think, provides an interesting explanation of why organizations supply election monitoring to other countries. However, in this dissertation, I argue that International Governmental Organizations are monitoring elections not only to obtain information and improve the quality of elections processes around the world but also to improve their own situations (i.e. position on the international stage, relationship with host country . . .). In other words, I think that the analysis of the supply side of the international election monitoring market needs to be more fine-tuned. This project will build on the scarce but existing literature on the supply of IEM in order to develop a theory of the determinants of International Organizations IEM policy.

# Chapter 3

## Theoretical Framework

### 3.1 Why does the EU observe elections around the world?

In this dissertation, the central question I ask is why the EU chooses to send election observers to some transitional democracies but not others. The theoretical approach I develop here proposes that, beyond simply promoting democracy, election monitoring is a foreign policy instrument that the EU can use to further its own interests. More specifically, this approach contrasts three different explanation for the EU's external actions in the area of election observation: external influence, internal cohesion, and cosmopolitanism (i.e. international altruism).

In other words, my objective is to explain the motivations behind the European Union's (EU) decision to act outside of its borders to support electoral processes in transitional and non established democracies. Understanding the motives and considerations that are important and influential and this specific decision making process will shed light on the broader question of why does the EU observe elections abroad.

In the field of election monitoring, academics, policy makers and practitioners alike are

involved in a constant debate over the question of the rationale behind such activity. The major international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations have agreed, at least on paper, that the rationale behind international election observation should be based on the needs of the countries holding elections (?). In other words, it is recognized that election monitoring is, or at the very least should be, benefiting the recipients –i.e. the countries holding elections and inviting observation missions. That being said, the very same international actors involved in election observation acknowledge that such activity should also benefit the international community itself. Finding a balance between the interests of the observing organizations or states and the need of the countries hosting the observation is, as a consequence, a challenging tasks for all the actors involved.

On the other side of the spectrum, academics such as Judith Kelley and Susan Hyde have found that even though practitioners believe that election monitoring can improve the democratic process, it is not always the case and often, election monitors fail at deterring fraud and/or providing constructive criticisms in order to improve the process in the future.

Ultimately, I think that we are still left with the question of why the European Union observes elections –especially if such an activity does not prove to be efficient. Indeed, if international election observation is not always efficient, then why does the EU bother spending the time and resources organizing election observation missions? In this dissertation, I assess the validity of both the ‘donor interest’ and the ‘recipient need’ models as explanation for EU’s international election monitoring policy.

## **3.2 Self Interest Vs. Altruism?**

To reiterate, I propose that, beyond simply promoting democracy as an altruistic endeavor, election monitoring is a foreign policy instrument that the EU can use to further its self interests. More specifically, I contrast three different explanations for the EU’s action in in-

ternational election monitoring: external influence, internal cohesion, and cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, the EU can use election monitoring in order to improve its international role and international standing. On the other hand, the EU could have the objective of improving internal cohesion around a deeper and more effective political integration in the foreign policy realm. Finally, the EU could be involved in international election observation out of altruistic concerns. More specifically I propose that strategic interests based on security, economic and soft power considerations are alone sufficient to motivate the EU to intervene and will help the EU improve its external influence. However, in the absence of such interests, internal cohesion and altruistic considerations can jointly push the EU to intervene while making a case for deeper and more efficient political integration in European external affairs.

The broader theoretical approach developed in this dissertation contends that the EU in fact uses its International Election Monitoring (IEM) policy as a tool to further its own interests. More specifically, I claim that by doing so, the EU aims at two different objectives: one external, the other internal. In other words, I argue that the EU uses election observation not only to promote democracy but as an instrument of its foreign policy.

Olsen explains the two different objectives very well:

“First the promotion of democracy abroad was conceived as one among a number of instruments promoting European security in the post-cold war. Secondly, promotion of democracy internationally contributed to the higher profile in world affairs that Europe had sought since 1958. And thirdly, this international profile might have pushed the integration process forward within Europe.” (Olsen 2000, p.142)

This tension between external influence and internal integration/cohesion is not new for the EU. Indeed, “ever since the start of the European Community (EC), there has been an ambition of developing ‘Europe’ into a significant foreign policy actor. This endeavor existed

next to or parallel to the much better known efforts to promote European integration.” (Olsen 2000, p.142) Most importantly, “the end of the Cold War changed the security framework of Europe in fundamental ways, as new and ‘softer’ security issues moved to the top of the foreign and security policy agenda of the Community instead of the former military threats.”(Olsen 2000, p.143) As a direct consequence of the end of the Cold War, the EU has started to inter-link economic, political and security issues in its policy making.

Starting in the 1990s, it became obvious that it was advantageous for the EU to tie “the idea of promoting democracy as a foreign policy issue.” (Olsen 2000, p.143) Indeed, it can be argued that the EU has an obvious comparative advantage using democracy promotion as a foreign policy instrument.

### **3.2.1 Self Interest: International Role**

As stated before, we can argue that the EU uses election observation as a foreign policy instrument with the goal of enhancing its own external role and influence on the international stage. Indeed, the EU always had the ambition of becoming a legitimate international actor, recognized and respected by other actors present on the international stage. With democracy promotion and election monitoring, the EU has a comparative advantage to use democracy promotion as a foreign policy issue: “‘democracy’ and economic assistance were probably the most effective civilian means that the EC/EU had at its disposal to promote global stability and thereby enhance European security.” (Olsen 2000, p.143)

This approach is particularly interesting because the literature on the EU traditionally sees the EU as this idealist, often benevolent agent, who acts to “help people [or states] who need it no matter what (...) in the interest of all humanity.”(Goldsmith 2003, p.1668) However, in this dissertation, I argue that the EU could and should be considered as a realist actor; an actor motivated by its own well being and international standing and not necessarily concerned with the ones of other international actors. Considering the current

global economic recession and the economic problems the EU is currently facing, I argue that it is important to investigate whether the EU has a future in the global system as an entity that would be more than an economic superpower with currency issues.

More specifically, I argue that election observation shows that “the EU is seeking to position itself as a global player with a broad spectrum of (...) capabilities.”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.1) In other words, the EU is pursuing an external strategy aimed at positioning itself in the broader international system by increasing its systemic role in this area of foreign policy. Ultimately, I argue that the EU’s intentions are to position itself as an actor capable of intervening abroad in order to stabilize countries and regions in difficulty, strengthen trade partnerships, and, in the end, increase its influence on third countries. If such an argument is true, it would have important implications on our understanding of the EU as a global actor. Indeed, it would show that by acting first and foremost for its own benefits, the EU might not be as benevolent an actor as many politicians and academics alike have been arguing for decades. Furthermore, it would show that, in a world where democracy is an important rationale for external action, the EU might have the tools and more importantly, the comparative advantage in the usage of this specific tool of foreign policy to pursue its own interests. In a nutshell, the EU would be considered as a macro-state with expanding power. Such an argument also highlights the value of soft power as a tool of foreign policy and the need for “the debate on EU’s international role (...) to move beyond the concepts of civilian and normative power.”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.2) Further, I concur with Aggestam when she writes that “the EU increasingly seeks to exercise power proactively by becoming a global player on the international arena.”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.3) Such an endeavor in turn “make[s] the EU more ‘capable’ in order to engage in conflict prevention around the world.”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.3)

At a time when the EU’s economic power on the world stage is questioned, it might be time for the EU to explore other avenues for developing its international standing. If this

argument is verified, democracy assistance in general and international election observation in particular might be politically beneficial areas of expansion. If the EU is using IEM with the goal of advancing its external position in the international system, we should expect the following motivations to be significant in explaining the EU's election monitoring policy: international security, economic partnership, soft-power gains, and information gathering.

### **3.2.2 Self Interest: Internal Cohesion**

More traditionally, the EU can use election monitoring as an instrument of its foreign policy with the objective of internal cohesion and deepening its political integration in external affairs. Indeed,

“the positive attitudes towards democracy in Western Europe could definitely contribute to create and strengthen popular support to the ambitious goal of having a common foreign and security policy, if promotion of such values were conspicuous and integrated elements of the CFSP. So, the promotion of democracy as a prominent theme in foreign policy of the EC/EU could contribute in creating a ‘European’ identity and thus further the European integration process.” (Olsen 2000, p.144)

Therefore, inspired by the neo-functionalist framework fathered by Ernest Haas in 1958 in *The Uniting of Europe* and pursued by many other scholars, an argument can be made that the EU's international election monitoring policy fits into its overall incremental integration strategy (Haas 1958). Along with many others, Moravcsik frames the context of European integration very well: “over the past half century, the EU has evolved until its policies and institutions are of a scope and significance without parallel among international organizations.”(Moravcsik 2005, p.349) It is therefore interesting to understand how such integration took place. With integration processes such as function and political spillovers, the

EU became, over time, more and more integrated (Haas 1958, Moravcsik 2005). In matters of foreign policy, since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EU has expanded its jurisdiction into more ‘sovereign’ policies of external and internal security. However, such expansion in level hasn’t necessarily been followed with an expansion in scope as justice and home affairs have moved to the supranational Pillar I Institutions when the Common Foreign and Security Policy has, overall, remained under the more intergovernmental Pillar II Institutions. That being said, in the matter of democracy assistance in general and election observation in particular, we have observed an expansion in scope of the EU supranational institution since the turn of the century. In this context, it is interesting to argue that the EU’s election observation policy is, in fact, internally motivated. Indeed, according to neo-functionalism, the decision-making actor, the European Commission, is interested in EOMs because it may increase power at the level of the EU community relative to the level of the member states. In this instance, the EC can make the case that some aspects of the EU’s external action is better managed at the supranational level and could lead to a functional spillover to other areas of European foreign policy. Therefore, IEM policy would be used by the EU in an effort to increase member states cohesion around a common foreign policy. As such, the EU would decide to act in cases that are relatively non-controversial and functionally practical and convenient for its institutional integration. Thus, the EU should find advantageous to observe ‘easy’ elections in order to build internal confidence in its potential as a foreign policy actor within this functional area of foreign policy. If the EU is using IEM as a way to further its internal development, we should expect the following considerations to be more important: normative, feasibility, and to some extent the internal politics of the EU.

### **3.2.3 International Altruism**

A third potential explanation for EU’s involvement in international election monitoring can be found in the concept of international altruism. According to this theory, the EU observes

elections in third countries to help them democratize successfully. In other words, it is argued that

“European foreign policy goals are driven by an honest concern for the well-being of others in an altruistic sense. From this standpoint, the EU would be an ‘ethical power’ because it employs its power for the good of others (...)”(Aggestam 2008*b*, p.8)

If this explanation is right, we expect the EU to respond to EOM requests where the need is highest, regardless of interest. Empirically, this argument is a challenging one to assess because we often face ‘win-win’ situations which benefit both the donor and the recipient; and shows signs of both self-interested and altruistic behavior. In such cases, isolating donor interest from altruistic concerns is very difficult.

### **3.3 The Motivations for EUEOMs**

In this dissertation, I identify the motivations leading the EU to deploy an Election Observation Mission in transitional and non-established democracies. Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 both illustrates the different motivations hypothesized to have a significant influence on the EU’s decision to deploy an election observation mission. In order to understand the decision making process behind such a decision, it is important to assess each condition independently (Figure 3.1) and in interaction with each others (Table 3.1).

In September of 2009 I was able to meet with an European Commission official in Brussels to discuss EU’s election observation activities.<sup>1</sup> Part of our conversation was on the potential motives for the EU to intervene in electoral processes as an observer organization. At that point, the European Commission was in the midst of observing the electoral process in

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<sup>1</sup>This trip was made possible with the help of the Dean’s Award for Social Science Research from the UGA Graduate School

Afghanistan: in fact, we met between the August 21st first round and the November 7th runoff.

The official I met with used the case of Afghanistan to highlight which considerations had been important in the EU’s decision to get involved in the observation of this election. An exploratory mission conducted during the spring of 2009 had found that, based on objective criteria approved by the EU Commission, it wouldn’t be safe nor feasible or normatively advisable to take part in such an operation. Therefore, the mission of experts had recommended to the Commissioner not to observe the 2009 election cycle in Afghanistan. That being said, the official continued, the Commissioner decided against the exploratory mission’s finding and approved an EUEOM for Afghanistan. In this case, according to the EC official, strategic considerations took prevalence against feasibility and normative considerations. With this case in mind, I wondered whether this was an isolated case or if it reflected standard decision making practices on the part of the EU.

Table 3.1: Expected outcomes based on different conditions combinations

International Role	Internal Cohesion	Altruism	Outcome
No	No	No	No
Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No
No	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Next, I will focus on each of the three potential explanations for this European external activity and define the theoretically significant clusters of motivations influencing the EU’s decision to observe elections. First, I explain the EU’s external strategy of election observation and the motivations influencing it. Second, I emphasize EU’s internal motivations for observing elections abroad. Finally, I highlight the potential for altruistic concerns motivating the deployment of EOMs abroad.

Figure 3.1: Possible Explanations for EU International Election Monitoring




figure1.jpg

In order to assess the validity of each of these arguments, I identified several clusters of considerations which can motivate the EU to participate in international election monitoring.

### **3.3.1 Theory 1– Self Interest: International Role**

In this dissertation, I argue that the EU is actually motivated by strategic considerations when deciding whether or not to observe elections in foreign countries. More specifically, I propose that this is an illustration of a broader foreign policy strategy aimed at strengthening the EU's place in world politics. In other words I claim that election monitoring is an example of a more complex external strategy. Ultimately, the EU's goal to position itself in world affairs by increasing its role as a legitimate actor on the international stage. The claim presented in this section contends that the EU's intentions are to position itself as an actor that would be able to intervene all over the world, in countries and regions in difficulty or in need of stabilizing, to strengthen trade partnerships, and increase its influence in said countries and/or regions. Very much like the United States has had a claim on world hegemony for decades, I argue that the EU, with its foreign policy in general and election observation in particular, is trying to claim ownership of part of this world leadership power.

As stated before, if such a claim is verified, it would change the way the EU is described and perceived as a global actor. An important aspect of the theoretical argument presented in this dissertation is that in the relationship between donors and recipient, the role of the beneficiary can be moved from the recipient back to the donor. Indeed, in any traditional foreign aid relationship, one can identify the donor, usually a developed government, and on the other side of the relationship, the recipient, usually an underdeveloped or developing government. Now, traditionally, or at least according to what the philosophy behind foreign aid would claim, the recipient should be the beneficiary of this transaction (? , p.39). Therefore, much of the literature on foreign aid (development assistance and such) focus on the recipient as the beneficiary of foreign aid from developed governments. Even though this is

often true, and in some instances, recipient of foreign aid do benefit from it, it is not always the case and even if it is, it happens that the recipient of foreign aid is in fact not the only beneficiary. Indeed, this dissertation claims that such pretended altruistic policies such as foreign aid, democracy assistance, and election monitoring are in fact part of a strategically comprehensive foreign policy which makes the donor the actual final beneficiary of these policies and activities. Therefore, showing that by acting first and foremost for its own benefits, the EU might not be the traditionally benevolent actor many have characterized it to be. More importantly, it emphasizes the idea that, in a world where democracy is an important rationale for intervention and a legitimate foreign policy goal, the EU might have the tools and further, a strong comparative advantage in using this specific tool of foreign policy for its own benefit.

Such an argument also highlights the EU's cosmopolitanism as it projects its ideas on other countries via soft power methods and the language of democracy. At a time when the EU's economic power on the world stage can be questioned, it might be time for the EU to explore other avenues for developing its international standing and for other actors to be convinced that the EU can do its part.

In this dissertation, I argue that the EU's external strategy is built around three different external motivations: international security, international political economy (trade and aid), and soft power. All three are legitimate motivations for the EU to send election observation mission in democratizing countries. In addition, I claim that these motivations are consistent with a strategy of advancing the EU's external position in the international system.

Therefore, if the EU is in fact following such a strategy, we should expect the following motivations to be significant in the decision making process of the EU regarding election observation: potential for international security, potential for economic partnership and potential for soft-power gains.

## **International Security: Peace and Democracy**

Again, the argument I present here states that the EU is interested in improving its soft power on third countries as well as developing a reputation as an advocate for democracy and human rights. Observing a country's electoral process increases the visibility of the EU both within that country as well as globally and ultimately increases its credibility and potential influence on the target country's population and leadership and/or government. Indeed, democracy assistance programs in general and election observation missions more specifically have been seen "to contribute to the strengthening of democratic structures and promotion of cross-cultural cooperation" based on democratic principles and values and can ultimately lead to a more stable system and consequently increase Europe's own security (Olsen 2000, p.149).

More specifically, while attempting to formulate an EU external strategy, the EU has consistently been linking peace, security, and democracy together. Indeed, Olsen argues, for example that:

"For Europe, there were a number of advantages tied to the idea of promoting democracy as a foreign policy issue(...) 'Democracy' and economic assistance were probably the most effective civilian means that the EC/EU had at its disposal to promote global security and thereby enhance European security."  
(Olsen 2000, p.143)

Indeed, the EU's democracy promotion policy is largely based on the liberal peace principle which states that increasing the number of democracies in the international system will reduce the number of potential conflicts and therefore improve the security of the European Union. Further, because international peace and stability are public goods, it would be in the EU's "indirect or enlightened self-interest" to promote them (van der Veen manuscript, p.45). An improvement in international or regional peace and stability would benefit most

actors in the international system. As a consequence, actors face a collective action dilemma when it comes to providing peace and stability: they want the benefit of peace and stability without having to pay the costs of securing it. In other words, it is not necessarily in any international actor's self-interest to provide these public goods. However, because there are some tremendous benefits to having access to public goods such as peace and security, some actors will find that it is in their "enlightened self-interests" to pursue them (van der Veen manuscript, p.11). Consistently with the EU Security Strategy, (EU Council 2003*b*) I argue that the EU sees peace and stability in the international system in general, and regions of interest in particular, as being directly linked to its "enlightened self-interests."

According to this theory, I expect the EU to observe elections that will improve its international standing and help profiling itself as an important and powerful international actor. More specifically, because the EU promotes electoral democracy as a way to promote peace and security, I expect the EC to be more likely to send EOMs where there is a need or an opportunity for efficiently promoting democracy and stability.

More specifically, I argue that the type of election matters in the decision to observe or not a given election. Indeed, some elections are deemed more important than others. Specifically, transitional elections represent bigger stakes than others. It is also important to note that this type of election usually attract significant international attention and therefore represents an important opportunity for the EU to 'publicize' its work in international election monitoring and consequently improve its reputation in the field. Therefore, I argue that transitional elections will be more likely to be observed than more ordinary, or regular, elections. For the purpose of this dissertation, I define transitional elections as the first cycle of elections which mark the beginning of an uninterrupted series of elections. In other words, they are the first elections happening after an interruption, long or short but always significant, in the regular occurrence of elections(Lindberg 2008). I include founding and post-conflict elections in this definition. I argue that the first 3 cycles of elections after an interruption (Coup d'État,

civil wars, international wars, electoral process break down) are critical in the stabilization and/or transition process of a country. Consequently, I argue that the EU will be more likely to observe such elections in order to foster democratic transition and promote consolidation and ultimately, highlight its own external role on the international stage.

Therefore:

H<sub>1a</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections critical for preserving international stability (e.g. transitional elections)

### **Economic Considerations: International Political Economy**

The EU was first and foremost founded on the idea of economic integration. Over the years, the EU developed as a strong economic entity and an important trading, investing, financial partner for most actors in the international system. Therefore, economic interests can be of utmost importance in the EU's strategic decision making. Thus, when deciding to send EUEOMs in countries holding elections, the EU should take into account past and future investments and trade relationships with the host country. I argue that the EU will be more likely to observe elections held by their significant trading partners. Indeed, the outcome of an election can have direct consequences on the trade relationship between the EU and a host country. Therefore, the EU has vested economic in the process and more importantly in its success. Alternatively, in the case of a break-down in electoral democracy, observation can give the EU enough legitimacy and credibility to then take economic actions to pressure the leadership of the host country to improve the situation. Either way, the EU has strong interest in observing the process, and gather information in order to assess the future of its trade relations with the host country.

The rationale behind foreign aid considerations for election observation is somewhat similar to the argument I developed regarding trade. As argued before, one of the rational for foreign aid is donor interest. Very often, donors distribute foreign aid to advance their own

well-being. An other way to look at the foreign aid-EOM connection is to look at the EU's fondness for conditional relations with third countries. Indeed, the EU is rather famous for its use of conditionality during its enlargement process. In that case, it required political as well as institutional changes on the part of candidate countries before they could be accepted to join the Union. Such requirements include, among others, democratic institutions, respect for human rights and freedom . . . Similarly to its accession criteria, the EU has included elements of conditionality in cooperation agreements with third countries. More specifically, the EU conditions its aid to third countries on their respect for human rights and democracy (i.e. the Cotonou Agreement which regulates cooperation between the European Commission and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) includes clauses (i.e. articles 96 and 97) allowing the EC to respond and open political dialogue in the even of poor governance and/or violation of human rights in ACP countries.) Once these agreements have been signed and the partnership launched, they take the characteristic of actual contracts and the EU needs to evaluate whether or not partner countries comply with the terms of these contracts. Consequently, we can consider EUEOMs to be the legitimate instrument to monitor compliance with conditionality criteria, especially the respect of human rights and good governance.

More specifically, as demonstrated in the existing literature on foreign aid, I argue that monitoring organizations are more likely to observe elections in countries where they have 'invested' important amounts of resources in the form of foreign aid. Indeed, "elections in countries that receive foreign aid (...) offer great opportunities for influence because their governments have an added incentive to strive for international approval." (Kelley N.d., p.4) Countries receiving large amounts of foreign aid are likely to invite monitoring organizations in order to gain legitimacy on the international stage. At the same time, monitoring organizations can also be providers of foreign aid and therefore have a significant interest in monitoring elections in order to assess their future strategy. The EU is a significant

donor of foreign aid to developing and under-developed countries. Therefore, I can argue that the EU considers foreign aid when deciding whether or not to monitor elections.

Consequently,

$H_{1b-c}$  : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries where it has significant economic interests (e.g. trade and foreign aid).

### **3.3.2 Theory 2 – Self Interest: Internal Cohesion and Functional Integration**

One of the main conditions for monitoring -as acknowledged by the European Commission- is a utilitarian one. Indeed, deploying a monitoring mission needs to be feasible. In other words, the costs of deploying an EOM must not exceed its benefits. In order to assess the potential feasibility of a particular EOM, I look at the quality of basic infrastructures in the recipient country and the type of elections. In this case, the EU, following a utilitarian explanation, tries to get the most ‘bang for its bucks’ and will observe relatively easier, less challenging elections.

I argue,

$H_{2a-b}$  : The EU is more likely to observe ‘easy-to-observe’ elections to insure its success and limit its losses and eventually promote cohesion.

#### **Logistical Challenge**

Deploying and EOM is always a logistical challenge. However, some aspect of infrastructure development can facilitate such an endeavor. Most of the literature using a measure of infrastructure development focuses on one single infrastructure sector: telecommunication, power capacity, road and railway network or sanitation (López 2004, Easterly 2001, Loayza, Fajnzylber & Calderón 2005, Calderon, Easterly & Servén 2003). Even though more recent

literature has developed more complex measures of infrastructure development using complicated indexes, the number of telephone lines per capita is usually taken as the preferred indicator of overall infrastructure (Easterly 2001, Calderon & Servén 2004).

### **Election Type**

The type of election observed can also influence the logistics, costs, and consequently the utility of deploying a mission. For example, from a utilitarian point of view, it might be a better ‘deal’ to observe general elections than observing presidential and legislative/parliamentary elections scheduled for different times during the electoral cycle. Indeed, observing general elections only involves deploying one mission to the country and gives a broader and more comprehensive assessment of the electoral process. Observing separate presidential and legislative/parliamentary elections would require sending two separate missions at different times during the electoral calendar, or alternatively, if constrained with funding allocations, choosing between the two elections and therefore losing valuable information in the assessment of the electoral process. Consequently, I argue that, based on a utilitarian argument, the EU will be more likely to observe general elections.

### **3.3.3 Theory 3 – International Altruism: Normative Considerations**

#### **The EU’s general commitment to democracy**

Over the years, the EU has been attributed a leading role in the area of democracy promotion in general and election assistance and observation in particular. Indeed, the EU “has made several efforts to transform itself from primarily a trading bloc into an important international actor in the political arena.” (Kubicek 2003, p.1) Simultaneously, the EU made changes in its foreign policy and started to dramatically emphasize democratization,

respect for human rights, pluralism, and the rule of law. Democratization has always been an important foundation of the EU since it has always been an organization of democratic states.

When the time for enlargement arrived, mostly in the 1990s with eastern European countries, the EU upheld conditionality criteria to determine the legitimacy of states' candidacy to enter the EU. More and more, the EU's external strategy emphasizes democratization, the rule of law and the respect for human rights. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU, through EOMs, takes an active role in spreading, enforcing, and monitoring international norms such as the norm of democracy and right to elect one's government in free and fair elections. Further, it is possible to argue that the EU's EOM policy is motivated by a normative commitment to elections human rights and democracy: international altruism (van der Veen manuscript).

Such a theoretical argument implies that, within the limits of funding, the EU's decision to observe or not to observe elections in third countries shouldn't reflect any strategic planning. Indeed, the argument here states that the EU should observe elections in order to solely improve the democratic process in transitioning countries. Therefore, we could expect the EU to deploy missions in countries needing it the most.

More specifically, by deploying an EOM, the EU must be making a difference in the process. In other words, a condition for the EU's intervention would be a country's own commitment to democracy. Here, I argue that to show a normative commitment to democracy, the EU must be willing to send an EOM in countries where it would be the most useful independently from the EU's pre-existing relationship with these countries. Such countries are transitional democracies (Monty G. Marshal 2009). Indeed, monitoring organizations observe elections when they can plausibly make a difference, in other words, when they can be useful to the process. Therefore, they will be less likely to observe elections in countries that are consolidated democracies since such countries are less likely to experience problems

related to elections. Similarly, organizations will rarely send monitoring missions to observe elections in countries that are strong autocracies, since such countries have no incentives to improve their electoral processes and will make observation more difficult (Kelley N.d., p.4).

In some cases, the EU can decide to observe elections in a ‘non-priority’ country. In order to publicize a ‘success story’ the EU can decide to observe elections that don’t necessarily need to be observed. Indeed, the EU considers that if a country has successfully transitioned to democracy it consequently graduated out of the IEM requirement to provide legitimacy to its government and. However, in order to advertise that such ‘graduation’ is possible, the EU sometimes decide to observe elections in these successful countries as a way to inspire other transitioning democracies.

H<sub>3a-b</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries needing it the most regardless of any strategic interest (i.e. colonies, polity)

Finally, because of the colonial past of many European Union member states, one can argue that the EU’s interventions in former colonies can be motivated by colonial guilt. In an attempt to ‘fix’ what they had done as colonial powers, EU states will be more likely to favor intervention in former colonies. In this case, the EU can be morally determined to help former colonies transition and/or consolidate democracy. Furthermore, such an argument for external intervention might be easier to sell to domestic audiences.

### **3.3.4 EU Institutional Reform: Controlling for dynamic integration in external affairs.**

Even though the EU started to observe elections around the world in 1993, the Community conducted major institutional reforms in the late 1990s that changed the way decisions were made regarding election observation. Originally, the EU’s election observation policy was conducted under both Pillar I (Commission) and Pillar II (Council) frameworks, on a case

by case basis. Following the adoption of the Council's Human Rights regulations 975/99 and 976/99 in 1999, the decision both to provide electoral assistance and to send EU observers must now be taken within the Institutions of Pillar I, on the basis of Commission proposals. Therefore, we have observed a transfer of competence from mostly intergovernmental institutions (Pillar II) to mostly supranational institutions (Pillar I). The goal of this decision making overhaul was to institutionalize this process and ease the decision making and the financing of such missions. Ultimately, EU leaders hoped to make the observation of election more systematic and easier. Therefore, we can expect EUEOM to be more likely in the post 1999 period.

H <sub>4</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe under post-1999 institutional arrangements.
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## Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the theoretical framework which is the backbone of this dissertation. To reiterate, I hypothesized three different, albeit theoretically significant, explanations for the EC's choice to observe some elections in some countries but not others. First, this choice might reflect the EC's self interest with the goal of expanding its international role and the credibility of its soft power and economic tools in its foreign policy box. Second, the EC is using election observation as an avenue for developing its own power relative to other EU institutions such as the Council and the 27 member states. Finally, the EC, as it is often argued in the literature on normative Europe, is acting as a benevolent actor helping countries needing it the most. In this dissertation, I argue that the EC is in fact a self-interested actor, using election observation as a tool for expanding its relative power on the international stage. In the next several chapters I will empirically test the three explanations developed in this chapter. First, I test my claim and the alternate hypotheses quantitatively using a series of proxy variables. Following this exercise, I develop a series of

case study with the goal of presenting direct evidence for EC's motivations to intervene in some cases but not others.

# Chapter 4

## Quantitative Analysis

In this dissertation, the empirical analysis centers on a large-N study for which I have collected original data. This quantitative study will be supplemented, in the subsequent chapters, with case studies. The qualitative study will focus on teasing out the specific causal process at play using direct evidence of the EU's motivations, something large-N analysis can not do very well, especially in the case at hand here. Indeed, as is explained in this chapter, because of the use of proxy quantitative measures, the variables used can sometime remain ambiguous and open the door to different, sometimes conflicting interpretations. However, I think that they can also highlight important patterns, across a large number of observations, in the EU's decision making process, a task which remains difficult to do qualitatively.

### 4.1 An Original Dataset

For the purpose of this study, I have collected original data on 401 direct national level elections, i.e presidential, legislative or parliamentary, general, and referendum polls. Indeed, indirect elections do not require a direct vote of the people and therefore there is no actual poll to observe. The dataset includes election from 1993, the year the EU started to observe

elections abroad, to 2008, the last year data was available for most independent variables of interest included in the analysis. The data collected covers 88 underdeveloped and developing countries with transitional or non-established democratic regimes. Consistently with the literature and for reasons linked with the difficulty to collect the data, I have excluded micro states from the data (Hyde 2006). Most of the data was collected from open sources such as IFES election guide website, the European Commission election website, the IMF, the World Bank, and the BBC Country Profiles. I will explain the collection process for each variable of interest in the subsequent sections of this chapter.<sup>1</sup> (Kelley 2009*b*, International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011, European Commission 2011*c*). The most important value added of this dataset is that it covers the entire history of EUEOMs since its creation in 1993. It also encompasses and assesses the effect of the 1999-2000 institutional reform that transferred decision making authority in IEM policy from Pillar II institutions to Pillar I institutions.

## 4.2 Dependent Variable: European Election Observation Missions

### 4.2.1 EUEOM (1993-2008)

For each election included in the dataset, I have coded whether or not the European Commission decided to deploy an EOM to monitor that election (Kelley 2009*b*). EUEOMs were coded using a binary variable taking the value  $1$  if an EUEOM was present and  $0$  if absent. I used both EU election observation mission website and Judith Kelley's data to code this variable (European Commission 2011*c*).

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<sup>1</sup>I am extremely thankful to Judith Kelley for sharing with me some of her data on EUEOMs. The data she shared with me was very helpful in identifying the cases of EUEOMs, especially for the 1993-2000 time period

In 327 instances, the EU didn't deploy an election observation mission compared to 74 observations where the EU did deploy an observation mission. In other words, the data shows that the EU deployed an observation mission in 18.45% of the elections. In our data set, there are about 4 times more non-events (i.e.  $EUEOM = 0$ ) than actual events (i.e.  $EUEOM = 1$ ). After considering whether or not this data fit the characteristics of rare event data, I decided that the proportion of events to non-events was well within the acceptable margins, of 2 to 5 times more non-events than events, determined by the literature on rare events data, and therefore shouldn't be systematically biased against actual events (King & Zeng 2001*a*, King & Zeng 2001*b*). In addition, as stated before, one of the major value of this dataset is that it includes all elections organized since the start of the EU's election monitoring policy and therefore allows us to look at the complete universe of observation. Further, I was able to collect relevant data for all the 401 observations and variables of interest. Thus, the goal of prioritizing the quality of the data instead of the sheer number of observation doesn't really apply in this case.

Because of the dependent variable's characteristics, the statistical model is estimated using a logistic analysis. Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the dependent variable.

Table 4.1: Summary statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>N</b>
year	2000.978	4.534	401
eueom	0.185	0.388	401

### 4.3 Independent Variables

In this dissertation, I propose that, beyond simply promoting democracy, international election monitoring is a foreign policy instrument the EU can use as a means to further its strategic interests on the international stage. More specifically, I contrast three different

explanations for why the EU sometimes uses this tool and sometimes doesn't. These three potential explanations are: external influence, internal cohesion, and international altruism. On the one hand, the EU can use election monitoring in order to improve its international role and standing. On the other hand, the EU could be motivated by the objective of improving internal cohesion around a deeper and more effective political integration based on a successful foreign policy. Finally, the EU could also be involved in altruistic behavior and be promoting democracy where it is needed, regardless of its strategic interests. I argue that the EU uses election observation as an instrument of its foreign policy with the self-interested goal of improving its standing on the international stage.

### **4.3.1 Theory 1— Self-interest: International Role**

As stated above, I argue that the EU uses democracy promotion, in our case election observation, as an instrument of its foreign policy in order to reach the broader objective of enhancing its own external role and influence. Here, I argue that the EU could and should be considered as a realist actor –and not necessarily this idealist actor, as it is often perceived to be; an actor motivated by its own well-being and international standing and not necessarily concerned with the fate of other international actors.

More specifically, the rationale at play here is the following: the EU is pursuing an external strategy aimed at positioning itself in the broader international system by increasing its systemic role in this area of foreign policy. Ultimately, I argue that the EU's intentions are to position itself as an actor capable of intervening abroad in order to stabilize countries and regions in difficulty, strengthen trade partnerships, and increase its influence on third countries.

If the EU is using IEM with the goal of advancing its external position in the international system, we should expect the following motivations to be significant in explaining the EU's election monitoring policy: international security and economic partnership.

## **International Security: Peace and Democracy**

**Transitional Election** The variable Transitional Election was coded in two stages. First it was measured based on Lindberg election number variable which is the sequential number of the election in terms of an uninterrupted series of elections within the category of presidential or parliamentary elections. In other words, it is the sequential number of the election cycle in the series (Lindberg 2009). Using open source data (BBC country profiles, BBC chronology of key events, IFES election guide, and Nohlan's Elections in the Americas handbook (Nohlan 2005)), I was able to complement Lindberg data, which is focused on Africa, for all the observations in the dataset.

Second, because I think that once elections have regularized there is no real difference between two election cycles as far as their significance for monitoring organizations, I transformed the sequential variable (varying between 1 and 26) into a 5-category variable. Again, I define transitional elections as "elections that look as if they will be pivotal to the country's democratic prospect." (Carothers 1997, Lyons 2004) For example, transitions from "one party systems, military regimes and personal dictatorship." (Huntington 1991, p.581). Consistently with the relevant literature, I argue that the first, second and third elections cycles after a breakdown are very significant on their own (Carothers 2002). The first cycle is important because it is the first one after the breakdown and is critical in setting the country on a successful transition path. The second election cycle is always important and is usually a good test for the strength of the institutions, especially if there is already a potential for a transition of power. If a transfer of power didn't occur during the second election cycle, it is more likely during the third election cycle especially with the more and more widespread adoption of term limits. If there hasn't been a breakdown after the third electoral cycle, I argue that elections have been regularized and the institutions are being consolidated. I decided to group the fourth, fifth and sixth election cycles in the same category: I believe that at that point, even if highly unlikely, there is still a possibility for a breakdown might hap-

pen. The final category comprises the remaining election cycles: even though there is always potential for fraud, especially in not fully democratized regime such as electoral democracies, observing organizations usually don't feel compelled to intervene. In a nutshell, I argue that the EU will be more likely to observe early election cycles in the transition process. I expect the likelihood of the EU observing elections to decrease as the election cycles occur without a breakdown.

Therefore,

H <sub>1a</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe early transitional election (lowest number)
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Transitional elections are especially important for the EU's foreign policy in the context of peace building and peacekeeping. Indeed, having no real "hard power" resources, such as a powerful military, the EU must rely on 'soft power' mechanisms to promote peace: democracy promotion and election assistance are such means. Moreover, I should emphasize the fact that because international peace and stability are public goods, and therefore, it is in the EU's "enlightened self-interest" to promote them. The EU has consistently used democracy assistance as a means to promote and increase international stability and security, de facto promoting its own immediate security (Olsen 2000). More specifically, the EU's democracy promotion policy is largely based on the liberal peace principle which states that increasing the number of democracies in the international system will reduce the number of potential conflicts and therefore improve the security of the European Union. This is consistent with our hypothesis: the EU will be more likely to send a mission to observe elections marking a transition after a breakdown of the electoral regime. Such elections represent an opportunity for peace building and/or peacekeeping.

It is important to acknowledge that the variable *Transitional Election* is ambiguous and can be interpreted differently than the way it is analyzed in this dissertation. Indeed, early

transitional elections are most likely to be elections where monitors actually might make a difference or even more likely to generate a ‘demand’ for observation on the part of the host country.

### **Economic Considerations: International Political Economy**

**Trade** Here, I measure economic interest using EU trade statistics. I argue that the EU will be more likely to observe elections in significant trading partners. I collected data on the EU’s imports and exports from the Department of Trade Statistics of the IMF. They are measured as follows:

- EU imports from target country: Imports from partner countries to the EU in USD millions for the year before each election.
- EU exports to target country: exports from the EU to partner countries in USD millions for the year before each election.
- EU total trade: imports and exports between EU and partner countries in USD millions for the year before each election.

In order to limit the number of variables in the final model (i.e. to preserve degrees of freedom), and to get a complete measure of the trade relationship between the EU and host countries, I only include the aggregate measure of trade with the variable *EU total trade*.

I argue:

$H_{1b}$ :The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries that are significant trading partners
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**Foreign Aid** Data for EU Official Development Aid was collected from the EU Statistics portal. The dyadic data measures EU Official Development aid in USD billions, to each

country holding election the year before the election (European Commission, Statistical Portal 2010).

H<sub>1c</sub> :The EU is more likely to monitor elections in countries recipient of high levels of foreign aid

**Theory 1: Model 1**

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Model 1

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
EUEOM	0.185	0.388	401
Transitional Election	2.713	1.471	401
Official Development Aid	36.683	42.364	401
Total Trade	3950.217	7383.098	401

Table 4.3: Estimation Results: Model 1 (Logit)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Transitional Election	-0.211** (0.097)
Total Trade (t-1)	0.000 (0.000)
EC Official Development Aid (t-1)	0.008*** (0.003)
Intercept	-1.227*** (0.301)

N=401

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01

Even though this is not a complete model and therefore makes hypothesis testing complicated at this point, we observe that the coefficient for Transitional Election and Official Development Aid are both significant and in the expected direction. Specifically, Transitional Election seem to increase the likelihood of the EU sending an observation mission or

in other words, the earlier the election is in a series the more likely this election is to be observed by the European Union. Similarly, the more foreign aid, or official development aid, the EU invests in a country, the more likely it is to observe the recipients' elections. Alternatively, the coefficient for Total Trade is not statistically significant and seems to have no effect on the EU's likelihood to observe an election.

### 4.3.2 Theory 2 –Self-interest: Internal cohesion

One of the main conditions for monitoring -as acknowledged by the European Commission- is a utilitarian one. Indeed, deploying a monitoring mission needs to be feasible. In other words the “costs” of deploying an EOM must not exceed its “benefits”. In order to assess the potential feasibility of a particular EOM, I measure the quality of basic infrastructures in the recipient country and the type of elections. This theory states that the EU is a strategic actor in choosing ‘easy’ elections to observe in order to look more effective in the eyes of EU member states with the goal of rallying more internal support for this policy and increasing the likelihood of functional spill over in other areas of foreign policy.

**Logistics** In this dissertation, I operationalize infrastructure development with two separate measures of telecommunication infrastructure development. The most commonly used one in the literature is the measure of telephone lines density (which is the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) provided by the World Bank's World Development Index (The World Bank 2010). In order to account for the spread of cellphones over the past decade, I also include a variable *Mobile Phone Subscription* which is a measure of mobile cellular telephone subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service. I use the measure provided by the World Bank's infrastructure indicators which include both postpaid and prepaid subscriptions per 100 people (The World Bank 2010). Data availability across the 401 observations included in the dataset was an important criteria in choosing a single in-

frastructure indicator (i.e. telecommunication). Both variables are lagged one year before the election.

H<sub>2a</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with better telephone infrastructure (i.e. cellphone and landlines)

**Election Type** Based on a utilitarian argument, I argue that the EU is more likely to observe General elections. Here I include a dummy variable with the value 1 if it is a general election and 0 for the residual categories (i.e. presidential, legislative, and referendum). This variable was coded using IFES election guide website for the period 1999-2008 and the Journal of Democracy’s Election Watch section for the period 1993-1999 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011, Election Watch 1993-1999).

Thus:

H<sub>2b</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe General Elections.

**Theory 2: Model 2**

Table 4.4: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Telephone Lines Density	5.729	6.994	401
MobilePhone Subscriptions	11.072	19.581	401
Election Type (General)	0.257	0.437	401

The results in the partial model presented here (Model 2 in Table 4.5) show only partial support for Theory 2: the variable *Telephone Lines* is statistically significant but it has a negative effect on the likelihood of the EU deploying an election observation mission. According to this model, the EU is more likely to send EOMs in countries with less telephone density. However, the variable *Mobile Phone Subscriptions* is statistically significant and positive which shows support for the argument that feasibility is a strong criteria in the EU’s decision to deploy an EOM in a developing country. Model 2 also offers strong statistical

Table 4.5: Estimation Results : Model 2 (Logit)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Telephone Lines Density	-0.150*** (0.037)
Mobile Phone Subscriptions	0.029*** (0.009)
Election Type	0.880*** (0.292)
Intercept	-1.389*** (0.186)

N=401

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01

support for H<sub>2b</sub>: the EU is significantly more likely to observe general elections than any of the other types of suffrage.

### 4.3.3 Theory 3 –International Altruism: Normative Considerations

**Regime Type** The Polity IV dataset offers a good measure of where a countries lies on an autocratic-democratic spectrum and therefore is a good proxy to assess whether or not a country could objectively benefit from election observation (Marshall, Jaggers & Ted Robert 2010). Indeed, the Polity data “examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions.” (Marshall, Jaggers & Ted Robert 2010) The polity score captures this regime spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10: hereditary monarchy, to +10: consolidated democracy.

In this dissertation, I use the Polity2 score from the Polity IV dataset, which is the revised combined Polity score. The Polity2 score measure the regime spectrum using the same 21-

point scale as the original Polity score. I measure the Polity2 score for each observation for the year preceding the election.


The authors of the Polity IV dataset suggest that the polity2 scores can also be converted to regime categories. Using a 3 part categorization, we can get a better idea of what the scores mean in term of regime types. Therefore, Polity2 scores between -10 and -6 suggest an autocratic regime; Polity2 scores between -5 and +5 describe anocracies; and Polity2 scores between +6 and +10 suggest a democratic regime.

Consistently with the theoretical argument presented above, I argue that the middle category of anocracies should benefit the most from election monitoring. Indeed, I purport that there is no point deploying an EOM for elections in countries that are consolidated democracies (+6 to +10) because the contribution of such a mission would be moot. Similarly, the likelihood of fraud in more autocratic regimes (-10 to -6) is so high and the significance of elections so low that deploying an EOM wouldn't change anything and might actually have the opposite effect of legitimizing bad practices. Therefore, regimes with middle range Polity2 scores (-5 to +5) should be the ones benefiting from EOM the most.

Consistent with this argument, we should expect the relationship between the likelihood of deploying an EUEOM and countries' Polity2 scores to be curvilinear. Such an expectation is confirmed by Figure 4.1 which presents a graph of the relationship between the predicted probability of the EU observing an election and the Polity2 score. We observe a curvilinear relationship which suggest that the EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with a Polity2 score around 0.


More specifically, the graph shows that the EU is more likely to observe elections in anacrocies which tend to lean toward democracy. It is to be expected that the EU will prefer intervening in countries which seem to have at least a minimum commitment to democracy which explains the fact that the predicted probability of the EU sending and EOM is the highest when the Polity2 score is between 0 and +5.

Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of EUEOM and Polity 2



Because of the curvilinear nature of the relationship between the Dependent Variable EUEOM and the Independent Variable Polity2 Score, it will be challenging to interpret the coefficient once the variable is added to the full statistical model. In order to ease the interpretation of the results, I introduce a linear transformation of this explanatory variable by squaring the Polity2 Score. Following such a transformation, we now expect a negative relationship between EUEOM and the Squared Polity2 variables which is illustrated and confirmed in Figure 4.2. Both the Polity2 variable and the squared Polity2 variables are included in the statistical model.

Figure 4.2: Transformation of Predicted Probability of EUEOM and Polity 2<sup>2</sup>



H<sub>3a</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with median Polity2 scores

**Colonial History** I use a binary variable to code whether or not countries holding elections are former colonies of any EU countries.

Therefore,

H<sub>3b</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in member states' former colonies.

**Theory 3: Model 3**

Table 4.6: Summary Statistics: Model 3

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Polity Score	2.319	5.634	401
Polity Score Squared	37.037	28.096	401
EU Colonies	0.626	0.484	401

Table 4.7: Estimation Results : Model 3 (Logit)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Polity Score	0.104*** (0.038)
Polity Score Squared	-0.027*** (0.007)
EU Colonies	0.427 (0.306)
Intercept	-1.124*** (0.324)

N=401

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01

The results presented in Model 3 (Table 4.7) confirm the argument stating that the merits of a regime matter in the EU's decision to observe elections. More specifically, countries in

the middle range of the *polity2* score are more likely to be recipients of EUEOMs. However, the coefficient for the *EU Colonies* variable is not statistically significant and therefore is likely to have no effect on the likelihood of EU EOMs.

#### 4.3.4 Control: EU Institutional Reform

In order to control for this institutional change in the decision making process, I introduced a control variable for Institutional Reform in the form of a binary variable coded 0 if the election year is before 2000 and 1 if it is after.

$H_4$ : The EU is more likely to observe elections after 1999
---

## 4.4 Results and Discussion

### 4.4.1 Summary of Hypotheses

$H_{1a}$ : The EU is more likely to observe transitional elections
--

$H_{1b}$ :The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with highest levels of net trade
--

$H_{1c}$ :The EU is more likely to monitor elections in countries recipient of high levels of foreign aid
---

$H_{2a}$ : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with higher telephone lines density and mobile phone subscriptions
---

$H_{2b}$ : The EU is more likely to observe General Elections
---

$H_{3a}$ : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries with median Polity2 scores
---

$H_{3b}$ : The EU is more likely to observe elections in member states' former colonies
---

$H_4$ : The EU is more likely to observe elections after 1999
---

#### 4.4.2 Comparing the three models

Table 4.8 present the models corresponding to each of the three theories presented in this dissertation with the final model including all variables of interests. The Wald Chi2 statistics allows us to compare the fit (i.e. usefulness) of each model compared to the other. Overall, we can say that the full model (model 4) provides us with a better fit. Indeed, I proceeded to run a series of *lr tests* in order to compare the fit of Model 4 against all other models and possible combination of the models. The results of these *lr tests* are shown in Table 4.9 which shows that adding the variables of interests in a single model results in a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the model. Consequently, I will pursue the statistical analysis using Model 4 as the model of reference (Table 4.10).

#### 4.4.3 Analysis of Model 4

##### Theory 1 –Self Interest: International Role

The variable *Transitional Election* is statistically significant at the .01 level confirming H<sub>1a</sub>. Further, for each additional election in a series of election (i.e. without any regime breakdown) the odds of the European Union observing a given election decreases by a factor .621. H<sub>1b</sub> is not confirmed in the statistical analysis. Indeed, the variable "Net Trade" is not statistically significant and thus we are unable to eliminate the null hypothesis. Finally, according to the results presented in table 4.11 , the EU is more likely to observe elections in countries recipient of higher levels of Foreign Aid, confirming H<sub>1c</sub>. The odds ratio shows (table 4.12) that for 1 million USD increase in Official Development Aid increase the odds of the EU observing elections in the recipient county by a factor 1.006.

Theory 1 is mostly confirmed even though the actual effect of the significant variables (Transitional Elections and Official Development Aid) are rather small. Thus even though, at this point in the analysis, we can say that the EU does not rest its decision on the weigh of net

Table 4.8: Estimation results : logistic

Variables	Model 1 (Std. Err.)	Model 2 (Std. Err.)	Model 3 (Std. Err.)	Model 4 (Std. Err.)
<u>Theory: Self Interest-International Role (Peace, Democracy and IPE)</u>				
Transitional Election	-0.211** (0.097)			-0.476*** (0.133)
Total Trade (t-1)	0.000 (0.000)			0.000 (0.000)
EC Official Development Aid (t-1)	0.008*** (0.003)			0.007** (0.003)
<u>Theory 2: Self Interest-Internal Cohesion (Feasibility)</u>				
Telephone Lines (t-1)		-0.090*** (0.027)		-0.091** (0.045)
Mobile Phone Subscriptions (t-1)		0.029*** (0.009)		0.015 (0.010)
Election Type		0.880*** (0.292)		1.177*** (0.356)
<u>Theory 3: International Altruism</u>				
Polity2 Score			0.104*** (0.038)	0.099** (0.040)
Polity2 Squared			-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.014* (0.008)
EU Colonies			0.427 (0.306)	0.085 (0.404)
<u>Control: Institutional Reform:</u>				
EU Institution Reform				2.502*** (0.629)
Intercept	-1.227*** (0.301)	-1.389*** (0.186)	-1.124*** (0.324)	-2.340*** (0.629)
Wald Chi2	(3)16.55	(3)20.98	(3)20.16	(10)57.96
Prob>Chi2	.0009	.0001	.0000	.0000

N=401

\*p&lt;.1; \*\*p&lt;.05; \*\*\*p&lt;.01

Table 4.9: LR Tests: Comparing the fit of the Models 1,2,3, and 4

	Model 4 Vs. Model 1	Model 4 Vs. Model 2	Model 4 Vs. Model 3	Model 4 Vs. Models 1,2	Model 4 Vs. Models 1,3	Model 4 Vs. Model 2,3
LR Chi2	(7)80.16	(7)66.08	(7)73.11 7	(4)55.32	(3)16.87	(3)16.81
Prob>Chi2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0008	.0008

(degrees of freedom)

trade with recipient countries, it appear that transitional elections, and more specifically, early transitional election (i.e. early in the transition process) will be more likely to be observed by the EU. This behavior suggests that the EU is interested in the potential of international role development these electoral events entail and is therefore willing to get involved in making them as credible as possible. Therefore, it seems that international stability, international peace and international development are significant considerations in the EU decision to observe elections abroad.

### **Theory 2 –Self Interest: Internal Cohesion**

According to the statistical analysis presented in this chapter,  $H_{2a}$  is no supported and  $H_{2b}$  is confirmed. Indeed, the coefficient for the variable *Telephone Density* is statistically significant but negative, which is contrary to the hypothesis. The results show that the odds of the EU observing a given election increases when the density of the telephone lines in a given country decreases. Such a result could be explained by the fact that election observation missions are often logistical challenges and tend to be deployed in logistically backward countries. In addition, the variable *Mobile Phone Subscriptions* which was statistically significant in the individual models (Model 2) is as lost all statistical significance as part of Model 4. However,  $H_{2b}$  receives significant support. The coefficient for this categorical independent variable is highly statistically significant and positive. The EU is therefore more likely to observe general elections compared to any other type of elections (i.e. presidential, legislative, referendum). Indeed, according to the odds ratio, the EU is about 3 times more likely to observe general national level elections.

To sum up, the statistical analysis presented in this chapter offers only mixed support for Theory 2 even though the variable *Election Type* is highly significant and seems to carry a lot of weight in explaining the dependent variable *EUEOM*. As explained before, because I use proxy-variables in this quantitative analysis, I must acknowledge the potential for ambiguity

Table 4.10: Estimation results : logit

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Transitional Election	-0.476*** (0.133)
Total Trade (t-1)	0.000 (0.000)
EC Official Development Aid (t-1)	0.007** (0.003)
Telephone Lines (t-1)	-0.091** (0.045)
Mobile Phone Subscriptions	0.015 (0.010)
ElectType	1.177*** (0.356)
Polity2 Score	0.099** (0.040)
Polity2 Squared	-0.014* (0.008)
EU Colonies	0.085 (0.404)
EU Institution Reform	2.502*** (0.465)
Intercept	-2.340*** (0.629)

N=401

\*p&lt;.1; \*\*p&lt;.05; \*\*\*p&lt;.01

in the interpretation of the statistical results. The direct evidence presented in the following chapter will complement the statistical results in order to provide a better assessment of the validity of this theory.

Table 4.11: Odds Ratio

Variable	Odds Ratio
Transitional Election	.621***
Total Trade (t-1)	.999
EC Official Development Aid (t-1)	1.006**
Telephone Lines (t-1)	.913**
Mobile Phone Subscriptions	1.015
Election Type	3.245***
Polity2 Score	1.104**
Polity2 Squared	.986*
EU Colonies	1.089
EU Institution Reform	12.207***

N=401

\*p<.1; \*\*p<.05; \*\*\*p<.01

### Theory 3 –International Altruism: Normative Considerations

Similarly to the previous two models presented in this chapter, the quantitative analysis offers mixed support for Theory 3 on which it is based.

The variables *Polity2 Score* and *Polity 2 Squared* show statistically significant results. According to the coefficient of both of these variables and their signs, the model suggests that the EU is more likely to observe elections in country scoring in the middle and the higher range of the Polity 2 scale. From this result we can interpret that the EU is more likely to observe democratizing countries which show promising signs of success instead of countries that are facing more challenges (low-middle range polity score). The odds ratios for both variables are relatively low, compared to other variables, and showing little impact on the likelihood of EUEOM. However, the model offers no statistical support for the variable

*EU Colonies* suggesting that whether or not an election is in a former EU colony has no significant effect on the EU's decision to observe it.

### **EU Institutional Reform**

The variable *EU Institution Reform* is statistically significant and has a very high effect on the likelihood of EUEOM. In other words the odds of having an EUEOM for any given election increase by a factor 12 after 1999. Such result implies that the EU Institutional Reform initiated in the late 1990's in the policy area of democracy assistance, which took effect in 2000 and gives more decision making power to the European Commission, has had the desired effects on EU election monitoring policy and its implementation. Indeed, starting in 2000, EUEOM seem to be more systematic and more widespread. In itself, this result shows that the EU seems to have been able to develop as a strong and credible actor in the field of International Election Monitoring.

### **Conclusion**

The statistical analysis developed and presented in this chapter offer some interesting results and mixed support for each of the three theoretical models presented in this dissertation. All three theories received some statistical support which suggest a complicated decision making process on the part of the EU Commission, when it comes to EUEOMs. To be more specific, the coefficients for the following variables are statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction: *Transitional Election*, *EC Official Development*, *Election Type*, *Polity2 Score*, *Polity2 Squared*, and *EU Institution Reform*. In other words, the EU is more likely to observe early transitional and general elections, in countries which receive high levels of EU foreign aid, and which score high in the middle range section of the polity2 scale. Overall, the EU is also more likely to observe any given election after 2000 than it was before. Because *Theory 1* seems to receive marginally more support, I suggest that

international role is an important consideration for the EU when making a decision on which election to observe. However, because of the ambiguity intrinsic to the use of proxy variables and the mixed statistical support for the other two theories (i.e. *Theory 2* and *Theory 3*), more research needs to be conducted in order to find direct evidence of EU's motivations for observing elections. In order to get a better idea of what exactly motivates the EU to observe elections, I designed a qualitative research section, based on six case studies, which will complement the quantitative research presented in this chapter.

## Chapter 5

# Empirical Qualitative Analysis

As a complement to the quantitative analysis presented above, I am now introducing a comparative study of 6 case studies. Indeed, “multiple studies of cases with the same level of manipulable independent variable can establish under what conditions that level of the variable is associated with different outcomes.” (George & Bennett 2005, p.82)

The universe of cases in the quantitative analysis is all national level elections in transitioning and non-established democracies since the mid-1990s. We know that the decision making process changed in 2000; therefore, for the purpose of consistency, our qualitative analysis will focus on post 2000 cases. The purpose of this qualitative section is to illustrate, with the collection of direct evidence or actual statements of interest, the motives for EU’s involvement in election observation in some cases but not in others. Because the direct evidence available is very scarce I think that answering the research question I ask in this dissertation would benefit from more breadth than depth in the qualitative analysis. With this in mind, I decided to look at six cases (three cases of events, with EUEOMs, and three cases of non events, without EUEOMs).

One goal of the qualitative analysis presented here is to confirm (or challenge) the hypotheses presented in the theory chapter and empirically tested, via the means of proxy

variables, in the quantitative method chapter of this dissertation. Another goal is to tease out direct evidence of the actual motivations for deciding to observe (or not) electoral processes in third countries. Indeed, many of the variables used in the quantitative chapter are proxies used to get a sense of the motivations that are theoretically significant in the decision making process behind the EU's international election observation activities. A major limitation of many proxy variables, and most of the ones used in the preceding chapter, is the uncertainty about whether it actually measures what we want them to measure, nothing more or nothing less. In social sciences, often, the phenomena we try to measure using simple numbers and more or less simple formulas are more complex than that. For example, a variable used in the quantitative chapter to measure a specific motivation could be argued to be measuring something else altogether.

## **5.1 Qualitative Research Design**

### **5.1.1 Method**

In this dissertation, I decided to use 'mixed methods' of empirical analysis. Such a research method has been the subject of increased attention from researchers and is defined as "a class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques." (Yin 2009, p.62) Here I am interested in the fact that "mixed methods research forces the methods to share the same research questions, to collect complementary data, and to conduct counterpart analyses (...) as such, mixed methods research can permit investigators to address more complicated research questions and collect a richer and stronger array of evidence than can be accomplished by any single method alone."(Yin 2009, p.63) In other words, I argue that mixed method research is specifically suited to my research question, as it will allow me to reach stronger and better answers.

"A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in

depth within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident...” Further,

“the case study inquiry copes with the technical distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one results, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another results, benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.”(Yin 2009, p.18)

The goals of such a method of inquiry are to

“explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies; describe an intervention and the real-life context in which it occurred; illustrates certain topics within an evaluation, again in a descriptive mode; enlighten these situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes.” (Yin 2009, p.19-20)

For these reasons, in this section, I present multiple (6) case studies with the goal of offering a cross-case analysis of the motivations behind the EU’s decision whether or not to observe elections in third countries. My intention is to provide a deeper analysis of the context along with the direct evidence of the motivations that was limited by the use of proxy variables in the quantitative analysis chapter of this dissertation.

Indeed, I believe that multiple case designs have important advantages compared to other qualitative research designs, more specifically single case designs. Indeed, “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling and therefore the overall study is therefore regarded as being more relevant (Yin 2009, p.53).

In this chapter, I present 6 case reports providing information about the context surrounding the relationship between the EU and each country-case, along with more specific country-election evidence. The individual case studies are followed by a cross-case analysis

which identifies patterns of motivations and offers answers to the research question I ask in this dissertation.

### 5.1.2 Case Selection

In order to clarify and further understand the motivations behind the EU's decision whether or not to observe elections in third world countries, I have collected qualitative evidence on six cases using a 'most-similar' research design. In order to isolate the independent variables of interest from potential spurious interactions and for the purpose of comparison, I selected the 6 cases from the post-2000 time period and limited to the sub-saharan cluster of countries. Indeed, the universe of cases in the quantitative dataset used in the previous chapter contains all national level elections in transitioning and non-established democracies since the mid 1990s. However, we know that the decision making process changed in 2000, therefore, for the purpose of consistency, I decided to focus my qualitative analysis on post-2000 cases. For similar reasons, I have restricted the pool of cases to one geographic region: Sub-saharan Africa which allow me to control for potential regional bias in the EU decision to observe elections in third countries.

The 6 cases were chosen based on the different possible combinations of motivations (theories) of interest (see table 5.1). Table 5.2 lists the cases, highlighting the combination of motivations at play in each case and briefly describing the cases. A further, more detailed, qualitative description of each case will be provided in the forthcoming chapters. To reiterate, I argue that strategic (self-interest: international role) motivations are alone sufficient reasons for the EU to deploy and EOM to observe elections in third country signaling that EOMs are, in fact, a means for the European Community to further their external self interest (i.e. international role) on the international stage. However, it is important to acknowledge that internal self-interest (function integration) as well as international altruism can be jointly but but not independently sufficient to determine whether or not the EU will send an EOM

to observe a given election. In other words, the EU wouldn't necessarily ignore 'easy' cases of election observation if it could make a powerful normative or internal case for deploying a mission. The evidence collected for this chapter will shed light on what the European Community has said about its involvement in election monitoring and how it justifies it.

Table 5.1: Expected outcomes based on different conditions combinations

Strategic Conditions	Feasibility Conditions	Altruistic Conditions	Outcome
No	No	No	No
Yes	No	No	Yes
No	Yes	No	No
No	No	Yes	No
No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

### 5.1.3 Qualitative Data

For each case listed in table 5.2, in addition to the data collected for the quantitative analysis, I collected additional qualitative data to provide us with detailed information concerning the context of the relationship between the EU and each of the cases reviewed as well as to test the different hypotheses presented in the theory chapter of this dissertation. I have looked for direct evidence supporting or challenging the alternative theories presented in the dissertation via extensive content analysis of EU country strategy papers with each of the country-case, EU websites on each of the country-case, official public minutes and agendas of European Commission weekly meeting, and finally press releases from the European Union. These sources provided significant information regarding the motivations -or lack thereof- for the EU's intervention in the different countries. They also provided interesting information regarding the context of the EU's overall relationship with each of these countries, outside of the time-frame covered by the elections observed (or not). Indeed, I think that in order to understand the motivations behind the decision of the EU to observe or not electoral

Table 5.2: Cases based on different combinations of EU level IVs and different value of the DV

EUEOM	Strategic	Feasibility	Normative	Case
No	No	No	No	Cameroon Presidential Election on October 11, 2004 First Presidential Election since October 12, 1997 Paul Biya (incumbent) won The EU didn't send an EOM
Yes	Yes	No	No	Democratic Republic of Congo General Election on July 30, 2006 Presidential run-off on October 29, 2006 First post-conflict elections and first elections in more than 40 years, since Mobutu took over the government Joseph Kabila (transition President) won in run-off The EU sent an EOM to both 2006 elections
No	No	Yes	No	Gambia Legislative election on January 25, 2007 48 seats in the unicameral National Assembly were at stake Party of President Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh won a majority (Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction) The EU didn't send an EOM
No	No	No	Yes	Burkina Faso Presidential election on November 13, 2005 Blaise Compaoré (incumbent) won a third term The EU didn't send an EOM
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Ghana General elections on December 7, 2008 and Presidential Run-off on December 28, 2008 The incumbent John Agyekum Kufuor didn't run. John Eva Atta Mills won in close run-off The EU sent an EOM
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rwanda In a period of 5 months Rwanda held 3 elections: the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were the first since 1994 Referendum on May 26, 2003: Asked voters to approve a new draft Constitution Presidential on August 25, 2003: Paul Kagame was elected President Parliamentary on September 29, 2003: The Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR, Kagame's party) won a majority of seats in the National Assembly The EU sent an EOM to observe the 3 elections

processes in any given country, one must take into account the overall relations with that specific country.

#### 5.1.4 Sources

The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter comes from several sources: official documentation from the European Community and archival records: press releases, (European Union 2011) minutes, (European Commission 2011*a*) and country strategy papers (European External Action Service 2011*a*, European External Action Service 2011*b*). These sources, contrary to the quantitatively measured proxy variables used in the previous chapter, offer the advantage of presenting direct evidence of motivations (or lack thereof) in a way that is directly formulated and revealed by the decision maker: the European Union. Even though the level of details is limited by the “classified nature” of many of these decision making processes, public minutes and press releases offer a good look at the revealed preferences and motivations of the European Commission as an institution.

In order to get an idea of the themes that seem relevant to the EU’s external relations, as revealed through the press releases and statements collected on the EU Rapid database, I grouped the evidence following thematic categories. By doing so, we can see what theme dominates the relationship between the EU and its partners. Further, this exercise allows me to characterize this relationship. Even though some of the content analyzed is broader than the simple theme of election, it is important not to ignore it as it provides some context to the relation between the EU and each partner country. Indeed, the decision to observe elections needs to be understood through the lens provided by the broader context of the external relation between the EU and each of its partners. Here, I argue that the themes characterizing the overall relationship between the EU and its partners (revealed through its press releases) can say a lot on the motivations for election observation. Even though this is not perfect, press releases provide direct evidence of what the preferences of the EU in the area of external

policy are- with regards to a specific partner country. This evidence is an interesting and valuable complement to the proxy variables, and indirect evidence, used in the quantitative analysis presented in the previous chapter. Therefore, for each press release collected, I recorded quotes characterizing the EU's qualitative relation with any given country under review here (DRC, Rwanda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Cameroon) and I grouped them following themes deduced from the theoretical and quantitative analysis presented in the previous chapters. These theoretically motivated categories are the following:

- Elections: and associated themes of democracy assistance, democratization, election assistance.
- Development Aid
- Trade
- Human Rights
- Humanitarian Aid: this category is usually linked to development aid, however, in the case of humanitarian aid, the funds go directly to NGOs and civil society organizations and not to government agencies (as it is the case for more traditional development aid)by-passing government institutions. This kind of aid show some indication of altruistic motivations.
- Peace and Conflict: mentions to peace and stability in the country and regions.
- Internal politics: statements reflecting the importance of internal EU politics in the decision making process.

The presentation of the content analysis of the press releases will be done in 2 stages. First, I will show the distribution of the themes evoked in the press releases, by country, giving some specific examples and contextual explanation. Results will be presented for the

entire time period 1993-2008 to provide context but I will also provide a more specific look at the time period around each case of election. Second, after this exercise is completed for each case (6), I will present a cross-country comparison of the evidence collected, thus highlighting the differences and the existing, or missing, patterns and finally shed some light on the motivations for intervention. It is important to note that each press release might contain more than one theme. Since we are more interested in the content of the press releases and what it might reveal about the EU's policy, any given press release might be included in several categories.

The evidence presented in this chapter, paired with the quantitative evidence presented in the previous chapter offer an interesting first look at the motivations of the EC when it comes to election observation in third countries.

This project could benefit from complementary data collected from interviews of various stakeholders (EU officials, local election officials, observers, officials from other election observation organizations . . . ) and more extensive field research. However, time and financial constraints imposed on this dissertation have limited the opportunities to do so. Nevertheless, this project is only the stepping stool toward further and more expensive research which shall be done in the future but are beyond the scope of this dissertation. This dissertation can be seen as a desk study preceding a potential field study.

Evidence collected from the sources listed above will be presented in two stages. First, I will present the evidence related to each case via six case study reports which will highlight the context relevant to each of the six cases (always guided by the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3) along with the direct evidence evidence collected from the content analysis of the documents and sources cited above. In the last section of this chapter, I provide the reader with a cross-case analysis based on the results from the multiple case studies, which allows for the identification of patterns of behavior and a more general understanding of the motivations in play.

### 5.1.5 Theoretical framework— a review:

#### Theoretical Framework in brief

Based on the theoretical framework developed in the theoretical chapter and further tested in the quantitative analysis presented in this dissertation, there are three possible non-mutually exclusive explanations for the EU's international election observation policy. Each theory leads us to expect different evidence from our inquiry of the qualitative evidence collected. *Theory 1* claims that the EU's intervention in election observation is based on self-interest with the goal of strengthening the EU's position in International Politics. If this is true, we expect the EU to intervene in elections it considers challenging or prestigious (important at some level) or, alternatively, beneficial to its own international standing. To confirm this strategy, we are looking for the following evidence in the sources examined: election theme dominates the country strategy and the EU's external relations with that country; the agenda and the minutes of the EC's weekly meetings show the importance of the country and its election for the European Commission (see trips, and discussion with the entire Commission); the language used in the press releases highlights the role of the European Union in the process (especially compared to other countries and actors in the International Community) and tends to link election observation with peace and stability or a broader economic strategy. Even though the absence of this evidence doesn't mean that the theory can be falsified, it gives some indication that these motivations are not probably at play in that specific case.

*Theory 2* also states that the EU is self interested when observing elections in third countries. However, here, it is argued that the EU does so with the goal of strengthening its internal institutional integration, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. If this is true, we expect the EU to cast election observation missions under the light of a feasibility and a utilitarian rationales, with language highlighting the EU's internal politics and the benefits

the EU could internally gain from intervention. The minutes of the EC's meetings should reflect some debate about the decision to intervene.

*Theory 3* presents a case for altruism being the main motivation behind the EU's international election observation policy. If such a theory is true, we expect the EU to use a language exempt from any mention, in any shape or form. Therefore, we expect the EU to express its willingness to act for the benefit of another actor, an emphasis on the consequences of the host country instead of for the EU. The language used should emphasize the potential for good for the host country versus what the EU could benefit from this operation. In addition, the EU relationship with the third country should be cast under a humanitarian light instead of peace, stability, and development aid.

### **EU in Africa: Context**

The relationship between the EU and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) is a dominant aspect of the EU's development cooperation policy and its foreign policy (including its democracy assistance policy of which election observation is a part).

It began in 1964 with the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention. It continued during the 1975-2000 period: the relations between the EU and the ACP countries were then regulated by the four Lomé Conventions. This period was characterized by major upheavals on the international stage, "socio-economic and political changes in the ACP countries, the spreading of poverty, resulting in instability and potential conflict, all highlighted the need for a rethinking of cooperation." (European Commission 2009)

The Lomé Convention expired in February 2000 which provided each side with the opportunity for renegotiating the status of this relationship. The negotiations concluded with a new ACP-EC agreement which was signed on June 23, 2000 in Cotonou, Benin and regulates the relationship between the European Union and the ACP countries for the 2000-2020 time period. This agreement was revised, in 2005, according to a clause comprised in the

Table 5.3: Evidence (and sources) Presented in this Chapter

Sources	Theory 1: International Role	Theory 2: Institutional Integration	Theory 3: International Altruism
Country Strategy Papers(European External Action Service 2011 <i>a</i> , European External Action Service 2011 <i>b</i> )	Election is a priority, Election related action on the ground, Election as salient for peace and security, Long term strategy	Utilitarian, cost-benefit rationale is highlighted, EU market and internal politics highlighted, EOM as a tool for monitoring Aid Agreement(EU investments)	Election is not a priority but means to improve governance and human rights
EC Weekly Meetings Minutes(European Commission 2011 <i>a</i> )	Multiple trips to country and region around the election, High visibility, No real debate over decision (Commissioner has discretion)	Debate within EC about the merits of sending EOM - ad hoc decision needing debate (integration is not at its farthest)	
EU Press Releases(European Union 2011)	High volume, EU role is highlighted, Election linked to peace and stability in country and region, Observation as norm diffusion	Member States and internal politics highlighted, Election cast as groundbreaking for the EU	Role of local institutions and benefit to population highlighted, election observation as the right thing to do, country described as needing and deserving help

original agreement, in order to ameliorate the effectiveness and the quality of the established partnership (European Commission 2011*b*).

The Cotonou Agreement is based on five independent pillars: reinforcement of the political dimension of the relations between the ACP States and the EU; promotion of participatory approaches, involvement of civil society, the private sector and other non-state actors; development strategies and the objective of poverty reduction; the establishment of a new framework for economic and trade cooperation; the reform of financial cooperation (European Commission 2009).

For the purpose of this project, I will focus on presenting the clauses related to the first of these five pillars: the political dimension, which includes democracy assistance activities. The key elements of this pillar are: political dialogue; peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution; respect for human rights, democratic principles based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance; good governance.

The Country Support Strategy (CSS or Country Strategy Paper) is the main instrument used by the EU in order to determine the programming and allocation of grants to any country signatory of the Cotonou Agreement. This document is drawn jointly by the Commission and each partner country and it sets the general rules for using the aid allocated by the EU. Annual reviews are set to keep the country accountable to their engagements reflected in the CSS and can lead to a readjustment of the aid in future development aid packages allocated to the country.

Violation of the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement are regulated under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement which “lays out the possibility of taking appropriate measures in cases of violation by one of the parties of the requirements of essential elements of the agreement, namely respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law.”(European Commission 2009) Further, the Agreement “provides for a consultation procedure to resolve the situation by establishing the necessary measures [article 8]. However,

in the absence of an acceptable solution, appropriate measures may be taken, including suspension of the agreement, although this is a last resort.”(European Commission 2009)

Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement illustrates the idea that both development and political foreign policy objectives need to be taken into consideration when the EU engages in ‘cooperation’ relationships with other countries, especially democratizing or non-consolidated democracies. Over the years, Article 96 has been applied a total of 21 times in 14 countries of the ACP group including 12 sub-saharan African cases (EU Consilium 2011). Even though there is no clear linkage between election observation and article 96, free and fair elections (or the lack thereof) has been central in all cases where article 96 has been invoked: violations of democratic principles, violations of human rights, and flawed electoral processes, or coup d’états are the main reasons for invoking article 96 (Laakso, Kivimäki & Seppänen 2008). In a handful of recent cases, the EU sent elections observers between the crisis leading to the invocation of Article 96 (usually a coup) and the normalization of the relationship: Guinea-Bissau and Liberia in 2005, Mauritania in 2006, and more recently Côte d’Ivoire in 2010. This is not a very large number of cases, however because they are recent, this suggests that the EU increasingly sees election observation as an instrument to normalize its relations with the consultation countries or with its partners in general. Indeed, in cases of coups d’état, holding democratic elections is critical for constitutional rule and normalization of the relations with the EU (Laakso, Kivimäki & Seppänen 2008, p.54). It also seems to be advantageous for the EU to send EOMs after the normalization of relations in order to insure the change of behavior is sustainable. Consequently, “the EU should be able to support or send election observers to the elections in all countries where electoral policy has raised concern in the consultation.”(Laakso, Kivimäki & Seppänen 2008, p.95) This strategy -if in play- should be highlighted in the EU country strategy with any APC country pending consultation. I argued (see Table 5.3) that this evidence supports the claims of *Theory 2* with the EU using election observation to protect its internal interests.

# Chapter 6

## Case 1: Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006 (EOM)

### 6.1 Quantitative Wrap-up

Before focusing on the new qualitative evidence introduced in this chapter, I think it is important to look at what is known from the quantitative evidence I collected for each case.

The case studied here is the general election (presidential and national assembly) of July 30, 2006. This is a significant election because it was the first election in more than 40 years since General Mobutu had taken over the government during the Cold War. Therefore, the 2005-2006 electoral cycle in the DRC is considered as being transitional and post-conflict. Moreover, the organization of free and transparent elections was mandated by the peace agreement ending, or at the very least slowing down, the conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa: the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which was political negotiations on the peace process and on the transition in the DRC which led to the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the the DRC in Pretoria, South Africa, on December 16 2002 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011). Even though these elections occurred

after the end of the regional war, it is important to note that conflict was still occurring in the eastern most regions of the country, bordering Rwanda and Uganda. The qualitative evidence presented farther in this chapter will show that increasing and maintaining a degree of stability in the region is an important priority for the EU.

In the quantitative chapter, I used the very commonly used polity2 score from the Polity IV dataset. It is a combined score which is computed subtracting the AUTO score (institutionalized autocracy) to the DEMOC score (institutionalized democracy) resulting in a scale ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Even though this is not a perfect measure of democracy, it is a solid indication of the level of development of the country's institutions on the autocracy-democracy scale, especially relatively to other countries. However, looking at the individual AUTO and DEMOC scores as well as a couple of other measures such as the measure of the competitiveness of participation can help us get a better idea of the real quality of democracy/democratization in this country. The competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP) gives us interesting information regarding political competition which is an important aspect of assessing the level of democracy/democratization in any given country. This variable is measured along a 5 point scale (1-5). The competitiveness of participation can be: (1) repressed<sup>1</sup>; (2) suppressed<sup>2</sup>; (3) factional<sup>3</sup>; (4)transitional<sup>4</sup>; and (5) competitive<sup>5</sup>. According to our normative argument, the 'best' case for EOM would be the middle of the road countries, and mostly the transitional countries. Indeed, EOM would be very beneficial in environments showing an upward or downward transitional trend

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<sup>1</sup>"No significant oppositional activity outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party"

<sup>2</sup>"Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism, but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups"

<sup>3</sup>"Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor groups members to the detriment of common, secular and cross-cutting agendas."

<sup>4</sup>"Any transitional arrangement from restricted or factional pattern to fully competitive patterns, or vice versa."

<sup>5</sup>"There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups."

in competitive participation. Additionally, using these measures for each case should help us assess the normative need for an election observation mission in that country. Theoretically, we should expect countries with middle range DEMOC scores and high AUTOOC scores along with a transitional level of participation competitiveness to be the best “candidate” for Election observation missions.

Table 6.1: Quality of Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005-2007

	2005	2006	2007
Democracy (DEMOC)	-88	6	6
Autocracy (AUTOOC)	-88	1	1
Polity2	4	5	5
Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP)	-88	4	4

According to the Polity IV dataset (Table 6.1), the institutions of the DRC are during the 2005-2007 timeframe, in transition. (Marshall, Jaggers & Ted Robert 2010) Additionally, it is a brand new regime with no durability as it is issued from several year of transitional government leading up to the general election of 2006. On a normative point of view, based on a qualitative assessment of the institutions, it would be normatively sound to observe this electoral cycle as it could highly benefit from it. In addition, the future of this new regime, post transitional election, could be negatively affected by the absence of an EOM.

In terms of trade, the situation has improved during the time period 2005-2007 (Table 6.2). Indeed, from an EU vantage point, it is consistently suffering from a trade deficit: the EU imports more products from the DRC than it exports back. Such numbers could be due to the fact that the DRC is a resource rich country and that years of civil war and a poor transportation system makes it a poor trading partner for the EU to export its products. That being said, the situation seems to be relatively more balanced, with EU exports increasing during and after the completion of the transition process.

Both 2006 and 2007 show a significant improvement in terms of trade deficit and total

Table 6.2: Democratic Republic of Congo-EU Trade (in \$ billion), 2004-2007

	2005	2006	2007
Imports	905	798	996
Exports	598	719	868
Trade Balance	-306	-79	-128
Total Trade	1,502	1,517	1,864

trade between the DRC and the EU. The table shows that the situation started to change in 2006 with a decrease in imports from the EU which was accompanied by an increase in exports from the DRC to the European Union and even though the volume of imports picked up again in 2007, the trade deficit didn't go back to the pre-election levels and the total volume of trade significantly augmented at the same time. This is one indication of good relationship between the EU and the central African giant.

Table 6.3: EU Official Development Aid to the DRC (in \$million), 2004-2007

2005	2006	2007
214	222	158

In the case of official development aid (Table 6.3), we see that there was a very significant decrease in official development aid allocated by the European Community to the Democratic Republic of Congo the year after the election cycle of 2006. This is one indication that the EU was significantly involved in the electoral process which necessitated significant allocation of development aid in order to support the organization of this challenging event.

A very salient fact in the case of the DRC is that it is characterized by a very poor level of infrastructure development (Table 6.4). Indeed, the gigantic size of this country paired with very little, if not none, infrastructure make any type of country-wide project

a challenge. Communication across the country is very difficult which is illustrated by the very low potential for telecommunications.

Table 6.4: Telephone Lines in the DRC (per 100 inhabitants): 2004-2007

2005	2006	2007
02	.02	.01

While developing infrastructures, telephone lines often follow the roads network or alternatively, the railroads network. In the case of the DRC, very few roads, even less paved roads, have been built. Some railroads were built by the Belgians during colonization with the goal of linking the mines inland with the ports closer to the capital for export to Europe. After the end of colonization, very little more was developed and whatever was there was mostly destroyed by years of conflict. As a result, telephone landlines are relatively scarce in this vast country -same as the roads- making both physical and telecommunications very difficult.

One of the requirement for a credible election observation mission is to have access to a representative number of polling stations. Such an objective is very difficult to reach due to the lack of roads as well as telephones. Indeed, observers need, in order to do their job and for security reasons, to be able to communicate with the core team. This was a known challenge in the DRC. Nonetheless, the EU decided to send an observation mission for this important electoral cycle.

An interesting aspect of African communication is the growing significance and availability of cell-phones which makes communications very convenient and affordable. That being said, most people in Africa use cell-phone as ‘pay as you go’ and it is therefore difficult to get an idea of the number of subscribers.

Data found on the DRC shows the level of mobile cellular subscriptions to be close to 0 even though it is a known fact that many people communicate via cell-phone, a means of

communication which has proved to be a useful and relatively reliable means of communication across the DRC by election monitors.<sup>6</sup>

## 6.2 Qualitative evidence

Moving on to the analysis of the original qualitative evidence which will be used in a similar fashion for each case, in order to assess the different motivations behind the EU's election observation missions. In order to be able to systematically compare the evidence across cases in the final chapter of this section, I will use the same sources of evidence for each country: the EEAS website dedicated to each case,(European External Action Service 2011*c*) the relevant Country Strategy Paper (CSS),(European External Action Service 2011*a*, European External Action Service 2011*b*)public minutes of Weekly EC meetings,(European Commission 2011*a*) relevant press releases compiled for each case (European Union 2011).

### 6.2.1 Context

For the purpose of this study, it is interesting to offer a picture of the context surrounding the relationship between the EU and its individual partners. Here, to understand the EU's election observation policy, it is important to understand the broader context surrounding the EU-DRC relationship during the period around the electoral cycle of 2006

#### European External Relations with the DRC

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the African Great Lakes region has been the target of continued involvement on the part of the European Union.

The DRC is a very vast country of 2.3 million square-kilometers which is about the size of Western Europe. This central African country is rich in natural resources, including

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<sup>6</sup>As an example, the Carter Center had observers present in all 15 regions of the DRC and the core team in Kinshasa was able to communicate directly with all its observers several times a day during deployment.

minerals, forests, oil in addition to a very fertile land. There are about 60 million people, belonging to about 200 different ethnic groups. Poverty is -as it is in many sub-saharan african countries-extremely widespread and is one of the main cause of the fragile economic and social situation of this large country. The Human Development Index of the DRC is one of the lowest in the world and it is widely acknowledged that the situation of the DRC is a direct consequence of decades of dictatorship under President Mobutu which was followed by two successively very destructive wars in 1997 and shortly after in 1998. Today, the DRC is considered to be a fragile post-conflict state.

Currently, several issues form the basis of the EU-DRC relationship, according to the European External Action Service. The current Country Strategy Paper (CSP) covering the time period 2008-2013 commits about €584 million for Development Cooperation with the DRC, with the objective of supporting reconstruction in the DRC, while pursuing stabilization efforts in some regions of the country. The European Commission acknowledges that “peace and security and stabilization are clear priorities in the Commission’s relations with the DRC. The Commission (...) is following closely and participating actively to restoring peace and stability in the eastern part of the DRC.”(EEAS 2010) Further, the Commission states that it is “one of the most important donors in eastern DRC (€300 million since 2003) via its humanitarian assistance as well as through its rehabilitation and capacity building programs, has recently increased its support to the region.”(EEAS 2010) The Commission also advertises that together with the member states, it “is actively supporting sustainable peace in the DRC through Security Sector reform comprising the army, police, and justice reforms” with two EU missions (EUSEC and EUPOL) which have been on the ground since 2005 to assist and advise the DRC government to reform and integrate the army and police (EEAS 2010). The Commission is also extremely involved in supporting the policy and justice reform in this democratizing country. Finally, the Commission states that it “was one of the main donors (€165 million) supporting the Parliamentary and presidential elections

of 2006” and it is committed to a continued support of the democratization process through the next electoral cycle with elections planned for November 2011 (EEAS 2010).

### **Europe Country Strategy towards the DRC: 2003-2007**

The 2006 electoral cycle falls under the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for the time period 2003-2006. The paper reminds us that the EU had suspended official cooperation in January 1992 before renewing it officially in January 2002. Therefore, this strategy paper is the first one in over a decade and is a good illustration of the state of the relationship between the EU and the DRC right before the 2006 election. In 2002, the European Commission committed to disbursing €206 million before 2007 (République Démocratique du Congo 2011).

The strategy paper emphasizes the fact that the EU was instrumental in supporting the peace process in the DRC with both diplomatic and financial means. EU-DRC cooperation for the 2003-2007 time period was set to focus on institutional and democratic transition support with the ultimate goal of building a strong basis for the improvement of good governance and transparency and improve the future prospects of the country (République Démocratique du Congo 2011, p.29).

The CSP identifies as the major goal of this cooperation relationship, the support of this sensitive period of democratic transition, including building transitional institutions, helping these function, and finally support the organization and the electoral process itself (République Démocratique du Congo 2011, p.29). It is important to point that this Strategy was signed in 2002 and illustrates a medium term commitment and planning on the part of the EU in its relations with the DRC and its support of the electoral system.

In this document, the EC emphasizes that all instruments available for the purpose of community cooperation will be used in order to help the political process of national reconciliation, with the goal of bringing back peace and improve the respect of human rights and the fight against poverty. To fulfill this goal, the DRC was also formally identified as

a priority country for the budget line associated to EIDHR (budget for human right and democratization related activities such as EOMs) and was allocated €2 million per year for the 2003-2005 time period, in preparation for the election.

Contextual evidence and the EC CSP for the DRC seem to provide support for Theory 1 and the importance of role expansion as a powerful motivation for the EC's electoral support of the 2005-2006 election cycle in the DRC. Even though one can find trace of altruistic motives such as poverty reduction and human rights, the election related activities of the EU in the DRC are always cast under the light of the EU's role in the country and the region as a stabilizing and peacemaking actor in this troubled region of the world. At this point, there doesn't seem to be any support for *Theory 2*. On the contrary, costs associated to the electoral support activities of the EC tend to be highlighted are relatively significant suggesting a rather costly project for the EU.

### **6.2.2 Agenda: EC Weekly Meetings**

I have read all the public minutes for the European Commission weekly meetings with the objective of identifying the priorities of the Commission in terms of its policy activity. I have looked for indications of interest in either the DRC or in the electoral cycle reviewed (2005-2006) in order to get direct evidence of motivations behind the EC's international election monitoring policy in this Central African country. In the event that the public minutes seemed to hold back on relevant informations regarding the Commission's agenda, I made direct requests to the Commission under rule 1049/2001 regarding public access to documents of the EU's institutions. In some instances, my requests were granted. However, more often than not, in cases where the DRC or the Great Lakes Region were on the agenda, I was denied access to more specific documents. In most instances, the reason given for the rejection was that the document I had requested was an exception and that the rule 1049-2001 wasn't applicable to it. More specifically, I was told that "access to a document containing

opinions for internal use as part of preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's decision making process." (GEST DEM 2010/5277, email to author November 17, 2010). In other cases, the documents requested were deemed containing information or elements that were considered to be still relevant for EU-country relations and if released, might give rise to unfortunate interpretations having an impact on these relations. Acknowledging these limitations, I discovered the following information when analyzing the content of EC weekly meeting minutes.

Mentions of African politics at different level of observed generalization are counted and presented in table 6.5. Even though it is hard to get a sense of what exactly the content of the discussions at the EC weekly meetings is, we can get an idea of what topics were on the agenda which is a good -even if not perfect- indication of the interest showed by the EU on specific topics. In general, topics related to the African continent were brought up in a significant proportion of meetings each year (between 14% and 25% per year). For the time period covered by this data, Africa was mentioned in 18% of the meetings. Looking more specifically at mentions of the DRC during the EC weekly meetings, we notice that there doesn't seem to have been a lot of time allocated to the discussion of the DRC during full EC weekly meetings. We notice that the Great Lakes Region and the DRC have occupied a more important (even if very moderate) position on the agenda of the EC weekly meetings during the 2005-2006 electoral process, with the DRC being on the agenda 3 times in 2005 and twice in 2006. In 2005, the discussion focused on multiple visits by EU officials to the DRC, ahead of the elections (PV(2004)1684, PV(2005)1708, PV(2005)1709). This illustrates a significant and relevant interest in the country (as well as in the Great Lakes region as a whole). In 2006, the DRC appeared twice on the agenda: once, in PV(2006)1736, the Commissioners discussed a comprehensive EC-Council strategy towards the DRC. A closer look at the record wasn't granted which makes impossible to assert that the upcoming elections were part of the

conversation. However, the agenda of a second meeting, PV(2006)1755, refers to a discussion of the situation in the DRC in the context of the electoral process. It was even reported that the contribution of the EU to the electoral process was considered to be very important. Further, a study was presented during this meeting, showing that member states responded positively to the election process and the role of the EU, including the election observation mission sent by the EU to observe the process. The DRC wasn't openly discussed during the EC's weekly meetings in 2007 but the topic seem to regain some level of traction in 2008 when the DRC was discussed in the context of the deterioration of the situation in the eastern regions of the country. Both documents containing indications about the specific conversations on these topics were denied access.

The evidence shows that the topic of the DRC gained obvious traction in the weekly meetings of the EC during the 2005-2006 electoral cycle (2005 constitutional referendum and 2006 general elections). However, because we only have access to the meetings' agendas and the public minutes, a lot of information is therefore not available to the public which makes it even more challenging to get a sense of the rationale behind the decision to observe the electoral process. The evidence presented above only shows an obvious interest in the situation in the DRC around the elections and a more specific statement of interest in the election process itself.

Table 6.6 shows the number of trips made by Commission officials in the Great Lakes Region and in the DRC. I argue that this gives us important information on the EU's strategy in this country and region. Indeed, by sending officials on the ground, the EU increases the visibility of its programs, in this case electoral support and observation. EU officials traveled more frequently in the DRC around the 2006 election with 3 trips in 2005 and 2 trips in 2006. Such trips by political officials reinforce the credibility and visibility of the EU's professional teams on the ground and improve its international visibility by creating, among other things, press opportunities and signals a strong commitment on the part of the EU.

Table 6.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes

Year	Africa(%of total)	Great Lakes	DRC	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	0	0	0
2004	7(16%)	0	0	0
2005	11(25%)	1	3	0
2006	6(14%)	0	2	1
2007	6 (14%)	0	0	0
2008	11(26%)	1	2	0

Note that there are no EC meetings scheduled during the month of August. Considering that the elections in the DRC were scheduled for July 30, 2006, the low number of meeting dedicated to the elections in the DRC might be caused by normal scheduling conflicts.

Table 6.6: EC trips to DRC and Great Lakes Region (2003-2008)

Year	Trips to DRC	Trips to Great Lakes Region
2003	0	0
2004	0	0
2005	3 (PV(2005)1684*, 1701*, 1709)	2 (PV(2005)1684*,1701*)
2006	2(PV(2006)1736, 1755)	0
2007	0	0
2008	2(PV(2008)1850, 1856)	2(PV(2008)1850, 1856)
Total	6	4

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

I argue that EC minutes bring most support to *Theory 1* by highlighting the importance of the DRC to the EC (agenda setting topic and trips), but the fact that the DRC is topic of ‘classified’ debates suggests that the EC policy could have been internally motivated.

### **6.2.3 Language: Rapid Press Releases**

A more direct way to get a sense of the motivations of the EU is to look at the topics covered and the language used in EU press releases regarding the DRC.

I ran a general search for any press release by the EU, on the Rapid Press Releases website, with the key phrase ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’ in order to get all the press releases regarding the DRC (European Union 2011). Such a research endeavor is useful in order to get an idea of the revealed motivations for the EU’s general policy towards the DRC. Indeed, studying the content of the relevant press releases, we can take a better look at the language used by the EU to ‘talk’ about its relations with its partners, here the DRC. Finally, in order to identify potential motivations for observing elections, I also isolated the documents dealing with the elections in the DRC to look at the specific language used (or not used) by the EU in its statements regarding the election.

The search for “Democratic Republic of Congo” on the Rapid Press Release database resulted in 72 hits covering the 1997-2010 time period. In this project, we are only interested in press releases issued between 1993 and 2008, with a specific interest on press releases covering the time period off and around the 2006 elections. Therefore, we are looking at 56 press releases published between 1993 and 2008 and 27 between 2004 and 2008.

In order to understand the volume and frequency of EU press releases regarding the DRC I provide a very brief political timeline of the DRC. After years of conflict, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the DRC, Angola, Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia in 1999. However, this agreement was never completely enforced and/or respected and there was renewed conflict until a series of agreements were signed in 2002. The Luanda

Table 6.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on the Democratic Republic of Congo (1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	1
1998	4
1999	5
2000	3
2001	3
2002	6
2003	7
2004	10
2005	6
2006	6
2007	3
2008	2
Total	56

Agreement was signed in september 2002, which was followed by the Pretoria Accords, which established a power sharing agreement and required the organization of free and transparent elections. Further, an international guarantee was required: the transitional government was obligated -per the agreement- to put together an International Committee in charge of guaranteeing the implementation of this agreement. The EU became an official part of the transition as a member of the *Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition* –CIAT. CIAT became a pillar of the democratic transition in the DRC. It was mandated by the Pretoria Accord and was composed of representatives in the DRC of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russian Federation, UK, USA) as well as Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, South Africa, Zambia, the EU, the AU, and the MONUC (Mission of the United Nations in the Congo). The decision of the EU to accompany the transition towards free and fair elections in the DRC, according to the Pretoria Agreement, was made by the EU's General and External Affairs Council in a January 27, 2003 decision (EU Council 2003a).

With this timeline in mind, it is interesting to look at the variation in frequency of EU press releases regarding the DRC (Table 6.7). Between 1993 and 2008, this frequency peaked in 2004 with a noticeably significant increase starting in 2002 after the formal end of the congolese conflict and the normalization of the relations between the EU and the DRC after several years of conflict. That said, the DRC has been regularly on the radar of the EU starting at the death of the DRC's long time dictator General Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 and the relative easier relationship with his western oriented successor, President Laurent Desiré Kabila. The EU seems to pay special attention to the DRC during the transition, after 2002, and during the electoral process, after 2004. This was followed by a time period with less frequent position statements by the EU after the election cycle of 2005-2006.

During the time period 1993-2008, the main theme brought up in EU press releases on the DRC was the topic of peace, or more specifically the issue of conflict and instability

Table 6.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on the Democratic Republic of Congo (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	DevelopmentAid	HumanRights	HumanitarianAid	InternalPolitics
1993	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0	0
1997	4	0	0	1	0
1998	2	0	4	9	0
1999	3	0	2	9	0
2000	1	0	0	2	0
2001	0	1	0	2	0
2002	0	2	0	7	0
2003	5	1	1	3	0
2004	3	0	1	6	0
2005	6	0	0	2	0
2006	5	0	0	1	0
2007	0	0	0	2	0
2008	0	0	0	1	0
Total	29	4	8	45	0

in the country and the Great Lakes region (Table 6.8). The theme of elections comes second, far ahead of other thematic concerns such as economic, development or humanitarian considerations and internal EU politics or institutional integration. Thus, we can say that the EU's external relations with the DRC has been dominated by concerns for peace and democratic transition and cast in a positive light regarding the EU's observation of the 2006 elections.

The frequency of press releases on the theme of conflict/peace culminated in 1998 and 1999 during the first Inter-Congolese war and again in 2002 at the end of the second inter-congolese war and has been decreasing since. The press releases often highlight the regional character of the conflict. It seems that the EU gives its "opinion" on everything Congolese and appears to be somewhat micro-managing or at the very least watching the situation very closely, which reveals a strong interest in what is going on in that country and its surrounding region. There were 19 references to the topic of human rights and/or humanitarian aid which is also significant as it reflects a relatively important normative, altruistic motivations for the EU's policy towards the country. At the very least, it appears that these concerns are more important characteristics of the EU-DRC relations than are more conventional economic interests such as the ones reflected in trade or development aid references.

References to elections were quite frequent in the EU's press releases on the DRC. The topic was a frequent reference in the late 1990s (1997-2000) and then again between 2003 and 2006. The frequency of the transitional electoral rhetoric between 1997 and 2000 can be explained by the death of Mobutu in 1997 and the opening of a democratic transition window which closed up relatively quickly with the start of the war. However, it is important to note that even back then, the EU showed interest in the electoral situation of the DRC. Elections became an even more salient theme between 2003 and 2006 after the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the signing of the Pretoria Agreement when the international community and more importantly, the European Union became the guarantor

of the electoral/transition process and it looked like the elections had finally an increased likelihood of actually happening. When reading the language used in the election related press releases, I noticed that very often, the EU highlights its role in the process, giving its opinion, mentioning past contributions to the process and presenting itself as a leader, and a successful one at that (See figure 6.1). The language used shows a very deep involvement of the EU in internal Congolese affairs and more specifically the election process.

Figure 6.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in the DRC: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows leadership/role
E/50/97	1997	"The EU looks forward to the implementation of President Kabila's commitments ... to hold elections within 2 years."	
E/50/98	1997	"The EU was encouraged that the change of government in Kinshasa has taken place without widespread fighting."	
E/50/99	1997	"The Union restates its willingness to support the democratic process leading to free and fair elections, which should bring lasting peace, stability and prosperity for all the people of the country."	
E/50/97	1997	"A presidency led mission, including the Commission... will convey the Union's view to the new authorities and, in the light of their visit, recommend appropriate next steps, including at the political level, to promote the EU's objective in the region."	Yes: objectives of EU in the region
E/98/87	1998	"The EU emphasizes that peaceful solutions must be found to resolve the current problems so that the process of reconstruction and democratization can proceed."	
E/98/76	1998	"It is ready to contribute to those efforts and supports the demarches undertaken by the OAU and several African countries in that connection"	
PESC/99/13	1999	"The EU remains deeply concerned about the ongoing crisis in the DRC... and reiterates that the current conflict can only be solved through a negotiated settlement acceptable to all Congolese that will allow the DRC and other countries in the region to find peace, stability and democracy."	
PESC/99/67	1999	"The EU stands ready to give its support to peace, reconciliation, and democratization process in the DRC."	
PESC/99/86	1999	"The EU is ready to support national reconciliation, rehabilitation and democratization of the DRC and the process of reintegration of displaced people in the great lakes region into their countries of origin."	
PESC/00/111	2000	"The EU takes note of the installation of the Constituent and legislative assembly on 21 August 2000 in Lumumbashi... However, it has decided not to attend the opening ceremony of the Assembly on the grounds that it is not certain that this new institution is compatible with the national dialogue provided for by the Lusaka Agreement."	
P/03/80	2003	"The EU calls on the new Transitional Government to take the necessary action to achieve the objectives of the transitional period as laid down in the Pretoria Agreements... in particular the holding of free and transparent elections at all levels enabling the establishment of a democratic constitutional regime, and the formation of a restructured and integrated army."	
P/03/80	2003	"The EU welcomes the formation of the transitional government of national Union in the DRC. This is a fundamental step in the peace process in the DRC., and marks the acme of the path mapped out by the Inter-Congolese dialogue and the Sun-City and Pretoria Agreements."	
P/03/80	2003	"The EU calls on the new Transitional Government to take the necessary action to achieve the objectives of the transitional period as laid down in the Pretoria Agreements... in particular the holding of free and transparent elections at all levels enabling the establishment of a democratic constitutional regime, and the formation of a restructured and integrated army."	
IP/03/827	2003	"[President Prodi] note with great satisfaction the establishment of the transitional government of national unity headed by President Kabila in the DRC... This is an important step forward in the democratic process in Congo and I hope that it will lead the country towards lasting national and regional reconstruction."	
IP/03/1195	2003	"The EC has signed [an] aid program with the DRC in implementation of the Colonoou Agreement. This signing of this document demonstrates the will of the EC to support the DRC throughout the awkward transition to democracy and lasting peace both within its borders and throughout the great lakes region. Since its inauguration, the interim government has committed itself firmly to taking the country to the first free elections in its history. In response to this commitment the EC wants to make clear its intention to support the government throughout this arduous task" Poul Nielson	
P/04/35	2004	"the EU is concerned by the details in implementation of the Transition programs and by the political tensions and obstacles observed of late.... In these circumstances, the EU calls for the urgent application of the necessary measures to restore the governing powers of the States and its authority over the whole territory of the DRC."	
P/04/40	2004	"The EU urges the Institutions of the Transition and all its components and groupings to take all the necessary measures to organize elections and restore order and the rule of law throughout the territory of the DRC as quickly as possible."	
IP/04/766	2004	"President Prodi firmly reiterated the support given by the EC and the EU to the transition process provided for by the Pretoria Agreement. He recalled the efforts recently deployed by the Union and its Member States to lower the last few days' tensions. He assured [the DRC official]...that the EU's highest authorities were staying abreast of the situation and would devote all proper attention to it in order to support the transition process in the Congo."	Yes: puts forth the important role of the EU in the process
IP/05/565	2005	"The EC welcomed the adoption by the DRC National Assembly last Friday of a draft constitution that should bring the country's institutions into the modern era... Having studied the draft in detail, the Commission believes that the Constitution provides for the creation of a balanced semi-presidential system and paves the way towards stable democracy."	

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows leadership/role
P/05/61	2005	The EU reiterates that its support for the transition is based on respect for the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement and on unequivocal commitment under conditions of good governance - particularly, as regards the management of officials' and army salaries - on the part of the Congolese players to the complete success of the transition."	
IP/05/758	2005	Following the decision by the parliament of the DRC to extend the transition process, Louis Michel, reiterated the Commission's unwavering support for this process. Mr. Michel felt the six months extension, renewable once only, would permit foundations to be laid for the proper working of the democratic process. ... It is strongly committed to supporting the electoral process, for which it has granted ...EUR... and is monitoring it closely	Yes: puts forth the investment so far.
IP/05/1074	2005	In the DRC, Commissioner Michel will visit... to observe voter registration operations... The Commission has already granted EUR 89 million for the electoral process and is planning to increase its contribution... to meet shortfalls in the financing of the elections... voter registration which had started well in Kinshasa is proving to be more difficult in other provinces where there are problems with logistics, organization and security.	Yes: puts forth the investment so far.
IP/05/1591	2005	Following the referendum on the new constitution, Louis Michel travels to the DRC this Monday to take stock of the ongoing transition process. Having contributed EUR 149 million the EC is the leading donor of funds for this elections. ... Louis Michel will receive an initial report from the EUEOM. These initial findings will provide inputs for the preparations of the next elections, the first free and democratic elections to be held in the DRC for 40 years. Mr Michel will have talks with the main actors in the transition.	Yes: puts forth the investment so far.
IP/05/1591	2005	On 10 november, the Commission approved additional financing ... for the program support to the electoral process on top of its first contribution... This is the most aid ever granted by the EU for elections in a non-member country.	Yes: highlights the place of DRC in EU foreign policy
IP/05/517	2005	Javier Solana and Louis Michel have participated... in the inaugural ceremony of the European Police mission EUPOL in Kinshasa and expressed to Congolese authorities the EU's support for an inclusive transition process... The EU is by far the most important political and financial support to this process and would like to maintain this commitment until the end. EUPOL is the first civil mission for crisis management in Africa and is in line with the ESDP framework. Its implementation will be strengthened by the imminent launching of EUSEC, an advisory and assistance mission for security reform.	Yes: by far the most important support
PRES/06/88	2006	Council launches planning for an EU operation in support of MONUC during electoral process. The mission will be genuinely European and multinational....	
PESC/06/101	2006	The European Union thanks the IEC, MONUC, and South Africa, which have contributed to the success of this election day by overcoming the immense logistical challenges. The EU reaffirms its determination to support the DRC in its progress towards a stable democratic future.	EU is thanking other actors... shows some kind of leadership role.
IP/06/153	2006	EU and UN to launch humanitarian action plan for the DRC... Michel "We are committed to a peaceful, democratic and prosperous DRC. The successful completion of the transition process is vital for Congo but also for the stability of the Great Lakes Region as a whole. We should and will help the Congolese people, at this moment of hope, to rise to the challenge. And we will help them now to tackle the urgent humanitarian needs... the DRC is a good example of the EC's policy of linking relief, rehabilitation and development."	
IP/06/198	2006	Louis Michel... was in Kinshasa today attending the ceremonial adoption of the DRC's new Constitution. This event is a crucial set in the country's process of transition and in restoring the democratic rule of law. The EC... is the largest donor towards the electoral process... "Brought them closer to the free and democratic elections that will open the way towards peace and prosperity." He reiterated the EU's strong commitment to a successful transition process. ... On November 10, the Commission granted a further... to support program for electoral reform in addition to the first contribution... This is the largest grant ever made by the EC to support elections in a third country.	Yes: puts forth the important role of the EU in the process
IP/06/845	2006	the EC has approved a contribution ... to the program for the restoration of the judicial system in Eastern Congo. There have been a number of European initiatives in recent years for the restoration of the judicial system in the DRC... Michel: "The promotion of respect for democratic principles, good governance and restoration of the rule of law in the DRC would continue to receive priority support..."	

Table 6.9: Summary Findings: Why an EU EOM in the DRC?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: EEAS website and CSP	<p><b>Yes:</b> Election assistance is a priority in EU cooperation strategy and is strongly linked to peace in country and region; the role of the EU is highly emphasized both in the are of election assistance as well as other community interventions.</p>	<p><b>No</b></p>	<p><b>Yes:</b> Even if not especially emphasized, fight against poverty and to promote human rights are pillars of the cooperation strategy.</p>
Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	<p><b>Yes:</b> DRC and the Great Lakes made the agenda of EC weekly meeting relatively often, especially during 2006 election cycle; EC officials made several trips in the DRC and region, increasing visibility on the ground.</p>	<p><b>Yes:</b> One instance of discussion of a comprehensive EU strategy regarding the DRC, and refusal to give researcher access to some proceedings suggesting that the content contains some sensitive internal debates.</p>	<p><b>No</b></p>
Language: Press Releases	<p><b>Yes:</b> Peace and stability issues alone and tied to the 2006 electoral cycle dominate the content of press releases. EU uses language highlighting its role and strong involvement in the process.</p>	<p><b>No</b></p>	<p><b>No</b></p>

# Chapter 7

## Case 2: Rwanda 2003 (EOM)

### 7.1 Quantitative Wrap-up

The 2003 election cycle (referendum, presidential and parliamentary elections) is especially salient since it is the first one since the infamous 1994 genocide. The referendum of May 26 2003 asked voters to approve a new 204-article draft constitution. The previous presidential election were held on April 17, 2000. It was a special election in which members of the National Assembly and government ministers chose a president: Paul Kagamé won this special election. The august 25,2003 Presidential election and the subsequent parliamentary election of september 29, 2003 were the first direct presidential and parliamentary elections since the 1994 genocide making this election cycle especially unique and salient in this context of democratic transition and post-conflict stabilization. Indeed the previous parliamentary election was held in December 1988. After the 1994 genocide, members of the transitional National Assembly were selected under the provisions set by the Arusha Peace Accords. Transitional institutions were established in July 1994. Their mandate was to expire in July 1999 but the transition was extended until 2003 until election could be organized. Over the course of 5 months in 2003, Rwanda was the stage of a constitutional referendum and

a transitional, post-conflict general election, the first one since the genocide in 2003. It is important to reiterate that not only this electoral cycle was post-conflict but it was also the first one after a regime change and a long period of political transition.

Rwanda has a president, a prime minister, and a bicameral National Assembly divided between a Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The President is elected by plurality vote to serve a 7 year term. In the Senate, 16 members (total of 26 seats) are indirectly elected to serve 8-year terms and 8 members are appointed by the President to serve 8-year terms. In the Chamber of Deputies, the 53 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms and 27 members are elected by special interest group to serve 5-year terms (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011).

Table 7.1: Rwanda Democracy Scores, 2002-2004

	2002	2003	2004
Democracy	0	0	0
Autocracy	4	3	3
Polity2	-4	-3	-3
Competitiveness of Participation	2	2	2

According to the Polity IV data (Table 7.1), Rwanda is a relatively stable autocracy with suppressed competitive participation. Indeed, even though the 2003 elections were transitional, Rwanda is and remains more autocratic than democratic. However, its Polity2 score is at the bottom of what I consider middle of the road policy score. Thus, theoretically, I argue that Rwanda would only marginally benefit from the involvement of an EUEOM.

In terms of trade (Table 7.2), the EU holds a consistent positive trade balance with Rwanda. It seems that Rwanda is seen as a good trading partner by the EU and its market is good for EU products. The level of net trade has been relatively stable during the time period under observation (2002-2004) with relatively low net amount, compared to other African partners.

Table 7.2: Rwanda-EU Trade, 2002-2004

	2002	2003	2004
Imports	23	21	31
Exports	72	72	72
Trade Balance	49	51	42
Total Trade	96	94	103

In terms of official development aid (Table 7.3), the net amounts have increased somewhat significantly during the time period around the 2003 elections. Indeed, development aid surged in 2003, which can be explained by the election itself and the special contribution made by the EU in this area. However, it continued to increase in 2004 as the EU was able to interact with Rwanda's elected government after a decade of political instability and transition. Comparatively to its neighbor, the DRC, Rwanda seemed to be receiving significantly more development aid which is an important sign of where the interests of the EU lie.

Table 7.3: Rwanda-EU Official Development Aid, 2002-2004

2002	2003	2004
41	54	66

The level of infrastructure development, reflected by the data on telephone lines is relatively mediocre but it is far from being bad for an African country. Rwanda being a small country, it didn't suffer from many of the challenges suffered by the DRC regarding infrastructure development. Physical and telecommunication in Rwanda are relatively good, making election observation mission relatively manageable logistically.

Table 7.4: Telephone lines, 2002-2004

2002	2003	2004
.29	.29	.26

## 7.2 Qualitative evidence

### 7.2.1 Context

#### European External Relations with Rwanda

The EU's relationship with the Republic of Rwanda is characterized by several important issues. Development cooperation via the European Development Fund (EDF) is the main axis of cooperation between the two actors. Currently, for the period 2008-2013, the 10th EDF of the European Union for Rwanda totals €290 million. The main focus of this aid is poverty reduction with an emphasis on social services such as education, health and water. Additionally, Rwanda benefits from access to budget support and a Millennium Development Goals account. It is important to note that according to the EU, the two priority areas are rural development and infrastructure and that areas such as governance are lower-priority areas (European Commission 2010*e*). Even though it appears that good governance is no longer a priority area in the EU's relations with Rwanda, it is still quite active in governance and democracy assistance in this country. Indeed, the EU states that "governance issues in the post-genocide context deserve special attention." (European Commission 2010*e*) Further, as it will be emphasized with additional qualitative evidence (press releases), "Rwanda's legacy of genocide continues to loom large over the country's political landscape" and on the relationship between the EU and the central african state (European Commission 2010*e*). It is argued that "consolidation of democracy is crucial, particularly when considering the 2008-

2011 electoral cycle.”(European Commission 2010*e*) As part of a broader agenda of national reconciliation, poverty reduction, economic growth and stability, the EC “contributed €1.5 million towards various logistical aspects of the electoral process as well as capacity building of the National Electoral Commission.”(European Commission 2010*e*) The EC had decided to invest in the 2008-2011 election cycle well in advance of it, showing a well-developed strategy. Finally, it is important to note that the EU and Rwanda have been involved in continued dialogue under the auspice of article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. In this case, EU ambassadors and officials have been meeting regularly, for high level talks, with their Rwandan counterparts, to discuss a number of issues which could be grounds for sanction under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement. However, there has been little concrete action taken against Rwanda on the basis of violations of human rights and good governance clauses of the Cotonou Agreement (Laakso, Kivimäki & Seppänen 2008, p.95).

### **Europe Country Strategy towards Rwanda: 2002-2007**

In this dissertation I am interested in the 2003 election cycle and highlighting the motivations for observing this specific electoral cycle. Earlier, I summarized the current development cooperation strategy between the EU and Rwanda. However, in order to understand the decision to observe the 2003 electoral cycle, it is important to take a look at the strategy in place during this time period. More specifically, the 2003 elections fall under the 9th EDF cooperation strategy which covers the time period between 2002 and 2007 and highlights the area of priority in the relationship between the EU and the Republic of Rwanda (République Rwandaise 2002).

The EU’s assessment of the situation in Rwanda at the beginning of the century was that Rwanda was still highly scared by the 1994 genocide whose consequences were still being felt at the national as well as the regional levels. At the regional level, the EU noted that Rwanda was a signatory of the Lusaka Accords but still had troops in a large area of the DRC’s

territory for the purpose of protecting its own borders -even though government officials had said they would withdraw troops as soon as security along its borders was guaranteed. Further, Rwanda was accused of illegally exploiting natural resources and violating human rights in the east of the DRC. Overall, the public spending related to defense was still the most important items on the public budget even though it seemed to be diminishing. This was viewed with concern on the part of the EU (République Rwandaise 2002, p.1).

In the eyes of the EU, Rwanda was a very special case in the sense that it faced two different types of problems: structural problems several decades long and originating before independence; problems linked to the genocide and the civil war which only emphasized and made structural problems worse (République Rwandaise 2002, p.3).

Through this cooperation strategy, the EU encouraged Rwanda to participate, including through its foreign policy, to the realization of regional stability (République Rwandaise 2002, p.4). Further, this cooperation strategy emphasized the transition to democracy as a priority area of the EU-Rwanda cooperation relationship. The document is very explicit in emphasizing the importance of completing the transition process by the extended deadline of 2003 (previously set by the Arusha Accords for July 1999 and later postponed to 2003). It states that this process was to be validated in a referendum and finalized by 2003.

This document, signed by both EU and Rwandan officials and is therefore binding between the two entities, acknowledged the challenge undertaken by Rwanda moving on from a situation of political transition and power-sharing to a situation a political rotation while maintaining a climate of security and peace for all, at the national and regional level (République Rwandaise 2002, p.4).

Further, the EU and the other partners of the Republic of Rwanda recognized and supported the strategy of the government to place national reconciliation as the central pillar of the government strategy and linking it to any development strategy such as the EU-Rwanda cooperation strategy (République Rwandaise 2002, p.5). Post-genocide national reconcil-

iation through political transition and elections seemed to be the main goal of the EU's strategy in Rwanda between 2002 and 2007.

Similarly to its relationship with the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU emphasized the role of Rwanda in regional politics and considered it a pillar of the EU cooperation strategy with countries of central Africa. Indeed, there is a strong link that is established (by the EU) between the conflicts in this region and the democratization and development prospects of the countries involved. The EU consistently links Rwanda and DRC in its efforts in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. These two countries along with the conflict in Central Africa are obvious priorities for the EU's external relations and seem to take an important part in the EU's activities on the sub-continent. According to the strategy, the Lusaka Accords established a parallel between the disarmament process in Rwanda and the withdrawal of its own forces from Eastern DRC. The hypothesis presented in this Country Strategy Paper was that a peaceful and politically stable Rwanda would help with the stabilization of the DRC through the stabilization of the region (République Rwandaise 2002, p.7). It seems that the regional dimension was overwhelmingly influencing the EU's relation with Rwanda. Other key areas for cooperation were the continued process of transition to democracy, deeper national reconciliation, support to vulnerable groups, justice, reinforcing capability of institutions and civil society, along with reinforcing security and stability in the region. The document states that the contribution of the Community to conflict prevention and resolution would be especially important (République Rwandaise 2002, p.18-19).

When the document was written and signed in 2002, the prospects for election observation were only mentioned, nothing had been planned and the EU hadn't committed itself to participate in the process of electoral observation, leaving a door open in the event that if the conditions were met, the EC could use EIDHR funds, finance an election observation mission. This is a major difference with the DRC where it seemed to be a given early on that the EU would be observing the process. In the case of Rwanda, it seems that the

decision to observe was highly conditional on a political dialogue with Rwandan officials and the fulfillment of conditions on the ground. That being said, already in 2001, the EU was committed in helping with preparing the transitional electoral process, setting aside EIDHR funds for the period 2002-2004 for this purpose: EU election assistance in Rwanda seemed to be part of a long-term strategy even though highly conditional on conditions on the ground closer to election day (République Rwandaise 2002, p.22).

The contextual evidence provides element supporting theory 1. Elections were a top priority in the EU's relationship with Rwanda. Moreover, the EU establishes a strong link between the fate of Rwanda and the fate of its more important neighbor, the DRC, and the fate of the entire region. This relationship seems to be cast in a 'post-genocide' light in the sense that the lack of intervention during the 1994 genocide triggered a lot of involvement post-genocide with development, humanitarian, and democracy assistance flowing in from the EU. This can be seen as a way for the EU to rebuild and shed more positive light on its relationship and involvement with Rwanda.

### **7.2.2 Agenda: EC weekly meetings**

Rwanda didn't make it on the agenda of EC weekly meetings during the 2003 transitional cycle which is somewhat at odds with what could be expected considering the saliency of this election (Table 7.5). It looks like the EC discussed Rwandan affairs more frequently following this transitional election cycle and more specifically closer to the 2008 elections.

Table 7.6 shows that EU officials took 6 trips of importance in Rwanda between 2003 and 2008, however there was none that made the EC meeting minutes during the period of the 2003 election cycle, even though the EU sent an election observation in the field. A different account can be made regarding the 2008 electoral cycle which was preceded by 4 trips in addition to two separate trips in 2008. It appears that visibility for the EU's involvement in the 2003 election cycle wasn't necessarily a priority for the European Commission. I will

Table 7.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes –emphasis on Rwanda

Year	Africa(%of total)	Great Lakes	Rwanda	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	0	0	0
2004	7(16%)	0	0	0
2005	11(25%)	3	2	0
2006	6(14%)	0	2	1
2007	6 (14%)	0	0	0
2008	11(26%)	2	2	0

show, with evidence from press releases that this surprisingly lesser European visibility at the time of the 2003 elections can be understood in the context of post-genocide politics: especially in the context of the EU’s relationship with Rwanda since the 1994 genocide which seems to have taken a more subtle and normative turn. At the same time, Rwanda is geopolitically, the smaller neighbor of the DRC and we will see that the EU tends to see Rwanda as one of the piece to solve the bigger DRC puzzle in the Great Lakes Region.

Table 7.6: EC trips to Rwanda and Great Lakes Region

Year	Trips to Rwanda	Trips to Great Lakes Region
2003	0	0
2004	0	0
2005	2 (PV(2005)1684*, 1701*)	2 (PV(2005)1684*,1701*)
2006	0	0
2007	0	0
2008	2(PV(2008)1850, 1856)	2(PV(2008)1850, 1856)
Total	4	4

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

### 7.2.3 Language: Rapid Press Releases

A search on the Rapid Press Releases website returned a total of 56 documents for the time period 1993-2008 (European Union 2011). Even though Rwanda appears quite consistently on a yearly basis in EU press releases, it was, not surprisingly, a more salient topic in 1994 before, during and after the infamous genocide, with 21 press releases (Table 7.7). There was also more interest in Rwandan affairs around the 2003 election cycle with 10 press releases between 2002 and 2004, and a similar pattern was repeated for the 2008 elections with a marginal increase in coverage.

Table 7.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on Rwanda(1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	4
1994	21
1995	5
1996	1
1997	2
1998	2
1999	0
2000	1
2001	1
2002	2
2003	4
2004	4
2005	2
2006	0
2007	3
2008	4
Total	56

Table 7.8 shows the thematic content of the 56 press releases issued by the European Union on Rwanda between 1993 and 2008. It is interesting to note that the most important topic was the theme of humanitarian aid with 25 press releases. Most of the attention on this topic was during the 1994 genocide. Indeed, as for the rest of the international

Table 7.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on Rwanda (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	Development Trade Aid	Human Rights	Humanitarian Peace Aid	Internal Politics
1993	0	0	0	4	0
1994	0	1	1	17	0
1995	0	2	1	3	0
1996	0	0	1	0	0
1997	0	0	1	1	0
1998	0	0	1	0	1
1999	0	0	0	0	0
2000	1	1	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	0	0
2002	1	0	0	0	0
2003	4	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	3	0	0
2005	1	1	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0
2007	1	1	3	0	1
2008	2	2	0	0	0
Total	10	8	11	25	2

community, there was little, on the ground and visible, intervention by the European Union. Nevertheless, during this tragic episode of Rwandan history, the EU was very much active in delivering humanitarian aid. Complementing its humanitarian aid, the EU has shown consistent interest in the quality of human rights protection in the few years following the genocide and even though humanitarian aid hasn't been mentioned in Press Releases since the late 1990s, human rights are regularly brought up: there were 3 press releases in 2004 and again in 2007 regarding human rights in Rwanda. The topic of peace was also an important one for the EU in 1994 and has been less relevant since, although it is brought up regularly regarding the involvement of Rwanda in the Great Lakes region and more specifically its responsibility in the continuing conflict in Eastern Congo. The topics of elections, transition and/or democratization was brought up 5 times between 2002 and 2004 including 4 times in 2003. Even though this might not be as much as expected, it still supports a certain level of saliency, in the point of view of the EU.

Figure 7.1 shows the relevant content of the press releases on the topic of Election and Democratization in Rwanda. The text in bold reflects some qualitative opinion expressed by the EU. Similarly to the DRC case, the EU seems very opinionated on the topic of election in Rwanda and is expressing a strong and visible commitment to 'support', and not just observe and assess, the democratic transition in Rwanda. In PESC/03/2003, the EU highlights its "substantial electoral assistance," advertising its own role in the process. However, it appears that the EU doesn't showcase its own role as much in the case of the 2004 Rwandan election. Indeed, press releases regarding the 2003 elections seem to also highlight the fact that these elections complete the post-genocide transition (IP/02/182, IP/03/608) opening the possibility that at some level, this assistance could be considered as compensation for failure to act a decade before. Nevertheless, consistently with other non-election related press releases, the EU seem to strongly link democratic transition in Rwanda with solving the problems in the Great Lakes Region and more specifically in the

Figure 7.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in Rwanda: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows Leadership/role
IP/00/220	2000	Visit of Commissioner Nielson to Rwanda: <b>discussions with the government will focus on the country's transition to democracy</b> and the judicial follow-up to the 1994 genocide, where the EU's possible role in the process will be examined.	
IP/02/182	2002	President Prodi <b>meeting with President Kagamé</b> , the meeting mainly focused on the <b>democratization process in Rwanda and the upcoming elections as well as the adoption of a new constitution</b> , both to take place in 2003. President Prodi strongly <b>encouraged President Kagamé to continue the path to democracy</b> in his country and acknowledged the positive developments in the country towards political and economic stability. He particularly <b>stressed the need for free and fair Presidential and Parliamentary elections</b> on the basis of a pluralistic expression of political opinions... <b>The EC is studying the request to support the Referendum and the elections and expects to respond favourably...</b> It has been decided that <b>in principle the EU will mobilize an International Election observation team for the process...</b> 8 years after the traumatizing experience of the genocide, President Prodi indicated that <b>the EC would be willing to strongly support this last part of the democratic process following the genocide of 1994.</b>	
IP/03/608	2003	The EU is... <b>deploying an EOM</b> to follow preparations and conduct of the 2003 referendum to adopt a new Constitution in Rwanda...the referendum, to be followed by presidential and parliamentary elections within 6 months is an important step towards completing the transition phase following the 1994 genocide and establish democratic institutions in Rwanda. <b>The EOM is an expression of the EU's efforts to support democratization in Rwanda</b>	
IP/03/114	2003	In follow-up to the observation of the referendum of 26 May on the new constitution, <b>the EU decided to observe the presidential... and parliamentary elections...</b> which will complete the process of laying the foundations of democratic and sustainable institutions in Rwanda. The aim is to enhance the transparency of the two upcoming electoral processes and to boost voters' confidence.	
PESC/03/	2003	Declaration on Presidential election: The EU wishes to <b>underline the importance of the elections</b> , which constitutes a fundamental step in the country's national reconciliation process. <b>The EU attaches great importance to the democratization process and the establishment of the rule of law in Rwanda</b> within the framework of its relations with that country. <b>It was in that context that the EC and the member states provided substantial electoral assistance.</b> In the same spirit, an EOM was dispatched.	highlights the substantial amount of the assistance
PESC/03/	2003	Parliamentary election: On the occasion of the parliamentary elections in Rwanda, the EU wishes to <b>highlight the importance of the completion of the country's electoral process</b> , which represents a very important step towards national reconciliation and the consolidation of viable democratic institutions... The elections in Rwanda also <b>represent a key factor in the prevailing situation in the Great Lakes region...</b> The EU <b>reaffirms its willingness to assist</b> the reconciliation process in the Great Lakes region which may emerge the stronger after the latest development.	links the Rwandan situation to the Great Lakes region situation
IP/05/496	2005	Louis Michel <b>assured</b> the Rwandan President, Paul Kagamé, of the <b>EC's support</b> for any steps take to reinsert the ex-FAR/Interahamwe militia operating in the eastern DRC... he also reiterated the Commission's <b>support for the "reconstruction of Rwanda on non-ethnic lines</b> thanks to a process of reconciliation that delivers justice to the victims of genocide and a <b>stable and pluralist democracy</b> where fundamental rights are upheld.	
IP/07/118	2007	<b>EC welcomes abolition of the death penalty</b> in Rwanda: Michel: "This important decision confirms the political and democratic commitment of the country towards national reconciliation. This significant step sends an important signal to the international community, showing Rwanda's commitment and respect for human rights. I hope that this decision will encourage other countries in Africa to follow."	highlights EU objective: abolishing the death penalty is -obviously- not an international recognized pre-requisite for democratization, however, the EU is unilaterally pushing for it.
IP/08/123	2008	The EC will <b>deploy an EOM</b> for the legislative elections in Rwanda... <b>It is a further contribution by the EC to supporting democracy in Rwanda.</b> Ferrero-Waldner:"these are the second legislative elections since the adoption the Constitution [in 2003]. <b>successful and credible elections would be a positive contribution to the long term democratic development of the country. Given the importance that the EU attaches to Rwanda and the need for continued efforts to reinforce sustainable democracy there.</b> I have decided to deploy an EU EOM to make a valuable contribution to transparent and credible elections." Michel: "Rwanda has made remarkable progress in its economic and social development in recent years. Despite this progress, Rwanda still faces the challenge of the reconciliation process, due to the country's legacy of genocide. That's why the EU has been <b>actively engaged in support of good governance, justice reform and the rule of law</b> in Rwanda during this electoral period." In addition, <b>the EC is contributing to the financing of these elections</b> ... which will cover the whole electoral cycle 2009-2012.	Yes; highlights previous contribution, and long term commitment of the EU as well as financial commitment for these election... investment.
IP/08/134	2008	<b>EC welcomes</b> the orderly conduct of the elections Rwanda. Ferrero-Waldner: "These elections mark the beginning of an important electoral cycle in Rwanda and I <b>congratulate</b> the Rwandan electoral authorities for the correct organization of these elections and the mobilization of the Rwandan electorate. In comparison to the elections of 2003, progress has been made including in the areas of freedom of association and assembly at local level..." Michel: "This second national legislative election since the genocide in Rwanda has highlighted the important steps towards the consolidation of democracy in Rwanda. Significant progress has been made, and I <b>encourage</b> the Rwandese authorities and population to build on the positive outcome of the elections and to continue contributing with full confidence to the consolidation of a stable, peaceful, and democratic country. <b>The EU will remain fully committed to sustain</b> the country in its development goals."	

DRC. This rhetoric which slowly appeared in election related press releases around 2003 is reinforced in the language used to describe subsequent electoral assistance to Rwanda (IP/08/123). This supports the argument that even though there might be some altruistic motivations explaining the EU's electoral assistance to post-genocide Rwanda, highlighting the EU's role in resolving the Great Lakes puzzle seems to be the main reason for assistance.

Table 7.9 summarizes the findings regarding the EU election observation in Rwanda thus far. There is no support for theory 2. Even though there are evidence supporting both *Theory 1* and *Theory 2*, I will argue that the evidence is more consistently supporting *Theory 1*.

Table 7.9: Summary Findings: Why an EU EOM in Rwanda?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: EEAS website and CSP	<b>Yes:</b> In 2003, election assistance is a priority of EU strategy with significant line of funding; EU's intervention leads to Article 8 (Cotonou) application and evaluation of norm compliance; Good conscience fix (repairing role after lack of action during Genocide)	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes:</b> Humanitarian aid to Genocide victims is one of the main concerns and linked to political transition
Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes:</b> No trips to assess conditions on the ground or reestablish presence/relationship: election observation in principle, no matter what the conditions are.
Language: Press Releases	<b>Yes:</b> highlights significance of EU support and importance of process for the Region at large.	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes:</b> Numerous mentions to being post-genocide elections (guilt induced intervention or genuine altruism?)

# Chapter 8

## Case 3: Ghana 2008 (EOM)

The last general elections in Ghana were in december 2008. The presidential election was interesting in the sense that it was an open election since after two terms in office, John Kufuor wasn't running, leaving the seat completely open. Even though the past couple decades have been relatively politically stable, it is important to remember that from independence in 1957 until the early 1990s, Ghana was ruled by military leaders coming into power via coup and that a multiparty system was only introduced with the 1992 constitution. The EU previously observed the 1996 election when Jerry Rawlings was seeking -and won- a second term in office but it didn't observe the 2000 poll -when John Kufuor (opposition leader) ran and won against then Vice President John Atta Mills (elected in 2008)- nor the 2004 poll when John Kufuor was elected to a second term in office. This general election is neither transitional nor post-conflict, however, as I will show later, it is important to note that democracy in Ghana has been strongly developing since the early 1990s and that after one voluntary transfer of power between political parties, Ghana's democracy was facing a crucial and very salient test which it passed in transferring power over between parties for the second time in 2008. Going through the motions for the second time in a row, Ghana's democracy was further consolidating, making it a showcase for democratization in Africa.

## 8.1 Quantitative Wrap-Up

The data collected from the PolityIV dataset illustrates this process of democratic consolidation (Table 8.1). Indeed, Ghana has now the same democracy score as many of the Western democracies and there is no sign of autocratic institutions. However, competitive participation is still at the transitional level. Indeed, this highlights the fact that there has only been two peaceful and voluntary transfers of power between administrations since the 1992 Constitution and the beginning of the current administration. Therefore, Ghana's democracy is on the way to consolidation but still has ways to go in order to sustain a high level of competitive participation. Thus, even though Ghana is not a middle range democracy in terms of polity score, it can still benefit from EOMs to validate its process of democratic consolidation.

Table 8.1: Ghana Democracy Scores, 2007-2008

	2007	2008
Democracy	8	8
Autocracy	0	0
Polity2	8	8
Competitiveness of Participation	4	4

In terms of trade, the EU enjoys a positive trade balance with Ghana and trades comparatively higher amounts in net worth, making Ghana a relatively important trading partner for the EU (Table 8.2).

With regards to official development aid, we can notice a significant raise in the aid allocated to Ghana which illustrates a potential contribution to the electoral process (Table 8.3).

Finally, the level of infrastructure development is relatively high compared to the preceding two cases (Table 8.4). Ghana was named the shining star of Africa at independence and

Table 8.2: EU-Ghana trade 2007-2008 (in \$ billion)

	2007	2008
Imports	1571	1826
Exports	2330	2828
Balance	759	1002
Total Trade	3902	4654

Table 8.3: EU Official Development Aid to Ghana, 2007-2008 (in \$ million)

2007	2008
85	116

even though it suffered from serious socio-economic downturns before the early 1990s, it was able to build on the pre and post independence prosperity and develop its infrastructures which is illustrated by a high propensity of telephone lines as well as the fact that Ghana is now in track to graduate from the ‘underdeveloped country’ category to the ‘developing country’ category, reflecting a positive dynamic at play.

Table 8.4: Telephone Lines in Ghana, 2007-2008 (per 100 inhabitants)

2007	2008
1.65	1.62

## 8.2 Qualitative Evidence

### 8.2.1 Context

In Ghana, the President is elected by absolute majority vote to serve a 4-year term. In the Parliament, the 230 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms. In the general election of 2008, the incumbent, John Agyekum Kufuor didn't run, leaving the seat open for competitive elections. Consequently, the 2008 election cycle was made more salient (in terms of democracy consolidation). John Atta Mills is now the head of State and Government (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011).

#### **European External Relations with Ghana**

The EU describes Ghana in these terms: “located in West Africa, Ghana was the first sub-saharan African country to gain independence in 1957. Its political and economic history has been checkered but the prospects of political stability and steady economic growth appear good.” (European Commission 2010*d*) This is an extremely positive assessment for a sub-saharan country. In a nutshell, Ghana is a country with 22 million inhabitants. It is a low-income country which has access to a lot of natural resources: agriculture, gold, timber and cocoa exports are the supporting pillars of the economy. More recently Ghana has discovered off-shore oil reserves and is starting to exploit it. It is noted that the level of poverty in Ghana has dramatically decreased in recent years. Moreover, a very rare event in sub-saharan Africa, Ghana is predicted to fulfill its Millennium Development Goals by the 2015 deadline. Further, it is emphasized that “Ghana has achieved great progress in the area of governance and human rights.” (European Commission 2010*d*) More importantly, the EU states that “in December 2008, Ghana conducted presidential and parliamentary elections that international observers including EUEOM described as open, transparent and highly competitive. Ghana thus reaffirmed its political maturity and its commitment to peace and

democracy.” (European Commission 2010*d*). Overall, Ghana is described in very positive terms by the EU.

As it is the case with most sub-saharan African countries, development cooperation is the main pillar of EU-Ghana relations. Therefore, “under the 10th EDF(2008-2013), the EC and Ghana signed a Country Strategy Paper(CSP) with a a budget of €367 million (...) aiming at improving the alignment of development assistance with the government’s Growth and Poverty Reduction strategy.”(European Commission 2010*d*) The EU’s cooperation with Ghana focuses on three areas: transport connectivity and regional integration, governance and society in national dialogue and decision making, and strengthening the practice of democracy. Further, “as one of the few non-LDC countries in West-Africa, Ghana initiated an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU in December 2007,” which opened access to full duty and quota free access to the EU market (European Commission 2010*d*). Based on the statements posted online and the EU’s own description of its relationship, Ghana is portrayed much more like a partner instead of a simple recipient of aid to development.

### **EU Country Strategy towards Ghana, 2008-2013**

In the EU’s country strategy paper accompanying the 10th EDF, Ghana is described in extremely flattering terms:

“Ghana, the ‘shinning star’ of Africa at independence in 1957, experienced political and economic shocks that led to a deterioration of living standards. From the mid-nineties, macroeconomic stability has improved considerably and Ghana’s democratic gains were impressive. At the moment, Ghana faces no external threats and plays a key stabilizing role in the otherwise troubled West African region.”(Ghana 2007)

Ghana is, according to the EU, a relatively trouble free country and acts as a stabilizing force on the sub-continent, at the very least in the West-African region. The EU seems to see Ghana as a relatively true partner instead of just a recipient of aid. As a consequence, it seems that the EU's involvement in internal affairs of Ghana is expected to be limited. Nevertheless, the EU decided to observe the election process in 2008 even though Ghana was deemed a consolidated democracy. We will see that in this case, it seems that the EU was trying to highlight Ghana as a the 'shinning star' it was and has once more become in order to potentially influence the paths of other countries in the region.

### 8.2.2 Agenda: EC weekly meetings

Table 8.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes

Year	Africa(%of total)	West Africa	Ghana	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	1	1	0
2004	7(16%)	1	0	0
2005	11(25%)	2	0	0
2006	6(14%)	0	0	0
2007	6 (14%)	1	0	0
2008	11(26%)	2	1	0

According to the data presented in table 8.5, Ghana is not a priority topic for discussion during EC weekly meetings. Indeed, even though, the region of West Africa is marginally more discussed than Ghana, the latter is only on the agenda twice between 2003 and 2008. Both times the discussion is related to EU officials visiting the country (table 8.6). Even though it is unclear whether elections were discussed at these occasions, both meetings and corresponding trips to Ghana coincide with subsequent elections (in 2004 and 2008). No matter whether or not elections were the trigger for the trip, it does signal some interests, on the part of the EU, in Ghanaian affairs and increases the visibility of the EU on the ground which is necessary for role development.

Table 8.6: EC trips to Ghana and West Africa Region

Year	Trips to Ghana	West Africa
2003	1(PV(2003)1610)	1(PV(2003)1610)
2004	0	1(PV(2004)1678)
2005	0	1(PV(2005)1685)
2006	0	0
2007	0	1(PV(2007)1772)
2008	1(PV(2008)1842)	1(PV(2008)1844)
Total	2	5

### Language: Rapid Press Releases

A search on the EU Rapid Press Release website for key word ‘Ghana’ returned 14 hits which is significantly less than the 2 preceding cases (Table 8.7). Overall, it signals that there is a lot less going on in Ghana that is a concern for the EU. In other words, the EU doesn’t feel the need to release a statement on what is going on in Ghana on a regular basis. Thus, for example, there wasn’t a single press release on Ghana between 1993 and 1995 and between 1997 and 2000. There was significantly more interest in Ghana in 2008 which coincides with the elections that were observed by the EU.

Now, looking at the themes discussed in the press releases, we notice that most of the press releases were about elections in Ghana (Table 8.8). Indeed, 2 statement were released regarding the transitional 1996 election which was observed by the EU, 1 statement was released about the 2000 election, an other one was released on the 2004 polls, and finally 2 were released on the 2008 election.

The content analysis of the press releases released by the EU on Ghana confirms the argument that Ghana is, for the EU, more a partner than a recipient of assistance. As such, the EU seems more reluctant, or even disinterested, to interfere either verbally or actively

Table 8.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on Ghana(1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	2
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	1
2002	1
2003	0
2004	3
2005	0
2006	0
2007	2
2008	5
Total	14

Table 8.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on Ghana (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	Development Aid	Trade	Human Rights	Aid	Humanitarian	Peace	Internal Politics
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	6	4	1	0	0	0	0	0

on the ground, in the internal affairs of Ghana. However, the EU seems eager to release statements about every election in Ghana which is interesting considering that it has only observed the 1996 election and more than a decade later, the 2008 election but didn't observe the two cycles in between.

Figure 8.1 highlights the language used by the EU in election related press releases. In each case (8 total), the EU highlights its role and contribution in the process while at the same time emphasizing the unique character of the Ghana case. Indeed, the EU is showcasing Ghana as an example of successful democratic transition and transfer of power with the objective of diffusing the norm to neighboring countries (IP/08/167, IP/08/191 for example).

I argue that the EU observed the 2008 election motivated by both normative and role considerations. Indeed, validating the 2008 election and a second partisan transfer of power at the head of the country helps Ghana graduate from the democratic transition process and the need for requesting election observation in the future. Further, the fact that the EU didn't observe the preceding two electoral cycles suggest that it didn't think it would be a sound strategic decision. At the same time, because the EU highlights its supporting role during the entire democratization process, being one of the organizations validating the 2008 election allows the EU to associate itself to the success, in addition to being a vector for the diffusion of the democratic transition and democratic election norm in the region by advertising the Ghanaian success.

As reflected in table 8.9, I suggest that the EOM sent by the EU in Ghana in 2008 was mostly motivated by role promotion concerns. Indeed, there wasn't a real need for this election to be observed by the EU, especially since the previous two elections were not observed. However, the 2008 elections was the opportunity for the EU to highlight successful democracy assistance and promotion in a sub-saharan country which is, let's be honest, relatively rare. Thus, I must recognize that the level of supporting evidence is relatively

Figure 8.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in Ghana: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows Leadership/ Role
PESC/ 96/93	1996	Declaration by the Presidency on the forthcoming elections in Ghana: "The EU welcomes the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections which are due to take place in Ghana on 7 December as an important further step forward in Ghana's democratic development." "In keeping with ongoing assistance to the electoral process in Ghana, the Union will provide a number of observers to monitor the December elections. It looks forward to the conduct of these elections in a free and fair manner, the results of which should thus be respected by all parties involved."	highlights ongoing assistance
PESC/ 96/113	1996	Declaration by the Presidency on the elections in Ghana: "The EU notes the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections... In particular, it is pleased to learn that the international election observers have found that the polling and counting was free, fair and transparent. In welcoming this consolidation of the democratic process, the Union congratulates the Government, opposition parties and the people of Ghana on the manner in which the elections were conducted... The conduct of the elections and the high turnout by the electorate have reaffirmed the commitment of the people of Ghana to democracy... The EU looks forward to building on its already warm relations and cooperation with Ghana and reaffirms its commitment to continued support for its social and economic development."	highlights quality of ongoing relationship
PESC/ 01/1	2001	Declaration on elections in Ghana: "The EU welcomes free, fair and transparent elections held in Ghana [in December 2000]... The orderly manner in which the elections took place is a clear sign of the commitment of the Ghanaian people, the authoritarian and the political parties to continue the consolidation of democracy in the country, in a spirit of tolerance and national unity... The EU congratulates all parties concerned for this achievement and expresses its willingness to contribute, in continued partnership with the Ghanaian authorities, to the economic and social development of the country, to the benefit of all Ghanaians."	highlights ongoing partnership
PESC/ 04/139	2004	Declaration on the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Ghana: "The EU welcomes the democratic and transparent manner in which the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Ghana on 7 December 2004 and wishes to extend its warmest congratulations... the Ghanaian people have given a clear sign of their commitment to the further consolidation of democracy in their country. The high turnout and the orderly and peaceful conduct of the elections demonstrate the maturity of the democratic process in Ghana. The EU looks forward to continuing its partnership with Ghana and expresses its willingness to contribute to the political, economic and social development of the country."	highlights partnership and contribution
IP/ 08/167 4	2008	The EC will deploy an EU EOM for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Ghana... to support democracy in Ghana. Ferrero-Waldner: "Ghana has been a positive example of democracy in Africa over the past 16 years. The upcoming elections in Ghana provide an opportunity to consolidate and further strengthen democracy in Ghana. The EU EOM is a contribution to strengthening confidence of all electoral stakeholders in the credibility of all stages of the electoral process and in the democratic structures in the country. I am confident that the EU EOM's comprehensive assessment will help the electoral authorities in further improving the conduct of the elections." Louis Michel: "Ghana has achieved impressive progress in terms of democratization, good governance and respect for human rights and can serve as a model for other countries in the West African region and in Africa. The EU EOM complements our cooperation strategy with Ghana that focuses, inter alia, on supporting good governance. The EU is one of Ghana's most important development partners and has been providing substantial funds to assist the country in implementing its development policy reform agenda."	Highlights relationship with Ghana and EU role as a partner for Ghana. Also highlights the fact that Ghana is an example in the region, a role for other countries.
IP/ 08/191 6	2008	Elections 2008: Ferrero-Waldner: "I congratulate the people of Ghana for their strong commitment to the democratic process in their country. I also want to commend the authorities for the orderly conduct of the elections, which took place in an open, transparent, and competitive environment. I am pleased to see that the fundamental freedoms such as the right to stand for election, the right to vote and the freedoms of assembly, expression and movement were widely respected. These elections can hopefully serve as a good example for upcoming elections in other countries on the African continent." Michel: "These are the fourth competitive general elections in Ghana since 1996. Once again, the proper conduct of these elections illustrate Ghanaian political maturity and represent an important milestone in further consolidating and strengthening Ghanaian democracy. The Ghanaian people showed their commitment to peace and the democratic development of their country and I trust that other countries in the region will follow this path. The EU remains engaged with Ghana and will continue to support the country's democratic and economic development in line with the EU-Ghana country strategy."	highlights EU's engagement to Ghana and the role of Ghana as a role model for other countries.

lower than for the preceding two cases where the observation of elections seem to be part of a bigger, more developed external strategy.

Table 8.9: Summary Findings: Why an EU EOM in Ghana?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: EEAS website and CSP Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	No	No	No
Language: Press Releases	Yes	No	No
	Yes: Highlights significance of EU support and importance of process as an example for other countries; The EU seems to take part ownership of that success	No	YesEOM is highlighted as a reward and validation of successful democratization

# Chapter 9

## Case 4: Burkina Faso 2005 (No EOM)

### 9.1 Quantitative Wrap-up

Table 9.1: Burkina Faso Democracy Scores, 2004-2006

	2004	2005	2006
Democracy	2	2	2
Autocracy	2	2	2
Polity2	0	0	0
Competitiveness of Participation	4	4	4

In November 2005, Blaise Compaoré, President since he came to power in a coup in 1987 won a third consecutive term in office. The EU never observed elections of any kind in Burkina Faso. The 2005 presidential election is neither a post-conflict nor a transitional election: it was part of the regular electoral cycle in Burkina Faso which started in 1991 with the presidential election followed by regular presidential elections in 1998 and then in 2005. Democracy in this Western African country seems to be relatively consolidated, however, there hasn't been any transfer of power between parties since the military coup of 1987. In addition, even though Blaise Compaoré is at the origin of many democratic reforms and the

sustainable democratization of his country, he has been in power for several decades now and doesn't seem to be facing any strong opposition.

Burkina Faso is located right in the middle of the polity2 score scale (0) with both democratic and autocratic institutions (Table 9.1). At the same time, the competitiveness of participation is still at a transitional level which is consistent with the fact that the ruling party doesn't seem to be facing any strong opposition -even if the latter is allowed- and there has never been a voluntary transfer of executive leadership.

The EU sustains a positive trade balance with Burkina Faso although the EU is importing more and more from the western african country (Table 9.2). The ratio of exports to imports went from 11 to 1 in 2004 to 3 to 1 in 2006. Even though Burkina Faso's economy is still very attractive for EU products, the EU seem to increasingly enjoy products from Burkina as well.

Table 9.2: EU- Burkina Faso Trade, 2004-2006 (in \$ billion)

	2004	2005	2006
Imports	38	50	131
Exports	414	486	498
Trade Balance	376	436	367
Total Trade	452	536	629

In terms of development aid, there was a peak in 2005 which coincides with the 2005 presidential election (Table 9.3). Like many other African countries, Burkina Faso benefits from significant official development aid from the EU. Even though there was a slight increase in 2005, it is unclear if this was driven only by the electoral process. This possibility will be explored using qualitative evidence.

The level of infrastructure development illustrated with the telephone lines data, is somewhat middle-range compared to other cases explored here (Table 9.4). In other words, communication in Burkina Faso shouldn't represent too much of a logistical challenge compared

Table 9.3: EU Official Development Aid to Burkina Faso, 2004-2006 (in \$ million)

2004	2005	2006
134	201	146

to other countries such as the DRC or to a lesser extent Rwanda. At the same time, infrastructures in Burkina Faso are not as developed as the ones in Ghana or the Gambia.

Table 9.4: Telephone Lines in Burkina Faso, 2004-2006 (per 100 inhabitants)

2002	2003	2004
.7	..83	.95

## 9.2 Qualitative Evidence

In Burkina Faso, the President is elected by absolute majority vote. The Prime minister is appointed by the President with the approval of the parliament. In the National Assembly, 111 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms.

Under the current Constitution, there were presidential elections in 1991, 1998, and 2005. Here we are interested in the 2005 presidential election. In this election, Blaise Compaore was reelected with 87.5% of the vote. Several things are important to note regarding this election. First, the Constitution was amended in April 2000 to reduce the presidential term from seven to five years, enforceable as of 2005, and to allow the president to be reelected only once. Second, despite this, president Compaore ran for and successfully won a third term in office arguing that the new rule wasn't retroactive. In the light of Compaore's decision

to run, the opposition candidate Hermann Yameogo of the National Union for Democracy and Development (UNDD) decided to boycott the election and the main opposition party in Burkina Faso, the African Democratic Rally-Alliance for Democratic and Federation (ADF-RDA) decided to support Blaise Compaoré (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011). This was an interesting turn of event and, as I will show with supporting evidence, the EU didn't seem to take any overt interest in this situation staying quite silent about it even though such acts seem to go against many democratic principles and are not evident signs of democratic consolidation.

### **9.2.1 Context**

#### **European External Relations with Burkina Faso**

Burkina Faso is a landlocked country of Western Africa which is ranked one of the poorest in the world, and contrary to many of its western african neighbors, doesn't benefit from many natural resources. Moreover, this already impoverished environment is the constant target of a very difficult Sahelian climate with scarce rainfall. The main production of the economy is cotton whose production is highly dependent on rainfall. The latter being scarce and not reliable, the agricultural production of cotton is not always a given and is not always able to support the local economy. Indeed, the economy is heavily dependent on the export of cotton and to some extent gold. With the unreliable climate and the falling trading price for cotton, Burkina Faso has been struggling to maintain its economy afloat. The EU accounts that about 80% of the working population is employed in the agricultural sector, which itself accounts for about 37% of the gross domestic product. Even though it remains informal, the service industry has recently been growing significantly (European Commission 2010*a*).

The EU's relationship with Burkina Faso is centered on the goal of fighting against poverty which is itself based on four pillars: to speed up growth and ensure it is equitable; to

ensure access for the poor to basic social services and social protection; to increase employment and income-producing opportunities for the poor in an equitable way; and to promote good governance (European Commission 2010*a*).

For the purpose of this dissertation, let's focus on the last goal: to promote good governance. The EU states that "in terms of governance, the country has been attempting to strengthen democracy and the rule of law since the early 1990s, but progress remains to be done." The support to improving good governance is one of the main objective of the 10th EDF between the EU and Burkina Faso (European Commission 2010*a*).

### **Europe Country Strategy towards Burkina Faso: 2001-2007**

As noted above, the EU's strategy towards Burkina Faso is based on its Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty. In the case of Burkina Faso, fighting poverty is the main objective of the EU's policy, with every else used as a means to reach this goal (République du Burkina Faso 2002, p.6). It is also important to note that even though promoting good governance is one of the axis of the EU policy in Burkina Faso, the EU considers that Burkina Faso is a consolidating democracy. Political instability is not an issue in this country, at least not as much of an issue as poverty might be.

In an analysis of the political situation of Burkina Faso, the history of the Upper Volta and later Burkina Faso is described as being quite agitated since its independence in 1960. Indeed, since independence, there have been four republics, either parliamentary or presidential systems, and frequent military governments including the government of Captain Sankara between 1983 and 1987 which called itself democratic and popular. After the Sankara regime ended in 1987, a new regime led by Captain Blaise Compaoré seemed to open up the political environment. In 1991, a new Constitution was adopted upholding the rule of law and introducing a multiparty system in Burkina Faso. Blaise Compaoré was elected via universal suffrage in december 1991(République du Burkina Faso 2002, p.12-13). The document states

that since then, there has been a continued process of democratic consolidation with regular and peaceful elections with a continued increase in political participation. In addition, it is noted that the democratic transition and consolidation processes have been relatively easier in Burkina Faso than in many of its neighbors. The EU seems to be highlighting Burkina Faso's democratic successes in this strategy paper. It is important to note that there hasn't been a true transfer of partisan control of the states' institutions and Blaise Compaoré is still in power and is often praised by European leaders. Therefore, it is not obvious here that electoral politics are a priority in the EU's relations with Burkina Faso. The document further states that the partnership between the European Community and Burkina Faso goes back 40 years and that aid was reinforced significantly at the beginning of the 1990s when the Community became the first international donor in 1997 (République du Burkina Faso 2002, p.17).

### 9.2.2 Agenda: EC weekly meetings

Table 9.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes

Year	Africa(%of total)	West Africa	Burkina Faso	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	1	1	0
2004	7(16%)	1	0	0
2005	11(25%)	2	0	0
2006	6(14%)	0	0	0
2007	6 (14%)	1	0	0
2008	11(26%)	2	0	0

Burkina Faso made the agenda of European Commission weekly meetings only once between 2003 and 2008 (Table 9.5). This instance was related to the only trip made by a high level EU official in the Western African country (Table 9.6). Considering that there were 5 trips made by EU officials to West Africa during this time period, I suggest that Burkina Faso is not a strategic country for the EU.

Table 9.6: EC trips to Burkina Faso and West Africa Region

Year	Trips to Burkina Faso	West Africa
2003	1(PV(2003)1610)	1(PV(2003)1610)
2004	0	1(PV(2004)1678)
2005	0	1(PV(2005)1685)
2006	0	0
2007	0	1(PV(2007)1772)
2008	0	1(PV(2008)1844)
Total	1	5

### 9.2.3 Language: Rapid Press Releases

The amount and frequency of press releases by the EU between 1993 and 2008 confirms the lack of EU interest in the internal affairs of Burkina Faso suggested by the lack of visibility of the EU in the West African country (Table 9.7). Indeed, only 7 press releases on Burkina Faso were published between 1993 and 2008. Moreover, it is important to notice that there wasn't a single statement released by the EU during the year preceding and the year of the 2005 polls which shows a lack of substantial involvement and interest in the process and its outcome.

The main topic mentioned in EU statements on Burkina Faso is humanitarian aid and the respect for human rights (Table 9.8). This is consistent with the EU's strategy for fighting poverty in Burkina Faso, showing altruistic motives. The only election related statement issued by the EU concerned a speech delivered by EU President Prodi in 2003 in Ouagadougou, in which he praised Burkina Faso's "long democratic tradition" and its long time President, Blaise Compaoré as a democratic leader and a positive force in the country and the region. It seems that Burkina Faso is, in the eyes of EU leaders, a successful case of democratization, and therefore could also benefit from election observation as a way

Table 9.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on Burkina Faso(1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	0
1994	0
1995	1
1996	0
1997	1
1998	0
1999	0
2000	1
2001	0
2002	1
2003	1
2004	0
2005	0
2006	1
2007	1
2008	0
Total	7

Table 9.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on Burkina Faso (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	Development Trade Aid	Human Rights	Humanitarian Peace Aid	Internal Politics
1993	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	1	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0	1	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	1	0
2001	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	2	0	1	0
2003	1	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	1	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0	0
2008	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1	3	1	3	0

to validate the process. However, the EU didn't observe the 2005 polls, suggesting that normative, altruistic motivations only were not quite enough to justify intervening.

Overall, it seems that the relationship between the EU and Burkina faso is relatively uneventful and quiet: there seems to be very little going on in Burkina Faso that raises EU's need to issue statements or intervene (Table 9.9).

Figure 9.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in Burkina Faso: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows Leadership/Role
SPEECH/03/549	2003	Speech of President Prodi to the National Assembly of Burkina Faso: praise of Burkina Faso and highlights value of EU-Burkina Faso cooperation. Praises the long tradition of democracy in Burkina Faso and the president Blaise Compaoré	Yes: highlights value of EU-Burkina Faso cooperation, praises long history of democracy....

Table 9.9: Summary Findings: Why not an EU EOM in Burkina Faso?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: Ev-EEAS website and CSP	No	No	Yes: Good governance as one of the pillars in the EU's Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty in Burkina Faso.
Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	No	No	No
Language: Press Releases	No	No	Yes: Prodi's speech in Burkina Faso praising Burkina Faso's democracy and its leader: seems to fit "good example" case, at least is presented this way by EU officials

# Chapter 10

## Case 5: The Gambia 2007 (no EOM)

### 10.1 Quantitative Wrap-Up

In 2007, the legislative election saw the ruling coalition of President Yahya Jammeh tighten its grip on government and power. This election completed the electoral cycle started in 2006 with the reelection of President Yahya Jammeh for a third consecutive term. The Gambia is not a post-conflict society and is not considered to be in transition. Indeed, the Gambia has enjoyed relatively long periods of stability since its independence from British rule in 1965. The current regime is issued of a bloodless coup led by the current President Jammeh in 1994 which was followed by the adoption of a constitution and a presidential election won by Yahya Jammeh in 1996. Even though the new constitution introduced multi-party politics in the Gambia, the leadership prohibited the main opposition parties from participating in the elections (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011). A decade later, the state of democracy in the Gambia is the same: even though the country has been enjoying relative political stability (compared to many of its neighbors), it is still a mostly autocratic regime (autoc(5); democ(0); polity 2: 5) and competitive participation is still widely suppressed (2) (Table 10.1). The Gambia seems to be set in its autocratic ways and is low on the democracy

score range, out of the middle range category and doesn't signal any will to transition to democracy.

Table 10.1: The Gambia Democracy Scores, 2006-2008

	2006	2007	2008
Democracy	0	0	0
Autocracy	5	5	5
Polity2	-5	-5	-5
Competitiveness of Participation	2	2	2

The EU enjoys a very stable positive trade balance with the Gambia, with ratios of exports to imports ranging from 9 and 12 to 1 (Table 10.2). With relatively small amounts of net trade. Gambia doesn't appear to be a major trading partner of the EU. Even though the Gambia has enjoyed long spells of political stability, this hasn't translated into economic prosperity. Considering that Gambia is one of the smallest countries in Africa, and a country whose economy is centered on fisheries, we can't expect Gambia to be a major trading partner with the EU except for the fisheries market and access to fishing waters.

Table 10.2: EU-Gambia Trade, 2006-2008 (in \$ billion)

	2006	2007	2008
Imports	14	14	13
Exports	133	147	162
Trade Balance	118	134	148
Total Trade	147	162	162

The Gambia receives very small amounts of official development aid from the EU even though amounts have increase significantly in 2007 (almost 7 times) after the 2006 elections (Table 10.3). Here again, it is unclear and doubtful this increase was linked to the electoral process but further quantitative inquiries will help shed light on this aspect of EU-Gambia relations.

Table 10.3: EU Official Development Aid to the Gambia, 2006-2008 (in \$ billion)

2006	2007	2008
1.5	9	10

In terms of infrastructure development, reflected in the prevalence of telephone lines in the country, Gambia clearly has the benefit of being a very small country, making communication's infrastructure development that much easier (Table 10.4). Compared to many of its neighbors and other cases explored in this dissertation, the state of infrastructure development, shouldn't represent a significant challenge for potential EU intervention in electoral observation.

Table 10.4: Telephone lines in the Gambia, 2006-2008 (per 100 inhabitants)

2006	2007	2008
2.95	3.01	2.94

## 10.2 Qualitative Evidence

The Chief of State of the Gambia is the President, Yahya A. J.J. Jammeh, who is also the head of government. The Gambia has a unicameral National Assembly with 53 seats. The President is elected by popular vote to serve a 5-year term. In the National Assembly, 48 members are elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms and 5 members are appointed by the President to serve 5-year terms. The case we are looking at here is the legislative election of 2007. The previous legislative election was in 2002. The legislative election of 2007 follow the presidential election of 2006 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011).

## 10.2.1 Context

### **European External Relations with the Gambia**

The Gambia is the smallest country on the African continent and along with many of its African neighbors, it is one of the poorest in the world. Similarly to the previous case, Burkina Faso, the revealed main objective of the EU's strategy towards the Gambia is to contribute to the attainment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy adopted by the Government of Gambia.

The 10th EDF covering the 2008-2013 time period supports this strategy of poverty reduction through sustainable socio-economic development of the Gambia. The focus of the 10th EDF is on two different areas: infrastructure and regional interconnectivity as well as governance. Indeed, the EU's strategy assumes that poor infrastructures in the areas of transport and energy, along with low levels of human capital and governance related issues are the main culprit for low development (European Commission 2010*c*).

### **Europe Country Strategy towards the Gambia: 2002-2007**

As part the 9th EDF, the EU “proposes aid measures in two focal sectors, namely rural development and transport, capacity building being a non-focal theme.” (The Gambia 2001, p.1) In an analysis of the political situation in the Gambia, used as a background for the Country Strategy Paper, it is acknowledged that after independence, the Gambia became a multi-party democracy with elections organized regularly every five years for nearly three decades. However, for this entire period, the country was ruled by Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara and his Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) and democratic governance started to weaken in the late 1980s and 1990s as the governing party started to see opposition groups as a threat and started to suppress any uprisings and dissolving trade unions. In 1994, “dissatisfaction with inequitable systems and a slow rate of economic growth led to demands for change” which

came in the form of a military coup (The Gambia 2001, p.6). A process of constitutional reform led to the restoration of democratic rule in 1996.

The elections of 1996-1997 helped resume international cooperation between the Gambia and its major donors, including the European Community (The Gambia 2001, p.8). Further, it is important to note that the EC conducted a high level mission in 2002 within the framework of article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement and conducted a political dialogue in order to assess the Gambia's level of commitment and respect of the Cotonou Agreement. Overall, the EC country strategy paper paints a very positive picture of the Gambia, despite some issues with its democratic governance:

“Generally, the Gambia has a long democratic history and a reputation as a supporter of human rights. The 1996 Constitution contains all the elements for good governance and the structures of judiciary, legislature, and executive to ensure a non-autocratic system where sovereignty lies with the people. The Gambia people are open, outward looking and hospitable, at peace with their neighbors and welcoming to thousands of European tourists every year.” (The Gambia 2001, p.9)

This account is very optimistic and worthy of being printed in a tourist brochure. However, the fact that a country has the potential of becoming a consolidated democracy doesn't mean that it is or will be.

### **10.2.2 Agenda: EC Weekly meetings**

The Gambia never made the agenda of EC weekly meetings during the 2003-2008 time period (Table 10.5). Combined with the fact that there was no official trips by EU representatives to this small West African state during the same time period, suggesting that the Gambia was not a priority country for the EU (Table 10.6).

Table 10.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes

Year	Africa(%of total)	West Africa	Gambia	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	1	0	0
2004	7(16%)	1	0	0
2005	11(25%)	2	0	0
2006	6(14%)	0	0	0
2007	6 (14%)	1	0	0
2008	11(26%)	2	0	0

Table 10.6: EC trips to Gambia and West Africa Region

Year	Trips to Gambia	West Africa
2003	0	1(PV(2003)1610)
2004	0	1(PV(2004)1678)
2005	0	1(PV(2005)1685)
2006	0	0
2007	0	1(PV(2007)1772)
2008	0	1(PV(2008)1844)
Total	0	5

### 10.2.3 Language: Rapid Press Releases

Table 10.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on the Gambia(1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	0
1994	3
1995	1
1996	1
1997	1
1998	0
1999	0
2000	1
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	1
2006	1
2007	0
2008	0
Total	9

A search in the Rapid Press Release website with the key word ‘Gambia’ returned 9 statements for the time period 1993-2008 (European Union 2011) (Table 10.7). There doesn’t seem to be any major economic interest in the country nor there seems to be any opportunity for role development or increase for the EU (Table 10.8). The Gambia doesn’t seem to be a very significant country in the eyes of the EU (unlike other cases such as DRC and Rwanda).

The content analysis of these statements reveals, somewhat surprisingly that elections and democracy related themes were the main topics of these statements. Indeed, the language (see figure 10.1) used in the statements highlights the EU’s concern for the fate of democracy in the Gambia and strongly condemns, in the name of the EU’s respect for democratic principles, the 1994 coup and ‘urges’ for the speedy return to civilian government. However, it is interesting to notice that contrary to other cases (DRC, Rwanda or Ghana), the EU never

Table 10.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on The Gambia (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	Development Aid	Trade	Human Rights	Humanitarian Aid	Peace	Internal Politics
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1997	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	7	0	0	0	0	0	0

highlights its real or potential role in achieving this goal. In this case, the EU limits itself to highlighting the importance for Gambia to respect democratic rules, principle of good governance, and human rights without actually intervening even in the case of the 2007 election which were preceded by an attempted coup (P/06/58). It seems that normative concern are present in this case and could have potentially justified the observation of the 2007 polls.

Figure 10.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in the Gambia: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows Leadership/Role
PESC/94/70	1994	Statement of the Presidency on behalf of the EU: The EU has learnt with great dismay of the attempted overthrow of the democratically elected government of the Gambia. It calls on the Gambian army to return to barracks immediately and to give its full allegiance to the legitimate government of Gambia with which the EU enjoys excellent relations. The EU reaffirms its attachment to the principles of representative democracy and the rule of law. It also draws on attention to the implications of the reported coup for the economy of Gambia if MS are obliged to review their aid program.	highlights relationship with the sitting government.
PESC/94/87	1994	Presidency statement on behalf of the EU: The EU regrets that in spite of the Gambian government's pledges, there has been no movement towards the restoration of democratic government. It recalls the Gambia's longstanding reputation for democracy and human rights and that free and fair elections were last held there in April 1992. The EU therefore considers that there should be no obstacle to an early return to constitutional rule... In response to these developments, the EU is suspending all military cooperation and balance of payment support to the Gambia, and will review new aid projects... The EU hope that the armed forces provisional ruling council will take concrete steps towards the restoration of democracy to enable such cooperation to be resumed.	
PESC/94/95	1994	Statement of the Presidency on behalf of the EU: The EU has noted the announcement of a four-year election timetable by the armed forces provisional ruling council. ... That the Gambia, a country with a previously good democratic and human rights record, should be ruled by a military government for a further 4 years is unsatisfactory and unnecessary. The EU believes that the restoration of constitutional government to the Gambia should be the most urgent priority ... any necessary reforms may then be carried out with the mandate of the Ghananian people. ... implementation of these measure [freeze of aid] has already begun and will be maintained until progress is made towards a return to democracy.	
PESC/95/29	1995	Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU: ... whilst noting with satisfaction that the period for transition towards a civil government has been reduced, the EU remains concerned that a military government will remain in place until July 1996. It greatly regrets that the opportunity has not been availed of to hand over to an interim civilian government and that effective control of the government consequently remains in the hands of the military. ... The EU would ask... to take practical steps without delay to restore constitutional government, thereby enabling the Union to resume its cooperation with the Gambia gradually and in the light of development.	
PESC/96/86	1996	Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on elections in the Gambia: The EU has taken note of the presidential elections in the Gambia... The Union is glad that polling passed off peacefully, and congratulates the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission on their role. It regrets however that the recommendations drawn up by the PIEC were ignored and that conditions which would have ensured free and fair elections were not met (main parties excluded from poll) The EU calls on the Gambian authorities to take all necessary measures so that parliamentary elections meet the guidelines established by the PIEC.	
P/005/97	1997	Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on elections in the Gambia: The EU has taken note of the National Assembly election... The Union considers the election as an important step for the Gambia on its return to civilian democratic government. In spite of the ban imposed before the presidential elections... The EU hopes that the National Assembly will soon be able to fulfill the important tasks bestowed on it by the constitution. The EU calls on the Gambian authorities to proceed further on its path to democracy, good governance and human rights in line with the new Constitution and is willing to reinforce its dialogue with the Gambia and other matters of common concern.	
PESC/00/103	1997	Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU concerning the Gambia: "the EU wishes to express its concern following the recent confrontations in the Gambia between members of an opposition party and representatives of the ruling party and the abuses of rights recorded on that occasion. The EU calls on the Gambian authorities to respect fully the independence of the courts in the proceedings instituted against the leader of the opposition... and to observe the principles of good governance.	
P/06/68	2006	Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on Gambia: The EU strongly condemns the attempted coup to remove the government of the Gambia... We reject any effort to overthrow a democratically elected government. We welcome the fact that the Gambian people responded with calm and restraint. ... The EU urges the Gambian authorities to adhere to correct procedures and to respect the human rights of those detained to disclose their place of detention and to ensure their safety and well-being as well as access to legal counsel.	

Table 10.9: Summary Findings: Why not an EU EOM in the Gambia?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: EEAS website and CSP	No	No	Yes Governance as a pillar of EU's poverty reduction strategy; Highlights the Gambia's long historic democratic tradition and respect of human rights.
Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	No	No	No
Language: Press Releases	No	No	Yes Highlights need to return to civilian rule, gives opinion on the matter without suggesting role for the EU.

# Chapter 11

## Case 6: Cameroon 2004 (no EOM)

### 11.1 Quantitative Wrap-up

The modern Cameroon was created in 1961 by the unification of the British and French former colonies and it has since struggled to reach true multi-party rule. Post-independence Cameroon was the stage of many insurrections and followed by two decades of repressive rule under President Ahmadou Ahidjo. The current president, Paul Biya, succeeded him in a 1982 one-party election. He introduced multi-party rule in the 1992 election which he won. He was reelected in 1997 and again in 2004. Even though competitive participation is at a transitional stage, brought by the move from one-party rule to multiparty rule in 1992, the Cameroonian regime sustains a majority of autocratic elements and is at the bottom of the middle-range category on the polity scale (Table 11.1). Therefore, Cameroon is still struggling to sustain multi-party rule and consolidate its democracy through competitive participation and changeover in power. It seems that there is limited potential for any of this to happen in the near future.

Despite its autocratic tendencies, Cameroon is a sizable trading partner for the EU (Table 11.2). The EU runs a trade deficit with Cameroon, importing slightly more than it exports in

Table 11.1: Cameroon Democracy Scores, 2003-2005

	2003	2004	2005
Democracy	1	1	1
Autocracy	5	5	5
Polity2	-4	-4	-4
Competitiveness of Participation	4	4	4

the Cameroon market. Cameroon is a resource rich country which is strategically important for the EU economy. The total amounts of trade was stable and didn't seem to be dependent on the electoral process in Cameroon in 2004.

Table 11.2: EU-Cameroon Trade, 2003-2005 (in \$ billion)

	2003	2004	2005
Imports	1934	2266	2637
Exports	1306	1143	1097
Trade Balance	-628	-1123	-1540
Total Trade	96	94	103

On the development aid front, Cameroon didn't receive large amount of foreign aid (Table 11.3). Further it appears that Cameroon has been receiving a decreasing amount of official development aid from the EU over the period under review, which seems also unrelated to the concurrent electoral cycle.

Table 11.3: EU Official Development Aid to Cameroon, 2002-2004 (in \$million)

2003	2004	2005
61	44	39

Cameroon is a medium size country and the state of infrastructure development is relatively mediocre compared to the other cases considered here (Table 11.4). Even though it

is far from being non-existent, it is still sub-par compared to other cases explored in this section. This illustrates the potential logistical challenges facing a deployment in the field of an electoral observation mission.

Table 11.4: Telephone lines in Cameroon, 2003-2005 (per 100 inhabitants)

2003	2004	2005
.57	.57	.56

### 11.1.1 Qualitative Evidence

#### Context

The Chief of State is the President, Paul Biya, and the Head of Government is the prime minister, Philemon Yang. Cameroon has a unicameral national assembly with 180 seats. The President is elected by popular vote to serve a 7-year term. In the National Assembly, the 180 members are elected by direct popular vote to serve 5-year terms. The President can either lengthen or shorten the term of the legislature. The system of government in place in Cameroon is very similar to the semi-presidential system in place in France under the 5th Republic (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2011).

In this dissertation, I look more closely at the case of the 2004 presidential election. The previous presidential election was held in 1997. Paul Biya was easily reelected as President. This election is interesting in the sense that significant attention was given to the shy reforms that were started at the start of the century to answer pressures for constitutional and electoral reforms, including the creation of an independent electoral commission (Coopération Cameroun 2002, p.7).

## European External Action in Cameroon

On its main web-page for EU-Cameroon relations, Cameroon is described as occupying “a key position between the Atlantic and the landlocked countries of central Africa.” Therefore, Cameroon could be seen as a strategic door onto central Africa. The country’s economy is mostly based on agriculture, fisheries, and forestry, as well as petroleum and water electricity but it also has a developing tertiary industry with significant transport and communication sectors. According to the EU website on Cameroon, its main advantages are “its geographical location at the centre of the continent, the diversity of its terrain and climate, its agricultural and mineral health, its bicultural heritage and well-educated senior management”. Based on this account, Cameroon seem to be holding a very strategic place in Central Africa, a place which makes it a strategic partner for the EU. However, this doesn’t come without challenges. As many of its neighbors and cases studied in this dissertation, Cameroon still has progress to make in the area of governance (European Commission 2010*b*).

The current cooperation framework regulating EC-Cameroon cooperation, the 10th EDF (2008-2013) allocated a total of €239 million to two priority areas: governance for measures in the areas of justice, public finances, forestry resources and (important in our case) elections; and business and regional integration, improving competitiveness through strengthening production and export capacity and road infrastructure to support the economic and social sectors. It is also important to note that the EU and Cameroon participate in a political dialogue in the context of article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement with the topics of good governance and the strengthening of the rule of law as the basis for this exchange. It is important to reiterate at this point that even though political dialogue under article 8 doesn’t necessarily lead to sanctions, it points to some problems in the area of governance that are deemed serious enough to require formal political dialogue. In other words, the topic of democracy, good governance and elections, are salient in the relationship between the EU and Cameroon (European Commission 2010*b*).

## **Europe Country Strategy towards Cameroon, 2002-2007**

In this document, the EU reiterates the strategic position of Cameroon compared to its neighbors, highlighting its wealth in varied natural resources and a well developed human capital. The EU sees Cameroon as having a great deal of potential for becoming a dynamic power player in the geopolitical region between the two African giants that are Nigeria and the DRC (Coopération Cameroun 2002, p.7).

A multiparty system was introduced in Cameroon in 1991, starting the process of democratization and opening up the political landscape. The first multiparty elections were held in 1992, however, a highly fragmented political landscape, with many parties taking advantage of the recent political opening but failing to find a coherent platform on which to agree and oppose the ruling party, which eventually benefited Paul Biya and his party who stayed in power. Since then, even though elections have been regularly scheduled, it seems that the Cameroon people has lost interest in elections and Paul Biya is being consistently reelected with a decreased participation rate which should be concerning when assessing democratic consolidation in Cameroon. In addition, there is no real political opposition strong enough to stand up to the coalition which has been ruling the country for several decades. It seems that according to this account, democracy in Cameroon is far from being consolidated and that the EU is aware of problems regarding electoral competition and participation (Coopération Cameroun 2002).

### **11.1.2 Agenda: EC weekly meetings**

Based on evidence presented in tables 11.5 and 11.6, it is safe to say that Cameroon, is also not a priority country for the European Union. Indeed, Cameroon has never been on the agenda of the European Commission weekly meeting between 2003 and 2008. Moreover, EU officials didn't travel to Cameroon while, during the same time period, they traveled in 5

Table 11.5: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes

Year	Africa(%of total)	West Africa	Cameroon	Elections
2003	7 (15%)	1	0	0
2004	7(16%)	1	0	0
2005	11(25%)	2	0	0
2006	6(14%)	0	0	0
2007	6 (14%)	1	0	0
2008	11(26%)	2	0	0

separate instances to other West African countries. This evidence illustrate a lack of interest on the part of the EU is increasing its visibility in Cameroon.

Table 11.6: EC trips to Cameroon and West Africa Region

Year	Trips to Cameroon	West Africa
2003	0	1(PV(2003)1610)
2004	0	1(PV(2004)1678)
2005	0	1(PV(2005)1685)
2006	0	0
2007	0	1(PV(2007)1772)
2008	0	1(PV(2008)1844g)
Total	0	5

### 11.1.3 Language: Rapid Press Releases

A search for ‘Cameroon’ in the Rapid Press Releases dataset returned a total of 13 press statement between 1993 and 2008 (Table 11.6). There was no press release in 2004, the year of the election under scrutiny in this dissertation.

Even though Cameroon wasn’t a very frequent topic of EU statements, when it was, the theme of development aid was the most likely to be brought up (5 times) (Table 11.8). The

Table 11.7: Yearly frequency of Press Releases on Cameroon(1993-2008)

Year	Number of Press Releases issued
1993	0
1994	2
1995	0
1996	1
1997	2
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	2
2002	2
2003	1
2004	0
2005	0
2006	1
2007	0
2008	2
Total	13

theme of election and democratization was discussed 4 times over the course of the period. In these instances, the EU shows some concern regarding Cameroon's electoral processes and appears to follow, from a distance, what is going on in the country, without committing to intervene in any way.

Indeed, the content of the democracy related press releases (figure 11.1) reveals that the EU thinks that Cameroon needs to consolidate its democratic institutions and seems to be encouraging Cameroon to do so. Similarly to the Gambia, there seems to be a need for democracy assistance and more specifically election assistance to make sure election can be considered free and fair. However, the EU doesn't seem to be willing to intervene in any specific way to make sure this happens.

Table 11.8: Thematic Content Analysis of Press Releases on Cameroon (1993-2008)

Year	Elections	Development Aid	Trade	Human Rights	Humanitarian Aid	Peace	Internal Politics
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1997	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2001	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2002	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
2003	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2008	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total	4	5	0	0	0	3	0

Figure 11.1: EU Press Releases on Elections and Democratization in Cameroon: 1993-2008

Ref #	Year	Useful Quotes	Shows Role/ Leadership
E/43/97	1997	<b>The EU has taken note</b> of the decision of the President of the Republic of Cameroon to organize general elections... <b>The EU expresses the desire that these elections take place in a calm and transparent manner</b> , and in particular that every citizen should be able to vote freely and without hindrance...	
E/97/1000	1997	<b>The EU has noted</b> the proclamation by the Cameroon Supreme Court acting in its capacity as Constitutional Council, of the official results of the presidential elections... the EU <b>hopes</b> that open talks can now begin between all the country's political forces so as to arrive at a political situation which can guarantee lasting economic, political and social development in keeping with the aspirations of the people. ... The EU <b>considers</b> that these talks should also cover the arrangements for the forthcoming elections so as to ensure that they can be held in conditions of transparency... <b>the EU renews its call for the application of principles of sound governance. It is willing to engage in a thorough dialogue on this subject, as on the subject of Cameroon's socio-economic future, with the Government of Cameroon.</b>	
P/02/110	2002	The EU is <b>pleased</b> that the recent legislative and municipal elections were conducted peacefully and welcomes the establishment of the National Elections Observatory.... the EU is nevertheless <b>concerned</b> at indications of irregularities in the electoral process and <b>would like to impress</b> upon the government of Cameroon the need for substantial electoral reform before the Presidential elections due in 2004.... <b>the EU looks forward to cooperating with the government of Cameroon in further strengthening the relevant institutions</b> and introducing the procedures necessary to achieve this.	highlights EU role in further strengthening development
P/08/40	2008	The EU is <b>watching closely</b> the discussion concerning the revision of the Constitution, while noting that any changes to the Constitution have to be decided by the people and the institution of Cameroon.... The EU <b>remains convinced</b> that the possibility of a changeover of power, the freedom of the press and guaranteeing of public freedoms are fundamental to the consolidation of democracy and draws attention to the urgent need to improve the electoral system and the standard of voter turnout, these being guarantors of the stability that the country needs.... The EU <b>condemns the violence</b> that occurred at the end of February and the attempts at ethnic manipulation that followed. It <b>reiterates its support</b> for Cameroon's economic and social development..	highlights continued support

Table 11.9: Summary Findings: Why an not EU EOM in Cameroon?

Sources	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3
Contextual Evidence: EEAS website and CSP Agenda: EC weekly meeting minutes	<b>Yes</b> Political Dialogue under Article 8 of Cotonou agreement <b>No</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b> Governance as a pillar of EU's poverty reduction strategy <b>No</b>
Language: Press Releases	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b> Show concern about election quality in Cameroon; Doesn't highlight specific action/role by EU besides a general support to democratic principles

# Chapter 12

## Cross-case analysis

The purpose of the qualitative analysis presented in this second empirical section is to provide and present direct evidence of the motivations for EUEOM in third countries.

In the previous chapters, I presented detailed reports for six countries with the goal of highlighting the ‘revealed’ preferences of EU decision makers for some elections over others.

Even though this endeavor was limited by the ‘classified’ aspect of many internal proceedings and relevant documentation, an analysis of the content of public official documents (open-source) has improved the understanding of how EU decision makers look at elections in other countries and eventually decide to observe, or not, some of them. As mentioned before, this study offers a solid basis for future research on this topic. The next step would be to include direct interview with European decision makers in order to further test the arguments presented in this dissertation.

Table 12.1 presents the results of the qualitative analysis of the 6 cases: Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Cameroon. The cross-case method allows for direct comparison and pattern identification which wouldn’t be possible otherwise. I identify, for each case, whether or not the qualitative evidence offered support for any of the three theoretical argument, hypothesized in this dissertation, explaining the

Table 12.1: Cross-Case Analysis: ‘to observe or not to observe’, that is the question.

Cases	Theory 1	Theory 2	Theory 3	EUEOM
Democratic Re-public of Congo	Yes***	Yes*	Yes*	Yes
Rwanda	Yes**	No	Yes***	Yes
Ghana	Yes*	No	Yes*	Yes
Burkina Faso	No	No	Yes**	No
Gambia	No	No	Yes**	No
Cameroon	Yes*	No	Yes**	No

\*\*\*supported by 3 sources; \*\*supported by 2 sources; \*supported by 1 source

deployment of an EUEOM. I also show the level of support for each of these hypotheses based on how many sources provide evidence supporting the claims. The known decision whether or not to send an EOM is also included in the table in order to present the full picture.

Keeping in mind the limitations intrinsic to the data used in this qualitative section, and based on the evidence presented, several conclusions can be reached.

First, there is very little to no evidence contained in the documents analyzed supporting *Theory 2*. Indeed, the potential for reinforcing internal institutional integration and cohesion wasn't revealed as a motivation for sending an EOM to observe some elections. Alternatively, there was no evidence of the contrary. Thus, based on the evidence provided, it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis. I think that assessing the validity of *Theory 2* could benefit from direct interviews of decision makers in order to get a better idea of the internal decision making process which is not openly discussed in the evidence collected from open-sources. However, I'd like to argue that based on the lack of evidence of any discussion regarding election observation missions in EC meetings, it seems that the decision to send a mission to observe polls in third countries has been 'decentralized' or delegated to the Commissioner for external affairs which would be a testimony to a completed and functional political integration in this area of external action.

Second, and more importantly, it appears that considerations regarding its international role and visibility are consistently linked to the EU's decision to send an EOM in the field. The DRC, Rwanda, and Ghana were viewed by the EU as countries presenting opportunities for the EU to increase its international role and to be more visible abroad by actively and very publicly supporting electoral processes. In those three cases there also seem to be some level of altruistic consideration at play, especially in the case of Rwanda where the 1994 genocide seem to have been a factor in the decision to observe the transitional polls. 'Non event' cases are critical in the sense that they provide a way to identify the actual effect (or

non effect) of some variables. In the three ‘non-event’ cases presented here, it seems that the EU acknowledged potential altruistic motivations for supporting elections. However, in these cases, the EU didn’t reveal any indication that the EU’s international role or visibility were motivations for involvement in the process. Indeed, only in the case of Cameroon was the EU directly involved -however in a limited way- through political dialogue, in the process. Therefore, even though altruistic motivations are often brought up by the EU in its election related documentation, it seems that the difference between EUEOM and no EUEOM is the presence of an opportunity for the EU to take on an important role in the process, thus supporting the argument presented in *Theory 1*.

# Chapter 13

## Conclusion

In this dissertation, I proposed to explain why the European Union decides to act outside of its borders to support electoral processes in transitional and non-established democracies around the world. My goal, with this research, is to contribute to shedding light on the process leading to this important decision and the broader question of why the EU observe elections around the world.

As explained in the body of this dissertation, the EU's support to democracies, including electoral support, can take multiple forms among which election observation missions are the most visible type. Since the early 1990's the EU has been increasingly active in the area of election assistance in general and election observation in particular, evolving from a small number of ad-hoc election observation missions for Russia's first multi-party election or South Africa's post-Apartheid electoral cycle, to more regular observation missions of elections all around the world.

**The Puzzle** This dissertation was first motivated by a quantitative puzzle. Since the first EUEOM in 1993, the frequency of EUEOMs has increased consistently every year. Further, I noticed that the EU observes, on average, 25% of all 'observable elections' every

year. This figure suggests that EUEOMs are a relatively rare event and justify asking the question: What makes these cases special for the EU to intervene in these 25% and not in the remaining 75% of elections?

Further, this research is also motivated by a theoretical puzzle brought up by the literatures on European foreign policy and election observation. In the case of the former, there are still many unanswered questions regarding the motivations behind a common European foreign policy: is the EU a traditional foreign policy actor or should it be considered as a more limited normative and civilian power? In the case of the latter, one can wonder why would any International actor (let alone the EU) be involved in Election observation considering that they are not always successful and that these organizations face important budgetary constraints.

**The Research Question** Considering these important puzzles, I proposed to answer the following research question: *What explains the decision of the EU to observe or not observe elections in transitional and non-established democracies?* Answering this question sheds light on the broader question asking *Why does the EU observe election around the world?*

**The Theoretical Framework** The theoretical approach I developed in this dissertation proposes that beyond simply promoting democracy, election observation is a foreign policy instrument that the EU can use to promote its own interests.

To answer the research question, I developed and tested three different explanations for EU's external actions in the area of election observation: external influence, internal cohesion, and international altruism.

My objective, with this dissertation, was to explain the motivations behind the EU's decision to act outside of its borders to support electoral processes in transitional and non-established democracies. To do so, I proposed that, beyond simply promoting democracy as an altruistic endeavor, election observation is a tool used by the EU in order to promote

its self-interests. In fact the theoretical framework presented in this work relies on three alternative explanations for the EU's decision to observe elections in some countries but not others. First, the decision can be seen as being self-interested with the goal of strengthening the EU's position in international politics. Second, the decision can also be self-interested but this time with the goal of strengthening the EU's internal cohesion. Finally, observing elections around the world could, alternatively, be seen as an altruistic action aimed at helping host countries democratize successfully, regardless of the EU's self interest.

In this dissertation, I argued that the first theory has the most explanatory power. Even though the three explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, I purported that the condition of self-interest with the goal of improving the EU's international role is alone sufficient to justify deploying an EUEOM. This argument undermines the more traditional view of the EU as an idealist actor unable to develop a consistent common foreign policy. With this dissertation, I show that the EU needs, in fact, to be considered as a self-interested strategic actor who is increasing its international role using election observation as a powerful foreign policy tool.

I will now review the three alternative theories and the associated hypotheses before summarizing and discussing the results.

**Theory 1** According to this theoretical perspective, the EU is motivated by strategic considerations when deciding whether or not to observe elections in foreign countries and is further aimed at strengthening the EU's place in world politics. International election monitoring is in fact an example of a more complex strategy. The claim presented here contends that the EU's intervention is to position itself as an actor that would be able to intervene all over the world, in countries and regions in difficulty or in need of stabilizing, to strengthen trade partnership, and increase its influence on said countries and/or regions.

If the EU is actually following this strategy, I expected the following motivations to hold

a significant weight in the decision making process of the EU, regarding election observation: potential for international security, potential for economic partnership, and potential for soft power gains.

Therefore, I hypothesized:

H<sub>1a</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections critical for preserving international stability (e.g. transitional elections)

H<sub>1b-c</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries where it has significant economic interests (e.g. trade and foreign aid).

**Theory 2** This theory contends that deploying an EOM could simply be a utilitarian decision. In other words, the costs of deploying an EOM must not exceed its benefits. To promote internal cohesion, I argue that the EU will look to observe ‘easy’ elections, which fulfill the utilitarian or feasibility conditions.

Consequently, I tested the following hypotheses:

H<sub>2a-b</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe ‘easy-to-observe’ elections to insure its success and limit its losses and eventually promote cohesion.

**Theory 3** Finally, it can also be argued that EU’s EOMs are motivated by a normative commitment to elections, human rights, and democracy: in two words *international altruism*. Within the limits of funding, the EU’s decision to observe elections shouldn’t reflect any specific strategic plan or self-interest promotion. According to this theory, the EU’s goal should only be to help improve the democratic process in third countries. In other words, the EU should observe elections in countries needing it the most.

Therefore,

H<sub>3a-b</sub> : The EU is more likely to observe elections in countries needing it the most regardless of any strategic interest.

**EU's Institutional Development** Since starting observing elections in 1993, major institutional reforms have been implemented which were engineered with the goal of institutionalizing the European Union's decision making for deploying election observation missions in third countries. Therefore, since the adoption of European Council Human Rights regulations 975/99 and 976/99 in 1999, the decisions to provide election assistance and to send election observation missions are made within Pillar I institutions (i.e. the European Commission). In this dissertation, I look at the entire history of EUEOMs in order to control for the effect on this institutional development on the likelihood of EUEOMs and to assess the actual effect and success of these reforms.

Consequently:

$H_4$  : The EU is more likely to observe under post-1999 institutional arrangements.

**Empirical Analysis** I designed the empirical analysis using a mixed of quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis centers on a large-N study using an original dataset for which I coded a series of proxy variables. The qualitative analysis complements the quantitative analysis with a set of desk studies of six cases showcasing direct evidence of the European Commission's motivations for deploying EOMs.

**Quantitative Analysis** Even though the proxy quantitative variables used can sometimes be ambiguous and open the door to different interpretations, I argue that the quantitative analysis developed in this dissertation offers interesting conclusions and highlights patterns of decision which provide support to the theoretical framework I developed in this research.

The statistical analysis offers some interesting results and mixed support for each of the three theoretical models. These three theoretical explanations received some level of statistical support which highlight the complex character of this particular decision making

process.

More specifically, The coefficients for the proxy variables used to test the three theories show that *the EU is in fact more likely to observe early transitional and general elections, in countries receiving high levels of EU foreign aid, and which score high in the middle range section of the Polity scale.*

Because *Theory 1* received more statistical support (i.e. variables *transitional election*, and *foreign* are statistically significant), the quantitative analysis suggests that international role is an important consideration in the EU's decision making to observe elections in third countries.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the proxy variables used to test *Theory 2* (i.e. *telephone lines*, *election type*) and *Theory 3* (i.e. *polity score*) received mixed statistical support suggesting that both feasibility/utilitarian and altruistic considerations might also motivate the decision whether or not to observe elections.

An important finding is that the variables *E.U. Institutional Reform* is statistically significant and has an important positive effect on the likelihood of the EU deploying an EOM for any given election. In other words, this result highlights the success of the 1999 reform which resulted in further institutionalizing and regularizing this originally ad-hoc activity of the EU and made it into a strong pillar of European foreign policy.

Consequently, the results of the quantitative analysis justify the need for a qualitative analysis relying on direct evidence of motivations to confirm and strengthen my argument.

**Qualitative Analysis** As a complement to the quantitative analysis, I also developed a qualitative section based on a comparative study of six cases. For the purpose of this dissertation, I limited the pool of cases I chose from to post-2000, sub-saharan African elections. The purpose of the qualitative analysis was to illustrate with direct evidence and actual statements of interest revealing the motives for the EU's involvement in election observa-

tion. With this objective in mind, I chose three cases of elections observed by the EU (i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Rwanda (2003), Ghana (2008) and three cases of elections not observed by the E.U. (i.e. Cameroon (2004), Burkina Faso (2005), Gambia (2007). For each case, I collected extensive evidence from several sources: official document from the European Commission, archival records, press releases, European Commission meeting minutes, and EU Country Strategy Papers. This evidence presented the advantage of directly revealing the motivations (or lack thereof) of the European Commission regarding observing any the six elections under study.

In order to further test the validity of three theoretical models, I organized the evidence resulting from a rigorous content analysis of the numerous documents collected across the different sources described above, according to thematic categories to understand the context of the EU's relationship with these six countries, and what was said about their respective elections. For each case, I summarized the quantitative evidence, offering a disaggregated view of each case, and presented a detailed narrative of the results of the analysis of the qualitative evidence in a way facilitating comparison across the six cases.

The cross-case analysis showed that there is, in fact, very little to no support for *Theory 2*. However, there is significant support for *Theory 3* with direct evidence highlighting '*role and visibility*' as a powerful motivation for EUEOMs.

Indeed, the three 'event' cases (i.e Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Ghana) were viewed by the EU as opportunities to strengthen its international role. However, in these three specific cases, there were also evidence showing that the EU expressed altruistic concerns as well. Such a finding highlights the difficulty of isolating altruistic motives completely from self-interest.

Ultimately, I argue that successful election observation missions occur in 'win-win' situations where the observation mission would be deployed in the interest of both the observing actor and the host country. Further, I argued that the results suggest that the potential for

international role promotion is not only a sufficient condition but also a necessary condition for the EU to deploy an election observation mission in a foreign country.

**Conclusion** I would like to suggest that this dissertation, considering the findings of both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses, provides strong support for the theory that the EU is using election observation as a way to improve its position on the international stage. Nevertheless, I recognize that further research needs to be pursued, especially with the goal of collecting better direct evidence on a broader range of cases. This dissertation lays the theoretical and empirical foundations for exploring this interesting development of European foreign policy with additional field studies and interviews of EU officials and stakeholders in host countries.

To conclude, the history of European election observation since its inception in 1993 and the quantitative analysis detailed in Chapter 4 suggest that European institutional reforms of the Maastricht Treaty and the 1999 Council resolution on election observation have had an important impact on this very salient external activity of the European Union, contributing in transforming the EU into this respected world leader in the area of democracy promotion and consequently improving its position on the international stage.

Recently, the EU went, once more, through significant institutional change with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which created the *European External Action Service* and the position of *High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy*. This institutional development has potentially important implications for the future development of European foreign policy and its democracy promotion activities. Indeed the creation of this European External Action Service highlights the EU's

“clear objective to support a more stable, prosperous and secure environment for its citizen (...). By bringing together (...) its many levers of influence in a more effective manner and pursue a wide range of goals on the international scene, it

will increase the Union's political and economic influence in the world.”(Council of the European Union 2010)

The emphasis on the word ‘influence’ reveals a lot about the EU's external action strategy and its focus on soft power. Thus, the expressed goal of the new European External Action Service is to

“help strengthen the EU on the global stage, give it more profile, and enable it to project its interests and values more efficiently.”(Council of the European Union 2010)

Further, the Treaty creates the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to conduct the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative also acts as the Vice President of the European Commission, illustrating the growing weight of external action matters in the Commission's daily operations, and is in charge of the election observation portfolio.

This institutional development seems to go in the direction of deeper integration in foreign policy matters and a stronger emphasis on soft power and international role as core principle of European foreign policy. As the Middle East and North Africa are experiencing rapid regime alteration and the door to electoral democracy is opening (e.g. in Egypt and Tunisia), it will be interesting to see whether the E.U. can and/or will in fact sustain a common foreign policy and whether it will use its position as a leader in election observation and democracy assistance to assert its influence on a neighboring region which represent high strategic value for the EU.

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# Appendix A

## EC Weekly Meeting Minutes

### References

Table A.1: Case 1: DRC: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	Great Lakes	DRC	DRC Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*,1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635			
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682			
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1701*	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1708, 1709	
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761		PV(2006)1736, 1755	PV(2006)1755
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812			
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1850, 1856	PV(2008)1850, 1856	

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

Table A.2: Case 2: Rwanda: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	Great Lakes	Rwanda	Rwanda Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*,1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635			
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682			
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1701*	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1708, 1709	
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761			
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812			
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1850, 1856	PV(2008)1850, 1856	

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

Table A.3: Case 3: Ghana: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	West Africa	Ghana	Ghana Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*,1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635	PV(2003)1610	PV(2003)1610	
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682	PV(2003)1678		
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2005)1685, 1689		
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761			
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812	PV(2007)1772		
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1842, 1844	PV(2008)1842	

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

Table A.4: Case 4: Burkina Faso: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	West Africa	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*,1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635	PV(2003)1610	PV(2003)1610	
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682	PV(2003)1678		
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2005)1685, 1689		
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761			
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812	PV(2007)1772		
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1842, 1844		

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

Table A.5: Case 5: Gambia: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	West Africa	Gambia	Gambia Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*,1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635	PV(2003)1610		
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682	PV(2003)1678		
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2005)1685, 1689		
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761			
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812	PV(2007)1772		
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1842, 1844		

\*access to the supporting documents was refused

Table A.6: Case 6: Cameroon: Thematic Analysis of EC weekly meeting minutes-Detailed References

Year	Africa	West Africa	Cameroon	Cameroon Elections
2003	PV(2003)1600, 1603*, 1610, 1616, 1621, 1632, 1635	PV(2003)1610		
2004	PV(2004)1648, 1666, 1670, 1677, 1678, 1681, 1682	PV(2003)1678		
2005	PV(2004)1684*, PV(2005)1685*, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1701*, 1703, 1708, 1709, 1718, 1722	PV(2005)1685, 1689		
2006	PV(2006)1733, 1751, 1755, 1760, 1761			
2007	PV(2007)1772, 1787, 1790, 1794, 1811, 1812	PV(2007)1772		
2008	PV(2008)1818, 1821*, 1823, 1833, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1847, 1850, 1851, 1856	PV(2008)1842, 1844		

\*access to the supporting documents was refused